俱舍論 義疏通講 · 冊8Abhidharmakośabhāṣya · Exposition Throughout · Vol. 8
諸定·功德·正法住世The Absorptions · The Merits · The Abiding of the True Dharma in the World
全文五層 →Full five layers →讀這一品之前
這是《俱舍論》的最後一品(破執我品是附論,不在八品之內)。三十卷走到這裡,論主要交代的是全書最後一塊拼圖:前面賢聖品講果、智品講因,這一品講緣——證果之智所依止的那個「定」。古德把三品的關係說得很清楚,光記釋此云「賢聖品明果,智品明因,定品明緣。緣望果疎,故次明定也」;寶疏則換一個角度說「前明智品能依定果,此明定品智所依因」。二家取角不同而方向一致:智不是憑空生的,它站在定上。
品的骨架分四段。前兩段講定本身——所依諸定(四靜慮、四無色、八等至的三分與諸門、三種等持)與能依功德(四無量、八解脫、八勝處、十遍處,以及這些功德由何而得、依何身起)。第三段忽然轉身,問「何謂正法?當住幾時?」。第四段是論主自陳造論宗旨,再以三首七言傷歎、一首七言勸學,闔上全書。
有一件事要先說在前頭。這一品讀起來像一張定學的清單,法數密得驚人:四、四、八、十八支、十一實事、四分、八解脫、八勝處、十遍處……但真正承重的不是清單,而是反覆出現的一個追問——這一法憑什麼算作『一件事』。十八支為什麼只有十一件實事?內等淨為什麼就是信根?初二靜慮的樂為什麼是輕安而不是樂受?八勝處和三解脫看起來重疊,分界在哪裡?整品最密集的兩段長行,做的都是這件事。清單只是外殼,『立法的分寸』才是骨頭。
一、所依諸定
〔一之一〕靜慮四層,每層各有二種
先問:講「定」為什麼從「靜慮」講起,不從無色講起?論給的理由極簡——「一切功德多依靜慮,故應先辯靜慮差別」。功德多半掛在靜慮上,所以先立這一支。
靜慮總有四層,每層各分二種:定靜慮(修所成的那一種)與生靜慮(生在那一地的果報)。生的那一種論主一句話帶過——「生靜慮體世品已說,謂第四八,前三各三」,因為世間品早已排過那十七處的地圖。這一品要講的是定的那一種。
定靜慮的體是什麼?「總而言之是善性攝心一境性,以善等持為自性故;若并助伴,五蘊為性」。這一句要拆成三層讀:其一,它是善性——染污的定不是這裡所立的體;其二,它是心一境性——不是別的什麼,就是心專注在一個所緣上這件事;其三,若把伴隨它一起現行的心心所都算進來,那就是五蘊。
易誤處:把「五蘊為性」和「心一境性」讀成兩個相衝的答案。它們回答的是兩個問題——狹義問『定這件事本身是什麼』,答心一境性;廣義問『一次入定時現起的是哪些法』,答五蘊。毘曇立體常有這種寬狹二說,讀時先確認問的是哪一問。
落地上:日常說『我入定了』,其實含混。這裡給了驗算法——先問你所說的是「善性」的嗎,再問你的心是不是真的專在一個所緣上,最後才談那一次現起的全部身心狀態。三層不可互推。
〔一之二〕四層怎麼分——不是四種東西,是一件事被撤了三次支
先問:既然體只有一個「一境性」,四層的界從哪裡來?論答得極漂亮——「具伺喜樂建立為初」,此後「漸離前支立二三四」:撤掉伺剩下二,再撤掉喜剩下樂,三者都撤便是第四。「如其次第,故一境性分為四種」。
這裡還藏著一句話要留意:論說「具伺喜樂」而沒有說尋,卻立刻補一句「由此已明亦具尋義,必俱行故,如煙與火」——尋伺必定同行,就像煙與火,說了伺就等於說了尋。所以初靜慮實有五支而頌只舉三。
易誤處:以為四靜慮是四樣不同的定。不是。是同一件事(心一境性)在支的加減上顯出的四個階段。這個讀法一立,後面所有的表都跟著鬆動起來——支表、受表、識表、解脫所依表,全是同一條軸上的刻度。
落地上:修行上這意味著『進階』不是換一個法,是放掉。從初到四,動作一律是減,不是加。
〔一之三〕「靜慮」二字的訓,與它憑什麼獨佔這個名
論自問「依何義故立靜慮名」,自答「由此寂靜能審慮故」。再訓「審慮」——「審慮即是實了知義,如說心在定,能如實了知」;並點明本宗的立場「此宗審慮以慧為體」。
先問:既然如此,一切等持都能叫靜慮了?論答「不爾,唯勝方立此名」,並舉一個極生活的譬喻——「如世間言發光名日,非螢燭等亦得日名」。會發光的東西很多,但只有太陽叫日。
再問:靜慮憑什麼稱勝?論給三條——「諸等持內唯此攝支」(唯有它有支的建制)、「止觀均行最能審慮」(止與觀均等)、「得現法樂住及樂通行名」(有現世安樂與順暢之行的功用)。
再問:那染污的靜慮憑什麼也叫靜慮?論答「由彼亦能邪審慮故」。追問「是則應有太過之失」,論答「要相似中方立名故,如敗種等」,並引世尊自說「有惡靜慮」為證。
易誤處:把「敗種」讀成貶詞。它是立名的分寸——壞掉的種子仍叫種子,因為它在「種子」這個相似範圍內;不相似的東西才不能借名。這一條在毘曇裡是通用的立名規矩。
〔一之四〕定是不是就是心——本品第一段對辯
論在定義句下立刻遇到一個逼問。有人說:既然心專注一境的那個狀態就可以安立「三摩地」之名,何必另立一個心所?論主答「別法令心於一境轉名三摩地,非體即心」。對方再逼:心本來剎那剎那滅,每個心都在一個境上轉,還要等持做什麼?論主用兩層拆它——你若說『要令心第二念不散亂才需等持』,那對於同時相應的那個等持它就無用了;你若說「又由此故三摩地成」,那何不直接說由心自己在一境上轉?對方再舉「三摩地是大地法,應一切心皆一境轉」,論主答「不爾,餘品等持劣故」。
論在此錄一家之說——「有餘師說:即心一境相續轉時名三摩地,契經說此為增上心學故,心清淨最勝即四靜慮故」。這一家的身分,古德有標:光記於此段標其為經部之義,逐字作「有餘經部師說:即心一境前後相續轉時名三摩地,離心之外無別有體」;而論中的那段破辭,光記標為論主牒有部『三摩地是心所法、離心別有』之義而設破。光記於此段未見結語——本節據實記,不代為收束。
易誤處:以為論主既然設破就已判定。論在這一段的最後並沒有下結案語,古德的科文也沒有。唯錄二造,不判勝負。
落地上:這場諍的實際分歧只有一句話——「專注」是心自己的一個樣子,還是另有一個法在使心專注。你若採前說,修定就是調心;你若採後說,修定就是培養一個別的力量。二說各有其修學上的落點,論不代讀者選。
〔一之五〕四無色——與靜慮同數同性,而助伴除色
先問:無色為什麼可以「亦如是」一句帶過?因為「此與靜慮數自性同,謂四各二」——同樣四層、同樣分定生二種,體同樣是善性所攝的心一境性。所以頌只說「無色亦如是」。
差別只有一處:「然助伴中此除色蘊,無色無有隨轉色故」。廣義的體從五蘊減為四蘊,因為那裡沒有隨心而轉的色。頌文「四蘊」二字即指此。
四層怎麼分?「雖一境性體相無差,離下地生故分四種」——由「離下地」而分。論隨手訓「離」字:「謂由此道解脫下地惑,是離下染義」。
易誤處:把四無色讀成四個「地方」。它們的分界不在方所,在離——離第四靜慮而立空無邊處,一直到離無所有處而立非想非非想處。
又一處要留意:「即此四根本并上三近分,總說名為除去色想」——除色想這個總名,收四根本與上三近分,唯獨空無邊處的近分不收,理由是「緣下地色起色想故」。它還在回頭看色,所以不入這個名。這是本品『立名須看它實際緣什麼』的又一例。
〔一之六〕無色界到底有沒有色——本品最長的一場逼問
這是繫於四無色之下的第一段長行專段(逾一千一百字),論主用了整段來拆一個主張。
先看立名的第一輪。有人說「皆無色故立無色名」,論主指出「此因不成,許有色故」——你這個理由不成立,因為對方本來就主張那裡有色。那麼名從何立?論主改立一個更謹慎的說法:「由彼色微故名無色,如微黃物亦名無黃。」極淡的黃仍可稱無黃,這是就相說名而非就有無說名。
接著是逐層逼問。若那裡只有身語律儀色——「身語既無,律儀寧有」;何況「又無大種,何有造色」。若比作無漏律儀——「不爾,無漏依有漏大種故」。若許有色根身——那「如何可言彼色微少」。若說身量小——「水細蟲極微亦應名無色」。若說身極清妙——「中有色界應名無色」。若說要清妙到極點——「應唯有頂得無色名」。每一步都是把對方的判準拿過來,推到它自己不能接受的地方。
再看教證的往復。對方引四段經:壽煖合、名色與識如二蘆束相依、名色以識為緣、遮離色乃至離行有識來去。論主不逐條駁,而是先立一條讀經的規矩——「此證不成,應審思故」,然後對四段各追一句「為約一切界、為約欲界說」。對方若說『經無簡別,不應審思』,論主便以太過之失回敬:那外面的煖也該與壽合、色無色界也該有段食了。
論主自己引的三段經才是正面立證:「無色解脫最為寂靜,超諸色故」、「無色有情,一切色想皆超越故」,以及靜慮說色類而無色不說色類。並且回頭堵住一條退路——若說「超色想」只是觀待下地粗色而說,那麼「諸靜慮超下麁色,亦應可說出離色言」,那靜慮也該叫無色界了;照樣還該說「出離受等」。經既不這樣說,可見無色是遍超色這一類,不是超受等。「由此定知,彼界無色。」
易誤處:把這一段讀成一場勝負。它其實示範了一套方法:對方的理由先問『這條理由對你自己成不成立』,對方的經證先問『這段經說的範圍到哪裡』,自己的結論則要能擋住『照這樣豈不是一切都成無色』的反推。
還有一個尾巴:無色界多劫色斷,死後生下界,色從哪來?論答「此從心生,非從色起」——昔日所起色的異熟因熏習在心,功能今熟。反問「彼無色身心依何轉」,論主把問題退回去:「離身何不轉?下曾不見故。」你說不行,只是因為你在下地沒見過;同理色界無段食而身能轉,你也沒見過。
〔一之七〕四個無色的名字為什麼這樣取
先問:空無邊等三名,是從所緣的空、識、無所有得的嗎?論答「不爾」——是「修加行時,思無邊空及無邊識、無所有故建立三名」。名從加行時所思而立,不是從果位所緣而立。
第四層則換一套立名法:「立第四名由想昧劣,謂無明勝想得非想名,有昧劣想故名非非想。」
這裡有一個極精細的分寸。論承認修加行時也會作這樣的念——「諸想如病如箭如癰。若想全無便同癡闇,唯有非想非非想中與上相違寂靜美妙」;但立名不就這個加行來立。理由是:若追問「何緣加行作如是念」,答案必定是「以於彼處想昧劣故」。所以昧劣才是那個正因,加行之念只是它的表現。
落地上:這是立名學上的一條通則——取因不取緣。同一個名可以從好幾處說起,論要的是最後那個不能再往回推的理由。
〔一之八〕八等至的三分——味、淨、無漏
四靜慮加四無色,「根本等至總有八種」。論在這裡下了本品最重要的一把尺:每一個等至都要再問一次它是哪一類。「於中前七各具有三,有頂等至唯有二種,此地昧劣無無漏故。」
三類的訓極簡潔。味——「謂愛相應,愛能味著故名為味,彼相應故此得味名」。淨——「名目世善定,與無貪等諸白淨法相應起故」。無漏——「謂出世定,愛不緣故非所味著」。
最精彩的是味與淨的關係:「即味相應所味著境,此無間滅彼味定生。緣過去淨深生味著,爾時雖名出所味定,於能味定得名為入。」味定所味著的,正是剛剛滅去的那個淨定。所以入了味定的人,就出定言是出了淨定,就入定言是入了味定——同一剎那,兩個說法都對。
易誤處:把「味」當成一般的貪。它是很特定的一件事——貪著自己剛得到的那一分定。修得越好越容易發生,這是它被單獨立為一類的理由。
落地上:這一分尺是全品後面所有門的前提。往下講初得、相生、斷惑、緣境,每一門都要先問『你說的是味、淨,還是無漏』。答案不同,結論完全不同。
〔一之九〕四靜慮的十八支
支的清單本身不難:初五支「一尋、二伺、三喜、四樂、五等持」;第二四支「一內等淨、二喜、三樂、四等持」;第三五支「一行捨、二正念、三正慧、四受樂、五等持」;第四四支「一行捨清淨、二念清淨、三非苦樂受、四等持」。
要注意的是兩個小注。其一,「等持與定名異體同,故契經說心定等定名正等持」——頌裡的「定」就是等持,不是兩件事。其二,論錄一個相傳之說「唯定是靜慮亦靜慮支,餘四支是靜慮支非靜慮」,隨即以如實義糾之——「如四支軍,餘靜慮支應知亦爾」。象兵、馬兵各自也叫軍;同樣,其餘的支自身也就是靜慮。
易誤處:把「支」當成靜慮的零件而不是靜慮本身。四支軍之喻正是要拆掉這個直覺。
〔一之十〕十八支只有十一件實事——本品第二段長行專段
這是全品最密的一段(逾一千一百九十字)。先問:十八個名目,實際上是幾件事?論算得極乾脆:初五支即五實事;第二增內淨為六;第三增行捨、正念、正慧、受樂為十;第四增非苦樂為十一。並附四句分別作驗算——第一句尋伺、第二句內淨、第三句喜樂等持、第四句除前餘法。
真正吃力的是兩個「同名異體」的問題。
第一個:初二靜慮的「樂」是什麼。論斷「由初二樂,輕安攝故」——初二定的樂不是樂受,是輕安。理證有三層:初二定中沒有樂根;沒有身受樂(定中無五識);沒有心受樂(已說有喜,而一心不能二受俱行)。也不能說喜樂交替現前,因為經明說初具五支、第二具四支,是同時具。
這裡引出本品第二段對辯。論錄「有說:無有心受樂根,三靜慮中說樂支者,皆是身受所攝樂根」。古德於此段標二造之名——光記逐字作「為有何德者,經部師通。有餘說一切有部師,於此經中增益心言,諸部經中唯說身故」,往下並以「經部師言……」「有部師言……」前後對舉的句式,錄二造往復:經部設通、有部反詰「說意名身,為有何功德」、經部復以第四定輕安倍增而不立樂支為難、二造再就內等淨得名之由往復。光記全程未見『論主判云』『今謂應言』一類的收束定讞語——本節據實記為『唯錄二造往復』,不代下判斷。
這一路所引的一經倒是清楚(光記把這一引繫在經部師名下,眾賢則當作論主自引——兩說並錄):「一歡、二喜、三輕安、四樂、五三摩地」——「此經輕安與樂別說,故初二樂非即輕安」。二造在此正面相反,經證各執一端。
順著這場諍,論還處理了一串連帶問題:定中若有身識,是否失壞定(答:輕安風從勝定生,還能順起三摩地);起身識是否名出定(答:由前因故,難不成立);無漏定中的觸與身識是否成無漏(答:起不俱時,斯有何失)。每一問都不離『同一段話裡的支,其漏無漏可否參差』這個核心。
第二個:內等淨是什麼。論先給描述——「此定遠離尋伺鼓動,相續清淨轉」,並以「如河有浪」狀其反面。但描述不足以立實事,所以有人難:「若爾,此應無有別體,如何許有十一實事?」論主於是把它落到一個已有的法上——「是故應說此即信根」,並逐字訓三個字:「信是淨相,故立淨名。離外均流,故名內等。淨而內等,故立內等淨名。」
論又錄一家「此內等淨等持尋伺皆無別體」,並記其自救「心分位殊亦得名心所」;論主答「雖有此理,非我所宗」。
至於「喜即喜受」,論以兩部阿笈摩作證——「漸無餘滅憂等五根,第三定中無餘滅喜,於第四定無餘滅樂」,以及「第四靜慮斷樂斷苦先喜憂沒」。既然第三定滅喜、第四定滅樂,可見喜與樂各是一受,「故第三定必無喜根,由此喜受是喜非樂」。
落地上:這一整段給的是一條可以帶走的規矩——同一個名出現在兩處,先問它在兩處是不是同一件事。初二定的「樂」與第三定的「樂」名同體異;「喜」與「樂」名異體亦異。毘曇的實事表就是這樣一次次數出來的。
〔一之十一〕染污靜慮缺哪些支
先問:靜慮支在染污的靜慮中是不是照樣具足?論答「不爾」,並錄兩家。
一家「隨相說言」:初染無「離生喜樂」,因為「非離煩惱而得生故」;第二染無「內等淨」,「彼為煩惱所擾濁故」;第三染無「正念慧」,「彼為染樂所迷亂故」;第四染無「捨念淨」,「彼為煩惱所染污故」。這一家的理由是逐支就其名義說——支名裡帶著「離生」「淨」「正」,染心當然配不上。
另一家說:「初二染中但無輕安,後二染中但無行捨,大善攝故。」這一家的理由是就法的類別說——輕安與行捨是大善地法,染心中必無。
易誤處:以為二家在爭對錯。二家的差別在判準:前者依支名之義,後者依法之善性所攝。並錄不判。
落地上:染污的定是真的定(所以仍有支的建制),只是缺了那幾支。這一條對修行者的用處是——定境現前時不要只驗『有沒有定』,要驗『那幾支在不在』。
〔一之十二〕第四靜慮為什麼叫「不動」
先問:經說三定有動、第四不動,依什麼義說?論答:「下三靜慮名有動者,有災患故。第四靜慮名不動者,無災患故。」災患有八——「尋、伺、四受、入息、出息」。
這裡有一處經與論的數目不合:經只說四(「第四靜慮不為尋伺喜樂所動」),論說八。光記於此給二解——一是「然契經中密作是說……但約支說,不言非支」,二是「經非盡理,論盡理說。故」。頌疏則不設會通,逕把八名逐一開列:「災患有八,所謂尋、伺、憂、苦、喜、樂、出息、入息」——由此可知頌中的「四受」即憂苦喜樂。
論末並錄一喻:「有餘師說:第四靜慮如密室燈照而無動。」
易誤處:把「不動」讀成心一動不動的靜止。它是清單式的定義——那八樣東西一樣都沒有,才叫不動。定義給得這麼具體,正是為了不讓「不動」變成一種感覺。
〔一之十三〕生在靜慮地的受
定靜慮與生靜慮不可互推,這是論在此立的一條分界。「生靜慮中初有三受」——喜受與意識相應、樂受與三識相應、捨受與四識相應;第二有喜與捨,「無有樂受,無餘識故、心悅麁故」;第三有樂與捨;第四唯有捨受。
先問:第二靜慮為什麼沒有樂受?論給兩個理由並列——沒有其餘的識(所以沒有身受樂),而心的喜悅還粗(所以那一分算在喜裡)。
易誤處:拿定靜慮的支表去套生靜慮的受表。二表的問題不同:支表問『這一層有哪幾支』,受表問『生在這一層會現起哪幾受』。論特意在此設問「所有諸受生亦爾不」並答「不爾」,就是為了防這個混。
〔一之十四〕生在上三靜慮怎麼見聞觸與說話
先問:上三靜慮沒有三識身、也沒有尋伺,生在那裡的天人怎麼看得見、聽得到、說得出話?
