俱舍論 結縛纏垢·五蓋·斷惑遍知Abhidharmakośabhāṣya · Fetters, Bonds, Entanglements, and Grime · The Five Hindrances · Abandoning the Afflictions and Full Comprehension

Before Reading This Fascicle

This fascicle is the close of the chapter on the afflictions in the Abhidharmakośa, and it is also the fascicle in the whole treatise that most resembles a ledger book. The two foregoing fascicles finished the entity, the number, the realm-affiliation, and the increase by attachment of the latent tendencies; this one opens its mouth and adds no new dharma at all — it merely changes the names: fetter, bond, latent tendency, secondary affliction, entanglement, and grime of affliction besides, six names turning back to look once more over the same set of afflictions. The three ancient commentaries let the knife of their outlines fall at one and the same place here: Puguang’s Record marks “below, the second, explaining the six gates of fetter and the rest,” Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary marks “from here the second, explaining the six gates of fetter and the rest,” and Fabao’s Commentary, citing the treatise’s own words, marks “it gathers up the four foregoing gates and produces the gate that follows” — three houses dividing their fascicles independently and the boundary agreeing throughout.

Why change the names? Because each name measures one function of the afflictions: a fetter ties, a bond binds fast, a latent tendency lies dormant, a secondary affliction follows along, an entanglement enwraps in the present moment, a grime defiles. The same set of things changes its number when the rule changes, and this is the move this treatise loves best; if in reading this fascicle one only remembers the numbers and never asks “which rule was this number taken with,” what one is left with at the end is a heap of names and marks impossible to keep hold of.

There is one more thing to say first. Concealed within this fascicle is a chapter-level main division of the outline — with the four words “now this should be considered” (the page anchor falling in the middle of the fascicle) the whole chapter turns from “explaining the entity of the afflictions” into “explaining the cessation of the afflictions.” This cut does not fall at the fascicle boundary; it falls in mid-fascicle. The three ancient commentaries all mark the second of the main text here at once: Puguang’s Record gives “below, within this chapter, the second of the main text, explaining the cessation of the afflictions,” Fabao’s Commentary gives “from here below, the second of the main text, explaining abandonment,” and Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary gives “from here the second of the main text, explaining the cessation of the afflictions.” This fascicle is therefore in fact two halves: the first half is still the general account book of the afflictions, and the whole second half is the method of settling accounts — the four causes of abandoning the afflictions, the four kinds of counteragent, abandonment from the side of the object, the four kinds of distance, and at the last the six-tiered mechanism of the nine full comprehensions closing the whole chapter. A separate large section will be set up below when that point is reached; take note of the turn made there.

I. Six Names: No New Dharma Added, Only a Change of Rule

〔1.1〕Why five more must be spoken of after the outflows and the torrents. First the question: the outflows, the torrents, the yokes, and the appropriations were just finished in the foregoing fascicle, and the names of the afflictions are already not few; why set up the five of fetter and the rest besides? The treatise’s answer is a single sentence — “it is just these afflictions that, because the senses of fetter, bond, latent tendency, secondary affliction, and entanglement differ, are further spoken of as five kinds.” The key lies in the three words “the senses differ”: it is not that dharmas have been added, but that senses have been added. What “outflow” takes is the leaking out, what “torrent” takes is the drowning and sweeping away, what “fetter” takes is the tying and binding, what “entanglement” takes is the enwrapping of what is presently active — the names are a functional profile of the afflictions and not an inventory of them.

The easy error: to take the six gates as six classes of affliction, and then to ask “how many fetters are there, how many entanglements, and what do they come to when added?” They cannot be added. The six gates are six fresh stocktakings of one and the same set of accounts, each with a different angle of questioning. In practice: when you read on and find nine fetters, ten entanglements, six grimes, do not hurry to add them up; ask first by which function this gate is gathering them in.

II. The Nine Fetters: Nine Cords from Craving and Ill Will to Envy and Avarice

〔2.1〕The list of the nine fetters and the definition of the fetter of craving. First the question: which nine are the nine fetters? The treatise lists them in good order — “first the fetter of craving, second the fetter of ill will, third the fetter of pride, fourth the fetter of ignorance, fifth the fetter of views, sixth the fetter of grasping, seventh the fetter of doubt, eighth the fetter of envy, ninth the fetter of avarice.” Among them there is one defining sentence for the fetter of craving that matters most: “the fetter of craving here means greed in the three realms.” Notice that it does not say “greed in the desire realm” — greed in all three realms counts as the fetter of craving, and so greed for form and greed for the formless are cords no less, not excused because they are subtle. As for the three of pride, ignorance, and doubt, the treatise says “for the rest, their marks should be adjudged as is fitting,” handing the definitions back to the places already adjudged in the foregoing fascicles rather than repeating them.

The easy error: to read “craving” as human affection. The craving here is another name for greed, and what it measures is adhesion; the subtler the greed for a state of absorption, the less it looks like an affliction, and yet it enters the fetters all the same. In practice: the very first of the nine fetters blocks off the line of retreat that says “what I feel is a pure liking” — greed in all three realms goes into the ledger without exception.

〔2.2〕A very fine exchange: the dharma bound by the fetter of craving alone and not by the fetter of views. The treatise inserts here an extremely fine posed question: is there a dharma that is associated with views and yet is bound only by the fetter of craving and not by the fetter of views, while the latent tendency of views still increases by attachment upon it? Answer: there is. It is, at that stage where the cognition of origination has already arisen and the cognition of cessation has not yet arisen, the dharmas associated with the two graspings that are abandoned through seeing cessation and through seeing the path.

First ask: why that stage in particular? Because the all-pervading fetter of views (that which can take another category for its object) has already been forever abandoned at the abandoning through seeing origination, and so the fetter of views cannot bind them; while the fetter of views that is not all-pervading can be neither their object nor associated with them, both roads being cut. But the fetter of craving takes an object universally, and can still bind them as its object. As for the latent tendency of views, that is their own latent tendency of the two graspings increasing by attachment upon them, which is a different matter from whether the fetter of views binds them.

The easy error: to take “being bound by a certain fetter” and “a certain latent tendency increasing by attachment” for one and the same thing. It is exactly these two that the treatise here means to pry apart — binding is spoken of from the side of the fetter’s power to bind, increase by attachment from the side of a latent tendency growing upon its object, and the one may be present where the other is not. In practice: when in reading Abhidharma you meet a fine exchange of this kind wedged into the middle of a list, do not skip it; such passages are very often demonstrating exactly how the criterion just established is to be used.

III. The Fetters of Views and of Grasping: An Equal Count of Things and the Division of What Grasps from What Is Grasped

〔3.1〕Why the three views and the two graspings must be split into two fetters. First the question: since the fetter of views gathers in the views, why not gather the two graspings in as well and set up one fetter only? The treatise answers: “the three views and the two graspings are equal in things and equal in grasping” — two layers of reason. The first layer is “equal in things”: the three views have eighteen things and the two graspings likewise eighteen, the count of entities being exactly equal; things are well gathered only where one side is more and the other less, and an equal number is precisely a reason for setting them up apart. The second layer is “equal in grasping”: the three views are the side of what is grasped, the two graspings the side of what grasps, and since what grasps and what is grasped differ, they are “set up as two fetters.”

The easy error: to suppose that “equal in things” means the two are of the same nature and therefore ought to be gathered. It is exactly the reverse — the treatise here uses the equality of the count to prove that they can each stand independently as a fetter without imbalance, and then uses the difference of what grasps from what is grasped to prove that they must be divided. In practice: hereafter, when you meet a dispute in this treatise over “opening out” and “gathering together,” look first for the two rules — the count of entities and the function; almost every joining and dividing in this treatise is settled by these two.

IV. Envy and Avarice Enter the Fetters: Two Conditions, and the Trouble Brought by the Ten Entanglements

〔4.1〕Why, of the ten entanglements, only envy and avarice are raised into the nine fetters. First the question: the entanglements being so many, why are only the two of envy and avarice promoted to fetters? The treatise answers, “because these two alone are unwholesome and arise of themselves” — two conditions must be present at once: being unwholesome alone (not extending to the indeterminate), and being able to arise of themselves (able to become active on their own without leaning upon a root affliction abandoned through seeing). “These two alone have both senses present; the rest are not so.”

〔4.2〕The author takes his own reason apart on the spot. This passage shows the character of the treatise better than any other. Having established the reason, the treatise at once points out its limit itself: “if the entanglements were eight alone this explanation would pass, but if one grants that there are ten entanglements this explanation is unreasonable” — since rage and concealment equally possess those two senses. The Vaibhāṣika school granting ten entanglements, this explanation is no longer sufficient, and so a second reason is established instead: “one should say that the faults of envy and avarice are especially grave, in that these two occur again and again”; and three further sets of reasons are added — that they can be causes of lowliness and of poverty (envy drawing lowliness, avarice drawing poverty), that they display universally the two classes of secondary affliction, the dejected and the glad (envy belonging to the dejected, avarice to the glad), and that they harass the two divisions of those gone forth and those at home (turned about again into the three pairs of gods and asuras, humans and gods, another’s party and one’s own).

The easy error: to take the string that follows as a “supplement.” It is not a supplement but a replacement — the earlier reason has already been adjudged unreasonable by the author himself under the premise of ten entanglements. In practice: in reading a treatise one must see clearly the premise under which a reason holds; one and the same conclusion does not rest on the same reason under a scheme of eight entanglements and under a scheme of ten. This passage is also a specimen of the treatise’s form: establishing one’s own account, refuting it oneself, and establishing another instead, all completed within one and the same passage.

