俱舍論 五無間·破僧·相業·施戒修Abhidharmakośabhāṣya · The Five Deeds of Immediate Retribution · Splitting the Saṅgha · The Action Producing the Marks · Giving, Discipline, and Cultivation

Before Reading This Fascicle

The Chapter on Action, arriving here, is at its sixth fascicle, and its last. The five preceding fascicles adjudged one by one the nature of the entity of action, the obtaining and relinquishing of discipline, the several gates of action spoken of in the sūtras, and the ten paths of action, and at the end set up the three obstructions — the obstruction of action, the obstruction of the afflictions, and the obstruction of maturation. This fascicle opens by catching hold of that very tail: “among the three obstructions adjudged above, it was said that the five deeds of immediate retribution are the entity of the obstruction of action.” Of the three obstructions, what is the entity of the first? The answer is the five deeds of immediate retribution. And so the whole fascicle unfolds from here.

The three ancient masters adjudge this one cut in complete agreement. Puguang’s Record marks it, “below, the second, explaining the obstruction of action separately. Within it, first setting out the entity of the obstruction of action; second, explaining the splitting of the Saṅgha separately; third, explaining the conditions that make a deed one of immediate retribution; fourth, explaining that the preparation is fixed; fifth, the heaviness of the offense and the greatness of the result; sixth, what is of the same class as the deeds of immediate retribution”; Fabao’s Commentary marks it, “second, explaining the obstruction of action separately”; Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary marks it, “from here the second, explaining the obstruction of action separately, and within it a division into six” — and even the sequence of the six subsections is one by one the same. This is not often met with in the history of the outlines of this treatise, and it may be seen from it that the boundary of the fascicle is itself the boundary of the outline, and not a cut forced upon the text by later hands.

The structure of this fascicle has a shape well worth noticing: the first half is utterly heavy, the second half utterly excellent. The first half speaks of the deepest evil that can be done — the five deeds of immediate retribution, and within them the force of a full eight stanzas is spent upon the single matter of “splitting the Saṅgha,” nailing down one by one its entity, the person who can split, the persons who are split, the place, the number, the term of time, and the six occasions on which it cannot happen at all. The second half turns of a sudden and speaks of the bodhisattva’s action producing the excellent marks (the three incalculable aeons, the hundred aeons of cultivating the marks, the meeting with Buddhas in reverse order, the leaping over of nine aeons, the fulfillment of the six pāramitās in four stages), and then of the three bases of meritorious action, giving, discipline, and cultivation — the name and sense of giving and its four alternatives, the donor and the goods and the field, the six causes of an action’s lightness or heaviness, action done and action increased, giving to a caitya, the two kinds of discipline, equipoise being called cultivation, the measure of the merit of Brahmā, the giving of Dharma, and the three wholesome things that are conducive. At the end it closes the whole chapter with the entities of writing, seals, calculation, letters, and numbers, and with the stanza “the wholesome without outflows is called excellent.”

The whole fascicle can therefore be read as a scale of the extremes of action: probing downward to the deepest notch (that one lying sentence that splits the Saṅgha), and upward to the highest notch (the volition that draws down eighty thousand great aeons, and the fulfillment of the six pāramitās over three incalculable aeons). The line running between them never changes — the lightness or heaviness of an action is not settled by the size of the deed but by the field, by the mind, and by the thing destroyed. This will be met with in passage after passage below.

There is one more thing to say at the outset. Three times in this fascicle the treatise records both accounts without adjudicating (the three accounts of the measure of a single merit, the two divergent accounts of purity of discipline, the two accounts of the measure of the merit of Brahmā), and the author passes not one sentence of judgment. In reading, do not hurry to look for “the correct answer”; look first, and clearly, at where each party puts the weight.

I. The Entity of the Five Deeds of Immediate Retribution

〔1.1〕Four of body and one of speech · three of killing and one of lying · one a preparation. First the question: the five deeds of immediate retribution are five matters, so why must the stanza take them apart into three groupings, “four of body and one of speech,” “three of killing and one of lying,” “one a preparation”? Because these are three different measures. The first measures the kind of action — “among the five deeds of immediate retribution, four are bodily action, one is verbal action; three are killing, one is the root path of action of false speech, one is the preparation for the path of action of killing”: killing one’s mother, killing one’s father, killing an arhat, and drawing blood from the body of a Buddha all set the body in motion, while splitting the Saṅgha sets the mouth in motion. The second measures the assignment to a path of action — the first three are the path of action of killing, splitting the Saṅgha is the path of action of false speech. The third is the most important: drawing blood from the body of a Buddha, though a bodily action, is not the path of action of killing but only a preparation for killing, and the reason is one sentence — “since the body of a Tathāgata cannot be killed.” For a path of action to be established there must be the result “the one killed dies”; the body of a Buddha cannot be killed, the result can never come about, and so it can only stop in the square of preparation.

The easy error: to suppose that “immediate retribution” means that the five matters are equally heavy. It does not — the five matters share the name “immediate retribution” with regard to falling inevitably into the hell without interval and not being separated off by another birth; as to the paths of action, their standing is not the same. In practice: with any set of enumerated dharmas in this treatise, ask first “by which measure was this set of headings compiled?”; give the same set of things another measure and the squares are rearranged — this same move is used later in this fascicle in treating the three bases of meritorious action and the four alternatives of giving.

II. The Chapter on Splitting the Saṅgha, Part One · What the Split in the Saṅgha Is, and in Whom It Is Possessed

〔2.1〕The entity of the split in the Saṅgha is “non-concord.” First the question: since splitting the Saṅgha is the heaviest of offenses, what sort of dharma ought its entity to be? Intuition answers, “surely some utterly evil state of mind.” But the treatise’s answer is unexpected — “the entity of the split in the Saṅgha is the nature of non-concord; it is gathered under the aggregate of formations, unobscured-indeterminate and not associated with mind.” What is called the split in the Saṅgha means the loss of the concord of the Saṅgha; this is a formation not associated with mind (not form, not mind or a mental factor, but that other class of dharmas set up within the aggregate of formations), and its quality is unobscured-indeterminate, neither wholesome nor unwholesome. The treatise itself raises the difficulty: if it is unobscured-indeterminate, how can it be of immediate retribution? The answer is thoroughly brisk — “such a split in the Saṅgha arises from a lie, and so the splitting of the Saṅgha is said to be a result of immediate retribution.” The split in the Saṅgha is the result; that one lie is the cause.

More decisive still is in whom it falls: “it is not the one who splits that possesses this split in the Saṅgha; it is possessed only by the Saṅgha that is split.” The man who splits the Saṅgha does not possess the dharma “split in the Saṅgha” at all; what possesses it is on the contrary the very body of monks who are split. The easy error: to confound “the split in the Saṅgha” with “the offense of splitting the Saṅgha” as one thing. The two belong to two different persons — the dharma is on the side of the Saṅgha, the offense on the side of the splitter. In practice: this is the model of how the treatise parts “the thing” from “the offense”; later, in treating “the merit of the class of relinquishing and the merit of the class of enjoyment,” the same parting is performed once again.

〔2.2〕What the splitter possesses is the offense of lying · maturing for an aeon · the more the deeds, the greater the suffering. First the question: since the split in the Saṅgha is not in the splitter, what after all does the splitter come to possess? The answer: “the man who splits the Saṅgha possesses the offense of splitting the Saṅgha” — and this offense “has false speech for its nature, that is, the manifest and nonmanifest verbal action arising together with the split in the Saṅgha,” and its retribution is that “he must undergo the most extreme suffering for an intermediate aeon in the great hell without interval.” Of the five deeds, splitting the Saṅgha alone is inevitably an intermediate aeon in the hell without interval, whereas of the other four “the remaining deeds of immediate retribution are not necessarily born in the hell without interval.” Here the author raises for himself a very sharp question: since many such deeds all mature in the next birth, how can one birth hold five portions of retribution? He answers himself — “as those offenses increase, so does the suffering increase in severity”: it is not the number of births that is increased but the density of the suffering; one obtains a body vast and soft, together with many keen instruments of suffering, and so the suffering becomes twofold, threefold, fourfold, fivefold. Puguang’s Record marks question and answer here, and states for itself that “among the several deeds of immediate retribution done, the first is the projecting action and the later ones are the completing action” — the projecting action settles “where one is born,” the completing action settles “to what degree one undergoes things there.”

The easy error: to suppose that “many deeds drawing one birth together” is a discount. Just the contrary — it is a multiplication. In practice: the pair of tools, projecting action and completing action, comes down here for the first time upon an extreme case; hereafter, in reading of the differences among the six destinies, and of beings born into one and the same destiny yet worlds apart in pleasure and pain, it is this same pair of tools that is used.

III. The Chapter on Splitting the Saṅgha, Part Two · Who Can Split, Whom, Where, and for How Long

〔3.1〕The one who can split must pass three thresholds. First the question: can anyone at all split the Saṅgha of the wheel of Dharma? The treatise sets up three thresholds. The first is standing — “the one who splits the Saṅgha must be a full bhikṣu; he is certainly not a householder, a bhikṣuṇī, or the like.” The second is class of conduct — “only one whose conduct is of views, not one whose conduct is of craving”: only a man who leans toward reckoning out views can bring it off; a man who leans toward affection and greedy attachment cannot. The third is observance — “one abiding in pure conduct, not one who has broken discipline,” the reason being “since one who has broken discipline has no weight in his words.” The three thresholds together make one thing plain: splitting the Saṅgha is not accomplished by evil but by prestige. A man who has broken discipline speaks without weight and cannot move the body of monks.

As for the side that is split, there is a threshold as well — “only ordinary beings are split, not noble ones, since the noble ones have realized the nature of dharmas”; and the treatise records alongside it another account, “some say: one who has gained receptivity also cannot be split,” so that the stanza uses the two words “the foolish” to cover both layers. The easy error: to read this as “the noble ones are firm in the resolve of the path and so are not taken in.” The reason the treatise gives is the realization of the nature of dharmas; it is a matter of what has been realized, not a matter of strength of will. In practice: this passage gives the reader a realistic criterion — the most dangerous breach in a body of monks is not the obviously evil man, but the man of discipline and prestige whose views have gone askew.

〔3.2〕The splitting must be elsewhere · nine men are needed · concord returns within one night. First the question: why must the splitting of the Saṅgha take place “elsewhere”? The treatise says “it must be split elsewhere, not in the presence of the Great Master,” because “the Tathāgatas may not be lightly pressed upon, and their words being majestic and grave, no one has the power to do it face to face” — in the presence of the Buddha, no one can bring it off. Puguang’s Record leaves here a note on the geography: “‘elsewhere’ means Mount Gayāśīrṣa, which here is called Elephant-Head Mountain, since the summit of the mountain is like an elephant’s head,” and corrects the vulgar error, “the old rendering ‘Mount Gayā’ is a corruption.” As to number, “eight bhikṣus must divide into two assemblies to be the party split, and the splitter is the ninth, and so the assembly at its smallest still requires nine men”; Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary explains this line as “‘nine and upward’ means that nine men are required,” and divides four as the correct assembly and four as the deviant. As to region, “not in the other continents, since there is no Buddha there” — where no Buddha appears in the world, there is no talk even of “setting up another master.” As to term of time, “that same night concord must return, and it does not last past the night,” and so the splitting of the Saṅgha of the wheel of Dharma, from its accomplishment to its undoing, does not exceed a single night.

