俱舍論隨眠體·諸門分別（前五門）Abhidharmakośabhāṣya · The Nature of the Latent Tendencies · Distinctions through the Several Gates (the First Five Gates)

〔T29 0098b13〕

心要Essence

業品講完了業，卻不收在業上。這一卷的第一句逐字接著上一品的末尾——世間的差別由業而生，而業要靠隨眠才長得起來，離了隨眠，業就沒有招感後有的能力。於是全卷從一問起：隨眠有幾？答案走了四步——六、七、十、九十八；然後辨見修所斷、五見自體、四顛倒、七慢九慢；再轉入諸門分別，本卷走完前五門，末附一節四種記門，卷就收了。

一句話：這一卷不是在數煩惱，是在示範同一批煩惱怎麼因為換一把尺而換一個數——六變七換的是貪，七變十換的是見，十變九十八一次換了三把（行、部、界）。凡遇數目對不上，第一問不是誰錯，是這幾項各用了哪一把尺。

三個眼目

『有』與『現行』是兩件事。全卷最密的一場諍——隨眠是心相應還是不相應——最後停在經部的一個分位上：煩惱在睡位叫隨眠，在覺位叫纏；睡是「不現行種子隨逐」，覺是「諸煩惱現起纏心」。所以經說樂受上『有』貪隨眠，並不等於那時貪正在活動——「經但說有，不言爾時即有隨眠」。這條分辨後面又用了兩次：聖者身中『有』殺生等纏而必不現行；隨眠緣得到某境，未必就能在那境上隨增。承認一物存在，不等於承認它正在作用。
判一個惑，看的是它從哪裡生，不是看它談什麼題目。戒禁取把非因執為因，題目明明是『因』，卻不歸見集所斷——因為執因之前必先「計度彼體是常一我作者」，見苦時常執我執一斷，因執就跟著落。同一手在『聖有而不起』一節再現：那些惑之所以起不來，不是被直接對治了，是「見疑所增故」——養它的那個先斷了。斷一個煩惱，未必要正面撞它。
煩惱要長膘，得先有一層『我的』。隨增一門給了一對極好的譬喻：被這一地的身見與愛攝為己有的法，煩惱緣它才增得起來，「如衣潤濕埃塵隨住」；無漏與上地之法不被攝為己有而且相違，緣它也黏不住，「如於炎石足不隨住」。所以六緣無漏、九緣上界的惑，於所緣境「無隨增義」；而嚮往上地的心，論還特地撇清一句——「是善法欲，非謂隨眠」。判準不在境的高低，在那境有沒有被認作『我的』。

一義（附）：論主為什麼在此下了一句評語

本論在許多諍處只錄二造而不判勝負，此卷卻有一處例外——隨眠相應之諍，三方各說盡了理由之後，論主逕下一句「然經部師所說最善」。

它所取的說法其實只有一個要點：隨眠不是另一個東西。既非心相應、亦非心不相應，因為「無別物故」——是同一個煩惱的兩個分位。撐住這一說的是兩個比喻：記憶的種子由曾經證知而生、又能生後來的憶念，沒有人會說它是另一個實物；芽由前果生、又能生後果，也是一樣。於是經部反問：既然念種只是功能，煩惱種為什麼非得另立一個不相應的實體？「差別因緣不可得故。」

要留意這一句評語的重量。它不是把另二方說錯了——毘婆沙師的三事之證、難方拆證的那一手（不承認前提，證自落空），本卷都一字不省地錄了下來。論主評取一說，與論主錄全二造，是可以並行的兩件事。

通於全論

六、七、十、九十八這四個數，以及五部三界的那張表，是後面兩卷（惑之能繫、隨增、次第）與整個『明惑滅』大文所要反覆取數的地基。遍行十一是其中最常被搬走的一組；緣無漏之六與緣上界之九，也在隨增一門立刻回用。

還有兩件事是這一卷留給讀者的線頭。其一，論主評取經部之說，而系內的反破恰恰最烈地落在同一句上——造論體例所記的『立薩婆多義，隨有僻處以經部義破之』，在此可以看見它長什麼樣，也可以看見它引來了什麼回應。其二，戒禁取所斷一段，論主連設六問而終以「故所執義應更思擇」收尾，未下結論；古德於此亦未代為收束。論自己標明未決之處，讀者不必替它結案。

The Chapter on Action finished speaking of action, yet did not close upon action. The first sentence of this fascicle follows word for word upon the end of the chapter before it — the differences of the world arise from action, and action grows only when the latent tendencies sustain it; parted from the latent tendencies, action has no power to call forth a coming existence. From there the whole fascicle proceeds from one question: how many are the latent tendencies? The answer walks four steps — six, seven, ten, ninety-eight; then it analyzes what is abandoned through seeing and through cultivation, the entities of the five views, the four inversions, the seven prides and the nine classes of pride; then it turns into the distinctions through the several gates, of which this fascicle walks the first five, appends a section on the four gates of determination, and the fascicle closes.

In one sentence: this fascicle is not counting afflictions; it is demonstrating how one and the same set of afflictions changes its number because the measuring rod has been changed — six becomes seven by changing the rod of greed, seven becomes ten by changing the rod of view, ten becomes ninety-eight by changing three rods at once (mode, category, realm). Whenever the numbers do not tally, the first question is not who has erred, but which rod each of these items has used.

Three Points to Watch

“There is” and “is active” are two different things. The densest dispute of the whole fascicle — whether the latent tendencies are associated with mind or not associated with it — comes at last to rest upon a distinction of stages made by the Sautrāntikas: an affliction in the stage of sleep is called a latent tendency, and in the stage of waking it is called an entanglement; sleep is “a seed following along without being active,” waking is “the afflictions arisen and entangling the mind.” Hence when the sūtra says that upon a pleasant feeling “there is” a latent tendency of greed, that does not mean that greed is at that moment at work — “the sūtra says only that there is one; it does not say that there is a latent tendency at that very moment.” This distinction is used twice more further on: in the noble one there “are” the entanglement of killing and the rest, and yet they are definitely not active; and a latent tendency may reach an object and still be unable to increase by attachment upon that object. To grant that a thing exists is not to grant that it is at work.
In adjudging an affliction, what one looks at is where it arises from, not what topic it talks about. Adherence to observances and vows holds what is not a cause to be a cause; the topic is plainly “cause,” and yet it is not classed as abandoned by seeing origination — because before one holds a thing to be a cause one must first “deliberate that its entity is eternal, one, a self, and an agent,” and when at the seeing of suffering the holding to eternity and to self is cut off, the holding to a cause falls away with it. The same move recurs in the section on “the noble one has them and yet they do not arise”: those afflictions cannot arise not because they were directly counteracted, but because “they are increased by view and doubt” — what fed them was cut off first. To cut off an affliction, one need not always strike it head-on.
For an affliction to grow fat, there must first be a layer of “mine.” The gate of increase by attachment gives an excellent pair of similes: a dharma appropriated as its own by the view of self and the craving of this level is one upon which an affliction taking it as object can increase, “as when a garment is damp the dust follows and stays upon it”; the dharmas without outflows and those of an upper level are not appropriated as one’s own and are moreover contrary to it, so that an affliction taking them as object cannot cling, “as upon a burning stone the foot does not stay.” Hence the six that take the dharmas without outflows as object and the nine that take an upper realm as object have, upon their object-fields, “no sense of increase by attachment”; and of the mind that aspires to an upper level the treatise expressly clears the ground with one sentence — “that is the desire for wholesome dharmas, and is not called a latent tendency.” The criterion is not the height of the object, but whether that object has been taken to be “mine.”

One Further Point (Appended): Why the Author Passes a Verdict Here

In many disputed places this treatise records the two parties only and does not adjudge which prevails; in this fascicle there is one exception — in the dispute over whether the latent tendencies are associated with mind, after all three parties have said out their reasons, the author lays down one sentence directly: “yet what the Sautrāntika masters say is the best.”

The account he takes has in truth only one main point: a latent tendency is not another thing. It is neither associated with mind nor dissociated from mind, because “there is no separate thing” — it is one and the same affliction in two stages. What holds this account up is two similes: the seed of memory arises from having once known and can produce a later act of recollection, and no one would say that it is a separate real thing; a sprout arises from a former fruit and can produce a later fruit, and it is the same. Whereupon the Sautrāntikas ask in return: if the seed of memory is a mere capability, why must the seed of an affliction have a further dissociated entity set up for it? “Because the causal ground of a difference between them cannot be found.”

The weight of this verdict is worth noting. It does not put the other two parties in the wrong — the Vaibhāṣikas’ proof from three functions, and the objector’s move of dismantling that proof (deny the premise and the proof falls of itself), are both set down in this fascicle without the omission of a single word. That the author takes one account, and that the author records both parties in full, are two things that can go together.

Bearing on the Treatise as a Whole

The four numbers six, seven, ten, and ninety-eight, together with that table of the five categories and the three realms, are the ground from which the two fascicles that follow (how the afflictions bind, increase by attachment, sequence) and the whole main division on “the extinction of the afflictions” will draw their numbers again and again. The eleven all-pervading are the set most often carried off; the six that take the dharmas without outflows as object and the nine that take an upper realm as object are put back to work at once in the gate of increase by attachment.

Two further things this fascicle leaves the reader as loose threads. First, the author takes the Sautrāntika account, and the counter-refutation within the lineage falls most fiercely upon that very sentence — the manner of composition recorded of him, “to set up the Sarvāstivāda sense and, wherever there is a bias, to refute it by the Sautrāntika sense,” can here be seen for what it looks like, and so can the response it drew. Second, in the section on what abandons adherence to observances and vows, the author poses six questions in a row and ends with “therefore the sense here held should be further examined,” passing no conclusion; nor did the ancient masters close it on his behalf. Where the treatise itself marks a place as unsettled, the reader need not close the case for it.

原典Canonical · verbatim

阿毘達磨俱舍論卷第十九　〔T29 0098b13〕

【品界】分別隨眠品第五之一　〔T29 0098b17〕

前言世別皆由業生，業由隨眠方得生長，離隨眠業無感有能。所以者何？隨眠有幾？頌曰：

〔頌·正1　T29 0098b21〕　　隨眠諸有本，此差別有六，
　　謂貪瞋亦慢，無明見及疑。
論曰：由此隨眠是諸有本，故業離此無感有能。何故隨眠能為有本？以諸煩惱現起能為十種事故，一堅根本、二立相續、三治自田、四引等流、五發業有、六攝自具、七迷所緣、八導識流、九越善品、十廣縛義，令不能越自界地故。由此隨眠能為有本，故業因此有感有能。此略應知差別有六，謂貪、瞋、慢、無明、見、疑。頌說亦言，意顯慢等亦由貪力於境隨增，由貪隨增義如後辯。及聲顯六體各不同。若諸隨眠體唯有六，何緣經說有七隨眠？頌曰：

〔頌·正2　T29 0098c05〕　　六由貪異七，有貪上二界，
　　於內門轉故，為遮解脫想。
論曰：即前所說六隨眠中分貪為二，故經說七。何等為七？一欲貪隨眠、二瞋隨眠、三有貪隨眠、四慢隨眠、五無明隨眠、六見隨眠、七疑隨眠。欲貪隨眠依何義釋？為欲貪體即是隨眠？為是欲貪之隨眠義？於餘六義徵問亦爾。若爾何失？二俱有過。若欲貪體即是隨眠，便違契經。如契經說：若有一類，非於多時為欲貪纏纏心而住，設心暫爾起欲貪纏，尋如實知出離方便，彼由此故於欲貪纏能正遣除并隨眠斷。若是欲貪之隨眠義，隨眠應是心不相應，便違對法。如本論說：欲貪隨眠三根相應。毘婆沙師作如是說：欲貪等體即是隨眠。豈不違經？無違經失，并隨眠者并隨縛故。或經於得假說隨眠，如火等中立苦等想。阿毘達磨依實相說，即諸煩惱說名隨眠，由此隨眠是相應法。何理為證知定相應？以諸隨眠染惱心故、覆障心故、能違善故，謂隨眠力能染惱心。未生善不生、已生善退失，故隨眠體非不相應。若不相應能為此事，則諸善法應無起時，以不相應恒現前故。既諸善法容有起時，故知隨眠是相應法。此皆非證。所以者何？若許隨眠非相應者，不許上三事是隨眠所為。然經部師所說最善。經部於此所說如何？彼說欲貪之隨眠義，然隨眠體非心相應非不相應，無別物故，煩惱睡位說名隨眠，於覺位中即名纏故。何名為睡？謂不現行種子隨逐。何名為覺？謂諸煩惱現起纏心。何等名為煩惱種子？謂自體上差別功能，從煩惱生能生煩惱。如念種子是證智生，能生當念功能差別。又如芽等有前果生，能生後果功能差別。若執煩惱別有隨眠心不相應名煩惱種，應許念種非但功能別有不相應能引生後念。此既不爾，彼云何然？差別因緣不可得故。若爾，六六契經相違，經說於樂受有貪隨眠故。經但說有，不言爾時即有隨眠。何所違害？於何時有？於彼睡時，或假於因立隨眠想。傍論且止，應辯正論。言貪分二，謂欲、有貪。此中有貪以何為體？謂色無色二界中貪。此名何因唯於彼立？彼貪多託內門轉故。謂彼二界多起定貪，一切定貪於內門轉，故唯於彼立有貪名。又由有人於上二界起解脫想，為遮彼故，謂於上界立有貪名，顯彼所緣非真解脫，此中自體立以有名。彼諸有情多於等至及所依止深生味著，故說彼唯味著自體；非味著境，離欲貪故，由此唯彼立有貪名。既說有貪在上二界，義准欲界貪名欲貪，故於頌中不別顯示。即上所說六種隨眠，於本論中復分為十。如何成十？頌曰：

〔頌·正3　T29 0099a29〕　　六由見異十，異謂有身見，
　　邊執見邪見，見取戒禁取。
論曰：六隨眠中見行異為五，餘非見五，積數總成十，故於十中五是見性：一有身見、二邊執見、三邪見、四見取、五戒禁取。五非見性：一貪、二瞋、三慢、四無明、五疑。又即所說六種隨眠，於本論中說九十八。依何義說九十八耶？頌曰：

〔頌·正4·正5　T29 0099b08〕　　六行部界異，故成九十八，
　　欲見苦等斷，十七七八四，
　　謂如次具離，三二見見疑，
　　色無色除瞋，餘等如欲說。
論曰：六種隨眠由行、部、界有差別，故成九十八。謂於六中由見行異分別為十，如前已辯。即此所辯十種隨眠，部、界不同成九十八。部謂見四諦、修所斷五部。界謂欲色無色三界。且於欲界五部不同，乘十隨眠成三十六。謂見苦諦至修所斷，如次有十七七八四。即上五部，於十隨眠一二一一如其次第，具離三見二見見疑。謂見苦諦所斷具十；見集滅諦所斷各七，離有身見、邊見、戒取；見道諦所斷八，離有身見及邊執見。修所斷四，離見及疑，如是合成三十六種。前三十二名見所斷，纔見諦時彼則斷故；最後有四名修所斷，見四諦已後後時中數數習道彼方斷故。如是已顯十隨眠中薩迦耶見唯在一部，謂見苦所斷。邊執見亦爾。戒禁取通在二部，謂見苦、見道所斷。邪見通四部，謂見苦、集、滅、道所斷，見取疑亦爾。餘貪等四各通五部，謂見四諦及修所斷。此中何相見苦所斷？乃至何相是修所斷？若緣見此所斷為境名見此所斷，餘名修所斷。如是六中見分十二、疑分為四、餘四各五，故欲界中有三十六。色無色界五部各除瞋，餘與欲同，故各三十一。由是本論以六隨眠行、部、界殊說九十八。於此所辯九十八中，八十八見所斷，忍所害故。十隨眠修所斷，智所害故。如是所說見、修所斷，為決定爾？不爾。云何？頌曰：

〔頌·正6　T29 0099c10〕　　忍所害隨眠，有頂唯見斷，
　　餘通見修斷，智所害唯修。
論曰：忍聲通說法類智忍。於忍所害諸隨眠中有頂地攝唯見所斷，唯類智忍方能斷故。餘八地攝通見修斷，謂聖者斷唯見非修，法類智忍如應斷故。若異生斷唯修非見，數習世俗智所斷故。智所害諸隨眠一切地攝，唯修所斷，以諸聖者及諸異生如其所應，皆由數習無漏世俗智所斷故。有餘師說：外道諸仙不能伏斷見所斷惑。如《大分別諸業契經》說：離欲貪諸外道類，有緣欲界邪見現行。及《梵網經》亦說：彼類有緣欲界諸見現行。謂於前際分別論者，有執全常、有執一分、有執諸法無因生等。非色界惑緣欲界生，於欲界境已離貪故，定是欲界諸見未斷。毘婆沙師釋彼經義：起見時暫退，如提婆達多。由行有殊分見為五，名先已列，自體如何？頌曰：

〔頌·正7　T29 0099c28〕　　我我所斷常，撥無劣謂勝，
　　非因道妄謂，是五見自體。
〔T29 0100a〕論曰：執我及我所，是薩迦耶見。壞故名薩，聚謂迦耶，即是無常和合蘊義，迦耶即薩名薩迦耶。此薩迦耶即五取蘊，為遮常一想故立此名，要此想為先方執我故。毘婆沙者作如是釋：有故名薩，身義如前。勿無所緣計我我所，故說此見緣於有身。緣薩迦耶而起此見，故標此見名薩迦耶。諸見但緣有漏法者，皆應標以薩迦耶名。然佛但於我我所執摽此名者，令知此見緣薩迦耶非我我所，以我我所畢竟無故。如契經說：苾芻當知，世間沙門婆羅門等，諸有執我等，隨觀見一切，唯於五取蘊起。即於所執我我所事執斷執常，名邊執見，以妄執取斷常邊故。於實有體苦等諦中起見撥無，名為邪見。一切妄見皆顛倒轉並應名邪，而但撥無名邪見者，以過甚故。如說臭酥惡執惡等，此唯損減，餘增益故。於劣謂勝，名為見取。有漏名劣，聖所斷故。執劣為勝總名見取，理實應立見等取名，略去等言但名見取。於非因道謂因道見，一切總說名戒禁取。如大自在生主，或餘非世間因，妄起因執。投水火等種種邪行，非生天因，妄起因執，唯受持戒禁，數相應智等，非解脫道妄起道執，理實應立戒禁等取名，略去等言但名戒禁取。是謂五見自體應知。若於非因起是因見，此見何故非見集斷？頌曰：

〔頌·正8　T29 0100a28〕　　於大自在等，非因妄執因，
　　從常我倒生，故唯見苦斷。
〔T29 0100b〕論曰：執大自在生主或餘為世間因生世間者，必先計度彼體是常一我作者方起因執。纔見苦時，於自在等常執我執永斷無餘，故彼所生因執亦斷。若爾，有執投水火等種種邪行是生天因，或執但由受持戒禁等便得清淨，不應見苦斷。然本論說有諸外道起如是見立如是論，若有士夫補特伽羅受持牛戒鹿戒狗戒，便得清淨解脫出離，永超眾苦樂至超苦樂處。如是等類非因執因，一切應知。是戒禁取見苦所斷，如彼廣說。此復何因是見苦斷？迷苦諦故有太過失，緣有漏惑皆迷苦故。復有何相別戒禁取，可說彼為見道所斷？諸緣見道所斷法生，彼亦應名迷苦諦故。又緣道諦邪見及疑，若撥若疑無解脫道，如何即執此能得永清淨？若彼撥無真解脫道，妄執別有餘清淨因，是則執餘能得清淨，非邪見等。此緣見道所斷諸法，理亦不成。又若有緣見集滅諦所斷邪見等執為清淨因，此復何因非見彼斷？故所執義應更思擇。如前所說，常我倒生，為但有斯二種顛倒。應知顛倒總有四種：一於無常執常顛倒、二於諸苦執樂顛倒、三於不淨執淨顛倒、四於無我執我顛倒。如是四倒其體云何？頌曰：

〔頌·正9　T29 0100b26〕　　四顛倒自體，謂從於三見，
　　唯倒推增故，想心隨見力。
論曰：從於三見立四倒體，謂邊見中唯取常見以為常倒，諸見取中取計樂淨為樂淨倒，有身見中唯取我見以為我倒。有說：我倒攝身見全。我倒如何攝我所見？如何不攝？由倒纏故。諸有計我，於彼事中有自在力，是我所見。此即我見由二門轉：是我、屬我。若是別見由我為我，見亦應別。何故餘惑非顛倒體？要具三因，勝者成倒。言三因者，一向倒故、推度性故、妄增益故。謂戒禁取非一向倒，緣少淨故。斷見邪見非妄增益，無門轉故。所餘煩惱不能推度，非見性故。由具三因，勝者成倒，是故餘惑非顛倒體。若爾，何故契經中言：於無常計常，有想心見倒。於苦、不淨、無我亦然。理實應知唯見是倒，想心隨見亦立倒名，與見相應行相同故。若爾，何故不說受等？彼於世間不極成故。謂心想倒世間極成，受等不然，故經不說。如是諸倒預流已斷，見及相應見所斷故。有餘部說：倒有十二，謂於無常計常倒中有想、心、見三種顛倒，乃至於無我計我倒亦爾。於中八唯見斷。四通見修斷，謂樂淨想心。若謂不然，未離欲聖離樂淨想，寧起欲貪？毘婆沙師不許此義。若有樂淨想心現行，便許聖者有樂淨倒；聖者亦起有情想心，是則亦應許有我倒。非於女等及於自身離有情想心有起欲貪故。由契經說：若有多聞諸聖弟子，於苦聖諦如實見知，乃至爾時彼聖弟子無常計常想心見倒皆已永斷，乃至廣說。故知想心唯取見倒相應力起是倒非餘。然聖有時暫迷亂故，率爾於境欲貪現前。如於旋火輪畫藥叉迷亂。若爾，何故尊者慶喜告彼尊者辯自在言：〔引頌·非本頌　T29 0101a03〕　　由有想亂倒，故汝心燋熱，
　　遠離彼想已，貪息心便淨。
故有餘師復作是說：八想心倒，學未全斷。如是八種，纏由如實見知聖諦方得永斷，離此無餘永斷方便，故此所說不違彼經。為唯見隨眠有多差別、為餘亦有？慢亦有。云何？頌曰：

〔頌·正10　T29 0101a10〕　　慢七九從三，皆通見脩斷，
　　聖如殺纏等，有脩斷不行。
論曰：且慢隨眠差別有七，一慢、二過慢、三慢過慢、四我慢、五增上慢、六卑慢、七邪慢。令心高舉總立慢名，行轉不同故分七種。於劣於等如其次第謂己為勝、謂己為等，令心高舉總說為慢。於等於勝如其次第謂勝謂等總名過慢。於勝謂勝名慢過慢。於五取蘊執我我，所令心高舉名為我慢。於未證得殊勝德中謂已證得名增上慢。於多分勝謂己少劣名為卑慢。於無德中謂己有德名為邪慢。然本論說慢類有九：一我勝慢類、二我等慢類、三我劣慢類、四有勝我慢類、五有等我慢類、六有劣我慢類、七無勝我慢類、八無等我慢類、九無劣我慢類。如是九種，從前七慢三中離出。從三者何？謂從前慢、過慢、卑慢如是三慢，若依見生行次有殊成三三類。初三如次，即過慢、慢、卑慢。中三如次，即卑慢、慢、過慢。後三如次，即慢、過慢、卑慢。於多分勝謂己少劣，卑慢可成，有高處故。無劣我慢高處是何？謂於如是自所愛樂勝有情聚，雖於己身知極下劣而自尊重。如是且依《發智論》釋。依《品類足》釋慢類者，且我勝慢從三慢出，謂慢、過慢、慢過慢三。由觀劣等勝境別故。如是七慢何所斷耶？一切皆通見修所斷。諸脩所斷，聖未斷時為可現行？此不決定，謂有脩所斷而聖定不行，如殺生纏是脩所斷，而諸聖者必不現行。殺生纏者，顯由此惑發起故思斷眾生命。等言為顯盜、婬、誑纏，無有愛全、有愛一分。無有名何法？謂三界無常，於此貪求，名無有愛。有愛一分，謂願當為藹羅筏拏大龍王等。此諸纏愛一切皆緣脩所斷故，唯脩所斷。已說慢類等，有是脩所斷，何緣聖者未斷不起？頌曰：

〔頌·正11　T29 0101b17〕　　慢類等我慢，惡作中不善，
　　聖有而不起，見疑所增故。
論曰：等言為顯殺等諸纏，無有愛全、有愛一分。此慢類等我慢惡悔，是見及疑親所增長。雖脩所斷，而由見疑背已折故，聖不能起。謂慢類我慢有身見所增，殺生等纏邪見所增，諸無有愛斷見所增，有愛一分常見所增，不善惡作是疑所增，故聖身中皆定不起。九十八隨眠中，幾是遍行、幾非遍行？頌曰：

〔頌·正12·正13　T29 0101b27〕　　見苦集所斷，諸見疑相應，
　　及不共無明，遍行自界地，
　　於中除二見，餘九能上緣，
　　除得餘隨行，亦是遍行攝。
論曰：唯見苦集所斷見疑，及彼相應不共無明，力能遍行自界地五部故，此十一皆得遍行名，謂七見、二疑、二無明十一。如是十一，於自界地五部諸法遍緣，隨眠為因遍生五部染法。依此三義立遍行名。此中所言遍緣五部，為約漸次、為約頓緣？若漸次緣，餘亦應遍。若頓緣者，誰復普於欲界諸法頓計為勝能得清淨或世間因？不說頓緣自界地一切，然說有力能頓緣五部。雖爾，遍行亦非唯此，以於是處有我見行，是處必應起我愛慢。若於是處淨勝見行，是處必應希求高舉，是則愛慢應亦遍行。若爾，頓緣見脩斷故，應言此二何所斷耶？應言脩所斷，雜緣境故。或應見所斷，見力引故。毘婆沙師作如是說：此二煩惱自相非共，無頓緣力，故非遍行。是故遍行唯此十一，餘非，准此不說自成。於十一中除身邊見，所餘九種亦能上緣。上言正明上界上地，兼顯無有緣下隨眠。此九雖能通緣自上，然理無有自上頓緣。於緣上中且約界說，或唯緣一或二合緣。故本論言：有諸隨眠是欲界繫、緣色界繫，有諸隨眠是欲界繫、緣無色界繫，有諸隨眠是欲界繫、緣色無色界繫，有諸隨眠是色界繫、緣無色界繫。約地分別，准界應思。生在欲界，若緣大梵起有情見或起常見，如何身邊見不緣上界地？不執彼為我我所故、邊見必由身見起故。若爾，計彼為有情常，是何見攝？對法者言：此二非見，是邪智攝。何緣所餘緣彼是見，此亦緣彼而非見耶？以宗為量，故作是說。為遍行體唯是隨眠？不爾。云何？并隨行法。謂上所說十一隨眠并彼隨行皆遍行攝，然除彼得，非一果故。由此故有作是問言：諸遍行隨眠，皆遍行因不？答言：於此應作四句。第一句者，謂未來世遍行隨眠。第二句者，謂過現世彼俱有法。第三第四如理應辯。九十八隨眠中，幾緣有漏、幾緣無漏？頌曰：

〔頌·正14–16　T29 0102a11〕　　見滅道所斷，邪見疑相應，
　　及不共無明，六能緣無漏。
　　於中緣滅者，唯緣自地滅，
　　緣道六九地，由別治相因。
　　貪瞋慢二取，並非無漏緣，
　　應離境非怨，靜淨勝性故。
論曰：唯見滅道所斷邪見、疑，彼相應不共無明，各三成六，能緣無漏。餘緣有漏，准此自成。於此六中緣滅諦者，各以自地滅為所緣，滅互相望非因果故。謂欲界繫三種隨眠，唯緣欲界諸行擇滅。乃至有頂三種隨眠，唯緣有頂諸行擇滅。緣道諦者緣六九地，謂欲界繫三種隨眠，唯緣六地法智品道，若治欲界、若能治餘，皆彼所緣，以類同故。色無色界八地各有三種隨眠，一一唯能通緣九地類智品道，若治自地、若能治餘，皆彼所緣，以類同故。何故緣滅自地非餘？緣道便通六九同類，以諸地道互相因故。雖法類品亦互相因，而類智品不治欲界，故類智品道非欲三所緣。法智品既能治色無色，應為彼八地各三所緣。非此皆能治色無色，苦集法智品非彼對治故。亦非全能治色無色，不能治彼見所斷故。二初無故，非彼所緣。即由此因，顯遍行惑有緣苦集諸地無遮，境互為緣因，非能對治故。何緣貪瞋慢戒禁取見取，見無漏斷非無漏緣？以貪隨眠應捨離故，若緣無漏便非過失，如善法欲不應捨離。緣怨害事起瞋隨眠，滅道非怨故非瞋境。緣麁動事起慢隨眠，滅道寂靜故非慢境。於非淨法執為淨因名戒禁取，滅道真淨，故不應為戒禁取境。於非勝法執為最勝名為見取，滅道真勝，故亦不應為見取境。是故貪等不緣無漏。九十八隨眠中，幾由所緣故隨增、幾由相應故隨增？頌曰：

〔頌·正17·正18　T29 0102b17〕　　未斷遍隨眠，於自地一切，
　　非遍於自部，所緣故隨增，
　　非無漏上緣，無攝有違故，
　　隨於相應法，相應故隨增。
論曰：遍行隨眠普於自地五部諸法所緣隨增，以能遍緣自地法故。所餘五部非遍隨眠，所緣隨增唯於自部，唯以自部為所緣故。此據總說。別分別者，六無漏緣、九上緣惑，於所緣境無隨增義。所以者何？無漏上境非所攝受及相違故。謂若有法為此地中身見及愛攝為己有，可有為此身見愛地中所有隨眠所緣隨增理，如衣潤濕埃塵隨住。非諸無漏及上地法，為諸下身見愛攝為己有，故緣彼下惑，非所緣隨增。住下地心求上地等，是善法欲，非謂隨眠。聖道涅槃及上地法與能緣彼下惑相違故，彼二亦無所緣隨增理，如於炎石足不隨住。有說：隨眠是隨順義，非無漏上境，順諸下隨眠，故雖是所緣而無隨增理。如風病者服乾澁藥，病者於藥非所隨增。已約所緣辯隨增義。今次應辯相應隨增。謂隨何隨眠於自相應法，由相應故於彼隨增。諸說隨增，謂至未斷，故初頌首標未斷言。頗有隨眠不緣無漏、不緣上界，而彼隨增但於相應非所緣不？有，謂緣上地諸遍行隨眠。九十八隨眠中，幾不善、幾無記？頌曰：

〔頌·正19　T29 0102c14〕　　上二界隨眠，及欲身邊見，
　　彼俱癡無記，此餘皆不善。
論曰：色無色界一切隨眠唯無記性，以染污法若是不善有苦異熟，苦異熟果上二界無，他逼惱因彼定無故。身邊二見及相應癡，欲界繫者亦無記性。所以者何？此與施等不相違故，為我當樂現在勤脩施戒等故。執斷邊見能順解脫，故世尊說：於諸外道諸見趣中此見最勝，謂我不有、我所亦不有。我當不有、我所當不有。又此二見迷自事故、非欲逼害他有情故。若爾，貪求天上快樂及起我慢，例亦應然。先軌範師作如是說：俱生身見是無記性，如禽獸等身見現行。若分別生是不善性。餘欲界繫一切隨眠，與上相違皆不善性。於上所說不善惑中，幾是不善根、幾非不善根？頌曰：

〔頌·正20前半　T29 0103a01〕　　不善根欲界，貪瞋不善癡。
〔T29 0103a〕論曰：唯欲界繫一切貪瞋及不善癡不善根攝。如其次第，世尊說為貪瞋癡三不善根。性唯不善煩惱，為不善法根立不善根。餘則不爾，所餘煩惱非不善根，義准已成，故頌不說。於上所說無記惑中，幾是無記根、幾非無記根？頌曰：

〔頌·正20後半·正21　T29 0103a08〕　　無記根有三，無記愛癡慧，
　　非餘二高故，外方立四種，
　　中愛見慢癡，三定皆癡故。
論曰：迦濕彌羅國諸毘婆沙師說無記根亦有三種，謂諸無記愛、癡、慧三，下至異熟生亦無記根攝。何緣疑、慢非無記根？疑二趣轉，慢高轉故。彼師謂疑二趣相轉，性動搖故，不應立根。慢於所緣高舉相轉，異根法故，亦不立根。為根必應堅住下轉，世間共了，故彼非根。外方諸師立此有四，謂諸無記愛、見、慢、癡。無記名中遮善惡故，何緣此四立無記根？以諸愚夫脩上定者，不過依託愛見慢三，此三皆依無明力轉，故立此四為無記根。諸契經中說十四無記事，彼亦是此無記攝耶？不爾。云何？彼經但約應捨置問立無記名，謂問記門總有四種。何等為四？頌曰：

〔頌·正22　T29 0103a25〕　　應一向分別，反詰捨置記，
　　如死生殊勝，我蘊一異等。
論曰：且問四者，一應一向記、二應分別記、三應反詰記、四應捨置記。此四如次。如有問者，問死生勝我一異等。記有四者，謂答四問。若作是問：一切有情皆當死不？應一向記一切有情皆定當死。若作是問：一切死者皆當生不？應分別記：有煩惱者當生非餘。若作是問：人為勝劣？應反詰記：為何所方？若言方天，應記人劣；若言方下，應記人勝。若作是問：蘊與有情為一為異？應捨置記：有情無實故，一異性不成，如石女兒白黑等性。如何捨置而立記名？以記彼問言，此不應記故。有作是說：彼第二問，亦應一向記，非一切當生。然問者言：一切死者皆當生不？理應分別記彼所問總答不成，雖令總知仍未解故。又作是說：彼第三問亦應一向記，人亦勝亦劣，所待異故，如識果因。然彼問者一向為問，非一向記故，應成分別記。但此應詰問意所方，故此名為應反詰記。又作是說：彼第四問既全不記蘊與有情若異若一，云何名記？然彼所問，理應捨置。記言應捨置，如何不名記？對法諸師作如是說：一向記者，若有問言：世尊是如來、應、正等覺耶？所說法要是善說耶？諸弟子眾行妙行耶？色乃至識皆無常耶？苦乃至道善施設耶？應一向記，契實義故。分別記者，若有直心請言：願尊為我說法。應為分別：法有眾多，謂去來今，欲說何者？若言為我說過去法。應復分別：過去法中亦有眾多，色乃至識。若請說色，應分別言：色中有三，善、惡、無記。若請說善，應分別言：善中有七，謂離殺生，廣說乃至離雜穢語。若彼復請說離殺生，應分別言：此有三種，謂無貪、瞋、癡三善根所發。若彼請說無貪發者，應分別言：此復有二，謂表、無表，欲說何者？反詰記者，若有諂心請言：願尊為我說法。應反詰彼：法有眾多，欲說何者？不應分別。乃至令彼默然而住，或令自記無便求非。豈不二中都無有問，唯有請說，亦無有記唯反詰言欲說何者，如何此二成問記耶？如有請言為我說道，豈非問道？即由反詰記彼所問，豈非記道？若爾，應俱是反詰記。不爾，問意直諂有殊，記有分別無分別故。捨置記者，若有問言：世為有邊、為無邊等？此應捨置不應為說。今依契經辯問記相。如大眾部契經中言：苾芻當知，問記有四。何等為四？謂或有問應一向記，乃至有問但應捨置。云何有問應一向記？謂問：諸行皆無常耶？此問名為應一向記。云何有問應分別記？謂若有問：諸有故思造作業已為受何果？此問名為應分別記。云何有問應反詰記？謂若有問：士夫想與我為一為異耶？應反詰言：汝依何我作如是問？若言依麁我，應記與想異。此問名為應反詰記。云何有問但應捨置？謂若有問：世為常、無常、亦常亦無常、非常非無常？世為有邊、無邊、亦有邊亦無邊、非有邊非無邊？如來死後為有、非有、亦有亦非有、非有非非有？為命者即身、為命者異身。此問名為但應捨置。

The canonical text stands in Chinese only. This edition renders the essence, the plain reading, the exposition and the apparatus into English — never the sūtra itself. Switch to 漢讀本 or 並行雙語 above to read it.

白話Plain reading

〔正1〕隨眠是諸有的根本——六種隨眠

論（承前起問）：前面說過，世間的種種差別都是由業而生的。而業要靠隨眠（潛伏而隨逐有情的煩惱）才得以生長；離開了隨眠，業就沒有招感後有的能力。為什麼這樣說呢？隨眠一共有幾種？頌說：

頌：隨眠是三有（欲有·色有·無有色的有）的根本。它的差別有六種——就是貪、瞋，也包括慢，還有無明、見與疑。

論：由於這隨眠正是諸有的根本，所以業一旦離了它，就沒有招感後有的能力。

那麼為什麼隨眠能夠作諸有的根本呢？因為種種煩惱一旦現起，能夠成辦十種事情——第一是堅固根本（使煩惱的根柢更牢），第二是建立相續（使煩惱一念接一念不斷），第三是整治自田（把心地整治成適合自己生長的田地），第四是引生等流（引出與自己同類的後續煩惱），第五是發起業有（發動能感後有的業），第六是收攝自具（把資助自己的種種條件收攏過來），第七是迷惑所緣（使心對所對的境界看不清楚），第八是導引識流（牽著識的相續往它要去的方向走），第九是越過善品（跨過、踰越善法那一分），第十是廣縛之義（廣泛地繫縛有情），使有情不能超越自己所在的界與地。由於隨眠能作諸有的根本，所以業憑著它才有招感後有的能力。

這裡簡略地說，隨眠的差別應當知道有六種——就是貪、瞋、慢、無明、見、疑。

頌文中說了一個『亦』字，用意在顯示：慢等等其餘的煩惱，也是靠著貪的力量而在境上隨增（隨著所緣的境而增長勢力）。至於『由貪隨增』的意思，後面還要辨明。

頌文中又有一個『及』字，是要顯示這六種的體性各各不同（不是同一個東西的六個名字）。

論（設問轉出七隨眠）：如果隨眠的體只有六種，那麼經中為什麼說有七種隨眠呢？頌說：

〔正2〕六開為七——有貪之名為什麼只安在上二界

頌：這六種，由於貪有差別而成為七種。所謂『有貪』，是指上二界（色界與無色界）的貪；因為那種貪多半是向著內門而轉的，並且是為了遮止把上二界當作解脫的那種想法。

論：就是前面所說的六種隨眠之中，把貪分成兩份，所以經中說有七種。

哪七種呢？一是欲貪隨眠、二是瞋隨眠、三是有貪隨眠、四是慢隨眠、五是無明隨眠、六是見隨眠、七是疑隨眠。

論（傍論起·隨眠與心相應不相應之諍）：『欲貪隨眠』這個名字，應當依什麼義去解釋？是說欲貪的體本身就是隨眠（前後二字同指一物）？還是說這是屬於欲貪的那個隨眠（隨眠另是一物而屬於欲貪）？其餘六種的名字要徵問起來，也都是同樣的兩關。

（難方反問）若是這樣，又有什麼過失呢？

（論主重顯這兩關的疑處）兩種讀法都有過失。

（難方就第一關發難）如果說欲貪的體本身就是隨眠，那就違背了契經。像契經所說：如果有一類人，並不是長時間被欲貪之纏（現起而纏縛心的煩惱）纏著心而住；即使心裡暫時起了欲貪之纏，他也能如實了知出離的方便，因此他對於欲貪之纏能夠正確地遣除，並且連隨眠也一併斷了。（既然說『並且隨眠也斷』，可見纏與隨眠是兩件事，不能說欲貪的體就是隨眠。）

（有部一方就第二關發難）如果說這是屬於欲貪的那個隨眠，那麼隨眠就應當是心不相應行（不與心相應的那一類法）了，這又違背了對法（阿毘達磨的本論）。像本論所說：欲貪隨眠與三根相應。（既然說它與根相應，可見它是相應法，不是不相應行。）

（毘婆沙師答·立自宗）毘婆沙師這樣說：欲貪等等的體，本身就是隨眠。

（難方徵問）豈不是違背了經嗎？

（毘婆沙師通經）沒有違經的過失。經中說『並且隨眠也斷』，是說連隨縛（隨逐而繫縛的那一分）也一併斷了。或者說，經是就『得』（得到煩惱的那個得）上假說隨眠的，就像在火等等之上安立苦等等的想一樣（火不是苦，而說觸火是苦，是就其所生而假說）。阿毘達磨是依實相而說的——就是把種種煩惱本身叫作隨眠。由這樣說，隨眠就是相應法。

（難方責問）有什麼道理可以作證，知道它決定是相應的？

（毘婆沙師舉三事為證）因為種種隨眠能夠染惱心、能夠覆障心、能夠違害善法。這是說：隨眠的力量能夠染惱心，使還沒有生起的善不能生起、已經生起的善退失，所以隨眠的體不是不相應行。假如不相應行能夠辦成這樣的事，那麼一切善法就應當永遠沒有生起的時候了——因為不相應行是恆常現前的（它若能障善，善就永無起時）。既然種種善法確實還有生起的時候，所以知道隨眠是相應法。

（難方非之）這些都不成其為證。為什麼呢？如果承認隨眠不是相應法的人，本來就不會承認上面那三件事（染惱心·覆障心·違善）是隨眠所辦的。（既不承認前提，你這證就落空。）

論（論主評取經部）：然而經部師所說的最為善巧。

經部在這裡是怎麼說的呢？他們說：這是屬於欲貪的那個隨眠。然而隨眠的體既不是與心相應，也不是與心不相應——因為它並不是另外一個東西。煩惱在睡位（潛伏而不現行的位次）時，就叫作隨眠；在覺位（現起而活動的位次）時，就叫作纏。

什麼叫作睡？就是煩惱不現行而只有種子隨逐著。什麼叫作覺？就是種種煩惱現起而纏縛心。

什麼叫作煩惱的種子？就是在自體之上的一種差別功能——它從煩惱生出來，又能生出煩惱。好比記憶的種子：它是由『證知』（曾經明白領受過那件事）而生的，又能生出將來的憶念，這也是一種功能上的差別。又好比芽等等：它由先前的果實而生出，又能生出後來的果實，這同樣是一種功能上的差別。

（經部反破不相應之說）如果有人執定煩惱之外另有一個叫隨眠的心不相應行，把它叫作煩惱的種子；那麼也應當承許記憶的種子不只是一種功能，而是另有一個不相應行能夠引生後來的憶念。這一邊既然不是這樣（沒有人把記憶的種子說成一個不相應的實物），那一邊怎麼能是這樣呢？因為找不出可以使二者差別的因緣。

（有部一方引經為難）若是這樣，就與《六六契經》相違了，因為經中說『於樂受有貪隨眠』（在樂受之上有貪的隨眠）。

（經部通經）經只是說『有』，並沒有說在那個時候就有隨眠現行，這有什麼相違害的呢？

（有部一方問）那麼是在什麼時候有？

（經部答）是在它睡的時候有；或者是就『因』上假立一個隨眠的想（就貪這個因，安上隨眠這個果名）。

論（收傍論·歸正論）：傍論姑且到此為止，應當回來辨正論。

論（有貪之立名）：說貪分為二份，就是欲貪與有貪。這裡的『有貪』以什麼為體呢？就是色界、無色界這二界之中的貪。

這個名字為什麼只安在那二界上？因為那種貪多半是依託內門而轉的。這是說：那二界的有情多半生起對定的貪，而一切對定的貪都是向內門而轉的（不緣外五欲之境），所以只在那二界立『有貪』之名。

又因為有人對於上二界起了解脫的想（誤以為生到那裡就是解脫），為了遮止這種想法，所以在上界立『有貪』之名，用以顯示它們所緣的並不是真實的解脫。這裡是就『自體』而安上一個『有』字（有＝三有之有，仍在生死之中）。

那二界的有情，多半對於等至（定的境界）以及所依止的身，深深地生起味著；所以說他們只是味著自體，並不是味著外境——因為他們已經離了欲界的貪了。由於這樣，才只在那二界立『有貪』之名。

既然說『有貪』是在上二界，那麼由此類推可知：欲界的貪就叫作『欲貪』，所以頌中不必另外標出來。

論（轉出十隨眠）：就是上面所說的六種隨眠，在本論之中又分成十種。怎麼成十的呢？頌說：

〔正3〕六開為十——五見與五非見

頌：這六種，由於『見』有差別而成十種。所謂差別，就是有身見、邊執見、邪見、見取、戒禁取。

論：六種隨眠之中，『見』依所行的行相不同而分成五種；其餘的五種不是見。把數目累加起來，總共成十。

所以在這十種之中，五種是見的體性——一是有身見、二是邊執見、三是邪見、四是見取、五是戒禁取。另外五種不是見的體性——一是貪、二是瞋、三是慢、四是無明、五是疑。

論（轉出九十八隨眠）：又就是上面所說的六種隨眠，在本論之中說成九十八種。是依什麼義說成九十八的呢？頌說：

〔正4·正5〕十開為九十八——行·部·界三重差別

頌：這六種，由於行、部、界三者有差別，所以成為九十八。欲界之中，見苦諦所斷等等（五部），依次是十、七、七、八、四。所謂如次具足或離去，就是離三見、離二見、離見與疑。色界與無色界，五部各各除去瞋，其餘的都與欲界一樣說。

論：六種隨眠由於行（所行的行相）、部（所斷的部類）、界（所繫的界地）有差別，所以成為九十八。

這是說：在六種之中，由於見的行相不同而分別為十，這在前面已經辨過了。就是這已辨的十種隨眠，再由部與界的不同而成九十八。

所謂『部』，是指見苦諦、見集諦、見滅諦、見道諦所斷，加上修所斷，共五部。所謂『界』，是指欲界、色界、無色界三界。

且就欲界的五部不同來說，乘上十種隨眠而成三十六。這是說：從見苦諦所斷一直到修所斷，依次有十、七、七、八、四。就是上面這五部，對於十種隨眠，依著一、二、一、一的次第（第一部具足十種；第二第三兩部同樣離三；第四部離二；第五部離見與疑），分別是具足、或是離三見、離二見、離見疑。

也就是說：見苦諦所斷的具足十種；見集諦、見滅諦所斷的各有七種，離去了有身見、邊見、戒禁取這三見；見道諦所斷的有八種，離去了有身見與邊執見這二見；修所斷的有四種，離去了五見與疑。這樣合起來成三十六種。

前面的三十二種叫作見所斷，因為一見到諦理時它們就斷了；最後的四種叫作修所斷，因為要見四諦之後，在後後的時位中屢屢修習聖道，它們才斷得掉。

這樣就已經顯示出：十種隨眠之中，薩迦耶見（有身見）只在一部，就是見苦所斷；邊執見也是這樣。戒禁取通在兩部，就是見苦所斷與見道所斷。邪見通在四部，就是見苦、見集、見滅、見道所斷；見取與疑也是這樣。其餘貪等等四種各各通在五部，就是見四諦所斷與修所斷。

那麼這裡以什麼為相，才叫作見苦所斷？乃至以什麼為相才是修所斷？答：如果所緣的境正是『見這一諦所斷』的那一類法，就叫作見這一諦所斷；其餘的就叫作修所斷。

這樣，六種之中見分為十二（五見各有所通之部，合計十二）、疑分為四、其餘四種各通五部而為二十，所以欲界之中有三十六。

色界與無色界的五部之中各各除去瞋（上二界無瞋），其餘的與欲界相同，所以各有三十一。

由於這樣，本論就以六種隨眠在行、部、界三者上的差殊，說為九十八。

在這裡所辨的九十八之中，八十八是見所斷，因為它們是被『忍』所害的；十種隨眠是修所斷，因為它們是被『智』所害的。

論（轉出見修斷之定不定）：這樣所說的見所斷與修所斷，是決定如此嗎？答：不是。那是怎樣？頌說：

〔正6〕見斷修斷不是死板的——有頂與八地的分別

頌：被忍所害的隨眠，若在有頂地，唯是見所斷；其餘的則通於見斷與修斷。被智所害的，唯是修所斷。

論：『忍』這個字，通指法智忍與類智忍。

在被忍所害的種種隨眠之中，屬於有頂地（非想非非想處）所攝的，唯是見所斷——因為唯有類智忍才能斷得了它。

其餘八地所攝的，則通於見斷與修斷。這是說：聖者去斷的時候，唯是見斷而非修斷，因為是由法智忍、類智忍照著所應而斷的；如果是異生（凡夫）去斷，那就唯是修斷而非見斷，因為他是靠屢屢修習世俗智去斷的。

被智所害的種種隨眠，則是一切地所攝的，唯是修所斷；因為種種聖者與種種異生，各照著他們所應的，都是靠屢屢修習無漏智或世俗智去斷的。

論（附錄一異說）：有其餘的論師說：外道的種種仙人不能夠伏斷見所斷的惑。像《大分別諸業契經》所說：已經離了欲貪的種種外道之類，還有緣著欲界而起的邪見現行。以及《梵網經》也說：那一類人有緣著欲界的種種見現行。這是說：在『前際分別論者』（依過去世作種種分別的一派）之中，有的執一切全是常、有的執一分是常、有的執諸法無因而生等等。

（推論的理由是）不會是色界的惑緣著欲界而生的，因為他對於欲界的境已經離貪了；所以那些見決定是欲界的種種見還沒有斷。

（毘婆沙師另作解釋）毘婆沙師解釋那部經的意思說：那是起見的時候暫時退失了，就像提婆達多那樣。

論（轉出五見自體）：由於所行的行相有殊異，把見分成五種，名字前面已經列過了；它們各自的體是怎樣的呢？頌說：

〔正7〕五見各自的體

頌：執我與我所，執斷與執常，撥為全無，把劣的說成勝的，把不是因不是道的妄說為因為道——這就是五見的自體。

論：執著『我』以及『我所』的，就是薩迦耶見。

（先釋此名）『薩』是壞的意思，『迦耶』是聚的意思——合起來就是『無常而和合的蘊』之義。迦耶就是薩，所以叫作薩迦耶。這薩迦耶就是五取蘊。之所以立這個名字，是為了遮止『常』與『一』的想；因為必定要先有那樣的想，才會在其上執著有我。

（另一家的解釋）毘婆沙師這樣解釋：『有』的意思叫作薩，『身』的意思如前面所說。（他們的理由是）不可能沒有所緣的東西而去計我與我所，所以說這見是緣著『有身』而起的。因為是緣著薩迦耶而起這個見，所以就標這個見叫作薩迦耶見。

（隨即設一難並通之）凡是只緣有漏法而起的種種見，豈不都應當標上薩迦耶的名字？然而佛只在『我與我所』的執著上標這個名字，是要讓人知道：這個見所緣的是薩迦耶（五取蘊），並不是真有一個我與我所——因為我與我所畢竟是沒有的。像契經所說：苾芻應當知道，世間的沙門、婆羅門等等，種種執有我的人，隨其所觀所見的，一切都只是在五取蘊上生起的。

（二）就在所執的我與我所這件事上，執它是斷、或執它是常，就叫作邊執見——因為是虛妄地執取斷與常這兩邊。

（三）在實有體的苦等四諦上起見而撥說為無，就叫作邪見。（設問）一切虛妄的見都是顛倒而轉的，都應該叫作『邪』，為什麼只把『撥無』的叫作邪見呢？答：因為它的過失太重。就像說『臭酥』——酥本來都有氣味，只有臭得極了的才特別叫臭酥。這是因為只有這一種是純粹的損減（把有的說成沒有），其餘四種都還是增益（在沒有的上頭添出東西來）。

（四）在劣的上頭說它是勝，就叫作見取。有漏法叫作『劣』，因為它是聖道所要斷的。把劣的執為勝的，總名見取。按道理說，本應立『見等取』之名（不只取見，還取見所依的蘊等），略去了『等』字，才只叫見取。

（五）在不是因、不是道的上頭，說它是因、是道的那種見，一切總說名為戒禁取。像把大自在天、生主，或其餘不是世間之因的東西，虛妄地起因的執著；像投水、赴火等等種種邪行，本不是生天之因而虛妄地起因的執著；像只是受持戒禁、以及與此相應的種種智等等，本不是解脫之道而虛妄地起道的執著。按道理說，本應立『戒禁等取』之名，略去了『等』字，才只叫戒禁取。

這就是五見的自體，應當知道。

論（轉出非因計因之所斷）：如果在不是因的上頭起『這是因』的見，這個見為什麼不是見集所斷（集諦正是講因的）呢？頌說：

〔正8〕非因計因為什麼唯是見苦所斷

頌：對於大自在天等等，把不是因的妄執為因——這是從『常』與『我』二倒生出來的，所以唯是見苦所斷。

論：執著大自在天、生主，或其餘的東西是世間之因、能生世間的人，必定先要計度那個東西的體是常、是一、是我、是作者，然後才起因的執著。

一見到苦諦的時候，對於自在天等等的常執與我執就永斷無餘了，所以由它們所生的因執也就跟著斷了。（所以斷處在見苦，不在見集。）

論（設難與往復）：若是這樣，那麼有人執『投水赴火等等種種邪行是生天之因』，或者執『只要受持戒禁等等便能得清淨』，這些就不應當是見苦所斷了（它們並沒有先計常我）。

然而本論說：有種種外道起這樣的見、立這樣的論——如果有士夫、補特伽羅受持牛戒、鹿戒、狗戒，便能得清淨、得解脫、得出離，永遠超越眾苦，安樂地到達超越苦樂之處。像這樣種種『不是因而執為因』的，一切都應當知道，是戒禁取、是見苦所斷，如那裡所廣說的。

（再徵）這又是因為什麼而是見苦所斷呢？

（若答『因為迷於苦諦』）那就有太過的失——因為凡是緣有漏的惑都是迷於苦諦的（若如此，一切緣有漏惑都成見苦所斷）。

（再進一步徵）另外還有什麼相狀，可以把戒禁取分別出來，說它是見道所斷呢？種種緣著見道所斷之法而生起的惑，豈不也都應當叫作『迷於苦諦』嗎？

又：緣道諦而起的邪見與疑，如果是撥無、或是疑無解脫之道，那怎麼還會執著『這個能得永遠的清淨』呢？（撥無與執取，方向相反。）

如果那個人撥無了真解脫道，卻虛妄地執有另外的清淨之因，那就是執『其餘的東西能得清淨』，這已經不是邪見等了。（所以）說它是緣見道所斷諸法而起的，道理也不成立。

又如果有人緣著見集諦、見滅諦所斷之法而起的邪見等等，把它執為清淨之因，這又是因為什麼而不是見那二諦所斷呢？

（收）所以這裡所執的義，應當再作思擇。

論（轉出四顛倒）：像前面所說的『從常我倒而生』，是不是只有這兩種顛倒呢？應當知道顛倒總共有四種——一是在無常上執常的顛倒、二是在諸苦上執樂的顛倒、三是在不淨上執淨的顛倒、四是在無我上執我的顛倒。這四種顛倒，它的體是怎樣的呢？頌說：

〔正9〕四顛倒的體：從三見而立

頌：四顛倒的自體，是從三種見而立的。因為必須是一向顛倒、是推度的體性、是虛妄增益，所以只取這幾種。想與心，是隨著見的力量而也叫作倒。

論：從三種見立四倒的體。這是說：邊見之中只取常見作為常倒；種種見取之中，取那計樂、計淨的作為樂倒與淨倒；有身見之中只取我見作為我倒。

（一個異說）有人說：我倒是把有身見全部都攝進去的。

（設問）我倒怎麼能攝我所見呢？（反問）為什麼不能攝？因為它同樣是被顛倒所纏縛的緣故。種種計我的人，在那件事上認為自己有自在之力，這就是我所見。這就是我見由兩個門而轉——一個是『是我』，一個是『屬我』。如果它們是各別的見，那麼由『我』而起的與由『為我』而起的，見也應當各別（然而實際上並不各別）。

論（何以只取這三見·倒之三因）：為什麼其餘的惑不是顛倒的體呢？因為要具足三個因，最勝的那一種才成為倒。

所謂三因，一是一向顛倒（沒有一分是真的）、二是推度的體性（會作判斷、下定論）、三是虛妄增益（在無中添出有來）。

這是說：戒禁取不是一向顛倒，因為它所緣的還有少分是淨的（受持戒禁本身並非全無淨分）；斷見與邪見不是虛妄增益，因為它們是從『無』的那一門而轉的（是損減不是增益）；其餘的種種煩惱不能推度，因為它們不是見的體性。由於要具足三因，最勝的那一種才成為倒，所以其餘的惑不是顛倒的體。

論（會通經中的想倒心倒）：若是這樣，那麼契經中為什麼說：在無常上計常，有想倒、心倒、見倒；在苦、不淨、無我上也是這樣（各有三倒）？

答：按實理應當知道，唯有見才是倒；想與心是隨著見而也立一個倒的名字，因為它們與見相應、行相相同的緣故。

（再問）若是這樣，為什麼不說受等等（也隨見立倒）呢？答：因為受等等在世間並不是很成立的說法。這是說：心倒與想倒在世間是大家都認得的，受等等就不然，所以經中不說。

這樣種種顛倒，預流果的人已經斷了——因為見以及與見相應的法都是見所斷的緣故。

論（異部十二倒之說與毘婆沙師之不許）：有其餘部派說：顛倒有十二種——就是在『於無常計常』這一倒之中，有想、心、見三種顛倒；乃至在『於無我計我』這一倒之中也是這樣（四倒各三，共十二）。在這十二之中，八種唯是見所斷；四種則通於見斷與修斷，就是樂與淨的想倒與心倒。

（他們進一步推論）如果不是這樣，那麼還沒有離欲的聖者已經離了樂想與淨想了，怎麼還會起欲貪呢？

毘婆沙師不許這個說法。（他們反難）如果有樂想、淨想現行，就得承許聖者還有樂倒淨倒；聖者也會起『有情』的想與心，那麼照樣也應當承許他有我倒了（然而聖者決定無我倒）。（他們順釋自宗）並不是在女人等等以及在自己身上離了有情之想與心，才會起欲貪的（起欲貪不必先有倒想）。

（他們引經正通）因為契經說：如果有多聞的種種聖弟子，對於苦聖諦如實地見知，乃至到那個時候，那位聖弟子的『在無常上計常』的想倒、心倒、見倒都已經永斷了，乃至廣說。所以知道：想與心唯有取『與見倒相應』的力量而起的，才是倒，其餘的不是。