V. The Five Fetters of the Lower Part: Two Keep You In, Three Drag You Back

〔5.1〕Which five they are, and what it is they favor. First the question: what does “the lower part” of “favoring the lower part” refer to? The treatise answers, “these five favor and benefit the realm that is the lower part” — “that is, the desire realm alone obtains the name of the lower part”; and the five are the view of a real person, the grasping at rules and observances, doubt, greed for the objects of desire, and ill will. The division of labor is quite clear: the latter two (greed for the objects of desire, ill will) make a man “unable to pass beyond the desire realm,” while the former three (the view of a real person, the grasping at rules and observances, doubt) make it that “even if he were able to pass beyond, by the former three he comes down again.” The simile the treatise gives is “like the jailer who keeps guard and the patrolman who goes his rounds” — the jailer shuts you in, the patrolman catches back the one who has got out, the one keeping guard and the other pursuing.

〔5.2〕Another reading: the lower part means sentient beings of the lower sort. The treatise records alongside “some other master says”: the lower part refers not to a realm but to two senses, “the lower sentient beings, that is, the ordinary beings,” and “the lower realm, that is, the desire realm”; the former three can obstruct one from passing beyond the class of ordinary beings (abandon them and one becomes a noble one), the latter two can make one not pass beyond the lower realm. ⇒ One and the same name has two ways of being cut, and the treatise records both without adjudicating.

The easy error: to suppose that one of the two accounts must be right. The form of this treatise is that where the sūtras have no express statement both parties are recorded together. In practice: the simile is very serviceable — when your practice is stuck, first distinguish whether you are being shut in by “greed for the objects of desire and ill will,” or whether you had got out and were caught back by “the view of a real person, the grasping at rules and observances, and doubt”; the two ways of being stuck are counteracted differently.

VI. The Stream-Enterer Abandons Three Fetters: Gate and Root, Two Ways of Gathering

〔6.1〕Six are plainly abandoned; why does the sūtra speak only of three. First the question: the afflictions abandoned by a stream-enterer are in truth six (besides the three fetters there are the extreme view, the grasping at views, and wrong view); why does the sūtra speak only of “abandoning three fetters”? The treatise answers with entire honesty: “in principle one ought to say that six afflictions are abandoned; it is because of the gathering of gate and of root that it speaks only of abandoning three” — speaking of three is not that fewer are abandoned, but raising the three that gather in as representatives of the six.

The gathering has two layers. One is “gate”: among the six there are three kinds of class — that extending to one category alone, that extending to two, that extending to four; speaking of abandoning these three kinds gathers in those three gates. The other is “root”: among the six there are three that turn along with another — “the extreme view turns along with the view of a real person, the grasping at views turns along with the grasping at rules and observances, wrong view turns along with doubt”; speaking of abandoning these three kinds gathers in those three roots. Hence “in saying that three are abandoned it has already said that six are abandoned.”

〔6.2〕A third explanation: the three obstructions to going to another region. The treatise records another explanation besides, taking the simile of a traveler: whoever would go to another region has three obstructions — not wishing to set out, losing the right road (because he goes by a wrong road), and doubting the right road; and one who goes toward liberation has three similar obstructions: by the view of a real person he dreads liberation and will not set out, by the grasping at rules and observances he clings to a wrong path and loses the right road, and by doubt he is deeply irresolute about the path.

The easy error: to read “abandoning three” as a shrunken list. In practice: this passage gives a very useful self-examination — when you halt upon the path, is it because you have no wish to walk at all, because you have taken the wrong road, or because you are walking and yet do not believe this is the road? Each of the three obstructions answers to one fetter.

VII. The Five Fetters of the Upper Part: The Subtler, the Harder to Pass; Five Cords Keeping One in the Upper Two Realms

〔7.1〕The symmetry of the upper five with the lower five. First the question: there being fetters favoring the lower part, why set up fetters favoring the upper part besides? The treatise answers: “if these five kinds are not yet abandoned, they can make sentient beings unable to pass beyond the upper realms. Because they favor and benefit the upper realms, they are called the fetters favoring the upper part” — the five being greed for form, greed for the formless, restlessness, pride, and ignorance. Their symmetry with the lower ones lies in this: the lower keep one in the desire realm, the upper keep one in the upper two realms; and the names are alike taken from “favoring and benefiting” — whichever part they favor gives them their name.

The easy error: to suppose that the afflictions of the upper realms, being indeterminate, are no obstruction. The afflictions of the upper two realms are indeed not unwholesome, and yet they bind all the same — the quality of good and evil and the matter of binding or not binding are two different things. In practice: restlessness and pride within a state of absorption are the hardest of all to notice, because they show no coarse mark; that the treatise sets them beside the two greeds for form and the formless is precisely a reminder that the stiller the place, the finer the cord.

VIII. The Three Bonds: Why There Are Only Three Bonds

〔8.1〕The entity of the three bonds and the reason for establishing three. First the question: the afflictions being so many, why are only three bonds established? The treatise first gives the entity — “first the bond of greed, that is, all greed; second the bond of hatred, that is, all hatred; third the bond of delusion, that is, all delusion” — and then the reason: “because it is in accordance with the three feelings that bonds are said to be three”: toward pleasant feeling the bond of greed increases by attachment (both kinds of increase by attachment, as object and as associated), toward painful feeling hatred, toward neutral feeling delusion.

〔8.2〕One misunderstanding that has to be cleared away. The treatise blocks it beforehand itself: “although toward neutral feeling there are greed and hatred as well, they are not as delusion is” — it is not that there are no greed and hatred toward neutral feeling, but that greed and hatred are not so fitting toward neutral feeling as delusion is. And it adds a limiting sentence: “with regard to one’s own continuum, and taking the three feelings, pleasant and the rest, as the object of the bonds, this settled statement is made” — this correspondence is a settled statement made with regard to one’s own continuum and with the three feelings as object, and is not a claim that greed arises only upon pleasant feeling.

The easy error: to read the three feelings and the three poisons as an iron rule of one-to-one correspondence. The treatise has said expressly that this is only a settled statement made with regard to “the feeling that is the object.” In practice: this set is the most serviceable index for contemplative practice — where there is pleasure look for greed, where there is pain look for hatred, where there is neither look for delusion; the third is the most easily missed, because neutral feeling gives no sting, and that is exactly the hotbed of delusion.

IX. The Latent Tendencies Dealt with in One Line: The Treatise’s Method of Abridgment

〔9.1〕Why this gate has only five characters. The stanza reads simply “the latent tendencies have been spoken of above,” and the prose adds only one sentence: “the latent tendencies are six, or seven or ten, or ninety-eight, as has been said above.” First ask: why, of the six gates, is this one alone so summary? Because the latent tendencies are the very subject of the two foregoing fascicles, where the four tiers of opening and gathering — six, seven, ten, ninety-eight — have been adjudged in the fullest detail; here only one slot needs to be filled on the roster of the six gates.

The easy error: to suppose that this gate has nothing to discuss and to skip it. It in fact points to something: the skeleton of the six gates was fixed beforehand, and the latent tendencies are merely one slot placed into that skeleton; in other words, the treatise does not set up a gate because it has something to say, but because the skeleton ought to have this slot. In practice: when in reading this treatise you meet an extremely short section, it is usually not that there is little content, but that it has been finished elsewhere; what to do then is to go back and fill in that place, not to pass it over.

X. Secondary Afflictions: One General Name, One Particular Name

〔10.1〕Two uses of one and the same name. First the question: do the root afflictions themselves count as secondary afflictions? The treatise’s answer has two layers. The layer of the general name: “these afflictions too are called secondary afflictions, since they all follow along with mind and do the work of harassing it” — the root afflictions too are called secondary afflictions, the sense taken being “following along with mind and harassing it.” The layer of the particular name: there is besides a set of defiled mental factors different from the root afflictions, gathered under the aggregate of formations, which “are also called secondary afflictions because they arise along with the afflictions, but are not called afflictions, since they are not roots” — the sense taken being “arising along with the afflictions.”

The easy error: to run the two layers into one, whereupon one cannot make sense of “why greed too is called a secondary affliction and rage too is called a secondary affliction.” One and the same name often has a general and a particular use in this treatise, and the criterion is the place from which the sense is taken: the one follows along with mind, the other follows along with an affliction. In practice: the ten entanglements and six grimes below all belong to the layer of the particular name; when you meet the words “secondary affliction,” ask first whether the general or the particular sense is being taken here.

XI. The Ten Entanglements: Two Schools on Eight and Ten, and the Glossing of Each Name

〔11.1〕Two schools on the number. First the question: are the entanglements eight or ten? The treatise records the two accounts together — “yet the Treatise on Categories of Dharmas says there are eight entanglements, and the Vaibhāṣika school says there are ten entanglements,” the ten being the eight plus rage and concealment. The treatise does not adjudge which is right; but below, in treating the reason for setting up envy and avarice as fetters, it has already taken the premise of “ten entanglements” in earnest (see section IV), from which one may see that within this treatise both schools’ numbers have to be able to run.

〔11.2〕Each name glossed, and every one given a verifiable mark. Envy is “that which makes the mind unglad at the flourishing affairs of others”; avarice is “that which, contrary to the giving of goods, of dharma, and of skill, makes the mind cling and grudge”; regret is just the regret over the evil deed done; sleep is “that whose nature is to make the mind murky and slight, having no force to sustain the body”; rage is “that which, apart from hatred and harmfulness, makes the mind flare up toward the sentient and the insentient”; concealment is “the hiding of one’s own sin.” Among them regret and sleep carry one important limitation — “the two entanglements of regret and sleep take only the defiled”: wholesome remorse and wholesome sleep do not enter this count.

