俱舍論 佛不共法·共功德·六通Abhidharmakośabhāṣya · The Dharmas Exclusive to a Buddha · Merits Held in Common · The Six Supernormal Knowledges

Before Reading This Fascicle

The preceding fascicle made out to the end the entity of the ten knowledges, their modes of apprehension, and their analysis through the several gates; this fascicle turns about upon fourteen characters only — “thus the differences of the several knowledges have been made out; the merits accomplished by knowledge are now to be shown.” What was made out above is ‘what knowledge itself is’; what is made out here is ‘what grows out of knowledge once it has been cultivated to accomplishment.’ Here the three ancient masters let the knife of the outline fall in the same place, and let it fall moreover at the head of their own Fascicle Twenty-Seven: Puguang marks “below, the second main section of the present chapter, making out the merits accomplished by knowledge,” Fabao marks “from here below, the second main section of the present chapter, making out the merits accomplished by knowledge,” and Yuanhui marks “from here the second main section, making out the merits accomplished by knowledge.” The three divide their fascicles independently and yet their boundary is wholly the same as Xuanzang’s division of the fascicles, from which one may see that this cut was not forced by later men but is a seam the text of the treatise opened of itself.

This fascicle divides below into three sections, and the order of them follows one very clear thread — they are arranged by ‘who can obtain them,’ from narrow to wide. The first section is the dharmas not held in common (the ten powers, the four fearlessnesses, the three foundations of mindfulness, great compassion), which the Buddha alone can obtain and of which the remaining noble ones have none whatever. The second section is merits held in common, yet held in common with the noble ones alone (non-contention, the knowledge of aspiration, the four unobstructed knowledges, together with the limit-stage absorption upon which they depend), in which śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas too have a share, and ordinary beings none. The third section is merits held in common with ordinary beings (the six supernormal knowledges and what opens out from them — the three clear knowings, the three guiding demonstrations, the two senses of the divine object-field, the minds capable of transformation, the faculties of the divine eye and ear, the classes of the five supernormal knowledges), which even ordinary beings may cultivate. Each of the three sections is wider than the last, and in reading one may take them for a set of concentric circles: the innermost ring the Buddha alone, the middle ring extending to the noble ones, the outermost ring extending to ordinary beings.

One thing must be said at the outset. This fascicle reads like a catalogue of merits, and the numbers in it are startlingly dense — the ten powers, the four fearlessnesses, the three foundations of mindfulness, the five senses, the eight causes, the sixteen limbs of the three perfections, the four unobstructed knowledges, the six supernormal knowledges, the three clear knowings, the three guiding demonstrations, the fourteen minds of transformation, the classes of the five supernormal knowledges. But what bears the weight is not the numbers; it is one manner of questioning that appears again and again: whenever a merit is established, the author must ask what knowledge is its entity, upon what level it depends, upon what body it depends, and how it is obtained. These four questions are the skeleton of this fascicle, and not one of its twenty-two nodes escapes them. Only when these four questions are understood do the numbers fall onto the account of practice.

I. Making Out the Dharmas Not Held in Common (the Eighteen Dharmas the Buddha Alone Has)

〔1.1 · First Half of Root 34〕The Eighteen Dharmas Not Held in Common — Why These Eighteen, and Why They Are Called Not Held in Common

First ask: When ‘the eighteen dharmas not held in common’ are spoken of, which eighteen are they after all? The treatise answers with the utmost directness — the Buddha’s ten powers, four fearlessnesses, three foundations of mindfulness, and great compassion; ten plus four plus three plus one comes to exactly eighteen. This is a total arrived at by addition, and not eighteen further things.

Ask again: On what ground are they called ‘not held in common’? The criterion the treatise gives is a single sentence — “they are cultivated only at the time of the buddhas’ knowledge of exhaustion, and the remaining noble ones have none of them, hence the name ‘not held in common’.” Note that two layers are hidden in this sentence: one is time (they are cultivated to accomplishment only at that stage of becoming a buddha and realizing the knowledge of exhaustion), and one is person (the remaining noble ones have none of them whatever). Let either be lacking and ‘not held in common’ cannot stand.

Clearing a misreading: taking ‘not held in common’ to mean that a śrāvaka cannot touch even the shadow of it. The later section on the third foundation of mindfulness strikes this misunderstanding down head-on — śrāvakas too can be free of delight and dejection amid the favorable and the adverse, and yet it is still called not held in common. So the exact sense of ‘not held in common’ is not ‘others have no such thing at all,’ but that others do not reach the ultimate degree the Buddha reaches in this matter. Puguang, glossing the word “power,” travels the same road: it is not that the two vehicles have no knowledge, but that they are “obstructed with regard to objects,” and so their knowledge does not earn the name of power.

In practice: reading on in this fascicle, wherever the two words ‘not held in common’ are met with, first ask, ‘is what is not held in common the thing itself, or the ultimate degree of the thing?’ Change that one question and the eighteen dharmas will not be read as a catalogue of marvels having nothing to do with ordinary beings and noble ones.

〔1.2 · Second Half of Root 34 to Root 36〕The Buddha’s Ten Powers — the Four Gates of Nature, Level of Dependence, Body of Dependence, and the Gloss

First ask: What knowledge has each of the ten powers for its entity? The treatise matches them one by one — the power of the possible and the impossible, ten knowledges; the power of actions and their maturation, eight knowledges (excluding cessation and the path); the four powers of the meditative absorptions, liberations, concentrations, and attainments, of the higher and lower faculties, of the various resolves, and of the various elements, nine knowledges each (excluding cessation); the power of the paths leading everywhere, nine knowledges or ten; the two powers of former abodes and of death and birth, conventional knowledge alone; the power of the exhaustion of the outflows, six knowledges or ten.

Here there is one key point in the reading: at the seventh and the tenth the word “or” appears, and the author himself points out that “the word ‘or’ shows that this sense has two routes” — this is not vagueness; it is that the count of knowledges differs because the object is taken differently. If the power of the paths leading everywhere takes only the practice that leads as object it is nine knowledges; if it takes also the place led to it becomes ten. If the power of the exhaustion of the outflows takes only the exhaustion of the outflows itself as object it is six knowledges; if it refers to all the knowledge obtained in a body whose outflows are exhausted it becomes ten. The difference in the count of knowledges comes from the breadth or narrowness of the object, and not from two schools disagreeing.

Ask again: What of the level and the body of dependence? The eighth and ninth powers depend upon the four meditative absorptions; the remaining eight extend to all eleven levels (the desire realm, the four meditative absorptions, access concentration, the intermediate absorption, and the four formless). All ten powers alike depend upon the body of a Buddha, a man of the southern continent Jambudvīpa.

Ask further: Why are they named ‘powers’? The treatise answers, “because within every object of knowledge his knowledge turns without obstruction.” Puguang glosses this, saying “because within every object of knowledge his knowledge turns without obstruction, it is named power,” and adds one layer of contrast — the Buddha alone has removed all afflictions and their residual habits and can know whatever he wishes with regard to every object; the two vehicles, though they too have knowledge, are obstructed with regard to objects, and so do not earn the name of power.

Clearing a misreading: reading ‘power’ as a matter of the magnitude of strength. It is a matter of being unobstructed or not, and not of strong or weak. The treatise adduces the instances of Śāriputra letting go of a man who sought to be led across, and of his being unable to observe and know the prior and later reaches of the dove pursued by the hawk, precisely to show this — Śāriputra had knowledge; it was only that at a certain place his knowledge was blocked.

In practice: these four gates (own nature, level of dependence, body of dependence, gloss) are the fixed form by which this fascicle opens an account for every merit; below, in non-contention, the knowledge of aspiration, the unobstructed knowledges, and the six supernormal knowledges, this same table is filled in throughout. Learn the table well first and the later text will not need to ask again.

〔1.3 · Root 37〕The Buddha’s Bodily Power — Three Accounts Set Side by Side, the Entity Being the Sense Field of the Tangible

First ask: How great is the Buddha’s bodily power? The treatise first establishes the sentence “the power of the Buddha’s born body equals that of Nārāyaṇa,” and then records three accounts — the treatise’s own ‘equal to Nārāyaṇa,’ some other masters’ ‘every joint fully possesses the power of Nārāyaṇa,’ and the Venerable Dharmatrāta’s ‘the bodily power is without limit, just as the power of mind is.’ Dharmatrāta’s reason is very strong: were bodily power not limitless, the Buddha’s body could not bear up that limitless power of mind.

These three accounts are not set out as equals. The author himself passes an assessing remark — “among the accounts given, only the greater is reasonable.” Puguang reads this sentence as an express assessing choice, his text running “up to here there have been three accounts in all of the Tathāgata’s bodily power. The author of the treatise assesses and takes what Dharmatrāta says,” and he records that Saṅghabhadra’s two treatises likewise assess it thus. This is the first time in this fascicle that the author takes one of several accounts, and it stands in exact contrast with the handling of ‘recorded without adjudication’ in the later text; in reading, the two must be told clearly apart.

Ask again: What is the measure of the power of Nārāyaṇa? The treatise gives a ladder increasing tenfold — the ordinary elephant, the fragrant elephant, the mahānagna, the praskandha, the varāṅga, the caṇūra, and Nārāyaṇa, each later one tenfold the one before; and there is another account which holds that the increase of the first six stages matches only the power of half the body of Nārāyaṇa, and must be doubled again to make the complete power.

