俱舍論 律儀得捨·業之諸門Abhidharmakośabhāṣya · Obtaining and Relinquishing Discipline · Action through the Several Gates

Before Reading This Fascicle

The last fascicle set up the three disciplines — individual liberation, the meditative absorptions, and that without outflows. Setting them up is only the first step; if of a discipline one cannot say clearly where it is obtained from, how much of it is obtained, and by what conditions it goes away, then it is no more than a name. What this fascicle does is exactly this. The very first sentence of the fascicle is a sharply pointed question — “of these three disciplines, that of individual liberation, that of the meditative absorptions, and that without outflows, if from some one place one of them has been obtained, are the remaining two obtained along with it? They are not. How then is it? The stanza says.” If one kind is obtained, are the other two obtained along with it? The answer is given flatly: they are not. And thereupon twenty-one blocks of stanza march on in a row, the first half treating the obtaining and relinquishing of the discipline, the second half treating action through the several gates.

Between the first half and the second there is one sentence that is the joint of the whole chapter — “since the natures and marks of the several actions have been made out to differ, the actions set forth in the sūtras should now be explained.” The three ancient commentators all let the knife of their outline fall at this very place: Puguang marks “‘since the several actions have been made out’ down to ‘the actions set forth’: from here on, within this chapter, the second of the main text, explaining the actions in the sūtras”; Fabao marks “from here below, the third of the main text, explaining that the actions spoken of in the sūtras differ”; Yuanhui marks “from here the second of the main text, explaining the actions in the sūtras, within which there are eleven: first the actions of the three ethical qualities, second the three actions of merit and the rest, third the three actions of feeling, fourth the actions of the three times, fifth bodily and mental feeling, sixth the crooked, the foul, and the turbid, seventh black and black and the rest, eighth the three of silence and the rest, ninth the three evil conducts and the rest, tenth the ten paths of action, eleventh the three wrong practices.” Three commentators outline independently and yet their boundary is wholly the same; from which it is plain that this cut is no forcing by later hands, but a seam that the text of the treatise opens of itself. The second half of this fascicle covers exactly the first six of the eleven items listed by Yuanhui.

There are two things to be said before anything else.

First, this fascicle reads like a piece of mechanics of the discipline — four conditions, five conditions, six conditions, three conditions, two conditions, counted off set after set. But what truly bears the weight is not the numbers; it is the sentence beneath each set that says ‘why just these conditions.’ Immediately after relinquishing the discipline of individual liberation the treatise adds: “why is the relinquishing of the discipline by these five conditions? Because a manifest action has arisen that contradicts what was undertaken, because the support is cast off, because the support is altered, because what it rests upon is cut off, because the term of time is passed” — the five conditions are not five stipulations, they are five ways in which the things the discipline rests upon break down. Take hold of this one sentence and all the numbered conditions that follow can stand up on their own.

Second, this fascicle has two passages of prose commentary of extreme density, in which the author lays down more than ten rounds of question and answer in a row, and the one asking and the one answering change hands again and again. One passage is at Root 37, one at Roots 39 and 40. If in these two passages one cannot read out who is speaking, the whole passage becomes a mass of self-contradiction. Fortunately the outlines of the ancient masters mark the speakers line by line: Puguang, in the first half of Root 37, marks “the house of total raising,” “the house of separate raising,” “the author,” and “the Vibhāṣā masters,” and in the second half of Root 37 and throughout Roots 39 and 40 changes to marking “the Sautrāntikas” and “the Sarvāstivādins.” Below, wherever an exchange is met, the wording follows these marks; the agreements and divergences among the three commentaries are gathered separately in the closing section.

I. From What Place Each of the Three Disciplines Is Obtained

〔1.1〕First ask one question: is the discipline obtained upon “persons” or upon “matters.” The four expressions on the face of this stanza — all, two, present, all times — are all answering ‘the place from which it is obtained.’ The treatise first sets up the discipline of the desire realm: “the discipline of the desire realm is individual liberation, and this is obtained from every root path of action and from the preparatory effort and the subsequent arising.” What is called the root path of action is the actual committing of such matters as killing, stealing, wrong conduct, and false speech; the preparatory effort is the preliminary movement before one sets hand to it, and the subsequent arising the residual momentum after the deed is done. The one who takes on the discipline obtains it not at the place of the actual committing alone, but at the places of preparation and of residual momentum as well. The easy error: to suppose that taking on the discipline guards only ‘that one instant in which the deed is brought off.’ It does not — what is guarded is one whole line. Where this lands: this is exactly why keeping the discipline is difficult and also why it is steady; one item of discipline governs three stretches, and so the place of preparation, where thought first stirs, is already within the care of the discipline.

〔1.2〕“Obtained from the two” is two different knives. The treatise says “‘obtained from the two’ means obtained from two kinds, namely the sentient and the non-sentient, and the offense by its own nature and the offense by prohibition.” This is two classifications laid one upon the other: one asks whether the object faced is a sentient being or not, and one asks whether the offense committed is evil in itself or is prohibited by the Buddha. First ask: why must these two layers be distinguished? Because the places from which the discipline is raised must be exhausted — if it were raised only toward sentient beings, then digging the ground and cutting green grass would have no discipline to speak of; if only from offenses by nature, then drinking liquor and other prohibited offenses would have no discipline to speak of. The easy error: to take “the two kinds” for two kinds of discipline. It is not the kinds of the discipline; it is the kinds of the places from which the discipline is raised. Where this lands: here the collated editions have besides a reading “two actions,” yet the text immediately following explains it by “the offense by its own nature and the offense by prohibition,” so that reading it as “kinds” is what fastens upon what follows.

〔1.3〕Why individual liberation is obtained from the present alone, while the disciplines of absorption and without outflows extend to all three times. The treatise gives an exceedingly clean reason — “‘obtained from the present’ means obtained from the aggregates, sense fields, and elements of the present, not from those of the past and the future” — and the ground of it is that “this discipline turns with regard to the place where sentient beings are, and the past and the future are not places where sentient beings are.” Individual liberation turns with regard to the present existence of sentient beings, and the past and future are not places where sentient beings are present. Conversely, “if one obtains the discipline of the meditative absorptions or the discipline without outflows, it should be known that these are from the root path of action alone,” and “‘from all times’ means obtained from the aggregates, sense fields, and elements of past, present, and future.” First ask: they are alike disciplines; why is the one confined to the present and the other extended to three times? Because individual liberation is undertaken by a manifest action and raised with regard to an object faced, whereas the discipline that accompanies absorption and the discipline that accompanies the path arise by the force of the ground of mind and do not wait upon an object being present. The easy error: to suppose that “extending to three times” says that the discipline itself has three times. It does not — what is said is that the place from which it is obtained extends to three times. Where this lands: this explains why a householder taking the five items of training must have an object he can face and words he can utter, while one who enters absorption has the discipline of himself without undertaking it.

〔1.4〕The four alternatives are a checklist. The treatise then crosses the foregoing into four alternatives — the first, where only individual liberation is obtained, “from the preparatory effort, the subsequent arising, and the offenses by prohibition of the present”; the second, where only the two disciplines of absorption and the path are obtained, “from the root paths of action of past and future”; the third, where both are obtained, “from the root path of action of the present”; the fourth, where neither is obtained, “from the preparatory effort and the subsequent arising of past and future.” First ask: what use is there in making four alternatives? Making four alternatives is the physical examination of Abhidharma — cross two criteria (present / past and future; root / preparatory and prohibited) once through and see whether there is any gap. The easy error: to take the four alternatives for four kinds of discipline. They are the distribution of one and the same set of disciplines over four places from which it is obtained. Where this lands: when four alternatives are met in reading Abhidharma, first find the two measures being crossed, and the four alternatives clear themselves up.

〔1.5〕The last sentence sets the key of the whole section. The treatise says “as regards principle one should say only ‘guarding against the future,’ and definitely should not say ‘guarding against the past and the present.’” First ask: what is this sentence correcting? It corrects the notion of understanding the discipline as ‘wiping out evil already done.’ The function of the discipline is in the future — evil action already past is not wiped out by the discipline, and evil action now present is not stopped by the discipline; what the discipline guards against is the portion that has not yet come. The easy error: to take the taking on of the discipline for a washing away of what is past. Where this lands: this one sentence gives the keeper of the discipline at once a very practical consolation and a very strict responsibility — the past is not settled by this, and the future is wholly within it.

II. Obtained from All Sentient Beings, While Limbs and Causes Are Said to Be Unsettled

〔2.1〕The four words “no principle of a portion” are the bone of this stanza. The treatise settles it as soon as it opens its mouth — “discipline is certainly obtained from all sentient beings. There is no principle of a portion; limbs and causes are said to be unsettled.” First ask: why must the discipline take all sentient beings for its object universally? Because the entity of the discipline is disposition, and if the disposition makes a selection, the unwholesome disposition has not wholly ceased. The treatise itself states this reason very clearly — “there is no one who obtains discipline without its extending to all sentient beings, since it is only by abiding in a wholesome disposition toward all sentient beings that discipline is obtained; otherwise not, since the unwholesome disposition has not wholly ceased.” The easy error: to suppose that ‘I will refrain from killing only toward certain persons’ also counts as keeping a portion of the discipline. The treatise says that this is not called discipline. Where this lands: this is the first threshold of keeping the discipline — it is not the range of behavior, it is the range of the mind.

〔2.2〕The limbs unsettled: how many items the discipline has depends on which kind you take on. The treatise divides them in two — “‘the limbs unsettled’ means: some obtain it from all, that is, the discipline of a bhikṣu”; “some obtain it from four limbs, that is, the remaining disciplines, because only the root path of action is called a limb of the discipline.” First ask: why have the remaining disciplines only four limbs? Because only the root path of action counts as a “limb of the discipline,” and what the householder and the novice abstain from is the four root ones, killing, stealing, wrong conduct, and false speech. The easy error: to confuse the eight limbs of the eight-limbed observance, or the five items of the five training rules, with the “limbs” spoken of here. The limbs here refer strictly to the root paths of action, and do not include the limbs of non-negligence and the limbs of restraint. Where this lands: before taking on a discipline one should first be clear how many limbs one is taking on; this is no matter of form — it settles from how many paths of action the entity of the discipline is raised.

〔2.3〕The causes unsettled: the three wholesome roots arise together, the three grades of mind do not. The treatise says “‘the causes unsettled’ means that from one point of view it is from all causes, and with regard to another sense it is allowed to be from one only,” and unties it itself — spoken of from non-greed, non-hatred, and non-delusion, “they necessarily arise together”; spoken of from the low, middle, and high grades of mind, “they do not arise together”; and “here it is with regard to the latter three causes that it is spoken of.” First ask: how can one and the same word “cause” have two answers? Because what is pointed at differs: the three wholesome roots are simultaneous, and the three grades of mind cannot be simultaneous. The easy error: to suppose that the treatise is contradicting itself. Where this lands: whenever in reading this treatise one meets “from one point of view … and with regard to another sense …,” it is a reminder that the sense with regard to which one speaks has changed measures.

〔2.4〕The four classes of person: a table crossed out of limbs and causes. The treatise adduces four classes — one who takes the lay follower’s or the novice’s discipline with one of the three grades of mind is “not by all limbs, not by all causes”; one who takes the bhikṣu’s discipline with one of the three grades of mind is “by all limbs, not by all causes”; one who takes the lay follower’s, the novice’s, and the bhikṣu’s discipline severally with the three minds is “by all limbs and by all causes”; one who takes the lay follower’s, the one-day, and the novice’s discipline severally with the three minds is “by all causes, not by all limbs.” First ask: what is this table meant to show? It shows that ‘the completeness of a discipline’ has two independent dimensions — completeness of items and completeness of the mind’s force — and that the two need not keep step. The easy error: to suppose that once the full ordination is taken everything is complete. It is not — if it be taken with a single grade of mind, the cause is still incomplete. Where this lands: this gives the practitioner a very concrete self-examination: is my discipline short in its items, or short in the force of mind?

〔2.5〕The five stipulations: the five most common trapdoors in taking on the discipline. The treatise lists them in the finest detail — “a man must make none of five stipulations if he is to be able to take on the discipline of individual liberation, namely the stipulations of sentient beings, of limbs, of places, of times, and of circumstances” — and explains each: the stipulation of sentient beings is “thinking, I shall abstain from killing and the rest only toward a certain class of sentient beings”; of limbs, “thinking, I shall keep without transgression only some one limb of the discipline”; of places, “thinking, I shall abstain from killing and the rest only while dwelling in a certain class of region”; of times, “thinking, I am able to abstain from killing and the rest only within a stretch of time such as a month”; of circumstances, “thinking, I am able to abstain from killing and the rest only apart from such circumstances as being at war.” First ask: why does a condition attached prevent the discipline from being formed? Because what the entity of the discipline relies upon is a disposition without selection, and once an exception is marked out, the unwholesome disposition has not wholly ceased. The treatise gives such a man a verdict at once generous and perfectly clear — “one who takes it up in this way does not obtain discipline; he obtains only an excellent conduct resembling discipline.” The easy error: to read “resembling excellent conduct” as a disparagement. It is no disparagement; it is a placing: there is what is wholesome, and it is excellent conduct — only it is not discipline. Where this lands: if at the time of taking on the discipline there still lingers in the mind an ‘except in such and such a case,’ that sentence is the stipulation spoken of here, and one had better know it beforehand.

