俱舍論 惑能繫·三世實有·惑隨增·漏瀑流軛取Abhidharmakośabhāṣya · How the Afflictions Bind · Real Existence in the Three Times · Increase by Attachment · Outflows, Torrents, Yokes, and Appropriations

Before Reading This Fascicle

This fascicle opens from an extremely short sentence — 「諸有情類於此事中隨眠隨增，名繫此事」 tr. “when for any class of sentient beings a latent tendency increases by attachment upon this thing, that is called binding this thing.” There is no transitional formula, no laying out of what the previous fascicle had done; the author settles a definition in one sentence and immediately asks: among the three times, past, present, and future, which latent tendencies can bind which things? The three ancient masters all bring the knife of the outline down at the same place here: Puguang marks 「此下第六明惑」 tr. “below, the sixth, explaining the afflictions,” Fabao marks 「已下大文第六明世縛事通局」 tr. “from here below, the sixth of the main text, explaining the general and particular extent of the binding of things across the times,” Yuanhui marks 「從此第六，明惑能繫」 tr. “from here the sixth, explaining that the afflictions can bind” — three different wordings for the division-name, and one and the same stretch pointed at; and each of the three divides his own fascicles, whose boundaries again coincide one by one with Xuanzang’s. This cut was not forced upon the text by later hands.

What matters is the manner of the question. Since it asks “what things can a past latent tendency bind,” it has already presupposed that the past has things to be bound. And so one question forces out one dispute: are the dharmas of past and future really existent or not? The treatise here inserts an incidental discussion, taking in the Sarvāstivādins’ two proofs from teaching and principle for their tenet, the four masters’ divergent accounts within the school of how the three times are established, and the author’s whole refutation line by line, the prose running unbroken to more than fifteen hundred characters, and then closing it with the one sentence 「法性甚深非尋思境」 tr. “the nature of dharmas is profound and is not the object-field that pondering can reach.” Having closed it, the author says 「傍論已了，今應思擇」 tr. “the incidental discussion is finished; now it should be pondered,” and turns back to the main theme as if nothing had happened.

So one should come to this fascicle prepared for this: its first third is one of the greatest disputes between the schools in the whole treatise, and its latter two-thirds one of the finest tables of numbers in the whole treatise (sixteen dharmas and sixteen consciousnesses; forty-one items and fifty-two items; twenty-nine, twenty-eight, thirty-six, and fifteen). Dispute and number stand together in one fascicle, and this is no accident of arrangement — what the dispute disputes is “whether there is,” what the numbers set out is “how many there are”; the former is unsettled, and only the latter can be counted.

One more thing must be said first. Within this fascicle the author records the two parties and does not conclude for either. He records the Sarvāstivādins’ establishing of their tenet in full, and he writes the Sautrāntikas’ refutation with a free hand; and at the end he lets the Sarvāstivādins say one sentence, “profound and not the object-field of pondering,” and the party breaks up. This is not vagueness; it is the form: one sense with two schools, recorded together without adjudication. In reading, one need not divide victory from defeat on behalf of the ancients; first see clearly where each side has laid its weight.

I. The General Rule of Binding — First Dividing the Afflictions of Individual and of Common Characteristic

〔1.1〕Why two classes of affliction must be divided the moment the mouth is opened. First ask: what is asked is “which latent tendencies can bind which things”; why does the answer not set out from the three times but first divide the afflictions into two classes? Because the rule of binding across the three times is not the same for the two classes, and without dividing them first there is no way to state it. The treatise establishes at once: 「一者自相，謂貪、瞋、慢」 tr. “the first is of individual characteristic, namely greed, hatred, and pride,” and 「二者共相，謂見、疑、癡」 tr. “the second is of common characteristic, namely view, doubt, and delusion.” The criterion of the division is given immediately after — an affliction of individual characteristic is so named because 「以貪瞋慢是自相惑，非諸有情定遍起故」 tr. “because greed, hatred, and pride are afflictions of individual characteristic, and it is not that all sentient beings must arouse them universally”; an affliction of common characteristic is so named because 「由此三種是共相惑，一切有情俱遍縛故」 tr. “because these three are afflictions of common characteristic, and all sentient beings are alike universally bound by them.”

Clearing a misreading: taking “individual characteristic” to mean the individual characteristic of the object taken and “common characteristic” the common characteristic of the object taken. The criterion lies not in the object but in whether it arises — greed, hatred, and pride depend upon each sentient being’s own particular object for their arising, while view, doubt, and delusion are had by every ordinary being without exception. Yuanhui explains this most cleanly and briefly, his meaning being that what arises taking a particular dharma as object is named of individual characteristic and what arises taking many dharmas as object is named of common characteristic; and reading the two accounts together one sees that this pair of technical terms is passable at both ends: from the side of arousing, it is universal or not universal; from the side of the object taken, it is particular or many.

In practice: every adjudication of increase by attachment below, the chain of the order of the ten latent tendencies, and even the number of items under the outflows, torrents, yokes, and appropriations all hang upon this pair of terms. Let the first section be blurred over, and every square of figures that follows will fall through.

〔1.2〕Why the binding across the three times is divided so finely. First ask: the two classes being divided, how is the rule of binding to be set out? The treatise’s ordering is this: of greed, hatred, and pride in past and present, only those “that have already arisen” are reckoned as binding — because an affliction of individual characteristic does not arise universally, and where it has not arisen there is no binding to speak of. Coming to the future, those three associated with the mental consciousness bind all three times throughout; while the greed and hatred associated with the five consciousnesses in the future divide into two roads — those that may arise bind the one future time alone, and those that will not arise bind on the contrary all three times throughout. As for view, doubt, and ignorance, past or future, so long as they are unabandoned they bind all three times throughout.

Clearing a misreading: on seeing that “those that will not arise bind on the contrary all three times” one feels it upside down — do those that will never arise bind more widely? In fact not: the portion that may arise is going to fall hereafter upon some one determinate moment, and the range of its binding is thereby held within that moment; the portion settled not to arise has no place to fall, and binds universally simply as an unabandoned potency. This is the first appearance of the sense that “a latent tendency is a potency and not an activity.”

In practice: what really has to be counteracted in practice is often not the mind that aroused greed on that one occasion, but that portion which has never once come into activity and yet has never been abandoned. This passage of the treatise writes just that fact into the rule.

II. The Establishing of Real Existence in the Three Times — Two Proofs from Teaching, Two from Principle

〔2.1〕How this dispute was forced out. First ask: the fascicle was speaking peacefully of the latent tendencies; why must it suddenly argue whether the three times exist? The treatise explains itself: 「應辯諸事過去未來，為實有無方可說繫」 tr. “one must make out whether things past and future are really existent or nonexistent, and only then may one speak of binding” — the things bound extending to past and future, one must first ask whether the things of past and future exist or not. And either side is difficult: if they are really existent, then all conditioned dharmas exist at all times, and would they not become permanent? And if they are really nonexistent, then the three matters of what binds, what is bound, and release from bondage have nowhere to come down. The Vaibhāṣika masters here decide for real existence and themselves resolve the difficulty of “becoming permanent”: 「毘婆沙師定立實有，然彼諸行不名為常」 tr. “the Vaibhāṣika masters decidedly establish real existence, yet those conditioned dharmas are not named permanent,” because conditioned dharmas are conjoined with the conditioned marks.

Clearing a misreading: taking this passage for a digression off the theme. It is not a digression; it is the ground floor of the main argument of this fascicle — what the later passage on “abandoned and yet not released from bondage” handles is precisely “the thing is abandoned and the binding still stands,” and that word “stands” cannot come down without the sense of the three times to hold it up. In practice: whenever one meets the two characters “incidental discussion” in this treatise, look at what it is incidental to; an incidental discussion is often precisely the hidden pile on which the main argument is able to stand.

〔2.2〕The four reasons must be seen in two layers. First ask: how many reasons are hidden in the ten characters of the stanza, 「三世有由說，二有境果故」 tr. “the three times exist because it is said so, and by the two of having an object-field and having a result”? Answer: four, in two layers. The first layer is the proof from teaching — first, 「由契經中世尊說故」 tr. “because the World-Honored One said so within the sūtras” (the Buddha teaching men to strive to cultivate disgust with and abandonment of past form and to strive to sever and to seek future form, from which it may be known that past and future form exist); second, 「又具二緣識方生故」 tr. “and again because a consciousness arises only when complete in two conditions” (the sūtra saying that a consciousness arises from two conditions, so that if past and future were not existent the consciousness that takes past and future as object would lack one condition). The second layer is the proof from principle — third, that a consciousness when it arises must have its object-field (without an object-field no consciousness arises; and since the consciousness that remembers the past does arise, its object-field ought to exist); fourth, 「又已謝業有當果故」 tr. “and again because an action already perished has a coming result” (if the entity of a past action were wholly nonexistent, the coming results of wholesome and unwholesome would have nowhere to come from).

