俱舍論 中有·入胎·緣起總說Abhidharmakośabhāṣya · Intermediate Existence · Entry into the Womb · Dependent Origination in General

Before reading this fascicle

The previous fascicle set in order the three realms and five destinies, the four modes of birth, and the four stations of consciousness, and at the end spent a great deal of strength proving that intermediate existence really exists. This fascicle opens its mouth with the question, “To which destiny will it go, and what appearance has the intermediate existence that arises?” — no longer asking whether it is, but asking directly what it looks like and where it goes. All three ancient masters mark their outlines here: Puguang’s Record says that what follows is “the distinctions through the several gates,” eleven gates in all; Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary likewise counts eleven gates but divides them into three sections (appearance, the nine gates, entry into the womb); while Fabao’s Commentary takes the stanza for its unit and says, “below, the third, has five stanzas of gates of meaning analyzing intermediate existence.” The three open and join differently, but what they point at is one and the same thing: the chapter proper on intermediate existence enters here upon its details.

Yet the real weight of this fascicle does not lie in intermediate existence. Intermediate existence once explained, the four modes of entry into the womb once explained, the author suddenly turns aside to refute the self of the non-Buddhists, and then writes the embryo from the kalala to birth, and from birth on to “he again arouses the afflictions and accumulates actions” — pressing the whole way to the intermediate existence of the next term. Only here does the reader discover that what the first half of the fascicle has been giving is not a report of things seen after death but a picture of the twelve links of dependent origination in their actual working. And so the latter half goes on to establish the twelve links, to divide the three periods, to analyze the entity of each link, and to adjudicate the account by stages, closing at last with the two stanzas “three afflictions and two actions, and seven entities” and “from an affliction an affliction is produced.” Puguang’s Record marks a main outline division here: “below, the eighth, explains the twelve links of dependent origination; and within it, first the full explanation of the twelve, second the summary gathering shown by simile” — and what this fascicle occupies is precisely the general analysis and the particular exposition of that “full explanation of the twelve.”

One more thing must be pointed out in advance: the closing passages of this fascicle have two places where the treatise sets out an explanation of the words and immediately raises an objection to it. In one, an explanation of the words “dependent origination” is first established by the science of sounds, and then the objection is at once raised that “such a sense of the phrase does not stand to reason” (the treatise does not mark who speaks the objection). In the other, he first records another party’s explanation of two sentences of a sūtra, and then refutes them one by one. A first-time reader will suppose the text disordered, but this is in fact a common manner of writing in Abhidharma — to set out the possible accounts first and then raise objections to the chief of them. Where a reader of this fascicle sticks at these two places, it is usually not the doctrine that is hard, but the failure to recognize the manner of writing.

I. The Appearance of Intermediate Existence: One Action, Two Bodies Drawn Forth

〔1.1〕The four words “drawn forth by one and the same action” are the ground of this fascicle. The treatise answers very shortly: “if an action can draw forth the destiny to which one is to go, that same action calls forth the intermediate existence that can go there” — the action that takes you to some destiny at the same time calls forth the intermediate existence ‘able to go to that destiny.’ First ask: why insist that it is one and the same action? Because if intermediate existence had a further action of its own, it would become an independent lifetime, and then the death of intermediate existence would also require a death-existence of its own to be established, and birth and death could no longer be reckoned. Since it is drawn forth by the same action, the shape of intermediate existence is of course like that coming body, and this is what is meant by “it has the shape of the coming basic existence.” Puguang’s Record adds here a simile easy to remember, saying that intermediate existence and basic existence are so “because the action is the same; and so this intermediate existence is like the basic existence in shape, as with a seal and what the seal impresses, the figure and image not differing” — two sheets stamped by one and the same seal naturally bear the same pattern. Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary simply gives an example: if the basic existence is of human shape, the intermediate existence is of human shape too, and so for the other destinies by extension. The easy error is to think of intermediate existence as some blurred lump of a soul; the treatise says plainly that it already has the complete appearance of the destiny it is about to be born into. In practice: this one sentence fixes the reckoning of the whole fascicle — intermediate existence is no third party outside death and birth; it is the front stretch of the very body that this term’s action draws forth.

〔1.2〕The intermediate existences of the five destinies dwell together in one belly, and why they do not burn one another. The objector seizes on the intermediate existence of the hells to press his point: if within the belly of a dog there were at one time the intermediate existences of all five destinies, and the hell intermediate existence among them were present, how is it that it does not burn the mother’s belly? The treatise answers in three layers, yielding layer by layer without giving up its ground. First layer: hell beings dwelling in the basic existence of the hells “are not, even while dwelling in the basic existence, constantly burning” — how much less what is merely an intermediate existence. Second layer: granting even that it could burn, intermediate existence is such that “as it cannot be seen, neither can it be touched,” because the body is exceedingly subtle, and so the objection itself does not stand. Only the third layer is the real answer: “the intermediate existences of the several destinies, though they dwell in one belly, do not touch and burn one another, being shut off by action.” First ask: why use three layers? Because the first two disentangle the difficulty at the level of the facts of the case, while only the third settles it at the level of the principle of dharmas — the force of action is itself a wall of separation. The easy error: reading “shut off by action” as some mysterious barrier; its real sense is that the intermediate existence of each destiny is bound to its own action and simply does not lie within the same range of enjoyment. In practice: this is exactly the standard answer of this treatise to the class of problems about ‘being in one place and yet not touching,’ and the same principle is used later for beings of moisture-birth and of transformation-birth taking birth in the same place.

〔1.3〕The bodily measure of intermediate existence, and the bodhisattva’s exception. The treatise says that intermediate existence in the desire realm is “in measure like a child of five or six years, yet its faculties are keen and bright,” while the bodhisattva’s intermediate existence is like a man in his prime, full and round in bodily measure and possessed of all the marks and signs, and that when about to enter the womb it can “illumine a hundred koṭis of sets of four great continents.” First ask: why speak of the bodhisattva in particular? Because a famous difficulty has to be dealt with next — Queen Māyā dreamed that a white elephant entered her right side. If intermediate existence really has the shape of the coming basic existence, the bodhisattva’s intermediate existence should be of human shape; how could it be an elephant? The treatise answers without any hedging: “this is an auspicious sign and has nothing to do with intermediate existence,” and further, “because the bodhisattva long ago abandoned the destiny of animals” — a bodhisattva can no longer take on the body of a beast. Clearing a misreading: it is easiest to read this as the author denying the reality of the dream; it is not. The treatise merely divides the dream-image and intermediate existence into two separate matters: the dream is an omen of good fortune, not the actual thing seen. In practice: whenever a transmitted account and a numbered set of dharmas come into conflict, this treatise always first asks ‘what kind of statement is this?’ rather than judging true or false outright — and this is the one measure of proportion most worth learning in the reading of Abhidharma.

II. The Ten Dreams of King Kṛkin: A Dream Is an Omen, Not a Thing Seen

〔2.1〕The author explains one dream by means of another. In order to establish that ‘a dream-image is not an actual event,’ the treatise quotes the stanza of the ten things seen by King Kṛkin — “a great elephant, a well, and parched flour; sandalwood and a fine grove; a small elephant, two monkeys; a broad and sturdy garment, and strife” — and at once pronounces upon it, “what is dreamed in this way merely betokens other events to come as their prior omen, and is not as it was seen.” First ask: what after all are these ten things? Here the three ancient masters agree, unusually, word for word: Puguang’s Record says, “Kṛkin means here Doer of Deeds, and he was the father of Kāśyapa Buddha. In the night he dreamed ten things, and in the morning reported them to Kāśyapa Buddha. The Buddha answered, saying: these betoken the prior omens of the disciples within Śākyamuni’s bequeathed teaching in time to come”; and what Fabao’s Commentary and Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary record is all but the same. That is to say, a king of Kāśyapa Buddha’s age dreamed ten strange things, and the Buddha told him they were omens of the various conditions of the disciples in Śākyamuni’s teaching in later ages. Clearing a misreading: readers often go looking one by one for what the ten things symbolize, and so wander from the point. The treatise quotes them for one use only — to prove that an elephant in a dream is not the same as a real elephant coming. In practice: since the king’s ten dreams were only omens, Queen Māyā’s dream of the white elephant is likewise only an omen, and has nothing to do with intermediate existence. This is a clean argument from analogy, whose premise and conclusion both stay within the bounds of scriptural teaching.

〔2.2〕A piece of common knowledge about womb-birth, given in passing. The treatise inserts a sentence here: “moreover, all intermediate existences enter by the birth-gate, and it is not by breaking open the mother’s belly that entry into the womb is had; and this is why, with twins, the one born first is the smaller and the one born after the larger.” First ask: what has this to do with the white elephant? A great deal — the white elephant in the dream ‘entered by the right side,’ and if intermediate existence really did enter by the side, the dream of the white elephant could be taken as fact. The treatise says that intermediate existence enters by the birth-gate without exception, and so ‘entering by the right side’ can only be the showing of an auspicious sign. As for twins, the first out being smaller, that is a verifiable inference drawn in passing: since both enter by the same gate, the one that entered first is the further in and the one that entered after comes out first, so that the one born first is the later entrant and the smaller in bodily measure. Clearing a misreading: this sentence is often skipped over as an aside, when in fact it is the evidence for the sentence before it. In practice: it is the habit of Abhidharma in establishing a position to push a rule out to where it can be seen in daily life, and let it take its testing there.

III. The Harmonizing of the White-Elephant Stanza, and the Establishing of “the Four Existences”

〔3.1〕The reason for not needing to harmonize it matters more than the harmonizing itself. Someone brings forward a stanza spoken by Dharmasubhūti — “the white elephant, upright and fair in its marks, complete with six tusks and four feet, entered the mother’s womb with full awareness, and lay as a seer secluded in a grove” — and puts the question. The treatise answers by two roads. The first road is, “it need not be harmonized, since it is not of the Three Baskets; and the words of chanted stanzas may sometimes overstate the fact”: this stanza is not among the works gathered in the sūtras, the discipline, and the treatises, and the language of chant and recitation habitually admits of exaggeration. The second road yields a step: “if it must be harmonized, then to make the stanza upon the dream-image seen by the bodhisattva’s mother is no fault” — if harmonized it must be, take it as a stanza composed upon the dream-image. First ask: why give two answers? Because the first road guards the rank of the evidence adduced, and the second guards the possibility of construing the words; with both roads standing, the author need neither deny the stanza nor alter his own conclusion. Clearing a misreading: reading the first road as the author holding the stanza lightly. He does not. He merely puts it back into the box marked “not of the Three Baskets.” In practice: when the latter part of this fascicle quotes “some say,” “other masters say,” and “the masters of former times,” the reader should always ask first, ‘of what rank is this evidence?’ — and that question is learned here.

〔3.2〕Arising together with clothing, and one nun. The treatise goes on to say that intermediate existence in the form realm is “full and round like the basic existence,” and arises together with clothing, because in the form realm conscience and shame are abundant; that the bodhisattva’s intermediate existence too comes with clothing; and that intermediate existence in the desire realm has no clothing, “because they have all increased in the lack of conscience and shame.” Into the middle of this is inserted the matter of the nun Śuklā: she “by the force of her original vow had of herself a garment in life after life,” down to the time of her final nirvāṇa, when the body was wrapped in this garment for cremation. First ask: why, in the midst of intermediate existence, this sudden talk of clothing? Because clothing here is not ornament but an outward index of conscience and shame. Where there is conscience and shame there is clothing, and where there is none there is none; this is one instance of the force of a mental factor being brought down onto the very bodily appearance of intermediate existence. Clearing a misreading: taking the passage about Śuklā for a tale of marvels. The treatise adduces it in order to show that the force of a vow can also form such a dominance, set beside conscience and shame as a second cause. In practice: this treatise consistently holds that mental dharmas can move the appearance of material dharmas, and this is the most concrete instance of it.

〔3.3〕The four existences: cutting one term of life into four segments. The question is asked, “that basic existence which it resembles — what is its entity?”, and the answer given: “the aggregates before death-existence and after birth-existence; stated in sum, the entity is the five aggregates of appropriation,” and then, “within this, by difference of stage it is analyzed into four” — “first, intermediate existence, whose sense is as stated above”; “second, birth-existence, that is, the moment of rebirth-linking in any of the destinies”; “third, basic existence, that is, all the stages except the moment of birth and before death”; “fourth, death-existence, that is, the last thought-moment.” At the end a sentence is added on order and range: “intermediate existence stands next before birth-existence; sentient beings possessed of form have all four existences complete, while in the formless one is wanting and three are had.” First ask: why establish the four existences just here? Because everything discussed before — what intermediate existence resembles, how long it abides, how it enters the womb — has presupposed a timetable, and only now is the table drawn. Clearing a misreading: taking the four existences for four things. They are the names of one and the same string of five aggregates of appropriation at four stages of time; the entity is one. In practice: the item the formless realm lacks intermediate existence is especially to be remembered — the formless has no body and needs no coming and going, and so has three existences only; and the ground for the later statement that of the twelve links “the middle eight are on the basis of one who is complete” and do not run through the formless realm lies just here.

IV. The Nine Gates of Intermediate Existence: A Checklist Item by Item

The longest passage of prose commentary in this fascicle falls here. The treatise gathers it under two lines of stanza, while the prose commentary explains gate by gate in detail, with three divergent accounts and two objections interposed. Puguang’s Record lists it as nine gates — “first, explaining the field of the eye; second, slowness and swiftness of movement; third, explaining completeness of the faculties; fourth, explaining nonresistance; fifth, that it cannot be turned; sixth, explaining what it feeds on; seventh, the time it abides; eighth, the mind of rebirth-linking; ninth, its manner of movement” — and the names listed by Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary differ slightly while the order agrees throughout. What follows teaches these nine gates item by item accordingly.

〔4.1〕The gate of the field of the eye: who can see intermediate existence. The treatise says, “this body of intermediate existence is seen by its own kind,” and that a divine eye obtained through cultivation and exceedingly pure can also see it, whereas “no eye acquired by birth can observe it, because it is exceedingly subtle.” Immediately after this a divergent account is recorded: “other masters say: the eye of the intermediate existence of gods is complete and can see,” while the intermediate existences of the five destinies can in order see four, three, two, and one, “that is, from themselves downward, excluding what is above.” First ask: why divide “obtained through cultivation” from “acquired by birth”? Because the divine eye acquired by birth is called forth by retribution and its power is limited, whereas the divine eye obtained through cultivation is formed by the power of concentration and can break through the exceedingly subtle. Clearing a misreading: reading “seen by its own kind” as meaning that intermediate existence can be seen only by intermediate existence; what the treatise says is that those of one kind see one another, which is no bar to one who has obtained the divine eye through cultivation seeing it from without. In practice: this gate fixes the levels of visibility of intermediate existence; and what “exceedingly subtle” is attached to in the treatise is “no eye acquired by birth can observe it” and “as it cannot be seen, neither can it be touched.” As for the swiftest supernormal power of action, completeness of the faculties, and nonresistance, the treatise establishes each as a gate of its own and gives its own reason for each.

