俱舍論 四念住·四善根·見道十六心Abhidharmakośabhāṣya · The Four Foundations of Mindfulness · The Four Wholesome Roots · The Sixteen Minds of the Path of Seeing

Before Reading This Fascicle

The last fascicle finished explaining the two gates of entering cultivation (the contemplation of impurity and mindfulness of the breath), and this one opens with a single sentence of transition — “thus have been explained the two gates of entering cultivation; by these two gates the mind then gains concentration. The mind having gained concentration, what further is to be cultivated?” Concentration is already there, and what remains to be done is one thing only: to raise up observation. This fascicle goes from the first step of raising observation (the four foundations of mindfulness) to the last step of its accomplishment (the highest worldly dharma), then leaps at a bound into the sixteen minds of the path of seeing, and comes to rest at last upon the stream-enterer who returns at most seven times. The end of the stage of preparatory practice and the beginning of the path of seeing are both within this one fascicle, and so it is the pivot of the whole chapter.

Here the three houses of ancient masters let the knife of their outlines fall in one and the same place. Puguang marks, “below, the third, explaining the four foundations of mindfulness. Within it, first the foundations of mindfulness on the individual characteristic, second the foundation of mindfulness on the common characteristic”; Fabao marks, “the three stanzas below are the third, explaining the four foundations of mindfulness. The first two stanzas explain the foundations of mindfulness on the individual characteristic, the last stanza the foundation of mindfulness on the common characteristic”; Yuanhui marks, “from here the third, explaining the four foundations of mindfulness, divided within into two: first the foundations of mindfulness on the individual characteristic, second the foundation of mindfulness on the common characteristic” — three houses dividing their fascicles independently and yet with boundaries wholly the same, and even the two divisions they make agreeing word for word; while Fabao further fastens the stanza count upon it (the first two stanzas the individual characteristic, the last stanza the common), which tallies exactly with the stanza order of Roots 15 to 17 in this fascicle.

One thing more must be said at the outset. This fascicle reads like a diagram of stairs — heat, summit, receptivity, the highest worldly dharma, rung above rung; but what really bears the weight is not the height of the stairs, it is the station fastened to each rung — when there is the foundation of mindfulness on dharmas alone and when all four foundations of mindfulness, when the four truths are observed in full and when there is left but the single mode of apprehension of the suffering of the desire realm. Let the stations fall into confusion, and the whole diagram is read as an inspirational figure of speech. Hence every passage below must come back to one question: what is taken as object at this moment, and how many things are cultivated.

1. Calm Abiding Accomplished First, and Only Then Has Observation a Footing

First ask: why must it be said at the outset that “in dependence upon the excellent calm abiding already cultivated to fullness, one cultivates the four foundations of mindfulness for the sake of insight”? Will it not do to cultivate observation directly?

The order the treatise gives is hard: calm abiding (śamatha) is that portion whereby the mind rests upon a single object and is not scattered, and insight (vipaśyanā) is that portion whereby one discriminates upon an object and sees its character. If calm abiding is not cultivated to fullness, the discrimination raised by discernment drifts along with its objects, and observation does not become observation at all. Hence the four foundations of mindfulness are not an exercise begun from nothing; they are an exercise joined onto concentration — and this is just where the contemplation of impurity and mindfulness of the breath of the last fascicle come down: those two gates gather the mind in, and only when it is gathered in does the turn come for this gate to put it to use.

The easy error: to read “in dependence upon the calm abiding already cultivated” as a mere polite sentence of transition. It is a sentence of qualification — without it, the whole line of heat, summit, receptivity, and the highest worldly dharma below has nowhere to take root.

In practice: before reading this fascicle make sure of one thing — everything spoken of in it takes place within the levels of meditative equipoise (the levels of concentration). The later statement that the four wholesome roots are “only of the levels of meditative equipoise” and are not found in the desire realm has its root just here.

2. The Individual and the Common Characteristic: Two Ways of Looking at One Object

First ask: in observing body, feeling, mind, and dharmas alike, where lies the difference between the “individual characteristic” and the “common characteristic”?

The treatise divides them very clearly. The individual characteristic is “the several intrinsic natures of body, feeling, mind, and dharmas are called the individual characteristic” — that portion in each which is not shared with anything else: the intrinsic nature of the body is the great elements and derived form; feeling and mind are “just as their names display them” (feeling being the receiving of what is felt, mind the discerning knowledge of an object); and the intrinsic nature of dharmas is “the dharmas remaining when the three are taken away.” The common characteristic is “that all the conditioned are of the nature of impermanence, that all with outflows are of the nature of suffering, and that all dharmas are of the nature of emptiness and non-self” — that portion which is not confined to one thing but runs through many. The individual characteristic is what can be told apart; the common characteristic is what passes through.

The easy error: to suppose that the common characteristic is the four individual characteristics added together. It is not. The observation by individual characteristic sets body, feeling, mind, and dharmas each in its own place; the observation by common characteristic sees impermanence, suffering, emptiness, and non-self upon all four at once — one and the same object, two ways of looking. And it is just because the two ways of looking are used together that there comes to be, further on, the division into “foundations of mindfulness on the individual characteristic” and “the foundation of mindfulness on the common characteristic”: the outlines of the three houses of ancient masters are cut along this very line.

In practice: hereafter, whenever one reads that a given observation has “an unmixed object only” or “extends to both mixed and unmixed,” first turn back and ask what kind of characteristic he is using at this moment — the answer usually lies in this very division of individual and common.

3. A Foundation of Mindfulness Has Three Entities: Intrinsic Nature, Conjunction, and Object

First ask: what after all is the entity of a foundation of mindfulness? The treatise says, “the entity of each of these four foundations of mindfulness is threefold”; why should one name require three entities?

Because the angle from which the question is put is threefold. The foundation of mindfulness as intrinsic nature “has discernment for its entity” — asking only what dharma that portion is which observes. The foundation of mindfulness as conjoined “has for its entity discernment together with the remaining dharmas coexisting with it” — reckoning in the feeling, perception, volition, and the rest that arise together with discernment. The foundation of mindfulness as object “has for its entity the dharmas that discernment takes as its object” — reckoning outright the four objects it takes. The three answers do not conflict; they are three measures laid to one and the same thing.

The treatise even adduces a sūtra for this: that sūtra says of the four foundations of mindfulness, “by what do they come to be gathered? by what do they come to cease,” and answers with the gathering and ceasing of food, contact, name-and-form, and attention as making body, feeling, mind, and dharmas gather and cease in order. The treatise adjudges this to be the foundation of mindfulness as object — since what is said to gather and cease is the four objects and not the discernment that observes.

The easy error: to read the three entities as three stages (first cultivating intrinsic nature, then conjunction, then object). They are not an order; they are three ways of reckoning one and the same practice. Paramārtha’s old version renders these three as “the station of mindfulness as intrinsic nature, as associated, and as object-field,” and although the renderings of the second and third members differ, the framework of the threefold division is wholly the same — which shows that this threefold division is the bone of the treatise itself and not an arrangement of the translator.

In practice: hereafter, when one meets the form “such and such has three entities,” first ask whether they are three stages or three measures; what this fascicle exhibits is the latter.

4. Why the Name “Foundation of Mindfulness” Is Established upon Discernment

First ask: since the intrinsic nature is discernment, why does the name contain “mindfulness”?

The treatise first records the Vaibhāṣika masters’ answer: “because in this class mindfulness is preponderant. The sense is that it is by the sustaining force of mindfulness that discernment gets to proceed, as in splitting wood with an axe the cleft is held by the force of the wedge” — the axe is discernment and the wedge is mindfulness; to split wood one must have the wedge hold the cleft open, and discernment must have the sustaining force of mindfulness before it can proceed. The author then gives another account: “in strict principle one should say that it is discernment that makes mindfulness stand fast, and therefore the name foundation of mindfulness is established upon discernment, since following upon what discernment observes it can record clearly” — it is not that mindfulness sustains discernment, but that discernment makes mindfulness able to stand fast. The two accounts stand out together, and the treatise does not declare the former wrong, saying only “in strict principle one should say.”

The easy error: to take this passage for a detail of glossing and skip it. What it settles is where the weight of practice is put: on the Vaibhāṣikas’ account the exertion goes into mindfulness; on the author’s, the exertion goes into the discrimination of discernment, and mindfulness is the result that stands fast in its train. Paramārtha’s version here has “because it is established by the force of mindfulness, as in splitting wood the wedge is firmly held,” the simile agreeing word for word, which shows that the two versions carry the same passage.

In practice: wherever this treatise brings out the words “in strict principle one should say,” it is the author putting forward his own view without concealing its difference from the tenet of the school; when one reads those words one should stop and see just where each of the two accounts, before and after, puts the weight.

