俱舍論黑白四業·十業道Abhidharmakośabhāṣya · The Four Actions, Black and White · The Ten Paths of Action

〔T29 0083b13〕

心要Essence

前三子講業之體、講表無表、講三種律儀從何處得。此子一句「又經中說，業有四種」轉身，逐條解釋經中所說的諸業：黑白四業、能盡諸業的那幾念無漏思、三牟尼三清淨、三惡行三妙行；而後從「又經中言：有十業道」起，開出全論講戒行最細的一段——業道之攝、表無表之分、加行根本後起三位、三根之起與究竟、所依之四處，以至殺盜婬妄離間麁惡雜穢與貪瞋邪見逐一辨其成與不成。

一句話：這一卷把『做了一件惡事』拆成一條有起點、有結點、有餘勢的線，然後逐條問：到哪一點才算真正成了業道。

位置（先立）

本子之界是本品第四道卷界，三家古德在此各自分卷而界線全同——光記與頌疏皆標為第七明黑黑等，寶疏標為第八明經中黑黑等四業，而所開的三個子目（四業名體、無漏斷別、敘異說）三分之義三家全合，只是科名的字面互異。卷中「又經中言：有十業道」一句是第二道更重的科界，三家同標為十業道章之始，所開六個子目也逐一相同。二端各有半頌跨界：起處的正六十只用後半，收處的正七十九只用前半——玄奘分卷取的是義界，不是頌界。真諦舊譯此段全落在他的一卷之內，其分卷與玄奘不同，跨本比對只能取場景結構。

三個眼目

業道之成，繫於一個確定的剎那。 屠羊者從發心、趣市、酬價、牽還、執刀，直到羊命未終，這一整段都只是加行；隨此表業而羊正命終的那一剎那之表無表業，才是根本業道；此後的無表相續，以至剝截烹賣讚美，都是後起。論並且點明成立根本的兩個緣——一由加行、二由果滿。所以本卷處處在問的其實是同一件事：現在講的這一條，是在講三段中的哪一段。俱死與前死之所以不成根本，正因為所依之身已滅而罪無所繫；軍陣同事之所以人人皆成，正因為那一念「同許為一事」的心已經把每個人都接到了同一條線上。
加行之根與究竟之根，是兩把不同的尺。 加行由三不善根一一而起——同一件殺業可以從貪起（為得財）、從瞋起（為除怨）、從癡起（以為是法、是律、是孝、是福）；而究竟則各有所繫：殺、麁語、瞋恚由瞋究竟，要無所顧的極麁惡心現前；盜、邪行、貪由貪究竟，要有所顧的極染污心現前；邪見由癡究竟，餘三語則許由三根。回頭看一件已經做成的惡事，起心的理由常常好看，成事那一刻的心藏不住——這一條分辨最實用。而論所舉的「從癡起」諸例尤其該慢讀：那不是糊塗，是一套有祭祀、有法律、有經典替它撐腰的錯理路。
十業道是一張粗顯的網，網眼有多大要先知道。 論明說它只從惡行妙行中取「麁顯易知」的一分：飲酒、打縛、愛語、善思都不在其中，一切加行後起也不在其中。不入業道不等於無罪——它們仍是善不善業，仍然感果，只是不在這張為「令遠離」而立的清單上。同理，「不誤」一條貫穿殺、盜、婬、妄四門：誤殺、誤取、誤行、誤言都不成業道，而那並不是替它們開的後門，是這張清單自身的成立條件。

一義（附）：留白的那一難

虛誑語之後，論自引一組問答：不動身而被殺罪所觸者是發語，不發語而被誑罪所觸者是動身，既不動身又不發語而被二罪所觸者，是仙人意憤與布灑他時。而後論主自設一難：若既不動身也不發語，而欲界又沒有離表而生的無表，這二者如何成業道？論主於此不答，只說「於如是難應設劬勞」。全卷細密如此，卻在收尾前留了一個明白的空缺——這不是疏漏，是論主自己劃出的未收束之處。眾賢於同一難處另立一解，以加行位必有表業相續為說；並錄不判。

通於全卷

這一卷讀起來像戒律的細則，數目與條件密得驚人；但真正承重的不是條目，是那個反覆出現的問法——心在哪一位、對著什麼境、由什麼根成。三位定其線，四處定其境，三根定其成；三者交出來的那一點，才是罪之所繫。

也正因如此，全卷最重的一條戒反而最短。前面九條業道走的是起心、動手、成事、餘勢那條長路，到了貪、瞋、邪見三種意業道，才現前即是根本，沒有加行後起可分。一念之現前與一場屠殺之完成，在這張表上是同一個位次——這是本卷讀到最後才顯出來的那一句話。

The first three units expounded the entity of action, expounded the manifest and the nonmanifest, and expounded from what the three disciplines are obtained. This unit turns upon a single sentence, “again the sūtra says that action is of four kinds,” and explains item by item the several actions spoken of in the sūtras: the four actions black and white, those few thought-moments of volition without outflows that can exhaust the actions, the three munis and the three purities, the three kinds of evil conduct and the three kinds of good conduct; and then, from “again the sūtra says: there are ten paths of action,” it opens the most finely worked stretch on conduct in the whole treatise — what the paths of action gather in, the division of the manifest and the nonmanifest, the three stages of the preparatory, the root, and the consequent, the arising from the three roots and the completion by them, the four places upon which they depend, and so on down to killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, false speech, divisive, harsh, and frivolous speech, and greed, hatred, and wrong view, each of them made out as to what does and does not constitute it.

In one sentence: This fascicle takes “an evil deed was done” apart into a line that has a starting point, a joining point, and a residual momentum, and then asks item by item: at which point does it truly become a path of action?

Placement (established first)

The boundary of this unit is the fourth fascicle-boundary of this chapter, and the three ancient masters, dividing their fascicles independently, set the line at exactly the same place — Puguang’s Record and Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary both mark it as the seventh, explaining the black-and-black and the rest, while Fabao’s Commentary marks it as the eighth, explaining the four actions black and black and the rest spoken of in the sūtras; and the three subsections they open (the names and entities of the four actions, the distinctions in what the actions without outflows cut off, and the recording of divergent accounts) agree among all three in the sense of the threefold division, differing only in the wording of the outline names. Within the fascicle, the sentence “again the sūtra says: there are ten paths of action” is a second and weightier outline boundary, which all three mark alike as the beginning of the chapter on the ten paths of action, and the six subsections they open there are likewise one and the same. At each of the two ends a half stanza straddles the boundary: at the opening only the second half of Root 60 is used, and at the close only the first half of Root 79 — Xuanzang’s fascicle division takes the boundary of the sense, not the boundary of the stanzas. In Paramārtha’s earlier translation this whole passage falls within a single fascicle of his, his fascicle division being unlike Xuanzang’s, so that comparison across the two translations can only be made by the structure of the scene.

Three Points to Watch

A path of action is completed only at one determinate moment. From the moment the butcher of sheep first raises the thought, goes to the market, pays the price, leads the beast home, and takes up the knife, down to the point where the sheep’s life is not yet ended, the whole of that stretch is preparatory only; the manifest and nonmanifest action of the single moment in which, following upon that manifest act, the sheep just then ends its life — that alone is the root path of action; and thereafter the continuing of the nonmanifest, on through the flaying, the cutting, the selling, and the praising of the flavor, is all the consequent stage. The treatise further points out the two conditions by which the root is completed — first by the preparation, second by the fullness of the result. So what this fascicle is asking everywhere is really one and the same thing: of the three stages, which one is the present item speaking of? That dying together with the victim, or dying before him, does not complete the root is precisely because the body depended upon has perished and the offense has nothing to rest on; that in an army acting as one all alike are completed is precisely because that one thought of “consenting together to one undertaking” has already joined every man of them to the same line.
The root of the preparation and the root of the completion are two different measures. The preparation arises from the three unwholesome roots one by one — one and the same act of killing may arise from greed (to get wealth), from hatred (to be rid of an enemy), or from delusion (taking it for what is lawful, what is legal, what is filial, what is meritorious); whereas the completion has its own several attachments: killing, harsh speech, and hatred are completed by hatred, requiring the presence of the extremely coarse and evil mind that spares nothing; stealing, sexual misconduct, and greed are completed by greed, requiring the presence of the extremely defiled mind that clings to something; wrong view is completed by delusion, and the remaining three of speech are granted completion by all three roots. Looking back at an evil deed already done, the reason given when the thought was raised is often presentable, but the mind at the moment the deed was brought off cannot hide itself — this distinction is the most serviceable of all. And the instances of “arising from delusion” that the treatise adduces deserve especially slow reading: that is not muddle-headedness, it is a wrong train of reasoning propped up by sacrifice, by law, and by scripture.
The ten paths of action are a coarse net, and one must first know how wide the mesh is. The treatise says expressly that it takes from evil conduct and good conduct only the portion that is “coarse, evident, and easily known”: drinking liquor, beating and binding, kindly speech, and wholesome volitions are not among them, nor is any preparatory or consequent stage. Not to enter the paths of action is not the same as being free of offense — those things are still wholesome or unwholesome actions and still draw their results; they are simply not on this list, which was set up in order “to make men keep away.” In the same way, the single item “not by mistake” runs through all four gates of killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, and false speech: killing by mistake, taking by mistake, acting by mistake, speaking by mistake do not complete a path of action — and that is not a back door opened for them, it is a condition of this list’s own constitution.

One Further Point (Appended): The Difficulty Left Blank

After false speech, the treatise quotes a set of questions and answers of its own: he who is touched by the offense of killing without moving his body is one who utters speech; he who is touched by the offense of false speech without uttering speech is one who moves his body; and those touched by both offenses while neither moving the body nor uttering speech are the seer in a fit of mental wrath and one at the time of the poṣadha. Thereupon the author raises a difficulty against himself: if there is neither movement of body nor utterance of speech, and the desire realm besides has no nonmanifest that arises apart from the manifest, how do these two come to be paths of action? Here the author gives no answer, saying only, “upon a difficulty such as this one should expend some labor.” Fine-meshed as the whole fascicle is, it leaves before its close one plain gap — and that is no oversight, it is a place left unclosed by the author’s own marking. Saṅghabhadra, at the very same difficulty, sets up another explanation, holding that at the preparatory stage there must be a manifest action continuing on; both parties are recorded and neither is adjudicated.

Through the whole fascicle

This fascicle reads like the fine print of the discipline, and its numbers and conditions are startlingly dense; but what bears the weight is not the items, it is the recurring form of the question — at which stage is the mind, upon what object is it turned, and by which root is it completed. The three stages fix its line, the four places fix its object, the three roots fix its completion; and the point where the three intersect is where the offense rests.

And just for that reason, the weightiest precept in the whole fascicle turns out to be the shortest. The first nine paths of action travel the long road of raising the thought, setting the hand to it, bringing it off, and trailing away; but when it comes to the three mental paths of action — greed, hatred, and wrong view — they are the root as soon as they are present, with no preparatory or consequent stage to be divided off. The presence of a single thought and the completion of a whole slaughter stand at the same rank on this table — and that is the sentence which shows itself only when the fascicle has been read to its end.

原典Canonical · verbatim

阿毘達磨俱舍論卷第十六　〔T29 0083b13〕

分別業品第四之四　〔T29 0083b17〕

又經中說，業有四種，謂或有業黑黑異熟、或復有業白白異熟、或復有業黑白黑白異熟、或復有業非黑非白無異熟能盡諸業。其相云何？頌曰：

〔頌·正60後半·正61　T29 0083b22〕　　依黑黑等殊，所說四種業，
　　惡色欲界善，能盡彼無漏，
　　應知如次第，名黑白俱非。
論曰：佛依業果性類不同，所治能治殊，說黑黑等四。諸不善業一向名黑，染污性故，異熟亦黑，不可意故。色界善業一向名白，不雜惡故，異熟亦白，是可意故。何故不言無色界善？傳說若處有二異熟謂中生有，具三種業謂身語意，則說非餘。然契經中有處亦說：欲界善業名為黑白，惡所雜故，異熟亦黑白，非愛果雜故。此黑白名依相續立，非據自性。所以者何？以無一業及一異熟是黑亦白，互相違故。豈不惡業果善業果雜故，是則亦應名為白黑。不善業果非必應為善業果雜，欲善業果必定應為惡業果雜，以欲界中惡勝善故。諸無漏業能永斷盡前三業者名為非黑，不染污故，亦名非白，以不能招白異熟故。此非白言是密意說，以佛於彼《大空經》中告阿難陀：諸無學法純善純白一向無罪。本論亦言：云何白法？謂諸善法無覆無記無異熟者，不墮界故、與流轉法性相違故。諸無漏業為皆能盡前三業不？不爾。云何？頌曰：

〔頌·正62·正63　T29 0083c16〕　　四法忍離欲，前八無間俱，
　　十二無漏思，唯盡純黑業，
　　離欲四靜慮，第九無間思，
　　一盡雜純黑，四令純白盡。
論曰：於見道中四法智忍及於修道離欲染位前八無間聖道俱行有十二思唯盡純黑，離欲界染第九無間聖道俱行一無漏思，雙令黑白及純黑盡，此時總斷欲界善故，亦斷第九不善業故。離四靜慮一一地染，第九無間道俱行無漏思，此四唯令純白業盡。何緣諸地有漏善法唯最後道能斷非餘？以諸善法非自性斷，已斷有容現在前故。然由緣彼煩惱盡時方說名為斷彼善法，爾時善法得離繫故。由此乃至緣彼煩惱餘一品在，斷義不成，善法爾時未離繫故。頌曰：

〔頌·正64　T29 0084a03〕　　有說地獄受，餘欲業黑雜，
　　有說欲見滅，餘欲業黑俱。
論曰：有餘師說：順地獄受及欲界中順餘受業，如次名為純黑雜業。謂地獄異熟唯不善業感，故順彼受名純黑業。唯除地獄，餘欲界中異熟皆通善惡業感，故順彼受名黑白業。有餘師說：欲見所斷及欲界中所有餘業，如次名為純黑俱業。謂見所斷無善雜故名純黑業，欲修所斷有善不善故名俱業。又經中說有三牟尼，又經中言有三清淨，俱身語意。相各云何？頌曰：

〔頌·正65　T29 0084a14〕　　無學身語業，即意三牟尼，
　　三清淨應知，即諸三妙行。
論曰：無學身語業，名身語牟尼，意牟尼即無學意非意業。所以者何？勝義牟尼唯心為體，謂由身語二業比知。又身語業是遠離體，意業不然，無無表故。由遠離義建立牟尼，是故即心由身語業能有所離，故名牟尼。何故牟尼唯在無學？以阿羅漢是實牟尼，諸煩惱言永寂靜故。諸身語意三種妙行，名身語意三種清淨。暫永遠離一切惡行煩惱垢故名為清淨。說此二者為息有情計邪牟尼，邪清淨故。又經中說有三惡行，又經中言有三妙行，俱身語意。相各云何？頌曰：

〔頌·正66　T29 0084a28〕　　惡身語意業，說名三惡行，
　　及貪瞋邪見，三妙行翻此。
〔T29 0084b〕論曰：一切不善身語意業，如次名身語意惡行。然意惡行復有三種，謂非意業貪、瞋、邪見，貪等離思別有體故。譬喻者言：貪瞋邪見即是意業，故《思經》中說此三種為意業故。若爾，則應業與煩惱合成一體。許有煩惱即是意業，斯有何失？毘婆沙師說彼非理。若許爾者，便與眾多理教相違，成大過失。然契經說是意業者，顯思以彼為門轉故、由此能感非愛果故、是聰慧者所訶厭故。此行即惡，故名惡行。三妙行者，翻此應知。謂身語意一切善業。非業無貪、無瞋、正見。正見邪見既無故思欲益他損他，如何成善惡？能與損益為根本故。又經中言：有十業道，或善或惡。其相云何？頌曰：

〔頌·正67　T29 0084b15〕　　所說十業道，攝惡妙行中，
　　麁品為其性，如應成善惡。
論曰：於前所說惡妙行中，若麁顯易知，攝為十業道。如應若善攝前妙行，不善業道攝前惡行。不攝何等惡妙行耶？且不善中身惡業道，於身惡行不攝一分，謂加行後起餘不善身業，即飲諸酒執打縛等，以加行等非麁顯故。若身惡行令他有情失命失財失妻妾等，說為業道，令遠離故。語惡業道於語惡行，不攝加行後起及輕。意惡業道於意惡行，不攝惡思及輕貪等。善業道中身善業道，於身妙行不攝一分，謂加行後起及餘善身業，即離飲酒施供養等。語善業道於語妙行不攝一分，謂愛語等。意善業道於意妙行不攝一分，謂諸善思。十業道中前七業道為皆定有表無表耶？不爾。云何？頌曰：

〔頌·正68　T29 0084c03〕　　惡六定無表，彼自作婬二，
　　善七受生二，定生唯無表。
論曰：七惡業道中，六定有無表，謂殺生、不與取、虛誑語、離間語、麁惡語、雜穢語。如是六種若遣他為，根本成時自表無故。若有自作彼六業道，則六皆有表無表二，謂起表時彼便死等；後方死等與遣使同，根本成時唯無表故。唯欲邪行必具二種，要是自身所究竟故，非遣他作，如自生喜。七善業道若從受生，必皆具二，謂表、無表，受生尸羅必依表故。靜慮無漏所攝律儀名為定生，此唯無表，但依心力而得生故。加行後起如根本耶？不爾。云何？頌曰：

〔頌·正69〔1–3句〕　T29 0084c16〕　　加行定有表，無表或有無，
　　後起此相違。
論曰：業道加行必定有表，此位無表或有或無。若猛利纏淳淨心起則有無表，異此則無。後起翻前，定有無表，此位表業或有或無。謂若後時起隨前業則有表業，異此便無。於此義中如何建立加行根本後起位耶？且不善中最初殺業，如屠羊者將行殺時，先發殺心從床而起，執持價直趣賣羊廛，㨊觸羊身酬價捉取，牽還養飯將入屠坊，手執杖刀若打若刺，或一或再至命未終，如是皆名殺生加行。隨此表業彼正命終，此剎那頃表無表業，是謂殺生根本業道。由二緣故，令諸有情根本業道殺罪所觸：一由加行、二由果滿。此剎那後殺無表業隨轉不絕，名殺後起。及於後時剝截治洗，若稱若賣或煮，或食讚述其美表業剎那，如是亦名殺生後起。餘六業道隨其所應三分不同，准例應說。貪瞋邪見纔現在前，即說名為根本業道，故無加行後起差別。此中應說。為所殺生住死有時，能殺生者彼剎那頃表無表業即成業道？為死後耶？若爾何失？二俱有過。若所殺生正住死有，能殺生者業道即成，即能殺者與所殺生，俱時命終應成業道。然宗不許彼業道成。若所殺生命終以後，能殺生者業道方成，是則不應先作是說：隨此表業彼正命終。此剎那頃表無表業，是謂殺生根本業道。又應違害毘婆沙師釋本論中加行未息，謂本論說：頗有已害生殺生未滅耶？曰：有，如已斷生命彼加行未息。毘婆沙者釋此文言：此中於後起，以加行聲說。應言於根本說加行聲，許命終後根本未息故。如無有過此中應說。此中說何名為無過？謂於根本說加行聲。若爾，于時所有表業如何可成根本業道？何為不成？以無用故。無表於此有何用耶？故業道成非由有用，但由加行果圓滿時，此二俱成根本業道。又諸業道展轉相望，容有互為加行後起。今且應說殺生業道以十業道為起加行。謂如有人欲害怨敵，設諸謀計合搆殺緣，或殺眾生祈請助力，或盜他物以資殺事，或婬彼婦令殺其夫，或為乖離彼親友故起語四過令生猜阻。設有勢力無救護心，或於彼財心生貪著，或即於彼起瞋恚心，或起邪見長養殺業然後方殺，如是名為以十業道為殺加行。殺怨敵已，復於後時誅其所親，收其財物婬彼所愛，乃至復起貪瞋邪見次第現前，此十名為殺生後起。所餘業道如應當知。貪等不應能為加行，非唯心起加行即成，唯起心時未作事故。又經中說：苾芻當知，殺有三種：一從貪生、二從瞋生、三從癡生。乃至邪見有三亦爾。此中應說：何相殺生？名從貪生。問餘亦爾。非諸業道一切皆由三根究竟，然其加行不與彼同。云何不同？頌曰：

〔頌·正69〔4句〕·正70前半　T29 0085b14〕　　加行三根起，彼無間生故，
　　貪等三根生。
論曰：不善業道加行生時，一一由三不善根起，依先等起故作是說。殺生加行由貪起者，如有為欲得彼身分、或為得財、或為戲樂、或為拔濟親友自身，從貪引起殺生加行。從瞋起者，如為除怨，發憤恚心起殺加行。從癡起者，如有祠中謂是法心起殺加行，又諸王等依世法律誅戮怨敵除剪凶徒，謂成大福起殺加行。又波剌私作如是說：父母老病，若令命終得免困苦便生勝福。又諸外道有作是言：蛇蠍蜂等為人毒害，若能殺者便生勝福。羊鹿水牛及餘禽獸，本擬供食故殺無罪。又因邪見殺害眾生，此等加行皆從癡起。偷盜加行從貪起者，謂隨所須起盜加行、或為別利恭敬名譽、或為救拔自身親友，從貪引起偷盜加行。從瞋起者，謂為除怨，發憤恚心起盜加行。從癡起者，謂諸王等依世法律奪惡人財，謂法應爾無偷盜罪。又婆羅門作如是說：世間財物於劫初時，大梵天王施諸梵志，於後梵志勢力微劣，為諸卑族侵奪受用。今諸梵志於世他財若奪若偷，充衣充食或充餘用或轉施他，皆用己財無偷盜罪。然彼取時有他物想，又因邪見盜他財物，皆名從癡起盜加行。邪婬加行從貪起者，謂於他妻等起染著心、或為求他財名位恭敬、或為救拔自身他身，從貪著心起婬加行。從瞋生者，謂為除怨，發憤恚心起婬加行。從癡生者，如波剌私讚於母等行非梵行。又諸梵志讚牛祠中有諸女男受持牛禁，吸水齧草或住或行，不簡親踈隨遇隨合。又諸外道作如是言：一切女人如臼花果熟食階隥道路橋船，世間眾人應共受用。此等加行從癡所生。虛誑語等語四業道從貪瞋生，類前應說。然虛誑語所有加行從癡生者，如外論言：〔引頌·非本頌　T29 0085c22〕　　若人因戲笑，嫁娶對女王，
　　及救命救財，虛誑語無罪。
又因邪見起虛誑語、離間語等所有加行，當知一切從癡所生。又諸吠陀及餘邪論，皆雜穢語攝，加行從癡生。貪瞋等三既無加行，如何可說從貪等生？以從三根無間生故，可說貪等從三根生。謂或有時從貪無間生貪業道，從二亦然。瞋及邪見從三亦爾。已說不善從三根生。善復云何？頌曰：

〔頌·正70後半　T29 0086a03〕　　善於三位中，皆三善根起。
論曰：諸善業道所有加行根本後起，皆從無貪無瞋無癡善根所起，以善三位皆是善心所等起故、善心必與三種善根共相應故。此善三位其相云何？謂遠離前不善三位離惡加行即善加行，離惡根本即善根本，離惡後起即善後起。且如勤策受具戒時，來入戒壇禮苾芻眾，至誠發語請親教師，乃至一白二羯磨等，皆名為善業道加行。第三羯磨竟一剎那中，表無表業名根本業道。從此以後至說四依，及餘依前相續隨轉表無表業，皆名後起。如先所說，非諸業道一切皆由三根究竟，何根究竟何業道耶？頌曰：

〔頌·正71·正72前半　T29 0086a17〕　　殺麁語瞋恚，究竟皆由瞋，
　　盜邪行及貪，皆由貪究竟，
　　邪見癡究竟，許所餘由三。
論曰：惡業道中殺生、麁語、瞋恚業道，由瞋究竟，要無所顧極麁惡心現在前時此三成故。諸不與取、欲邪行、貪，此三業道由貪究竟，要有所顧極染污心現在前時此三成故。邪見究竟要由愚癡，由上品癡現前成故。虛誑、離間、雜穢語三，許一一由三根究竟，以貪瞋等現在前時一一能令此三成故。諸惡業道何處起耶？頌曰：

〔頌·正72後半　T29 0086a28〕　　有情具名色，名身等處起。
論曰：如前所說四節業道，三三一三隨其次第於有情等四處而生。謂殺等三有情處起，偷盜等三眾具處起，唯邪見一名色處起，虛誑語等三名身等處起。有起加行定欲殺他，而與所殺生俱死或前死，亦得根本業道罪耶？頌曰：

〔頌·正73前半　T29 0086b06〕　　俱死及前死，無根依別故。
論曰：若能殺者與所殺生俱時命終、或在前死，彼定不得根本業道。故有問言：頗有殺者起殺加行及令果滿，而彼不為殺罪觸耶？曰：有。云何？謂能殺者與所殺生俱死、前死。何緣如是？以所殺生其命猶存，不可令彼能殺生者成殺罪故。非能殺者其命已終可得殺罪，別依生故。謂殺加行所依止身今已斷滅，雖有別類身同分生，非罪依止。此曾未起殺生加行，成殺業道理不應然。若有多人集為軍眾欲殺怨敵、或獵獸等，於中隨有一殺生時，何人得成殺生業道？頌曰：

〔頌·正73後半　T29 0086b19〕　　軍等若同事，皆成如作者。
論曰：於軍等中若隨有一作殺生事，如自作者，一切皆成殺生業道，由彼同許為一事故。如為一事展轉相教，故一殺生餘皆得罪。若有他力逼入此中，因即同心亦成殺罪。唯除若有立誓自要救自命緣亦不行殺，雖由他力逼在此中，而無殺心故無殺罪。今次應辯成業道相。謂齊何量名曰殺生？乃至齊何名為邪見？且先分別殺生相者，頌曰：

〔頌·正74前半　T29 0086b29〕　　殺生由故思，他想不誤殺。
〔T29 0086c〕論曰：要由先發欲殺故思，於他有情他有情想，作殺加行不誤而殺。謂唯殺彼不漫殺餘，齊此名為殺生業道。有猶豫殺亦成殺生，謂彼先於所欲殺境心懷猶豫為生非生？設復是生為彼非彼？後起決志，若是若非我定當殺。由心無顧，若殺有情亦成業道。於剎那滅蘊，如何成殺生？息風名生，依身心轉，若有令斷不更續生，如滅燈光、鈴聲名殺。或復生者即是命根，若有令斷不續名殺。謂以惡心隔斷他命，乃至一念應生不生，唯此非餘，殺罪所觸。此所斷命為屬於誰？謂命若無彼便死者，既標第六，非我而誰？破我論中當廣思擇。故薄伽梵所說頌言：〔引頌·非本頌　T29 0086c15〕　　壽煖及與識，三法捨身時，
　　所捨身僵仆，如木無思覺。
故有根身名有命者，無根名死其理決然。離繫者言，不思而殺亦得殺罪。猶如觸火，設不先思亦被燒害。若爾汝等遇見他妻，或誤觸身亦應有罪。又善心者拔離繫髮，或師慈心勸修苦行，或因施主宿食不消，此等皆應獲苦他罪。又胎與母互為苦因，應母與胎有苦他罪。又所殺者既與殺合，亦應如火能燒自依，不應但令能殺得罪。又遣他殺，殺罪應無，如火不燒教觸火者。又諸木等應為罪觸，如舍等崩亦害生故。又非但喻，立義可成。已分別殺生。當辯不與取。頌曰：

〔頌·正74後半　T29 0086c29〕　　不與取他物，力竊取屬己。
〔T29 0087a〕論曰：前不誤等如其所應，流至後門故不重說。謂要先發欲盜故思，於他物中起他物想，或力或竊起盜加行，不誤而取令屬己身，齊此名為不與取罪。若有盜取窣堵波物，彼於如來得偷盜罪，以佛臨欲入涅槃時，哀愍世間總受所施。有餘師說：望守護者。若有掘取無主伏藏，於國主邊得偷盜罪。若有盜取諸迴轉物，已作羯磨於界內僧、若羯磨未成，普於佛弟子得偷盜罪。餘例應思。已辯不與取。當辯欲邪行。頌曰：

〔頌·正75前半　T29 0087a12〕　　欲邪行四種，行所不應行。
論曰：總有四種行不應行，皆得名為欲邪行罪：一於非境行不應行，謂行於他所攝妻妾或母或父或父母親乃至或王所守護境。二於非道行不應行，謂於自妻口及餘道。三於非處行不應行，謂於寺中制多逈處。四於非時行不應行。非時者何？謂懷胎時、飲兒乳時、受齋戒時。設自妻妾亦犯邪行。有說：若夫許受齋戒而有所犯方謂非時。既不誤言，亦流至此。若於他婦謂是己妻，或於己妻謂為他婦，道非道等但有誤心，雖有所行而非業道。若於此他婦作餘他婦想，行非梵行成業道耶？有說亦成，以於他婦起婬加行及受用故。有說不成，如殺業道於此起加行，於餘究竟故。於苾芻尼行非梵行，為從何處得業道耶？此從國王不忍許故。於自妻妾受齋戒時尚不應行，況出家者。若於童女行非梵行，為從何處得業道耶？若已許他，於所許處；未許他者，於能護人；此及所餘，皆於王得。已辯欲邪行。當辯虛誑語。頌曰：

〔頌·正75後半　T29 0087b04〕　　染異想發言，解義虛誑語。
論曰：於所說義異想發言，及所誑者解所說義，染心不誤成虛誑語。若所誑者未解言義，此言是何？是雜穢語。既虛誑語是所發言，有多字成言，何時成業道？與最後字俱生表聲及無表業成此業道。或隨何時所誑解義，表無表業成此業道。前字俱行皆此加行，所言解義定據何時？為據已聞正解名解？為據正聞能解名解？若爾何失？若據已聞正解名解，言所詮義意識所知，語表耳識俱時滅故，應此業道唯無表成。若據正聞能解名解，雖無有失然未了知，如何正聞可名能解？善言義者無迷亂緣，耳識已生名為能解，如無失者應取為宗。經說諸言略有十六，謂於不見不聞不覺不知事中言實見等，或於所見所聞所覺所知事中言不見等，如是八種名非聖言。若於不見乃至不知言不見等，或於所見乃至所知言實見等，如是八種名為聖言。何等名為所見等相？頌曰：

〔頌·正76　T29 0087b24〕　　由眼耳意識，并餘三所證，
　　如次第名為，所見聞知覺。
論曰：毘婆沙師作如是說：若境由眼識所證名所見，若境由耳識所證名所聞，若境由意識所證名所知，若境由鼻識舌識及身識所證名所覺。所以然者，香味觸三無記性故如死無覺，故能證者偏立覺名。何證知然？由經理證。言由經者，謂契經說：佛告大母：汝意云何？諸所有色非汝眼見、非汝曾見、非汝當見、非希求見，汝為因此起欲起貪、起親起愛、起阿賴耶、起尼延底、起耽著不？不爾。大德！諸所有聲非汝耳聞，廣說乃至諸所有法非汝意知，廣說乃至，不爾。大德！復告大母：汝於此中應知所見，唯有所見應知所聞所覺所知，唯有所聞所覺所知。此經既於色聲法境說為所見所聞所知，准此定於香等三境總合建立一所覺名。若不許然，何名所覺？又香味觸在所見等外，於彼三境應不起言說。是名為理。此證不成，且經非證，經義別故。非此經中世尊為欲決判見等四所言相，然見此經所說義者，謂佛勸彼於六境中及於見等四所言事，應知但有所見等言，不應增益愛非愛相。若爾，何相名所見等？有餘師說：若是五根現所證境名為所見，若他傳說名為所聞，若運自心以種種理比度所許名為所覺，若意現證名為所知。於五境中一一容起見聞覺知四種言說，於第六境除見有三，由此覺名非無所目，香等三境言說非無，故彼理言亦為無理。先軌範師作如是說：眼所現見名為所見，從他傳聞名為所聞，自運己心諸所思搆名為所覺，自內所受及自所證名為所知。且止傍言，應申正論。頗有由身表異想義不由發語成虛誑語耶？曰：有。故論言：頗有不動身殺生罪觸耶？曰：有，謂發語。頗有不發語誑語罪觸耶？曰：有，謂動身。頗有不動身不發語二罪所觸耶？曰：有，謂仙人意憤及布灑他時。若不動身亦不發語，欲無無表離表而生，此二如何得成業道？於如是難應設劬勞。已辯虛誑語。當辯餘三語。頌曰：

〔頌·正77·正78前半　T29 0088a08〕　　染心壞他語，說名離間語，
　　非愛麁惡語，諸染雜穢語，
　　餘說異三染，佞歌邪論等。
論曰：若染污心發壞他語，若他壞不壞俱成離間語。解義不誤，流至此中。若以染心發非愛語毀呰於他，名麁惡語。前染心語流至此故，解義不誤亦與前同。謂本期心所欲罵者，解所說義業道方成。一切染心所發諸語名雜穢語。所以者何？染所發言皆雜穢故。唯前語字流至此中。有餘師說：異虛誑等前三種語，所有一切染心發言名雜穢語，此謂佞歌及邪論等。佞謂諂佞，如有苾芻邪命居懷發諂佞語。歌謂歌詠，如世有人以染污心諷吟相調，及倡伎者為悅他情以染污心作諸詞曲。言邪論者，謂廣辯說諸不正見所執言詞。等謂染心所發悲嘆，及諸世俗戲論言詞。但異前三染心所發，一切皆是雜穢語收。輪王現時亦有歌詠，如何不是雜穢語收？由彼語從出離心發，能引出離，非預染心。有餘師言：爾時亦有成嫁娶等所發染言，由過輕故不成業道。已辯三語。當辯意三。頌曰：

〔頌·正78後半·正79前半　T29 0088b02〕　　惡欲他財貪，憎有情瞋恚，
　　撥善惡等見，名邪見業道。
論曰：於他財物惡欲名貪，謂於他財非理起欲，如何令彼屬我非他，起力竊心耽求他物，如是惡欲名貪業道。有餘師言：諸欲界愛皆貪業道。所以者何？《五蓋經》中依貪欲蓋，佛說應斷此世間貪，故知貪名總說欲愛。有說：欲愛雖盡名貪，而不可說皆成業道，此惡行中攝麁品故。勿輪王世及北俱盧所起欲貪成貪業道。於有情類憎恚名瞋，謂於他有情欲為傷害事，如是憎恚名瞋業道。於善惡等惡見撥無，此見名為邪見業道。如經說：無施與、無愛樂、無祠祀、無妙行、無惡行、無妙惡行業果異熟、無此世間無彼世間、無母無父、無化生有情、世間無沙門、或婆羅門是阿羅漢。彼經具顯謗業謗果謗聖邪見，此頌舉初等言攝後。

The canonical text stands in Chinese only. This edition renders the essence, the plain reading, the exposition and the apparatus into English — never the sūtra itself. Switch to 漢讀本 or 並行雙語 above to read it.

白話Plain reading

〔正60後半·正61〕黑白四業——四種業與它們的異熟

論（承前起問）：（前面剛說完曲、穢、濁三種業。）經中又說，業有四種：有的業是黑業而感黑異熟（『異熟』就是業所招來的果報），有的業是白業而感白異熟，有的業是黑白業而感黑白異熟，有的業既不是黑也不是白、也沒有異熟可招，而且能夠把前三種業都滅盡。這四種的相狀各是怎樣的？頌說：

頌：依著黑黑等等的差別，說有四種業。不善業、色界的善業、欲界的善業，以及能滅盡它們的無漏業——應當知道，依次就叫作黑、白、俱（黑白）、非（非黑非白）。

論：佛是依著兩件事的不同才說黑黑等四種業：一是業所感之果的性類不同，二是所治與能治的不同（能治就是能對治、能斷除的一方，所治就是被斷除的一方）。

一切不善業一向叫作黑，因為它的體性是染污的；它所感的異熟也叫作黑，因為那是不可意（不合心意）的果。色界的善業一向叫作白，因為它不夾雜惡業；它所感的異熟也叫作白，因為那是可意的果。

論（自設一問）：那麼為什麼不說無色界的善業也是白業呢？答：傳說是這樣——凡是一處具足二種異熟（就是中有與生有這二種身），又具足身、語、意三種業的，才在這裡說；其餘的就不說。（無色界沒有中有，也沒有身、語二業，所以不列在內。）

論（引經之別說）：然而契經之中也有一處這樣說：欲界的善業叫作黑白業，因為它被惡業所夾雜；它所感的異熟也叫作黑白，因為它的非愛果（不可愛的果）夾雜在其中。

要注意：這個『黑白』之名，是依著相續（一段前後相續的生命之流）而立的，不是依著業的自性而立。為什麼？因為沒有哪一個業、哪一個異熟自身既是黑又是白——黑與白互相違反，不可能同體。

論（自設難與答）：（論主自設一難。）難者說：惡業之果不是也被善業之果所夾雜嗎？既然如此，惡業豈不也應該叫作『白黑』？（意思是：既然善被惡雜就叫黑白，惡被善雜也該叫白黑才對。）

答：不善業之果不一定會被善業之果所夾雜（例如斷了善根的人所造諸惡，以及地獄中純受黑異熟之處，那裡並無善果可雜）；而欲界善業之果卻一定會被惡業之果所夾雜。所以者何？因為欲界之中惡的勢力勝過善的勢力。（所以只說欲界善業是黑白，不說惡業是白黑。）

論（第四業）：一切無漏業能夠永遠斷盡前面三種業，所以叫作『非黑』，因為它不是染污性的；也叫作『非白』，因為它不能招感白異熟。

這個『非白』之言是密意說（就是別有用意而說，不是就字面取義）。何以見得？因為佛在《大空經》中告訴阿難陀說：一切無學之法是純善、純白、一向無罪的。（可見無漏法本身正是純白，此處說『非白』只取『不招白異熟』一義。）本論（指毘曇本論）也說：什麼叫作白法？就是諸善法以及無覆無記法（此二皆非染污，所以同名為白）。至於其中無漏之法所以沒有異熟，是因為不墮三界，又與那墮在三界流轉之法的法性相違（所以不能招感異熟果）。

〔正62·正63〕能盡諸業的無漏思——十二思、一思、四思

論（承轉起問）：那麼一切無漏業都能滅盡前三種業嗎？答：不是。問：那麼是怎樣？頌說：

頌：見道中的四法忍，以及離欲染位中前八無間道——這兩處共有十二種無漏思，唯獨滅盡純黑業。離欲界染的第九無間道之思，一併滅盡黑白業與純黑業。離四靜慮之染，各各第九無間道之思，這四種思唯獨令純白業盡。

論：在見道之中有四種法智忍（『忍』是無間道位上斷惑的智，四法忍即苦、集、滅、道四諦下的法智忍）；在修道之中離欲染的階位上，前八個無間道（『無間道』就是正斷煩惱的那一念，其後緊接解脫道）所俱行的思——這樣合起來共十二種思，唯獨滅盡純黑業。

離欲界染的第九無間道所俱行的那一種無漏思，能同時令黑白業與純黑業都盡。為什麼這一念兼盡二業？因為到這一念時，欲界的善法總斷了（黑白業即欲界善業，故隨之而盡），同時也斷了第九品的不善業（純黑業之殘餘於此而盡）。

離四靜慮各一地之染，各各第九無間道所俱行的無漏思——這四種思唯獨令純白業盡（純白業即色界善業，四靜慮各盡其一地）。

論（自設一問）：什麼緣故諸地的有漏善法唯獨最後一個無間道才能斷，其餘的不能斷？答：因為諸善法不是『自性斷』（不是被直接斷掉自體），既已斷了它還可以現前；只是由於緣著它的那些煩惱斷盡的時候，才說名為斷了那些善法——那時候善法得了離繫（脫離煩惱之繫縛）的緣故。由這個道理，乃至緣著它的煩惱只要還剩一品在，斷義就不成立，因為那時善法還沒有離繫。

〔正64〕另有兩家的說法——地獄受、見所斷

論（承轉）：頌說：（此下是別家異說，論本並錄二家而不作取捨。）

頌：有一家說：順地獄受的業與其餘欲界的業，是黑業與黑白雜業。又有一家說：欲界見所斷的業與其餘欲界的業，是純黑業與俱業。

論（第一家·有餘師）：有一位餘師說：順地獄受的業，以及欲界之中順其餘諸趣受的業，依次叫作純黑業與雜業。因為地獄的異熟唯獨由不善業所感，所以順地獄受的業叫作純黑業；除了地獄之外，其餘欲界之中的異熟都通於善惡二業所感，所以順那些受的業叫作黑白業。

論（第二家·有餘師）：又有一位餘師說：欲界見所斷的業（見道所斷的那一分），以及欲界之中所有其餘的業，依次叫作純黑業與俱業。因為見所斷的業沒有善業夾雜，所以叫作純黑業；欲界修所斷的業則有善有不善，所以叫作俱業。

（此段二家並列，論本唯錄二說而不加判斷。）

〔正65〕三牟尼與三清淨

論（承轉起問）：經中又說有三牟尼，經中又說有三清淨，二者都通於身、語、意三處。它們的相狀各是怎樣的？頌說：

頌：無學位的身業、語業，以及無學的意——這就是三牟尼。三清淨應當知道，就是身、語、意三種妙行。

論：無學位的身業與語業，叫作身牟尼、語牟尼；至於意牟尼，指的是無學的『意』本身，而不是意業。（『牟尼』是寂默之義，即諸煩惱之言永已寂靜。）

論（自設一問）：所以者何（為什麼意牟尼取心而不取業）？答：因為勝義的牟尼唯以心為體。心之相難以直接顯示，是由身、語二業比知而得的。又身業、語業是『遠離』之體（能離惡行），意業卻不然，因為意業沒有無表。由『遠離』之義建立牟尼之名，所以就是這個心，由身語二業而能有所遠離，因此叫作牟尼。

論（自設一問）：為什麼牟尼唯獨在無學位？答：因為阿羅漢才是真實的牟尼——諸煩惱之言到此永遠寂靜了。

論（三清淨）：身、語、意三種妙行，叫作身、語、意三種清淨。因為它們或暫時、或永遠地遠離一切惡行與煩惱之垢，所以叫作清淨。

論（何以說此二法）：說這牟尼與清淨二者，是為了止息有情心中所計的邪牟尼與邪清淨（外道自以為其寂默、其淨行即是牟尼與清淨）。

〔正66〕三惡行與三妙行

論（承轉起問）：經中又說有三惡行，經中又說有三妙行，都通於身、語、意。它們的相狀各是怎樣的？頌說：

頌：不善的身業、語業、意業，叫作三惡行；再加上貪、瞋、邪見，也是意惡行。三妙行則與此相翻。

論：一切不善的身業、語業、意業，依次叫作身惡行、語惡行、意惡行。

然而意惡行另外還有三種，就是不屬於意業的貪、瞋、邪見。（為什麼它們不算意業？）因為貪等離開『思』另有自體（意業以思為體，貪瞋邪見則是煩惱，別有自性）。

論（譬喻者立宗）：譬喻者說：貪、瞋、邪見就是意業，因為《思經》中把這三種說為意業。

論（毘婆沙師難之）：若是這樣，那麼業與煩惱就合成一體了。

論（譬喻者答）：承認煩惱就是意業，這有什麼過失呢？

論（毘婆沙師破之）：毘婆沙師說他們這樣講不合道理。如果容許這樣，就與眾多的理與教相違，成為大過失。至於契經中之所以說這三種是意業，那是為了顯示『思』以貪等為門而轉起（思由這三者為門而發動），並且由此能招感非愛之果，又是聰慧者所訶厭的。

這樣的行就是惡，所以叫作惡行。

論（三妙行）：三妙行就與此相翻而知：就是身、語、意的一切善業；而不屬於業的那三種，是無貪、無瞋、正見。

論（自設一問）：正見與邪見既然沒有『故意要利益他人或損害他人』的思，怎麼能成為善或惡呢？答：因為它們能為損、益作根本（一切損益之行以見為根）。

〔正67〕十業道——只取惡行妙行中的粗顯者

論（承轉起問）：經中又說有十業道，或善或惡。它們的相狀是怎樣的？頌說：

頌：所說的十業道，是從惡行、妙行之中，取其粗顯的一分為其體性；隨其所應，成為善業道與惡業道。

論：在前面所說的惡行與妙行之中，凡是粗顯而容易了知的，就攝為十業道。隨其所應：善的一邊攝前面的妙行，不善業道攝前面的惡行。

論（自設一問）：那麼不攝的是哪些惡行、妙行呢？

答：先說不善的一邊。身惡業道對於身惡行，不攝其中一分，就是加行、後起，以及其餘的不善身業——例如飲酒、執持、打、縛等等；因為加行等不是粗顯的緣故。（那麼哪些身惡行才立為業道？）如果身惡行使得別的有情失去性命、失去財物、失去妻妾等，就說它為業道，因為要令人遠離的緣故。

語惡業道對於語惡行，不攝加行、後起以及輕微的一分。意惡業道對於意惡行，不攝惡思以及輕微的貪等。

再說善的一邊。身善業道對於身妙行，不攝其中一分，就是加行、後起以及其餘的善身業——例如離飲酒、施供養等。語善業道對於語妙行，不攝一分，就是愛語等。意善業道對於意妙行，不攝一分，就是諸善思。

〔正68〕前七業道的表與無表

論（承轉起問）：十業道之中，前七業道（身三、語四）都一定具有表與無表嗎？（『表』是能表示於他人的身語動作，『無表』是隨之而起、不能表示於他人而相續不斷的一分。）答：不是。問：那麼是怎樣？頌說：

頌：惡的六種一定有無表；那六種若是自己作，則表無表二者俱有；欲邪行則必定二者俱有。善的七種若從受戒而生，二者俱有；若是定所生的，則唯有無表。

論：七種惡業道之中，有六種一定有無表，就是殺生、不與取、虛誑語、離間語、麁惡語、雜穢語。這六種如果是差遣他人去作，那麼根本業道成就的時候，自身並沒有表業（動作是別人作的），所以唯有無表。

如果是自己親作，那麼這六種業道就表與無表二者都有——就是在自己起表業（動手）的時候對方便死了等等；如果動手之後過些時候才死，那就與差遣使者相同，根本業道成就時唯有無表。

唯獨欲邪行必定具足表與無表二種，因為它一定要自身才能究竟，不能差遣他人代作——就像自己的歡喜不能差人代生一樣。

七種善業道如果是從受戒而生的，必定具足表與無表二種；因為受生尸羅（受戒所生的戒體）一定要依表業（受戒的作法）才能生起。至於靜慮律儀與無漏律儀所攝的，叫作『定生』，這一種唯有無表，因為它只依心力而得生起。

〔正69〔1–3句〕〕加行、根本、後起——三位怎麼分

論（承轉起問）：加行與後起，跟根本業道一樣嗎？答：不一樣。問：那麼是怎樣？頌說：

頌：加行必定有表，無表則或有或無；後起與此相反。

論：業道的加行必定有表業；這一位上的無表則或有或無——如果是猛利的纏（強烈的煩惱）或淳淨之心所起，就有無表；不是這樣就沒有。後起與前面相反：必定有無表，而這一位上的表業或有或無——如果後來還起了隨順前業的動作，就有表業；不是這樣就沒有。

論（自設一問）：在這個道理之中，加行位、根本位、後起位是怎麼建立的呢？

答：先說不善的一邊，就以最初的殺業為例。像屠羊的人將要行殺的時候：先發起殺心而從床上起身，拿了錢財走到賣羊的市集，摸觸羊身、付價捉取，牽回來餵養，將牠趕入屠坊，手執杖刀或打或刺，一次或再次，直到牠的命還沒有斷——這一切都叫作殺生的加行。

隨著這個表業，那隻羊正好命終；就在這一剎那之間的表業與無表業，這才叫作殺生的根本業道。由兩個緣故，使諸有情被根本業道的殺罪所觸：一是由加行，二是由果滿（對方確實死了）。

這一剎那之後，殺的無表業相續不斷地隨轉，叫作殺的後起。以及後來剝皮、截解、整治、洗滌，或稱斤兩、或販賣、或烹煮、或食用、或讚述其味美——這些表業的剎那，也都叫作殺生的後起。

其餘六種業道，隨其所應，三分（加行、根本、後起）雖有不同，可以照這個例子推說。

至於貪、瞋、邪見，才一現前就叫作根本業道，所以它們沒有加行與後起的差別。

論（自設之難·兩關）：這裡應當說一說：所殺的有情正住在死有的那一剎那時，能殺的人那一剎那的表無表業就成為業道呢，還是要等他死後才成？

問：若是這樣有什麼過失？答：兩種說法都有過失。

若說所殺的有情正住死有時能殺者的業道就成，那麼能殺者與所殺者同時命終的情形，也應該成就業道——然而本宗不許那樣成就業道。

若說要等所殺的有情命終以後，能殺者的業道才成，那麼前面就不應該那樣說：『隨著這個表業，那隻羊正好命終；就在這一剎那之間的表無表業，是殺生的根本業道。』（前後自語相違。）而且這樣也會違害毘婆沙師對本論『加行未息』一語的解釋——本論說：有沒有『已害生而殺生未滅』的情形？答：有，就像已經斷了他的命，而加行還沒有止息。毘婆沙師解釋這一句說：這是在後起位上用『加行』一語來說的。

論（論主自答）：應當說：是在根本位上用『加行』一語來說，因為本宗許可命終之後根本業道還沒有止息。這樣說就沒有過失。

問：這裡所說的『沒有過失』是指什麼？答：就是在根本位上用『加行』之語（如此則前後不相違）。

論（自設一問）：若是這樣，那時候所有的表業怎麼還能成為根本業道呢？答：為什麼不能成？問：因為它已經沒有作用了。答：無表在這裡又有什麼作用呢？所以業道之成就並不是由於有作用，只是由於加行與果圓滿的時候，表與無表這二者一齊成為根本業道。

論（業道互為加行後起）：又諸業道互相對望，可以互為加行與後起。現在且說殺生業道以十業道為它的加行：譬如有人要殺害怨敵，設下種種謀計、湊合殺害的條件——或者殺害眾生以祈請助力（殺生），或者盜取他人之物以資助殺事（不與取），或者與他的妻子行婬以使她殺其夫（欲邪行），或者為了離間他與親友而起語四過令彼此猜疑阻隔（虛誑語、離間語、麁惡語、雜穢語），使得縱然有力堪能救護的人在，也不再有救護之心；或者對他的財物心生貪著（貪），或者就對他起瞋恚心（瞋），或者起邪見以長養殺業（邪見），然後才殺——這樣就叫作以十業道為殺的加行。

殺了怨敵之後，又在後來誅殺他的親屬、收取他的財物、婬其所愛，乃至又起貪、瞋、邪見次第現前——這十種就叫作殺生的後起。其餘的業道也應照這樣了知。

論（自設一問）：貪等三者不應當能作加行嗎？答：不能。因為只在心裡起念，加行並不因此就成——起心的時候還沒有作事的緣故。

論（承轉起問）：經中又說：苾芻應當知道，殺有三種：一是從貪生，二是從瞋生，三是從癡生；乃至邪見也有三種。這裡應當說：什麼相狀的殺生叫作從貪生？其餘的也照這樣問。

（總答：）並不是諸業道一切都由三根究竟，然而它們的加行卻與此不同。問：怎麼不同？頌說：

〔正69〔4句〕·正70前半〕加行由三不善根起

頌：加行由三根而起；至於根本，則因為是從三根無間而生的緣故，所以說貪等三者也從三根生。

論：不善業道在加行生起的時候，一一都由三種不善根而起——這是依著『先等起』（在前引發的那一念心）而作這樣說的。

殺生的加行。從貪起的，例如為了得到他的身分（皮肉筋骨之類）、或為了得財、或為了戲樂、或為了拔濟親友與自身，由貪引起殺生加行。從瞋起的，例如為了除去怨敵，發起憤恚之心而起殺加行。從癡起的，例如在祭祠之中以為這是如法之事而起殺加行；又如諸王等依世間的法律誅戮怨敵、除剪凶徒，以為這樣能成大福而起殺加行。又如波剌私人這樣說：父母年老有病，若使他們早些命終，就能免去困苦，反而生大福。又如諸外道有這樣說的：蛇、蠍、蜂等是害人的毒物，若能殺牠們反而生勝福；羊、鹿、水牛以及其餘禽獸，本來就是預備供人食用的，所以殺牠們無罪。又因為邪見而殺害眾生——這些加行都是從癡而起。

偷盜的加行。從貪起的，就是隨自己所需而起盜加行，或為了別的利養、恭敬、名譽，或為了救拔自身親友，由貪引起偷盜加行。從瞋起的，就是為了除怨，發憤恚心而起盜加行。從癡起的，就是諸王等依世間法律沒收惡人的財物，以為法應如此而無偷盜之罪；又如婆羅門這樣說：世間的財物在劫初之時是大梵天王施給諸梵志的，後來梵志的勢力衰微，才被諸卑族侵奪受用；如今諸梵志對世間他人的財物，或奪或偷，用來充衣充食、或充其餘之用、或轉施他人，都是在用自己的財物，沒有偷盜之罪——然而他們取的時候心中明明有『這是他物』之想。又因邪見而盜取他人財物——這些都叫作從癡而起的盜加行。

