One Cannot See the Tathāgata Through Marks

I. Introduction

1.1 The Problem

S5-P06 demonstrated how to generate mind without abiding in marks (yīng wú suǒ zhù ér shēng qí xīn). But that teaching immediately raises a deeper question: when you are not abiding in marks, what do you see?

The Diamond Sūtra gives an unequivocal answer: you see the Tathāgata. But not through the kind of "seeing" that involves eyes.

This question runs through the entire sūtra. The Buddha asks Subhūti four times whether the Tathāgata can be seen through marks, and each time the context, object, and level of negation differ. Kuiji, in his Commentary on the Diamond Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra (Zànshù), provides a precise summary¹:

第一第七第十七及此一段，皆云不以相見如來者，義意皆別。初以對果疑因，次明感果離相，次說依真現假，後明約假求真。

"The first, seventh, seventeenth, and this passage all say one cannot see the Tathāgata through marks, yet the meaning in each case is different. The first addresses doubting the cause upon seeing the fruit; the second clarifies that attaining the fruit is apart from marks; the third speaks of manifesting the provisional on the basis of the real; the last addresses seeking the real through the provisional."

Four passes, four levels of depth — from "seeing the fruit and doubting the cause" to "using provisional marks to infer the real dharma-body." This paper focuses on the fourth level: the reductio of §26. If one can observe the Tathāgata through the thirty-two marks, then a wheel-turning sage king — who also possesses the thirty-two marks — would be a Tathāgata. This is the sūtra's sharpest and most unexpected cut.

Unexpected because Subhūti gets it wrong.

In §13, asked the same question, Subhūti answers correctly: "No, World-Honored One."² In §26, the same question returns, and Subhūti answers: "Yes, yes — one may observe the Tathāgata through the thirty-two marks."³ A great arhat who has listened to twenty-five sections of teaching — why does he stumble here?

This is not Subhūti regressing. It is the sūtra's pedagogical architecture. P07 demonstrated that the entire sūtra folds into a dual-layer structure at §17 — the first half dismantles self-grasping (afflictive obstruction), the second half dismantles dharma-grasping (cognitive obstruction). §13 falls in the first half, where understanding that "the thirty-two marks do not equal the Tathāgata" poses no great difficulty — it is a coarse negation of marks. §26 falls in the second half, where the Buddha is no longer addressing the proposition Subhūti has already answered correctly. He is probing a subtler attachment: after sustained study and practice, might the practitioner use the thirty-two marks as an inferential basis (anumāna) for "knowing" the dharma-body? Might one extrapolate from visible merit-marks to the invisible dharma-body?

This attachment is harder to detect because it appears reasonable: the Buddha has thirty-two marks; I see thirty-two marks; therefore I see the Buddha. The inference is formally valid — but the conclusion is wrong, because wheel-turning sage kings also have thirty-two marks.

1.2 Positioning

This is the eighth paper in the S5 series. Together with S5-P03 ("All marks are illusory"), it forms a deconstruction–reconstruction pair: P03 deconstructs (all marks are illusory), P08 reconstructs — after marks are deconstructed, what do you see? Not nothingness, but the Tathāgata. Not through eyes, but through prajñā.

Within P07's dual-layer framework, this paper's sūtra anchors span both halves:

• First half: §5 — "All marks are illusory; if one sees that all marks are non-marks, then one sees the Tathāgata" — deconstructing the form-body, positive thesis
• First half: §20 — "The Tathāgata should not be seen through the complete form-body… should not be seen through complete marks" — direct negation
• Second half: §26 — "If one observed the Tathāgata through the thirty-two marks, a wheel-turning sage king would be a Tathāgata" — reductio
• Second half: §26 verse — "If one sees me through form, seeks me through sound, this person walks a deviant path and cannot see the Tathāgata" — final negation

The first half deconstructs "seeing the Buddha through the form-body" (coarse); the second half deconstructs "seeing the Buddha through the thirty-two marks" (subtle). The latter is more insidious, because the thirty-two marks are the Buddha's distinctive excellences — not ordinary form — yet they are still marks.

II. Scriptural Foundations

A. Sūtra Sources

2.1 The Reductio of §26 — Primary Text

The complete exchange in §26, the "Section on the Dharma-Body Being Beyond Marks" (fǎshēn fēi xiāng fēn)³:

須菩提！於意云何？可以三十二相觀如來不？」須菩提言：「如是，如是！以三十二相觀如來。」佛言：「須菩提！若以三十二相觀如來者，轉輪聖王則是如來。」須菩提白佛言：「世尊！如我解佛所說義，不應以三十二相觀如來。」

"Subhūti, what do you think — can one observe the Tathāgata through the thirty-two marks?" Subhūti said: "Yes, yes — through the thirty-two marks one observes the Tathāgata." The Buddha said: "Subhūti, if one could observe the Tathāgata through the thirty-two marks, then a wheel-turning sage king would be a Tathāgata." Subhūti addressed the Buddha: "World-Honored One, as I understand the meaning of what you have spoken, one should not observe the Tathāgata through the thirty-two marks."

Subhūti first answers incorrectly ("yes"), then the Buddha corrects through reductio: if premise P (the Tathāgata can be observed through the thirty-two marks) holds, then conclusion C (a wheel-turning sage king would be a Tathāgata) must also hold — but C is manifestly absurd, so P is falsified. Subhūti immediately revises his position.

The Buddha then delivers the concluding verse⁴:

若以色見我，以音聲求我，是人行邪道，不能見如來。

"If one sees me through form, / seeks me through sound, / this person walks a deviant path / and cannot see the Tathāgata."

The negation extends from the thirty-two marks to all form and sound — any attempt to approach the Tathāgata through sensory perception (seeing form, seeking sound) is a deviant path. "Seeing" here is not ocular perception but prajñā realization.

2.2 §5 and §14 — The Positive Thesis

§26 negates. What about the positive side — how can one see the Tathāgata?

§5 delivers the Diamond Sūtra's most celebrated answer⁵:

凡所有相，皆是虛妄；若見諸相非相，則見如來。

"All marks whatsoever are illusory. If one sees that all marks are non-marks, then one sees the Tathāgata."