5. Order, the Counteracting of the Inversions, and Mixed Objects: Why Four Are Four

First ask: why are the foundations of mindfulness exactly four, and in this order of body, feeling, mind, and dharmas?

The treatise gives two layers of reason. As to the ground of the order: “because what is coarse in the aspect of its object ought to be observed first,” and again because “the several desires and greeds proceed upon this one thing, the body,” so that the observation of the body comes first; and then a chain follows — greed for the body arises from taking delight in feeling, delight in feeling from the mind’s being untamed, the mind’s being untamed from the afflictions not yet cut off, and so feeling, mind, and dharmas come down in that order. As to the ground of the number: “these four foundations of mindfulness counteract, each in its own order, those four inversions of purity, pleasure, permanence, and self; hence there are only four, neither more nor fewer” — body counteracting the inversion of purity, feeling that of pleasure, mind that of permanence, dharmas that of self; the inversions being only four, the foundations of mindfulness are neither more nor fewer.

There is a further layer of opening and closing: the first three have “unmixed objects only,” while the fourth, the foundation of mindfulness on dharmas, “extends to both the mixed and the unmixed” — “if among body and the rest one observes two, three, or four of them together, it is called having a mixed object.” This sentence is the foreshadowing of what follows: the foundation of mindfulness on the common characteristic and the four wholesome roots all grow out of this foundation of mindfulness on dharmas with mixed objects.

The easy error: to take the order of the four foundations of mindfulness for an ordering by importance. It is an order of counteraction, and also an order of coarse and fine, and not an order of value.

In practice: an order of practice without a reason is mere ritual; here the treatise gives the reason in full — the four inversions are the illness and the four foundations of mindfulness the medicine, one medicine to one illness, and the number is thereby sealed of itself.

6. The Foundation of Mindfulness on Dharmas with a Total Object: Gathering the Four Objects into One

First ask: when the foundations of mindfulness on the individual characteristic have been cultivated to ripeness, what comes next?

The treatise says, “that practitioner of observation, abiding within the foundation of mindfulness on dharmas whose object is total and mixed, observes together the four objects, body and the rest, and cultivates the four modes of apprehension, namely impermanent, suffering, empty, and non-self.” This is the foundation of mindfulness on the common characteristic — no longer looking at one object after another, but taking the four objects of body, feeling, mind, and dharmas together and observing them as one, the modes of apprehension cultivated being likewise gathered into the four modes of the common characteristic.

The easy error: to suppose that the foundation of mindfulness on the common characteristic is a new exercise raised up beside those on the individual characteristic. It is not. It is the same foundation of mindfulness on dharmas, only with its object turned from “unmixed” to “total and mixed”; which is why all three houses of ancient masters outline it as the second of the two divisions of the four foundations of mindfulness, and do not set up a separate division for it.

In practice: this passage is exceedingly short (Root 17 of this fascicle being a single stanza), yet it is the joint of the whole fascicle — the wholesome root of heat in the next passage is precisely what arises out of this foundation of mindfulness on dharmas taking the common characteristic as a total object, ripening by degrees. Read this section too lightly, and the four wholesome roots turn into four steps sprung out of nowhere.

7. The Wholesome Root of Heat: The Forerunner of the Fire of the Noble Path

First ask: why is the first rung of the four wholesome roots named “heat”?

The treatise says, “when the foundation of mindfulness on dharmas taking the common characteristic as a total object is cultivated and ripens by degrees up to the highest of the high grades, then after this foundation of mindfulness there arises the first wholesome root of the factors conducive to penetration, named the wholesome root of heat,” and explains the name — “this dharma is named the wholesome root of heat as being like heat, being the forerunner of the fire of the noble path which can burn the firewood of the afflictions.” The afflictions are the firewood, the noble path is the fire, and heat is the warmth that is there when the fire is about to rise and has not yet risen. Hidden in the name is an adjudication: this station is not yet the noble path, but only its forerunner.

The station of heat is long, and so it “is able to observe in full the objects that are the four noble truths, and able also to cultivate in full the sixteen modes of apprehension.” The sixteen modes of apprehension the treatise here lists truth by truth: four on suffering, “first impermanent, second suffering, third empty, fourth non-self”; four on origin, “first cause, second origin, third production, fourth condition”; four on cessation, “first cessation, second calm, third excellent, fourth escape”; four on the path, “first path, second suitable, third proceeding, fourth deliverance.”

The easy error: to read heat as some warm sensation of body and mind. What the treatise gives is the sense taken from a simile — taking it as the forerunner of fire, not as something felt by touch. Fabao at this section points out expressly the discernment from which heat arises, “this arises from the discernment formed by reflection or the discernment formed by cultivation,” and this too is said with reference to discernment and not to feeling.

In practice: wherever this treatise establishes a name from a physical image (heat, summit, receptivity), first ask which of its senses is taken; the answer is almost always in the sentence of gloss that immediately follows.

8. The Wholesome Root of Summit: That Point on the Brink of Advance and Retreat

First ask: since heat can already observe the four truths in full and cultivate the sixteen modes of apprehension in full, what does the wholesome root of summit add?

The treatise says, “this wholesome root of heat, increasing by degrees through the low, middling, and high grades until it is complete, gives rise to a wholesome root named the wholesome root of summit, and since it is more excellent a different name is further established for it,” and that “this too, like heat, observes the four truths in full and is able to cultivate the sixteen modes of apprehension in full” — what is observed and what is cultivated have not increased; what has increased is the excellence of the station. The gloss of the name is twofold: “among the movable wholesome roots this dharma is the most excellent, as with the crown of a man, and so it is named the wholesome root of summit. Or because it is the very brink between advance and retreat, as with the summit of a mountain, it is called summit.”

The two glosses take different senses. “As with the crown of a man” takes the highest point — among wholesome roots that still waver it is the top; “as with the summit of a mountain” takes the critical edge — standing here, not to advance is to fall back. (Yuanhui in this passage writes the word “heat” with a variant graph, not a different sense; recorded as it stands, without adjudication.)

The easy error: to suppose that summit is steadier than heat. Just the contrary — summit still stands in the rank of “movable wholesome roots” and can still retreat. Real non-retreat waits upon the station of receptivity. The meaning of summit lies not in steadiness but in its being the watershed between the movable and the unmovable.

In practice: in the stations of practice, whatever is called a “summit” is for the most part not a place of security but a place of decision; this gloss of the treatise may be borrowed for reading every technical term of the same type.

9. The Three Grades of Receptivity: From Observing the Four Truths at Large to the Single Suffering of the Desire Realm

First ask: why is receptivity named receptivity? And where lies its real difference from summit?

The treatise glosses the name in two senses: “because among those that can receive the principle of the four truths this is the most excellent” — the former stations too can receive the four truths, and this station is the most excellent; “again, because the receptivity of this station has no falling back, it is named the wholesome root of receptivity” — from here on there is no more falling back. The former sense is said with reference to discernment’s calm reception, the latter with reference to the station’s non-retreat. As to entity, “this wholesome root of receptivity, both in setting foot and in advancing further, is the foundation of mindfulness on dharmas, and herein it differs from the former two”: heat and summit are the foundation of mindfulness on dharmas alone when they first set foot and have all four when they advance further, whereas receptivity is the foundation of mindfulness on dharmas from first to last.

The division into three grades is the crux of this section: “the low and middling grades are the same as summit, that is, they observe in full the objects that are the four noble truths and cultivate in full the sixteen modes of apprehension; the high grade is different, observing only the suffering of the desire realm, since it stands close beside the highest worldly dharma.” The treatise sets out the intervening course in the finest detail as well — the practitioner of yoga, with regard to the counteracting paths and the rest of the form and formless realms, “lessens and abridges by degrees the modes of apprehension and the objects upon each single noble truth, until there is left only a two-moment attention pondering the object that is the noble truth of the suffering of the desire realm,” and this is called the station of middling receptivity; and from this, with nothing intervening, there arises a high grade of receptivity of “one mode of apprehension and one moment.”

The easy error: to read “lessening and abridging by degrees” as a falling off in the exercise. Just the contrary — this is a gathering in: the fewer the objects and the simpler the modes of apprehension, the more the strength is concentrated, until only the single mode of apprehension of the suffering of the desire realm and a single moment are left, and only then can it join to the highest worldly dharma. The three commentaries each have their own point of view here: Puguang takes the opening and closing of the three grades, Fabao the comparison in establishing the name, Yuanhui both senses of receiving and of non-retreat.

In practice: wherever this treatise speaks of “abridging the object by degrees,” it is a mark of the ripening of preparatory practice and not a mark of slackening retreat; the measure lies in whether what follows is a keener path or a scattered mind.

10. The Highest Worldly Dharma: The Last Rung among Things with Outflows

First ask: since it is still with outflows, on what ground is it called “highest”?