邪婬的加行。從貪起的，就是對他人之妻等起染著之心，或為了求取他人的財物、名位、恭敬，或為了救拔自身他身，由貪著之心而起婬加行。從瞋生的，就是為了除怨，發憤恚心而起婬加行。從癡生的，例如波剌私人讚歎與母親等行非梵行；又如諸梵志讚歎牛祠之中有男女受持牛禁（學牛的行為為苦行），吸水齧草，或住或行，不分親疏，隨遇隨合；又如諸外道這樣說：一切女人如同臼、如同花果、如同熟食、如同階梯、如同道路、如同橋、如同船，世間眾人應當共同受用——這些加行都是從癡而生。

虛誑語等四種語業道的加行，從貪、從瞋而生的，比照前面就可以說。至於虛誑語的加行從癡而生的，就像外道之論中所說的：

引頌（外論之言）：如果人是因為戲笑、因為嫁娶、因為面對女人與國王、以及為了救命救財而說虛誑語，那是無罪的。

論：又因為邪見而起的虛誑語、離間語等一切加行，應當知道全是從癡所生。又諸吠陀以及其餘的邪論，都屬雜穢語所攝，它們的加行從癡而生。

論（自設一問）：貪、瞋、邪見這三者既然沒有加行，怎麼可以說它們從貪等而生呢？答：因為它們是從三根無間而生的緣故，所以可以說貪等三者從三根生。就是說：有時從貪無間而生貪業道，從瞋、從癡無間而生也是一樣；瞋與邪見從三根生也是如此。

〔正70後半〕善業道三位都由三善根起

論（承轉起問）：已經說了不善業道從三根生。善的又是怎樣？頌說：

頌：善業道在三位之中，都是由三善根而起。

論：諸善業道所有的加行、根本、後起，都是從無貪、無瞋、無癡三善根所起。因為善的這三位都是善心所等起的，而善心必定與三種善根相應。

論（自設一問）：這善的三位其相狀是怎樣的？答：就是遠離前面不善的三位——離惡的加行就是善加行，離惡的根本就是善根本，離惡的後起就是善後起。

例如勤策（沙彌）受具足戒的時候：進入戒壇、禮敬苾芻大眾、至誠發語請親教師，乃至一白二羯磨等等，都叫作善業道的加行。到第三羯磨完畢的那一剎那之中，所起的表業與無表業，叫作根本業道。從此以後直到為他說四依，以及其餘依前而相續隨轉的表無表業，都叫作後起。

〔正71·正72前半〕業道由什麼根究竟

論（承轉起問）：如前所說，並不是諸業道一切都由三根究竟。那麼哪一根究竟哪一種業道呢？頌說：

頌：殺生、麁惡語、瞋恚，究竟都由瞋；不與取、欲邪行以及貪，都由貪究竟；邪見由癡究竟；其餘的則許由三根究竟。

論：惡業道之中，殺生、麁語、瞋恚這三種業道由瞋而究竟——因為必定要在『無所顧惜的極麁惡之心』現在前的時候，這三者才成就。

不與取、欲邪行、貪這三種業道由貪而究竟——因為必定要在『有所顧戀的極染污之心』現在前的時候，這三者才成就。

邪見的究竟必定由愚癡，因為要上品的癡現前才成就。

虛誑語、離間語、雜穢語這三種，則許它們一一都由三根究竟；因為貪、瞋等現在前的時候，一一都能使這三者成就。

〔正72後半〕業道在什麼處所生起

論（承轉起問）：諸惡業道是在什麼處所生起的呢？頌說：

頌：在有情、資具、名色、名身等四處而起。

論：如前面所說的四節業道（身三、語四、意三之中分為四類），依著三、三、一、三的次第，於有情等四處而生：殺生等三種於有情處起，偷盜等三種於眾具（資生之具）處起，唯獨邪見一種於名色處起，虛誑語等三種於名身等處起（名身、句身、文身，即語言之所依）。

〔正73前半〕俱死與前死——為什麼不成根本業道

論（承轉起問）：有人起了加行決定要殺他人，而自己與所殺的有情同時死，或者自己先死，也得根本業道之罪嗎？頌說：

頌：同時死以及在前死的，不成根本業道，因為沒有『根』、所依已別的緣故。

論：如果能殺的人與所殺的有情同時命終，或者自己在前死，他決定不得根本業道。

所以有這樣的設問：有沒有一種情形，殺者起了殺的加行，並且使果圓滿（對方確實死了），而他卻不被殺罪所觸？答：有。問：是怎樣？答：就是能殺者與所殺者同死、或前死的情形。

問：什麼緣故如此？答：因為在能殺者死的那一刻，所殺的有情其命還存在，不可能使那位能殺者成就殺罪（罪要在對方命斷時才成）；也不能說能殺者其命已終之後還可以得殺罪，因為所依已別的緣故——就是說，起殺加行時所依止的那個身現在已經斷滅了；雖然另有一類同分之身生起（下一生的身），但那不是罪的依止處，那個身不曾起過殺生加行，說它成殺業道，於理不應如此。

〔正73後半〕軍陣同事——一人殺而眾人皆得罪

論（承轉起問）：如果有很多人聚集成軍，要殺怨敵，或者去打獵等等；其中隨有一人行殺的時候，什麼人得成殺生業道？頌說：

頌：軍等之中若是同事，都成業道，如同親作者一樣。

論：在軍等之中，若隨有一人作了殺生之事，那麼如同親自作的人一樣，一切人都成殺生業道；因為他們共同許可為一事的緣故。就像為了一件事而輾轉相教一樣，所以一人殺生，其餘的人都得罪。

如果有人是被他人的勢力逼迫而入這軍中的，只要他因此也同了那個心，一樣成殺罪。唯獨除去一種人：他若立誓自要——縱使為救自己的性命也不行殺——那麼雖然由他力逼迫而在其中，卻沒有殺心，所以沒有殺罪。

〔正74前半〕殺生之相——故思、他想、不誤

論（承轉起問）：現在應當辨明業道成就之相：要到什麼程度才叫作殺生，乃至到什麼程度才叫作邪見？且先分別殺生之相。頌說：

頌：殺生要由故思，於他有情作他有情之想，並且不誤而殺。

論：要先發起『欲殺』的故思，對於他有情起他有情之想，作殺的加行而不誤地殺——就是只殺他所要殺的那一個，不是漫無分別地殺了別的；到這個程度才叫作殺生業道。

論（簡別一種）：有猶豫而殺的也成殺生。就是他先前對所要殺的境界心懷猶豫：這是活的還是不是活的？就算是活的，是他還是不是他？後來起了決定之志：不論是與不是，我一定要殺。由於心中無所顧惜，若是殺了有情，也成業道。

論（自設一問）：在剎那剎那生滅的五蘊之上，怎麼能成殺生（既然它自己念念在滅）？

答有二解。一解說：『息風』叫作生命，它依著身與心而轉；如果有人令它斷絕、不再相續而生，就像滅去燈的光、滅去鈴的聲一樣，這就叫作殺。另一解說：或者所謂『生』就是命根；如果有人令它斷絕而不相續，就叫作殺。就是說：以惡心隔斷他人的命，乃至使應當生起的一念不得生起——唯獨這樣才被殺罪所觸，其餘的不是。

論（自設一問）：這所斷的命是屬於誰的？答：所謂『命若沒有了，他就死了』——既然標出了第六轉（『誰的』這個屬格），那麼不是『我』又是誰呢？（此難出自執我者。）論主答：這在破我品中當廣加思擇。（此處先引經證命之為法。）所以薄伽梵所說的頌言：

引頌（薄伽梵所說）：壽、煖以及識，這三法捨離身體的時候，所捨的身體便僵仆倒地，像木頭一樣沒有思、沒有覺。

論：所以有根之身叫作有命者，沒有根的叫作死——這個道理是決定的。

論（外道離繫者之計）：離繫者（露形之外道）說：不經思慮而殺也得殺罪，就像觸火一樣，縱使不先思慮也一樣被燒害。

論（論主連下六難以破之）：若是這樣，那麼你們遇見他人之妻，或者無意中誤觸其身，也應當有罪。又如善心的人為離繫者拔除鬚髮（苦行之事），或者師長以慈心勸他修苦行，或者因為施主所施的宿食不消化而使人受苦——這些都應當得『使他人受苦』之罪。又胎兒與母親互相為苦因，那麼母親對胎兒也應當有使他受苦之罪。又所殺的那一位既然與『殺』相合，也應當像火能燒自己的所依一樣（自作自受），不應該只令能殺者得罪。又若是這樣，差遣他人去殺，殺罪就應該沒有——如同火不會燒那位教人觸火的人。又諸木石等也應當被罪所觸，因為房舍等崩塌時也害了生命。而且不只是譬喻不成，我方所立之義本身就可以成立。

〔正74後半〕不與取之相

論（承轉）：已經分別了殺生，現在應當辨明不與取。頌說：

頌：不與取，是以力或以竊取他人之物，使之屬於自己。

論：前面所說的『不誤』等等，隨其所應都流貫到後面各門，所以不再重說。就是說：要先發起『欲盜』的故思，對於他人之物起他物之想，或以力（強奪）、或以竊（暗取）而起盜的加行，不誤而取，使之屬於自身；到這個程度才叫作不與取之罪。

論（別問三事）：若有人盜取窣堵波（塔）之物，他是對如來得偷盜罪——因為佛將要入涅槃的時候，哀愍世間而總受了一切所施之物。（另有一位餘師說：是望守護的人而得罪。）

若有人掘取無主的伏藏，是對國主一邊得偷盜罪。

若有人盜取諸迴轉物（亡故苾芻之遺物，可迴轉屬於其餘苾芻，所以叫作迴轉物）：已經作了羯磨的，是對界內之僧得罪；若羯磨尚未成的，是普對佛弟子得偷盜罪。

其餘的例子照這樣思量便可。

〔正75前半〕欲邪行之相——四種行所不應行

論（承轉）：已經辨明不與取，現在應當辨明欲邪行。頌說：

頌：欲邪行有四種，都是行於所不應行。

論：總有四種『行不應行』，都得名為欲邪行之罪。

一是於非境行不應行：就是行於他人所攝的妻妾，或母、或父、或父母之親，乃至或是國王所守護的境。

二是於非道行不應行：就是於自妻的口以及其餘非道之處。

三是於非處行不應行：就是於寺中、制多（塔廟）之處、僻遠之處。

四是於非時行不應行。什麼叫非時？就是懷胎之時、飲兒乳之時、受齋戒之時——縱使是自己的妻妾，這時候也犯邪行。（另有一說：要丈夫許可她受齋戒而後有所犯，才叫作非時。）

前面所說的『不誤』一語，也流貫到此。若是對他人之婦而以為是自己的妻，或者對自己的妻而以為是他人之婦，乃至道非道等只要心中有誤，雖然有所行也不成業道。

論（自設一問）：若是對這位他婦而作另一位他婦之想，行非梵行成業道嗎？

（此處二說並陳。）有一說：也成，因為畢竟是對他婦起了婬加行並且受用了。又有一說：不成，就像殺業道對這一個起加行、卻在另一個上究竟（那樣就不成根本業道）一樣。

論（自設一問）：對苾芻尼行非梵行，是從什麼處得業道呢？答：這是從國王處得罪，因為國王不容許這樣的事。（並以輕況重：）對自己的妻妾在受齋戒之時尚且不應行，何況是出家之人。

論（自設一問）：若對童女行非梵行，是從什麼處得業道呢？答：若她已經許配他人，就在所許之處得罪；未許人的，就在能守護她的人處得罪。這些以及其餘的情形，都是從國王處得罪。

〔正75後半〕虛誑語之相——染心、異想、發言、解義

論（承轉）：已經辨明欲邪行，現在應當辨明虛誑語。頌說：

頌：以染心於所說之義起異想而發言，並且對方解了其義，就成虛誑語。

論：對於所說之義起相異之想而發言，並且所誑的人領解了所說之義，以染污之心而不誤，就成虛誑語。

論（自設一問）：如果所誑的人沒有領解所說的言義，那這一番言語算什麼？答：是雜穢語。

論（自設一問）：既然虛誑語就是所發之言，而言是由許多字合成的，那麼什麼時候成業道呢？答：與最後一個字俱生的表聲以及無表業，成就這個業道；或者隨於什麼時候所誑者領解了義，那時的表無表業成就這個業道。在此之前諸字所俱行的，都是它的加行。

論（自設二難）：所說的『解義』究竟依據什麼時候？是依據『已經聽完而正解』叫作解，還是依據『正在聽而能解』叫作解？

問：若是這樣有什麼過失？答：若依據『已聽完而正解』叫作解，那麼言語所詮之義是意識所了知的，而語表已與耳識同時謝滅了，這樣一來這個業道就應當唯有無表能成（表業已滅）。若依據『正在聽而能解』叫作解，雖然沒有這個過失，然而那時還沒有了知，怎麼可以說正在聽就叫能解？

論（論主取一為宗）：善知言義的人沒有迷亂之緣，耳識已生就叫作能解——這樣既然沒有過失，就應當取這一說為宗。

論（承轉起問）：經中說諸言略有十六種：對於不見、不聞、不覺、不知之事而說『我實見』等等，或者對於所見、所聞、所覺、所知之事而說『我不見』等等——這樣八種叫作非聖言。若對於不見乃至不知而說不見等等，或者對於所見乃至所知而說實見等等——這樣八種叫作聖言。那麼什麼叫作所見等等之相？頌說：

〔正76〕見聞覺知——四種言依的相狀

頌：由眼識、耳識、意識以及其餘三識所證的，依次叫作所見、所聞、所知、所覺。

論（毘婆沙師之說）：毘婆沙師這樣說：若境是由眼識所證的叫作所見，由耳識所證的叫作所聞，由意識所證的叫作所知，由鼻識、舌識、身識所證的叫作所覺。

論（自設一問）：所以然者何（為什麼後三識合為一名）？答：因為香、味、觸這三者是無記性的，就像死人一樣沒有覺知，所以在能證的一邊偏立『覺』之名。

論（自設一問）：何以知道確實如此？答：由經與理二證。

所謂由經，就是契經說：佛告大母：你意下如何？凡是那些色，不是你眼所見、不是你曾見、不是你當見、也不是你所希求見的，你會因此起欲、起貪、起親、起愛、起阿賴耶（執藏）、起尼延底（執取）、起耽著嗎？（大母答：）不會，大德！凡是那些聲，不是你耳所聞的，廣說乃至凡是那些法，不是你意所知的，廣說乃至——不會，大德！佛又告訴大母：你在這裡面，於所見應當知道唯有所見，於所聞、所覺、所知應當知道唯有所聞、所覺、所知。

這部經既然對色、聲、法三境說為所見、所聞、所知，比照這個，就決定可以對香等三境總合建立一個『所覺』之名。若不許這樣，那麼什麼叫作所覺呢？又香、味、觸在所見等之外，對那三境就應當不能起言說了。這就叫作理證。

論（論主破此證）：這個證不成立。且說經不足為證，因為經義另有所在——這部經中世尊並不是為了決判見等四種言依之相。看這部經所說之義，是佛勸他在六境之中以及在見等四種所言之事上，應當知道只有所見等等之言，不應當增益可愛與不可愛之相。

論（毘婆沙師問）：若是這樣，什麼相才叫作所見等等呢？

論（有餘師之說）：有一位餘師說：若是五根現量所證之境叫作所見；若是從他人傳說而得的叫作所聞；若是運用自心以種種道理比度所許的叫作所覺；若是意所現證的叫作所知。這樣，於五境之中一一都可以起見、聞、覺、知四種言說；於第六境（法境）之中除見之外有三種。由此可知『覺』之名並非沒有所指，香等三境也不是不能言說；所以他們（毘婆沙師）那個『理』之言也是無理的。

論（先軌範師之說）：先軌範師這樣說：眼所現見的叫作所見，從他人傳聞的叫作所聞，自己運用己心種種思構的叫作所覺，自內所領受以及自所證的叫作所知。

論（收）：且止傍論，應當申說正論。

論（本論自引之問答）：有沒有由身表而於義起異想，不由發語而成虛誑語的？答：有。所以本論說：有沒有不動身而被殺生罪所觸的？答：有，就是發語（叫人去殺）。有沒有不發語而被誑語罪所觸的？答：有，就是動身（以身表示）。有沒有既不動身、又不發語而被這二罪所觸的？答：有，就是仙人意憤之時（以意念致害）以及布灑他（布薩）之時（默然妄表清淨）。

論（自設一難）：若既不動身、也不發語，而欲界又沒有離開表業而生的無表，那麼這二者怎麼能成業道呢？答：對這樣的難，應當設劬勞（此處論主置而不決，留與後人用力）。

〔正77·正78前半〕離間語·麁惡語·雜穢語

論（承轉）：已經辨明虛誑語，現在應當辨明其餘三種語。頌說：

頌：以染心發出壞他之語，叫作離間語；非愛之語叫作麁惡語；諸染心所發之語叫作雜穢語。另有一說：異於前三種染語的（如諂佞、歌詠、邪論等），才叫雜穢語。

論（離間語）：若以染污之心發出壞他（破壞他人和合）之語，那麼不論他人是壞或不壞，都成離間語。『解義』與『不誤』二事流貫到這裡（即對方須領解、且不誤）。

論（麁惡語）：若以染心發出非愛之語毀呰他人，叫作麁惡語。前面的『染心』一語流貫到此，『解義』與『不誤』也與前面相同——就是說，本來所期心要罵的那個人領解了所說之義，業道才成。

論（雜穢語）：一切染心所發的諸語都叫作雜穢語。所以然者何？因為染心所發之言都是雜穢的。唯有前面的『語』字流貫到這裡（其餘諸緣不必具）。

論（有餘師之異說）：有一位餘師說：異於虛誑語等前三種語之外，所有一切染心所發之言才叫作雜穢語，這就是指諂佞、歌詠以及邪論等等。『佞』就是諂佞，例如有苾芻心懷邪命而發諂佞之語。『歌』就是歌詠，例如世間有人以染污心諷詠相調戲，以及倡伎之人為了取悅他人之情而以染污心作諸詞曲。所謂『邪論』，就是廣為辯說諸不正見所執的言詞。『等』字所攝的，是染心所發的悲嘆以及諸世俗戲論的言詞。只要異於前三種而是染心所發的，一切都收在雜穢語中。

論（自設一問）：轉輪王出世之時也有歌詠，怎麼不算雜穢語所收？答：因為那些歌詠之語是從出離之心而發，能引生出離，不是預先就有的染心。

論（又一有餘師之說）：又有一位餘師說：那時候也有成就嫁娶等事所發的染語，只是因為過失輕微，所以不成業道。

〔正78後半·正79前半〕貪·瞋·邪見三種意業道

論（承轉）：已經辨明三種語業道，現在應當辨明意三。頌說：

頌：對他人財物起惡欲的是貪，憎恨有情的是瞋恚，撥無善惡等的見叫作邪見業道。

論（貪業道）：對於他人的財物起惡欲，叫作貪。就是說：對他人之財非理起欲——想著『怎樣才能使那個東西屬於我而不屬於他』，起了強奪、暗竊之心而耽求他人之物；這樣的惡欲叫作貪業道。

論（有餘師之說）：有一位餘師說：一切欲界之愛都是貪業道。所以然者何？《五蓋經》中依貪欲蓋，佛說應當斷除此世間之貪；由此可知『貪』之名是總說欲愛。

論（又一說）：又有一說：欲愛雖然都可以叫作貪，卻不可以說它們都成業道，因為這貪業道在惡行之中只攝取粗顯的一分。（若不如此，）豈不是輪王出世之時以及北俱盧洲之人所起的欲貪也成貪業道了。

論（瞋業道）：對於有情類起憎恚，叫作瞋。就是說：對他有情要作傷害之事；這樣的憎恚叫作瞋業道。

論（邪見業道）：對於善惡等事以惡見撥無（否定其有），這個見叫作邪見業道。

如經中所說：沒有布施、沒有愛樂、沒有祠祀，沒有妙行、沒有惡行，沒有妙行惡行之業所感的果異熟，沒有此世間、沒有彼世間，沒有母、沒有父，沒有化生的有情，世間沒有沙門或婆羅門是阿羅漢。

那部經完整地顯示了謗業、謗果、謗聖三類邪見；本頌只舉出最初的一項，用一個『等』字把其餘的都攝在內。

〔Second Half of Root 60 · Root 61〕The Four Actions Black and White — The Four Kinds of Action and Their Maturations

Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): (Above, the three actions of the crooked, the foul, and the turbid have just been finished.) Again the sūtra says that action is of four kinds: there is action that is black and has a black maturation (“maturation” being the retribution that action draws upon one), there is action that is white and has a white maturation, there is action that is black-and-white and has a black-and-white maturation, and there is action that is neither black nor white, has no maturation to draw, and is able to exhaust the former three kinds of action. What are the marks of these four? The stanza says:

Stanza: In accordance with the differences of black-and-black and the rest, action is said to be of four kinds. Unwholesome action, wholesome action of the form realm, wholesome action of the desire realm, and the action without outflows that is able to exhaust them — these, it should be known, are called in order black, white, both (black and white), and neither (neither black nor white).

Treatise: It is in accordance with the difference of two matters that the Buddha spoke of the four actions black-and-black and the rest: first, the difference in the kind of result that the action draws; second, the difference between what is to be counteracted and what counteracts (what counteracts being the side that can counteract and cut off, and what is to be counteracted being the side that is cut off).

All unwholesome action is called black without exception, because its nature is defiled; and the maturation it draws is likewise called black, because it is a result that is not agreeable. Wholesome action of the form realm is called white without exception, because it is not mingled with evil action; and the maturation it draws is likewise called white, because it is a result that is agreeable.

Treatise (a question raised against itself): Why then is wholesome action of the formless realm not also said to be white action? Answer: it is transmitted thus — wherever there are two maturations complete (that is, the two bodies of intermediate existence and of the existence of birth) and the three actions of body, speech, and mind complete, there it is spoken of here; elsewhere it is not spoken of. (The formless realm has no intermediate existence, nor the two actions of body and speech, and so it is not listed here.)

Treatise (a separate account quoted from a sūtra): Yet there is a place in the sūtras where it is also said thus: wholesome action of the desire realm is called black-and-white action, because it is mingled with evil action; and the maturation it draws is likewise called black-and-white, because its unlovely results are mingled therein.

It is to be noted: this name “black-and-white” is established with respect to a continuum (a stretch of life flowing on before and after), and not with respect to the intrinsic nature of the action. Why so? Because there is no single action and no single maturation that is itself both black and white — black and white are mutually opposed, and cannot be one entity.

Treatise (an objection raised against itself, with the answer): (The author raises an objection against himself.) The objector says: is the result of evil action not likewise mingled with the result of wholesome action? That being so, ought not evil action too be called “white-black”? (The sense being: if the wholesome mingled with the evil is called black-and-white, then the evil mingled with the wholesome ought likewise to be called white-black.)

Answer: the result of unwholesome action is not necessarily mingled with the result of wholesome action (as with the several evils done by one who has cut off the wholesome roots, and the places in the hells where a black maturation alone is undergone, where there is no wholesome result to mingle with it); whereas the result of wholesome action of the desire realm is necessarily mingled with the result of evil action. Why so? Because within the desire realm the force of the evil prevails over the force of the wholesome. (Hence only wholesome action of the desire realm is said to be black-and-white, and evil action is not said to be white-black.)

Treatise (the fourth action): All action without outflows is able forever to cut off and exhaust the former three kinds of action, and so is called “not black,” because it is not of a defiled nature; and it is also called “not white,” because it cannot draw a white maturation.

This word “not white” is spoken with a hidden intent (that is, it is spoken with a further purpose and is not to be taken in its literal sense). How is this known? Because the Buddha, in the Sūtra of the Great Emptiness, told Ānanda: all the dharmas of one beyond learning are purely wholesome, purely white, and wholly without blame. (Whence it appears that the dharmas without outflows are themselves purely white, and that in saying “not white” here he takes only the one sense of “not drawing a white maturation.”) The root treatise (that is, the root treatise of Abhidharma) also says: what is called white dharma? It is the wholesome dharmas together with the unobscured-indeterminate dharmas (both of these being undefiled, and so alike named white). As for why among these the dharmas without outflows have no maturation, it is because they do not fall within the three realms, and are besides opposed in dharma-nature to those dharmas that fall within the flowing on of the three realms (and so cannot draw a maturational result).

〔Root 62 · Root 63〕The Volition without Outflows That Can Exhaust the Actions — Twelve Volitions, One, and Four

Treatise (transition raising a question): Is then all action without outflows able to exhaust the former three kinds of action? Answer: it is not. Question: how then is it? The stanza says:

Stanza: The four receptivities of dharma in the path of seeing, together with the first eight uninterrupted paths at the stage of becoming free from the defilement of desire — these two places make twelve volitions without outflows, which exhaust the purely black action alone. The volition of the ninth uninterrupted path for becoming free from the defilement of the desire realm exhausts both the black-and-white action and the purely black action together. Of the freedom from the defilement of the four meditative absorptions, the volition of the ninth uninterrupted path in each — these four volitions make the purely white action alone come to an end.

Treatise: Within the path of seeing there are four receptivities to the cognition of dharma (“receptivity” being the cognition that cuts off the afflictions at the stage of an uninterrupted path, the four receptivities of dharma being those under the four truths of suffering, origin, cessation, and path); and within the path of cultivation, at the stage of becoming free from the defilement of desire, the volitions that accompany the first eight uninterrupted paths (an “uninterrupted path” being the very thought-moment that cuts off the affliction, upon which the path of liberation immediately follows) — these together make twelve volitions in all, and they exhaust the purely black action alone.

The one volition without outflows that accompanies the ninth uninterrupted path for becoming free from the defilement of the desire realm is able to make both the black-and-white action and the purely black action come to an end at once. Why does this one thought-moment exhaust the two actions together? Because at this thought-moment the wholesome dharmas of the desire realm are cut off altogether (the black-and-white action being wholesome action of the desire realm, and so ending along with them), and at the same time the unwholesome action of the ninth grade is cut off as well (the remainder of the purely black action ending here).

Of the freedom from the defilement of the four meditative absorptions, one level each, the volitions without outflows that accompany the ninth uninterrupted path in each — these four volitions make the purely white action alone come to an end (the purely white action being wholesome action of the form realm, of which the four absorptions each exhaust one level).

Treatise (a question raised against itself): For what reason can the wholesome dharmas with outflows of the several levels be cut off by the last uninterrupted path alone, and not by the rest? Answer: because the wholesome dharmas are not “cut off in their intrinsic nature” (they are not directly cut off in their own entity), and once cut off they may still come to be present; it is only when the afflictions that take them as object are exhausted that one speaks of those wholesome dharmas as cut off — because at that time the wholesome dharmas obtain release from bondage (release from the binding of the afflictions). By this principle, so long as even one grade remains of the afflictions that take them as object, the sense of “cut off” is not established, because at that time the wholesome dharmas have not yet obtained release from bondage.

〔Root 64〕Two Further Accounts — Experienced in the Hells, and Abandoned by Seeing

Treatise (transition): The stanza says: (What follows are the divergent accounts of other parties, both of which the treatise records without choosing between them.)

Stanza: One party says: action to be experienced in the hells and the remaining action of the desire realm are black action and mingled black-and-white action. Another party says: action of the desire realm abandoned by seeing and the remaining action of the desire realm are purely black action and action that is both.

Treatise (the first party · some other master): Some other master says: action to be experienced in the hells, and action within the desire realm to be experienced in the remaining destinies, are called in order purely black action and mingled action. Because the maturation of the hells is drawn by unwholesome action alone, action to be experienced there is called purely black action; and apart from the hells, the maturations within the remaining parts of the desire realm are all drawn by the two, wholesome and evil action, and so action to be experienced there is called black-and-white action.

Treatise (the second party · some other master): Again some other master says: action of the desire realm abandoned by seeing (that portion which is cut off by the path of seeing), and all the remaining action within the desire realm, are called in order purely black action and action that is both. Because action abandoned by seeing has no wholesome action mingled with it, it is called purely black action; while action of the desire realm abandoned by cultivation is partly wholesome and partly unwholesome, and so is called action that is both.

(In this passage the two parties stand side by side; the treatise records the two accounts only and adds no judgment.)

〔Root 65〕The Three Munis and the Three Purities

Treatise (transition raising a question): Again the sūtra speaks of three munis, and again the sūtra speaks of three purities, and both of these extend to the three of body, speech, and mind. What are the marks of each? The stanza says:

Stanza: The bodily action and the verbal action of one beyond learning, together with the mind of one beyond learning — these are the three munis. The three purities, it should be known, are the three kinds of good conduct of body, speech, and mind.

Treatise: The bodily action and the verbal action of one beyond learning are called the muni of body and the muni of speech; as for the muni of mind, what is meant is the “mind” itself of one beyond learning, and not mental action. (“Muni” has the sense of silent stillness — that is, the speech of all the afflictions has forever been stilled.)

Treatise (a question raised against itself): Why so (why does the muni of mind take mind and not action)? Answer: because the muni in the ultimate sense has mind alone for its entity. The mark of mind is hard to display directly, and is obtained by inference from the two actions of body and speech. Moreover, bodily action and verbal action are entities of “keeping away” (they can keep away from evil conduct), whereas mental action is not so, because mental action has no nonmanifest. It is from the sense of “keeping away” that the name muni is established, and so it is just this mind which, through the two actions of body and speech, is able to keep away from something, and is therefore called a muni.

Treatise (a question raised against itself): Why is a muni found only at the stage beyond learning? Answer: because it is the arhat who is the true muni — the speech of all the afflictions is here forever stilled.

Treatise (the three purities): The three kinds of good conduct of body, speech, and mind are called the three purities of body, speech, and mind. Because they keep away, whether for a time or forever, from all evil conduct and from the grime of the afflictions, they are called purities.

Treatise (why these two are spoken of): These two, the munis and the purities, are spoken of in order to put a stop to the false munis and false purities reckoned upon in the minds of sentient beings (the non-Buddhists taking their own silence and their own pure practice to be muni-hood and purity).

〔Root 66〕The Three Kinds of Evil Conduct and the Three Kinds of Good Conduct

Treatise (transition raising a question): Again the sūtra speaks of three kinds of evil conduct, and again the sūtra speaks of three kinds of good conduct, both extending to body, speech, and mind. What are the marks of each? The stanza says:

Stanza: Unwholesome bodily action, verbal action, and mental action are called the three kinds of evil conduct; and adding greed, hatred, and wrong view, these too are mental evil conduct. The three kinds of good conduct are the reverse of these.

Treatise: All unwholesome bodily action, verbal action, and mental action are called in order bodily evil conduct, verbal evil conduct, and mental evil conduct.

Yet mental evil conduct has besides three further kinds, namely greed, hatred, and wrong view, which do not belong to mental action. (Why are they not reckoned as mental action?) Because greed and the rest have an entity of their own apart from “volition” (mental action having volition for its entity, while greed, hatred, and wrong view are afflictions and have an intrinsic nature of their own).

Treatise (the masters of similes state their tenet): The masters of similes say: greed, hatred, and wrong view are just mental action, since the Sūtra on Volition speaks of these three as mental action.

Treatise (the Vaibhāṣikas object): If that were so, then action and affliction would be combined into one entity.

Treatise (the masters of similes answer): To grant that an affliction is just mental action — what fault is there in this?

Treatise (the Vaibhāṣikas refute them): The Vaibhāṣika masters say that they speak thus without reason. If this were allowed, it would be at odds with many principles and many teachings, and would become a great fault. As for why the sūtra speaks of these three as mental action, that is in order to display that “volition” turns with greed and the rest for its gate (volition being set going with these three for its gate), and that it can thereby draw an unlovely result, and is besides what the discerning reproach and abhor.

Conduct such as this is evil, and so it is called evil conduct.

Treatise (the three kinds of good conduct): The three kinds of good conduct are to be known as the reverse of these: they are all the wholesome action of body, speech, and mind; and the three that do not belong to action are non-greed, non-hatred, and right view.

Treatise (a question raised against itself): Since right view and wrong view have no deliberate volition “to benefit another or to harm another,” how can they come to be wholesome or evil? Answer: because they can serve as the root of harm and of benefit (all conduct of harm and of benefit having view for its root).

〔Root 67〕The Ten Paths of Action — Taking Only the Coarse and Evident within Evil and Good Conduct

Treatise (transition raising a question): Again the sūtra speaks of ten paths of action, some wholesome and some evil. What are their marks? The stanza says:

Stanza: The ten paths of action that are spoken of take, from within evil conduct and good conduct, the coarse and evident portion for their nature; and, as is fitting to each, they become the wholesome paths of action and the evil paths of action.

Treatise: Within the evil conduct and good conduct spoken of above, whatever is coarse, evident, and easily known is gathered in as the ten paths of action. As is fitting to each: on the wholesome side they gather in the good conduct spoken of above, and the unwholesome paths of action gather in the evil conduct spoken of above.

Treatise (a question raised against itself): Which then are the evil conduct and good conduct that are not gathered in?

Answer: let the unwholesome side be spoken of first. The bodily evil paths of action, as regards bodily evil conduct, do not gather in one portion of it, namely the preparatory stage, the consequent stage, and the remaining unwholesome bodily actions — such as drinking liquor, seizing, beating, and binding; because the preparatory stage and the rest are not coarse and evident. (Which bodily evil conduct, then, is established as a path of action?) If bodily evil conduct makes another sentient being lose his life, lose his goods, or lose his wife — that is spoken of as a path of action, because men are to be made to keep away from it.

The verbal evil paths of action, as regards verbal evil conduct, do not gather in the preparatory stage, the consequent stage, or the slight portion. The mental evil paths of action, as regards mental evil conduct, do not gather in evil volitions or slight greed and the rest.

Now let the wholesome side be spoken of. The bodily wholesome paths of action, as regards bodily good conduct, do not gather in one portion of it, namely the preparatory stage, the consequent stage, and the remaining wholesome bodily actions — such as abstaining from liquor and making offerings. The verbal wholesome paths of action, as regards verbal good conduct, do not gather in one portion, namely kindly speech and the like. The mental wholesome paths of action, as regards mental good conduct, do not gather in one portion, namely the wholesome volitions.

〔Root 68〕The Manifest and the Nonmanifest in the First Seven Paths of Action

Treatise (transition raising a question): Among the ten paths of action, do the first seven (three of body and four of speech) all necessarily have both the manifest and the nonmanifest? (The “manifest” is the bodily or verbal act that can be displayed to another; the “nonmanifest” is the portion that arises along with it, cannot be displayed to another, and continues on unbroken.) Answer: they do not. Question: how then is it? The stanza says:

Stanza: Six of the evil ones necessarily have the nonmanifest; and if those six are done by oneself, then both the manifest and the nonmanifest are present; sexual misconduct necessarily has both. Seven of the wholesome ones, if they arise from taking up the precepts, have both; if they are produced in absorption, they have the nonmanifest alone.

Treatise: Among the seven evil paths of action, six necessarily have the nonmanifest, namely killing, taking what is not given, false speech, divisive speech, harsh speech, and frivolous speech. If these six are done by dispatching another, then at the time when the root path of action is completed there is no manifest action in oneself (the act being another’s), and so there is the nonmanifest alone.

If they are done by oneself in person, then these six paths of action have both the manifest and the nonmanifest — that is, when one sets going the manifest act oneself (laying hand to it) the other dies then and there; whereas if he dies only some time after the hand was laid to it, then it is the same as dispatching a messenger, and at the time when the root path of action is completed there is the nonmanifest alone.

Sexual misconduct alone necessarily has both the manifest and the nonmanifest complete, because it must be brought to completion by one’s own body and cannot be done by dispatching another in one’s stead — just as one’s own delight cannot be produced by deputing another.

If the seven wholesome paths of action arise from taking up the precepts, they necessarily have both the manifest and the nonmanifest complete; for the śīla born of taking them up (the entity of the precepts produced by taking them up) must arise in dependence upon the manifest act (the formal procedure of taking up the precepts). As for those gathered in by the discipline of meditative absorption and the discipline without outflows, which are called “produced in absorption,” this kind has the nonmanifest alone, because it arises in dependence upon the force of mind alone.

〔Root 69〔Lines 1–3〕〕Preparatory, Root, and Consequent — How the Three Stages Are Divided

Treatise (transition raising a question): Are the preparatory stage and the consequent stage the same as the root path of action? Answer: they are not. Question: how then is it? The stanza says:

Stanza: The preparatory stage necessarily has the manifest, while the nonmanifest may or may not be present; the consequent stage is the reverse of this.

Treatise: The preparatory stage of a path of action necessarily has manifest action; the nonmanifest at this stage may or may not be present — if it is set going by a violent entanglement (an intense affliction) or by a mind of pure sincerity, then the nonmanifest is present; otherwise it is not. The consequent stage is the reverse of the foregoing: it necessarily has the nonmanifest, while the manifest action at this stage may or may not be present — if there afterwards arise acts that follow upon the former action, then manifest action is present; otherwise it is not.

Treatise (a question raised against itself): Within this principle, how are the preparatory stage, the root stage, and the consequent stage established?

Answer: let the unwholesome side be spoken of first, taking the first of them, the act of killing, as the example. As with a butcher of sheep about to do the killing: he first raises the thought of killing and rises from his bed, takes money and goes to the market where sheep are sold, feels the body of the sheep, pays the price and takes hold of it, leads it back and feeds it, drives it into the slaughterhouse, and taking staff or knife in hand beats or stabs it, once and again, up to the point where its life is not yet cut off — all this is called the preparatory stage of killing.

Following upon this manifest act, that sheep just then ends its life; the manifest and nonmanifest action within that single moment — this and this alone is called the root path of action of killing. By two conditions are sentient beings touched by the offense of killing that belongs to the root path of action: first by the preparatory stage, second by the fullness of the result (the other having in fact died).

After this single moment, the nonmanifest action of killing continues on unbroken and turns along with it, and this is called the consequent stage of killing. And the flaying, cutting up, dressing, and washing that come afterwards, or the weighing, or the selling, or the cooking, or the eating, or the praising of its savor — the moments of these manifest acts are all likewise called the consequent stage of killing.

For the remaining six paths of action, as is fitting to each, the three divisions (preparatory, root, and consequent) differ, but may be set forth on the model of this example.

As for greed, hatred, and wrong view, they are called the root path of action as soon as they are present, and so they have no distinction of a preparatory or a consequent stage.

Treatise (an objection raised against itself · the two horns): Here it should be asked: when the sentient being who is killed is abiding at the very moment of the existence of death, does the manifest and nonmanifest action of the killer at that moment become the path of action, or must one wait until after his death?

Question: if it be so, what fault is there? Answer: both accounts have a fault.

If it be said that the killer’s path of action is completed while the sentient being killed is abiding in the existence of death, then in the case where the killer and the one killed end their lives at the same moment the path of action ought likewise to be completed — yet our own school does not allow that a path of action is completed in that case.

If it be said that the killer’s path of action is completed only after the sentient being killed has ended his life, then what was said above ought not to have been said: “following upon this manifest act, that sheep just then ends its life; the manifest and nonmanifest action within that single moment is the root path of action of killing.” (The earlier and later statements would contradict each other.) And this would besides do violence to the Vaibhāṣika masters’ explanation of the words “the preparatory stage is not yet stilled” in the root treatise — the root treatise says: is there a case of “having already harmed a living being while the killing is not yet extinguished”? Answer: there is, as when one has already cut off his life while the preparatory stage is not yet stilled. The Vaibhāṣika masters explain this sentence by saying: this is a case of using the words “preparatory stage” with regard to the consequent stage.

Treatise (the author answers for himself): It should be said: this is a case of using the words “preparatory stage” with regard to the root stage, for our own school allows that after the ending of life the root path of action is not yet stilled. Said thus, there is no fault.

Question: what is meant here by “there is no fault”? Answer: it is the using of the words “preparatory stage” with regard to the root stage (in which case the earlier and later statements do not contradict each other).

Treatise (a question raised against itself): If it be so, how can all the manifest action at that time still become the root path of action? Answer: why can it not? Question: because it has no function any longer. Answer: and what function has the nonmanifest here? Therefore the completion of a path of action is not by reason of having a function, but only because, at the time when the preparation and the fullness of the result are present, the two, the manifest and the nonmanifest, become the root path of action together.

Treatise (the paths of action serve one another as preparatory and consequent): Again, the several paths of action, regarded with respect to one another, may serve one another as preparatory and as consequent. Let it be said for the present that the path of action of killing has the ten paths of action for its preparatory stage: as when a man wishes to kill an enemy and lays all sorts of plans and gathers the conditions for the killing — whether he kills living beings to petition for aid (killing), or steals another’s goods to fund the killing (taking what is not given), or fornicates with his wife so that she may kill her husband (sexual misconduct), or, in order to divide him from his kin and friends, sets going the four faults of speech so as to make them suspect and be estranged from one another (false speech, divisive speech, harsh speech, frivolous speech), so that even if there be those with power enough to protect him they no longer have the mind to protect him; or he conceives greedy attachment for his goods (greed), or conceives hatred toward him (hatred), or raises a wrong view to nourish the act of killing (wrong view), and only then kills — this is what is called having the ten paths of action for the preparatory stage of killing.

After the enemy has been killed, he afterwards puts to death his kin, takes his goods, fornicates with the woman he loved, and so on to raising greed, hatred, and wrong view one after another as they come to be present — these ten are called the consequent stage of killing. The remaining paths of action are to be understood in the same way.

Treatise (a question raised against itself): Ought not the three, greed and the rest, be able to serve as a preparatory stage? Answer: they cannot. Because the thought is merely raised in the mind and the preparatory stage is not thereby completed — at the time of raising the thought the deed has not yet been done.

Treatise (transition raising a question): Again the sūtra says: a bhikṣu should know that killing is of three kinds — first that arising from greed, second that arising from hatred, third that arising from delusion; and so on down to wrong view, which is likewise of three kinds. Here it should be asked: killing of what mark is called that which arises from greed? And the rest are to be asked in the same way.

(The general answer:) It is not that all the paths of action are brought to completion by the three roots in every case, whereas their preparatory stages are otherwise than this. Question: how are they otherwise? The stanza says:

〔Root 69〔Line 4〕· First Half of Root 70〕The Preparation Arises from the Three Unwholesome Roots

Stanza: The preparatory stage arises from the three roots; as for the root stage, because it is produced from the three roots without interval, it is said that the three, greed and the rest, also arise from the three roots.

Treatise: When the preparatory stage of an unwholesome path of action arises, in every case it arises from the three unwholesome roots — this is said with respect to the “prior raising” (the thought that draws it forth beforehand).

The preparation for killing. That which arises from greed is, for instance, killing set going by greed for the sake of obtaining parts of the other’s body (skin, flesh, sinew, bone, and the like), or for the sake of obtaining goods, or for sport, or for the sake of rescuing kin, friends, and oneself. That which arises from hatred is, for instance, the preparation for killing set going by raising a mind of wrath in order to be rid of an enemy. That which arises from delusion is, for instance, the preparation for killing set going within a sacrifice in the belief that this accords with the Dharma; or again as when kings and the like put enemies to death and root out the villainous according to the laws of the world, in the belief that great merit is accomplished thereby, and so set going the preparation for killing. Again the people of Persia speak thus: if one’s parents are old and ill, then to have them end their lives early frees them from distress and produces great merit instead. Again there are non-Buddhists who speak thus: snakes, scorpions, wasps, and the like are venomous things that harm men, and to be able to kill them produces excellent merit instead; sheep, deer, buffalo, and the other birds and beasts were from the first prepared to serve men for food, and so to kill them is without offense. And there is killing living beings by reason of wrong view — all these preparations arise from delusion.

The preparation for stealing. That which arises from greed is the preparation for stealing set going according to one’s own needs, or for the sake of other gain, honor, or repute, or for the sake of rescuing oneself, one’s kin, or one’s friends: the preparation for stealing set going by greed. That which arises from hatred is the preparation for stealing set going by raising a mind of wrath in order to be rid of an enemy. That which arises from delusion is, for instance, when kings and the like confiscate the goods of evil men according to the laws of the world, in the belief that the law is so and that there is no offense of stealing; or again as when brahmins speak thus: the goods of the world at the beginning of the aeon were bestowed by the great Brahmā king upon the brahmin seers, and only later, when the power of the seers waned, were they seized and enjoyed by the base clans; today, when the brahmin seers take by force or by stealth the goods of other men in the world and use them for clothing or for food or for other purposes or bestow them upon others, they are all the while using their own goods and are without offense of stealing — and yet at the time of the taking there is plainly in their minds the perception “this is another’s.” And there is taking another’s goods by reason of wrong view — these are all called preparations for stealing arising from delusion.

The preparation for sexual misconduct. That which arises from greed is when, conceiving a defiled attachment toward another’s wife and the like, or for the sake of seeking another’s goods, station, or honor, or for the sake of rescuing oneself or another, one sets going the preparation for fornication out of a mind of greedy attachment. That which is produced from hatred is the preparation for fornication set going by raising a mind of wrath in order to be rid of an enemy. That which is produced from delusion is, for instance, the people of Persia praising the practice of what is not the pure life with one’s mother and the like; or again as when the brahmin seers praise those men and women within the cow-sacrifice who keep the cow-observance (taking on the behavior of cattle as an austerity), drinking water and cropping grass, standing or walking, coupling as they meet without distinction of near kin or stranger; or again as when non-Buddhists speak thus: all women are like a mortar, like a flower or fruit, like cooked food, like a stair, like a road, like a bridge, like a boat, and the multitude of the world ought to enjoy them in common — these preparations are all produced from delusion.

The preparations for the four verbal paths of action beginning with false speech, when they are produced from greed and from hatred, may be stated on the model of the foregoing. As for the preparation for false speech that is produced from delusion, it is as is said in a treatise of the non-Buddhists:

Quoted Stanza (the words of a non-Buddhist treatise): If a man, by reason of jest, by reason of marriage, by reason of facing a woman or a king, or for the sake of saving life or saving goods, speaks false speech, that is without offense.

Treatise: And all the preparations for false speech, divisive speech, and the rest that arise by reason of wrong view are, it should be known, wholly produced from delusion. Moreover the several Vedas and the other false treatises are all gathered in by frivolous speech, and their preparations are produced from delusion.

Treatise (a question raised against itself): Since the three, greed, hatred, and wrong view, have no preparatory stage, how can it be said that they arise from greed and the rest? Answer: because they are produced from the three roots without interval, and so it may be said that the three, greed and the rest, arise from the three roots. That is to say: sometimes the path of action of greed is produced from greed without interval, and it is the same with its being produced from hatred and from delusion without interval; and it is likewise with hatred and wrong view arising from the three roots.

〔Second Half of Root 70〕All Three Stages of the Wholesome Paths of Action Arise from the Three Wholesome Roots

Treatise (transition raising a question): It has been said how the unwholesome paths of action arise from the three roots. How is it then with the wholesome? The stanza says:

Stanza: The wholesome paths of action, in all three stages, arise from the three wholesome roots.

Treatise: All the preparatory, root, and consequent stages of the wholesome paths of action arise from the three wholesome roots of non-greed, non-hatred, and non-delusion. For these three wholesome stages are all raised by a wholesome mind, and a wholesome mind is necessarily associated with the three wholesome roots.

Treatise (a question raised against itself): What are the marks of these three wholesome stages? Answer: they are the keeping away from the three unwholesome stages above — keeping away from the evil preparatory stage is the wholesome preparatory stage, keeping away from the evil root is the wholesome root, keeping away from the evil consequent stage is the wholesome consequent stage.

For instance, when a diligent trainee (a śrāmaṇera) receives the full precepts: entering the ordination platform, paying homage to the assembly of bhikṣus, uttering with all sincerity the request to his preceptor, and so on to the one motion and two announcements of karman and the rest — all these are called the preparatory stage of the wholesome path of action. Within the single moment at which the third announcement of karman is completed, the manifest and nonmanifest action then set going is called the root path of action. From that point on, down to the declaring to him of the four resorts, together with the manifest and nonmanifest action that continues on and turns along in dependence upon what went before, all is called the consequent stage.

〔Root 71 · First Half of Root 72〕By Which Root a Path of Action Is Completed

Treatise (transition raising a question): As was said above, it is not that all the paths of action are brought to completion by the three roots in every case. Which root, then, brings which path of action to completion? The stanza says:

Stanza: Killing, harsh speech, and hatred are all completed by hatred; taking what is not given, sexual misconduct, and greed are all completed by greed; wrong view is completed by delusion; and the rest are granted completion by all three roots.

Treatise: Among the evil paths of action, the three paths of action of killing, harsh speech, and hatred are completed by hatred — for these three are completed only when a “supremely coarse and evil mind that spares nothing” is present.

The three paths of action of taking what is not given, sexual misconduct, and greed are completed by greed — for these three are completed only when a “supremely defiled mind that clings to something” is present.

The completion of wrong view is necessarily by delusion, for it is completed only when delusion of the highest grade is present.

The three of false speech, divisive speech, and frivolous speech are granted completion by all three roots, each by each; for when greed, hatred, and the rest are present, each of them can bring these three to completion.

〔Second Half of Root 72〕In What Place a Path of Action Arises

Treatise (transition raising a question): In what place do the evil paths of action arise? The stanza says:

Stanza: They arise in the four places of sentient beings, goods, name-and-form, and the name-bodies and the rest.

Treatise: The four sections of paths of action spoken of above (the three of body, the four of speech, and the three of mind being divided into four classes) arise, in the order of three, three, one, and three, in the four places of sentient beings and the rest: the three of killing and the rest arise in the place of sentient beings; the three of stealing and the rest arise in the place of goods (the requisites of livelihood); wrong view alone arises in the place of name-and-form; and the three of false speech and the rest arise in the place of the name-bodies and the rest (the name-body, the phrase-body, and the syllable-body, which are what speech depends upon).

〔First Half of Root 73〕Dying Together and Dying First — Why the Root Path of Action Is Not Completed

Treatise (transition raising a question): If a man has set going the preparation and is resolved to kill another, and he and the sentient being killed die at the same time, or he himself dies first, does he still incur the offense of the root path of action? The stanza says:

Stanza: Those who die together and those who die first do not complete the root path of action, because there is no “root” and because the support has become other.

Treatise: If the killer and the sentient being killed end their lives at the same time, or if he himself dies first, he assuredly does not obtain the root path of action.

Hence there is this question posed: is there a case in which the killer has set going the preparation for killing and has made the result full (the other having in fact died), and yet is not touched by the offense of killing? Answer: there is. Question: how so? Answer: it is the case where the killer and the one killed die together, or where the killer dies first.

Question: for what reason is it so? Answer: because at the moment when the killer dies, the life of the sentient being killed still remains, and it is impossible to make that killer complete the offense of killing (the offense being completed only when the other’s life is cut off); nor can it be said that the killer may obtain the offense of killing after his own life has ended, because the support has become other — that is, the body upon which he relied when he set going the preparation for killing has now been cut off; and though there arises another body of the same commonality (the body of the next life), that is not the support of the offense, for that body never set going the preparation for killing, and to say that it completes the path of action of killing is in principle not to be allowed.

〔Second Half of Root 73〕Acting as One in an Army — One Kills and All Incur the Offense

Treatise (transition raising a question): If many men gather into an army and would kill an enemy, or go hunting and the like, and at the time when any one among them does the killing, who is it that completes the path of action of killing? The stanza says:

Stanza: Within an army and the like, if they act as one, all complete the path of action, as does the one who does it in person.

Treatise: Within an army and the like, if any one man does the deed of killing, then, just as with the man who does it in person, all of them complete the path of action of killing; because they have consented together to one undertaking. It is like teaching one another in turn for the sake of one undertaking, and so, one man killing, all the rest incur the offense.

If a man has been forced by the power of others into this army, then so long as he thereby also shares that mind, he likewise completes the offense of killing. One kind of man alone is excepted: if he has vowed of himself — that not even to save his own life will he kill — then although he is forced by the power of others to be among them, he has no mind of killing, and so has no offense of killing.

〔First Half of Root 74〕The Marks of Killing — Deliberate Volition, the Perception of Another, and Not by Mistake

Treatise (transition raising a question): Now the marks by which a path of action is completed should be made out: to what degree is it called killing, and so on down to what degree is it called wrong view? Let the marks of killing be analyzed first. The stanza says:

Stanza: Killing requires deliberate volition, the perception of another sentient being with respect to another sentient being, and killing not by mistake.

Treatise: One must first set going the deliberate volition “I would kill,” and with respect to another sentient being raise the perception of another sentient being, and set going the preparation for killing and kill not by mistake — that is, killing only the very one he meant to kill, and not killing another indiscriminately; to this degree it is called the path of action of killing.

Treatise (a case set apart): Killing with hesitation also completes killing. That is, he beforehand harbored hesitation about the object he meant to kill: is this a living thing or not? and granting it is a living thing, is it he or not? Afterwards he raised a settled resolve: be it he or not, I shall assuredly kill. Since his mind spares nothing, if he does kill a sentient being he likewise completes the path of action.

Treatise (a question raised against itself): Upon five aggregates that arise and cease moment by moment, how can killing be completed (since they are themselves ceasing thought by thought)?

