Dissociated Factors: The Provisional Designation of Concepts

3.13 Dissociated Factors: The Provisional Designation of Concepts

You are sitting in a café.

The clock on the wall reads three o'clock. On the table are two cups of coffee and a book open to page forty-seven. Your friend, twenty minutes late, is walking toward you from the door.

In that little description, form-dharmas make up only a small part—the coffee, the clock, the paper, your friend's body, the patch of space at the door. Everything else is the concepts you used to describe the scene: "three o'clock," "two cups," "page forty-seven," "twenty minutes," "late," "walking toward you." Time, quantity, sequence, direction—they seem to point at objective facts. But press the question one step further: what, exactly, are they?

Suppose someone now said to you: "'Three o'clock' is not the hands of that clock. 'Two cups' is not those coffees. 'Twenty minutes' is not some real thing existing in the gap between the clock and your friend—they are concepts the activity of consciousness provisionally sets up." Most people would frown. Time is plainly flowing, quantity can plainly be counted, direction can plainly be pointed to—where is the "provisional designation" in any of that?

This chapter is here to tell you: the fourth category of the Hundred Dharmas—the factors dissociated from mind (citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra), twenty-four in all—deals with exactly this whole apparatus. They are conceptual tools consciousness uses to organize its own experience, not real properties of an objective world. Time, space, quantity, causal sequence, language, life, individuality—these things we use most naturally, the things that seem least likely to be made up, Yogācāra judges in a single phrase: "merely provisionally established based on positional differences of form and so forth."

The Common Feature of the Twenty-Four: No Essential Characteristics at All

Factors dissociated from mind—"mind" means the activity of mind-consciousness; "dissociated" means not arising together with mind-consciousness (these are not mental factors); "factors" (formations) means part of the formation aggregate (one branch of conditioned dharmas). Put together: the class of dharmas that belong to the formation aggregate but are neither mind, nor arising-with-mind, nor form.

The clearest way to see them is by elimination. Mind-dharmas have discernment—they can cognize. Mental factors arise with mind—they shape the quality of cognition. Form-dharmas have material resistance—they occupy space. All three have an identifiable "essential characteristic." When we reach the dissociated factors, the essential characteristic vanishes entirely—they cannot cognize (not mind), they do not arise with mind (not mental factors), they do not occupy space (not form)—yet they are still listed among the conditioned dharmas.

So what are they, exactly?

Kuiji, in his commentary on the Cheng weishi lun, gives a clean etymology: "non-form" excludes form-dharmas; "dissociated" excludes mind and mental factors; "formations" excludes the unconditioned. Four-sided exclusion done—and what remains is concept.

The more precise term is "positional designation": conceptual existences provisionally set up by nominal designation, based on the differences in the positions (before and after, present and absent, same-type and different-type, continuity) of form, mind, and the rest. The Cheng weishi lun (fascicle one) puts it without softening:

"Dissociated factors are also not real existences … Unlike form, mind, and mental factors, no essential characteristics can be apprehended for them; unlike form, mind, and mental factors, no distinct functions can be apprehended for them. Therefore they are definitely not real existences, but are merely provisionally established based on positional differences of form and so forth."

They do not, like form and mind, have an essential characteristic that can be cognized; they do not, like form and mind, have a function that can be observed—therefore they are not real existences. They are concepts provisionally established on the positional differences of form, mind, and other dharmas.

Here is a homely but accurate comparison. You see a group of people queuing for coffee. The word "queue" describes a real spatial arrangement—these people really are standing in a line. But "queue" itself is not an independent entity. It has no essential characteristic of its own; take the people away, and there is no "queue" to speak of. The dissociated factors exist at exactly this level—they describe some relationship or state among form and mind dharmas, but they themselves are not "things."

A misreading is easy here: "If they are provisionally designated, then they don't exist." Not so. "Provisionally designated" is not the same as "nonexistent." What the Cheng weishi lun says is "merely provisionally established based on positional differences of form and so forth"; the word "merely" restricts what is being denied—substantial self-nature—not the provisional function. Practice really does have sequence; life really is maintained by a life-faculty; conditioned dharmas really do have arising, aging, abiding, and impermanence—these are real functions at the dependent level. One simply must not mistake them for entities standing apart from form and mind. Provisional designation is a particular mode of existence: existent yet not real, empty yet not nothing—this is the middle way of the Hundred Dharmas.