The treatise answers directly: “since this is with outflows it is called worldly, and since it is the most excellent it is called highest. This dharma with outflows is the most excellent among worldly dharmas, and is therefore named the highest worldly dharma.” The reason for its excellence is given too — “it has the force of human effort, and apart from a homogeneous cause it draws forth the arising of the noble path, and so it is called the most excellent”: without depending upon a former dharma of its own class as cause, it can draw the noble path out. Paramārtha’s version here has “apart from a homogeneous cause, by this force it can draw forth the noble path,” the doctrine being wholly the same.

In form it is the same as the high grade of receptivity: “taking the truth of the suffering of the desire realm as object, it cultivates one mode of apprehension and lasts one moment only.”

The easy error: to imagine the highest worldly dharma as some long and excellent state. It lasts one moment only. The terminus of the whole preparatory practice with outflows is a cause, one moment long, with nothing intervening after it.

In practice: this section explains why the later text says the highest worldly dharma “has no relinquishing at the end of life” — there is simply no time for life to end, for the next moment is the receptivity to the cognition of dharma concerning suffering. The higher the station the shorter the time: this is one of the hidden threads of the fascicle.

11. The Entity of the Four Wholesome Roots and What They Cultivate: Four Cultivated in the Present, Sixteen for the Future

First ask: since the four wholesome roots are named foundations of mindfulness, what is their entity?

The treatise says, “being of the nature of foundations of mindfulness they all have discernment for their entity; taken together with their attendants they are all of the nature of the five aggregates. Yet their acquisition is to be excepted, lest the wholesome roots of heat and the rest belonging to the noble ones should come to be present once more” — reckoned with their attendants they are the five aggregates, but “acquisition” must be taken out; otherwise the wholesome roots of heat and the rest that a noble one has relinquished would come to be present again. This little subtraction looks like a trifle, and yet it is made to hold the consistency of what comes before and after.

There follows a long passage of fine accounts of cultivation in the present and cultivation for the future: at the first setting foot of heat, the foundation of mindfulness on dharmas taking the three truths as object is cultivated in the present while four are cultivated for the future, and any one mode of apprehension is cultivated in the present while four are cultivated for the future; taking the truth of cessation as object, one only is cultivated for the future. When it advances further, the modes of apprehension for the future rise to sixteen. The treatise gives the reason itself in two sentences — at the first setting foot, “because this class has not been obtained before, only what is of the same portion can be cultivated”; in advancing further, “because this class has already been obtained before, what is not of the same portion can also be cultivated.”

The easy error: to take this tabular stretch of text for a side branch that may be passed over. It is the treatise’s demonstration of what it means by the word “cultivate”: cultivation in the present is the one actually arising, and cultivation for the future is everything obtained thereby; and whether a thing has been obtained before or not settles how wide the future cultivation is.

In practice: in reading numbers of this kind, first sort out three columns — which truth is the object, how many arise in the present, how many are obtained for the future. Sort the three columns, and the close-packed figures fall at once into rows.

12. The Factors Conducive to Penetration: The General Name of the Four Rungs, and Their Six Levels, Nine Places, Male and Female

First ask: how is the general name “factors conducive to penetration,” covering heat, summit, receptivity, and the highest worldly dharma, taken apart?

The treatise takes it apart word by word: “‘decision’ means deciding, ‘discernment’ means discriminating” — deciding and discriminating refer to the noble paths, since the noble path can cut off doubt (decision) and can distinguish the characteristics of the four truths (discernment). “‘Factor’ means a portion; the sense of the words is to show that what they are conducive to is only one portion, the path of seeing” — what they are conducive to is only this one portion, the path of seeing. The four can draw forth the factors of decisive discernment and are conducive to them, whence they are named the factors conducive to penetration.

Below this each of the several gates has its measure. What they are formed by: “all four are formed by cultivation and not by hearing or reflection, since they belong only to the levels of meditative equipoise.” Grade: the first two are of the low grade (both movable and liable to retreat), receptivity of the middling, the highest worldly dharma alone of the high. Level: they depend upon six levels (the four meditative absorptions, access concentration, and the intermediate absorption); they are not in the desire realm because “meditative equipoise is wanting there,” and not in the higher levels because they “belong to the retinue of the path of seeing.” Maturation: they can call forth the maturation of the five aggregates of the form realm as a cause of fullness but cannot project, “because they abhor and turn away from the existences.” Body: they depend upon a body of the desire realm, in the nine places of men and gods excepting Uttarakuru; the first three wholesome roots arise for the first time in the three continents, and the fourth can arise for the first time in the places of the gods as well, because “it has no first and later but only a single moment.” Male and female: as to the first three, man and woman alike obtain both kinds, and as to the fourth a woman’s body also obtains both, whereas one depending upon a male body obtains only the wholesome root of a male body, because “with regard to a female body he has already obtained cessation independent of discernment.” Relinquishing: a noble one relinquishes only upon losing the level, an ordinary being must relinquish at the end of life, and the first two wholesome roots are relinquished by retreat as well; “the two relinquishings, losing and retreat, have non-acquisition for their nature, and retreat certainly involves the raising of a fault while losing does not necessarily.”

The treatise also honestly leaves room for one divergent account: the “six or seven” of the stanza is “in order to display that there are two divergent accounts,” the Venerable Ghoṣa saying that heat and summit depend upon the six former levels together with the desire realm, seven in all.

The easy error: to take this whole stretch for a table of classifications without asking why it is so divided. Every gate is in fact answering one and the same question — just where these four rungs of wholesome root stand: they stand upon the levels of concentration (what they are formed by, level), upon a body of the desire realm (body, male and female), and upon a position that may still be lost (relinquishing, retreat).

In practice: whenever one meets an “analysis through the several gates” in this treatise, read the gates through in connection with one another and the coordinates of that dharma come out; memorized gate by gate in isolation, they are on the contrary not retained.

13. The Advantages of the Four Wholesome Roots: What Each of the Four Sentences Guarantees

First ask: having obtained these four rungs, what settled guarantee does one obtain at each?

The treatise gives four sentences: “one who obtains heat will certainly reach nirvāṇa; one who obtains summit will in the end not cut off the wholesome; one who obtains receptivity will not fall into the evil destinies; the highest enters the certainty of the noble path.” The force of the four sentences increases by degrees. One who obtains heat, though he may still have “retreat, cutting off the wholesome roots, doing deeds of immediate retribution, falling into the evil destinies and so forth,” yet “will not go on wandering for long, but will certainly reach nirvāṇa in the end” — what is guaranteed is the end, not the course. One who obtains summit, “though he may still retreat and so forth, yet by ascendancy will in the end not cut off his wholesome roots.” One who obtains receptivity, “though he relinquishes it at the end of life and still abides in the station of an ordinary being, yet by ascendancy does not retreat, does not do deeds of immediate retribution, and does not fall into the evil destinies.” One who obtains the highest worldly dharma, “though he abides in the station of an ordinary being, is nevertheless able to enter the certainty of the noble path.”

The treatise also supplies two inferences on behalf of the stanza: the stanza says only “does not fall into the evil destinies,” but since “one who does deeds of immediate retribution must fall into the evil destinies,” the not doing of deeds of immediate retribution is already contained in it; and the stanza does not speak of being apart from relinquishing at the end of life, but since the highest worldly dharma enters the certainty of the noble path with nothing intervening, its having no relinquishing at the end of life is likewise established.

The ground of the receptivity-station’s not falling into the evil destinies the treatise sets out in the finest detail — “upon reaching the station of receptivity, he obtains the dharma of not being born with regard to a portion of destinies, births, places, bodies, existences, and afflictions,” and it then glosses the six word by word: destinies means the several evil destinies; births means birth from an egg and from moisture; places means the Heaven of Non-Percipient Beings, Uttarakuru, and the place of great Brahmā; bodies means the bodies of one congenitally without a sexual faculty, of one whose sexual faculty is incomplete, and of a person of both sexes; existences means an eighth existence and the like; afflictions means the afflictions abandoned by seeing; and “at low receptivity there is obtained the not being born in the evil destinies, while the rest are obtained only upon high receptivity.”

The easy error: to read “one who obtains heat will certainly reach nirvāṇa” as meaning that after obtaining heat all goes smoothly. The treatise says expressly that one who obtains heat may still retreat, may still cut off the wholesome, may still do deeds of immediate retribution, may still fall into the evil destinies — what is guaranteed is only that he will not wander for ever. Here the treatise inserts a question: “if that is so, how does it differ from the factors conducive to liberation” (which likewise certainly reach nirvāṇa)? The answer is, “because it is without obstruction, because it is near to seeing the truths, and because its modes of apprehension are the same as those of the path of seeing” — the difference lies in distance and in modes of apprehension, not in the end.

In practice: in reading every saying of the form “he will certainly obtain,” first ask whether what is certain is the end or the course. This section is the clearest place in the whole treatise for telling the two apart.