"If one sees that all marks are non-marks" — seeing that all marks are not (what you take them to be). "Then one sees the Tathāgata" — that is seeing the Tathāgata. This is not a Zen-style circumlocution but a precise epistemological instruction: what you see is not a blank void without marks, but the true nature of all dharmas — pariniṣpanna-svabhāva, the perfected nature.

§14 extends the analysis⁶:

是實相者，則是非相，是故如來說名實相。

"What is called 'true mark' (shí xiāng) is precisely non-mark — therefore the Tathāgata calls it 'true mark.'"

離一切諸相，則名諸佛。

"Departing from all marks — that is called 'all Buddhas.'"

"Departing from all marks" does not mean "all marks vanish." The marks of dependent arising remain. What is departed from is the reification imposed by the imagined nature (parikalpita) — the habit of treating marks as inherently real.

2.3 §20 and §13 — First-Half and Second-Half Parallels

§20, in the first half, poses a question parallel to §26 but deploys the jífēi tripartite formula⁷:

佛可以具足色身見不？」「不也，世尊！如來不應以具足色身見。何以故？如來說具足色身，即非具足色身，是名具足色身。

"Can the Buddha be seen through the complete form-body?" "No, World-Honored One. The Tathāgata should not be seen through the complete form-body. Why? What the Tathāgata calls the 'complete form-body' is precisely not the complete form-body — it is called 'the complete form-body.'"

§13 handles "body-marks" (shēn xiāng) with a two-part formula — without the third "is called" element⁸:

如來所說身相，即非身相。

"What the Tathāgata calls body-marks are precisely non-body-marks."

This is the jífēi structure applied directly to "body-marks," as analyzed in S5-P01. The absence of the "is called" third segment leaves the listener suspended in negation — the Buddha does not rush to say what body-marks are.

And in §13, Subhūti answers "No" correctly when asked whether the Tathāgata can be seen through the thirty-two marks². In §26, faced with the same question, he answers "Yes" — incorrectly. The contrast between the two responses maps precisely onto P07's dual-layer structure: the first-half understanding (marks ≠ Tathāgata) is easy; what the second half must deconstruct is the subtler attachment that persists after understanding.

2.4 The Śūraṅgama Sūtra — Seeing-Nature Is Not Seeing

The Śūraṅgama Sūtra (Léngyán Jīng), fascicle 2, offers another angle on "not seeing the Tathāgata through marks"⁹:

見明之時，見非是明；見暗之時，見非是暗；見空之時，見非是空；見塞之時，見非是塞。

"When seeing brightness, seeing is not brightness. When seeing darkness, seeing is not darkness. When seeing space, seeing is not space. When seeing obstruction, seeing is not obstruction."

When you see brightness, the seeing itself is not brightness. When you see darkness, the seeing itself is not darkness. No matter how the object changes, the seeing-nature does not change with it.

The Buddha then delivers the pivotal proposition¹⁰:

見見之時，見非是見；見猶離見，見不能及。

"When seeing sees seeing, that seeing is not seeing. Seeing is still apart from seeing — seeing cannot reach it."

When you attempt to "see" seeing itself, what you grasp is already not the seeing-nature — it has become another object of seeing, an image. The seeing-nature always withdraws one step behind; it cannot be reached by what is seen.

This parallels the Diamond Sūtra's logic exactly: the dharma-body, like the seeing-nature, is never on the "seen" side. You use marks to look — but what you see is always marks (the seen), never the dharma-body (the seeing-nature). Trying to capture the dharma-body through marks is like trying to see "seeing" itself with your eyes — you only ever produce another objectified image, never the thing itself.

Further, the Buddha states¹¹:

見精性未曾皺……變者受滅，彼不變者元無生滅。

"The nature of seeing-essence has never wrinkled… What changes undergoes destruction; what does not change is originally without arising or ceasing."

The seeing-essence does not age with the face. What wrinkles is phenomena; what does not wrinkle is the nature. This resonates perfectly with the dharma-body thesis: the thirty-two marks change (conditioned, subject to the four marks of impermanence), but the dharma-body does not change (unconditioned, beyond the three times).

2.5 The Vimalakīrti Sūtra — Observing the Tathāgata

In the "Observing the Tathāgata" chapter of the Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra, the Buddha asks Vimalakīrti how he observes the Tathāgata. Vimalakīrti responds¹²:

如自觀身實相，觀佛亦然。我觀如來前際不來，後際不去，今則不住；不觀色……不可以智知，不可以識識……無生無滅……作如是觀，以斯觀者，名為正觀；若他觀者，名為邪觀。

"As one observes the true nature of one's own body, so one observes the Buddha. I observe the Tathāgata — not coming from the past, not going to the future, not abiding in the present. Not observing form… not knowable through cognition, not recognizable through consciousness… without arising or ceasing… To observe in this way — this is called right observation. Any other observation is deviant observation."

Vimalakīrti's "right observation" has three elements. First, observing the Tathāgata is the same as observing the true nature of one's own body — not observing an external object. Second, the Tathāgata does not come, go, or abide — transcending the three times. Third, the Tathāgata is beyond form, beyond cognitive knowledge, beyond discriminating consciousness — transcending all modes of knowing.

Xuanzang's translation is more concise¹³:

我觀如來都無所見，如是而觀。

"I observe the Tathāgata with no observation whatsoever — such is how I observe."

"No observation whatsoever, such is how I observe." This is the Vimalakīrti version of "if one sees that all marks are non-marks, then one sees the Tathāgata": not closing one's eyes to see nothing, but within all that is seen, grasping at no mark.

In the same sūtra's "Entering the Gate of Non-Duality" chapter, Vimalakīrti responds to Mañjuśrī with silence¹⁴:

時維摩詰默然無言。 文殊師利歎曰：「善哉，善哉！乃至無有文字、語言，是真入不二法門。」

Vimalakīrti remained silent. Mañjuśrī praised: "Excellent, excellent! To the point of being without words or language — this is truly entering the gate of non-duality."