然而聖者有時也會因暫時的迷亂，猝然地對境起欲貪現前——就像對著旋轉的火輪、對著畫出來的藥叉（夜叉像）而生迷亂一樣（明知不實而一時錯認）。

論（引一頌為難）：若是這樣，那麼為什麼尊者慶喜告訴那位尊者辯自在說：

引頌（非本頌）：由於有『想』的亂倒，所以你的心才焦熱；遠離了那個想以後，貪就止息，心也就清淨了。

論（另一師的會通）：所以有其餘的論師又這樣說：八種想倒心倒，有學的人還沒有完全斷盡。像這八種現起的煩惱，要靠如實地見知聖諦才得永斷；離開這個，再沒有別的永斷的方便。所以這裡所說的（想心倒唯與見倒相應）並不違背那部經。

論（轉出七慢九慢）：是只有『見』這個隨眠有很多差別呢，還是其餘的也有？答：慢也有。是怎樣的呢？頌說：

〔正10〕七慢與九慢類·聖者不現行的那一分

頌：慢有七種，九慢類是從其中三種流出的。它們都通於見所斷與修所斷。聖者就像對殺生之纏等等一樣——雖有修所斷的那一分，卻不現行。

論：且說慢隨眠的差別有七種——一是慢、二是過慢、三是慢過慢、四是我慢、五是增上慢、六是卑慢、七是邪慢。

使心高舉起來的，總立一個『慢』名；由於所行所轉不同，所以分成七種。

（一與二）對於比自己劣的、對於與自己相等的，依次認為自己更勝、認為自己相等，使心高舉，總說為『慢』。（三）對於與自己相等的、對於比自己勝的，依次認為自己勝、認為自己相等，總名『過慢』。（四）對於比自己勝的還說自己更勝，名為『慢過慢』。（五）在五取蘊上執著我與我所，使心高舉，名為『我慢』。（六）在還沒有證得的殊勝功德上，說自己已經證得，名為『增上慢』。（七）對於多分勝過自己的人，說自己只差一點點，名為『卑慢』。（八）在自己並無功德之中，說自己有德，名為『邪慢』。

論（九慢類）：然而本論說慢類有九種——一是我勝慢類、二是我等慢類、三是我劣慢類、四是有勝我慢類、五是有等我慢類、六是有劣我慢類、七是無勝我慢類、八是無等我慢類、九是無劣我慢類。

這樣九種，是從前面七慢之中的三種離出來的。是從哪三種呢？就是從前面的慢、過慢、卑慢這三種。如果依著見而生，所行的次第有殊異，就成了三組三類。

第一組三個，依次就是過慢、慢、卑慢。中間一組三個，依次就是卑慢、慢、過慢。後面一組三個，依次就是慢、過慢、卑慢。

（設一問）對於多分勝過自己的說自己只差一點點，卑慢是可以成立的，因為還有一個高舉之處；那麼『無劣我慢』的高舉之處是什麼呢？答：就是對於這樣自己所愛樂的殊勝有情之群，雖然知道自己極其下劣，卻仍舊自我尊重（我雖不如，仍與彼為類）。

以上且是依《發智論》的解釋。若依《品類足論》解釋慢類，那麼『我勝慢』是從三種慢出的——就是慢、過慢、慢過慢這三種，因為所觀的境有劣、等、勝的差別。

論（七慢之所斷與聖者不現行）：這樣七種慢，是哪一種所斷呢？答：一切都通於見所斷與修所斷。

（設問）那些修所斷的，聖者在還沒有斷盡的時候，是可以現行的嗎？答：這不一定。這是說：有修所斷而聖者決定不現行的——比如殺生之纏是修所斷的，而種種聖者必定不現行。

所謂殺生之纏，是顯示由這個惑而發起故意去斷眾生的命。『等』這個字是要顯示偷盜、婬欲、誑語這些纏，以及無有愛的全部、有愛的一分。

什麼是『無有愛』？就是三界都是無常的，而對這個無常起貪求，叫作無有愛。什麼是『有愛的一分』？就是願自己將來成為藹羅筏拏那樣的大龍王等等。

這些纏與愛，一切都是緣著修所斷之法而起的，所以唯是修所斷。

論（轉出何以聖者未斷不起）：已經說過慢類等等有屬於修所斷的，那麼為什麼聖者還沒有斷卻不起呢？頌說：

〔正11〕聖者身中有而不起的理由

頌：慢類等等與我慢，以及惡作（追悔）之中屬不善的那一分——聖者身中雖有而不現起，因為它們是被見與疑所增長的。

論：『等』這個字是要顯示殺生等等種種纏，以及無有愛的全部、有愛的一分。

這些慢類等等、我慢、以及不善的惡悔，都是被見與疑親自增長起來的。它們雖然是修所斷，但由於見與疑的背脊已經被折斷了（聖者見道已斷見與疑），所以聖者不能起。

這是說：慢類與我慢是被有身見所增長的，殺生等等的纏是被邪見所增長的，種種無有愛是被斷見所增長的，有愛的一分是被常見所增長的，不善的惡作是被疑所增長的；所以在聖者身中，這些都決定不起。

論（轉入諸門分別·門一）：九十八種隨眠之中，有幾種是遍行的、有幾種不是遍行的呢？頌說：

〔正12·正13〕門一·遍行與非遍行

頌：見苦諦、見集諦所斷的種種見與疑，以及與它們相應的、還有不共無明——這些是遍行的，遍行於自己的界與自己的地。在這其中除去二見，其餘九種還能夠緣上界上地。除去『得』以外，其餘隨行的法，也是遍行所攝。

論：唯有見苦諦、見集諦所斷的見與疑，以及與它們相應的不共無明（不與其餘煩惱相共而獨起的無明），力量能夠遍行於自己界地的五部，所以這十一種都得到『遍行』之名。這十一種就是七種見、二種疑、二種無明。

這樣的十一種，對於自己界地五部的種種法能夠遍緣；作為隨眠又能為因而遍生五部的染法。依這三種義（遍緣·為因·遍生五部）立『遍行』之名。

論（頓緣或漸緣之徵）：這裡所說的『遍緣五部』，是就漸次而緣呢，還是就一時頓緣呢？

如果是漸次而緣，那麼其餘的隨眠也應當算遍行了（因為誰都可以次第緣過去）。如果是一時頓緣，那麼有誰能夠對欲界的一切法一時頓時計為最勝、計為能得清淨、或計為世間之因呢？

答：並不是說一時頓緣自己界地的一切法，只是說它有力量能夠一時頓緣五部而已。

論（難方之難·愛慢是否亦遍行）：雖然這樣說，遍行也不只是這十一種。因為凡是在某處有我見現行的，在那處就必定會起我愛、我慢；如果在某處有『淨』『勝』之見現行的，在那處就必定會生希求與高舉。這樣一來，愛與慢也應當是遍行了。

（毘婆沙師反責）若是這樣，那麼由於它們是一時頓緣見所斷與修所斷之法而起的，就應當說這兩種到底是哪一種所斷呢？

（難方答）應當說是修所斷，因為它們是雜緣境的緣故；或者也應當說是見所斷，因為是由見的力量所引起的。

（毘婆沙師述自宗作結）毘婆沙師這樣說：這兩種煩惱是自相惑而不是共相惑，沒有頓緣的力量，所以不是遍行。因此遍行唯有這十一種。其餘不是遍行的，依此類推自然明白，所以不必另說。

論（九種能緣上界上地）：在這十一種之中，除去有身見與邊執見，其餘九種也能夠緣上界上地。

頌中的『上』字，正是要說明上界與上地，同時也兼顯：沒有緣下界下地的隨眠（上不緣下）。

這九種雖然能夠通緣自地與上地，然而按理沒有『自地與上地一時頓緣』這回事。

在『緣上』這件事上，姑且就界來說：或者只緣一界，或者兩界合起來緣。所以本論說：有種種隨眠是欲界所繫而緣色界所繫的，有種種隨眠是欲界所繫而緣無色界所繫的，有種種隨眠是欲界所繫而緣色界無色界所繫的，有種種隨眠是色界所繫而緣無色界所繫的。至於就地來分別，依著界的說法去思量就可以了。

論（身邊二見何以不緣上）：生在欲界的人，如果緣著大梵天而起『有情』之見、或起『常』見，那麼為什麼說身見、邊見不緣上界上地呢？

答：因為他並不是把大梵執為自己的我與我所（身見要緣自己所繫之蘊）；而邊見必定是由身見而起的（身見既不緣上，邊見自然也不緣上）。

（再問）若是這樣，那麼計大梵為有情、為常，這是什麼見所攝？

對法諸師說：這兩種不是見，是邪智所攝。

（再問）為什麼其餘的惑緣著它就算是見，這兩種也緣著它卻不算見呢？

答：這是以本宗為量而這樣說的（依本宗的判準如此安立）。

論（遍行之體是否只是隨眠）：遍行的體，是只有隨眠嗎？答：不是。那是怎樣？答：連同隨行之法一起。

這是說：上面所說的十一種隨眠，連同它們的隨行之法，都是遍行所攝。然而要除去它們的『得』——因為『得』與它們不是同一個果。

由於這樣，所以有人這樣發問：種種遍行的隨眠，都是遍行因嗎？答：對這個問題應當作四句分別。第一句（是遍行隨眠而非遍行因）的，就是未來世的遍行隨眠。第二句（是遍行因而非遍行隨眠）的，就是過去現在世與它俱有的法。第三句與第四句，照著道理去辨就可以了。

論（轉入門二）：九十八種隨眠之中，有幾種是緣有漏的、有幾種是緣無漏的呢？頌說：

〔正14至正16〕門二·緣有漏與緣無漏

頌：見滅諦、見道諦所斷的邪見與疑，以及與它們相應的、還有不共無明——這六種能夠緣無漏。在這其中緣滅諦的，唯緣自地的滅；緣道諦的，則緣六地或九地，因為對治有別而彼此互為同類之因。貪、瞋、慢、二取，都不是緣無漏的——因為所緣應當捨離、不是怨害、是寂靜的、是清淨的、是最勝的體性。

論：唯有見滅諦、見道諦所斷的邪見、疑，以及與它們相應的不共無明，各各三種合成六種，能夠緣無漏。其餘的緣有漏，依此類推自然明白。

在這六種之中，緣滅諦的，各各以自地的滅為所緣——因為種種滅彼此相望不是因果（此地之滅不能為彼地之滅的因）。這是說：欲界所繫的三種隨眠，唯緣欲界諸行的擇滅；乃至有頂地的三種隨眠，唯緣有頂諸行的擇滅。

緣道諦的，則緣六地或九地。這是說：欲界所繫的三種隨眠，唯緣六地的法智品道——不論是對治欲界的、還是能對治其餘的，都是它所緣的，因為同是一類的緣故。色界無色界的八地各有三種隨眠，一一都唯能通緣九地的類智品道——不論是對治自地的、還是能對治其餘的，都是它所緣的，因為同是一類的緣故。

論（何以緣滅不通而緣道通）：為什麼緣滅只緣自地而不緣其餘，緣道卻能通於六地九地的同類呢？

答：因為種種地的道彼此互為因（同類相因）。（再徵）雖然法智品與類智品也彼此互為因，然而類智品不對治欲界，所以類智品的道不是欲界三種隨眠的所緣。

（再徵）法智品既然能對治色無色界，就應當作那八地各三種隨眠的所緣才是。答：並不是法智品全都能對治色無色界——因為苦法智品、集法智品不是那二界的對治；也不是全部都能對治色無色界——因為它不能對治那二界的見所斷。這兩個開頭的條件既然沒有（既非普遍對治、又非全分對治），所以不是它們的所緣。

就由這個道理，也顯示出：遍行的惑緣苦諦集諦的種種地是沒有遮攔的——因為所緣的境彼此互為因，而不是能對治的緣故（對治才有隔限，境相為因則無隔限）。

論（何以貪等五不緣無漏）：為什麼貪、瞋、慢、戒禁取、見取，這些見無漏（滅道二諦）所斷的，卻不是緣無漏的呢？

（一）因為貪的隨眠所緣的應當是要捨離的東西；如果緣無漏，那就不成過失了——像善法欲就不應當捨離（可見緣無漏的欲不算貪）。（二）緣著怨害之事才起瞋的隨眠，而滅道二諦不是怨害，所以不是瞋的境。（三）緣著麁動之事才起慢的隨眠，而滅道二諦是寂靜的，所以不是慢的境。（四）在不淨之法上執為淨因的叫作戒禁取，而滅道二諦是真淨，所以不應當作戒禁取的境。（五）在不勝之法上執為最勝的叫作見取，而滅道二諦是真勝，所以也不應當作見取的境。

所以貪等等不緣無漏。

論（轉入門三）：九十八種隨眠之中，有幾種是由所緣而隨增的、有幾種是由相應而隨增的呢？頌說：

〔正17·正18〕門三·所緣隨增與相應隨增

頌：還沒有斷的遍行隨眠，於自地的一切法（都由所緣而隨增）；不是遍行的，則只於自部的法由所緣而隨增。不是無漏、不是緣上界的（才有隨增），因為無漏與上境不被攝為己有而且與之相違。隨著與它相應的法，由相應而隨增。

論：遍行的隨眠，普遍地在自地五部的種種法上由所緣而隨增，因為它能遍緣自地之法。其餘五部之中不是遍行的隨眠，由所緣而隨增的唯在自部，因為它只以自部為所緣。

這是就總的說。如果分別地說，那麼六種緣無漏的惑、九種緣上界的惑，在它們的所緣境上是沒有隨增之義的。

為什麼呢？因為無漏與上地之境，不被攝受為己有，而且是相違的。

這是說：如果有一法，被這一地之中的身見與愛攝為己有，那才可以有『被這一地之中所有的隨眠由所緣而隨增』的道理，就像衣服潮濕了，塵埃就會隨著附住在上面。而種種無漏法以及上地之法，並不被種種下地的身見與愛攝為己有，所以緣它們的下地之惑，不是所緣隨增。

（附辨）住在下地的心而希求上地等等，那是善法欲，不叫作隨眠。

聖道、涅槃以及上地之法，與能緣它們的下地之惑是相違的，所以那兩類也沒有所緣隨增的道理——就像在炎熱的石頭上，腳不會停住。

（另一說）有人說：隨眠是『隨順』的意思。不是無漏與上境，才隨順種種下地的隨眠；所以雖然是它的所緣，卻沒有隨增的道理——就像患風病的人服用乾澀的藥，病對於藥不是所隨增的。

論（相應隨增）：已經就所緣辨了隨增之義，現在應當辨相應隨增。這是說：隨便哪一種隨眠，在與它自己相應的法上，由於相應的緣故就在那上面隨增。

種種說隨增的，都是指還沒有斷的時候；所以第一頌的開頭先標出『未斷』二字。

（附一問）有沒有那樣的隨眠——它不緣無漏、也不緣上界，而它的隨增卻只在相應而不在所緣？答：有。就是緣上地的種種遍行隨眠。

論（轉入門四）：九十八種隨眠之中，有幾種是不善的、有幾種是無記的呢？頌說：

〔正19〕門四·不善與無記

頌：上二界的隨眠，以及欲界的身見、邊見，還有與它們俱起的癡，是無記的；除此之外的其餘一切，都是不善的。

論：色界無色界的一切隨眠唯是無記性。因為染污之法如果是不善的，就會有苦的異熟；而苦的異熟之果上二界是沒有的——那種能逼惱他人的因，在那裡決定沒有。

身見、邊見這二見，以及與它們相應的癡，凡屬欲界所繫的，也是無記性。

為什麼呢？（一）因為這與布施等等並不相違——為了『我』將來能得安樂，現在正好勤修布施持戒等等。（二）執斷的邊見還能隨順解脫，所以世尊說：在種種外道的種種見趣之中，這個見最勝——就是『我不有、我所也不有；我當來不有、我所當來也不有』。（三）又這二見只是迷於自己的事，並不是要逼害其他有情。

（設難）若是這樣，那麼貪求天上的快樂以及起我慢，照例也應當是無記了（它們也不逼害他人）。

（另一師說）先軌範師這樣說：俱生的身見是無記性——像禽獸等等身見現行那樣；如果是分別而生的（由邪教邪思惟而起的），就是不善性。

其餘欲界所繫的一切隨眠，與上面所說的相違，都是不善性。

論（轉入門五）：在上面所說的不善之惑之中，有幾種是不善根、有幾種不是不善根呢？頌說：

〔正20前半〕門五之一·三不善根

頌：不善根在欲界——就是貪、瞋、不善的癡。

論：唯有欲界所繫的一切貪與瞋，以及不善的癡，是不善根所攝。依著次第，世尊說為貪、瞋、癡三不善根。

（何以立根）體性唯是不善的煩惱，才能作不善法的根而立為不善根。其餘的就不是這樣了——所剩下的種種煩惱不是不善根，這一義依上文類推已經成立，所以頌中不說。

論（轉出無記根）：在上面所說的無記之惑之中，有幾種是無記根、有幾種不是無記根呢？頌說：

〔正20後半·正21〕門五之二·無記根三與外方之四

頌：無記根有三種——無記的愛、癡、慧。其餘的不立，因為疑是二趣而轉、慢是高舉而轉。外方諸師則立四種——其中是愛、見、慢、癡，因為修上定的人三者決定都依於癡。

論：迦濕彌羅國的種種毘婆沙師說：無記根也有三種——就是種種無記的愛、癡、慧這三種，下至異熟所生的那一分也是無記根所攝。

（設問）為什麼疑與慢不是無記根呢？答：因為疑是向二趣而轉的、慢是高舉而轉的。

那些論師的意思是說：疑是向著兩條路互相流轉的，體性動搖不定，所以不應當立為根；慢是在所緣上以高舉之相而轉的，與根的法不同，所以也不立為根。因為要作根的，必定應當堅住而向下而轉（如樹根下扎），這是世間共同了解的，所以那二種不是根。

論（外方四無記根之說）：外方的種種論師則立四種——就是種種無記的愛、見、慢、癡。（『無記』這個名，是在遮止善與惡二者。）

為什麼這四種立為無記根呢？因為種種愚夫修上界之定的，不外乎依託愛、見、慢這三者；而這三者又都是依著無明的力量而轉的，所以立這四種為無記根。

論（轉出四記門）：種種契經之中說的十四無記事，那個也是這裡所說的無記所攝嗎？答：不是。那是怎樣？答：那部經只是就『應當捨置的問』而立無記之名。所謂問記之門，總共有四種。是哪四種呢？頌說：

〔正22〕門五之附·四種記門

頌：應當一向記、應當分別記、應當反詰記、應當捨置記——就像問死、問生、問勝劣、問我與蘊是一是異等等。

論：且說四種問——一是應當一向記的、二是應當分別記的、三是應當反詰記的、四是應當捨置記的。這四種依著次第（配下面四問）。

像有發問的人，問死、問生、問勝劣、問我與蘊是一是異等等。所謂『記有四種』，就是回答這四種問。

（一）如果這樣問：一切有情都會死嗎？應當一向記——一切有情都決定會死。

（二）如果這樣問：一切死了的都會再生嗎？應當分別記——還有煩惱的會再生，其餘的不會。

（三）如果這樣問：人是勝還是劣？應當反詰記——是拿什麼來比？如果他說是拿天來比，就應當記人是劣；如果他說是拿下趣（惡趣）來比，就應當記人是勝。

（四）如果這樣問：蘊與有情是一還是異？應當捨置記——因為有情並非實有，所以一與異的性都不成立，就像石女的兒子談不上白或黑的性。

論（設難之一·捨置何以名記）：捨置了卻立一個『記』的名，是怎麼回事？答：因為記他的問時說了『這個不應當記』（說出這一句，本身就是一種記）。

論（外人設難與論主釋通·其一）：有人這樣說：那第二問也應當一向記——一切死了的並不都會再生（可以直接這樣答）。

（論主釋通）然而發問的人說的是『一切死了的都會再生嗎』，按理應當分別記；對他所問的作總答是不成的，因為雖然使他知道了一個總的說法，他還是沒有解開（他問的是『一切』，須分別開來答才解得開）。

論（外人設難與論主釋通·其二）：又有人這樣說：那第三問也應當一向記——人也是勝也是劣，因為所待（所比對的對象）不同的緣故，就像識既是果又是因（待前為果、待後為因）。

（論主釋通）然而那個發問的人是作一向的問，而你的答不是一向記，所以應當成為分別記才對。但這裡應當詰問他的問意是拿什麼來比，所以這叫作應反詰記。

論（外人設難與論主釋通·其三）：又有人這樣說：那第四問既然完全不記蘊與有情是異是一，怎麼能叫作記呢？

（論主釋通）然而他所問的，按理應當捨置。既然說了『應當捨置』，怎麼不算是記呢？

論（對法諸師依四問廣釋四記）：對法諸師這樣說：

（一）所謂一向記：如果有人問——世尊是如來、應、正等覺嗎？所說的法要是善說的嗎？種種弟子眾所行的是妙行嗎？色乃至識都是無常嗎？苦乃至道是善加施設的嗎？這些都應當一向記，因為契合實義。

（二）所謂分別記：如果有人以直心請求說——願尊者為我說法。就應當為他分別：法有很多，就是過去、未來、現在，你要說哪一種？如果他說為我說過去法，應當再分別：過去法之中也有很多，色乃至識。如果他請說色，應當分別說：色中有三種，善、惡、無記。如果他請說善，應當分別說：善中有七種，就是離殺生，廣說乃至離雜穢語。如果他又請說離殺生，應當分別說：這有三種，就是由無貪、無瞋、無癡三善根所發起的。如果他請說由無貪所發的，應當分別說：這又有二種，就是表與無表，你要說哪一種？

（三）所謂反詰記：如果有人以諂心請求說——願尊者為我說法。就應當反詰他：法有很多，你要說哪一種？不應當為他分別。乃至使他默然而住，或者使他自己說出來而沒有機會挑毛病。

論（就此再設一難）：豈不是這二種（分別記與反詰記）之中都沒有『問』，只有請說；也沒有『記』，只有反詰一句『你要說哪一種』——這二種怎麼能算是問與記呢？

答：像有人請求說『為我說道』，這豈不就是問道嗎？就由反詰去記他所問，這豈不就是記道嗎？

（再難）若是這樣，那二種都應當是反詰記了（何必分作二種）。答：不是。因為問意有直心與諂心的殊異，而所記有分別與無分別的不同（直心者為之分別，諂心者但反詰）。

（四）所謂捨置記：如果有人問——世間是有邊的、還是無邊的等等？這就應當捨置，不應當為他說。

論（依契經辨四記之相）：現在依契經來辨問記之相。像大眾部的契經中說：苾芻應當知道，問記有四種。是哪四種呢？就是有的問應當一向記，乃至有的問只應當捨置。

怎樣的問應當一向記？就是問——種種行都是無常嗎？這個問就叫作應當一向記。

怎樣的問應當分別記？就是如果有人問——種種有故意而造作的業已經造了，將要受什麼果？這個問就叫作應當分別記。

怎樣的問應當反詰記？就是如果有人問——士夫的『想』與『我』是一還是異？就應當反詰他說：你是依哪一個我而這樣問的？如果他說是依麁的我，就應當記說『與想是異』。這個問就叫作應當反詰記。

怎樣的問只應當捨置？就是如果有人問——世間是常、是無常、也常也無常、非常非無常？世間是有邊、是無邊、也有邊也無邊、非有邊非無邊？如來死後是有、是非有、也有也非有、非有非非有？命者就是身、還是命者異於身？這個問就叫作只應當捨置。

〔Root 1〕The Latent Tendencies Are the Root of the Several Existences — the Six Latent Tendencies

Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): It was said before that the manifold differences of the world all arise from action. And action grows only when the latent tendencies (the afflictions that lie hidden and follow along after sentient beings) sustain it; parted from the latent tendencies, action has no power to call forth a coming existence. Why is this so said? And how many in all are the latent tendencies? The stanza says:

Stanza: The latent tendencies are the root of the three existences (the existence of desire · the existence of form · the existence without form). Their differences are six — namely greed and hatred, and also pride, and further ignorance, view, and doubt.

Treatise: Because these latent tendencies are precisely the root of the several existences, action once parted from them has no power to call forth a coming existence.

Why, then, can the latent tendencies serve as the root of the several existences? Because the afflictions, once they have arisen, are able to perform ten kinds of function — first, strengthening the root (making the foundation of the afflictions firmer); second, establishing the continuity (making the afflictions run on thought after thought unbroken); third, tilling its own field (working the ground of mind into a field fit for its own growth); fourth, drawing forth the homogeneous (drawing out a sequel of afflictions of its own kind); fifth, setting going action and existence (setting in motion the action that can call forth a coming existence); sixth, gathering its own equipment (drawing in the several conditions that furnish it); seventh, bewildering the object (making the mind unable to see clearly the object-field it faces); eighth, leading the stream of consciousness (dragging the continuity of consciousness in the direction it means to go); ninth, overstepping the wholesome class (stepping across and overpassing that portion which is wholesome dharma); tenth, the sense of binding widely (binding sentient beings far and wide), so that sentient beings cannot overstep the realm and the level in which they stand. Because the latent tendencies can serve as the root of the several existences, it is by relying upon them that action has the power to call forth a coming existence.

Here, spoken of in brief, it should be known that the differences of the latent tendencies are six — namely greed, hatred, pride, ignorance, view, and doubt.

In the stanza the one word ‘also’ is used, and its intent is to display that pride and the other remaining afflictions likewise increase upon their objects by the force of greed (growing their strength along with the object taken). As for the sense of ‘increasing by the force of greed,’ that will be analyzed further below.

In the stanza there is again the one word ‘and,’ which is meant to display that the entities of these six are each different (that they are not six names for one thing).

Treatise (a question posed, bringing out the seven latent tendencies): If the entities of the latent tendencies are six only, why then does the sūtra say that there are seven latent tendencies? The stanza says:

〔Root 2〕Six Opened into Seven — Why the Name “Craving for Existence” Is Fixed Only upon the Upper Two Realms

Stanza: These six become seven by a difference in greed. What is called ‘craving for existence’ is the greed of the upper two realms (the form realm and the formless realm); for that greed for the most part turns toward the inner gate, and it is moreover in order to block the notion that the upper two realms are liberation.

Treatise: That is, within the six latent tendencies spoken of above, greed is divided into two portions, and so the sūtra says there are seven.

Which seven? First the latent tendency of greed for desire, second the latent tendency of hatred, third the latent tendency of craving for existence, fourth the latent tendency of pride, fifth the latent tendency of ignorance, sixth the latent tendency of view, seventh the latent tendency of doubt.

Treatise (the incidental discussion begins · the dispute whether the latent tendencies are associated with mind or not): By what sense is the name ‘the latent tendency of greed for desire’ to be explained? Is it that the entity of greed for desire is itself the latent tendency (the two words pointing at one and the same thing)? Or is it that this is the latent tendency belonging to greed for desire (the latent tendency being another thing that belongs to greed for desire)? Press the names of the other six with the same question, and there are the same two alternatives in each case.

(The objector asks in return) If it be so, what fault is there?

(The author displays again the doubtful point of the two alternatives) Both readings have a fault.

(The objector presses upon the first alternative) If it be said that the entity of greed for desire is itself the latent tendency, that contradicts the sūtra. As the sūtra says: if there be a certain kind of person who does not for a long time dwell with his mind entangled by the entanglement of greed for desire (the affliction that arises and entangles the mind); and if, when the entanglement of greed for desire arises in his mind for a while, he yet knows as it really is the means of going forth, then by this he is able rightly to expel the entanglement of greed for desire, together with the cutting off of the latent tendency. (Since it says ‘together with the cutting off of the latent tendency,’ plainly entanglement and latent tendency are two things, and it cannot be said that the entity of greed for desire is the latent tendency.)

(The Sarvāstivāda side presses upon the second alternative) If it be said that this is the latent tendency belonging to greed for desire, then the latent tendency would have to be a formation not associated with mind (a dharma of that class which is not associated with mind), and this again contradicts the Abhidharma (the root treatise of Abhidharma). As the root treatise says: the latent tendency of greed for desire is associated with three faculties. (Since it says that it is associated with faculties, plainly it is an associated dharma and not a dissociated formation.)

(The Vaibhāṣika masters answer · establishing their own tenet) The Vaibhāṣika masters say thus: the entities of greed for desire and the rest are themselves the latent tendencies.

(The objector presses) Does this not contradict the sūtra?

(The Vaibhāṣikas explain the sūtra through) There is no fault of contradicting the sūtra. Where the sūtra says ‘together with the cutting off of the latent tendency,’ it says that the accompanying bondage (that portion which follows along and binds) is cut off together with it. Or else, the sūtra speaks of the latent tendency conventionally upon the ‘acquisition’ (the acquisition of the affliction), as one sets up the notion of suffering and the rest upon fire and the rest (fire is not suffering, and yet touching fire is called suffering, which is a conventional way of speaking from what it produces). The Abhidharma speaks in accordance with the real mark — that is, it calls the afflictions themselves the latent tendencies. Speaking thus, the latent tendencies are associated dharmas.

(The objector reproaches) By what principle can it be brought in evidence and known that they are definitely associated?

(The Vaibhāṣikas bring three functions in evidence) Because the several latent tendencies can defile and vex the mind, can cover and obstruct the mind, and can go against and injure the wholesome. That is to say: the force of the latent tendencies can defile and vex the mind, so that the wholesome not yet arisen cannot arise and the wholesome already arisen falls away; therefore the entity of a latent tendency is not a dissociated formation. Suppose a dissociated formation could perform work of this kind: then all wholesome dharmas ought never to have a time of arising — for dissociated formations are constantly present (if such a thing could obstruct the wholesome, the wholesome would never arise). Since the several wholesome dharmas do indeed still have a time of arising, it is known that the latent tendencies are associated dharmas.

(The objector denies it) None of this amounts to proof. Why? Because one who grants that the latent tendencies are not associated dharmas will not in the first place grant that those three matters above (defiling and vexing the mind · covering and obstructing the mind · going against the wholesome) are performed by the latent tendencies. (The premise not being granted, your proof falls to nothing.)

Treatise (the author appraises and takes the Sautrāntikas): Yet what the Sautrāntika masters say is the best.

What, then, do the Sautrāntikas say here? They say: this is the latent tendency belonging to greed for desire. Yet the entity of a latent tendency is neither associated with mind nor dissociated from mind — for it is not another thing at all. When an affliction is in the stage of sleep (the station in which it lies hidden and is not active), it is called a latent tendency; when it is in the stage of waking (the station in which it has arisen and is at work), it is called an entanglement.

What is called sleep? It is the affliction not being active, with only a seed following along. What is called waking? It is the several afflictions arisen and entangling the mind.

What is called the seed of an affliction? It is a capability that is a differentiation upon one’s own entity — it arises from an affliction and is able in turn to produce an affliction. It is like the seed of memory: that seed arises from ‘knowing in evidence’ (having once clearly received and undergone that matter), and can in turn produce a recollection to come, and this too is a differentiation of capability. It is again like a sprout and the rest: it arises from a former fruit and can produce a later fruit, and this likewise is a differentiation of capability.

(The Sautrāntikas refute in return the account of dissociation) If someone insists that apart from the afflictions there is a further formation not associated with mind called the latent tendency, and calls that the seed of the affliction; then he ought likewise to grant that the seed of memory is not a mere capability, but that there is a further dissociated formation able to draw forth the recollection to come. Since it is not so on the one side (no one makes the seed of memory a dissociated real thing), how can it be so on the other? Because the causal ground of a difference between the two cannot be found.

(The Sarvāstivāda side cites a sūtra by way of objection) If it be so, this contradicts the Sūtra of the Six Sixes, for the sūtra says ‘upon a pleasant feeling there is a latent tendency of greed’ (upon a pleasant feeling there is the latent tendency of greed).

(The Sautrāntikas explain the sūtra through) The sūtra says only that there is one; it does not say that at that very moment a latent tendency is active. What contradiction is there in this?

(The Sarvāstivāda side asks) At what time, then, is there one?

(The Sautrāntikas answer) At the time when it sleeps there is one; or else the notion of a latent tendency is conventionally set up upon the ‘cause’ (upon greed, which is the cause, the name of the result, ‘latent tendency,’ being fixed).

Treatise (gathering up the incidental discussion · returning to the main discussion): Let the incidental discussion rest here for now; the main discussion should be taken up again.

Treatise (the setting up of the name ‘craving for existence’): To say that greed is divided into two portions is to say greed for desire and craving for existence. What here has ‘craving for existence’ for its entity? It is the greed within the two realms of form and of formlessness.

Why is this name fixed upon those two realms alone? Because that greed for the most part turns in dependence upon the inner gate. That is to say: the sentient beings of those two realms for the most part give rise to greed for absorption, and all greed for absorption turns toward the inner gate (not taking the five outer objects of desire as object), and so the name ‘craving for existence’ is set up in those two realms alone.

Again, because some give rise to the notion of liberation with regard to the upper two realms (mistakenly supposing that to be born there is liberation), it is in order to block that notion that the name ‘craving for existence’ is set up in the upper realms, so as to display that what they take as object is not true liberation. Here it is upon their ‘own entity’ that the word ‘existence’ is fixed (existence being the existence of the three existences, still within birth and death).

The sentient beings of those two realms for the most part give rise to a deep savoring attachment toward meditative attainment (the state reached in absorption) and toward the body upon which they depend; and so it is said that they savor and cling to their own entity alone, and do not savor and cling to an outer object — for they have already left greed for the realm of desire. It is for this reason that the name ‘craving for existence’ is set up in those two realms alone.

Since ‘craving for existence’ is said to be in the upper two realms, it may be known by extension that the greed of the realm of desire is called ‘greed for desire,’ and so the stanza need not mark it out separately.

Treatise (bringing out the ten latent tendencies): These same six latent tendencies spoken of above are, within the root treatise, further divided into ten. How do they become ten? The stanza says:

〔Root 3〕Six Opened into Ten — the Five Views and the Five That Are Not Views

Stanza: These six become ten by a difference in ‘view.’ The difference is the view of a real person, the extreme view, wrong view, adherence to views, and adherence to observances and vows.

Treatise: Within the six latent tendencies, ‘view’ is divided into five according to the difference of the modes in which it operates; the remaining five are not views. Adding the counts together, they come to ten in all.

Hence among these ten, five are of the nature of view — first the view of a real person, second the extreme view, third wrong view, fourth adherence to views, fifth adherence to observances and vows. The other five are not of the nature of view — first greed, second hatred, third pride, fourth ignorance, fifth doubt.

Treatise (bringing out the ninety-eight latent tendencies): Again, these same six latent tendencies spoken of above are, within the root treatise, spoken of as ninety-eight. By what sense are they spoken of as ninety-eight? The stanza says:

〔Roots 4 and 5〕Ten Opened into Ninety-Eight — the Threefold Difference of Mode · Category · Realm

Stanza: These six, by a difference in the three of mode, category, and realm, become ninety-eight. Within the realm of desire, what is abandoned by seeing the truth of suffering and the rest (the five categories) have, in order, ten, seven, seven, eight, and four. What is called being complete in order, or lacking, is the lacking of three views, the lacking of two views, and the lacking of the views and doubt. In the realm of form and the formless realm, the five categories each lack hatred, and the rest are spoken of as in the realm of desire.

Treatise: The six latent tendencies, by a difference in mode (the modes in which they operate), category (the class by which they are abandoned), and realm (the realm and level to which they are affiliated), become ninety-eight.

That is to say: within the six, they are analyzed into ten by the difference in the modes of view, which has already been analyzed above. These same ten latent tendencies, already analyzed, become ninety-eight by the differences of category and of realm.

What is called ‘category’ means what is abandoned by seeing the truth of suffering, by seeing the truth of origination, by seeing the truth of cessation, and by seeing the truth of the path, together with what is abandoned by cultivation, five categories in all. What is called ‘realm’ means the three realms of desire, of form, and of formlessness.

Take first the difference of the five categories in the realm of desire: multiplied into the ten latent tendencies they make thirty-six. That is to say: from what is abandoned by seeing the truth of suffering down to what is abandoned by cultivation there are, in order, ten, seven, seven, eight, and four. These same five categories, with respect to the ten latent tendencies, are, in the order one, two, one, one (the first category being complete in all ten; the second and third categories alike lacking three; the fourth lacking two; the fifth lacking the views and doubt), respectively complete, or lacking three views, lacking two views, and lacking the views and doubt.

That is to say: what is abandoned by seeing the truth of suffering is complete in all ten; what is abandoned by seeing the truth of origination and by seeing the truth of cessation have seven each, lacking the three views of the view of a real person, the extreme view, and adherence to observances and vows; what is abandoned by seeing the truth of the path has eight, lacking the two views of the view of a real person and the extreme view; what is abandoned by cultivation has four, lacking the five views and doubt. Gathered together in this way they make thirty-six.

The former thirty-two are called what is abandoned by seeing, since they are cut off as soon as the principle of the truths is seen; the last four are called what is abandoned by cultivation, since only after seeing the four truths, by cultivating the noble path again and again in the stations that come after, are they cut off.

Thus it has already been displayed that among the ten latent tendencies the view of a real person (the view of self) is in one category only, namely what is abandoned by seeing suffering; and the extreme view is likewise. Adherence to observances and vows extends to two categories, namely what is abandoned by seeing suffering and by seeing the path. Wrong view extends to four categories, namely what is abandoned by seeing suffering, origination, cessation, and the path; and adherence to views and doubt are likewise. The remaining four, greed and the rest, each extend to all five categories, namely what is abandoned by seeing the four truths and by cultivation.

Then what is the mark here by which a thing is called abandoned by seeing suffering, and so on to, by what mark is it abandoned by cultivation? Answer: if what it takes as object is of that class of dharma which is ‘abandoned by seeing this truth,’ it is called abandoned by seeing this truth; the rest are called abandoned by cultivation.

Thus, within the six, view is divided into twelve (each of the five views having the categories to which it extends, twelve in the sum), doubt is divided into four, and the remaining four each extend to five categories and make twenty; and so within the realm of desire there are thirty-six.

In the realm of form and the formless realm, the five categories each lack hatred (there being no hatred in the upper two realms), and the rest are the same as in the realm of desire, and so each has thirty-one.

For this reason the root treatise, by the differences of the six latent tendencies in the three of mode, category, and realm, speaks of them as ninety-eight.

Among the ninety-eight here analyzed, eighty-eight are abandoned by seeing, since they are injured by ‘receptivity’; ten latent tendencies are abandoned by cultivation, since they are injured by ‘cognition.’

Treatise (bringing out whether abandonment by seeing and by cultivation is settled or unsettled): Is what has thus been said of abandonment by seeing and abandonment by cultivation decidedly so? Answer: it is not. How is it then? The stanza says:

〔Root 6〕Abandonment by Seeing and by Cultivation Is Not Rigid — the Distinction of the Summit of Existence and the Eight Levels

Stanza: Of the latent tendencies injured by receptivity, those at the level of the summit of existence are abandoned by seeing alone; the rest extend to abandonment by seeing and by cultivation. Those injured by cognition are abandoned by cultivation alone.

Treatise: The word ‘receptivity’ speaks in general of the receptivity to the cognition of dharma and the receptivity to the subsequent cognition.

Among the several latent tendencies injured by receptivity, those gathered into the level of the summit of existence (the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception) are abandoned by seeing alone — for only the receptivity to the subsequent cognition is able to abandon them.

Those gathered into the other eight levels extend to abandonment by seeing and by cultivation. That is to say: when a noble one abandons them, it is by seeing and not by cultivation, since he abandons by the receptivity to the cognition of dharma and the receptivity to the subsequent cognition as each is fitting; but if an ordinary being (a common man) abandons them, then it is by cultivation and not by seeing, since he abandons by cultivating conventional cognition again and again.

The several latent tendencies injured by cognition, being gathered into all levels, are abandoned by cultivation alone; for the several noble ones and the several ordinary beings alike, each as is fitting for him, abandon them by cultivating again and again the cognition without outflows or conventional cognition.

Treatise (a divergent account appended): Some other masters say: the several seers among the non-Buddhists cannot suppress or abandon the confusions abandoned by seeing. As the Sūtra of the Great Analysis of the Several Actions says: the several kinds of non-Buddhists who have already left greed for desire still have wrong views active that take the realm of desire as object. And the Brahmā Net Sūtra also says: that class of persons have the several views active that take the realm of desire as object. That is to say: among the ‘theorists of the prior limit’ (the party that makes its several discriminations in dependence upon past lives) some hold that all is eternal, some that a portion is eternal, some that dharmas arise without a cause, and so on.

(The reason of the inference is that) it will not be a confusion of the realm of form taking the realm of desire as object, since with respect to the objects of the realm of desire he has already left greed; and therefore those views are decidedly the several views of the realm of desire not yet cut off.

(The Vaibhāṣika masters explain otherwise) The Vaibhāṣika masters explain the sense of that sūtra thus: that is a momentary falling back at the time when the view arises, as in the case of Devadatta.

Treatise (bringing out the entities of the five views): Because the modes in which they operate differ, view is divided into five, whose names have been listed above; what is the entity of each of them? The stanza says:

〔Root 7〕The Entity of Each of the Five Views

Stanza: To hold to a self and to what belongs to self; to hold to annihilation and to hold to eternity; to deny outright as wholly nonexistent; to call the inferior superior; to say falsely of what is neither cause nor path that it is cause and path — these are the entities of the five views.

Treatise: To hold to ‘self’ and to ‘what belongs to self’ is the view of a real person.

(First the name is glossed) ‘Sat’ has the sense of perishing, ‘kāya’ has the sense of aggregation — taken together they have the sense of ‘aggregates conjoined and impermanent.’ Kāya is just sat, and so it is called satkāya. This satkāya is just the five aggregates of appropriation. This name is set up in order to block the notion of ‘eternity’ and of ‘unity’; for that notion must come first before a self is held to upon it.

(The gloss of another house) The Vaibhāṣika masters gloss it thus: the sense of ‘existing’ is called sat, and the sense of ‘person’ is as said above. (Their ground is that) it is impossible to reckon a self and what belongs to self without an object taken, and so it is said that this view arises taking an ‘existing person’ as object. Because it is taking satkāya as object that this view arises, this view is accordingly marked as the view of a real person.

(An objection is at once posed and explained through) Ought not all the several views that arise taking only dharmas with outflows as object to be marked with the name satkāya? Yet the Buddha marks this name upon the holding to ‘self and what belongs to self’ alone, in order to let men know that what this view takes as object is satkāya (the five aggregates of appropriation), and that there is no real self or what belongs to self — for self and what belongs to self are in the end nonexistent. As the sūtra says: bhikṣus should know that the several śramaṇas, brahmins, and the rest in the world who hold to a self, whatever they observe and see, all arise upon the five aggregates of appropriation alone.

(2) Just upon this matter of the self and what belongs to self that are held to, to hold it to be annihilated or to hold it to be eternal is called the extreme view — for it falsely holds to the two extremes of annihilation and eternity.

(3) To give rise to a view denying outright as nonexistent, within the really existent truths of suffering and the rest, is called wrong view. (A question posed) All false views turn invertedly and all ought to be called ‘wrong’; why is only ‘denying outright’ called wrong view? Answer: because its fault is the graver. It is as when one says ‘stinking ghee’ — all ghee has a smell, and only what is stinking in the extreme is specially called stinking ghee. This is because this one alone is pure diminishment (calling what is, nonexistent), while the other four are still superimposition (adding something upon what is not).

(4) To say of the inferior that it is superior is called adherence to views. What has outflows is called ‘inferior,’ since it is what the noble path abandons. To hold the inferior to be superior is given the general name of adherence to views. In strictness the name ought to be set up as ‘adherence to views and the rest’ (it adhering not to views alone but to the aggregates and the rest upon which the views depend); the word ‘and the rest’ being dropped, it is called adherence to views only.

(5) The view that says of what is neither cause nor path that it is cause and path, all of this together is called adherence to observances and vows. As when Maheśvara, the Lord of Creatures, or other things that are not the cause of the world are falsely held to be a cause; as when throwing oneself into water, going into fire, and other such perverse practices, which are not the cause of birth in heaven, are falsely held to be a cause; as when the mere keeping of observances and vows, together with the several cognitions associated with it, which are not the path of liberation, are falsely held to be the path. In strictness the name ought to be set up as ‘adherence to observances and vows and the rest’; the word ‘and the rest’ being dropped, it is called adherence to observances and vows only.

These, it should be known, are the entities of the five views.

Treatise (bringing out what abandons the holding of what is not a cause to be a cause): If a view arises upon what is not a cause that ‘this is the cause,’ why is this view not abandoned by seeing origination (the truth of origination being precisely what speaks of causes)? The stanza says:

〔Root 8〕Why Holding What Is Not a Cause to Be a Cause Is Abandoned by Seeing Suffering Alone

Stanza: With regard to Maheśvara and the rest, falsely to hold what is not a cause to be a cause — this arises from the two inversions of ‘eternity’ and ‘self,’ and so is abandoned by seeing suffering alone.

Treatise: One who holds Maheśvara, the Lord of Creatures, or some other thing to be the cause of the world and able to produce the world must first deliberate that the entity of that thing is eternal, is one, is a self, and is an agent, and only then does the holding to a cause arise.

As soon as the truth of suffering is seen, the holding to eternity and the holding to self with regard to Maheśvara and the rest are forever cut off without remainder, and so the holding to a cause produced by them is cut off along with them. (Hence the place of abandonment is at the seeing of suffering, and not at the seeing of origination.)

Treatise (an objection posed and the exchange): If it be so, then those who hold that ‘perverse practices such as throwing oneself into water or going into fire are the cause of birth in heaven,’ or who hold that ‘merely keeping observances and vows and the rest can bring purity,’ ought not to be abandoned by seeing suffering (for they have not first reckoned eternity and self).

Yet the root treatise says: there are several non-Buddhists who give rise to such a view and set up such a doctrine — that if a man, a pudgala, keeps the ox-observance, the deer-observance, or the dog-observance, he can attain purity, attain liberation, attain going forth, forever overpass the mass of sufferings, and arrive happily at the place beyond suffering and pleasure. All such holdings of ‘what is not a cause to be a cause’ should be known to be adherence to observances and vows and to be abandoned by seeing suffering, as is there set out at length.

(Pressed again) And on what ground is this abandoned by seeing suffering?

(If one answers ‘because it is bewildered about the truth of suffering’) that has the fault of overreach — for all afflictions taking what has outflows as object are bewildered about the truth of suffering (if it were so, all afflictions taking what has outflows as object would become abandoned by seeing suffering).

(Pressed a step further) What further mark is there by which adherence to observances and vows may be told apart and said to be abandoned by seeing the path? Ought not the several afflictions that arise taking as object the dharmas abandoned by seeing the path all likewise to be called ‘bewildered about the truth of suffering’?

Again: if the wrong view and the doubt that arise taking the truth of the path as object are a denying outright, or a doubting, of the path of liberation, how could they still hold that ‘this can attain everlasting purity’? (Denying outright and adhering run in opposite directions.)

If that man denies outright the true path of liberation and yet falsely holds that there is some other cause of purity, that is holding that ‘some other thing can attain purity,’ and this is no longer wrong view and the rest. (Therefore) to say that it arises taking as object the several dharmas abandoned by seeing the path does not hold in principle either.

Again, if someone gives rise to a wrong view and the rest taking as object the dharmas abandoned by seeing the truth of origination and by seeing the truth of cessation, and holds it to be the cause of purity, on what ground is this not abandoned by seeing those two truths?

(Gathering up) Therefore the sense here held should be further examined.

Treatise (bringing out the four inversions): As was said above, ‘arising from the inversions of eternity and self’ — are there only these two inversions? It should be known that the inversions are four in all — first the inversion of holding the impermanent to be eternal, second the inversion of holding the several sufferings to be pleasure, third the inversion of holding the impure to be pure, fourth the inversion of holding what is without self to be a self. What is the entity of these four inversions? The stanza says:

〔Root 9〕The Entity of the Four Inversions: Set Up from Three Views

Stanza: The entity of the four inversions is set up from three kinds of view. Because they must be inverted in every part, be of the nature of deliberative judgment, and be false superimposition, only these are taken. Perception and mind, following upon the force of view, are likewise called inversions.

Treatise: The entity of the four inversions is set up from three kinds of view. That is to say: within the extreme view only the view of eternity is taken as the inversion of eternity; within the several adherences to views, those that reckon pleasure and reckon purity are taken as the inversions of pleasure and of purity; within the view of a real person only the view of self is taken as the inversion of self.

(A divergent account) Some say: the inversion of self takes in the view of a real person entire.

(A question posed) How can the inversion of self take in the view of what belongs to self? (Asked in return) Why can it not take it in? Because it too is bound by inversion. Those who reckon a self hold that they have a power of mastery over that matter, and this is the view of what belongs to self. This is the view of self turning by two gates — the one ‘this is the self,’ the other ‘this belongs to the self.’ If they were separate views, then the view that arises from ‘self’ and the view that arises from ‘for the self’ ought also to be separate (yet in fact they are not separate).

Treatise (why only these three views are taken · the three causes of an inversion): Why are the remaining afflictions not the entity of an inversion? Because three causes must be complete before the most excellent of them becomes an inversion.

The three causes are: first, being inverted in every part (no portion of it being true); second, being of the nature of deliberative judgment (able to weigh and to settle a verdict); third, being false superimposition (adding something existent upon what is not).

That is to say: adherence to observances and vows is not inverted in every part, since a small portion of what it takes as object is pure (the keeping of observances and vows being not wholly without a portion of purity); the view of annihilation and wrong view are not false superimposition, since they turn by the gate of ‘nonexistence’ (being diminishment and not superimposition); the remaining several afflictions cannot deliberate and judge, since they are not of the nature of view. Because three causes must be complete before the most excellent of them becomes an inversion, the remaining afflictions are not the entity of an inversion.

Treatise (explaining through the inversions of perception and of mind in the sūtra): If it be so, why then does the sūtra say: in reckoning the impermanent eternal there is the inversion of perception, the inversion of mind, and the inversion of view; and with regard to suffering, the impure, and what is without self it is likewise (each having three inversions)?

Answer: in strict principle it should be known that view alone is inversion; perception and mind, following upon view, are likewise given the name of inversion, because they are associated with view and share its mode of apprehension.

(Asked again) If it be so, why are feeling and the rest not spoken of (as likewise taking the name of inversion in the train of view)? Answer: because feeling and the rest are not well established as a usage in the world. That is to say: the inversion of mind and the inversion of perception are recognized by all in the world, and feeling and the rest are not, and so the sūtra does not speak of them.

Such inversions the man who has the fruit of stream-entry has already cut off — because view, and the dharmas associated with view, are all abandoned by seeing.

Treatise (the account of twelve inversions held by another school, and the Vaibhāṣika masters’ not granting it): Some other school says: the inversions are twelve — that is, within the one inversion of ‘reckoning the impermanent eternal’ there are the three inversions of perception, of mind, and of view; and so on down to, within the one inversion of ‘reckoning what is without self a self’ it is likewise (the four inversions each having three, twelve in all). Of these twelve, eight are abandoned by seeing alone, and four extend to abandonment by seeing and by cultivation, namely the inversions of perception and of mind with respect to pleasure and to purity.

(They infer a step further) If it were not so, then a noble one who has not yet left greed for desire has already left the perception of pleasure and the perception of purity — how then would greed for desire still arise in him?

The Vaibhāṣika masters do not grant this account. (They counter-object) If the perception of pleasure and the perception of purity were active in him, one would have to grant that a noble one still has the inversions of pleasure and of purity; and a noble one also gives rise to the perception and the mind of ‘a sentient being,’ so that by the same token one would have to grant that he has the inversion of self (yet a noble one decidedly has no inversion of self). (They explain in accordance so as to establish their own tenet) It is not that greed for desire arises only when one has left the perception and the mind of ‘a sentient being’ with regard to women and the rest and with regard to one’s own body (the arising of greed for desire needing no prior inverted perception).

(They cite a sūtra to explain it through properly) For the sūtra says: if there be several learned noble disciples who see and know as it really is the noble truth of suffering, then down to that time the inversions of perception, of mind, and of view of ‘reckoning the impermanent eternal’ in that noble disciple are all forever cut off, and so on at length. Hence it is known: perception and mind are inversions only when they arise taking the force of ‘association with the inversion of view,’ and not otherwise.

Yet a noble one may at times, through a momentary confusion, suddenly have greed for desire present toward an object — just as one is confused before a whirling firebrand-wheel or before a painted yakṣa (an image of a yakṣa), knowing plainly that it is unreal and yet for a moment mistaking it.

Treatise (a stanza cited by way of objection): If it be so, why then did the Venerable Ānanda say to that Venerable Sovereign in Eloquence:

Quoted stanza (not a root stanza): Because there is a disordered inversion of ‘perception,’ your mind is scorched; having gone far from that perception, greed is stilled and mind becomes pure.

Treatise (another master’s explaining through): Hence some other master further says thus: the eight inversions of perception and of mind are not entirely cut off by one in training. Eight such afflictions as arise must be forever cut off by knowing as it really is the noble truths; apart from this there is no other means of forever cutting them. Therefore what is said here (that the inversions of perception and mind are only those associated with the inversion of view) does not contradict that sūtra.

Treatise (bringing out the seven prides and the nine classes of pride): Is it view alone among the latent tendencies that has many differences, or have the rest them too? Answer: pride has them too. How is it so? The stanza says:

〔Root 10〕The Seven Prides and the Nine Classes of Pride · the Portion in Which the Noble One Is Not Active

Stanza: Pride has seven kinds, and the nine classes of pride flow out from three among them. They all extend to abandonment by seeing and by cultivation. The noble one is as with the entanglement of killing and the rest — though he has that portion which is abandoned by cultivation, it is not active in him.

Treatise: Take first the differences of the latent tendency of pride, which are seven — first pride, second excessive pride, third pride beyond excessive pride, fourth the pride of self, fifth the pride of superior attainment, sixth the pride of slight inferiority, seventh wrong pride.

What makes the mind exalt itself is given the one general name of ‘pride’; because the modes in which it operates and turns differ, it is divided into seven kinds.

(One and two) Toward one inferior to oneself and toward one equal to oneself, to hold in order that one is the more excellent and that one is equal, making the mind exalt itself, is spoken of in general as ‘pride.’ (Three) Toward one equal to oneself and toward one more excellent than oneself, to hold in order that one is more excellent and that one is equal, is given the general name of ‘excessive pride.’ (Four) Toward one more excellent than oneself, still to say that one is the more excellent, is called ‘pride beyond excessive pride.’ (Five) Upon the five aggregates of appropriation to hold to a self and to what belongs to self, making the mind exalt itself, is called ‘the pride of self.’ (Six) With regard to excellent qualities not yet attained, to say that one has already attained them, is called ‘the pride of superior attainment.’ (Seven) Toward one who surpasses oneself by much, to say that one falls short only a little, is called ‘the pride of slight inferiority.’ (Eight) Where one has no quality of one’s own, to say that one has quality, is called ‘wrong pride.’

Treatise (the nine classes of pride): Yet the root treatise says that the classes of pride are nine — first the class ‘I am superior,’ second the class ‘I am equal,’ third the class ‘I am inferior,’ fourth the class ‘there is one superior to me,’ fifth the class ‘there is one equal to me,’ sixth the class ‘there is one inferior to me,’ seventh the class ‘there is none superior to me,’ eighth the class ‘there is none equal to me,’ ninth the class ‘there is none inferior to me.’

These nine kinds are drawn out from three among the seven prides above. From which three? From the three above, namely pride, excessive pride, and the pride of slight inferiority. If they arise in dependence upon view, and the order in which they operate differs, they become three sets of three classes.

The first set of three are, in order, excessive pride, pride, and the pride of slight inferiority. The middle set of three are, in order, the pride of slight inferiority, pride, and excessive pride. The last set of three are, in order, pride, excessive pride, and the pride of slight inferiority.

(A question posed) Toward one who surpasses oneself by much, to say that one falls short only a little — the pride of slight inferiority may indeed be established, for there is still a place of exalting; but what is the place of exalting in ‘the pride that there is none inferior to me’? Answer: it is that toward such a host of excellent sentient beings as one loves and delights in, though one knows one’s own person to be utterly inferior, one still holds oneself in esteem (I may fall short, and yet I am of a kind with them).

The above, moreover, follows the gloss of the Treatise on the Development of Wisdom. If one follows the Treatise on Categories of Dharmas in glossing the classes of pride, then ‘the pride I am superior’ comes out of three prides — namely pride, excessive pride, and pride beyond excessive pride — because the objects observed differ as inferior, equal, and superior.

Treatise (what abandons the seven prides, and their not being active in the noble one): By what, then, are these seven prides abandoned? Answer: all of them extend to abandonment by seeing and by cultivation.

(A question posed) Those of them abandoned by cultivation — may they be active in a noble one at a time when they have not yet been wholly cut off? Answer: this is not settled. That is to say: there are things abandoned by cultivation in which a noble one is decidedly not active — as the entanglement of killing is abandoned by cultivation, and yet the several noble ones are necessarily not active in it.

What is called the entanglement of killing displays that by this confusion one deliberately sets about cutting off the life of a sentient being. The word ‘and the rest’ is meant to display the entanglements of stealing, sexual misconduct, and false speech, together with craving for nonexistence entire and one portion of craving for existence.

What is craving for nonexistence? It is that the three realms are all impermanent, and to seek greedily upon this impermanence is called craving for nonexistence. What is ‘one portion of craving for existence’? It is to wish that one may hereafter become such a great nāga king as Airāvaṇa and the like.

These entanglements and cravings all arise taking as object the dharmas abandoned by cultivation, and so they are abandoned by cultivation alone.

Treatise (bringing out why the noble one, not having cut them off, still does not give rise to them): It has been said that the classes of pride and the rest have a portion abandoned by cultivation; why then does the noble one, not having cut them off, still not give rise to them? The stanza says:

〔Root 11〕The Reason They Are in the Noble One and Yet Do Not Arise

Stanza: The classes of pride and the rest, and the pride of self, and that portion of regret (remorse) which is unwholesome — in the person of a noble one they are and yet do not arise, because they are increased by view and doubt.

Treatise: The word ‘and the rest’ is meant to display the several entanglements of killing and the like, together with craving for nonexistence entire and one portion of craving for existence.

These classes of pride and the rest, the pride of self, and unwholesome regret are all increased by view and doubt in person. Though they are abandoned by cultivation, yet because the backbone of view and doubt has already been broken (the noble one having cut off view and doubt at the path of seeing), the noble one cannot give rise to them.