There are two explanations in answer. The first says: the “breath-wind” is called life, and it turns in dependence upon body and mind; if a man makes it be cut off so that it no longer continues to arise, that is like extinguishing the light of a lamp or extinguishing the sound of a bell, and this is called killing. The second says: or else what is called “life” is just the life faculty; if a man makes it be cut off so that it does not continue, that is called killing. That is to say: with an evil mind one severs another’s life, so that even a single thought-moment which ought to arise cannot arise — this alone is touched by the offense of killing, and nothing else.

Treatise (a question raised against itself): Whose is this life that is cut off? Answer: as is said, “if life be gone, he is dead” — since the sixth case-ending has been marked out (the possessive “whose”), what can it be but a “self”? (This objection comes from those who grasp a self.) The author answers: this will be pondered at length in the chapter refuting the self. (Here he first quotes a sūtra to prove that life is a dharma.) Hence the stanza spoken by the Bhagavat:

Quoted Stanza (spoken by the Bhagavat): When the three dharmas of lifespan, warmth, and consciousness leave the body, then the body that is left falls stiff to the ground, without thought and without sensation, like a log.

Treatise: Therefore a body endowed with faculties is called a living being, and one without faculties is called dead — this principle is settled.

Treatise (the reckoning of the Nirgrantha non-Buddhists): The Nirgranthas say: killing without deliberation also incurs the offense of killing, just as with touching fire, where even without deliberating beforehand one is burned all the same.

Treatise (the author refutes with six objections in succession): If it were so, then when you meet another man’s wife, or unintentionally touch her body by mistake, you ought likewise to have an offense. Again, as when a man of wholesome mind pulls out the hair and beard for a Nirgrantha (an act of austerity), or a teacher out of a mind of loving-kindness urges him to cultivate austerities, or food kept overnight given by a donor does not digest and thereby causes a man to suffer — all these ought to incur the offense of “causing another to suffer.” Again, the child in the womb and the mother are causes of suffering to each other, and so the mother too ought to have the offense of causing the child to suffer. Again, since the one killed is himself conjoined with the killing, he too, like fire that can burn its own support, ought to bear it himself, and it ought not to be the killer alone who incurs the offense. Again, if it were so, then in dispatching another to kill there ought to be no offense of killing — just as fire does not burn the man who taught another to touch fire. Again, timber and stones and the like ought also to be touched by the offense, since houses and the like, when they collapse, likewise harm life. And besides, it is not merely that your analogy fails: the position we ourselves set up can be established.

〔Second Half of Root 74〕The Marks of Taking What Is Not Given

Treatise (transition): Killing having been analyzed, taking what is not given should now be made out. The stanza says:

Stanza: Taking what is not given is making another’s goods belong to oneself, by force or by stealth.

Treatise: The “not by mistake” and the rest spoken of above run on into each of the gates that follow, as is fitting to each, and so are not spoken of again. That is to say: one must first set going the deliberate volition “I would steal,” and with respect to another’s goods raise the perception of another’s goods, and by force (seizing openly) or by stealth (taking in secret) set going the preparation for stealing, and take not by mistake, making it belong to oneself; to this degree it is called the offense of taking what is not given.

Treatise (three separate questions): If a man steals the goods of a stūpa, he incurs the offense of stealing with respect to the Tathāgata — for when the Buddha was about to enter nirvāṇa he took pity on the world and accepted in sum all that was given. (Some other master says: the offense is incurred with respect to those who guard it.)

If a man digs up an ownerless hidden treasure, he incurs the offense of stealing on the side of the ruler of the country.

If a man steals the goods that revert (the effects of a deceased bhikṣu, which may revert to the remaining bhikṣus, and so are called goods that revert): if the karman has already been performed, the offense is incurred with respect to the saṅgha within the boundary; if the karman is not yet completed, the offense of stealing is incurred with respect to the disciples of the Buddha at large.

The remaining cases may be pondered on this model.

〔First Half of Root 75〕The Marks of Sexual Misconduct — Four Kinds of Going Where One Ought Not

Treatise (transition): Taking what is not given having been made out, sexual misconduct should now be made out. The stanza says:

Stanza: Sexual misconduct is of four kinds, all of them going where one ought not to go.

Treatise: There are in all four kinds of “going where one ought not to go,” and all of them get the name of the offense of sexual misconduct.

The first is going where one ought not with respect to a forbidden object: that is, going to a wife held by another, or to one’s mother, or one’s father, or a kinswoman of one’s parents, and so on to one who is guarded by the king.

The second is going where one ought not by a forbidden way: that is, by the mouth of one’s own wife and by the other ways that are not the way.

The third is going where one ought not in a forbidden place: that is, within a monastery, in the place of a caitya (a shrine), or in a remote place.

The fourth is going where one ought not at a forbidden time. What is meant by a forbidden time? It is the time of carrying a child, the time of nursing an infant, and the time of undertaking the fast-day precepts — even with one’s own wife, at these times one transgresses by misconduct. (There is another account: only if the husband has allowed her to undertake the fast-day precepts and there is afterwards a transgression is it called a forbidden time.)

The word “not by mistake” spoken of above runs on into this gate too. If with respect to another’s wife one supposes her to be one’s own, or with respect to one’s own wife supposes her to be another’s, and so on with the way and what is not the way, then so long as there is mistake in the mind, though something be done it does not complete a path of action.

Treatise (a question raised against itself): If with respect to this wife of another one raises the perception of a different wife of another, does the practice of what is not the pure life complete a path of action?

(Here two accounts stand side by side.) One account says: it does complete it, since after all he raised the preparation for fornication with respect to another’s wife and enjoyed her. Another account says: it does not complete it, just as with the path of action of killing when one raises the preparation with respect to this one and brings it to completion upon another (in which case the root path of action is not completed).

Treatise (a question raised against itself): In practicing what is not the pure life with a bhikṣuṇī, from what place is the path of action incurred? Answer: the offense is incurred from the place of the king, because the king does not allow such a thing. (And by arguing from the lighter to the heavier:) even with one’s own wife at the time when she is undertaking the fast-day precepts one ought not to go; how much less with one who has gone forth.

Treatise (a question raised against itself): If one practices what is not the pure life with a maiden, from what place is the path of action incurred? Answer: if she has already been promised to another, the offense is incurred at the place of the one to whom she is promised; if she is not promised to a man, then at the place of those who are able to guard her. These and the remaining cases all incur the offense from the place of the king.

〔Second Half of Root 75〕The Marks of False Speech — Defiled Mind, a Divergent Perception, Uttering, and Understanding the Sense

Treatise (transition): Sexual misconduct having been made out, false speech should now be made out. The stanza says:

Stanza: To utter, with a defiled mind, a divergent perception of the sense one speaks, the other understanding that sense, completes false speech.

Treatise: To raise a divergent perception with respect to the sense one speaks and to utter it, the one deceived understanding the sense spoken, with a defiled mind and not by mistake, completes false speech.

Treatise (a question raised against itself): If the one deceived does not understand the sense of what is spoken, what is that stretch of speech to be reckoned as? Answer: it is frivolous speech.

Treatise (a question raised against itself): Since false speech is just the utterance set going, and an utterance is composed of many words, at what point is the path of action completed? Answer: the manifest sound and the nonmanifest action that arise together with the last word complete this path of action; or else, at whatever point the one deceived understands the sense, the manifest and nonmanifest action at that time complete this path of action. What accompanies the several words before that is all its preparatory stage.

Treatise (two objections raised against itself): Upon what point does the “understanding of the sense” that is spoken of depend? Does it depend upon “having finished hearing and rightly understanding” for the understanding, or upon “being in the act of hearing and being able to understand” for the understanding?

Question: if it be so, what fault is there? Answer: if it depend upon “having finished hearing and rightly understanding” for the understanding, then the sense conveyed by the utterance is what mental consciousness knows, whereas verbal manifest action has already passed away together with auditory consciousness, and so this path of action ought to be completed by the nonmanifest alone (the manifest having already ceased). If it depend upon “being in the act of hearing and being able to understand” for the understanding, then although this fault is absent, yet at that time there is not yet any knowing, so how can it be said that being in the act of hearing is being able to understand?

Treatise (the author takes one as his tenet): For one who well knows the sense of words and has no condition of confusion, auditory consciousness having arisen is called being able to understand — and since thus there is no fault, this account should be taken as the tenet.

Treatise (transition raising a question): The sūtra says that utterances are in brief of sixteen kinds: with respect to what is not seen, not heard, not sensed, not known, to say “I truly saw it” and the like; or with respect to what is seen, heard, sensed, and known, to say “I did not see it” and the like — these eight are called ignoble utterances. If with respect to what is not seen, and so on to what is not known, one says “I did not see it” and the like, or with respect to what is seen, and so on to what is known, one says “I truly saw it” and the like — these eight are called noble utterances. What then are the marks of “what is seen” and the rest? The stanza says:

〔Root 76〕Seen, Heard, Sensed, Known — The Marks of the Four Bases of Speech

Stanza: What is attested by eye consciousness, by ear consciousness, by mental consciousness, and by the remaining three consciousnesses is called in order what is seen, what is heard, what is known, and what is sensed.

Treatise (the account of the Vaibhāṣika masters): The Vaibhāṣika masters speak thus: if an object is attested by eye consciousness it is called what is seen; what is attested by ear consciousness is called what is heard; what is attested by mental consciousness is called what is known; and what is attested by nose, tongue, and body consciousness is called what is sensed.

Treatise (a question raised against itself): Why so (why are the latter three consciousnesses gathered under one name)? Answer: because the three of scent, taste, and touch are of indeterminate nature, and like a dead man have no sensing; and so on the side of what attests them the name “sensing” is established for them in particular.

Treatise (a question raised against itself): How is it known that it is indeed so? Answer: by the two proofs of scripture and principle.

As for the proof from scripture, the sūtra says: the Buddha told the Great Mother: what do you think? As for those forms that are not seen by your eye, that you have not seen, that you will not see, and that you do not even wish to see — will you thereupon raise desire, raise greed, raise intimacy, raise craving, raise ālaya (grasping and storing), raise niyandi (grasping and holding), raise infatuation? (The Great Mother answered:) I will not, Venerable Sir. As for those sounds that are not heard by your ear, and so at length, as for those dharmas that are not known by your mind, and so at length — I will not, Venerable Sir. The Buddha further told the Great Mother: herein, with respect to what is seen you should know that there is only what is seen, and with respect to what is heard, what is sensed, and what is known you should know that there is only what is heard, what is sensed, and what is known.

Since this sūtra speaks of the three objects of form, sound, and dharma as what is seen, what is heard, and what is known, one may by parity of reasoning assuredly establish, for the three objects of scent and the rest gathered together, the single name “what is sensed.” If this be not allowed, what then is called what is sensed? Moreover, scent, taste, and touch would fall outside what is seen and the rest, and so it would be impossible to set going speech about those three objects. This is what is called the proof from principle.

Treatise (the author refutes this proof): This proof does not hold. Let it be said first that the sūtra is no proof, for the sense of the sūtra lies elsewhere — in this sūtra the World-Honored One is not adjudicating the marks of the four bases of speech beginning with what is seen. Looking to the sense that this sūtra speaks, the Buddha is urging her that, with respect to the six objects and with respect to the four matters spoken of beginning with what is seen, she should know that there is only the speech of what is seen and the rest, and should not add on the marks of the lovely and the unlovely.

Treatise (the Vaibhāṣikas ask): If it be so, what marks then are called what is seen and the rest?

Treatise (the account of some other master): Some other master says: whatever object is attested by direct perception through the five faculties is called what is seen; whatever is obtained from the report of another is called what is heard; whatever is allowed by applying one’s own mind and inferring by all manner of reasoning is called what is sensed; whatever is directly attested by mind is called what is known. Thus with respect to the five objects one may in each case set going all four kinds of speech, that of seeing, hearing, sensing, and knowing; and with respect to the sixth object (the object that is dharma) there are three apart from seeing. Hence it may be known that the name “sensing” is not without a referent, and that the three objects of scent and the rest are not beyond speaking of; and so their (the Vaibhāṣikas’) words of “principle” are likewise without principle.

Treatise (the account of the earlier preceptors): The earlier preceptors speak thus: what the eye directly sees is called what is seen; what is heard from the report of another is called what is heard; whatever one’s own mind constructs by thought of every kind is called what is sensed; what is received within oneself and what is attested by oneself is called what is known.

Treatise (closing): Let the incidental discussion rest, and let the proper discussion be set forth.

Treatise (a set of questions and answers quoted from the root treatise): Is there a case in which, by bodily manifest action, one raises a divergent perception of the sense and, without uttering speech, completes false speech? Answer: there is. Hence the root treatise says: is there a case of being touched by the offense of killing without moving the body? Answer: there is, namely uttering speech (bidding another kill). Is there a case of being touched by the offense of false speech without uttering speech? Answer: there is, namely moving the body (indicating by bodily gesture). Is there a case of being touched by these two offenses while neither moving the body nor uttering speech? Answer: there is, namely at the time when a seer is wrathful in mind (harming by mental thought), and at the time of the poṣadha (falsely displaying purity by keeping silent).

Treatise (an objection raised against itself): If there be neither movement of body nor utterance of speech, and the desire realm besides has no nonmanifest that arises apart from the manifest, how then can these two come to be paths of action? Answer: upon a difficulty such as this one should expend some labor (here the author leaves it undecided and leaves it for later men to labor over).

〔Root 77 · First Half of Root 78〕Divisive Speech · Harsh Speech · Frivolous Speech

Treatise (transition): False speech having been made out, the remaining three of speech should now be made out. The stanza says:

Stanza: To set going with a defiled mind an utterance that would break another is called divisive speech; an unlovely utterance is called harsh speech; and all utterances set going by a defiled mind are frivolous speech. There is another account: only what is other than the three defiled utterances above (such as flattery, singing, and false treatises) is called frivolous speech.

Treatise (divisive speech): If with a defiled mind one sets going an utterance that would break another (break the concord of others), then whether or not the other is in fact broken, divisive speech is completed in either case. The two matters of “understanding the sense” and “not by mistake” run on into this (that is, the other must understand, and there must be no mistake).

Treatise (harsh speech): If with a defiled mind one sets going an unlovely utterance abusing another, that is called harsh speech. The word “defiled mind” above runs on into this, and “understanding the sense” and “not by mistake” are likewise as above — that is to say, the path of action is completed only when the very man he intended in his mind to abuse understands the sense spoken.

Treatise (frivolous speech): All utterances set going by a defiled mind are called frivolous speech. Why so? Because all speech set going by a defiled mind is frivolous. Only the word “utterance” above runs on into this (the remaining conditions need not be complete).

Treatise (a divergent account of some other master): Some other master says: only what is other than the former three utterances beginning with false speech, all speech set going by a defiled mind, is called frivolous speech; and this refers to flattery, singing, false treatises, and the like. “Flattery” is fawning speech, as when a bhikṣu harbors a wrong livelihood in his heart and sets going fawning words. “Singing” is chanting, as when men in the world with a defiled mind chant and sing in mutual dalliance, and as when performers, in order to please the feelings of others, make all manner of songs with a defiled mind. What is called a “false treatise” is the extended argument of words held by the several incorrect views. What the word “and the like” gathers in are lamentations set going by a defiled mind and the words of the several worldly frivolities. So long as it is other than the former three and is set going by a defiled mind, all of it is gathered into frivolous speech.

Treatise (a question raised against itself): At the time when a wheel-turning monarch appears in the world there is singing too; how is it not gathered in by frivolous speech? Answer: because those songs are set going from a mind of renunciation and are able to draw forth renunciation, and are not a mind defiled beforehand.

Treatise (the account of yet another master): Again some other master says: at that time there are also defiled utterances set going in accomplishing marriages and the like, only their fault is slight and so they do not complete a path of action.

〔Second Half of Root 78 · First Half of Root 79〕Greed · Hatred · Wrong View, the Three Mental Paths of Action

Treatise (transition): The three verbal paths of action having been made out, the three of mind should now be made out. The stanza says:

Stanza: Evil desire toward another’s goods is greed; hostility toward sentient beings is hatred; and the view that denies outright the wholesome and the evil and the rest is called the path of action of wrong view.

Treatise (the path of action of greed): Evil desire toward another’s goods is called greed. That is to say: to raise desire contrary to reason toward another’s wealth — thinking “how may that thing come to belong to me and not to him,” and raising a mind of seizing openly and taking in secret and so hankering after another’s goods; evil desire such as this is called the path of action of greed.

Treatise (the account of some other master): Some other master says: all craving of the desire realm is the path of action of greed. Why so? Because in the Sūtra of the Five Hindrances, with respect to the hindrance of sensual desire, the Buddha said that this greed for the world should be cut off; whence it may be known that the name “greed” is said in general of the craving of the desire realm.

Treatise (yet another account): Again there is another account: though the craving of the desire realm may all be called greed, it may not be said that they all complete a path of action, for this path of action of greed gathers in only the coarse and evident portion within evil conduct. (Were it not so,) would not the sensual greed set going at the time when a wheel-turning monarch appears in the world, and by the men of Uttarakuru, also become the path of action of greed?

Treatise (the path of action of hatred): To raise hostility toward the class of sentient beings is called hatred. That is to say: to wish to do harm to another sentient being; hostility such as this is called the path of action of hatred.

Treatise (the path of action of wrong view): To deny outright with an evil view, with respect to the wholesome and the evil and the rest (denying that they are), this view is called the path of action of wrong view.

As the sūtra says: there is no giving, there is no delighting, there is no sacrifice; there is no good conduct, there is no evil conduct; there is no result and maturation drawn by the action of good conduct and evil conduct; there is no this world, there is no other world; there is no mother, there is no father; there are no sentient beings born by transformation; there is in the world no śramaṇa or brahmin who is an arhat.

That sūtra displays in full the three classes of wrong view, slandering action, slandering results, and slandering the noble ones; the present stanza raises only the first item and by the one word “and the rest” gathers in all the rest.

義疏Exposition

讀這一子之前

這一卷開頭只有一句轉語——「又經中說，業有四種」。前面三子講的是業的體（表與無表）、講的是三種律儀從何處得，論主一句話轉身，開始逐條解釋『經中所說的那些業』。三家古德在這裡都把科判的刀落在同一處：光記標「此下第七明黑黑等。就中，一明四業名體、二明無漏斷別、三敘異說不同」，頌疏標「從此第七，明黑黑等，就中：一明四業、二明無漏斷、三明異說」，寶疏標「自此已下有四頌半，第八明經中黑黑等四業」——三家獨立分卷而界線全同，可見這一刀不是後人硬切的，是論文自己開的口。

這一卷分兩截。前一截短，是經中四組法數的收尾：黑白四業、能盡諸業的無漏思、三牟尼三清淨、三惡行三妙行。後一截長，從「又經中言：有十業道」一句起，直到卷末——那是整部俱舍論講戒行講得最細的一段，也是本卷的重心。三家古德在這一句上又同時落刀：光記標「此下第十明十業道」，頌疏標「從此第十，明十業道」，寶疏標「第十一明十業道也」，而所開的六個子目（業道體性、業道名義、義便明斷善、業道俱轉、約處成業道、業道三果）三家逐一相同。

有一件事要先說在前頭。這一卷讀起來像戒律的細則，但它問的其實始終是同一個問題：一個行為，到什麼程度才算真正成了業道？ 論主的答法是把一個行為拆成三段（加行、根本、後起），再問這三段各由什麼心所起、在什麼處所生、由什麼根究竟、要具足哪些條件才算「不誤」。整卷的細目都掛在這一張表上。讀的時候不妨隨時回頭問一句：現在講的這一條，是在講三段中的哪一段。

一、黑白四業：業與果的四種配對

先問：經中把業分成黑黑、白白、黑白、非黑非白四種，這個「黑白」是在說什麼？是說業的顏色，還是說別的？

論答得很清楚，是說兩件事：一是業所感之果的性類，二是所治與能治。四業之立，逐一是——不善業一向名黑，因為體性染污，其果也黑，因為不可意：「諸不善業一向名黑，染污性故，異熟亦黑，不可意故」；色界善業一向名白，因為不雜惡業，其果也白，因為可意：「色界善業一向名白，不雜惡故，異熟亦白，是可意故」；欲界善業名黑白，因為被惡所雜；無漏業名非黑非白，因為不染污、又不招白異熟。

易誤處：以為某一個業自己既黑又白。論特別擋掉這條路——「此黑白名依相續立，非據自性」，理由是「以無一業及一異熟是黑亦白，互相違故」。黑白是就一整段生命之流上善惡交雜而說的，不是就某一念業體說的。光記於此標其問答之科，把論主所設之難標作「『豈不惡業果至名為白黑』者，問」，把答標作「『不善業果至惡勝善故』者，答」；寶疏同一段則標作「難也」與「答也」——科名雖異而所分全同。

落地：這一條給了讀業論的第一把尺——凡遇『這個業是善是惡』的問題，先分開問三層：業的自性、業的果、業所在的那一段相續。三層各有各的答案，混在一起就必定纏夾。

二、能盡諸業的那一分無漏思：十二、一、四

先問：既然無漏業能盡前三業，是不是每一分無漏業都能盡？

論答：不是。能盡的是特定位次上的那幾念思。見道中的四法智忍，加上修道離欲染位的前八無間道，合為十二思，唯盡純黑業；離欲界染的第九無間道那一思，兼盡黑白與純黑；離四靜慮各一地之染的第九無間道，四思唯令純白業盡。

為什麼第九那一念能兼盡二業？論自己給了理由：那一念上欲界的善法總斷了（黑白業即欲界善業），同時也斷了第九品的不善（純黑業之殘）。

易誤處：以為善法是被『斷掉自體』的。論明說不是——善法非自性斷，斷了還可以現前；所謂斷善法，是緣著它的煩惱盡的時候，它得了離繫。寶疏於此把兩種斷分得最清楚，其語作「此上十二皆自性斷，非所緣斷也……斷黑一分斷雜業全斷，黑是自性及所緣斷，斷白唯所緣斷」；頌疏於同一義則另立一名，作「解云：緣縛斷者，有漏善法被煩惱縛，斷此能緣九品惑盡。善法離繫，名緣縛斷」——所緣斷與緣縛斷是同一義的兩個名字。

落地：讀「斷」字先問一句是斷什麼——斷體，還是斷繫。這一問往後讀隨眠品、賢聖品都要一路用下去。

三、另有兩家的分法：地獄受與見所斷

先問：黑與雜（黑白）除了上面那種分法，還有別的分法嗎？

論在此並錄兩家。第一家以受果之處分：順地獄受的業是純黑（因為地獄異熟唯不善所感），除地獄外其餘欲界之業是黑白（因為那些異熟通善惡所感）。第二家以斷位分：欲界見所斷的業是純黑（見所斷無善可雜），欲界修所斷的是俱業（有善有不善）。

易誤處：以為論主既然錄了兩家，就是含糊。不是——這是本論的體例：凡遇異說而經無明文者，二造並錄。而且這兩家並不衝突，只是切法不同：一家切在果的落處，一家切在惑的斷位。三疏在這裡的判斷也一致，都把這一段標為「敘異說」而不標為問答——光記作「此即第三敘異說」，頌疏作「從此第三，敘異說」。

落地：往後凡讀到「有說……有說……」，先不要急著找哪一個是正確答案，先看清兩家各自把重量壓在什麼地方；分不清切法，就會把兩把不同的尺當成一把來用。

四、三牟尼與三清淨：為什麼牟尼取心不取業

先問：三牟尼是身、語、意三種，何以前二取「業」而第三卻取「意」本身，不取意業？

論給的理由有二。其一，「勝義牟尼唯心為體」——真正的寂默在心，心相難顯，只能由身語二業比知。其二，身語二業是遠離之體，意業不然，因為意業沒有無表。所以「由遠離義建立牟尼」——就是這個心，藉身語二業而有所遠離，因而得名。

牟尼二字的訓詁，三疏逐字相同：光記作「牟尼，此云寂默」，寶疏作「牟尼，此云寂默。無學身、語二業，名身、語牟尼。意牟尼，是無學意，非意業也。以真實牟尼唯是意故，身、語二業比知心故，能比、所比總名牟尼」，頌疏作「釋曰：牟尼者，此云寂默。無學身語業者，謂身、語二牟尼也。即意者，第三意牟尼也。謂即意名牟尼，非意業也」。三家同傳一訓，可見這不是哪一家的私解。

又問：牟尼何以唯在無學？論答「何故牟尼唯在無學？以阿羅漢是實牟尼，諸煩惱言永寂靜故」——寂默不是不說話，是煩惱之言永寂。

易誤處：把三清淨與三牟尼看成兩套東西。論說三清淨即三妙行，其得名之由是「暫永遠離一切惡行煩惱垢故名為清淨」——一個從「離」立名，一個從「寂」立名，所指的是同一件事的兩面。而論主之所以要說這兩者，論自己交代了：是為息有情所計的邪牟尼、邪清淨。

落地：這一節是全卷少見的正面指向果位的一段。前面講四業講的是流轉的帳，這裡忽然標出一個無學位的樣子——後面十業道的一切細目，最後都是要回到這個「離」字上。

五、三惡行三妙行：貪瞋邪見算不算意業

先問：意惡行為什麼有三種而不只是意業？

論說：一切不善身語意業依次名三惡行——「一切不善身語意業，如次名身語意惡行」；而意惡行另有貪、瞋、邪見三種，它們不是意業。理由是「貪等離思別有體故」——意業以思為體，貪瞋邪見是煩惱，別有自性。

這裡起了本子第一場對辯。譬喻者立宗說「貪瞋邪見即是意業」，並引《思經》為證。毘婆沙師難之：若是這樣，業與煩惱就合成一體了。譬喻者答：承認煩惱就是意業，有什麼過失呢？毘婆沙師破之：論錄其語作「毘婆沙師說彼非理」，並說若許此則與眾多理教相違；至於經中之所以說這三者是意業，是為顯示思以它們為門而轉、由此能招非愛果、又為聰慧者所訶厭。

易誤處：把「毘婆沙師說彼非理」讀成論主自己的判語。這一句的主語是毘婆沙師，不是論主——論在此是錄一家之破，不是自下斷語。（此段之宗派歸屬與眾賢對此句的另一種讀法，見文末承衍節。）

又一問：正見邪見既然沒有『要利益他人、要損害他人』的故思，怎麼算善惡？論答「能與損益為根本故」——它們是一切損益之行的根。光記於此句未別立科判標記，只依論文順釋。

落地：這一節給的是判「業」與「惑」界線的第一刀。往後凡遇『某某心所是不是業』，先問一句：它離開思還有沒有自體。

六、十業道：從惡行妙行中只取粗顯的一分

先問：十業道與三惡行三妙行是什麼關係？是同一套，還是一寬一窄？

論答得乾脆：「於前所說惡妙行中，若麁顯易知，攝為十業道」——十業道是惡行妙行中『粗顯易知』的那一分，不是全部。所以身惡行裡的飲酒、執、打、縛等等，以及一切加行、後起，都不入身惡業道；語惡業道不攝加行後起及輕微的一分；意惡業道不攝惡思與輕微的貪等。善的一邊同理：離飲酒、施供養不入身善業道，愛語不入語善業道，諸善思不入意善業道。

為什麼要這樣切？論自己給了判準：如果身惡行使他有情失命、失財、失妻妾，就說它是業道，「以加行等非麁顯故」而不立。光記把這條理由講得更明白，其語作「『惡妙行耶』者，問。『且不善中至令遠離故』者，此下答。且不善中身惡業道，於身惡行不攝加行、後起，及餘不善身業，即是飲酒、或執、或打、或縛等事。或行殺等，闕緣不成。以加行等非麁顯故，不名業道」。

易誤處：以為不入業道就等於無罪。完全不是——飲酒、打縛仍是不善身業，仍然感果；只是它們不在「十業道」這張粗顯的清單上。清單是為了「令遠離」而立的教學工具，不是罪與非罪的分界。

落地：十業道是一張教學用的粗網。讀它的時候要記得網眼有多大——凡是從網眼漏下去的，不是沒有，是另有安放之處。

七、前七業道的表與無表：自作與遣他的分水嶺

先問：前七業道（身三語四）是不是都一定表、無表兩者俱有？

論答不是，並給了一條很細的分界。惡業道中六種一定有無表——「七惡業道中，六定有無表」；這六種若是遣他人作，根本業道成時自身沒有表業（動作是別人的），所以唯有無表；若是自作，則二者俱有，但要看死的時間：起表業時對方就死，二者俱有；動手之後過些時候才死，那就與遣使相同，根本成時唯有無表。唯獨欲邪行必定二者俱有，因為它一定要自身究竟，不能遣人代作——論用了一個很直的譬喻：如自生喜（歡喜不能請人代生）。

善的一邊：從受戒而生的七善業道必定二者俱有，因為受生尸羅一定要依表業（受戒的作法）才生；靜慮律儀與無漏律儀所攝的叫定生，唯有無表，因為它只依心力而得。

易誤處：把『遣他作而自身無表業』讀成『遣他作罪較輕』。論在這裡說的只是表業之有無，不是罪之輕重；根本業道照樣成，無表照樣起。

落地：這一節是全卷第一次用「自作／遣他」與『當下死／後來死』兩把尺去切一個行為。這兩把尺後面還要再用——講俱死前死、講軍等同事，用的都是同一組刀法。

八、加行·根本·後起：屠羊者的一段路

先問：一個殺業從哪裡開始、到哪裡才算真正成？

論用了本卷最著名的一個譬喻來答。屠羊的人：先發殺心而起身，執價直趣賣羊之處，「㨊觸羊身酬價捉取，牽還養飯將入屠坊」，手執杖刀或打或刺，一次再次，直到羊命未終——「如是皆名殺生加行」。隨此表業而羊正命終，那一剎那的表無表業，才是「此剎那頃表無表業，是謂殺生根本業道」。此後無表相續不絕叫殺後起，乃至後來剝截治洗、「若稱若賣或煮，或食讚述其美」也都是後起。

論並且點出根本業道成立的兩個緣：「由二緣故，令諸有情根本業道殺罪所觸：一由加行、二由果滿」。加行位必定有表，無表或有或無（猛利纏或淳淨心起則有）；後起翻前，必定有無表而表業或有或無。

這一段裡有一場最細的兩難。論自設問：所殺者正住死有時業道就成，還是死後才成？兩關都有過——若說正住死有時成，則能殺者與所殺者同死也應成業道，而本宗不許；若說死後才成，則前面「隨此表業彼正命終……是謂殺生根本業道」一語自語相違，而且會違害毘婆沙師對本論「加行未息」的解釋。論主自答：應說是在根本位上用「加行」一語，因為本宗許命終後根本未息，如此則無過。光記於此明標答者是誰，其文作「『此中說何名為無過』者，問。『謂於根本說加行聲』者，論主答」；寶疏亦標「加行聲，論主正」——二疏一致，這一答是論主自己的解，不是毘婆沙師的。

又一問：那時的表業既然已無作用，如何還能成根本業道？論主答得很硬：業道之成不是由於有作用，只是由於加行與果圓滿之時，表無表二者一齊成為根本業道。

還有一層：諸業道可以互為加行與後起。論舉殺為例，把十業道一一排成殺的加行（殺生祈助、盜物資殺、婬彼婦令殺其夫、起語四過令生猜阻、貪其財、瞋其人、起邪見長養殺業），又把誅其親、收其財、婬其所愛、次起貪瞋邪見排成殺的後起。而貪等三者不能作加行，因為「唯起心時未作事故」。

易誤處：以為加行、根本、後起是時間上的三段而已。不是——它們是罪之所繫的三段：加行位所起的無表可有可無，根本位那一剎那是罪之所成，後起位的無表則相續不絕。一個行為的責任不是集中在一點上，而是分佈在這一整條線上。

落地：這一段是全卷最該慢讀的一段。它把『一件事做了』拆成一條有起點、有結點、有餘勢的線；讀懂了這條線，後面十業道的一切細目才有掛處。

九、加行由三不善根起：殺盜婬的十二條路

先問：業道的加行由什麼心所發？

論答：「不善業道加行生時，一一由三不善根起」——依先等起（在前引發的那一念）而說。然後逐一舉例，殺、盜、婬三者各從貪、瞋、癡起，合為九路，語四業道再類推。

從貪起的殺：為得他的身分、為得財、為戲樂、為拔濟親友自身。從瞋起：為除怨而發憤恚。從癡起的一組最值得看：於祭祠中以為是法而殺；諸王依世法律誅戮凶徒而以為成大福；波剌私人說父母老病令其命終可免困苦而生勝福；諸外道說蛇蠍蜂等是毒害之物，殺之生福，羊鹿水牛本擬供食故殺無罪；以及因邪見而殺。

盜與婬的三根同樣各舉數例：盜從癡起者，如王依法律奪惡人財而以為無罪，如婆羅門說劫初之財本是大梵所施梵志、今日奪回即是取己財；婬從癡起者，如讚母等行非梵行，如牛祠中受持牛禁而「吸水齧草或住或行，不簡親踈隨遇隨合」，如外道說一切女人如臼花果乃至橋船而應共受用。

易誤處：把「從癡起」讀成『無心之失』。恰恰相反——論所舉的癡例，全是有一套道理在支持的殺、盜、婬：祭祀之理、法律之理、孝養之理、宗教之理。癡不是糊塗，是一套錯的理路。

落地：這一節是全卷最刺人的一段。它提醒讀者：最難察覺的惡業，不是衝動下犯的，是有理由、有制度、有經典替它撐腰的那一種。讀到自己心裡冒出『這樣做是應該的』時，正是該回頭核一次這一段的時候。

十、外論的一首開緣頌：戲笑、嫁娶、救命救財

先問：虛誑語的加行從癡起，是什麼樣子？

論不自造例，逕引外道之論所說的一首頌為證——「若人因戲笑，嫁娶對女王，及救命救財，虛誑語無罪」。這一頌的前文標記作「然虛誑語所有加行從癡生者，如外論言」，所以它不是佛說，也不是論主自造，是所引的外論之言。

這一頌在說什麼：它列出四類開緣，主張在這四種場合說虛誑語無罪。論引它，正是要指出——這樣的主張本身就是癡，而依此主張所發的虛誑語，其加行即從癡生。此外，論又說：因邪見而起的虛誑語、離間語等一切加行都從癡生；諸吠陀及其餘邪論都屬雜穢語所攝，其加行亦從癡生。

易誤處：把這一頌讀成本論所許的開緣。它不是——它是被引來作反面標本的。判引頌與本頌的準繩，正在前文的那一句「如外論言」。

又一問：貪瞋邪見既然沒有加行，怎麼說它們從貪等生？論主自答：因為它們從三根無間而生——從貪無間生貪業道，從二根亦然，瞋與邪見同理。光記標此答之語作「『同』者，答。非諸業道根本成時，一切皆由三根究竟」。

落地：凡讀到一段替某種妄語開脫的道理，先問它從哪裡來。論在這裡示範的方法很簡單：把那套道理原原本本引出來，然後指出它落在三不善根的哪一根上。

十一、善業道三位皆由三善根：受戒的那一場羯磨

先問：善業道的三位由什麼根起？是不是也像不善那樣一一分配？

論答得比不善簡單：善的三位（加行、根本、後起）都從無貪、無瞋、無癡三善根起。理由有二：善的三位都是善心所等起，而善心必與三種善根相應。

這三位的樣子是什麼？論說就是遠離不善的三位——離惡加行即善加行，離惡根本即善根本，離惡後起即善後起。然後給了本卷唯一的一個善業道實例：勤策受具足戒時，入戒壇、禮苾芻眾、至誠請親教師，乃至一白二羯磨等，都是善業道加行；第三羯磨完畢的那一剎那之表無表業，是根本業道；此後至說四依以及依前相續隨轉的表無表業，都是後起。光記於此標其問答之科，作「此善三位其相云何者，問」。

易誤處：以為善業道的成立比惡業道鬆。並不鬆——它同樣要具三位，同樣要在一個確定的剎那上成根本；受戒之所以要有戒壇、要有眾、要有羯磨的次第，正因為那個「第三羯磨竟」的剎那是有實義的，不是儀式。

落地：這一節與屠羊者那一段恰成對照——同一套三位的結構，一邊用來拆一場殺業，一邊用來立一堂戒。讀者若要記住本卷的骨架，記這兩個例子就夠了。

十二、究竟由何根：瞋三、貪三、癡一、餘三

先問：加行由三根起，那麼「究竟」（業道真正成就的那一刻）也由三根嗎？

論答：不是。究竟另有分配——「惡業道中殺生、麁語、瞋恚業道，由瞋究竟」，因為要「無所顧」的極麁惡心現前這三者才成；不與取、欲邪行、貪三種由貪究竟，因為要「有所顧」的極染污心現前才成；邪見由癡究竟，要上品癡現前；虛誑、離間、雜穢三語則許一一由三根究竟。

這裡最值得看的是那組對舉：「無所顧」與「有所顧」。殺、罵、瞋是把對方連同自己都不顧了；盜、婬、貪則是有所顧戀——顧著那個要得到的東西。同樣是究竟位的極重心，一個是捨，一個是取。

易誤處：把加行之根與究竟之根混為一談。論一開始就把二者分開說：加行「一一由三不善根起」，究竟則各有所繫。同一件殺業，加行可以從貪起（為得財而殺），究竟卻必定由瞋——因為下手成事的那一念一定是無所顧的麁惡心。

落地：這一條給了一個很實用的自檢法：回頭看一件已經做成的惡事，別只看起心時的理由，要看成事那一刻的心。起心的理由常常好看，成事那一刻的心藏不住。

十三、業道所依的四處：有情、眾具、名色、名身

先問：業道是『對著什麼』而起的？

論以四處配十業道：「謂殺等三有情處起，偷盜等三眾具處起，唯邪見一名色處起，虛誑語等三名身等處起」。殺、麁語、瞋三者對著有情；盜、邪行、貪三者對著資生之具；邪見獨對名色（即撥無名色所攝的一切法）；虛誑、離間、雜穢三語對著名身等（語言之所依）。

為什麼語業道繫在名身而不繫在有情？論本身說得簡略，光記引《顯宗》補足其理，其文作「故《顯宗》云『虛誑語等三，名身等處起，語體必依名等起故。語雖亦託有情等生，而正親依名身等起』」——語雖然也對著人說，但它親依的是名句文身。這是眾賢《顯宗論》之語，非本論所自出。

易誤處：把「所依處」讀成『地點』。它不是空間之處，是所對之境——業道要有一個所緣的落點，那個落點決定了它算哪一種業道。

落地：這一條與前一條合看，一個業道的身分就完全定了：所對之境定其類，究竟之根定其成。

十四、俱死與前死：所依已別，罪無所繫

先問：如果殺人者比被殺者先死、或兩人同時死，他還得根本業道之罪嗎？

論答：不得。並自設一問來逼出這個結論——有沒有一種情形，殺者起了殺加行、也令果滿，而竟不被殺罪所觸？答：有，就是俱死與前死。

理由是什麼？論給了兩層。第一層：能殺者死的那一刻，所殺者的命還存在，罪還無所繫（罪要在對方命斷時才成）。第二層更要緊：不能說他死後再得罪，因為「別依生故」——起殺加行時所依止的那個身已經斷滅，雖然另有一類同分之身生起，但那個身不曾起過殺加行，說它成殺業道於理不然。光記把這一層釋得很明白，其語作「何緣俱死、前死不成業道？『以所殺生至理不應然』者，答。以所殺生現命猶存，不可令彼俱死、前死能殺生者成殺生罪，以所殺生命未斷故」。

易誤處：把這一條讀成『先死就沒事了』。論說的是根本業道不成，不是說沒有罪——加行位所起的表無表業並不會因此消失。這一條真正在講的是：業道之罪必須繫在一個現實存在的所依身上。

落地：這是全卷第一次把「業道」與「業」分開來看的地方。業道是一張有嚴格成立條件的清單；條件不足時，行為並沒有消失，只是不落在這張清單上。

十五、軍等同事：一人殺而眾人皆成

先問：一群人結成軍陣去殺敵，或結伴去打獵，其中只有一個人動了手，誰得殺生業道？

論答得毫不迂迴：「於軍等中若隨有一作殺生事，如自作者，一切皆成殺生業道」——理由是「由彼同許為一事故」，就像為一事而輾轉相教，所以一人殺而餘人皆得罪。

論還處理了兩種邊界情形。其一，被人以勢力逼迫而入軍中的：只要他因此也同了那個心，一樣成殺罪。其二，唯一的例外是立誓自要之人——縱使為救自己的性命也不行殺；這樣的人雖被逼在其中而無殺心，所以無罪。光記標此段與前一頌同屬論主自設之問答，其科作「『有起加行至無根依別故』者，此下第四問答分別。就中，一殺已非根本、二他殺成業道」。

易誤處：想替這一條找軟化的餘地——例如說沒動手的人罪輕一等。論文並沒有這樣說，它說的是「皆成如作者」。這一條要如實地讀，不可代論主打折。真正的出口論也只給了一個，而且給得極窄：不是『我沒動手』，是『我立過誓，寧死不殺，而且當下確實無殺心』。

落地：這一條講的是共業如何成立——不是靠動作，是靠「同許為一事」的那一念心。凡是自己也在其中的集體行動，先問一句：我同許的是哪一件事。

十六、殺生之相：故思、他想、不誤

先問：到什麼程度才算「殺生」？

論給三緣：「要由先發欲殺故思，於他有情他有情想，作殺加行不誤而殺」——一要先有欲殺的故思，二要於他有情起他有情之想，三要不誤而殺（只殺所要殺的那一個，不是漫殺了別的）。三緣具足，才是殺生業道。

論隨即簡別一種情形：「有猶豫殺亦成殺生」。他先前心懷猶豫——是活的不是活的？就算是活的，是他不是他？後來起了決志：是與不是，我一定要殺。由心無顧，若殺有情亦成業道。光記於此標為簡別之文，其語作「『猶預殺至亦成業道』者，簡差別。此顯猶預殺亦成業道」。

易誤處：以為「不誤」是替誤殺開的一扇後門。它不是開門，是定相——誤殺的行為並沒有變成無罪，只是它不成「殺生業道」這一條。這與前面俱死前死那一條是同一個道理：清單有清單的條件。

落地：三緣之中最容易被人略過的是第二緣（他有情想）。它提醒的是：業道之成不只看你做了什麼，還看你當時把對方認作了什麼。

十七、壽煖識三法：命根與死的界線

先問：五蘊念念生滅，本來就在滅，那麼「殺」是殺了什麼？

論給了兩解。一解：「息風名生，依身心轉，若有令斷不更續生」——像滅了燈的光、滅了鈴的聲一樣，這叫殺。另一解：「或復生者即是命根，若有令斷不續名殺」。二解都歸到同一句判準上：以惡心隔斷他命，乃至令應生之一念不得生，唯此才被殺罪所觸。光記於這一段只隨文順釋二解之由，未另立問答或敘異說的科名——這一點如實記下，不代判二解是否互斥、孰為正。

接著論處理了一個更麻煩的問題：這所斷之命是屬於誰的？既說『誰的』，豈不是有一個我？論主把這一問推到破我品去廣加思擇，此處只引經證命之為法——「壽煖及與識，三法捨身時，所捨身僵仆，如木無思覺」。這一頌前文作「故薄伽梵所說頌言」，是所引之經頌，非本頌。由此論結一句：有根之身名有命者，無根名死。

外道離繫者在這裡出面。他說「不思而殺亦得殺罪」，並舉觸火為喻——不先思也一樣被燒。論主連下六難反破：那麼遇見他人之妻而誤觸其身也應有罪；善心為離繫者拔髮、師以慈心勸修苦行、施主宿食不消而令人受苦，都應得『使他受苦』之罪；胎與母互為苦因，母於胎亦應有罪；所殺者既與殺相合，也應如火能燒自依而自受其罪；遣他殺則殺罪應無，如火不燒教人觸火者；諸木石亦應被罪所觸，因為屋舍崩塌也害生命。末後一句收得極硬——「又非但喻，立義可成」。二疏於此段的科名一致，都標作「敘外計」，可見這一段不是部派內部之諍，是斥非佛教之外道說。

易誤處：把離繫者這一段讀成又一組『並錄不判』。它不是——論主在這裡是明破，而且破到底。本論的不判只用於佛法內部異說；對外道之計，論該破就破。

落地：這一段給了一條判準：凡主張『不必有心也照樣得罪』的說法，其代價是連善意、連無心、連自然之事都要一併算成罪。論主用六個荒謬的推論把這個代價一次擺出來——這是本卷最完整的一次反破示範。

十八、不與取：力與竊，屬己而成

先問：偷盜到什麼程度才成業道？

論答：前面所說的「不誤」等等隨其所應流貫到後面各門，不再重說；就此門而言，要先發欲盜故思，於他物起他物想，「於他物中起他物想，或力或竊起盜加行，不誤而取令屬己身」，到此才叫不與取之罪。

論隨即處理三種特別的所有權。其一，盜窣堵波（塔）之物：「若有盜取窣堵波物，彼於如來得偷盜罪」，因為佛臨涅槃時哀愍世間而總受了一切所施——另有一位餘師說是望守護者而得罪。其二，掘取無主伏藏，於國主邊得罪。其三，盜諸迴轉物：已作羯磨的對界內僧得罪，羯磨未成的普對佛弟子得罪。

易誤處：以為『無主之物』就沒有得罪之處。論的答法很值得注意——它總能找到一個「屬於誰」的落點：塔物屬佛，伏藏屬國主，迴轉物屬僧或屬佛弟子。這與前面所依處那一條是同一套思路：業道必須有所繫之境。

落地：這一節提醒的是：判斷一件取奪之事，先問三件——是誰的、我認它是誰的、取了之後屬了誰。三問走完，「不與取」的成不成自然分明。

十九、欲邪行：四種行所不應行

先問：欲邪行的界線畫在哪裡？

論以四種「行不應行」立之——「總有四種行不應行，皆得名為欲邪行罪」：一於非境（他所攝妻妾、母、父、父母之親，乃至王所守護之境），二於非道，三於非處（「三於非處行不應行，謂於寺中制多逈處」），四於非時（懷胎時、飲兒乳時、受齋戒時，縱是自妻亦犯）。第四項下論本另錄一說：要丈夫許可她受齋戒而後有犯，才叫非時。

「不誤」一語同樣流貫到這裡：若對他婦以為己妻、對己妻以為他婦，乃至道非道等只要有誤心，雖有所行而非業道。至於『對此他婦而作餘他婦想』是否成業道，論並錄二說：「有說亦成」——畢竟起了婬加行並且受用；「有說不成」——如殺業道於此起加行而於餘究竟則不成。

論又答了兩個實際的問題：於苾芻尼行非梵行，從國王處得業道，因為國王不忍許此事，並以輕況重（於自妻受齋戒時尚不應行，何況出家者）；於童女行非梵行，已許他者於所許處得，未許他者於能護人處得，此及所餘皆於王得。

易誤處：把四種「不應行」讀成四條互不相干的禁令。它們其實是同一個判準的四個維度——境、道、處、時；四者任一不應，即成邪行。

落地：這一節與不與取一節合看，可以看出本論處理戒行的一貫手法：先立所對之境，再加「不誤」一條心的條件，最後補幾個邊界案例。三步走完，一條戒的輪廓就清楚了。

二十、虛誑語：染心、異想、發言、解義

先問：說謊到什麼程度才成業道？

論給四緣：「於所說義異想發言，及所誑者解所說義，染心不誤成虛誑語」——於所說之義起異想、發之為言、對方領解、染心而不誤。四緣缺一則不成：若對方沒有領解言義，那一番話就落成雜穢語。

成業道的時刻在哪一點？論答得極精確：與最後一個字俱生的表聲及無表業成此業道；或隨何時對方領解了義，那時的表無表業成此業道；在此之前諸字所俱行的都是加行。

這裡起了一場關於「解義」的細辯。論自設二難：所謂解義，是據『已聞而正解』，還是據『正聞而能解』？若據前者，則言所詮之義是意識所知，而語表已與耳識俱時謝滅，這業道就應唯無表能成；若據後者，雖無此失，然而那時還未了知，怎能說正聞就是能解？論主取後者為宗，其結語作「如無失者應取為宗」——善知言義者無迷亂緣，耳識已生即名能解。二疏於此一致，都標這一取捨之主是論主：光記作「此亦何定？若有耳識無迷亂緣，即據正聞能解名解……由斯不定，故論主言：如無失者應取為宗」，寶疏作「『無有失應取為宗』，論主評取正聞能解成業道」。

易誤處：以為「解義」是聽者的責任、與說者無關。恰恰相反——業道之成要等對方領解，正說明妄語之罪不在口動，在『使人受了那個假』。

落地：這一節之後，論接著引經列出十六種言（於不見等說見等、於所見等說不見等，各八種為非聖言與聖言），由此帶出下一節「所見等相」之問——語業道的細分至此轉入認識論的地面。

二十一、見聞覺知：四種言依的相

先問：所謂『所見、所聞、所覺、所知』，各以什麼為相？

毘婆沙師之說在前：「若境由眼識所證名所見」，耳識所證名所聞，意識所證名所知，鼻舌身三識所證合名所覺。何以後三識合為一名？因為香味觸三者是無記性，如死人無覺，所以在能證的一邊偏立「覺」名。光記引婆沙補其所以然，其語作「『至偏立覺名』者，別釋三境同名所覺所以。三境同名所覺者，以此三境同無記故，其性昧鈍，猶如死人無所覺知，故能證根偏立覺名」。

毘婆沙師並舉經理二證，經證即佛告大母之教——「汝於此中應知所見，唯有所見」，於色聲法三境說為所見所聞所知，比類則香等三境合立一「所覺」之名。

論主破此證：「此證不成，且經非證，經義別故」——這部經不是為決判四種言依之相而說，它所說之義是勸大母於六境及見等四事上「應知但有所見等言，不應增益愛非愛相」。

於是別出二說。有餘師說：五根現量所證名所見，從他傳說名所聞，運自心以種種理比度所許名所覺，意現證名所知；如此五境之中一一可起四種言說，第六境除見有三。先軌範師說：眼所現見名所見，從他傳聞名所聞，「自運己心諸所思搆名為所覺」，自內所受及自所證名所知。末後論主一句收住：且止傍論，應申正論。

易誤處：把這一段讀成離題的插曲。它不離題——上一節已經說了虛誑語要「於所說義異想發言」，那麼『所說之義』究竟指涉什麼，就必須先把見聞覺知的界線劃清；十六種聖言非聖言的判別全繫於此。

論末又自引一組問答：有沒有由身表而不發語成虛誑語的？有——本論說：不動身而被殺罪所觸者，謂發語；不發語而被誑罪所觸者，謂動身；既不動身又不發語而被二罪所觸者，謂仙人意憤及布灑他時。而後論主自設一難：若既不動身又不發語，而欲界無「離表而生」的無表，這二者如何成業道？論主於此不決，只說「於如是難應設劬勞」。（此難所引起的系內對辯，見文末承衍節。）

落地：這一節示範了論主處理認識問題的方式——先錄一家之說，再指出其經證不足，再別錄二家，而不急於自立一宗。讀者要學的是那個「經非證，經義別故」的分辨力：一段經文能證什麼，要看它當初是為什麼而說。

二十二、離間·麁惡·雜穢：三種語業道

先問：其餘三種語業道各要具幾緣？

離間語：「若染污心發壞他語，若他壞不壞俱成離間語」——只要染心、發壞他之語、對方解義、不誤，四緣具足即成；他人實際上有沒有被離間開，不影響業道之成。光記把這四緣列得最清楚，其語作「『論曰至流至此中』者，釋初兩句，明離間語具四種緣方成業道：一染污心。二發壞他語，若他壞、不壞，但領解時即成離間語」。

麁惡語：「若以染心發非愛語毀呰於他，名麁惡語」——前面的染心一語流貫到此，解義不誤亦與前同；要本期心所欲罵的那個人領解了所說之義，業道才成。

雜穢語：「一切染心所發諸語名雜穢語」，因為染心所發之言皆雜穢；唯有前面的「語」字流貫到此，其餘諸緣不必具。此下論本另錄一說：異於前三種語之外，一切染心所發之言才叫雜穢語，即諂佞、歌詠、邪論等——諂佞如苾芻邪命居懷而發諂語，歌詠如以染心諷吟相調及倡伎為悅他情而作詞曲，邪論如廣辯諸不正見之言詞，「等」字則攝染心所發之悲嘆與世俗戲論。

論並解了一個實際的疑問：輪王出世時也有歌詠，何以不是雜穢語？答：那些語從出離心發，能引出離，非預染心。此下又錄一說：那時也有成嫁娶等所發的染言，只是過輕而不成業道。

易誤處：把「他壞不壞俱成」讀成不近人情。它其實與前面幾條同理——業道之成繫於發者之心與受者之解，不繫於後果是否兌現。這一條與麁惡語『所罵之人須領解』對讀，界線就很清楚：要有一個確定的受話人，而且他確實聽懂了。