〔2.6〕How discipline is obtained toward objects one cannot reach — the entrance to the first dense debate of this fascicle. The treatise first sets a question: “as for objects beyond one’s power, how is discipline obtained? It is because a dominant disposition of not harming their lives has been raised toward all sentient beings universally that discipline is obtained.” The answer is already given: the discipline hangs not upon capacity but upon disposition. But one house among the Vibhāṣā masters is not satisfied. First ask: where does its dissatisfaction lie? In the fear that the discipline would have increase and decrease. That house says: if the discipline were taken on only upon ‘objects within one’s power,’ and the two classes of sentient being, within and beyond one’s power, change places with each other, then the discipline would increase and decrease of itself, apart from the conditions of obtaining and relinquishing. The author objects on the spot with the instance of grass — “it is not so as you say. Just as with green grass and the like, which formerly was not and afterwards arises, or having arisen withers away, there is neither increase nor decrease as regards the discipline.” That house defends itself, saying that the nature of sentient beings before and after is equal while the nature of grass before and after is not the same; and the author objects again: after a sentient being has reached parinirvāṇa, is that “equal nature” not likewise gone? The easy error: to take this passage for a petty wrangle over terms. Its substance is a very large question — is what the entity of the discipline takes as object ‘the actually existing individual’ or ‘the class of sentient beings’? Where this lands: the author’s leaning is perfectly plain — “the reason given before is the better in principle,” that is, a return to the disposition that takes all sentient beings universally as its object.

〔2.7〕The beings the former buddhas led across have reached nirvāṇa; is not the discipline of the later buddhas thereby less? This objection is raised against the house of total raising. The objector says: the former buddhas and the beings they led across have all reached nirvāṇa, and since the later buddhas can raise no discipline from them, is not their moral discipline less than that of the former buddhas? The house of total raising answers most handsomely — “because the discipline of individual liberation of all buddhas is obtained from all sentient beings. Supposing those sentient beings were still present now, the later buddhas would obtain discipline from them just the same; hence the moral discipline of the later buddhas has no fault of being less than that of the former.” First ask: why does this answer hold? Because what is taken as object is the general mark “all sentient beings,” not a roll of individuals called one by one. The easy error: to read “obtained from all sentient beings” as ‘obtained one by one from every sentient being now existing.’ Where this lands: this one answer preserves two things at once — the universality of the entity of the discipline, and the fact that those who have reached nirvāṇa are indeed no longer present.

〔2.8〕Why the obtaining of non-discipline is on the contrary the wider. The treatise passes over to non-discipline and says that “non-discipline is certainly obtained from all sentient beings and all paths of action; there is no one of non-discipline with only a portion of objects or with limbs incomplete.” First ask: the wholesome discipline must be universal in its object to be formed, and so must the evil discipline — is this symmetrical? The treatise’s answer is symmetrical — the evil discipline likewise permits no portion of objects and no want of limbs. But on the side of causes it differs: “this certainly does not exist; as for from all causes, the minds of low grade and the rest do not arise together.” And the treatise adds a very important detail — that where non-discipline was obtained by a mind of low grade and killing is afterwards done with a mind of high grade, “he accomplishes only the non-discipline of the low grade, and accomplishes besides a manifest action of killing of the high grade and the rest.” The easy error: to suppose that when the mind grows fiercer afterward, the evil discipline rises in grade along with it. It does not — the grade of the entity of the discipline was settled at the moment it was obtained; the fierce mind that arises later forms a separate manifest action. Where this lands: this holds for the wholesome discipline just as well — the grade of mind at the time of taking on the discipline settles the grade of its entity, and later diligence has a merit of its own without altering that entity.

〔2.9〕Who are those of non-discipline: a list of trades and one sentence at the heart of it. The treatise lists them very concretely — “who are here called those of non-discipline? Those who slaughter sheep, slaughter fowl, slaughter swine, catch birds, catch fish, hunt beasts, rob and steal, do execution, keep prisons, bind nāgas, boil dogs, and set nets and snares, and the like” — and says that the word “and the like” further adduces the king’s officers of punishment and those who hear pleas and decide on crimes. First ask: why should even an officer who decides on crimes be counted? The criterion the treatise gives lies not in the trade itself but in “their minds constantly harbor a harming mind.” Ask further: does a man who kills one sheep on one occasion count? The treatise explains by taking the slaughterer of sheep as its sample — “what is called one who slaughters sheep means that for the sake of a livelihood he has set up a term to last as long as his body lasts, and constantly wishes to harm sheep” — and the key lies in the term set to last a lifetime. The easy error: to understand non-discipline as ‘having done bad things.’ It is not an accumulation of acts; it is a continuing state, with a term set to it, exactly opposite to the discipline. Where this lands: this shows just why the evil discipline is hard to relinquish — like the wholesome discipline, it is an entity that has been set up, not a heap of scattered deeds.

〔2.10〕The near kinsman and the sheep: the most famous exchange in this fascicle. The Sautrāntikas raise the objection: one who slaughters sheep has no harming intent toward his own near kinsmen, “and would not be willing to kill them even for the sake of saving his own life; how then can it be said that he obtains non-discipline toward all universally?” The Sarvāstivādins answer: “because if that near kinsman were to become a sheep or the like, toward him too a harming mind could be had.” The Sautrāntikas press again, and press all the way down in one breath: knowing full well that the near kinsman is not now a sheep, and that a noble one certainly has no principle of becoming a sheep; and granting a step, that you shift your position to the future self-body — “if with regard to the future self-body of a sheep or the like non-discipline is obtained upon the present continuum” — then a sheep will in the future likewise have the body of a near kinsman and of a noble one, toward which there is certainly no harming mind, and so “it ought to be said that one may regard only the future self-body and cannot obtain non-discipline in the present.” This “if with regard to the future” is not a fresh round of rescue mounted by the Sarvāstivādins themselves; it is the Sautrāntikas setting up the Sarvāstivādins’ rescue on their behalf and demolishing it at once; Puguang’s outline gathers the whole stretch within the single division of the Sautrāntikas’ renewed objection, and his explanation puts it in the hypothetical form “if it be said … then it follows that …,” without setting up any Sarvāstivādin answer in between; Fabao at the same round marks simply “a further objection.” Two commentaries independently marking the same way — this may be relied upon. Only then do the hands change: the Sarvāstivādins press the point by principle, asking one sentence only — “since there is a harming intent toward the present body of a sheep and the like, why is non-discipline not obtained upon it?”; whereupon the Sautrāntikas reproach in return with ‘matters equal such as these,’ setting the asymmetry back on both sides: “since there is no harming intent toward the present body of a mother and the like, why is non-discipline obtained upon her body as well? In matters equal such as these another principle should be sought.” First ask: is there a conclusion at the end of this passage? There is none. The treatise stops here, leaving only this sentence of the Sautrāntikas, “another principle should be sought,” and hands down no verdict. The easy error: to read “another principle should be sought” as the author confessing that his own reasoning has failed — it is not the author’s own avowal, it is the Sautrāntikas’ words of objection; and the reason the treatise records without adjudicating is the form of this treatise: where reasoning is unsettled, nothing is forced into place. Where this lands: when such a sentence is met in reading Abhidharma, it is exactly the place where one ought most to stop and think, not the place one ought most to skip.

〔2.11〕The mute and the want of a limb: can the evil discipline be raised only in part. The Sautrāntikas object again from ‘matters equal such as these’: a slaughterer of sheep does not steal all his life long, is content with his own wife, and may even be mute and unable to speak and so without the four faults of speech; “how then does he too obtain the non-discipline complete in its limbs?” The Sarvāstivādins answer: “because he has universally damaged the wholesome āśaya. Though mute and not speaking, his bodily manifest action has expressed the sense he wished to say, and so he obtains it complete in its limbs.” The Sautrāntikas object again: if he had first taken on two or three items of training and afterwards taken on only killing, and as to the remaining limbs had not damaged the wholesome disposition, how should he raise complete the seven limbs? Here the two schools each draw together — the Vibhāṣā masters say “there can certainly be no man with a limb wanting or with only a part remaining who may be called one abiding in non-discipline”; the Sautrāntika masters say “according to the term he has set, whether the limbs be complete or incomplete, whether the whole or a part, in every case non-discipline is obtained,” and add “it is the same with discipline as well, the eight-limbed observance alone excepted.” First ask: where does the real divergence of the two schools lie? In whether the entity of the evil discipline is ‘raised wholly at one raising’ or ‘raised according to the term set.’ The easy error: to suppose that this is a question only about the evil discipline. That sentence of the Sautrāntikas, “it is the same with discipline as well,” has already carried the battlefield over onto the wholesome discipline. Where this lands: here two accounts are recorded together and the treatise does not judge which prevails; what the reader is to learn is to see clearly where the point at issue lies, not to hurry to take a side.

III. The Two Causes for Obtaining Non-Discipline and the Three Causes for Obtaining the Middling Nonmanifest

〔3.1〕The two entrances to the evil discipline: being born into such a family, and setting up a term. The treatise says “the non-disciplines are obtained by two causes” — the first, being born into a family of non-discipline, “by first performing the preparatory effort of killing and the rest”; the second, though born into another family, “by first setting up a term and undertaking the business of killing and the rest,” his mind thinking “by this I shall seek goods and support my own life; and at that very moment he raises the evil discipline.” First ask: why does the first kind need no vow? Because for one born into such a family this trade is already the family business, and setting hand to it the first time is itself a taking up of the succession; the second kind requires an express term to be set. The easy error: to suppose that an evil vow must be uttered before an evil discipline is formed. The first kind is precisely the one where no vow is needed. Where this lands: this is exactly symmetrical with the obtaining of the wholesome discipline — that too has its two roads, by undertaking (a vow) and by absorption (naturally).

〔3.2〕The middling nonmanifest: that great tract which is neither discipline nor non-discipline. The treatise gives three causes. The first, “by the field” — “first, by the field, that is, toward such fields of merit as these one gives a park or grove and the like, and that wholesome nonmanifest arises at the first giving” — which it ties to “the meritorious deeds that have a support” spoken of in the sūtra. The second, “by undertaking” — “second, by undertaking, that is, one sets up a vow of one’s own: if I have not yet made obeisance to the Buddha I will not eat first, and the rest” — or makes a vow with a term to it, such as giving food constantly on fast days, monthly, half-monthly, and yearly. The third, “by weighty performance” — “third, by weighty performance, that is, raising an attention weighty in this way one performs the wholesome or performs the unwholesome.” First ask: what have these three causes in common? None of them requires a formal rite for taking on the discipline, and yet each can raise a continuing nonmanifest. The easy error: to suppose that without taking on the discipline there is no entity of discipline to speak of. What these three causes raise is precisely a nonmanifest that does not wait upon taking on a discipline. Where this lands: the small vows one sets up in daily life (one prostration a day, one gift a month) have a real substance within the system of this treatise — they raise a nonmanifest, and the seventh section below will tell you that they are relinquished by six conditions.

IV. Relinquishing the Discipline of Individual Liberation: Four Conditions, Five Conditions, and the One Principle behind the Five

〔4.1〕The two words “taming” must first be made good. The treatise begins not by explaining relinquishing but by glossing the name — “what is called taming means to show the discipline, since by this it can make the faculties tamed.” First ask: why gloss this word before speaking of relinquishing? Because what is relinquished must first be established. The discipline is called taming with regard to its function, not with regard to its form. The easy error: to understand keeping the discipline as observing rules. The treatise says it is making the faculties tamed — what is counteracted is the racing of the six faculties. Where this lands: to judge whether a practice of the discipline has landed, what one looks at is not whether there is a record of transgression but whether the faculties have been tamed.

〔4.2〕The disciplines of the seven classes are relinquished by four conditions, the one-day discipline by one more. The treatise lists the four conditions — “first, by disposition, raising a manifest action toward a person who can understand and giving up the training”; “second, by casting off the commonality of sentient beings”; “third, by the two sexual characteristics arising together”; “fourth, by the wholesome roots it rests upon being cut off” — and says “the one-day discipline is relinquished by the four conditions above and by the passing of a night; hence it is said in sum that the discipline of individual liberation is relinquished by five conditions.” First ask: why must the giving up be declared to “a person who can understand”? Because the substance of the first condition is a manifest action contradicting what was undertaken, and a manifest action must have an object able to take it in. The easy error: to suppose that thinking silently ‘I no longer hold it’ counts as relinquishing the discipline. The treatise says a manifest action must be raised toward one who can understand. Where this lands: this stipulation also protects the one who has taken on the discipline — a moment’s vexation will not make the discipline lapse of itself.

〔4.3〕The five conditions are not five stipulations; they are five ways of breaking down. This is the most important sentence in the section. The treatise asks and answers itself — “why is the relinquishing of the discipline by these five conditions? Because a manifest action has arisen that contradicts what was undertaken, because the support is cast off, because the support is altered, because what it rests upon is cut off, because the term of time is passed.” First ask: what do these five sentences say? They say the ways in which the five things the discipline rests upon severally break down: the manifest action contradicting the undertaking (the reverse of the undertaking), the body that is its support cast off (the end of life), the body that is its support altered (two sexual characteristics), the wholesome roots it rested upon cut off, the term run out. The easy error: to take the five conditions for a list to be memorized. Where this lands: grasp these five ways of breaking down, and when other disciplines are met (the one night of the one-day discipline, the six conditions of the middling nonmanifest) they can be worked out for oneself — they are no more than the same set of breakings-down rearranged over different disciplines.

〔4.4〕Whether a grave transgression relinquishes the discipline: three accounts recorded together, the treatise passing no verdict. The treatise writes the three accounts together in four lines of stanza. The first account is “some other school says: among the four gravest sins that can draw one down to an evil destiny, if any one be transgressed, the disciplines of the novice and the bhikṣu are relinquished” — the treatise itself gives only “some other school” without naming its tenet, while Puguang ties it word for word: “some other Sautrāntika master says: a grave transgression relinquishes the discipline.” The second account is “yet another school says: by the extinction of the true dharma too one may be made to relinquish the discipline of individual liberation,” the ground being that at the extinction of the dharma “all the items of training, the establishing of boundaries, and the formal acts cease”; and here too Puguang ties the tenet word for word: “some other Dharmaguptaka school says, which here means the school of the dharma-secret” (the sentence at the end of this fascicle about the extinction of the dharma being marked by Puguang precisely as “this refutes the school of the dharma-secret,” which fastens together with the attribution here). The third is the account of the Vibhāṣā masters of the land of Kaśmīra — “the Vibhāṣā masters of the land of Kaśmīra say: at the time of transgressing a root sin, the discipline of one gone forth is not relinquished” — with two grounds, “it is not that transgressing on one side requires all the disciplines to be wholly relinquished” and “it is not that transgressing the remaining sins involves the cutting off of moral discipline.” First ask: on which side does the author stand among the three accounts? Both stanza and prose write them together and hand down no verdict. The easy error: to take the account of the masters of Kaśmīra for the settled position of this treatise. It is one of the three accounts. Where this lands: the form of this treatise is that where divergent accounts are met and the sūtras have no express text, both parties are recorded; the reader had better first make clear the grounds of each of the three accounts, and the choosing among them belongs to someone else.