The easy error: to read “concord must return within a night” as “splitting the Saṅgha is not serious.” Where it is serious is not in how long it lasts but in that during that one night “in the great thousandfold world the wheel of Dharma does not turn.” In practice: splitting the Saṅgha in its formal acts is much broader — “the splitting of formal acts alone extends to three continents, at the least eight men, and at the most without limit,” it being only required that “within one boundary the Saṅgha divide into two parties and perform formal acts separately, and so eight men are required.” The one strict and the other broad, the reader may know from this that what the treatise calls “splitting the Saṅgha” is in truth two matters different in nature.

〔3.3〕Six occasions on which there is no splitting of the wheel of Dharma. First the question: why set out expressly the times when it “cannot happen”? Because this defines, from the other side, the conditions under which splitting the wheel of Dharma can be established. The six occasions are — “‘first’ means when the World-Honored One has not long turned the wheel of Dharma, ‘last’ means when the Well-Gone One is about to enter parinirvāṇa; in these two times the Saṅgha is of one taste”; “when the blisters upon right discipline and right view have not yet arisen, since two blisters must arise before there can be a splitting,” a “blister” being a swelling newly raised, borrowed here as a figure for the fissures just budding upon discipline and view, and it takes two openings before a thing can be torn apart; “when the first pair is not yet established, since it is the very nature of things that through them concord swiftly returns,” the two chief disciples of calm and of insight being present, the body of monks naturally comes together again quickly; “after the Buddha has passed away, since there is no true Great Master to be opposed,” there being no Buddha, “setting up another master” loses its object; “when a boundary has not yet been established, since within one boundary there is no dividing into two parties.”

The easy error: to take the six occasions as six isolated rules. They are in fact six ways of lacking one and the same condition: splitting the wheel of Dharma requires all at once that “there be a Buddha to be opposed,” that “the Saṅgha already have a fissure,” that “there be no powerful reconciler,” and that “a boundary have been established”; lacking any one, it does not come about. In practice: at the end of the passage the treatise adds one sentence, “not all Buddhas have the splitting of the wheel of Dharma; there must be past action for this thing to occur” — it is not that every Buddha meets with it; whether he meets with it hangs upon past action. This one sentence pulls the whole passage back from a question of institutions to a question of action drawing its result, which is precisely the spine of this fascicle.

IV. The Chapter on the Conditions of Immediate Retribution · Why It Is Parents and Arhats in Particular

〔4.1〕Forsaking the field of kindness · destroying the field of virtue, and the four distinctions of change of sex, killing by mistake, drawing blood, and one who becomes beyond learning afterward. First the question: harming people takes many forms, so why do only these few become deeds of immediate retribution? The treatise answers, “because one forsakes the field of kindness and destroys the field of virtue.” Puguang’s Record takes apart the structure of question and answer in this passage layer by layer — marking “‘because one forsakes the field of kindness and destroys the field of virtue’ is the general answer,” then “‘how is there kindness?’ is the probing question” · “‘because they are the root of the body’s arising’ is the answer” · “‘how does one forsake them?’ is the question” · “‘it is forsaking their kindness’ is the answer.” This is a structure of the author asking and answering himself and glossing his own words, not an outsider coming to challenge him; do not read it as a debate. On the side of the field of virtue it gives “the field of virtue means the remaining arhats and the like, who are furnished with all excellent virtues and are able to produce them,” and to harm such a one is to “destroy the support of virtue, and so it becomes an offense of immediate retribution.”

The treatise then sets up four distinctions, each finer than the last. Change of sex — “the offense of immediate retribution is likewise accomplished, since the support is one”: the sex has changed and the body is still that body. The portion of blood — the case of the kalala that has fallen out and been borne by another woman, where the criterion is “because she from whose blood it came is the root of the body’s arising,” the one who gave the portion of blood being the mother, and the one who reared him the later mother. Killing by mistake — “if one raises a preparation to kill one’s father or mother and by mistake kills another, there is no offense of immediate retribution,” and conversely too it is no deed of immediate retribution; where one preparation harms the mother and another together, then “if by one preparation one harms the mother and another as well, two nonmanifests arise, but the manifest is only the offense of immediate retribution,” the reason being “since the force of the deed of immediate retribution is the stronger.” Drawing the Buddha’s blood — “it must be with a mind to kill that it becomes an offense of immediate retribution; if with a mind only to strike one draws blood, there is no immediate retribution.” One who becomes beyond learning afterward — “since there was no preparation to kill directed at a body beyond learning,” and so to kill a man who realizes the fruit only when he is about to die is not a deed of immediate retribution.

The easy error: to suppose that an offense of immediate retribution is settled by “the standing of the object.” The four distinctions taken together say exactly the opposite: standing is the necessary condition; mind and preparation are the sufficient condition. In practice: this passage is the finest demonstration in the whole treatise of “whether an action is accomplished or not”; when one later reads of the completion or non-completion of the ten paths of action, a look back at these four distinctions gives a ready feel for the thing.

〔4.2〕Once the preparation is fixed, there is no road back in the middle. First the question: a man has already set his hand to a deed of immediate retribution — is it still possible that in the middle he should suddenly awaken, suddenly become free of desire? The treatise answers with the utmost decision — “if the preparation for a deed of immediate retribution is bound to be accomplished, then in the interval there is definitely no freeing from defilement and no gaining of a fruit.” With the other paths of unwholesome action it is not so: if in the midst of the preparation the noble path arises, the path of action will not be completed, because “the support is definitely opposed to it” — the body and mind that support it are definitely opposed to that path of action, and once the noble path arises, the unwholesome path of action can go no further.

The easy error: to read this stanza as “one who has done a deed of immediate retribution can never rise again.” What the treatise says is that within this stretch of preparation one cannot be freed from defilement or gain a fruit; it does not say that this man can never be delivered. In practice: the two lines are most savory read against one another — with the other unwholesome actions, the noble path can halt them midway; with the preparation for a deed of immediate retribution alone, once it is “bound to be accomplished,” it cannot be halted. This shows precisely why immediate retribution is named “immediate”: not only is the retribution without interval, but the causal stage too admits of no interval.

V. The Heaviest Offense and the Greatest Good

〔5.1〕That one sentence that splits the Saṅgha, and that volition which draws down eighty thousand great aeons. First the question: which of the five deeds is heaviest? The treatise answers, splitting the Saṅgha, the reason being “because it wounds and destroys the Dharma body of the Buddha, and obstructs the path of birth in heaven and of liberation for the world” — what it destroys is not the physical body of one person but the Dharma body of the Buddha (the body that is the teaching); what it blocks is not one man’s road but the road of the whole world to birth in heaven and to liberation. The treatise then spreads out the scene of that night: once the Saṅgha is split, until concord returns, entering the noble state, gaining the fruits, freedom from defilement, and the exhaustion of the outflows are all blocked in the world; the works of practicing absorption, reciting, and reflecting cease; in the great thousandfold world the wheel of Dharma does not turn; and gods, men, nāgas, and the rest are disturbed in body and mind. Accordingly the other four deeds are, in order, “the remaining offenses of immediate retribution grow lighter one after another in the order fifth, third, first,” while “the second is lightest, since the kindness and the rest are less.” Puguang’s Record adds here a principle of light and heavy: “of the two fields, kindness and virtue, the field of virtue surpasses the field of kindness, since that field of virtue is able to draw sentient beings out of the suffering of birth and death.”

Here there is a round of challenge from an outsider: if the verbal action of splitting the Saṅgha is the heaviest, why does a sūtra say that among the three punitive actions the punishment of mind is greatest, and again that among all offenses wrong view is greatest? The author answers, “with regard to the five deeds of immediate retribution, splitting the Saṅgha is heavy; with regard to the three punitive actions, the offense of mind is great; with regard to the five deviant views, wrong view is heavy” — the three sentences belong to three different ranges of comparison and do not conflict. The latter half of the stanza then turns to the wholesome side: the greatest in result among worldly wholesome things is the volition that can draw down the foremost existence, “since it draws down a maturation utterly still, of eighty thousand great aeons”; but if the result of release from bondage is in question, then “with regard to the result of release from bondage, it is the volition associated with the vajra-like concentration that gains the great result,” and so the stanza deliberately adds the two words “worldly wholesome” to mark the distinction.

The easy error: to read the reconciling of the three sentences as “the author speaking vaguely.” It is in fact a method — every “most” must first be asked, “most within which collection?” In practice: this section sets “heaviest” and “greatest” side by side, which is a miniature of the whole structure of the fascicle: at one end that one lie, at the other end that one volition. Neither is a question of “the size of the affair”; both are questions of “the thing destroyed or brought to fullness.”

VI. The Class Like the Five Deeds, and the Three Times When Action Is Most Feared

〔6.1〕The five of the same class. First the question: since they are called “of the same class,” are they as heavy as the five deeds? The treatise says, “these five, in that same order, are the entities of the actions of the same class as the deeds of immediate retribution” — defiling one’s mother who is an arhat nun, killing a bodhisattva abiding in certainty, killing a noble one who is still a learner, seizing away the requisites of the Saṅgha’s concord, and destroying a stūpa, matched one by one and in order with the five deeds. The opening line has been read in two ways since ancient times: Puguang’s Record records both readings, giving “that is, one who commits an act of extreme defilement toward his mother who is an arhat nun, or toward his mother and toward an arhat nun” — the former reading takes “mother who is an arhat nun” as one person, the latter takes “mother” and “arhat nun” as two persons and two objects; Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary takes the two-object reading outright, giving “defiling one’s mother and defiling a nun beyond learning”; while Paramārtha takes the one-person reading, “if a man defiles his own mother who is an arhat.” Here both are recorded and neither is chosen. They are of the same class, not of the same name: near in nature and near in what they destroy, but not the deeds of immediate retribution themselves. As to whether they too are certainly born in the hells, the treatise records before the stanza one account, “some other master says: not born without interval” — although the same class is certainly born in the hells, it is not necessarily born there immediately after death.

The easy error: to read “the same class” as “an equal offense.” The treatise does not say that they too draw down the intermediate aeon of the retribution without interval. In practice: the five of the same class are clearest when set one by one against the five deeds — defiling one’s mother who is an arhat nun against killing one’s mother, killing a bodhisattva abiding in certainty against killing one’s father, killing a noble learner against killing an arhat, seizing away the requisites of the Saṅgha’s concord against splitting the Saṅgha, and destroying a stūpa against drawing blood from the body of a Buddha. This table of correspondences comes from Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary, which marks them one by one as “of the same class as the offense of killing one’s mother,” “of the same class as the offense of killing one’s father,” “of the same class as the offense of killing an arhat,” “of the same class as the offense of splitting the Saṅgha,” “of the same class as the offense of drawing blood from the body of a Buddha”; the treatise itself says only “in that same order” and does not fasten a name to each. As to why they are alike, Puguang’s Record supplies the grounds one by one: “‘of the same class’ means the sense of resemblance”; killing a bodhisattva abiding in certainty is matched with killing one’s father because “the bodhisattva’s kindness is deep, like a father’s”; killing a noble learner is matched with killing an arhat because “the learner and the one beyond learning are alike a noble field of merit”; seizing away the requisites of the Saṅgha’s concord is matched with splitting the Saṅgha because “the requisites of concord are equal in sense to the Saṅgha”; and destroying a stūpa is matched with drawing blood from the body of a Buddha because the multitude reveres that stūpa “as resembling the Buddha.” These five sentences are Puguang’s added explanation, not something the text of the treatise has of itself. Table and grounds read together, the logic by which the treatise compiled these five items becomes wholly transparent.

