俱舍論 義疏通講 · 冊4Abhidharmakośabhāṣya · Exposition Throughout · Vol. 4

Before Reading This Fascicle

The Chapter on the World took four fascicles to finish its account of the twofold world, of sentient beings and of the receptacle. This fascicle opens with a single sentence: “by what are differences such as these produced?” — the author turns on the heel of one question, and the whole Kośa walks out of “what the world looks like” into “why the world is as it is.” Puguang’s Record, explaining at the head of the chapter why it comes in this order, says that “the reason action is explained next is that the previous chapter explained results and this chapter explains causes; a result does not arise alone but must arise in dependence upon a cause, and as regards the result action is the nearer, and so action is spoken of next” — the previous chapter treated results, this chapter treats causes; a result does not arise all by itself but must rely upon a cause, and action is nearer to the result than the afflictions are, and so action is spoken of first.

The skeleton of this fascicle is really just two words: entity and dispute. First the entity of action is established (volition and what volition brings about; the three actions of body, speech, and mind; the manifest and the nonmanifest), and then the two great disputes are entered — what the entity of bodily manifest action is, and whether the nonmanifest really exists at all. The two disputes together take up more than half of the Chinese text of this fascicle, and are among the densest places of question and answer in the whole treatise. One should be prepared before reading: what is going on here is not the handing down of a verdict but making the reasons of each of the two parties clear. In the midst of the dispute the author himself says the single most important sentence in it — “this and that are alike hard to know, and here I bear no grudge against either.” Both sides are hard to know; toward neither do I bear ill will. That sentence sets the key of the whole fascicle.

There is one more thing to say first. A technical pair of words recurs throughout this fascicle: manifest and nonmanifest. The manifest is that portion of a bodily or verbal act which is displayed outwardly and which others can see; the nonmanifest is that portion which arises along with the act, is not displayed outwardly, and yet is able to continue on. Everything argued in the fascicle — “does it exist?” and “what is it?” — turns over and over upon these two words. Set these two words firmly in place, and the whole fascicle’s questions and answers have something to hang from.

I. By What Are the Differences of the World Produced

〔1.1〕First strike out the item “creator.” First the question: why does the world have so many differences? The treatise answers with the utmost bluntness — “they do not arise from a single lord who first conceived them, but arise from the differences in the actions of sentient beings.” It is not that some sovereign first stirred a thought and thereafter made them; it is only that the actions of sentient beings severally differ. This one sentence occupies a weighty place in the whole treatise: it hands the enormous panorama described throughout the Chapter on the World back, at one stroke, to sentient beings themselves.

The easy error: to read “a single lord” as a general term for “some cause.” It is not. “A single lord” means that class of account which maintains an eternally abiding creator; what the author blocks is “one maker who first conceives,” not “cause” itself — for action is precisely the cause.

In practice: in reading Abhidharma, when you meet “why is it thus?”, the first step is not to ask “who arranged it?” but to ask “whose action drew it?” Make that exchange, and all the classifications and numbers that follow will be entered in the ledger of practice.

〔1.2〕Why the inner body is ugly and the outer goods lovely — two faces of one set of actions. The treatise inserts here an excellent objection: since both alike arise from action, why are saffron and sandalwood, which are outside the body, so lovely, while the form within the body “constantly runs impurity from the nine sores”? The answer is: “because the class of actions of sentient beings is just so.” If what was done was mixed action (wholesome and unwholesome mingled), then the inner body obtained is exactly of this sort; and in order to counteract just this portion, the same set of actions further “obtains outward goods whose color, scent, taste, and touch are most lovely and delightful.” As for the gods, “the hosts of gods do purely pure actions, and so the two things they draw to themselves are both excellent” — the action being pure, inner and outer are both excellent.

First ask: what is this passage proving? It is proving that “being obtained by action” is not one coarse line but a fine-grained ledger: in one and the same person the inner body and the outer goods may be obtained by one and the same set of actions and yet be opposite in quality, simply because the action itself is mixed. The easy error: to read it as a fixed apportionment, “the beautiful to the outside, the ugly to the inside.” It is not — the sentence about the gods is precisely the counter-instance: if the action is pure, inner and outer are both excellent.

In practice: this passage yields a very serviceable self-examination — when you see the unevenness between yourself and your surroundings, think first “my action is mixed,” and not “the world has treated me unfairly.”

〔1.3〕What the entity of action is: volition, and what volition brings about. The author poses himself the question “what is the entity of this action by which they come about,” and answers himself: “it is the volition that arises in the mind, together with what volition brings about,” and adduces a sūtra in proof: “hence the sūtra says: there are two kinds of action, first the action that is volition, second the action of having willed; and the action of having willed refers to what volition brings about.”

First ask: why divide it into two kinds? Because action has two stages, “still in the mind” and “already carried out.” The action that is volition is the stretch within the mind; the action of having willed is the stretch that the mind has brought to completion. The later text distinguishes the two most clearly: what arises at the stage of preliminary effort is the “deliberating volition” — I should do such a thing; what arises once one has deliberated is the “volition that does the deed,” which moves the body and issues speech in accordance with what was deliberated before. The easy error: to read “volition” as ordinary “thinking.” It is one of the mental factors, and its sense is doing; and precisely because it is a doing, it can serve as the entity of action.

In practice: this division into two is the ground floor of all the treatments of action that follow. Whenever, further on, you read of the ten paths of action or the five deeds of immediate retribution and ask “does this constitute an action or not?”, turn back and ask one question: is it in the stretch of the action that is volition, or has it gone on to the action of having willed?

〔1.4〕How the three actions can be established as three — three different measures. The two actions are opened out again into three: body, speech, and mind. The author sets up a very severe objection here: on what ground are three established? From their support, from their own nature, or from what raises them? And he walks each of the three roads himself, and none of them is passable — if from their support, all action depends upon the body, and then there would be only one action; if from their own nature, of the three only speech is of itself a doing, and then speech alone would be action; if from what raises them, all action is raised by mind, and then again there would be only one action.

The answer lies with the Vaibhāṣikas: “the Vaibhāṣika masters say that the three actions are established, in that same order, by the three causes above.” That is to say — the three actions are not measured out with one and the same measure: bodily action is established from its support (all action alike depends upon the body, but bodily action alone takes the body as the name of its support); verbal action is established from its own nature (speech is itself a doing, and its nature as action is just speech); mental action is established from what raises it (mind is that which raises, and the two actions of body and speech are both raised by mind). The author at once draws the conclusion: “the volition that arises in the mind is mental action; and the action that volition brings about divides into the two, bodily action and verbal action, since these are raised by volition.”

The easy error: to suppose that because none of the three roads was passable, the three actions cannot be established. Quite the contrary — the treatise here demonstrates a standing rule of Abhidharma: one and the same set of enumerated dharmas may be established separately by different criteria. Whenever the numbers of a classification fail to agree, the first question is not “who is wrong?” but “which measure was each of these items taken with?”

In practice: the move will be used once more later in this fascicle — the four causes of the four wholesome and four unwholesome (ultimate · intrinsic · associated · raised) run on exactly the same line of thought.

II. Bodily and Verbal Action Both Extend to the Manifest and the Nonmanifest

〔2.1〕One line of stanza, two worlds. “These two, bodily action and verbal action, both alike have the nature of the manifest and the nonmanifest” — ten characters. First ask: why should this one line be set up as half a stanza of its own? Because at one breath it cuts each of the two actions, bodily and verbal, into halves: the half that can be seen (the manifest) and the half that cannot (the nonmanifest). Every dispute in the rest of the fascicle hangs upon this one cut.

The easy error: to understand the nonmanifest as “a thought in the mind.” It is not — for the Sarvāstivādins the nonmanifest is a form-dharma, a form invisible and unresistant, gathered under the sphere of dharmas; it is neither mind nor a mental factor. It is precisely because it is adjudged a form that a challenge such as “the nonmanifest has no characteristic of form” arises (how can what has no characteristic of form count as form?), and precisely for that reason there is the great dispute in the latter half of this fascicle.

In practice: on reaching this point, set a question in your mind at once — “on what ground does a thing invisible, untouchable, and without resistance count as form?” That question is the fuse of the fascicle’s second half.

III. Bodily Manifest Action Is Shape, Not Motion

〔3.1〕The correct position of the Sarvāstivādins: the force of volition raises a bodily shape. The treatise first sets out the account of its own school: “by the force of volition, such and such a shape further arises in the body, and this is called bodily manifest action.” Puguang’s Record marks this sentence as “setting out the Sarvāstivādins and displaying the tenet of his own masters” — telling the reader plainly that this sentence is the author narrating the Sarvāstivādins’ own school, and is not language refuting another.

First ask: since bodily manifest action is a movement, why is its entity said to be “shape” and not “motion”? Because in the Sarvāstivādins’ scheme of dharma-characteristics, what the eye faculty can apprehend is only visible color (blue, yellow, red, white) and shape-form (long, short, square, round, and the rest); and if a movement is to have an entity, it can fall only into the square of shape-form. So the Sarvāstivādins say: as soon as volition sets things going, such and such shapes further arise in the body, and these shapes are bodily manifest action.

The easy error: to imagine “shape” as a process of change in physical form. What the treatise establishes is a shape at each single moment, not a stretch of continuous movement. In practice: this very point is the fuse laid for the refutation of “motion” in the next passage — continuous movement cannot serve as an entity precisely because dharmas have only moments.

〔3.2〕What the school that is refuted says. The treatise records the divergent account: “some other school says: motion is called bodily manifest action, since when the body moves it is by action that it moves.” This school maintains that the true bodily manifest action is “motion” itself — when the body moves, it is action that makes it move, and so motion is action. The three ancient commentaries agree entirely in their attribution here: Puguang’s Record marks it, “‘some other master says’ down to ‘not motion’ explains the second line. Some others, the Sāṃmitīyas, say: there is a separate moving form going from here to there, and that is called bodily manifest action”; Fabao’s Commentary marks it, “refuting the Sāṃmitīyas’ holding that motion is called bodily manifest action. ‘Since when the body moves it is by action that it moves’ is the Sāṃmitīyas’ reckoning. The body has no moments”; and Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary marks it, “‘action; not motion for its entity’: the Sāṃmitīyas say motion is called bodily manifest action, and in order to refute this it says ‘not motion.’”

First ask: how does this school dare to establish “motion”? Because they do not grant that all dharmas cease momentarily — Fabao’s Commentary puts a finger on it in one line: “the body has no moments.” If the body does not cease momentarily, then there is something that moves from this place to that, and that is motion. The easy error: to suppose this a mere quarrel over names. It is not — it is the opposition of two views of time: on one side, dharmas cease as soon as they arise and there is no room at all for movement; on the other, dharmas can persist, and so there is real movement.

In practice: whenever hereafter you meet a dispute over “does such and such really exist,” look first at whether the two sides agree in their view of “the moment”; where they do not, what is being argued is not that thing at all, but time.

〔3.3〕The author’s counterstroke is a single sentence: all conditioned things have moments. The author refutes with the utmost economy: “it is in order to refute this that it says ‘not motion,’ since all conditioned dharmas have moments.” He then defines the moment: “having obtained its own entity, it perishes with nothing intervening; a dharma that has this moment is called ‘having a moment,’ just as a man with a staff is called ‘having a staff’” — having obtained its own entity, it perishes without one thought-instant intervening, and a dharma possessing that nature is called “having a moment,” just as a man holding a staff is called a man having a staff. He presses one step further: “conditioned dharmas, as soon as they obtain their own entity, must from that point, with nothing intervening, perish into nonexistence”; and since “if it arises in this place it ceases in this place,” there is “no opportunity to shift from here to another quarter.”

First ask: what is that simile of the man with a staff saying? It is saying that “having a moment” is a designation carrying an attribute — a dharma carries the attribute “perishing as soon as it obtains its entity,” and so is called having a moment, just as a man carries a staff and so is called a man having a staff. The easy error: to read “moment” as a unit of extremely short time. Here it is not a stretch of time but a property.

In practice: this definition is the sentence most often cited back to throughout the fascicle; the treatments of the continuity of the nonmanifest and of the raising and the concurrent raising in the fascicle’s second half all presuppose it.

IV. Cessation Awaits No Cause — the Hardest Inference in the Fascicle

〔4.1〕The pivot sentence of the demonstration. That school retreats a step to save itself: “if all conditioned dharmas have moments, then the sense that they do not shift to another quarter can indeed be established” — first prove that “conditioned dharmas all have moments,” and then I will grant your conclusion. The proof the author gives is a single sentence: “that is, the cessation of conditioned dharmas awaits no cause. Why so? What awaits a cause is a result; cessation is a nonexistence, and a nonexistence is not a result, and so it awaits no cause.”

First ask: what is this sentence inferring? The inference is very short: what needs a cause is a “result”; and “cessation” is a kind of “nonexistence,” and a nonexistence is not a result; therefore cessation needs no cause. And since cessation needs no cause, there is nothing whatever to hold it back — and so it ceases as soon as it arises.

The author adds a further reverse inference: “if the first did not cease, the later ought to be the same, since the later and the first are equal in the nature of existing. And since there is a perishing later, one knows that the earlier was ceasing.” If the first thought-instant did not cease, the one after ought likewise not to cease, since the two are exactly alike in the single point of “existing”; and since later on there truly is a perishing, one can see that all along it was ceasing.

The easy error: to read “cessation is a nonexistence and a nonexistence is not a result” as “after cessation there is nothing at all.” What it says is that the event of ceasing is not itself a newly arisen thing, and so cause and effect cannot be laid over it. In practice: this is one of the very few stretches of pure inference in the whole treatise, and it must be followed sentence by sentence and not by the feel of the language.

〔4.2〕The difficulty from direct perception: when firewood meets fire, is it not plainly extinguished? That school brings out direct perception: “is it not plainly seen in the world that firewood and the rest come to cessation and nonexistence through conjunction with fire?” — and adds a formidable line: no means of knowledge surpasses direct perception, and so one cannot say that all cessation awaits no cause.

The author questions back: “how do you know that firewood and the rest cease through conjunction with fire?” The other answers: because after the firewood is conjoined with fire it is no longer seen. Whereupon the author brings out the key distinction of the whole passage: not seeing admits of two explanations — is it because the fire extinguished it, or because the firewood before ceased of itself and what follows does not arise, so that, there being nothing there, it is not seen? The text offers a ready pair of instances: “as with the conjunction of wind with a lamp flame and of a hand with a bell’s sound” — wind blows on the lamp, a hand stops the bell, and the flame and the sound no longer continue; yet nobody would say that the wind and the hand “extinguished” them; they merely no longer arise.

First ask: why is this distinction fatal? Because the other party’s direct perception can establish only “it is not seen afterward,” and cannot establish “the fire made it cease”; and “not seen” accommodates both explanations. Hence the author says: “therefore this sense must be made out by inference” — this matter can be settled only by reasoning and not by the eyes.

The easy error: to suppose the author is denying direct perception. He is not — he grants that you did indeed see that phenomenon, and only points out that your interpretation was not given you by direct perception. In practice: this is a discriminating method you can carry with you — tell apart “what I saw” and “my interpretation of what I saw.”

〔4.3〕Three alternative accounts, each refuted by the author. The opponent’s camp offers three further accounts, all of which the treatise records and refutes.

The first: “some hold that with a thought and a sound the earlier is the cause and the later ceases” — a thought and a sound being extinguished by the thought-instant that follows. The author refutes: “this too is unreasonable, since the two cannot be simultaneous,” and instances doubt and knowledge, pain and pleasure, greed and hatred: two dharmas whose own characteristics are opposed cannot be simultaneous; the earlier having ceased, the later then arises — so where is there anything to extinguish it? And there is a further pursuit that is very neat: “and by whom is the very last thought and sound extinguished?” The last thought-instant has no successor; by what should it cease?

The second and third: “some hold that the cessation of a lamp flame has the nonexistence of abiding for its cause” (taking the mark of abiding as the cause of cessation) and “some hold that when a flame ceases it is by the power of dharma and non-dharma” (taking the power of dharma and non-dharma as the cause of cessation). Puguang’s Record marks the provenance of the latter two very clearly: of the first, “this is the reckoning of the Elders and the Sāṃmitīyas. ‘Abiding’ means the mark of abiding”; of the second, “this is a divergent reckoning of the Vaiśeṣikas. Dharma and non-dharma are gathered under the category of quality”; and the item of thought and sound is likewise marked, “this is a divergent master of the Vaiśeṣikas.” The author’s refutation is “both are unreasonable, since there is nothing that is not a cause” — for by such a reckoning one might at will contrive such a cause upon any conditioned dharma whatever, and then anyone may say anything and there is no settled standard; and once that is granted, “this being so, the original dispute ought to be laid to rest, since it is granted that without awaiting any other cause all have moments” — the dispute ends of itself, for both sides must then grant momentariness without an external cause.

The easy error: to take the three accounts for trivial side-matters. They are in fact three answers to one and the same question: does cessation require an external cause or not? In practice: hereafter in this fascicle, whenever you meet “does such a dharma require something else to accomplish it?”, these three refutations can serve as your template.

〔4.4〕The three grades of cooking-change: forcing the “productive cause” and the “extinguishing cause” to be one and the same. The author strikes heavily once more: if the cessation of firewood has conjunction with fire for its cause, then in the process of gradual alteration under cooking there are the three grades, low, middle, and high; at the very moment when the middle and high grades of cooking arise, the low and middle grades are ceasing. One and the same conjunction with fire produces on one side and extinguishes on the other — “the entity of the productive cause would become the extinguishing cause.” And the author blocks the line of retreat as well: even granting that where the flames differ one might contrive to distinguish two causes, then “where ash, snow, vinegar, sun, water, and earth are conjoined and can make cooking-change arise in firewood and the rest, how will you contrive to reckon the productive and the extinguishing causes as different?” Ash, snow, vinegar, sun, water, and earth can all bring about cooking-change; is each of them to be fitted out with an extinguishing cause of its own?

The opponent’s last question is very concrete: “if that is so, when it is plainly seen that water boiled dwindles away, what does the conjunction of fire accomplish in it?” Water boiled to dryness — surely the fire did something. The author’s answer is superb: the conjunction with fire strengthens the fire element, and the strengthening of the fire element “makes the mass of water arise ever more slightly in each successive stage, until at the slightest it no longer continues” — fire attends only to “making what arises afterward less each time”; it has never “extinguished” anything.

First ask: why does this answer count as a victory? Because it gives “fire has a function” a complete place, while dispensing with the role of “extinguishing cause.” The easy error: to read it as “fire does nothing.” What the author says is that what fire performs is the work of producing (making the later instants ever slighter), not the work of extinguishing.

In practice: and so the whole passage closes — “therefore there is no cause that makes dharmas cease; dharmas cease of themselves, since it is their nature to perish,” “since they have moments, motion is definitely nonexistent,” and at last back to the topic: “since by this principle motion is definitely nonexistent, that bodily manifest action is shape is established in principle.” As for why people feel that something is moving, the author accounts for that too: like the flame of burning grass spreading along, it is merely “a conceit of superiority about traveling” — an illusion that there is a “going.”

V. Whether Shape-Form Really Exists — Eight Rounds between the Sautrāntikas and the Sarvāstivādins

〔5.1〕The author changes sides. The previous engagement over, the author turns about at once: “yet the Sautrāntikas say: shape is not really existent; that is, where visible color arises abundantly on one side of a mass, just therein a long form is conventionally established . . .” — long, short, square, and round are no more than four arrangements of visible color arising abundantly on one side, sparsely on one side, abundantly on all four sides, or pervading throughout, each given a name. The treatise offers an instance everyone has experienced: a torch swung swiftly in one direction is called “long”; whirled about in a circle, it is called “round” — “therefore shape has no real form-entity of a further kind.”

The three commentaries adjudge this passage identically: Puguang’s Record marks, “‘yet the Sautrāntikas say’ down to ‘a form-entity of a further kind’: from here the author sets out the Sautrāntika sense and refutes the Sarvāstivādins”; Fabao’s Commentary marks, “‘yet the Sautrāntikas say’ down to ‘to be understood as applicable’: the author sets out the Sautrāntika sense and refutes the Sarvāstivādins”; Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary marks, “this is the Sautrāntika school declaring its refutation of the Sarvāstivāda school’s really existent shape-form. Hence the treatise says: yet the Sautrāntika masters hold shape not to be really existent.”

First ask: what is likeliest to leave a reader dizzy here? The change of identity. In the previous engagement the author stood with the Sarvāstivādins to refute the Sāṃmitīyas; in this one he stands with the Sautrāntikas to refute the Sarvāstivādins. The easy error: to suppose the author contradicts himself. He does not — this is precisely the form of the Kośa, and the Life of Master Vasubandhu records his manner of composing it as “establishing the sense of the Sarvāstivādins and, wherever there was a partial position, refuting it with the sense of the Sautrāntikas”: taking the Sarvāstivādins as the ground, and where a thing will not hold, refuting it with Sautrāntika doctrine.

In practice: whenever hereafter you come to a stretch of dispute, ask first, “on which side is the author standing in this stretch?”; the three commentaries almost always mark it expressly, and are the most reliable of signposts.

〔5.2〕The difficulty of apprehension by two faculties — if shape really exists, it will be apprehended by two faculties. The Sautrāntikas’ first difficulty is a very clean reduction to absurdity: “if it be said that there really exists a further kind of shape-form, then one form ought to be apprehended by two faculties” — if long, short, square, and round have an entity besides, then on one and the same mass of form the eye sees its length and the body can also feel out its length, and one and the same form is apprehended by two faculties, the eye and the body; whereas by the Abhidharma scheme of characteristics, “in principle no form-sphere is apprehended by two faculties.” Puguang’s Record explains the line of the reasoning sentence by sentence, saying, “this explains the stanza’s eighth line, ‘since it would be apprehended by two faculties.’ The Sautrāntika masters say: your standing tenet . . .” and so on, pointing out that the Sautrāntikas are striking back with the Sarvāstivādins’ own standing tenet.

First ask: how do the Sarvāstivādins save themselves? They answer: what is felt is in fact only touch, not shape; it is only because touch and shape are in one mass and inseparable from each other that on apprehending touch one can recollect shape — just as seeing the color of fire one recollects its warmth, or smelling a flower’s scent one recollects its color. Puguang’s Record marks this as “‘touch and shape’ down to ‘can recollect the flower’s color’: the Sarvāstivādins save their position.”

The easy error: to read “recollect” as vague association. The Sarvāstivādins’ rescue has a strict condition — “the two dharmas here are definitely inseparable, and so by apprehending one the other can be recollected”: the two dharmas must be definitely inseparable. That very condition is where the next difficulty applies its leverage.

〔5.3〕The Sautrāntikas strike back and the Sarvāstivādins save themselves again. The Sautrāntikas fasten at once on that condition: “there is no touch definitely inseparable from shape; how then can apprehending touch recollect shape with certainty?” — touch and shape are not definitely inseparable (one and the same touch may go with different shapes); on what ground do you recollect shape with certainty from touch? Puguang’s Record marks this as “down to ‘can recollect shape’: the Sautrāntikas object.” The Sautrāntikas press one layer further: if the two are not definitely in one mass and yet shape can still be recollected from touch, then visible color too ought to be recollected with certainty from touch; or else shape-form too ought to be as indefinite as visible color, and then on apprehending touch one ought not to know shape — “but in fact it is not so.” And they add an instance: many shapes are seen upon brocade; are there then many real shapes in one place?

The Sautrāntikas change tack again and strike from the side of atoms: “again, whatever is a real form with resistance must have real atoms of a further kind of its own. Yet there is no atom called long and the rest” — every real form with resistance ought to have atoms of its own class, yet there has never been an atom called “long”; and so long and short can only be “conventionally established within the differing marks of many things arrayed in such and such a way.” Puguang’s Record marks it, “‘again, whatever there is’ down to ‘conventionally establishing long and the rest’: the Sautrāntikas object again.”

The Sarvāstivādins save themselves again: then let it be said that the atoms of shape-form arrayed in this way are called long and the rest. The Sautrāntikas cite this and refute it: “this is mere partisanship, since it is not thoroughly granted” — it is only a statement partial to one’s own school, and the two parties do not grant it in common; for shape-form has no atoms whose own characteristic is thoroughly granted, as visible color has, and whence then the “assembling and arraying”? Puguang’s Record marks this as “‘if it be said that just by’ down to ‘assembled and arrayed’: the Sautrāntikas cite the Sarvāstivādins’ rescue and refute it.”

The Sarvāstivādins offer a further instance from daily life: “is it not plainly seen that earthen vessels and the like have their visible appearance alike while their shapes differ” — the same color of clay, and yet the vessel-shapes differ (from which it appears that shape has an entity of its own). Puguang’s Record marks it, “‘is it not plainly seen’ down to ‘while their shapes differ’: the Sarvāstivādins save their position.” The Sautrāntikas answer beautifully: is this not exactly what I said — “as with many ants, whose appearance is no different, and yet arrayed in a line or in a ring their shape differs”; every ant in a swarm looks the same, and yet ranged in a line or in a ring the shape differs. Puguang’s Record marks it, “‘has it not already been made out’ down to ‘ought in principle to be so’: the Sautrāntikas refute again.”

The last difficulty is the dark and the distance: looking at a tree stump in the dark or from afar, one makes out only its shape and not its color, from which it appears that shape exists independently of visible color. The Sautrāntikas explain it through: precisely because in the dark and at a distance the color cannot be seen clearly, one gives rise only to the discrimination of long and short; just as looking at a crowd of people from afar, one knows only that it is a marching army and not the several particular marks — “because at times one does not know visible color and shape and knows only a general mass.” Puguang’s Record marks it, “‘knows only a general mass’: the Sautrāntikas explain it through. Because in the dark and at a distance one looks at the mass of visible color.”

First ask: what is to be remembered from these eight rounds? Remember the criterion, not who won: the whole engagement argues one sentence only — are long, short, square, and round “another kind of thing,” or “an arrangement of the same kind of thing”? The easy error: to suppose one ought to pick a side when the reading is done. The treatise passes no sentence here, and the words of both parties stand in the treatise together.

In practice: this passage is one of the finest models of debate in the whole treatise. Whenever hereafter you meet any dispute over “does such and such really exist,” you can measure it with the three tools used here: can it be reduced to absurdity (apprehension by two faculties), does it have atoms of its own (the test of real form), and can it be explained away by differences of array (the test of conventional establishment)?

〔5.4〕What the Sautrāntikas establish as bodily manifest action — a one-sentence disclosure. The author closes with a question: “since both motion and shape have been set aside, what do you of the Sautrāntika school establish as bodily manifest action?” Motion refuted and real shape refuted, what do you establish? The Sautrāntikas answer: “we establish shape as bodily manifest action, but as a convention and not as a real thing.” Puguang’s Record marks it here with the utmost clarity: the question is “since the Sāṃmitīya masters’ motion as bodily manifest action and the Sarvāstivādins’ real shape as bodily manifest action have both been set aside, what do you of the Sautrāntika school establish,” and the answer is “‘we establish shape as bodily manifest action, but as a convention and not as a real thing’: the Sautrāntikas answer.”

First ask: what kind of answer is this? It is “keep the name in use, refuse the entity” — the name shape is retained to serve as bodily manifest action, but only conventionally established. This is the standing method of the Sautrāntikas.

Ask a layer deeper: what then is bodily action? The Sautrāntikas answer: “if action established in dependence upon the body is called bodily action, then the volition that can move the body in its various ways, proceeding by the gate of the body, is called bodily action” — the real action is that volition which can make the body perform its various movements; because it proceeds in dependence upon the gate that is the body, it is called bodily action. Verbal action and mental action likewise. Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary restates it here: “in the Sautrāntika school shape is bodily manifest action, a convention and not a real thing. Shape, though it is the manifest, is not action” — separating “manifest” and “action” with perfect clarity.

The easy error: to take “the three actions have volition for their entity” as the author’s settled position. In this fascicle it is one of two parties recorded; the Vaibhāṣikas at once conclude by reverting to their own school: “the Vaibhāṣika masters say: shape is really existent, and so bodily manifest action has shape-form for its entity, and the entity of verbal manifest action is just vocal sound.” Both accounts stand in the treatise.

In practice: this parting of ways is the fuse for the fascicle’s second half — precisely because the Sautrāntikas gather action up into volition, the nonmanifest will be turned by them into “a continuum of the seeds of volition”; the whole of the next great dispute grows out of here.

〔5.5〕If manifest action is definitely nonexistent, what of the nonmanifest — the Sautrāntikas answer a round for themselves first. At the end of this passage the treatise sets up three further questions, each tighter than the last. The first: since shape is conventional, “if that is so, manifest action is definitely nonexistent”; and manifest action being nonexistent, the nonmanifest of the desire realm ought also to be absent (since the nonmanifest arises in dependence upon the manifest), and “this becomes a great fault.” The Sautrāntikas answer: “such a great fault we have a principle by which to fend off” — from the two spoken of above, bodily manifest and verbal manifest, there arises by a superior volition a certain difference of volition, and this is called the nonmanifest. The second question: what fault is there in this? “This ought rather to be called action that turns along with the mind, since the nonmanifest of absorption turns together with the mind” — since your nonmanifest arises from volition, it ought to turn together with the mind at the same time; how then does it differ from the nonmanifest that turns along with the mind produced by absorption? The Sautrāntikas answer: “there is no such fault, since it is produced by the superior volition that resolves and the superior volition that sets in motion” — it is drawn forth by the resolving volition and the setting-in-motion volition, and is not of that class which turns together with the mind. And they add a conceding line: even granting that there is manifest action, manifest action too must rely upon the force of volition, “since its own nature is dull.”

First ask: why is the second question keen? Because it seizes the Sautrāntikas’ soft place — if you gather the nonmanifest up into volition, it becomes very hard to say that it does not turn along with the mind. The easy error: to read the Sautrāntikas’ answer as equivocation. Their distinction is in fact very clear: “being drawn forth by volition” and “turning together with the mind” are two different things; the former is a sequence of cause and effect, the latter a simultaneous co-arising.

Look again at one sentence within the first question — “if that is so, why does the sūtra say that there are two kinds of action?” The Sautrāntikas take the opening to redefine the action that is volition and the action of having willed: what arises at the stage of preliminary effort is the “deliberating volition,” what arises once one has deliberated is the “volition that does the deed,” and “doing the deed to be done in accordance with what was deliberated before, moving the body and issuing speech, is called the action of having willed.” ⇒ The Sautrāntikas have not thrown away the sūtra text; they have only shifted where the text comes down, from “form” to “volition.” In practice: to judge whether a school is “denying outright,” look at whether it has thrown away the sūtra text; one that has merely shifted where it comes down is not denying outright.

VI. Whether the Nonmanifest Really Exists — the Vaibhāṣikas’ Eight Proofs

〔6.1〕The stanza has only ten characters, and yet it is a table of contents. “Because it says three, and says form without outflows, and says increase, and says not doing, and so on” — it says three kinds of form, says form without outflows, says that (meritorious action) increases, says that (having another do a deed and) not doing it, and so on. First ask: why is the stanza so short? Because it is a list of evidence, not the argument itself; every word of it points to a passage of sūtra. Puguang’s Record, marking the Sautrāntikas’ refutations, numbers them one by one, saying “below, the Sautrāntikas refute the eight foregoing proofs; this is the refutation of the first proof”; and Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary likewise has “the eight proofs above prove the nonmanifest real. From here the Sautrāntikas explain the foregoing through” — all three count eight proofs.

The eight, set out, are these: ① the sūtra says form is of three kinds, and the third has form yet is invisible and unresistant — if it is not the nonmanifest, what is it? ② the sūtra says there is form without outflows — if it is not the nonmanifest, what form can be without outflows? ③ the sūtra says meritorious action increases, and it goes on increasing even when another mind has arisen or when there is no mind — without the nonmanifest, by what does it increase? ④ one dispatches another to do a deed and does not do it oneself, and yet a path of action is accomplished — without the nonmanifest, by what is it accomplished? ⑤ the sūtra says that the dharma sphere is invisible and unresistant and does not say “without form” — from which it appears that there is form within the dharma sphere. ⑥ without the nonmanifest, there being no speech and the rest in absorption, the eight limbs of the noble path fall short. ⑦ without the nonmanifest, after the precepts are received there is no entity of discipline continuing on, and on what ground is he still called a monk? ⑧ the sūtra says that the discipline of abstaining from killing and the rest is called “the discipline that is a dyke,” able to dam and hold back transgression for a long time — “a thing without entity cannot be called a dyke.”

The easy error: to read these eight as eight independent theses. They are in fact eight applications of one and the same method of inference: there is a slot standing empty in the sūtras, and only the nonmanifest will fit it. In practice: whenever hereafter you see an argument that “such a dharma must really exist,” look first whether it is of this type; if it is, there is only one way of refutation — find another thing that fits the slot as well.

〔6.2〕The author’s closing words and the sentence that lays the dispute to rest. The Vaibhāṣikas conclude: “by these proofs it is known that nonmanifest form really exists.” And after the whole train of refutation has ended, the author lays the dispute to rest with his own hand: “let these many disputes rest here for now”; whereupon the Vaibhāṣika masters conclude by reverting to their own school: “the Vaibhāṣika masters say: there is a real thing called nonmanifest form, and this is the tenet of my school.”

First ask: who says these two sentences, and what is the difference? The first is the author’s laying the dispute aside; the second is the Vaibhāṣikas declaring their own position. The treatise closes the passage with this and adds no sentence of judgment — and this is of the utmost importance: it is the standard form of “recording both parties without adjudication.”

The easy error: to read “this is the tenet of my school” as the author’s own confession. It is the Vaibhāṣikas’ confession; Puguang’s Record marks it here, “‘the Vaibhāṣika masters’ down to ‘the tenet of my school’: the Sarvāstivādins conclude by reverting to their own school.” In practice: when you meet the first person in reading a treatise, first make sure who is speaking — within this fascicle the word “I” changes owners at least twice.

VII. The Sautrāntikas Refute the Eight Proofs One by One

〔7.1〕The blanket denial, and the first pattern of refutation: find another thing to fill the slot. The Sautrāntikas’ blanket denial is a single sentence: “the Sautrāntika masters say: these proofs, though many and of all kinds of marvelousness, are nevertheless unreasonable.” Fabao’s Commentary marks it, “on the treatise’s ‘the Sautrāntika masters say’ down to ‘nevertheless unreasonable’: the Sautrāntikas deny the foregoing proofs — that there is a separate real entity of the nonmanifest is unreasonable.”

The method of refuting the first proof is just the “find another thing to fill the slot” spoken of above: the third kind of form, invisible and unresistant, may be the form in the object-field of absorption obtained by cultivating absorption — “the yogins say: when one cultivates the meditative absorptions, the form in the object-field of absorption produced by the force of absorption”; it is invisible because it is not the object-field of the eye faculty, and unresistant because it does not obstruct a place. Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary agrees entirely here, giving “as for the three forms, they are the form in the object-field of absorption and not nonmanifest form.”

The Sarvāstivādins at once turn and challenge: since it is invisible and unresistant, on what ground is it still called “form”? The Sautrāntikas answer very neatly: the explaining through of this difficulty is “the same as with the nonmanifest” — we are under one difficulty together; answer me as you answer yourself.

First ask: does this manner of answering, “the same difficulty,” count as evasion? It does not. It points out that the other party’s difficulty is a double-edged blade: if you can explain why the nonmanifest is form, I shall explain the form in the object-field of absorption with the same explanation. The easy error: to suppose that the Sautrāntikas have granted that the form in the object-field of absorption really exists. They say only that “this slot need not be filled by the nonmanifest alone.”

In practice: to refute an argument of the “only explanation” type, the standard technique is to supply a second explanation — one need not prove it better; it is enough to prove that it holds just as well, and the original argument’s claim of uniqueness lapses.

〔7.2〕The section on form without outflows: three accounts side by side and a short exchange. In refuting the second proof, the Sautrāntikas bring out first the yogins’ explanation: “within the form produced by the force of absorption, that produced in dependence upon an absorption without outflows is said to be without outflows.” Another master gives a divergent explanation — that the form on the body of one beyond training and all outer form are without outflows, since they are not what the outflows depend upon for their increase; Puguang’s Record marks this as “‘another master says’ down to ‘obtain the name without outflows’: setting out a divergent explanation. Some other master of similes says.”

Whereupon there is a short and dense exchange. The Sarvāstivādins object: that being so, why does the sūtra say “as for dharmas with outflows, they are all the eye whatever, and so on at length” (speaking of form as with outflows throughout)? Puguang’s Record marks it, “the Sarvāstivādins object. Why does the sūtra say that dharmas with outflows are the fifteen elements.” The masters of similes answer: that is said from the side of its not being the counteragent of the outflows. The Sarvāstivādins press again: then one and the same thing is both with outflows and without outflows. The masters of similes ask back, “if so, what fault is there?” The Sarvāstivādins answer: the fault of mixture. The masters of similes answer: when it is called with outflows with regard to this principle, it was not with regard to this principle called without outflows, and conversely likewise; each is said with regard to one sense, and where is the mixture?

First ask: where is the technical point of this short passage? In “one thing may receive different names with regard to different senses.” The easy error: to read “mixture” as logical contradiction. It means disorder in the system of names and characteristics; and the masters of similes’ answer is precisely that so long as one marks with regard to which sense a thing is said, the system is not disordered.

In practice: this is Abhidharma’s general solution for “multiple adjudications of a single dharma”; further on, in treating how one dharma extends over several natures and several realms, the treatise resorts to this move again and again.

〔7.3〕The section on the increase of merit: the seeds of volition make their first formal entrance. In refuting the third proof, the Sautrāntikas bring out the explanation of the masters of the norm of former times: meritorious action increases by the force of the very nature of things — what the donor gives is enjoyed by the recipient, the merit gathered and benefited differs, and so afterward, though the donor’s mind take some other thing for its object, “the subtle continuum perfumed by that earlier volition which took the giving for its object goes on gradually transforming and differentiating as it arises, and by this it can in time to come draw forth many fruits.” Puguang’s Record marks it, “below, the refutation of the third proof. As for the increase of merit, it is the explanation of the Sautrāntika masters of the norm of former times.”

This passage is the fullest statement of the Sautrāntika “seed” doctrine in this fascicle, and three words are to be seized in reading it: perfuming (the earlier volition leaves a trace), continuity (the trace is handed on instant by instant), and transformation and differentiation (there is change in the handing on, and so a new fruit can be drawn forth).

The Sarvāstivādins ask back: how should the differences of merit in another (the recipient) produce a transformation in this continuum of mine? The Sautrāntikas answer: this difficulty is “the same as with the nonmanifest” — you cannot make it out either. And they strike back with something heavier: “and how should he, by differences of merit and benefit in another continuum, cause a really existent nonmanifest dharma to arise besides within another continuum?” On my side there is only a continuum undergoing change; on yours a really existent dharma must arise out of nothing — the difficulty is yours, not mine. Puguang’s Record marks this as “‘if it be asked how’ down to ‘a nonmanifest dharma arises’: the Sautrāntikas cite the difficulty and question it back.”

Then comes the question and answer on merit without a support. Question: with no recipient to give to, how does merit increase? The Sautrāntikas answer: also by the volition that repeatedly practices taking that object-field for its object, “so that even in dreams it turns along at all times.” And then the Sautrāntikas object in return to the Sarvāstivādins: “you proponents of the nonmanifest, since in merit without a support you have no manifest action, whence should you have a nonmanifest?” With no bodily or verbal movement, where does your nonmanifest come from?

The author at last cites a sūtra to refute a divergent master who has gone too far (the one who maintains that even merit with a support rests on repeatedly practiced volition alone): the sūtra says that after a monk has received what was given he enters the immeasurable states of mind, and the donor’s merit at that time increases at all times — “but is there necessarily always a superior volition taking that matter for its object?” The donor is not necessarily giving rise to that volition at every moment. And so one must come back to “the subtle continuum perfumed by volition goes on gradually transforming and differentiating as it arises, and this is decidedly the reasonable account.” Puguang’s Record marks this as “‘if that were so, the sūtra says’ down to ‘decidedly the reasonable account’: the author cites a sūtra to refute the divergent master’s account.”

First ask: whom is the author striking here? He is striking a wayward branch within the Sautrāntikas, not the Sarvāstivādins. The easy error: to read this passage as the author changing sides. In practice: in reading passages of dispute, keep track at every moment of “which way is this arrow flying?”; within this fascicle the author looses more than one arrow at his own side.

〔7.4〕The section on having another act: the path of action and that Venerable. In refuting the fourth proof, the Sautrāntikas give the correct account: by the original preparatory effort, when the messenger has done the deed as instructed, “by the very nature of things the subtle continuum on the instructor’s side is made to arise transforming and differentiating”; and “it should be known that just this subtle continuum transforming and differentiating is what is called the path of action” — this being a conventional establishing of the name of the cause upon the result, since it is the result drawn forth by bodily and verbal action. Puguang’s Record marks it, “below, the refutation of the fourth proof.”

The treatise sets out in passing the divergent account of the Venerable: that within the appropriated aggregates one is touched by the sin of killing by giving rise to volition at the three times, “I shall kill,” “I am killing,” and “I have killed.” Puguang’s Record gives his name, “the Venerable means Dharmatrāta,” and Fabao’s Commentary likewise gives, “on the treatise’s ‘yet the Venerable says’ down to ‘I am killing, I have killed’: setting out a divergent reckoning. This is the reckoning of Dharmatrāta” — the two commentaries agree entirely in the attribution. The author’s treatment of it refutes in part and accepts in part: if merely giving rise to volition at the three times completed the path of action, then when one’s mother has in fact not been harmed but one supposed oneself to have harmed her, a deed of immediate retribution would be accomplished, which is wrong; yet if these three volitions arise in a matter of one’s own doing that is not a killing by mistake, “if it is said in this way, it is after all not unreasonable.”

First ask: is this treatment of “refuting one half and accepting the other” common? In this treatise it is very common, and it tries the reader most of all. The easy error: to see “not unreasonable” and take it for the author’s wholesale acceptance. He accepts only the version that has had a qualifying condition added to it.

In practice: when reading ancient treatises and meeting double negatives (“not unreasonable,” “not without sense”), stop and see clearly what has been qualified; the qualifier is where the judgment lies.

〔7.5〕The sentence that sets the key: alike hard to know, and no grudge borne. The Sarvāstivādins here voice the most emotional question in the whole fascicle: “why do you bear a grudge against the nonmanifest in particular and definitely deny it as nonexistent, while granting a perfumed subtle continuum transforming and differentiating?” — both being equally invisible, on what ground do you grant seeds and not the nonmanifest? Puguang’s Record marks this as “‘why against the nonmanifest’ down to ‘transforming and differentiating’: the Sarvāstivādins complain.”

The author’s answer falls into two layers. The first is a posture: “this and that are alike hard to know, and here I bear no grudge against either” — both sides are hard to know, and I have no ill will. Only the second layer is the reason: since you grant that a path of action is of the class of mind, and yet would say that when the matter is brought to completion by bodily preparatory effort a further nonmanifest dharma arises within the instructor’s body apart from mind and body — “a tenet such as this cannot make one glad”; whereas if it be said that it is just this continuum of mind that arises transforming and differentiating by force of that, “a tenet such as this can make one glad,” since by the transforming and differentiating of the continuum of mind and the rest alone a future fruit can be produced.

First ask: what exactly is the author refusing? Not “things that cannot be seen,” but the step of “setting up a new dharma apart from mind and body.” The easy error: to read it as the author’s opposing all invisible dharmas.

In practice: this is the passage in the whole fascicle from which most can be learned — a debate may be as keen as you like while the heart bears no grudge. The author first declares that he bears no ill will, and then presses his reasons to the end; posture and reason are kept apart, and neither is discounted.

〔7.6〕The refutation of the remaining four proofs: form in the dharma sphere, the eight limbs of the path, individual liberation, and the dyke. The refutation of the fifth proof is very short: the reason the dharma sphere is not said to be “without form” is that there is the invisible and unresistant form gathered under the dharma sphere in the object-field of absorption spoken of above, and it need not be the nonmanifest. Puguang’s Record marks it, “‘again, as to the dharma sphere’ down to ‘form gathered under the dharma sphere’: this refutes the fifth proof.”

The refutation of the sixth proof is a complete exchange. The Sautrāntikas first make the Sarvāstivādins speak for themselves: while one is in the path, whence right speech, right action, and right livelihood? Is there truly a raising of words, a doing of deeds, a begging for robes? The Sarvāstivādins answer: there is not; it is that at that time a nonmanifest of a class without outflows is obtained, and after emerging from contemplation one is able by the force of what went before to give rise to the three right ones and not the three wrong — “since the name of the result is conventionally established upon the cause.” The Sautrāntikas take it up at once: “if that is so, why do you not accept this sense?” — the name of the result being likewise established upon the cause, I say that what is obtained in the path is a “resolve and support” and not a nonmanifest, and the eight limbs of the noble path can be established just as well; why will you not accept it? Puguang’s Record marks it, “‘if that is so, how’ down to ‘the eight limbs of the noble path’: the Sautrāntika masters say”; and Fabao’s Commentary marks the same passage with “on the treatise’s ‘let them first say’ down to ‘begging for a support and the rest, or not’: the Sautrāntikas ask the Sarvāstivādins in return” and “on the treatise’s ‘there is not’: the Sarvāstivādins answer,” the two commentaries agreeing in attribution. The treatise sets out besides the account of a divergent Sautrāntika master: that it is merely a matter of saying “the not doing of wrong speech and the rest” and taking that as a limb of the path, with the instance that among the eight worldly dharmas “not gaining robes and food” is not a further real entity; Puguang’s Record marks it, “‘another master says’ down to ‘this too ought to be so’: setting out a divergent Sautrāntika account.”

The refutations of the seventh and eighth proofs are taken together: the discipline of individual liberation is a matter of setting up a limit undertaken by the force of a resolve of intention, so as to hold off the unwholesome actions of body and speech; and to the Sarvāstivādins’ earlier objection that “once a mind of another object has arisen there ought to be no discipline,” the Sautrāntikas explain it through: “since by the force of perfuming, at the time when a fault is about to arise a single act of recollection stops it.” Puguang’s Record marks it, “‘if a mind of another object arises’ down to ‘a recollection stops it’: citing the Sarvāstivādins’ earlier objection and explaining it through.” The discipline that is a dyke runs the same way — one first sets up a vowed limit definitely not to do what is unwholesome, and afterward, by repeated recollection and by conscience and shame being present, restrains and upholds oneself, “and so the sense of a dyke is upheld by the mind.” At the end the author reproaches them in one line: “if transgression of the discipline were held off by a nonmanifest, there ought to be nobody who transgresses through loss of mindfulness” — if a nonmanifest were truly holding the door, how should anyone lose mindfulness and break the precepts? Puguang’s Record marks this as “this refutes the eighth proof.”

First ask: have these eight refutations a common skeleton? They have — wherever the Sarvāstivādins would set up a real dharma, the Sautrāntikas put in a function of the continuum of mind. The easy error: to suppose the Sautrāntikas deny that discipline exists. What they deny is only that “discipline is an entity of the class of form”; of discipline’s function, its continuity, and its holding off of wrongdoing they cancel not one item.

In practice: this whole stretch gives the reader a most serviceable measure — tell apart “does this function exist?” and “does this function require an entity to carry it?” Many disputes in the whole treatise, taken apart to the bottom, are just this one question.

VIII. The Great Elements That Produce the Nonmanifest Differ from Those upon Which the Manifest Depends

〔8.1〕One line of stanza, one reason. “These great elements that produce it differ from those upon which the manifest depends” — the great elements that produce the nonmanifest are not the same set as those upon which manifest action depends. The reason is a single sentence: “the nonmanifest arises from great elements different from those of the manifest. Why so? Because for one combination to have a subtle result and a coarse result is unreasonable.” For one and the same combination of the four great elements to produce at once a subtle result (the nonmanifest) and a coarse one (the manifest) is unreasonable. Puguang’s Record marks the outline of this passage as “‘it was said above that the nonmanifest’ down to ‘or is there a difference’: below, the second, explaining what produces it.”

First ask: why can the subtle and the coarse not have one source? Because in the Sarvāstivādins’ causal scheme, the results produced by one set of four great elements ought to be of equal grade; for one and the same set of causes to produce two results of vastly different class would throw the marks of cause and effect into disorder. The easy error: to suppose this is saying that “the nonmanifest is higher than the manifest.” It is not — subtle and coarse here are the fineness and grossness of resistance, not a matter of value.

In practice: this item looks trifling, and yet it is the ground floor of the two later lines of stanza, “arising from different great elements” and “not from different great elements”; those two lines are precisely counting how many sets of these great elements there are.

IX. The Nonmanifest of the Desire Realm from the Second Thought-Instant On Depends upon Past Great Elements

〔9.1〕Why past great elements have to be brought in. “In the desire realm the nonmanifest thereafter arises in dependence upon past great elements” — only for the nonmanifest affiliated to the desire realm, from after the first moment on, does it all arise from past great elements. First ask: why is it arranged so? Because the nonmanifest of the desire realm must be carried on by the great elements on which the very first moment of manifest action depended; that set of great elements passes in a single instant, and if the nonmanifest thereafter is still to have a support, it can only depend upon the set that has passed.

The text accounts for the role of the great elements upon the present body: “the great elements of the present body can serve only as a support, and as the raising cause and the concurrently raising cause each in its own order” — the present great elements serve only as a “support,” and serve in order as the raising cause and the concurrently raising cause. And it gives a very vivid simile: “as a wheel runs upon the ground, with the hand and the ground for its support” — the wheel can run, the force of the hand that pushes being one kind of support (like the raising cause) and the force of the ground that bears it another (like the concurrently raising cause).

The easy error: to read “depends upon past great elements” as “the nonmanifest resides in the past.” The nonmanifest itself is still a present or future dharma; only its support is taken from the past. In practice: this item brings in the pair of words “raising / concurrently raising” for the first time — the same pair will be used again in the fascicle’s closing passage on the raising of action by mind, and the two places should be read together.

X. Action with Outflows Depends on the Great Elements of Its Own Level, Action without Outflows Follows the Place of Birth

〔10.1〕Three reasons hold up one line of stanza. “With outflows depends on its own level; without outflows follows the place of birth.” Bodily and verbal action with outflows of the desire realm is produced by desire-realm great elements, and so on up to the fourth meditative absorption, whose action is produced by the great elements of that level — realm and level being of a piece. Bodily and verbal action without outflows has no level of its own, and can only be produced by the great elements of whatever level the practitioner is presently born in.

The treatise gives three reasons: “because dharmas without outflows do not fall within the realms; because there are definitely no great elements that are without outflows; and because it is by the force of their support that what is without outflows arises.” First ask: what does each of the three govern? The first says that what is without outflows does not belong to the three realms, and so has no “own level” to speak of; the second says that no great element is itself without outflows, so that the producer of action without outflows can only be great elements with outflows; the third says that what enables what is without outflows to arise is precisely the force of its support.

The easy error: to suppose that “action without outflows is produced by great elements with outflows” is a contradiction. It is not — the producer and the produced may be of different natures, and this same item will be used again later in the fascicle in treating that the great elements are not abandoned by seeing.

In practice: this is an excellent point of self-examination — whenever you read that “a certain dharma is produced by a certain dharma,” ask separately once about the nature of the producer and the nature of the produced.

XI. The Class of the Nonmanifest and the Manifest: Appropriated, Outflowing, of the Class of Sentient Beings, Unconcentrated and Concentrated

〔11.1〕First pin down a few technical terms. The stanza gives seven or eight adjudications at one breath, and three words must be set up before reading it: appropriated (is it that portion which consciousness appropriates as its own entity and which can give rise to pain and pleasure?), homogeneous (is it produced by a homogeneous cause?), and of the class of sentient beings (does it belong to a sentient being?).

The treatise says: the nonmanifest is unappropriated, “since it has no alterability and resistance”; it is also of homogeneous nature, and the word “also” in the stanza carries a further account — “the word ‘also’ shows that a portion of it is momentary, namely the first without outflows,” the first thought-instant of nonmanifest without outflows being not homogeneous but momentary; the rest are “all of homogeneous nature, that is, produced by a homogeneous cause.” As for the class of sentient beings, “it belongs to sentient beings alone, since it arises in dependence upon the inner body.”

First ask: why must that word “also” be explained specially? Because the stanza is extremely economical, and the addition or removal of one word admits or excludes a whole class of dharmas. Puguang’s Record commonly supplies instances at such places, and Fabao’s Commentary likewise marks the outline of this passage as “on the treatise’s ‘these manifest and nonmanifest, what is their class,’ the two stanzas below are the third main division, explaining the appropriated and the classes.” The easy error: to see “also homogeneous” and take it that all of it is homogeneous; the first thought-instant of what is without outflows is precisely the exception.

In practice: in reading the stanzas one should form a habit — whenever you meet the words “also,” “only,” “all,” or “the rest,” stop and ask what it is taking in and what it is letting go.

〔11.2〕The unconcentrated nonmanifest and the nonmanifest of absorption: the one several, the other shared. The nonmanifest of the desire realm is “homogeneous, appropriated, arising from different great elements”; and as to “different great elements,” the treatise explains itself: “the words ‘arising from different great elements’ show that the seven limbs of body and speech are each produced by separate great elements” — three of body and four of speech, seven limbs in all, each with its own set of four great elements. The nonmanifest produced in absorption is the reverse: the discipline of the meditative absorptions and the discipline without outflows “both depend upon what is nourished by absorption,” being unappropriated and not produced from different great elements; the treatise explains itself: “the words ‘not from different great elements’ show that this nonmanifest has its seven limbs produced from one and the same set of four great elements,” the reason being that “the great elements on which it depends are, like the mind, but one and admit of no difference.”

First ask: why must the unconcentrated levels be several and the level of absorption shared? Because the nonmanifest of the unconcentrated levels arises along with several distinct bodily and verbal movements, and the movements being several, their supports are naturally several; while the nonmanifest of the level of absorption arises along with the mind, and the mind of absorption being one, its support is one as well. The easy error: to read “the seven limbs from one and the same set of four great elements” as the seven limbs merging into one. They do not — the seven limbs are still seven; they merely share one support.

In practice: this pair of contrasts yields a rule that can be extended — the number of supports follows the number of what raises them. One mind, one support; seven movements, seven supports.

〔11.3〕Does manifest action swell the body — a very concrete pursuit. The treatise inserts here a most homely question and answer: when manifest action arises, must the original bodily measure be destroyed? If it must, then the maturational form already cut off could be continued anew, contrary to the Vaibhāṣika tenet; if it need not, how should one place contain two bodily measures? The answer is: there are further newly arisen homogeneous great elements which produce manifest action without destroying the original body. The pursuit is not over: then the place where manifest action arises ought to be larger than before. The treatise’s answer is only eight characters — “there are interstices in the body, and so they can be contained.”

First ask: this exchange looks trifling; why is it kept? Because it is a demonstration of pressing an abstract characteristic down into the concrete: having said that manifest action is produced by newly arisen great elements, one must answer “where is it put?” The easy error: to take “interstices” for anatomy. It is a “place of containing” in the scheme of dharma-characteristics.

In practice: in reading treatises one may often learn this move — push an abstract thesis down to the most concrete scene and ask it once; whether it can answer is a good way of testing whether it is thorough.

XII. The Three Natures and Realm and Level: The Nonmanifest Extends to Two Natures, the Manifest to Three

〔12.1〕Why the nonmanifest has no indeterminate. “The nonmanifest extends only to the wholesome and unwholesome natures and has no indeterminate,” the reason being: “because the force of an indeterminate mind is feeble and inferior and cannot draw forth a strong action and make it arise, such that after the cause has ceased the result may still continue to arise.” First ask: what is this reason saying? The mark of the nonmanifest is that “the cause has ceased and the result still continues” — the movement is past, and that portion is still there. For such continuing force there must be a mind strong enough to set it going; and an indeterminate mind is too weak to set it going.

The easy error: to read “an indeterminate mind is weak” as “the indeterminate is unimportant.” Here it is called weak only as regards this one function of drawing forth a strong action. In practice: this item yields a measure for weighing actions — to see whether an action has continuing force, look first at whether the mind that set it going was strong.

〔12.2〕The manifest and volition extend to all three natures; the unwholesome only in the desire realm; the nonmanifest pervades desire and form. “What is called the rest refers to the manifest and to volition,” and these two extend to the three natures, wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate. The unwholesome nonmanifest is only in the desire realm, since in the two higher realms “the unwholesome roots and non-conscience and shamelessness have already been cut off.” The nonmanifest pervades the two realms of desire and form, “since within the formless realm there are no great elements” — the formless realm has no great elements, and the nonmanifest being produced from great elements, there naturally is none. And the treatise adds a general rule: “wherever bodily and verbal action operates, there and there alone is there discipline of body and speech.”

Someone at once poses a difficulty: then one whose body is in the desire or form realm and who has entered a formless absorption ought to have discipline (just as, when a mind without outflows arises, there is a nonmanifest without outflows). The author answers: he will not — “since that does not fall within the realms”; and moreover, if the formless realm had a nonmanifest, there ought to be a nonmanifest not produced from great elements; nor may the great elements of another realm and level be taken as its support; and besides, entering a formless absorption is precisely turning away from and abandoning the forms, “and so within that absorption form cannot be produced, since that absorption suppresses the perception of form.” The Vaibhāṣika masters add another road: discipline arises in order to counteract bad conduct, and bad conduct exists only in the desire realm, while the formless realm has toward the desire realm the four kinds of remoteness (remoteness of support, of mode of activity, of object, and of counteragent), and so within the formless realm there is no nonmanifest form.

First ask: why are so many reasons given here? Because this is a boundary question across realms, and the author blocks all four roads at once — realm, support, object, and counteragent. The easy error: to push “there is no nonmanifest in a formless absorption” into “there is no discipline in the formless realm.” What the treatise says is that the formless realm has no nonmanifest form, not that those there have no virtue.

In practice: whenever you meet an adjudication about the boundary of a realm or level, you may question yourself along these four roads: does it belong to this realm, has it a support, can it reach the object, and does it require a counteragent?

〔12.3〕Manifest form is only in the two levels with sustained thought; the desire realm has no obscured-indeterminate manifest. “Manifest form is only in the two levels that have sustained thought” — the desire realm and the first meditative absorption; above that there is no manifest. “Obscured-indeterminate manifest is definitely absent in the desire realm, and can be said to exist only in the Brahmā world,” and the treatise adduces an old story in proof: “it was once heard that Mahābrahmā uttered words of deceit and flattery” — Mahābrahmā, within his own assembly, dissembling and praising himself in order to evade the challenging questions of the monk Aśvajit.

Someone asks: since the higher levels have no speech, whence a sound sphere? Answer: “there are outer great elements which serve as cause and give rise to sound.” Another master says that the upper three meditative absorptions too have unobscured-indeterminate manifest action, and the author adjudicates, “the former account is the good one.” As for why the desire realm has no obscured-indeterminate manifest, the reason is “because there is no raising mind able to set action going” — only a mind with applied and sustained thought can set the manifest going, and the second absorption and above have no such mind; and further, “a mind that sets the manifest going is only such as is abandoned by cultivation, since the afflictions abandoned by seeing turn toward the inner gate,” while the obscured-indeterminate of the desire realm is abandoned by seeing alone, turning inward and not issuing in bodily or verbal action.

First ask: what is the axis of this whole train of adjudications? It is the mind that sets action going. Whether there is a manifest depends on whether there is a mind able to set it going. The easy error: to misread “the desire realm has no obscured-indeterminate manifest” as “the desire realm has no obscured-indeterminate.” The desire realm has obscured-indeterminate afflictions; only that class of affliction does not set the manifest going.

In practice: here for the first time the fascicle expressly puts forward the role of “the mind that sets action going”; it is the forerunner of the words “what raises” in the next stanza, and the two passages should be read continuously.

XIII. The Four Kinds of Wholesome, the Four Kinds of Unwholesome, and the Two Constant Indeterminates

〔13.1〕Four measures for the one word “wholesome.” The transitional question is put very bluntly: is it by what raises them alone that dharmas are made wholesome and unwholesome? Answer: it is not — “it is by four kinds of cause that they come to be of wholesome nature and the rest: first by the ultimate, second by their own nature, third by association, fourth by what raises them.”

Each of the four has its definition and its simile, and the text gives them with perfect regularity: the ultimate wholesome is true liberation, “since within nirvāṇa there is the utmost security and all sufferings are forever stilled, as when one is free of illness”; the intrinsically wholesome are conscience, shame, and the three wholesome roots, which “need not await association nor anything else to raise them, but are in their nature wholesome, like a good medicine”; the associated wholesome are the mind and mental factors associated with them, likened to “water mixed with medicine”; the wholesome by what raises them are bodily and verbal action and the dissociated formations, likened to “the milk drawn forth by the juice of a good medicine.” The four unwholesome answer to them one by one: the ultimate unwholesome is the dharmas of birth and death, “like a chronic disease”; the intrinsically unwholesome are non-conscience, shamelessness, and the three unwholesome roots, “like a poison”; the associated unwholesome are “like water mixed with poison”; and the unwholesome by what raises them are “like the milk drawn forth by the juice of a poison.” Puguang’s Record marks the outline of this passage as “‘the treatise says’ down to ‘as when free of illness’ explains the first line, showing the ultimate wholesome,” and in the section on the intrinsic marks, “these five, being strong and superior, are called intrinsic.”

First ask: why are the four similes ranged so regularly? Because they are deliberately ranged as a descending chain: freedom from illness (secure of itself) → good medicine (good in itself) → medicinal water (called medicine because medicine is mixed in) → milk drawn forth by the medicine’s juice (sweet because of the medicine). Wholesomeness is “borrowed” down one layer at a time, and the further along, the more it depends upon what precedes. The easy error: to read the four as four parallel kinds of wholesome. They are a chain of transmission, not four squares side by side.

In practice: this chain is the general outline of value judgment in the whole treatise. Whenever hereafter you judge a dharma wholesome or unwholesome, you may ask: is it wholesome of itself, or wholesome by association, or wholesome by what raises it?

〔13.2〕Two places of “should be pondered” — blanks the author leaves himself. The treatise leaves two questions unfinished in this section. The first: “if it be a case of obtainment and the rest raised by a mind of another class, how does it become wholesome?” How should the dissociated formations such as obtainment, raised by a defiled mind, count as wholesome? The author answers only, “this sense should be pondered.” The second: how should the nonmanifest that turns along with the mind in absorption become wholesome, being neither drawn forth by an act of attention while in absorption nor set going by the preparatory effort of an unconcentrated mind — or else the divine eye and divine ear would have to become wholesome in nature? The author answers, “upon a sense such as this one should expend some labor.”

First ask: why does the author not answer? Because these two places touch the boundary of the item “wholesome by what raises them”: the wholesome by what raises them rests upon the mind that can raise, and in these two instances the mind that raises and the dharma raised do not agree in class. The easy error: to read “should be pondered” as the author’s not knowing. It is the formulaic language for marking expressly a place awaiting study, and it is honesty and not vagueness.

In practice: when in reading ancient treatises you see “should be pondered” or “one should expend some labor,” note them down as signposts — they are the hard places the treatise itself has marked, and they are often just where the treatise masters of later ages spent most of their strength.

〔13.3〕If the ultimate unwholesome holds, is not everything with outflows unwholesome? Someone at once seizes the gap: if the dharmas of birth and death are all ultimate unwholesome, then no dharma with outflows is indeterminate or wholesome. The author’s solution is very fine: “if the matter be argued from the ultimate, it is indeed as you say; yet here it is spoken of with regard to maturation” — from the ultimate it is indeed so, but here the speaking is with regard to maturation: “of dharmas with outflows whatever, those that cannot record a maturational result are given the name indeterminate,” and those that can record a lovely maturation are said to be wholesome. As for the ultimate indeterminate, “it refers to the two unconditioned, since empty space and cessation independent of discernment are of indeterminate nature alone and there is no other gate.”

First ask: what kind of solution is this? It is changing the measure: the ultimate is one measure and maturation another, and one and the same set of dharmas may receive different names under the two. The easy error: to suppose the author contradicts himself. He does not; he has merely changed the criterion — and he says expressly that he has changed it.

In practice: this is a repetition of the move of “three actions, three measures” in the first section. Instances of “one set of dharmas, different criteria, different conclusions” are extremely numerous throughout the treatise; see the measure clearly and the numbers will not fall into confusion.

〔13.4〕Why the great elements do not become wholesome and unwholesome by what raises them. The treatise poses a further question: if the force of what raises them can make bodily and verbal action wholesome and unwholesome, then the great elements ought by the same rule to be so. Answer: “because what the mind of the doer originally intends to raise is action and not the four great elements, and so the rule cannot be extended.” What the doer’s mind intends to raise is “action,” not the great elements; the great elements are only produced incidentally and lie outside the mind’s intention.

