俱舍論諸門分別·結Abhidharmakośabhāṣya · Distinctions through the Several Gates · Conclusion

〔T29 0007a02〕

心要Essence

界品後半：二十二門逐一分別十八界——阿毘達磨方法論的展示廳，也是「眼見識見」千年之諍的現場。

一句話：拿二十二個問題把十八界問到見底——而在『誰在看』這一問上，論主以「傳說」二字存疑、讓經部說出『唯法因果，實無作用』——破執之問於此已然開口。

三個眼目

二十二門＝把每一法放到所有維度上過篩。有見有對、三性界繫、尋伺分別、執受五類、同分三斷……在界上問（界具顯根境識），蘊處之義連帶而成。要學的不是答案清單，是這個問法本身。細針處：尋自身是「無尋唯伺」、欲界初靜慮之伺自身是「無伺唯尋」（中間靜慮之伺則同非相應法，是「無尋無伺」；分類法在自己身上不打折）；法界恆同分——無一法永遠不被心觀照（聖者無我觀前後二念遍緣一切）。
眼見識見諍：從實體之問到用語之判。四家計（眼見·識見·慧見·和合見）往復攻防，論主頌中「傳說不能觀」二字存疑——眾賢讀出「經主意不忍彼因」，普光判「論主意朋識見」，法寶唯科文，圓暉以經部收結。經部一段收束全局：眼色緣生眼識，孰為能所？『唯法因果，實無作用』，眼能見識能了皆隨順世情之假名，「智者於中不應封著」。後來大乘破我法二執之論式，可與此對讀。
極微不相觸，但由無間假立觸名。毘婆沙立「無間生」義（相擊出聲而不相糅、風界攝持而不散）；論主於法救「假立觸名」語下著評「此大德意應可愛樂」——連這句讚語眾賢也起而究詰。傍論之世界（二眼俱見·至不至境·根極微形狀·識依二世·四事地）皆此類：問到物理的盡頭，答案總在「假立」與「實有」之間。

一義（附）：識名隨根

識何以名眼識不名色識？「隨根變識異」——識隨根之明昧而轉、不隨境變，且根不共（此眼唯發此識）而境共（一色人人可見）。所依勝、不共故，隨根立名。

通於全論

「審慮為先決度名見」之見義、三分別（自性·計度·隨念）架構、同分之界類義——皆後出法相之學的原座標。界品全品至此收卷：前半立體（三科攝法）、後半致用（諸門過篩）；下一品「根」，將把二十二根與五位七十五法全幅展開。

The second half of the Chapter on the Elements: twenty-two gates distinguish the eighteen elements one by one—the showroom of Abhidharma method, and the site of the thousand-year dispute over whether the eye sees or consciousness sees.

In one sentence: twenty-two questions are put to the eighteen elements until they are seen through to the bottom—and on the question of who it is that sees, the author holds his distance with the words it is transmitted and lets the Sautrāntikas say that there are only dharmas as cause and result, with no agent function at all: here the question that breaks attachment has already opened its mouth.

Three Points to Watch

Twenty-two gates = putting every dharma through the sieve on every dimension. Visible and resistant, the three ethical qualities and realm affiliation, applied and sustained thought and discrimination, appropriation and the five classes, participating and the three abandonings . . . the questions are put on the elements (which display faculty, object, and consciousness together), and the senses of aggregate and sense field follow along. What is to be learned is not the list of answers but this way of asking. A fine needle-point: applied thought itself is “without applied thought and with sustained thought only,” and the sustained thought of the realm of desire and the first meditative absorption is itself “without sustained thought and with applied thought only” (while the sustained thought of the intermediate absorption goes with the unassociated dharmas as “without applied and without sustained thought”; a taxonomy grants itself no discount). And the element of dharmas is always participating—no dharma is forever unobserved by mind (the noble one’s contemplation of no-self covers everything in two successive thoughts).
Whether the eye sees or consciousness sees: from a question about substance to a judgment about usage. Four masters’ positions (the eye sees · consciousness sees · the discernment associated with eye consciousness sees · the assemblage sees) attack and defend by turns, and in the stanza the author marks his distance with the two words it is transmitted in “it is transmitted that it cannot observe”—Saṅghabhadra reads this as “the Sūtra-master’s mind cannot accept that reason,” Puguang judges that “the author inclines to the view that consciousness sees,” Fabao only divides the text, and Yuanhui closes with the Sautrāntikas. One Sautrāntika passage sweeps the whole board: eye and form as conditions give rise to eye consciousness—which of them is the seer, which the seen? “There are only dharmas as cause and result, and in fact no agent function”; that the eye sees and consciousness cognizes are provisional names adopted to accord with worldly feeling, and “the wise should not fasten upon them.” The later Mahāyāna forms of argument that break attachment to self and to dharmas may be read against this.
Ultimate atoms do not touch; the name touch is provisionally established upon there being no interval. The Vaibhāṣikas establish the sense of arising without interval (things struck together give out sound yet are not commingled; the wind element holds them so that they do not scatter); and on Dharmatrāta’s phrase about provisionally establishing the name touch the author sets down the comment, “this venerable one’s intent should be found agreeable”—and even this word of praise Saṅghabhadra rose up to interrogate. The whole world of the incidental discussions (two eyes seeing together · objects reached and not reached · the shapes of the faculties’ ultimate atoms · the two times of consciousness’s support · the levels of the four things) is of this kind: press a question to the limit of the physical, and the answer always lies between provisionally established and really existent.

A Single Point (Appended): Consciousness Is Named after the Faculty

Why is consciousness named eye consciousness rather than form consciousness? “As the faculty alters, consciousness differs”—consciousness turns with the clarity or dimness of the faculty and not with changes in the object; and the faculty is not held in common (this eye generates only this consciousness) while the object is held in common (one form may be seen by anyone). Because the support is the more excellent and because it is not held in common, the name follows the faculty.

Bearing on the Whole Treatise

The sense of seeing in “deliberation first, then decisive judgment, is called seeing,” the framework of the three kinds of discrimination (intrinsic · conceptual · recollective), and the sense of participation as a class of elements—all are the original coordinates of the later dharma-characteristics learning. With this the whole Chapter on the Elements is closed: the first half established the entities (the three classifications gathering all dharmas), the second half put them to use (the several gates as a sieve). The next chapter, on the faculties, will open out the twenty-two faculties and the five positions of the seventy-five dharmas in full.

原典Canonical · verbatim

阿毘達磨俱舍論卷第二　〔T29 0007a02〕

分別界品第一之二　〔T29 0007a06〕

〔T29 0007a〕復次於前所說十八界中，幾有見、幾無見？幾有對、幾無對？幾善、幾不善、幾無記？頌曰：

〔頌·正26　T29 0007a09〕　　一有見謂色，十有色有對，
　　此除色聲八，無記餘三種。
論曰：十八界中色界有見，以可示現此彼差別。由此義准，說餘無見。如是已說有見無見。唯色蘊攝十界有對，對是礙義。此復三種：障礙、境界、所緣異故。障礙有對，謂十色界。自於他處被礙不生，如手礙手或石礙石或二相礙。境界有對，謂十二界法界一分諸有境法於色等境，故《施設論》作如是言：有眼於水有礙非陸，如魚等眼。有眼於陸有礙非水，從多分說，如人等眼。有眼俱礙，如畢舍遮、室獸摩羅及捕魚人、蝦蟇等眼。有俱非礙，謂除前相。有眼於夜有礙非晝，如諸蝙蝠鵂鶹等眼。有眼於晝有礙非夜，從多分說，如人等眼。有眼俱礙，如狗野干馬豹豺狼猫狸等眼。有俱非礙，謂除前相。此等名為境界有對。所緣有對，謂心心所於自所緣。境界、所緣復有何別？若於彼法此有功能，即說彼為此法境界。心心所法執彼而起，彼於心等名為所緣。云何眼等於自境界所緣轉時說名有礙？越彼於餘此不轉故。或復礙者是和會義，謂眼等法於自境界及自所緣和會轉故。應知此中唯就障礙有對而說，故但言十有色有對，更相障故。由此義准說餘無對。若法境界有對，亦障礙有對耶？應作四句。謂七心界法界一分諸相應法是第一句。色等五境是第二句。眼等五根是第三句。法界一分非相應法是第四句。若法境界有對，亦所緣有對耶？應順後句，謂若所緣有對，定是境界有對。有雖境界有對而非所緣有對，謂眼等五根。此中大德鳩摩邏多作如是說：〔引頌·非本頌　T29 0007b12〕　　是處心欲生，他礙令不起，
　　應知是有對，無對此相違。
此是所許。如是已說有對無對。於此所說十有對中，除色及聲餘八無記，謂五色根、香、味、觸境，不可記為善不善性，故名無記。有說：不能記異熟果故名無記。若爾，無漏應唯無記。其餘十界通善等三，謂七心界與無貪等相應名善，貪等相應名為不善，餘名無記。法界若是無貪等性相應等起擇滅名善，若貪等性相應等起名為不善，餘名無記。色界聲界若善不善心力等起身語表攝，是善不善，餘是無記。已說善等。十八界中幾欲界繫、幾色界繫、幾無色界繫？頌曰：

〔頌·正27　T29 0007b26〕　　欲界繫十八，色界繫十四，
　　除香味二識，無色繫後三。
論曰：繫謂繫屬，即被縛義。欲界所繫具足十八，色界所繫唯十四種，除香味境及鼻舌識。除香味者，段食性故，離段食欲方得生彼。除鼻舌識，無所緣故。若爾，觸界於彼應無，如香味境段食性故，彼所有觸非段食性。若爾，香味類亦應然，香味離食無別受用，觸有別用持根衣等，彼離食欲香味無用，有根衣等故觸非無。有餘師說：住此依彼靜慮等至見色聞聲，輕安俱起有殊勝觸攝益於身，是故此三生彼靜慮猶相隨逐，香味不爾，故在彼無。若爾，鼻舌彼應非有，如香味境彼無用故。不爾，二根於彼有用，謂起言說及莊嚴身。若為嚴身及起說用，但須依處，何用二根？如無男根亦無依處，二根無者依處亦無。於彼可無男根依處，彼無用故。鼻舌依處彼有用故，離根應有。有雖無用而有根生，如處胞胎定當死者。有雖無用而非無因，彼從何因得有根起？於根有愛發殊勝業。若離境愛，於根定然，彼離境貪應無鼻舌。或應許彼男根亦生，若謂不生由醜陋者，陰藏隱密何容醜陋？又諸根生非由有用，若有因力無用亦生。男根於彼雖為醜陋，設許有因於彼應起，男根非有，鼻舌應無。若爾，便違契經所說：彼無支缺，不減諸根。隨彼諸根應可有者，說為不減。何所相違？若不許然男根應有。如是說者，鼻舌二根於彼非無，但無香味，以六根愛依內身生，非依境界而得現起。其男根愛依婬觸生，婬觸彼無，男根非有，故於色界十八界中，唯十四種理得成立。無色界繫唯有後三，所謂意、法及意識界，要離色欲於彼得生，故無色中無十色界。依緣無故五識亦無，故唯後三無色界繫。已說界繫，十八界中幾有漏、幾無漏？頌曰：

〔頌·正28前半　T29 0008a05〕　　意法意識通，所餘唯有漏。
論曰：意及意識道諦攝者，名為無漏，餘名有漏。法界若是道諦無為，名為無漏，餘名有漏。餘十五界唯名有漏。如是已說有漏無漏。十八界中幾有尋有伺、幾無尋唯伺、幾無尋無伺？頌曰：

