俱舍論 業道諸門·斷善·三障Abhidharmakośabhāṣya · The Paths of Action through the Several Gates · Cutting Off the Wholesome Roots · The Three Obstructions

Before Reading This Fascicle

The fascicle before finished going through the ten paths of action one by one; this fascicle opens by asking only a single thing: since all ten have been treated, what after all do the two words ‘path of action’ mean? — a treatise that has come this far suddenly turns from ‘which are they’ to ‘how was this name established.’ The three ancient masters all let the knife of their outlines fall at the very same place: Puguang’s Record marks “this is the second of the main text, explaining the name ‘path of action’”; Fabao’s Commentary marks “below, the half stanza, the second of the main text, explaining the name of the path of action”; Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary marks “from here the second of the main text, explaining the name and sense of ‘path of action’” — the three agreeing word for word, from which it appears that this cut was opened by the text of the treatise itself and not forced upon it by later hands.

The frame of this fascicle divides into two stretches. The first half is still within the chapter on ‘the ten paths of action,’ following the author’s own order: the name of the path of action, wrong view cutting off the wholesome roots, the number of paths of action that turn together with volition, the destinies and the places, the three results, wrong livelihood — of which the passage on ‘wrong view cutting off the wholesome roots’ is the longest, and which the author himself calls an incidental discussion made ‘as the sense conveniently allowed,’ expressly drawing the thread back at its close with “now the sense of the paths of action proper should be made clear again.” The latter half begins from the sentence “as was said above, results are of five kinds” and changes chapters — Puguang, Fabao, and Yuanhui alike mark this place as the beginning of ‘the miscellaneous explanations of the actions.’ That is to say, within one fascicle it straddles the boundary of two chapters. The two chapter-level boundaries of this chapter never did fall upon a fascicle boundary — the other one (the beginning of the chapter ‘explaining the actions in the sūtras’) falls within Fascicle Fifteen, and this one (the beginning of ‘the miscellaneous explanations of the actions’) falls within the present fascicle; and it is precisely in this that this fascicle is the most densely outlined of the whole chapter.

One thing should be said before all else. This fascicle reads like two books: the first half thick with questions, answers, and divergent accounts, the latter half thick with numbers. Yet the two stretches are in truth doing one and the same work — taking the measure, line by line, of every line that the one word ‘action’ sets moving. The first half measures ‘what action can cut off, where it can arise, what it can summon’; the latter half measures ‘how many cells action and result can be matched in.’ Keep this in mind while reading, and that heap of ‘four, two, three’ in the latter half ceases to be a table and becomes one and the same question asked over and over six times.

I. The Name ‘Path of Action’: Why the Last Three Are Path Alone While the First Seven Are Both Action and Path

First ask: all ten are called ‘paths of action’ — are the ten then of the same standing? The treatise answers that they are not. The last three (greed, hatred, wrong view) are path alone and not action — the action is that ‘volition’ which arises in association with them; and that volition turns and proceeds along with greed, hatred, and wrong view and does its doing by their force, so that greed, hatred, and wrong view are the road that volition walks, and this is ‘the road of action.’ The first seven (killing, theft, misconduct, false speech, divisive speech, harsh speech, frivolous speech) are themselves bodily and verbal action, and hence are action; and at the same time the volition able to set going bodily and verbal action must turn with them as its object-field, and hence they are also the road that action walks. The two layers of sense taken together establish the single name ‘path of action.’

The easy error is to suppose that ‘path of action’ is one label held in common by all ten, and that once stuck on the matter is done. It is not so — the treatise is here expressly taking a compound word apart into two senses, to show that it governs at once two classes of dharma of different standing. Hence the treatise says, “in saying ‘path of action’ it fully displays both the sense of action and the sense of the road of action”: the two occurrences of ‘path of action’ in that one sentence are not of one meaning.

Will it not then be confusing for one name to take in two classes of differing entity? The treatise answers: this is a usage commonly allowed in the writings of the world. Puguang here brings out two ready examples that make the point through: what is commonly allowed in the world, as with the word ‘cart-ox,’ where cart and ox are by nature not of one kind and yet are named in common by one name; and what is commonly allowed in the treatises, as with the word ‘station of consciousness,’ where the four stations of consciousness are likewise not of one kind and yet share one name. Where this lands: when in reading Abhidharma one meets a compound technical name, the first step is not to hunt for its ‘definition’ but to ask, ‘of how many standings is this name put together?’ — so with the path of action, and so likewise with the projecting and completing actions further on.

II. Why the Preparatory and Consequent Stages Do Not Count as Paths of Action

First ask: in taking a life there are always three stretches — the getting ready before setting to work (the preparatory), the moment of the killing itself (the basic), and the momentum left over after the killing is done (the consequent). Since all three stretches are that same matter of killing, why is only the middle stretch counted a path of action?

The treatise gives three grounds, which Puguang takes apart one by one: first, the sentence “because for this and in dependence upon this they turn” is in fact a double fastening — the preparatory turns for the sake of the basic (the sense of heading toward), the consequent turns in dependence upon the basic (the sense of relying on); and since both are established only by looking to the basic, they cannot in turn serve as the basic themselves. Second, it was said above that what a path of action gathers is ‘the coarse grade’ (the weighty portion), and the preparatory and the consequent are not the weighty portion. Third, and most important: to be established as a path of action means that by it the things within and without have increase and decrease; apart from this stretch there is no such working. Puguang here cites the Mahāvibhāṣā to gloss the words: what one dwells in is called ‘outer,’ and lifespan and the rest are called ‘inner’ — that is, ‘outer’ points to the lands and vessels of the environing result, and ‘inner’ to the body and life of the direct result.

The easy error is to read the three grounds as three sentences of one meaning. Their points of view differ entirely — the first asks ‘which depends upon which,’ the second asks ‘light or weighty,’ the third asks ‘is there a real working of increase and decrease.’ The third is the standard; the first two are the grounds.

Where this lands: this is a measuring rule for the whole chapter on action. Thereafter, whenever it is asked whether something counts as a path of action, one first measures it by the third: has it really made the things within and without increase or decrease? If the answer is no, then however long the preparatory work goes on, it is still outside the door.

III. Cutting Off the Wholesome Roots (1): Just Which Kind of Wholesome Is Cut Off

First ask: when it is said that someone has ‘cut off his wholesome roots,’ is it all his wholesome that is cut off? The treatise answers as narrowly as can be — only the wholesome roots of the desire realm acquired by birth. The wholesome acquired by birth is that portion which is had from birth and needs no applied cultivation; as for the wholesome acquired through preparation (that portion which arises only when effort is put in), the treatise says, “because the wholesome roots acquired through preparation had already fallen away before this” — that portion was lost long before the cutting off of the wholesome, and its turn does not come now. And the wholesome of the form and formless realms was never accomplished to begin with, so there is no question of cutting it off.

The author here also reconciles an objection drawn from the text of another school’s treatise: the Treatise of Designations says, ‘by just this much it is said that this person has cut off the wholesome roots of the three realms.’ If the three realms are really cut off, does that not contradict ‘only the desire realm is cut off’? The treatise answers: that is said with regard to the wholesome roots of the upper realms becoming thereby yet more remote — this continuum is no longer a vessel for the wholesome dharmas of the upper realms; it is not that the wholesome of the upper realms is really cut off.

The easy error is to hear ‘cutting off the wholesome roots’ and imagine ‘this person has not one particle of the wholesome left in him.’ The scope the treatise establishes is in fact very small: only that portion of the wholesome of the desire realm which is had without effort. Where this lands: this point first reins in a terrifying picture, and also lays the ground for how ‘restoring the wholesome roots’ is possible at all — it is precisely because the scope of the cutting off is narrow that the restoring can be.

IV. Cutting Off the Wholesome Roots (2): What Kind of Wrong View Is Able to Cut

First ask: there are ten unwholesome paths of action; why is it wrong view alone that can cut off the wholesome roots, and why must it further be restricted to a wrong view ‘of the high grade and complete’? The treatise answers: a wrong view able to cut off the wholesome must be one that decisively denies cause and result. To deny cause is decisively to refuse that there are good conduct and evil conduct; to deny result is decisively to refuse the maturations felt from those deeds. If either is wanting, the force is not enough.

Why then does the root treatise say in another place that ‘what cuts off the wholesome roots are the unwholesome roots of the high grade’? The author’s answer is a fine one: it is because the unwholesome roots are able to draw forth wrong view, and so people push the credit for cutting off the wholesome onto the unwholesome roots — as when fire burns a village and the fire was set by a thief, and the world says ‘that thief burned the village.’ What burned the village was in fact the fire.

The easy error is to read ‘wrong view’ as ordinary crookedness of opinion. The wrong view the treatise speaks of has a hard threshold — it must be decisive, and it must deny both cause and result. Half believing and half doubting does not count; denying only one half does not count. Where this lands: this point is at the same time the key to ‘restoring the wholesome roots’ further on — the conditions for restoring are ‘doubt’ or ‘right view’; and since cutting off requires a ‘decision,’ then as soon as that decision loosens into a doubt, the wholesome roots have a road back. Cutting off and restoring, the opening and the shutting, turn upon the same hinge.