First ask: what is the key word of this reason? It is what the intention is directed at. The force of what raises a thing dyes only what the mind is directed at. The easy error: to suppose that “raised at the same time” entails “of the same nature.” In practice: this item will be used once more at the end of the fascicle — that the great elements, though raised by a mind abandoned by seeing, are still not abandoned by seeing, rests on this very principle.

XIV. What Raises Action Is of Two Kinds: the Raising and the Concurrent Raising

〔14.1〕Two minds, two positions. “What raises manifest and nonmanifest action is of two kinds, the causal raising and the momentary raising, since the former is prior and serves as cause and the latter is present with that moment. In order the first is called the raising and the second the concurrent raising.” The treatise explains itself: “the causal raising, at the time when the action is about to be done, is able to draw it forth, and so is called the raising”; “the momentary raising, at the time when the action is being done, is inseparable from it, and so is called the concurrent raising.” Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary glosses this most concisely and clearly: “the mind before the action is raised is called the causal raising, since it is prior and serves as cause. The mind together with the action is called the momentary raising, since it is of the same single moment.”

First ask: why must two be distinguished? Because a bodily or verbal action from its setting going to its completion sets at least two minds in motion — the mind that decides to do it (prior) and the mind that accompanies the doing (simultaneous). The treatise at once asks what use the concurrent raising is, and answers most vividly: “though there be a prior cause able to draw it forth, yet if there were no concurrent raising it would be like a dead man and action ought not to be established” — with only the prior decision and no mind at the time of doing, it would be like a corpse twitching, and would not count as action.

Someone poses a difficulty: how then does one who has entered a mindless absorption generate discipline? The author answers: “whoever has a mind, his action arises distinctly” — for one who has a mind, action arises distinctly; the mindless stages are a separate matter and cannot be used to deny the function of the concurrent raising.

The easy error: to read the raising and the concurrent raising as the ordinary continuity of earlier and later thought-instants. They are functional positions: one governs the drawing forth, the other the bringing to completion. In practice: this pair of words is the key tool for judging the wholesome or unwholesome nature of an action, and the whole of the next section rests upon it.

〔14.2〕The fourfold distinction: ranging four minds into two squares. The treatise sets out the four members: “there is what is the raising and not the concurrent raising, namely a mind abandoned by seeing”; what is the concurrent raising and not the raising is the five consciousnesses beginning with the eye; what is both is the mental consciousness abandoned by cultivation in all three natures; “there is what is neither the raising nor the concurrent raising, namely minds without outflows and maturation-born minds.” The reasons too are given clearly: the five consciousnesses, “being without discrimination and arising by the outer gate,” can only be the concurrent raising; the mental consciousness abandoned by cultivation, “having discrimination and arising by the outer gate,” extends to both; and minds without outflows and maturation-born minds, being “only in absorption” and “turning spontaneously without preparatory effort,” are neither.

First ask: what are the two axes of this table? One is whether there is discrimination (whether it can draw forth), the other is whether it turns by the inner gate or the outer (whether it can accompany bodily and verbal movement). The values of the four minds on these two axes range out exactly into the four members. The easy error: to read the five consciousnesses’ “being without discrimination” as their having no cognitive function. The discrimination meant here is the deliberative discrimination that can draw forth bodily and verbal action.

In practice: the fourfold method is the ordering technique most used in Abhidharma. Wherever two criteria cross, you may set out a fourfold table with your own hand, which is far more serviceable than memorizing conclusions.

〔14.3〕If a mind abandoned by seeing sets manifest form going, is that form abandoned by seeing? This section has a short and keen exchange. The Sautrāntika masters ask: if a mind abandoned by seeing sets manifest form going, that form ought to be abandoned by seeing; and if it be granted so, what fault is there? Puguang’s Record marks it, “‘if a mind abandoned by seeing sets manifest form going, the form ought to be abandoned by seeing. If it be granted to be so, what fault is there’: the Sautrāntika masters ask.” The Sarvāstivādins answer: that would “transgress the Abhidharma,” and moreover “knowledge and ignorance are not mutually opposed”; Puguang’s Record marks it, “‘that would transgress’ down to ‘not abandoned by seeing’: the Sarvāstivādins answer.”

The Sarvāstivādins at once strike back: then the great elements too ought to be abandoned by seeing, since they likewise are set going by the force of a mind abandoned by seeing. Puguang’s Record marks it, “‘if so, the great elements’ down to ‘drawn forth by that force’: the Sarvāstivādins object in return. The Sautrāntikas.” The Sautrāntikas answer: there is no such fault — just as the great elements, though raised by a wholesome mind, are neither wholesome nor unwholesome in nature. The Sarvāstivādins settle it at last: it should not be granted, since undefiled dharmas of every class are not opposed to knowledge or ignorance, and so the great elements are definitely neither abandoned by seeing nor of the not-to-be-abandoned.

First ask: what is this passage arguing? It is arguing whether “the nature of the dharma raised follows the mind that raises it.” The easy error: to see this and the earlier “the great elements do not become wholesome and unwholesome by what raises them” as two different matters. They are two applications of one and the same principle.

In practice: the passage closes with “that sūtra speaks so only with regard to the prior causal raising, and so there is no contradiction” — the sūtra’s saying that “from wrong view there arise wrong speech and wrong action” speaks of the causal raising (prior and drawing forth), not of the momentary raising (simultaneous). A debate seemingly so intricate turns out in the end to be only for the sake of finding a place for one sentence of sūtra. This is exactly the character of Abhidharma.

〔14.4〕Whether the raising and the concurrent raising are of one nature — only in the Buddha is it otherwise. Question: are the raising mind and the concurrently raising mind necessarily of one nature? Answer: “this is not settled.” If the raising mind is wholesome, the concurrent raising may extend to all three natures; and so likewise if it is unwholesome or indeterminate. There is only one exception: “only in the Sage are the raising and concurrently raising consciousnesses for the most part of one nature, with a small portion not so” — in the Buddha the raising and the concurrent raising are for the most part of one nature, with only a small portion otherwise: a wholesome raising has a wholesome concurrent raising, an indeterminate raising an indeterminate concurrent raising; and yet “at times there is a wholesome concurrent raising following upon an indeterminate raising, while there has never been an indeterminate concurrent raising following upon a wholesome raising.” The reason is “because the Buddha, the World-Honored One, in expounding the Dharma and the like, has a mind that may increase and has never flagged.”

First ask: why is the Buddha alone the exception? Because the Buddha’s mind does not fall back — it may rise from an indeterminate raising to a wholesome concurrent raising, but will not fall from a wholesome raising to an indeterminate concurrent raising. The easy error: to read “for the most part of one nature” as “necessarily of one nature.” The stanza itself says “a small portion not so.”

In practice: this section brings a set of cold, hard adjudications about mind to rest at last upon a very warm conclusion — the Buddha’s mind goes only upward, never downward. At this point in the fascicle, the line of dharma-characteristics and the line of practice and realization are joined for the first time.

XV. The Nāga Stanza: Is the Buddha Always in Absorption

〔15.1〕One sūtra stanza and one small debate. The treatise records the account of another school: that the Buddhas, the World-Honored Ones, being always in absorption, have minds that are wholesome alone and no indeterminate mind; and it adduces a sūtra stanza in proof — “the nāga when he walks is in absorption; the nāga when he stands is in absorption; the nāga when he sits is in absorption; the nāga when he lies down is in absorption.” Nāga means the great dragon, by which the sūtras designate the Buddha; the four postures of walking, standing, sitting, and lying down are line by line in absorption.

The Vaibhāṣika masters’ explanation has a fine sense of proportion: “this shows the Buddha’s intent — if he takes no delight in an unconcentrated mind, then in the four postures he is able to be always in absorption; yet at the remaining stages it is not that there arise no mind of the modes of deportment, no maturation-born mind, and no mind of penetrative effect” — what the stanza shows is the Buddha’s “intent”: so long as he takes no delight in an unconcentrated mind, in all four postures he can be always in absorption; but at the remaining stages it is not that the mind of the modes of deportment, the maturation-born mind, and the mind of penetrative effect (which are of indeterminate nature) do not arise. Fabao’s Commentary marks it here as “down to ‘the nāga when he lies down is in absorption’: setting out a divergent account.”

First ask: why do the Vaibhāṣikas take it apart in this way? Because if one bit down on the letter and insisted that the Buddha has no indeterminate mind whatever, it would conflict with the dharma-characteristics of “the Buddha has deportment and has the maturation-born.” So they read the stanza as displaying the Buddha’s inclination, and not as an exhaustive adjudication of dharma-characteristics. The easy error: to take this passage as a slighting of the Buddha. Quite the contrary — it holds fast to “the Buddha does not lose absorption” while not letting the system of dharma-characteristics contradict itself.

In practice: this is a good specimen of how the relation of sūtra stanza to treatise doctrine is handled — a sūtra stanza displays the intent, the treatise settles the characteristics; the two need not be mortised word for word.

〔15.2〕The last question: does manifest action become wholesome after the manner of the raising or of the concurrent raising? At the end of the fascicle a challenge is left: does the wholesome nature and the rest of the several manifest actions follow the manner of the raising mind or of the concurrent raising? Each side has its difficulty: if after the manner of the raising mind, the desire realm ought to have obscured-indeterminate manifest action (since the view of self and the extreme views can act as its raising); if after the manner of the concurrent raising, the manifest of individual liberation arising together with an unwholesome or indeterminate mind ought not to be of wholesome nature.

The author’s correct explanation is: “it should be said that manifest action comes to be of wholesome nature and the rest after the manner of the raising mind” — after the manner of the raising mind; yet not after the manner of that raising mind abandoned by seeing, since a raising mind abandoned by cultivation intervenes between them. And so that sūtra should be read thus: “that sūtra speaks only with regard to the causal raising that is separated off by other minds” — the sūtra speaks with regard to a causal raising separated off by other minds; and so, though a mind abandoned by seeing can act as the raising, within the desire realm there is still definitely no obscured-indeterminate manifest action.

First ask: what does this “separating off” mean? It means that between a mind abandoned by seeing and the actual issuing of bodily or verbal action a mind abandoned by cultivation must intervene; and what settles the nature of the action is the latter, not the foremost. The easy error: to read it as meaning that the mind abandoned by seeing takes no part at all. It takes part; only it does not settle the nature of the action.

In practice: the fascicle closes here, and closes upon a most typical Abhidharma move — not cancelling the point at issue, but adding a qualifier to it. With the four words “separated off by other minds” added, both horns dissolve at once. The three disciplines to be argued in the next fascicle walk out from just here.

Further Resonances: The Mirror of the Three Commentaries

The above is the sense of the treatise’s own text in this fascicle. Below, a further section is set up to gather four matters: the adjudications of the three commentaries and their divergences, Saṅghabhadra’s refutations and supplements, the divergences of Paramārtha’s earlier translation, and coordinates for parallel reading. A mirror is not the treatise; it is only looking at the same text by another way of reading. Both are recorded without adjudication, each restored to its own place.

1. Where the Three Commentaries Diverge

One commentary absent. The commentaries on this fascicle are in a special situation: Shentai’s commentary is a fragment, and the seven fascicles extant belong to the Chapter on the Elements, the Chapter on the Faculties, and the Chapter on the Worthy and the Noble; the Chapter on Action is wholly wanting, and so there is no line-by-line commentary of Shentai to hang upon this fascicle. Within the extant fascicles on the Chapter on the Elements, Shentai’s commentary still has two forward references to the Chapter on Action (“in the chapter analyzing action this will be further considered” and “as is said below in the chapter on action”), from which it appears that he did once comment on the Chapter on Action, and only that portion no longer survives. The absence is marked as it stands, and text from other fascicles is not made to stand in for it. Only the phrase in the general conspectus of the whole treatise in Shentai’s first fascicle, “the chapter on action, one hundred thirty-one lines,” is a second independent source for the stanza count of this chapter, and it agrees with the interlinear note under the chapter title in the separate edition of the root stanzas.

Whether the chapter divides into three or into four. Puguang’s Record marks at the head of the chapter, “within this chapter, first the nature of the entity of action, second the explanation of the actions in the sūtras, third miscellaneous explanations of the actions,” and Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary marks, “three gates in all: first the nature of the entity of action, second the explanation of the names of the actions, third miscellaneous explanations of the actions” — both dividing into three. Fabao’s Commentary alone makes it four: “the main text of this chapter divides into four: first the entity of action, second discipline and the rest, third the actions in the sūtras, fourth miscellaneous explanations of the actions.” The difference lies in the section on “discipline and the rest”: Puguang and Yuanhui gather it into the chapter on the nature of the entity of action as its third subsection (the extended explanation of the manifest and nonmanifest), while Fabao sets it up separately as a chapter-level division. The three in fact agree entirely as to the extent covered by this fascicle — all adjudge this fascicle to be the whole of the chapter on “the entity of action”; what differs is only the layer from which the next fascicle is to be hung. Recorded without adjudication.

How action gets its name: one sense or three. Puguang and Yuanhui both explain action by the single sense of “doing” (Yuanhui gives, “doing is called action, and this chapter explains it at length, hence ‘analysis’”); Fabao alone brings out three senses: “by three senses it is called action: first function, second upholding a norm, third distinguishing results.” The one takes the simplicity of the etymology, the other the fullness of sense and function. Recorded without adjudication.

The internal subdivision of this fascicle: two sections or six. Puguang divides the chapter on the nature of the entity of action into two sections only (properly explaining the nature of the entity of action, and analyzing action through the several gates); Fabao has six sections of his own, each hung with its stanza count — “the first four and a half stanzas explain the nature of the entity of action, the second one and a half stanzas explain what produces the great elements” — and thereafter lists the appropriated and the classes, analysis through the gates of sense, the four wholesome and the rest, and the two raisings. Yuanhui agrees with Puguang. ⇒ Fabao’s outline is the finest of the three and takes the stanza as its unit, which makes it the one most convenient for collating against the stanza text. Recorded without adjudication.

The two commentaries differ as to who asks the closing question “what do you establish as bodily manifest action.” On the treatise’s sentence “since both motion and shape have been set aside, what do you of the Sautrāntika school establish as bodily manifest action,” Puguang marks it as a “closing question,” and his explanation takes what is set aside to be the Sāṃmitīyas’ motion and the Sarvāstivādins’ real shape and the one questioned to be the Sautrāntikas — “since the Sāṃmitīya masters’ motion as bodily manifest action and the Sarvāstivādins’ real shape as bodily manifest action have been set aside, what do you of the Sautrāntika school establish” — so that the questioner is the author; Fabao, on the same sentence, marks it as “the Sāṃmitīyas and the Sarvāstivādins put the question,” assigning the questioner to those two schools. The two point at one and the same sentence while differing as to whose the question is. ⇒ One sentence, and the two commentaries give different questioners; recorded without adjudication; the vernacular layer of this fascicle follows Puguang’s outline and takes it as the author’s closing question. Here a further layer must be distinguished: Fabao’s mark “‘since you hold that only’ down to ‘as bodily action’: the Sarvāstivādins ask” hangs upon the next sentence, “what dharma then do you establish as bodily action,” and not upon the closing question above; while Puguang on this next sentence marks only the single word “question” and gives no school name. Each of the two sentences has its own mark, and in reading the commentaries the mark on the lower sentence may not be moved up to stand for the upper — this is the general rule of the commentaries’ sentence-by-sentence attribution, and the place in this fascicle where collating the two commentaries most easily slips out of alignment.

The posture of the author’s laying the dispute to rest: complaint or reproach. On the passage “why do you bear a grudge against the nonmanifest in particular,” Puguang marks it as “the Sarvāstivādins complain,” and Fabao marks it as “here the Sarvāstivādins reproach the Sautrāntikas for partiality of feeling.” The one marks it a plaint, the other an arraignment — Puguang inclining to neutral narration, Fabao to the tone of reproach. One and the same passage, and the two commentaries read a different temperature out of it; recorded without adjudication.

The explanation of the four wholesome: simile and counter-illumination. Puguang sets forth the four wholesome sentence by sentence with similes, his mark being “‘the treatise says’ down to ‘as when free of illness’ explains the first line, showing the ultimate wholesome,” and in the section on the intrinsic, “these five, being strong and superior, are called intrinsic”; Fabao in the section on the intrinsic goes the other way and lists the five senses of the unwholesome roots by way of counter-illumination — “this explains the second, the intrinsically wholesome. Non-conscience and shamelessness have two senses” — and thereafter lists five senses: that the unwholesome roots extend over the five categories, pervade the six consciousnesses, are of the nature of latent tendencies, make a firm and strong preparatory effort when the wholesome roots are cut off, and can set going the coarse and evil actions of body and speech. Yuanhui is the briefest here, preserving only the formulaic gloss “within it the utmost security, all sufferings wholly stilled, as when free of illness.” The three differ in their inclination as to fullness and brevity. Recorded without adjudication.

The gloss on the two raisings: Yuanhui is the fullest. Puguang in this section marks only “the distinction. ‘The treatise says’ down to ‘is called the concurrent raising’ explains the first stanza, and may be known,” and adds no gloss of his own; Yuanhui takes it apart word by word — “‘what raises is of two kinds’ is the heading”; “‘the cause and the moment of that’ is the listing of names”; “the mind before the action is raised is called the causal raising, since it is prior and serves as cause; the mind together with the action is called the momentary raising, since it is of the same single moment.” The most abstract set of words in the whole fascicle is glossed most clearly, of all places, by the commentary of outlines. Recorded without adjudication.

Each commentary’s outline terminology forms a system of its own. Puguang uses “below, the Nth”; Fabao uses “the Nth of the main text”; Yuanhui uses “from here the Nth.” In citing the “Nth” of the three commentaries one must attach it to its own house and not let one stand for another — for one and the same outline boundary the three often give different numbers. This is where reading the three commentaries most easily goes wrong, and it is recorded as it stands.

Fabao once uses “Sūtra-master.” At the end of the section on the raisings Fabao gives “this is because the Sūtra-master did not understand the tenet of my school” — designating Vasubandhu as “the Sūtra-master.” This is the usage of the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle lineage (Saṅghabhadra throughout calls Vasubandhu the Sūtra-master), and its appearance in a commentary on the Kośa is well worth noticing, showing the influence of that lineage upon Fabao’s composition. Recorded without adjudication.

A one-word divergence in the root stanza as cited by Yuanhui. Yuanhui cites the last line of the root stanza as “in the Sage they are necessarily of one nature; where indeterminate, the concurrent raising may be wholesome,” using the character for “may,” where the base text has the character for “delusion.” This one-word divergence has further collateral evidence: the Taishō collation notes for this treatise record the Ming and the Palace editions as having “may,” and the separate edition of the root stanzas likewise has “may” here. Four lines of collateral evidence run one way, and the base text still has “delusion.” By the form of this collection the base-text reading is not altered; here only its divergence is recorded, the choice between them belonging to doctrinal adjudication.

2. Saṅghabhadra’s Refutations and Supplementary Explanations

The chapter name in Saṅghabhadra’s two treatises is not “Analysis of Action” but “Adjudication of Action” — the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle has “Adjudication of Action, chapter four,” the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine has “Adjudication of Action, chapter five.” To search them with the Kośa’s chapter name is bound to yield a false zero.

The gloss on the moment is expressly denied. Vasubandhu’s definition of the moment (having obtained its entity it perishes with nothing intervening, as a man with a staff is called having a staff) is upheld as settled doctrine by all three commentaries; Saṅghabhadra, however, cites it word for word and refutes it — “yet the Sūtra-master says: what is called a moment? Having obtained its entity it perishes with nothing intervening; a dharma that has this moment is called having a moment, as one has” — and adjudges, “his explanation is unreasonable, since a staff is other than the man and so it cannot be said; the simile is not of like dharma, and there is no separate dharma other than the obtaining of the entity.” His reason is that a staff and a man are two things and so “having a staff” may be said, whereas “perishing with nothing intervening after obtaining its entity” is not a separate dharma other than the dharma-entity, and the simile is not of like dharma. ⇒ This is not a refutation of an argument but an outright denial of the gloss itself. One sense with two schools, recorded together, with no adjudication of who prevails.

Cessation awaiting no cause is likewise met with an express counter-thesis. Saṅghabhadra cites “the Sūtra-master explains it thus: the cessation of conditioned dharmas awaits no cause,” and adjudges, “his explanation is unreasonable; exhaustion is just cessation, and the Buddha said that exhaustion and cessation are a mark of the conditioned” — exhaustion is cessation, and the Buddha said that exhaustion and cessation are a mark of the conditioned; being a “mark,” it is a dharma that is had, and cannot be said to be a mere “nonexistence.” He establishes by scriptural proof that “cessation too is a mark of the conditioned,” meeting head-on Vasubandhu’s “cessation is a nonexistence and a nonexistence is not a result, and so it awaits no cause.” This is the place where the two parties of this fascicle stand most sharply opposed. Recorded without adjudication.

On the dispute over shape-form the two treatises are almost word for word the same. Saṅghabhadra cites “yet the Sūtra-master says: shape is not really existent; that is, where visible color arises abundantly in one quarter” (the Kośa has “on one side,” Saṅghabhadra’s citation has “in one quarter,” a one-word divergence), then cites the difficulty of apprehension by two faculties and adjudges, “this principle is not so, since what is made out differs in mark” — what the eye makes out and what the body makes out differ in mark, and so the fault of one form apprehended by two faculties does not follow. He further cites “the Sūtra-master here says again: whatever two dharmas are definitely inseparable, therefore” and refutes it. The corresponding passage in the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine gives “the supports being separate, that the entities are separate is established in principle,” and so on, almost word for word the same as in the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle. ⇒ Saṅghabhadra here expressly establishes that “shape-form has atoms of its own” in order to refute the Sautrāntikas — that is, to refute the Sautrāntika position as set out by Vasubandhu. Recorded without adjudication.

A direct challenge to Vasubandhu’s closing words. “What do you of the Sautrāntika school establish as bodily manifest action? Here the Sūtra-master states their school’s position, saying: bodily manifest action is just shape, yet conventional” — Saṅghabhadra cites Vasubandhu’s closing words and goes on to press the ambiguity of the position stated: does “conventional and not real” mean that the shape of long and the rest is conventional and not real, or that “the atoms that make up the long and the rest, called shape,” are conventional and not real? What this question addresses is not the Sautrāntika school itself but Vasubandhu’s own wording. Recorded without adjudication.

The sentence that the nonmanifest is not really existent is gone over word for word. “Yet the Sautrāntikas say: this too is not real, since it is merely a not-doing by force of a limit vowed beforehand” — Saṅghabhadra cites the Kośa’s original sentence word for word and goes on to refute, “all such causes are unreasonable. And a mere not-doing is not to be called nonmanifest action.” The sentence in the two texts agrees character for character, and this is the most exactly matched passage of word-for-word collation in the disputation of this fascicle. Recorded without adjudication.

What is the decisive cause of an action’s becoming wholesome and the rest. The Kośa establishes that “all minds without outflows and maturation-born minds are neither the raising nor the concurrent raising”; Saṅghabhadra cites and comments, “yet the Sūtra-master says: because they turn spontaneously without preparatory effort, the maturational consciousnesses are neither the raising nor the concurrent raising,” and adjudges, “by this the Sūtra-master has the fault of both diminishing and adding, making a cause of what is not a cause,” and at the end establishes his own school’s position, “that an action becomes wholesome and the rest is definitely by the force of the raising and not by the force of the concurrent raising, and this principle is well made out.” Whereas the Vaibhāṣika answer at the end of the Kośa is precisely “it should be said that manifest action comes to be of wholesome nature and the rest after the manner of the raising mind” — the two run in the same direction while the lines of reasoning differ. Recorded without adjudication.

The nāga stanza passage is not a disputation. The two treatises cite the same stanza, word for word the same with no divergent reading; Saṅghabhadra goes on to set it forth with the Vaibhāṣika explanation, agreeing in doctrine with what the Kośa records while a little fuller in wording. ⇒ This passage is a difference of fullness in setting forth the sense of one and the same school, not a disputation, and is recorded as it stands.

The two treatises also differ in fullness between themselves. The Treatise Revealing the Doctrine is far briefer than the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle in the passages corresponding to this fascicle: a fault-tolerant re-check of the two phrases “motion is called bodily manifest action” and “the nāga when he walks is in absorption” within the corresponding range of the Samayapradīpikā yields a word-for-word zero, and only the one sense of the real existence of shape-form has a condensed correspondence. This is a fact about the form of the two treatises, not a failure of searching.

3. The Divergences of Paramārtha’s Earlier Translation

Paramārtha’s Commentary on the Abhidharmakośa forms a system of its own in the passages corresponding to this fascicle. The first thing to know is the master switch of the renderings: Xuanzang’s manifest / nonmanifest is throughout Paramārtha’s instructive / uninstructive. This pair runs through the whole passage, and everything touching the manifest and nonmanifest changes with it; search Paramārtha’s text with Xuanzang’s words, and in this field you will never find anything.

A basic difference of form. Xuanzang has “the stanza says / the treatise says,” the whole stanza coming out first and the prose commentary after; Paramārtha has “the verse says / the explanation says,” glossing line by line inset, so that one stanza is often broken into two or several places of citation, and his verse lines are not confined to five characters. So Xuanzang’s fourteen stanzas in this fascicle appear in Paramārtha as a number of short verses scattered about. The two also divide their fascicles differently: Xuanzang’s Chapter on Action has six fascicles, Paramārtha’s four; the passage corresponding to this fascicle still falls within one fascicle of Paramārtha, and its boundaries can be fixed only by the structure of the scenes.

The renderings form a system of their own. What is without outflows becomes “without flow”; yogins become “the observing masters of former times”; invisible and unresistant becomes “without display and without obstruction”; great elements become “the four greats”; sentient beings become “the designation of living beings”; homogeneous nature becomes “the flowing result”; unappropriated becomes “not grasped by mind”; nourished becomes “increased”; having sustained thought becomes “having observation”; conscience and shame become “conscience and abashment”; abandoned by cultivation becomes “extinguished by the path of cultivation”; maturation-born becomes “born of retribution.” Of these the one most to be watched is what raises / conditioned arising: Paramārtha renders “what raises” by “conditioned arising,” the same characters as the “conditioned arising” of the twelvefold chain but pointing at something else, and the two must be told apart in reading.

Two instances where the methods of translation most clearly part. The first is the mark of bodily manifest action: Xuanzang has “by the force of volition, such and such a shape further arises in the body, and this is called bodily manifest action,” while Paramārtha’s verse has “it is said that the body has the instructive mark,” and his explanation, “in accordance with intention, the body is of such and such an appearance, and this is called instructive” — Xuanzang taking “bodily shape,” Paramārtha “appearance.” The second is the yogins: Xuanzang has simply yogins, Paramārtha “here the observing masters of former times say,” with the two extra words “of former times” expressly marking them as an account of an earlier age, a qualifier Xuanzang does not have.

A twofold divergence in the nāga stanza. Xuanzang cites the stanza with the four lines of walking, standing, sitting, and lying down, all in absorption; Paramārtha has “the nāga in walking is at peace, the nāga in leaning is at peace, the nāga in lying down is at peace, the nāga in sitting is at peace” — “standing” becoming “leaning,” “in absorption” becoming “at peace,” and the lines of sitting and lying exchanged in order. A fault-tolerant re-check of “the nāga when he stands is in absorption” across the whole of Paramārtha yields zero: this is a real divergence of the two translations, not a failure of searching. Recorded without adjudication.

Fullness does not run all one way. In several passages Paramārtha is the fuller: in the section where the Sautrāntikas establish bodily manifest action, Xuanzang answers with a single sentence while Paramārtha first sets up a question and then brings out the answer. In several passages the two texts agree almost word for word: the simile of the man with a staff for momentary cessation, the inference that the productive cause becomes the extinguishing cause, and the opening sentence of the Sautrāntikas’ blanket denial of the eight proofs — and especially that last sentence, where Xuanzang has “these proofs, though many and of all kinds of marvelousness, are nevertheless unreasonable” and Paramārtha has “these proofs are very many and of all kinds of rarity, yet in truth it is not so,” differing by only a few words, from which the stability of this sentence in the translation halls may be seen. Fullness varies passage by passage, with no settled direction.

4. Coordinates for Parallel Reading

The nonmanifest form established in this fascicle is the central pivot of the “side of the entity of action” in the Abhidharma of the schools; its being taken up by the Yogācāra lineage is one of the most direct lines in the whole treatise.

The Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only poses on the same topic exactly the same question: are manifest and nonmanifest form not really existent? Its reason for refuting shape-form is that “if shape is said to be really existent, what is its nature? — if it is said to be shape, then it is not really existent, since it can be analyzed”; its reason for refuting motion is that “what arises ceases at once, and so there is no sense of motion” and “the cessation of a conditioned dharma awaits no cause.” ⇒ These are precisely the three tools used by the Sautrāntikas in this fascicle (analyzability, the absence of separate atoms for long and the rest, momentary cessation), not one of them missing. Its final conclusion is that “the manifest being really nonexistent, how should the nonmanifest be real,” and it establishes instead that “the nonmanifest is conventionally established upon the wholesome and unwholesome limits of resolve and intention.” ⇒ The Sautrāntika position that stands in this fascicle as one of two parties recorded is taken up entire in the Yogācāra lineage and becomes its own school’s position. The same set of arguments in two positions — this is the most readily collated place of all (for the word-for-word citations and page anchors, see item seven of this unit’s apparatus).

The entity of the three actions is likewise. In this fascicle the Sautrāntikas answer that “bodily action is the volition that can move the body”; that lineage too gives “it is not denied as nonexistent, but only said not to be form” and “the volition that can move the body is called bodily action, the volition that can issue speech is called verbal action” — the one sense that “the three actions have volition for their entity” is handed on in both systems; what differs is only that this fascicle takes it as one of two parties recorded, while that lineage takes it as its own school’s position.

And one thing further, on the side of enumeration: this fascicle establishes the nonmanifest as invisible and unresistant form, while the prose commentary records the yogins’ separate explanation of the three forms without outflows by the form in the object-field of absorption. The Yogācārabhūmi, in listing the sphere of dharmas, divides the form gathered under the dharma sphere into two — the form gathered under discipline and non-discipline, and the form ranged over by concentration. ⇒ These two forms of the dharma sphere in that lineage correspond one to one with the two matters of this fascicle: the former to the nonmanifest, the latter to the form in the object-field of absorption. ⇒ The coordinates by which one and the same set of dharmas is opened out in the two systems are recorded only, and no settled judgment is passed (for the word-for-word citations and page anchors, see item seven of this unit’s apparatus).

As for the “raising and concurrent raising” with which this fascicle closes, the next fascicle will use them again in treating the obtaining and relinquishing of the three disciplines; that is the business of the next. This fascicle does two things only: it sets up the entity of action, and it records the two great disputes exactly as they stand.

Before Reading This Fascicle

The previous fascicle finished making out the nature of the entity of action — action has volition for its entity, what volition brings about is bodily action and verbal action, and these two, bodily and verbal, each extend to the manifest and the nonmanifest. A subsidiary discussion was inserted in the middle (the four kinds of wholesome and four kinds of unwholesome, the two raisings), and the opening sentence of this fascicle gathers it up: “the subsidiary discussion is finished; now again we should make out the marks of the manifest and the nonmanifest spoken of before.” The author turns on his heel in one sentence, and the main discussion sets out from “the nonmanifest is of three kinds.”

The three ancient masters all let the knife of their outline fall in the same place here, differing only in the layer to which they attach it: Puguang marks “below, the third, explaining the manifest and the nonmanifest at length,” Yuanhui marks “from here the third, explaining the manifest and the nonmanifest at length,” and the two houses agree word for word even in the names of the subsections (first, explaining the three nonmanifests; second, explaining individual liberation in reliance upon the three); Fabao marks the same cut higher up, as “from here below, the second of the main text, explaining the three of discipline and the rest.” The cut is the same and the layer is of two patterns; recorded without adjudication.

There is one thing to read in this fascicle: discipline is not a vow but a really existent thing that does not follow the mind and that continues on. The Sarvāstivādins lodge it in the square called “the nonmanifest” — not displayed outwardly, yet really existent; it is there while you sleep, it is there while you raise an evil thought, until the time you relinquish it. The three disciplines, the eight names, the four real entities, the past, present, and future of possession, the term of life and of a day and a night, the eight limbs and the three refuges — the whole fascicle hangs upon that one adjudication. While reading, one may ask at any point: what about discipline is this article speaking of — its entity, its name, its time, or its condition?

I. The Three Kinds of Nonmanifest and the Three Disciplines

〔1.1〕Why the nonmanifest must first be divided into three squares. First ask: the previous fascicle of the Chapter on Action has already said what the nonmanifest is, so why must this fascicle open by dividing it into three kinds? Because the previous fascicle was saying “whether the nonmanifest is really existent,” while this fascicle is to say “into how many classes the nonmanifest divides” — the question has been changed. The treatise answers with the utmost brevity: “the nonmanifest here, stated in brief, is of three kinds,” first discipline, second non-discipline, third “neither of the two” (neither discipline nor non-discipline). As for why that portion is named discipline, the reason the treatise gives is that “it can block and can extinguish the continuum of evil discipline, and so is called discipline” — blocking holds off what is to come, extinguishing cuts off what has already come. Puguang takes those eight characters apart layer by layer, and on the make-up of the word “discipline” glosses it as “‘dis-’ means law and rule, ‘-cipline’ means norm and form,” adding that manifest action does not extend to all three alike, and so the manifest is not spoken of here.

The easy error: to suppose that “neither of the two” is a vague middle ground. It is not vague; it is a third square with a strict definition — the whole passage of the first half of Root 23 below is devoted to how a person in this square possesses the nonmanifest. In practice: before you undertake the discipline you are not “without discipline”; you are in the third square. Undertake it and you enter the first square; raise a settled evil inclination and you fall into the second. The three squares are not degrees but identities.

〔1.2〕Why the three disciplines are cut in this way. First ask: discipline being one, why divide it into individual liberation, produced by meditative absorption, and produced by the path? The treatise’s cut is not by how well the discipline is kept but by the realm to which the discipline is affiliated: “first, the discipline of individual liberation, that is, the discipline bound to the desire realm”; “second, the discipline produced by meditative absorption, that is, the discipline bound to the form realm”; “third, the discipline produced by the path, that is, the discipline without outflows.” Under those three names Fabao sets up a simile of his own, saying that “bound” is like a binding market (the sense of winding round and being affiliated): the discipline of individual liberation is affiliated to the desire realm and so is called the discipline bound to desire, the discipline of absorption is affiliated to the form realm and so is called the discipline bound to form, and the discipline produced by the path is bound to none of the three realms and so is called the discipline without outflows — this simile is Fabao’s alone, and Puguang has it not.

The easy error: to read “produced by meditative absorption” as “a discipline that is kept rather better while one is in absorption.” It is not. It is another kind of entity of discipline that is had along with absorption and lost along with it — obtained when absorption is obtained, not lost on emerging from absorption but lost as soon as one falls away from it, and having nothing at all to do with whether you undertook it. In practice: these three can be present in one body at the same time; a man who has undertaken the five precepts, if he obtains the first meditative absorption, has two disciplines in him, and if he sees the path, three. The three are not three stages but three parallel lines.

II. Individual Liberation Has Eight Names but Only Four Entities

〔2.1〕Where the gap between eight and four comes from. First ask: bhikṣu, bhikṣuṇī, probationer, novice, female novice, lay follower, female lay follower, one-day observance — plainly eight kinds of person undertaking eight kinds of discipline, so why is it said that “the real entities are four only”? The treatise’s reason is a single sentence: apart from the one for the men, there is no further one for the women. Hence the discipline of the bhikṣuṇī is not outside the discipline of the bhikṣu, the disciplines of the probationer and the female novice are not outside the discipline of the novice, and the discipline of the female lay follower is not outside the discipline of the lay follower. There remain the bhikṣu, the novice, the lay follower, and the one-day observance, four, and only these have each their own entity.

How is this known? The proof the treatise gives is the turning of the faculty: “because by the changing and turning of the shape the entity is neither relinquished nor obtained, and yet the name differs” — “‘shape’ means the shape and mark, that is, the male and female faculties.” A bhikṣu whose faculty turns is then called a bhikṣuṇī; the entity of the discipline has neither been relinquished nor newly obtained, only the name has been exchanged. And since there is no occasion of relinquishing or obtaining, one may see that it was one and the same entity all along.

The easy error: to suppose that since the bhikṣuṇī has more articles than the bhikṣu, the entity cannot be the same. Puguang sets up several explanations upon just this doubt, the first of which runs “men and women are not the same, what is opened and what is prohibited differ, and they differ according to circumstance” — as regards the basic seven limbs the disciplines of the two companies are equal, and what is in excess is prohibitory discipline, differing according to circumstance and not touching the root. In practice: the measure for judging sameness and difference of the entity of discipline is “whether there is relinquishing and obtaining,” not “the number of articles.” This measure will be used once more below, in adjudging “one part” and the rest of the lay follower.

〔2.2〕From lay follower to novice to bhikṣu: is it addition or exchange? First ask: when a man first undertakes the five precepts, then the ten, then full ordination, are the earlier disciplines replaced by the later? This passage of the treatise — “are these three disciplines given separate names by the increasing of the abstentions and of the means? as with a single or a double gold coin, and with fifty and twenty; or are their entities separate, each arising complete and all at once upon undertaking?” — is a question and not a plain statement, and the two commentaries mark it alike: Puguang word for word makes it “below is the explanation of the fourth line. Question: if from being a lay follower one undertakes the discipline of a novice, and then from being a novice undertakes the discipline of a bhikṣu,” and takes up the following sentence with “the answer explains that the stanza says they are separate”; Fabao likewise makes it “a question about the sameness or difference of the limbs and entity of the disciplines of lay follower, novice, and bhikṣu,” and takes it up with “the answer: the three are each separate in entity.” The question has two horns: the former is that upon one and the same entity the abstentions are successively increased and the means enlarged, and a name is changed accordingly — just as a single coin with one added is called a double, and the number runs from fifty to twenty, the entity being only one while the names mount up; the latter is that the three entities are each their own, and upon undertaking each arises complete and all at once. The treatise takes the latter horn in its answer: “the entities of the three disciplines are not mixed with one another; their marks are severally distinct, and they arise complete and all at once”; and each of the three has in it that portion which abstains from killing and so on down to that which abstains from liquor.

Then, abstention from killing being the same in all, what difference is there among the three? The treatise answers: by difference of conditions. The more training articles you seek to undertake, the more occasions of self-intoxication you are able to abstain from, and the more numerous become the occasions of killing and the rest that you abstain from — abstention is raised in dependence upon conditions, and where the conditions differ the abstention differs. The treatise gives a counter-proof besides: if the three were not separate entities, then on relinquishing the discipline of the bhikṣu all three ought to be relinquished together (the former two being gathered into the latter); and since this is not allowed, one may see that the three are each separate.

The easy error: to read full ordination as “handing back the five precepts in exchange for a larger certificate.” It is not an exchange but a stacking — “in one body they turn at the same time,” and a man who has relinquished the discipline of a bhikṣu does not thereby cease to be a lay follower as well. In practice: this article answers a practical doubt directly — does one who returns to lay life lose even the five precepts? By this treatise, no.

III. Five, Eight, Ten, and All: How the Four Disciplines Are Established

〔3.1〕The skeleton of the four disciplines is “the number of articles abstained from.” First ask: on what does the treatise range the four — lay follower, one-day observance, novice, bhikṣu — into a single row? Upon the number of the abstentions undertaken, “in reliance upon four abstentions the four disciplines are established”: undertaking abstention from five articles establishes the lay follower, from eight the one-day observance, from ten the novice, and from all the bodily and verbal actions that ought to be abstained from, the bhikṣu. The five are killing, taking what is not given, sexual misconduct, false speech, and drinking liquors; the eight exchange sexual misconduct for unchastity and then add anointing with scents and wearing garlands and watching dancing and singing, sleeping and sitting on high, broad, and ornate seats, and eating at the improper time; the ten split the sixth into two and add the receiving and hoarding of gold, silver, and other treasures.

The easy error: to suppose that the eight of the one-day observance are the five precepts with three added. They are not — the third article is first exchanged (sexual misconduct for unchastity), and only then are the last three added. That exchange is the most important thing about the discipline of the one-day observance: for one day and one night, the householder undertakes the article of the renunciant. In practice: when reading the articles of the eight-limbed fast, do not read the third as it stands in the five precepts.

A further question: why is the receiving and hoarding of gold and silver not listed among the eight of the one-day observance, yet opened out as the tenth among the novice’s ten? Puguang sets himself a question here, “Question: the receiving and hoarding of gold and the rest — why is it not established within the discipline of the one-day observance,” and his answer is that householders are attached to gold, silver, and other treasures and cannot abstain from them, and so this article is not instituted in the discipline of the one-day observance; and he cites the Correct Principle on “drawing in those who take fright at many training articles,” saying that the reason the one-day observance joins anointing with scents and wearing garlands together with watching dancing and singing into one limb is to draw in those householders who take fright at the sight of many training articles. ⇒ The opening out and gathering up of the number of articles is not casual; it is so that people can undertake them.

IV. One Entity, Several Names: Śīla, Excellent Conduct, Action, Discipline, Individual Liberation, Path of Action

〔4.1〕Why one and the same portion of discipline has so many names. First ask: this passage produces six names in a row — are they six things? They are not; they are one and the same portion of discipline seen from six sides. The treatise glosses them one by one: “because it can level rugged action, it is called śīla” (it can level the rough and uneven ground of action), and it says besides, as to the sense of the word, that “the gloss of the term is that it is cooling,” adducing a gāthā in proof (one who upholds the discipline is at ease and has no fever of body); “the wise extol it, and so it is called excellent conduct”; “it is the very self of what is done, and so it is called action”; “it can guard body and speech, and so it is called discipline.”

Here the author inserts a difficulty of his own: is the nonmanifest not also called “not doing” in the sūtras, and how then can it now be said to be the very self of “what is done”? — Puguang marks this sentence as a question and adjudges it a question the author raises for himself, not a difficulty brought by another school. The author answers himself: a man who has conscience and shame does not, by the force of the nonmanifest, commit manifold evils, and on that side it is named not doing; and it is also produced by the volition of manifest action, and on that side it obtains the name of what is done. Another explanation says that it is the cause of doing and the result of doing, and so there is no fault in calling it doing either.

The easy error: to take “not doing” and “what is done” as a contradiction and try to choose one. The treatise never asked you to choose — the two names have their eyes on two different things. In practice: in reading the technical terms of Abhidharma, the first step is to ask “from which side is this name established”; that one thing should have six names is not strange at all.

〔4.2〕Why only the first thought-instant is called individual liberation and path of action. First ask: if the whole article of discipline is called śīla, excellent conduct, action, and discipline, why are the two names “individual liberation” and “path of action” given only to the very first thought-instant? The treatise’s reason is this: at the time of undertaking the discipline, the first manifest and nonmanifest are “a relinquishing severally and separately of the manifold evils” — cast off one article at a time, and so “in reliance upon the sense of a first relinquishing severally, the name individual liberation is established”; and at just that time what is done is brought to its utmost completion, and so “in reliance upon the sense of action being brought through, the name path of action is established.” From the second thought-instant on it is no longer called individual liberation but only the discipline of individual liberation; nor is it called a path of action any longer, but is called instead “not a path of action, but what arises afterward.”

The easy error: to suppose that “individual liberation” means being able to be liberated in the future, so that the whole article of discipline ought to bear the name. That is not the treatise’s gloss — the “individual” of individual liberation is the “individually, one article at a time” of relinquishing, a matter of the event at the instant of undertaking, and not a prophecy of a fruit to be attained. In practice: the instant of undertaking the discipline and the subsequent keeping of it are, in Abhidharma, two stages and two sets of names; and this is also why, in treating possession below, the text distinguishes again and again the “first thought-instant” from “after the first thought-instant.”

V. Who Possesses Which Discipline

〔5.1〕The eight companies, those who obtain absorption, the noble ones — three tables of possession. First ask: to whom does each of the three disciplines belong? The treatise answers in three layers: “the eight companies all possess the discipline of individual liberation,” from the bhikṣu down to the one-day observance; one who obtains the meditative absorptions certainly possesses the discipline produced by absorption; the discipline produced by the path is possessed by the noble ones alone, and divides again into the two, the learner and the one beyond learning. As for the question of turning along with the mind, the treatise says that of the three only the two, produced by absorption and produced by the path, turn along with the mind, and individual liberation does not — the reason being “because it turns constantly even when the mind is other and when there is no mind”: you may raise another mind, or have no mind at all, and the discipline of individual liberation is there as before.

Here the author sets himself a question: have the non-Buddhists then no discipline that they undertake? (Puguang marks this passage as a question the author sets and answers himself.) The author answers himself: they have, yet it is not called the discipline of individual liberation, because “it has no power to liberate one from evils forever”; their undertaking is raised in reliance upon a grasping at existence.

The easy error: to read “have the non-Buddhists no discipline that they undertake?” as the author denying that they have discipline. The treatise says expressly that they have — what is denied is not that they have a discipline but whether it can count as individual liberation. In practice: in judging whether an article of discipline is individual liberation, what one looks at is not how many things it abstains from but whether it points toward being liberated from evils forever; and this is just the extension of the sense of “relinquishing severally” above.

VI. The Discipline of Cutting Off: A Separate Name at One Stage

〔6.1〕Why a further “discipline of cutting off” is set up. First ask: the two disciplines produced by absorption and by the path already have names, so why give another? Because a stage must be marked out: “the nine uninterrupted paths within access concentration, and the disciplines of absorption and without outflows arising together with them,” these two disciplines at this stage “can cut off forever the evil discipline bound to the desire realm and the afflictions that can raise it, and so are called the discipline of cutting off” — the name is established separately upon the matter of “cutting off, now.” Puguang cites the Mahāvibhāṣā and sets himself a question, “Question: why is this alone called the discipline of cutting off,” his answer being that it can serve as the antidote that cuts off both the breaking of discipline and the afflictions that can raise the breaking of discipline.

The treatise then draws the boundary clear with four statements: what is a discipline of absorption and not a discipline of cutting off is all the remaining disciplines of absorption with outflows, apart from the nine uninterrupted paths of access concentration; what is a discipline of cutting off and not a discipline of absorption is the discipline without outflows of the nine uninterrupted paths of access concentration; what is both is the discipline with outflows of the nine uninterrupted paths of access concentration; and what is neither is all the remaining disciplines without outflows apart from the nine uninterrupted paths of access concentration. The four statements of the discipline without outflows and the discipline of cutting off are to be read by the same pattern.

The easy error: to take the discipline of cutting off as a fourth discipline. It is not a fourth kind but a separate name for the former two at a particular stage — and the four statements are precisely what settle the matter beyond dispute. In practice: whenever in Abhidharma you meet “such-and-such is also called such-and-such,” the first question is “is this a separate entity or a separate name?”; and this treatise’s way of answering is to try it with four statements — if four statements can be sorted out, it is a separate name and not a separate entity.

VII. The Discipline of the Faculties: The Problem Raised by a Stanza of Abbreviated Discipline

〔7.1〕The “discipline of mind” in the sūtra drives the treatise into a corner. First ask: where does this stanza of abbreviated discipline come from? The author has adduced it himself in order to set up a difficulty. Having finished the discipline of cutting off with four statements upon four statements, the author asks himself: if that is so, how is one to construe the abbreviated discipline spoken by the World-Honored One — “the discipline of body is excellent, excellent is the discipline of speech, the discipline of mind is excellent, excellent is the universal discipline”; and there is besides a sūtra that says one should well guard and well abide in the discipline of the eye faculty. The difficulty is this: the two disciplines of body and speech may be nonmanifest form, but the discipline of mind and the discipline of the faculties cannot be form (mind has no body or speech to guard). The author concedes it on the spot: “the nature of these two is not nonmanifest form.”

The easy error: to read this passage as the treatise explaining the sūtra. It is not explaining a sūtra; it is the treatise exposing a difficulty of its own — this treatise makes the nonmanifest to be form, and yet the sūtras have two things called “discipline” that are not form. In practice: in reading a book of the treatise class, whenever you see the construction “if that is so, what is said in the sūtra …,” recognize first that this is a barrier the author has set for himself, and the next passage will certainly be his way through it.

〔7.2〕The way through is to exchange the entity, not to alter the name. First ask: if it is not nonmanifest form, what is it? The stanza answers bluntly: “correct knowing and correct mindfulness joined are called the discipline of mind and of the faculties.” The treatise explains that both disciplines have correct knowing and correct mindfulness for their entity, and so “the discipline of mind has discernment and mindfulness for its entity” — correct knowing is discernment, correct mindfulness is mindfulness, and both are mental factors and not form. The treatise explains besides why the stanza lists the names first and then says the one word “joined”: it is to show that one may not pair them off woodenly in the order of the letters (“the words separated and joined show that it is not in that order”).

The easy error: to suppose that since the discipline of mind is not form, this proves the Sarvāstivādins granting that discipline may be other than form. What the treatise holds is that “the three disciplines, individual liberation and the rest, are form”; it never said that everything called discipline is form — the discipline of mind and the discipline of the faculties are another usage in the sūtras, and the treatise gives them another entity precisely so that they shall not unsettle the position taken above. In practice: one and the same word need not have one sense in sūtra and in treatise; before adjudging the doctrine, adjudge “what entity this word points to here.”

VIII. The Stages of Possessing the Nonmanifest (1): Abiding in Discipline, in Non-Discipline, Having Obtained Absorption, the Noble Ones

〔8.1〕Four kinds of person, four timetables. First ask: why does this long passage range them one position at a time? Because what Abhidharma asks is not “is there discipline or not” but “in which portion of the three times, past, present, and future, it is possessed.” The treatise ranges them position by position: one who abides in individual liberation, so long as he has not relinquished it, constantly possesses the present, and “after the first thought-instant possesses the past as well,” while that future portion no one possesses — the reason being “because form that does not follow the mind is feeble in force.” One who abides in non-discipline is likewise. One who has obtained the discipline of absorption “constantly possesses past and future until he relinquishes it,” possessing even the past, because the past discipline of absorption lost in another life is necessarily regained at this first thought-instant (Puguang cites this sentence as “because the past discipline of absorption that was lost is necessarily regained at this first thought-instant,” and cites the Correct Principle in explanation of this stage). The discipline without outflows of all noble ones is constantly possessed in past and future too, only that at the first thought-instant the future alone is possessed and not the past, since this class of noble path has not arisen before. Only when one is presently abiding in absorption or in the path is the present possessed.

The easy error: to read “possesses the past” as “in that past stretch of time I had discipline.” It is not — the “possession” of Abhidharma is whether at this present moment there is in you the “acquisition” of that portion of dharma; to possess the past is to say that there is now in you the acquisition of that past portion. In practice: this is the passage in the fascicle that most resembles a ledger, and the way to read it is first to identify the person (four positions), then the time (three times), then the time-portion (first thought-instant / after the first thought-instant); get the three coordinates lined up and the sentences cease to wind.

IX. How One Who Abides in the Middle Possesses the Nonmanifest

〔9.1〕Has one in the third square a nonmanifest? First ask: has a man who is neither in discipline nor in non-discipline any nonmanifest when he does good or does evil? The treatise answers with care: “as for one said to abide in the middle, he is neither in discipline nor in non-discipline,” and the actions such a man raises “need not all of them have a nonmanifest”; and if there is a nonmanifest, it is gathered under the class of wholesome discipline or evil discipline. If there is, then at the first thought-instant he possesses the present alone, and after the first thought-instant, until it is relinquished, he constantly possesses the two times, past and present.

The treatise also explains in passing why the stanza uses the one word “middle” to say the present: because “the present time is situated in the middle of past and future, and so possessing the middle is said for possessing the present” — the present lies just between past and future, and so to say “possesses the middle” is to say “possesses the present.”

The easy error: to take one who abides in the middle for “a man with no nonmanifest.” He is not without one; he is undetermined — do the deed heavily enough and there is one, do it lightly and there is manifest action only. In practice: this square is speaking of the great majority of people who have undertaken no discipline. A good deed done offhand need not leave a nonmanifest behind, but done with sufficient earnestness it will; and this is the preparation for the passage below on “one abiding in discipline raising the defiled, one abiding in non-discipline raising the pure.”

X. One Abiding in Discipline Raises the Defiled; One Abiding in Non-Discipline Raises the Pure

〔10.1〕Discipline and evil discipline do not exclude each other. First ask: if a man who has undertaken the discipline does an evil deed, will an evil nonmanifest be raised? The treatise answers: it will — “if one abides in discipline and, by a superior affliction, does unwholesome actions of killing, binding, and the rest, thereby an unwholesome nonmanifest is raised”; and conversely, a butcher abiding in non-discipline who, out of pure and thick faith, does superior wholesome actions such as paying homage to the Buddha “thereby raises wholesome nonmanifests as well.” How long do these two nonmanifests continue? “So long as these two minds are not cut off, the nonmanifest raised continues constantly,” the first thought possessing the present alone and thereafter possessing both past and present — which is what the stanza calls “until the force of the defiled or the pure is spent.”

The easy error: to suppose that having undertaken the discipline one will have no evil nonmanifest, or that having an evil nonmanifest is the same as having lost the discipline. The two coexist: that portion which is discipline is still there, and the evil portion arises besides, each with its own term of continuing. In practice: this article settles a practical doubt — if one has broken a precept, is one then without discipline? By this treatise, no; not until the occasion of relinquishing. And the sentence that a good deed done out of pure and thick faith leaves a nonmanifest behind matters especially for those in the second square: your present identity does not seal off the fruit of your present thought.

XI. The Stages of Possessing Manifest Action and the Two Indeterminate Manifests

〔11.1〕The ledger of manifest action is shorter than that of the nonmanifest. First ask: is the possessing of manifest action the same as that of the nonmanifest? It is not. The treatise says: one who abides in discipline, in non-discipline, or in the middle, “so long as he is presently doing the various manifest actions, constantly possesses the present manifest”; after the first thought-instant, until it is relinquished, he constantly possesses the past; and there is certainly no one who possesses the future manifest. The two manifest actions that are obscured-indeterminate and unobscured-indeterminate are shorter still, since “there is certainly none who can possess their past and future,” and they possess the present alone — the reason being “since the force of the dharma is already inferior, the force of acquisition is feeble too, and so there is none who can possess them backward or forward.”

The easy error: to suppose that manifest action and nonmanifest action are one ledger. They are not — the nonmanifest may be possessed as future (as by one who has obtained the meditative absorptions), while manifest action is never possessed as future; and the indeterminate manifest is not even possessed as past. The two sides of one and the same portion of action differ in the range of their possession. In practice: read this passage with the three squares side by side, and you will see how Abhidharma uses “the range of possession” to rank the strength and weakness of the various dharmas.

〔11.2〕The author’s four-part pattern of asking and answering himself. First ask: why is the force of the indeterminate manifest so inferior? The author asks himself “this dharma being inferior in force, by what is it so,” and answers himself “it is done by the mind”; then at once raises a difficulty against himself: if that is so, then the obscured-indeterminate minds and the rest ought likewise not to be possessed as past and future; and finally explains himself: “this reproach is unreasonable” — manifest action is dull and slow and arises in dependence upon another, while minds and the rest are not so; and the indeterminate manifest arises from an inferior mind, its force being once again more inferior than the mind that can raise it, and so manifest action and mind differ in respect of possession. Puguang marks this passage sentence by sentence into the four parts of question, answer, difficulty, and explanation, and cites the Correct Principle to supply a reason, saying that what is raised must be inferior to the mind that raises it, as an indeterminate mind can raise manifest action while the manifest action it raises produces no nonmanifest.

The easy error: to see “if that is so …” and suppose that a second person has entered. From beginning to end there is only the author speaking here — this is the most common form in all Abhidharma, of raising a difficulty against oneself and explaining it oneself. In practice: the surest way to tell “a difficulty set for oneself” from “a difficulty of another school” is to look at the outlines of the ancient masters; more than half the questions and answers in this fascicle are the author asking and answering himself.

XII. The Five Names of Non-Discipline

〔12.1〕From which side each of the five names is established. First ask: why should non-discipline have five separate names? It is the same manner of writing as Root 18 above, “one entity, several names” — one and the same portion of evil discipline seen from five sides. The treatise glosses them one by one: because the wise reproach and loathe it, and because its result is not lovely, the name evil conduct is established; “because it obstructs pure śīla it is called evil discipline”; because it is produced by body and speech it is called action; because it is gathered under the root it is called a path of action; “not restraining body and speech, it is called non-discipline.” And it supplies one boundary line: “the name path of action refers to the first thought alone,” while the other four names extend to the first and to every stage that follows.

Puguang, at this passage, avows that the text can be construed as it stands and adds nothing new; and so the teaching material for this section can only be unfolded word by word from the treatise’s own five glosses — which is exactly what makes it useful to set against Root 18: on the wholesome side there are six names and on the evil side five, and the rule that “path of action refers to the first thought alone, while the other names extend to the first and to what follows” is exactly the same on both sides.

The easy error: to take the five names as five kinds of evil differing in gravity. They do not differ in gravity but in angle. In practice: when the ten paths of action come up in the text below, this rule that “a path of action refers to the first thought alone” will appear again; get it by heart here first.

XIII. Possessing the Manifest but Not the Nonmanifest: Four Statements That Fix the Boundary

〔13.1〕Who has manifest action without a nonmanifest. First ask: is there such a case as “doing a deed and yet leaving no nonmanifest”? There is. The treatise answers: one who abides in the middle and “by a feeble volition does good or does evil raises manifest action only and has no nonmanifest at all,” how much less the manifest action raised by an indeterminate volition; but one must set aside the meritorious deeds with a basis and those cases in which a path of action has already been completed (these do have a nonmanifest). Conversely, those who have the nonmanifest without the manifest are “the noble persons who change their birth, whose manifest action has not yet arisen or has arisen and been relinquished.” “Changing birth” must be made clear first: it does not mean “easily arisen” but being reborn and taking up a new support — Puguang explains this sentence as “the noble ones who change their birth within the three realms,” and gives the reason: “there are cases where the manifest is not possessed, as when in the womb and the like the manifest action has not yet arisen, or the manifest having arisen it is again relinquished upon meeting a condition.” The noble one has exchanged the body he depends upon, and in the new body manifest action has not yet had time to be produced (as at the stage of being in the womb and the like), or the manifest action produced before has been relinquished along with the body, while the nonmanifest of absorption and of the path obtained before is still there — whence the statement “the nonmanifest without the manifest.” The remaining two statements (both, and neither) may be known by the same pattern.

The easy error: to understand “feeble volition” as a moral verdict of “insincerity of heart.” It is a term of degree of force, not a matter of sincerity — with one and the same good deed, a weak volition leaves the manifest only, and a strong volition leaves a nonmanifest behind. In practice: this article gives a very concrete index — whether a continuing force is to be left behind by a good or evil deed depends upon the strength of the volition with which it is done; earnestness of mind is just the practitioner’s way of saying this principle.

XIV. By What Conditions Each of the Three Disciplines Is Obtained

〔14.1〕The disciplines of absorption and of the path are obtained along with the mind; the discipline of individual liberation must be given by another. First ask: are the three disciplines obtained in the same way? Not at all. The treatise says: the discipline of absorption is obtained “by obtaining the mind of a fundamental or preliminary stage of meditative absorption with outflows, at that time it is obtained, since it arises together with the mind”; the discipline without outflows is obtained by obtaining that portion of mind which is without outflows, “also since it arises together with the mind”; the word “that” in the stanza points to the mind of absorption spoken of before, and the word “noble” distinguishes what is without outflows. Six stages of meditative absorption have minds without outflows (access concentration, the intermediate absorption, and the four fundamental absorptions), and the three preliminary stages are not included. As for the discipline of individual liberation, it is “obtained through the instruction of another and the rest” — one who can instruct is called “another,” and the discipline is raised by the force of instruction from him. This divides again into two: the three disciplines of bhikṣu, bhikṣuṇī, and probationer are obtained from the Saṅgha, and the remaining five from a person.

The easy error: to suppose that the discipline of absorption too must be undertaken. The disciplines of absorption and of the path have no rite of undertaking at all; obtain the mind and you obtain them, lose the mind and you lose them; only individual liberation cannot be had unless someone gives it. In practice: this article explains something often asked — why undertaking the discipline requires a master and requires the Saṅgha. Because the condition by which this kind of discipline is obtained is precisely “the instruction of another”; this is not a fastidiousness about ritual but the way the entity itself is.

〔14.2〕The ten ways of obtaining full ordination. First ask: if it is said “obtained through the instruction of another and the rest,” what does that “and the rest” gather up? The treatise answers: it gathers up the ten ways of obtaining full ordination spoken of by the Vaibhāṣika masters of the Vinaya — spontaneously (the Buddha and the pratyekabuddhas), by entering the certainty of the noble path (the five bhikṣus), by the Buddha’s call of “come well” (Yaśas and the rest), by receiving in faith the Buddha as the great master (Mahākāśyapa), by answering skillfully what was asked (Sudāyin), by receiving with reverence the eight weighty dharmas (Mahāprajāpatī), by sending a messenger (the nun Dharmadinnā), by an upholder of the Vinaya as the fifth man (in the border countries), by ten of the Saṅgha (in the central country), and by saying three times the refuge in the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Saṅgha (the sixty of the worthy company). The treatise adds one important sentence besides: “the discipline of individual liberation so obtained is not necessarily raised in dependence upon manifest action.”

Puguang examines the persons of these ten one by one, explaining the first as “at the time of the mind of the knowledge of exhaustion spontaneously, full ordination is obtained,” and on the fifth giving a small biography, “Sudāyin, which here means Good Giving, was but seven years old,” saying that because he was clever and answered the Buddha’s questions well and pleased the Buddha’s mind, the Buddha had the Saṅgha perform the formal act and give him full ordination though he was not yet twenty.

The easy error: to take these ten as ten parallel procedures for undertaking the discipline. The first eight are all single occasions, and only the ninth (the ten of the Saṅgha) and the tenth (the three refuges) are standing methods that can be carried on. In practice: the meaning of these ten lies in the sentence “not necessarily raised in dependence upon manifest action” — the form of undertaking may differ, and what raises the discipline does not lie in the form itself.

XV. For Life and for a Day and a Night: Discipline Has Only Two Bounds of Time

〔15.1〕Why there are only two terms. First ask: may a discipline be undertaken for three years, or for ten days? The treatise answers that it may not, since “the bounds of time for discipline are two only: first the bound of the life span, second the bound of a day and a night,” a half-month and the rest being only the day and night said over again. The discipline of individual liberation held by the seven companies is to be undertaken for life alone; that held for the one-day observance for a day and a night alone. The treatise explains in passing what dharma “time” is — “it is a designation upon the formations,” a conventional name upon the continuum of the formations; and in the four continents the stretch of light and the stretch of darkness are established in order as the names of day and night. As for after death, the earlier engagement cannot raise the discipline again, because “the support is different, and in a different support there is neither preliminary effort nor recollection.”

〔15.2〕Whether the one-day observance may be undertaken again beyond one day and night — an exchange of six turns. First ask: once a day and a night have passed, may one undertake the one-day observance for five days or ten? In this passage the speakers must be identified turn by turn (following Puguang’s marks). The Sautrāntikas first ask: after one day and night, or within five or ten days and nights, when the one-day observance is undertaken, what dharma acts as an obstruction so that those many disciplines of the one-day observance cannot arise as well? The Sarvāstivādins answer: there must certainly be a dharma that can act as an obstruction, because the Bhagavat says in the sūtra that the discipline of the one-day observance is for one day and night alone. The Sautrāntikas say again: upon this matter we should consider together — was it that the Buddha rightly observed that after one day and night there is in principle no room for it to arise, and therefore said “one day and night” in the sūtra? or was it that, observing that those to be trained were hard to tame in their faculties, he provisionally conferred a discipline of one day and night? The Sarvāstivādins ask: on what principle or what scriptural teaching do you speak so? The Sautrāntikas answer: that the discipline should arise beyond this term is not contrary to principle. Finally the Sarvāstivādins raise a further difficulty and close back upon their own school: there has never been a sūtra saying that beyond a day and a night there is a separate undertaking and obtaining of the discipline of the one-day observance, and therefore our school does not allow this position.

The easy error: to read that last sentence as the author’s conclusion. It marks itself on its face with “the Vaibhāṣikas say thus” and “our school” — it is the closing word of the school in question, not the author’s verdict. In practice: the point of divergence in this dispute is very clean — the Sarvāstivādins want the proof of the holy teaching, the Sautrāntikas want a principle not contravened; what the two parties dispute is not whether it may be undertaken but on what ground that is to be judged.