Clearing a misreading: taking the four as four items standing abreast. The text of the treatise divides them very plainly: 「已依聖教證去來有，當依正理證有去來」 tr. “having proved by the noble teaching that past and future exist, we shall now prove by correct principle that past and future exist” — the first two by teaching, the latter two by principle, and the latter two are precisely the former two turned into reasoning and stated again. In practice: whenever one reads a passage establishing a tenet, count clearly how many proofs are from teaching and how many from principle, and then in the refutation set them against each other one by one, and there will be no confusion.

〔2.3〕“The school that says all exists” is a school-name and also a criterion. First ask: is the stanza’s closing 「說三世有故，許說一切有」 tr. “because they say the three times exist, they are allowed to be the school that says all exists” a conclusion or a definition? A definition. The text of the treatise gives the criterion sentence by sentence — 「若自謂是說一切有宗，決定應許實有去來世」 tr. “if one calls oneself a follower of the school that says all exists, one must decidedly grant that the times of past and future are really existent”; and conversely, if one grants only the present and the past actions that have not yet given their result, saying that there is no future and no past action that has already given its result, then 「彼可許為分別說部，非此部攝」 tr. “such a one may be allowed to be of the Vibhajyavādins, and is not gathered into this school.”

Clearing a misreading: taking “the school that says all exists” to mean “all dharmas exist.” It does not — what it says is “all three times exist,” the stress falling upon time and not upon the number of dharmas. In practice: when the author closes the passage later he says 「若欲善說一切有者，應如契經所說而說」 tr. “if one would state ‘all exists’ well, one ought to state it as the sūtra states it,” and adduces the sūtra to explain “all exists” by the twelve sense fields or the three times — which is precisely to return this criterion upon its owner. One school’s name, explained by each of the two parties in its own way: the point at issue in this fascicle in fact begins from the school’s very name.

III. The Four Masters Who Establish the Three Times — Class, Mark, Position, and Relation

〔3.1〕What the four masters are disputing. First ask: since all four belong to the Sarvāstivādins, what is left for them to dispute? What they dispute is this: the entity being the same in all three times, upon what are the differences of “time” to be established? Dharmatrāta says upon “class,” Ghoṣa upon “mark,” Vasumitra upon “position,” Buddhadeva upon “relation.” Each of the four has his simile: Dharmatrāta’s is 「如破金器作餘物時，形雖有殊而體無異」 tr. “as when a vessel of gold is broken up and made into some other vessel, the shape being distinct while the entity is not distinct”; Ghoṣa’s is 「如人正染一妻室時，於餘姬媵不名離染」 tr. “as when a man is at the moment enamored of one wife, of his remaining consorts it is not said that he has left off desire”; Vasumitra’s is 「如運一籌，置一名一、置百名百、置千名千」 tr. “as with the moving of a single counting-rod: set at one it is called one, set at a hundred it is called a hundred, set at a thousand it is called a thousand”; Buddhadeva’s is 「如一女人名母名女」 tr. “as one and the same woman is named mother and named daughter.”

Clearing a misreading: reading the four similes as four turns of rhetoric. Each of the four fastens upon one mechanism — the gold vessel fastens upon “the entity unaltered while the class to which it belongs alters”; the wife upon “the marks being all possessed together while the activity is partial”; the counting-rod upon “the thing being one while the position differs and so the name differs”; the mother and daughter upon “the name established by what it is related to.” In practice: hereafter, whenever one meets a set of divergent accounts standing abreast, first find out each master’s mechanism; the mechanisms found, the author’s refutation below has something to come down upon.

〔3.2〕The names of the four masters are themselves a lesson. Puguang glosses each of these four names, and this is the most learned passage in the fascicle. He glosses Dharmatrāta’s name thus: 「能救正法、或正法救彼、或以正法救人，故名法救」 tr. “he can defend the right dharma, or the right dharma defends him, or he defends men with the right dharma, and so he is named Dharma-defended”; he glosses Ghoṣa’s name thus: 「梵云懼沙，舊云瞿沙，訛也」 tr. “in Sanskrit Jusha; the old rendering Qusha is corrupt”; on Vasumitra he carries also the account of how he got his name, saying first 「此即第三師說。世是天名，與天遂友故名世友」 tr. “this is the third master’s account. ‘World’ is the name of a god, and because he came to be friends with the god he is named World-Friend,” and then analyzing his Sanskrit name, 「梵名筏蘇密呾囉，筏蘇名世，密呾囉名友。舊云和須密，訛也」 tr. “the Sanskrit name is Fasumidaluo; fasu means world and midaluo means friend; the old rendering Hexumi is corrupt”; and he glosses Buddhadeva thus: 「能覺悟天，故名覺天。梵云勃陀提婆，勃陀名覺，提婆名天。舊云佛陀提婆，訛也」 tr. “he can awaken the gods, and so is named Awakening-God; in Sanskrit Botuotipo, botuo meaning awakening and tipo meaning god; the old rendering Fotuotipo is corrupt.”

First ask: what use are these glosses? They have two uses. One is that in reading the earlier translation one will not mistake the men — Paramārtha’s earlier translation gives this passage as Damoduoluo, Qusha, Poxumiduoluo, and Fotuotipo, all by transcription; and one who does not know that the renderings of sound and of sense are one and the same man will read four masters as eight. The other is to know that renderings have a history — Puguang marks each of the three old transcriptions “corrupt,” and that is his own glossing verdict. Clearing a misreading: taking Puguang’s word “corrupt” for an adjudication of the treatise. The treatise here only records the four masters’ accounts, and touches not a word upon renderings of names. In practice: whenever one sees an ancient master set down the two words “this is corrupt,” first ask who is speaking; within this fascicle, it is Puguang speaking.

〔3.3〕How the author assesses and refutes the first three and takes the third. First ask: since he takes the third, why refute the first, the second, and the fourth, and not in order? Because what he refutes is three forms of one and the same malady. He refutes the first master thus: 「第一執法有轉變故，應置數論外道朋中」 tr. “the first holds that dharmas undergo transformation, and ought to be placed within the party of the Sāṃkhya non-Buddhists” — the entity unaltered while the class alters is precisely the Sāṃkhya doctrine of “transformation.” He refutes the second thus: 「第二所立世相雜亂，三世皆有三世相故」 tr. “the marks of time established by the second are jumbled, since the dharmas of all three times have the marks of all three times” — the three marks being possessed together, the three times cannot be told apart. He refutes the fourth thus: 「第四所立前後相待，一世法中應有三世」 tr. “the relation of earlier and later established by the fourth would make there be three times within the dharmas of one time” — earlier and later standing in mutual relation within one time, the earlier and later moments of the past become past and future again, and the three times have no fixed standard. He takes the third alone, on the ground that 「彼謂諸法作用未有名為未來，有作用時名為現在，作用已滅名為過去，非體有殊」 tr. “his meaning is that when the function of dharmas is not yet present they are called future, at the time when there is function they are called present, and when the function has ceased they are called past, the entity not being distinct.”

Clearing a misreading: taking “the assessment that takes Vasumitra” for Puguang’s or Yuanhui’s adjudication. It is not. Puguang expressly marks here 「此即評取第三世友」 tr. “this is the assessment that takes the third, Vasumitra,” which is precisely to point out that the assessment comes from the author himself; and Yuanhui, narrating the same passage, likewise opens with “the author assesses, saying.” In practice: the most vital question in reading a commentary is “is this sentence the treatise’s or the commentary’s?” And this passage is just where all three commentaries with one voice tell you: this one is the treatise’s.

IV. Five Preliminary Interrogations — Pressing “Function” into the Corner

〔4.1〕Who is asking whom in these five exchanges. First ask: the third master having been taken as best, why is he at once objected to? Because the author’s own standpoint was never with the Sarvāstivādins. In the five exchanges that follow, the three ancient masters mark them consistently: the first exchange, 「彼應復說，若去來世體亦實有，應名現在，何謂去來」 tr. “he ought further to say: if the entities of the times of past and future are also really existent, they ought to be called present; what is meant by past and future?” is the Sautrāntikas’ objection — Puguang marks it 「經部難。去、來實有，應名現在，何謂去、來」 tr. “the Sautrāntikas object: if past and future are really existent they ought to be called present; what is meant by past and future?”; the second, 「豈不前言約作用立」 tr. “was it not said above that it is established upon function?” is the Sarvāstivādins’ answer — Puguang marks it 「說一切有部答。指同前說」 tr. “the school that says all exists answers, pointing to what was said above”; the third, “the present eye and the other faculties, gathered under the participating, what function have they?” is the Sautrāntikas objecting again; the fourth, 「彼豈不能取果與果」 tr. “can it not take a result and give a result?” is the Sarvāstivādins’ answer; the fifth, 「有半作用，世相應雜」 tr. “there is half a function, and the marks of the times would be jumbled,” is the Sautrāntikas objecting again.