論的答法極漂亮——不是沒有識,是那些識不屬於那一地。「非生彼地無眼識等,但非彼繫」;「生上三地起三識身及發表心皆初定繫」。就像生在上地而起下地的變化心一樣,「生上起下如起化心」。
這些借來的識是什麼性質?「此四唯是無覆無記。」為什麼不是染、不是善?「不起下染,已離染故。不起下善,以下劣故。」上不去也下不來,只剩中間那一格。
易誤處:把「借識」讀成上地有眼識。它是繫屬的問題,不是有無的問題。
落地上:這一條是本品『名與繫屬要分開問』的最清楚一例——同一個眼識,問『有沒有』與問『屬哪一地』是兩個問題。
〔一之十五〕淨定與無漏最初怎麼得
從這裡起,論一連開了十門來分別八等至。第一門是初得。
規矩是三條:淨定「由離染及由受生」而得;無漏「但由離染故得」;染污「由受生及退故得」。有頂是唯一的例外——「唯由離染無由生故」,因為上面沒有地可以生下來了。
為什麼頌要說「全不成」三字?論自己解釋:「為遮已成更得少分」——已經成就而再得一部分的情形(由加行得順決擇分、由退得順退分)不在此列。
論還示範了一次驗算:以初靜慮順退分為例,「離欲染時得,離自染時捨,退離自染得,退離欲染捨。從上生自得,從自生下捨」——同一個定,在六種時機下有得有捨。
易誤處:以為「入正性離生」時就初得無漏等至。論明說「此非決定。以次第者,爾時未得根本定故」。
落地上:這一門教的是問句要問全——問『什麼時候得到』,還要同時問『什麼時候捨掉』,一得一捨配成對,那個法在相續中的位置才算定住。
〔一之十六〕一個等至之後能生幾個
第二門是相生。骨架只有幾句:無漏之後生自地上下的善(善兼攝淨與無漏),「然於上下各至第三,遠故無能超生第四」;淨之後也一樣,再兼生自地的染;染之後生自地的淨染,並生次下一地的淨。
數目由這幾條推出來——初靜慮無間生六、無所有處生七、第二靜慮生八、識無邊處生九、第三與四空生十;淨定則各再加自地染而成六、七、八、九、十、十一。
最有意思的是從染生下地淨這一條。有人難:染污法不能正確了知,怎麼能從染生淨?論主答「先願力故」——「寧得下淨不須上染」的願先立在那裡,「先願勢力隨相續轉」。並舉一喻:「如先立願方趣睡眠,至所期時便能覺寤。」
易誤處:把「先願」當成臨時的作意。它是已經立過而還在相續中運作的力量,正因為當下的染心不能了知,才必須靠先前立下的願。
又一分界:以上都是就「在定中」說的;若是受生時則不同——「命終時從生得淨,一一無間生一切染」。論特意把在定與命終分開,是因為二處的規矩不一樣。
〔一之十七〕淨定的四分
第三門是淨四分。淨定總有四種——順退分、順住分、順勝進分、順決擇分。「地各有四,有頂唯三」,因為有頂之上無地可趣,沒有順勝進分。
四者的相狀由所順而定:「順退分能順煩惱,順住分能順自地,順勝進分能順上地,順決擇分能順無漏」。所以能生無漏的只有第四分。
互生的數目是二、三、三、一:「初能生二,謂順退住。第二生三,除順決擇。第三生三,除順退分。第四生一,謂自非餘。」
易誤處:把四分讀成四種修法。它們是同一個淨定的四個走向——同樣在定中,你的相續實際順著什麼走,就是哪一分。
落地上:這一門把『定修得好不好』換成了一個更準的問題——你的定在往哪邊順。順煩惱的定也是淨定,但它是順退分。
〔一之十八〕超越等至
第四門是超等至。論先立六個字的座標:「往上名順,還下名逆。同類名均,異類名間。相隣名次,越一名超。」三對六字,構成一張可以組合的表。
修法是五步遞進:有漏八地順逆均次、無漏七地順逆均次、有漏無漏順逆間次、有漏順逆均超、無漏順逆均超——「是名修習超加行滿」。最後在有漏無漏上作順逆間超,才叫「超定成」。
限制有二。其一,「此中超者唯能超一,遠故無能超入第四」。其二,能修的人極少——「唯人三洲、不時解脫諸阿羅漢,定自在故、無煩惱故」;時解脫者「雖無煩惱定不自在」,見至者「雖定自在有餘煩惱」,二者各缺一項,都修不成。
易誤處:把「超」想成跳級。它是在已經全部熟練的八地之間任意換位的能力——先要能一級一級順逆走順了,才談得上越一。
〔一之十九〕諸等至依什麼身起
第五門是依身。通則一句:「諸等至起依自下身。」為什麼不依上地起下地?論一口氣給五個理由——「上地起下無所用故、自有勝定故、下勢力劣故、已棄捨故、可厭毀故」。
但通則有一個例外,論特意標明「總相雖然,若委細說」——聖者生在有頂必定要起無漏的無所有處定。理由是三層:為盡自地所餘煩惱;有頂自地沒有聖道可以欣樂而起;無所有處是最鄰近的。
易誤處:把這個例外讀成通則的破例。它其實是通則的應用——正因為『自地無用』,才不得不往最近的下地借一個聖道。
〔一之二十〕諸等至緣什麼境
第六門是緣境。味定的範圍最窄:「但緣自地有漏」,不緣下(已離染)、不緣上(愛地別)、不緣無漏(緣了就該成善了)。
淨與無漏最寬:「俱能遍緣自上下地有為無為」。但論隨即補一條差別——「無記無為非無漏境」,非擇滅是無記的無為,無漏定不緣它。
根本地所攝的善無色定另有一格:「不緣下地諸有漏法」,而自上地法無不能緣;它能緣下地的無漏,卻只緣類智品的道,不緣法智品,也不緣下地諸法之滅。至於無色的近分則反而緣下地,「彼無間道必緣下故」——要斷下地的惑,當然得緣下地。
易誤處:以為「無色定,不緣下」是一條通則。論在這裡把根本與近分分開了,方向恰好相反。根本地看不看下地,近分地非看不可。
〔一之二十一〕哪一種定能斷煩惱
第七門是斷惑。答案只有一句:「無漏能斷惑,及諸淨近分。」
有意思的是論證明『根本淨定不能斷』的方式——三面堵死:「不能斷下,已離染故。不能斷自,自所縛故。不能斷上,以勝己故。」下面的已經斷完了,自己的斷不了自己,上面的比自己強。三個方向都不通。
至於淨近分為什麼能斷?「以皆能斷次下地故」——近分定的職責本來就是離下地染。而中間定所攝的淨則不能斷。
落地上:這一門把一個常見的誤會扳正了——定越深越能斷煩惱,不成立。斷煩惱靠的是無漏慧,或者靠處在『正要往上跨一步』那個位置上的近分。已經安坐在根本定裡的淨定,反而是不斷惑的。
〔一之二十二〕近分定八種
先問:根本定有八個,那八個門在哪裡?第八門問的正是這個——近分。
論答得直截:「諸近分定亦有八種,與八根本為入門故。」數目上與根本一一相對。受上一律是捨,理由有二——「作功用轉故、未離下怖故」:還在用力,還怕著下地,喜樂安不上來。性上,八近分皆淨定所攝,「唯初近分亦通無漏」;三分之中則都沒有味,「離染道故」。論又補一句分寸:近分心也會有結生的染,但這裡是就『遮定的染』而說的。另錄一說:「未至定亦有味相應,未起根本亦貪此故,由此未至具有三種。」
易誤處:把近分看成根本定淺一級的同類。近分是門,不是屋——所以它的受唯捨而不通喜樂。也不可拿「近分心有結生染」倒推近分有味相應:論已自標所遮者是定染,二者所指不同。
落地上:這一門給出的分際是——八個門對八間屋,而只有第一個門(未至)在淨之外還通無漏,其餘七門唯淨。
〔一之二十二之附〕中間靜慮
第九門是中間靜慮。論先問它與近分有沒有差別,答「義亦有殊」——近分是為離下染、是入根本的因,中間定不是。再從支上定它的位置:「上七定中皆無尋伺,唯中靜慮有伺無尋,故彼勝初未及第二」——高於初定、不及第二定,所以叫中間。也因此「上無中間靜慮,一地升降無如此故」。
中間定具味淨無漏三種,「以有勝德可愛味故」;唯與捨相應,「非喜相應功用轉故」,並由此「說是苦通行攝」。它的果報是「能招大梵處果,多修習者為大梵故」。
易誤處:把中間靜慮當成第一與第二之間的一個「地」。它是同一初靜慮地內的一個殊勝分位(無尋唯伺),所以上面沒有相應的東西。
〔一之二十三〕三種等持——就尋伺分
先問:等至講完了,「等持」又是什麼?論引經立三種——有尋有伺、無尋唯伺、無尋無伺,並逐一定其所攝地:有尋有伺者「謂與尋伺相應等持,此初靜慮及未至攝」;無尋唯伺者「謂唯與伺相應等持,此即靜慮中間地攝」;無尋無伺者「謂非尋伺相應等持」,「此從第二靜慮近分乃至非想非非想攝」。
三句立法一致:先以尋伺定其相,再以相定其地;分界既全落在尋伺,便只有有二、唯一、俱無三段。
易誤處:把這三種和前面的八等至混作一表。這一組是就尋伺的有無橫切諸地,八等至是就地的高下縱列;一橫一縱,不是一回事。另一處易誤是把無尋無伺的起點放在第二靜慮根本——論明說界在其近分;而唯伺一段,只有中間靜慮一地當之。
落地上:同一個地在兩張表上各有位置——如未至,縱表上是初靜慮的門,橫表上是有尋有伺。問是什麼定看縱表,問尋伺還動不動,看這一張橫表。
〔一之二十四〕空·無願·無相
經另說三種等持,這一組是就所緣的行相分的。
空——「謂空、非我二種行相相應等持」。無相——「謂緣滅諦四種行相相應等持」;名字的由來論訓得極細:「涅槃離十相,故名無相」,十相是「色等五、男女二種、三有為相」。無願——「謂緣餘諦十種行相相應等持」,即除去空、非我之外的十種;為什麼叫無願?「非常苦因可厭患故,道如船筏必應捨故」——連道諦都在所捨之列。
這裡有一個極重要的不對稱:空與非我二相不入無願,論給的理由是「空非我相非所厭捨,以與涅槃相相似故」。厭與捨是對著要離開的東西說的,而空、非我這兩個相,本身就與涅槃之相相似,沒有要離開它的道理。
三者各通淨與無漏,「世間攝者通十一地,出世攝者唯通九地」;其中無漏的一分別得一名——「三解脫門,能與涅槃為入門故」。
落地上:這一組給的是觀什麼的三個入口。同樣是定,看的是空非我、還是看滅諦四相、還是看其餘十相,出來的名字就不同。定的深淺由前面的表管,定的方向由這一組管。
〔一之二十五〕重三等持——拿定當所緣
再一組更精細的:空空、無願無願、無相無相。「此三等持,緣前空等取空等相,故立空空等名」——它們的所緣不是諦,是前面那個定本身。
三者各取一相,取法都很講究。空空「緣前無學空三摩地取彼空相」,為什麼取空不取非我?「空相順厭勝非我故」。無願無願「取非常相」,為什麼不取苦、因?因為所緣是無漏道,那不是無漏之相;為什麼不取道等相?「為厭捨故」。無相無相「即緣無學無相三摩地非擇滅為境」,只取「靜」一相,不取滅、妙、離三相,理由三條——「濫非常滅故、是無記性故、非離繫果故」。
這三種唯是有漏。論給的理由極短也極重——「厭聖道故」。既然是厭著聖道而起的,就不可能是無漏。能起的人也窄:「唯三洲人不時解脫」;依十一地,「除七近分,謂欲未至八本中間」。
易誤處:以為「重」是更高的意思。它是再一次——把已經修成的無漏定拿來當所緣再觀一遍,所以反而落在有漏。層次上更後,性質上更低,這兩件事在此並不矛盾。
〔一之二十六〕四種修等持
最後一組是就目的分的四修:為得現法樂、為得勝知見、為得分別慧、為得諸漏永盡。
對應的修法是:修諸善靜慮(善通攝淨與無漏)、修淨天眼通、修三界諸加行善及無漏善、修金剛喻定。
論在此處理了兩次『經只說一個而理實通餘』。其一,經只說初靜慮得現法樂住,論說「舉初顯後,理實通餘」;並補一句為什麼不說「為住後法樂」——「以後法樂非定住故,謂或退墮、或上受生、或般涅槃便不住故」。其二,金剛喻定經只說第四靜慮,論說「理實修此通依諸地」,而經之所以只說第四,「傳說世尊依自說故」。
落地上:這一組是全段所依諸定的收尾,也是最貼近修行動機的一組——你為什麼修這個定。四個答案,四條路。至此定的那一邊講完了,下面轉入依定而起的功德。
二、能依功德
〔二之一〕四無量——本品第三段長行專段
卷二十九一開口就轉身:「如是已說所依止定,當辯依定所起功德。諸功德中先辯無量。」
先問:為什麼叫「無量」?論給三個理由——「無量有情為所緣故、引無量福故、感無量果故」。所緣無量、所引之福無量、所感之果無量。
再問:為什麼只有四種?「對治四種多行障故。」四障是「諸瞋害、不欣慰、欲貪、瞋」,慈治瞋、悲治害、喜治不欣慰、捨治欲貪與瞋。
體性要分寬狹兩層說。粗說「四中初二體是無瞋」;細說則「理實應言悲是不害,喜即喜受,捨即無貪」;若連眷屬一起算,「五蘊為體」。論還處理了一個小難:捨若以無貪為性,怎麼治瞋?答「此所治瞋,貪所引故」,並補「理實應用二法為體」。
行相是四句最好記的話:「云何當令諸有情類得如是樂」入慈,「離如是苦」入悲,「得樂離苦豈不快哉」入喜,「平等平等無有親怨」入捨。
是不是顛倒——這一問極要緊。四無量並不能真的令別人得樂,那豈不是顛倒?論給三條:只是「願欲令彼得樂」(不是判定他已得樂);「阿世耶無顛倒」(意樂本身不顛倒);「與勝解想相應起故」(本來就是勝解作意,不是決定認知)。再退一步:就算是顛倒,也不能說它非善(與善根相應)、不能說它引惡(能治瞋等)。
易誤處:以為修慈就是想像別人快樂,想像不真所以是妄。論的回答是:這一類作意的效力不在所緣真不真,在能對治什麼。
能不能斷惑——論說得很清楚:不能。理由三條——「有漏根本靜慮攝故、勝解作意相應起故、遍緣一切有情境故」。它能做的是「加行位制伏瞋等」,或「令已斷更遠」。真正斷惑要靠另一條路:在欲界未至地起相似的慈等,「由此制伏瞋等障已,引斷道生能斷諸惑」;惑斷之後在離染位中,才得根本的四種無量。到那個位次,「雖遇強緣,而非瞋等之所蔽伏」。
怎麼修慈——這是全論裡少見的、逐步可操作的一段。先思惟自己所受的樂,或聽聞佛菩薩聲聞獨覺所受快樂,發願「願諸有情一切等受如是快樂」。若煩惱增盛運不動心,就把有情分七品——親分上中下三、處中一、怨分下中上三。先對上親發真誠與樂勝解,次中親下親;三品親平等了,再依次處中、下怨、中怨、上怨;「由數習力能於上怨起與樂願與上親等」。既得無退,再把所緣漸漸放大——「一邑一國一方一切世界,與樂行相無不遍滿」,這才叫慈無量成。
論還附一句取向上的提醒:「若於有情樂求德者能修慈定令速疾成,非於有情樂求失者」——理由是連斷善根的人也有德可取、連麟喻獨覺也有失可挑,德與失都找得到,差別只在你習慣找哪一樣。
悲與喜比照可知;修捨則反過來——「最初從處中起」,漸次乃至能對上親起平等心而與處中相等。
依身與成就:「此四無量人起非餘,隨得一時必成三種。生第三定等,唯不成喜故。」
〔二之二〕八解脫
先問:解脫是哪八個?論列:內有色想觀外色、內無色想觀外色、淨解脫身作證具足住、四無色定為次四、滅受想定為第八。
體性:前三「無貪為性,近治貪故」;經中所以說「想」「觀」,是因為「想觀增故」。三者之中「初二不淨相轉,作青瘀等諸行相」,第三「清淨相轉,作淨光鮮行相」。連同助伴皆五蘊性。
所依:初二「一一通依初二靜慮」,因為要治欲界與初靜慮的顯色貪;第三「依後靜慮,離八災患心澄淨故」。其餘地也有相似的解脫而不建立,「非增上故」。
次四以四無色定的善為性——「非無記染,非解脫故。亦非散善,性微劣故」。論在此還分了近分與無間道:近分的解脫道也得解脫之名,無間道則不然,「以緣下故。彼要背下地,方名解脫故」。
第八就是滅盡定。它為什麼得解脫之名?「厭背受想而起此故,或總厭背有所緣故」;另有一說「由此解脫定障」。入它之前的心叫「微微」——「前對想心已名微細,此更微細故曰微微」。出定則「或起有頂淨定心,或即能起無所有處無漏心」;入心唯有漏,出則通有漏無漏。
所緣:前三唯以欲界色處為境,「二境可憎、一境可愛」;次四各以自上苦集滅諦、一切地類智品道、非擇滅與虛空為境。
論還答了兩個『為什麼不是』。第三靜慮為什麼沒有解脫?「第三定中無色貪故,自地妙樂所動亂故。」第三與第八為什麼獨說「身作證」?「以於八中此二勝故,於二界中各在邊故」——一個在色界之邊,一個在無色界之邊。
修淨解脫為的是什麼——論答得很體貼:「為欲令心暫欣悅故。前不淨觀令心沈慼,今修淨觀策發令欣。」還有一個驗收的用意:「為審知自堪能故」——若觀淨相而煩惱不起,前面的不淨解脫才算修成。
易誤處:把八解脫當成八個果位。它們是背捨的訓練,論明說修的兩個緣是「為諸惑已斷更遠」與「為於定得勝自在」。
〔二之三〕八勝處
八勝處的清單與八解脫高度重疊——前二如初解脫、次二如第二解脫、後四如第三解脫。所以論自己設問:「若爾,八勝處何殊三解脫?」