〔6.2〕About to gain receptivity, about to gain non-return, about to gain the state beyond learning. First the question: when is action most apt to obstruct? The treatise points out three occasions — “if from the stage of the summit one is about to gain receptivity, all actions that draw down the evil destinies are the greatest obstruction, since receptivity passes beyond the levels of their maturation”; when one is about to gain the fruit of non-return, all actions bound to the desire realm are the greatest obstruction, excepting only actions to be experienced in the present life, “excepting only action that conforms to being experienced in the present life”; when one is about to gain the fruit beyond learning, the actions of the form and formless realms are the greatest obstruction, and again with the same exception. The simile the treatise gives is exceedingly vivid: “like a man about to leave the country where he has lived, whom all his creditors obstruct to the utmost.”

The easy error: to suppose that “action obstructs” in the same way at all times. The treatise says expressly that it is fiercest at the very moment one is about to cross a boundary — because that moment amounts to writing off the maturation of that level, and the actions of that level naturally all surge up to bar the way. In practice: this section is really three passes announced in advance upon the map of practice; when the Chapter on the Worthy and the Noble treats receptivity, non-return, and the state beyond learning, these three passes will appear once more. Here the reader is given a preparation of mind: the nearer the breakthrough, the more evident the drag of old action; this is not a falling back but the ordinary condition of a pass.

VII. The Bodhisattva Abiding in Certainty and the Action Producing the Excellent Marks

〔7.1〕Where the name “abiding in certainty” begins. First the question: since it was said above that “killing a bodhisattva abiding in certainty” is of the same class as the deeds of immediate retribution, from what point is a bodhisattva reckoned as “abiding in certainty”? The treatise answers, “it is from cultivating the action that draws down as its maturation result the excellent thirty-two marks of a great person that a bodhisattva first gains the name of abiding in certainty” — from the very moment he begins to cultivate the action producing the excellent marks. As for “certainty,” the treatise marks it out by four things: he is always born in a good destiny (the two destinies of men and gods); he is always born into a noble house (of brahmans, kṣatriyas, wealthy elders, or great brahman families); he always has the body of a man (“within noble houses the faculties may be complete or defective, yet that bodhisattva always has excellent faculties”); and his power of recollection is firm (“birth after birth he can always recollect his former lives, and in the good he does he never draws back”). At the end the treatise uses a very unusual simile — “as the world hands down that there is a priceless tuosuo, one should know that this saying points at that bodhisattva” — and explains why: through long practice of the great compassion without object, he is spontaneously and always bound to others, gathering all sentient beings to himself as his own equals with a mind free of pride, and even “always regarding himself as their servant.”

The easy error: to read “abiding in certainty” as “having entered some absorption.” The “certainty” here is the certainty of being fixed beyond falling back, not the concentration of the training in absorption — Puguang’s Record marks the boundary plainly: “‘certainty’ here means that his birth in the good destinies and the rest is fixed, and this is called certainty; it is not the gaining of an absorption. The bodhisattva abiding in this is called abiding in certainty.” In practice: this passage is the most positive description of the bodhisattva path in this treatise — a treatise of the schools. Its weight lies not upon supernormal powers and merits but upon the sentence “in all things hard to seek he can be patient, and in all things toilsome and pressing he can bear the burden.”

〔7.2〕The five conditions for cultivating the action producing the excellent marks. First the question: this action cannot be cultivated in any place at any time — what are its conditions? The stanza gives five, and the treatise explains each. Place — it must be in Jambudvīpa, “since in this continent the awakened discernment is keenest and clearest.” Standing — “only a man, and not the body of a woman and the rest, since by then he has already passed beyond the stage of a woman and the rest.” Object and mental ground — “only in the direct presence of a Buddha, the volition arisen with a Buddha for its object, formed through reflection and not of the classes formed through hearing or through cultivation”: he must be face to face with a Buddha, and it must arise with a Buddha for its object, and it falls in the square of discernment formed through reflection, not of that formed through hearing or through cultivation. Term of time — “only the remaining hundred aeons of cultivation, and not more; among the causes of Buddhas the norm is such.” Adornment — each mark is adorned with a hundred merits. Śākyamuni is the exception: “blazing in vigor, he could leap over nine aeons,” accomplishing it in ninety-one aeons, whence the saying, “I recollect that in ninety-one aeons I have not seen one household suffer the least loss by giving me food, but only accomplish great benefit.”

Here the treatise records alongside the account of one master (“the masters of old say,” which Puguang’s Record glosses as “the masters of old means the old masters within one’s own school”), and further sets up for itself the question “what then is the measure of a single merit?” and sets out three accounts, the last being “some say: this measure is known to a Buddha alone.” The easy error: to take the last of the three accounts as the author’s settled conclusion. The text of the treatise itself passes no judgment. In practice: the most serviceable phrase in this section is “formed through reflection” — the action producing the excellent marks rests neither upon hearing nor upon absorption, but upon that one thought of volition raised while facing a Buddha. It points the pivot of the cultivation of merit back to a single moment of mind.

VIII. The Three Incalculable Aeons and the Four Buddhas Met in Reverse Order

〔8.1〕Seventy-five thousand, seventy-six thousand, seventy-seven thousand. First the question: is the span of the three great incalculable aeons an empty figure of speech, or does the treatise give a real number? The treatise gives a real number — “in the first incalculable aeon he made offerings to seventy-five thousand Buddhas,” in the second to seventy-six thousand, in the third to seventy-seven thousand. The three figures increase by a thousand in each aeon — these three numbers are what the treatise gives, and it does not set out why the increase is so; here they are recorded simply as the numbers stand.

The easy error: to take this string of figures as an astronomical quantity fit only to be gazed at, and to skip it. Its function in the treatise is to calibrate the scale: just above, one lie was said to draw down an intermediate aeon in the hell without interval; here the number of Buddhas served over three incalculable aeons pulls the wholesome end onto the same chart. In practice: in reading Abhidharma numbers, ask first “against which other number is this one to be read?” Here what is to be read against it is precisely that intermediate aeon in the first half of the fascicle.

〔8.2〕Meeting Buddhas in reverse order, and that first vow. First the question: what is meant by “reverse order”? The treatise explains, “‘reverse order’ means from the later toward the earlier” — at the fulfillment of the third aeon he met Excellent Insight, at the fulfillment of the second Burning Lamp, at the fulfillment of the first Jewel-Topknot, while the Buddha met at the first raising of the aspiration was Śākyamuni. The most moving part of this passage is the last section: the Buddha the bodhisattva first met was also named Śākyamuni, and it was before that Buddha that he made the vow, “may I become a Buddha, in all things as this World-Honored One is now”; and that Buddha too appeared in a final aeon, and after his passing his true Dharma likewise abode a thousand years, so that the Tathāgata of today is in every point the same as that Buddha.

The easy error: to read “reverse order” as though the order in which the Buddhas appeared in the world were inverted. What is inverted is the order of the telling; the treatise is counting from the near toward the far. In practice: this passage buckles “making a vow” and “the marks of Buddhahood” into one line of cause and result — the shape drawn by that first thought of aspiration is the shape of the final accomplishment. Here the treatise rarely compresses an enormous span of time into one very concrete sentence, and the reader may well remember it as the general outline of the whole fascicle’s treatment of merit.

IX. The Four Stages at Which the Six Pāramitās Are Fulfilled

〔9.1〕Four stages matched to six pāramitās. First the question: why are the six matched to four stages and not to six? The treatise’s arrangement is one, two, one more, two. The first stage — “the giving he practices is by compassion alone, and not out of seeking for himself a difference of excellent birth”: able to give all things, even his eyes and marrow, and out of compassion alone; here the pāramitā of giving is fulfilled. The second stage — “when the bodhisattva has the limbs of his body cut apart, though not yet free of the greed of desire, yet in his mind there is not the least resentment”; here the two pāramitās of discipline and of patience are fulfilled together. The third stage is the praising of the Buddha Tiṣya and the leaping over of nine aeons, where vigor is fulfilled. The fourth stage — “about to mount to unsurpassed perfect awakening, abiding in the vajra-like concentration just before unsurpassed awakening”; here the two pāramitās of absorption and of discernment are fulfilled together. At the end the treatise explains the name: “because they are able to reach the far shore of the fullness of virtue toward which they go, these six are called pāramitā”; and Puguang’s Record glosses the sound and sense for this — “six. Pāra here means the far shore. Mitā here means to reach.”

The easy error: to suppose that “fulfillment” means that a given pāramitā has been cultivated until it can be cultivated no further. What the treatise marks is the event of that pāramitā’s reaching the far shore — the fulfillment of giving is fulfilled in the four words “by compassion alone,” not in how much was given. In practice: of the four stages, the one most to be carried back into oneself is the second. Why are discipline and patience fulfilled at the same time? Because the body is cut apart and the mind has not the least resentment, and this one moment proves at once both not transgressing and not stirring — discipline is not doing, patience is not being moved; upon one and the same object the two are verified together.

〔9.2〕That gāthā in praise of the Buddha, and “leaping over nine aeons.” First the question: only three gāthās that are not root stanzas are quoted in the whole fascicle — why quote one here? Because it is the very scene of “leaping over nine aeons.” The treatise narrates the setting: the bodhisattva came upon the Tathāgata Tiṣya seated within a jeweled niche in the absorption of the fire element, his majestic radiance blazing beyond the ordinary, and so he gazed with single-hearted devotion and forgot to set down his other foot, and thus “for seven days and nights without slackening, with a purified mind he praised that Buddha in an excellent gāthā,” and having praised him “he thereupon leapt over nine aeons.” The sense of the gāthā is this: in heaven above and on earth below, in the hall of much hearing of this world, in the palaces of the departed and the abodes of the gods, and out to the ten directions, there is nothing to compare with him; great man, bull among men, great śramaṇa — searching through the earth and the mountain forests, there is none his equal.

The easy error: to read “leaping over nine aeons” as taking a shortcut. The cause the treatise gives is “blazing in vigor” — seven days and nights standing on one foot, eyes unmoving, mind without slackening; this is pressing the work of a hundred aeons into the density of seven days. In practice: this is the one narrative with a scene in the whole fascicle, and it draws all those astronomical figures back at a stroke to a single man standing motionless. The measure of merit may be immense, but the place it starts from is always the concentration and sincerity of a single thought.