Clearing a misreading: reading this passage as the author’s rhetorical self-questioning and self-answering. There really are two parties, and the three commentaries mark the schools identically, not one round diverging. In practice: hereafter, on meeting a long chain of question and answer, first fix the speakers by the ancient masters’ outlines and then read the content; otherwise one is certain in the end to fit the cap to the wrong head.

〔4.2〕The weight of the objection from “half a function.” First ask: why can the fifth exchange close these five rounds? Because it turns the Sarvāstivādins’ own criterion back upon them. They say that “at the time when there is function it is called present,” and they also say that the participating eye, though it does not see form, can take a result and give a result — then since the past homogeneous cause and the rest can give a result, they too have function, and they too ought to be called present. And thus upon one and the same dharma the two functions of “taking a result” and “giving a result” are the one present and the other absent, which makes 「有半作用，世相應雜」 tr. “half a function, and the marks of the times jumbled.”

Clearing a misreading: taking this for a game with words. It is not — what it points out is that the criterion itself is not self-sufficient: if time is fixed by “function,” then function must first be cut clean, whereas taking and giving a result belong from the outset to two different times. In practice: whenever a criterion is set up, first ask whether it can adjudicate itself cleanly; this is the most serviceable single move the fascicle teaches its reader. The author lays down his pen here himself — “having briefly probed, next comes the refutation at length” — from which it is plain that all the above was still only a warming-up.

V. The Root Stanza’s Refutation at Length Line by Line — What Obstructs the Function, What Time the Function Is, No Distinction, Time Collapses, Unarisen and Ceased

〔5.1〕The four lines of the stanza are a table of contents for the refutation. First ask: how are the twenty characters of the root stanza, 「何礙用云何？無異世便壞，有誰未生滅？此法性甚深」 tr. “what obstructs the function, and what time is the function? If there is no distinction, time collapses; who then is unarisen or ceased? The nature of this dharma is profound,” to be read? Yuanhui here gives the least laborious reading, his general adjudication being 「前三句經部破，第四句有宗答」 tr. “the first three lines are the Sautrāntikas refuting, the fourth line the answer of the school that holds existence.” That is to say: the first three lines are three objections and the fourth is the Sarvāstivādins’ answer; and among the three objections the first line in fact contains two — “what obstructs the function” and “what time is the function.” Puguang’s marking of the schools line by line agrees with this, only that he scatters the general adjudication beneath the prose line by line.

Clearing a misreading: reading the fourth line, “the nature of this dharma is profound,” as the author’s conclusion. Yuanhui expressly marks 「此法性甚深者，薩婆多救也」 tr. “as for ‘the nature of this dharma is profound,’ that is the Sarvāstivādins defending” — it is the Sarvāstivādins’ defense and not the author’s verdict. In practice: that the words of two parties should stand within one stanza is no isolated case in this treatise; in reading a stanza, to ask first “whose is this line?” is often more vital than glossing it word by word.

〔5.2〕The first objection: what is it that blocks the function. First ask: where does the objection cut in? It cuts in at the seam between “existing constantly” and “now arising and now not.” The treatise runs: if the own-entity of a dharma exists constantly, it ought at all times to be able to arouse its function; what force then makes the function aroused by this entity of a dharma be now present and now absent? Thereupon the Sarvāstivādins set up a defense — that the several conditions have not come together; and the Sautrāntikas at once reject it: this defense is unreasonable, since on the Sarvāstivādins’ own account the conditions themselves exist constantly.

Clearing a misreading: taking this for an interrogation from common sense. It is not — what it uses is precisely the Sarvāstivādins’ own “existing constantly.” If they answer “the conditions have not come together,” they must grant that the conditions have a time of coming together and a time of not; and the conditions existing constantly, whence the two times? In practice: the most forceful material for refuting another school is always that school’s own premise.

〔5.3〕The second objection: to which time does the function itself belong. First ask: why does this objection follow immediately upon the last? Because the last forced out “the function is now present and now absent,” and this one presses after that “now.” The treatise runs: how is this function itself to be said to be past, future, or present? Can a further function be established upon a function (which would be without end)? And if the function belongs to none of the three times and is yet said to exist, it becomes an unconditioned dharma and ought to be constant and incapable of being nonexistent — and then it ought no longer to be said that “the function has ceased” or that “the function is not yet present.” Here the Sarvāstivādins defend, saying 「若許作用異法體者，可有此失，然無有異，故不應言有此過失」 tr. “if it were granted that the function is other than the entity of the dharma, there might be this fault; but there is no distinction, and so it ought not to be said that there is this fault” — Puguang marks this sentence as the Sarvāstivādins’ defense, and Fabao likewise marks it a Sarvāstivādin defense and points out that it is precisely the explanation of the two characters “not distinct” in the stanza.

Clearing a misreading: reading “not distinct” as the author’s words. It is the Sarvāstivādins’ defense, and it is also the heading marked upon the first half of the stanza’s second line. In practice: the characters of a stanza are sometimes the words of the refuting party and sometimes of the defending party, and only the commentary’s outline can tell them apart — which is just where the ancient masters’ outlines cannot be dispensed with.

〔5.4〕The third objection: since there is no distinction, the three times collapse. First ask: the Sarvāstivādins say “the function is just the entity”; why is that to their disadvantage? Because the entity existing constantly, the function too ought to exist constantly, and then there is no moment that can be called past or future. The treatise runs, “if that is so, the sense of time you have established must collapse … how could there ever be a time called past or future?” — Puguang marks this as the Sautrāntikas’ refutation and expressly points out that what it explains is the three characters “time collapses” in the stanza. The Sarvāstivādins defend again: how can it not be made out? Not yet arisen is called future, arisen and not yet ceased is called present, already ceased is called past. The Sautrāntikas thereupon answer with the third line of the stanza and press to the bottom by questioning and answering themselves: since the entity truly exists constantly, who is not yet arisen? Who is already ceased? — What was lacking before is “it was not yet”; what was lacking afterward is “it is already gone.” And so they conclude, still in the Sautrāntikas’ own voice, 「故不許法本無今有、有已還無」 tr. “therefore he does not grant that a dharma was not before and is now, and having been returns to nonexistence,” and the sense of the three times cannot be made out on any account.

Clearing a misreading: taking this round for a mere tangle of technical terms. What it asks is in fact something utterly plain — if the two words “arising” and “ceasing” are not allowed to have “was not before” and “is not afterward,” what meaning is left in them? In practice: this question may be carried over and used directly upon oneself — if one says that the nature of mind is originally complete and the entity of a dharma exists constantly, then what is it that the word “cultivation” alters? The treatise does not answer for its reader; it only whets the question to its keenest.

VI. The Quoted Stanza and the Sautrāntikas’ Comprehensive Answer — Having Once Been, Being to Be

〔6.1〕That stanza is not a stanza of this treatise. First ask: why must the four lines 「許法體恒有，而說性非常，性體復無別，此真自在作」 tr. “to grant that the entity of a dharma exists constantly and yet to say that its nature is not permanent, while nature and entity are further not distinct — this is truly the handiwork of Īśvara” be separately marked as not a root stanza? Because there is a warrant in the preceding text — the treatise itself gives 「依如是義故，有頌言」 tr. “following out this sense, there is a stanza that says,” from which it is plain that the author adduces it to help his refutation and that it is not one of the stanzas within this treatise’s own reckoning. Fabao marks it here 「引頌破也」 tr. “a stanza adduced in refutation.” The sense of the stanza is: having granted that the entity exists constantly, and yet saying that its nature is not permanent, while nature and entity are again not distinct — that comes to “let it be permanent when we want it permanent and impermanent when we want it impermanent,” which is no different from the Īśvara the non-Buddhists reckon, who acts at his own will.

Clearing a misreading: counting it into the sixty-nine stanzas of this chapter. In practice: the prose of this treatise often adduces the stanzas of others, and the way to judge them rests not upon doctrine but upon the warrant in the preceding text — whenever one sees such phrases as “as a stanza says,” “hence there is a stanza that says,” “a further stanza is spoken,” one must stop and ask first whose that stanza is.

〔6.2〕The Sautrāntikas take the word “exists” apart into two layers. First ask: the Sautrāntikas having refuted the real existence of past and future, why do they yet say “we too say that the times of past and future exist”? Because they have taken the word “exists” apart: 「謂過去世曾有名有，未來當有，有果因故」 tr. “that is, the past time is named existent as having once existed, and the future as being to exist, there being a cause able to produce the result” — the existence of the past is “it once was,” the existence of the future is “it will be, and there is presently a cause able to produce it”; to say they exist upon these two natures is not to say that past and future are really existent in entity as the present is. Their warrant is 「有聲通顯有無法故」 tr. “because the word ‘exists’ can point to both existent and nonexistent dharmas”: the world says “there is a lamp that was not there before,” and that word “is” does not make the nonexistent a real thing.