Life-Faculty, Acquisition, Class-Similarity, Ordinary-Being Nature—The Conceptual Skeleton of Individual Existence

Of the twenty-four, four bear most directly on "the existence of a person": life-faculty, acquisition, class-similarity, and ordinary-being nature.

Life-faculty—the thread along which life continues.

In the Āgamas, the classic form of this thread is the triad of lifespan, warmth, and consciousness. The Madhyama Āgama's Dharmadinā Bhikṣunī Sūtra records the most precise teaching: the body is alive because lifespan, warmth, and consciousness are conjoined; when the three disperse, the body becomes "like senseless wood"—and that is death. The relation of lifespan and warmth is like the fire and light within a lamp—inseparable, mutually dependent.

Yogācāra presses further: what is the substance of lifespan? Is there an independent "lifespan" inside the body holding life up? The Cheng weishi lun's answer is direct: "Life-faculty is merely provisionally established based on the positional differences of the root consciousness's direct seeds—it has no separate nature." Life-faculty is not a separate thing. It is the nominal name for the direct-cause seeds of the eighth ālaya-vijñāna at the position of "determinate duration." There is no independent "lifespan." The continuation of life happens in the ālaya-vijñāna's ongoing function of holding the body and sense-faculties; the stretch of "determinate duration" in which that function persists is nominally named "life-faculty."

This carries a far-reaching implication for practice. The same sūtra distinguishes death from the cessation attainment—both look like the body lying still, but the difference is whether the ālaya-vijñāna is still maintaining the body. For the dead, "lifespan is extinguished, warmth has departed"; for one who has entered the cessation attainment, "lifespan is not extinguished, warmth has not departed." To know that life-faculty is provisionally designated means this: the moment of death is not an end-point but a changeover in the continuity of the ālaya-vijñāna—the old body-holding function ends, the new one is about to begin. This dovetails exactly with the chapter on the ālaya-vijñāna in 3.4: the substance of life-faculty is simply the name for its body-holding function across a stretch of time.

Acquisition—the "possession-relationship" between an individual and dharmas.

This person "has" a habit of giving; that person "has" anger; a certain noble one "accomplishes" the ten dharmas of the adept—everyday language is forever presupposing a substantial "acquisition." The Sarvāstivāda school of sectarian Buddhism even listed "acquisition" as a real dharma.

The Cheng weishi lun's rebuttal is brilliant. You cite scripture as proof? "The sūtra only says one 'accomplishes wholesome and unwholesome'; it does not say there is some entity called 'acquisition' apart from form and mind." And it offers a counter-example: scripture also says a wheel-turning king "accomplishes the seven treasures"—does the king really "possess" the substance of those seven treasures? The treasures are external things, even insentient things, and yet "accomplishing" can be said of them; why insist that wholesome and unwholesome dharmas be real?

In the end the Cheng weishi lun replaces a substantial "acquisition" with three types of accomplishment: seed-accomplishment (the seeds of this dharma are present in the ālaya-vijñāna), mastery-accomplishment (the seeds can now be activated at will), and manifest-accomplishment (the dharma is presently active). All three are positional designations; all three can be explained by the ālaya-vijñāna's seed-theory—with no need for an "acquisition" entity apart from form and mind.

Class-similarity—the resemblance among same-type beings.

Why do people resemble people, cats resemble cats, tables resemble tables? The Sarvāstivāda held that a real "class-similarity" was needed to account for the resemblance. The Cheng weishi lun's rebuttal is elegant: if resemblance needs a "class-similarity" to explain it, then the resemblance between two class-similarities would need yet another "class-similarity of class-similarity"—infinite regress.

The Yogācāra answer connects to the shared-characteristic seeds of 3.12: class-similarity is the result of shared-karma's shared-characteristic seeds manifesting "with similar features, in non-differing locations"—like many lamps whose lights each pervade and seem as one. There is no "essence of humanity" floating out there; it is countless beings' shared-characteristic seeds each manifesting similar bodily forms and a similar vessel-world, the overlap of which looks like "the same type."

Ordinary-being nature—the position by which an ordinary being is an ordinary being.

The definition is exact: "At the position where the seeds severed by the path-of-seeing have not yet been permanently destroyed, non-acquisition is provisionally established and called 'ordinary-being nature.'" The state in which the seeds of affliction severed by the path-of-seeing "have not yet been permanently destroyed" is nominally called "ordinary-being nature." It is not a thing attached to the ordinary being—it is a state.