V. Cutting Off the Wholesome Roots (3): One Stroke of the Blade, or a Grinding Away Portion by Portion

First ask: are the wholesome roots of the nine grades cut through all at once by a wrong view of a single instant, or ground away grade by grade? Here the treatise records two accounts together. One holds cutting off all at once, with the simile of the path of seeing where the afflictions abandoned through seeing are exhausted at one stroke; the correct sense the author takes is cutting off by degrees — the wholesome roots of the nine grades being cut off by degrees by wrong views of the nine grades matched against them in reverse, with the simile of the path of cultivation where the afflictions abandoned through cultivation are cut off grade by grade: the lowest of the low grade of wrong view cuts off the highest of the high grade of wholesome root, and so on down to the lowest of the low grade of wholesome root being cut off by the highest of the high grade of wrong view.

The account of cutting off by degrees has the wording of the root treatise for its proof: the root treatise says, ‘what are called the wholesome roots that occur together with feebleness? They are that portion last relinquished at the time of cutting off the wholesome roots’ — since there is a ‘portion last relinquished,’ it appears that others were relinquished before, and this is precisely gradation. How then is the root treatise’s other saying, ‘the unwholesome roots of the high grade can cut off the wholesome roots,’ to be reckoned? Puguang states this layer very plainly: the root treatise speaks of the cutting off in reverse order, and though the cutting off of the first eight grades is also called cutting off, it is not yet exhausted; only when the ninth grade is cut is it ultimately exhausted, and so that sentence is a statement of hidden intent made with regard to ‘the ultimate,’ not a saying that the first eight grades cannot cut off the wholesome.

Here, by the way, the form of the passage on cutting off the wholesome should be made clear, for it is the densest passage in the fascicle. Within this one long passage there are five matched pairs of ‘first setting out a divergent account, then stating the correct sense,’ and the pattern is invariably this: first there comes a sentence with “there is another master who says” or “there is another master who declares,” and thereafter “stated thus” leads out the correct sense the author takes. The five pairs are, in order — the realm taken as object by the wrong view that cuts off the wholesome (one master holding that it takes only what has outflows and only its own realm; the author taking that it takes all things for its object); the manner of cutting off the nine grades (one master holding cutting off all at once; the author taking cutting off by degrees, as in this section); whether one may stop midway in the course of cutting off (one master holding that there is never a stopping midway; the author taking that both stopping and not stopping occur); which is relinquished first, discipline or the wholesome roots (one master holding that discipline is relinquished first; the author taking that both are relinquished together); and whether the restoring of the wholesome is by degrees or all at once (one master holding restoration by degrees in nine grades; the author taking restoration all at once and thereafter manifesting by degrees). Besides these five pairs there are three places that do not follow the pattern: one is the account that the two wrong views denying cause and denying result have a before and after like the uninterrupted and the liberation paths, which is an added divergent account with no correct sense set against it; the second is the account of Jambudvīpa alone, and the third the account that a woman’s body cannot cut off the wholesome — and in these last two the author does not use the manner of “stated thus,” but cites the text of the root treatise and strikes back directly, in a plainly weightier tone. The most important thing in reading this passage is that, at each sentence of divergent account, one should first make out whether the next sentence is ‘stating the correct sense’ or ‘refuting.’

The easy error is to see two accounts standing side by side and suppose the author vague. He is not — the author here plainly takes cutting off by degrees, and cites the text of the root treatise for proof. Where this lands: that the cutting off of the wholesome roots is a process and not an instant matters most of all in practice — for so long as one grade of wholesome root remains, the other grades may be raised again through it, and then it does not yet count as cutting off the wholesome. Leave one portion, and a road is left.

VI. Cutting Off the Wholesome Roots (4): Where It Is Cut, in What Body, and by What Sort of Person

First ask: can this matter of cutting off the wholesome roots happen anywhere and to anyone? The treatise’s answer is a threefold restriction.

First, the place: only in the three continents of the human destiny, not in the evil destinies, and not in the destiny of the gods. The reason is very concrete — in the evil destinies neither defiled nor undefiled discernment is firm enough to bear up such a ‘decision’; in the destiny of the gods the results of action are seen directly before one, so that one could not deny cause and result even if one wished. And within the three continents Uttarakuru must further be excluded, since the people there have no exceedingly evil ‘āśaya.’ Fabao here glosses it expressly: āśaya, which here means inclination of mind — that is, the leaning of the heart. Once this gloss is set, the whole passage’s “an evil āśaya too unsettled” and “an evil āśaya exceedingly firm and deep” become clear.

Second, the body: only the body of a man or of a woman, since the will and intent of these two bodies are decisive.

Third, the class of conduct: only a person who walks by views, not one who walks by craving. One who walks by craving has an evil inclination too unsettled — wavering and unstable, striking no deep root; one who walks by views has an evil inclination exceedingly firm and deep. By this principle the ṣaṇḍha and the rest also cannot cut off the wholesome roots, since they belong to the class that walks by craving.

The easy error is to read these three restrictions as a rating of qualifications, as though ‘being able to cut off the wholesome’ had become a kind of capacity. It is quite the reverse — what the treatise points out is that to cut off the wholesome roots thoroughly requires a rare firmness; and that firmness, turned to the side of evil, becomes the deepest of disasters. Where this lands: this point is most useful read backward — a person whose mind is not settled enough cannot be thoroughly bad, and that means he can turn back at any moment.

VII. Cutting Off the Wholesome Roots (5): The Entity of the Cutting Off Is ‘Non-Acquisition’; the Conditions of the Restoring Are ‘Doubt’ and ‘View’

First ask: when the wholesome roots are cut off, what after all is the thing that is cut off? The treatise answers with great precision: the cutting off of the wholesome has ‘non-acquisition’ for its entity. That is to say, at the stage of cutting off the wholesome the ‘acquisition’ of the wholesome dharmas no longer arises and ‘non-acquisition’ arises in succession; the stage at which non-acquisition has arisen in place of the acquisition of the wholesome roots is what is called cutting off the wholesome roots.

By what, then, are they restored after being cut off? The treatise says: by ‘doubt’ or by ‘the holding of view.’ That is, with regard to cause and result there sometimes arises in the mind a doubt — ‘perhaps there is such a thing after all’; or else right view arises outright — ‘cause and result decidedly are.’ At that time the acquisition of the wholesome roots is restored, and so it is called restoring the wholesome roots. The restoring is all at once and only thereafter manifests by degrees, and the treatise closes it with an excellent simile: as when illness is removed all at once while strength returns by degrees — the sickness ends in a moment, the strength comes back slowly.

Can the wholesome be restored within the present body? The treatise says it can, save only for one who has committed a deed of immediate retribution — such a person can restore it only when he is about to end his life from the hells, or when he is about to take birth there. The treatise further divides two pairs: one who cut off the wholesome by the force of a cause restores it when about to die; one who cut it off by the force of a condition restores it when about to be born. One whose inclination alone was spoiled while his preparatory conduct was not can restore it in this very life; one whose inclination was spoiled and his preparatory conduct as well must wait until the body is destroyed.

The easy error is to imagine ‘non-acquisition’ as some solid thing carried away. It is not carried away; it is that acquisition does not arise and non-acquisition does — as the lamp was not carried off, but simply stopped shining. Where this lands: the condition for restoring the wholesome turns out to be ‘doubt’ — this is the sentence in the fascicle most worth remembering. For a man who denies cause and result with flat finality, the first step in saving him is not to persuade him to believe, but to shake that ‘decision’ loose into a question mark.

VIII. Cutting Off the Wholesome Roots (6): Cutting Off the Wholesome and Falling into the Class Fixed in Wrongness Are Not One Matter

First ask: is a man who has cut off his wholesome roots thereby fallen into the class fixed in wrongness? The treatise here makes an analysis by four alternatives, and tells us plainly that these are two matters. First alternative, cutting off the wholesome without falling into the class fixed in wrongness: as with Pūraṇa and his sort. Second alternative, falling into the class fixed in wrongness without cutting off the wholesome: as with Ajātaśatru and his sort. Third alternative, having both: as with Devadatta and his sort. Fourth alternative, having neither: namely all persons apart from the three marks above.

The easy error is to take two names both very grave for one and the same matter, and to infer the one wherever the other is seen. The treatise uses the analysis by four alternatives to take them apart precisely to guard against such confusion — that two categories overlap does not make them equal.

Where this lands: the analysis by four alternatives is the most frequently used tool in Abhidharma, and this is its only appearance in this fascicle. Thereafter, whenever two technical names look as though they overlapped, first try asking: is there an instance of ‘the first without the second’? Is there an instance of ‘the second without the first’? If both questions can be answered, the two names must be established apart. As for the author, he has already set out three ready personal names as instances of the four alternatives, so that the reader need seek no further examples — the author has finished the demonstration himself.

IX. How Many Paths of Action Can Turn Together with Volition in a Single Mind

First ask: in one thought-moment of one man, how many paths of action at most can turn together with that ‘volition’? The treatise speaks of two sides. On the unwholesome side, from one to eight; on the wholesome side, spoken of generally, up to ten.

Why does the unwholesome stop at eight? Because when the last three (greed, hatred, wrong view) are present by their own force they decidedly cannot run side by side — one cannot in a single thought-moment give rise to greed and to hatred at once. The first seven are actions of form and can, by preparatory work done earlier, all be brought to completion at this moment, so that at most seven paths of action of form plus one of mental action makes exactly eight. Nine and ten therefore do not occur.