Ask further: What has bodily power for its entity? The treatise answers “it has the sense field of the tangible for its nature,” that is, the differences of the great elements among things touched; and it records another account which holds it to be a derived tangible existing separately apart from the seven. Here two accounts stand side by side and the treatise passes no judgment.

Clearing a misreading: reading the simile of the joints of the three persons (coiled like a dragon, like a linked chain, like hooks meeting) as ornament. It is language of gradation — the Great Awakened One, the pratyekabuddha, and the wheel-turning monarch are superior and inferior in power precisely because the tightness with which their limbs and joints are linked differs. In practice: this treatise, in speaking of the body, never speaks of the surface of the skin, but only of ‘how the limbs are linked’ and ‘how the great elements among things touched differ’; this is Abhidharma’s fixed angle of vision upon the body.

〔1.4 · First Half of Root 38〕The Four Fearlessnesses — the Name Rests upon Knowledge, but the Entity Is Not Just Knowledge

First ask: To what is each of the four fearlessnesses matched? The treatise matches them one by one and hangs each upon a power — fearlessness in perfect awakening, ten knowledges, as with the first power of the possible and the impossible; fearlessness in the permanent exhaustion of the outflows, six knowledges or ten, as with the tenth power of the knowledge of the exhaustion of the outflows; fearlessness in declaring the dharmas that obstruct, eight knowledges, as with the second power of the knowledge of actions and their maturation; fearlessness in declaring the path of deliverance, nine knowledges or ten, as with the seventh power of the paths leading everywhere. Puguang expressly marks these correspondences here and adds one sentence of importance: the World-Honored One in truth accomplishes forty powers and forty fearlessnesses, and the sūtra, going by the fundamental ones, speaks of them briefly as ten powers and four fearlessnesses — this is a matter of fullness and brevity, and not a difference in the numbers.

Ask again: Since the entity is knowledge, why establish the further name ‘fearlessness’? The treatise answers very finely: what the name ‘fearlessness’ designates is ‘the absence of timidity’; because he has knowledge he is not timid before another’s objection, and so upon the entity of knowledge the name fearlessness is brought forth.

The key lies in the next sentence — “in truth fearlessness is accomplished by knowledge, and one should not say that its entity is just knowledge.” Puguang judges this sentence to be the author’s own explanation, and states its principle as ‘knowledge is the cause and fearlessness the result.’ A name may be established upon knowledge, and yet the entity is not equal to knowledge: this is the most delicate piece of glossing in the fascicle.

Clearing a misreading: reading “the name fearlessness designates the entity of the several knowledges” and thereupon supposing that the author holds ‘fearlessness is just knowledge,’ so that the next sentence becomes a self-contradiction. It is not so — the former sentence speaks of what the establishing of the name rests upon, the latter of the reality of the entity. The two sentences are cause and result, and their order is in good array.

In practice: wherever this treatise uses the form ‘such a name designates such an entity,’ one must press the question, ‘is this speaking of what the name rests upon, or of the reality of the entity?’ This one question saves the greater part of misreadings.

〔1.5 · Second Half of Root 38〕The Three Foundations of Mindfulness — Abiding in Right Mindfulness and Right Knowing amid the Favorable, the Adverse, and the Mixed

First ask: Which three are the three foundations of mindfulness? The treatise lists them following the sūtra — the disciples wholly reverent and rightly receiving and practicing, and the Tathāgata taking this as object gives rise to no delight; the disciples only irreverent and not rightly receiving and practicing, and the Tathāgata taking this as object gives rise to no dejection; one class of disciples reverent and another irreverent, and the Tathāgata taking this as object gives rise to neither delight nor dejection. In all three he “abides in equanimity with right mindfulness and right knowing.” The entity is mindfulness and discernment.

Note the arrangement of these three: favorable, adverse, mixed — they are not three things, but three showings forth of one and the same abiding amid three sorts of circumstance. The three circumstances exhaust the attitudes of sentient beings, and so the Buddha’s ‘unmovedness’ is thereby proved to extend to all circumstances, and not merely to have chanced upon no adversity.

Ask again: The great śrāvakas too can be free of delight and dejection amid the favorable, the adverse, and the mixed; on what ground does this count as a dharma of a buddha not held in common? The treatise raises this objection to itself and answers itself — “because in the Buddha alone the residual habits are cut off along with them in this matter.” Puguang expressly marks the outline of question and answer here, his question running “these three foundations of mindfulness the śrāvakas too can fully have; how is it that in the Buddha alone they are named a dharma not held in common.” Fabao agrees wholly with Puguang in doctrine and adds a second explanation besides: the disciples belong to the Tathāgata and not to the śrāvakas, and toward the Tathāgata strong delight or dejection ought by rights to arise, and that the Buddha can refrain is what may be called marvelous.

Clearing a misreading: reading ‘equanimity’ as coldness. Equanimity is here written together with ‘right mindfulness and right knowing,’ and is not being drawn along by circumstance while still being perfectly clear, and not a refusal to attend.

In practice: this section is the strongest evidence in the whole fascicle for ‘the sense of not held in common being the ultimate degree and not the presence or absence’ — the śrāvakas are not without such abiding; their residual habits are not yet cut off. The question mark left at the first section is here closed.

〔1.6 · Root 39〕Great Compassion — Why It Must Use Conventional Knowledge

First ask: What has great compassion for its entity? The treatise answers “it has conventional knowledge for its nature,” and at once gives the reason — were it not conventional knowledge, it “could not take all sentient beings as object,” nor “form the mode of apprehension of the three sufferings.” This reason must be looked at closely: knowledge without outflows takes the principle of the four truths as object, and cannot reach the concrete mark of suffering in each sentient being; to take universally as object all the sentient beings of the three realms, and to form the mode of apprehension upon the three sufferings, only conventional knowledge can manage. The settling of the nature is forced out by ‘the breadth of the object’, and is not established at will.

Ask again: On what ground is it called ‘great’? The treatise establishes five senses — great by provision (accomplished by vast merit and knowledge), great by mode of apprehension (able to form the mode of apprehension upon the three sufferings), great by object (taking the sentient beings of the three realms together as object), great by equality (doing the work of benefit and ease equally for all sentient beings), great by highest grade (being of the highest grade, with no other compassion its equal).

Ask further: Wherein does it differ from ordinary compassion? The treatise gives eight causes — own nature (non-delusion against non-hatred), mode of apprehension (three sufferings against one), object (three realms against one), level of dependence (the fourth meditative absorption alone against extending to the rest), body of dependence (the Buddha’s body alone against extending to the rest), realization (requiring freedom from craving for the summit of existence against not requiring it), deliverance (the matter accomplished against a hope only), pity (equal against unequal).

Clearing a misreading: supposing that ‘great compassion uses conventional knowledge’ is a demotion. The contrary is the case — only conventional knowledge can take all sentient beings universally as object; the ‘conventional’ here speaks of the object being conventional matters, and not of the knowledge itself being inferior. In practice: taking the five senses and the eight causes together, one finds that they are in fact answering two sides of one question — the five senses say ‘why it is called great,’ the eight causes say ‘why it is not that smaller thing.’ The two sides, positive and negative, fence in one and the same boundary.

〔1.7 · Root 40〕Buddhas Regarded One against Another — Equal in Three Things, Differing in Four

First ask: Are the buddhas equal in every dharma among themselves? The treatise answers in two layers. Equal are three things — provision alike complete, dharma body alike accomplished, benefiting others alike ultimate. Differing are four things and an ‘and the like’ — lifespan short or long, class either kṣatriya or brahmin, clan either Gautama or Kāśyapa, bodily size small or large, and the word ‘and the like’ takes in also the length or brevity of the abiding of the true Dharma in the world.

Ask again: Since they are buddhas, why are there still differences? The reason the treatise gives is of the utmost importance — “because the times at which they appear in the world differ and what suits the faculties and capacities of the sentient beings to be trained is severally different.” The difference lies not in the merits of the Buddha but in the capacities of those to be trained. This one sentence shifts the weight of the whole passage away from ‘the buddhas being higher and lower than one another.’

Then the treatise turns to the three perfections — the perfection of cause (cultivation without remainder, over a long time, without interval, with reverence), the perfection of result (knowledge, abandonment, majestic power, form body, four kinds each opened into four limbs), and the perfection of grace (making beings forever liberated from birth and death in the three evil destinies, or setting them in the good destinies and the three vehicles). This long passage is not a digression; it is precisely answering the question ‘the three things of provision, dharma body, and benefiting others being equal, what is it that is equal?’

Clearing a misreading: reading the differences of lifespan and bodily size as the buddhas having superiority and inferiority. The treatise’s criterion is already written down fast in that one sentence about ‘what suits the capacities of those to be trained’ — the difference is a showing forth answering to capacity, and not a height or lowness of merit.

In practice: reading here, one should attend to the author’s closing sentence — the perfections of the Tathāgata “were they analyzed one by one would be limitless, and the Buddha, the World-Honored One, alone can know them and can declare them.” This is a rare instance of the treatise stating its own boundary: what can be listed has been listed, and what cannot be listed to the end is honestly said to be beyond listing.