答案是全品最精練的一句對比:「前修解脫唯能棄背,後修勝處能制所緣,隨所樂觀惑終不起。」解脫只能背過去不看,勝處能面對著而制伏它——想怎麼觀就怎麼觀,煩惱始終不起。
易誤處:把「勝處」的勝讀成境界高。它指的是對所緣的支配力——同樣的青瘀、同樣的淨色,解脫位是躲,勝處位是能自在地看。
〔二之四〕十遍處
遍處有十——地、水、火、風、青、黃、赤、白,加空無邊處與識無邊處。名字的由來是「於一切處周遍觀察無有間隙,故名遍處」。
前八「如淨解脫」,自性皆無貪,并助伴五蘊為性,依第四靜慮,緣欲界可見色。論在此錄一異說:「有餘師說:唯風遍處緣所觸中風界為境」——因為風不是可見色,這一家把它單獨挑出來。後二「如次空識二淨無色為其自性,各緣自地四蘊為境」。
論末給了三門功德的次第:「從諸解脫入諸勝處,從諸勝處入諸遍處,以後後起勝前前故。」
落地上:三門連讀就是一條線——背捨、制伏、周遍。從躲開,到能面對,到能鋪滿一切處。這是本品把散列的功德串成次第的地方。
〔二之五〕三門功德由何而得·依何身起
得法:第八解脫如前已辯(即滅盡定);其餘「通由二得,謂由離染及加行得,以有曾習未曾習故」——曾修過的靠離染就自然得,沒修過的要靠加行。
依身:「四無色解脫、二無色遍處,一一通依三界身起,餘唯人起。」並補一句「由教力故,異生及聖皆能現起」——這些功德不是聖者專有,凡夫依教也能起。
易誤處:把「二得」看成兩條並行的路。它是同一功德在兩種人身上的兩種得法,分野在於此生之前修過沒有。
〔二之六〕生在上二界的人由什麼緣起定
最後一門問的是起定之緣。論給三緣:因力(「先時近及數修為起因故」)、業力(先造感上地生的順後受業,異熟將起而勢力引定)、法爾力(「器世界將欲壞時,下地有情法爾能起上地靜慮」,因為那時一切善法由法爾力增盛)。
三緣的分配很細:生在上二界起無色定的,「由因業力,非法爾力」,理由是「無雲等天不為三災之所壞故」——法爾力是三災壞劫時的事,壞不到的地方就用不上。生在色界起靜慮的,則三緣俱有。至於生欲界而起上定,「一一應知皆由教力」。
落地上:這一門把『為什麼有人突然入得了定』拆成三個互不相同的來源——修來的、業帶來的、時節逼出來的。三者不可混為一談,也不可拿其中一個去解釋另一個。
三、正法住世
〔三之一〕什麼叫正法·它住多久
先問:講了整整八品的法門,是為了什麼?論主自己收攏:「前來分別種種法門,皆為弘持世尊正法。」然後提兩個問題——「何謂正法?當住幾時?」
第一問的答案是一個二分:「世尊正法體有二種,一教、二證。教謂契經、調伏、對法,證謂三乘菩提分法。」教是三藏,證是三乘的菩提分法。
第二問的答案不是給時間,是給條件:「有能受持及正說者,佛正教法便住世間。有能依教正修行者,佛正證法便住世間。故隨三人住世時量,應知正法住爾所時。」正法住世的長短,不繫於年數,繫於還有沒有那三種人——能受持的、能正說的、能依教修行的。
至於年數,論只是照錄舊說並標其為異說:「聖教總言唯住千載,有釋證法唯住千年,教法住時復過於此。」光記於此明標「敘異說」;寶疏則補出一層次第之理——「因教得證,故先明教法」。
易誤處:把千年讀成一個預言的期限。論的重心明明在前面那一句——條件說。年數是被引述的異說,條件才是論主的答案。
落地上:這一段把讀者從『法會不會滅』轉到『我在不在那三種人裡面』。受持、宣說、修行——三者任一,正法就多住一分。
四、造論宗旨
〔四之一〕我依誰而說·誰有資格判法
先問:這部論既然是依攝阿毘達磨而作,那麼依什麼道理來解釋對法?結頌第一首答:「迦濕彌羅議理成,我多依彼釋對法,少有貶量為我失,判法正理在牟尼。」
長行把它逐句展開:「迦濕彌羅國毘婆沙師議阿毘達磨理善成立,我多依彼釋對法宗,少有貶量為我過失。判法正理唯在世尊,及諸如來大聖弟子。」
這四句要一句一句讀。第一句是歸屬——我所依的是迦濕彌羅一系已經成立的義理。第二句是分寸——「多依」二字留了餘地,並非全依。第三句是認錯在先——凡有貶量之處,過在我,不在他。第四句是歸敬——真正有資格判定法之正理的,只有世尊與諸大聖弟子。
易誤處:把第三句讀成客套。它是造論者的自我定位:論主明知自己書中有異於毘婆沙處,卻不把那些地方說成『我對他錯』,而說成『若有貶量,那是我的過失』。判與不判的界線劃在「牟尼」那裡。
落地上:這一首是全書的體例宣言,也是讀這部論的鑰匙——凡遇論中並錄二說而不判之處,回頭看這一句就明白了:不判不是含糊,是有意識地把判的位子留給世尊。
〔四之二〕大師世眼久已閉——三首傷歎與一句勸學
最後三首七言,論主不再論法,只說世相。
第一首說教法之衰:「大師世眼久已閉,堪為證者多散滅,不見真理無制人,由鄙尋思亂聖教。」古德在此逐句配:光記標此下為「傷歎勸學」,分「傷歎人」與「勸學法」二段,並釋首二句云「上句傷歎如來,下句傷歎弟子」,又訓「三界大師為世眼目」。寶疏於「久已閉」三字繫年釋之——「大師涅槃向有千年,故言久閉」。四句連讀是一條因果鏈:眼閉 → 證者散 → 無人能判 → 鄙劣的尋思攪亂聖教。
第二首說證法之衰:「自覺已歸勝寂靜,持彼教者多隨滅,世無依怙喪眾德,無鉤制惑隨意轉。」「無鉤制惑」一喻極重——煩惱如狂象,本來有鉤可制,如今鉤已不在。
第三首是勸學:「既知如來正法壽,漸次淪亡如至喉,是諸煩惱力增時,應求解脫勿放逸。」「如至喉」三字是全論最後一個譬喻——命在咽喉,只剩一口氣。
這三首與前一首合看,才見全論收筆的用意。前一首說「判法正理在牟尼」,這三首說『牟尼已滅、堪證者散』。二者連起來是一句沒有明說的話:能判的人已經不在了,所以你更該自己去修,而不是等一個判者出現。 末句「應求解脫勿放逸」不是勸勉的套語,是這一整段推論的結論。
易誤處:把這四首讀成書末的感慨文字。它們是有科文可依的正式段落——古德一律科為「造論宗旨」與「傷歎勸學」二段,是全論結構的一部分,不是附錄。
落地上:三十卷的法數讀到這裡,論主親手把讀者推出書外——法門已經分別完了,正法正在淪亡,煩惱力正在增盛;此時此刻要做的不是再讀一遍,是去求解脫。
承衍:三疏之鏡
以下所錄,是古德與異譯、對辯二論於本品之判釋與互異。並錄不判。
一、三疏於品的大科各判其分
三家所標的四個界完全相同(明所依諸定、明能依功德、明正法住世、明造論宗旨),而分法之數互異。光記與頌疏皆作品級三分——定功德、正法住世、造論宗旨,而定功德之下再開所依與能依二分。寶疏則於品首自言二分——「此品大文有二:一明德所依定、二明餘性功德」,然其行文的科號卻一路行到第四(第二明依定功德、第三明法住時、第四明論宗趣)。同一家自身二用,照錄不判。
八等至之下的分科差距最大:光記與頌疏都只作總明、別明二分,寶疏獨開十二科——淨等三別、具支多少、不動、受多少、借識、二得、相生、依身、所緣、斷惑、近分、中定。本篇正文所用的門次,即與寶疏這一系最為貼合。
二、輕安與行捨為什麼各配二地——二疏所依之理不同
同一個問題,二疏給的理由不一樣。光記引《婆沙》而答,取的是用勝與所治——「初、二輕安用勝,性舉治惛沈;三、四行捨用勝,沈靜治掉舉」,並補「為治五識及所引身麁重故,初定立輕安」。頌疏自設問答,取的是捨的對象——「第三定捨極喜、第四定捨極樂,故立行捨;初二既不立行捨,故立輕安」。
頌疏在同處還連設二問,補出本論長行未及的兩個理由:信通諸地而唯第二靜慮立信為支,是因為「隨起增上淨信,必依大喜,第二靜慮有勝喜故」;慧通諸地而第三定獨立慧為支,是因為那裡有樂受而恐耽著。二疏各成一系,並錄不判。
三、經說四災患而論說八——光記的兩個會通
本論說災患有八,而契經只說「不為尋伺喜樂所動」四個。光記給二解:一是密意說——「然契經中密作是說:第四靜慮不為尋、伺、喜、樂所動。但約支說,不言非支」(經只就支說,入出息不是支所以不列);二是「經非盡理,論盡理說。故」。頌疏不設會通,逕把八名開列——「所謂尋、伺、憂、苦、喜、樂、出息、入息」,由此坐實頌中「四受」即憂苦喜樂。會通之有無,二家不同,唯錄不判。
四、修慈的品數——光記並錄一個更細的分法
本論說修慈分七品(親三、處中一、怨三)。光記於此並錄另一系的分法:「若依《正理》,修四無量各分九品,中復開三。」頌疏則不改品數而補出三品怨的判準——「中怨讐者,謂奪己身命緣資具。下怨讐者,謂奪親友命緣資具」,這是本論長行沒有給的。七品與九品並錄,不判。
五、三解脫門之下,光記另有一表
論說三等持中的無漏一分名三解脫門。光記於釋名之外另出一表,逐一定其所緣——「若有漏空緣一切法,若無漏空唯緣苦諦。無願能緣苦集道諦,無相唯緣滅諦為境」,並補一句立場「非諸有漏法是真解脫門,性住世間違解脫故」。頌疏於同處止於釋名。詳略之差,唯錄不判。
六、結頌四首的配當——寶疏獨立一系
光記與頌疏的科文近乎逐字相同,都作『傷歎人、勸學法』二分,再開『正傷歎人、重釋傷歎』。寶疏則自成一系,把它讀成三頌的配當——「自下有三頌,大文第三勸學流通分」,並逐一配屬「初一頌傷歎教法,次一頌傷歎證法,第三頌勸求證法」;又獨出一句繫年語,「論主造論之時,佛涅槃後九百年中,教、證正法並皆將滅」。此外寶疏於「久已閉」三字給了一個具體的解釋——「大師涅槃向有千年,故言久閉」。三家並錄,不判。
七、序、正、流通之三分——古德自身即並錄二解
本品末的兩大段(正法住世、造論宗旨)落在全論三分的哪一分,古德有二解,而光記自己就把二解並錄。第一解以正宗分一直算到破我品,流通分從破我品末起;依這一解,「雖定品末傷歎勸學,為在正宗前故,亦名正宗」。第二解則以正宗分止於定品,「從定品末『前來分別』以下,總名流通」,破我品因為在流通之後也叫流通。光記於品內復重申此二解,逐字作「若序、正、流通三分,依前一解……又依前一解……」。頌疏於同一界處逐字同判第二解——「若三分明義,已下是流通分」。
依第二解,「前來分別種種法門」一句就是全論流通分的起點。 這是一個遠大於其字數的界。二解並存於古傳,光記自身不判,本節照錄,取捨屬譯者。
八、神泰疏於本品全闕
神泰《俱舍論疏》為殘本,現存七卷不含本品。實查之下,「分別定品」四字與本品首頌「靜慮四各二」皆零命中。據實標闕,不以他卷之文充之。 唯其卷一的全論總覽表仍記「定品三十九行」一語,與本論的頌數相符——那是總表之文,不是本品的逐段釋,不得充作疏文。
九、真諦舊譯之異
真諦《俱舍釋論》於本品自成一系,且品題就不同——他作「分別三摩跋提品」,是音寫全稱而不義譯;玄奘則義譯作「定」。以玄奘的品名去搜真諦本,永遠找不到。二本的分卷也不同:真諦此品恰占一整卷,破說我品從下一卷卷首起,真諦本沒有卷中品界;玄奘本則此品跨二卷而在卷中換品。
譯名自成一系。 一境性作「一類」、五蘊作「五陰」、尋伺作「覺觀」、無漏作「無流」、味作「噉味」、喜受作「適心根」、災患作「過失」、勝處作「制入」、遍處作「遍入」;連定的音寫也分二詞——品題用「三摩跋提」,定體用「三摩提」,另有一處錄靜慮的音寫「持訶那」。教與證二字則作「正教」與「正修得」,並附音寫「阿地伽摩」;三藏之名玄奘義譯(契經、調伏、對法)而真諦音寫(修多羅、毘那耶、阿毘達磨)。
一處開合之異。 四無量得名的理由,玄奘給三條(所緣無量、引福無量、感果無量),真諦只給二條(以無量眾生為境、感無量果報),不出「引無量福」一項。並錄不判。
一處結論相同而詳略異。 初二靜慮的樂是輕安不是受樂——這一結論二本一致,真諦作「於第一第二定,是輕安說名樂」。但玄奘本於此下錄了大段往復,真諦本的開合與之不同,逐段對位尚未細校,據實記。
最要緊的一處是繫屬相違。 本品末的七言四頌,玄奘本、本頌單行本、光記、頌疏都繫在定品之末;真諦本卻把「大師世間眼已閉……求脫勿放逸」放在破說我品的卷首。同一組頌,二本所繫的品不同。本帙已裁定從三疏(繫定品末),異繫並錄不判。
十、眾賢二論之破
眾賢的二部論用本論的頌而另作長行,所以它們也有一個「辯定品」。二論的品號有一處差別:《順正理論》作「辯定品第八」,與本論相同;《顯宗論》作「辯定品第九」,品號後移一位——這是《顯宗論》全書的體例(其智品也作第八而本論作第七),不是本品特有。二論的品首長行則逐字全同。
《順正理論》於本品域內四處稱「經主」(即指論主)。第一處是一境性的自設問答——「此中經主自興問答:何名一境性?謂專一所緣」;《顯宗論》有逐字相同的對應。第二處是樂支——「經主此中假引他說,謂定無有心受樂根。三靜慮中說樂支者」,眾賢把論主所引的那一家標為「假引他說」。第三處是破辭最明的一處——「身受樂。是故知樂非即輕安,破此同前經主所引。然彼所說,若是輕安體應說輕安名,此說非理」,眾賢在此明說「非理」。第四處則是背景陳述——「經主此中述己本意」,牒的正是結頌第一首所陳的造論依據。
《顯宗論》於第二、三、四處未檢得對應句——它是《順正理論》的略本,篇幅遠簡,此類簡化是它的體例常態,據實記為零命中,不以他處之文充之。
還有一處體例上的事實:二論都不收本品末的七言四頌(「大師世眼」四字於二論皆零見)。那四首是論主自陳宗旨與傷歎之作,別造之論自然不取。照錄不判。
以上凡二造相對之處,一律唯錄二造、不判勝負。眾賢立什麼、依什麼理而立,論主立什麼、依什麼理而立,本節已盡力說明白;至於孰是孰非,不在此節,也不在本篇。
Before Reading This Chapter
This is the last chapter of the Abhidharmakośa (the Chapter on Refuting the Grasped Self is an appended discussion and does not stand within the eight chapters). Thirty fascicles have come this far, and what the author has to set out is the last piece of the whole book: the Chapter on the Worthy and the Noble treated the result and the Chapter on Knowledge the cause, and this chapter treats the condition — that “absorption” upon which the knowledge that realizes the result depends. The ancient masters state the relation of the three chapters very clearly. Puguang, explaining this, says, “the Chapter on the Worthy and the Noble explains the result, the Chapter on Knowledge explains the cause, and the Chapter on Absorption explains the condition. A condition is remote as compared with a result, and so absorption is explained next”; Fabao, taking another angle, says, “the foregoing Chapter on Knowledge explains the result of absorption that relies upon it, and this Chapter on Absorption explains the cause upon which knowledge relies.” The two take different angles and agree in direction: knowledge does not arise out of nowhere, but stands upon absorption.
