俱舍論 三律儀·近事近住·三歸Abhidharmakośabhāṣya · The Three Disciplines · The Lay Follower and the One-Day Observance · The Three Refuges

Before Reading This Fascicle

The previous fascicle finished making out the nature of the entity of action — action has volition for its entity, what volition brings about is bodily action and verbal action, and these two, bodily and verbal, each extend to the manifest and the nonmanifest. A subsidiary discussion was inserted in the middle (the four kinds of wholesome and four kinds of unwholesome, the two raisings), and the opening sentence of this fascicle gathers it up: “the subsidiary discussion is finished; now again we should make out the marks of the manifest and the nonmanifest spoken of before.” The author turns on his heel in one sentence, and the main discussion sets out from “the nonmanifest is of three kinds.”

The three ancient masters all let the knife of their outline fall in the same place here, differing only in the layer to which they attach it: Puguang marks “below, the third, explaining the manifest and the nonmanifest at length,” Yuanhui marks “from here the third, explaining the manifest and the nonmanifest at length,” and the two houses agree word for word even in the names of the subsections (first, explaining the three nonmanifests; second, explaining individual liberation in reliance upon the three); Fabao marks the same cut higher up, as “from here below, the second of the main text, explaining the three of discipline and the rest.” The cut is the same and the layer is of two patterns; recorded without adjudication.

There is one thing to read in this fascicle: discipline is not a vow but a really existent thing that does not follow the mind and that continues on. The Sarvāstivādins lodge it in the square called “the nonmanifest” — not displayed outwardly, yet really existent; it is there while you sleep, it is there while you raise an evil thought, until the time you relinquish it. The three disciplines, the eight names, the four real entities, the past, present, and future of possession, the term of life and of a day and a night, the eight limbs and the three refuges — the whole fascicle hangs upon that one adjudication. While reading, one may ask at any point: what about discipline is this article speaking of — its entity, its name, its time, or its condition?

I. The Three Kinds of Nonmanifest and the Three Disciplines

〔1.1〕Why the nonmanifest must first be divided into three squares. First ask: the previous fascicle of the Chapter on Action has already said what the nonmanifest is, so why must this fascicle open by dividing it into three kinds? Because the previous fascicle was saying “whether the nonmanifest is really existent,” while this fascicle is to say “into how many classes the nonmanifest divides” — the question has been changed. The treatise answers with the utmost brevity: “the nonmanifest here, stated in brief, is of three kinds,” first discipline, second non-discipline, third “neither of the two” (neither discipline nor non-discipline). As for why that portion is named discipline, the reason the treatise gives is that “it can block and can extinguish the continuum of evil discipline, and so is called discipline” — blocking holds off what is to come, extinguishing cuts off what has already come. Puguang takes those eight characters apart layer by layer, and on the make-up of the word “discipline” glosses it as “‘dis-’ means law and rule, ‘-cipline’ means norm and form,” adding that manifest action does not extend to all three alike, and so the manifest is not spoken of here.

The easy error: to suppose that “neither of the two” is a vague middle ground. It is not vague; it is a third square with a strict definition — the whole passage of the first half of Root 23 below is devoted to how a person in this square possesses the nonmanifest. In practice: before you undertake the discipline you are not “without discipline”; you are in the third square. Undertake it and you enter the first square; raise a settled evil inclination and you fall into the second. The three squares are not degrees but identities.

〔1.2〕Why the three disciplines are cut in this way. First ask: discipline being one, why divide it into individual liberation, produced by meditative absorption, and produced by the path? The treatise’s cut is not by how well the discipline is kept but by the realm to which the discipline is affiliated: “first, the discipline of individual liberation, that is, the discipline bound to the desire realm”; “second, the discipline produced by meditative absorption, that is, the discipline bound to the form realm”; “third, the discipline produced by the path, that is, the discipline without outflows.” Under those three names Fabao sets up a simile of his own, saying that “bound” is like a binding market (the sense of winding round and being affiliated): the discipline of individual liberation is affiliated to the desire realm and so is called the discipline bound to desire, the discipline of absorption is affiliated to the form realm and so is called the discipline bound to form, and the discipline produced by the path is bound to none of the three realms and so is called the discipline without outflows — this simile is Fabao’s alone, and Puguang has it not.

The easy error: to read “produced by meditative absorption” as “a discipline that is kept rather better while one is in absorption.” It is not. It is another kind of entity of discipline that is had along with absorption and lost along with it — obtained when absorption is obtained, not lost on emerging from absorption but lost as soon as one falls away from it, and having nothing at all to do with whether you undertook it. In practice: these three can be present in one body at the same time; a man who has undertaken the five precepts, if he obtains the first meditative absorption, has two disciplines in him, and if he sees the path, three. The three are not three stages but three parallel lines.

II. Individual Liberation Has Eight Names but Only Four Entities

〔2.1〕Where the gap between eight and four comes from. First ask: bhikṣu, bhikṣuṇī, probationer, novice, female novice, lay follower, female lay follower, one-day observance — plainly eight kinds of person undertaking eight kinds of discipline, so why is it said that “the real entities are four only”? The treatise’s reason is a single sentence: apart from the one for the men, there is no further one for the women. Hence the discipline of the bhikṣuṇī is not outside the discipline of the bhikṣu, the disciplines of the probationer and the female novice are not outside the discipline of the novice, and the discipline of the female lay follower is not outside the discipline of the lay follower. There remain the bhikṣu, the novice, the lay follower, and the one-day observance, four, and only these have each their own entity.

How is this known? The proof the treatise gives is the turning of the faculty: “because by the changing and turning of the shape the entity is neither relinquished nor obtained, and yet the name differs” — “‘shape’ means the shape and mark, that is, the male and female faculties.” A bhikṣu whose faculty turns is then called a bhikṣuṇī; the entity of the discipline has neither been relinquished nor newly obtained, only the name has been exchanged. And since there is no occasion of relinquishing or obtaining, one may see that it was one and the same entity all along.

The easy error: to suppose that since the bhikṣuṇī has more articles than the bhikṣu, the entity cannot be the same. Puguang sets up several explanations upon just this doubt, the first of which runs “men and women are not the same, what is opened and what is prohibited differ, and they differ according to circumstance” — as regards the basic seven limbs the disciplines of the two companies are equal, and what is in excess is prohibitory discipline, differing according to circumstance and not touching the root. In practice: the measure for judging sameness and difference of the entity of discipline is “whether there is relinquishing and obtaining,” not “the number of articles.” This measure will be used once more below, in adjudging “one part” and the rest of the lay follower.

〔2.2〕From lay follower to novice to bhikṣu: is it addition or exchange? First ask: when a man first undertakes the five precepts, then the ten, then full ordination, are the earlier disciplines replaced by the later? This passage of the treatise — “are these three disciplines given separate names by the increasing of the abstentions and of the means? as with a single or a double gold coin, and with fifty and twenty; or are their entities separate, each arising complete and all at once upon undertaking?” — is a question and not a plain statement, and the two commentaries mark it alike: Puguang word for word makes it “below is the explanation of the fourth line. Question: if from being a lay follower one undertakes the discipline of a novice, and then from being a novice undertakes the discipline of a bhikṣu,” and takes up the following sentence with “the answer explains that the stanza says they are separate”; Fabao likewise makes it “a question about the sameness or difference of the limbs and entity of the disciplines of lay follower, novice, and bhikṣu,” and takes it up with “the answer: the three are each separate in entity.” The question has two horns: the former is that upon one and the same entity the abstentions are successively increased and the means enlarged, and a name is changed accordingly — just as a single coin with one added is called a double, and the number runs from fifty to twenty, the entity being only one while the names mount up; the latter is that the three entities are each their own, and upon undertaking each arises complete and all at once. The treatise takes the latter horn in its answer: “the entities of the three disciplines are not mixed with one another; their marks are severally distinct, and they arise complete and all at once”; and each of the three has in it that portion which abstains from killing and so on down to that which abstains from liquor.

Then, abstention from killing being the same in all, what difference is there among the three? The treatise answers: by difference of conditions. The more training articles you seek to undertake, the more occasions of self-intoxication you are able to abstain from, and the more numerous become the occasions of killing and the rest that you abstain from — abstention is raised in dependence upon conditions, and where the conditions differ the abstention differs. The treatise gives a counter-proof besides: if the three were not separate entities, then on relinquishing the discipline of the bhikṣu all three ought to be relinquished together (the former two being gathered into the latter); and since this is not allowed, one may see that the three are each separate.

The easy error: to read full ordination as “handing back the five precepts in exchange for a larger certificate.” It is not an exchange but a stacking — “in one body they turn at the same time,” and a man who has relinquished the discipline of a bhikṣu does not thereby cease to be a lay follower as well. In practice: this article answers a practical doubt directly — does one who returns to lay life lose even the five precepts? By this treatise, no.

III. Five, Eight, Ten, and All: How the Four Disciplines Are Established

〔3.1〕The skeleton of the four disciplines is “the number of articles abstained from.” First ask: on what does the treatise range the four — lay follower, one-day observance, novice, bhikṣu — into a single row? Upon the number of the abstentions undertaken, “in reliance upon four abstentions the four disciplines are established”: undertaking abstention from five articles establishes the lay follower, from eight the one-day observance, from ten the novice, and from all the bodily and verbal actions that ought to be abstained from, the bhikṣu. The five are killing, taking what is not given, sexual misconduct, false speech, and drinking liquors; the eight exchange sexual misconduct for unchastity and then add anointing with scents and wearing garlands and watching dancing and singing, sleeping and sitting on high, broad, and ornate seats, and eating at the improper time; the ten split the sixth into two and add the receiving and hoarding of gold, silver, and other treasures.

The easy error: to suppose that the eight of the one-day observance are the five precepts with three added. They are not — the third article is first exchanged (sexual misconduct for unchastity), and only then are the last three added. That exchange is the most important thing about the discipline of the one-day observance: for one day and one night, the householder undertakes the article of the renunciant. In practice: when reading the articles of the eight-limbed fast, do not read the third as it stands in the five precepts.

A further question: why is the receiving and hoarding of gold and silver not listed among the eight of the one-day observance, yet opened out as the tenth among the novice’s ten? Puguang sets himself a question here, “Question: the receiving and hoarding of gold and the rest — why is it not established within the discipline of the one-day observance,” and his answer is that householders are attached to gold, silver, and other treasures and cannot abstain from them, and so this article is not instituted in the discipline of the one-day observance; and he cites the Correct Principle on “drawing in those who take fright at many training articles,” saying that the reason the one-day observance joins anointing with scents and wearing garlands together with watching dancing and singing into one limb is to draw in those householders who take fright at the sight of many training articles. ⇒ The opening out and gathering up of the number of articles is not casual; it is so that people can undertake them.