〔1.8 · The Quoted Stanza at the End of Root 40〕The Stanza on the Buddha’s Field of Merit — One Thought of Confidence and Reverence Can Turn Away and Extinguish Limitless Evil Action

First ask: This stanza, “if in the field of merit that is the Buddha one can plant even a small portion of the wholesome, one obtains at first a superior good destiny, and at last one assuredly attains nirvāṇa,” joins on where? It joins after the three perfections and before the merits held in common, and is the tying off of the section on the dharmas not held in common. The treatise first spreads out the Buddha’s merits as a great mountain of jewels, and then divides men into two — the fool himself lacking the many merits, who hears and yet cannot give rise to confidence and reverence; the man of discernment, in whom, hearing it, the mind of confidence and reverence “penetrates to the marrow of the bones.”

Ask again: How great a force can one thought of confidence and reverence have? The treatise says it very concretely — “it turns away and extinguishes limitless indeterminate evil actions, and takes to itself the superior human and heavenly destinies and nirvāṇa.” Note that what is turned away and extinguished is indeterminate action, and not every action; the treatise’s choice of words here is exactly measured. Therefore the appearing of the Tathāgata is, for the man of discernment, an “unsurpassed field of merit,” relying upon which one can draw forth a result that is not passed in vain, lovely, superior, swift, and ultimate. These five epithets are just the prose version of the stanza’s ‘one obtains at first a superior good destiny, and at last assuredly attains nirvāṇa.’

That this stanza is judged a quoted stanza and not a root stanza has its warrant in the preceding text — “as the Bhagavat himself said in a stanza,” an express formula of another’s speech. All three quoted stanzas in this fascicle have such a warrant in the preceding text, and the criterion does not rest upon doctrinal guesswork.

Clearing a misreading: reading ‘field of merit’ as a kind of trade — so much offered for so much in return. The treatise’s order is not that: first there is the mountain of merits, next the mind of confidence and reverence, and only then the force that turns action away. What can turn action away is the mind; the field is only the object that lets that mind be able to arise.

In practice: this is the one place in the fascicle where the whole abstract discourse of merits falls back upon the ordinary reader. The eighteen dharmas above are all the Buddha’s affair; only at this stanza is it said ‘and what has that to do with you’ — and the point of contact lies in that ‘small portion’ of ‘being able to plant even a small portion of the wholesome.’

II. Making Out the Merits Held in Common (with the Remaining Noble Ones)

〔2.1 · Root 41〕The General Roll of the Merits Held in Common — First Drawing Two Boundaries

First ask: What are the merits held in common? The treatise answers: the World-Honored One has further immeasurable merits held in common with the remaining noble ones and with ordinary beings. It then lists a long string — non-contention, the knowledge of aspiration, the unobstructed knowledges, the supernormal knowledges, the meditative absorptions, the formless attainments and concentrations, the immeasurables, the liberations, the bases of mastery, the totalities, and the rest.

The real function of this section is to draw a boundary, and it lies in the two sentences that follow “according as it suits” — “the first three gates are held in common with the remaining noble ones alone; the supernormal knowledges, the meditative absorptions, and the rest are held in common with ordinary beings as well.” In the first three gates (non-contention, the knowledge of aspiration, the unobstructed knowledges) ordinary beings have no share; the supernormal knowledges and the meditative absorptions and the rest even ordinary beings may cultivate. This one cut settles the whole arrangement of what follows: the first three gates are made out first, then the six supernormal knowledges.

Ask again: Why must these two layers be divided? Because non-contention, the knowledge of aspiration, and the unobstructed knowledges must all be obtained in dependence upon limit-stage absorption, and limit-stage absorption is the fourth meditative absorption cultivated to the utmost — where ordinary beings cannot reach. The six supernormal knowledges need only depend upon the four meditative absorptions, and ordinary beings can cultivate them. The depth of the absorption depended upon settles who can hold a merit in common.

Clearing a misreading: seeing the word ‘common’ and supposing that these merits of the Buddha are wholly the same as those of śrāvakas and ordinary beings. It is not so — the later section on limit-stage absorption will explain that of these same six, the remaining noble ones obtain them by preparatory effort alone while the Buddha obtains them by separation from defilement, and that the Buddha raises them before him as he wishes without preparatory effort. What is held in common is the name and the entity; what is not held in common is the manner of obtaining and the mastery.

In practice: while reading the second and third sections of this fascicle, keep the sentence “the first three gates are held in common with the remaining noble ones alone; the supernormal knowledges, the meditative absorptions, and the rest are held in common with ordinary beings as well” always at hand; it is the table of contents of those two sections.

〔2.2 · Root 42〕Non-contention — a Knowledge Cultivated So as Not to Provoke Affliction in Others

First ask: What is non-contention? The treatise’s definition is most unusual — the arhat observes that the suffering of sentient beings arises from affliction, and knows moreover that this body of his own is the most superior among fields of merit (others easily giving rise to greed and hatred over him), and fearing that the afflictions of others may again arise with himself for their object, he deliberately draws forth a knowledge of this kind, so that other sentient beings may not give rise to greed, hatred, and the rest with his body for their object.

This is a merit rarely seen in the whole treatise: its aim lies not upon himself but upon preventing others from giving rise to affliction because of him. The origin of the name lies here too — “because this practice can still the contention of affliction among the classes of sentient beings, it obtains the name ‘non-contention’.”

Ask again: What of its four gates? Its entity is conventional knowledge alone; it depends upon the fourth meditative absorption (which is the most superior among the pleasant modes of progress); only an arhat of the unshakable lineage can raise it (the remaining arhats cannot even guard against the arising of afflictions in themselves); it depends upon a human body in the three continents alone; and it takes as object the afflictions of the desire realm, in the future, and possessed of an entity.

Ask further: Why only the future and only afflictions possessed of an entity? The future is taken as object because only the future can still be forestalled; as for afflictions without an entity (those arising without a concrete object-situation as object), the treatise says expressly that they “cannot be forestalled, since they arise from within and take their objects generally, according as it suits” — they do not arise from ‘you’ as their object at all, and so there is nothing to forestall.

Clearing a misreading: reading non-contention as not disputing with others. What it stills is the affliction in the minds of others, and not a quarrel in words.

In practice: this section demonstrates a rare angle in this treatise’s way of establishing merits — establishing a name by ‘the effect upon others.’ When practice has reached a certain stage, this body of one’s own becomes an object for others, and thereupon even how others regard oneself becomes a matter to be dealt with.

〔2.3 · First Half of Root 43〕The Knowledge of Aspiration — Knowing as One Has Aspired, the Rest as with Non-contention

First ask: What is the knowledge of aspiration? The treatise answers, “because with aspiration foremost it draws forth the arising of a fine knowledge that understands as it aspired, it is named the knowledge of aspiration” — one first makes the aspiration to know something, then draws forth the arising of knowledge, and knows as one aspired.

Ask again: Wherein does it differ from non-contention? The treatise answers with the utmost economy: the four items of own nature, level, lineage, and body are wholly the same as with non-contention, and “only its object differs” — non-contention takes as object the afflictions of the desire realm, future, and possessed of an entity, while the knowledge of aspiration “takes all dharmas for its object.” This is this treatise’s method of abridgement: what is of the same form is not written again; only the item of difference is marked.

Ask further: If all dharmas are its object, can the formless realm too be known? The treatise here records the words of the Vaibhāṣikas — the knowledge of aspiration cannot realize and know the formless, but only observes the causal practices there and the differences of their homogeneous outcome and so knows by inference, “knowing like the class of farmers” (seeing the sprout and knowing the seed).

The manner of cultivation is given too: one first makes a sincere aspiration seeking to know that object, and then enters the limit-stage fourth meditative absorption as preparatory effort; from this, with nothing intervening, according as the force of the absorption entered is superior or inferior, right knowledge arises as drawn forth by the prior force of aspiration, and one knows the object sought as it really is.

Clearing a misreading: reading ‘understanding as one aspired’ as knowing automatically whatever one wishes to know. The treatise’s order is aspiration first, preparatory effort in the middle, knowledge last, and the middle step of ‘entering the limit-stage fourth meditative absorption’ cannot be omitted.

In practice: that the knowledge of aspiration and non-contention share one set of four gates verifies exactly what was said at the end of the first section — the form by which this fascicle opens an account for every merit is fixed. Reading on into the unobstructed knowledges and the six supernormal knowledges, it is still this same table.

〔2.4 · Second Half of Root 43 to Root 45〕The Four Unobstructed Knowledges — Four Objects, Four Inclusions among the Knowledges, and All Four Obtained Together

First ask: Which four are the four unobstructed knowledges? Dharma, meaning, speech, and eloquence. They take as object, in that order, name, meaning, utterance, and the way of utterance, and all have for their own nature a knowledge that cannot be turned back. The treatise explains it very finely: taking as object the name-, phrase-, and syllable-bodies that express is established as the first; taking as object the meaning expressed is established as the second; taking as object the words of local speech is established as the third; taking as object ‘utterance according with correct principle and unhindered’ and ‘the two masterful ways of absorption and discernment’ is established as the fourth.