落地：三語之中，雜穢語的門檻最低——只要染心所發即是。這一條落到日常最實在：不必說謊、不必離間、不必罵人，只要那一句話是從染心裡出來的，它就已經在這張清單上了。

二十三、貪·瞋·邪見：三種意業道

先問：意三業道各以什麼為相？

貪：「於他財物惡欲名貪」——於他財非理起欲，想著怎樣令彼屬我而不屬他，起力竊之心而耽求他物。此下論本並錄二說：一說一切欲界愛皆是貪業道，並引《五蓋經》依貪欲蓋佛說應斷此世間貪為證；又一說：欲愛雖都可名貪，卻不可說皆成業道，因為貪業道於惡行中只攝粗品——否則輪王之世與北俱盧洲所起的欲貪也要算成貪業道了。

瞋：「於有情類憎恚名瞋」——於他有情欲為傷害之事。

邪見：「於善惡等惡見撥無，此見名為邪見業道」。論引經列其所撥——無施與、無愛樂、無祠祀、無妙行、無惡行、無妙惡行業果異熟、無此世間無彼世間、無母無父、無化生有情、世間無沙門或婆羅門是阿羅漢。而後論自收一句：「彼經具顯謗業謗果謗聖邪見，此頌舉初等言攝後」。光記引婆沙把這十一句逐句判入三類——無施與、無愛樂、無祠祀及無妙行無惡行是謗因，無業果異熟是謗果，無此世間彼世間、無母無父、無化生有情通謗因果，末一句是謗聖。

易誤處：把邪見讀成『見解不同』。論所說的邪見有一個很硬的形狀：它是撥無——把因、把果、把聖者一併說成沒有。光記引婆沙釋外道何以連現見之事也撥，其語作「故《婆沙》釋云『問：他世是不現見，說無可爾。此世現見，何故言無？答：彼諸外道無明所盲，於現見事亦復非撥。不應責無明者、愚盲者墮坑故』」。

落地：十業道到此收束。三意業道之所以放在最後，是因為它們才現前即成根本，沒有加行後起可分——前面九條走的那條『起心、動手、成事、餘勢』的長路，到這裡縮成一念。全卷最重的一條戒，其實是最短的一條。

承衍：三疏之鏡

以上是本子論文自身之義。此下另立一節，收四事：三疏之判釋與互異、眾賢之破與補、真諦舊譯之異、可對讀之座標。鏡非論，只是換一種讀法看同一段文；並錄不判，各還其位。

一、三疏互異之處

一部完全不在場的疏。 神泰疏是殘本，現存七卷分屬界品、根品與賢聖品，業品全闕，所以本子沒有泰疏的逐文釋可繫。據實標闕，不以他卷之文充之。

同一段文，該叫「問答」還是「難答」。 「豈不惡業果」那一輪往復，光記標為問與答，寶疏標為難也與答也。科名互異而所分全同，並錄不判。

善法離繫，是「所緣斷」還是「緣縛斷」。 光記與寶疏用所緣斷，頌疏另出「緣縛斷」一名並自為之解。同義異名，並錄不判。

譬喻者到底是誰。 光記明標其為經部，其文作「『譬喻者言至為意業故』者，經部、譬喻者言：貪等三種即是意思，離思無體」；寶疏於同段只作「述異說」，未標宗名。是否明標宗派，二疏互異，唯錄不判。

欲邪行「非時」二說，該不該下判。 光記逕評「後說為勝，是誤攝故」；寶疏於同段明言「『夫至方謂非時』，敘異說。無評文也」——一家評，一家明說無評。本論自身只是並錄二說而不判，光記之評屬其一家之見。

貪業道二說，同樣一評一不評。 光記評「於二說中，後師為正，以見斷貪不緣財故」；寶疏隨文順釋，未另下判。二疏所異，正在『古德可不可以替論主下判』這一點上。並錄不判。

先軌範師是不是經部。 寶疏把這一說也繫於經部，其語作「為所知，論主敘經部師義也」；光記則只釋其名之由來——「學瑜伽論者，名先軌範師」，未明繫宗派。三疏於此不齊，唯錄不判。

三家全合的一條。 見聞覺知一段的「有餘師說」，光記、寶疏、頌疏三家都判為經部——光記作「經部答」，寶疏作「此引經部餘師釋也」，頌疏作「依經部宗」。這是本子繫屬最穩固的一條。

盜迴轉物的得罪處。 本論只錄「有餘師說：望守護者」一說而不判；光記則引《婆沙》評家之取捨，其文作「十三評取此論前師為正，故彼論云『有說亦於國王處得，有說於施主處得，有說於守護人處得，有說於能護彼天、龍、藥叉』」。此屬婆沙評家之判，非本論定判。

苾芻尼與童女向誰結罪。 本論原句極簡，光記補出兩解——一云從國王得罪，二云以輕況重、但有侵陵即成業道。此二解是光記所補，本論未自出二解之名。

離間語是否須「他壞方成」。 光記引《正理》錄一家「有餘師說：他壞方成」，並評「前說為善」——理由是聖者深固難壞，若須他壞方成，則壞聖之離間語應無罪，而事實上壞聖者獲罪更深。此為光記之取捨，非本論明文。

二、眾賢之破與補釋

眾賢二論於此品的品名不作「分別業品」而作「辯業品」（《順正理論》第四、《顯宗論》第五）。二論的起界與收界與本子相同，都起於「又經中說，業有四種，謂或有業黑黑異熟」，收於「如是已辯十業道相。依何義」——四本獨立傳寫而科界相合。

「許有煩惱即是意業」一句，發語者到底是誰。 本論此句作「若爾，則應業與煩惱合成一體。許有煩惱即是意業，斯有何失？」光記讀為論主代譬喻者（經部）轉述的設想語，故標「『許有煩惱至斯有何失』者，譬喻者答」。眾賢則逕讀為論主自許，故其破辭直指經主——「經主言：許有煩惱即是意業。斯有何過？如是所許，違前契經及後正理，豈非大過」，並舉阿笈摩與正理二證，末歸惡行之名。同一句而注疏傳統與系內對辯傳統的讀法相反，二造並錄，不判孰是。

見聞覺知一段是本子對辯篇幅最大處。 論主破毘婆沙師之經證曰「此證不成，且經非證，經義別故」；眾賢牒之曰「經主撥言：此不成證，經義別故，非此經中佛欲決判四所言相」，並引大母領佛教言之頌以證毘婆沙師之解實有經證，繼而正面反破——「故經主言經義別者，誠如所說，以經義別，經主於中異分別故」，續舉四難，末結曰「今謂經主僻執居心，背此正宗黨彼邪說」。措辭之烈，為本子之最。二造並錄，不判勝負。

「應設劬勞」那一難，眾賢代為作答。 本論於『不動身不發語如何成業道』一難置而不決；眾賢牒此難後自立一解，光記轉引其文作「然彼得果、五苾芻等，先加行時必定有表，相續乃至得果、入道，依此表業發別解脫」——以加行位必有表業相續為說。本論留白之處，眾賢補之；補與不補，各是一家體例。

《顯宗論》於此段全不涉辯。 以容錯法逐字覆核，《顯宗論》在本子範圍內「經主」一詞零命中——它只正述宗義，不作廣破。這是二論體例之異，誠實記，不臆定其故。

眾賢之語也曾被光記引入以補本論。 業道所依四處一段，本論說得簡略，光記引《顯宗》補「語體必依名等起故」之理。此為以對辯之論補本論之未詳，非反破。

三、真諦舊譯之異

真諦《俱舍釋論》於本子相應段自成一系，其體例是「偈曰／釋曰」逐句嵌釋，一頌常拆數處分引；玄奘則「頌曰／論曰」整頌先出而後長行。二本分卷也不同——真諦業品四卷、玄奘六卷，本子所對之段全落在真諦一卷之內。跨本比對只能取場景結構，以玄奘的詞去搜真諦本，多半永遠找不到。

開合之差。 奘頌六句一氣總標四業與能盡之無漏；諦偈只作「黑白等差別，復說業四種」二句，四業細目全賴釋曰逐句補足。

同一經證，繫屬之主不同。 「欲界善業名為黑白」一句所依的經證，奘本逕作本論自陳，諦本則繫於「有餘師云」。並錄不判。

經名之出否。 譬喻者立宗所引之經，奘本明作《思經》，諦本只作「經中說」而不出經名；以容錯法覆核真諦業品全篇，《思經》一名零命中——不是檢索之失，是真諦本身不點名此經。反之，《五蓋經》二本皆點名。可見經證詳略非通則性偏向，逐條互異。

譯名自成一系。 牟尼作牟那、虛誑語作妄語、不與取作偷盜、欲邪行作邪婬、離間語作破語、麁惡語作惡語、雜穢語作非應語、窣堵波作藪抖波、波剌私作波尸國人、密意說作不了義說。其中最見譯法分途的是命根一處：奘取意譯作「息風」，諦取音譯作「波羅那」而後訓其義「以風為義」。附帶一提，真諦本自身用字也不一致——同一離間語，頌釋段作破語而前段行文中作兩舌，據實記，不臆定何者為正。

詳略之向雙頭。 軍陣同殺一段，諦本多出掘坑與偷破二類而詳於奘本；邪見所撥的經文，奘本全譯十一句而諦本節作六句，又詳略互易。詳略隨段而異，無定向。

引頌之譯最自由。 外論開緣頌，奘作「若人因戲笑，嫁娶對女王，及救命救財，虛誑語無罪」，諦作「戲笑及女人，娶婦并救命，救財故妄語，梵王說無害」——句序字面全異而所開四緣之義同。壽煖識頌亦然：奘之「僵仆」對諦之「永眠」，奘之「壽」對諦之「命根」。並錄不判。

四、可對讀之座標

本子所立的，是一張『行為如何成罪』的結構表：三位（加行、根本、後起）、三根、究竟、所依處、加上「不誤」一條心的條件。同一組問題到了唯識一系，開法有同有異。

殺生之相，本子取故思、他想、不誤三緣；瑜伽行系之根本論於同一法則作欲樂、染污心、方便、究竟——加行（方便）與究竟二支二系同用，而俱舍別出「他想不誤」一支、彼系別出「欲樂」一支。欲邪行一條更近：彼系亦以非道、非處、非時為目，與本子四目中的後三目逐字相對。

分歧最大的一處在表業之體。本子以七惡業道的表與無表逐一分別，表與無表都許為色法之實；瑜伽行系之根本論則於表業三分之後，結之曰一切表業皆是假有。同一組法數，二系於其體之實假所判正相反——這是本子最可對讀的一處。數目相同而所繫的義理框架不同，可以並看，不判勝負。

十業道這一組法數，彼系另立八損害門與八利益門以收之——法數同而所開之門異，亦可並看。

Before Reading This Unit

The fascicle opens with a single sentence of transition — “again the sūtra says that action is of four kinds.” The three units before it expounded the entity of action (the manifest and the nonmanifest) and expounded from what the three disciplines are obtained; with one sentence the author turns about and begins to explain item by item “those actions spoken of in the sūtras.” The three ancient masters all let the knife of the outline fall at the same place here: Puguang’s Record marks “below, the seventh, explaining the black-and-black and the rest. Within it, first the names and entities of the four actions, second the distinctions in what the actions without outflows cut off, third the recording of divergent accounts”; Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary marks “from here the seventh, explaining the black-and-black and the rest, within it: first the four actions, second the cutting off by the action without outflows, third the divergent accounts”; Fabao’s Commentary marks “from here below there are four and a half stanzas, the eighth, explaining the four actions black and black and the rest spoken of in the sūtras” — the three divided their fascicles independently and yet the boundary is identical in all, whence it appears that this cut was not forced upon the text by later men but is a mouth opened by the treatise itself.

This fascicle divides into two stretches. The first is short, and is the winding up of four sets of numbered dharmas from the sūtras: the four actions black and white, the volition without outflows that can exhaust the actions, the three munis and the three purities, the three kinds of evil conduct and the three kinds of good conduct. The second is long, running from the sentence “again the sūtra says: there are ten paths of action” down to the end of the fascicle — and that is the most finely worked stretch on conduct in the whole Abhidharmakośa, and the center of gravity of this fascicle. At this sentence the three ancient masters again let the knife fall together: Puguang’s Record marks “below, the tenth, explaining the ten paths of action,” Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary marks “from here the tenth, explaining the ten paths of action,” Fabao’s Commentary marks “the eleventh, explaining the ten paths of action”; and the six subsections they open (the nature of the entity of a path of action, the sense of the name path of action, the cutting off of the wholesome roots taken up as convenient, the paths of action turning together, the completing of a path of action with respect to a place, and the three results of the paths of action) are one by one the same in all three.

There is one thing to be said before all else. This fascicle reads like the fine print of the discipline, but what it asks is always in fact one and the same question: at what degree does an act truly become a path of action? The author’s way of answering is to take an act apart into three stretches (preparatory, root, and consequent), and then to ask by what mind each of these three is set going, in what place it arises, by what root it is completed, and what conditions must be complete for it to count as “not by mistake.” Every detail in the fascicle hangs upon this one table. As one reads, it is worth turning back from time to time to ask: this present item — which of the three stretches is it speaking of?

I. The Four Actions Black and White: The Four Pairings of Action and Result

First ask: the sūtra divides action into the four of black-black, white-white, black-and-white, and neither-black-nor-white; what is this “black and white” saying? Is it speaking of the color of an action, or of something else?

The treatise answers quite plainly that it is speaking of two matters: first, the kind of result that the action draws; second, what is to be counteracted and what counteracts. The four actions are established one by one thus — unwholesome action is called black without exception, because its nature is defiled, and its result too is black, because it is not agreeable: “all unwholesome action is called black without exception, because its nature is defiled; and the maturation is likewise black, because it is not agreeable”; wholesome action of the form realm is called white without exception, because it is not mingled with evil action, and its result too is white, because it is agreeable: “wholesome action of the form realm is called white without exception, because it is not mingled with evil; and the maturation is likewise white, because it is agreeable”; wholesome action of the desire realm is called black-and-white, because it is mingled with the evil; and action without outflows is called neither black nor white, because it is undefiled and because it does not draw a white maturation.

Clearing a misreading: supposing that some one action is of itself both black and white. The treatise blocks this road in particular — “this name black-and-white is established with respect to a continuum, and not with respect to intrinsic nature” — the reason being that “there is no single action and no single maturation that is black and also white, since they are mutually opposed.” Black-and-white is said with respect to the mingling of wholesome and evil across a whole stretch of the stream of life; it is not said of the entity of some one thought-moment of action. Puguang’s Record here marks the outline of question and answer, marking the objection the author raises for himself as “‘is not the result of evil action’ down to ‘be called white-black’: the question,” and marking the answer as “‘the result of unwholesome action’ down to ‘the evil prevails over the wholesome’: the answer”; Fabao’s Commentary on the same passage marks them as “an objection” and “an answer” — the outline names differ while the division is entirely the same.

Where it lands: this item gives the first measuring-rod for reading the treatise on action — whenever one meets the question “is this action wholesome or evil,” one must first divide the question into three layers: the intrinsic nature of the action, the result of the action, and the stretch of continuum in which the action stands. Each of the three layers has its own answer, and to mix them is to be entangled without fail.

II. That Portion of Volition without Outflows Which Can Exhaust the Actions: Twelve, One, and Four

First ask: since action without outflows can exhaust the former three actions, is every portion of action without outflows able to exhaust them?

The treatise answers: no. What can exhaust them are those few thought-moments of volition at particular stages. The four receptivities to the cognition of dharma in the path of seeing, together with the first eight uninterrupted paths at the stage of becoming free from the defilement of desire in the path of cultivation, make twelve volitions and exhaust the purely black action alone; the one volition of the ninth uninterrupted path for becoming free from the defilement of the desire realm exhausts both the black-and-white and the purely black; and the ninth uninterrupted path for becoming free from the defilement of the four meditative absorptions, one level each, makes four volitions that cause the purely white action alone to come to an end.

Why can that ninth thought-moment exhaust two actions at once? The treatise gives the reason itself: at that thought-moment the wholesome dharmas of the desire realm are cut off altogether (the black-and-white action being wholesome action of the desire realm), and at the same time the unwholesome of the ninth grade is cut off (the remainder of the purely black).

Clearing a misreading: supposing that wholesome dharmas are “cut off in their own entity.” The treatise says expressly that they are not — wholesome dharmas are not cut off in their intrinsic nature, and once cut off they may still come to be present; what is called cutting off wholesome dharmas is that, at the time when the afflictions that take them as object are exhausted, they obtain release from bondage. Fabao’s Commentary here divides the two kinds of cutting off most clearly, his words being “these twelve above are all cutting off in intrinsic nature and not cutting off as object … cutting off one portion of the black is the cutting off of the mingled action entire; the black is cut off both in intrinsic nature and as object, while the white is cut off as object alone”; Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary sets up another name for the same sense, giving “explanation: cutting off the bond of the object means that wholesome dharmas with outflows are bound by the afflictions, and when the nine grades of affliction that take them as object are cut off and exhausted, the wholesome dharmas obtain release from bondage, and this is called cutting off the bond of the object” — cutting off as object and cutting off the bond of the object are two names for one and the same sense.

Where it lands: on reading the word “cut off,” ask first what is being cut off — the entity, or the binding. This one question will be in use all the way on through the Chapter on the Latent Tendencies and the Chapter on the Worthy and the Noble.

III. Two Further Ways of Dividing: Experienced in the Hells, and Abandoned by Seeing

First ask: apart from the division above, are there other ways of dividing the black and the mingled (the black-and-white)?

Here the treatise records two parties. The first divides by the place where the result is experienced: action to be experienced in the hells is purely black (because the maturation of the hells is drawn by the unwholesome alone), and action of the desire realm apart from the hells is black-and-white (because those maturations are drawn by both the wholesome and the evil). The second divides by the stage of cutting off: action of the desire realm abandoned by seeing is purely black (what is abandoned by seeing has no wholesome to be mingled with it), and what is abandoned by cultivation in the desire realm is action that is both (having both wholesome and unwholesome).

Clearing a misreading: supposing that because the author records two parties he is being vague. He is not — this is the form of the treatise: wherever there is a divergent account and no express text of scripture, both parties are recorded. And these two parties are not in conflict; only their manner of cutting differs: the one cuts at where the result falls, the other at the stage where the affliction is cut off. The three commentaries agree in their judgment here, all marking this passage as “recording divergent accounts” and not as question and answer — Puguang’s Record gives “this is the third, recording divergent accounts,” and Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary gives “from here the third, recording divergent accounts.”

Where it lands: hereafter, whenever one reads “one account says … another account says …,” do not hasten to find which is the right answer; see first where each party has laid its weight. To fail to distinguish the manner of cutting is to take two different measuring-rods for one.

IV. The Three Munis and the Three Purities: Why a Muni Takes Mind and Not Action

First ask: the three munis are the three of body, speech, and mind; why do the first two take “action” while the third takes “mind” itself and not mental action?

The treatise gives two reasons. The first, “the muni in the ultimate sense has mind alone for its entity” — true silent stillness lies in the mind, and the mark of mind is hard to display and can only be inferred from the two actions of body and speech. The second, the two actions of body and speech are entities of keeping away, while mental action is not, because mental action has no nonmanifest. Hence “it is from the sense of keeping away that the name muni is established” — that is, it is just this mind which, by means of the two actions of body and speech, has something it keeps away from, and thereby gets the name.

The gloss on the two graphs of the word muni is word for word the same in the three commentaries: Puguang’s Record gives “muni, which here means silent stillness”; Fabao’s Commentary gives “muni, which here means silent stillness. The two actions of body and speech of one beyond learning are called the muni of body and the muni of speech. The muni of mind is the mind of one beyond learning, and not mental action. For the truly real muni is mind alone, and the two actions of body and speech are what the mind is inferred from; and what infers and what is inferred are together named muni”; Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary gives “explanation: as for muni, it here means silent stillness. ‘The bodily and verbal action of one beyond learning’ means the two munis of body and speech. ‘That is, the mind’ is the third, the muni of mind. That is, the mind itself is named muni, and not mental action.” The three transmit one gloss alike, whence it appears that this is no private reading of any one of them.

And again ask: why is a muni found only at the stage beyond learning? The treatise answers, “why is a muni found only at the stage beyond learning? Because the arhat is the true muni, the speech of all the afflictions being forever stilled” — silent stillness is not the not-speaking of words; it is the forever stilling of the speech of the afflictions.

Clearing a misreading: taking the three purities and the three munis for two separate sets of things. The treatise says that the three purities are just the three kinds of good conduct, and the ground of their name is “because they keep away, whether for a time or forever, from all evil conduct and from the grime of the afflictions, they are called purities” — the one takes its name from “keeping away” and the other from “stilling,” and what they point at is two faces of one and the same thing. And why the author must speak of these two he explains himself: it is to put a stop to the false munis and false purities reckoned upon by sentient beings.

Where it lands: this section is one of the rare stretches in the fascicle that points squarely at the fruit. The four actions above were an accounting of the flowing on; here of a sudden the figure of the stage beyond learning is set up — and all the details of the ten paths of action that follow are in the end to come back to this one word, “keeping away.”

V. The Three Kinds of Evil Conduct and the Three Kinds of Good Conduct: Do Greed, Hatred, and Wrong View Count as Mental Action

First ask: why is mental evil conduct of three kinds and not merely mental action?

The treatise says: all unwholesome bodily, verbal, and mental action is called in order the three kinds of evil conduct — “all unwholesome bodily, verbal, and mental action is called in order bodily, verbal, and mental evil conduct”; and mental evil conduct has besides the three of greed, hatred, and wrong view, which are not mental action. The reason is “because greed and the rest have an entity of their own apart from volition” — mental action has volition for its entity, while greed, hatred, and wrong view are afflictions and have an intrinsic nature of their own.

Here begins the first exchange of the unit. The masters of similes state their tenet, saying “greed, hatred, and wrong view are just mental action,” and quote the Sūtra on Volition in proof. The Vaibhāṣikas object: if that were so, action and affliction would be combined into one entity. The masters of similes answer: to grant that an affliction is just mental action — what fault is there in this? The Vaibhāṣikas refute them: the treatise records their words as “the Vaibhāṣika masters say that they speak thus without reason,” and says that to allow this would be at odds with many principles and teachings; while as for why the sūtra speaks of these three as mental action, it is to display that volition turns with them for its gate, that it can thereby draw an unlovely result, and that it is what the discerning reproach and abhor.

Clearing a misreading: reading “the Vaibhāṣika masters say that they speak thus without reason” as the author’s own verdict. The subject of that sentence is the Vaibhāṣika masters and not the author — here the treatise is recording one party’s refutation and is not passing sentence of its own. (For the school attribution of this passage and for Saṅghabhadra’s other way of reading this sentence, see the section of Further Resonances at the end.)

And a further question: since right view and wrong view have no deliberate volition “to benefit another, to harm another,” how do they count as wholesome or evil? The treatise answers, “because they can serve as the root of harm and of benefit” — they are the root of all conduct of harm and of benefit. Puguang’s Record sets up no separate outline mark at this sentence and explains it simply as the text runs.

Where it lands: this section gives the first cut that divides the boundary between “action” and “affliction.” Hereafter, whenever one meets the question “is such and such a mental factor an action,” ask first: does it have an entity of its own apart from volition?

VI. The Ten Paths of Action: Taking Only the Coarse and Evident Portion from Evil and Good Conduct

First ask: what is the relation of the ten paths of action to the three kinds of evil conduct and the three kinds of good conduct? Are they one and the same set, or is the one wide and the other narrow?

The treatise answers straight out: “within the evil conduct and good conduct spoken of above, whatever is coarse, evident, and easily known is gathered in as the ten paths of action” — the ten paths of action are that portion of evil and good conduct which is “coarse, evident, and easily known,” and not the whole. Hence drinking liquor, seizing, beating, and binding within bodily evil conduct, together with every preparatory and consequent stage, do not enter the bodily evil paths of action; the verbal evil paths of action do not gather in the preparatory and consequent stages nor the slight portion; the mental evil paths of action do not gather in evil volitions nor slight greed and the rest. It is the same on the wholesome side: abstaining from liquor and making offerings do not enter the bodily wholesome paths of action, kindly speech does not enter the verbal wholesome paths of action, and the wholesome volitions do not enter the mental wholesome paths of action.

Why cut it in this way? The treatise gives the criterion itself: if bodily evil conduct makes another sentient being lose his life, his goods, or his wife, then it is spoken of as a path of action, while the rest is not established “because the preparatory stage and the rest are not coarse and evident.” Puguang’s Record states this reason still more plainly, his words being “‘evil conduct and good conduct?’: the question. ‘Let the unwholesome be spoken of first’ down to ‘because men are to be made to keep away’: the answer follows below. Let the unwholesome be spoken of first: the bodily evil paths of action, as regards bodily evil conduct, do not gather in the preparatory stage, the consequent stage, or the remaining unwholesome bodily actions, that is, drinking liquor, or seizing, or beating, or binding, and the like. Or where killing and the like are done but a condition is lacking and it is not completed. Because the preparatory stage and the rest are not coarse and evident, they are not named paths of action.”

Clearing a misreading: supposing that not to enter the paths of action is the same as being without offense. It is nothing of the kind — drinking liquor and beating and binding are still unwholesome bodily actions and still draw their results; they are simply not on this coarse and evident list. The list is a teaching instrument set up “to make men keep away,” and is not the boundary between offense and no offense.

Where it lands: the ten paths of action are a coarse net for teaching. In reading it one must remember how wide the mesh is — whatever falls through the mesh is not thereby absent; it is only lodged elsewhere.

VII. The Manifest and the Nonmanifest in the First Seven Paths of Action: The Watershed of Doing It Oneself and Dispatching Another

First ask: do the first seven paths of action (three of body and four of speech) all necessarily have both the manifest and the nonmanifest?

The treatise answers that they do not, and gives a very fine boundary. Six among the evil paths of action necessarily have the nonmanifest — “among the seven evil paths of action, six necessarily have the nonmanifest”; if these six are done by dispatching another, then at the time when the root path of action is completed there is no manifest action in oneself (the act being another’s), and so there is the nonmanifest alone; if they are done by oneself, then both are present, but this depends on the timing of the death: if the other dies at the moment the manifest act is set going, both are present; if he dies only some time after the hand was laid to it, then it is the same as dispatching a messenger, and at the completion of the root there is the nonmanifest alone. Sexual misconduct alone necessarily has both, because it must be brought to completion by one’s own body and cannot be deputed to another — and the treatise uses a very direct simile: as one’s own delight (delight cannot be produced by deputy).

On the wholesome side: the seven wholesome paths of action that arise from taking up the precepts necessarily have both, because the śīla born of taking them up must arise in dependence upon the manifest act (the formal procedure of taking up the precepts); while those gathered in by the discipline of meditative absorption and the discipline without outflows are called produced in absorption, and have the nonmanifest alone, because they are obtained in dependence upon the force of mind alone.

Clearing a misreading: reading “dispatching another, with no manifest action in oneself” as “dispatching another is a lighter offense.” What the treatise is speaking of here is only whether there is manifest action, not the weight of the offense; the root path of action is completed all the same, and the nonmanifest arises all the same.

Where it lands: this section is the first place in the fascicle where two measuring-rods, “doing it oneself / dispatching another” and “dying then and there / dying later,” are used to cut an act. These two rods will be used again — in the passages on dying together and dying first, and on acting as one in an army, the same set of knife-strokes is at work.

VIII. Preparatory · Root · Consequent: The Stretch of Road Walked by the Butcher of Sheep

First ask: where does an act of killing begin, and at what point is it truly completed?

The treatise answers with the most famous simile in the fascicle. The butcher of sheep: he first raises the thought of killing and rises, takes the price and goes straight to the place where sheep are sold, “feels the body of the sheep, pays the price and takes hold of it, leads it back and feeds it, drives it into the slaughterhouse,” takes staff or knife in hand and beats or stabs it, once and again, until the sheep’s life is not yet ended — “all this is called the preparatory stage of killing.” Following upon this manifest act the sheep just then ends its life, and the manifest and nonmanifest action of that single moment is what alone is “the manifest and nonmanifest action within that single moment, and this is called the root path of action of killing.” Thereafter the nonmanifest continuing on unbroken is called the consequent stage of killing, and so on to the later flaying, cutting, dressing, and washing, and “the weighing, the selling, the cooking, the eating, and the praising of its savor,” all of which are likewise the consequent stage.

The treatise moreover points out the two conditions on which the root path of action is established: “by two conditions are sentient beings touched by the offense of killing that belongs to the root path of action: first by the preparatory stage, second by the fullness of the result.” The preparatory stage necessarily has the manifest, while the nonmanifest may or may not be present (if set going by a violent entanglement or a mind of pure sincerity, it is present); the consequent stage is the reverse of the foregoing, necessarily having the nonmanifest while the manifest may or may not be present.

Within this passage there is the finest of the dilemmas. The author raises a question against himself: is the path of action completed while the one killed is abiding in the existence of death, or only after his death? Both horns have their fault — if it be said to be completed while he abides in the existence of death, then the case where killer and killed die at the same time ought likewise to complete a path of action, which our own school does not allow; if it be said to be completed only after his death, then the earlier sentence “following upon this manifest act, that sheep just then ends its life … this is called the root path of action of killing” contradicts itself, and besides it would do violence to the Vaibhāṣika masters’ explanation of the root treatise’s words “the preparatory stage is not yet stilled.” The author answers for himself: it should be said that it is with regard to the root stage that the words “preparatory stage” are used, for our own school allows that after the ending of life the root is not yet stilled, and said thus there is no fault. Puguang’s Record marks expressly here who it is that answers, his text being “‘what is meant here by there is no fault’: the question. ‘It is using the words preparatory stage with regard to the root’: the author answers”; Fabao’s Commentary likewise marks “the words preparatory stage: the author sets it right” — the two commentaries agree, and this answer is the author’s own explanation and not the Vaibhāṣika masters’.

And a further question: since the manifest action at that time has no function any longer, how can it still become the root path of action? The author answers with great firmness: the completion of a path of action is not by reason of having a function, but only because, at the time when the preparation and the fullness of the result are present, the manifest and the nonmanifest together become the root path of action.

And a further layer: the several paths of action may serve one another as preparatory and as consequent. The treatise takes killing for its example and ranges the ten paths of action one by one as the preparation for killing (killing living beings to petition for aid, stealing goods to fund the killing, fornicating with the wife so that she may kill her husband, setting going the four faults of speech to breed suspicion and estrangement, greed for his goods, hatred toward the man, raising a wrong view to nourish the act of killing), and then ranges the putting to death of his kin, the taking of his goods, the fornicating with the woman he loved, and the raising in turn of greed, hatred, and wrong view as the consequent stage of killing. And the three of greed and the rest cannot serve as a preparatory stage, because “at the time of raising the thought the deed has not yet been done.”

Clearing a misreading: supposing that preparatory, root, and consequent are merely three stretches in time. They are not — they are the three stretches to which the offense is attached: the nonmanifest set going at the preparatory stage may or may not be present, the single moment of the root stage is where the offense is completed, and the nonmanifest of the consequent stage continues on unbroken. The responsibility for an act is not gathered at a single point; it is distributed along this whole line.

Where it lands: this passage is the one in the fascicle that most deserves slow reading. It takes “a thing was done” apart into a line that has a starting point, a joining point, and a residual momentum; and only when this line is understood do all the details of the ten paths of action that follow have anything to hang upon.

IX. The Preparation Arises from the Three Unwholesome Roots: Twelve Roads for Killing, Stealing, and Fornication

First ask: by what mind is the preparation for a path of action set going?

The treatise answers: “when the preparatory stage of an unwholesome path of action arises, in every case it arises from the three unwholesome roots” — said with respect to the prior raising (the thought that draws it forth beforehand). Then it gives instances one by one, killing, stealing, and fornication each arising from greed, from hatred, and from delusion, making nine roads in all, with the four verbal paths of action to be inferred on the same model.

Killing arising from greed: for the sake of obtaining parts of the other’s body, for goods, for sport, for rescuing kin, friends, and oneself. Arising from hatred: raising wrath in order to be rid of an enemy. The set arising from delusion is the most worth looking at: killing within a sacrifice in the belief that it accords with the Dharma; kings and the like putting the villainous to death according to the laws of the world in the belief that great merit is accomplished; the people of Persia saying that when parents are old and ill, to have them end their lives frees them from distress and produces great merit; the non-Buddhists saying that snakes, scorpions, wasps, and the like are venomous and harmful things and that killing them produces merit, and that sheep, deer, and buffalo were from the first prepared for food and so are killed without offense; and killing by reason of wrong view.

For stealing and for fornication the three roots are likewise given with several instances: stealing arising from delusion, as when kings confiscate the goods of evil men according to law in the belief that there is no offense, or as when brahmins say that the goods of the beginning of the aeon were bestowed by the great Brahmā upon the brahmin seers and that to take them back today is to take one’s own; fornication arising from delusion, as in praising the practice of what is not the pure life with one’s mother and the like, as in the keeping of the cow-observance within the cow-sacrifice, “drinking water and cropping grass, standing or walking, coupling as they meet without distinction of near kin or stranger,” and as when non-Buddhists say that all women are like a mortar, a flower or fruit, and so on to a bridge or a boat, and are to be enjoyed in common.

Clearing a misreading: reading “arising from delusion” as “a fault committed unwittingly.” Just the contrary — the instances of delusion that the treatise adduces are one and all acts of killing, stealing, and fornication that have a whole body of reasoning behind them: the reasoning of sacrifice, the reasoning of law, the reasoning of filial care, the reasoning of religion. Delusion is not muddle-headedness; it is a wrong train of reasoning.

Where it lands: this section is the most piercing in the fascicle. It reminds the reader that the evil action hardest to detect is not the one committed on impulse, but the kind that has reasons, institutions, and scriptures propping it up. When the thought “this is what ought to be done” rises in one’s own mind, that is precisely the moment to turn back and check this passage once more.

X. A Stanza of Exemptions from a Non-Buddhist Treatise: Jest, Marriage, Saving Life and Saving Goods

First ask: what does the preparation for false speech arising from delusion look like?

The treatise does not make an instance of its own but quotes straight from a treatise of the non-Buddhists a stanza in proof — “if a man, by reason of jest, by reason of marriage, by reason of facing a woman or a king, or for the sake of saving life or saving goods, speaks false speech, that is without offense.” The text preceding this stanza is marked as “as for the preparation for false speech that is produced from delusion, it is as is said in a treatise of the non-Buddhists,” and so it is neither spoken by the Buddha nor made by the author, but the words of a quoted non-Buddhist treatise.

What this stanza says: it lists four classes of exemption and holds that to speak false speech on these four occasions is without offense. The treatise quotes it precisely in order to point out that such a claim is itself delusion, and that the false speech set going in reliance upon such a claim has a preparation arising from delusion. Besides this, the treatise says that all the preparations for false speech, divisive speech, and the rest that arise by reason of wrong view are produced from delusion; and that the several Vedas and the other false treatises are gathered in by frivolous speech, their preparations likewise produced from delusion.

Clearing a misreading: reading this stanza as an exemption allowed by the treatise. It is not — it is quoted as a specimen for the contrary. The touchstone that tells a quoted stanza from a root stanza is precisely that preceding sentence, “as is said in a treatise of the non-Buddhists.”

And a further question: since greed, hatred, and wrong view have no preparation, how can they be said to arise from greed and the rest? The author answers for himself: because they are produced from the three roots without interval — the path of action of greed being produced from greed without interval, and likewise from the other two roots, and hatred and wrong view in the same way. Puguang’s Record marks the words of this answer as “‘the same’: the answer. It is not that when the root of the paths of action is completed, all of them are brought to completion by the three roots.”

Where it lands: whenever one reads a piece of reasoning that excuses some kind of false speech, ask first where it came from. The method the treatise demonstrates here is very simple: quote that whole body of reasoning out in full, and then point out which of the three unwholesome roots it falls upon.

XI. All Three Stages of the Wholesome Paths of Action Arise from the Three Wholesome Roots: That One Act of Karman at the Taking of the Precepts

First ask: from what roots do the three stages of the wholesome paths of action arise? Are they too apportioned one by one, as with the unwholesome?

The treatise answers more simply than for the unwholesome: all three wholesome stages (preparatory, root, and consequent) arise from the three wholesome roots of non-greed, non-hatred, and non-delusion. There are two reasons: all three wholesome stages are raised by a wholesome mind, and a wholesome mind is necessarily associated with the three wholesome roots.

What do these three stages look like? The treatise says that they are the keeping away from the three unwholesome stages — keeping away from the evil preparation is the wholesome preparation, keeping away from the evil root is the wholesome root, keeping away from the evil consequent is the wholesome consequent. Then it gives the one instance of a wholesome path of action in the whole fascicle: when a diligent trainee receives the full precepts, entering the ordination platform, paying homage to the assembly of bhikṣus, uttering with all sincerity the request to his preceptor, and so on to the one motion and two announcements of karman and the rest, all is the preparatory stage of the wholesome path of action; the manifest and nonmanifest action of the single moment at which the third announcement of karman is completed is the root path of action; and from that point on, down to the declaring of the four resorts and the manifest and nonmanifest action that continues on and turns along in dependence upon what went before, all is the consequent stage. Puguang’s Record here marks the outline of question and answer, giving “‘what are the marks of these three wholesome stages’: the question.”

Clearing a misreading: supposing that the constituting of a wholesome path of action is looser than that of an evil one. It is not loose at all — it likewise requires the three stages complete, and likewise requires the root to be completed at one determinate moment; and the very reason the taking of the precepts must have an ordination platform, an assembly, and the successive announcements of karman is that the moment of “the third announcement of karman being finished” has a real sense in it, and is no mere ceremony.

Where it lands: this section stands in exact contrast with the passage of the butcher of sheep — one and the same structure of three stages, used on the one side to take an act of killing apart and on the other to establish a hall of the precepts. If the reader would remember the skeleton of this fascicle, these two instances are enough.

XII. By Which Root Completion Comes: Hatred for Three, Greed for Three, Delusion for One, All Three for the Rest

First ask: the preparation arises from the three roots; does “completion” (the very moment at which a path of action is truly constituted) likewise come by all three roots?

The treatise answers: no. Completion has an apportionment of its own — “among the evil paths of action, the three paths of action of killing, harsh speech, and hatred are completed by hatred,” because these three are constituted only when the extremely coarse and evil mind “that spares nothing” is present; the three of taking what is not given, sexual misconduct, and greed are completed by greed, because they are constituted only when the extremely defiled mind “that clings to something” is present; wrong view is completed by delusion, requiring delusion of the highest grade to be present; and the three of false speech, divisive speech, and frivolous speech are granted completion by all three roots, each by each.

What is most worth looking at here is that pair of contrasts: “sparing nothing” and “clinging to something.” Killing, abusing, and hating are a disregarding both of the other and of oneself; stealing, fornicating, and coveting are a clinging — a regard for the thing one would obtain. Both alike are the extremely weighty mind of the stage of completion, but the one is a casting away and the other a taking hold.

Clearing a misreading: confounding the root of the preparation with the root of the completion. The treatise separates the two from the outset: the preparation “in every case arises from the three unwholesome roots,” whereas the completion has its several attachments. In one and the same act of killing, the preparation may arise from greed (killing for gain), while the completion is necessarily by hatred — because the thought at the moment when the hand brings the thing off is assuredly the coarse and evil mind that spares nothing.

Where it lands: this item gives a very serviceable way of checking oneself: looking back at an evil deed already done, do not look only at the reason present when the thought was raised, but at the mind at the moment the thing was brought off. The reason for raising the thought is often presentable; the mind at the moment of bringing it off cannot hide.

XIII. The Four Places on Which the Paths of Action Depend: Sentient Beings, Goods, Name-and-Form, the Name-Bodies

First ask: “toward what” is a path of action set going?

The treatise matches four places to the ten paths of action: “the three of killing and the rest arise in the place of sentient beings; the three of stealing and the rest arise in the place of goods; wrong view alone arises in the place of name-and-form; and the three of false speech and the rest arise in the place of the name-bodies and the rest.” Killing, harsh speech, and hatred are turned toward sentient beings; stealing, sexual misconduct, and greed toward the requisites of livelihood; wrong view alone toward name-and-form (that is, it denies outright all the dharmas gathered in by name-and-form); and false speech, divisive speech, and frivolous speech toward the name-bodies and the rest (what speech depends upon).

Why are the verbal paths of action attached to the name-bodies and not to sentient beings? The treatise itself states it briefly, and Puguang’s Record quotes the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine to fill out the reason, his text being “hence the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine says: ‘the three of false speech and the rest arise in the place of the name-bodies and the rest, since the entity of speech must arise in dependence upon names and the rest. Though speech also arises with sentient beings and the like for its ground, yet it arises in immediate dependence upon the name-bodies and the rest’” — though speech is indeed spoken toward men, what it immediately depends upon is the name-, phrase-, and syllable-bodies. This is Saṅghabhadra’s language in the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine, and does not issue from the Kośa itself.

Clearing a misreading: reading “the place depended upon” as “a location.” It is not a place in space; it is the object that is turned toward — a path of action must have a point where its object falls, and that point determines which kind of path of action it is.

Where it lands: read together with the item before it, the identity of a path of action is fully fixed: the object it faces fixes its kind, and the root of its completion fixes its constituting.

XIV. Dying Together and Dying First: The Support Has Become Other, and the Offense Has Nothing to Rest On

First ask: if the killer dies before the one killed, or if the two die at the same time, does he still incur the offense of the root path of action?

The treatise answers: he does not. And it raises a question against itself to force out this conclusion — is there a case in which the killer has set going the preparation for killing and has made the result full, and yet is not touched by the offense of killing? Answer: there is, namely dying together and dying first.

What is the reason? The treatise gives two layers. First: at the moment the killer dies, the life of the one killed still remains, and the offense has as yet nothing to rest on (the offense being completed only when the other’s life is cut off). The second layer matters more: it cannot be said that he obtains the offense after his own death, “because the support has become other” — the body upon which he relied when he set going the preparation for killing has already been cut off; and though there arises another body of the same commonality, that body never set going the preparation for killing, and to say that it completes the path of action of killing is in principle not to be allowed. Puguang’s Record explains this layer very plainly, his words being “for what reason do dying together and dying first not complete a path of action? ‘Because the sentient being killed’ down to ‘in principle not to be allowed’: the answer. Because the present life of the sentient being killed still remains, it is impossible to make the one who dies together with him or before him, the killer, complete the offense of killing, since the life of the sentient being killed is not yet cut off.”

Clearing a misreading: reading this item as “dying first gets one off.” What the treatise says is that the root path of action is not completed, not that there is no offense — the manifest and nonmanifest action set going at the preparatory stage does not thereby vanish. What this item is really saying is that the offense of a path of action must be attached to a support-body that actually exists.

Where it lands: this is the first place in the fascicle where “path of action” and “action” are viewed apart. A path of action is a list with strict conditions of constitution; when the conditions are wanting, the act has not vanished, it merely does not fall upon this list.

XV. Acting as One in an Army: One Kills and All Are Completed

First ask: a body of men band together into an army to kill an enemy, or set out in company to hunt, and only one of them lays hand to it; who obtains the path of action of killing?

The treatise answers without the least evasion: “within an army and the like, if any one man does the deed of killing, then, just as with the man who does it in person, all of them complete the path of action of killing” — the reason being “because they have consented together to one undertaking,” just as with teaching one another in turn for the sake of one undertaking, and so, one man killing, all the rest incur the offense.

The treatise moreover handles two borderline cases. First, one who has been forced by the power of others into the army: so long as he thereby also shares that mind, he likewise completes the offense of killing. Second, the one exception is the man who has vowed of himself — that not even to save his own life will he kill; such a man, though forced to be among them, has no mind of killing, and so has no offense. Puguang’s Record marks this passage as belonging, with the stanza before it, to the questions and answers the author raises for himself, his outline being “‘if a man has set going the preparation’ down to ‘because there is no root and the support has become other’: below, the fourth, analysis by question and answer. Within it, first that having killed it is not the root, second that another’s killing completes the path of action.”

Clearing a misreading: looking for room to soften this item — saying, for instance, that those who did not lay hand to it bear a lighter offense. The text of the treatise says nothing of the kind; it says “all complete it as does the one who does it.” This item must be read as it stands, and no discount may be taken on the author’s behalf. The one way out that the treatise does give is given very narrowly: not “I did not lay hand to it,” but “I have taken a vow, that I would die rather than kill, and at that moment I in fact had no mind of killing.”

Where it lands: this item is about how a shared action is constituted — not by the deed, but by that one thought of “consenting together to one undertaking.” In any collective action in which one is oneself involved, ask first: what is the undertaking I have consented to?

XVI. The Marks of Killing: Deliberate Volition, the Perception of Another, Not by Mistake

First ask: at what degree does it count as “killing”?

The treatise gives three conditions: “one must first set going the deliberate volition ‘I would kill,’ and with respect to another sentient being raise the perception of another sentient being, and set going the preparation for killing and kill not by mistake” — first there must be the deliberate volition to kill, second the perception of another sentient being with respect to another sentient being, third killing not by mistake (killing only the very one he meant to kill, and not killing another indiscriminately). The three conditions complete, it is the path of action of killing.

The treatise at once sets one case apart: “killing with hesitation also completes killing.” He harbored hesitation beforehand — is it a living thing or not? and granting it is, is it he or not? — and afterwards raised a settled resolve: be it he or not, I shall assuredly kill. Since the mind spares nothing, if he kills a sentient being the path of action is likewise completed. Puguang’s Record marks this as a text of setting apart, his words being “‘killing with hesitation’ down to ‘also completes the path of action’: setting apart a difference. This displays that killing with hesitation also completes killing.”

Clearing a misreading: supposing that “not by mistake” is a back door opened for killing by mistake. It is not an opening of a door but a fixing of the mark — an act of killing by mistake has not thereby become free of offense; it merely does not complete this item, “the path of action of killing.” This is the same principle as the item on dying together and dying first above: a list has the conditions of a list.

Where it lands: of the three conditions, the one most easily passed over is the second (the perception of another sentient being). What it reminds us of is that the constituting of a path of action turns not only on what you did, but on what at that time you took the other to be.

XVII. The Three Dharmas of Lifespan, Warmth, and Consciousness: The Boundary between the Life Faculty and Death

First ask: the five aggregates arise and cease thought by thought, ceasing of themselves already; what then does “killing” kill?

The treatise gives two explanations. The first: “the breath-wind is called life, and it turns in dependence upon body and mind; if a man makes it be cut off so that it no longer continues to arise” — like extinguishing the light of a lamp or the sound of a bell, and this is called killing. The second: “or else what is called life is just the life faculty; if a man makes it be cut off so that it does not continue, that is called killing.” Both explanations come home to one and the same criterion: with an evil mind one severs another’s life, so that even a thought-moment which ought to arise cannot arise, and this alone is touched by the offense of killing. Puguang’s Record in this passage only explains the grounds of the two explanations as the text runs, and sets up no separate outline name of question and answer or of recording divergent accounts — this is set down as it stands, and no judgment is made on his behalf as to whether the two explanations exclude each other or which is correct.

Then the treatise handles a still more troublesome question: to whom does this life that is cut off belong? Since one says “whose,” is there not then a self? The author pushes this question over to the chapter refuting the self for extended pondering, and here only quotes a sūtra to prove that life is a dharma — “when the three dharmas of lifespan, warmth, and consciousness leave the body, then the body that is left falls stiff to the ground, without thought and without sensation, like a log.” The text preceding this stanza reads “hence the stanza spoken by the Bhagavat,” so it is a quoted stanza from a sūtra and not a root stanza. From this the treatise draws one conclusion: a body endowed with faculties is called a living being, and one without faculties is called dead.

Here the Nirgrantha non-Buddhists come forward. They say “killing without deliberation also incurs the offense of killing,” and adduce the touching of fire as their analogy — even without deliberating beforehand one is burned all the same. The author refutes them with six objections in succession: then meeting another man’s wife and touching her body by mistake ought likewise to be an offense; pulling out hair and beard for a Nirgrantha out of a wholesome mind, a teacher urging austerities out of loving-kindness, food kept overnight by a donor failing to digest and causing suffering — all these ought to incur the offense of “causing another to suffer”; the child in the womb and the mother being causes of suffering to each other, the mother too ought to have an offense toward the child; the one killed being conjoined with the killing, he too, like fire that burns its own support, ought to bear it himself; if it were so, dispatching another to kill ought to carry no offense of killing, as fire does not burn the man who taught another to touch it; and timber and stones ought also to be touched by the offense, since houses too, in collapsing, harm life. The closing sentence is exceedingly firm — “and besides, it is not merely that your analogy fails: the position we ourselves set up can be established.” The two commentaries agree in the outline name for this passage, both marking it as “recording a non-Buddhist reckoning,” whence it appears that this passage is not a dispute internal to the schools, but the rejecting of a non-Buddhist account outside the Dharma.

Clearing a misreading: reading the Nirgrantha passage as another instance of “recording two accounts without adjudication.” It is not — here the author refutes expressly, and refutes to the end. The treatise’s not adjudicating is used only for divergent accounts within the Buddha’s Dharma; toward a non-Buddhist reckoning, the treatise refutes when refutation is due.

Where it lands: this passage gives a criterion: any claim that “one incurs an offense even without a mind for it” has for its price that goodwill, and unawareness, and even the course of nature itself must all alike be reckoned as offense. The author sets that price out at one stroke with six absurd consequences — this is the completest demonstration of counter-refutation in the fascicle.

XVIII. Taking What Is Not Given: By Force and by Stealth, Made to Belong to Oneself

First ask: at what degree does stealing complete a path of action?

The treatise answers: the “not by mistake” and the rest spoken of above run on into each of the gates that follow, as is fitting, and are not repeated; as regards this gate, one must first set going the deliberate volition to steal and raise with respect to another’s goods the perception of another’s goods — “with respect to another’s goods raise the perception of another’s goods, and by force or by stealth set going the preparation for stealing, and take not by mistake, making it belong to oneself” — and to this degree it is called the offense of taking what is not given.

The treatise then handles three special kinds of ownership. First, stealing the goods of a stūpa: “if a man steals the goods of a stūpa, he incurs the offense of stealing with respect to the Tathāgata,” because when the Buddha was about to enter nirvāṇa he took pity on the world and accepted in sum all that was given — while some other master says that the offense is incurred with respect to those who guard it. Second, digging up an ownerless hidden treasure: the offense is incurred on the side of the ruler of the country. Third, stealing goods that revert: if the karman has been performed, the offense is incurred with respect to the saṅgha within the boundary; if the karman is not yet completed, it is incurred with respect to the disciples of the Buddha at large.

Clearing a misreading: supposing that “ownerless goods” leave no place from which an offense can be incurred. The treatise’s manner of answering is worth noticing — it can always find a point of “belonging to someone”: the goods of a stūpa belong to the Buddha, a hidden treasure to the ruler of the country, goods that revert to the saṅgha or to the disciples of the Buddha. This is the same train of thought as the item on the places depended upon above: a path of action must have an object to which it is attached.

Where it lands: what this section reminds us of is that in judging a case of taking and seizing, three questions come first — whose is it, whose did I take it to be, and to whom did it belong after the taking. Walk through the three questions, and whether taking what is not given is completed becomes plain of itself.

XIX. Sexual Misconduct: Four Kinds of Going Where One Ought Not

First ask: where is the line of sexual misconduct drawn?

The treatise establishes it by four kinds of “going where one ought not” — “there are in all four kinds of going where one ought not to go, and all of them get the name of the offense of sexual misconduct”: first with respect to a forbidden object (a wife held by another, one’s mother, one’s father, a kinswoman of one’s parents, and so on to one guarded by the king), second by a forbidden way, third in a forbidden place (“the third is going where one ought not in a forbidden place, that is, within a monastery, in the place of a caitya, or in a remote place”), fourth at a forbidden time (the time of carrying a child, of nursing an infant, of undertaking the fast-day precepts, transgressed even with one’s own wife). Under the fourth the treatise records another account: only if the husband has allowed her to undertake the fast-day precepts and there is afterwards a transgression is it called a forbidden time.

The word “not by mistake” likewise runs on into this gate: if with respect to another’s wife one supposes her to be one’s own, or with respect to one’s own wife supposes her to be another’s, and so on with the way and what is not the way, then so long as there is a mistaken mind, though something be done it is no path of action. As to whether “raising with respect to this wife of another the perception of a different wife of another” completes a path of action, the treatise records two accounts: “one account says it does complete it” — since after all the preparation for fornication was raised and she was enjoyed; “another account says it does not complete it” — as with the path of action of killing, where the preparation is raised toward this one and the completion falls upon another, and it is not completed.

The treatise moreover answers two practical questions: in practicing what is not the pure life with a bhikṣuṇī, the path of action is incurred from the place of the king, because the king does not allow such a thing, and this is argued from the lighter to the heavier (even with one’s own wife at the time of the fast-day precepts one ought not to go, how much less with one who has gone forth); in practicing what is not the pure life with a maiden, if she has been promised to another it is incurred at the place of the one to whom she is promised, if not promised then at the place of those able to guard her, and these and the rest are all incurred at the place of the king.

Clearing a misreading: reading the four kinds of “going where one ought not” as four unrelated prohibitions. They are in fact four dimensions of one and the same criterion — object, way, place, and time; and where any one of the four is amiss, misconduct is constituted.

