俱舍論 心不相應行Abhidharmakośabhāṣya · Formations Not Associated with Mind

Twelve of the fourteen formations not associated with mind are finished in a single fascicle: commonality, the result of non-perception, the absorption without perception, the absorption of cessation, the life faculty, the four marks and the four secondary marks, and the name-, phrase-, and syllable-bodies, together with their placement under realm affiliation, the five classes, and the three ethical qualities. The Sarvāstivādins establish them as separate real things apart from form and mind; the author of the treatise presses each one with the Sautrāntika sense, and at the end judges the Sautrāntikas with his own hand as “not well stated.”

In one sentence: whatever cannot be assigned to form and cannot be assigned to mind, and yet really does work within experience—the ‘reasons why’ of resemblance, of the blank, of continuity, of flowing, and of meaning—are all gathered here; the question is whether they count as real things or only as a way of speaking.

Provenance (Established First)

The preceding fascicle analyzed acquisition and non-acquisition, and this fascicle continues it. The pattern of each item is the same: the Sarvāstivādins establish the thesis, adduce scriptural proof, and open a fourfold analysis; the author of the treatise puts on Sautrāntika eyes and presses; and at the end comes the sentence “this is not well stated, because it contradicts my own school”—having spoken the Sautrāntikas’ words, he declares that he is not a Sautrāntika. Saṅghabhadra’s Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle refutes this passage by passage, calling Vasubandhu “the Sūtra-master”; it is the most densely contested fascicle in the whole treatise. All four commentaries (Puguang’s Record, Fabao’s Commentary, Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary, and Shentai’s Commentary) have a fifth fascicle explaining it, and Shentai’s further cites Paramārtha’s own commentary at second hand, assigning a source to each of the three quoted stanzas within the fascicle.

Three Points to Watch

1. Commonality: what is presupposed behind a noun. Sentient beings without number differ severally, and yet a person can call them all at once “sentient beings”—the Sarvāstivādins say this rests upon a real thing at work. The author of the treatise’s five questions grow sharper one by one: given a commonality of ordinary beings, what need is there for ordinary-being status besides? Grain, wheat, gold, and iron each resemble their own kinds—why not allow a commonality of the insentient? The several commonalities also differ—why not establish a further tier? And the last is the weightiest: does not this establishment amount to the Vaiśeṣikas’ category of sameness-and-difference? The Sarvāstivādins answer only the last and fall back on scripture for the rest. Whether the stability of a noun is the structure of the world or the convenience of speech becomes here, for the first time, a question squarely faced.

2. The two absorptions: shutting off mind in the same way, but with different aspiration the results differ entirely. The absorption without perception and the absorption of cessation are almost identical in appearance, and the divide is a single moment of attention—the one “preceded by an attention with the notion of renunciation,” holding non-perception to be true liberation; the other “preceded by an attention with the notion of stilling,” seeking peaceful abiding. Hence the one is attained by ordinary beings only and brings about five hundred aeons of blankness in the Heaven of Non-Percipient Beings, while the other is attained by noble ones only and makes one liberated in both parts; and the noble ones regard the absorption without perception “as the sight of a deep pit, and take no pleasure in entering it.” As to whether there is any mind at all within the absorption of cessation, three answers are already on the table: the past has entity, mind and the body endowed with faculties are seeds of one another, and there is still a subtle mind. This page is the one most worth being thoroughly familiar with before reading Yogācāra—the question is the same question that the later constant running of the eighth consciousness was set up to answer.

3. The four marks: impermanence stated as a structure. Arising makes a dharma arise, abiding makes it settle, change makes it decay, cessation makes it break up; the sūtra states only three marks, because “abiding is what sentient beings cling to and love,” and to make them weary of it, it is stated together with change. The treatise’s simile is the three enemies in the dense forest—one drags you from the future into the present, one wears down your strength, one cuts off your life. The Sarvāstivādins set the four marks upon the moment and stop the objection of infinite regress by the difference of function between the primary marks upon eight dharmas and the secondary marks upon one; the Sautrāntikas call this “cutting up empty space” and maintain that the four marks have places to stand only upon a continuum, quoting three stanzas in a row to make it firm. What you cling to is precisely that “abiding,” and the sūtra will not even give you that name by itself.

One Further Point (Appended): The Life Faculty

The life faculty is not a lump of vital force, and it is not a soul. Its definition is functional—“able to sustain warmth and consciousness,” the cause that keeps bodily warmth and consciousness upon one and the same continuum. A stanza the World-Honored One himself spoke gives a verification anyone has seen: when the three dharmas leave the body, the body they leave lies stiff and prone, like a piece of wood without thought or feeling. As to whether this “sustaining” should count as a real thing, the author of the treatise presses through eighteen turns: one who establishes a real thing must carry the circle of the three sustaining one another, and one who establishes a portion of duration must carry the objection of having no entity. The cost to both parties lies open on the table, and at the end the author of the treatise still closes for the Sarvāstivādins.

Bearing on the Treatise as a Whole

What this fascicle analyzes is the position of the formations not associated with mind among the seventy-five dharmas, and it is the ground plan of the later twenty-four of the hundred dharmas: non-acquisition is dropped, ordinary-being status is on the contrary taken in, change and cessation among the four marks are renamed aging and impermanence, and the name-, phrase-, and syllable-bodies are carried over unaltered. Paramārtha’s older translation renders this passage “arising, aging, abiding, and impermanence,” on the same track as the wording of the hundred dharmas. And the two difficulties of ‘how continuity is maintained in a mindless station’ and ‘how meaning is carried’ run on from here all the way into Yogācāra—it is by reading the Kośa back that one learns for what questions those answers were devised.

〔Stanza 42, First Line〕Commonality—The Real Thing by Which Sentient Beings Resemble One Another

Stanza: Commonality is the dharma that makes sentient beings “alike.”

Treatise: There is a separate real thing named “commonality”—it makes sentient beings equal in class as they succeed one another. The Root Treatise (the fundamental treatise of the Sarvāstivādins) calls it “the commonality of sentient beings.” This commonality is again of two kinds: undifferentiated and differentiated. Undifferentiated commonality is the “commonality of sentient beings” shared by all sentient beings—because every sentient being possesses it equally. Differentiated commonality is the commonality established severally for sentient beings according to realm, level, destiny, mode of birth, and lineage, and according to female, male, lay follower (a householder who has taken the precepts), monk (one gone forth), one in training, one beyond training, and the rest—because sentient beings of one class each possess it equally. There is also dharma-commonality, established according to the aggregates, sense fields, and elements〔the dharma by which dharmas resemble one another〕.

If there were no real thing having “undifferentedness” for its characteristic and named commonality, then among sentient beings that differ one from another the equal and undifferentiated cognition and expression, ‘this too is a sentient being, that too is a sentient being,’ ought not to be established. So too with the equal and undifferentiated cognition and expression regarding the aggregates and the rest〔the dharmas of the three classifications〕〔which would likewise not be established without dharma-commonality〕—the reasoning is to be understood in the same way.

Is there a case of dying and being born again in which the commonality of sentient beings is neither relinquished nor newly acquired? A fourfold analysis should be made. The first case: dying in one place and being born again in that same place〔commonality neither relinquished nor acquired〕. The second case: at the moment of entering “the certainty of the noble path” (the path of seeing), relinquishing the commonality of an ordinary being and acquiring the commonality of a noble one〔both relinquished and acquired〕. The third case: dying in this destiny and being born in another destiny and the like〔both relinquished and acquired, as regards destiny〕. The fourth case: excluding the three cases above〔all that remains〕.