Ask again: What of the inclusion among the knowledges and the level of dependence? The two knowledges of dharma and of speech are included in conventional knowledge alone (their object being the object-situation of the name-bodies and of worldly speech); the unobstructed knowledge of dharma extends to five levels (the desire realm and the four meditative absorptions, since in the higher levels there are no names and the rest); the unobstructed knowledge of speech depends upon two levels alone (the desire realm and the first meditative absorption, since in the higher levels there is neither applied nor sustained thought). The unobstructed knowledge of meaning is included in sixteen knowledges — and here again is a case of ‘two routes’: if all dharmas are named meaning it is included in ten knowledges; if nirvāṇa alone is named meaning it is included in six (conventional, dharma, subsequent, cessation, exhaustion, non-arising). The unobstructed knowledge of eloquence is included in nine knowledges (excluding the knowledge of cessation alone, since it takes the way of utterance as object). Meaning and eloquence both extend to all levels, up to the summit of existence.

Ask further: What of the obtaining? The treatise says “whichever one is obtained, at that moment all four are assuredly obtained together; it cannot be called obtaining if the four are not complete” — all four are obtained together and cannot be bought singly.

The treatise has here two further passages worth attending to: one, it adduces the Treatise of Designations, matching four phrases to the order of the four unobstructed knowledges; two, it records a divergent explanation of some other masters (speech being all glossing words, eloquence being declaring on and on with words unhindered), together with the order of preparatory efforts in the transmitted account (repeated practice of calculation, the Buddha’s words, the science of sounds, and the science of reasons). And the author’s correct sense is “in truth the arising of every unobstructed knowledge has for its preparatory effort the study of the Buddha’s words alone.”

Clearing a misreading: supposing that the four unobstructed knowledges are four kinds of eloquence in speaking. Their entity is ‘a knowledge that cannot be turned back,’ and its falling upon language is only its function; that the unobstructed knowledge of speech depends upon two levels alone is precisely because in the higher levels there is not even applied or sustained thought — without applied and sustained thought there is no working machinery of language.

In practice: this section demonstrates how the treatise uses the single item of ‘object’ to run through every adjudication — the object is name, hence conventional knowledge alone, hence limited to five levels; the object is speech, hence limited to two levels; the object is the way of utterance, hence the knowledge of cessation is excluded. To ask after the object is at the same time to have asked after the inclusion among the knowledges and the level of dependence.

〔2.5 · Root 46〕Limit-Stage Absorption — Universally According with All, and Increasing to the Utmost

First ask: In dependence upon what are those six above (non-contention, the knowledge of aspiration, the four unobstructed knowledges) obtained? The treatise answers, “they are all obtained in dependence upon limit-stage absorption.” And the entity of limit-stage meditative absorption is likewise of six kinds, that is, of those six, “the former six with speech removed and the remaining limit-stage added” — the unobstructed knowledge of speech, though obtained in dependence upon limit-stage absorption, has an entity not gathered in by the fourth meditative absorption, because the name ‘limit-stage’ is established in dependence upon the fourth meditative absorption alone.

Ask again: How do the two words ‘limit-stage’ earn their name? The treatise gives two conditions, each matched with a stretch of cultivation. Universally according with all — when cultivating this meditative absorption, one enters in order from a mind of the desire realm into the first meditative absorption and up to the summit of existence, then from the summit of existence enters in reverse into the sphere of nothingness and down to the desire realm, then from the desire realm enters upward in order and turns about to the fourth meditative absorption; only when up and down, forward and reverse, have been walked through in this way is it called universally according with all the levels. Increasing to the utmost — cultivating the fourth meditative absorption exclusively, from low to middle and middle to high, and the three grades each divided again into three, and when the highest of the high arises it is named reaching the utmost.

Ask further: What do the two words ‘limit’ and ‘stage’ severally gloss? The treatise says “the word ‘limit’ shows the sense of there being nothing beyond it” (superior with nothing beyond it), and “the word ‘stage’ shows the sense of class and the sense of the utmost,” adducing ‘the four stages’ and ‘the real stage’ as examples.

Ask again: How are they obtained? For all noble ones apart from the Buddha, these six are obtained by preparatory effort alone, not obtained by separation from defilement, the reason being “because it is not that everyone obtains them.” The Buddha alone obtains these by separation from defilement as well — the merits of the buddhas, when the knowledge of exhaustion first arises, are by reason of separation from defilement all obtained at once, and afterwards raised before him as he wishes without preparatory effort.

Clearing a misreading: reading ‘limit-stage’ as an edge or a tail-end. It is precisely the utmost, the summit; the word ‘stage’ takes the sense of the utmost, and not the sense of a corner or an edge.

In practice: this section answers the question left over from the first section — to what degree the merits held in common are ‘held in common.’ Of one and the same set of merits, the remaining noble ones cultivate them one by one by preparatory effort, while the Buddha obtains the whole set at once upon separation from defilement and has them present as he wishes. The difference in the manner of obtaining is the real boundary between the Buddha and the remaining noble ones in the merits held in common.

III. Making Out the Merits Held in Common with Ordinary Beings (the Six Supernormal Knowledges Even Ordinary Beings May Cultivate)

〔3.1 · Roots 47 to 50〕The Six Supernormal Knowledges — the Densest Stretch of Prose in the Fascicle

First ask: Which six are the six supernormal knowledges? Those realized through the knowledge of the divine object-field, of the divine eye, of the divine ear, of the minds of others, of the recollection of former abodes, and of the exhaustion of the outflows. Among them the sixth belongs to the noble ones alone, while the former five ordinary beings too obtain — and so, speaking by the general mark, it is said that they are ‘held in common with ordinary beings as well.’

Ask again: What is the entity? The treatise answers “included in the path of liberation, having discernment for their own nature, like the fruits of the ascetic life,” and glosses “the words ‘path of liberation’ show the sense of issuing forth from obstruction.” A supernormal knowledge is not a marvelous affair; it is discernment — and moreover that portion of discernment which issues forth from obstruction. This is the pole-star of the whole passage.

Inclusion among the knowledges: the four supernormal knowledges beginning with the divine object-field are included in conventional knowledge alone; that of the minds of others in five knowledges (dharma, subsequent, path, conventional, minds of others); that of the exhaustion of the outflows is as stated under the power of the exhaustion of the outflows (six or ten), by which it is also shown that it depends upon all levels and takes all objects.

Level of dependence: the former five supernormal knowledges depend upon the four meditative absorptions. Why not upon the formless? The treatise gives four reasons — the former three supernormal knowledges take form as object; cultivating that of the minds of others uses form as its gate; cultivating that of former abodes requires recollecting in order the differences of the stages and, when accomplished, takes the sense fields and the natures and the rest as object, and in the formless levels there are none of these capacities; and again, the formless levels are of ‘observation decreased and stillness increased,’ while the five supernormal knowledges must depend upon a level where stillness and observation are equal, and access concentration and the like are by this reason likewise excluded.

The manner of cultivating three of the supernormal knowledges the treatise gives very concretely: to cultivate that of the minds of others one first examines closely the alterations before and after of the two marks of one’s own body and mind and how they follow one upon another, and then examines closely the marks of another’s body and mind; to cultivate that of former abodes one first examines the mind just ceased before, observes in reverse the earlier and earlier differences of the stages of this life down to the mind of taking rebirth, and even to recollecting the first thought-instant of intermediate existence, and afterwards extends to others. When first raised it knows only in order; when practice has ripened it can also recollect leaping over the order. What is recollected must have been experienced before — how then does one recollect the Pure Abodes? The treatise answers, “because one had heard of them in the past.”

The object is one’s own level and those below alone: whichever level the divine object-field arises in dependence upon, upon that level and those below it exercises transformation at will, and not upon the higher, its force being inferior; and the remaining four are likewise. Therefore none can take the minds of others or the former abodes of the formless realm as object.

The breadth and narrowness of the operation: the great śrāvaka, the pratyekabuddha likened to the rhinoceros horn, and the Great Awakened One, when not attending to the utmost, can in that order exert them upon a thousand, two thousand, and three thousand worlds; when attending to the utmost, upon two thousand, three thousand, and countless worlds.

The manner of obtaining: what has never been obtained and is of keen and superior operation is obtained by preparatory effort; what has been practiced before and has no superior operation is obtained by separation from defilement; raising them before one is in every case by preparatory effort; while for the Buddha everything is obtained by separation from defilement and raised before him as he wishes without preparatory effort.

Inclusion in the foundations of mindfulness: the former three supernormal knowledges are in the foundation of mindfulness of the body alone (taking only form as object — the divine object-field taking the four outer sense fields of form, scent, taste, and the tangible; the divine eye taking form; the divine ear taking sound). Here the treatise raises an objection to itself — the sūtra says the knowledge of death and birth can know that sentient beings, by the evil conduct of body, speech, and mind accomplished in their present bodies, and so forth; does that not take mental dharmas as object? The treatise answers: that is not what the supernormal knowledge of the divine eye itself can know; there is a further superior knowledge that is the retinue of this supernormal knowledge, arising in dependence upon the body of a noble one, and because it is drawn forth by the divine eye it is joined with this supernormal knowledge and the one name ‘knowledge of death and birth’ is established. That of the minds of others is included in three foundations of mindfulness (feeling, mind, dharmas); those of former abodes and of the exhaustion of the outflows in four (taking as object all objects, the five aggregates).

The three ethical qualities: the divine eye and the divine ear are included among things of indeterminate nature, because the entity of these two is granted to be the discernment associated with eye-consciousness and ear-consciousness. Here the treatise again raises an objection to itself — if that is so, how can they be said to depend upon the four meditative absorptions? There are two answers: one, that it is said in accordance with the ‘faculty’ (the two faculties of eye and ear depended upon being drawn forth by the force of the four meditative absorptions and thus included in those levels); two, that it is said in accordance with the uninterrupted path of the supernormal knowledge (that uninterrupted path depending upon four levels). The remaining four supernormal knowledges are all of wholesome nature. And at the last one further objection is raised — if that is so, why does the Treatise on Categories of Dharmas say “what is a supernormal knowledge? It is wholesome discernment”? The treatise answers, “that is said with regard to the greater part, or with regard to the superior.”