Where it lands: read together with the section on taking what is not given, this section shows the treatise’s consistent manner of handling conduct: first establish the object faced, then add the condition of mind that is “not by mistake,” and last fill in a few borderline cases. The three steps walked through, the outline of a precept is clear.

XX. False Speech: Defiled Mind, a Divergent Perception, Uttering, Understanding the Sense

First ask: at what degree does lying complete a path of action?

The treatise gives four conditions: “to raise a divergent perception with respect to the sense one speaks and to utter it, the one deceived understanding the sense spoken, with a defiled mind and not by mistake, completes false speech” — a divergent perception of the sense spoken, the uttering of it as speech, the other’s understanding, and a defiled mind not by mistake. Wanting any one of the four it is not completed: if the other does not understand the sense of the words, that stretch of speech falls to frivolous speech.

At what point is the path of action completed? The treatise answers with great precision: the manifest sound and the nonmanifest action arising together with the last word complete this path of action; or else, at whatever point the other understands the sense, the manifest and nonmanifest action of that time completes it; and what accompanies the several words before that is all the preparatory stage.

Here begins a fine dispute over “understanding the sense.” The treatise raises two objections against itself: is the understanding of the sense taken with respect to “having finished hearing and rightly understanding,” or with respect to “being in the act of hearing and being able to understand”? On the former, the sense conveyed by the utterance is what mental consciousness knows, whereas verbal manifest action has already passed away together with auditory consciousness, and so the path of action ought to be completed by the nonmanifest alone; on the latter, though this fault is absent, yet at that time there is not yet any knowing, so how can being in the act of hearing be called being able to understand? The author takes the latter as his tenet, his closing words being “since thus there is no fault, this account should be taken as the tenet” — for one who well knows the sense of words and has no condition of confusion, auditory consciousness having arisen is called being able to understand. The two commentaries agree here, both marking the author as the one who makes this choice: Puguang’s Record gives “how is this to be settled? If there is auditory consciousness with no condition of confusion, then the understanding is taken with respect to being in the act of hearing and being able to understand … it being thus unsettled, the author therefore says: since thus there is no fault, this account should be taken as the tenet”; Fabao’s Commentary gives “‘there being no fault, it should be taken as the tenet’: the author adjudges, taking being in the act of hearing and being able to understand as completing the path of action.”

Clearing a misreading: supposing that “understanding the sense” is the hearer’s responsibility and has nothing to do with the speaker. Just the contrary — that the completion of the path of action must wait upon the other’s understanding shows precisely that the offense of lying lies not in the moving of the mouth but in “making a man take the false thing in.”

Where it lands: after this section the treatise goes on to quote a sūtra listing the sixteen kinds of utterance (saying “seen” and the rest of what is not seen and the rest, and saying “not seen” and the rest of what is seen and the rest, eight of each being ignoble and noble utterances), and thereby brings on the question of the next section, the marks of “what is seen” and the rest — the fine division of the verbal paths of action here turns onto the ground of the theory of knowledge.

XXI. Seen, Heard, Sensed, Known: The Marks of the Four Bases of Speech

First ask: what are the marks of what is called “what is seen, what is heard, what is sensed, and what is known”?

The account of the Vaibhāṣika masters comes first: “if an object is attested by eye consciousness it is called what is seen,” what is attested by ear consciousness is called what is heard, what is attested by mental consciousness is called what is known, and what is attested by the three consciousnesses of nose, tongue, and body is together called what is sensed. Why are the latter three consciousnesses gathered under one name? Because the three of scent, taste, and touch are of indeterminate nature and, like a dead man, have no sensing, and so the name “sensing” is established in particular on the side of what attests them. Puguang’s Record quotes the Mahāvibhāṣā to fill out the reason, his words being “‘down to the name sensing is established in particular’: a separate explanation of why the three objects are alike named what is sensed. That the three objects are alike named what is sensed is because these three objects are alike indeterminate, their nature dull and obscure, like a dead man who has no sensing or knowing, and so the name sensing is established in particular for the faculties that attest them.”

The Vaibhāṣika masters adduce besides the two proofs of scripture and principle, the proof from scripture being the Buddha’s instruction to the Great Mother — “herein, with respect to what is seen you should know that there is only what is seen” — where the three objects of form, sound, and dharma are spoken of as what is seen, what is heard, and what is known, so that by parity of reasoning the three objects of scent and the rest may be gathered under the single name “what is sensed.”

The author refutes this proof: “this proof does not hold; let it be said first that the sūtra is no proof, for the sense of the sūtra lies elsewhere” — this sūtra is not spoken in order to adjudicate the marks of the four bases of speech, and the sense it speaks is to urge the Great Mother that with respect to the six objects and the four matters beginning with what is seen she “should know that there is only the speech of what is seen and the rest, and should not add on the marks of the lovely and the unlovely.”

Thereupon two further accounts are set out. Some other master says: what is attested by direct perception through the five faculties is called what is seen, what is obtained from the report of another is called what is heard, what is allowed by applying one’s own mind and inferring by all manner of reasoning is called what is sensed, and what is directly attested by mind is called what is known; thus with respect to the five objects all four kinds of speech may be set going in each case, and with respect to the sixth object there are three apart from seeing. The earlier preceptors say: what the eye directly sees is called what is seen, what is heard from the report of another is called what is heard, “whatever one’s own mind constructs by thought of every kind is called what is sensed,” and what is received within oneself and attested by oneself is called what is known. At the end the author closes with a single sentence: let the incidental discussion rest, and let the proper discussion be set forth.

Clearing a misreading: reading this passage as a digression from the subject. It is not a digression — the section before it has already said that false speech requires one “to raise a divergent perception with respect to the sense one speaks”; and so what “the sense spoken” refers to must first have the boundaries of seen, heard, sensed, and known drawn clearly, since the whole discrimination of the sixteen noble and ignoble utterances hangs upon it.

At the close the treatise quotes a further set of questions and answers: is there a case of completing false speech by bodily manifest action without uttering speech? There is — the root treatise says: he who is touched by the offense of killing without moving the body is one who utters speech; he who is touched by the offense of false speech without uttering speech is one who moves the body; and those touched by both offenses while neither moving the body nor uttering speech are the seer in a fit of mental wrath and one at the time of the poṣadha. Thereupon the author raises a difficulty against himself: if there is neither movement of body nor utterance of speech, and the desire realm has no nonmanifest that “arises apart from the manifest,” how do these two come to be paths of action? The author leaves it undecided, saying only “upon a difficulty such as this one should expend some labor.” (For the debate within the Abhidharma lineage that this difficulty gave rise to, see the section of Further Resonances at the end.)

Where it lands: this section demonstrates the author’s way of handling a question of knowledge — first record one party’s account, then point out that its scriptural proof is insufficient, then record two further parties, without hastening to set up a tenet of his own. What the reader is to learn is that power of discrimination in “the sūtra is no proof, for the sense of the sūtra lies elsewhere”: what a passage of scripture can prove depends on what it was spoken for in the first place.

XXII. Divisive · Harsh · Frivolous: The Three Verbal Paths of Action

First ask: how many conditions does each of the remaining three verbal paths of action require?

Divisive speech: “if with a defiled mind one sets going an utterance that would break another, then whether or not the other is in fact broken, divisive speech is completed in either case” — so long as there are the defiled mind, the setting going of an utterance that would break another, the other’s understanding of the sense, and the absence of mistake, the four conditions complete, it is constituted; whether the other was in fact divided does not affect the completing of the path of action. Puguang’s Record lists these four conditions most clearly, his words being “‘the treatise says’ down to ‘runs on into this’: explaining the first two lines, showing that divisive speech requires four kinds of condition before the path of action is completed: first a defiled mind; second the setting going of an utterance that would break another, and whether the other is broken or not, at the very moment of his understanding divisive speech is completed.”

Harsh speech: “if with a defiled mind one sets going an unlovely utterance abusing another, that is called harsh speech” — the word “defiled mind” above runs on into this, and understanding the sense and the absence of mistake are likewise as above; the path of action is completed only when the very man he intended in his mind to abuse understands the sense spoken.

Frivolous speech: “all utterances set going by a defiled mind are called frivolous speech,” because all speech set going by a defiled mind is frivolous; only the word “utterance” above runs on into this, and the remaining conditions need not be complete. Below this the treatise records another account: only what is other than the former three utterances, all speech set going by a defiled mind, is called frivolous speech, namely flattery, singing, false treatises, and the like — flattery as when a bhikṣu harbors a wrong livelihood in his heart and sets going fawning words, singing as when men chant and sing in mutual dalliance with a defiled mind and as when performers make songs to please the feelings of others, a false treatise as the extended argument of words held by incorrect views; while the word “and the like” gathers in lamentations set going by a defiled mind and the words of worldly frivolity.

The treatise moreover resolves one practical doubt: at the time when a wheel-turning monarch appears in the world there is singing too, so how is it not frivolous speech? Answer: those utterances are set going from a mind of renunciation and can draw forth renunciation, and are not a mind defiled beforehand. Below this it records a further account: at that time there are also defiled utterances set going in accomplishing marriages and the like, only their fault is slight and so they do not complete a path of action.

Clearing a misreading: reading “whether or not the other is broken, it is completed in either case” as inhumane. It is in fact of a piece with the items before it — the completing of a path of action is attached to the mind of the one who sets it going and the understanding of the one who receives it, and not to whether the consequence is realized. Read together with harsh speech’s requirement that “the man abused must understand,” the boundary is quite clear: there must be a determinate hearer, and he must in fact have taken the sense.

Where it lands: of the three of speech, frivolous speech has the lowest threshold — it is enough that it be set going by a defiled mind. This item comes down most concretely into daily life: without lying, without dividing, without abusing, so long as that one sentence came out of a defiled mind, it is already on this list.

XXIII. Greed · Hatred · Wrong View: The Three Mental Paths of Action

First ask: what are the marks of each of the three mental paths of action?

Greed: “evil desire toward another’s goods is called greed” — to raise desire contrary to reason toward another’s wealth, thinking how that thing may come to belong to me and not to him, and raising a mind of seizing openly and taking in secret and so hankering after another’s goods. Below this the treatise records two accounts: one account says that all craving of the desire realm is the path of action of greed, and quotes in proof the Sūtra of the Five Hindrances, where with respect to the hindrance of sensual desire the Buddha said that this greed for the world should be cut off; and another account says that though the craving of the desire realm may all be called greed, it may not be said that they all complete a path of action, since the path of action of greed gathers in only the coarse portion within evil conduct — otherwise the sensual greed set going in the age of a wheel-turning monarch and by the men of Uttarakuru would have to be reckoned the path of action of greed as well.

Hatred: “to raise hostility toward the class of sentient beings is called hatred” — to wish to do harm to another sentient being.

Wrong view: “to deny outright with an evil view, with respect to the wholesome and the evil and the rest, this view is called the path of action of wrong view.” The treatise quotes a sūtra listing what it denies — there is no giving, no delighting, no sacrifice, no good conduct, no evil conduct, no result and maturation drawn by the action of good conduct and evil conduct, no this world and no other world, no mother and no father, no sentient beings born by transformation, and in the world no śramaṇa or brahmin who is an arhat. Then the treatise closes with one sentence of its own: “that sūtra displays in full the three classes of wrong view, slandering action, slandering results, and slandering the noble ones; the present stanza raises only the first item and by the one word ‘and the rest’ gathers in the rest.” Puguang’s Record quotes the Mahāvibhāṣā to adjudge these eleven clauses one by one into the three classes — there is no giving, no delighting, no sacrifice, and no good conduct and no evil conduct are slandering the cause; no result and maturation of action is slandering the result; no this world and no other world, no mother and no father, and no sentient beings born by transformation extend to both slandering the cause and slandering the result; and the last clause is slandering the noble ones.

Clearing a misreading: reading wrong view as “a difference of opinion.” The wrong view the treatise speaks of has a very hard shape: it is denial outright — declaring the cause, the result, and the noble ones alike to be nonexistent. Puguang’s Record quotes the Mahāvibhāṣā to explain why the non-Buddhists deny even what is plainly seen, his words being “hence the Mahāvibhāṣā explains: ‘question: that the other world is not plainly seen, and so to say it is not may pass. But this world is plainly seen; why say that it is not? Answer: those non-Buddhists are blinded by ignorance and deny even what is plainly seen. One should not call the ignorant to account, since the blind fall into pits.’”

Where it lands: the ten paths of action are here wound up. The reason the three mental paths of action are placed last is that they are the root as soon as they are present, with no preparatory or consequent stage to be divided off — the long road of raising the thought, laying hand to it, bringing it off, and trailing away, which the nine before them walk, contracts here into a single thought. The weightiest precept in the fascicle turns out to be the shortest.

Further Resonances: The Mirror of the Three Commentaries

The foregoing is the sense of the treatise’s own text in this unit. Below, a separate section gathers four matters: the adjudications of the three commentaries and where they diverge, Saṅghabhadra’s refutations and supplements, the divergences of Paramārtha’s earlier translation, and coordinates for parallel reading. A mirror is not the treatise; it is only another way of reading the same text. Both parties are recorded and neither adjudicated, each left in its own place.

1. Where the Three Commentaries Diverge

One commentary wholly absent. Shentai’s Commentary is a fragmentary text, its seven surviving fascicles belonging to the Chapter on the Elements, the Chapter on the Faculties, and the Chapter on the Worthy and the Noble; the Chapter on Action is wholly wanting, and so this unit has no running exposition of Shentai’s to hang upon. The lack is marked as it stands, and text from his other fascicles is not made to serve in its place.

One and the same passage: should it be called “question and answer” or “objection and answer.” For the round of exchange at “is not the result of evil action,” Puguang’s Record marks question and answer, while Fabao’s Commentary marks “an objection” and “an answer.” The outline names diverge while the division is entirely the same; both are recorded without adjudication.

Wholesome dharmas obtaining release from bondage: “cutting off as object” or “cutting off the bond of the object.” Puguang’s Record and Fabao’s Commentary use cutting off as object, while Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary sets out the further name “cutting off the bond of the object” and explains it for himself. The same sense under two names; recorded without adjudication.

Who exactly are the masters of similes. Puguang’s Record marks them expressly as Sautrāntikas, his text being “‘the masters of similes say’ down to ‘as mental action’: the Sautrāntikas, the masters of similes, say that the three of greed and the rest are just mental volition and have no entity apart from volition”; Fabao’s Commentary on the same passage gives merely “recording a divergent account,” without marking the school. Whether the school is expressly marked is where the two commentaries diverge, and this is recorded without adjudication.

The two accounts of the “forbidden time” in sexual misconduct: ought a judgment to be passed. Puguang’s Record judges outright, “the latter account is the better, since it is gathered in under mistake”; Fabao’s Commentary on the same passage says expressly, “‘the husband’ down to ‘is then called a forbidden time’: recording a divergent account. There is no text of judgment.” One judges, the other says expressly that there is no judgment. The treatise itself only records the two accounts without adjudicating, and Puguang’s judgment is the view of one commentator.

The two accounts of the path of action of greed: again one judges and one does not. Puguang’s Record judges, “of the two accounts the latter master is correct, since the greed abandoned by seeing does not take goods as its object”; Fabao’s Commentary explains as the text runs and passes no separate judgment. Where the two commentaries differ is precisely on the point whether an ancient master may pass judgment on the author’s behalf. Recorded without adjudication.

Are the earlier preceptors Sautrāntikas. Fabao’s Commentary attaches this account too to the Sautrāntikas, his words being “‘called what is known’: the author records the sense of the Sautrāntika masters”; Puguang’s Record explains only the derivation of the name — “those who study the Yogācārabhūmi are called the earlier preceptors” — without expressly attaching a school. The three commentaries are not of one mind here; recorded without adjudication.

The one item on which all three agree. For the “some other master says” of the passage on seen, heard, sensed, and known, Puguang’s Record, Fabao’s Commentary, and Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary all adjudge Sautrāntika — Puguang giving “the Sautrāntikas answer,” Fabao “this quotes the explanation of the Sautrāntika other master,” and Yuanhui “on the tenet of the Sautrāntikas.” This is the most firmly settled attribution in the unit.

From what place the offense of stealing goods that revert is incurred. The treatise records only the one account “some other master says: with respect to those who guard it,” without adjudicating; Puguang’s Record quotes the choice made by the adjudicators of the Mahāvibhāṣā, his text being “the thirteenth adjudges the former master of this treatise to be correct, and hence that treatise says: ‘some say it is also incurred at the place of the ruler of the country, some say at the place of the donor, some say at the place of those who guard it, some say at the place of the gods, nāgas, and yakṣas who are able to protect it.’” This is a judgment of the adjudicators of the Mahāvibhāṣā, and not a settled judgment of the Kośa.

Toward whom the offense is incurred with a bhikṣuṇī and with a maiden. The treatise’s original sentence is extremely brief, and Puguang’s Record supplies two explanations — the first that the offense is incurred from the king, the second that by arguing from the lighter to the heavier any encroachment at all completes the path of action. These two explanations are Puguang’s supplement, and the treatise does not itself set out two accounts by name.

Whether divisive speech requires that “the other be in fact broken.” Puguang’s Record quotes from the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle one party’s “some other master says: it is completed only when the other is broken,” and judges “the former account is the better” — the reason being that a noble one is deeply firm and hard to break, so that if the other’s being broken were required, divisive speech that would break a noble one would carry no offense, whereas in fact one who breaks a noble one incurs a deeper offense. This is Puguang’s own choice, and not the express text of the treatise.

2. Saṅghabhadra’s Refutations and Supplementary Explanations

Saṅghabhadra’s two treatises name this chapter not “Analysis of Action” but “Making Out Action” (the fourth in the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle, the fifth in the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine). The opening and closing boundaries of the two treatises are the same as this unit’s, both beginning at “again the sūtra says that action is of four kinds, that is, there is action that is black and has a black maturation” and closing at “thus the marks of the ten paths of action have been made out. By what sense” — four texts transmitted independently, and their outline boundaries in agreement.

Who exactly utters the sentence “to grant that an affliction is just mental action.” The treatise’s sentence reads “if that were so, then action and affliction would be combined into one entity. To grant that an affliction is just mental action — what fault is there in this?” Puguang reads it as the author’s relaying, on behalf of the masters of similes (the Sautrāntikas), of a supposition, and so marks “‘to grant that an affliction’ down to ‘what fault is there in this’: the masters of similes answer.” Saṅghabhadra reads it outright as the author’s own granting, and so his refutation points straight at the Sūtra-master — “the Sūtra-master says: to grant that an affliction is just mental action, what fault is there in this? What is thus granted is at odds with the sūtra above and with correct principle below; is this not a great fault?” — and he adduces the two proofs of the āgama and of correct principle, and comes home at last to the name of evil conduct. One and the same sentence, and the commentarial tradition and the tradition of debate within the lineage read it in opposite ways; both parties are recorded and neither adjudicated.

The passage on seen, heard, sensed, and known is where the debate within the lineage runs longest in this unit. The author refutes the Vaibhāṣika masters’ scriptural proof with “this proof does not hold; let it be said first that the sūtra is no proof, for the sense of the sūtra lies elsewhere”; Saṅghabhadra cites him thus: “the Sūtra-master dismisses it, saying: this does not constitute a proof, for the sense of the sūtra lies elsewhere, and in this sūtra the Buddha does not mean to adjudicate the marks of the four things spoken of,” and quotes the stanza in which the Great Mother received the Buddha’s instruction, to show that the Vaibhāṣika masters’ explanation does have scriptural proof; then he refutes head-on — “so when the Sūtra-master says that the sense of the sūtra lies elsewhere, it is truly as he says, for the sense of the sūtra being elsewhere, the Sūtra-master analyzes it otherwise there” — and goes on to four objections, closing with “now I say that the Sūtra-master harbors a warped attachment in his heart, turning his back on this correct tenet and taking the part of that false account.” The vehemence of the wording is the greatest in the unit. Both parties are recorded and neither is adjudged to prevail.

At the difficulty of “one should expend some labor,” Saṅghabhadra answers on the treatise’s behalf. The treatise leaves undecided the difficulty of “how, without moving the body or uttering speech, a path of action is completed”; Saṅghabhadra, after citing this difficulty, sets up an explanation of his own, which Puguang’s Record relays as “yet for those who obtained the fruit, the five bhikṣus and the rest, at the time of the preparatory stage there must have been manifest action, continuing on until they obtained the fruit and entered the path, and it is in dependence upon this manifest action that individual liberation is set going” — holding that at the preparatory stage there must be manifest action continuing on. Where the Kośa leaves a blank, Saṅghabhadra fills it in; to fill in and not to fill in are each a form of its own.

The Treatise Revealing the Doctrine takes no part at all in the debate in this passage. Checked word for word by a fault-tolerant method, the term “Sūtra-master” has zero occurrences in the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine within the range of this unit — it only states the tenets straightforwardly and mounts no extended refutation. This is a divergence of form between the two treatises, honestly recorded, with no conjecture as to its cause.

Saṅghabhadra’s words too have been drawn in by Puguang to supplement the Kośa. In the passage on the four places upon which the paths of action depend, the treatise speaks briefly, and Puguang quotes the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine to fill out the reason, “since the entity of speech must arise in dependence upon names and the rest.” This is supplementing what the Kośa leaves undetailed by means of a treatise of debate, and is not a counter-refutation.

3. The Divergences of Paramārtha’s Earlier Translation

Paramārtha’s Expository Treatise on the Treasury of Abhidharma, in the passage corresponding to this unit, forms a system of its own, its manner being “the verse says / the explanation says,” embedding the explanation line by line, one stanza often being broken up and quoted in several places; whereas Xuanzang gives “the stanza says / the treatise says,” setting out the whole stanza first and the prose after. The two also divide their fascicles differently — Paramārtha’s Chapter on Action is in four fascicles and Xuanzang’s in six, and the passage this unit corresponds to falls entirely within one of Paramārtha’s fascicles. Comparison across the two texts can be made only by the structure of the scene; to search Paramārtha’s text with Xuanzang’s words is for the most part never to find anything at all.

A difference of opening out and drawing together. Xuanzang’s stanza of six lines states in one breath the four actions and the volition without outflows that can exhaust them; Paramārtha’s verse gives only the two lines “the differences of black and white and the rest, action is again said to be of four kinds,” the details of the four actions being wholly filled out by the explanation line by line.

One and the same scriptural proof, attached to different subjects. The scriptural proof underlying the sentence “wholesome action of the desire realm is called black-and-white” is given by Xuanzang outright as the treatise’s own statement, while Paramārtha attaches it to “some other master says.” Recorded without adjudication.

Whether the name of the sūtra is given. The sūtra quoted by the masters of similes in stating their tenet is expressly the Sūtra on Volition in Xuanzang, while Paramārtha gives merely “the sūtra says” without naming it; checked by a fault-tolerant method through the whole of Paramārtha’s Chapter on Action, the name Sūtra on Volition has zero occurrences — this is no failure of the search, but Paramārtha’s own not naming the sūtra. Conversely, the Sūtra of the Five Hindrances is named in both. Whence it appears that the fullness or brevity of scriptural proof is no general leaning of either, but differs item by item.

The rendering-names form a system of their own. Muni is given as Mouna, false speech as lying, taking what is not given as stealing, sexual misconduct as fornication, divisive speech as breaking speech, harsh speech as evil speech, frivolous speech as unfitting speech, stūpa as soudoupo, Bolasi as the people of the country of Boshi, and “spoken with a hidden intent” as “spoken in a sense not fully drawn out.” Among these the one place where the two methods of rendering part most visibly is the life faculty: Xuanzang takes the sense and gives “breath-wind,” while Paramārtha takes the sound and gives prāṇa and then glosses its sense, “it has wind for its sense.” It may be added that Paramārtha’s own usage is not consistent either — for one and the same divisive speech, the stanza-explanation passage gives breaking speech while the running text of an earlier passage gives double-tongued speech; this is recorded as it stands, with no conjecture as to which is correct.

Fullness and brevity run both ways. In the passage on killing as one in an army, Paramārtha has two further classes, digging pits and robbery in bands, and is fuller than Xuanzang; while for the sūtra text of what wrong view denies, Xuanzang translates all eleven clauses and Paramārtha abridges to six — the fullness and brevity are exchanged. Fullness and brevity vary by passage and have no fixed direction.

Quoted stanzas are the most freely rendered. The non-Buddhist stanza of exemptions Xuanzang gives as “if a man, by reason of jest, marriage, facing a woman or a king, and for the sake of saving life or saving goods, speaks false speech, that is without offense,” while Paramārtha gives “jest and women, taking a wife and saving life, and for saving goods one lies; the Brahmā king says it does no harm” — the order of the lines and the wording are wholly unlike, while the sense of the four exemptions opened is the same. It is the same with the stanza of lifespan, warmth, and consciousness: Xuanzang’s “falls stiff” answers to Paramārtha’s “sleeps forever,” and Xuanzang’s “lifespan” to Paramārtha’s “life faculty.” Both are recorded without adjudication.

4. Coordinates for Parallel Reading

What this unit establishes is a structural table of “how an act comes to be an offense”: the three stages (preparatory, root, consequent), the three roots, the completion, the place depended upon, together with the one condition of mind that is “not by mistake.” When the same set of questions comes to the Yogācāra lineage, the way of opening them out is partly the same and partly different.

For the marks of killing this unit takes the three conditions of deliberate volition, the perception of another, and not by mistake; the root treatise of the Yogācāra lineage, on the same dharma, gives desire and delight, a defiled mind, the means, and the completion — the two limbs of the preparatory stage (the means) and the completion are used by both systems, while the Kośa sets out the further limb “the perception of another, not by mistake” and that system the further limb “desire and delight.” The item of sexual misconduct is closer still: that system too takes what is not the way, what is not the place, and what is not the time for its items, answering word for word to the last three of this unit’s four.

The place of greatest divergence is the entity of manifest action. This unit analyzes the manifest and the nonmanifest of the seven evil paths of action one by one, and grants both the manifest and the nonmanifest to be real as form; the root treatise of the Yogācāra lineage, after dividing manifest action into three, closes with the statement that all manifest action is merely conventional. Upon one and the same set of numbered dharmas the two systems adjudge the reality or conventionality of its entity in exactly opposite ways — and this is the place in this unit that most invites parallel reading. The numbers are the same while the doctrinal frames they hang upon differ; the two may be looked at side by side, with neither adjudged to prevail.

For the set of numbered dharmas that is the ten paths of action, that system sets up instead the eight gates of harm and the eight gates of benefit to gather them in — the set of dharmas being the same while the gates opened differ; this too may be looked at side by side.

考據Apparatus

業品前三子明業之體、明表無表與三種律儀；此子轉入『經中所說之諸業』一章之後半。自「又經中說，業有四種」一問起，先立黑黑·白白·黑白·非黑非白四業，次辨能盡諸業之無漏思，次錄地獄受與見所斷二師異說，次明三牟尼三清淨與三惡行三妙行，末以「又經中言：有十業道」開十業道一章——業道之攝、表無表之分、加行根本後起三位、三根之起與究竟、所依四處，以至殺盜婬妄離間麁惡雜穢與貪瞋邪見逐一辨其成不成之相。一部毘曇之『業道篇』自此開卷。

一、科判定位

科判系統	此段之位
玄奘 T1558 九品	分別業品第四（品題〔T29 0067b06〕）之第四分——本子（子4）＝卷十六全〔0083b13–0088b22〕。本頌正六十後半至正七十九前半，`<lg>` 塊二十三（本頌二十一＋引頌二）
承前之錨	卷十五末段釋三曲穢濁業訖，其收句作「若依貪生身語意業名為濁業，貪濁類故」〔T29 0083b08〕；本子逕以「又經中說」遞起經中所說之第四類業，與前三處同式
三家品級大科（三分／四分之異）	光記〔T41n1821 0200b09〕「就此品中，一明業體性、二釋經諸業、三雜明諸業」·頌疏〔T41n1823 0889b07〕「釋此品頌總作三門：一明業體性、二釋諸業名、三雜明諸業」·寶疏〔T41n1822 0627a17〕「此品大文分四：一明業體、二明律儀等、三明經中諸業、四雜明諸業」 ⇒ 光記頌疏三分·寶疏四分，唯錄不判
本子首科（三家同標其名·序數二式）	光記〔T41n1821 0250c06〕「此下第七明黑黑等。就中，一明四業名體、二明無漏斷別、三敘異說不同」·頌疏〔T41n1823 0906a16〕「從此第七，明黑黑等，就中：一明四業、二明無漏斷、三明異說」·寶疏〔T41n1822 0662a11〕「自此已下有四頌半，第八明經中黑黑等四業」 ⇒ 三分之義三家全合（四業名體·無漏斷別·敘異說），而科名字面三家互異（逐字見本欄上引：光記作四業名體·無漏斷別·敘異說不同，頌疏作四業·無漏斷·異說，寶疏作業體·斷異·述異說），唯序數光記頌疏作第七·寶疏作第八
十業道章之始（三家同標·六子目全同）	底本作「又經中言：有十業道，或善或惡」〔T29 0084b13〕——光記〔T41n1821 0252c27〕「此下第十明十業道。就中，一明業道體性、二釋業道名義、三義便明斷善、四明業道俱轉、五約處成業道、六明業道三果」·頌疏〔T41n1823 0907b03〕「從此第十，明十業道」·寶疏〔T41n1822 0663c03〕「論『又經中說有十業道』，已下一頌，第十一明十業道也」。寶疏牒論作「說」而底本作「言」，誌錄不判
三疏分卷與玄奘分卷全同	光記卷十六〔T41n1821 0250c02〕（品續題「分別業品第四之四」〔T41n1821 0250c05〕）·寶疏卷十六〔T41n1822 0662a07〕（品續題「分別業品第四之四」〔T41n1822 0662a10〕）·頌疏論本第十六〔T41n1823 0906a14〕（無別立品題行，卷首逕入正文）⇒ 三家獨立分卷而界與玄奘逐一相合，此為本子 carve 之獨立 witness
收卷句	「彼經具顯謗業謗果謗聖邪見，此頌舉初等言攝後」〔T29 0088b17〕——邪見業道釋畢之總收，其後即卷十六卷尾題
次子之承轉（不屬本子）	「如是已辯十業道相。依何義名業道」〔T29 0088b28〕

開卷承轉句〔T29 0083b18〕：「又經中說，業有四種，謂或有業黑黑異熟、或復有業白白異熟、或復有業黑白黑白異熟、或復有業非黑非白無異熟能盡諸業。其相云何？」

頌／長行體例：本頌（T1560 單行本定頌界·業品品題夾注作一百三十一頌）＋長行自釋。本子二十三塊之中，本頌二十一塊——〔0083b22〕正六十後半·正六十一（三十字）·〔0083c16〕正六十二·正六十三（四十字）·〔0084a03〕正六十四·〔0084a14〕正六十五·〔0084a28〕正六十六·〔0084b15〕正六十七·〔0084c03〕正六十八·〔0084c16〕正六十九一至三句（十五字）·〔0085b14〕正六十九第四句·正七十前半（十五字）·〔0086a03〕正七十後半（十字）·〔0086a17〕正七十一·正七十二前半（三十字）·〔0086a28〕正七十二後半·〔0086b06〕正七十三前半·〔0086b19〕正七十三後半·〔0086b29〕正七十四前半·〔0086c29〕正七十四後半·〔0087a12〕正七十五前半·〔0087b04〕正七十五後半·〔0087b24〕正七十六·〔0088a08〕正七十七·正七十八前半（三十字）·〔0088b02〕正七十八後半·正七十九前半。

引頌二塊·皆有前文之徵：〔0085c22〕「若人因戲笑」一頌，前文作「然虛誑語所有加行從癡生者，如外論言」〔T29 0085c20〕——外道論之頌，非佛說亦非論主自造；〔0086c15〕「壽煖及與識」一頌，前文作「故薄伽梵所說頌言」〔T29 0086c13〕。二塊 T1560 皆不收。

二端皆拆半跨子：正六十為玄奘分卷所斷——前半（說曲穢濁業）在子3、後半起於本子；正七十九為卷十六與卷十七之界所斷——前半訖於本子、後半屬子5。判準繫底本牒釋塊是否被切開，二側之牒釋塊各自完整，故不作降案之由；跨子之半頌以前半後半誠實顯記於二子。

長行之最大一段〔0084c16〕正六十九一至三句之釋：八百五十八純漢字，內含「如何」二見·「若爾」二見·「云何」一見。加行根本後起三位之立、屠羊者喻、業道成於死有抑死後之兩難、以十業道為殺加行與殺後起之互為——皆在此一段內。

本子之並錄不判五處（唯錄二造·不判勝負）：①正六十四之二師說（順地獄受名純黑／欲見所斷名純黑）②正七十六見聞覺知四言依之三說（毘婆沙師·有餘師·先軌範師）③欲邪行境想誤（「若於此他婦作餘他婦想」〔T29 0087a23〕）之「有說亦成」〔T29 0087a24〕與「有說不成」〔T29 0087a25〕④雜穢語之「有餘師說」異解〔T29 0088a17〕⑤貪業道之「有餘師言」與「有說」〔T29 0088b06〕。

本子之明判三處（非並錄不判）：①譬喻者立「貪瞋邪見即是意業」，論錄「毘婆沙師說彼非理」〔T29 0084b06〕而列其三由——此判之主為毘婆沙師，非論主自身；②虛誑語「解義」之二讀，論主取後者，其結語作「如無失者應取為宗」〔T29 0087b17〕；③離繫者「不思而殺亦得殺罪」之計，論主連下六難而結之曰「又非但喻，立義可成」〔T29 0086c27〕。另毘婆沙師之見聞覺知釋，論主下一破語「此證不成，且經非證，經義別故」〔T29 0087c14〕，而後別引二家之說——所破者為經證之力，非逕立己宗。

二、術語（名相）

漢（玄奘）	真諦異名（首出 loc）	本論定義句／所繫
黑黑業	黑業黑果報〔T29n1559 0239b23〕	「諸不善業一向名黑，染污性故，異熟亦黑，不可意故」〔0083b26〕
白白業	白業白果報〔T29n1559 0239b23〕	「色界善業一向名白，不雜惡故，異熟亦白，是可意故」〔0083b27〕
黑白業	黑白業黑白果報〔T29n1559 0239b23〕	「欲界善業名為黑白，惡所雜故，異熟亦黑白，非愛果雜故」〔0083c02〕·「此黑白名依相續立，非據自性」〔0083c03〕
非黑非白業	不黑不白業〔T29n1559 0239b23〕	「諸無漏業能永斷盡前三業者名為非黑，不染污故，亦名非白，以不能招白異熟故」〔0083c08〕
密意說	「不了義說」〔T29n1559 0239c13〕	「此非白言是密意說」〔0083c10〕之所繫——以《大空經》為證
牟尼	「牟那」〔T29n1559 0240a11〕	「勝義牟尼唯心為體」〔0084a17〕·「由遠離義建立牟尼」〔0084a19〕
三清淨	三種清淨（同系）	「暫永遠離一切惡行煩惱垢故名為清淨」〔0084a23〕
三惡行·三妙行	三惡行·三善行（同系）	「一切不善身語意業，如次名身語意惡行」〔0084b01〕·「三妙行者，翻此應知」〔0084b10〕
業道	業道（同）	「於前所說惡妙行中，若麁顯易知，攝為十業道」〔0084b17〕
表·無表	有教·無教（諦本體例語）	「七惡業道中，六定有無表」〔0084c05〕
加行	加行（同）	「業道加行必定有表，此位無表或有或無」〔0084c18〕·「如是皆名殺生加行」〔0084c27〕
根本業道	根本業道（同系）	「此剎那頃表無表業，是謂殺生根本業道」〔0084c28〕·「由二緣故，令諸有情根本業道殺罪所觸：一由加行、二由果滿」〔0084c29〕
後起	後起（同系）	「此剎那後殺無表業隨轉不絕，名殺後起」〔0085a01〕
三不善根	三不善根（同系）	「不善業道加行生時，一一由三不善根起」〔0085b16〕
究竟	究竟（同系）	「惡業道中殺生、麁語、瞋恚業道，由瞋究竟」〔0086a20〕
業道所依四處	——（諦本此段從略式）	「謂殺等三有情處起，偷盜等三眾具處起，唯邪見一名色處起，虛誑語等三名身等處起」〔0086b01〕
殺生	殺生（同）	「要由先發欲殺故思，於他有情他有情想，作殺加行不誤而殺」〔0086c01〕·「有猶豫殺亦成殺生」〔0086c03〕
息風（意譯）	「波羅那」（音譯·訓「以風為義」〔T29n1559 0242a16〕）	「息風名生，依身心轉，若有令斷不更續生」〔0086c07〕·「或復生者即是命根，若有令斷不續名殺」〔0086c09〕
不與取	「偷盜」〔T29n1559 0242b05〕	「於他物中起他物想，或力或竊起盜加行，不誤而取令屬己身」〔0087a02〕
窣堵波	「藪抖波」〔T29n1559 0242b08〕	「若有盜取窣堵波物，彼於如來得偷盜罪」〔0087a04〕
欲邪行	「邪婬」〔T29n1559 0241b09〕	「總有四種行不應行，皆得名為欲邪行罪」〔0087a13〕
虛誑語	「妄語」〔T29n1559 0241b15〕	「於所說義異想發言，及所誑者解所說義，染心不誤成虛誑語」〔0087b05〕
見聞覺知（四言依）	見聞覺知（同系）	「若境由眼識所證名所見」〔0087b26〕以下四句
離間語	「破語」〔T29n1559 0243a24〕／「兩舌」〔T29n1559 0241b19〕	「若染污心發壞他語，若他壞不壞俱成離間語」〔0088a11〕
麁惡語	「惡語」〔T29n1559 0243a27〕	「若以染心發非愛語毀呰於他，名麁惡語」〔0088a12〕
雜穢語	「非應語」（亦名散語）〔T29n1559 0243b02〕	「一切染心所發諸語名雜穢語」〔0088a15〕
貪業道	貪欲業道（同系）	「於他財物惡欲名貪」〔0088b04〕
瞋業道	瞋恚業道（同系）	「於有情類憎恚名瞋」〔0088b11〕
邪見業道	邪見業道（同系）	「於善惡等惡見撥無，此見名為邪見業道」〔0088b13〕
譬喻者	「譬喻部」〔T29n1559 0240a29〕	立「貪瞋邪見即是意業」之宗〔0084b03〕——光記標其為經部（見目六）
毘婆沙者／毘婆沙師	毘婆沙師（同系）	「毘婆沙者釋此文言」〔0085a17〕·「毘婆沙師作如是說」〔0087b26〕
離繫者	——（諦本此段對應句另出）	「離繫者言，不思而殺亦得殺罪」〔0086c18〕——光記標其為尼乾陀·露形外道（見目六）
先軌範師	——（諦本此說另出）	「先軌範師作如是說」〔0087c24〕——光記釋作「學瑜伽論者，名先軌範師」〔T41n1821 0261a26〕
波剌私	「波尸國人」〔T29n1559 0241a25〕	從癡起殺之外道說所繫——「又波剌私作如是說」〔0085b23〕

名相之梵語羅馬字唯繫於古德所傳之音寫可徵者。本子之異名多屬二譯譯字之別（見目四全表），非古德音義之訓；唯「牟尼」一名三疏同傳其訓（「牟尼，此云寂默」，見目六），錄於目六。他者從闕，不據現代校本擬補。

三、校勘（大正原書校記＋CBETA 回改·卷十六全枚舉）

子4 範圍〔0083b13–0088b22〕校記錨共三十一枚，其中梵語還原註十二枚（僅出梵名之羅馬字，非異讀，依本帙體例不入下表）；餘十九枚 ＝ <app> 系異讀十三（重出併零）＋ CBETA 回改六（以 ⟨CB⟩ 標·不入上列十三之數·列於表末）＋無 witness 零。回改六枚之中，三枚（0085003·0088004·0088005）大正本自有原印校記，並錄其原印之讀；三枚（0085c1601·0087c0801·0087c2601）唯 CBETA 出註而大正無原印校記。異讀十三條全列，底本從大正【大】讀。

註號	錨	底本【大】／異讀	語境（逐字·底本讀）	所校之字	觀察（唯錄不判）
0083005	0083c02	黑／異【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「欲界善業名為黑白，惡所雜故，異熟亦黑白，非愛果雜故」	黑	作「異」則成『名為異白』，與下句「異熟亦黑白」之對舉不合；不涉「黑白名依相續立」之義理骨幹
0084004	0084c25	㨊／揣【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「㨊觸羊身酬價捉取」	㨊	二字皆有以手觸探之義，屠羊喻之動作不變
0084005	0084c25	飯／飼【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「牽還養飯將入屠坊」	飯	飯與飼皆謂餵養，義近
0085001	0085a03	稱／秤【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「若稱若賣或煮，或食讚述其美」	稱	二字為異體，皆謂權衡；此句屬殺生後起之事例
0085002	0085a12	以／已【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「若所殺生命終以後，能殺生者業道方成」	以	以與已於時位語古通用，不涉業道成於死有抑死後之判
0085004	0085a17	者／師【明】	「毘婆沙者釋此文言」	者	作「師」則逕同本子他處之「毘婆沙師」〔0087b26〕；涉稱謂用字，不涉義理
0085005	0085b05	愛／受【宋】【元】	「復於後時誅其所親，收其財物婬彼所愛」	愛	此句在以十業道為殺後起之列舉中，「婬彼所愛」與上「收其財物」對舉；作「受」則語不成對
0085006	0085c06	後／〔－〕【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「世間財物於劫初時，大梵天王施諸梵志，於後梵志勢力微劣」	後	有無「後」字僅涉語氣繁簡，不涉偷盜加行從癡起之義理
0085007	0085c16	簡／揀【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「吸水齧草或住或行，不簡親踈隨遇隨合」	簡	簡與揀同義異體，皆謂分別；此句屬邪婬加行從癡生之外道說
0086002	0086b27	曰／自【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「謂齊何量名曰殺生」	曰	作「自」則語法不成；此句為後六段業道相之總問
0086003	0086c22	獲／受【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「此等皆應獲苦他罪」	獲	獲與受義近（皆謂得），不涉論主反破離繫者六難之骨幹
0087002	0087a17	逈／迴【宋】【元】【宮】	「三於非處行不應行，謂於寺中制多逈處」	逈	逈謂僻遠·迴謂迴繞，所指之處稍異，而不涉欲邪行四種之立
0088002	0088a13	呰／訾【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「毀呰於他，名麁惡語」	呰	呰與訾同義異體（皆謂毀謗），不涉麁惡語成業道之緣

CBETA 回改六枚（⟨CB⟩·不入上列十三之數·有原印者並錄）——依本帙體例：首列讀＝底本流所從。

註號	錨	讀（首列＝底本流）	大正原印校記	語境（逐字·底本讀）
0085003 ⟨CB⟩	0085a13	則【CB】【麗-CB】【宋】【元】【明】【宮】／即【大】	即＝則【三】【宮】	「是則不應先作是說：隨此表業彼正命終」
0085c1601 ⟨CB⟩	0085c16	踈【CB】【麗-CB】／疎【大】	——（大正無原印）	「吸水齧草或住或行，不簡親踈隨遇隨合」
0087c0801 ⟨CB⟩	0087c08	唯【CB】【麗-CB】／雖【大】	——（大正無原印）	「汝於此中應知所見，唯有所見」
0087c2601 ⟨CB⟩	0087c26	搆【CB】【麗-CB】／構【大】	——（大正無原印）	「自運己心諸所思搆名為所覺」
0088004 ⟨CB⟩	0088a17	〔－〕【CB】【麗-CB】【宋】【宮】／語【大】	〔語〕－【宋】【宮】	「染所發言皆雜穢故」
0088005 ⟨CB⟩	0088a22	倡伎【CB】【麗-CB】／倡妓【大】／相枝【宋】／倡𠆸【磧-CB】	倡妓＝相枝【宋】	「及倡伎者為悅他情以染污心作諸詞曲」

誠實記一：0084004 與 0084005 二註同錨於〔0084c25〕，皆落在屠羊者喻一句之內（「㨊觸羊身酬價捉取，牽還養飯將入屠坊」），非重出之一記。

誠實記二：0085c1601 之回改處與異讀 0085007 同錨於〔0085c16〕——同一行內既有大正校記之異讀（簡／揀），又有 CBETA 之回改（踈／疎），二者所校非同一字，並列於本目二表。

誠實記三：0087c0801 與 0087c2601 二回改皆落在見聞覺知一段（正七十六之釋）內——前者在佛告大母經之引文中，後者在先軌範師之說中。

誠實記四：回改六枚，本子底本流（本帙 L1）逐處皆從 CBETA 之讀而不從大正原印——「是則不應先作是說」（非「即」）·「不簡親踈」（非「疎」）·「唯有所見」（非「雖」）·「諸所思搆」（非「構」）·「皆雜穢故」（大正衍「語」字）·「及倡伎者」（非「倡妓」）。六處所校皆屬字形或衍字，無一涉義理判定。

校勘結語：十三條之中，屬形近訛字或同義異體字者七（㨊／揣·飯／飼·稱／秤·以／已·簡／揀·獲／受·呰／訾），涉稱謂用字者一（0085004 者／師），涉語境繁簡或所指稍異而不涉義理骨幹者五（0083005·0085005·0085006·0086002·0087002）。無一條涉義理判定之核心——十業道之成立、加行根本後起三位、三根究竟、業道所依四處等骨幹，皆不因異讀而動搖。無升定本案（無古德牒文與義理雙證支持異讀者）。異讀並錄備考，本目唯錄不判。

四、異譯對勘（真諦《阿毘達磨俱舍釋論》T1559 ★）

對勘基座：玄奘本卷十六〔T29n1558 0083b13–0088b22〕↔ 真諦本〔T29n1559 0239b23–0243b27〕。

段界之定（場景結構·非以卷題界充）——起：玄奘開卷句「又經中說，業有四種」〔T29n1558 0083b18〕，真諦以偈直陳同一四業之立「黑白等差別，復說業四種」〔T29n1559 0239b23〕，其下二本逐句釋黑黑·白白·黑白·非黑非白四業之得名，義理節點一一相扣（玄奘「諸不善業一向名黑」／真諦「非善業者，一向名黑」〔T29n1559 0239b28〕）。迄：玄奘收句「彼經具顯謗業謗果謗聖邪見，此頌舉初等言攝後」〔T29n1558 0088b17〕，真諦作「此邪見具足，謂撥業、撥果、撥聖人。於經中有多種文句，此偈但顯重」〔T29n1559 0243b26〕；其後真諦緊接「是十業道體相，如此業道是何義？偈曰：此後三，唯道七業道」〔T29n1559 0243b28〕，轉入十業道立名之新問——此問於玄奘子4 全文無對應句，當屬卷十七（子5）之首。

二譯分卷不同：真諦業品分四卷、玄奘分六卷，本子對應段全落於真諦「之三」卷之內，故段界唯以場景結構定，不得以卷題界充。體例基差：玄奘「頌曰／論曰」整頌先出而後長行；真諦「偈曰／釋曰」逐句嵌釋，一頌常拆數處分引。

對勘要目（逐條·錄義理承重與譯名系統差者二十條）：

開卷頌之開合——奘頌六句一氣總標四業之因果性類與能盡之無漏思〔0083b22〕；諦偈僅「黑白等差別，復說業四種」〔T29n1559 0239b23〕二句先標其有差別，四業細目全賴釋曰逐句自釋。開合之差：奘頌詳而諦偈簡，長行補足。
無色界善何以不名白——奘「何故不言無色界善？傳說若處有二異熟謂中生有，具三種業謂身語意，則說非餘」〔0083b28〕‖諦「云何不說無色界業？若是處有二種果報，謂中陰、生陰。有三種業，謂身口意。此中說黑白業，餘處不說」〔T29n1559 0239c01〕。義理密合，「中生有」／「中陰生陰」屬譯名系統差。
欲界善業名黑白之經證·繫屬之異——奘「然契經中有處亦說：欲界善業名為黑白，惡所雜故」〔0083c01〕逕作本論自陳；諦「有餘師云：此亦於餘經中說。欲界善業名黑白業，非善所雜故」〔T29n1559 0239c04〕繫此經證於有餘師。⇒ 同一經證，二本繫屬之主體不同，唯錄不判。
非黑非白之密意說——奘「此非白言是密意說，以佛於彼《大空經》中告阿難陀：諸無學法純善純白一向無罪」〔0083c10〕‖諦「此不白言，是不了義說，有別意故。佛世尊於《大空經》中，依無學法說：阿難！如此法，一向白、一向善、一向無訶」〔T29n1559 0239c12〕。二本皆點名《大空經》，而奘作密意說·諦作不了義說——譯字系統差，義同詞異。
黑黑雜業之師說一（地獄受）——奘「有餘師說：順地獄受及欲界中順餘受業，如次名為純黑雜業。謂地獄異熟唯不善業感，故順彼受名純黑業」〔0084a05〕‖諦「有餘師見，應受地獄報業，離地獄於欲界餘道應受報業，次第應知是黑業是黑白業。何以故？唯地獄定是惡業報故，說受地獄報業名黑業」〔T29n1559 0240a02〕。義理全同，先總後別之句法次第小異。
黑黑雜業之師說二（見所斷）——奘「有餘師說：欲見所斷及欲界中所有餘業，如次名為純黑俱業。謂見所斷無善雜故名純黑業，欲修所斷有善不善故名俱業」〔0084a09〕‖諦「有餘師說：見諦所滅業名黑業，與善不相雜故……欲界業異見諦所滅業，名黑白業。此異云何？謂修道所滅。何以故？此業有善有惡」〔T29n1559 0240a07〕。二本皆以有餘師冠此二說而不名其宗，唯錄不判。
三牟尼之立名——奘「無學身語業，名身語牟尼，意牟尼即無學意非意業」〔0084a16〕‖諦「無學身口業，意應知次第，三牟那。釋曰：無學身口二業，名身口牟那。無學心名意牟那，非意業」〔T29n1559 0240a11〕。牟尼／牟那，同一梵語音譯用字之異。
牟尼獨在無學之問答——奘「何故牟尼唯在無學？以阿羅漢是實牟尼，諸煩惱言永寂靜故」〔0084a21〕‖諦「云何說無學不說餘？阿羅漢是真實聖者故。一切，或言分別滅故」〔T29n1559 0240a17〕。奘本收句唯一由（煩惱永寂），諦本增末一句而語意稍晦——詳略之差，唯錄不判，不臆補。
譬喻者立宗之經證·經名之出否——奘「譬喻者言：貪瞋邪見即是意業，故《思經》中說此三種為意業故」〔0084b03〕‖諦「譬喻部說：貪等名意業，於故心作。經中說：若執如此，惑業成一性」〔T29n1559 0240a29〕。諦本此句之斷句今有二讀，並錄不判：①依現行標點作「於故心作。經中說」，則諦本但云經中說而不出經名，與奘之點名《思經》成經證來源詳略之差；②以「故心作」三字為經名之譯（諦系以此譯奘本之「思」），此處遂當讀作於故心作經中說，與奘「故《思經》中說」逐位相對，則二本皆點名此經而唯譯名不同；如此則其下「若執如此，惑業成一性」乃詰難之語（與奘「若爾，則應業與煩惱合成一體」相當），非所引之經文。二讀並存，本目不判（並見誠實記二）。
十業道之總說——奘「於前所說惡妙行中，若麁顯易知，攝為十業道。如應若善攝前妙行，不善業道攝前惡行」〔0084b17〕‖諦「前所說惡行及善行中，由攝明了易知善惡二業，是故經中說十業道，如理應知，若善從善行出，若惡從惡行出」〔T29n1559 0240b11〕。義理全同；諦本增「是故經中說」一語，隱以十業道之立名溯於經教，奘本無此溯源語——唯錄不判。
殺生加行從貪起之緣——奘「如有為欲得彼身分、或為得財、或為戲樂、或為拔濟親友自身，從貪引起殺生加行」〔0085b18〕‖諦「若為得彼身分、為得物、為戲樂等事，令他失命，或為救濟自身及自眷屬」〔T29n1559 0241a20〕。奘作「親友自身」·諦作「自身及自眷屬」——次序與範圍字面小異，義理無別。
從癡起殺之外道說——奘「又波剌私作如是說：父母老病，若令命終得免困苦便生勝福」〔0085b23〕‖諦「又波尸國人殺業亦從癡生。何以故？彼說如此言：若二親老困及有重疾，必應為捨命」〔T29n1559 0241a25〕。波剌私／波尸國人，同音譯之異寫；諦本明加「國人」限定，奘本泛稱不加。
虛誑語從癡生之外論引頌——奘「若人因戲笑，嫁娶對女王，及救命救財，虛誑語無罪」〔0085c22〕‖諦「戲笑及女人，娶婦并救命，救財故妄語，梵王說無害」〔T29n1559 0241b17〕。二本句序字面全異（奘之「對女王」屬事類之一，諦之「梵王說無害」屬引語收句），而所開四緣之義同——引頌迻譯自由度最大之一例。
軍陣同殺之詳略——奘「若有多人集為軍眾欲殺怨敵、或獵獸等，於中隨有一殺生時，何人得成殺生業道」〔0086b16〕‖諦「復次若為殺他故，集眾為軍、或掘坑或獵或偷破。多人聚集同為此事，於中一人若行殺生事，何人得殺生罪」〔T29n1559 0241c29〕。諦本多出掘坑與偷破二類（陷阱·群盜），奘本唯軍眾與獵獸——真諦此處詳於玄奘。
命根之立·意譯與音譯——奘「於剎那滅蘊，如何成殺生？息風名生，依身心轉，若有令斷不更續生」〔0086c07〕‖諦「於剎那剎那滅五陰中，云何斷波羅那？此名有何義？以風為義，此風依身依心起」〔T29n1559 0242a15〕。奘取意譯「息風」，諦取音譯「波羅那」而後訓其義——譯例之異。
薄伽梵所說壽煖識頌——奘「壽煖及與識，三法捨身時，所捨身僵仆，如木無思覺」〔0086c15〕‖諦「命根暖及識，若三棄捨身，彼捨即永眠，如枯木無覺」〔T29n1559 0242a23〕。首詞「壽」／「命根」譯字不同，「僵仆」對「永眠」——義同詞異，引頌自由譯之例。
窣堵波物之偷盜罪——奘「若有盜取窣堵波物，彼於如來得偷盜罪，以佛臨欲入涅槃時，哀愍世間總受所施」〔0087a04〕‖諦「若盜藪抖波物，從佛得罪。何以故？一切供養物，於般涅槃時佛世尊悉已受」〔T29n1559 0242b08〕。窣堵波／藪抖波，同一梵語音譯用字之異。
離間語之譯名——奘「若染污心發壞他語，若他壞不壞俱成離間語」〔0088a11〕‖諦「若有染污心，為壞他和合及相喜愛，是名破語」〔T29n1559 0243a25〕。離間語／破語，譯名系統之異。
邪見所撥之經文·詳略差最顯之一例——奘全譯十一句「如經說：無施與、無愛樂、無祠祀、無妙行、無惡行、無妙惡行業果異熟、無此世間無彼世間、無母無父、無化生有情、世間無沙門、或婆羅門是阿羅漢」〔0088b14〕‖諦節作六句「如經言：無施、無供養、無嗅多、無善行、無惡行，於世間無沙門婆羅門是阿羅漢」〔T29n1559 0243b24〕。諦本省去「無妙惡行業果異熟」「無此世間無彼世間」「無母無父」「無化生有情」諸項。又「無祠祀」奘作意譯、諦作「無嗅多」（音譯）——譯例音義之異，誠實記，不臆定其梵源。
五蓋經之引據·二本皆點名——奘「有餘師言：諸欲界愛皆貪業道。所以者何？《五蓋經》中依貪欲蓋，佛說應斷此世間貪」〔0088b06〕‖諦「有餘師說：一切欲界愛欲皆是貪欲業道。何以故？於《五蓋經》依愛欲有如此言：此人捨於世間貪欲蓋」〔T29n1559 0243b16〕。二本皆點名《五蓋經》——與第九條之詳略差成對照，可證二本經證之詳略非通則性偏向，逐條互異。