〔4.5〕The simile of the debt: one man may have two names at the same time. The masters of Kaśmīra set up a simile — “yet he has two names, namely keeper and transgressor of the discipline; as a man of wealth who owes another a debt is called at once a rich man and a debtor” — and add the way out, “if he confesses and clears away what he has transgressed, he is called complete in moral discipline and not called a transgressor, as one who has repaid a debt is called simply a rich man.” First ask: what is this simile meant to rescue? The coexistence of these two things: that the entity of the discipline is not lost, and that the fault is indeed there. The easy error: to read it as ‘it does not matter if one transgresses.’ The latter half of the simile says expressly that one must confess and clear away before returning to being merely a rich man. Where this lands: on the position of this line of the masters of Kaśmīra, this is a division of the greatest practical use for practice — to break the discipline is not to be without discipline; only where there is a discipline to rely upon is there a repentance that can be made. Since the preceding section has already said expressly that the three accounts are recorded together and the treatise passes no verdict, here only the road opened by the doctrine of this one line is set out, and no verdict is handed down on the treatise’s behalf.

〔4.6〕The Sautrāntikas’ objection: the World-Honored One said expressly that one who transgresses the four grave sins is not called a bhikṣu. The Sautrāntika masters object — “if that be so, why did the Bhagavat say that one who has transgressed the four grave sins is not called a bhikṣu” — and adduce the World-Honored One’s words, “he has broken the entity of a bhikṣu and destroyed the nature of an ascetic, and, ruined and fallen, the name of defeat is set up for him.” The Sarvāstivādins answer in a sentence: “it was said with a hidden intent, with regard to the bhikṣu in the ultimate sense.” First ask: wherein lies the weight of this answer? In that it adjudges the World-Honored One’s words to be a saying of hidden intent, that is, not of definitive meaning. The easy error: to suppose that this is merely a technical handling of terms. The Sautrāntikas in their next sentence seize upon just how serious it is. Where this lands: to adjudge a sentence of sūtra to be of hidden intent is a matter of the gravest responsibility — this is exactly why the dispute in the next passage is so fierce.

〔4.7〕The two words “violent and overbearing,” and the head-on collision of the two schools. The Sautrāntikas hand down their verdict outright: “this saying is violent and overbearing.” The Sarvāstivādins ask in return, “wherein is it violent and overbearing?” The Sautrāntikas answer with the utmost weight — “in that the World-Honored One’s saying of definitive meaning is explained by another sense so as to be made non-definitive, and in that it provides those of many afflictions with an occasion for transgressing grave sins.” First ask: how many charges do the Sautrāntikas bring? Two: making the definitive non-definitive, and opening a convenient door to grave transgression for those heavy with afflictions. The Sarvāstivādins press further, “how do you know that this saying is of definitive meaning?”; and the Sautrāntikas adduce the Vinaya’s own explanation as proof — “because the Vinaya itself explains that there are four bhikṣus,” namely “first the bhikṣu in name and notion, second the self-styled bhikṣu, third the mendicant bhikṣu, fourth the bhikṣu who has broken the afflictions” — while the one the sūtra calls not a bhikṣu is “the bhikṣu who has not received full ordination by a formal act of one motion and three announcements.” The easy error: to read this passage as a clash of tempers. Its substance is the authority to interpret the sūtras: when may one say that a sentence of sūtra is of hidden intent? Where this lands: this treatise records both parties without judging; what a later reader is to learn is the ground of each — the one relies on principle (the discipline ought not to be wholly relinquished for a single transgression), the other on the text of the Vinaya (the Vinaya itself explains four bhikṣus).

〔4.8〕The simile of the palmyra tree, and what this simile really shows. The Sautrāntikas cite the Sarvāstivādins’ position and refute it, saying that that saying of theirs “is in fact to call the Great Master to account,” because the Great Master himself set up a simile — “the Great Master set up this simile here: as a palmyra tree, if its head be cut off, can certainly not grow tall and wide again, so it is with bhikṣus and the rest who transgress a grave sin.” The Sarvāstivādins ask, “what principle did the Great Master mean this simile to show?” The Sautrāntikas answer: the intent is to show that to transgress on one side, in a root grave sin, makes all the rest of what was undertaken unable to grow tall and wide, because “he violates and oversteps the root practice of a bhikṣu, and is joined with an exceedingly fierce absence of conscience and shame”; the root of practice being cut off, all the disciplines ought in principle to be wholly relinquished. First ask: why do the two schools read different senses out of one and the same simile? The Sarvāstivādins read “unable to grow” as not increasing; the Sautrāntikas read it as the root being cut. The easy error: to think similes ornamental. This passage is precisely where in the whole fascicle a simile carries the heaviest weight — the point at issue falls upon how the simile is read. Where this lands: in reading the similes of sūtra and treatise, first ask ‘which portion of the simile is what is taken,’ and this one question saves more than half the misunderstandings.

〔4.9〕Tares in the rice, rotten beams, chaff among the seed: the sūtra of expulsion, the answer of the four ascetics, and the Sautrāntikas’ reconciling of the sūtra. The Sautrāntikas cite a further sūtra as proof: one who has gravely transgressed is not permitted to eat the food of the assembly “even a single morsel,” nor to “tread within the monastery so much as a heel’s breadth of ground,” and they adduce the Great Master’s words — “one should swiftly pull out the tares and weeds within the rice, should swiftly select and discard the rotten ridgepoles and beams, should swiftly winnow the chaff and blighted grain among the seed; even so should one swiftly drive out and expel from the assembly those who, being in truth no bhikṣus, are yet styled bhikṣus.” The Sautrāntikas then ask, “what is the mark of the entity of a bhikṣu?” The Sarvāstivādins answer: whatever the mark may be, the entity must exist, and they adduce the World-Honored One’s words as their ground — “for the World-Honored One has said: know, Cunda, that there are four ascetics and no fifth” — the four being of the excellent path, showing the path, living by the path, and defiling the path. The Sarvāstivādins’ words stop here. What follows is not a supplement of theirs but the Sautrāntikas turning about and reconciling this sūtra — “though the sūtra says so, yet he has merely the look of an ascetic remaining, and so is called an ascetic” — with six similes adduced in a row: “as with wood that has been burnt, a counterfeit parrot, a dried-up pool, a spoiled seed, the wheel of a whirling firebrand, and a dead man.” First ask: what does each party read out of one and the same passage of sūtra? The Sarvāstivādins read out that ‘the sūtra sets up four only and not a fifth, from which it is plain that one who has gravely transgressed still has the entity of the discipline within him’; the Sautrāntikas read out that ‘the reason the fourth kind is still called an ascetic is only that a look of an ascetic remains, and not that he has the entity of the discipline’ — and the six similes are set up for just this, saying that the name remains and the reality is gone. The easy error: to take the six similes for the Sarvāstivādins’ words, and so to read them as the Sarvāstivādins granting that in one who has gravely transgressed both name and entity of discipline remain. Precisely the contrary — the six similes are the Sautrāntikas’ words denying the entity of the discipline, following upon their earlier position that a grave transgression relinquishes the discipline. Where this lands: one passage of sūtra and each of two schools makes its own reading of it; this is exactly why this fascicle records both parties without judging, and what the reader is to learn is to see clearly what each relies upon, not to hurry to declare a winner.

〔4.10〕The bhikṣu still in training and the “single thought of concealment”: an exceedingly fine dividing line. Here the hands change once more. The Sarvāstivādins object: if a grave transgression makes one no bhikṣu, then the class of “bhikṣu still in training” set up in the Vinaya has nowhere to stand — “if one who has gravely transgressed is not a bhikṣu, there ought to be no bhikṣu still in training.” The Sautrāntikas answer: the case cannot be spoken of alike — “it is not said that all who gravely transgress commit a sin of defeat; only of one who has committed a sin of defeat is it definitely said that he is not a bhikṣu” — and the dividing line lies in “because he has not had a single thought of concealment.” It should be noted that this fine division comes from the mouth of the Sautrāntikas and is no supplement of the Sarvāstivādins; the Sautrāntikas maintain that a grave transgression relinquishes the discipline, and yet at the same time grant that one who transgresses without concealing is superior in his continuum and commits no defeat — and this is precisely where they part ‘grave transgression’ and ‘defeat’ into two matters. First ask: wherein do defeat and grave transgression differ? In concealment. One who transgresses without concealing is superior in his continuum and may enter the class of those still in training. The easy error: to suppose that the weight of a sin lies wholly in the deed. Here it is said expressly to hang upon a single thought of concealment or non-concealment. Where this lands: this is the sentence in the whole fascicle most directly addressed to the practitioner — whether that one thought after the transgression conceals or not settles the whole road afterward.

〔4.11〕The simile of the scorched seed, and a residual point about the extinction of the dharma. Still the two schools stand opposed. The Sarvāstivādins object: since there is no discipline, “why is he not made to go forth and take the discipline afresh?” The Sautrāntikas answer, “because his continuum has already been enfolded by an exceedingly grave absence of conscience and shame, and he has no strength to raise the discipline of one gone forth, like a scorched seed,” and say expressly that this is not because one sees that he still has a discipline — “it is not that, seeing that he has the bhikṣu’s discipline, he is therefore not made to go forth and take the discipline afresh.” That last sentence, “on this point there is no doctrine left; why labor so bitterly to rescue him,” gathers it up most trenchantly, but the momentum of the words must be seen for what it is: it is no neutral close, it is a sentence at the end of the Sautrāntikas’ answer turning the Sarvāstivādins’ own words back upon them — since you insist on preserving his entity of discipline, then you ought to go and make obeisance to bhikṣus of this kind. And a further residual point about the extinction of the dharma is added — “at the time when the true dharma is extinguished, though there are none of the establishings of boundaries, the formal acts, and the Vinaya, and those who have not obtained the discipline have no principle by which to obtain it anew, yet those who obtained it beforehand have no principle by which to relinquish it.” First ask: are the simile of the scorched seed and the simile of the palmyra tree one and the same thing? They are not. The palmyra tree simile disputes whether a discipline already obtained still exists; the scorched seed simile speaks of whether it can be raised again in the future. The easy error: to read the two similes together, whereupon the treatise seems to contradict itself. Where this lands: that passage on the extinction of the dharma yields a clean principle — the institution may be cut off, and an entity already obtained is not lost through the cutting off of the institution.

V. Relinquishing the Wholesome Dharmas Produced in Absorption and the Wholesome Dharmas without Outflows

〔5.1〕The discipline that accompanies absorption is relinquished by two conditions, and the word “and the like” points to something else. The treatise says “the wholesome dharmas affiliated to the levels of the meditative absorptions are relinquished by two conditions,” first by changing levels (born from a lower level up, or passing away from a higher and born below), second by falling back (falling back from a superior merit of absorption already acquired). There is besides in the stanza the word “and the like,” which the treatise itself explains as showing that “at the casting off of the commonality of sentient beings a small portion of superior wholesome roots is likewise relinquished.” First ask: why does changing levels relinquish it? Because the discipline that accompanies absorption is affiliated to a level, and when the level changes the dharmas affiliated to it naturally do not follow. The easy error: to imagine that the discipline accompanying absorption, once cultivated and obtained, goes with one forever. Where this lands: this shows just why the discipline accompanying absorption cannot take the place of the discipline of individual liberation — the one is affiliated to the continuum of a body, the other to a level.

〔5.2〕A small difference in the formless realm, not to be let slip. The treatise adds a sentence: the wholesome dharmas of the form realm are relinquished by changing levels and by falling back, “and so it is with the formless realm as well, save only that there is no discipline there, and in this it differs from the form realm.” First ask: why has the formless realm no discipline? Because the discipline is form, and in the formless realm there is no form. The easy error: to suppose that the higher the realm the more excellent the discipline. It is exactly the formless realm that has no discipline accompanying absorption to speak of. Where this lands: this sentence reminds the reader that the position that the entity of the discipline is a form-dharma is carried through consistently in this treatise.

〔5.3〕The discipline that accompanies the path is relinquished by three conditions, each of substance. The treatise says “the wholesome dharmas without outflows are relinquished by three conditions” — first by obtaining a fruit (“at the time of obtaining a fruit one relinquishes the path of approach and the path of the fruit that went before”), second by refining the faculties (“at the stage of refining the faculties one relinquishes the path of the dull through obtaining the path of the sharp”), third by falling back (“at the time of falling back one loses the path of the fruit and the path superior to the fruit”). First ask: obtaining a fruit is plainly an advance; why is it counted as relinquishing? Because what is relinquished is the earlier path of approach and path of the fruit; this is a relinquishing that ‘exchanges the inferior for the superior,’ not a losing. The easy error: to see the word “relinquish” and think of falling away. Where this lands: “relinquishing” in this treatise is a neutral technical term — wherever the dharma one rests upon is replaced, cut off, or broken down, it is called relinquishing; in reading, first ask which of these it is.

VI. The Three Conditions for Relinquishing Evil Discipline

〔6.1〕The three conditions: death, obtaining the discipline, the arising of the two sexual characteristics. The treatise says “the non-disciplines are relinquished by three conditions” — first by death, “because the support is cast off”; second by obtaining the discipline, “that is, if one takes on the discipline of individual liberation, or through acquiring the discipline of the meditative absorptions, the evil discipline is thereupon relinquished,” the ground being “since the natures of the wholesome and the evil discipline contradict each other, and the wholesome discipline is the stronger in force among them”; third by the two sexual characteristics arising together, “because at that time the support is altered.” First ask: why can the wholesome discipline drive out the evil, and not the evil the wholesome? The treatise says expressly that the wholesome discipline is the stronger in force. The easy error: to suppose that the wholesome and evil disciplines are on a par. They contradict each other in nature and are unequal in force. Where this lands: this is a most powerful practical warrant given by this treatise — the taking on of the discipline is itself the way to cut off the evil discipline, and there is no need to clear away one’s evil actions first before coming to take it on.