IV. One Entity, Several Names: Śīla, Excellent Conduct, Action, Discipline, Individual Liberation, Path of Action

〔4.1〕Why one and the same portion of discipline has so many names. First ask: this passage produces six names in a row — are they six things? They are not; they are one and the same portion of discipline seen from six sides. The treatise glosses them one by one: “because it can level rugged action, it is called śīla” (it can level the rough and uneven ground of action), and it says besides, as to the sense of the word, that “the gloss of the term is that it is cooling,” adducing a gāthā in proof (one who upholds the discipline is at ease and has no fever of body); “the wise extol it, and so it is called excellent conduct”; “it is the very self of what is done, and so it is called action”; “it can guard body and speech, and so it is called discipline.”

Here the author inserts a difficulty of his own: is the nonmanifest not also called “not doing” in the sūtras, and how then can it now be said to be the very self of “what is done”? — Puguang marks this sentence as a question and adjudges it a question the author raises for himself, not a difficulty brought by another school. The author answers himself: a man who has conscience and shame does not, by the force of the nonmanifest, commit manifold evils, and on that side it is named not doing; and it is also produced by the volition of manifest action, and on that side it obtains the name of what is done. Another explanation says that it is the cause of doing and the result of doing, and so there is no fault in calling it doing either.

The easy error: to take “not doing” and “what is done” as a contradiction and try to choose one. The treatise never asked you to choose — the two names have their eyes on two different things. In practice: in reading the technical terms of Abhidharma, the first step is to ask “from which side is this name established”; that one thing should have six names is not strange at all.

〔4.2〕Why only the first thought-instant is called individual liberation and path of action. First ask: if the whole article of discipline is called śīla, excellent conduct, action, and discipline, why are the two names “individual liberation” and “path of action” given only to the very first thought-instant? The treatise’s reason is this: at the time of undertaking the discipline, the first manifest and nonmanifest are “a relinquishing severally and separately of the manifold evils” — cast off one article at a time, and so “in reliance upon the sense of a first relinquishing severally, the name individual liberation is established”; and at just that time what is done is brought to its utmost completion, and so “in reliance upon the sense of action being brought through, the name path of action is established.” From the second thought-instant on it is no longer called individual liberation but only the discipline of individual liberation; nor is it called a path of action any longer, but is called instead “not a path of action, but what arises afterward.”

The easy error: to suppose that “individual liberation” means being able to be liberated in the future, so that the whole article of discipline ought to bear the name. That is not the treatise’s gloss — the “individual” of individual liberation is the “individually, one article at a time” of relinquishing, a matter of the event at the instant of undertaking, and not a prophecy of a fruit to be attained. In practice: the instant of undertaking the discipline and the subsequent keeping of it are, in Abhidharma, two stages and two sets of names; and this is also why, in treating possession below, the text distinguishes again and again the “first thought-instant” from “after the first thought-instant.”

V. Who Possesses Which Discipline

〔5.1〕The eight companies, those who obtain absorption, the noble ones — three tables of possession. First ask: to whom does each of the three disciplines belong? The treatise answers in three layers: “the eight companies all possess the discipline of individual liberation,” from the bhikṣu down to the one-day observance; one who obtains the meditative absorptions certainly possesses the discipline produced by absorption; the discipline produced by the path is possessed by the noble ones alone, and divides again into the two, the learner and the one beyond learning. As for the question of turning along with the mind, the treatise says that of the three only the two, produced by absorption and produced by the path, turn along with the mind, and individual liberation does not — the reason being “because it turns constantly even when the mind is other and when there is no mind”: you may raise another mind, or have no mind at all, and the discipline of individual liberation is there as before.

Here the author sets himself a question: have the non-Buddhists then no discipline that they undertake? (Puguang marks this passage as a question the author sets and answers himself.) The author answers himself: they have, yet it is not called the discipline of individual liberation, because “it has no power to liberate one from evils forever”; their undertaking is raised in reliance upon a grasping at existence.

The easy error: to read “have the non-Buddhists no discipline that they undertake?” as the author denying that they have discipline. The treatise says expressly that they have — what is denied is not that they have a discipline but whether it can count as individual liberation. In practice: in judging whether an article of discipline is individual liberation, what one looks at is not how many things it abstains from but whether it points toward being liberated from evils forever; and this is just the extension of the sense of “relinquishing severally” above.

VI. The Discipline of Cutting Off: A Separate Name at One Stage

〔6.1〕Why a further “discipline of cutting off” is set up. First ask: the two disciplines produced by absorption and by the path already have names, so why give another? Because a stage must be marked out: “the nine uninterrupted paths within access concentration, and the disciplines of absorption and without outflows arising together with them,” these two disciplines at this stage “can cut off forever the evil discipline bound to the desire realm and the afflictions that can raise it, and so are called the discipline of cutting off” — the name is established separately upon the matter of “cutting off, now.” Puguang cites the Mahāvibhāṣā and sets himself a question, “Question: why is this alone called the discipline of cutting off,” his answer being that it can serve as the antidote that cuts off both the breaking of discipline and the afflictions that can raise the breaking of discipline.

The treatise then draws the boundary clear with four statements: what is a discipline of absorption and not a discipline of cutting off is all the remaining disciplines of absorption with outflows, apart from the nine uninterrupted paths of access concentration; what is a discipline of cutting off and not a discipline of absorption is the discipline without outflows of the nine uninterrupted paths of access concentration; what is both is the discipline with outflows of the nine uninterrupted paths of access concentration; and what is neither is all the remaining disciplines without outflows apart from the nine uninterrupted paths of access concentration. The four statements of the discipline without outflows and the discipline of cutting off are to be read by the same pattern.

The easy error: to take the discipline of cutting off as a fourth discipline. It is not a fourth kind but a separate name for the former two at a particular stage — and the four statements are precisely what settle the matter beyond dispute. In practice: whenever in Abhidharma you meet “such-and-such is also called such-and-such,” the first question is “is this a separate entity or a separate name?”; and this treatise’s way of answering is to try it with four statements — if four statements can be sorted out, it is a separate name and not a separate entity.

VII. The Discipline of the Faculties: The Problem Raised by a Stanza of Abbreviated Discipline

〔7.1〕The “discipline of mind” in the sūtra drives the treatise into a corner. First ask: where does this stanza of abbreviated discipline come from? The author has adduced it himself in order to set up a difficulty. Having finished the discipline of cutting off with four statements upon four statements, the author asks himself: if that is so, how is one to construe the abbreviated discipline spoken by the World-Honored One — “the discipline of body is excellent, excellent is the discipline of speech, the discipline of mind is excellent, excellent is the universal discipline”; and there is besides a sūtra that says one should well guard and well abide in the discipline of the eye faculty. The difficulty is this: the two disciplines of body and speech may be nonmanifest form, but the discipline of mind and the discipline of the faculties cannot be form (mind has no body or speech to guard). The author concedes it on the spot: “the nature of these two is not nonmanifest form.”

The easy error: to read this passage as the treatise explaining the sūtra. It is not explaining a sūtra; it is the treatise exposing a difficulty of its own — this treatise makes the nonmanifest to be form, and yet the sūtras have two things called “discipline” that are not form. In practice: in reading a book of the treatise class, whenever you see the construction “if that is so, what is said in the sūtra …,” recognize first that this is a barrier the author has set for himself, and the next passage will certainly be his way through it.

〔7.2〕The way through is to exchange the entity, not to alter the name. First ask: if it is not nonmanifest form, what is it? The stanza answers bluntly: “correct knowing and correct mindfulness joined are called the discipline of mind and of the faculties.” The treatise explains that both disciplines have correct knowing and correct mindfulness for their entity, and so “the discipline of mind has discernment and mindfulness for its entity” — correct knowing is discernment, correct mindfulness is mindfulness, and both are mental factors and not form. The treatise explains besides why the stanza lists the names first and then says the one word “joined”: it is to show that one may not pair them off woodenly in the order of the letters (“the words separated and joined show that it is not in that order”).

The easy error: to suppose that since the discipline of mind is not form, this proves the Sarvāstivādins granting that discipline may be other than form. What the treatise holds is that “the three disciplines, individual liberation and the rest, are form”; it never said that everything called discipline is form — the discipline of mind and the discipline of the faculties are another usage in the sūtras, and the treatise gives them another entity precisely so that they shall not unsettle the position taken above. In practice: one and the same word need not have one sense in sūtra and in treatise; before adjudging the doctrine, adjudge “what entity this word points to here.”

VIII. The Stages of Possessing the Nonmanifest (1): Abiding in Discipline, in Non-Discipline, Having Obtained Absorption, the Noble Ones

〔8.1〕Four kinds of person, four timetables. First ask: why does this long passage range them one position at a time? Because what Abhidharma asks is not “is there discipline or not” but “in which portion of the three times, past, present, and future, it is possessed.” The treatise ranges them position by position: one who abides in individual liberation, so long as he has not relinquished it, constantly possesses the present, and “after the first thought-instant possesses the past as well,” while that future portion no one possesses — the reason being “because form that does not follow the mind is feeble in force.” One who abides in non-discipline is likewise. One who has obtained the discipline of absorption “constantly possesses past and future until he relinquishes it,” possessing even the past, because the past discipline of absorption lost in another life is necessarily regained at this first thought-instant (Puguang cites this sentence as “because the past discipline of absorption that was lost is necessarily regained at this first thought-instant,” and cites the Correct Principle in explanation of this stage). The discipline without outflows of all noble ones is constantly possessed in past and future too, only that at the first thought-instant the future alone is possessed and not the past, since this class of noble path has not arisen before. Only when one is presently abiding in absorption or in the path is the present possessed.

The easy error: to read “possesses the past” as “in that past stretch of time I had discipline.” It is not — the “possession” of Abhidharma is whether at this present moment there is in you the “acquisition” of that portion of dharma; to possess the past is to say that there is now in you the acquisition of that past portion. In practice: this is the passage in the fascicle that most resembles a ledger, and the way to read it is first to identify the person (four positions), then the time (three times), then the time-portion (first thought-instant / after the first thought-instant); get the three coordinates lined up and the sentences cease to wind.