The skeleton of the chapter divides into four sections. The first two treat absorption itself — the absorptions relied upon (the four meditative absorptions, the four formless absorptions, the threefold division and the several gates of the eight attainments, and the three concentrations) and the merits that rely upon them (the four immeasurables, the eight liberations, the eight bases of mastery, the ten totalities, and by what these merits are obtained and upon what body they arise). The third section turns about all at once and asks, “what is called the true Dharma? And how long should it abide?” The fourth is the author’s own statement of the purport of his composition, with three stanzas of lament in seven-character lines and one of exhortation to study, closing the whole book.
There is one thing to be said before anything else. This chapter reads like a register of the study of absorption, and the dharma-numbers are astonishingly dense: four, four, eight, eighteen factors, eleven real entities, four portions, eight liberations, eight bases of mastery, ten totalities . . . But what really bears the weight is not the register; it is one question that recurs again and again — on what ground does this dharma count as “one thing”? Why are the eighteen factors only eleven real entities? Why is inner evenness and purity just the faculty of confidence? Why is the pleasure of the first two meditative absorptions pliancy and not the feeling of pleasure? The eight bases of mastery and the three liberations look as though they overlap — where is the boundary? The two densest passages of prose in the whole chapter are doing just this. The register is only the shell; “the measure taken in establishing a dharma” is the bone.
I. The Absorptions Relied Upon
〔1.1〕Meditative Absorption Has Four Stories, and Each Story Has Two Kinds
First ask: why, in treating “absorption,” begin from “meditative absorption” and not from the formless? The reason the treatise gives is of the utmost brevity — “all merits for the most part depend upon meditative absorption, and so the differences of meditative absorption should be adjudicated first.” Merits mostly hang upon meditative absorption, and so this limb is established first.
Meditative absorption has four stories in all, and each story divides into two kinds: meditative absorption as absorption (the kind formed by cultivation) and meditative absorption as birth (the maturational result of being born in that level). The kind that is birth the author disposes of in one sentence — “the entity of meditative absorption as birth has already been spoken of in the Chapter on the World: the fourth has eight, the first three have three each” — because the Chapter on the World long ago laid out the map of those seventeen places. What this chapter is to treat is the kind that is absorption.
What is the entity of meditative absorption as absorption? “Spoken of generally, it is the one-pointedness of mind upon a single object gathered under the wholesome nature, since it has wholesome concentration for its own nature; and if one reckons together with it the accompaniments, it has the five aggregates for its nature.” This sentence is to be read as three layers: first, it is of the wholesome nature — a defiled absorption is not the entity here established; second, it is one-pointedness of mind upon a single object — nothing else than the fact of the mind’s being intent upon a single object of consciousness; third, if one counts in all the mind and mental factors that become present along with it, then it is the five aggregates.
The easy error: to read “it has the five aggregates for its nature” and “one-pointedness of mind upon a single object” as two answers at odds with each other. They answer two questions — the narrow one asks “what is this fact of absorption itself?” and the answer is one-pointedness upon a single object; the broad one asks “what dharmas become present at one entry into absorption?” and the answer is the five aggregates. Abhidharma commonly establishes an entity with such a broad and a narrow account; in reading, first make sure which question is being asked.
In practice: to say in ordinary speech “I entered absorption” is in fact muddled. Here a way of checking is given — first ask whether what you speak of is “of the wholesome nature,” then ask whether your mind really is intent upon a single object, and only last speak of the entire bodily and mental state that became present on that occasion. The three layers cannot be inferred one from another.
〔1.2〕How the Four Stories Are Divided — Not Four Things, but One Thing from Which Factors Have Been Withdrawn Three Times
First ask: since the entity is only one “one-pointedness upon a single object,” whence come the boundaries of the four stories? The treatise’s answer is exceedingly handsome — “what possesses sustained thought, joy, and pleasure is established as the first,” and thereafter “by degrees the preceding factors are left behind and the second, third, and fourth are established”: withdraw sustained thought and the second remains; withdraw joy further and pleasure remains; withdraw all three and it is the fourth. “Following this order, one one-pointedness upon a single object divides into four kinds.”
There is a further sentence here to be noticed: the treatise says “possesses sustained thought, joy, and pleasure” without saying applied thought, and yet at once adds, “by this it has already been made clear that it possesses applied thought too, since they must proceed together, as smoke and fire” — applied and sustained thought certainly go together, like smoke and fire, and to have said sustained thought is to have said applied thought. So the first meditative absorption really has five factors while the stanza adduces only three.
The easy error: to suppose that the four meditative absorptions are four different absorptions. They are not. They are one and the same thing (one-pointedness of mind upon a single object) showing four stages in the adding and subtracting of factors. Once this reading is set up, every table that follows loosens along with it — the table of factors, of feelings, of consciousnesses, of the levels the liberations rest upon: all are graduations on one and the same axis.
In practice: in cultivation this means that “advancing” is not exchanging one dharma for another; it is letting go. From the first to the fourth, the motion is always subtraction, never addition.
〔1.3〕The Gloss on the Two Graphs “Meditative Absorption,” and on What Ground It Alone Holds the Name
The treatise asks itself, “by what sense is the name meditative absorption established,” and answers itself, “because by this one is able, in stillness, to consider examiningly.” It then glosses “examining consideration” — “examining consideration is the sense of knowing as it really is, as when it is said that the mind being in absorption it can know as it really is” — and marks the position of this school: “in this school examining consideration has discernment for its entity.”
First ask: if that is so, then may every concentration be called meditative absorption? The treatise answers, “no; only the excellent is given this name,” and adduces a comparison from ordinary life — “as the world says that what emits light is called the sun, and not that a firefly or a candle may also be called the sun.” Many things emit light, but only the sun is called the sun.
Ask again: on what ground is meditative absorption called excellent? The treatise gives three counts — “among the several concentrations it alone gathers the factors” (it alone has the institution of factors), “calm and insight proceed evenly matched and it can consider examiningly best of all” (calm and insight in even measure), and “it obtains the names abiding in ease in the present life and the pleasant mode of progress” (it has the function of present ease and of an unimpeded progress).
Ask again: on what ground is a defiled meditative absorption also called meditative absorption? The treatise answers, “because it too can carry on a wrong examining consideration.” Pressed further, “then there is the fault of over-extension,” the treatise answers, “because the name is established only within the bounds of what resembles it, as with a spoiled seed and the rest,” and adduces the World-Honored One’s own words that there is an “evil meditative absorption.”
The easy error: to read “a spoiled seed” as a term of disparagement. It is the measure taken in establishing a name — a seed gone bad is still called a seed, because it is within the resembling range of “seed”; only what does not resemble cannot borrow the name. This is a rule of naming in general use throughout Abhidharma.
〔1.4〕Is Absorption Just Mind — the First Disputation of the Chapter
Immediately below the sentence of definition the treatise meets a pressing question. Someone says: since the very state of the mind’s being intent upon a single object may be given the name “concentration,” what need is there to establish a further mental factor? The author answers, “it is a further dharma that makes the mind turn upon a single object that is called concentration; its entity is not the mind itself.” The opponent presses again: mind ceases moment by moment from the outset, and every mind is turning upon some object — what then is concentration for? The author takes it apart in two layers — if you say “concentration is needed to keep the mind from being distracted in the second moment,” then as regards the concentration associated at the same moment it would be useless; and if you say “and it is by this that concentration is established,” why not say straight off that it is by the mind’s own turning upon a single object? The opponent adduces further, “concentration is a factor of the great ground, so every mind ought to be turning upon a single object,” and the author answers, “not so; the concentration in the remaining classes is feeble.”
Here the treatise records the account of one party — “some masters say: the very state in which the mind turns continuously upon a single object is called concentration, since the sūtras call this the training in the higher mind, and the utmost purity and excellence of mind is just the four meditative absorptions.” The identity of this party the ancient masters do mark: Puguang marks it here as the sense of the Sautrāntikas, saying word for word, “some other Sautrāntika masters say: the very state in which the mind turns continuously, before and after, upon a single object is called concentration, and apart from mind it has no separate entity”; and the passage of refutation in the treatise Puguang marks as the author’s citing the Sarvāstivāda sense that “concentration is a mental factor and has a separate entity apart from mind” and setting up a refutation of it. In Puguang no closing sentence is to be found for this passage — this section records the fact as it stands and does not gather it up on his behalf.
The easy error: to suppose that because the author set up a refutation he has already given a verdict. At the end of this passage the treatise passes no sentence closing the case, and neither do the ancient masters’ outlines. The two parties are recorded only; which prevails is not adjudicated.
In practice: the actual divergence in this dispute is a single sentence — is “being intent” a mode of the mind itself, or is there a further dharma that makes the mind be intent? If you take the former, cultivating absorption is tuning the mind; if the latter, cultivating absorption is fostering another power. The two accounts each have their bearing in practice, and the treatise does not choose for the reader.
〔1.5〕The Four Formless Absorptions — the Same in Number and Nature as Meditative Absorption, but with Form Removed from the Accompaniments
First ask: why may the formless be disposed of with the one phrase “it too is thus”? Because “this agrees with meditative absorption in number and own nature, namely four with two each” — the same four stories, the same division into absorption and birth, and the entity likewise the one-pointedness of mind upon a single object gathered under the wholesome nature. Hence the stanza says only “the formless too is thus.”
There is a difference in only one place: “yet among the accompaniments the aggregate of form is here removed, since the formless has no form that turns along with mind.” The broad entity is reduced from five aggregates to four aggregates, because there is there no form that turns along with mind. The two words “four aggregates” in the stanza point to just this.
How are the four stories divided? “Although the entity and mark of one-pointedness upon a single object have no difference, they divide into four kinds by the leaving of the level below at which one takes birth” — the division comes from “leaving the level below.” The treatise glosses the word “leaving” in passing: “that is, by this path one is liberated from the afflictions of the level below, and this is the sense of leaving the defilement of the level below.”
The easy error: to read the four formless as four “places.” Their boundary does not lie in location but in leaving — leaving the fourth meditative absorption establishes the sphere of boundless space, and so on until leaving the sphere of nothingness establishes the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception.
Another point to notice: “these four basic ones together with the preliminary stages of the upper three are named as a whole the removal of the perception of form” — this general name gathers in the four basic absorptions and the upper three preliminary stages, and the preliminary stage of the sphere of boundless space alone is not gathered in, the reason being that it “takes as object the form of the level below and gives rise to a perception of form.” It is still looking back at form, and so does not enter this name. This is one more instance of the chapter’s rule that “in establishing a name one must look at what it actually takes as object.”
〔1.6〕Whether the Formless Realm Has Form at All — the Longest Pressing of the Chapter
This is the first long passage of prose devoted to a single matter hung beneath the four formless absorptions (over eleven hundred characters), and the author uses the whole passage to take one position apart.
Look first at the first round upon the name. Someone says, “because there is no form there at all it is named formless,” and the author points out, “this reason does not hold, since form is allowed to be there” — your reason does not hold, since your party maintains from the outset that there is form there. Whence, then, is the name established? The author establishes instead a more cautious account: “because the form there is subtle it is named formless, just as a thing of faint yellow is also named without yellow.” An exceedingly faint yellow may still be called without yellow: this is naming with respect to a mark, not with respect to existing or not existing.
Next comes the pressing, layer by layer. If there be only bodily and verbal form of discipline there — “body and speech being absent, whence should there be discipline?”; still more, “there being no great elements, whence derived form?” If it be likened to discipline without outflows — “not so; what is without outflows depends upon great elements with outflows.” If a body with faculties of form be allowed there — then “how can it be said that the form there is slight?” If it be said the bodily measure is small — “the fine worms in water and even the ultimate atoms ought also to be called formless.” If it be said the body is exceedingly pure and fine — “the form-body of intermediate existence and of the form realm ought to be called formless.” If it be said that it must be pure and fine to the utmost degree — “then only the summit of existence would obtain the name formless.” Every step takes the opponent’s own measure and carries it to a place where he himself cannot accept it.
Look next at the exchange over proof from scripture. The opponent adduces four passages: lifespan conjoined with warmth; name-and-form and consciousness depending on one another like two sheaves of reeds; name-and-form having consciousness for condition; and the blocking of a consciousness coming and going apart from form and so on down to apart from the formations. The author does not refute them one by one, but first sets up a rule for reading scripture — “this proof does not hold, for one ought to examine and consider” — and then presses each of the four with the same question, “is it said with regard to all realms, or with regard to the desire realm?” If the opponent says, “the sūtra makes no distinction, so one ought not to examine,” the author returns him the fault of over-extension: then the warmth outside ought also to be conjoined with lifespan, and the form and formless realms ought also to have morsel nutriment.
The three passages of scripture the author himself adduces are the positive proof: “the formless liberation is the most still of all, since it goes beyond all forms”; “sentient beings of the formless have gone beyond every perception of form”; and that in speaking of the meditative absorptions he spoke of a class of form while in speaking of the formless he did not. And he turns back to block one line of retreat — if “going beyond the perception of form” is said only relative to the coarse form of the level below, then “the meditative absorptions too go beyond the coarse form of the level below, and of them too it ought to be possible to say ‘apart from form’,” and the meditative absorptions would have to be called the formless realm; and by the same token one ought also to say “apart from feeling and the rest.” Since the sūtra does not speak so, it may be seen that the formless goes beyond form as a whole class, and does not go beyond feeling and the rest. “From this it is decidedly known: in that realm there is no form.”
The easy error: to read this passage as a contest of winning and losing. What it in fact demonstrates is a method: of the opponent’s reason, ask first “does this reason hold for you yourself?”; of the opponent’s scriptural proof, ask first “how far does the range of this passage extend?”; and one’s own conclusion must be able to withstand the counter-inference, “on this showing, would not everything become formless?”