The easy error: to suppose the two terms an administrative regulation of the discipline. They are established upon the two natural bounds of “the body one depends upon” and “a day and a night” — one bounded by the body, one by the light of day, and there is no third natural bound to be had. In practice: this article explains why the eight-limbed fast must be undertaken at sunrise and relinquished at the next sunrise, and also why there is no such thing as “undertaking the five precepts for a year.”

XVI. Evil Discipline Has No Day-and-Night Term

〔16.1〕Why evil discipline cannot be undertaken for a short term. First ask: wholesome discipline has the two terms of life and of a day and a night; why has evil discipline the term of life alone? The treatise answers: “because this is not undertaken as wholesome discipline is” — there will certainly be no one who sets a term and undertakes non-discipline before a master, saying “for one day and night I definitely undertake non-discipline,” since that is a thing the wise reproach and loathe. The author at once raises a difficulty against himself: if that is so, neither will anyone set a term and say before a master “until the end of my life I definitely undertake evil discipline”; and then non-discipline ought not to be obtained even for life. The author answers himself: though there is no engagement before a master, so long as one does evil actions all one’s life, “by raising the inclination to destroy the wholesome once and for all, non-discipline is obtained”; whereas if one raises only a temporary inclination to destroy the wholesome and has no master besides, it cannot make him obtain non-discipline.

At the end of the passage the treatise records an account of the Sautrāntikas: since wholesome discipline has no separate real thing called the nonmanifest, this non-discipline too ought not to be really existent; what is called non-discipline is just that unwholesome inclination to do evil continuing on unrelinquished, and therefore, though a wholesome mind arise later, he is still called one who possesses non-discipline, since he has not yet relinquished that inclination.

The easy error: to understand “obtaining non-discipline” as a punishment or a designation of status. It is a continuing entity: raised by an inclination to destroy the wholesome once and for all, and not interrupted because you happened not to kill today. In practice: the meaning of this article for cultivation lies in its converse — a settled inclination fixes a man’s continuum more surely than a single act does; and it is the same on the wholesome side, which is exactly why undertaking the discipline calls for a vow.

XVII. How the One-Day Observance Is Undertaken: Seven Matters, and It Fails If One Is Lacking

〔17.1〕Each of the seven matters guards against one ailment. First ask: why does undertaking the eight-limbed fast require so many particulars? The treatise lists seven: undertaking it at dawn (at sunrise, since this discipline must run a day and a night; one who has made an engagement beforehand may, if there is a hindering condition in the morning, still undertake it when the fast is done), a low seat (a humble and lowly seat before the master, squatting or kneeling, the body bent and the palms joined, only the sick excepted, since “if one is not reverent the discipline is not raised”), undertaking it from a master (“this must be from a master, and there is no room for undertaking it oneself,” the reason being that when afterwards one meets an occasion of transgression, shame before the master of the discipline will keep one from transgressing), speaking after the instruction (speaking after the master’s instruction, neither before nor together with him, or else both the giving and the undertaking fail), completeness of the limbs (“undertaking all eight limbs completes the one-day observance, and if any is lacking the one-day observance is not completed”), leaving off ornaments (because they are occasions of self-intoxication; but the ornaments one habitually wears need not be laid aside, since one cannot raise much self-intoxication by taking them for object), and a day and a night (until the first rising of the sun the next morning). The treatise says besides that if it is not undertaken according to the rule, “only excellent conduct is produced and the discipline is not obtained.”

The easy error: to take these seven for a fastidiousness of ritual. For each the treatise gives a reason, and every reason points to whether the entity of discipline can be raised at all — without reverence it is not raised, undertaken by oneself it is not completed, with a limb lacking it is not completed, undertaken contrary to the rule it becomes excellent conduct only. In practice: this passage may be taken article by article as a self-examination before undertaking the discipline; and the sentence “shame before the master of the discipline will keep one from transgressing” tells what the real work of “undertaking it from a master” is — not the rite, but the keeping of it afterwards.

XVIII. The One-Day Observance Is Also Called the Nourishing: A Name Established by a Stanza

〔18.1〕Two names, two functions. First ask: why has this discipline of a day and a night the two names “one-day observance” and “the nourishing”? The treatise glosses the one-day observance thus: “as for what is called the one-day observance, this discipline abides near the arhat, since one trains after him,” and it records besides another account, “some say: this abides near the discipline for life.” Puguang, besides these two explanations, cites the Mahāvibhāṣā for one more (this discipline abides near in time), setting the three side by side. The treatise glosses “the nourishing” by saying: “such a discipline is also named the nourishing,” since it can nourish sentient beings whose wholesome roots are thin and few and make those roots increase by degrees; and it adduces a stanza in proof — by this one can nourish the pure and wholesome mind of oneself and of others, and therefore the Bhagavat called this the nourishing.

The easy error: to take this adduced stanza for a root stanza. It is expressly preceded by “as a stanza says,” and is adduced in proof, not a stanza of this treatise. In practice: the two names mark out the two ends of this discipline — looking up, one trains after the arhat (the one-day observance); looking down, one raises up wholesome roots that are thin (the nourishing). The place of the eight-limbed fast in practice lies between those two names.

XIX. Why the Limbs Are Eight

〔19.1〕Four, one, three — three classes of limb, each guarding against one ailment. First ask: may one undertake fewer than the eight limbs? The treatise first classifies them: the first four limbs (from abstaining from killing to abstaining from false speech) are the limbs of śīla, “because by these four the intrinsic offences are abstained from”; the next one limb (abstaining from drinking liquors, an occasion of heedlessness) is the limb of heedfulness, because “though one has undertaken śīla, if one drinks liquors the mind becomes heedless and transgresses śīla”; the last three limbs (from abstaining from anointing with scents and wearing garlands to abstaining from eating at the improper time) are the limbs of restraint, “because they can conduce to a mind of disgust and turning away.” It then answers why they must be undertaken complete: without completeness one cannot abstain from the three faults of intrinsic offence, lost mindfulness, and self-intoxication — the first four guard against intrinsic offences, the one about liquor guards against lost mindfulness (in drinking one forgets what should and should not be done), and the last three guard against self-intoxication (making use of garlands and high broad seats and frequenting song and dance, the mind is elated and forthwith the discipline is ruined).

The treatise explains besides the function of the article on “eating at the improper time”: one who can keep to eating at the proper time, because the times of constant eating are blocked, “then recollects the discipline of the one-day observance he has undertaken, and can generate a deep disgust with the world”; whereas if he eats at the improper time, both things — recollecting the discipline and disgust — are absent, and frequent eating makes the mind loose and dissolute.

〔19.2〕Is the entity of the fast abstention from untimely eating, or the eight limbs together — an exchange of five turns. First ask: which among these eight limbs is the “fast” itself? Some other masters first set up an account: abstention from untimely eating is called the entity of the fast, and the remaining eight (splitting anointing with scents and wearing garlands from watching dancing and singing) are called the limbs of the fast. The Sautrāntikas at once cite the sūtra to refute it: to hold this is to contravene the sūtra — for the sūtra, having finished with abstention from untimely eating, goes straight on to say “this eighth limb I now train in after the noble arhats,” which shows that abstention from untimely eating is itself the eighth limb and not an entity outside the limbs. The other masters then ask in return: if that is so, what other entity of the fast is there, that these eight are called limbs of the fast? The Sautrāntikas answer: the fast is the name of the whole, and the limbs are stated by division; it is by the several constituting the whole that the several obtain the name of limb — as a chariot is made up of many parts, as with the fourfold army and the five-ingredient powder, so also with the eight limbs of the fast. The Vaibhāṣikas then establish their own school head-on: abstention from untimely eating is both the fast and a limb of the fast, while the remaining seven limbs are limbs of the fast and not the fast, just as right view is both the path and a limb of the path, the awakening-factor of discernment of dharmas is both awakening and an awakening-factor, and concentration is both meditative absorption and a limb of meditative absorption. The Sautrāntikas raise one last difficulty: a limb means a branch, and must be said with respect to another, so that right view and the rest cannot be limbs of themselves; and if the right view and the rest of an earlier moment be said to be the limbs of the right view and the rest of a later moment, then the noble path of the first thought-instant ought not to be complete in the eight limbs.

The easy error: to read this passage as a dispute over whether one may eat after noon. What is disputed is the relation of entity and limb — whether the fast is an independent entity or a conventional name made up of the eight limbs. In practice: this question is really one exercise, within the study of discipline, of a way of asking common throughout the treatise (whole and part, conventional and real); learn the shape of it here, and you will not lose your way when the same form of question and answer comes later.

The easy error: to suppose the last three limbs mere details that might be omitted. The treatise’s structure is four against intrinsic offences, one against lost mindfulness, three against self-intoxication — drop one class and one ailment goes unguarded. In practice: the eight limbs are not eight prohibitions but three lines of defence; undertake them knowing which ailment your article is guarding against, and the keeping will be more than endurance.

XX. One Need Not Be a Lay Follower to Undertake the One-Day Observance, but Without the Three Refuges There Is None

〔20.1〕The threshold of the one-day observance is the three refuges, not the state of lay follower. First ask: may a man who has not undertaken the five precepts undertake the eight-limbed fast? The treatise answers that he may — “whoever has not undertaken the discipline of the lay follower, if within a day and a night he takes refuge in the Three Jewels and, having said the three refuges, undertakes the discipline of the one-day observance, he too undertakes and obtains the discipline of the one-day observance”; but without first saying the three refuges there is none, only those excepted who do not know that the three refuges must be undertaken first. The treatise cites the Mahānāman Sūtra in proof: a white-robed layman of the household, whose male faculty is complete, taking refuge in the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Saṅgha, raising a mind earnest and pure and uttering words sincere and true, declares of himself “I am an upāsaka, may the venerable one bear me in mind and guard me with compassion,” and “at this point he is named an upāsaka.”

The easy error: to read the three refuges as a courtesy before undertaking the discipline. The treatise establishes them as a necessary condition of the discipline’s being raised — without them the eight limbs may be undertaken and no discipline is raised. In practice: this article gives the householder a very clear order: the three refuges are the gate, and both the lay follower and the one-day observance come in by that gate; whence the text next asks “at what moment, then, is the discipline raised?”

XXI. When the Discipline Is Raised

〔21.1〕It is raised at the moment of self-declaration. First ask: at the time when one has taken the three refuges but the marks of the five precepts have not been said, has the discipline been raised? The treatise answers that it has — “raising a mind earnest and pure and uttering words sincere and true, he declares of himself ‘I am an upāsaka, may the venerable one bear me in mind and guard me with compassion.’ At that time the discipline of the lay follower is raised,” since words declaring oneself a lay follower and the rest are the very condition that raises the discipline; and further because the sūtra goes on to say “from this time forward, until the end of my life, I renounce living beings,” a sentence that omits killing and the rest and says only the one word “living,” which shows that the five precepts had already been obtained at the earlier time. As for the five marks of discipline set out for him afterwards, that is “in order that he may know the training articles he ought to train in,” just as after obtaining a bhikṣu’s full ordination the training articles are said over again so that he may know them and hold them firmly; and it is so with the novice as well.

〔21.2〕Whether taking the three refuges alone makes a lay follower — four turns between the masters abroad and the masters of Kaśmīra. First ask: who forced out this question of “when the discipline is raised”? It is the outcome of a short dispute in the passage before, the speakers being as Puguang marks them. Asking in reliance upon the sūtra: is one made a lay follower by taking the three refuges only? The masters abroad (the Sautrāntika line of Gandhāra, outside the country of Kaśmīra) answer: by this alone he is made one — at the time of taking the three refuges the five precepts are not raised, and the discipline is separately raised only when the marks of the discipline are said afterwards. The treatise masters of the country of Kaśmīra say instead: apart from the discipline of the lay follower there is no lay follower, and one must be complete in the five precepts to be named a lay follower. The masters abroad raise a difficulty: if that is so, it ought to contravene this sūtra. The masters of Kaśmīra answer: it does not contravene it, since the discipline has already been raised. The masters abroad then press: at what time is the discipline raised? The next stanza is the answer to that question.

The easy error: to read “if that is so, it ought to contravene this sūtra” as the words of the Kaśmīra side. By Puguang, this difficulty is raised by the masters abroad, and “it does not contravene it, since the discipline has already been raised” is the answer of Kaśmīra. Attach the one question and one answer to the wrong parties and the whole direction of the passage is reversed. In practice: in reading a short dispute, counting the alternations of “difficulty” and “answer” guards against error better than remembering the conclusion.

The easy error: to take the saying of the marks of the discipline afterwards for the formal undertaking. The treatise says it is so that he may know them and hold them firmly, not the raising of the discipline; the discipline is raised at the instant of self-declaration. In practice: this article together with the preceding section is the whole of this fascicle’s adjudication of the householder’s undertaking of discipline — the three refuges are the condition, the self-declaration raises it, and the saying of the marks keeps it.

XXII. The Four Statements of “One Part” and the Rest: The Largest Dispute in the Fascicle

〔22.1〕Does the sūtra’s four kinds of lay follower conflict with “a lay follower must be complete in the discipline”? First ask: the World-Honored One plainly says that there are four lay followers, able to train in one part, in a small part, in a large part, and in the full part; if every lay follower is complete in the five precepts, how are these four to be construed? This difficulty is raised by the Sautrāntikas (Puguang marks the first two sentences of the passage as the Sautrāntikas adducing the sūtra as a difficulty, and the third as the Sarvāstivādins’ construal). The Sarvāstivādins’ way of construing is a single sentence: “it is said with regard to what can be kept” — the four are said with regard to “what can be kept,” not to “what has been undertaken”; what they can keep is what they undertook beforehand, and so the word “train” is used, since otherwise the sūtra ought to have said “undertakes one part.”

The easy error: to read “able to train in one part” as “has undertaken one article only.” The Sarvāstivādins’ reading is: all five articles have been undertaken, and the difference lies only in how many can be held. In practice: the practical import of this dispute is large — it settles whether a man who cannot keep all five precepts counts as a lay follower. The two schools have each their answer, and this treatise records both.

〔22.2〕The course of the seven exchanges. First ask: how is this dispute pressed forward? Following Puguang’s marks sentence by sentence, the order is this: the Sautrāntikas raise the difficulty, “what is thus held contravenes the sūtra”; the Sarvāstivādins probe, “how does it contravene the sūtra”; the Sautrāntikas answer — no sūtra says that the self-declaration itself raises the five precepts, and this sūtra does not say “from this time forward, until the end of my life, I renounce living beings”; the Sarvāstivādins ask, “how then does the sūtra say it”; the Sautrāntikas answer, “as in the Mahānāman Sūtra; in that sūtra alone are the marks of a lay follower stated”; the Sautrāntikas then adduce another sūtra to construe the former (that line about renouncing life and turning to the pure being one who has seen the truths staking his life upon his own oath and showing that he cherishes the true Dharma deeply, and not said in order to set out the marks of a lay follower); the Sautrāntikas refute the construal offered before (if “one part” and the rest were said with regard to keeping and transgressing, the man undertaking the discipline ought not even to have asked the Buddha, much less should the Buddha have answered him); the Sautrāntikas explain the text of the sūtra for themselves (it is precisely because he had not understood how much the discipline of a lay follower comprises that he asked, and when the Buddha answered that there are four upāsakas he still did not understand and asked again what is meant by able to train in one part); the Sarvāstivādins raise a difficulty (if one may be called a lay follower while lacking the discipline, then a bhikṣu and a novice who lack it ought to be established as such too); the Sautrāntikas retort (then why is the measure of limbs undertaken by the lay follower and on up to the bhikṣu fixed as it is); the Sarvāstivādins answer (it is so instituted by the force of the Buddha’s teaching); the Sautrāntikas answer by parallel instance (then it should equally be allowed that by the force of the Buddha’s teaching one may be called a lay follower, though lacking the discipline, and not a bhikṣu and the rest); and finally Kaśmīra closes back upon its own school — “the Vaibhāṣika masters of the country of Kaśmīra do not allow that one who lacks the discipline can become a lay follower.”

The easy error: to read that last sentence as the author’s verdict. It is the closing word of the school, marking the Vaibhāṣika masters of Kaśmīra on its face; the form of this treatise is one meaning and two schools recorded together, and here no judgment is passed as to who prevails. In practice: in reading a long chain of exchanges like this, the surest method is to mark out “who is speaking” before reading what is said — Puguang and Fabao are entirely at one in their attributions in this passage, which makes it the most reliable stretch of outline in the fascicle.

XXIII. Low, Middle, and High Follow the Mind

〔23.1〕What settles the grade of a discipline. First ask: undertaking the same five precepts, is there a higher and a lower in the discipline? The treatise answers that there is, and the criterion is a single word — the mind: “the discipline of individual liberation undertaken by the eight companies all has the low, middle, and high grades according to the mind with which it is undertaken.” From this principle a very startling result follows: “some arhats may possess a discipline of the low grade, while some ordinary beings may possess one of the high.” At the end of this section the treatise also answers a question in passing: does one who undertakes the discipline of the lay follower but not the three refuges become a lay follower? The answer: he does not, save those who do not know.

The easy error: to suppose that the grade of the discipline follows the fruit attained by the person. The treatise says expressly that it does not — what it follows is the strength or weakness of the very thought at the time of undertaking, and has nothing to do with where you later attain. In practice: this article raises the force of mind at the instant of undertaking into the decisive place; at one and the same assembly, undertaking one and the same article, the grade obtained may be wholly different, and the difference lies only in whether that thought was earnest.

XXIV. The Entity of the Three Refuges

〔24.1〕In taking refuge in the Buddha, in what does one take refuge? First ask: in saying that one takes refuge in the Buddha, is it that body one takes refuge in? The treatise answers: “one who takes refuge in the Buddha takes refuge only in the dharmas beyond learning that can make a Buddha” — because those dharmas are superior, the body obtains the name of Buddha; or because by obtaining those dharmas the Buddha is able to awaken to all. Which are the Buddha’s dharmas beyond learning? “The knowledge of exhaustion and the rest, together with what accompanies them,” and not the body of form and the rest, since the body is the same before and after becoming a Buddha. As to whether one takes refuge in one Buddha or in all, the treatise answers that in truth one should say all Buddhas, since the mark of the path is no different in any Buddha.

The easy error: to read this sentence as a one-sided assertion that “one does not take refuge in the Buddha’s form body.” The treatise itself later in the same passage blocks that misreading — it says expressly that this treatise never said “the dharmas beyond learning alone are what is called Buddha,” but only that “the dharmas beyond learning can make a Buddha,” and it does not exclude the body one depends upon from being gathered into the entity of a Buddha. The weight of what is taken refuge in rests upon the dharmas, and not upon shutting the body out of the entity of a Buddha. In practice: this is the place where the three refuges are most easily taught awry; remember the treatise’s own measure — the weight is on the dharmas, not on excluding the body.

〔24.2〕Taking refuge in the Saṅgha and in the Dharma. First ask: and in what do the Saṅgha and the Dharma take refuge? The treatise answers: “one who takes refuge in the Saṅgha takes refuge generally in the dharmas of the learner and beyond learning that can make a Saṅgha,” since by obtaining those dharmas the Saṅgha becomes the eight persons and cannot be broken; and in truth one takes refuge generally in the Saṅgha of all Buddhas, since the mark of the path is no different in any Saṅgha. As for the sūtra’s saying “there will be a Saṅgha in time to come, in which you should take refuge,” the treatise says that this only shows the Jewel of the Saṅgha that will be present and visible in time to come. Taking refuge in the Dharma is “one who takes refuge in the Dharma takes refuge in nirvāṇa” — this word nirvāṇa displays cessation through discernment alone, and the stilling of the afflictions and suffering in one’s own and in others’ continua is of one mark, and so the refuge is general.

The easy error: to understand “taking refuge in the Saṅgha” as taking refuge in some one renunciant or some group of them. What the treatise takes refuge in is the dharmas of the learner and beyond learning that can make a Saṅgha, and that is why it says “cannot be broken” — what can be broken is persons, what cannot be broken is dharmas. In practice: the three objects of the three refuges are, in the treatise, taken refuge in in one and the same way — all of them in dharmas: the Buddha in the dharmas beyond learning, the Saṅgha in the dharmas of the learner and beyond learning, the Dharma in cessation through discernment. This article lifts the three refuges wholly clear of the plane of human feeling.

〔24.3〕The difficulty of drawing blood from the Buddha’s body, and the author’s close. First ask: if the dharmas beyond learning alone are the Buddha, then when one with an evil mind draws blood from the Buddha’s body only the born body is injured — how should this constitute a deed of immediate retribution? On this difficulty Puguang himself leaves two explanations standing, his outline running word for word “the author’s difficulty, or a setting out of the Sautrāntikas’ difficulty” — the ancient master here made no settled adjudication, and this section records it as it stands without adjudicating on his behalf. The answerers are the Vaibhāṣikas: “his support being ruined, they are ruined along with it.” On the second difficulty that follows, Puguang likewise leaves two explanations standing without adjudicating, his outline running word for word “the author raises a further difficulty, or advances the Sautrāntikas’ difficulty” — and this section records it as it stands too: searching this treatise, it has not said that the dharmas beyond learning alone are what is called Buddha, but only that the dharmas beyond learning can make a Buddha; and since it does not exclude the entity of a Buddha from gathering the body it depends upon, there is no room for the former difficulty. And the treatise pushes back: were it otherwise, the Buddha and the Saṅgha, while abiding in a conventional mind, would be neither Saṅgha nor Buddha; and one ought likewise to hold that the discipline that makes a bhikṣu is just the bhikṣu — in which case a man who wished to make offerings to a bhikṣu would be making offerings only to that śīla which can make a bhikṣu, and a man who wished to take refuge in the Buddha ought to take refuge only in those dharmas beyond learning that can make a Buddha. These two sentences are the consequent of a reduction to absurdity and not the treatise’s own position; and Puguang makes it plain by pressing it back the other way: “it should not be that the four requisites are offered to the body one depends upon; and since it is plainly seen that offerings are made to the body upon which the discipline depends, one knows that the body one depends upon is also the bhikṣu,” and again, “if one says that one takes refuge only in the Buddha’s dharmas beyond learning, then this again contravenes the world, since it is plainly seen that people take refuge in and pay homage to the Buddha’s born body” — what the world plainly sees itself making offerings to and paying homage to is just that body, which shows that the body one depends upon is not outside the entity of a Buddha. At the end of the passage another account is recorded: “some other masters say: one who takes refuge in the Buddha takes refuge generally in the eighteen dharmas exclusive to the Tathāgata.”

The easy error: to read this passage as an opposition between the author and the Vaibhāṣikas. The author’s final landing is a defence of the wording of this treatise — the trouble lies in the word “alone,” not in the dharmas beyond learning. In practice: this passage is the fascicle’s best demonstration of how to take a misreading apart: first find the word the other side has added on your behalf, then prove that the treatise has no such word.

XXV. The Sense of Taking Refuge: Gathered by a Stanza of the Sūtra

〔25.1〕What the refuge-taking side has for its entity, and what taking refuge means. First ask: having said what is taken refuge in, what of the side that takes refuge? The treatise answers: “what does this refuge-taking have for its entity? Verbal manifest action for its entity” — it is verbal manifest action. And what does taking refuge mean? “Its sense is rescue and relief,” since by making it one’s support one can be liberated from all suffering forever. The treatise then adduces a stanza of the sūtra to gather up the passage: multitudes driven by fear take refuge for the most part in mountains, in gardens and groves, in thickets, in lone trees, in caityas, and the like; such a refuge is not the most excellent, is not the most honorable, and by such a refuge one is not liberated from the manifold sufferings; whereas those who take refuge in the Buddha and in the Dharma and the Saṅgha, contemplating the four noble truths constantly with discernment, know suffering, know the arising of suffering, know the transcending of the manifold sufferings forever, and know the eightfold noble path, and go toward the security of nirvāṇa — such a refuge is the most excellent, such a refuge is the most honorable, and by such a refuge one is certainly liberated from the manifold sufferings. The treatise gathers it up in one sentence: “therefore taking refuge is universally the gateway of means at every place where a discipline is undertaken.”

The easy error: to take this stanza for a stanza of this treatise. It is expressly preceded by “as the World-Honored One says,” and is a stanza adduced from the sūtra. In practice: this stanza sets “taking refuge” apart from “seeking shelter out of dread” — the criterion lies not in whether you are afraid but in whether the one you take refuge in can make discernment arise in you upon the four truths. And that last sentence, “the gateway of means,” answers exactly to the earlier section on “without the three refuges there is no one-day observance”: the three refuges are not an entrance ceremony; they are the gate itself.

XXVI. Sexual Misconduct Is the Most Reproachable: Why the Lay Follower Abstains from Misconduct Only

〔26.1〕Three reasons and one misgiving. First ask: the disciplines of the other six companies all establish abstention from unchastity, so why is the lay follower alone instituted to abstain from sexual misconduct? The treatise gives three reasons: first, “sexual misconduct alone the world reproaches utterly,” since it can violate and injure another’s wife and the rest and draws on the evil destinies, whereas unchastity is not so; second, sexual misconduct is easy to abstain from, whereas householders are attached to desires and abstention from unchastity is hard for them to hold, and observing that they cannot train in it for long it is not instituted; third, all noble ones certainly obtain the discipline of not doing with regard to sexual misconduct, and noble ones who pass through birth do not commit it either, whereas abstention from unchastity is not so. The treatise supplies one misgiving besides: “lest noble ones who pass through birth transgress the discipline of the lay follower” — were abstention from unchastity written into the discipline of the lay follower, then a noble one still in the household life after rebirth would have to transgress it.

The easy error: to read this article as the Buddha lowering the standard for householders. The treatise’s third reason is precisely the contrary: it is so that a noble one shall not transgress — the boundary set must be one that a noble one can keep without fail, and this is a hard constraint upon the instituting of the discipline. In practice: the breadth or strictness of an article of discipline is not settled by “how hard it is to keep” alone, but also by “whether instituting it would force out transgressions that ought never to have been.”

XXVII. Discipline Is Obtained in Accordance with the Vow

〔27.1〕Why taking a wife afterwards is not a transgression. First ask: those who first undertook the discipline of the lay follower and afterwards took wives and concubines — with regard to those wives and concubines, was the discipline obtained at the time of undertaking? The author asks and answers himself: “in truth it should have been obtained” — otherwise the discipline of individual liberation would be obtained with respect to only a part of sentient beings. The author at once raises a difficulty against himself: if so, is the taking of wives and concubines afterwards not a transgression? The stanza answers: “the discipline is obtained in accordance with the vow, and not upon the whole of the continua.” The treatise explains: the vow originally undertaken was to abstain from sexual misconduct, and it was not said with regard to the continua of all sentient beings “from all of them I shall abstain from unchastity”; and so with respect to the continua of sentient beings universally one obtains only the discipline of abstaining from sexual misconduct and not the discipline of abstaining from unchastity, and therefore “taking wives and concubines afterwards is no violation of the earlier discipline.” Puguang here cites the Correct Principle to supply a sentence, saying that for one who took wives and concubines first and undertook the discipline afterwards, the discipline is raised with regard to his own wife and the rest as well, since the discipline of individual liberation of the lay follower and the rest is obtained with regard to every sentient being.

The easy error: to read “not upon the whole of the continua” as “this article of discipline holds with regard to only some people.” It is exactly the contrary — the discipline holds with regard to the continua of all sentient beings, and only what is abstained from is settled by the vow. In practice: this article gives keeping the discipline a very exact measure — the discipline you obtain is coextensive with the vow you made when undertaking it, no more and no less.

XXVIII. Once the Door of Lying Is Open, Every Training Article Will Be Transgressed

〔28.1〕Why false speech must be instituted. First ask: speech has four faults (false, divisive, harsh, and idle); why does the discipline of the lay follower institute only the first? The treatise first says that it is still by the three reasons above, and Puguang marks this question as “speech has four faults, why is only one instituted,” adjudging the answer to be by the three former causes. Then the treatise gives a further reason of its own: “when one is examined for having transgressed the training articles, if the door of false speech be opened, he will say ‘I did not do it,’ and thereby will transgress much in the discipline” — once lying is allowed, on being asked about a transgression he brushes it aside with “I did not do it,” and thereupon all the articles slacken along with it. And so the Buddha, to make them hold firmly, instituted abstention from false speech in every discipline; only thus can it make a man “when he transgresses the discipline, disclose it himself and so guard against transgressing again.”

The easy error: to read this article as “lying is graver than divisive speech.” What the treatise gives is not a comparison of gravity but a comparison of function — false speech is the one article that would rob every other article of its mechanism of examination. In practice: this is the article in the fascicle with the strongest savor of practice: the true gatekeeper of the discipline is disclosure, and once lying is allowed, disclosure is gone.

XXIX. Among Prohibited Offences, Liquor Alone

〔29.1〕How liquor got into the limbs of the discipline. First ask: the prohibited offences are so many; why is liquor alone instituted into the discipline of the lay follower? The author first asks himself, “for what reason is the discipline of the lay follower not established upon abstaining from prohibited offences,” and answers himself, “who says that there is no abstaining from a prohibited offence here?” — namely abstention from drinking liquor. He asks again why liquor alone is prohibited, and the stanza answers: “among the prohibited, liquor alone is abstained from, to guard the remaining disciplines.” The treatise explains: “those who drink liquor are for the most part loose and dissolute in mind and cannot guard the remaining disciplines; therefore, in order to guard the rest, they are made to abstain from drinking liquor.” Puguang in this passage marks question, probe, and explanation sentence by sentence, marking out the chain of the author’s own questions and answers very densely.

The easy error: to suppose that liquor is listed because it is itself a grave offence. The treatise’s reason lies not in liquor at all but in its making you unable to hold the others — this article is instituted for the sake of guarding the remaining four. In practice: this gives a way of judging — whatever would take away your power to guard the remaining articles stands in the same place as this one.

〔29.2〕Is drinking liquor an intrinsic offence or a prohibited one? First ask: how is it known that drinking liquor is a prohibited offence? The author answers himself: “because there is no mark of an intrinsic offence in it, since all intrinsic offences proceed only in a defiled mind” — one who drinks to cure an illness and not for intoxication can be without a defiled mind. The author raises a difficulty against himself again: to know plainly that liquor can intoxicate and yet deliberately wish to drink it — is this not a defiled mind? He answers himself: it is not, because knowing his own measure, drinking within a limit for the curing of illness, he does not let himself be intoxicated. The treatise then records both parties: those who uphold the Vinaya say that drinking liquor is an intrinsic offence, and adduce Upāli’s asking about supplying the sick and the World-Honored One’s answering “only intrinsic offences excepted,” and instance a man of the Śākya clan afflicted with illness who needed liquor and to whom the World-Honored One would not allow it, and the sūtra’s saying that not so much as the measure of liquor that would wet the tip of a reed should be drunk, and that the noble ones do not transgress it though they pass through many births, and that the sūtra calls it a bodily evil conduct, and other proofs; while the Abhidharma masters say that it is not an intrinsic offence, and answer them article by article — at that time the prohibitory disciplines were opened for the sick as a whole, the prohibition of liquor at other times being to guard against transgressing an intrinsic offence thereby, the prohibition down to the measure of a reed’s tip being because the measure of intoxication has no fixed limit, the noble ones’ not drinking being because they have conscience and shame and because liquor can make one lose correct mindfulness, the not drinking of even the smallest portion being because it is like a poison whose measure is not fixed, and the sūtra’s calling it a bodily evil conduct being because “liquor is the occasion of all heedlessness,” whence “it alone obtains the name occasion of heedlessness” while the others do not obtain that name (the others being all intrinsic offences).

At the very end the treatise glosses a few terms besides: what is called falling into the evil destinies by frequent habituation shows that frequent drinking can make the various unwholesome dharmas in the body continue on and turn, can draw forth actions leading to the evil destinies, or can make those actions grow the stronger; surā is liquor fermented from grain, maireya is made by fermenting other things, and these two liquors, when not yet ripened or already spoiled so that they cannot intoxicate, are not called madya, and only when they can intoxicate are they called madya liquor; and because betel nut and barnyard millet and the like can also intoxicate, in order to distinguish them it is necessary to say surā and maireya liquor. The last sentence of the fascicle is: “as for the words occasion of heedlessness, liquor is the place upon which heedlessness depends.”

The easy error: to take one of the two parties for the conclusion of this treatise. The treatise here records both accounts and does not judge which prevails — this is the second plain instance in the fascicle of one meaning and two schools recorded together. In practice: however the adjudication of intrinsic and prohibited may go, the two parties are wholly at one on the matter of not drinking, and what they dispute is only on what ground one is not to drink. One who keeps the discipline need not wait for this dispute to be concluded before keeping it.

Further Resonances: The Mirror of the Three Commentaries

The above is the sense of the text of this fascicle itself. Below a separate section is set up, gathering four matters: the adjudications of the three commentaries and their divergences, Saṅghabhadra’s refutations and supplements, the divergences of Paramārtha’s earlier translation, and coordinates for parallel reading. A mirror is not the treatise; it is only another way of reading the same passage. Recorded together without adjudication, each restored to its own place.

1. Where the Three Commentaries Diverge

A commentary with no text to hang upon. Shentai’s commentary is a fragment; the seven fascicles extant belong to the Chapter on the Elements, the Chapter on the Faculties, and the Chapter on the Worthy and the Noble, and the Chapter on Action is wholly wanting, so that this fascicle has no line-by-line commentary of his to hang upon. The want is marked as it stands, and text from other fascicles is not made to stand for it.

One and the same cut, attached by the three houses to different layers. For the cut at the head of Fascicle Fourteen, Puguang marks “below, the third, explaining the manifest and the nonmanifest at length,” Yuanhui marks “from here the third, explaining the manifest and the nonmanifest at length,” the two houses agreeing word for word even in the names of the subsections, and both attaching it as “the third” within the chapter on the nature of the entity of action; Fabao instead marks “from here below, the second of the main text, explaining the three of discipline and the rest,” raising the same cut to the second main division at the chapter level. The names agree entirely and the layers are of two patterns; recorded without adjudication.

A simile Fabao has alone. On the gloss of the three disciplines as affiliated to the realms, Fabao sets up the simile “as for being bound to desire and the rest, it is like a binding market,” and Puguang has no such simile at the same place. The presence or absence of one simile shows the different roads the two commentaries take — Fabao is fond of establishing similes from familiar things of the world, Puguang of glossing the sense by the make-up of the words.

Whether the one-day observance may be undertaken again beyond a day and a night: one house marks the turns of outline, the other hands down a verdict outright. Puguang marks this passage exchange by exchange in the finest detail, from “the Sautrāntikas allow that the discipline of the one-day observance may be undertaken and obtained for many days, and so raise this question,” through the Sarvāstivādins’ answer, the Sautrāntika masters’ words, the Sarvāstivādins’ question, the Sautrāntikas’ answer, and finally the Sarvāstivādins’ further difficulty, one turn at a time and no verdict passed; Fabao at the end of the same passage hands down a verdict outright, saying that the two houses in truth have no dispute and yet have raised a crosswise quarrel — his text running “the Sautrāntikas and the master of the Correct Principle, in a matter where in principle there is no dispute, have raised a crosswise quarrel.” Puguang has not this sentence; but it should be noted that the same sentence is found word for word in the corresponding passage of Saṅghabhadra’s Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle, the Chinese in the two places being wholly identical and differing only in a mark of punctuation, so that it ought not to be called outright a verdict of Fabao’s own, but must be a taking over of Saṅghabhadra’s words by Fabao. The style of the two commentaries is plain at a glance here, and the source of what is taken over should be marked as well; recorded together without adjudication.

The dispute over the entity of the fast: Puguang divides the turns, Fabao is brief. On the treatise’s passage “some other masters say: abstention from untimely eating is called the entity of the fast,” Puguang marks the exchanges of the two parties layer by layer in five turns — the Sautrāntikas adducing the sūtra in refutation, the other masters’ question, the Sautrāntikas’ answer (the fast has no separate entity, being made up by gathering the eight), the setting out of the Vaibhāṣikas’ explanation, and the Sautrāntikas’ difficulty; Fabao at the same passage gives only a brief mark of the kind “setting out the Sarvāstivāda school,” without dividing the turns. The disparity of fullness is the greatest in the fascicle; recorded together without adjudication.

Masters abroad or Sautrāntikas: the two commentaries differ in the labels of the camps. On the dispute “is one made a lay follower by taking the three refuges only,” Puguang here sets “the masters abroad” over against “the masters of the country of Kaśmīra,” marking the answer of the masters abroad as “setting out the answer of the masters abroad; abroad means the Sautrāntikas of the country of Gandhāra outside the country of Kaśmīra”; Fabao instead opens straightway with “the masters abroad are the Sautrāntika masters of the country of Gandhāra outside the country of Kaśmīra,” and in the exchanges below uses the two words “Sautrāntika” outright. The same body of men is labeled with different breadth; recorded only, without adjudication — the reader who sees the two commentaries marking them differently need not suppose that what is pointed to differs.

The four statements of “one part” and the rest: here the two commentaries are entirely at one in their attributions. Puguang throughout the passage makes the Sautrāntikas the questioning and objecting party and the Sarvāstivādins (the home school of Kaśmīra) the answering and defending party; Fabao’s marks correspond word for word, running “the Sautrāntikas ask in return about the Sarvāstivādins’ difference in the limbs of the discipline” and “the Sautrāntikas adduce a difference of text, and explain by parallel instance the difference between being complete in the limbs and not being complete.” Among the disputes of this fascicle, this passage alone has no divergence between the two commentaries — and it is also the stretch that bears the deepest doctrinal weight in the fascicle, so that reliable attribution is the reader’s good fortune.

The difficulty of drawing blood from the Buddha’s body: Puguang leaves two explanations standing, Fabao is broad. Puguang marks this difficulty as “the author’s difficulty, or a setting out of the Sautrāntikas’ difficulty,” setting the two side by side without deciding; Fabao marks it straightway as an outsider’s difficulty against the Sarvāstivādins, without distinguishing the author from the Sautrāntikas. That the ancient master, where the attribution was doubtful, marked the doubt plainly is itself part of the form, and it is recorded as it stands.

A passage supplied by Fabao alone and untouched by Puguang. Under “one who takes refuge in the Dharma takes refuge in nirvāṇa,” Fabao alone cites an entire passage of question and answer from the thirty-fourth fascicle of the Mahāvibhāṣā, the head of the citation running “Question: as for taking refuge in the Dharma, is it taking refuge in the cessation of the aggregates of one’s own continuum,” followed by the two further questions of another’s continuum and of what is not counted among sentient beings, the answer being that one should say the refuge is in the cessation of all aggregates, of one’s own and of others’ continua and of what is not counted among sentient beings; and he sets himself a difficulty besides — the cessation of the aggregates of another’s continuum and the rest has no sense of rescue and protection for me, so how is it taken refuge in? and answers that though it has no sense of rescue and protection for me it has for another. Puguang has no corresponding text for this passage. Because it touches the threefold adjudication of the nature of “taking refuge in the Dharma,” it is placed in this section and not in the main text.

Puguang’s avowal where the text of the treatise is plain. In the passage on the five names of non-discipline, Puguang avows that the text can be construed as it stands and establishes no new sense of his own. That an ancient master, where there is nothing to supply, says outright “it can be construed” is another kind of form — he does not force an interpretation.

2. Saṅghabhadra’s Refutations and Supplementary Explanations

The chapter name in Saṅghabhadra’s two treatises for this chapter is not “Analysis of Action” but “Adjudication of Action”; to search them with the Kośa’s chapter name is bound to yield a false zero.

A philological objection to one line of the stanza. On the stanza about the conditions by which the three disciplines are obtained, Saṅghabhadra criticizes the line “what is produced by absorption is obtained upon obtaining the stage of absorption,” saying that the one word “stage of absorption” gathers up all the dharmas of that stage, so that discipline too is gathered under that stage, and thus it becomes “obtaining the discipline by obtaining the discipline” and nothing is accomplished, his closing words running outright “the Sūtra-master should here consider for himself,” and maintaining that one ought to say only “obtaining the meditative absorption.” ⇒ What is objected to is the wording of the stanza, not the doctrinal position. Recorded only, without adjudication.

The dispute over “one part” and the rest: the passage of harshest wording. Saṅghabhadra cites and refutes sentence by sentence, his citation running “the Sūtra-master here says thus: what is thus held contravenes the sūtra,” and his final adjudication running “the Sūtra-master here does not consider rightly,” reproaching him besides for harboring a partisan attachment in a matter of disputed principle. Yet upon the core of this dispute (whether a lay follower must be complete in the five limbs of discipline), the author of the Kośa himself has already set up in his prose commentary the explanation “it is said with regard to what can be kept,” and closes back upon his own school with the Vaibhāṣika masters of Kaśmīra; what Saṅghabhadra does is to defend the Sarvāstivāda home school sentence by sentence against the Sautrāntika-style reading cited in this passage of the Kośa. One meaning and two schools recorded together, with no adjudication of who prevails.

The Elder rejects “low, middle, and high follow the mind” — and the objector is not the Sūtra-master. Saṅghabhadra himself records the Elder’s difficulty, his citation running “here the Elder speaks in rejection thus,” saying that what is thus held contravenes correct principle and teaching, and that if it must be so there would be no vigorous and right exertion in upholding the prohibitions. The subject of this difficulty is the Elder and not Vasubandhu; upon this stanza the Sarvāstivāda home school, the Elder, and the Sūtra-master each have a position. Recorded only, without adjudication.

The entity of the three refuges: the wording is heavier still than in the passage before. On the argument over “the dharmas beyond learning alone are the Buddha,” Saṅghabhadra passes judgment three times, giving “the Sūtra-master here says thus,” “now, in detail, the Sūtra-master has not searched deeply into the sense of the root treatise,” and at the end reproaching him with “therefore the Sūtra-master, in the school of Abhidharma, does not well understand the sense of what is said.” In the same passage Saṅghabhadra also records and refutes the account of a third party — “the Vātsīputrīyas speak thus: the pudgala is the Buddha in whom refuge is taken” — adjudging it unreasonable (since it has no distinction, it does not constitute a refuge). This account is not recorded in the text of the Kośa, and is material of extension belonging to Saṅghabhadra’s book alone.

The argument over drinking liquor: here Saṅghabhadra does not refute but expounds. On the same point at issue Saṅghabhadra first records the party of the intrinsic offence, his citation running “some say that drinking liquor is gathered under intrinsic offence,” establishing it by the two gates of scripture and correct principle and adducing the same exchange with Upāli in proof; and afterwards advances his own school, marked as “the master of the Correct Principle speaks thus,” saying that drinking liquors is not gathered under intrinsic offence, since there is no mark of an intrinsic offence in it. ⇒ This agrees in direction with the school to which the text of the Kośa returns (both adjudging it not an intrinsic offence, which is the home position of Abhidharma), and the base material adduced is the same; this is the one passage in the fascicle where Saṅghabhadra runs in the same direction as the author. Recorded together without adjudication.

The shallowness of the collation and the harshness of the debate stand in exact contrast. The Taishō collation notes for this fascicle number twenty-five and the variant readings twenty-one, mostly graphically similar corruptions, additions and omissions of particles, and inversions of word order, and not one of them is enough to unsettle the doctrine; whereas the debate within the lineage reaches its harshest wording at just the two places of “one part and the rest” and “the entity of the three refuges” — the two stretches that bear the deepest doctrinal weight in the fascicle. Recorded as it stands, without forcing an adjudication of cause and effect.

3. The Divergences of Paramārtha’s Earlier Translation

Paramārtha’s Expository Treatise on the Treasury forms a system of its own in the passage corresponding to this fascicle, its form being “the verse says / the explanation says,” glossing sentence by sentence inset, so that one stanza is often broken into two to five short verses scattered about with long prose between; Xuanzang has “the stanza says / the treatise says,” the whole stanza coming out first and the prose after. And so Xuanzang’s twenty-eight blocks of root stanza in this fascicle are scattered into many short verses in Paramārtha’s text — the eight lines on one who abides in individual liberation possessing the nonmanifest are broken by Paramārtha into five places of inset gloss.

The renderings form a system of their own. The nonmanifest is made the uninstructive, discipline is made protection, non-discipline is made non-protection, abiding in the middle is made middle-abiding, individual liberation is made prātimokṣa, the discipline produced by meditative absorption is made the protection of absorption, the discipline produced by the path is made the protection without flow, the discipline of cutting off is made the protection of extinction; the names of the eight companies are made bhikṣu, bhikṣuṇī, śikṣamāṇā, śrāmaṇera, śrāmaṇerī, upāsaka, upāsikā, upavāsa; excellent conduct is made good conduct, the discipline of speech is made the protection of the mouth, correct knowing is made good discernment, caitya is made caitya in his own transcription, a prohibited offence is made a conventionally instituted offence, following the mind is made according to intention, one part is made one place. To search Paramārtha’s text with Xuanzang’s words is never to find these boundaries — comparison across the two versions can only take the structure of the scenes.

The fascicle divisions of the two versions do not coincide. The passage of Paramārtha corresponding to this fascicle runs across the end of his own “part one” and the front of “part two,” and the chapter continuation-title of Paramārtha’s “part two” falls exactly upon a seam — the prose on Xuanzang’s stanza “abiding in discipline or non-discipline” has just been finished and the stanza “the manifest, while presently being done, possesses the middle” has not yet come out, and there Paramārtha changes fascicle. And so the boundaries of the passage corresponding to this fascicle can only be fixed by the structure of the scenes, and Paramārtha’s fascicle boundaries may not be made to stand for them.

One ★ divergence of rendering-character worth noting. On the stanza about sexual misconduct, Xuanzang gives “sexual misconduct is the most reproachable; it is easy to abstain from, and the discipline of not doing is obtained,” Paramārtha “sexual misconduct is the most reproachable; it is easy to do, and the discipline of not doing is obtained.” Xuanzang’s “easy to abstain from” says outright that misconduct is easy to abstain from; Paramārtha’s “easy to do” is liable in its word order to yield the divergent reading “misconduct is easy to commit,” yet by the run of his prose it is an abbreviation of “to abstain … is easy to do.” Recorded only, without adjudication.

Two places where the fullness runs each way. First, Paramārtha uses the same construction (most reproachable, easy to do, the discipline of not doing obtained) three times over at the three places of abstaining from killing, from sexual misconduct, and from false speech, while Xuanzang makes a stanza of its own only at the two places of misconduct and false speech, without the threefold repetition upon three training articles — the density of Paramārtha’s rhetoric is the higher. Second, the other way about: Xuanzang gathers up “the self-declaration raises the discipline of the lay follower” with a whole stanza (the self-declaration raises the discipline, said as with the bhikṣu and the rest), whereas Paramārtha in the same scene makes no separate stanza to gather it and passes it off with a single short verse line, his prose being sparer as well. The fullness varies by passage without a fixed direction.

One name where the two translations take different roads. For the alternative name of the one-day observance, Xuanzang gives the rendering by sense, “the nourishing,” and Paramārtha the transcription poṣadha; the first two lines of the same adduced stanza are nearly identical word for word, and the last line is a rendering by sense in the one and a transcription in the other. The same holds for the principal name of the one-day observance — Xuanzang gives the one-day observance, Paramārtha upavāsa (or, by sense, poṣadha). Recorded together without adjudication.

4. Coordinates for Parallel Reading

What this fascicle establishes is a complete account of lodging discipline in the square called “the nonmanifest.” That one adjudication is wholly reversed in the Yogācāra lineage: the Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only, upon the same dharma, adjudges outright in reverse, saying that manifest and nonmanifest form are not really existent, and establishes its own reason for this, that in dependence upon the wholesome and unwholesome limits of resolve and intention the nonmanifest is conventionally established. ⇒ Upon one and the same name “nonmanifest,” the two systems make one real and one conventional: the Sarvāstivādins attach it to a real entity among the dharmas of form, the Yogācārins attach it to a conventional establishment at the stage where the seeds of volition increase. One and the same question and two ages’ answers — this is the most rewarding place in the fascicle for parallel reading.

The names of the three disciplines admit of a word-for-word parallel reading with what the root treatise of the Yogācāra line establishes: that system, under action gathered under discipline, lists the three of the discipline of individual liberation, the discipline of cutting off that is the result of meditative absorption and attainment, and the discipline without outflows — the three names agreeing with this fascicle’s, save that that system gathers under the single name “the discipline of cutting off that is the result of meditative absorption and attainment” both this fascicle’s “discipline produced by meditative absorption” and its “discipline of cutting off.” One and the same set of enumerated dharmas opened and gathered differently; they may be looked at side by side.

As for non-discipline, this fascicle sets out its five alternative names and the stages of its possession in detail, yet does not list its classes; that system instead poses the question outright, “which are the twelve classes of non-discipline,” and lists them one by one. The fullness of the two systems is complementary — the Kośa asks what it is and how far it is possessed, the Yogācārabhūmi asks which ones there are; the same name with a different manner of questioning is a small cross-section of the character of the two systems.

Before Reading This Fascicle

The last fascicle set up the three disciplines — individual liberation, the meditative absorptions, and that without outflows. Setting them up is only the first step; if of a discipline one cannot say clearly where it is obtained from, how much of it is obtained, and by what conditions it goes away, then it is no more than a name. What this fascicle does is exactly this. The very first sentence of the fascicle is a sharply pointed question — “of these three disciplines, that of individual liberation, that of the meditative absorptions, and that without outflows, if from some one place one of them has been obtained, are the remaining two obtained along with it? They are not. How then is it? The stanza says.” If one kind is obtained, are the other two obtained along with it? The answer is given flatly: they are not. And thereupon twenty-one blocks of stanza march on in a row, the first half treating the obtaining and relinquishing of the discipline, the second half treating action through the several gates.

Between the first half and the second there is one sentence that is the joint of the whole chapter — “since the natures and marks of the several actions have been made out to differ, the actions set forth in the sūtras should now be explained.” The three ancient commentators all let the knife of their outline fall at this very place: Puguang marks “‘since the several actions have been made out’ down to ‘the actions set forth’: from here on, within this chapter, the second of the main text, explaining the actions in the sūtras”; Fabao marks “from here below, the third of the main text, explaining that the actions spoken of in the sūtras differ”; Yuanhui marks “from here the second of the main text, explaining the actions in the sūtras, within which there are eleven: first the actions of the three ethical qualities, second the three actions of merit and the rest, third the three actions of feeling, fourth the actions of the three times, fifth bodily and mental feeling, sixth the crooked, the foul, and the turbid, seventh black and black and the rest, eighth the three of silence and the rest, ninth the three evil conducts and the rest, tenth the ten paths of action, eleventh the three wrong practices.” Three commentators outline independently and yet their boundary is wholly the same; from which it is plain that this cut is no forcing by later hands, but a seam that the text of the treatise opens of itself. The second half of this fascicle covers exactly the first six of the eleven items listed by Yuanhui.

There are two things to be said before anything else.

First, this fascicle reads like a piece of mechanics of the discipline — four conditions, five conditions, six conditions, three conditions, two conditions, counted off set after set. But what truly bears the weight is not the numbers; it is the sentence beneath each set that says ‘why just these conditions.’ Immediately after relinquishing the discipline of individual liberation the treatise adds: “why is the relinquishing of the discipline by these five conditions? Because a manifest action has arisen that contradicts what was undertaken, because the support is cast off, because the support is altered, because what it rests upon is cut off, because the term of time is passed” — the five conditions are not five stipulations, they are five ways in which the things the discipline rests upon break down. Take hold of this one sentence and all the numbered conditions that follow can stand up on their own.

Second, this fascicle has two passages of prose commentary of extreme density, in which the author lays down more than ten rounds of question and answer in a row, and the one asking and the one answering change hands again and again. One passage is at Root 37, one at Roots 39 and 40. If in these two passages one cannot read out who is speaking, the whole passage becomes a mass of self-contradiction. Fortunately the outlines of the ancient masters mark the speakers line by line: Puguang, in the first half of Root 37, marks “the house of total raising,” “the house of separate raising,” “the author,” and “the Vibhāṣā masters,” and in the second half of Root 37 and throughout Roots 39 and 40 changes to marking “the Sautrāntikas” and “the Sarvāstivādins.” Below, wherever an exchange is met, the wording follows these marks; the agreements and divergences among the three commentaries are gathered separately in the closing section.

I. From What Place Each of the Three Disciplines Is Obtained

〔1.1〕First ask one question: is the discipline obtained upon “persons” or upon “matters.” The four expressions on the face of this stanza — all, two, present, all times — are all answering ‘the place from which it is obtained.’ The treatise first sets up the discipline of the desire realm: “the discipline of the desire realm is individual liberation, and this is obtained from every root path of action and from the preparatory effort and the subsequent arising.” What is called the root path of action is the actual committing of such matters as killing, stealing, wrong conduct, and false speech; the preparatory effort is the preliminary movement before one sets hand to it, and the subsequent arising the residual momentum after the deed is done. The one who takes on the discipline obtains it not at the place of the actual committing alone, but at the places of preparation and of residual momentum as well. The easy error: to suppose that taking on the discipline guards only ‘that one instant in which the deed is brought off.’ It does not — what is guarded is one whole line. Where this lands: this is exactly why keeping the discipline is difficult and also why it is steady; one item of discipline governs three stretches, and so the place of preparation, where thought first stirs, is already within the care of the discipline.

〔1.2〕“Obtained from the two” is two different knives. The treatise says “‘obtained from the two’ means obtained from two kinds, namely the sentient and the non-sentient, and the offense by its own nature and the offense by prohibition.” This is two classifications laid one upon the other: one asks whether the object faced is a sentient being or not, and one asks whether the offense committed is evil in itself or is prohibited by the Buddha. First ask: why must these two layers be distinguished? Because the places from which the discipline is raised must be exhausted — if it were raised only toward sentient beings, then digging the ground and cutting green grass would have no discipline to speak of; if only from offenses by nature, then drinking liquor and other prohibited offenses would have no discipline to speak of. The easy error: to take “the two kinds” for two kinds of discipline. It is not the kinds of the discipline; it is the kinds of the places from which the discipline is raised. Where this lands: here the collated editions have besides a reading “two actions,” yet the text immediately following explains it by “the offense by its own nature and the offense by prohibition,” so that reading it as “kinds” is what fastens upon what follows.

〔1.3〕Why individual liberation is obtained from the present alone, while the disciplines of absorption and without outflows extend to all three times. The treatise gives an exceedingly clean reason — “‘obtained from the present’ means obtained from the aggregates, sense fields, and elements of the present, not from those of the past and the future” — and the ground of it is that “this discipline turns with regard to the place where sentient beings are, and the past and the future are not places where sentient beings are.” Individual liberation turns with regard to the present existence of sentient beings, and the past and future are not places where sentient beings are present. Conversely, “if one obtains the discipline of the meditative absorptions or the discipline without outflows, it should be known that these are from the root path of action alone,” and “‘from all times’ means obtained from the aggregates, sense fields, and elements of past, present, and future.” First ask: they are alike disciplines; why is the one confined to the present and the other extended to three times? Because individual liberation is undertaken by a manifest action and raised with regard to an object faced, whereas the discipline that accompanies absorption and the discipline that accompanies the path arise by the force of the ground of mind and do not wait upon an object being present. The easy error: to suppose that “extending to three times” says that the discipline itself has three times. It does not — what is said is that the place from which it is obtained extends to three times. Where this lands: this explains why a householder taking the five items of training must have an object he can face and words he can utter, while one who enters absorption has the discipline of himself without undertaking it.

〔1.4〕The four alternatives are a checklist. The treatise then crosses the foregoing into four alternatives — the first, where only individual liberation is obtained, “from the preparatory effort, the subsequent arising, and the offenses by prohibition of the present”; the second, where only the two disciplines of absorption and the path are obtained, “from the root paths of action of past and future”; the third, where both are obtained, “from the root path of action of the present”; the fourth, where neither is obtained, “from the preparatory effort and the subsequent arising of past and future.” First ask: what use is there in making four alternatives? Making four alternatives is the physical examination of Abhidharma — cross two criteria (present / past and future; root / preparatory and prohibited) once through and see whether there is any gap. The easy error: to take the four alternatives for four kinds of discipline. They are the distribution of one and the same set of disciplines over four places from which it is obtained. Where this lands: when four alternatives are met in reading Abhidharma, first find the two measures being crossed, and the four alternatives clear themselves up.

〔1.5〕The last sentence sets the key of the whole section. The treatise says “as regards principle one should say only ‘guarding against the future,’ and definitely should not say ‘guarding against the past and the present.’” First ask: what is this sentence correcting? It corrects the notion of understanding the discipline as ‘wiping out evil already done.’ The function of the discipline is in the future — evil action already past is not wiped out by the discipline, and evil action now present is not stopped by the discipline; what the discipline guards against is the portion that has not yet come. The easy error: to take the taking on of the discipline for a washing away of what is past. Where this lands: this one sentence gives the keeper of the discipline at once a very practical consolation and a very strict responsibility — the past is not settled by this, and the future is wholly within it.

II. Obtained from All Sentient Beings, While Limbs and Causes Are Said to Be Unsettled

〔2.1〕The four words “no principle of a portion” are the bone of this stanza. The treatise settles it as soon as it opens its mouth — “discipline is certainly obtained from all sentient beings. There is no principle of a portion; limbs and causes are said to be unsettled.” First ask: why must the discipline take all sentient beings for its object universally? Because the entity of the discipline is disposition, and if the disposition makes a selection, the unwholesome disposition has not wholly ceased. The treatise itself states this reason very clearly — “there is no one who obtains discipline without its extending to all sentient beings, since it is only by abiding in a wholesome disposition toward all sentient beings that discipline is obtained; otherwise not, since the unwholesome disposition has not wholly ceased.” The easy error: to suppose that ‘I will refrain from killing only toward certain persons’ also counts as keeping a portion of the discipline. The treatise says that this is not called discipline. Where this lands: this is the first threshold of keeping the discipline — it is not the range of behavior, it is the range of the mind.

〔2.2〕The limbs unsettled: how many items the discipline has depends on which kind you take on. The treatise divides them in two — “‘the limbs unsettled’ means: some obtain it from all, that is, the discipline of a bhikṣu”; “some obtain it from four limbs, that is, the remaining disciplines, because only the root path of action is called a limb of the discipline.” First ask: why have the remaining disciplines only four limbs? Because only the root path of action counts as a “limb of the discipline,” and what the householder and the novice abstain from is the four root ones, killing, stealing, wrong conduct, and false speech. The easy error: to confuse the eight limbs of the eight-limbed observance, or the five items of the five training rules, with the “limbs” spoken of here. The limbs here refer strictly to the root paths of action, and do not include the limbs of non-negligence and the limbs of restraint. Where this lands: before taking on a discipline one should first be clear how many limbs one is taking on; this is no matter of form — it settles from how many paths of action the entity of the discipline is raised.

〔2.3〕The causes unsettled: the three wholesome roots arise together, the three grades of mind do not. The treatise says “‘the causes unsettled’ means that from one point of view it is from all causes, and with regard to another sense it is allowed to be from one only,” and unties it itself — spoken of from non-greed, non-hatred, and non-delusion, “they necessarily arise together”; spoken of from the low, middle, and high grades of mind, “they do not arise together”; and “here it is with regard to the latter three causes that it is spoken of.” First ask: how can one and the same word “cause” have two answers? Because what is pointed at differs: the three wholesome roots are simultaneous, and the three grades of mind cannot be simultaneous. The easy error: to suppose that the treatise is contradicting itself. Where this lands: whenever in reading this treatise one meets “from one point of view … and with regard to another sense …,” it is a reminder that the sense with regard to which one speaks has changed measures.

〔2.4〕The four classes of person: a table crossed out of limbs and causes. The treatise adduces four classes — one who takes the lay follower’s or the novice’s discipline with one of the three grades of mind is “not by all limbs, not by all causes”; one who takes the bhikṣu’s discipline with one of the three grades of mind is “by all limbs, not by all causes”; one who takes the lay follower’s, the novice’s, and the bhikṣu’s discipline severally with the three minds is “by all limbs and by all causes”; one who takes the lay follower’s, the one-day, and the novice’s discipline severally with the three minds is “by all causes, not by all limbs.” First ask: what is this table meant to show? It shows that ‘the completeness of a discipline’ has two independent dimensions — completeness of items and completeness of the mind’s force — and that the two need not keep step. The easy error: to suppose that once the full ordination is taken everything is complete. It is not — if it be taken with a single grade of mind, the cause is still incomplete. Where this lands: this gives the practitioner a very concrete self-examination: is my discipline short in its items, or short in the force of mind?

〔2.5〕The five stipulations: the five most common trapdoors in taking on the discipline. The treatise lists them in the finest detail — “a man must make none of five stipulations if he is to be able to take on the discipline of individual liberation, namely the stipulations of sentient beings, of limbs, of places, of times, and of circumstances” — and explains each: the stipulation of sentient beings is “thinking, I shall abstain from killing and the rest only toward a certain class of sentient beings”; of limbs, “thinking, I shall keep without transgression only some one limb of the discipline”; of places, “thinking, I shall abstain from killing and the rest only while dwelling in a certain class of region”; of times, “thinking, I am able to abstain from killing and the rest only within a stretch of time such as a month”; of circumstances, “thinking, I am able to abstain from killing and the rest only apart from such circumstances as being at war.” First ask: why does a condition attached prevent the discipline from being formed? Because what the entity of the discipline relies upon is a disposition without selection, and once an exception is marked out, the unwholesome disposition has not wholly ceased. The treatise gives such a man a verdict at once generous and perfectly clear — “one who takes it up in this way does not obtain discipline; he obtains only an excellent conduct resembling discipline.” The easy error: to read “resembling excellent conduct” as a disparagement. It is no disparagement; it is a placing: there is what is wholesome, and it is excellent conduct — only it is not discipline. Where this lands: if at the time of taking on the discipline there still lingers in the mind an ‘except in such and such a case,’ that sentence is the stipulation spoken of here, and one had better know it beforehand.

〔2.6〕How discipline is obtained toward objects one cannot reach — the entrance to the first dense debate of this fascicle. The treatise first sets a question: “as for objects beyond one’s power, how is discipline obtained? It is because a dominant disposition of not harming their lives has been raised toward all sentient beings universally that discipline is obtained.” The answer is already given: the discipline hangs not upon capacity but upon disposition. But one house among the Vibhāṣā masters is not satisfied. First ask: where does its dissatisfaction lie? In the fear that the discipline would have increase and decrease. That house says: if the discipline were taken on only upon ‘objects within one’s power,’ and the two classes of sentient being, within and beyond one’s power, change places with each other, then the discipline would increase and decrease of itself, apart from the conditions of obtaining and relinquishing. The author objects on the spot with the instance of grass — “it is not so as you say. Just as with green grass and the like, which formerly was not and afterwards arises, or having arisen withers away, there is neither increase nor decrease as regards the discipline.” That house defends itself, saying that the nature of sentient beings before and after is equal while the nature of grass before and after is not the same; and the author objects again: after a sentient being has reached parinirvāṇa, is that “equal nature” not likewise gone? The easy error: to take this passage for a petty wrangle over terms. Its substance is a very large question — is what the entity of the discipline takes as object ‘the actually existing individual’ or ‘the class of sentient beings’? Where this lands: the author’s leaning is perfectly plain — “the reason given before is the better in principle,” that is, a return to the disposition that takes all sentient beings universally as its object.

〔2.7〕The beings the former buddhas led across have reached nirvāṇa; is not the discipline of the later buddhas thereby less? This objection is raised against the house of total raising. The objector says: the former buddhas and the beings they led across have all reached nirvāṇa, and since the later buddhas can raise no discipline from them, is not their moral discipline less than that of the former buddhas? The house of total raising answers most handsomely — “because the discipline of individual liberation of all buddhas is obtained from all sentient beings. Supposing those sentient beings were still present now, the later buddhas would obtain discipline from them just the same; hence the moral discipline of the later buddhas has no fault of being less than that of the former.” First ask: why does this answer hold? Because what is taken as object is the general mark “all sentient beings,” not a roll of individuals called one by one. The easy error: to read “obtained from all sentient beings” as ‘obtained one by one from every sentient being now existing.’ Where this lands: this one answer preserves two things at once — the universality of the entity of the discipline, and the fact that those who have reached nirvāṇa are indeed no longer present.