Vimalakīrti's thunderous silence — seeing beyond the subject–object divide. Not using concepts to understand non-duality, but directly being non-duality. This is the ultimate form of "seeing the Tathāgata": you are not "seeing," nor are you "not seeing."

2.6 The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra — Tathāgatagarbha Is Not Self

§26 deconstructs seeing the Tathāgata through marks. But might this produce a substitute attachment — understanding "Tathāgata" as an eternal self that transcends the form-body? The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, fascicle 2, preempts this misreading¹⁵:

我說如來藏，不同外道所說之我。大慧！有時說空、無相、無願、如、實際、法性、法身、涅槃、離自性、不生不滅、本來寂靜、自性涅槃，如是等句，說如來藏已。如來、應供、等正覺，為斷愚夫畏無我句故，說離妄想無所有境界如來藏門。

"When I speak of tathāgatagarbha, it is not the same as what non-Buddhists call 'self.' Mahāmati, sometimes I speak of emptiness, marklessness, wishlessness, suchness, the ultimate, dharma-nature, dharma-body, nirvāṇa, absence of self-nature, non-arising and non-ceasing, original quiescence, intrinsic nirvāṇa — all these expressions describe tathāgatagarbha. The Tathāgata, worthy of offerings, perfectly enlightened, speaks of the tathāgatagarbha gate — the realm free of false discrimination and without any thing — in order to lead those foolish beings who fear the teaching of non-self."

Tathāgatagarbha is not a soul. The Buddha teaches it to guide beings who would fall into nihilism upon hearing "non-self." Its ultimate meaning is "the realm free of false discrimination" — not another entity to be grasped.

The same sūtra's fascicle 4 clarifies the cognitive basis through the five dharmas¹⁶:

五法、自性、識、二無我分別趣相者，謂名、相、妄想、正智、如如。

"The five dharmas are: name, mark, false discrimination, right wisdom, and suchness."

以此正智，不立名相……知名相不生，是名如如。

"Through this right wisdom, one does not establish names and marks… Knowing that names and marks do not arise — this is called suchness."

Name, mark, and false discrimination constitute the structure of the imagined nature. Right wisdom (samyag-jñāna) and suchness (tathatā) constitute the perfected nature. "Seeing the Tathāgata" does not proceed through names and marks but through right wisdom and suchness.

B. Treatise Sources

2.7 The Cheng weishi lun — Trikāya and Five Dharmas as Nature

The Cheng weishi lun (Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only), fascicle 10, gives the most precise Yogācāra definition of the dharma-body¹⁷:

自性身，謂諸如來真淨法界，受用、變化平等所依，離相寂然，絕諸戲論，具無邊際真常功德，是一切法平等實性，即此自性，亦名法身，大功德法所依止故。

"The self-nature body (svabhāvika-kāya) refers to the Tathāgatas' truly pure dharma-realm — the equal basis for the enjoyment-body and transformation-body — apart from marks, quiescent, beyond all discursive elaboration, endowed with boundless true and constant merits. It is the equal true nature of all dharmas. This self-nature is also called the dharma-body, because it is the support of the great meritorious dharmas."

The dharma-body is "apart from marks, quiescent, beyond all discursive elaboration" — not any object that can be apprehended through sensation or conceptualization.

The trikāya distinction is critical¹⁸:

自性法身，雖有真實無邊功德，而無為故，不可說為色、心等物。四智品中真實功德，鏡智所起，常、遍色身，攝自受用；平等智品，所現佛身，攝他受用；成事智品，所現隨類種種身相，攝變化身。

"The self-nature dharma-body, though possessing truly real and boundless merits, being unconditioned, cannot be spoken of as form, mind, or any such thing. Among the four wisdoms' genuine merits: mirror-wisdom gives rise to the constant, pervasive form-body — subsumed under self-enjoyment. Equality-wisdom manifests Buddha-bodies — subsumed under other-enjoyment. Accomplishing-wisdom manifests various bodies according to type — subsumed under the transformation-body."

The key phrase is "cannot be spoken of as form, mind, or any such thing" (bù kě shuō wéi sè xīn děng wù). The dharma-body is neither form-dharma (rūpa) nor mind-dharma (citta). It falls outside every category in the Yogācāra taxonomy of one hundred dharmas. The thirty-two marks are merely reflections "given rise to by mirror-wisdom" — conditioned form-bodies in the domain of the enjoyment-body or transformation-body, not the dharma-body.

The four wisdoms are defined respectively¹⁹: great mirror-wisdom (ādarśa-jñāna) is free from all discrimination and "can manifest and generate reflections of bodies, lands, and wisdoms"; equality-wisdom (samatā-jñāna) observes all dharmas and beings as equal; profound-observation-wisdom (pratyavekṣaṇā-jñāna) skillfully observes the specific and shared marks of all dharmas; accomplishing-wisdom (kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna) manifests various transformative activities across the ten directions. The four wisdoms are the fruit of the turning of the basis (āśraya-parāvṛtti) — not products of form-marks.

2.8 The Cheng weishi lun — Five Dharmas as Nature and the Uncontaminated Realm

The positive description of the dharma-body²⁰:

二乘所得二轉依果，唯永遠離煩惱障縛，無殊勝法故，但名解脫身。大覺世尊……永離二障，亦名法身。無量無邊力無畏等，大功德法所莊嚴故。……故此法身，五法為性。

"The two-vehicle practitioners' attainment of the twofold turning of the basis only involves permanently departing from the bonds of afflictive obstruction, without any supreme dharmas — therefore it is merely called the 'liberation-body.' The Great Awakened World-Honored One… permanently departs from both obstructions and is also called the dharma-body, adorned by the boundless meritorious dharmas of the powers, fearlessnesses, and so forth…. Therefore this dharma-body has the five dharmas as its nature."

"Five dharmas as nature" — the dharma-body's essential nature consists of the four wisdoms plus the pure dharma-realm (suchness). This means the dharma-body is not "nothing" — it contains the boundless merits of the four wisdoms. Those merits simply do not exist in the mode of form-marks.