There is also a tail-piece: in the formless realm form has been cut off for many aeons; after death from there one is born in a lower realm — whence comes the form? The treatise answers, “it is produced from mind, not arisen from form” — the maturation cause of the form aroused of old has been perfumed into the mind, and that capability ripens today. It is asked back, “there being no body of form there, upon what does mind turn?”, and the author returns the question: “why should it not turn apart from a body? Because in the levels below it has never been seen.” You say it cannot only because in the levels below you have not seen it; and by the same token, the form realm has no morsel nutriment and yet the body turns, and that too you have not seen.
〔1.7〕Why the Four Formless Are Named as They Are
First ask: are the three names of boundless space and the rest obtained from the space, the consciousness, and the nothingness that are taken as object? The treatise answers, “no” — they are established “at the time of cultivating the preparatory practice, from thinking of boundless space, boundless consciousness, and nothing at all.” The names are established from what is thought in the preparatory practice, and not from what is taken as object at the stage of the result.
For the fourth story another way of naming is used: “the fourth name is established from the dullness and inferiority of perception, that is, having no keen perception it obtains the name non-perception, and having a dull and inferior perception it is called not non-perception.”
Here there is a measure taken with the utmost fineness. The treatise allows that at the time of cultivating the preparatory practice one does think in this way — “perceptions are like a disease, like an arrow, like an abscess; if perception were altogether absent, that would be the same as the darkness of delusion; only in neither perception nor non-perception is it contrary to these, still and fine” — yet the name is not established with reference to that preparatory practice. The reason is that if one asks further, “on what ground does one think so in the preparatory practice?”, the answer must be, “because in that place perception is dull and inferior.” So dullness and inferiority is the proper cause, and the thought of the preparatory practice is only its expression.
In practice: this is a general rule in the study of naming — take the cause, not the condition. One and the same name may be spoken of from several starting points, and what the treatise wants is that last reason behind which one cannot push further.
〔1.8〕The Threefold Division of the Eight Attainments — Savoring, Pure, Without Outflows
The four meditative absorptions plus the four formless: “the basic attainments are eight in all.” Here the treatise lays down the most important measure of the chapter: of every attainment one must ask once more which of the kinds it is. “Of these the first seven possess three kinds each; the attainment of the summit of existence has only two kinds, since this level is dull and inferior and has nothing without outflows.”
The glosses on the three kinds are exceedingly terse. Savoring — “it is what is associated with craving; craving is able to savor, and hence the name savoring; and the attainment, being associated with it, obtains the name of savoring.” Pure — “the name marks a mundane wholesome absorption, since it arises associated with the several bright and pure dharmas such as non-greed.” Without outflows — “it is the absorption beyond the world; craving cannot take it as object, and so it is not an object of savoring.”
The finest thing of all is the relation of savoring to pure: “that object which is savored by what is associated with savoring — this ceases with nothing intervening and that absorption of savoring arises. It is taking the past pure absorption as object that savoring deeply arises; and at that time, though it be called emerging from the absorption savored, with regard to the absorption that savors it is called entering.” What the absorption of savoring savors is precisely the pure absorption that has just ceased. So of one who has entered the absorption of savoring, spoken of as emerging he has emerged from the pure absorption, and spoken of as entering he has entered the absorption of savoring — in one and the same moment, both statements are right.
The easy error: to take “savoring” for greed in general. It is a very particular thing — being greedy for that portion of absorption one has just obtained. The better one cultivates, the more readily it happens, and that is the reason it is established as a class by itself.
In practice: this one measure is the presupposition of every gate that follows in the chapter. Below, in treating first obtaining, mutual production, the cutting off of afflictions, and the objects taken, each gate must first ask, “are you speaking of the savoring, the pure, or the one without outflows?” The answers differ and the conclusions differ altogether.
〔1.9〕The Eighteen Factors of the Four Meditative Absorptions
The register of the factors is itself not hard: the first has five, “first applied thought, second sustained thought, third joy, fourth pleasure, fifth concentration”; the second has four, “first inner evenness and purity, second joy, third pleasure, fourth concentration”; the third has five, “first the equanimity that is a formation, second right mindfulness, third right discernment, fourth pleasure as feeling, fifth concentration”; the fourth has four, “first the purity of the equanimity that is a formation, second the purity of mindfulness, third the feeling that is neither suffering nor pleasure, fourth concentration.”
What is to be noticed are two small notes. First, “concentration and absorption differ in name and are one in entity, and so the sūtra says the mind settled, evenly settled, is called right concentration” — the “absorption” of the stanza is concentration, and they are not two things. Second, the treatise records a transmitted account, “only absorption is both meditative absorption and a factor of meditative absorption; the remaining four factors are factors of meditative absorption and not meditative absorption,” and at once corrects it by the sense as it really is — “as with an army of four limbs, so should the remaining factors of meditative absorption be known to be.” Elephant troops and horse troops are each of them called army; in the same way the remaining factors are themselves meditative absorption.
The easy error: to take a “factor” for a component part of meditative absorption rather than meditative absorption itself. The comparison of the army of four limbs is meant precisely to dismantle this intuition.
〔1.10〕The Eighteen Factors Are Only Eleven Real Entities — the Second Long Prose Passage of the Chapter
This is the densest passage of the chapter (over eleven hundred and ninety characters). First ask: eighteen names — how many things are they in fact? The treatise reckons with the utmost dispatch: the five factors of the first are five real entities; the second adds inner purity for six; the third adds the equanimity that is a formation, right mindfulness, right discernment, and pleasure as feeling for ten; the fourth adds what is neither suffering nor pleasure for eleven. And it appends a fourfold analysis as a check — the first alternative applied and sustained thought, the second inner purity, the third joy, pleasure, and concentration, the fourth the remaining dharmas apart from the foregoing.
What is really laborious is the two problems of “the same name with a different entity.”
The first: what the “pleasure” of the first two meditative absorptions is. The treatise adjudges, “the pleasure of the first two is gathered under pliancy” — the pleasure of the first two absorptions is not the feeling of pleasure but pliancy. The reasoned proof has three layers: within the first two absorptions there is no faculty of pleasure; there is no bodily feeling of pleasure (within absorption there are no five consciousnesses); there is no mental feeling of pleasure (joy has already been stated to be there, and within one mind two feelings cannot proceed together). Nor may it be said that joy and pleasure become present by turns, since the sūtra says expressly that the first possesses five factors and the second four, which they possess at the same time.
Here the second disputation of the chapter is drawn out. The treatise records, “some say: there is no mental faculty of pleasure at all; the factor of pleasure spoken of in the three meditative absorptions is in every case the faculty of pleasure gathered under bodily feeling.” The ancient masters mark the names of the two parties here — Puguang says word for word, “as to ‘what real virtue is there,’ this is the Sautrāntika masters’ explaining through; ‘some say’ is the Sarvāstivāda masters, who have added in the word ‘mental’ in this sūtra, since the sūtras of the several schools speak only of the body,” and thereafter, in the paired sentence-forms “the Sautrāntika masters say . . .” and “the Sarvāstivāda masters say . . . ,” records the exchange of the two parties: the Sautrāntikas explain through, the Sarvāstivādins counter-question, “what merit is there in calling mind body?”, the Sautrāntikas object again with the fourth absorption where pliancy is redoubled and yet no factor of pleasure is established, and the two parties exchange once more over the ground on which inner evenness and purity obtains its name. Throughout, in Puguang no closing verdict of the kind “the author adjudges” or “I now say it should be said” is to be found — this section records the fact as it stands, as “the exchange of the two parties recorded only,” and does not pass judgment on his behalf.
The one sūtra adduced along this line is clear enough (the Guangji puts the citation in the Sautrāntika master’s mouth, while Saṅghabhadra takes it as the author’s own — both accounts are recorded): “first gladness, second joy, third pliancy, fourth pleasure, fifth concentration” — “this sūtra speaks of pliancy and pleasure separately, and so the pleasure of the first two is not just pliancy.” Here the two parties are directly opposed, and each holds one end of the scriptural proof.
Following upon this dispute the treatise also handles a train of attendant questions: whether, if there is bodily consciousness in absorption, absorption is destroyed (answer: the wind of pliancy is produced from an excellent absorption and conduces in turn to the arising of concentration); whether arousing bodily consciousness is to be called emerging from absorption (answer: for the reason as before, the objection does not hold); whether, within an absorption without outflows, contact and bodily consciousness become without outflows (answer: they do not arise at the same time, and what fault is there in this?). Every question turns upon the core of “within one and the same passage, may the factors be uneven as to outflows and no outflows?”
The second: what inner evenness and purity is. The treatise gives a description first — “this absorption, being far removed from the agitation of applied and sustained thought, proceeds with a pure continuum” — and states its reverse as “like a river rising in waves.” But a description is not enough to establish a real entity, and so someone objects: “if that is so, it would have no entity of its own; how can there be eleven real entities?” The author therefore lands it upon a dharma already had — “therefore it should be said that it is just the faculty of confidence” — and glosses the three graphs word for word: “confidence is the mark of purity, and hence the name purity is established; being apart from an outward even flowing, it is called inner and even; being pure and also inner and even, the name inner evenness and purity is established.”
The treatise also records one party who holds that “inner evenness and purity, concentration, applied thought, and sustained thought have no separate entities,” and sets down their self-defense, “a difference of the stages of mind may also be called a mental factor”; and the author answers, “though there is this principle, it is not the tenet of my school.”
As for “joy is the feeling of joy,” the treatise proves it by two āgamas — “in order and without remainder the five faculties of grief and the rest cease; within the third absorption joy ceases without remainder; in the fourth absorption pleasure ceases without remainder,” and “in the fourth meditative absorption pleasure is cut off and suffering is cut off, and joy and grief have sunk away before.” Since joy ceases in the third and pleasure in the fourth, it may be seen that joy and pleasure are each a feeling of its own, and “hence within the third absorption there is decidedly no faculty of joy; from this it is known that the feeling of joy is joy and not pleasure.”
In practice: what this whole passage gives is a rule one can carry away — when one and the same name turns up in two places, ask first whether in the two places it is one and the same thing. The “pleasure” of the first two absorptions and the “pleasure” of the third are the same in name and different in entity; “joy” and “pleasure” are different in name and different in entity too. An Abhidharma register of real entities is counted out just so, one pass at a time.
〔1.11〕Which Factors Are Wanting in a Defiled Meditative Absorption
First ask: are the factors of meditative absorption fully present in a defiled meditative absorption as well? The treatise answers, “no,” and records two parties.
One party “speaks following the marks”: the first defiled has no “joy and pleasure born of seclusion,” since “it is not born from having left the afflictions”; the second defiled has no “inner evenness and purity,” since “it is disturbed and made turbid by the afflictions”; the third defiled has no “right mindfulness and discernment,” since “it is bewildered by a defiled pleasure”; the fourth defiled has no “purity of equanimity and mindfulness,” since “it is defiled by the afflictions.” This party’s reason is stated factor by factor with regard to the sense of the name — the names of the factors carry “born of seclusion,” “purity,” “right,” and a defiled mind is of course unequal to them.
The other party says: “within the first two defiled there is only no pliancy, and within the latter two defiled only no equanimity that is a formation, since these are gathered under the great wholesome ground.” This party’s reason is stated with regard to the class of the dharma — pliancy and the equanimity that is a formation are factors of the great wholesome ground and are certainly absent from a defiled mind.
The easy error: to suppose that the two parties are disputing over right and wrong. The difference of the two lies in the measure: the former goes by the sense of the factor’s name, the latter by the wholesome nature under which the dharma is gathered. They are recorded together without adjudication.
In practice: a defiled absorption is really an absorption (and so still has the institution of factors); only those several factors are wanting. The use of this for a practitioner is that when a state of absorption becomes present, one should not merely check “is there absorption?” but check “are those particular factors there?”
〔1.12〕Why the Fourth Meditative Absorption Is Called “Unmoving”
First ask: the sūtra says three absorptions have movement and the fourth is unmoving; with regard to what sense is this said? The treatise answers: “the lower three meditative absorptions are called having movement, since they have calamities; the fourth meditative absorption is called unmoving, since it has no calamities.” The calamities are eight — “applied thought, sustained thought, the four feelings, in-breath, and out-breath.”
Here there is a place where sūtra and treatise do not agree in number: the sūtra says only four (“the fourth meditative absorption is not moved by applied thought, sustained thought, joy, and pleasure”), the treatise says eight. Puguang gives two explanations here — one, “yet in the sūtra it is said with an implied sense . . . it is said only with regard to the factors and not with regard to what is not a factor”; two, “the sūtra does not state the principle exhaustively; the treatise states it exhaustively. Thus.” Yuanhui sets up no reconciliation and simply lists the eight names one by one: “the calamities are eight, namely applied thought, sustained thought, grief, suffering, joy, pleasure, out-breath, and in-breath” — from which it is known that “the four feelings” of the stanza are grief, suffering, joy, and pleasure.
At the end of the passage the treatise also records a comparison: “other masters say: the fourth meditative absorption is like a lamp within a closed room, which shines and does not waver.”
The easy error: to read “unmoving” as a stillness in which the mind does not stir at all. It is a register-style definition — only when not one of those eight things is there is it called unmoving. That the definition is given so concretely is precisely so that “unmoving” shall not turn into a feeling.
〔1.13〕The Feelings of One Born in a Level of Meditative Absorption
Meditative absorption as absorption and as birth may not be inferred one from the other: this is a boundary the treatise sets here. “Within meditative absorption as birth the first has three feelings” — the feeling of joy associated with mental consciousness, the feeling of pleasure associated with three consciousnesses, the feeling of equanimity associated with four consciousnesses; the second has joy and equanimity, “there being no feeling of pleasure, since there are none of the remaining consciousnesses and since the gladness of mind is coarse”; the third has pleasure and equanimity; the fourth has the feeling of equanimity alone.
First ask: why has the second meditative absorption no feeling of pleasure? The treatise gives two reasons side by side — there are none of the remaining consciousnesses (hence no bodily feeling of pleasure), and the gladness of mind is still coarse (hence that portion is reckoned under joy).
The easy error: to apply the table of factors of meditative absorption as absorption to the table of feelings of meditative absorption as birth. The two tables ask different questions: the table of factors asks “which factors has this story?”, the table of feelings asks “which feelings become present in one born in this story?” That the treatise expressly sets up here the question “are all the feelings of birth also thus?” and answers “no” is precisely to guard against this confusion.
〔1.14〕How Those Born in the Upper Three Meditative Absorptions See, Hear, Touch, and Speak
First ask: the upper three meditative absorptions have no group of three consciousnesses and no applied or sustained thought; how can the gods born there see, hear, and speak?
The treatise’s way of answering is exceedingly handsome — it is not that there are no consciousnesses, but that those consciousnesses do not belong to that level. “It is not that those born in that level have no eye consciousness and the rest; only they are not affiliated to it”; “the group of three consciousnesses aroused by those born in the upper three levels, and the mind that issues manifest action, are all affiliated to the first absorption.” It is just as one born in an upper level arouses a mind of transformation of a lower level: “that one born above arouses what is below is as with arousing a mind of transformation.”
Of what nature are these borrowed consciousnesses? “These four are unobscured-indeterminate alone.” Why neither defiled nor wholesome? “He does not arouse the defiled of the level below, since he has already left its defilement; he does not arouse the wholesome of the level below, since the lower is inferior.” He can go neither up nor down, and only the middle square is left.
The easy error: to read “borrowing a consciousness” as meaning that an upper level has eye consciousness. It is a question of affiliation, not of existing or not existing.
In practice: this is the clearest instance in the chapter of “name and affiliation must be asked separately” — of one and the same eye consciousness, to ask “is there such a thing?” and to ask “to which level does it belong?” are two questions.
〔1.15〕How the Pure and the Without-Outflows Absorptions Are First Obtained
From here the treatise opens ten gates in a row for analyzing the eight attainments. The first gate is first obtaining.
The rule is of three counts: the pure absorption is obtained “by leaving defilement and by taking birth”; the without-outflows “by leaving defilement alone”; the defiled “by taking birth and by falling back.” The summit of existence is the one exception — “only by leaving defilement, there being no obtaining by birth,” since there is no level above from which one might come down.
Why must the stanza say the three words “not accomplished at all”? The treatise explains for itself: “in order to block obtaining some portion further when it is already accomplished” — the cases of obtaining the portion conducive to penetration by preparatory practice, and of obtaining the portion conducive to falling back by falling back, are not entered here.
The treatise also demonstrates a check once: taking the portion conducive to falling back of the first meditative absorption as its instance, “it is obtained when one leaves the defilement of the desire realm, relinquished when one leaves the defilement of one’s own level, obtained again when one falls back from having left the defilement of one’s own level, and relinquished again when one falls back from having left the defilement of the desire realm; obtained when one is born into one’s own level from above, relinquished when one is born into a lower level from one’s own” — one and the same absorption, obtained and relinquished on six occasions.