Why can the wholesome side reach ten? Because non-greed, non-hatred, and non-delusion can arise together, and with the seven limbs of the wholesome of form added they make just ten. The treatise here further divides two ways of counting, ‘taken separately with regard to what is displayed’ and ‘taken generally with regard to both hidden and displayed’ — by what is displayed, the three numbers one, eight, and five must be blocked out; by hidden and displayed together, nothing need be blocked out, since apart from discipline there are the cases of one limb, eight limbs, and five limbs.

The easy error is to treat this passage as mere play with numbers. It is in fact answering a very concrete question: evil comes piecemeal, whereas the wholesome can arise in one whole sheet. The number of the unwholesome is limited by greed and hatred not arising together, while the number of the wholesome is filled out because the three wholesome roots can turn together.

Where this lands: that more wholesome than unwholesome can be accomplished at once within a single thought-moment is not a figure of speech but a reckoning of Abhidharma. If in reading this far one has retained only the two ranges of one-to-eight and one-to-ten, one has dropped the most important sentence of the passage.

X. The Destinies and the Places: ‘Possession’ and ‘Being in Act’ Are Two Rules

The stanza of this section presses the answer very tight; read it through first and then look at the prose, and one will not lose the way. The unwholesome side: “of the unwholesome, in the hells, harsh, frivolous, and hatred extend to both; greed and wrong view are possessed; Uttarakuru possesses the last three; frivolous speech extends to being in act and possession; the remaining desire-realm ten extend to both” — in the hells the three of harsh speech, frivolous speech, and hatred ‘extend to both’ (to possession and to being in act), while greed and wrong view are only possessed; Uttarakuru ‘possesses the last three’ (greed, hatred, and wrong view being possessed alone), while frivolous speech alone ‘extends to being in act and possession’; and in the rest of the desire realm all ten ‘extend to both.’ The wholesome side: “of the wholesome, in all places the last three extend to being in act and possession; in the formless realm and the Heaven of Non-Percipient Beings the first seven are possessed alone; in the remaining places they extend to possession and being in act, save the hells and Uttarakuru” — non-greed, non-hatred, and non-delusion extend to being in act and possession in all places; the seven limbs of body and speech are possessed alone in the formless realm and the Heaven of Non-Percipient Beings; and in the remaining places they extend to possession and being in act, save the hells and Uttarakuru.

First ask: when it is said that a certain destiny ‘has’ a certain path of action, is it said that the beings there are really doing it, or that they carry it about with them? The treatise here divides the two matters with two rules — possession (carrying it, the seed uncut) and being in act (really arising here and now). One and the same path of action may be possessed without being in act.

The picture within the hells is thus a strange one: harsh speech, frivolous speech, and hatred extend to both — they rail at one another, hence harsh speech; they wail and cry out, hence frivolous speech; they are coarse and hard and perverse in body and mind and hate one another, hence hatred. Whereas greed and wrong view are possessed only and not in act, since there is no lovable object-field there (greed having nothing to be greedy for) and the results of action are seen directly before them (so that denial of cause and result cannot be carried through). As for the five of killing, theft, misconduct, false speech, and divisive speech, the treatise gives a reason for each: they die when their action is spent, hence no killing; no possessions and no women, hence no theft and no misconduct; lying is of no use, hence no false speech; they are constantly in estrangement, hence no divisive speech.

Uttarakuru is strange in another way: greed, hatred, and wrong view are decidedly possessed and not in act, and only frivolous speech extends to both — because the people there sometimes sing and chant with a defiled mind, and yet have no evil inclination. The treatise also notes in passing how the people there practice what is not the pure life: when a man and a woman have given rise to a defiled mind they take hands and walk to a tree; if the branches droop and cover them, they know it is permitted; if the branches do not droop, they are ashamed together and part.

As for the wholesome side, non-greed, non-hatred, and non-delusion extend to both throughout the three realms and five destinies; the seven limbs of body and speech in the formless realm and the Heaven of Non-Percipient Beings can only be possessed and decidedly are not in act. Puguang here takes the difference finer still: among the three classes of gods, ghosts, and animals, the first seven paths of action have only the portion gathered under ‘the intermediate’ and no non-discipline; in the three human continents both the intermediate and non-discipline are found.

The easy error is to read ‘there is no killing in the hells’ as ‘there is no mutual injury in the hells.’ What the treatise says is that there is no path of action of killing — because the beings there die when their action is spent and are not killed to death, so that the limb of ‘the other’s dying’ required by the path of action of killing is not made up.

Where this lands: the most useful sentence in this passage is the two rules. Thereafter, whenever one reads that ‘a certain place has a certain dharma,’ first ask: is this said of possession, or of being in act? Separate the two rules, and many an apparently contradictory scriptural passage unties itself.

XI. The Three Results of the Ten Paths of Action: Maturation, Homogeneous Outflow, and Dominance

First ask: what does one summon by doing one evil path of action? The treatise says three things — the maturation result, the homogeneous outflow result, and the dominance result.

The maturation result is said with regard to the general retribution: practicing, cultivating, or doing much, by that force one is born among the nārakas. The homogeneous outflow result is said with regard to that portion experienced among humans after coming forth from the hells, and each of the ten has its own shape: one who kills is short in the measure of life; one who takes what is not given is destitute of goods; one who commits sexual misconduct has a wife who is not chaste; one who speaks falsely meets with much slander; one who speaks divisively is estranged from kin and friends; one who speaks harshly forever hears words unpleasant to hear; one who speaks frivolously has speech that carries no weight; one who is greedy grows the more greedy, one who hates has his hatred the more increased, one of wrong view has his delusion the more increased. The dominance result is said with regard to the goods of livelihood outside the body: by killing, outward things have little luster; by taking what is not given, there is much frost and hail; by sexual misconduct, much dust; by false speech, much foul stench; by divisive speech, the dwelling place is steep and crooked; by harsh speech, the fields have many brambles and are stony, thin, and salt so that they are unfit for tillage; by frivolous speech, the seasons change and go awry; by greed, few fruits; by hatred, acrid fruits; by wrong view, few fruits or none.

The three results established, the treatise at once adds a question after the dominance result, pressing whether the two results of maturation and homogeneous outflow come from one cause or two: “is it one action of killing that first summons the maturation result of the nārakas and afterward makes the measure of life in the human destiny short? Or is there something further?” — is it the same action of killing that first summons the maturation there and then makes the human lifespan short, or is there another cause? The treatise sets out two accounts and makes no choice between them. The first account (“there is another master who declares”) holds one cause: “it is just that same action of killing that first summons the maturation there and afterward the homogeneous outflow here” — one and the same action of killing, summoning the maturation there first and the homogeneous outflow here afterward. The second account (“and there is another who says”) holds two causes: “the causes of the two results are not the same — the former means the preparatory stage, the latter the basic stage” — what summons the maturation is the preparatory stretch, what summons the homogeneous outflow is the basic stretch; so that although one speaks in general of a single ‘killing,’ it is in truth spoken of as gathering in both the basic and its retinue. The two accounts stand side by side, and the treatise goes no further, passing no verdict.

After this passage the treatise adds one important closing sentence: the ‘homogeneous outflow result’ spoken of here is “not beyond the maturation and dominance results; it is conventionally called homogeneous outflow with regard to a small likeness.” That is to say, this cell of short human life is not really a further entity of result established beyond the maturation result and the dominance result — set against wholesome action it is a maturation, set against the action of killing it is a dominance; only because there is that small likeness between ‘cutting off another’s life’ and ‘shortness in the measure of life’ (both being a diminishing of life) is it conventionally named homogeneous outflow. Read this with care: the ‘three’ of the three results is a division by gates of sense, and does not mean that one action necessarily produces three mutually unrelated entities of result.

The author here also poses an objection of his own: the span of human life is itself summoned by wholesome action; how can a short life be called a homogeneous outflow of killing? Answer: it is not said that a person’s span of life is the result of the action of killing; only that because of killing the measure of life becomes short — the action of killing is a cause that makes an obstruction to the life faculty, so that it cannot abide long. Fabao puts this question still more plainly: the life faculty in a good destiny, long or short, is a result of wholesome action; how then should a short life be the homogeneous outflow result of killing? The answer lies in those three words, ‘cause of obstruction.’

The easy error is to read the homogeneous outflow result as ‘a one-to-one correspondence of deed and retribution,’ and then, meeting a good man who dies young, to think the treatise mistaken. The treatise’s account is far more precise: the lifespan is given by wholesome action, the shortening is taken by evil action — two forces at work upon one matter, not one.

Where this lands: what is most useful in the establishing of the three results is that it divides the effect of one action into three layers — where one falls in the next life (maturation), what habits and circumstances one carries on returning among humans (homogeneous outflow), and what even the hills, streams, and fields outside the body become (dominance). The third layer is the most easily overlooked, and it is just there that this passage strikes the reader: one man’s evil will change the look of a whole stretch of land.

XII. Why Wrong Livelihood Must Be Established as a Limb Apart from Wrong Speech and Wrong Action

First ask: the reverse of the eightfold noble path has the three limbs of wrong speech, wrong action, and wrong livelihood. Yet since ‘livelihood’ too is carried on by the two actions of body and speech, where is there a wrong livelihood apart from wrong speech and wrong action? The treatise’s answer is very deft: indeed there is no further thing; this is a regrouping of the same set of actions — the verbal and bodily actions arising from hatred and delusion are called, in that order, wrong speech and wrong action; the two actions of body and speech arising from greed are, because they are hard to be rid of, separately given the name wrong livelihood.