譯名對照表（子4 範圍·逐字所見·首出 loc）

玄奘（T1558）	首出 loc	真諦（T1559）	首出 loc
牟尼	0084a15	牟那	0240a11
虛誑語	0084c06	妄語	0241b15
不與取	0084c05	偷盜	0242b05
欲邪行	0084c10	邪婬	0241b09
離間語	0084c06	破語（頌釋段）／兩舌（從三根生段）	0243a24
麁惡語	0084c06	惡語	0243a27
雜穢語	0084c06	非應語（亦名散語）	0243b02
窣堵波	0087a04	藪抖波	0242b08
波剌私	0085b23	波尸國人	0241a25
密意說	0083c11	不了義說	0239c12
息風（意譯）	0086c07	波羅那（音譯·訓「以風為義」）	0242a15
無祠祀（意譯）	0088b14	無嗅多（音譯）	0243b25
頌曰／論曰	—	偈曰／釋曰	—

誠實記一（真諦本自身用字不一）：同一離間語，真諦本頌釋段〔T29n1559 0243a24〕作「破語」，而從三根生一段〔T29n1559 0241b19〕行文中作「兩舌」——此非二譯之異，乃真諦本自身用字不一，據實記，不臆定何者為正。

誠實記二（零命中亦誠實記·二讀並錄）：《思經》一名於真諦 T1559 業品全篇以容錯法覆核，零命中——此為機械事實，非檢索之失。然零命中不足以斷定諦本不點名此經：諦本此處作「於故心作。經中說」，其斷句二讀（見目四 #9）——依現行標點則諦本不出經名；若以「故心作」為經名之譯，則諦本亦點名此經而譯名與奘異，以奘之詞搜諦本自必零命中。二讀並錄，候譯者裁，本目不代判。

五、系內對辯（眾賢《順正理論》T1562 ★·有則錄）

眾賢二論之品名作「辯業品」（T1562 第四·T1563 第五），非「分別業品」——勿以俱舍品名搜之。本子對應段以場景結構夾定：T1562 起「又經中說業有四種，謂或有業黑黑異熟」〔T29n1562 0573a16〕、迄「如是已辯十業道相。依何義」〔T29n1562 0580b17〕；T1563 起〔T29n1563 0877c16〕同句、迄〔T29n1563 0881b24〕同句。⇒ 玄奘·真諦·順正理·顯宗四本獨立傳寫而於同一場景節點（邪見業道釋畢）轉入同一新問（十業道立名），四本科界互證。體例＝唯於俱舍實有對辯之處引·不通引。

一、三惡行三妙行——「許有煩惱即是意業」一句之發語者（本子繫屬之異最顯處）——俱舍原句「若爾，則應業與煩惱合成一體。許有煩惱即是意業，斯有何失？」〔T29n1558 0084b05〕。眾賢於此先自設一問而以二證答之——「寧知貪等非意業耶？由阿笈摩及正理故」〔T29n1562 0574b24〕：前引阿笈摩者「阿笈摩者，謂契經言：貪瞋邪見是業緣集。故知貪等非即業性。又契經言：諸愛者表即是意業。故知非愛即意業體」〔T29n1562 0574b25〕，後申正理者「正理者何？謂若煩惱即是業者，十二緣起及三障等差別應無。由此證知貪等非業」〔T29n1562 0574c12〕。二證之間，逕將此句繫於經主（世親）自身之主張而破之：「經主言：許有煩惱即是意業。斯有何過？如是所許，違前契經及後正理，豈非大過」〔T29n1562 0574b29〕——其自語「違前契經及後正理」正與此序相應（前者阿笈摩·後者正理，即上二證之次）。末歸惡行之名「是聰慧者所訶厭故，又能感得非愛果故。此行即惡，故名惡行」〔T29n1562 0574c14〕。⇒ 光記讀作論主代譬喻者（經部）轉述之設想語（見目六），眾賢讀作論主自許，故其破辭直指經主。二造並錄，不判孰是。

二、見聞覺知四言依——經主之破與眾賢之還破（本子系內對辯篇幅最大處）——俱舍於毘婆沙師之理證後自設一破「毘婆沙師作如是說：若境由眼識所證名所見……此證不成，且經非證，經義別故」〔T29n1558 0087b26〕。眾賢逐句牒引而還破：先錄其破語「經主撥言：此不成證，經義別故，非此經中佛欲決判四所言相」〔T29n1562 0579a28〕，並引大母領佛教言之頌「見色已失念，妄增愛相者……」〔T29n1562 0579b19〕以證毘婆沙師之解實有經證；次正面反破「故經主言經義別者，誠如所說，以經義別，經主於中異分別故。又何意趣朋彼二師違理教釋，而偏憎背毘婆沙者順理教言」〔T29n1562 0579c03〕，續舉四難——「彼二師所釋違教，所見等相佛於經中於色等境分明別說，而彼棄捨異建立故」〔T29n1562 0579c06〕·「此有何理，唯五所證立所見名」〔T29n1562 0579c14〕·「若爾，見何緣非自內所受？是則所見應即所知」〔T29n1562 0579c16〕·「若比量境方名所覺，不應所覺在所知先」〔T29n1562 0579c19〕；末結之曰「今謂經主僻執居心，背此正宗黨彼邪說」〔T29n1562 0579c20〕。

三、「頗有由身表異想」段之延伸破——俱舍作「頗有由身表異想義不由發語成虛誑語耶……於如是難應設劬勞」〔T29n1558 0087c28〕。眾賢牒之曰「經主於此作如是難：若不動身亦不發語，欲無無表離表而生，此二如何得成業道？於如是難，應設劬勞」〔T29n1562 0579c25〕。光記轉引此評作「如何經主乃作難言：欲無無表離表而生」〔T41n1821 0261c15〕，並錄眾賢自宗之別解「然彼得果、五苾芻等，先加行時必定有表，相續乃至得果、入道，依此表業發別解脫」〔T41n1821 0261c17〕。⇒ 本段實有四說並列——毘婆沙師（本論引）·有餘師（三疏皆標經部）·先軌範師·眾賢自宗；四說於『見聞覺知因何得名』與『無表可否離表而生』二問各有取捨。唯錄二造·不判勝負。

誠實記（二論體例之詳略差）：T1562 於本子範圍內「經主」明標八見〔0574b29·0579a28·0579b08·0579b17·0579c03·0579c04·0579c20·0579c25〕，皆集中於上列二段；T1563 於本子範圍內「經主」零見（容錯法覆核全段〔0877c16–0881b24〕）。⇒ 顯宗論此段不涉與世親之正面辯難，唯正述宗義——與順正理論廣破之體例成對比，誠實記，不臆定其故。

六、諸家異釋（光記·寶疏·頌疏·神泰疏）

神泰疏之闕（負命題已證·據實標闕）：神泰《俱舍論疏》X53n0836 為殘本，現存七卷＝卷一·二·四·五·六·七·十七，世品·業品·隨眠品全闕。機械覆核（容錯法·取 ed="X" 系）：「分別業品」零見，業品標誌串「十業道」「五無間」等亦皆零見。⇒ 泰疏殘·業品闕·本子無逐文釋可繫，不以他卷之文充之。以下三家並錄。

（一）黑白四業與無漏斷

科判之三分（三家全合）——光記「『又經中說至其相云何』者，此下第七明黑黑等。就中，一明四業名體、二明無漏斷別、三敘異說不同。此即第一明四業名體。依經起問」〔T41n1821 0250c06〕；寶疏「論『又經中說至其相云何』，自此已下有四頌半，第八明經中黑黑等四業。文中有三：一明業體、二明斷異、三述異說。此一頌半明四業體，先問、後答。此即問也」〔T41n1822 0662a11〕。⇒ 三分之義全合而科名字面互異（逐字見上引：光記作四業名體·無漏斷別·敘異說不同，寶疏作業體·斷異·述異說），唯光記標「就中」·寶疏標「文中有三」。
黑之二義（婆沙所傳）——光記「『諸不善業至不可意故』者，釋惡名黑。不善名惡，黑謂黑黑。諸不善業一向名黑，染污性故。異熟亦黑，不可意故」〔T41n1821 0250c18〕。
白之所以（引《正理》補證）——光記「『色界善業至是可意故』者，釋色善名白，白謂白白。色界善業一向名白，不雜不善惡業、惑故」〔T41n1821 0250c25〕。
「豈不惡業果」一問之科（二疏異名而同分）——光記標問答「『豈不惡業果至名為白黑』者，問。豈不欲界惡業及果，亦為善業及果間雜相續起故，是則亦應名為白黑。此即以惡業果例善業果」〔T41n1821 0251a21〕·「『不善業果至惡勝善故』者，答。於欲界中，不善業果非必應為善業果雜，如斷善人造諸惡業，及地獄中受黑異熟」〔T41n1821 0251a24〕；寶疏標難答「論『豈不惡業果至名為白黑』，難也。善為惡業雜，善名為黑白；惡為善業雜，惡應名白黑。論『不善業果至惡勝善故』，答也。於地獄中不善業果，不為善業果之所雜也」〔T41n1822 0662b01〕。⇒ 光記作問／答·寶疏作難／答，科名互異而所分全同，唯錄不判。
密意說之所以——寶疏「論『此非白言至性相違故』，釋疑難也。非黑言是了義說，非白言是密意說，以不能招白異熟故，經密意說名非白業。准經及本論，是純白法也」〔T41n1822 0662b12〕。
自性斷與所緣斷（本段義理骨幹）——寶疏「此上十二皆自性斷，非所緣斷也……斷黑一分斷雜業全斷，黑是自性及所緣斷，斷白唯所緣斷」〔T41n1822 0662b19〕；光記標其問答「『何緣諸地至能斷非餘』者，問」〔T41n1821 0251c01〕·「『以諸善法至未離繫故』者，答。若煩惱斷是自性斷」〔T41n1821 0251c01〕；寶疏同段作「論『何緣諸地至能斷非餘』，問也。論『以諸善法至未離繫故』，答也。自性斷者，謂結法及結一果法并得，斷彼得時名之為斷」〔T41n1822 0662b27〕。頌疏於此另出一名——「彼善法，善法爾時得離繫故」〔T41n1823 0906c13〕·「解云：緣縛斷者，有漏善法被煩惱縛，斷此能緣九品惑盡。善法離繫，名緣縛斷」〔T41n1823 0906c15〕。⇒ 頌疏之「緣縛斷」與光記寶疏之「所緣斷」同義異名，唯錄不判。
敘異說（正六十四）——光記「此即第三敘異說」〔T41n1821 0251c16〕；頌疏「從此第三，敘異說，頌曰：『有說地獄受，餘欲業黑雜。有說欲見滅，餘欲業黑俱』」〔T41n1823 0906c22〕。⇒ 三家皆標此段體例為敘異說，非問答。

（二）三牟尼·三清淨·三妙行

牟尼之訓（三家逐字同傳）——光記「牟尼，此云寂默」〔T41n1821 0251c24〕；寶疏「論『又經中說有三牟尼』，已下一頌，第九明三牟尼、三清淨也」〔T41n1822 0662c21〕·「牟尼，此云寂默。無學身、語二業，名身、語牟尼。意牟尼，是無學意，非意業也。以真實牟尼唯是意故，身、語二業比知心故，能比、所比總名牟尼」〔T41n1822 0662c23〕；頌疏「從此第八，明三牟尼等」〔T41n1823 0907a05〕·「釋曰：牟尼者，此云寂默。無學身語業者，謂身、語二牟尼也。即意者，第三意牟尼也。謂即意名牟尼，非意業也」〔T41n1823 0907a10〕。⇒ 「牟尼，此云寂默」三家逐字全合，可證此訓詁三家同傳。
牟尼唯在無學之問答——光記「『何故牟尼唯在無學』者，問。『以阿羅漢至永寂靜故』者，答。以阿羅漢是實牟尼，諸煩惱言永寂靜故」〔T41n1821 0252a07〕。
譬喻者之宗名（二疏互異）——光記明標其為經部「『譬喻者言至為意業故』者，經部、譬喻者言：貪等三種即是意思，離思無體。引證可知」〔T41n1821 0252b19〕·「『若爾則應至合成一體』者，說一切有部難。若說貪等即是意思，是則應有業與煩惱合成一體」〔T41n1821 0252b21〕·「『許有煩惱至斯有何失』者，譬喻者答。我許貪等即是意業，斯有何失」〔T41n1821 0252b24〕·「『毘婆沙師至為門轉故』者，毘婆沙師總非」〔T41n1821 0252b25〕。⇒ 光記於此段標主四次全備——譬喻者立〔0252b19〕→說一切有部難〔0252b21〕→譬喻者答〔0252b24〕→毘婆沙師總非〔0252b25〕，難與破同屬有部一造。寶疏於同段但作「論『譬喻者言至為意業故』，述異說」〔T41n1822 0663a26〕，未如光記逕標經部二字。⇒ 宗名之明標與否二疏互異，唯錄不判。
正見邪見既無故思，如何成善惡——底本自答「能與損益為根本故」〔T29 0084b13〕；光記於此句未別立科判標記，逕依論文順釋——據實標『光記無明標』。

（三）十業道總說與表無表

何以身惡行不全入業道——光記「『惡妙行耶』者，問。『且不善中至令遠離故』者，此下答。且不善中身惡業道，於身惡行不攝加行、後起，及餘不善身業，即是飲酒、或執、或打、或縛等事。或行殺等，闕緣不成。以加行等非麁顯故，不名業道」〔T41n1821 0253a04〕。
本論自問自答自徵之句式——光記逐字標其科層「『不爾』者，答。『云何』者，徵。『頌曰至定生唯無表』者，上兩句明不善業道，下兩句明善業道」〔T41n1821 0253b22〕。
六定有無表一段——寶疏·頌疏於此段皆隨論文順釋，三疏無異說可錄，據實標闕，不湊補。
三位之立（加行·根本·後起）——光記「『耶』者，問。於此業道義中，如何建立三位別耶」〔T41n1821 0254a12〕·「『且不善中至殺生後起』者，答。明殺三位。加行謂前加行，果滿謂殺究竟。餘文可知」〔T41n1821 0254a13〕。

（四）加行未息與三根究竟

「加行聲」之答主（二疏一致）——光記明標為論主之答——「『應說至為死後耶』者，問成業道時。『若爾何失』者，答。『二俱有過至根本業道』者，兩關徵責」〔T41n1821 0254a27〕，續作「『此中說何名為無過』者，問。『謂於根本說加行聲』者，論主答」〔T41n1821 0254b19〕；寶疏亦標「加行聲，論主正，婆沙釋文可知，正理論……」〔T41n1822 0665a05〕。⇒ 此答非毘婆沙師之答，乃論主自身之解，二疏繫屬相合。
《正理》所引之「有餘師說」——光記「正理四十一云：有餘師說，貪等不應能為加……」〔T41n1821 0254c24〕；寶疏「正理論云：有餘師說貪等不應能為……」〔T41n1822 0665b06〕。⇒ 此「有餘師」為《正理》所引，非本論自身之有餘師段（居承衍之類）。
三根究竟之總攝——光記「以從三根至從三亦爾者，答：貪瞋邪……」〔T41n1821 0255b23〕·「『同』者，答。非諸業道根本成時，一切皆由三根究竟」〔T41n1821 0255a09〕。
善三位之問答——光記「此善三位其相云何者，問：謂遠離前至皆名後起者，答：善業道是止善，離前……」〔T41n1821 0255c11〕。

（五）業道所依處與殺生成不成

虛誑語等三何以獨繫名身處——光記引顯宗補之「故《顯宗》云『虛誑語等三，名身等處起，語體必依名等起故。語雖亦託有情等生，而正親依名身等起』」〔T41n1821 0257b13〕。⇒ 此為眾賢《顯宗論》之語，繫屬須明。
俱死前死與軍等同事二段之科——光記「『有起加行至無根依別故』者，此下第四問答分別。就中，一殺已非根本、二他殺成業道」〔T41n1821 0257b17〕·「何緣俱死、前死不成業道？『以所殺生至理不應然』者，答。以所殺生現命猶存，不可令彼俱死、前死能殺生者成殺生罪，以所殺生命未斷故」〔T41n1821 0257b21〕。⇒ 二頌皆論主自設問答，非外人詰難。
後六段業道相之總科（全篇脈絡之骨架）——光記「『今次應辨至名為邪見』者，此下第五明惡業道相。就中，一問、二答。此即問也。『且先分別至他想不誤殺』者，此下答。就中，一明殺業道相、二明盜業道相、三明欲邪行相、四明虛誑語相、五明離間語等相、六明意業道相」〔T41n1821 0257c06〕。
猶豫殺亦成業道——光記「猶預殺至亦成業道者，簡差別，此顯猶預殺亦成業道，又解此猶預殺……」〔T41n1821 0257c23〕。
剎那滅蘊如何成殺生——光記於此段隨文順釋息風與命根二解之由，未另立問答或敘異說之科名——據實標『光記無明標』，不代判此二解之屬性。
離繫者之敘外計（二疏一致）——光記「離繫者言至亦被燒害者，敘外計，離繫者……故思亦成殺罪，不同佛法，離繫梵云尼〔乾陀〕……即露形外道也」〔T41n1821 0258b23〕；寶疏「論『離繫者言』至『亦被燒害』，敘……」〔T41n1822 0666c28〕。⇒ 二疏同標「敘（外計）」，此段非部派內部之諍，乃斥非佛教之外道說。

（六）不與取·欲邪行·虛誑語

盜迴轉物之得罪處（光記引婆沙評家）——光記「十三評取此論前師為正，故彼論云『有說亦於國王處得，有說於施主處得，有說於守護人處得，有說於能護彼天、龍、藥叉』」〔T41n1821 0259a18〕。⇒ 本論自身唯錄「有餘師說：望守護者」一說而不判，婆沙評家之取捨屬判釋性材料。
欲邪行段二諍與二疏之評——非時之諍：光記敘兩前師義「有說：若夫許受齋戒，有犯非時。若不許受而輒自受，夫後若犯不成業道。前師意說，許與不許，若有所犯皆成業道」〔T41n1821 0259b10〕；寶疏於同段明言無評——「『夫至方謂非時』，敘異說。無評文也」〔T41n1822 0667b19〕。境想誤之諍（「有說亦成」「有說不成」〔0087a24–a25〕）：光記獨評「有說亦成至於餘究竟故者，答中兩說，後說為勝，是誤攝故」〔T41n1821 0259b16〕。⇒ 二諍各屬：非時之諍二疏皆不下判；境想誤之諍光記評「後說為勝」而論自身無判——本目錄其評，不代論作判。
苾芻尼與童女向誰結罪——光記「『於苾芻尼至得業道耶』者，問。尼不屬他，望誰結罪」〔T41n1821 0259b18〕·「『此從國王至況出家者』者，答。有兩解。一云：此從國王得罪，行非法事不忍許故。第二說云：於自妻妾受八戒時尚不應行，況出家者。以輕況重，但有侵陵即成業道」〔T41n1821 0259b19〕。⇒ 本論原句簡略，此二解為光記所補，本論未自出二解之名。
虛誑語成業道之時位——光記「若所誑者至此言是何者，問：是雜穢語者，答……成業道時，與最後字至皆此加行者，答：雖虛誑語有多字成，與最後字俱生表及無表業成此業道」〔T41n1821 0259c13〕。
「解義」二讀之取捨（二疏一致）——光記「『若爾何失』者，答。『若據已聞至可名能解』者，復徵」〔T41n1821 0259c24〕·「『善言義者至名為能解』者，答。善言義者，耳識至現已生位中無迷亂緣故，即名為能解」〔T41n1821 0260a02〕·「此亦何定？若有耳識無迷亂緣，即據正聞能解名解……由斯不定，故論主言：如無失者應取為宗」〔T41n1821 0260a11〕；寶疏「『無有失應取為宗』，論主評取正聞能解成業道」〔T41n1822 0667c28〕。⇒ 二疏皆標此取捨之主為論主。

（七）見聞覺知·三語·意三

三境同名所覺之由（婆沙尊者世友）——光記「『至偏立覺名』者，別釋三境同名所覺所以。三境同名所覺者，以此三境同無記故，其性昧鈍，猶如死人無所覺知，故能證根偏立覺名」〔T41n1821 0260b27〕。
有餘師之宗名（三家全合作經部）——光記「『此證不成至愛非愛相』者，經部總非，釋經意」〔T41n1821 0260c29〕·「若爾何相名所見等者，毘婆沙問；有餘師說至亦為非理者，經部答：有餘經部師說：若是五根現量所證五境，以分明故，名所見……」〔T41n1821 0261a12〕；寶疏「所見等，有部問也……有餘師說至名為所知，此引經部餘師釋也」〔T41n1822 0668c08〕；頌疏「依經部宗，若是五根現量所證色等五境……」〔T41n1823 0910a22〕。⇒ 三家於此段之宗派繫屬相合，為本子繫屬最穩之一條。
先軌範師之繫屬（二疏互異）——寶疏將此第二說亦繫於經部「為所知，論主敘經部師義也」〔T41n1822 0668c19〕；光記唯釋其名之由來「學瑜伽論者，名先軌範師」〔T41n1821 0261a26〕而不明繫宗派。⇒ 三疏互異，唯錄不判。
離間語成業道之四緣——光記「『論曰至流至此中』者，釋初兩句，明離間語具四種緣方成業道：一染污心。二發壞他語，若他壞、不壞，但領解時即成離間語」〔T41n1821 0262b14〕。其下光記引《正理》「有餘師說：他壞方成」而評「前說為善」——屬光記自身之取捨。
雜穢語二解之敘異說——光記「解義。『有餘師說至雜穢語收』者，釋第五、第六句。此師意說：異前三語染心所發方名雜穢，皆是獨起雜穢語也。前三語起時不兼雜穢，有此不同故敘異說。文顯可知」〔T41n1821 0262c17〕；頌疏簡注「有餘師說：異虛誑等前三種語，餘染心……」〔T41n1823 0910b22〕。
輪王歌詠何以不成雜穢語——光記「『輪王現時至雜穢語收』者，問。『由彼語從至非預染心』者，答。染心所發名為雜穢。由彼語從出離善心發，讚嘆諸善、毀呰諸惡，能引出離善故。非預染心，不名雜穢」〔T41n1821 0262c23〕·「『有餘師言至不成業道』者，敘異說。爾時亦有染心發言，由過輕故不成業道」〔T41n1821 0262c27〕；頌疏「非實染心，有餘師言：此時嫁娶歌詠過輕，不……」〔T41n1823 0910b28〕。
貪業道二說與光記之評（二疏互異）——光記「有餘師言至總說欲愛者，此師意說：於欲界中五部諸愛皆貪業道，依《五蓋經》……有說欲愛至成貪業道者，此師意說：於欲界中五部諸愛雖盡名貪，非皆業道，此貪業道於惡行中攝麁品故……前文已同此說，於二說中後師為正，以見斷貪不緣財故」〔T41n1821 0263a18〕；寶疏隨文順釋而未見另評「論『有餘師言』至『總說欲愛』，餘……」〔T41n1822 0669c23〕。⇒ 光記逕評「後師為正」而寶疏無明評，唯錄不判。
邪見所撥十一句之三類判（光記引婆沙逐句）——光記「如經說至等言攝後者，引經顯彼邪見撥無，經中總有十一不同：言一無施與、二無愛樂、三無祠祀者，此三皆是謗因邪見，見集所斷……四無妙行無惡行者，此總撥妙行惡行，亦是謗因邪見，見集所斷。五無妙行惡行業所感果異熟，此是總撥業所感果，謗果邪見，見苦所斷。六無此世間、七無彼世間，此二通謗因果……八無母、九無父，此二是謗因邪見，見集所斷……十無化生有情者，此通謗因果……十一世間無有沙門或婆羅門及阿羅漢，此是謗聖邪見，見道所斷」〔T41n1821 0263b06〕。
此世現見何故言無——光記引婆沙釋其所以然「故《婆沙》釋云『問：他世是不現見，說無可爾。此世現見，何故言無？答：彼諸外道無明所盲，於現見事亦復非撥。不應責無明者、愚盲者墮坑故』」〔T41n1821 0263b28〕。

（八）三疏互異總覽（並錄不判）

議題	光記	寶疏	頌疏	互異之點
品級大科之分	三分（業體性·釋經諸業·雜明諸業）	四分（業體·律儀等·經中諸業·雜明諸業）	三分（業體性·釋諸業名·雜明諸業）	三分／四分
本子首科之序數	第七	第八	第七	序數之差（科名全合）
十業道章之序數	第十	第十一	第十	同上
「豈不惡業果」之科名	問／答	難／答	未及此段	科名互異而所分全同
善法離繫之名	所緣斷	所緣斷	緣縛斷	同義異名
譬喻者之宗名	明標經部	但作「述異說」	未及此段	宗名明標與否
欲邪行段二諍	於境想誤二說逕評「後說為勝」	於非時異說明言「無評文也」	未及此段	所評之段各異·是否下判
貪業道二說	逕評「後師為正」	隨文順釋不評	未及此段	是否下判
先軌範師之繫屬	唯釋名之由來·不明繫宗	繫於「論主敘經部師義」	未及此段	繫屬有無
有餘師（見聞覺知）之宗名	經部	經部餘師	經部宗	三家全合

三疏互異之處，逐家並錄，不判是非。三疏之判釋與其互異之義理取捨，別居義疏層之承衍節。

七、互讀（唯識根系掛鏈·②橋）

本子所立之十業道與其成緣（加行·根本·後起·三根·究竟·所依處），是部派毘曇『業道面』之總表；其向唯識根系之承接（逐條繫彼系逐字）：

殺生等業道之成相 → 瑜伽本地分之五相式：本子立「要由先發欲殺故思，於他有情他有情想，作殺加行不誤而殺」〔T29 0086c01〕，以故思·他想·不誤三緣定其成。《瑜伽師地論》於同一法作「云何殺生？謂於他眾生起殺欲樂，起染污心，若即於彼起殺方便，及即於彼殺究竟中所有身業」〔T30n1579 0317b05〕——其目作欲樂·染污心·方便·究竟。⇒ 加行（方便）與究竟二支二系同用，而俱舍別出「他想不誤」一支、瑜伽別出「欲樂」一支，可為逐支對讀之座標。同段之欲邪行，瑜伽作「云何欲邪行？謂於所不應行，非道、非處、非時起習近欲樂」〔T30n1579 0317b09〕，與本子「一於非境行不應行……二於非道……三於非處……四於非時」〔T29 0087a14〕之四目，除首目外逐字相對。
業道表無表之體 → 瑜伽表業假有之立：本子以七惡業道之表無表逐一分別，其立處在「七惡業道中，六定有無表」〔T29 0084c05〕，表與無表皆許為色法之實。《瑜伽師地論》攝決擇分於表業作三種分「云何表業？謂略有三種。一、染污，二、善，三、無記」〔T30n1579 0589b11〕，而其結語作「是故當知一切表業皆是假有」〔T30n1579 0589b23〕。⇒ 同一組法數（表業·十不善業道），二系於其體之實假所判不同——此為②橋於業品最直之一錨，唯誌錄座標·不判勝負。
十業道之法數 → 瑜伽之八損害門：本子以十業道逐一辨其所依處（有情·眾具·名色·名身等四處）〔T29 0086b01〕。《瑜伽師地論》以同一組法數別立損益之門——「謂於諸有情，依十不善業道，建立八損害門」〔T30n1579 0318c17〕。⇒ 法數同而所開之門異，可並看。

八、譯史

玄奘新譯（本底本）：《開元釋教錄》著錄「阿毘達磨俱舍論三十卷」〔T55n2154 0557a22〕，其夾註逐字作「第二出與真諦出者同本永徽二年五月十日於大慈恩寺翻經院譯至五年七月二十七日畢沙門元瑜筆受」〔T55n2154 0557a22〕。本子卷端題「阿毘達磨俱舍論卷第十六」〔T29 0083b13〕，品續題「分別業品第四之四」〔T29 0083b17〕。
真諦舊譯（異譯校本）：《開元釋教錄》著錄「阿毘達磨俱舍釋論二十二卷」〔T55n2154 0545c16〕；於論藏部類作「阿毘達磨俱舍釋論二十二卷陳天竺三藏真諦譯」〔T55n2154 0620c17〕，玄奘本著錄於其後作「阿毘達磨俱舍論三十卷大唐三藏玄奘譯」〔T55n2154 0620c22〕。
對辯二論之譯：《開元釋教錄》「阿毘達磨順正理論八十卷大唐三藏玄奘譯」〔T55n2154 0620c25〕·「阿毘達磨顯宗論四十卷大唐三藏玄奘譯」〔T55n2154 0620c27〕，並結曰「右二部論與俱舍論頌同釋異並眾賢造」〔T55n2154 0621a01〕。「頌同釋異」四字即本目五體例之根據——二論用俱舍本頌而別作長行，故其品名作「辯業品」而非「分別業品」。
譯事旁證：《大慈恩寺三藏法師傳》錄玄奘永徽五年答書「其《俱舍》、《順正理》，見譯未周，今年必了」〔T50n2053 0261c20〕。⇒ 俱舍與順正理同期並譯，此為本子對辯材料何以密集之背景（唯錄事實·不作因果之判）。
造論緣起：《婆藪盤豆法師傳》記其造論之體例作「立薩婆多義隨有僻處以經部義破之。名為阿毘達磨俱舍論」〔T50n2049 0190b15〕。⇒ 本子明錄「譬喻者言」一處〔T29 0084b03〕而以毘婆沙師之破收之，正是此體例之實例；眾賢於此處反破（見目五之一），亦與傳所記之後事相應。
三疏之次：光記 T41n1821（普光·主）·寶疏 T41n1822（法寶·副）·頌疏 T41n1823（圓暉·科判）·神泰疏 X53n0836（殘·業品闕）。

九、校本定位

玄奘 T1558 卷十六（底本）〔0083b13–0088b22〕：卷端題 0083b13 · 品續題 0083b17 · 開卷承轉 0083b18 · 正六十後半·正六十一 0083b22 · 正六十二·正六十三 0083c16 · 正六十四 0084a03 · 正六十五 0084a14 · 正六十六 0084a28 · 正六十七 0084b15 · 正六十八 0084c03 · 正六十九一至三句 0084c16 · 正六十九第四句·正七十前半 0085b14 · 引頌一 0085c22 · 正七十後半 0086a03 · 正七十一·正七十二前半 0086a17 · 正七十二後半 0086a28 · 正七十三前半 0086b06 · 正七十三後半 0086b19 · 正七十四前半 0086b29 · 引頌二 0086c15 · 正七十四後半 0086c29 · 正七十五前半 0087a12 · 正七十五後半 0087b04 · 正七十六 0087b24 · 正七十七·正七十八前半 0088a08 · 正七十八後半·正七十九前半 0088b02 · 收卷句 0088b17。
真諦 T1559：對應段 0239b23–0243b27。要目 0239b23 · 0239b28 · 0239c01 · 0239c04 · 0239c12 · 0240a02 · 0240a07 · 0240a11 · 0240a17 · 0240a29 · 0240b11 · 0241a20 · 0241a25 · 0241b09 · 0241b15 · 0241b17 · 0241b19 · 0241c29 · 0242a15 · 0242a23 · 0242b05 · 0242b08 · 0243a24 · 0243a25 · 0243a27 · 0243b02 · 0243b16 · 0243b24 · 0243b26 · 0243b28（次章之首·段界）。
眾賢 T1562〔0573a16–0580b17〕：0573a16（段界） · 0574b24 · 0574b25 · 0574b29 · 0574c12 · 0574c14 · 0579a28 · 0579b08 · 0579b17 · 0579b19 · 0579c03 · 0579c04 · 0579c06 · 0579c14 · 0579c16 · 0579c19 · 0579c20 · 0579c25 · 0580b17（承轉·段界）。T1563〔0877c16–0881b24〕：0877c16（段界） · 0881b24（承轉·段界）——本子範圍內「經主」零見。
光記 T41n1821〔卷十六 0250c02 起〕：0250c05 · 0250c06 · 0250c18 · 0250c25 · 0251a21 · 0251a24 · 0251c01 · 0251c16 · 0251c23 · 0252a07 · 0252b19 · 0252b21 · 0252b24 · 0252b25 · 0252c27 · 0253a04 · 0253b22 · 0254a12 · 0254a13 · 0254a27 · 0254c24 · 0255a09 · 0255b23 · 0255c11 · 0257b13 · 0257b17 · 0257b21 · 0257c06 · 0257c23 · 0258b23 · 0259a18 · 0259b10 · 0259b16 · 0259b18 · 0259b19 · 0259c13 · 0259c24 · 0260a02 · 0260a11 · 0260b27 · 0260c29 · 0261a12 · 0261a26 · 0261c15 · 0261c17 · 0262b14 · 0262c17 · 0262c23 · 0262c27 · 0263a18 · 0263b06 · 0263b28。
寶疏 T41n1822〔卷十六 0662a07 起〕：0662a10 · 0662a11 · 0662b01 · 0662b12 · 0662b19 · 0662b27 · 0662c21 · 0663a26 · 0663c03 · 0665a05 · 0665b06 · 0666c28 · 0667b19 · 0667c28 · 0668c08 · 0668c19 · 0669c23。
頌疏 T41n1823〔論本第十六 0906a14 起·無品題行〕：0906a16 · 0906c13 · 0906c15 · 0906c22 · 0907a05 · 0907b03 · 0910a22 · 0910b22 · 0910b28。
神泰疏 X53n0836：業品全闕——本子無泰疏可繫（據實標闕·不補）。
互讀所繫：《瑜伽師地論》T30n1579 0317b05 · 0317b09 · 0318c17 · 0589b11 · 0589b23。
校勘：子4 範圍校記錨三十一枚——梵語還原註十二枚不入表；餘十九枚＝異讀十三（全枚舉）＋CBETA 回改六（⟨CB⟩ 表·其中三枚並錄大正原印）·無升定本案。

The first three units of the Chapter on Action expound the entity of action, expound the manifest and the nonmanifest, and expound the three disciplines; this unit turns into the latter half of the chapter on “the several actions spoken of in the sūtras.” From the one question 「又經中說，業有四種」 tr. “again the sūtra says that action is of four kinds,” it first establishes the four actions black-black, white-white, black-and-white, and neither-black-nor-white, next makes out the volition without outflows that can exhaust the actions, next records the two masters’ divergent accounts of experience in the hells and of what is abandoned by seeing, next expounds the three munis and three purities and the three kinds of evil conduct and good conduct, and closes by opening, with 「又經中言：有十業道」 tr. “again the sūtra says: there are ten paths of action,” the chapter on the ten paths of action — what the paths of action gather in, the division of the manifest and the nonmanifest, the three stages of the preparatory, the root, and the consequent, the arising from and completion by the three roots, the four places depended upon, and so on down to killing, stealing, fornication, lying, divisive, harsh, and frivolous speech, and greed, hatred, and wrong view, each of them made out as to what does and does not constitute it. The “section on the paths of action” of an Abhidharma treatise opens from here.

I. Doctrinal Outline and Placement

Outline system	The position of this passage
Xuanzang’s T1558 in nine chapters	The fourth part of Chapter Four, Analysis of Action (chapter title〔T29 0067b06〕) — this unit (Unit 4) = the whole of Fascicle Sixteen〔0083b13–0088b22〕. Root stanzas from the second half of Root 60 to the first half of Root 79, with twenty-three `<lg>` blocks (twenty-one of root stanza plus two of quoted stanza)
The anchor carried over	At the end of Fascicle Fifteen the explanation of the three actions crooked, foul, and turbid is finished, and its closing sentence reads 「若依貪生身語意業名為濁業，貪濁類故」 tr. “if bodily, verbal, and mental action arises in dependence upon greed it is called turbid action, since greed is of the class of the turbid”〔T29 0083b08〕; this unit takes up directly with 「又經中說」 tr. “again the sūtra says” to bring on the fourth class of action spoken of in the sūtras, in the same form as the three places before it
The chapter-level main outline in the three commentaries (the divergence of threefold and fourfold)	Puguang’s Record〔T41n1821 0200b09〕: 「就此品中，一明業體性、二釋經諸業、三雜明諸業」 tr. “within this chapter, first the nature of the entity of action, second the explanation of the actions in the sūtras, third miscellaneous explanations of the actions” · Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary〔T41n1823 0889b07〕: 「釋此品頌總作三門：一明業體性、二釋諸業名、三雜明諸業」 tr. “in explaining the stanzas of this chapter three gates are made in all: first the nature of the entity of action, second the explanation of the names of the actions, third miscellaneous explanations of the actions” · Fabao’s Commentary〔T41n1822 0627a17〕: 「此品大文分四：一明業體、二明律儀等、三明經中諸業、四雜明諸業」 tr. “the main text of this chapter divides into four: first the entity of action, second discipline and the rest, third the actions in the sūtras, fourth miscellaneous explanations of the actions” ⇒ Puguang and Yuanhui divide it into three, Fabao into four; recorded without adjudication
The first outline of this unit (the three name it alike · two forms of numbering)	Puguang’s Record〔T41n1821 0250c06〕: 「此下第七明黑黑等。就中，一明四業名體、二明無漏斷別、三敘異說不同」 tr. “below, the seventh, explaining the black-black and the rest. Within it, first the names and entities of the four actions, second the distinctions in what the actions without outflows cut off, third the recording of divergent accounts” · Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary〔T41n1823 0906a16〕: 「從此第七，明黑黑等，就中：一明四業、二明無漏斷、三明異說」 tr. “from here the seventh, explaining the black-black and the rest, within it: first the four actions, second the cutting off by the action without outflows, third the divergent accounts” · Fabao’s Commentary〔T41n1822 0662a11〕: 「自此已下有四頌半，第八明經中黑黑等四業」 tr. “from here below there are four and a half stanzas, the eighth, explaining the four actions black-black and the rest spoken of in the sūtras” ⇒ the sense of the threefold division agrees entirely in all three (the names and entities of the four actions · the distinctions in cutting off by what is without outflows · the recording of divergent accounts), while the wording of the outline names differs in all three (word for word as quoted in the column above: Puguang gives the names and entities of the four actions · the distinctions in cutting off by what is without outflows · the recording of divergent accounts; Yuanhui gives the four actions · the cutting off by what is without outflows · the divergent accounts; Fabao gives the entity of action · the differences in cutting off · the relating of divergent accounts); only in the numbering do Puguang and Yuanhui give the seventh and Fabao the eighth
The beginning of the chapter on the ten paths of action (the three mark it alike · the six subsections identical)	The base text reads 「又經中言：有十業道，或善或惡」 tr. “again the sūtra says: there are ten paths of action, some wholesome and some evil”〔T29 0084b13〕— Puguang’s Record〔T41n1821 0252c27〕: 「此下第十明十業道。就中，一明業道體性、二釋業道名義、三義便明斷善、四明業道俱轉、五約處成業道、六明業道三果」 tr. “below, the tenth, explaining the ten paths of action. Within it, first the nature of the entity of a path of action, second the explanation of the sense of the name path of action, third the cutting off of the wholesome taken up as convenient to the sense, fourth the paths of action turning together, fifth the completing of a path of action with respect to a place, sixth the three results of the paths of action” · Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary〔T41n1823 0907b03〕: 「從此第十，明十業道」 tr. “from here the tenth, explaining the ten paths of action” · Fabao’s Commentary〔T41n1822 0663c03〕: 「論『又經中說有十業道』，已下一頌，第十一明十業道也」 tr. “the treatise’s ‘again the sūtra says there are ten paths of action’: below, one stanza, the eleventh, explaining the ten paths of action.” Fabao cites the treatise with 「說」 tr. “says” where the base text has 「言」 tr. “says”; recorded without adjudication
The three commentaries’ fascicle divisions agree entirely with Xuanzang’s	Puguang’s fascicle sixteen〔T41n1821 0250c02〕(with the continued chapter title 「分別業品第四之四」 tr. “Chapter Four, Analysis of Action, part four”〔T41n1821 0250c05〕) · Fabao’s fascicle sixteen〔T41n1822 0662a07〕(with the continued chapter title 「分別業品第四之四」 tr. “Chapter Four, Analysis of Action, part four”〔T41n1822 0662a10〕) · Yuanhui’s treatise proper, sixteen〔T41n1823 0906a14〕(with no separate chapter-title line, the fascicle beginning directly with the main text) ⇒ the three divide their fascicles independently and yet their boundaries agree one by one with Xuanzang’s, and this is an independent witness for the carving of this unit
The closing sentence of the fascicle	「彼經具顯謗業謗果謗聖邪見，此頌舉初等言攝後」 tr. “that sūtra displays in full the wrong views that slander action, slander results, and slander the noble ones; the present stanza raises the first and by the word ‘and the rest’ gathers in the rest”〔T29 0088b17〕— the general close of the explanation of the path of action of wrong view, followed immediately by the end-title of Fascicle Sixteen
The transition of the next unit (not belonging to this unit)	「如是已辯十業道相。依何義名業道」 tr. “thus the marks of the ten paths of action have been made out. By what sense are they named paths of action”〔T29 0088b28〕

The opening transitional sentence〔T29 0083b18〕: 「又經中說，業有四種，謂或有業黑黑異熟、或復有業白白異熟、或復有業黑白黑白異熟、或復有業非黑非白無異熟能盡諸業。其相云何？」 tr. “again the sūtra says that action is of four kinds, that is, there is action that is black and has a black maturation, or again there is action that is white and has a white maturation, or again there is action that is black-and-white and has a black-and-white maturation, or again there is action that is neither black nor white, has no maturation, and is able to exhaust the actions. What are their marks?”

Stanza / prose-commentary format: root stanzas (the stanza boundaries fixed by the separate edition T1560 · the interlinear note under the chapter title of the Chapter on Action reads one hundred thirty-one stanzas) plus the prose self-commentary. Of the twenty-three blocks in this unit, twenty-one are of root stanza —〔0083b22〕the second half of Root 60 and Root 61 (thirty characters)·〔0083c16〕Roots 62 and 63 (forty characters)·〔0084a03〕Root 64·〔0084a14〕Root 65·〔0084a28〕Root 66·〔0084b15〕Root 67·〔0084c03〕Root 68·〔0084c16〕Root 69, lines one to three (fifteen characters)·〔0085b14〕Root 69, fourth line, and the first half of Root 70 (fifteen characters)·〔0086a03〕the second half of Root 70 (ten characters)·〔0086a17〕Root 71 and the first half of Root 72 (thirty characters)·〔0086a28〕the second half of Root 72·〔0086b06〕the first half of Root 73·〔0086b19〕the second half of Root 73·〔0086b29〕the first half of Root 74·〔0086c29〕the second half of Root 74·〔0087a12〕the first half of Root 75·〔0087b04〕the second half of Root 75·〔0087b24〕Root 76·〔0088a08〕Root 77 and the first half of Root 78 (thirty characters)·〔0088b02〕the second half of Root 78 and the first half of Root 79.

Two blocks of quoted stanza · both with a warrant in the preceding text:〔0085c22〕the stanza 「若人因戲笑」 tr. “if a man by reason of jest,” whose preceding text reads 「然虛誑語所有加行從癡生者，如外論言」 tr. “as for the preparation for false speech that is produced from delusion, it is as is said in a treatise of the non-Buddhists”〔T29 0085c20〕— a stanza of a non-Buddhist treatise, neither spoken by the Buddha nor made by the author;〔0086c15〕the stanza 「壽煖及與識」 tr. “lifespan, warmth, and consciousness,” whose preceding text reads 「故薄伽梵所說頌言」 tr. “hence the stanza spoken by the Bhagavat”〔T29 0086c13〕. Neither block is included in T1560.

Both ends split a half stanza across units: Root 60 is cut by Xuanzang’s fascicle division — the first half (expounding the crooked, foul, and turbid actions) falls in Unit 3, and the second half begins this unit; Root 79 is cut by the boundary between Fascicles Sixteen and Seventeen — the first half ends within this unit and the second half belongs to Unit 5. The criterion hangs upon whether a block of citation-and-explanation in the base text is cut open, and the blocks of citation-and-explanation on either side are each complete, so this is no ground for a lower carving; the half stanzas that straddle units are honestly noted in both units as first half and second half.

The longest single passage of prose commentary〔0084c16〕the explanation of Root 69, lines one to three: eight hundred fifty-eight Chinese characters proper, containing two occurrences of 「如何」 tr. “how”·two of 「若爾」 tr. “if it be so”·one of 「云何」 tr. “how so.” The establishing of the three stages of preparatory, root, and consequent, the simile of the butcher of sheep, the dilemma whether a path of action is completed in the existence of death or after death, and the mutual serving of the ten paths of action as the preparation for and the consequence of killing — all lie within this one passage.

Five places in this unit where two accounts are recorded without adjudication (recording the two parties only · not judging which prevails): ① the two masters’ accounts at Root 64 (what is to be experienced in the hells is named purely black / what is abandoned by seeing in the desire realm is named purely black) ② the three accounts of the four bases of speech, seen, heard, sensed, and known, at Root 76 (the Vaibhāṣika masters · some other master · the earlier preceptors) ③ mistaken perception of the object in sexual misconduct — 「若於此他婦作餘他婦想」 tr. “if toward this other man’s wife one has the perception of a different other man’s wife”〔T29 0087a23〕— its 「有說亦成」 tr. “one account says it does complete it”〔T29 0087a24〕and 「有說不成」 tr. “one account says it does not complete it”〔T29 0087a25〕 ④ the divergent explanation of frivolous speech at 「有餘師說」 tr. “some other master says”〔T29 0088a17〕 ⑤ the 「有餘師言」 tr. “some other master says” and 「有說」 tr. “one account says” of the path of action of greed〔T29 0088b06〕.

Three places in this unit where a judgment is expressly passed (not a recording of two accounts without adjudication): ① the masters of similes set up 「貪瞋邪見即是意業」 tr. “greed, hatred, and wrong view are just mental action,” and the treatise records 「毘婆沙師說彼非理」 tr. “the Vaibhāṣika masters say that they speak thus without reason”〔T29 0084b06〕and lists their three grounds — the subject of this judgment is the Vaibhāṣika masters and not the author himself; ② of the two readings of 「解義」 tr. “understanding the sense” in false speech the author takes the latter, his closing words being 「如無失者應取為宗」 tr. “since thus there is no fault, this account should be taken as the tenet”〔T29 0087b17〕; ③ against the Nirgranthas’ reckoning of 「不思而殺亦得殺罪」 tr. “killing without deliberation also incurs the offense of killing,” the author brings down six objections in succession and closes with 「又非但喻，立義可成」 tr. “and besides, it is not merely that the analogy fails: the position set up can be established”〔T29 0086c27〕. Besides these, against the Vaibhāṣika masters’ explanation of seen, heard, sensed, and known the author brings down the refuting words 「此證不成，且經非證，經義別故」 tr. “this proof does not hold; and let it be said first that the sūtra is no proof, for the sense of the sūtra lies elsewhere”〔T29 0087c14〕, and thereafter quotes separately the accounts of two parties — what is refuted is the force of the scriptural proof, and he does not thereby set up a tenet of his own.