IX. How One Who Abides in the Middle Possesses the Nonmanifest

〔9.1〕Has one in the third square a nonmanifest? First ask: has a man who is neither in discipline nor in non-discipline any nonmanifest when he does good or does evil? The treatise answers with care: “as for one said to abide in the middle, he is neither in discipline nor in non-discipline,” and the actions such a man raises “need not all of them have a nonmanifest”; and if there is a nonmanifest, it is gathered under the class of wholesome discipline or evil discipline. If there is, then at the first thought-instant he possesses the present alone, and after the first thought-instant, until it is relinquished, he constantly possesses the two times, past and present.

The treatise also explains in passing why the stanza uses the one word “middle” to say the present: because “the present time is situated in the middle of past and future, and so possessing the middle is said for possessing the present” — the present lies just between past and future, and so to say “possesses the middle” is to say “possesses the present.”

The easy error: to take one who abides in the middle for “a man with no nonmanifest.” He is not without one; he is undetermined — do the deed heavily enough and there is one, do it lightly and there is manifest action only. In practice: this square is speaking of the great majority of people who have undertaken no discipline. A good deed done offhand need not leave a nonmanifest behind, but done with sufficient earnestness it will; and this is the preparation for the passage below on “one abiding in discipline raising the defiled, one abiding in non-discipline raising the pure.”

X. One Abiding in Discipline Raises the Defiled; One Abiding in Non-Discipline Raises the Pure

〔10.1〕Discipline and evil discipline do not exclude each other. First ask: if a man who has undertaken the discipline does an evil deed, will an evil nonmanifest be raised? The treatise answers: it will — “if one abides in discipline and, by a superior affliction, does unwholesome actions of killing, binding, and the rest, thereby an unwholesome nonmanifest is raised”; and conversely, a butcher abiding in non-discipline who, out of pure and thick faith, does superior wholesome actions such as paying homage to the Buddha “thereby raises wholesome nonmanifests as well.” How long do these two nonmanifests continue? “So long as these two minds are not cut off, the nonmanifest raised continues constantly,” the first thought possessing the present alone and thereafter possessing both past and present — which is what the stanza calls “until the force of the defiled or the pure is spent.”

The easy error: to suppose that having undertaken the discipline one will have no evil nonmanifest, or that having an evil nonmanifest is the same as having lost the discipline. The two coexist: that portion which is discipline is still there, and the evil portion arises besides, each with its own term of continuing. In practice: this article settles a practical doubt — if one has broken a precept, is one then without discipline? By this treatise, no; not until the occasion of relinquishing. And the sentence that a good deed done out of pure and thick faith leaves a nonmanifest behind matters especially for those in the second square: your present identity does not seal off the fruit of your present thought.

XI. The Stages of Possessing Manifest Action and the Two Indeterminate Manifests

〔11.1〕The ledger of manifest action is shorter than that of the nonmanifest. First ask: is the possessing of manifest action the same as that of the nonmanifest? It is not. The treatise says: one who abides in discipline, in non-discipline, or in the middle, “so long as he is presently doing the various manifest actions, constantly possesses the present manifest”; after the first thought-instant, until it is relinquished, he constantly possesses the past; and there is certainly no one who possesses the future manifest. The two manifest actions that are obscured-indeterminate and unobscured-indeterminate are shorter still, since “there is certainly none who can possess their past and future,” and they possess the present alone — the reason being “since the force of the dharma is already inferior, the force of acquisition is feeble too, and so there is none who can possess them backward or forward.”

The easy error: to suppose that manifest action and nonmanifest action are one ledger. They are not — the nonmanifest may be possessed as future (as by one who has obtained the meditative absorptions), while manifest action is never possessed as future; and the indeterminate manifest is not even possessed as past. The two sides of one and the same portion of action differ in the range of their possession. In practice: read this passage with the three squares side by side, and you will see how Abhidharma uses “the range of possession” to rank the strength and weakness of the various dharmas.

〔11.2〕The author’s four-part pattern of asking and answering himself. First ask: why is the force of the indeterminate manifest so inferior? The author asks himself “this dharma being inferior in force, by what is it so,” and answers himself “it is done by the mind”; then at once raises a difficulty against himself: if that is so, then the obscured-indeterminate minds and the rest ought likewise not to be possessed as past and future; and finally explains himself: “this reproach is unreasonable” — manifest action is dull and slow and arises in dependence upon another, while minds and the rest are not so; and the indeterminate manifest arises from an inferior mind, its force being once again more inferior than the mind that can raise it, and so manifest action and mind differ in respect of possession. Puguang marks this passage sentence by sentence into the four parts of question, answer, difficulty, and explanation, and cites the Correct Principle to supply a reason, saying that what is raised must be inferior to the mind that raises it, as an indeterminate mind can raise manifest action while the manifest action it raises produces no nonmanifest.

The easy error: to see “if that is so …” and suppose that a second person has entered. From beginning to end there is only the author speaking here — this is the most common form in all Abhidharma, of raising a difficulty against oneself and explaining it oneself. In practice: the surest way to tell “a difficulty set for oneself” from “a difficulty of another school” is to look at the outlines of the ancient masters; more than half the questions and answers in this fascicle are the author asking and answering himself.

XII. The Five Names of Non-Discipline

〔12.1〕From which side each of the five names is established. First ask: why should non-discipline have five separate names? It is the same manner of writing as Root 18 above, “one entity, several names” — one and the same portion of evil discipline seen from five sides. The treatise glosses them one by one: because the wise reproach and loathe it, and because its result is not lovely, the name evil conduct is established; “because it obstructs pure śīla it is called evil discipline”; because it is produced by body and speech it is called action; because it is gathered under the root it is called a path of action; “not restraining body and speech, it is called non-discipline.” And it supplies one boundary line: “the name path of action refers to the first thought alone,” while the other four names extend to the first and to every stage that follows.

Puguang, at this passage, avows that the text can be construed as it stands and adds nothing new; and so the teaching material for this section can only be unfolded word by word from the treatise’s own five glosses — which is exactly what makes it useful to set against Root 18: on the wholesome side there are six names and on the evil side five, and the rule that “path of action refers to the first thought alone, while the other names extend to the first and to what follows” is exactly the same on both sides.

The easy error: to take the five names as five kinds of evil differing in gravity. They do not differ in gravity but in angle. In practice: when the ten paths of action come up in the text below, this rule that “a path of action refers to the first thought alone” will appear again; get it by heart here first.

XIII. Possessing the Manifest but Not the Nonmanifest: Four Statements That Fix the Boundary

〔13.1〕Who has manifest action without a nonmanifest. First ask: is there such a case as “doing a deed and yet leaving no nonmanifest”? There is. The treatise answers: one who abides in the middle and “by a feeble volition does good or does evil raises manifest action only and has no nonmanifest at all,” how much less the manifest action raised by an indeterminate volition; but one must set aside the meritorious deeds with a basis and those cases in which a path of action has already been completed (these do have a nonmanifest). Conversely, those who have the nonmanifest without the manifest are “the noble persons who change their birth, whose manifest action has not yet arisen or has arisen and been relinquished.” “Changing birth” must be made clear first: it does not mean “easily arisen” but being reborn and taking up a new support — Puguang explains this sentence as “the noble ones who change their birth within the three realms,” and gives the reason: “there are cases where the manifest is not possessed, as when in the womb and the like the manifest action has not yet arisen, or the manifest having arisen it is again relinquished upon meeting a condition.” The noble one has exchanged the body he depends upon, and in the new body manifest action has not yet had time to be produced (as at the stage of being in the womb and the like), or the manifest action produced before has been relinquished along with the body, while the nonmanifest of absorption and of the path obtained before is still there — whence the statement “the nonmanifest without the manifest.” The remaining two statements (both, and neither) may be known by the same pattern.

The easy error: to understand “feeble volition” as a moral verdict of “insincerity of heart.” It is a term of degree of force, not a matter of sincerity — with one and the same good deed, a weak volition leaves the manifest only, and a strong volition leaves a nonmanifest behind. In practice: this article gives a very concrete index — whether a continuing force is to be left behind by a good or evil deed depends upon the strength of the volition with which it is done; earnestness of mind is just the practitioner’s way of saying this principle.

XIV. By What Conditions Each of the Three Disciplines Is Obtained

〔14.1〕The disciplines of absorption and of the path are obtained along with the mind; the discipline of individual liberation must be given by another. First ask: are the three disciplines obtained in the same way? Not at all. The treatise says: the discipline of absorption is obtained “by obtaining the mind of a fundamental or preliminary stage of meditative absorption with outflows, at that time it is obtained, since it arises together with the mind”; the discipline without outflows is obtained by obtaining that portion of mind which is without outflows, “also since it arises together with the mind”; the word “that” in the stanza points to the mind of absorption spoken of before, and the word “noble” distinguishes what is without outflows. Six stages of meditative absorption have minds without outflows (access concentration, the intermediate absorption, and the four fundamental absorptions), and the three preliminary stages are not included. As for the discipline of individual liberation, it is “obtained through the instruction of another and the rest” — one who can instruct is called “another,” and the discipline is raised by the force of instruction from him. This divides again into two: the three disciplines of bhikṣu, bhikṣuṇī, and probationer are obtained from the Saṅgha, and the remaining five from a person.

The easy error: to suppose that the discipline of absorption too must be undertaken. The disciplines of absorption and of the path have no rite of undertaking at all; obtain the mind and you obtain them, lose the mind and you lose them; only individual liberation cannot be had unless someone gives it. In practice: this article explains something often asked — why undertaking the discipline requires a master and requires the Saṅgha. Because the condition by which this kind of discipline is obtained is precisely “the instruction of another”; this is not a fastidiousness about ritual but the way the entity itself is.

〔14.2〕The ten ways of obtaining full ordination. First ask: if it is said “obtained through the instruction of another and the rest,” what does that “and the rest” gather up? The treatise answers: it gathers up the ten ways of obtaining full ordination spoken of by the Vaibhāṣika masters of the Vinaya — spontaneously (the Buddha and the pratyekabuddhas), by entering the certainty of the noble path (the five bhikṣus), by the Buddha’s call of “come well” (Yaśas and the rest), by receiving in faith the Buddha as the great master (Mahākāśyapa), by answering skillfully what was asked (Sudāyin), by receiving with reverence the eight weighty dharmas (Mahāprajāpatī), by sending a messenger (the nun Dharmadinnā), by an upholder of the Vinaya as the fifth man (in the border countries), by ten of the Saṅgha (in the central country), and by saying three times the refuge in the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Saṅgha (the sixty of the worthy company). The treatise adds one important sentence besides: “the discipline of individual liberation so obtained is not necessarily raised in dependence upon manifest action.”