X. The Naming of the Three Bases of Meritorious Action, Giving, Discipline, and Cultivation

〔10.1〕The three words merit, action, and basis must be read apart. First the question: since they are called “the three bases of meritorious action,” are all three alike merit, and action, and basis? The treatise says, “all three classes are merit; some are action and some are basis, each according to what fits it, as was said of the paths of action” — it must be divided into squares as the ten paths of action were. Among the ten paths of action some are both action and path, some are path and not action; here there are four squares: some are merit and action and basis; some are merit and action but not basis; some are merit and basis but not action; and some are merit alone, neither action nor basis. The treatise assigns them one by one: within the class of giving, “within the class of giving, the two actions of body and speech are furnished with all three of the names merit, action, and basis”; the volition that can raise them is called merit and action only; the dharmas coexistent with that volition receive only the name of merit. The class of discipline is of the nature of bodily and verbal action only, and so all of it is furnished with the three names. Within the class of cultivation, loving-kindness is called merit and basis only (being the basis upon which action depends); the volition associated with loving-kindness and the discipline arising together with loving-kindness are called merit and action only; and the remaining coexistent dharmas receive only the name of merit. The treatise offers another reading as well: the name “meritorious action” displays the sense of “doing merit,” and “basis” displays the support. At the end it records alongside one account, “some say: volition alone is true meritorious action.”

The easy error: to take “basis of meritorious action” as an indivisible compound. It is three criteria laid one upon another, and only taken apart does it read through. In practice: this section is the doorway into the whole chapter on giving, discipline, and cultivation that follows. Wherever one reads “such and such is a basis of meritorious action,” ask first which of the three squares the sentence is using — whether it is saying that the thing is merit, or that it is action, or that it is the basis upon which these depend.

XI. The Entity of Giving and the Name of Giving

〔11.1〕The entity of giving is not the thing given. First the question: is the entity of giving the thing that is sent out? The treatise answers no — “the equipment of relinquishing is called giving; that is, it is by this equipment that the act of relinquishing is accomplished, and so that by which one relinquishes is the true entity of giving.” The true entity of giving is the equipment by which one is able to relinquish (bodily and verbal action, together with the mind and mental factors that can raise it), and not the thing relinquished. The treatise also makes a distinction: “or the act of relinquishing may be accomplished out of fear, out of hope, out of greed, and the like” — where one relinquishes out of fear, out of hope, out of greed, the act of relinquishing is accomplished just the same, and yet it is not the giving spoken of here; and it is to mark these off that the stanza says “for the sake of offering, for the sake of benefit.” What then is the “equipment”? “It means bodily and verbal action, and what can raise them”; and what is “what can raise”? “It is what, together with non-greed, is able to raise this collection” — that portion which, associated with non-greed, can give rise to this collection.

The easy error: to fasten the accomplishment of giving upon the quantity of goods. What the treatise fastens it to is that equipment of mind and action, and it nails the root down with the three words “together with non-greed.” In practice: this section yields a very hard test — wherever one relinquishes out of fear, out of exchange, out of greedy seeking, the goods go out just the same and yet do not fall into the square of “giving.” The criterion is not in the hand but in that one thought of non-greed.

〔11.2〕A single moment’s wholesome aggregates already receive the name of giving. First the question: the treatise quotes the stanza “if a man with a purified mind stints himself and practices giving” — what does it supply? It supplies the term of time. The stanza says that the wholesome aggregates of this one moment, taken together, receive the name of giving — giving is not a continuing process but a collection of wholesome aggregates in a single moment. The treatise then explains at once the word-formation of the phrase “merit of the class of giving”: “‘merit of the class of giving’ displays the sense of having giving for its entity, as with ‘a vessel of the class of leaves’ or ‘a hut of the class of grass’” — just as a “vessel of the class of leaves” is a vessel made of leaves and a “hut of the class of grass” a hut thatched with grass, so the “merit of the class of giving” is merit having giving for its entity; and the classes of discipline and of cultivation may be understood on the same pattern.

The easy error: to read the quoted stanza as a stanza of the author’s own. The text just before it reads “it is what, together with non-greed, is able to raise this collection. As there is a stanza that says,” and the two words “as there is” crown it: it is a stanza of another’s saying, and does not enter into the count of the treatise’s own stanzas. In practice: this section changes the measure of giving from “how much was relinquished” to “how pure the wholesome aggregates of that one moment were.” Read together with “together with non-greed” in the section above, the criterion of giving is by now wholly gathered into the mind.

XII. The Four Alternatives of Giving, and the Three Causes of Its Result

〔12.1〕For oneself, for another, for both, for neither. First the question: giving is always for the benefit of another, so how can there be a giving that is “only for one’s own benefit”? The treatise arranges four alternatives out of two variables — whether the giver is an ordinary being or a noble one (whether he is already free of the greed of desire), and whether the recipient is a sentient being or a caitya (a stūpa of the Buddha). When ordinary beings, whether or not yet free of desire, make an offering to a caitya, this is “only for one’s own benefit,” since the caitya does not make use of it and others gain no benefit thereby. When a noble one already free of desire gives to sentient beings, this is “only for the benefit of another,” since “others obtain benefit thereby, and it is not for his own benefit, since he has passed beyond that stage of fruition” — he himself has already passed beyond that stage of fruition and no longer gains benefit from it. When ordinary beings give to sentient beings, this is “for the benefit of both.” When a noble one makes an offering to a caitya, this is “not for the benefit of either,” since “this giving is called not for the benefit of either, because it is only out of reverence and requital of kindness.”

The easy error: to read “only for one’s own benefit” as selfishness. What it speaks of is where the benefit lands, not the height or lowness of the motive — the caitya does not make use of it, and so the benefit does not land on the other side. In practice: with the four alternatives set out, one can see that the treatise’s framework for weighing giving has two axes — the standing of the giver, and whether the recipient can make use of the gift. These two axes open out next into the three causes: the donor, the goods, and the field.

〔12.2〕The difference of result hangs upon three things. First the question: giving being the same, why do the results differ? The treatise answers, “giving has differences by three causes, namely differences in the donor, in the goods, and in the field,” and adds a sentence of causal linkage: giving having differences, the results have differences.The three causes are the donor, the goods given, and the field given to.

The easy error: to suppose that the difference of result depends only upon the field (upon whom one gives to). The treatise lists three items plainly, and the field is only one of them; the virtue of the donor and the quality of the goods given enter into the account just as much. In practice: this is the most important table in the treatise’s treatment of merit. The three sections that follow are the opening out of these three causes one by one, and in reading them one should treat the three causes as three independent columns, each of which can by itself raise or lower the result.

XIII. The Three Causes, Donor, Goods, and Field, Opened Out One by One

〔13.1〕The donor’s four virtues matched to four results. First the question: what do the donor’s “virtues” mean? The treatise answers, “because the donor is accomplished in the several virtues of faith, discipline, learning, and the rest, he is called differing as donor.” But the difference of result hangs upon the manner in which he gives, and four manners are matched to four results — “if a donor practices giving with reverence, he obtains being constantly honored by others”; giving with his own hand, he obtains delight in the use of vast wealth; giving in due season, he obtains wealth in due season, so that what he needs does not come too late; “if he gives without injury, he obtains resources not to be encroached upon by others nor destroyed by fire and the like.”

The easy error: to read the four results as random recompense. The four in fact correspond one to one — reverence draws honor, one’s own hand draws use, due season draws timeliness, absence of injury draws indestructibility; the manner and the retribution are of one structure. In practice: this section may be taken as a table for self-examination. With one and the same gift, change the manner of giving and the result changes its shape; and not one of the four manners costs a single coin more.

〔13.2〕The four sense-objects of the goods given matched to four results. First the question: how is the difference of the goods measured? The treatise measures it by the four sense-objects, visible form, scent, taste, and touch — the goods given being complete in visible form, one obtains excellent form; “because complete in scent, one obtains a good name, as fragrance spreads its perfume through all quarters”; because complete in taste, one obtains being loved by the multitude; “because complete in touch, one obtains a supple body, and touches that give rise to pleasant feeling in due season.” Conversely, “where the result is diminished, it is because the cause was lacking.”

The easy error: to read “complete in form, scent, taste, and touch” as requiring costly things. What the treatise speaks of is whether this offering is complete in the four sense-objects — good to see, good to smell, good to taste, good to touch; and these four are not the same thing as price. In practice: this section together with the one above amounts to saying that the quality of giving has eight adjustable knobs (the four manners of giving and the four sense-objects), all of them within the giver’s control. When this treatise speaks of merit, it never speaks of luck.

〔13.3〕The four differences of the field. First the question: how is the field given to divided? The treatise divides it into four — destiny, suffering, kindness, and virtue. With regard to destiny, “if one gives to an animal one receives a hundredfold result; if one gives to a man who has broken discipline, a thousandfold result.” With regard to suffering, as among the seven bases of meritorious action that have a support, “it is first said that one should give to travelers, to the sick and their nurses, and give groves, regular food, and food in due season against cold, wind, and heat,” and afterwards it is said that one who accomplishes these seven obtains merit beyond all measure. With regard to kindness, “such as father and mother, teachers, and others who have shown kindness,” and it adduces the bears, deer, and the like of the birth stories as kinds that have shown kindness. With regard to virtue, “if one gives to a man who keeps discipline, one receives a hundred-millionfold result,” and so on.

The easy error: to take the four items as one linear ladder. They are four parallel dimensions — an animal that is at this moment suffering falls at once into the two squares of “low destiny” and “heavy suffering,” and the two accounts must be reckoned apart. In practice: of the four, “suffering” and “kindness” are the two most easily overlooked. The treatise deliberately enters such utterly ordinary matters as “travelers, the sick and their nurses” and “food in due season against cold, wind, and heat” into the seven bases of meritorious action that have a support, precisely to make plain that a field of merit need not be sought far off.

XIV. The Most Excellent Giving, and the Five Fields That Need Not Be Noble Ones

〔14.1〕Three “most excellents.” First the question: which giving is most excellent in merit? The treatise gives three most excellents side by side. The first is what the Bhagavat said — “if one free of defilement gives resources to one free of defilement, this is the most excellent among gifts of goods,” one free of defilement giving to one free of defilement. The second is the giving of a bodhisattva — “though it is not called the freed giving to the freed, yet in merit of giving it too is most excellent,” because it is the cause of universally benefiting and gladdening all sentient beings. The third is the eighth of the eight kinds of giving, and the treatise lists the names of the eight, “what are the eight kinds of giving? First, giving to whoever comes; second, giving out of fear; third, giving in return for kindness; fourth, giving in hope of return; fifth, giving after the custom of forebears; sixth, giving in hope of heaven; seventh, giving to secure a name; eighth, giving in order to adorn the mind, to support the mind, to further the practice of yoga, and to gain the higher sense,” and then briefly explains several of the earlier ones, among which giving out of fear is “that is, seeing before one the marks of this wealth’s destruction, one would rather give it than lose it,” and giving after the custom of forebears is giving in continuation of the household usage of fathers and ancestors. Puguang’s Record adds a gloss to “giving to secure a name” — “to practice giving in search of a fine reputation is called giving to secure a name.”