That is to say: the classes of pride and the pride of self are increased by the view of a real person; the entanglements of killing and the rest are increased by wrong view; the several cravings for nonexistence are increased by the view of annihilation; one portion of craving for existence is increased by the view of eternity; unwholesome regret is increased by doubt. Therefore in the person of a noble one all these decidedly do not arise.

Treatise (turning into the distinctions through the several gates · Gate One): Among the ninety-eight latent tendencies, how many are all-pervading and how many are not all-pervading? The stanza says:

〔Roots 12 and 13〕Gate One · All-Pervading and Not All-Pervading

Stanza: The several views and doubt abandoned by seeing the truth of suffering and the truth of origination, together with what is associated with them, and further the independent ignorance — these are all-pervading, pervading their own realm and their own level. Among these, setting aside two views, the other nine can further take an upper realm and an upper level as object. Setting aside the ‘acquisition,’ the remaining dharmas that accompany them are likewise gathered into the all-pervading.

Treatise: Only the views and doubt abandoned by seeing the truth of suffering and the truth of origination, together with the independent ignorance associated with them (the ignorance that arises alone, not in common with the other afflictions), have the power to pervade the five categories of their own realm and level, and so these eleven all obtain the name ‘all-pervading.’ These eleven are the seven views, the two doubts, and the two ignorances.

Such eleven can take as object throughout the several dharmas of the five categories of their own realm and level; and as latent tendencies they can further be a cause and produce throughout the defiled dharmas of the five categories. Upon these three senses (taking as object throughout · being a cause · producing the five categories throughout) the name ‘all-pervading’ is set up.

Treatise (pressing whether it takes as object all at once or gradually): This ‘taking the five categories as object throughout’ that is spoken of here — is it taking as object gradually, or taking as object all at once?

If it takes as object gradually, then the other latent tendencies ought to count as all-pervading too (for anyone can take them as object one after another). If it takes as object all at once, then who is able at one time to reckon all the dharmas of the realm of desire at once as most excellent, as able to attain purity, or as the cause of the world?

Answer: it is not said that it takes as object at once everything of its own realm and level; it is said only that it has the power to take the five categories as object at one time.

Treatise (the objector’s objection · whether craving and pride too are all-pervading): Even so, the all-pervading are not these eleven only. For wherever the view of self is active, there the craving for self and the pride of self must arise; and wherever a view of ‘purity’ or of ‘superiority’ is active, there seeking and exalting must arise. This being so, craving and pride ought to be all-pervading too.

(The Vaibhāṣika masters reproach in return) If it be so, then since these arise taking at one time as object the dharmas abandoned by seeing and by cultivation, it must be said by what these two are abandoned.

(The objector answers) It should be said that they are abandoned by cultivation, since they take mixed object-fields as object; or it should also be said that they are abandoned by seeing, since they are drawn forth by the force of view.

(The Vaibhāṣika masters state their own tenet in conclusion) The Vaibhāṣika masters say thus: these two afflictions are afflictions with an individual characteristic and not afflictions with a common characteristic; they have no power of taking as object all at once, and so they are not all-pervading. Therefore the all-pervading are these eleven alone. The rest, which are not all-pervading, are plain of themselves by extension, and so need not be separately stated.

Treatise (the nine that can take an upper realm and an upper level as object): Among these eleven, setting aside the view of a real person and the extreme view, the other nine can further take an upper realm and an upper level as object.

The word ‘upper’ in the stanza properly makes plain the upper realm and the upper level, and at the same time displays besides that there is no latent tendency that takes a lower realm or a lower level as object (the upper does not take the lower as object).

Although these nine can take both their own level and an upper level as object, yet in principle there is no such thing as taking one’s own level and an upper level as object at once.

In this matter of ‘taking an upper as object,’ speaking first with respect to realms: either one realm alone is taken as object, or two are taken as object together. Hence the root treatise says: there are several latent tendencies affiliated to the realm of desire that take as object what is affiliated to the realm of form; there are several latent tendencies affiliated to the realm of desire that take as object what is affiliated to the formless realm; there are several latent tendencies affiliated to the realm of desire that take as object what is affiliated to the realm of form and the formless realm; there are several latent tendencies affiliated to the realm of form that take as object what is affiliated to the formless realm. As for analyzing with respect to levels, one need only ponder it following the way it is said of realms.

Treatise (why the two views of self and of extremes do not take an upper as object): If one born in the realm of desire, taking Mahābrahmā as object, gives rise to a view of ‘a sentient being’ or to a view of ‘eternity,’ why then is it said that the view of self and the extreme view do not take an upper realm or an upper level as object?

Answer: because he does not hold Mahābrahmā to be his own self or what belongs to his self (the view of self must take as object the aggregates affiliated to oneself); and the extreme view must arise from the view of self (the view of self not taking an upper as object, the extreme view naturally does not either).

(Asked again) If it be so, then reckoning Mahābrahmā a sentient being or eternal — into what view is this gathered?

The Abhidharma masters say: these two are not views, but are gathered into wrong cognition.

(Asked again) Why is it a view when the other afflictions take that as object, while these two also take it as object and yet are not views?

Answer: this is said taking our own tenet as the measure (it being so established by the criterion of our own school).

Treatise (whether the entity of the all-pervading is the latent tendencies alone): Is the entity of the all-pervading the latent tendencies alone? Answer: it is not. How is it then? Answer: together with the dharmas that accompany them.

That is to say: the eleven latent tendencies spoken of above, together with the dharmas that accompany them, are all gathered into the all-pervading. Yet their ‘acquisition’ must be set aside — because the acquisition is not of one result with them.

For this reason someone asks thus: are the several all-pervading latent tendencies all all-pervading causes? Answer: to this question a fourfold alternative should be made. The first alternative (being an all-pervading latent tendency and not an all-pervading cause) is the all-pervading latent tendencies of the future. The second alternative (being an all-pervading cause and not an all-pervading latent tendency) is the dharmas coexistent with them in the past and present. The third and fourth alternatives may be analyzed in accordance with the principle.

Treatise (turning into Gate Two): Among the ninety-eight latent tendencies, how many take what has outflows as object and how many take what is without outflows as object? The stanza says:

〔Roots 14 through 16〕Gate Two · Taking as Object What Has Outflows and What Is without Outflows

Stanza: The wrong view and doubt abandoned by seeing the truth of cessation and the truth of the path, together with what is associated with them, and further the independent ignorance — these six can take what is without outflows as object. Among these, those that take cessation as object take only the cessation of their own level as object; those that take the path as object take six levels or nine levels as object, because the counteragents differ and because they are homogeneous causes of one another. Greed, hatred, pride, and the two adherences do not take what is without outflows as object — because what is taken as object should be relinquished, is not enmity and harm, is quiescent, is pure, and is of the most excellent nature.

Treatise: Only the wrong view and doubt abandoned by seeing the truth of cessation and the truth of the path, together with the independent ignorance associated with them, three each making six in all, can take what is without outflows as object. That the rest take what has outflows as object is plain of itself by extension.

Among these six, those that take cessation as object each take the cessation of their own level as object — because the several cessations are not causes and results with respect to one another (the cessation of this level cannot be the cause of the cessation of that level). That is to say: the three latent tendencies affiliated to the realm of desire take as object only the cessation through discernment of the formations of the realm of desire; and so on down to the three latent tendencies of the level of the summit of existence, which take as object only the cessation through discernment of the formations of the summit of existence.

Those that take the path as object take six levels or nine levels as object. That is to say: the three latent tendencies affiliated to the realm of desire take as object only the path of the class of the cognition of dharma in six levels — whether it counteracts the realm of desire or is able to counteract the rest, all of it is their object, because it is all of one class. The three latent tendencies in each of the eight levels of the realm of form and the formless realm each can take as object throughout only the path of the class of the subsequent cognition in nine levels — whether it counteracts its own level or is able to counteract the rest, all of it is their object, because it is all of one class.

Treatise (why taking cessation as object does not extend, while taking the path as object does): Why is it that in taking cessation as object one takes only one’s own level and not the rest, while in taking the path as object one can extend to what is of one class in six levels and in nine?

Answer: because the paths of the several levels are causes of one another (the homogeneous being cause to the homogeneous). (Pressed again) Although the class of the cognition of dharma and the class of the subsequent cognition are also causes of one another, yet the class of the subsequent cognition does not counteract the realm of desire, and so the path of the class of the subsequent cognition is not the object of the three latent tendencies of the realm of desire.

(Pressed again) Since the class of the cognition of dharma can counteract the realm of form and the formless realm, it ought to be the object of the three latent tendencies in each of those eight levels. Answer: it is not that the class of the cognition of dharma can counteract the realm of form and the formless realm in every part — for the class of the cognition of dharma concerning suffering and the class concerning origination are not the counteragents of those two realms; nor is it able to counteract the realm of form and the formless realm in the whole part — for it cannot counteract what is abandoned by seeing in those two realms. These two beginning conditions being absent (being neither a universal counteragent nor a counteragent in the whole part), it is not their object.

By this very principle it is displayed besides that there is no barrier to the several levels that the all-pervading confusions take as object under the truths of suffering and origination — because the object-fields taken are causes of one another and are not counteragents (a counteragent has its bounds, while an object-mark as cause has none).

Treatise (why greed and the other four do not take what is without outflows as object): Why is it that greed, hatred, pride, adherence to observances and vows, and adherence to views, which are abandoned by seeing what is without outflows (the two truths of cessation and the path), yet do not take what is without outflows as object?

(1) Because what the latent tendency of greed takes as object should be relinquished; if it took what is without outflows as object, then no fault would follow — as the desire for wholesome dharmas ought not to be relinquished (which shows that a desire taking what is without outflows as object does not count as greed). (2) It is by taking a matter of enmity and harm as object that the latent tendency of hatred arises, and the two truths of cessation and the path are not enmity and harm, and so are not the object-field of hatred. (3) It is by taking a matter of coarse agitation as object that the latent tendency of pride arises, and the two truths of cessation and the path are quiescent, and so are not the object-field of pride. (4) To hold what is impure to be the cause of purity is called adherence to observances and vows, and the two truths of cessation and the path are truly pure, and so ought not to be made the object-field of adherence to observances and vows. (5) To hold what is not superior to be most excellent is called adherence to views, and the two truths of cessation and the path are truly excellent, and so ought not to be made the object-field of adherence to views either.

Therefore greed and the rest do not take what is without outflows as object.

Treatise (turning into Gate Three): Among the ninety-eight latent tendencies, how many increase by attachment through the object and how many increase by attachment through association? The stanza says:

〔Roots 17 and 18〕Gate Three · Increase by Attachment through the Object and through Association

Stanza: An all-pervading latent tendency not yet cut off, upon all the dharmas of its own level (increases by attachment through the object); one not all-pervading increases by attachment through the object only upon the dharmas of its own category. What is not without outflows and not taken from an upper realm (only there is increase by attachment), because what is without outflows and what is of an upper object-field are not appropriated as one’s own and are moreover contrary to it. Following upon the dharmas associated with it, it increases by attachment through association.

Treatise: An all-pervading latent tendency increases by attachment through the object upon the several dharmas of the five categories of its own level throughout, because it can take the dharmas of its own level as object throughout. A latent tendency that is not all-pervading, among the remaining five categories, increases by attachment through the object only upon its own category, because it takes only its own category as object.

This is said in general. If it be said in particular, then the six confusions that take what is without outflows as object and the nine confusions that take an upper realm as object have no sense of increase by attachment upon their object-fields.

Why? Because the object-fields that are without outflows and of an upper level are not appropriated as one’s own, and are moreover contrary to it.

That is to say: if there be a dharma appropriated as its own by the view of self and the craving within this level, then it may have the principle of ‘increase by attachment through the object by the latent tendencies present in this level,’ as when a garment is damp the dust follows and stays upon it. But the several dharmas without outflows and the dharmas of an upper level are not appropriated as their own by the view of self and the craving of the lower levels, and so the confusions of a lower level that take them as object do not increase by attachment through the object.

(A note in passing) To dwell in a mind of a lower level and seek an upper level and the like is the desire for wholesome dharmas, and is not called a latent tendency.

The noble path, nirvāṇa, and the dharmas of an upper level are contrary to the confusions of a lower level that can take them as object, and so those two classes likewise have no principle of increase by attachment through the object — as upon a burning stone the foot does not stay.

(Another account) Some say: ‘latent tendency’ has the sense of ‘following in accord.’ It is only what is not without outflows and not of an upper object-field that follows in accord with the several latent tendencies of the lower levels; and so, though they are its object, there is no principle of increase by attachment — as when one with the wind-sickness takes a dry and astringent medicine, the sickness is not what is increased by attachment upon the medicine.

Treatise (increase by attachment through association): The sense of increase by attachment having been analyzed with respect to the object, increase by attachment through association should now be analyzed. That is to say: whatever latent tendency it be, upon the dharmas associated with itself, by reason of association it increases by attachment upon them.

All statements of increase by attachment refer to the time when it has not yet been cut off; and so the head of the first stanza marks first the two words ‘not yet cut off.’

(A question appended) Is there such a latent tendency as takes neither what is without outflows nor an upper realm as object, and yet whose increase by attachment is through association only and not through the object? Answer: there is. It is the several all-pervading latent tendencies that take an upper level as object.

Treatise (turning into Gate Four): Among the ninety-eight latent tendencies, how many are unwholesome and how many are indeterminate? The stanza says:

〔Root 19〕Gate Four · The Unwholesome and the Indeterminate

Stanza: The latent tendencies of the upper two realms, and the view of self and the extreme view of the realm of desire, and the delusion that arises together with them, are indeterminate; all the rest besides these are unwholesome.

Treatise: All the latent tendencies of the realm of form and the formless realm are of indeterminate quality alone. For if a defiled dharma were unwholesome, it would have a painful maturation; and a painful maturational result the upper two realms do not have — the cause that can vex and afflict others is decidedly absent there.

The two views of self and of extremes, and the delusion associated with them, in so far as they are affiliated to the realm of desire, are likewise of indeterminate quality.

Why? (1) Because these do not go against giving and the rest — it is in order that ‘I’ may obtain happiness hereafter that one now diligently cultivates giving, discipline, and the rest. (2) The extreme view that holds to annihilation can further accord with liberation, and so the World-Honored One said: among the several courses of view of the several non-Buddhists, this view is the best, namely ‘I am not and what belongs to me is not; I shall not be hereafter and what belongs to me shall not be hereafter.’ (3) And these two views are bewildered about one’s own affair alone, and do not seek to vex and injure other sentient beings.

(An objection posed) If it be so, then greedily seeking the pleasures of heaven and giving rise to the pride of self ought by the same rule to be indeterminate too (they also not vexing and injuring others).

(Another master’s account) The preceptors of former times say thus: an innate view of self is of indeterminate quality — as the view of self is active in beasts and the like; if it arises from discrimination (arising from perverse teaching and perverse pondering), it is of unwholesome quality.

All the remaining latent tendencies affiliated to the realm of desire are contrary to what has been said above, and are all of unwholesome quality.

Treatise (turning into Gate Five): Among the unwholesome confusions spoken of above, how many are unwholesome roots and how many are not unwholesome roots? The stanza says:

〔First Half of Root 20〕Gate Five, Part One · The Three Unwholesome Roots

Stanza: The unwholesome roots are in the realm of desire — namely greed, hatred, and unwholesome delusion.

Treatise: Only all greed and hatred affiliated to the realm of desire, and unwholesome delusion, are gathered into the unwholesome roots. Following the order, the World-Honored One spoke of them as the three unwholesome roots of greed, hatred, and delusion.

(Why they are set up as roots) Only an affliction whose quality is unwholesome alone can serve as the root of unwholesome dharmas and be set up as an unwholesome root. The rest are not so — that the remaining several afflictions are not unwholesome roots is a sense already established by extension from the text above, and so the stanza does not state it.

Treatise (bringing out the indeterminate roots): Among the indeterminate confusions spoken of above, how many are indeterminate roots and how many are not indeterminate roots? The stanza says:

〔Second Half of Root 20 and Root 21〕Gate Five, Part Two · The Three Indeterminate Roots and the Four of the Masters of Other Regions

Stanza: The indeterminate roots are three — indeterminate craving, delusion, and discernment. The rest are not set up, because doubt turns toward two courses and pride turns by exalting. The masters of other regions set up four — among which are craving, view, pride, and delusion, because for those who cultivate the upper absorptions the three all decidedly depend upon delusion.

Treatise: The several Vaibhāṣika masters of the land of Kaśmīra say: the indeterminate roots are likewise three — namely the three of the several indeterminate craving, delusion, and discernment; and even that portion produced by maturation is gathered into the indeterminate roots.

(A question posed) Why are doubt and pride not indeterminate roots? Answer: because doubt turns toward two courses and pride turns by exalting.

The intent of those masters is this: doubt turns to and fro between two roads, and its nature is wavering and unsettled, and so it ought not to be set up as a root; pride turns upon its object with the mark of exalting, and is unlike the dharma of a root, and so it is not set up as a root either. For what is to be a root must abide firmly and turn downward (as a root strikes down), which is commonly understood in the world; and so those two are not roots.

Treatise (the account of the four indeterminate roots of the masters of other regions): The several masters of other regions, however, set up four — namely indeterminate craving, view, pride, and delusion. (The name ‘indeterminate’ is to block both the wholesome and the evil.)

Why are these four set up as indeterminate roots? Because the several foolish men who cultivate the absorptions of the upper realms depend upon nothing beyond the three of craving, view, and pride; and these three all turn by the force of ignorance, and so these four are set up as the indeterminate roots.

Treatise (bringing out the gate of the four determinations): The fourteen indeterminate matters spoken of in the several sūtras — are these too gathered into the indeterminate spoken of here? Answer: they are not. How is it then? Answer: that sūtra sets up the name ‘indeterminate’ only with respect to a question that ‘should be set aside.’ The gates of question and determination are four in all. Which four? The stanza says:

〔Root 22〕Appendix to Gate Five · The Four Gates of Determination

Stanza: What should be determined categorically, what should be determined by analysis, what should be determined by counter-question, what should be determined by setting aside — as with asking about death, asking about birth, asking about superior and inferior, and asking whether self and aggregates are one or different, and the like.

Treatise: Take first the four kinds of question — first what should be determined categorically, second what should be determined by analysis, third what should be determined by counter-question, fourth what should be determined by setting aside. These four follow the order (matching the four questions below).

As when a questioner asks about death, asks about birth, asks about superior and inferior, and asks whether self and aggregates are one or different, and the like. What is called ‘the determinations are four’ is the answering of these four questions.

(1) If he asks thus: will all sentient beings die? It should be determined categorically — all sentient beings will decidedly die.

(2) If he asks thus: will all who have died be born again? It should be determined by analysis — those who still have afflictions will be born again, and not the rest.

(3) If he asks thus: is a human superior or inferior? It should be determined by counter-question — set against what? If he says set against gods, then it should be determined that a human is inferior; if he says set against the lower destinies (the evil destinies), then it should be determined that a human is superior.

(4) If he asks thus: are the aggregates and a sentient being one or different? It should be determined by setting aside — because a sentient being is not really existent, the natures of oneness and difference are alike not established, as the son of a barren woman cannot be spoken of as having the nature of white or of black.

Treatise (the first objection posed · why setting aside is called a determination): To set aside and yet to set up the name of a ‘determination’ — how is this? Answer: because in determining his question one says ‘this ought not to be determined’ (and to utter this one sentence is itself a kind of determination).

Treatise (an outsider’s objection and the author’s explaining through · the first): Someone says thus: that second question may also be determined categorically — not all who have died will be born again (one may answer so straight out).

(The author explains through) Yet what the questioner said was ‘will all who have died be born again’; in principle it should be determined by analysis. A general answer to what he asks does not do, for though it makes him know a general statement, he is still not resolved (what he asked was ‘all,’ and only by dividing the cases in answering is he resolved).

Treatise (an outsider’s objection and the author’s explaining through · the second): Someone else says thus: that third question may also be determined categorically — a human is both superior and inferior, because what he is set against differs, as consciousness is both result and cause (result with respect to what precedes, cause with respect to what follows).

(The author explains through) Yet that questioner puts a categorical question, and your answer is not a categorical determination, and so it should amount rather to a determination by analysis. But here one should press him as to what his question sets it against, and hence this is called what should be determined by counter-question.

Treatise (an outsider’s objection and the author’s explaining through · the third): Someone else says thus: since that fourth question determines nothing at all as to whether the aggregates and a sentient being are different or one, how can it be called a determination?

(The author explains through) Yet what he asks should in principle be set aside. Having said ‘it should be set aside,’ how is that not counted a determination?

Treatise (the Abhidharma masters explain the four determinations at length according to the four questions): The Abhidharma masters say thus:

(1) As for what is called categorical determination: if someone asks — is the World-Honored One a Tathāgata, an Arhat, a Perfectly Awakened One? Is the Dharma he speaks well spoken? Is what the several communities of disciples practice excellent practice? Are form and so on down to consciousness all impermanent? Are suffering and so on down to the path well set forth? All these should be determined categorically, because they accord with the real sense.

(2) As for what is called determination by analysis: if someone with a straight mind requests, saying — may the Venerable One speak Dharma for me. Then one should analyze for him: the dharmas are many, namely past, future, and present; which do you wish spoken? If he says, speak the past dharmas for me, one should analyze again: among past dharmas too there are many, form and so on down to consciousness. If he requests form to be spoken, one should analyze and say: within form there are three kinds, wholesome, evil, and indeterminate. If he requests the wholesome, one should analyze and say: within the wholesome there are seven, namely abstention from killing and so at length down to abstention from frivolous and defiled speech. If he further requests abstention from killing, one should analyze and say: this has three kinds, namely what is set going by the three wholesome roots of non-greed, non-hatred, and non-delusion. If he requests what is set going by non-greed, one should analyze and say: this again has two kinds, namely the manifest and the nonmanifest; which do you wish spoken?

(3) As for what is called determination by counter-question: if someone with a fawning mind requests, saying — may the Venerable One speak Dharma for me. Then one should counter-question him: the dharmas are many; which do you wish spoken? One should not analyze for him — down to making him stand silent, or making him state it himself so that he has no occasion to pick a fault.

Treatise (a further objection posed upon this): Is it not that within these two (determination by analysis and determination by counter-question) there is no ‘question’ at all but only a request to be told; and no ‘determination’ either, but only the one counter-question ‘which do you wish spoken?’ — how then can these two count as question and determination?

Answer: as when someone requests, saying ‘speak the path for me,’ is this not asking about the path? And to determine what he asks by counter-questioning, is this not determining the path?

(Objected again) If it be so, then both ought to be determination by counter-question (why divide them into two?). Answer: not so. Because the intent of the question differs as straight or fawning, and what is determined differs as analyzed or unanalyzed (for one of straight mind it is analyzed, for one of fawning mind it is only counter-questioned).

(4) As for what is called determination by setting aside: if someone asks — has the world an end, or has it no end, and the like? This should be set aside, and it ought not to be spoken for him.

Treatise (analyzing the marks of the four determinations according to the sūtra): Now the marks of question and determination are analyzed according to the sūtra. As the sūtra of the Mahāsāṃghikas says: bhikṣus should know that question and determination are of four kinds. Which four? Namely, there are questions that should be determined categorically, and so on down to, there are questions that should only be set aside.

What kind of question should be determined categorically? It is asking — are all the formations impermanent? This question is called one that should be determined categorically.

What kind of question should be determined by analysis? It is if someone asks — the actions performed with deliberate intent having been done, what result is to be experienced? This question is called one that should be determined by analysis.

What kind of question should be determined by counter-question? It is if someone asks — are a man’s ‘perception’ and his ‘self’ one or different? Then one should counter-question him, saying: in dependence upon which self do you ask thus? If he says in dependence upon the coarse self, then it should be determined that ‘it differs from perception.’ This question is called one that should be determined by counter-question.

What kind of question should only be set aside? It is if someone asks — is the world eternal, not eternal, both eternal and not eternal, neither eternal nor not eternal? Has the world an end, no end, both an end and no end, neither an end nor no end? After the Tathāgata’s death does he exist, not exist, both exist and not exist, neither exist nor not exist? Is the life-principle the body, or is the life-principle other than the body? This question is called one that should only be set aside.

義疏Exposition

讀這一卷之前

這一卷的第一句話，是整部論裡最明白的一次交接——「前言世別皆由業生，業由隨眠方得生長，離隨眠業無感有能」。上一品用整整三卷講業，講到最後卻沒有收在業上，而是把手指向另一個東西：業自己不會發芽，要有隨眠潤著它，它才長得起來。所以隨眠品不是在業品之外另起一題，是把業品沒有講完的那一半補上。

三家古德在這一品的第一刀落得少見地整齊——光記標「就此品中，一明惑體、二明惑滅」，頌疏標「就此品中分二：一明惑體、二明惑滅」，寶疏雖改字作「一明惑體用、二明斷不同」，二分之判仍舊相同。本卷全部落在『明惑體』這一半，而且是這一半的開頭：辨根本惑的五節（增數·見修斷·五見·四倒·七九慢）走完，再走諸門分別的前五門（遍行·漏無漏緣·二種隨增·二性·根非根），末後附一節四種記門，卷就收了。

有一件事要先說在前頭。這一卷讀起來像在做算術——六、七、十、九十八，四倒、七慢、九慢類、十一遍行、六緣無漏、三不善根、三無記根、四記——數目多到令人生畏。但真正承重的不是數目，而是每一次改數目時所換的那一把尺。六變七，換的是『貪』這把尺；七變十，換的是『見』這把尺；十變九十八，一次換了三把（行·部·界）。全卷的骨架就是這一句：同一批煩惱，換一把尺就換一個數；問哪個數對之前，先問這是哪一把尺。

一、隨眠為什麼能作諸有的根本——煩惱的十件事

先問：業已經是能感果的了，為什麼還要說「業由隨眠方得生長」？論的答案不在別處，就在「以諸煩惱現起能為十種事故」這一句——煩惱一起，就同時在辦十件事。

這十件事值得一件一件看，因為它們不是同義的鋪陳，而是十個不同的作用面。「堅根本」是加固煩惱自身的根柢；「立相續」是使它一念接一念不斷；「治自田」是把心地整治成合它生長的田；「引等流」是引出同類的後續；「發業有」才是我們熟悉的『發動業』那一項；「攝自具」是把資助它的條件收攏；「迷所緣」是使心對境看不清；「導識流」是牽著識往它要去的方向走；「越善品」是踰越善法那一分；「廣縛義」是廣泛繫縛，論自己加了一句解釋——「令不能越自界地故」。

易誤處：把十事讀成十個形容詞。它們不是。十事之中只有第五件直接說到業，其餘九件都在說煩惱怎麼替自己備料。所以論才敢說業離了它「無感有能」——不是業不能感果，是業在沒有隨眠的田裡根本長不出來。

落地上：讀本品時，凡遇到『這個煩惱有什麼要緊』的疑問，回頭數一數它在十事之中占了哪幾件，輕重立刻分明。光記於此十事逐條引《順正理論》為訓，其首事作「一、堅固根本令得堅牢，對治遠故」——可見這十事之訓不是後起的，古德早已逐條有解。

附辨兩個虛字。頌說「謂貪瞋亦慢」，一個『亦』字；又說「無明見及疑」，一個『及』字。論主自己把這兩字挑出來解釋：『亦』是要顯「慢等亦由貪力於境隨增」——慢等其餘煩惱也是靠貪的力量在境上長勢力；『及』是要顯「六體各不同」——這六個不是一物的六名。先問：兩個虛字何必解？因為若不解，讀者會把六隨眠讀成平列的六件事，看不出它們彼此有力量上的牽連；也可能反過來把它們讀成一物之異名。一個字扶住一邊，兩個字把界線劃準。

二、六為什麼開成七——「有貪」這個名字安在哪裡

先問：經說七隨眠，論說六隨眠，哪一個是對的？論的答法不是選一個，是說明開合之由——「即前所說六隨眠中分貪為二，故經說七」。六與七是同一批東西，差別只在貪要不要拆開。

拆開之後，上二界的那一份叫『有貪』。為什麼不也叫欲貪？論給了兩個理由，而且是兩個層次的理由。第一個是就事實說的——「彼貪多託內門轉故」：上二界的有情多起對定的貪，而一切定貪都是向內門而轉的，不緣外五欲之境。第二個是就用意說的——「為遮解脫想」：有人把生到上二界誤當作解脫，立一個『有』字（三有之有），就是要顯示那裡所緣的「非真解脫」。光記於此明分二由，云「第二句於內門轉故，所以不名欲貪。第三句為遮解脫想，所以名有貪」——一句解釋為什麼不用舊名，一句解釋為什麼要用新名。

易誤處：以為『有貪』是另一種煩惱。不是，它就是貪，只是所在的界不同、所緣的門不同。論隨後又補一層——那裡的有情「多於等至及所依止深生味著，故說彼唯味著自體；非味著境，離欲貪故」：他們貪的是定的自體，不是外境，因為外境之貪早已離了。

落地上：這一節示範了本論安立名相的一個常法——名字的分合，跟著所緣與所行走，不跟著體性走。體性只有一個貪，因為所緣與所行分成兩路，名字就分成兩個。往後遇到『同一個法為什麼有兩個名』的問題，先照這條去問。

三、〔長行專段〕隨眠是心相應，還是心不相應

這是本卷第一場大諍，也是全品問答最密的一段。先問：這一諍是怎麼引起的？起點小得幾乎不像個問題——『欲貪隨眠』這四個字該怎麼讀。論說「欲貪隨眠依何義釋？為欲貪體即是隨眠？為是欲貪之隨眠義？」讀作前者，欲貪與隨眠是同一物；讀作後者，隨眠是屬於欲貪的另一物。光記把這兩讀點得很清楚——「兩關徵定。為欲貪體即是隨眠，據持業釋？為是欲貪之隨眠義，據依主釋」，一個是持業釋，一個是依主釋。

論主的回答是「二俱有過」——兩讀都有過失，於是兩邊各出一難。

難第一讀者引經：契經說有人暫起欲貪之纏而能如實知出離方便，「彼由此故於欲貪纏能正遣除并隨眠斷」。經既然說『纏斷，並且隨眠也斷』，可見纏與隨眠是兩件事；若說欲貪之體就是隨眠，便與經相違。

難第二讀者引本論：本論說「欲貪隨眠三根相應」。既然與根相應，它就是相應法；若說隨眠另是一物而屬於欲貪，隨眠就成了心不相應行，便與對法相違。

毘婆沙師的立場是取第一讀——「欲貪等體即是隨眠」，隨眠就是煩惱自身，是相應法。難方隨即徵「豈不違經」，毘婆沙師通經有二路：一路說經文「并隨眠者并隨縛故」——所斷的是連同隨縛的那一分；一路說經是就『得』上假說隨眠，「如火等中立苦等想」，火不是苦而說觸火為苦，是就其所生假說。末後歸到宗上——「阿毘達磨依實相說，即諸煩惱說名隨眠」。

難方再責「何理為證知定相應」，毘婆沙師舉三事作證：隨眠能染惱心、能覆障心、能違害善。其推論很細——若隨眠是不相應行，而不相應行「恒現前故」，那麼善法就應當永無起時；既然善法還會起，可見隨眠不是不相應。難方一句拆掉這證——「此皆非證」，理由是：不承認隨眠是相應的人，本來就不承認那三件事是隨眠所辦的。易誤處：以為難方是在否認隨眠能染心。不是，他否認的是『這件事必須由相應法來辦』這個前提。凡遇論中一方說「此皆非證」，先看他拆的是結論還是前提。

論主於此下了一句評語——「然經部師所說最善」。光記於此明標「論主評取經部」四字。這一句要緊：本論在許多諍處是二造並錄而不下判語的，此處卻明白有取捨。經部之說是：隨眠既非心相應、也非心不相應，因為它「無別物故」——它根本不是另一個東西。煩惱在睡位叫隨眠，在覺位叫纏。什麼是睡？「不現行種子隨逐」。什麼是覺？「諸煩惱現起纏心」。什麼是煩惱種子？「自體上差別功能，從煩惱生能生煩惱」。

這一路的關鍵在兩個比喻。念的種子：憶念是由曾經證知而生的，又能生起將來的憶念，這只是一種功能上的差別，沒有人會說念的種子是另一個實物。芽等：芽由前果生，又能生後果，同樣只是功能差別。於是經部反問：既然念種只是功能，煩惱種為什麼要另立一個不相應的實物？「差別因緣不可得故」——找不出使二者不同的理由。

末後一番是六六經之難。有部一方引經說「於樂受有貪隨眠」，若隨眠只是種子，經怎麼說樂受上『有』它？經部通經只用一句——「經但說有，不言爾時即有隨眠」；經說有，沒說那時它現行。再問「於何時有」，答「於彼睡時，或假於因立隨眠想」：或者是在種子潛伏之時有，或者是就貪這個因上安了隨眠這個果名。

落地上：這一整段真正教會讀者的，是一個可以帶走的分辨法——『有』與『現行』是兩回事。經說某處有某惑，不等於該處該惑正在活動。這條分辨在下文『聖者身中有而不起』一節還要再用一次，在『所緣隨增』一門也還要用。論主收得也乾脆——「傍論且止，應辯正論」。

四、六為什麼開成十——見的行相之異

先問：既然六已經開成七了，為什麼還要另開一次成十？因為換了一把尺。前一次拆的是貪，這一次拆的是見——「六隨眠中見行異為五，餘非見五，積數總成十」。

十之中，五是見性：有身見、邊執見、邪見、見取、戒禁取；五非見性：貪、瞋、慢、無明、疑。易誤處：以為十是在六之外加了四個。不是。六之中的『見』一項，因所行的行相有五種不同而析為五，其餘五項原封不動，五加五恰成十。所以十與六的關係，和七與六的關係是同一型的——都是某一項內部的析分，不是外加。

落地上：讀到本品任何一個新數目，先做一件事——把它與前一個數目相減，看多出來的那幾個是從哪一項裡分出來的。這一卷從六到七、從七到十、從十到九十八，三次都經得起這樣一減。

五、十為什麼開成九十八——行·部·界三重

先問：這一次為什麼一下子跳到九十八？因為這一次同時用了三把尺——「六種隨眠由行、部、界有差別，故成九十八」。行，就是前一節見行之異（六析為十）；部，是「見四諦、修所斷五部」；界，是「欲色無色三界」。

算法論給得很實。欲界五部乘十隨眠，得三十六——「見苦諦至修所斷，如次有十七七八四」。這五個數不是隨手排的，各有其離：見苦所斷具足十；見集、見滅所斷各七，「離有身見、邊見、戒取」；見道所斷八，「離有身見及邊執見」；修所斷四，「離見及疑」。上二界則「五部各除瞋」，故各三十一。三十六加三十一加三十一，恰九十八。

由這一表可以反過來讀出每一惑的分布，論也逐條給了：薩迦耶見唯在見苦一部，邊執見亦爾；戒禁取通見苦、見道二部；邪見通四部，見取與疑亦爾；貪等四各通五部。易誤處：把『某見唯在某部』誤讀成『某見只緣某諦』。論給的判準是另一句——「若緣見此所斷為境名見此所斷，餘名修所斷」：所斷之部，看它所緣的是哪一部所斷之法。

末後論把九十八再切一刀：「八十八見所斷，忍所害故。十隨眠修所斷，智所害故。」落地上：這一節是全品的骨架。往後幾乎每一門（遍行、緣無漏、隨增、二性）都要回到這張五部三界之表上取數，讀時最好把它記牢——記不牢也不要緊，記牢『行·部·界三把尺』這件事就夠了，表隨時可以推回來。

六、見斷修斷是不是死板的——有頂與其餘八地

先問：上一節剛立了『八十八見所斷、十修所斷』，論隨即自問「為決定爾」，然後自答「不爾」。既然剛立，為什麼馬上鬆動？因為前表是就法而分，此節是就人而分——同一個惑，聖者去斷與異生去斷，所屬的斷法可以不同。

論分三層。第一層：忍所害的隨眠，若在有頂地，「唯見所斷，唯類智忍方能斷故」——有頂地只有類智忍能斷，所以沒有第二條路。第二層：其餘八地所攝的，「通見修斷」——「聖者斷唯見非修」，因為他是靠法類智忍斷的；「若異生斷唯修非見」，因為他只能「數習世俗智所斷」。第三層：智所害的一切地所攝，「唯修所斷」。

易誤處：把『通見修斷』讀成同一個人有兩條路可選。不是——通的是這一類惑，而不是某一個人。聖者只走見這一路，異生只走修那一路；合起來說才叫『通』。

落地上：這一節示範了本論一個重要的讀法——一個法的分類，可能是相對於能斷之人而說的。往後遇到分類互相打架，先問一句『這兩個分類是不是站在不同的人身上說的』。論末又錄一異說：有餘師說外道諸仙不能伏斷見所斷惑，並引《大分別諸業契經》與《梵網經》為證；毘婆沙師則另解那經之義，說是「起見時暫退，如提婆達多」。二說並錄。

七、五見各自的體——五個不同的錯法

先問：五見既然都是見，差別在哪裡？論的答法是逐一給出所執之相，五個相彼此不能替換。

薩迦耶見執「我及我所」。此名的訓詁本卷特別詳——「壞故名薩，聚謂迦耶，即是無常和合蘊義」，薩是壞、迦耶是聚，合起來就是『無常而和合的蘊』。論主接著點出立名的用意：「為遮常一想故立此名，要此想為先方執我故」——先有『常』與『一』的想，才會在其上執我；名字裡放進一個『壞』字，正是要把那個想擋掉。此段另有一家之釋（「有故名薩」），二釋並陳，其判釋入承衍節。

邊執見「即於所執我我所事執斷執常」——注意它的所緣不是別的，正是前一見所執的我與我所；所以邊執見必定跟在身見後面，這一點下文論遍行時還要用到。

邪見「於實有體苦等諦中起見撥無」。論在此自設一問：一切妄見都是顛倒，何以獨此名邪？答得極好——「以過甚故。如說臭酥惡執惡等，此唯損減，餘增益故」。酥都有氣味，臭得極了的才叫臭酥；五見之中只有這一種是純粹的損減（把有說成無），其餘四種都還是增益。

見取「於劣謂勝」，而『劣』有定義——「有漏名劣，聖所斷故」。戒禁取「於非因道謂因道見」，論舉三類例：計大自在天生主等為世間因、投水火等邪行為生天因、唯受持戒禁與相應智等為解脫道。

易誤處：把見取與戒禁取混為一談。二者所執的方向不同——見取是把劣的抬成勝的，戒禁取是把非因非道當成因與道；一個錯在價，一個錯在路。落地上：論在後二見之下都補了一句「理實應立見等取名」「理實應立戒禁等取名」，說明現行之名是略去『等』字的簡稱。凡遇本論說『理實應立某名』，那是在提醒讀者：現行的名相是簡稱，不要拿簡稱去限死它的範圍。

八、非因計因為什麼只在見苦斷

先問：戒禁取是把非因執為因，而『因』正是集諦所講的事，它為什麼不是見集所斷？這一問論主自己提出，答案在一句因果次第上——「必先計度彼體是常一我作者方起因執」。

也就是說，計大自在天為世間因的人，並不是先有一個『因』的錯，而是先有一個『常』『我』的錯：先認定那個東西是常、是一、是我、是作者，然後才把它當作因。既然如此，「纔見苦時，於自在等常執我執永斷無餘，故彼所生因執亦斷」——見苦時把根拔了，枝自然落。

易誤處：以為凡是講因的錯都歸見集所斷。不是。本論判所斷之部，看的是那個錯從哪裡生出來，不是看它談論什麼題目。

論隨後展開一長串詰問而不作結。先難：那麼執投水赴火為生天因、執持戒禁便得清淨的，也沒有先計常我，豈不就不是見苦斷了？次引本論所說牛戒鹿戒狗戒之例，判為「是戒禁取見苦所斷」。再自徵「此復何因是見苦斷」，若答『迷苦諦故』便「有太過失，緣有漏惑皆迷苦故」。再徵戒禁取何時算見道所斷、緣道之邪見與疑何以不成清淨之執、緣集滅之邪見執為淨因又何以不屬彼斷。末後只留一句——「故所執義應更思擇」。

落地上：這一段最可貴的不是答案，是論主肯把一個尚未收束的問題原樣留在紙上。讀阿毘達磨要能認得出這種段落：凡收在『應更思擇』一類語的，就是論自己標明未決之處，不必替它補一個結論。

九、四顛倒的體——為什麼只取三見之一分

先問：顛倒有四（常·樂·淨·我），見有五，四倒的體怎麼安？論答「從於三見立四倒體」：邊見中只取常見作常倒，見取中取計樂淨者作樂倒淨倒，有身見中只取我見作我倒。

要緊的是『只取』二字。不是三見全部都是倒，是三見之中各取一分。論隨即說明何以其餘不入——要具三因，「一向倒故、推度性故、妄增益故」。戒禁取不入，因為「非一向倒，緣少淨故」（受持戒禁本身還有少分淨可緣）；斷見與邪見不入，因為「非妄增益，無門轉故」（它們是損減不是增益）；其餘煩惱不入，因為「不能推度，非見性故」。三個因像三道篩子，篩下來的恰是那三見之一分。

論又處理了一個經與論的表面衝突。經說「於無常計常，有想心見倒」，想與心也叫倒；論說唯見是倒。論主的會通是——「想心隨見亦立倒名，與見相應行相同故」：想與心是隨著見而得名的。有人再問何以不說受等，答「彼於世間不極成故」——心倒想倒是世人都認得的說法，受等不然。

易誤處：把『隨見立名』讀成想心也是倒的體。不是。此節與異部十二倒之說的分歧正在這裡，其詳入承衍節。落地上：本論處理『經這樣說而論那樣說』的常法，就是這一手——不改經文，改讀法：承認經文所說的名，而說明那個名是隨他而立的。

十、慶喜的一首頌——想倒到底斷了沒有

先問：上文既說想心之倒隨見而斷，預流已斷，那麼為什麼尊者慶喜對尊者辯自在說「由有想亂倒，故汝心燋熱，遠離彼想已，貪息心便淨」？這首頌明明是對一位已入聖位者說的，而它說他還有『想亂倒』。

論在此並不硬解，而是引一家之說作會通——「有餘師復作是說：八想心倒，學未全斷。如是八種，纏由如實見知聖諦方得永斷，離此無餘永斷方便，故此所說不違彼經」。也就是說：有學位的人，八種想心倒還沒有全斷；它們要到如實見知聖諦才永斷，而除此之外別無永斷之方便。經與論於是各得其位。

易誤處：把這一首二十字讀成本論的正頌。它不是——它是論所引之頌，前文有明白之徵「若爾，何故尊者慶喜告彼尊者辯自在言」。寶疏於此標「論主引慶喜頌難」，頌疏標「故引頌言」，古德二家皆判其為所引。

落地上：讀本論的頌，要先看它前面有沒有『如經頌言』『告彼某言』一類的徵。有徵者是引頌，無徵而承『頌曰』者才是本頌——這一分辨看似瑣碎，卻直接決定一品有幾頌。

十一、七慢與九慢類——高舉的七種姿態

先問：慢只是自高，何必分七種？因為所對的境不同、所擺的姿態不同。論先給總相——「令心高舉總立慢名，行轉不同故分七種」，再逐一給別相。

慢與過慢是一組：於劣、於等而謂己勝、謂己等，是慢；於等、於勝而謂己勝、謂己等，是過慢。慢過慢更進一步——「於勝謂勝名慢過慢」。我慢是「於五取蘊執我我，所令心高舉」。增上慢是「於未證得殊勝德中謂已證得」。卑慢最曲折——「於多分勝謂己少劣」，明明差得遠而說只差一點。邪慢是「於無德中謂己有德」。

九慢類則是從七慢之中的三種（慢·過慢·卑慢）「若依見生行次有殊成三三類」流出的。論給了三組配對：初三如次是過慢、慢、卑慢；中三如次是卑慢、慢、過慢；後三如次是慢、過慢、卑慢。

論自設一問極見細膩：卑慢還有高處可說（於勝中自居少劣，仍有所恃），那麼『無劣我慢』的高處是什麼？答曰「謂於如是自所愛樂勝有情聚，雖於己身知極下劣而自尊重」——明知不如而仍自尊重，因為與所敬之群同類。易誤處：以為慢一定要自誇。此例證明不然：自居下劣而仍自重，一樣是慢。

論末並記二本之異釋：「如是且依《發智論》釋」，若依《品類足》，則我勝慢從慢、過慢、慢過慢三慢出，「由觀劣等勝境別故」。二釋並錄。落地上：慢的關鍵不在說了什麼話，在心有沒有『舉』起來。這把尺比『有沒有自誇』細得多。

十二、聖者身中有而不起——修所斷之中的一個例外

先問：慢通見修所斷，那麼其中修所斷的那一分，聖者未斷之前會不會現行？論答「此不決定」，並舉一個人人可解的例——殺生之纏是修所斷，而「諸聖者必不現行」。

這一節的教學價值全在那個『為什麼』上。頌給的理由是「見疑所增故」：這些惑雖然是修所斷，卻是被見與疑親自增長起來的；聖者見道時已斷見與疑，「由見疑背已折故，聖不能起」——支撐它的脊梁斷了，它就立不起來。論逐條配對：慢類與我慢是有身見所增，殺生等纏是邪見所增，無有愛是斷見所增，有愛一分是常見所增，不善的惡作是疑所增。

順帶學兩個名相。「無有愛」不是『沒有愛』，是對『三界無常』這件事起貪求——「謂三界無常，於此貪求，名無有愛」。「有愛一分」則是「願當為藹羅筏拏大龍王等」，願自己來世成為某種殊勝的有情。

易誤處：把『聖有而不起』讀成『聖者已斷』。恰恰相反——論說的是未斷而不起。有它，卻起不來。落地上：這正是第三節那條分辨（有與現行是兩回事）的第二次兌現。修行上可用的一句話是：斷一個惑，未必要直接對治它；斷掉養它的那個，它自己就起不來了。

十三、門一·遍行與非遍行——十一個能通吃五部的惑

自「九十八隨眠中，幾是遍行、幾非遍行？」以下，本卷轉入諸門分別，本卷涵前五門。

先問：什麼叫遍行？論給的不是一個定義，是三個條件——「於自界地五部諸法遍緣」（能遍緣）、「隨眠為因遍生五部染法」（能遍生）、「依此三義立遍行名」。合此三義的，唯有十一種：「唯見苦集所斷見疑，及彼相應不共無明」，數起來是「七見、二疑、二無明」。

論自徵一句最見分寸：所謂遍緣五部，是漸次緣還是頓緣？若漸次，其餘惑也能漸次緣，那就人人是遍行；若頓緣，誰能把欲界一切法一時都計為勝、為淨、為因？論的答法是把話收窄——「不說頓緣自界地一切，然說有力能頓緣五部」：不是說它一時緣盡一切法，是說它有能力一時緣及五部。易誤處：把『遍』讀成『全部』。此處的遍是就部而說，不是就法而說。

九能上緣。十一之中除去身見與邊見，其餘九種還能緣上界上地。論說「上言正明上界上地，兼顯無有緣下隨眠」——一個『上』字兼帶說明了『沒有緣下的隨眠』。又補一句限制：「此九雖能通緣自上，然理無有自上頓緣」。至於身邊二見何以不緣上，理由乾淨——「不執彼為我我所故、邊見必由身見起故」：身見緣的是自己所繫之蘊，邊見又必跟著身見，所以二者都上不去。若問計大梵為有情、為常算什麼見，「對法者言：此二非見，是邪智攝」，而其所以然，論明白說是「以宗為量，故作是說」。

遍行之體不止隨眠。論說要「并隨行法」，但要除去它們的『得』，「非一果故」。末後附一個四句分別：遍行隨眠是否皆遍行因？第一句是未來世的遍行隨眠，第二句是過現世與它俱有之法，「第三第四如理應辯」。落地上：遍行這一門是後面幾門的地基——所緣隨增一門要用它，緣上界一義也要用它，讀時值得多花一點力氣。

十四、門二·哪些惑能緣無漏

先問：煩惱能不能以涅槃與聖道為所緣？論答能，但只有六種——「唯見滅道所斷邪見、疑，彼相應不共無明，各三成六」。餘者緣有漏，「准此自成」。

緣滅與緣道，範圍大不相同。緣滅的「各以自地滅為所緣」，欲界三惑只緣欲界諸行之擇滅，乃至有頂三惑只緣有頂之擇滅；理由是「滅互相望非因果故」——此地之滅不能為彼地之滅的因，所以緣不過去。緣道的則寬得多，「緣六九地」：欲界三惑唯緣六地的法智品道，上八地各三唯通緣九地的類智品道，理由是「以類同故」「以諸地道互相因故」——道彼此為同類因，所以緣得過去。

論隨即處理一個對稱性的疑難：法智品既然能對治色無色，何以不作那八地之所緣？答有二重——「苦集法智品非彼對治故」（不是普遍對治），「不能治彼見所斷故」（不是全分對治）。「二初無故，非彼所緣」。

至於貪瞋慢與二取何以不緣無漏，論給了五個各不相同的理由，這是本節最好的教材：貪者「應捨離故」，而無漏不應捨離（若緣無漏便如善法欲，不成過失）；瞋緣怨害而「滅道非怨」；慢緣麁動而「滅道寂靜」；戒禁取執非淨為淨因而「滅道真淨」；見取執非勝為勝而「滅道真勝」。

易誤處：把這五條當成同一個理由的五種說法。不是——五條各扣各自的行相。落地上：由此可以反推一條通則：煩惱能不能緣某境，看的是那個境有沒有它所需要的『把柄』。滅道二諦身上沒有怨、沒有麁動、沒有可執為淨為勝的欠缺，於是這四種惑無從下手；唯有邪見與疑不需要把柄——撥無與猶豫，對什麼都做得出來。

十五、門三·所緣隨增與相應隨增

先問：隨眠在什麼情形下算是在某法上『隨增』？論分二路：由所緣而隨增、由相應而隨增。

所緣一路先給總說：遍行隨眠「普於自地五部諸法所緣隨增」，非遍行的「唯於自部」。隨即給別說——六種緣無漏的惑與九種緣上界的惑，「於所緣境無隨增義」。

這一節的兩個譬喻極好，值得逐字讀。 何以有隨增？「謂若有法為此地中身見及愛攝為己有，可有……所緣隨增理，如衣潤濕埃塵隨住」——衣服潮濕了，塵埃才附得住；『攝為己有』就是那層潮濕。何以無隨增？無漏與上地之法不被下地的身見與愛攝為己有，且與能緣它的下惑相違，「如於炎石足不隨住」——石頭燙腳，站不住。一個說黏得住，一個說黏不住，二喻恰成一對。論並附錄另一家之說，以「隨順」訓隨眠，並舉「如風病者服乾澁藥，病者於藥非所隨增」為喻。

論又順手撇清一個容易混淆的心行：「住下地心求上地等，是善法欲，非謂隨眠」——嚮往上地不是煩惱。

相應一路則簡潔：「隨何隨眠於自相應法，由相應故於彼隨增」。論並提醒一個前提——「諸說隨增，謂至未斷，故初頌首標未斷言」：一切隨增之說都以未斷為限。末後設一問答：有沒有隨眠不緣無漏、不緣上界，而只有相應隨增沒有所緣隨增？「有，謂緣上地諸遍行隨眠」。

易誤處：把隨增讀成『緣』。二者不同——緣得到，未必增得起來。落地上：這一門教的是煩惱增長的條件，而條件只有一個——所緣須是被我執與愛攝為己有的東西。凡不曾被認作『我的』，煩惱緣它也長不了膘。

十六、門四·哪些是不善、哪些是無記

先問：煩惱不是都該是不善嗎？論答不然，並先給上二界一個總判——「色無色界一切隨眠唯無記性」。理由是一條因果推理：「以染污法若是不善有苦異熟，苦異熟果上二界無，他逼惱因彼定無故」。上二界沒有苦異熟之果，也沒有逼惱他人的因，所以那裡的煩惱只能是無記。

欲界之中也有兩個例外——身見、邊見以及與它們相應的癡。論給了三個理由。其一，「此與施等不相違故，為我當樂現在勤脩施戒等故」：為了『我』將來得樂而現在修施戒，身見反而與布施持戒並行不悖。其二，斷見「能順解脫」，論並引世尊之語為證——「於諸外道諸見趣中此見最勝，謂我不有、我所亦不有」。其三，「此二見迷自事故、非欲逼害他有情故」：它們只是迷自己的事，不是要害人。

論隨即自設一難：若照這個理由，貪求天上快樂與起我慢也不害人，豈不也該是無記？此難提出而不作結，隨後另錄先軌範師一說——「俱生身見是無記性，如禽獸等身見現行。若分別生是不善性」，以俱生與分別二分。餘欲界隨眠「與上相違皆不善性」。

易誤處：把『無記』讀成『無害』。不是。無記說的是感不感苦異熟果，不是說它不障道。落地上：這一門給了一把很實用的尺——判一個心行的善惡，先問它感不感苦異熟、逼不逼惱他人，而不是先問它看起來像不像煩惱。

十七、門五之一·三不善根

先問：不善的惑那麼多，為什麼只有三個叫『根』？論的答句很短——「唯欲界繫一切貪瞋及不善癡不善根攝」，並說「性唯不善煩惱，為不善法根立不善根」。要作根，須有兩個條件：自體必須唯是不善（不通無記），並且要能作其餘不善法的根。

論並補一句省文之例：「餘則不爾，所餘煩惱非不善根，義准已成，故頌不說」——其餘的不是根，這義由上文類推自明，所以頌裡不再說。

易誤處：以為『根』是指最重的煩惱。不是，根是就『能生』說的，不是就『最粗重』說的。慢也很重，卻不是根。光記於此引《婆沙》所出的五義以明何以獨立此三為根——「通五部、遍在六識，是隨眠性，能起麁惡身業、語業，作斷善根牢強加行」，五義具足才立為根。

落地上：由『根』這個字可以帶走一條修學上的提醒——對治煩惱要找它的根，而根的標記是『別的煩惱靠它長出來』，不是『它最讓人難受』。

十八、門五之二·無記根三與外方之四

先問：無記也有根嗎？迦濕彌羅國的毘婆沙師說有三——「無記愛、癡、慧三，下至異熟生亦無記根攝」。

論自問何以疑與慢不入，答語很有畫面感——「疑二趣轉，慢高轉故」。疑是在兩條路之間來回擺盪，「性動搖故，不應立根」；慢是「於所緣高舉相轉，異根法故」。論並給出所依的意象：「為根必應堅住下轉，世間共了」——根要往下扎、要站得住；一個搖擺、一個上翹，都不像根。

外方諸師則立四種——無記的愛、見、慢、癡。他們的理由是就修定者的實況說的：「以諸愚夫脩上定者，不過依託愛見慢三，此三皆依無明力轉」。愛、見、慢三者是修上定的凡夫所倚，而三者又都依無明而轉，合成四根。論並釋『無記』之名——「無記名中遮善惡故」。

易誤處：以為三與四是誰算錯了。不是。三家所取的角度不同：一家取『能否堅住下轉』的根相，一家取『修上定者實際依託什麼』。兩造並錄不判，本論於此未下判語。

落地上：無記根這一節最堪玩味之處，是它承認無記的心行也有根——不起眼、不感苦果的那些心行，同樣有一套生長的機制。修行上不能只盯著明顯的不善。

十九、〔長行專段〕四種記門——怎麼回答一個問題

論由『十四無記事』一問轉入此節，並先劃清界線：那部經所說的無記「但約應捨置問立無記名」，與前門三性之無記不是一事。先問：既然名同義異，何必收在此處？因為讀者一見『無記』二字必生疑，論索性把它處理完。

四記是：一向記、分別記、反詰記、捨置記，各配一問——死、生、勝劣、我蘊一異。論給的四個例子乾淨到可以背下來。問「一切有情皆當死不」，一向記：都會死。問「一切死者皆當生不」，分別記：「有煩惱者當生非餘」。問「人為勝劣」，反詰記：「為何所方」——拿什麼比？比天則人劣，比下則人勝。問「蘊與有情為一為異」，捨置記，理由是「有情無實故，一異性不成」，並舉一喻——「如石女兒白黑等性」：不存在的東西談不上黑白。

捨置何以名記？論自答「以記彼問言，此不應記故」——說出『這個不應當記』，本身就是一種記。

後三問各有一番外人設難與論主釋通，這三番值得逐一看清楚，因為它們示範了三種不同的辯法。其一，難者說第二問也可一向記（逕答『不是一切都會生』）；論主釋通：問者問的是『一切』，總答「雖令總知仍未解故」。其二，難者說第三問也可一向記（人亦勝亦劣，「所待異故，如識果因」）；論主釋通：問者是作一向之問而你的答不一向，那只成分別記，「但此應詰問意所方，故此名為應反詰記」。其三，難者說第四問既全不記，何得名記；論主釋通：「然彼所問，理應捨置。記言應捨置，如何不名記」。

對法諸師另依四問廣釋四記，其分別記一段是全卷最長的一串層層追問——法有去來今，取過去；過去有色乃至識，取色；色有善惡無記，取善；善有七，取離殺生；離殺生有三善根所發，取無貪所發；無貪所發有表無表——一路分下去六層。與之對照的反詰記則一步不分：「不應分別。乃至令彼默然而住」。二者的分水嶺不在問題，在問心——論說得極明白：「問意直諂有殊，記有分別無分別故」。直心來問就為他分別，諂心來問就只反詰。

論並自設一難：分別記與反詰記之中「都無有問，唯有請說」，也「無有記唯反詰言欲說何者」，怎麼算問記？答曰：請說『為我說道』豈非問道，反詰以記其問豈非記道。

末後依契經再辨一次四記之相，經中四例與前面對法諸師所舉不同——一向記舉「諸行皆無常耶」，分別記舉「諸有故思造作業已為受何果」，反詰記舉「士夫想與我為一為異耶」（應反詰「汝依何我作如是問」，若言依麁我則「記與想異」），捨置記則逐一枚舉十四事：世常無常四句、世有邊無邊四句、如來死後有非有四句、命者即身與異身二句。

易誤處：把捨置記讀成佛不知道或不肯說。論給的理由自始至終只有一個——所問的前提不成立（「有情無實故，一異性不成」），問題本身就是壞的。落地上：這一節其實是一篇答問之學。它教的是：回答之前先判問題的類型——問題是否成立、問者是否誠心、所問是否需要分格。四記之分，先於任何答案。