〔6.2〕Throwing away knife and net is not relinquishing the evil discipline. The treatise adds a passage on purpose — “one who abides in evil discipline, though he may at times give rise to the volition of not doing and lay aside knife and net, yet if he does not take on the wholesome disciplines, those non-disciplines can in no way be cast off” — and sets up the simile, “as when, though one avoids the causes and conditions of falling ill, yet without taking good medicine the illness is in the end hard to cure.” First ask: why is not doing not enough? Because the evil discipline is an entity that has been set up; it does not break down of itself through the stopping of behavior, and must be dispossessed by an entity that contradicts it. The easy error: to suppose that changing one’s trade is the same as getting out. Where this lands: this is the item in the whole fascicle that comes down most squarely upon the gate of practice — to leave the evil discipline, one must take on the wholesome discipline; to avoid the circumstances is only to stop adding weight, not to be released.

〔6.3〕After the night has passed: the third place in this fascicle where both accounts are recorded without adjudication. The treatise sets the question, “when a man who abides in non-discipline has taken the one-day discipline, and at the passing of the night relinquishes that discipline, does he obtain non-discipline, or is he called a middling man?” The former master says he obtains non-discipline again, on the ground that “that unwholesome disposition has not been relinquished forever, as when iron heated red is taken off the fire, the red vanishes and the dark comes forth”; the latter master says “if he does not do the deed afresh, there is no condition to make him obtain non-discipline, since non-discipline is obtained in dependence upon a manifest action.” First ask: where does the divergence of the two accounts lie? In whether obtaining the evil discipline anew requires a new manifest action. The easy error: to hurry to decide which account is right. The treatise here hands down no verdict. Where this lands: this question is still direct for a modern reader — when a period of temporary discipline has run out and a man returns to his former life, does he ‘revert of himself to his former state,’ or ‘have to make something afresh to get back’? Each account has its reason.

VII. The Six Conditions for Relinquishing the Middling Nonmanifest

〔7.1〕The six conditions are a very complete table of breakings-down. The stanza has only ten characters — “the middling relinquished by undertaking, momentum, performance, thing, life, and roots cut off” — five characters to a condition, the last word “cut off” gathering in the cutting off of the roots as well; the prose commentary spreads it out most neatly. The treatise lists “the middling nonmanifest is relinquished by six conditions” — “first, relinquished by the breaking down of the mind of undertaking” (saying in the mind, “from this day on I cast off what I undertook before”), “second, relinquished by the breaking down of the momentum,” “third, relinquished by the breaking down of the performance” (“as with the matter undertaken, one afterwards does it no more”), “fourth, relinquished by the breaking down of the thing,” “fifth, relinquished by the breaking down of the life span” (“because the support has undergone a change”), “sixth, relinquished by the breaking down of the wholesome roots” (“at the time when the preparatory effort is raised and the wholesome roots are cut off”). First ask: why are the conditions of the middling nonmanifest more numerous than those of individual liberation? Because it is not established by a formal act, and the things it rests upon are more mixed — mind, momentum, performance, thing, life, root, every one of them breakable. The easy error: to see the six conditions as trivia. They are in fact an extended application of the five ways of breaking down in the fourth section. Where this lands: before setting up a small vow, look first among these six for the one likeliest to break down first, and that is where the vow most needs guarding.

〔7.2〕The arrow and the potter’s wheel: the moment when momentum runs out. For the second condition the treatise sets up a simile of its own — the nonmanifest drawn forth by the force of pure faith or of the afflictions has “a limit to both, and when the momentum of that limit is cut off the nonmanifest is thereupon relinquished, as with an arrow that has been shot and a potter’s wheel, which come to a stop when the thrust of the bowstring and the rest is spent.” First ask: what is this simile meant to correct? The imagination that ‘a fierce mind at one moment can be effective forever.’ The easy error: to suppose that a mind raised in a moment of being moved will stay there. The treatise says it is like an arrow: it will come to the ground. Where this lands: this is why the treatise sets up “by undertaking” as a separate cause — to turn a momentary momentum into a vow with a term to it, so that when the momentum is spent there is still a mind of undertaking to rely on.

〔7.3〕A thing too can break down the entity of the discipline, and this item is the easiest to skip. The treatise asks itself, “what is a thing?” and answers itself, “the monastery, bedding, caitya, and park or grove given away, and the nets and snares and the like set up.” First ask: if the thing is destroyed, is my merit then gone? What is spoken of here is not the presence or absence of merit but the nonmanifest that kept arising in dependence upon that thing, which stops with the thing. The easy error: to read it as ‘the fruit of retribution of the gift disappears.’ It does not — the action of giving is already accomplished, and only that portion of the nonmanifest that turned with the thing stops. Where this lands: this item applies symmetrically on the evil side as well — nets and snares being destroyed, the evil nonmanifest that arose in dependence upon them likewise stops.

VIII. Relinquishing the Wholesome Not-Form of the Desire Realm and the Defiled Not-Form of the Three Realms

〔8.1〕The relinquishing of wholesome dharmas takes two conditions, the relinquishing of defiled dharmas only one. The treatise says “all the wholesome dharmas of the desire realm that are not form are relinquished by two conditions: first, cutting off the wholesome roots; second, being born into a higher realm”; while “all the defiled dharmas of the three realms that are not form are relinquished by one condition alone, namely by the arising of the path that counteracts them.” First ask: why do wholesome dharmas take two conditions and defiled dharmas only one? Because the relinquishing of wholesome dharmas has two roads — being uprooted (the wholesome roots cut off) and being passed beyond (birth in a higher realm); the relinquishing of defiled dharmas has one road only — being counteracted. The easy error: to suppose that defiled dharmas are the easier to relinquish. Exactly the contrary: there is one road only, and that road is the noble path. Where this lands: this section states the matter of ‘cutting off the afflictions’ with the utmost economy — apart from the counteracting path there is no second way.

〔8.2〕The four words “no other means” are to be remembered. The treatise says “if the path that can cut off this category has arisen, one relinquishes all the afflictions within this category together with their attendants; no other means will do.” First ask: what is meant by “this category”? The afflictions are cut off by categories, and only when the path that can cut off this category arises is this category relinquished. The easy error: to suppose that cultivating any wholesome dharma whatever can diminish the entity of an affliction. To diminish its actual occurrence is one thing; to relinquish its entity is another. Where this lands: this sentence of the fascicle is best read together with the earlier ‘the wholesome discipline can dispossess the evil discipline’ — the wholesome discipline can dispossess the entity of the evil discipline, but wholesome dharmas cannot dispossess the entity of an affliction; the entity of an affliction can be cut off by the counteracting path alone.

IX. In Which Sentient Beings Discipline and Non-Discipline Are Found

〔9.1〕Three lines drawn first: destiny, continent, body. The treatise says “non-discipline is found only in the human destiny, and the northern continent being excepted, it is found in the three quarters alone,” and “within the three continents there must further be excepted the ṣaṇḍha, the paṇḍaka, and those who have the two sexual characteristics”; while discipline likewise excepts the same classes among men, “and is found among the gods as well.” First ask: why draw three lines? Because the support of the discipline has three layers of condition — the destiny (there must be undertaking and conscience and shame), the continent (there must be a dharma of undertaking), and the body (there must be a support that has the capacity). The easy error: to read “the northern continent excepted” as meaning that the men of the northern continent are bad. The treatise gives its own reason later, and it has nothing to do with good and evil. Where this lands: whenever an ‘excepting so-and-so’ is met in this treatise, first find the reason the treatise itself gives, and do not fill it in for oneself.

〔9.2〕Why the ṣaṇḍha and the rest have no discipline: two proofs from sūtra and Vinaya and three reasons. The treatise first adduces the proofs — “and by what is it known that the continuum of the ṣaṇḍha and the rest is not a support for discipline? Because sūtra and Vinaya have express proof” — the sūtra passage where the Buddha tells Mahānāman taking “the male faculty complete” as the mark of a layman of the male sort, and the Vinaya where it says “you should put away and reject persons of this sort of form.” Then it adduces three reasons — “because the afflictions raised by the two supports are both in full increase within one continuum,” “because they have no capacity for correct discernment,” “because they have no exceedingly weighty mind of conscience and shame.” First ask: what do these three point to in common? To the capacity of the support that is the body, not to a moral appraisal. The easy error: to read this passage as a disparagement of a class of persons. What the treatise sets up is the condition of the body upon which the entity of the discipline rests. Where this lands: this also explains why they likewise have no evil discipline — the treatise goes on to say “because their minds are not settled in evil either,” and adds a general rule, “moreover, wherever there is wholesome discipline, there evil discipline is also found, because these two are established as the reverse of one another.”

〔9.3〕The northern continent and the evil destinies: two different lacks. The treatise says “the men of Uttarakuru have no undertaking and no absorption, nor a superior āśaya for doing evil, and hence have neither wholesome nor evil discipline”; and again, “fierce conscience and shame are absent in the evil destinies, and hence discipline and non-discipline are alike absent there.” First ask: is what the northern continent lacks the same thing that the evil destinies lack? It is not — the northern continent lacks “undertaking” and ‘the superior disposition for doing evil,’ while the evil destinies lack fierce conscience and shame. The easy error: to lump the two together as ‘heavy in action.’ Where this lands: this section together with the passage on the ṣaṇḍha makes up a ‘table of the conditions of the body that supports the discipline’ — there must be a dharma of undertaking, conscience and shame, capacity, and a settled mind.

〔9.4〕The simile of the field of salt and alkali: it grows no good sprouts, and no foul weeds either. The treatise sets up the simile, “moreover the ṣaṇḍha and the rest are like a field of salt and alkali, and hence cannot grow wholesome discipline or evil discipline,” and explains it itself, “it is plainly seen in the world that any field of salt and alkali can grow neither good sprouts nor foul weeds.” First ask: on which word does the weight of this simile fall? On ‘nor foul weeds either’ — the two-way character of the simile is the very heart of it. The easy error: to take only the half ‘it grows no good sprouts’ and read it as disparagement. Where this lands: whenever a simile is read, first see whether it is a one-way or a two-way simile; this simile in the treatise is plainly two-way.

〔9.5〕Egg-born nāgas taking the eight-limbed observance: the solution to an objection from a sūtra. The treatise sets the objection, “if that be so, why does the sūtra say that there are egg-born nāgas who on the eighth day of each half-month and the rest come out from the palace to the world of men to ask for the eight-limbed one-day fast discipline,” and answers, “what they obtain is excellent conduct, it is not the obtaining of discipline.” First ask: since they have taken it, why does it not count as obtaining the discipline? Because the discipline has its conditions of a support, and what they obtain is excellent conduct. The easy error: to suppose that this says the nāgas took it in vain. It does not — excellent conduct is a wholesome thing really obtained. Where this lands: this is one and the same establishing as the “excellent conduct resembling discipline” obtained under the “five stipulations” of the second section: there is real good and yet it is not discipline; the treatise applies the same measure in these two places.

〔9.6〕The distribution of the three disciplines through the three realms. The treatise concludes, “hence discipline is found only among men and gods, and only men have all three disciplines complete, namely individual liberation, the meditative absorptions, and that without outflows”; and it says separately that “those born among the gods of the desire realm and in the form realm may all have the discipline of the meditative absorptions, while for those born in the formless realm it is certainly absent,” whereas the discipline without outflows “is found even in the formless realm,” only that “those born in the formless realm merely possess it, since, there being no form, it certainly cannot be made present.” First ask: what is the difference between “possessing” and “being made present”? Possessing is having obtained it; being made present is having it in act. The easy error: to read “the formless realm has the discipline without outflows” as meaning that the formless realm has a discipline that can be practiced. The treatise says expressly that it certainly cannot be made present. Where this lands: this pairing of “possessing” and “being made present” has to be used everywhere in Abhidharma, and this sentence of the fascicle is one of the cleanest samples of it.

X. The Three Actions, Wholesome, Unwholesome, and Indeterminate

〔10.1〕The two words “secure” are the criterion. The treatise says “the action that is secure is named wholesome, because it can obtain a lovely maturation and nirvāṇa, relieving the sufferings of beings in the two divisions of time, the temporary and the everlasting”; it says “the action that is not secure is named unwholesome, because it draws on an unlovely maturation and is contrary in nature to what was called secure”; it says “the action that belongs to neither of the two is given the name indeterminate, because it cannot be determined as wholesome or unwholesome.” First ask: why is the criterion of the wholesome fixed at “secure” rather than at “good”? Because security is spoken of with regard to the result — it can obtain a lovely maturation (temporary) and nirvāṇa (everlasting). This pairing of “the two divisions of time, the temporary and the everlasting” is one of the most essential establishings in the treatise: the suffering relieved by wholesome action has two layers of effect. The easy error: to understand the wholesome merely as what draws on a pleasant result. If it were only that, nirvāṇa would have nowhere to stand. Where this lands: to check whether a thing is wholesome, the question the treatise gives is ‘does it relieve suffering, and is the relief temporary or everlasting?’

〔10.2〕Why the indeterminate is not a third kind of wholesome. The treatise says that the indeterminate is that portion which “cannot be determined as wholesome or unwholesome.” First ask: is ‘cannot be determined’ a not knowing, or a genuine belonging to neither side? It is the latter — it is affiliated to neither the secure nor the insecure nature. The easy error: to take the indeterminate for a neutral good thing. It has not even the strength to draw on a maturation. Where this lands: this division reminds the practitioner that a great deal of daily behavior in fact falls into the indeterminate, accumulating neither good nor evil — and this is precisely why one must ‘raise a weighty attention’ if a nonmanifest is to be raised.