The easy error: to read sleep as physiological slumber and regret as all reflection. The treatise has already cut them in half with the words “taking only the defiled.” In practice: glossing names is not memorizing names and marks; it is being given a set of marks that can be checked against oneself on the spot — being unglad at another’s flourishing, a mind that clings and grudges, a mind murky and slight, a mind that flares up, the hiding of a sin: all five marks can be verified upon the mind here and now.

XII. The Four Homogeneous Outflows of the Entanglements: Three Divergent Accounts of Concealment

〔12.1〕From which root affliction each entanglement flows out. First the question: what does “homogeneous outflow” mean? It means issuing forth as a continuation of the same class — a certain secondary affliction is the residual force of the same class as a certain root affliction. The treatise’s assignments are: non-conscience, avarice, and restlessness belong to the homogeneous outflow of greed; shamelessness, sleep, and torpor to the homogeneous outflow of ignorance; envy and rage to the homogeneous outflow of hatred; regret to the homogeneous outflow of doubt.

〔12.2〕Concealment alone has three accounts. The treatise here records three houses together: “some say concealment is the homogeneous outflow of greed. Some say it is the homogeneous outflow of ignorance. Some say it is the homogeneous outflow of both,” and with the words “knowing and not knowing, each in its own order” it points out what the three accounts fasten upon: if the man who hides his sin knows in his heart that he has sinned and hides it deliberately, it inclines to greed; if he covers it over without knowing or noticing, it inclines to ignorance; if there is something of both, then it belongs to the homogeneous outflow of both.

The easy error: to suppose that one of the three accounts must be chosen. The treatise here does not even hand down a verdict; it merely gives a rule for reading the three accounts (knowing / not knowing). In practice: what makes concealment hard to classify is precisely that hiding a sin may arise either from cherishing one’s name and gain (greed) or from having no knowledge of oneself (delusion) — and this item, of all of them, comes closest to daily use.

XIII. The Six Grimes of Affliction: Another Set, Coarser in Their Defilement

〔13.1〕The names and marks of the six grimes. First the question: where does a grime differ from an entanglement? The name of grime is established in “these six kinds arise from the afflictions, and being coarse in the mark of their defilement are called grimes of affliction” — what it takes is defilement that is coarse and manifest. The six are vexation, harmfulness, resentment, flattery, deception, and self-intoxication, each with its definition: vexation is “stubbornly holding fast to sinful matters, and by this not accepting reasonable admonition and instruction”; harmfulness is “being able to press hard upon others, and by this able to perform beating and reviling and the like”; resentment is “upon the matter that was the object of rage, pondering again and again, binding up enmity and not letting go”; flattery is “crookedness of mind, and by this being unable to display oneself as one truly is”; deception is “deluding others”; self-intoxication has been explained above.

〔13.2〕Four homogeneous outflows and one proof from a sūtra. Deception and self-intoxication belong to the homogeneous outflow of greed; harmfulness and resentment to the homogeneous outflow of hatred; vexation to the homogeneous outflow of the grasping at views; flattery to the homogeneous outflow of the views. For this last the treatise adds a proof from a sūtra of set purpose — “as it is said, what is crookedness? It is the evil views; hence flattery is definitely the homogeneous outflow of the views.”

The easy error: to confound resentment with rage. The treatise has already divided their work — rage is the flaring up of the present moment, resentment is the aftermath, “pondering again and again, binding up enmity and not letting go”; the one is fire, the other embers under ash. In practice: four of the six grimes are directed at other people (harmfulness, resentment, flattery, deception), and this set is the best test of whether “my afflictions have come down upon somebody else.”

XIV. The Gate of Abandonment for the Entanglements and Grimes: Five Extend to Both Seeing and Cultivation, the Rest Are Abandoned through Cultivation Alone

〔14.1〕Why only five extend to what is abandoned through seeing. First the question: the ten entanglements and six grimes are sixteen in all, and in respect of abandonment they fall into two batches; what is the criterion of the division? The treatise answers: the five of non-conscience, shamelessness, sleep, torpor, and restlessness “extend to what is abandoned through seeing and through cultivation, since these extend to arising in association with the afflictions of both categories” — they can arise in association with the afflictions of both the categories abandoned through seeing and abandoned through cultivation, and so their abandonment is settled by whichever they accompany: “as it is associated with what is abandoned through seeing this truth, so it is said to be abandoned through seeing this truth.” The rest — envy, avarice, regret, rage, concealment, together with the six grimes — “are abandoned through cultivation alone, since they arise of themselves.”

〔14.2〕The definition of “arising of themselves” must be seen clearly. The definition the treatise gives is: “because they are associated only with the ignorance dependent on another that is abandoned through cultivation, they are called arising of themselves” — “of themselves” does not mean that they are strong; it means that they do not lean upon a root affliction abandoned through seeing, and keep company only with the solitary ignorance abandoned through cultivation.

The easy error: to read “arising of themselves” as free and unconstrained, or as powerful. It is a technical term, and what it measures is the relation of dependence. In practice: this item explains something very real — the path of seeing abandons a great many afflictions, and yet not one of envy, avarice, rage, and the other things that trouble one most in daily life is abandoned by it; because they do not hang on the side of what is abandoned through seeing at all, and can only be ground away grade by grade by the path of cultivation.

XV. The Gate of the Three Ethical Qualities: Three of the Desire Realm Extend to Two Qualities

〔15.1〕Which of them are not purely evil. First the question: are the secondary afflictions unwholesome without exception? The treatise answers that they are not — “the three of sleep, torpor, and restlessness affiliated to the desire realm all extend to the two qualities of unwholesome and indeterminate; all the rest are unwholesome alone”; while those of the upper two realms are “all gathered under the indeterminate quality alone.”

The easy error: to read “indeterminate” as harmless. Indeterminate says only that it does not draw a maturational result; it does not say that it is no obstruction to the path. Torpor, restlessness, and self-intoxication in the upper realms are all indeterminate, and yet they remain fetters binding one to the upper realms (as was said in section VII). In practice: this gate should be read together with the earlier item “envy and avarice are unwholesome alone” — it is precisely because envy and avarice are purely unwholesome that they qualify for promotion to fetters, while sleep, torpor, and restlessness extend to two qualities and so cannot be promoted. The two gates corroborate each other, and this is the use of the six gates’ repeated stocktaking.

XVI. The Gate of Realm-Affiliation: A Story of Flattery and Deception Reaching the First Meditative Absorption

〔16.1〕The great Brahmā king deludes the monk Aśvajit. First the question: how do such coarse mental factors as flattery and deception get up as far as the first meditative absorption? The treatise takes an event from a sūtra as its proof: “because the great Brahmā king concealed the facts of his own condition and, displaying an appearance, deluded the monk Aśvajit” — the great Brahmā king hid his real state and put forth an appearance that turned the questioner aside. And the treatise states its own form: “although these two were analyzed above, since the sense is connected they are adjudged over again here.” As for the rest: torpor, restlessness, and self-intoxication extend to the three realms; the remaining eleven are in the desire realm alone.

The easy error: to suppose that no such mental factor could be found in the states of the heavens. The one the treatise adduces is the Brahmā king in the highest position of all. In practice: this story is cited more than once in Abhidharma, and its weight lies here — a high station does not mean that the afflictions have been purified; what keeps flattery and deception in being is that there is still an image of an “I” to be maintained.

XVII. The Gate of the Ground of Consciousness: Which Arise in the Mental Consciousness Alone

〔17.1〕The three batches belonging to the mental ground alone. First the question: can all six consciousnesses give rise to the afflictions? The treatise divides them into two batches: all that is abandoned through seeing, all pride and sleep, and among the secondary afflictions those that arise of themselves — “all these depend upon the mental consciousness, since there is no room for their arising in dependence upon the group of five consciousnesses”; the rest extend to all six consciousnesses — greed, hatred, and ignorance abandoned through cultivation, and the non-conscience, shamelessness, torpor, and restlessness associated with them, and those gathered under the factors of the great defiled ground.

The easy error: to suppose that “arising in dependence upon the five consciousnesses” means that eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body are giving rise to afflictions. The treatise’s criterion is whether or not they can arise apart from discrimination: an affliction abandoned through seeing must depend upon discrimination, and the five consciousnesses do not discriminate, so there is no room for their arising. In practice: this gate explains why the path of seeing can abandon a great batch of afflictions all at once — whatever is propped up by discrimination collapses as soon as the principle is seen through; while the batch that extends to all six consciousnesses must be ground away slowly by the path of cultivation, because they do not live upon reasons.

XVIII. The Feelings Associated with the Root Afflictions: The Glad Mode and the Dejected Mode

〔18.1〕A new rule: the glad mode and the dejected mode. First the question: how does one adjudge which feeling a given affliction is associated with? The treatise crosses two lines — whether the mode of apprehension is glad or dejected, and whether it pervades the six consciousnesses or not. Greed is of the glad mode and pervades the six consciousnesses, and so is associated with joy and pleasure; hatred is of the dejected mode and pervades the six consciousnesses, and so is associated with sorrow and pain; ignorance turns in both the glad and the dejected modes and pervades the six consciousnesses, and so is associated with all the four foregoing feelings; wrong view turns in both modes but belongs to the mental ground alone, and so extends to sorrow and joy; doubt is of the dejected mode and belongs to the mental ground alone, and so is associated with sorrow; the remaining four views and pride are of the glad mode and belong to the mental ground alone, and so are associated with joy.