The easy error: to suppose that the eight kinds of giving are eight good ways of giving. The first seven in fact run down the line from the passive, the fearful, the transactional, to the reputation-seeking; only the eighth is given in order to adorn one’s own mind, to further the practice of yoga, and to gain the higher sense. In practice: the eight are most useful read as a ladder of motives — with one and the same act of giving, at whatever rung the motive stops, there the result stops too.

〔14.2〕Five fields where, even if they are ordinary beings, the result of giving is measureless. First the question: was it not said that the higher the virtue of the field the greater the result? Then why is the result measureless even for those who are “not realized noble ones”? The treatise lists five — father, mother, the sick, one who preaches the Dharma, and a bodhisattva in his last birth — “these five, even if they are ordinary beings, yet giving to them can draw down a measureless result.” Of these the bodhisattva in his last birth is one who “abides in his final existence and is called of the last birth.” The treatise sets up a question especially about the preacher of the Dharma: to which of the four fields does he belong? The answer: “he is gathered under the field of kindness,” the reason being “because he is the great good friend of the several worlds” — he can give the eye of discernment to those blinded by ignorance, can open out for the world what is safe and what is perilous, and can cause sentient beings to give rise to the Dharma body without outflows; in brief, one who preaches the Dharma well can do even what a Buddha does.

The easy error: to read this stanza as overturning the earlier “the field of virtue is most excellent.” It does not overturn it; it only points out that the field of kindness and the field of suffering can also, independently, draw the result up to the measureless — father and mother are the extreme of kindness, the sick are the extreme of suffering, the preacher of the Dharma is adjudged by the treatise to be gathered under the field of kindness, and the reason the treatise gives already shows his weight, while the bodhisattva in his last birth is the extreme of standing. In practice: the most practical word in this section is “the sick.” That an ordinary person who is at this moment ill stands, on this treatise’s books, side by side with a preacher of the Dharma — this is worth remembering over and over.

XV. The Six Causes of an Action’s Lightness or Heaviness and the Five Causes of Increased Action

〔15.1〕Lightness and heaviness by six causes. First the question: by what is an action’s lightness or heaviness settled? The treatise lists six causes — the after-effect (“the after-effect means that having done it one goes on doing it,” doing it and then doing it again), the field (doing harm or benefit to that object), the root (the root path of action itself), the preparation (the stretch that raises the bodily or verbal act), the volition (that by which the path of action reaches its end), and the intent (“the intent means whatever inclination of purpose there is,” that I ought to do such and such). Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary here numbers them one by one, giving “there are six causes here: the after-effect is the first cause,” and so on, the clearest in form. The treatise also adduces three cases of one-sided weight: some become heavy by the after-effect alone taking hold of them; some become heavy by the field; and some, upon one and the same field, become heavy by the force of the root — “as killing upon the field of one’s father or mother is a heavy offense,” whereas stealing and the like directed at father and mother do not constitute such a heavy offense; while as to those that become heavy by the remaining causes (preparation, volition, and intent), the treatise gathers them up with “from this one should reason out the rest.” Puguang’s Record fills it out word for word: “as killing upon the field of father or mother is a heavy offense and constitutes a deed of immediate retribution, whereas stealing and the like done to father or mother do not constitute an offense of immediate retribution.” At the end it settles the general rule: “if all six causes are of the higher grade, this action is heaviest,” and the reverse of this is lightest, while what lies between is neither lightest nor heaviest.

The easy error: to read the six causes as six bonus points. They are six independent notches, each of which may be of the lower or the higher grade, and only when all six are high is an action heaviest. In practice: of the six, “the after-effect” is the most easily overlooked — doing the thing again and again after it is done, rejoicing in it again and again, this item by itself can push an action up into the heavy grade.

〔15.2〕The boundary between action done and action increased. First the question: the sūtras speak of action done and action increased — where is the boundary? The treatise answers, by five causes — deliberation (“‘because of deliberation’ means that the action he does is neither done wholly without prior thought nor done upon a sudden thought”), completeness (the measure being already enough that one should fall into an evil destiny, “so long as it is not complete it is called only done and is not called increased”), the absence of regret and of counteraction (“‘because there is no regret and no counteraction’ means that there is no remorse and no action that counteracts it”), having companions (“‘because it has companions’ means that in doing an unwholesome action, unwholesome things serve as its helpers”), and maturation (its being fixed to give a maturation). For wholesome actions the reverse is to be understood. Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary likewise numbers them one by one, giving “there are five causes here: ‘because of deliberation’ is the first cause.”

The easy error: to suppose that “increased” is merely “doing it a few more times.” Of the five causes the one that truly bears weight is the absence of regret and of counteraction — one act of remorse, one counteragent, and the action stops at “done” and does not become “increased.” In practice: this is the section of the whole fascicle that can be used most directly. The difference between action done and action increased amounts to a criterion for whether an action can still be headed off; remorse and counteraction are not psychological consolation but an actual gap in one of the five causes.

XVI. Merit Where There Is No Recipient, and a Good Result in a Bad Field

〔16.1〕The merit of the class of relinquishing and the merit of the class of enjoyment. First the question: an offering is made to a caitya and the caitya does not make use of it — whence then does merit arise? The treatise first divides two classes — “merit is of two classes, first relinquishing, second enjoyment”; “the merit of the class of relinquishing means that with a wholesome mind one merely relinquishes resources and the merit of giving arises at once,” and “the merit of the class of enjoyment means that the field given to makes use of the thing given, and only then does the merit of giving arise.” Giving to a caitya has no merit of the class of enjoyment, yet it has merit of the class of relinquishing. In this passage there is a round of exchange that must be kept clear, and Puguang’s Record marks the speaker of each sentence: the outsider asks, “since he does not receive it, whence does the merit arise” 〔Puguang marks this “the question”〕; the author reproaches the outsider in return and asks him on what ground he knows that merit must arise from receiving 〔Puguang marks this “the author reproaches the outsider in return”〕; the outsider answers, “not being received by another, there is no gathering in of benefit” 〔Puguang marks this “the outsider answers”〕; the author denies this in general 〔Puguang marks this “the author denies in general, properly explaining the following line”〕 — this is no decisive proof, for if merit must be accomplished by gathering in benefit for another, then cultivating loving-kindness and the rest, or cultivating right view and the rest, ought not to give rise to merit. And so the conclusion is “therefore it should be granted that in making offerings to a caitya much merit arises, as in cultivating loving-kindness and the rest.” Thereafter there is a round of challenge from an outsider: “is not this act of giving and reverence then thrown away for nothing? It is not so, for the mind that raises the act is what is excellent” — and the author answers with the simile of harming an enemy: the enemy’s life has ended and yet one still bears the thought of enmity and raises evil bodily and verbal actions, producing much demerit, and not merely a thought of mind; and it is the same in making offerings to a Great Master who has passed away.

The easy error: to read “there is merit even without a recipient” as “it makes no difference whether there is an object or not.” What the treatise says is that the merit of the class of relinquishing does not wait upon receiving, while the merit of the class of enjoyment still waits upon receiving; the two classes stand together, and it is not a matter of choosing one of two. In practice: this section settles a very practical doubt — whether making offerings to one already gone, to a stūpa of the Buddha, or to the object of the cultivation of loving-kindness, and cultivating in that way, is of any use at all. The treatise’s answer is that it is, and the reason lies not in whether the other receives but in “the mind that raises the act is what is excellent.”

〔16.2〕Even a bad field has a lovely result. First the question: if one gives in a bad field, can it draw down only an unlovely result? The treatise answers that it cannot, and proves it by farming — “from the seed of the madhuka the fruit of the madhuka arises, and its taste is exceedingly sweet,” “from the seed of the nimba the fruit of the nimba arises, and its taste is exceedingly bitter”; one gets what one sows, and “it is not by the power of the field that seed and fruit are inverted.” Therefore, though the donor be in a bad field, so long as he sows the seed of giving with a mind to benefit others, what he draws down is still a lovely result. But the treatise at once adds a limiting sentence: “yet by the fault of the field, the seed sown may bear little fruit or no fruit at all.”

The easy error: to read this section as “it makes no difference whether the field is good or bad.” The fault of the field does not alter the nature of the result, but it does alter the quantity of it — and these are two different matters. In practice: this section together with the one above forms the most reassuring stretch of the treatise’s treatment of merit — giving to one who does not deserve it does not turn a wholesome mind into an evil result; only the harvest may be reduced. The criterion remains always that one thought in one’s own mind.

XVII. Discipline as a Basis of Meritorious Action

〔17.1〕The entity of discipline and the four virtues of purity. First the question: what is “discipline”? The treatise sets it up from the negative side — “the several unwholesome forms are called breaking discipline,” and among them the offenses that are so by nature are given the name of breaking discipline; “‘what is prohibited’ means eating at the wrong time and the rest that are prohibited,” and these, though not offenses by nature, yet “though not offenses by nature, the Buddha prohibited them with a further purpose, for the protection of the Dharma and of sentient beings,” and one who has taken the precepts and transgresses them is likewise said to break discipline. Keeping away from these two is discipline — “keeping away from what is an offense by nature and from what is prohibited, both are called discipline”; and each is of two kinds, the manifest and the nonmanifest, having bodily and verbal action for their own nature.

Purity is then set up with four virtues of its own: “first, not being destroyed by the breaking of discipline”; second, not being destroyed by the causes of that (greed and the rest, the afflictions and the secondary afflictions); third, being founded on counteraction (founded on the foundations of mindfulness and the rest, which can counteract the breaking of discipline and its causes); “fourth, being founded on cessation, that is, founded on nirvāṇa and turned toward nirvāṇa, and not for the sake of an excellent birth.” The word “and the rest” in the stanza opens out into two accounts — “some say: purity of discipline is by five causes,” namely purity of the root, purity of the retinue, not being injured by applied thought, being taken up by right mindfulness, and being turned toward the quiescent; “some other master says: discipline is of four kinds,” namely discipline out of fear, discipline out of hope, discipline conducive to the factors of awakening, and pure discipline, of which the last is “fourth, pure discipline, that is, discipline without outflows, since it can forever part one from the grime of action and affliction.”

The easy error: to read “offenses by nature” and “offenses by prohibition” as two classes ranked higher and lower. The treatise says that offenses by prohibition are given a separate heading precisely because they are not in themselves evil, but were “prohibited with a further purpose” by the Buddha — the offense in transgressing them lies in transgressing what the Buddha laid down, not in the deed itself. In practice: the four virtues make a very serviceable table for self-examination — not transgressing, not invaded by the afflictions, having a counteragent to rely on, and turned toward the right place; lacking any one of the four, discipline still stands but is not called pure. And the four kinds of discipline of the second account are precisely a ladder of motives: fear, hope, for the sake of the factors of awakening, and without outflows.