XI. Meritorious, Unmeritorious, Immovable

〔11.1〕The definitions of the three actions are of the utmost brevity, and the reason lies in the second half of each sentence. The treatise says “the wholesome action of the desire realm is said to be named meritorious, because it draws on a lovely result and benefits sentient beings,” “the unwholesome actions are said to be named unmeritorious, because they draw on an unlovely result and harm sentient beings,” “the wholesome action of the two higher realms is said to be named immovable.” First ask: why is the wholesome of the higher realms not called meritorious? Because the pair meritorious and unmeritorious is set up with regard to benefiting and harming sentient beings, while the name immovable is set up with regard to action and result not shifting — the three do not share one measure. The easy error: to suppose that the three actions are three cells under one and the same standard. Where this lands: when a set of dharma-numbers is met standing side by side, first make sure whether they were measured with one and the same measure; here the treatise offers exactly a counter-instance.

〔11.2〕How the sūtras of “immovable” and “having movement” are reconciled. The treatise sets itself the objection from a sūtra — the World-Honored One said that the three lower absorptions are all named having movement. Answer: “since within the three lower absorptions there are applied and sustained thought and the rest, the calamities are not yet stilled, and hence the name moving is set up,” whereas “the immovable of which the Sūtra of the Immovable speaks is said with regard to being able to draw on an immovable maturation.” First ask: why has one and the same word “movement” two explanations? Because what each is spoken with regard to differs: the one with regard to the calamities within the absorption, the other with regard to the place of action and result. Puguang here further adduces the words of the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle as a help — “the noble ones say: within these there is the movement of applied thought, sustained thought, joy, and the feeling of pleasure. By the applied and sustained thought of the lower first absorption there is movement, by the feeling of joy of the lower second there is movement, by the feeling of pleasure of the lower third there is movement” — and puts forward two explanations of his own, one saying “because there are applied thought and the rest, and the calamities are not yet stilled, the name moving is set up,” and one saying “a further explanation: taking in joy, pleasure, and the in-breath and out-breath as well, each as is fitting is called movement.” The easy error: to suppose that the actions of the form and formless realms really have movement. Where this lands: when the same word is met with different explanations in sūtra and treatise, first ask ‘with regard to what is “movement” spoken of in this place?’

〔11.3〕Actions of the desire realm may be turned aside by other conditions, those of the higher realms may not. The treatise sets a further objection, “how can an absorption that has movement draw on an immovable maturation,” and answers, “although within such an absorption there is the movement of calamity, yet its action as regards its result has not the shifting that the desire realm has, and hence the name immovable is set up,” adducing an actual instance from the desire realm — an action that properly ought to ripen among the gods, “being drawn aside by the force of other causes and conditions, ripens among men instead.” Conversely, “an action of the form and formless realms belonging to some other level and place has no way of being turned into being experienced at another level and place; the place of action and result is settled, and hence the name immovable is set up.” First ask: what does the “movement” here really move? It moves the destiny and place where the result of the action is. The easy error: to mistake “immovable” for meaning unalterable and irremediable. What is said here is that the level and the place do not shift, not that the result cannot be turned. Where this lands: the very reason that actions of the desire realm can be turned is why practice has a place to lay hold; this item is most powerful read together with the section on settled and unsettled action.

XII. Conducive to Pleasant Feeling, to Painful Feeling, to Feeling Neither Painful nor Pleasant

〔12.1〕The bounds of level for the three actions of feeling are drawn by the limit of pleasant feeling. The treatise says “among the wholesome actions, those from the desire realm up to the third meditative absorption are called actions conducive to pleasant feeling, because pleasant feelings extend only so far”; “the unwholesome actions are called conducive to painful feeling”; “the wholesome actions of the levels beyond the third absorption are said to be named conducive to feeling neither painful nor pleasant, because above that there are no feelings of pain or pleasure at all.” First ask: why is the line drawn at the third meditative absorption? Because pleasant feeling reaches only so far. The easy error: to suppose that this is a ranking of value. It is a boundary in the distribution of feeling. Where this lands: this boundary is used again and again in the study of absorption — above the third absorption there is no pleasant feeling, and above the fourth there is the feeling of equanimity alone.

〔12.2〕Action draws on not feeling alone but the provisions of feeling as well. The treatise adds a sentence of great importance — “it is not that these actions draw on the result of feeling alone; it should be known that they draw on the provisions of that feeling as well; feeling and its provisions are here called feeling.” First ask: what are the provisions of feeling? The remaining dharmas that arise together with feeling and support that feeling. The easy error: to read “action conducive to pleasant feeling” as drawing on one isolated pleasant feeling only. Where this lands: this explains why the result of a wholesome action is a whole setting and not merely a sensation.

〔12.3〕Whether the lower levels have a third kind of action: three accounts set forth and the author expressly adjudicating. The treatise records three accounts — the first, that the lower levels too have the third, action conducive to feeling neither, on the ground that the action of the intermediate absorption must draw on a maturation, for otherwise “the action of the intermediate absorption ought to have no maturation, or else there ought to be no such action at all, since it has no maturational result of pain or pleasure”; the second, that this action draws on the maturation of the faculty of pleasure within the fundamental levels; the third, that this action draws on no result of feeling. The author gathers them up directly with “both accounts contradict the root treatise,” adducing two questions from the root treatise as proof, and concluding, “by this it may be proved that the lower levels too have action conducive to feeling neither.” First ask: does this passage conflict with the form of ‘recording both without adjudication’ set out above? It does not — recording without adjudication is for cases where the sūtras have no express text, whereas here the author has an express text of the root treatise to adduce, and so he adjudicates. The easy error: to take every divergent account in this fascicle for a recording without adjudication. Where this lands: the dividing line between adjudicating and not adjudicating is whether there is an express text to rely upon, and this passage is the one sample of express adjudication in this fascicle.

〔12.4〕The action of the feeling of equanimity is wholesome but inferior: an answer that looks like a contradiction. The treatise asks itself, “is this action wholesome or unwholesome? It is wholesome, only inferior,” and at once objects to itself: since it was said above that the wholesome up to the third absorption is called conducive to pleasant feeling, and that what obtains a lovely result is called wholesome action, is this not a contradiction? Answer: “it should be known that that was said with regard to the greater part.” Puguang here states the reason more thoroughly — he sets the question why the equanimity of the higher levels should be drawn on by a superior wholesome while the equanimity below the third absorption is on the contrary drawn on by an inferior wholesome, and answers, “in the higher levels there is no joy or pleasure left to delight in, and so a superior wholesome can draw it on; in the lower levels there are still the two feelings of joy and pleasure, and men mostly delight in these and do not much seek equanimity,” adducing the words of the Mahāvibhāṣā, “the mode of apprehension of the faculty of equanimity is subtle and still, and delighted in by the wise, and so it is a wholesome action that draws it on.” First ask: what does “said with regard to the greater part” mean? It means that the earlier sentence adduced the general case and is not a rule without exception. The easy error: to see the treatise break its own earlier words and suppose the text disordered. Where this lands: this treatise often uses “with regard to the greater part” to reconcile the general case with the exception, and one should watch for it in reading.

〔12.5〕The natures of action and feeling differ; how the word “conducive” is established. The treatise asks itself, “since the natures of action and of feeling are distinct, how are they said to be conducive to pleasant feeling and the rest,” and the answer has several roads: first, “though the natures of action and pleasant feeling are distinct, action can act as cause to benefit pleasant feeling”; second, this action is what is experienced by pleasure, “because pleasure is the maturational result of this action”; third, that pleasure is what the action experiences. And a simile is set up, “as with the bath powder conducive to bathing” — which Puguang glosses word for word, “bathing means washing, and powder means the sort of bean flour; the powder being conducive to the bathing, it is called the bath powder conducive to bathing” — from which it is plain that this is the powder of beans and flour used at bathing (of the sort of bath-meal), so named because it is conducive to bathing, and not a scented dust. First ask: wherein do the three roads differ? One is with regard to benefit, one to what is experienced, one to what experiences. Puguang divides the three explanations in just this way. The easy error: to suppose that the three accounts exclude one another. They are three roads by which one and the same name is established. Where this lands: when a compound name of the form ‘conducive to such and such’ is met, first ask whether it is said with regard to the cause, to the result, or to the function.

〔12.6〕The five kinds of conduciveness to feeling: a table for preventing confusion. The treatise lists five — conducive by its own nature (all feeling), by association (all contact), as object (all objects), as maturation (the action that can draw on a maturation), and as present before one (the feeling now occurring) — adducing a sūtra as proof for each, and at the end fixing the range: “what is spoken of here is only conduciveness as maturation, because action can draw on the maturation of feeling.” First ask: what use is there in setting up these five? The use is in delimiting what is under discussion: the conduciveness spoken of in this section is only the fourth kind and no other, and must not be mixed up with the other four. The easy error: to read the text on conduciveness as maturation with the sense of conduciveness by its own nature, whereupon nothing goes through anywhere. Where this lands: this is a typical device of Abhidharma — first spread out the several uses of a word, then designate which one is in use here.

XIII. Settled and Unsettled Action · Actions of the Three Times

〔13.1〕Settled and unsettled must first be clearly defined. The treatise says “of the actions conducive to pleasant feeling and the rest spoken of above, it should be known that each has the difference of settled and unsettled; because they are not certainly to be experienced, the name unsettled is set up.” Settled action is further of three — “settled action is of three kinds: first conducive to being experienced in the present life, second conducive to being experienced in the next birth, third conducive to being experienced in a life after the next” — each with its definition: “conducive to being experienced in the present life means done in this life and ripening in this very life”; conducive to being experienced in the next birth is done in this life and ripening in the second life; conducive to being experienced in a life after the next is done in this life and ripening in order from the third life on. The three settled with the one unsettled make four kinds in all. First ask: in what is the “unsettled” unsettled? Here it is unsettled first with regard to the division of time. The easy error: to take unsettled action for action that receives no result. What is unsettled is the time, not whether there is a result. Where this lands: this set of four actions is the skeleton of the teaching on action and result, and the two sections following both hang upon it.

〔13.2〕The account of five actions: cutting the unsettled once more. The treatise records an account — “some maintain that unsettled action is further of two kinds, namely settled and unsettled as regards maturation” — which with the three settled actions makes five. First ask: where does this cut fall? On a second dimension, ‘whether the maturation itself is settled.’ The easy error: to suppose that the account of five actions conflicts with that of four. It has only used one more measure. Where this lands: from this it is plain that “settled” in this treatise has at least two senses, settledness of time and settledness of maturation; and when the words “settled action” are read, one should first ask which settledness is meant.

〔13.3〕Whether action conducive to the present may ripen in a later life: a divergent account and the Vibhāṣā masters’ refusal. Some other master says that action conducive to being experienced in the present may ripen in other births as well, “the name of the action being established according to the stage at which it first ripens,” on the ground that “lest a strong action should have little maturational result.” “The Vibhāṣā masters do not allow this account, because some actions have a result near and yet not superior, and some are just the contrary,” and they adduce outward seeds as a simile — “as with outward seeds, the mallow bears fruit after three and a half months, while wheat must pass six months before it bears fruit.” First ask: what is this simile meant to refute? The inference that ‘what ripens early must therefore be small in strength.’ The mallow ripens early and wheat late, and one cannot say that the strength of the mallow must be the smaller. The easy error: to suppose that a divergent account, once adduced, is thereby granted. Where this lands: this passage is a fine training in reasoning — a seemingly plausible analogy overturned by an analogy that fits better.

〔13.4〕The masters of similes’ four alternatives and eight actions. The treatise records the masters of similes as saying that action has four alternatives — settled as to time and unsettled as to maturation, settled as to maturation and unsettled as to time, settled as to both, unsettled as to both — and concludes “on their account actions come to eight kinds in all.” First ask: how do these four alternatives stand to the account of five actions above? They cross the two measures (time and maturation) completely, so that each kind of action divides in two and makes eight. The easy error: to take the four alternatives and the five actions for two opposed positions. The four alternatives are a method; the five actions are one of its results. Where this lands: this is the second demonstration of the method of four alternatives in this fascicle; crossing two measures exhaustively is the basic skill of Abhidharma analysis.

XIV. The Four Actions Done at Once · Drawing On the Commonality · What All Places May Do · What Is Debarred to the “Firm”

〔14.1〕Whether four actions can be done at the same time: a very concrete answer. The treatise asks itself, “are there four actions done at the same time? It is allowed that there are. How? Having sent three messengers, one at the same time carries a wrong desire through to its end.” First ask: wherein lies the beauty of this instance? In that with a single affair it does all four actions of the four divisions of time at once — what the three messengers do severally accomplishes the three settled actions, and what he does himself accomplishes the unsettled action, and all four are brought to completion at the same time. The easy error: to suppose that actions of different divisions of time cannot be done at the same time. The doing is at one time, the ripening at different times, and the two must not be confused. Where this lands: this also shows from the other side how much action is to be feared — in the space of a single thought four lines of time can be set going at once.

〔14.2〕Only three can draw on the commonality of sentient beings; the present-life kind does not. The treatise answers, “how many actions can draw on the commonality of sentient beings? Only three can draw on it, the action conducive to being experienced in the present excepted, because the commonality of this present body was drawn on by an earlier action.” First ask: why can the action conducive to being experienced in the present not draw on the commonality? Because the body of general retribution of this present term was drawn on by an earlier action; the action conducive to being experienced in the present receives its result within this very body and comes too late to draw this body on. The easy error: to confuse the drawing action with the filling action. Where this lands: this item is precisely the forerunner of the doctrine of ‘drawing and filling causes’ — what draws on the general retribution of one term and what fills out its particular retribution are not one and the same set of actions.