Puguang examines the persons of these ten one by one, explaining the first as “at the time of the mind of the knowledge of exhaustion spontaneously, full ordination is obtained,” and on the fifth giving a small biography, “Sudāyin, which here means Good Giving, was but seven years old,” saying that because he was clever and answered the Buddha’s questions well and pleased the Buddha’s mind, the Buddha had the Saṅgha perform the formal act and give him full ordination though he was not yet twenty.

The easy error: to take these ten as ten parallel procedures for undertaking the discipline. The first eight are all single occasions, and only the ninth (the ten of the Saṅgha) and the tenth (the three refuges) are standing methods that can be carried on. In practice: the meaning of these ten lies in the sentence “not necessarily raised in dependence upon manifest action” — the form of undertaking may differ, and what raises the discipline does not lie in the form itself.

XV. For Life and for a Day and a Night: Discipline Has Only Two Bounds of Time

〔15.1〕Why there are only two terms. First ask: may a discipline be undertaken for three years, or for ten days? The treatise answers that it may not, since “the bounds of time for discipline are two only: first the bound of the life span, second the bound of a day and a night,” a half-month and the rest being only the day and night said over again. The discipline of individual liberation held by the seven companies is to be undertaken for life alone; that held for the one-day observance for a day and a night alone. The treatise explains in passing what dharma “time” is — “it is a designation upon the formations,” a conventional name upon the continuum of the formations; and in the four continents the stretch of light and the stretch of darkness are established in order as the names of day and night. As for after death, the earlier engagement cannot raise the discipline again, because “the support is different, and in a different support there is neither preliminary effort nor recollection.”

〔15.2〕Whether the one-day observance may be undertaken again beyond one day and night — an exchange of six turns. First ask: once a day and a night have passed, may one undertake the one-day observance for five days or ten? In this passage the speakers must be identified turn by turn (following Puguang’s marks). The Sautrāntikas first ask: after one day and night, or within five or ten days and nights, when the one-day observance is undertaken, what dharma acts as an obstruction so that those many disciplines of the one-day observance cannot arise as well? The Sarvāstivādins answer: there must certainly be a dharma that can act as an obstruction, because the Bhagavat says in the sūtra that the discipline of the one-day observance is for one day and night alone. The Sautrāntikas say again: upon this matter we should consider together — was it that the Buddha rightly observed that after one day and night there is in principle no room for it to arise, and therefore said “one day and night” in the sūtra? or was it that, observing that those to be trained were hard to tame in their faculties, he provisionally conferred a discipline of one day and night? The Sarvāstivādins ask: on what principle or what scriptural teaching do you speak so? The Sautrāntikas answer: that the discipline should arise beyond this term is not contrary to principle. Finally the Sarvāstivādins raise a further difficulty and close back upon their own school: there has never been a sūtra saying that beyond a day and a night there is a separate undertaking and obtaining of the discipline of the one-day observance, and therefore our school does not allow this position.

The easy error: to read that last sentence as the author’s conclusion. It marks itself on its face with “the Vaibhāṣikas say thus” and “our school” — it is the closing word of the school in question, not the author’s verdict. In practice: the point of divergence in this dispute is very clean — the Sarvāstivādins want the proof of the holy teaching, the Sautrāntikas want a principle not contravened; what the two parties dispute is not whether it may be undertaken but on what ground that is to be judged.

The easy error: to suppose the two terms an administrative regulation of the discipline. They are established upon the two natural bounds of “the body one depends upon” and “a day and a night” — one bounded by the body, one by the light of day, and there is no third natural bound to be had. In practice: this article explains why the eight-limbed fast must be undertaken at sunrise and relinquished at the next sunrise, and also why there is no such thing as “undertaking the five precepts for a year.”

XVI. Evil Discipline Has No Day-and-Night Term

〔16.1〕Why evil discipline cannot be undertaken for a short term. First ask: wholesome discipline has the two terms of life and of a day and a night; why has evil discipline the term of life alone? The treatise answers: “because this is not undertaken as wholesome discipline is” — there will certainly be no one who sets a term and undertakes non-discipline before a master, saying “for one day and night I definitely undertake non-discipline,” since that is a thing the wise reproach and loathe. The author at once raises a difficulty against himself: if that is so, neither will anyone set a term and say before a master “until the end of my life I definitely undertake evil discipline”; and then non-discipline ought not to be obtained even for life. The author answers himself: though there is no engagement before a master, so long as one does evil actions all one’s life, “by raising the inclination to destroy the wholesome once and for all, non-discipline is obtained”; whereas if one raises only a temporary inclination to destroy the wholesome and has no master besides, it cannot make him obtain non-discipline.

At the end of the passage the treatise records an account of the Sautrāntikas: since wholesome discipline has no separate real thing called the nonmanifest, this non-discipline too ought not to be really existent; what is called non-discipline is just that unwholesome inclination to do evil continuing on unrelinquished, and therefore, though a wholesome mind arise later, he is still called one who possesses non-discipline, since he has not yet relinquished that inclination.

The easy error: to understand “obtaining non-discipline” as a punishment or a designation of status. It is a continuing entity: raised by an inclination to destroy the wholesome once and for all, and not interrupted because you happened not to kill today. In practice: the meaning of this article for cultivation lies in its converse — a settled inclination fixes a man’s continuum more surely than a single act does; and it is the same on the wholesome side, which is exactly why undertaking the discipline calls for a vow.

XVII. How the One-Day Observance Is Undertaken: Seven Matters, and It Fails If One Is Lacking

〔17.1〕Each of the seven matters guards against one ailment. First ask: why does undertaking the eight-limbed fast require so many particulars? The treatise lists seven: undertaking it at dawn (at sunrise, since this discipline must run a day and a night; one who has made an engagement beforehand may, if there is a hindering condition in the morning, still undertake it when the fast is done), a low seat (a humble and lowly seat before the master, squatting or kneeling, the body bent and the palms joined, only the sick excepted, since “if one is not reverent the discipline is not raised”), undertaking it from a master (“this must be from a master, and there is no room for undertaking it oneself,” the reason being that when afterwards one meets an occasion of transgression, shame before the master of the discipline will keep one from transgressing), speaking after the instruction (speaking after the master’s instruction, neither before nor together with him, or else both the giving and the undertaking fail), completeness of the limbs (“undertaking all eight limbs completes the one-day observance, and if any is lacking the one-day observance is not completed”), leaving off ornaments (because they are occasions of self-intoxication; but the ornaments one habitually wears need not be laid aside, since one cannot raise much self-intoxication by taking them for object), and a day and a night (until the first rising of the sun the next morning). The treatise says besides that if it is not undertaken according to the rule, “only excellent conduct is produced and the discipline is not obtained.”

The easy error: to take these seven for a fastidiousness of ritual. For each the treatise gives a reason, and every reason points to whether the entity of discipline can be raised at all — without reverence it is not raised, undertaken by oneself it is not completed, with a limb lacking it is not completed, undertaken contrary to the rule it becomes excellent conduct only. In practice: this passage may be taken article by article as a self-examination before undertaking the discipline; and the sentence “shame before the master of the discipline will keep one from transgressing” tells what the real work of “undertaking it from a master” is — not the rite, but the keeping of it afterwards.

XVIII. The One-Day Observance Is Also Called the Nourishing: A Name Established by a Stanza

〔18.1〕Two names, two functions. First ask: why has this discipline of a day and a night the two names “one-day observance” and “the nourishing”? The treatise glosses the one-day observance thus: “as for what is called the one-day observance, this discipline abides near the arhat, since one trains after him,” and it records besides another account, “some say: this abides near the discipline for life.” Puguang, besides these two explanations, cites the Mahāvibhāṣā for one more (this discipline abides near in time), setting the three side by side. The treatise glosses “the nourishing” by saying: “such a discipline is also named the nourishing,” since it can nourish sentient beings whose wholesome roots are thin and few and make those roots increase by degrees; and it adduces a stanza in proof — by this one can nourish the pure and wholesome mind of oneself and of others, and therefore the Bhagavat called this the nourishing.

The easy error: to take this adduced stanza for a root stanza. It is expressly preceded by “as a stanza says,” and is adduced in proof, not a stanza of this treatise. In practice: the two names mark out the two ends of this discipline — looking up, one trains after the arhat (the one-day observance); looking down, one raises up wholesome roots that are thin (the nourishing). The place of the eight-limbed fast in practice lies between those two names.

XIX. Why the Limbs Are Eight

〔19.1〕Four, one, three — three classes of limb, each guarding against one ailment. First ask: may one undertake fewer than the eight limbs? The treatise first classifies them: the first four limbs (from abstaining from killing to abstaining from false speech) are the limbs of śīla, “because by these four the intrinsic offences are abstained from”; the next one limb (abstaining from drinking liquors, an occasion of heedlessness) is the limb of heedfulness, because “though one has undertaken śīla, if one drinks liquors the mind becomes heedless and transgresses śīla”; the last three limbs (from abstaining from anointing with scents and wearing garlands to abstaining from eating at the improper time) are the limbs of restraint, “because they can conduce to a mind of disgust and turning away.” It then answers why they must be undertaken complete: without completeness one cannot abstain from the three faults of intrinsic offence, lost mindfulness, and self-intoxication — the first four guard against intrinsic offences, the one about liquor guards against lost mindfulness (in drinking one forgets what should and should not be done), and the last three guard against self-intoxication (making use of garlands and high broad seats and frequenting song and dance, the mind is elated and forthwith the discipline is ruined).

The treatise explains besides the function of the article on “eating at the improper time”: one who can keep to eating at the proper time, because the times of constant eating are blocked, “then recollects the discipline of the one-day observance he has undertaken, and can generate a deep disgust with the world”; whereas if he eats at the improper time, both things — recollecting the discipline and disgust — are absent, and frequent eating makes the mind loose and dissolute.

〔19.2〕Is the entity of the fast abstention from untimely eating, or the eight limbs together — an exchange of five turns. First ask: which among these eight limbs is the “fast” itself? Some other masters first set up an account: abstention from untimely eating is called the entity of the fast, and the remaining eight (splitting anointing with scents and wearing garlands from watching dancing and singing) are called the limbs of the fast. The Sautrāntikas at once cite the sūtra to refute it: to hold this is to contravene the sūtra — for the sūtra, having finished with abstention from untimely eating, goes straight on to say “this eighth limb I now train in after the noble arhats,” which shows that abstention from untimely eating is itself the eighth limb and not an entity outside the limbs. The other masters then ask in return: if that is so, what other entity of the fast is there, that these eight are called limbs of the fast? The Sautrāntikas answer: the fast is the name of the whole, and the limbs are stated by division; it is by the several constituting the whole that the several obtain the name of limb — as a chariot is made up of many parts, as with the fourfold army and the five-ingredient powder, so also with the eight limbs of the fast. The Vaibhāṣikas then establish their own school head-on: abstention from untimely eating is both the fast and a limb of the fast, while the remaining seven limbs are limbs of the fast and not the fast, just as right view is both the path and a limb of the path, the awakening-factor of discernment of dharmas is both awakening and an awakening-factor, and concentration is both meditative absorption and a limb of meditative absorption. The Sautrāntikas raise one last difficulty: a limb means a branch, and must be said with respect to another, so that right view and the rest cannot be limbs of themselves; and if the right view and the rest of an earlier moment be said to be the limbs of the right view and the rest of a later moment, then the noble path of the first thought-instant ought not to be complete in the eight limbs.