〔2.8〕Why the obtaining of non-discipline is on the contrary the wider. The treatise passes over to non-discipline and says that “non-discipline is certainly obtained from all sentient beings and all paths of action; there is no one of non-discipline with only a portion of objects or with limbs incomplete.” First ask: the wholesome discipline must be universal in its object to be formed, and so must the evil discipline — is this symmetrical? The treatise’s answer is symmetrical — the evil discipline likewise permits no portion of objects and no want of limbs. But on the side of causes it differs: “this certainly does not exist; as for from all causes, the minds of low grade and the rest do not arise together.” And the treatise adds a very important detail — that where non-discipline was obtained by a mind of low grade and killing is afterwards done with a mind of high grade, “he accomplishes only the non-discipline of the low grade, and accomplishes besides a manifest action of killing of the high grade and the rest.” The easy error: to suppose that when the mind grows fiercer afterward, the evil discipline rises in grade along with it. It does not — the grade of the entity of the discipline was settled at the moment it was obtained; the fierce mind that arises later forms a separate manifest action. Where this lands: this holds for the wholesome discipline just as well — the grade of mind at the time of taking on the discipline settles the grade of its entity, and later diligence has a merit of its own without altering that entity.

〔2.9〕Who are those of non-discipline: a list of trades and one sentence at the heart of it. The treatise lists them very concretely — “who are here called those of non-discipline? Those who slaughter sheep, slaughter fowl, slaughter swine, catch birds, catch fish, hunt beasts, rob and steal, do execution, keep prisons, bind nāgas, boil dogs, and set nets and snares, and the like” — and says that the word “and the like” further adduces the king’s officers of punishment and those who hear pleas and decide on crimes. First ask: why should even an officer who decides on crimes be counted? The criterion the treatise gives lies not in the trade itself but in “their minds constantly harbor a harming mind.” Ask further: does a man who kills one sheep on one occasion count? The treatise explains by taking the slaughterer of sheep as its sample — “what is called one who slaughters sheep means that for the sake of a livelihood he has set up a term to last as long as his body lasts, and constantly wishes to harm sheep” — and the key lies in the term set to last a lifetime. The easy error: to understand non-discipline as ‘having done bad things.’ It is not an accumulation of acts; it is a continuing state, with a term set to it, exactly opposite to the discipline. Where this lands: this shows just why the evil discipline is hard to relinquish — like the wholesome discipline, it is an entity that has been set up, not a heap of scattered deeds.

〔2.10〕The near kinsman and the sheep: the most famous exchange in this fascicle. The Sautrāntikas raise the objection: one who slaughters sheep has no harming intent toward his own near kinsmen, “and would not be willing to kill them even for the sake of saving his own life; how then can it be said that he obtains non-discipline toward all universally?” The Sarvāstivādins answer: “because if that near kinsman were to become a sheep or the like, toward him too a harming mind could be had.” The Sautrāntikas press again, and press all the way down in one breath: knowing full well that the near kinsman is not now a sheep, and that a noble one certainly has no principle of becoming a sheep; and granting a step, that you shift your position to the future self-body — “if with regard to the future self-body of a sheep or the like non-discipline is obtained upon the present continuum” — then a sheep will in the future likewise have the body of a near kinsman and of a noble one, toward which there is certainly no harming mind, and so “it ought to be said that one may regard only the future self-body and cannot obtain non-discipline in the present.” This “if with regard to the future” is not a fresh round of rescue mounted by the Sarvāstivādins themselves; it is the Sautrāntikas setting up the Sarvāstivādins’ rescue on their behalf and demolishing it at once; Puguang’s outline gathers the whole stretch within the single division of the Sautrāntikas’ renewed objection, and his explanation puts it in the hypothetical form “if it be said … then it follows that …,” without setting up any Sarvāstivādin answer in between; Fabao at the same round marks simply “a further objection.” Two commentaries independently marking the same way — this may be relied upon. Only then do the hands change: the Sarvāstivādins press the point by principle, asking one sentence only — “since there is a harming intent toward the present body of a sheep and the like, why is non-discipline not obtained upon it?”; whereupon the Sautrāntikas reproach in return with ‘matters equal such as these,’ setting the asymmetry back on both sides: “since there is no harming intent toward the present body of a mother and the like, why is non-discipline obtained upon her body as well? In matters equal such as these another principle should be sought.” First ask: is there a conclusion at the end of this passage? There is none. The treatise stops here, leaving only this sentence of the Sautrāntikas, “another principle should be sought,” and hands down no verdict. The easy error: to read “another principle should be sought” as the author confessing that his own reasoning has failed — it is not the author’s own avowal, it is the Sautrāntikas’ words of objection; and the reason the treatise records without adjudicating is the form of this treatise: where reasoning is unsettled, nothing is forced into place. Where this lands: when such a sentence is met in reading Abhidharma, it is exactly the place where one ought most to stop and think, not the place one ought most to skip.

〔2.11〕The mute and the want of a limb: can the evil discipline be raised only in part. The Sautrāntikas object again from ‘matters equal such as these’: a slaughterer of sheep does not steal all his life long, is content with his own wife, and may even be mute and unable to speak and so without the four faults of speech; “how then does he too obtain the non-discipline complete in its limbs?” The Sarvāstivādins answer: “because he has universally damaged the wholesome āśaya. Though mute and not speaking, his bodily manifest action has expressed the sense he wished to say, and so he obtains it complete in its limbs.” The Sautrāntikas object again: if he had first taken on two or three items of training and afterwards taken on only killing, and as to the remaining limbs had not damaged the wholesome disposition, how should he raise complete the seven limbs? Here the two schools each draw together — the Vibhāṣā masters say “there can certainly be no man with a limb wanting or with only a part remaining who may be called one abiding in non-discipline”; the Sautrāntika masters say “according to the term he has set, whether the limbs be complete or incomplete, whether the whole or a part, in every case non-discipline is obtained,” and add “it is the same with discipline as well, the eight-limbed observance alone excepted.” First ask: where does the real divergence of the two schools lie? In whether the entity of the evil discipline is ‘raised wholly at one raising’ or ‘raised according to the term set.’ The easy error: to suppose that this is a question only about the evil discipline. That sentence of the Sautrāntikas, “it is the same with discipline as well,” has already carried the battlefield over onto the wholesome discipline. Where this lands: here two accounts are recorded together and the treatise does not judge which prevails; what the reader is to learn is to see clearly where the point at issue lies, not to hurry to take a side.

III. The Two Causes for Obtaining Non-Discipline and the Three Causes for Obtaining the Middling Nonmanifest

〔3.1〕The two entrances to the evil discipline: being born into such a family, and setting up a term. The treatise says “the non-disciplines are obtained by two causes” — the first, being born into a family of non-discipline, “by first performing the preparatory effort of killing and the rest”; the second, though born into another family, “by first setting up a term and undertaking the business of killing and the rest,” his mind thinking “by this I shall seek goods and support my own life; and at that very moment he raises the evil discipline.” First ask: why does the first kind need no vow? Because for one born into such a family this trade is already the family business, and setting hand to it the first time is itself a taking up of the succession; the second kind requires an express term to be set. The easy error: to suppose that an evil vow must be uttered before an evil discipline is formed. The first kind is precisely the one where no vow is needed. Where this lands: this is exactly symmetrical with the obtaining of the wholesome discipline — that too has its two roads, by undertaking (a vow) and by absorption (naturally).

〔3.2〕The middling nonmanifest: that great tract which is neither discipline nor non-discipline. The treatise gives three causes. The first, “by the field” — “first, by the field, that is, toward such fields of merit as these one gives a park or grove and the like, and that wholesome nonmanifest arises at the first giving” — which it ties to “the meritorious deeds that have a support” spoken of in the sūtra. The second, “by undertaking” — “second, by undertaking, that is, one sets up a vow of one’s own: if I have not yet made obeisance to the Buddha I will not eat first, and the rest” — or makes a vow with a term to it, such as giving food constantly on fast days, monthly, half-monthly, and yearly. The third, “by weighty performance” — “third, by weighty performance, that is, raising an attention weighty in this way one performs the wholesome or performs the unwholesome.” First ask: what have these three causes in common? None of them requires a formal rite for taking on the discipline, and yet each can raise a continuing nonmanifest. The easy error: to suppose that without taking on the discipline there is no entity of discipline to speak of. What these three causes raise is precisely a nonmanifest that does not wait upon taking on a discipline. Where this lands: the small vows one sets up in daily life (one prostration a day, one gift a month) have a real substance within the system of this treatise — they raise a nonmanifest, and the seventh section below will tell you that they are relinquished by six conditions.

IV. Relinquishing the Discipline of Individual Liberation: Four Conditions, Five Conditions, and the One Principle behind the Five

〔4.1〕The two words “taming” must first be made good. The treatise begins not by explaining relinquishing but by glossing the name — “what is called taming means to show the discipline, since by this it can make the faculties tamed.” First ask: why gloss this word before speaking of relinquishing? Because what is relinquished must first be established. The discipline is called taming with regard to its function, not with regard to its form. The easy error: to understand keeping the discipline as observing rules. The treatise says it is making the faculties tamed — what is counteracted is the racing of the six faculties. Where this lands: to judge whether a practice of the discipline has landed, what one looks at is not whether there is a record of transgression but whether the faculties have been tamed.

〔4.2〕The disciplines of the seven classes are relinquished by four conditions, the one-day discipline by one more. The treatise lists the four conditions — “first, by disposition, raising a manifest action toward a person who can understand and giving up the training”; “second, by casting off the commonality of sentient beings”; “third, by the two sexual characteristics arising together”; “fourth, by the wholesome roots it rests upon being cut off” — and says “the one-day discipline is relinquished by the four conditions above and by the passing of a night; hence it is said in sum that the discipline of individual liberation is relinquished by five conditions.” First ask: why must the giving up be declared to “a person who can understand”? Because the substance of the first condition is a manifest action contradicting what was undertaken, and a manifest action must have an object able to take it in. The easy error: to suppose that thinking silently ‘I no longer hold it’ counts as relinquishing the discipline. The treatise says a manifest action must be raised toward one who can understand. Where this lands: this stipulation also protects the one who has taken on the discipline — a moment’s vexation will not make the discipline lapse of itself.

〔4.3〕The five conditions are not five stipulations; they are five ways of breaking down. This is the most important sentence in the section. The treatise asks and answers itself — “why is the relinquishing of the discipline by these five conditions? Because a manifest action has arisen that contradicts what was undertaken, because the support is cast off, because the support is altered, because what it rests upon is cut off, because the term of time is passed.” First ask: what do these five sentences say? They say the ways in which the five things the discipline rests upon severally break down: the manifest action contradicting the undertaking (the reverse of the undertaking), the body that is its support cast off (the end of life), the body that is its support altered (two sexual characteristics), the wholesome roots it rested upon cut off, the term run out. The easy error: to take the five conditions for a list to be memorized. Where this lands: grasp these five ways of breaking down, and when other disciplines are met (the one night of the one-day discipline, the six conditions of the middling nonmanifest) they can be worked out for oneself — they are no more than the same set of breakings-down rearranged over different disciplines.

〔4.4〕Whether a grave transgression relinquishes the discipline: three accounts recorded together, the treatise passing no verdict. The treatise writes the three accounts together in four lines of stanza. The first account is “some other school says: among the four gravest sins that can draw one down to an evil destiny, if any one be transgressed, the disciplines of the novice and the bhikṣu are relinquished” — the treatise itself gives only “some other school” without naming its tenet, while Puguang ties it word for word: “some other Sautrāntika master says: a grave transgression relinquishes the discipline.” The second account is “yet another school says: by the extinction of the true dharma too one may be made to relinquish the discipline of individual liberation,” the ground being that at the extinction of the dharma “all the items of training, the establishing of boundaries, and the formal acts cease”; and here too Puguang ties the tenet word for word: “some other Dharmaguptaka school says, which here means the school of the dharma-secret” (the sentence at the end of this fascicle about the extinction of the dharma being marked by Puguang precisely as “this refutes the school of the dharma-secret,” which fastens together with the attribution here). The third is the account of the Vibhāṣā masters of the land of Kaśmīra — “the Vibhāṣā masters of the land of Kaśmīra say: at the time of transgressing a root sin, the discipline of one gone forth is not relinquished” — with two grounds, “it is not that transgressing on one side requires all the disciplines to be wholly relinquished” and “it is not that transgressing the remaining sins involves the cutting off of moral discipline.” First ask: on which side does the author stand among the three accounts? Both stanza and prose write them together and hand down no verdict. The easy error: to take the account of the masters of Kaśmīra for the settled position of this treatise. It is one of the three accounts. Where this lands: the form of this treatise is that where divergent accounts are met and the sūtras have no express text, both parties are recorded; the reader had better first make clear the grounds of each of the three accounts, and the choosing among them belongs to someone else.

〔4.5〕The simile of the debt: one man may have two names at the same time. The masters of Kaśmīra set up a simile — “yet he has two names, namely keeper and transgressor of the discipline; as a man of wealth who owes another a debt is called at once a rich man and a debtor” — and add the way out, “if he confesses and clears away what he has transgressed, he is called complete in moral discipline and not called a transgressor, as one who has repaid a debt is called simply a rich man.” First ask: what is this simile meant to rescue? The coexistence of these two things: that the entity of the discipline is not lost, and that the fault is indeed there. The easy error: to read it as ‘it does not matter if one transgresses.’ The latter half of the simile says expressly that one must confess and clear away before returning to being merely a rich man. Where this lands: on the position of this line of the masters of Kaśmīra, this is a division of the greatest practical use for practice — to break the discipline is not to be without discipline; only where there is a discipline to rely upon is there a repentance that can be made. Since the preceding section has already said expressly that the three accounts are recorded together and the treatise passes no verdict, here only the road opened by the doctrine of this one line is set out, and no verdict is handed down on the treatise’s behalf.

〔4.6〕The Sautrāntikas’ objection: the World-Honored One said expressly that one who transgresses the four grave sins is not called a bhikṣu. The Sautrāntika masters object — “if that be so, why did the Bhagavat say that one who has transgressed the four grave sins is not called a bhikṣu” — and adduce the World-Honored One’s words, “he has broken the entity of a bhikṣu and destroyed the nature of an ascetic, and, ruined and fallen, the name of defeat is set up for him.” The Sarvāstivādins answer in a sentence: “it was said with a hidden intent, with regard to the bhikṣu in the ultimate sense.” First ask: wherein lies the weight of this answer? In that it adjudges the World-Honored One’s words to be a saying of hidden intent, that is, not of definitive meaning. The easy error: to suppose that this is merely a technical handling of terms. The Sautrāntikas in their next sentence seize upon just how serious it is. Where this lands: to adjudge a sentence of sūtra to be of hidden intent is a matter of the gravest responsibility — this is exactly why the dispute in the next passage is so fierce.

〔4.7〕The two words “violent and overbearing,” and the head-on collision of the two schools. The Sautrāntikas hand down their verdict outright: “this saying is violent and overbearing.” The Sarvāstivādins ask in return, “wherein is it violent and overbearing?” The Sautrāntikas answer with the utmost weight — “in that the World-Honored One’s saying of definitive meaning is explained by another sense so as to be made non-definitive, and in that it provides those of many afflictions with an occasion for transgressing grave sins.” First ask: how many charges do the Sautrāntikas bring? Two: making the definitive non-definitive, and opening a convenient door to grave transgression for those heavy with afflictions. The Sarvāstivādins press further, “how do you know that this saying is of definitive meaning?”; and the Sautrāntikas adduce the Vinaya’s own explanation as proof — “because the Vinaya itself explains that there are four bhikṣus,” namely “first the bhikṣu in name and notion, second the self-styled bhikṣu, third the mendicant bhikṣu, fourth the bhikṣu who has broken the afflictions” — while the one the sūtra calls not a bhikṣu is “the bhikṣu who has not received full ordination by a formal act of one motion and three announcements.” The easy error: to read this passage as a clash of tempers. Its substance is the authority to interpret the sūtras: when may one say that a sentence of sūtra is of hidden intent? Where this lands: this treatise records both parties without judging; what a later reader is to learn is the ground of each — the one relies on principle (the discipline ought not to be wholly relinquished for a single transgression), the other on the text of the Vinaya (the Vinaya itself explains four bhikṣus).

〔4.8〕The simile of the palmyra tree, and what this simile really shows. The Sautrāntikas cite the Sarvāstivādins’ position and refute it, saying that that saying of theirs “is in fact to call the Great Master to account,” because the Great Master himself set up a simile — “the Great Master set up this simile here: as a palmyra tree, if its head be cut off, can certainly not grow tall and wide again, so it is with bhikṣus and the rest who transgress a grave sin.” The Sarvāstivādins ask, “what principle did the Great Master mean this simile to show?” The Sautrāntikas answer: the intent is to show that to transgress on one side, in a root grave sin, makes all the rest of what was undertaken unable to grow tall and wide, because “he violates and oversteps the root practice of a bhikṣu, and is joined with an exceedingly fierce absence of conscience and shame”; the root of practice being cut off, all the disciplines ought in principle to be wholly relinquished. First ask: why do the two schools read different senses out of one and the same simile? The Sarvāstivādins read “unable to grow” as not increasing; the Sautrāntikas read it as the root being cut. The easy error: to think similes ornamental. This passage is precisely where in the whole fascicle a simile carries the heaviest weight — the point at issue falls upon how the simile is read. Where this lands: in reading the similes of sūtra and treatise, first ask ‘which portion of the simile is what is taken,’ and this one question saves more than half the misunderstandings.

〔4.9〕Tares in the rice, rotten beams, chaff among the seed: the sūtra of expulsion, the answer of the four ascetics, and the Sautrāntikas’ reconciling of the sūtra. The Sautrāntikas cite a further sūtra as proof: one who has gravely transgressed is not permitted to eat the food of the assembly “even a single morsel,” nor to “tread within the monastery so much as a heel’s breadth of ground,” and they adduce the Great Master’s words — “one should swiftly pull out the tares and weeds within the rice, should swiftly select and discard the rotten ridgepoles and beams, should swiftly winnow the chaff and blighted grain among the seed; even so should one swiftly drive out and expel from the assembly those who, being in truth no bhikṣus, are yet styled bhikṣus.” The Sautrāntikas then ask, “what is the mark of the entity of a bhikṣu?” The Sarvāstivādins answer: whatever the mark may be, the entity must exist, and they adduce the World-Honored One’s words as their ground — “for the World-Honored One has said: know, Cunda, that there are four ascetics and no fifth” — the four being of the excellent path, showing the path, living by the path, and defiling the path. The Sarvāstivādins’ words stop here. What follows is not a supplement of theirs but the Sautrāntikas turning about and reconciling this sūtra — “though the sūtra says so, yet he has merely the look of an ascetic remaining, and so is called an ascetic” — with six similes adduced in a row: “as with wood that has been burnt, a counterfeit parrot, a dried-up pool, a spoiled seed, the wheel of a whirling firebrand, and a dead man.” First ask: what does each party read out of one and the same passage of sūtra? The Sarvāstivādins read out that ‘the sūtra sets up four only and not a fifth, from which it is plain that one who has gravely transgressed still has the entity of the discipline within him’; the Sautrāntikas read out that ‘the reason the fourth kind is still called an ascetic is only that a look of an ascetic remains, and not that he has the entity of the discipline’ — and the six similes are set up for just this, saying that the name remains and the reality is gone. The easy error: to take the six similes for the Sarvāstivādins’ words, and so to read them as the Sarvāstivādins granting that in one who has gravely transgressed both name and entity of discipline remain. Precisely the contrary — the six similes are the Sautrāntikas’ words denying the entity of the discipline, following upon their earlier position that a grave transgression relinquishes the discipline. Where this lands: one passage of sūtra and each of two schools makes its own reading of it; this is exactly why this fascicle records both parties without judging, and what the reader is to learn is to see clearly what each relies upon, not to hurry to declare a winner.

〔4.10〕The bhikṣu still in training and the “single thought of concealment”: an exceedingly fine dividing line. Here the hands change once more. The Sarvāstivādins object: if a grave transgression makes one no bhikṣu, then the class of “bhikṣu still in training” set up in the Vinaya has nowhere to stand — “if one who has gravely transgressed is not a bhikṣu, there ought to be no bhikṣu still in training.” The Sautrāntikas answer: the case cannot be spoken of alike — “it is not said that all who gravely transgress commit a sin of defeat; only of one who has committed a sin of defeat is it definitely said that he is not a bhikṣu” — and the dividing line lies in “because he has not had a single thought of concealment.” It should be noted that this fine division comes from the mouth of the Sautrāntikas and is no supplement of the Sarvāstivādins; the Sautrāntikas maintain that a grave transgression relinquishes the discipline, and yet at the same time grant that one who transgresses without concealing is superior in his continuum and commits no defeat — and this is precisely where they part ‘grave transgression’ and ‘defeat’ into two matters. First ask: wherein do defeat and grave transgression differ? In concealment. One who transgresses without concealing is superior in his continuum and may enter the class of those still in training. The easy error: to suppose that the weight of a sin lies wholly in the deed. Here it is said expressly to hang upon a single thought of concealment or non-concealment. Where this lands: this is the sentence in the whole fascicle most directly addressed to the practitioner — whether that one thought after the transgression conceals or not settles the whole road afterward.

〔4.11〕The simile of the scorched seed, and a residual point about the extinction of the dharma. Still the two schools stand opposed. The Sarvāstivādins object: since there is no discipline, “why is he not made to go forth and take the discipline afresh?” The Sautrāntikas answer, “because his continuum has already been enfolded by an exceedingly grave absence of conscience and shame, and he has no strength to raise the discipline of one gone forth, like a scorched seed,” and say expressly that this is not because one sees that he still has a discipline — “it is not that, seeing that he has the bhikṣu’s discipline, he is therefore not made to go forth and take the discipline afresh.” That last sentence, “on this point there is no doctrine left; why labor so bitterly to rescue him,” gathers it up most trenchantly, but the momentum of the words must be seen for what it is: it is no neutral close, it is a sentence at the end of the Sautrāntikas’ answer turning the Sarvāstivādins’ own words back upon them — since you insist on preserving his entity of discipline, then you ought to go and make obeisance to bhikṣus of this kind. And a further residual point about the extinction of the dharma is added — “at the time when the true dharma is extinguished, though there are none of the establishings of boundaries, the formal acts, and the Vinaya, and those who have not obtained the discipline have no principle by which to obtain it anew, yet those who obtained it beforehand have no principle by which to relinquish it.” First ask: are the simile of the scorched seed and the simile of the palmyra tree one and the same thing? They are not. The palmyra tree simile disputes whether a discipline already obtained still exists; the scorched seed simile speaks of whether it can be raised again in the future. The easy error: to read the two similes together, whereupon the treatise seems to contradict itself. Where this lands: that passage on the extinction of the dharma yields a clean principle — the institution may be cut off, and an entity already obtained is not lost through the cutting off of the institution.

V. Relinquishing the Wholesome Dharmas Produced in Absorption and the Wholesome Dharmas without Outflows

〔5.1〕The discipline that accompanies absorption is relinquished by two conditions, and the word “and the like” points to something else. The treatise says “the wholesome dharmas affiliated to the levels of the meditative absorptions are relinquished by two conditions,” first by changing levels (born from a lower level up, or passing away from a higher and born below), second by falling back (falling back from a superior merit of absorption already acquired). There is besides in the stanza the word “and the like,” which the treatise itself explains as showing that “at the casting off of the commonality of sentient beings a small portion of superior wholesome roots is likewise relinquished.” First ask: why does changing levels relinquish it? Because the discipline that accompanies absorption is affiliated to a level, and when the level changes the dharmas affiliated to it naturally do not follow. The easy error: to imagine that the discipline accompanying absorption, once cultivated and obtained, goes with one forever. Where this lands: this shows just why the discipline accompanying absorption cannot take the place of the discipline of individual liberation — the one is affiliated to the continuum of a body, the other to a level.

〔5.2〕A small difference in the formless realm, not to be let slip. The treatise adds a sentence: the wholesome dharmas of the form realm are relinquished by changing levels and by falling back, “and so it is with the formless realm as well, save only that there is no discipline there, and in this it differs from the form realm.” First ask: why has the formless realm no discipline? Because the discipline is form, and in the formless realm there is no form. The easy error: to suppose that the higher the realm the more excellent the discipline. It is exactly the formless realm that has no discipline accompanying absorption to speak of. Where this lands: this sentence reminds the reader that the position that the entity of the discipline is a form-dharma is carried through consistently in this treatise.

〔5.3〕The discipline that accompanies the path is relinquished by three conditions, each of substance. The treatise says “the wholesome dharmas without outflows are relinquished by three conditions” — first by obtaining a fruit (“at the time of obtaining a fruit one relinquishes the path of approach and the path of the fruit that went before”), second by refining the faculties (“at the stage of refining the faculties one relinquishes the path of the dull through obtaining the path of the sharp”), third by falling back (“at the time of falling back one loses the path of the fruit and the path superior to the fruit”). First ask: obtaining a fruit is plainly an advance; why is it counted as relinquishing? Because what is relinquished is the earlier path of approach and path of the fruit; this is a relinquishing that ‘exchanges the inferior for the superior,’ not a losing. The easy error: to see the word “relinquish” and think of falling away. Where this lands: “relinquishing” in this treatise is a neutral technical term — wherever the dharma one rests upon is replaced, cut off, or broken down, it is called relinquishing; in reading, first ask which of these it is.

VI. The Three Conditions for Relinquishing Evil Discipline

〔6.1〕The three conditions: death, obtaining the discipline, the arising of the two sexual characteristics. The treatise says “the non-disciplines are relinquished by three conditions” — first by death, “because the support is cast off”; second by obtaining the discipline, “that is, if one takes on the discipline of individual liberation, or through acquiring the discipline of the meditative absorptions, the evil discipline is thereupon relinquished,” the ground being “since the natures of the wholesome and the evil discipline contradict each other, and the wholesome discipline is the stronger in force among them”; third by the two sexual characteristics arising together, “because at that time the support is altered.” First ask: why can the wholesome discipline drive out the evil, and not the evil the wholesome? The treatise says expressly that the wholesome discipline is the stronger in force. The easy error: to suppose that the wholesome and evil disciplines are on a par. They contradict each other in nature and are unequal in force. Where this lands: this is a most powerful practical warrant given by this treatise — the taking on of the discipline is itself the way to cut off the evil discipline, and there is no need to clear away one’s evil actions first before coming to take it on.

〔6.2〕Throwing away knife and net is not relinquishing the evil discipline. The treatise adds a passage on purpose — “one who abides in evil discipline, though he may at times give rise to the volition of not doing and lay aside knife and net, yet if he does not take on the wholesome disciplines, those non-disciplines can in no way be cast off” — and sets up the simile, “as when, though one avoids the causes and conditions of falling ill, yet without taking good medicine the illness is in the end hard to cure.” First ask: why is not doing not enough? Because the evil discipline is an entity that has been set up; it does not break down of itself through the stopping of behavior, and must be dispossessed by an entity that contradicts it. The easy error: to suppose that changing one’s trade is the same as getting out. Where this lands: this is the item in the whole fascicle that comes down most squarely upon the gate of practice — to leave the evil discipline, one must take on the wholesome discipline; to avoid the circumstances is only to stop adding weight, not to be released.

〔6.3〕After the night has passed: the third place in this fascicle where both accounts are recorded without adjudication. The treatise sets the question, “when a man who abides in non-discipline has taken the one-day discipline, and at the passing of the night relinquishes that discipline, does he obtain non-discipline, or is he called a middling man?” The former master says he obtains non-discipline again, on the ground that “that unwholesome disposition has not been relinquished forever, as when iron heated red is taken off the fire, the red vanishes and the dark comes forth”; the latter master says “if he does not do the deed afresh, there is no condition to make him obtain non-discipline, since non-discipline is obtained in dependence upon a manifest action.” First ask: where does the divergence of the two accounts lie? In whether obtaining the evil discipline anew requires a new manifest action. The easy error: to hurry to decide which account is right. The treatise here hands down no verdict. Where this lands: this question is still direct for a modern reader — when a period of temporary discipline has run out and a man returns to his former life, does he ‘revert of himself to his former state,’ or ‘have to make something afresh to get back’? Each account has its reason.

VII. The Six Conditions for Relinquishing the Middling Nonmanifest

〔7.1〕The six conditions are a very complete table of breakings-down. The stanza has only ten characters — “the middling relinquished by undertaking, momentum, performance, thing, life, and roots cut off” — five characters to a condition, the last word “cut off” gathering in the cutting off of the roots as well; the prose commentary spreads it out most neatly. The treatise lists “the middling nonmanifest is relinquished by six conditions” — “first, relinquished by the breaking down of the mind of undertaking” (saying in the mind, “from this day on I cast off what I undertook before”), “second, relinquished by the breaking down of the momentum,” “third, relinquished by the breaking down of the performance” (“as with the matter undertaken, one afterwards does it no more”), “fourth, relinquished by the breaking down of the thing,” “fifth, relinquished by the breaking down of the life span” (“because the support has undergone a change”), “sixth, relinquished by the breaking down of the wholesome roots” (“at the time when the preparatory effort is raised and the wholesome roots are cut off”). First ask: why are the conditions of the middling nonmanifest more numerous than those of individual liberation? Because it is not established by a formal act, and the things it rests upon are more mixed — mind, momentum, performance, thing, life, root, every one of them breakable. The easy error: to see the six conditions as trivia. They are in fact an extended application of the five ways of breaking down in the fourth section. Where this lands: before setting up a small vow, look first among these six for the one likeliest to break down first, and that is where the vow most needs guarding.

〔7.2〕The arrow and the potter’s wheel: the moment when momentum runs out. For the second condition the treatise sets up a simile of its own — the nonmanifest drawn forth by the force of pure faith or of the afflictions has “a limit to both, and when the momentum of that limit is cut off the nonmanifest is thereupon relinquished, as with an arrow that has been shot and a potter’s wheel, which come to a stop when the thrust of the bowstring and the rest is spent.” First ask: what is this simile meant to correct? The imagination that ‘a fierce mind at one moment can be effective forever.’ The easy error: to suppose that a mind raised in a moment of being moved will stay there. The treatise says it is like an arrow: it will come to the ground. Where this lands: this is why the treatise sets up “by undertaking” as a separate cause — to turn a momentary momentum into a vow with a term to it, so that when the momentum is spent there is still a mind of undertaking to rely on.

〔7.3〕A thing too can break down the entity of the discipline, and this item is the easiest to skip. The treatise asks itself, “what is a thing?” and answers itself, “the monastery, bedding, caitya, and park or grove given away, and the nets and snares and the like set up.” First ask: if the thing is destroyed, is my merit then gone? What is spoken of here is not the presence or absence of merit but the nonmanifest that kept arising in dependence upon that thing, which stops with the thing. The easy error: to read it as ‘the fruit of retribution of the gift disappears.’ It does not — the action of giving is already accomplished, and only that portion of the nonmanifest that turned with the thing stops. Where this lands: this item applies symmetrically on the evil side as well — nets and snares being destroyed, the evil nonmanifest that arose in dependence upon them likewise stops.

VIII. Relinquishing the Wholesome Not-Form of the Desire Realm and the Defiled Not-Form of the Three Realms

〔8.1〕The relinquishing of wholesome dharmas takes two conditions, the relinquishing of defiled dharmas only one. The treatise says “all the wholesome dharmas of the desire realm that are not form are relinquished by two conditions: first, cutting off the wholesome roots; second, being born into a higher realm”; while “all the defiled dharmas of the three realms that are not form are relinquished by one condition alone, namely by the arising of the path that counteracts them.” First ask: why do wholesome dharmas take two conditions and defiled dharmas only one? Because the relinquishing of wholesome dharmas has two roads — being uprooted (the wholesome roots cut off) and being passed beyond (birth in a higher realm); the relinquishing of defiled dharmas has one road only — being counteracted. The easy error: to suppose that defiled dharmas are the easier to relinquish. Exactly the contrary: there is one road only, and that road is the noble path. Where this lands: this section states the matter of ‘cutting off the afflictions’ with the utmost economy — apart from the counteracting path there is no second way.

〔8.2〕The four words “no other means” are to be remembered. The treatise says “if the path that can cut off this category has arisen, one relinquishes all the afflictions within this category together with their attendants; no other means will do.” First ask: what is meant by “this category”? The afflictions are cut off by categories, and only when the path that can cut off this category arises is this category relinquished. The easy error: to suppose that cultivating any wholesome dharma whatever can diminish the entity of an affliction. To diminish its actual occurrence is one thing; to relinquish its entity is another. Where this lands: this sentence of the fascicle is best read together with the earlier ‘the wholesome discipline can dispossess the evil discipline’ — the wholesome discipline can dispossess the entity of the evil discipline, but wholesome dharmas cannot dispossess the entity of an affliction; the entity of an affliction can be cut off by the counteracting path alone.

IX. In Which Sentient Beings Discipline and Non-Discipline Are Found

〔9.1〕Three lines drawn first: destiny, continent, body. The treatise says “non-discipline is found only in the human destiny, and the northern continent being excepted, it is found in the three quarters alone,” and “within the three continents there must further be excepted the ṣaṇḍha, the paṇḍaka, and those who have the two sexual characteristics”; while discipline likewise excepts the same classes among men, “and is found among the gods as well.” First ask: why draw three lines? Because the support of the discipline has three layers of condition — the destiny (there must be undertaking and conscience and shame), the continent (there must be a dharma of undertaking), and the body (there must be a support that has the capacity). The easy error: to read “the northern continent excepted” as meaning that the men of the northern continent are bad. The treatise gives its own reason later, and it has nothing to do with good and evil. Where this lands: whenever an ‘excepting so-and-so’ is met in this treatise, first find the reason the treatise itself gives, and do not fill it in for oneself.

〔9.2〕Why the ṣaṇḍha and the rest have no discipline: two proofs from sūtra and Vinaya and three reasons. The treatise first adduces the proofs — “and by what is it known that the continuum of the ṣaṇḍha and the rest is not a support for discipline? Because sūtra and Vinaya have express proof” — the sūtra passage where the Buddha tells Mahānāman taking “the male faculty complete” as the mark of a layman of the male sort, and the Vinaya where it says “you should put away and reject persons of this sort of form.” Then it adduces three reasons — “because the afflictions raised by the two supports are both in full increase within one continuum,” “because they have no capacity for correct discernment,” “because they have no exceedingly weighty mind of conscience and shame.” First ask: what do these three point to in common? To the capacity of the support that is the body, not to a moral appraisal. The easy error: to read this passage as a disparagement of a class of persons. What the treatise sets up is the condition of the body upon which the entity of the discipline rests. Where this lands: this also explains why they likewise have no evil discipline — the treatise goes on to say “because their minds are not settled in evil either,” and adds a general rule, “moreover, wherever there is wholesome discipline, there evil discipline is also found, because these two are established as the reverse of one another.”

〔9.3〕The northern continent and the evil destinies: two different lacks. The treatise says “the men of Uttarakuru have no undertaking and no absorption, nor a superior āśaya for doing evil, and hence have neither wholesome nor evil discipline”; and again, “fierce conscience and shame are absent in the evil destinies, and hence discipline and non-discipline are alike absent there.” First ask: is what the northern continent lacks the same thing that the evil destinies lack? It is not — the northern continent lacks “undertaking” and ‘the superior disposition for doing evil,’ while the evil destinies lack fierce conscience and shame. The easy error: to lump the two together as ‘heavy in action.’ Where this lands: this section together with the passage on the ṣaṇḍha makes up a ‘table of the conditions of the body that supports the discipline’ — there must be a dharma of undertaking, conscience and shame, capacity, and a settled mind.

〔9.4〕The simile of the field of salt and alkali: it grows no good sprouts, and no foul weeds either. The treatise sets up the simile, “moreover the ṣaṇḍha and the rest are like a field of salt and alkali, and hence cannot grow wholesome discipline or evil discipline,” and explains it itself, “it is plainly seen in the world that any field of salt and alkali can grow neither good sprouts nor foul weeds.” First ask: on which word does the weight of this simile fall? On ‘nor foul weeds either’ — the two-way character of the simile is the very heart of it. The easy error: to take only the half ‘it grows no good sprouts’ and read it as disparagement. Where this lands: whenever a simile is read, first see whether it is a one-way or a two-way simile; this simile in the treatise is plainly two-way.

〔9.5〕Egg-born nāgas taking the eight-limbed observance: the solution to an objection from a sūtra. The treatise sets the objection, “if that be so, why does the sūtra say that there are egg-born nāgas who on the eighth day of each half-month and the rest come out from the palace to the world of men to ask for the eight-limbed one-day fast discipline,” and answers, “what they obtain is excellent conduct, it is not the obtaining of discipline.” First ask: since they have taken it, why does it not count as obtaining the discipline? Because the discipline has its conditions of a support, and what they obtain is excellent conduct. The easy error: to suppose that this says the nāgas took it in vain. It does not — excellent conduct is a wholesome thing really obtained. Where this lands: this is one and the same establishing as the “excellent conduct resembling discipline” obtained under the “five stipulations” of the second section: there is real good and yet it is not discipline; the treatise applies the same measure in these two places.

〔9.6〕The distribution of the three disciplines through the three realms. The treatise concludes, “hence discipline is found only among men and gods, and only men have all three disciplines complete, namely individual liberation, the meditative absorptions, and that without outflows”; and it says separately that “those born among the gods of the desire realm and in the form realm may all have the discipline of the meditative absorptions, while for those born in the formless realm it is certainly absent,” whereas the discipline without outflows “is found even in the formless realm,” only that “those born in the formless realm merely possess it, since, there being no form, it certainly cannot be made present.” First ask: what is the difference between “possessing” and “being made present”? Possessing is having obtained it; being made present is having it in act. The easy error: to read “the formless realm has the discipline without outflows” as meaning that the formless realm has a discipline that can be practiced. The treatise says expressly that it certainly cannot be made present. Where this lands: this pairing of “possessing” and “being made present” has to be used everywhere in Abhidharma, and this sentence of the fascicle is one of the cleanest samples of it.

X. The Three Actions, Wholesome, Unwholesome, and Indeterminate

〔10.1〕The two words “secure” are the criterion. The treatise says “the action that is secure is named wholesome, because it can obtain a lovely maturation and nirvāṇa, relieving the sufferings of beings in the two divisions of time, the temporary and the everlasting”; it says “the action that is not secure is named unwholesome, because it draws on an unlovely maturation and is contrary in nature to what was called secure”; it says “the action that belongs to neither of the two is given the name indeterminate, because it cannot be determined as wholesome or unwholesome.” First ask: why is the criterion of the wholesome fixed at “secure” rather than at “good”? Because security is spoken of with regard to the result — it can obtain a lovely maturation (temporary) and nirvāṇa (everlasting). This pairing of “the two divisions of time, the temporary and the everlasting” is one of the most essential establishings in the treatise: the suffering relieved by wholesome action has two layers of effect. The easy error: to understand the wholesome merely as what draws on a pleasant result. If it were only that, nirvāṇa would have nowhere to stand. Where this lands: to check whether a thing is wholesome, the question the treatise gives is ‘does it relieve suffering, and is the relief temporary or everlasting?’

〔10.2〕Why the indeterminate is not a third kind of wholesome. The treatise says that the indeterminate is that portion which “cannot be determined as wholesome or unwholesome.” First ask: is ‘cannot be determined’ a not knowing, or a genuine belonging to neither side? It is the latter — it is affiliated to neither the secure nor the insecure nature. The easy error: to take the indeterminate for a neutral good thing. It has not even the strength to draw on a maturation. Where this lands: this division reminds the practitioner that a great deal of daily behavior in fact falls into the indeterminate, accumulating neither good nor evil — and this is precisely why one must ‘raise a weighty attention’ if a nonmanifest is to be raised.

XI. Meritorious, Unmeritorious, Immovable

〔11.1〕The definitions of the three actions are of the utmost brevity, and the reason lies in the second half of each sentence. The treatise says “the wholesome action of the desire realm is said to be named meritorious, because it draws on a lovely result and benefits sentient beings,” “the unwholesome actions are said to be named unmeritorious, because they draw on an unlovely result and harm sentient beings,” “the wholesome action of the two higher realms is said to be named immovable.” First ask: why is the wholesome of the higher realms not called meritorious? Because the pair meritorious and unmeritorious is set up with regard to benefiting and harming sentient beings, while the name immovable is set up with regard to action and result not shifting — the three do not share one measure. The easy error: to suppose that the three actions are three cells under one and the same standard. Where this lands: when a set of dharma-numbers is met standing side by side, first make sure whether they were measured with one and the same measure; here the treatise offers exactly a counter-instance.

〔11.2〕How the sūtras of “immovable” and “having movement” are reconciled. The treatise sets itself the objection from a sūtra — the World-Honored One said that the three lower absorptions are all named having movement. Answer: “since within the three lower absorptions there are applied and sustained thought and the rest, the calamities are not yet stilled, and hence the name moving is set up,” whereas “the immovable of which the Sūtra of the Immovable speaks is said with regard to being able to draw on an immovable maturation.” First ask: why has one and the same word “movement” two explanations? Because what each is spoken with regard to differs: the one with regard to the calamities within the absorption, the other with regard to the place of action and result. Puguang here further adduces the words of the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle as a help — “the noble ones say: within these there is the movement of applied thought, sustained thought, joy, and the feeling of pleasure. By the applied and sustained thought of the lower first absorption there is movement, by the feeling of joy of the lower second there is movement, by the feeling of pleasure of the lower third there is movement” — and puts forward two explanations of his own, one saying “because there are applied thought and the rest, and the calamities are not yet stilled, the name moving is set up,” and one saying “a further explanation: taking in joy, pleasure, and the in-breath and out-breath as well, each as is fitting is called movement.” The easy error: to suppose that the actions of the form and formless realms really have movement. Where this lands: when the same word is met with different explanations in sūtra and treatise, first ask ‘with regard to what is “movement” spoken of in this place?’

〔11.3〕Actions of the desire realm may be turned aside by other conditions, those of the higher realms may not. The treatise sets a further objection, “how can an absorption that has movement draw on an immovable maturation,” and answers, “although within such an absorption there is the movement of calamity, yet its action as regards its result has not the shifting that the desire realm has, and hence the name immovable is set up,” adducing an actual instance from the desire realm — an action that properly ought to ripen among the gods, “being drawn aside by the force of other causes and conditions, ripens among men instead.” Conversely, “an action of the form and formless realms belonging to some other level and place has no way of being turned into being experienced at another level and place; the place of action and result is settled, and hence the name immovable is set up.” First ask: what does the “movement” here really move? It moves the destiny and place where the result of the action is. The easy error: to mistake “immovable” for meaning unalterable and irremediable. What is said here is that the level and the place do not shift, not that the result cannot be turned. Where this lands: the very reason that actions of the desire realm can be turned is why practice has a place to lay hold; this item is most powerful read together with the section on settled and unsettled action.

XII. Conducive to Pleasant Feeling, to Painful Feeling, to Feeling Neither Painful nor Pleasant

〔12.1〕The bounds of level for the three actions of feeling are drawn by the limit of pleasant feeling. The treatise says “among the wholesome actions, those from the desire realm up to the third meditative absorption are called actions conducive to pleasant feeling, because pleasant feelings extend only so far”; “the unwholesome actions are called conducive to painful feeling”; “the wholesome actions of the levels beyond the third absorption are said to be named conducive to feeling neither painful nor pleasant, because above that there are no feelings of pain or pleasure at all.” First ask: why is the line drawn at the third meditative absorption? Because pleasant feeling reaches only so far. The easy error: to suppose that this is a ranking of value. It is a boundary in the distribution of feeling. Where this lands: this boundary is used again and again in the study of absorption — above the third absorption there is no pleasant feeling, and above the fourth there is the feeling of equanimity alone.

〔12.2〕Action draws on not feeling alone but the provisions of feeling as well. The treatise adds a sentence of great importance — “it is not that these actions draw on the result of feeling alone; it should be known that they draw on the provisions of that feeling as well; feeling and its provisions are here called feeling.” First ask: what are the provisions of feeling? The remaining dharmas that arise together with feeling and support that feeling. The easy error: to read “action conducive to pleasant feeling” as drawing on one isolated pleasant feeling only. Where this lands: this explains why the result of a wholesome action is a whole setting and not merely a sensation.

〔12.3〕Whether the lower levels have a third kind of action: three accounts set forth and the author expressly adjudicating. The treatise records three accounts — the first, that the lower levels too have the third, action conducive to feeling neither, on the ground that the action of the intermediate absorption must draw on a maturation, for otherwise “the action of the intermediate absorption ought to have no maturation, or else there ought to be no such action at all, since it has no maturational result of pain or pleasure”; the second, that this action draws on the maturation of the faculty of pleasure within the fundamental levels; the third, that this action draws on no result of feeling. The author gathers them up directly with “both accounts contradict the root treatise,” adducing two questions from the root treatise as proof, and concluding, “by this it may be proved that the lower levels too have action conducive to feeling neither.” First ask: does this passage conflict with the form of ‘recording both without adjudication’ set out above? It does not — recording without adjudication is for cases where the sūtras have no express text, whereas here the author has an express text of the root treatise to adduce, and so he adjudicates. The easy error: to take every divergent account in this fascicle for a recording without adjudication. Where this lands: the dividing line between adjudicating and not adjudicating is whether there is an express text to rely upon, and this passage is the one sample of express adjudication in this fascicle.

〔12.4〕The action of the feeling of equanimity is wholesome but inferior: an answer that looks like a contradiction. The treatise asks itself, “is this action wholesome or unwholesome? It is wholesome, only inferior,” and at once objects to itself: since it was said above that the wholesome up to the third absorption is called conducive to pleasant feeling, and that what obtains a lovely result is called wholesome action, is this not a contradiction? Answer: “it should be known that that was said with regard to the greater part.” Puguang here states the reason more thoroughly — he sets the question why the equanimity of the higher levels should be drawn on by a superior wholesome while the equanimity below the third absorption is on the contrary drawn on by an inferior wholesome, and answers, “in the higher levels there is no joy or pleasure left to delight in, and so a superior wholesome can draw it on; in the lower levels there are still the two feelings of joy and pleasure, and men mostly delight in these and do not much seek equanimity,” adducing the words of the Mahāvibhāṣā, “the mode of apprehension of the faculty of equanimity is subtle and still, and delighted in by the wise, and so it is a wholesome action that draws it on.” First ask: what does “said with regard to the greater part” mean? It means that the earlier sentence adduced the general case and is not a rule without exception. The easy error: to see the treatise break its own earlier words and suppose the text disordered. Where this lands: this treatise often uses “with regard to the greater part” to reconcile the general case with the exception, and one should watch for it in reading.

〔12.5〕The natures of action and feeling differ; how the word “conducive” is established. The treatise asks itself, “since the natures of action and of feeling are distinct, how are they said to be conducive to pleasant feeling and the rest,” and the answer has several roads: first, “though the natures of action and pleasant feeling are distinct, action can act as cause to benefit pleasant feeling”; second, this action is what is experienced by pleasure, “because pleasure is the maturational result of this action”; third, that pleasure is what the action experiences. And a simile is set up, “as with the bath powder conducive to bathing” — which Puguang glosses word for word, “bathing means washing, and powder means the sort of bean flour; the powder being conducive to the bathing, it is called the bath powder conducive to bathing” — from which it is plain that this is the powder of beans and flour used at bathing (of the sort of bath-meal), so named because it is conducive to bathing, and not a scented dust. First ask: wherein do the three roads differ? One is with regard to benefit, one to what is experienced, one to what experiences. Puguang divides the three explanations in just this way. The easy error: to suppose that the three accounts exclude one another. They are three roads by which one and the same name is established. Where this lands: when a compound name of the form ‘conducive to such and such’ is met, first ask whether it is said with regard to the cause, to the result, or to the function.

〔12.6〕The five kinds of conduciveness to feeling: a table for preventing confusion. The treatise lists five — conducive by its own nature (all feeling), by association (all contact), as object (all objects), as maturation (the action that can draw on a maturation), and as present before one (the feeling now occurring) — adducing a sūtra as proof for each, and at the end fixing the range: “what is spoken of here is only conduciveness as maturation, because action can draw on the maturation of feeling.” First ask: what use is there in setting up these five? The use is in delimiting what is under discussion: the conduciveness spoken of in this section is only the fourth kind and no other, and must not be mixed up with the other four. The easy error: to read the text on conduciveness as maturation with the sense of conduciveness by its own nature, whereupon nothing goes through anywhere. Where this lands: this is a typical device of Abhidharma — first spread out the several uses of a word, then designate which one is in use here.

XIII. Settled and Unsettled Action · Actions of the Three Times

〔13.1〕Settled and unsettled must first be clearly defined. The treatise says “of the actions conducive to pleasant feeling and the rest spoken of above, it should be known that each has the difference of settled and unsettled; because they are not certainly to be experienced, the name unsettled is set up.” Settled action is further of three — “settled action is of three kinds: first conducive to being experienced in the present life, second conducive to being experienced in the next birth, third conducive to being experienced in a life after the next” — each with its definition: “conducive to being experienced in the present life means done in this life and ripening in this very life”; conducive to being experienced in the next birth is done in this life and ripening in the second life; conducive to being experienced in a life after the next is done in this life and ripening in order from the third life on. The three settled with the one unsettled make four kinds in all. First ask: in what is the “unsettled” unsettled? Here it is unsettled first with regard to the division of time. The easy error: to take unsettled action for action that receives no result. What is unsettled is the time, not whether there is a result. Where this lands: this set of four actions is the skeleton of the teaching on action and result, and the two sections following both hang upon it.

〔13.2〕The account of five actions: cutting the unsettled once more. The treatise records an account — “some maintain that unsettled action is further of two kinds, namely settled and unsettled as regards maturation” — which with the three settled actions makes five. First ask: where does this cut fall? On a second dimension, ‘whether the maturation itself is settled.’ The easy error: to suppose that the account of five actions conflicts with that of four. It has only used one more measure. Where this lands: from this it is plain that “settled” in this treatise has at least two senses, settledness of time and settledness of maturation; and when the words “settled action” are read, one should first ask which settledness is meant.

〔13.3〕Whether action conducive to the present may ripen in a later life: a divergent account and the Vibhāṣā masters’ refusal. Some other master says that action conducive to being experienced in the present may ripen in other births as well, “the name of the action being established according to the stage at which it first ripens,” on the ground that “lest a strong action should have little maturational result.” “The Vibhāṣā masters do not allow this account, because some actions have a result near and yet not superior, and some are just the contrary,” and they adduce outward seeds as a simile — “as with outward seeds, the mallow bears fruit after three and a half months, while wheat must pass six months before it bears fruit.” First ask: what is this simile meant to refute? The inference that ‘what ripens early must therefore be small in strength.’ The mallow ripens early and wheat late, and one cannot say that the strength of the mallow must be the smaller. The easy error: to suppose that a divergent account, once adduced, is thereby granted. Where this lands: this passage is a fine training in reasoning — a seemingly plausible analogy overturned by an analogy that fits better.

〔13.4〕The masters of similes’ four alternatives and eight actions. The treatise records the masters of similes as saying that action has four alternatives — settled as to time and unsettled as to maturation, settled as to maturation and unsettled as to time, settled as to both, unsettled as to both — and concludes “on their account actions come to eight kinds in all.” First ask: how do these four alternatives stand to the account of five actions above? They cross the two measures (time and maturation) completely, so that each kind of action divides in two and makes eight. The easy error: to take the four alternatives and the five actions for two opposed positions. The four alternatives are a method; the five actions are one of its results. Where this lands: this is the second demonstration of the method of four alternatives in this fascicle; crossing two measures exhaustively is the basic skill of Abhidharma analysis.

XIV. The Four Actions Done at Once · Drawing On the Commonality · What All Places May Do · What Is Debarred to the “Firm”

〔14.1〕Whether four actions can be done at the same time: a very concrete answer. The treatise asks itself, “are there four actions done at the same time? It is allowed that there are. How? Having sent three messengers, one at the same time carries a wrong desire through to its end.” First ask: wherein lies the beauty of this instance? In that with a single affair it does all four actions of the four divisions of time at once — what the three messengers do severally accomplishes the three settled actions, and what he does himself accomplishes the unsettled action, and all four are brought to completion at the same time. The easy error: to suppose that actions of different divisions of time cannot be done at the same time. The doing is at one time, the ripening at different times, and the two must not be confused. Where this lands: this also shows from the other side how much action is to be feared — in the space of a single thought four lines of time can be set going at once.

〔14.2〕Only three can draw on the commonality of sentient beings; the present-life kind does not. The treatise answers, “how many actions can draw on the commonality of sentient beings? Only three can draw on it, the action conducive to being experienced in the present excepted, because the commonality of this present body was drawn on by an earlier action.” First ask: why can the action conducive to being experienced in the present not draw on the commonality? Because the body of general retribution of this present term was drawn on by an earlier action; the action conducive to being experienced in the present receives its result within this very body and comes too late to draw this body on. The easy error: to confuse the drawing action with the filling action. Where this lands: this item is precisely the forerunner of the doctrine of ‘drawing and filling causes’ — what draws on the general retribution of one term and what fills out its particular retribution are not one and the same set of actions.

〔14.3〕Within the hells wholesome action must except that conducive to being experienced in the present. The treatise says “in all the realms and destinies, whether wholesome or unwholesome, according to what is fitting all four may be done,” which is the general permission; and the particular debarring is “as for the particular debarring, within the hells wholesome action excepts that conducive to being experienced in the present, since there is no lovely result; the rest may all be done.” First ask: why is just this one kind excepted? Because what is conducive to being experienced in the present must receive its result in this life, and the hells have no lovely result to receive. The easy error: to suppose that no wholesome action can be done in the hells. The treatise says expressly that the remaining three may be done. Where this lands: this is one of the rare rays of light in this fascicle — in the most painful of places wholesome action can still be done, only its result is not received there.

〔14.4〕What is debarred to the “firm”: a line drawn for those who do not fall back. The treatise says “those who do not fall back from their lineage are called firm, and on a level whose defilement they have left behind,” dividing them in two — those of the class of ordinary beings, “excepting the action conducive to being experienced in the next birth, may do the remaining three”; noble ones, “excepting both those conducive to the next birth and to a later one, may do the remaining two” — the ground being that an ordinary being who does not fall back has no ‘being born again below in the next life,’ and a noble one who does not fall back “will certainly not be born again into the lower levels.” First ask: why are those conducive to the next birth and to a later one the ones debarred? Because those two must receive their results in the lower levels, and one who does not fall back is no longer born into the lower levels. The easy error: to suppose that this says a noble one does no action. The treatise says expressly that the remaining two may be done. Where this lands: this section shows that whether an action may be done hangs upon whether the place where its result is received is still within his future itinerary.

〔14.5〕An exception for one who falls back from a fruit, and a thread laid for later. The treatise says that noble ones who have obtained the freedom from defilement in the desire realm and at the summit of existence, “though there be falling back, still do not do the actions conducive to the next birth or to a later one, because one who falls back from there must fall back from a fruit,” and adds, “those who have fallen back from a fruit certainly do not then meet their end, as will be made out later.” First ask: why does one who has fallen back from a fruit still not do the actions conducive to the next birth or a later one? Because one who falls back from a fruit will not thereupon meet his end, and is still within this life. The easy error: to read “falling back” as sinking down into a lower level. The treatise says expressly that he does not meet his end. Where this lands: this sentence is at the same time a thread laid for later — the relation of falling back from a fruit to the end of life is left by the treatise to be made out in the text that follows, and the reader should note the thread down.

XV. The Twenty-Two Kinds of Action Done in the Stage of Intermediate Existence

〔15.1〕How the twenty-two are counted out. The treatise says “within the desire realm, while abiding in the stage of intermediate existence, it is allowed that twenty-two actions can be done,” and the way of counting is that the stage of intermediate existence, the five stages within the womb, and the five stages outside the womb make eleven stages, each with a settled and an unsettled action, hence twenty-two. The five stages within the womb are the kalala, the arbuda, the peśī, the ghana, and the praśākhā; of the five outside the womb the treatise says “the five outside the womb are: first infancy, second childhood, third youth, fourth middle age, fifth old age.” First ask: why cut one life into eleven segments? Because what action bears upon differs stage by stage. The easy error: to take the twenty-two for twenty-two actions of different natures. It is eleven stages multiplied by two. Where this lands: this way of counting is itself a way of contemplation — laying out one term of life from intermediate existence to old age and seeing every segment as a place upon which action may bear.

〔15.2〕Why the settled actions done in intermediate existence all count as conducive to being experienced in the present. The treatise says “it should be known that the eleven kinds of settled action thus done in intermediate existence are all included in what is conducive to being experienced in the present, because the commonality of the class has no difference,” and explains itself, “that is, this stage of intermediate existence and the ten stages of its own class are drawn on by one commonality of sentient beings and one action.” First ask: are intermediate existence and the time in the womb and on to old age not different stages? How then do they count as one and the same “present”? Because they belong to one and the same commonality of sentient beings and are drawn on by one and the same action; they are segments within one and the same term of life. The easy error: to take intermediate existence for a life of its own. Where this lands: and it is for this very reason that the treatise says “hence there is no need to speak of a separate action conducive to being experienced in intermediate existence, since intermediate existence is itself drawn on by the actions conducive to the next birth and the rest.”

〔15.3〕The precise sense of the four words “the commonality of the class.” This term is exceedingly easy to confuse with “the commonality of sentient beings.” Puguang adduces the words of the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle to explain it — “the commonality of the class means the class of men and the like, not the destiny and not the birth, since with regard to destiny and birth the commonalities of intermediate existence and of birth-existence differ.” First ask: what does this explanation settle? It settles the difficulty that intermediate existence and birth-existence are in fact not of one commonality as regards “destiny” and “birth”: what they share is the layer of “the class of men and the like,” not the layer of destiny and birth. The easy error: to read “the commonality of the class” here with the “commonality of sentient beings” of the five aggregates. Where this lands: when two closely similar technical terms are met, first look whether the ancient masters have drawn a boundary between them; the words Puguang adduces here are exactly that boundary.

XVI. Why an Action Must Draw On a Maturation

〔16.1〕Four marks plus one, five places in all. The treatise says that if the action done be “from a weighty affliction, or a purely pure mind, or constantly done, or arising toward a dominant field of merit,” together with “the doing of harm toward father and mother with a mind whether light or weighty,” then “all such are included in settled action, and the rest are not certainly to be experienced.” First ask: what have these five places in common? The first three are extremes of mind (utterly defiled, utterly pure, utterly habitual), the latter two extremes of field (the most excellent field, the weightiest kindness). The easy error: to suppose that only great evil forms a settled action. A mind utterly pure forms a settled action just the same. Where this lands: this item gives the practitioner a very practical application — to make a wholesome action settled, work upon these five: the purely pure mind, constant doing, and arising toward a field of merit.

〔16.2〕Who the field of merit is. The treatise explains itself, “what is called a field of merit means the Buddha, the dharma, and the assembly, or a superior person, that is, one who has obtained a superior fruit or a superior absorption.” First ask: why is “a superior person” reckoned in as well? Because what makes a field a field is its virtue, not its formal station. The easy error: to identify the field of merit with the institutional assembly. The treatise says expressly that one who has obtained a superior fruit or absorption is such a field too. Where this lands: this sentence is at the same time a warning — harm or benefit done toward one who has virtue has a settled retribution, whatever his name and rank.

〔16.3〕Why father and mother are listed separately. The treatise says on purpose “or the doing of harm toward father and mother with a mind whether light or weighty,” placing it beside the field of merit. First ask: father and mother have not necessarily a superior fruit or absorption; why are they listed with the field of merit? Because what is spoken with regard to here is not virtue but kindness. The easy error: to class father and mother under the field of merit. The treatise sets it up as a separate item. Where this lands: here the treatise sets the two lines of “virtue” and “kindness” side by side as the objects of settled action, an establishing at once most economical and most weighty.

XVII. What Action Certainly Draws On a Result in the Present Life

〔17.1〕Superiority of field and superiority of intent: two reports. The treatise adduces two matters. For superiority of field — “by the field being superior, it is heard that there was a bhikṣu who within the assembly spoke the speech of a woman, and who in the present life was turned into a woman” — and it says “reports of this class are not one only.” For superiority of intent — “by the intent being superior, it is heard that there was a eunuch who, because he rescued a number of oxen from the eunuch’s business, was in the present life turned into a man.” First ask: what do these two reports prove? They prove that the swiftness of retribution hangs upon the superiority of the field and of the intent, and not upon the size of the deed. The easy error: to read these two as tales of the marvelous. They are instances adduced by the treatise itself. Where this lands: a single sentence uttered within the assembly, and a single act of rescuing oxen, both have their retribution in the present life — and this is the weight that this section would have the reader remember.

〔17.2〕The third condition is the most winding and must be read slowly. The treatise says “or one born in this level who leaves behind the defilement of this level forever, of the wholesome and unwholesome actions within this level,” if the action be “settled as to maturation and unsettled as to stage,” “this action must draw on a result in the present life.” First ask: why should leaving behind the defilement of this level forever turn an action into one experienced in the present life? Because after leaving the defilement behind he is no longer born into this level, and if this action is not experienced in this life there is no place where it can be experienced. The treatise then makes the other two cases plain as well: if it be an action conducive to being certainly experienced at some other stage, then such a man “certainly has no principle of leaving defilement behind forever”; and if even the maturation be unsettled, then “because he leaves defilement behind forever he does not experience the maturation.” The easy error: to run the three cases together. Where this lands: this is the most tightly reasoned little passage in the fascicle, and its method is first to fix the settledness or unsettledness of the action, then to look at whether the man has left defilement behind, the two crossing to yield three conclusions.

XVIII. Toward Which Fields an Action Raised Has Its Result Experienced at Once

〔18.1〕The five fields are all the moment of ‘having just come out.’ The treatise says “what is called a field of merit means the assembly headed by the Buddha; and by the distinction of persons there are five” — one risen from the absorption of cessation, from non-contention, from the absorption of loving-kindness, from the path of seeing, from the path of cultivation. First ask: why is the stress on “risen”? Because that is the moment when merit is newly complete and the continuum is just pure. Of one risen from the absorption of cessation, “the stillness of this absorption resembles nirvāṇa,” and when the mind first arises upon rising it is “as though one had entered nirvāṇa and come out again”; of those risen from non-contention and from loving-kindness, at the time of rising “the continuum of the body is perfumed and cultivated by boundless and most excellent merits and so proceeds”; of those risen from the paths of seeing and of cultivation, having cut off the afflictions forever and obtained a superior transformation of the support, “upon rising a pure bodily continuum arises.” The easy error: to suppose that it is the standing of these persons in themselves that makes the field superior. What the treatise ties it to is the very moment of rising from that absorption or that contemplation. Where this lands: this also explains the division at the end of the passage — “as for the time of rising from the remaining absorptions and fruits, since the absorption cultivated beforehand is not especially superior and the afflictions abandoned through cultivation are not yet utterly cut off, that continuum is not a superior field of merit.”

〔18.2〕Non-contention and loving-kindness: two absorptions taking boundless sentient beings as their object. The treatise says of the absorption of non-contention that it “takes boundless sentient beings as its object, with a dominant disposition of benefiting attending upon it,” and of the absorption of loving-kindness that it “takes boundless sentient beings as its object, with a dominant disposition of gladdening attending upon it.” First ask: in which single word do the two differ? The one is “benefiting,” the other “gladdening.” The easy error: to make non-contention and loving-kindness one and the same thing. Where this lands: this pairing repays much pondering — to benefit is to draw out their suffering and affliction, to gladden is to give them pleasure; and the treatise divides them as two absorptions.

〔18.3〕Both harm and benefit are experienced at once. The treatise says “if there be an action of harm or of benefit toward them, this action must necessarily draw its result at once.” First ask: why are harm and benefit spoken of together? Because a field as a field is neutral — it makes the results of both the wholesome and the unwholesome side the swifter. The easy error: to take the field of merit only for a place where merit is sown. Where this lands: this is the sentence in this section most to be remembered — before the most excellent of fields the result of an unwholesome action is likewise the swiftest.

XIX. Mental Feeling and Bodily Feeling: The Difference in the Feeling Drawn On by Action

〔19.1〕Action without applied thought draws on mental feeling alone, and the reason is a single sentence. The treatise says “wholesome action without applied thought means all the wholesome action from the intermediate absorption up to the summit of existence,” and that of these those that can draw on a maturation of feeling “should be known to draw on mental feeling and not bodily,” the reason being “because bodily feeling must arise together with applied and sustained thought.” First ask: why must bodily feeling be together with applied and sustained thought? Because bodily feeling is affiliated to the five consciousnesses, and the levels where the five consciousnesses are must have applied and sustained thought; from the intermediate absorption up there are no longer applied and sustained thought, and so there is no bodily feeling to be drawn on. The easy error: to suppose that the higher realms have no bodily feeling because they have no body. The reason the treatise gives is the absence of applied and sustained thought. Where this lands: this item states with the utmost clarity the interlocking of the three, level, consciousness, and feeling.