Clearing a misreading: reading the six supernormal knowledges as a catalogue of six marvelous abilities. From beginning to end the treatise has not one sentence describing the effects of supernormal power; the whole of its strength is spent upon the four questions of what discernment is the entity, upon what level it depends, what object it takes, and how it is obtained. In practice: these eight hundred eighty characters are the sole extended prose passage of the fascicle, and the four-gate format is used here at its most complete; read this through, and the abridged places in the earlier sections on non-contention, the knowledge of aspiration, and the unobstructed knowledges are all supplied.

〔3.2 · Root 51〕The Three Clear Knowings — Why Only Three among the Six Supernormal Knowledges Are Called Clear Knowings

First ask: Which three are the three clear knowings? The clear knowing realized through the knowledge of former abodes, that realized through the knowledge of death and birth, and that realized through the knowledge of the exhaustion of the outflows, having for their own nature, in that order, the fifth, the second, and the sixth supernormal knowledges as included in the stage beyond training. Note that restriction — the same supernormal knowledge, in the stage of one in training, is not called a clear knowing.

Ask again: Why among the six supernormal knowledges do these three alone earn the name of clear knowing? The reason the treatise gives is “because in that order they counteract the folly regarding the three periods” — the supernormal knowledge of former abodes counteracts the folly regarding the prior period, that of death and birth the folly regarding the later period, that of the exhaustion of the outflows the folly regarding the middle period. The folly and darkness of the three stretches of time, past, future, and present, have each a supernormal knowledge to counteract them, and so these three alone earn the name of clear knowing.

Ask further: Are all three true clear knowings? The treatise divides finely: the last (the exhaustion of the outflows) “may be truly so,” because it extends to what is without outflows; the other two are said conventionally to be clear knowings, because their entity is only what is neither in training nor beyond training.

Ask again: In the body of one in training the former two supernormal knowledges are also present; why are they not established as clear knowings? The treatise answers, “because in the body of one in training there is folly and darkness,” and adds a sentence of importance — “although at times he can subdue and extinguish folly and darkness for a while, afterwards he is covered over again, and so they are not named clear knowings.” A temporary lighting is not clear knowing; what can be covered over again is not clear knowing.

Clearing a misreading: supposing the three clear knowings to be three things higher than the supernormal knowledges. They just are those three supernormal knowledges, only that standing in the stage beyond training they earn this name. The establishing of the name hangs upon the stage and upon what is counteracted, and not upon the ability itself.

In practice: this section demonstrates a device very common in this treatise — one and the same entity of a dharma bearing different names according to stage and function. The relation of ‘power’ and ‘fearlessness’ above was of the same sort. In reading Abhidharma, when a new technical term is met with, the first question is always ‘is this a new entity, or a new name for an old one?’

〔3.3 · Root 52〕The Three Guiding Demonstrations — Why Instruction Is the Most Honored

First ask: Which three are the three guiding demonstrations? The guiding demonstration of divine transformation, of discerning minds, and of instruction, having for their own nature, in that order, the first (the divine object-field), the fourth (the minds of others), and the sixth (the exhaustion of the outflows) among the six supernormal knowledges. Why these three alone? Because these three alone can guide the sentient beings to be trained to raise the mind for the first time and are the most superior, or can guide those who hate and turn their backs on the true Dharma and those who stand in the middle to raise the mind. Because they can ‘demonstrate’ and can ‘guide’ they earn the name guiding demonstration; and again, because these three alone can bring a man within the Buddha’s Dharma to submit, to accept in faith, and to practice, in that order.

Ask again: Among the three, why is instruction the most honored? The treatise gives two reasons. The first — the former two demonstrations spell-craft too can accomplish, without necessarily relying upon a supernormal knowledge, and so they are not definite; and the treatise adduces two actual instances, the Gandhārī spell that can make one soar into the sky at will and the Īkṣaṇī spell that can make one know what is in another’s mind. The guiding demonstration by instruction, apart from the supernormal knowledge of the exhaustion of the outflows, nothing else can accomplish, and so it is definite. The second — the former two demonstrations can only make another turn his mind for a while and do not draw forth a superior result; the guiding demonstration by instruction assuredly can make another draw forth a result of benefit and ease to come, “because it declares by skillful means just as things really are.”

Clearing a misreading: supposing that the author is disparaging supernormal power. He is not — the treatise’s criterion is perfectly cool: what can be counterfeited by spell-craft is not enough to serve as a criterion. That divine transformation and the discerning of minds fall into second place is not because they are not real, but because those who see them have no way of telling whether what they see is a supernormal knowledge or a spell.

In practice: this section is the most serviceable stretch of the fascicle for the present world. Wherever one meets with someone who wins men’s trust by an unusual ability, the treatise has already set up the measuring rod for us — ask one question, ‘can spell-craft do this thing?’, and then ask another, ‘is what it draws forth a temporary turning of the mind, or benefit and ease to come?’

〔3.4 · Roots 53 and 54〕The Supernormal Knowledge of the Divine Object-Field — Motion of Three Kinds, Transformation of Two

First ask: What sense do the two words ‘divine object-field’ designate? The treatise answers following the tenor of what the Mahāvibhāṣā says: what ‘the divine’ designates is superior concentration alone (a superior absorption), since by it deeds of divine transformation can be done; and the deeds of divine transformation are named the ‘object-field.’ The divine is absorption, the object-field is the deeds — the two words each point at something, and it is not one compound word.

Ask again: How many kinds is the object-field? Two — motion and transformation. Motion is again of three kinds: conveying the body (riding through space like a flying bird), resolve (pondering a place utterly far off as near, whereupon one can swiftly arrive), and the momentum of thought (when for a place utterly far off one raises the mind and takes it as object, the body at once arrives; the operation being as thought, it is named the momentum of thought). Among the three, the momentum of thought belongs to the Buddha alone; conveying the body and resolve extend to the other vehicles as well. The treatise here adduces the World-Honored One’s own words, ‘the object-field of the buddhas is inconceivable,’ as warrant, and sets out a ladder — the momentum of thought belongs to the World-Honored One alone, resolve extends to the remaining noble ones, conveying the body extends even to ordinary beings.

Ask further: How many kinds is transformation? Two — transformation in the desire realm and in the form realm. A transformation of the desire realm transforms the four outer sense fields (with sound removed); a transformation of the form realm transforms two alone (form and the tangible, since in the form realm there is neither scent nor taste). The transformations of these two realms are each of two kinds (belonging to one’s own body and belonging to another’s), and so when the body is in the desire realm the transformations are four kinds and when in the form realm likewise four, making eight in all.

Here the treatise raises an objection to itself: if one is born in the form realm and makes a transformation of the desire realm, does one not incur the fault of accomplishing scent and taste? Two answers are given — one, that it is like making clothes and ornaments, made and yet not accomplished; and there is another account which holds that in the form realm only two sense fields are transformed.

Clearing a misreading: reading ‘resolve’ as a kind of conviction. Here it is a form of attention within absorption — taking what is utterly far off as near — whereupon the body swiftly arrives. The differences among the three kinds of motion are in fact three ways of arriving: walking over, thinking over, and arriving the moment the mind stirs.

In practice: at the last the author asks himself, “is a deed of transformation done by a mind of transformation just the supernormal knowledge?”, and answers “it is not,” “it is the result produced by the supernormal knowledge.” The supernormal knowledge is the cause, the transformation the result — this one sentence ties off the whole section and opens the next.

〔3.5 · Roots 55 to 58〕The Fourteen Minds Capable of Transformation — Level of Dependence, Arising, Speech and Silence, Preserving the Body

First ask: Why are the minds capable of transformation fourteen? Because they arise in dependence upon the four fundamental meditative absorptions and there is a difference of level — two in dependence upon the first meditative absorption (included in the desire realm, included in the first meditative absorption), three upon the second, four upon the third, five upon the fourth, each adding those of its own level and of the levels below; and two plus three plus four plus five is exactly fourteen.

Ask again: What is the rule for the level of dependence? “The minds of transformation that are results depend upon their own level and the levels above, and assuredly do not depend upon those below” — a mind of absorption of a lower level does not produce a result of a higher, its force being inferior. Again, the mind of transformation of a lower level produced by the second absorption and the rest, as against the mind of transformation of a higher level produced by the first absorption and the rest, is also named superior by reason of what it depends upon and what it ranges over.

Ask further: How does a mind of transformation arise, and how does it end? The treatise says it “assuredly has no sense of issuing from contemplation directly” — from the pure absorption arises the first mind of transformation, thereafter the later minds arise from their own class and each earlier thought-instant produces a mind of its own class, and the last mind of transformation produces the pure absorption again; and so this mind arises from two and can produce two. The reason is that a mind that is the result of absorption is included among things of indeterminate nature and cannot issue from contemplation directly; only a mind that does not re-enter absorption has the sense of issuing directly, “as one goes in by the gate and comes out again by the gate.”