〔頌·正28後半　T29 0008a11〕　　五識唯尋伺，後三三餘無。
論曰：眼等五識有尋有伺，由與尋伺恒共相應，以行相麁外門轉故、顯義決定，故說唯言。後三謂是意、法、意識，根、境、識中各居後故。此後三界皆通三品，意界、意識界及相應法界，除尋與伺。若在欲界初靜慮中有尋有伺，靜慮中間無尋唯伺，第二靜慮以上諸地乃至有頂無尋無伺。法界所攝非相應法，靜慮中間伺亦如是。尋一切時無尋唯伺，無第二尋故、但伺相應故。伺在欲界初靜慮中三品不收，應名何等？此應名曰無伺唯尋，無第二伺故、但尋相應故。由此故言有尋伺地有四品法：一有尋有伺，謂除尋伺餘相應法。二無尋唯伺，謂即是尋。三無尋無伺，謂即一切非相應法。四無伺唯尋，謂即是伺。餘十色界尋伺俱無，常與尋伺不相應故。若五識身有尋有伺，如何得說無分別耶？頌曰：

〔頌·正29　T29 0008a29〕　　說五無分別，由計度隨念，
　　以意地散慧，意諸念為體。
論曰：傳說，分別略有三種：一自性分別、二計度分別、三隨念分別。由五識身雖有自性而無餘二，說無分別，如一足馬名為無足。自性分別體唯是尋，後心所中自當辯釋。餘二分別如其次第。意地散慧諸念為體，散謂非定。意識相應散慧，名為計度分別。若定若散意識相應諸念，名為隨念分別。如是已說有尋伺等。十八界中幾有所緣、幾無所緣？幾有執受、幾無執受？頌曰：

〔頌·正30　T29 0008b11〕　　七心法界半，有所緣餘無，
　　前八界及聲，無執受餘二。
論曰：六識意界及法界攝諸心所法，名有所緣，能取境故。餘十色界及法界攝不相應法，名無所緣，義准成故。如是已說有所緣等。十八界中九無執受，前七心界及法界全，此八及聲皆無執受。所餘九界各通二門，謂有執受、無執受故。眼等五根住現在世名有執受，過去未來名無執受。色香味觸住現在世不離五根名有執受，若住現在非不離根過去未來名無執受。如在身內除與根合，髮毛爪齒大小便利洟唾血等，及在身外地水等中色香味觸，雖在現世而無執受。有執受者，此言何義？心心所法共所執持攝為依處名有執受，損益展轉更相隨故。即諸世間說有覺觸，眾緣所觸覺樂等故。與此相違名無執受。如是已說有執受等。十八界中幾大種性、幾所造性？幾可積集、幾非積集？頌曰：

〔頌·正31　T29 0008c01〕　　觸界中有二，餘九色所造，
　　法一分亦然，十色可積集。
〔T29 0008c〕論曰：觸界通二，謂大種及所造。大種有四，謂堅性等。所造有七，謂滑性等，依大種生故名所造。餘九色界唯是所造，謂五色根、色等四境。法界一分無表業色亦唯所造。餘七心界法界一分，除無表色俱非二種。尊者覺天作如是說：十種色處唯大種性。彼說不然，契經唯說堅等四相為大種故。此四大種唯觸攝故，非堅濕等眼等所取，非色聲等身根所覺，是故彼說理定不然。又契經說：苾芻當知，眼謂內處四大種所造淨色，有色無見有對，乃至身處廣說亦爾。苾芻當知，色謂外處四大種所造，有色有見有對。聲謂外處四大種所造，有色無見有對。香味二處，廣說亦爾。觸謂外處，是四大種及四大種所造，有色無見有對。如是經中唯說觸處攝四大種，分明顯示餘有色處皆非大種。若爾，何故契經中言謂於眼肉團中若內各別堅性堅類，乃至廣說。彼說不離眼根肉團有堅性等，無相違過。《入胎經》中唯說六界為士夫者，為顯能成士夫本事，非唯爾所，彼經復說六觸處故。又諸心所應非有故，亦不應執心所即心，以契經言想受等心所法依止心故。又亦說有貪心等故。由此如前所說諸界大種所造，差別義成。如是已說大種性等。十八界中，五根、五境十有色界是可積集，極微聚故。義准餘八非可積集，非極微故。如是已說可積集等。十八界中，幾能斫、幾所斫？幾能燒、幾所燒？幾能稱、幾所稱？頌曰：

〔頌·正32　T29 0009a03〕　　謂唯外四界，能斫及所斫，
　　亦所燒能稱，能燒所稱諍。
論曰：色香味觸成斧薪等，此即名為能斫所斫。何法名斫？薪等色聚相逼續生，斧等分隔令各續起，此法名斫。身等色根不名所斫，非可全斷令成二故。非身根等可成二分，支分離身則無根故。又身根等亦非能斫，以淨妙故如珠寶光。如能斫所斫體唯外四界，所燒能稱其體亦爾，謂唯外四界名所燒能稱。身等色根亦非二事，以淨妙故如珠寶光。聲界總非，不相續故。能燒所稱有異諍論，謂或有說：能燒所稱體亦如前，唯外四界。或復有說：唯有火界可名能燒，所稱唯重。如是已說能所斫等。十八界中幾異熟生、幾所長養、幾等流性、幾有實事、幾一剎那？頌曰：

〔頌·正33–34前半　T29 0009a19〕　　內五有熟養，聲無異熟生，
　　八無礙等流，亦異熟生性，
　　餘三實唯法，剎那唯後三。
論曰：內五即是眼等五界。有異熟生及所長養無等流者，離異熟生及所長養，無別性故。異熟因所生名異熟生，如牛所駕車名曰牛車，略去中言故作是說。或所造業至得果時變而能熟，故名異熟。果從彼生，名異熟生。彼所得果與因別類，而是所熟，故名異熟。或於因上假立果名，如於果上假立因名。如契經說：今六觸處，應知即是昔所造業。飲食資助眠睡等持勝緣所益，名所長養。有說：梵行亦能長養。此唯無損，非別有益。長養相續常能護持異熟相續，猶如外郭防援內城。聲有等流及所長養無異熟生。所以者何？隨欲轉故。若爾，不應《施設論》說善修遠離麁惡語故，感得大士梵音聲相。有說：聲屬第三傳故，雖由彼生而非異熟。謂從彼業生諸大種，從諸大種緣擊發聲。有說：聲屬第五傳故，雖由彼生而非異熟。謂彼業生異熟大種，從此傳生長養大種，此復傳生等流大種此乃生聲。若爾，身受從業所生大種生故，應非異熟。若受如聲，便違正理。八無礙者，七心法界此有等流異熟生性。同類遍行因所生者是等流性，若異熟因所引生者名異熟生，諸無礙法無積集故非所長養。餘謂餘四：色、香、味、觸，皆通三種，有異熟生、有所長養、有等流性。實唯法者，實謂無為，以堅實故。此法界攝故，唯法界獨名有實。意、法、意識名為後三，於六三中最後說故。唯此三界有一剎那，謂初無漏苦法忍品，非等流故名一剎那。此說究竟非等流者，餘有為法無非等流。苦法忍相應心名意界、意識界，餘俱起法名為法界。如是已說異熟生等。今應思擇，若有眼界先不成就今得成就亦眼識耶？若眼識界先不成就今得成就亦眼界耶？如是等問，今應略答。頌曰：

〔頌·正34後半　T29 0009b28〕　　眼與眼識界，獨俱得非等。
論曰：獨得者，謂或有眼界先不成就今得成就非眼識，謂生欲界漸得眼根，及無色沒生二三四靜慮地時。或有眼識先不成就今得成就非眼界，謂生二三四靜慮地眼識現起，及從彼沒生下地時。俱得者，謂或有二界先不成就今得成就，謂無色沒生於欲界及梵世時。非者俱非，謂除前相。等謂若有成就眼界亦眼識耶？應作四句。第一句者，謂生二三四靜慮地眼識不起。第二句者，謂生欲界未得眼根及得已失。第三句者，謂生欲界得眼不失，及生梵世若生二三四靜慮地正見色時。第四句者，謂除前相。如是眼界與色界。眼識與色界得成就等如理應思，為攝如是所未說義，是故頌中總復言等。如是已說得成就等。十八界中幾內、幾外？頌曰：

〔頌·正35前半　T29 0009c16〕　　內十二眼等，色等六為外。
論曰：六根、六識十二名內，外謂所餘色等六境。我依名內，外謂此餘。我體既無，內外何有？我執依止故，假說心為我。故契經說：〔引頌·非本頌　T29 0009c20〕　　由善調伏我，智者得生天。
世尊餘處說調伏心，如契經言：〔引頌·非本頌　T29 0009c22〕　　應善調伏心，心調能引樂。
故但於心假說為我。眼等為此所依親近，故說名內。色等為此所緣踈遠，故說名外。若爾，六識應不名內，未至意位非心依故。至意位時不失六識界，未至意位亦非越意相。若異此者，意界唯應在過去世，六識唯在現在未來，便違自宗許十八界皆通三世。又若未來現在六識無意界相，過去意界亦應不立，相於三世無改易故。已說內外。十八界中幾是同分、幾彼同分？頌曰：

〔頌·正35後半　T29 0010a04〕　　法同分餘二，作不作自業。
論曰：法同分者，謂一法界唯是同分。若境與識定為所緣，識於其中已生生法，此所緣境說名同分。無一法界不於其中已正當生無邊意識，由諸聖者決定生心，觀一切法皆為無我。彼除自體及俱有法，餘一切法皆為所緣。如是所除亦第二念心所緣境，此二念心緣一切境無不周遍，是故法界恒名同分。餘二者，謂餘十七界皆有同分及彼同分。何名同分、彼同分耶？謂作自業、不作自業。若作自業名為同分，不作自業名彼同分。此中眼界於有見色已正當見名同分眼，如是廣說，乃至意界各於自境應說自用。迦濕彌羅國毘婆沙師說：彼同分眼但有四種，謂不見色已正當滅及不生法。西方諸師說有五種：謂不生法復開為二，一有識屬、二無識屬，乃至身界應知亦然。意彼同分唯不生法。色界為眼已正當見名同分色，彼同分色亦有四種，謂非眼見已正當滅及不生法，廣說乃至觸界亦爾。各對自根應說自用，應知同分及彼同分。眼若於一是同分，於餘一切亦同分。彼同分亦如是，廣說乃至意界亦爾。色即不然，於見者是同分，於不見者是彼同分。所以者何？色有是事，謂一所見亦多所見，如觀月舞相撲等色。眼無是事，謂一眼根二能見色，眼不共故，依一相續建立同分及彼同分。色是共故，依多相續建立同分及彼同分。如說色界，聲香味觸應知亦爾。聲可如色。香味觸三至根方取，是不共故，一取非餘。理應如眼等，不應如色說。雖有是理而容有共。所以者何？香等三界於一及餘，皆有可生鼻等識義。眼等不然，故如色說。眼等六識同分彼同分生不生法故，如意界說。云何同分、彼同分義？根境識三更相交涉故名為分，或復分者是已作用，或復分者是所生觸，同有此分故名同分。與此相違名彼同分，由非同分與彼同分種類分同，名彼同分。已說同分及彼同分。十八界中幾見所斷、幾修所斷、幾非所斷？頌曰：

〔頌·正36　T29 0010b15〕　　十五唯修斷，後三界通三，
　　不染非六生，色定非見斷。
論曰：十五界者，謂十色界及五識界。唯修斷者，此十五界唯修所斷。後三界者，意界、法界及意識界。通三者，謂此後三界各通三種。八十八隨眠及彼俱有法并隨行得，皆見所斷，諸餘有漏皆修所斷，一切無漏皆非所斷。豈不更有見所斷法，謂異生性及招惡趣身語業等，此與聖道極相違故。雖爾，此法非見所斷，略說彼相，謂不染法非六生色，定非見斷。其異生性是不染污，無記性攝，已離欲者斷善根者猶成就故。此異生性若見所斷，苦法忍位應是異生。六謂意處，異此而生名非六生，是從眼等五根生義，即五識等。色謂一切身語業等。前及此色，定非見斷。所以者何？非迷諦理親發起故。如是已說見所斷等。十八界中幾是見、幾非見？頌曰：