II. Terminology (Technical Terms)

Chinese (Xuanzang)	Paramārtha’s divergent name (loc of first occurrence)	The treatise’s defining sentence / what it hangs on
black-black action	black action with a black retribution〔T29n1559 0239b23〕	「諸不善業一向名黑，染污性故，異熟亦黑，不可意故」 tr. “all unwholesome action is called black without exception, because its nature is defiled; and the maturation is likewise black, because it is not agreeable”〔0083b26〕
white-white action	white action with a white retribution〔T29n1559 0239b23〕	「色界善業一向名白，不雜惡故，異熟亦白，是可意故」 tr. “wholesome action of the form realm is called white without exception, because it is not mingled with evil; and the maturation is likewise white, because it is agreeable”〔0083b27〕
black-and-white action	black-and-white action with a black-and-white retribution〔T29n1559 0239b23〕	「欲界善業名為黑白，惡所雜故，異熟亦黑白，非愛果雜故」 tr. “wholesome action of the desire realm is called black-and-white, because it is mingled with evil; and the maturation is likewise black-and-white, because its unlovely results are mingled therein”〔0083c02〕·「此黑白名依相續立，非據自性」 tr. “this name black-and-white is established with respect to a continuum, and not with respect to intrinsic nature”〔0083c03〕
action neither black nor white	action not black and not white〔T29n1559 0239b23〕	「諸無漏業能永斷盡前三業者名為非黑，不染污故，亦名非白，以不能招白異熟故」 tr. “the actions without outflows that can forever cut off and exhaust the former three actions are called not black, because they are undefiled; and are also called not white, because they cannot draw a white maturation”〔0083c08〕
spoken with a hidden intent	「不了義說」 tr. “spoken in a sense not fully drawn out”〔T29n1559 0239c13〕	what 「此非白言是密意說」 tr. “this word ‘not white’ is spoken with a hidden intent”〔0083c10〕hangs upon — with the Sūtra of the Great Emptiness as proof
muni	「牟那」 tr. “Mouna”〔T29n1559 0240a11〕	「勝義牟尼唯心為體」 tr. “the muni in the ultimate sense has mind alone for its entity”〔0084a17〕·「由遠離義建立牟尼」 tr. “it is from the sense of keeping away that muni is established”〔0084a19〕
the three purities	the three kinds of purity (of the same family)	「暫永遠離一切惡行煩惱垢故名為清淨」 tr. “because they keep away, whether for a time or forever, from all evil conduct and from the grime of the afflictions, they are called purities”〔0084a23〕
the three kinds of evil conduct · the three kinds of good conduct	the three kinds of evil conduct · the three kinds of wholesome conduct (of the same family)	「一切不善身語意業，如次名身語意惡行」 tr. “all unwholesome bodily, verbal, and mental action is called in order bodily, verbal, and mental evil conduct”〔0084b01〕·「三妙行者，翻此應知」 tr. “as for the three kinds of good conduct, they are to be known as the reverse of these”〔0084b10〕
path of action	path of action (the same)	「於前所說惡妙行中，若麁顯易知，攝為十業道」 tr. “within the evil conduct and good conduct spoken of above, whatever is coarse, evident, and easily known is gathered in as the ten paths of action”〔0084b17〕
manifest · nonmanifest	instructive · uninstructive (a term of Paramārtha’s system)	「七惡業道中，六定有無表」 tr. “among the seven evil paths of action, six necessarily have the nonmanifest”〔0084c05〕
the preparatory stage	the preparatory stage (the same)	「業道加行必定有表，此位無表或有或無」 tr. “the preparatory stage of a path of action necessarily has the manifest, and the nonmanifest at this stage may or may not be present”〔0084c18〕·「如是皆名殺生加行」 tr. “all this is called the preparatory stage of killing”〔0084c27〕
the root path of action	the root path of action (of the same family)	「此剎那頃表無表業，是謂殺生根本業道」 tr. “the manifest and nonmanifest action within this single moment, this is called the root path of action of killing”〔0084c28〕·「由二緣故，令諸有情根本業道殺罪所觸：一由加行、二由果滿」 tr. “by two conditions are sentient beings touched by the offense of killing that belongs to the root path of action: first by the preparatory stage, second by the fullness of the result”〔0084c29〕
the consequent stage	the consequent stage (of the same family)	「此剎那後殺無表業隨轉不絕，名殺後起」 tr. “after this moment the nonmanifest action of killing turns along unbroken, and this is called the consequent stage of killing”〔0085a01〕
the three unwholesome roots	the three unwholesome roots (of the same family)	「不善業道加行生時，一一由三不善根起」 tr. “when the preparatory stage of an unwholesome path of action arises, in every case it arises from the three unwholesome roots”〔0085b16〕
completion	completion (of the same family)	「惡業道中殺生、麁語、瞋恚業道，由瞋究竟」 tr. “among the evil paths of action, the paths of action of killing, harsh speech, and hatred are completed by hatred”〔0086a20〕
the four places on which the paths of action depend	—— (Paramārtha abridges this passage)	「謂殺等三有情處起，偷盜等三眾具處起，唯邪見一名色處起，虛誑語等三名身等處起」 tr. “that is, the three of killing and the rest arise in the place of sentient beings; the three of stealing and the rest arise in the place of goods; wrong view alone arises in the place of name-and-form; and the three of false speech and the rest arise in the place of the name-bodies and the rest”〔0086b01〕
killing	killing (the same)	「要由先發欲殺故思，於他有情他有情想，作殺加行不誤而殺」 tr. “one must first set going the deliberate volition to kill, and with respect to another sentient being raise the perception of another sentient being, and set going the preparation for killing and kill not by mistake”〔0086c01〕·「有猶豫殺亦成殺生」 tr. “killing with hesitation also completes killing”〔0086c03〕
the breath-wind (a rendering by sense)	「波羅那」 tr. “prāṇa” (a rendering by sound · glossed as 「以風為義」 tr. “it has wind for its sense”〔T29n1559 0242a16〕)	「息風名生，依身心轉，若有令斷不更續生」 tr. “the breath-wind is called life, and it turns in dependence upon body and mind; if a man makes it be cut off so that it no longer continues to arise”〔0086c07〕·「或復生者即是命根，若有令斷不續名殺」 tr. “or else what is called life is just the life faculty; if a man makes it be cut off so that it does not continue, that is called killing”〔0086c09〕
taking what is not given	「偷盜」 tr. “stealing”〔T29n1559 0242b05〕	「於他物中起他物想，或力或竊起盜加行，不誤而取令屬己身」 tr. “with respect to another’s goods raise the perception of another’s goods, and by force or by stealth set going the preparation for stealing, and take not by mistake, making it belong to oneself”〔0087a02〕
stūpa	「藪抖波」 tr. “soudoupo”〔T29n1559 0242b08〕	「若有盜取窣堵波物，彼於如來得偷盜罪」 tr. “if a man steals the goods of a stūpa, he incurs the offense of stealing with respect to the Tathāgata”〔0087a04〕
sexual misconduct	「邪婬」 tr. “fornication”〔T29n1559 0241b09〕	「總有四種行不應行，皆得名為欲邪行罪」 tr. “there are in all four kinds of going where one ought not to go, and all of them get the name of the offense of sexual misconduct”〔0087a13〕
false speech	「妄語」 tr. “lying”〔T29n1559 0241b15〕	「於所說義異想發言，及所誑者解所說義，染心不誤成虛誑語」 tr. “to raise a divergent perception with respect to the sense one speaks and to utter it, the one deceived understanding the sense spoken, with a defiled mind and not by mistake, completes false speech”〔0087b05〕
seen, heard, sensed, known (the four bases of speech)	seen, heard, sensed, known (of the same family)	「若境由眼識所證名所見」 tr. “if an object is attested by eye consciousness it is called what is seen”〔0087b26〕and the three sentences following
divisive speech	「破語」 tr. “breaking speech”〔T29n1559 0243a24〕／「兩舌」 tr. “double-tongued speech”〔T29n1559 0241b19〕	「若染污心發壞他語，若他壞不壞俱成離間語」 tr. “if with a defiled mind one sets going an utterance that would break another, then whether or not the other is broken, divisive speech is completed in either case”〔0088a11〕
harsh speech	「惡語」 tr. “evil speech”〔T29n1559 0243a27〕	「若以染心發非愛語毀呰於他，名麁惡語」 tr. “if with a defiled mind one sets going an unlovely utterance abusing another, that is called harsh speech”〔0088a12〕
frivolous speech	「非應語」 tr. “unfitting speech” (also named scattered speech)〔T29n1559 0243b02〕	「一切染心所發諸語名雜穢語」 tr. “all utterances set going by a defiled mind are called frivolous speech”〔0088a15〕
the path of action of greed	the path of action of sensual greed (of the same family)	「於他財物惡欲名貪」 tr. “evil desire toward another’s goods is called greed”〔0088b04〕
the path of action of hatred	the path of action of hostility (of the same family)	「於有情類憎恚名瞋」 tr. “to raise hostility toward the class of sentient beings is called hatred”〔0088b11〕
the path of action of wrong view	the path of action of wrong view (of the same family)	「於善惡等惡見撥無，此見名為邪見業道」 tr. “to deny outright with an evil view, with respect to the wholesome and the evil and the rest, this view is called the path of action of wrong view”〔0088b13〕
the masters of similes	「譬喻部」 tr. “the school of similes”〔T29n1559 0240a29〕	they set up the tenet 「貪瞋邪見即是意業」 tr. “greed, hatred, and wrong view are just mental action”〔0084b03〕— Puguang marks them as Sautrāntikas (see item six)
the Vaibhāṣikas / the Vaibhāṣika masters	the Vaibhāṣika masters (of the same family)	「毘婆沙者釋此文言」 tr. “the Vaibhāṣikas explain this text, saying”〔0085a17〕·「毘婆沙師作如是說」 tr. “the Vaibhāṣika masters speak thus”〔0087b26〕
the Nirgranthas	—— (Paramārtha’s corresponding sentence for this passage is given otherwise)	「離繫者言，不思而殺亦得殺罪」 tr. “the Nirgranthas say: killing without deliberation also incurs the offense of killing”〔0086c18〕— Puguang marks them as Nirgranthas, non-Buddhists who go naked (see item six)
the earlier preceptors	—— (Paramārtha gives this account otherwise)	「先軌範師作如是說」 tr. “the earlier preceptors speak thus”〔0087c24〕— Puguang explains the name as 「學瑜伽論者，名先軌範師」 tr. “those who study the Yogācārabhūmi are called the earlier preceptors”〔T41n1821 0261a26〕
Bolasi	「波尸國人」 tr. “the people of the country of Boshi”〔T29n1559 0241a25〕	what the non-Buddhist account of killing arising from delusion hangs upon — 「又波剌私作如是說」 tr. “again the people of Persia speak thus”〔0085b23〕

The Sanskrit in roman letters for a technical term is hung only upon transcriptions transmitted by the ancient masters and capable of being evidenced. Most of the divergent names in this unit are differences of rendering-character between the two translations (for the full table see item four), and not glosses of sound and sense by the ancient masters; only for the name 「牟尼」 tr. “muni” do the three commentaries transmit the same gloss (「牟尼，此云寂默」 tr. “muni, which here means silent stillness”; see item six), which is recorded at item six. The rest are left blank, and are not supplied conjecturally on the authority of a modern collated edition.

III. Textual Collation (Taishō Original Notes + CBETA Restorations · Complete Enumeration for Fascicle Sixteen)

Within the range of Unit 4〔0083b13–0088b22〕the anchors of collation notes number thirty-one, of which the notes restoring Sanskrit are twelve (giving only the roman letters of a Sanskrit name, not variant readings, and by the form of this collection not entering the table below); the remaining nineteen = variant readings in the <app> system thirteen (repetitions merged, zero) + CBETA restorations six (marked ⟨CB⟩ · not entered into the count of thirteen above · listed at the end of the table) + without witness zero. Of the six restorations, three (0085003·0088004·0088005) have original Taishō collation notes of their own, whose printed readings are recorded alongside; three (0085c1601·0087c0801·0087c2601) are noted by CBETA alone, with no original Taishō collation note. All thirteen variant readings are listed, the base text following the Taishō 【大】 reading.

Note no.	Anchor	Base text 【大】 / variants	Context (word for word · the base-text reading)	The character collated	Observation (recorded without adjudication)
0083005	0083c02	黑／異【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「欲界善業名為黑白，惡所雜故，異熟亦黑白，非愛果雜故」 tr. “wholesome action of the desire realm is called black-and-white, because it is mingled with evil; and the maturation is likewise black-and-white, because its unlovely results are mingled therein”	『黑』	Read as 「異」 tr. “divergent” it would make “called divergent-white,” which does not agree with the pairing of the following clause 「異熟亦黑白」 tr. “the maturation is likewise black-and-white”; it does not touch the doctrinal spine of 「黑白名依相續立」 tr. “the name black-and-white is established with respect to a continuum”
0084004	0084c25	㨊／揣【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「㨊觸羊身酬價捉取」 tr. “feels the body of the sheep, pays the price and takes hold of it”	『㨊』	Both characters have the sense of feeling and probing with the hand, and the action of the simile of the butcher of sheep is unchanged
0084005	0084c25	飯／飼【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「牽還養飯將入屠坊」 tr. “leads it back and feeds it, and drives it into the slaughterhouse”	『飯』	To feed and to fodder both mean to nourish, and the sense is close
0085001	0085a03	稱／秤【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「若稱若賣或煮，或食讚述其美」 tr. “or the weighing, or the selling, or the cooking, or the eating, or the praising of its savor”	『稱』	The two characters are variant writings of one thing, both meaning to weigh; this sentence belongs to the instances of the consequent stage of killing
0085002	0085a12	以／已【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「若所殺生命終以後，能殺生者業道方成」 tr. “if the killer’s path of action is completed only after the sentient being killed has ended his life”	『以』	The two characters were used interchangeably in the old language for the marking of temporal position, and this does not touch the adjudication whether a path of action is completed in the existence of death or after death
0085004	0085a17	者／師【明】	「毘婆沙者釋此文言」 tr. “the Vaibhāṣikas explain this text, saying”	『者』	Read as 「師」 tr. “masters” it would agree exactly with 「毘婆沙師」 tr. “the Vaibhāṣika masters” elsewhere in this unit〔0087b26〕; it touches the wording of an appellation and not the doctrine
0085005	0085b05	愛／受【宋】【元】	「復於後時誅其所親，收其財物婬彼所愛」 tr. “and afterwards he puts to death his kin, takes his goods, and fornicates with the woman he loved”	『愛』	This sentence stands within the enumeration of the ten paths of action as the consequent stage of killing, and 「婬彼所愛」 tr. “fornicates with the woman he loved” is paired with the foregoing 「收其財物」 tr. “takes his goods”; read as 「受」 tr. “received,” the phrasing does not make the pair
0085006	0085c06	後／〔－〕【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「世間財物於劫初時，大梵天王施諸梵志，於後梵志勢力微劣」 tr. “the goods of the world at the beginning of the aeon were bestowed by the great Brahmā king upon the brahmin seers, and later the power of the seers waned”	『後』	Whether the character 「後」 tr. “later” is present touches only the fullness or brevity of the phrasing, and not the doctrine that the preparation for stealing arises from delusion
0085007	0085c16	簡／揀【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「吸水齧草或住或行，不簡親踈隨遇隨合」 tr. “drinking water and cropping grass, standing or walking, coupling as they meet without distinction of near kin or stranger”	『簡』	The two characters are variant writings of one sense, both meaning to distinguish; this sentence belongs to the non-Buddhist account of the preparation for fornication produced from delusion
0086002	0086b27	曰／自【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「謂齊何量名曰殺生」 tr. “that is, to what degree is it called killing”	『曰』	Read as 「自」 tr. “of itself” the syntax does not stand; this sentence is the general question introducing the six passages that follow on the marks of the paths of action
0086003	0086c22	獲／受【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「此等皆應獲苦他罪」 tr. “all these ought to incur the offense of causing another to suffer”	『獲』	To incur and to receive are close in sense (both meaning to get), and this does not touch the spine of the author’s six counter-objections against the Nirgranthas
0087002	0087a17	逈／迴【宋】【元】【宮】	「三於非處行不應行，謂於寺中制多逈處」 tr. “the third is going where one ought not in a forbidden place, that is, within a monastery, in the place of a caitya, or in a remote place”	『逈』	『逈』 means remote and 『迴』 means winding about, so the place indicated differs a little, but this does not touch the establishing of the four kinds of sexual misconduct
0088002	0088a13	呰／訾【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「毀呰於他，名麁惡語」 tr. “abusing another, that is called harsh speech”	『呰』	『呰』 and 『訾』 are variant writings of one sense (both meaning to slander), and this does not touch the conditions by which harsh speech completes a path of action

Six CBETA restorations (⟨CB⟩ · not entered into the count of thirteen above · where an original printed note exists it is recorded alongside) — by the form of this collection: the reading listed first is the one the base-text stream follows.

Note no.	Anchor	Reading (the first listed = the base-text stream)	Taishō original printed collation note	Context (word for word · the base-text reading)
0085003 ⟨CB⟩	0085a13	則【CB】【麗-CB】【宋】【元】【明】【宮】／即【大】	『即＝則』【三】【宮】	「是則不應先作是說：隨此表業彼正命終」 tr. “then it ought not to have been said before: following upon this manifest act, that one just then ends its life”
0085c1601 ⟨CB⟩	0085c16	踈【CB】【麗-CB】／疎【大】	——(no original Taishō note)	「吸水齧草或住或行，不簡親踈隨遇隨合」 tr. “drinking water and cropping grass, standing or walking, coupling as they meet without distinction of near kin or stranger”
0087c0801 ⟨CB⟩	0087c08	唯【CB】【麗-CB】／雖【大】	——(no original Taishō note)	「汝於此中應知所見，唯有所見」 tr. “herein, with respect to what is seen you should know that there is only what is seen”
0087c2601 ⟨CB⟩	0087c26	搆【CB】【麗-CB】／構【大】	——(no original Taishō note)	「自運己心諸所思搆名為所覺」 tr. “whatever one’s own mind constructs by thought of every kind is called what is sensed”
0088004 ⟨CB⟩	0088a17	〔－〕【CB】【麗-CB】【宋】【宮】／語【大】	〔語〕－【宋】【宮】	「染所發言皆雜穢故」 tr. “because all speech set going by a defiled mind is frivolous”
0088005 ⟨CB⟩	0088a22	倡伎【CB】【麗-CB】／倡妓【大】／相枝【宋】／倡𠆸【磧-CB】	『倡妓＝相枝』【宋】	「及倡伎者為悅他情以染污心作諸詞曲」 tr. “and performers, in order to please the feelings of others, make all manner of songs with a defiled mind”

Honest note one: the two notes 0084004 and 0084005 are anchored at the same place〔0084c25〕, both falling within one sentence of the simile of the butcher of sheep (「㨊觸羊身酬價捉取，牽還養飯將入屠坊」 tr. “feels the body of the sheep, pays the price and takes hold of it, leads it back and feeds it, and drives it into the slaughterhouse”), and they are not one note counted twice.

Honest note two: the place restored at 0085c1601 and the variant reading 0085007 are anchored at the same place〔0085c16〕— within one and the same line there are both a Taishō collation note of a variant reading (『簡／揀』) and a CBETA restoration (『踈／疎』), and what the two collate is not the same character; both are listed in the two tables of this item.

Honest note three: the two restorations 0087c0801 and 0087c2601 both fall within the one passage on seen, heard, sensed, and known (the explanation of Root 76) — the former within the quoted sūtra in which the Buddha addresses the Great Mother, the latter within the account of the earlier preceptors.

Honest note four: of the six restorations, the base-text stream of this unit (L1 of this collection) follows the CBETA reading at every place and not the Taishō printed reading — 「是則不應先作是說」 tr. “then it ought not to have been said before” (not 「即」 tr. “thereupon”)·「不簡親踈」 tr. “without distinction of near kin or stranger” (not 「疎」 tr. “estranged”)·「唯有所見」 tr. “there is only what is seen” (not 「雖」 tr. “though”)·「諸所思搆」 tr. “whatever is constructed by thought” (not 「構」 tr. “construes”)·「皆雜穢故」 tr. “because all is frivolous” (the Taishō having the intrusive character 「語」 tr. “speech”)·「及倡伎者」 tr. “and performers” (not 「倡妓」 tr. “singing girls”). All six places collate either a graphic form or an intrusive character, and not one touches a doctrinal adjudication.

Closing note on the collation: of the thirteen, seven are graphically similar corruptions or variant writings of one sense (『㨊／揣』·『飯／飼』·『稱／秤』·『以／已』·『簡／揀』·『獲／受』·『呰／訾』), one touches the wording of an appellation (0085004 『者／師』), and five touch the fullness or brevity of the context or a slight difference in what is indicated without touching the doctrinal spine (0083005·0085005·0085006·0086002·0087002). Not one of them touches the core of a doctrinal adjudication — the constituting of the ten paths of action, the three stages of preparatory, root, and consequent, the completion by the three roots, and the four places the paths of action depend upon are none of them shaken by a variant reading. There is no case for raising a variant into the fixed text (none where both an ancient master’s citation and doctrine support the variant). The variants are recorded alongside for reference, and this item only records without adjudicating.

IV. Comparison with Paramārtha’s Earlier Translation (Expository Treatise on the Treasury of Abhidharma T1559 ★)

The base of the comparison: Xuanzang’s Fascicle Sixteen〔T29n1558 0083b13–0088b22〕↔ Paramārtha〔T29n1559 0239b23–0243b27〕.

The fixing of the boundaries of the passage (by the structure of the scene · not by making a fascicle title serve for it) — Beginning: Xuanzang’s opening sentence 「又經中說，業有四種」 tr. “again the sūtra says that action is of four kinds”〔T29n1558 0083b18〕, where Paramārtha states the same establishing of the four actions directly in verse, 「黑白等差別，復說業四種」 tr. “the differences of black and white and the rest, action is again said to be of four kinds”〔T29n1559 0239b23〕, after which the two texts explain sentence by sentence how the four actions black-black, white-white, black-and-white, and neither-black-nor-white get their names, their doctrinal nodes interlocking one by one (Xuanzang’s 「諸不善業一向名黑」 tr. “all unwholesome action is called black without exception” / Paramārtha’s 「非善業者，一向名黑」 tr. “what is not wholesome action is called black without exception”〔T29n1559 0239b28〕). Ending: Xuanzang’s closing sentence 「彼經具顯謗業謗果謗聖邪見，此頌舉初等言攝後」 tr. “that sūtra displays in full the wrong views that slander action, slander results, and slander the noble ones; the present stanza raises the first and by the word ‘and the rest’ gathers in the rest”〔T29n1558 0088b17〕, where Paramārtha gives 「此邪見具足，謂撥業、撥果、撥聖人。於經中有多種文句，此偈但顯重」 tr. “this wrong view is complete, that is, denying action, denying results, denying the noble persons. In the sūtra there are many kinds of clauses, and this verse displays only the weighty ones”〔T29n1559 0243b26〕; whereupon Paramārtha follows immediately with 「是十業道體相，如此業道是何義？偈曰：此後三，唯道七業道」 tr. “such are the entity and marks of the ten paths of action; by what sense are these paths of action so called? The verse says: of these the last three are paths only, and seven are paths of action”〔T29n1559 0243b28〕, turning to the new question of the establishing of the name path of action — a question that has no corresponding sentence anywhere in Xuanzang’s Unit 4, and belongs to Fascicle Seventeen (Unit 5).

The two translations divide their fascicles differently: Paramārtha divides the Chapter on Action into four fascicles and Xuanzang into six, and the passage corresponding to this unit falls wholly within Paramārtha’s 「之三」 tr. “part three” fascicle, so the boundaries of the passage can be fixed only by the structure of the scene, and a fascicle title may not be made to serve for them. The basic difference of form: Xuanzang gives 「頌曰／論曰」 tr. “the stanza says / the treatise says,” setting out the whole stanza first and the prose after; Paramārtha gives 「偈曰／釋曰」 tr. “the verse says / the explanation says,” embedding the explanation line by line, one stanza often being broken up and quoted in several places.

The main items of comparison (item by item · recording the twenty that bear doctrinal weight or differ in the system of rendering-names):

The opening out and drawing together of the opening stanza — Xuanzang’s stanza of six lines states in one breath the causal and resultant kinds of the four actions and the volition without outflows that can exhaust them〔0083b22〕; Paramārtha’s verse gives only the two lines 「黑白等差別，復說業四種」 tr. “the differences of black and white and the rest, action is again said to be of four kinds”〔T29n1559 0239b23〕, stating first that there are differences, while the details of the four actions are wholly supplied by the explanation line by line. A difference of opening out and drawing together: Xuanzang’s stanza is full and Paramārtha’s verse spare, the prose making up the rest.
Why the wholesome of the formless realm is not called white — Xuanzang: 「何故不言無色界善？傳說若處有二異熟謂中生有，具三種業謂身語意，則說非餘」 tr. “why is the wholesome of the formless realm not spoken of? It is transmitted that wherever there are two maturations, namely intermediate existence and the existence of birth, and the three actions complete, namely body, speech, and mind, there it is spoken of and not elsewhere”〔0083b28〕‖ Paramārtha: 「云何不說無色界業？若是處有二種果報，謂中陰、生陰。有三種業，謂身口意。此中說黑白業，餘處不說」 tr. “why is the action of the formless realm not spoken of? Where there are two kinds of retribution, namely the intermediate aggregate and the birth aggregate, and three kinds of action, namely body, mouth, and mind — there black-and-white action is spoken of, and elsewhere it is not”〔T29n1559 0239c01〕. The doctrine is closely the same, and 「中生有」 tr. “intermediate existence and the existence of birth” / 「中陰生陰」 tr. “the intermediate aggregate and the birth aggregate” is a difference of rendering-system.
The scriptural proof that wholesome action of the desire realm is called black-and-white · a difference in attribution — Xuanzang: 「然契經中有處亦說：欲界善業名為黑白，惡所雜故」 tr. “yet there is a place in the sūtras where it is also said: wholesome action of the desire realm is called black-and-white, because it is mingled with evil”〔0083c01〕gives it directly as the treatise’s own statement; Paramārtha: 「有餘師云：此亦於餘經中說。欲界善業名黑白業，非善所雜故」 tr. “some other master says: this too is spoken of in another sūtra. Wholesome action of the desire realm is called black-and-white action, because it is mingled with the unwholesome”〔T29n1559 0239c04〕attaches this scriptural proof to some other master. ⇒ One and the same scriptural proof, and the subject to which the two texts attribute it differs; recorded without adjudication.
The hidden intent of “neither black nor white” — Xuanzang: 「此非白言是密意說，以佛於彼《大空經》中告阿難陀：諸無學法純善純白一向無罪」 tr. “this word ‘not white’ is spoken with a hidden intent, since the Buddha in the Sūtra of the Great Emptiness told Ānanda: all the dharmas of one beyond learning are purely wholesome, purely white, and wholly without blame”〔0083c10〕‖ Paramārtha: 「此不白言，是不了義說，有別意故。佛世尊於《大空經》中，依無學法說：阿難！如此法，一向白、一向善、一向無訶」 tr. “this word ‘not white’ is spoken in a sense not fully drawn out, having a further intent. The Buddha the World-Honored One in the Sūtra of the Great Emptiness, with respect to the dharmas of one beyond learning, said: Ānanda! such dharmas are wholly white, wholly wholesome, wholly without reproach”〔T29n1559 0239c12〕. Both texts name the Sūtra of the Great Emptiness, while Xuanzang gives “spoken with a hidden intent” and Paramārtha “spoken in a sense not fully drawn out” — a difference of rendering-system, the sense the same and the words different.
The first master’s account of the black and the mingled black (experience in the hells) — Xuanzang: 「有餘師說：順地獄受及欲界中順餘受業，如次名為純黑雜業。謂地獄異熟唯不善業感，故順彼受名純黑業」 tr. “some other master says: action to be experienced in the hells and action within the desire realm to be experienced in the remaining destinies are called in order purely black action and mingled action. Because the maturation of the hells is drawn by unwholesome action alone, action to be experienced there is called purely black action”〔0084a05〕‖ Paramārtha: 「有餘師見，應受地獄報業，離地獄於欲界餘道應受報業，次第應知是黑業是黑白業。何以故？唯地獄定是惡業報故，說受地獄報業名黑業」 tr. “some other master holds that action whose retribution is to be undergone in the hells, and action whose retribution is to be undergone in the remaining destinies of the desire realm apart from the hells, are to be known in order as black action and black-and-white action. Why so? Because the hells alone are assuredly the retribution of evil action, and so action whose retribution is undergone in the hells is called black action”〔T29n1559 0240a02〕. The doctrine is wholly the same, with a slight difference in the order of the clauses, general before particular.
The second master’s account of the black and the mingled black (abandoned by seeing) — Xuanzang: 「有餘師說：欲見所斷及欲界中所有餘業，如次名為純黑俱業。謂見所斷無善雜故名純黑業，欲修所斷有善不善故名俱業」 tr. “some other master says: what is abandoned by seeing in the desire realm and all the remaining action within the desire realm are called in order purely black action and action that is both. What is abandoned by seeing has no wholesome mingled with it and so is called purely black action; what is abandoned by cultivation in the desire realm is partly wholesome and partly unwholesome and so is called action that is both”〔0084a09〕‖ Paramārtha: 「有餘師說：見諦所滅業名黑業，與善不相雜故……欲界業異見諦所滅業，名黑白業。此異云何？謂修道所滅。何以故？此業有善有惡」 tr. “some other master says: action extinguished by seeing the truths is called black action, since it is not mingled with the wholesome … action of the desire realm other than what is extinguished by seeing the truths is called black-and-white action. What is this other? It is what is extinguished by the path of cultivation. Why so? Because this action is partly wholesome and partly evil”〔T29n1559 0240a07〕. Both texts head these two accounts with “some other master” and do not name their school; recorded without adjudication.
The establishing of the name of the three munis — Xuanzang: 「無學身語業，名身語牟尼，意牟尼即無學意非意業」 tr. “the bodily and verbal action of one beyond learning is called the muni of body and the muni of speech; the muni of mind is the mind of one beyond learning and not mental action”〔0084a16〕‖ Paramārtha: 「無學身口業，意應知次第，三牟那。釋曰：無學身口二業，名身口牟那。無學心名意牟那，非意業」 tr. “the bodily and verbal action of one beyond learning, and the mind, should be known in order as the three Mouna. Explanation: the two actions of body and mouth of one beyond learning are called the Mouna of body and of mouth. The mind of one beyond learning is called the Mouna of mind, and not mental action”〔T29n1559 0240a11〕. Muni / Mouna, a difference in the characters used to transcribe one and the same Sanskrit word.
The question and answer why a muni is only at the stage beyond learning — Xuanzang: 「何故牟尼唯在無學？以阿羅漢是實牟尼，諸煩惱言永寂靜故」 tr. “why is a muni found only at the stage beyond learning? Because the arhat is the true muni, the speech of all the afflictions being forever stilled”〔0084a21〕‖ Paramārtha: 「云何說無學不說餘？阿羅漢是真實聖者故。一切，或言分別滅故」 tr. “why is one beyond learning spoken of and not the rest? Because the arhat is the truly real noble one. All, or it is said, because discrimination is extinguished”〔T29n1559 0240a17〕. Xuanzang’s closing sentence gives one ground alone (the afflictions being forever stilled), while Paramārtha adds a final clause whose sense is somewhat obscure — a difference of fullness and brevity, recorded without adjudication and not supplied conjecturally.
The scriptural proof of the masters of similes’ tenet · whether the name of the sūtra is given — Xuanzang: 「譬喻者言：貪瞋邪見即是意業，故《思經》中說此三種為意業故」 tr. “the masters of similes say: greed, hatred, and wrong view are just mental action, since the Sūtra on Volition speaks of these three as mental action”〔0084b03〕‖ Paramārtha: 「譬喻部說：貪等名意業，於故心作。經中說：若執如此，惑業成一性」 tr. “the school of similes says: greed and the rest are called mental action, done with deliberate mind. The sūtra says: if it be grasped thus, affliction and action become one nature”〔T29n1559 0240a29〕. The punctuation of this sentence of Paramārtha’s admits of two readings today, and both are recorded without adjudication: ① taking the present punctuation, 「於故心作。經中說」 tr. “done with deliberate mind. The sūtra says” — Paramārtha says only that the sūtra says so and does not name the sūtra, which against Xuanzang’s naming of the Sūtra on Volition is a difference in the fullness of the source of the scriptural proof; ② taking the three characters 「故心作」 tr. “deliberate mental doing” as the rendering of the sūtra’s name (Paramārtha’s system rendering Xuanzang’s 「思」 tr. “volition” by these), the passage should then be read as “the Sūtra on Deliberate Mental Doing says,” answering position for position to Xuanzang’s 「故《思經》中說」 tr. “hence the Sūtra on Volition says”, in which case both texts name this sūtra and only the rendering of the name differs; on that reading the following 「若執如此，惑業成一性」 tr. “if it be grasped thus, affliction and action become one nature” is language of objection (answering to Xuanzang’s 「若爾，則應業與煩惱合成一體」 tr. “if that were so, then action and affliction would be combined into one entity”) and not the sūtra text quoted. The two readings stand together, and this item does not adjudicate (see also honest note two).
The general statement of the ten paths of action — Xuanzang: 「於前所說惡妙行中，若麁顯易知，攝為十業道。如應若善攝前妙行，不善業道攝前惡行」 tr. “within the evil conduct and good conduct spoken of above, whatever is coarse, evident, and easily known is gathered in as the ten paths of action. As is fitting, the wholesome gather in the good conduct above, and the unwholesome paths of action gather in the evil conduct above”〔0084b17〕‖ Paramārtha: 「前所說惡行及善行中，由攝明了易知善惡二業，是故經中說十業道，如理應知，若善從善行出，若惡從惡行出」 tr. “within the evil conduct and wholesome conduct spoken of above, because they gather in the clear and easily known wholesome and evil actions, therefore the sūtra speaks of ten paths of action, as should be known in accordance with principle: the wholesome issue from wholesome conduct and the evil from evil conduct”〔T29n1559 0240b11〕. The doctrine is wholly the same; Paramārtha adds the words 「是故經中說」 tr. “therefore the sūtra speaks,” tracing the establishing of the name of the ten paths of action to the teaching of the sūtras, which Xuanzang’s text does not do — recorded without adjudication.
The conditions for the preparation for killing arising from greed — Xuanzang: 「如有為欲得彼身分、或為得財、或為戲樂、或為拔濟親友自身，從貪引起殺生加行」 tr. “as when for the sake of obtaining parts of the other’s body, or of obtaining goods, or for sport, or for rescuing kin, friends, and oneself, the preparation for killing is drawn forth from greed”〔0085b18〕‖ Paramārtha: 「若為得彼身分、為得物、為戲樂等事，令他失命，或為救濟自身及自眷屬」 tr. “if for the sake of obtaining parts of his body, of obtaining goods, for sport and the like, one makes another lose his life; or for the sake of saving oneself and one’s own household”〔T29n1559 0241a20〕. Xuanzang gives 「親友自身」 tr. “kin, friends, and oneself” and Paramārtha 「自身及自眷屬」 tr. “oneself and one’s own household” — a slight difference of order and extent in the wording, with no difference of doctrine.
The non-Buddhist account of killing arising from delusion — Xuanzang: 「又波剌私作如是說：父母老病，若令命終得免困苦便生勝福」 tr. “again the people of Persia speak thus: if parents are old and ill, to make them end their lives frees them from distress and produces excellent merit”〔0085b23〕‖ Paramārtha: 「又波尸國人殺業亦從癡生。何以故？彼說如此言：若二親老困及有重疾，必應為捨命」 tr. “again the killing of the people of the country of Boshi likewise arises from delusion. Why so? They speak thus: if both parents are old and worn and have a grave illness, one ought assuredly to make them lay down life”〔T29n1559 0241a25〕. Bolasi / the people of the country of Boshi, variant writings of one transcription; Paramārtha adds the qualifier 「國人」 tr. “of the country,” which Xuanzang does not.
The quoted stanza of a non-Buddhist treatise on false speech arising from delusion — Xuanzang: 「若人因戲笑，嫁娶對女王，及救命救財，虛誑語無罪」 tr. “if a man by reason of jest, of marriage, of facing a woman or a king, and for the sake of saving life or saving goods, speaks false speech, that is without offense”〔0085c22〕‖ Paramārtha: 「戲笑及女人，娶婦并救命，救財故妄語，梵王說無害」 tr. “jest and women, taking a wife and saving life, and lying for the sake of saving goods — the Brahmā king says it does no harm”〔T29n1559 0241b17〕. The order of the lines and the wording differ wholly between the two texts (Xuanzang’s 「對女王」 tr. “facing a woman or a king” belonging to the classes of occasion, Paramārtha’s 「梵王說無害」 tr. “the Brahmā king says it does no harm” being the closing line of the quotation), while the sense of the four exemptions opened is the same — one of the clearest instances of the freedom of rendering in quoted stanzas.
Fullness and brevity in killing as one in an army — Xuanzang: 「若有多人集為軍眾欲殺怨敵、或獵獸等，於中隨有一殺生時，何人得成殺生業道」 tr. “if many men gather into an army and would kill an enemy, or go hunting and the like, and at the time when any one among them does the killing, who completes the path of action of killing”〔0086b16〕‖ Paramārtha: 「復次若為殺他故，集眾為軍、或掘坑或獵或偷破。多人聚集同為此事，於中一人若行殺生事，何人得殺生罪」 tr. “again, if for the sake of killing another men gather in a body as an army, or dig pits, or hunt, or rob in bands; many men gathering to do this thing in common, if one among them does the deed of killing, who incurs the offense of killing”〔T29n1559 0241c29〕. Paramārtha has two further classes, digging pits and robbery in bands (traps · banded thieves), while Xuanzang has only the army and the hunting of beasts — Paramārtha is here fuller than Xuanzang.
The establishing of the life faculty · rendering by sense and by sound — Xuanzang: 「於剎那滅蘊，如何成殺生？息風名生，依身心轉，若有令斷不更續生」 tr. “upon aggregates that cease moment by moment, how is killing completed? The breath-wind is called life, and it turns in dependence upon body and mind; if a man makes it be cut off so that it no longer continues to arise”〔0086c07〕‖ Paramārtha: 「於剎那剎那滅五陰中，云何斷波羅那？此名有何義？以風為義，此風依身依心起」 tr. “within five aggregates that cease moment by moment, how is prāṇa cut off? What sense has this name? It has wind for its sense, and this wind arises in dependence upon body and upon mind”〔T29n1559 0242a15〕. Xuanzang takes the sense and gives 「息風」 tr. “the breath-wind,” while Paramārtha takes the sound and gives 「波羅那」 tr. “prāṇa” and then glosses its sense — a difference of rendering-practice.
The stanza of lifespan, warmth, and consciousness spoken by the Bhagavat — Xuanzang: 「壽煖及與識，三法捨身時，所捨身僵仆，如木無思覺」 tr. “when the three dharmas of lifespan, warmth, and consciousness leave the body, the body left falls stiff, like a log without thought or sensation”〔0086c15〕‖ Paramārtha: 「命根暖及識，若三棄捨身，彼捨即永眠，如枯木無覺」 tr. “the life faculty, warmth, and consciousness — when these three cast off the body, what is cast off sleeps forever, like a withered log without sensation”〔T29n1559 0242a23〕. The first word 「壽」 tr. “lifespan” / 「命根」 tr. “life faculty” is rendered by different characters, and 「僵仆」 tr. “falls stiff” answers to 「永眠」 tr. “sleeps forever” — the sense the same and the words different, an instance of the free rendering of quoted stanzas.
The offense of stealing the goods of a stūpa — Xuanzang: 「若有盜取窣堵波物，彼於如來得偷盜罪，以佛臨欲入涅槃時，哀愍世間總受所施」 tr. “if a man steals the goods of a stūpa, he incurs the offense of stealing with respect to the Tathāgata, since when the Buddha was about to enter nirvāṇa he took pity on the world and accepted in sum what was given”〔0087a04〕‖ Paramārtha: 「若盜藪抖波物，從佛得罪。何以故？一切供養物，於般涅槃時佛世尊悉已受」 tr. “if one steals the goods of a soudoupo, the offense is incurred from the Buddha. Why so? Because all things offered were already accepted by the Buddha the World-Honored One at the time of his parinirvāṇa”〔T29n1559 0242b08〕. Stūpa / soudoupo, a difference in the characters used to transcribe one and the same Sanskrit word.
The rendering-name of divisive speech — Xuanzang: 「若染污心發壞他語，若他壞不壞俱成離間語」 tr. “if with a defiled mind one sets going an utterance that would break another, then whether or not the other is broken, divisive speech is completed in either case”〔0088a11〕‖ Paramārtha: 「若有染污心，為壞他和合及相喜愛，是名破語」 tr. “if with a defiled mind one would break the concord and mutual liking of others, this is called breaking speech”〔T29n1559 0243a25〕. Divisive speech / breaking speech, a difference of rendering-system.
The sūtra text of what wrong view denies · the clearest instance of a difference of fullness — Xuanzang translates all eleven clauses, 「如經說：無施與、無愛樂、無祠祀、無妙行、無惡行、無妙惡行業果異熟、無此世間無彼世間、無母無父、無化生有情、世間無沙門、或婆羅門是阿羅漢」 tr. “as the sūtra says: there is no giving, no delighting, no sacrifice, no good conduct, no evil conduct, no result and maturation of the action of good and evil conduct, no this world and no other world, no mother and no father, no sentient beings born by transformation, and in the world no śramaṇa or brahmin who is an arhat”〔0088b14〕‖ Paramārtha abridges to six clauses, 「如經言：無施、無供養、無嗅多、無善行、無惡行，於世間無沙門婆羅門是阿羅漢」 tr. “as the sūtra says: there is no giving, no offering, no xiuduo, no wholesome conduct, no evil conduct, and in the world no śramaṇa or brahmin who is an arhat”〔T29n1559 0243b24〕. Paramārtha omits the items 「無妙惡行業果異熟」 tr. “no result and maturation of the action of good and evil conduct,” 「無此世間無彼世間」 tr. “no this world and no other world,” 「無母無父」 tr. “no mother and no father,” and 「無化生有情」 tr. “no sentient beings born by transformation.” Moreover Xuanzang renders 「無祠祀」 tr. “no sacrifice” by sense while Paramārtha gives 「無嗅多」 tr. “no xiuduo” (by sound) — a difference of rendering-practice between sound and sense; honestly recorded, with no conjectural fixing of its Sanskrit source.
The citing of the Sūtra of the Five Hindrances · both texts name it — Xuanzang: 「有餘師言：諸欲界愛皆貪業道。所以者何？《五蓋經》中依貪欲蓋，佛說應斷此世間貪」 tr. “some other master says: all craving of the desire realm is the path of action of greed. Why so? Because in the Sūtra of the Five Hindrances, with respect to the hindrance of sensual desire, the Buddha said that this greed for the world should be cut off”〔0088b06〕‖ Paramārtha: 「有餘師說：一切欲界愛欲皆是貪欲業道。何以故？於《五蓋經》依愛欲有如此言：此人捨於世間貪欲蓋」 tr. “some other master says: all the craving and desire of the desire realm is the path of action of sensual greed. Why so? Because in the Sūtra of the Five Hindrances, with respect to craving and desire, there are these words: this man casts off the hindrance of sensual greed for the world”〔T29n1559 0243b16〕. Both texts name the Sūtra of the Five Hindrances — which, set against the difference of fullness at item nine, proves that the fullness or brevity of scriptural proof in the two texts is no general leaning but differs item by item.

Table of Rendering-Name Correspondences (within the range of Unit 4 · word for word as seen · loc of first occurrence)

Xuanzang (T1558)	loc of first occurrence	Paramārtha (T1559)	loc of first occurrence
muni	0084a15	Mouna	0240a11
false speech	0084c06	lying	0241b15
taking what is not given	0084c05	stealing	0242b05
sexual misconduct	0084c10	fornication	0241b09
divisive speech	0084c06	breaking speech (in the stanza-explanation passage) / double-tongued speech (in the passage on arising from the three roots)	0243a24
harsh speech	0084c06	evil speech	0243a27
frivolous speech	0084c06	unfitting speech (also named scattered speech)	0243b02
stūpa	0087a04	soudoupo	0242b08
Bolasi	0085b23	the people of the country of Boshi	0241a25
spoken with a hidden intent	0083c11	spoken in a sense not fully drawn out	0239c12
the breath-wind (rendered by sense)	0086c07	prāṇa (rendered by sound · glossed as 「以風為義」 tr. “it has wind for its sense”)	0242a15
no sacrifice (rendered by sense)	0088b14	no xiuduo (rendered by sound)	0243b25
the stanza says / the treatise says	—	the verse says / the explanation says	—

Honest note one (Paramārtha’s own usage is not consistent): for one and the same divisive speech, Paramārtha’s stanza-explanation passage〔T29n1559 0243a24〕gives 「破語」 tr. “breaking speech,” while the running text of the passage on arising from the three roots〔T29n1559 0241b19〕gives 「兩舌」 tr. “double-tongued speech” — this is not a divergence between the two translations but an inconsistency of usage within Paramārtha’s own text; recorded as it stands, with no conjectural fixing of which is correct.

Honest note two (a zero result honestly recorded · two readings recorded together): the name of the Sūtra on Volition has been checked throughout Paramārtha’s Chapter on Action in T1559 by a fault-tolerant method, with zero occurrences — this is a mechanical fact and not a failure of the search. Yet a zero result does not suffice to settle that Paramārtha does not name this sūtra: his text here reads 「於故心作。經中說」 tr. “done with deliberate mind. The sūtra says,” whose punctuation admits of two readings (see item four, #9) — on the present punctuation Paramārtha gives no name of a sūtra; if 「故心作」 tr. “deliberate mental doing” be taken as the rendering of the sūtra’s name, then Paramārtha too names this sūtra with a rendering unlike Xuanzang’s, and to search his text with Xuanzang’s words must of necessity give zero. Both readings are recorded, awaiting the translator’s adjudication; this item does not adjudicate on his behalf.

V. Debate within the Abhidharma Lineage (Saṅghabhadra · Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle T1562 ★ · recorded where present)

Saṅghabhadra’s two treatises name this chapter 「辯業品」 tr. “Making Out Action” (the fourth in T1562, the fifth in T1563), and not 「分別業品」 tr. “Analysis of Action” — it must not be searched for by the Kośa’s chapter name. The passage in them corresponding to this unit is fixed at both ends by the structure of the scene: T1562 begins at 「又經中說業有四種，謂或有業黑黑異熟」 tr. “again the sūtra says that action is of four kinds, that is, there is action that is black and has a black maturation”〔T29n1562 0573a16〕and ends at 「如是已辯十業道相。依何義」 tr. “thus the marks of the ten paths of action have been made out. By what sense”〔T29n1562 0580b17〕; T1563 begins at〔T29n1563 0877c16〕with the same sentence and ends at〔T29n1563 0881b24〕with the same sentence. ⇒ Xuanzang, Paramārtha, the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle, and the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine were transmitted independently and yet turn at one and the same node of the scene (the finishing of the explanation of the path of action of wrong view) to one and the same new question (the establishing of the name of the ten paths of action) — four texts attesting one another’s outline boundaries. The form: quoted only where the Kośa actually has a debate, and not cited throughout.

One. The three kinds of evil conduct and good conduct — who utters the sentence 「許有煩惱即是意業」 tr. “to grant that an affliction is just mental action” (the clearest place of divergent attribution in this unit) — the Kośa’s original sentence reads 「若爾，則應業與煩惱合成一體。許有煩惱即是意業，斯有何失？」 tr. “if that were so, then action and affliction would be combined into one entity. To grant that an affliction is just mental action — what fault is there in this?”〔T29n1558 0084b05〕. Saṅghabhadra here first raises a question of his own and answers it with two proofs — 「寧知貪等非意業耶？由阿笈摩及正理故」 tr. “how is it known that greed and the rest are not mental action? By the āgama and by correct principle”〔T29n1562 0574b24〕: first quoting the āgama, 「阿笈摩者，謂契經言：貪瞋邪見是業緣集。故知貪等非即業性。又契經言：諸愛者表即是意業。故知非愛即意業體」 tr. “as for the āgama, the sūtra says: greed, hatred, and wrong view are the gathering of the conditions of action. Hence it is known that greed and the rest are not the nature of action itself. Again the sūtra says: the manifest of those who crave is just mental action. Hence it is known that craving is not the entity of mental action”〔T29n1562 0574b25〕, and afterwards setting forth correct principle, 「正理者何？謂若煩惱即是業者，十二緣起及三障等差別應無。由此證知貪等非業」 tr. “what is correct principle? If an affliction were just action, then the differences of the twelvefold dependent origination and of the three obstructions and the rest ought not to exist. By this it is proved that greed and the rest are not action”〔T29n1562 0574c12〕. Between the two proofs he attaches this sentence directly to the Sūtra-master (Vasubandhu) himself as his own position, and refutes it: 「經主言：許有煩惱即是意業。斯有何過？如是所許，違前契經及後正理，豈非大過」 tr. “the Sūtra-master says: to grant that an affliction is just mental action, what fault is there in this? What is thus granted is at odds with the sūtra above and with correct principle below; is this not a great fault”〔T29n1562 0574b29〕— his own words 「違前契經及後正理」 tr. “at odds with the sūtra above and with correct principle below” answering exactly to this order (first the āgama · afterwards correct principle, the order of the two proofs above). At the end he comes home to the name of evil conduct, 「是聰慧者所訶厭故，又能感得非愛果故。此行即惡，故名惡行」 tr. “because it is what the discerning reproach and abhor, and because it can draw an unlovely result. This conduct is evil, and so it is called evil conduct”〔T29n1562 0574c14〕. ⇒ Puguang reads it as the author’s relaying, on behalf of the masters of similes (the Sautrāntikas), of a supposition (see item six), while Saṅghabhadra reads it as the author’s own granting, and so his refutation points straight at the Sūtra-master. Both parties are recorded, and neither is adjudged correct.

Two. Seen, heard, sensed, and known, the four bases of speech — the Sūtra-master’s refutation and Saṅghabhadra’s counter-refutation (the longest stretch of debate within the lineage in this unit) — after the Vaibhāṣika masters’ proof from principle the Kośa raises a refutation of its own, 「毘婆沙師作如是說：若境由眼識所證名所見……此證不成，且經非證，經義別故」 tr. “the Vaibhāṣika masters speak thus: if an object is attested by eye consciousness it is called what is seen … this proof does not hold; and let it be said first that the sūtra is no proof, for the sense of the sūtra lies elsewhere”〔T29n1558 0087b26〕. Saṅghabhadra cites it sentence by sentence and refutes it in turn: first recording the words of refutation, 「經主撥言：此不成證，經義別故，非此經中佛欲決判四所言相」 tr. “the Sūtra-master dismisses it, saying: this does not constitute a proof, for the sense of the sūtra lies elsewhere, and in this sūtra the Buddha does not mean to adjudicate the marks of the four things spoken of”〔T29n1562 0579a28〕, and quoting the stanza in which the Great Mother received the Buddha’s instruction, 「見色已失念，妄增愛相者……」 tr. “he who, having seen a form, loses mindfulness and falsely adds on the marks of the lovely …”〔T29n1562 0579b19〕, to prove that the Vaibhāṣika masters’ explanation does have scriptural proof; then refuting head-on, 「故經主言經義別者，誠如所說，以經義別，經主於中異分別故。又何意趣朋彼二師違理教釋，而偏憎背毘婆沙者順理教言」 tr. “so when the Sūtra-master says that the sense of the sūtra lies elsewhere, it is truly as he says, for the sense of the sūtra being elsewhere, the Sūtra-master analyzes it otherwise there. And with what intent does he side with those two masters’ explanations that are at odds with principle and teaching, while bearing a particular grudge against the Vaibhāṣikas’ words that accord with principle and teaching”〔T29n1562 0579c03〕, and going on to four objections — 「彼二師所釋違教，所見等相佛於經中於色等境分明別說，而彼棄捨異建立故」 tr. “those two masters’ explanations are at odds with the teaching, for the marks of what is seen and the rest the Buddha distinctly and separately stated in the sūtra with respect to the objects of form and the rest, and they discard this and establish otherwise”〔T29n1562 0579c06〕·「此有何理，唯五所證立所見名」 tr. “what principle is there in establishing the name ‘what is seen’ for what is attested by the five alone”〔T29n1562 0579c14〕·「若爾，見何緣非自內所受？是則所見應即所知」 tr. “if it be so, on what ground is seeing not what is received within oneself? Then what is seen ought to be just what is known”〔T29n1562 0579c16〕·「若比量境方名所覺，不應所覺在所知先」 tr. “if only an object of inference is called what is sensed, then what is sensed ought not to stand before what is known”〔T29n1562 0579c19〕; and closing with 「今謂經主僻執居心，背此正宗黨彼邪說」 tr. “now I say that the Sūtra-master harbors a warped attachment in his heart, turning his back on this correct tenet and taking the part of that false account”〔T29n1562 0579c20〕.

Three. The extended refutation of the passage 「頗有由身表異想」 tr. “is there a case where by bodily manifest action a divergent perception” — the Kośa reads 「頗有由身表異想義不由發語成虛誑語耶……於如是難應設劬勞」 tr. “is there a case in which, by bodily manifest action, one raises a divergent perception of the sense and, without uttering speech, completes false speech … upon a difficulty such as this one should expend some labor”〔T29n1558 0087c28〕. Saṅghabhadra cites it thus: 「經主於此作如是難：若不動身亦不發語，欲無無表離表而生，此二如何得成業道？於如是難，應設劬勞」 tr. “the Sūtra-master here raises this difficulty: if there is neither movement of body nor utterance of speech, and the desire realm has no nonmanifest that arises apart from the manifest, how do these two come to be paths of action? Upon a difficulty such as this one should expend some labor”〔T29n1562 0579c25〕. Puguang relays this remark as 「如何經主乃作難言：欲無無表離表而生」 tr. “how is it that the Sūtra-master makes the objection: the desire realm has no nonmanifest that arises apart from the manifest”〔T41n1821 0261c15〕, and records also Saṅghabhadra’s own separate explanation, 「然彼得果、五苾芻等，先加行時必定有表，相續乃至得果、入道，依此表業發別解脫」 tr. “yet for those who obtained the fruit, the five bhikṣus and the rest, at the time of the preparatory stage there must have been manifest action, continuing on until they obtained the fruit and entered the path, and it is in dependence upon this manifest action that individual liberation is set going”〔T41n1821 0261c17〕. ⇒ In this passage four accounts in fact stand side by side — the Vaibhāṣika masters (quoted by the Kośa) · some other master (marked Sautrāntika by all three commentaries) · the earlier preceptors · and Saṅghabhadra’s own tenet; and the four take different sides on the two questions of how seen, heard, sensed, and known get their names, and whether the nonmanifest may arise apart from the manifest. Recording the two parties only · not judging which prevails.

Honest note (a difference of form between the two treatises): within the range of this unit T1562 marks 「經主」 tr. “the Sūtra-master” expressly eight times〔0574b29·0579a28·0579b08·0579b17·0579c03·0579c04·0579c20·0579c25〕, all gathered in the two passages above; within the range of this unit T1563 has zero occurrences of 「經主」 tr. “the Sūtra-master”** (checked throughout the range〔0877c16–0881b24〕by a fault-tolerant method). ⇒ The Treatise Revealing the Doctrine in this passage takes no part in direct debate with Vasubandhu and only states the tenets straightforwardly — a contrast with the extended refutation of the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle; honestly recorded, with no conjecture as to its cause.

VI. Divergent Interpretations of the Commentators (Puguang · Fabao · Yuanhui · Shentai)

The lack of Shentai’s commentary (a negative proposition proved · the lack marked as it stands): Shentai’s Commentary on the Abhidharmakośa, X53n0836, is a fragmentary text, its seven surviving fascicles being fascicles one, two, four, five, six, seven, and seventeen, with the Chapter on the World, the Chapter on Action, and the Chapter on the Latent Tendencies wholly wanting. Checked mechanically (by a fault-tolerant method, taking the ed="X" system): 「分別業品」 tr. “Analysis of Action” has zero occurrences, and the marker strings of the Chapter on Action, 「十業道」 tr. “the ten paths of action,” 「五無間」 tr. “the five deeds of immediate retribution,” and the rest, are likewise all zero. ⇒ Shentai’s commentary is fragmentary, the Chapter on Action wanting, and this unit has no running exposition of his to hang upon, and text from his other fascicles is not made to serve in its place. The three commentaries below are recorded together.