承衍：三疏之鏡

以上是本卷論文自身之義。此下另立一節，收四事：三疏之判釋與互異、眾賢之破與補、真諦舊譯之異、可對讀之座標。鏡非論，只是換一種讀法看同一段文；並錄不判，各還其位。

一、三疏互異之處

一部完全缺席的疏。 本卷的疏有一個特別的情形：神泰疏是殘本，現存七卷分屬界品、根品、賢聖品，隨眠品全闕，所以本卷沒有泰疏的逐文釋可繫。機械覆核之下，本品的標誌語句於泰疏中一概零命中；唯其卷一總覽表留有『隨眠品六十九行』一語，那是全論頌數之表，不是隨眠品的疏文，不得充作科判的證。據實標闕，不以他卷之文充之。

品科分判：一次少見的整齊，與一處獨立的異。 光記與頌疏於品級同判二分（明惑體／明惑滅），連大文二之起處都同錨於論之『今應思擇』一句，這在本帙之中是頭一次見到三家於品級全同。寶疏則獨立一格——改『惑體』為『惑體用』、改『惑滅』為『斷不同』，且惑體用章之下位不用『根本惑／諸門分別』之分，而改作『明隨眠／雜明諸惑／義門分別／別明五蓋』四分。名同而科層寬窄有異。由此帶出一條讀疏的規矩：寶疏的章內編號自成一系，引其『第幾』時必須繫其家，不得與光記頌疏互充。並錄不判。

品名之訓，三家各取一義。 光記取「隨逐有情名隨，行相微細名眠」，並以睡眠為喻——「如人睡眠行相難了」；寶疏取「行相微細，隨縛隨增」；頌疏取「隨逐有情，增昏滯故」。三家所指同是一物，而各自拈出的那一面不同：一家強調難了知，一家強調隨縛隨增，一家強調增昏滯。並錄不判。

至於業品之後何以次明隨眠，二疏也各出其由。光記說「業因感果不能獨起必藉惑緣，惑望果疎故，隨眠後說」——惑離果較遠，所以排在後面；寶疏說「業別、惑通，故先明業，後釋隨眠」——業別而惑通，所以先別後通。同一個編次，兩個不同的理由，並錄不判。

薩迦耶見之二釋：科判精細度三式。 論本於此明有二釋——「壞故名薩」與「有故名薩」。光記分二科而各繫其家，前釋標「經部師釋」並判為持業釋，後釋標「第二毘婆沙師釋」；寶疏亦分二科，標「論主引經部釋」「論主引有部釋」，且另補《正理》對前釋之反詰——「若爾，何用標以薩聲？但迦耶聲足遮常故，則應但立迦耶見名。無法是常而可聚集，何用身上標以壞聲」，此反詰為光記所未見引；頌疏則不分科，逕連書之。⇒ 同一段文，三家切成二科、二科加補、一段連書三式。並錄不判。

毘婆沙師不許十二倒說：寶疏最見綱要。 光記於此逐句直釋，並先繫十二倒異說之宗為分別論者（「准婆沙、正理，是分別論者」），並代為說明其八唯見斷、四通見修斷之分。寶疏則於同段拈出一個三分之科——「論『毘婆沙師不許此義』，已下有三：一反難破異部、二順釋成自宗、三正通異部難」，把毘婆沙師的三段答法一次點清。二疏義理內容全合，唯科判細密度有異。並錄不判。

頌之四句各司何職：頌疏獨有的一手。 頌疏釋四顛倒一頌云「初兩句出體，第三句廢立，第四句通經」——第一二句出四倒之體，第三句說明為何獨取此三見（廢立），第四句會通經中的想倒心倒（通經）。這個角度光記寶疏皆未明白拈出，而它對讀者極有用：一首二十字的頌，四句各有職司，讀懂職司就讀懂了結構。此為疏家之科判創見，不入本論正文。

三宗立場的陳法：體例之異而繫屬全合。 光記於隨眠相應之諍逐句標宗，一問一答皆繫其家；寶疏則於段首先列一張三宗總表——「經部師宗現行名纏，種名隨眠。大眾部等隨眠體是不相應行，即是欲貪之隨眠。有部欲貪即隨眠」，體例遠較光記綱要化。要緊的是：二疏之繫屬全合，無一處互異；異的只是陳述的體例。

一條必須顯記的繫屬。 本卷難隨眠相應說的那一方，論本自身並未標出其部派之名；光記則明標為「大眾部等」（如「豈不違經者，大眾部等徵」「何理為證知定相應者，大眾部等責」）。⇒ 此一歸屬是疏家所繫，不是論本明文，引用時須顯其為誰所繫。並錄不判。

九慢類：三家全無互異。 光記、寶疏、頌疏於九慢類之列名與其從三慢流出之架構逐一相合，寶疏並引《正理》訓『類』字——「類是品類義，即慢之差別」。三家於此無可爭之處，據實記之。

遍行一段之繫屬，另有一處角度之異。 光記於愛慢是否亦遍行之四番往復逐句標宗——經部難、毘婆沙師反責、經部答、毘婆沙師述自宗；而眾賢引其中一句時，逕稱之為經主自身之詰難（見下）。同一句，二家所繫之發言者不同，唯錄不判。

二、眾賢之破與補釋

眾賢二論於此品的品名不作『分別隨眠品』而作『辯隨眠品』，一在第五、一在第六。以其慣用的牒引標記逐條檢之，本卷範圍內《順正理》牒引世親之句共九處，而《顯宗論》於同範圍內未見一處逐字牒引——這是一條誠實的負命題，它所能證的只有一件事：顯宗論體例較簡練，於此段未逐句反破；不能由此推出彼論無異義。

牒引最烈的一處，正是本論評取經部的那一句。 論主說「隨眠體非心相應非不相應，無別物故，煩惱睡位說名隨眠」，眾賢逐字牒之而判曰「今詳彼釋，於理不然」，並直指其自相矛盾之處——既然自許隨眠離諸煩惱別無他物，而不染污之法又不能作煩惱之體，那麼「不可說為睡隨眠體，故無少物名睡隨眠」。⇒ 本論以為最善之說，眾賢正面否定其訓詞本身。一義二宗並錄，不判勝負。

六六經一段亦然。 論主以「經但說有，不言爾時即有隨眠」通經，眾賢牒而破之——「此釋非理，爾時隨眠說現有聲，理不成故」，並續以隨眠自體應不可知等難逐一詰之。並錄不判。

有一處眾賢所評的不是義理，是行文。 有貪立名之由，論主先說內門而轉，後說味著自體；眾賢評曰「此釋與前義有何別？……詳經主釋義不異前，但搆浮詞似有少異」——他認為這是一義的兩次複述。⇒ 此屬行文之評騭而非義理之對立，讀者宜與前二條分開看。並錄不判。

一處最工整的逐字對照。 論主自問自答「此中何相見苦所斷？乃至何相是修所斷？若緣見此所斷為境名見此所斷」，眾賢逐字牒之而破曰「此不應理……遍行隨眠緣五部故，則見苦集所斷隨眠亦應通是見集苦等所斷」，並另立己宗以忍所斷立所斷之相。二本此句字字相合，是本卷對辯之中最便於對讀的一段。並錄不判。

一處『結論同而理由異』。 戒禁取何以見苦所斷，論主以『若言迷苦諦故則有太過失』為難；眾賢則說這個難本身不成立——「以非一切緣有漏惑皆以果苦為所緣故。如何得有太過失耶」，並另立『非道計道有二類』之說以善成同一個結論。⇒ 二家所護的結論相同，所爭的是達到它的理由。這一型在本卷僅此一見，值得記住。

一處薩迦耶見之反詰。 眾賢就『壞故名薩』一訓反問「若爾，何用標以薩聲」——若只為遮常，單一個『迦耶』就夠了，何必再標一個『壞』字。此難亦見於寶疏所引之《正理》原句，可見古德早知此難而未取以定是非。並錄不判。

一處俱舍未駁而眾賢獨駁。 論本錄先軌範師『俱生身見是無記性』之說而未置可否，眾賢則正面判之「此不應理，不能分別而言見攝、見道所斷，理不成故」，而立俱生身見為修所斷。⇒ 這是本卷唯一『本論單邊引說、駁議只見於眾賢』之例；前面八處本論多少都已有雙方交鋒。並錄不判。

一處繫屬之異。 遍行段中『何緣所餘緣彼是見，此亦緣彼而非見耶』一句，光記標為毘婆沙師對難方之反責，眾賢則逕稱其為經主自身之詰難。同一句而二家所繫的發言者不同，唯錄不判。

三、真諦舊譯之異

真諦《俱舍釋論》於本卷相應段自成一系。最先要知道的是：他此品的名字就不同——作『分別惑品』而不作『分別隨眠品』，同一梵語而取譯不同（一取『惑』，一取『隨眠』）。以玄奘的詞去搜真諦本，品名永遠找不到；跨本比對只能取場景結構。二本的分卷數也不同：玄奘三卷、真諦二卷，且二本之卷界無一重合。

譯名自成一系。 玄奘的『貪』真諦作『欲欲』、『有貪』作『有欲』、『纏』作『上心』、『無漏』作『無流』、『不共無明』作『獨行無明』、『邊執見』作『邊見』、『戒禁取』作『戒執取』、『不善根』作『惡根』、『外方』作『外師』、『反詰記』作『反問記』、『捨置記』作『置記』、『慢過慢』作『過過慢』、『卑慢』作『下慢』。體例上，玄奘作『頌曰／論曰』整頌先出，真諦作『偈曰／釋曰』逐句嵌釋，一頌常拆數處分引。

兩處最見著眼分途的例。 其一是有貪之立名：玄奘作「為遮解脫想」，真諦作「為除彼涅槃想故」——一取解脫，一取涅槃，同指一事而所取之名不同；且真諦此處另出一個音譯詞『三摩跋提』，玄奘則以義譯之語行文，字面上不見這個音。其二是四倒之計數：玄奘作「從於三見」，真諦作『從二見半生四倒』——玄奘以三見概舉，真諦則精算到半數（三見之中或取其全、或取其一分，合起來恰是二又二分之一）。二本所指的義理內容完全相同，異的只是計數的表述方式。並錄不判。

兩處字面可疑而長行自解者。 其一，真諦列六隨眠之名時作『見心疑』，較玄奘『見及疑』多一『心』字，其確義未明。其二，真諦遍行一偈之字面作『見苦集滅惑』，多一『滅』字，照字面讀恐與玄奘『見苦集所斷』不合；然其長行隨即申明仍以苦集為限，與玄奘義理全合。⇒ 二處皆不強解，唯錄其實。

一處署名的顯隱。 難隨眠相應說的那一方，真諦本於該段並未點出部名；而到了引四記經證之處，真諦卻明白寫出『大德摩訶僧祇』（玄奘作『大眾部』，一意譯一音譯全稱）。⇒ 可見真諦於同品之內對此部之名並非通篇迴避，只是該段未特標。唯錄其實，不代判譯者用心。

一處最工整的對照。 十四無記事之枚舉，二本次第與內容全合，是本卷末段最便於逐字對讀的一處；唯玄奘作『如來死後』而真諦作『如來異死』，訓詞角度稍異而所指同。另有十事訓詞一段，二本開合幾同，真諦多以雙字冠首（堅固·安立·數治·生起），十事次第一一相合，是本卷二譯最貼近的一段。

四、可對讀之座標

本卷所立的，是一張『煩惱如何被編號』的表。它反覆示範的那一手——同一批法，換一把尺就換一個數——在本論其餘各品都還要再用；而本卷用得最密。

向後看，本卷只做了半件事。惑之體既已辨定，惑之能繫、隨增、次第，以至於惑之斷滅，都在後面兩卷與下一大文；本卷末的四記門是插在根非根之後的一段附論，論主自己也說那部經之無記「但約應捨置問立無記名」，與本門之無記不是一事。

向前看，本卷處處回用前品的成果。三界之立、五部見修之分，是界品根品世品一路鋪下來的坐標；而開卷那一句「前言世別皆由業生」，更是逐字接著業品之末。⇒ 隨眠品不是新起一題，是替業品補上它的另一半——業是種子，隨眠是使種子得以生長的濕潤。

還有兩件事是這一卷留給讀者的線頭。 其一，論主於隨眠相應之諍明白評取經部，而眾賢於此處反破最烈——世親傳所記『立薩婆多義，隨有僻處以經部義破之』的體例，在本卷可以看見它具體長什麼樣，也可以看見它引來了什麼樣的回應。其二，論主於戒禁取所斷一段留下「故所執義應更思擇」一語而不作結——古德於此亦未代為收束。論自己標明未決之處，讀者不必替它結案。

Before Reading This Fascicle

The first sentence of this fascicle is the plainest hand-over in the whole treatise — “it was said before that the differences of the world all arise from action; action grows only when the latent tendencies sustain it; parted from the latent tendencies, action has no power to call forth a coming existence.” The chapter before spent three whole fascicles on action, and at the very end did not close upon action, but pointed its finger at another thing: action does not sprout of itself, and only when the latent tendencies moisten it can it grow. So the chapter on the latent tendencies does not raise a new topic beside the chapter on action; it supplies the half that the chapter on action left unfinished.

The first cut made by the three ancient masters in this chapter falls with a rare evenness — Puguang’s Record marks “within this chapter, first the entity of the confusions is explained, second the extinction of the confusions”; Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary marks “within this chapter it divides into two: first explaining the entity of the confusions, second explaining the extinction of the confusions”; and Fabao’s Commentary, though it changes the wording to “first explaining the entity and function of the confusions, second explaining the differences of their abandonment,” still adjudges the same twofold division. This whole fascicle falls within the half “explaining the entity of the confusions,” and moreover at the head of that half: it walks through the five sections that analyze the root confusions (increasing the count · what is abandoned through seeing and cultivation · the five views · the four inversions · the seven and the nine prides), then walks the first five of the distinctions through the several gates (all-pervading · taking objects with and without outflows · the two kinds of increase by attachment · the two ethical qualities · what is and is not a root), appends at the end a section on the four gates of determination, and the fascicle closes.

There is one thing to be said in advance. This fascicle reads as though one were doing arithmetic — six, seven, ten, ninety-eight; four inversions, seven prides, nine classes of pride, eleven all-pervading, six that take the dharmas without outflows as object, three unwholesome roots, three indeterminate roots, four determinations — the numbers grow so many as to daunt one. But what bears the load is not the numbers; it is the measuring rod that is exchanged each time the number changes. Six becomes seven by exchanging the rod of greed; seven becomes ten by exchanging the rod of view; ten becomes ninety-eight by exchanging three rods at once (mode · category · realm). The skeleton of the whole fascicle is this one sentence: one and the same set of afflictions takes a new number with each new rod; before asking which number is right, ask which rod this is.

I. Why the Latent Tendencies Can Be the Root of the Several Existences — the Ten Functions of the Afflictions

First the question: action is already what can call forth a result; why must it further be said that “action grows only when the latent tendencies sustain it”? The treatise’s answer is nowhere else than in the sentence “because the afflictions, once arisen, are able to perform ten kinds of function” — the moment an affliction arises, it is at the same instant doing ten things.

These ten are worth looking at one by one, for they are not a spread of synonyms but ten different faces of function. “Strengthening the root” is the fortifying of the affliction’s own foundation; “establishing the continuity” makes it run on thought after thought unbroken; “tilling its own field” works the ground of mind into a field fit for its own growth; “drawing forth the homogeneous” draws out a sequel of its own kind; “setting going action and existence” is the item we know as ‘starting action off’; “gathering its own equipment” draws in the conditions that furnish it; “bewildering the object” makes the mind unable to see its object clearly; “leading the stream of consciousness” drags consciousness along in the direction it wants to go; “overstepping the wholesome class” is the stepping across of that portion which is wholesome; “the sense of binding widely” is a broad binding, and to it the treatise adds a clause of its own — “because it makes one unable to overstep one’s own realm and level.”

The easy error: to read the ten functions as ten adjectives. They are not. Of the ten, only the fifth speaks directly of action; the other nine all speak of how an affliction lays in its own materials. Only so does the treatise dare to say that action parted from it “has no power to call forth a coming existence” — it is not that action cannot call forth a result, but that action in a field without the latent tendencies simply cannot grow.

In practice: while reading this chapter, whenever the doubt arises ‘what is so important about this affliction?’, go back and count which of the ten functions it occupies, and its weight becomes plain at once. Puguang cites the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle item by item as the gloss on these ten, his first item reading “first, strengthening the root, making it firm, because what counteracts it is far off” — from which one sees that the gloss on these ten is no late invention: the ancient masters already had an explanation of each.

A further note on two particles. The stanza says “that is, greed, hatred, and also pride,” with the one word ‘also’; and it says “ignorance, view, and doubt,” with the one word ‘and.’ The author himself picks out these two words and explains them: ‘also’ is meant to display that “pride and the rest likewise increase upon their objects by the force of greed” — the other afflictions such as pride also grow their strength upon objects by the force of greed; ‘and’ is meant to display that “the entities of the six are each different” — these six are not six names for one thing. First the question: why should two particles need explaining? Because without the explanation the reader would take the six latent tendencies for six coordinate items and miss the linkage of force among them; or would swing the other way and take them for the several names of one thing. One word props up the one side, and the two words together draw the boundary straight.

II. Why Six Is Opened Out into Seven — Where the Name “Craving for Existence” Is Fixed

First the question: the sūtra says seven latent tendencies and the treatise says six; which is right? The treatise’s way of answering is not to choose one but to explain the ground of the opening and gathering — “within the six latent tendencies spoken of before, greed is divided into two, and so the sūtra says seven.” Six and seven are the same set of things; the difference lies only in whether greed is taken apart.

Once it is taken apart, the portion belonging to the upper two realms is called “craving for existence.” Why is this not also called greed for desire? The treatise gives two reasons, and they are reasons on two levels. The first is stated from the fact — “because that greed for the most part turns in dependence upon the inner gate”: sentient beings of the upper two realms mostly give rise to greed for absorption, and all greed for absorption turns toward the inner gate and does not take the five outer objects of desire for its object. The second is stated from the intent — “in order to block the notion of liberation”: some mistake birth in the upper two realms for liberation, and to set up the word ‘existence’ (the existence of the three existences) is precisely to display that what is taken there as object is “not true liberation.” Puguang divides the two reasons expressly here, saying “the second line, ‘because it turns in dependence upon the inner gate,’ is why it is not called greed for desire; the third line, ‘in order to block the notion of liberation,’ is why it is called craving for existence” — one line explaining why the old name is not used, one line explaining why a new name must be.

The easy error: to suppose that “craving for existence” is another kind of affliction. It is not; it is just greed, only that the realm in which it stands and the gate upon which it takes its object are different. The treatise then adds a further layer — the sentient beings there “deeply give rise to savoring attachment toward meditative attainment and toward the body upon which they depend, and so it is said that they savor and cling to their own entity alone; they do not savor and cling to an object, since they have left greed for desire”: what they are greedy for is the entity of absorption, not an outer object, for greed for outer objects was left behind long ago.

In practice: this section demonstrates a standing practice of this treatise in establishing its terms — the dividing and joining of names follows the object and the mode, not the entity. The entity is only one, greed; because object and mode part into two roads, the name parts into two. Hereafter, when the question arises ‘why does one and the same dharma have two names?’, ask it first along this line.

III. 〔A Passage of Prose Commentary Set Apart〕Are the Latent Tendencies Associated with Mind, or Not Associated with It

This is the first great dispute of the fascicle, and the densest run of question and answer in the whole chapter. First the question: how is this dispute raised? The starting point is so small it hardly seems a question at all — how the four characters ‘the latent tendency of greed for desire’ are to be read. The treatise says, “‘the latent tendency of greed for desire’ — by which sense is it to be explained? Is the entity of greed for desire itself the latent tendency? Or is the sense ‘the latent tendency belonging to greed for desire’?” Read the first way, greed for desire and the latent tendency are one and the same thing; read the second, the latent tendency is another thing belonging to greed for desire. Puguang marks these two readings very clearly — “a twofold alternative pressed to a decision. Is the entity of greed for desire itself the latent tendency, on an appositional-determinative reading? Or is it the sense ‘the latent tendency of greed for desire,’ on a dependent-determinative reading?” — the one appositional-determinative, the other dependent-determinative.

The author’s answer is “both alike have a fault” — both readings have a fault, and so an objection is brought against each side.

The objection to the first reading cites a sūtra: the sūtra says that a man may for a while give rise to the entanglement of greed for desire and yet know as it really is the means of going forth, and “thereby he is able rightly to expel the entanglement of greed for desire, together with the cutting off of the latent tendency.” Since the sūtra says ‘the entanglement is cut off, and the latent tendency too is cut off,’ entanglement and latent tendency are plainly two things; and to say that the entity of greed for desire is itself the latent tendency contradicts the sūtra.

The objection to the second reading cites the treatise: the treatise says “the latent tendency of greed for desire is associated with three faculties.” Since it is associated with faculties, it is an associated dharma; and to say that the latent tendency is another thing belonging to greed for desire makes it a formation not associated with mind, which contradicts the Abhidharma.

The position of the Vaibhāṣikas is to take the first reading — “the entities of greed for desire and the rest are just the latent tendencies”; a latent tendency is the affliction itself, an associated dharma. The objector at once presses, “does this not contradict the sūtra?”, and the Vaibhāṣikas explain the sūtra through by two roads: on one road, the sūtra’s words “together with the latent tendency” mean “together with the accompanying bondage” — what is cut off is that portion together with the bondage accompanying it; on the other road, the sūtra speaks of the latent tendency conventionally upon the ‘acquisition,’ “as one sets up the notion of suffering and the rest in fire and the rest,” fire not being suffering, and yet touching fire is called suffering, which is a conventional way of speaking from what it produces. At the end they come back to their own tenet — “the Abhidharma speaks in accordance with the real mark, calling the afflictions themselves latent tendencies.”

The objector presses again, “by what principle is it proved that they are definitely associated?”, and the Vaibhāṣikas bring three functions in evidence: the latent tendencies can defile and vex the mind, can cover and obstruct the mind, and can go against and injure the wholesome. Their inference is very fine — if the latent tendencies were dissociated formations, and dissociated formations are “constantly present,” then wholesome dharmas ought never to have a time of arising; but since wholesome dharmas do still arise, the latent tendencies are plainly not dissociated. The objector takes the proof apart in one sentence — “none of this is proof” — his ground being that one who does not grant that the latent tendencies are associated will not in the first place grant that those three functions are performed by the latent tendencies. The easy error: to suppose that the objector is denying that the latent tendencies can defile the mind. He is not; what he denies is the premise that ‘this work must be performed by an associated dharma.’ Whenever one party in the treatise says “none of this is proof,” look first at whether he is taking apart the conclusion or the premise.

Here the author lays down a verdict — “yet what the Sautrāntika masters say is the best.” Puguang expressly marks it with four words, “the author appraises and takes the Sautrāntikas.” This sentence matters: in many disputed places this treatise records both parties and passes no verdict, whereas here there is a plain taking of sides. The Sautrāntika account is: a latent tendency is neither associated with mind nor dissociated from mind, because “there is no separate thing” — it simply is not another thing. An affliction in the stage of sleep is called a latent tendency, in the stage of waking an entanglement. What is sleep? “A seed following along without being active.” What is waking? “The afflictions arisen and entangling the mind.” What is the seed of an affliction? “A capability that is a differentiation upon its own entity, arising from an affliction and able to produce an affliction.”

The key to this road lies in two similes. The seed of memory: recollection arises from having once known, and can produce a later recollection; this is only a differentiation of capability, and no one would say that the seed of memory is a separate real thing. A sprout and the rest: a sprout arises from a former fruit and can produce a later fruit, and this too is only a differentiation of capability. Whereupon the Sautrāntikas ask in return: if the seed of memory is a mere capability, why must the seed of an affliction have a further dissociated real thing set up for it? “Because the causal ground of a difference cannot be found” — no reason can be found to make the two unlike.

The last round is the objection from the Sūtra of the Six Sixes. The Sarvāstivāda side cites the sūtra saying “upon a pleasant feeling there is a latent tendency of greed”: if a latent tendency were merely a seed, how could the sūtra say that upon a pleasant feeling it ‘is’ there? The Sautrāntikas explain the sūtra through in one sentence — “the sūtra says only that there is one; it does not say that there is a latent tendency at that very moment”; the sūtra says there is, it does not say that at that time it is active. Asked again, “at what time, then, is there one?”, the answer is “at the time of its sleeping; or else the notion of a latent tendency is conventionally set up upon the cause”: either it is there while the seed lies dormant, or the name of the result, ‘latent tendency,’ is fixed upon the cause, which is greed.

In practice: what this whole passage really teaches the reader is a distinction that can be carried away — ‘there is’ and ‘is active’ are two different things. When a sūtra says that a certain affliction is present somewhere, that does not mean that the affliction is at work there. This distinction will be used once more below in the section ‘in the noble one they are and yet do not arise,’ and again in the gate of increase by attachment. The author closes just as briskly — “let the incidental discussion rest here for now; the main discussion should be taken up again.”

IV. Why Six Is Opened Out into Ten — the Difference in the Modes of View

First the question: since six has already been opened into seven, why open it once more into ten? Because the rod has been changed. What was taken apart before was greed; what is taken apart this time is view — “within the six latent tendencies the modes of view differ and make five; the remaining five are not views; adding the counts together makes ten in all.”

Of the ten, five are of the nature of view: the view of a real person, the extreme view, wrong view, adherence to views, adherence to observances and vows; and five are not of the nature of view: greed, hatred, pride, ignorance, doubt. The easy error: to suppose that ten adds four to the six. It does not. The one item ‘view’ within the six is analyzed into five because the modes in which it operates differ in five ways, while the other five items are left untouched, and five plus five makes exactly ten. The relation of ten to six is therefore of the same type as the relation of seven to six — both are the analysis of the inside of one item, not an addition from outside.

In practice: whenever a new number is met with in this chapter, do one thing first — subtract it from the number before, and see out of which item the surplus has been divided. From six to seven, from seven to ten, from ten to ninety-eight, all three subtractions in this fascicle hold good.

V. Why Ten Is Opened Out into Ninety-Eight — the Three Layers of Mode, Category, and Realm

First the question: why does this one leap all the way to ninety-eight? Because this time three rods are used at once — “the six latent tendencies differ by mode, category, and realm, and so become ninety-eight.” Mode is the difference in the modes of view of the section before (six analyzed into ten); category is “the five categories, what is abandoned by seeing the four truths and what is abandoned by cultivation”; realm is “the three realms of desire, form, and formlessness.”

The treatise gives the reckoning very concretely. The five categories of the desire realm multiplied into the ten latent tendencies give thirty-six — “from what is abandoned by seeing the truth of suffering down to what is abandoned by cultivation there are, in order, ten, seven, seven, eight, four.” These five numbers are not set down at random; each has what it lacks: what is abandoned by seeing suffering has all ten; what is abandoned by seeing origination and by seeing cessation have seven each, “lacking the view of a real person, the extreme view, and adherence to observances and vows”; what is abandoned by seeing the path has eight, “lacking the view of a real person and the extreme view”; what is abandoned by cultivation has four, “lacking the views and doubt.” The upper two realms “each lack hatred in the five categories,” and so have thirty-one each. Thirty-six plus thirty-one plus thirty-one is exactly ninety-eight.

From this table one can read off, in reverse, the distribution of each affliction, and the treatise gives it item by item: the view of a real person is in the one category, what is abandoned by seeing suffering, and the extreme view likewise; adherence to observances and vows extends to two categories, what is abandoned by seeing suffering and by seeing the path; wrong view extends to four categories, and adherence to views and doubt likewise; greed and the other three each extend to all five. The easy error: to misread ‘a given view is in one category only’ as ‘a given view takes only one truth as its object.’ The criterion the treatise gives is another sentence — “if what it takes as object is what is abandoned by seeing this truth, it is named as abandoned by seeing this truth; the rest are named as abandoned by cultivation”: the category of abandonment is fixed by which category’s dharmas it takes as object.

At the end the treatise gives the ninety-eight one more cut: “eighty-eight are abandoned by seeing, being injured by receptivity; ten latent tendencies are abandoned by cultivation, being injured by cognition.” In practice: this section is the skeleton of the whole chapter. Almost every gate that follows (all-pervading, taking the dharmas without outflows as object, increase by attachment, the two ethical qualities) will come back to this table of five categories and three realms to draw its numbers, and it is best held firmly in mind while reading — and if it will not be held firmly, no matter: it is enough to hold firmly the fact of ‘the three rods, mode · category · realm,’ for the table can always be derived again.

VI. Are What Is Abandoned by Seeing and by Cultivation Rigid — the Summit of Existence and the Other Eight Levels

First the question: the section before has just established that ‘eighty-eight are abandoned by seeing and ten by cultivation,’ and the treatise at once asks itself “is it decidedly so?” and answers itself, “it is not.” Why loosen what has just been set up? Because the former table divides by the dharma, while this section divides by the person — one and the same affliction may belong to different modes of abandoning according as a noble one abandons it or an ordinary being abandons it.

The treatise divides into three layers. First: a latent tendency injured by receptivity, if it is at the level of the summit of existence, is “abandoned by seeing alone, because only the receptivity to the subsequent cognition can abandon it” — at the level of the summit of existence only the receptivity to the subsequent cognition can abandon it, and so there is no second road. Second: those gathered into the other eight levels “extend to abandonment by seeing and by cultivation” — “when a noble one abandons them it is by seeing and not by cultivation,” since he abandons by the receptivities to the cognition of dharma and to the subsequent cognition; “when an ordinary being abandons them it is by cultivation and not by seeing,” since he can only abandon by “repeated cultivation of conventional cognition.” Third: those injured by cognition, gathered into all levels, are “abandoned by cultivation alone.”

The easy error: to read ‘extending to abandonment by seeing and by cultivation’ as one person having two roads to choose between. It is not so — what extends is this class of affliction, not any one person. The noble one walks only the road of seeing, the ordinary being only the road of cultivation; only taken together are they called ‘extending.’

In practice: this section demonstrates an important way of reading this treatise — the classification of a dharma may be stated relative to the person who abandons it. Hereafter, when two classifications collide, first ask the one sentence, ‘are these two classifications stated with respect to different persons?’ At the end the treatise records a divergent account as well: some other masters say that the seers among the non-Buddhists cannot suppress or abandon the afflictions abandoned by seeing, and cite the Sūtra of the Great Analysis of the Several Actions and the Brahmā Net Sūtra in evidence; whereas the Vaibhāṣikas explain the sense of that sūtra otherwise, saying it is “a momentary falling back at the time when the view arises, as with Devadatta.” Both accounts are recorded together.

VII. The Entities of the Five Views — Five Different Ways of Going Wrong

First the question: if the five views are all views, wherein lies their difference? The treatise answers by giving one by one the mark of what each holds, and the five marks cannot be exchanged for one another.

The view of a real person holds to “self and what belongs to self.” The gloss on this name is given at particular length in this fascicle — “because it perishes it is called sat; the aggregation is kāya, that is, the sense of impermanent conjoined aggregates”; sat is perishing, kāya is aggregation, and together they are ‘aggregates conjoined and impermanent.’ The author goes on to point out the intent of setting up the name: “this name is set up in order to block the notion of eternity and of unity, since that notion must come first before there is any holding to a self” — first there is the notion of ‘eternal’ and ‘one,’ and only upon that is a self held to; to put the word ‘perishing’ into the name is precisely to fend that notion off. This passage has also another master’s gloss (“because it exists it is called sat”), and the two glosses stand together, their adjudication belonging to the section of Further Resonances.

The extreme view is “just upon the self and what belongs to self that are held to, the holding to annihilation and the holding to eternity” — note that its object is nothing else than the self and what belongs to self held to by the view before it; hence the extreme view necessarily follows behind the view of self, a point that will be used again below when all-pervading is treated.

Wrong view is “to give rise to a view denying outright, within the really existent truths of suffering and the rest.” Here the treatise poses itself a question: all false views are inverted, why is this one alone called wrong? The answer is excellent — “because its fault is the graver. As one says ‘stinking ghee’ — where evil holds and evil and the rest, this alone is diminishment, while the rest are superimposition.” All ghee has a smell, and only the most stinking is called stinking ghee; among the five views, this one alone is pure diminishment (calling what is, not), while the other four are still superimposition.

Adherence to views is “to call the inferior superior,” and ‘inferior’ has a definition — “what has outflows is called inferior, since it is what the noble path abandons.” Adherence to observances and vows is “the view that holds what is neither cause nor path to be cause and path,” and the treatise gives three classes of instance: reckoning Maheśvara, the Lord of Creatures, and the rest to be the cause of the world; reckoning perverse practices such as throwing oneself into water or fire to be the cause of birth in heaven; and reckoning the mere keeping of observances and vows, together with the cognitions associated with it, to be the path of liberation.

The easy error: to run adherence to views and adherence to observances and vows together. What each holds runs in a different direction — adherence to views raises the inferior into the superior, adherence to observances and vows takes what is neither cause nor path for cause and path; the one errs about worth, the other about the road. In practice: under both of the latter two views the treatise adds the clause “in strictness the name ought to be set up as adherence to views and the rest” and “in strictness the name ought to be set up as adherence to observances and vows and the rest,” showing that the current names are abbreviations with the word ‘and the rest’ dropped. Whenever this treatise says ‘in strictness the name ought to be so-and-so,’ it is reminding the reader: the current term is an abbreviation; do not use the abbreviation to bind down its range.

VIII. Why Holding What Is Not a Cause to Be a Cause Is Abandoned by Seeing Suffering Alone

First the question: adherence to observances and vows holds what is not a cause to be a cause, and ‘cause’ is precisely what the truth of origination treats; why then is it not abandoned by seeing origination? The author raises this question himself, and the answer lies in one sentence about the order of cause and effect — “one must first deliberate that its entity is eternal, one, a self, and an agent, and only then does the holding to a cause arise.”

That is to say, a man who reckons Maheśvara to be the cause of the world does not first have an error about ‘cause’; he first has an error about ‘eternal’ and ‘self’: he first settles it that the thing is eternal, is one, is a self, is an agent, and only then takes it for a cause. This being so, “as soon as suffering is seen, the holding to eternity and the holding to self with respect to Maheśvara and the rest are forever cut off without remainder, and so the holding to a cause produced by them is cut off as well” — at the seeing of suffering the root is pulled up, and the branches fall of themselves.

The easy error: to suppose that every error about causes is assigned to abandonment by seeing origination. It is not so. When this treatise adjudges the category of abandonment, what it looks at is where that error arises from, not what topic it discusses.

The treatise then unfolds a long string of interrogations and comes to no conclusion. First an objection: then those who hold that perverse practices such as throwing oneself into water or fire are the cause of birth in heaven, and that keeping observances and vows suffices for purity, have not first reckoned eternity and self — must they not then fail to be abandoned by seeing suffering? Next it cites what the treatise says of the ox-observance, the deer-observance, and the dog-observance, adjudging them “adherence to observances and vows, abandoned by seeing suffering.” Then it presses itself, “on what ground is this abandoned by seeing suffering?”, and to answer ‘because it is bewildered about the truth of suffering’ would “have the fault of overreach, since all afflictions taking what has outflows as object are bewildered about suffering.” It presses further as to when adherence to observances and vows counts as abandoned by seeing the path, why the wrong view and the doubt that take the path as object cannot amount to a holding to purity, and why a wrong view and the rest taking as object what is abandoned by seeing origination and cessation, when held to be the cause of purity, should not belong to the abandonment of those. At the end it leaves only one sentence — “therefore the sense here held should be further examined.”

In practice: what is most precious in this passage is not the answer but the author’s willingness to leave a question that has not yet been closed lying on the page just as it is. In reading Abhidharma one must be able to recognize passages of this kind: whatever closes with words of the class ‘should be further examined’ is a place the treatise itself marks as unsettled, and there is no need to supply a conclusion for it.

IX. The Entity of the Four Inversions — Why Only a Portion of Three Views Is Taken

First the question: the inversions are four (eternity · pleasure · purity · self) and the views are five; how is the entity of the four inversions fixed? The treatise answers, “the entity of the four inversions is set up from three views”: within the extreme view only the view of eternity is taken as the inversion of eternity; within adherence to views those that reckon pleasure and purity are taken as the inversions of pleasure and of purity; within the view of a real person only the view of self is taken as the inversion of self.

What matters is the words ‘only taken.’ It is not that the three views are inversions entire, but that from each of the three a portion is taken. The treatise then explains why the rest do not enter — three causes must be complete, “because they are inverted in every part, because they are of the nature of deliberative judgment, because they are false superimposition.” Adherence to observances and vows does not enter, because “it is not inverted in every part, since a small portion of what it takes as object is pure” (the keeping of observances and vows has itself some small portion of purity to take as object); the view of annihilation and wrong view do not enter, because “they are not false superimposition, turning by the gate of nonexistence” (they are diminishment, not superimposition); the remaining afflictions do not enter, because “they cannot deliberate and judge, not being of the nature of view.” The three causes are like three sieves, and what is sifted out is exactly that portion of those three views.

The treatise also handles an apparent conflict between sūtra and treatise. The sūtra says “to reckon the impermanent as eternal — there is the inversion of perception, of mind, and of view,” so that perception and mind too are called inversions; the treatise says that view alone is inversion. The author explains it through thus — “perception and mind, following upon view, are likewise given the name of inversion, since they are associated with view and share its mode of apprehension”: perception and mind take the name in the train of view. Someone asks further why feeling and the rest are not so spoken of, and the answer is “because they are not well established in the world” — the inversion of mind and the inversion of perception are usages everyone recognizes, and feeling and the rest are not.

The easy error: to read ‘taking the name in the train of view’ as making perception and mind also the entity of inversion. They are not. This is exactly the point where this section parts from the account of the twelve inversions held by another school, for which see Further Resonances. In practice: the standing practice of this treatise for handling ‘the sūtra says thus while the treatise says otherwise’ is just this move — it does not alter the text of the sūtra, it alters the reading: it grants the name the sūtra uses, and explains that the name is set up in the train of something else.

X. A Stanza of Ānanda’s — Has the Inversion of Perception Been Cut Off or Not

First the question: since it was said above that the inversions of perception and of mind are cut off in the train of view, and that the stream-enterer has cut them, why then did the Venerable Ānanda say to the Venerable Sovereign in Eloquence, “because there is a disordered inversion of perception, your mind is scorched; having gone far from that perception, greed is stilled and mind becomes pure”? This stanza is plainly addressed to one who has already entered the station of the noble, and yet it says that he still has a ‘disordered inversion of perception.’

The treatise does not here force an explanation, but cites the account of one master by way of explaining it through — “some other master further says: the eight inversions of perception and of mind are not entirely cut off by one in training. Eight such entanglements are forever cut off only by knowing the noble truths as they really are, and apart from this there is no other means of forever cutting them; therefore what is said here does not contradict that sūtra.” That is: one at the station of training has not entirely cut off the eight inversions of perception and mind; they are forever cut off only upon knowing the noble truths as they really are, and besides this there is no other means of forever cutting them. Sūtra and treatise thus each receive their place.

The easy error: to read these twenty characters as a root stanza of this treatise. They are not — they are a stanza the treatise quotes, and the preceding text has a plain warrant, “if that is so, why then did the Venerable Ānanda say to the Venerable Sovereign in Eloquence.” Fabao’s Commentary marks it here as “the author cites Ānanda’s stanza as an objection,” and Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary marks “hence a stanza is cited that says”; both ancient masters adjudge it a quoted stanza.

In practice: in reading the stanzas of this treatise, look first at whether there is a warrant before it of the class ‘as a stanza of the sūtra says,’ ‘he said to so-and-so.’ What has a warrant is a quoted stanza; only what has no warrant and follows upon ‘the stanza says’ is a root stanza — a distinction that looks trifling and yet directly decides how many stanzas a chapter has.

XI. The Seven Prides and the Nine Classes of Pride — Seven Postures of Exalting Oneself

First the question: pride is merely holding oneself high; why must it be divided into seven? Because the objects met with differ and the postures struck differ. The treatise first gives the general mark — “what makes the mind exalt itself is given the general name of pride; because the modes in which it operates differ, it is divided into seven” — and then gives the particular marks one by one.

Pride and excessive pride make one pair: toward the inferior and toward the equal, to call oneself superior and to call oneself equal, is pride; toward the equal and toward the superior, to call oneself superior and to call oneself equal, is excessive pride. Pride beyond excessive pride goes one step further — “toward the superior to call oneself superior is pride beyond excessive pride.” The pride of self is “upon the five aggregates of appropriation to hold to self and what belongs to self, making the mind exalt itself.” The pride of superior attainment is “to call oneself to have attained, among excellent qualities not yet attained.” The pride of slight inferiority is the most winding — “toward one superior by much, to call oneself but slightly inferior,” plainly far behind and yet saying one is only a little behind. Wrong pride is “to call oneself possessed of quality where one has no quality.”

The nine classes of pride flow out from three of the seven prides (pride · excessive pride · the pride of slight inferiority), “if they arise in dependence upon view, the order in which they operate differing,” making three sets of three. The treatise gives the three matchings: the first three are, in order, excessive pride, pride, the pride of slight inferiority; the middle three are, in order, the pride of slight inferiority, pride, excessive pride; the last three are, in order, pride, excessive pride, the pride of slight inferiority.

A question the treatise poses itself shows great fineness: the pride of slight inferiority still has a place of exalting to speak of (within the superior one still sets oneself as only slightly inferior, and so has still something to lean on); what then is the place of exalting in ‘the pride that there is none inferior to me’? The answer runs, “that is, toward such a host of superior sentient beings as one loves and delights in, though one knows one’s own person to be utterly inferior, one still holds oneself in esteem” — knowing plainly that one falls short and yet still esteeming oneself, because one is of a kind with the host one reveres. The easy error: to suppose that pride must boast. This instance proves otherwise: to set oneself as inferior and yet still esteem oneself is pride all the same.

At the end the treatise records the divergent gloss of two treatises: “thus far the gloss follows the Treatise on the Development of Wisdom”; and if one follows the Treatise on Categories of Dharmas, then the pride ‘I am superior’ flows out from three prides — pride, excessive pride, and pride beyond excessive pride — “because the objects observed differ as inferior, equal, and superior.” Both glosses are recorded together. In practice: the crux of pride lies not in what is said but in whether the mind has ‘exalted’ itself. This rod is far finer than ‘whether one has boasted.’

XII. In the Noble One They Are and Yet Do Not Arise — One Exception among What Is Abandoned by Cultivation

First the question: pride extends to abandonment by seeing and by cultivation; will then that portion of it abandoned by cultivation be active in a noble one before it has been cut off? The treatise answers “this is not settled,” and gives an instance anyone can follow — the entanglement of killing is abandoned by cultivation, and yet “the noble ones are necessarily not active in it.”

The whole teaching value of this section lies in that ‘why.’ The reason the stanza gives is “because they are increased by view and doubt”: these afflictions, though abandoned by cultivation, are increased by view and doubt in person; and since at the path of seeing the noble one has already cut off view and doubt, “because the backbone of view and doubt has been broken, the noble one cannot give rise to them” — the spine that propped them up is snapped, and they cannot stand up. The treatise matches them item by item: the classes of pride and the pride of self are increased by the view of a real person, the entanglements of killing and the rest are increased by wrong view, craving for nonexistence is increased by the view of annihilation, one portion of craving for existence is increased by the view of eternity, and unwholesome regret is increased by doubt.

Two terms may be learned in passing. “Craving for nonexistence” is not ‘the absence of craving’; it is a greedy seeking after this very fact that ‘the three realms are impermanent’ — “that is, the three realms are impermanent, and to seek greedily upon this is called craving for nonexistence.” “One portion of craving for existence” is “to wish to become the great nāga king Airāvaṇa and the like,” to wish that one may in a coming life become some excellent kind of sentient being.

The easy error: to read ‘the noble one has them and yet they do not arise’ as ‘the noble one has cut them off.’ It is exactly the opposite — what the treatise says is not cut off and yet not arising. He has them, and they cannot get up. In practice: this is the second redemption of the distinction made in section three (that ‘there is’ and ‘is active’ are two different things). The sentence usable in practice is: to cut off an affliction one need not always counteract it directly; cut off what feeds it, and it cannot rise of itself.

XIII. Gate One · All-Pervading and Not All-Pervading — the Eleven That Can Take In All Five Categories

From “among the ninety-eight latent tendencies, how many are all-pervading and how many not all-pervading?” onward, this fascicle turns into the distinctions through the several gates, of which it covers the first five.

First the question: what is meant by all-pervading? What the treatise gives is not one definition but three conditions — “taking as object, throughout, the dharmas of the five categories of its own realm and level” (able to take all as object), “as a latent tendency being a cause and producing throughout the defiled dharmas of the five categories” (able to produce throughout), and “upon these three senses the name all-pervading is set up.” Those that meet these three senses are only eleven: “the views and doubt abandoned by seeing suffering and origination alone, and the independent ignorance associated with them,” which counted out are “seven views, two doubts, two ignorances.”

One question the treatise puts to itself shows the finest sense of measure: this taking of the five categories as object — is it gradual or all at once? If gradual, the other latent tendencies can also take them gradually, and then everyone is all-pervading; if all at once, who is able at one time to reckon all the dharmas of the desire realm as superior, as pure, as the cause of the world? The treatise’s way of answering is to narrow the claim — “it is not said that it takes as object at once everything of its own realm and level; it is said that it has the power to take the five categories as object at once”: not that it exhausts all dharmas in one moment, but that it has the capacity to reach the five categories at one time. The easy error: to read ‘throughout’ as ‘the whole of.’ The throughout here is said with respect to category, not with respect to dharmas.

Nine can take an upper realm as object. Of the eleven, setting aside the view of self and the extreme view, the other nine can further take an upper realm and an upper level as object. The treatise says, “the word ‘upper’ properly makes plain the upper realm and the upper level, and at the same time displays that there is no latent tendency taking a lower one as object” — the one word ‘upper’ carries along with it the point that ‘there is no latent tendency taking a lower one as object.’ And it adds a restriction: “although these nine can take both their own and an upper level as object, in principle there is no taking of one’s own and an upper level as object at once.” As for why the two views of self and of extremes cannot take an upper level as object, the reason is clean — “because he does not hold that to be his self or what belongs to his self, and because the extreme view must arise from the view of self”: the view of self takes as object the aggregates affiliated to oneself, and the extreme view follows upon the view of self, so neither can go up. If it be asked what kind of view it is to reckon Mahābrahmā a sentient being or eternal, “the Abhidharma masters say: these two are not views, but are gathered into wrong cognition,” and as for why, the treatise says plainly “taking our own tenet as the measure, it is so stated.”

The entity of the all-pervading is not the latent tendencies alone. The treatise says one must take “together with the dharmas that accompany them,” yet must exclude their ‘acquisition,’ “since it is not of one result with them.” At the end it appends a fourfold alternative: are all all-pervading latent tendencies all-pervading causes? The first alternative is the all-pervading latent tendencies of the future; the second is the dharmas coexistent with them in the past and present; “the third and fourth should be analyzed in accordance with the principle.” In practice: this gate of all-pervading is the foundation of the gates that follow — the gate of increase by attachment will use it, and the sense of taking an upper realm as object will use it too, so it is worth spending a little more effort upon in reading.

XIV. Gate Two · Which Afflictions Can Take the Dharmas without Outflows as Object

First the question: can afflictions take nirvāṇa and the noble path as their object? The treatise answers that they can, but only six — “the wrong view and doubt abandoned by seeing cessation and the path alone, and the independent ignorance associated with them, three each making six.” The rest take the dharmas with outflows as object, and “this is established of itself by extension.”

Taking cessation as object and taking the path as object differ greatly in range. Those that take cessation as object “each take the cessation of their own level as object”: the three afflictions of the desire realm take only the cessation through discernment of the formations of the desire realm as object, and so on up to the three of the summit of existence taking only the cessation of the summit of existence; the reason is “because the cessations are not causes and results with respect to one another” — the cessation of this level cannot be a cause of the cessation of that level, and so it cannot reach across. Those that take the path as object are far wider, “taking six levels or nine levels as object”: the three afflictions of the desire realm take as object only the path of the class of the cognition of dharma in six levels, and the three each in the upper eight levels take as object throughout the path of the class of the subsequent cognition in nine levels; the reason is “because they are of one class” and “because the paths of the several levels are causes of one another” — the paths are homogeneous causes of one another, and so they can reach across.

The treatise then handles a difficulty of symmetry: since the class of the cognition of dharma can counteract form and formlessness, why is it not the object of the three in each of those eight levels? The answer has two layers — “because the classes of the cognition of dharma concerning suffering and concerning origination are not their counteragent” (it is not a universal counteragent) and “because it cannot counteract what is abandoned there by seeing” (it is not a counteragent in the whole part). “These two beginnings being absent, it is not their object.”

As for why greed, hatred, pride, and the two adherences do not take the dharmas without outflows as object, the treatise gives five reasons, each different from the others, and this is the best teaching material in the section: for greed, “because what it takes as object should be relinquished,” whereas what is without outflows should not be relinquished (if it took what is without outflows as object it would be like the desire for wholesome dharmas, and no fault would follow); hatred takes enmity and harm as object, and “cessation and the path are not enmity”; pride takes what is coarse and agitated as object, and “cessation and the path are quiescent”; adherence to observances and vows holds what is not pure to be the cause of purity, and “cessation and the path are truly pure”; adherence to views holds what is not superior to be superior, and “cessation and the path are truly superior.”

The easy error: to take these five as five statements of one reason. They are not — each of the five fastens upon its own mode of apprehension. In practice: from this a general rule can be inferred in reverse: whether an affliction can take a given object depends on whether that object has the handle the affliction needs. Upon the two truths of cessation and the path there is no enmity, no coarse agitation, no defect that can be held as pure or as superior, and so these four afflictions have nowhere to lay hold; only wrong view and doubt need no handle — denying outright and hesitating can be done to anything.

XV. Gate Three · Increase by Attachment through the Object and through Association

First the question: under what conditions does a latent tendency count as ‘increasing by attachment’ upon a given dharma? The treatise divides into two roads: increase by attachment through the object, and increase by attachment through association.

The road of the object is first given in general: an all-pervading latent tendency “increases by attachment through the object upon the dharmas of all five categories of its own level throughout,” and one not all-pervading “only upon its own category.” Then it is given in particular — the six afflictions that take the dharmas without outflows as object and the nine that take an upper realm as object have, “upon their object-fields, no sense of increase by attachment.”

The two similes of this section are excellent and repay reading word for word. Why is there increase by attachment? “That is, if there is a dharma appropriated as its own by the view of self and the craving within this level, then there may be … the principle of increase by attachment through the object, as when a garment is damp the dust follows and stays upon it” — only when the garment is damp can the dust cling to it, and ‘appropriated as its own’ is that layer of dampness. Why is there no increase by attachment? The dharmas without outflows and those of an upper level are not appropriated as its own by the view of self and the craving of a lower level, and are moreover contrary to the lower affliction that takes them as object, “as upon a burning stone the foot does not stay” — the stone scalds the foot, and it cannot stand there. The one says it clings, the other says it does not, and the two similes make an exact pair. The treatise also records alongside another master’s account, which glosses ‘latent tendency’ by ‘following in accord,’ and gives as its simile “as when one with the wind-sickness takes a dry and astringent medicine, the sickness is not what is increased by attachment upon the medicine.”

The treatise also clears the ground, in passing, of one easily confused movement of mind: “to dwell in a mind of the lower level and seek the upper level and the like is the desire for wholesome dharmas, and is not called a latent tendency” — to aspire to an upper level is not an affliction.

The road of association is concise: “whatever latent tendency it be, upon the dharmas associated with it, by reason of association it increases by attachment upon them.” And the treatise recalls one presupposition — “all statements of increase by attachment are said with reference to what has not yet been cut off, and so the head of the first stanza marks the words ‘not yet cut off’”: every statement of increase by attachment is bounded by ‘not yet cut off.’ At the end it sets a question and answer: is there a latent tendency that takes neither the dharmas without outflows nor an upper realm as object, and yet has increase by attachment through association only and not through the object? “There is: the all-pervading latent tendencies that take an upper level as object.”

The easy error: to read increase by attachment as ‘taking as object.’ The two differ — what can be reached as object may still not be increased upon. In practice: what this gate teaches is the condition for the growth of afflictions, and the condition is only one — the object must be something appropriated as its own by the holding to self and by craving. What has never been taken for ‘mine’ an affliction may take as object and still grow no fat upon.

XVI. Gate Four · Which Are Unwholesome and Which Are Indeterminate

First the question: ought not afflictions all to be unwholesome? The treatise answers that it is not so, and first gives a general adjudication of the upper two realms — “all latent tendencies of the form and formless realms are of indeterminate quality alone.” The reason is a chain of causal inference: “because if a defiled dharma were unwholesome it would have a painful maturation; and a painful maturational result the upper two realms do not have, since the cause that vexes and afflicts another is definitely absent there.” The upper two realms have no painful maturational result, and no cause of vexing and afflicting others, and so the afflictions there can only be indeterminate.

Within the desire realm too there are two exceptions — the view of self, the extreme view, and the delusion associated with them. The treatise gives three reasons. First, “because these do not go against giving and the rest, for it is in order that ‘I’ may obtain happiness hereafter that one now diligently cultivates giving, discipline, and the rest”: it is for the sake of ‘self’ obtaining happiness hereafter that one now cultivates giving and discipline, so that the view of self runs together with giving and discipline without conflict. Second, the extreme view of annihilation “can accord with liberation,” and the treatise cites the World-Honored One’s words in evidence — “among the several courses of view of the several non-Buddhists, this view is the best, namely that ‘I am not and what belongs to me is not.’” Third, “because these two views are bewildered about one’s own affair alone, and do not seek to vex and injure other sentient beings”: they are only bewildered about one’s own affair, and do not intend to harm others.

The treatise at once poses itself an objection: if the reason be so, then greedily seeking the pleasures of heaven and giving rise to the pride of self likewise do not harm others — should they too not be indeterminate? This objection is raised and not concluded, and there is then recorded alongside an account of the preceptors of former times — “an innate view of self is of indeterminate quality, as the view of self is active in beasts and the like; if it arises from discrimination it is of unwholesome quality,” dividing by the innate and the discriminated. The remaining latent tendencies affiliated to the desire realm “are contrary to the above and are all of unwholesome quality.”

The easy error: to read ‘indeterminate’ as ‘harmless.’ It is not. Indeterminate speaks of whether a painful maturational result is called forth, not of whether it obstructs the path. In practice: this gate gives a very serviceable rod — in adjudging the good or ill of a movement of mind, ask first whether it calls forth a painful maturation and whether it vexes and afflicts others, rather than asking first whether it looks like an affliction.

XVII. Gate Five, Part One · The Three Unwholesome Roots

First the question: unwholesome afflictions are so many; why are only three called ‘roots’? The treatise’s answering sentence is very short — “all greed and hatred affiliated to the desire realm alone, and unwholesome delusion, are gathered into the unwholesome roots” — and it says, “an affliction whose quality is unwholesome alone is set up as an unwholesome root, being the root of unwholesome dharmas.” To be a root, two conditions are needed: the entity itself must be unwholesome alone (not extending to the indeterminate), and it must be able to be the root of the other unwholesome dharmas.

The treatise also adds an instance of its abbreviating manner: “the rest are not so; that the remaining afflictions are not unwholesome roots is established by extension of the sense already given, and so the stanza does not state it” — that the rest are not roots is plain by extension from the text above, and so it is not stated again in the stanza.

The easy error: to suppose that ‘root’ means the gravest affliction. It does not; root is said with respect to ‘being able to produce,’ not with respect to ‘being the coarsest and heaviest.’ Pride too is grave, and yet is no root. Puguang here cites the five senses given by the Mahāvibhāṣā to make plain why these three alone are set up as roots — “they extend to the five categories, are present throughout the six consciousnesses, are of the nature of latent tendency, can set going coarse and evil bodily action and verbal action, and make the firm and forceful preparatory effort that cuts off the wholesome roots” — only where the five senses are complete is a root set up.

In practice: from the word ‘root’ one may carry away a reminder for practice — to counteract an affliction one must find its root, and the mark of a root is ‘other afflictions grow out of it’, not ‘it is what makes one most uncomfortable.’

XVIII. Gate Five, Part Two · The Three Indeterminate Roots and the Four of the Masters of Other Regions

First the question: does the indeterminate too have roots? The Vaibhāṣika masters of the land of Kaśmīra say that it has three — “the three, indeterminate craving, delusion, and discernment; and even the portion produced by maturation is gathered into the indeterminate roots.”

The treatise asks itself why doubt and pride do not enter, and the answering words are full of picture — “because doubt turns toward two courses and pride turns by exalting.” Doubt swings back and forth between two roads, “being of a wavering nature, and so should not be set up as a root”; pride “turns upon its object with the mark of exalting, being unlike the dharma of a root.” And the treatise gives the image on which this rests: “for what is to be a root, it must abide firmly and turn downward, as the world commonly understands” — a root must strike downward and must stand firm; the one wavers and the other tilts upward, and neither looks like a root.

The masters of other regions, however, set up four — indeterminate craving, view, pride, and delusion. Their reason is stated from the actual condition of those who cultivate absorption: “because the several foolish men who cultivate the absorptions of the upper realms depend on nothing beyond the three of craving, view, and pride; and these three all turn by the force of ignorance.” Craving, view, and pride are what ordinary beings who cultivate the upper absorptions lean upon, and these three all turn in dependence upon ignorance, making four roots in all. The treatise also glosses the name ‘indeterminate’ — “within the name indeterminate the wholesome and the evil are both blocked out.”

The easy error: to suppose that in three and four someone has miscounted. It is not so. The two houses take different angles: the one takes the mark of a root, ‘whether it can abide firmly and turn downward’; the other takes ‘what those who cultivate the upper absorptions actually lean upon.’ Both parties are recorded without adjudication, and this treatise passes no verdict here.

In practice: what most repays turning over in this section on the indeterminate roots is that it grants that movements of mind that are indeterminate also have roots — those inconspicuous movements that call forth no painful result have their own machinery of growth all the same. In practice one cannot watch only what is conspicuously unwholesome.