〔頌·正37–38　T29 0010c04〕　　眼法界一分，八種說名見，
　　五識俱生慧，非見不度故。
　　眼見色同分，非彼能依識，
　　傳說不能觀，彼障諸色故。
論曰：眼全是見，法界一分八種是見，餘皆非見。何等為八？謂身見等五染污見、世間正見、有學正見、無學正見。於法界中此八是見，所餘非見。身見等五，隨眠品中時至當說。世間正見，謂意識相應善有漏慧。有學正見，謂有學身中諸無漏見。無學正見，謂無學身中諸無漏見。譬如夜分晝分有雲無雲，覩眾色像明昧有異，如是世間諸見有染無染。學無學見，觀察法相明昧不同。何故？世間正見唯意識相應，以五識俱生慧不能決度故，審慮為先決度名見。五識俱慧無如是能，以無分別是故非見。准此，所餘染無染慧及諸餘法非見應知。若爾，眼根不能決度，云何名見？以能明利觀照諸色故亦名見。若眼見者，餘識行時亦應名見。非一切眼皆能現見。誰能現見？謂同分眼與識合位能見非餘。若爾，則應彼能依識見色非眼。不爾，眼識定非能見。所以者何？傳說，不能觀障色故，現見壁等所障諸色則不能觀。若識見者，識無對故，壁等不礙應見障色。於被障色眼識不生，識既不生如何當見？眼識於彼何故不生？許眼見者眼有對故，於彼障色無見功能。識與所依一境轉故，可言於彼眼識不生。許識見者何緣不起？眼豈如身根境合方取而言有對故不見彼耶？又頗胝迦、瑠璃、雲母、水等所障云何得見？是故不由眼有對故，於彼障色無見功能。若爾，所執眼識云何？若於是處光明無隔，於彼障色眼識亦生。若於是處光明有隔，於彼障色眼識不生。識既不生，故不能見。然經說眼能見色者，是見所依，故說能見。如彼經言：意能識法。非意能識，以過去故。何者能識？謂是意識。意是識依，故說能識。或就所依說能依業，如世間說床座言聲。又如經言：眼所識色可愛可樂。然實非此可愛樂色是眼所識。又如經說：梵志當知，以眼為門唯為見色。故知眼識依眼門見。亦不應言門即是見，豈容經說以眼為見唯為見色？若識能見誰復了別？見與了別二用何異？以即見色名了色故，譬如少分慧名能見亦能簡擇。如是少分識名能見亦能了別。有餘難言：若眼能見，眼是見者，誰是見用？此言非難，如共許識是能了別，然無了者。了用不同，見亦應爾。有餘復言：眼識能見，是見所依故，眼亦名能見。如鳴所依故，亦說鍾能鳴。若爾，眼根識所依，故應名能識。無如是失。世間同許眼識是見，由彼生時說能見色，不言識色。毘婆沙中亦作是說：若眼所得、眼識所受說名所見。是故但說眼名能見，不名能識。唯識現前說能識色，譬如說日名能作晝。經部諸師有作是說：如何共聚楂掣虛空眼色等緣生於眼識？此等於見孰為能所？唯法因果實無作用，為順世情假興言說，眼名能見、識名能了，智者於中不應封著。如世尊說：方域言詞不應堅執，世俗名想不應固求。然迦濕彌羅國毘婆沙宗，說眼能見、耳能聞、鼻能嗅、舌能嘗、身能覺、意能了。於見色時，為一眼見、為二眼見？此無定准。頌曰：

〔頌·正39前半　T29 0011b10〕　　或二眼俱時，見色分明故。
論曰：阿毘達磨諸大論師咸言：或時二眼俱見，以開二眼見色分明，開一眼時不分明故。又開一眼觸一眼時，便於現前見二月等，閉一觸一此事則無，是故或時二眼俱見。非所依別識成二分，住無方故不同礙色。若此宗說眼見耳聞乃至意了，彼所取境根正取時，為至不至？頌曰：

〔頌·正39後半　T29 0011b18〕　　眼耳意根境，不至三相違。
論曰：眼耳意根取非至境，謂眼能見遠處諸色，眼中藥等則不能觀。耳亦能聞遠處聲響，逼耳根者則不能聞。若眼耳根唯取至境，則修定者應不修生天眼、耳根，如鼻根等。若眼能見不至色者，何故不能普見一切遠有障等不至諸色？如何磁石吸不至鐵，非吸一切不至鐵耶？執見至境亦同此難。何故不能普見一切眼藥籌等至眼諸色？又如鼻等能取至境，然不能取一切與根俱有香等。如是眼根雖見不至而非一切，耳根亦爾。意無色故，非能有至。有執：耳根通取至境及不至境，自耳中聲亦能聞故。所餘鼻等三有色根，與上相違唯取至境。如何知鼻唯取至香？由斷息時不嗅香故。云何名至？謂無間生。又諸極微為相觸不？迦濕彌羅國毘婆沙師說不相觸。所以者何？若諸極微遍體相觸，即有實物體相雜過。若觸一分，成有分失，然諸極微更無細分。若爾，何故相擊發聲？但由極微無間生故。若許相觸，擊石拊手體應相糅。不相觸者，聚色相擊云何不散？風界攝持故令不散。或有風界能有壞散，如劫壞時。或有風界能有成攝，如劫成時。云何三根由無間生名取至境？即由無間名取至境，謂於中間都無片物。又和合色許有分故，相觸無失。由許此理，毘婆沙文義善成立。故彼問言：諸是觸物為是觸為因故生？為非觸為因故生？諸非觸物為問亦爾。彼就此理為不定答，有時是觸為因生於非觸，謂和合物正離散時。有時非觸為因生於是觸，謂離散物正和合時。有時是觸為因生於是觸，謂和合物復和合時。有時非觸為因生於非觸，謂向遊塵同類相續。尊者世友說：諸極微相觸即應住至後念。然大德說：一切極微實不相觸，但由無間假立觸名。此大德意應可愛樂。若異此者，是諸極微應有間隙。中間既空，誰障其行許為有對？又離極微無和合色，和合相觸即觸極微。如可變礙，此亦應爾。又許極微若有方分，觸與不觸皆應有分。若無方分，設許相觸亦無斯過。又眼等根，為於自境唯取等量，速疾轉故，如旋火輪見大山等？為於自境通取等量不等量耶？頌曰：

〔頌·正40前半　T29 0012a04〕　　應知鼻等三，唯取等量境。
論曰：前說至境鼻等三根，應知唯能取等量境。如根微量，境微亦然，相稱合生鼻等識故。眼耳不定，謂眼於色有時取小如見毛端，有時取大如暫開目見大山等，有時取等如見蒲桃。如是耳根，聽蚊雷等所發種種小大音聲，隨其所應小大等量。意無質礙，不可辯其形量差別。云何眼等諸根極微安布差別？眼根極微在眼星上傍布而住，如香荾花清澈映覆令無分散。有說：重累如丸而住，體清澈故，如頗胝迦不相障礙。耳根極微居耳穴內旋環而住，如卷樺皮。鼻根極微居鼻頞內背上面下，如雙爪甲。此初三根橫作行度處無高下，如冠花鬘。舌根極微布在舌上，形如半月。傳說：舌中如毛端量，非為舌根極微所遍。身根極微遍住身分，如身形量。女根極微形如鼓𣞙，男根極微形如指𩎽。眼根極微有時一切皆是同分，有時一切皆彼同分，有時一分是彼同分餘是同分。乃至舌根極微亦爾。身根極微定無一切皆是同分，乃至極熱捺落迦中猛焰纏身，猶有無量身根極微是彼同分。傳說：身根設遍發識身應散壞，以無根境各一極微為所依緣能發身識。五識決定積集多微，方成所依所緣性故。即由此理亦說極微名無見體，不可見故。如前所說識有六種，謂眼識界乃至意識，為如五識唯緣現在意識通緣三世非世，如是諸識依亦爾耶？不爾，云何？頌曰：

〔頌·正40後半　T29 0012b04〕　　後依唯過去，五識依或俱。
論曰：意識唯依無間滅意，眼等五識所依或俱，或言表此亦依過去。眼是眼識俱生所依，如是乃至身是身識俱生所依，同現世故。無間滅意是過去依。此五識身所依各二，謂眼等五是別所依，意根為五通所依性，故如是說。若是眼識所依性者，即是眼識等無間緣耶？設是眼識等無間緣者，復是眼識所依性耶？應作四句。第一句，謂俱生眼根。第二句，謂無間滅心所法界。第三句，謂過去意根。第四句，謂除所說法。乃至身識亦爾，各各應說自根。意識應作順前句答，謂是意識所依性者，定是意識等無間緣。有是意識等無間緣，非與意識為所依性，謂無間滅心所法界。何因識起俱託二緣，得所依名在根非境？頌曰：

〔頌·正41前半　T29 0012b20〕　　隨根變識異，故眼等名依。
論曰：眼等即是眼等六界，由眼等根有轉變故。諸識轉異，隨根增損識明昧故。非色等變令識有異，以識隨根不隨境故。依名唯在眼等非餘。何緣色等正是所識而名眼識，乃至意識不名色識乃至法識？頌曰：

〔頌·正41後半　T29 0012b26〕　　彼及不共因，故隨根說識。
論曰：彼謂前說眼等名依，根是依故隨根說識。及不共者，謂眼唯自眼識所依，色亦通為他身眼識及通自他意識所取，乃至身觸應知亦爾，由所依勝及不共因故識得名。隨根非境，如名鼓聲及麥牙等。隨身所住眼見色時，身眼色識地為同不？應言此四或異或同，謂生欲界，若以自地眼見自地色，四皆自地。若以初靜慮眼見欲界色，身色欲界、眼識初定。見初定色，身屬欲界、三屬初定。若以二靜慮眼見欲界色，身色欲界、眼屬二定、識屬初定。見初定色，身屬欲界、眼屬二定、色識初定。見二定色，身屬欲界、眼色二定、識屬初定。如是若以三四靜慮地眼見下地色或自地色，如理應思。生初靜慮，若以自地眼見自地色，四皆同地見欲界色，三屬初定、色屬欲界。若以二靜慮眼見初定色，三屬初定、眼屬二定。見欲界色，身識初定、色屬欲界、眼屬二定。見二定色，身識初定、眼色二定。如是若以三四靜慮地眼見自地色或下上色，如理應思。如是生二三四靜慮，以自他地眼見自他地色，如理應思。餘界亦應如是分別。今當略辯此決定相。頌曰：

〔頌·正42–43　T29 0012c21〕　　眼不下於身，色識非上眼，
　　色於識一切，二於身亦然。
　　如眼耳亦然，次三皆自地，
　　身識自下地，意不定應知。
論曰：身眼色三皆通五地，謂在欲界四靜慮中，眼識唯在欲界初定。此中眼根望身生地，或等或上終不居下。色識望眼等下非上，下眼不能見上色故、上識不依下地眼故。色望於識通等上下，色識於身如色於識。廣說耳界應知如眼，謂耳不下於身，聲識非上耳，聲於識一切。二於身亦然，隨其所應廣如眼釋。鼻舌身三總皆自地，於中別者，謂身與觸其地必同。識望觸身或自或下，自謂若生欲界初定，生上三定謂之為下。應知意界四事不定，謂意有時與身識法四皆同地，有時上下。身唯五地，三通一切。於遊等至及受生時，隨其所應或同或異，如後定品當廣分別。為捨繁文故今未辯，前後再述用少功多。傍論已周，應辯正論。今當思擇，十八界中誰六識內幾識所識？幾常、幾無常？幾根、幾非根？頌曰。〔頌·正44　T29 0013a13〕　　五外二所識，常法界無為，
　　法一分是根，并內界十二。
論曰：十八界中色等五界，如其次第眼等五識各一所識，又總皆是意識所識。如是五界各六識中二識所識。由此准知，餘十三界一切唯是意識所識，非五識身所緣境故。十八界中無有一界全是常者，唯法一分無為是常，義准無常法餘餘界。又經中說二十二根，謂眼根、耳根、鼻根、舌根、身根、意根、女根、男根、命根、樂根、苦根、喜根、憂根、捨根、信根、勤根、念根、定根、慧根、未知當知根、已知根、具知根。阿毘達磨諸大論師，皆越經中六處次第，於命根後方說意根，有所緣故。如是所說二十二根，十八界中內十二界法一分攝。法一分者，命等十一、後三一分，法界攝故。內十二者，眼等五根如自名攝，意根通是七心界攝，後三一分意意識攝，女根、男根即是身界一分所攝。如後當辯。義准所餘，色等五界法界一分皆體非根。

The canonical text stands in Chinese only. This edition renders the essence, the plain reading, the exposition and the apparatus into English — never the sūtra itself. Switch to 漢讀本 or 並行雙語 above to read it.