〔What follows is the author of the treatise raising questions on behalf of the Sautrāntikas.〕If there were a separate real thing named “the commonality of an ordinary being,” what need would there be to establish “ordinary-being status” separately? It is not as though there were a “humanness” apart from the commonality of a human being. Moreover, commonality is not what the world can see with its eyes—for it is not form; nor is it what awakened discernment can discern—for it has no separate operation. People, though they do not know that there is〔a substantial〕commonality of sentient beings, all the same form the cognition of ‘no difference’ regarding sentient beings; so even granting that it has an entity, what use is it?

Again, on what ground is “commonality of the insentient” not allowed? Grain, wheat, beans, gold, iron, and the mango and the jackfruit tree, and the rest—do not these too have their several likenesses within their own kinds? Again, the several commonalities also differ one from another; how is it that no further commonality is established upon those commonalities, and yet the cognition and expression that ‘they have no difference’ can still arise?

Further,〔by establishing it thus〕you exactly establish the position held by the Vaiśeṣika outsiders: that school holds that there is a “category of universal sameness,” saying that the expression and understanding of ‘all is one and the same being’ which arises with regard to all dharmas is produced by this category of universal sameness; and it further holds that there is a “category of sameness-and-difference,” saying that the expression and understanding of ‘this is the same, that is different’ which arises with regard to distinct classes is produced by this category of sameness-and-difference.

The Vaibhāṣikas answer thus: what they hold is not of the same kind of sense as this〔commonality〕of ours—for they speak of ‘one thing operating upon many things’〔whereas our commonality belongs to each sentient being severally and is momentary and impermanent〕. And, granting the point either way, whether or not that amounts to establishing the outsiders’ position, this commonality must have a real entity, because the sūtra says so. As the World-Honored One said: ‘If he comes back here, he acquires the commonality of a human being,’ and so on at length.

〔The Sautrāntikas answer:〕Though there is such a scriptural text, the sūtra does not say that ‘there is a separate real thing named commonality.’〔The Sarvāstivādins ask:〕If so, what is the commonality the sūtra speaks of?〔The Sautrāntikas answer:〕It is that when formations of this class arise, ‘the commonality of a human being’ and the like are provisionally established upon them—just as one speaks of the commonality of grain, wheat, beans, and the rest〔a mere name〕.〔The author of the treatise judges:〕This is not well stated, because it contradicts my own〔Sarvāstivāda〕school.

Commonality has now been analyzed. What is the result of non-perception? The stanza says:

〔Stanza 42, Lines Two through Four〕The Result of Non-Perception—The Maturation That Shuts Off Mind in the Heaven of Non-Percipient Beings

Stanza: The result of non-perception is the dharma that, within the Heaven of Non-Percipient Beings, makes mind and the dharmas that are mental factors cease; it is maturation, and its dwelling is in the Bṛhatphala Heaven.

Treatise: If one is born among the non-percipient sentient beings of that heaven, there is a dharma that can make mind and mental factors cease, and this dharma is named “the result of non-perception.” It is a real thing, able to block future mind and mental factors and make them not arise for a time—just as a dyke blocks a river. This dharma is invariably a maturation result. The maturation of what? Of the absorption without perception.

Where do the non-percipient sentient beings dwell? In the Bṛhatphala Heaven. Within the Bṛhatphala Heaven there is a high and superior place—just as〔within the first meditative absorption there is〕the intermediate absorption—named the Heaven of Non-Percipient Beings.

Are those sentient beings constantly without perception, or do they also have perception? In the phases of being born and of dying they have perception for a long while. They are called “non-percipient” because in the long interval between, perception does not arise in them. As the sūtra says: those sentient beings pass away from that place because perception arises. And those sentient beings, like one waking from a long sleep, give rise to perception again.

After passing away from there they are necessarily born in the desire realm and not in any other place—because the force of the concentrated practice cultivated earlier is exhausted, and there they cannot cultivate concentration again; just as an arrow shot into the sky must fall when its force is spent. If a sentient being is about to be born in that place, he must first have karma of the desire realm “to be experienced in a later life”〔karma whose result is held over to a later birth〕—just as one who is about to be born in Uttarakuru must have karma for birth among the gods〔since one who dies there is necessarily born among gods〕.

The result of non-perception has now been analyzed. What are the two absorptions? They are the absorption without perception and the absorption of cessation. The absorption without perception is stated first: what is its characteristic? The stanza says:

〔Stanza 43〕The Absorption without Perception—The Outsiders’ Absorption That Shuts Off Mind in Search of Liberation

Stanza: The absorption without perception is like the result of non-perception stated above〔making mind and mental factors cease〕; it is in the later meditative absorption, its attention is directed to seeking liberation; its quality is wholesome only, and it is to be experienced in the next life only; it is not attained by noble ones, and at its first attainment only one time-period is obtained.

Treatise: As stated above, there is a dharma able to make mind and mental factors cease, named “the result of non-perception”; in the same way there is another dharma able to make mind and mental factors cease, named “the absorption without perception.” The absorption of one who is without perception is called the absorption without perception; or else, the absorption that is itself non-perception is called the absorption without perception〔the former is a dependent-determinative reading, the latter an appositional-determinative one〕. The words “is like this” in the stanza are only meant to show this much: that in making mind and mental factors cease, this absorption is the same as the result of non-perception.

On which level is this absorption? In the later meditative absorption, that is, in the fourth meditative absorption, and on no other level. In search of what is the absorption without perception cultivated? In search of liberation. Those people hold “non-perception” to be true liberation, and in order to realize it they cultivate the absorption without perception.

It was said above that the result of non-perception is maturation, and so it is of indeterminate quality, which need not be stated again. This absorption without perception, however, is invariably wholesome. Because it is wholesome, it can bring about the five-aggregate maturation among the non-percipient sentient beings of that heaven. Being of wholesome quality, then, in which manner is it to be experienced〔as to the time of its result〕? To be experienced in the next life only—not in the present life, not in a later life, and not indeterminately. If one has aroused this absorption and afterwards falls away from it, it is transmitted that such a person will certainly be able to arouse it again in this present life and will in future be born among the non-percipient sentient beings of that heaven; hence one who has attained this absorption certainly cannot enter the certainty of the noble path〔the path of seeing〕.

Again, this absorption can be attained by ordinary beings only and not by noble ones—for the noble ones regard the absorption without perception as they would the sight of a deep pit and take no pleasure in entering it. Only by holding “non-perception” to be true liberation and giving rise to the notion of renunciation does one cultivate this absorption; and no noble one holds what is with outflows to be true liberation or true renunciation, and so they certainly do not practice this absorption.

When noble ones attain the absorption of the fourth meditative absorption, do they, as with attaining a meditative absorption, thereby also attain the past and future absorption without perception? They do not attain even the rest〔of that absorption without perception〕. Why? Because although that absorption without perception has been cultivated before, being without mind it must be attained by a great preparatory effort, and so at its first attainment only one time-period is obtained—that is, the present time only; as with first receiving the individual liberation precepts〔where too only the present is obtained〕. After attaining this absorption, from the second moment onward and until it has not yet been relinquished, one also possesses〔that share〕belonging to the past; but because it is without mind, there is no “future cultivation.”

Next the absorption of cessation is stated: what is its characteristic? The stanza says:

〔Stanza 44 and Stanza 45, First Half〕The Absorption of Cessation—The Mindless Absorption a Noble One Enters in Search of Peaceful Abiding

Stanza: The absorption of cessation is likewise as above〔making mind and mental factors cease〕; its attention is directed to seeking peaceful abiding, and its level is the summit of existence; its quality is wholesome, and its being experienced in the next life or in a later life is indeterminate; it is attained by noble ones only, through preparatory practice; the Buddha attains it at the moment of becoming a buddha and not before, because of the thirty-four moments.

Treatise: As with the absorption without perception, so it is with the absorption of cessation. What is the sense that the words “likewise so” take by analogy? They take by analogy the “ceasing of mind and mental factors” in the absorption without perception. As was said above, ‘there is another dharma able to make mind and mental factors cease, named the absorption without perception’; in the same way, there is another dharma able to make mind and mental factors cease, named the absorption of cessation.