Clearing a misreading: taking the Sautrāntikas to be playing with the surface of words. They are not — what they are handling is why the Buddha said that past and future exist. The answer they give is: it was in order to block the view that denies cause and result that he spoke of existence upon the sense of having-once-been and being-to-be. In practice: when in reading the sūtras one meets the word “exists,” ask first whether it is the existence of an entity or the existence of a narration; this fascicle raises that distinction into a general rule for interpreting the sūtras.

〔6.3〕The proofs are each returned in turn. First ask: how do the Sautrāntikas return the four reasons of the establishing? First, the sūtra of the staff-and-topknot non-Buddhist says that “an action, though past and exhausted and perished, is nevertheless existent” — the Sautrāntikas answer: that is said covertly of the “capability of giving a result” within the present continuum drawn forth by the action; unless so explained, a past action becomes really existent in the present, and what past is left? Second, the Sūtra of Ultimate Emptiness says 「以薄伽梵於勝義空契經中說：眼根生位無所從來，眼根滅時無所造集」 tr. “for the Bhagavat said in the Sūtra of Ultimate Emptiness: at the position where the eye faculty arises it comes from nowhere, and when the eye faculty ceases it is made and gathered nowhere,” and says expressly that it was not before and is now, and having been returns to nonexistence — if the eye faculty of past and future were really existent, the sūtra ought not to have spoken so. Third, the proof from a consciousness arising from two conditions: the Sautrāntikas ask back, in “the mental faculty and dharmas as conditions,” does that “dharma” act as a producing condition in the way the mental faculty does, or only as the object-field taken as object? If as a producing condition, how can a dharma a hundred thousand aeons hence, or even the nature of nirvāṇa, produce today’s consciousness? And if only as the object-field taken as object, then past and future as “having once been and being to be” are equally objects taken. Fourth, the proof from an action having a coming result: the Sautrāntikas say expressly 「非經部師作如是說，即過去業能生當果」 tr. “it is not that the Sautrāntika masters say that that very past action can produce the coming result,” their tenet being that the transformation and differentiation of the continuum drawn forth by the action make the coming result arise.

Clearing a misreading: reading the fourth item as the Sautrāntikas denying action and result. Quite the contrary — what the Sautrāntikas deny is that “an action already ceased directly produces the result,” and what they establish is the transformation of the continuum. In practice: among these four returns, the third and the fourth afterward became the old root upon which the whole Yogācāra learning established seeds and the continuum, and it is worth remembering that their prototype lies in this passage.

〔6.4〕The move of the “thirteenth sense field.” First ask: why does the treatise suddenly bring forward a “thirteenth sense field” outside the twelve? This is the Sautrāntikas finding an extreme instance for their own claim that “a consciousness may take the nonexistent as object.” If the other party says that “what is wholly without entity cannot be taken as object,” then when someone plainly penetrates that “there is no thirteenth sense field,” what does this consciousness that takes an object take? And if it be said that what it takes is that name, that is to grant that the name is nonexistent and yet is taken. The treatise concludes therefrom 「故識通緣有非有境」 tr. “therefore consciousness extends to taking as object both an existent and a nonexistent object-field.”

Clearing a misreading: reading it as sophistry. It is in fact pushing the point at issue to the place where no further retreat is possible — whoever is able to think “nonexistent” has thereby demonstrated that a consciousness can take the nonexistent as object. In practice: this move is quoted again and again in later treatises, and once it is well learned one knows where to lay hold when one meets any claim of the type “the nonexistent cannot be taken as object.”

〔6.5〕How the author closes this passage. First ask: after so long a refutation, who is at last adjudged the winner? No one. The treatise first records the Sautrāntikas’ closing — that if one would state “all exists” well one ought to state it as the sūtra does, all that exists being only the twelve sense fields or only the three times; then records the Sarvāstivādins’ response to the difficulty raised at the outset — that though past and future are nonexistent, the producing cause, the latent tendency, is still present, and so one speaks of past and future afflictions that bind and past and future things that are bound, the latent tendency abandoned being named release from bondage; and last records the Vaibhāṣika masters’ closing: past and future are really existent as the present is, and wherever within this something cannot be explained through, one who cherishes himself ought to know that 「法性甚深非尋思境」 tr. “the nature of dharmas is profound and is not the object-field that pondering can reach,” for how can one deny a thing as nonexistent merely because one cannot explain it? And then one sentence, 「傍論已了，今應思擇」 tr. “the incidental discussion is finished; now it should be pondered,” turns back to the main argument.

Clearing a misreading: reading the two characters “profound” as the author’s own closing, or as a concession of his. Yuanhui expressly marks it a Sarvāstivādin defense; and Saṅghabhadra’s Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle, reading this place, reacts with the greatest heat, calling the author’s sentence outright “a slanderous saying craftily set up” — from which it may be seen that within the lineage this sentence is taken as having been fastened upon the Sarvāstivādins. In practice: it is the form of this treatise to record the two parties and leave the last sentence to the other side, and the reader must see for himself to whom that last sentence belongs. To carry on the posture of his closing without carrying his conclusion for him — this is the measure most to be kept in reading this fascicle.

VII. Abandoned and Yet Not Released from Bondage

〔7.1〕The boundary between two words. First ask: are “abandoned” and “released from bondage” not one and the same thing? They are not. The treatise sets up the question: when things are abandoned are they released from bondage, and when things are released have they been abandoned? Answer: what is released has decidedly been abandoned, and yet there is what is abandoned and not released. Puguang here divides the bounds of the two words very clearly, saying that “already abandoned” is stated with reference to having been abandoned and “released from bondage” with reference to being freed from the binding — the one looking at whether the thing itself has been abandoned, the other at whether there is still an affliction binding it.

Clearing a misreading: taking “abandoned” for the terminus. The treatise here tells you: the thing taken as object being abandoned, if the affliction that takes it as object still stands, that thing is bound as before. In practice: this is an extremely serviceable item on the ledger of practice — that the object of some portion of affliction no longer arises does not mean that this portion is liberated; one must still see whether some other affliction still takes it as object.

〔7.2〕Two instances. First ask: which cases are “abandoned and yet not released from bondage”? The treatise gives two positions. The first is on the path of seeing: at the time when the knowledge of suffering has arisen and the knowledge of origin has not, the things abandoned through the seeing of suffering have been abandoned, and yet if the all-pervading latent tendencies abandoned through the seeing of origin are not yet forever abandoned, those that can take them as object bind them as before. The second is on the path of cultivation: among the nine grades the earlier grades have been abandoned, and the latent tendencies of the unabandoned grades, if they can take them as object, bind them as before. The treatise closes with 「斷非離繫，如是應知」 tr. “abandoned and yet not released from bondage, it ought to be understood thus.”

Clearing a misreading: taking the all-pervading latent tendency for some further special affliction. It is just that family of the afflictions of common characteristic spoken of above — because they can take all five categories as object, the things of this category being abandoned, the afflictions of that category can still come and bind them. In practice: this section puts to use the division of the afflictions of individual and of common characteristic made in the first section; the reason the afflictions of common characteristic had to be singled out is precisely the ambush laid for this place.

VIII. The Sixteen Dharmas as the Object-Fields of the Sixteen Consciousnesses

〔8.1〕Why the author first makes a table. First ask: what was asked was “how many latent tendencies increase by attachment upon a given thing”; why speak first of consciousnesses and their objects? The treatise explains itself: to answer thing by thing separately would cost a great many words, and so 「是故應造略毘婆沙」 tr. “therefore one ought to compose a brief Vibhāṣā,” 「而能越渡大大問流」 tr. “and one is able to cross the very great flood of questions.” The device is to reduce the dharmas in brief to sixteen kinds — 「略為十六種，即三界、五部及無漏法」 tr. “in brief they are sixteen kinds, namely the three realms, the five categories, and the dharmas without outflows” — the consciousnesses that can take them as object being likewise sixteen in number; and once one knows which dharma is the object-field of which consciousness, the question of increase by attachment becomes easy.

Clearing a misreading: taking the “brief Vibhāṣā” for laziness. Quite the contrary — it turns an endless run of particular questions into one table that can be consulted. In practice: on meeting a great table in Abhidharma, first find where its “brevity” lies; the brevity of this fascicle lies in the number sixteen.