白話Plain reading

〔正26〕有見無見·有對無對·善不善無記三門

〔卷二起。〕再者，在前面所說的十八界中，幾界有見、幾界無見？幾界有對、幾界無對？幾界是善、幾界不善、幾界無記？頌說：

頌：一界「有見」，即色界；十界是有色的「有對」；這十界中除去色與聲的八界是無記；其餘諸界通善、不善、無記三種。

論：十八界中，唯「色界」（色境）是有見——因為可以指示出「在此」「在彼」的差別。以此類推，其餘諸界都是無見。有見無見已說。唯色蘊所攝的十界（五根五境）是有對。「對」是障礙之義，又分三種：障礙有對、境界有對、所緣有對。障礙有對，指十色界——自身在他物所占之處被礙而不能生起，如手礙手、石礙石、或手石相礙。境界有對，指十二界（七心界＋五根）及法界一分的『有境之法』，於色等境界〔被局限〕。所以《施設論》這樣說：有的眼於水中有礙〔起用〕而非陸上，如魚等的眼；有的眼於陸上有礙而非水中——就多分說，如人等的眼；有的眼水陸俱礙，如畢舍遮（噉精氣鬼）、室獸摩羅（鱷）及捕魚人、蝦蟇等的眼；有的俱非，即除前三相之外者。有的眼於夜有礙而非晝，如蝙蝠、鵂鶹等的眼；有的眼於晝有礙而非夜——就多分說，如人等的眼；有的晝夜俱礙，如狗、野干、馬、豹、豺、狼、貓、狸等的眼；有的俱非，除前相。這些名為境界有對。所緣有對，指心與心所於自己的所緣〔被局限〕。境界與所緣又有什麼分別？若此法於彼法有功能，就說彼是此法的「境界」；心心所法執取彼而生起，彼對於心等就名「所緣」。為什麼眼等在自己的境界、所緣上轉起時說名「有礙」？因為越出彼境，它便不能於其餘處轉起。或者「礙」是和會之義——眼等法於自境界、自所緣和會而轉。應知此頌中是單就「障礙有對」而說，所以只說「十有色有對」——互相障礙之故。以此類推，其餘諸界無對。〔問：〕若法是境界有對，也必是障礙有對嗎？應作四句：七心界與法界一分的相應法，是第一句（境界有對而非障礙有對）；色等五境是第二句（障礙有對而非境界有對）；眼等五根是第三句（俱是）；法界一分的非相應法是第四句（俱非）。若法境界有對，也必所緣有對嗎？應作「順後句」：凡所緣有對，定是境界有對；有境界有對而非所緣有對者，即眼等五根。此中大德鳩摩邏多這樣說：

〔引頌〕心欲於此處生起，被他物所礙而不得起——應知這就是「有對」；「無對」與此相違。

這是〔論主〕所認可的。有對無對已說。在這十種有對之中，除去色與聲，其餘八界是無記——五色根與香、味、觸境，不可記別為善或不善之性，所以名無記。有人說：因為不能記招異熟果，所以名無記。〔評：〕若這樣，無漏法就應當都是無記了〔無漏不招異熟〕。其餘十界通善等三種：七心界與無貪等相應的名善、與貪等相應的名不善、其餘名無記。法界中，若是無貪等自性、相應、等起，以及擇滅，名善；若貪等自性、相應、等起，名不善；餘名無記。色界（色境）與聲界，若是善、不善心之力所等起、屬身表語表所攝的，是善不善；其餘是無記。善等已說。十八界中幾界繫屬欲界、幾界繫屬色界、幾界繫屬無色界？頌說：

〔正27〕三界繫屬門

頌：欲界繫具足十八；色界繫十四——除去香、味與鼻識、舌識；無色界繫唯有後三。

論：「繫」是繫屬，就是被縛之義。欲界所繫具足十八界。色界所繫唯十四種：除香味二境及鼻舌二識。除香味，因為它們是段食之性——要離了段食之欲才能生到色界。除鼻舌識，因為〔彼界香味既無〕它們沒有所緣。〔難：〕若這樣，觸界在色界也應當沒有——觸如香味一樣是段食性。〔答：〕色界所有的觸不是段食性。〔難：〕那香味也應如此〔留下非段食性的香味〕。〔答：〕香味離了飲食沒有別的受用；觸有別的用途——執持諸根、作衣服等。生彼界者既離食欲，香味便無用；而根與衣等仍在，所以觸不無。有其他論師說：住此欲界、依彼色界靜慮等至而見色聞聲時，與輕安俱起的殊勝之觸攝益於身——所以色、聲、觸三者生到彼界靜慮仍相隨逐；香味不然，所以彼界沒有。〔難：〕若這樣，鼻舌二根在彼應非有——如香味境一樣，在彼無用。〔答：〕不然，二根於彼有用：發起言說、莊嚴身相。〔難：〕若為嚴身與言說，只須「依處」（鼻舌之形）就夠了，何必要「根」？〔答：〕如彼界無男根、也就無男根依處——二根若無，依處也應無〔依處猶在，正顯根有用〕。〔難：〕彼界男根依處可以沒有，因為於彼全無用；鼻舌依處於彼有用，所以離根仍應有依處〔仍不須根〕。〔答：〕也有雖無用而根照樣生起的——如處於胞胎中注定將死者〔諸根仍具〕；雖無用而生，也不是無因。〔徵：〕那麼彼界從什麼因得有根起？〔答：〕由於對根有愛、發起殊勝之業。〔難：〕若已離境愛，對根之愛也決定離——彼界既離香味之貪，就應無鼻舌根。否則也應許彼界男根生起。若說男根不生是因為醜陋——陰藏隱密，哪有什麼醜陋？而且諸根之生本不由「有用」：若有因力，無用也生。〔評破：〕男根在彼縱是醜陋，設若有因，於彼應起；男根既非有，鼻舌〔依同理〕應無。〔難：〕若這樣，便違契經所說：彼界眾生「無支缺，不減諸根」。〔答：〕經意是：隨彼界諸根應可有者說為不減，有什麼相違？〔評：〕若不許這樣解，男根也應有了。如是說者（論主評定）：鼻舌二根於彼非無，只是無香味——因為對六根的愛是依內身而生，不是依境界而現起；而男根之愛是依婬觸而生，婬觸彼無，男根便非有。所以色界十八界中唯十四種，道理得以成立。無色界所繫唯有後三：意界、法界及意識界。要離色欲方得生彼，所以無色界中沒有十色界；所依（五根）所緣（五境）既無，五識也無——所以唯後三界繫屬無色。界繫已說。十八界中幾有漏、幾無漏？頌說：

〔正28前半〕有漏無漏門

頌：意、法、意識三界通〔有漏無漏〕；其餘唯是有漏。

論：意界及意識界，屬道諦所攝的名無漏，其餘名有漏。法界中，若是道諦及無為，名無漏，餘名有漏。其餘十五界唯名有漏。有漏無漏已說。十八界中幾有尋有伺、幾無尋唯伺、幾無尋無伺？頌說：

〔正28後半〕尋伺門

頌：五識唯是有尋有伺；後三界通三品；其餘〔十色界〕俱無。

論：眼等五識有尋有伺——因為恆與尋、伺共相應，行相粗、向外門轉，此義決定，故頌置「唯」言。「後三」即意、法、意識——在根、境、識三類中各居最後。此後三界皆通三品：意界、意識界及〔法界中〕相應法界（除尋與伺自身），在欲界、初靜慮中有尋有伺，靜慮中間（中間定）無尋唯伺，第二靜慮以上諸地乃至有頂無尋無伺。法界所攝的非相應法〔一向無尋無伺〕；靜慮中間的伺也是這樣〔亦是無尋無伺〕。至於「尋」自身：一切時皆是「無尋唯伺」——因為沒有第二個尋〔尋不與尋相應〕、只與伺相應。那麼欲界、初靜慮中的「伺」三品不收，應叫什麼？應名「無伺唯尋」——沒有第二個伺、只與尋相應。由此說：有尋伺地共有四品法——一、有尋有伺，即除尋伺外其餘相應法；二、無尋唯伺，即尋自身；三、無尋無伺，即一切非相應法；四、無伺唯尋，即伺自身。其餘十色界尋伺俱無，因為恆不與尋伺相應。〔問：〕五識身既有尋有伺，為何又說它「無分別」？頌說：

〔正29〕五識無分別義

頌：說五識無分別，是就「計度」「隨念」二分別而言；此二以意地的散慧、與意識相應的諸念為體。

論：傳說：分別略有三種——自性分別、計度分別、隨念分別。五識身雖有自性分別而無其餘二種，所以說「無分別」——如只有一足的馬名為「無足」。自性分別，體就是「尋」，後面心所法中自當辨釋。其餘二種分別，依次以「意地散慧」與「諸念」為體：「散」謂非定；與意識相應的散慧，名計度分別；或定或散、與意識相應的諸念，名隨念分別。有尋伺等已說。十八界中幾有所緣、幾無所緣？幾有執受、幾無執受？頌說：

〔正30〕有所緣·執受二門

頌：七心界與法界之半（心所），有所緣；其餘無。前八界（七心＋法）及聲，無執受；其餘九界通二。

論：六識、意界及法界所攝的諸心所法，名有所緣——能取境之故。其餘十色界及法界所攝的不相應法，名無所緣——以理類推可成。有所緣等已說。十八界中九界無執受：前七心界及法界全部，這八界加上聲界，皆無執受。所餘九界（五根＋色香味觸）各通二門——有執受、無執受：眼等五根住現在世的名有執受，過去未來的名無執受；色香味觸住現在世、不離五根的名有執受，若住現在而非不離根、以及過去未來的，名無執受——如身內除了與根相合者之外的髮、毛、爪、齒、大小便利、涕、唾、血等，及身外地水等中的色香味觸，雖在現世而無執受。「有執受」是什麼意思？心與心所共同執持、攝為依處，名有執受——損益展轉互相隨故；也就是世間說的「有覺觸」——眾緣所觸便覺樂等。與此相違名無執受。執受等已說。十八界中幾是大種性、幾是所造性？幾可積集、幾非積集？頌說：