Why are those arising from greed peculiarly hard to be rid of? The treatise says: greed can rob a sentient being of his mind, and the action raised by greed is hard to restrain and guard against. So that people might cultivate earnestly in the portion of ‘right livelihood,’ the Buddha expressly divided it out and spoke of it apart.

The easy error is to suppose wrong livelihood a third new thing and to go hunting for an entity of its own. It has no entity of its own — it is a piece cut out afresh from wrong speech and wrong action according to ‘the affliction it depends upon.’

Where this lands: this passage demonstrates one of the Buddha’s ways of establishing technical names — the same heap of dharmas, cut a different way, yields one more important warning. The three limbs are not three heaps; they are two ways of cutting laid one upon the other. And the reason for making this extra cut is only three words: because it is hard to be rid of. Whatever is peculiarly easy to slip past must be peculiarly singled out and watched; this is a compassion in the establishing of technical names, not a fondness for classification.

XIII. The Scope of Wrong Livelihood: A Narrowing Turned Back by the Text of a Sūtra

First ask: since wrong livelihood is ‘the bodily and verbal action arising from greed,’ ought it to be narrowed further, so that only what arises from a greed aimed at keeping oneself alive should count? The treatise here records one master’s holding: only the two actions of body and speech arising from a greed that takes ‘the requisites of life’ for its object are called wrong livelihood, and those arising from any other greed are not — the ground being that to perform song and dance for one’s own sport and delight is not for the sustaining of life.

The author here does not record it alongside but refutes it outright: this contradicts the text of the sūtra, and so decidedly does not stand in principle. In the Sūtra on the Aggregate of Precepts, the World-Honored One establishes even the watching of elephant fights and the like within wrong livelihood — since that is a wrong taking in of outward object-fields whereby life is spent in vain.

The easy error is to take this passage for one more instance of ‘two accounts recorded together.’ It is not — in this fascicle, when a divergent account is met with, it is mostly first set out and then corrected, both parties being set forth; but here the author cites the sacred teaching and strikes back directly, in a plainly weightier tone. In reading a treatise one must be able to tell these two tones apart: the one is ‘there is a further account,’ the other is “it decidedly does not stand in principle.”

Where this lands: that master’s narrowing looks scrupulous, but it in fact shrinks wrong livelihood down to the single matter of ‘greed for food and clothing’; the sūtra, by taking in the watching of elephant fights as well, says in effect: whatever is a wrong taking in of outward object-fields whereby life is dragged emptily along falls within wrong livelihood. Widened thus, this limb at last really governs daily life.

XIV. The Beginning of the Gates of Result: First Set Up the Way of Asking at the ‘Gate’

First ask: the root treatise says that results are of five kinds — maturation, homogeneous outflow, release from bondage, human effort, and dominance. How many results, then, has each class of action? With this one question the treatise enters that long string of numbers in the latter half of the fascicle. Before reading it the way of asking must be set up clearly, or the whole passage is nothing but a table.

The treatise’s way of asking is this: take one class of action as ‘cause,’ take one class of dharma as ‘result,’ and ask how many of the five results this pair can be matched in. So every cell is a three-part question of the form ‘such an action has such a dharma for how many results.’ The first gate asks first about ‘the path that cuts off’ — what is called a path is that which can both realize cessation through discernment and cut off the afflictions, that is, the uninterrupted path. The path that cuts off is of two kinds, with outflows and without: action of the path that cuts off with outflows has the five results in full; that without outflows lacks maturation (what is without outflows summons no maturation); the remaining wholesome and unwholesome actions with outflows lack release from bondage (they cannot realize cessation through discernment); the remaining actions without outflows and the indeterminate actions lack both maturation and release from bondage, and only three results remain.

The treatise here gives a definition of each of the five results: the maturation result is the lovable maturation summoned within its own level by the path that cuts off; the homogeneous outflow result is the like dharmas arising afterward within its own level, equal or increased; the result of release from bondage is the unconditioned cessation through discernment realized by cutting off the afflictions through the force of this path; the result of human effort is the coexistent dharmas drawn along by this path, the path of liberation, what is cultivated, and what is cut off; the dominance result is the remaining conditioned dharmas apart from its own entity, excepting only those already arisen beforehand. Puguang analyzes the term ‘result of human effort’ further into four kinds: the co-arisen result of human effort, the uninterrupted result of human effort, the result of human effort at an interval, and the result of human effort not arising; Fabao merely glosses it briefly in three phrases — by ‘coexistent’ are meant co-arisen dharmas, by ‘liberation’ what arises uninterruptedly, that is, the path of liberation, and by ‘cultivated’ the future cultivation and cutting off.

The easy error is to see numbers and set about memorizing them, and after memorizing still not to know how the numbers came about. In fact every cell can be worked out for oneself: first ask whether between this pair there is a relation of ‘summoning a maturation,’ whether there is a relation of ‘flowing on in likeness,’ whether there is a relation of ‘realizing cessation through discernment,’ whether there is a relation of ‘what is achieved by function,’ and whether there is a relation of ‘not obstructing’ — answer the five questions, and the number comes out.

Where this lands: what is to be learned in this passage is not the numbers but the five questions. Learn the five questions, and all five gates below can be worked out for oneself; work them out and then check against the text of the treatise, and it becomes self-verification.

XV. The First Gate: Wholesome, Unwholesome, and Indeterminate Action Set Against One Another

First ask: how many results has wholesome action with a wholesome dharma for its result? The treatise answers four, all but maturation — because the maturation summoned by wholesome action is of indeterminate nature and cannot be a wholesome dharma. With the unwholesome it has two (human effort and dominance) — wholesome action does not flow out an unwholesome homogeneous outflow, does not summon an unwholesome maturation, and still less can realize cessation through discernment. With the indeterminate it has three, all but homogeneous outflow and release from bondage.

Unwholesome action with a wholesome dharma for its result has two (human effort and dominance); with the unwholesome, three, all but maturation and release from bondage; with the indeterminate, four, all but release from bondage. Here one cell in particular needs explaining: unwholesome action having the indeterminate for a homogeneous outflow result — how can that be? The treatise poses and answers the question itself: it means the all-pervading unwholesome and the remaining unwholesome actions abandoned through the seeing of suffering, which have for their homogeneous outflow the indeterminate dharmas of the grade of the view of a real person and the extreme view.

Indeterminate action with a wholesome dharma for its result has two; with the unwholesome, three, all but maturation and release from bondage; with the indeterminate, three, all but maturation and release from bondage. Here too a cell needs explaining: indeterminate action having the unwholesome for a homogeneous outflow — namely that the indeterminate actions of the grade of the view of a real person and the extreme view have the unwholesome dharmas for their homogeneous outflow.

The easy error is to suppose that ‘the wholesome does not summon an unwholesome homogeneous outflow’ is absolute, and so, seeing those two cells, to think the text of the treatise mistaken. The treatise stops precisely at those two cells to pose and answer the question itself, which shows that it knows these are the places where one is most easily stuck.

Where this lands: what this gate teaches is a rule of thumb — when the number in some cell does not agree with intuition, go first and see whether the treatise has appended a note to that cell. In this fascicle, every cell that has a note appended is a cell that has an exception.

XVI. The Second Gate: Past, Present, and Future Action Set Against One Another

First ask: is there a direction in time between action and result? The treatise answers that there is, and a rigid one. The stanza has only four lines: “past with respect to the three, each four; present with respect to future, likewise; present with respect to present, two results; future with respect to future, three results” — ‘past with respect to the three, each four’ says that past action has four results with respect to the dharmas of each of the three times; ‘present with respect to future, likewise’ says that present action with respect to future dharmas likewise has four; ‘present with respect to present, two results’ says that present action with respect to present dharmas has only two; ‘future with respect to future, three results’ says that future action with respect to future dharmas has three. In all four lines not one speaks of ‘a later action with respect to an earlier dharma,’ and this blank is where the reason given below lies. Past action has four results with respect to the dharmas of each of the three times, excepting only release from bondage. Present action has four with respect to the future (as above), and two with respect to the present (human effort and dominance). Future action has three with respect to the future, all but homogeneous outflow and release from bondage.

Most important is that closing sentence of reason: the reason it is not said that ‘a later action has an earlier result’ is that a dharma that is before decidedly cannot be the result of an action that is after.

The easy error is to read this sentence as a smooth supplementary remark. It is in fact the foundation of the whole set of gates of result — the result cannot run ahead of the cause. Once this point loosens, every cell above must be reckoned anew.

Where this lands: this gate gives the reader the most labor-saving check of all: wherever a cell says that some action has an earlier dharma for its result, that cell is certainly wrong. One rule sifts out a whole class of misreadings, and this is where Abhidharma is at its most economical.

XVII. The Third Gate: The Same Level and a Different Level Set Against Each Other

First ask: will action and result within the same level differ from action and result across levels? The treatise answers that they will. The action of any level whatever has four results with respect to dharmas of the same level, all but release from bondage. If this action is with outflows, it has only two results with respect to dharmas of a different level (human effort and dominance) — because what has outflows falls within a realm and level, and cannot flow across a level. If this action is without outflows, it has three results with respect to dharmas of a different level, all but maturation and release from bondage; and the treatise here expressly adds a sentence: because what is without outflows does not fall under affiliation to a realm, the homogeneous outflow result is not blocked out here.