XIX. 〔A Passage of Prose Commentary Set Apart〕The Four Gates of Determination — How to Answer a Question

The treatise turns into this section from the question of ‘the fourteen indeterminate matters,’ and first draws the boundary: the indeterminate of that sūtra “sets up the name indeterminate only with respect to a question that should be set aside,” and is not the same thing as the indeterminate of the three ethical qualities in the gate before. First the question: since the name is the same and the sense different, why gather it in here? Because at the sight of the two words ‘indeterminate’ the reader is bound to doubt, and the treatise simply finishes the matter off.

The four determinations are: categorical determination, determination by analysis, determination by counter-question, determination by setting aside, each matched to one question — death, birth, superior and inferior, and whether self and aggregates are one or different. The four instances the treatise gives are clean enough to be committed to memory. Asked “will all sentient beings die?”, categorical determination: all will die. Asked “will all who have died be born again?”, determination by analysis: “those who still have afflictions will be born again, and not the rest.” Asked “is a human superior or inferior?”, determination by counter-question: “compared with what?” — compared with what? Compared with gods, a human is inferior; compared with the lower destinies, a human is superior. Asked “are the aggregates and a sentient being one or different?”, determination by setting aside, the reason being “because a sentient being is not really existent, the natures of oneness and difference are not established,” with a simile — “as with the whiteness or blackness of the son of a barren woman”: of what does not exist, black and white cannot be spoken.

Why is setting aside called a determination? The treatise answers itself, “because in determining his question one says that this ought not to be determined” — to utter the words ‘this ought not to be determined’ is itself a determination.

The latter three questions each carry a round of an outsider’s objection and the author’s explaining through, and these three rounds repay looking at one by one, for they demonstrate three different manners of argument. First, the objector says the second question may also be determined categorically (answering straight out, ‘not all will be born again’); the author explains through: what the questioner asked was ‘all,’ and a general answer, “though it makes him know a general statement, still leaves him unresolved.” Second, the objector says the third question may also be determined categorically (a human is both superior and inferior, “because what he is set against differs, as consciousness is result and cause”); the author explains through: the questioner puts a categorical question and your answer is not categorical, so it can only amount to determination by analysis; “but here one should press him as to what his question sets it against, and hence this is called determination by counter-question.” Third, the objector says that since the fourth question determines nothing at all, how can it be called a determination; the author explains through: “yet what he asks should in principle be set aside. Having said that it should be set aside, how is that not called a determination?”

The Abhidharma masters further explain the four determinations at length according to the four questions, and their passage on determination by analysis is the longest string of layered pressing in the whole fascicle — dharmas are past, future, and present, and he takes the past; the past has form up to consciousness, and he takes form; form is wholesome, evil, and indeterminate, and he takes the wholesome; the wholesome has seven, and he takes abstention from killing; abstention from killing is set going by the three wholesome roots, and he takes what is set going by non-greed; what is set going by non-greed has the manifest and the nonmanifest — six layers of division all the way down. Set against it, determination by counter-question divides not a single step: “one should not analyze for him, but only bring him at last to stand silent.” The watershed between the two lies not in the question but in the mind that asks — the treatise says it with the utmost plainness: “because the intent of the question differs as straight or fawning, and the determination differs as analyzed or unanalyzed.” To one who comes to ask with a straight mind one analyzes; to one who comes with a fawning mind one only counter-questions.

The treatise also poses itself an objection: within determination by analysis and determination by counter-question “there is no question at all, only a request to be told,” nor is there “any determination, but only the counter-question ‘which one do you wish told?’” — how then do these count as question and determination? The answer: to request, saying ‘tell me the path,’ is that not asking about the path? and to determine his question by counter-questioning, is that not determining the path?

At the end it analyzes the marks of the four determinations once more according to the sūtra, and the four instances in the sūtra differ from those given above by the Abhidharma masters — categorical determination instances “are all the formations impermanent?”; determination by analysis instances “having done actions performed with deliberate intent, what result is to be experienced?”; determination by counter-question instances “are a man’s perception and his self one or different?” (to which one should counter-question, “in dependence upon which self do you ask thus?”, and if he says in dependence upon the coarse self, then “it is determined that it differs from perception”); and determination by setting aside enumerates the fourteen matters one by one: the four alternatives of the world’s being eternal or not eternal, the four alternatives of the world’s having an end or not, the four alternatives of the Tathāgata’s existing or not existing after death, and the two alternatives of the life-principle being the body or being other than the body.

The easy error: to read determination by setting aside as the Buddha’s not knowing or not being willing to say. The reason the treatise gives is one and the same from beginning to end — the presupposition of what is asked is not established (“because a sentient being is not really existent, the natures of oneness and difference are not established”), and the question itself is a bad one. In practice: this section is in truth a treatise on the art of answering. What it teaches is: before answering, adjudge the type of the question — whether the question is well formed, whether the asker is sincere, whether what is asked needs to be divided into cases. The division of the four determinations comes before any answer whatever.

Further Resonances: The Mirror of the Three Commentaries

The above is the sense of the treatise text of this fascicle itself. Below a further section is set up, gathering four matters: the adjudications of the three commentaries and their divergences, Saṅghabhadra’s refutations and supplements, the divergences of Paramārtha’s earlier translation, and coordinates for parallel reading. A mirror is not the treatise; it is only another way of reading the same passage — recorded together without adjudication, each restored to its own place.

1. Where the Three Commentaries Diverge

One commentary altogether absent. The commentaries on this fascicle stand in a particular case: Shentai’s Commentary is a fragment, its seven surviving fascicles belonging to the chapters on the elements, on the faculties, and on the worthy and the noble, the chapter on the latent tendencies being wholly lacking; and so this fascicle has no word-by-word gloss of Shentai’s to hang upon. Under mechanical rechecking, the marker sentences of this chapter yield a uniform zero result in Shentai. Only the general conspectus in his first fascicle retains the one phrase ‘the chapter on the latent tendencies, sixty-nine lines,’ and that is a table of the stanza counts of the whole treatise, not a gloss on the chapter on the latent tendencies, and cannot be made to serve as evidence of outlining. The lack is marked as it stands, and no text from another fascicle is put in its place.

The chapter outline: a rare evenness, and one independent divergence. Puguang and Yuanhui adjudge the chapter-level division as twofold in the same way (explaining the entity of the confusions / explaining the extinction of the confusions), and even anchor the head of the second main division to the same sentence of the treatise, ‘now this should be examined’ — the first time in this collection that all three houses agree at the chapter level. Fabao stands apart: he changes ‘the entity of the confusions’ to ‘the entity and function of the confusions’ and ‘the extinction of the confusions’ to ‘the differences of their abandonment,’ and for the subdivision of the chapter on the entity and function of the confusions he does not use the division ‘the root confusions / the distinctions through the several gates,’ but instead a fourfold ‘explaining the latent tendencies / miscellaneous explanation of the confusions / analysis through the gates of sense / a separate explanation of the five hindrances.’ The names are the same and the width of the outline levels differs. From this a rule for reading the commentaries follows: Fabao’s chapter-internal numbering forms a system of its own, and when his ‘the nth’ is cited it must be tied to his house and never made interchangeable with Puguang’s or Yuanhui’s. Recorded without adjudication.

The gloss on the chapter name: each house takes one sense. Puguang takes “following along after sentient beings is called ‘following’; a mode of apprehension that is subtle is called ‘slumber,’” with sleep for a simile — “as when a man sleeps, his mode of apprehension is hard to know”; Fabao takes “a subtle mode of apprehension, binding along and increasing by attachment”; Yuanhui takes “following along after sentient beings, because it increases their dimness and stagnation.” The three houses point at the same thing, and the face each picks out is different: one stresses that it is hard to know, one that it binds along and increases by attachment, one that it increases dimness and stagnation. Recorded without adjudication.

As for why the latent tendencies are explained next after the chapter on action, the two commentaries each give their own reason. Puguang says, “because action, as a cause calling forth results, cannot arise alone but must depend on the condition of confusion, and confusion is the remoter with respect to the result, the latent tendencies are spoken of afterward” — confusion is farther from the result, and so is ranged later; Fabao says, “because action is particular and confusion general, action is explained first and the latent tendencies glossed after” — action is particular and confusion general, and so the particular comes before the general. One and the same order, two different reasons, recorded without adjudication.

The two glosses on the view of a real person: three degrees of fineness in outlining. The treatise itself plainly has two glosses here — “because it perishes it is called sat” and “because it exists it is called sat.” Puguang divides into two sections and ties each to its house, marking the former “the Sautrāntika masters’ gloss” and adjudging it appositional-determinative, and marking the latter “second, the Vaibhāṣika masters’ gloss”; Fabao likewise divides into two, marking “the author cites the Sautrāntika gloss” and “the author cites the Sarvāstivāda gloss,” and supplies besides the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle’s counter-question to the former — “if so, what use is there in marking it with the word sat? The word kāya alone suffices to block eternity, and so the name ought to be set up as the view of kāya only. No dharma that is eternal can be aggregated; what use is it to mark the word ‘perishing’ upon the person?” — a counter-question nowhere cited by Puguang; Yuanhui makes no division of sections and writes them out one after another. ⇒ One and the same passage cut three ways: into two sections, into two sections with a supplement, and written out continuously. Recorded without adjudication.

The Vaibhāṣikas’ not granting the account of twelve inversions: Fabao is the most schematic. Puguang here glosses sentence by sentence, and first ties the school of the divergent account of twelve inversions to the Masters of Distinction (“following the Mahāvibhāṣā and the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle, they are the Masters of Distinction”), and explains on their behalf the division of eight abandoned by seeing alone and four extending to abandonment by seeing and by cultivation. Fabao, on the same passage, picks out a threefold outline — “from ‘the Vaibhāṣika masters do not grant this sense’ below there are three: first counter-objecting to refute the other school, second explaining in accordance so as to establish his own tenet, third properly explaining through the other school’s objection” — pointing out at one stroke the three stages of the Vaibhāṣikas’ answer. The doctrinal content of the two commentaries agrees entirely; only the fineness of the outlining differs. Recorded without adjudication.

What office each of the stanza’s four lines performs: a stroke that is Yuanhui’s alone. Yuanhui, glossing the one stanza on the four inversions, says “the first two lines set out the entity, the third line establishes and rejects, the fourth line explains the sūtra through” — the first and second lines set out the entity of the four inversions, the third states why these three views alone are taken (establishing and rejecting), and the fourth explains through the inversions of perception and of mind spoken of in the sūtra. This angle neither Puguang nor Fabao makes explicit, and it is of great use to the reader: in a stanza of twenty characters, each of the four lines has its own office, and to understand the offices is to understand the structure. This is an original stroke of outlining by a commentator, and does not enter the main text of the treatise.

The manner of setting out the positions of the three schools: a difference of form with attributions entirely agreeing. Puguang, in the dispute over the association of the latent tendencies, marks the school at every sentence, tying each question and each answer to its house; Fabao instead sets out at the head of the passage one general table of the three schools — “the Sautrāntika tenet: what is active is called entanglement, the seed is called latent tendency. The Mahāsāṃghikas and the rest: the entity of a latent tendency is a dissociated formation, that is, the latent tendency belonging to greed for desire. The Sarvāstivādins: greed for desire is itself the latent tendency” — a form far more schematic than Puguang’s. What matters is this: the attributions of the two commentaries agree entirely, without a single divergence; what differs is only the form of setting them out.

One attribution that must be shown as such. The party that objects in this fascicle to the account that the latent tendencies are associated is not marked in the treatise itself with the name of its school; Puguang, however, marks it plainly as “the Mahāsāṃghikas and the rest” (as in “‘does this not contradict the sūtra?’ — the Mahāsāṃghikas and the rest press” and “‘by what principle is it proved that they are definitely associated?’ — the Mahāsāṃghikas and the rest reproach”). ⇒ This ascription is what a commentator ties, not the plain text of the treatise, and in citing it one must show whose tying it is. Recorded without adjudication.

The nine classes of pride: no divergence at all among the three houses. Puguang, Fabao, and Yuanhui agree item by item on the listing of the nine classes of pride and on the framework of their flowing out from three of the prides, and Fabao besides cites the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle glossing the word ‘class’ — “class is the sense of category, that is, the differentiations of pride.” Here the three houses have nothing to contend over, and this is recorded as it stands.

In the attribution of the passage on the all-pervading there is one further divergence of angle. Puguang marks the school at every sentence of the four rounds of exchange over whether craving and pride too are all-pervading — the Sautrāntikas object, the Vaibhāṣikas reproach in return, the Sautrāntikas answer, the Vaibhāṣikas state their own tenet; whereas Saṅghabhadra, citing one of those sentences, calls it outright the Sūtra-master’s own interrogation (see below). One and the same sentence, and the two houses tie it to different speakers, recorded without adjudication.

2. Saṅghabhadra’s Refutations and Supplementary Explanations

Saṅghabhadra’s two treatises do not name this chapter ‘the chapter analyzing the latent tendencies’ but ‘the chapter adjudicating the latent tendencies,’ the one as the fifth and the other as the sixth. Checking item by item with the marker of quotation he habitually uses, within the range of this fascicle the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle quotes Vasubandhu’s sentences in nine places, while the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine, within the same range, has not one word-for-word quotation — and this is an honest negative proposition, which can prove only one thing: that the form of the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine is the more concise and that it does not counter-refute sentence by sentence in this passage; one cannot infer from it that that treatise has no divergent sense.

The place where the quotation is fiercest is precisely that sentence in which this treatise appraises and takes the Sautrāntikas. The author says, “the entity of a latent tendency is neither associated with mind nor dissociated from it, because there is no separate thing; an affliction in the stage of sleep is called a latent tendency”; Saṅghabhadra quotes it word for word and adjudges, “examining that gloss closely, it is not so in principle,” pointing straight at where it contradicts itself — since he himself grants that apart from the afflictions a latent tendency is no other thing, and since an undefiled dharma cannot be the entity of an affliction, then “it cannot be said to be the entity of a sleeping latent tendency, and so there is no least thing named a sleeping latent tendency.” ⇒ The account this treatise holds to be the best, Saṅghabhadra denies in its very gloss. One meaning and two schools, recorded together, with no adjudication of which prevails.

The passage on the Sūtra of the Six Sixes is likewise. The author explains the sūtra through with “the sūtra says only that there is one; it does not say that there is a latent tendency at that very moment”; Saṅghabhadra quotes and refutes — “this gloss is unreasonable, since it is unreasonable in principle that at that moment the latent tendency should be spoken of with the word of present existence” — and goes on to press him item by item with the objection that the entity of a latent tendency would then have to be unknowable. Recorded without adjudication.

In one place what Saṅghabhadra appraises is not the doctrine but the composition. On the ground for setting up the name ‘craving for existence,’ the author speaks first of turning by the inner gate and afterwards of savoring attachment toward one’s own entity; Saṅghabhadra appraises, “what difference in sense has this gloss from the former? … examining it, the Sūtra-master’s gloss differs in sense not at all from the former, but only frames floating words to make it seem a little different” — he holds this to be one sense stated twice over. ⇒ This belongs to an appraisal of composition and not an opposition of doctrine, and the reader should keep it apart from the two items before. Recorded without adjudication.

One place of the most exact word-for-word correspondence. The author asks and answers himself, “what is the mark here of being abandoned by seeing suffering? And so on to, what is the mark of being abandoned by cultivation? If what it takes as object is what is abandoned by seeing this, it is named as abandoned by seeing this”; Saṅghabhadra quotes it word for word and refutes, “this is unreasonable … since the all-pervading latent tendencies take the five categories as object, the latent tendencies abandoned by seeing suffering and origination ought also to extend to being abandoned by seeing origination and suffering and the rest,” and sets up in its place his own tenet, establishing the mark of abandonment by receptivity. In this sentence the two treatises correspond character for character, and it is the passage in the debate of this fascicle most convenient for reading side by side. Recorded without adjudication.

One place of ‘the same conclusion by a different reason.’ On why adherence to observances and vows is abandoned by seeing suffering, the author objects that ‘to say it is because one is bewildered about the truth of suffering has the fault of overreach’; Saṅghabhadra says that this objection is itself not established — “since not all afflictions taking what has outflows as object take the suffering that is result for their object. How then is there any fault of overreach?” — and sets up besides the account that ‘holding what is not the path to be the path is of two classes’ so as to establish the same conclusion well. ⇒ The two houses guard the same conclusion, and what is contested is the reason for reaching it. This type occurs once only in this fascicle and is worth remembering.

One counter-question on the view of a real person. Saṅghabhadra asks in return upon the gloss ‘because it perishes it is called sat’ — “if so, what use is there in marking it with the word sat?” — if it is only to block eternity, the single word kāya would suffice; why mark a further word ‘perishing’? This objection appears also in the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle passage cited by Fabao, from which one sees that the ancient masters knew of this objection long ago and did not take it to settle right and wrong. Recorded without adjudication.

One place where the treatise does not refute and Saṅghabhadra alone does. The treatise itself records the preceptors of former times’ account that ‘an innate view of self is of indeterminate quality’ and passes no verdict; Saṅghabhadra adjudges it head-on — “this is unreasonable, since to say that what cannot discriminate is gathered into view and is abandoned by the path of seeing is unreasonable in principle” — and establishes the innate view of self as abandoned by cultivation. ⇒ This is the one instance in this fascicle of ‘the treatise citing an account from one side only, the refutation appearing in Saṅghabhadra alone’; in the eight places before, the treatise already has some exchange of both parties. Recorded without adjudication.

One divergence of attribution. In the passage on the all-pervading, the sentence ‘on what ground is it a view when the other afflictions take that as object, while these too take it as object and yet are not views?’ Puguang marks as the Vaibhāṣikas’ reproach in return against the objector, while Saṅghabhadra calls it outright the Sūtra-master’s own interrogation. One and the same sentence, and the two houses tie it to different speakers; recorded without adjudication.

3. The Divergences of Paramārtha’s Earlier Translation

Paramārtha’s Expository Treatise on the Treasury forms a system of its own in the passage corresponding to this fascicle. The first thing to know is that the very name of this chapter differs in his version — it reads ‘the chapter analyzing the confusions’ and not ‘the chapter analyzing the latent tendencies,’ one and the same Sanskrit taken in different renderings (one taking ‘confusion,’ the other ‘latent tendency’). To search Paramārtha’s version with Xuanzang’s words is never to find the chapter name; a comparison across versions can only take the structure of the scene. The two versions also differ in the number of fascicles: Xuanzang three and Paramārtha two, and not one of the fascicle boundaries of the two coincides.

The rendering-names form a system of their own. Xuanzang’s ‘greed’ Paramārtha renders ‘desire for desire’; ‘craving for existence’ as ‘desire for existence’; ‘entanglement’ as ‘the upper mind’; ‘without outflows’ as ‘without flow’; ‘independent ignorance’ as ‘solitary ignorance’; ‘the extreme view’ as ‘the view of extremes’; ‘adherence to observances and vows’ as ‘adherence by holding to precepts’; ‘the unwholesome roots’ as ‘the evil roots’; ‘other regions’ as ‘the outside masters’; ‘determination by counter-question’ as ‘determination by asking back’; ‘determination by setting aside’ as ‘setting-aside determination’; ‘pride beyond excessive pride’ as ‘pride beyond excess’; ‘the pride of slight inferiority’ as ‘the lower pride.’ In form, Xuanzang writes ‘the stanza says / the treatise says,’ the whole stanza coming out first; Paramārtha writes ‘the verse says / the explanation says,’ glossing line by line as embedded, so that one stanza is often broken up and cited in several places.

Two instances that best show the parting of angle. The first is the setting up of the name ‘craving for existence’: Xuanzang has “in order to block the notion of liberation,” Paramārtha “in order to remove that notion of nirvāṇa” — one takes liberation and the other nirvāṇa, pointing at one thing and taking a different name for it; and Paramārtha here brings out besides a transcription, ‘samāpatti,’ where Xuanzang writes with a rendering by sense and the transcription does not appear on the face of his text. The second is the reckoning of the four inversions: Xuanzang has “from three views,” Paramārtha ‘the four inversions arise from two and a half views’ — Xuanzang taking the three views as a rough enumeration, Paramārtha reckoning precisely to the half (of the three views, some taken whole and some in part, making exactly two and a half). The doctrinal content the two versions point at is entirely the same, and what differs is only the manner of reckoning. Recorded without adjudication.

Two places where the face of the text is doubtful and the prose commentary resolves it of itself. First, in listing the names of the six latent tendencies Paramārtha writes ‘view, mind, doubt,’ one character ‘mind’ more than Xuanzang’s ‘view and doubt,’ and its exact sense is unclear. Second, the face of Paramārtha’s stanza on the all-pervading reads ‘the confusions of seeing suffering, origination, cessation,’ one character ‘cessation’ more, which read on its face would seem not to agree with Xuanzang’s ‘abandoned by seeing suffering and origination’; yet his prose commentary immediately states that it is still bounded by suffering and origination, and agrees entirely with Xuanzang in doctrine. ⇒ In both places no explanation is forced, and the fact alone is recorded.

One place of showing and hiding a name. For the party that objects to the account that the latent tendencies are associated, Paramārtha’s version in that passage does not bring out the name of the school; yet when it comes to citing the sūtra in evidence for the four determinations, Paramārtha writes out plainly ‘the Venerable Mahāsāṃghika’ (Xuanzang writing ‘the Mahāsāṃghikas,’ the one a rendering by sense, the other a full transcription). ⇒ From this one sees that Paramārtha does not avoid the name of this school throughout the chapter; it is only that in that passage he did not mark it specially. The fact alone is recorded, and no judgment is made on the translator’s intent in his stead.

One place of the most exact correspondence. In the enumeration of the fourteen indeterminate matters, the order and the content of the two versions agree entirely, and it is the place in the closing passage of this fascicle most convenient for word-for-word parallel reading; only that Xuanzang writes ‘after the Tathāgata’s death’ and Paramārtha ‘the Tathāgata as other than death,’ the angle of the gloss differing slightly while what is pointed at is the same. There is besides the passage glossing the ten functions, where the opening and gathering of the two versions are almost the same, Paramārtha for the most part heading each with a doubled word (firmly strengthening · settledly establishing · repeatedly tilling · producing and arising), the order of the ten functions corresponding one to one; and it is the passage in this fascicle where the two translations come closest.

4. Coordinates for Parallel Reading

What this fascicle sets up is a table of ‘how the afflictions are numbered.’ The move it demonstrates again and again — one and the same set of dharmas takes a new number with each new rod — will be used again in every remaining chapter of this treatise; and in this fascicle it is used most densely.

Looking forward, this fascicle has done only half a piece of work. The entity of the confusions being adjudged, how the confusions bind, their increase by attachment, and their sequence, and further the abandonment and extinction of the confusions, all lie in the two fascicles that follow and in the next main division; and the four gates of determination at the end of this fascicle are an appended discussion inserted after what is and is not a root, the author himself saying that the indeterminate of that sūtra “sets up the name indeterminate only with respect to a question that should be set aside,” and is not the same thing as the indeterminate of the present gate.

Looking back, this fascicle everywhere puts to use the results of the chapters before. The establishing of the three realms and the division of the five categories into seeing and cultivation are coordinates laid down all along the way by the chapters on the elements, on the faculties, and on the world; while the sentence that opens the fascicle, “it was said before that the differences of the world all arise from action,” follows word for word upon the end of the chapter on action. ⇒ The chapter on the latent tendencies does not raise a new topic; it supplies the chapter on action with its other half — action is the seed, and the latent tendencies are the moisture by which the seed is enabled to grow.

Two further things this fascicle leaves the reader as loose threads. First, the author expressly appraises and takes the Sautrāntikas in the dispute over the association of the latent tendencies, and it is at this very place that Saṅghabhadra’s counter-refutation is fiercest — the manner of composition recorded in the Life of Vasubandhu, ‘to set up the Sarvāstivāda sense and, wherever there is a bias, to refute it by the Sautrāntika sense,’ can here be seen for what it concretely looks like, and so can the sort of response it drew. Second, in the passage on what abandons adherence to observances and vows the author leaves the one sentence “therefore the sense here held should be further examined” and draws no conclusion; nor did the ancient masters close it on his behalf. Where the treatise itself marks a place as unsettled, the reader need not close the case for it.

考據Apparatus

世品明有情與器之所安立，業品明其所以然，隨眠品則問業之所以能生長者。此子自「隨眠有幾」一問起——先立隨眠為諸有本而舉煩惱十事，次由貪之開合立六與七，於是入本品第一場大諍：隨眠是心相應抑心不相應。諍畢，次以見行之異開十，次以行部界三門開九十八，次辨見修所斷之定與不定，次別明五見自體與非因計因，次會四顛倒與八想心倒，次明七慢九慢與聖者不起之由；自「九十八隨眠中，幾是遍行」以下轉入諸門分別，本子涵前五門——遍行非遍行、漏無漏緣、二種隨增、二性分別、根非根，末附四種記門收之——一部毘曇之『煩惱體篇』自此開卷。

一、科判定位

科判系統	此段之位
玄奘 T1558 九品	分別隨眠品第五（品題〔T29 0098b17〕）之第一分——本子（子1）＝卷十九全〔0098b13–0104a01〕。本頌正一至正二十二，`<lg>` 塊十八（本頌十七塊＋引頌一塊）
承前之錨	品首「前言世別皆由業生，業由隨眠方得生長，離隨眠業無感有能。所以者何？隨眠有幾？」〔T29 0098b18〕——所承者即業品開卷之「世別由業生」，逐字相接，為本帙最明確之跨品承轉
三家品級大科（逐字二分·本帙首見三家全同）	光記〔T41n1821 0291a13〕「就此品中，一明惑體、二明惑滅」·頌疏〔T41n1823 0923a14〕「就此品中分二：一明惑體、二明惑滅」·寶疏〔T41n1822 0687a10〕「此品文中大分為二：一明惑體用、二明斷不同」
品名解題（三家並錄）	光記〔T41n1821 0291a06〕「分別隨眠品者，隨逐有情名隨，行相微細名眠，如人睡眠行相難了。此品廣明，故名分別」·寶疏〔T41n1822 0687a06〕「行相微細，隨縛隨增，是隨眠義。此品廣明，名分別隨眠品」·頌疏〔T41n1823 0923a13〕「貪等煩惱，名曰隨眠，隨逐有情，增昏滯故，故名隨眠。此品廣明，故名分別」
業後何以次明隨眠（二疏各出其由）	光記〔T41n1821 0291a10〕「所以業後次明隨眠者，業因感果不能獨起必藉惑緣，惑望果疎故，隨眠後說」·寶疏〔T41n1822 0687a08〕「所以業後明隨眠者，業因惑故能招諸有。業別、惑通，故先明業，後釋隨眠」
本子所占之章	光記〔T41n1821 0291a15〕「就正明根本惑中，一辨根本惑、二諸門分別。就辨根本惑中，一增數以明；二明見、修斷；三別明五見；四便明四倒；五明七、九慢」——⇒ 子1 涵「辨根本惑」章之全部五節，再加「諸門分別」章之前五門
諸門分別章之起（三家同錨）	T1558 錨〔0101b25〕「九十八隨眠中，幾是遍行、幾非遍行？」——光記〔T41n1821 0303b11〕「此下大文第二諸門分別。就中，一遍行、非遍行；二漏、無漏緣；三二種隨增；四二性分別；五明根、非根；六明惑能繫；七明惑隨增；八明次第」·頌疏〔T41n1823 0926a10〕「從此大文第二，諸門分別，就中分八：一明遍行非遍行、二明漏無漏、三明二種隨增、四明二性分別、五明根非根、六明惑能繫、七明惑隨增、八明次第起」 ⇒ 八門之名二家逐字幾同；本子涵前五門，門六以下落卷二十（子2）
三疏分卷與玄奘分卷全同	子1 起處：俱舍卷十九〔T29 0098b13〕·光記卷十九〔T41n1821 0291a02〕·寶疏卷十九〔T41n1822 0687a02〕·頌疏論本第十九〔T41n1823 0923a11〕。⇒ 三疏之隨眠品皆恰三卷，卷界皆落 T1558 之〔0104a06〕與〔0108b19〕，此為本子 carve 之獨立 witness
收卷句	「為命者即身、為命者異身。此問名為但應捨置」〔T29 0103c26 前後〕——十四無記事之枚舉既盡，卷十九隨即卷尾題。卷界恰落頌界（正22 之末），本子之 carve 於此品最強

頌／長行體例：本頌（T1560 單行本定頌界）＋長行自釋。本子本頌十七塊——〔0098b21〕正1·〔0098c05〕正2·〔0099a29〕正3·〔0099b08〕正4·正5（四十字）·〔0099c10〕正6·〔0099c28〕正7·〔0100a28〕正8·〔0100b26〕正9·〔0101a10〕正10·〔0101b17〕正11·〔0101b27〕正12·正13（四十字）·〔0102a11〕正14至正16（六十字）·〔0102b17〕正17·正18（四十字）·〔0102c14〕正19·〔0103a01〕正20前半（十字）·〔0103a08〕正20後半·正21（三十字）·〔0103a25〕正22。引頌一塊〔0101a03〕「由有想亂倒」二十字——其判有前文之徵「若爾，何故尊者慶喜告彼尊者辯自在言」〔0101a01 前後〕，並有古德二證：寶疏〔T41n1822 0693c20〕「論主引慶喜頌難」·頌疏〔T41n1823 0925a28〕「故引頌言」。

長行之二大段（各逾七百純漢·問答與異說最密處）：〔0098c05〕正2 之釋（八百十一字·問答鏈最密·三宗鼎立處）·〔0103a25〕正22 之釋（一千零十一字·四記門之全部展開與經證）。

本子之並錄不判二處（唯錄二造·不判勝負）：①八想心倒與四倒之會通——「有餘部說：倒有十二」〔0100c17〕與「毘婆沙師不許此義」〔0100c21〕二造並錄，末又引「有餘師復作是說：八想心倒，學未全斷」〔0101a05 前後〕。②無記根三與四——「迦濕彌羅國諸毘婆沙師說無記根亦有三種」〔0103a11 前後〕與「外方諸師立此有四」〔0103a17 前後〕二說並錄。

本子之論主明評一處（非並錄不判）：隨眠與心相應抑不相應〔繫正2 塊·0098c11 起〕——毘婆沙師立「欲貪等體即是隨眠」〔0098c19〕，難方立隨眠是心不相應，經部立「隨眠體非心相應非不相應」〔0099a02〕，論主於三宗之外逕下一語「然經部師所說最善」〔0099a01〕，光記於此明標「論主評取經部」〔T41n1821 0292b21〕。⇒ 此處論主有取捨之語，不得以『並錄不判』概之；然二造之理由本子仍逐字錄全。

二、術語（名相）

漢（玄奘）	真諦異名（首出 loc）	本論定義句／所繫
隨眠	惑〔T29n1559 0252c06〕·品題作「分別惑品第五」	「由此隨眠是諸有本，故業離此無感有能」〔0098b23 後〕·光記釋名〔T41n1821 0291a06〕「隨逐有情名隨，行相微細名眠」
煩惱十事	「一堅固根本、二安立相續、三數治自田、四生起等流、五能引生業有、六圓滿自資糧、七令迷境界、八引將識相續、九令離淨品善法類、十成就縛義」〔T29n1559 0252c11〕	「一堅根本、二立相續、三治自田、四引等流、五發業有、六攝自具、七迷所緣、八導識流、九越善品、十廣縛義」〔0098b25〕
貪（欲貪）	「欲欲」〔T29n1559 0252c18〕	六隨眠之首——「此略應知差別有六，謂貪、瞋、慢、無明、見、疑」〔0098b29 前後〕
有貪	「有欲」〔T29n1559 0252c18〕	「此中有貪以何為體？謂色無色二界中貪」〔0099a17 前後〕·「彼貪多託內門轉故」〔0099a18〕
纏	「上心」〔T29n1559 0253a16〕	「於覺位中即名纏故」〔0099a04 前後〕·「謂諸煩惱現起纏心」〔0099a05 前後〕
隨眠之睡與覺	「惑眠」／「惑覺」〔T29n1559 0253a17〕	「何名為睡？謂不現行種子隨逐。何名為覺？謂諸煩惱現起纏心」〔0099a04〕
煩惱種子	「種子隨逐」〔T29n1559 0253a18 前後〕	「謂自體上差別功能，從煩惱生能生煩惱」〔0099a06 前後〕
薩迦耶見	「身見」〔T29n1559 0253c25〕	「執我及我所，是薩迦耶見」〔0100a01〕·「壞故名薩，聚謂迦耶，即是無常和合蘊義」〔0100a01〕·異釋「有故名薩，身義如前」〔0100a05〕
邊執見	「邊見」〔T29n1559 0253b07〕	「即於所執我我所事執斷執常，名邊執見，以妄執取斷常邊故」〔0100a13 前後〕
邪見	邪見（同）	「於實有體苦等諦中起見撥無，名為邪見」〔0100a14 前後〕·「而但撥無名邪見者，以過甚故」〔0100a16 前後〕
見取	見取（同）	「於劣謂勝，名為見取」〔0100a18 前後〕·「有漏名劣，聖所斷故」〔0100a18 前後〕
戒禁取	「戒執取」〔T29n1559 0253b07〕	「於非因道謂因道見，一切總說名戒禁取」〔0100a20 前後〕·「理實應立戒禁等取名，略去等言但名戒禁取」〔0100a24 前後〕
五部（見四諦·修所斷）	——（諦本此段以五部所滅之系語行文·未別立定名）	「部謂見四諦、修所斷五部。界謂欲色無色三界」〔0099b15 前後〕
忍所害／智所害	「忍所滅」〔T29n1559 0253c10〕	「八十八見所斷，忍所害故。十隨眠修所斷，智所害故」〔0099c07 前後〕·「忍聲通說法類智忍」〔0099c12〕
四顛倒	「四倒」〔T29n1559 0254b16〕	「一於無常執常顛倒、二於諸苦執樂顛倒、三於不淨執淨顛倒、四於無我執我顛倒」〔0100b22 前後〕·倒之三因「一向倒故、推度性故、妄增益故」〔0100c07 前後〕
慢過慢	「過過慢」〔T29n1559 0254c29 前後〕	七慢之三——「於勝謂勝名慢過慢」〔0101a17 前後〕
卑慢	「下慢」〔T29n1559 0254c29 前後〕	七慢之六——「於多分勝謂己少劣名為卑慢」〔0101a19 前後〕
慢類九	「慢類有九種」〔T29n1559 0255a08〕	「然本論說慢類有九」〔0101a21〕·「如是九種，從前七慢三中離出」〔0101a24 前後〕
無有愛	——（諦本此段從略）	「謂三界無常，於此貪求，名無有愛」〔0101b12 前後〕
遍行（隨眠）	「遍行」（同系）〔T29n1559 0255b14〕	「力能遍行自界地五部故，此十一皆得遍行名」〔0101c03 前後〕·三義所結「依此三義立遍行名」〔0101c06 前後〕
不共無明	「獨行無明」〔T29n1559 0255b15〕	「謂七見、二疑、二無明十一」〔0101c04 前後〕
無漏	「無流」〔T29n1559 0255c19〕	「見滅道所斷，邪見疑相應，及不共無明，六能緣無漏」〔0102a11 前後〕
所緣隨增／相應隨增	「由緣緣故」〔T29n1559 0256a19〕	「遍行隨眠普於自地五部諸法所緣隨增，以能遍緣自地法故」〔0102b21 前後〕·「謂隨何隨眠於自相應法，由相應故於彼隨增」〔0102c08 前後〕
不善根	「惡根」〔T29n1559 0256b28〕	「唯欲界繫一切貪瞋及不善癡不善根攝」〔0103a02 前後〕·「煩惱，為不善法根立不善根」〔0103a04 前後〕
無記根	「無記根」（同）〔T29n1559 0256c04〕	「謂諸無記愛、癡、慧三，下至異熟生亦無記根攝」〔0103a12 前後〕
外方諸師	「外師」〔T29n1559 0256c11 後〕	「外方諸師立此有四，謂諸無記愛、見、慢、癡」〔0103a17 前後〕
四記（一向·分別·反詰·捨置）	「一向記、分別、反問及置記」〔T29n1559 0256c21〕	「一應一向記、二應分別記、三應反詰記、四應捨置記」〔0103a27 前後〕
十四無記事	「十四非記類」系語〔T29n1559 0257b07 前後〕	「諸契經中說十四無記事」〔0103a21 前後〕·末段逐一枚舉〔0103c25 前後〕

名相之梵語羅馬字唯繫於古德所傳之音寫可徵者。本子之異名多屬二譯譯字之別（見目四全表），非古德音義之訓；本子三疏於此諸名未見別出音義之訓，從闕，不據現代校本擬補。

三、校勘（大正原書校記·本卷全枚舉）

子1 範圍〔0098b13–0104a01〕<app> 錨共三十七枚 ＝異讀三十一（重出併四）＋濾器桶二（拉丁濾器所汰·見表末）＋無 witness 零。異讀三十一條中，二條屬 CBETA 自身底本系統內之校訂記（〔0098c12〕與〔0103a07〕），非藏本間之異讀，表中以〔CB 校訂〕標明而不與傳統異讀混計；餘二十九條為宋·元·明·宮·石諸本之異讀。依本帙體例底本從大正【大】讀，CBETA 回改處底本從【CB】讀而並錄大正原印（以 ⟨CB⟩ 標·不入異讀之數）。

註號	錨	底本【大】／異讀	語境（逐字·底本讀）	觀察（唯錄不判）
0098002	0098b25	種【大】，〔－〕【宋】【元】【明】【宮】【石】	「諸煩惱現起能為十【種】事故，一堅根本」	「十種事」與「十事」，數詞後綴之虛字增減·不改十事之數與內容
0098c1201 ⟨CB⟩	0098c12	若【CB 校訂】／苦【大正原刻】	「於餘六義徵問亦爾。【若】爾何失？二俱有過」	CBETA 底本系統內之校訂——原刻作『苦爾何失』語不成句，逕正為「若」·非版本間歧異
0098003	0098c12	欲【大】，復【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「若【欲】貪體即是隨眠，便違契經」	「若欲貪體」與『若復貪體』，二讀皆通此設問之句法·不改所設兩關之論證
0099001	0099a08	芽【大】，牙【石】	「又如【芽】等有前果生，能生後果功能差別」	芽與牙形近音同·種芽之喻正扣種子相續之義
0099002	0099a10	眠【大】，順【宮】	「若執煩惱別有隨【眠】心不相應，名煩惱種」	涉句意而不涉論旨：「隨眠心不相應」文從字順，『隨順心不相應』語意含混·二讀皆不改此句破『別立不相應法為種』之方向
0099008	0099b26	耶【大】，邪【石】	承「邊執見亦爾。戒禁取通在二部……邪見通四部」句系	耶與邪形近通假之常例·不改五見所斷部數之判
0099009	0099b29	諦【大】，諦斷【石】	承「邪見通四部，謂見苦、集、滅、道所斷」句系	石本多一「斷」字·或蒙後而衍·不改邪見通四部之判
0099017	0099c13	忍【大】，〔－〕【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「論曰：【忍】聲通說法類智忍。於忍所害諸隨眠中有頂地攝唯見所斷」	「忍聲」與「聲」·或蒙上文「忍所害」而衍·四本闕之於文意無礙
0100001	0100a02	無【大】＊，非【石】＊	承「執我及我所，是薩迦耶見……要此想為先方執我故」句系（薩迦耶見訓詞段）	底本內部帶星號之重出校記·異讀「非」於此訓詞句法中難通
0100002	0100a17	酥【大】，蘇【宋】【元】【明】【宮】【石】	「如說臭【酥】，惡執惡等，此唯損減，餘增益故」	酥與蘇為同物異寫（臭酥之喻）·光記引此喻即作「蘇」〔T41n1821 0298a23〕·純屬用字習慣
0100003	0100b10	苦【大】，若【宋】【元】【明】	「永超眾苦樂，至超【苦】樂處」	「超苦樂處」與『超若樂處』·後者不成詞·三本恐為形近訛字
0101001	0101a01	畫【大】，晝【石】	「如於旋火輪、【畫】藥叉迷亂」	畫與晝形近·「畫藥叉」謂所繪之藥叉像·作「晝」不成詞
0101002	0101a06	纏【大】，終【宮】【石】	「如是八種【纏】，由如實見知聖諦方得永斷」	「八種纏」與『八種終』·後者於此句法中難通
0101003	0101a07	此【大】，此此【石】	「離【此】無餘永斷方便，故此所說不違彼經」	石本疊字為衍文·不改文意
0101004	0101a12	差別有【大】，有差別【石】	「為唯見隨眠有多【差別】，為餘亦有」	語序倒置而語意全同
0101010	0101b02	雖於【大】，反顧【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「謂於如是自所愛樂勝有情聚，【雖於】己身知極下劣而自尊重」	涉措辭而不涉論旨：「雖於己身」與「反顧己身」·二讀皆通『於下劣中仍自尊重』之義·唯轉折語勢有異
0101011	0101b03	下【大】，〔－〕【宮】【石】	「雖於己身知極【下】劣而自尊重」	「極下劣」與「極劣」·闕字於文意無礙
0101016	0101b27	見【大】，之【宮】	頌「【見】苦集所斷，諸見疑相應」（正12 首句）	「見苦集所斷」為頌文本句·『之苦集所斷』不成詞
0101017	0101c02	集【大】，〔－〕【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「論曰：唯見苦【集】所斷見疑，及彼相應不共無明」	此長行句緊承頌文「見苦集所斷」（同段之 0101016 條）·闕字或為傳抄脫漏·不改遍行十一之範圍
0101018	0101c11	有【大】，百【宮】	「不說頓緣自界地一切，然說【有】力能頓緣五部」	「有力」與『百力』·後者於此句法中難通
0101019	0101c12	於是處淨勝見行是處必應希求高舉是【大】，〔－〕【宮】	「以於是處有我見行，是處必應起我愛慢；若【於是處淨勝見行，是處必應希求高舉，是】則愛慢應亦遍行」	涉句意而不涉論旨：宮本闕此整句（難方比類之後半）·若闕則其難唯存我見一喻而缺淨勝見一喻·論證力較弱而結論不變
0101020	0101c20	能【大】，遍【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「此九雖【能】通緣自上，然理無有自上頓緣」	二讀皆通『九惑可緣自上二界』之義·唯副詞用字有異
0101021	0101c21	界【大】，戒【宮】	「於緣上中，且約【界】說，或唯緣一，或二合緣」	「約界說」謂依界地而說·作「戒」於此論緣上地惑之語脈中難通
0102001	0102a18	准【大】，惟【明】	「各三成六，能緣無漏。餘緣有漏，【准】此自成」	「准此自成」謂依此類推自明·二讀皆通『餘緣有漏不待別釋』之義
0103a0701 ⟨CB⟩	0103a07	無【CB 校訂補】／〔原刻闕〕【大正原刻】	頌「【無】記根有三，無記愛癡慧」（正20後半之首）	CBETA 底本系統內之校訂——原刻此處為空格·依上下文校補「無」字·非版本歧異
0103003	0103a25	反【大】，乃【宮】	頌「應一向分別，【反】詰捨置記」（正22 首句）	「反詰記」為頌文定名（下文長行逐一釋之）·『乃詰記』不成詞
0103007	0103b13	人【大】，入【宋】【元】	「又作是說：彼第三問亦應一向記，【人】亦勝亦劣，所待異故，如識果因」	「人亦勝亦劣」承上「人為勝劣」之問·作「入」於此語脈中難通
0103008	0103c05	令【大】，今【明】	「不應分別，乃至【令】彼默然而住，或令自記無便求非」	令與今形近·不改反詰記之義
0103009	0103c07	記【大】，說【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「豈不二中都無有問，唯有請說，亦無有【記】，唯反詰言：欲說何者」	涉措辭而不涉論旨：「亦無有記」與『亦無有說』·二讀皆通『請說與反詰二者皆非明確問答』之論證
0103010	0103c09	詰【大】，詰詰【石】	「即由反【詰】記彼所問，豈非記道」	石本疊字為衍文
0103011	0103c10	是【大】，是是【石】	「若爾，應俱【是】反詰記」	石本疊字為衍文
0099b2301	0099b23	最【大】【磧-CB】，家【麗-CB】（K28n0958 0593c17）	承「見道諦所斷八，離有身見及邊執見。修所斷四」句系	校異而底本不改——大正與磧砂系作「最」，高麗系作「家」·誌錄備考
0101b1801 ⟨CB⟩	0101b18	有【CB】【麗-CB】（K27n0955 0596b19）／者【大正原印】	頌「慢類等我慢，惡作中不善，聖【有】而不起」（正11）	CBETA 回改——大正原印作「者」，CBETA 從麗本回改作「有」·底本流從【CB】·並錄大正原印。「聖有而不起」謂聖身中有此惑而不現行，正扣下文「聖有而不起」之長行釋

誠實記一（脩與修之異體不一致·不得統一）：本子頌文塊十〔0101a10〕二見「脩」——「皆通見【脩】斷」與「有【脩】斷不行」；而同品塊五〔0099c11〕作「餘通見【修】斷」。大正於此三處皆無校記，T1560 單行本則三處皆作「修」。⇒ 同義同位而字形二用，屬異體字之不一致，依本帙體例照底本錄之，不正規化、不統一。取捨屬義理之判，本目唯錄不判。

誠實記二（重出併四）：三十七枚 <app> 錨中，有四枚為同一異讀之重出標記（底本內部星號互見之屬，其顯者即 0100001 條），併入所繫之條而不重計，故異讀之數為三十一。

誠實記三（二類須分）：本子範圍內之 <app> 含二種性質截然不同者——傳統異本對校（宋·元·明·宮·石諸本之異讀，二十九條）與CBETA 於大正印本系統內之校訂記（原刻訛字或闕字之逕正，二條）。二者不可混計，表中已別標。

校勘結語：二十九條傳統異讀中，約二十三條純屬形近訛字、虛詞增減或疊字衍文；涉措辭或句意者五條——0099002（眠與順）·0101010（雖於與反顧）·0101019（宮本闕比類句）·0101020（能與遍）·0103009（記與說），然皆不改該句所屬論證鏈之結論；另一條 0101017（集字之闕）因與同段頌文本句緊鄰對照而較具體，亦不改遍行十一之範圍。全表無一升定本案（無古德牒文與義理雙證支持異讀者）。異讀並錄備考，唯錄不判——異讀之取捨屬義理之判。

四、異譯對勘（真諦《阿毘達磨俱舍釋論》T1559 ★）

對勘基座：玄奘本卷十九〔T29n1558 0098b13–0104a01〕↔ 真諦本〔T29n1559 0252c06–0257b11〕。

段界之定（場景結構·非詞形對搜）：起＝〔T29n1559 0252c06〕，真諦作「分別惑品1中分別惑品第五前已說，世間多種異從業生，諸業由隨屬惑故，至得生長」——與玄奘品首「前言世別皆由業生，業由隨眠方得生長」〔0098b18〕同一承轉、同一問起。迄＝〔T29n1559 0257b10〕，真諦作「命者即是身、命者異於身」——此收十四無記事之全部枚舉，其後同行即轉入「若人隨眠惑於境界中生起，此人由此惑於此境界相應」，與玄奘子2 開篇「諸有情類於此事中隨眠隨增，名繫此事」〔0104a07〕同屬新起之場景。⇒ 本子之真諦對應段界＝〔0252c06〕至〔0257b10〕。

品題之異：真諦此品作「分別惑品第五」〔T29n1559 0252c06〕，非「分別隨眠品」——同一梵語之譯語不同（玄奘取「隨眠」，真諦取「惑」）。真諦此品僅二卷（卷十四〔0252c02〕·卷十五〔0259c19〕），玄奘三卷，二本之卷界無一重合。⇒ 分卷是譯場之事，非論本自然科段之獨立證。

體例基差：玄奘「頌曰／論曰」整頌先出而後長行；真諦「偈曰／釋曰」逐句嵌釋，一頌常拆數處分引。故本子玄奘之二十二本頌，於真諦本作若干短偈散布。

禁以奘詞搜諦本：玄奘之譯語於真諦本常零命中而場景確在。以下逐條之定位一律取場景結構——誰、對誰說、問什麼、依何理、得何答。

十事訓詞之對照（本子二譯最貼近之一段·開合幾同）：奘「一堅根本、二立相續、三治自田、四引等流、五發業有、六攝自具、七迷所緣、八導識流、九越善品、十廣縛義」〔0098b25〕‖諦「一堅固根本、二安立相續、三數治自田、四生起等流、五能引生業有、六圓滿自資糧、七令迷境界、八引將識相續、九令離淨品善法類、十成就縛義」〔T29n1559 0252c11〕。十事次第一一相合，諦本多以雙字冠首（堅固·安立·數治·生起·能引生·圓滿·令迷·引將·令離·成就）。

對勘要目（逐條）：

隨眠總標與六隨眠——奘「隨眠諸有本，此差別有六，謂貪瞋亦慢，無明見及疑」〔0098b21〕‖諦「隨眠惑有本」〔T29n1559 0252c09〕，列名作「謂如欲瞋，憍慢無明見，心疑」〔T29n1559 0252c16〕。譯名差：奘「貪」／諦「欲」·奘「慢」／諦「憍慢」。諦本列名末作「見心疑」，較奘「見及疑」多一「心」字，其確義未明（或為「見」之訓詞殘字，或版本異文），不強解，誌錄其實。
六由貪異七——奘「六由貪異七，有貪上二界，於內門轉故，為遮解脫想」〔0098c05〕‖諦「復說彼，六由欲別七」〔T29n1559 0252c18〕，七隨眠列名作「謂欲欲隨眠、瞋隨眠、有欲隨眠、憍慢隨眠、無明隨眠、心見隨眠、疑隨眠」。譯名系統差（全篇貫穿）：奘「貪」／諦「欲欲」·奘「有貪」／諦「有欲」。下表凡涉此二詞者皆隨此系統對應，不再重注。
隨眠與心相應之諍（三宗鼎立）——奘「毘婆沙師作如是說：欲貪等體即是隨眠……豈不違經？無違經失，并隨眠者并隨縛故」〔0098c18〕‖諦「若爾何有？若欲欲即是隨眠，則違佛經……毘婆沙師說：欲欲即是隨眠」〔T29n1559 0252c23〕。二本皆具三宗鼎立之結構，場景全合；然真諦此段未見「大眾部」之名逐字標出（僅作泛稱之異宗語），奘側之古德則明標之（光記〔T41n1821 0292a18〕「大眾部等徵」）。⇒ 二譯歸屬顯隱之異，誌錄不判。
經部宗之安立——奘「然經部師所說最善……彼說欲貪之隨眠義，然隨眠體非心相應非不相應，無別物故，煩惱睡位說名隨眠，於覺位中即名纏故」〔0099a01〕‖諦「經部師說此義非證……如經部執隨眠者，是欲欲隨眠，此隨眠不與心相應亦不與心相離，由非別類故」〔T29n1559 0253a12〕。開合差：奘徑以評語承接，諦本先申「此義非證」駁前說，方引出經部自身之安立，行文較奘曲折一層而終局義理相合。
睡覺與種子之訓詞——奘「何名為睡？謂不現行種子隨逐。何名為覺？謂諸煩惱現起纏心」〔0099a04〕‖諦「若惑眠說名隨眠，若惑覺說名上心。此惑眠何相？不在現前種子隨逐惑覺，何相正現前起」〔T29n1559 0253a16〕。譯名差：奘「纏」／諦「上心」——「上心」為真諦所用以指煩惱現起活動之譯語。二譯措辭殊異而義理全合。
六六經之諍——奘「若爾，六六契經相違，經說於樂受有貪隨眠故。經但說有，不言爾時即有隨眠……於彼睡時，或假於因立隨眠想」〔0099a12〕‖諦「於六六經中此義云何？經言：此惑於此人樂受成欲隨眠……若爾，於何時眠？時，是時或於因說果名故稱隨眠」〔T29n1559 0253a23〕。詳略幾同：「因說果名」與奘「假於因立隨眠想」義理全合。
有貪立名之由——奘「彼貪多託內門轉故……又由有人於上二界起解脫想，為遮彼故」〔0099a18〕‖諦「於彼二界人，多起三摩跋提欲，此欲依內門起故，說名有欲。復次於此二界中，有餘人起涅槃想，為除彼涅槃想故，說此欲名有欲」〔T29n1559 0253b01〕。譯名差：奘「解脫想」／諦「涅槃想」；諦本另出一音譯詞「三摩跋提」，奘本此段以義譯之語行文而未見此音譯字面。
十隨眠——奘「六由見異十，異謂有身見，邊執見邪見，見取戒禁取」〔0099a29〕‖諦「見五，謂身見、邊見及邪見、見取戒執取，由此復成十」〔T29n1559 0253b07〕。譯名差：奘「邊執見」／諦「邊見」·奘「戒禁取」／諦「戒執取」——此二差貫穿五見諸段，不再重注。
九十八隨眠之立——奘「六行部界異，故成九十八」〔0099b08〕‖諦「復次此十隨眠惑，於阿毘達磨藏中更立為九十八」〔T29n1559 0253b12〕。開合幾同：二本皆以『十隨眠→部界二門→九十八』為次第，唯諦本多一承接語。
忍所害唯見斷——奘「忍所害隨眠，有頂唯見斷，餘通見修斷，智所害唯修」〔0099c10〕‖諦「有頂忍所滅，定見滅」〔T29n1559 0253c10〕。開合差：奘一頌四句連書，諦本頌句拆分而餘句另段。
薩迦耶見之訓詞——奘「執我及我所，是薩迦耶見。壞故名薩，聚謂迦耶」〔0100a01〕‖諦「我及我所見名身見，由剎那剎那壞故說滅，由聚集故名身」〔T29n1559 0253c25〕。二本訓詞次第全合（先壞後聚），唯諦本以「滅」「身」二字分釋，奘本音義兼譯而存「薩」「迦耶」之音。
非因計因唯見苦斷——奘「於大自在等，非因妄執因，從常我倒生，故唯見苦斷」〔0100a28〕‖諦「於自在等處，從常我倒生，因等虛妄執，是故見苦滅」〔T29n1559 0254a22〕。開合差：二本頌句之序恰相反（奘先「非因妄執因」後「從常我倒生」，諦反之），義理全合，屬翻譯體例之異。
四顛倒自體——奘「四顛倒自體，謂從於三見」〔0100b26〕‖諦「從二見半生四倒」〔T29n1559 0254b16〕。計數表述之差：奘以「三見」概舉（邊見·見取·身見），諦以「二見半」精算（三見之中或取其全或取其分）。二本所指之義理內容全同——邊見中之常見·見取中之樂淨見·身見中之我見三者為四倒之體，唯計數方式之異，唯錄不判。
七慢列名——奘「慢七九從三」〔0101a10〕‖諦「七慢」〔T29n1559 0254c28〕，列名作「一慢、二過慢、三過過慢、四我慢、五增上慢、六下慢、七邪慢」。譯名差：奘「慢過慢」／諦「過過慢」·奘「卑慢」／諦「下慢」·餘五名全同。
九慢類——奘「然本論說慢類有九」〔0101a21〕‖諦「若爾，於阿毘達磨藏中說慢類有九種」〔T29n1559 0255a07〕，續偈「九慢類從三」〔T29n1559 0255a12〕。開合幾同：列名次第與三慢流出之架構全合，唯隨第十四條之譯名差而異其字面。
慢類等聖不起——奘「慢類等我慢，惡作中不善，聖有而不起，見疑所增故」〔0101b17〕‖諦「慢類等」〔T29n1559 0255b02〕，長行作「九慢類中，有慢類修道所破，我慢亦爾。如此等於聖人不現前起」。詳略幾同：諦本另補「殺等上心惑，修滅如彼爾」一句，與奘頌「聖如殺纏等」相呼應。
遍行十一——奘「見苦集所斷，諸見疑相應，及不共無明，遍行自界地」〔0101b27〕‖諦「遍行見苦集，滅惑謂諸見，疑共彼無明，及獨行無明」〔T29n1559 0255b14〕。諦本偈句字面多一「滅」字，若照字面讀恐與奘「見苦集所斷」不合；然諦本長行隨即申明「見苦集所滅諸見及疑惑，與彼共相應起無明及獨行無明，皆見苦集所滅」，仍以苦集為限，與奘義理全合。此「滅」字或為偈句湊字之虛字，不強解，誌錄其實。
緣無漏之六——奘「見滅道所斷，邪見疑相應，及不共無明，六能緣無漏」〔0102a11〕‖諦「邪見疑與二，應無明獨行，見滅道所滅，六無流為境」〔T29n1559 0255c19〕。譯名差：奘「無漏」／諦「無流」·奘「不共無明」／諦「獨行無明」（全篇系統性譯字）。
隨增之所緣與相應——奘「未斷遍隨眠，於自地一切，非遍於自部，所緣故隨增」〔0102b17〕‖諦「遍行隨眠惑，具自地隨眠，唯由緣緣故」〔T29n1559 0256a19〕。開合差：奘一頌四句合書遍行與非遍行二義，諦偈先出遍行一義而非遍行之義別見後續長行，頌長開合互異而義理全合。
上二界與身邊二見皆無記——奘「上二界隨眠，及欲身邊見，彼俱癡無記，此餘皆不善」〔0102c14〕‖諦「上界惑無記」〔T29n1559 0256b13〕，續作「於欲界身見，邊見共無明」。開合幾同：二本皆循『上二界全無記→欲界身邊二見亦無記→餘皆不善』之三層，唯諦本分句逐層出而奘本一頌合書。
三不善根——奘「不善根欲界，貪瞋不善癡」〔0103a01〕‖諦「於欲界惡根，貪欲瞋無明」〔T29n1559 0256b28〕。譯名差：奘「不善癡」／諦「無明」·奘「不善根」／諦「惡根」（癡與無明二詞互譯，全篇偶見互用）。
無記根三與外方四——奘「無記根有三，無記愛癡慧，非餘二高故，外方立四種，中愛見慢癡，三定皆癡故」〔0103a08〕‖諦「無記根有三」〔T29n1559 0256c04〕·「愛無明及慧」〔T29n1559 0256c05〕，續作「外師說四」「謂愛見慢癡」。譯名差：奘「外方」／諦「外師」·奘「癡」／諦「無明」·餘義理次第全合。
四種記——奘「應一向分別，反詰捨置記，如死生殊勝，我蘊一異等」〔0103a25〕‖諦「一向記、分別、反問及置記，譬如死生勝，及我異等義」〔T29n1559 0256c21〕。譯名差：奘「反詰記」／諦「反問記」·奘「捨置記」／諦「置記」。所舉四問之次第（死→生→勝→我一異）二本全同。
十四無記事之枚舉——奘「世為常、無常、亦常亦無常、非常非無常？世為有邊、無邊、亦有邊亦無邊、非有邊非無邊？如來死後為有、非有、亦有亦非有、非有非非有？為命者即身、為命者異身」〔0103c23 前後〕‖諦「世間常、非常、亦常非常、非常非非常，世間有邊、無邊、亦有邊無邊、非有邊非無邊，如來異死、不異死、亦異死不異死、非異死非非異死，命者即是身、命者異於身」〔T29n1559 0257b07〕。譯名差：奘「如來死後」／諦「如來異死」（訓詞角度稍異而義同）。十四事之枚舉次第與內容二本全合，屬本子末段最工整之逐字對照。
四記經證之出處——奘「如大眾部契經中言：苾芻當知，問記有四」〔0103c13 前後〕‖諦「大德摩訶僧祇說經言：比丘！記問有四種」〔T29n1559 0257a27〕。署名差：奘作「大眾部」（義譯），諦作「大德摩訶僧祇」（音譯全稱並冠「大德」二字）。此與第三條相呼應——真諦於此處確有摩訶僧祇之名，而於前段（隨眠不相應之諍）未特標其名。⇒ 可見其於同品內對此部之名並非通篇迴避，唯錄其實，不代判譯者用心。