〔4.2〕The gate of speed of movement: why the supernormal power of action is the swiftest. The treatise says, “among all supernormal powers, the supernormal power of action is the swiftest,” and glosses the sense of supernormal power as “to soar through space at will is what is meant by supernormal power,” and the supernormal power of action as “a supernormal power obtained through action is named the supernormal power of action; and because the operation of this power is fast it is named swift,” adding at the end a sentence of great weight: “intermediate existence has obtained the swiftest supernormal power of action, and up to the World-Honored One there is none who can hold it back, because the force of action is the strongest of all.” First ask: even the Buddha cannot stop it — does this say that supernormal power is no match for the force of action? The treatise here states only the fact and passes no comparative judgment. Clearing a misreading: reading “there is none who can hold it back” as a limit upon the Buddha’s power. The treatise means the decisiveness of action itself — once intermediate existence arises, it must go to its destiny. In practice: this sentence lays the ground for the gate of what cannot be turned below, and is one of this treatise’s hard proofs that the result of action cannot be turned aside.

〔4.3〕The gate of completeness of the faculties, and 〔4.4〕the gate of nonresistance. The treatise says, “all intermediate existences are complete in the five faculties,” and again, “resistance means obstruction; this cannot be blocked even by adamant and the rest, and so it is called nonresistant,” adducing a report as evidence: “it was once heard that a lump of red-hot iron was split open, and worms were seen to have been born within it.” First ask: what has completeness of the five faculties to do with nonresistance? The treatise establishes the two gates separately and does not gather them under one cause — completeness of the faculties speaks of the body of faculties lacking nothing, nonresistance of its not being blocked by adamant and the rest. Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary explains the two gates in a single run, saying that intermediate existence “soars through the air, and mountains of adamant and the rest cannot block it.” Clearing a misreading: reading “nonresistance” as having no body. Intermediate existence has form and has faculties; it merely does not resist coarse form. In practice: the item of completeness of the faculties is used once more below — the treatise says, “there is certainly no intermediate existence that is neither female nor male, because the body of intermediate existence must be complete in its faculties,” and the classes without shape such as the ṣaṇḍha can only be formed while growing within the womb, the intermediate existence stage being necessarily male or female.

〔4.5〕The gate of what cannot be turned. The treatise says, “once the intermediate existence for the destiny to which one should go has arisen, no power of any kind whatever can turn it,” and explains concretely: “that is, a human intermediate existence cannot be made to disappear and another intermediate existence to arise,” and so likewise for the rest; since the intermediate existence for going to a given destiny has arisen, “it should go only there, and definitely goes nowhere else.” First ask: does this not contradict “turning and taking birth in a similar class” below? The author has himself refuted that: at the end of the gate of the time it abides he counters the account that “some say it turns and takes birth in a similar class” with, “is it not that intermediate existence certainly does not differ in commonality of sentient beings from that into which it is born, being drawn forth by one action? How then can it be said to turn and take a similar class?” Puguang’s Record and Fabao’s Commentary both mark this as “the author refutes,” and Puguang’s Record further pronounces that account “not the correct sense.” The author having finished his refutation, that party makes no further answer, and the treatise does not harmonize the matter on their behalf; this is honest practice, and the reader need not smooth it over for them. Clearing a misreading: reading “cannot be turned” as meaning that there is no variable at all in intermediate existence. The treatise says here only that “no power of any kind whatever can turn it,” and puts forward no further general explanation; Saṅghabhadra has an answer of his own, for which see ‘Further Resonances.’ In practice: this item is the necessary consequence of “drawn forth by one and the same action” — the action having fixed the destiny, the destiny is not to be exchanged.

〔4.6〕The gate of what it feeds on: fragrance and the name gandharva. The treatise asks whether intermediate existence draws support from morsel food, and answers, “it does draw support from morsel food, but subtle and not coarse”; asked again what the subtle is, it answers, “fragrance alone; and it is for this that it gets the name gandharva,” adding a note on the sounds — the sense of a verbal root is not of one kind only, and one who reads it with the short vowel is like the instances “sekantu” and “kekantu,” “abbreviated, and so no fault.” Then the gradations: “those of little merit feed only on foul fragrance, those of much merit take good fragrance for their food.” First ask: intermediate existence being exceedingly subtle, why should it eat at all? Because it is still a body of five aggregates with outflows and must have something to draw support from. Clearing a misreading: reading “feeding on fragrance” as a romantic way of speaking. It is a strict classification — the subtlest portion within morsel food. As for the name and its sense, Puguang’s Record explains it thus: “gandha is the name for fragrance and is the accompanying condition; arva is the verbal root, and points either to the sense of seeking or to the sense of feeding. Seeking means seeking fragrance, feeding means feeding on fragrance”; and Fabao’s Commentary assigns them all identically while gathering them under the single sense of “seeking fragrance.” In practice: food is pure or foul according to merit, and this is one instance of the force of action apportioning suffering and pleasure even at the subtlest level.

〔4.7〕The gate of the time it abides: four masters’ accounts and one long objection. To the question, “for how long does such an intermediate existence abide?”, the treatise first records the Bhadanta’s account: “the Bhadanta says: this has no fixed limit,” the reason being that the life faculty of intermediate existence is not drawn forth by a separate action, and that it shares one commonality of sentient beings with the destiny to which it goes; for otherwise, “when the life faculty of intermediate existence finally ceased, a death-existence would have to be established.” Then a long objection is inserted: when a mass of flesh becomes worms, do they wait for this season gradually, or do they come here all at once? The one who resolves this objection Puguang’s Record marks as the Venerable just named (Fabao’s Commentary gives only “the first explanation” without attaching it to a person, recording both without adjudication): he frankly grants that “there is no reliable text of sūtra or treatise to adjudicate it,” yet says that according to correct principle it should be said that there are boundless mixed classes of sentient beings, greedy for the taste of fragrance and short in lifespan, who on smelling the odor die and receive at the same time the bodies of tiny worms; or else that there were from the first many sentient beings who ought to be born in this place, and who abide in intermediate existence because the conditions have not yet met, and now, meeting the many conditions, are born all at once. And he takes as a comparison the action of a wheel-turning monarch, which must wait until human lifespan is eighty thousand years before it gives its result all at once, closing with “the differences among the results of the actions of the classes of sentient beings are inconceivable.” Only then are the three accounts listed: “the Venerable Vasumitra says: at the most seven days”; “other masters say: at the most seven times seven days”; “the Mahāvibhāṣā says: it abides a short time.” First ask: why take so long a circuit? Because ‘how long it abides’ bears upon ‘where the beings not yet born are at this moment,’ and the treatise must first make ‘being born all at once’ intelligible before the three accounts have anywhere to be set. Clearing a misreading: reading “there is no reliable text of sūtra or treatise to adjudicate it” as diffidence on the author’s part. Quite the contrary — for the treatise to say expressly that here there is no plain text and that the account is established according to correct principle is to mark the rank of its warrant honestly. In practice: on reading the words “according to correct principle it should be said,” raise the guard at once, for that signals that what follows is inference and not scriptural proof.

〔4.7 appended〕Below the time it abides there is a further layer: where intermediate existence goes when the conditions for birth have not met. The four accounts are not the end of the gate of the time it abides. After the Mahāvibhāṣā’s account of a short abiding, the treatise goes on to divide two roads: “for those whose conditions for birth have not yet met, if it is fixed that they should be born in this place and in this class, the force of action makes these conditions meet; if it is not fixed that they are to be lodged in this meeting of conditions, then they are lodged in another place and another class; some say it turns and takes birth in a similar class” — and it gives as instances the domestic ox, the dog, the bear, and the horse, whose seasons of increased desire belong in order to summer, autumn, winter, and spring, while the wild ox, the jackal, the brown bear, and the ass have no fixed season: the first four, if they do not meet their season, are born in order into the classes of the latter four. Puguang’s Record adjudicates the speaker of this passage, saying that from “the Mahāvibhāṣā says” to “another place and another class” is “the fourth master’s correct sense.” First ask: what is the relation among these three clauses? They are one set of conditional branches: ① fixed lodging (fixed that it should be born in this place and this class) ⇒ the force of action forces the conditions to meet; ② not fixed lodging ⇒ lodged in another place and another class; ③ a further account, that it turns and takes birth in a similar class. Clearing a misreading: reading this as ‘intermediate existence may change its destiny at will.’ It may not — this is precisely paired with the gate of what cannot be turned already taught at 〔4.5〕: the intermediate existences of the five destinies cannot be turned, and what can be turned is only the place and class within one and the same kind. The author at once refutes the third account as well: “is it not that intermediate existence certainly does not differ in commonality of sentient beings from that into which it is born, being drawn forth by one action? How then can it be said to turn and take a similar class?” (Puguang’s Record and Fabao’s Commentary both mark this “the author refutes”). In practice: there are four accounts of the time it abides because the matter of ‘waiting’ itself has two outcomes; read the branches clearly, and the four accounts each find their place.

〔4.8〕The gate of the mind of rebirth-linking: how a single inverted thought completes the taking of a womb. The treatise says that intermediate existence “first arouses an inverted mind and hastens toward the object of desire”; that the eye faculty aroused by the force of action, though dwelling at a distance, can see the parents joining, so that “if male, it arouses a male desire with the mother for object; if female, a female desire with the father for object,” and reversing the object toward the other, hatred arises toward both. And it adduces the Treatise of Designations as evidence: “at that time the gandharva has one or other of two minds in operation, namely craving or hatred.” Then comes the most crucial passage of all: “by arousing these two inverted minds, it supposes its own body to have joined with the one it loves,” and when the impurity of the one it hates flows into the womb, “supposing this to be its own, it gives rise to joy and comfort,” whereupon “from this the aggregates thicken, intermediate existence disappears, birth-existence has arisen, and this is named having linked rebirth.” First ask: why must rebirth-linking depend upon an inverted mind? Because without craving and hatred there would be no impetus to hasten toward it — and this is said of the ordinary intermediate existence. The treatise at once asks itself, “what was said above, that an inverted mind enters the mother’s womb — is this fixed for all intermediate existences?” and answers, “it is not,” setting out below the four classes who enter the womb with full awareness; so it may not be said that the impetus of all taking of a womb comes down to inversion and craving and hatred. Clearing a misreading: reading this passage as descriptive and sensational writing. The treatise says here only that the impetus of rebirth-linking is the inverted mind together with craving and hatred; the “craving” and “grasping” of the twelve links by stages have their own places — “greed for fine goods and the operation of sexual craving, without wide pursuit, is the stage named craving” — and the two share a name while pointing to different stages, and may not be simply equated. In practice: the single thought that practice contends for is exactly the thought at this place.

〔4.9〕The gate of manner of movement, and three matters after rebirth-linking. The treatise says that the intermediate existence of gods “rises head upward as if getting up from a seat,” that those of humans, ghosts, and animals go as human beings and the rest go, and that the intermediate existence of the hells “falls headlong, head down and feet up, into them.” After rebirth-linking there are three further matters. First, the appearance of dwelling in the womb — the male squats against the right side facing the back, the female dwells against the left side facing the belly, and one neither male nor female dwells according to its craving; and it is affirmed that “there is certainly no intermediate existence that is neither female nor male, because the body of intermediate existence must be complete in its faculties,” though it may later become a non-male as the embryo grows. Second, the two accounts of the great elements on which the faculties depend — “some say: the semen and blood themselves become the support of the faculties,” on the principle of the seed ceasing and the sprout arising; “other masters say: separate great elements are produced,” as worms are separately produced in dependence upon leaves and dung. The two accounts each adduce the same passage of scripture as evidence, and the treatise records both without adjudicating. Third, the two births from moisture and by transformation — “one of moisture-birth is born through being defiled by fragrance,” “one of transformation-birth is born through being defiled by the place,” and both are pure or foul according to action; and to the objection that craving arises even for the hells it answers, “because the mind is inverted, the arising of defilement is no fault,” for one may see cold rain and delight in flames, or feel hot wind and desire the cool. Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary brings the principle out into the open here: all taking of birth requires that defilement arise, and since moisture and transformation have no womb, fragrance and place are taken instead as what is defiled by. First ask: why must all four modes of birth have something ‘defiled by’? Because craving is the hook by which the womb is taken, and without a hook nothing can be hung on. Clearing a misreading: reading the casting of oneself into the hells as being deceived. The treatise says plainly that it is the inverted mind that makes the marks of suffering appear as things to delight in. In practice: only here is the principle of taking birth in the four modes fully stated, and all four share one and the same principle — defilement first, and then birth.

〔4.9 appended〕For the casting of oneself into the hells there is a further account of the masters of former times. The account of the inverted mind is not the only explanation the treatise records here. After the account of inversion regarding cold and heat it sets out another: “the masters of former times say thus: on seeing the fellows of their own company at the time when they formerly did the action that calls forth that hell, they run and hasten to join them” — seeing the band of companions of the day when they did that hell-action, they run to throw in with them. First ask: where do the two accounts differ? The former takes inversion for the hook (marks of suffering appearing as things to delight in), this one takes the company for the hook (seeing old fellows and going to them); the one lies in an inversion of the appearance of the object, the other in the pull of commonality. Clearing a misreading: kneading the two accounts into one, or supposing the second to be an explanation of the first. The treatise marks the speaker with “the masters of former times say thus,” which is the practice of recording divergent accounts together, not a supplement to one and the same account. (For the school to which this account belongs the ancient masters differ; see Further Resonances in this unit.) In practice: wherever the marks “the masters of former times” or “other masters say” appear, one knows that the speaker has changed below, and in reading one must start a fresh column and not run it together with what precedes.

V. A Gāthā on Falling Headlong into the Hells

〔5.1〕The use to which a quoted stanza is put is worth more study than its content. At the end of the gate of manner of movement the treatise says that the intermediate existence of the hells is head down and feet up, and at once quotes a stanza as evidence: “falling headlong into the hells, feet upward and head turned down, through slandering the seers who delight in quiet and cultivate austerities.” First ask: does this count as one of this treatise’s own root stanzas? It does not. Before it stand the four words “hence a gāthā says” as its warrant; it is a stanza quoted from scripture and is not counted among the ninety-nine root stanzas of this chapter. Clearing a misreading: reading it as the author’s warning to slanderers. What the stanza proves is one thing only — that the manner of movement of hell intermediate existence is a headlong fall; as for “slandering the seers,” that is one cause of action instanced in the stanza, and not the thesis the author is establishing here. In practice: this fascicle has six places where stanzas are quoted, and before each there is a mark of warrant (“as the noble one says,” “hence a gāthā says,” “hence a stanza is spoken,” and the like). In reading a treatise, recognize the mark first, and one will neither take a quoted stanza for a root stanza nor take another party’s words for the author’s adjudication.

〔5.2〕Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary adds here a limitation the text of the treatise does not state. At the end of the gate of manner of movement Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary adds that what has been discussed above is said of one who dies among human beings and is born again into the human destiny, and that “if it is extended to the other destinies, the manner of movement is not fixed.” First ask: does this count as altering the sense of the treatise? It does not; it makes clear the range within which the treatise’s words apply. The rising of gods, the horizontal going of humans, and the headlong fall of the hells that the treatise instances are said of one common case; if one dies in the hells and is born among the gods, the manner of movement is of course reckoned otherwise. Clearing a misreading: taking an ancient master’s supplement for the treatise’s own statement. In practice: in reading a treatise one must divide two layers — what the treatise said, and what an ancient master supplied for it; in the latter part of this fascicle the two layers are more closely intertwined, and here is the easiest exercise in telling them apart.