14. The Turning of Class: Up to Which Rung the Turning May Go

First ask: since each of the three vehicular classes has its own heat, summit, receptivity, and highest worldly dharma, may one change vehicles midway?

The treatise’s answer is a turning with bounds. When heat and summit have arisen in one of the class of the śrāvaka, “it is still possible to turn toward unsurpassed perfect awakening”; but “if he has obtained receptivity there is no principle by which he may become a Buddha” — and the reason is most interesting: “a bodhisattva bears the welfare of beings in his heart, and in order to convert sentient beings he must go to the evil destinies, whereas that class which has obtained receptivity cannot be turned back.” One who obtains receptivity is determined not to fall into the evil destinies, while a bodhisattva must be able to go to the evil destinies in order to convert beings; and so this good thing, the not falling into the evil destinies, on the contrary blocks up the road to Buddhahood. As for turning into a pratyekabuddha, all three stations of heat, summit, and receptivity may do so, “and since he lies outside the vehicle of the Buddha he is spoken of as ‘the other.’”

For the pratyekabuddha likened to the qilin’s horn and for the Buddha there is no turning, because the two of them “both take the fourth meditative absorption as their support and awaken to the awakening of their own vehicle in a single sitting”; the fourth meditative absorption is “a concentration unshaken and utterly clear and keen,” and so is fit to be their support. The bound of “a single sitting” the author fixes himself as “from the wholesome root of heat up to awakening he does not rise from his seat,” and he records another account alongside — “some other master says: from the contemplation of impurity he does not rise from his seat, up to awakening.”

The easy error: to take “not falling into the evil destinies” as a merit which is simply better the higher it goes. This section exhibits the treatise’s sense of measure: one and the same merit has different consequences in different classes. This is not a judgment of value; it is a structural conflict between station and vow.

In practice: in reading the differences among the three vehicles, note that the treatise never compares them as higher and lower but only sets out the conditions and bounds of each; the sentence “since he lies outside the vehicle of the Buddha he is spoken of as ‘the other’” is especially worth savoring — it is a word of classification, not a word of disparagement.

15. The Factors Conducive to Liberation: Three Lifetimes at the Fastest, and the Three Continents of Men

First ask: what is there before the factors conducive to penetration?

The treatise says, “one in whom the factors conducive to penetration arise in this present life must have given rise to the factors conducive to liberation in a former life,” and “whoever first plants the factors conducive to liberation gains liberation in three lifetimes at the fastest” — in the first life the factors conducive to liberation arise, in the second the factors conducive to penetration, in the third he enters the noble state and so on to liberation. The treatise uses a simile from farming: “it is as with the three different stations of sowing the seed, the shoot’s growing, and the bearing of fruit; and so it is with the three stations of the body’s entering the nature of dharma, of ripening, and of liberation.”

Their entity is “formed by hearing and reflection only, having all three kinds of action for their entity” — as regards what is most excellent they are mental action only, yet the bodily and verbal actions raised up under this resolve and vow also get the name. So the threshold is not high at all: “if a man gives a single meal or keeps a single precept and the like and deeply delights in seeking liberation, then, sustained by the force of his vow, this is called planting the factors conducive to liberation.” The place is confined to the three continents of the destiny of men, and one must “meet the appearance of a Buddha in the world to plant this wholesome root,” with another account recorded alongside, “some other master says that meeting a pratyekabuddha will do as well.”

The easy error: to suppose that the factors conducive to liberation are a lofty station. They are low enough to be planted with a single meal and a single precept — the point lies not in the size of the deed but in “deeply delighting in liberation” and in “being sustained by the force of a vow.” What settles whether it is a factor conducive to liberation is the vow, not the amount.

In practice: this section fits the lowest step to the stairs of the whole fascicle, and gives besides a very practical measure: an everyday act of giving or of discipline, fastened to the vow of liberation, has already entered this line.

16. The Receptivity to the Cognition of Dharma concerning Suffering: The Gate of the Path of Seeing and the Establishing of Its Name

First ask: what is the first moment after the highest worldly dharma?

The treatise says, “with nothing intervening after the wholesome root of the highest worldly dharma, taking as object the noble truth of the suffering of the desire realm, there arises a receptivity to the cognition of dharma comprised within the outflowless; this receptivity is named the receptivity to the cognition of dharma concerning suffering.” The ground of the name is that “in order to show that this receptivity is without outflows, its later homogeneous outflow is adduced as its distinguishing mark” — its later homogeneous result (the cognition of dharma concerning suffering) is used to mark it out; “since it can produce the cognition of dharma and is the cause of the cognition of dharma, it gets the name receptivity to the cognition of dharma, as a tree is named from its flower and fruit,” the result being spoken of in the cause.

The same moment has a second designation as well: “this very one is named the entry into the certainty of the noble path, and is also named the entry into rightness and determination.” The treatise glosses it word by word — “what the sūtra calls rightness is nirvāṇa”; “‘birth’ means the afflictions, or the faculties not yet ripened. The noble path can pass beyond it, and hence it is called separation from birth”; the noble path can with certainty tend toward nirvāṇa and can decidedly discern the characteristics of the truths, whence the name “determination”; and “on reaching this station, one is said to enter.”

The easy error: to read the “birth” of “separation from birth” as the birth of birth and death. The treatise says expressly, “‘birth’ means the afflictions, or the faculties not yet ripened” — what is separated from is the afflictions and unripeness, not the taking of birth itself.

In practice: that one moment should have three names (the receptivity to the cognition of dharma concerning suffering, the entry into the certainty of the noble path, the entry into rightness and determination) is because it is at once the first outflowless mind, the terminus of the station of an ordinary being, and the beginning of the noble station. Many names are not prolixity; they are three faces of one thing.

17. By What Ordinary-Being Status Is Relinquished: One Correct Sense and Two Divergent Accounts

First ask: by which dharma, after all, is ordinary-being status relinquished?

The treatise’s correct sense is the receptivity to the cognition of dharma concerning suffering: “once this receptivity has arisen one gets the name of noble one, and it relinquishes ordinary-being status while in the future” — note “while in the future,” that is, in the station where this receptivity is about to arise and has not yet arisen; and the treatise itself explains the sense as “that is, it is allowed that this receptivity has this function at its future moment of arising, and that no other dharma has it, as with a lamp and with the mark of arising” (the lamp dispelling the darkness before it has arrived, the mark of arising producing the dharma while itself in the future).

Below this two accounts are recorded alongside. The first: “some other master says: it is the highest worldly dharma that relinquishes ordinary-being status,” which the treatise objects to, saying “this principle is not so, because the two of them are alike named worldly dharmas, and because their natures are contrary.” There follows a sentence explaining it through: “there is no fault in this either, as by the shoulder of an enemy one can take the enemy’s life” — borrowing the shoulder of an enemy to take an enemy’s life, things of one class being able to harm one another. The second: “some other master says: it is the two of them that relinquish it together, as an uninterrupted path and a path of liberation do.”

The easy error: to read “relinquishing while in the future” as putting the relinquishing off till later. The “future” here is a station of a dharma (the station of not yet having arisen) and not a later point of time. Fail to make this station clear, and the boundary between “the fifteen minds of the path of seeing” and “the sixteenth mind” below will go astray with it. Again, as to the speaker of the sentence “there is no fault in this either, as by the shoulder of an enemy one can take the enemy’s life,” Puguang marks it as “some other master explains,” whereas the momentum with which the treatise connects it is close to the author speaking for himself — this difference of label the fascicle records without adjudicating, for which see the section on further resonances.

In practice: where this treatise records divergent accounts side by side, the objection and the sentence explaining it through often follow hard upon each other; in reading one must hang every sentence back upon its own master, for hang one sentence wrong and the establishing and refuting of the whole passage are reversed.

18. The Course of the Sixteen Minds: The Cognition of Dharma, the Subsequent Cognition, and the Eight Receptivities and Eight Cognitions

First ask: how are the sixteen minds laid out?

One rule walked four times over. Upon each truth, first, taking the desire realm as object, a “receptivity to the dharma” arises, and with nothing intervening after it a “cognition of dharma”; then, taking the two realms of form and formlessness together as object, a “subsequent receptivity” arises, and with nothing intervening after it a “subsequent cognition” — four minds to one truth, sixteen minds to four truths. Hence upon the truth of suffering there are the receptivity to the cognition of dharma concerning suffering, the cognition of dharma concerning suffering, the receptivity to the subsequent cognition concerning suffering, and the subsequent cognition concerning suffering, while upon the three truths of origin, cessation, and the path “there are likewise four minds each.” The treatise writes out all sixteen names in full and abridges nothing.

For the names “dharma” and “subsequent” the treatise gives its reason too: “because it first realizes and knows the true principle of dharmas it is named the cognition of dharma; the objects and cognitions after it, because they resemble the former, get the name subsequent, for the latter realizes its object following after the former.” The cognition of dharma is the first realization, and the subsequent cognition is of the same kind, realizing in its train.