誠實記（本目）：第一條之「見心疑」多一「心」字、第十七條之偈句多一「滅」字——二處諦本字面與奘本似有出入之表象，皆未強解，唯列其長行佐證實際義理仍與奘本相合，是否升入校勘或存疑，別俟義理之判。

五、系內對辯（眾賢《順正理論》T1562 ★·有則錄）

眾賢二論之品名：T1562 作「辯隨眠品第五」〔T29n1562 0596a11 起〕·T1563 作「辯隨眠品第六」〔T29n1563 0892c12 起〕。非「分別隨眠品」——勿以俱舍品名搜二論。本子場景範圍約〔T29n1562 0596a11〕至〔T29n1562 0622c10〕，以「經主」牒引之逐一場景比對定位（非頁題界）。體例＝唯於俱舍實有對辯之 loc 引·不通引；「一義二宗」並錄不判。

一、隨眠是否與心相應（涉正2 長行之核心諍·場景最密）——俱舍作「彼說欲貪之隨眠義，然隨眠體非心相應非不相應，無別物故，煩惱睡位說名隨眠」〔0099a02〕。眾賢逐字牒引而評之：「經主於此作是釋言：此是欲貪之隨眠義。然隨眠體非心相應、非不相應，無別物故。煩惱睡位說名隨眠，於覺位中即名纏故」〔T29n1562 0596c24〕，判曰「今詳彼釋，於理不然，自許隨眠離諸煩惱無別物故。不染污法為煩惱體，理不成故，不可說為睡隨眠體，故無少物名睡隨眠」〔T29n1562 0597a02〕。⇒ 眾賢正面否定世親所述經部訓詞本身，而此訓詞於本論為論主評取之說。一義二宗並錄·不判勝負。

二、六六經之「經但說有」義——俱舍作「經但說有，不言爾時即有隨眠。何所違害？於何時有？於彼睡時，或假於因立隨眠想」〔0099a13〕。眾賢逐字牒引而破之：「經主此中作如是釋：經但說有，不言爾時即有隨眠，何所違害？於何時有？於彼睡時，或假於因立隨眠想。此釋非理，爾時隨眠說現有聲，理不成故」〔T29n1562 0598b16〕，續以隨眠自體應不可知等難逐一詰之。一義二宗並錄·不判勝負。

三、有貪立名之由——俱舍作「彼諸有情多於等至及所依止深生味著，故說彼唯味著自體」〔0099a22 前後〕。眾賢引而評之：「經主於斯復作是釋：此中自體立以有名，彼諸有情多於等至及所依止深生味著，故說彼唯味著自體，非味著境，離欲貪故，由此唯彼立有貪名。此釋與前義有何別？……詳經主釋義不異前，但搆浮詞似有少異」〔T29n1562 0599c29〕。⇒ 眾賢於此非否定其義理，而評其二次立名之釋（內門轉義與自體味著義）實為一義複述——屬行文之評騭而非義理之正反對立。一義二宗並錄·不判勝負。

四、見苦所斷等相之安立（俱舍本句與眾賢逐字全合之典型例）——俱舍作「此中何相見苦所斷？乃至何相是修所斷？若緣見此所斷為境名見此所斷，餘名修所斷」〔0099b29〕。眾賢逐字牒引而破之：「經主於此自問答言：此中何相見苦所斷？乃至何相是修所斷？若緣見此所斷為境名見，此所斷餘名修所斷。此不應理。所以者何？遍行隨眠緣五部故，則見苦集所斷隨眠亦應通是見集苦等所斷」〔T29n1562 0601b13〕，續立己宗「見緣苦為境名為見苦，即是苦法苦類智忍，此二所斷總說名為見苦所斷……是名為善立所斷相」。⇒ 二本此句字字相合，係本子對辯中最工整之逐字對照段。一義二宗並錄·不判勝負。

五、薩迦耶見之訓詞（訓詁最具體之諍點）——俱舍作「壞故名薩，聚謂迦耶，即是無常和合蘊義，迦耶即薩名薩迦耶」〔0100a01〕。眾賢引而反詰之：「經主此中作如是釋：壞故名薩，聚謂迦耶，即是無常和合蘊義，迦耶即薩名薩迦耶。此薩迦耶即五取蘊，為遮常一想故立此名，要此想為先方執我故。若爾，何用標以薩聲？但迦耶聲足遮常故，則應但立迦耶見名。無法是常而可聚集，何用身上標以壞聲」〔T29n1562 0606a03〕。⇒ 其難在『若唯取遮常之義，何須另標壞聲』。此難亦見於寶疏所引之《正理》原句（目六）。一義二宗並錄·不判勝負。

六、戒禁取見道所斷之辨——俱舍作「若彼撥無真解脫道，妄執別有餘清淨因，是則執餘能得清淨，非邪見等」〔0100b16〕。眾賢引而評之：「由此經主所作是言：若彼撥無真解脫道，妄執別有餘清淨因，是則執餘能得清淨非邪見等，此緣見道所斷諸法。理亦不成，彼全未詳對法宗義」〔T29n1562 0606c21〕，續立己宗「若爾，見滅諦所斷戒禁取體亦應成與道同故……總計解脫是常是寂，執謗彼心為清淨因，理不成故」。一義二宗並錄·不判勝負。

七、迷苦諦之太過失——俱舍作「此復何因是見苦斷？迷苦諦故有太過失，緣有漏惑皆迷苦故」〔0100b11〕。眾賢引而破之：「故。由此己遮經主所難，迷苦諦故有太過失，緣有漏惑皆迷苦故，以非一切緣有漏惑皆以果苦為所緣故。如何得有太過失耶？非許二俱見苦所斷，見道所斷便畢竟無」〔T29n1562 0607b10〕，另立己說「非道計道有二類故，一緣戒禁等、二緣親迷道」〔T29n1562 0607b13〕以善成同一結論。⇒ 眾賢於此非駁其結論（戒禁取見苦所斷），而駁其『太過失』一喻之理由不成立——屬細部理由異而結論同之一例。一義二宗並錄·不判勝負。

八、愛慢是否亦遍行——俱舍作「雖爾，遍行亦非唯此，以於是處有我見行，是處必應起我愛慢」〔0101c10〕。眾賢引而評之：「唯自界自地遍行故。經主於此作是責言：何緣所餘緣彼是見，此亦緣彼而非見耶？以欲界生不作是執我是大梵，亦不執言梵是我所，故非身見」〔T29n1562 0613a05〕。眾賢所引此句之繫屬角度與光記有異——光記標此句為毘婆沙師對難方之反責〔T41n1821 0303c12 系〕，眾賢則逕稱其為經主自身之詰難。二家繫屬之異，唯錄不判。

九、俱生身見是否無記（本子唯一『俱舍錄異說而未自駁、駁議僅見於眾賢』之例）——俱舍作「先軌範師作如是說：俱生身見是無記性，如禽獸等身見現行。若分別生是不善性」〔0102c25〕。眾賢引而評之：「本論說：身見能令三有相續，乃至廣說。然經主言：俱生身見是無記性，如禽獸等身見現行。若分別生是不善性，此不應理，不能分別而言見攝、見道所斷，理不成故。此不應言是修所斷，與無我解正相違故」〔T29n1562 0618a17〕。⇒ 前八條俱舍本文或多或少皆有雙方之交鋒，此條俱舍僅單邊引先軌範師之說而論主未置可否，眾賢則正面立己宗。一義二宗並錄·不判勝負。

誠實記（負命題·據實標闕）：《顯宗論》T1563 於本子場景範圍〔0892c12〕至約〔0913b〕內，未見任何逐字牒引之「經主」句——容錯覆核「此是欲貪之隨眠義」「俱生身見是無記性」「壞故名薩」「此中何相見苦所斷」等關鍵語皆零命中；「薩迦耶見」一詞雖於〔T29n1563 0893c12〕有近似申義句，然非逐字對辯句。此為二論詳略之實（顯宗論體例本較順正理簡練），非檢索之失。又：T1562 隨眠品全篇「經主」共四十九見，本目僅取子1 場景範圍內之九條，餘不通引。

六、諸家異釋（光記·寶疏·頌疏·神泰疏）

神泰疏之闕（負命題已證·據實標闕）：神泰《俱舍論疏》X53n0836 為殘本，現存七卷＝卷一·卷二·卷四·卷五·卷六·卷七·卷十七；卷八至卷十六（九卷）全佚，該缺口吞沒世品·業品·隨眠品全部。機械容錯覆核：「分別隨眠品」零見·本品頌首句「隨眠諸有本」零見·「六由貪異七」零見·「捨置記」零見；「薩迦耶見」雖一見〔X53n0836 0010a24〕，然其語境屬界品十八界「見處」科段之泛涉五見，非隨眠品之疏文。⇒ 泰疏殘·隨眠品闕·本子無逐文釋可繫，不以他卷之文充之。唯泰疏卷一總覽表之「隨眠品六十九行」〔X53n0836 0006b06〕為本品頌數之第二獨立源，非疏文，不得充作科判 witness。以下三家並錄。

（一）十事與品科

十事訓詞之所本——光記逐事引《順正理論》為訓詁根據，其首事作「正理四十五云一堅固根本，令得堅牢，對治遠故」〔T41n1821 0291b03〕。⇒ 十事之訓權威錨於《正理》，非光記自撰。
品級大科與五節細目——光記〔T41n1821 0291a13〕「就此品中，一明惑體、二明惑滅。就第一明惑體中，一正明根本惑、二明雜諸煩惱。就正明根本惑中，一辨根本惑、二諸門分別。就辨根本惑中，一增數以明；二明見、修斷；三別明五見；四便明四倒；五明七、九慢」；頌疏〔T41n1823 0923a14〕「就此品中分二：一明惑體、二明惑滅。就明惑體中分三：一明根本惑、二諸門分別、三雜明諸煩惱。就明根本惑中分五：一明增數、二明見修斷、三明五見、四明四倒、五明七九慢。就第一，明增數中分四：一明六隨眠、二明七隨眠、三明十隨眠、四明九十八隨眠」；寶疏〔T41n1822 0687a10〕「此品文中大分為二：一明惑體用、二明斷不同。就前門中又分為四：一明隨眠、二雜明諸惑、三義門分別、四別明五蓋。明隨眠中，一明體數、二逐要例釋、三緣縛等別。體數門中，一明六隨眠、二明經說七、三分六為十、四分九十八」。⭐ 互異點＝惑體章下位之分法（光記二分·頌疏三分·寶疏四分）與用字（惑體與惑體用·惑滅與斷不同）。唯錄不判。

（二）七隨眠與有貪之立

科判起——光記〔T41n1821 0291c14〕「此下第二明七隨眠，此即問也……上一句正答，下三句立有貪所以」。
有貪立名之二由——光記〔T41n1821 0291c20〕「第二句於內門轉故，所以不名欲貪。第三句為遮解脫想，所以名有貪」。⇒ 明分二由而與頌之二三句一一相配。

（三）隨眠與心相應之諍（三宗鼎立·子1 最密之問答鏈）

兩關徵定——光記〔T41n1821 0291c25〕「兩關徵定。為欲貪體即是隨眠，據持業釋？為是欲貪之隨眠義，據依主釋」。
反責疑意——光記〔T41n1821 0291c27〕「若爾何失者，反責疑意」；寶疏〔T41n1822 0687c13〕「若爾何失，反問二釋也」。
二俱有過——光記〔T41n1821 0291c28〕「至三根相應者，重顯疑意。持業、依主二俱有過」。
難方之引經與難依主釋——光記〔T41n1821 0292a05〕「引經正取并隨眠斷一句為難」·〔T41n1821 0292a07〕「據依主釋。隨眠應是心不相應，同大眾部等。彼計隨眠是心不相應」。
毘婆沙師之正義——光記〔T41n1821 0292a15〕「毘婆沙師至即是隨眠者，毘婆沙師作如是說：欲貪等體即是隨眠，據持業釋。是心相應，非不相應」；寶疏〔T41n1822 0687c12〕「有部欲貪即隨眠。前二屬主，有部持業。論」。
豈不違經之徵——光記〔T41n1821 0292a18〕「豈不違經者，大眾部等徵」。此徵之部派歸屬繫於光記之標，論本無其名——引用時須顯其為疏家所繫，勿作論本明文。
通經——光記〔T41n1821 0292a18〕「無違經失至是相應法者，毘婆沙師通經。經言并隨眠斷者，不但斷欲貪體，并貪相應、所緣隨縛亦斷故」。
何理為證之責與法勝論師之解——光記〔T41n1821 0292b02〕「何理為證知定相應者，大眾部等責」·〔T41n1821 0292b03〕「以諸隨眠至是相應法者，毘婆沙師中法勝論師解。故正理云經主此中先敘法勝所說」。⇒ 光記於此逕引《正理》之「經主」一詞，並繫「法勝論師」之名為毘婆沙一系立說之本源。
此皆非證——光記〔T41n1821 0292b16〕「此皆非證至是隨眠所為者，大眾部等非。此皆非證」。
論主評取經部——光記〔T41n1821 0292b21〕「論主評取經部。經部於此所說如何？」。⇒ 明標「評取」二字。
述經部宗——光記〔T41n1821 0292b22〕「彼說欲貪至即名纏故者，述經部宗」。
睡覺二義——光記〔T41n1821 0292c01〕「經部答。惑不現行，如睡相似，故名為睡」·〔T41n1821 0292c03〕「經部答。惑現行時，覺察」。
種子與念種子之同一功能——光記〔T41n1821 0293a02〕「經部師，煩惱種子及念種子，俱有功能，竝無別體。由此不同故，難大眾部等」。
六六經之四番問答——光記〔T41n1821 0293a05〕「說一切有部難。經中既說於其樂受有貪隨眠，明知隨眠即是現起，如何乃言隨眠名種」·〔T41n1821 0293a08〕「經部通經。經中但說有貪隨眠，不言樂受現行之時即有隨眠，何所違害」·〔T41n1821 0293a10〕「於何時有者，說一切有部問」·〔T41n1821 0293a11〕「經部答。於彼樂受熏種睡時名有貪隨眠。或假於貪因上立隨眠果名」。
寶疏之三宗總表——寶疏〔T41n1822 0687c10〕「經部師宗現行名纏，種名隨眠。大眾部等隨眠體是不相應行，即是欲貪之隨眠。有部欲貪即隨眠」。⇒ 寶疏於段首先列三宗立場，體例較光記逐句問答式更綱要化，三宗繫屬與光記全合而無互異。

（四）十隨眠·九十八·見修斷

見修斷科判起——光記〔T41n1821 0294a16〕「此下第二明見修斷，此即總標……忍聲通說法智忍、類智忍，此中明忍而言智者，從果為名」。
異生不能斷見所斷惑之異說——光記〔T41n1821 0294b02〕「有餘師說至諸見未斷者，敘異說。外道諸仙不能伏見所斷惑，修所斷惑但能暫伏而得上生。故婆沙五十一云謂譬喻者作如是說：異生不能斷諸煩惱」。⇒ 光記引《婆沙》繫此說出自譬喻者，與本論之「有餘師說」相印證。

（五）五見自體

科判起——光記〔T41n1821 0297c04〕「此下第三別明五見體。就中，一正明五見體、二別釋戒禁取」。
薩迦耶見之二釋並陳——光記〔T41n1821 0297c09〕「經部師釋。壞故名薩，聚謂迦耶，迦耶名身。壞即是非常義，聚即是和合蘊義。迦耶即薩，名薩迦耶，持業釋也」·〔T41n1821 0297c15〕「毘婆沙者至五取蘊起者，第二毘婆沙師釋。有故名薩，身義如前。故正理云有故名薩，聚謂迦耶，即是和合積聚為義」。寶疏於同段標其繫屬〔T41n1822 0690c09〕「論『壞故名薩至方執我故』，論主引經部釋，如文可解」·〔T41n1822 0690c13〕「論『毘婆沙者至名薩迦耶』，論主引有部釋也」，並另補《正理》對經部釋之反詰〔T41n1822 0690c10〕「正理破云若爾，何用標以薩聲，但迦耶聲足遮常故，則應但立迦耶見名。無法是常而可聚集，何用身上標以壞聲」——此反詰為光記所未見引。頌疏則不分二科，逕連書之〔T41n1823 0924b16〕「薩迦耶見，此云壞身見，或名有身見，故論云：壞故名薩，聚謂迦耶……毘婆沙師作如是釋：有故名薩，身義如前」。⭐ 互異點＝科判之精細度（光記寶疏分二釋·頌疏連書）。
邪見之立名——光記〔T41n1821 0298a23〕「邪見者，以過重故偏立邪名，如說臭蘇，凡蘇皆臭，臭中極者名曰臭蘇……謂此邪見唯損減故，所餘四見有增益故」。光記引喻用字作「蘇」，與底本之「酥」為同物異寫（目三之 0100002 條）。
見取之釋名——光記〔T41n1821 0298b02〕「見取者，釋劣謂勝，明見取。諸有漏法皆名為劣，聖所斷故。執此劣法為最勝者，總名見取」。
戒禁取之釋名——光記〔T41n1821 0298b09〕「戒禁取者，釋第三句非因道妄謂，明戒禁取。於非因、非道，妄謂是因、是道，是見一切總說名戒禁取。如諸外道或計大自在天為因、或計生主為因」；寶疏於同處僅一句總標〔T41n1822 0691a23〕「戒禁取，此釋戒禁取也」——詳略差顯著；頌疏行文最簡〔T41n1823 0924c15〕「戒禁取者，論云：『若於非因起是因見，此見何故非見集斷？』頌曰：於大自在等，非因妄執因，從常我倒生，故唯見苦斷」。
別釋戒禁取之科——光記〔T41n1821 0298c08〕「此下第二別釋戒禁取。問：若於非因起是因見，此見何故非見集斷，而說見苦斷耶？『頌曰至故唯見苦斷』者，頌答」。

（六）四顛倒

科判起——光記〔T41n1821 0299c22〕「此下第四明四顛倒。問：如前所說戒禁取從常我倒生，為但有斯二種顛倒？應知顛倒……總有四」。
十二倒異說之部屬——光記〔T41n1821 0300c28〕「敘異說。准《婆沙》、《正理》，是分別論者。於十二中八唯見斷。常、我各三，謂想、心、見。樂、淨各一，所謂見倒。四通見、修斷。樂、淨各二，所謂想、心」。⇒ 光記明繫此異說之宗為分別論者。
毘婆沙師之不許——光記〔T41n1821 0301a04〕「毘婆沙師至畫藥叉迷亂者，毘婆沙師不許此義。若有樂、淨想心現行，便許聖者有樂、淨倒。聖者亦起有情想、心，是即亦應許有我見倒」；寶疏於同段另出三分科判〔T41n1822 0693c10〕「論『毘婆沙師不許此義』，已下有三：一反難破異部、二順釋成自宗、三正通異部難」，其上並先申此段之問所在〔T41n1822 0693c07〕「四顛倒不通修斷唯見斷者，未離欲聖。既已斷樂、淨二倒，因何於不淨之境而取淨相，無樂之中而求於樂起貪欲也」。⭐ 互異點＝科判之細密度（寶疏三分·光記逐句直釋），義理內容全合。
引慶喜頌之判——寶疏〔T41n1822 0693c20〕「論主引慶喜頌難」；頌疏〔T41n1823 0925a28〕「故引頌言」。⇒ 二疏同判此二十字為所引之頌而非本頌，是本子引頌之古德 witness。
頌文四句之科判功能——頌疏〔T41n1823 0925a09〕「四顛倒自體，謂從於三見，唯倒推增故，想心隨見力。釋曰：初兩句出體，第三句廢立，第四句通經」。⇒ 此拈出頌之四句各司何職（出體·廢立·通經），為光記寶疏所未明白揭出之科判角度。

（七）七慢九慢

科判起——光記〔T41n1821 0301b19〕「此下第五明七、九慢。就中，一正明七、九慢；二釋未斷不起」。
增上慢之異釋——光記〔T41n1821 0301c25〕「有餘師說：於證少德，謂己證多，心生高舉，名增上慢」。⇒ 於本論訓詞外別引一異釋供並存。
九慢類——光記〔T41n1821 0302a14〕「慢類有九：我勝者，謂我勝彼；我等者，謂我等彼；我劣者，謂我劣彼……此九從前七中三出」；寶疏〔T41n1822 0695b14〕「慢類有九，自此已下第二釋慢類也。正理論云類是品類義，即慢之差別」；頌疏〔T41n1823 0925b22〕「慢類有九：一我勝慢類、二我等慢類、三我劣慢類……從三者，此九慢類從前七慢中三慢流出」。⇒ 三疏於九慢類之列名與流出架構全無互異。

（八）諸門分別（前五門）

八門總科——光記〔T41n1821 0303b11〕「此下大文第二諸門分別。就中，一遍行、非遍行；二漏、無漏緣；三二種隨增；四二性分別；五明根、非根；六明惑能繫；七明惑隨增；八明次第起」；頌疏〔T41n1823 0926a11〕「遍行非遍行、二明漏無漏、三明二種隨增、四明二性分別、五明根非根、六明惑能繫、七明惑隨增、八明次第起」。⇒ 二家逐字幾同；本子涵前五門，門六至門八落子2 與子3，不越界。
愛慢是否亦遍行之四番往復——光記〔T41n1821 0303c06〕「雖爾遍行至應亦遍行者，經部難：雖爾，遍行亦非唯此十一隨眠，以理而言，若於是處有我見行，是處必應起我愛我慢……是即愛慢亦應遍行」·〔T41n1821 0303c12〕「若爾頓緣至何所斷耶者，毘婆沙師反責經部。若說愛、慢頓緣見、修所斷起故，應言愛、慢何所斷耶」·〔T41n1821 0303c14〕「應言修所斷至見力引故者，經部答。應言修所斷，以雜緣境界故，見斷愛、慢部分別緣。或應見所斷，由見力引故」·〔T41n1821 0303c18〕「毘婆沙師至不說自成者，述自宗。毘婆沙師作如是說：此愛、慢二是自相惑，非共相惑，無頓緣力故非遍行」。⇒ 子1 第二密之問答鏈，光記逐句標明宗屬。其第二番之繫屬與眾賢所引之角度有異（目五之八），唯錄不判。
根非根之科與婆沙廢立——光記〔T41n1821 0306c26〕「此下第五明根非根，就中：一明不善根、二明無記根……婆沙一百一十二廢立云：又此三種具足五義，謂通五部、遍在六識、是隨眠性、能起麁惡身業語業、作斷善根牢強加行，是故獨立為不善根」；頌疏〔T41n1823 0927c04〕「無記根。且初第一，明不善根者，論云：於上所說不善惑中，幾是不善根？幾非不善根」；寶疏〔T41n1822 0699a03〕「無記根、三明四記論。此文初也」。
無記根之三——光記〔T41n1821 0307b12〕「此國諸師說無記根亦有三種……毘婆沙師說無記根有三，謂無記愛、慧、無明。無記愛者，謂色無色界五部愛；無記慧者，謂有覆無記慧、無覆無記慧」。

（九）四種記

四記如次答四問——光記〔T41n1821 0308a20〕「捨置記。此之四記，如其次第答彼四問。此即釋上半頌。如有問者：一問死；二問生；三問勝；四問我一、異等。此即指事別顯四也」。
後三問之異說與釋通——光記逐一標其層次〔T41n1821 0308b13〕「有作是說至非一切當生者，初問無異說，後三問有異說。此即外人設難」·〔T41n1821 0308b16〕「者言至仍未解故者，此即論主釋通」·〔T41n1821 0308b22〕「又作是說至如識果因者，此即外人設難」·〔T41n1821 0308b28〕「然彼問者至應反詰記者，此即論主釋通」·〔T41n1821 0308c05〕「又作是說至云何名記者，此即外人設難」·〔T41n1821 0308c08〕「然彼所問至如何不名記者，此即論主釋通」。
依經辨釋之經屬——光記〔T41n1821 0309a14〕「此下第三依經辨釋。今依契經辨問記相。於大眾部經，問記有四。『何等為四』者，此即總問」。⇒ 明標所引之經出自大眾部經，與目四第二十五條真諦之「大德摩訶僧祇」相印證。
寶疏之三重科判——寶疏〔T41n1822 0700a03〕「捨置記，長行中有三：一敘婆沙釋、二本論諸師釋、三依經釋。就婆沙釋中有四：一舉數、二列名、三牒釋、四問答分別」。⇒ 較光記之三段（總問總答·別問別答·依經辨釋）另立一系。⭐ 互異點＝科判之角度。
頌疏之逐例對配——頌疏〔T41n1823 0928a13〕「捨置記，如死生殊勝，我蘊一異等。釋曰：上兩句標，下兩句指事釋之。且問記有四：一應一向記、二應分別記、三應反詰記、四應捨置記。如問死者：『一切有情皆當死不？』應一向記」。⇒ 於四記逐一舉例最為條理，行文亦最精簡。

（十）三疏互異總覽（並錄不判）

議題	光記	寶疏	頌疏	互異之點
品級大科之用字	明惑體／明惑滅	明惑體用／明斷不同	明惑體／明惑滅	寶疏獨立一格
惑體章之下位分法	二分（正明根本惑／明雜諸煩惱）	四分（隨眠／雜明諸惑／義門分別／五蓋）	三分（根本惑／諸門分別／雜明諸煩惱）	科層寬窄三式
品名之釋	隨逐有情名隨·行相微細名眠	行相微細·隨縛隨增	隨逐有情·增昏滯故	訓詞著眼各異而所指同
薩迦耶見之二釋	分二科（經部師釋／毘婆沙師釋）	分二科並補正理反詰	連書不分科	科判精細度三式
戒禁取之釋	詳列外道所計	一句總標	覆述頌文略釋	詳略差最大之一處
毘婆沙師不許此義之科	逐句直釋	三分（反難破異部／順釋成自宗／正通異部難）	未別立科	寶疏最見綱要
頌之四句何職	未明拈	未明拈	出體／廢立／通經	頌疏獨有
三宗立場之陳法	逐句問答標宗	段首先列三宗總表	未逐句標	體例之異·繫屬全合
九慢類之列名與流出	全合	全合	全合	三家無互異
諸門八門之總科	全合	章內編號自成一系	全合	引「第N」必繫其家

三疏互異之處，逐家並錄，不判是非。三疏之判釋與其互異之義理取捨，別居義疏層之承衍節。寶疏之章內編號自成一系，引其「第N」時不得與光記頌疏互充。

七、互讀（唯識根系掛鏈·②橋）

本子所立之隨眠體與其開合，於唯識根系有可掛鏈之題目——其最顯者為煩惱種子與現行之分位：本子錄經部之說作「煩惱睡位說名隨眠，於覺位中即名纏故」〔0099a03 前後〕，並訓種子曰「謂自體上差別功能，從煩惱生能生煩惱」〔0099a06 前後〕，又以念種子為比〔0099a07 前後〕；其次為隨眠是否心不相應一諍〔0098c16 前後〕，其所爭之『不相應行能否為煩惱之種』一問，正是彼系論種子所依之前題。

然本子之唯識系逐字錨無徵——本帙體例，掛鏈須逐條繫彼系之逐字與頁錨，方得入讀者面；本子所備之校本座標中無一條唯識系逐字錨。⇒ 依零命中亦據實誌錄之律，本目唯標題目而從闕逐字，不據記憶擬補、不據現代研究補入。掛鏈之逐字取材，別俟義理之判。

八、譯史

玄奘新譯（本底本）：《開元釋教錄》著錄「阿毘達磨俱舍論三十卷」〔T55n2154 0557a22〕，其夾註逐字作「第二出與真諦出者同本永徽二年五月十日於大慈恩寺翻經院譯至五年七月二十七日畢沙門元瑜筆受」〔T55n2154 0557a22〕。本子卷端題「阿毘達磨俱舍論卷第十九」〔T29 0098b13〕，品續題「分別隨眠品第五之一」〔T29 0098b17〕。
真諦舊譯（異譯校本）：《開元釋教錄》於論藏部類作「阿毘達磨俱舍釋論二十二卷陳天竺三藏真諦譯」〔T55n2154 0620c17〕。其本品作「分別惑品第五」，品名與玄奘不同（目四）。
對辯二論之譯：《開元釋教錄》並結曰「右二部論與俱舍論頌同釋異並眾賢造」〔T55n2154 0621a01〕。「頌同釋異」四字即本子目五體例之根據——二論用俱舍本頌而別作長行；本子所引眾賢九條，條條皆牒俱舍長行之語而別立己釋，正是此四字之實況。
造論緣起：《婆藪盤豆法師傳》記其造論體例作「立薩婆多義隨有僻處以經部義破之」〔T50n2049 0190b15〕。⇒ 本子之隨眠不相應一諍，論主錄毘婆沙師之正義而末下「然經部師所說最善」〔0099a01〕一語，正是此體例最典型之一例；而眾賢於此處反破最烈（目五之一·之二），亦與傳所記後事相應。唯錄事實·不作優劣之判。
頌本之獨立：本頌別行本＝《阿毘達磨俱舍論本頌》T29n1560，其隨眠品品題夾注作「六十九頌」〔T29n1560 0319a09〕。此數與神泰疏卷一總覽表之「隨眠品六十九行」〔X53n0836 0006b06〕相合，二源之數同而量詞之二讀互見（T1560 之校記 0319003 作「頌【大】，行【宋】【元】」）。誌錄不判。
諸疏之次：光記 T41n1821（普光·主）·寶疏 T41n1822（法寶·副）·頌疏 T41n1823（圓暉·科判）·神泰疏 X53n0836（殘·隨眠品闕）。

九、校本定位

玄奘 T1558 卷十九（底本）〔0098b13–0104a01〕：卷端題 0098b13 · 品續題 0098b17 · 開卷承轉 0098b18 · 正1 0098b21 · 正2 0098c05 · 正3 0099a29 · 正4·正5 0099b08 · 正6 0099c10 · 正7 0099c28 · 正8 0100a28 · 正9 0100b26 · 引頌 0101a03 · 正10 0101a10 · 正11 0101b17 · 正12·正13 0101b27 · 正14至正16 0102a11 · 正17·正18 0102b17 · 正19 0102c14 · 正20前半 0103a01 · 正20後半·正21 0103a08 · 正22 0103a25。章界：辨根本惑五節之起 0098b18 · 0099c06 · 0099c26 · 0100b21 · 0101a08；諸門分別章起 0101b25 · 門二 0102a09 · 門三 0102b14 · 門四 0102c12 · 門五（含四記）0102c28。
真諦 T1559：對應段 0252c06–0257b11。要目 0252c06 · 0252c09 · 0252c11 · 0252c16 · 0252c18 · 0252c23 · 0253a12 · 0253a16 · 0253a20 · 0253b01 · 0253b07 · 0253b12 · 0253c10 · 0253c25 · 0254a22 · 0254b16 · 0254c28 · 0255a07 · 0255a12 · 0255b02 · 0255b14 · 0255c19 · 0256a19 · 0256b13 · 0256b28 · 0256c04 · 0256c05 · 0256c21 · 0257a27 · 0257b07 · 0257b11（迄·段界）。卷界：卷十四 0252c02 · 卷十五 0259c19。
眾賢 T1562〔辯隨眠品第五 0596a11 起〕：0596c24 · 0597a02 · 0598b16 · 0599c29 · 0601b13 · 0606a03 · 0606c21 · 0607b10 · 0607b13 · 0613a05 · 0618a17。T1563〔辯隨眠品第六 0892c12 起〕：0893c12（近似申義句·非逐字對辯）。子1 場景範圍約 0596a11 至 0622c10。
光記 T41n1821〔卷十九 0291a02–0309b20〕：0291a05 · 0291a06 · 0291a13 · 0291b03 · 0291c14 · 0291c20 · 0291c25 · 0291c27 · 0291c28 · 0292a05 · 0292a07 · 0292a15 · 0292a18 · 0292b02 · 0292b03 · 0292b16 · 0292b21 · 0292b22 · 0292c01 · 0292c03 · 0293a02 · 0293a05 · 0293a08 · 0293a10 · 0293a11 · 0294a16 · 0294b02 · 0297c04 · 0297c09 · 0297c15 · 0298a23 · 0298b02 · 0298b09 · 0298c08 · 0299c22 · 0300c28 · 0301a04 · 0301b19 · 0301c25 · 0302a14 · 0303b11 · 0303c06 · 0303c12 · 0303c14 · 0303c18 · 0306c26 · 0307b12 · 0308a20 · 0308b13 · 0308b16 · 0308b22 · 0308b28 · 0308c05 · 0308c08 · 0309a14。
寶疏 T41n1822〔卷十九 0687a02–0701a17〕：0687a05 · 0687a06 · 0687a10 · 0687c10 · 0687c12 · 0687c13 · 0690c09 · 0690c10 · 0690c13 · 0691a23 · 0693c07 · 0693c10 · 0693c20 · 0695b14 · 0699a03 · 0700a03。
頌疏 T41n1823〔論本第十九 0923a11–0928b21〕：0923a13 · 0923a14 · 0924b16 · 0924c15 · 0925a09 · 0925a28 · 0925b22 · 0926a10 · 0926a11 · 0927c04 · 0928a13。無「分別隨眠品」五字——以此為檢索串搜頌疏必假零命中，其界以卷題與卷首正文首句核。
神泰疏 X53n0836：隨眠品全闕——本子無泰疏可繫（據實標闕·不補）。其卷一總覽表之頌數語＝0006b06；界品泛涉五見之句＝0010a24（非隨眠品疏文·不得充）。
頌本 T1560：隨眠品品題夾注 0319a09（六十九頌）·校記 0319003。
經錄·僧傳：T55n2154 0557a22 · 0620c17 · 0621a01；T50n2049 0190b15。
校勘：卷十九 <app> 錨三十七枚（異讀三十一·重出併四·濾器桶二）·無升定本案。
唯識系互讀錨：從闕（本子未有經裁准之逐字錨·目七已誌）。

The Chapter on the World shows the establishing of sentient beings and of the receptacle; the Chapter on Action shows why they are so; and the Chapter on the Latent Tendencies then asks by what action is able to grow. This unit begins from the one question 「隨眠有幾」 tr. “how many are the latent tendencies?” — first establishing the latent tendencies as the root of the several existences and adducing the ten functions of the afflictions, next setting up six and seven by the opening and gathering of greed, whereupon it enters the first great dispute of this chapter: whether the latent tendencies are associated with mind or not associated with mind. The dispute done, it next opens them into ten by the difference in the modes of view, next opens them into ninety-eight by the three gates of mode, category, and realm, next analyzes what is settled and unsettled in abandonment by seeing and by cultivation, next explains separately the entities of the five views and the holding of what is not a cause to be a cause, next explains through the four inversions and the eight inversions of perception and of mind, next makes plain the seven prides and the nine classes of pride and the ground on which the noble one does not give rise to them; and from 「九十八隨眠中，幾是遍行」 tr. “among the ninety-eight latent tendencies, how many are all-pervading?” onward it turns into the distinctions through the several gates, this unit covering the first five gates — all-pervading and not all-pervading, taking as object what has and what is without outflows, the two kinds of increase by attachment, the analysis by the two ethical qualities, and what is and is not a root — closing with an appended section on the four gates of determination: the section on the entity of the afflictions of an Abhidharma treatise opens from here.

I. Doctrinal Outline and Placement

Outline system	The position of this passage
Xuanzang’s T1558 in nine chapters	The first part of Chapter Five, Analysis of the Latent Tendencies (chapter title〔T29 0098b17〕) — this unit (Unit 1) = the whole of Fascicle Nineteen〔0098b13–0104a01〕. Root stanzas 1 through 22, eighteen `<lg>` blocks (seventeen blocks of root stanza plus one block of quoted stanza)
The anchor carried over	At the head of the chapter, 「前言世別皆由業生，業由隨眠方得生長，離隨眠業無感有能。所以者何？隨眠有幾？」 tr. “it was said before that the differences of the world all arise from action; action grows only when the latent tendencies sustain it; parted from the latent tendencies, action has no power to call forth a coming existence. Why so? And how many are the latent tendencies?”〔T29 0098b18〕— what is carried over is precisely 「世別由業生」 tr. “the differences of the world arise from action,” with which the Chapter on Action opened, joined word for word, and it is the plainest cross-chapter hand-over in this collection
The chapter-level main outline in the three commentaries (a twofold division word for word · the first time in this collection that all three houses agree entirely)	Puguang’s Record〔T41n1821 0291a13〕: 「就此品中，一明惑體、二明惑滅」 tr. “within this chapter, first the entity of the confusions is explained, second the extinction of the confusions” · Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary〔T41n1823 0923a14〕: 「就此品中分二：一明惑體、二明惑滅」 tr. “within this chapter it divides into two: first explaining the entity of the confusions, second explaining the extinction of the confusions” · Fabao’s Commentary〔T41n1822 0687a10〕: 「此品文中大分為二：一明惑體用、二明斷不同」 tr. “the text of this chapter is mainly divided into two: first explaining the entity and function of the confusions, second explaining the differences of their abandonment”
The gloss on the chapter name (all three recorded together)	Puguang’s Record〔T41n1821 0291a06〕: 「分別隨眠品者，隨逐有情名隨，行相微細名眠，如人睡眠行相難了。此品廣明，故名分別」 tr. “as for the chapter analyzing the latent tendencies: following along after sentient beings is called ‘following,’ and a mode of apprehension that is subtle is called ‘slumber,’ as when a man sleeps his mode of apprehension is hard to know; this chapter explains it at length, hence ‘analysis’” · Fabao’s Commentary〔T41n1822 0687a06〕: 「行相微細，隨縛隨增，是隨眠義。此品廣明，名分別隨眠品」 tr. “a subtle mode of apprehension, binding along and increasing by attachment, is the sense of latent tendency; this chapter explains it at length, and is named the chapter analyzing the latent tendencies” · Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary〔T41n1823 0923a13〕: 「貪等煩惱，名曰隨眠，隨逐有情，增昏滯故，故名隨眠。此品廣明，故名分別」 tr. “the afflictions of greed and the rest are called latent tendencies, since they follow along after sentient beings and increase their dimness and stagnation, and so are named latent tendencies; this chapter explains it at length, hence ‘analysis’”
Why the latent tendencies are explained next after action (the two commentaries each give their ground)	Puguang’s Record〔T41n1821 0291a10〕: 「所以業後次明隨眠者，業因感果不能獨起必藉惑緣，惑望果疎故，隨眠後說」 tr. “the reason the latent tendencies are explained next after action is that action as a cause calling forth results cannot arise alone but must depend upon the condition of confusion, and since confusion is the remoter with respect to the result, the latent tendencies are spoken of afterward” · Fabao’s Commentary〔T41n1822 0687a08〕: 「所以業後明隨眠者，業因惑故能招諸有。業別、惑通，故先明業，後釋隨眠」 tr. “the reason the latent tendencies are explained after action is that action, by reason of confusion, can call forth the several existences; action is particular and confusion general, and so action is explained first and the latent tendencies glossed after”
The chapters occupied by this unit	Puguang’s Record〔T41n1821 0291a15〕: 「就正明根本惑中，一辨根本惑、二諸門分別。就辨根本惑中，一增數以明；二明見、修斷；三別明五見；四便明四倒；五明七、九慢」 tr. “within the properly explaining of the root confusions, first the root confusions are analyzed, second the distinctions through the several gates; within the analyzing of the root confusions, first explaining by increasing the count; second explaining what is abandoned by seeing and by cultivation; third explaining the five views separately; fourth explaining thereupon the four inversions; fifth explaining the seven and the nine prides” — ⇒ Unit 1 covers all five sections of the chapter 「辨根本惑」 tr. “analyzing the root confusions,” together with the first five gates of the chapter 「諸門分別」 tr. “distinctions through the several gates”
The opening of the chapter of distinctions through the several gates (all three houses at one anchor)	The T1558 anchor〔0101b25〕: 「九十八隨眠中，幾是遍行、幾非遍行？」 tr. “among the ninety-eight latent tendencies, how many are all-pervading and how many are not all-pervading?” — Puguang’s Record〔T41n1821 0303b11〕: 「此下大文第二諸門分別。就中，一遍行、非遍行；二漏、無漏緣；三二種隨增；四二性分別；五明根、非根；六明惑能繫；七明惑隨增；八明次第」 tr. “below, the second of the main text, the distinctions through the several gates. Within it, first all-pervading and not all-pervading; second taking as object what has and what is without outflows; third the two kinds of increase by attachment; fourth the analysis by the two ethical qualities; fifth explaining what is and is not a root; sixth explaining how the confusions bind; seventh explaining the increase by attachment of the confusions; eighth explaining their sequence” · Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary〔T41n1823 0926a10〕: 「從此大文第二，諸門分別，就中分八：一明遍行非遍行、二明漏無漏、三明二種隨增、四明二性分別、五明根非根、六明惑能繫、七明惑隨增、八明次第起」 tr. “from here the second of the main text, the distinctions through the several gates, within which it divides into eight: first explaining all-pervading and not all-pervading, second explaining what has and what is without outflows, third explaining the two kinds of increase by attachment, fourth explaining the analysis by the two ethical qualities, fifth explaining what is and is not a root, sixth explaining how the confusions bind, seventh explaining the increase by attachment of the confusions, eighth explaining the arising in sequence” ⇒ the names of the eight gates are all but word for word the same in the two houses; this unit covers the first five gates, gate six onward falling in Fascicle Twenty (Unit 2)
The fascicle divisions of the three commentaries agree entirely with Xuanzang’s	Where Unit 1 begins: Abhidharmakośa Fascicle Nineteen〔T29 0098b13〕· Puguang’s Record Fascicle Nineteen〔T41n1821 0291a02〕· Fabao’s Commentary Fascicle Nineteen〔T41n1822 0687a02〕· Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary, Treatise Proper Nineteen〔T41n1823 0923a11〕. ⇒ the chapter on the latent tendencies is exactly three fascicles in all three commentaries, and their fascicle boundaries all fall at〔0104a06〕and〔0108b19〕of T1558; this is an independent witness to the carving of this unit
The closing sentence of the fascicle	「為命者即身、為命者異身。此問名為但應捨置」 tr. “is the life-principle the body, or is the life-principle other than the body? This question is called one that should only be set aside”〔T29 0103c26 and thereabouts〕— the enumeration of the fourteen indeterminate matters being exhausted, Fascicle Nineteen is at once closed by its end-title. The fascicle boundary falls exactly at a stanza boundary (the end of Root 22), and the carving of this unit is the strongest in this chapter

Stanza / prose-commentary format: root stanzas (the stanza boundaries fixed by the separate edition T1560) plus the prose self-commentary. This unit has seventeen blocks of root stanza —〔0098b21〕Root 1·〔0098c05〕Root 2·〔0099a29〕Root 3·〔0099b08〕Roots 4 and 5 (forty characters)·〔0099c10〕Root 6·〔0099c28〕Root 7·〔0100a28〕Root 8·〔0100b26〕Root 9·〔0101a10〕Root 10·〔0101b17〕Root 11·〔0101b27〕Roots 12 and 13 (forty characters)·〔0102a11〕Roots 14 through 16 (sixty characters)·〔0102b17〕Roots 17 and 18 (forty characters)·〔0102c14〕Root 19·〔0103a01〕the first half of Root 20 (ten characters)·〔0103a08〕the second half of Root 20 and Root 21 (thirty characters)·〔0103a25〕Root 22. One block of quoted stanza〔0101a03〕, the twenty characters of 「由有想亂倒」 tr. “because there is a disordered inversion of perception”— the judgment of it has a warrant in the preceding text, 「若爾，何故尊者慶喜告彼尊者辯自在言」 tr. “if that is so, why then did the Venerable Ānanda say to that Venerable Sovereign in Eloquence”〔0101a01 and thereabouts〕, and it has two witnesses among the ancient masters: Fabao’s Commentary〔T41n1822 0693c20〕: 「論主引慶喜頌難」 tr. “the author cites Ānanda’s stanza as an objection” · Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary〔T41n1823 0925a28〕: 「故引頌言」 tr. “hence a stanza is cited that says”.

The two long passages of prose commentary (each exceeding seven hundred characters of pure Chinese · the densest places of question and answer and of divergent accounts):〔0098c05〕the explanation of Root 2 (eight hundred eleven characters · the densest chain of question and answer · the place where three schools stand together)·〔0103a25〕the explanation of Root 22 (one thousand and eleven characters · the whole unfolding of the four gates of determination and the evidence from the sūtras).

Two places in this unit where two accounts are recorded without adjudication (recording the two parties only · not judging which prevails): ① the explaining through of the eight inversions of perception and mind and of the four inversions — 「有餘部說：倒有十二」 tr. “some other school says: the inversions are twelve”〔0100c17〕and 「毘婆沙師不許此義」 tr. “the Vaibhāṣika masters do not grant this sense”〔0100c21〕are recorded together as two parties, and at the end there is cited besides 「有餘師復作是說：八想心倒，學未全斷」 tr. “some other master further says thus: the eight inversions of perception and of mind are not entirely cut off by one in training”〔0101a05 and thereabouts〕. ② the three and the four indeterminate roots — 「迦濕彌羅國諸毘婆沙師說無記根亦有三種」 tr. “the several Vaibhāṣika masters of the land of Kaśmīra say that the indeterminate roots are likewise three”〔0103a11 and thereabouts〕and 「外方諸師立此有四」 tr. “the masters of other regions set up four of these”〔0103a17 and thereabouts〕are two accounts recorded together.

One place in this unit where the author states his own appraisal (not a recording of two accounts without adjudication): whether the latent tendencies are associated with mind or not associated〔hanging on the block of Root 2 ·0098c11 onward〕— the Vaibhāṣika masters establish 「欲貪等體即是隨眠」 tr. “the entities of greed for desire and the rest are themselves the latent tendencies”〔0098c19〕, the objector establishes that the latent tendencies are formations not associated with mind, the Sautrāntikas establish 「隨眠體非心相應非不相應」 tr. “the entity of a latent tendency is neither associated with mind nor dissociated from it”〔0099a02〕, and the author, standing outside the three schools, lays down the one sentence 「然經部師所說最善」 tr. “yet what the Sautrāntika masters say is the best”〔0099a01〕, and Puguang marks it here expressly as 「論主評取經部」 tr. “the author appraises and takes the Sautrāntikas”〔T41n1821 0292b21〕. ⇒ here the author has words of taking and rejecting, and this may not be summed up as ‘recording both parties without adjudication’; yet the reasons of both parties are still recorded in full, word for word, in this unit.

II. Terminology (Technical Terms)

Chinese (Xuanzang)	Paramārtha’s divergent name (loc of first occurrence)	The treatise’s defining sentence / what it hangs on
latent tendency	confusion〔T29n1559 0252c06〕· the chapter title reading 「分別惑品第五」 tr. “Chapter Five, Analysis of the Confusions”	「由此隨眠是諸有本，故業離此無感有能」 tr. “because these latent tendencies are the root of the several existences, action parted from them has no power to call forth a coming existence”〔0098b23 and after〕· Puguang’s gloss on the name〔T41n1821 0291a06〕: 「隨逐有情名隨，行相微細名眠」 tr. “following along after sentient beings is called ‘following’; a mode of apprehension that is subtle is called ‘slumber’”
the ten functions of the afflictions	「一堅固根本、二安立相續、三數治自田、四生起等流、五能引生業有、六圓滿自資糧、七令迷境界、八引將識相續、九令離淨品善法類、十成就縛義」 tr. “first firmly strengthening the root, second settledly establishing the continuity, third repeatedly tilling its own field, fourth producing and arising the homogeneous, fifth being able to draw forth and produce action and existence, sixth completing its own provisions, seventh making one bewildered about the object-field, eighth drawing and leading on the continuity of consciousness, ninth making one part from the class of pure and wholesome dharmas, tenth accomplishing the sense of binding”〔T29n1559 0252c11〕	「一堅根本、二立相續、三治自田、四引等流、五發業有、六攝自具、七迷所緣、八導識流、九越善品、十廣縛義」 tr. “first strengthening the root, second establishing the continuity, third tilling its own field, fourth drawing forth the homogeneous, fifth setting going action and existence, sixth gathering its own equipment, seventh bewildering the object, eighth leading the stream of consciousness, ninth overstepping the wholesome class, tenth the sense of binding widely”〔0098b25〕
greed (greed for desire)	「欲欲」 tr. “desire for desire”〔T29n1559 0252c18〕	the first of the six latent tendencies — 「此略應知差別有六，謂貪、瞋、慢、無明、見、疑」 tr. “here, spoken of in brief, it should be known that the differences are six, namely greed, hatred, pride, ignorance, view, and doubt”〔0098b29 and thereabouts〕
craving for existence	「有欲」 tr. “desire for existence”〔T29n1559 0252c18〕	「此中有貪以何為體？謂色無色二界中貪」 tr. “what here has craving for existence for its entity? It is the greed within the two realms of form and of formlessness”〔0099a17 and thereabouts〕·「彼貪多託內門轉故」 tr. “because that greed for the most part turns in dependence upon the inner gate”〔0099a18〕
entanglement	「上心」 tr. “the upper mind”〔T29n1559 0253a16〕	「於覺位中即名纏故」 tr. “because in the stage of waking it is called entanglement”〔0099a04 and thereabouts〕·「謂諸煩惱現起纏心」 tr. “that is, the several afflictions arisen and entangling the mind”〔0099a05 and thereabouts〕
the sleep and the waking of a latent tendency	「惑眠」 tr. “the sleep of a confusion”／「惑覺」 tr. “the waking of a confusion”〔T29n1559 0253a17〕	「何名為睡？謂不現行種子隨逐。何名為覺？謂諸煩惱現起纏心」 tr. “what is called sleep? It is a seed following along without being active. What is called waking? It is the several afflictions arisen and entangling the mind”〔0099a04〕
the seed of an affliction	「種子隨逐」 tr. “a seed following along”〔T29n1559 0253a18 and thereabouts〕	「謂自體上差別功能，從煩惱生能生煩惱」 tr. “it is a capability that is a differentiation upon its own entity, arising from an affliction and able to produce an affliction”〔0099a06 and thereabouts〕
the view of a real person	「身見」 tr. “the view of self”〔T29n1559 0253c25〕	「執我及我所，是薩迦耶見」 tr. “to hold to a self and to what belongs to self is the view of a real person”〔0100a01〕·「壞故名薩，聚謂迦耶，即是無常和合蘊義」 tr. “because it perishes it is called sat; the aggregation is kāya, that is, the sense of aggregates conjoined and impermanent”〔0100a01〕· the divergent gloss 「有故名薩，身義如前」 tr. “because it exists it is called sat; the sense of ‘person’ is as before”〔0100a05〕
the extreme view	「邊見」 tr. “the view of extremes”〔T29n1559 0253b07〕	「即於所執我我所事執斷執常，名邊執見，以妄執取斷常邊故」 tr. “just upon the matter of the self and what belongs to self that are held to, to hold to annihilation and to hold to eternity is called the extreme view, since it falsely holds to the extremes of annihilation and eternity”〔0100a13 and thereabouts〕
wrong view	wrong view (the same)	「於實有體苦等諦中起見撥無，名為邪見」 tr. “to give rise to a view denying outright, within the really existent truths of suffering and the rest, is called wrong view”〔0100a14 and thereabouts〕·「而但撥無名邪見者，以過甚故」 tr. “that only denying outright is called wrong view is because its fault is the graver”〔0100a16 and thereabouts〕
adherence to views	adherence to views (the same)	「於劣謂勝，名為見取」 tr. “to say of the inferior that it is superior is called adherence to views”〔0100a18 and thereabouts〕·「有漏名劣，聖所斷故」 tr. “what has outflows is called inferior, since it is what the noble ones abandon”〔0100a18 and thereabouts〕
adherence to observances and vows	「戒執取」 tr. “adherence by holding to precepts”〔T29n1559 0253b07〕	「於非因道謂因道見，一切總說名戒禁取」 tr. “the view that says of what is neither cause nor path that it is cause and path, all of this together is called adherence to observances and vows”〔0100a20 and thereabouts〕·「理實應立戒禁等取名，略去等言但名戒禁取」 tr. “in strictness the name ought to be set up as adherence to observances and vows and the rest; the word ‘and the rest’ being dropped, it is called adherence to observances and vows only”〔0100a24 and thereabouts〕
the five categories (seeing the four truths · abandonment by cultivation)	—— (Paramārtha’s version in this passage runs with the wording of what the five categories extinguish · setting up no separate fixed name)	「部謂見四諦、修所斷五部。界謂欲色無色三界」 tr. “category means the five categories, what is abandoned by seeing the four truths and by cultivation. Realm means the three realms of desire, form, and formlessness”〔0099b15 and thereabouts〕
injured by receptivity / injured by cognition	「忍所滅」 tr. “extinguished by receptivity”〔T29n1559 0253c10〕	「八十八見所斷，忍所害故。十隨眠修所斷，智所害故」 tr. “eighty-eight are abandoned by seeing, since they are injured by receptivity; ten latent tendencies are abandoned by cultivation, since they are injured by cognition”〔0099c07 and thereabouts〕·「忍聲通說法類智忍」 tr. “the word ‘receptivity’ speaks in general of the receptivity to the cognition of dharma and to the subsequent cognition”〔0099c12〕
the four inversions	「四倒」 tr. “the four inversions”〔T29n1559 0254b16〕	「一於無常執常顛倒、二於諸苦執樂顛倒、三於不淨執淨顛倒、四於無我執我顛倒」 tr. “first the inversion of holding the impermanent to be eternal, second the inversion of holding the several sufferings to be pleasure, third the inversion of holding the impure to be pure, fourth the inversion of holding what is without self to be a self”〔0100b22 and thereabouts〕· the three causes of an inversion, 「一向倒故、推度性故、妄增益故」 tr. “because they are inverted in every part, because they are of the nature of deliberative judgment, because they are false superimposition”〔0100c07 and thereabouts〕
pride beyond excessive pride	「過過慢」 tr. “pride beyond excess”〔T29n1559 0254c29 and thereabouts〕	the third of the seven prides — 「於勝謂勝名慢過慢」 tr. “toward one superior to call oneself superior is pride beyond excessive pride”〔0101a17 and thereabouts〕
the pride of slight inferiority	「下慢」 tr. “the lower pride”〔T29n1559 0254c29 and thereabouts〕	the sixth of the seven prides — 「於多分勝謂己少劣名為卑慢」 tr. “toward one superior by much, to call oneself but slightly inferior, is called the pride of slight inferiority”〔0101a19 and thereabouts〕
the nine classes of pride	「慢類有九種」 tr. “the classes of pride are nine”〔T29n1559 0255a08〕	「然本論說慢類有九」 tr. “yet the root treatise says the classes of pride are nine”〔0101a21〕·「如是九種，從前七慢三中離出」 tr. “these nine kinds are drawn out from three among the seven prides above”〔0101a24 and thereabouts〕
craving for nonexistence	—— (Paramārtha’s version abridges this passage)	「謂三界無常，於此貪求，名無有愛」 tr. “that is, the three realms are impermanent, and to seek greedily upon this is called craving for nonexistence”〔0101b12 and thereabouts〕
all-pervading (latent tendency)	「遍行」 tr. “all-pervading” (of the same family)〔T29n1559 0255b14〕	「力能遍行自界地五部故，此十一皆得遍行名」 tr. “because they have the power to pervade the five categories of their own realm and level, these eleven all obtain the name all-pervading”〔0101c03 and thereabouts〕· the conclusion drawn from three senses, 「依此三義立遍行名」 tr. “upon these three senses the name all-pervading is set up”〔0101c06 and thereabouts〕
independent ignorance	「獨行無明」 tr. “solitary ignorance”〔T29n1559 0255b15〕	「謂七見、二疑、二無明十一」 tr. “that is, the seven views, the two doubts, and the two ignorances, eleven in all”〔0101c04 and thereabouts〕
without outflows	「無流」 tr. “without flow”〔T29n1559 0255c19〕	「見滅道所斷，邪見疑相應，及不共無明，六能緣無漏」 tr. “what is abandoned by seeing cessation and the path, the wrong view and doubt and what is associated with them, and the independent ignorance — these six can take what is without outflows as object”〔0102a11 and thereabouts〕
increase by attachment through the object / through association	「由緣緣故」 tr. “by reason of the object as condition”〔T29n1559 0256a19〕	「遍行隨眠普於自地五部諸法所緣隨增，以能遍緣自地法故」 tr. “an all-pervading latent tendency increases by attachment through the object upon the several dharmas of the five categories of its own level throughout, because it can take the dharmas of its own level as object throughout”〔0102b21 and thereabouts〕·「謂隨何隨眠於自相應法，由相應故於彼隨增」 tr. “that is, whatever latent tendency it be, upon the dharmas associated with itself, by reason of association it increases by attachment upon them”〔0102c08 and thereabouts〕
the unwholesome roots	「惡根」 tr. “the evil roots”〔T29n1559 0256b28〕	「唯欲界繫一切貪瞋及不善癡不善根攝」 tr. “only all greed and hatred affiliated to the realm of desire, and unwholesome delusion, are gathered into the unwholesome roots”〔0103a02 and thereabouts〕·「煩惱，為不善法根立不善根」 tr. “an affliction, being the root of unwholesome dharmas, is set up as an unwholesome root”〔0103a04 and thereabouts〕
the indeterminate roots	「無記根」 tr. “the indeterminate roots” (the same)〔T29n1559 0256c04〕	「謂諸無記愛、癡、慧三，下至異熟生亦無記根攝」 tr. “that is, the three of the several indeterminate craving, delusion, and discernment; and even that produced by maturation is gathered into the indeterminate roots”〔0103a12 and thereabouts〕
the masters of other regions	「外師」 tr. “the outside masters”〔T29n1559 0256c11 and after〕	「外方諸師立此有四，謂諸無記愛、見、慢、癡」 tr. “the masters of other regions set up four of these, namely the several indeterminate craving, view, pride, and delusion”〔0103a17 and thereabouts〕
the four determinations (categorical · by analysis · by counter-question · by setting aside)	「一向記、分別、反問及置記」 tr. “categorical determination, analysis, asking back, and setting-aside determination”〔T29n1559 0256c21〕	「一應一向記、二應分別記、三應反詰記、四應捨置記」 tr. “first what should be determined categorically, second what should be determined by analysis, third what should be determined by counter-question, fourth what should be determined by setting aside”〔0103a27 and thereabouts〕
the fourteen indeterminate matters	the wording of 「十四非記類」 tr. “the fourteen of the class not determined”〔T29n1559 0257b07 and thereabouts〕	「諸契經中說十四無記事」 tr. “the several sūtras speak of fourteen indeterminate matters”〔0103a21 and thereabouts〕· enumerated one by one in the closing passage〔0103c25 and thereabouts〕

The Sanskrit in roman letters for a technical term is hung only upon transcriptions transmitted by the ancient masters and capable of being evidenced. The divergent names in this unit are for the most part differences of rendering-character between the two translations (for the full table see item four), and not glosses of sound and sense by the ancient masters; the three commentaries on this unit show no separate gloss of sound and sense for these names, and so it is left blank, and is not supplied conjecturally on the authority of a modern collated edition.