〔正31〕大種所造·積集二門

頌：觸界中有二種（大種與所造）；其餘九色界唯是所造；法界一分（無表）亦然；十色界可積集。

論：觸界通二：大種（堅等四）與所造（滑等七，依大種生故名所造）。其餘九色界（五根＋色聲香味）唯是所造。法界一分的無表業色也唯是所造。其餘七心界及法界一分（除無表色）二種俱非。尊者覺天這樣說：十種色處都唯是大種性。〔評：〕他的說法不對：契經唯說堅、濕、煖、動四相為大種，這四大種唯觸處所攝——堅濕等並非眼等所能取，色聲等並非身根所能覺，所以彼說決定不然。又契經說：『苾芻當知：眼是內處，四大種所造淨色，有色、無見、有對』，乃至身處，廣說也是這樣；『色是外處，四大種所造，有色、有見、有對；聲是外處，四大種所造，有色、無見、有對』，香味二處廣說亦然；『觸是外處，是四大種及四大種所造，有色、無見、有對』——經中唯於觸處說「攝四大種」，分明顯示其餘有色處皆非大種。〔難：〕那為何契經又說『於眼肉團中，若內各別有堅性堅類』，乃至廣說？〔答：〕彼經是說不離眼根的「肉團」中有堅性等〔堅在肉團不在眼根〕，沒有相違之過。《入胎經》中唯說六界為士夫（人），那是為顯能成士夫的根本事，並非唯止於此——彼經又說六觸處之故。又〔若唯六界〕諸心所便應非有；也不應執『心所即是心』——契經說想、受等心所法「依止心」之故，又說「有貪心」等之故。由此，如前所說諸界的大種、所造分別，其義得成。大種性等已說。十八界中，五根五境十有色界是可積集——極微所聚之故；以理類推，其餘八界非可積集——非極微之故。可積集等已說。十八界中，幾能斫、幾所斫？幾能燒、幾所燒？幾能稱、幾所稱？頌說：

〔正32〕能斫所斫·能燒所燒·能稱所稱門

頌：唯外四界（色香味觸），是能斫及所斫，也是所燒、能稱；至於能燒與所稱，有諍論。

論：色香味觸構成斧、薪等，這就名為能斫、所斫。什麼叫「斫」？薪等色聚相連續生，斧等把它分隔、令各自相續生起——這就名斫。身等色根不名所斫——不可能把它全然斷開成兩個：身根等不能成為二分，支分一離身，其中便無根了。身根等也非能斫——因為淨妙之故，如珠寶之光〔光不能砍物〕。如能斫所斫唯外四界，所燒、能稱其體亦然——唯外四界名所燒、能稱；身等色根也非此二事，淨妙如珠寶光故；聲界全然不是——不相續之故〔聲隨生隨滅，無可燒可稱之相續體〕。至於能燒與所稱，有不同諍論：有人說能燒、所稱之體也如前唯外四界；又有人說唯火界可名能燒、所稱唯是重性。能斫所斫等已說。十八界中幾異熟生、幾所長養、幾等流性、幾有實事、幾一剎那？頌說：

〔正33–34前半〕五類分別門

頌：內五界（五根）有異熟生與所長養；聲無異熟生；八無礙界（七心＋法）是等流性、也是異熟生性；其餘（色香味觸）三種俱通；「實」唯法界；「一剎那」唯後三界。

論：內五即眼等五界，有異熟生及所長養，無等流——因為離了異熟生與所長養，並無別體。異熟生：異熟因所生名異熟生，如牛所駕的車名牛車，省去中間之言。或者：所造之業到得果時「變而能熟」，故名異熟，果從彼生名異熟生。或者：彼所得果與因類別不同而是「所熟」，故名異熟。或者：在因上假立果名——如同在果上假立因名，如契經說：『今六觸處，應知即是昔所造業』〔果上立因名之例〕。所長養：由飲食、資助（塗摩沐浴）、眠睡、等持（定）等勝緣所增益的，名所長養。有人說梵行也能長養。〔評：〕梵行只是無損，並非別有增益。長養的相續常能護持異熟的相續，猶如外郭防衛內城。聲有等流性及所長養，無異熟生。為什麼？因為它『隨欲而轉』〔想發聲就發聲，異熟不由現欲〕。〔難：〕若這樣，就不應如《施設論》所說：善修遠離粗惡語故，感得大士梵音聲相〔聲豈非業果〕。〔答一〕有人說：聲屬「第三傳」故，雖由彼業生而非異熟——謂從彼業生諸大種、從諸大種緣擊發聲。〔答二〕有人說：聲屬「第五傳」故，雖由彼業生而非異熟——謂彼業生異熟大種、從此傳生長養大種、此復傳生等流大種、此乃生聲。〔評：〕若這樣，身受也是從業所生的大種而生，也應非異熟了；若受同聲一例，便違正理。八無礙（七心界與法界）有等流性、異熟生性：同類因、遍行因所生的是等流性，異熟因所引生的名異熟生；諸無礙法無積集故非所長養。「餘」謂餘四——色、香、味、觸——皆通三種：有異熟生、有所長養、有等流性。實唯法：「實」謂無為，以其堅實之故；無為唯法界所攝，所以唯法界獨名「有實」。一剎那：意、法、意識名「後三」（六界三類中最後說故）；唯此三界有「一剎那」法，即最初無漏的苦法忍品——非等流之故名一剎那〔前無同類，唯一剎那孤起〕。這是說「究竟非等流者」；其餘有為法沒有不是等流的。苦法忍相應之心，名意界、意識界；與之俱起的其餘諸法，名法界。異熟生等已說。現在應思擇：若有眼界先前不成就、如今得成就，眼識也如此嗎？若眼識界先不成就今得成就，眼界也如此嗎？這類問題，如今應略答。頌說：

〔正34後半〕眼界眼識得·成就四句

頌：眼界與眼識界，有獨得、俱得、俱非；「成就」亦應如「等」字所示廣作四句。

論：獨得：或有眼界先不成就今得成就而眼識不然——如生在欲界漸得眼根時、或從無色界歿生二三四靜慮地時〔彼地眼識須借初定〕。或有眼識先不成就今得成就而眼界不然——如生二三四靜慮地眼識現起時、或從彼歿生下地時。俱得：或有二界先俱不成就今俱得——如從無色界歿、生欲界或梵世時。俱非：除前相。「等」謂：若成就眼界，也成就眼識嗎？應作四句：第一句（成就眼界非眼識），謂生二三四靜慮地而眼識不起時；第二句（成就眼識非眼界），謂生欲界未得眼根、或得而復失時；第三句（俱成就），謂生欲界得眼不失時、生梵世時、及生二三四靜慮地正見色時；第四句（俱不成就），除前相。眼界與色界、眼識與色界的得與成就等，也照此道理應思——為攝這些未說之義，頌中總說一「等」字。得成就等已說。十八界中幾內、幾外？頌說：

〔正35前半〕內外門

頌：內是十二界——眼等（六根六識）；色等六境為外。

論：六根、六識十二界名內，其餘色等六境為外。〔問：〕內外是依「我」而立（我所依名內，此外名外）；「我體」既然沒有，哪來內外？〔答：〕「我執」之所依止，故假說心為我。所以契經說：

〔引頌〕由於善調伏「我」，智者得以生天。

而世尊在別處說的是調伏「心」，如契經言：

〔引頌〕應當善調伏心，心調伏了能引安樂。

可見只是在「心」上假說為我。眼等諸根是這假我（心）所依、與它親近，所以名內；色等是它所緣、疏遠，所以名外。〔難：〕若這樣，六識應不名內——它們還沒到「意」的位置（尚未過去），不是心（意）之所依。〔答：〕六識到達意位時並不失六識界之性，未至意位時也不曾越出「意」之相〔它本性即是當來之意〕。若不這樣，意界就唯在過去世、六識唯在現在未來，便違自宗「十八界皆通三世」之義。又，若未來現在的六識沒有意界之相，過去的意界也應不得成立——法相於三世是不會改易的。內外已說。十八界中幾是同分、幾是彼同分？頌說：

〔正35後半〕同分彼同分門

頌：法界唯是同分；其餘十七界通同分、彼同分二種——依「作自業、不作自業」而分。

論：法同分：唯一法界一向是同分。若境對於識決定作所緣、識於其中已生或必將生（生法），這所緣境就名同分。而沒有任何一分法界，不是無邊意識已、正、當生於其中的——因為諸聖者決定會生起『觀一切法皆無我』之心；此心除自體及俱有法外，緣一切法；而所除的那一分，也是第二念心的所緣境。這前後二念心緣一切境無不周遍，所以法界恆名同分。「餘二」：其餘十七界皆有同分及彼同分。什麼叫同分、彼同分？作自業的名同分，不作自業的名彼同分。此中眼界對於有見之色『已見、正見、當見』的，名同分眼；如是廣說乃至意界，各於自境應說自用。迦濕彌羅國毘婆沙師說：彼同分眼只有四種——不見色而已滅、正滅、當滅者，及畢竟不生法。西方諸師說有五種：把「不生法」再開為二——有識屬（曾有識俱）與無識屬。乃至身界應知亦然；意界的彼同分唯是不生法〔意必有所了，起則作業〕。色界（色境）為眼「已正當見」的名同分色；彼同分色也有四種——非眼所見而已、正、當滅者，及不生法。廣說乃至觸界亦爾——各對自根應說自用。應知同分及彼同分〔的通局〕：眼若對一個有情是同分，對其餘一切有情也是同分；彼同分亦然——廣說乃至意界亦爾。色就不同：對見它的人是同分，對不見的人是彼同分。為什麼？色有『一人所見、也可多人共見』之事——如共觀月亮、舞蹈、相撲等色；眼沒有『一個眼根為兩個相續見色』之事。眼是不共的，依一相續（一有情）建立同分彼同分；色是共的，依多相續建立。如色界所說，聲香味觸應知亦爾。〔問：〕聲可以如色（共聞）；香味觸三者要「至根」方能取，是不共的——一人取了別人就取不到，理應如眼等〔依一相續〕，不應如色說。〔答：〕雖有此理，但仍「容有共」：香等三界對此人及餘人，皆有「可生鼻等識」之義〔可能性共通〕；眼等則不然〔此眼決不為他人發識〕，所以還是如色說。眼等六識，依『生法、不生法』〔分同分彼同分〕，如意界說。「同分」「彼同分」是什麼字義？根、境、識三者互相交涉，名之為「分」；或者「分」是已作之用；或者「分」是所生之觸——同有此分，故名同分。與此相違名彼同分——由於這「非同分」與彼同分者種類相同〔同一界類〕，所以名「彼同分」。同分彼同分已說。十八界中幾見所斷、幾修所斷、幾非所斷？頌說：

〔正36〕三斷門

頌：十五界唯修所斷；後三界通三種；不染污法、非六生、色，定非見所斷。

論：十五界（十色界及五識界）唯是修所斷。後三界（意、法、意識）各通三種：八十八隨眠及其俱有法、並其隨行之「得」，皆見所斷；其餘有漏皆修所斷；一切無漏皆非所斷。〔難：〕豈不是還有見所斷之法？如異生性、及招惡趣的身語業等——它們與聖道極相違〔理應見道所斷〕。〔答：〕雖然相違，此法非見所斷。略說其相：不染污法、非六生、色，定非見斷。異生性是不染污的、無記性所攝——已離欲者與斷善根者都還成就它〔故知其非染〕；這異生性若是見所斷，那麼苦法忍位的行者就應仍是異生了〔見道初念尚未捨異生性故〕。「六」謂意處；異於此而生名為「非六生」，是從眼等五根生之義，即五識等。「色」謂一切身語業等。前二者〔不染法與非六生〕以及此色，定非見斷。為什麼？因為它們不是『迷於諦理』所親自發起的。見所斷等已說。十八界中幾是「見」、幾非見？頌說：