The difference between the two vehicles and the Buddha lies here: śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas eliminate the afflictive obstruction and attain the "liberation-body"; only the Buddha permanently eliminates both obstructions and attains the "dharma-body." The liberation-body is not the dharma-body.

The uncontaminated realm (anāsrava-dhātu)²¹:

此即無漏界，不思議善常，安樂解脫身，大牟尼名法。

"This is the uncontaminated realm — inconceivable, wholesome, constant, blissful — the liberation-body. The Great Sage is called Dharma."

界是藏義，此中含容無邊希有大功德故。

"'Realm' means 'treasury' — because within it are contained boundless, rare, great merits."

The uncontaminated realm is a treasury — not an empty void but a fullness. The dharma-body is full, but this fullness cannot be seen through marks.

2.9 The Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra — Dharma-Body versus Liberation-Body

The Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, fascicle 5, records Mañjuśrī directly asking the Buddha about the characteristics of the dharma-body²²:

若於諸地波羅蜜多，善修出離，轉依成滿，是名如來法身之相。當知此相，二因緣故不可思議：無戲論故，無所為故。

"When one has skillfully cultivated liberation through the perfections across all stages, and the turning of the basis reaches completion — this is the characteristic of the Tathāgata's dharma-body. Know that this characteristic is inconceivable for two reasons: because it is without discursive elaboration, and because it is without purposive action."

The dharma-body is "without discursive elaboration" (wú xì lùn) and "without purposive action" (wú suǒ wéi) — inconceivable. It cannot be described through any conceptual framework, nor can it be accomplished through any goal-directed effort.

The Buddha then makes the definitive distinction²³:

聲聞、獨覺所得轉依，名法身不？」「善男子！不名法身。」「世尊！當名何身？」「善男子！名解脫身。由解脫身故，說一切聲聞、獨覺與諸如來平等平等；由法身故，說有差別。

"Is the turning of the basis attained by śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas called the dharma-body?" "Good son, it is not called the dharma-body." "World-Honored One, what should it be called?" "Good son, it is called the liberation-body. Through the liberation-body, all śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and Tathāgatas are said to be equal. Through the dharma-body, there is said to be difference."

At the level of liberation, all noble beings are equal — all have eliminated the afflictive obstruction. But at the level of the dharma-body, only the Buddha is complete — because only the Buddha has permanently eliminated the cognitive obstruction. This distinction provides deep Yogācāra support for §26's argument: the thirty-two marks, as the form-marks of the transformation-body, are visible to śrāvakas, to ordinary beings, and are possessed even by wheel-turning sage kings — but the dharma-body is not visible, because it does not operate at the level of form-marks.

C. Commentary Sources

2.10 Kuiji's Zànshù — Mirror-Wisdom Reflection Theory

Kuiji provides this paper's most important Yogācāra analytic framework in his Zànshù²⁴:

三十二相蓋是鏡智之上所現影像，既墮有為之數，故當四相所遷，況對機宜有無不定，焉可將此而為法身。

"The thirty-two marks are nothing but reflections manifested upon mirror-wisdom. Since they fall within the category of the conditioned, they are subject to the four marks of impermanence. Moreover, their manifestation varies according to the dispositions of those to be taught — how could one take these as the dharma-body?"

The thirty-two marks are reflections projected by great mirror-wisdom. Reflections are conditioned phenomena — subject to arising, abiding, change, and cessation. Furthermore, "their manifestation varies" — the Buddha may or may not display the thirty-two marks depending on what the situation requires. Whether they appear is a matter of pedagogical necessity, not of the dharma-body's nature.

This is like images in a mirror: the images depend on what stands before the mirror, but regardless of how the images change, the mirror itself does not change. You cannot know the mirror's nature by observing its reflections — what you see is always the reflection, never the mirror itself²⁵.

Kuiji further quotes a verse attributed to Maitreya²⁶:

應化非真佛，亦非說法者。

"The response-body and transformation-body are not the true Buddha, nor are they the Dharma-speaker."

The response-body and transformation-body are not the true Buddha. The true Buddha — the dharma-body — is "apart from marks, quiescent," beyond sensory apprehension.

Regarding §5's "all marks are illusory; if one sees that all marks are non-marks, then one sees the Tathāgata," Kuiji explains²⁷:

夫一切相皆從妄念而生，是故佛相亦是虛妄，若分別不起，相自無生，即見非相，諸相既亡唯是覺體，名見如來。

"All marks arise from deluded thought; therefore even the Buddha's marks are illusory. If discrimination does not arise, marks naturally do not arise — one then sees non-marks. When all marks have subsided, what remains is nothing but the awakened nature — this is called 'seeing the Tathāgata.'"

Not that marks are annihilated — but that when discrimination ceases, marks are no longer reified. What remains is the awakened nature itself. The awakened nature is the Tathāgata.

Kuiji's mirror analogy extends the point²⁸:

譬如鏡中現一人像兼現餘物，不唯人像空處是鏡，餘物空處亦皆是鏡，合法可知。

"It is like a mirror that reflects the image of a person along with other objects — not only where the person's image is absent is it the mirror; where the other objects appear, too, it is all the mirror. Apply this to the dharma and the meaning is clear."

The mirror is not only the mirror where there are no reflections — it is also the mirror where there are reflections. Applied to the dharma: the dharma-body is not only present in the absence of the thirty-two marks — it is present precisely where the marks appear. The problem is not that marks exist, but that you mistake the reflection for the mirror.

2.11 Vasubandhu's Śāstra — Refuting Inferential Knowledge

Vasubandhu's analysis of §26 in the Vajracchedikā-śāstra reveals a subtlety deeper than the surface argument²⁹:

復有疑，雖相成就不可得見如來，以非彼體，以如來法身為體；而如來法身以見相成就比知，則知如來法身為福相成就。

"A further doubt arises: although the Tathāgata cannot be seen through the accomplishment of marks, since that is not his body — the Tathāgata's body being the dharma-body — yet one might inferentially know (bǐ zhī, anumāna) the dharma-body through seeing the accomplished marks, thereby concluding that the dharma-body is accomplished through merit-marks."