The differing characteristics of these two absorptions are as follows: the former, the absorption without perception, is for seeking liberation, and is preceded by an attention with the “notion of renunciation”; this absorption of cessation is for seeking peaceful abiding, and is preceded by an attention with the “notion of stilling.” The former, the absorption without perception, is in the later meditative absorption; this absorption of cessation is only at the summit of existence, that is, at the station of neither perception nor non-perception.

This absorption, like the absorption without perception above, is of wholesome quality only, neither indeterminate nor defiled—because it is set in motion by a wholesome mind. The former, the absorption without perception, is to be experienced in the next life only; this absorption of cessation extends to being experienced in the next life, in a later life, and indeterminately—as regards its maturation, it may be experienced in the next life, or in a later life, or indeterminately, or not experienced at all. “Not experienced at all” means that if one reaches parinirvāṇa upon a lower level〔one does not experience the result at the summit of existence〕. Of which level and of how many aggregates does this absorption bring about the maturation? It brings about the four-aggregate maturation at the summit of existence only〔the summit of existence being formless, there is no aggregate of form there〕.

The former, the absorption without perception, is attained by ordinary beings only; this absorption of cessation is attained by noble ones only and cannot be aroused by an ordinary being—because ordinary beings fear annihilation; and because it can be aroused only by the force of the noble path; and because it is entered only through the resolve upon “nirvāṇa in the present dharma.”

This absorption too, like the former, is not “attained by leaving defilement behind.” By what, then, is it attained? By preparatory practice—because it must be realized through preparatory practice. Again, at its first attainment only the present is obtained; the past is not obtained and the future is not cultivated—because it can be cultivated only by the force of mind. From the second moment onward and until it has not yet been relinquished, one also possesses〔that share〕belonging to the past.

Does the World-Honored One too attain it through preparatory practice? He does not. How, then? He attains it at the moment of becoming a buddha—that is, the Buddha, the World-Honored One, attains it when the “knowledge of exhaustion” arises. The Buddha has no quality attained through preparatory practice: he need only briefly arouse the wish and make it present, and every perfect quality arises just as he pleases; hence all the Buddha’s qualities are attained by leaving defilement behind.

〔Question:〕The World-Honored One had never before aroused the absorption of cessation; how then, at the moment of attaining the knowledge of exhaustion, did he become one “liberated in both parts”〔liberated from the obstruction of discernment and from the obstruction of concentration alike〕?〔Answer:〕Because he had attained sovereignty with regard to arousing the absorption of cessation, he is one liberated in both parts just as one who has already aroused it.

The masters of the West say: the bodhisattva, while still in training, first aroused this absorption and only then attained awakening.〔Question:〕Why is their account not allowed here?〔Answer:〕If their account were allowed, it would accord with the Venerable Upagupta’s Treatise That Is the Feet of Reason’s Eye—as that treatise says: ‘It should be said that the Tathāgata first aroused the absorption of cessation and afterwards produced the knowledge of exhaustion.’ The Vaibhāṣikas of Kaśmīra say: it is not that he first aroused the absorption of cessation and only afterwards produced the knowledge of exhaustion. Why? It is transmitted that the bodhisattva attained awakening in thirty-four moments.〔Those thirty-four moments are:〕in the direct realization of the truths there are sixteen moments; in leaving behind the craving of the summit of existence there are eighteen—that is, cutting off the nine grades of affliction of the summit of existence, arousing nine uninterrupted paths and nine paths of liberation; these eighteen, added to the preceding sixteen, make thirty-four. Every bodhisattva must already have left behind craving as far as the station of nothingness before he enters the path of seeing, and need not cut off the afflictions of the lower levels again; and in the midst of this there is no occasion for a “mind of an unlike kind” to arise〔the mind of the absorption of cessation is with outflows, unlike the thirty-four moments without outflows〕; hence bodhisattvas while in training should not arouse the absorption of cessation.

The masters abroad speak thus: if a mind of an unlike kind did arise in the midst, what fault would there be?〔Answer:〕If so, there would be the fault of “transgressing the resolve of mind”〔going against the limit he had himself set〕. Yet bodhisattvas do not transgress the resolve of mind.〔The masters abroad:〕Reasonably, a bodhisattva does not transgress the resolve of mind; but it is not that he does not transgress the noble path without outflows〔arousing a mind with outflows is no transgression〕.〔Answer:〕If so, how is the resolve of mind not transgressed? The resolve of mind is this: ‘Until I attain the permanent exhaustion of the outflows, I shall not unloose this cross-legged posture.’〔The bodhisattva〕certainly does not transgress such a resolve of mind, because it is within a single sitting that he brings all things to their conclusion. The former account〔that of the masters of Kaśmīra〕is the better, because it is what my own school holds.

Although many characteristics in which the two absorptions are alike and unlike have already been stated, there are further likenesses and differences among them〔still to be stated〕. The stanza says:

〔Stanza 45, Second Half〕The Likeness and Difference of the Bodies upon Which the Two Absorptions Depend

Stanza: Both absorptions depend upon the desire and form realms〔for the bodies in which they arise〕; the absorption of cessation first arises among humans only.

Treatise: By “the two absorptions” are meant the absorption without perception and the absorption of cessation. Both these absorptions can become present in dependence upon the two realms, desire and form. If someone does not allow that the absorption without perception can also be aroused in the form realm, that contradicts this passage—the Root Treatise says: ‘There may be an existence that is form, and this existence is not of five formations.’ The meaning is: a sentient being bound to form may be born in a heaven with perception and dwell in a mind of an unlike kind, or may enter the absorption without perception, or may enter the absorption of cessation; or, having been born in the Heaven of Non-Percipient Beings, may enter non-perception—and this is what is called ‘an existence that is form, and this existence is not of five formations’〔being in the form realm and yet not having the formations of five aggregates〕. By this it is proved that both these absorptions can become present in dependence upon the desire and form realms, and this is their likeness.

As to their difference: the absorption without perception can first arise in both realms, desire and form; the absorption of cessation first arises among humans only. Only after this absorption has first been cultivated among humans, and there has first been a falling away from it, is one born in the form realm and cultivates it again in dependence upon a body of the form realm.

Does this absorption of cessation too fall away? It should be said that it does. Were it not so, it would injure the Udāyin Sūtra. That sūtra says: ‘Venerable one! There are monks who, having formerly here been complete in pure moral discipline, complete in concentration, and complete in discernment, are able to enter and emerge from the absorption of the cessation of feeling and perception again and again—this does occur. It should be known as it really is that in the present dharma, or at the moment of death, they cannot diligently cultivate so as to fulfill liberation; and that after the breaking up of this body they pass beyond the gods who take food in portions and are reborn in one place or another with a heavenly body formed by mind. Having been born there, they are again able to enter and emerge from the absorption of the cessation of feeling and perception again and again—this too does occur.’ It should be known as it really is that this “heavenly body formed by mind” the Buddha declares to be of the form realm, while the absorption of the cessation of feeling and perception is only at the summit of existence. If one who has attained this absorption certainly did not fall away, how could he take birth in the form realm?

Some other schools hold that the fourth meditative absorption also has the absorption of cessation. On what they hold, the position that the absorption of cessation does not fall away is also tenable.〔Answer:〕The position that ‘the fourth meditative absorption has the absorption of cessation’ certainly does not hold. Why? Because the sūtra speaks of “nine successive absorptions”〔the absorption of cessation standing ninth, above the summit of existence〕.〔Objection:〕If this must be so, how can there be the sense of a “leaping absorption”?〔Answer:〕This succession is stated with reference to a beginner; when sovereignty is attained, one may leap over and enter as one pleases.