〔正37–38〕見非見門；眼見識見之諍

頌：眼界與法界一分的八種，說名為「見」；五識俱生的慧非見——不能決度故。眼見色，是同分眼〔見〕，而非彼所依附的識〔見〕；傳說：〔若識能見〕它就不該看不見被障隔的色。

論：眼〔界〕全是見；法界一分的八種是見；其餘皆非見。哪八種？身見等五染污見（薩迦耶見、邊見、邪見、見取、戒禁取）、世間正見、有學正見、無學正見。身見等五，隨眠品中時至當說。世間正見，謂與意識相應的善有漏慧。有學正見，謂有學身中的諸無漏見；無學正見，謂無學身中的諸無漏見。譬如夜間、晝間，有雲、無雲，看眾色像明昧各異——世間諸見的有染無染、有學無學之見的觀察法相，明昧不同也是如此。為什麼世間正見唯限意識相應？因為五識俱生的慧不能決度——先審慮而後決度，才名為「見」；五識俱慧沒有這種能力，因為無分別，所以非見。以此類推，其餘染污不染污慧及其餘諸法非見，應知。

〔識家難：〕若這樣，眼根也不能決度，憑什麼名「見」？〔眼家答：〕因為它能明利地觀照諸色，所以也名見。〔識家難：〕若說是「眼」在見，那麼當其他識現行時〔眼仍在〕，也應名見〔何以不見〕？〔眼家答：〕不是一切眼都能現見。〔識家徵：〕誰能現見？〔眼家釋：〕同分眼與識合位（正與眼識俱起的眼）能見，非餘。〔識家難：〕若這樣，應是那能依的「識」在見色，不是眼。〔眼家答：〕不然，眼識決定非能見。〔識家徵：〕為什麼？〔眼家釋：〕傳說：〔識若能見〕它就不能『不觀被障之色』了——現見牆壁等所障的諸色不能被看見。〔眼家反徵：〕若是識在見，識是無對之物，牆壁不能礙它，應能見被障之色〔既實不能見，可知非識見〕。〔識家答：〕對被障之色，眼識根本不生；識既不生，怎麼會見？〔眼家總徵：〕眼識於彼為什麼不生？——我們主張眼見的可以說：眼是有對的，於被障之色沒有見的功能；而識與所依（眼）同於一境而轉，所以可說眼識於彼不生。你們主張識見的，又是什麼緣故不生呢？〔識家難：〕眼難道像身根那樣要境合方取，而說『因為有對所以不見被障』嗎？再說，玻璃、琉璃、雲母、水等所障之色為什麼能看見？所以並不是『因為眼有對，於被障色便無見功能』。〔眼家却問：〕那你們所執的眼識〔不生〕怎麼講？〔識家答：〕若彼處光明無所隔絕，對被障之色眼識也生〔隔玻璃可見〕；若彼處光明被隔絕，眼識便不生。識既不生，所以不能見。〔識家通經：〕但經中說「眼能見色」，如何？——眼是『見之所依』，所以說能見。如彼經言「意能識法」：其實不是意在識（意已過去），是意識在識；意是識之所依，故說能識。或者是『就所依說能依之業』——如世間就床座說『床在言語』〔坐床者言而曰床言〕。又如經言「眼所識色可愛可樂」——其實這可愛之色並非眼所「識」。又如經說：『梵志當知：以眼為門，唯為見色』——可知是眼識依著眼這個「門」而見；總不能說『門就是見』吧？豈容經說「以眼為見唯為見色」？〔眼家難：〕若識能見，那誰在「了別」？見與了別二用何異？〔識家釋：〕見色就是了色——譬如某一分慧，名能見也能簡擇；某一分識，名能見也能了別。〔有餘者難：〕若「眼能見」，眼是見者，那誰是「見用」？〔眼家答：〕此語不成難：如大家共許『識能了別』，卻不必另有一個「了者」——了與用不相離；見也應如此。〔有餘者又言：〕是眼識能見；因為眼是『見（眼識）之所依』，所以眼也名能見——如鐘是『鳴之所依』，故說鐘能鳴。〔眼家難：〕若這樣，眼根是『識之所依』，也應名「能識」了。〔識家答：〕沒有這種過失：世間共許「眼識是見」——當眼識生時，說『見到色了』，不說『識到色了』；《毘婆沙》中也這樣說：「若眼所得、眼識所受說名所見」所以只說眼名能見，不名能識；唯當識現前時，說「能識色」——譬如說「日」名能作晝〔日之照即晝，識之現即識色〕。經部諸師則這樣說：這是何苦來哉——大家聚在一起抓撮虛空！眼、色等緣生眼識，這裡面誰是能見、誰是所見？唯法因果，實無作用；只是為隨順世情，假立言說：「眼名能見、識名能了」——智者於中不應執著。如世尊說：『方域的言詞不應堅執，世俗的名想不應固求。』然而迦濕彌羅國毘婆沙宗說：眼能見、耳能聞、鼻能嗅、舌能嘗、身能覺、意能了。

〔問：〕見色的時候，是一隻眼在見，還是兩眼同見？這並無定準。頌說：

〔正39前半〕二眼俱見

頌：有時是二眼俱時而見——因為〔開二眼〕見色分明之故。

論：阿毘達磨諸大論師都說：有時二眼俱見——開兩眼時見色分明、只開一眼時不分明之故；又，開一眼而以手觸按另一眼時，便於現前見到二個月亮等，閉一眼觸一眼就無此事——所以有時二眼俱見。〔問：〕所依既然分在兩處，識豈不成了兩片？〔答：〕識不會因所依分開而成二分——識『住無方所』，不像有礙之色〔識非色法，無方分可裂〕。〔問：〕若依此宗說眼見、耳聞乃至意了，那諸根正取境時，是「至境」而取、還是「不至境」而取？頌說：

〔正39後半〕至不至境門；極微相觸之辯

頌：眼、耳、意三根，取「不至」之境；其餘三根與此相違〔唯取至境〕。

論：眼耳意根取非至境：眼能見遠處諸色，而眼中的眼藥等〔至眼之色〕反而看不見；耳也能聞遠處聲響，逼近耳根的反聽不到。若眼耳唯取至境，修定者就不必修生天眼天耳了——如鼻根等〔至境之根無須遠用〕。〔難：〕若眼能見不至之色，為何不能普見一切遠處、有障等不至之色？〔答：〕那磁石吸不至之鐵，為何不吸一切不至之鐵？「執見至境」也同樣有此難——為何不能普見一切至眼之色如眼藥、籌等？又如鼻等取至境，也不能取一切與根俱在的香等。所以眼雖見不至而非見一切，耳亦然。意無色體，本無「至」可言。有人執：耳根通取至、不至境——自己耳中之聲也能聽到。其餘鼻、舌、身三種有色根，與上相違，唯取至境。怎麼知道鼻唯取至香？——斷息（閉氣）時就嗅不到香。什麼叫「至」？無間而生〔中間無隔〕。〔附辯：〕那麼諸極微相觸不相觸？迦濕彌羅國毘婆沙師說不相觸。為什麼？若諸極微全體相觸，就有「實物體相雜」之過〔二微混為一〕；若只觸一部分，就成「有分」之失——而極微是沒有更細部分的。〔難：〕不觸，為何相擊出聲？〔答：〕只因極微「無間生」之故〔逼近而不觸〕。若許相觸，擊石拍手，二物之體應互相糅雜。〔難：〕不相觸，色聚相擊為何不散？〔答：〕風界攝持故令不散——有的風界能壞散（如劫壞時）、有的風界能成攝（如劫成時）。〔問：〕那三根「無間生」怎麼叫取至境？〔答：〕就以「無間」名至——中間全無一物。又，「和合色」是許有部分的，說它相觸並無過失。由此理，《毘婆沙》文義善得成立。所以彼論問：『凡是觸物，是以觸為因而生、還是以非觸為因而生？非觸之物，問亦如此。』而就此理作不定答：有時觸因生非觸（和合物正離散時）、有時非觸因生觸（離散物正和合時）、有時觸因生觸（和合物復和合時）、有時非觸因生非觸（如飛揚的遊塵同類相續）。尊者世友說：諸極微若相觸，就應住到後念〔觸即有礙有住，違剎那滅〕。而大德（法救）說：一切極微實不相觸，只是由「無間」假立觸名。〔論主：〕這位大德之意，應可愛樂〔論主表態〕。若不是這樣，諸極微間應有間隙——中間既空，誰障其行而許它們「有對」？又，離了極微並無和合色，和合相觸就是觸極微〔和合觸則微觸，同一難〕。如「可變礙」義〔在聚不在微而說微有對〕，此〔觸〕也應如此〔在聚假說〕。又，若許極微有方分，觸與不觸皆有「有分」之失；若無方分，設許相觸也無此過。又，眼等諸根對自境是唯取等量之境（根量境量相稱）、因為轉動迅速——如旋火輪〔本是一點，急轉似輪〕——而似能見大山等呢？還是通取等量、不等量之境？頌說：

〔正40前半〕等量境；諸根極微安布

頌：應知鼻等三根，唯取等量之境。

論：前面說「取至境」的鼻舌身三根，應知唯取等量境——如根的微量，境的微量也如此，根境相稱、合而生識。眼耳不定：眼於色有時取小（如見毛端）、有時取大（如暫開目見大山）、有時取等（如見葡萄）；耳根聽蚊、雷等種種大小音聲，隨其所應或小或大或等。意無質礙，無形量差別可辨。〔附：〕眼等諸根的極微如何安布？眼根極微在眼珠之上傍布而住，如香荾花，有清澈的膜覆蓋令不分散；有人說是重疊如丸而住——體清澈故，如玻璃互不相礙。耳根極微居耳穴內旋環而住，如捲起的樺樹皮。鼻根極微居鼻頞內、背上面下，如雙爪甲。這前三根橫作行列、處無高下，如冠上的花鬘。舌根極微布在舌上，形如半月；傳說：舌中有如毛端量的一點，非舌根極微所遍。身根極微遍住身之各分，如身形量。女根極微形如「鼓𣞙」，男根極微形如「指𩎽」〔二奇字照錄原文〕。眼根極微有時一切皆是同分（全在用）、有時一切皆彼同分、有時一分彼同分餘是同分；乃至舌根極微亦爾。身根極微決無『一切皆同分』之時——乃至極熱地獄中猛焰纏身，仍有無量身根極微是彼同分〔若全身根齊發識，身即散壞〕。傳說：身根設若遍體發識，身應散壞。而且沒有『根與境各以一個極微』為所依所緣而能發身識的——五識決定要積集眾多極微，方成所依所緣之性。也就由這個道理，說極微名「無見」體——不可見之故〔單微不發眼識〕。如前所說識有六種，那麼——五識唯緣現在、意識通緣三世及非世（無為），諸識的「所依」也是這樣〔與識同世〕嗎？不然。如何？頌說：

〔正40後半〕識與所依之世

頌：後識（意識）之依唯是過去；五識之依或俱時〔或過去〕。

論：意識唯依「無間滅」的意（過去）；眼等五識的所依「或俱」——「或」字表示也依過去。眼是眼識俱生的所依，乃至身是身識俱生的所依，同在現世；而無間滅的意，是它們過去的所依。所以五識身的所依各有二：眼等五根是各別所依，意根是五識共通的所依。〔問：〕凡是眼識的「所依」，就是眼識的「等無間緣」嗎？設是等無間緣，又必是所依嗎？應作四句：第一句（是依非等無間緣）——俱生眼根；第二句（是等無間緣非依）——無間滅的心所法界；第三句（俱是）——過去意根；第四句（俱非）——除上述諸法。乃至身識亦然，各各應說自根。意識應作「順前句」答：凡是意識所依，定是意識等無間緣；有是意識等無間緣而非其所依的——無間滅的心所法界。〔問：〕識起同時依託根、境二緣，為什麼「所依」之名只在根不在境？頌說：