〔19.2〕Unwholesome action draws on bodily feeling alone, and melancholy is not a maturation. The treatise says of the unwholesome actions that can draw on feeling that they “should be known to draw on bodily feeling and not mental, because an unwholesome cause has painful feeling for its result, and a painful feeling arising together with mind is certainly named melancholy, and melancholy is not a maturation, as was already made out above.” First ask: melancholy too is plainly painful; why does it not count as a maturation? Because melancholy arises in association with discrimination and waits upon deliberation, and does not arise spontaneously, and so is not established as a maturation. Yuanhui here gathers the reasoning of the whole passage very neatly — “this is called action without applied thought, drawing on mental feeling alone. Bodily feeling must arise together with applied and sustained thought, and so action without applied thought does not draw on bodily feeling. As for ‘the unwholesome draws on bodily feeling alone,’ the unwholesome draws on suffering alone, and suffering is in the five consciousnesses, and so it draws on bodily feeling.” The easy error: to read “melancholy is not a maturation” as meaning that melancholy is not painful. It is painful, but it is not the maturation directly drawn on by action. Where this lands: this division is put to use at once in the next section — it is by this that madness of mind does not conflict with “melancholy is not a maturation.”

XX. Madness of Mind: In the Mental Consciousness Alone · Five Causes · The Limit as to Place

〔20.1〕Why madness of mind is in the mental consciousness alone. The treatise says “a sentient being’s madness of mind is in the mental consciousness alone; in the five consciousnesses there is certainly no madness of mind, because the five bodies of consciousness have no discrimination.” First ask: what has madness to do with discrimination? Madness is an inverted discrimination, and the five consciousnesses do not discriminate, and so there is no madness in them to speak of. The easy error: to understand madness of mind as a disorder of the senses. The place the treatise fixes for it is the mental consciousness. Where this lands: this item counteracts a very common misunderstanding — madness and distraction are not in the faculty, not in the object, but in that consciousness which can discriminate.

〔20.2〕The first of the five causes is the maturation of action, and the matters adduced are exceedingly concrete. The treatise says “first, it arises from the sentient being’s own maturation of action,” and lists: making another’s mind mad by drugs and spells; making a man drink poison or liquor he did not wish to drink; displaying a terrible aspect to frighten birds and beasts; setting fierce fires to burn mountains and marshes; making pits and traps to bring beings down; or doing other work to make others lose mindfulness — “by such causes in action he draws on a distinct maturation in a future life that can make his mind mad.” First ask: what have this string of instances in common? All of them take away another’s self-mastery of mind. The easy error: to suppose that only directly driving a man mad draws on this result. The treatise lists them very widely, taking in even the frightening of birds and beasts and the burning of mountains and marshes. Where this lands: this is the neatest correspondence of cause and result in the whole fascicle — he who takes away another’s self-mastery of mind loses his own mind in a later life.

〔20.3〕The remaining four causes: terror, injury, discord, sorrow. The treatise says, second by terror, “that is, non-human beings and the rest display a terrifying form and press upon him”; third by injury, “that is, because by what he has done he has vexed non-human beings and the rest, they out of hatred injure his limbs and joints and thus his mind is made mad”; fourth by discord, “fourth by discord, that is, because within the body the elements of wind, heat, and phlegm contradict one another and the great elements are out of accord, his mind is thus made mad”; fifth by sorrow, “fifth by sorrow, that is, because he has lost those dear to him and the like, the poison of grief winds about his breast and his mind thereupon goes mad, as with Vasiṣṭhā and the rest.” First ask: how do these four causes stand to the first? The first cause is action; the remaining four are present conditions. The easy error: to take the five causes for five causes on one and the same level. One cause lies in a former life, four in the present. Where this lands: this layering matters much — madness of mind may have causes wholly of the present life, and need not be ascribed wholesale to action in a former one.

〔20.4〕A handsome self-correction. The treatise sets itself the difficulty: since madness of mind is allowed to arise from the maturation of action, and mental feeling is not a maturation (the section just above having said “melancholy is not a maturation”), how are the two to be reconciled? The answer is exact — “it was not said that madness of mind is the maturation of action, but only that it is produced by the maturation of action” — the mechanism being “that is, an unwholesome cause in action draws on a maturation of great elements out of balance, and in dependence upon these great elements the mind loses mindfulness, and hence it is spoken of as madness.” First ask: wherein lies the difference of a single word? What is the maturation is the great elements (form); madness of mind is a loss of mindfulness arising in dependence upon the great elements. The easy error: to take “produced by the maturation of action” and “is the maturation of action” for the same thing. Where this lands: this is the most finely reasoned sentence in the fascicle, and the most worth copying out of the whole — what is drawn on is the body; what is produced is the mind.

〔20.5〕The four alternatives of madness and distraction. The treatise makes four alternatives — mad and not distracted is “the undefiled minds of one who is mad,” distracted and not mad is “the defiled minds of one who is not mad,” both mad and distracted is “the defiled minds of one who is mad,” neither mad nor distracted is “the undefiled minds of one who is not mad.” First ask: what does distraction refer to? Distraction here refers to defilement. The easy error: to take madness and distraction for synonyms. The treatise divides them expressly into two matters — one who is mad may have undefiled minds, and one who is not mad may have defiled minds. Where this lands: this set of four alternatives is a stroke of admonition to the reader — not mad and yet defiled in mind is precisely the second of the four.

〔20.6〕The limit as to place, and the bounds set for noble ones. The treatise says “excepting Uttarakuru, the remaining classes of sentient beings of the desire realm may have madness of mind,” and pushes it down layer by layer: even the gods of the desire realm have madness, how much more men and the evil destinies; “the hells are constantly mad, because pressed by much suffering,” for “pressed by painful feelings, they do not even know themselves, much less discriminate right from wrong.” As for noble ones, the treatise says “among the noble ones of the desire realm, the buddhas alone excepted, madness of mind may be had through the great elements being out of accord,” and no madness produced by the maturation of action, the reasons being: if the action be settled it must be experienced first before sanctity can be obtained, and if it be not settled then by the obtaining of sanctity it can be made without result; nor is there terror, “since they have passed beyond the five fears”; nor injury, “since the noble ones have nothing that would draw the dislike of non-human beings and the rest”; nor sorrow, “since they have realized the nature of dharmas.” Yuanhui gathers these four grounds up very neatly — “among the noble ones of the desire realm the Buddha has no madness; the remaining noble ones may have madness of mind through the great elements being at discord. There is no madness produced by maturation, since sanctity has been obtained. Nor is there terror, since they have passed beyond the five fears. Nor injury, since non-human beings revere them. Nor sorrow, since they have realized the nature of dharmas.” First ask: does it detract from the virtue of the noble ones that they may still have madness of mind? It does not — the one cause remaining is only the discord of the great elements, which belongs to the illness of the body and not to the afflictions of the mind. The easy error: to suppose that after the realization of sanctity all madness and distraction cease. The treatise says expressly that only the buddhas are excepted. Where this lands: this item is a great consolation to the practitioner and also a very clear-eyed boundary — the noble ones are free of madness caused by the afflictions, but not of madness caused by the four great elements being out of accord.

XXI. The Three Actions, Crooked, Foul, and Turbid

〔21.1〕The three actions each depend upon one root affliction. The treatise says “the three of body, speech, and mind have each three kinds, namely the crooked, the foul, and the turbid; and in that same order it should be known that they arise in dependence upon flattery, hatred, and greed,” and establishes each name in turn: “that is, the bodily, verbal, and mental actions arising in dependence upon flattery are called crooked action, since they are of the class of the crookedness of flattery”; “the bodily, verbal, and mental actions arising in dependence upon hatred are called foul action, since they are of the class of the foulness of hatred”; and those arising in dependence upon greed are called turbid action, since they are of the class of the turbidity of greed. First ask: why are the three words “crooked,” “foul,” and “turbid” chosen? All three are taken from the appearance of the affliction itself — the mark of flattery is crooked, the mark of hatred is foul, the mark of greed is turbid. The easy error: to suppose that the three names are three grades in the weight of an offense. They are descriptions of three afflictions. Where this lands: Yuanhui here points out that “‘spoken of’ means spoken of in the sūtras,” that is, this set of three names of action comes from the sūtras and is not set up by the author himself; and when one reads in this treatise of ‘speaking of such and such an action,’ one should first ask who the subject of that word ‘speaking’ is.

〔21.2〕The point of closing this fascicle here. Of this stanza only the first half is in this fascicle, the second half belonging to the next. First ask: why draw to a close here? Because the three actions crooked, foul, and turbid are the sixth of the eleven items of “explaining the actions in the sūtras,” and the seventh item, the four actions black and black and the rest, starts a new hearth. The easy error: to take this section for an appendix to the fascicle. It is in fact the winding up of that whole line of gates of action in the second half — from wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate down to the crooked, the foul, and the turbid, the whole way through has been establishing entities for the names of action in the sūtras. Where this lands: link up the eleven sections of the second half of this fascicle and one sees that the author is doing one and the same thing throughout — for every name of action that has occurred in the sūtras, an entity must be given that can be checked.

Further Resonances: A Mirror of the Three Commentaries

The above is the sense of the treatise’s own text in this fascicle. Below, a further section is set up to gather four matters: the adjudications of the three commentaries and their divergences, Saṅghabhadra’s refutations and supplements, the divergences of Paramārtha’s earlier translation, and coordinates for parallel reading. A mirror is not the treatise; it is only looking at the same text by another way of reading. Both are recorded without adjudication, each restored to its own place.

1. Where the Three Commentaries Diverge

A commentary that leaves but one sentence in a general conspectus. The commentaries on this fascicle are in a special situation: Shentai’s commentary is a fragment, and the seven fascicles extant belong to the Chapter on the Elements, the Chapter on the Faculties, and the Chapter on the Worthy and the Noble; the Chapter on Action is wholly wanting, and so there is no line-by-line commentary of Shentai to hang upon this fascicle. The one trace Shentai leaves upon the Chapter on Action is a sentence in the general conspectus of the whole treatise in his first fascicle, “the chapter on action, one hundred thirty-one lines” — a witness to the stanza count, not commentary upon this fascicle. The absence is marked as it stands, and text from other fascicles is not made to stand in for it.

One and the same fascicle, and the three commentators give it three different numbers. Puguang marks “below, the fifth of the main text, the differences in obtaining the three disciplines. Within it, first the sameness and difference of the places from which they are obtained; second sentient beings, limbs, and causes; third the obtaining of the evil and the middling”; Yuanhui marks “from here the fifth of the main text, explaining the differences in obtaining the three disciplines, within which: first the sameness and difference of place and time of obtaining, second sentient beings, limbs, and causes, third the obtaining of the evil and the middling,” all but word for word the same as Puguang save that his “sameness and difference of place and time of obtaining” has one word more; Fabao, however, forms a system of his own, giving “this one stanza below, the ninth of the main text, explaining the places from which the three disciplines are obtained.” And a layer higher up, the divisions of the chapter-level main outline differ as well: Puguang makes three gates, “within this chapter, first the nature of the entity of action, second the explanation of the actions in the sūtras, third miscellaneous explanations of the actions”; Yuanhui likewise three gates with slightly different names, “three gates in all for the stanzas of this chapter: first the nature of the entity of action, second the explanation of the names of the actions, third miscellaneous explanations of the actions”; while Fabao makes four gates, “the main text of this chapter divides into four: first the entity of action, second discipline and the rest, third the actions in the sūtras, fourth miscellaneous explanations of the actions.” What the three contend over is into how many segments one and the same treatise should be cut and what number each segment should bear; both are recorded without adjudication.

Puguang changes two sets of speaker labels within the prose of one and the same stanza. In the first half of the prose of Root 37 Puguang marks “the house of total raising,” “the house of separate raising,” “the author,” and “the Vibhāṣā masters,” and ties the two houses to the correct and the incorrect senses of the Mahāvibhāṣā — “this is in sense the Mahāvibhāṣā’s correct sense, the house that raises the discipline toward sentient beings as a whole” and “this is in sense the Mahāvibhāṣā’s incorrect sense, the house that raises the discipline toward sentient beings severally”; while in the second half of the same passage (the simile of the kinsman and the sheep) and throughout Roots 39 and 40 he changes to marking “the Sautrāntikas” and “the Sarvāstivādins.” This is no oversight in the commentary; it is Puguang varying his way of labeling with the content of the passage. What matters is this: the names “the house of total raising” and “the house of separate raising” are Puguang’s own outline coinages, and the treatise itself has no such names, nor is the same coinage found in Fabao at the same passage. Recorded without adjudication.

Fabao has one layer of arrangement more than Puguang, and one measure more of tone. In the passage on “violent and overbearing” Puguang merely marks the questions and answers round by round; Fabao besides puts it into numbers, “there are two violences: first, explaining a sūtra of definitive meaning so as to make it non-definitive; second, providing those of many afflictions with an occasion for transgressing grave sins.” And at one round Fabao marks “the Sautrāntikas make sport of the Sarvāstivādins” — that word “make sport” carries a tone of appraisal, and no such expression is found in Puguang at the same passage. This character of Fabao’s, of one layer more of arrangement and one measure more of attitude, may be seen a second time in this fascicle: at the passage of the field of salt and alkali, Fabao marks “the treatise, ‘moreover the ṣaṇḍha and the rest’ down to ‘good sprouts and foul weeds’: explaining the ṣaṇḍha and the rest a second time,” pointing out that the text here is making a second statement, and Puguang has no such mark. Recorded without adjudication; the main text of this fascicle does not take up his tone of appraisal.

Puguang alone hands down a judgment of preference. As to whether, after the one-day discipline is relinquished at the passing of the night, non-discipline is obtained or the man is called middling, the treatise merely sets the two masters side by side. Puguang here not only marks out their regional affiliations (the former master being the masters of Gandhāra, the latter the great masters of the treatises of the land of Kaśmīra) but adds the sentence “although that treatise has no appraiser, yet the latter master is to be taken as correct.” The point is this: the Mahāvibhāṣā he relies upon has itself no appraiser’s adjudication, and this “taking the latter master as correct” is Puguang’s own choice, not the position of the treatise. Recorded without adjudication.

Puguang gives two explanations of “the bhikṣu in name and notion” and takes one of them himself. For the first of the four kinds of bhikṣu, Puguang first explains, “his body is that of a layman while his name and title are those of a bhikṣu, hence it is said, the bhikṣu in name and notion,” and then gives another explanation, “a further explanation: by a formal act of one motion and three announcements he obtains the name of full ordination and the rest, and to such a man the name of bhikṣu is given, hence it is said, the bhikṣu in name and notion,” and adjudges the former explanation the better; and he goes on to explain the mendicant bhikṣu, “one gone forth who lives by begging is called the mendicant bhikṣu.” The choice between the two explanations belongs to Puguang himself; recorded without adjudication.

Two places where Puguang alone is detailed, and one where Fabao alone is detailed. On the getting of the name “movement,” Puguang adduces the words of the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle and then gives two explanations of his own; on the establishing of the name “conducive,” Puguang sets up three explanations of his own (with regard to benefit, to what is experienced, to what experiences) — in both places Puguang alone is detailed, and Fabao and Yuanhui do not touch them. Conversely, on whether action conducive to being experienced in the present may be turned aside, Fabao alone adduces the Mahāvibhāṣā and sets out both schools in full: “the masters of similes say: this is not settled, since all action may here be turned aside, and even a deed of immediate retribution may be made to turn,” and “the masters of the Abhidharma treatises say: actions conducive to being experienced in the present life are settled to be experienced in the present life, and hence are called actions conducive to being experienced in the present life,” listing alongside them “some other masters again speak of five kinds of action” and “some other masters again speak of eight kinds of action.” The two schools are here squarely opposed, the treatise itself passes no verdict, and both are recorded without adjudication.

Two small divergences of wording among the three commentaries. First, the treatise has “the action that is secure is named wholesome,” while Yuanhui has “the action that is settled and secure is named wholesome, obtaining a lovely result and relieving the sufferings of beings” — a difference of one character between “secure” and “settled and secure.” Second, at the fifth cause of madness of mind the treatise gives the name as “Vasiṣṭhā and the rest,” while Yuanhui gives “Vasiṣṭhā of the Vāsiṣṭha clan and the rest,” with one character more. Both are recorded only, without adjudication.

2. Saṅghabhadra’s Refutations and Supplementary Explanations

Saṅghabhadra’s two treatises do not give the name of this chapter as “the Analysis of Action,” but as “the Chapter Making Out Action” — the fourth in the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle, the fifth in the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine. To search them by the chapter name of the Kośa is bound to yield a false zero.

The simile of the kinsman and the sheep: Saṅghabhadra takes that objection head on. The treatise here avows for itself, “in matters equal such as these another principle should be sought,” and Saṅghabhadra answers it squarely. He first adduces the instance the author set up — “the Sūtra-master makes here this parallel: if with regard to the future self-body of a sheep and the like non-discipline is obtained toward the present kinsman and the rest, then sheep and the like have in the future the body of kinsmen and the rest, and since toward such a body there is no harming mind, one ought, with regard to the future body of a near kinsman, not to obtain evil discipline toward the present sheep and the like. Parallels such as this are not level in principle: because there is no wholesome disposition, because there is an unwholesome disposition” — and divides them by the breadth or narrowness of the disposition: at the time when one of non-discipline takes it on, his mind is universally set on harming all sentient beings, so that though the deed be aimed at sheep his mind is broad and universal. One meaning and two schools, recorded together, with no judging which prevails.

Whether a grave transgression relinquishes the discipline: Saṅghabhadra brings in a third party. This passage of the Kośa is an exchange between the Sautrāntikas and the Sarvāstivādins; at the same passage Saṅghabhadra brings in the objection of “the Elder” — “the Elder here makes this objection: if it be said that there is none, what moral discipline is there none of? For the name moral discipline, besides denoting the habituation of wholesome and evil discipline, is also seen used in the expressions ‘this wholesome moral discipline’ and ‘evil moral discipline’; what principle does it contradict to speak thus?” — and at once appraises it, “his objection has no deep purport in it,” and does not take it up; while against the author he makes a reconstruction and a counter-reproach, in the words “the Sūtra-master here asks and answers himself: if one who has gravely transgressed is not a bhikṣu, then there ought to be no bhikṣu still in training … ought not the masters of the Abhidharma to say that the Sautrāntikas are certainly men of the utmost violence?” Two points matter: first, that this passage is in fact three houses set forth and not two schools only; second, that Saṅghabhadra’s appraisal is itself the verdict of one house and not the position of the Kośa, and the main text of this fascicle may not take his appraisal for a settled conclusion. Recorded without adjudication.

Whether refining the faculties ought to be set up as a separate condition: an objection the Kośa itself does not answer. The Kośa sets up three conditions for relinquishing the wholesome dharmas without outflows, and Saṅghabhadra objects, “the Sūtra-master here ought to speak of two conditions, since the words ‘obtaining a fruit’ take in the refining of the faculties; for at the stage of refining the faculties one must again obtain a fruit, casting off the dull fruit and the path superior to the fruit” — maintaining that refining the faculties must be accompanied by obtaining a fruit and can be merged into the one condition of obtaining a fruit. The Kośa itself stops at setting up three conditions and does not answer this objection; those who set up a rescue on its behalf are the later commentators: Puguang records “the masters of the Kośa rescue it, saying: the author speaks separately of the two relinquishings, by obtaining a fruit and by refining the faculties, because if it is a relinquishing by obtaining a fruit, it is with regard to a relinquishing of the same class,” and further, “if it is a relinquishing by refining the faculties, it is with regard to a relinquishing of a different class, as the dull path is relinquished in obtaining the sharp; and though at the stage of turning the faculties a fruit must also be obtained, yet since it is not a relinquishing of the same class the name of obtaining a fruit is not given it.” This rescue comes from the commentators and not from the treatise itself; recorded without adjudication.

The name of the sixth condition: Saṅghabhadra holds the Kośa’s naming not close enough. For the sixth condition of relinquishing the middling nonmanifest the Kośa has “relinquished by the breaking down of the wholesome roots.” Saṅghabhadra discusses it: “what of the middling nonmanifest, wholesome and unwholesome? The Sūtra-master in this sense names the sixth condition the cutting off of the wholesome. If it be said so, then the preparatory effort of cutting off the wholesome is also called the cutting off of the wholesome and is a sixth condition; and in that case one ought to say that the preparatory effort of the meditative absorption is also called the meditative absorption, and there would be seven conditions, since within the preparatory effort of the absorption the evil nonmanifest is relinquished. One ought to say that ‘root’ extends to the wholesome and the unwholesome roots, and that the word ‘cutting off’ spoken of is the cutting off of the preparatory effort; and by the cutting off in dependence upon the root there is the sixth condition. This explains the wording of the stanza without fault in principle” — and he puts forward his own positive explanation, “sixth, relinquished by the breaking down in dependence upon the root; that is, when the preparatory effort is raised and the wholesome or the unwholesome is cut off, one relinquishes in each case the nonmanifest drawn forth by that root.” It should be noted that Saṅghabhadra himself concludes, “this explains the wording of the stanza without fault in principle” — he has not denied the Kośa’s six conditions, but only maintains that the name “cutting off in dependence upon the root” be used instead, so as to gather in both the wholesome and the unwholesome root. This is a refining of terminology, not a contradiction in doctrine. Recorded only, without adjudication.

Besides the four marks of settled action, Saṅghabhadra adduces a further set. The Kośa sets up four marks of settled action, and after them Saṅghabhadra adduces separately: “some other master says: whatever is done with a fierce disposition, or where having done it one raises a mind of gladness, or where at all times it is repeatedly habituated, or where it is raised by the force of a superior vow or the force of the thing, is in every case settled.” This set (a fierce disposition, gladness after the doing, habituation, the force of vow and of thing) is another master’s account adduced by Saṅghabhadra, and its character is supplementary, not a counter-refutation; if it is to be used, its attribution must be clear, and it may not be mixed into the four marks of the Kośa itself.

On the term “the commonality of the class,” Saṅghabhadra and Puguang cite all but word for word the same. Saṅghabhadra explains it, “the commonality of the class means the class of men and the like, not the destiny and not the birth, since with regard to destiny and birth the commonalities of intermediate existence and of birth-existence differ”; and what Puguang cites from the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle is all but word for word the same. This is an expository fine explanation and not a debate, and may be used directly to teach the precise sense of these four words.

The Treatise Revealing the Doctrine is a stretch of quiet within the compass of this fascicle. Checking word for word by the marks of counter-refutation habitual to the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle, the six expressions “the Sūtra-master,” “the Elder,” “the appraisal says,” “I now say,” “in principle it certainly cannot be so,” and “in principle it does not hold” all yield zero occurrences in the passage of the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine corresponding to this fascicle; the one sentence found within the passage, “some other master says: if he does not do the deed afresh, there is no condition to make …,” is, on examination, a restatement of a divergent account already present in the Kośa itself, and not new material of debate added by the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine. This is an honest negative proposition, and all it can prove is one thing — that the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine is at this passage a restating condensation, in sharp contrast with the ten and more rounds of exchange in the same passage of the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle; nothing is inferred from it about the reasons for its compilation.

3. The Divergences of Paramārtha’s Earlier Translation

Paramārtha’s Expository Treatise on the Treasury of Abhidharma forms a system of its own in the passage corresponding to this fascicle. What must be known first is the boundary of the passage: the opening sentence of this fascicle reads in Paramārtha’s version, “these three disciplines, namely the prātimokṣa, that produced in absorption, and that without flow — if from this cause one discipline be obtained, are the other two obtained? It is said not. If not, how then? The verse says” — the three disciplines named in one list and the question and answer of one structure, corresponding one to one with Xuanzang’s version; and the closing point is where the explanation of the three actions crooked, coarse, and rough ends, immediately after which it passes over to the four actions black and white. The two versions differ also in the division of fascicles: Paramārtha’s Chapter on Action has four fascicles and Xuanzang’s six, and the passage corresponding to this fascicle straddles two of Paramārtha’s fascicles, its fascicle boundary falling exactly so as to cut Xuanzang’s one stanza Root 51 in half — the first half, “these are settled or unsettled … and settled experiencing is again of three, being experienced in the present and the rest,” standing at the end of Paramārtha’s fascicle eleven, and the second half, “again there are five kinds of action … another master speaks of four alternatives,” at the head of fascicle twelve. Xuanzang’s version for its part has the one stanza Root 60 split across two units. Each version has its instance of a stanza boundary straddling a fascicle boundary; recorded without adjudication.

The renderings form a system of their own. Discipline is rendered protection; non-discipline, non-protection; the nonmanifest, the uninstructive; limb, part; bhikṣu, bhikṣu in the older transcription; intermediate existence, intermediate skandha; applied and sustained thought, awareness and observation; Kaśmīra, Jibin; madness of mind, derangement of mind; the northern continent, Kuru; foul and turbid, coarse and rough; individual liberation is rendered prātimokṣa, while for the one-day observance he uses on the contrary the transcription upavāsa. As to form, Xuanzang gives “the stanza says / the treatise says,” setting out the whole stanza first, while Paramārtha gives “the verse says / the explanation says,” embedding the explanation line by line.

One place happens to afford a collateral witness to a variant reading. For the last of the four kinds of bhikṣu Xuanzang has “the bhikṣu who has broken the afflictions,” and the Taishō collation note gives a further reading “who has broken the discipline”; Paramārtha’s version has “bhikṣus are of four kinds: first the bhikṣu in name, second the self-styled bhikṣu, third the mendicant bhikṣu, fourth the bhikṣu who has broken the afflictions” — and what he relies upon runs the same road as the reading “afflictions.” This is a cross-version collateral witness, and the choosing between the readings belongs to another; here it is only recorded.

One divergence of gathering and dividing is worth noting. For the five fields of merit Xuanzang sets out the path of seeing and the path of cultivation as two and so makes five, while Paramārtha’s version has “the absorption of cessation, non-contention, loving-kindness, and rising from the fruit of an arhat by seeing; the actions of harm or benefit toward them have their result experienced in the present life,” gathering the paths of seeing and cultivation into the single item “the fruit of an arhat by seeing.” All three commentaries follow the fivefold structure of Xuanzang’s version, and no divergent explanation answering to Paramārtha’s gathered account is found. This difference touches whether the number of the five fields is listed alike; recorded without adjudication.

The direction of fullness and brevity is not uniform. In the simile of the palmyra tree Paramārtha’s version has the further phrase “nor will it put forth shoots again,” which Xuanzang’s version lacks; while for the names of the five stages within the womb the characters of transcription differ wholly between the two versions (kalala against kalala otherwise written, arbuda against arbuda otherwise written, peśī against peśī otherwise written, ghana against ghana otherwise written, praśākhā against praśākhā otherwise written), being different transcriptions of one and the same Sanskrit word and no divergence in doctrine. As for the seven characters “the Vibhāṣā masters do not allow this account,” the two versions agree word for word — a rare instance in this fascicle of the two translations coinciding completely.

4. Coordinates for Parallel Reading

The core of what this fascicle makes out is the full compass of the dharma “nonmanifest” on its two sides of obtaining and relinquishing. Its real existence is in this treatise a premise; once one comes to the Yogācāra lineage this premise is expressly cancelled — the Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only puts to the same dharma a counter-question outright: if manifest action is really nonexistent, on what ground is the nonmanifest real? And it sets up another road instead — establishing the nonmanifest conventionally upon the delimitations, wholesome and unwholesome, of volition and aspiration. One and the same name, which the one lineage establishes as a really existent form and discusses in fine detail as to the conditions of its obtaining and relinquishing, while the other adjudges it a conventional establishment upon the delimitations of volition and aspiration. The two lineages part ways, and here the edge shows most; both parties are recorded only, without adjudication.

The gates of action explained in the second half of this fascicle correspond almost item for item in the root treatise of the Yogācāra lineage: action included in discipline, action included in non-discipline, action included in what is neither discipline nor non-discipline, meritorious action, unmeritorious action, immovable action, action conducive to pleasant feeling, action conducive to painful feeling, action conducive to feeling neither painful nor pleasant, action conducive to being experienced in the present life, action conducive to being experienced in the next birth, action conducive to being experienced in a later life, crooked action, foul action, turbid action, pure action, still action — the items of the dharma-numbers are wholly the same in the two lineages, save that that lineage lists after the crooked, foul, and turbid the two further items of pure action and still action, which this fascicle does not have.

Where the name is the same and the criterion differs is in settled and unsettled action. This fascicle judges by the settledness or unsettledness of time and the settledness or unsettledness of maturation; that lineage judges by doing and increasing — the Yogācārabhūmi takes as action conducive to being certainly experienced what is ‘after deliberate volition both done and increased,’ and as action conducive to being uncertainly experienced what is ‘after deliberate volition done but not increased,’ while as to what counts as increasing that treatise sets up a definition of its own, excepting ten kinds of action. This difference may further be read together with the section on madness of mind in this fascicle: among the ten kinds of action excepted in that lineage is one, the action done in madness and distraction — action done in madness and distraction not being reckoned as increased in that lineage, while this fascicle makes out at Root 59 the causes and places of madness of mind. What the two lineages ask is different: the one asks when it is experienced and whether the maturation is settled, the other asks whether it is done and increased. Recorded without adjudication.

The last place is the gathering and dividing of discipline. The discipline of this fascicle is made out as to obtaining and relinquishing only with regard to the three kinds, individual liberation, the meditative absorptions, and that without outflows; the Mahāyāna study of the discipline makes three collections — the Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only, explaining the study of the discipline, makes three divisions: first the discipline of restraint, which is the right separation from the dharmas to be separated from; second the discipline of gathering wholesome dharmas, which is the right cultivation and realization of the dharmas to be cultivated and realized; third the discipline of benefiting sentient beings, which is the right benefiting and gladdening of all sentient beings. There the whole discipline discussed in this fascicle is only the first of the three collections, and the remaining two collections have no answering item in the system of this fascicle. The divergence of gathering and dividing is recorded only.

Before Reading This Unit

The fascicle opens with a single sentence of transition — “again the sūtra says that action is of four kinds.” The three units before it expounded the entity of action (the manifest and the nonmanifest) and expounded from what the three disciplines are obtained; with one sentence the author turns about and begins to explain item by item “those actions spoken of in the sūtras.” The three ancient masters all let the knife of the outline fall at the same place here: Puguang’s Record marks “below, the seventh, explaining the black-and-black and the rest. Within it, first the names and entities of the four actions, second the distinctions in what the actions without outflows cut off, third the recording of divergent accounts”; Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary marks “from here the seventh, explaining the black-and-black and the rest, within it: first the four actions, second the cutting off by the action without outflows, third the divergent accounts”; Fabao’s Commentary marks “from here below there are four and a half stanzas, the eighth, explaining the four actions black and black and the rest spoken of in the sūtras” — the three divided their fascicles independently and yet the boundary is identical in all, whence it appears that this cut was not forced upon the text by later men but is a mouth opened by the treatise itself.

This fascicle divides into two stretches. The first is short, and is the winding up of four sets of numbered dharmas from the sūtras: the four actions black and white, the volition without outflows that can exhaust the actions, the three munis and the three purities, the three kinds of evil conduct and the three kinds of good conduct. The second is long, running from the sentence “again the sūtra says: there are ten paths of action” down to the end of the fascicle — and that is the most finely worked stretch on conduct in the whole Abhidharmakośa, and the center of gravity of this fascicle. At this sentence the three ancient masters again let the knife fall together: Puguang’s Record marks “below, the tenth, explaining the ten paths of action,” Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary marks “from here the tenth, explaining the ten paths of action,” Fabao’s Commentary marks “the eleventh, explaining the ten paths of action”; and the six subsections they open (the nature of the entity of a path of action, the sense of the name path of action, the cutting off of the wholesome roots taken up as convenient, the paths of action turning together, the completing of a path of action with respect to a place, and the three results of the paths of action) are one by one the same in all three.

There is one thing to be said before all else. This fascicle reads like the fine print of the discipline, but what it asks is always in fact one and the same question: at what degree does an act truly become a path of action? The author’s way of answering is to take an act apart into three stretches (preparatory, root, and consequent), and then to ask by what mind each of these three is set going, in what place it arises, by what root it is completed, and what conditions must be complete for it to count as “not by mistake.” Every detail in the fascicle hangs upon this one table. As one reads, it is worth turning back from time to time to ask: this present item — which of the three stretches is it speaking of?

I. The Four Actions Black and White: The Four Pairings of Action and Result

First ask: the sūtra divides action into the four of black-black, white-white, black-and-white, and neither-black-nor-white; what is this “black and white” saying? Is it speaking of the color of an action, or of something else?

The treatise answers quite plainly that it is speaking of two matters: first, the kind of result that the action draws; second, what is to be counteracted and what counteracts. The four actions are established one by one thus — unwholesome action is called black without exception, because its nature is defiled, and its result too is black, because it is not agreeable: “all unwholesome action is called black without exception, because its nature is defiled; and the maturation is likewise black, because it is not agreeable”; wholesome action of the form realm is called white without exception, because it is not mingled with evil action, and its result too is white, because it is agreeable: “wholesome action of the form realm is called white without exception, because it is not mingled with evil; and the maturation is likewise white, because it is agreeable”; wholesome action of the desire realm is called black-and-white, because it is mingled with the evil; and action without outflows is called neither black nor white, because it is undefiled and because it does not draw a white maturation.

Clearing a misreading: supposing that some one action is of itself both black and white. The treatise blocks this road in particular — “this name black-and-white is established with respect to a continuum, and not with respect to intrinsic nature” — the reason being that “there is no single action and no single maturation that is black and also white, since they are mutually opposed.” Black-and-white is said with respect to the mingling of wholesome and evil across a whole stretch of the stream of life; it is not said of the entity of some one thought-moment of action. Puguang’s Record here marks the outline of question and answer, marking the objection the author raises for himself as “‘is not the result of evil action’ down to ‘be called white-black’: the question,” and marking the answer as “‘the result of unwholesome action’ down to ‘the evil prevails over the wholesome’: the answer”; Fabao’s Commentary on the same passage marks them as “an objection” and “an answer” — the outline names differ while the division is entirely the same.

Where it lands: this item gives the first measuring-rod for reading the treatise on action — whenever one meets the question “is this action wholesome or evil,” one must first divide the question into three layers: the intrinsic nature of the action, the result of the action, and the stretch of continuum in which the action stands. Each of the three layers has its own answer, and to mix them is to be entangled without fail.

II. That Portion of Volition without Outflows Which Can Exhaust the Actions: Twelve, One, and Four

First ask: since action without outflows can exhaust the former three actions, is every portion of action without outflows able to exhaust them?

The treatise answers: no. What can exhaust them are those few thought-moments of volition at particular stages. The four receptivities to the cognition of dharma in the path of seeing, together with the first eight uninterrupted paths at the stage of becoming free from the defilement of desire in the path of cultivation, make twelve volitions and exhaust the purely black action alone; the one volition of the ninth uninterrupted path for becoming free from the defilement of the desire realm exhausts both the black-and-white and the purely black; and the ninth uninterrupted path for becoming free from the defilement of the four meditative absorptions, one level each, makes four volitions that cause the purely white action alone to come to an end.

Why can that ninth thought-moment exhaust two actions at once? The treatise gives the reason itself: at that thought-moment the wholesome dharmas of the desire realm are cut off altogether (the black-and-white action being wholesome action of the desire realm), and at the same time the unwholesome of the ninth grade is cut off (the remainder of the purely black).

Clearing a misreading: supposing that wholesome dharmas are “cut off in their own entity.” The treatise says expressly that they are not — wholesome dharmas are not cut off in their intrinsic nature, and once cut off they may still come to be present; what is called cutting off wholesome dharmas is that, at the time when the afflictions that take them as object are exhausted, they obtain release from bondage. Fabao’s Commentary here divides the two kinds of cutting off most clearly, his words being “these twelve above are all cutting off in intrinsic nature and not cutting off as object … cutting off one portion of the black is the cutting off of the mingled action entire; the black is cut off both in intrinsic nature and as object, while the white is cut off as object alone”; Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary sets up another name for the same sense, giving “explanation: cutting off the bond of the object means that wholesome dharmas with outflows are bound by the afflictions, and when the nine grades of affliction that take them as object are cut off and exhausted, the wholesome dharmas obtain release from bondage, and this is called cutting off the bond of the object” — cutting off as object and cutting off the bond of the object are two names for one and the same sense.

Where it lands: on reading the word “cut off,” ask first what is being cut off — the entity, or the binding. This one question will be in use all the way on through the Chapter on the Latent Tendencies and the Chapter on the Worthy and the Noble.

III. Two Further Ways of Dividing: Experienced in the Hells, and Abandoned by Seeing

First ask: apart from the division above, are there other ways of dividing the black and the mingled (the black-and-white)?

Here the treatise records two parties. The first divides by the place where the result is experienced: action to be experienced in the hells is purely black (because the maturation of the hells is drawn by the unwholesome alone), and action of the desire realm apart from the hells is black-and-white (because those maturations are drawn by both the wholesome and the evil). The second divides by the stage of cutting off: action of the desire realm abandoned by seeing is purely black (what is abandoned by seeing has no wholesome to be mingled with it), and what is abandoned by cultivation in the desire realm is action that is both (having both wholesome and unwholesome).

Clearing a misreading: supposing that because the author records two parties he is being vague. He is not — this is the form of the treatise: wherever there is a divergent account and no express text of scripture, both parties are recorded. And these two parties are not in conflict; only their manner of cutting differs: the one cuts at where the result falls, the other at the stage where the affliction is cut off. The three commentaries agree in their judgment here, all marking this passage as “recording divergent accounts” and not as question and answer — Puguang’s Record gives “this is the third, recording divergent accounts,” and Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary gives “from here the third, recording divergent accounts.”

Where it lands: hereafter, whenever one reads “one account says … another account says …,” do not hasten to find which is the right answer; see first where each party has laid its weight. To fail to distinguish the manner of cutting is to take two different measuring-rods for one.

IV. The Three Munis and the Three Purities: Why a Muni Takes Mind and Not Action

First ask: the three munis are the three of body, speech, and mind; why do the first two take “action” while the third takes “mind” itself and not mental action?

The treatise gives two reasons. The first, “the muni in the ultimate sense has mind alone for its entity” — true silent stillness lies in the mind, and the mark of mind is hard to display and can only be inferred from the two actions of body and speech. The second, the two actions of body and speech are entities of keeping away, while mental action is not, because mental action has no nonmanifest. Hence “it is from the sense of keeping away that the name muni is established” — that is, it is just this mind which, by means of the two actions of body and speech, has something it keeps away from, and thereby gets the name.

The gloss on the two graphs of the word muni is word for word the same in the three commentaries: Puguang’s Record gives “muni, which here means silent stillness”; Fabao’s Commentary gives “muni, which here means silent stillness. The two actions of body and speech of one beyond learning are called the muni of body and the muni of speech. The muni of mind is the mind of one beyond learning, and not mental action. For the truly real muni is mind alone, and the two actions of body and speech are what the mind is inferred from; and what infers and what is inferred are together named muni”; Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary gives “explanation: as for muni, it here means silent stillness. ‘The bodily and verbal action of one beyond learning’ means the two munis of body and speech. ‘That is, the mind’ is the third, the muni of mind. That is, the mind itself is named muni, and not mental action.” The three transmit one gloss alike, whence it appears that this is no private reading of any one of them.

And again ask: why is a muni found only at the stage beyond learning? The treatise answers, “why is a muni found only at the stage beyond learning? Because the arhat is the true muni, the speech of all the afflictions being forever stilled” — silent stillness is not the not-speaking of words; it is the forever stilling of the speech of the afflictions.

Clearing a misreading: taking the three purities and the three munis for two separate sets of things. The treatise says that the three purities are just the three kinds of good conduct, and the ground of their name is “because they keep away, whether for a time or forever, from all evil conduct and from the grime of the afflictions, they are called purities” — the one takes its name from “keeping away” and the other from “stilling,” and what they point at is two faces of one and the same thing. And why the author must speak of these two he explains himself: it is to put a stop to the false munis and false purities reckoned upon by sentient beings.

Where it lands: this section is one of the rare stretches in the fascicle that points squarely at the fruit. The four actions above were an accounting of the flowing on; here of a sudden the figure of the stage beyond learning is set up — and all the details of the ten paths of action that follow are in the end to come back to this one word, “keeping away.”

V. The Three Kinds of Evil Conduct and the Three Kinds of Good Conduct: Do Greed, Hatred, and Wrong View Count as Mental Action

First ask: why is mental evil conduct of three kinds and not merely mental action?

The treatise says: all unwholesome bodily, verbal, and mental action is called in order the three kinds of evil conduct — “all unwholesome bodily, verbal, and mental action is called in order bodily, verbal, and mental evil conduct”; and mental evil conduct has besides the three of greed, hatred, and wrong view, which are not mental action. The reason is “because greed and the rest have an entity of their own apart from volition” — mental action has volition for its entity, while greed, hatred, and wrong view are afflictions and have an intrinsic nature of their own.

Here begins the first exchange of the unit. The masters of similes state their tenet, saying “greed, hatred, and wrong view are just mental action,” and quote the Sūtra on Volition in proof. The Vaibhāṣikas object: if that were so, action and affliction would be combined into one entity. The masters of similes answer: to grant that an affliction is just mental action — what fault is there in this? The Vaibhāṣikas refute them: the treatise records their words as “the Vaibhāṣika masters say that they speak thus without reason,” and says that to allow this would be at odds with many principles and teachings; while as for why the sūtra speaks of these three as mental action, it is to display that volition turns with them for its gate, that it can thereby draw an unlovely result, and that it is what the discerning reproach and abhor.

Clearing a misreading: reading “the Vaibhāṣika masters say that they speak thus without reason” as the author’s own verdict. The subject of that sentence is the Vaibhāṣika masters and not the author — here the treatise is recording one party’s refutation and is not passing sentence of its own. (For the school attribution of this passage and for Saṅghabhadra’s other way of reading this sentence, see the section of Further Resonances at the end.)

And a further question: since right view and wrong view have no deliberate volition “to benefit another, to harm another,” how do they count as wholesome or evil? The treatise answers, “because they can serve as the root of harm and of benefit” — they are the root of all conduct of harm and of benefit. Puguang’s Record sets up no separate outline mark at this sentence and explains it simply as the text runs.

Where it lands: this section gives the first cut that divides the boundary between “action” and “affliction.” Hereafter, whenever one meets the question “is such and such a mental factor an action,” ask first: does it have an entity of its own apart from volition?

VI. The Ten Paths of Action: Taking Only the Coarse and Evident Portion from Evil and Good Conduct

First ask: what is the relation of the ten paths of action to the three kinds of evil conduct and the three kinds of good conduct? Are they one and the same set, or is the one wide and the other narrow?

The treatise answers straight out: “within the evil conduct and good conduct spoken of above, whatever is coarse, evident, and easily known is gathered in as the ten paths of action” — the ten paths of action are that portion of evil and good conduct which is “coarse, evident, and easily known,” and not the whole. Hence drinking liquor, seizing, beating, and binding within bodily evil conduct, together with every preparatory and consequent stage, do not enter the bodily evil paths of action; the verbal evil paths of action do not gather in the preparatory and consequent stages nor the slight portion; the mental evil paths of action do not gather in evil volitions nor slight greed and the rest. It is the same on the wholesome side: abstaining from liquor and making offerings do not enter the bodily wholesome paths of action, kindly speech does not enter the verbal wholesome paths of action, and the wholesome volitions do not enter the mental wholesome paths of action.

Why cut it in this way? The treatise gives the criterion itself: if bodily evil conduct makes another sentient being lose his life, his goods, or his wife, then it is spoken of as a path of action, while the rest is not established “because the preparatory stage and the rest are not coarse and evident.” Puguang’s Record states this reason still more plainly, his words being “‘evil conduct and good conduct?’: the question. ‘Let the unwholesome be spoken of first’ down to ‘because men are to be made to keep away’: the answer follows below. Let the unwholesome be spoken of first: the bodily evil paths of action, as regards bodily evil conduct, do not gather in the preparatory stage, the consequent stage, or the remaining unwholesome bodily actions, that is, drinking liquor, or seizing, or beating, or binding, and the like. Or where killing and the like are done but a condition is lacking and it is not completed. Because the preparatory stage and the rest are not coarse and evident, they are not named paths of action.”

Clearing a misreading: supposing that not to enter the paths of action is the same as being without offense. It is nothing of the kind — drinking liquor and beating and binding are still unwholesome bodily actions and still draw their results; they are simply not on this coarse and evident list. The list is a teaching instrument set up “to make men keep away,” and is not the boundary between offense and no offense.

Where it lands: the ten paths of action are a coarse net for teaching. In reading it one must remember how wide the mesh is — whatever falls through the mesh is not thereby absent; it is only lodged elsewhere.

VII. The Manifest and the Nonmanifest in the First Seven Paths of Action: The Watershed of Doing It Oneself and Dispatching Another

First ask: do the first seven paths of action (three of body and four of speech) all necessarily have both the manifest and the nonmanifest?

The treatise answers that they do not, and gives a very fine boundary. Six among the evil paths of action necessarily have the nonmanifest — “among the seven evil paths of action, six necessarily have the nonmanifest”; if these six are done by dispatching another, then at the time when the root path of action is completed there is no manifest action in oneself (the act being another’s), and so there is the nonmanifest alone; if they are done by oneself, then both are present, but this depends on the timing of the death: if the other dies at the moment the manifest act is set going, both are present; if he dies only some time after the hand was laid to it, then it is the same as dispatching a messenger, and at the completion of the root there is the nonmanifest alone. Sexual misconduct alone necessarily has both, because it must be brought to completion by one’s own body and cannot be deputed to another — and the treatise uses a very direct simile: as one’s own delight (delight cannot be produced by deputy).

On the wholesome side: the seven wholesome paths of action that arise from taking up the precepts necessarily have both, because the śīla born of taking them up must arise in dependence upon the manifest act (the formal procedure of taking up the precepts); while those gathered in by the discipline of meditative absorption and the discipline without outflows are called produced in absorption, and have the nonmanifest alone, because they are obtained in dependence upon the force of mind alone.

Clearing a misreading: reading “dispatching another, with no manifest action in oneself” as “dispatching another is a lighter offense.” What the treatise is speaking of here is only whether there is manifest action, not the weight of the offense; the root path of action is completed all the same, and the nonmanifest arises all the same.

Where it lands: this section is the first place in the fascicle where two measuring-rods, “doing it oneself / dispatching another” and “dying then and there / dying later,” are used to cut an act. These two rods will be used again — in the passages on dying together and dying first, and on acting as one in an army, the same set of knife-strokes is at work.

VIII. Preparatory · Root · Consequent: The Stretch of Road Walked by the Butcher of Sheep

First ask: where does an act of killing begin, and at what point is it truly completed?

The treatise answers with the most famous simile in the fascicle. The butcher of sheep: he first raises the thought of killing and rises, takes the price and goes straight to the place where sheep are sold, “feels the body of the sheep, pays the price and takes hold of it, leads it back and feeds it, drives it into the slaughterhouse,” takes staff or knife in hand and beats or stabs it, once and again, until the sheep’s life is not yet ended — “all this is called the preparatory stage of killing.” Following upon this manifest act the sheep just then ends its life, and the manifest and nonmanifest action of that single moment is what alone is “the manifest and nonmanifest action within that single moment, and this is called the root path of action of killing.” Thereafter the nonmanifest continuing on unbroken is called the consequent stage of killing, and so on to the later flaying, cutting, dressing, and washing, and “the weighing, the selling, the cooking, the eating, and the praising of its savor,” all of which are likewise the consequent stage.

The treatise moreover points out the two conditions on which the root path of action is established: “by two conditions are sentient beings touched by the offense of killing that belongs to the root path of action: first by the preparatory stage, second by the fullness of the result.” The preparatory stage necessarily has the manifest, while the nonmanifest may or may not be present (if set going by a violent entanglement or a mind of pure sincerity, it is present); the consequent stage is the reverse of the foregoing, necessarily having the nonmanifest while the manifest may or may not be present.

Within this passage there is the finest of the dilemmas. The author raises a question against himself: is the path of action completed while the one killed is abiding in the existence of death, or only after his death? Both horns have their fault — if it be said to be completed while he abides in the existence of death, then the case where killer and killed die at the same time ought likewise to complete a path of action, which our own school does not allow; if it be said to be completed only after his death, then the earlier sentence “following upon this manifest act, that sheep just then ends its life … this is called the root path of action of killing” contradicts itself, and besides it would do violence to the Vaibhāṣika masters’ explanation of the root treatise’s words “the preparatory stage is not yet stilled.” The author answers for himself: it should be said that it is with regard to the root stage that the words “preparatory stage” are used, for our own school allows that after the ending of life the root is not yet stilled, and said thus there is no fault. Puguang’s Record marks expressly here who it is that answers, his text being “‘what is meant here by there is no fault’: the question. ‘It is using the words preparatory stage with regard to the root’: the author answers”; Fabao’s Commentary likewise marks “the words preparatory stage: the author sets it right” — the two commentaries agree, and this answer is the author’s own explanation and not the Vaibhāṣika masters’.

And a further question: since the manifest action at that time has no function any longer, how can it still become the root path of action? The author answers with great firmness: the completion of a path of action is not by reason of having a function, but only because, at the time when the preparation and the fullness of the result are present, the manifest and the nonmanifest together become the root path of action.

And a further layer: the several paths of action may serve one another as preparatory and as consequent. The treatise takes killing for its example and ranges the ten paths of action one by one as the preparation for killing (killing living beings to petition for aid, stealing goods to fund the killing, fornicating with the wife so that she may kill her husband, setting going the four faults of speech to breed suspicion and estrangement, greed for his goods, hatred toward the man, raising a wrong view to nourish the act of killing), and then ranges the putting to death of his kin, the taking of his goods, the fornicating with the woman he loved, and the raising in turn of greed, hatred, and wrong view as the consequent stage of killing. And the three of greed and the rest cannot serve as a preparatory stage, because “at the time of raising the thought the deed has not yet been done.”

Clearing a misreading: supposing that preparatory, root, and consequent are merely three stretches in time. They are not — they are the three stretches to which the offense is attached: the nonmanifest set going at the preparatory stage may or may not be present, the single moment of the root stage is where the offense is completed, and the nonmanifest of the consequent stage continues on unbroken. The responsibility for an act is not gathered at a single point; it is distributed along this whole line.

Where it lands: this passage is the one in the fascicle that most deserves slow reading. It takes “a thing was done” apart into a line that has a starting point, a joining point, and a residual momentum; and only when this line is understood do all the details of the ten paths of action that follow have anything to hang upon.

IX. The Preparation Arises from the Three Unwholesome Roots: Twelve Roads for Killing, Stealing, and Fornication

First ask: by what mind is the preparation for a path of action set going?

The treatise answers: “when the preparatory stage of an unwholesome path of action arises, in every case it arises from the three unwholesome roots” — said with respect to the prior raising (the thought that draws it forth beforehand). Then it gives instances one by one, killing, stealing, and fornication each arising from greed, from hatred, and from delusion, making nine roads in all, with the four verbal paths of action to be inferred on the same model.

Killing arising from greed: for the sake of obtaining parts of the other’s body, for goods, for sport, for rescuing kin, friends, and oneself. Arising from hatred: raising wrath in order to be rid of an enemy. The set arising from delusion is the most worth looking at: killing within a sacrifice in the belief that it accords with the Dharma; kings and the like putting the villainous to death according to the laws of the world in the belief that great merit is accomplished; the people of Persia saying that when parents are old and ill, to have them end their lives frees them from distress and produces great merit; the non-Buddhists saying that snakes, scorpions, wasps, and the like are venomous and harmful things and that killing them produces merit, and that sheep, deer, and buffalo were from the first prepared for food and so are killed without offense; and killing by reason of wrong view.

For stealing and for fornication the three roots are likewise given with several instances: stealing arising from delusion, as when kings confiscate the goods of evil men according to law in the belief that there is no offense, or as when brahmins say that the goods of the beginning of the aeon were bestowed by the great Brahmā upon the brahmin seers and that to take them back today is to take one’s own; fornication arising from delusion, as in praising the practice of what is not the pure life with one’s mother and the like, as in the keeping of the cow-observance within the cow-sacrifice, “drinking water and cropping grass, standing or walking, coupling as they meet without distinction of near kin or stranger,” and as when non-Buddhists say that all women are like a mortar, a flower or fruit, and so on to a bridge or a boat, and are to be enjoyed in common.

Clearing a misreading: reading “arising from delusion” as “a fault committed unwittingly.” Just the contrary — the instances of delusion that the treatise adduces are one and all acts of killing, stealing, and fornication that have a whole body of reasoning behind them: the reasoning of sacrifice, the reasoning of law, the reasoning of filial care, the reasoning of religion. Delusion is not muddle-headedness; it is a wrong train of reasoning.

Where it lands: this section is the most piercing in the fascicle. It reminds the reader that the evil action hardest to detect is not the one committed on impulse, but the kind that has reasons, institutions, and scriptures propping it up. When the thought “this is what ought to be done” rises in one’s own mind, that is precisely the moment to turn back and check this passage once more.

X. A Stanza of Exemptions from a Non-Buddhist Treatise: Jest, Marriage, Saving Life and Saving Goods

First ask: what does the preparation for false speech arising from delusion look like?

The treatise does not make an instance of its own but quotes straight from a treatise of the non-Buddhists a stanza in proof — “if a man, by reason of jest, by reason of marriage, by reason of facing a woman or a king, or for the sake of saving life or saving goods, speaks false speech, that is without offense.” The text preceding this stanza is marked as “as for the preparation for false speech that is produced from delusion, it is as is said in a treatise of the non-Buddhists,” and so it is neither spoken by the Buddha nor made by the author, but the words of a quoted non-Buddhist treatise.

What this stanza says: it lists four classes of exemption and holds that to speak false speech on these four occasions is without offense. The treatise quotes it precisely in order to point out that such a claim is itself delusion, and that the false speech set going in reliance upon such a claim has a preparation arising from delusion. Besides this, the treatise says that all the preparations for false speech, divisive speech, and the rest that arise by reason of wrong view are produced from delusion; and that the several Vedas and the other false treatises are gathered in by frivolous speech, their preparations likewise produced from delusion.

Clearing a misreading: reading this stanza as an exemption allowed by the treatise. It is not — it is quoted as a specimen for the contrary. The touchstone that tells a quoted stanza from a root stanza is precisely that preceding sentence, “as is said in a treatise of the non-Buddhists.”

And a further question: since greed, hatred, and wrong view have no preparation, how can they be said to arise from greed and the rest? The author answers for himself: because they are produced from the three roots without interval — the path of action of greed being produced from greed without interval, and likewise from the other two roots, and hatred and wrong view in the same way. Puguang’s Record marks the words of this answer as “‘the same’: the answer. It is not that when the root of the paths of action is completed, all of them are brought to completion by the three roots.”

Where it lands: whenever one reads a piece of reasoning that excuses some kind of false speech, ask first where it came from. The method the treatise demonstrates here is very simple: quote that whole body of reasoning out in full, and then point out which of the three unwholesome roots it falls upon.

XI. All Three Stages of the Wholesome Paths of Action Arise from the Three Wholesome Roots: That One Act of Karman at the Taking of the Precepts

First ask: from what roots do the three stages of the wholesome paths of action arise? Are they too apportioned one by one, as with the unwholesome?

The treatise answers more simply than for the unwholesome: all three wholesome stages (preparatory, root, and consequent) arise from the three wholesome roots of non-greed, non-hatred, and non-delusion. There are two reasons: all three wholesome stages are raised by a wholesome mind, and a wholesome mind is necessarily associated with the three wholesome roots.

What do these three stages look like? The treatise says that they are the keeping away from the three unwholesome stages — keeping away from the evil preparation is the wholesome preparation, keeping away from the evil root is the wholesome root, keeping away from the evil consequent is the wholesome consequent. Then it gives the one instance of a wholesome path of action in the whole fascicle: when a diligent trainee receives the full precepts, entering the ordination platform, paying homage to the assembly of bhikṣus, uttering with all sincerity the request to his preceptor, and so on to the one motion and two announcements of karman and the rest, all is the preparatory stage of the wholesome path of action; the manifest and nonmanifest action of the single moment at which the third announcement of karman is completed is the root path of action; and from that point on, down to the declaring of the four resorts and the manifest and nonmanifest action that continues on and turns along in dependence upon what went before, all is the consequent stage. Puguang’s Record here marks the outline of question and answer, giving “‘what are the marks of these three wholesome stages’: the question.”

Clearing a misreading: supposing that the constituting of a wholesome path of action is looser than that of an evil one. It is not loose at all — it likewise requires the three stages complete, and likewise requires the root to be completed at one determinate moment; and the very reason the taking of the precepts must have an ordination platform, an assembly, and the successive announcements of karman is that the moment of “the third announcement of karman being finished” has a real sense in it, and is no mere ceremony.

Where it lands: this section stands in exact contrast with the passage of the butcher of sheep — one and the same structure of three stages, used on the one side to take an act of killing apart and on the other to establish a hall of the precepts. If the reader would remember the skeleton of this fascicle, these two instances are enough.

XII. By Which Root Completion Comes: Hatred for Three, Greed for Three, Delusion for One, All Three for the Rest

First ask: the preparation arises from the three roots; does “completion” (the very moment at which a path of action is truly constituted) likewise come by all three roots?

The treatise answers: no. Completion has an apportionment of its own — “among the evil paths of action, the three paths of action of killing, harsh speech, and hatred are completed by hatred,” because these three are constituted only when the extremely coarse and evil mind “that spares nothing” is present; the three of taking what is not given, sexual misconduct, and greed are completed by greed, because they are constituted only when the extremely defiled mind “that clings to something” is present; wrong view is completed by delusion, requiring delusion of the highest grade to be present; and the three of false speech, divisive speech, and frivolous speech are granted completion by all three roots, each by each.

What is most worth looking at here is that pair of contrasts: “sparing nothing” and “clinging to something.” Killing, abusing, and hating are a disregarding both of the other and of oneself; stealing, fornicating, and coveting are a clinging — a regard for the thing one would obtain. Both alike are the extremely weighty mind of the stage of completion, but the one is a casting away and the other a taking hold.

Clearing a misreading: confounding the root of the preparation with the root of the completion. The treatise separates the two from the outset: the preparation “in every case arises from the three unwholesome roots,” whereas the completion has its several attachments. In one and the same act of killing, the preparation may arise from greed (killing for gain), while the completion is necessarily by hatred — because the thought at the moment when the hand brings the thing off is assuredly the coarse and evil mind that spares nothing.

Where it lands: this item gives a very serviceable way of checking oneself: looking back at an evil deed already done, do not look only at the reason present when the thought was raised, but at the mind at the moment the thing was brought off. The reason for raising the thought is often presentable; the mind at the moment of bringing it off cannot hide.

XIII. The Four Places on Which the Paths of Action Depend: Sentient Beings, Goods, Name-and-Form, the Name-Bodies

First ask: “toward what” is a path of action set going?

The treatise matches four places to the ten paths of action: “the three of killing and the rest arise in the place of sentient beings; the three of stealing and the rest arise in the place of goods; wrong view alone arises in the place of name-and-form; and the three of false speech and the rest arise in the place of the name-bodies and the rest.” Killing, harsh speech, and hatred are turned toward sentient beings; stealing, sexual misconduct, and greed toward the requisites of livelihood; wrong view alone toward name-and-form (that is, it denies outright all the dharmas gathered in by name-and-form); and false speech, divisive speech, and frivolous speech toward the name-bodies and the rest (what speech depends upon).

Why are the verbal paths of action attached to the name-bodies and not to sentient beings? The treatise itself states it briefly, and Puguang’s Record quotes the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine to fill out the reason, his text being “hence the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine says: ‘the three of false speech and the rest arise in the place of the name-bodies and the rest, since the entity of speech must arise in dependence upon names and the rest. Though speech also arises with sentient beings and the like for its ground, yet it arises in immediate dependence upon the name-bodies and the rest’” — though speech is indeed spoken toward men, what it immediately depends upon is the name-, phrase-, and syllable-bodies. This is Saṅghabhadra’s language in the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine, and does not issue from the Kośa itself.

Clearing a misreading: reading “the place depended upon” as “a location.” It is not a place in space; it is the object that is turned toward — a path of action must have a point where its object falls, and that point determines which kind of path of action it is.

Where it lands: read together with the item before it, the identity of a path of action is fully fixed: the object it faces fixes its kind, and the root of its completion fixes its constituting.

XIV. Dying Together and Dying First: The Support Has Become Other, and the Offense Has Nothing to Rest On

First ask: if the killer dies before the one killed, or if the two die at the same time, does he still incur the offense of the root path of action?

The treatise answers: he does not. And it raises a question against itself to force out this conclusion — is there a case in which the killer has set going the preparation for killing and has made the result full, and yet is not touched by the offense of killing? Answer: there is, namely dying together and dying first.

What is the reason? The treatise gives two layers. First: at the moment the killer dies, the life of the one killed still remains, and the offense has as yet nothing to rest on (the offense being completed only when the other’s life is cut off). The second layer matters more: it cannot be said that he obtains the offense after his own death, “because the support has become other” — the body upon which he relied when he set going the preparation for killing has already been cut off; and though there arises another body of the same commonality, that body never set going the preparation for killing, and to say that it completes the path of action of killing is in principle not to be allowed. Puguang’s Record explains this layer very plainly, his words being “for what reason do dying together and dying first not complete a path of action? ‘Because the sentient being killed’ down to ‘in principle not to be allowed’: the answer. Because the present life of the sentient being killed still remains, it is impossible to make the one who dies together with him or before him, the killer, complete the offense of killing, since the life of the sentient being killed is not yet cut off.”

Clearing a misreading: reading this item as “dying first gets one off.” What the treatise says is that the root path of action is not completed, not that there is no offense — the manifest and nonmanifest action set going at the preparatory stage does not thereby vanish. What this item is really saying is that the offense of a path of action must be attached to a support-body that actually exists.

Where it lands: this is the first place in the fascicle where “path of action” and “action” are viewed apart. A path of action is a list with strict conditions of constitution; when the conditions are wanting, the act has not vanished, it merely does not fall upon this list.

XV. Acting as One in an Army: One Kills and All Are Completed

First ask: a body of men band together into an army to kill an enemy, or set out in company to hunt, and only one of them lays hand to it; who obtains the path of action of killing?

The treatise answers without the least evasion: “within an army and the like, if any one man does the deed of killing, then, just as with the man who does it in person, all of them complete the path of action of killing” — the reason being “because they have consented together to one undertaking,” just as with teaching one another in turn for the sake of one undertaking, and so, one man killing, all the rest incur the offense.

The treatise moreover handles two borderline cases. First, one who has been forced by the power of others into the army: so long as he thereby also shares that mind, he likewise completes the offense of killing. Second, the one exception is the man who has vowed of himself — that not even to save his own life will he kill; such a man, though forced to be among them, has no mind of killing, and so has no offense. Puguang’s Record marks this passage as belonging, with the stanza before it, to the questions and answers the author raises for himself, his outline being “‘if a man has set going the preparation’ down to ‘because there is no root and the support has become other’: below, the fourth, analysis by question and answer. Within it, first that having killed it is not the root, second that another’s killing completes the path of action.”

Clearing a misreading: looking for room to soften this item — saying, for instance, that those who did not lay hand to it bear a lighter offense. The text of the treatise says nothing of the kind; it says “all complete it as does the one who does it.” This item must be read as it stands, and no discount may be taken on the author’s behalf. The one way out that the treatise does give is given very narrowly: not “I did not lay hand to it,” but “I have taken a vow, that I would die rather than kill, and at that moment I in fact had no mind of killing.”

Where it lands: this item is about how a shared action is constituted — not by the deed, but by that one thought of “consenting together to one undertaking.” In any collective action in which one is oneself involved, ask first: what is the undertaking I have consented to?

XVI. The Marks of Killing: Deliberate Volition, the Perception of Another, Not by Mistake

First ask: at what degree does it count as “killing”?

The treatise gives three conditions: “one must first set going the deliberate volition ‘I would kill,’ and with respect to another sentient being raise the perception of another sentient being, and set going the preparation for killing and kill not by mistake” — first there must be the deliberate volition to kill, second the perception of another sentient being with respect to another sentient being, third killing not by mistake (killing only the very one he meant to kill, and not killing another indiscriminately). The three conditions complete, it is the path of action of killing.

The treatise at once sets one case apart: “killing with hesitation also completes killing.” He harbored hesitation beforehand — is it a living thing or not? and granting it is, is it he or not? — and afterwards raised a settled resolve: be it he or not, I shall assuredly kill. Since the mind spares nothing, if he kills a sentient being the path of action is likewise completed. Puguang’s Record marks this as a text of setting apart, his words being “‘killing with hesitation’ down to ‘also completes the path of action’: setting apart a difference. This displays that killing with hesitation also completes killing.”