Thus the two absorptions have several differences: a difference of level—the one in the fourth meditative absorption, the other on the level of the summit of existence; a difference of preparation—the one preceded by an attention with the notion of renunciation, the other by an attention with the notion of stilling; a difference of continuum—the one arising in the continuum of an ordinary being, the other in the continuum of a noble one; a difference of maturation—the one bringing about the Heaven of Non-Percipient Beings, the other the maturation result of the summit of existence; a difference in the manner of experience—the one to be experienced in the next life only, the other in the next life, in a later life, and indeterminately; a difference of first arising—the one first arising in the two realms of desire and form, the other among humans only.

The two absorptions have as their own nature simply “the ceasing of mind and mental factors”; why then are they called only “non-perception” and “cessation of feeling and perception”? Because in the preparatory practice of the two absorptions it is only these〔perception, or feeling and perception〕that are turned away from in disgust—just as〔the cognition of another’s mind〕can also know feeling and the rest and yet is called only “the cognition of another’s mind”〔being named from where the preparatory practice weighs〕.

Now that within the two absorptions mind has been cut off for a long time, how does mind arise again afterwards? The Vaibhāṣikas allow that the past exists, and so an earlier mind can serve as the immediately antecedent condition of a later mind. Certain other masters say: just as, when one is born in the formless realm, form is cut off for a long time, how does form arise again afterwards? The re-arising of that form must be from mind and not from form〔the earlier form not existing〕; in the same way, the mind that emerges from the absorption should also be so—it arises from the “body endowed with faculties” and not from〔a previous〕mind. And so those preceptors of former times all said that the two dharmas, mind and the body endowed with faculties, are seeds of one another. By the two dharmas are meant mind and the body endowed with faculties.

The Venerable Vasumitra says in the Treatise of Questions: if one holds that the absorption of cessation is wholly without mind, then this fault does arise; I say that in the absorption of cessation there is still a subtle mind〔and so there is no need to posit their being seeds of one another〕, and therefore this fault does not arise. The Venerable Ghoṣa says that this does not hold in reason. Why? If there were consciousness in this absorption, then, faculty, object, and consciousness having come together, there would necessarily be contact; and with contact for a condition there would be feeling and perception. As the World-Honored One said: ‘With mind and dharmas for conditions, mind-consciousness arises; and with the contact of the three come together arise feeling, perception, and volition.’ Then within this absorption feeling, perception, and the rest would also not cease〔and it would not be an absorption of the cessation of feeling and perception〕.

If it be said: just as the sūtra says “feeling is the condition of craving,” and yet an arhat, though he has feelings, does not give rise to craving; so it should be with contact—not every contact serves as the condition of feeling and the rest.〔Answer:〕This example does not hold, because there is a difference of qualification. The sūtra qualifies it of itself, saying: ‘Feelings produced by a contact of ignorance are the condition for the arising of craving.’ But nowhere has it ever qualified “contact producing feeling.” Hence the two differ.

For this reason the Vaibhāṣikas say that within the absorption of cessation all minds cease.〔Question:〕If there is wholly no mind, how is it still called an “absorption”?〔Answer:〕Because it makes the great elements operate evenly, it is called an absorption; or else, because the force of the〔preceding〕mind of concentration reaches evenly to this point, it is called an absorption.

Are these two absorptions really existent or provisionally existent? It should be said that they are really existent—because they can block mind and make mind not arise. Some say: this proof does not hold in reason, because it is the preceding mind of concentration that does the blocking. That is: the preceding mind of concentration arises in opposition to other minds, and by its arising it merely makes other minds not operate for a time; it〔the mind of concentration〕can give rise to a support opposed to mind and make it continue on, and so an absorption is provisionally established only upon this station in which “mind does not operate,” and there is no separate entity. This is an absorption merely provisionally established upon the station in which mind does not operate: it is not there before the absorption is entered nor after it is emerged from, and so it is provisionally said to be included among the conditioned. Or else: it is that very support, drawn on by the mind of concentration and made to arise in that way, upon which an absorption is provisionally established.

It should be known that the result of non-perception is likewise: a preceding mind arises in opposition to other minds, and by its arising it merely makes other minds not operate for a time; and upon the station in which “mind does not operate” the result of non-perception is provisionally established, the rest being as stated above.〔The author of the treatise judges:〕This is not well stated, because it contradicts my own school.

The two absorptions have now been analyzed. What is the life faculty? The stanza says:

〔Stanza 46, First Half〕The Life Faculty—It Is “Lifespan,” Able to Sustain Warmth and Consciousness

Stanza: The entity of the life faculty is lifespan, and it is able to sustain warmth and consciousness.

Treatise: The entity of life is lifespan. Therefore the Abhidharma says: ‘What is the life faculty? Lifespan in the three realms.’ This is still not clear: what dharma is called lifespan? It is that there is another dharma able to sustain warmth and consciousness, and this is called lifespan. Therefore the World-Honored One said:

〔Quoted Stanza〕When the Three Dharmas Lifespan, Warmth, and Consciousness Leave the Body

Stanza: Lifespan, warmth, and consciousness—when these three dharmas leave the body, the body they leave lies stiff and prone, like a piece of wood without thought or feeling.

Treatise: Therefore there is another dharma serving as the cause that sustains warmth and consciousness in continuing to abide, and it is called “lifespan.”

〔What follows is the incidental discussion on whether the life faculty is really or provisionally existent.〕If so, what dharma is able to sustain this lifespan? It is warmth and consciousness that in turn sustain this lifespan.〔If so,〕these three dharmas sustain one another and turn on together—then which dharma ceases first? And by that one’s ceasing, the other two would cease after it.〔If none ceases first,〕then these three dharmas should be everlasting and never pass away. That being so, this lifespan must be sustained by “karma”—because it continues on as karma draws it.

If so, on what ground is it not allowed that karma alone sustains warmth and consciousness, and that lifespan is required besides? In reason it should not be so: one must not let it follow that ‘all consciousness from beginning to end is constantly maturation’〔for if there were no lifespan and karma alone sustained consciousness, consciousness would be constantly maturation, which does not accord with the facts〕. That being so, it should be said that karma sustains warmth and warmth in turn sustains consciousness—what need is there for this lifespan?〔Answer:〕In that case, in the formless realm there would be nothing to sustain consciousness, since there is no warmth there.〔Objection:〕Then it should be said that in the formless realm consciousness is sustained by karma.〔Answer:〕How can you shift your account again and again to suit yourself—now saying that this consciousness is sustained by warmth alone, now again that karma alone sustains consciousness? And this has already been said above. What was said above? Just this: one must not let it follow that ‘all consciousness from beginning to end is maturation.’ Therefore it must be granted that there is another dharma able to sustain warmth and consciousness, and it is called lifespan.

〔The Sautrāntikas say:〕Now I too do not say that there is no entity of lifespan at all; I say only that the entity of lifespan is not a separate real thing.〔Question:〕If so, what dharma is called the entity of lifespan?〔Answer:〕It is the “portion of duration of the commonality” drawn forth by the karma of the three realms, and this is said to be the entity of lifespan. The commonality drawn forth by the karma of the three realms has a portion of duration that continues on with determinacy, and one abides for just so long as one is to abide; hence this portion is said to be the entity of lifespan. It is like the portion drawn forth by a seed of grain and the rest, lasting until the time of ripening; or like the portion drawn forth by the shooting of an arrow, lasting until the time of coming to rest.

〔An outsider interposes an objection:〕Some say that there is a “formation” that is a distinct quality, arising in dependence on an arrow and the like, and that by its force the arrow keeps travelling without cease so long as it has not fallen to the ground.〔The author of the treatise refutes:〕Its entity being one and having no resistance, there ought to be no differences of station in going toward a different direction—of speed, of slowness, of time of arrival; and it ought never to fall at all. If it be said that it is obstructed by wind, then it ought either to fall as soon as it is released or never to fall—since the wind that obstructs has no difference before and after.