XVIII. Cultivation as a Basis of Meritorious Action, and What Discipline and Cultivation Draw Down

〔18.1〕Why the wholesome of the concentrated stage alone is called “cultivation.” First the question: all wholesome things must be cultivated, so why is only the wholesome of equipoise called “cultivation”? The treatise first asks after its entity — “as for the wholesome of equipoise, what is its entity?” — and answers that it is the own-nature of concentration together with the dharmas coexistent with it. Then it asks after its sense — “what does the name ‘cultivation’ mean? It means perfuming the mind” — since the wholesome of the concentrated stage is supremely able to perfume the continuum of mind and make it a thing of virtue. The simile the treatise gives is “as flowers perfume sesame; therefore it alone is named cultivation”: set flowers and sesame together, and the sesame takes on the fragrance of the flowers.

The easy error: to understand “cultivation” as “repeated practice.” What the treatise takes is the sense of perfuming — not that the times are many, but whether a scent can be left behind. The wholesome of a scattered mind, however much of it is done, leaves nothing behind; the wholesome of the concentrated stage takes color at a single stroke. In practice: this section explains why the treatise sets the training in absorption apart as a class of the bases of meritorious action. The simile of flowers perfuming sesame is well worth keeping in mind — the effect of cultivation is measured not by how long you have done it, but by whether the mind has taken the scent.

〔18.2〕Discipline draws down birth in heaven, cultivation draws down liberation. First the question: what does each of the three bases of meritorious action draw down? It has already been said that giving draws down great wealth; here it is said that “discipline draws down birth in heaven, cultivation draws down liberation.” But the treatise at once adds a distinction: the word “excellent” in the stanza is said with regard to the more excellent side — “that is, giving too can draw down the result of birth in heaven, and it is with regard to the more excellent that discipline is spoken of”; keeping discipline too can draw down the result of release from bondage, and it is only with regard to the more excellent that cultivation is spoken of.

The easy error: to read the matching of three to three as sealed one to one — to suppose that giving can only obtain wealth, discipline only birth in heaven, and cultivation alone liberation. The treatise says plainly that it is not so; the domains of the three results overlap, and the pairing takes only what is most excellent. In practice: this section demonstrates the general rule for reading the pairing tables of Abhidharma — wherever one meets a form of the type “such and such draws down such and such,” ask first whether this is drawing it down exclusively or said with regard to the more excellent. Here the treatise hands over the answer itself, and the reader may take it as the key that unlocks every pairing table hereafter.

XIX. The Measure of the Merit of Brahmā

〔19.1〕The reckoning of the preceptors of former times. First the question: what is the merit of Brahmā? The treatise first cites a sūtra listing four men who can produce the merit of Brahmā — “first, one who, in order to make offerings to the relics of a Tathāgata, erects a stūpa in a place where none has been before”; second, one who, in order to make offerings to the Saṅgha of the four quarters, builds a monastery, gives a garden, and supplies the four requisites; third, a disciple of the Buddha who brings a Saṅgha that has been split back into concord; and fourth, one who universally cultivates loving-kindness and the rest toward sentient beings. What then is its measure? The first account is that of the preceptors of former times — “the merit that can draw down one aeon of birth in heaven and the enjoyment of every pleasure is one measure of merit,” the reason being that the time of enjoying pleasure so drawn down is “as long as the aeon-lifespan of the Brahmapurohita gods”; and a gāthā of another school is adduced in proof.

The easy error: to read the four merits of Brahmā as four great undertakings. Neither the third item, “bringing back into concord what has been split,” nor the fourth, “universally cultivating loving-kindness and the rest,” requires any wealth at all — joining together again a body of monks that has been torn apart forms an exact pair with the utter heaviness of splitting the Saṅgha in the first half of the fascicle. In practice: this section answers from afar to the opening of the fascicle, and is the most beautiful piece of reflection in the whole structure: destroying concord is the heaviest of offenses, and making concord is one of the merits of Brahmā.

〔19.2〕That gāthā of another school, and the reckoning of the Vibhāṣā masters. First the question: the treatise quotes the gāthā “a man of faith and right view who cultivates the ten excellent practices thereby produces the merit of Brahmā, drawing down an aeon of heavenly pleasure” — what is it to prove? It proves the measure “one aeon of heavenly pleasure” — and so the text just before it says “since among another school there is a gāthā that says,” marking that it comes from another school and is a stanza adduced in proof, not a stanza of this treatise. The second account is “the Vibhāṣā masters say thus: it is the same as the measure of merit adjudged in the analysis of the action producing the excellent marks” — the measure of the merit of Brahmā is just equal to the measure of merit adjudged earlier in the analysis of the action producing the excellent marks. At the end the treatise closes with “the word ‘and the rest’ is to display divergent accounts such as these.”

The easy error: to read the two accounts as higher and lower. The text of the treatise itself passes no judgment, and the word “and the rest” in the stanza is set there precisely to make room for divergent accounts. In practice: this is the third place in the fascicle where both are recorded without adjudication (the first two being the three accounts of the measure of a single merit and the two divergent accounts of purity of discipline). Of the three, the measure of a single merit and the measure of the merit of Brahmā are indeed questions of quantity, while purity of discipline is a question of the cause of purity of discipline and of the kinds of discipline, and they are not of one kind. Where the reader meets a place in this treatise at which no judgment is passed, what is to be looked at is whether the author did or did not, in that very place, pass a judgment; there is no need to presuppose which kind it belongs to.

XX. The Giving of Dharma and the Three Conducive Wholesome Things

〔20.1〕The two conditions of the giving of Dharma. First the question: the giving of goods has been spoken of; where does the giving of Dharma have its bounds? The treatise gives two conditions — in accordance with the real, and undefiled: “if one can, in accordance with the real, expound the sūtras and the rest for sentient beings with an undefiled mind so that they give rise to right understanding, this is called the giving of Dharma.” On the reverse side it speaks with the utmost weight: “therefore one who expounds with inversion or with a defiled mind, seeking gain, reputation, or reverence,” such a man “thereby injures the great merit of himself and of others” — not that he is without merit, but that he injures it, and injures it in both himself and others.

The easy error: to suppose that preaching is always better than not preaching. The treatise says plainly that to preach with inversion or with a defiled mind is to injure the great merit of oneself and others. In practice: the two conditions each answer to one side — “in accordance with the real” answers to the Dharma spoken, “undefiled” to the mind that speaks. Lacking either, the giving of Dharma turns over into injury. This section is of one workmanship with the earlier sentence that “the entity of giving lies in being together with non-greed”: in weighing merit, this treatise always looks first at the mind.

〔20.2〕Conducive to merit, conducive to liberation, conducive to penetration. First the question: toward what does each of these three words “conducive” incline? The treatise explains, “‘conducive to merit’ means the wholesome that draws down the lovely results of the world,” which inclines toward the lovely results of the world; “‘conducive to liberation’ means the wholesome that is fixed to draw down the result that is nirvāṇa,” which inclines toward nirvāṇa; “‘conducive to penetration’ means the wholesome that nearly draws down the result that is the noble path,” which inclines toward the noble path, that is, toward the four stages of warmth and the rest — “namely the four, warmth and the rest, which will be explained at length later on.” The most moving is the middle passage: once the wholesome conducive to liberation has arisen, “once this wholesome has arisen, it makes that sentient being one who is said to have the dharma of nirvāṇa within his body”; and how is one to know that one has sown it? The treatise gives a sign that can be verified in oneself — on hearing that birth and death have fault, that dharmas are without self, that nirvāṇa has virtue, the hairs of the body stand up and one weeps and sheds tears. And it gives the simile, “as when one sees a sprout come up in a rain-soaked field, one knows that there was a seed in the ground before.”

The easy error: to read the three conducives as three stages. They are three orientations — one and the same wholesome, inclined toward lovely results, toward nirvāṇa, or toward the noble path, is altogether different in nature. In practice: this section is the most personal stretch the fascicle leaves to its reader. The wholesome conducive to liberation can neither be seen nor touched, and yet the treatise gives a sign for it: to be moved on hearing of no-self and of nirvāṇa. That is not an emotion; it is evidence that there was already a seed in the ground.

XXI. Writing, Seals, Calculation, Letters, and Numbers, and the Four Divergent Names at the End of the Chapter

〔21.1〕Even worldly arts are explained by the three actions. First the question: writing, seals, calculation, letters, and numbers are worldly arts, so why should the treatise settle their entities? Because the task of this chapter is to gather every “doing” into the framework of action. The treatise explains “‘what is raised in accordance with principle’ means what arises from a right preparation” — arising from a right preparation; the three actions are those of body, speech, and mind; and “what raises them” is feeling, perception, and the rest, according to what fits each. The assignment is that “among these, writing and seals have the bodily action spoken of above and the five aggregates that raise it for their entity,” calculation and letters have verbal action and the five aggregates that raise it for their entity, and numbers have mental action and the four aggregates that raise it for their entity, since “it is by mental volition alone that dharmas are counted.” Puguang’s Record glosses the words themselves here — “writing means writing by hand, seals mean sealing by hand.”

The easy error: to see “the five aggregates for its entity” and “the four aggregates for its entity” and not understand the difference. Numbers use only four aggregates because they are accomplished by mental volition alone and do not involve the aggregate of form. In practice: this section looks like a side matter but is in fact the closing demonstration of the method of the whole chapter — any worldly deed whatever can be taken apart into “which action, plus which aggregates that raise it.” Once this knife has been learned, the reader can take apart in the same way any behavior he meets with.

〔21.2〕Excellent, inferior, to be practiced, unsurpassed — the close of the whole chapter. First the question: at the end of the chapter it suddenly treats a set of divergent names; what is the point? This is to define at one stroke four terms of evaluation constantly used in the whole treatise. “Wholesome dharmas without outflows are also called excellent”; “the several defiled dharmas are also called blameworthy, obscured, and inferior,” and by comparison with this one excellent and one inferior the middle class is established of itself, so that the stanza does not adjudge it again; “the several conditioned wholesome dharmas are also called to be practiced.” The treatise also sets up a question for itself: why are unconditioned dharmas not called to be practiced? There are two answers — “because they cannot be practiced again and again so as to increase,” and further, practice is for the sake of seeking a result, and unconditioned dharmas have no result. At the end, “liberation, nirvāṇa, is also called unsurpassed,” the reason being “since there is no single dharma that can surpass nirvāṇa, it being wholesome and permanent and passing beyond the host of dharmas”; while all remaining dharmas have something above them, established by inference from the sense. The whole chapter stops at “that the remaining dharmas have something above them is established by inference from the sense.”

The easy error: to read “to be practiced” and “unsurpassed” as terms of praise on one and the same level. They are exactly opposite — what is to be practiced is what can be practiced again and again so as to increase, and is therefore restricted to the conditioned wholesome; the unsurpassed is what has nothing further above it, and belongs therefore to nirvāṇa alone. In practice: the whole fascicle begins from the heaviest of lies and closes here with “no single dharma can surpass nirvāṇa.” At one end is that one night in which the wheel of Dharma was broken, at the other that one dharma which passes beyond the host of dharmas; and all the measuring of the six fascicles of the Chapter on Action comes to rest at last upon this one pairing.