〔8.2〕How the three numbers five, eight, and ten arise. First ask: five in the desire realm, eight in the form realm, ten in the formless — what is the rule of this staircase? The rule is one only: what can take them as object must be of the same realm or of a higher one, plus one consciousness without outflows. The dharmas of the three categories abandoned through the seeing of suffering, through the seeing of origin, and through cultivation, if affiliated to the desire realm, are each the object of five consciousnesses — the three categories of their own realm, plus one category of the form realm abandoned through cultivation, with the consciousness without outflows as the fifth. Those of the form realm are each the object of eight — the three categories of their own and of the lower realm together, plus one category of the formless realm abandoned through cultivation, with the consciousness without outflows as the eighth. Those of the formless realm are each the object of ten — the three categories of each of the three realms, nine in all, with the consciousness without outflows as the tenth. As for the dharmas abandoned through the seeing of cessation and of the path, to each is added one consciousness that takes its own category as object, and so the desire realm becomes six, the form realm nine, and the formless eleven. The dharmas without outflows are the object-fields of ten consciousnesses — the last three categories of each of the three realms, nine in all, with the consciousness without outflows as the tenth.

Clearing a misreading: reading “three each” as three realms each. The desire realm’s “three of its own realm” means the three categories of its own realm abandoned through the seeing of suffering, through the seeing of origin, and through cultivation, and not the three realms. In practice: the way to check the reckoning lies in the text of the treatise itself — the three categories of each realm take the three categories of its own and lower realms as their floor, one category being added realm by realm as one goes up, and then the one without outflows; multiply that rule through once again and five, eight, and ten fasten of themselves. Whenever one reads the numbers of this fascicle, ask first “is this a category of its own realm or of another realm,” and the numbers will not fall into confusion.

IX. The Summary Stanza and the Instance of the Faculty of Pleasure

〔9.1〕Why this stanza must be specially marked. First ask: are the two lines and forty characters beginning 「見苦集脩斷，欲色無色繫，應知如次第，五八十識緣」 tr. “what is abandoned through the seeing of suffering, of origin, and through cultivation, affiliated to the desire, the form, and the formless realms, should be known to be the object of five, of eight, and of ten consciousnesses respectively” a stanza of this treatise? No. Its warrant in the preceding text is 「為攝前義，復說頌言」 tr. “in order to gather up the preceding sense, a further stanza is spoken” — it gathers the prose just finished back into a stanza, for ease of memorizing and reciting. Puguang marks it 「說頌重攝。總結」 tr. “a stanza is spoken to gather it again; a general conclusion,” and Fabao marks it 「此兩行頌重述前義」 tr. “these two lines of stanza restate the preceding sense.”

Clearing a misreading: taking it for another’s stanza adduced by the author, or counting it into the chapter’s stanza-count. It is neither adduced from elsewhere nor does it enter the count of the root stanzas — it is the summary of this passage’s own prose. In practice: within this treatise, wherever “a further stanza is spoken” and its content answers line by line to what precedes, it is mostly of this kind; the judgment still rests upon the warrant in the preceding text and not upon guesses from doctrine. This stanza is the first instance of such a mark seen in this collection, and its pattern is worth remembering.

〔9.2〕How the single instance of the faculty of pleasure is held up. First ask: the sixteen dharmas expounded, why does the treatise close by holding up the faculty of pleasure alone? The treatise says so itself: 「故我於此略示方隅」 tr. “and so I here indicate only one corner” — holding up one corner so that the reader may turn back the other three of himself. The instance held up advances in three layers. The first layer asks how many latent tendencies increase by attachment upon the faculty of pleasure: 「應觀樂根總有七種」 tr. “it ought to be observed that the faculty of pleasure has seven kinds in all,” namely one of the desire realm abandoned through cultivation, five categories of the form realm, and the one without outflows as the seventh; and since 「一切無漏非諸隨眠之所隨增」 tr. “all that is without outflows is not such as the latent tendencies increase by attachment upon,” there is increase by attachment only upon the first six. The second layer asks how many latent tendencies increase by attachment upon the consciousness that takes the faculty of pleasure as object: this consciousness has twelve in all, namely four categories of the desire realm (excepting that abandoned through the seeing of cessation), five of the form realm, two of the formless, and the one without outflows as the twelfth. The third layer asks about what takes “the consciousness that takes the faculty of pleasure as object” as its object: fourteen in all, the two categories of the formless realm abandoned through the seeing of suffering and of origin being added to the preceding twelve.

Clearing a misreading: reading the three layers as one question asked three times over. What the three layers ask about moves outward step by step — first the faculty, next the consciousness that takes the faculty as object, next the consciousness that takes that consciousness as object; and with each step outward the things that can take them as object become more numerous, because the all-pervading latent tendencies can climb up layer by layer. In practice: these three layers are the only reckoning taught hand to hand in this fascicle; once it is worked through, the author’s “reasoning from this one corner, the rest ought to be pondered out” is no empty phrase.

X. The Two Kinds of Mind Possessed of Latent Tendencies

〔10.1〕“Possessed of latent tendencies” and “increase by attachment” are two different matters. First ask: when a mind is called “a mind possessed of latent tendencies,” does the latent tendency necessarily increase by attachment upon it? The treatise says expressly that this is not settled. A mind possessed of latent tendencies divides in all into two — 「有隨眠心總有二種，有染、無染心差別故」 tr. “a mind possessed of latent tendencies has two kinds in all, because there is a difference between the defiled and the undefiled mind.” The defiled mind extends to both senses: the latent tendencies associated with it and those that take it as object, if unabandoned, increase by attachment; and if that associated portion has been abandoned they do not increase by attachment, and yet it is still said to be possessed of latent tendencies, because they are constantly associated with it. The undefiled mind, on the other hand, 「若無染者，唯局隨增」 tr. “if it is undefiled, it is confined to increase by attachment alone” — because the latent tendencies that take it as object are decidedly unabandoned, this name being established upon increase by attachment alone.

Clearing a misreading: confounding “possessed of latent tendencies” with “increase by attachment.” Puguang under this division separates the two very finely, pointing out that “increase by attachment” has of itself the two senses of increase through association and increase through the object taken, while what “possessed of latent tendencies” takes is the sense of accompaniment — accompanying does not necessarily mean increasing. In practice: this item is the place in the whole fascicle where the technical terms are most apt to slip out of the hand, and it is also the premise of every later question of “how many latent tendencies increase by attachment”; failing to tell these two senses apart, the table of sixteen dharmas above has been reckoned for nothing.

XI. The Ten Latent Tendencies Arise in Due Order

〔11.1〕The starting point of this chain. First ask: do the ten latent tendencies arise in an order? The treatise says they do, and gives the reason link by link: first, through ignorance one fails to understand the truths and is unwilling to observe suffering and so on to the path; failing to understand, there is next drawn forth doubt, one having heard the accounts of two roads and harboring hesitation; from hesitation is drawn forth wrong view, wrong hearing and wrong reflection producing a wrong determination that denies the truth of suffering and so on to the truth of the path; from denying the principle of the truths is drawn forth the view of self, one denying the principle of suffering within the aggregates of appropriation and determinedly grasping “this is I”; from the view of self is drawn forth the extreme view, one falling by the grasping of self into the two extremes of annihilation and permanence; from the extreme view is drawn forth the grasping of rules and observances, one grasping at one extreme and reckoning this grasping to be able to purify; from the grasping of rules and observances is drawn forth the grasping of views, one having reckoned it able to purify and so grasping it as most excellent; from the grasping of views is drawn forth greed, one being deeply attached in feeling to one’s own view; from greed is drawn forth pride, one having been deeply attached and so relying upon it, arousing self-exaltation and disdaining others; from pride is drawn forth hatred, one being unable to bear in feeling what others arouse against one’s own view and hating and detesting it.

Clearing a misreading: reading this chain as a psychological account of cause and effect. It is in fact a chain fastened upon “view” — the treatise marks it at the end: when greed and the rest abandoned through the seeing of the truths arise, they take the “view” within one’s own continuum as their object-field. That is to say, these ten links from beginning to end are telling how a man comes to fall in love with his own opinion, and then to exalt himself for it and to hate men for it.

〔11.2〕Which kind of ignorance stands at the start. First ask: ignorance is of several kinds; which is this? The text of the treatise gives only 「先由無明於諦不了」 tr. “first, through ignorance one fails to understand the truths,” without qualification; Puguang here adds two characters, giving “first, through independent ignorance, one fails to understand the truths” — limiting it to independent ignorance and not to the general sense of defiled ignorance associated with other afflictions.

Clearing a misreading: reading the two characters Puguang adds as belonging to the treatise’s own text. The treatise here truly does not have those two characters. In practice: this is just the sort of thing most to be watched for in reading a commentary — a limitation the commentator adds in order to make the sense go through is often full of insight, and yet may not be taken for a direct statement of the treatise. Both layers are recorded together here: the treatise gives “ignorance,” Puguang gives “independent ignorance.”