〔The author of the treatise endorses the Sarvāstivādins:〕‘There is a separate real thing able to sustain warmth and consciousness, named the entity of lifespan’—this account is the better.

〔What follows analyzes the cause of death.〕Does one die because lifespan is exhausted, or is there some other cause? The Treatise of Designations says: there is dying because lifespan is exhausted, and there is dying not because merit is exhausted, making a fourfold analysis at length. The first case: the force of the karma bringing about the maturation of lifespan is exhausted. The second case: the force of the karma bringing about the result of wealth and pleasure is exhausted. The third case: the karma able to bring about both is exhausted together. The fourth case: one cannot avoid a violent condition coming from without〔an untimely death〕. Besides these it should also be said that ‘one dies through relinquishing the life-formations’〔as the Buddha and the arhats relinquish the life-formations themselves〕. At the station where lifespan is exhausted, the exhaustion of merit has no further operation with regard to death; hence when both are exhausted together there is death, and this is called “dying because both are exhausted.”

The Treatise on the Development of Wisdom says: should this lifespan be said to turn along with the continuum, or should it be said to abide as soon as it arises?—Of sentient beings bound to the desire realm who do not enter the absorption without perception and do not enter the absorption of cessation, it should be said that this lifespan turns along with the continuum; of those who enter the absorption without perception or the absorption of cessation, and of all sentient beings bound to form and to the formless, it should be said that this lifespan abides as soon as it arises. What does that mean? If the supporting body can be injured, lifespan is injured along with it, and this is called the first kind, “turning along with the continuum”; if the supporting body cannot be injured but abides just as it arose, this is called the second kind, “abiding as soon as it arises.”

The Vaibhāṣikas of Kaśmīra say: the first clause shows that there is obstruction and the second that there is none; and by this it is settled that there is “untimely death.” Therefore the sūtra speaks of four kinds of “acquiring a body of one’s own”: there is a kind of acquiring a body of one’s own that can be injured only by oneself and not by another. A fourfold analysis is made at length. That which can be injured only by oneself and not by another: the gods of playful forgetfulness and the gods of mental wrath born in the desire realm—because they arouse an excessive delight or anger and so pass away there, and not by any other condition. Besides these it should also be said “the Buddhas who enter parinirvāṇa of themselves”〔this too being by oneself and not by another〕. That which can be injured only by another and not by oneself: the classes of sentient beings within the womb or the egg. That which can be injured by both: most of the remaining sentient beings of the desire realm. That which can be injured by neither: all sentient beings in the intermediate existence and in the form and formless realms, and a portion of those in the desire realm—such as the beings of naraka (the hells), those of Uttarakuru, one properly abiding on the path of seeing, one abiding in the absorption of loving-kindness, one abiding in the absorption of cessation or the absorption without perception, royal seers, the Buddha’s envoys, and those the Buddha has prophesied—Damira, Uttara, Gaṅgila, Yaśas the householder’s son, and Kumārajīva—together with the bodhisattva in his final body, and the mother of that bodhisattva while she bears the bodhisattva in her womb, and every wheel-turning monarch, and the mother of a wheel-turning monarch while she bears him in her womb.

If so, why does the sūtra say: ‘Great one! Which sentient being’s acquired body of his own can be injured neither by himself nor by another?’ ‘Śāriputra! It is the sentient being reborn in the station of neither perception nor non-perception’〔naming only the summit of existence〕? It is transmitted: the bodies of their own acquired in the remaining formless meditative absorptions can be injured by the noble path of their own level and can also be injured by the preliminary stage of one level above; only at the summit of existence are both these injuries absent, and so it is said to be “injurable by neither.”

〔Objection:〕Is not the summit of existence also injured by the noble path of another level, and should it not then be called injurable by another?〔Answer:〕Here it should be said to be “naming the last to display the first”—just as elsewhere it is “naming the first to display the last.” Where is the first named to display the last? As the sūtra says: ‘Like the Brahmakāyika gods—this is called the first heaven of pleasant birth.’ Where is the last named to display the first? As the sūtra says: ‘Like the Ābhāsvara gods—this is called the second heaven of pleasant birth.’

〔The objector says again:〕The word “like” in those sūtras displays the sense of a simile, and only so may one say “naming one to display the rest”—because the way of a simile is to name one and display its like. Here〔in the sūtra of Śāriputra’s question and answer〕there is no word “like,” and so one may not reason in the same way.〔Answer:〕If the word “like” occurred only where there is the sense of a simile, then the word “like” ought not to occur in the other sūtras. But another sūtra says thus: ‘Sentient beings with form, differing in body and differing in perception, like a portion of humans and the gods—this is the first station of consciousness.’ Hence it is known that the word “like” occurs where there is no simile as well.

The incidental discussion stops here. The life faculty has now been analyzed. What are the characteristics? The stanza says:

〔Stanza 46, Second Half〕The Four Conditioned Marks—Arising, Abiding, Change, and Cessation

Stanza: What are called the marks are the arising, abiding, change, and cessation of conditioned dharmas.

Treatise: Since these four are the marks of the conditioned, a dharma that has these four should be conditioned, and what is contrary to this is an unconditioned dharma. These four marks, with regard to dharmas: what can make a dharma arise is called “arising”; what can make it settle is called “abiding”; what can make it decay is called “change”; what can make it break up is called “cessation.” “Nature” has the sense of entity.

〔Objection:〕Does not the sūtra speak of “three conditioned marks of the conditioned”?〔Answer:〕In that sūtra four should reasonably have been stated; which is the one not stated? It is the mark of “abiding.” Yet what the sūtra calls “change of what abides” is precisely another name for “change” here—just as “arising” is called “origination” and “cessation” is called “exhaustion”; so it should be known that “change” is called “change of what abides.”

If a dharma can make the formations flow through the three times, this sūtra speaks of it as a conditioned mark, in order to make sentient beings give rise to a mind of weariness and dread. That is: those formations are moved by the force of “arising” and made to flow from the future into the present; and are pressed by the force of the marks “change” and “cessation” and made to flow from the present into the past—because they are made to decay and to break up. It is transmitted: it is like a man in the midst of a dense forest with three enemies wishing to injure him: one drags him out of the dense forest, one weakens his strength, and one destroys his life faculty. So it should be known are the three marks with regard to the formations.

As for “abiding,” it takes hold and settles those formations, is pleasant to them and does not part from them, and so it is not established among the conditioned marks. Again, unconditioned dharmas also have “abiding in their own characteristic,” and the mark of abiding would be confused with that, so the sūtra does not state it.

Some say: this sūtra takes “abiding” and “change” together as one, called the “mark of the change of what abides”〔and so the sūtra states three marks〕.〔Question:〕Why state them thus together?〔Answer:〕“Abiding” is what sentient beings cling to and love; in order to make them weary of it and cast it away, it is stated together with “change”—just as Black-Ear is shown together with Auspicious〔so that seeing Black-Ear one casts Auspicious away too〕. Therefore there are certainly four conditioned marks.

〔Objection:〕Since these four marks, arising and the rest, are themselves conditioned, there should be further marks of arising and the rest for them; and if there are further marks, an infinite regress follows, because those marks would again have their own further marks of arising and the rest.〔Answer:〕It should be said that there are further ones, and yet there is no infinite regress. Why? The stanza says:

〔Stanza 47, First Half〕The Four Secondary Marks—Their Function upon Eight Dharmas and upon One

Stanza: These four primary marks have in turn the “arising of arising” and the rest〔the four secondary marks〕; the primary marks have their function upon eight dharmas, the secondary marks upon one.

Treatise: “These” refers to the four primary marks stated above. “The arising of arising and the rest” refers to the four secondary marks—the arising of arising, the abiding of abiding, the change of change, and the cessation of cessation. That the formations are conditioned is by the four primary marks; that the primary marks are conditioned is by the four secondary marks.