Further Resonances: The Mirror of the Three Commentaries

The above is the sense of the treatise’s own text in this fascicle. Below, a further section is set up to gather four matters: the adjudications of the three commentaries and their divergences, Saṅghabhadra’s refutations and supplements, the divergences of Paramārtha’s earlier translation, and coordinates for parallel reading. A mirror is not the treatise; it is only looking at the same text by another way of reading. Both are recorded without adjudication, each restored to its own place.

1. Where the Three Commentaries Diverge

A commentary wholly absent. For this fascicle there are only three houses to collate. Shentai’s commentary is a fragmentary text: the seven fascicles now extant belong to the chapters on the elements, on the faculties, and on the worthy and the noble, and the Chapter on Action is wholly wanting, so that for this fascicle there is no line-by-line explanation of Shentai’s to be fastened on. The lack is marked as it stands, and the text of other fascicles is not made to fill it.

The three houses adjudge this one cut word for word alike. This is not often met with in this treatise: Puguang’s Record has “below, the second, explaining the obstruction of action separately. Within it, first setting out the entity of the obstruction of action; second, explaining the splitting of the Saṅgha separately; third, explaining the conditions that make a deed one of immediate retribution; fourth, explaining that the preparation is fixed; fifth, the heaviness of the offense and the greatness of the result; sixth, what is of the same class as the deeds of immediate retribution”; Fabao’s Commentary has “second, explaining the obstruction of action separately,” with its six items beginning from “first setting out the entity of action, second explaining the split in the Saṅgha separately”; and Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary has “from here the second, explaining the obstruction of action separately, and within it a division into six: first explaining the entity of the obstruction of action, second explaining the splitting of the Saṅgha, third explaining the conditions that make a deed one of immediate retribution, fourth explaining that the preparation is fixed, fifth explaining the heaviness of the offense and the greatness of the result, sixth explaining what is of the same class as the deeds of immediate retribution.” That three houses dividing their fascicles independently should agree one by one in the names of the outline and in the order of the six items may serve as collateral evidence that the boundary of the fascicle is the boundary of the outline.

Whether the splitting of the wheel of Dharma and the splitting of formal acts are the same in entity — the explanations of two ancient masters and Puguang’s own objections. Puguang’s Record sets up for itself, “question: as to splitting the Saṅgha of the wheel of Dharma and splitting the Saṅgha in its formal acts, are they the same in entity or not? The ancient master, the Dharma Master Xiu, explains: the entity of splitting the Saṅgha is of two kinds. If it is splitting the Saṅgha of the wheel of Dharma, it has cessation independent of discernment for its entity. If it is splitting the Saṅgha in its formal acts, it has non-concord for its entity,” and at once objects, “objection: to say that splitting the Saṅgha in its formal acts has non-concord for its nature is not amiss. But to say that splitting the Saṅgha of the wheel of Dharma has cessation independent of discernment for its entity is not so. All the treatises say that the entity of the Saṅgha that is split is the nature of non-concord”; it also records, “the Dharma Master Kong explains the sense thus: if it is splitting the Saṅgha of the wheel of Dharma, it has the non-acquisition upon the concord in the principle of the wheel of Dharma for its entity. If it is splitting the Saṅgha in its formal acts, it has the non-acquisition upon the concord in the affair of the formal acts for its entity,” and objects to this too, “objection: to speak of non-acquisition in general is likewise not amiss.” ⇒ The text of the treatise itself says only that the entity of the split in the Saṅgha is non-concord, and does not divide it in two; the divergent explanations of the two ancient masters and Puguang’s objections belong alike to the layer of commentarial adjudication, and are recorded without adjudication.

“Some say: one who has gained receptivity also cannot be split” — Puguang gives no marking, and Fabao supplies it. The treatise does not state the reason for this sentence. Searching Puguang’s Fascicle Eighteen word for word, there is no separate marking of a speaker for this sentence; Puguang merely passes over it in explaining the two senses of “the foolish.” Fabao’s Commentary however cites the Correct Principle to supply its ground — “some say that one who has gained receptivity also cannot be split, since the Buddha said that receptivity is fixed.” ⇒ This is one place where Fabao is fuller than Puguang: a blank in the base text is filled by the mutual evidence of the treatise of debate and of the ancient commentaries, yet the reason is not expressly in the base text itself, and in citing it the source must be made plain. Recorded without adjudication.

Whether the manifest action is one or two when one preparation harms two persons — “the earlier master / the later master” is Puguang’s outline. The treatise says only “if by one preparation one harms the mother and another as well, two nonmanifests arise, but the manifest is only the offense of immediate retribution,” and thereafter records “the Venerable Ghoṣa says that there are two manifests,” without marking an earlier and a later master. Puguang divides them in words of his own — “the earlier master’s sense is: from the stronger, one manifest” · “the later master’s sense is: in both there arise two manifests and two nonmanifests, the atoms of the manifest being distinct in each” — and cites the Mahāvibhāṣā in proof, “the Venerable Ghoṣa said: manifest actions are formed of atoms, and the atoms in harming the mother and in harming the other are distinct in each, and so the offense of the manifest is obtained on the side of two persons.” Fabao’s Commentary adjudges likewise, “this master’s sense is that the manifest too is twofold.” ⇒ The division into “earlier master / later master” belongs to Puguang’s outline and is not a structure of the treatise’s own text; it is recorded without adjudication.

The narrative of the case of Shiqianchi is a supplement of the two commentaries. The treatise says only “the Buddha told Shiqianchi: you have already done two deeds of immediate retribution,” and does not tell how it came about. Puguang’s Record marks “‘if that is so, how is the simile’ down to ‘killing an arhat’: citing a sūtra to raise a difficulty,” and supplies the story, “of old, when the Buddha was in the world, in a kingdom of southern India there was a king,” and so on, closing the difficulty with “‘that shows one deed of immediate retribution’ down to ‘reproaching him for that offense’: the answer.” Fabao’s Commentary cites the same case and gives the same label, “a difficulty.” ⇒ The supplied narrative lets the reader know the story behind the text, while the speaker-label “citing a sūtra to raise a difficulty” is itself a matter of commentarial outline. The two commentaries agree in their labels here.

The three accounts of the measure of a single merit — Puguang alone passes judgment. The text of the treatise sets out three accounts and passes no judgment. Puguang however marks plainly, “of the three accounts here, they may be known from the text, and the later master is to be taken as correct,” and cites the appraisers’ words in the Mahāvibhāṣā, “only a Buddha can know it; it is not to be fathomed by others.” ⇒ The text of the treatise itself has no judgment; the judgment is in Puguang; in citing it the attribution must be made plain, and it may not be taken outright as the treatise’s settled conclusion. Recorded without adjudication.

The explanation of the eight givings name by name — Puguang is full and Fabao brief. Puguang explains each name briefly and supplies “to practice giving in search of a fine reputation is called giving to secure a name”; Fabao at this section merely marks the outline and does not open out the names one by one.

The ordering of the two divergent accounts of purity of discipline — Puguang numbers them and Fabao does not. Puguang marks “this then is the first master. Some say: purity of discipline is by five causes,” and cites the Miscellaneous Heart Treatise in proof, “purity of the root means keeping away from raising the root path of action,” and so on; and again marks “this then is the second master. He says discipline is of four kinds.” Fabao however gives only “‘the word and the rest is to display’ down to ‘fifth, turned toward the quiescent’: explaining the word ‘and the rest’ in the stanza as displaying that there are divergent accounts” and “‘some other master says’ down to ‘since it forever parts one from the grime of action and affliction’: setting out a divergent account,” without numbering them one by one. ⇒ One instance of the three houses differing in fullness and depth.

The school to which the first master on the merit of Brahmā belongs — Puguang wavers among three schools in one sentence. Of “the preceptors of former times” Puguang says, “there are two masters’ accounts. This then is the first master, who is of the Sautrāntikas, or is a master of the Mahāsāṃghikas, or is a divergent master within our own school,” setting out three possibilities within a single sentence; while for the second master he simply follows the wording of the base text, “this then is the account of the second master. He says that the measure of the merit of Brahmā points to the same as the foregoing explanation.” ⇒ Within one and the same passage Puguang’s attitude to the two masters is in the one case doubtful and in the other settled; recorded without adjudication.

⭐ The order of the six “ten excellent practices” cited by the two commentaries from Paramārtha is exactly reversed. Puguang’s “Master Paramārtha explains: as for the ten excellent practices,” and what follows, gives first saving one’s mother and second saving one’s father; Fabao’s “Paramārtha says: to the four merits of Brahmā above six more are added,” and what follows, gives first saving one’s father and second saving one’s mother. ⇒ The same ancient master’s account, and the order in which the two commentaries cite it is reversed; this is the most concrete instance of divergence among the three commentaries in this fascicle, and it is recorded only, without adjudication; in citing the “ten excellent practices” it is well to note that the other house has a different order.

The entity of writing and seals — this time it is Fabao who is full and Puguang who is brief. Puguang explains only the words themselves, “writing means writing by hand, seals mean sealing by hand”; Fabao at the place where he marks “explaining that the entities of writing and seals are the same” supplies the source in the Mahāvibhāṣā. ⇒ The direction is exactly the reverse of that in the section on the eight givings (where Puguang was full and Fabao brief), and neither may be taken as the general rule.

Yuanhui’s strength lies in numbering. In the two sections on the six causes of an action’s lightness or heaviness and the five causes of increased action, Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary numbers them one by one — “there are six causes here: the after-effect is the first cause” · “there are five causes here: ‘because of deliberation’ is the first cause”; and Fabao likewise numbers the five causes one by one. The three houses differ in form at this section without any dispute over doctrine.

Where the ancient masters agree must also be recorded. At the sentence “is it not then thrown away for nothing” in the section on the meritorious action of the caitya, Puguang marks “‘is not this act of giving and reverence then thrown away for nothing’: an outsider’s difficulty,” and Fabao marks “an outsider’s difficulty” — the two commentaries agree in their speaker-labels, both adjudging it a difficulty from an outsider and not one set up by the author himself. The attribution in the main text of this section follows this.

Where the three commentaries merely restate, that is recorded as it stands. In the explanation of the five of the same class one by one, and in the explanation of the single stanza of divergent names of dharmas at the end of the chapter, all three commentaries are word for word nearly identical with the base text’s prose commentary, and no divergent account or added sense is to be found. A zero result is recorded honestly as well; in these two sections the exposition may simply teach the base text plainly.

2. Saṅghabhadra’s Refutations and Supplementary Explanations

The adversary of this fascicle has changed. In the first five fascicles of the Chapter on Action, Saṅghabhadra repeatedly names Vasubandhu with the two words “the Sūtra-master” and refutes him sentence by sentence; in this fascicle it is not so. Collating word for word by a fault-tolerant method, the term “the Sūtra-master” occurs fifty-five times in the whole Chapter Adjudicating Action of the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle, yet all of them fall within the range preceding the passage corresponding to this fascicle, and within the passage corresponding to this fascicle there are none; and it is the same with the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine. ⇒ What Saṅghabhadra refutes in this fascicle is the lineage of “the Elder,” and not “the Sūtra-master.” This is a negative proposition collated in two ways, and the only thing it can prove is this one thing — a shift in the name marked; one may not infer from it that there is no dispute in this fascicle.