VI. The Four Modes of Entry into the Womb: Who Is Still Awake at the Pass of Death and Birth

〔6.1〕First ask the one question, “is this fixed for all intermediate existences?” Having said above that intermediate existence enters the womb with an inverted mind, the treatise at once asks itself: is it so for all? The answer is “it is not,” and scripture is adduced to establish four modes of entry into the womb. First ask: why does this question matter? Because if entering the womb with an inverted mind were the general rule, the Buddha and the pratyekabuddha would fall under it too, and the account of “entering the womb with full awareness” would have nowhere to be set. The treatise preserves the exception to the general rule by the division into four. Clearing a misreading: reading the “four modes” as four kinds of person. What it divides is the combinations of awareness and unawareness at the three stages of entering, dwelling, and coming out: the first has awareness at the stage of entering alone, the second at entering and dwelling, the third at entering, dwelling, and coming out alike, and the fourth has awareness at none of the three, while egg-birth is always without awareness. In practice: this is the standard handling of ‘general rule and exception’ in this treatise — not to alter the rule, but to divide it by stages.

〔6.2〕The word “also,” and the reversed order of statement, each resolve a technical problem. The treatise says, “the word ‘also’ is to show that what comes after necessarily carries what comes before” — one who is aware at coming out is necessarily aware at entering and dwelling too, so that the three are related by inclusion and not by coordination. It says also that where entering is without awareness, dwelling and coming out are necessarily so; and that the reason the stanza runs from the first to the fourth is that it is “stated in reverse in order to follow the rule of composing stanzas.” First ask: what use are these two petty explanations? What they resolve are the two places most easily misread in the stanza: the first, supposing that the second mode is aware of dwelling but not of entering; the second, supposing that the sequence of the four has some doctrinal weight of higher and lower. Clearing a misreading: the order of the stanza is for the convenience of the metre and is not an order of doctrine. In practice: the stanzas of this treatise are memory compressed to the limit, and the prose commentary often spends several sentences restoring the relations that were compressed out — half the labor of reading an introductory work such as a verse commentary goes into just such restoration.

〔6.3〕Why egg-birth too is called “entering the womb.” The treatise raises the objection: those of egg-birth come out of an egg, so how are they reckoned as entering the womb? The answer takes two roads: first, that those of egg-birth “must first enter the womb,” forming into an egg within the mother’s body; second, “or they are named of egg-birth with reference to what is to come,” being called by the name of what will be formed in the future. And three instances are adduced as evidence: scripture says “to make the conditioned,” and the world says “boiling rice” and “grinding parched flour.” First ask: what do these three instances prove? They prove that to name a prior stage by the name of the later result is a current habit of speech — while the rice is boiling one says beforehand boiling rice, while the wheat is grinding one says beforehand grinding flour. Clearing a misreading: reading it as a play upon words. This is the principle of ‘the name of what is to come’ commonly used in Abhidharma, and when the text below says that the wheel-turning monarch, the pratyekabuddha, and the great awakened one enter the womb, it “shows them by the name of what is to come,” which is the very same item. In practice: learn this one item, and expressions of the class ‘stating the result within the cause’ will cause no perplexity hereafter.

〔6.4〕The concrete appearances of awareness and unawareness at the three stages. The treatise writes it out in the finest detail: one of scant merit, on entering the womb, arouses inverted notions and construals, seeing great wind and rain, fierce heat and bitter cold, and the noise and might of great armies, and “thereupon sees himself entering dense grass and thick woods, a cave of leaves, a hut of thatch”; at the stage of dwelling he sees himself already dwelling within it; at the stage of coming out he sees the body going out from it. One whose merit is greater sees himself “entering fine gardens and groves, mounting flowered terraces and palaces, dwelling on excellent couches and the like,” dwelling and coming out being as before. One truly with full awareness, however, “has no inverted notions and construals at the time of entering and the rest”: entering the womb he knows he enters, and at dwelling and coming out knows of himself that he dwells and comes out. First ask: why are there two sorts of what the unaware see? Because merit is thick or thin, and the object-appearances that manifest are coarse and mean or fine and excellent accordingly — yet both alike are inversions. Clearing a misreading: taking ‘seeing oneself enter fine gardens and groves’ for a good thing. The treatise’s criterion is not the beauty or ugliness of what appears but whether inverted notions are present. In practice: this item carries great weight for training — the dignity of what appears is not the same as full awareness, and the goodness or badness of what is seen at the time of death cannot serve as a criterion.

〔6.5〕The three grades of person, and the division of action and cognition. The treatise lists the first three: the wheel-turning monarch has “awareness at the stage of entering, not at dwelling nor at coming out”; the solitary victorious awakened one has “awareness at entering and dwelling, but not at the stage of coming out”; and the unsurpassed awakened one “has full awareness at the stages of entering, dwelling, and coming out”; and it says that “these first three persons are shown by the name of what is to come.” Asked on what ground the three grades differ, it answers, “because action and cognition are excellent in this order”: in the first, action is excellent, the wheel-turning monarch having in former lives cultivated vast merit; in the second, cognition is excellent, the pratyekabuddha having long practiced much learning and excellent discrimination; in the third both are excellent, the unsurpassed awakened one having cultivated excellent merit and cognition through aeons. Apart from these three, the remaining beings of womb-birth and egg-birth are “inferior in both merit and cognition, and together make the fourth.” First ask: why two axes, action and cognition, rather than one? Because merit preserves the body on which the power of mindfulness rests, and cognition preserves the clarity of that power; lacking either, full awareness is incomplete. Clearing a misreading: reading the wheel-turning monarch’s awareness at entering alone as a shortfall in his cultivation. What the treatise adjudicates is the proportion of action to cognition, not the height of a total. In practice: this is one of the treatise’s rare instances of ‘adjudicating a fruition-stage by the cause cultivated,’ and its criteria — action and cognition — are exactly what counteracts the “formations” and “ignorance” of the twelve links below.

VII. No Self and Only Aggregates: Who Is It That Takes a Womb

〔7.1〕The non-Buddhist’s objection comes at exactly the right moment. The non-Buddhist says: since it is granted that a sentient being can pass over to another world, “the sense of a self that I hold to is established.” First ask: why is this objection so hard to shake off? Because a whole chapter has just been spent on intermediate existence going from this destiny to that, and in the feel of the language it does sound as if something were running. The author must deny the self without denying the coming and going — and this is the real difficulty of the section. Clearing a misreading: reading the author’s answer as ‘there is in fact no rebirth.’ He has never denied the continuum; what he denies is that there is an unchanging subject within the continuum. In practice: this section is a rehearsal within the Chapter on the World of the whole treatise’s learning on refuting the self, and the scale of what the ninth chapter on refuting the self establishes is already here in embryo.

〔7.2〕First ask what the mark of the self is. The author first puts the question: “what is the mark of that self which you hold to?” The holder of self answers: it is that “inner functioning person” which “can cast off these aggregates and can continue other aggregates.” The author then refutes: “this certainly does not exist, because it cannot be got at as form and the eye and the rest are got at.” (For the division of these three parts, Fabao’s Commentary marks, “from the treatise’s ‘can cast off these aggregates’ to ‘inner functioning person’ is the answer; from the treatise’s ‘this certainly does not exist’ to ‘because it cannot be got at’ is the refutation of the non-Buddhist’s position”; what Puguang’s Record marks is broadly the same, taking “can cast off these aggregates and can continue other aggregates” as the answer of the holder of self and “inner functioning person” onward as the author’s refutation — the two commentaries differ slightly on the boundary, and agree on who answers and who refutes.) First ask: what work do form and the eye do here? Puguang’s Record explains that form and the rest “have an entity and are knowable by direct perception,” and the eye and the rest “have a function and are knowable by inference,” the two standing for two roads of knowability; and the self held to is passable on neither road, and so is said not to be got at. Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary likewise explains “person” as the agent held to by the non-Buddhists. Clearing a misreading: reading “cannot be got at” as a limitation of the author’s sensory experience. This is a testing by the means of knowledge — neither direct perception nor inference gets anything, and therefore the dharma does not exist. In practice: whenever this treatise refutes a dharma it first asks its mark and then asks by what means of knowledge it is knowable, and here that whole procedure appears complete in one place.

〔7.3〕The World-Honored One’s words, and “the provisional designation of dharmas.” The treatise quotes, “there is action and there is maturation, but an agent cannot be got at,” and glosses the agent as what can cast off these aggregates and continue other aggregates, “save only the provisional designation of dharmas.” Asked, “what is the provisional designation of dharmas?”, it answers, “this being, that is; this arising, that arises — dependent origination stated at length.” First ask: since there is no agent, how can “casting off” and “continuing” still be spoken of? Because casting off and continuing are only another way of speaking of the continuity of cause and result before and after. Puguang’s Record adds a closing sentence here: “what is now made clear, that this is cast off and one goes to another, is just the continuity of cause and result before and after. Upon this dharma an agent is provisionally named; there is no separate agent. Hence the Correct Principle, fascicle twenty-five, says, ‘to show that the formations continuous in cause and result are themselves the agent, it further says: this being, that is; this arising, that arises.’” Clearing a misreading: reading “provisional designation of dharmas” as an expedient falsehood. Provisional does not mean false; it means established in dependence on others and without an independent self-entity. In practice: here for the first time dependent origination is brought out as the positive substitute for the self, and a full half of the latter part of this fascicle is spent making that substitute clear.

〔7.4〕The simile of the lamp-flame: momentary cessation and yet the power to continue and shift. The treatise raises a further objection: then it should be granted that the aggregates themselves can pass from this world to another. The answer: “the aggregates cease moment by moment and have no power over the turning round,” yet “because of what is done by afflictions and action long habituated, the aggregates of intermediate existence continue and enter the womb,” and the simile is set up, “as a lamp-flame, though it ceases moment by moment, can yet continue and shift to another place.” First ask: what is the simile of the lamp-flame to prove? It proves that without anything unchanging there can still be a real transfer. The flame is newly born in every moment, and yet the lamp can be moved from this end to that. Clearing a misreading: reading the flame as one and the same mass of fire. The treatise insists that it ceases moment by moment, and the force of the simile lies just there. In practice: this simile is the most often quoted in the whole treatise, and hereafter, whenever continuity and rebirth are discussed, one may return to this one sentence.

〔7.5〕The force of the action that draws forth the lifespan decides the length of a life. The treatise says that not all the aggregates drawn forth are “equal in the length or brevity of their growth and continuity,” because “the causes of the actions that draw forth the lifespan differ,” and that according as the force of the drawing action increases or is slight, “they grow in order for just so long a time.” First ask: what is this sentence doing wedged between the refutation of the self and the stages within the womb? It is a bridge. Above, continuity was said to be done by afflictions and action; here the length of that continuity is said to be decided by action as well, and so the next passage follows naturally — how the continuity of this term grows all the way along. Clearing a misreading: reading it as fatalism. What the treatise says is that the projecting action fixes the outer limit; it does not exclude the working of the completing action and of present conditions. In practice: this sentence extends “action” from the single point of taking a womb into a line, and lays the road for the five stages within the womb and for the account by stages of the twelve links below.

VIII. The Five Stages within the Womb, and Birth as Suffering

〔8.1〕The names of the five stages and their appearances. The treatise quotes the stanza spoken by the noble one, listing the five stages — kalala, arbuda, peśī, ghana, praśākhā — after which “hair, down, nails, and the rest, and the shape of the material faculties, gradually grow by turns”; while the prose commentary says expressly, “that is, within the mother’s belly the stages are five,” and further, “this arrow within the womb gradually grows by turns,” up to the stage where the material faculties and the shape are complete. First ask: what do these five transcriptions actually refer to? Puguang’s Record explains: “kalala means here conjoined, or mixed and foul, or congealed and slippery. Arbuda means here a blister. Peśī means here flesh and blood. Ghana means here firm flesh. Praśākhā means here limbs and joints”; Fabao’s Commentary explains them much the same, only giving peśī as “soft flesh,” and adds “because it rises like a blister” to explain how arbuda got its name. Clearing a misreading: reading the five stages as a medical description. The treatise lists them in order to give the two words “stage” the most immediately visible sample — one continuum, with five names established by difference of appearance. In practice: the twelve links below can be ‘named from what is eminent’ — and that passage costs nothing at all to a reader who has first grown familiar here with the way stages are handled.

〔8.2〕The suffering of the birth-gate, and the wind of maturation. The treatise says that “by the force of the wind of maturation aroused by action, the arrow within the womb is turned so as to move toward the birth-gate,” its suffering being like “a hard lump of dung stopped and straitened beyond measure,” and that from there it “falls by turns into fierce suffering hard to bear”; or else, through the mother’s deportment, food, or labor being excessive, or through the force of the child’s own former sinful action, it dies within the womb; and so there are women skilled in the art of delivery, or physicians, who warm butter and the juice of the śāmalī to smear on their hands and take up a small sharp knife. Then comes the most unsparingly realistic passage in the whole treatise: within the womb it is “like a cesspit, utterly base and mean, packed with mixed filth, a dwelling of darkness, the support of numberless thousands of worms,” with foul fluids constantly running, semen, blood, grime, and grease, impurities overflowing, covered above only by a thin and perforated skin. First ask: why does the treatise write it out so bluntly? Because the theme of this fascicle is the turning round of birth and death, and the beginning of that turning is just such a thing as this; write it beautifully, and the five words “the origination of the sheer great mass of suffering” have nowhere solid to land. Clearing a misreading: reading it as a mood of world-weariness. This is material for direct observation, not a venting of feeling. In practice: on this passage all three commentaries do no more than mark the run of the text without establishing any new sense — the ancient masters too judged that this passage needs no further explanation, and that one simply reads it through.

〔8.3〕After birth, on to “he again arouses the afflictions and accumulates actions.” The treatise writes of the infant’s body as “like a fresh sore, fine and soft and hard to touch”; the mother or another woman takes it up with “two hands rough as a knife or as ashes,” washing, wiping, and settling it, and “next puts clear butter in its mouth and gives it the mother’s milk,” gradually accustoming it to take fine and coarse food, “growing by turns in order until the stage where the faculties are mature, and then again arousing the afflictions and accumulating actions.” Thereby the body is destroyed, and again an intermediate existence continues and goes on to another world. First ask: why is this sentence the hinge of the fascicle? Because it closes the circle — from intermediate existence entering the womb, to the maturity of the faculties and the doing of actions, and to the arising of intermediate existence again. The treatise at once names the theme: “thus afflictions and action being the cause, there is birth; and birth being again the cause, afflictions and action arise,” and therefore “it is known that the wheel of existence revolves without beginning.” Clearing a misreading: reading “without beginning” as a claim about time. It is the outcome of an inference: if there were a beginning, the beginning would have to be without a cause; and if without a cause, then the rest too should arise of themselves — whereas we plainly see the sprout arise from the seed, with place and time determined; hence “there is definitely no dharma that arises without a cause.” In practice: the treatise states two further matters in passing here — the account of a constant cause has already been dispelled above; and birth and death have no beginning yet have a final limit, because the cause is exhausted. The sentence “as when the seed is destroyed the sprout certainly does not grow” is where the whole doctrine of liberation lands within the Chapter on the World.