〔18.2〕Why wrong view can be either glad or dejected. The treatise poses itself a question and answers it: “because they had formerly done, in that order, sinful or meritorious action” — one who had formerly done sin is glad when wrong view arises (supposing there is no retribution), while one who had formerly done merit is dejected when wrong view arises (supposing his merit is void). For doubt there is a separate explanation: “one who harbors irresolution seeks a settled knowing, and so his mind is downcast.”

〔18.3〕Above the particular mark there is one further item, neutral feeling. The particular marks done, the treatise adds one general mark: “all of them are associated with neutral feeling, since the latent tendencies, at the stage where the continuum is about to be abandoned, have their force spent and must abide in neutral feeling.” For the upper grounds, “all of them, as is fitting, are associated with the feelings that arise together with their own ground and their own consciousness.”

The easy error: to suppose that neutral feeling conflicts with the joy, sorrow, pain, and pleasure spoken of above. There is no conflict — the particular mark is spoken of from the side of the mode of apprehension of what is presently active, the general mark from the side of the stage where the force is spent; the two rules are not measuring the same stretch. In practice: this gate is the most serviceable passage of all for contemplation — from “is this moment glad or dejected” you can infer backward which class of affliction is present.

XIX. The Feelings Associated with the Secondary Afflictions: The Four That Are Associated Universally, beyond Sorrow and Joy

〔19.1〕The assignments group by group. The six of envy, regret, rage, vexation, harmfulness, and resentment “are all associated with the faculty of sorrow, since they turn in the dejected mode and belong to the mental ground alone”; avarice is associated with joy, and the treatise adds a reason — “since the mark of avarice is extremely like that of greed”; flattery, deception, sleep, and concealment arise together with both sorrow and joy, because “sometimes one performs flattery and the rest with a glad mind, and sometimes one performs them with a dejected mind”; self-intoxication is associated with joy and pleasure, being associated with pleasure in the third meditative absorption and with joy in the grounds below.

〔19.2〕Why the last four are associated with all five feelings. Non-conscience, shamelessness, torpor, and restlessness “are all four associated universally with the five feelings,” the reason lying in the ground-factors they belong to — the first two are factors of the great unwholesome ground (pervading every unwholesome mind), the latter two factors of the great defiled ground (pervading every defiled mind). Whatever “pervades” naturally pervades in respect of feeling as well.

The easy error: to memorize the assignments by rote. The treatise gives a reason for every one of them (the glad or dejected mode, belonging to the mental ground alone, being gathered under a ground-factor); what is to be learned is the reason, not the table. In practice: the group of flattery and deception is most worth noticing — one and the same flattery may be done with a smile or done with a heavy heart; which shows precisely that a secondary affliction is fixed in its nature not by the emotion but by the mode of apprehension.

XX. The Five Hindrances: In the Desire Realm Alone, Two Entities Gathered into One, Five Because They Obstruct the Aggregates

〔20.1〕How it is proved that the five hindrances are in the desire realm alone. First the question: are the three of torpor, restlessness, and doubt among the five hindrances, like sleep and regret, in the desire realm alone? The treatise answers that they are in the desire realm alone, and takes its evidence from a sūtra — “since the sūtra says that these five kinds are purely and entirely an unwholesome heap”; and “in the form and formless realms there is nothing unwholesome,” so the five hindrances do not extend to the upper realms. This is a way of inferring that fixes the realm from the quality: being purely unwholesome, they cannot go up.

〔20.2〕Food, counteragent, and function being the same, two entities are gathered into one hindrance. First the question: torpor and sleep are two dharmas, restlessness and regret are two dharmas; why is each pair gathered into one hindrance? The treatise gives three words and glosses them one by one — “food is what is eaten, also called provision”; “counteragent is what counteracts, also called non-food”; “function is the activity performed, also called capability.” The food of the hindrance of torpor-and-sleep is five dharmas: murkiness, dissatisfaction, yawning and stretching, unevenness of diet, and dullness and inferiority of mind; its non-food is the ideation of light; and their function is the same in that “both can make the nature of mind sink and grow murky.” The food of the hindrance of restlessness-and-regret is four dharmas: thought of kinsfolk, thought of one’s native land, thought of not dying, and recollection of the various sport, mirth, merrymaking, and being waited upon formerly undergone; its non-food is calm abiding; and their function is the same in that “both can make the mind unquiet.” The three being the same, they are gathered into one.

〔20.3〕The reason for establishing five only: they obstruct the five aggregates. “Because these alone can be an eminent obstruction to the five aggregates” — greed and ill will obstruct the aggregate of discipline, torpor and sleep obstruct the aggregate of discernment, restlessness and regret obstruct the aggregate of concentration; and concentration and discernment being gone, doubt arises with regard to the four truths, and “because of doubt they can make it that even liberation and the knowledge and vision of liberation do not arise.” The five hindrances obstruct all the way down, blocking off the whole of the five aggregates without outflows (discipline, concentration, discernment, liberation, and the knowledge and vision of liberation).

The easy error: to read “food” as food and drink. The food here has the sense of nourishing and sustaining — what is feeding this hindrance. In practice: this is the passage in the whole fascicle that can most directly be taken up and used. If you would abandon torpor and sleep, what the treatise gives is not willpower but an inspection of its food (have you eaten too much, is there something you are unhappy about) and of its non-food (arouse the ideation of light); if you would abandon restlessness and regret, likewise first inspect the four thoughts (longing for home, longing for one’s country, supposing one will not die, savoring the merriment of former days), the non-food being calm abiding. To abandon an affliction, first cut off its board and keep — this is the method this passage leaves behind.

XXI. The Dispute over the Order of the Five Hindrances: One Public Exchange

〔21.1〕The author first refutes the old explanation of his own school. First the question: since greed and ill will obstruct discipline, torpor and sleep discernment, restlessness and regret concentration, then the order in the sūtra (torpor-and-sleep before, restlessness-and-regret after) is in difficulty — for “it is necessarily in dependence upon concentration that discernment arises, and so what obstructs concentration ought likewise to come before what obstructs discernment”; restlessness and regret obstructing concentration, they ought in principle to be ranked before torpor and sleep. This objection is raised by the author himself; and Puguang’s Record marks the refuter plainly here, giving “the author refutes the explanation of the Sarvāstivādin masters given above.”

〔21.2〕The first explanation: exchange the assignments. The treatise adduces “some other master says”: among the five hindrances, torpor-and-sleep and restlessness-and-regret “can obstruct, in that order, the aggregate of concentration and the aggregate of discernment” — torpor-and-sleep obstructing concentration and restlessness-and-regret discernment; the assignments once exchanged, the order in the sūtra falls right. This account has a sūtra in proof besides: “one who cultivates meditative poise dreads torpor and sleep; one who cultivates the discernment of dharmas dreads restlessness and regret.”

〔21.3〕The second explanation: set up the five by five causes instead. The treatise adduces further, “some other, differing account: five are established by five causes,” and unfolds it by question and answer: “what do they say? That is, at the stage of moving about . . .” — first, at the stage of moving about, one takes up toward form and the rest the two marks of the lovable and the detestable; afterward, at the stage of dwelling, there arise the two hindrances of greed for the objects of desire and ill will, and these two obstruct the mind that is about to enter absorption; by this, at the stage of actually entering absorption, calm and insight cannot be rightly practiced, and so torpor-and-sleep and restlessness-and-regret arise, obstructing in that order calm abiding and insight; and by this, at the stage of emerging from absorption, when one considers dharmas, doubt is an obstruction in its turn. ⇒ This explanation leaves the assignments untouched and rearranges the five hindrances upon the time-axis of practice (the stage of moving about, of dwelling, of entering absorption, of emerging from absorption), so that the order falls into place of itself.

The easy error: to read the three passages as three accounts set side by side. They are one continuous line: the objection → the first explanation (exchanging the assignments) → the second explanation (changing the axis). In practice: this passage demonstrates the two legitimate ways of dealing with a difficulty about the order in which a sūtra’s items appear — either change the assignments, or change the axis relied upon; and neither requires altering the text of the sūtra. As to which of the two explanations prevails, the treatise does not adjudge, nor do the ancient masters (see Further Resonances).

XXII. 【Chapter-Level Main Section】From Explaining the Entity of the Afflictions to Explaining Their Cessation

At this point the section of the whole chapter that explains “the entity of the afflictions” is finished. With the four words “now this should be considered” the chapter enters the second of the main text: explaining the cessation of the afflictions. The three ancient commentaries let their knives fall here at once: Puguang’s Record gives “below, within this chapter, the second of the main text, explaining the cessation of the afflictions,” Fabao’s Commentary gives “from here below, the second of the main text, explaining abandonment,” Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary gives “from here the second of the main text, explaining the cessation of the afflictions” — and the six subsections the three of them mark agree as well: the four causes of abandoning the afflictions, the four kinds of counteragent, the place from which the afflictions are abandoned, the four kinds of distance, the cessation obtained in abandoning the afflictions, and the nine full comprehensions.

This cut does not fall at the fascicle boundary but within this fascicle; in reading, one should take a fresh breath here oneself: up to now the counting has been of how many afflictions there are and which slot they belong in; from here on, everything asks one thing — how they came to be gone.