The easy error: to read this passage as a dispute over whether one may eat after noon. What is disputed is the relation of entity and limb — whether the fast is an independent entity or a conventional name made up of the eight limbs. In practice: this question is really one exercise, within the study of discipline, of a way of asking common throughout the treatise (whole and part, conventional and real); learn the shape of it here, and you will not lose your way when the same form of question and answer comes later.

The easy error: to suppose the last three limbs mere details that might be omitted. The treatise’s structure is four against intrinsic offences, one against lost mindfulness, three against self-intoxication — drop one class and one ailment goes unguarded. In practice: the eight limbs are not eight prohibitions but three lines of defence; undertake them knowing which ailment your article is guarding against, and the keeping will be more than endurance.

XX. One Need Not Be a Lay Follower to Undertake the One-Day Observance, but Without the Three Refuges There Is None

〔20.1〕The threshold of the one-day observance is the three refuges, not the state of lay follower. First ask: may a man who has not undertaken the five precepts undertake the eight-limbed fast? The treatise answers that he may — “whoever has not undertaken the discipline of the lay follower, if within a day and a night he takes refuge in the Three Jewels and, having said the three refuges, undertakes the discipline of the one-day observance, he too undertakes and obtains the discipline of the one-day observance”; but without first saying the three refuges there is none, only those excepted who do not know that the three refuges must be undertaken first. The treatise cites the Mahānāman Sūtra in proof: a white-robed layman of the household, whose male faculty is complete, taking refuge in the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Saṅgha, raising a mind earnest and pure and uttering words sincere and true, declares of himself “I am an upāsaka, may the venerable one bear me in mind and guard me with compassion,” and “at this point he is named an upāsaka.”

The easy error: to read the three refuges as a courtesy before undertaking the discipline. The treatise establishes them as a necessary condition of the discipline’s being raised — without them the eight limbs may be undertaken and no discipline is raised. In practice: this article gives the householder a very clear order: the three refuges are the gate, and both the lay follower and the one-day observance come in by that gate; whence the text next asks “at what moment, then, is the discipline raised?”

XXI. When the Discipline Is Raised

〔21.1〕It is raised at the moment of self-declaration. First ask: at the time when one has taken the three refuges but the marks of the five precepts have not been said, has the discipline been raised? The treatise answers that it has — “raising a mind earnest and pure and uttering words sincere and true, he declares of himself ‘I am an upāsaka, may the venerable one bear me in mind and guard me with compassion.’ At that time the discipline of the lay follower is raised,” since words declaring oneself a lay follower and the rest are the very condition that raises the discipline; and further because the sūtra goes on to say “from this time forward, until the end of my life, I renounce living beings,” a sentence that omits killing and the rest and says only the one word “living,” which shows that the five precepts had already been obtained at the earlier time. As for the five marks of discipline set out for him afterwards, that is “in order that he may know the training articles he ought to train in,” just as after obtaining a bhikṣu’s full ordination the training articles are said over again so that he may know them and hold them firmly; and it is so with the novice as well.

〔21.2〕Whether taking the three refuges alone makes a lay follower — four turns between the masters abroad and the masters of Kaśmīra. First ask: who forced out this question of “when the discipline is raised”? It is the outcome of a short dispute in the passage before, the speakers being as Puguang marks them. Asking in reliance upon the sūtra: is one made a lay follower by taking the three refuges only? The masters abroad (the Sautrāntika line of Gandhāra, outside the country of Kaśmīra) answer: by this alone he is made one — at the time of taking the three refuges the five precepts are not raised, and the discipline is separately raised only when the marks of the discipline are said afterwards. The treatise masters of the country of Kaśmīra say instead: apart from the discipline of the lay follower there is no lay follower, and one must be complete in the five precepts to be named a lay follower. The masters abroad raise a difficulty: if that is so, it ought to contravene this sūtra. The masters of Kaśmīra answer: it does not contravene it, since the discipline has already been raised. The masters abroad then press: at what time is the discipline raised? The next stanza is the answer to that question.

The easy error: to read “if that is so, it ought to contravene this sūtra” as the words of the Kaśmīra side. By Puguang, this difficulty is raised by the masters abroad, and “it does not contravene it, since the discipline has already been raised” is the answer of Kaśmīra. Attach the one question and one answer to the wrong parties and the whole direction of the passage is reversed. In practice: in reading a short dispute, counting the alternations of “difficulty” and “answer” guards against error better than remembering the conclusion.

The easy error: to take the saying of the marks of the discipline afterwards for the formal undertaking. The treatise says it is so that he may know them and hold them firmly, not the raising of the discipline; the discipline is raised at the instant of self-declaration. In practice: this article together with the preceding section is the whole of this fascicle’s adjudication of the householder’s undertaking of discipline — the three refuges are the condition, the self-declaration raises it, and the saying of the marks keeps it.

XXII. The Four Statements of “One Part” and the Rest: The Largest Dispute in the Fascicle

〔22.1〕Does the sūtra’s four kinds of lay follower conflict with “a lay follower must be complete in the discipline”? First ask: the World-Honored One plainly says that there are four lay followers, able to train in one part, in a small part, in a large part, and in the full part; if every lay follower is complete in the five precepts, how are these four to be construed? This difficulty is raised by the Sautrāntikas (Puguang marks the first two sentences of the passage as the Sautrāntikas adducing the sūtra as a difficulty, and the third as the Sarvāstivādins’ construal). The Sarvāstivādins’ way of construing is a single sentence: “it is said with regard to what can be kept” — the four are said with regard to “what can be kept,” not to “what has been undertaken”; what they can keep is what they undertook beforehand, and so the word “train” is used, since otherwise the sūtra ought to have said “undertakes one part.”

The easy error: to read “able to train in one part” as “has undertaken one article only.” The Sarvāstivādins’ reading is: all five articles have been undertaken, and the difference lies only in how many can be held. In practice: the practical import of this dispute is large — it settles whether a man who cannot keep all five precepts counts as a lay follower. The two schools have each their answer, and this treatise records both.

〔22.2〕The course of the seven exchanges. First ask: how is this dispute pressed forward? Following Puguang’s marks sentence by sentence, the order is this: the Sautrāntikas raise the difficulty, “what is thus held contravenes the sūtra”; the Sarvāstivādins probe, “how does it contravene the sūtra”; the Sautrāntikas answer — no sūtra says that the self-declaration itself raises the five precepts, and this sūtra does not say “from this time forward, until the end of my life, I renounce living beings”; the Sarvāstivādins ask, “how then does the sūtra say it”; the Sautrāntikas answer, “as in the Mahānāman Sūtra; in that sūtra alone are the marks of a lay follower stated”; the Sautrāntikas then adduce another sūtra to construe the former (that line about renouncing life and turning to the pure being one who has seen the truths staking his life upon his own oath and showing that he cherishes the true Dharma deeply, and not said in order to set out the marks of a lay follower); the Sautrāntikas refute the construal offered before (if “one part” and the rest were said with regard to keeping and transgressing, the man undertaking the discipline ought not even to have asked the Buddha, much less should the Buddha have answered him); the Sautrāntikas explain the text of the sūtra for themselves (it is precisely because he had not understood how much the discipline of a lay follower comprises that he asked, and when the Buddha answered that there are four upāsakas he still did not understand and asked again what is meant by able to train in one part); the Sarvāstivādins raise a difficulty (if one may be called a lay follower while lacking the discipline, then a bhikṣu and a novice who lack it ought to be established as such too); the Sautrāntikas retort (then why is the measure of limbs undertaken by the lay follower and on up to the bhikṣu fixed as it is); the Sarvāstivādins answer (it is so instituted by the force of the Buddha’s teaching); the Sautrāntikas answer by parallel instance (then it should equally be allowed that by the force of the Buddha’s teaching one may be called a lay follower, though lacking the discipline, and not a bhikṣu and the rest); and finally Kaśmīra closes back upon its own school — “the Vaibhāṣika masters of the country of Kaśmīra do not allow that one who lacks the discipline can become a lay follower.”

The easy error: to read that last sentence as the author’s verdict. It is the closing word of the school, marking the Vaibhāṣika masters of Kaśmīra on its face; the form of this treatise is one meaning and two schools recorded together, and here no judgment is passed as to who prevails. In practice: in reading a long chain of exchanges like this, the surest method is to mark out “who is speaking” before reading what is said — Puguang and Fabao are entirely at one in their attributions in this passage, which makes it the most reliable stretch of outline in the fascicle.

XXIII. Low, Middle, and High Follow the Mind

〔23.1〕What settles the grade of a discipline. First ask: undertaking the same five precepts, is there a higher and a lower in the discipline? The treatise answers that there is, and the criterion is a single word — the mind: “the discipline of individual liberation undertaken by the eight companies all has the low, middle, and high grades according to the mind with which it is undertaken.” From this principle a very startling result follows: “some arhats may possess a discipline of the low grade, while some ordinary beings may possess one of the high.” At the end of this section the treatise also answers a question in passing: does one who undertakes the discipline of the lay follower but not the three refuges become a lay follower? The answer: he does not, save those who do not know.

The easy error: to suppose that the grade of the discipline follows the fruit attained by the person. The treatise says expressly that it does not — what it follows is the strength or weakness of the very thought at the time of undertaking, and has nothing to do with where you later attain. In practice: this article raises the force of mind at the instant of undertaking into the decisive place; at one and the same assembly, undertaking one and the same article, the grade obtained may be wholly different, and the difference lies only in whether that thought was earnest.

XXIV. The Entity of the Three Refuges

〔24.1〕In taking refuge in the Buddha, in what does one take refuge? First ask: in saying that one takes refuge in the Buddha, is it that body one takes refuge in? The treatise answers: “one who takes refuge in the Buddha takes refuge only in the dharmas beyond learning that can make a Buddha” — because those dharmas are superior, the body obtains the name of Buddha; or because by obtaining those dharmas the Buddha is able to awaken to all. Which are the Buddha’s dharmas beyond learning? “The knowledge of exhaustion and the rest, together with what accompanies them,” and not the body of form and the rest, since the body is the same before and after becoming a Buddha. As to whether one takes refuge in one Buddha or in all, the treatise answers that in truth one should say all Buddhas, since the mark of the path is no different in any Buddha.