IX. The Twelve Links and the Three Periods: A Table of the Segments of Birth and Death

〔9.1〕The listing of the twelve links, and the real sense of the two words “three periods.” The treatise lists the names of the twelve links, and glosses the three periods as “first the earlier period, second the later period, third the middle period, that is, the three lives past, future, and present.” First ask: why are the three periods three lives and not three times? Because what this treatise establishes is dependent origination by stages — the twelve links belong to three segments of life, not to three times within a single thought. Clearing a misreading: reading the three periods as the abstract times past, present, and future. They are three concrete terms of life. In practice: only when this is seen does one know on what ground the account of ‘two rounds of cause and result’ below is established — the two links of the earlier period against the five results of the middle, and the three causes of the middle against the two results of the later.

〔9.2〕The distribution two, two, eight. The treatise answers, “that is, the earlier and later periods have two links established for each and the middle period eight, and so they make twelve” — ignorance and the formations in the earlier period, birth and aging-and-death in the later, and the remaining eight in the middle. First ask: why is the middle period so much fuller? Because the middle period is the present life and can be observed closely stage by stage, and so is opened out finely; the earlier and later periods can only be inferred, and so are given in brief. This layer the treatise states positively only later, at Root 26: “because the entities are opened into five and the afflictions into two.” Clearing a misreading: reading the greater number of the eight links as meaning that the middle period is more important. It is only a difference in the precision of observation. In practice: one and the same set of facts is opened or gathered differently according to the position from which it is observed, and this is a constant practice of Abhidharma; the twelve links, the twofold dependent origination, and the three afflictions, two actions, and seven entities are all different cuts of the same set of facts.

〔9.3〕The four words “on the basis of one who is complete” fend off the greater part of the misreadings. The treatise asks itself whether the eight links of the middle period are all present in this life for every sentient being, and answers, “not all have them”; asked then on what ground eight links are spoken of, it answers, “on the basis of one who is complete.” And it explains one who is complete as “a person who has passed through all the stages is named one who is complete,” not one who dies untimely, nor beings of the form and formless realms, “but only with reference to persons of the desire realm,” adducing the Great Sūtra of Dependent Origination as evidence — the Buddha asks Ānanda, “if consciousness did not enter the womb, would it get growth and increase?”, and the answer is, “it would not, World-Honored One.” First ask: why set up this limitation? Because if the twelve links were taken as a general rule for all sentient beings, one who dies untimely lacks the last several links and the form and formless realms have no name-and-form nor six sense fields, and the general rule collapses at once. Clearing a misreading: reading “complete” as completeness in practice. It refers to having gone through the whole sequence of stages. Puguang’s Record marks here the four layers of question, answer, objection, and explanation, and the teaching scaffold is exceedingly clear. In practice: in reading any numbered set of dharmas, first ask its range of application — a question this fascicle has already taught twice (the four existences do not run through the formless, and the eight links are only on the basis of one complete in the desire realm).

〔9.4〕Twofold dependent origination: folding the twelve links in half. The treatise says that sometimes only two divisions are spoken of — the first seven links gathered into the earlier period (ignorance through feeling) and the latter five into the later period (from craving to aging-and-death), “because the earlier and later are gathered by the two divisions of cause and result.” First ask: does this conflict with the division into three periods? It does not. The three periods divide by life, the two divisions by cause and result: the first seven are one round of cause and result (ignorance and the formations being causes, consciousness and the other four results), the latter five a second round (craving, grasping, and existence being causes, birth and aging-and-death results); it is another measuring stick. Clearing a misreading: reading the two divisions as a second system of dependent origination. It is still these twelve links. In practice: when the latter part of this fascicle speaks of “the cause-portion originating” and “what has already arisen from conditions,” it uses just this stick of cause and result; here it is shown once beforehand. The reader may work the reckoning out for himself — dividing the first seven links into two causes and five results and the latter five into three causes and two results, and setting that against the two, two, and eight of the three periods; the links cut by the two tables overlap while the boundaries differ, which shows exactly that this treatise never takes one cut for the only cut.

X. The Entity of the Twelve Links: One Link, One Stage, and Every Stage the Five Aggregates

〔10.1〕“The stage of the afflictions of a former life is ignorance,” and the simile of the king’s going forth. The treatise says that in a past life “the stage of the afflictions, whose result has now matured, is stated in sum to be ignorance,” because they operated at the same time as ignorance and it was by the force of ignorance that they operated; and it sets up the simile, “as when one says the king goes forth, it is not that there are no outriders and retinue; because the king who goes with them is the most eminent, the whole is called the king’s going forth.” First ask: since one stage is complete in the five aggregates, why is ignorance singled out? Just because at that stage ignorance is the most eminent. Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary puts this layer in the plainest words, saying, “‘the stage of the afflictions of a former life is ignorance’ means that when the afflictions arose in a past life, that is named the stage of the afflictions of a former life; and the five aggregates of that stage, whose result has now matured, are named ignorance as a whole”; and the reason for singling out ignorance lies precisely in “because the king who goes with them is the most eminent, the whole is called the king’s going forth.” Clearing a misreading: reading the link of ignorance as being that one mental factor ignorance alone. Every link is the five aggregates, and the name is only the representative of that stage. In practice: this item is the vital point of dependent origination by stages, and what the stanza below, “transmitted and allowed, stated with reference to stages, the name of a link is established from what is eminent,” guards is just this one sentence.

〔10.2〕The boundaries of the three links consciousness, name-and-form, and the six sense fields. The treatise fixes consciousness as “at the very moment of rebirth-linking in the mother’s womb and the like, the stage of a single instant, whose five aggregates are named consciousness”; name-and-form as “after the consciousness of rebirth-linking and before the six sense fields arise, all the intervening stages together named name-and-form”; and the six sense fields as “from when the eye and the rest have arisen up to the stage where faculty, object, and consciousness have not yet met, it gets the name six sense fields.” A question is inserted midway: since at rebirth-linking the body and mind sense fields already exist, this ought to say before four sense fields arise — why does it say six? The answer: “because it is established on the basis of completeness.” First ask: is this question worth answering separately? It is — for it is exactly the place where the account by stages is most easily attacked: where does the boundary between name-and-form and the six sense fields lie? Puguang’s Record traces the original text of the Mahāvibhāṣā for evidence, saying, “the kalala runs through many thought-moments. At the stage of name-and-form the body and mind sense fields have arisen, and here it ought to say before four sense fields arise,” while saying six is established on the basis of the completeness of the six sense fields; Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary states the conclusion only and does not trace its source. Clearing a misreading: reading “name-and-form” as a stretch with no faculties at all. The body and mind sense fields already exist at the stage of name-and-form; they are merely not complete. In practice: whenever this treatise meets a mismatch of number of the class ‘it ought to say four and yet says six,’ it resolves it uniformly by naming on the basis of completeness, and this is the first instance.

〔10.3〕The five links contact, feeling, craving, grasping, and existence are each bounded in their own way. The treatise fixes contact as “having reached the meeting of three, at the stage where the differences of the causes of the three feelings are not yet known”; feeling as “having known the marks of difference of the causes of the three feelings, and sexual greed not yet arisen”; craving as “greed for fine goods and the operation of sexual craving, without wide pursuit”; grasping as “ranging in pursuit everywhere for the getting of all manner of fine and excellent objects”; and existence as “through that ranging pursuit, accumulating the action that can draw forth the result of a coming existence.” First ask: are these five definitions all cut in the same way? They are not. Contact and feeling have both bounds marked by a paired “having . . . not yet . . .”; craving has only its upper bound stopped by “without wide pursuit” (its lower bound being set by “greed for fine goods and the operation of sexual craving”); while grasping is fixed by “ranging in pursuit everywhere” and existence by “accumulating the action that can draw forth the result of a coming existence,” each on its own mark and with no paired “having” and “not yet.” Clearing a misreading: reading them as five different psychological states. They are five stretches upon one and the same continuum, and the manner in which each stretch is bounded is not uniform — contact and feeling doubly marked by “having” and “not yet,” craving stopped at “without wide pursuit,” and grasping and existence each established on its own mark. In practice: this is the handsomest set of stage-definitions in the whole treatise, and a reader who can write these five sentences from memory is half through the study of the twelve links.

〔10.4〕Birth and aging-and-death carry this life’s four links over into the life to come. The treatise fixes birth as “by that force of action, casting off life here and linking the coming existence,” and aging-and-death as the coming link of birth “growing gradually after the moment of arising, as consciousness does now, up to the stage of feeling in the time to come,” and says expressly, “such aging-and-death is just the four links name-and-form, six sense fields, contact, and feeling of this present life.” First ask: why does the later period hold the content of four links under two names only? Because the later period can only be inferred and not directly observed, and so is stated in brief. Clearing a misreading: reading aging-and-death as the two matters of growing old and dying. In the account by stages, aging-and-death is the whole stretch from the coming name-and-form to the coming stage of feeling. In practice: once this sentence is out, the symmetry of the two rounds of cause and result is wholly disclosed — the two links of the earlier period against the five results of the middle, the three causes of the middle against the two results of the later, and the two results of the later being in fact a second performance of the five results of the middle.

〔10.5〕Four kinds of dependent origination: momentary, of unbroken linkage, by stages, and of remote continuance. The treatise says, “further, dependent origination is stated as four by difference,” and explains the momentary in detail — “what is the momentary? That is, in the space of one instant, in doing a killing out of greed, the twelve links are complete”: delusion is ignorance; volition is the formations; discerning is consciousness; the three aggregates that arise with consciousness are name-and-form; the faculties resting on name-and-form are the six sense fields; the meeting of these is contact; the receiving of contact is feeling; greed is craving; the several bonds associated with it are grasping; the two actions of body and speech are existence; their arising is birth; ripening and altering are aging; and destruction is death. It records also an account that the momentary and that of unbroken linkage, as the Treatise on Categories of Dharmas has it, “both run through all that is conditioned”; that all the five aggregates at the stages of the twelve links are gathered under the account by stages; and that “this same continuity, remote and without beginning, is named that of remote continuance.” First ask: since there are four, which one does this treatise establish? The stanza of the next section answers — the one by stages. Clearing a misreading: reading the four as four different dharmas of dependent origination. They are four ways of viewing one and the same dependent origination across four spans of time — one instant, unbroken linkage, the stages of three lives, and remote continuance without beginning. In practice: this section is set up for the question of the next stanza, and a reader who passes it over will find the five words “transmitted and allowed, stated with reference to stages” with nothing to rest on.

XI. “Transmitted and Allowed, Stated with Reference to Stages”: A Fissure within Five Words

〔11.1〕First look at what the text of the treatise itself says. The stanza says, “transmitted and allowed, stated with reference to stages; the name of a link established from what is eminent,” and the treatise says, “it is transmitted and allowed that the World-Honored One spoke of the several dependent originations as twelve links solely with reference to stages.” Then it raises an outside objection against itself: if each and every link is complete in the five aggregates, on what ground are the names ignorance and the rest alone established? The answer: “because at each of the stages ignorance and the rest are eminent,” and the name is established from what is eminent — if at a stage ignorance is most eminent, the five aggregates of that stage are named ignorance as a whole, and so on down to aging-and-death. It closes with the sentence, “thus though the entity is one in sum, that the names are separate is no fault.” First ask: on what ground can ‘establishing the name from what is eminent’ stand? On the ground that ordinary language already has such a usage — the simile of the king’s going forth has been laid down beforehand. Clearing a misreading: reading “though the entity is one in sum” as meaning that the twelve links have no distinctions. The entity is one in sum (all being five aggregates) and the names are separate (established according to what is eminent), and the two do not conflict. In practice: this is the complete defense of dependent origination by stages, and it uses only two layers — that stages have what is eminent and what is not, and that names are established from what is eminent.

〔11.2〕Why the two words “transmitted and allowed” are jarring. Throughout the text of the treatise the author adjudicates the sense of his own school mostly by plain statement; here, however, he sets the two words “transmitted and allowed” in the stanza, and the prose commentary repeats them once more. First ask: what tone do these two words carry? Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary uniquely brings it into the open, saying, “dependent origination by stages is refuted by the Sautrāntikas, and the author’s intent is plain, and so he says ‘transmitted and allowed’” — meaning that since dependent origination by stages has already met with Sautrāntika questioning, the author has a reservation in his own mind and sets these two words to mark his distance. Clearing a misreading: this is an ancient master’s adjudication of the author’s motive in his choice of words, not the treatise’s own statement. The text of the treatise itself says only “it is transmitted and allowed that the World-Honored One spoke solely with reference to stages,” and does not explain why it says so. In practice: wherever this fascicle meets a modal word (“transmitted and allowed,” “some say,” “other masters say”), one should first ask, ‘is this the author’s adjudication, or another party’s account that he is reporting?’ — and that question often decides the reading more than the doctrine itself does. For the four lines of material that these two words set in motion, see Further Resonances.

〔11.3〕The difference from the Treatise on Categories of Dharmas, and the division of sentient and insentient. The treatise asks itself on what ground scripture speaks of twelve links while the Treatise on Categories of Dharmas speaks otherwise, and answers that that treatise says, “what is dependent origination? All that is conditioned,” and so on at length; and it adjudicates the reason thus: “the sūtrānta speaks with a particular intent, while the Abhidharma states things according to the marks of dharmas.” It says further that the four — by stages, momentary, of remote continuance, and of unbroken linkage — “belong only to the class of sentient beings. Sentient and insentient and the rest: this is the difference.” First ask: within one and the same Buddha-dharma, why do a sūtra and a treatise state different ranges? Because a sūtra speaks with reference to the doubts of those it converts (as the next section says outright), while a treatise speaks with reference to the general rule of the marks of dharmas. Clearing a misreading: reading the difference between the two as a contradiction. The intents differing, the ranges naturally differ. In practice: this is the standard answer of this treatise to ‘a sūtra and a treatise not agreeing,’ and the reader may apply it directly to similar cases hereafter.

XII. Why Scripture Speaks Only of Sentient Beings: To Dispel Bewilderment over the Three Periods

〔12.1〕The stanza has ten words only, yet it states the purpose of the whole fascicle. The stanza says, “in the earlier, the later, and the middle period, in order to dispel another’s bewilderment,” and the treatise says, “in order to dispel another’s bewilderment within the three periods,” adding, “the difference of the three periods is only among sentient beings.” First ask: what question does this stanza answer? It answers the question left at the end of the last section — why the sūtras speak only of sentient beings. The answer is: because the doubt to be counteracted arises only in sentient beings. Clearing a misreading: reading it as meaning that dependent origination does not run through the insentient. The treatise has already said that when the Abhidharma states things according to the marks of dharmas it runs through all that is conditioned; what is said here is that scripture speaks only of sentient beings with reference to what is to be counteracted. In practice: this stanza fixes the nature of the twelve links once for all — they are a dose of medicine, not a map of the universe.