Clearing a misreading: supposing that “not by mistake” is a back door opened for killing by mistake. It is not an opening of a door but a fixing of the mark — an act of killing by mistake has not thereby become free of offense; it merely does not complete this item, “the path of action of killing.” This is the same principle as the item on dying together and dying first above: a list has the conditions of a list.

Where it lands: of the three conditions, the one most easily passed over is the second (the perception of another sentient being). What it reminds us of is that the constituting of a path of action turns not only on what you did, but on what at that time you took the other to be.

XVII. The Three Dharmas of Lifespan, Warmth, and Consciousness: The Boundary between the Life Faculty and Death

First ask: the five aggregates arise and cease thought by thought, ceasing of themselves already; what then does “killing” kill?

The treatise gives two explanations. The first: “the breath-wind is called life, and it turns in dependence upon body and mind; if a man makes it be cut off so that it no longer continues to arise” — like extinguishing the light of a lamp or the sound of a bell, and this is called killing. The second: “or else what is called life is just the life faculty; if a man makes it be cut off so that it does not continue, that is called killing.” Both explanations come home to one and the same criterion: with an evil mind one severs another’s life, so that even a thought-moment which ought to arise cannot arise, and this alone is touched by the offense of killing. Puguang’s Record in this passage only explains the grounds of the two explanations as the text runs, and sets up no separate outline name of question and answer or of recording divergent accounts — this is set down as it stands, and no judgment is made on his behalf as to whether the two explanations exclude each other or which is correct.

Then the treatise handles a still more troublesome question: to whom does this life that is cut off belong? Since one says “whose,” is there not then a self? The author pushes this question over to the chapter refuting the self for extended pondering, and here only quotes a sūtra to prove that life is a dharma — “when the three dharmas of lifespan, warmth, and consciousness leave the body, then the body that is left falls stiff to the ground, without thought and without sensation, like a log.” The text preceding this stanza reads “hence the stanza spoken by the Bhagavat,” so it is a quoted stanza from a sūtra and not a root stanza. From this the treatise draws one conclusion: a body endowed with faculties is called a living being, and one without faculties is called dead.

Here the Nirgrantha non-Buddhists come forward. They say “killing without deliberation also incurs the offense of killing,” and adduce the touching of fire as their analogy — even without deliberating beforehand one is burned all the same. The author refutes them with six objections in succession: then meeting another man’s wife and touching her body by mistake ought likewise to be an offense; pulling out hair and beard for a Nirgrantha out of a wholesome mind, a teacher urging austerities out of loving-kindness, food kept overnight by a donor failing to digest and causing suffering — all these ought to incur the offense of “causing another to suffer”; the child in the womb and the mother being causes of suffering to each other, the mother too ought to have an offense toward the child; the one killed being conjoined with the killing, he too, like fire that burns its own support, ought to bear it himself; if it were so, dispatching another to kill ought to carry no offense of killing, as fire does not burn the man who taught another to touch it; and timber and stones ought also to be touched by the offense, since houses too, in collapsing, harm life. The closing sentence is exceedingly firm — “and besides, it is not merely that your analogy fails: the position we ourselves set up can be established.” The two commentaries agree in the outline name for this passage, both marking it as “recording a non-Buddhist reckoning,” whence it appears that this passage is not a dispute internal to the schools, but the rejecting of a non-Buddhist account outside the Dharma.

Clearing a misreading: reading the Nirgrantha passage as another instance of “recording two accounts without adjudication.” It is not — here the author refutes expressly, and refutes to the end. The treatise’s not adjudicating is used only for divergent accounts within the Buddha’s Dharma; toward a non-Buddhist reckoning, the treatise refutes when refutation is due.

Where it lands: this passage gives a criterion: any claim that “one incurs an offense even without a mind for it” has for its price that goodwill, and unawareness, and even the course of nature itself must all alike be reckoned as offense. The author sets that price out at one stroke with six absurd consequences — this is the completest demonstration of counter-refutation in the fascicle.

XVIII. Taking What Is Not Given: By Force and by Stealth, Made to Belong to Oneself

First ask: at what degree does stealing complete a path of action?

The treatise answers: the “not by mistake” and the rest spoken of above run on into each of the gates that follow, as is fitting, and are not repeated; as regards this gate, one must first set going the deliberate volition to steal and raise with respect to another’s goods the perception of another’s goods — “with respect to another’s goods raise the perception of another’s goods, and by force or by stealth set going the preparation for stealing, and take not by mistake, making it belong to oneself” — and to this degree it is called the offense of taking what is not given.

The treatise then handles three special kinds of ownership. First, stealing the goods of a stūpa: “if a man steals the goods of a stūpa, he incurs the offense of stealing with respect to the Tathāgata,” because when the Buddha was about to enter nirvāṇa he took pity on the world and accepted in sum all that was given — while some other master says that the offense is incurred with respect to those who guard it. Second, digging up an ownerless hidden treasure: the offense is incurred on the side of the ruler of the country. Third, stealing goods that revert: if the karman has been performed, the offense is incurred with respect to the saṅgha within the boundary; if the karman is not yet completed, it is incurred with respect to the disciples of the Buddha at large.

Clearing a misreading: supposing that “ownerless goods” leave no place from which an offense can be incurred. The treatise’s manner of answering is worth noticing — it can always find a point of “belonging to someone”: the goods of a stūpa belong to the Buddha, a hidden treasure to the ruler of the country, goods that revert to the saṅgha or to the disciples of the Buddha. This is the same train of thought as the item on the places depended upon above: a path of action must have an object to which it is attached.

Where it lands: what this section reminds us of is that in judging a case of taking and seizing, three questions come first — whose is it, whose did I take it to be, and to whom did it belong after the taking. Walk through the three questions, and whether taking what is not given is completed becomes plain of itself.

XIX. Sexual Misconduct: Four Kinds of Going Where One Ought Not

First ask: where is the line of sexual misconduct drawn?

The treatise establishes it by four kinds of “going where one ought not” — “there are in all four kinds of going where one ought not to go, and all of them get the name of the offense of sexual misconduct”: first with respect to a forbidden object (a wife held by another, one’s mother, one’s father, a kinswoman of one’s parents, and so on to one guarded by the king), second by a forbidden way, third in a forbidden place (“the third is going where one ought not in a forbidden place, that is, within a monastery, in the place of a caitya, or in a remote place”), fourth at a forbidden time (the time of carrying a child, of nursing an infant, of undertaking the fast-day precepts, transgressed even with one’s own wife). Under the fourth the treatise records another account: only if the husband has allowed her to undertake the fast-day precepts and there is afterwards a transgression is it called a forbidden time.

The word “not by mistake” likewise runs on into this gate: if with respect to another’s wife one supposes her to be one’s own, or with respect to one’s own wife supposes her to be another’s, and so on with the way and what is not the way, then so long as there is a mistaken mind, though something be done it is no path of action. As to whether “raising with respect to this wife of another the perception of a different wife of another” completes a path of action, the treatise records two accounts: “one account says it does complete it” — since after all the preparation for fornication was raised and she was enjoyed; “another account says it does not complete it” — as with the path of action of killing, where the preparation is raised toward this one and the completion falls upon another, and it is not completed.

The treatise moreover answers two practical questions: in practicing what is not the pure life with a bhikṣuṇī, the path of action is incurred from the place of the king, because the king does not allow such a thing, and this is argued from the lighter to the heavier (even with one’s own wife at the time of the fast-day precepts one ought not to go, how much less with one who has gone forth); in practicing what is not the pure life with a maiden, if she has been promised to another it is incurred at the place of the one to whom she is promised, if not promised then at the place of those able to guard her, and these and the rest are all incurred at the place of the king.

Clearing a misreading: reading the four kinds of “going where one ought not” as four unrelated prohibitions. They are in fact four dimensions of one and the same criterion — object, way, place, and time; and where any one of the four is amiss, misconduct is constituted.

Where it lands: read together with the section on taking what is not given, this section shows the treatise’s consistent manner of handling conduct: first establish the object faced, then add the condition of mind that is “not by mistake,” and last fill in a few borderline cases. The three steps walked through, the outline of a precept is clear.

XX. False Speech: Defiled Mind, a Divergent Perception, Uttering, Understanding the Sense

First ask: at what degree does lying complete a path of action?

The treatise gives four conditions: “to raise a divergent perception with respect to the sense one speaks and to utter it, the one deceived understanding the sense spoken, with a defiled mind and not by mistake, completes false speech” — a divergent perception of the sense spoken, the uttering of it as speech, the other’s understanding, and a defiled mind not by mistake. Wanting any one of the four it is not completed: if the other does not understand the sense of the words, that stretch of speech falls to frivolous speech.

At what point is the path of action completed? The treatise answers with great precision: the manifest sound and the nonmanifest action arising together with the last word complete this path of action; or else, at whatever point the other understands the sense, the manifest and nonmanifest action of that time completes it; and what accompanies the several words before that is all the preparatory stage.

Here begins a fine dispute over “understanding the sense.” The treatise raises two objections against itself: is the understanding of the sense taken with respect to “having finished hearing and rightly understanding,” or with respect to “being in the act of hearing and being able to understand”? On the former, the sense conveyed by the utterance is what mental consciousness knows, whereas verbal manifest action has already passed away together with auditory consciousness, and so the path of action ought to be completed by the nonmanifest alone; on the latter, though this fault is absent, yet at that time there is not yet any knowing, so how can being in the act of hearing be called being able to understand? The author takes the latter as his tenet, his closing words being “since thus there is no fault, this account should be taken as the tenet” — for one who well knows the sense of words and has no condition of confusion, auditory consciousness having arisen is called being able to understand. The two commentaries agree here, both marking the author as the one who makes this choice: Puguang’s Record gives “how is this to be settled? If there is auditory consciousness with no condition of confusion, then the understanding is taken with respect to being in the act of hearing and being able to understand … it being thus unsettled, the author therefore says: since thus there is no fault, this account should be taken as the tenet”; Fabao’s Commentary gives “‘there being no fault, it should be taken as the tenet’: the author adjudges, taking being in the act of hearing and being able to understand as completing the path of action.”

Clearing a misreading: supposing that “understanding the sense” is the hearer’s responsibility and has nothing to do with the speaker. Just the contrary — that the completion of the path of action must wait upon the other’s understanding shows precisely that the offense of lying lies not in the moving of the mouth but in “making a man take the false thing in.”

Where it lands: after this section the treatise goes on to quote a sūtra listing the sixteen kinds of utterance (saying “seen” and the rest of what is not seen and the rest, and saying “not seen” and the rest of what is seen and the rest, eight of each being ignoble and noble utterances), and thereby brings on the question of the next section, the marks of “what is seen” and the rest — the fine division of the verbal paths of action here turns onto the ground of the theory of knowledge.

XXI. Seen, Heard, Sensed, Known: The Marks of the Four Bases of Speech

First ask: what are the marks of what is called “what is seen, what is heard, what is sensed, and what is known”?

The account of the Vaibhāṣika masters comes first: “if an object is attested by eye consciousness it is called what is seen,” what is attested by ear consciousness is called what is heard, what is attested by mental consciousness is called what is known, and what is attested by the three consciousnesses of nose, tongue, and body is together called what is sensed. Why are the latter three consciousnesses gathered under one name? Because the three of scent, taste, and touch are of indeterminate nature and, like a dead man, have no sensing, and so the name “sensing” is established in particular on the side of what attests them. Puguang’s Record quotes the Mahāvibhāṣā to fill out the reason, his words being “‘down to the name sensing is established in particular’: a separate explanation of why the three objects are alike named what is sensed. That the three objects are alike named what is sensed is because these three objects are alike indeterminate, their nature dull and obscure, like a dead man who has no sensing or knowing, and so the name sensing is established in particular for the faculties that attest them.”

The Vaibhāṣika masters adduce besides the two proofs of scripture and principle, the proof from scripture being the Buddha’s instruction to the Great Mother — “herein, with respect to what is seen you should know that there is only what is seen” — where the three objects of form, sound, and dharma are spoken of as what is seen, what is heard, and what is known, so that by parity of reasoning the three objects of scent and the rest may be gathered under the single name “what is sensed.”

The author refutes this proof: “this proof does not hold; let it be said first that the sūtra is no proof, for the sense of the sūtra lies elsewhere” — this sūtra is not spoken in order to adjudicate the marks of the four bases of speech, and the sense it speaks is to urge the Great Mother that with respect to the six objects and the four matters beginning with what is seen she “should know that there is only the speech of what is seen and the rest, and should not add on the marks of the lovely and the unlovely.”

Thereupon two further accounts are set out. Some other master says: what is attested by direct perception through the five faculties is called what is seen, what is obtained from the report of another is called what is heard, what is allowed by applying one’s own mind and inferring by all manner of reasoning is called what is sensed, and what is directly attested by mind is called what is known; thus with respect to the five objects all four kinds of speech may be set going in each case, and with respect to the sixth object there are three apart from seeing. The earlier preceptors say: what the eye directly sees is called what is seen, what is heard from the report of another is called what is heard, “whatever one’s own mind constructs by thought of every kind is called what is sensed,” and what is received within oneself and attested by oneself is called what is known. At the end the author closes with a single sentence: let the incidental discussion rest, and let the proper discussion be set forth.

Clearing a misreading: reading this passage as a digression from the subject. It is not a digression — the section before it has already said that false speech requires one “to raise a divergent perception with respect to the sense one speaks”; and so what “the sense spoken” refers to must first have the boundaries of seen, heard, sensed, and known drawn clearly, since the whole discrimination of the sixteen noble and ignoble utterances hangs upon it.

At the close the treatise quotes a further set of questions and answers: is there a case of completing false speech by bodily manifest action without uttering speech? There is — the root treatise says: he who is touched by the offense of killing without moving the body is one who utters speech; he who is touched by the offense of false speech without uttering speech is one who moves the body; and those touched by both offenses while neither moving the body nor uttering speech are the seer in a fit of mental wrath and one at the time of the poṣadha. Thereupon the author raises a difficulty against himself: if there is neither movement of body nor utterance of speech, and the desire realm has no nonmanifest that “arises apart from the manifest,” how do these two come to be paths of action? The author leaves it undecided, saying only “upon a difficulty such as this one should expend some labor.” (For the debate within the Abhidharma lineage that this difficulty gave rise to, see the section of Further Resonances at the end.)

Where it lands: this section demonstrates the author’s way of handling a question of knowledge — first record one party’s account, then point out that its scriptural proof is insufficient, then record two further parties, without hastening to set up a tenet of his own. What the reader is to learn is that power of discrimination in “the sūtra is no proof, for the sense of the sūtra lies elsewhere”: what a passage of scripture can prove depends on what it was spoken for in the first place.

XXII. Divisive · Harsh · Frivolous: The Three Verbal Paths of Action

First ask: how many conditions does each of the remaining three verbal paths of action require?

Divisive speech: “if with a defiled mind one sets going an utterance that would break another, then whether or not the other is in fact broken, divisive speech is completed in either case” — so long as there are the defiled mind, the setting going of an utterance that would break another, the other’s understanding of the sense, and the absence of mistake, the four conditions complete, it is constituted; whether the other was in fact divided does not affect the completing of the path of action. Puguang’s Record lists these four conditions most clearly, his words being “‘the treatise says’ down to ‘runs on into this’: explaining the first two lines, showing that divisive speech requires four kinds of condition before the path of action is completed: first a defiled mind; second the setting going of an utterance that would break another, and whether the other is broken or not, at the very moment of his understanding divisive speech is completed.”

Harsh speech: “if with a defiled mind one sets going an unlovely utterance abusing another, that is called harsh speech” — the word “defiled mind” above runs on into this, and understanding the sense and the absence of mistake are likewise as above; the path of action is completed only when the very man he intended in his mind to abuse understands the sense spoken.

Frivolous speech: “all utterances set going by a defiled mind are called frivolous speech,” because all speech set going by a defiled mind is frivolous; only the word “utterance” above runs on into this, and the remaining conditions need not be complete. Below this the treatise records another account: only what is other than the former three utterances, all speech set going by a defiled mind, is called frivolous speech, namely flattery, singing, false treatises, and the like — flattery as when a bhikṣu harbors a wrong livelihood in his heart and sets going fawning words, singing as when men chant and sing in mutual dalliance with a defiled mind and as when performers make songs to please the feelings of others, a false treatise as the extended argument of words held by incorrect views; while the word “and the like” gathers in lamentations set going by a defiled mind and the words of worldly frivolity.

The treatise moreover resolves one practical doubt: at the time when a wheel-turning monarch appears in the world there is singing too, so how is it not frivolous speech? Answer: those utterances are set going from a mind of renunciation and can draw forth renunciation, and are not a mind defiled beforehand. Below this it records a further account: at that time there are also defiled utterances set going in accomplishing marriages and the like, only their fault is slight and so they do not complete a path of action.

Clearing a misreading: reading “whether or not the other is broken, it is completed in either case” as inhumane. It is in fact of a piece with the items before it — the completing of a path of action is attached to the mind of the one who sets it going and the understanding of the one who receives it, and not to whether the consequence is realized. Read together with harsh speech’s requirement that “the man abused must understand,” the boundary is quite clear: there must be a determinate hearer, and he must in fact have taken the sense.

Where it lands: of the three of speech, frivolous speech has the lowest threshold — it is enough that it be set going by a defiled mind. This item comes down most concretely into daily life: without lying, without dividing, without abusing, so long as that one sentence came out of a defiled mind, it is already on this list.

XXIII. Greed · Hatred · Wrong View: The Three Mental Paths of Action

First ask: what are the marks of each of the three mental paths of action?

Greed: “evil desire toward another’s goods is called greed” — to raise desire contrary to reason toward another’s wealth, thinking how that thing may come to belong to me and not to him, and raising a mind of seizing openly and taking in secret and so hankering after another’s goods. Below this the treatise records two accounts: one account says that all craving of the desire realm is the path of action of greed, and quotes in proof the Sūtra of the Five Hindrances, where with respect to the hindrance of sensual desire the Buddha said that this greed for the world should be cut off; and another account says that though the craving of the desire realm may all be called greed, it may not be said that they all complete a path of action, since the path of action of greed gathers in only the coarse portion within evil conduct — otherwise the sensual greed set going in the age of a wheel-turning monarch and by the men of Uttarakuru would have to be reckoned the path of action of greed as well.

Hatred: “to raise hostility toward the class of sentient beings is called hatred” — to wish to do harm to another sentient being.

Wrong view: “to deny outright with an evil view, with respect to the wholesome and the evil and the rest, this view is called the path of action of wrong view.” The treatise quotes a sūtra listing what it denies — there is no giving, no delighting, no sacrifice, no good conduct, no evil conduct, no result and maturation drawn by the action of good conduct and evil conduct, no this world and no other world, no mother and no father, no sentient beings born by transformation, and in the world no śramaṇa or brahmin who is an arhat. Then the treatise closes with one sentence of its own: “that sūtra displays in full the three classes of wrong view, slandering action, slandering results, and slandering the noble ones; the present stanza raises only the first item and by the one word ‘and the rest’ gathers in the rest.” Puguang’s Record quotes the Mahāvibhāṣā to adjudge these eleven clauses one by one into the three classes — there is no giving, no delighting, no sacrifice, and no good conduct and no evil conduct are slandering the cause; no result and maturation of action is slandering the result; no this world and no other world, no mother and no father, and no sentient beings born by transformation extend to both slandering the cause and slandering the result; and the last clause is slandering the noble ones.

Clearing a misreading: reading wrong view as “a difference of opinion.” The wrong view the treatise speaks of has a very hard shape: it is denial outright — declaring the cause, the result, and the noble ones alike to be nonexistent. Puguang’s Record quotes the Mahāvibhāṣā to explain why the non-Buddhists deny even what is plainly seen, his words being “hence the Mahāvibhāṣā explains: ‘question: that the other world is not plainly seen, and so to say it is not may pass. But this world is plainly seen; why say that it is not? Answer: those non-Buddhists are blinded by ignorance and deny even what is plainly seen. One should not call the ignorant to account, since the blind fall into pits.’”

Where it lands: the ten paths of action are here wound up. The reason the three mental paths of action are placed last is that they are the root as soon as they are present, with no preparatory or consequent stage to be divided off — the long road of raising the thought, laying hand to it, bringing it off, and trailing away, which the nine before them walk, contracts here into a single thought. The weightiest precept in the fascicle turns out to be the shortest.

Further Resonances: The Mirror of the Three Commentaries

The foregoing is the sense of the treatise’s own text in this unit. Below, a separate section gathers four matters: the adjudications of the three commentaries and where they diverge, Saṅghabhadra’s refutations and supplements, the divergences of Paramārtha’s earlier translation, and coordinates for parallel reading. A mirror is not the treatise; it is only another way of reading the same text. Both parties are recorded and neither adjudicated, each left in its own place.

1. Where the Three Commentaries Diverge

One commentary wholly absent. Shentai’s Commentary is a fragmentary text, its seven surviving fascicles belonging to the Chapter on the Elements, the Chapter on the Faculties, and the Chapter on the Worthy and the Noble; the Chapter on Action is wholly wanting, and so this unit has no running exposition of Shentai’s to hang upon. The lack is marked as it stands, and text from his other fascicles is not made to serve in its place.

One and the same passage: should it be called “question and answer” or “objection and answer.” For the round of exchange at “is not the result of evil action,” Puguang’s Record marks question and answer, while Fabao’s Commentary marks “an objection” and “an answer.” The outline names diverge while the division is entirely the same; both are recorded without adjudication.

Wholesome dharmas obtaining release from bondage: “cutting off as object” or “cutting off the bond of the object.” Puguang’s Record and Fabao’s Commentary use cutting off as object, while Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary sets out the further name “cutting off the bond of the object” and explains it for himself. The same sense under two names; recorded without adjudication.

Who exactly are the masters of similes. Puguang’s Record marks them expressly as Sautrāntikas, his text being “‘the masters of similes say’ down to ‘as mental action’: the Sautrāntikas, the masters of similes, say that the three of greed and the rest are just mental volition and have no entity apart from volition”; Fabao’s Commentary on the same passage gives merely “recording a divergent account,” without marking the school. Whether the school is expressly marked is where the two commentaries diverge, and this is recorded without adjudication.

The two accounts of the “forbidden time” in sexual misconduct: ought a judgment to be passed. Puguang’s Record judges outright, “the latter account is the better, since it is gathered in under mistake”; Fabao’s Commentary on the same passage says expressly, “‘the husband’ down to ‘is then called a forbidden time’: recording a divergent account. There is no text of judgment.” One judges, the other says expressly that there is no judgment. The treatise itself only records the two accounts without adjudicating, and Puguang’s judgment is the view of one commentator.

The two accounts of the path of action of greed: again one judges and one does not. Puguang’s Record judges, “of the two accounts the latter master is correct, since the greed abandoned by seeing does not take goods as its object”; Fabao’s Commentary explains as the text runs and passes no separate judgment. Where the two commentaries differ is precisely on the point whether an ancient master may pass judgment on the author’s behalf. Recorded without adjudication.

Are the earlier preceptors Sautrāntikas. Fabao’s Commentary attaches this account too to the Sautrāntikas, his words being “‘called what is known’: the author records the sense of the Sautrāntika masters”; Puguang’s Record explains only the derivation of the name — “those who study the Yogācārabhūmi are called the earlier preceptors” — without expressly attaching a school. The three commentaries are not of one mind here; recorded without adjudication.

The one item on which all three agree. For the “some other master says” of the passage on seen, heard, sensed, and known, Puguang’s Record, Fabao’s Commentary, and Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary all adjudge Sautrāntika — Puguang giving “the Sautrāntikas answer,” Fabao “this quotes the explanation of the Sautrāntika other master,” and Yuanhui “on the tenet of the Sautrāntikas.” This is the most firmly settled attribution in the unit.

From what place the offense of stealing goods that revert is incurred. The treatise records only the one account “some other master says: with respect to those who guard it,” without adjudicating; Puguang’s Record quotes the choice made by the adjudicators of the Mahāvibhāṣā, his text being “the thirteenth adjudges the former master of this treatise to be correct, and hence that treatise says: ‘some say it is also incurred at the place of the ruler of the country, some say at the place of the donor, some say at the place of those who guard it, some say at the place of the gods, nāgas, and yakṣas who are able to protect it.’” This is a judgment of the adjudicators of the Mahāvibhāṣā, and not a settled judgment of the Kośa.

Toward whom the offense is incurred with a bhikṣuṇī and with a maiden. The treatise’s original sentence is extremely brief, and Puguang’s Record supplies two explanations — the first that the offense is incurred from the king, the second that by arguing from the lighter to the heavier any encroachment at all completes the path of action. These two explanations are Puguang’s supplement, and the treatise does not itself set out two accounts by name.

Whether divisive speech requires that “the other be in fact broken.” Puguang’s Record quotes from the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle one party’s “some other master says: it is completed only when the other is broken,” and judges “the former account is the better” — the reason being that a noble one is deeply firm and hard to break, so that if the other’s being broken were required, divisive speech that would break a noble one would carry no offense, whereas in fact one who breaks a noble one incurs a deeper offense. This is Puguang’s own choice, and not the express text of the treatise.

2. Saṅghabhadra’s Refutations and Supplementary Explanations

Saṅghabhadra’s two treatises name this chapter not “Analysis of Action” but “Making Out Action” (the fourth in the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle, the fifth in the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine). The opening and closing boundaries of the two treatises are the same as this unit’s, both beginning at “again the sūtra says that action is of four kinds, that is, there is action that is black and has a black maturation” and closing at “thus the marks of the ten paths of action have been made out. By what sense” — four texts transmitted independently, and their outline boundaries in agreement.

Who exactly utters the sentence “to grant that an affliction is just mental action.” The treatise’s sentence reads “if that were so, then action and affliction would be combined into one entity. To grant that an affliction is just mental action — what fault is there in this?” Puguang reads it as the author’s relaying, on behalf of the masters of similes (the Sautrāntikas), of a supposition, and so marks “‘to grant that an affliction’ down to ‘what fault is there in this’: the masters of similes answer.” Saṅghabhadra reads it outright as the author’s own granting, and so his refutation points straight at the Sūtra-master — “the Sūtra-master says: to grant that an affliction is just mental action, what fault is there in this? What is thus granted is at odds with the sūtra above and with correct principle below; is this not a great fault?” — and he adduces the two proofs of the āgama and of correct principle, and comes home at last to the name of evil conduct. One and the same sentence, and the commentarial tradition and the tradition of debate within the lineage read it in opposite ways; both parties are recorded and neither adjudicated.

The passage on seen, heard, sensed, and known is where the debate within the lineage runs longest in this unit. The author refutes the Vaibhāṣika masters’ scriptural proof with “this proof does not hold; let it be said first that the sūtra is no proof, for the sense of the sūtra lies elsewhere”; Saṅghabhadra cites him thus: “the Sūtra-master dismisses it, saying: this does not constitute a proof, for the sense of the sūtra lies elsewhere, and in this sūtra the Buddha does not mean to adjudicate the marks of the four things spoken of,” and quotes the stanza in which the Great Mother received the Buddha’s instruction, to show that the Vaibhāṣika masters’ explanation does have scriptural proof; then he refutes head-on — “so when the Sūtra-master says that the sense of the sūtra lies elsewhere, it is truly as he says, for the sense of the sūtra being elsewhere, the Sūtra-master analyzes it otherwise there” — and goes on to four objections, closing with “now I say that the Sūtra-master harbors a warped attachment in his heart, turning his back on this correct tenet and taking the part of that false account.” The vehemence of the wording is the greatest in the unit. Both parties are recorded and neither is adjudged to prevail.

At the difficulty of “one should expend some labor,” Saṅghabhadra answers on the treatise’s behalf. The treatise leaves undecided the difficulty of “how, without moving the body or uttering speech, a path of action is completed”; Saṅghabhadra, after citing this difficulty, sets up an explanation of his own, which Puguang’s Record relays as “yet for those who obtained the fruit, the five bhikṣus and the rest, at the time of the preparatory stage there must have been manifest action, continuing on until they obtained the fruit and entered the path, and it is in dependence upon this manifest action that individual liberation is set going” — holding that at the preparatory stage there must be manifest action continuing on. Where the Kośa leaves a blank, Saṅghabhadra fills it in; to fill in and not to fill in are each a form of its own.

The Treatise Revealing the Doctrine takes no part at all in the debate in this passage. Checked word for word by a fault-tolerant method, the term “Sūtra-master” has zero occurrences in the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine within the range of this unit — it only states the tenets straightforwardly and mounts no extended refutation. This is a divergence of form between the two treatises, honestly recorded, with no conjecture as to its cause.

Saṅghabhadra’s words too have been drawn in by Puguang to supplement the Kośa. In the passage on the four places upon which the paths of action depend, the treatise speaks briefly, and Puguang quotes the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine to fill out the reason, “since the entity of speech must arise in dependence upon names and the rest.” This is supplementing what the Kośa leaves undetailed by means of a treatise of debate, and is not a counter-refutation.

3. The Divergences of Paramārtha’s Earlier Translation

Paramārtha’s Expository Treatise on the Treasury of Abhidharma, in the passage corresponding to this unit, forms a system of its own, its manner being “the verse says / the explanation says,” embedding the explanation line by line, one stanza often being broken up and quoted in several places; whereas Xuanzang gives “the stanza says / the treatise says,” setting out the whole stanza first and the prose after. The two also divide their fascicles differently — Paramārtha’s Chapter on Action is in four fascicles and Xuanzang’s in six, and the passage this unit corresponds to falls entirely within one of Paramārtha’s fascicles. Comparison across the two texts can be made only by the structure of the scene; to search Paramārtha’s text with Xuanzang’s words is for the most part never to find anything at all.

A difference of opening out and drawing together. Xuanzang’s stanza of six lines states in one breath the four actions and the volition without outflows that can exhaust them; Paramārtha’s verse gives only the two lines “the differences of black and white and the rest, action is again said to be of four kinds,” the details of the four actions being wholly filled out by the explanation line by line.

One and the same scriptural proof, attached to different subjects. The scriptural proof underlying the sentence “wholesome action of the desire realm is called black-and-white” is given by Xuanzang outright as the treatise’s own statement, while Paramārtha attaches it to “some other master says.” Recorded without adjudication.

Whether the name of the sūtra is given. The sūtra quoted by the masters of similes in stating their tenet is expressly the Sūtra on Volition in Xuanzang, while Paramārtha gives merely “the sūtra says” without naming it; checked by a fault-tolerant method through the whole of Paramārtha’s Chapter on Action, the name Sūtra on Volition has zero occurrences — this is no failure of the search, but Paramārtha’s own not naming the sūtra. Conversely, the Sūtra of the Five Hindrances is named in both. Whence it appears that the fullness or brevity of scriptural proof is no general leaning of either, but differs item by item.

The rendering-names form a system of their own. Muni is given as Mouna, false speech as lying, taking what is not given as stealing, sexual misconduct as fornication, divisive speech as breaking speech, harsh speech as evil speech, frivolous speech as unfitting speech, stūpa as soudoupo, Bolasi as the people of the country of Boshi, and “spoken with a hidden intent” as “spoken in a sense not fully drawn out.” Among these the one place where the two methods of rendering part most visibly is the life faculty: Xuanzang takes the sense and gives “breath-wind,” while Paramārtha takes the sound and gives prāṇa and then glosses its sense, “it has wind for its sense.” It may be added that Paramārtha’s own usage is not consistent either — for one and the same divisive speech, the stanza-explanation passage gives breaking speech while the running text of an earlier passage gives double-tongued speech; this is recorded as it stands, with no conjecture as to which is correct.

Fullness and brevity run both ways. In the passage on killing as one in an army, Paramārtha has two further classes, digging pits and robbery in bands, and is fuller than Xuanzang; while for the sūtra text of what wrong view denies, Xuanzang translates all eleven clauses and Paramārtha abridges to six — the fullness and brevity are exchanged. Fullness and brevity vary by passage and have no fixed direction.

Quoted stanzas are the most freely rendered. The non-Buddhist stanza of exemptions Xuanzang gives as “if a man, by reason of jest, marriage, facing a woman or a king, and for the sake of saving life or saving goods, speaks false speech, that is without offense,” while Paramārtha gives “jest and women, taking a wife and saving life, and for saving goods one lies; the Brahmā king says it does no harm” — the order of the lines and the wording are wholly unlike, while the sense of the four exemptions opened is the same. It is the same with the stanza of lifespan, warmth, and consciousness: Xuanzang’s “falls stiff” answers to Paramārtha’s “sleeps forever,” and Xuanzang’s “lifespan” to Paramārtha’s “life faculty.” Both are recorded without adjudication.

4. Coordinates for Parallel Reading

What this unit establishes is a structural table of “how an act comes to be an offense”: the three stages (preparatory, root, consequent), the three roots, the completion, the place depended upon, together with the one condition of mind that is “not by mistake.” When the same set of questions comes to the Yogācāra lineage, the way of opening them out is partly the same and partly different.

For the marks of killing this unit takes the three conditions of deliberate volition, the perception of another, and not by mistake; the root treatise of the Yogācāra lineage, on the same dharma, gives desire and delight, a defiled mind, the means, and the completion — the two limbs of the preparatory stage (the means) and the completion are used by both systems, while the Kośa sets out the further limb “the perception of another, not by mistake” and that system the further limb “desire and delight.” The item of sexual misconduct is closer still: that system too takes what is not the way, what is not the place, and what is not the time for its items, answering word for word to the last three of this unit’s four.

The place of greatest divergence is the entity of manifest action. This unit analyzes the manifest and the nonmanifest of the seven evil paths of action one by one, and grants both the manifest and the nonmanifest to be real as form; the root treatise of the Yogācāra lineage, after dividing manifest action into three, closes with the statement that all manifest action is merely conventional. Upon one and the same set of numbered dharmas the two systems adjudge the reality or conventionality of its entity in exactly opposite ways — and this is the place in this unit that most invites parallel reading. The numbers are the same while the doctrinal frames they hang upon differ; the two may be looked at side by side, with neither adjudged to prevail.

For the set of numbered dharmas that is the ten paths of action, that system sets up instead the eight gates of harm and the eight gates of benefit to gather them in — the set of dharmas being the same while the gates opened differ; this too may be looked at side by side.

Before Reading This Fascicle

The fascicle before finished going through the ten paths of action one by one; this fascicle opens by asking only a single thing: since all ten have been treated, what after all do the two words ‘path of action’ mean? — a treatise that has come this far suddenly turns from ‘which are they’ to ‘how was this name established.’ The three ancient masters all let the knife of their outlines fall at the very same place: Puguang’s Record marks “this is the second of the main text, explaining the name ‘path of action’”; Fabao’s Commentary marks “below, the half stanza, the second of the main text, explaining the name of the path of action”; Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary marks “from here the second of the main text, explaining the name and sense of ‘path of action’” — the three agreeing word for word, from which it appears that this cut was opened by the text of the treatise itself and not forced upon it by later hands.

The frame of this fascicle divides into two stretches. The first half is still within the chapter on ‘the ten paths of action,’ following the author’s own order: the name of the path of action, wrong view cutting off the wholesome roots, the number of paths of action that turn together with volition, the destinies and the places, the three results, wrong livelihood — of which the passage on ‘wrong view cutting off the wholesome roots’ is the longest, and which the author himself calls an incidental discussion made ‘as the sense conveniently allowed,’ expressly drawing the thread back at its close with “now the sense of the paths of action proper should be made clear again.” The latter half begins from the sentence “as was said above, results are of five kinds” and changes chapters — Puguang, Fabao, and Yuanhui alike mark this place as the beginning of ‘the miscellaneous explanations of the actions.’ That is to say, within one fascicle it straddles the boundary of two chapters. The two chapter-level boundaries of this chapter never did fall upon a fascicle boundary — the other one (the beginning of the chapter ‘explaining the actions in the sūtras’) falls within Fascicle Fifteen, and this one (the beginning of ‘the miscellaneous explanations of the actions’) falls within the present fascicle; and it is precisely in this that this fascicle is the most densely outlined of the whole chapter.

One thing should be said before all else. This fascicle reads like two books: the first half thick with questions, answers, and divergent accounts, the latter half thick with numbers. Yet the two stretches are in truth doing one and the same work — taking the measure, line by line, of every line that the one word ‘action’ sets moving. The first half measures ‘what action can cut off, where it can arise, what it can summon’; the latter half measures ‘how many cells action and result can be matched in.’ Keep this in mind while reading, and that heap of ‘four, two, three’ in the latter half ceases to be a table and becomes one and the same question asked over and over six times.

I. The Name ‘Path of Action’: Why the Last Three Are Path Alone While the First Seven Are Both Action and Path

First ask: all ten are called ‘paths of action’ — are the ten then of the same standing? The treatise answers that they are not. The last three (greed, hatred, wrong view) are path alone and not action — the action is that ‘volition’ which arises in association with them; and that volition turns and proceeds along with greed, hatred, and wrong view and does its doing by their force, so that greed, hatred, and wrong view are the road that volition walks, and this is ‘the road of action.’ The first seven (killing, theft, misconduct, false speech, divisive speech, harsh speech, frivolous speech) are themselves bodily and verbal action, and hence are action; and at the same time the volition able to set going bodily and verbal action must turn with them as its object-field, and hence they are also the road that action walks. The two layers of sense taken together establish the single name ‘path of action.’

The easy error is to suppose that ‘path of action’ is one label held in common by all ten, and that once stuck on the matter is done. It is not so — the treatise is here expressly taking a compound word apart into two senses, to show that it governs at once two classes of dharma of different standing. Hence the treatise says, “in saying ‘path of action’ it fully displays both the sense of action and the sense of the road of action”: the two occurrences of ‘path of action’ in that one sentence are not of one meaning.

Will it not then be confusing for one name to take in two classes of differing entity? The treatise answers: this is a usage commonly allowed in the writings of the world. Puguang here brings out two ready examples that make the point through: what is commonly allowed in the world, as with the word ‘cart-ox,’ where cart and ox are by nature not of one kind and yet are named in common by one name; and what is commonly allowed in the treatises, as with the word ‘station of consciousness,’ where the four stations of consciousness are likewise not of one kind and yet share one name. Where this lands: when in reading Abhidharma one meets a compound technical name, the first step is not to hunt for its ‘definition’ but to ask, ‘of how many standings is this name put together?’ — so with the path of action, and so likewise with the projecting and completing actions further on.

II. Why the Preparatory and Consequent Stages Do Not Count as Paths of Action

First ask: in taking a life there are always three stretches — the getting ready before setting to work (the preparatory), the moment of the killing itself (the basic), and the momentum left over after the killing is done (the consequent). Since all three stretches are that same matter of killing, why is only the middle stretch counted a path of action?

The treatise gives three grounds, which Puguang takes apart one by one: first, the sentence “because for this and in dependence upon this they turn” is in fact a double fastening — the preparatory turns for the sake of the basic (the sense of heading toward), the consequent turns in dependence upon the basic (the sense of relying on); and since both are established only by looking to the basic, they cannot in turn serve as the basic themselves. Second, it was said above that what a path of action gathers is ‘the coarse grade’ (the weighty portion), and the preparatory and the consequent are not the weighty portion. Third, and most important: to be established as a path of action means that by it the things within and without have increase and decrease; apart from this stretch there is no such working. Puguang here cites the Mahāvibhāṣā to gloss the words: what one dwells in is called ‘outer,’ and lifespan and the rest are called ‘inner’ — that is, ‘outer’ points to the lands and vessels of the environing result, and ‘inner’ to the body and life of the direct result.

The easy error is to read the three grounds as three sentences of one meaning. Their points of view differ entirely — the first asks ‘which depends upon which,’ the second asks ‘light or weighty,’ the third asks ‘is there a real working of increase and decrease.’ The third is the standard; the first two are the grounds.

Where this lands: this is a measuring rule for the whole chapter on action. Thereafter, whenever it is asked whether something counts as a path of action, one first measures it by the third: has it really made the things within and without increase or decrease? If the answer is no, then however long the preparatory work goes on, it is still outside the door.

III. Cutting Off the Wholesome Roots (1): Just Which Kind of Wholesome Is Cut Off

First ask: when it is said that someone has ‘cut off his wholesome roots,’ is it all his wholesome that is cut off? The treatise answers as narrowly as can be — only the wholesome roots of the desire realm acquired by birth. The wholesome acquired by birth is that portion which is had from birth and needs no applied cultivation; as for the wholesome acquired through preparation (that portion which arises only when effort is put in), the treatise says, “because the wholesome roots acquired through preparation had already fallen away before this” — that portion was lost long before the cutting off of the wholesome, and its turn does not come now. And the wholesome of the form and formless realms was never accomplished to begin with, so there is no question of cutting it off.

The author here also reconciles an objection drawn from the text of another school’s treatise: the Treatise of Designations says, ‘by just this much it is said that this person has cut off the wholesome roots of the three realms.’ If the three realms are really cut off, does that not contradict ‘only the desire realm is cut off’? The treatise answers: that is said with regard to the wholesome roots of the upper realms becoming thereby yet more remote — this continuum is no longer a vessel for the wholesome dharmas of the upper realms; it is not that the wholesome of the upper realms is really cut off.

The easy error is to hear ‘cutting off the wholesome roots’ and imagine ‘this person has not one particle of the wholesome left in him.’ The scope the treatise establishes is in fact very small: only that portion of the wholesome of the desire realm which is had without effort. Where this lands: this point first reins in a terrifying picture, and also lays the ground for how ‘restoring the wholesome roots’ is possible at all — it is precisely because the scope of the cutting off is narrow that the restoring can be.

IV. Cutting Off the Wholesome Roots (2): What Kind of Wrong View Is Able to Cut

First ask: there are ten unwholesome paths of action; why is it wrong view alone that can cut off the wholesome roots, and why must it further be restricted to a wrong view ‘of the high grade and complete’? The treatise answers: a wrong view able to cut off the wholesome must be one that decisively denies cause and result. To deny cause is decisively to refuse that there are good conduct and evil conduct; to deny result is decisively to refuse the maturations felt from those deeds. If either is wanting, the force is not enough.

Why then does the root treatise say in another place that ‘what cuts off the wholesome roots are the unwholesome roots of the high grade’? The author’s answer is a fine one: it is because the unwholesome roots are able to draw forth wrong view, and so people push the credit for cutting off the wholesome onto the unwholesome roots — as when fire burns a village and the fire was set by a thief, and the world says ‘that thief burned the village.’ What burned the village was in fact the fire.

The easy error is to read ‘wrong view’ as ordinary crookedness of opinion. The wrong view the treatise speaks of has a hard threshold — it must be decisive, and it must deny both cause and result. Half believing and half doubting does not count; denying only one half does not count. Where this lands: this point is at the same time the key to ‘restoring the wholesome roots’ further on — the conditions for restoring are ‘doubt’ or ‘right view’; and since cutting off requires a ‘decision,’ then as soon as that decision loosens into a doubt, the wholesome roots have a road back. Cutting off and restoring, the opening and the shutting, turn upon the same hinge.

V. Cutting Off the Wholesome Roots (3): One Stroke of the Blade, or a Grinding Away Portion by Portion

First ask: are the wholesome roots of the nine grades cut through all at once by a wrong view of a single instant, or ground away grade by grade? Here the treatise records two accounts together. One holds cutting off all at once, with the simile of the path of seeing where the afflictions abandoned through seeing are exhausted at one stroke; the correct sense the author takes is cutting off by degrees — the wholesome roots of the nine grades being cut off by degrees by wrong views of the nine grades matched against them in reverse, with the simile of the path of cultivation where the afflictions abandoned through cultivation are cut off grade by grade: the lowest of the low grade of wrong view cuts off the highest of the high grade of wholesome root, and so on down to the lowest of the low grade of wholesome root being cut off by the highest of the high grade of wrong view.

The account of cutting off by degrees has the wording of the root treatise for its proof: the root treatise says, ‘what are called the wholesome roots that occur together with feebleness? They are that portion last relinquished at the time of cutting off the wholesome roots’ — since there is a ‘portion last relinquished,’ it appears that others were relinquished before, and this is precisely gradation. How then is the root treatise’s other saying, ‘the unwholesome roots of the high grade can cut off the wholesome roots,’ to be reckoned? Puguang states this layer very plainly: the root treatise speaks of the cutting off in reverse order, and though the cutting off of the first eight grades is also called cutting off, it is not yet exhausted; only when the ninth grade is cut is it ultimately exhausted, and so that sentence is a statement of hidden intent made with regard to ‘the ultimate,’ not a saying that the first eight grades cannot cut off the wholesome.

Here, by the way, the form of the passage on cutting off the wholesome should be made clear, for it is the densest passage in the fascicle. Within this one long passage there are five matched pairs of ‘first setting out a divergent account, then stating the correct sense,’ and the pattern is invariably this: first there comes a sentence with “there is another master who says” or “there is another master who declares,” and thereafter “stated thus” leads out the correct sense the author takes. The five pairs are, in order — the realm taken as object by the wrong view that cuts off the wholesome (one master holding that it takes only what has outflows and only its own realm; the author taking that it takes all things for its object); the manner of cutting off the nine grades (one master holding cutting off all at once; the author taking cutting off by degrees, as in this section); whether one may stop midway in the course of cutting off (one master holding that there is never a stopping midway; the author taking that both stopping and not stopping occur); which is relinquished first, discipline or the wholesome roots (one master holding that discipline is relinquished first; the author taking that both are relinquished together); and whether the restoring of the wholesome is by degrees or all at once (one master holding restoration by degrees in nine grades; the author taking restoration all at once and thereafter manifesting by degrees). Besides these five pairs there are three places that do not follow the pattern: one is the account that the two wrong views denying cause and denying result have a before and after like the uninterrupted and the liberation paths, which is an added divergent account with no correct sense set against it; the second is the account of Jambudvīpa alone, and the third the account that a woman’s body cannot cut off the wholesome — and in these last two the author does not use the manner of “stated thus,” but cites the text of the root treatise and strikes back directly, in a plainly weightier tone. The most important thing in reading this passage is that, at each sentence of divergent account, one should first make out whether the next sentence is ‘stating the correct sense’ or ‘refuting.’

The easy error is to see two accounts standing side by side and suppose the author vague. He is not — the author here plainly takes cutting off by degrees, and cites the text of the root treatise for proof. Where this lands: that the cutting off of the wholesome roots is a process and not an instant matters most of all in practice — for so long as one grade of wholesome root remains, the other grades may be raised again through it, and then it does not yet count as cutting off the wholesome. Leave one portion, and a road is left.

VI. Cutting Off the Wholesome Roots (4): Where It Is Cut, in What Body, and by What Sort of Person

First ask: can this matter of cutting off the wholesome roots happen anywhere and to anyone? The treatise’s answer is a threefold restriction.

First, the place: only in the three continents of the human destiny, not in the evil destinies, and not in the destiny of the gods. The reason is very concrete — in the evil destinies neither defiled nor undefiled discernment is firm enough to bear up such a ‘decision’; in the destiny of the gods the results of action are seen directly before one, so that one could not deny cause and result even if one wished. And within the three continents Uttarakuru must further be excluded, since the people there have no exceedingly evil ‘āśaya.’ Fabao here glosses it expressly: āśaya, which here means inclination of mind — that is, the leaning of the heart. Once this gloss is set, the whole passage’s “an evil āśaya too unsettled” and “an evil āśaya exceedingly firm and deep” become clear.

Second, the body: only the body of a man or of a woman, since the will and intent of these two bodies are decisive.

Third, the class of conduct: only a person who walks by views, not one who walks by craving. One who walks by craving has an evil inclination too unsettled — wavering and unstable, striking no deep root; one who walks by views has an evil inclination exceedingly firm and deep. By this principle the ṣaṇḍha and the rest also cannot cut off the wholesome roots, since they belong to the class that walks by craving.

The easy error is to read these three restrictions as a rating of qualifications, as though ‘being able to cut off the wholesome’ had become a kind of capacity. It is quite the reverse — what the treatise points out is that to cut off the wholesome roots thoroughly requires a rare firmness; and that firmness, turned to the side of evil, becomes the deepest of disasters. Where this lands: this point is most useful read backward — a person whose mind is not settled enough cannot be thoroughly bad, and that means he can turn back at any moment.

VII. Cutting Off the Wholesome Roots (5): The Entity of the Cutting Off Is ‘Non-Acquisition’; the Conditions of the Restoring Are ‘Doubt’ and ‘View’

First ask: when the wholesome roots are cut off, what after all is the thing that is cut off? The treatise answers with great precision: the cutting off of the wholesome has ‘non-acquisition’ for its entity. That is to say, at the stage of cutting off the wholesome the ‘acquisition’ of the wholesome dharmas no longer arises and ‘non-acquisition’ arises in succession; the stage at which non-acquisition has arisen in place of the acquisition of the wholesome roots is what is called cutting off the wholesome roots.

By what, then, are they restored after being cut off? The treatise says: by ‘doubt’ or by ‘the holding of view.’ That is, with regard to cause and result there sometimes arises in the mind a doubt — ‘perhaps there is such a thing after all’; or else right view arises outright — ‘cause and result decidedly are.’ At that time the acquisition of the wholesome roots is restored, and so it is called restoring the wholesome roots. The restoring is all at once and only thereafter manifests by degrees, and the treatise closes it with an excellent simile: as when illness is removed all at once while strength returns by degrees — the sickness ends in a moment, the strength comes back slowly.

Can the wholesome be restored within the present body? The treatise says it can, save only for one who has committed a deed of immediate retribution — such a person can restore it only when he is about to end his life from the hells, or when he is about to take birth there. The treatise further divides two pairs: one who cut off the wholesome by the force of a cause restores it when about to die; one who cut it off by the force of a condition restores it when about to be born. One whose inclination alone was spoiled while his preparatory conduct was not can restore it in this very life; one whose inclination was spoiled and his preparatory conduct as well must wait until the body is destroyed.

The easy error is to imagine ‘non-acquisition’ as some solid thing carried away. It is not carried away; it is that acquisition does not arise and non-acquisition does — as the lamp was not carried off, but simply stopped shining. Where this lands: the condition for restoring the wholesome turns out to be ‘doubt’ — this is the sentence in the fascicle most worth remembering. For a man who denies cause and result with flat finality, the first step in saving him is not to persuade him to believe, but to shake that ‘decision’ loose into a question mark.

VIII. Cutting Off the Wholesome Roots (6): Cutting Off the Wholesome and Falling into the Class Fixed in Wrongness Are Not One Matter

First ask: is a man who has cut off his wholesome roots thereby fallen into the class fixed in wrongness? The treatise here makes an analysis by four alternatives, and tells us plainly that these are two matters. First alternative, cutting off the wholesome without falling into the class fixed in wrongness: as with Pūraṇa and his sort. Second alternative, falling into the class fixed in wrongness without cutting off the wholesome: as with Ajātaśatru and his sort. Third alternative, having both: as with Devadatta and his sort. Fourth alternative, having neither: namely all persons apart from the three marks above.

The easy error is to take two names both very grave for one and the same matter, and to infer the one wherever the other is seen. The treatise uses the analysis by four alternatives to take them apart precisely to guard against such confusion — that two categories overlap does not make them equal.

Where this lands: the analysis by four alternatives is the most frequently used tool in Abhidharma, and this is its only appearance in this fascicle. Thereafter, whenever two technical names look as though they overlapped, first try asking: is there an instance of ‘the first without the second’? Is there an instance of ‘the second without the first’? If both questions can be answered, the two names must be established apart. As for the author, he has already set out three ready personal names as instances of the four alternatives, so that the reader need seek no further examples — the author has finished the demonstration himself.

IX. How Many Paths of Action Can Turn Together with Volition in a Single Mind

First ask: in one thought-moment of one man, how many paths of action at most can turn together with that ‘volition’? The treatise speaks of two sides. On the unwholesome side, from one to eight; on the wholesome side, spoken of generally, up to ten.

Why does the unwholesome stop at eight? Because when the last three (greed, hatred, wrong view) are present by their own force they decidedly cannot run side by side — one cannot in a single thought-moment give rise to greed and to hatred at once. The first seven are actions of form and can, by preparatory work done earlier, all be brought to completion at this moment, so that at most seven paths of action of form plus one of mental action makes exactly eight. Nine and ten therefore do not occur.

Why can the wholesome side reach ten? Because non-greed, non-hatred, and non-delusion can arise together, and with the seven limbs of the wholesome of form added they make just ten. The treatise here further divides two ways of counting, ‘taken separately with regard to what is displayed’ and ‘taken generally with regard to both hidden and displayed’ — by what is displayed, the three numbers one, eight, and five must be blocked out; by hidden and displayed together, nothing need be blocked out, since apart from discipline there are the cases of one limb, eight limbs, and five limbs.

The easy error is to treat this passage as mere play with numbers. It is in fact answering a very concrete question: evil comes piecemeal, whereas the wholesome can arise in one whole sheet. The number of the unwholesome is limited by greed and hatred not arising together, while the number of the wholesome is filled out because the three wholesome roots can turn together.

Where this lands: that more wholesome than unwholesome can be accomplished at once within a single thought-moment is not a figure of speech but a reckoning of Abhidharma. If in reading this far one has retained only the two ranges of one-to-eight and one-to-ten, one has dropped the most important sentence of the passage.

X. The Destinies and the Places: ‘Possession’ and ‘Being in Act’ Are Two Rules

The stanza of this section presses the answer very tight; read it through first and then look at the prose, and one will not lose the way. The unwholesome side: “of the unwholesome, in the hells, harsh, frivolous, and hatred extend to both; greed and wrong view are possessed; Uttarakuru possesses the last three; frivolous speech extends to being in act and possession; the remaining desire-realm ten extend to both” — in the hells the three of harsh speech, frivolous speech, and hatred ‘extend to both’ (to possession and to being in act), while greed and wrong view are only possessed; Uttarakuru ‘possesses the last three’ (greed, hatred, and wrong view being possessed alone), while frivolous speech alone ‘extends to being in act and possession’; and in the rest of the desire realm all ten ‘extend to both.’ The wholesome side: “of the wholesome, in all places the last three extend to being in act and possession; in the formless realm and the Heaven of Non-Percipient Beings the first seven are possessed alone; in the remaining places they extend to possession and being in act, save the hells and Uttarakuru” — non-greed, non-hatred, and non-delusion extend to being in act and possession in all places; the seven limbs of body and speech are possessed alone in the formless realm and the Heaven of Non-Percipient Beings; and in the remaining places they extend to possession and being in act, save the hells and Uttarakuru.

First ask: when it is said that a certain destiny ‘has’ a certain path of action, is it said that the beings there are really doing it, or that they carry it about with them? The treatise here divides the two matters with two rules — possession (carrying it, the seed uncut) and being in act (really arising here and now). One and the same path of action may be possessed without being in act.

The picture within the hells is thus a strange one: harsh speech, frivolous speech, and hatred extend to both — they rail at one another, hence harsh speech; they wail and cry out, hence frivolous speech; they are coarse and hard and perverse in body and mind and hate one another, hence hatred. Whereas greed and wrong view are possessed only and not in act, since there is no lovable object-field there (greed having nothing to be greedy for) and the results of action are seen directly before them (so that denial of cause and result cannot be carried through). As for the five of killing, theft, misconduct, false speech, and divisive speech, the treatise gives a reason for each: they die when their action is spent, hence no killing; no possessions and no women, hence no theft and no misconduct; lying is of no use, hence no false speech; they are constantly in estrangement, hence no divisive speech.

Uttarakuru is strange in another way: greed, hatred, and wrong view are decidedly possessed and not in act, and only frivolous speech extends to both — because the people there sometimes sing and chant with a defiled mind, and yet have no evil inclination. The treatise also notes in passing how the people there practice what is not the pure life: when a man and a woman have given rise to a defiled mind they take hands and walk to a tree; if the branches droop and cover them, they know it is permitted; if the branches do not droop, they are ashamed together and part.

As for the wholesome side, non-greed, non-hatred, and non-delusion extend to both throughout the three realms and five destinies; the seven limbs of body and speech in the formless realm and the Heaven of Non-Percipient Beings can only be possessed and decidedly are not in act. Puguang here takes the difference finer still: among the three classes of gods, ghosts, and animals, the first seven paths of action have only the portion gathered under ‘the intermediate’ and no non-discipline; in the three human continents both the intermediate and non-discipline are found.

The easy error is to read ‘there is no killing in the hells’ as ‘there is no mutual injury in the hells.’ What the treatise says is that there is no path of action of killing — because the beings there die when their action is spent and are not killed to death, so that the limb of ‘the other’s dying’ required by the path of action of killing is not made up.

Where this lands: the most useful sentence in this passage is the two rules. Thereafter, whenever one reads that ‘a certain place has a certain dharma,’ first ask: is this said of possession, or of being in act? Separate the two rules, and many an apparently contradictory scriptural passage unties itself.

XI. The Three Results of the Ten Paths of Action: Maturation, Homogeneous Outflow, and Dominance

First ask: what does one summon by doing one evil path of action? The treatise says three things — the maturation result, the homogeneous outflow result, and the dominance result.

The maturation result is said with regard to the general retribution: practicing, cultivating, or doing much, by that force one is born among the nārakas. The homogeneous outflow result is said with regard to that portion experienced among humans after coming forth from the hells, and each of the ten has its own shape: one who kills is short in the measure of life; one who takes what is not given is destitute of goods; one who commits sexual misconduct has a wife who is not chaste; one who speaks falsely meets with much slander; one who speaks divisively is estranged from kin and friends; one who speaks harshly forever hears words unpleasant to hear; one who speaks frivolously has speech that carries no weight; one who is greedy grows the more greedy, one who hates has his hatred the more increased, one of wrong view has his delusion the more increased. The dominance result is said with regard to the goods of livelihood outside the body: by killing, outward things have little luster; by taking what is not given, there is much frost and hail; by sexual misconduct, much dust; by false speech, much foul stench; by divisive speech, the dwelling place is steep and crooked; by harsh speech, the fields have many brambles and are stony, thin, and salt so that they are unfit for tillage; by frivolous speech, the seasons change and go awry; by greed, few fruits; by hatred, acrid fruits; by wrong view, few fruits or none.

The three results established, the treatise at once adds a question after the dominance result, pressing whether the two results of maturation and homogeneous outflow come from one cause or two: “is it one action of killing that first summons the maturation result of the nārakas and afterward makes the measure of life in the human destiny short? Or is there something further?” — is it the same action of killing that first summons the maturation there and then makes the human lifespan short, or is there another cause? The treatise sets out two accounts and makes no choice between them. The first account (“there is another master who declares”) holds one cause: “it is just that same action of killing that first summons the maturation there and afterward the homogeneous outflow here” — one and the same action of killing, summoning the maturation there first and the homogeneous outflow here afterward. The second account (“and there is another who says”) holds two causes: “the causes of the two results are not the same — the former means the preparatory stage, the latter the basic stage” — what summons the maturation is the preparatory stretch, what summons the homogeneous outflow is the basic stretch; so that although one speaks in general of a single ‘killing,’ it is in truth spoken of as gathering in both the basic and its retinue. The two accounts stand side by side, and the treatise goes no further, passing no verdict.

After this passage the treatise adds one important closing sentence: the ‘homogeneous outflow result’ spoken of here is “not beyond the maturation and dominance results; it is conventionally called homogeneous outflow with regard to a small likeness.” That is to say, this cell of short human life is not really a further entity of result established beyond the maturation result and the dominance result — set against wholesome action it is a maturation, set against the action of killing it is a dominance; only because there is that small likeness between ‘cutting off another’s life’ and ‘shortness in the measure of life’ (both being a diminishing of life) is it conventionally named homogeneous outflow. Read this with care: the ‘three’ of the three results is a division by gates of sense, and does not mean that one action necessarily produces three mutually unrelated entities of result.

The author here also poses an objection of his own: the span of human life is itself summoned by wholesome action; how can a short life be called a homogeneous outflow of killing? Answer: it is not said that a person’s span of life is the result of the action of killing; only that because of killing the measure of life becomes short — the action of killing is a cause that makes an obstruction to the life faculty, so that it cannot abide long. Fabao puts this question still more plainly: the life faculty in a good destiny, long or short, is a result of wholesome action; how then should a short life be the homogeneous outflow result of killing? The answer lies in those three words, ‘cause of obstruction.’

The easy error is to read the homogeneous outflow result as ‘a one-to-one correspondence of deed and retribution,’ and then, meeting a good man who dies young, to think the treatise mistaken. The treatise’s account is far more precise: the lifespan is given by wholesome action, the shortening is taken by evil action — two forces at work upon one matter, not one.

Where this lands: what is most useful in the establishing of the three results is that it divides the effect of one action into three layers — where one falls in the next life (maturation), what habits and circumstances one carries on returning among humans (homogeneous outflow), and what even the hills, streams, and fields outside the body become (dominance). The third layer is the most easily overlooked, and it is just there that this passage strikes the reader: one man’s evil will change the look of a whole stretch of land.

XII. Why Wrong Livelihood Must Be Established as a Limb Apart from Wrong Speech and Wrong Action

First ask: the reverse of the eightfold noble path has the three limbs of wrong speech, wrong action, and wrong livelihood. Yet since ‘livelihood’ too is carried on by the two actions of body and speech, where is there a wrong livelihood apart from wrong speech and wrong action? The treatise’s answer is very deft: indeed there is no further thing; this is a regrouping of the same set of actions — the verbal and bodily actions arising from hatred and delusion are called, in that order, wrong speech and wrong action; the two actions of body and speech arising from greed are, because they are hard to be rid of, separately given the name wrong livelihood.

Why are those arising from greed peculiarly hard to be rid of? The treatise says: greed can rob a sentient being of his mind, and the action raised by greed is hard to restrain and guard against. So that people might cultivate earnestly in the portion of ‘right livelihood,’ the Buddha expressly divided it out and spoke of it apart.

The easy error is to suppose wrong livelihood a third new thing and to go hunting for an entity of its own. It has no entity of its own — it is a piece cut out afresh from wrong speech and wrong action according to ‘the affliction it depends upon.’

Where this lands: this passage demonstrates one of the Buddha’s ways of establishing technical names — the same heap of dharmas, cut a different way, yields one more important warning. The three limbs are not three heaps; they are two ways of cutting laid one upon the other. And the reason for making this extra cut is only three words: because it is hard to be rid of. Whatever is peculiarly easy to slip past must be peculiarly singled out and watched; this is a compassion in the establishing of technical names, not a fondness for classification.

XIII. The Scope of Wrong Livelihood: A Narrowing Turned Back by the Text of a Sūtra

First ask: since wrong livelihood is ‘the bodily and verbal action arising from greed,’ ought it to be narrowed further, so that only what arises from a greed aimed at keeping oneself alive should count? The treatise here records one master’s holding: only the two actions of body and speech arising from a greed that takes ‘the requisites of life’ for its object are called wrong livelihood, and those arising from any other greed are not — the ground being that to perform song and dance for one’s own sport and delight is not for the sustaining of life.

The author here does not record it alongside but refutes it outright: this contradicts the text of the sūtra, and so decidedly does not stand in principle. In the Sūtra on the Aggregate of Precepts, the World-Honored One establishes even the watching of elephant fights and the like within wrong livelihood — since that is a wrong taking in of outward object-fields whereby life is spent in vain.

The easy error is to take this passage for one more instance of ‘two accounts recorded together.’ It is not — in this fascicle, when a divergent account is met with, it is mostly first set out and then corrected, both parties being set forth; but here the author cites the sacred teaching and strikes back directly, in a plainly weightier tone. In reading a treatise one must be able to tell these two tones apart: the one is ‘there is a further account,’ the other is “it decidedly does not stand in principle.”

Where this lands: that master’s narrowing looks scrupulous, but it in fact shrinks wrong livelihood down to the single matter of ‘greed for food and clothing’; the sūtra, by taking in the watching of elephant fights as well, says in effect: whatever is a wrong taking in of outward object-fields whereby life is dragged emptily along falls within wrong livelihood. Widened thus, this limb at last really governs daily life.

XIV. The Beginning of the Gates of Result: First Set Up the Way of Asking at the ‘Gate’

First ask: the root treatise says that results are of five kinds — maturation, homogeneous outflow, release from bondage, human effort, and dominance. How many results, then, has each class of action? With this one question the treatise enters that long string of numbers in the latter half of the fascicle. Before reading it the way of asking must be set up clearly, or the whole passage is nothing but a table.

