Chapter 6 · The Two Truths and "Emptiness of the Unreal"

Part Two · Doctrine

The sūtras sometimes say that a thing exists and sometimes that it is empty—which is right?

This is the second great perplexity in reading the Prajñā sūtras. The last chapter established emptiness; this one asks how Buddhism finds a place for speaking of 「existence」. The answer is the two truths. China's most brilliant assimilation of the two truths is Sengzhao's Treatise on the Emptiness of the Unreal: first it clears away three one-sided misreadings, then establishes an account that inclines to neither side.

1 · Naming the Two Truths

The Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra is direct:

「Within the Buddha-Dharma there are two truths: first, conventional truth; second, ultimate truth.」 〔《大智度論》卷三十八·T25n1509 0336b28·待譯〕

When one speaks in accordance with what the world commonly accepts, this is conventional truth—there is accomplishment and attainment, practice and realization. When one speaks in accordance with ultimate true reality, this is ultimate truth—there is no accomplishment and no attainment. In the Treatise on the Emptiness of the Unreal, Sengzhao cites the Fangguang Prajñāpāramitā and sets the two side by side:

「In ultimate truth there is no accomplishment and no attainment; because of conventional truth, there are accomplishment and attainment.」 〔僧肇〈不真空論〉引《放光》·T45 0152b〕

Notice: the two truths are two ways of 「speaking」, not two 「worlds」. This precision is the key to the whole chapter.

2 · The One-Sidedness of Three Schools

Before Kumārajīva's translations arrived, Prajñā scholars of the Eastern Jin had already explored the teaching for decades and formed several schools. Sengzhao examines three of them in turn:

「As for the mind-without school, the mind is without attachment toward the ten thousand things, but the ten thousand things have never been absent. Its gain lies in spiritual stillness; its loss lies in failing to empty things.」 〔〈不真空論〉·T45 0152a 段〕

The mind-without school attends only to keeping the mind from clinging to external things and does not dare to say that things themselves are empty. It gains tranquility of mind but loses the true reality of dharmas.

「As for the form-itself school, it clarifies that form does not make itself form; therefore, although it is form, it is not form.」 〔同篇〕

The form-itself school sees that form does not establish itself as form, but it has 「not yet comprehended form's being not-form」. It reaches only the point that form is established through conditions and has not fully said that form, just as it is, is empty.

「As for the fundamental-non-being school, its sentiments exalt non-being, and it frequently presses words into serving non-being.」 〔同篇〕

The fundamental-non-being school, meanwhile, is deeply enamored of 「non-being」 and draws every statement toward 「non-being」. Sengzhao calls this 「talk that delights in non-being」: it has tilted to the opposite extreme. Each of the three clings to one side—mind, form, or non-being. What is refuted is not their lack of earnest practice, but the incompleteness of their reading.

3 · Establishing the Emptiness of the Unreal

How, then, can one speak without leaning to one side? Sengzhao's positive statement comes in sets of eight characters:

「Though it appears as being, it is not truly existent—this is what is called not-being. Though empty, it is not wholly absent—this is what is called not-non-being.」 〔同篇·T45 0152b〕

The ten thousand things vividly exist, yet when their own substance is sought, it is absent—and so they are not truly existent. They have no own substance, yet through the meeting of conditions they appear before us—and so they are not annihilated into non-being. Existence and non-being are both established in the same thing at the same time, because that 「existence」 has always been an unreal existence. The three words 「emptiness of the unreal」 mean precisely that the unreal is empty, not that existence must first be destroyed and only then become empty. The relation between the two truths is thereby made clear:

「The two statements have never been one; the two principles have never been different.」 「How could the two truths make the thing itself two?」 〔同篇〕

The two modes of speech have never been one sentence, yet the two levels of principle have never belonged to separate realities. The truths are two; the thing has never been two. The closing sentence places the whole subtle teaching back beneath our feet:

「Then is the Way far away? Touch any matter, and there is truth! Is the sage far away? Embody it, and there is numinous awareness!」 〔同篇·T45 0153a〕

Truth is not outside the matters before us. The two truths do not cleave the world in half; they teach us to see true reality in the very things at hand.

4 · The Grammar of the Two Truths in the Sūtras

What Sengzhao argues, the sūtras have always been doing. The Diamond Sūtra has a distinctive syntax that traverses both truths in a single sentence:

「Subhūti! What the Buddha calls prajñā-pāramitā is not prajñā-pāramitā.」 〔羅什譯《金剛般若波羅蜜經》如法受持分·T08 0750a14（段起 0750a11）〕

「Subhūti! As for the motes of dust, the Tathāgata says they are not motes of dust, and they are named motes of dust. What the Tathāgata calls a world is not a world, and it is named a world.」 〔同分〕

“Says”—a name is established in conventional truth; “is not”—ultimate truth blocks the name from being grasped as a substance; “is named”—the provisional name is not discarded. Three movements are completed within one sentence. Not even the words 「Buddha-Dharma」 are exempt: 「Subhūti! What is called the Buddha-Dharma is precisely not the Buddha-Dharma.」〔依法出生分·T08 0749b18 段〕 The sūtra is not playing with a tongue-twister. It is demonstrating how to use the two truths: whenever a name is established, grasping at it as real is immediately blocked, while the provisional name continues to function without error. The Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra's establishment of the two truths and the Diamond's syntax are two sides of the same matter. Sūtra and treatise have already recognized one another.

Return to the opening question: when the sūtras speak of existence and emptiness, which is right? Both are right—each within its truth. The error has never been existence or emptiness, but grasping either sentence as the whole. With the two truths as our eyes, the next question naturally appears: what kind of wisdom is the 「wisdom」 that sees both truths without leaning to either?—prajñā without knowing, chapter seven.

Author · Shi Huijing CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 · 二〇二六 · 夏