What Vasubandhu deconstructs is not the naive equation of marks with the Tathāgata — §13 already handled that. §26 targets a subtler dharma-attachment: "I know that form-marks are not the dharma-body, but I can infer the dharma-body's nature from what I see of the marks." This is attachment at the level of inference (anumāna) rather than direct perception (pratyakṣa): not identifying the form-body with the dharma-body, but using form-body data to construct a theory about the dharma-body.

Vasubandhu's verse eliminates this backdoor³⁰:

非是色身相，可比知如來；諸佛唯法身，轉輪王非佛。

"It is not through form-body marks / that the Tathāgata can be inferentially known. / All Buddhas are the dharma-body alone; / the wheel-turning king is not a Buddha."

法身者是智相身，福德者是異相身故。

"The dharma-body is the wisdom-nature body; merit-marks constitute a different-nature body."

The dharma-body is a "wisdom-nature body" — its essence is the four wisdoms, not form-marks. The thirty-two marks are a "different-nature body" — a body of a completely different category, arising from merit. You cannot infer from form-marks to wisdom-nature, just as you cannot infer a mirror's composition from its reflections.

Vasubandhu's commentary on the verse "if one sees me through form, seeks me through sound" is equally decisive³¹:

唯見色聞聲，是人不知佛；以真如法身，非是識境故。

"One who merely sees form and hears sound does not know the Buddha — because the suchness dharma-body is not a domain of consciousness."

"Not a domain of consciousness" (fēi shì shí jìng) — the dharma-body lies outside the cognitive range of all forms of consciousness. Seeing form and hearing sound are operations of the first six consciousnesses; the dharma-body transcends the subject–object polarity of all consciousness. This aligns perfectly with the Śūraṅgama Sūtra's "seeing cannot reach it" and Vimalakīrti's "not knowable through cognition, not recognizable through consciousness."

III. Core Argument

3.1 The Logical Structure of §26's Reductio ✅

The argument of §26 is a textbook reductio ad absurdum:

Assume premise P: The Tathāgata can be observed through the thirty-two marks. Known fact F: Wheel-turning sage kings also possess the thirty-two marks. From P + F, derive C: A wheel-turning sage king would be a Tathāgata. C is manifestly absurd (wheel-turning sage kings are not Buddhas), therefore P is falsified.

The Buddha does not simply announce that "marks do not equal the Tathāgata" — that would be too easy, and §13 already established it. §26's teaching strategy first allows Subhūti to answer incorrectly, then uses the reductio to let him discover the error himself. This is more powerful than direct negation, because it forces the listener to walk through the entire inferential chain and personally experience the absurdity of attachment to marks.

Kuiji's commentary identifies the precise nature of the error³²:

法身無為真實性故，色身有為影像相故。

"The dharma-body, being unconditioned, is truly real; the form-body, being conditioned, is a reflected image."

縱得三十二相，但是轉輪王，色相雖同不名為佛。若能持說此經，則智慧圓起……如此三十二相，始得名為佛焉。

"Even possessing the thirty-two marks, one is merely a wheel-turning king — though the form-marks are identical, one is not called a Buddha. If one can uphold and expound this sūtra, wisdom arises in fullness… Only then can these thirty-two marks be called those of a Buddha."

Identical form-marks do not make a Buddha. What makes a Buddha is not the marks but the wisdom. A wheel-turning king and the Buddha may be indistinguishable in form — but the Buddha is a Buddha because of "wisdom arising in fullness," not because of thirty-two marks.

3.2 First-Half and Second-Half Contrast — Coarse-to-Subtle Progression ✅

The difference between coarse and subtle lies not in the object — both involve the thirty-two marks — but in the cognitive mode. The first half deconstructs the direct identification of marks with the Tathāgata (parikalpita's immediate reification). The second half deconstructs the inferential use of marks to "know" the Tathāgata (anumāna's indirect reasoning). The former is an ordinary person's error; the latter is a practitioner's error.

This maps precisely onto P07's dual-layer architecture: the first half addresses afflictive obstruction (self-grasping — "I see the Buddha's marks, therefore I see the Buddha"); the second half addresses cognitive obstruction (dharma-grasping — "I know marks aren't the Buddha, but I use mark-data to infer the dharma-body").

3.3 §13's Body-Marks — Trisvabhāva Mapping

§5's "what the Tathāgata calls body-marks are precisely non-body-marks" directly applies the jífēi structure to "body-marks," following S5-P01's mapping framework:

• Body-marks (dependent nature): The Buddha's form-body arising through causes and conditions — illusory yet functionally real, serving the purpose of teaching
• Precisely non-body-marks (negation of the imagined nature): Not the inherently real, unchanging, dharma-body-equivalent "body-marks" you take them to be
• No "is called body-marks" (perfected nature omitted): The Buddha withholds the third element, leaving the listener in the oscillation of negation

As S5-P01 analyzed, the abbreviated formula (omitting "is called") keeps the listener "suspended in negation." §5's two-part treatment of body-marks does exactly this — first stripping away attachment to the Buddha's form-body, then leaving the practitioner to see for themselves.

3.4 The Yogācāra Reading of "If One Sees Non-Marks, One Sees the Tathāgata" ✅

§5's positive thesis — "if one sees that all marks are non-marks, then one sees the Tathāgata" — receives a precise Yogācāra reading:

• "Sees": not ocular seeing (direct perception of form-marks) but prajñā realization (the wisdom that arises through the turning of the basis)
• "All marks": all phenomena of the dependent nature (paratantra)
• "Non-marks": not the marks as reified by the imagined nature (parikalpita) — seeing that dependent arising is illusory-yet-functional, without reification
• "Tathāgata": the dharma-body — the perfected nature (pariniṣpanna) — the equal true nature of all dharmas

In Yogācāra translation: when prajñā wisdom realizes that all dependent-nature phenomena are not the inherently real entities projected by the imagined nature, one realizes the perfected nature — and that is the dharma-body.