〔12.2〕The ten questions of bewilderment over the three periods. The treatise lists them one by one: for the earlier period the doubt, “was I in the past world existent or not existent? What sort of I was I? How was I?”; for the later period, “shall I in the future world be existent or not existent? What sort of I shall I be? How shall I be?”; for the middle period, “what is I? How is this I? Whose is this I? Whom shall I have?” First ask: what have these questions in common? Every one has “I” for its subject — bewilderment over the three periods is in truth only three shapes taken by the grasping of self across three stretches of time. Clearing a misreading: treating them as philosophical questions to be solved. The treatise never answers head-on ‘what is the self?’; it merely sets out the twelve links and lets the premise of the question fall apart of itself. In practice: hence it says, “in order to remove such bewilderment over the three periods, scripture speaks only of the dependent origination of sentient beings,” and “states in their order ignorance and the formations, and birth and aging-and-death, together with consciousness through existence” — the two links of the earlier period answering the doubt of the earlier period, the two of the later answering the doubt of the later, and the eight of the middle answering the doubt of the middle, each matched to its place.

〔12.3〕The scriptural proof and one supplementary account. The treatise adduces a sūtra as its ground: “listen well, monks! If a monk can see with true and correct discernment, as they really are, the several dependent originations and the dharmas that have already arisen from conditions, he will certainly not be bewildered over the three periods.” At the end a further account is recorded: “other masters say: the three, craving, grasping, and existence, are also for the removing of another’s bewilderment over the later period, since these three are all causes of the later period.” First ask: what does this supplement change? It reckons the last three links of the middle period also into the function of counteracting bewilderment over the later period, since they are precisely the causes of the later period. Clearing a misreading: taking “other masters say” for the author’s adjudication. It is an account recorded alongside. In practice: whatever this treatise introduces with “other masters say” is invariably kept without adjudication — remember this mark, and one can separate the author’s own sense from another party’s account unaided.

XIII. Three Afflictions, Two Actions, Seven Entities: Cutting the Twelve Links Once More

〔13.1〕The distribution three, two, seven. The stanza says, “three afflictions and two actions, and seven entities, also named results,” and the treatise says that ignorance, craving, and grasping have affliction for their nature, that the formations and existence have action for their nature, and that “the remaining seven, consciousness and the rest, have entity for their nature, being the entities on which the afflictions and action rest.” First ask: why are they called “entities”? Because they are that mass of actual content on which afflictions and action rest — consciousness, name-and-form, the six sense fields, contact, feeling, birth, and aging-and-death. Clearing a misreading: reading “entity” as an affair or a matter. Here it means that on which something rests. In practice: this is the second stick applied to the twelve links (the first being the three periods). One and the same set of links is divided by nature into the three classes affliction, action, and entity, and thereupon the whole of birth and death has only three things turning in it — the afflictions make action, action produces entities, and entities again arouse the afflictions.

〔13.2〕The seven entities are also named results, and the five links also named causes. The treatise says, “these seven entities are also named results; and it follows by implication that the remaining five are also named causes, since they have afflictions and action for their own nature.” First ask: why add this further layer? Because affliction, action, and entity divide by nature while cause and result divide by relation; one and the same link is an “entity” on the former stick and a “result” on the latter. Clearing a misreading: reading cause and result as two different sets of links. In practice: this is the third demonstration in this fascicle of ‘one and the same set of facts rearranged on another axis’ — the twelve links, the three periods, the two divisions, affliction-action-entity, and cause and result: five cuts, all cutting the same thing.

〔13.3〕On what ground the middle period alone is treated fully. The treatise asks itself, “on what ground does the middle period state result and cause at length?”, and answers, “because the entities are opened into five and the afflictions into two”; the later period states the result in brief, “because the entities there are two only”; and the earlier period states the cause in brief, “because the affliction there is one only.” And it says that “because the middle period is stated at length, the earlier and later may be inferred from it,” the sense at length being established, “and so they are not stated separately; to state them would be useless.” First ask: what perplexity does this passage resolve? It resolves ‘why the distribution of the twelve links is so unsymmetrical.’ The answer: the middle period can be directly observed and so is opened out finely, while the earlier and later can only be inferred and so are stated in brief. Clearing a misreading: taking the asymmetry for an oversight in the treatise. It is determined by the conditions of observation. In practice: the four words “to state them would be useless” show the character of Abhidharma most clearly — a numbered set of dharmas is established by the measure of usefulness, and not made symmetrical for symmetry’s sake.

XIV. From an Affliction an Affliction Is Produced: Five Modes of Mutual Production, and a Long Debate about Infinity

The prose commentary of this section runs to nearly eight hundred characters and contains several rounds of question and answer and the divergent explanations of two parties; it is the densest passage in the latter half of this fascicle. What follows teaches it through in three layers.

〔14.1〕First look at the objection. The treatise raises the objection: if the links of dependent origination are twelve only, then “not stating a result of aging-and-death, birth and death should have an end; not stating a cause of ignorance, birth and death should have a beginning”; and if further links were established for this, the further would have further still, “falling into the fault of infinity.” First ask: why is this objection so formidable? Because it is a dilemma — not to supply the links leaves birth and death with a beginning and an end, and to supply them yields infinity. Clearing a misreading: reading it as an outsider’s cavil. The author raises it himself, because the account of the twelve links must stand up to just this question. In practice: whenever this treatise establishes a closed numbered set of dharmas, it asks itself how its boundaries are kept from leaking — this is the self-testing mechanism of the study of numbered dharmas.

〔14.2〕The stanza answers with five modes of mutual production. The stanza says, “from an affliction an affliction and an action are produced; from action an entity is produced; from an entity an entity and an affliction are produced; the principle of the links of existence is only this,” and the treatise matches them one by one: from an affliction an affliction is craving producing grasping; from an affliction an action is grasping producing existence, and ignorance producing the formations; from action an entity is the formations producing consciousness, and existence producing birth; from an entity an entity is consciousness producing name-and-form and so on to contact producing feeling, and the link of birth producing aging-and-death; from an entity an affliction is feeling producing craving. It closes, “by establishing the links of existence, the principle is only this.” First ask: how do these five modes resolve the difficulty of infinity? Because they show that affliction, action, and entity are joined head to tail — an entity can produce an affliction, and an affliction again produces an action, so that after aging-and-death there are of themselves afflictions and action (no further link need be established, and birth and death have no end), and before ignorance there are of themselves entities and afflictions (no further link need be established, and birth and death have no beginning). The treatise says so at once: “it has already been shown that aging-and-death is a cause of entity and affliction, and that ignorance is a result of entity and affliction,” since ignorance and aging-and-death are themselves of the nature of affliction and of entity. Clearing a misreading: remembering the five modes of mutual production as five isolated rules. It is a closed ring. In practice: Fabao’s Commentary here matches them against the three lives most concretely, saying, “craving and grasping are both afflictions, and craving conditions grasping: this is from an affliction an affliction is produced”; and again that grasping and ignorance are alike afflictions, “that is, present grasping is named ignorance in the past,” and that the formations and existence are alike action — one and the same thing bearing different names in different periods. Once this matching is understood, the chart of the twelve links comes alive.

〔14.3〕Two parties’ remedies, and the author’s two refutations. Other masters adduce another sūtra that says improper attention is the cause of ignorance and that ignorance in turn produces improper attention, and that improper attention is gathered under the link of grasping, so that it has already been stated within this sūtra. The author objects: if it belongs to grasping because it is associated with it as its cause, then craving and ignorance too should belong to grasping; and even granting that it belongs to grasping, how does that prove that it is the cause of ignorance? The other party explains further: improper attention is stated at the time of contact, and adduces “from eye and form as condition delusion arises, and the defiled attention thus produced” and “conditioned by the feelings produced by contact accompanied by ignorance, craving arises” as evidence, so that ignorance has a cause and the links are not infinite. The author objects again: though the other sūtra has such trustworthy words, within this sūtra it should still be stated further; the other party answers that it need not be stated further, and that this is known by reasoning — “apart from ignorance, feeling cannot be a condition of craving, since the feeling of an arhat does not produce craving,” and likewise an uninverted contact cannot be a condition of defiled feeling, since an arhat’s contact is not inverted. The author’s last stroke: “if so, there would be the fault of proving too much” — whatever can be known by correct reasoning would all not need to be stated further, and then what is scripture stating at all? Hence “what they say does not amount to an explanation of the objection.” First ask: why does the author not accept a remedy that looks reasonable enough? Because it assigns ‘why scripture does not state it’ to ‘the principle is already knowable,’ and that reason, once granted, would swallow all scripture. Clearing a misreading: reading the author’s objection as a denial of the doctrine that improper attention is the cause of ignorance. What he denies is its use to explain scripture’s not stating something. In practice: the author’s own correct explanation comes after — that the objection itself is “not reasonable, since the intent of the sūtra lies elsewhere,” because “this sūtra means only to remove the bewilderment of those it converts over the three periods”; scripture is not incomplete, it has a different purpose. This answer answers exactly to the stanza of section XII, and only here does the framework of the whole latter half of the fascicle close.

XV. Dependent Origination and What Has Already Arisen from Conditions: Two Faces of One Link

The prose commentary of this section runs to about nine hundred characters: it first distinguishes the two names, next records the fourfold analysis of the Venerable Wangman, then adduces the Sautrāntikas’ long objection, the Sarvāstivādins’ defense and counter-objection, and closes with the Sautrāntikas’ resolution of the objection, their rejoinder, and their conclusion; it is the passage of highest doctrinal density in this fascicle.

〔15.1〕Why the World-Honored One states two names. The treatise quotes the World-Honored One’s words, “I shall state for you the dharma of dependent origination and the dharmas that have already arisen from conditions,” and at once asks what the difference between them is. It first records the account of the older text of this treatise: “these two have no difference, since both are said to gather all dharmas.” Then follows a series of exchanges: the outside party first objects — future dharmas that have not yet arisen, how can they be called what has already arisen from conditions along with the past and present? This objection is not answered directly; instead the outside party is counter-objected to with a question — a future dharma that has not yet been made, how can it be named conditioned along with the past and present (the name ‘conditioned’ upon future dharmas being one the outside party itself allows)? Puguang’s Record marks this as “counter-objecting to the outside party” and Fabao’s Commentary as “a counter-objection in the form of a question,” so that this sentence is not asked by the outside party but is a demand turned back upon him. The outside party then explains, “because it has been made by the force of an effective volition.” It is objected again: if so, how is the undefiled conditioned? The outside party explains: that too has been made by the force of a wholesome volition. It is objected again: if so, the same should hold of the attaining of nirvāṇa. It closes with, “in strict principle it should be said that it is stated with reference to class, as what has not yet deteriorated also gets the name of form.” First ask: what is being contended in this string of questions and answers? What is contended is whether the word “already” can be used of a future dharma. The answer is that it can — stated with reference to class, as what has not yet deteriorated also gets the name of form. Clearing a misreading: reading it as a play upon words. “Made by the force of volition” is a trial explanation, tried layer by layer and twice forced back; and the treatise closes with “in strict principle it should be said that it is stated with reference to class, as what has not yet deteriorated also gets the name of form” — what it guards is the establishing of a name with reference to class, and not ‘that future dharmas have really already been made by the action of volition.’ In practice: this passage is the prelude to the objection of the masters of the science of sounds in the next section — the usage of the word “already” is the very core of that debate.

〔15.2〕The stanza’s correct explanation: the cause-portion and the result-portion. The stanza says, “what is here properly stated is: the cause originates, the result has already arisen,” and the treatise says, “the cause-portion of the links is called dependent origination, since with this for condition a result can be originated,” and “the result-portion of the links is called what has already arisen from conditions, since these are all produced from conditions,” so that “in all of them both senses hold, since all the links have the natures of both cause and result.” There is an objection: if it is set up thus, the two senses should not both hold. The answer: “it is not so, because what is regarded differs” — where this side is regarded it is named what has already arisen from conditions, and it is not that in regarding this same side it is at once named dependent origination as well, “as with the names cause and result, father and son, and the like.” First ask: what is the simile of father and son to prove? It proves that one and the same person is a son regarded toward the father and a father regarded toward the son, and the two names do not conflict. Clearing a misreading: reading dependent origination and what has already arisen from conditions as two sets of dharmas. They are the two faces of one and the same link. In practice: this is the third demonstration in the fascicle of ‘a name established according to what is regarded’ (the first two being naming from what is eminent, and showing a stage by the name of what is to come); take the three together and this treatise’s view of names and marks is clear — a name is designated with reference to relation and to stage, and is not a label upon an entity.

〔15.3〕The fourfold analysis of the Venerable Wangman, and the Sautrāntikas’ long objection. The treatise records the account of the Venerable the Venerable Wangman: among dharmas some are dependent origination and not what has already arisen from conditions, and a fourfold analysis should be made — the first alternative being future dharmas, the second the past and present dharmas at the stage of an arhat’s last thought, the third the remaining past and present dharmas, and the fourth the unconditioned dharmas. The treatise goes on to record the refutation, “the fourfold analysis so stated is likewise not reasonable” (Puguang’s Record marks this as the Sautrāntikas refuting Wangman’s four alternatives), because if future dharmas were not what has already arisen from conditions this would contradict a sūtra, or else the two links birth and aging-and-death would have to be disallowed in the future, “and this would wreck the three periods established above.” On the other side, the Sautrāntika masters raise a long objection: dependent origination by stages, taking twelve sets of five aggregates for the twelve links, contradicts a sūtra, since the sūtra says, “what is ignorance? Absence of knowledge regarding the earlier period,” and so at length; this is a statement of definitive meaning and may not be forced into an interpretable one. The Sarvāstivādins answer with the Sūtra of the Simile of the Elephant’s Footprint as an instance: the sūtra says that the inner earth element is hair, down, nails, and the rest, and though there are other dharmas of form there, it is “stated from what is eminent”; here it should be the same. The Sautrāntikas rejoin: that sūtra analyzes the earth element by hair and the rest, and there is no earth element beyond hair and the rest, and so it is a complete statement. The Sarvāstivādins press one further question: is it not that the earth element’s entity is present in mucus and tears as well (in which case hair and the rest do not exhaust the earth element, and it is still stated from what is eminent). The three passages below are all the Sautrāntikas’ words: first, resolving this objection — mucus and the rest are also stated within that sūtra, as the sūtra itself says, “and there are yet other things in the body”; second, conceding and then demanding — granting even that, as you say, there is an earth element apart from hair and the rest, then a further ignorance apart from ignorance should now be exhibited, and if a thing of another class is put inside ignorance, what good does that do; third, establishing the principle and concluding their own sense — “though at all the stages there are five aggregates, yet only where this being that definitely is, and this not being that definitely is not, may this dharma be established as a link of that,” and so the sense of the sūtra is just as stated. First ask: where exactly does this long debate divide? On whether the two words “ignorance” refer to absence of knowledge alone, or to the five aggregates of the stage at which ignorance is most eminent. Clearing a misreading: reading the last three passages together as the Sarvāstivādins’ answer. Puguang’s Record marks them sentence by sentence — from “does not the earth element” to “its entity being present as well” is the Sarvāstivādins objecting; from “mucus and the rest are also” to “should now be exhibited” is the Sautrāntikas resolving the objection; from “if a thing of another class is put in” to “what good does that do” is the Sautrāntikas demanding further; and from “though at all the stages” to “just as stated” is the Sautrāntikas establishing the principle, resolving throughout, and concluding their own sense (Fabao’s Commentary marks the same passage on the same lines, only marking from “granting even that, as you say” to “should now be exhibited” separately as the Sautrāntikas’ concession). And a second misreading to be cleared away: reading it as a matter of who is right, the Sarvāstivādins or the Sautrāntikas. The author here passes no word of adjudication and merely sets out the reasoning of both parties. In practice: this passage is the most typical scene of one meaning and two schools in this fascicle, and what the reader should learn is on what each of the two parties bases what it says, rather than hurrying to take a side. For Saṅghabhadra’s comment on this passage, see Further Resonances.