The treatise’s way of asking is this: take one class of action as ‘cause,’ take one class of dharma as ‘result,’ and ask how many of the five results this pair can be matched in. So every cell is a three-part question of the form ‘such an action has such a dharma for how many results.’ The first gate asks first about ‘the path that cuts off’ — what is called a path is that which can both realize cessation through discernment and cut off the afflictions, that is, the uninterrupted path. The path that cuts off is of two kinds, with outflows and without: action of the path that cuts off with outflows has the five results in full; that without outflows lacks maturation (what is without outflows summons no maturation); the remaining wholesome and unwholesome actions with outflows lack release from bondage (they cannot realize cessation through discernment); the remaining actions without outflows and the indeterminate actions lack both maturation and release from bondage, and only three results remain.

The treatise here gives a definition of each of the five results: the maturation result is the lovable maturation summoned within its own level by the path that cuts off; the homogeneous outflow result is the like dharmas arising afterward within its own level, equal or increased; the result of release from bondage is the unconditioned cessation through discernment realized by cutting off the afflictions through the force of this path; the result of human effort is the coexistent dharmas drawn along by this path, the path of liberation, what is cultivated, and what is cut off; the dominance result is the remaining conditioned dharmas apart from its own entity, excepting only those already arisen beforehand. Puguang analyzes the term ‘result of human effort’ further into four kinds: the co-arisen result of human effort, the uninterrupted result of human effort, the result of human effort at an interval, and the result of human effort not arising; Fabao merely glosses it briefly in three phrases — by ‘coexistent’ are meant co-arisen dharmas, by ‘liberation’ what arises uninterruptedly, that is, the path of liberation, and by ‘cultivated’ the future cultivation and cutting off.

The easy error is to see numbers and set about memorizing them, and after memorizing still not to know how the numbers came about. In fact every cell can be worked out for oneself: first ask whether between this pair there is a relation of ‘summoning a maturation,’ whether there is a relation of ‘flowing on in likeness,’ whether there is a relation of ‘realizing cessation through discernment,’ whether there is a relation of ‘what is achieved by function,’ and whether there is a relation of ‘not obstructing’ — answer the five questions, and the number comes out.

Where this lands: what is to be learned in this passage is not the numbers but the five questions. Learn the five questions, and all five gates below can be worked out for oneself; work them out and then check against the text of the treatise, and it becomes self-verification.

XV. The First Gate: Wholesome, Unwholesome, and Indeterminate Action Set Against One Another

First ask: how many results has wholesome action with a wholesome dharma for its result? The treatise answers four, all but maturation — because the maturation summoned by wholesome action is of indeterminate nature and cannot be a wholesome dharma. With the unwholesome it has two (human effort and dominance) — wholesome action does not flow out an unwholesome homogeneous outflow, does not summon an unwholesome maturation, and still less can realize cessation through discernment. With the indeterminate it has three, all but homogeneous outflow and release from bondage.

Unwholesome action with a wholesome dharma for its result has two (human effort and dominance); with the unwholesome, three, all but maturation and release from bondage; with the indeterminate, four, all but release from bondage. Here one cell in particular needs explaining: unwholesome action having the indeterminate for a homogeneous outflow result — how can that be? The treatise poses and answers the question itself: it means the all-pervading unwholesome and the remaining unwholesome actions abandoned through the seeing of suffering, which have for their homogeneous outflow the indeterminate dharmas of the grade of the view of a real person and the extreme view.

Indeterminate action with a wholesome dharma for its result has two; with the unwholesome, three, all but maturation and release from bondage; with the indeterminate, three, all but maturation and release from bondage. Here too a cell needs explaining: indeterminate action having the unwholesome for a homogeneous outflow — namely that the indeterminate actions of the grade of the view of a real person and the extreme view have the unwholesome dharmas for their homogeneous outflow.

The easy error is to suppose that ‘the wholesome does not summon an unwholesome homogeneous outflow’ is absolute, and so, seeing those two cells, to think the text of the treatise mistaken. The treatise stops precisely at those two cells to pose and answer the question itself, which shows that it knows these are the places where one is most easily stuck.

Where this lands: what this gate teaches is a rule of thumb — when the number in some cell does not agree with intuition, go first and see whether the treatise has appended a note to that cell. In this fascicle, every cell that has a note appended is a cell that has an exception.

XVI. The Second Gate: Past, Present, and Future Action Set Against One Another

First ask: is there a direction in time between action and result? The treatise answers that there is, and a rigid one. The stanza has only four lines: “past with respect to the three, each four; present with respect to future, likewise; present with respect to present, two results; future with respect to future, three results” — ‘past with respect to the three, each four’ says that past action has four results with respect to the dharmas of each of the three times; ‘present with respect to future, likewise’ says that present action with respect to future dharmas likewise has four; ‘present with respect to present, two results’ says that present action with respect to present dharmas has only two; ‘future with respect to future, three results’ says that future action with respect to future dharmas has three. In all four lines not one speaks of ‘a later action with respect to an earlier dharma,’ and this blank is where the reason given below lies. Past action has four results with respect to the dharmas of each of the three times, excepting only release from bondage. Present action has four with respect to the future (as above), and two with respect to the present (human effort and dominance). Future action has three with respect to the future, all but homogeneous outflow and release from bondage.

Most important is that closing sentence of reason: the reason it is not said that ‘a later action has an earlier result’ is that a dharma that is before decidedly cannot be the result of an action that is after.

The easy error is to read this sentence as a smooth supplementary remark. It is in fact the foundation of the whole set of gates of result — the result cannot run ahead of the cause. Once this point loosens, every cell above must be reckoned anew.

Where this lands: this gate gives the reader the most labor-saving check of all: wherever a cell says that some action has an earlier dharma for its result, that cell is certainly wrong. One rule sifts out a whole class of misreadings, and this is where Abhidharma is at its most economical.

XVII. The Third Gate: The Same Level and a Different Level Set Against Each Other

First ask: will action and result within the same level differ from action and result across levels? The treatise answers that they will. The action of any level whatever has four results with respect to dharmas of the same level, all but release from bondage. If this action is with outflows, it has only two results with respect to dharmas of a different level (human effort and dominance) — because what has outflows falls within a realm and level, and cannot flow across a level. If this action is without outflows, it has three results with respect to dharmas of a different level, all but maturation and release from bondage; and the treatise here expressly adds a sentence: because what is without outflows does not fall under affiliation to a realm, the homogeneous outflow result is not blocked out here.

The easy error is to memorize the two numbers for the with-outflows and without-outflows crossing of levels (two and three) without knowing where the difference lies. The difference lies exactly in the cell of homogeneous outflow: the homogeneous outflow of what has outflows is blocked by realm and level; that of what is without outflows cannot be blocked.

Where this lands: this gate is in fact saying something very interesting — the wholesome with outflows has a native place; the wholesome without outflows has none. The same stretch of effort, while it still carries outflows, can have its effect only within its own storey; once without outflows, it can flow across storeys. This sentence can be carried straight on to the gate of learner and beyond learning that follows.

XVIII. The Fourth Gate: The Learner, the One beyond Learning, and Neither Set Against One Another

First ask: when the three classes of action of different stages of practice are set against one another, why are the numbers of results so unsymmetrical? The treatise sets them out: the action of a learner has three results with respect to the dharmas of a learner, three with respect to those of one beyond learning, three with respect to those of neither (the first two excepting maturation and release from bondage, the last excepting maturation and homogeneous outflow). The action of one beyond learning has with respect to the dharmas of a learner only one result (dominance), with respect to those of one beyond learning three, with respect to those of neither two. The action of neither has with respect to the dharmas of a learner two, with respect to those of one beyond learning two, with respect to those of neither the five results in full.

The most unsymmetrical is that the action of one beyond learning has with respect to the dharmas of a learner only a dominance result left. Why? Because the order of practice runs from the learner into the beyond-learning, and not the reverse. Puguang explains it: the root treatise speaks with regard to like nature set against like and to the successive producing of one from another, so that the learner may be a cause for the one beyond learning while the one beyond learning is not a cause for the learner — the action of the stage beyond learning being no longer a homogeneous cause for the dharmas of the learner’s stage, not even homogeneous outflow can be matched, and only a dominance of ‘not obstructing’ is left.

The easy error is to see ‘the five results in full’ appearing only in the cell of neither set against neither, and to suppose that the actions of the ordinary being are the most powerful. It is not so. One must see clearly how wide are the dharmas that this cell gathers: the wholesome and unwholesome actions with outflows able to summon a maturation are within it, and so is the path that cuts off with outflows (that is, the mundane uninterrupted path) able to cut off the afflictions and realize cessation; while the dharmas of neither that are set against it further take in the unconditioned cessation through discernment. Hence all five cells — maturation, homogeneous outflow, release from bondage, human effort, dominance — can be matched. The cell of release from bondage in particular must not be misread: the definition the treatise gave itself at the first gate is “the result of release from bondage means the unconditioned cessation through discernment realized by cutting off the afflictions through the force of this path,” and cessation through discernment is an unconditioned dharma, never within the world of outflows at all; the reason the cell of neither has a result of release from bondage is precisely that it can take in that path with outflows which cuts off the afflictions and realizes cessation, and not that it is ‘wholly within the world.’ The higher one goes, the fewer the cells that can be matched, precisely because the dharmas of the higher stages have already escaped those relations.

Where this lands: having read this gate one may look back at the sentence of the seventeenth — what has no native place has, on the contrary, fewer relations. The dwindling of the number of results is not a dwindling of power; it is a dwindling of entanglement.

XIX. The Fifth Gate: Action Abandoned through Seeing, through Cultivation, and Not Subject to Abandonment Set Against One Another

First ask: when the three kinds of action are divided by ‘which path abandons them,’ how do they stand when set against one another? The treatise sets them out: action abandoned through seeing has with respect to dharmas abandoned through seeing three results (all but maturation and release from bondage), with respect to dharmas abandoned through cultivation four (all but release from bondage), with respect to dharmas not subject to abandonment one (dominance). Action abandoned through cultivation has with respect to dharmas abandoned through seeing two, with respect to dharmas abandoned through cultivation four, with respect to dharmas not subject to abandonment three (all but maturation and homogeneous outflow). Action not subject to abandonment has with respect to dharmas abandoned through seeing one, with respect to dharmas abandoned through cultivation two, with respect to dharmas not subject to abandonment four (all but maturation).

The treatise closes with the sentence, “‘all in their order’ means that according as it applies this runs through the several gates above; the practice of abridgment is of its own nature just so.” Yuanhui states the use of this sentence very clearly: the first half says that according as it applies it runs through the causes and results assigned in the several gates above; the second half says that the author’s habit of abridgment in composition is by nature just so. Once this sentence is set, the reader knows why the latter half of the fascicle is everywhere ‘to be known by the example below,’ ‘to be explained on this example,’ ‘to be pondered as is fitting,’ and does not write out every cell.

The easy error is to take ‘all in their order’ for an empty formula and skip it. It is in fact the author’s warrant given to the reader — the treatise has finished teaching the method; the cells that remain, please work out for yourself.

Where this lands: of the six gates in the latter half of this fascicle, few are really written out cell by cell in the text; whether one can read them turns entirely on whether one has really learned the five questions of section XIV. Here one may test oneself once: cover any cell and work it out, and if it comes out, this chapter has been read through.

XX. What Ought and Ought Not to Be Done: Two Rules of Different Width

First ask: the root treatise says there are three, action that ought to be done, action that ought not to be done, and action that neither ought nor ought not to be done — what are their marks? The treatise here records two accounts together without adjudicating.

The first master says: defiled action is called what ought not to be done, since it arises from improper attention; wholesome action is called what ought to be done, since it arises from proper attention. This is a narrow rule, measuring only the defiled and the wholesome.

The second master says: whatever bodily, verbal, or mental action damages the norms is also called what ought not to be done — one ought to walk thus, stand thus, speak thus, wear one’s robes thus, eat and drink thus, and if one does not do accordingly it is what ought not to be done, since it does not accord with the ceremonial usages of the world; and conversely, bodily, verbal, and mental action that accords with the norms is also called what ought to be done. This is a wide rule, taking in deportment and bearing as well.

Hence the scope of the third class (what neither ought nor ought not to be done) differs accordingly. Yuanhui puts this layer with the utmost brevity: by the first account the third class is indeterminate action alone; by the second master’s explanation, the portion of the norms must be taken out and only the remaining indeterminate is left.

The easy error is to suppose the two accounts ranked and to hasten to pick one. The treatise says at the close simply, “this differs in the two accounts according as each applies,” plainly declaring that no choice is made.

Where this lands: the difference between these two rules comes down in daily life to a single question — does deportment count as precept? The first master says no (it is indeterminate); the second says yes. The treatise lays both rules on the table for the reader to see, precisely because this is a question of proportion that recurs in every age.

XXI. One Action Projects One Birth; Many Actions Fill That Birth Out

First ask: how many births can one action project? And by how many actions is one birth projected? The author declares his own school’s position in answer: by one action alone is one birth projected. The ‘one birth’ here means one commonality of sentient beings — it is upon obtaining a commonality that one is said to be born.

At once the treatise poses an objection here: the Venerable Aniruddha says of himself that he once made an offering of a single meal upon an eminent field of merit, and the maturation of it caused him seven times to be born in the Heaven of the Thirty-Three and seven times among humans as a wheel-turning noble emperor, and at last to be born in the great house of the Śākyas abounding in treasure — is this not one action projecting many births? The treatise gives two answers side by side. The first explanation says: he obtained by one action great wealth and abundant goods within a single birth together with the knowledge of former lives, and mounting on that force did further actions able to summon the merits of the remaining births, and so on to the last body — he spoke as he did with regard to the point that ‘it came of that first force’; as when a man takes one gold coin and by trading back and forth obtains a thousand, and then says, ‘it was because I had one gold coin that I gained great wealth.’ The latter explanation says: taking that one offering of a meal as his support, he then gave rise to many eminent volitions and aspirations, some summoning birth among the gods, some among humans, differing instant by instant and ripening earlier and later — so that it is not one action projecting many births.

As for the side of ‘completing,’ the treatise says that though it is but one action that projects one commonality, yet the completing of that commonality is allowed to be by many actions. It is as when a painter first draws the shape with one color and then fills it in with many hues. Hence, though men receive the human body alike, some are complete in every point of limb, faculty, figure, measure, color, strength, and adornment, while others are much diminished. Yuanhui points out the correspondences of this simile: drawing the shape with one color is the simile of the one projecting action, filling in the many hues afterward the simile of the many completing actions; and he notes the old renderings of this pair of names — the projecting action, anciently called the action of general retribution; the completing action, anciently called the action of particular retribution.

The easy error is to read ‘one action projects one birth’ as ‘a whole life is settled by one action.’ The treatise says it very plainly: the projecting is one, the completing is many. What settles that you are born a human is one action; what settles what sort of human you grow into is a countless number of actions.

Where this lands: this point is the pivot in teaching the arising of the world through action. It gives two pieces of news at once — that one cell, the birth you take, is fixed by one action (so there is no need to look everywhere for causes), and that all the manifold differences within a life are filled in by countless actions (so that everywhere there is still something to be done).

XXII. Why the Two Absorptions without Mind and ‘Acquisition’ Cannot Project

First ask: since all dharmas having a maturation extend alike to projecting and completing, are there any exceptions? The treatise answers that there are two. The two absorptions without mind (the absorption without perception and the absorption of cessation), though they have maturation, yet have no force to project the commonality of sentient beings, because they are not coexistent with the several actions; ‘acquisition’ likewise has no force to project, because it does not share one result with the several actions. All the rest extend to both projecting and completing.

The treatise here also states the general rule in full: all unwholesome dharmas and the wholesome dharmas with outflows, having maturation, extend alike to projecting and completing; it is only because the force of action is most eminent that the single word ‘action’ is set up to stand for them. Of these, what is coexistent with action can both project and complete; what is not coexistent with action can only complete and not project, its force being feeble.

The easy error is to be puzzled at “the two absorptions without mind, though they have maturation.” Since they have maturation, why can they not project? The answer is in the two words ‘coexistent’: to project the commonality of sentient beings a thing must exist at the same time as the action, and in the absorptions without mind the workings of mind have ceased at the moment of entry, so that they are not coexistent with action, and therefore have result but no force of projecting.

Where this lands: this section is in fact supplying a boundary line to the section before — the threshold for projecting is far higher than the threshold for completing. Having a maturation is only the ticket of entry; the thing must further be coexistent with action and share a result with action to be fit to fix the skeleton of a period of life. Reading this and looking back at ‘one action projects one birth,’ one sees how weighty that word ‘one’ is.

XXIII. The Three Obstructions: The Obstruction of Action, of the Afflictions, and of Maturation

First ask: the Bhagavat says that grave obstructions are three; what is the entity of each? The treatise brings them out one by one. The obstruction of action is the five deeds of immediate retribution — harming one’s mother, harming one’s father, harming an arhat, splitting a harmonious Saṅgha, drawing blood from the Buddha’s body with an evil mind. The obstruction of the afflictions requires a finer division: afflictions are of two classes, the first of frequent occurrence (arising constantly), the second fierce (of the high grade); and only that class of frequent occurrence is named the obstruction of the afflictions. The obstruction of maturation is the whole of the three evil destinies, together with Uttarakuru within the human destiny and the Heaven of Non-Percipient Beings.

Why should the fierce ones not count as an obstruction? The treatise’s reason is worth long pondering: the afflictions of the high grade, though fierce, are easily subdued and removed because they do not arise constantly; whereas the afflictions of frequent occurrence among the low grade, though not fierce, are hard to subdue and remove — because their constant occurrence makes an opening hard to come by. The treatise also states the manner of their growth: with the low grade as condition the middle arises, with the middle as condition the high arises again, so that the path able to subdue and remove them has no chance to arise. Yuanhui closes this with a neat twofold division: those of frequent occurrence are spoken of as an obstruction; those that are fierce but do not arise constantly are not spoken of as an obstruction.

What, then, does this obstruction obstruct? The treatise answers: it obstructs the noble path, and the wholesome roots that are the preparatory practice for the noble path. The treatise further adds: within the obstruction of action the other determinate actions ought in principle to be spoken of as well (those that decidedly summon an evil destiny, birth from the egg, birth from moisture, the body of a woman, an eighth existence, and the like); only, the five deeds of immediate retribution are by the five causes and conditions of place, destiny, birth, result, and person the most easily seen and the most easily known, and so it is of them in particular that we speak here.

The three obstructions established, the treatise must also ask whether there is gravity and lightness among them. What it gives is a twofold statement, and Puguang expressly marks this place as the explanations of two masters. The first explanation is that sentence of the treatise itself: “among these three obstructions the obstruction of the afflictions and the obstruction of action are both grave, since one who has these is still not to be treated within a second birth” — the obstruction of the afflictions and the obstruction of action are adjudged grave. Puguang states the reason very finely: one who commits a deed of immediate retribution decidedly falls into the hells, and one in whom the obstruction of the afflictions arises falls into an evil destiny and cannot enter the noble state, so that neither can be treated within a second birth but must wait until a third birth to be helped, and hence they are called grave; whereas the obstruction of maturation, once this life is undergone, admits of a share in entering the noble state in a second birth and can be helped, and hence is light. The second master’s explanation expressly brings out a school name: “the Vaibhāṣika masters explain it thus: since the former can draw forth the latter, the latter is lighter than the former” — and Puguang and Yuanhui alike point out that what is meant by ‘the former drawing forth the latter’ is the sequence in which the afflictions draw forth action and action draws forth maturation; the former being root and the latter branch, the branch is lighter than the root. This is the one place in the fascicle where ‘the Vaibhāṣika masters’ is expressly named, and the treatise cites their explanation without setting down any further verdict of its own.

The easy error is to read “both obstructions are grave” and “the latter is lighter than the former” as contradicting each other, and to hasten to choose between them. Since Puguang reads them as two masters each giving an explanation, there is no need to force them together; and besides, the two do not ask the same thing — the first asks ‘within how many births can it be treated,’ by which the obstructions of the afflictions and of action are alike adjudged grave and the obstruction of maturation light; the second asks ‘set against one another, which is root and which branch,’ and ranks them by the sequence of drawing forth and being drawn forth. The one adjudges by treatability, the other by the order of root and branch, and they run side by side without conflict. To record two explanations together without choosing on the treatise’s behalf is just the consistent practice of this fascicle.

As for the sense of the name ‘immediate,’ the treatise gives two explanations: the first with regard to the fixedness of the maturation result, no other action and no other birth being able to be interposed between; the second that the man who does this action decidedly falls into the hells from here at the ending of his life, with nothing intervening. Since that sentient being has this matter of ‘nothing intervening,’ he obtains the name of the immediate — being joined with the dharma of the immediate he is called one of the immediate, just as being joined with the dharma of an ascetic one is called an ascetic.

The easy error is to read the three obstructions as three kinds of sin. They are in fact three kinds of blocking of the road — the obstruction of action is what one has made oneself, the obstruction of the afflictions is what one carries oneself, the obstruction of maturation is that one was born in the wrong place; and the one thing the three have in common is only this, that they block the noble path.

Where this lands: what should most be remembered in this section is the passage on the obstruction of the afflictions. It turns over the commonest illusion in practice — we always suppose the fiercest afflictions the most troublesome, whereas the treatise says: what is fierce but occasional is easy to deal with; what is feeble but constant is the real obstruction. This one sentence will serve a lifetime.

XXIV. In Which Destiny Each of the Three Obstructions Is Found

First ask: are the three obstructions found in all five destinies? The treatise answers that they are not. The obstruction of action is only in the three continents of the human destiny, not in Uttarakuru nor in the other destinies and realms; and within the three continents it is only a woman and a man who can commit it, the ṣaṇḍha and the rest cannot. The other two obstructions are in all five destinies — yet within the human destiny only in Uttarakuru, and within the destiny of the gods only in the place of non-perception.

Why can the ṣaṇḍha and the rest not accomplish a deed of immediate retribution? The treatise gives two layers of reason. The first layer looks back and cites the earlier passage on cutting off the wholesome roots: since they have no cause of cutting off the wholesome roots and of taking on non-discipline, that is here the reason why they commit no deed of immediate retribution. The second layer is new: their parents are toward them of little kindness — having given them only the dominant condition of a defective body, and their loving thought being little; and their conscience and shame toward their parents is likewise slight — since there is no present dominant conscience and shame that can be said to have been spoiled, and so they do not touch the sin of the immediate.

By this same principle another matter too is explained: ghosts and animals, though they harm their mothers and the rest, do not accomplish a deed of immediate retribution; and if a man harms the parents of a non-human, he likewise does not accomplish such a deed, since both mind and object-field are inferior.

The easy error is to read “little kindness and little sense of shame” as a disparagement of a certain class of persons. The treatise’s reasoning in fact runs the other way — it is precisely because the weight of that filial bond is insufficient that the sin of destroying it does not come up to the gravest grade. The sin of the immediate is gravest because what is destroyed is the weightiest kindness; if the kindness is not weighty, the sin does not reach that grade either.

Where this lands: this section and section VI (that the cutting off of the wholesome roots is only in the three continents, in men and women, in those who walk by views) use one and the same rule, as the treatise itself says with “just that which was said before.” The conditions for committing the gravest evil and the conditions for cutting off the deepest wholesome are the same set of conditions — all requiring a situation strong enough, settled enough, and weighty enough in kindness and duty. That the end of the fascicle falls upon this sentence buckles the two stretches, before and after, together.

Further Resonances: The Mirror of the Three Commentaries

The above is the sense of the treatise’s own text in this fascicle. Below, a further section is set up to gather four matters: the adjudications of the three commentaries and their divergences, Saṅghabhadra’s refutations and supplements, the divergences of Paramārtha’s earlier translation, and coordinates for parallel reading. A mirror is not the treatise; it is only looking at the same text by another way of reading. Both are recorded without adjudication, each restored to its own place.

1. Where the Three Commentaries Diverge

One commentary with nothing at all to hang upon. The commentaries on this fascicle are in a special situation: Shentai’s commentary is a fragment, and the seven fascicles extant belong to the Chapter on the Elements, the Chapter on the Faculties, and the Chapter on the Worthy and the Noble; the Chapter on Action is wholly wanting, and so there is no line-by-line commentary of Shentai to hang upon this fascicle. Yet within this fascicle Puguang twice names and refutes “Master Tai” — once in the passage on turning together with volition, refuting his account that “intermediate killing and the rest become paths of action only through the completeness of the conditions”; and once in the passage on the three results, refuting his account that “the consequent stage makes another lose his splendor,” and citing the correct explanation of the Correct Principle. This shows that Master Tai did once comment on these topics, and only that portion no longer survives, a few words of it being seen through another house’s citation. These two refutations may not in turn be made to stand as proof that Shentai’s commentary on the Chapter on Action exists — the want is marked as it stands, and text from other fascicles is not made to stand in for it.

Whether a mind of preparatory wholesome can issue discipline: Puguang’s three explanations, which he alone has. Under the sentence “because the wholesome roots acquired through preparation had already fallen away before this,” Puguang poses a question of his own and cites Master Kong’s three explanations: first, that a mind of preparatory wholesome cannot issue discipline; second, that it can issue it but cannot cut it off (the treatises’ saying that the wholesome roots acquired through preparation were not accomplished beforehand being said with regard to the feeble and inferior, while the strong and eminent are firm and not relinquished); third, that the preparatory can issue discipline, but that when one is about to cut off the wholesome one must first relinquish the discipline by a formal act and only then cut off the wholesome. Fabao and Yuanhui under this sentence merely gloss the text of the treatise, and these three explanations are not seen in them. This is a difference of fullness among the three houses, recorded without adjudication.

The stage at which the wholesome roots are restored: the Mahāvibhāṣā questions and answers that Fabao alone cites. Fabao cites two questions from the thirty-fifth fascicle of the Mahāvibhāṣā — who restores while abiding in a mind of doubt, and who while abiding in right view? One account holds that one who restores after changing bodies restores while abiding in doubt, and one who restores in the present dharma restores while abiding in right view; and the appraiser of the Mahāvibhāṣā adjudges “this is not settled.” It is further asked whether, once the wholesome roots are restored, they can then be in act, and the appraiser likewise adjudges it ‘not settled.’ The ancient masters themselves here leave the matter doubtful and undecided, and neither Puguang nor Yuanhui cites this passage in this fascicle. Recorded together without adjudication.

Two further Mahāvibhāṣā questions and answers that Fabao alone cites. The first asks which is graver, killing a man who has cut off his wholesome roots or destroying the eggs of ants; the appraiser answers from two angles: by the penalty of the offense, killing the man who has cut off his wholesome roots is graver (since one incurs a border offense), and by the path of action, destroying the ants’ eggs is graver (since the ants still possess wholesome dharmas). The second asks whether the wrong view that cuts off the wholesome can only complete the commonality of sentient beings or can also project it; the appraiser takes “it can both project and complete.” Both passages concern standards of the Mahāvibhāṣā’s appraiser rather than anything the root treatise says directly, and so they are placed in this section.

Whether a learner in the formless realm possesses the past seven limbs: one house records without adjudicating, one house adjudges for itself. Puguang cites at length the two accounts of the one hundred thirty-second and one hundred thirty-fourth fascicles of the Mahāvibhāṣā and sets them side by side, recording without adjudicating; Fabao on the same question declares himself plainly, “examining the two accounts, the latter is correct,” and states his reason — the former master’s general explanation does not account for why the root treatise should speak without exhausting the principle, and since it takes only one side and has no cutting reason, one should follow the root treatise. On one and the same question, one house declines to take a position and the other takes one: this is the sharpest of the contrasts among the three commentaries in this fascicle. Recorded together without adjudication.

The analysis of the result of human effort: Puguang full, Fabao brief. Puguang analyzes the result of human effort into four kinds — the co-arisen result of human effort, the uninterrupted result of human effort, the result of human effort at an interval, and the result of human effort not arising; Fabao merely glosses the three words ‘coexistent,’ ‘liberation,’ and ‘cultivated’ directly and makes no outline-style subdivision. The fullness of the three houses is not one-directional: in most items Puguang is fuller, but in the two places of restoring the wholesome roots and of the seven limbs in the formless realm it is Fabao who is fuller.

Whether the result of release from bondage is gathered under the dharmas of a level: here Puguang adjudges expressly. Under the gate of the same level and a different level Puguang gives a further explanation, citing the text of the Miscellaneous Heart Treatise, “if one rightly ponders, a level too has the result of liberation,” and pointing out that by that treatise the result of release from bondage would also be gathered under the dharmas of a level; yet since release from bondage is unconditioned and does not arise in dependence upon a level, how can it be said to be gathered under the dharmas of a level? Hence Puguang adjudges expressly, “what this treatise says is the better.” This is a commentary appraising another treatise, not commentaries appraising one another; the reader should know that Puguang here makes an express choice, and need not mediate on his behalf.

The number of results of the action of one beyond learning with respect to the dharmas of a learner: the Correct Principle differs from the Kośa, and Puguang has already reconciled them. Puguang cites the text of the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle, “the action of one beyond learning has one result with respect to the dharmas of a learner, namely dominance; in principle it ought to say two, adding homogeneous outflow,” and brings out two explanations: the first taking the dull path beyond learning and the future keen path of the learner as a homogeneous cause and dividing them by being in act and not being in act — at the end of which explanation Puguang himself sets down a sentence, “this is that the intents of the treatises are each their own, and hard to reconcile,” which is an express statement that the intents of the two treatises are each their own and cannot be forced together, and not a reconciling; the second holding that the Kośa speaks with regard to like nature set against like (the successive producing of one from another, the learner being a cause for the one beyond learning while the one beyond learning is not a cause for the learner) and the Correct Principle with regard to unlike nature set against unlike (and so says that the one beyond learning too is a cause for the learner), so that “each takes hold of one sense, and they are not in conflict.” ⇒ Puguang here in fact first lets the difference stand and then reconciles: to call this ‘bringing out two explanations that reconcile them’ requires this measure of precision, for the first explanation does not itself reconcile. The latter explanation alone is the ancient master’s own demonstration of the method by which ‘two tenets stand together without needing to refute each other.’

The school to which the author’s own position belongs: only Yuanhui names it. In the section on projecting and completing, the treatise declares “according to the position of my own school” without bringing out a school name; Puguang and Fabao here both follow the treatise’s general phrase, and only Yuanhui explains it directly as “according to the Sarvāstivāda school.” This is the one place in this fascicle where any of the three commentaries expressly names a school. Yuanhui also notes under the two names of projecting and completing their old renderings, “anciently called the action of general retribution” and “anciently called the action of particular retribution” — a comparison of old and new renderings that likewise only Yuanhui has. As for which house the ‘old rendering’ Yuanhui speaks of points to, there is no express text in this fascicle, and it is recorded without adjudication.

The manner of stating the obstruction of the afflictions: one full, one brief. Puguang at the obstruction of the afflictions states it in the outline form of an analysis by four alternatives (of frequent occurrence but not fierce, fierce but not of frequent occurrence, both of frequent occurrence and fierce, neither of frequent occurrence nor fierce), while Yuanhui omits the four alternatives and states the same doctrine directly by the twofold division of frequent occurrence and fierceness. One who goes deep may take Puguang’s four alternatives; one who is beginning may take Yuanhui’s twofold division.

One place where the three houses have almost the same wording. The wording by which the three commentaries define ‘the obstruction of maturation’ agrees to a high degree: Puguang and Fabao are almost word for word the same (differing only by a single particle), and Yuanhui likewise merely restates the text of the treatise, changing ‘obstruction of maturation’ to ‘obstruction of retribution.’ In this fascicle the three commentaries differ much in fullness, and this item is a rare instance of the three houses agreeing in wording; it is recorded together to note the fact.

One and the same divergent account marked by the three houses in different forms. For the divergent account of that ‘Venerable’ at the end of the fascicle (that an animal, if its awareness and discernment are distinct, also accomplishes a deed of immediate retribution, as with that intelligent horse), Puguang marks it “setting out a divergent account,” Fabao marks it “this is setting out a divergent account” and goes on to give the story, and Yuanhui simply records the original wording without adding any outline label at all. Whom this ‘Venerable’ points to none of the three commentaries says expressly, and it is recorded as it stands, without being determined on their behalf.

Two places where the two commentaries differ in nicety as to ‘who is asking.’ First, in the passage on cutting off the wholesome roots, the objection “if it be so, on what principle does that text further say,” which Puguang marks as “an objection citing the text of the root treatise” (without saying who cites it), Fabao marks as “another master objects citing the root treatise” — Fabao seeming to hint that this challenge comes from the mouth of another master, while Puguang takes it as a documentary challenge the author sets for himself. Second, in the passage on projecting and completing, the objection “if it be so, why then does the Venerable Aniruddha say of himself,” which Puguang marks with the single word ‘objection,’ Fabao marks expressly as “the Sautrāntikas and others object” — this being the one place in this fascicle where Fabao names a school for the challenger while Puguang does not. In these two places the two commentaries may differ in nicety of attribution, and it is recorded without adjudication.

2. Saṅghabhadra’s Refutations and Supplementary Explanations

The chapter name in Saṅghabhadra’s two treatises is not ‘Analysis of Action’ but ‘Adjudication of Action’ — to search Saṅghabhadra with this treatise’s chapter name is forever a false zero.

Refutation by name: the passage on turning together with volition. Saṅghabhadra, at the passage on ‘two turning together,’ calls Vasubandhu ‘the Sūtra-master’ outright and refutes him sentence by sentence: if the action of killing is itself enough to be completed, why need a mind of hatred be separately spoken of; the same for speaking of greed in theft and misconduct; and at frivolous speech a deficiency is displayed instead (only greed being spoken of as completing frivolous speech, without reaching the other two); he holds that it ought to be altered to the stricter statement, “if the preparatory work is done beforehand, then at the time of completion one ought in each case to say ‘greed or one of the rest.’” This is the most direct and the most explicitly named criticism of this treatise by Saṅghabhadra within this fascicle. Fabao cites it without defending on the treatise’s behalf, merely setting down the Correct Principle’s own wording. Recording the two parties only, without adjudicating which prevails.

A correction of terminology: is short life a homogeneous outflow or a near dominance? This treatise says that the homogeneous outflow result of killing is a short life among humans; Saṅghabhadra re-adjudges it a “near dominance result” — the reason being that strictly speaking a short life is not a continuation of the kind of maturation summoned by the action of killing, but a near effect brought about by the action of killing overpowering wholesome action by dominant force; and as for why this treatise calls it homogeneous outflow, Saṅghabhadra answers himself, “to show that within the dominance result there is what is nearest.” This is a dispute over precision of terminology, not a denial of the root doctrine of this treatise — both parties admit a relation of cause and result between killing and short life, and what they differ over is which class the result belongs to. Fabao cites it. Recorded without adjudication.

A challenge to a simile: what after all does ‘one color’ stand for? Saṅghabhadra raises a fine challenge to the simile “the painter first draws the shape with a single color”: what does that ‘one color’ stand for, a class of action or a single instant? If it stands for a class of action, it contradicts the school’s own position (a class must be many, and many actions projecting one birth does not stand in principle); if it stands for a single instant, then a single instant cannot draw a shape, and the simile is of no force in the proof. He offers a reconciliation of his own: within one class of action only a single instant can project the commonality of sentient beings, while many instants of action of like and unlike class can complete it. This is a discussion of the manner of the proof, not a denial of the conclusion that ‘one action projects one birth.’ Recorded without adjudication.

A divergence of number: the one instance in the matrix of the gates of result. This treatise says that the action of one beyond learning has one result (dominance) with respect to the dharmas of a learner, and Saṅghabhadra says “in principle it ought to say two, adding homogeneous outflow.” This is the one clear divergence of number among the six gates of result, and its path of reconciliation has already been seen in Puguang (see the section above). Noted in passing: the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine at the same sentence gives only “the action of one beyond learning has one result with respect to the dharmas of a learner” and appends no “in principle it ought to say two” — this is a difference of fullness between Saṅghabhadra’s two treatises.

Material supplied by Saṅghabhadra and not carried in this treatise. Saṅghabhadra records the account, “there is another master who says: the three bodily paths of action each turn together with a volition of their own, namely killing, theft, and misconduct,” and refutes it. This divergent account is nowhere to be seen in this treatise, in Paramārtha’s divergent translation, or in the wording of Puguang and Yuanhui within this fascicle, and only Fabao records it when citing the Correct Principle. It appears, then, that this is material internal to the schools supplied by Saṅghabhadra in his own treatise, and not a refutation of this treatise itself — differing in kind from the other items above, and set down as it stands so that it may not be wrongly assigned.

A difference in the weight of the two treatises’ postures. Checking the corresponding passage of the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine for this fascicle, it does have the content corresponding to this fascicle (the cause and stage of cutting off the wholesome roots, the wrong views of householders being hard to cut off, the explanation of the result of human effort, and the number of results of the action of one beyond learning all being found), and so it is not that there is no corresponding passage; yet those sharp sentences in the Conforming to Correct Principle that point directly at ‘the Sūtra-master’ are none of them to be seen at the same places in the Revealing the Doctrine. This accords with the aim with which Saṅghabhadra composed the Revealing the Doctrine (restating the Sarvāstivāda tenets upon this treatise’s outline, in a more even posture). This is a difference between the two treatises themselves, recorded without adjudication, and no appraisal is made of which is the better.

3. The Divergences of Paramārtha’s Earlier Translation

Paramārtha’s Expository Treatise on the Treasury of Abhidharma forms a system of its own in the passage corresponding to this fascicle, and moreover it straddles two fascicles — beginning at the end of ‘part three’ of his Chapter on Action and ending in the middle of ‘part four’; and so the boundaries of the passage corresponding to this fascicle can be fixed only by the structure of the scenes, and the fascicle titles may not be made to stand for them. Xuanzang divides this chapter into six fascicles and Paramārtha into four, and the opening and gathering were different to begin with.

Two systematic differences of rendering are the most conspicuous. The first is the names of the results: Xuanzang has ‘maturation result,’ Paramārtha ‘retribution result’; Xuanzang has ‘result of human effort,’ Paramārtha ‘result of the power of effort’; Xuanzang has ‘result of release from bondage,’ Paramārtha ‘result of separation.’ Of the five results, only the two names of homogeneous outflow and dominance agree in the two texts, the other three differing entirely — and this set of differences runs through the whole of the gates of result in the latter half of this fascicle. The second is the name of the mental factor: Xuanzang has ‘volition,’ Paramārtha ‘intention.’

The one place most easily misjudged as a divergence of doctrine. In the passage on the three paths of action in the hells, Xuanzang has ‘harsh speech’ and ‘frivolous speech,’ Paramārtha ‘evil speech’ and ‘unfitting speech’; and on the face of it the occasions the two texts fasten them to look as though they had been exchanged. Checked word for word, however, the correspondence is in fact the same — railing goes with harsh speech (evil speech), wailing with frivolous speech (unfitting speech), and only the renderings differ so that the visual order is not the same. This is not a difference of doctrine between the two texts; do not misjudge it.

The remaining differences of rendering. High grade / highest of the high grade; the root treatise / the Abhidharma Treasury or grantha; good conduct / wholesome conduct; with outflows and without outflows / with flow and without flow; another master / a master of another school; āśaya / evil mind; Jambudvīpa / Yanfu continent; Uttarakuru / the northern Kuru; the path that cuts off / the path that extinguishes; abandoned through seeing and abandoned through cultivation / extinguished by seeing the truths and extinguished by the path of cultivation; what ought not and ought to be done / improperly done and properly done. Of these the name ‘āśaya’ is the most worth savoring: Xuanzang keeps the transcription and lets an ancient master gloss it separately, while Paramārtha renders the sense directly as ‘evil mind’ and drops the transcription — the one keeping, the other dropping, which is just the two translators’ two ways of handling sound and sense.

A difference of opening and gathering. Xuanzang has ‘the stanza says / the treatise says,’ the whole stanza coming out first and the prose glossing sentence by sentence after; Paramārtha has ‘the verse says / the explanation says,’ and though the pattern of the sentences is the same, in the sections of the gates of result he often lets the verse lines themselves carry most of the technical terms and lets the explanation supply only the details, no longer dividing the sections stanza by stanza. This is a difference of opening and gathering, not an abridgment.

One honest record. In the passage on the place where the wholesome roots are cut off, Paramārtha’s text uses the word ‘knowledge’ where Xuanzang has ‘discernment,’ and this is set down word for word without alteration. No adjudication is made as to the merits of the two translations.

4. Coordinates for Parallel Reading

What this fascicle establishes are the two lines of ‘what action can cut off’ and ‘what action can project.’ Both have places that may be read in parallel with the Yogācāra system.

The entity of the cutting off of the wholesome roots. This fascicle says that the cutting off of the wholesome has ‘non-acquisition’ for its entity — the acquisition of the wholesome not arising, non-acquisition arising in succession. The root treatise of the Yogācāra lineage states it upon another road for the same dharma: there it is expressly said that the seeds are not permanently uprooted, and that it is only the establishing of a continuum contrary to the wholesome roots in act that is named cutting off the wholesome roots; and as for the conditions of restoring the wholesome, that text lists four, of which two answer exactly to this fascicle — ‘giving rise to hesitation’ answering to this fascicle’s ‘doubt,’ and ‘realizing what is settled’ to this fascicle’s ‘the holding of view.’ The conditions of restoring the wholesome answer word for word in the two systems, while what the two systems establish as the entity of what is cut off differs: the one fastens it upon non-acquisition, the other says expressly that the seeds are not uprooted. One and the same question with the answers of two ages — this is the place in this fascicle most open to parallel reading.

Cutting off the wholesome and the class fixed in wrongness. This fascicle makes an analysis by four alternatives to show that cutting off the wholesome roots and falling into the class fixed in wrongness are not one matter; the Section on Ascertainment of the Yogācāra lineage simply sets the two matters, ‘the deeds of immediate retribution and the cutting off of the wholesome roots,’ side by side as the entity of the class fixed in wrongness. The two systems use the same set of doctrinal numbers while asking different questions — the one asking whether the two include each other, the other asking what the entity of the class fixed in wrongness is. They may be looked at side by side, but are not to be made equivalent.

The projecting and the completing action. This fascicle establishes “one action projects one birth, and many actions can complete it,” taking the commonality of sentient beings as the measure of ‘one birth’; the Consciousness-Only lineage uses the same pair of concepts to establish two kinds of maturation — what requites the force of the projecting action and continues constantly is established as maturation, and what requites the completing action and arises from the maturation is named maturation-born. The division of the projecting and completing actions is unchanged in the two systems, while the bodies of consciousness assigned to them differ: the one fastens them upon the projecting and completing of the commonality, the other upon the requital by the eighth consciousness and by the first six. The numbers agree while the doctrinal frames they are fastened to differ, and they may be looked at side by side.

As for the school to which the phrase ‘according to the position of my own school’ in this fascicle belongs, Yuanhui explains it directly as the Sarvāstivāda school, while the treatise itself brings out no name — the supplying of a name, recorded only.

Before Reading This Fascicle

The Chapter on Action, arriving here, is at its sixth fascicle, and its last. The five preceding fascicles adjudged one by one the nature of the entity of action, the obtaining and relinquishing of discipline, the several gates of action spoken of in the sūtras, and the ten paths of action, and at the end set up the three obstructions — the obstruction of action, the obstruction of the afflictions, and the obstruction of maturation. This fascicle opens by catching hold of that very tail: “among the three obstructions adjudged above, it was said that the five deeds of immediate retribution are the entity of the obstruction of action.” Of the three obstructions, what is the entity of the first? The answer is the five deeds of immediate retribution. And so the whole fascicle unfolds from here.

The three ancient masters adjudge this one cut in complete agreement. Puguang’s Record marks it, “below, the second, explaining the obstruction of action separately. Within it, first setting out the entity of the obstruction of action; second, explaining the splitting of the Saṅgha separately; third, explaining the conditions that make a deed one of immediate retribution; fourth, explaining that the preparation is fixed; fifth, the heaviness of the offense and the greatness of the result; sixth, what is of the same class as the deeds of immediate retribution”; Fabao’s Commentary marks it, “second, explaining the obstruction of action separately”; Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary marks it, “from here the second, explaining the obstruction of action separately, and within it a division into six” — and even the sequence of the six subsections is one by one the same. This is not often met with in the history of the outlines of this treatise, and it may be seen from it that the boundary of the fascicle is itself the boundary of the outline, and not a cut forced upon the text by later hands.

The structure of this fascicle has a shape well worth noticing: the first half is utterly heavy, the second half utterly excellent. The first half speaks of the deepest evil that can be done — the five deeds of immediate retribution, and within them the force of a full eight stanzas is spent upon the single matter of “splitting the Saṅgha,” nailing down one by one its entity, the person who can split, the persons who are split, the place, the number, the term of time, and the six occasions on which it cannot happen at all. The second half turns of a sudden and speaks of the bodhisattva’s action producing the excellent marks (the three incalculable aeons, the hundred aeons of cultivating the marks, the meeting with Buddhas in reverse order, the leaping over of nine aeons, the fulfillment of the six pāramitās in four stages), and then of the three bases of meritorious action, giving, discipline, and cultivation — the name and sense of giving and its four alternatives, the donor and the goods and the field, the six causes of an action’s lightness or heaviness, action done and action increased, giving to a caitya, the two kinds of discipline, equipoise being called cultivation, the measure of the merit of Brahmā, the giving of Dharma, and the three wholesome things that are conducive. At the end it closes the whole chapter with the entities of writing, seals, calculation, letters, and numbers, and with the stanza “the wholesome without outflows is called excellent.”

The whole fascicle can therefore be read as a scale of the extremes of action: probing downward to the deepest notch (that one lying sentence that splits the Saṅgha), and upward to the highest notch (the volition that draws down eighty thousand great aeons, and the fulfillment of the six pāramitās over three incalculable aeons). The line running between them never changes — the lightness or heaviness of an action is not settled by the size of the deed but by the field, by the mind, and by the thing destroyed. This will be met with in passage after passage below.

There is one more thing to say at the outset. Three times in this fascicle the treatise records both accounts without adjudicating (the three accounts of the measure of a single merit, the two divergent accounts of purity of discipline, the two accounts of the measure of the merit of Brahmā), and the author passes not one sentence of judgment. In reading, do not hurry to look for “the correct answer”; look first, and clearly, at where each party puts the weight.

I. The Entity of the Five Deeds of Immediate Retribution

〔1.1〕Four of body and one of speech · three of killing and one of lying · one a preparation. First the question: the five deeds of immediate retribution are five matters, so why must the stanza take them apart into three groupings, “four of body and one of speech,” “three of killing and one of lying,” “one a preparation”? Because these are three different measures. The first measures the kind of action — “among the five deeds of immediate retribution, four are bodily action, one is verbal action; three are killing, one is the root path of action of false speech, one is the preparation for the path of action of killing”: killing one’s mother, killing one’s father, killing an arhat, and drawing blood from the body of a Buddha all set the body in motion, while splitting the Saṅgha sets the mouth in motion. The second measures the assignment to a path of action — the first three are the path of action of killing, splitting the Saṅgha is the path of action of false speech. The third is the most important: drawing blood from the body of a Buddha, though a bodily action, is not the path of action of killing but only a preparation for killing, and the reason is one sentence — “since the body of a Tathāgata cannot be killed.” For a path of action to be established there must be the result “the one killed dies”; the body of a Buddha cannot be killed, the result can never come about, and so it can only stop in the square of preparation.

The easy error: to suppose that “immediate retribution” means that the five matters are equally heavy. It does not — the five matters share the name “immediate retribution” with regard to falling inevitably into the hell without interval and not being separated off by another birth; as to the paths of action, their standing is not the same. In practice: with any set of enumerated dharmas in this treatise, ask first “by which measure was this set of headings compiled?”; give the same set of things another measure and the squares are rearranged — this same move is used later in this fascicle in treating the three bases of meritorious action and the four alternatives of giving.

II. The Chapter on Splitting the Saṅgha, Part One · What the Split in the Saṅgha Is, and in Whom It Is Possessed

〔2.1〕The entity of the split in the Saṅgha is “non-concord.” First the question: since splitting the Saṅgha is the heaviest of offenses, what sort of dharma ought its entity to be? Intuition answers, “surely some utterly evil state of mind.” But the treatise’s answer is unexpected — “the entity of the split in the Saṅgha is the nature of non-concord; it is gathered under the aggregate of formations, unobscured-indeterminate and not associated with mind.” What is called the split in the Saṅgha means the loss of the concord of the Saṅgha; this is a formation not associated with mind (not form, not mind or a mental factor, but that other class of dharmas set up within the aggregate of formations), and its quality is unobscured-indeterminate, neither wholesome nor unwholesome. The treatise itself raises the difficulty: if it is unobscured-indeterminate, how can it be of immediate retribution? The answer is thoroughly brisk — “such a split in the Saṅgha arises from a lie, and so the splitting of the Saṅgha is said to be a result of immediate retribution.” The split in the Saṅgha is the result; that one lie is the cause.

More decisive still is in whom it falls: “it is not the one who splits that possesses this split in the Saṅgha; it is possessed only by the Saṅgha that is split.” The man who splits the Saṅgha does not possess the dharma “split in the Saṅgha” at all; what possesses it is on the contrary the very body of monks who are split. The easy error: to confound “the split in the Saṅgha” with “the offense of splitting the Saṅgha” as one thing. The two belong to two different persons — the dharma is on the side of the Saṅgha, the offense on the side of the splitter. In practice: this is the model of how the treatise parts “the thing” from “the offense”; later, in treating “the merit of the class of relinquishing and the merit of the class of enjoyment,” the same parting is performed once again.

〔2.2〕What the splitter possesses is the offense of lying · maturing for an aeon · the more the deeds, the greater the suffering. First the question: since the split in the Saṅgha is not in the splitter, what after all does the splitter come to possess? The answer: “the man who splits the Saṅgha possesses the offense of splitting the Saṅgha” — and this offense “has false speech for its nature, that is, the manifest and nonmanifest verbal action arising together with the split in the Saṅgha,” and its retribution is that “he must undergo the most extreme suffering for an intermediate aeon in the great hell without interval.” Of the five deeds, splitting the Saṅgha alone is inevitably an intermediate aeon in the hell without interval, whereas of the other four “the remaining deeds of immediate retribution are not necessarily born in the hell without interval.” Here the author raises for himself a very sharp question: since many such deeds all mature in the next birth, how can one birth hold five portions of retribution? He answers himself — “as those offenses increase, so does the suffering increase in severity”: it is not the number of births that is increased but the density of the suffering; one obtains a body vast and soft, together with many keen instruments of suffering, and so the suffering becomes twofold, threefold, fourfold, fivefold. Puguang’s Record marks question and answer here, and states for itself that “among the several deeds of immediate retribution done, the first is the projecting action and the later ones are the completing action” — the projecting action settles “where one is born,” the completing action settles “to what degree one undergoes things there.”

The easy error: to suppose that “many deeds drawing one birth together” is a discount. Just the contrary — it is a multiplication. In practice: the pair of tools, projecting action and completing action, comes down here for the first time upon an extreme case; hereafter, in reading of the differences among the six destinies, and of beings born into one and the same destiny yet worlds apart in pleasure and pain, it is this same pair of tools that is used.

III. The Chapter on Splitting the Saṅgha, Part Two · Who Can Split, Whom, Where, and for How Long

〔3.1〕The one who can split must pass three thresholds. First the question: can anyone at all split the Saṅgha of the wheel of Dharma? The treatise sets up three thresholds. The first is standing — “the one who splits the Saṅgha must be a full bhikṣu; he is certainly not a householder, a bhikṣuṇī, or the like.” The second is class of conduct — “only one whose conduct is of views, not one whose conduct is of craving”: only a man who leans toward reckoning out views can bring it off; a man who leans toward affection and greedy attachment cannot. The third is observance — “one abiding in pure conduct, not one who has broken discipline,” the reason being “since one who has broken discipline has no weight in his words.” The three thresholds together make one thing plain: splitting the Saṅgha is not accomplished by evil but by prestige. A man who has broken discipline speaks without weight and cannot move the body of monks.

As for the side that is split, there is a threshold as well — “only ordinary beings are split, not noble ones, since the noble ones have realized the nature of dharmas”; and the treatise records alongside it another account, “some say: one who has gained receptivity also cannot be split,” so that the stanza uses the two words “the foolish” to cover both layers. The easy error: to read this as “the noble ones are firm in the resolve of the path and so are not taken in.” The reason the treatise gives is the realization of the nature of dharmas; it is a matter of what has been realized, not a matter of strength of will. In practice: this passage gives the reader a realistic criterion — the most dangerous breach in a body of monks is not the obviously evil man, but the man of discipline and prestige whose views have gone askew.

〔3.2〕The splitting must be elsewhere · nine men are needed · concord returns within one night. First the question: why must the splitting of the Saṅgha take place “elsewhere”? The treatise says “it must be split elsewhere, not in the presence of the Great Master,” because “the Tathāgatas may not be lightly pressed upon, and their words being majestic and grave, no one has the power to do it face to face” — in the presence of the Buddha, no one can bring it off. Puguang’s Record leaves here a note on the geography: “‘elsewhere’ means Mount Gayāśīrṣa, which here is called Elephant-Head Mountain, since the summit of the mountain is like an elephant’s head,” and corrects the vulgar error, “the old rendering ‘Mount Gayā’ is a corruption.” As to number, “eight bhikṣus must divide into two assemblies to be the party split, and the splitter is the ninth, and so the assembly at its smallest still requires nine men”; Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary explains this line as “‘nine and upward’ means that nine men are required,” and divides four as the correct assembly and four as the deviant. As to region, “not in the other continents, since there is no Buddha there” — where no Buddha appears in the world, there is no talk even of “setting up another master.” As to term of time, “that same night concord must return, and it does not last past the night,” and so the splitting of the Saṅgha of the wheel of Dharma, from its accomplishment to its undoing, does not exceed a single night.

The easy error: to read “concord must return within a night” as “splitting the Saṅgha is not serious.” Where it is serious is not in how long it lasts but in that during that one night “in the great thousandfold world the wheel of Dharma does not turn.” In practice: splitting the Saṅgha in its formal acts is much broader — “the splitting of formal acts alone extends to three continents, at the least eight men, and at the most without limit,” it being only required that “within one boundary the Saṅgha divide into two parties and perform formal acts separately, and so eight men are required.” The one strict and the other broad, the reader may know from this that what the treatise calls “splitting the Saṅgha” is in truth two matters different in nature.

〔3.3〕Six occasions on which there is no splitting of the wheel of Dharma. First the question: why set out expressly the times when it “cannot happen”? Because this defines, from the other side, the conditions under which splitting the wheel of Dharma can be established. The six occasions are — “‘first’ means when the World-Honored One has not long turned the wheel of Dharma, ‘last’ means when the Well-Gone One is about to enter parinirvāṇa; in these two times the Saṅgha is of one taste”; “when the blisters upon right discipline and right view have not yet arisen, since two blisters must arise before there can be a splitting,” a “blister” being a swelling newly raised, borrowed here as a figure for the fissures just budding upon discipline and view, and it takes two openings before a thing can be torn apart; “when the first pair is not yet established, since it is the very nature of things that through them concord swiftly returns,” the two chief disciples of calm and of insight being present, the body of monks naturally comes together again quickly; “after the Buddha has passed away, since there is no true Great Master to be opposed,” there being no Buddha, “setting up another master” loses its object; “when a boundary has not yet been established, since within one boundary there is no dividing into two parties.”

The easy error: to take the six occasions as six isolated rules. They are in fact six ways of lacking one and the same condition: splitting the wheel of Dharma requires all at once that “there be a Buddha to be opposed,” that “the Saṅgha already have a fissure,” that “there be no powerful reconciler,” and that “a boundary have been established”; lacking any one, it does not come about. In practice: at the end of the passage the treatise adds one sentence, “not all Buddhas have the splitting of the wheel of Dharma; there must be past action for this thing to occur” — it is not that every Buddha meets with it; whether he meets with it hangs upon past action. This one sentence pulls the whole passage back from a question of institutions to a question of action drawing its result, which is precisely the spine of this fascicle.

IV. The Chapter on the Conditions of Immediate Retribution · Why It Is Parents and Arhats in Particular

〔4.1〕Forsaking the field of kindness · destroying the field of virtue, and the four distinctions of change of sex, killing by mistake, drawing blood, and one who becomes beyond learning afterward. First the question: harming people takes many forms, so why do only these few become deeds of immediate retribution? The treatise answers, “because one forsakes the field of kindness and destroys the field of virtue.” Puguang’s Record takes apart the structure of question and answer in this passage layer by layer — marking “‘because one forsakes the field of kindness and destroys the field of virtue’ is the general answer,” then “‘how is there kindness?’ is the probing question” · “‘because they are the root of the body’s arising’ is the answer” · “‘how does one forsake them?’ is the question” · “‘it is forsaking their kindness’ is the answer.” This is a structure of the author asking and answering himself and glossing his own words, not an outsider coming to challenge him; do not read it as a debate. On the side of the field of virtue it gives “the field of virtue means the remaining arhats and the like, who are furnished with all excellent virtues and are able to produce them,” and to harm such a one is to “destroy the support of virtue, and so it becomes an offense of immediate retribution.”

The treatise then sets up four distinctions, each finer than the last. Change of sex — “the offense of immediate retribution is likewise accomplished, since the support is one”: the sex has changed and the body is still that body. The portion of blood — the case of the kalala that has fallen out and been borne by another woman, where the criterion is “because she from whose blood it came is the root of the body’s arising,” the one who gave the portion of blood being the mother, and the one who reared him the later mother. Killing by mistake — “if one raises a preparation to kill one’s father or mother and by mistake kills another, there is no offense of immediate retribution,” and conversely too it is no deed of immediate retribution; where one preparation harms the mother and another together, then “if by one preparation one harms the mother and another as well, two nonmanifests arise, but the manifest is only the offense of immediate retribution,” the reason being “since the force of the deed of immediate retribution is the stronger.” Drawing the Buddha’s blood — “it must be with a mind to kill that it becomes an offense of immediate retribution; if with a mind only to strike one draws blood, there is no immediate retribution.” One who becomes beyond learning afterward — “since there was no preparation to kill directed at a body beyond learning,” and so to kill a man who realizes the fruit only when he is about to die is not a deed of immediate retribution.

The easy error: to suppose that an offense of immediate retribution is settled by “the standing of the object.” The four distinctions taken together say exactly the opposite: standing is the necessary condition; mind and preparation are the sufficient condition. In practice: this passage is the finest demonstration in the whole treatise of “whether an action is accomplished or not”; when one later reads of the completion or non-completion of the ten paths of action, a look back at these four distinctions gives a ready feel for the thing.

〔4.2〕Once the preparation is fixed, there is no road back in the middle. First the question: a man has already set his hand to a deed of immediate retribution — is it still possible that in the middle he should suddenly awaken, suddenly become free of desire? The treatise answers with the utmost decision — “if the preparation for a deed of immediate retribution is bound to be accomplished, then in the interval there is definitely no freeing from defilement and no gaining of a fruit.” With the other paths of unwholesome action it is not so: if in the midst of the preparation the noble path arises, the path of action will not be completed, because “the support is definitely opposed to it” — the body and mind that support it are definitely opposed to that path of action, and once the noble path arises, the unwholesome path of action can go no further.

The easy error: to read this stanza as “one who has done a deed of immediate retribution can never rise again.” What the treatise says is that within this stretch of preparation one cannot be freed from defilement or gain a fruit; it does not say that this man can never be delivered. In practice: the two lines are most savory read against one another — with the other unwholesome actions, the noble path can halt them midway; with the preparation for a deed of immediate retribution alone, once it is “bound to be accomplished,” it cannot be halted. This shows precisely why immediate retribution is named “immediate”: not only is the retribution without interval, but the causal stage too admits of no interval.

V. The Heaviest Offense and the Greatest Good

〔5.1〕That one sentence that splits the Saṅgha, and that volition which draws down eighty thousand great aeons. First the question: which of the five deeds is heaviest? The treatise answers, splitting the Saṅgha, the reason being “because it wounds and destroys the Dharma body of the Buddha, and obstructs the path of birth in heaven and of liberation for the world” — what it destroys is not the physical body of one person but the Dharma body of the Buddha (the body that is the teaching); what it blocks is not one man’s road but the road of the whole world to birth in heaven and to liberation. The treatise then spreads out the scene of that night: once the Saṅgha is split, until concord returns, entering the noble state, gaining the fruits, freedom from defilement, and the exhaustion of the outflows are all blocked in the world; the works of practicing absorption, reciting, and reflecting cease; in the great thousandfold world the wheel of Dharma does not turn; and gods, men, nāgas, and the rest are disturbed in body and mind. Accordingly the other four deeds are, in order, “the remaining offenses of immediate retribution grow lighter one after another in the order fifth, third, first,” while “the second is lightest, since the kindness and the rest are less.” Puguang’s Record adds here a principle of light and heavy: “of the two fields, kindness and virtue, the field of virtue surpasses the field of kindness, since that field of virtue is able to draw sentient beings out of the suffering of birth and death.”

Here there is a round of challenge from an outsider: if the verbal action of splitting the Saṅgha is the heaviest, why does a sūtra say that among the three punitive actions the punishment of mind is greatest, and again that among all offenses wrong view is greatest? The author answers, “with regard to the five deeds of immediate retribution, splitting the Saṅgha is heavy; with regard to the three punitive actions, the offense of mind is great; with regard to the five deviant views, wrong view is heavy” — the three sentences belong to three different ranges of comparison and do not conflict. The latter half of the stanza then turns to the wholesome side: the greatest in result among worldly wholesome things is the volition that can draw down the foremost existence, “since it draws down a maturation utterly still, of eighty thousand great aeons”; but if the result of release from bondage is in question, then “with regard to the result of release from bondage, it is the volition associated with the vajra-like concentration that gains the great result,” and so the stanza deliberately adds the two words “worldly wholesome” to mark the distinction.

The easy error: to read the reconciling of the three sentences as “the author speaking vaguely.” It is in fact a method — every “most” must first be asked, “most within which collection?” In practice: this section sets “heaviest” and “greatest” side by side, which is a miniature of the whole structure of the fascicle: at one end that one lie, at the other end that one volition. Neither is a question of “the size of the affair”; both are questions of “the thing destroyed or brought to fullness.”

VI. The Class Like the Five Deeds, and the Three Times When Action Is Most Feared

〔6.1〕The five of the same class. First the question: since they are called “of the same class,” are they as heavy as the five deeds? The treatise says, “these five, in that same order, are the entities of the actions of the same class as the deeds of immediate retribution” — defiling one’s mother who is an arhat nun, killing a bodhisattva abiding in certainty, killing a noble one who is still a learner, seizing away the requisites of the Saṅgha’s concord, and destroying a stūpa, matched one by one and in order with the five deeds. The opening line has been read in two ways since ancient times: Puguang’s Record records both readings, giving “that is, one who commits an act of extreme defilement toward his mother who is an arhat nun, or toward his mother and toward an arhat nun” — the former reading takes “mother who is an arhat nun” as one person, the latter takes “mother” and “arhat nun” as two persons and two objects; Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary takes the two-object reading outright, giving “defiling one’s mother and defiling a nun beyond learning”; while Paramārtha takes the one-person reading, “if a man defiles his own mother who is an arhat.” Here both are recorded and neither is chosen. They are of the same class, not of the same name: near in nature and near in what they destroy, but not the deeds of immediate retribution themselves. As to whether they too are certainly born in the hells, the treatise records before the stanza one account, “some other master says: not born without interval” — although the same class is certainly born in the hells, it is not necessarily born there immediately after death.

The easy error: to read “the same class” as “an equal offense.” The treatise does not say that they too draw down the intermediate aeon of the retribution without interval. In practice: the five of the same class are clearest when set one by one against the five deeds — defiling one’s mother who is an arhat nun against killing one’s mother, killing a bodhisattva abiding in certainty against killing one’s father, killing a noble learner against killing an arhat, seizing away the requisites of the Saṅgha’s concord against splitting the Saṅgha, and destroying a stūpa against drawing blood from the body of a Buddha. This table of correspondences comes from Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary, which marks them one by one as “of the same class as the offense of killing one’s mother,” “of the same class as the offense of killing one’s father,” “of the same class as the offense of killing an arhat,” “of the same class as the offense of splitting the Saṅgha,” “of the same class as the offense of drawing blood from the body of a Buddha”; the treatise itself says only “in that same order” and does not fasten a name to each. As to why they are alike, Puguang’s Record supplies the grounds one by one: “‘of the same class’ means the sense of resemblance”; killing a bodhisattva abiding in certainty is matched with killing one’s father because “the bodhisattva’s kindness is deep, like a father’s”; killing a noble learner is matched with killing an arhat because “the learner and the one beyond learning are alike a noble field of merit”; seizing away the requisites of the Saṅgha’s concord is matched with splitting the Saṅgha because “the requisites of concord are equal in sense to the Saṅgha”; and destroying a stūpa is matched with drawing blood from the body of a Buddha because the multitude reveres that stūpa “as resembling the Buddha.” These five sentences are Puguang’s added explanation, not something the text of the treatise has of itself. Table and grounds read together, the logic by which the treatise compiled these five items becomes wholly transparent.