This is not a special mystical experience but a fundamental epistemological reorientation: from the imagined nature's cognitive mode (treating marks as inherently real) to the perfected nature's cognitive mode (seeing suchness within the dependent). What turns is not the object — marks remain as they are — but the mode of cognition.

Kuiji's explanation echoes this reading: "If discrimination does not arise, marks naturally do not arise… what remains is nothing but the awakened nature — this is called 'seeing the Tathāgata.'" Not that marks disappear — but that when the discriminating mind ceases, what remains is the awakened nature itself.

3.5 The Dharma-Body Is Neither Form nor Mind — The Core of Trikāya Doctrine

Why can the dharma-body not be seen through marks? Because the dharma-body is neither form (rūpa) nor mind (citta).

The Cheng weishi lun is explicit: the self-nature dharma-body "cannot be spoken of as form, mind, or any such thing." This means the dharma-body does not fit into any category of the Yogācāra one hundred dharmas — not among the eleven form-dharmas, not among the eight consciousnesses, not among the fifty-one mental factors, not among the twenty-four factors not associated with mind, nor even among the six unconditioned dharmas taken as conceptual labels. The dharma-body is the "pure dharma-realm" — another name for suchness — plus the uncontaminated merits of the four wisdoms.

The trikāya distinction clarifies the fundamental error in "seeing the Tathāgata through marks":

• Dharma-body (svabhāvika-kāya): apart from marks, quiescent, unconditioned, invisible — this is the true Tathāgata
• Enjoyment-body (sāṃbhogika-kāya): the constant, pervasive form-body arising from mirror-wisdom (self-enjoyment) + Buddha-bodies manifested by equality-wisdom (other-enjoyment) — has form, but as a manifestation of wisdom
• Transformation-body (nairmāṇika-kāya): various bodies manifested by accomplishing-wisdom — the thirty-two marks belong here

The "Buddha" you encounter in sūtras as a form-body is the transformation-body or enjoyment-body. The dharma-body you cannot see — not because it hides somewhere, but because it is not the kind of thing that can be seen.

The story of Bhikṣuṇī Utpalavarṇā provides the most vivid illustration³³:

The Buddha once ascended to Trāyastriṃśa heaven for three months to teach his mother. When he returned to Jambudvīpa, Bhikṣuṇī Utpalavarṇā, eager to be first to see the Buddha, transformed herself into a wheel-turning king with a full retinue and went before the Buddha. The Buddha rebuked her. At the same time, Subhūti, in his mountain dwelling, also wished to see the Buddha — but then reflected: "The principle of emptiness and marklessness is the true dharma-body. What need is there to see a form-body?" Having thought thus, he sat back down and did not go.

Two attitudes — one rushing to see the form-body (even disguising as a wheel-turning king, which only deepens the irony given §26's argument), one realizing that the dharma-body is seen through the principle of emptiness, not through form. The Buddha rebuked the former. The latter is the Diamond Sūtra's way.

3.6 Calling Back to S1-P02: The Dharma-Body Transcends the Three Times ✅

S1-P02, "Bodhicitta and the Dharma Stream," argued from the Yogācāra framework that the dharma-body transcends the three times. "All Buddhas of the three times are one in suchness" — past, present, and future Buddhas are without distinction at the level of the dharma-body. The dharma-body is not in time, because time itself is constructed by the momentary arising and ceasing of consciousness; the dharma-body transcends the subject–object polarity of consciousness.

P08 re-opens this thesis within the S5 framework. The Diamond Sūtra's "one cannot see the Tathāgata through marks" and the thesis that the dharma-body transcends the three times are two faces of the same proposition:

• Transcending space: the thirty-two marks are the form-body's presentation in space — the dharma-body is not in space (apart from marks, quiescent)
• Transcending time: the thirty-two marks arise and cease according to conditions — the dharma-body is not in time (without arising or ceasing), as the Śūraṅgama Sūtra states: "the nature of seeing-essence has never wrinkled"
• Transcending cognition: the thirty-two marks are objects of consciousness — the dharma-body transcends the subject–object polarity (not a domain of consciousness)

Vimalakīrti's "I observe the Tathāgata — not coming from the past, not going to the future, not abiding in the present" is the precise articulation of the dharma-body's transcendence of the three times within the "observing the Tathāgata" problematic. You cannot find the Tathāgata in the past (not coming), cannot expect the Tathāgata in the future (not going), cannot grasp the Tathāgata in the present (not abiding) — because the dharma-body does not enter time.

3.7 The Śūraṅgama's "Seeing Cannot Reach It" and Seeing the Tathāgata ✅

The Śūraṅgama Sūtra's "when seeing sees seeing, that seeing is not seeing; seeing is still apart from seeing — seeing cannot reach it" provides the deep epistemological structure for the Diamond Sūtra's "one cannot see the Tathāgata through marks":

The faculty you use to "see" (the seeing-nature) can never become the object of your seeing. If you objectify it — "I see the seeing-nature" — then what you "see" is already not the seeing-nature itself but another objectified image. The true seeing-nature is always on the "seeing" side, never on the "seen" side.

By the same logic: the dharma-body cannot be seen through marks because the dharma-body is not on the "seen" side. The dharma-body is the very nature of seeing — the essence of prajñā wisdom — not an object of prajñā wisdom. You cannot make the dharma-body into a "thing" to be "seen," just as you cannot make "seeing" into a "thing" to be seen.

This is not agnosticism. Neither the Śūraṅgama Sūtra nor the Diamond Sūtra claims that the dharma-body is unknowable. What they say is that the dharma-body cannot be known through the mode of "seeing marks." Prajñā realization is not seeing with the eyes, hearing with the ears, or reasoning with the intellect — it is a fundamentally different mode of knowing, a direct realization that occurs when the turning of the basis is complete.

3.8 A Living Analogy — Love Is Not in the Face

You love someone. You see their face, hear their voice, remember the things they have done. But is "love" in any of these?

Can you point to where love is? It is not in the face — faces age, but love does not change because a new wrinkle appears. It is not in the voice — voices grow hoarse, but love does not vanish because the voice changes. It is not in the things they have done — those events are past, but love remains.