XXIII. The Four Causes of Abandoning the Afflictions: Not Every Affliction Is Abandoned by “Seeing Clearly”

〔23.1〕Look first at how the question is raised. The treatise’s transitional sentence is itself a difficulty: as to the all-pervading afflictions of another realm, and among those abandoned through seeing cessation and seeing the path those that take what has outflows for their object, “at the stage of their abandonment their object is not known, and when their object is known they are not being abandoned” — at the time of abandoning, their object is not yet known; by the time the object is known, they were long since abandoned. Whence it appears that “it is not necessary that they be abandoned through fully comprehending their object.”

〔23.2〕The division of labor among the four causes. The afflictions abandoned through seeing are abandoned by the first three causes: first, abandoned through fully comprehending their object — those abandoned through seeing suffering and seeing origination that take their own realm for their object, and those abandoned through seeing cessation and seeing the path that take what is without outflows for their object (their object being fully comprehended, the affliction is abandoned); second, abandoned through the abandoning of what takes them as object — those abandoned through seeing suffering and seeing origination that take another realm for their object, “since what takes one’s own realm as object can take them as object, and when what takes them as object is abandoned they are abandoned along with it”; third, abandoned through the abandoning of their object — those abandoned through seeing cessation and seeing the path that take what has outflows for their object, “since what takes the outflowless as object can be their field, and when their object is abandoned what takes it as object is abandoned along with it.” The afflictions abandoned through cultivation are abandoned by the fourth cause alone: abandoned because the counteragent arises, “since when the path counteracting this grade arises, the afflictions in this grade are abandoned all at once.”

〔23.3〕One rule of counteragents running the other way. The treatise adds besides: “the afflictions of the highest of the high grades have the path of the lowest of the low grades for their counteragent; and so on down to the afflictions of the lowest of the low grades, which have the path of the highest of the high grades for their counteragent.”

The easy error: to take “abandoned through fully comprehending their object” as the sole model of abandoning the afflictions. This whole section is meant precisely to reduce it to a quarter. In practice: the second and third causes speak of abandonment by association — abandon what takes it as object and the object is abandoned along with it, abandon the object and what takes it as object is abandoned along with it; in practice it is not that every affliction must be dealt with separately once. As for the coarsest afflictions being abandoned by the weakest path and the subtlest waiting for the strongest, this item will be used again and again at the stage of the path of cultivation.

XXIV. The Four Kinds of Counteragent: Four Names, Two Arrangements

〔24.1〕The definitions of the four kinds. The counteragent of abandoning is the path of no interval (the moment of actual abandoning); the counteragent of upholding is “the path after this, since by it the acquisition of this abandonment can be upheld”; the counteragent of distancing is “all the paths after the path of liberation, since by those paths what is abandoned here can be made more distant,” and the treatise records alongside “some other master says: the path of liberation as well” (the path of liberation itself counting too); the counteragent of disgust is “where there is a path that sees the faults of this realm and deeply gives rise to disgust.”

〔24.2〕The second arrangement the author gives. Having listed the four names, the treatise at once states of its own accord: “yet if one would speak well of these counteragents, in principle the order ought to be as follows” — disgust (the path of preparation, arising with suffering and origination for its object), abandoning (the path of no interval, arising with all for its object), upholding (the path of liberation, arising with all for its object), distancing (the path of distinguished progress, arising with all for its object). ⇒ The former is a listing by the names, the latter a listing by the order in which they actually occur in practice.

The easy error: to take the two orders as contradictory. The treatise says it quite clearly itself: the second is “if one would speak well of it” — one and the same set of dharmas, listed once by name and once by fact. In practice: these four answer exactly to the four stages of the path of preparation, the path of no interval, the path of liberation, and the path of distinguished progress; hang the counteragents of the afflictions back upon the four paths, and the map of practice comes right.

XXV. The Afflictions Are Abandoned from the Side of the Object: A Principle Very Easily Misread

〔25.1〕It cannot leave what is associated with it; it can only leave its object. First the question: what, after all, does abandoning an affliction abandon? The treatise answers: “it cannot be made to leave the dharmas associated with it, but it can be made to depart from its object, so that it no longer arises toward that object” — the associated dharmas are simultaneous and coexistent and cannot be pried apart; the only thing that can be pried apart is the affliction and its field.

〔25.2〕How past afflictions are abandoned. The treatise poses itself a difficulty: “abandoning future afflictions” passes well enough (it can be made not to arise toward its field again), but what of past afflictions? And it blocks off one ready answer besides — if “from the side of the object” were taken to mean “abandoned through fully comprehending the object,” that too will not do, “this too being unreasonable, since it is not settled” (the foregoing section having proved that to be only one of four causes). The correct account the treatise gives changes the road: the abandonment of the afflictions in one’s own continuum is “because their acquisition is abandoned” (the acquisition of the affliction being abandoned, the affliction no longer belongs to this body); the abandonment of the afflictions in another’s continuum, and of all form and all undefiled dharmas, is “because all the afflictions in one’s own continuum that take them as object are at last completely abandoned.”

The easy error: to suppose that abandoning an affliction is digging something out of the mind. The treatise’s model is nothing of the kind — what is abandoned is the acquisition and the road to the object, not the affliction annihilated. In practice: this also explains why another’s afflictions are not abandoned by me, nor outer form abandoned by me — all I can abandon is that portion of me which takes them as object.

XXVI. The Four Kinds of Distance: Four Similes and a Passage of Four Rounds

〔26.1〕The four kinds of distance and the four similes. The treatise begins with the two words “it is transmitted” and lists four kinds: distance of mark, as the four great elements (in one mass together and yet differing in mark); distance of counteragent, as keeping and breaking the discipline (in one body together and yet counteracting one another); distance of place, as the eastern and the western seas (in one world together and yet separated by quarter); distance of time, as the past and future ages (resting upon one dharma together and yet separated in time). The structure common to the four similes is distant while in the same place: so “distant” is not a spatial notion but the notion of “not reaching one another.”

〔26.2〕Four rounds of exchange. What follows is the longest passage of question and answer in this fascicle, and Puguang’s Record marks the speaker for each round: “relative to what is distance spoken of” is the author’s question, “relative to the present age” is the Sarvāstivādins’ answer; “what has ceased with nothing intervening . . . how are they called distant” is the author’s objection, “because the natures of the ages differ . . . only then are they called distant” is the Sarvāstivādins’ answer; “if that is so, the present . . . would be called distant” is the author’s further objection. The further objection has three limbs: if the unconditioned dharmas have no activity, how is it that they are on the contrary called near; if it is because the present universally obtains the unconditioned that they are called near, then the past and future ages are equally so, and how much more so empty space, which is unconditioned and has no obtaining at all; and if it is said that the past and future are called distant because they are separated by the present when set against one another, while the present is near to both ages, then the past and the future, being both adjacent to and separated from the present, “have both names, and it should not be said flatly that they are distant.”

〔26.3〕The closing sentence. At the end the treatise gives one explanation: “if one goes by correct principle, one should say that the past and the future are called distant because they are apart from the intrinsic mark of a dharma, the future because it has not yet obtained the intrinsic mark of a dharma, and the past because it has already cast off the intrinsic mark of a dharma” — near and distant being spoken of not from temporal interval but from whether the intrinsic mark of a dharma has been obtained. The word “and the rest” at the end of the stanza the treatise also accounts for: “the word ‘and the rest’ is to show that the instances raised are not exhausted.”

The easy error: to read past the two words “it is transmitted.” When this treatise uses “it is transmitted,” the tone keeps its distance — this is passing on what has been transmitted without taking it as one’s own. In practice: this passage is the best specimen of reasoning in the fascicle; all three objections use one and the same stroke — take the opponent’s criterion and measure something else with it, and see whether it still holds. As for the attribution of this closing sentence and Saṅghabhadra’s counter-refutation, see Further Resonances.

XXVII. The Afflictions Are Not Abandoned Twice, but Release from Bondage Is Obtained Again: Six Occasions

〔27.1〕First distinguish two things. First the question: the path being always in distinguished progress, will the afflictions already abandoned be abandoned a second time? The treatise answers that they will not — “by that path these afflictions are abandoned all at once, and there can be no abandoning of the afflictions again at a later time.” But release from bondage (the unconditioned displayed by abandonment) does have a “repeated obtaining”: release from bondage itself does not improve, “and yet when the path advances there may be the sense of arousing again a superior acquisition of it” — what changes is the acquisition, not the release from bondage.

〔27.2〕The six occasions and the subtraction stage by stage. The six occasions are the arising of the counteracting path (the path of liberation), the obtaining of a fruit (the four of stream-entry, once-returning, non-returning, and arhatship), and the sharpening of the faculties (the turning of the faculties). Below this the treatise performs a subtraction stage by stage: for what is abandoned through seeing the four truths in the desire realm, and through seeing the first three truths in the upper realms, all six occasions are present; for what is abandoned through seeing the truth of the path in the upper realms there are five (the arising of the counteracting path being itself the obtaining of a fruit, not divided into two occasions), and for the first five grades abandoned through cultivation in the desire realm likewise five (the fruit of stream-entry being deducted); for the sixth grade four (the obtaining of the fruit of once-returning falling together with the arising of the counteragent), and for the seventh and eighth grades four (the first two of the four fruits being deducted); for the ninth grade three (the arising of the counteragent being itself the obtaining of the fruit of non-returning), and for what is abandoned through cultivation in the upper two realms, apart from the ninth grade of the summit of existence, likewise three (the first three of the four fruits being deducted); and for the ninth grade of the summit of existence two alone (the arising of the counteragent being itself the obtaining of arhatship).