Whether the entity of the five deeds of immediate retribution is mental action alone — Saṅghabhadra first refutes the Elder and then establishes his own tenet. At the very opening of this fascicle Saṅghabhadra cites and refutes the Elder’s account: “now the Elder says: the three actions are its entity, and bodily action and verbal action can each alone draw down a maturation result. This is hard to establish in principle, for it is only because what mental action does is weighty that it is granted to be able to draw down a special maturation; this is utterly vague.” He objects, “you have already granted that volition proceeding in dependence upon body and speech is called bodily and verbal action; now if you grant that mental action is the entity of a deed of immediate retribution, then merely to raise for a moment a volition to do such a deed would be to accomplish a deed of immediate retribution,” and adjudges at the end, “its principle is hard to establish, and so what he says lies outside the holy teaching,” and only then cites the stanza, word for word identical with the Kośa’s, and establishes it as his own tenet. ⇒ This round of debate is raised before the Kośa’s stanza itself, and is a framework of Saṅghabhadra’s own adding; there is no such difficulty in the text of the Kośa. One sense and two schools are recorded together, and no verdict of victory is passed.

The case of the kalala that miscarries and is reborn, which the Elder questions as a fiction. The Kośa sets up this case to ask in whom the offense of immediate retribution for killing one’s mother falls. Saṅghabhadra cites the Elder’s difficulty: “the Elder says thus of this: if the kalala has life it does not fall out, and if it has fallen out it must already have died, for a sentient being can certainly not abide in filth. Since there is no such thing, the question is asked in vain” — meaning that the case cannot occur at all, and to ask it is to ask to no purpose. Saṅghabhadra answers him, “the Elder is certainly unable to know exactly the differences of capability within the destinies of action,” and adduces in proof that the intermediate existence pierces through vajra and that the fire in the mother’s womb can dissolve metal and stone while the kalala grows within it, and cites “it is heard that a sūtra says that the venerable Kāśyapa the Youth was born in just this way” as a precedent. ⇒ What is disputed is whether the case itself can stand, and not the doctrine of the offense of immediate retribution for killing one’s mother. Recorded without adjudication.

In the section on giving to a caitya, Saṅghabhadra is of one purport with the Kośa. Here Saṅghabhadra sets up no divergent account but expounds the answer the Kośa already has, and expounds it more fully — “upon a field endowed with virtue one gives rise to a strong resolve, and with the utmost reverence makes an offering to a caitya” — and uses the simile of harming an enemy, which corresponds almost word for word with the Kośa’s. ⇒ This passage does not belong to the class of debate; it takes up rather than refutes, and is recorded as such.

The designations of the two masters on the merit of Brahmā differ in the two treatises. Xuanzang’s Kośa has “the preceptors of former times” and “the Vibhāṣā masters,” whereas the corresponding text of the treatise as carried in Saṅghabhadra has in both places “some other master says” — “the treatise says: some other master says, the merit that can draw down one aeon of birth in heaven and the enjoyment of every pleasure, just this is called one measure of the merit of Brahmā” · “some other master says: this is as the measure of merit spoken of in the analysis of the action producing the excellent marks.” ⇒ Two treatises issuing from the same translation hall of Xuanzang and yet differing in designation; recorded only, without adjudication, and no conjecture is made as to which represents the original Sanskrit and which a choice of rendering. Read together with Puguang’s “wavering among three schools in one sentence” above, it may be seen that the attribution of this lineage has been without settled account since ancient times.

The ground for “one who has gained receptivity also cannot be split,” with one voice in three places. Both of Saṅghabhadra’s treatises supply “some say that one who has gained receptivity also cannot be split, since the Buddha said that receptivity is fixed,” and Fabao cites the same sentence from the Correct Principle. Yet neither the Kośa’s own text nor Puguang marks it plainly. ⇒ This is a good instance of comparison across texts — a blank in the base text may have its reason supplied by the mutual evidence of a divergent translation, of the treatise of debate, and of the ancient commentaries — yet it remains supplementary material, and may not be taken outright as a principle inherent in the base text.

3. The Divergences of Paramārtha’s Earlier Translation

Paramārtha’s Expository Treatise on the Treasury of Abhidharma forms a system of its own in the passage corresponding to this fascicle. The boundaries of the passage can be fixed only by the structure of the scene: it begins with “what is the nature of the entity of these deeds of immediate retribution? Four have bodily action for their entity, one has verbal action for its entity, three have killing for their nature, one has false speech for its nature, one has the fore-part of killing for its nature,” answering word for word Xuanzang’s question at the head of the fascicle; and it ends with “there is not even a dharma equal to nirvāṇa, how much less one above it,” the same close as Xuanzang’s at the end of the chapter. The two texts divide their fascicles differently, and the passage answering to this fascicle falls within Paramārtha’s “part four” without coinciding with the fascicle boundary, so that to search Paramārtha’s text with Xuanzang’s wording will never find the boundary.

A basic difference of form: one stanza split into several short verses. Xuanzang sets out the whole stanza first under “the stanza says / the treatise says,” while Paramārtha embeds his explanation line by line under “the verse says / the explanation says.” Within this fascicle, where Xuanzang has one stanza of four lines, Paramārtha again and again splits it into two, three, or four short verses — the stanza on the split in the Saṅgha is split into two (“the verse says: the split in the Saṅgha is non-concord, its nature is a dharma not associated, an undefiled and indeterminate dharma” and “the verse says: the assembly is associated with it”), the stanza on the one who splits into three, the stanza on the six pāramitās into four, and the closing stanza of the chapter into four as well. There are also places where Xuanzang sets up a stanza and Paramārtha uses prose alone — so at the entity of the five deeds of immediate retribution and at the number of Buddhas served through the three incalculable aeons. This is a difference of form, not an omission here and there.

The renderings form a system of their own. Bhikṣu is rendered by another transcription, Jambudvīpa as the Jambu Continent, “without interval” by transcription, both stūpa and caitya by a single transcription, “non-returner” by a shortened transcription, “incalculable aeon” as asaṃkhyeya, “volition” as “intention,” “equipoise” as “the stage of tranquility,” “the fruit of liberation” as “the fruit of separation,” “aggregate” as skandha, and “basis of meritorious action” as “class of meritorious action.” The names of Buddhas differ too — Excellent Insight appears as Vipaśyin and Jewel-Topknot as Jewel-Light, while Burning Lamp bears the same name. ⇒ Whether the difference in the names of Buddhas is a divergent rendering of one and the same Buddha, or rests upon a different transmission, is not to be settled by the words, and is recorded only, without adjudication.

⭐ Three quoted stanzas that lay out the whole range of divergence in translation. In the stanza praising the Buddha Tiṣya the two texts are wholly different word for word — Xuanzang has “in heaven and earth, in the hall of much hearing of this world, in the palaces of the departed, the abodes of the gods, and the ten directions, there is none; great man, bull among men, great śramaṇa, searching the earth and the mountain forests there is nowhere an equal,” while Paramārtha has “in earth, heaven, and the quiescent abode of Brahmā there is none; in the three times and ten directions there has never been; going everywhere and searching this earth and the mountain forests, what man is equal to the Honored One in his three virtues?” The stanza on the merit of the class of giving, however, can be matched line by line — “these wholesome aggregates of a moment are together established under the name of giving” against “these wholesome skandhas of a moment, these are called the action of giving.” And the gāthā of another school on the merit of Brahmā is almost word for word the same — the first line “a man of faith and right view” is identical in both, and the remaining three differ only by a word or two. Within one and the same fascicle, and all of them quoted stanzas, the three run from wholly different to wholly identical, which shows well enough that there is no fixed rule for the rendering of quoted stanzas. Recorded without adjudication.

The naming of discipline, positive in the one text and negative in the other. Xuanzang sets up discipline positively — keeping away from the breaking of discipline and from what is prohibited is called discipline; Paramārtha sets up the negative first, “the verse says: wrong discipline means evil form, right discipline is keeping away from these two,” displaying “right discipline” by way of “wrong discipline.” ⇒ This is a difference in the opening and gathering of the order of exposition, not an error of wording.

One place differing in fullness of wording. At the head of the five of the same class as the deeds of immediate retribution, Xuanzang marks plainly “defiling one’s mother who is a nun beyond learning” (bringing out her standing as a bhikṣuṇī), while Paramārtha has only “defiling one’s mother who is an arhat,” without setting down the word “nun”; yet his own prose explanation gives “if a man defiles his own mother who is an arhat, by practicing what is not the pure life,” and the sense still runs through. Recorded without adjudication.

4. Coordinates for Parallel Reading

The two sets of enumerated dharmas established in this fascicle both have namesakes in the root treatises of the Yogācāra lineage, and may be set side by side word for word.

The five deeds of immediate retribution and the deeds of the same portion as the deeds of immediate retribution. This fascicle establishes the items of the five deeds of immediate retribution as killing one’s mother, killing one’s father, killing an arhat, splitting the Saṅgha, and drawing blood from the body of a Buddha, and their same class as defiling one’s mother who is a nun beyond learning, killing a bodhisattva abiding in certainty, killing a noble learner, seizing away the requisites of the Saṅgha’s concord, and destroying a stūpa. The Yogācārabhūmi, on the same set of enumerated dharmas, lists five items which are one by one killing one’s mother, killing one’s father, killing an arhat, splitting the Saṅgha, and drawing blood with an evil mind from a Tathāgata — the items of the five deeds of immediate retribution are wholly the same in the two systems; but that lineage sets up separately an item “deeds of the same portion as the deeds of immediate retribution,” of which the first named are practicing a defiled act toward an arhat nun and toward one’s mother, and striking a bodhisattva in his last existence, and which continues with such items as slaughtering sheep and setting it up as a norm, injuring friends and kin, turning afterwards to harm one to whom one had already given fearlessness, and robbing the gate of the Saṅgha. ⇒ The same set of enumerated dharmas, and yet the items gathered under it are plainly different — the five of the same class in this treatise are each matched with one of the five deeds of immediate retribution, while the same portion in the Yogācārabhūmi gathers broadly all sorts of conduct that turns against kindness and injures the wholesome. Namesakes with different items, recorded only, without adjudication.

The three incalculable aeons and the pāramitās. This fascicle matches the three incalculable aeons with numbers of Buddhas served, and the four stages with the fulfillment of the six pāramitās. The Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only, on the same span of time, matches the three incalculable aeons with the threefold greatness and smallness of the pāramitās, and takes the third outright as the third incalculable aeon, “the great pāramitā.” ⇒ The number of the span of time is the same in the two systems, while the doctrinal framework upon which it is hung is different — this treatise hangs it upon the action producing the excellent marks and the six pāramitās in four stages, the Yogācāra lineage upon the marks of cultivation of the ten stages and ten pāramitās. The numbers being the same and the frameworks different, they may be set side by side.

As for the word-for-word correspondences in that lineage of this fascicle’s three bases of meritorious action of giving, discipline, and cultivation, the six causes of an action’s lightness or heaviness, the four alternatives of action done and action increased, and the three conducive wholesome things, this layer has not obtained them item by item; the lack is marked as it stands, and the text of other places is not made to fill it.