〔Objection:〕Should not the primary marks, like the dharma they mark, each have four secondary marks, and those again four each, and so on without end?〔Answer:〕There is no such fault, because the four primary marks and the four secondary marks differ in their function upon “eight dharmas” and upon “one dharma.”

What is called function? It is a dharma’s operation, or what is called “human effort”〔as with a man’s doing〕. Each of the four primary marks has its operation upon eight dharmas, and each of the four secondary marks upon one dharma only. What does this mean? It means: when one dharma arises, together with its own entity nine dharmas arise all at once—its own entity being one, and the primary and secondary marks being eight. The “arising” among the primary marks, excluding itself, can give rise to the other eight; the “arising of arising” among the secondary marks gives rise, among these nine dharmas, only to the “arising” of the primary marks. It is like a hen: some hens bear many chicks and some bear only one; the powers of “arising” and “the arising of arising,” the one giving rise to eight and the other to one, are likewise. The “abiding” among the primary marks likewise excludes itself and makes the other eight abide; the “abiding of abiding” among the secondary marks makes only the “abiding” of the primary marks abide among the nine. “Change” and “cessation” are correspondingly the same. Hence, although the marks of arising and the rest have marks of their own again, the secondary marks are only four, and there is no fault of infinite regress.

〔What follows is the Sautrāntikas raising an objection.〕The Sautrāntika masters say: on what ground is empty space cut up in this fashion〔dividing names where there is nothing〕? It is not that the marks of arising and the rest have a real dharma-entity such as you distinguish. Why? Because there is no determinate means of knowledge〔that could prove it〕. That is: these marks are not like color and the rest, for which there is a determinate direct perception, inference, or authoritative testimony that could prove their entity to be real.

〔The Sarvāstivādins cite scripture:〕If so, why does the sūtra say: ‘The origination of the conditioned may be known; its exhaustion and its change of what abides may also be known’?〔The author of the treatise answers:〕Beloved of the gods! You cling to the letter and lose the sense. The Blessed One said: it is the sense that is to be relied upon. What is the real sense stated in this sūtra? It is this: the class of the foolish, blinded by ignorance, clings to self and what belongs to self upon the continuum of the formations and through the long night gives rise to attachment there; and the World-Honored One, in order to cut off that clinging of theirs, wished to display that ‘the continuum of the formations is in its entity conditioned and of the nature of what arises from conditions,’ and therefore spoke thus of three conditioned marks of the conditioned—it is not to display that the formations possess these three marks within a single moment; for the origination and the rest of a single moment cannot be known, and what cannot be known should not be established as a “mark.” Therefore that sūtra goes on to say: ‘The origination of the conditioned may be known; its exhaustion and its change of what abides may also be known.’

As for the sūtra’s repeating the two words “conditioned,” it is to make one know that ‘this mark declares the conditioned,’ and not to think that the mark declares ‘the existence of a conditioned dharma’—as a gathering of white egrets declares that water is not absent; nor to think that it declares the wholesomeness or unwholesomeness of a conditioned dharma—as the marks of a maiden declare the wholesome or the unwholesome.

The first arising of the continuum of the formations is called “arising”; at the station of final exhaustion it is called “cessation”; the continuum turning on in the middle is called “abiding”; and the difference between what is earlier and what is later is called “change of what abides.” It was upon this sense that the World-Honored One said to Nanda: ‘This good son well knows the arising of feeling, well knows the abiding of feeling, and well knows the decay, change, and breaking up of feeling.’ Therefore a stanza says:

〔Quoted Stanza〕The Four Marks of the Continuum, First

Stanza: The first of a continuum is called “arising”; “cessation” is the station of final exhaustion; the turning on in the middle is called “abiding”; “change of what abides” is the difference of earlier and later.

And there is a further stanza:

〔Quoted Stanza〕The Four Marks of the Continuum, Second

Stanza: Not being before and being now is “arising”; the continuum turning on is “abiding”; a difference of earlier and later is “change of what abides”; the cutting off of the continuum is called “cessation.”

And there is a further stanza:

〔Quoted Stanza〕The Stanza on There Being No Abiding in a Moment

Stanza: Since dharmas are momentary, there is no “abiding” but only cessation; they cease of themselves, and so to hold that there is “abiding”〔as a mark〕does not hold in reason.

Treatise: Therefore “abiding” is spoken of only upon the continuum—and in this way what the Abhidharma says is established. For that treatise says: ‘What is called abiding? It is every formation that has arisen and not yet ceased.’ It is not that “having arisen and not ceasing” is the nature of a momentary dharma〔a momentary dharma, having arisen, ceases at once and has no station of not ceasing〕.

Although the Treatise on the Development of Wisdom says thus: ‘Within a single mind, what arising is called birth? What exhaustion is called death? What change of what abides is called aging?’—yet that treatise’s text is stated with reference to ‘the mind in the continuum of the commonality of sentient beings’ and not with reference to a single moment.

Again, even with respect to conditioned dharmas moment by moment, the four marks are established once one has left aside “holding that there are real things.” How are they established? Thus: each thought’s not being before and being now is called “arising”; being and then not being again is called “cessation”; the later moments succeeding the earlier and arising is called “abiding”; and that difference of earlier and later is called “change of what abides.”

〔Objection:〕When earlier and later thoughts arise alike, is there not in fact no difference between the earlier and the later?〔Answer:〕How is that mark of difference to be known? It is like a diamond and the like, where there is a difference between being thrown and not thrown, and between being thrown with strong force and with weak force, and a difference of speed and slowness in falling—which shows that the sense of a difference in the transformation of the great elements is established. When formations arise in a continuum alike, there is no great difference between earlier and later, and so, though there is change, they look alike.

〔Objection:〕If so, the last moment of sound or of light, and the last six sense fields at nirvāṇa, having no later thought, should have no “change of what abides”; and then the mark you establish would not extend to all the conditioned.〔Answer:〕Here “abiding” is not being spoken of as a conditioned mark. What then is meant? What is meant is “the change of what abides.” Hence if there is abiding, there is necessarily change; and by establishing the mark thus, there is no fault of not extending to all.

Yet the conditioned mark stated by the World-Honored One in this sūtra, displayed in brief, is just this: that a conditioned dharma is not before and is now, is and then is not again, and continues on in abiding; and the difference between the earlier and the later set against each other. Here what need is there of separate things such as arising and the rest?

〔The Sarvāstivādins object:〕How can what is “the dharma marked” be established as “what marks”?〔The Sautrāntikas answer:〕Just as the marks of a great man are not other than a great man; as the marks of a bull—horns, hump, dewlap, hooves, and tail—are not other than the bull; and as hardness and the rest are the marks of the earth element and the rest and are not other than earth and the rest; and as seeing at a distance something rising and knowing it to be the mark of smoke is not other than the entity of smoke. The conditioned mark should be so in reason as well. Though one has understood the intrinsic nature of a conditioned form and the rest, so long as one has not understood “the difference of the continuum of not being before and not being after,” one still does not know that its entity is conditioned; and so it is not that ‘the nature of form and the rest’ is itself the conditioned mark—and yet neither is there, apart from that nature of form and the rest, a separate real thing such as arising and the rest.

〔The Sarvāstivādins ask in return:〕If, apart from the intrinsic nature of a conditioned form and the rest, there are things such as arising and the rest, what does not hold in reason?〔The Sautrāntikas answer:〕One dharma at one time would have to be at once presently arising, presently abiding, presently decaying and changing, and presently breaking up—because you allow that the four marks are present together.〔The Sarvāstivādins answer:〕This objection does not hold, because the times of their operation differ: the operation of arising is in the future, and what has already arisen in the present does not arise again. When dharmas have arisen and are in the present, only then do the operations of the three marks abiding and the rest begin; it is not that at the time of the operation of arising the other three operate. Hence, though present together, they are not in conflict.