The moment one sees the path (severing the three fetters: identity-view, attachment to rules and rituals, and doubt), ordinary-being nature ends in that very instant. The Saṃyukta Āgama's "purification of the dharma-eye" describes this moment: "Seeing the Dharma, attaining the Dharma, knowing the Dharma, entering the Dharma—transcending all doubts, relying on no other, gaining fearlessness in the true Dharma." No more doubt, no more need to lean on another's authority—that person, no longer an ordinary being, is born in this instant.

Horizontal class-similarity (what "type" you are) and vertical ordinary-being nature (where you stand on the ordinary-noble scale) together sketch an "identity map." Yogācāra wants to tell you: both coordinates are provisionally designated. You do not "have" any essential category, nor are you "at" any fixed position. The very possibility of practice is built on this provisional designation—if identity were a fixed essence, no transformation would be possible at all; precisely because these are nominal names for positional differences, they can be changed through practice.

Non-Perceptual Attainment, Cessation Attainment, Non-Perceptual Reward—Can Consciousness "Pause"?

Three of the twenty-four deal specifically with states where "consciousness pauses": non-perceptual attainment (asaṃjñi-samāpatti), cessation attainment (nirodha-samāpatti), and non-perceptual reward (asaṃjñi-sattva, the heaven of non-perception). On the surface all three are "mind and mental factors not active," yet in nature they are worlds apart.

Non-perceptual attainment is an ordinary being's achievement. It is entered through the mental attention of "aspiration for liberation"—an attempt to escape the state of "having perception" by pressing coarse ideation down. The non-constantly-active mind and mental factors of the first six consciousnesses cease, but the seventh and eighth consciousnesses do not. The Cheng weishi lun renders its verdict without mercy: "not undertaken by noble ones."

Why do noble ones not cultivate it? The Śūraṅgama Sūtra judges it more sharply still: the heaven of non-perception "takes arising-and-ceasing as the cause and cannot discover the nature of non-arising and non-ceasing"—a fundamental methodological error. To use the thought "I want to stop thinking" in order to stop thinking is itself a thought; to use the deluded notion "I will suppress delusion" to suppress delusion is itself a delusion. The Śūraṅgama's fifty Māra-states classify the heaven of non-perception outright as "emptying the mind into vacancy, achieving the fruit of void extinction"—mistaking vacancy for nirvāṇa.

Cessation attainment is a noble one's achievement. It is entered through the mental attention of "cessation of ideation," extinguishing not only the first six consciousnesses but also the afflicted aspect of the seventh. The Cheng weishi lun's verdict: "ordinary beings cannot [achieve this]." Cessation attainment is uncontaminated; non-perceptual attainment is contaminated.

The root difference between them is not whether one can hold delusion down, but whether one can see the real. Non-perceptual attainment "suppresses delusion with delusion"; cessation attainment "stills delusion with wisdom." The direction of the method decides the result.

The Madhyama Āgama's Dharmadinā Bhikṣunī offers an exquisitely fine contrast between the two attainments. In cessation attainment "ideation and cognition cease," and on emerging one does not raise the thought "I am arising from cessation attainment"; non-perceptual attainment only extinguishes coarse ideation, and on emerging one does raise the self-reflection "Was I perceiving, or not perceiving?" The former pauses even the "I" entirely; the latter still has the "I" checking on itself—a difference of worlds in the level of attainment.

The most crucial scriptural witness is the mechanism for emerging from cessation attainment: "It is due to this body, the six sense-bases, and the condition of life-faculty that one arises from the attainment." In cessation attainment, where the first six consciousnesses are wholly inactive, life still continues—precisely because the ālaya-vijñāna has not let go of its body-holding (life-faculty). This binds life-faculty and cessation attainment together: without that hidden thread, the ālaya-vijñāna, no emergence from cessation attainment would be possible at all.

Non-perceptual reward (the heaven of non-perception) is the karmic fruit of cultivating non-perceptual attainment: rebirth in the heaven of non-perception within the fourth dhyāna, lasting five hundred kalpas (the scriptures vary slightly). After five hundred kalpas one must fall—because the very basis of this heaven is the erroneous attainment that "takes arising-and-ceasing as cause," and it cannot be sustained.