The easy error is to memorize the two numbers for the with-outflows and without-outflows crossing of levels (two and three) without knowing where the difference lies. The difference lies exactly in the cell of homogeneous outflow: the homogeneous outflow of what has outflows is blocked by realm and level; that of what is without outflows cannot be blocked.

Where this lands: this gate is in fact saying something very interesting — the wholesome with outflows has a native place; the wholesome without outflows has none. The same stretch of effort, while it still carries outflows, can have its effect only within its own storey; once without outflows, it can flow across storeys. This sentence can be carried straight on to the gate of learner and beyond learning that follows.

XVIII. The Fourth Gate: The Learner, the One beyond Learning, and Neither Set Against One Another

First ask: when the three classes of action of different stages of practice are set against one another, why are the numbers of results so unsymmetrical? The treatise sets them out: the action of a learner has three results with respect to the dharmas of a learner, three with respect to those of one beyond learning, three with respect to those of neither (the first two excepting maturation and release from bondage, the last excepting maturation and homogeneous outflow). The action of one beyond learning has with respect to the dharmas of a learner only one result (dominance), with respect to those of one beyond learning three, with respect to those of neither two. The action of neither has with respect to the dharmas of a learner two, with respect to those of one beyond learning two, with respect to those of neither the five results in full.

The most unsymmetrical is that the action of one beyond learning has with respect to the dharmas of a learner only a dominance result left. Why? Because the order of practice runs from the learner into the beyond-learning, and not the reverse. Puguang explains it: the root treatise speaks with regard to like nature set against like and to the successive producing of one from another, so that the learner may be a cause for the one beyond learning while the one beyond learning is not a cause for the learner — the action of the stage beyond learning being no longer a homogeneous cause for the dharmas of the learner’s stage, not even homogeneous outflow can be matched, and only a dominance of ‘not obstructing’ is left.

The easy error is to see ‘the five results in full’ appearing only in the cell of neither set against neither, and to suppose that the actions of the ordinary being are the most powerful. It is not so. One must see clearly how wide are the dharmas that this cell gathers: the wholesome and unwholesome actions with outflows able to summon a maturation are within it, and so is the path that cuts off with outflows (that is, the mundane uninterrupted path) able to cut off the afflictions and realize cessation; while the dharmas of neither that are set against it further take in the unconditioned cessation through discernment. Hence all five cells — maturation, homogeneous outflow, release from bondage, human effort, dominance — can be matched. The cell of release from bondage in particular must not be misread: the definition the treatise gave itself at the first gate is “the result of release from bondage means the unconditioned cessation through discernment realized by cutting off the afflictions through the force of this path,” and cessation through discernment is an unconditioned dharma, never within the world of outflows at all; the reason the cell of neither has a result of release from bondage is precisely that it can take in that path with outflows which cuts off the afflictions and realizes cessation, and not that it is ‘wholly within the world.’ The higher one goes, the fewer the cells that can be matched, precisely because the dharmas of the higher stages have already escaped those relations.

Where this lands: having read this gate one may look back at the sentence of the seventeenth — what has no native place has, on the contrary, fewer relations. The dwindling of the number of results is not a dwindling of power; it is a dwindling of entanglement.

XIX. The Fifth Gate: Action Abandoned through Seeing, through Cultivation, and Not Subject to Abandonment Set Against One Another

First ask: when the three kinds of action are divided by ‘which path abandons them,’ how do they stand when set against one another? The treatise sets them out: action abandoned through seeing has with respect to dharmas abandoned through seeing three results (all but maturation and release from bondage), with respect to dharmas abandoned through cultivation four (all but release from bondage), with respect to dharmas not subject to abandonment one (dominance). Action abandoned through cultivation has with respect to dharmas abandoned through seeing two, with respect to dharmas abandoned through cultivation four, with respect to dharmas not subject to abandonment three (all but maturation and homogeneous outflow). Action not subject to abandonment has with respect to dharmas abandoned through seeing one, with respect to dharmas abandoned through cultivation two, with respect to dharmas not subject to abandonment four (all but maturation).

The treatise closes with the sentence, “‘all in their order’ means that according as it applies this runs through the several gates above; the practice of abridgment is of its own nature just so.” Yuanhui states the use of this sentence very clearly: the first half says that according as it applies it runs through the causes and results assigned in the several gates above; the second half says that the author’s habit of abridgment in composition is by nature just so. Once this sentence is set, the reader knows why the latter half of the fascicle is everywhere ‘to be known by the example below,’ ‘to be explained on this example,’ ‘to be pondered as is fitting,’ and does not write out every cell.

The easy error is to take ‘all in their order’ for an empty formula and skip it. It is in fact the author’s warrant given to the reader — the treatise has finished teaching the method; the cells that remain, please work out for yourself.

Where this lands: of the six gates in the latter half of this fascicle, few are really written out cell by cell in the text; whether one can read them turns entirely on whether one has really learned the five questions of section XIV. Here one may test oneself once: cover any cell and work it out, and if it comes out, this chapter has been read through.

XX. What Ought and Ought Not to Be Done: Two Rules of Different Width

First ask: the root treatise says there are three, action that ought to be done, action that ought not to be done, and action that neither ought nor ought not to be done — what are their marks? The treatise here records two accounts together without adjudicating.

The first master says: defiled action is called what ought not to be done, since it arises from improper attention; wholesome action is called what ought to be done, since it arises from proper attention. This is a narrow rule, measuring only the defiled and the wholesome.

The second master says: whatever bodily, verbal, or mental action damages the norms is also called what ought not to be done — one ought to walk thus, stand thus, speak thus, wear one’s robes thus, eat and drink thus, and if one does not do accordingly it is what ought not to be done, since it does not accord with the ceremonial usages of the world; and conversely, bodily, verbal, and mental action that accords with the norms is also called what ought to be done. This is a wide rule, taking in deportment and bearing as well.

Hence the scope of the third class (what neither ought nor ought not to be done) differs accordingly. Yuanhui puts this layer with the utmost brevity: by the first account the third class is indeterminate action alone; by the second master’s explanation, the portion of the norms must be taken out and only the remaining indeterminate is left.

The easy error is to suppose the two accounts ranked and to hasten to pick one. The treatise says at the close simply, “this differs in the two accounts according as each applies,” plainly declaring that no choice is made.

Where this lands: the difference between these two rules comes down in daily life to a single question — does deportment count as precept? The first master says no (it is indeterminate); the second says yes. The treatise lays both rules on the table for the reader to see, precisely because this is a question of proportion that recurs in every age.

XXI. One Action Projects One Birth; Many Actions Fill That Birth Out

First ask: how many births can one action project? And by how many actions is one birth projected? The author declares his own school’s position in answer: by one action alone is one birth projected. The ‘one birth’ here means one commonality of sentient beings — it is upon obtaining a commonality that one is said to be born.

At once the treatise poses an objection here: the Venerable Aniruddha says of himself that he once made an offering of a single meal upon an eminent field of merit, and the maturation of it caused him seven times to be born in the Heaven of the Thirty-Three and seven times among humans as a wheel-turning noble emperor, and at last to be born in the great house of the Śākyas abounding in treasure — is this not one action projecting many births? The treatise gives two answers side by side. The first explanation says: he obtained by one action great wealth and abundant goods within a single birth together with the knowledge of former lives, and mounting on that force did further actions able to summon the merits of the remaining births, and so on to the last body — he spoke as he did with regard to the point that ‘it came of that first force’; as when a man takes one gold coin and by trading back and forth obtains a thousand, and then says, ‘it was because I had one gold coin that I gained great wealth.’ The latter explanation says: taking that one offering of a meal as his support, he then gave rise to many eminent volitions and aspirations, some summoning birth among the gods, some among humans, differing instant by instant and ripening earlier and later — so that it is not one action projecting many births.

As for the side of ‘completing,’ the treatise says that though it is but one action that projects one commonality, yet the completing of that commonality is allowed to be by many actions. It is as when a painter first draws the shape with one color and then fills it in with many hues. Hence, though men receive the human body alike, some are complete in every point of limb, faculty, figure, measure, color, strength, and adornment, while others are much diminished. Yuanhui points out the correspondences of this simile: drawing the shape with one color is the simile of the one projecting action, filling in the many hues afterward the simile of the many completing actions; and he notes the old renderings of this pair of names — the projecting action, anciently called the action of general retribution; the completing action, anciently called the action of particular retribution.

The easy error is to read ‘one action projects one birth’ as ‘a whole life is settled by one action.’ The treatise says it very plainly: the projecting is one, the completing is many. What settles that you are born a human is one action; what settles what sort of human you grow into is a countless number of actions.

Where this lands: this point is the pivot in teaching the arising of the world through action. It gives two pieces of news at once — that one cell, the birth you take, is fixed by one action (so there is no need to look everywhere for causes), and that all the manifold differences within a life are filled in by countless actions (so that everywhere there is still something to be done).

XXII. Why the Two Absorptions without Mind and ‘Acquisition’ Cannot Project

First ask: since all dharmas having a maturation extend alike to projecting and completing, are there any exceptions? The treatise answers that there are two. The two absorptions without mind (the absorption without perception and the absorption of cessation), though they have maturation, yet have no force to project the commonality of sentient beings, because they are not coexistent with the several actions; ‘acquisition’ likewise has no force to project, because it does not share one result with the several actions. All the rest extend to both projecting and completing.