〔The Sautrāntikas refute further:〕It should first be considered whether the entity of a future dharma exists or not, and only then should it be said whether “arising” has an operation at that station or not. Supposing you allow that the arising of a future thing has an operation, how is it still future? Please state the “mark of the future.” When a dharma is in the present, the operation of arising has already passed away; how is it still present? Please state the “mark of the present.”

Again, the three operations of abiding and the rest are all in the present; then the entity of one dharma would at one moment be at once settling, decaying, and breaking up. If at that time the mark of abiding can make this dharma abide, while at the same time change and cessation can make it decay and break up, then at that time is this dharma to be called abiding, decaying, or breaking up? Those who say ‘the operations of abiding and the rest are not simultaneous’—their account contradicts the sense of momentary cessation.

If it be said: I say that a moment is when the operations of all a dharma’s marks are brought to completion—then you should now say on what ground the mark of abiding arises together with the two marks change and cessation and yet “abiding” can operate first and make the dharma it makes abide neither change nor cease. If it be said that the force of abiding is strong and so it operates first, then how does it afterwards grow weak, so that together with the root dharma it too suffers decay from change and cessation?

If it be said that the mark of abiding, having once operated, should not operate again, as with “arising”—of “arising” this may be said: the operation of arising is to draw the dharma it produces into the present, and once drawn in it need not be drawn in again. But of “abiding” this should not be said: the operation of abiding is to settle the dharma it makes abide and make it neither decay nor cease; and having made it abide, it may well make it abide forever. For this reason the operation of the mark of abiding should arise constantly, and one may not take “arising” as an example to say that it has no further operation.

Again, who obstructs the operation of abiding and makes it be for a moment and then be no more? If it be said that change and cessation obstruct it, then the force of change and cessation should be the stronger—why do they not operate first? Again, once the operation of abiding stops, change and cessation and the root dharma of themselves do not abide; where then and how do the two marks change and cessation operate? And what work is left for these two operations to do? By the holding of abiding, dharmas that have arisen do not cease for a time; and once the operation of abiding is relinquished, the dharma certainly does not abide and ceases of itself at once—so that there is nothing left for the operations of change and cessation to do.

Again, that a dharma having arisen and not yet broken up is called “abiding,” and having abided and at the time of breaking up is called “cessation”—this may pass for now; but as for “change,” pressed forward or backward within one dharma, in reason it cannot be. Why? “Change” means the transformation of the nature and characteristic between earlier and later, and it is not that upon this very dharma one may say it is “changed from this.” Therefore a stanza says:

〔Quoted Stanza〕Change Cannot Be Established upon One Dharma

Stanza: If it is said to be that very earlier one〔and change asserted of it〕, change is not established; if it is said to differ from the earlier, it is not one and the same dharma. Therefore, upon one dharma, to establish “change” cannot in the end be established.

Treatise: Although another school says that only when the causes and conditions of cessation are met can the mark of cessation cause the cessation of what it makes cease—yet what they say is like someone saying that when a purgative is taken a god must also come to make it work.〔Since〕the causes and conditions of cessation can themselves make it cease, what need is there to posit a mark of cessation besides? Again, they too allow that mind and mental factors cease momentarily and need not wait for any further cause and condition of cessation; then the operations of “cessation” and “abiding” would have no earlier and later—and in that case one dharma at one time both abiding and ceasing does not accord with correct reasoning.

Therefore to speak of the conditioned marks in dependence on “the continuum” neither contradicts correct reasoning and accords well with the sūtras.

〔What follows answers why future dharmas do not arise all at once.〕If “arising,” while in the future, can give rise to the dharma it produces, why do not all future dharmas arise all at once? The stanza says:

〔Stanza 47, Second Half〕Arising Gives Rise to What It Produces, Not Apart from the Meeting of Causes and Conditions

Stanza: “Arising” can give rise to the dharma it produces, yet not apart from the meeting of causes and conditions.

Treatise: It is not that, apart from the meeting of the other causes and conditions, the force of the mark of arising alone can give rise to what it produces; hence future dharmas do not all arise at once.

〔The Sautrāntikas object:〕If so, we see only that causes and conditions have the capacity to give rise, and there is no separate mark of arising. When causes and conditions meet, dharmas arise; when they do not meet, they do not arise—what need is there to trouble a mark of arising? It is evident that the force of causes and conditions alone gives rise〔to dharmas〕.

〔The Sarvāstivādins answer:〕Are all existent dharmas such as you can know? The nature of dharmas is subtle and exceedingly hard to know, and so, though a thing presently has its entity, it may be unknowable. Were there no mark of arising, there ought to be no cognition of “arising”; and further, the expression in the sixth case〔the possessive relation expressed by “of”〕could not be established—as when one says “the arising of form,” “the arising of feeling,” and the like. Just as one ought not to say “the form of form.” And as you object that there is no arising, so also, as fits each case, may one object all the way to there being no cessation.

〔The Sautrāntikas object in return:〕If so, in order to establish the cognitions of “emptiness” and “non-self,” must one also posit ‘the nature of emptiness’ and ‘the nature of non-self’ apart from dharmas? In order to establish the cognitions of “one and two, large and small, several, joined and separate, this and that, being,” and the rest, must one, like the outsiders, posit apart from dharmas separate natures of number, magnitude, severalty, junction, separation, that, this, being, and the rest? And in order to establish the expression in the sixth case, must one posit a separate “nature of a collection, of form”? And when one says “the intrinsic nature of form,” how is this expression in the sixth case to be established?

Therefore arising and the rest are merely provisionally established and have no separate real thing. To explain that the formations are “not before and are now,” it is provisionally established as “arising.” Such a mark of arising that is “not before and now” is of many kinds according to the dharmas of form and the rest upon which it depends; and to distinguish it from the others, the expression in the sixth case, “the arising of form,” “the arising of feeling,” and the like, is used, in order to let another know that ‘this arising belongs to form alone and not to feeling and the rest.’ The other cases are likewise. It is like the world saying “the fragrance of sandalwood” or “the substance of a stone,” and here it should be the same. As for abiding and the rest, they should be understood in the same way as fits each case.

〔The Sarvāstivādins object:〕If formations can arise apart from a mark of arising, why do unconditioned space and the rest not arise?〔The Sautrāntikas answer:〕Formations are called “arising” because they are not before and are now; the entity of the unconditioned exists constantly—how can it be said to arise? Again, just as it is so by the nature of things, and one does not say that all dharmas have arising; in the same way it should also be allowed that ‘not all dharmas can arise.’ Again, just as conditioned dharmas alike have a mark of arising, and you also allow that causes and conditions may or may not have a capacity with regard to a conditioned dharma; in the same way it should be allowed that all dharmas, conditioned and unconditioned alike, have no mark of arising, and that the causes and conditions have the operation of giving rise to the one class and not to the other.

〔The Sarvāstivādins conclude:〕The Vaibhāṣikas say that the marks of arising and the rest are separate real things, and this position should stand. Why? How could one abandon one’s own school merely because those who raise objections are many? One does not refrain from sowing wheat for fear that deer may come, nor refrain from eating a sweet ball for fear that many flies may settle on it. Hence one should diligently apply oneself to answering objections and should practice in accordance with the sense of one’s own school.

Thus the conditioned marks have been analyzed. What is the sense of the name-bodies and the like? The stanza says:

〔Stanza 48, First Half〕Name-Body, Phrase-Body, Syllable-Body

Stanza: What are called the name-bodies and the rest are the “collective expression” of ideation, statement, and letter-sound.