A line is worth adding on where the three stand among the dissociated factors: all three are positionally designated—non-perceptual attainment is the position where the mind and mental factors of the first six consciousnesses "temporarily do not arise"; cessation attainment is that, plus the afflicted aspect of the seventh consciousness "temporarily not arising"; the heaven of non-perception is the position of the karmic fruit of non-perceptual attainment. There is no substantial "attainment" or "heaven" apart from form and mind. The Cheng weishi lun uses the metaphor of an embankment: the force that obstructs the activity of consciousness need not itself be a real thing—just as an embankment holds back water while the embankment itself is a provisional composite of earth and stone.

Name, Sentence, Syllable—Language Is the Tool of Concepts, and the Tool Is Itself Provisionally Designated

Three of the twenty-four deal specifically with language: name-clusters (words expressing the intrinsic nature of things, like "form," "feeling"), sentence-clusters (sentences expressing the distinctions among things, like "form is impermanent"), and syllable-clusters (the letters and phonemes on which the first two depend, like "ā," "ka").

The structure is: syllable → name → sentence. Phonemes compose words; words compose sentences. But all three layers are provisionally designated. Apart from the understanding activity of consciousness, phonemes are merely sound waves, words merely arrangements of phonemes, sentences merely strings of words. Meaning is not built into language; it is endowed by the activity of consciousness.

Nāgārjuna says it sharply in the Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra: "These names are forcefully and provisionally imposed … all composite dharmas are merely nominal designations; we use names to grasp dharmas." The word "forcefully" carries great weight. Names do not naturally correspond to the essence of things; they are forcibly set up. We "use names to grasp dharmas"—we use names to "catch hold of" things, and clutching at them long enough, we come to think the name is the thing—which is exactly the linguistic mechanism of imagined-nature grasping.

The Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra's teaching goes one layer deeper: "Their characteristics are established through nominal designation, not through intrinsic characteristics." The "characteristic" of a thing is not set up by its own nature but by nominal designation. This means: all our cognition of the world passes through the provisional designation of name, sentence, and syllable. You never directly cognize "the thing itself"; what you cognize is "the thing after it has been conceptualized by names and words."

⚠️ A small cross-disciplinary comparison can be made here. Saussure's structural linguistics distinguishes the "signifier" (the sound-form) from the "signified" (the conceptual meaning), and argues that the relation between them is "arbitrary"—no natural, necessary connection. This runs parallel in insight to the Yogācāra "these names are forcefully and provisionally imposed." But the boundary must be kept clear: Saussure analyzes how language works; Yogācāra asks why language exists—because it is provisionally established by the conceptualizing activity of consciousness. The two can illuminate each other; they need not prove each other.

Name, sentence, and syllable hold a special place among the twenty-four: they are the provisional designation of the conceptualizing activity itself. If the other dissociated factors (time, direction, number) are the conceptual frameworks consciousness uses on the world, then name, sentence, and syllable are the very tools used in conceptualizing. A meta-level designation—the tool is provisionally designated, and the concepts the tool produces are provisionally designated too. This is the most uncomfortable but most necessary self-awareness for any user of language.

A correction must be made here: ⚠️ knowing that name, sentence, and syllable are provisionally designated does not mean removing all concepts. Concepts are tools of practice—the Buddha's own teaching is transmitted in the form of name, sentence, and syllable. If all concepts were obstacles, the Buddha should not have taught the Dharma. The Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra is clear: the Buddha "provisionally established the conceptual label 'conditioned' … wishing to enable others to directly realize"—he provisionally set up names and notions in order to guide beings toward awakening. Concepts are not the goal, but they are a necessary means. The aim of practice is not to abolish concepts but to not be bound by them—to use the map skillfully without mistaking the map for the road.

Arising, Aging, Abiding, Impermanence—Even "Change" Itself Is Provisionally Designated

Arising, aging, abiding, impermanence—the four marks of conditioned existence. Every conditioned dharma undergoes arising (previously absent, now present), aging (continuous change), abiding (continuous non-interruption), and impermanence (continuous deterioration).

A problem arises: if the four marks are the signatures of conditioned dharmas, then the four marks themselves are also conditioned, and should also have four marks—"arising" would need an "arising of arising," and that "arising of arising" would need an "arising of the arising of arising"… infinite regress. Nāgārjuna uses this argument in the Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra to overturn entirely the possibility of the four marks being real dharmas.