The easy error: to read this sentence as a one-sided assertion that “one does not take refuge in the Buddha’s form body.” The treatise itself later in the same passage blocks that misreading — it says expressly that this treatise never said “the dharmas beyond learning alone are what is called Buddha,” but only that “the dharmas beyond learning can make a Buddha,” and it does not exclude the body one depends upon from being gathered into the entity of a Buddha. The weight of what is taken refuge in rests upon the dharmas, and not upon shutting the body out of the entity of a Buddha. In practice: this is the place where the three refuges are most easily taught awry; remember the treatise’s own measure — the weight is on the dharmas, not on excluding the body.

〔24.2〕Taking refuge in the Saṅgha and in the Dharma. First ask: and in what do the Saṅgha and the Dharma take refuge? The treatise answers: “one who takes refuge in the Saṅgha takes refuge generally in the dharmas of the learner and beyond learning that can make a Saṅgha,” since by obtaining those dharmas the Saṅgha becomes the eight persons and cannot be broken; and in truth one takes refuge generally in the Saṅgha of all Buddhas, since the mark of the path is no different in any Saṅgha. As for the sūtra’s saying “there will be a Saṅgha in time to come, in which you should take refuge,” the treatise says that this only shows the Jewel of the Saṅgha that will be present and visible in time to come. Taking refuge in the Dharma is “one who takes refuge in the Dharma takes refuge in nirvāṇa” — this word nirvāṇa displays cessation through discernment alone, and the stilling of the afflictions and suffering in one’s own and in others’ continua is of one mark, and so the refuge is general.

The easy error: to understand “taking refuge in the Saṅgha” as taking refuge in some one renunciant or some group of them. What the treatise takes refuge in is the dharmas of the learner and beyond learning that can make a Saṅgha, and that is why it says “cannot be broken” — what can be broken is persons, what cannot be broken is dharmas. In practice: the three objects of the three refuges are, in the treatise, taken refuge in in one and the same way — all of them in dharmas: the Buddha in the dharmas beyond learning, the Saṅgha in the dharmas of the learner and beyond learning, the Dharma in cessation through discernment. This article lifts the three refuges wholly clear of the plane of human feeling.

〔24.3〕The difficulty of drawing blood from the Buddha’s body, and the author’s close. First ask: if the dharmas beyond learning alone are the Buddha, then when one with an evil mind draws blood from the Buddha’s body only the born body is injured — how should this constitute a deed of immediate retribution? On this difficulty Puguang himself leaves two explanations standing, his outline running word for word “the author’s difficulty, or a setting out of the Sautrāntikas’ difficulty” — the ancient master here made no settled adjudication, and this section records it as it stands without adjudicating on his behalf. The answerers are the Vaibhāṣikas: “his support being ruined, they are ruined along with it.” On the second difficulty that follows, Puguang likewise leaves two explanations standing without adjudicating, his outline running word for word “the author raises a further difficulty, or advances the Sautrāntikas’ difficulty” — and this section records it as it stands too: searching this treatise, it has not said that the dharmas beyond learning alone are what is called Buddha, but only that the dharmas beyond learning can make a Buddha; and since it does not exclude the entity of a Buddha from gathering the body it depends upon, there is no room for the former difficulty. And the treatise pushes back: were it otherwise, the Buddha and the Saṅgha, while abiding in a conventional mind, would be neither Saṅgha nor Buddha; and one ought likewise to hold that the discipline that makes a bhikṣu is just the bhikṣu — in which case a man who wished to make offerings to a bhikṣu would be making offerings only to that śīla which can make a bhikṣu, and a man who wished to take refuge in the Buddha ought to take refuge only in those dharmas beyond learning that can make a Buddha. These two sentences are the consequent of a reduction to absurdity and not the treatise’s own position; and Puguang makes it plain by pressing it back the other way: “it should not be that the four requisites are offered to the body one depends upon; and since it is plainly seen that offerings are made to the body upon which the discipline depends, one knows that the body one depends upon is also the bhikṣu,” and again, “if one says that one takes refuge only in the Buddha’s dharmas beyond learning, then this again contravenes the world, since it is plainly seen that people take refuge in and pay homage to the Buddha’s born body” — what the world plainly sees itself making offerings to and paying homage to is just that body, which shows that the body one depends upon is not outside the entity of a Buddha. At the end of the passage another account is recorded: “some other masters say: one who takes refuge in the Buddha takes refuge generally in the eighteen dharmas exclusive to the Tathāgata.”

The easy error: to read this passage as an opposition between the author and the Vaibhāṣikas. The author’s final landing is a defence of the wording of this treatise — the trouble lies in the word “alone,” not in the dharmas beyond learning. In practice: this passage is the fascicle’s best demonstration of how to take a misreading apart: first find the word the other side has added on your behalf, then prove that the treatise has no such word.

XXV. The Sense of Taking Refuge: Gathered by a Stanza of the Sūtra

〔25.1〕What the refuge-taking side has for its entity, and what taking refuge means. First ask: having said what is taken refuge in, what of the side that takes refuge? The treatise answers: “what does this refuge-taking have for its entity? Verbal manifest action for its entity” — it is verbal manifest action. And what does taking refuge mean? “Its sense is rescue and relief,” since by making it one’s support one can be liberated from all suffering forever. The treatise then adduces a stanza of the sūtra to gather up the passage: multitudes driven by fear take refuge for the most part in mountains, in gardens and groves, in thickets, in lone trees, in caityas, and the like; such a refuge is not the most excellent, is not the most honorable, and by such a refuge one is not liberated from the manifold sufferings; whereas those who take refuge in the Buddha and in the Dharma and the Saṅgha, contemplating the four noble truths constantly with discernment, know suffering, know the arising of suffering, know the transcending of the manifold sufferings forever, and know the eightfold noble path, and go toward the security of nirvāṇa — such a refuge is the most excellent, such a refuge is the most honorable, and by such a refuge one is certainly liberated from the manifold sufferings. The treatise gathers it up in one sentence: “therefore taking refuge is universally the gateway of means at every place where a discipline is undertaken.”

The easy error: to take this stanza for a stanza of this treatise. It is expressly preceded by “as the World-Honored One says,” and is a stanza adduced from the sūtra. In practice: this stanza sets “taking refuge” apart from “seeking shelter out of dread” — the criterion lies not in whether you are afraid but in whether the one you take refuge in can make discernment arise in you upon the four truths. And that last sentence, “the gateway of means,” answers exactly to the earlier section on “without the three refuges there is no one-day observance”: the three refuges are not an entrance ceremony; they are the gate itself.

XXVI. Sexual Misconduct Is the Most Reproachable: Why the Lay Follower Abstains from Misconduct Only

〔26.1〕Three reasons and one misgiving. First ask: the disciplines of the other six companies all establish abstention from unchastity, so why is the lay follower alone instituted to abstain from sexual misconduct? The treatise gives three reasons: first, “sexual misconduct alone the world reproaches utterly,” since it can violate and injure another’s wife and the rest and draws on the evil destinies, whereas unchastity is not so; second, sexual misconduct is easy to abstain from, whereas householders are attached to desires and abstention from unchastity is hard for them to hold, and observing that they cannot train in it for long it is not instituted; third, all noble ones certainly obtain the discipline of not doing with regard to sexual misconduct, and noble ones who pass through birth do not commit it either, whereas abstention from unchastity is not so. The treatise supplies one misgiving besides: “lest noble ones who pass through birth transgress the discipline of the lay follower” — were abstention from unchastity written into the discipline of the lay follower, then a noble one still in the household life after rebirth would have to transgress it.

The easy error: to read this article as the Buddha lowering the standard for householders. The treatise’s third reason is precisely the contrary: it is so that a noble one shall not transgress — the boundary set must be one that a noble one can keep without fail, and this is a hard constraint upon the instituting of the discipline. In practice: the breadth or strictness of an article of discipline is not settled by “how hard it is to keep” alone, but also by “whether instituting it would force out transgressions that ought never to have been.”

XXVII. Discipline Is Obtained in Accordance with the Vow

〔27.1〕Why taking a wife afterwards is not a transgression. First ask: those who first undertook the discipline of the lay follower and afterwards took wives and concubines — with regard to those wives and concubines, was the discipline obtained at the time of undertaking? The author asks and answers himself: “in truth it should have been obtained” — otherwise the discipline of individual liberation would be obtained with respect to only a part of sentient beings. The author at once raises a difficulty against himself: if so, is the taking of wives and concubines afterwards not a transgression? The stanza answers: “the discipline is obtained in accordance with the vow, and not upon the whole of the continua.” The treatise explains: the vow originally undertaken was to abstain from sexual misconduct, and it was not said with regard to the continua of all sentient beings “from all of them I shall abstain from unchastity”; and so with respect to the continua of sentient beings universally one obtains only the discipline of abstaining from sexual misconduct and not the discipline of abstaining from unchastity, and therefore “taking wives and concubines afterwards is no violation of the earlier discipline.” Puguang here cites the Correct Principle to supply a sentence, saying that for one who took wives and concubines first and undertook the discipline afterwards, the discipline is raised with regard to his own wife and the rest as well, since the discipline of individual liberation of the lay follower and the rest is obtained with regard to every sentient being.

The easy error: to read “not upon the whole of the continua” as “this article of discipline holds with regard to only some people.” It is exactly the contrary — the discipline holds with regard to the continua of all sentient beings, and only what is abstained from is settled by the vow. In practice: this article gives keeping the discipline a very exact measure — the discipline you obtain is coextensive with the vow you made when undertaking it, no more and no less.

XXVIII. Once the Door of Lying Is Open, Every Training Article Will Be Transgressed

〔28.1〕Why false speech must be instituted. First ask: speech has four faults (false, divisive, harsh, and idle); why does the discipline of the lay follower institute only the first? The treatise first says that it is still by the three reasons above, and Puguang marks this question as “speech has four faults, why is only one instituted,” adjudging the answer to be by the three former causes. Then the treatise gives a further reason of its own: “when one is examined for having transgressed the training articles, if the door of false speech be opened, he will say ‘I did not do it,’ and thereby will transgress much in the discipline” — once lying is allowed, on being asked about a transgression he brushes it aside with “I did not do it,” and thereupon all the articles slacken along with it. And so the Buddha, to make them hold firmly, instituted abstention from false speech in every discipline; only thus can it make a man “when he transgresses the discipline, disclose it himself and so guard against transgressing again.”