The treatise here also states the general rule in full: all unwholesome dharmas and the wholesome dharmas with outflows, having maturation, extend alike to projecting and completing; it is only because the force of action is most eminent that the single word ‘action’ is set up to stand for them. Of these, what is coexistent with action can both project and complete; what is not coexistent with action can only complete and not project, its force being feeble.

The easy error is to be puzzled at “the two absorptions without mind, though they have maturation.” Since they have maturation, why can they not project? The answer is in the two words ‘coexistent’: to project the commonality of sentient beings a thing must exist at the same time as the action, and in the absorptions without mind the workings of mind have ceased at the moment of entry, so that they are not coexistent with action, and therefore have result but no force of projecting.

Where this lands: this section is in fact supplying a boundary line to the section before — the threshold for projecting is far higher than the threshold for completing. Having a maturation is only the ticket of entry; the thing must further be coexistent with action and share a result with action to be fit to fix the skeleton of a period of life. Reading this and looking back at ‘one action projects one birth,’ one sees how weighty that word ‘one’ is.

XXIII. The Three Obstructions: The Obstruction of Action, of the Afflictions, and of Maturation

First ask: the Bhagavat says that grave obstructions are three; what is the entity of each? The treatise brings them out one by one. The obstruction of action is the five deeds of immediate retribution — harming one’s mother, harming one’s father, harming an arhat, splitting a harmonious Saṅgha, drawing blood from the Buddha’s body with an evil mind. The obstruction of the afflictions requires a finer division: afflictions are of two classes, the first of frequent occurrence (arising constantly), the second fierce (of the high grade); and only that class of frequent occurrence is named the obstruction of the afflictions. The obstruction of maturation is the whole of the three evil destinies, together with Uttarakuru within the human destiny and the Heaven of Non-Percipient Beings.

Why should the fierce ones not count as an obstruction? The treatise’s reason is worth long pondering: the afflictions of the high grade, though fierce, are easily subdued and removed because they do not arise constantly; whereas the afflictions of frequent occurrence among the low grade, though not fierce, are hard to subdue and remove — because their constant occurrence makes an opening hard to come by. The treatise also states the manner of their growth: with the low grade as condition the middle arises, with the middle as condition the high arises again, so that the path able to subdue and remove them has no chance to arise. Yuanhui closes this with a neat twofold division: those of frequent occurrence are spoken of as an obstruction; those that are fierce but do not arise constantly are not spoken of as an obstruction.

What, then, does this obstruction obstruct? The treatise answers: it obstructs the noble path, and the wholesome roots that are the preparatory practice for the noble path. The treatise further adds: within the obstruction of action the other determinate actions ought in principle to be spoken of as well (those that decidedly summon an evil destiny, birth from the egg, birth from moisture, the body of a woman, an eighth existence, and the like); only, the five deeds of immediate retribution are by the five causes and conditions of place, destiny, birth, result, and person the most easily seen and the most easily known, and so it is of them in particular that we speak here.

The three obstructions established, the treatise must also ask whether there is gravity and lightness among them. What it gives is a twofold statement, and Puguang expressly marks this place as the explanations of two masters. The first explanation is that sentence of the treatise itself: “among these three obstructions the obstruction of the afflictions and the obstruction of action are both grave, since one who has these is still not to be treated within a second birth” — the obstruction of the afflictions and the obstruction of action are adjudged grave. Puguang states the reason very finely: one who commits a deed of immediate retribution decidedly falls into the hells, and one in whom the obstruction of the afflictions arises falls into an evil destiny and cannot enter the noble state, so that neither can be treated within a second birth but must wait until a third birth to be helped, and hence they are called grave; whereas the obstruction of maturation, once this life is undergone, admits of a share in entering the noble state in a second birth and can be helped, and hence is light. The second master’s explanation expressly brings out a school name: “the Vaibhāṣika masters explain it thus: since the former can draw forth the latter, the latter is lighter than the former” — and Puguang and Yuanhui alike point out that what is meant by ‘the former drawing forth the latter’ is the sequence in which the afflictions draw forth action and action draws forth maturation; the former being root and the latter branch, the branch is lighter than the root. This is the one place in the fascicle where ‘the Vaibhāṣika masters’ is expressly named, and the treatise cites their explanation without setting down any further verdict of its own.

The easy error is to read “both obstructions are grave” and “the latter is lighter than the former” as contradicting each other, and to hasten to choose between them. Since Puguang reads them as two masters each giving an explanation, there is no need to force them together; and besides, the two do not ask the same thing — the first asks ‘within how many births can it be treated,’ by which the obstructions of the afflictions and of action are alike adjudged grave and the obstruction of maturation light; the second asks ‘set against one another, which is root and which branch,’ and ranks them by the sequence of drawing forth and being drawn forth. The one adjudges by treatability, the other by the order of root and branch, and they run side by side without conflict. To record two explanations together without choosing on the treatise’s behalf is just the consistent practice of this fascicle.

As for the sense of the name ‘immediate,’ the treatise gives two explanations: the first with regard to the fixedness of the maturation result, no other action and no other birth being able to be interposed between; the second that the man who does this action decidedly falls into the hells from here at the ending of his life, with nothing intervening. Since that sentient being has this matter of ‘nothing intervening,’ he obtains the name of the immediate — being joined with the dharma of the immediate he is called one of the immediate, just as being joined with the dharma of an ascetic one is called an ascetic.

The easy error is to read the three obstructions as three kinds of sin. They are in fact three kinds of blocking of the road — the obstruction of action is what one has made oneself, the obstruction of the afflictions is what one carries oneself, the obstruction of maturation is that one was born in the wrong place; and the one thing the three have in common is only this, that they block the noble path.

Where this lands: what should most be remembered in this section is the passage on the obstruction of the afflictions. It turns over the commonest illusion in practice — we always suppose the fiercest afflictions the most troublesome, whereas the treatise says: what is fierce but occasional is easy to deal with; what is feeble but constant is the real obstruction. This one sentence will serve a lifetime.

XXIV. In Which Destiny Each of the Three Obstructions Is Found

First ask: are the three obstructions found in all five destinies? The treatise answers that they are not. The obstruction of action is only in the three continents of the human destiny, not in Uttarakuru nor in the other destinies and realms; and within the three continents it is only a woman and a man who can commit it, the ṣaṇḍha and the rest cannot. The other two obstructions are in all five destinies — yet within the human destiny only in Uttarakuru, and within the destiny of the gods only in the place of non-perception.

Why can the ṣaṇḍha and the rest not accomplish a deed of immediate retribution? The treatise gives two layers of reason. The first layer looks back and cites the earlier passage on cutting off the wholesome roots: since they have no cause of cutting off the wholesome roots and of taking on non-discipline, that is here the reason why they commit no deed of immediate retribution. The second layer is new: their parents are toward them of little kindness — having given them only the dominant condition of a defective body, and their loving thought being little; and their conscience and shame toward their parents is likewise slight — since there is no present dominant conscience and shame that can be said to have been spoiled, and so they do not touch the sin of the immediate.

By this same principle another matter too is explained: ghosts and animals, though they harm their mothers and the rest, do not accomplish a deed of immediate retribution; and if a man harms the parents of a non-human, he likewise does not accomplish such a deed, since both mind and object-field are inferior.

The easy error is to read “little kindness and little sense of shame” as a disparagement of a certain class of persons. The treatise’s reasoning in fact runs the other way — it is precisely because the weight of that filial bond is insufficient that the sin of destroying it does not come up to the gravest grade. The sin of the immediate is gravest because what is destroyed is the weightiest kindness; if the kindness is not weighty, the sin does not reach that grade either.

Where this lands: this section and section VI (that the cutting off of the wholesome roots is only in the three continents, in men and women, in those who walk by views) use one and the same rule, as the treatise itself says with “just that which was said before.” The conditions for committing the gravest evil and the conditions for cutting off the deepest wholesome are the same set of conditions — all requiring a situation strong enough, settled enough, and weighty enough in kindness and duty. That the end of the fascicle falls upon this sentence buckles the two stretches, before and after, together.

Further Resonances: The Mirror of the Three Commentaries

The above is the sense of the treatise’s own text in this fascicle. Below, a further section is set up to gather four matters: the adjudications of the three commentaries and their divergences, Saṅghabhadra’s refutations and supplements, the divergences of Paramārtha’s earlier translation, and coordinates for parallel reading. A mirror is not the treatise; it is only looking at the same text by another way of reading. Both are recorded without adjudication, each restored to its own place.

1. Where the Three Commentaries Diverge

One commentary with nothing at all to hang upon. The commentaries on this fascicle are in a special situation: Shentai’s commentary is a fragment, and the seven fascicles extant belong to the Chapter on the Elements, the Chapter on the Faculties, and the Chapter on the Worthy and the Noble; the Chapter on Action is wholly wanting, and so there is no line-by-line commentary of Shentai to hang upon this fascicle. Yet within this fascicle Puguang twice names and refutes “Master Tai” — once in the passage on turning together with volition, refuting his account that “intermediate killing and the rest become paths of action only through the completeness of the conditions”; and once in the passage on the three results, refuting his account that “the consequent stage makes another lose his splendor,” and citing the correct explanation of the Correct Principle. This shows that Master Tai did once comment on these topics, and only that portion no longer survives, a few words of it being seen through another house’s citation. These two refutations may not in turn be made to stand as proof that Shentai’s commentary on the Chapter on Action exists — the want is marked as it stands, and text from other fascicles is not made to stand in for it.