The Yogācāra solution: the four marks are not four entities existing outside conditioned dharmas; they are characteristics that conditioned dharmas present at different positions, nominally designated as "four marks." The Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā's definitions all end in the words "provisionally established": "The nature of formations previously absent now becoming present within class-similarity—provisionally established as 'arising.' The nature of continuous change—provisionally established as 'aging' …" The four marks are characteristics of "formations" at a certain position, not four separate things existing apart from formations.

The Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā points out an important detail: "Know that herein, arising and so forth are established in terms of the continuity-position, not in terms of the instant." The four marks are established on the continuity-position, not on the instant. When we say a person "has aged," it is not that a thing called "aging" has attached itself to them; it is that their physical body has, across continuity, presented the characteristic of "change," and we nominally name that characteristic "aging." The instant itself has no "aging"—a single instant cannot hold still into the next; where would aging be? Aging is a concept visible only across a stretch of continuity.

This has a very direct meaning for contemplative practice. In the Āgamas the Buddha teaches over and over: "all formations are impermanent," "form is impermanent; what is impermanent is suffering; what is suffering is non-self"—contemplating impermanence is the core practice of the path to liberation. But one more layer must be added here: when you contemplate impermanence, do not treat "impermanence" as a real thing. "Impermanence" too is provisionally designated—it is the nominal name for the "deteriorating nature" of formations across continuity.

The Buddha's final verse at the threshold of parinirvāṇa: "All formations are impermanent—such is the dharma of arising and ceasing; when arising and ceasing themselves cease, that quiescence is bliss." Arising and ceasing are provisional, and contemplating arising and ceasing is a contemplation of the provisional; but through contemplating the provisional, one can arrive at the real place where arising and ceasing alike are wholly extinguished. Contemplating impermanence is not for clinging to the concept "everything is changing"; it is for transcending the four marks themselves.

Time, Direction, Number—The Last Stronghold

The three hardest to see through as provisional designations are time, direction, and number—time, space, quantity. These three coordinates make up the "operating system" of our everyday cognition, and they are almost impossible to imagine being able to do without. For exactly that reason, their provisionally designated nature is also the most profound teaching.

Time—the Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā's definition: "Based on the continuous flow of causal results among formations, time is provisionally established. That which has arisen and ceased establishes past time; that which has not yet arisen establishes future time; that which has arisen and not yet ceased establishes present time."

Past, present, and future are not three parallel rivers of time; they are three markers of consciousness's flow-states. The Śūraṅgama Sūtra defines "world" (time) as "temporal flow"—time is the nominal name for "flowing." The Avataṃsaka Sūtra goes further: "Beginning from a single thought-instant culminating in a kalpa—all arise depending on sentient beings' mental activity." Kalpas "arise depending on the mind." The interpenetration of thought-instant and kalpa—"ineffable kalpas equal a single thought-instant"—if time were objectively fixed, how could one thought-instant ever equal ineffable kalpas?

The Avataṃsaka's Lifespan Chapter also shows time increasing geometrically across Buddha-lands—one kalpa in this world equals one day and night in that world, cascading on through hundreds of millions of asaṃkhyeya worlds. Time is not a fixed objective measure; it is the provisional designation of the resultant world. Sudhana's experience entering Maitreya's tower is more direct still: "in a short time, perceiving immeasurable kalpas"—the subjective stretching of time directly confirms that "time" is a provisional designation of the activity of consciousness.

A second correction must be made here: ⚠️ knowing that "time" is provisionally designated does not mean one may squander time. A provisionally designated concept has a real function at the level of conventional truth—the provisional nature of "time" is an insight of ultimate truth; "cherishing this precious human life" is a practice of conventional truth. The two truths do not contradict each other: precisely because one knows time to be provisionally designated and ungraspable, one should cherish every "now" all the more—because "now" will not wait for you. The Avataṃsaka's "beginning from a single thought culminating in a kalpa" does not say time does not matter; it says a single thought-instant contains the infinite—every present moment is a complete field for practice.

Direction—the Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā's definition is very exactly bounded: "For the causal differences of east, west, south, north, the four intermediate directions, up and down, direction is provisionally established. Spoken only of causal results subsumed under form dharmas." Spatial direction has meaning only in the context of form dharmas. Without form dharmas there is no direction; space is not an empty container preceding form.