The easy error: to suppose that at the time of “entering into the certainty of the noble path” one first obtains an attainment without outflows. The treatise says expressly, “this is not settled, for one who cultivates in the gradual order has not at that time obtained a basic absorption.”
In practice: what this gate teaches is that a question must be asked whole — having asked “when is it obtained?”, one must at the same time ask “when is it relinquished?”; only when an obtaining and a relinquishing are paired is the place of that dharma in the continuum fixed.
〔1.16〕How Many Attainments Can Arise after One Attainment
The second gate is mutual production. The skeleton is but a few sentences: after the without-outflows there arises the wholesome of one’s own level and of those above and below (the “wholesome” gathering in both the pure and the without-outflows), “yet only as far as the third above and below, since beyond that it is too far and it cannot leap so as to produce the fourth”; after the pure it is likewise, with the defiled of its own level produced besides; after the defiled there arise the pure and the defiled of its own level, together with the pure of the next level below.
The numbers are inferred from these few counts — the first meditative absorption produces six with nothing intervening, the sphere of nothingness seven, the second absorption eight, the sphere of boundless consciousness nine, the third and the four formless ten; and the pure absorption adds in each case the defiled of its own level, making six, seven, eight, nine, ten, and eleven.
The most interesting is the count of producing the pure of a lower level out of the defiled. Someone objects: a defiled dharma cannot rightly know, so how can the pure be produced out of the defiled? The author answers, “it is by the force of a prior vow” — the vow “rather let me obtain the pure below than the defiled above” was made beforehand, and “the force of that prior vow turns along with the continuum.” And he adduces a comparison: “as when one first makes a resolve and then goes to sleep, and at the time appointed is able to wake.”
The easy error: to take the “prior vow” for an attention formed on the spot. It is a power already vowed and still operating within the continuum; it is precisely because the present defiled mind cannot know rightly that one must rely upon the vow made before.
One further boundary: all the foregoing is said with regard to “while in absorption”; at the time of taking birth it is otherwise — “at the time of death, from a pure absorption obtained at birth every defiled arises with nothing intervening, one by one.” That the treatise expressly separates being in absorption from dying is because the rules of the two places are not the same.
〔1.17〕The Four Portions of the Pure Absorption
The third gate is the four portions of the pure. The pure absorption is of four kinds in all — conducive to falling back, conducive to abiding, conducive to advancing, conducive to penetration. “Each level has the four; the summit of existence has only three,” since above the summit of existence there is no level to proceed to and hence no portion conducive to advancing.
The marks of the four are fixed by what they are conducive to: “the portion conducive to falling back is conducive to the afflictions, the portion conducive to abiding is conducive to one’s own level, the portion conducive to advancing is conducive to the upper level, and the portion conducive to penetration is conducive to what is without outflows.” Hence only the fourth portion can produce what is without outflows.
The numbers of their producing one another are two, three, three, one: “the first can produce two, namely those conducive to falling back and to abiding; the second produces three, excepting that conducive to penetration; the third produces three, excepting that conducive to falling back; the fourth produces one, namely itself and not the rest.”
The easy error: to read the four portions as four methods of cultivation. They are four directions of one and the same pure absorption — being alike in absorption, whichever way your continuum is actually tending is the portion you are in.
In practice: this gate exchanges “is my absorption well cultivated?” for a more exact question — which way is my absorption tending? An absorption conducive to the afflictions is a pure absorption too, but it is the portion conducive to falling back.
〔1.18〕The Leaping Attainment
The fourth gate is the leaping attainment. The treatise first sets up a coordinate of six graphs: “going upward is called ascending, returning downward descending; the same class is called even, a different class alternating; the adjacent is called next, passing over one leaping.” Three pairs, six graphs, making a table that may be combined.
The way of cultivation is five steps in ascending order: with outflows over eight levels, ascending and descending, even and next; without outflows over seven levels, ascending and descending, even and next; with and without outflows, ascending and descending, alternating and next; with outflows, ascending and descending, even and leaping; without outflows, ascending and descending, even and leaping — “this is called the fulfilling of the preparatory practice of cultivating the leap.” Last, upon the attainments with and without outflows one performs the ascending and descending, alternating and leaping, and only then is it called the accomplishment of the leaping absorption.
The restrictions are two. First, “the leaping here can pass over only one, since beyond that it is too far and one cannot leap into the fourth.” Second, those who can cultivate it are exceedingly few — “only men of the three continents and those arhats whose liberation does not depend upon circumstance, because they have mastery over absorption and are without afflictions”; those whose liberation depends upon circumstance “though without afflictions have no mastery over absorption,” and those attained through view “though they have mastery over absorption still have remaining afflictions” — each wanting one of the two, and neither able to accomplish it.
The easy error: to think of “leaping” as skipping a grade. It is the ability to change position at will among eight levels already wholly mastered — one must first be able to walk them up and down one grade at a time before there is any talk of passing over one.
〔1.19〕Upon What Body the Several Attainments Arise
The fifth gate is the body relied upon. The general rule is one sentence: “the several attainments arise in dependence upon a body of one’s own level and of the levels below.” Why does an upper level not arouse a lower? The treatise gives five reasons in one breath — “because for an upper level to arouse a lower is of no use, because one has an excellent absorption of one’s own, because the force of the lower is feeble, because it has already been cast away, and because it is fit to be spurned.”
But the general rule has one exception, which the treatise expressly marks with “though the general mark is thus, yet if one speaks in detail” — a noble one born at the summit of existence must arouse the absorption of the sphere of nothingness without outflows. The reasons are three layers: in order to exhaust the remaining afflictions of his own level; because his own level has no noble path he might delight in and arouse; and because the sphere of nothingness is the nearest.
The easy error: to read this exception as a breach of the general rule. It is in fact an application of the general rule — it is precisely because “one’s own level is of no use” that he has no choice but to borrow a noble path from the nearest level below.
〔1.20〕What Objects the Several Attainments Take
The sixth gate is the object taken. The range of the absorption of savoring is the narrowest: “it takes as object only what is with outflows of its own level,” not the level below (whose defilement it has left), not the level above (the level loved being a separate one), not what is without outflows (for taking that as object it would have to become wholesome).
The pure and the without-outflows are the widest: “both can universally take as object the conditioned and unconditioned of their own level and of the levels above and below.” But the treatise at once adds one difference — “an indeterminate unconditioned is not the object of an absorption without outflows”: cessation independent of discernment is an indeterminate unconditioned, and an absorption without outflows does not take it as object.
The wholesome formless absorptions gathered under the basic levels have a column of their own: “they do not take as object the dharmas with outflows of the level below,” while of the dharmas of their own and the upper levels there is none they cannot take; they can take as object what is without outflows of the level below, but only the path of the class of the knowledge of inference and not that of the class of the knowledge of the dharma, nor the cessation of the several dharmas of the level below. As for the preliminary stages of the formless, these on the contrary do take the level below as object, “since their uninterrupted path must take what is below as object” — to cut off the afflictions of the level below one must of course take the level below as object.
The easy error: to suppose that “the formless absorptions do not take the level below as object” is a general rule. The treatise here separates the basic from the preliminary stages, and their directions are exactly opposite. Whether the basic levels look below is one thing; the preliminary stages have no choice but to look.
〔1.21〕Which Absorption Can Cut Off the Afflictions
The seventh gate is cutting off the afflictions. The answer is a single sentence: “what is without outflows can cut off the afflictions, and so can the preliminary stages of the several pure absorptions.”
What is interesting is the way the treatise proves that a basic pure absorption cannot cut off — blocked on three sides: “it cannot cut off the level below, since it has already left its defilement. It cannot cut off its own level, since it is bound by its own. It cannot cut off the level above, since the level above surpasses it.” What is below has already been cut off, one’s own cannot cut off itself, and what is above is stronger than oneself. All three directions are impassable.
Why then can the pure preliminary stages cut off? “Because they can every one of them cut off the afflictions of the next level below” — the office of a preliminary-stage absorption is from the outset to leave the defilement of the level below. And the pure gathered under the intermediate absorption cannot cut off.
In practice: this gate sets right a common misunderstanding — that the deeper the absorption the better it can cut off the afflictions does not hold. Cutting off the afflictions relies upon discernment without outflows, or upon the preliminary stage that stands at the position of “being just about to take one step upward.” The pure absorption of one already sitting at ease within a basic absorption is on the contrary the one that does not cut off the afflictions.
〔1.22〕The Eight Preliminary-Stage Absorptions
First ask: there are eight basic absorptions — where are their eight gateways? The eighth gate asks just this — the preliminary stages.
The treatise answers straightforwardly: “the several preliminary-stage absorptions are eight in number too, because they serve as the gateways of the eight basic absorptions.” In number they correspond one to one with the basic. As to feeling they are all equanimity, for two reasons — “because they proceed by applying effort, and because they have not yet left the dread of the level below”: one is still applying effort and still afraid of the level below, and joy and pleasure cannot be settled upon them. As to nature, all eight preliminary stages are gathered under the pure absorption, “only the first preliminary stage also extending to what is without outflows”; and of the three kinds, none of them has savoring, “since they are the path of leaving defilement.” The treatise adds a further measure: the mind of a preliminary stage may also have the defilement of linking to a new birth, but what is spoken of here is with reference to “blocking out the defilement of absorption.” Another account is also recorded: “access concentration too has something associated with savoring, since before one has aroused a basic absorption one is greedy even for this; and by this access concentration possesses all three kinds.”
The easy error: to regard a preliminary stage as of one kind with a basic absorption, only a grade shallower. A preliminary stage is a gate, not a room — and so its feeling is equanimity alone and does not extend to joy and pleasure. Neither may one infer from “the mind of a preliminary stage has the defilement of linking to a new birth” that a preliminary stage has something associated with savoring: the treatise has itself marked that what is blocked out is the defilement of absorption, and the two point at different things.
In practice: the boundary this gate gives is that eight gates answer to eight rooms, and that only the first gate (access concentration) extends, besides the pure, to what is without outflows, the remaining seven being pure alone.
〔1.22, Appended〕The Intermediate Meditative Absorption
The ninth gate is the intermediate meditative absorption. The treatise first asks whether it differs from the preliminary stages, and answers, “in sense too there is a divergence” — a preliminary stage is for leaving the defilement of the level below and is the cause of entering a basic absorption; the intermediate absorption is not. Then it fixes its position by way of the factors: “among the seven absorptions above there is neither applied nor sustained thought; only the intermediate meditative absorption has sustained thought without applied thought, and so it surpasses the first and has not come up to the second” — higher than the first absorption and not up to the second, whence the name “intermediate.” And for this reason too “there is no intermediate meditative absorption above, since within one level there is no such rising and descending.”
The intermediate absorption possesses all three kinds, savoring, pure, and without outflows, “because it has excellent virtues that may be savored with craving”; it is associated with equanimity alone, “because it proceeds by applying effort,” and hence it is “said to be gathered under the painful mode of progress.” Its maturational result is that “it can draw down the result of the station of Mahābrahmā, and one who cultivates it much becomes a Mahābrahmā.”
The easy error: to take the intermediate meditative absorption for a “level” between the first and the second. It is an excellent stage within the level of the first meditative absorption itself (without applied thought and with sustained thought alone), and so above it there is nothing answering to it.
〔1.23〕The Three Concentrations — Divided by Applied and Sustained Thought
First ask: the attainments having been treated, what then is “concentration”? The treatise adduces a sūtra and establishes three kinds — with applied and sustained thought, with sustained thought alone, with neither — and fixes the levels each is gathered under, one by one: the one with applied and sustained thought is “the concentration associated with applied and sustained thought, gathered under the first meditative absorption and access concentration”; the one with sustained thought alone is “the concentration associated with sustained thought alone, gathered under the level of the intermediate meditative absorption”; the one with neither is “the concentration not associated with applied and sustained thought,” “gathered under everything from the preliminary stage of the second meditative absorption as far as neither perception nor non-perception.”
The three are established on one and the same pattern: first the mark is fixed by applied and sustained thought, then the level by the mark; and the boundaries falling entirely upon applied and sustained thought, there can be only the three stretches of having both, having one alone, and having neither.
The easy error: to confuse these three with the eight attainments above as one table. This set cuts across the levels with respect to the presence or absence of applied and sustained thought; the eight attainments are ranged in a column with respect to the height of the levels; one crosswise and one lengthwise, they are not the same thing. Another easy error is to put the starting point of “neither applied nor sustained thought” at the basic second meditative absorption — the treatise says expressly that the boundary is at its preliminary stage; and as for the stretch with sustained thought alone, only the one level of the intermediate meditative absorption answers to it.
In practice: one and the same level has a position in each of two tables — access concentration, for instance, is on the lengthwise table the gate of the first meditative absorption, and on the crosswise table has applied and sustained thought. To ask what absorption it is, look at the lengthwise table; to ask whether applied and sustained thought are still stirring, look at this crosswise one.
〔1.24〕Emptiness, Wishlessness, and Signlessness
The sūtra speaks besides of three concentrations, and this set is divided with respect to the mode of apprehension of what is taken as object.
Emptiness — “the concentration associated with the two modes of apprehension, empty and not-self.” Signlessness — “the concentration associated with the four modes of apprehension that take the truth of cessation as object”; the origin of the name the treatise glosses with the utmost fineness: “nirvāṇa is apart from ten signs, and so it is called signless,” the ten signs being “the five of visible form and the rest, the two of male and female, and the three marks of the conditioned.” Wishlessness — “the concentration associated with the ten modes of apprehension that take the remaining truths as object,” that is, the ten apart from empty and not-self; and why is it called wishless? “Because impermanence, suffering, and the causes of the origin are fit to be spurned, and the path is like a raft which in the end must be relinquished” — even the truth of the path stands among what is to be relinquished.
Here there is an asymmetry of the first importance: the two signs empty and not-self do not enter wishlessness, and the reason the treatise gives is that “the signs empty and not-self are not what is spurned and relinquished, because they resemble the mark of nirvāṇa.” Spurning and relinquishing are spoken of with regard to what one wishes to get away from, and these two signs, empty and not-self, themselves resemble the mark of nirvāṇa, so that there is no reason for wishing to get away from them.
Each of the three extends to the pure and the without-outflows, “what is gathered under the world extending to eleven levels and what is gathered under the beyond-worldly to nine levels alone”; and that portion of them which is without outflows obtains a name of its own — “the three gates of liberation, because they can serve as the gateway to nirvāṇa.”
In practice: what this set gives is three gateways of what to contemplate. It is absorption alike, but whether one looks at empty and not-self, or at the four signs of the truth of cessation, or at the remaining ten signs, the name that comes out differs. The depth of absorption is governed by the tables above; the direction of absorption by this set.
〔1.25〕The Threefold Redoubled Concentration — Taking Absorption Itself as Object
Then a finer set still: emptiness of emptiness, wishlessness of wishlessness, signlessness of signlessness. “These three concentrations take as object the foregoing emptiness and the rest and apprehend the signs of emptiness and the rest, and so the names emptiness of emptiness and the rest are established” — what they take as object is not a truth but the foregoing absorption itself.
Each of the three apprehends one sign, and the manner of apprehending is very exactly measured. Emptiness of emptiness “takes as object the foregoing concentration of emptiness of the stage beyond learning and apprehends its sign empty” — why apprehend empty and not not-self? “Because the sign empty is more conducive to spurning than the sign not-self.” Wishlessness of wishlessness “apprehends the sign impermanent” — why not suffering and cause? Because what it takes as object is a path without outflows, and those are not signs of what is without outflows; why not the signs of the path and the rest? “Because that is to be spurned and relinquished.” Signlessness of signlessness “takes as object precisely the cessation independent of discernment of the signless concentration of the stage beyond learning,” and apprehends only the sign “still,” not the three signs cessation, excellent, and separation, for three reasons — “because it is confusable with the cessation that is impermanence, because it is of indeterminate nature, and because it is not the result of release from bondage.”
These three are with outflows alone. The reason the treatise gives is exceedingly short and exceedingly weighty — “because they spurn the noble path.” Since they arise out of a spurning of the noble path, they cannot possibly be without outflows. The persons who can arouse them are few as well: “only men of the three continents and those whose liberation does not depend upon circumstance”; and they rest upon eleven levels, “seven preliminary stages excepted, namely the desire realm, access concentration, the eight basic absorptions, and the intermediate absorption.”
The easy error: to suppose that “redoubled” means higher. It means once again — taking the absorption without outflows already accomplished as an object and contemplating it once more, and so falling on the contrary among what is with outflows. Later in order and lower in nature: the two facts are not in contradiction here.
〔1.26〕The Four Kinds of Cultivating Concentration
The last set is the four cultivations divided with respect to purpose: for obtaining the ease of the present life, for obtaining superior knowledge and vision, for obtaining discriminating discernment, for the everlasting exhaustion of the outflows.
The answering cultivations are: cultivating the several wholesome meditative absorptions (the “wholesome” gathering in both the pure and the without-outflows), cultivating the purified supernormal knowledge of the divine eye, cultivating the several wholesome things of preparatory practice of the three realms and the wholesome without outflows, and cultivating the vajra-like concentration.