Whether a mind of preparatory wholesome can issue discipline: Puguang’s three explanations, which he alone has. Under the sentence “because the wholesome roots acquired through preparation had already fallen away before this,” Puguang poses a question of his own and cites Master Kong’s three explanations: first, that a mind of preparatory wholesome cannot issue discipline; second, that it can issue it but cannot cut it off (the treatises’ saying that the wholesome roots acquired through preparation were not accomplished beforehand being said with regard to the feeble and inferior, while the strong and eminent are firm and not relinquished); third, that the preparatory can issue discipline, but that when one is about to cut off the wholesome one must first relinquish the discipline by a formal act and only then cut off the wholesome. Fabao and Yuanhui under this sentence merely gloss the text of the treatise, and these three explanations are not seen in them. This is a difference of fullness among the three houses, recorded without adjudication.

The stage at which the wholesome roots are restored: the Mahāvibhāṣā questions and answers that Fabao alone cites. Fabao cites two questions from the thirty-fifth fascicle of the Mahāvibhāṣā — who restores while abiding in a mind of doubt, and who while abiding in right view? One account holds that one who restores after changing bodies restores while abiding in doubt, and one who restores in the present dharma restores while abiding in right view; and the appraiser of the Mahāvibhāṣā adjudges “this is not settled.” It is further asked whether, once the wholesome roots are restored, they can then be in act, and the appraiser likewise adjudges it ‘not settled.’ The ancient masters themselves here leave the matter doubtful and undecided, and neither Puguang nor Yuanhui cites this passage in this fascicle. Recorded together without adjudication.

Two further Mahāvibhāṣā questions and answers that Fabao alone cites. The first asks which is graver, killing a man who has cut off his wholesome roots or destroying the eggs of ants; the appraiser answers from two angles: by the penalty of the offense, killing the man who has cut off his wholesome roots is graver (since one incurs a border offense), and by the path of action, destroying the ants’ eggs is graver (since the ants still possess wholesome dharmas). The second asks whether the wrong view that cuts off the wholesome can only complete the commonality of sentient beings or can also project it; the appraiser takes “it can both project and complete.” Both passages concern standards of the Mahāvibhāṣā’s appraiser rather than anything the root treatise says directly, and so they are placed in this section.

Whether a learner in the formless realm possesses the past seven limbs: one house records without adjudicating, one house adjudges for itself. Puguang cites at length the two accounts of the one hundred thirty-second and one hundred thirty-fourth fascicles of the Mahāvibhāṣā and sets them side by side, recording without adjudicating; Fabao on the same question declares himself plainly, “examining the two accounts, the latter is correct,” and states his reason — the former master’s general explanation does not account for why the root treatise should speak without exhausting the principle, and since it takes only one side and has no cutting reason, one should follow the root treatise. On one and the same question, one house declines to take a position and the other takes one: this is the sharpest of the contrasts among the three commentaries in this fascicle. Recorded together without adjudication.

The analysis of the result of human effort: Puguang full, Fabao brief. Puguang analyzes the result of human effort into four kinds — the co-arisen result of human effort, the uninterrupted result of human effort, the result of human effort at an interval, and the result of human effort not arising; Fabao merely glosses the three words ‘coexistent,’ ‘liberation,’ and ‘cultivated’ directly and makes no outline-style subdivision. The fullness of the three houses is not one-directional: in most items Puguang is fuller, but in the two places of restoring the wholesome roots and of the seven limbs in the formless realm it is Fabao who is fuller.

Whether the result of release from bondage is gathered under the dharmas of a level: here Puguang adjudges expressly. Under the gate of the same level and a different level Puguang gives a further explanation, citing the text of the Miscellaneous Heart Treatise, “if one rightly ponders, a level too has the result of liberation,” and pointing out that by that treatise the result of release from bondage would also be gathered under the dharmas of a level; yet since release from bondage is unconditioned and does not arise in dependence upon a level, how can it be said to be gathered under the dharmas of a level? Hence Puguang adjudges expressly, “what this treatise says is the better.” This is a commentary appraising another treatise, not commentaries appraising one another; the reader should know that Puguang here makes an express choice, and need not mediate on his behalf.

The number of results of the action of one beyond learning with respect to the dharmas of a learner: the Correct Principle differs from the Kośa, and Puguang has already reconciled them. Puguang cites the text of the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle, “the action of one beyond learning has one result with respect to the dharmas of a learner, namely dominance; in principle it ought to say two, adding homogeneous outflow,” and brings out two explanations: the first taking the dull path beyond learning and the future keen path of the learner as a homogeneous cause and dividing them by being in act and not being in act — at the end of which explanation Puguang himself sets down a sentence, “this is that the intents of the treatises are each their own, and hard to reconcile,” which is an express statement that the intents of the two treatises are each their own and cannot be forced together, and not a reconciling; the second holding that the Kośa speaks with regard to like nature set against like (the successive producing of one from another, the learner being a cause for the one beyond learning while the one beyond learning is not a cause for the learner) and the Correct Principle with regard to unlike nature set against unlike (and so says that the one beyond learning too is a cause for the learner), so that “each takes hold of one sense, and they are not in conflict.” ⇒ Puguang here in fact first lets the difference stand and then reconciles: to call this ‘bringing out two explanations that reconcile them’ requires this measure of precision, for the first explanation does not itself reconcile. The latter explanation alone is the ancient master’s own demonstration of the method by which ‘two tenets stand together without needing to refute each other.’

The school to which the author’s own position belongs: only Yuanhui names it. In the section on projecting and completing, the treatise declares “according to the position of my own school” without bringing out a school name; Puguang and Fabao here both follow the treatise’s general phrase, and only Yuanhui explains it directly as “according to the Sarvāstivāda school.” This is the one place in this fascicle where any of the three commentaries expressly names a school. Yuanhui also notes under the two names of projecting and completing their old renderings, “anciently called the action of general retribution” and “anciently called the action of particular retribution” — a comparison of old and new renderings that likewise only Yuanhui has. As for which house the ‘old rendering’ Yuanhui speaks of points to, there is no express text in this fascicle, and it is recorded without adjudication.

The manner of stating the obstruction of the afflictions: one full, one brief. Puguang at the obstruction of the afflictions states it in the outline form of an analysis by four alternatives (of frequent occurrence but not fierce, fierce but not of frequent occurrence, both of frequent occurrence and fierce, neither of frequent occurrence nor fierce), while Yuanhui omits the four alternatives and states the same doctrine directly by the twofold division of frequent occurrence and fierceness. One who goes deep may take Puguang’s four alternatives; one who is beginning may take Yuanhui’s twofold division.

One place where the three houses have almost the same wording. The wording by which the three commentaries define ‘the obstruction of maturation’ agrees to a high degree: Puguang and Fabao are almost word for word the same (differing only by a single particle), and Yuanhui likewise merely restates the text of the treatise, changing ‘obstruction of maturation’ to ‘obstruction of retribution.’ In this fascicle the three commentaries differ much in fullness, and this item is a rare instance of the three houses agreeing in wording; it is recorded together to note the fact.

One and the same divergent account marked by the three houses in different forms. For the divergent account of that ‘Venerable’ at the end of the fascicle (that an animal, if its awareness and discernment are distinct, also accomplishes a deed of immediate retribution, as with that intelligent horse), Puguang marks it “setting out a divergent account,” Fabao marks it “this is setting out a divergent account” and goes on to give the story, and Yuanhui simply records the original wording without adding any outline label at all. Whom this ‘Venerable’ points to none of the three commentaries says expressly, and it is recorded as it stands, without being determined on their behalf.

Two places where the two commentaries differ in nicety as to ‘who is asking.’ First, in the passage on cutting off the wholesome roots, the objection “if it be so, on what principle does that text further say,” which Puguang marks as “an objection citing the text of the root treatise” (without saying who cites it), Fabao marks as “another master objects citing the root treatise” — Fabao seeming to hint that this challenge comes from the mouth of another master, while Puguang takes it as a documentary challenge the author sets for himself. Second, in the passage on projecting and completing, the objection “if it be so, why then does the Venerable Aniruddha say of himself,” which Puguang marks with the single word ‘objection,’ Fabao marks expressly as “the Sautrāntikas and others object” — this being the one place in this fascicle where Fabao names a school for the challenger while Puguang does not. In these two places the two commentaries may differ in nicety of attribution, and it is recorded without adjudication.

2. Saṅghabhadra’s Refutations and Supplementary Explanations

The chapter name in Saṅghabhadra’s two treatises is not ‘Analysis of Action’ but ‘Adjudication of Action’ — to search Saṅghabhadra with this treatise’s chapter name is forever a false zero.

Refutation by name: the passage on turning together with volition. Saṅghabhadra, at the passage on ‘two turning together,’ calls Vasubandhu ‘the Sūtra-master’ outright and refutes him sentence by sentence: if the action of killing is itself enough to be completed, why need a mind of hatred be separately spoken of; the same for speaking of greed in theft and misconduct; and at frivolous speech a deficiency is displayed instead (only greed being spoken of as completing frivolous speech, without reaching the other two); he holds that it ought to be altered to the stricter statement, “if the preparatory work is done beforehand, then at the time of completion one ought in each case to say ‘greed or one of the rest.’” This is the most direct and the most explicitly named criticism of this treatise by Saṅghabhadra within this fascicle. Fabao cites it without defending on the treatise’s behalf, merely setting down the Correct Principle’s own wording. Recording the two parties only, without adjudicating which prevails.