Someone asks you: "What do you love about them?" You begin to list — their smile, their gentleness, their insight. But when the list is finished, something remains: none of these items is love. Love is more real than any feature you can name — yet you simply cannot turn it into an object that can be pointed to.

This is the everyday experience of "one cannot see the Tathāgata through marks." The thirty-two marks are like the face, voice, and deeds — real, but not the Tathāgata. The Tathāgata is like love — you cannot identify it with any nameable feature, yet it is more fundamental, more real than all those features combined.

And you would never conclude that "because I cannot point to where love is, love does not exist." Likewise, you should not conclude that "because I cannot point to the dharma-body, the dharma-body is empty nothingness."

IV. Cross-Disciplinary Dialogue

4.1 Kant's Phenomenon and Thing-in-Itself ⚠️

Immanuel Kant distinguished between the phenomenon (Phänomenon) and the thing-in-itself (Ding an sich). We can only cognize phenomena — experiential objects constituted through sensory intuition and the categories of the understanding — while the thing-in-itself remains unknowable.

On the surface, the Diamond Sūtra's "one cannot see the Tathāgata through marks" resembles Kant's framework: thirty-two marks = phenomena (what we can perceive); dharma-body = thing-in-itself (unknowable noumenon). But the analogy breaks at a critical point.

Kant's thing-in-itself is unknowable — it lies permanently beyond the limits of human cognitive capacity. The dharma-body, however, is not unknowable — it simply cannot be known through "seeing marks." Prajñā realization is an entirely different cognitive mode that transcends the categories of sensibility and understanding, yet it constitutes genuine knowledge. Upon completion of the turning of the basis, the dharma-body is directly realized.

In other words, Kant draws an impassable line across epistemology — humans remain permanently on the phenomena side. Buddhism draws no such line. Buddhism's claim is that the two sides (dependent nature and perfected nature) were never two separate worlds to begin with — the perfected nature is not external to the dependent nature but is its true face. You do not need to "cross over" — you need prajñā.

⚠️ This analogy takes only the formal structure of "the noumenon cannot be known through ordinary cognition" and does not posit ontological equivalence between Buddhist philosophy and Kant's critical philosophy. Buddhism does not accept an unknowable thing-in-itself — the Tathāgata can be realized through prajñā; it simply cannot be "seen" through sensation and inference.

4.2 Gestalt Perception Psychology ⚠️

Gestalt psychology's core thesis holds that the whole is not the sum of its parts. When you see a face, you do not see "one nose plus two eyes plus one mouth" added together — you perceive "this face," an irreducible gestalt.

"One cannot see the Tathāgata through marks" can be read through the Gestalt lens as: you cannot accumulate thirty-two discrete features and synthesize them into "the Tathāgata." Even if you catalogued every one of the thirty-two marks, the sum would not equal "the Tathāgata" — just as "this face" is not the sum of its features.

But the Gestalt's "irreducible whole" still operates at the level of perception — you are still "seeing" a holistic object. "Seeing the Tathāgata" transcends perception altogether. Gestalt psychology tells you the whole exceeds the sum of parts; Buddhist teaching tells you the Tathāgata is on neither side of the whole/part distinction — it transcends the distinction itself.

⚠️ This analogy takes the structural insight that "the whole is not the sum of parts" and does not claim that Gestalt perceptual theory can account for prajñā realization. Prajñā realization is not a higher-order Gestalt percept but a fundamentally different cognitive mode that transcends the subject–object polarity.

V. Middle Way Corrections

❌ Misreading 1: "One cannot see the Tathāgata through marks" = The Tathāgata does not exist

§26 negates seeing the Tathāgata through marks. Pushed to an extreme, the inference "the Tathāgata has no marks, therefore the Tathāgata does not exist" collapses into nihilism.

The dharma-body is not "nothing." The Cheng weishi lun is explicit: the dharma-body has "the five dharmas as its nature," containing the four wisdoms and the pure dharma-realm with their boundless merits. The uncontaminated realm is defined as a "treasury" — "containing boundless, rare, great merits." The dharma-body's being "unspeakable as form, mind, or any such thing" does not negate its existence; it specifies that the dharma-body does not operate within the cognitive categories of form and mind.

The Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra's description particularly guards against this error: the dharma-body "can emit the great light of wisdom and produce various transformation-body reflections." It is not a functionless void but the source of all transformation-bodies. That source simply does not exist in the mode of marks.

❌ Misreading 2: The thirty-two marks are entirely meaningless

If the Tathāgata cannot be seen through marks, are the thirty-two marks superfluous?

No. The thirty-two marks are the expedient means of the transformation-body (nirmāṇakāya) for teaching sentient beings. The Cheng weishi lun defines the transformation-body as "various bodies manifested by accomplishing-wisdom according to type." The thirty-two marks serve a pedagogical function — they are the proper use of the dependent nature.

The problem is not that marks exist, but that marks are mistaken for the dharma-body. As in the raft analogy (S5-P04): you cannot say the raft is meaningless because "one must abandon the raft upon reaching the other shore." But neither can you mistake the raft for the shore. The thirty-two marks are the raft; the dharma-body is the shore.

Distinguish the three bodies: the dharma-body is invisible; the enjoyment-body is visible in pure Buddha-lands; the transformation-body's form-marks are visible to all. "One cannot see the Tathāgata through marks" targets the dharma-body — the transformation-body's marks continue to function, and their pedagogical efficacy is undiminished.

❌ Misreading 3: "I have seen the dharma-body" can be verified

If someone claims "I have already seen the dharma-body," can you verify it?

Not through third-party observation. The dharma-body is not an object that can be pointed to. Prajñā is self-awareness (svasaṃvedana) — you yourself know that the turning of the basis has occurred, but you cannot display the dharma-body to another person like an object.

This does not mean there are no criteria. Practice proceeds through stages — depths of meditative concentration, degrees of obstruction eliminated, capacity for benefiting beings — these serve as indirect indicators. You cannot directly verify "that person has seen the dharma-body," but you can assess the degree of their practice through their meditative attainment, compassionate conduct, and manifest wisdom.