〔14.3〕Within the hells wholesome action must except that conducive to being experienced in the present. The treatise says “in all the realms and destinies, whether wholesome or unwholesome, according to what is fitting all four may be done,” which is the general permission; and the particular debarring is “as for the particular debarring, within the hells wholesome action excepts that conducive to being experienced in the present, since there is no lovely result; the rest may all be done.” First ask: why is just this one kind excepted? Because what is conducive to being experienced in the present must receive its result in this life, and the hells have no lovely result to receive. The easy error: to suppose that no wholesome action can be done in the hells. The treatise says expressly that the remaining three may be done. Where this lands: this is one of the rare rays of light in this fascicle — in the most painful of places wholesome action can still be done, only its result is not received there.

〔14.4〕What is debarred to the “firm”: a line drawn for those who do not fall back. The treatise says “those who do not fall back from their lineage are called firm, and on a level whose defilement they have left behind,” dividing them in two — those of the class of ordinary beings, “excepting the action conducive to being experienced in the next birth, may do the remaining three”; noble ones, “excepting both those conducive to the next birth and to a later one, may do the remaining two” — the ground being that an ordinary being who does not fall back has no ‘being born again below in the next life,’ and a noble one who does not fall back “will certainly not be born again into the lower levels.” First ask: why are those conducive to the next birth and to a later one the ones debarred? Because those two must receive their results in the lower levels, and one who does not fall back is no longer born into the lower levels. The easy error: to suppose that this says a noble one does no action. The treatise says expressly that the remaining two may be done. Where this lands: this section shows that whether an action may be done hangs upon whether the place where its result is received is still within his future itinerary.

〔14.5〕An exception for one who falls back from a fruit, and a thread laid for later. The treatise says that noble ones who have obtained the freedom from defilement in the desire realm and at the summit of existence, “though there be falling back, still do not do the actions conducive to the next birth or to a later one, because one who falls back from there must fall back from a fruit,” and adds, “those who have fallen back from a fruit certainly do not then meet their end, as will be made out later.” First ask: why does one who has fallen back from a fruit still not do the actions conducive to the next birth or a later one? Because one who falls back from a fruit will not thereupon meet his end, and is still within this life. The easy error: to read “falling back” as sinking down into a lower level. The treatise says expressly that he does not meet his end. Where this lands: this sentence is at the same time a thread laid for later — the relation of falling back from a fruit to the end of life is left by the treatise to be made out in the text that follows, and the reader should note the thread down.

XV. The Twenty-Two Kinds of Action Done in the Stage of Intermediate Existence

〔15.1〕How the twenty-two are counted out. The treatise says “within the desire realm, while abiding in the stage of intermediate existence, it is allowed that twenty-two actions can be done,” and the way of counting is that the stage of intermediate existence, the five stages within the womb, and the five stages outside the womb make eleven stages, each with a settled and an unsettled action, hence twenty-two. The five stages within the womb are the kalala, the arbuda, the peśī, the ghana, and the praśākhā; of the five outside the womb the treatise says “the five outside the womb are: first infancy, second childhood, third youth, fourth middle age, fifth old age.” First ask: why cut one life into eleven segments? Because what action bears upon differs stage by stage. The easy error: to take the twenty-two for twenty-two actions of different natures. It is eleven stages multiplied by two. Where this lands: this way of counting is itself a way of contemplation — laying out one term of life from intermediate existence to old age and seeing every segment as a place upon which action may bear.

〔15.2〕Why the settled actions done in intermediate existence all count as conducive to being experienced in the present. The treatise says “it should be known that the eleven kinds of settled action thus done in intermediate existence are all included in what is conducive to being experienced in the present, because the commonality of the class has no difference,” and explains itself, “that is, this stage of intermediate existence and the ten stages of its own class are drawn on by one commonality of sentient beings and one action.” First ask: are intermediate existence and the time in the womb and on to old age not different stages? How then do they count as one and the same “present”? Because they belong to one and the same commonality of sentient beings and are drawn on by one and the same action; they are segments within one and the same term of life. The easy error: to take intermediate existence for a life of its own. Where this lands: and it is for this very reason that the treatise says “hence there is no need to speak of a separate action conducive to being experienced in intermediate existence, since intermediate existence is itself drawn on by the actions conducive to the next birth and the rest.”

〔15.3〕The precise sense of the four words “the commonality of the class.” This term is exceedingly easy to confuse with “the commonality of sentient beings.” Puguang adduces the words of the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle to explain it — “the commonality of the class means the class of men and the like, not the destiny and not the birth, since with regard to destiny and birth the commonalities of intermediate existence and of birth-existence differ.” First ask: what does this explanation settle? It settles the difficulty that intermediate existence and birth-existence are in fact not of one commonality as regards “destiny” and “birth”: what they share is the layer of “the class of men and the like,” not the layer of destiny and birth. The easy error: to read “the commonality of the class” here with the “commonality of sentient beings” of the five aggregates. Where this lands: when two closely similar technical terms are met, first look whether the ancient masters have drawn a boundary between them; the words Puguang adduces here are exactly that boundary.

XVI. Why an Action Must Draw On a Maturation

〔16.1〕Four marks plus one, five places in all. The treatise says that if the action done be “from a weighty affliction, or a purely pure mind, or constantly done, or arising toward a dominant field of merit,” together with “the doing of harm toward father and mother with a mind whether light or weighty,” then “all such are included in settled action, and the rest are not certainly to be experienced.” First ask: what have these five places in common? The first three are extremes of mind (utterly defiled, utterly pure, utterly habitual), the latter two extremes of field (the most excellent field, the weightiest kindness). The easy error: to suppose that only great evil forms a settled action. A mind utterly pure forms a settled action just the same. Where this lands: this item gives the practitioner a very practical application — to make a wholesome action settled, work upon these five: the purely pure mind, constant doing, and arising toward a field of merit.

〔16.2〕Who the field of merit is. The treatise explains itself, “what is called a field of merit means the Buddha, the dharma, and the assembly, or a superior person, that is, one who has obtained a superior fruit or a superior absorption.” First ask: why is “a superior person” reckoned in as well? Because what makes a field a field is its virtue, not its formal station. The easy error: to identify the field of merit with the institutional assembly. The treatise says expressly that one who has obtained a superior fruit or absorption is such a field too. Where this lands: this sentence is at the same time a warning — harm or benefit done toward one who has virtue has a settled retribution, whatever his name and rank.

〔16.3〕Why father and mother are listed separately. The treatise says on purpose “or the doing of harm toward father and mother with a mind whether light or weighty,” placing it beside the field of merit. First ask: father and mother have not necessarily a superior fruit or absorption; why are they listed with the field of merit? Because what is spoken with regard to here is not virtue but kindness. The easy error: to class father and mother under the field of merit. The treatise sets it up as a separate item. Where this lands: here the treatise sets the two lines of “virtue” and “kindness” side by side as the objects of settled action, an establishing at once most economical and most weighty.

XVII. What Action Certainly Draws On a Result in the Present Life

〔17.1〕Superiority of field and superiority of intent: two reports. The treatise adduces two matters. For superiority of field — “by the field being superior, it is heard that there was a bhikṣu who within the assembly spoke the speech of a woman, and who in the present life was turned into a woman” — and it says “reports of this class are not one only.” For superiority of intent — “by the intent being superior, it is heard that there was a eunuch who, because he rescued a number of oxen from the eunuch’s business, was in the present life turned into a man.” First ask: what do these two reports prove? They prove that the swiftness of retribution hangs upon the superiority of the field and of the intent, and not upon the size of the deed. The easy error: to read these two as tales of the marvelous. They are instances adduced by the treatise itself. Where this lands: a single sentence uttered within the assembly, and a single act of rescuing oxen, both have their retribution in the present life — and this is the weight that this section would have the reader remember.

〔17.2〕The third condition is the most winding and must be read slowly. The treatise says “or one born in this level who leaves behind the defilement of this level forever, of the wholesome and unwholesome actions within this level,” if the action be “settled as to maturation and unsettled as to stage,” “this action must draw on a result in the present life.” First ask: why should leaving behind the defilement of this level forever turn an action into one experienced in the present life? Because after leaving the defilement behind he is no longer born into this level, and if this action is not experienced in this life there is no place where it can be experienced. The treatise then makes the other two cases plain as well: if it be an action conducive to being certainly experienced at some other stage, then such a man “certainly has no principle of leaving defilement behind forever”; and if even the maturation be unsettled, then “because he leaves defilement behind forever he does not experience the maturation.” The easy error: to run the three cases together. Where this lands: this is the most tightly reasoned little passage in the fascicle, and its method is first to fix the settledness or unsettledness of the action, then to look at whether the man has left defilement behind, the two crossing to yield three conclusions.

XVIII. Toward Which Fields an Action Raised Has Its Result Experienced at Once

〔18.1〕The five fields are all the moment of ‘having just come out.’ The treatise says “what is called a field of merit means the assembly headed by the Buddha; and by the distinction of persons there are five” — one risen from the absorption of cessation, from non-contention, from the absorption of loving-kindness, from the path of seeing, from the path of cultivation. First ask: why is the stress on “risen”? Because that is the moment when merit is newly complete and the continuum is just pure. Of one risen from the absorption of cessation, “the stillness of this absorption resembles nirvāṇa,” and when the mind first arises upon rising it is “as though one had entered nirvāṇa and come out again”; of those risen from non-contention and from loving-kindness, at the time of rising “the continuum of the body is perfumed and cultivated by boundless and most excellent merits and so proceeds”; of those risen from the paths of seeing and of cultivation, having cut off the afflictions forever and obtained a superior transformation of the support, “upon rising a pure bodily continuum arises.” The easy error: to suppose that it is the standing of these persons in themselves that makes the field superior. What the treatise ties it to is the very moment of rising from that absorption or that contemplation. Where this lands: this also explains the division at the end of the passage — “as for the time of rising from the remaining absorptions and fruits, since the absorption cultivated beforehand is not especially superior and the afflictions abandoned through cultivation are not yet utterly cut off, that continuum is not a superior field of merit.”

〔18.2〕Non-contention and loving-kindness: two absorptions taking boundless sentient beings as their object. The treatise says of the absorption of non-contention that it “takes boundless sentient beings as its object, with a dominant disposition of benefiting attending upon it,” and of the absorption of loving-kindness that it “takes boundless sentient beings as its object, with a dominant disposition of gladdening attending upon it.” First ask: in which single word do the two differ? The one is “benefiting,” the other “gladdening.” The easy error: to make non-contention and loving-kindness one and the same thing. Where this lands: this pairing repays much pondering — to benefit is to draw out their suffering and affliction, to gladden is to give them pleasure; and the treatise divides them as two absorptions.

〔18.3〕Both harm and benefit are experienced at once. The treatise says “if there be an action of harm or of benefit toward them, this action must necessarily draw its result at once.” First ask: why are harm and benefit spoken of together? Because a field as a field is neutral — it makes the results of both the wholesome and the unwholesome side the swifter. The easy error: to take the field of merit only for a place where merit is sown. Where this lands: this is the sentence in this section most to be remembered — before the most excellent of fields the result of an unwholesome action is likewise the swiftest.

XIX. Mental Feeling and Bodily Feeling: The Difference in the Feeling Drawn On by Action

〔19.1〕Action without applied thought draws on mental feeling alone, and the reason is a single sentence. The treatise says “wholesome action without applied thought means all the wholesome action from the intermediate absorption up to the summit of existence,” and that of these those that can draw on a maturation of feeling “should be known to draw on mental feeling and not bodily,” the reason being “because bodily feeling must arise together with applied and sustained thought.” First ask: why must bodily feeling be together with applied and sustained thought? Because bodily feeling is affiliated to the five consciousnesses, and the levels where the five consciousnesses are must have applied and sustained thought; from the intermediate absorption up there are no longer applied and sustained thought, and so there is no bodily feeling to be drawn on. The easy error: to suppose that the higher realms have no bodily feeling because they have no body. The reason the treatise gives is the absence of applied and sustained thought. Where this lands: this item states with the utmost clarity the interlocking of the three, level, consciousness, and feeling.

〔19.2〕Unwholesome action draws on bodily feeling alone, and melancholy is not a maturation. The treatise says of the unwholesome actions that can draw on feeling that they “should be known to draw on bodily feeling and not mental, because an unwholesome cause has painful feeling for its result, and a painful feeling arising together with mind is certainly named melancholy, and melancholy is not a maturation, as was already made out above.” First ask: melancholy too is plainly painful; why does it not count as a maturation? Because melancholy arises in association with discrimination and waits upon deliberation, and does not arise spontaneously, and so is not established as a maturation. Yuanhui here gathers the reasoning of the whole passage very neatly — “this is called action without applied thought, drawing on mental feeling alone. Bodily feeling must arise together with applied and sustained thought, and so action without applied thought does not draw on bodily feeling. As for ‘the unwholesome draws on bodily feeling alone,’ the unwholesome draws on suffering alone, and suffering is in the five consciousnesses, and so it draws on bodily feeling.” The easy error: to read “melancholy is not a maturation” as meaning that melancholy is not painful. It is painful, but it is not the maturation directly drawn on by action. Where this lands: this division is put to use at once in the next section — it is by this that madness of mind does not conflict with “melancholy is not a maturation.”

XX. Madness of Mind: In the Mental Consciousness Alone · Five Causes · The Limit as to Place

〔20.1〕Why madness of mind is in the mental consciousness alone. The treatise says “a sentient being’s madness of mind is in the mental consciousness alone; in the five consciousnesses there is certainly no madness of mind, because the five bodies of consciousness have no discrimination.” First ask: what has madness to do with discrimination? Madness is an inverted discrimination, and the five consciousnesses do not discriminate, and so there is no madness in them to speak of. The easy error: to understand madness of mind as a disorder of the senses. The place the treatise fixes for it is the mental consciousness. Where this lands: this item counteracts a very common misunderstanding — madness and distraction are not in the faculty, not in the object, but in that consciousness which can discriminate.