〔15.4〕Is dependent origination conditioned or unconditioned? Some say that dependent origination is an unconditioned dharma, proving it by the sūtra, “whether a Tathāgata appears in the world or does not appear, such is the abiding constancy of the dharma-nature of dependent origination.” The author answers by dividing two roads: “said with such an intent, the principle may be granted; said with another intent, the principle may not be granted.” What may be granted refers to the intent of saying that the formations and the rest constantly arise with ignorance and the rest for condition, and not with any other dharma for condition nor with no condition at all, and that abiding constancy is said for this; what may not be granted refers to the intent of saying that there is besides an entity of a dharma named dependent origination which abides limpidly and constantly. The author gives three reasons: first, “arising and origination are both marks of the conditioned,” and no separate constant dharma can be the mark of what is impermanent; second, “further, origination must be established in dependence upon what originates,” and what relation has this constant dharma to ignorance and the rest, that it should be said to be established in dependence on them; third, to name it dependent origination and yet say that it points at what is constant, “such a sense of the phrase has no reasonable correspondence.” First ask: why divide “such an intent” from “another intent”? Because one and the same sentence of scripture admits of two readings, and the author does not deny the scripture but only one of those readings. Clearing a misreading: reading it as the author refuting the scripture. What he refutes is one understanding of the scripture. In practice: this is the standard procedure of this treatise where a sentence of scripture appears to support a divergent account — first divide the intents, then adjudicate what may and may not be granted; the scripture is not touched, and the reading is examined. The relation of this item to Saṅghabhadra is rather unexpected; see Further Resonances.

XVI. The Objection of the Masters of the Science of Sounds: Where Does the Word “Already” Fall?

〔16.1〕First look at the explanation of the words that the treatise establishes. The treatise asks, “what is the sense of the phrase ‘dependent origination’ here?”, and answers by the method of the science of sounds: “prati has the sense of reaching, and the verbal root i has the sense of going,” and by the helping force of the former the sense of the root is altered, so that going, through reaching, is altered into “dependent”; “sam has the sense of conjoining and ud the sense of rising, and the verbal root pad has the sense of being,” and being, by borrowing conjoining and rising, is altered into “origination”; and so “a dharma reaching its condition, having conjoined, rises: this is the sense of dependent origination.” First ask: what is being done here? The construction of the word “dependent origination” is being taken apart with the grammatical science current at the time. Puguang’s Record unfolds it in more detail according to the treatises on the science of sounds, saying that sam and ud are accompanying conditions and pad the verbal root, and that the root is altered into “origination” by the helping force of the accompanying conditions. Clearing a misreading: taking this passage for a digression into linguistics. It is the target of the debate that follows — the treatise establishes the explanation of the words first. In practice: whenever this treatise adduces a method of an outside learning, it is in order to test that learning within its own rules, and this is the treatise’s consistent practice.

〔16.2〕The objection raised: one agent cannot have two operations. The treatise at once says, “such a sense of the phrase does not stand to reason,” the reason being that “upon one agent there would be two operations” — if it first “reaches the condition” and afterwards “originates,” the former operation should carry the word “already,” “as when a man eats only after he has bathed.” Yet “there is no dharma of the formations whatever that exists before origination, reaching the condition first and only afterwards arising,” and where there is no agent, “there being no agent, there can be no operation.” And a stanza is quoted to close it: “if reaching the condition is before origination, it does not exist, and this is unreasonable; if the two are simultaneous, then ‘already’ is spoiled, for it should have been stated as prior.” First ask: what is the structure of this dilemma? If reaching the condition is before origination, then at that time the dharma does not yet exist, and who is it that reaches the condition; and if the two are simultaneous, then the word “already” falls to nothing. Clearing a misreading: adjudicating outright who speaks this objection. The text of the treatise here does not mark the speaker of the objection; Fabao’s Commentary, Puguang’s Record, and Saṅghabhadra each fix its character differently — see ‘Further Resonances.’ In practice: where in reading this treatise one meets “hence a stanza is spoken” and its sense refutes what precedes, it is most often this manner of raising an objection through a borrowed mouth.

〔16.3〕The answer to the objection: a counter-question and the fixing of a stage. The treatise answers, “there is no such fault,” and counter-questions the masters of the science of sounds: at what time does a dharma originate — in the present, or in the future? If in the present, then “origination is not what has already arisen; how then is it present? The present is what has already arisen; how then is it originating?” And if what has already arisen originates again, this leads to infinity. If in the future, “at that time it does not yet exist; how is it an agent? And the agent being absent, how can there be an operation?” Whereupon it gives the correct explanation: “therefore at the very stage of originating it also reaches the condition” — the stage of originating being the stage at which future formations are in the act of originating, “and at just this stage it is also said to reach the condition.” And a step further: the agent and the operation posited by the masters of the science of sounds “in strict principle are not established,” for “being is the agent and origination the operation,” and here there is no real agent to be got at as other than the operation of originating, “and so this way of speaking is without error at the level of convention.” First ask: where is the cleverness of this answer? It does not deny the two matters “reaching the condition” and “originating”; it denies only that they stand before and after — two names stated at one and the same stage. Clearing a misreading: reading “without error at the level of convention” as the author granting an agent in the ultimate sense as well. Quite the contrary — it says that this way of speaking is not in error only in worldly speech. In practice: this passage runs on the same track as “what is regarded differs” in section XV — a name is established with reference to what is regarded, and there is no separate thing following upon the name.

XVII. The Stanza Explaining the Sense of Dependent Origination, and the Fourfold Intent of Two Sentences of Scripture

The prose commentary of this section exceeds one thousand two hundred characters and is the largest passage at the close of this fascicle, containing one stanza, a further explanation by one party, four layers of correct explanation, and the divergent explanations of four parties.

〔17.1〕The quoted stanza, and the similes of the lamp and of sleep. The treatise says that the sense of dependent origination is just “this being, that is; this arising, that arises,” and so quotes a stanza to explain it: “as it originates though not existing, so should reaching the condition be; if origination follows arising there is infinity; whether prior existence or prior nonexistence is said, both alike have the word ‘already’; darkness arriving, the lamp has already gone out; and the mouth having been opened, one sleeps — were sleep to come after, the mouth would have to be shut.” First ask: what is this stanza saying? It carries forward the objection of the previous section and presses it further — if you allow that what does not exist can originate, then “reaching the condition” must be so as well; and whether one says it exists first or does not exist first, the problem of the word “already” arises. The last two similes are the key to the release: darkness arriving and the lamp going out are simultaneous, and yet one says “darkness arriving, the lamp has already gone out”; opening the mouth and sleeping are simultaneous, and yet one says “the mouth having been opened, one sleeps.” Puguang’s Record fills out the attack and defense here, saying that the masters of the science of sounds do not try to rescue the simile of the lamp and the darkness but shift their objection to “the mouth having been opened, one sleeps,” arguing that the mouth must be opened first and only afterwards is there sleep; and the author counter-proves that the two are in fact simultaneous with “were sleep to come after, the mouth would have to be shut.” Fabao’s Commentary runs on the same track. Clearing a misreading: reading the two similes as casual observations of daily life. They are instances proving that the word “already” may be used of two simultaneous matters, and the key of the whole section’s argument lies just here. In practice: sequence in language is not sequence in fact — an item that serves in the reading of every treatise.

〔17.2〕Another party’s further explanation, and the author’s one-sentence test. Some hold to a further sense in explaining the objection: “prati has the sense of variety, and the verbal root i has the sense of not abiding,” and not abiding, by the help of variety, becomes “dependent”; “sam has the sense of gathering and ud the sense of rising, and the verbal root pad has the sense of going,” and ud coming first, going is altered into “origination”; so that the sense of dependent origination is that a variety of conditions meet and make the formations gather and rise. The author answers most economically: such an explanation “may be granted here,” but “eye and form each being a condition, an eye-consciousness originates” — where in this is a “gathering of variety” to be made out? First ask: why is this question fatal? Because the arising of an eye-consciousness depends on the two conditions of eye and form alone, and there is no talk of “variety.” Clearing a misreading: reading the author’s test as fault-finding. He uses a minimal counter-instance, which is the standard method for testing a general definition. In practice: to establish a definition, try it first on the simplest case — and this treatise has here given one demonstration of it.

〔17.3〕The fourfold intent of the World-Honored One in stating two sentences. The treatise asks why the World-Honored One states “this being, that is” and “this arising, that arises,” and answers that there are four: first, “in order that dependent origination be known as fixed” — the formations are in dependence on ignorance, and apart from ignorance there can be no formations; second, “further, in order to show the successive production of the links” — in dependence upon this link that link comes to be, and by the arising of that link the remaining links come to arise; third, “further, in order to show the successive production of the three periods” — in dependence upon the earlier period the middle comes to be, and by the arising of the middle the later comes to arise; fourth, “further, in order to show the two conditions, the immediate and the mediate” — that ignorance being, the formations arise without interval is the immediate, and that the formations arise only by a force passing through intermediaries is the mediate. First ask: how can one sentence of scripture carry a fourfold intent? Because it holds fast four levels at once — the fixedness of dharmas, link and link, period and period, and the nearness and distance of the condition. Clearing a misreading: reading the four layers as four explanations of which one must be chosen. The treatise sets them side by side, and all four hold. In practice: this is one of the fascicle’s rare passages of positive exposition, and the reader may use it to check whether his own understanding of the twelve links has all four layers.

〔17.4〕Four parties’ divergent explanations, of which the author expressly refutes three. One party says the two sentences are for refuting the causeless and the constant cause; the author objects that then the first sentence becomes useless, since the second sentence alone can refute both positions. The author at once explains for himself: or else some hold that with a self as support the formations and the rest come to be, and so the World-Honored One decisively adjudicates that “the being of a result is by the cause of its arising,” and not by dependence on some other cause. A second party (the preceptor masters) says that it is to show the unbrokenness and the arising of cause and result — and this one account the treatise records without refuting. A third party says that it is to show the abiding and the arising of cause and result; the author objects that if arising is what is to be analyzed, on what ground is abiding stated? And why should the Buddha break the order, stating abiding first and arising after? A fourth party says, “‘this being, that is’ means that on the being of the result the cause has its ceasing; ‘this arising, that arises’ is lest one doubt that the result arises without a cause”; the author objects that if the sense of the sūtra were so, it should be stated as “this being, that ceases and is not,” and that it should first say “the cause arising, the result arises,” and only then say “on the being of the result the cause ceases and is not” — “in such an order it would be well stated”; otherwise, “if one means to analyze dependent origination, on what order would the ceasing of the cause be stated first?”; hence what they explain is not the sense of this sūtra. First ask: what criteria does the author use in testing the four parties? Only two — whether anything is superfluous (the first party) and whether the order suits the matter being analyzed (the third and fourth parties). Clearing a misreading: taking these four parties for non-Buddhists. They are all interpreters within the Buddha-dharma. In practice: this is the clearest demonstration in the fascicle of ‘how the author examines an explanation,’ and its criteria are simple and strict.

〔17.5〕The closing explanation conforming to the sense of the scripture, and “the sheer great mass of suffering.” The author says of himself, “I shall now briefly show what conforms to the sense of the sūtra,” and thereupon walks the twelve links through from the beginning: the fool, “not knowing that in dharmas arisen from conditions there is only the formations, falsely gives rise to the view of self and the conceit of self,” and for the sake of feeling pleasure and what is neither painful nor pleasant makes meritorious action, imperturbable action, and demeritorious action, and this is ignorance conditioning the formations; “by the force of the projecting action the stream of consciousness continues as a flame goes,” and relying on intermediate existence it hastens to the place of birth and links a birth-existence body, and this is the formations conditioning consciousness; within that destiny name-and-form arises, complete in the five aggregates and running through the whole term of life; name-and-form matures and, complete in the eye and the other faculties, becomes the six sense fields; meeting with objects, consciousness arises, and by the meeting of three there is contact conducive to pleasure and the rest; upon contact the three feelings arise; from the three feelings the three cravings are drawn forth (craving for desire, for form, and for the formless); from the craving that delights in feeling arise the four kinds of grasping beginning with the grasping of desire — and it glosses the four heads of grasping one by one: desire means the five fine desires; “views mean the sixty-two views”; rules mean keeping away from bad discipline; and observances mean the observances of dogs and oxen and the like, instancing the meaningless austerities of the Nirgranthas and of the brahmins and other non-Buddhists of various classes; “talk of a self means the inner body, since in dependence upon it a self is spoken of,” and a further account is recorded that the view of self and the conceit of self are named talk of a self, since “by these two a self is spoken of, and the self not existing, it is named talk of a self”; and the grasping of the four kinds of grasping is desire-greed; conditioned by grasping, the action that calls forth a coming existence is accumulated and named existence; conditioned by existence, the stream of consciousness goes toward a future birth; and conditioned by birth there is aging-and-death. At the end it glosses the words of the sūtra one by one: “the word ‘sheer’ shows that there is only the formations and no self or what belongs to a self”; “the words ‘great mass of suffering’ show that the accumulation of suffering has neither beginning nor end”; “the word ‘origination’ is to show the arising of the masses of suffering.” First ask: how does this passage differ from the explanation of the entities of the links above? The former is an explanation by stages (one stage, five aggregates, the name established from what is eminent), while this one is an explanation conforming to the sūtra (making dependent origination into an observable process according to the order of the sūtra’s words). The two stand together without obstructing each other. Clearing a misreading: reading the closing passage as a repetition. It walks the same links once more in a different reading, and is the last demonstration in this fascicle of ‘one and the same set of facts rearranged on another axis.’ In practice: the whole fascicle closes with the sentence “the Vaibhāṣika school’s account has been stated above” — Puguang’s Record marks expressly here, “the above is the Sautrāntikas setting out the entities of the twelve links,” and so this sentence means that the Vaibhāṣika explanation was stated earlier, and not that what has just been explained belongs to the correct Vaibhāṣika sense; while as for that Sautrāntika objection earlier, the author has not concluded it on their behalf. Fabao’s Commentary points out here the switch of framework in the text of the treatise, saying, “the above explains the twelve links according to the Sautrāntikas; what follows explains the sūtra’s ‘origination of the sheer great mass of suffering’ according to the treatise” — and if a reader can see this switch, the layers of the fascicle become wholly distinct.