The level of dependence of a deed of transformation and of transformed speech: a deed of transformation is by a mind of its own level, and no mind of transformation of a different level raises a transformation of another level; the speech uttered by a transformation, however, extends to a mind of its own level or of a lower — the speech uttered by a transformation of the desire realm or of the first absorption is assuredly raised by a mind of its own level, while a transformation of a higher level raising speech does so by a mind of the first absorption, because in the higher levels themselves there is no mind that raises manifest action.

Speech and silence at the same time: if one master of transformation raises many transformed bodies, only when the master of transformation speaks do the transformed bodies speak, and the content expressed by the sounds of speech is in every case the same.

Preserving the body: the treatise raises an objection to itself — once the mind that utters speech has arisen the mind of transformation is gone, and the mind of transformation being gone there ought to be no transformed body; how then can the transformed body speak? The answer is that by the force of a prior vow the transformed body has been preserved, and afterwards another mind is raised that utters the manifest action of speech, and so although the two minds are not present together speech can still be uttered in dependence upon the transformed body. Again, a transformed body can be preserved not only while the life of the master of transformation is present but also after his life has ended — the instance given is the Venerable Mahākāśyapa leaving his body of linked bones to last until the age of the Compassionate One, with the explanation that only a solid entity may be preserved long, and so he did not preserve his flesh and the rest. There is another class of masters who say that the force of a vow preserving a body assuredly cannot make it last after death, and that the body of linked bones of the Venerable Drinker of Light was made to last long by the upholding of the gods.

One newly at the practice and one who has become accomplished: one newly at the practice uses many minds of transformation to transform one thing; one whose practice has become accomplished transforms many things with a single mind. The three ethical qualities: these fourteen minds of transformation are all obtained by cultivation and included among things of indeterminate nature, that is, the indeterminate of penetrative effect; the other minds capable of transformation, obtained at birth and the like, extend to all three ethical qualities, as with gods and nāgas and the rest, who too can make transformations for their own bodies and for others, transforming nine among the ten sense fields of form, with sound removed. The treatise adds at the end: stated in principle, there is nothing that can transform a faculty, yet since the object transformed is not apart from a faculty, to say ‘nine sense fields are transformed’ is likewise not at fault.

Clearing a misreading: reading transformed bodies as an art of dividing the body. What the treatise attends to from first to last is the level of dependence and the order of arising and ceasing of the mind — whether a transformed body can speak and whether it can last long is settled entirely by ‘whether the mind is present at this moment.’

In practice: this section is the densest in the fascicle in its arithmetic. In reading, hold to one thread — whenever one asks what a transformed body can do, first ask whether the mind capable of transformation is still present at that moment; if it is, the deed follows the mind; if it is not, it must be held up by what the prior vow has preserved.

〔3.6 · The Quoted Stanza at the End of Root 58〕The Stanza on the Speech and Silence of the Master of Transformation — Read the Buddha’s Exception Along with It

First ask: This gāthā, “when the one master of transformation speaks, all the transformed speak; if the one master of transformation is silent, all the transformed too are so,” says what? It says that master of transformation and transformed body are assuredly together in speech and in silence — the master of transformation opens his mouth and the transformed bodies speak with one voice, the master of transformation keeps silence and the transformed bodies are all still, and moreover “the content expressed by the sounds of speech is in every case the same.”

Ask again: Does this rule extend to the Buddha? The treatise immediately breaks it — “this is said only with regard to the rest; with the Buddha it is not so.” The reason is that the force of the Buddha’s several absorptions is the most masterful, and his speaking with the transformed bodies may be at different times, and the content expressed by the sounds of speech may also differ. So this gāthā is established for the other vehicles, and not for the Buddha.

That this stanza is judged a quoted stanza has its warrant in the preceding text, “there is a gāthā that says thus” — of the same type as the earlier “as the Bhagavat himself said in a stanza,” both express formulas of another’s speech.

Clearing a misreading: reading only the stanza and not what follows, and thereupon taking ‘speech and silence assuredly together’ for a general rule. The treatise’s arrangement is precisely to establish the general rule first and then to mark the exception; the sentence of the exception is what this passage really means to say — it shows the degree to which the Buddha is masterful in absorption.

In practice: in this fascicle, wherever it is said that ‘the Buddha and the other vehicles alike obtain a certain merit,’ having read it one must ask a further question, ‘has the Buddha an exception in this matter?’ The obtaining by separation from defilement under limit-stage absorption above was one such; the speech and silence not being together here is another.

〔3.7 · Root 59〕The Divine Eye and Ear — They Are Faculties, Not Supernormal Knowledges

First ask: What sense do the three words ‘divine eye and ear’ designate? The treatise answers with perfect decisiveness — “these words designate only the faculties of the divine eye and ear,” that is, the subtle form produced by the four meditative absorptions. The manner of cultivation is to take light and sound as object in one’s preparatory effort, and in dependence upon the four meditative absorptions to draw forth, at the edge of the eye and the ear, the two subtle-form faculties of eye and ear produced by the fine great elements of those levels; and to see forms and hear sounds with them is named the divine eye and ear.

Ask again: Why are they named ‘divine’? The treatise answers, “their entity is just divine, since they are included in the levels of absorption” — it is not that they are like the divine; their entity itself belongs to the levels of absorption, and the levels of absorption are of the class of the divine.

Ask further: Is the divine eye and ear of one kind only, obtained by cultivation? The treatise lists three kinds: divine by cultivation (as stated above), divine by birth (obtained by being born among the gods), and resembling the divine (a being born in the other destinies, by reason of a superior action and the like, able to see far and hear far and so resembling the divine), adducing as instances the jewel that is the treasurer minister, bodhisattvas, wheel-turning monarchs, the several nāgas, ghosts, and spirits, and intermediate existence.

Ask again: What is the mark of what is obtained by cultivation? “Whether past, present, or yet to arise, they are constantly participating” — because on reaching the present they assuredly arise together with a consciousness and can see and hear; “their locations are assuredly complete, without film and without defect,” as with all the sentient beings born in the form realm; and they can, according as it suits, apprehend the forms and sounds of the several quarters that are obstructed, utterly subtle, and utterly far off.

Clearing a misreading: confusing the divine eye and ear with the supernormal knowledges of the divine eye and of the divine ear. This section speaks of the faculty (the subtle form depended upon); the earlier section on the six supernormal knowledges speaks of the supernormal knowledge (the discernment that arises in dependence upon the faculty). The two are entity and function, and the treatise sets up a section here on purpose to tell them clearly apart.

In practice: this also explains the difficulty raised above — how the supernormal knowledges of the divine eye and ear can be of indeterminate nature and yet be said to depend upon the four meditative absorptions. Because the faculty depended upon is drawn forth by the four meditative absorptions and is thus included in those levels; to say ‘depending upon four’ is said in accordance with the faculty. This section is exactly the ground material of that answer.

〔3.8 · The Quoted Stanza at the End of Root 59〕The Stanza on the Fleshly Eye and the Divine Eye — One Contrast Ties Off the Whole Section

First ask: This stanza, “the fleshly eye, with regard to the several quarters, to obstructed, subtle, and far-off forms, has no function of seeing; the divine eye sees them without anything left out,” has what function? It takes the one sentence of the preceding prose, “they can according as it suits apprehend the forms and sounds of the several quarters that are obstructed, utterly subtle, and utterly far off,” and rewrites it as a pair of contrasts — the fleshly eye has no function of seeing with regard to all three, the obstructed form, the utterly subtle form, and the utterly far-off form, while the divine eye sees them with nothing left out.

Ask again: Why adduce a stanza again after the prose? Because the prose came down from ‘the mark of what is obtained by cultivation’ (constantly participating, without film and without defect, apprehending according as it suits), while this stanza speaks from ‘the comparison with the fleshly eye.’ One and the same thing set in another coordinate system, and only then does the reader know what it is that the divine eye surpasses — not that it sees more clearly, but that all three that could not be seen at all are seen.

That this stanza is judged a quoted stanza has its warrant in the preceding text, “hence there is here a stanza such as this,” of the same type as the two before it.

Clearing a misreading: supposing that the divine eye is a strengthened version of the fleshly eye. The three items the stanza lists (obstructed, utterly subtle, utterly far off) are none of them matters of clarity; they are matters of whether a thing can be seen at all; at these three the fleshly eye “has no function of seeing,” and does not see them blurrily.

In practice: each of the three quoted stanzas is attached to its own section — the first ties off the dharmas not held in common (the result of confidence and reverence), the second ties off the minds of transformation (the rule of speech and silence), and this one ties off the divine eye and ear (seeing with nothing left out). None of the three enters the count of the root stanzas, and yet each, at the end of its section, makes one tying off of the prose.

〔3.9 · Roots 60 and 61〕The Classes of the Five Supernormal Knowledges — Cultivation, Birth, Spell, Drug, Action, and the Restrictions of the Destinies

First ask: It was said above that minds of transformation differ as obtained by cultivation and as otherwise obtained; do the five supernormal knowledges beginning with the divine object-field each have such a difference as well? The treatise answers “they do too,” and then lists them one by one. The knowledge of the divine object-field is of five kinds in all — obtained by cultivation, obtained by birth, accomplished by spell, accomplished by drug, accomplished by action; and it adduces the knowledges of the divine object-field of King Māndhātṛ and of intermediate existence and the like as instances of what is accomplished by action. The knowledge of the minds of others is of four kinds in all — the former three as above (cultivation, birth, spell) with accomplishment by the reading of marks added. The remaining three (the divine eye, the divine ear, former abodes) are each of three kinds, that is, cultivation, birth, and action.