The easy error: to suppose that “the cognition of dharma” means a cognition taking “dharmas” as its object, and “the subsequent cognition” a cognition that sorts things into classes. It does not. The cognition of dharma takes the desire realm as object and the subsequent cognition the two higher realms; “subsequent” means resembling what went before. Paramārtha’s old version renders the “outflowless” of this section as “without flow,” which is a difference of rendering-character and not of sense.

In practice: the sixteen minds need not be memorized by force; remember one formula — “one truth, two realms; upon each realm a receptivity and a cognition”; multiply by the four truths, and the sixteen come out of themselves.

19. The Three Kinds of Direct Realization and the Dispute over Simultaneity and Gradualness

First ask: since the sixteen minds arise in order, where is the error in those who maintain “simultaneous direct realization only”?

The treatise is in no haste to declare it wrong, but first sorts out the sense of the word: “here another school says this: with regard to the truths there is only simultaneous direct realization. Yet their intent should be further sought out, since the word ‘direct realization’ as they use it is undistinguished” — which kind of “direct realization” do you mean? Thereupon it establishes three kinds: “outflowless discernment alone seeing clearly before it the objects that are the truths is called the direct realization that is seeing” · “this outflowless discernment together with the other associated dharmas taking one and the same object is called the direct realization that is taking as object” · “these dharmas that take an object, together with the other coexisting dharmas not associated with mind, such as discipline and the mark of arising, performing one and the same business, is called the direct realization that is the matter done.”

Once they are sorted out the answer comes of itself: at the time of seeing the truth of suffering, “with regard to the noble truth of suffering there are all three kinds of direct realization, and with regard to the other three truths only the direct realization that is the matter done, namely cutting off, realizing, and cultivating.” Hence if simultaneity be said of the direct realization that is seeing, it does not stand — “since among the truths the modes of apprehension are severally different”; and if one were to see all the truths together by the single mode of apprehension of non-self, that would contradict the sūtra’s saying that one “ponders suffering by the mode of apprehension of suffering” and the rest. But if one says simultaneity on the ground that “at the time of seeing one truth one gains mastery with regard to the other truths,” or says simultaneity on the ground that “at the time of seeing suffering one is able to cut off origin, realize cessation, and cultivate the path,” the treatise answers in both cases, “in principle there is no fault either” — because what is spoken of there is in fact the direct realization that is the matter done. As proof from scripture the treatise adduces “the Buddha told the householder: with regard to the four noble truths there is no simultaneous direct realization but necessarily a gradual direct realization,” and says “of sūtras such as this there are three, and each has its own simile.”

The easy error: to read this passage as a contest for victory. The treatise’s way is first to sort out the sense of the word and then to discuss right and wrong: one and the same word “simultaneous” does not stand when it falls upon the direct realization that is seeing, and is allowed when it falls upon the direct realization that is the matter done. The point at issue is not simultaneity or gradualness, but what is being referred to.

In practice: when two parties stand opposed, the first step this treatise exhibits is always to ask, “which of these does your word refer to?”; sort out the word, and most contradictions untie themselves.

20. Upon What Level the Sixteen Minds Depend

First ask: upon what level do these sixteen moments arise?

The treatise answers most sparingly: “following upon the levels on which the highest worldly dharma depends, it should be known that these sixteen minds depend upon just those. It depends upon six levels, as was said above.” That is, the six levels of the four meditative absorptions, access concentration, and the intermediate absorption — the same level as the highest worldly dharma.

The easy error: to suppose that on entering the path of seeing one has changed to a higher level. There is no change. The level depended upon does not change; what changes is whether it is outflowless or not — the highest worldly dharma is the last of what has outflows, the receptivity to the cognition of dharma concerning suffering the first of what is outflowless, the two of the same level and of different nature.

In practice: short as this section is, it blocks a common imagining: the path of seeing is not a change of place, but a change of path in the same place.

21. Receptivity Is the Uninterrupted Path, Cognition the Path of Liberation

First ask: why must receptivity and cognition arise alternately, one before and one after?

The treatise adjudges it by the two paths: “among the sixteen minds, receptivity is the uninterrupted path, since with regard to the acquisition that cuts off the afflictions there is nothing that can block it. Cognition is the path of liberation, since it has already been liberated from the acquisition of the afflictions and arises at the same time as the acquisition of release from bondage.” Receptivity is what properly cuts off the acquisition of the afflictions, with nothing to block it; cognition is where the acquisition of the afflictions has been shed and it arises together with the acquisition of release. The simile the treatise gives is homely — “as when men in the world drive out a thief and shut the door”: first drive the thief out (the uninterrupted path), then shut the door (the path of liberation).

Below it there is a supposed objection: if the second be merely an uninterrupted path arising together with the acquisition of release from bondage, then at this station there should arise no cognition of doubt already cut off; and if in the station of the path of seeing receptivity alone cuts off the afflictions, that contradicts the nine clusters of fetters spoken of in the treatise itself. The author answers: “this objection is not so, because all the receptivities are the retinue of cognition, as the business done by a king’s retinue is called the doing of the king.”

The easy error: to read “cognition is the path of liberation” as meaning that cognition does not cut off the afflictions. The division of labor the treatise makes is between cutting off and realizing: the proper doing of the cutting is in receptivity, the presence of the acquisition in cognition; and since receptivity is the retinue of cognition, to say “cognition cuts off” is not wrong either — which is precisely the point of the author’s answer to the objection.

In practice: the figure of driving out the thief and shutting the door may be carried straight on into the station of the path of cultivation — the nine grades of uninterrupted and liberation paths of the nine grades of fault and virtue below use the very same structure.

22. The First Fifteen Minds Are the Path of Seeing: The Simile of a Field of Paddy

First ask: since all sixteen minds see the principle of the truths, why are only the first fifteen counted as the path of seeing?

The treatise says, “with the receptivity to the cognition of dharma concerning suffering for the first and the receptivity to the subsequent cognition concerning the path for the last, there are fifteen moments in all therein, and all are comprised within the path of seeing, because they see truths not seen. By the time of the sixteenth, the subsequent cognition concerning the path, there is no principle of a truth unseen that is now seen, and it is like reviewing what has been seen, and so it is comprised within the path of cultivation.” The measure is a single one — whether it is “unseen and now seen.”

An objection follows at once: is not the receptivity to the subsequent cognition concerning the path, observed at the sixteenth mind, also unseen and now seen? The treatise answers, “here we speak with regard to the truths and not with regard to moments,” and gives a simile: “as when in reaping a paddy field there is one plant left, one may not say that this field has not been reaped” — one plant left unreaped in a field does not mean the field has not been reaped through. The treatise adds four further reasons: the subsequent cognition concerning the path is comprised within a fruit, it cultivates at once the eight cognitions and sixteen modes of apprehension, it relinquishes the path before it, and it arises in continuity; and so it is like the rest of the path of cultivation.

A further objection: the subsequent cognition concerning the path certainly does not retreat, precisely because it sustains the cutting off of what is cut off by the path of seeing, and so ought to count as the path of seeing. The treatise answers, “this objection is not so, because the fault goes too far” (by such reasoning every later-arisen path would become the path of seeing). And a last question: “for what reason are the seven cognitions also comprised within the path of seeing?” Answer: “because the seeing of the principles of the truths is not yet complete, that is, because they arise in the midst of a seeing of the principles of the truths that is not yet all-round.”

The easy error: to suppose that the boundary between the path of seeing and the path of cultivation is “whether one has understood.” The treatise’s boundary is whether any truth is left unseen — one truth left unseen and it is the path of seeing, not one truth left and it is the path of cultivation, and this has nothing to do with dullness or keenness of faculty or with the height of station.

In practice: the simile of the paddy field may be turned round for self-examination: in judging whether a thing is finished, look at the whole field and not at the last plant.

23. One Who Follows through Faith and One Who Follows the Dharma: The Difference of Dull and Keen, and the Establishing of the Three Approachings

First ask: how are persons in the station of the path of seeing divided?

The treatise says, “in the station of the path of seeing there are two kinds of noble one, first one who follows through faith and second one who follows the dharma; these two names are established by the difference of dull and keen faculties” — those of dull faculties are named ones who follow through faith, those of keen faculties ones who follow the dharma. The gloss the treatise gives in fine detail: “because his practice follows upon faith he is named following through faith; and since he has this following through faith he is named one who follows through faith,” and again “or because by repeated practice of this following through faith it has become his nature,” such a person “in the former time believing the words of others and practicing following upon them”; while one who follows the dharma is such “because in the former time he perused for himself the sūtras and the other dharmas and practiced following upon them.” One first believed the words of others, the other first perused the sūtras for himself. Fabao here further divides two layers — first explaining “the name of the practice,” then explaining “the person” (practice and person being each a layer), which is a distinction he alone among the three commentaries brings out.