Further Resonances: A Mirror of Three Commentaries

The above is the sense of the text of this fascicle itself. Below, a separate section gathers four matters: the ancient masters’ adjudications and the divergences among the three commentaries, Saṅghabhadra’s comments and amplifications, the divergences of Paramārtha’s old translation, and coordinates for cross-reading. A mirror is not the treatise; it is only a second way of reading the same passage. Recorded together without adjudication, each returned to its own place.

One thing must first be honestly marked: Shentai’s Commentary is a fragmentary text, and its seven surviving fascicles do not include the five fascicles (Eight through Twelve) where the Chapter on the World falls, so that for this fascicle there is not one word of Shentai’s to attach. This section can therefore be called only a mirror of three commentaries and not of four — which differs from the usual state in the Chapter on the Faculties, and is recorded as it stands, without making up the number from the text of other fascicles.

One. Places where the Three Commentaries Diverge

The translated term for the stage peśī. On the sounds and senses of the five stages within the womb the three agree in the main, only the third differing: Puguang’s Record gives “peśī means here flesh and blood,” Fabao’s Commentary gives “peśī means here soft flesh.” For the other four stages (kalala, arbuda, ghana, praśākhā) the renderings agree throughout; Fabao’s Commentary adds besides the sentence “arbuda means here a blister, because it rises like a blister” to explain how the name arose, which Puguang’s Record does not have. A difference of one word, arising perhaps from a slight difference in the materials of the science of sounds the two commentaries relied on; recorded together without adjudication.

The personal names of the masters on the time intermediate existence abides. The text of the treatise itself gives only “other masters say” without a name for the master of “seven times seven days,” and only “the Venerable says” for the master of “no fixed limit.” Fabao’s Commentary supplies the name of the former, saying, “the Venerable Śarmadatta said: intermediate existence abides at the most seven times seven days”; while Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary supplies the name of the latter, saying, “the Bhadanta Dharmatrāta said that the time has no fixed limit.” The two commentaries supply names at different places and do not conflict with each other, yet both supply names that the text of the treatise does not have. Puguang’s Record here sets up a numbering of its own, calling Vasumitra “the second master,” the seven times seven days “the third master,” and the Mahāvibhāṣā “the fourth master’s correct sense” — this numbering by ‘which master’ is Puguang’s Record’s own device, and the treatise does not number them itself. All three matters recorded together without adjudication.

“The supernormal power of action is the swiftest” and its apparent conflict with the Mahāvibhāṣā. This treatise says, “among all supernormal powers, the supernormal power of action is the swiftest,” whereas the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle seventy, says that the force of the supernormal power over objects moves with speed and swiftness, and that intermediate existences do not. Puguang’s Record gives three resolutions for this: one, that “swift” in this treatise means unobstructedness and not swiftness of movement; another, that the supernormal power over objects is of three kinds, of mental impetus, of resolve, and of moving the body, and that this treatise speaks with reference to moving the body while the Mahāvibhāṣā speaks with reference to mental impetus and resolve; a third, that the Kośa speaks on the basis of the sense of the first master in the Mahāvibhāṣā. Fabao’s Commentary, instead of resolving it from within, simply adduces the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle to prove that the Kośa and the Mahāvibhāṣā take different positions and are not in conflict, saying, “the sense of the Correct Principle’s text agrees with the Kośa, and from this it follows that it differs in sense from the Mahāvibhāṣā.” The two commentaries take different roads in harmonizing — Puguang’s Record inclines to resolution by doctrine, Fabao’s Commentary to comparison of documents — and both are recorded together without adjudication. Fabao’s Commentary further sets out in this passage, following the Mahāvibhāṣā, the ranking of who can block whose supernormal power (the Buddha can block all sentient beings, the pratyekabuddha all but the Buddha, Śāriputra all but those two, Mahāmaudgalyāyana all but those three), which is an extension made in reliance on the Mahāvibhāṣā and not a direct statement of the treatise.

To which school “the masters of former times” belong. In stating the reason for the casting of oneself into the hells, the text of the treatise gives only “the masters of former times say thus.” Puguang’s Record examines the matter here and says it may be taken as “the Sautrāntika masters of former times” or as “the Sarvāstivādin masters of former times” — both kept, without adjudication. This is an examination of school affiliation, and the text of the treatise does not mark it.

Who asks “what is the sense of the phrase ‘dependent origination’ here?” Puguang’s Record and Fabao’s Commentary both mark this question as “a Mahāsāṃghika asks,” and Puguang’s Record further marks the answer as “a Sautrāntika answers, or a Sarvāstivādin answers.” Yet the original sentence of the treatise gives only “what is the sense of the phrase ‘dependent origination’ here?” without saying who asks. The two commentaries agree in what they mark, and it remains in character an adjudication of the ancient masters.

The school censured under “dependent origination is unconditioned,” named differently in two texts. Fabao’s Commentary traces its source, saying that the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle twenty-three, calls it “the Vibhajyavādins” while the Treatise on the Wheel of Tenets calls it “the Mahāsāṃghikas” — Fabao’s Commentary sets the two texts side by side without forcing a judgment of sameness or difference. This may be viewed together with Paramārtha’s version: Paramārtha here gives outright “some other school says,” making clear that it is a separate school, whereas Xuanzang’s version says only “some say” without marking the school.

The objection of the masters of the science of sounds admits of two readings. Puguang’s Record says: since the masters of the science of sounds and the Sautrāntikas both hold that past and future have no entity, the refutation is made against that Sautrāntika position by way of nonexistence; “if this stanza is used to refute the Sarvāstivādins, then the masters of the science of sounds are refuting by the sense of their own tenet. ‘There is no such fault’ down to ‘or in the future’” — two readings kept, without adjudication. Fabao’s Commentary, on the other hand, simply takes one reading, saying, “the author takes the sense and intent of the Sautrāntikas and raises the refutation in the assumed person of a master of the science of sounds.” The two commentaries take different roads; recorded together without adjudication.

Two reminders that Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary adds beyond the text of the treatise. One is at the end of the gate of manner of movement, adding, “if it is extended to the other destinies, the manner of movement is not fixed”; the other is beneath the sentence on “transmitted and allowed,” adding, “dependent origination by stages is refuted by the Sautrāntikas, and the author’s intent is plain, and so he says ‘transmitted and allowed.’” The former is a supplement about the range of application, the latter an adjudication of the tone of a choice of words — and the author himself never states his motive in the choice — a point that must be kept clear.

Puguang’s Record’s outline scaffold. At the head of the chapter on dependent origination Puguang’s Record marks the main outline, “below, the eighth, explains the twelve links of dependent origination; and within it, first the full explanation of the twelve, second the summary gathering shown by simile. Within the full explanation, first the general analysis, second the particular exposition”; and at the eight links of the middle period it marks layer by layer the four parts question, answer, objection, and explanation. Outlines of this kind were established by the ancient masters and are not marked by the treatise itself, yet they are of the greatest use in teaching, and so are recorded here together and not mixed into the main text.

The gate of what cannot be turned left unanswered, and Saṅghabhadra supplying the resolution. At the end of the gate of the time it abides the author refutes the account that “some say it turns and takes birth in a similar class,” saying, “is it not that intermediate existence certainly does not differ in commonality of sentient beings from that into which it is born, being drawn forth by one action? How then can it be said to turn and take a similar class?” (Puguang’s Record and Fabao’s Commentary both mark “the author refutes,” and Puguang’s Record further pronounces that account “not the correct sense”), and that party makes no further answer, the treatise passing at once into the passage on rebirth-linking. Saṅghabhadra, however, answers, “granting that it turns and takes birth in a similar class, since the classes are in some measure the same there is no fault. And further, if realm, destiny, and place are not wholly shifted, then though the class differ in some measure there is no loss, since the action for realm, destiny, and place definitely does not shift.” ⇒ ‘The destiny does not shift while the similar class may differ’ is Saṅghabhadra’s resolution, and this treatise here closes with the question only.

As for the objection to the explanation of the words by the science of sounds, the three parties fix the speaker’s character each in its own way. Having established the explanation of the words “a dharma reaching its condition, having conjoined, rises: this is the sense of dependent origination,” the treatise at once raises the objection, “such a sense of the phrase does not stand to reason,” and quotes a stanza, and does not mark the speaker of the objection. Fabao’s Commentary takes one reading, saying, “the author takes the sense and intent of the Sautrāntikas and raises the refutation in the assumed person of a master of the science of sounds”; Puguang’s Record keeps both explanations without settling on one; and Saṅghabhadra makes it otherwise: “the Sūtra-master, having established this sense of the phrase himself, then himself assumedly raises such an objection.” ⇒ The frameworks the three set up differ; recorded together without adjudication.

Two. Saṅghabhadra’s Comments and Amplifications

Saṅghabhadra’s Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle calls Vasubandhu “the Sūtra-master.” In the passages of this fascicle that correspond, Saṅghabhadra’s appearances are not uniformly counter-refutations, and must be seen in six classes. The first four classes are matters between him and Vasubandhu; the last two are cases in which he records another party’s account and then adjudicates it himself — the speaker not being Vasubandhu, they cannot be counted as debate, yet as divergent explanations of the same topic they cannot be left unknown in reading this fascicle.

First, the refutation of the two words “transmitted and allowed” — the most concentrated place in this fascicle. Saṅghabhadra says, “the Abhidharma masters all say thus: the Buddha spoke of the several dependent originations in dependence upon stages. The Sūtra-master does not believe it and says ‘transmitted and allowed,’” and thereafter refutes one by one the Elder’s (that is, the Sautrāntika master’s) nine objections to dependent origination by stages, concluding, “therefore the stanza should say: the Buddha spoke in dependence upon stages. There is no need to say the sound ‘transmitted and allowed’ here; on examination he only sought to fill out the words and complete the line. Dependent origination by stages is what is here explained, and its principle is established” — not only urging the change of the words, but jeering that he set them there merely to fill out the syllables of a five-character line. More noteworthy still: in the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine Saṅghabhadra alters the stanza outright, its corresponding stanza reading “the Buddha spoke in dependence upon stages; the name of a link established from what is eminent,” the two words “transmitted and allowed” not being there. This is no longer comment but alteration at the level of the text. Another line of material is Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary — Yuanhui is of no lineage of Saṅghabhadra’s, yet notes independently that “dependent origination by stages is refuted by the Sautrāntikas, and the author’s intent is plain, and so he says ‘transmitted and allowed,’” agreeing in direction with Saṅghabhadra’s reading while composed on its own. Four lines of material recorded together: that Vasubandhu set the words “transmitted and allowed”; that Saṅghabhadra urged the change to “the Buddha spoke in dependence upon stages”; that the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine has already changed it; and that Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary independently adjudicates the same.

Second, whether dependent origination is conditioned or unconditioned — here Saṅghabhadra is of one accord with Vasubandhu, and does not counter-refute. This must be marked with particular honesty, lest one fall into the prejudice that ‘Saṅghabhadra always refutes Vasubandhu.’ Saṅghabhadra says, “some other school’s masters say that dependent origination is unconditioned,” and at once adjudicates, “said with this intent, the principle may indeed be granted” — if the intent is to say that the formations and the rest constantly arise with ignorance and the rest for condition and that, there being no separate agent, it is called unconditioned, this may be granted; “if a separate dharma is called dependent origination, congealed and constant like cessation through discernment and the rest, this certainly cannot be granted.” This agrees almost sentence by sentence with what this treatise establishes, that ‘with such an intent it may be granted, with another intent it may not.’ Saṅghabhadra goes a step further, refuting by a threefold formula that exhausts the alternatives: “further, that unconditioned dependent origination they hold to — is it other than ignorance and the rest, or is it ignorance and the rest, or is it composed of them? These three positions are all unreasonable.” ⇒ The relation in this item is that Saṅghabhadra amplifies and extends a sense Vasubandhu has already established, not that he counter-refutes it; the framework of the words “debate within the lineage” must not be allowed to force it into an opposition.

Third, comments on the form of the argument and on consistency of position (not on doctrinal content). One is at the place of the explanation of the words by the science of sounds: Saṅghabhadra points out that Vasubandhu, “the Sūtra-master, having established this sense of the phrase himself, then himself assumedly raises such an objection,” and comments that what he explains “goes beyond what that school holds,” demanding of him, “what in the end does it accomplish?” — what is commented on is the rhetorical arrangement of establishing a thing and objecting to it oneself, not the sound and sense of the explanation of the words. Yet besides this comment on rhetoric Saṅghabhadra has a substantive refutation as well: “such words cannot explain the previous objection, since the stage of actual originating is allowed to belong to the future, and in that school the future has as yet no entity; on what then are reaching the condition and originating established?” — what he catches hold of is the opponent’s own premise: since the stage of ‘actually originating’ is allowed to belong to the future, and that school holds that future dharmas have no entity, then the two matters “reaching” (the formations reaching their condition) and “originating” (conjoining and rising) have nothing to rest on and cannot be established. ⇒ This item has two layers of comment: one comments on the arrangement of establishing and objecting oneself, the other refutes the stage on which the explanation of the words depends. A second is at the place of “this being, that is”: Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra in fact censure the Elder alike, yet Saṅghabhadra thinks Vasubandhu’s refutation not forceful enough, saying, “on what ground does the Sūtra-master only say that his explanation is not the sense of this sūtra? I now say that what the Elder says has no doctrinal sense at all,” and utters the sigh, “that the East should prize this — truly a wonder.” A third is at the place of the stanza “from an affliction an affliction and an action are produced”: Saṅghabhadra says, “examining the matter, the Sūtra-master, wishing to contravene the Vaibhāṣika school, abandons the stanza he had labored himself to make, which resolves the doubt and the objection according to principle” — meaning that Vasubandhu, having composed this stanza himself to resolve the difficulty of infinity, then seems to side with the Sautrāntikas’ doubt of dependent origination by stages, the two being self-contradictory. The stanza itself is word for word the same in the two treatises, with no divergent reading.

Fourth, the passage harshest in wording. At the place of the Sautrāntikas’ long objection Saṅghabhadra states expressly that the objection is a case of Vasubandhu “assumedly speaking” and framing words on the Sautrāntikas’ behalf, and his response runs beyond two thousand characters, concluding, “examining the Sūtra-master’s saying that this contradicts scripture: it is because he has not received instruction from the Vaibhāṣika masters, or his master had not penetrated the sense of the Mahāvibhāṣā, or, though he had looked over the text of the Mahāvibhāṣā, a wrong holding covered his mind and he did not discern correct principle.” Recorded without adjudication: the actual object of his rebuttal is the Sautrāntikas, together with a comment on Vasubandhu’s motive in reporting the objection. Further, the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine at the same place does not assume the Sautrāntikas’ mouth but points straight at the Sūtra-master: it cites him with, “the Sūtra-master falsely supposes the above sense to be wrong. Why so? Because the sūtra states it otherwise,” and answers, “therefore the charge that the dependent origination by stages stated above contradicts the sense of the sūtra: this contradicts nothing, since it is stated as it was set out” — the abridged treatise gathering those two thousand and more characters of the fuller one into a single citation and a single answer, while the speaker changes from ‘the Sautrāntika masters’ to ‘the Sūtra-master’ himself. ⇒ That the arrangement of speakers differs between the fuller and the abridged treatise is itself a textual fact; recorded together without adjudication.