〔11.3〕Another account, and arising out of order. First ask: is this chain the only road? The treatise leaves itself two openings. First, at the link of hatred it records another account alongside — another master says that hatred and detestation arise at the very juncture of taking up or setting aside one’s own view, without waiting until after pride. Second, at the end the treatise says expressly: the above is stated with reference to arising in due order, while for those that arise out of order there is nothing fixed about before and after. In practice: the treatise gives an order, not a law; wherever one sees the words “with reference to,” the author is himself marking the range within which his account applies.

XII. The Three Causes and Conditions of the Arising of an Affliction

〔12.1〕Three conditions of which not one may be lacking. First ask: what does an affliction need in order to arise? The treatise takes the entanglement of desire-greed for its instance and lists three matters: first, that the latent tendency of desire-greed is unabandoned and not yet fully understood; second, that the object-field conformable to desire-greed is present before one; third, that the improper attention taking it as object arises; 「由此力故便起欲貪」 tr. “by these forces desire-greed thereupon arises.” The three in order are just 「即因境界加行三力」 tr. “the three forces of cause, of the object-field, and of preparatory effort” — the latent tendency being the force of cause, the object-field’s being present the force of the object-field, and improper attention the force of preparatory effort.

Clearing a misreading: taking the three for three successive steps. They are three conditions complete at one and the same time, and not three stages. In practice: this is the passage in the whole fascicle most directly usable. Among the three forces, the force of cause (the latent tendency) is not to be abandoned in a day, and the force of the object-field is often not in one’s own hands; only the force of preparatory effort — that one thought of improper attention — can be turned at the present moment. The place where practice takes hold is just this link.

〔12.2〕The exception and the general sense. First ask: must every arising of an affliction be complete in the three conditions? The treatise adds a sentence of its own: this is stated with reference to being complete in causes and conditions, and there are also those that arise by the force of the object-field alone, as for instance an arhat of the lineage liable to falling back. Puguang here hangs the three causes and conditions upon the general Abhidharma frame, explaining 「因謂六因、緣謂四緣」 tr. “cause means the six causes, condition means the four conditions” — joining the three forces of this passage back to the great frame of the six causes and the four conditions.

Clearing a misreading: reading the six causes and four conditions as established by the treatise here. The text here speaks only of three forces; the six causes and four conditions are a frame Puguang adduces in order to make the whole treatise hang together. In practice: both layers are recorded together — the treatise says three forces, Puguang carries it through by the six causes and four conditions; the reader gains both the practical use of the passage and a sense of its position within the whole treatise.

XIII. Outflows, Torrents, Yokes, and Appropriations — the Four Gates and Their Number of Items

〔13.1〕First look at the names of the four gates, then at the numbers. First ask: are the four gates of outflow and the rest four different kinds of affliction? They are not; they are four accounts of one and the same set of afflictions. The sūtras call the latent tendencies together with their entanglements outflows, torrents, yokes, and appropriations: the outflows are three (of desire, of existence, of ignorance), the torrents four, the yokes four, and the appropriations four (of desire, of views, of rules and observances, of assertions of self). Their entity runs through them all — 「應知四軛與瀑流同，四取應知體同四軛」 tr. “it should be known that the four yokes are the same as the torrents, and the four appropriations should be known to be the same in entity as the four yokes.”

Clearing a misreading: memorizing the four gates as four batches of things. They are one heap of afflictions regrouped under four senses of the term; and the reason the groupings differ lies wholly in the opening and gathering of the two items “view” and “ignorance.” In practice: the trick of holding this passage is not to memorize numbers but to hold two rules of opening and gathering — view is gathered in among the outflows and opened out among the torrents and yokes; ignorance is gathered in among the yokes, while among the appropriations view is opened and ignorance gathered in.

〔13.2〕The number of items one by one. For the outflows, 「四十一物總名欲漏」 tr. “forty-one items are named in sum the outflow of desire,” namely the thirty-one root afflictions of the desire realm with the ten entanglements; 「五十二物總名有漏」 tr. “fifty-two items are named in sum the outflow of existence,” namely twenty-six root afflictions in each of the two upper realms; and the fifteen ignorances of the three realms separately as the outflow of ignorance. For the torrents: 「如是已顯二十九物名欲瀑流」 tr. “thus it is displayed that twenty-nine items are named the torrent of desire” (greed, hatred, and pride five each, doubt four, entanglements ten), 「二十八物名有瀑流」 tr. “twenty-eight items are named the torrent of existence” (greed and pride ten each, doubt eight), 「三十六物名見瀑流」 tr. “thirty-six items are named the torrent of views” (twelve views in each of the three realms), 「十五物名無明瀑流」 tr. “fifteen items are named the torrent of ignorance.” For the appropriations: 「三十四物總名欲取」 tr. “thirty-four items are named in sum the appropriation of desire” (the yoke of desire with the ignorance of the desire realm), 「三十八物總名我語取」 tr. “thirty-eight items are named in sum the appropriation of assertions of self” (the yoke of existence with the ignorance of the two upper realms), 「餘三十物總名見取，所除六物名戒禁取」 tr. “the remaining thirty items are named in sum the appropriation of views, and the six items excepted are named the appropriation of rules and observances.”

Clearing a misreading: taking the forty-one of the outflow of desire and the twenty-nine of the torrent of desire for a contradiction. They do not contradict — the outflow of desire contains the afflictions other than delusion together with the entanglements and does not open out view, while the torrent of desire draws view out, and so is short by twelve views and comes to exactly twenty-nine. In practice: every group of figures can be checked by the rules of opening and gathering; wherever the reckoning will not come out, it is most often because one has overlooked the phrase “delusion excepted” or “view drawn out.”

〔13.3〕What the several occurrences of “on what ground” ask about is the reason for the grouping. First ask: why does the treatise set down several questions of “on what ground” in a row? Because the number of items is easy to list while the reason for the grouping is hard to make plain. On what ground are the latent tendencies of the two upper realms joined into one outflow of existence — 「同無記性於內門轉，依定地生，由三義同故合為一」 tr. “alike indeterminate in nature, turning by the inner gate, and arising in dependence upon the levels of absorption: by these three senses being the same, they are joined into one.” On what ground is ignorance separately established as one outflow — 「無明能為諸有本故」 tr. “because ignorance is able to be the root of all existences.” On what ground is view not made a name of its own among the outflows — because an outflow takes the sense of “causing to abide,” while the nature of view is fierce and sharp and does not conform to abiding. On what ground must the grasping of rules and observances be established separately — 「由此獨為聖道怨故，雙誑在家出家眾故」 tr. “because it alone is the enemy of the noble path, and because it deludes both assemblies, the householders and those gone forth”: the householders are deluded by it into reckoning self-starvation and the rest to be the road to heaven, and those gone forth into reckoning the abandoning of agreeable object-fields to be the road to purity. On what ground is ignorance not established as an appropriation — 「謂不了相說名無明，彼非能取，非猛利故」 tr. “that is, not understanding the marks is what is called ignorance; it is not that which appropriates, its nature not being fierce and sharp.”

Clearing a misreading: taking these questions for supplementary explanation. They are the very bone of this passage — the numbers are the result and the reasons for the grouping are the cause. In practice: the item on the grasping of rules and observances is especially to be remembered. The two delusions it reproaches — one in austerity, one in aversion to objects — are still, for the most part, the two squares within which practitioners today go wrong.

XIV. The Glosses on the Names “Latent Tendency” and the Rest

〔14.1〕The four senses of “latent tendency.” First ask: the entity and the numbers having been fully expounded, why gloss the names as well? Because within the name lies the manner of its working. The treatise gives four senses: first, subtle — at the time when a root affliction is present, 「行相難知故名微細」 tr. “because its mode of apprehension is hard to be aware of it is called subtle”; second, twofold increase by attachment — 「能於所緣及所相應增惛滯故」 tr. “because it is able to increase torpor and clogging upon what is taken as object and upon what it is associated with,” that is, increasing torpor at the two places of the object-field taken and the mind it is associated with; third, following after — it can draw forth “acquisition” and constantly follow after a sentient being, and can be made to arise even without any doing; fourth, binding along — even if one spends strength to block it, it still appears again and again.

Clearing a misreading: reading “subtle” as small in quantity. What it says is that its mode of apprehension is hard to be aware of — not weak in force, but hard to detect. In practice: these four senses taken together are just that portion in practice which is hardest to be rid of: undetectable, unceasing in its increase, not to be shaken off, not to be pressed down. Recognizing these four words, one knows why the latent tendencies must be abandoned and not merely suppressed.