A correction of terminology: is short life a homogeneous outflow or a near dominance? This treatise says that the homogeneous outflow result of killing is a short life among humans; Saṅghabhadra re-adjudges it a “near dominance result” — the reason being that strictly speaking a short life is not a continuation of the kind of maturation summoned by the action of killing, but a near effect brought about by the action of killing overpowering wholesome action by dominant force; and as for why this treatise calls it homogeneous outflow, Saṅghabhadra answers himself, “to show that within the dominance result there is what is nearest.” This is a dispute over precision of terminology, not a denial of the root doctrine of this treatise — both parties admit a relation of cause and result between killing and short life, and what they differ over is which class the result belongs to. Fabao cites it. Recorded without adjudication.

A challenge to a simile: what after all does ‘one color’ stand for? Saṅghabhadra raises a fine challenge to the simile “the painter first draws the shape with a single color”: what does that ‘one color’ stand for, a class of action or a single instant? If it stands for a class of action, it contradicts the school’s own position (a class must be many, and many actions projecting one birth does not stand in principle); if it stands for a single instant, then a single instant cannot draw a shape, and the simile is of no force in the proof. He offers a reconciliation of his own: within one class of action only a single instant can project the commonality of sentient beings, while many instants of action of like and unlike class can complete it. This is a discussion of the manner of the proof, not a denial of the conclusion that ‘one action projects one birth.’ Recorded without adjudication.

A divergence of number: the one instance in the matrix of the gates of result. This treatise says that the action of one beyond learning has one result (dominance) with respect to the dharmas of a learner, and Saṅghabhadra says “in principle it ought to say two, adding homogeneous outflow.” This is the one clear divergence of number among the six gates of result, and its path of reconciliation has already been seen in Puguang (see the section above). Noted in passing: the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine at the same sentence gives only “the action of one beyond learning has one result with respect to the dharmas of a learner” and appends no “in principle it ought to say two” — this is a difference of fullness between Saṅghabhadra’s two treatises.

Material supplied by Saṅghabhadra and not carried in this treatise. Saṅghabhadra records the account, “there is another master who says: the three bodily paths of action each turn together with a volition of their own, namely killing, theft, and misconduct,” and refutes it. This divergent account is nowhere to be seen in this treatise, in Paramārtha’s divergent translation, or in the wording of Puguang and Yuanhui within this fascicle, and only Fabao records it when citing the Correct Principle. It appears, then, that this is material internal to the schools supplied by Saṅghabhadra in his own treatise, and not a refutation of this treatise itself — differing in kind from the other items above, and set down as it stands so that it may not be wrongly assigned.

A difference in the weight of the two treatises’ postures. Checking the corresponding passage of the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine for this fascicle, it does have the content corresponding to this fascicle (the cause and stage of cutting off the wholesome roots, the wrong views of householders being hard to cut off, the explanation of the result of human effort, and the number of results of the action of one beyond learning all being found), and so it is not that there is no corresponding passage; yet those sharp sentences in the Conforming to Correct Principle that point directly at ‘the Sūtra-master’ are none of them to be seen at the same places in the Revealing the Doctrine. This accords with the aim with which Saṅghabhadra composed the Revealing the Doctrine (restating the Sarvāstivāda tenets upon this treatise’s outline, in a more even posture). This is a difference between the two treatises themselves, recorded without adjudication, and no appraisal is made of which is the better.

3. The Divergences of Paramārtha’s Earlier Translation

Paramārtha’s Expository Treatise on the Treasury of Abhidharma forms a system of its own in the passage corresponding to this fascicle, and moreover it straddles two fascicles — beginning at the end of ‘part three’ of his Chapter on Action and ending in the middle of ‘part four’; and so the boundaries of the passage corresponding to this fascicle can be fixed only by the structure of the scenes, and the fascicle titles may not be made to stand for them. Xuanzang divides this chapter into six fascicles and Paramārtha into four, and the opening and gathering were different to begin with.

Two systematic differences of rendering are the most conspicuous. The first is the names of the results: Xuanzang has ‘maturation result,’ Paramārtha ‘retribution result’; Xuanzang has ‘result of human effort,’ Paramārtha ‘result of the power of effort’; Xuanzang has ‘result of release from bondage,’ Paramārtha ‘result of separation.’ Of the five results, only the two names of homogeneous outflow and dominance agree in the two texts, the other three differing entirely — and this set of differences runs through the whole of the gates of result in the latter half of this fascicle. The second is the name of the mental factor: Xuanzang has ‘volition,’ Paramārtha ‘intention.’

The one place most easily misjudged as a divergence of doctrine. In the passage on the three paths of action in the hells, Xuanzang has ‘harsh speech’ and ‘frivolous speech,’ Paramārtha ‘evil speech’ and ‘unfitting speech’; and on the face of it the occasions the two texts fasten them to look as though they had been exchanged. Checked word for word, however, the correspondence is in fact the same — railing goes with harsh speech (evil speech), wailing with frivolous speech (unfitting speech), and only the renderings differ so that the visual order is not the same. This is not a difference of doctrine between the two texts; do not misjudge it.

The remaining differences of rendering. High grade / highest of the high grade; the root treatise / the Abhidharma Treasury or grantha; good conduct / wholesome conduct; with outflows and without outflows / with flow and without flow; another master / a master of another school; āśaya / evil mind; Jambudvīpa / Yanfu continent; Uttarakuru / the northern Kuru; the path that cuts off / the path that extinguishes; abandoned through seeing and abandoned through cultivation / extinguished by seeing the truths and extinguished by the path of cultivation; what ought not and ought to be done / improperly done and properly done. Of these the name ‘āśaya’ is the most worth savoring: Xuanzang keeps the transcription and lets an ancient master gloss it separately, while Paramārtha renders the sense directly as ‘evil mind’ and drops the transcription — the one keeping, the other dropping, which is just the two translators’ two ways of handling sound and sense.

A difference of opening and gathering. Xuanzang has ‘the stanza says / the treatise says,’ the whole stanza coming out first and the prose glossing sentence by sentence after; Paramārtha has ‘the verse says / the explanation says,’ and though the pattern of the sentences is the same, in the sections of the gates of result he often lets the verse lines themselves carry most of the technical terms and lets the explanation supply only the details, no longer dividing the sections stanza by stanza. This is a difference of opening and gathering, not an abridgment.

One honest record. In the passage on the place where the wholesome roots are cut off, Paramārtha’s text uses the word ‘knowledge’ where Xuanzang has ‘discernment,’ and this is set down word for word without alteration. No adjudication is made as to the merits of the two translations.

4. Coordinates for Parallel Reading

What this fascicle establishes are the two lines of ‘what action can cut off’ and ‘what action can project.’ Both have places that may be read in parallel with the Yogācāra system.

The entity of the cutting off of the wholesome roots. This fascicle says that the cutting off of the wholesome has ‘non-acquisition’ for its entity — the acquisition of the wholesome not arising, non-acquisition arising in succession. The root treatise of the Yogācāra lineage states it upon another road for the same dharma: there it is expressly said that the seeds are not permanently uprooted, and that it is only the establishing of a continuum contrary to the wholesome roots in act that is named cutting off the wholesome roots; and as for the conditions of restoring the wholesome, that text lists four, of which two answer exactly to this fascicle — ‘giving rise to hesitation’ answering to this fascicle’s ‘doubt,’ and ‘realizing what is settled’ to this fascicle’s ‘the holding of view.’ The conditions of restoring the wholesome answer word for word in the two systems, while what the two systems establish as the entity of what is cut off differs: the one fastens it upon non-acquisition, the other says expressly that the seeds are not uprooted. One and the same question with the answers of two ages — this is the place in this fascicle most open to parallel reading.

Cutting off the wholesome and the class fixed in wrongness. This fascicle makes an analysis by four alternatives to show that cutting off the wholesome roots and falling into the class fixed in wrongness are not one matter; the Section on Ascertainment of the Yogācāra lineage simply sets the two matters, ‘the deeds of immediate retribution and the cutting off of the wholesome roots,’ side by side as the entity of the class fixed in wrongness. The two systems use the same set of doctrinal numbers while asking different questions — the one asking whether the two include each other, the other asking what the entity of the class fixed in wrongness is. They may be looked at side by side, but are not to be made equivalent.

The projecting and the completing action. This fascicle establishes “one action projects one birth, and many actions can complete it,” taking the commonality of sentient beings as the measure of ‘one birth’; the Consciousness-Only lineage uses the same pair of concepts to establish two kinds of maturation — what requites the force of the projecting action and continues constantly is established as maturation, and what requites the completing action and arises from the maturation is named maturation-born. The division of the projecting and completing actions is unchanged in the two systems, while the bodies of consciousness assigned to them differ: the one fastens them upon the projecting and completing of the commonality, the other upon the requital by the eighth consciousness and by the first six. The numbers agree while the doctrinal frames they are fastened to differ, and they may be looked at side by side.

As for the school to which the phrase ‘according to the position of my own school’ in this fascicle belongs, Yuanhui explains it directly as the Sarvāstivāda school, while the treatise itself brings out no name — the supplying of a name, recorded only.