Below this, three approachings are established according to how much of the afflictions abandoned by cultivation was cut off before: he who has not before cut off any affliction by the mundane path is named one with the fetters entire, or he may have cut off from one grade up to five grades of the desire realm, and at this station he is named an approacher to the first fruit; he who has cut off six grades, or seven or eight, is named an approacher to the second fruit; he who has become separated from all nine grades of the desire realm, or has cut off from one grade of the first absorption up to being wholly separated from the sphere of nothingness, is named an approacher to the third fruit. The treatise also explains in passing why the first fruit is first — “that is, the fruit of stream-entry, because among all the fruits of the ascetic life this is certainly the first to be obtained.”

The easy error: to look down upon one who follows through faith as a rung lower. The treatise says only that faculties are dull or keen, and does not say that the fruits are better or worse; the two are alike in the path of seeing, and the three approachings they tend toward are the same as well. Dullness and keenness divide the way in, not the accomplishment.

In practice: in reading this treatise’s adjudication of persons, first sort out which distinctions are of “faculty” and which of “station”; in this section the two cross without infringing upon each other, and it is a good specimen.

24. At the Sixteenth Mind: Approaching Turns into Fruit, and the Names Turn with It

First ask: when the sixteenth mind arrives, what changes?

Two things happen at once. The station changes: “those very ones who follow through faith and who follow the dharma, on reaching the sixteenth mind, the subsequent cognition concerning the path, are named as abiding in a fruit and are no longer named approachers” — the former approacher to stream-entry now abides in the fruit of stream-entry, the former approacher to once-returning in the fruit of once-returning, the former approacher to non-returning in the fruit of non-returning. The names change: “on reaching the station of abiding in a fruit the two names are relinquished and two obtained, that is, one is no longer named one who follows through faith or one who follows the dharma but obtains instead the two names one resolute through faith and one attained through view,” and “those of dull faculties, formerly named ones who follow through faith, are now named ones resolute through faith; those of keen faculties, formerly named ones who follow the dharma, are now named ones attained through view” — because “in these two noble ones faith and discernment are each preponderant, and so the separate names one resolute through faith and one attained through view are marked out.”

The treatise also excludes one item in passing: “the fruit of the arhat is certainly not obtained here for the first time, because the path of seeing cannot cut off the afflictions abandoned by cultivation, and because the mundane path cannot separate one from the defilement of the summit of existence.”

The easy error: to suppose that a change of name is a change of person. The person has not changed; what has changed is the station depended upon: in the station of approaching the name is established upon practice (following through faith, following the dharma), and in the station of fruit upon virtue (resolute through faith, attained through view). Paramārtha’s old version here stands exactly opposite to Xuanzang’s in its system of renderings — at the causal station it has “following in accordance with faith” and “following in accordance with the dharma” (the two graphs inverted), and at the fruit station “one who attains through faith and delight,” while the one name “one attained through view” is on the contrary wholly the same in the two versions.

In practice: the technical terms of this treatise are for the most part functions of station; when one reads that a person has different names before and after, first ask whether his station has moved, and then ask why the name has moved with it.

25. Abiding in a Fruit Is Not Approaching: Why He Is Not Straightway Called an Approacher to the Later Fruit

First ask: one who has before cut off from one to five grades of the afflictions of the desire realm abandoned by cultivation plainly can go upward when he reaches the sixteenth mind; why then is he named only as abiding in a fruit and not as an approacher to the later fruit?

The treatise’s measure is a single one: “at the times of obtaining the fruits the path of the higher fruit is certainly not yet obtained, and so one abiding in a fruit, so long as the path of the higher fruit has not arisen, is named only as abiding in a fruit and not as approaching the next.” The name of approaching is fastened to the path of the higher fruit having arisen; where it has not arisen he is not named an approacher — and this has nothing to do with whether he can go upward.

The treatise at once adds a matter of fact: those who had before cut off from one to five grades, “at the time of obtaining the fruit, will certainly give rise to the path of the higher fruit in this very life”; and from this it draws one further conclusion: “from this, one who had before become separated from the defilement of three meditative absorptions and afterwards entered the path of seeing in dependence upon a lower level will, after obtaining the fruit, certainly be able to draw forth the later path of the higher fruit in his present life. Were it otherwise, it could not be said that a noble one born into a higher level certainly possesses the faculty of pleasure.”

The easy error: to read “not approaching” as meaning that he cannot go forward. What it says is only the name at this moment — the name is established upon the path actually in course, not upon a capacity for the future.

In practice: here the general rule by which this treatise establishes names appears at its cleanest: the name is fastened to what has already arisen, not to what may yet be had. Read the earlier “approaching” and “fruit” back in the light of this, and everything tallies.

26. The Nine Grades of Fault and Virtue: The Path of the Lowest of the Low Cuts Off the Obstruction of the Highest of the High

First ask: why must the afflictions abandoned by cultivation and the counteracting paths be divided into nine grades, and that with the lowest of the low set against the highest of the high?

The treatise first fixes the two names: “‘fault’ means defect, that is, the obstruction to be counteracted; ‘virtue’ means merit, that is, the path that counteracts.” The afflictions of the desire realm abandoned by cultivation have nine grades, and “so likewise it should be for the higher levels up to the summit of existence”; the two counteracting paths, uninterrupted and of liberation, have nine grades each as well. The way of dividing is three multiplied by three — the fundamental three grades each divided into low, middling, and high, yielding the lowest of the low, the middling of the low, the highest of the low, the lowest of the middling, the middling of the middling, the highest of the middling, the lowest of the high, the middling of the high, and the highest of the high.

The rule of pairing is crosswise: “the path of the lowest of the low grades has the force to cut off the obstruction of the highest of the high grades, and so on in this way until the path of the highest of the high grades has the force to cut off the obstruction of the lowest of the low grades.” The reason the treatise gives quite plainly: the virtue of the highest of the high grades is at first not there at all; and by the time that virtue is there, the fault of the highest of the high grades is long since gone.

Here the treatise sets down three sets of similes one after another: the washing of clothes, “the coarse grime is removed first, and afterwards the fine grime is removed by degrees”; brightness and darkness, “a coarse darkness a small light can extinguish, whereas to extinguish a fine darkness a great light is required”; and again, “as when the many illnesses gathered over a long time are all at once healed by taking a little good medicine,” “as when a great darkness gathered over a long time is extinguished by a small lamp in a single moment.” The last sentence points the theme — “the force of the bright dharmas is strong and the force of the dark dharmas is weak.”

The easy error: to suppose that the strongest path must be used to cut off the heaviest affliction. The treatise says just the contrary. The coarse and heavy afflictions are cut off first by the weakest path, and the finer the affliction the more excellent the path required — because the coarse afflictions are present first while the excellent path is accomplished later. The order is not from strong to weak, but from coarse to fine.

In practice: the three sets of similes are in fact three sayings of one line of reasoning; remember the one sentence “in washing clothes the coarse grime goes first,” and the direction of the pairing of the nine grades will never be remembered backwards.

27. The Stream-Enterer Returning at Most Seven Times: Seven as a Number, and the Dispute over an Eighth Existence

First ask: in the four words “returning at most seven times,” what does each word govern?

The treatise takes them apart word by word: “the words ‘seven returns’ display seven births of going and returning, in the sense of seven births each among men and among gods. The word ‘at most’ is to display that the births taken are no more than this, and not that all stream-enterers take seven returns.” So the “seven” is seven each among men and gods, and “at most” is an upper bound and not a fixed quota. The name stream-enterer is glossed word by word too: “the several outflowless paths are together named the stream, since by them as cause one tends toward nirvāṇa. The word ‘entering’ is to display the first arrival and attainment; he enters this stream, and so is named a stream-enterer.”

The treatise also puts a question to itself: what sense does this name point to? If first obtaining the path is what is named stream-entry, then one in his eighth existence ought also to be named a stream-enterer; if first obtaining a fruit is what is named stream-entry, then one twofold separated and one wholly separated from desire ought also to be named stream-enterers on reaching the subsequent cognition concerning the path. The treatise gathers it up thus: “this name stream-enterer points to the first obtaining of a fruit, yet the name is established with reference to that fruit which is first obtained by one who obtains all the fruits one after another” — once-returning and non-returning are not certainly obtained first, and this alone is certainly obtained first.