〔14.2〕The two layers of gloss on the names of outflow and the rest. First ask: how many layers of gloss does the treatise give for the four names outflow, torrent, yoke, and appropriation? Two. The first glosses them by their function — it can 「稽留有情久住生死」 tr. “detain sentient beings so that they long abide in birth and death,” or make them turn round within birth and death from the heaven at the summit of existence down to the Unremitting Hell; because within the continuum it leaks out harm without end from the six sores it is named outflow; 「極漂善品故名瀑流」 tr. “because it utterly sweeps away the wholesome, it is called torrent”; 「和合有情故名為軛」 tr. “because it joins sentient beings together, it is called yoke”; 「能為依執故名為取」 tr. “because it can act as support and appropriation, it is called appropriation.” The second is the better explanation the author gives of himself — 「諸境界中流注相續泄過不絕故名為漏」 tr. “because within the several object-fields it flows on in a continuous stream and leaks out harm without ceasing, it is called outflow” — and he adduces the sūtra’s simile of drawing a boat against the current in proof: to draw a boat upstream is hard even with great strength expended, while to let it go downstream is not hard even with strength given up; and the arising of a wholesome mind and of a defiled mind is likewise. Following the sense of this sūtra, the afflictions’ not ceasing within the object-fields is named outflow; 「若勢增上說名瀑流」 tr. “if its potency preponderates it is called torrent,” surging and flooding and sweeping and dashing and hard to withstand; what at the time of activity is not utterly preponderant is named yoke, merely joining sentient beings together with sufferings of every kind, or named yoke because it is active again and again; and 「執欲等故說名為取」 tr. “because it appropriates desire and the rest, it is called appropriation.”

Clearing a misreading: reading the second layer as a denial of the first. The treatise itself marks it “one who would explain it well” — it is a closer explanation and not a refutation of what precedes. What the two explanations differ in is where they look: the former looks to the result (long abiding in birth and death), the latter to the mark (the difference between not ceasing and preponderating). In practice: that simile of drawing a boat against the current is a solid object handed to the reader at the fascicle’s end — from disputing whether the three times exist to opening and gathering the number of items, the fascicle comes down at last upon one sentence that anyone may verify: going with the current costs no strength, going against it costs strength, and practice is the going against.

Further Resonances: The Mirror of the Three Commentaries

The above is the sense of the treatise’s own text in this fascicle. Below a further section is set up to take in four matters: the commentaries’ adjudications and their divergences from one another, Saṅghabhadra’s refutations and supplements, the divergences of Paramārtha’s earlier translation, and coordinates for parallel reading. A mirror is not the treatise; it is only another way of reading one and the same text. Recorded together without adjudication, each returned to its own place.

1. Where the Three Commentaries Diverge

One commentary wholly absent. The commentaries on this fascicle stand in a special case: Shentai’s commentary is a fragmentary text, of which the surviving seven fascicles belong to the Chapter on the Elements, the Chapter on the Faculties, and the Chapter on the Worthy and the Noble, while the Chapter on the Latent Tendencies is wholly absent; and so this fascicle has no line-by-line explanation of Shentai’s to hang upon. Although his Fascicle One’s general conspectus carries a remark on the number of lines of this chapter, that is a conspectus and not a commentary, and cannot be made to serve, nor may the words of other fascicles be substituted. It is marked absent as it stands.

One and the same stretch, and two patterns of division. All three adjudge Unit 2 to belong wholly to the sixth main division of this chapter, and in this they agree completely; the number of divisions, however, runs in two patterns. Puguang divides beneath the main division into two, “first, explaining binding with reference to the times; second, explaining binding with reference to abandonment”; Yuanhui runs with him and adds in each the one character “can,” giving 「一約世明能繫、二約斷明能繫」 tr. “first, explaining the power to bind with reference to the times; second, explaining the power to bind with reference to abandonment”; while Fabao alone opens four divisions — 「一世縛通局、二證三世有、三建立三世、四破三世有」 tr. “first, the general and particular extent of binding across the times; second, proving that the three times exist; third, establishing the three times; fourth, refuting the existence of the three times” — his latter three answering exactly to the three passages of the establishing of the tenet, the four masters, and the refutation at length. ⇒ The names agree while the number of divisions differs, Fabao alone being fine. The sentence-forms of the three commentaries’ division-names likewise each form a family: Puguang is accustomed to “below, the Nth,” Fabao to “the Nth of the main text,” Yuanhui to “from here the Nth.” Recorded together without adjudication.

On the four masters, Puguang is full and Fabao is neat. Puguang sets out for each of the four masters the gloss of his name and the account of how he got it, most fully for Vasumitra, carrying also the tale that his parents named him “friend of the god” in order to keep spirits from harming him — a piece of lore that among the three commentaries only Puguang has. Fabao uses for all four the uniform sentence-form 「此述第三計也」 tr. “this sets forth the third reckoning,” his doctrinal attributions wholly the same as Puguang’s while his wording forms a manner of its own. Yuanhui again strikes out a line of his own: at his general outline sentence he first sets the four terms side by side, 「一類異、二相異、三位異、四待異」 tr. “first, difference of class; second, difference of mark; third, difference of position; fourth, difference of relation,” a summary peculiar among the three to Yuanhui — Puguang and Fabao both explain the masters one by one as the text runs, and do not list the four terms at the general outline sentence. The differences of fullness and of sentence-form among the three let one see the three characters proper to the commentary as a form. Recorded together without adjudication.

That one assessment of Yuanhui’s occurs twice in his whole book. In this fascicle Yuanhui narrates the author’s assessment and refutation of the four masters as 「應置數論外道朋中，以數論執法有轉變故也」 tr. “it ought to be placed within the party of the Sāṃkhya non-Buddhists, since the Sāṃkhyas hold that dharmas undergo transformation,” continuing below with Vasumitra’s establishing the times best; and one and the same passage occurs exactly twice in the whole of Yuanhui’s book, the two being nearly word for word the same and differing only in the presence or absence of one character “school.” This is a repetition within Yuanhui’s own writing, recorded as a fact, and it does not affect the force of the passage here.

One difference in the density of attribution. Within the passage of refutation at length, Puguang and Fabao handle the sentence “if it be said that the several conditions have not come together, this defense is unreasonable, since they are granted to exist constantly” differently: Puguang folds it into the continuation of the Sautrāntikas’ objection and sets up no separate label for the answering party, while Fabao expressly marks 「牒救非也」 tr. “citing the defense and rejecting it” — citing the Sarvāstivādins’ defense first and then having the Sautrāntikas reject it, dividing one layer more than Puguang. This is the one difference between the two commentaries in the density of attribution at one and the same sentence, recorded as it stands, with no verdict as to which is right.

And at the places that matter most, the three commentaries agree completely. Through the thirteen rounds of question and answer in the passage of refutation at length, all three mark the refuting party “the Sautrāntikas” (Puguang giving the Sautrāntikas object, the Sautrāntikas object again, the Sautrāntikas refute; Fabao the Sautrāntikas object; Yuanhui the Sautrāntikas refute), and the defending party uniformly “the school that says all exists,” “the Sarvāstivādins,” or “the Sarvāstivādins” by another name — different names for the same thing, and compared round by round not one round diverges. Yuanhui moreover passes at the head of the stanza a general adjudication, 「前三句經部破，第四句有宗答」 tr. “the first three lines are the Sautrāntikas refuting, the fourth line the answer of the school that holds existence,” and marks the last line separately, 「此法性甚深者，薩婆多救也」 tr. “as for ‘the nature of this dharma is profound,’ that is the Sarvāstivādins defending.” Such convergence is not common among the long passages of debate in this treatise, and is worth recording.

Puguang marks the boundary of his own division. For the passage of glosses Puguang marks 「此下第二釋名」 tr. “below, the second, explaining the names,” and states of himself what it does not include — 「纏後別明，故此不問」 tr. “the entanglements are explained separately later, and so are not asked after here,” that is, the gloss on “entanglement” falls not in this fascicle but after it. This remark, the boundary of this treatise’s fascicle, and the boundary of Paramārtha’s earlier translation corroborate one another on three sides and fall exactly at one and the same place. That the boundary of an ancient master’s outline should coincide with the boundary of a translation is the hardest set of corroborations for the carving of this fascicle.

2. Saṅghabhadra’s Refutations and Supplements

Saṅghabhadra’s two treatises name this chapter not “Analysis of the Latent Tendencies” but “Adjudication of the Latent Tendencies”; and the stretch answering to this fascicle begins in the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle at the sentence 「如是略述三世有無理趣正邪有差別已」 tr. “having thus briefly set forth that in the reasoning about the existence or nonexistence of the three times there is a difference of right and wrong.” Saṅghabhadra calls the author “the Sūtra-master,” and within the range of this fascicle that designation occurs twenty-two times, every one of them citing the author’s own words word for word and then refuting them.