〔27.3〕The author marks this himself as a provisional statement. At the end he adds a limiting sentence: “thus is it said for the present, as a statement of what may be” — those of sharp faculties do not sharpen the faculties, and those who realize by leaping do not pass through the fruit of stream-entry and the rest; each requires a further subtraction.

The easy error: to memorize this string of numbers by rote. It has in fact only one rule of computation — wherever the arising of the counteracting path and the obtaining of a fruit fall in the same moment, they are merged into one occasion; and wherever that fruit was obtained beforehand, one occasion is deducted. In practice: this section also accounts for one fact of practice: what has been abandoned need not be abandoned again, and yet one and the same “already abandoned” will be certified afresh at every checkpoint that follows, and certified more eminently at each.

XXVIII. The Nine Full Comprehensions, One: How the Nine Are Counted Out

〔28.1〕First distinguish the full comprehension that is cognition from the full comprehension that is abandonment. Before turning to the nine full comprehensions the treatise first sets up the names: “full comprehension is of two kinds: first the full comprehension that is cognition, second the full comprehension that is abandonment” — the full comprehension that is cognition is the cognition without outflows; the full comprehension that is abandonment is “just the abandonments, the name of the cause being established here upon the result,” that is, those very “abandonments,” merely called by the name of the cognition that can fully comprehend. The nine full comprehensions all speak of the latter.

〔28.2〕The reckoning of six plus three. For what is abandoned through seeing the truths, six are established: in the desire realm the abandonment of the first two categories (seeing suffering, seeing origination) together establishes one, and the next two categories each establish one, three in all; for the upper two realms reckoned together, likewise “the first two abandonments one, the two each one,” making three — six in all. For what is abandoned through cultivation, three are established: what is abandoned through cultivation in the desire realm establishes one, namely the full comprehension of the exhaustion of the five fetters of the lower part; what is abandoned through cultivation in the form realm establishes one, namely the full comprehension of the exhaustion of craving for form; what is abandoned through cultivation in the formless realm establishes one, namely the full comprehension of the everlasting exhaustion of all fetters.

〔28.3〕Why what is abandoned through cultivation divides form from formless while what is abandoned through seeing does not. The treatise closes this subsection with a question and answer: “because the counteragents of what is abandoned through cultivation are not the same” — what is abandoned through cultivation has in the form realm and in the formless realm each its own counteracting path, and so they must be set up separately; while for what is abandoned through seeing the counteragent of the upper two realms is the same, and so they are established together.

The easy error: to suppose that the nine were thrown together at random. Nine = six abandoned through seeing + three abandoned through cultivation, and the six and the three each have their own rule of joining and dividing. In practice: note the two occurrences of “because it is established together with the foregoing” — the exhaustion of the lower part is reckoned together with the three abandoned through seeing in the desire realm, and the exhaustion of all fetters likewise together with those before it; full comprehension is a cumulative account, not an itemized one, and this point is the key later on at the losing and obtaining of full comprehensions.

XXIX. The Nine Full Comprehensions, Two: Whose Result Each of Them Is

〔29.1〕Six the result of receptivity, three the result of cognition. The treatise first adjudges receptivity and cognition: six are the result of receptivity, namely the six full comprehensions of what is abandoned through seeing in the three realms; three are the result of cognition, namely the three of the exhaustion of the lower part, the exhaustion of craving for form, and the exhaustion of all fetters, “since these three full comprehensions are the result of the path of cultivation.” The treatise poses itself a difficulty: how can receptivity be called full comprehension (full comprehension being properly the name of a cognition)? The answer is twofold: “because all the receptivities are the retinue of cognition, as the retinue of a king is conventionally given the name of the king”; “or because receptivity and cognition have one and the same result.”

〔29.2〕The results divided by ground. The result of access concentration is all nine (in dependence upon access one can abandon what is abandoned through seeing and through cultivation in the three realms); the result of the fundamental meditative absorptions is five or eight — “as for what is called five, the Vaibhāṣika masters say” that the fundamental grounds can only abandon the afflictions gathered under the form and formless realms, while abandonment in the desire realm is the result of access concentration alone; “as for what is called eight, the Venerable Ghoṣa says” that the fundamental grounds are counteragents of abandonment for the afflictions of the desire realm too, for whoever has first become free of desire and enters upon the seeing of the truths in dependence upon a fundamental ground, in respect of the abandonment of what is abandoned through seeing in the desire realm, “grants that a separate path draws forth the acquisition without outflows,” except only the full comprehension of the exhaustion of the lower part (that one being the result of access concentration alone). The intermediate meditative absorption is to be spoken of as the fundamental ones are. The result of the marginal ground of the formless (the access of the sphere of space) is one alone, namely the exhaustion of craving for form; and the result of the first three fundamental formless grounds is likewise one alone, namely the exhaustion of all fetters.

〔29.3〕The results divided by path. The result of the mundane path is two (the exhaustion of the lower part, the exhaustion of craving for form); the result of the noble path is nine; the result of the cognition of dharma is three, of subsequent cognition two; the result of the class of the cognition of dharma is six, of the class of subsequent cognition five, “since the word ‘class’ gathers in both cognition and receptivity.”

The easy error: to read “five or eight” as hesitation on the treatise’s part. This is two houses set side by side — five is what the Vaibhāṣika masters say, eight what the Venerable Ghoṣa says, and the text of the treatise itself carries the speakers’ labels. In practice: this section is the treatise’s art of “counting one and the same set of dharmas over again from a different axis” at its height — counted once by receptivity and cognition, once by ground, once by path, the nine figures rearranged each time. That they can be rearranged without conflict is precisely the proof that the classification of the nine full comprehensions stands.

XXX. The Nine Full Comprehensions, Three: Why Nine and Not More

〔30.1〕The four conditions. First the question: the abandonment of dharmas with outflows has “many entities and stages”; why are only nine established? The treatise answers that it is by four conditions. The first three conditions establish the six that are the result of receptivity: obtaining the acquisition of release from bondage without outflows, being deficient in the summit of existence, and the removal of the twofold cause — “the abandonments must have these three conditions present to be given the name of full comprehension, and where one is wanting they are not.”

〔30.2〕Verifying these three conditions stage by stage. At the stage of an ordinary being there is the removal of the twofold cause but no acquisition of abandonment without outflows, and no deficiency yet in the summit of existence, so they are not called full comprehension; at the stage of a noble one, from entering upon the seeing of the truths up to before the receptivity of the subsequent kind concerning suffering, there is the acquisition of abandonment without outflows but no deficiency yet in the summit of existence and no removal yet of the twofold cause; at the stage of the cognition of the subsequent kind concerning suffering and the receptivity of the dharma kind concerning origination, there is deficiency in the summit of existence and yet no removal of the twofold cause (the all-pervading causes abandoned through seeing origination not yet being abandoned); and only at the stages of the cognition of dharma and subsequent cognition that follow are the three conditions present in the abandonments there obtained, so that a full comprehension is established at each such stage.

〔30.3〕The fourth condition and a fifth that is absorbed. For the three that are the result of cognition, the fourth condition of “crossing the realm” is added — “what is called crossing the realm is that the afflictions and the rest within this realm have all been wholly departed from.” There is besides an account that establishes “departure from what is bound together with it” as a fifth condition; the treatise’s choice is that this condition “does not differ in function from the removal of the twofold cause and from crossing the realm, and so, although it differs in sense, it is not separately stated.” At the end a necessary distinction is added: every stage of crossing the realm removes the twofold cause, but the removal of the twofold cause is not always a crossing of the realm, and so crossing the realm must be established apart from the removal of the twofold cause.

The easy error: to read the four conditions as a list of four requirements. It is in fact a calculating machine — the treatise takes it and runs every stage through it, and whatever fails to pass has no full comprehension established. In practice: this section demonstrates the most exacting mode of proof in the treatise: first establish the conditions, then take all the stages and try them one by one, eliminating on the spot whatever does not fit; the number nine was not laid down by decree but reckoned out.

XXXI. The Nine Full Comprehensions, Four: Who Possesses How Many

〔31.1〕The staircase at the stage of the path of seeing. An ordinary being “decidedly has no possibility of possessing a full comprehension.” A noble one abiding at the stage of the seeing of the truths: from the beginning up to the receptivity of the dharma kind concerning origination he possesses none; at the cognition of the dharma kind concerning origination and the receptivity of the subsequent kind concerning origination he possesses one; at the cognition of the subsequent kind concerning origination and the receptivity of the dharma kind concerning cessation, two; at the cognition of the dharma kind concerning cessation and the receptivity of the subsequent kind concerning cessation, three; at the cognition of the subsequent kind concerning cessation and the receptivity of the dharma kind concerning the path, four; at the cognition of the dharma kind concerning the path and the receptivity of the subsequent kind concerning the path, five. ⇒ Step by step it mounts, one added at every two minds.

〔31.2〕The increase and decrease at the stage of the path of cultivation and at the stage beyond training. At the stage of the path of cultivation, beginning from the cognition of the subsequent kind concerning the path, up to one not yet wholly free of desire in the desire realm, and one fallen back from freedom from desire, all possess six. One wholly free of desire whose craving for form is not yet exhausted, or one previously free of desire, from the cognition of the subsequent kind concerning the path up to before the arising of the path of the distinguished fruit that exhausts form, possesses one alone (the exhaustion of the lower part); and one who from the exhaustion of craving for form or from the stage beyond training falls back and arouses the entanglements of form likewise possesses one. One who has craving for form, from the everlasting exhaustion of craving for form, or one previously free of form, from the arousing of the path exhausting form, up to before he is wholly free of craving for the formless, possesses two (the exhaustion of the lower part, the exhaustion of craving for form); and one who falls back from the stage beyond training and arouses the entanglements of the formless likewise possesses two. One abiding at the stage beyond training possesses one alone, namely the full comprehension of the everlasting exhaustion of all fetters.