Here the treatise twice handles a case of “the sūtra speaks of one only, while in principle it extends in truth to the rest.” First, the sūtra speaks only of the first meditative absorption as obtaining an abiding in present ease, and the treatise says, “adducing the first so as to show the rest, in principle it extends in truth to the remaining”; and it adds a word on why “abiding in the ease of a later life” is not spoken of — “because the ease of a later life is not an abiding that is settled, since one may fall back, or be born above, or attain final nirvāṇa, and then one does not abide.” Second, of the vajra-like concentration the sūtra speaks only of the fourth meditative absorption, and the treatise says, “in principle the cultivation of this extends in truth to all the levels,” while the reason the sūtra speaks only of the fourth is that “the transmitted account is that the World-Honored One spoke with reference to his own.”
In practice: this set is the closing of the whole section on the absorptions relied upon, and is also the set that lies closest to the motive of practice — why are you cultivating this absorption? Four answers, four roads. With this the side of absorption is finished, and below we turn to the merits that arise in dependence upon absorption.
II. The Merits That Rely upon Them
〔2.1〕The Four Immeasurables — the Third Long Prose Passage of the Chapter
Fascicle Twenty-Nine turns about as soon as it opens its mouth: “thus the absorptions relied upon have been spoken of; next are to be adjudicated the merits that arise in dependence upon absorption. Among the several merits, the immeasurables are adjudicated first.”
First ask: why are they called “immeasurable”? The treatise gives three reasons — “because they take immeasurable sentient beings as object, because they draw forth immeasurable merit, and because they draw down an immeasurable result.” The object taken is immeasurable, the merit drawn forth is immeasurable, and the result drawn down is immeasurable.
Ask again: why are there only four kinds? “Because they counteract four obstructions that are much practiced.” The four obstructions are “hatred, harmfulness, want of gladness, and greed for desire together with hatred”; loving-kindness counteracts hatred, compassion harmfulness, sympathetic joy want of gladness, and equanimity greed for desire and hatred.
The entity must be stated in two layers, broad and narrow. Broadly, “the entity of the first two of the four is non-hatred”; finely, “in principle it should in truth be said: compassion is non-harming, sympathetic joy is just the feeling of joy, and equanimity is just non-greed”; and if the retinue be counted in too, “they have the five aggregates for entity.” The treatise also handles a small objection: if equanimity has non-greed for its nature, how can it counteract hatred? Answer: “the hatred counteracted here is drawn forth by greed,” with the addition that “in principle it should in truth take the two dharmas for entity.”
The modes of apprehension are four sentences that are best of all to remember: “how may the classes of sentient beings obtain such ease?” — entering loving-kindness; “be freed from such suffering?” — entering compassion; “that they should obtain ease and be freed from suffering, is that not a joy!” — entering sympathetic joy; “even, even, with no distinction of dear and hostile” — entering equanimity.
Whether they are inverted — this question is of the first importance. The four immeasurables cannot really make others obtain ease; are they not then inverted? The treatise gives three counts: it is only “a wish and desire that they should obtain ease” (not an adjudging that they have obtained it); “that disposition is not inverted” (the intent itself is not inverted); “they arise associated with a perception of resolve” (they are an attention through resolve from the outset, not a settled cognition). And a step further back: even granting they were inverted, one may not say that they are therefore not wholesome (they arise associated with the wholesome roots), nor that they draw forth evil (they can counteract hatred and the rest).
The easy error: to suppose that cultivating loving-kindness is imagining that others are happy, and that since the imagination is not true it is a delusion. The treatise’s answer is that the efficacy of this class of attention lies not in whether what it takes as object is true, but in what it can counteract.
Whether they can cut off the afflictions — the treatise states it very clearly: they cannot. The reasons are three counts — “because they are gathered under a basic meditative absorption with outflows, because they arise associated with an attention through resolve, and because they take all sentient beings universally as object.” What they can do is “at the stage of preparatory practice to hold down hatred and the rest,” or “to make what has already been cut off yet further removed.” Really to cut off the afflictions relies upon another road: in the desire realm and access concentration one arouses a resembling loving-kindness and the rest, “and when by this one has held down hatred and the other obstructions, one draws forth and produces the path that cuts off, and can cut off the several afflictions”; the afflictions being cut off, it is at the stage of leaving defilement that one obtains the basic four immeasurables. At that stage, “even meeting with a strong condition, one is not overborne by hatred and the rest.”
How loving-kindness is cultivated — this is a rare passage in the whole treatise that is step by step and can be put into practice. One first thinks upon the ease one has oneself received, or hears of the pleasures received by Buddhas, bodhisattvas, śrāvakas, and pratyekabuddhas, and makes the vow, “may all sentient beings alike receive such pleasure.” If the afflictions are strong and the mind cannot be moved, one divides sentient beings into seven classes — three of the dear, high, middle, and low; one of those in between; three of the hostile, low, middle, and high. One first gives rise toward the high dear to a sincere resolve of giving ease, then toward the middle and the low dear; the three classes of the dear being made even, one proceeds in order to those in between, then the low, middle, and high hostile; “by the force of repeated cultivation one becomes able to give rise toward the high hostile to a wish of giving ease equal to that toward the high dear.” This being made irreversible, one makes the object grow wide by degrees — “one town, one country, one quarter, and all worlds, so that the mode of apprehension of giving ease is everywhere full” — and only this is called the accomplished cultivation of the immeasurable of loving-kindness.
The treatise also appends a reminder about one’s bent: “one who as regards sentient beings delights to seek their virtues can make the absorption of loving-kindness be accomplished quickly; one who delights to seek their faults cannot” — the reason being that even one who has cut off the wholesome roots has virtues that may be set down, and even a pratyekabuddha of the rhinoceros-horn kind has faults that may be picked out; virtues and faults are both to be found, and the difference lies only in which you are in the habit of seeking.
Compassion and sympathetic joy may be known by comparison; the cultivation of equanimity runs the other way — “one begins the cultivation from those in between,” and by degrees becomes able to give rise toward the high dear to an even mind equal to that toward those in between.
The body relied upon and accomplishment: “these four immeasurables can be aroused by men and not by the others; as one obtains any one of them, three are necessarily accomplished. Those born in the third absorption and the like alone fail to accomplish sympathetic joy.”
〔2.2〕The Eight Liberations
First ask: which are the eight liberations? The treatise lists them: with perception of form within one contemplates forms without; without perception of form within one contemplates forms without; the pure liberation, realizing it with the body and dwelling in its full attainment; the four formless absorptions as the next four; and the absorption of the cessation of feeling and perception as the eighth.
Entity: the first three “have non-greed for their nature, because they are the near counteragent of greed”; that the sūtra says “perception” and “contemplation” is because “perception and contemplation are strong.” Of the three, “the first two proceed upon the impure mark, making the several modes of apprehension of the livid and the rest,” and the third “proceeds upon the pure mark, making the mode of apprehension of what is pure and bright.” Together with their accompaniments all have the five aggregates for nature.
The levels relied upon: the first two “extend, each of them, to the first two meditative absorptions,” because they must counteract the greed for visible color of the desire realm and the first meditative absorption; the third “rests upon the latter absorption, since it is apart from the eight calamities and its mind is clear and pure.” The remaining levels too have resembling liberations that are not established as such, “because they are not dominant.”
The next four have the wholesome of the four formless absorptions for their nature — “not the indeterminate and the defiled, since these are not liberation; nor the unconcentrated wholesome, since its nature is feeble and inferior.” Here the treatise also distinguishes the preliminary stage from the uninterrupted path: the path of liberation of a preliminary stage also obtains the name of liberation, but the uninterrupted path does not, “because it takes the level below as object; only when one turns his back on the level below is it called liberation.”
The eighth is just the absorption of cessation. Why does it obtain the name of liberation? “Because one turns his back in spurning feeling and perception and thereupon arouses this, or because one turns his back in spurning all that has an object at all”; and another account is “because it liberates from the obstruction to absorption.” The mind before entering it is called “exceedingly subtle” — “the mind that formerly counteracted perception is already called subtle, and this one is more subtle still, and so it is called exceedingly subtle.” In emerging, “one either arouses the pure mind of absorption of the summit of existence, or is able to arouse the mind without outflows of the sphere of nothingness”; the mind of entering is with outflows alone, while emerging extends to both with and without outflows.
The objects taken: the first three take the sphere of visible form of the desire realm alone as object, “the object of two being repugnant and of one lovely”; the next four take each of them the truths of suffering, origin, and cessation of their own and the upper levels, the path of the class of inference of all levels, and cessation independent of discernment and space, as their objects.
The treatise also answers two questions of “why is it not so.” Why has the third meditative absorption no liberation? “Because within the third absorption there is no greed for visible color, and because one is disturbed by the excellent pleasure of one’s own level.” Why are the third and the eighth alone said to be “realized with the body”? “Because among the eight these two are the most excellent, and because within the two realms each of them stands at the border” — one at the border of the form realm and one at the border of the formless.
For what is the pure liberation cultivated — the treatise answers very considerately: “for the sake of making the mind for a while glad. The foregoing contemplation of the impure makes the mind sunken and sad; now one cultivates the contemplation of the pure, to rouse and set it going so that it be glad.” And there is also a purpose of checking: “for the sake of knowing examiningly one’s own capability” — only if, contemplating the pure mark, the afflictions do not arise, is the impure liberation cultivated before to be reckoned accomplished.
The easy error: to take the eight liberations for eight stages of fruition. They are a training in turning the back and casting away, and the treatise says expressly that the two conditions for cultivating them are “in order that the several afflictions already cut off be yet further removed” and “in order to obtain excellent mastery over absorption.”
〔2.3〕The Eight Bases of Mastery
The register of the eight bases of mastery overlaps to a high degree with the eight liberations — the first two as the first liberation, the next two as the second, the latter four as the third. And so the treatise sets up the question itself: “if that is so, what difference is there between the eight bases of mastery and the three liberations?”
The answer is the most finely wrought sentence of contrast in the chapter: “in the foregoing cultivating of the liberations one can only cast away and turn from; in the latter cultivating of the bases of mastery one can master what is taken as object, contemplating as one pleases, and the afflictions in the end do not arise.” Liberation can only turn away and not look; a base of mastery can face it and hold it down — one contemplates as one pleases and the afflictions never arise.
The easy error: to read the “mastery” of “base of mastery” as height of state. It refers to the power of governance over what is taken as object — the same livid corpse, the same pure visible form; at the stage of liberation one dodges, at the stage of mastery one can look at it with sovereign ease.
〔2.4〕The Ten Totalities
The totalities are ten — earth, water, fire, wind, blue, yellow, red, white, with the addition of the sphere of boundless space and the sphere of boundless consciousness. The origin of the name is that “in every place one contemplates universally with no gap at all, and so they are called totalities.”
The first eight are “as the pure liberation”: their own nature is in every case non-greed; together with their accompaniments they have the five aggregates for nature; they rest upon the fourth meditative absorption; and they take as object the visible form of the desire realm. Here the treatise records a divergent account: “other masters say: only the totality of wind takes as its object the wind element among the tangibles” — because wind is not a visible form, this party singles it out. The latter two have “in that same order the two purified formless absorptions of space and consciousness for their own nature, and take as object the four aggregates of their own level.”
At the end of the passage the treatise gives the order of the three gates of merit: “from the several liberations one goes into the several bases of mastery, and from the several bases of mastery into the several totalities, because each latter arises as more excellent than each former.”
In practice: read the three gates together and they are one line — turning away, holding down, filling everywhere. From dodging, to being able to face, to being able to spread over every place. This is where the chapter strings the scattered merits into an order.
〔2.5〕By What the Three Gates of Merit Are Obtained · Upon What Body They Arise
How obtained: the eighth liberation is as already adjudicated (namely the absorption of cessation); the rest “extend to two ways of obtaining, namely obtaining by leaving defilement and obtaining by preparatory practice, because there are those that have been practiced before and those that have not.” What has been cultivated before is obtained of itself upon leaving defilement; what has not must rely upon preparatory practice.
The body relied upon: “the four formless liberations and the two formless totalities arise, each of them, in dependence upon a body of any of the three realms; the rest can be aroused by men alone.” And there is an addition: “by the force of the teaching, both ordinary beings and noble ones are able to make them present” — these merits are not the noble ones’ alone; an ordinary being too can arouse them in dependence upon the teaching.
The easy error: to take the “two ways of obtaining” for two parallel roads. They are two ways of obtaining one and the same merit in two kinds of person, and the line falls at whether it was cultivated before this life.
〔2.6〕By What Condition Those Born in the Two Upper Realms Arouse Absorption
The last gate asks about the condition for arousing absorption. The treatise gives three conditions: the force of cause (“having drawn near and repeatedly cultivated them in former times, this serves as the cause of their arising”); the force of action (having formerly done an action to be experienced in a later life that draws down birth in an upper level, the maturation being about to arise, its force draws forth the absorption); the force of the nature of things (“when the receptacle world is about to be dissolved, sentient beings of the levels below by the nature of things are able to arouse the meditative absorptions of the upper levels,” because at that time all wholesome dharmas increase by the force of the nature of things).
The assignment of the three conditions is very exactly made: those born in the two upper realms who arouse the formless absorptions do so “by the force of cause and the force of action, and not by the force of the nature of things,” the reason being that “the Anabhraka Heaven and the rest are not destroyed by the three catastrophes” — the force of the nature of things is a matter of the three catastrophes and the aeon of dissolution, and where they cannot reach it is of no use. Where one born in the form realm arouses meditative absorption, all three conditions are present. As for one born in the desire realm arousing an absorption of an upper level, “it should be known that in every case it is by the force of the teaching.”
In practice: this gate takes apart “why does someone suddenly become able to enter absorption?” into three sources that differ from one another — cultivated for, brought along by action, forced out by the season. The three may not be run together, nor may one of them be used to explain another.
III. The Abiding of the True Dharma in the World
〔3.1〕What the True Dharma Is · How Long It Abides
First ask: eight whole chapters of dharma-gates have been expounded — for what? The author gathers it up himself: “the various dharma-gates analyzed above are all for the sake of spreading and upholding the true Dharma of the World-Honored One.” And then he raises two questions — “what is called the true Dharma? And how long should it abide?”
The answer to the first question is a twofold division: “the entity of the true Dharma of the World-Honored One is of two kinds, first teaching and second realization. Teaching is the sūtras, the discipline, and the Abhidharma; realization is the factors of awakening of the three vehicles.” Teaching is the three baskets; realization is the factors of awakening of the three vehicles.
The answer to the second question is not a length of time but a condition: “as there are those able to uphold and rightly to expound it, the true teaching-Dharma of the Buddha abides in the world; as there are those able rightly to practice according to the teaching, the true realization-Dharma of the Buddha abides in the world. Hence, according to the measure of time that these three persons abide in the world, one may know the measure of time that the true Dharma abides.” How long the true Dharma abides hangs not upon a number of years but upon whether those three kinds of person are still there — those able to uphold, able to expound rightly, and able to practice according to the teaching.
As for the number of years, the treatise merely sets down the old account and marks it as a divergent one: “the general saying of the holy teaching is that it abides one thousand years alone; another explanation says that the realization-Dharma abides one thousand years alone, while the time the teaching-Dharma abides exceeds even this.” Puguang here marks it expressly, “setting out a divergent account”; and Fabao adds a further layer of the reason of order — “it is through the teaching that realization is obtained, and so the teaching-Dharma is explained first.”
The easy error: to read the thousand years as a term prophesied. The weight of the treatise plainly lies on the sentence before it — the account by condition. The number of years is a divergent account cited from elsewhere; the condition is the author’s answer.
In practice: this passage moves the reader from “will the Dharma perish?” to “am I among those three kinds of person?” Upholding, expounding, practicing — with any one of them, the true Dharma abides a portion longer.
IV. The Purport of the Treatise’s Composition
〔4.1〕Whom I Follow in Speaking · Who Is Qualified to Adjudicate the Dharma
First ask: this treatise being composed as gathering in the Abhidharma, by what principle then is the Abhidharma explained? The first closing stanza answers: “the principle argued in Kaśmīra is established; I mostly follow them in explaining the Abhidharma; if there is any small disparagement, that is my fault; the right principle for adjudicating the dharma rests in the Sage.”
The prose unfolds it sentence by sentence: “the principle of the Abhidharma argued by the Vaibhāṣika masters of the country of Kaśmīra is well established, and I mostly follow them in explaining the tenets of the Abhidharma; if there is any small disparagement, that is my own fault. Those able to adjudicate the right principle of the dharma are the World-Honored One alone, together with the great noble disciples of the Tathāgatas.”
These four sentences are to be read one by one. The first is affiliation — what I follow is the doctrine already established by the Kaśmīra line. The second is measure — the two words “mostly follow” leave room, and it is not a following in all things. The third is owning the fault first — wherever there is disparagement, the fault is mine and not theirs. The fourth is rendering honor — those really qualified to settle the right principle of the dharma are the World-Honored One and the great noble disciples alone.