The easy error: to read this article as “lying is graver than divisive speech.” What the treatise gives is not a comparison of gravity but a comparison of function — false speech is the one article that would rob every other article of its mechanism of examination. In practice: this is the article in the fascicle with the strongest savor of practice: the true gatekeeper of the discipline is disclosure, and once lying is allowed, disclosure is gone.

XXIX. Among Prohibited Offences, Liquor Alone

〔29.1〕How liquor got into the limbs of the discipline. First ask: the prohibited offences are so many; why is liquor alone instituted into the discipline of the lay follower? The author first asks himself, “for what reason is the discipline of the lay follower not established upon abstaining from prohibited offences,” and answers himself, “who says that there is no abstaining from a prohibited offence here?” — namely abstention from drinking liquor. He asks again why liquor alone is prohibited, and the stanza answers: “among the prohibited, liquor alone is abstained from, to guard the remaining disciplines.” The treatise explains: “those who drink liquor are for the most part loose and dissolute in mind and cannot guard the remaining disciplines; therefore, in order to guard the rest, they are made to abstain from drinking liquor.” Puguang in this passage marks question, probe, and explanation sentence by sentence, marking out the chain of the author’s own questions and answers very densely.

The easy error: to suppose that liquor is listed because it is itself a grave offence. The treatise’s reason lies not in liquor at all but in its making you unable to hold the others — this article is instituted for the sake of guarding the remaining four. In practice: this gives a way of judging — whatever would take away your power to guard the remaining articles stands in the same place as this one.

〔29.2〕Is drinking liquor an intrinsic offence or a prohibited one? First ask: how is it known that drinking liquor is a prohibited offence? The author answers himself: “because there is no mark of an intrinsic offence in it, since all intrinsic offences proceed only in a defiled mind” — one who drinks to cure an illness and not for intoxication can be without a defiled mind. The author raises a difficulty against himself again: to know plainly that liquor can intoxicate and yet deliberately wish to drink it — is this not a defiled mind? He answers himself: it is not, because knowing his own measure, drinking within a limit for the curing of illness, he does not let himself be intoxicated. The treatise then records both parties: those who uphold the Vinaya say that drinking liquor is an intrinsic offence, and adduce Upāli’s asking about supplying the sick and the World-Honored One’s answering “only intrinsic offences excepted,” and instance a man of the Śākya clan afflicted with illness who needed liquor and to whom the World-Honored One would not allow it, and the sūtra’s saying that not so much as the measure of liquor that would wet the tip of a reed should be drunk, and that the noble ones do not transgress it though they pass through many births, and that the sūtra calls it a bodily evil conduct, and other proofs; while the Abhidharma masters say that it is not an intrinsic offence, and answer them article by article — at that time the prohibitory disciplines were opened for the sick as a whole, the prohibition of liquor at other times being to guard against transgressing an intrinsic offence thereby, the prohibition down to the measure of a reed’s tip being because the measure of intoxication has no fixed limit, the noble ones’ not drinking being because they have conscience and shame and because liquor can make one lose correct mindfulness, the not drinking of even the smallest portion being because it is like a poison whose measure is not fixed, and the sūtra’s calling it a bodily evil conduct being because “liquor is the occasion of all heedlessness,” whence “it alone obtains the name occasion of heedlessness” while the others do not obtain that name (the others being all intrinsic offences).

At the very end the treatise glosses a few terms besides: what is called falling into the evil destinies by frequent habituation shows that frequent drinking can make the various unwholesome dharmas in the body continue on and turn, can draw forth actions leading to the evil destinies, or can make those actions grow the stronger; surā is liquor fermented from grain, maireya is made by fermenting other things, and these two liquors, when not yet ripened or already spoiled so that they cannot intoxicate, are not called madya, and only when they can intoxicate are they called madya liquor; and because betel nut and barnyard millet and the like can also intoxicate, in order to distinguish them it is necessary to say surā and maireya liquor. The last sentence of the fascicle is: “as for the words occasion of heedlessness, liquor is the place upon which heedlessness depends.”

The easy error: to take one of the two parties for the conclusion of this treatise. The treatise here records both accounts and does not judge which prevails — this is the second plain instance in the fascicle of one meaning and two schools recorded together. In practice: however the adjudication of intrinsic and prohibited may go, the two parties are wholly at one on the matter of not drinking, and what they dispute is only on what ground one is not to drink. One who keeps the discipline need not wait for this dispute to be concluded before keeping it.

Further Resonances: The Mirror of the Three Commentaries

The above is the sense of the text of this fascicle itself. Below a separate section is set up, gathering four matters: the adjudications of the three commentaries and their divergences, Saṅghabhadra’s refutations and supplements, the divergences of Paramārtha’s earlier translation, and coordinates for parallel reading. A mirror is not the treatise; it is only another way of reading the same passage. Recorded together without adjudication, each restored to its own place.

1. Where the Three Commentaries Diverge

A commentary with no text to hang upon. Shentai’s commentary is a fragment; the seven fascicles extant belong to the Chapter on the Elements, the Chapter on the Faculties, and the Chapter on the Worthy and the Noble, and the Chapter on Action is wholly wanting, so that this fascicle has no line-by-line commentary of his to hang upon. The want is marked as it stands, and text from other fascicles is not made to stand for it.

One and the same cut, attached by the three houses to different layers. For the cut at the head of Fascicle Fourteen, Puguang marks “below, the third, explaining the manifest and the nonmanifest at length,” Yuanhui marks “from here the third, explaining the manifest and the nonmanifest at length,” the two houses agreeing word for word even in the names of the subsections, and both attaching it as “the third” within the chapter on the nature of the entity of action; Fabao instead marks “from here below, the second of the main text, explaining the three of discipline and the rest,” raising the same cut to the second main division at the chapter level. The names agree entirely and the layers are of two patterns; recorded without adjudication.

A simile Fabao has alone. On the gloss of the three disciplines as affiliated to the realms, Fabao sets up the simile “as for being bound to desire and the rest, it is like a binding market,” and Puguang has no such simile at the same place. The presence or absence of one simile shows the different roads the two commentaries take — Fabao is fond of establishing similes from familiar things of the world, Puguang of glossing the sense by the make-up of the words.

Whether the one-day observance may be undertaken again beyond a day and a night: one house marks the turns of outline, the other hands down a verdict outright. Puguang marks this passage exchange by exchange in the finest detail, from “the Sautrāntikas allow that the discipline of the one-day observance may be undertaken and obtained for many days, and so raise this question,” through the Sarvāstivādins’ answer, the Sautrāntika masters’ words, the Sarvāstivādins’ question, the Sautrāntikas’ answer, and finally the Sarvāstivādins’ further difficulty, one turn at a time and no verdict passed; Fabao at the end of the same passage hands down a verdict outright, saying that the two houses in truth have no dispute and yet have raised a crosswise quarrel — his text running “the Sautrāntikas and the master of the Correct Principle, in a matter where in principle there is no dispute, have raised a crosswise quarrel.” Puguang has not this sentence; but it should be noted that the same sentence is found word for word in the corresponding passage of Saṅghabhadra’s Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle, the Chinese in the two places being wholly identical and differing only in a mark of punctuation, so that it ought not to be called outright a verdict of Fabao’s own, but must be a taking over of Saṅghabhadra’s words by Fabao. The style of the two commentaries is plain at a glance here, and the source of what is taken over should be marked as well; recorded together without adjudication.

The dispute over the entity of the fast: Puguang divides the turns, Fabao is brief. On the treatise’s passage “some other masters say: abstention from untimely eating is called the entity of the fast,” Puguang marks the exchanges of the two parties layer by layer in five turns — the Sautrāntikas adducing the sūtra in refutation, the other masters’ question, the Sautrāntikas’ answer (the fast has no separate entity, being made up by gathering the eight), the setting out of the Vaibhāṣikas’ explanation, and the Sautrāntikas’ difficulty; Fabao at the same passage gives only a brief mark of the kind “setting out the Sarvāstivāda school,” without dividing the turns. The disparity of fullness is the greatest in the fascicle; recorded together without adjudication.

Masters abroad or Sautrāntikas: the two commentaries differ in the labels of the camps. On the dispute “is one made a lay follower by taking the three refuges only,” Puguang here sets “the masters abroad” over against “the masters of the country of Kaśmīra,” marking the answer of the masters abroad as “setting out the answer of the masters abroad; abroad means the Sautrāntikas of the country of Gandhāra outside the country of Kaśmīra”; Fabao instead opens straightway with “the masters abroad are the Sautrāntika masters of the country of Gandhāra outside the country of Kaśmīra,” and in the exchanges below uses the two words “Sautrāntika” outright. The same body of men is labeled with different breadth; recorded only, without adjudication — the reader who sees the two commentaries marking them differently need not suppose that what is pointed to differs.

The four statements of “one part” and the rest: here the two commentaries are entirely at one in their attributions. Puguang throughout the passage makes the Sautrāntikas the questioning and objecting party and the Sarvāstivādins (the home school of Kaśmīra) the answering and defending party; Fabao’s marks correspond word for word, running “the Sautrāntikas ask in return about the Sarvāstivādins’ difference in the limbs of the discipline” and “the Sautrāntikas adduce a difference of text, and explain by parallel instance the difference between being complete in the limbs and not being complete.” Among the disputes of this fascicle, this passage alone has no divergence between the two commentaries — and it is also the stretch that bears the deepest doctrinal weight in the fascicle, so that reliable attribution is the reader’s good fortune.

The difficulty of drawing blood from the Buddha’s body: Puguang leaves two explanations standing, Fabao is broad. Puguang marks this difficulty as “the author’s difficulty, or a setting out of the Sautrāntikas’ difficulty,” setting the two side by side without deciding; Fabao marks it straightway as an outsider’s difficulty against the Sarvāstivādins, without distinguishing the author from the Sautrāntikas. That the ancient master, where the attribution was doubtful, marked the doubt plainly is itself part of the form, and it is recorded as it stands.

A passage supplied by Fabao alone and untouched by Puguang. Under “one who takes refuge in the Dharma takes refuge in nirvāṇa,” Fabao alone cites an entire passage of question and answer from the thirty-fourth fascicle of the Mahāvibhāṣā, the head of the citation running “Question: as for taking refuge in the Dharma, is it taking refuge in the cessation of the aggregates of one’s own continuum,” followed by the two further questions of another’s continuum and of what is not counted among sentient beings, the answer being that one should say the refuge is in the cessation of all aggregates, of one’s own and of others’ continua and of what is not counted among sentient beings; and he sets himself a difficulty besides — the cessation of the aggregates of another’s continuum and the rest has no sense of rescue and protection for me, so how is it taken refuge in? and answers that though it has no sense of rescue and protection for me it has for another. Puguang has no corresponding text for this passage. Because it touches the threefold adjudication of the nature of “taking refuge in the Dharma,” it is placed in this section and not in the main text.