❌ Misreading 4: Turning the dharma-body into another kind of "mark"

"The dharma-body has the five dharmas as its nature" → "Now I know what the dharma-body is" → You have just manufactured a conceptual mark of the dharma-body.

This is dharma-attachment upgraded. You have deconstructed form-body marks, only to construct a "dharma-body mark" in your mind — a concept about the dharma-body. P07's "self-replay" architecture applies directly here: the sūtra's teaching gets re-encoded by your very understanding into another layer of attachment. You understand "one cannot see the Tathāgata through marks," and then you turn that understanding into a new mark — "the mark of not-seeing-the-Tathāgata-through-marks."

The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra's warning is especially relevant: "tathāgatagarbha is not the same as what non-Buddhists call 'self.'" If you understand the dharma-body as an eternal noumenon transcending the form-body — a "true Buddha" that can be conceptually grasped — you have turned tathāgatagarbha into the non-Buddhists' "self." The dharma-body is not another kind of object-to-be-marked — it is the true nature of all marks, and the true nature cannot be extracted as a standalone thing.

S5-P02's kōan-mirror poses the sharpest question here: when you read "one cannot see the Tathāgata through marks," what arises in your mind? If what arises is "a Tathāgata that cannot be seen through marks" — you are constructing marks again. The Diamond Sūtra is always one step ahead of your understanding.

VI. Conclusion

The Diamond Sūtra asks four times whether the Tathāgata can be seen through marks — from "doubting the cause upon seeing the fruit" to "seeking the real through the provisional" — each time deepening the negation. §26's reductio delivers the most thorough of these: even the thirty-two marks — generally regarded as the Buddha's most distinguished form-merit — cannot serve as a basis for seeing the Tathāgata. Because wheel-turning sage kings have them too.

But this is not nihilism. "If one sees that all marks are non-marks, then one sees the Tathāgata." To see, within all marks, that marks are not inherently real — that is seeing the Tathāgata. The dharma-body is not the opposite of marks (that would be nihilism) but the true face of marks — the perfected nature. You do not need to find a "place without marks" to see the Tathāgata. You need prajñā — and within the place where marks appear, you see suchness.

Kuiji's mirror analogy captures this best: there are reflections in the mirror, but it is not only where reflections are absent that the mirror exists — where reflections appear, too, that is the mirror. You do not need to annihilate the thirty-two marks to see the dharma-body. You need to stop mistaking the reflection for the mirror itself.

This paper and S5-P03 form a deconstruction–reconstruction pair: P03's "all marks are illusory" is the deconstruction — marks cannot be clung to. P08's "if one sees non-marks, one sees the Tathāgata" is the reconstruction — after marks are deconstructed, what you see is not nothingness, but the Tathāgata.

The next paper, S5-P09, enters the Diamond Sūtra's final conclusion: the six similes of §32 — "all conditioned phenomena are like dreams, illusions, bubbles, shadows, like dew and like lightning — one should observe them thus." From negating a particular set of marks (P08) to negating the inherent reality of all conditioned phenomena (P09). P08 says you cannot see the Tathāgata through the thirty-two marks; P09 says you cannot see any ultimate reality through any conditioned phenomenon. That is the entire series' final arena for Middle Way correction — "like an illusion" does not mean "nonexistent."

References

I. Primary Buddhist Sources

1. Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra (金剛般若波羅蜜經), trans. Kumārajīva, Taishō Tripiṭaka vol. 8, No. 235.
2. Śūraṅgama Sūtra (大佛頂如來密因修證了義諸菩薩萬行首楞嚴經), trans. Pramiti, Taishō vol. 19, No. 945《大佛頂首楞嚴經》Śūraṅgama-sūtra (Chinese)T19, No. 945View on CBETA online reader ↗.
3. Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra (維摩詰所說經), trans. Kumārajīva, Taishō vol. 14, No. 475《維摩詰所說經》Vimalakīrti-nirdeśaT14, No. 475View on CBETA online reader ↗.
4. Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra (說無垢稱經), trans. Xuanzang, Taishō vol. 14, No. 476《說無垢稱經》(玄奘譯)Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa (Xuanzang tr.)T14, No. 476View on CBETA online reader ↗.
5. Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra (楞伽阿跋多羅寶經), trans. Guṇabhadra, Taishō vol. 16, No. 670《楞伽阿跋多羅寶經》(四卷楞伽)Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra (4-fascicle)T16, No. 670View on CBETA online reader ↗.
6. Cheng weishi lun (成唯識論), composed by Dharmapāla et al., trans. Xuanzang, Taishō vol. 31, No. 1585《成唯識論》Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi-śāstraT31, No. 1585View on CBETA online reader ↗.
7. Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra (解深密經), trans. Xuanzang, Taishō vol. 16, No. 676《解深密經》Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtraT16, No. 676View on CBETA online reader ↗.
8. Kuiji, Jīngāng bōrě bōluómì jīng zànshù (金剛般若波羅蜜經讚述), Taishō vol. 33, No. 1700《金剛般若經贊述》T33, No. 1700View on CBETA online reader ↗.
9. Vasubandhu, Vajracchedikā-prajñāpāramitā-śāstra (金剛般若波羅蜜經論), trans. Bodhiruci, Taishō vol. 25, No. 1511《金剛般若波羅蜜經論》(世親)Vajracchedikā-prajñāpāramitā-śāstra (Vasubandhu)T25, No. 1511View on CBETA online reader ↗.

II. Modern Scholarship

(No modern scholarship is cited in this paper. Cross-disciplinary references to Kant and Gestalt psychology are general-knowledge heuristic parallels and do not constitute core evidence for this paper's arguments.)

Sūtra & Śāstra Index

Cross-Reference Index

Footnotes

Pointing at the Moon · S5-P08 · One Cannot See the Tathāgata Through Marks · Version 1.0 · 2026 The true nature of all dharmas — just as it is.

All sūtra and śāstra quotations in this study have been verified against the CBETA Chinese Electronic Tripiṭaka Collection.

This research paper is released under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0.

Source repository: https://github.com/pointing-at-the-moon/dharma-research