The easy error: to read the third sentence as a courtesy. It is the composer’s placing of himself: the author knows full well that there are places in his book divergent from the Vaibhāṣikas, and yet he does not put those places as “I am right and they are wrong” but as “if there is any disparagement, that is my fault.” The line between adjudicating and not adjudicating is drawn at “the Sage.”
In practice: this stanza is the declaration of form for the whole book and the key to reading this treatise — wherever in the treatise one meets two accounts recorded together and not adjudicated, look back at this sentence and it is plain: not to adjudicate is not vagueness; it is deliberately leaving the seat of adjudication to the World-Honored One.
〔4.2〕The World-Eye of the Great Master Has Long Since Closed — Three Stanzas of Lament and One Sentence of Exhortation
In the last three stanzas in seven-character lines the author no longer discusses the dharma and speaks only of the state of the world.
The first speaks of the decline of the teaching-Dharma: “the world-eye of the great Master has long since closed, and those fit to bear witness are for the most part scattered and gone; the true principle is not seen and there is none to check it, and by mean speculation the holy teaching is thrown into confusion.” The ancient masters assign it sentence by sentence here: Puguang marks what follows as “the lament and the exhortation to study,” divided into “lamenting the persons” and “exhorting to the dharma,” and explains the first two lines as “the upper line laments the Tathāgata, the lower line laments the disciples,” glossing further, “the great Master of the three realms is the eye of the world.” Fabao explains the three graphs “has long since closed” with a date — “it is toward a thousand years since the great Master’s nirvāṇa, and so it says long closed.” Read the four lines together and they are one chain of cause and effect: the eye closes → those who realize are scattered → none can adjudicate → mean speculation throws the holy teaching into confusion.
The second speaks of the decline of the realization-Dharma: “he who awakened by himself has returned to the excellent stillness, and those who upheld that teaching have for the most part perished after him; the world is without refuge and has lost the several virtues, and with no hook to check delusion, delusion turns at its own will.” The figure “no hook to check delusion” is exceedingly weighty — the afflictions are like a maddened elephant, which there was from the outset a hook to check, and now the hook is gone.
The third is the exhortation to study: “since you know that the lifespan of the Tathāgata’s true Dharma is sinking away by degrees and is now as though it had reached the throat, and since this is the very time when the force of these afflictions increases, you should seek liberation and not be heedless.” The three graphs “as though it had reached the throat” are the last comparison of the whole treatise — life is in the gullet, and only one breath is left.
Only when these three are read together with the one before does the intent of the whole treatise’s closing appear. The one before says “the right principle for adjudicating the dharma rests in the Sage”; these three say that the Sage has passed away and those fit to bear witness are scattered. Put together they are a sentence never said outright: the one who could adjudicate is no longer here, and so you should all the more go and practice yourself, rather than wait for an adjudicator to appear. The last line, “one should seek liberation and not be heedless,” is not a formula of exhortation; it is the conclusion of this whole stretch of reasoning.
The easy error: to read these four stanzas as a piece of feeling appended at the end of the book. They are formal passages with outlines to rest upon — the ancient masters uniformly outline them as the two sections “the purport of the treatise’s composition” and “the lament and the exhortation to study,” a part of the structure of the whole treatise and not an appendix.
In practice: reading the dharma-numbers of thirty fascicles this far, the author with his own hand pushes the reader out of the book — the dharma-gates have been analyzed to the end, the true Dharma is sinking away, and the force of the afflictions is increasing; what is to be done at this very moment is not to read it once more but to go and seek liberation.
Further Resonances: A Mirror of Three Commentaries
What is recorded below is the adjudication and the divergences of the ancient masters, of the earlier translation, and of the two treatises of the disputation, upon this chapter. Recorded together without adjudication.
1. The Three Commentaries Each Divide the Chapter Differently at the Chapter Level
The four boundaries the three of them mark are entirely the same (the absorptions relied upon, the merits that rely upon them, the abiding of the true Dharma in the world, the purport of the treatise’s composition), and yet the number of their divisions differs. Puguang and Yuanhui both make a threefold division at the chapter level — the merits of absorption, the abiding of the true Dharma, the purport of the composition — and open the merits of absorption below into the two of relied upon and relying. Fabao at the head of the chapter says himself that it is twofold — “the main text of this chapter has two: first the absorption upon which the virtues rely, second the merits of the remaining kinds” — yet the outline numbers of his own text run all the way to a fourth (second, the merits relying on absorption; third, the time the Dharma abides; fourth, the purport of the treatise). One and the same commentator using two divisions, recorded without adjudication.
The widest gap in the subdivision beneath the eight attainments: Puguang and Yuanhui make only the twofold division of general and separate explanation, while Fabao alone opens twelve — the difference of the three, pure and the rest; how many factors each possesses; the unmoving; how many feelings; the borrowing of consciousness; the two ways of obtaining; mutual production; the body relied upon; the object taken; cutting off the afflictions; the preliminary stages; and the intermediate absorption. The order of gates used in the main text above fits this line of Fabao’s most closely.
2. Why Pliancy and the Equanimity That Is a Formation Are Each Assigned to Two Levels — the Two Commentaries Rest upon Different Reasons
To one and the same question the two commentaries give different reasons. Puguang answers by adducing the Mahāvibhāṣā, taking strength of function and what is counteracted — “in the first and second, pliancy is strong in function, and by its nature lifting up, it counteracts torpor; in the third and fourth, the equanimity that is a formation is strong in function, and being sunken and still, it counteracts restlessness” — with the addition, “in order to counteract the five consciousnesses and the coarse heaviness of the body they draw forth, pliancy is established in the first absorption.” Yuanhui sets up his own question and answer, taking the object of the relinquishing — “the third absorption relinquishes the utmost joy and the fourth the utmost pleasure, and so the equanimity that is a formation is established; and since the first two do not establish it, pliancy is established.”
In the same place Yuanhui also sets up two questions in a row, supplying two reasons the prose of this treatise does not reach: that confidence extends to all levels and yet is established as a factor only in the second meditative absorption is because “the arising of a dominant pure confidence must depend upon a great joy, and the second meditative absorption has an excellent joy”; and that discernment extends to all levels and yet only in the third absorption is discernment established as a factor is because there is there a feeling of pleasure and it is feared one may cling to it. The two commentaries each make a line of their own, recorded together without adjudication.
3. The Sūtra Says Four Calamities and the Treatise Says Eight — Puguang’s Two Reconciliations
This treatise says the calamities are eight, while the sūtra says only the four of “not moved by applied thought, sustained thought, joy, and pleasure.” Puguang gives two explanations: one is the implied sense — “yet in the sūtra it is said with an implied sense: the fourth meditative absorption is not moved by applied thought, sustained thought, joy, and pleasure. It is said only with regard to the factors and does not speak of what is not a factor” (the sūtra speaks only of the factors, and in-breath and out-breath are not factors and so are not listed); the other is “the sūtra does not state the principle exhaustively; the treatise states it exhaustively. Thus.” Yuanhui sets up no reconciliation and simply lists the eight names — “namely applied thought, sustained thought, grief, suffering, joy, pleasure, out-breath, and in-breath” — thereby making good that “the four feelings” of the stanza are grief, suffering, joy, and pleasure. The presence or absence of a reconciliation differs in the two, and it is recorded only, without adjudication.
4. The Number of Classes in Cultivating Loving-Kindness — Puguang Records a Finer Division Alongside
This treatise says that in cultivating loving-kindness there are seven classes (three of the dear, one in between, three of the hostile). Puguang here records alongside the division of another line: “if one follows the Correct Principle, in cultivating each of the four immeasurables there are nine classes, the middle being opened into three besides.” Yuanhui does not alter the number of classes but supplies the measure for the three classes of the hostile — “the middle hostile is one who takes away one’s own life or the goods on which it depends; the low hostile is one who takes away the life of a friend or the goods on which it depends” — which the prose of this treatise does not give. The seven classes and the nine are recorded together, without adjudication.
5. Beneath the Three Gates of Liberation, Puguang Has a Further Table
The treatise says that the portion of the three concentrations which is without outflows is called the three gates of liberation. Besides the gloss on the name Puguang brings out a further table, fixing one by one what each takes as object — “if emptiness is with outflows it takes all dharmas as object; if emptiness is without outflows it takes the truth of suffering alone as object. Wishlessness can take as object the truths of suffering, origin, and path. Signlessness takes the truth of cessation alone for its object” — with the addition of a sentence of position, “dharmas with outflows are not true gates of liberation, since standing by nature within the world they run counter to liberation.” Yuanhui in the same place stops at the gloss on the name. A difference of fullness, recorded only, without adjudication.
6. The Assignment of the Four Closing Stanzas — Fabao Alone Makes a Line of His Own
The outlines of Puguang and Yuanhui are nearly word for word the same, both making the twofold division “lamenting the persons, exhorting to the dharma,” and opening it further into “properly lamenting the persons, restating the lament.” Fabao makes a line of his own, reading it as an assignment of three stanzas — “below there are three stanzas, the third of the main text, exhorting to study, the section of dissemination” — and assigning them one by one, “the first stanza laments the teaching-Dharma, the next laments the realization-Dharma, the third exhorts to seek the realization-Dharma”; and he brings out besides one sentence dating it, “at the time the author composed the treatise, within nine hundred years after the Buddha’s nirvāṇa, both the teaching and the realization of the true Dharma were about to perish.” Fabao also gives a concrete explanation of the three graphs “has long since closed” — “it is toward a thousand years since the great Master’s nirvāṇa, and so it says long closed.” The three are recorded together, without adjudication.
7. The Threefold Division into Preface, Main Doctrine, and Dissemination — the Ancient Masters Themselves Record Two Explanations Together
Into which of the three divisions of the whole treatise the two great passages at the end of this chapter (the abiding of the true Dharma, the purport of the composition) fall, the ancient masters have two explanations, and Puguang himself records both. The first explanation reckons the section of the main doctrine all the way to the Chapter on Refuting the Self, the section of dissemination beginning from the end of that chapter; by this explanation, “though the lament and exhortation at the end of the Chapter on Absorption stand before the main doctrine, they are also called main doctrine.” The second explanation stops the main doctrine at the Chapter on Absorption — “from the end of the Chapter on Absorption, ‘the various dharma-gates analyzed above’ onward, the whole is called dissemination” — and the Chapter on Refuting the Self, standing after the dissemination, is also called dissemination. Puguang restates the two explanations within the chapter as well, saying word for word, “if the three divisions of preface, main doctrine, and dissemination, then by the former explanation . . . and again by the former explanation . . .” Yuanhui at the same boundary adjudges the second explanation word for word — “from here, the second of the main text, the abiding of the true Dharma; if the sense be set out by three divisions, what follows is the section of dissemination.”
By the second explanation, the sentence “the various dharma-gates analyzed above” is the starting point of the section of dissemination of the whole treatise. This is a boundary far larger than the number of its characters. The two explanations stand together in the ancient transmission and Puguang himself does not adjudicate; this section records them as they stand, and the choice belongs to the translator.
8. Shentai’s Commentary Is Wholly Wanting for This Chapter
Shentai’s Commentary on the Abhidharmakośa is a fragment, and the seven fascicles extant do not include this chapter. On actual search, the four graphs “the Chapter Analyzing Absorption” and the first stanza of this chapter, “meditative absorption is of four, each of two,” both yield zero. The want is marked as it stands, and the text of other fascicles is not made to stand for it. Only the general conspectus of the whole treatise in his first fascicle still records the phrase “the Chapter on Absorption, thirty-nine lines,” which agrees with the stanza count of this treatise — but that is the text of a general table, not a passage-by-passage commentary on this chapter, and may not be made to stand for commentary.
9. The Divergences of Paramārtha’s Earlier Translation
Paramārtha’s Expository Treatise on the Treasury of Abhidharma makes a line of its own upon this chapter, and even the chapter title differs — he gives “the Chapter Analyzing Samāpatti,” a full transcription without translation of the sense, while Xuanzang renders the sense as “absorption.” To search Paramārtha’s version with Xuanzang’s chapter name will never find it. The two versions divide their fascicles differently too: this chapter in Paramārtha occupies exactly one whole fascicle and the Chapter on Refuting the Self as Spoken of begins at the head of the next, so that Paramārtha’s version has no chapter boundary in mid-fascicle; Xuanzang’s version has this chapter across two fascicles and changes chapters in mid-fascicle.
The renderings make a line of their own. One-pointedness upon a single object he gives as “of a single class”; the five aggregates as “the five skandhas”; applied and sustained thought as “awareness and observation”; without outflows as “without flow”; savoring as “relishing the savor”; the feeling of joy as “the faculty that suits the mind”; calamity as “fault”; the bases of mastery as “masteries entered”; the totalities as “totalities entered.” Even the transcriptions of absorption divide into two words — the chapter title uses “samāpatti” and the entity of absorption “samādhi,” and in one place besides he records the transcription of meditative absorption, “dhyāna.” The two words teaching and realization he gives as “the true teaching” and “the true attainment through practice,” with the transcription “adhigama” appended; and the names of the three baskets Xuanzang renders by sense (the sūtras, the discipline, the Abhidharma) while Paramārtha transcribes them (sūtra, vinaya, abhidharma).
One divergence of opening and gathering. For the reason the four immeasurables obtain their name, Xuanzang gives three counts (an immeasurable object, immeasurable merit drawn forth, an immeasurable result drawn down) and Paramārtha only two (taking immeasurable living beings as object, drawing down an immeasurable maturational result), leaving out the item “drawing forth immeasurable merit.” Recorded together without adjudication.
One place where the conclusion agrees and the fullness differs. That the pleasure of the first two meditative absorptions is pliancy and not the feeling of pleasure — on this conclusion the two versions agree, and Paramārtha gives, “in the first and second absorptions, pliancy is called pleasure.” But Xuanzang’s version records a long exchange below it, and Paramārtha’s opening and gathering differ from it; the passage-by-passage correspondence has not yet been collated in detail, and the fact is recorded as it stands.
The place that matters most is a divergence of attachment. The four closing stanzas in seven-character lines at the end of this chapter are attached to the end of the Chapter on Absorption by Xuanzang’s version, by the separate edition of the root stanzas, by Puguang, and by Yuanhui; Paramārtha’s version, however, places “the world-eye of the great Master has closed . . . seek release and be not heedless” at the head of the fascicle of the Chapter on Refuting the Self as Spoken of. One and the same set of stanzas, and the two versions attach it to different chapters. This collection has already adjudged to follow the three commentaries (attaching it to the end of the Chapter on Absorption), and the divergent attachment is recorded together without adjudication.
10. Saṅghabhadra’s Refutations in His Two Treatises
Saṅghabhadra’s two treatises use the stanzas of this treatise and compose a separate prose exposition, and so they too have a “Chapter Adjudicating Absorption.” In the chapter numbers of the two treatises there is one difference: the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle gives “the Chapter Adjudicating Absorption, the eighth,” the same as this treatise; the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine gives “the Chapter Adjudicating Absorption, the ninth,” the chapter number moved back by one — this is the form of the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine throughout (its Chapter on Knowledge is likewise the eighth where this treatise has the seventh), and is not peculiar to this chapter. The opening prose of the chapter in the two treatises is word for word the same.
Within the range of this chapter the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle speaks of “the Sūtra-master” (that is, the author of this treatise) in four places. The first is the question and answer he sets up for himself upon one-pointedness upon a single object — “here the Sūtra-master raises a question and answer of his own: what is called one-pointedness upon a single object? It is being intent upon a single object”; the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine has a word-for-word counterpart. The second is the factor of pleasure — “the Sūtra-master here adduces another’s account for the sake of argument, namely that there is decidedly no mental faculty of pleasure; the factor of pleasure spoken of in the three meditative absorptions” — Saṅghabhadra marking the party the author had adduced as “another’s account adduced for the sake of argument.” The third is the place where his refutation is most explicit — “the bodily feeling of pleasure. Hence it is known that pleasure is not just pliancy; the refutation of this is as before with what the Sūtra-master adduced. Yet what he says, that if it were pliancy in entity it should be called by the name pliancy, this account is contrary to principle” — where Saṅghabhadra says outright “contrary to principle.” The fourth is a statement of background — “the Sūtra-master here sets out his own original intent” — citing the very ground of composition stated in the first closing stanza.
In the second, third, and fourth places no counterpart is found in the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine — it is an abridgment of the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle, far briefer in extent, and such abridgment is the constant of its form; it is recorded as a zero result as it stands, and the text of other places is not made to stand for it.
There is one further fact of form: neither treatise takes in the four closing stanzas in seven-character lines at the end of this chapter (the four graphs “the great Master’s world-eye” yield zero in both). Those four are the author’s own statement of purport and his lament, and a separately composed treatise of course does not take them. Recorded as it stands, without adjudication.
In every place above where two parties stand opposed, the two parties are recorded only and which prevails is not adjudicated. What Saṅghabhadra establishes and on what principle, what the author establishes and on what principle, this section has done its best to make clear; as to which is right and which wrong, that is not in this section, and not in this piece.