The fierceness of the wording is rare in the whole treatise. Upon the Sautrāntikas’ comprehensive answer, “we too say that the times of past and future exist,” Saṅghabhadra cites it and says 「經主於中欲以強力逼令非了」 tr. “the Sūtra-master would herein by main force press it into unintelligibility”; upon the objection from a consciousness arising from two conditions, he rejects it with 「經主此言乖於論道」 tr. “these words of the Sūtra-master are at variance with the way of treatise-reasoning”; upon the sentence “if one would state ‘all exists’ well,” he marks outright 「經主此中作如是謗」 tr. “here the Sūtra-master utters such a slander”; and upon the Vaibhāṣika masters’ closing “the nature of dharmas is profound” he further adjudges 「經主於此詭設謗言」 tr. “here the Sūtra-master craftily sets up a slanderous saying.” At the end of the whole passage Saṅghabhadra concludes for himself, 「正對經主決擇過未，盡彼所能」 tr. “meeting the Sūtra-master directly and adjudicating past and future, to the utmost of his power.”

Here there is one thing worth stopping over. When Saṅghabhadra says that the author “craftily sets up a slanderous saying,” his meaning is that the sentence “the nature of dharmas is profound” is not a closing phrase the Vaibhāṣika masters could have uttered of themselves, but one the author fastened upon them. One and the same sentence: within this treatise it is the Sarvāstivādins’ defense, in Yuanhui too it is marked a Sarvāstivādin defense, while in Saṅghabhadra’s eyes it is the author’s own contrivance. The three sides see it differently, and they are recorded together without adjudication — but the reader may know from this that the attribution of that last sentence of the fascicle is itself a point at issue with a history behind it.

Saṅghabhadra himself also points out the character of that root stanza. Before the passage of refutation at length Saṅghabhadra gives 「然彼經主於此義中，迷執情深復廣興難」 tr. “yet that Sūtra-master, in this matter, being deep in confused attachment, further raises objections at length,” and below cites directly the whole stanza “what obstructs the function” as the text objected with. ⇒ The defining verdict of the debate within the lineage and the three commentaries’ attribution “the Sautrāntikas refute” stand as obverse and reverse: the one side says this is the Sautrāntikas’ refutation, the other that this is the Sūtra-master’s raising of objections at length, and what is pointed at is one and the same stretch.

The passage of glosses was not let pass either. The better explanation at the end of this treatise Saṅghabhadra likewise cites, giving 「經主此中復作是說：若善釋者應作是言」 tr. “here the Sūtra-master says again: one who would explain it well ought to say thus” — from which it is plain that even upon the gloss of the word “outflow” the lineage has something to say.

The two treatises divide the labor differently. Within the passage answering to this fascicle, the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine reproduces the four masters’ divergent accounts almost word for word, as 「尊者法救作如是說：由類不同，三世有異」 tr. “the Venerable Dharmatrāta says thus: it is by difference of class that the three times differ” and 「尊者妙音作如是說：由相有別，三世有異」 tr. “the Venerable Ghoṣa says thus: it is by there being a difference of mark that the three times differ,” nearly identical with this treatise’s own sentences (Ghoṣa’s “there being a difference of mark” differing by one character from this treatise’s “difference of mark”); and then it closes directly with 「是故三世實有義成，諸有智人應隨信學」 tr. “therefore the sense that the three times are really existent is made out, and all who have wisdom ought to follow it in faith and study it,” without one character in between touching the author’s long interrogation from “what obstructs the function” onward, and without one citation of “the Sūtra-master.” ⇒ The whole passage of refutation is absent from the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine. This is a fact of form and not an omission — the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle is charged with debating line by line, the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine only with restating positively the definitions of its own school. One and the same author, and the two treatises divide the labor differently; marked absent as it stands, recorded without adjudication.

3. The Divergences of Paramārtha’s Earlier Translation

The first thing to know is that Paramārtha’s earlier translation gives this chapter not as “latent tendency” but as “affliction” — the greatest single divergence of rendering in the whole text. To search Paramārtha with Xuanzang’s two characters for “latent tendency” is to search forever in vain; a comparison across the two texts can only be taken by the structure of the scene. The opening sentence of this fascicle stands in Paramārtha as 「若人隨眠惑於境界中生起」 tr. “if a man’s latent affliction arises within an object-field,” agreeing wholly in scene with the question with which this treatise opens, except that this treatise takes “thing” for what is bound and Paramārtha “object-field.”

The names of the four masters are all by transcription. Paramārtha gives 「大德達磨多羅，分別有異故安立三世」 tr. “the Bhadanta Dharmatrāta: because the analysis differs, the three times are established,” 「大德瞿沙說：由相別異故立三世」 tr. “the Bhadanta Qusha says: because the marks are separately distinct, the three times are established,” 「大德婆須蜜多羅說：由位別異故立三世」 tr. “the Bhadanta Poxumiduoluo says: because the positions are separately distinct, the three times are established,” and 「大德佛陀提婆說：由異異故立三世」 tr. “the Bhadanta Fotuotipo says: because of difference upon difference, the three times are established” — the four answering one by one to those Xuanzang lists, while the style of address is “Bhadanta” and not “the Venerable,” and the names are wholly by transcription. Puguang’s glosses on the names are precisely the bridge between this set of renderings by sound and by sense.

For one of the four the whole system of rendering differs. For Buddhadeva, Xuanzang gives “relation” (relation as regarding), while Paramārtha does not use the character for relation at all and gives “difference upon difference” (earlier and later mutually different). What is meant doctrinally is one and the same, while the characters chosen for the rendering are wholly different — the most conspicuous systematic divergence in this fascicle. Recorded together without adjudication.

Divergences of rendering in a sūtra title and a verb. The Sūtra of Ultimate Emptiness stands in Paramārtha as the Sūtra of Real Emptiness, its citation reading 「眼根若生無所從來，若滅無所增集」 tr. “if the eye faculty arises it comes from nowhere, if it ceases it is increased and gathered nowhere,” differing by one character from Xuanzang’s “made and gathered nowhere”; the core sense of “coming from nowhere” and of “was not before and is now, having been returns to nonexistence” corresponds line by line closely in the two texts, and this is the passage among this fascicle’s adduced proofs where the two translations stand nearest each other.

One name of a non-Buddhist reproached differs. In the proof from teaching concerning the staff-and-topknot non-Buddhist, Paramārtha names, within the same line of doctrinal reasoning, a class of non-Buddhist different from Xuanzang’s; and re-checked by a fault-tolerant method, Xuanzang’s two characters for “staff-and-topknot” yield zero throughout Paramārtha’s text — the scene is certainly there, and only the name of the non-Buddhist reproached differs between the two texts. This is not a failure of searching but a real divergence of the translations, recorded without adjudication.

Divergences of format and of fascicle arrangement. Xuanzang gives “the stanza says / the treatise says,” the whole stanza coming first and the prose after; Paramārtha gives “the verse says / the explanation says,” embedding his explanation line by line, so that one stanza is often broken into several passages for citation, the passage on real existence in the three times being especially fragmented. The fascicle arrangement does not align either — Paramārtha gives this chapter in two fascicles only, Xuanzang in three; and the stretch answering to this fascicle straddles a boundary between two of Paramārtha’s own fascicles. The division into fascicles is a matter of the translation bureau and not evidence of doctrinal sections; the opening and closing of fascicles do not align, and the scenes align throughout.

4. Coordinates for Parallel Reading

The problem disputed in this fascicle — if the two times of past and future are not really existent, how are cause and result unbroken — did not come to an end with this fascicle. The Yogācāra lineage took it up head-on, its treatise saying expressly that since past and future are not really existent, to say they are not permanent may be granted while to say they are not annihilated is hard — and setting up the answering line, that if past and future were really existent it might be granted that they are not annihilated; and it resolves the two extremes of annihilation and permanence by a consciousness that turns constantly like a stream. ⇒ Upon one and the same difficulty, this fascicle records the two parties and closes with “profound,” while the Yogācāra lineage sets up another entity of continuity to bear it. The entity established differs, and the difficulty met is entirely the same. This is the straightest line this fascicle draws forward.

The entity of the latent tendency too admits of parallel reading. This fascicle establishes its name by the character “following” — subtle, twofold increase by attachment, following after, binding along, all four senses being stated upon “accompanying.” The Yogācārabhūmi lineage establishes its entity upon seeds, its text saying that among the seeds belonging to one’s own being, what is gathered under the class of the afflictions is named coarseness and also named latent tendency, while what is gathered under the class of maturation and under the remaining indeterminate classes is named coarseness alone and not named latent tendency. ⇒ The one establishes the name by the manner of its working, the other by the entity it depends upon; both lineages grant that the latent tendency is a portion lying dormant and constantly following, while the entity to which it is fastened differs. Where the numbers agree and the frames differ, they may be read side by side; where the frames differ and the problem is the same, they may be read side by side all the more.

As for that simile of drawing a boat against the current at the end of this fascicle, it belongs to no lineage’s point at issue. Whether the three times exist may be disputed, and the opening and gathering of the number of items may be disputed; but that going with the current is easy and going against it hard is a thing neither party will dispute. That the whole fascicle closes here is not without meaning.