III. Textual Collation (Taishō Original Notes · Complete Enumeration for Fascicle Nineteen)

Within the range of Unit 1〔0098b13–0104a01〕the <app> anchors number thirty-seven = variant readings thirty-one (four repetitions merged) + filter buckets two (culled by the Latin filter · see the end of the table) + without witness zero. Among the thirty-one variant readings, two belong to collation notes within CBETA’s own base-text system（〔0098c12〕and〔0103a07〕）, not variant readings among the canons, and are marked in the table with 〔CB collation〕 and not counted together with the traditional variants; the remaining twenty-nine are variants of the Song, Yuan, Ming, Palace, and Stone editions. By the form of this collection the base text follows the Taishō 【大】 reading, and where CBETA has restored a reading the base text follows the 【CB】 reading with the Taishō original print recorded alongside (marked ⟨CB⟩ · not entering the count of variant readings).

Note no.	Anchor	Base text 【大】 / variants	Context (word for word · the base-text reading)	Observation (recorded without adjudication)
0098002	0098b25	種【大】，〔absent〕【宋】【元】【明】【宮】【石】	「諸煩惱現起能為十【種】事故，一堅根本」 tr. “because the afflictions, once arisen, are able to perform ten kinds of function; first, strengthening the root”	「十種事」 tr. “ten kinds of function” and 「十事」 tr. “ten functions” — the addition or omission of an empty word after a numeral · it does not change the number or content of the ten functions
0098c1201 ⟨CB⟩	0098c12	若【CB】(collated)／苦 (the Taishō original print)	「於餘六義徵問亦爾。【若】爾何失？二俱有過」 tr. “pressing the other six with the same question is likewise. If it be so, what fault is there? Both alike have a fault”	A collation note within CBETA’s own base-text system — the original print reads 『苦爾何失』, which does not make a sentence, and it is directly corrected to 「若」 tr. “if” · not a divergence between editions
0098003	0098c12	欲【大】，復【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「若【欲】貪體即是隨眠，便違契經」 tr. “if the entity of greed for desire is itself the latent tendency, it contradicts the sūtra”	「若欲貪體」 tr. “if the entity of greed for desire” and 『若復貪體』 — both readings pass in the syntax of this posed question · they do not change the two alternatives set up in the argument
0099001	0099a08	芽【大】，牙【石】	「又如【芽】等有前果生，能生後果功能差別」 tr. “it is again like a sprout and the rest: it arises from a former fruit and can produce a later fruit, a differentiation of capability”	Sprout and tooth are graphically close and identical in sound · the simile of seed and sprout fastens exactly upon the sense of the continuity of the seed
0099002	0099a10	眠【大】，順【宮】	「若執煩惱別有隨【眠】心不相應，名煩惱種」 tr. “if someone insists that apart from the afflictions there is a further latent tendency not associated with mind, and calls it the seed of the affliction”	It touches the sense of the sentence and not the intent of the argument: 「隨眠心不相應」 tr. “the latent tendency not associated with mind” reads smoothly, while 『隨順心不相應』 is muddled in sense · neither reading changes the direction of this sentence, which refutes ‘setting up a separate dissociated dharma as the seed’
0099008	0099b26	耶【大】，邪【石】	following upon the sentence-run 「邊執見亦爾。戒禁取通在二部……邪見通四部」 tr. “the extreme view is likewise. Adherence to observances and vows extends to two categories … wrong view extends to four categories”	Ye and xie are a common instance of graphic closeness and phonetic loan · it does not change the adjudication of the categories by which the five views are abandoned
0099009	0099b29	諦【大】，諦斷【石】	following upon the sentence-run 「邪見通四部，謂見苦、集、滅、道所斷」 tr. “wrong view extends to four categories, namely what is abandoned by seeing suffering, origination, cessation, and the path”	The Stone edition has one character 「斷」 tr. “abandoned” more · perhaps a redundancy carried over from what follows · it does not change the adjudication that wrong view extends to four categories
0099017	0099c13	忍【大】，〔absent〕【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「論曰：【忍】聲通說法類智忍。於忍所害諸隨眠中有頂地攝唯見所斷」 tr. “the treatise says: the word ‘receptivity’ speaks in general of the receptivity to the cognition of dharma and to the subsequent cognition. Among the several latent tendencies injured by receptivity, those gathered into the level of the summit of existence are abandoned by seeing alone”	「忍聲」 tr. “the word ‘receptivity’” and 「聲」 tr. “the word” · perhaps a redundancy carried over from 「忍所害」 tr. “injured by receptivity” above · its absence in the four editions is no obstacle to the sense
0100001	0100a02	無【大】＊，非【石】＊	following upon the sentence-run 「執我及我所，是薩迦耶見……要此想為先方執我故」 tr. “to hold to a self and to what belongs to self is the view of a real person … for that notion must come first before a self is held to” (the glossing passage on the view of a real person)	A collation note with an asterisk repeated within the base text · the variant 「非」 tr. “not” hardly passes in the syntax of this glossing sentence
0100002	0100a17	酥【大】，蘇【宋】【元】【明】【宮】【石】	「如說臭【酥】，惡執惡等，此唯損減，餘增益故」 tr. “as one says ‘stinking ghee’ — where evil holds and evil and the rest, this alone is diminishment, while the rest are superimposition”	The two characters for ghee are variant writings of one thing (in the simile of stinking ghee) · Puguang, citing this simile, writes 「蘇」 tr. “ghee”〔T41n1821 0298a23〕· purely a habit of orthography
0100003	0100b10	苦【大】，若【宋】【元】【明】	「永超眾苦樂，至超【苦】樂處」 tr. “forever overpassing the mass of sufferings and pleasures, arriving at the place beyond suffering and pleasure”	「超苦樂處」 tr. “the place beyond suffering and pleasure” and 『超若樂處』 · the latter is not a word at all · the three editions are perhaps a graphically similar corruption
0101001	0101a01	畫【大】，晝【石】	「如於旋火輪、【畫】藥叉迷亂」 tr. “as one is confused before a whirling firebrand-wheel or a painted yakṣa”	Painted and daytime are graphically close · 「畫藥叉」 tr. “a painted yakṣa” means an image of a yakṣa that has been painted; read as 「晝」 tr. “daytime” it is not a word
0101002	0101a06	纏【大】，終【宮】【石】	「如是八種【纏】，由如實見知聖諦方得永斷」 tr. “eight such entanglements are forever cut off only by knowing as it really is the noble truths”	「八種纏」 tr. “eight kinds of entanglement” and 『八種終』 · the latter hardly passes in this syntax
0101003	0101a07	此【大】，此此【石】	「離【此】無餘永斷方便，故此所說不違彼經」 tr. “apart from this there is no other means of forever cutting them, and so what is said here does not contradict that sūtra”	The doubled character of the Stone edition is a redundancy · it does not change the sense
0101004	0101a12	差別有【大】，有差別【石】	「為唯見隨眠有多【差別】，為餘亦有」 tr. “is it view alone among the latent tendencies that has many differences, or have the rest them too”	An inversion of word order with the sense entirely the same
0101010	0101b02	雖於【大】，反顧【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「謂於如是自所愛樂勝有情聚，【雖於】己身知極下劣而自尊重」 tr. “that is, toward such a host of excellent sentient beings as one loves and delights in, though one knows one’s own person to be utterly inferior, one still holds oneself in esteem”	It touches the wording and not the intent of the argument: 「雖於己身」 tr. “though as to one’s own person” and 「反顧己身」 tr. “looking back upon one’s own person” · both readings pass the sense that ‘within inferiority one still esteems oneself’ · only the momentum of the turn differs
0101011	0101b03	下【大】，〔absent〕【宮】【石】	「雖於己身知極【下】劣而自尊重」 tr. “though one knows one’s own person to be utterly inferior, one still holds oneself in esteem”	「極下劣」 tr. “utterly inferior” and 「極劣」 tr. “utterly low” · the missing character is no obstacle to the sense
0101016	0101b27	見【大】，之【宮】	The stanza, 「【見】苦集所斷，諸見疑相應」 tr. “what is abandoned by seeing suffering and origination, the several views and doubt and what is associated with them” (the first line of Root 12)	「見苦集所斷」 tr. “abandoned by seeing suffering and origination” is the very line of the stanza · 『之苦集所斷』 is not a word
0101017	0101c02	集【大】，〔absent〕【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「論曰：唯見苦【集】所斷見疑，及彼相應不共無明」 tr. “the treatise says: only the views and doubt abandoned by seeing suffering and origination, together with the independent ignorance associated with them”	This prose sentence follows closely upon the stanza line 「見苦集所斷」 tr. “abandoned by seeing suffering and origination” (item 0101016 in the same passage) · the missing character is perhaps a scribal omission · it does not change the range of the eleven all-pervading
0101018	0101c11	有【大】，百【宮】	「不說頓緣自界地一切，然說【有】力能頓緣五部」 tr. “it is not said that it takes as object at once everything of its own realm and level; it is said that it has the power to take the five categories as object at once”	「有力」 tr. “has the power” and 『百力』 · the latter hardly passes in this syntax
0101019	0101c12	於是處淨勝見行是處必應希求高舉是【大】，〔absent〕【宮】	「以於是處有我見行，是處必應起我愛慢；若【於是處淨勝見行，是處必應希求高舉，是】則愛慢應亦遍行」 tr. “for wherever the view of self is active, there the craving for self and the pride of self must arise; if wherever a view of purity or of superiority is active, there seeking and exalting must arise, then craving and pride ought to be all-pervading too”	It touches the sense of the sentence and not the intent of the argument: the Palace edition lacks this whole sentence (the latter half of the objector’s comparison) · lacking it, his objection retains only the one simile of the view of self and lacks the simile of the view of purity and superiority · the force of the argument is the weaker and the conclusion unchanged
0101020	0101c20	能【大】，遍【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「此九雖【能】通緣自上，然理無有自上頓緣」 tr. “although these nine can take both their own and an upper level as object, yet in principle there is no taking of one’s own and an upper level as object at once”	Both readings pass the sense that ‘the nine confusions may take their own and the upper two realms as object’ · only the adverb used differs
0101021	0101c21	界【大】，戒【宮】	「於緣上中，且約【界】說，或唯緣一，或二合緣」 tr. “in taking an upper as object, speaking first with respect to realms, either one alone is taken as object, or two are taken as object together”	「約界說」 tr. “speaking with respect to realms” means speaking according to realm and level; read as 「戒」 tr. “observance” it hardly passes in this passage discussing the confusions that take an upper level as object
0102001	0102a18	准【大】，惟【明】	「各三成六，能緣無漏。餘緣有漏，【准】此自成」 tr. “three each making six, they can take what is without outflows as object. That the rest take what has outflows as object is established of itself by extension from this”	「准此自成」 tr. “established of itself by extension from this” means that it is plain by extension · both readings pass the sense that ‘the rest, taking what has outflows as object, need no separate gloss’
0103a0701 ⟨CB⟩	0103a07	無【CB】(supplied by collation)／〔the original print lacking it〕(the Taishō original print)	The stanza, 「【無】記根有三，無記愛癡慧」 tr. “the indeterminate roots are three, indeterminate craving, delusion, and discernment” (the head of the second half of Root 20)	A collation note within CBETA’s own base-text system — the original print has a blank space here · the character 「無」 tr. “in-” is supplied by collation from the context · not a divergence between editions
0103003	0103a25	反【大】，乃【宮】	The stanza, 「應一向分別，【反】詰捨置記」 tr. “what should be determined categorically, by analysis, by counter-question, and by setting aside” (the first line of Root 22)	「反詰記」 tr. “determination by counter-question” is the fixed name of the stanza (glossed one by one in the prose below) · 『乃詰記』 is not a word
0103007	0103b13	人【大】，入【宋】【元】	「又作是說：彼第三問亦應一向記，【人】亦勝亦劣，所待異故，如識果因」 tr. “someone else says thus: that third question may also be determined categorically — a human is both superior and inferior, because what he is set against differs, as consciousness is result and cause”	「人亦勝亦劣」 tr. “a human is both superior and inferior” follows upon the question above, 「人為勝劣」 tr. “is a human superior or inferior” · read as 「入」 tr. “to enter” it hardly passes in this passage
0103008	0103c05	令【大】，今【明】	「不應分別，乃至【令】彼默然而住，或令自記無便求非」 tr. “one should not analyze for him, down to making him stand silent, or making him state it himself so that he has no occasion to pick a fault”	Ling and jin are graphically close · it does not change the sense of determination by counter-question
0103009	0103c07	記【大】，說【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「豈不二中都無有問，唯有請說，亦無有【記】，唯反詰言：欲說何者」 tr. “is it not that within these two there is no question at all but only a request to be told, and no determination either, but only the counter-question ‘which do you wish spoken?’”	It touches the wording and not the intent of the argument: 「亦無有記」 tr. “nor is there any determination” and 『亦無有說』 · both readings pass the argument that ‘a request to be told and a counter-question are alike not a plain question and answer’
0103010	0103c09	詰【大】，詰詰【石】	「即由反【詰】記彼所問，豈非記道」 tr. “to determine what he asks by counter-questioning — is this not determining the path?”	The doubled character of the Stone edition is a redundancy
0103011	0103c10	是【大】，是是【石】	「若爾，應俱【是】反詰記」 tr. “if it be so, both ought to be determination by counter-question”	The doubled character of the Stone edition is a redundancy
0099b2301	0099b23	最【大】【磧-CB】，家【麗-CB】（K28n0958 0593c17）	following upon the sentence-run 「見道諦所斷八，離有身見及邊執見。修所斷四」 tr. “what is abandoned by seeing the truth of the path has eight, lacking the view of a real person and the extreme view. What is abandoned by cultivation has four”	A cross-edition divergence with the base text unaltered — the Taishō and the Qisha line read 「最」 tr. “most,” the Korean line 「家」 tr. “house” · recorded alongside for reference
0101b1801 ⟨CB⟩	0101b18	有【CB】【麗-CB】（K27n0955 0596b19）／者 (the Taishō original printing)	The stanza, 「慢類等我慢，惡作中不善，聖【有】而不起」 tr. “the classes of pride and the rest and the pride of self, and that portion of regret which is unwholesome — the noble one has them and yet they do not arise” (Root 11)	A CBETA restoration — the Taishō original print reads 「者」 tr. “the one who,” and CBETA restores 「有」 tr. “has” following the Korean edition · the base text follows the 【CB】 stream · the Taishō original print is recorded alongside. 「聖有而不起」 tr. “the noble one has them and yet they do not arise” means that in the person of a noble one these confusions are present and yet not active, fastening exactly upon the prose gloss below, 「聖有而不起」 tr. “the noble one has them and yet they do not arise”

Honest record one (the inconsistency of the variant graphs for ‘cultivate’ · not to be unified): in the tenth block of stanza in this unit〔0101a10〕the graph 「脩」 tr. “cultivate” appears twice — 「皆通見【脩】斷」 tr. “they all extend to abandonment by seeing and by cultivation” and 「有【脩】斷不行」 tr. “there is what is abandoned by cultivation and yet is not active”; whereas in the fifth block of the same chapter〔0099c11〕it reads 「餘通見【修】斷」 tr. “the rest extend to abandonment by seeing and by cultivation.” The Taishō has no collation note at any of these three places, while the separate edition T1560 has 「修」 tr. “cultivate” at all three. ⇒ Same sense and same position with two graphic forms: this belongs to the inconsistency of variant characters, and by the form of this collection it is recorded as the base text has it, neither normalized nor unified. The choice between them belongs to doctrinal adjudication, and this item only records without adjudicating.

Honest record two (four repetitions merged): among the thirty-seven <app> anchors, four are repeated markers of one and the same variant reading (of the class of asterisks cross-referring within the base text, the plainest instance being item 0100001); they are merged into the item to which they belong and not counted again, and so the number of variant readings is thirty-one.

Honest record three (two classes that must be told apart): the <app> within the range of this unit contains two classes of utterly different nature — traditional collation against other editions (the variants of the Song, Yuan, Ming, Palace, and Stone editions, twenty-nine items) and CBETA’s collation notes within the Taishō printed system (the direct correction of corrupt or missing characters in the original print, two items). The two may not be counted together, and they are marked apart in the table.

Conclusion on the collation: of the twenty-nine traditional variants, about twenty-three are purely graphically similar corruptions, the addition or omission of particles, or redundancies from doubled characters; five touch the wording or the sense of a sentence — 0099002 (sleep and accord) · 0101010 (though as to and looking back upon) · 0101019 (the Palace edition lacking the comparison sentence) · 0101020 (can and pervades) · 0103009 (determination and telling) — yet none of them alters the conclusion of the chain of argument to which the sentence belongs; one further item, 0101017 (the missing character 『集』), is the more concrete for standing in close comparison with the stanza line in the same passage, and it too does not change the range of the eleven all-pervading. Not one item in the whole table rises to a case for emending the base text (none being supported both by a commentator’s citation and by doctrine). The variant readings are recorded alongside for reference, recorded without adjudication — the choice between variants belongs to doctrinal adjudication.

IV. Comparison with Paramārtha’s Earlier Translation (Expository Treatise on the Treasury of Abhidharma · T1559 ★)

The base of comparison: Xuanzang’s Fascicle Nineteen〔T29n1558 0098b13–0104a01〕↔ Paramārtha’s version〔T29n1559 0252c06–0257b11〕.

The fixing of the passage boundaries (by the structure of the scene · not by searching for word-forms): the beginning =〔T29n1559 0252c06〕, where Paramārtha reads 「分別惑品1中分別惑品第五前已說，世間多種異從業生，諸業由隨屬惑故，至得生長」 tr. “within the chapter analyzing the confusions, Chapter Five, the chapter analyzing the confusions: it was already said before that the manifold differences of the world arise from action, and that the several actions, by reason of belonging along with the confusions, come to grow” — the same hand-over and the same opening question as Xuanzang’s at the head of the chapter, 「前言世別皆由業生，業由隨眠方得生長」 tr. “it was said before that the differences of the world all arise from action; action grows only when the latent tendencies sustain it”〔0098b18〕. The end =〔T29n1559 0257b10〕, where Paramārtha reads 「命者即是身、命者異於身」 tr. “the life-principle is the body, or the life-principle is other than the body” — this closes the whole enumeration of the fourteen indeterminate matters, and in the same line thereafter it turns to 「若人隨眠惑於境界中生起，此人由此惑於此境界相應」 tr. “if a man’s latent confusion arises within an object-field, that man is by this confusion associated with that object-field,” which belongs to a newly begun scene together with the opening of Xuanzang’s Unit 2, 「諸有情類於此事中隨眠隨增，名繫此事」 tr. “where the several kinds of sentient beings have latent tendencies increasing by attachment upon a matter, they are said to be bound to that matter”〔0104a07〕. ⇒ the boundaries of the corresponding passage in Paramārtha for this unit =〔0252c06〕to〔0257b10〕.

The divergence of the chapter title: Paramārtha’s chapter here reads 「分別惑品第五」 tr. “Chapter Five, Analysis of the Confusions”〔T29n1559 0252c06〕, and not 「分別隨眠品」 tr. “the chapter analyzing the latent tendencies” — one and the same Sanskrit rendered differently (Xuanzang taking 「隨眠」 tr. “latent tendency,” Paramārtha taking 「惑」 tr. “confusion”). Paramārtha’s chapter is only two fascicles (Fascicle Fourteen〔0252c02〕· Fascicle Fifteen〔0259c19〕), Xuanzang’s three, and not one fascicle boundary of the two versions coincides. ⇒ The division into fascicles is an affair of the translation bureau, and is not independent evidence of the natural sections of the treatise.

The basic difference of form: Xuanzang has 「頌曰／論曰」 tr. “the stanza says / the treatise says,” the whole stanza coming out first and the prose after; Paramārtha has 「偈曰／釋曰」 tr. “the verse says / the explanation says,” glossing line by line as embedded, so that one stanza is often broken up and cited in several places. Hence the twenty-two root stanzas of Xuanzang in this unit appear in Paramārtha’s version as a number of short verses scattered about.

Forbidden to search Paramārtha with Xuanzang’s words: Xuanzang’s renderings often yield a zero result in Paramārtha’s version while the scene is certainly there. The locating of each item below is uniformly taken from the structure of the scene — who, to whom, what is asked, on what principle, and what answer is obtained.

The comparison of the glossing of the ten functions (one of the closest passages of the two translations in this unit · the opening and gathering almost the same): Xuanzang 「一堅根本、二立相續、三治自田、四引等流、五發業有、六攝自具、七迷所緣、八導識流、九越善品、十廣縛義」 tr. “first strengthening the root, second establishing the continuity, third tilling its own field, fourth drawing forth the homogeneous, fifth setting going action and existence, sixth gathering its own equipment, seventh bewildering the object, eighth leading the stream of consciousness, ninth overstepping the wholesome class, tenth the sense of binding widely”〔0098b25〕‖ Paramārtha 「一堅固根本、二安立相續、三數治自田、四生起等流、五能引生業有、六圓滿自資糧、七令迷境界、八引將識相續、九令離淨品善法類、十成就縛義」 tr. “first firmly strengthening the root, second settledly establishing the continuity, third repeatedly tilling its own field, fourth producing and arising the homogeneous, fifth being able to draw forth and produce action and existence, sixth completing its own provisions, seventh making one bewildered about the object-field, eighth drawing and leading on the continuity of consciousness, ninth making one part from the class of pure and wholesome dharmas, tenth accomplishing the sense of binding”〔T29n1559 0252c11〕. The order of the ten functions corresponds one to one, Paramārtha for the most part heading each with a doubled word (firmly · settledly · repeatedly · producing · able to draw forth · completing · making bewildered · drawing and leading · making part from · accomplishing).

The chief items of comparison (one by one):

The general statement of the latent tendencies and the six latent tendencies — Xuanzang 「隨眠諸有本，此差別有六，謂貪瞋亦慢，無明見及疑」 tr. “the latent tendencies are the root of the several existences; their differences are six, namely greed and hatred and also pride, ignorance, view, and doubt”〔0098b21〕‖ Paramārtha 「隨眠惑有本」 tr. “the latent confusions are the root of existence”〔T29n1559 0252c09〕, the names listed as 「謂如欲瞋，憍慢無明見，心疑」 tr. “namely desire and hatred, conceited pride, ignorance, view, mind, doubt”〔T29n1559 0252c16〕. A divergence of rendering-name: Xuanzang 「貪」 tr. “greed” / Paramārtha 「欲」 tr. “desire” · Xuanzang 「慢」 tr. “pride” / Paramārtha 「憍慢」 tr. “conceited pride.” Paramārtha’s list ends with 「見心疑」 tr. “view, mind, doubt,” which exceeds Xuanzang’s 「見及疑」 tr. “view and doubt” by the one character 「心」 tr. “mind,” and its exact sense is unclear (whether a leftover character glossing 「見」 tr. “view” or a variant of the edition); no explanation is forced, and the fact is recorded as it stands.
Six becoming seven by a difference in greed — Xuanzang 「六由貪異七，有貪上二界，於內門轉故，為遮解脫想」 tr. “these six become seven by a difference in greed; craving for existence is of the upper two realms, because it turns toward the inner gate, and in order to block the notion of liberation”〔0098c05〕‖ Paramārtha 「復說彼，六由欲別七」 tr. “again it is said of them, the six become seven by a difference in desire”〔T29n1559 0252c18〕, the seven latent tendencies listed as 「謂欲欲隨眠、瞋隨眠、有欲隨眠、憍慢隨眠、無明隨眠、心見隨眠、疑隨眠」 tr. “namely the latent tendency of desire for desire, the latent tendency of hatred, the latent tendency of desire for existence, the latent tendency of conceited pride, the latent tendency of ignorance, the latent tendency of the view of mind, the latent tendency of doubt.” A systematic divergence of rendering-names (running through the whole): Xuanzang 「貪」 tr. “greed” / Paramārtha 「欲欲」 tr. “desire for desire” · Xuanzang 「有貪」 tr. “craving for existence” / Paramārtha 「有欲」 tr. “desire for existence.” Every entry below that touches these two terms follows this correspondence and is not noted again.
The dispute over the association of the latent tendencies with mind (three schools standing together) — Xuanzang 「毘婆沙師作如是說：欲貪等體即是隨眠……豈不違經？無違經失，并隨眠者并隨縛故」 tr. “the Vaibhāṣika masters say thus: the entities of greed for desire and the rest are themselves the latent tendencies … does this not contradict the sūtra? There is no fault of contradicting the sūtra, for ‘together with the latent tendency’ means together with the accompanying bondage”〔0098c18〕‖ Paramārtha 「若爾何有？若欲欲即是隨眠，則違佛經……毘婆沙師說：欲欲即是隨眠」 tr. “if so, what is there? If desire for desire is itself the latent tendency, then it contradicts the Buddha’s sūtra … the Vaibhāṣika masters say: desire for desire is itself the latent tendency”〔T29n1559 0252c23〕. Both versions have the structure of three schools standing together, and the scene agrees entirely; yet Paramārtha in this passage does not have the name 「大眾部」 tr. “the Mahāsāṃghikas” written out word for word (using only the general wording of another school), whereas the ancient masters on Xuanzang’s side mark it plainly (Puguang〔T41n1821 0292a18〕: 「大眾部等徵」 tr. “the Mahāsāṃghikas and the rest press”). ⇒ A divergence between the two translations in showing and hiding an attribution, recorded without adjudication.
The establishing of the Sautrāntika tenet — Xuanzang 「然經部師所說最善……彼說欲貪之隨眠義，然隨眠體非心相應非不相應，無別物故，煩惱睡位說名隨眠，於覺位中即名纏故」 tr. “yet what the Sautrāntika masters say is the best … they say it has the sense of the latent tendency belonging to greed for desire; yet the entity of a latent tendency is neither associated with mind nor dissociated from it, because there is no separate thing; an affliction in the stage of sleep is called a latent tendency, and in the stage of waking it is called entanglement”〔0099a01〕‖ Paramārtha 「經部師說此義非證……如經部執隨眠者，是欲欲隨眠，此隨眠不與心相應亦不與心相離，由非別類故」 tr. “the Sautrāntika masters say that this sense is no proof … as the Sautrāntikas hold, the latent tendency is the latent tendency of desire for desire; this latent tendency is neither associated with mind nor separated from mind, because it is not of a separate class”〔T29n1559 0253a12〕. A divergence of opening and gathering: Xuanzang joins on with an appraisal directly, while Paramārtha first states 「此義非證」 tr. “this sense is no proof” in refutation of the former account and only then brings out the Sautrāntikas’ own establishing, his composition winding one turn more than Xuanzang’s while the doctrine agrees in the end.
The glossing of sleep and waking and of the seed — Xuanzang 「何名為睡？謂不現行種子隨逐。何名為覺？謂諸煩惱現起纏心」 tr. “what is called sleep? A seed following along without being active. What is called waking? The several afflictions arisen and entangling the mind”〔0099a04〕‖ Paramārtha 「若惑眠說名隨眠，若惑覺說名上心。此惑眠何相？不在現前種子隨逐惑覺，何相正現前起」 tr. “if the confusion sleeps it is called a latent tendency; if the confusion wakes it is called the upper mind. What is the mark of this sleeping of a confusion? Not being present, a seed following along; and the waking of a confusion, what is its mark? Arising properly present”〔T29n1559 0253a16〕. A divergence of rendering-name: Xuanzang 「纏」 tr. “entanglement” / Paramārtha 「上心」 tr. “the upper mind” — 「上心」 tr. “the upper mind” being the rendering Paramārtha uses to point at the arisen activity of an affliction. The wording of the two translations differs while the doctrine agrees entirely.
The dispute over the Sūtra of the Six Sixes — Xuanzang 「若爾，六六契經相違，經說於樂受有貪隨眠故。經但說有，不言爾時即有隨眠……於彼睡時，或假於因立隨眠想」 tr. “if it be so, this contradicts the Sūtra of the Six Sixes, for the sūtra says that upon a pleasant feeling there is a latent tendency of greed. The sūtra says only that there is one; it does not say that at that very moment there is a latent tendency … at the time when it sleeps; or else the notion of a latent tendency is conventionally set up upon the cause”〔0099a12〕‖ Paramārtha 「於六六經中此義云何？經言：此惑於此人樂受成欲隨眠……若爾，於何時眠？時，是時或於因說果名故稱隨眠」 tr. “how is this sense within the Sūtra of the Six Sixes? The sūtra says: this confusion in this man upon a pleasant feeling becomes the latent tendency of desire … if so, at what time does it sleep? At that time; or, because the name of the result is spoken of upon the cause, it is called a latent tendency”〔T29n1559 0253a23〕. The fullness and brevity are almost the same: 「因說果名」 tr. “speaking the name of the result upon the cause” agrees entirely in doctrine with Xuanzang’s 「假於因立隨眠想」 tr. “conventionally setting up the notion of a latent tendency upon the cause.”
The ground for setting up the name ‘craving for existence’ — Xuanzang 「彼貪多託內門轉故……又由有人於上二界起解脫想，為遮彼故」 tr. “because that greed for the most part turns in dependence upon the inner gate … and again because some give rise to the notion of liberation with regard to the upper two realms, in order to block that”〔0099a18〕‖ Paramārtha 「於彼二界人，多起三摩跋提欲，此欲依內門起故，說名有欲。復次於此二界中，有餘人起涅槃想，為除彼涅槃想故，說此欲名有欲」 tr. “among the men of those two realms, the desire for samāpatti arises for the most part, and because this desire arises in dependence upon the inner gate it is called desire for existence. Again, within these two realms some other men give rise to the notion of nirvāṇa, and in order to remove that notion of nirvāṇa this desire is called desire for existence”〔T29n1559 0253b01〕. A divergence of rendering-name: Xuanzang 「解脫想」 tr. “the notion of liberation” / Paramārtha 「涅槃想」 tr. “the notion of nirvāṇa”; and Paramārtha brings out besides a transcription, 「三摩跋提」 tr. “samāpatti,” whereas Xuanzang in this passage writes with a rendering by sense and this transcription does not appear on the face of his text.
The ten latent tendencies — Xuanzang 「六由見異十，異謂有身見，邊執見邪見，見取戒禁取」 tr. “these six become ten by a difference in view; the difference is the view of a real person, the extreme view, wrong view, adherence to views, adherence to observances and vows”〔0099a29〕‖ Paramārtha 「見五，謂身見、邊見及邪見、見取戒執取，由此復成十」 tr. “view is five, namely the view of self, the view of extremes and wrong view, adherence to views and adherence by holding to precepts; by this they become ten again”〔T29n1559 0253b07〕. Divergences of rendering-name: Xuanzang 「邊執見」 tr. “the extreme view” / Paramārtha 「邊見」 tr. “the view of extremes” · Xuanzang 「戒禁取」 tr. “adherence to observances and vows” / Paramārtha 「戒執取」 tr. “adherence by holding to precepts” — these two divergences run through all the passages on the five views and are not noted again.
The setting up of the ninety-eight latent tendencies — Xuanzang 「六行部界異，故成九十八」 tr. “the six differ by mode, category, and realm, and so become ninety-eight”〔0099b08〕‖ Paramārtha 「復次此十隨眠惑，於阿毘達磨藏中更立為九十八」 tr. “again, these ten latent confusions are further set up within the Treasury of Abhidharma as ninety-eight”〔T29n1559 0253b12〕. The opening and gathering are almost the same: both versions follow the order ‘the ten latent tendencies → the two gates of category and realm → ninety-eight,’ only that Paramārtha has one connecting sentence more.
What is injured by receptivity is abandoned by seeing alone — Xuanzang 「忍所害隨眠，有頂唯見斷，餘通見修斷，智所害唯修」 tr. “latent tendencies injured by receptivity, at the summit of existence are abandoned by seeing alone; the rest extend to abandonment by seeing and by cultivation; those injured by cognition are abandoned by cultivation alone”〔0099c10〕‖ Paramārtha 「有頂忍所滅，定見滅」 tr. “at the summit of existence what is extinguished by receptivity is decidedly extinguished by seeing”〔T29n1559 0253c10〕. A divergence of opening and gathering: Xuanzang writes the four lines of one stanza together, while Paramārtha breaks up the stanza lines and puts the remaining lines in another passage.
The glossing of the view of a real person — Xuanzang 「執我及我所，是薩迦耶見。壞故名薩，聚謂迦耶」 tr. “to hold to a self and to what belongs to self is the view of a real person. Because it perishes it is called sat; the aggregation is kāya”〔0100a01〕‖ Paramārtha 「我及我所見名身見，由剎那剎那壞故說滅，由聚集故名身」 tr. “the view of self and of what belongs to self is called the view of self; because it perishes moment by moment it is said to be perishing, and because it is aggregated it is called person”〔T29n1559 0253c25〕. The order of the glossing agrees entirely in both versions (perishing first, aggregation after), only that Paramārtha glosses with the two characters 「滅」 tr. “perishing” and 「身」 tr. “person” separately, while Xuanzang renders both sound and sense and keeps the transcription 「薩」 tr. “sat” and 「迦耶」 tr. “kāya”.
Holding what is not a cause to be a cause is abandoned by seeing suffering alone — Xuanzang 「於大自在等，非因妄執因，從常我倒生，故唯見苦斷」 tr. “with regard to Maheśvara and the rest, falsely holding what is not a cause to be a cause, arising from the inversions of eternity and self, is abandoned by seeing suffering alone”〔0100a28〕‖ Paramārtha 「於自在等處，從常我倒生，因等虛妄執，是故見苦滅」 tr. “with regard to Īśvara and the rest, arising from the inversions of eternity and self, the false holding to a cause and the rest is therefore extinguished by seeing suffering”〔T29n1559 0254a22〕. A divergence of opening and gathering: the order of the stanza lines in the two versions is exactly the reverse (Xuanzang putting 「非因妄執因」 tr. “falsely holding what is not a cause to be a cause” first and 「從常我倒生」 tr. “arising from the inversions of eternity and self” after, Paramārtha the reverse), the doctrine agreeing entirely; it belongs to a difference in the form of the translation.
The entity of the four inversions — Xuanzang 「四顛倒自體，謂從於三見」 tr. “the entity of the four inversions is from three views”〔0100b26〕‖ Paramārtha 「從二見半生四倒」 tr. “the four inversions arise from two and a half views”〔T29n1559 0254b16〕. A divergence in the manner of reckoning: Xuanzang enumerates roughly by 「三見」 tr. “three views” (the extreme view · adherence to views · the view of self), Paramārtha reckons precisely by 「二見半」 tr. “two and a half views” (of the three views, taking now the whole and now a portion). The doctrinal content pointed at is entirely the same in both versions — the view of eternity within the extreme view · the views of pleasure and purity within adherence to views · the view of self within the view of self are the entity of the four inversions; only the manner of reckoning differs, recorded without adjudication.
The listing of the seven prides — Xuanzang 「慢七九從三」 tr. “pride is seven, and nine come from three”〔0101a10〕‖ Paramārtha 「七慢」 tr. “seven prides”〔T29n1559 0254c28〕, the names listed as 「一慢、二過慢、三過過慢、四我慢、五增上慢、六下慢、七邪慢」 tr. “first pride, second excessive pride, third pride beyond excess, fourth the pride of self, fifth the pride of superior attainment, sixth the lower pride, seventh wrong pride.” Divergences of rendering-name: Xuanzang 「慢過慢」 tr. “pride beyond excessive pride” / Paramārtha 「過過慢」 tr. “pride beyond excess” · Xuanzang 「卑慢」 tr. “the pride of slight inferiority” / Paramārtha 「下慢」 tr. “the lower pride” · the other five names agree entirely.
The nine classes of pride — Xuanzang 「然本論說慢類有九」 tr. “yet the root treatise says the classes of pride are nine”〔0101a21〕‖ Paramārtha 「若爾，於阿毘達磨藏中說慢類有九種」 tr. “if so, within the Treasury of Abhidharma the classes of pride are said to be nine”〔T29n1559 0255a07〕, continuing with the verse 「九慢類從三」 tr. “the nine classes of pride come from three”〔T29n1559 0255a12〕. The opening and gathering are almost the same: the order of the names and the framework of their flowing out from three prides agree entirely, differing on the face of the text only as the rendering-names of item fourteen differ.
The classes of pride and the rest not arising in a noble one — Xuanzang 「慢類等我慢，惡作中不善，聖有而不起，見疑所增故」 tr. “the classes of pride and the rest and the pride of self, and that portion of regret which is unwholesome, the noble one has and yet they do not arise, because they are increased by view and doubt”〔0101b17〕‖ Paramārtha 「慢類等」 tr. “the classes of pride and the rest”〔T29n1559 0255b02〕, the prose reading 「九慢類中，有慢類修道所破，我慢亦爾。如此等於聖人不現前起」 tr. “among the nine classes of pride there are classes of pride destroyed by the path of cultivation, and the pride of self is likewise; such as these do not arise present in a noble person.” The fullness and brevity are almost the same: Paramārtha supplies besides the line 「殺等上心惑，修滅如彼爾」 tr. “the upper-mind confusions of killing and the rest are extinguished by cultivation, just as with those,” answering to Xuanzang’s stanza 「聖如殺纏等」 tr. “the noble one is as with the entanglement of killing and the rest.”
The eleven all-pervading — Xuanzang 「見苦集所斷，諸見疑相應，及不共無明，遍行自界地」 tr. “what is abandoned by seeing suffering and origination, the several views and doubt and what is associated with them, and the independent ignorance, pervade their own realm and level”〔0101b27〕‖ Paramārtha 「遍行見苦集，滅惑謂諸見，疑共彼無明，及獨行無明」 tr. “the all-pervading, extinguished by seeing suffering and origination, are the confusions, namely the several views, doubt, the ignorance in common with them, and solitary ignorance”〔T29n1559 0255b14〕. The face of Paramārtha’s verse has one character 「滅」 tr. “cessation” more, which read on its face would seem not to agree with Xuanzang’s 「見苦集所斷」 tr. “abandoned by seeing suffering and origination”; yet his prose at once states 「見苦集所滅諸見及疑惑，與彼共相應起無明及獨行無明，皆見苦集所滅」 tr. “the several views and doubting confusions extinguished by seeing suffering and origination, together with the ignorance arising in association with them and solitary ignorance, are all extinguished by seeing suffering and origination,” still bounded by suffering and origination, and agreeing entirely with Xuanzang in doctrine. This character 「滅」 tr. “cessation” may be an empty word making up the count of the verse line; no explanation is forced, and the fact is recorded as it stands.
The six that take what is without outflows as object — Xuanzang 「見滅道所斷，邪見疑相應，及不共無明，六能緣無漏」 tr. “what is abandoned by seeing cessation and the path, the wrong view and doubt and what is associated with them, and the independent ignorance — these six can take what is without outflows as object”〔0102a11〕‖ Paramārtha 「邪見疑與二，應無明獨行，見滅道所滅，六無流為境」 tr. “wrong view and doubt and the two, the ignorance associated with them and the solitary, extinguished by seeing cessation and the path, six taking what is without flow as object”〔T29n1559 0255c19〕. Divergences of rendering-name: Xuanzang 「無漏」 tr. “without outflows” / Paramārtha 「無流」 tr. “without flow” · Xuanzang 「不共無明」 tr. “independent ignorance” / Paramārtha 「獨行無明」 tr. “solitary ignorance” (systematic rendering-characters throughout).
Increase by attachment through the object and through association — Xuanzang 「未斷遍隨眠，於自地一切，非遍於自部，所緣故隨增」 tr. “an all-pervading latent tendency not yet cut off, upon all of its own level; one not all-pervading, upon its own category; increase by attachment through the object”〔0102b17〕‖ Paramārtha 「遍行隨眠惑，具自地隨眠，唯由緣緣故」 tr. “an all-pervading latent confusion, complete in the latent tendencies of its own level, only by reason of the object as condition”〔T29n1559 0256a19〕. A divergence of opening and gathering: Xuanzang writes the two senses of all-pervading and not all-pervading together in the four lines of one stanza, while Paramārtha’s verse brings out the sense of the all-pervading alone and the sense of the not all-pervading appears separately in the prose that follows; stanza and prose open and gather differently while the doctrine agrees entirely.
The upper two realms and the two views of self and of extremes are all indeterminate — Xuanzang 「上二界隨眠，及欲身邊見，彼俱癡無記，此餘皆不善」 tr. “the latent tendencies of the upper two realms, and the view of self and the extreme view of the realm of desire, and the delusion together with them, are indeterminate; all the rest besides these are unwholesome”〔0102c14〕‖ Paramārtha 「上界惑無記」 tr. “the confusions of the upper realms are indeterminate”〔T29n1559 0256b13〕, continuing with 「於欲界身見，邊見共無明」 tr. “in the realm of desire the view of self, the view of extremes together with ignorance.” The opening and gathering are almost the same: both versions follow the three layers of ‘the upper two realms wholly indeterminate → the two views of self and of extremes in the realm of desire likewise indeterminate → the rest all unwholesome,’ only that Paramārtha brings out the layers in separate lines while Xuanzang writes them together in one stanza.
The three unwholesome roots — Xuanzang 「不善根欲界，貪瞋不善癡」 tr. “the unwholesome roots are in the realm of desire, greed, hatred, and unwholesome delusion”〔0103a01〕‖ Paramārtha 「於欲界惡根，貪欲瞋無明」 tr. “in the realm of desire the evil roots are greedy desire, hatred, and ignorance”〔T29n1559 0256b28〕. Divergences of rendering-name: Xuanzang 「不善癡」 tr. “unwholesome delusion” / Paramārtha 「無明」 tr. “ignorance” · Xuanzang 「不善根」 tr. “the unwholesome roots” / Paramārtha 「惡根」 tr. “the evil roots” (delusion and ignorance being rendered for each other, used interchangeably here and there throughout).
The three indeterminate roots and the four of the other regions — Xuanzang 「無記根有三，無記愛癡慧，非餘二高故，外方立四種，中愛見慢癡，三定皆癡故」 tr. “the indeterminate roots are three, indeterminate craving, delusion, and discernment; not the rest, because of the two, turning to two courses and exalting; the other regions set up four kinds, among which are craving, view, pride, and delusion, because for the absorptions the three all decidedly depend upon delusion”〔0103a08〕‖ Paramārtha 「無記根有三」 tr. “the indeterminate roots are three”〔T29n1559 0256c04〕·「愛無明及慧」 tr. “craving, ignorance, and discernment”〔T29n1559 0256c05〕, continuing with 「外師說四」 tr. “the outside masters say four” and 「謂愛見慢癡」 tr. “namely craving, view, pride, and delusion.” Divergences of rendering-name: Xuanzang 「外方」 tr. “other regions” / Paramārtha 「外師」 tr. “the outside masters” · Xuanzang 「癡」 tr. “delusion” / Paramārtha 「無明」 tr. “ignorance” · the remaining doctrine and order agree entirely.
The four determinations — Xuanzang 「應一向分別，反詰捨置記，如死生殊勝，我蘊一異等」 tr. “what should be determined categorically, by analysis, by counter-question, and by setting aside, as with death, birth, the excellent, and whether self and aggregates are one or different, and the like”〔0103a25〕‖ Paramārtha 「一向記、分別、反問及置記，譬如死生勝，及我異等義」 tr. “categorical determination, analysis, asking back, and setting-aside determination; as with death, birth, the superior, and the sense of self being different, and the like”〔T29n1559 0256c21〕. Divergences of rendering-name: Xuanzang 「反詰記」 tr. “determination by counter-question” / Paramārtha 「反問記」 tr. “determination by asking back” · Xuanzang 「捨置記」 tr. “determination by setting aside” / Paramārtha 「置記」 tr. “setting-aside determination.” The order of the four questions adduced (death → birth → superior → whether self is one or different) agrees entirely in the two versions.
The enumeration of the fourteen indeterminate matters — Xuanzang 「世為常、無常、亦常亦無常、非常非無常？世為有邊、無邊、亦有邊亦無邊、非有邊非無邊？如來死後為有、非有、亦有亦非有、非有非非有？為命者即身、為命者異身」 tr. “is the world eternal, not eternal, both eternal and not eternal, neither eternal nor not eternal? Has the world an end, no end, both an end and no end, neither an end nor no end? After the Tathāgata’s death does he exist, not exist, both exist and not exist, neither exist nor not exist? Is the life-principle the body, or is the life-principle other than the body?”〔0103c23 and thereabouts〕‖ Paramārtha 「世間常、非常、亦常非常、非常非非常，世間有邊、無邊、亦有邊無邊、非有邊非無邊，如來異死、不異死、亦異死不異死、非異死非非異死，命者即是身、命者異於身」 tr. “the world is eternal, not eternal, both eternal and not eternal, neither eternal nor not eternal; the world has an end, no end, both an end and no end, neither an end nor no end; the Tathāgata is other than death, not other than death, both other than death and not other than death, neither other than death nor not other than death; the life-principle is the body, the life-principle is other than the body”〔T29n1559 0257b07〕. A divergence of rendering-name: Xuanzang 「如來死後」 tr. “after the Tathāgata’s death” / Paramārtha 「如來異死」 tr. “the Tathāgata other than death” (the angle of the gloss differing slightly while the sense is the same). The order and content of the enumeration of the fourteen matters agree entirely in the two versions, and it is the most exact word-for-word comparison in the closing passage of this unit.
The provenance of the sūtra evidence for the four determinations — Xuanzang 「如大眾部契經中言：苾芻當知，問記有四」 tr. “as the sūtra of the Mahāsāṃghikas says: bhikṣus should know, question and determination are of four kinds”〔0103c13 and thereabouts〕‖ Paramārtha 「大德摩訶僧祇說經言：比丘！記問有四種」 tr. “the Venerable Mahāsāṃghika’s spoken sūtra says: bhikṣu! determination and question are of four kinds”〔T29n1559 0257a27〕. A divergence of ascription: Xuanzang writes 「大眾部」 tr. “the Mahāsāṃghikas” (a rendering by sense), Paramārtha 「大德摩訶僧祇」 tr. “the Venerable Mahāsāṃghika” (a full transcription with the two characters 「大德」 tr. “Venerable” prefixed). This answers to item three — Paramārtha does indeed have the name of the Mahāsāṃghikas here, while in the earlier passage (the dispute over the dissociation of the latent tendencies) he did not mark the name specially. ⇒ It may be seen that he does not avoid the name of this school throughout the chapter; the fact alone is recorded, and no judgment is made on the translator’s intent in his stead.

Honest record (this item): the 「見心疑」 tr. “view, mind, doubt” of item one, one character 「心」 tr. “mind” more, and the one character 「滅」 tr. “cessation” more in the verse line of item seventeen — in both places the face of Paramārtha’s text seems to depart from Xuanzang’s, and in neither is an explanation forced; only the corroboration of his prose is set out, showing that the doctrine is in fact still in accord with Xuanzang, while whether they rise to a matter of collation or of doubt awaits a doctrinal adjudication.

V. Debate within the Abhidharma Lineage (Saṅghabhadra · Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle T1562 ★ · recorded where present)

The chapter names in Saṅghabhadra’s two treatises: T1562 reads 「辯隨眠品第五」 tr. “Chapter Five, Adjudicating the Latent Tendencies”〔T29n1562 0596a11 onward〕· T1563 reads 「辯隨眠品第六」 tr. “Chapter Six, Adjudicating the Latent Tendencies”〔T29n1563 0892c12 onward〕. Not 「分別隨眠品」 tr. “the chapter analyzing the latent tendencies” — do not search the two treatises with the Abhidharmakośa’s chapter name. The range of the scene for this unit is about〔T29n1562 0596a11〕to〔T29n1562 0622c10〕, located by comparing scene by scene the passages quoted under the marker 「經主」 tr. “the Sūtra-master” (not by the boundaries of the running head). The form = citing only the loc where there is an actual debate with the Abhidharmakośa · not citing at large; 「一義二宗」 tr. “one meaning and two schools,” recorded without adjudication.

One, whether the latent tendencies are associated with mind (touching the core dispute of the prose of Root 2 · the densest scene) — the Abhidharmakośa reads 「彼說欲貪之隨眠義，然隨眠體非心相應非不相應，無別物故，煩惱睡位說名隨眠」 tr. “they say it has the sense of the latent tendency belonging to greed for desire; yet the entity of a latent tendency is neither associated with mind nor dissociated from it, because there is no separate thing; an affliction in the stage of sleep is called a latent tendency”〔0099a02〕. Saṅghabhadra quotes it word for word and appraises it: 「經主於此作是釋言：此是欲貪之隨眠義。然隨眠體非心相應、非不相應，無別物故。煩惱睡位說名隨眠，於覺位中即名纏故」 tr. “the Sūtra-master here glosses thus: this is the sense of the latent tendency belonging to greed for desire. Yet the entity of a latent tendency is neither associated with mind nor dissociated from it, because there is no separate thing. An affliction in the stage of sleep is called a latent tendency, and in the stage of waking it is called entanglement”〔T29n1562 0596c24〕, and adjudges 「今詳彼釋，於理不然，自許隨眠離諸煩惱無別物故。不染污法為煩惱體，理不成故，不可說為睡隨眠體，故無少物名睡隨眠」 tr. “examining that gloss closely, it is not so in principle, since he himself grants that apart from the afflictions a latent tendency is no separate thing. Since it is unreasonable in principle for an undefiled dharma to be the entity of an affliction, it cannot be said to be the entity of a sleeping latent tendency, and so there is no least thing named a sleeping latent tendency”〔T29n1562 0597a02〕. ⇒ Saṅghabhadra denies head-on the very gloss of the Sautrāntikas as Vasubandhu relates it, and that gloss is in this treatise the account the author appraises and takes. One meaning and two schools recorded together · not adjudging which prevails.

Two, the sense of 「經但說有」 tr. “the sūtra says only that there is one” in the Sūtra of the Six Sixes — the Abhidharmakośa reads 「經但說有，不言爾時即有隨眠。何所違害？於何時有？於彼睡時，或假於因立隨眠想」 tr. “the sūtra says only that there is one; it does not say that at that very moment there is a latent tendency. What contradiction is there? At what time is there one? At the time when it sleeps; or else the notion of a latent tendency is conventionally set up upon the cause”〔0099a13〕. Saṅghabhadra quotes it word for word and refutes it: 「經主此中作如是釋：經但說有，不言爾時即有隨眠，何所違害？於何時有？於彼睡時，或假於因立隨眠想。此釋非理，爾時隨眠說現有聲，理不成故」 tr. “the Sūtra-master here glosses thus: the sūtra says only that there is one; it does not say that at that very moment there is a latent tendency; what contradiction is there? At what time is there one? At the time when it sleeps, or else the notion of a latent tendency is conventionally set up upon the cause. This gloss is unreasonable, since it is unreasonable in principle that at that moment the latent tendency should be spoken of with the word of present existence”〔T29n1562 0598b16〕, and goes on to press him item by item with the objection that the entity of a latent tendency would then have to be unknowable. One meaning and two schools recorded together · not adjudging which prevails.

Three, the ground for setting up the name ‘craving for existence’ — the Abhidharmakośa reads 「彼諸有情多於等至及所依止深生味著，故說彼唯味著自體」 tr. “those sentient beings for the most part give rise to a deep savoring attachment toward meditative attainment and toward the body upon which they depend, and so it is said that they savor and cling to their own entity alone”〔0099a22 and thereabouts〕. Saṅghabhadra cites and appraises it: 「經主於斯復作是釋：此中自體立以有名，彼諸有情多於等至及所依止深生味著，故說彼唯味著自體，非味著境，離欲貪故，由此唯彼立有貪名。此釋與前義有何別？……詳經主釋義不異前，但搆浮詞似有少異」 tr. “the Sūtra-master glosses again upon this: here the word ‘existence’ is set up upon their own entity; those sentient beings for the most part give rise to a deep savoring attachment toward meditative attainment and toward the body upon which they depend, and so it is said that they savor and cling to their own entity alone and do not savor and cling to an object, having left greed for desire, and by this the name craving for existence is set up in them alone. What difference in sense has this gloss from the former? … examining it, the Sūtra-master’s gloss differs in sense not at all from the former, but only frames floating words to make it seem a little different”〔T29n1562 0599c29〕. ⇒ Saṅghabhadra here does not deny the doctrine, but appraises his twofold gloss on the setting up of the name (the sense of turning by the inner gate and the sense of savoring attachment to one’s own entity) as being in fact one sense restated — this belongs to an appraisal of composition and not an opposition of doctrine, positive and negative. One meaning and two schools recorded together · not adjudging which prevails.

Four, the establishing of the marks of what is abandoned by seeing suffering and the rest (a typical instance where the Abhidharmakośa’s sentence and Saṅghabhadra’s agree word for word) — the Abhidharmakośa reads 「此中何相見苦所斷？乃至何相是修所斷？若緣見此所斷為境名見此所斷，餘名修所斷」 tr. “what is the mark here of being abandoned by seeing suffering? And so on to, what is the mark of being abandoned by cultivation? If what it takes as object is what is abandoned by seeing this, it is named as abandoned by seeing this; the rest are named as abandoned by cultivation”〔0099b29〕. Saṅghabhadra quotes it word for word and refutes it: 「經主於此自問答言：此中何相見苦所斷？乃至何相是修所斷？若緣見此所斷為境名見，此所斷餘名修所斷。此不應理。所以者何？遍行隨眠緣五部故，則見苦集所斷隨眠亦應通是見集苦等所斷」 tr. “the Sūtra-master here asks and answers himself: what is the mark here of being abandoned by seeing suffering? And so on to, what is the mark of being abandoned by cultivation? If what it takes as object is what is abandoned by seeing this, it is named as seeing; the rest of what is abandoned by this are named as abandoned by cultivation. This is unreasonable. Why? Because the all-pervading latent tendencies take the five categories as object, and so the latent tendencies abandoned by seeing suffering and origination ought also to extend to being abandoned by seeing origination and suffering and the rest”〔T29n1562 0601b13〕, and goes on to establish his own tenet, 「見緣苦為境名為見苦，即是苦法苦類智忍，此二所斷總說名為見苦所斷……是名為善立所斷相」 tr. “a view taking suffering as its object is called seeing suffering, that is, the receptivities to the cognition of dharma and to the subsequent cognition concerning suffering, and what these two abandon is spoken of together as abandoned by seeing suffering … this is called well establishing the mark of abandonment.” ⇒ In this sentence the two texts agree character for character, and it is the most exact word-for-word comparison in the debate of this unit. One meaning and two schools recorded together · not adjudging which prevails.

Five, the glossing of the view of a real person (the most concrete point of dispute in glossing) — the Abhidharmakośa reads 「壞故名薩，聚謂迦耶，即是無常和合蘊義，迦耶即薩名薩迦耶」 tr. “because it perishes it is called sat; the aggregation is kāya, that is, the sense of aggregates conjoined and impermanent; kāya is just sat, and so it is called satkāya”〔0100a01〕. Saṅghabhadra cites it and asks in return: 「經主此中作如是釋：壞故名薩，聚謂迦耶，即是無常和合蘊義，迦耶即薩名薩迦耶。此薩迦耶即五取蘊，為遮常一想故立此名，要此想為先方執我故。若爾，何用標以薩聲？但迦耶聲足遮常故，則應但立迦耶見名。無法是常而可聚集，何用身上標以壞聲」 tr. “the Sūtra-master here glosses thus: because it perishes it is called sat; the aggregation is kāya, that is, the sense of aggregates conjoined and impermanent; kāya is just sat, and so it is called satkāya. This satkāya is just the five aggregates of appropriation, and this name is set up in order to block the notion of eternity and unity, since that notion must come first before a self is held to. If so, what use is there in marking it with the word sat? The word kāya alone suffices to block eternity, and so the name ought to be set up as the view of kāya only. No dharma that is eternal can be aggregated; what use is it to mark the word ‘perishing’ upon the person?”〔T29n1562 0606a03〕. ⇒ His objection is that ‘if it be only to block eternity, what need is there to mark a further word for perishing.’ This objection appears also in the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle passage cited by Fabao (item six). One meaning and two schools recorded together · not adjudging which prevails.