〔20.2〕The first of the five causes is the maturation of action, and the matters adduced are exceedingly concrete. The treatise says “first, it arises from the sentient being’s own maturation of action,” and lists: making another’s mind mad by drugs and spells; making a man drink poison or liquor he did not wish to drink; displaying a terrible aspect to frighten birds and beasts; setting fierce fires to burn mountains and marshes; making pits and traps to bring beings down; or doing other work to make others lose mindfulness — “by such causes in action he draws on a distinct maturation in a future life that can make his mind mad.” First ask: what have this string of instances in common? All of them take away another’s self-mastery of mind. The easy error: to suppose that only directly driving a man mad draws on this result. The treatise lists them very widely, taking in even the frightening of birds and beasts and the burning of mountains and marshes. Where this lands: this is the neatest correspondence of cause and result in the whole fascicle — he who takes away another’s self-mastery of mind loses his own mind in a later life.

〔20.3〕The remaining four causes: terror, injury, discord, sorrow. The treatise says, second by terror, “that is, non-human beings and the rest display a terrifying form and press upon him”; third by injury, “that is, because by what he has done he has vexed non-human beings and the rest, they out of hatred injure his limbs and joints and thus his mind is made mad”; fourth by discord, “fourth by discord, that is, because within the body the elements of wind, heat, and phlegm contradict one another and the great elements are out of accord, his mind is thus made mad”; fifth by sorrow, “fifth by sorrow, that is, because he has lost those dear to him and the like, the poison of grief winds about his breast and his mind thereupon goes mad, as with Vasiṣṭhā and the rest.” First ask: how do these four causes stand to the first? The first cause is action; the remaining four are present conditions. The easy error: to take the five causes for five causes on one and the same level. One cause lies in a former life, four in the present. Where this lands: this layering matters much — madness of mind may have causes wholly of the present life, and need not be ascribed wholesale to action in a former one.

〔20.4〕A handsome self-correction. The treatise sets itself the difficulty: since madness of mind is allowed to arise from the maturation of action, and mental feeling is not a maturation (the section just above having said “melancholy is not a maturation”), how are the two to be reconciled? The answer is exact — “it was not said that madness of mind is the maturation of action, but only that it is produced by the maturation of action” — the mechanism being “that is, an unwholesome cause in action draws on a maturation of great elements out of balance, and in dependence upon these great elements the mind loses mindfulness, and hence it is spoken of as madness.” First ask: wherein lies the difference of a single word? What is the maturation is the great elements (form); madness of mind is a loss of mindfulness arising in dependence upon the great elements. The easy error: to take “produced by the maturation of action” and “is the maturation of action” for the same thing. Where this lands: this is the most finely reasoned sentence in the fascicle, and the most worth copying out of the whole — what is drawn on is the body; what is produced is the mind.

〔20.5〕The four alternatives of madness and distraction. The treatise makes four alternatives — mad and not distracted is “the undefiled minds of one who is mad,” distracted and not mad is “the defiled minds of one who is not mad,” both mad and distracted is “the defiled minds of one who is mad,” neither mad nor distracted is “the undefiled minds of one who is not mad.” First ask: what does distraction refer to? Distraction here refers to defilement. The easy error: to take madness and distraction for synonyms. The treatise divides them expressly into two matters — one who is mad may have undefiled minds, and one who is not mad may have defiled minds. Where this lands: this set of four alternatives is a stroke of admonition to the reader — not mad and yet defiled in mind is precisely the second of the four.

〔20.6〕The limit as to place, and the bounds set for noble ones. The treatise says “excepting Uttarakuru, the remaining classes of sentient beings of the desire realm may have madness of mind,” and pushes it down layer by layer: even the gods of the desire realm have madness, how much more men and the evil destinies; “the hells are constantly mad, because pressed by much suffering,” for “pressed by painful feelings, they do not even know themselves, much less discriminate right from wrong.” As for noble ones, the treatise says “among the noble ones of the desire realm, the buddhas alone excepted, madness of mind may be had through the great elements being out of accord,” and no madness produced by the maturation of action, the reasons being: if the action be settled it must be experienced first before sanctity can be obtained, and if it be not settled then by the obtaining of sanctity it can be made without result; nor is there terror, “since they have passed beyond the five fears”; nor injury, “since the noble ones have nothing that would draw the dislike of non-human beings and the rest”; nor sorrow, “since they have realized the nature of dharmas.” Yuanhui gathers these four grounds up very neatly — “among the noble ones of the desire realm the Buddha has no madness; the remaining noble ones may have madness of mind through the great elements being at discord. There is no madness produced by maturation, since sanctity has been obtained. Nor is there terror, since they have passed beyond the five fears. Nor injury, since non-human beings revere them. Nor sorrow, since they have realized the nature of dharmas.” First ask: does it detract from the virtue of the noble ones that they may still have madness of mind? It does not — the one cause remaining is only the discord of the great elements, which belongs to the illness of the body and not to the afflictions of the mind. The easy error: to suppose that after the realization of sanctity all madness and distraction cease. The treatise says expressly that only the buddhas are excepted. Where this lands: this item is a great consolation to the practitioner and also a very clear-eyed boundary — the noble ones are free of madness caused by the afflictions, but not of madness caused by the four great elements being out of accord.

XXI. The Three Actions, Crooked, Foul, and Turbid

〔21.1〕The three actions each depend upon one root affliction. The treatise says “the three of body, speech, and mind have each three kinds, namely the crooked, the foul, and the turbid; and in that same order it should be known that they arise in dependence upon flattery, hatred, and greed,” and establishes each name in turn: “that is, the bodily, verbal, and mental actions arising in dependence upon flattery are called crooked action, since they are of the class of the crookedness of flattery”; “the bodily, verbal, and mental actions arising in dependence upon hatred are called foul action, since they are of the class of the foulness of hatred”; and those arising in dependence upon greed are called turbid action, since they are of the class of the turbidity of greed. First ask: why are the three words “crooked,” “foul,” and “turbid” chosen? All three are taken from the appearance of the affliction itself — the mark of flattery is crooked, the mark of hatred is foul, the mark of greed is turbid. The easy error: to suppose that the three names are three grades in the weight of an offense. They are descriptions of three afflictions. Where this lands: Yuanhui here points out that “‘spoken of’ means spoken of in the sūtras,” that is, this set of three names of action comes from the sūtras and is not set up by the author himself; and when one reads in this treatise of ‘speaking of such and such an action,’ one should first ask who the subject of that word ‘speaking’ is.

〔21.2〕The point of closing this fascicle here. Of this stanza only the first half is in this fascicle, the second half belonging to the next. First ask: why draw to a close here? Because the three actions crooked, foul, and turbid are the sixth of the eleven items of “explaining the actions in the sūtras,” and the seventh item, the four actions black and black and the rest, starts a new hearth. The easy error: to take this section for an appendix to the fascicle. It is in fact the winding up of that whole line of gates of action in the second half — from wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate down to the crooked, the foul, and the turbid, the whole way through has been establishing entities for the names of action in the sūtras. Where this lands: link up the eleven sections of the second half of this fascicle and one sees that the author is doing one and the same thing throughout — for every name of action that has occurred in the sūtras, an entity must be given that can be checked.

Further Resonances: A Mirror of the Three Commentaries

The above is the sense of the treatise’s own text in this fascicle. Below, a further section is set up to gather four matters: the adjudications of the three commentaries and their divergences, Saṅghabhadra’s refutations and supplements, the divergences of Paramārtha’s earlier translation, and coordinates for parallel reading. A mirror is not the treatise; it is only looking at the same text by another way of reading. Both are recorded without adjudication, each restored to its own place.

1. Where the Three Commentaries Diverge

A commentary that leaves but one sentence in a general conspectus. The commentaries on this fascicle are in a special situation: Shentai’s commentary is a fragment, and the seven fascicles extant belong to the Chapter on the Elements, the Chapter on the Faculties, and the Chapter on the Worthy and the Noble; the Chapter on Action is wholly wanting, and so there is no line-by-line commentary of Shentai to hang upon this fascicle. The one trace Shentai leaves upon the Chapter on Action is a sentence in the general conspectus of the whole treatise in his first fascicle, “the chapter on action, one hundred thirty-one lines” — a witness to the stanza count, not commentary upon this fascicle. The absence is marked as it stands, and text from other fascicles is not made to stand in for it.

One and the same fascicle, and the three commentators give it three different numbers. Puguang marks “below, the fifth of the main text, the differences in obtaining the three disciplines. Within it, first the sameness and difference of the places from which they are obtained; second sentient beings, limbs, and causes; third the obtaining of the evil and the middling”; Yuanhui marks “from here the fifth of the main text, explaining the differences in obtaining the three disciplines, within which: first the sameness and difference of place and time of obtaining, second sentient beings, limbs, and causes, third the obtaining of the evil and the middling,” all but word for word the same as Puguang save that his “sameness and difference of place and time of obtaining” has one word more; Fabao, however, forms a system of his own, giving “this one stanza below, the ninth of the main text, explaining the places from which the three disciplines are obtained.” And a layer higher up, the divisions of the chapter-level main outline differ as well: Puguang makes three gates, “within this chapter, first the nature of the entity of action, second the explanation of the actions in the sūtras, third miscellaneous explanations of the actions”; Yuanhui likewise three gates with slightly different names, “three gates in all for the stanzas of this chapter: first the nature of the entity of action, second the explanation of the names of the actions, third miscellaneous explanations of the actions”; while Fabao makes four gates, “the main text of this chapter divides into four: first the entity of action, second discipline and the rest, third the actions in the sūtras, fourth miscellaneous explanations of the actions.” What the three contend over is into how many segments one and the same treatise should be cut and what number each segment should bear; both are recorded without adjudication.

Puguang changes two sets of speaker labels within the prose of one and the same stanza. In the first half of the prose of Root 37 Puguang marks “the house of total raising,” “the house of separate raising,” “the author,” and “the Vibhāṣā masters,” and ties the two houses to the correct and the incorrect senses of the Mahāvibhāṣā — “this is in sense the Mahāvibhāṣā’s correct sense, the house that raises the discipline toward sentient beings as a whole” and “this is in sense the Mahāvibhāṣā’s incorrect sense, the house that raises the discipline toward sentient beings severally”; while in the second half of the same passage (the simile of the kinsman and the sheep) and throughout Roots 39 and 40 he changes to marking “the Sautrāntikas” and “the Sarvāstivādins.” This is no oversight in the commentary; it is Puguang varying his way of labeling with the content of the passage. What matters is this: the names “the house of total raising” and “the house of separate raising” are Puguang’s own outline coinages, and the treatise itself has no such names, nor is the same coinage found in Fabao at the same passage. Recorded without adjudication.

Fabao has one layer of arrangement more than Puguang, and one measure more of tone. In the passage on “violent and overbearing” Puguang merely marks the questions and answers round by round; Fabao besides puts it into numbers, “there are two violences: first, explaining a sūtra of definitive meaning so as to make it non-definitive; second, providing those of many afflictions with an occasion for transgressing grave sins.” And at one round Fabao marks “the Sautrāntikas make sport of the Sarvāstivādins” — that word “make sport” carries a tone of appraisal, and no such expression is found in Puguang at the same passage. This character of Fabao’s, of one layer more of arrangement and one measure more of attitude, may be seen a second time in this fascicle: at the passage of the field of salt and alkali, Fabao marks “the treatise, ‘moreover the ṣaṇḍha and the rest’ down to ‘good sprouts and foul weeds’: explaining the ṣaṇḍha and the rest a second time,” pointing out that the text here is making a second statement, and Puguang has no such mark. Recorded without adjudication; the main text of this fascicle does not take up his tone of appraisal.

Puguang alone hands down a judgment of preference. As to whether, after the one-day discipline is relinquished at the passing of the night, non-discipline is obtained or the man is called middling, the treatise merely sets the two masters side by side. Puguang here not only marks out their regional affiliations (the former master being the masters of Gandhāra, the latter the great masters of the treatises of the land of Kaśmīra) but adds the sentence “although that treatise has no appraiser, yet the latter master is to be taken as correct.” The point is this: the Mahāvibhāṣā he relies upon has itself no appraiser’s adjudication, and this “taking the latter master as correct” is Puguang’s own choice, not the position of the treatise. Recorded without adjudication.

Puguang gives two explanations of “the bhikṣu in name and notion” and takes one of them himself. For the first of the four kinds of bhikṣu, Puguang first explains, “his body is that of a layman while his name and title are those of a bhikṣu, hence it is said, the bhikṣu in name and notion,” and then gives another explanation, “a further explanation: by a formal act of one motion and three announcements he obtains the name of full ordination and the rest, and to such a man the name of bhikṣu is given, hence it is said, the bhikṣu in name and notion,” and adjudges the former explanation the better; and he goes on to explain the mendicant bhikṣu, “one gone forth who lives by begging is called the mendicant bhikṣu.” The choice between the two explanations belongs to Puguang himself; recorded without adjudication.

Two places where Puguang alone is detailed, and one where Fabao alone is detailed. On the getting of the name “movement,” Puguang adduces the words of the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle and then gives two explanations of his own; on the establishing of the name “conducive,” Puguang sets up three explanations of his own (with regard to benefit, to what is experienced, to what experiences) — in both places Puguang alone is detailed, and Fabao and Yuanhui do not touch them. Conversely, on whether action conducive to being experienced in the present may be turned aside, Fabao alone adduces the Mahāvibhāṣā and sets out both schools in full: “the masters of similes say: this is not settled, since all action may here be turned aside, and even a deed of immediate retribution may be made to turn,” and “the masters of the Abhidharma treatises say: actions conducive to being experienced in the present life are settled to be experienced in the present life, and hence are called actions conducive to being experienced in the present life,” listing alongside them “some other masters again speak of five kinds of action” and “some other masters again speak of eight kinds of action.” The two schools are here squarely opposed, the treatise itself passes no verdict, and both are recorded without adjudication.

Two small divergences of wording among the three commentaries. First, the treatise has “the action that is secure is named wholesome,” while Yuanhui has “the action that is settled and secure is named wholesome, obtaining a lovely result and relieving the sufferings of beings” — a difference of one character between “secure” and “settled and secure.” Second, at the fifth cause of madness of mind the treatise gives the name as “Vasiṣṭhā and the rest,” while Yuanhui gives “Vasiṣṭhā of the Vāsiṣṭha clan and the rest,” with one character more. Both are recorded only, without adjudication.