Ask again: How are the three ethical qualities divided? The treatise answers, “apart from what is obtained by cultivation, all extend to the wholesome and the rest” — what is obtained by cultivation is indeterminate (that is, the indeterminate of penetrative effect spoken of before), while what is obtained by birth, accomplished by spell, by drug, or by action extends to all three ethical qualities; and it adds a further verdict, “since they are not the result of absorption they do not obtain the name of supernormal knowledge.” Note this sentence: what is not obtained by cultivation ought not, strictly speaking, to be given even the name ‘supernormal knowledge,’ because they are not results produced by absorption.

Ask further: How is it among the several destinies? “In the human destiny there is wholly none obtained by birth; in the remaining destinies they are all admitted” — the human destiny has none obtained of itself by being born, while the other destinies may all have them; and each according as it suits, the recollection arising from one’s own nature is included in what is accomplished by action. As for the destiny of the hells, the treatise says it very finely: at the first taking of birth they can, with the supernormal knowledges of the minds of others and of former abodes obtained by birth alone, know the minds of others and the rest and their past lives, but “once the feeling of suffering has pressed upon them, there is no further sense in which they know” — once suffering presses upon them, that little knowing is gone. For those born in the remaining destinies it should be inferred accordingly.

Clearing a misreading: seeing the five sources as five roads set out as equals. The treatise has already laid them in layers for us — only what is obtained by cultivation is truly a supernormal knowledge (the result of absorption), and the other four are only a resembling function; and moreover only what is obtained by cultivation is indeterminate, while the rest extend to all three ethical qualities. The source settles whether a thing is a ‘supernormal knowledge,’ and settles also its ethical quality.

In practice: the whole fascicle ends here, and its closing upon that one sentence about the hells is full of meaning — even beings in hell, when first born, have a little knowing, but once suffering presses upon them it is extinguished. This fascicle begins from the Buddha’s ten powers and stops at one thought of knowing in the hells; it is the same ‘knowing,’ and the distance between them is the whole measure of the merits this fascicle makes out.

Further Resonances: The Mirror of the Three Commentaries

The above is the sense of the text of the treatise itself in this fascicle. Below a separate section is set up, gathering four matters: the interpretations and the fullness and brevity of the three commentaries, Saṅghabhadra’s refutations and rescuing objections, the divergences of Paramārtha’s earlier translation, and the loose threads this fascicle leaves. A mirror is not the treatise; it only looks at the same passage in another way of reading; recorded without adjudication, each returned to its place.

1. A Commentary Wholly Absent in This Chapter

The commentaries on this fascicle have one peculiar circumstance: Shentai’s commentary is a fragmentary text, and its surviving fascicles are wholly absent for the chapter on knowledge — a fault-tolerant check of such words as “the eighteen not held in common,” “the four fearlessnesses,” “the three foundations of mindfulness,” “great compassion,” “non-contention,” “the knowledge of aspiration,” “the unobstructed knowledges,” “the divine object-field,” and “the divine eye and ear” yields zero hits throughout that commentary. So this fascicle has no running exposition of Shentai’s to hang upon; the absence is marked as it stands, and the text of other fascicles is not used to fill it in. (Although his general conspectus table in Fascicle One does record the phrase “the chapter on knowledge, sixty-one lines,” that is a number in a conspectus and not commentarial exposition, and may not serve as a running exposition.) Two further matters the reader should know: Yuanhui has no separate chapter-title line in the chapter on knowledge, so that to search Yuanhui by a string of the chapter name is bound to yield a false zero; and Fabao, because he divides main section one of this chapter into seven and not into four, has outline numbers forming a system of his own, so that in citing his ‘number so-and-so’ one must always name his house and not reckon it together with Puguang’s.

2. The Refutations and Rescuing Objections Puguang Marks — the Firmest Set of Structures in the Fascicle

The thing most worth attending to in this fascicle is that Puguang, in the section on the six supernormal knowledges, marks in two places the format of exchange, “a refutation says” and “a rescuing objection says,” and that the ‘refutation’ in both places is, on the word-for-word cross-evidence of three sides, the original sentence of Saṅghabhadra’s Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle.

The first place is whether the supernormal knowledges of former abodes and of the exhaustion of the outflows both extend to the four foundations of mindfulness. The prose self-commentary of this treatise gives “those of former abodes and of the exhaustion of the outflows are included in the four foundations of mindfulness, since they take as object all objects, the five aggregates.” Saṅghabhadra assesses it, saying “the Sūtra-master would have each one alike extend to inclusion in the four foundations of mindfulness, since they take as object all objects, the five aggregates. But in truth that of former abodes is included in the foundation of mindfulness of dharmas,” holding that in truth that of former abodes is included in the foundation of mindfulness of dharmas alone and that of the exhaustion of the outflows is as with the power (either dharmas or all four), so that “one should not say definitely that they are included in the four foundations of mindfulness.” What Puguang cites in his “a refutation says” passage is word for word the same as this saying of Saṅghabhadra. ⇒ The refuter is Saṅghabhadra and the one refuted is Vasubandhu (the Sūtra-master); this attribution has three-sided word-for-word evidence and leaves no room for inversion.

Thereafter Puguang marks “a rescuing objection says,” his text running “I grant that former abodes too has a separate object, and so it extends to the four foundations of mindfulness. That the exhaustion of the outflows extends to the four foundations of mindfulness is said with regard to the ten knowledges,” and he adduces the account of the Venerable Ghoṣa in the Mahāvibhāṣā as support. Yet Puguang here marks only the two words ‘a rescuing objection says,’ without naming who rescues — whether Puguang resolves it by principle on another’s behalf, or whether there was some other master. It is recorded as it stands, without adjudicating the identity of the rescuer on his behalf.

The second place is whether the supernormal knowledges of the divine eye and ear are included among things of indeterminate nature. This treatise gives “among these six supernormal knowledges the divine eye and the divine ear are included among things of indeterminate nature, since the entity of these two is granted to be the discernment associated with eye-consciousness and ear-consciousness.” Saṅghabhadra first cites Vasubandhu’s explanation word for word, then refutes it head-on with “this explanation is not so,” setting up instead the position that “the discernment associated with the two consciousnesses of eye and ear is not a supernormal knowledge, but may only be said to be drawn forth by a supernormal knowledge.” Puguang’s second “a refutation says” passage gives “this explanation is not so. The six supernormal knowledges are all included in the path of liberation. That the two consciousnesses of eye and ear are the path of liberation cannot be established in principle,” answering word for word to Saṅghabhadra’s original sentence. ⇒ The refuter is likewise Saṅghabhadra. Thereafter Puguang likewise marks “a rescuing objection says,” giving “the two supernormal knowledges were originally raised for seeing and hearing at a distance, and to obtain seeing and hearing at a distance is just to display the absence of obstruction. The two consciousnesses of eye and ear are named the path of liberation” — and the rescuer here too is unnamed, and it is recorded as it stands, as above.

What these two places dispute is in fact two sides of one matter: whether the entity of a supernormal knowledge can after all be discernment associated with a consciousness. Vasubandhu grants that the discernment associated with eye- and ear-consciousness is the entity of a supernormal knowledge; Saṅghabhadra says the six supernormal knowledges are all included in the path of liberation and that the two consciousnesses do not constitute the path of liberation, so that the discernment of the two consciousnesses is not a supernormal knowledge but only drawn forth by one. One meaning and two schools, recorded together without adjudication.

A place different in kind must further be noted: in the section on the four fearlessnesses this treatise gives “in truth fearlessness is accomplished by knowledge, and one should not say that its entity is just knowledge,” and Saṅghabhadra here does not refute but sets forth — he says positively, “one should say that fearlessness is accomplished by knowledge. In truth it should be so,” and raises an objection to himself and answers it (“is it not that the absence of knowledge is the entity of fear; how then can it be said that the entity of knowledge is just fearlessness? This reproach is not so”) in order to show why this gloss stands. This is mutual evidence of attribution, and not an opposition of two schools, and may not be run together into one form with the refuting and rescuing of the two places above.

One further thing must be honestly recorded: the debate in this fascicle is highly concentrated in the section on the six supernormal knowledges. In the sections on the ten powers, the four fearlessnesses, the three foundations of mindfulness, great compassion, buddhas regarded one against another, non-contention, the knowledge of aspiration, and the four unobstructed knowledges, no assessment and refutation of Saṅghabhadra’s in the form of citing “the Sūtra-master” is found within the range of this fascicle. This is the actual state and not a failure of searching, and no supplement is forced. As for the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine, its line-by-line fine collation within the range of this fascicle’s scenes is not yet completed; its chapter number is shifted one place later than in the base text and in the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle (the chapter on knowledge being the eighth), which belongs to a book-wide phenomenon, and citing it must give the eighth.

3. Puguang’s Three Layers of Divergent Explanation in the Passage on Bodily Power

Beneath the sentence that bodily power has “the sense field of the tangible for its nature,” Puguang lists three layers of divergent explanation without judging which is superior — the first takes the assessors of the Mahāvibhāṣā (the fifth account) as correct; the second holds that the Kośa need not take the assessors of the Mahāvibhāṣā for its measure, and that on this explanation the first master’s account is correct; the third holds that this sentence of the Kośa in fact adopts the sense of the Sautrāntikas, and passes the verdict “the author’s intent sides with the Sautrāntikas, and so he sets out their tenet. This explanation seems the better.” Three explanations set out together, and Puguang does not judge.