The easy error: to suppose that the number increases all the way. It increases first and is then merged — at the path of seeing the six are added one by one, and at the path of cultivation they are on the contrary gathered into one (the exhaustion of the lower part having swallowed the five before it). In practice: this is exactly the cashing out of that “because it is established together with the foregoing” of section XXVIII; when you read “one beyond training possesses one alone,” do not suppose this a falling back — that one is the one that has taken everything into itself.

XXXII. The Nine Full Comprehensions, Five: Why the Non-Returner and the Arhat Must Be Gathered into One

〔32.1〕Two conditions. First the question: why is it that the fruit of non-returning and the fruit of arhatship alone “gather the abandonments together and establish them as one full comprehension”? The treatise answers that it is because two conditions are present: “first crossing the realm, second obtaining a fruit. Those two stages alone have both conditions present.” — these two stages have both crossed a whole realm (the non-returner crossing the desire realm, the arhat the upper two realms) and are at the same time stages of obtaining a fruit of the ascetic life; only when the two conditions fall together at once is there any qualification to gather them.

The easy error: to suppose that the gathering is for the sake of remembering fewer names. It is not — the gathering is itself a qualification in doctrine, granted only where two conditions are present. In practice: this section interlocks with the earlier item on the condition of crossing the realm (section XXX); wherever this treatise meets a “gathering” or an “opening out,” it must without exception first produce the qualification for gathering, and never gathers for convenience.

XXXIII. The Nine Full Comprehensions, Six: Losing and Obtaining, and the Close of the Whole Chapter

〔33.1〕The four cases of losing. Losing one: falling back from the stage beyond training or from the stage of the exhaustion of craving for form into complete freedom from desire being lost. Losing two: a non-returner who from the stage of the exhaustion of craving for form falls back and arouses the entanglements of the desire realm, and the same person when he attains arhatship. Losing five: one previously free of desire who afterward enters upon the seeing of the truths, at the cognition of the subsequent kind concerning the path, obtaining the exhaustion of the lower part and losing the five before it. Losing six: a noble one not yet free of desire at the time when he obtains freedom from desire.

〔33.2〕The three cases of obtaining, and one empty slot. “‘Obtaining likewise’ means that there is obtaining one, obtaining two, and obtaining six, only obtaining five being excepted.” Obtaining one: obtaining what was not obtained before, and falling back from the stage beyond training and arousing the entanglements of form. Obtaining two: falling back from the stage beyond training and arousing the entanglements of the formless realm. Obtaining six: falling back from non-returning.

〔33.3〕Notice that empty slot. The words “only excepting five” in the stanza’s “obtaining likewise, only excepting five” are the mechanism of the whole passage: there is a losing of five, but no obtaining of five. Because “losing five” occurs at the moment of obtaining the exhaustion of the lower part and swallowing up the five before it, which is a stage of outgo only and no income; there is no stage whatever at which five are obtained at one time.

The easy error: to read losing as regression and obtaining as progress. Losing here has two sources — losing by falling back (arousing the entanglements and falling back) and losing by advancing (obtaining the exhaustion of the lower part and losing the five before it, attaining arhatship and losing two); the latter is a merging of accounts and not a loss. In practice: the whole chapter closes upon the sentence “in adjudging the latent tendencies, the analysis of abandonment is finished” — for the sake of adjudging the latent tendencies, the analysis of “abandonment” has been finished incidentally. Read the fascicle through and then look back at that sentence in section I, “because the senses differ, five kinds are further spoken of,” and you will find that the head and tail of the whole fascicle are one and the same thing: one and the same set of afflictions must have its accounts settled afresh at every change of angle; until, at the last settling, nothing at all is left on the books.

Further Resonances: The Mirror of the Three Commentaries

The above is the sense of this fascicle’s text taken by itself. A separate section is set up below to gather four matters: the adjudications of the three commentaries and their divergences, Saṅghabhadra’s refutations and supplements, the divergences of Paramārtha’s earlier translation, and coordinates for parallel reading. A mirror is not the treatise; it is only a different way of reading one and the same passage — recorded together without adjudication, each returned to its own place.

1. The Adjudications of the Three Commentaries and Their Divergences

One commentary wholly absent. The commentaries on this fascicle are in a peculiar situation: Shentai’s Commentary is a fragment, and the seven fascicles extant belong to the Chapter on the Elements, the Chapter on the Faculties, and the Chapter on the Worthy and the Noble; the Chapter on the Latent Tendencies is wholly wanting, and so this fascicle has no line-by-line commentary of his to hang upon. Although his general conspectus in Fascicle One does contain a catalogue phrase such as “the chapter on the latent tendencies, sixty-nine lines,” that is not commentary and cannot be made to stand for commentary, nor is text from his other fascicles pieced in to supply it. The want is marked as it stands.

The three houses agree wholly in the skeleton of their outlines and differ in character. Their words for opening the section: Puguang’s Record gives “below, the second, explaining the six gates of fetter and the rest,” Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary gives “from here the second, explaining the six gates of fetter and the rest,” the two houses agreeing almost word for word; while Fabao’s Commentary, citing the treatise’s own words, marks “it gathers up the four foregoing gates and produces the gate that follows,” taking the momentum of “gathering what precedes and producing what follows.” In the divisions themselves the three agree — Fabao gives “below, five and a half stanzas, the first explaining the fetters. Within it three kinds: first the nine fetters, second the five fetters of the lower part, third the five fetters of the upper part,” no different from Puguang’s divisions, save that Fabao alone marks the stanza count (five and a half stanzas), which neither Puguang nor Yuanhui does. In their manner of adducing evidence each has his preference: Puguang inclines to cite the Mahāvibhāṣā, Fabao to cite the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle — as in glossing the name “fetter,” where Fabao cites “the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle says, ‘it has the power of binding with respect to an object and with respect to arising, and so is called a fetter.’” Recorded together without adjudication.

Two places of “no conclusion”: Puguang does not adjudge where adjudication was due. This is the point most worth noticing in reading the three commentaries on this fascicle. The first is the dispute over the order of the five hindrances (section XXI of the main text): Puguang marks the refuter plainly as “the author refutes the explanation of the Sarvāstivādin masters given above,” marks the words of the Sautrāntikas, marks “setting out the Sautrāntikas’ explanation,” and marks “what do they say” as the question and everything from “that is, at the stage of moving about” on as the Sautrāntikas’ answer — the speakers marked out plainly all the way through, and yet at the end of the passage he hands down no verdict of any kind, and having finished the exposition turns at once to the next subsection. The second is the passage on distance (section XXVI): Puguang marks each round, “the author asks,” “the Sarvāstivādins answer,” “the author objects,” “the Sarvāstivādins answer,” “the author objects further,” and for the last sentence marks “the author sets out the Sautrāntikas’ explanation of the mark of distance” — saying expressly that that sentence is not the author’s own school but the author setting out another’s; and then equally does not adjudge which of the Sautrāntika and Sarvāstivāda explanations is right. ⇒ Puguang’s form here is: mark the speakers through to the end; do not hand down right and wrong on the author’s behalf.

One place with a conclusion: “five or eight” for the result of the fundamental grounds. As against the two places above where he does not adjudge, here Puguang hands down his own judgment first — “although the fundamental meditative absorptions are said to be five by some and eight by others, the account of five is the correct sense” — fixing the Vaibhāṣika masters’ “five” as the correct sense; and when the account of the Ghoṣa line is finished he adds the note “the Venerable Ghoṣa means: the fundamental grounds, set against the desire realm, have a counteragent of abandonment,” marking plainly that “eight” is the Venerable Ghoṣa’s divergent account and not the correct sense. Puguang also cites the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle, Fascicle Fifty-Six, in support of his judgment. ⇒ One and the same commentary, three passages, three ways: two without adjudication, one with adjudication first; and the boundary between adjudging and not adjudging lies precisely in whether the text of the treatise itself already carries the speakers’ labels (the passage on “five or eight” carrying in the treatise itself “the Vaibhāṣika masters say” and “the Venerable Ghoṣa says,” Puguang therefore dares to adjudge; in the two former passages the treatise says only “some other master says” and “some other, differing account,” and Puguang therefore does not). Recorded together without adjudication.

Puguang’s characters in citing the treatise differ from the base text. Puguang cites the opening sentence of this fascicle, “thus have already been adjudged,” with two characters differing from the base text — the particle for “already” written in a near-identical variant form, and the verb “to adjudge” written with the discriminating-radical graph where the treatise habitually writes the disputation-radical graph. The latter is a difference of usage at the level of whole books between this treatise and the three commentaries, and is recorded as it stands without alteration.

The chapter title at the head of Yuanhui’s fascicle is not in the main text. The head of the main text of this fascicle in Yuanhui gives simply “Verse Commentary on the Root Text of the Abhidharmakośa, the twenty-first,” without the chapter name; the eighteen characters of the chapter name, “Chapter Five, Analysis of the Latent Tendencies, part three,” are a variant of the second witness and are found in that fascicle’s collation note. This is a methodological reminder for reading the commentaries — wherever one meets a chapter title at the head of a fascicle in a commentary, one must check its note separately and may not take it straight off as belonging to the main text.