Puguang’s avowal where the text of the treatise is plain. In the passage on the five names of non-discipline, Puguang avows that the text can be construed as it stands and establishes no new sense of his own. That an ancient master, where there is nothing to supply, says outright “it can be construed” is another kind of form — he does not force an interpretation.

2. Saṅghabhadra’s Refutations and Supplementary Explanations

The chapter name in Saṅghabhadra’s two treatises for this chapter is not “Analysis of Action” but “Adjudication of Action”; to search them with the Kośa’s chapter name is bound to yield a false zero.

A philological objection to one line of the stanza. On the stanza about the conditions by which the three disciplines are obtained, Saṅghabhadra criticizes the line “what is produced by absorption is obtained upon obtaining the stage of absorption,” saying that the one word “stage of absorption” gathers up all the dharmas of that stage, so that discipline too is gathered under that stage, and thus it becomes “obtaining the discipline by obtaining the discipline” and nothing is accomplished, his closing words running outright “the Sūtra-master should here consider for himself,” and maintaining that one ought to say only “obtaining the meditative absorption.” ⇒ What is objected to is the wording of the stanza, not the doctrinal position. Recorded only, without adjudication.

The dispute over “one part” and the rest: the passage of harshest wording. Saṅghabhadra cites and refutes sentence by sentence, his citation running “the Sūtra-master here says thus: what is thus held contravenes the sūtra,” and his final adjudication running “the Sūtra-master here does not consider rightly,” reproaching him besides for harboring a partisan attachment in a matter of disputed principle. Yet upon the core of this dispute (whether a lay follower must be complete in the five limbs of discipline), the author of the Kośa himself has already set up in his prose commentary the explanation “it is said with regard to what can be kept,” and closes back upon his own school with the Vaibhāṣika masters of Kaśmīra; what Saṅghabhadra does is to defend the Sarvāstivāda home school sentence by sentence against the Sautrāntika-style reading cited in this passage of the Kośa. One meaning and two schools recorded together, with no adjudication of who prevails.

The Elder rejects “low, middle, and high follow the mind” — and the objector is not the Sūtra-master. Saṅghabhadra himself records the Elder’s difficulty, his citation running “here the Elder speaks in rejection thus,” saying that what is thus held contravenes correct principle and teaching, and that if it must be so there would be no vigorous and right exertion in upholding the prohibitions. The subject of this difficulty is the Elder and not Vasubandhu; upon this stanza the Sarvāstivāda home school, the Elder, and the Sūtra-master each have a position. Recorded only, without adjudication.

The entity of the three refuges: the wording is heavier still than in the passage before. On the argument over “the dharmas beyond learning alone are the Buddha,” Saṅghabhadra passes judgment three times, giving “the Sūtra-master here says thus,” “now, in detail, the Sūtra-master has not searched deeply into the sense of the root treatise,” and at the end reproaching him with “therefore the Sūtra-master, in the school of Abhidharma, does not well understand the sense of what is said.” In the same passage Saṅghabhadra also records and refutes the account of a third party — “the Vātsīputrīyas speak thus: the pudgala is the Buddha in whom refuge is taken” — adjudging it unreasonable (since it has no distinction, it does not constitute a refuge). This account is not recorded in the text of the Kośa, and is material of extension belonging to Saṅghabhadra’s book alone.

The argument over drinking liquor: here Saṅghabhadra does not refute but expounds. On the same point at issue Saṅghabhadra first records the party of the intrinsic offence, his citation running “some say that drinking liquor is gathered under intrinsic offence,” establishing it by the two gates of scripture and correct principle and adducing the same exchange with Upāli in proof; and afterwards advances his own school, marked as “the master of the Correct Principle speaks thus,” saying that drinking liquors is not gathered under intrinsic offence, since there is no mark of an intrinsic offence in it. ⇒ This agrees in direction with the school to which the text of the Kośa returns (both adjudging it not an intrinsic offence, which is the home position of Abhidharma), and the base material adduced is the same; this is the one passage in the fascicle where Saṅghabhadra runs in the same direction as the author. Recorded together without adjudication.

The shallowness of the collation and the harshness of the debate stand in exact contrast. The Taishō collation notes for this fascicle number twenty-five and the variant readings twenty-one, mostly graphically similar corruptions, additions and omissions of particles, and inversions of word order, and not one of them is enough to unsettle the doctrine; whereas the debate within the lineage reaches its harshest wording at just the two places of “one part and the rest” and “the entity of the three refuges” — the two stretches that bear the deepest doctrinal weight in the fascicle. Recorded as it stands, without forcing an adjudication of cause and effect.

3. The Divergences of Paramārtha’s Earlier Translation

Paramārtha’s Expository Treatise on the Treasury forms a system of its own in the passage corresponding to this fascicle, its form being “the verse says / the explanation says,” glossing sentence by sentence inset, so that one stanza is often broken into two to five short verses scattered about with long prose between; Xuanzang has “the stanza says / the treatise says,” the whole stanza coming out first and the prose after. And so Xuanzang’s twenty-eight blocks of root stanza in this fascicle are scattered into many short verses in Paramārtha’s text — the eight lines on one who abides in individual liberation possessing the nonmanifest are broken by Paramārtha into five places of inset gloss.

The renderings form a system of their own. The nonmanifest is made the uninstructive, discipline is made protection, non-discipline is made non-protection, abiding in the middle is made middle-abiding, individual liberation is made prātimokṣa, the discipline produced by meditative absorption is made the protection of absorption, the discipline produced by the path is made the protection without flow, the discipline of cutting off is made the protection of extinction; the names of the eight companies are made bhikṣu, bhikṣuṇī, śikṣamāṇā, śrāmaṇera, śrāmaṇerī, upāsaka, upāsikā, upavāsa; excellent conduct is made good conduct, the discipline of speech is made the protection of the mouth, correct knowing is made good discernment, caitya is made caitya in his own transcription, a prohibited offence is made a conventionally instituted offence, following the mind is made according to intention, one part is made one place. To search Paramārtha’s text with Xuanzang’s words is never to find these boundaries — comparison across the two versions can only take the structure of the scenes.

The fascicle divisions of the two versions do not coincide. The passage of Paramārtha corresponding to this fascicle runs across the end of his own “part one” and the front of “part two,” and the chapter continuation-title of Paramārtha’s “part two” falls exactly upon a seam — the prose on Xuanzang’s stanza “abiding in discipline or non-discipline” has just been finished and the stanza “the manifest, while presently being done, possesses the middle” has not yet come out, and there Paramārtha changes fascicle. And so the boundaries of the passage corresponding to this fascicle can only be fixed by the structure of the scenes, and Paramārtha’s fascicle boundaries may not be made to stand for them.

One ★ divergence of rendering-character worth noting. On the stanza about sexual misconduct, Xuanzang gives “sexual misconduct is the most reproachable; it is easy to abstain from, and the discipline of not doing is obtained,” Paramārtha “sexual misconduct is the most reproachable; it is easy to do, and the discipline of not doing is obtained.” Xuanzang’s “easy to abstain from” says outright that misconduct is easy to abstain from; Paramārtha’s “easy to do” is liable in its word order to yield the divergent reading “misconduct is easy to commit,” yet by the run of his prose it is an abbreviation of “to abstain … is easy to do.” Recorded only, without adjudication.

Two places where the fullness runs each way. First, Paramārtha uses the same construction (most reproachable, easy to do, the discipline of not doing obtained) three times over at the three places of abstaining from killing, from sexual misconduct, and from false speech, while Xuanzang makes a stanza of its own only at the two places of misconduct and false speech, without the threefold repetition upon three training articles — the density of Paramārtha’s rhetoric is the higher. Second, the other way about: Xuanzang gathers up “the self-declaration raises the discipline of the lay follower” with a whole stanza (the self-declaration raises the discipline, said as with the bhikṣu and the rest), whereas Paramārtha in the same scene makes no separate stanza to gather it and passes it off with a single short verse line, his prose being sparer as well. The fullness varies by passage without a fixed direction.

One name where the two translations take different roads. For the alternative name of the one-day observance, Xuanzang gives the rendering by sense, “the nourishing,” and Paramārtha the transcription poṣadha; the first two lines of the same adduced stanza are nearly identical word for word, and the last line is a rendering by sense in the one and a transcription in the other. The same holds for the principal name of the one-day observance — Xuanzang gives the one-day observance, Paramārtha upavāsa (or, by sense, poṣadha). Recorded together without adjudication.

4. Coordinates for Parallel Reading

What this fascicle establishes is a complete account of lodging discipline in the square called “the nonmanifest.” That one adjudication is wholly reversed in the Yogācāra lineage: the Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only, upon the same dharma, adjudges outright in reverse, saying that manifest and nonmanifest form are not really existent, and establishes its own reason for this, that in dependence upon the wholesome and unwholesome limits of resolve and intention the nonmanifest is conventionally established. ⇒ Upon one and the same name “nonmanifest,” the two systems make one real and one conventional: the Sarvāstivādins attach it to a real entity among the dharmas of form, the Yogācārins attach it to a conventional establishment at the stage where the seeds of volition increase. One and the same question and two ages’ answers — this is the most rewarding place in the fascicle for parallel reading.

The names of the three disciplines admit of a word-for-word parallel reading with what the root treatise of the Yogācāra line establishes: that system, under action gathered under discipline, lists the three of the discipline of individual liberation, the discipline of cutting off that is the result of meditative absorption and attainment, and the discipline without outflows — the three names agreeing with this fascicle’s, save that that system gathers under the single name “the discipline of cutting off that is the result of meditative absorption and attainment” both this fascicle’s “discipline produced by meditative absorption” and its “discipline of cutting off.” One and the same set of enumerated dharmas opened and gathered differently; they may be looked at side by side.

As for non-discipline, this fascicle sets out its five alternative names and the stages of its possession in detail, yet does not list its classes; that system instead poses the question outright, “which are the twelve classes of non-discipline,” and lists them one by one. The fullness of the two systems is complementary — the Kośa asks what it is and how far it is possessed, the Yogācārabhūmi asks which ones there are; the same name with a different manner of questioning is a small cross-section of the character of the two systems.