Here the layers must be told especially clearly apart: the prose commentary of this treatise records only the two accounts of “having the sense field of the tangible for its nature” and “some say: it is a derived tangible, existing separately apart from the seven,” and the three layers of divergent explanation are wholly Puguang’s interpretation and not the treatise’s direct statement. In reading, one may not take a commentator’s division for the position of the text of the treatise itself.

As for the choice among the three accounts of bodily power, this treatise does pass an express assessing remark — “among the accounts given, only the greater is reasonable”; Puguang reads this as “the author of the treatise assesses and takes what Dharmatrāta says,” and records that Saṅghabhadra’s two treatises assess it likewise. This place is an express judgment of the author’s and not a recording without adjudication, exactly the contrary in kind to the three layers of divergent explanation in the passage above, and the one may not be taken as a case of the other.

4. Puguang’s Two Accounts Introduced by “Some Say” in the Passage on the Knowledge of Aspiration

In the passage on the knowledge of aspiration Puguang brings out two further accounts and raises an objection and resolves it — first he says “some say: by observing the homogeneous outcome and the differences of the practice, as one observes a man walking a road and knows whence he has come,” and then raises the objection that ‘if that is so the knowledge of aspiration ought to be inferential knowledge and not direct perception,’ answering that this knowledge does not know the result by observing the cause nor the cause by observing the result, and so is direct perception and not inference. Two accounts introduced by “some say” set out together, and Puguang only records without adjudicating. This belongs to a commentator’s interpretation; the prose commentary of this treatise records only the Vaibhāṣikas’ passage that “the knowledge of aspiration cannot realize and know the formless,” and does not reach the telling apart of direct perception and inference.

5. The Three Layers of Structure in the Passage on the Unobstructed Knowledge of Speech

In the passage on the unobstructed knowledge of speech this treatise records three layers — the divergent explanation of some other masters (speech being glossing words, eloquence being words unhindered), the transmitted account of the Vaibhāṣika masters (the order of preparatory efforts being calculation, the Buddha’s words, the science of sounds, and the science of reasons), and the author’s correct sense (“in truth the arising of every unobstructed knowledge has for its preparatory effort the study of the Buddha’s words alone”). Puguang expressly marks the first two as “setting out a divergent account” and “this explains the preparatory effort,” and the third as “stating the correct sense,” and adduces the assessors’ account in Fascicle One Hundred Eighty of the Mahāvibhāṣā as the ground of this sentence of the author’s.

These three are not refuting one another. The transmitted account of the Vaibhāṣika masters is what the author’s sentence beginning “in truth” means to supplement and clarify, and is not judged erroneous and refuted. Its character lies between a plain setting out of divergent accounts and a formal refuting and rescuing, and only its actual state is recorded, without giving it the name of a debate.

6. The Differences of Fullness and Brevity among the Three Commentaries

In the doctrinal content within the range of this fascicle the three are not found to differ from one another, all following the treatise; wherein they differ is in the fullness and brevity of the pedagogical scaffolding, each having its own strength.

The fivefold outline of the dharmas not held in common (the ten powers, the four fearlessnesses, the three foundations of mindfulness, great compassion, the sameness and difference of buddhas) agrees word for word in all three, save that Puguang analyzes line by line the three layers of raising, question, and explanation, Fabao is terse in composition, and Yuanhui’s summary is the most concise. On the reason the three foundations of mindfulness are not held in common, Puguang expressly marks the question and answer (because the residual habits are cut off along with them), Fabao agrees wholly in doctrine and adds a second explanation besides (the disciples belong to the Tathāgata and not to the śrāvakas), and Yuanhui explains directly without setting up a separate question and answer — Fabao alone adds an explanation. On the outline of the merits held in common, Puguang marks two sections in general (marking the names in general, explaining separately), Fabao sets up four gates instead (the absorption of non-contention, the knowledge of aspiration, the unobstructed knowledges, the difference in obtaining, with the one further section-name ‘the difference in obtaining’) and adduces from the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle the scriptural warrant that an arhat recollects the bodies of various kinds received in many past lives, to supplement his explanation of the intent of non-contention, and Yuanhui is the most concise — Fabao alone adds a scriptural warrant. On the dispute over the wholesome nature of the divine eye and ear, Fabao handles it in the format of question and answer (the surface conflict between the Treatise on Categories of Dharmas’ “a supernormal knowledge is wholesome discernment” and the indeterminate nature of the two supernormal knowledges) and adduces the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle’s “the six supernormal knowledges are all included in the path of liberation” as support, which is related to Puguang’s two passages of refuting and rescuing but is not the same passage. On the names and senses of the two spell-crafts, Fabao alone adduces the account of Paramārtha (Gandhārī rendered ‘Upholder of the Earth,’ and Īkṣaṇī being the name of a treatise composed by a non-Buddhist master, rendered ‘Observing the Times’), which neither Puguang nor Yuanhui adduces. On the refuting and rescuing over the six supernormal knowledges, Puguang expressly marks two exchanges, Fabao shows no labels of refuting and rescuing, and Yuanhui omits the structure of debate and presents it directly as an outline summary — this is the most conspicuous place where the fullness and brevity of the three differ.

⇒ Puguang excels in the labels of refuting and rescuing and in setting out divergent accounts together; Fabao now and then adds an explanation, a scriptural warrant, or an adducing of Paramārtha; Yuanhui excels in the conciseness of his outline summary. No judgment of superiority, each taken at its strength.

7. The Divergences of Paramārtha’s Earlier Translation

The chapter title of this section in Paramārtha’s version is “Chapter Analyzing Discernment, part two,” a different system of chapter naming from Xuanzang’s “Chapter Analyzing Knowledge” (discernment against knowledge), and it does not attach the number of the chapter. Its opening sentence answers wholly in scene to Xuanzang’s opening sentence, the same question raised, and is one further collateral witness to the fascicle boundary of this fascicle.

Systematic differences of rendering: Xuanzang’s “three foundations of mindfulness” against Paramārtha’s “three stations of mindfulness”; Xuanzang’s “dharmas not held in common” against Paramārtha’s “dharmas of a buddha obtained and not held in common”; Xuanzang’s “non-contention” against Paramārtha’s “the concentration of non-contention” (suffixing the name so as to display its being an absorption); Xuanzang’s “supernormal knowledge” against Paramārtha’s “penetrating discernment”; Xuanzang’s “bases of mastery” and “totalities” against Paramārtha’s “masteries entered” and “totalities entered”; Xuanzang’s “exhaustion of the outflows” against Paramārtha’s “exhaustion of the flows”; Xuanzang’s “intermediate existence” against Paramārtha’s “the intermediate skandhas”; Xuanzang’s “Īkṣaṇī” against Paramārtha’s “Īkṣaṇika.”

Two places deserve separate mention. The first is a difference of dividing and gathering: Paramārtha’s version sets up for the ten powers a further outline, “in explaining the ten powers there are seven senses” (own nature, analysis, obtaining alone, equality, doing the work, order, difference), one layer finer than the four gates of Xuanzang’s version (own nature, level of dependence, body of dependence, gloss). The two versions do not conflict in doctrine and differ only in the dividing and gathering. The second is a difference of personal name: Xuanzang’s version names him expressly, “the Venerable Dharmatrāta,” while Paramārtha’s version here gives only “the Venerable” without bringing out the name of Dharmatrāta. How this came about is recorded without adjudication, and no explanation is forced.

There is one further divergence of source that must be honestly recorded: the account of Paramārtha’s adduced by Fabao runs “there is a god named Gandhārī, rendered ‘Upholder of the Earth’,” while the main text of Paramārtha’s version in this section gives “a spell, whereby one can fly through the sky,” without bringing out the name of the spell at all. The sources of the two places differ (whether from another passage or from another recension of a commentary), and they are not forced into one. As for the lines listing one by one the four unobstructed knowledges and the six supernormal knowledges, their matching places in Paramārtha’s version have not yet been finely collated; this is recorded as it stands, as still to be supplied, and Xuanzang’s words are not used to fill it in.

8. The Loose Threads This Fascicle Leaves

At the end this fascicle speaks of the six supernormal knowledges depending upon the four meditative absorptions, while absorption itself has not yet been made out — that is the affair of the next chapter. The opening sentence of this fascicle carries over “the differences of the several knowledges” from the preceding fascicle, and at the end it hands the matter of ‘arising in dependence upon absorption’ over to the next chapter; it joins hands once before and once behind, and the whole chapter ends here.

There is one further thing worth attending to. The three clear knowings established in this fascicle counteract the folly regarding the three periods, while the restriction ‘the stage beyond training’ is carried over from the chapter on the worthy and the noble; and the six supernormal knowledges established in this fascicle as depending upon the four meditative absorptions, having discernment for their entity, and being included in the path of liberation, can all be stated clearly only by relying upon the technical terms of knowledge, level, and path established in the preceding chapters. This fascicle seems to be speaking of merits, but is in fact taking every technical term established in the preceding six chapters and putting them to one general use — wherever the reading is obscure, go back and find the place where that term was first established, and for the most part it will come clear.