Treatise: The word “and the rest” takes in the phrase-body and the syllable-body. It should be known that the “name” spoken of here is “ideation”—as one says the ideations of form, sound, odor, flavor, and the rest. A “phrase” is a “statement,” able to express a sense to completion—as the statement ‘all formations are impermanent’ and the like. Or else: a statement able to make clear the correspondence and difference of action, quality, and time is called a phrase. A “syllable” is a “letter-sound”—as one says the letters a, ā, i, ī, and the rest.

〔Objection:〕Are these letters not also the names of written signs?〔Answer:〕It is not that the letters were made in order to display written signs, but that written signs were made in order to display the letters.〔Since one must consider〕how a person may understand even without having heard them spoken, written signs were made. Hence the letters are not names of written signs.

What is called “the body of names and the rest”? It is the “collective expression” of ideations and the rest. What is called collective expression is the sense of gathering together—because in the sense of gathering together the verbal base utsa is spoken of. The name-body spoken of here is form, sound, odor, and the rest〔many names joined〕; the phrase-body is ‘all formations are impermanent,’ ‘all dharmas are without self,’ ‘nirvāṇa is peace,’ and the like; the syllable-body is ka, kha, ga, and the rest.

〔Objection:〕Are these three not of the nature of speech? Having sound for their entity, they belong to the intrinsic nature of form; how then can they instead be said to be formations not associated with mind?〔Answer:〕These three are not of the intrinsic nature of speech. Speech is vocal sound, and it is not that by vocal sound alone the sense can be made known to another.〔Question:〕How then is the sense made known?〔Answer:〕It is speech that gives rise to “name,” and name that displays the sense—and only so can it be made known.

〔Moreover〕not every vocal sound is called “speech”; only a vocal sound by which the sense can be made known is called speech. What sort of vocal sound makes the sense knowable? One that speakers have jointly settled among the several senses as “the fixed measure of what expresses”〔by common convention〕. Thus the ancients jointly settled upon the single sound go among nine senses as the fixed measure of what expresses. Therefore a stanza says:

〔Quoted Stanza〕The Nine Senses of the Sound Go

Stanza: Direction, beast, earth, light, speech, diamond, eye, heaven, and water—upon these nine senses the wise established the single sound go〔as their common designation〕.

Treatise: Those who hold that “name displays the sense” must likewise grant that such a “name of a sense” is also jointly settled as a fixed measure of what expresses. And since this sense of a phrase is displayed only by “name,” while the work of displaying by vocal sound alone is already accomplished, what need is there to reckon crosswise and posit besides a really existent “name”?

Further, it has not yet been made clear how this “name” is given rise to by speech: is it displayed by speech, or produced by speech? If it is produced by speech, then since all speech is of the nature of sound, every sound ought to be able to produce a name; and if it be said that the sound able to produce a name has a distinguishing feature, then that distinguishing feature already suffices to display the sense—what need is there to wait upon a separate “name”? If it is displayed by speech, then since all speech is of the nature of sound, every sound ought to be able to display a name; and if it be said that the sound able to display a name has a distinguishing feature, then that distinguishing feature already suffices to display the sense—what need is there to wait upon a separate “name”?

Again, the sounds of the several moments cannot be gathered together, nor is there any dharma that arises little by little in parts; how then can the arising of a “name” be given rise to by speech?〔Someone draws an analogy:〕How then do you explain that ‘after the moments of past manifest karma, the last moment of manifest karma can produce nonmanifest karma’?〔Answer:〕If so, only at the last position of the sound would a name be produced; then hearing only the last sound ought to make the sense known〔which is not the fact〕.

If one holds thus: speech produces the syllable, the syllable in turn produces the name, and the name displays the sense—here the objections are the same as stated above, because the syllables of the several moments likewise cannot be gathered together. And as for the fault in “speech displays the name,” it too should be stated on the model of “speech produces the name.” Again, of a “syllable” other than speech, even the clear-witted, applying their thought, cannot make out its characteristic〔which shows that apart from speech there is no separate syllable〕. Again, that the syllable is either displayed or produced by speech, on the model of “speech with respect to name,” does not hold in reason.

Again, if someone holds that the name, like arising and the rest〔the four marks〕, arises together with the sense—then a present name designating a past or a future sense ought to be impossible. Again, parents and others give names to their children as they please; how can it be said that the name arises together with the sense as arising and the rest do? Again, unconditioned dharmas ought to have no name, since they have no sense of “arising”—and yet you do not grant this〔that the unconditioned has no name〕.

Yet the World-Honored One said in a stanza that ‘it arises in dependence on name and syllable’—this only says that these are the measure jointly settled by many upon the several senses. Sound is itself name, and the differing arrangement of this name makes a stanza. It is upon this sense that “a stanza depends on name” is said. This stanza is the differing arrangement of names; to hold that it is a really existent thing does not accord with correct reasoning—as with many trees forming a row, or minds in succession〔the row and the succession being nothing apart from the trees and the minds〕.

Or else one should hold only that there is a separate entity of “syllable,” and gather them together to make the name-bodies and the rest; to posit the others〔name and phrase〕besides is superfluous and useless.

〔The Sarvāstivādins conclude:〕The Vaibhāṣikas say that there are separate real things as the name-bodies and the rest, included in the aggregate of formations not associated with mind, real and not provisional. Why? Because not every dharma is such as reflective thought can know.

To which realms do these name-bodies and the rest belong? Are they of the class of sentient beings or not? Are they maturation-born, nourished, or of homogeneous outflow? Are they wholesome, unwholesome, or indeterminate? All this should be analyzed. The stanza says:

〔Stanza 48, Second Half〕The Realm Affiliation, Five Classes, and Three Qualities of the Name-Bodies and the Rest

Stanza:〔The name-bodies and the rest〕belong to the desire and form realms only, are included in the class of sentient beings, are of homogeneous outflow, and are of unobscured-indeterminate quality.

Treatise: These name-bodies and the rest belong to the two realms, desire and form, only. Some say that they also belong to the formless realm, and yet it cannot be stated〔they cannot say how〕. Again, the name-bodies and the rest are included in the class of sentient beings—because they are possessed by a speaker and are not the sense displayed〔the sense extending to the insentient as well〕. Again, the name-bodies and the rest are of homogeneous outflow only〔neither maturation nor nourished〕. And they are included in the unobscured-indeterminate quality only.

As stated above, the senses of the remaining formations not associated with mind that have not yet been stated should now be analyzed in brief. The stanza says:

〔Stanza 49〕A General Analysis of the Remaining Senses of Commonality and the Rest

Stanza: Commonality is likewise as〔the name-bodies and the rest〕, and also extends to the formless realm and also to maturation; acquisition and the marks extend to three classes; non-acquisition and the two absorptions are of homogeneous outflow only.

Treatise: The words “likewise so” are meant to show that commonality, like the name-bodies and the rest, extends to the desire and form realms, to the class of sentient beings, to homogeneous outflow, and to the unobscured-indeterminate. The words “and the formless” show that it is not confined to the two realms desire and form. The words “and maturation” show that it is not confined to homogeneous outflow. Hence, as to realm,〔commonality〕extends to all three realms, and as to class it extends to the two senses of homogeneous outflow and maturation.

“Acquisition” and the marks, as to class, extend to all three—that is, momentary, of homogeneous outflow, and maturation. “Non-acquisition” and the two absorptions are of homogeneous outflow only. The single word “only” is to make clear that they are not maturation and the rest.

The senses not stated above have now been stated. The result of non-perception and the life faculty were analyzed above〔and so are not stated again here〕.

〔Question:〕Why is it not said that acquisition and the rest are included in the class of sentient beings only?〔Answer:〕Because it was already said above that they are ‘what a sentient being possesses,’ and the rest.〔Question:〕Why is it not said that the marks extend to both the class of sentient beings and what is not of that class?〔Answer:〕Because it was already said above that ‘all that is conditioned is together with the four marks.’ What remains unstated may be known by inference as fits each case.