The Śūraṅgama's Seven Locations for Seeking Mind is more thorough still: the Buddha asks Ānanda, where is the mind? Ānanda says inside, outside, in between—seven times he is refuted. The conclusion: "The nature of the discriminating mind is neither inside, nor outside, nor in between—it is nowhere at all." If the mind is not even "inside, outside, or in between," then "direction" cannot be the mind's objective container; direction itself is a concept provisionally designated by consciousness.

The Avataṃsaka pushes the vision of space to its extreme: "Within a single fine hair-pore, ineffable lands enter in sequence; the hair-pore can receive those lands, yet those lands cannot fill the hair-pore." Immeasurable lands can enter a single hair-tip, and the hair-tip does not enlarge. Great and small contain each other, layer within layer without end—space can fold—thoroughly shattering the substantiality of "direction."

Number—the Pañcaskandhaka's definition: "the nature of the separate continuous flow of each formation's characteristics." Number is a provisional marker of "separateness." The Avataṃsaka's Asaṃkhyeya Chapter displays a 124-level system of numerical progression, each level being the square of the previous, climbing from koṭi all the way up to "ineffable-ineffable-turn." But the whole chapter concludes: "Ineffable kalpas can still be exhausted, but praising the Buddha's merit can never be exhausted." No matter how large, number is finite; only the place that transcends number is where the Buddha's merit lies. Number is a tool, not an entity.

Time, direction, number—if you can see through these three provisional designations, you begin to approach the border of non-discriminating wisdom. Because nearly all our discriminations are built on these three coordinates: this happened before that (time), this is beside that (direction), this is more than that (number). See through the three provisional designations, and the discriminating mind loosens at its deepest level.

Dissociated Factors and the Descent-Route of the Hundred Dharmas

Return to the whole structure of the five categories of the Hundred Dharmas:

Mind-dharmas → mental factors → form-dharmas → dissociated factors → unconditioned dharmas the transformer　psychological content　the transformed material aspect　the conceptual provisional aspect　the true nature of consciousness

From 3.1 to 3.11, we looked at how consciousness operates and projects—the transformer (mind-dharmas) operates, accompanied by psychological quality (mental factors), and projects a material world (form-dharmas). At 3.12, form-dharmas were judged to be the object-aspect of consciousness; "the visible projection" was already seen through.

At 3.13, we take one more step: consciousness not only projects a world, it also conceptualizes its own projection—provisionally setting up a whole apparatus of conceptual tools: time, space, quantity, causal sequence, language, life, individuality. Form-dharmas still have "material resistance," which still carries some "sense of existence"; dissociated factors lack even material resistance—they are pure nominal designation. From form-dharmas to dissociated factors is to move from "the visible projection" to "the invisible provisional designation."

Continuing the vehicle metaphor of 3.6: mind-dharmas are the driver, mental factors the driving mindset, form-dharmas the road and scenery—so what are the dissociated factors? They are the map, the timetable, the odometer reading. You use the map to describe the road, the timetable to describe time, the odometer to describe distance. But the map is not the road itself, the timetable is not time itself, the odometer reading is not distance itself. Mistake the map for the road, and you are trapped inside the concept and cannot get out—this is imagined-nature grasping.

But the reverse—supposing that "throwing away the map" solves the problem—is another kind of grasping. The map is provisionally designated (not substantially real), yet it genuinely has a descriptive function (the dependently arisen kind of existence). Practice is not throwing away all concepts; it is knowing the provisionally designated nature of concepts and using them skillfully without grasping. This is what 3.13 prepares for the coming Diamond Sūtra of S5—first see through the structure of provisional designation completely, and only then can there be talk of the prajñā cut: "neither the hundred dharmas, yet named the hundred dharmas."

The Hundred Dharmas are moving, step by step, from "being" toward "emptiness": mind-dharmas are the most "real" (they are consciousness itself), mental factors next (they arise with mind), form-dharmas next (they are the object-aspect of consciousness), dissociated factors the most "insubstantial" (pure provisionally designated concept). The next chapter—unconditioned dharmas—will leap beyond the entire conditioned framework and arrive at the destination of the Hundred Dharmas: thusness. From "being" to "emptiness," from "emptiness" to "thusness"—this is the complete route-map the Śatadharmaprakāśamukha-śāstra has to show you.

If the dissociated factors are the thinnest point of conditioned dharmas, then the unconditioned dharmas are the true nature of consciousness reached after passing all the way through the conditioned. In the next chapter, we arrive at where the descent of the Hundred Dharmas comes to its end.