〔正41前半〕依名在根

頌：識隨根之變而異，所以眼等名「依」。

論：眼等即眼等六界。由眼等根有轉變（增損），諸識隨之轉異——根明利則識明、根損則識昧；而色等境之變不令識異——識是隨根、不隨境的。所以「依」名唯在眼等，不在其餘。〔問：〕色等才是所識的對象，為什麼識叫「眼識」乃至「意識」，不叫「色識」乃至「法識」？頌說：

〔正41後半〕隨根說識；四事同異地

頌：由前述「依」義、以及「不共」之因，所以隨根立識名。

論：「彼」指前面說的眼等名依——根是所依，所以隨根說識。「不共」：眼唯是自身眼識的所依；色卻通為他人眼識所取、也通為自他意識所取——乃至身與觸，應知亦爾。由『所依殊勝』及「不共」二因，識依根得名、不依境——如「鼓聲」（依鼓立名）與「麥芽」（依麥立名）。〔附辯四事之地：〕隨身所住而眼見色時，身、眼、色、識四事所屬之地為同為異？應說此四或異或同：生在欲界，若以自地眼見自地色，四皆自地；若以初靜慮眼見欲界色，身色屬欲界、眼識屬初定；見初定色，身屬欲界、餘三屬初定。若以二靜慮眼見欲界色，身色欲界、眼屬二定、識屬初定；見初定色，身屬欲界、眼屬二定、色識初定；見二定色，身屬欲界、眼色二定、識屬初定。如是若以三、四靜慮地之眼見下地色或自地色，照理應思。生初靜慮，以自地眼見自地色，四皆同地；見欲界色，三屬初定、色屬欲界。若以二靜慮眼見初定色，三屬初定、眼屬二定；見欲界色，身識初定、色屬欲界、眼屬二定；見二定色，身識初定、眼色二定。如是以三、四靜慮地眼見自地或下上色，照理應思。生二、三、四靜慮，以自他地眼見自他地色，照理應思。其餘界（耳聲等）也應如此分別。現在把這決定之相略作總辨。頌說：

〔正42–43〕四事地之決定相

頌：眼不下於身；色與識不上於眼；色對於識，一切〔等上下〕皆可；色與識對於身亦然。耳如眼例；鼻舌身三，皆唯自地；身識屬自地或下地；意則不定，應知。

論：身、眼、色三者皆通五地（欲界與四靜慮）；眼識唯在欲界與初定。此中眼根望身之生地，或等或上，終不居下；色與識望眼，或等或下、終不居上——下地之眼不能見上地之色、上地之識不依下地之眼；色望於識，通等、上、下；色與識對於身，如色對於識〔通等上下〕。廣說耳界如眼應知：耳不下於身、聲識非上於耳、聲於識一切、二者於身亦然，隨其所應，廣如眼釋。鼻舌身三，總皆自地；其中差別：身與觸其地必同；識望觸、身，或自地或下地——「自」謂生在欲界、初定〔識即自地〕，生上三定則識屬下（初定）。應知意界四事（身、意、法、意識）不定：有時四皆同地，有時上下——身唯五地，餘三通一切地；於遊歷等至（入諸定）及受生時，隨其所應或同或異，如後〈定品〉當廣分別。為省繁文，此處暫不詳辨——前後重述，用功多而益少。傍論已周，應辯正論。現在應思擇：十八界中，誰為六識中幾識所識？幾常、幾無常？幾根、幾非根？頌說：

〔正44〕所識·常·根三門（品末）

頌：五外境界為二識所識；「常」是法界中的無為；法界一分是根，加上內十二界〔中的若干〕。

論：十八界中，色等五界依次為眼等五識「各一所識」，又總為意識所識——所以這五界各是六識中「二識」所識。以此准知，其餘十三界一切唯是意識所識——非五識身的所緣境之故。十八界中沒有任何一界全體是常；唯法界一分的無為是常——以理類推，其餘的法與其餘諸界皆無常。又，經中說二十二根：眼根、耳根、鼻根、舌根、身根、意根、女根、男根、命根、樂根、苦根、喜根、憂根、捨根、信根、勤根、念根、定根、慧根、未知當知根、已知根、具知根。阿毘達磨諸大論師都越過經中六處的次第，在命根之後才說意根——因為它「有所緣」〔與命根等不同類，另歸心法〕。這二十二根，在十八界中為內十二界及法界一分所攝：「法一分」謂命等十一——命根，與樂、苦、喜、憂、捨五受根，信、勤、念、定、慧五善根（古德疏：命、樂、苦、喜、憂、捨、信、勤、念、定、慧）——及後三根（未知當知、已知、具知）的一分，屬法界攝；「內十二」：眼等五根如自名所攝；意根通為七心界所攝；後三根的一分為意界、意識界所攝；女根、男根即身界一分所攝——如後〔根品〕當辨。以理准知，其餘色等五界及法界一分，其體皆非根。

〔Principal 26〕Three Gates: Visible and Invisible · Resistant and Nonresistant · Wholesome, Unwholesome, and Indeterminate

〔Fascicle Two begins here.〕Furthermore, among the eighteen elements stated above, how many elements are visible and how many invisible? How many are resistant and how many nonresistant? How many are wholesome, how many unwholesome, how many indeterminate? The stanza says:

Stanza: One element is visible, namely the form element; ten elements possess form and are resistant; of these ten, the eight apart from form and sound are indeterminate; the remaining elements extend to all three—wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate.

Treatise: Among the eighteen elements, only the form element (the object of form) is visible—because the distinction of its being here and there can be pointed out. Extending the principle from this, all the remaining elements are invisible. Visible and invisible have now been stated. Only the ten elements included in the aggregate of form (five faculties and five objects) are resistant. Resistance has the sense of obstruction, and it is further of three kinds: resistance as obstruction, resistance of the object field, and resistance of the object of consciousness. Resistance as obstruction refers to the ten elements of form—being obstructed where another thing occupies a place, so that it cannot arise there, as hand obstructs hand, or stone obstructs stone, or hand and stone obstruct one another. Resistance of the object field refers to the twelve elements (the seven mind elements + the five faculties) and to that portion of the element of dharmas which consists of dharmas that possess an object field, with respect to the objects such as form 〔by which they are bounded〕. Thus the Treatise of Designations says: some eyes are obstructed 〔in their functioning〕 in water and not on land, such as the eyes of fish and the like; some eyes are obstructed on land and not in water—speaking for the most part—such as the eyes of humans and the like; some eyes are obstructed both in water and on land, such as the eyes of piśācas (spirits that devour vitality), śiśumāras (crocodiles), fishermen, frogs and the like; and some are neither, that is, those apart from the three preceding cases. Some eyes are obstructed at night and not by day, such as the eyes of bats and horned owls; some are obstructed by day and not at night—speaking for the most part—such as the eyes of humans and the like; some are obstructed both by day and at night, such as the eyes of dogs, jackals, horses, leopards, dholes, wolves, cats, wildcats and the like; and some are neither, apart from the preceding cases. These are named resistance of the object field. Resistance of the object of consciousness refers to mind and mental factors with respect to their own objects 〔by which they are bounded〕. And what is the difference between object field and object of consciousness? If this dharma has a capacity with respect to that dharma, then that is said to be this dharma’s object field; if mind and mental factors arise grasping that, then that, with respect to mind and the rest, is named their object of consciousness. Why is it that when the eye and the rest proceed upon their own object field and object of consciousness they are said to be obstructed? Because, once past that field, they cannot proceed anywhere else. Or else obstruction has the sense of meeting and joining—the eye and the rest proceed by meeting and joining with their own object field and object of consciousness. It should be known that in this stanza the statement is made solely with respect to resistance as obstruction, and therefore it says only that the ten that possess form are resistant—because they obstruct one another. Extending the principle from this, the remaining elements are nonresistant. 〔Question:〕 If a dharma has resistance of the object field, must it also have resistance as obstruction? A fourfold distinction should be made: the seven mind elements and the associated dharmas of one portion of the element of dharmas are the first case (resistance of the object field but not resistance as obstruction); the five objects beginning with form are the second case (resistance as obstruction but not of the object field); the five faculties beginning with the eye are the third case (both); the non-associated dharmas of one portion of the element of dharmas are the fourth case (neither). If a dharma has resistance of the object field, must it also have resistance of the object of consciousness? A following-consequent answer should be made: whatever has resistance of the object of consciousness certainly has resistance of the object field; but there are those that have resistance of the object field and not of the object of consciousness, namely the five faculties beginning with the eye. Here the venerable Kumāralāta says thus:

〔Cited stanza〕Where mind would arise, but is obstructed by another thing so that it cannot arise—know that this is what is resistant; the nonresistant is the contrary of this.

This is 〔by the author〕 accepted. Resistant and nonresistant have now been stated. Among these ten that are resistant, apart from form and sound the remaining eight elements are indeterminate—the five faculties of form and the objects of odor, taste, and the tangible cannot be determined as wholesome or unwholesome in nature, and so they are named indeterminate. Some say: because they cannot determine a result of maturation, they are named indeterminate. 〔Assessment:〕 If that were so, dharmas without outflows would all have to be indeterminate 〔since they too do not bring on a maturation〕. The remaining ten elements extend to all three, wholesome and the rest: the seven mind elements are named wholesome when associated with non-greed and the rest, unwholesome when associated with greed and the rest, and the remainder indeterminate. Within the element of dharmas, what is by its own nature, by association, or by co-origination non-greed and the rest, together with cessation through discernment, is named wholesome; what is by its own nature, by association, or by co-origination greed and the rest is named unwholesome; the remainder is indeterminate. The form element (the object of form) and the sound element are wholesome or unwholesome when they are co-originated by the force of a wholesome or unwholesome mind and are included in bodily or vocal manifest action; the remainder is indeterminate. Wholesome and the rest have now been stated. Among the eighteen elements, how many belong to the realm of desire, how many to the realm of form, how many to the formless realm? The stanza says:

〔Principal 27〕The Gate of Affiliation with the Three Realms

Stanza: Affiliated with the realm of desire, all eighteen; affiliated with the realm of form, fourteen—excluding odor and taste and the nose and tongue consciousnesses; affiliated with the formless realm, only the last three.