〔6.2〕About to gain receptivity, about to gain non-return, about to gain the state beyond learning. First the question: when is action most apt to obstruct? The treatise points out three occasions — “if from the stage of the summit one is about to gain receptivity, all actions that draw down the evil destinies are the greatest obstruction, since receptivity passes beyond the levels of their maturation”; when one is about to gain the fruit of non-return, all actions bound to the desire realm are the greatest obstruction, excepting only actions to be experienced in the present life, “excepting only action that conforms to being experienced in the present life”; when one is about to gain the fruit beyond learning, the actions of the form and formless realms are the greatest obstruction, and again with the same exception. The simile the treatise gives is exceedingly vivid: “like a man about to leave the country where he has lived, whom all his creditors obstruct to the utmost.”

The easy error: to suppose that “action obstructs” in the same way at all times. The treatise says expressly that it is fiercest at the very moment one is about to cross a boundary — because that moment amounts to writing off the maturation of that level, and the actions of that level naturally all surge up to bar the way. In practice: this section is really three passes announced in advance upon the map of practice; when the Chapter on the Worthy and the Noble treats receptivity, non-return, and the state beyond learning, these three passes will appear once more. Here the reader is given a preparation of mind: the nearer the breakthrough, the more evident the drag of old action; this is not a falling back but the ordinary condition of a pass.

VII. The Bodhisattva Abiding in Certainty and the Action Producing the Excellent Marks

〔7.1〕Where the name “abiding in certainty” begins. First the question: since it was said above that “killing a bodhisattva abiding in certainty” is of the same class as the deeds of immediate retribution, from what point is a bodhisattva reckoned as “abiding in certainty”? The treatise answers, “it is from cultivating the action that draws down as its maturation result the excellent thirty-two marks of a great person that a bodhisattva first gains the name of abiding in certainty” — from the very moment he begins to cultivate the action producing the excellent marks. As for “certainty,” the treatise marks it out by four things: he is always born in a good destiny (the two destinies of men and gods); he is always born into a noble house (of brahmans, kṣatriyas, wealthy elders, or great brahman families); he always has the body of a man (“within noble houses the faculties may be complete or defective, yet that bodhisattva always has excellent faculties”); and his power of recollection is firm (“birth after birth he can always recollect his former lives, and in the good he does he never draws back”). At the end the treatise uses a very unusual simile — “as the world hands down that there is a priceless tuosuo, one should know that this saying points at that bodhisattva” — and explains why: through long practice of the great compassion without object, he is spontaneously and always bound to others, gathering all sentient beings to himself as his own equals with a mind free of pride, and even “always regarding himself as their servant.”

The easy error: to read “abiding in certainty” as “having entered some absorption.” The “certainty” here is the certainty of being fixed beyond falling back, not the concentration of the training in absorption — Puguang’s Record marks the boundary plainly: “‘certainty’ here means that his birth in the good destinies and the rest is fixed, and this is called certainty; it is not the gaining of an absorption. The bodhisattva abiding in this is called abiding in certainty.” In practice: this passage is the most positive description of the bodhisattva path in this treatise — a treatise of the schools. Its weight lies not upon supernormal powers and merits but upon the sentence “in all things hard to seek he can be patient, and in all things toilsome and pressing he can bear the burden.”

〔7.2〕The five conditions for cultivating the action producing the excellent marks. First the question: this action cannot be cultivated in any place at any time — what are its conditions? The stanza gives five, and the treatise explains each. Place — it must be in Jambudvīpa, “since in this continent the awakened discernment is keenest and clearest.” Standing — “only a man, and not the body of a woman and the rest, since by then he has already passed beyond the stage of a woman and the rest.” Object and mental ground — “only in the direct presence of a Buddha, the volition arisen with a Buddha for its object, formed through reflection and not of the classes formed through hearing or through cultivation”: he must be face to face with a Buddha, and it must arise with a Buddha for its object, and it falls in the square of discernment formed through reflection, not of that formed through hearing or through cultivation. Term of time — “only the remaining hundred aeons of cultivation, and not more; among the causes of Buddhas the norm is such.” Adornment — each mark is adorned with a hundred merits. Śākyamuni is the exception: “blazing in vigor, he could leap over nine aeons,” accomplishing it in ninety-one aeons, whence the saying, “I recollect that in ninety-one aeons I have not seen one household suffer the least loss by giving me food, but only accomplish great benefit.”

Here the treatise records alongside the account of one master (“the masters of old say,” which Puguang’s Record glosses as “the masters of old means the old masters within one’s own school”), and further sets up for itself the question “what then is the measure of a single merit?” and sets out three accounts, the last being “some say: this measure is known to a Buddha alone.” The easy error: to take the last of the three accounts as the author’s settled conclusion. The text of the treatise itself passes no judgment. In practice: the most serviceable phrase in this section is “formed through reflection” — the action producing the excellent marks rests neither upon hearing nor upon absorption, but upon that one thought of volition raised while facing a Buddha. It points the pivot of the cultivation of merit back to a single moment of mind.

VIII. The Three Incalculable Aeons and the Four Buddhas Met in Reverse Order

〔8.1〕Seventy-five thousand, seventy-six thousand, seventy-seven thousand. First the question: is the span of the three great incalculable aeons an empty figure of speech, or does the treatise give a real number? The treatise gives a real number — “in the first incalculable aeon he made offerings to seventy-five thousand Buddhas,” in the second to seventy-six thousand, in the third to seventy-seven thousand. The three figures increase by a thousand in each aeon — these three numbers are what the treatise gives, and it does not set out why the increase is so; here they are recorded simply as the numbers stand.

The easy error: to take this string of figures as an astronomical quantity fit only to be gazed at, and to skip it. Its function in the treatise is to calibrate the scale: just above, one lie was said to draw down an intermediate aeon in the hell without interval; here the number of Buddhas served over three incalculable aeons pulls the wholesome end onto the same chart. In practice: in reading Abhidharma numbers, ask first “against which other number is this one to be read?” Here what is to be read against it is precisely that intermediate aeon in the first half of the fascicle.

〔8.2〕Meeting Buddhas in reverse order, and that first vow. First the question: what is meant by “reverse order”? The treatise explains, “‘reverse order’ means from the later toward the earlier” — at the fulfillment of the third aeon he met Excellent Insight, at the fulfillment of the second Burning Lamp, at the fulfillment of the first Jewel-Topknot, while the Buddha met at the first raising of the aspiration was Śākyamuni. The most moving part of this passage is the last section: the Buddha the bodhisattva first met was also named Śākyamuni, and it was before that Buddha that he made the vow, “may I become a Buddha, in all things as this World-Honored One is now”; and that Buddha too appeared in a final aeon, and after his passing his true Dharma likewise abode a thousand years, so that the Tathāgata of today is in every point the same as that Buddha.

The easy error: to read “reverse order” as though the order in which the Buddhas appeared in the world were inverted. What is inverted is the order of the telling; the treatise is counting from the near toward the far. In practice: this passage buckles “making a vow” and “the marks of Buddhahood” into one line of cause and result — the shape drawn by that first thought of aspiration is the shape of the final accomplishment. Here the treatise rarely compresses an enormous span of time into one very concrete sentence, and the reader may well remember it as the general outline of the whole fascicle’s treatment of merit.

IX. The Four Stages at Which the Six Pāramitās Are Fulfilled

〔9.1〕Four stages matched to six pāramitās. First the question: why are the six matched to four stages and not to six? The treatise’s arrangement is one, two, one more, two. The first stage — “the giving he practices is by compassion alone, and not out of seeking for himself a difference of excellent birth”: able to give all things, even his eyes and marrow, and out of compassion alone; here the pāramitā of giving is fulfilled. The second stage — “when the bodhisattva has the limbs of his body cut apart, though not yet free of the greed of desire, yet in his mind there is not the least resentment”; here the two pāramitās of discipline and of patience are fulfilled together. The third stage is the praising of the Buddha Tiṣya and the leaping over of nine aeons, where vigor is fulfilled. The fourth stage — “about to mount to unsurpassed perfect awakening, abiding in the vajra-like concentration just before unsurpassed awakening”; here the two pāramitās of absorption and of discernment are fulfilled together. At the end the treatise explains the name: “because they are able to reach the far shore of the fullness of virtue toward which they go, these six are called pāramitā”; and Puguang’s Record glosses the sound and sense for this — “six. Pāra here means the far shore. Mitā here means to reach.”

The easy error: to suppose that “fulfillment” means that a given pāramitā has been cultivated until it can be cultivated no further. What the treatise marks is the event of that pāramitā’s reaching the far shore — the fulfillment of giving is fulfilled in the four words “by compassion alone,” not in how much was given. In practice: of the four stages, the one most to be carried back into oneself is the second. Why are discipline and patience fulfilled at the same time? Because the body is cut apart and the mind has not the least resentment, and this one moment proves at once both not transgressing and not stirring — discipline is not doing, patience is not being moved; upon one and the same object the two are verified together.

〔9.2〕That gāthā in praise of the Buddha, and “leaping over nine aeons.” First the question: only three gāthās that are not root stanzas are quoted in the whole fascicle — why quote one here? Because it is the very scene of “leaping over nine aeons.” The treatise narrates the setting: the bodhisattva came upon the Tathāgata Tiṣya seated within a jeweled niche in the absorption of the fire element, his majestic radiance blazing beyond the ordinary, and so he gazed with single-hearted devotion and forgot to set down his other foot, and thus “for seven days and nights without slackening, with a purified mind he praised that Buddha in an excellent gāthā,” and having praised him “he thereupon leapt over nine aeons.” The sense of the gāthā is this: in heaven above and on earth below, in the hall of much hearing of this world, in the palaces of the departed and the abodes of the gods, and out to the ten directions, there is nothing to compare with him; great man, bull among men, great śramaṇa — searching through the earth and the mountain forests, there is none his equal.

The easy error: to read “leaping over nine aeons” as taking a shortcut. The cause the treatise gives is “blazing in vigor” — seven days and nights standing on one foot, eyes unmoving, mind without slackening; this is pressing the work of a hundred aeons into the density of seven days. In practice: this is the one narrative with a scene in the whole fascicle, and it draws all those astronomical figures back at a stroke to a single man standing motionless. The measure of merit may be immense, but the place it starts from is always the concentration and sincerity of a single thought.

X. The Naming of the Three Bases of Meritorious Action, Giving, Discipline, and Cultivation

〔10.1〕The three words merit, action, and basis must be read apart. First the question: since they are called “the three bases of meritorious action,” are all three alike merit, and action, and basis? The treatise says, “all three classes are merit; some are action and some are basis, each according to what fits it, as was said of the paths of action” — it must be divided into squares as the ten paths of action were. Among the ten paths of action some are both action and path, some are path and not action; here there are four squares: some are merit and action and basis; some are merit and action but not basis; some are merit and basis but not action; and some are merit alone, neither action nor basis. The treatise assigns them one by one: within the class of giving, “within the class of giving, the two actions of body and speech are furnished with all three of the names merit, action, and basis”; the volition that can raise them is called merit and action only; the dharmas coexistent with that volition receive only the name of merit. The class of discipline is of the nature of bodily and verbal action only, and so all of it is furnished with the three names. Within the class of cultivation, loving-kindness is called merit and basis only (being the basis upon which action depends); the volition associated with loving-kindness and the discipline arising together with loving-kindness are called merit and action only; and the remaining coexistent dharmas receive only the name of merit. The treatise offers another reading as well: the name “meritorious action” displays the sense of “doing merit,” and “basis” displays the support. At the end it records alongside one account, “some say: volition alone is true meritorious action.”

The easy error: to take “basis of meritorious action” as an indivisible compound. It is three criteria laid one upon another, and only taken apart does it read through. In practice: this section is the doorway into the whole chapter on giving, discipline, and cultivation that follows. Wherever one reads “such and such is a basis of meritorious action,” ask first which of the three squares the sentence is using — whether it is saying that the thing is merit, or that it is action, or that it is the basis upon which these depend.

XI. The Entity of Giving and the Name of Giving

〔11.1〕The entity of giving is not the thing given. First the question: is the entity of giving the thing that is sent out? The treatise answers no — “the equipment of relinquishing is called giving; that is, it is by this equipment that the act of relinquishing is accomplished, and so that by which one relinquishes is the true entity of giving.” The true entity of giving is the equipment by which one is able to relinquish (bodily and verbal action, together with the mind and mental factors that can raise it), and not the thing relinquished. The treatise also makes a distinction: “or the act of relinquishing may be accomplished out of fear, out of hope, out of greed, and the like” — where one relinquishes out of fear, out of hope, out of greed, the act of relinquishing is accomplished just the same, and yet it is not the giving spoken of here; and it is to mark these off that the stanza says “for the sake of offering, for the sake of benefit.” What then is the “equipment”? “It means bodily and verbal action, and what can raise them”; and what is “what can raise”? “It is what, together with non-greed, is able to raise this collection” — that portion which, associated with non-greed, can give rise to this collection.

The easy error: to fasten the accomplishment of giving upon the quantity of goods. What the treatise fastens it to is that equipment of mind and action, and it nails the root down with the three words “together with non-greed.” In practice: this section yields a very hard test — wherever one relinquishes out of fear, out of exchange, out of greedy seeking, the goods go out just the same and yet do not fall into the square of “giving.” The criterion is not in the hand but in that one thought of non-greed.

〔11.2〕A single moment’s wholesome aggregates already receive the name of giving. First the question: the treatise quotes the stanza “if a man with a purified mind stints himself and practices giving” — what does it supply? It supplies the term of time. The stanza says that the wholesome aggregates of this one moment, taken together, receive the name of giving — giving is not a continuing process but a collection of wholesome aggregates in a single moment. The treatise then explains at once the word-formation of the phrase “merit of the class of giving”: “‘merit of the class of giving’ displays the sense of having giving for its entity, as with ‘a vessel of the class of leaves’ or ‘a hut of the class of grass’” — just as a “vessel of the class of leaves” is a vessel made of leaves and a “hut of the class of grass” a hut thatched with grass, so the “merit of the class of giving” is merit having giving for its entity; and the classes of discipline and of cultivation may be understood on the same pattern.

The easy error: to read the quoted stanza as a stanza of the author’s own. The text just before it reads “it is what, together with non-greed, is able to raise this collection. As there is a stanza that says,” and the two words “as there is” crown it: it is a stanza of another’s saying, and does not enter into the count of the treatise’s own stanzas. In practice: this section changes the measure of giving from “how much was relinquished” to “how pure the wholesome aggregates of that one moment were.” Read together with “together with non-greed” in the section above, the criterion of giving is by now wholly gathered into the mind.

XII. The Four Alternatives of Giving, and the Three Causes of Its Result

〔12.1〕For oneself, for another, for both, for neither. First the question: giving is always for the benefit of another, so how can there be a giving that is “only for one’s own benefit”? The treatise arranges four alternatives out of two variables — whether the giver is an ordinary being or a noble one (whether he is already free of the greed of desire), and whether the recipient is a sentient being or a caitya (a stūpa of the Buddha). When ordinary beings, whether or not yet free of desire, make an offering to a caitya, this is “only for one’s own benefit,” since the caitya does not make use of it and others gain no benefit thereby. When a noble one already free of desire gives to sentient beings, this is “only for the benefit of another,” since “others obtain benefit thereby, and it is not for his own benefit, since he has passed beyond that stage of fruition” — he himself has already passed beyond that stage of fruition and no longer gains benefit from it. When ordinary beings give to sentient beings, this is “for the benefit of both.” When a noble one makes an offering to a caitya, this is “not for the benefit of either,” since “this giving is called not for the benefit of either, because it is only out of reverence and requital of kindness.”

The easy error: to read “only for one’s own benefit” as selfishness. What it speaks of is where the benefit lands, not the height or lowness of the motive — the caitya does not make use of it, and so the benefit does not land on the other side. In practice: with the four alternatives set out, one can see that the treatise’s framework for weighing giving has two axes — the standing of the giver, and whether the recipient can make use of the gift. These two axes open out next into the three causes: the donor, the goods, and the field.

〔12.2〕The difference of result hangs upon three things. First the question: giving being the same, why do the results differ? The treatise answers, “giving has differences by three causes, namely differences in the donor, in the goods, and in the field,” and adds a sentence of causal linkage: giving having differences, the results have differences.The three causes are the donor, the goods given, and the field given to.

The easy error: to suppose that the difference of result depends only upon the field (upon whom one gives to). The treatise lists three items plainly, and the field is only one of them; the virtue of the donor and the quality of the goods given enter into the account just as much. In practice: this is the most important table in the treatise’s treatment of merit. The three sections that follow are the opening out of these three causes one by one, and in reading them one should treat the three causes as three independent columns, each of which can by itself raise or lower the result.

XIII. The Three Causes, Donor, Goods, and Field, Opened Out One by One

〔13.1〕The donor’s four virtues matched to four results. First the question: what do the donor’s “virtues” mean? The treatise answers, “because the donor is accomplished in the several virtues of faith, discipline, learning, and the rest, he is called differing as donor.” But the difference of result hangs upon the manner in which he gives, and four manners are matched to four results — “if a donor practices giving with reverence, he obtains being constantly honored by others”; giving with his own hand, he obtains delight in the use of vast wealth; giving in due season, he obtains wealth in due season, so that what he needs does not come too late; “if he gives without injury, he obtains resources not to be encroached upon by others nor destroyed by fire and the like.”

The easy error: to read the four results as random recompense. The four in fact correspond one to one — reverence draws honor, one’s own hand draws use, due season draws timeliness, absence of injury draws indestructibility; the manner and the retribution are of one structure. In practice: this section may be taken as a table for self-examination. With one and the same gift, change the manner of giving and the result changes its shape; and not one of the four manners costs a single coin more.

〔13.2〕The four sense-objects of the goods given matched to four results. First the question: how is the difference of the goods measured? The treatise measures it by the four sense-objects, visible form, scent, taste, and touch — the goods given being complete in visible form, one obtains excellent form; “because complete in scent, one obtains a good name, as fragrance spreads its perfume through all quarters”; because complete in taste, one obtains being loved by the multitude; “because complete in touch, one obtains a supple body, and touches that give rise to pleasant feeling in due season.” Conversely, “where the result is diminished, it is because the cause was lacking.”

The easy error: to read “complete in form, scent, taste, and touch” as requiring costly things. What the treatise speaks of is whether this offering is complete in the four sense-objects — good to see, good to smell, good to taste, good to touch; and these four are not the same thing as price. In practice: this section together with the one above amounts to saying that the quality of giving has eight adjustable knobs (the four manners of giving and the four sense-objects), all of them within the giver’s control. When this treatise speaks of merit, it never speaks of luck.

〔13.3〕The four differences of the field. First the question: how is the field given to divided? The treatise divides it into four — destiny, suffering, kindness, and virtue. With regard to destiny, “if one gives to an animal one receives a hundredfold result; if one gives to a man who has broken discipline, a thousandfold result.” With regard to suffering, as among the seven bases of meritorious action that have a support, “it is first said that one should give to travelers, to the sick and their nurses, and give groves, regular food, and food in due season against cold, wind, and heat,” and afterwards it is said that one who accomplishes these seven obtains merit beyond all measure. With regard to kindness, “such as father and mother, teachers, and others who have shown kindness,” and it adduces the bears, deer, and the like of the birth stories as kinds that have shown kindness. With regard to virtue, “if one gives to a man who keeps discipline, one receives a hundred-millionfold result,” and so on.

The easy error: to take the four items as one linear ladder. They are four parallel dimensions — an animal that is at this moment suffering falls at once into the two squares of “low destiny” and “heavy suffering,” and the two accounts must be reckoned apart. In practice: of the four, “suffering” and “kindness” are the two most easily overlooked. The treatise deliberately enters such utterly ordinary matters as “travelers, the sick and their nurses” and “food in due season against cold, wind, and heat” into the seven bases of meritorious action that have a support, precisely to make plain that a field of merit need not be sought far off.

XIV. The Most Excellent Giving, and the Five Fields That Need Not Be Noble Ones

〔14.1〕Three “most excellents.” First the question: which giving is most excellent in merit? The treatise gives three most excellents side by side. The first is what the Bhagavat said — “if one free of defilement gives resources to one free of defilement, this is the most excellent among gifts of goods,” one free of defilement giving to one free of defilement. The second is the giving of a bodhisattva — “though it is not called the freed giving to the freed, yet in merit of giving it too is most excellent,” because it is the cause of universally benefiting and gladdening all sentient beings. The third is the eighth of the eight kinds of giving, and the treatise lists the names of the eight, “what are the eight kinds of giving? First, giving to whoever comes; second, giving out of fear; third, giving in return for kindness; fourth, giving in hope of return; fifth, giving after the custom of forebears; sixth, giving in hope of heaven; seventh, giving to secure a name; eighth, giving in order to adorn the mind, to support the mind, to further the practice of yoga, and to gain the higher sense,” and then briefly explains several of the earlier ones, among which giving out of fear is “that is, seeing before one the marks of this wealth’s destruction, one would rather give it than lose it,” and giving after the custom of forebears is giving in continuation of the household usage of fathers and ancestors. Puguang’s Record adds a gloss to “giving to secure a name” — “to practice giving in search of a fine reputation is called giving to secure a name.”

The easy error: to suppose that the eight kinds of giving are eight good ways of giving. The first seven in fact run down the line from the passive, the fearful, the transactional, to the reputation-seeking; only the eighth is given in order to adorn one’s own mind, to further the practice of yoga, and to gain the higher sense. In practice: the eight are most useful read as a ladder of motives — with one and the same act of giving, at whatever rung the motive stops, there the result stops too.

〔14.2〕Five fields where, even if they are ordinary beings, the result of giving is measureless. First the question: was it not said that the higher the virtue of the field the greater the result? Then why is the result measureless even for those who are “not realized noble ones”? The treatise lists five — father, mother, the sick, one who preaches the Dharma, and a bodhisattva in his last birth — “these five, even if they are ordinary beings, yet giving to them can draw down a measureless result.” Of these the bodhisattva in his last birth is one who “abides in his final existence and is called of the last birth.” The treatise sets up a question especially about the preacher of the Dharma: to which of the four fields does he belong? The answer: “he is gathered under the field of kindness,” the reason being “because he is the great good friend of the several worlds” — he can give the eye of discernment to those blinded by ignorance, can open out for the world what is safe and what is perilous, and can cause sentient beings to give rise to the Dharma body without outflows; in brief, one who preaches the Dharma well can do even what a Buddha does.

The easy error: to read this stanza as overturning the earlier “the field of virtue is most excellent.” It does not overturn it; it only points out that the field of kindness and the field of suffering can also, independently, draw the result up to the measureless — father and mother are the extreme of kindness, the sick are the extreme of suffering, the preacher of the Dharma is adjudged by the treatise to be gathered under the field of kindness, and the reason the treatise gives already shows his weight, while the bodhisattva in his last birth is the extreme of standing. In practice: the most practical word in this section is “the sick.” That an ordinary person who is at this moment ill stands, on this treatise’s books, side by side with a preacher of the Dharma — this is worth remembering over and over.

XV. The Six Causes of an Action’s Lightness or Heaviness and the Five Causes of Increased Action

〔15.1〕Lightness and heaviness by six causes. First the question: by what is an action’s lightness or heaviness settled? The treatise lists six causes — the after-effect (“the after-effect means that having done it one goes on doing it,” doing it and then doing it again), the field (doing harm or benefit to that object), the root (the root path of action itself), the preparation (the stretch that raises the bodily or verbal act), the volition (that by which the path of action reaches its end), and the intent (“the intent means whatever inclination of purpose there is,” that I ought to do such and such). Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary here numbers them one by one, giving “there are six causes here: the after-effect is the first cause,” and so on, the clearest in form. The treatise also adduces three cases of one-sided weight: some become heavy by the after-effect alone taking hold of them; some become heavy by the field; and some, upon one and the same field, become heavy by the force of the root — “as killing upon the field of one’s father or mother is a heavy offense,” whereas stealing and the like directed at father and mother do not constitute such a heavy offense; while as to those that become heavy by the remaining causes (preparation, volition, and intent), the treatise gathers them up with “from this one should reason out the rest.” Puguang’s Record fills it out word for word: “as killing upon the field of father or mother is a heavy offense and constitutes a deed of immediate retribution, whereas stealing and the like done to father or mother do not constitute an offense of immediate retribution.” At the end it settles the general rule: “if all six causes are of the higher grade, this action is heaviest,” and the reverse of this is lightest, while what lies between is neither lightest nor heaviest.

The easy error: to read the six causes as six bonus points. They are six independent notches, each of which may be of the lower or the higher grade, and only when all six are high is an action heaviest. In practice: of the six, “the after-effect” is the most easily overlooked — doing the thing again and again after it is done, rejoicing in it again and again, this item by itself can push an action up into the heavy grade.

〔15.2〕The boundary between action done and action increased. First the question: the sūtras speak of action done and action increased — where is the boundary? The treatise answers, by five causes — deliberation (“‘because of deliberation’ means that the action he does is neither done wholly without prior thought nor done upon a sudden thought”), completeness (the measure being already enough that one should fall into an evil destiny, “so long as it is not complete it is called only done and is not called increased”), the absence of regret and of counteraction (“‘because there is no regret and no counteraction’ means that there is no remorse and no action that counteracts it”), having companions (“‘because it has companions’ means that in doing an unwholesome action, unwholesome things serve as its helpers”), and maturation (its being fixed to give a maturation). For wholesome actions the reverse is to be understood. Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary likewise numbers them one by one, giving “there are five causes here: ‘because of deliberation’ is the first cause.”

The easy error: to suppose that “increased” is merely “doing it a few more times.” Of the five causes the one that truly bears weight is the absence of regret and of counteraction — one act of remorse, one counteragent, and the action stops at “done” and does not become “increased.” In practice: this is the section of the whole fascicle that can be used most directly. The difference between action done and action increased amounts to a criterion for whether an action can still be headed off; remorse and counteraction are not psychological consolation but an actual gap in one of the five causes.

XVI. Merit Where There Is No Recipient, and a Good Result in a Bad Field

〔16.1〕The merit of the class of relinquishing and the merit of the class of enjoyment. First the question: an offering is made to a caitya and the caitya does not make use of it — whence then does merit arise? The treatise first divides two classes — “merit is of two classes, first relinquishing, second enjoyment”; “the merit of the class of relinquishing means that with a wholesome mind one merely relinquishes resources and the merit of giving arises at once,” and “the merit of the class of enjoyment means that the field given to makes use of the thing given, and only then does the merit of giving arise.” Giving to a caitya has no merit of the class of enjoyment, yet it has merit of the class of relinquishing. In this passage there is a round of exchange that must be kept clear, and Puguang’s Record marks the speaker of each sentence: the outsider asks, “since he does not receive it, whence does the merit arise” 〔Puguang marks this “the question”〕; the author reproaches the outsider in return and asks him on what ground he knows that merit must arise from receiving 〔Puguang marks this “the author reproaches the outsider in return”〕; the outsider answers, “not being received by another, there is no gathering in of benefit” 〔Puguang marks this “the outsider answers”〕; the author denies this in general 〔Puguang marks this “the author denies in general, properly explaining the following line”〕 — this is no decisive proof, for if merit must be accomplished by gathering in benefit for another, then cultivating loving-kindness and the rest, or cultivating right view and the rest, ought not to give rise to merit. And so the conclusion is “therefore it should be granted that in making offerings to a caitya much merit arises, as in cultivating loving-kindness and the rest.” Thereafter there is a round of challenge from an outsider: “is not this act of giving and reverence then thrown away for nothing? It is not so, for the mind that raises the act is what is excellent” — and the author answers with the simile of harming an enemy: the enemy’s life has ended and yet one still bears the thought of enmity and raises evil bodily and verbal actions, producing much demerit, and not merely a thought of mind; and it is the same in making offerings to a Great Master who has passed away.

The easy error: to read “there is merit even without a recipient” as “it makes no difference whether there is an object or not.” What the treatise says is that the merit of the class of relinquishing does not wait upon receiving, while the merit of the class of enjoyment still waits upon receiving; the two classes stand together, and it is not a matter of choosing one of two. In practice: this section settles a very practical doubt — whether making offerings to one already gone, to a stūpa of the Buddha, or to the object of the cultivation of loving-kindness, and cultivating in that way, is of any use at all. The treatise’s answer is that it is, and the reason lies not in whether the other receives but in “the mind that raises the act is what is excellent.”

〔16.2〕Even a bad field has a lovely result. First the question: if one gives in a bad field, can it draw down only an unlovely result? The treatise answers that it cannot, and proves it by farming — “from the seed of the madhuka the fruit of the madhuka arises, and its taste is exceedingly sweet,” “from the seed of the nimba the fruit of the nimba arises, and its taste is exceedingly bitter”; one gets what one sows, and “it is not by the power of the field that seed and fruit are inverted.” Therefore, though the donor be in a bad field, so long as he sows the seed of giving with a mind to benefit others, what he draws down is still a lovely result. But the treatise at once adds a limiting sentence: “yet by the fault of the field, the seed sown may bear little fruit or no fruit at all.”

The easy error: to read this section as “it makes no difference whether the field is good or bad.” The fault of the field does not alter the nature of the result, but it does alter the quantity of it — and these are two different matters. In practice: this section together with the one above forms the most reassuring stretch of the treatise’s treatment of merit — giving to one who does not deserve it does not turn a wholesome mind into an evil result; only the harvest may be reduced. The criterion remains always that one thought in one’s own mind.

XVII. Discipline as a Basis of Meritorious Action

〔17.1〕The entity of discipline and the four virtues of purity. First the question: what is “discipline”? The treatise sets it up from the negative side — “the several unwholesome forms are called breaking discipline,” and among them the offenses that are so by nature are given the name of breaking discipline; “‘what is prohibited’ means eating at the wrong time and the rest that are prohibited,” and these, though not offenses by nature, yet “though not offenses by nature, the Buddha prohibited them with a further purpose, for the protection of the Dharma and of sentient beings,” and one who has taken the precepts and transgresses them is likewise said to break discipline. Keeping away from these two is discipline — “keeping away from what is an offense by nature and from what is prohibited, both are called discipline”; and each is of two kinds, the manifest and the nonmanifest, having bodily and verbal action for their own nature.

Purity is then set up with four virtues of its own: “first, not being destroyed by the breaking of discipline”; second, not being destroyed by the causes of that (greed and the rest, the afflictions and the secondary afflictions); third, being founded on counteraction (founded on the foundations of mindfulness and the rest, which can counteract the breaking of discipline and its causes); “fourth, being founded on cessation, that is, founded on nirvāṇa and turned toward nirvāṇa, and not for the sake of an excellent birth.” The word “and the rest” in the stanza opens out into two accounts — “some say: purity of discipline is by five causes,” namely purity of the root, purity of the retinue, not being injured by applied thought, being taken up by right mindfulness, and being turned toward the quiescent; “some other master says: discipline is of four kinds,” namely discipline out of fear, discipline out of hope, discipline conducive to the factors of awakening, and pure discipline, of which the last is “fourth, pure discipline, that is, discipline without outflows, since it can forever part one from the grime of action and affliction.”

The easy error: to read “offenses by nature” and “offenses by prohibition” as two classes ranked higher and lower. The treatise says that offenses by prohibition are given a separate heading precisely because they are not in themselves evil, but were “prohibited with a further purpose” by the Buddha — the offense in transgressing them lies in transgressing what the Buddha laid down, not in the deed itself. In practice: the four virtues make a very serviceable table for self-examination — not transgressing, not invaded by the afflictions, having a counteragent to rely on, and turned toward the right place; lacking any one of the four, discipline still stands but is not called pure. And the four kinds of discipline of the second account are precisely a ladder of motives: fear, hope, for the sake of the factors of awakening, and without outflows.

XVIII. Cultivation as a Basis of Meritorious Action, and What Discipline and Cultivation Draw Down

〔18.1〕Why the wholesome of the concentrated stage alone is called “cultivation.” First the question: all wholesome things must be cultivated, so why is only the wholesome of equipoise called “cultivation”? The treatise first asks after its entity — “as for the wholesome of equipoise, what is its entity?” — and answers that it is the own-nature of concentration together with the dharmas coexistent with it. Then it asks after its sense — “what does the name ‘cultivation’ mean? It means perfuming the mind” — since the wholesome of the concentrated stage is supremely able to perfume the continuum of mind and make it a thing of virtue. The simile the treatise gives is “as flowers perfume sesame; therefore it alone is named cultivation”: set flowers and sesame together, and the sesame takes on the fragrance of the flowers.

The easy error: to understand “cultivation” as “repeated practice.” What the treatise takes is the sense of perfuming — not that the times are many, but whether a scent can be left behind. The wholesome of a scattered mind, however much of it is done, leaves nothing behind; the wholesome of the concentrated stage takes color at a single stroke. In practice: this section explains why the treatise sets the training in absorption apart as a class of the bases of meritorious action. The simile of flowers perfuming sesame is well worth keeping in mind — the effect of cultivation is measured not by how long you have done it, but by whether the mind has taken the scent.

〔18.2〕Discipline draws down birth in heaven, cultivation draws down liberation. First the question: what does each of the three bases of meritorious action draw down? It has already been said that giving draws down great wealth; here it is said that “discipline draws down birth in heaven, cultivation draws down liberation.” But the treatise at once adds a distinction: the word “excellent” in the stanza is said with regard to the more excellent side — “that is, giving too can draw down the result of birth in heaven, and it is with regard to the more excellent that discipline is spoken of”; keeping discipline too can draw down the result of release from bondage, and it is only with regard to the more excellent that cultivation is spoken of.

The easy error: to read the matching of three to three as sealed one to one — to suppose that giving can only obtain wealth, discipline only birth in heaven, and cultivation alone liberation. The treatise says plainly that it is not so; the domains of the three results overlap, and the pairing takes only what is most excellent. In practice: this section demonstrates the general rule for reading the pairing tables of Abhidharma — wherever one meets a form of the type “such and such draws down such and such,” ask first whether this is drawing it down exclusively or said with regard to the more excellent. Here the treatise hands over the answer itself, and the reader may take it as the key that unlocks every pairing table hereafter.

XIX. The Measure of the Merit of Brahmā

〔19.1〕The reckoning of the preceptors of former times. First the question: what is the merit of Brahmā? The treatise first cites a sūtra listing four men who can produce the merit of Brahmā — “first, one who, in order to make offerings to the relics of a Tathāgata, erects a stūpa in a place where none has been before”; second, one who, in order to make offerings to the Saṅgha of the four quarters, builds a monastery, gives a garden, and supplies the four requisites; third, a disciple of the Buddha who brings a Saṅgha that has been split back into concord; and fourth, one who universally cultivates loving-kindness and the rest toward sentient beings. What then is its measure? The first account is that of the preceptors of former times — “the merit that can draw down one aeon of birth in heaven and the enjoyment of every pleasure is one measure of merit,” the reason being that the time of enjoying pleasure so drawn down is “as long as the aeon-lifespan of the Brahmapurohita gods”; and a gāthā of another school is adduced in proof.

The easy error: to read the four merits of Brahmā as four great undertakings. Neither the third item, “bringing back into concord what has been split,” nor the fourth, “universally cultivating loving-kindness and the rest,” requires any wealth at all — joining together again a body of monks that has been torn apart forms an exact pair with the utter heaviness of splitting the Saṅgha in the first half of the fascicle. In practice: this section answers from afar to the opening of the fascicle, and is the most beautiful piece of reflection in the whole structure: destroying concord is the heaviest of offenses, and making concord is one of the merits of Brahmā.

〔19.2〕That gāthā of another school, and the reckoning of the Vibhāṣā masters. First the question: the treatise quotes the gāthā “a man of faith and right view who cultivates the ten excellent practices thereby produces the merit of Brahmā, drawing down an aeon of heavenly pleasure” — what is it to prove? It proves the measure “one aeon of heavenly pleasure” — and so the text just before it says “since among another school there is a gāthā that says,” marking that it comes from another school and is a stanza adduced in proof, not a stanza of this treatise. The second account is “the Vibhāṣā masters say thus: it is the same as the measure of merit adjudged in the analysis of the action producing the excellent marks” — the measure of the merit of Brahmā is just equal to the measure of merit adjudged earlier in the analysis of the action producing the excellent marks. At the end the treatise closes with “the word ‘and the rest’ is to display divergent accounts such as these.”

The easy error: to read the two accounts as higher and lower. The text of the treatise itself passes no judgment, and the word “and the rest” in the stanza is set there precisely to make room for divergent accounts. In practice: this is the third place in the fascicle where both are recorded without adjudication (the first two being the three accounts of the measure of a single merit and the two divergent accounts of purity of discipline). Of the three, the measure of a single merit and the measure of the merit of Brahmā are indeed questions of quantity, while purity of discipline is a question of the cause of purity of discipline and of the kinds of discipline, and they are not of one kind. Where the reader meets a place in this treatise at which no judgment is passed, what is to be looked at is whether the author did or did not, in that very place, pass a judgment; there is no need to presuppose which kind it belongs to.

XX. The Giving of Dharma and the Three Conducive Wholesome Things

〔20.1〕The two conditions of the giving of Dharma. First the question: the giving of goods has been spoken of; where does the giving of Dharma have its bounds? The treatise gives two conditions — in accordance with the real, and undefiled: “if one can, in accordance with the real, expound the sūtras and the rest for sentient beings with an undefiled mind so that they give rise to right understanding, this is called the giving of Dharma.” On the reverse side it speaks with the utmost weight: “therefore one who expounds with inversion or with a defiled mind, seeking gain, reputation, or reverence,” such a man “thereby injures the great merit of himself and of others” — not that he is without merit, but that he injures it, and injures it in both himself and others.

The easy error: to suppose that preaching is always better than not preaching. The treatise says plainly that to preach with inversion or with a defiled mind is to injure the great merit of oneself and others. In practice: the two conditions each answer to one side — “in accordance with the real” answers to the Dharma spoken, “undefiled” to the mind that speaks. Lacking either, the giving of Dharma turns over into injury. This section is of one workmanship with the earlier sentence that “the entity of giving lies in being together with non-greed”: in weighing merit, this treatise always looks first at the mind.

〔20.2〕Conducive to merit, conducive to liberation, conducive to penetration. First the question: toward what does each of these three words “conducive” incline? The treatise explains, “‘conducive to merit’ means the wholesome that draws down the lovely results of the world,” which inclines toward the lovely results of the world; “‘conducive to liberation’ means the wholesome that is fixed to draw down the result that is nirvāṇa,” which inclines toward nirvāṇa; “‘conducive to penetration’ means the wholesome that nearly draws down the result that is the noble path,” which inclines toward the noble path, that is, toward the four stages of warmth and the rest — “namely the four, warmth and the rest, which will be explained at length later on.” The most moving is the middle passage: once the wholesome conducive to liberation has arisen, “once this wholesome has arisen, it makes that sentient being one who is said to have the dharma of nirvāṇa within his body”; and how is one to know that one has sown it? The treatise gives a sign that can be verified in oneself — on hearing that birth and death have fault, that dharmas are without self, that nirvāṇa has virtue, the hairs of the body stand up and one weeps and sheds tears. And it gives the simile, “as when one sees a sprout come up in a rain-soaked field, one knows that there was a seed in the ground before.”

The easy error: to read the three conducives as three stages. They are three orientations — one and the same wholesome, inclined toward lovely results, toward nirvāṇa, or toward the noble path, is altogether different in nature. In practice: this section is the most personal stretch the fascicle leaves to its reader. The wholesome conducive to liberation can neither be seen nor touched, and yet the treatise gives a sign for it: to be moved on hearing of no-self and of nirvāṇa. That is not an emotion; it is evidence that there was already a seed in the ground.

XXI. Writing, Seals, Calculation, Letters, and Numbers, and the Four Divergent Names at the End of the Chapter

〔21.1〕Even worldly arts are explained by the three actions. First the question: writing, seals, calculation, letters, and numbers are worldly arts, so why should the treatise settle their entities? Because the task of this chapter is to gather every “doing” into the framework of action. The treatise explains “‘what is raised in accordance with principle’ means what arises from a right preparation” — arising from a right preparation; the three actions are those of body, speech, and mind; and “what raises them” is feeling, perception, and the rest, according to what fits each. The assignment is that “among these, writing and seals have the bodily action spoken of above and the five aggregates that raise it for their entity,” calculation and letters have verbal action and the five aggregates that raise it for their entity, and numbers have mental action and the four aggregates that raise it for their entity, since “it is by mental volition alone that dharmas are counted.” Puguang’s Record glosses the words themselves here — “writing means writing by hand, seals mean sealing by hand.”

The easy error: to see “the five aggregates for its entity” and “the four aggregates for its entity” and not understand the difference. Numbers use only four aggregates because they are accomplished by mental volition alone and do not involve the aggregate of form. In practice: this section looks like a side matter but is in fact the closing demonstration of the method of the whole chapter — any worldly deed whatever can be taken apart into “which action, plus which aggregates that raise it.” Once this knife has been learned, the reader can take apart in the same way any behavior he meets with.

〔21.2〕Excellent, inferior, to be practiced, unsurpassed — the close of the whole chapter. First the question: at the end of the chapter it suddenly treats a set of divergent names; what is the point? This is to define at one stroke four terms of evaluation constantly used in the whole treatise. “Wholesome dharmas without outflows are also called excellent”; “the several defiled dharmas are also called blameworthy, obscured, and inferior,” and by comparison with this one excellent and one inferior the middle class is established of itself, so that the stanza does not adjudge it again; “the several conditioned wholesome dharmas are also called to be practiced.” The treatise also sets up a question for itself: why are unconditioned dharmas not called to be practiced? There are two answers — “because they cannot be practiced again and again so as to increase,” and further, practice is for the sake of seeking a result, and unconditioned dharmas have no result. At the end, “liberation, nirvāṇa, is also called unsurpassed,” the reason being “since there is no single dharma that can surpass nirvāṇa, it being wholesome and permanent and passing beyond the host of dharmas”; while all remaining dharmas have something above them, established by inference from the sense. The whole chapter stops at “that the remaining dharmas have something above them is established by inference from the sense.”

The easy error: to read “to be practiced” and “unsurpassed” as terms of praise on one and the same level. They are exactly opposite — what is to be practiced is what can be practiced again and again so as to increase, and is therefore restricted to the conditioned wholesome; the unsurpassed is what has nothing further above it, and belongs therefore to nirvāṇa alone. In practice: the whole fascicle begins from the heaviest of lies and closes here with “no single dharma can surpass nirvāṇa.” At one end is that one night in which the wheel of Dharma was broken, at the other that one dharma which passes beyond the host of dharmas; and all the measuring of the six fascicles of the Chapter on Action comes to rest at last upon this one pairing.

Further Resonances: The Mirror of the Three Commentaries

The above is the sense of the treatise’s own text in this fascicle. Below, a further section is set up to gather four matters: the adjudications of the three commentaries and their divergences, Saṅghabhadra’s refutations and supplements, the divergences of Paramārtha’s earlier translation, and coordinates for parallel reading. A mirror is not the treatise; it is only looking at the same text by another way of reading. Both are recorded without adjudication, each restored to its own place.

1. Where the Three Commentaries Diverge

A commentary wholly absent. For this fascicle there are only three houses to collate. Shentai’s commentary is a fragmentary text: the seven fascicles now extant belong to the chapters on the elements, on the faculties, and on the worthy and the noble, and the Chapter on Action is wholly wanting, so that for this fascicle there is no line-by-line explanation of Shentai’s to be fastened on. The lack is marked as it stands, and the text of other fascicles is not made to fill it.

The three houses adjudge this one cut word for word alike. This is not often met with in this treatise: Puguang’s Record has “below, the second, explaining the obstruction of action separately. Within it, first setting out the entity of the obstruction of action; second, explaining the splitting of the Saṅgha separately; third, explaining the conditions that make a deed one of immediate retribution; fourth, explaining that the preparation is fixed; fifth, the heaviness of the offense and the greatness of the result; sixth, what is of the same class as the deeds of immediate retribution”; Fabao’s Commentary has “second, explaining the obstruction of action separately,” with its six items beginning from “first setting out the entity of action, second explaining the split in the Saṅgha separately”; and Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary has “from here the second, explaining the obstruction of action separately, and within it a division into six: first explaining the entity of the obstruction of action, second explaining the splitting of the Saṅgha, third explaining the conditions that make a deed one of immediate retribution, fourth explaining that the preparation is fixed, fifth explaining the heaviness of the offense and the greatness of the result, sixth explaining what is of the same class as the deeds of immediate retribution.” That three houses dividing their fascicles independently should agree one by one in the names of the outline and in the order of the six items may serve as collateral evidence that the boundary of the fascicle is the boundary of the outline.

Whether the splitting of the wheel of Dharma and the splitting of formal acts are the same in entity — the explanations of two ancient masters and Puguang’s own objections. Puguang’s Record sets up for itself, “question: as to splitting the Saṅgha of the wheel of Dharma and splitting the Saṅgha in its formal acts, are they the same in entity or not? The ancient master, the Dharma Master Xiu, explains: the entity of splitting the Saṅgha is of two kinds. If it is splitting the Saṅgha of the wheel of Dharma, it has cessation independent of discernment for its entity. If it is splitting the Saṅgha in its formal acts, it has non-concord for its entity,” and at once objects, “objection: to say that splitting the Saṅgha in its formal acts has non-concord for its nature is not amiss. But to say that splitting the Saṅgha of the wheel of Dharma has cessation independent of discernment for its entity is not so. All the treatises say that the entity of the Saṅgha that is split is the nature of non-concord”; it also records, “the Dharma Master Kong explains the sense thus: if it is splitting the Saṅgha of the wheel of Dharma, it has the non-acquisition upon the concord in the principle of the wheel of Dharma for its entity. If it is splitting the Saṅgha in its formal acts, it has the non-acquisition upon the concord in the affair of the formal acts for its entity,” and objects to this too, “objection: to speak of non-acquisition in general is likewise not amiss.” ⇒ The text of the treatise itself says only that the entity of the split in the Saṅgha is non-concord, and does not divide it in two; the divergent explanations of the two ancient masters and Puguang’s objections belong alike to the layer of commentarial adjudication, and are recorded without adjudication.

“Some say: one who has gained receptivity also cannot be split” — Puguang gives no marking, and Fabao supplies it. The treatise does not state the reason for this sentence. Searching Puguang’s Fascicle Eighteen word for word, there is no separate marking of a speaker for this sentence; Puguang merely passes over it in explaining the two senses of “the foolish.” Fabao’s Commentary however cites the Correct Principle to supply its ground — “some say that one who has gained receptivity also cannot be split, since the Buddha said that receptivity is fixed.” ⇒ This is one place where Fabao is fuller than Puguang: a blank in the base text is filled by the mutual evidence of the treatise of debate and of the ancient commentaries, yet the reason is not expressly in the base text itself, and in citing it the source must be made plain. Recorded without adjudication.

Whether the manifest action is one or two when one preparation harms two persons — “the earlier master / the later master” is Puguang’s outline. The treatise says only “if by one preparation one harms the mother and another as well, two nonmanifests arise, but the manifest is only the offense of immediate retribution,” and thereafter records “the Venerable Ghoṣa says that there are two manifests,” without marking an earlier and a later master. Puguang divides them in words of his own — “the earlier master’s sense is: from the stronger, one manifest” · “the later master’s sense is: in both there arise two manifests and two nonmanifests, the atoms of the manifest being distinct in each” — and cites the Mahāvibhāṣā in proof, “the Venerable Ghoṣa said: manifest actions are formed of atoms, and the atoms in harming the mother and in harming the other are distinct in each, and so the offense of the manifest is obtained on the side of two persons.” Fabao’s Commentary adjudges likewise, “this master’s sense is that the manifest too is twofold.” ⇒ The division into “earlier master / later master” belongs to Puguang’s outline and is not a structure of the treatise’s own text; it is recorded without adjudication.

The narrative of the case of Shiqianchi is a supplement of the two commentaries. The treatise says only “the Buddha told Shiqianchi: you have already done two deeds of immediate retribution,” and does not tell how it came about. Puguang’s Record marks “‘if that is so, how is the simile’ down to ‘killing an arhat’: citing a sūtra to raise a difficulty,” and supplies the story, “of old, when the Buddha was in the world, in a kingdom of southern India there was a king,” and so on, closing the difficulty with “‘that shows one deed of immediate retribution’ down to ‘reproaching him for that offense’: the answer.” Fabao’s Commentary cites the same case and gives the same label, “a difficulty.” ⇒ The supplied narrative lets the reader know the story behind the text, while the speaker-label “citing a sūtra to raise a difficulty” is itself a matter of commentarial outline. The two commentaries agree in their labels here.

The three accounts of the measure of a single merit — Puguang alone passes judgment. The text of the treatise sets out three accounts and passes no judgment. Puguang however marks plainly, “of the three accounts here, they may be known from the text, and the later master is to be taken as correct,” and cites the appraisers’ words in the Mahāvibhāṣā, “only a Buddha can know it; it is not to be fathomed by others.” ⇒ The text of the treatise itself has no judgment; the judgment is in Puguang; in citing it the attribution must be made plain, and it may not be taken outright as the treatise’s settled conclusion. Recorded without adjudication.

The explanation of the eight givings name by name — Puguang is full and Fabao brief. Puguang explains each name briefly and supplies “to practice giving in search of a fine reputation is called giving to secure a name”; Fabao at this section merely marks the outline and does not open out the names one by one.

The ordering of the two divergent accounts of purity of discipline — Puguang numbers them and Fabao does not. Puguang marks “this then is the first master. Some say: purity of discipline is by five causes,” and cites the Miscellaneous Heart Treatise in proof, “purity of the root means keeping away from raising the root path of action,” and so on; and again marks “this then is the second master. He says discipline is of four kinds.” Fabao however gives only “‘the word and the rest is to display’ down to ‘fifth, turned toward the quiescent’: explaining the word ‘and the rest’ in the stanza as displaying that there are divergent accounts” and “‘some other master says’ down to ‘since it forever parts one from the grime of action and affliction’: setting out a divergent account,” without numbering them one by one. ⇒ One instance of the three houses differing in fullness and depth.

The school to which the first master on the merit of Brahmā belongs — Puguang wavers among three schools in one sentence. Of “the preceptors of former times” Puguang says, “there are two masters’ accounts. This then is the first master, who is of the Sautrāntikas, or is a master of the Mahāsāṃghikas, or is a divergent master within our own school,” setting out three possibilities within a single sentence; while for the second master he simply follows the wording of the base text, “this then is the account of the second master. He says that the measure of the merit of Brahmā points to the same as the foregoing explanation.” ⇒ Within one and the same passage Puguang’s attitude to the two masters is in the one case doubtful and in the other settled; recorded without adjudication.

⭐ The order of the six “ten excellent practices” cited by the two commentaries from Paramārtha is exactly reversed. Puguang’s “Master Paramārtha explains: as for the ten excellent practices,” and what follows, gives first saving one’s mother and second saving one’s father; Fabao’s “Paramārtha says: to the four merits of Brahmā above six more are added,” and what follows, gives first saving one’s father and second saving one’s mother. ⇒ The same ancient master’s account, and the order in which the two commentaries cite it is reversed; this is the most concrete instance of divergence among the three commentaries in this fascicle, and it is recorded only, without adjudication; in citing the “ten excellent practices” it is well to note that the other house has a different order.

The entity of writing and seals — this time it is Fabao who is full and Puguang who is brief. Puguang explains only the words themselves, “writing means writing by hand, seals mean sealing by hand”; Fabao at the place where he marks “explaining that the entities of writing and seals are the same” supplies the source in the Mahāvibhāṣā. ⇒ The direction is exactly the reverse of that in the section on the eight givings (where Puguang was full and Fabao brief), and neither may be taken as the general rule.

Yuanhui’s strength lies in numbering. In the two sections on the six causes of an action’s lightness or heaviness and the five causes of increased action, Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary numbers them one by one — “there are six causes here: the after-effect is the first cause” · “there are five causes here: ‘because of deliberation’ is the first cause”; and Fabao likewise numbers the five causes one by one. The three houses differ in form at this section without any dispute over doctrine.

Where the ancient masters agree must also be recorded. At the sentence “is it not then thrown away for nothing” in the section on the meritorious action of the caitya, Puguang marks “‘is not this act of giving and reverence then thrown away for nothing’: an outsider’s difficulty,” and Fabao marks “an outsider’s difficulty” — the two commentaries agree in their speaker-labels, both adjudging it a difficulty from an outsider and not one set up by the author himself. The attribution in the main text of this section follows this.

Where the three commentaries merely restate, that is recorded as it stands. In the explanation of the five of the same class one by one, and in the explanation of the single stanza of divergent names of dharmas at the end of the chapter, all three commentaries are word for word nearly identical with the base text’s prose commentary, and no divergent account or added sense is to be found. A zero result is recorded honestly as well; in these two sections the exposition may simply teach the base text plainly.

2. Saṅghabhadra’s Refutations and Supplementary Explanations

The adversary of this fascicle has changed. In the first five fascicles of the Chapter on Action, Saṅghabhadra repeatedly names Vasubandhu with the two words “the Sūtra-master” and refutes him sentence by sentence; in this fascicle it is not so. Collating word for word by a fault-tolerant method, the term “the Sūtra-master” occurs fifty-five times in the whole Chapter Adjudicating Action of the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle, yet all of them fall within the range preceding the passage corresponding to this fascicle, and within the passage corresponding to this fascicle there are none; and it is the same with the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine. ⇒ What Saṅghabhadra refutes in this fascicle is the lineage of “the Elder,” and not “the Sūtra-master.” This is a negative proposition collated in two ways, and the only thing it can prove is this one thing — a shift in the name marked; one may not infer from it that there is no dispute in this fascicle.

Whether the entity of the five deeds of immediate retribution is mental action alone — Saṅghabhadra first refutes the Elder and then establishes his own tenet. At the very opening of this fascicle Saṅghabhadra cites and refutes the Elder’s account: “now the Elder says: the three actions are its entity, and bodily action and verbal action can each alone draw down a maturation result. This is hard to establish in principle, for it is only because what mental action does is weighty that it is granted to be able to draw down a special maturation; this is utterly vague.” He objects, “you have already granted that volition proceeding in dependence upon body and speech is called bodily and verbal action; now if you grant that mental action is the entity of a deed of immediate retribution, then merely to raise for a moment a volition to do such a deed would be to accomplish a deed of immediate retribution,” and adjudges at the end, “its principle is hard to establish, and so what he says lies outside the holy teaching,” and only then cites the stanza, word for word identical with the Kośa’s, and establishes it as his own tenet. ⇒ This round of debate is raised before the Kośa’s stanza itself, and is a framework of Saṅghabhadra’s own adding; there is no such difficulty in the text of the Kośa. One sense and two schools are recorded together, and no verdict of victory is passed.

The case of the kalala that miscarries and is reborn, which the Elder questions as a fiction. The Kośa sets up this case to ask in whom the offense of immediate retribution for killing one’s mother falls. Saṅghabhadra cites the Elder’s difficulty: “the Elder says thus of this: if the kalala has life it does not fall out, and if it has fallen out it must already have died, for a sentient being can certainly not abide in filth. Since there is no such thing, the question is asked in vain” — meaning that the case cannot occur at all, and to ask it is to ask to no purpose. Saṅghabhadra answers him, “the Elder is certainly unable to know exactly the differences of capability within the destinies of action,” and adduces in proof that the intermediate existence pierces through vajra and that the fire in the mother’s womb can dissolve metal and stone while the kalala grows within it, and cites “it is heard that a sūtra says that the venerable Kāśyapa the Youth was born in just this way” as a precedent. ⇒ What is disputed is whether the case itself can stand, and not the doctrine of the offense of immediate retribution for killing one’s mother. Recorded without adjudication.

In the section on giving to a caitya, Saṅghabhadra is of one purport with the Kośa. Here Saṅghabhadra sets up no divergent account but expounds the answer the Kośa already has, and expounds it more fully — “upon a field endowed with virtue one gives rise to a strong resolve, and with the utmost reverence makes an offering to a caitya” — and uses the simile of harming an enemy, which corresponds almost word for word with the Kośa’s. ⇒ This passage does not belong to the class of debate; it takes up rather than refutes, and is recorded as such.

The designations of the two masters on the merit of Brahmā differ in the two treatises. Xuanzang’s Kośa has “the preceptors of former times” and “the Vibhāṣā masters,” whereas the corresponding text of the treatise as carried in Saṅghabhadra has in both places “some other master says” — “the treatise says: some other master says, the merit that can draw down one aeon of birth in heaven and the enjoyment of every pleasure, just this is called one measure of the merit of Brahmā” · “some other master says: this is as the measure of merit spoken of in the analysis of the action producing the excellent marks.” ⇒ Two treatises issuing from the same translation hall of Xuanzang and yet differing in designation; recorded only, without adjudication, and no conjecture is made as to which represents the original Sanskrit and which a choice of rendering. Read together with Puguang’s “wavering among three schools in one sentence” above, it may be seen that the attribution of this lineage has been without settled account since ancient times.

The ground for “one who has gained receptivity also cannot be split,” with one voice in three places. Both of Saṅghabhadra’s treatises supply “some say that one who has gained receptivity also cannot be split, since the Buddha said that receptivity is fixed,” and Fabao cites the same sentence from the Correct Principle. Yet neither the Kośa’s own text nor Puguang marks it plainly. ⇒ This is a good instance of comparison across texts — a blank in the base text may have its reason supplied by the mutual evidence of a divergent translation, of the treatise of debate, and of the ancient commentaries — yet it remains supplementary material, and may not be taken outright as a principle inherent in the base text.

3. The Divergences of Paramārtha’s Earlier Translation

Paramārtha’s Expository Treatise on the Treasury of Abhidharma forms a system of its own in the passage corresponding to this fascicle. The boundaries of the passage can be fixed only by the structure of the scene: it begins with “what is the nature of the entity of these deeds of immediate retribution? Four have bodily action for their entity, one has verbal action for its entity, three have killing for their nature, one has false speech for its nature, one has the fore-part of killing for its nature,” answering word for word Xuanzang’s question at the head of the fascicle; and it ends with “there is not even a dharma equal to nirvāṇa, how much less one above it,” the same close as Xuanzang’s at the end of the chapter. The two texts divide their fascicles differently, and the passage answering to this fascicle falls within Paramārtha’s “part four” without coinciding with the fascicle boundary, so that to search Paramārtha’s text with Xuanzang’s wording will never find the boundary.

A basic difference of form: one stanza split into several short verses. Xuanzang sets out the whole stanza first under “the stanza says / the treatise says,” while Paramārtha embeds his explanation line by line under “the verse says / the explanation says.” Within this fascicle, where Xuanzang has one stanza of four lines, Paramārtha again and again splits it into two, three, or four short verses — the stanza on the split in the Saṅgha is split into two (“the verse says: the split in the Saṅgha is non-concord, its nature is a dharma not associated, an undefiled and indeterminate dharma” and “the verse says: the assembly is associated with it”), the stanza on the one who splits into three, the stanza on the six pāramitās into four, and the closing stanza of the chapter into four as well. There are also places where Xuanzang sets up a stanza and Paramārtha uses prose alone — so at the entity of the five deeds of immediate retribution and at the number of Buddhas served through the three incalculable aeons. This is a difference of form, not an omission here and there.

The renderings form a system of their own. Bhikṣu is rendered by another transcription, Jambudvīpa as the Jambu Continent, “without interval” by transcription, both stūpa and caitya by a single transcription, “non-returner” by a shortened transcription, “incalculable aeon” as asaṃkhyeya, “volition” as “intention,” “equipoise” as “the stage of tranquility,” “the fruit of liberation” as “the fruit of separation,” “aggregate” as skandha, and “basis of meritorious action” as “class of meritorious action.” The names of Buddhas differ too — Excellent Insight appears as Vipaśyin and Jewel-Topknot as Jewel-Light, while Burning Lamp bears the same name. ⇒ Whether the difference in the names of Buddhas is a divergent rendering of one and the same Buddha, or rests upon a different transmission, is not to be settled by the words, and is recorded only, without adjudication.

⭐ Three quoted stanzas that lay out the whole range of divergence in translation. In the stanza praising the Buddha Tiṣya the two texts are wholly different word for word — Xuanzang has “in heaven and earth, in the hall of much hearing of this world, in the palaces of the departed, the abodes of the gods, and the ten directions, there is none; great man, bull among men, great śramaṇa, searching the earth and the mountain forests there is nowhere an equal,” while Paramārtha has “in earth, heaven, and the quiescent abode of Brahmā there is none; in the three times and ten directions there has never been; going everywhere and searching this earth and the mountain forests, what man is equal to the Honored One in his three virtues?” The stanza on the merit of the class of giving, however, can be matched line by line — “these wholesome aggregates of a moment are together established under the name of giving” against “these wholesome skandhas of a moment, these are called the action of giving.” And the gāthā of another school on the merit of Brahmā is almost word for word the same — the first line “a man of faith and right view” is identical in both, and the remaining three differ only by a word or two. Within one and the same fascicle, and all of them quoted stanzas, the three run from wholly different to wholly identical, which shows well enough that there is no fixed rule for the rendering of quoted stanzas. Recorded without adjudication.

The naming of discipline, positive in the one text and negative in the other. Xuanzang sets up discipline positively — keeping away from the breaking of discipline and from what is prohibited is called discipline; Paramārtha sets up the negative first, “the verse says: wrong discipline means evil form, right discipline is keeping away from these two,” displaying “right discipline” by way of “wrong discipline.” ⇒ This is a difference in the opening and gathering of the order of exposition, not an error of wording.

One place differing in fullness of wording. At the head of the five of the same class as the deeds of immediate retribution, Xuanzang marks plainly “defiling one’s mother who is a nun beyond learning” (bringing out her standing as a bhikṣuṇī), while Paramārtha has only “defiling one’s mother who is an arhat,” without setting down the word “nun”; yet his own prose explanation gives “if a man defiles his own mother who is an arhat, by practicing what is not the pure life,” and the sense still runs through. Recorded without adjudication.

4. Coordinates for Parallel Reading

The two sets of enumerated dharmas established in this fascicle both have namesakes in the root treatises of the Yogācāra lineage, and may be set side by side word for word.

The five deeds of immediate retribution and the deeds of the same portion as the deeds of immediate retribution. This fascicle establishes the items of the five deeds of immediate retribution as killing one’s mother, killing one’s father, killing an arhat, splitting the Saṅgha, and drawing blood from the body of a Buddha, and their same class as defiling one’s mother who is a nun beyond learning, killing a bodhisattva abiding in certainty, killing a noble learner, seizing away the requisites of the Saṅgha’s concord, and destroying a stūpa. The Yogācārabhūmi, on the same set of enumerated dharmas, lists five items which are one by one killing one’s mother, killing one’s father, killing an arhat, splitting the Saṅgha, and drawing blood with an evil mind from a Tathāgata — the items of the five deeds of immediate retribution are wholly the same in the two systems; but that lineage sets up separately an item “deeds of the same portion as the deeds of immediate retribution,” of which the first named are practicing a defiled act toward an arhat nun and toward one’s mother, and striking a bodhisattva in his last existence, and which continues with such items as slaughtering sheep and setting it up as a norm, injuring friends and kin, turning afterwards to harm one to whom one had already given fearlessness, and robbing the gate of the Saṅgha. ⇒ The same set of enumerated dharmas, and yet the items gathered under it are plainly different — the five of the same class in this treatise are each matched with one of the five deeds of immediate retribution, while the same portion in the Yogācārabhūmi gathers broadly all sorts of conduct that turns against kindness and injures the wholesome. Namesakes with different items, recorded only, without adjudication.

The three incalculable aeons and the pāramitās. This fascicle matches the three incalculable aeons with numbers of Buddhas served, and the four stages with the fulfillment of the six pāramitās. The Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only, on the same span of time, matches the three incalculable aeons with the threefold greatness and smallness of the pāramitās, and takes the third outright as the third incalculable aeon, “the great pāramitā.” ⇒ The number of the span of time is the same in the two systems, while the doctrinal framework upon which it is hung is different — this treatise hangs it upon the action producing the excellent marks and the six pāramitās in four stages, the Yogācāra lineage upon the marks of cultivation of the ten stages and ten pāramitās. The numbers being the same and the frameworks different, they may be set side by side.

As for the word-for-word correspondences in that lineage of this fascicle’s three bases of meritorious action of giving, discipline, and cultivation, the six causes of an action’s lightness or heaviness, the four alternatives of action done and action increased, and the three conducive wholesome things, this layer has not obtained them item by item; the lack is marked as it stands, and the text of other places is not made to fill it.