2. Saṅghabhadra’s Refutations and Supplementary Explanations

Saṅghabhadra’s two treatises do not give the name of this chapter as “the Analysis of Action,” but as “the Chapter Making Out Action” — the fourth in the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle, the fifth in the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine. To search them by the chapter name of the Kośa is bound to yield a false zero.

The simile of the kinsman and the sheep: Saṅghabhadra takes that objection head on. The treatise here avows for itself, “in matters equal such as these another principle should be sought,” and Saṅghabhadra answers it squarely. He first adduces the instance the author set up — “the Sūtra-master makes here this parallel: if with regard to the future self-body of a sheep and the like non-discipline is obtained toward the present kinsman and the rest, then sheep and the like have in the future the body of kinsmen and the rest, and since toward such a body there is no harming mind, one ought, with regard to the future body of a near kinsman, not to obtain evil discipline toward the present sheep and the like. Parallels such as this are not level in principle: because there is no wholesome disposition, because there is an unwholesome disposition” — and divides them by the breadth or narrowness of the disposition: at the time when one of non-discipline takes it on, his mind is universally set on harming all sentient beings, so that though the deed be aimed at sheep his mind is broad and universal. One meaning and two schools, recorded together, with no judging which prevails.

Whether a grave transgression relinquishes the discipline: Saṅghabhadra brings in a third party. This passage of the Kośa is an exchange between the Sautrāntikas and the Sarvāstivādins; at the same passage Saṅghabhadra brings in the objection of “the Elder” — “the Elder here makes this objection: if it be said that there is none, what moral discipline is there none of? For the name moral discipline, besides denoting the habituation of wholesome and evil discipline, is also seen used in the expressions ‘this wholesome moral discipline’ and ‘evil moral discipline’; what principle does it contradict to speak thus?” — and at once appraises it, “his objection has no deep purport in it,” and does not take it up; while against the author he makes a reconstruction and a counter-reproach, in the words “the Sūtra-master here asks and answers himself: if one who has gravely transgressed is not a bhikṣu, then there ought to be no bhikṣu still in training … ought not the masters of the Abhidharma to say that the Sautrāntikas are certainly men of the utmost violence?” Two points matter: first, that this passage is in fact three houses set forth and not two schools only; second, that Saṅghabhadra’s appraisal is itself the verdict of one house and not the position of the Kośa, and the main text of this fascicle may not take his appraisal for a settled conclusion. Recorded without adjudication.

Whether refining the faculties ought to be set up as a separate condition: an objection the Kośa itself does not answer. The Kośa sets up three conditions for relinquishing the wholesome dharmas without outflows, and Saṅghabhadra objects, “the Sūtra-master here ought to speak of two conditions, since the words ‘obtaining a fruit’ take in the refining of the faculties; for at the stage of refining the faculties one must again obtain a fruit, casting off the dull fruit and the path superior to the fruit” — maintaining that refining the faculties must be accompanied by obtaining a fruit and can be merged into the one condition of obtaining a fruit. The Kośa itself stops at setting up three conditions and does not answer this objection; those who set up a rescue on its behalf are the later commentators: Puguang records “the masters of the Kośa rescue it, saying: the author speaks separately of the two relinquishings, by obtaining a fruit and by refining the faculties, because if it is a relinquishing by obtaining a fruit, it is with regard to a relinquishing of the same class,” and further, “if it is a relinquishing by refining the faculties, it is with regard to a relinquishing of a different class, as the dull path is relinquished in obtaining the sharp; and though at the stage of turning the faculties a fruit must also be obtained, yet since it is not a relinquishing of the same class the name of obtaining a fruit is not given it.” This rescue comes from the commentators and not from the treatise itself; recorded without adjudication.

The name of the sixth condition: Saṅghabhadra holds the Kośa’s naming not close enough. For the sixth condition of relinquishing the middling nonmanifest the Kośa has “relinquished by the breaking down of the wholesome roots.” Saṅghabhadra discusses it: “what of the middling nonmanifest, wholesome and unwholesome? The Sūtra-master in this sense names the sixth condition the cutting off of the wholesome. If it be said so, then the preparatory effort of cutting off the wholesome is also called the cutting off of the wholesome and is a sixth condition; and in that case one ought to say that the preparatory effort of the meditative absorption is also called the meditative absorption, and there would be seven conditions, since within the preparatory effort of the absorption the evil nonmanifest is relinquished. One ought to say that ‘root’ extends to the wholesome and the unwholesome roots, and that the word ‘cutting off’ spoken of is the cutting off of the preparatory effort; and by the cutting off in dependence upon the root there is the sixth condition. This explains the wording of the stanza without fault in principle” — and he puts forward his own positive explanation, “sixth, relinquished by the breaking down in dependence upon the root; that is, when the preparatory effort is raised and the wholesome or the unwholesome is cut off, one relinquishes in each case the nonmanifest drawn forth by that root.” It should be noted that Saṅghabhadra himself concludes, “this explains the wording of the stanza without fault in principle” — he has not denied the Kośa’s six conditions, but only maintains that the name “cutting off in dependence upon the root” be used instead, so as to gather in both the wholesome and the unwholesome root. This is a refining of terminology, not a contradiction in doctrine. Recorded only, without adjudication.

Besides the four marks of settled action, Saṅghabhadra adduces a further set. The Kośa sets up four marks of settled action, and after them Saṅghabhadra adduces separately: “some other master says: whatever is done with a fierce disposition, or where having done it one raises a mind of gladness, or where at all times it is repeatedly habituated, or where it is raised by the force of a superior vow or the force of the thing, is in every case settled.” This set (a fierce disposition, gladness after the doing, habituation, the force of vow and of thing) is another master’s account adduced by Saṅghabhadra, and its character is supplementary, not a counter-refutation; if it is to be used, its attribution must be clear, and it may not be mixed into the four marks of the Kośa itself.

On the term “the commonality of the class,” Saṅghabhadra and Puguang cite all but word for word the same. Saṅghabhadra explains it, “the commonality of the class means the class of men and the like, not the destiny and not the birth, since with regard to destiny and birth the commonalities of intermediate existence and of birth-existence differ”; and what Puguang cites from the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle is all but word for word the same. This is an expository fine explanation and not a debate, and may be used directly to teach the precise sense of these four words.

The Treatise Revealing the Doctrine is a stretch of quiet within the compass of this fascicle. Checking word for word by the marks of counter-refutation habitual to the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle, the six expressions “the Sūtra-master,” “the Elder,” “the appraisal says,” “I now say,” “in principle it certainly cannot be so,” and “in principle it does not hold” all yield zero occurrences in the passage of the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine corresponding to this fascicle; the one sentence found within the passage, “some other master says: if he does not do the deed afresh, there is no condition to make …,” is, on examination, a restatement of a divergent account already present in the Kośa itself, and not new material of debate added by the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine. This is an honest negative proposition, and all it can prove is one thing — that the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine is at this passage a restating condensation, in sharp contrast with the ten and more rounds of exchange in the same passage of the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle; nothing is inferred from it about the reasons for its compilation.

3. The Divergences of Paramārtha’s Earlier Translation

Paramārtha’s Expository Treatise on the Treasury of Abhidharma forms a system of its own in the passage corresponding to this fascicle. What must be known first is the boundary of the passage: the opening sentence of this fascicle reads in Paramārtha’s version, “these three disciplines, namely the prātimokṣa, that produced in absorption, and that without flow — if from this cause one discipline be obtained, are the other two obtained? It is said not. If not, how then? The verse says” — the three disciplines named in one list and the question and answer of one structure, corresponding one to one with Xuanzang’s version; and the closing point is where the explanation of the three actions crooked, coarse, and rough ends, immediately after which it passes over to the four actions black and white. The two versions differ also in the division of fascicles: Paramārtha’s Chapter on Action has four fascicles and Xuanzang’s six, and the passage corresponding to this fascicle straddles two of Paramārtha’s fascicles, its fascicle boundary falling exactly so as to cut Xuanzang’s one stanza Root 51 in half — the first half, “these are settled or unsettled … and settled experiencing is again of three, being experienced in the present and the rest,” standing at the end of Paramārtha’s fascicle eleven, and the second half, “again there are five kinds of action … another master speaks of four alternatives,” at the head of fascicle twelve. Xuanzang’s version for its part has the one stanza Root 60 split across two units. Each version has its instance of a stanza boundary straddling a fascicle boundary; recorded without adjudication.

The renderings form a system of their own. Discipline is rendered protection; non-discipline, non-protection; the nonmanifest, the uninstructive; limb, part; bhikṣu, bhikṣu in the older transcription; intermediate existence, intermediate skandha; applied and sustained thought, awareness and observation; Kaśmīra, Jibin; madness of mind, derangement of mind; the northern continent, Kuru; foul and turbid, coarse and rough; individual liberation is rendered prātimokṣa, while for the one-day observance he uses on the contrary the transcription upavāsa. As to form, Xuanzang gives “the stanza says / the treatise says,” setting out the whole stanza first, while Paramārtha gives “the verse says / the explanation says,” embedding the explanation line by line.

One place happens to afford a collateral witness to a variant reading. For the last of the four kinds of bhikṣu Xuanzang has “the bhikṣu who has broken the afflictions,” and the Taishō collation note gives a further reading “who has broken the discipline”; Paramārtha’s version has “bhikṣus are of four kinds: first the bhikṣu in name, second the self-styled bhikṣu, third the mendicant bhikṣu, fourth the bhikṣu who has broken the afflictions” — and what he relies upon runs the same road as the reading “afflictions.” This is a cross-version collateral witness, and the choosing between the readings belongs to another; here it is only recorded.

One divergence of gathering and dividing is worth noting. For the five fields of merit Xuanzang sets out the path of seeing and the path of cultivation as two and so makes five, while Paramārtha’s version has “the absorption of cessation, non-contention, loving-kindness, and rising from the fruit of an arhat by seeing; the actions of harm or benefit toward them have their result experienced in the present life,” gathering the paths of seeing and cultivation into the single item “the fruit of an arhat by seeing.” All three commentaries follow the fivefold structure of Xuanzang’s version, and no divergent explanation answering to Paramārtha’s gathered account is found. This difference touches whether the number of the five fields is listed alike; recorded without adjudication.

The direction of fullness and brevity is not uniform. In the simile of the palmyra tree Paramārtha’s version has the further phrase “nor will it put forth shoots again,” which Xuanzang’s version lacks; while for the names of the five stages within the womb the characters of transcription differ wholly between the two versions (kalala against kalala otherwise written, arbuda against arbuda otherwise written, peśī against peśī otherwise written, ghana against ghana otherwise written, praśākhā against praśākhā otherwise written), being different transcriptions of one and the same Sanskrit word and no divergence in doctrine. As for the seven characters “the Vibhāṣā masters do not allow this account,” the two versions agree word for word — a rare instance in this fascicle of the two translations coinciding completely.

4. Coordinates for Parallel Reading

The core of what this fascicle makes out is the full compass of the dharma “nonmanifest” on its two sides of obtaining and relinquishing. Its real existence is in this treatise a premise; once one comes to the Yogācāra lineage this premise is expressly cancelled — the Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only puts to the same dharma a counter-question outright: if manifest action is really nonexistent, on what ground is the nonmanifest real? And it sets up another road instead — establishing the nonmanifest conventionally upon the delimitations, wholesome and unwholesome, of volition and aspiration. One and the same name, which the one lineage establishes as a really existent form and discusses in fine detail as to the conditions of its obtaining and relinquishing, while the other adjudges it a conventional establishment upon the delimitations of volition and aspiration. The two lineages part ways, and here the edge shows most; both parties are recorded only, without adjudication.

The gates of action explained in the second half of this fascicle correspond almost item for item in the root treatise of the Yogācāra lineage: action included in discipline, action included in non-discipline, action included in what is neither discipline nor non-discipline, meritorious action, unmeritorious action, immovable action, action conducive to pleasant feeling, action conducive to painful feeling, action conducive to feeling neither painful nor pleasant, action conducive to being experienced in the present life, action conducive to being experienced in the next birth, action conducive to being experienced in a later life, crooked action, foul action, turbid action, pure action, still action — the items of the dharma-numbers are wholly the same in the two lineages, save that that lineage lists after the crooked, foul, and turbid the two further items of pure action and still action, which this fascicle does not have.

Where the name is the same and the criterion differs is in settled and unsettled action. This fascicle judges by the settledness or unsettledness of time and the settledness or unsettledness of maturation; that lineage judges by doing and increasing — the Yogācārabhūmi takes as action conducive to being certainly experienced what is ‘after deliberate volition both done and increased,’ and as action conducive to being uncertainly experienced what is ‘after deliberate volition done but not increased,’ while as to what counts as increasing that treatise sets up a definition of its own, excepting ten kinds of action. This difference may further be read together with the section on madness of mind in this fascicle: among the ten kinds of action excepted in that lineage is one, the action done in madness and distraction — action done in madness and distraction not being reckoned as increased in that lineage, while this fascicle makes out at Root 59 the causes and places of madness of mind. What the two lineages ask is different: the one asks when it is experienced and whether the maturation is settled, the other asks whether it is done and increased. Recorded without adjudication.

The last place is the gathering and dividing of discipline. The discipline of this fascicle is made out as to obtaining and relinquishing only with regard to the three kinds, individual liberation, the meditative absorptions, and that without outflows; the Mahāyāna study of the discipline makes three collections — the Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only, explaining the study of the discipline, makes three divisions: first the discipline of restraint, which is the right separation from the dharmas to be separated from; second the discipline of gathering wholesome dharmas, which is the right cultivation and realization of the dharmas to be cultivated and realized; third the discipline of benefiting sentient beings, which is the right benefiting and gladdening of all sentient beings. There the whole discipline discussed in this fascicle is only the first of the three collections, and the remaining two collections have no answering item in the system of this fascicle. The divergence of gathering and dividing is recorded only.