Six, the analysis of adherence to observances and vows as abandoned by seeing the path — the Abhidharmakośa reads 「若彼撥無真解脫道，妄執別有餘清淨因，是則執餘能得清淨，非邪見等」 tr. “if he denies outright the true path of liberation and falsely holds that there is some other cause of purity, that is holding that something else can attain purity, and is not wrong view and the rest”〔0100b16〕. Saṅghabhadra cites and appraises it: 「由此經主所作是言：若彼撥無真解脫道，妄執別有餘清淨因，是則執餘能得清淨非邪見等，此緣見道所斷諸法。理亦不成，彼全未詳對法宗義」 tr. “hence the Sūtra-master says: if he denies outright the true path of liberation and falsely holds that there is some other cause of purity, that is holding that something else can attain purity and is not wrong view and the rest, and this takes as object the dharmas abandoned by seeing the path. This too does not hold in principle, for he has wholly failed to examine the tenets of the Abhidharma”〔T29n1562 0606c21〕, and goes on to establish his own tenet, 「若爾，見滅諦所斷戒禁取體亦應成與道同故……總計解脫是常是寂，執謗彼心為清淨因，理不成故」 tr. “if so, the entity of adherence to observances and vows abandoned by seeing the truth of cessation ought also to be established, since it is the same as with the path … to reckon liberation in general as eternal and as quiescent, and to hold that a mind slandering it is the cause of purity, is unreasonable in principle.” One meaning and two schools recorded together · not adjudging which prevails.

Seven, the fault of overreach in being bewildered about the truth of suffering — the Abhidharmakośa reads 「此復何因是見苦斷？迷苦諦故有太過失，緣有漏惑皆迷苦故」 tr. “and on what ground is this abandoned by seeing suffering? To say ‘because it is bewildered about the truth of suffering’ has the fault of overreach, since all afflictions taking what has outflows as object are bewildered about suffering”〔0100b11〕. Saṅghabhadra cites and refutes it: 「故。由此己遮經主所難，迷苦諦故有太過失，緣有漏惑皆迷苦故，以非一切緣有漏惑皆以果苦為所緣故。如何得有太過失耶？非許二俱見苦所斷，見道所斷便畢竟無」 tr. “therefore. By this he has already blocked the Sūtra-master’s objection that ‘to say it is because one is bewildered about the truth of suffering has the fault of overreach, since all afflictions taking what has outflows as object are bewildered about suffering,’ since not all afflictions taking what has outflows as object take the suffering that is result for their object. How then is there any fault of overreach? It is not that, granting both to be abandoned by seeing suffering, what is abandoned by seeing the path becomes in the end nonexistent”〔T29n1562 0607b10〕, and sets up besides his own account, 「非道計道有二類故，一緣戒禁等、二緣親迷道」 tr. “because holding what is not the path to be the path is of two classes, first taking observances and vows and the rest as object, second taking as object what is directly bewildered about the path”〔T29n1562 0607b13〕, so as to establish the same conclusion well. ⇒ Saṅghabhadra here does not refute the conclusion (that adherence to observances and vows is abandoned by seeing suffering), but refutes the ground that his one figure of ‘the fault of overreach’ does not hold — an instance of a difference in the detailed reason with the same conclusion. One meaning and two schools recorded together · not adjudging which prevails.

Eight, whether craving and pride too are all-pervading — the Abhidharmakośa reads 「雖爾，遍行亦非唯此，以於是處有我見行，是處必應起我愛慢」 tr. “even so, the all-pervading are not these only, for wherever the view of self is active, there the craving for self and the pride of self must arise”〔0101c10〕. Saṅghabhadra cites and appraises it: 「唯自界自地遍行故。經主於此作是責言：何緣所餘緣彼是見，此亦緣彼而非見耶？以欲界生不作是執我是大梵，亦不執言梵是我所，故非身見」 tr. “because they are all-pervading only in their own realm and their own level. The Sūtra-master here reproaches thus: on what ground is it a view when the other afflictions take that as object, while these too take it as object and yet are not views? Because one born in the realm of desire does not hold that ‘I am Mahābrahmā,’ nor hold and say that ‘Brahmā belongs to me,’ and so it is not the view of self”〔T29n1562 0613a05〕. The angle from which Saṅghabhadra ties this sentence differs from Puguang’s — Puguang marks this sentence as the Vaibhāṣikas’ reproach in return against the objector〔T41n1821 0303c12 sequence〕, whereas Saṅghabhadra calls it outright the Sūtra-master’s own interrogation. A divergence of attribution between the two houses, recorded without adjudication.

Nine, whether the innate view of self is indeterminate (the one instance in this unit where ‘the Abhidharmakośa records a divergent account without refuting it, and the refutation appears in Saṅghabhadra alone’) — the Abhidharmakośa reads 「先軌範師作如是說：俱生身見是無記性，如禽獸等身見現行。若分別生是不善性」 tr. “the preceptors of former times say thus: an innate view of self is of indeterminate quality, as the view of self is active in beasts and the like; if it arises from discrimination it is of unwholesome quality”〔0102c25〕. Saṅghabhadra cites and appraises it: 「本論說：身見能令三有相續，乃至廣說。然經主言：俱生身見是無記性，如禽獸等身見現行。若分別生是不善性，此不應理，不能分別而言見攝、見道所斷，理不成故。此不應言是修所斷，與無我解正相違故」 tr. “the root treatise says: the view of self makes the three existences continue on, and so at length. Yet the Sūtra-master says: an innate view of self is of indeterminate quality, as the view of self is active in beasts and the like; if it arises from discrimination it is of unwholesome quality. This is unreasonable, since to say that what cannot discriminate is gathered into view and is abandoned by the path of seeing is unreasonable in principle. This ought not to be said to be abandoned by cultivation, since it is directly contrary to the understanding of no-self”〔T29n1562 0618a17〕. ⇒ In the eight items before, the text of the Abhidharmakośa has more or less an exchange of both parties; in this item the Abhidharmakośa cites the account of the preceptors of former times from one side only and the author passes no verdict, while Saṅghabhadra establishes his own tenet head-on. One meaning and two schools recorded together · not adjudging which prevails.

Honest record (a negative proposition · the lack marked as it stands): within the range of the scene of this unit in the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine T1563,〔0892c12〕to about〔0913b〕, not one word-for-word quotation under 「經主」 tr. “the Sūtra-master” is found — under fault-tolerant rechecking the key phrases 「此是欲貪之隨眠義」 tr. “this is the sense of the latent tendency belonging to greed for desire,” 「俱生身見是無記性」 tr. “an innate view of self is of indeterminate quality,” 「壞故名薩」 tr. “because it perishes it is called sat,” and 「此中何相見苦所斷」 tr. “what is the mark here of being abandoned by seeing suffering” all yield a zero result; and though the term 「薩迦耶見」 tr. “the view of a real person” has one occurrence at〔T29n1563 0893c12〕with a sentence of similar purport, it is not a word-for-word sentence of debate. This is the fact of the fullness and brevity of the two treatises (the form of the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine being of itself more concise than the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle), and not a failure of the search. Further: 「經主」 tr. “the Sūtra-master” occurs forty-nine times in all in the chapter on the latent tendencies of T1562, and this item takes only the nine within the range of the scene of Unit 1, the rest not being cited at large.

VI. Divergent Interpretations of the Commentators (Puguang · Fabao · Yuanhui · Shentai)

The lack of Shentai’s commentary (a negative proposition already proved · the lack marked as it stands): Shentai’s Commentary on the Abhidharmakośa X53n0836 is a fragment, its surviving seven fascicles being Fascicles One · Two · Four · Five · Six · Seven · Seventeen; Fascicles Eight through Sixteen (nine fascicles) are wholly lost, and that gap swallows up the whole of the Chapter on the World, the Chapter on Action, and the Chapter on the Latent Tendencies. Under mechanical fault-tolerant rechecking: 「分別隨眠品」 tr. “the chapter analyzing the latent tendencies” yields zero occurrences · the first line of this chapter’s stanza, 「隨眠諸有本」 tr. “the latent tendencies are the root of the several existences,” yields zero · 「六由貪異七」 tr. “these six become seven by a difference in greed” yields zero · 「捨置記」 tr. “determination by setting aside” yields zero; and though 「薩迦耶見」 tr. “the view of a real person” has one occurrence〔X53n0836 0010a24〕, its context belongs to a general reference to the five views under the section on 「見處」 tr. “the basis of views” among the eighteen elements in the Chapter on the Elements, and is not commentary on the chapter on the latent tendencies. ⇒ Shentai’s commentary is fragmentary · the chapter on the latent tendencies is lacking · this unit has no word-by-word gloss of his to hang upon, and no text from another fascicle is put in its place. Only the phrase 「隨眠品六十九行」 tr. “the chapter on the latent tendencies, sixty-nine lines”〔X53n0836 0006b06〕in the general conspectus of his first fascicle is a second independent source for the stanza count of this chapter, and being no commentary it cannot be made to serve as an outlining witness. The three houses below are recorded together.

(1) The Ten Functions and the Chapter Outline

The warrant for the glossing of the ten functions — Puguang cites the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle item by item as the ground of the gloss, his first item reading 「正理四十五云一堅固根本，令得堅牢，對治遠故」 tr. “the Correct Principle, fascicle forty-five, says: first, firmly strengthening the root, making it firm, because what counteracts it is far off”〔T41n1821 0291b03〕. ⇒ The authority for the glossing of the ten functions is anchored in the Correct Principle and is not Puguang’s own composition.
The chapter-level main outline and the detailed five sections — Puguang’s Record〔T41n1821 0291a13〕: 「就此品中，一明惑體、二明惑滅。就第一明惑體中，一正明根本惑、二明雜諸煩惱。就正明根本惑中，一辨根本惑、二諸門分別。就辨根本惑中，一增數以明；二明見、修斷；三別明五見；四便明四倒；五明七、九慢」 tr. “within this chapter, first the entity of the confusions, second the extinction of the confusions. Within the first, the entity of the confusions, first properly explaining the root confusions, second explaining the miscellaneous afflictions. Within the properly explaining of the root confusions, first analyzing the root confusions, second the distinctions through the several gates. Within the analyzing of the root confusions, first explaining by increasing the count; second explaining what is abandoned by seeing and by cultivation; third explaining the five views separately; fourth explaining thereupon the four inversions; fifth explaining the seven and the nine prides”; Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary〔T41n1823 0923a14〕: 「就此品中分二：一明惑體、二明惑滅。就明惑體中分三：一明根本惑、二諸門分別、三雜明諸煩惱。就明根本惑中分五：一明增數、二明見修斷、三明五見、四明四倒、五明七九慢。就第一，明增數中分四：一明六隨眠、二明七隨眠、三明十隨眠、四明九十八隨眠」 tr. “within this chapter it divides into two: first explaining the entity of the confusions, second explaining the extinction of the confusions. Within the explaining of the entity of the confusions it divides into three: first explaining the root confusions, second the distinctions through the several gates, third the miscellaneous explanation of the afflictions. Within the explaining of the root confusions it divides into five: first explaining the increasing of the count, second explaining what is abandoned by seeing and by cultivation, third explaining the five views, fourth explaining the four inversions, fifth explaining the seven and nine prides. Within the first, the increasing of the count, it divides into four: first explaining the six latent tendencies, second explaining the seven latent tendencies, third explaining the ten latent tendencies, fourth explaining the ninety-eight latent tendencies”; Fabao’s Commentary〔T41n1822 0687a10〕: 「此品文中大分為二：一明惑體用、二明斷不同。就前門中又分為四：一明隨眠、二雜明諸惑、三義門分別、四別明五蓋。明隨眠中，一明體數、二逐要例釋、三緣縛等別。體數門中，一明六隨眠、二明經說七、三分六為十、四分九十八」 tr. “the text of this chapter is mainly divided into two: first explaining the entity and function of the confusions, second explaining the differences of their abandonment. Within the former gate it divides again into four: first explaining the latent tendencies, second the miscellaneous explanation of the confusions, third the analysis through the gates of sense, fourth the separate explanation of the five hindrances. Within the explaining of the latent tendencies, first explaining the entity and count, second glossing by instances as the essentials require, third the differences of taking as object and binding and the rest. Within the gate of entity and count, first explaining the six latent tendencies, second explaining the seven the sūtra speaks of, third dividing the six into ten, fourth dividing them into ninety-eight.” ⭐ The points of divergence = the manner of subdividing the chapter on the entity of the confusions (Puguang twofold · Yuanhui threefold · Fabao fourfold) and the wording used (the entity of the confusions and the entity and function of the confusions · the extinction of the confusions and the differences of their abandonment). Recorded without adjudication.

(2) The Seven Latent Tendencies and the Setting Up of ‘Craving for Existence’

The opening of the outline — Puguang’s Record〔T41n1821 0291c14〕: 「此下第二明七隨眠，此即問也……上一句正答，下三句立有貪所以」 tr. “below, the second, explaining the seven latent tendencies, this being the question … the first line properly answers, and the three lines below set up the reason for craving for existence.”
The two grounds for setting up the name ‘craving for existence’ — Puguang’s Record〔T41n1821 0291c20〕: 「第二句於內門轉故，所以不名欲貪。第三句為遮解脫想，所以名有貪」 tr. “the second line, ‘because it turns toward the inner gate,’ is why it is not called greed for desire. The third line, ‘in order to block the notion of liberation,’ is why it is called craving for existence.” ⇒ He divides the two grounds expressly and matches them one to one with the second and third lines of the stanza.

(3) The Dispute over the Association of the Latent Tendencies with Mind (Three Schools Standing Together · the Densest Chain of Question and Answer in Unit 1)

The twofold alternative pressed to a decision — Puguang’s Record〔T41n1821 0291c25〕: 「兩關徵定。為欲貪體即是隨眠，據持業釋？為是欲貪之隨眠義，據依主釋」 tr. “a twofold alternative pressed to a decision. Is the entity of greed for desire itself the latent tendency, on an appositional-determinative reading? Or is it the sense ‘the latent tendency of greed for desire,’ on a dependent-determinative reading?”
The intent of the reproach in return — Puguang’s Record〔T41n1821 0291c27〕: 「若爾何失者，反責疑意」 tr. “‘if it be so, what fault is there’ is a reproach in return as to the intent of the doubt”; Fabao’s Commentary〔T41n1822 0687c13〕: 「若爾何失，反問二釋也」 tr. “‘if it be so, what fault is there’ asks back about the two glosses.”
Both alike have a fault — Puguang’s Record〔T41n1821 0291c28〕: 「至三根相應者，重顯疑意。持業、依主二俱有過」 tr. “down to ‘associated with three faculties,’ he displays the intent of the doubt again. The appositional-determinative and the dependent-determinative alike have a fault.”
The objector’s citing of the sūtra and his objection to the dependent-determinative reading — Puguang’s Record〔T41n1821 0292a05〕: 「引經正取并隨眠斷一句為難」 tr. “he cites the sūtra and properly takes the one sentence ‘together with the cutting off of the latent tendency’ as his objection” ·〔T41n1821 0292a07〕: 「據依主釋。隨眠應是心不相應，同大眾部等。彼計隨眠是心不相應」 tr. “on a dependent-determinative reading, the latent tendency ought to be not associated with mind, the same as with the Mahāsāṃghikas and the rest, who reckon a latent tendency to be not associated with mind.”
The correct sense of the Vaibhāṣikas — Puguang’s Record〔T41n1821 0292a15〕: 「毘婆沙師至即是隨眠者，毘婆沙師作如是說：欲貪等體即是隨眠，據持業釋。是心相應，非不相應」 tr. “‘the Vaibhāṣika masters’ down to ‘are themselves the latent tendencies’: the Vaibhāṣika masters say thus: the entities of greed for desire and the rest are themselves the latent tendencies, on an appositional-determinative reading. They are associated with mind and not dissociated”; Fabao’s Commentary〔T41n1822 0687c12〕: 「有部欲貪即隨眠。前二屬主，有部持業。論」 tr. “for the Sarvāstivādins greed for desire is itself the latent tendency. The former two belong to the dependent-determinative; the Sarvāstivādins to the appositional-determinative. The treatise.”
The pressing of ‘does this not contradict the sūtra’ — Puguang’s Record〔T41n1821 0292a18〕: 「豈不違經者，大眾部等徵」 tr. “‘does this not contradict the sūtra’ is the pressing of the Mahāsāṃghikas and the rest.” This ascription of the pressing to a school hangs upon Puguang’s marking; the treatise itself has no such name — in citing it one must show that it is what the commentator ties, and not take it for the plain text of the treatise.
The explaining through of the sūtra — Puguang’s Record〔T41n1821 0292a18〕: 「無違經失至是相應法者，毘婆沙師通經。經言并隨眠斷者，不但斷欲貪體，并貪相應、所緣隨縛亦斷故」 tr. “‘there is no fault of contradicting the sūtra’ down to ‘they are associated dharmas’: the Vaibhāṣika masters explain the sūtra through. Where the sūtra says ‘together with the cutting off of the latent tendency,’ it is that not only the entity of greed for desire is cut off, but the bondage following along in association with greed and in what is taken as object is cut off as well.”
The reproach ‘by what principle is it proved’ and the gloss of the treatise master Fasheng — Puguang’s Record〔T41n1821 0292b02〕: 「何理為證知定相應者，大眾部等責」 tr. “‘by what principle is it proved that they are definitely associated’ is the reproach of the Mahāsāṃghikas and the rest” ·〔T41n1821 0292b03〕: 「以諸隨眠至是相應法者，毘婆沙師中法勝論師解。故正理云經主此中先敘法勝所說」 tr. “‘because the several latent tendencies’ down to ‘they are associated dharmas’ is the gloss of the treatise master Fasheng among the Vaibhāṣikas. Hence the Correct Principle says: the Sūtra-master here first relates what Fasheng says.” ⇒ Puguang here cites outright the word 「經主」 tr. “the Sūtra-master” from the Correct Principle, and ties the name 「法勝論師」 tr. “the treatise master Fasheng” as the source of the Vaibhāṣika line of argument.
None of this amounts to proof — Puguang’s Record〔T41n1821 0292b16〕: 「此皆非證至是隨眠所為者，大眾部等非。此皆非證」 tr. “‘none of this amounts to proof’ down to ‘are performed by the latent tendencies’ is the denial of the Mahāsāṃghikas and the rest. None of this amounts to proof.”
The author appraises and takes the Sautrāntikas — Puguang’s Record〔T41n1821 0292b21〕: 「論主評取經部。經部於此所說如何？」 tr. “the author appraises and takes the Sautrāntikas. What do the Sautrāntikas say here?” ⇒ He marks the two words 「評取」 tr. “appraises and takes” expressly.
Relating the Sautrāntika tenet — Puguang’s Record〔T41n1821 0292b22〕: 「彼說欲貪至即名纏故者，述經部宗」 tr. “‘they say, of greed for desire’ down to ‘it is called entanglement’ relates the Sautrāntika tenet.”
The two senses of sleep and waking — Puguang’s Record〔T41n1821 0292c01〕: 「經部答。惑不現行，如睡相似，故名為睡」 tr. “the Sautrāntikas answer. A confusion not active is like being asleep, and so is called sleep” ·〔T41n1821 0292c03〕: 「經部答。惑現行時，覺察」 tr. “the Sautrāntikas answer. When a confusion is active there is awareness.”
The seed and the seed of memory being of one capability — Puguang’s Record〔T41n1821 0293a02〕: 「經部師，煩惱種子及念種子，俱有功能，竝無別體。由此不同故，難大眾部等」 tr. “for the Sautrāntika masters, the seed of an affliction and the seed of memory alike have a capability and neither has a separate entity. By this difference they object to the Mahāsāṃghikas and the rest.”
The four rounds of question and answer on the Sūtra of the Six Sixes — Puguang’s Record〔T41n1821 0293a05〕: 「說一切有部難。經中既說於其樂受有貪隨眠，明知隨眠即是現起，如何乃言隨眠名種」 tr. “the Sarvāstivādins object. Since the sūtra says that upon a pleasant feeling there is a latent tendency of greed, it is plainly known that a latent tendency is just what has arisen; how then say that a latent tendency is named a seed?” ·〔T41n1821 0293a08〕: 「經部通經。經中但說有貪隨眠，不言樂受現行之時即有隨眠，何所違害」 tr. “the Sautrāntikas explain the sūtra through. The sūtra says only that there is a latent tendency of greed; it does not say that at the time when a pleasant feeling is active there is a latent tendency. What contradiction is there?” ·〔T41n1821 0293a10〕: 「於何時有者，說一切有部問」 tr. “‘at what time is there one’ is the Sarvāstivādins’ question” ·〔T41n1821 0293a11〕: 「經部答。於彼樂受熏種睡時名有貪隨眠。或假於貪因上立隨眠果名」 tr. “the Sautrāntikas answer. At the time when the seed perfumed upon that pleasant feeling is asleep, it is said that there is a latent tendency of greed. Or else the name of the result, ‘latent tendency,’ is conventionally set up upon greed, which is the cause.”
Fabao’s general table of the three schools — Fabao’s Commentary〔T41n1822 0687c10〕: 「經部師宗現行名纏，種名隨眠。大眾部等隨眠體是不相應行，即是欲貪之隨眠。有部欲貪即隨眠」 tr. “for the Sautrāntika tenet what is active is called entanglement and the seed is called a latent tendency. For the Mahāsāṃghikas and the rest the entity of a latent tendency is a dissociated formation, that is, the latent tendency belonging to greed for desire. For the Sarvāstivādins greed for desire is itself the latent tendency.” ⇒ Fabao sets out the positions of the three schools at the head of the passage, his form being more schematic than Puguang’s sentence-by-sentence question and answer, and his attributions agree entirely with Puguang’s, with no divergence.

(4) The Ten Latent Tendencies · the Ninety-Eight · Abandonment by Seeing and by Cultivation

The opening of the outline on abandonment by seeing and by cultivation — Puguang’s Record〔T41n1821 0294a16〕: 「此下第二明見修斷，此即總標……忍聲通說法智忍、類智忍，此中明忍而言智者，從果為名」 tr. “below, the second, explaining abandonment by seeing and by cultivation, this being the general marking … the word ‘receptivity’ speaks in general of the receptivity to the cognition of dharma and the receptivity to the subsequent cognition; here receptivity is explained and yet ‘cognition’ is said, which takes its name from the result.”
The divergent account that an ordinary being cannot abandon what is abandoned by seeing — Puguang’s Record〔T41n1821 0294b02〕: 「有餘師說至諸見未斷者，敘異說。外道諸仙不能伏見所斷惑，修所斷惑但能暫伏而得上生。故婆沙五十一云謂譬喻者作如是說：異生不能斷諸煩惱」 tr. “‘some other masters say’ down to ‘the several views not yet cut off’ relates a divergent account. The seers among the non-Buddhists cannot suppress the confusions abandoned by seeing; the confusions abandoned by cultivation they can suppress only for a while and thereby obtain birth above. Hence the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle fifty-one, says: the masters of similes say thus: an ordinary being cannot cut off the several afflictions.” ⇒ Puguang cites the Mahāvibhāṣā to tie this account to the masters of similes, corroborating the treatise’s 「有餘師說」 tr. “some other masters say.”

(5) The Entities of the Five Views

The opening of the outline — Puguang’s Record〔T41n1821 0297c04〕: 「此下第三別明五見體。就中，一正明五見體、二別釋戒禁取」 tr. “below, the third, explaining separately the entities of the five views. Within it, first properly explaining the entities of the five views, second glossing adherence to observances and vows separately.”
The two glosses on the view of a real person set out together — Puguang’s Record〔T41n1821 0297c09〕: 「經部師釋。壞故名薩，聚謂迦耶，迦耶名身。壞即是非常義，聚即是和合蘊義。迦耶即薩，名薩迦耶，持業釋也」 tr. “the Sautrāntika masters’ gloss. Because it perishes it is called sat; the aggregation is kāya, and kāya is called person. Perishing is the sense of impermanence, and aggregation is the sense of conjoined aggregates. Kāya is just sat, called satkāya, an appositional-determinative reading” ·〔T41n1821 0297c15〕: 「毘婆沙者至五取蘊起者，第二毘婆沙師釋。有故名薩，身義如前。故正理云有故名薩，聚謂迦耶，即是和合積聚為義」 tr. “‘the Vaibhāṣikas’ down to ‘arise upon the five aggregates of appropriation’ is the second gloss, that of the Vaibhāṣika masters. Because it exists it is called sat; the sense of ‘person’ is as before. Hence the Correct Principle says: because it exists it is called sat; the aggregation is kāya, that is, having conjunction and heaping up for its sense.” Fabao, on the same passage, marks the attributions〔T41n1822 0690c09〕: 「論『壞故名薩至方執我故』，論主引經部釋，如文可解」 tr. “the treatise’s ‘because it perishes it is called sat’ down to ‘before a self is held to’: the author cites the Sautrāntika gloss, plain as it stands” ·〔T41n1822 0690c13〕: 「論『毘婆沙者至名薩迦耶』，論主引有部釋也」 tr. “the treatise’s ‘the Vaibhāṣikas’ down to ‘called satkāya’: the author cites the Sarvāstivāda gloss,” and supplies besides the Correct Principle’s counter-question to the Sautrāntika gloss〔T41n1822 0690c10〕: 「正理破云若爾，何用標以薩聲，但迦耶聲足遮常故，則應但立迦耶見名。無法是常而可聚集，何用身上標以壞聲」 tr. “the Correct Principle refutes, saying: if so, what use is there in marking it with the word sat? The word kāya alone suffices to block eternity, and so the name ought to be set up as the view of kāya only. No dharma that is eternal can be aggregated; what use is it to mark the word ‘perishing’ upon the person?” — this counter-question is nowhere cited by Puguang. Yuanhui, however, makes no division into two sections and writes them out one after another〔T41n1823 0924b16〕: 「薩迦耶見，此云壞身見，或名有身見，故論云：壞故名薩，聚謂迦耶……毘婆沙師作如是釋：有故名薩，身義如前」 tr. “the view of satkāya, which here means the view of a perishing person, or is named the view of an existing person; hence the treatise says: because it perishes it is called sat; the aggregation is kāya … the Vaibhāṣika masters gloss thus: because it exists it is called sat; the sense of ‘person’ is as before.” ⭐ The point of divergence = the fineness of the outlining (Puguang and Fabao dividing into two glosses · Yuanhui writing them out continuously).
The setting up of the name ‘wrong view’ — Puguang’s Record〔T41n1821 0298a23〕: 「邪見者，以過重故偏立邪名，如說臭蘇，凡蘇皆臭，臭中極者名曰臭蘇……謂此邪見唯損減故，所餘四見有增益故」 tr. “as for wrong view, because its fault is graver the name ‘wrong’ is set up upon it alone, as one says stinking ghee: all ghee stinks, and what is extreme in stinking is called stinking ghee … that is, this wrong view is diminishment alone, while the remaining four views have superimposition.” Puguang cites the simile with the character 「蘇」 tr. “ghee”, which is a variant writing of the base text’s 「酥」 tr. “ghee” for one and the same thing (item 0100002 of item three).
The glossing of the name ‘adherence to views’ — Puguang’s Record〔T41n1821 0298b02〕: 「見取者，釋劣謂勝，明見取。諸有漏法皆名為劣，聖所斷故。執此劣法為最勝者，總名見取」 tr. “as for adherence to views, it glosses ‘calling the inferior superior’ and explains adherence to views. All dharmas with outflows are called inferior, since they are what the noble ones abandon. To hold these inferior dharmas to be most excellent is given the general name of adherence to views.”
The glossing of the name ‘adherence to observances and vows’ — Puguang’s Record〔T41n1821 0298b09〕: 「戒禁取者，釋第三句非因道妄謂，明戒禁取。於非因、非道，妄謂是因、是道，是見一切總說名戒禁取。如諸外道或計大自在天為因、或計生主為因」 tr. “as for adherence to observances and vows, it glosses the third line, ‘falsely calling what is neither cause nor path so,’ and explains adherence to observances and vows. Toward what is neither cause nor path, falsely to call it cause and path — all such views together are called adherence to observances and vows, as when the several non-Buddhists reckon Maheśvara to be the cause, or reckon the Lord of Creatures to be the cause”; Fabao at the same place gives only one general marking sentence〔T41n1822 0691a23〕: 「戒禁取，此釋戒禁取也」 tr. “adherence to observances and vows: this glosses adherence to observances and vows” — a marked divergence of fullness and brevity; Yuanhui’s composition is the briefest〔T41n1823 0924c15〕: 「戒禁取者，論云：『若於非因起是因見，此見何故非見集斷？』頌曰：於大自在等，非因妄執因，從常我倒生，故唯見苦斷」 tr. “as for adherence to observances and vows, the treatise says: ‘if a view arises upon what is not a cause that this is the cause, why is this view not abandoned by seeing origination?’ The stanza says: with regard to Maheśvara and the rest, falsely holding what is not a cause to be a cause, arising from the inversions of eternity and self, it is abandoned by seeing suffering alone.”
The outline of the separate gloss on adherence to observances and vows — Puguang’s Record〔T41n1821 0298c08〕: 「此下第二別釋戒禁取。問：若於非因起是因見，此見何故非見集斷，而說見苦斷耶？『頌曰至故唯見苦斷』者，頌答」 tr. “below, the second, glossing adherence to observances and vows separately. Question: if a view arises upon what is not a cause that this is the cause, why is this view not abandoned by seeing origination but said to be abandoned by seeing suffering? ‘The stanza says’ down to ‘abandoned by seeing suffering alone’ is the stanza’s answer.”

(6) The Four Inversions

The opening of the outline — Puguang’s Record〔T41n1821 0299c22〕: 「此下第四明四顛倒。問：如前所說戒禁取從常我倒生，為但有斯二種顛倒？應知顛倒……總有四」 tr. “below, the fourth, explaining the four inversions. Question: as was said above, adherence to observances and vows arises from the inversions of eternity and self; are there only these two inversions? It should be known that the inversions … are four in all.”
The school to which the divergent account of twelve inversions belongs — Puguang’s Record〔T41n1821 0300c28〕: 「敘異說。准《婆沙》、《正理》，是分別論者。於十二中八唯見斷。常、我各三，謂想、心、見。樂、淨各一，所謂見倒。四通見、修斷。樂、淨各二，所謂想、心」 tr. “relating a divergent account. Following the Mahāvibhāṣā and the Correct Principle, they are the Masters of Distinction. Of the twelve, eight are abandoned by seeing alone: eternity and self have three each, namely perception, mind, and view; pleasure and purity have one each, namely the inversion of view. Four extend to abandonment by seeing and by cultivation: pleasure and purity have two each, namely perception and mind.” ⇒ Puguang plainly ties the school of this divergent account to the Masters of Distinction.
The Vaibhāṣikas’ not granting it — Puguang’s Record〔T41n1821 0301a04〕: 「毘婆沙師至畫藥叉迷亂者，毘婆沙師不許此義。若有樂、淨想心現行，便許聖者有樂、淨倒。聖者亦起有情想、心，是即亦應許有我見倒」 tr. “‘the Vaibhāṣika masters’ down to ‘confused before a painted yakṣa’: the Vaibhāṣika masters do not grant this sense. If the perception and mind of pleasure and of purity were active, one would grant that a noble one has the inversions of pleasure and purity. A noble one also gives rise to the perception and mind of ‘a sentient being,’ and by that one would also have to grant that he has the inversion of the view of self”; Fabao at the same passage brings out a threefold outline of his own〔T41n1822 0693c10〕: 「論『毘婆沙師不許此義』，已下有三：一反難破異部、二順釋成自宗、三正通異部難」 tr. “the treatise’s ‘the Vaibhāṣika masters do not grant this sense’: from here below there are three: first counter-objecting to refute the other school, second explaining in accordance so as to establish his own tenet, third properly explaining through the other school’s objection,” and above it he first states where the question of this passage lies〔T41n1822 0693c07〕: 「四顛倒不通修斷唯見斷者，未離欲聖。既已斷樂、淨二倒，因何於不淨之境而取淨相，無樂之中而求於樂起貪欲也」 tr. “if the four inversions do not extend to abandonment by cultivation but are abandoned by seeing alone, then a noble one who has not yet left greed for desire, having already cut off the two inversions of pleasure and purity, on what ground does he grasp the mark of purity in an impure object-field, and seek pleasure where there is none, and give rise to greedy desire?” ⭐ The point of divergence = the closeness of the outlining (Fabao threefold · Puguang glossing sentence by sentence directly), the doctrinal content agreeing entirely.
The adjudication of the citing of Ānanda’s stanza — Fabao’s Commentary〔T41n1822 0693c20〕: 「論主引慶喜頌難」 tr. “the author cites Ānanda’s stanza as an objection”; Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary〔T41n1823 0925a28〕: 「故引頌言」 tr. “hence a stanza is cited that says.” ⇒ Both commentaries adjudge these twenty characters to be a quoted stanza and not a root stanza, and are the ancient witnesses for the quoted stanza of this unit.
The outlining function of the four lines of the stanza — Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary〔T41n1823 0925a09〕: 「四顛倒自體，謂從於三見，唯倒推增故，想心隨見力。釋曰：初兩句出體，第三句廢立，第四句通經」 tr. “the entity of the four inversions is from three views; because they are inverted, deliberate, and superimpose, perception and mind follow the force of view. The explanation says: the first two lines set out the entity, the third line establishes and rejects, the fourth line explains the sūtra through.” ⇒ This picks out what office each of the four lines of the stanza performs (setting out the entity · establishing and rejecting · explaining the sūtra through), an angle of outlining that Puguang and Fabao do not make explicit.

(7) The Seven Prides and the Nine Prides

The opening of the outline — Puguang’s Record〔T41n1821 0301b19〕: 「此下第五明七、九慢。就中，一正明七、九慢；二釋未斷不起」 tr. “below, the fifth, explaining the seven and the nine prides. Within it, first properly explaining the seven and nine prides; second glossing their not arising though not cut off.”
A divergent gloss on the pride of superior attainment — Puguang’s Record〔T41n1821 0301c25〕: 「有餘師說：於證少德，謂己證多，心生高舉，名增上慢」 tr. “some other master says: having realized a small quality, to say that one has realized much, and the mind exalting itself, is called the pride of superior attainment.” ⇒ Beyond the treatise’s own gloss he cites a divergent gloss for it to stand alongside.
The nine classes of pride — Puguang’s Record〔T41n1821 0302a14〕: 「慢類有九：我勝者，謂我勝彼；我等者，謂我等彼；我劣者，謂我劣彼……此九從前七中三出」 tr. “the classes of pride are nine: ‘I am superior’ means I am superior to him; ‘I am equal’ means I am equal to him; ‘I am inferior’ means I am inferior to him … these nine come out of three among the seven above”; Fabao’s Commentary〔T41n1822 0695b14〕: 「慢類有九，自此已下第二釋慢類也。正理論云類是品類義，即慢之差別」 tr. “the classes of pride are nine; from here below is the second, glossing the classes of pride. The Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle says that ‘class’ is the sense of category, that is, the differentiations of pride”; Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary〔T41n1823 0925b22〕: 「慢類有九：一我勝慢類、二我等慢類、三我劣慢類……從三者，此九慢類從前七慢中三慢流出」 tr. “the classes of pride are nine: first the class ‘I am superior,’ second the class ‘I am equal,’ third the class ‘I am inferior’ … ‘from three’ means these nine classes of pride flow out from three of the seven prides above.” ⇒ The three commentaries have no divergence whatever in the listing of the nine classes of pride and the framework of their flowing out.

(8) The Distinctions through the Several Gates (the First Five Gates)

The general outline of the eight gates — Puguang’s Record〔T41n1821 0303b11〕: 「此下大文第二諸門分別。就中，一遍行、非遍行；二漏、無漏緣；三二種隨增；四二性分別；五明根、非根；六明惑能繫；七明惑隨增；八明次第起」 tr. “below, the second of the main text, the distinctions through the several gates. Within it, first all-pervading and not all-pervading; second taking as object what has and what is without outflows; third the two kinds of increase by attachment; fourth the analysis by the two ethical qualities; fifth explaining what is and is not a root; sixth explaining how the confusions bind; seventh explaining the increase by attachment of the confusions; eighth explaining the arising in sequence”; Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary〔T41n1823 0926a11〕: 「遍行非遍行、二明漏無漏、三明二種隨增、四明二性分別、五明根非根、六明惑能繫、七明惑隨增、八明次第起」 tr. “all-pervading and not all-pervading, second explaining what has and what is without outflows, third explaining the two kinds of increase by attachment, fourth explaining the analysis by the two ethical qualities, fifth explaining what is and is not a root, sixth explaining how the confusions bind, seventh explaining the increase by attachment of the confusions, eighth explaining the arising in sequence.” ⇒ The two houses are all but word for word the same; this unit covers the first five gates, and gates six through eight fall in Units 2 and 3, without overstepping the boundary.
The four rounds of exchange on whether craving and pride too are all-pervading — Puguang’s Record〔T41n1821 0303c06〕: 「雖爾遍行至應亦遍行者，經部難：雖爾，遍行亦非唯此十一隨眠，以理而言，若於是處有我見行，是處必應起我愛我慢……是即愛慢亦應遍行」 tr. “‘even so, the all-pervading’ down to ‘ought to be all-pervading too’ is the Sautrāntikas’ objection: even so, the all-pervading are not these eleven latent tendencies only; speaking by principle, wherever the view of self is active, there the craving for self and the pride of self must arise … and so craving and pride ought to be all-pervading too” ·〔T41n1821 0303c12〕: 「若爾頓緣至何所斷耶者，毘婆沙師反責經部。若說愛、慢頓緣見、修所斷起故，應言愛、慢何所斷耶」 tr. “‘if so, taking as object at once’ down to ‘by what are they abandoned’ is the Vaibhāṣika masters reproaching the Sautrāntikas in return. If it be said that craving and pride arise taking at once as object what is abandoned by seeing and by cultivation, it must be said by what craving and pride are abandoned” ·〔T41n1821 0303c14〕: 「應言修所斷至見力引故者，經部答。應言修所斷，以雜緣境界故，見斷愛、慢部分別緣。或應見所斷，由見力引故」 tr. “‘it should be said abandoned by cultivation’ down to ‘drawn forth by the force of view’ is the Sautrāntikas’ answer. It should be said that they are abandoned by cultivation, since they take mixed object-fields as object, the craving and pride abandoned by seeing taking their objects by category. Or it should be said that they are abandoned by seeing, since they are drawn forth by the force of view” ·〔T41n1821 0303c18〕: 「毘婆沙師至不說自成者，述自宗。毘婆沙師作如是說：此愛、慢二是自相惑，非共相惑，無頓緣力故非遍行」 tr. “‘the Vaibhāṣika masters’ down to ‘established of itself without being stated’ relates their own tenet. The Vaibhāṣika masters say thus: these two, craving and pride, are afflictions with an individual characteristic and not afflictions with a common characteristic, and having no power of taking as object at once they are not all-pervading.” ⇒ The second densest chain of question and answer in Unit 1, with Puguang marking the school at every sentence. The angle from which he ties the second round differs from that of Saṅghabhadra’s citation (item eight of item five), recorded without adjudication.
The outline of what is and is not a root, and the Mahāvibhāṣā’s establishing and rejecting — Puguang’s Record〔T41n1821 0306c26〕: 「此下第五明根非根，就中：一明不善根、二明無記根……婆沙一百一十二廢立云：又此三種具足五義，謂通五部、遍在六識、是隨眠性、能起麁惡身業語業、作斷善根牢強加行，是故獨立為不善根」 tr. “below, the fifth, explaining what is and is not a root. Within it: first explaining the unwholesome roots, second explaining the indeterminate roots … the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle one hundred twelve, establishing and rejecting, says: further, these three are complete in five senses, namely extending to the five categories, being present throughout the six consciousnesses, being of the nature of latent tendency, being able to set going coarse and evil bodily and verbal action, and making the firm and forceful preparatory effort that cuts off the wholesome roots, and therefore they alone are set up as unwholesome roots”; Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary〔T41n1823 0927c04〕: 「無記根。且初第一，明不善根者，論云：於上所說不善惑中，幾是不善根？幾非不善根」 tr. “the indeterminate roots. Taking first the first, explaining the unwholesome roots, the treatise says: among the unwholesome confusions spoken of above, how many are unwholesome roots? How many are not unwholesome roots?”; Fabao’s Commentary〔T41n1822 0699a03〕: 「無記根、三明四記論。此文初也」 tr. “the indeterminate roots; third, explaining the treatment of the four determinations. This is the beginning of that text.”
The three indeterminate roots — Puguang’s Record〔T41n1821 0307b12〕: 「此國諸師說無記根亦有三種……毘婆沙師說無記根有三，謂無記愛、慧、無明。無記愛者，謂色無色界五部愛；無記慧者，謂有覆無記慧、無覆無記慧」 tr. “the several masters of this land say that the indeterminate roots are likewise three … the Vaibhāṣika masters say that the indeterminate roots are three, namely indeterminate craving, discernment, and ignorance. Indeterminate craving is the craving of the five categories in the realms of form and formlessness; indeterminate discernment is obscured-indeterminate discernment and unobscured-indeterminate discernment.”

(9) The Four Determinations

The four determinations answering the four questions in order — Puguang’s Record〔T41n1821 0308a20〕: 「捨置記。此之四記，如其次第答彼四問。此即釋上半頌。如有問者：一問死；二問生；三問勝；四問我一、異等。此即指事別顯四也」 tr. “determination by setting aside. These four determinations answer those four questions each in its order. This glosses the first half of the stanza. As when there is a questioner: first asking about death; second asking about birth; third asking about the superior; fourth asking whether self is one or different, and the like. This points at the matters and displays the four severally.”
The divergent accounts on the latter three questions and the explaining through — Puguang marks their layers one by one〔T41n1821 0308b13〕: 「有作是說至非一切當生者，初問無異說，後三問有異說。此即外人設難」 tr. “‘someone says thus’ down to ‘not all will be born again’: the first question has no divergent account, the latter three have divergent accounts. This is an outsider posing an objection” ·〔T41n1821 0308b16〕: 「者言至仍未解故者，此即論主釋通」 tr. “‘the one who says’ down to ‘he is still not resolved’: this is the author explaining it through” ·〔T41n1821 0308b22〕: 「又作是說至如識果因者，此即外人設難」 tr. “‘someone else says thus’ down to ‘as consciousness is result and cause’: this is an outsider posing an objection” ·〔T41n1821 0308b28〕: 「然彼問者至應反詰記者，此即論主釋通」 tr. “‘yet that questioner’ down to ‘what should be determined by counter-question’: this is the author explaining it through” ·〔T41n1821 0308c05〕: 「又作是說至云何名記者，此即外人設難」 tr. “‘someone else says thus’ down to ‘how is it called a determination’: this is an outsider posing an objection” ·〔T41n1821 0308c08〕: 「然彼所問至如何不名記者，此即論主釋通」 tr. “‘yet what he asks’ down to ‘how is it not called a determination’: this is the author explaining it through.”
The provenance of the sūtra used in the analysis — Puguang’s Record〔T41n1821 0309a14〕: 「此下第三依經辨釋。今依契經辨問記相。於大眾部經，問記有四。『何等為四』者，此即總問」 tr. “below, the third, analyzing and glossing according to the sūtra. Now the marks of question and determination are analyzed according to the sūtra. In the sūtra of the Mahāsāṃghikas, question and determination are four. ‘Which four’ is the general question.” ⇒ He marks plainly that the sūtra cited comes from a Mahāsāṃghika sūtra, corroborating Paramārtha’s 「大德摩訶僧祇」 tr. “the Venerable Mahāsāṃghika” in item twenty-five of item four.
Fabao’s threefold outline — Fabao’s Commentary〔T41n1822 0700a03〕: 「捨置記，長行中有三：一敘婆沙釋、二本論諸師釋、三依經釋。就婆沙釋中有四：一舉數、二列名、三牒釋、四問答分別」 tr. “determination by setting aside: within the prose there are three: first relating the Mahāvibhāṣā’s gloss, second the gloss of the masters of the root treatise, third glossing according to the sūtra. Within the Mahāvibhāṣā’s gloss there are four: first adducing the count, second listing the names, third quoting and glossing, fourth analyzing by question and answer.” ⇒ He sets up a system apart from Puguang’s three stages (general question and general answer · particular question and particular answer · analyzing according to the sūtra). ⭐ The point of divergence = the angle of the outlining.
Yuanhui’s matching of the instances one by one — Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary〔T41n1823 0928a13〕: 「捨置記，如死生殊勝，我蘊一異等。釋曰：上兩句標，下兩句指事釋之。且問記有四：一應一向記、二應分別記、三應反詰記、四應捨置記。如問死者：『一切有情皆當死不？』應一向記」 tr. “determination by setting aside, as with death, birth, the excellent, and whether self and aggregates are one or different, and the like. The explanation says: the first two lines mark it, the latter two point at the matters and gloss it. Take first that question and determination are four: first what should be determined categorically, second what should be determined by analysis, third what should be determined by counter-question, fourth what should be determined by setting aside. As for asking about death: ‘will all sentient beings die?’ It should be determined categorically.” ⇒ Of the four determinations he adduces instances one by one most methodically, and his composition is the most concise.

(10) A Conspectus of the Divergences among the Three Commentaries (Recorded without Adjudication)

Topic	Puguang	Fabao	Yuanhui	The point of divergence
The wording of the chapter-level main outline	the entity of the confusions / the extinction of the confusions	the entity and function of the confusions / the differences of their abandonment	the entity of the confusions / the extinction of the confusions	Fabao stands in a class of his own
The subdivision of the chapter on the entity of the confusions	twofold (properly explaining the root confusions / explaining the miscellaneous afflictions)	fourfold (the latent tendencies / the miscellaneous explanation of the confusions / the analysis through the gates of sense / the five hindrances)	threefold (the root confusions / the distinctions through the several gates / the miscellaneous explanation of the afflictions)	three patterns of wide and narrow outline levels
The gloss on the chapter name	following along after sentient beings is called ‘following’ · a subtle mode of apprehension is called ‘slumber’	a subtle mode of apprehension · binding along and increasing by attachment	following along after sentient beings · because it increases dimness and stagnation	the gloss takes a different face in each while pointing at the same thing
The two glosses on the view of a real person	divided into two sections (the Sautrāntika masters’ gloss / the Vaibhāṣika masters’ gloss)	divided into two sections with the Correct Principle’s counter-question supplied	written out continuously without division	three degrees of fineness in outlining
The gloss on adherence to observances and vows	listing in detail what the non-Buddhists reckon	one general marking sentence	restating the stanza with a brief gloss	one of the widest divergences of fullness and brevity
The outline of ‘the Vaibhāṣika masters do not grant this sense’	glossing sentence by sentence directly	threefold (counter-objecting to refute the other school / explaining in accordance so as to establish his own tenet / properly explaining through the other school’s objection)	setting up no separate outline	Fabao is the most schematic
What office each of the four lines of the stanza performs	not made explicit	not made explicit	setting out the entity / establishing and rejecting / explaining the sūtra through	Yuanhui alone has it
The manner of setting out the positions of the three schools	marking the school at every sentence of question and answer	setting out a general table of the three schools at the head of the passage	not marking at every sentence	a divergence of form · the attributions agreeing entirely
The listing and flowing out of the nine classes of pride	agreeing entirely	agreeing entirely	agreeing entirely	no divergence among the three houses
The general outline of the eight gates of the several distinctions	agreeing entirely	the chapter-internal numbering forms a system of its own	agreeing entirely	in citing 「第N」 tr. “the nth” one must tie it to its house

Where the three commentaries diverge, each house is recorded, without adjudging right and wrong. Their adjudications and the doctrinal choices among their divergences belong elsewhere, in the section of Further Resonances of the exposition layer. Fabao’s chapter-internal numbering forms a system of its own, and in citing his 「第N」 tr. “the nth” it may not be made interchangeable with Puguang’s or Yuanhui’s.

VII. Cross-Reading with the Yogācāra Root Lineage (Link to the Yogācāra Root System · Bridge ②)

The entity of the latent tendencies established in this unit, and its opening and gathering, have topics in the Yogācāra root lineage upon which a link might be hung — the plainest being the stations of the seed and of the active state of an affliction: this unit records the Sautrāntika account as 「煩惱睡位說名隨眠，於覺位中即名纏故」 tr. “an affliction in the stage of sleep is called a latent tendency, and in the stage of waking it is called entanglement”〔0099a03 and thereabouts〕, and glosses the seed as 「謂自體上差別功能，從煩惱生能生煩惱」 tr. “it is a capability that is a differentiation upon its own entity, arising from an affliction and able to produce an affliction”〔0099a06 and thereabouts〕, taking the seed of memory besides for a comparison〔0099a07 and thereabouts〕; next in plainness is the one dispute over whether the latent tendencies are dissociated from mind〔0098c16 and thereabouts〕, whose contested question of ‘whether a dissociated formation can be the seed of an affliction’ is precisely the presupposition upon which that lineage’s doctrine of seeds rests.

Yet this unit has no word-for-word anchor in the Yogācāra system to be evidenced — by the form of this collection, a link must be tied item by item to a word-for-word passage and page anchor in that lineage before it may enter the reader’s face; and among the collation coordinates prepared for this unit there is not one word-for-word anchor in the Yogācāra system. ⇒ Following the rule that a zero result too is recorded as it stands, this item marks the topic only and leaves the word-for-word blank, and supplies nothing conjecturally from memory or from modern research. The word-for-word material for the link awaits a doctrinal adjudication.

VIII. Translation History

Xuanzang’s new translation (the base text of this collection): the Kaiyuan Catalogue of the Teachings records 「阿毘達磨俱舍論三十卷」 tr. “the Abhidharmakośa, thirty fascicles”〔T55n2154 0557a22〕, its interlinear note reading word for word 「第二出與真諦出者同本永徽二年五月十日於大慈恩寺翻經院譯至五年七月二十七日畢沙門元瑜筆受」 tr. “the second issue, of the same original as the one issued by Paramārtha; translated at the Scripture-Translating Cloister of the Great Ci’en Monastery from the tenth day of the fifth month of the second year of Yonghui until the twenty-seventh day of the seventh month of the fifth year, the śramaṇa Yuanyu taking it down”〔T55n2154 0557a22〕. The head of this unit’s fascicle is titled 「阿毘達磨俱舍論卷第十九」 tr. “the Abhidharmakośa, Fascicle Nineteen”〔T29 0098b13〕, and the continuation of the chapter title 「分別隨眠品第五之一」 tr. “Chapter Five, Analysis of the Latent Tendencies, part one”〔T29 0098b17〕.
Paramārtha’s earlier translation (the collating witness): the Kaiyuan Catalogue of the Teachings, in the section of the treatise basket, reads 「阿毘達磨俱舍釋論二十二卷陳天竺三藏真諦譯」 tr. “the Expository Treatise on the Treasury of Abhidharma, twenty-two fascicles, translated by the Tripiṭaka Master Paramārtha of India under the Chen”〔T55n2154 0620c17〕. His chapter here reads 「分別惑品第五」 tr. “Chapter Five, Analysis of the Confusions,” the chapter name differing from Xuanzang’s (item four).
The translation of the two treatises of debate: the Kaiyuan Catalogue of the Teachings concludes together 「右二部論與俱舍論頌同釋異並眾賢造」 tr. “the two treatises above are the same as the Abhidharmakośa in their stanzas and different in their explanations, and both were composed by Saṅghabhadra”〔T55n2154 0621a01〕. The four characters 「頌同釋異」 tr. “the same in stanzas, different in explanation” are the very ground of the form of item five of this unit — the two treatises use the root stanzas of the Abhidharmakośa and compose their own prose; and the nine items of Saṅghabhadra cited in this unit each quote a phrase of the Abhidharmakośa’s prose and set up a separate gloss, which is exactly the fact of those four characters.
The occasion of the treatise’s composition: the Life of Master Vasubandhu records his manner of composition as 「立薩婆多義隨有僻處以經部義破之」 tr. “to set up the Sarvāstivāda sense and, wherever there is a bias, to refute it by the Sautrāntika sense”〔T50n2049 0190b15〕. ⇒ In the one dispute in this unit over the dissociation of the latent tendencies, the author records the correct sense of the Vaibhāṣika masters and at the end lays down the one sentence 「然經部師所說最善」 tr. “yet what the Sautrāntika masters say is the best”〔0099a01〕, which is the most typical instance of that manner; and that Saṅghabhadra counter-refutes here most fiercely (items one and two of item five) answers likewise to what the Life records of what came after. The fact alone is recorded · no judgment of better and worse is made.
The independence of the stanza text: the separate edition of the root stanzas = the Root Stanzas of the Abhidharmakośa T29n1560, whose interlinear note under the chapter title of the chapter on the latent tendencies reads 「六十九頌」 tr. “sixty-nine stanzas”〔T29n1560 0319a09〕. This number agrees with the 「隨眠品六十九行」 tr. “the chapter on the latent tendencies, sixty-nine lines”〔X53n0836 0006b06〕of the general conspectus in Fascicle One of Shentai’s commentary, the two sources agreeing in number while the two readings of the measure-word appear side by side (the collation note 0319003 of T1560 reading 「頌【大】，行【宋】【元】」 tr. “stanza 【Taishō】, line 【Song】【Yuan】”). Recorded without adjudication.
The order of the commentaries: Puguang’s Record T41n1821 (Puguang · principal) · Fabao’s Commentary T41n1822 (Fabao · secondary) · Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary T41n1823 (Yuanhui · outlining) · Shentai’s Commentary X53n0836 (fragmentary · the chapter on the latent tendencies lacking).

IX. Edition Location Register

Xuanzang’s T1558, Fascicle Nineteen (the base text)〔0098b13–0104a01〕: the fascicle head-title 0098b13 · the continuation of the chapter title 0098b17 · the transitional sentence opening the fascicle 0098b18 · Root 1 0098b21 · Root 2 0098c05 · Root 3 0099a29 · Roots 4 and 5 0099b08 · Root 6 0099c10 · Root 7 0099c28 · Root 8 0100a28 · Root 9 0100b26 · the quoted stanza 0101a03 · Root 10 0101a10 · Root 11 0101b17 · Roots 12 and 13 0101b27 · Roots 14 through 16 0102a11 · Roots 17 and 18 0102b17 · Root 19 0102c14 · the first half of Root 20 0103a01 · the second half of Root 20 and Root 21 0103a08 · Root 22 0103a25. Chapter boundaries: the openings of the five sections analyzing the root confusions 0098b18 · 0099c06 · 0099c26 · 0100b21 · 0101a08; the opening of the chapter of distinctions through the several gates 0101b25 · gate two 0102a09 · gate three 0102b14 · gate four 0102c12 · gate five (including the four determinations) 0102c28.
Paramārtha’s T1559: the corresponding passage 0252c06–0257b11. Chief items 0252c06 · 0252c09 · 0252c11 · 0252c16 · 0252c18 · 0252c23 · 0253a12 · 0253a16 · 0253a20 · 0253b01 · 0253b07 · 0253b12 · 0253c10 · 0253c25 · 0254a22 · 0254b16 · 0254c28 · 0255a07 · 0255a12 · 0255b02 · 0255b14 · 0255c19 · 0256a19 · 0256b13 · 0256b28 · 0256c04 · 0256c05 · 0256c21 · 0257a27 · 0257b07 · 0257b11 (the end · the passage boundary). Fascicle boundaries: Fascicle Fourteen 0252c02 · Fascicle Fifteen 0259c19.
Saṅghabhadra’s T1562〔Chapter Five, Adjudicating the Latent Tendencies, from 0596a11〕: 0596c24 · 0597a02 · 0598b16 · 0599c29 · 0601b13 · 0606a03 · 0606c21 · 0607b10 · 0607b13 · 0613a05 · 0618a17. T1563〔Chapter Six, Adjudicating the Latent Tendencies, from 0892c12〕: 0893c12 (a sentence of similar purport · not a word-for-word sentence of debate). The range of the scene for Unit 1 is about 0596a11 to 0622c10.
Puguang’s Record T41n1821〔Fascicle Nineteen 0291a02–0309b20〕: 0291a05 · 0291a06 · 0291a13 · 0291b03 · 0291c14 · 0291c20 · 0291c25 · 0291c27 · 0291c28 · 0292a05 · 0292a07 · 0292a15 · 0292a18 · 0292b02 · 0292b03 · 0292b16 · 0292b21 · 0292b22 · 0292c01 · 0292c03 · 0293a02 · 0293a05 · 0293a08 · 0293a10 · 0293a11 · 0294a16 · 0294b02 · 0297c04 · 0297c09 · 0297c15 · 0298a23 · 0298b02 · 0298b09 · 0298c08 · 0299c22 · 0300c28 · 0301a04 · 0301b19 · 0301c25 · 0302a14 · 0303b11 · 0303c06 · 0303c12 · 0303c14 · 0303c18 · 0306c26 · 0307b12 · 0308a20 · 0308b13 · 0308b16 · 0308b22 · 0308b28 · 0308c05 · 0308c08 · 0309a14.
Fabao’s Commentary T41n1822〔Fascicle Nineteen 0687a02–0701a17〕: 0687a05 · 0687a06 · 0687a10 · 0687c10 · 0687c12 · 0687c13 · 0690c09 · 0690c10 · 0690c13 · 0691a23 · 0693c07 · 0693c10 · 0693c20 · 0695b14 · 0699a03 · 0700a03.
Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary T41n1823〔Treatise Proper Nineteen 0923a11–0928b21〕: 0923a13 · 0923a14 · 0924b16 · 0924c15 · 0925a09 · 0925a28 · 0925b22 · 0926a10 · 0926a11 · 0927c04 · 0928a13. The five characters 「分別隨眠品」 tr. “the chapter analyzing the latent tendencies” do not occur — to search Yuanhui with this string is bound to yield a false zero, and his boundary is checked by the fascicle title and by the first sentence of the main text at the head of the fascicle.
Shentai’s Commentary X53n0836: the chapter on the latent tendencies is wholly lacking — this unit has no Shentai to hang upon (the lack marked as it stands · not supplied). His phrase on the stanza count in the general conspectus of Fascicle One = 0006b06; the sentence generally touching the five views in the Chapter on the Elements = 0010a24 (not commentary on the chapter on the latent tendencies · it cannot be made to serve).
The stanza text T1560: the interlinear note under the chapter title of the chapter on the latent tendencies 0319a09 (sixty-nine stanzas) · the collation note 0319003.
Catalogues and biographies: T55n2154 0557a22 · 0620c17 · 0621a01; T50n2049 0190b15.
Collation: thirty-seven <app> anchors in Fascicle Nineteen (thirty-one variant readings · four repetitions merged · two filter buckets) · not one case for emending the base text.
The Yogācāra cross-reading anchor: blank (this unit has no word-for-word anchor that has passed adjudication · recorded at item seven).

俱舍論 隨眠體·諸門分別（前五門）Abhidharmakośabhāṣya · The Nature of the Latent Tendencies · Distinctions through the Several Gates (the First Five Gates)