Below this there is a threefold exchange. The objection: the sūtra says plainly, “there is no place and no room for one whose seeing is complete to have the sense of taking an eighth existence,” and yet seven each among men and gods make twenty-eight births — is this not a contradiction? The answer: “the intent of this sūtra is stated with regard to a single destiny; if one holds fast to the letter, then intermediate existence would have to be nonexistent.” The further objection: then for one who goes upstream to the summit of existence there ought likewise to be no eighth birth within a single destiny. The explaining through: “this is said with regard to the desire realm, and so there is no such fault.” The treatise adduces proof from scripture as well — “because the sūtra says ‘seven among gods and among men,’” and “the sūtra of the Kāśyapīyas plainly and separately says that seven births are taken in the place of men and in the place of gods.” As to why there is no eighth existence, the reason the treatise gives is that “his continuum, having come this far, must ripen, and the class of the noble path is by its very nature just so,” with the similes of “the seven-step snake and the fourth-day fever”; and again that he “still has seven other fetters remaining, namely the two lower fetters and the five higher fetters,” so that though the noble path is present in the meantime, being held by the force of the remaining actions he does not realize complete quiescence.

The easy error: to take the twenty-eight births and the sūtra’s “no eighth existence” for a hard contradiction. The treatise’s resolution is that the compass differs — the sūtra says seven with regard to a single destiny, the treatise says twenty-eight with men and gods reckoned together. Again, as to who the objector is, Puguang conjectures the Mahīśāsakas and marks his own words “it may be” (a conjectural tone), which the fascicle records without adjudicating, for which see the section on further resonances.

In practice: whenever numbers in sūtra and treatise disagree, first ask whether the compass of the two is the same; this section is the completest specimen in the treatise of the handling of such contradictions.

28. The Quoted Stanza of Seven Characters and the Limit of Suffering: Where the Fascicle Comes to Rest

First ask: at the end of the fascicle a stanza of seven characters to the line is suddenly quoted; what is it to prove?

Above it is said that the stream-enterer is “of the nature not to fall back,” for four reasons — he does not grow the actions that fall back, he goes counter to the growing of such actions and to their fruits, his strong wholesome roots hold his body down, and both his preparatory practice and his intention are pure; and the last sentence is “those who have actions that will certainly make them fall into the evil destinies cannot so much as raise up receptivity, still less obtain stream-entry.” It is just here that the stanza is quoted as proof: “the sin done by a fool, though small, still makes him fall into the evil; the sin wrought by a wise man, though great, can still be freed from suffering; as a lump of iron, though small, sinks in the water, while iron made into a bowl, though great, can float.” The same iron, in a lump and small, sinks; beaten into a bowl and great, it floats instead — what settles sinking and floating is not the size of the sin but whether the continuum that bears it is foolish or wise. The text before this block reads “hence there is a stanza that says” and not “the stanza says,” and it does not enter the count of the root stanzas, and so this collection marks it as a quoted stanza; the Taishō gives it as a stanza while the Ming edition gives it as prose, which is a difference of format between editions and has been recorded at item three of the apparatus.

At the last the treatise closes with “the limit of suffering.” Asked on what sense the name is established, it answers, “it is established upon there being no further suffering after this present life, in the sense of making the later suffering not continue. Or the limit of suffering is just nirvāṇa.” Asked further how nirvāṇa can be made, it answers, “because the obstruction to its acquisition is removed, the word ‘make’ is used; as when one speaks of making a space, meaning the demolishing of a terrace and tower” — to say “make a space” is not to produce a space, but to pull down what was blocking the place. The last sentence is the fascicle’s close: “those in the other stations also have at most seven returning births, yet not with certainty, and so it is not spoken of.”

The easy error: to read “making the limit of suffering” as producing a thing called nirvāṇa. The treatise uses the simile of “making a space” precisely to block that reading — what is made is the removal of an obstruction, not the producing of a dharma.

In practice: the fascicle begins from the question “the mind having gained concentration, what further is to be cultivated?” and comes to rest at “because the obstruction to its acquisition is removed, the word ‘make’ is used”; the beginning is the start of preparatory practice, the close is the exhaustion of obstruction. Those sixteen moments in between are where the whole weight of the fascicle lies.

Further Resonances: A Mirror of Three Commentaries

The above is the sense of the text of the fascicle itself. Below, a separate section gathers four matters: the adjudications of the three commentaries and their divergences, Saṅghabhadra’s refutations and supplements, the divergences of Paramārtha’s old version, and the coordinates available for reading alongside. A mirror is not the treatise; it is only another way of reading one and the same text; and the accounts are recorded together without adjudication, each returned to its own place.

One. Where the Three Commentaries Diverge

One commentary wholly absent from this fascicle. Shentai’s commentary is a fragment, and of its seven extant fascicles only Fascicle Seventeen touches the Chapter on the Worthy and the Noble; that fascicle marks itself as “the twenty-fifth fascicle of the treatise,” and what it explains is the fourth unit of this chapter (the series on the six kinds of lineage). A mechanical check over the whole range of this fascicle yields zero occurrences, and the want is marked as it stands, the text of another fascicle not being used to fill it out. So the mirror of this fascicle has only three faces and not four.

One and the same outline division, the three houses agreeing wholly while what they fasten to it differs. On the outline of the four foundations of mindfulness the three houses adjudge the twofold division “individual characteristic / common characteristic” word for word, which is the strongest single witness of the ancient masters in this chapter; yet Fabao alone fastens the stanza count upon it (“the first two stanzas explain the foundations of mindfulness on the individual characteristic, the last stanza the foundation of mindfulness on the common characteristic”), while Puguang and Yuanhui give only the names of the divisions. The outline being the same and what is fastened to it differing in detail, both are recorded without adjudication.

The discernment from which the wholesome root of heat arises. Fabao alone marks “this arises from the discernment formed by reflection or the discernment formed by cultivation,” which Puguang and Yuanhui do not give here. This is not a contradiction among the three houses but a further layer supplied by Fabao alone; yet what he supplies borders precisely upon the treatise’s later question of what is “not formed by hearing or reflection” (whence the discernment of this station comes, and to what forming this station itself belongs, being two questions), and the two are worth looking at together.

One variant graph. Yuanhui in the section on the wholesome root of heat writes the graph for “heat” in a variant form, where Puguang and Fabao write the usual form. A variant writing of the graph, not a different sense; recorded as it stands, without adjudication.

In establishing the name of receptivity, each house takes one sense. Puguang takes the opening and closing of the three grades (“receptivity has three grades; the low and the middling are the same as summit, observing the four truths in full and cultivating the sixteen modes of apprehension — this is said in general terms”), Fabao takes the comparison in establishing the name (“the wholesome roots of the former stations can also receive the principle of the four truths; this is the most …” — the former stations too can receive, and this is the most excellent), and Yuanhui takes both senses (“since it receives the four truths and is the most excellent. Again, since there is no retreat …”). What each takes is within the text of the treatise; only the point of view differs.

In explaining the name of the receptivity to the cognition of dharma concerning suffering, the coverage of the three commentaries is unevenly divided. Yuanhui has here the sentence that comes closest to a pure explanation of the name — “as for the receptivity to the cognition of dharma concerning suffering: the dharma of suffering is the dharma of the truth of suffering, and the receptivity takes the dharma of suffering as its object, whence it is named the receptivity to the dharma of suffering”; within the range of this fascicle no independent sentence of pure explanation of the name is found in Puguang, what may be hung upon him being an extension appended to the dispute over “relinquishing ordinary-being status” — “when the highest worldly dharma reaches the station of abiding, the receptivity to the cognition of dharma concerning suffering is at its very moment of arising and, not yet accomplished, he is not called a noble one.” ⇒ For one and the same technical term the coverage of the three commentaries is uneven; recorded as it stands, the text of another section not being used to fill out the want here.

The speaker of the sentence “there is no fault in this either.” This is the place in the fascicle where the marking of speakers most needs care. The treatise’s sentence “there is no fault in this either, as by the shoulder of an enemy one can take the enemy’s life” is, in the momentum of its connection, close to the author speaking for himself; whereas Puguang marks it as “some other master explains: though the highest worldly dharma and ordinary-being status are alike worldly, since their natures are contrary it can relinquish ordinary-being status, and there is no fault in this either.” The two are at variance, and it is recorded without adjudication — it may be that Puguang uses “some other master” as a general designation for the divergent accounts of the Mahāvibhāṣā, and is not setting up a third tenet. The vernacular layer of this fascicle assigns no speaker to this sentence, which runs in the same direction.

In glossing one who follows through faith, Fabao alone divides two layers. Puguang gives “because his practice follows upon faith, he is called following through faith. That person has this following through faith …” and Yuanhui gives “by the dullness or keenness of the faculties these two names are established. He of dull faculties is named one who follows through faith, since in the former time he followed …,” both explaining straight through; whereas Fabao expressly divides two layers — “this explains the name of the practice. ‘He who has this following through faith is called one who follows through faith’ explains the person.” The name of the practice and the name of the person are each a layer, a distinction which among the three commentaries Fabao alone points out; and turning back to the treatise’s two sentences, “is named following through faith” and “is named one who follows through faith,” it is indeed so, the one explaining the dharma and the other the person.