(1) The Four Actions Black and White, and Cutting Off by What Is without Outflows

The threefold division of the outline (all three agreeing) — Puguang’s Record: 「『又經中說至其相云何』者，此下第七明黑黑等。就中，一明四業名體、二明無漏斷別、三敘異說不同。此即第一明四業名體。依經起問」 tr. “‘again the sūtra says’ down to ‘what are their marks’: below, the seventh, explaining the black-black and the rest. Within it, first the names and entities of the four actions, second the distinctions in what the actions without outflows cut off, third the recording of divergent accounts. This is the first, explaining the names and entities of the four actions. The question is raised on the strength of the sūtra”〔T41n1821 0250c06〕; Fabao’s Commentary: 「論『又經中說至其相云何』，自此已下有四頌半，第八明經中黑黑等四業。文中有三：一明業體、二明斷異、三述異說。此一頌半明四業體，先問、後答。此即問也」 tr. “the treatise’s ‘again the sūtra says’ down to ‘what are their marks’: from here below there are four and a half stanzas, the eighth, explaining the four actions black-black and the rest spoken of in the sūtras. The text has three parts: first the entity of action, second the differences in cutting off, third the relating of divergent accounts. This one and a half stanzas explain the entity of the four actions, the question first and the answer after. This is the question”〔T41n1822 0662a11〕. ⇒ The sense of the threefold division agrees entirely in all three while the wording of the outline names differs (word for word as quoted above: Puguang gives the names and entities of the four actions · the distinctions in cutting off by what is without outflows · the recording of divergent accounts; Fabao gives the entity of action · the differences in cutting off · the relating of divergent accounts), only Puguang marking 「就中」 tr. “within it” and Fabao 「文中有三」 tr. “the text has three parts.”
The two senses of black (as transmitted by the Mahāvibhāṣā) — Puguang’s Record: 「『諸不善業至不可意故』者，釋惡名黑。不善名惡，黑謂黑黑。諸不善業一向名黑，染污性故。異熟亦黑，不可意故」 tr. “‘all unwholesome action’ down to ‘because it is not agreeable’: explaining that evil is called black. The unwholesome is called evil, and black means black-black. All unwholesome action is called black without exception, because its nature is defiled. The maturation is likewise black, because it is not agreeable”〔T41n1821 0250c18〕.
The ground of white (with supporting proof quoted from the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle) — Puguang’s Record: 「『色界善業至是可意故』者，釋色善名白，白謂白白。色界善業一向名白，不雜不善惡業、惑故」 tr. “‘wholesome action of the form realm’ down to ‘because it is agreeable’: explaining that the wholesome of the form realm is called white, white meaning white-white. Wholesome action of the form realm is called white without exception, because it is not mingled with unwholesome and evil action or with affliction”〔T41n1821 0250c25〕.
The outline of the question 「豈不惡業果」 tr. “is not the result of evil action” (two commentaries differing in name and agreeing in division) — Puguang marks question and answer: 「『豈不惡業果至名為白黑』者，問。豈不欲界惡業及果，亦為善業及果間雜相續起故，是則亦應名為白黑。此即以惡業果例善業果」 tr. “‘is not the result of evil action’ down to ‘be called white-black’: the question. Are not the evil action of the desire realm and its result likewise interspersed with wholesome action and its result and arising in continuum, so that they too ought to be called white-black? This is to take the result of evil action on the model of the result of wholesome action”〔T41n1821 0251a21〕·「『不善業果至惡勝善故』者，答。於欲界中，不善業果非必應為善業果雜，如斷善人造諸惡業，及地獄中受黑異熟」 tr. “‘the result of unwholesome action’ down to ‘the evil prevails over the wholesome’: the answer. Within the desire realm, the result of unwholesome action is not necessarily mingled with the result of wholesome action, as with the evil actions done by one who has cut off the wholesome, and with the black maturation undergone in the hells”〔T41n1821 0251a24〕; Fabao marks objection and answer: 「論『豈不惡業果至名為白黑』，難也。善為惡業雜，善名為黑白；惡為善業雜，惡應名白黑。論『不善業果至惡勝善故』，答也。於地獄中不善業果，不為善業果之所雜也」 tr. “the treatise’s ‘is not the result of evil action’ down to ‘be called white-black’: an objection. The wholesome being mingled with evil action, the wholesome is called black-and-white; the evil being mingled with wholesome action, the evil ought to be called white-black. The treatise’s ‘the result of unwholesome action’ down to ‘the evil prevails over the wholesome’: the answer. In the hells the result of unwholesome action is not mingled with the result of wholesome action”〔T41n1822 0662b01〕. ⇒ Puguang gives question and answer, Fabao objection and answer; the outline names differ while the division is entirely the same, recorded without adjudication.
The ground of speaking with a hidden intent — Fabao’s Commentary: 「論『此非白言至性相違故』，釋疑難也。非黑言是了義說，非白言是密意說，以不能招白異熟故，經密意說名非白業。准經及本論，是純白法也」 tr. “the treatise’s ‘this word not white’ down to ‘because their natures are opposed’: resolving a doubt. The word ‘not black’ is spoken in a sense fully drawn out, and the word ‘not white’ is spoken with a hidden intent, since it cannot draw a white maturation, and so the sūtra with a hidden intent calls it action that is not white. By the sūtra and the root treatise it is a purely white dharma”〔T41n1822 0662b12〕.
Cutting off in intrinsic nature and cutting off as object (the doctrinal spine of this passage) — Fabao’s Commentary: 「此上十二皆自性斷，非所緣斷也……斷黑一分斷雜業全斷，黑是自性及所緣斷，斷白唯所緣斷」 tr. “these twelve above are all cutting off in intrinsic nature and not cutting off as object … cutting off one portion of the black is the cutting off of the mingled action entire; the black is cut off both in intrinsic nature and as object, while the white is cut off as object alone”〔T41n1822 0662b19〕; Puguang marks its question and answer: 「『何緣諸地至能斷非餘』者，問」 tr. “‘for what reason of the several levels’ down to ‘can cut off and not the rest’: the question”〔T41n1821 0251c01〕·「『以諸善法至未離繫故』者，答。若煩惱斷是自性斷」 tr. “‘because the wholesome dharmas’ down to ‘have not yet obtained release from bondage’: the answer. If it is the afflictions that are cut off, that is cutting off in intrinsic nature”〔T41n1821 0251c01〕; Fabao on the same passage gives 「論『何緣諸地至能斷非餘』，問也。論『以諸善法至未離繫故』，答也。自性斷者，謂結法及結一果法并得，斷彼得時名之為斷」 tr. “the treatise’s ‘for what reason of the several levels’ down to ‘can cut off and not the rest’: the question. The treatise’s ‘because the wholesome dharmas’ down to ‘have not yet obtained release from bondage’: the answer. Cutting off in intrinsic nature means the dharmas that are fetters and the dharmas that are one result with a fetter together with their acquisition, and when that acquisition is cut off it is called cutting off”〔T41n1822 0662b27〕. Yuanhui here sets out another name — 「彼善法，善法爾時得離繫故」 tr. “those wholesome dharmas, since the wholesome dharmas at that time obtain release from bondage”〔T41n1823 0906c13〕·「解云：緣縛斷者，有漏善法被煩惱縛，斷此能緣九品惑盡。善法離繫，名緣縛斷」 tr. “explanation: cutting off the bond of the object means that wholesome dharmas with outflows are bound by the afflictions, and when the nine grades of affliction that take them as object are cut off and exhausted, the wholesome dharmas obtain release from bondage, and this is called cutting off the bond of the object”〔T41n1823 0906c15〕. ⇒ Yuanhui’s 「緣縛斷」 tr. “cutting off the bond of the object” and Puguang and Fabao’s 「所緣斷」 tr. “cutting off as object” are the same sense under different names; recorded without adjudication.
The recording of divergent accounts (Root 64) — Puguang’s Record: 「此即第三敘異說」 tr. “this is the third, recording divergent accounts”〔T41n1821 0251c16〕; Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary: 「從此第三，敘異說，頌曰：『有說地獄受，餘欲業黑雜。有說欲見滅，餘欲業黑俱』」 tr. “from here the third, recording divergent accounts. The stanza says: ‘one account says action experienced in the hells and the remaining action of the desire realm are black and mingled; one account says action of the desire realm extinguished by seeing and the remaining action of the desire realm are black and both’”〔T41n1823 0906c22〕. ⇒ All three mark the form of this passage as the recording of divergent accounts and not as question and answer.

(2) The Three Munis · The Three Purities · The Three Kinds of Good Conduct

The gloss of muni (transmitted word for word alike by all three) — Puguang’s Record: 「牟尼，此云寂默」 tr. “muni, which here means silent stillness”〔T41n1821 0251c24〕; Fabao’s Commentary: 「論『又經中說有三牟尼』，已下一頌，第九明三牟尼、三清淨也」 tr. “the treatise’s ‘again the sūtra speaks of three munis’: below, one stanza, the ninth, explaining the three munis and the three purities”〔T41n1822 0662c21〕·「牟尼，此云寂默。無學身、語二業，名身、語牟尼。意牟尼，是無學意，非意業也。以真實牟尼唯是意故，身、語二業比知心故，能比、所比總名牟尼」 tr. “muni, which here means silent stillness. The two actions of body and speech of one beyond learning are called the muni of body and the muni of speech. The muni of mind is the mind of one beyond learning and not mental action. For the truly real muni is mind alone, and the two actions of body and speech are what the mind is inferred from; and what infers and what is inferred are together named muni”〔T41n1822 0662c23〕; Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary: 「從此第八，明三牟尼等」 tr. “from here the eighth, explaining the three munis and the rest”〔T41n1823 0907a05〕·「釋曰：牟尼者，此云寂默。無學身語業者，謂身、語二牟尼也。即意者，第三意牟尼也。謂即意名牟尼，非意業也」 tr. “explanation: as for muni, it here means silent stillness. ‘The bodily and verbal action of one beyond learning’ means the two munis of body and speech. ‘That is, the mind’ is the third, the muni of mind. That is, the mind itself is named muni, and not mental action”〔T41n1823 0907a10〕. ⇒ The sentence 「牟尼，此云寂默」 tr. “muni, which here means silent stillness” agrees word for word in all three, proving that this gloss is transmitted alike by the three.
The question and answer why a muni is only at the stage beyond learning — Puguang’s Record: 「『何故牟尼唯在無學』者，問。『以阿羅漢至永寂靜故』者，答。以阿羅漢是實牟尼，諸煩惱言永寂靜故」 tr. “‘why is a muni found only at the stage beyond learning’: the question. ‘Because the arhat’ down to ‘forever stilled’: the answer. Because the arhat is the true muni, the speech of all the afflictions being forever stilled”〔T41n1821 0252a07〕.
The school name of the masters of similes (the two commentaries differing) — Puguang marks them expressly as Sautrāntikas: 「『譬喻者言至為意業故』者，經部、譬喻者言：貪等三種即是意思，離思無體。引證可知」 tr. “‘the masters of similes say’ down to ‘as mental action’: the Sautrāntikas, the masters of similes, say that the three of greed and the rest are just mental volition and have no entity apart from volition. The proof adduced may be understood”〔T41n1821 0252b19〕·「『若爾則應至合成一體』者，說一切有部難。若說貪等即是意思，是則應有業與煩惱合成一體」 tr. “‘if that were so’ down to ‘combined into one entity’: the Sarvāstivādins object. If greed and the rest are said to be just mental volition, then action and affliction ought to be combined into one entity”〔T41n1821 0252b21〕·「『許有煩惱至斯有何失』者，譬喻者答。我許貪等即是意業，斯有何失」 tr. “‘to grant that an affliction’ down to ‘what fault is there in this’: the masters of similes answer. I grant that greed and the rest are just mental action; what fault is there in this”〔T41n1821 0252b24〕·「『毘婆沙師至為門轉故』者，毘婆沙師總非」 tr. “‘the Vaibhāṣika masters’ down to ‘turns with them for its gate’: the Vaibhāṣika masters deny it altogether”〔T41n1821 0252b25〕. ⇒ Puguang marks the speaker four times over in this passage — the masters of similes set up〔0252b19〕→ the Sarvāstivādins object〔0252b21〕→ the masters of similes answer〔0252b24〕→ the Vaibhāṣika masters deny altogether〔0252b25〕, the objection and the refutation belonging alike to the Sarvāstivādin side. Fabao on the same passage gives only 「論『譬喻者言至為意業故』，述異說」 tr. “the treatise’s ‘the masters of similes say’ down to ‘as mental action’: relating a divergent account”〔T41n1822 0663a26〕, not marking the two characters for Sautrāntika as Puguang does. ⇒ Whether the school name is expressly marked differs between the two commentaries; recorded without adjudication.
How right view and wrong view, having no deliberate volition, come to be wholesome or evil — the base text answers for itself, 「能與損益為根本故」 tr. “because they can serve as the root of harm and of benefit”〔T29 0084b13〕; Puguang sets up no separate outline mark at this sentence and explains it simply as the text runs — marked as it stands, “Puguang has no express mark.”

(3) The General Statement of the Ten Paths of Action, and the Manifest and the Nonmanifest

Why bodily evil conduct does not wholly enter the paths of action — Puguang’s Record: 「『惡妙行耶』者，問。『且不善中至令遠離故』者，此下答。且不善中身惡業道，於身惡行不攝加行、後起，及餘不善身業，即是飲酒、或執、或打、或縛等事。或行殺等，闕緣不成。以加行等非麁顯故，不名業道」 tr. “‘evil conduct and good conduct?’: the question. ‘Let the unwholesome be spoken of first’ down to ‘because men are to be made to keep away’: the answer follows below. Let the unwholesome be spoken of first: the bodily evil paths of action, as regards bodily evil conduct, do not gather in the preparatory stage, the consequent stage, or the remaining unwholesome bodily actions, that is, drinking liquor, or seizing, or beating, or binding, and the like. Or where killing and the rest are done but a condition is lacking and it is not completed. Because the preparatory stage and the rest are not coarse and evident, they are not named paths of action”〔T41n1821 0253a04〕.
The treatise’s own form of raising, answering, and probing its own questions — Puguang marks its outline layers word for word: 「『不爾』者，答。『云何』者，徵。『頌曰至定生唯無表』者，上兩句明不善業道，下兩句明善業道」 tr. “‘it is not so’: the answer. ‘How then’: the probing. ‘The stanza says’ down to ‘produced in absorption, the nonmanifest alone’: the upper two lines explain the unwholesome paths of action, the lower two the wholesome paths of action”〔T41n1821 0253b22〕.
The passage on six necessarily having the nonmanifest — Fabao and Yuanhui both explain this passage as the text runs, and the three commentaries have no divergent account to record; the lack is marked as it stands and nothing is patched in.
The establishing of the three stages (preparatory · root · consequent) — Puguang’s Record: 「『耶』者，問。於此業道義中，如何建立三位別耶」 tr. “‘?’: the question. Within this sense of a path of action, how are the three stages established as distinct?”〔T41n1821 0254a12〕·「『且不善中至殺生後起』者，答。明殺三位。加行謂前加行，果滿謂殺究竟。餘文可知」 tr. “‘let the unwholesome be spoken of first’ down to ‘the consequent stage of killing’: the answer. Explaining the three stages of killing. The preparatory stage is the preparation before; the fullness of the result is the completion of the killing. The rest of the text may be understood”〔T41n1821 0254a13〕.

(4) “The Preparatory Stage Not Yet Stilled” and Completion by the Three Roots

Who answers with 「加行聲」 tr. “the words preparatory stage” (the two commentaries agreeing) — Puguang marks it expressly as the author’s answer — 「『應說至為死後耶』者，問成業道時。『若爾何失』者，答。『二俱有過至根本業道』者，兩關徵責」 tr. “‘it should be said’ down to ‘or after death’: the question as to when the path of action is completed. ‘If it be so, what fault is there’: the answer. ‘Both alike have a fault’ down to ‘the root path of action’: the probing by the two horns”〔T41n1821 0254a27〕, going on with 「『此中說何名為無過』者，問。『謂於根本說加行聲』者，論主答」 tr. “‘what is meant here by there is no fault’: the question. ‘It is using the words preparatory stage with regard to the root’: the author answers”〔T41n1821 0254b19〕; Fabao likewise marks 「加行聲，論主正，婆沙釋文可知，正理論……」 tr. “the words ‘preparatory stage’: the author sets it right; the Mahāvibhāṣā’s explanatory text may be understood; the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle …”〔T41n1822 0665a05〕. ⇒ This answer is not the Vaibhāṣika masters’ but the author’s own explanation, and the two commentaries agree in the attribution.
The 「有餘師說」 tr. “some other master says” quoted from the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle — Puguang’s Record: 「正理四十一云：有餘師說，貪等不應能為加……」 tr. “the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle, fascicle forty-one, says: some other master says, greed and the rest ought not to be able to serve as prepar-…”〔T41n1821 0254c24〕; Fabao’s Commentary: 「正理論云：有餘師說貪等不應能為……」 tr. “the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle says: some other master says greed and the rest ought not to be able to serve as …”〔T41n1822 0665b06〕. ⇒ This 「有餘師」 tr. “some other master” is one quoted by the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle, and not a “some other master” passage of the Kośa itself (it belongs to the class of Further Resonances).
The general gathering of completion by the three roots — Puguang’s Record: 「以從三根至從三亦爾者，答：貪瞋邪……」 tr. “‘because from the three roots’ down to ‘likewise from the three’: the answer. Greed, hatred, and wrong …”〔T41n1821 0255b23〕·「『同』者，答。非諸業道根本成時，一切皆由三根究竟」 tr. “‘the same’: the answer. It is not that when the root of the paths of action is completed, all of them are brought to completion by the three roots”〔T41n1821 0255a09〕.
The question and answer on the three wholesome stages — Puguang’s Record: 「此善三位其相云何者，問：謂遠離前至皆名後起者，答：善業道是止善，離前……」 tr. “‘what are the marks of these three wholesome stages’: the question. ‘That is, keeping away from the former’ down to ‘all are called the consequent stage’: the answer. The wholesome paths of action are the wholesome of restraint, keeping away from the former …”〔T41n1821 0255c11〕.

(5) The Places on Which the Paths of Action Depend, and the Completing or Not Completing of Killing

Why the three of false speech and the rest alone are attached to the place of the name-bodies — Puguang quotes the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine to supply it: 「故《顯宗》云『虛誑語等三，名身等處起，語體必依名等起故。語雖亦託有情等生，而正親依名身等起』」 tr. “hence the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine says: ‘the three of false speech and the rest arise in the place of the name-bodies and the rest, since the entity of speech must arise in dependence upon names and the rest. Though speech also arises with sentient beings and the like for its ground, yet it arises in immediate dependence upon the name-bodies and the rest’”〔T41n1821 0257b13〕. ⇒ This is language of Saṅghabhadra’s Treatise Revealing the Doctrine, and the attribution must be made plain.
The outline of the two passages on dying together and dying first and on acting as one in an army — Puguang’s Record: 「『有起加行至無根依別故』者，此下第四問答分別。就中，一殺已非根本、二他殺成業道」 tr. “‘if a man has set going the preparation’ down to ‘because there is no root and the support has become other’: below, the fourth, analysis by question and answer. Within it, first that having killed it is not the root, second that another’s killing completes the path of action”〔T41n1821 0257b17〕·「何緣俱死、前死不成業道？『以所殺生至理不應然』者，答。以所殺生現命猶存，不可令彼俱死、前死能殺生者成殺生罪，以所殺生命未斷故」 tr. “for what reason do dying together and dying first not complete a path of action? ‘Because the sentient being killed’ down to ‘in principle not to be allowed’: the answer. Because the present life of the sentient being killed still remains, it is impossible to make the one who dies together with him or before him, the killer, complete the offense of killing, since the life of the sentient being killed is not yet cut off”〔T41n1821 0257b21〕. ⇒ Both stanzas are questions and answers the author raises for himself, and not the objections of an outsider.
The general outline of the six later passages on the marks of the paths of action (the skeleton of the whole) — Puguang’s Record: 「『今次應辨至名為邪見』者，此下第五明惡業道相。就中，一問、二答。此即問也。『且先分別至他想不誤殺』者，此下答。就中，一明殺業道相、二明盜業道相、三明欲邪行相、四明虛誑語相、五明離間語等相、六明意業道相」 tr. “‘now next it should be made out’ down to ‘is called wrong view’: below, the fifth, explaining the marks of the evil paths of action. Within it, first the question, second the answer. This is the question. ‘Let killing be analyzed first’ down to ‘the perception of another, killing not by mistake’: the answer follows below. Within it, first the marks of the path of action of killing, second the marks of the path of action of stealing, third the marks of sexual misconduct, fourth the marks of false speech, fifth the marks of divisive speech and the rest, sixth the marks of the mental paths of action”〔T41n1821 0257c06〕.
Killing with hesitation also completing a path of action — Puguang’s Record: 「猶預殺至亦成業道者，簡差別，此顯猶預殺亦成業道，又解此猶預殺……」 tr. “‘killing with hesitation’ down to ‘also completes the path of action’: setting apart a difference. This displays that killing with hesitation also completes a path of action; and again this killing with hesitation is explained …”〔T41n1821 0257c23〕.
How killing is completed upon aggregates that cease moment by moment — Puguang in this passage explains as the text runs the grounds of the two explanations of the breath-wind and of the life faculty, without setting up a separate outline name of question and answer or of recording divergent accounts — marked as it stands, “Puguang has no express mark,” and no judgment is made on his behalf as to the character of the two explanations.
The recording of a non-Buddhist reckoning in the case of the Nirgranthas (the two commentaries agreeing) — Puguang’s Record: 「離繫者言至亦被燒害者，敘外計，離繫者……故思亦成殺罪，不同佛法，離繫梵云尼〔乾陀〕……即露形外道也」 tr. “‘the Nirgranthas say’ down to ‘is burned all the same’: recording a non-Buddhist reckoning. The Nirgranthas … deliberate volition too completes the offense of killing, unlike the Buddha’s Dharma; ‘unfettered’ in Sanskrit is Nir[grantha] … that is, the non-Buddhists who go naked”〔T41n1821 0258b23〕; Fabao’s Commentary: 「論『離繫者言』至『亦被燒害』，敘……」 tr. “the treatise’s ‘the Nirgranthas say’ down to ‘is burned all the same’: recording …”〔T41n1822 0666c28〕. ⇒ The two commentaries alike mark it as 「敘（外計）」 tr. “recording (a non-Buddhist reckoning)”; this passage is not a dispute internal to the schools but the rejecting of a non-Buddhist account outside the Buddha’s Dharma.

(6) Taking What Is Not Given · Sexual Misconduct · False Speech

From what place the offense of stealing goods that revert is incurred (Puguang quoting the adjudicators of the Mahāvibhāṣā) — Puguang’s Record: 「十三評取此論前師為正，故彼論云『有說亦於國王處得，有說於施主處得，有說於守護人處得，有說於能護彼天、龍、藥叉』」 tr. “the thirteenth adjudges the former master of this treatise to be correct, and hence that treatise says: ‘some say it is also incurred at the place of the ruler of the country, some say at the place of the donor, some say at the place of those who guard it, some say at the place of the gods, nāgas, and yakṣas who are able to protect it’”〔T41n1821 0259a18〕. ⇒ The Kośa itself records only the one account 「有餘師說：望守護者」 tr. “some other master says: with respect to those who guard it” and does not adjudicate; the adjudicators of the Mahāvibhāṣā are material of an adjudicating kind.
The two disputes within the sexual-misconduct passage, and the two commentaries’ judgments — On the dispute over the forbidden time, Puguang’s Record reports the two earlier masters’ senses: 「有說：若夫許受齋戒，有犯非時。若不許受而輒自受，夫後若犯不成業道。前師意說，許與不許，若有所犯皆成業道」 tr. “one account says: if the husband has allowed her to undertake the fast-day precepts, there is a transgression of the forbidden time. If he has not allowed it and she undertakes it of herself, then if the husband afterwards transgresses it does not complete a path of action. The former master’s intent is that, allowed or not allowed, if there is a transgression it completes a path of action in either case”〔T41n1821 0259b10〕; Fabao on the same passage says expressly that there is no judgment — 「『夫至方謂非時』，敘異說。無評文也」 tr. “‘the husband’ down to ‘is then called a forbidden time’: recording a divergent account. There is no text of judgment”〔T41n1822 0667b19〕. On the dispute over mistaken perception of the object (「有說亦成」 tr. “one account says it does complete it” and 「有說不成」 tr. “one account says it does not complete it”〔0087a24–a25〕), Puguang alone judges: 「有說亦成至於餘究竟故者，答中兩說，後說為勝，是誤攝故」 tr. “‘one account says it does complete it’ down to ‘because the completion falls upon another’: of the two accounts in the answer, the latter account is the better, since it is gathered in under mistake”〔T41n1821 0259b16〕. ⇒ The two disputes each have their own standing: on the forbidden time neither commentary passes judgment; on mistaken perception Puguang judges 「後說為勝」 tr. “the latter account is the better” while the treatise itself passes none — this item records his judgment and does not judge in the treatise’s stead.
Toward whom the offense is incurred with a bhikṣuṇī and with a maiden — Puguang’s Record: 「『於苾芻尼至得業道耶』者，問。尼不屬他，望誰結罪」 tr. “‘with a bhikṣuṇī’ down to ‘is the path of action incurred?’: the question. A nun belongs to no one; with respect to whom is the offense fastened?”〔T41n1821 0259b18〕·「『此從國王至況出家者』者，答。有兩解。一云：此從國王得罪，行非法事不忍許故。第二說云：於自妻妾受八戒時尚不應行，況出家者。以輕況重，但有侵陵即成業道」 tr. “‘this is from the king’ down to ‘how much less one who has gone forth’: the answer. There are two explanations. One says: the offense is incurred from the king, since he does not allow the doing of what is contrary to law. The second account says: even with one’s own wife at the time when she undertakes the eight precepts one ought not to go, how much less with one who has gone forth. Arguing from the lighter to the heavier, any encroachment at all completes a path of action”〔T41n1821 0259b19〕. ⇒ The Kośa’s original sentence is extremely brief, and these two explanations are Puguang’s supplement; the Kośa does not itself set out two explanations by name.
The time at which false speech completes a path of action — Puguang’s Record: 「若所誑者至此言是何者，問：是雜穢語者，答……成業道時，與最後字至皆此加行者，答：雖虛誑語有多字成，與最後字俱生表及無表業成此業道」 tr. “‘if the one deceived’ down to ‘what is that utterance’: the question. ‘It is frivolous speech’: the answer … as to when the path of action is completed, ‘together with the last word’ down to ‘all this is its preparatory stage’: the answer. Though false speech is composed of many words, the manifest and nonmanifest action arising together with the last word completes this path of action”〔T41n1821 0259c13〕.
The choice between the two readings of 「解義」 tr. “understanding the sense” (the two commentaries agreeing) — Puguang’s Record: 「『若爾何失』者，答。『若據已聞至可名能解』者，復徵」 tr. “‘if it be so, what fault is there’: the answer. ‘If it depend upon having finished hearing’ down to ‘may be called being able to understand’: a further probing”〔T41n1821 0259c24〕·「『善言義者至名為能解』者，答。善言義者，耳識至現已生位中無迷亂緣故，即名為能解」 tr. “‘one who well knows the sense of words’ down to ‘is called being able to understand’: the answer. For one who well knows the sense of words, auditory consciousness having reached the stage of present arising and there being no condition of confusion, this is called being able to understand”〔T41n1821 0260a02〕·「此亦何定？若有耳識無迷亂緣，即據正聞能解名解……由斯不定，故論主言：如無失者應取為宗」 tr. “how is this to be settled? If there is auditory consciousness with no condition of confusion, then the understanding is taken with respect to being in the act of hearing and being able to understand … it being thus unsettled, the author therefore says: since thus there is no fault, this account should be taken as the tenet”〔T41n1821 0260a11〕; Fabao’s Commentary: 「『無有失應取為宗』，論主評取正聞能解成業道」 tr. “‘there being no fault, it should be taken as the tenet’: the author adjudges, taking being in the act of hearing and being able to understand as completing the path of action”〔T41n1822 0667c28〕. ⇒ Both commentaries mark the author as the subject of this choice.

(7) Seen, Heard, Sensed, Known · The Three of Speech · The Three of Mind

The ground on which the three objects are alike named what is sensed (the Mahāvibhāṣā and the Venerable Vasumitra) — Puguang’s Record: 「『至偏立覺名』者，別釋三境同名所覺所以。三境同名所覺者，以此三境同無記故，其性昧鈍，猶如死人無所覺知，故能證根偏立覺名」 tr. “‘down to the name sensing is established in particular’: a separate explanation of why the three objects are alike named what is sensed. That the three objects are alike named what is sensed is because these three objects are alike indeterminate, their nature dull and obscure, like a dead man who has no sensing or knowing, and so the name sensing is established in particular for the faculties that attest them”〔T41n1821 0260b27〕.
The school name of “some other master” (all three agreeing on Sautrāntika) — Puguang’s Record: 「『此證不成至愛非愛相』者，經部總非，釋經意」 tr. “‘this proof does not hold’ down to ‘the marks of the lovely and the unlovely’: the Sautrāntikas deny it altogether, explaining the intent of the sūtra”〔T41n1821 0260c29〕·「若爾何相名所見等者，毘婆沙問；有餘師說至亦為非理者，經部答：有餘經部師說：若是五根現量所證五境，以分明故，名所見……」 tr. “‘if it be so, what marks are called what is seen and the rest’: the Vaibhāṣikas ask. ‘Some other master says’ down to ‘likewise without principle’: the Sautrāntikas answer. Some other Sautrāntika master says: if the five objects are attested by direct perception through the five faculties, then because they are clear they are called what is seen …”〔T41n1821 0261a12〕; Fabao’s Commentary: 「所見等，有部問也……有餘師說至名為所知，此引經部餘師釋也」 tr. “‘what is seen and the rest’: the Sarvāstivādins ask … ‘some other master says’ down to ‘is called what is known’: this quotes the explanation of the Sautrāntika other master”〔T41n1822 0668c08〕; Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary: 「依經部宗，若是五根現量所證色等五境……」 tr. “on the tenet of the Sautrāntikas, if the five objects of form and the rest are attested by direct perception through the five faculties …”〔T41n1823 0910a22〕. ⇒ The three agree in the school attribution of this passage, and it is the most firmly settled attribution in this unit.
The attribution of the earlier preceptors (the two commentaries differing) — Fabao attaches this second account too to the Sautrāntikas: 「為所知，論主敘經部師義也」 tr. “‘is called what is known’: the author records the sense of the Sautrāntika masters”〔T41n1822 0668c19〕; Puguang explains only the derivation of the name, 「學瑜伽論者，名先軌範師」 tr. “those who study the Yogācārabhūmi are called the earlier preceptors”〔T41n1821 0261a26〕, and does not expressly attach a school. ⇒ The three commentaries differ here; recorded without adjudication.
The four conditions by which divisive speech completes a path of action — Puguang’s Record: 「『論曰至流至此中』者，釋初兩句，明離間語具四種緣方成業道：一染污心。二發壞他語，若他壞、不壞，但領解時即成離間語」 tr. “‘the treatise says’ down to ‘runs on into this’: explaining the first two lines, showing that divisive speech requires four kinds of condition before the path of action is completed: first a defiled mind; second the setting going of an utterance that would break another, and whether the other is broken or not, at the very moment of his understanding divisive speech is completed”〔T41n1821 0262b14〕. Below this Puguang quotes the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle’s 「有餘師說：他壞方成」 tr. “some other master says: it is completed only when the other is broken” and judges 「前說為善」 tr. “the former account is the better” — a choice of Puguang’s own.
The recording of the two explanations of frivolous speech as divergent accounts — Puguang’s Record: 「解義。『有餘師說至雜穢語收』者，釋第五、第六句。此師意說：異前三語染心所發方名雜穢，皆是獨起雜穢語也。前三語起時不兼雜穢，有此不同故敘異說。文顯可知」 tr. “understanding the sense. ‘Some other master says’ down to ‘gathered in by frivolous speech’: explaining the fifth and sixth lines. This master’s intent is that only what is other than the former three utterances and set going by a defiled mind is called frivolous, all of it being frivolous speech arising alone. When the former three utterances arise they do not include the frivolous; there being this difference, a divergent account is recorded. The text is plain and may be understood”〔T41n1821 0262c17〕; Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary notes it briefly, 「有餘師說：異虛誑等前三種語，餘染心……」 tr. “some other master says: other than the former three utterances beginning with false speech, the remaining defiled mind …”〔T41n1823 0910b22〕.
Why the singing at the time of a wheel-turning monarch does not complete frivolous speech — Puguang’s Record: 「『輪王現時至雜穢語收』者，問。『由彼語從至非預染心』者，答。染心所發名為雜穢。由彼語從出離善心發，讚嘆諸善、毀呰諸惡，能引出離善故。非預染心，不名雜穢」 tr. “‘at the time when a wheel-turning monarch appears’ down to ‘gathered in by frivolous speech’: the question. ‘Because those utterances arise from’ down to ‘not a mind defiled beforehand’: the answer. What is set going by a defiled mind is called frivolous. Because those utterances are set going from a wholesome mind of renunciation, praising the wholesome and censuring the evil, and can draw forth the wholesome of renunciation. Not being a mind defiled beforehand, they are not called frivolous”〔T41n1821 0262c23〕·「『有餘師言至不成業道』者，敘異說。爾時亦有染心發言，由過輕故不成業道」 tr. “‘some other master says’ down to ‘does not complete a path of action’: recording a divergent account. At that time there are also utterances set going by a defiled mind, but because the fault is slight they do not complete a path of action”〔T41n1821 0262c27〕; Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary: 「非實染心，有餘師言：此時嫁娶歌詠過輕，不……」 tr. “not truly a defiled mind. Some other master says: at this time the marriages and the singing are of slight fault, and do not …”〔T41n1823 0910b28〕.
The two accounts of the path of action of greed and Puguang’s judgment (the two commentaries differing) — Puguang’s Record: 「有餘師言至總說欲愛者，此師意說：於欲界中五部諸愛皆貪業道，依《五蓋經》……有說欲愛至成貪業道者，此師意說：於欲界中五部諸愛雖盡名貪，非皆業道，此貪業道於惡行中攝麁品故……前文已同此說，於二說中後師為正，以見斷貪不緣財故」 tr. “‘some other master says’ down to ‘said in general of the craving of the desire realm’: this master’s intent is that within the desire realm all the cravings of the five categories are the path of action of greed, on the strength of the Sūtra of the Five Hindrances … ‘one account says the craving of the desire realm’ down to ‘complete the path of action of greed’: this master’s intent is that within the desire realm, though all the cravings of the five categories be called greed, they are not all paths of action, since this path of action of greed gathers in the coarse grade within evil conduct … the text above already agrees with this account, and of the two accounts the latter master is correct, since the greed abandoned by seeing does not take goods as its object”〔T41n1821 0263a18〕; Fabao explains as the text runs and no separate judgment is found — 「論『有餘師言』至『總說欲愛』，餘……」 tr. “the treatise’s ‘some other master says’ down to ‘said in general of the craving of the desire realm’: the remaining …”〔T41n1822 0669c23〕. ⇒ Puguang judges outright 「後師為正」 tr. “the latter master is correct,” while Fabao passes no express judgment; recorded without adjudication.
The adjudication of the eleven clauses of what wrong view denies into three classes (Puguang quoting the Mahāvibhāṣā clause by clause) — Puguang’s Record: 「如經說至等言攝後者，引經顯彼邪見撥無，經中總有十一不同：言一無施與、二無愛樂、三無祠祀者，此三皆是謗因邪見，見集所斷……四無妙行無惡行者，此總撥妙行惡行，亦是謗因邪見，見集所斷。五無妙行惡行業所感果異熟，此是總撥業所感果，謗果邪見，見苦所斷。六無此世間、七無彼世間，此二通謗因果……八無母、九無父，此二是謗因邪見，見集所斷……十無化生有情者，此通謗因果……十一世間無有沙門或婆羅門及阿羅漢，此是謗聖邪見，見道所斷」 tr. “‘as the sūtra says’ down to ‘by the word and the rest gathers in the rest’: quoting the sūtra to display that wrong view’s denying outright. The sūtra has eleven different clauses in all: as to the first, there is no giving, the second, there is no delighting, the third, there is no sacrifice — these three are all wrong views slandering the cause, abandoned by seeing origination … the fourth, there is no good conduct and no evil conduct — this denies good conduct and evil conduct altogether, and is likewise a wrong view slandering the cause, abandoned by seeing origination. The fifth, there is no result and maturation drawn by the action of good and evil conduct — this denies altogether the result drawn by action, a wrong view slandering the result, abandoned by seeing suffering. The sixth, there is no this world, the seventh, there is no other world — these two extend to slandering both cause and result … the eighth, there is no mother, the ninth, there is no father — these two are wrong views slandering the cause, abandoned by seeing origination … the tenth, there are no sentient beings born by transformation — this extends to slandering both cause and result … the eleventh, in the world there is no śramaṇa or brahmin or arhat — this is a wrong view slandering the noble ones, abandoned by the path of seeing”〔T41n1821 0263b06〕.
Why what is plainly seen in this world is nevertheless said not to be — Puguang quotes the Mahāvibhāṣā to explain the ground: 「故《婆沙》釋云『問：他世是不現見，說無可爾。此世現見，何故言無？答：彼諸外道無明所盲，於現見事亦復非撥。不應責無明者、愚盲者墮坑故』」 tr. “hence the Mahāvibhāṣā explains: ‘question: that the other world is not plainly seen, and so to say it is not may pass. But this world is plainly seen; why say that it is not? Answer: those non-Buddhists are blinded by ignorance and deny even what is plainly seen. One should not call the ignorant to account, since the blind fall into pits’”〔T41n1821 0263b28〕.

(8) A Conspectus of the Divergences among the Three Commentaries (Recorded without Adjudication)

Issue	Puguang’s Record	Fabao’s Commentary	Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary	The point of divergence
The chapter-level main outline	Threefold (the nature of the entity of action · the explanation of the actions in the sūtras · miscellaneous explanations of the actions)	Fourfold (the entity of action · discipline and the rest · the actions in the sūtras · miscellaneous explanations of the actions)	Threefold (the nature of the entity of action · the explanation of the names of the actions · miscellaneous explanations of the actions)	Threefold / fourfold
The numbering of the first outline of this unit	The seventh	The eighth	The seventh	A difference of numbering (the outline names agreeing entirely)
The numbering of the chapter on the ten paths of action	The tenth	The eleventh	The tenth	The same as above
The outline name of 「豈不惡業果」 tr. “is not the result of evil action”	Question / answer	Objection / answer	Does not treat this passage	The outline names differ while the division is entirely the same
The name for wholesome dharmas obtaining release from bondage	Cutting off as object	Cutting off as object	Cutting off the bond of the object	The same sense under different names
The school name of the masters of similes	Expressly marked Sautrāntika	Only 「述異說」 tr. “relating a divergent account”	Does not treat this passage	Whether the school name is expressly marked
The two disputes within the sexual-misconduct passage	On mistaken perception, judges outright 「後說為勝」 tr. “the latter account is the better”	On the forbidden time, says expressly 「無評文也」 tr. “there is no text of judgment”	Does not treat this passage	The passages judged differ · whether a judgment is passed
The two accounts of the path of action of greed	Judges outright 「後師為正」 tr. “the latter master is correct”	Explains as the text runs, without judgment	Does not treat this passage	Whether a judgment is passed
The attribution of the earlier preceptors	Only explains the derivation of the name · does not expressly attach a school	Attaches it to 「論主敘經部師義」 tr. “the author records the sense of the Sautrāntika masters”	Does not treat this passage	Whether an attribution is made
The school name of “some other master” (seen, heard, sensed, known)	Sautrāntika	The Sautrāntika other master	The tenet of the Sautrāntikas	All three agreeing

Where the three commentaries diverge, each is recorded, without judging right and wrong. The adjudications of the three commentaries and the doctrinal choices in their divergences are lodged separately in the section of Further Resonances in the exposition layer.

VII. Cross-Reading with the Yogācāra Root Lineage (Bridge ②)

The ten paths of action established in this unit, with the conditions by which they are completed (the preparatory stage · the root · the consequent stage · the three roots · the completion · the place depended upon), are the general table of the “side of the paths of action” in the Abhidharma of the schools; their carrying over into the Yogācāra root lineage (item by item, hanging upon that system word for word):

The marks by which killing and the other paths of action are completed → the fivefold form of the Yogācārabhūmi’s Basic Section: this unit establishes 「要由先發欲殺故思，於他有情他有情想，作殺加行不誤而殺」 tr. “one must first set going the deliberate volition to kill, and with respect to another sentient being raise the perception of another sentient being, and set going the preparation for killing and kill not by mistake”〔T29 0086c01〕, fixing its constitution by the three conditions of deliberate volition, the perception of another, and not by mistake. The Yogācārabhūmi on the same dharma gives 「云何殺生？謂於他眾生起殺欲樂，起染污心，若即於彼起殺方便，及即於彼殺究竟中所有身業」 tr. “what is killing? It is to raise the desire and delight to kill toward another living being, to raise a defiled mind, to set going upon him the means of killing, and the bodily action within the completion of killing him”〔T30n1579 0317b05〕— its items being desire and delight · a defiled mind · the means · the completion. ⇒ The two limbs of the preparatory stage (the means) and the completion are used by both systems, while the Kośa sets out the further limb 「他想不誤」 tr. “the perception of another, not by mistake” and the Yogācārabhūmi the further limb 「欲樂」 tr. “desire and delight,” which may serve as coordinates for reading limb against limb. For sexual misconduct in the same passage, the Yogācārabhūmi gives 「云何欲邪行？謂於所不應行，非道、非處、非時起習近欲樂」 tr. “what is sexual misconduct? It is to raise the desire and delight to resort, toward what ought not to be gone to, by what is not the way, in what is not the place, at what is not the time”〔T30n1579 0317b09〕, which answers word for word, apart from the first item, to this unit’s four items 「一於非境行不應行……二於非道……三於非處……四於非時」 tr. “first going where one ought not with respect to a forbidden object … second by a forbidden way … third in a forbidden place … fourth at a forbidden time”〔T29 0087a14〕.
The entity of the manifest and nonmanifest of the paths of action → the Yogācārabhūmi’s establishing of manifest action as merely conventional: this unit analyzes the manifest and nonmanifest of the seven evil paths of action one by one, its ground being 「七惡業道中，六定有無表」 tr. “among the seven evil paths of action, six necessarily have the nonmanifest”〔T29 0084c05〕, both the manifest and the nonmanifest being granted to be real as form. The Yogācārabhūmi’s Section of Ascertainment divides manifest action into three, 「云何表業？謂略有三種。一、染污，二、善，三、無記」 tr. “what is manifest action? In brief it is of three kinds: first defiled, second wholesome, third indeterminate”〔T30n1579 0589b11〕, and its closing sentence is 「是故當知一切表業皆是假有」 tr. “therefore it should be known that all manifest action is merely conventional”〔T30n1579 0589b23〕. ⇒ Upon one and the same set of numbered dharmas (manifest action · the ten unwholesome paths of action), the two systems adjudge the reality or conventionality of its entity differently — this is the most direct anchor of Bridge ② in the Chapter on Action, and only the coordinates are recorded · which prevails is not judged.
The set of dharmas that is the ten paths of action → the Yogācārabhūmi’s eight gates of harm: this unit makes out one by one the place each of the ten paths of action depends upon (the four places of sentient beings · goods · name-and-form · the name-bodies and the rest)〔T29 0086b01〕. The Yogācārabhūmi upon the same set of dharmas establishes instead the gates of harm and benefit — 「謂於諸有情，依十不善業道，建立八損害門」 tr. “that is, with respect to sentient beings, on the strength of the ten unwholesome paths of action, eight gates of harm are established”〔T30n1579 0318c17〕. ⇒ The set of dharmas is the same while the gates opened differ, and the two may be looked at side by side.

VIII. Translation History

Xuanzang’s new translation (the base text here): the Kaiyuan Catalogue of the Teachings records 「阿毘達磨俱舍論三十卷」 tr. “Abhidharmakośa, thirty fascicles”〔T55n2154 0557a22〕, its interlinear note reading word for word 「第二出與真諦出者同本永徽二年五月十日於大慈恩寺翻經院譯至五年七月二十七日畢沙門元瑜筆受」 tr. “the second issue, of the same original as the one issued by Paramārtha; translated in the Sūtra-Translation Cloister of the Great Ci’en Monastery beginning the tenth day of the fifth month of the second year of Yonghui and finished the twenty-seventh day of the seventh month of the fifth year, the śramaṇa Yuanyu taking it down”〔T55n2154 0557a22〕. This unit’s fascicle-head title is 「阿毘達磨俱舍論卷第十六」 tr. “Abhidharmakośa, fascicle sixteen”〔T29 0083b13〕, and its continued chapter title 「分別業品第四之四」 tr. “Chapter Four, Analysis of Action, part four”〔T29 0083b17〕.
Paramārtha’s earlier translation (the collation witness): the Kaiyuan Catalogue of the Teachings records 「阿毘達磨俱舍釋論二十二卷」 tr. “Expository Treatise on the Treasury of Abhidharma, twenty-two fascicles”〔T55n2154 0545c16〕; in the section of the treatise basket it gives 「阿毘達磨俱舍釋論二十二卷陳天竺三藏真諦譯」 tr. “Expository Treatise on the Treasury of Abhidharma, twenty-two fascicles, translated by the Tripiṭaka Master Paramārtha of India under the Chen”〔T55n2154 0620c17〕, with Xuanzang’s version recorded after it as 「阿毘達磨俱舍論三十卷大唐三藏玄奘譯」 tr. “Abhidharmakośa, thirty fascicles, translated by the Tripiṭaka Master Xuanzang of the Great Tang”〔T55n2154 0620c22〕.
The translation of the two treatises of debate: the Kaiyuan Catalogue of the Teachings gives 「阿毘達磨順正理論八十卷大唐三藏玄奘譯」 tr. “Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle of Abhidharma, eighty fascicles, translated by the Tripiṭaka Master Xuanzang of the Great Tang”〔T55n2154 0620c25〕·「阿毘達磨顯宗論四十卷大唐三藏玄奘譯」 tr. “Treatise Revealing the Doctrine of Abhidharma, forty fascicles, translated by the Tripiṭaka Master Xuanzang of the Great Tang”〔T55n2154 0620c27〕, and concludes 「右二部論與俱舍論頌同釋異並眾賢造」 tr. “the two treatises above have the same stanzas as the Abhidharmakośa and a different explanation, and both were composed by Saṅghabhadra”〔T55n2154 0621a01〕. The four words 「頌同釋異」 tr. “the same stanzas and a different explanation” are the warrant for the form of item five — the two treatises use the Kośa’s root stanzas and compose their own prose, and so their chapter is named 「辯業品」 tr. “Making Out Action” and not 「分別業品」 tr. “Analysis of Action.”
A side witness to the work of translation: the Biography of the Tripiṭaka Master of the Great Ci’en Monastery records Xuanzang’s reply of the fifth year of Yonghui, 「其《俱舍》、《順正理》，見譯未周，今年必了」 tr. “the Kośa and the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle, now being translated, are not yet complete, but will assuredly be finished this year”〔T50n2053 0261c20〕. ⇒ The Kośa and the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle were translated together in the same period, which is the background of the density of debate material in this unit (the fact only being recorded · no causal judgment made).
The occasion of the treatise’s composition: the Life of Master Vasubandhu records the form of its composition as 「立薩婆多義隨有僻處以經部義破之。名為阿毘達磨俱舍論」 tr. “setting up the Sarvāstivāda sense and, wherever there was a warped place, refuting it by the Sautrāntika sense; it is named the Abhidharmakośa”〔T50n2049 0190b15〕. ⇒ This unit records expressly one place of 「譬喻者言」 tr. “the masters of similes say”〔T29 0084b03〕and closes it with the Vaibhāṣika masters’ refutation, which is just an instance of that form; and Saṅghabhadra’s counter-refutation at this place (see item five, one) likewise answers to the later events the biography records.
The order of the three commentaries: Puguang’s Record T41n1821 (Puguang · principal) · Fabao’s Commentary T41n1822 (Fabao · secondary) · Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary T41n1823 (Yuanhui · outline) · Shentai’s Commentary X53n0836 (fragmentary · the Chapter on Action wanting).

IX. Edition Location Register

Xuanzang T1558, Fascicle Sixteen (the base text)〔0083b13–0088b22〕: fascicle-head title 0083b13 · continued chapter title 0083b17 · opening transition 0083b18 · second half of Root 60 and Root 61 0083b22 · Roots 62 and 63 0083c16 · Root 64 0084a03 · Root 65 0084a14 · Root 66 0084a28 · Root 67 0084b15 · Root 68 0084c03 · Root 69 lines one to three 0084c16 · Root 69 fourth line and first half of Root 70 0085b14 · quoted stanza one 0085c22 · second half of Root 70 0086a03 · Root 71 and first half of Root 72 0086a17 · second half of Root 72 0086a28 · first half of Root 73 0086b06 · second half of Root 73 0086b19 · first half of Root 74 0086b29 · quoted stanza two 0086c15 · second half of Root 74 0086c29 · first half of Root 75 0087a12 · second half of Root 75 0087b04 · Root 76 0087b24 · Root 77 and first half of Root 78 0088a08 · second half of Root 78 and first half of Root 79 0088b02 · closing sentence of the fascicle 0088b17.
Paramārtha T1559: the corresponding passage 0239b23–0243b27. Main items 0239b23 · 0239b28 · 0239c01 · 0239c04 · 0239c12 · 0240a02 · 0240a07 · 0240a11 · 0240a17 · 0240a29 · 0240b11 · 0241a20 · 0241a25 · 0241b09 · 0241b15 · 0241b17 · 0241b19 · 0241c29 · 0242a15 · 0242a23 · 0242b05 · 0242b08 · 0243a24 · 0243a25 · 0243a27 · 0243b02 · 0243b16 · 0243b24 · 0243b26 · 0243b28 (the head of the next chapter · the boundary of the passage).
Saṅghabhadra T1562〔0573a16–0580b17〕: 0573a16 (the boundary of the passage) · 0574b24 · 0574b25 · 0574b29 · 0574c12 · 0574c14 · 0579a28 · 0579b08 · 0579b17 · 0579b19 · 0579c03 · 0579c04 · 0579c06 · 0579c14 · 0579c16 · 0579c19 · 0579c20 · 0579c25 · 0580b17 (the transition · the boundary of the passage). T1563〔0877c16–0881b24〕: 0877c16 (the boundary of the passage) · 0881b24 (the transition · the boundary of the passage) — within the range of this unit 「經主」 tr. “the Sūtra-master” has zero occurrences.
Puguang’s Record T41n1821〔fascicle sixteen beginning 0250c02〕: 0250c05 · 0250c06 · 0250c18 · 0250c25 · 0251a21 · 0251a24 · 0251c01 · 0251c16 · 0251c23 · 0252a07 · 0252b19 · 0252b21 · 0252b24 · 0252b25 · 0252c27 · 0253a04 · 0253b22 · 0254a12 · 0254a13 · 0254a27 · 0254c24 · 0255a09 · 0255b23 · 0255c11 · 0257b13 · 0257b17 · 0257b21 · 0257c06 · 0257c23 · 0258b23 · 0259a18 · 0259b10 · 0259b16 · 0259b18 · 0259b19 · 0259c13 · 0259c24 · 0260a02 · 0260a11 · 0260b27 · 0260c29 · 0261a12 · 0261a26 · 0261c15 · 0261c17 · 0262b14 · 0262c17 · 0262c23 · 0262c27 · 0263a18 · 0263b06 · 0263b28.
Fabao’s Commentary T41n1822〔fascicle sixteen beginning 0662a07〕: 0662a10 · 0662a11 · 0662b01 · 0662b12 · 0662b19 · 0662b27 · 0662c21 · 0663a26 · 0663c03 · 0665a05 · 0665b06 · 0666c28 · 0667b19 · 0667c28 · 0668c08 · 0668c19 · 0669c23.
Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary T41n1823〔treatise proper, sixteen, beginning 0906a14 · with no chapter-title line〕: 0906a16 · 0906c13 · 0906c15 · 0906c22 · 0907a05 · 0907b03 · 0910a22 · 0910b22 · 0910b28.
Shentai’s Commentary X53n0836: the Chapter on Action wholly wanting — this unit has no Shentai to hang upon (the lack marked as it stands · nothing supplied).
What the cross-reading hangs upon: the Yogācārabhūmi T30n1579 0317b05 · 0317b09 · 0318c17 · 0589b11 · 0589b23.
Collation: within the range of Unit 4 the anchors of collation notes are thirty-one — twelve notes restoring Sanskrit do not enter the table; the remaining nineteen = thirteen variant readings (completely enumerated) + six CBETA restorations (the ⟨CB⟩ table · three of them recording the Taishō printed reading alongside) · no case for raising a variant into the fixed text.

俱舍論 黑白四業·十業道Abhidharmakośabhāṣya · The Four Actions, Black and White · The Ten Paths of Action