2. Saṅghabhadra’s Refutations and Supplementary Explanations

Look first at the name: the chapter name in Saṅghabhadra’s two treatises is not “Analysis of the Latent Tendencies.” The Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle and the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine both give this chapter as “Adjudication of the Latent Tendencies.” To search the two treatises with this treatise’s chapter name is bound to yield a zero, while the scenes are plainly there — this is a common trap of cross-text collation, and one can only fix position by the structure of the scenes.

The passage on distance: Puguang has no conclusion, Saṅghabhadra has one. This is the clearest contrasting pair in the fascicle. The closing sentence of section XXVI, “if one goes by correct principle, one should say that the past and the future are called distant because they are apart from the intrinsic mark of a dharma . . . ,” Saṅghabhadra cites word for word and prefaces with “the Sūtra-master here says thus,” and immediately adjudges it: “his account is one-sidedly at variance with correct principle. Whatever has no intrinsic mark is not distance; this, being distance, must have an intrinsic mark, since it is gathered under distance, as the other distances are” — the line of reasoning being that if there were no intrinsic mark it would not be distance at all, and since the past and future are granted to be gathered under distance, it ought not to be said that they are “apart from the intrinsic mark of a dharma.” There is besides an earlier occurrence in the same passage: the self-posed difficulty in the treatise’s prose, “if it is because the present universally obtains the unconditioned that they are called near, then the past and future ages are equally so,” Saṅghabhadra likewise cites as the Sūtra-master’s account and refutes with “by the principle explained above, the parallel does not hold.” ⇒ On one and the same topic, Puguang chooses to hand down no verdict and Saṅghabhadra chooses to adjudge it at variance; the two houses differ in their choice about “conclusion,” and it is only recorded, not adjudged.

The passage on obtaining and losing full comprehensions: one technical correction of a stage-term. The treatise glosses “losing five” as “that is, one previously free of desire who afterward enters upon the seeing of the truths, at the cognition of the subsequent kind concerning the path,” which Saṅghabhadra cites as “as for what is called losing five, the Sūtra-master explains: that is, one previously free of desire, at the stage of the cognition of the subsequent kind concerning the path,” and corrects with “this should be said only of the moment of the receptivity of the subsequent kind concerning the path, since at the cognition of the subsequent kind concerning the path they have already been lost. To speak of obtaining and losing is to speak with regard to what is about to be”; and he adds a distinction — it must be stated that this is for one who enters upon the seeing of the truths in dependence upon access concentration, since for one who enters in dependence upon a fundamental absorption there is no acquisition of release from bondage without outflows in respect of abandonment in the desire realm, and those three full comprehensions were never obtained at all, and “what was not obtained before cannot be said to be lost now.” ⇒ What is at issue in this item is not a doctrinal position but the precision of the stage-term and the distinction of the absorption relied upon. This item recurs identically in the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine.

One honest negative proposition. The two occurrences on distance (the first set above) are wanting in the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine — the corresponding passage there lays out flatly the four kinds of distance and the four similes, with neither the words “Sūtra-master” nor any restatement or criticism of this treatise’s sentences, and passes straight on to the next stanza. This is not a failure of searching but a difference of fullness between the two treatises themselves: the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle has the refutation and the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine has none. It is recorded as it stands.

3. The Divergences of Paramārtha’s Earlier Translation

His renderings form a system of their own, and one group of them calls for the greatest care. Paramārtha’s Expository Treatise on the Treasury forms a system of its own in the passage corresponding to this fascicle. Among the nine fetters, Xuanzang names them from the intrinsic nature of the affliction (fetter of craving, fetter of ill will), Paramārtha from the mode of the affliction (fetter of conformity, fetter of contrariety); and so too with the three bonds (bond of greed and bond of delusion / bond of desire and bond of ignorance). What most calls for notice is the six grimes of affliction: Xuanzang gives vexation, harmfulness, resentment, flattery, deception, self-intoxication, Paramārtha gives not letting go, oppressive harassing, binding up fault, flattery, deception, and intoxication — the six names differing almost one for one, so that they can be matched only by Paramārtha’s own glosses (not letting go = stubbornly holding fast and not accepting right teaching, close to Xuanzang’s “vexation”; binding up fault = pondering again and again the object of a raging mind, close to Xuanzang’s “resentment”; oppressive harassing = injuring and humiliating another’s intention and performing beating and reviling, close to Xuanzang’s “harmfulness”; intoxication = Xuanzang’s “self-intoxication”). They may not be read across at face value. The personal name differs doubly as well: Xuanzang’s “the monk Aśvajit” Paramārtha gives as “Aśvajit of pure livelihood,” one and the same person and the rendering-characters entirely different.

Differences of form and of opening and gathering. Xuanzang has “the stanza says / the treatise says,” the whole stanza coming out first and the prose after; Paramārtha has “the verse says / the explanation says,” glossing line by line inset, so that one stanza is often broken into several passages. Hence the “four homogeneous outflows of the entanglements,” which Xuanzang writes as one stanza of four limbs continuously, Paramārtha breaks into five passages of verse before its sense is complete; and the four causes of abandoning the afflictions, which Xuanzang writes as one stanza of four lines continuously, Paramārtha lists in two separate places, the three causes for what is abandoned through seeing and the one cause for what is abandoned through cultivation. Conversely, in the passage on the faults of envy and avarice Paramārtha adduces a passage of ancient verse in evidence besides, which Xuanzang does not have. Fullness varies passage by passage, with no fixed direction.

One discrepancy in a number, recorded and left undecided. In the section on the results of receptivity and cognition among the nine full comprehensions, Xuanzang’s stanza gives “of these, six are the result of receptivity,” while Paramārtha’s explanation gives “these are the result of eight receptivities.” The doctrinal joint is the same in the two texts (the six full comprehensions of what is abandoned through seeing being the result of receptivity, the three of what is abandoned through cultivation the result of cognition), and yet there is indeed a discrepancy in the statement of the number. This is the one manifest numerical divergence in this fascicle, and it is recorded without adjudication — Paramārtha has not been altered to follow Xuanzang, nor Xuanzang to follow Paramārtha.

One instance of the two texts distributing matter differently between stanza and prose. In the gate of the secondary afflictions, Paramārtha’s verse has one line more, “it says they are not afflictions”; Xuanzang’s equivalent lies not in the stanza but in the prose (“they are not called afflictions, since they are not roots”). One and the same sense, put by one text into the stanza and by the other into the exposition: this is the structural difference of the two translations in miniature.

4. Coordinates for Parallel Reading

Two restorations in the collation. The base text of this fascicle has two places restored from the Koryŏ canon: the word “poverty” in “again, because these two can be causes of lowliness and poverty” (the Taishō original printing giving “greed”), and the word “instruction” in “and by this not accepting reasonable admonition and instruction” (the Taishō original printing giving “regret”). With the first restored, the interlocking pair — envy drawing lowliness, avarice drawing poverty — holds together; with the second restored, “admonition and instruction” becomes a word at all. Both Taishō original printings are recorded alongside in the apparatus, recorded without adjudication. There are besides several variant readings that touch sense more plainly — the word “after” in “all the paths after the path of liberation” for the counteragent of distancing (one witness giving “those”), the phrase “a separate path draws forth” in the result of the path of seeing in a fundamental ground (the Song, Yuan, and Ming editions inverting its word order, the Palace edition doubling “separate”), and the word “one” in “as for what is called obtaining one” in the obtaining of full comprehensions (the Palace edition giving “two”) — all recorded alongside for reference; the choice among variant readings is a doctrinal adjudication and does not belong in this section.

This slot of the secondary afflictions was afterward recompiled. This fascicle sets up the two senses of the secondary afflictions, general and particular (the general, following along with mind and harassing it; the particular, arising along with the afflictions and not being roots), and the layer of the particular name lists the ten entanglements and six grimes. The Yogācāra lineage, at the same doctrinal position, establishes instead twenty items — rage, resentment, concealment, vexation, envy, avarice, deception, flattery, harmfulness, self-intoxication, non-conscience, shamelessness, restlessness, torpor, lack of confidence, indolence, heedlessness, lost mindfulness, distraction, and incorrect knowing — and gathers them under the three classes of small, medium, and great (those arising each separately being small, those pervading the unwholesome medium, those pervading defiled minds great). ⇒ The one sense of “not a root, yet arising along with mind” is unchanged in the two lineages, while the items listed and the rule of classification have changed: this fascicle classifies by the homogeneous stream from which they arise (the outflow of greed, of hatred, of ignorance, of doubt), the Yogācāra by the extent of what they pervade. One and the same set of mental factors, two ways of indexing, which may be read side by side.

The setting side by side of the six gates: the Yogācāra lineage too has a table of the same type. This fascicle gathers one and the same set of afflictions under the six names of fetter, bond, latent tendency, secondary affliction, and entanglement; the Yogācārabhūmi, in its gate of defilement, has a setting side by side of the same type — nine fetters, three bonds, seven latent tendencies, three secondary afflictions listed in order, and after them the five hindrances as well. The listed names of the five hindrances agree entirely in the two lineages, only the third and fourth items differing in the fullness of their rendering (this fascicle giving torpor-and-sleep and restlessness-and-regret, the other torpor and sleep, restlessness and regret) — and the mechanism of this fascicle’s “two entities gathered into one hindrance” (food, counteragent, and function being the same) may be taken as the coordinate for reading them together.