Who the objector concerning an eighth existence is. Puguang marks, “it may be an objection of the Mahīśāsakas, who hold that seven births are taken by men and gods together,” using “it may be” to express his own conjecture and not a definite ascription; and on the answering side he expressly marks “the answer of the Sarvāstivādins.” Fabao sets up no separate label sentence by sentence in this passage. ⇒ As to who the objector is, only Puguang’s conjecture is recorded, and no definite ascription is made on his behalf; the treatise itself does not say who the objector is.

Three places “without an express mark” are not a want of explanation. The supposed objection concerning the uninterrupted and liberation paths of receptivity and cognition, the answering sentence to the question why the seven cognitions too are comprised within the path of seeing, and the second answering sentence in the dispute over an eighth existence — at all three Puguang writes continuously with the text of the treatise and sets up no separate label of question and answer. This is the form of the commentary and not a blank in it; it is of a different nature from Shentai’s “wholly wanting for this fascicle,” and the two may not be listed together.

Two. Saṅghabhadra’s Refutations and Supplementary Explanations

Saṅghabhadra’s two treatises do not name this chapter “Analysis of the Worthy and the Noble”: the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle has “Adjudication of the Worthy and the Noble, chapter six” and the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine “Adjudication of the Worthy and the Noble, chapter seven” — search the two treatises with the Kośa’s chapter name and one will never find them.

Two word-for-word citations, both on the establishing of names. Within the range of this fascicle the places where Saṅghabhadra says “the Sūtra-master” and reports Vasubandhu word for word are only two in all, and both fall upon the establishing of a technical term. The first is the receptivity to the cognition of dharma concerning suffering: Saṅghabhadra first sets up his own explanation, “it is the counteragent of the obstruction to the arising of that cognition, and so it is further named the receptivity to the cognition of dharma concerning suffering,” then recites Vasubandhu’s explanation, “the Sūtra-master here explains it thus: in order to show that this receptivity is without outflows, its later homogeneous outflow is adduced as its distinguishing mark; since it can produce the cognition of dharma and is the cause of the cognition of dharma, it gets the name receptivity to the cognition of dharma, as a tree is named from its flower and fruit,” and thereupon puts forward his own view. What is at issue is the ground on which the name is established — Saṅghabhadra fastens it to what is counteracted (the counteragent of the obstruction to the arising of that cognition), Vasubandhu to the later homogeneous result (adducing the later homogeneous outflow as a distinguishing mark). The two accounts are recorded together, and neither is judged to prevail.

The second is the uninterrupted and liberation paths: Saṅghabhadra poses the question, “again, on what ground is the counteragent that cuts off called the uninterrupted path, and the cognition arising at the same time as the acquisition of release from bondage called the path of liberation?”, and then recites, “the Sūtra-master explains: because with regard to the acquisition that cuts off the afflictions there is nothing that can block it, it is named the uninterrupted path; because it has been liberated from the acquisition of the afflictions and arises at the same time as the acquisition of release from bondage, it is named the path of liberation.” Here he merely reports and then sets out separately, and this section records only his citing sentence and its location.

An honest negative proposition. In the passage of the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine corresponding to this fascicle the two characters for “the Sūtra-master” have zero occurrences; yet it does have coverage of the same doctrine (technical terms such as the receptivity to the cognition of dharma concerning suffering all occurring there). ⇒ This is a difference of the explicit and the implicit, and one may not infer from it that the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine says nothing on this passage. All that the negative proposition can prove is one thing: that Saṅghabhadra in this passage of the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine did not use the designation “the Sūtra-master” to name Vasubandhu.

The scarcity of debate in this fascicle is itself a fact. Compared with the other units of this chapter, the places in this fascicle where Saṅghabhadra cites word for word are exceedingly few, and there is no direct refutation. What this fascicle treats is the doctrinal laying out of the foundations of mindfulness, the wholesome roots, and the order of the path of seeing, and not a focus of controversy over Sarvāstivāda tenets — this is recorded as it stands, no judgment being made on its behalf as to why.

Three. The Divergences of Paramārtha’s Old Version

Paramārtha’s Expository Treatise on the Treasury of Abhidharma, in the passage corresponding to this fascicle, forms a system of its own: its chapter name is “Analysis of the Persons of the Fruits of the Noble Path, chapter six,” wholly different from Xuanzang’s “Analysis of the Worthy and the Noble, chapter six,” and Paramārtha divides this chapter into three fascicles where Xuanzang divides it into four. In form, Xuanzang gives “the stanza says / the treatise says,” the whole stanza set out first, whereas Paramārtha gives “the verse says / the explanation says,” embedding the explanation line by line — so that Xuanzang’s sixteen blocks of root stanza in this fascicle appear in Paramārtha’s version as a number of short verses scattered about.

The renderings form a system of their own. Foundation of mindfulness becomes station of mindfulness, conjoined becomes associated, object becomes object-field, the wholesome root of heat becomes the practice of warmth, without outflows becomes without flow, the mind gains concentration becomes having already gained concentration. These differences run through the whole passage and are not occasional.

The most concrete set of systematic differences lies in the names of the persons of the path of seeing. At the causal station Xuanzang has “one who follows through faith” and “one who follows the dharma,” Paramārtha “following in accordance with faith” and “following in accordance with the dharma” — the two graphs inverted; at the fruit station Xuanzang has “one resolute through faith,” Paramārtha “one who attains through faith and delight.” And the one name “one attained through view” within the same set is on the contrary wholly the same in the two versions. ⇒ Within a set of four names three differ and one is wholly the same, which is an exception within a systematic difference of rendering, recorded as it stands.

The two closest passages. The first is the simile of splitting wood with a wedge in the establishing of the name foundation of mindfulness: Xuanzang, “the sense is that it is by the sustaining force of mindfulness that discernment gets to proceed, as in splitting wood with an axe the cleft is held by the force of the wedge” ‖ Paramārtha, “because it is established by the force of mindfulness, as in splitting wood the wedge is firmly held” — the simile agreeing word for word. The second is the establishing of the wholesome root of heat: Xuanzang, “it is the forerunner of the fire of the noble path which can burn the firewood of the afflictions” ‖ Paramārtha, “it can burn the firewood of the afflictions, being before the fire of the four noble paths.” At these two places the two versions have hardly any difference of compass.

Instances of differing compass. In the gloss of the wholesome root of summit, Xuanzang sets out the two explanations “as with the crown of a man” and “as with the summit of a mountain” in the very sentence establishing the name, whereas Paramārtha places the glosses in another sentence; in the counteracting of the four inversions, Xuanzang states it directly in prose while Paramārtha gives the verse first and then explains; in the closing sentence of the fascicle, Xuanzang sets out “not with certainty” first and “and so it is not spoken of” after, while Paramārtha’s order of sentences is just the reverse. ⇒ All are differences of order and not of doctrine, and no judgment of merit is made between the two versions.

Four. Coordinates for Reading Alongside

What it joins to before is Unit 1. The first sentence of this fascicle takes over the two gates of entering cultivation word for word — “thus have been explained the two gates of entering cultivation; by these two gates the mind then gains concentration.” The concentration accomplished by the contemplation of impurity and mindfulness of the breath is the footing of the four foundations of mindfulness of this fascicle; between Unit 1 and Unit 2 there is no break, and they are two stretches upon one line.

What it joins to after is Unit 3. This fascicle closes upon “abiding in a fruit and returning at most seven times,” saying expressly “those in the other stations also have at most seven returning births, yet not with certainty, and so it is not spoken of”; and the next fascicle opens at once upon the approaching and the fruit of once-returning after the cutting off of the afflictions abandoned by cultivation — the blank left by the last sentence of this fascicle is precisely where the next begins.

What it joins to crosswise is the Chapter on the Latent Tendencies. The nine grades of fault and virtue used in the first half of Root 35 of this fascicle rest upon the division of the nine grades of afflictions abandoned by cultivation established in the Chapter on the Latent Tendencies; this fascicle says only “as was already analyzed before, the nine grades of difference among the afflictions of the desire realm abandoned by cultivation — so likewise it should be for the higher levels up to the summit of existence,” and does not establish it afresh, taking over the measure of the earlier chapter directly. If in reading this section the division into nine grades seems to come out of nowhere, go back to the Chapter on the Latent Tendencies and its root is found.

What runs lengthwise through the whole chapter is the word “station.” From the first setting foot and the later advancing of heat, to the three grades low, middling, and high of receptivity, to the first fifteen and the sixteenth of the sixteen minds, to abiding in a fruit and approaching — every establishing of a name and every adjudication of persons in this fascicle has its measure in the station and not in the height of an attainment. This is the most portable measure the chapter affords.

As for the coordinates by which this fascicle might be read alongside the Yogācāra line, no word-for-word anchor with adjudicated warrant has been obtained on this occasion; it is left wanting, awaiting supply, and nothing is cited conjecturally from memory.