A further chain of discussion: the fourfold analysis of the Venerable Wangman. The Kośa here records the Sautrāntikas’ refutation of Wangman’s four alternatives; Saṅghabhadra first restates it in full and then, with “now examining the sense and intent of what the Venerable says,” sets up an adjudication of his own — naming what “has already arisen from its cause” what has already arisen from conditions, and what “is a cause for others” dependent origination, and holding that an unconditioned dharma does not get the name of dependent origination. Fabao’s Commentary further excerpts this passage of the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle and brings it in. ⇒ The ancient masters’ discussion is layer upon layer (the Kośa reporting the Venerable Wangman, Saṅghabhadra commenting on the Venerable Wangman, Fabao’s Commentary excerpting Saṅghabhadra), and may not be compressed into a single narrative of refutation and establishment.

A collateral piece of textual evidence. For this treatise’s sentence “if the sense of the sūtra were so, it should be stated as: this being, that ceases and is not,” the Taishō collation notes list the variant “ceases / becomes”; and Saṅghabhadra, in reporting the Sūtra-master’s objection, gives outright “becomes not.” This may serve as one external corroboration of the variant, yet it is merely a record of textual difference and does not adjudicate on our behalf which reading of the base text is right.

Fifth, on the passage on intermediate existence, Saṅghabhadra records besides eight sets of other parties’ accounts (the speaker not being Vasubandhu). Beneath the several gates of intermediate existence in this fascicle, Saṅghabhadra gathers other parties’ divergent accounts place by place and adjudicates each. Read alongside this treatise, one sees how many further roads there are on the same topic among the schools:

One, bodily measure — this treatise makes the bodily measure of intermediate existence like a child of five or six years, while Saṅghabhadra records besides an account that “other masters say: the intermediate existences of the desire realm are all of the measure of the basic existence in its prime”: the intermediate existences of the desire realm are without exception of the measure of the prime of the basic existence, and do not take the appearance of a child. Two, by what gate it enters the womb — one account holds that intermediate existence must enter by the birth-gate, “some say that all intermediate existences enter by the birth-gate, and it is not by breaking open the mother’s belly that entry into the womb is had; and this is why, with twins, the one born first is the smaller and the one born after the larger,” taking as evidence that of twins the one born first is smaller and the one born after larger; Saṅghabhadra himself adjudicates against it, saying, “in strict principle intermediate existence enters the womb as it wills, and need not go by the birth-gate, since it is without obstruction” — intermediate existence has no resistant substance and enters as it wills, without needing to pass by the birth-gate. Three, the garment of the nun Śuklā — this treatise says that intermediate existence has no clothing and that this nun alone had a garment, while Saṅghabhadra records an explanation, “other masters say: this nun alone excepted, because she gave a monastic robe to the Saṅgha and made an excellent vow”: it was called forth by giving a monastic robe to the Saṅgha and making an excellent vow. Four, how the name gandharva was got — this treatise explains the name by ‘feeding on fragrance,’ while Saṅghabhadra records besides, “some say that intermediate existence upholds the body by means of fragrance, and being one who goes seeking fragrance is named gandharva”: named from going in search of fragrance, and not from feeding on fragrance. Five, the time it abides — Saṅghabhadra here first raises an objection, “this body of intermediate existence certainly does not abide long. The conditions for birth not having met, how is it not long?” — since it is said that intermediate existence does not abide long, how then can it not be long when the conditions for birth have not met? This objection is in the same arena as the four masters’ accounts in this treatise’s gate of the time it abides. Six, the great elements on which the faculties depend — this treatise records both ‘the semen and blood themselves become the support of the faculties’ and ‘separate great elements are produced’ without adjudicating; the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine, however, expressly takes the latter: “the form of birth-existence arises with intermediate existence as its proper cause. The parents’ semen and blood are merely the condition of birth” — the form of birth-existence has intermediate existence for its proper cause, the parents’ semen and blood being only assisting conditions. This sentence is the actual source of what Puguang’s Record speaks of as ‘the Correct Principle adjudicating in favor of this treatise’s latter master.’ Seven, whether, taking birth at the very place of death, there is still an intermediate existence — the Elder holds that if one takes birth directly at the place where life ends, there is no intermediate existence; Saṅghabhadra cites and censures him, “yet the Elder says: if one takes birth at the very place where life ends, there is no intermediate existence. What he says is not good,” concluding, “granting that one takes birth at the very place of death, it must still be allowed that immediately after death-existence an intermediate existence arises” — even if one really takes birth at the place of death, it must still be allowed that immediately after death-existence an intermediate existence arises. Eight, another general explanation of the four modes of entry into the womb — this treatise matches the four modes of entering the womb with full awareness to the wheel-turning monarch, the pratyekabuddha, and the bodhisattva; Saṅghabhadra records besides an account, “some say: these four all analyze the bodhisattva,” holding that all four are said with reference to the bodhisattva, and raises an objection of his own, “is not the mind of continuing existence definitely defiled? How then can there be room for entering the mother’s womb with full awareness?” — the mind of continuing existence being definitely defiled, how can it still be ‘with full awareness’?

⇒ All eight sets are cases in which Saṅghabhadra records a divergent account himself and then adjudicates; they are not this treatise’s own statements, nor Saṅghabhadra’s counter-refutations of Vasubandhu. Recorded together without adjudication.

Sixth, on the passage on dependent origination there are four further materials not gathered above. Besides the four classes listed above, four further places in the explanation of the links of dependent origination are worth reading alongside:

One, the preceptor master’s sense of the two sentences — Saṅghabhadra comments on Vasubandhu’s reporting of his own preceptor master’s (his master of ordination) explanation of the two sentences “this being, that is,” saying, “further, the Sūtra-master reports his own preceptor master’s explanation of the sense of the two sentences, showing his own filial piety; and though there is a fault in it, he does not bring it to light” — meaning that Vasubandhu, out of reverence for his master, does not expose his fault; and only afterwards does he refute the master’s account itself: “that is, those masters explain these two sentences as showing the unbrokenness and the arising of cause and result. That is, in dependence upon ignorance being unbroken the formations are unbroken; and just by ignorance arising the formations get to arise. And so by turns it should all be stated at length. This explanation is not so.” ⇒ This item must be read in two layers: one layer a comment on the ‘attitude in reporting,’ the other a refutation of ‘the sense reported’; the two may not be made one. Two, a positive divergent explanation of the sense of the two sentences — after refuting the other account Saṅghabhadra offers an explanation of his own: “the Abhidharma masters explain these two sentences thus: the arising of every link of existence must be by two causes, since there is a difference between the co-arisen and the previously arisen” — the arising of every link of existence must be by two causes, their difference being that between a co-arisen cause and a previously arisen cause. This is a divergent explanation of the same topic, recorded together with the item before. Three, why the stage of the afflictions of a former life is named ignorance as a whole — Saṅghabhadra cites the two reasons Vasubandhu gives, “yet the Sūtra-master says: because they operated at the same time as ignorance; because it was by the force of ignorance that they operated” (first, that they operated together with ignorance; second, that they operated by the force of ignorance), and concludes, “these two roads are both unreasonable.” ⇒ What is censured are the ‘reasons,’ not the ‘establishing of stages’ itself; do not enlarge it in reading. Four, the opening and gathering of dependent origination differs in the fuller and the abridged treatise — this treatise lists the momentary, of remote continuance, of unbroken linkage, and by stages as four kinds of dependent origination, while the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine gives, “further, dependent origination is stated as four by difference: first the momentary, second of remote continuance, third of unbroken linkage, fourth by stages. Others say besides: the manifesting of the capacity of dharmas” — adding by ‘others say besides’ a fifth kind, ‘the manifesting of the capacity of dharmas,’ to make five classes, and setting the question, “among these five classes of dependent origination, which did the World-Honored One state?”, passing straight on to the debate over dependent origination by stages. ⇒ That four and five differ in opening and gathering is a textual fact, recorded without adjudication.

Three. Divergences of Paramārtha’s Old Translation

Paramārtha’s Expository Treatise on the Treasury forms a system of its own in its renderings for the corresponding passages of this fascicle, and moreover divides its fascicles on a different boundary from Xuanzang’s — Paramārtha divides his Chapter on the World into four fascicles and Xuanzang into five, and the passage answering to this fascicle straddles the end of Paramārtha’s “part one” and the whole of his “part two,” the fascicle title and the chapter continuation title falling in the middle of this fascicle.

The divergences of rendering come in sets. Intermediate existence he renders the intermediate skandha; entry into the womb, entrusting to the womb; full awareness and its absence, possessing and lacking cognizance; gandharva, Qiantapo; the inner functioning person, the inner agent person; maturation, retribution. The personal names are especially worth setting side by side: Dharmasubhūti (a rendering by sense) appears in Paramārtha’s version as Damoxubuhoudi (a full transcription); the Venerable Vasumitra as the Venerable Poxumiduoluo; the nun Śuklā as the bhikṣuṇī Shukela; King Kṛkin as King Keji. The five stages within the womb are of a wholly different system of sounds — kalala appears as Kalaluo, arbuda as Efutuo, peśī as Bishi, ghana as Qiena, praśākhā as Boluoshequ.

In the latter half of this fascicle there is besides a set of systematic divergences of rendering not met with in the Chapter on the Elements or the Chapter on the Faculties: dependent origination he renders arising from conditions; the twelve links, the twelve divisions; the three periods, the three joints; entity, class; link, division. These five pairs occur densely from the chapter on the twelve links onward, so that they can be seen at almost every sentence, and they should be regarded as a system of rendering and not as scattered differences.

Three divergences of opening and gathering. The first is the ten dreams of King Kṛkin — Xuanzang brings them out in a stanza of four lines, Paramārtha simply lists them in prose, and the items differ somewhat between them (Paramārtha’s version has a necklace and a lotus and does not have the name of the two monkeys). The second is the four kinds of dependent origination — Xuanzang establishes four (momentary, of unbroken linkage, by stages, of remote continuance) and takes ‘sentient / insentient’ besides as a separate dimension, while Paramārtha first establishes the same four and then adduces a ‘separate account’ increasing them to six, folding the sentient-insentient dimension into the fifth and sixth. The third is bodily measure and what is illumined — Xuanzang has “five or six years” and “four great continents,” Paramārtha “six or seven years” and “the Jambu Continent.”

The place most worth noting: Paramārtha’s version has no mark of transmitted report. Xuanzang’s version gives “transmitted and allowed, stated with reference to stages,” while the corresponding verse of Paramārtha’s version gives simply “this is now stated with reference to stages,” and his prose commentary too states it plainly with no modal word answering to “transmitted and allowed” to be seen. Taken together with Saṅghabhadra’s express refutation of the two words “transmitted and allowed,” it can be seen that these two words have indeed been a focus in the history of Chinese translation. Why the difference arose (whether the text Paramārtha had before him lacked the modal word, or whether it was abridged in translation) this section does not force an explanation of. One honest record. Throughout the passage Paramārtha’s version has the intermediate skandha for its regular term, yet at one place, “there are only the aggregates, and by intermediate existence continuing they go and enter the mother’s womb,” it uses the two words “intermediate existence” outright, so that the two terms are not divided absolutely. This is the one exception in the whole passage. Further: all the collation of divergent renderings in this fascicle is located by the structure of the scene, and no negative proposition has been made by searching Paramārtha’s version for Xuanzang’s renderings — the words “transmitted and allowed,” “dependent origination,” “unbroken linkage,” and the rest do indeed yield zero hits on a word-for-word search of Paramārtha’s version, while the scenes are certainly there.

Four. Coordinates for Cross-Reading

The appearances of intermediate existence, the order of entry into the womb, and the twelve links and three periods established in this fascicle are the antecedent dharma-marks of the embryology and the doctrine of dependent origination of the later Yogācāra system, and their agreements and differences can be read across item by item.

The names and their number for intermediate existence. This treatise brings out the single name gandharva only, and only on the sense of feeding on fragrance; the Yogācārabhūmi lists four names — intermediate existence (because it is born in the middle between the two existences of death and birth), gandharva, mind-going (because it goes to the place of birth with mind as its support), and going-to-birth (because it arises facing birth-existence) — and says that intermediate existence excludes the formless realm and covers all places of birth. The sense that “the formless has no intermediate existence” agrees in the two systems, this treatise giving “if in the formless, one is wanting and three are had.”

The time intermediate existence abides. This treatise records Vasumitra’s “at the most seven days” as one divergent account, and sets it level with the Mahāvibhāṣā’s “it abides a short time” — Puguang’s Record adjudicating this fourth account to be the correct sense; while the Yogācārabhūmi simply establishes the seven days as its account, saying that if intermediate existence has not got the conditions for birth it abides at the most seven days, and that if it has not got the conditions for birth in seven days at the most it dies and is born again. A divergent account within a school has become in the Yogācāra system a settled account — this is one instance of a divergent account being promoted.

The opening and gathering of the stages within the womb: five stages and eight. This treatise says, “within the mother’s belly the stages are five,” gathering the three matters hair-down-and-nails, the material faculties, and the shape after the fifth stage; the Yogācārabhūmi establishes each of these three as a stage of its own, making eight stages in difference — kalala, arbuda, peśī, ghana, praśākhā, hair-down-and-nails, faculties, shape — and brings out the appearance of each stage. A difference in the opening and gathering of the same material is the steadiest of coordinates for reading embryology across the two.

Three afflictions, two actions, and seven entities, against the three paths of affliction, action, and suffering. This treatise has “three afflictions and two actions, and seven entities”; the Section on Ascertainment of the Yogācārabhūmi asks how many of the twelve links are the path of affliction, how many the path of action, and how many the path of suffering, and answers that three are the path of affliction, two the path of action, and the rest the path of suffering. The numbers agree throughout while the names differ (entity against path of suffering), and this is the most direct correspondence between this fascicle and the Yogācāra system. The Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only likewise carries on this division, saying that three are defiled alone and seven undefiled alone; and it says further that ignorance, craving, and grasping are named the solitary marks and the rest the mixed marks.

The paired names dependent origination and what has already arisen from conditions. This treatise adjudicates them by “the cause-portion / the result-portion”; the Yogācārabhūmi says that the dharma-nature of the arising of the formations is named dependent origination, and that they, having arisen, are named arisen from conditions. The two systems establish the same pair of names while the criteria on which they hang differ.

The largest divergence: two rounds of cause and result against one. This treatise establishes the twelve links by dependent origination by stages, two in the earlier period, eight in the middle, and two in the later, which is the type of the two rounds of cause and result across three lives; the Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only, however, says expressly that the ten causes and two results of the twelve links definitely are not of the same life, and adjudicates that one round of cause and result suffices to show the turning round and to keep clear of annihilation and constancy, and that to set up two rounds is in fact useless. One and the same set of twelve links, with a different number of rounds established — this treatise making it two rounds across three lives, that system one round.