Treatise: Affiliation means belonging, that is, the sense of being bound. Affiliated with the realm of desire are all eighteen elements. Affiliated with the realm of form are only fourteen kinds: excluding the two objects of odor and taste and the two consciousnesses of nose and tongue. Odor and taste are excluded because they have the nature of morsel food—one must be free of the desire for morsel food to be born in the realm of form. The nose and tongue consciousnesses are excluded because 〔odor and taste being absent there〕 they have no object. 〔Objection:〕 If so, the tangible element too ought to be absent in the realm of form—for the tangible, like odor and taste, has the nature of morsel food. 〔Answer:〕 The tangibles that exist in the realm of form are not of the nature of morsel food. 〔Objection:〕 Then odor and taste should be likewise 〔leaving behind the odor and taste that are not morsel food〕. 〔Answer:〕 Odor and taste have no other use apart from eating; the tangible has other uses—maintaining the faculties, serving as clothing, and the like. One born in that realm being free of the desire for food, odor and taste are of no use, while the faculties, clothing and the rest remain, and so the tangible is not absent. Some other masters say: when one dwells in this realm of desire and, in dependence on the meditative absorption and attainment of the realm of form, sees form and hears sound, the excellent tangible that arises together with pliancy benefits the body—and so form, sound, and the tangible, all three, follow along when one is born in that realm’s meditative absorptions, while odor and taste do not, and so are absent there. 〔Objection:〕 If so, the two faculties of nose and tongue ought not to exist there—like the objects of odor and taste, they are of no use there. 〔Answer:〕 Not so, the two faculties do have a use there: giving rise to speech and adorning the bodily form. 〔Objection:〕 If it is for adorning the body and giving rise to speech, then the bases (the shapes of nose and tongue) suffice; what need is there for the faculties? 〔Answer:〕 Just as that realm has no male faculty and therefore no base of the male faculty either—if the two faculties were absent, their bases would also be absent 〔yet the bases remain, which shows precisely that the faculties have their use〕. 〔Objection:〕 The base of the male faculty may be absent there because it is wholly useless there; but the bases of nose and tongue are useful there, and so they may still exist without the faculties 〔and the faculties are still not needed〕. 〔Answer:〕 There are also cases where the faculty arises although it has no use—as with one who is destined to die while in the womb 〔whose faculties are nevertheless complete〕; and arising without use is still not arising without a cause. 〔Challenge:〕 Then from what cause does that realm come to have those faculties? 〔Answer:〕 From craving for the faculties, which sets an excellent action in motion. 〔Objection:〕 If craving for the objects has already been left behind, craving for the faculties must also have been left behind—since that realm is free of greed for odor and taste, it should have no nose or tongue faculties. Otherwise one would also have to allow the male faculty to arise there. And if it be said that the male faculty does not arise because it is unseemly—the private organ is concealed, so where is the unseemliness? Moreover the arising of the faculties is not on account of their being useful: if the force of a cause is present, they arise even without use. 〔Assessment and refutation:〕 Even granting that the male faculty is unseemly there, if a cause were present it ought to arise there; and since the male faculty is not present, nose and tongue 〔by the same reasoning〕 ought to be absent. 〔Objection:〕 If so, this contradicts what the sūtra says of the beings of that realm: “without deficiency of limb, with no diminution of the faculties.” 〔Answer:〕 The sūtra’s intent is that whatever faculties may be had in that realm are said to be undiminished—where is the contradiction? 〔Assessment:〕 If this reading is not granted, the male faculty too would have to be present. Stated as it should be (the author’s decision): the two faculties of nose and tongue are not absent there, only odor and taste are—because craving for the six faculties arises in dependence on the inner body and does not appear in dependence on objects; whereas craving for the male faculty arises in dependence on sexual touch, and since sexual touch is absent there, the male faculty is not present. Therefore the principle that in the realm of form only fourteen of the eighteen elements exist is established. Affiliated with the formless realm are only the last three: the mind element, the element of dharmas, and the mind consciousness element. One must be free of desire for form to be born there, and so in the formless realm the ten elements of form are absent; and the supports (the five faculties) and objects (the five objects) being absent, the five consciousnesses are absent too—and so only the last three elements are affiliated with the formless. Realm affiliation has now been stated. Among the eighteen elements, how many are with outflows and how many without? The stanza says:

〔Principal 28, first half〕The Gate of With and Without Outflows

Stanza: The three elements of mind, dharmas, and mind consciousness extend to both 〔with and without outflows〕; the rest are only with outflows.

Treatise: Of the mind element and the mind consciousness element, what is included in the truth of the path is named without outflows, and the rest is named with outflows. Of the element of dharmas, what is the truth of the path and what is unconditioned is named without outflows, and the rest with outflows. The remaining fifteen elements are named only with outflows. With and without outflows have now been stated. Among the eighteen elements, how many have applied and sustained thought, how many have sustained thought only without applied thought, how many have neither applied nor sustained thought? The stanza says:

〔Principal 28, second half〕The Gate of Applied and Sustained Thought

Stanza: The five consciousnesses have only applied and sustained thought; the last three extend to all three classes; the rest 〔the ten elements of form〕 have neither.

Treatise: The five consciousnesses beginning with the eye have applied and sustained thought—because they are always associated with applied and sustained thought, their mode being coarse and turning toward the outer gate; this sense being fixed, the stanza places the word only. The last three are mind, dharmas, and mind consciousness—the last within each of the three classes of faculty, object, and consciousness. These last three elements all extend to the three classes: the mind element, the mind consciousness element, and 〔within the element of dharmas〕 the associated element of dharmas (excluding applied and sustained thought themselves) have applied and sustained thought in the realm of desire and in the first meditative absorption, have sustained thought only without applied thought in the intermediate meditative absorption (the intermediate absorption), and have neither applied nor sustained thought from the second meditative absorption upward through the summit of existence. The non-associated dharmas included in the element of dharmas 〔have throughout neither applied nor sustained thought〕; and the sustained thought of the intermediate meditative absorption is likewise 〔also without applied and without sustained thought〕. As for applied thought itself: at all times it has sustained thought only without applied thought—since there is no second applied thought 〔applied thought is not associated with applied thought〕 and it is associated only with sustained thought. Then what should the sustained thought of the realm of desire and the first meditative absorption be called, since the three classes do not receive it? It should be named having applied thought only without sustained thought—since there is no second sustained thought and it is associated only with applied thought. Hence it is said: in the stage that has applied and sustained thought there are four classes of dharma—first, having applied and sustained thought, namely the associated dharmas other than applied and sustained thought; second, having sustained thought only without applied thought, namely applied thought itself; third, having neither applied nor sustained thought, namely all non-associated dharmas; fourth, having applied thought only without sustained thought, namely sustained thought itself. The remaining ten elements of form have neither applied nor sustained thought, because they are never associated with applied and sustained thought. 〔Question:〕 Since the five bodies of consciousness have applied and sustained thought, why are they also said to be without discrimination? The stanza says:

〔Principal 29〕The Sense in Which the Five Consciousnesses Are Without Discrimination

Stanza: The five consciousnesses are said to be without discrimination with respect to the conceptual and the recollective kinds; these two have as their substance the diffuse discernment of the mind stage and the forms of mindfulness associated with mind consciousness.

Treatise: It is transmitted: discrimination is briefly of three kinds—intrinsic discrimination, conceptual discrimination, and recollective discrimination. The five bodies of consciousness, though they have intrinsic discrimination, lack the other two, and so are said to be without discrimination—as a horse with only one leg is named legless. Intrinsic discrimination has applied thought as its very substance, and will be distinguished below among the mental factors. The other two kinds of discrimination have, in order, the diffuse discernment of the mind stage and the forms of mindfulness as their substance: diffuse means not in absorption, and the diffuse discernment associated with mind consciousness is named conceptual discrimination; the forms of mindfulness associated with mind consciousness, whether in absorption or diffuse, are named recollective discrimination. Applied and sustained thought and the rest have now been stated. Among the eighteen elements, how many have an object of consciousness and how many have none? How many are appropriated and how many unappropriated? The stanza says:

〔Principal 30〕Two Gates: Having an Object of Consciousness · Appropriation

Stanza: The seven mind elements and half of the element of dharmas (the mental factors) have an object of consciousness; the rest have none. The first eight elements (the seven mind elements and dharmas) and sound are unappropriated; the remaining nine extend to both.

Treatise: The six consciousnesses, the mind element, and the mental factors included in the element of dharmas are named having an object of consciousness—because they can grasp an object. The remaining ten elements of form and the non-associated dharmas included in the element of dharmas are named having no object of consciousness—which is established by extending the principle. Having an object of consciousness and the rest have now been stated. Among the eighteen elements, nine are unappropriated: the first seven mind elements and the whole element of dharmas, these eight together with the sound element, are all unappropriated. The remaining nine elements (the five faculties + form, odor, taste, and the tangible) each extend to both gates, appropriated and unappropriated: the five faculties beginning with the eye are named appropriated when they abide in the present, and unappropriated when past or future; form, odor, taste, and the tangible are named appropriated when they abide in the present and are not separate from the five faculties, and unappropriated when they abide in the present but are not inseparable from the faculties, and when they are past or future—as within the body, apart from what is joined to the faculties, the hair, body-hair, nails, teeth, excrement and urine, mucus, saliva, blood and the rest, and the form, odor, taste, and tangible in the earth, water, and so forth outside the body, which, though present, are unappropriated. What is meant by appropriated? What mind and mental factors together hold and take as their base is named appropriated—because benefit and injury are passed back and forth between them; this is also what the world calls having felt contact, since when touched by an assemblage of conditions there is a feeling of pleasure and the rest. The contrary of this is named unappropriated. Appropriation and the rest have now been stated. Among the eighteen elements, how many have the nature of great elements and how many the nature of derived form? How many are accumulable and how many not accumulable? The stanza says:

〔Principal 31〕Two Gates: Great Elements and Derived Form · Accumulation

Stanza: Within the tangible element there are two kinds (great elements and derived form); the remaining nine elements of form are only derived; one portion of the element of dharmas (nonmanifest form) is likewise; the ten elements of form are accumulable.

Treatise: The tangible element extends to both: the great elements (the four, hardness and the rest) and derived form (the seven, smoothness and the rest, named derived because they arise in dependence on the great elements). The remaining nine elements of form (the five faculties + form, sound, odor, and taste) are only derived. The nonmanifest form of action, one portion of the element of dharmas, is likewise only derived. The remaining seven mind elements and one portion of the element of dharmas (excluding nonmanifest form) are neither of the two. The venerable Juetian says thus: all ten sense fields of form have only the nature of great elements. 〔Assessment:〕 What he says is not right: the sūtras say only that the four marks of hardness, moisture, warmth, and motion are the great elements, and these four great elements are included only in the sense field of the tangible—hardness, moisture and the rest are not what the eye and the rest can grasp, and form, sound and the rest are not what the body faculty can feel; therefore what he says is definitively not so. Moreover a sūtra says: ‘Bhikṣus, know that the eye is an inner sense field, subtle form derived from the four great elements, possessing form, invisible, resistant,’ and so on at length down to the sense field of the body likewise; ‘form is an outer sense field, derived from the four great elements, possessing form, visible, resistant; sound is an outer sense field, derived from the four great elements, possessing form, invisible, resistant,’ and the two sense fields of odor and taste are expounded at length likewise; ‘the tangible is an outer sense field, being the four great elements and what is derived from the four great elements, possessing form, invisible, resistant’—the sūtra speaks of including the four great elements only in the case of the sense field of the tangible, plainly showing that the remaining sense fields possessing form are not great elements. 〔Objection:〕 Then why does a sūtra also say, ‘within the fleshy lump of the eye, if internally and separately there is a hardness or a class of hardness,’ and so on at length? 〔Answer:〕 That sūtra says that hardness and the rest are within the fleshy lump not separate from the eye faculty 〔the hardness being in the lump, not in the eye faculty〕, and there is no fault of contradiction. That the Sūtra on Entry into the Womb speaks only of six elements as constituting a person is in order to display the root items that can constitute a person, and is not a restriction to these alone—for that same sūtra also speaks of the six sense fields of contact. Moreover 〔if there were only six elements〕 the mental factors would have to be nonexistent; nor may one hold that the mental factors just are mind—for the sūtra says that mental factors such as perception and feeling “rest upon mind,” and also speaks of “a mind with greed” and the like. By this, the distinction of great elements and derived form among the elements as stated above is established. The nature of great elements and the rest has now been stated. Among the eighteen elements, the ten elements possessing form, five faculties and five objects, are accumulable—because they are aggregations of ultimate atoms; extending the principle, the remaining eight are not accumulable—because they are not ultimate atoms. Accumulable and the rest have now been stated. Among the eighteen elements, how many can cut and how many are cut? How many can burn and how many are burned? How many can be weighed and how many do the weighing? The stanza says:

〔Principal 32〕The Gates of Cutting and Being Cut · Burning and Being Burned · Weighing and Being Weighed

Stanza: Only the four outer elements (form, odor, taste, and the tangible) can cut and are cut, and are likewise what is burned and what does the weighing; as for what can burn and what is weighed, there is dispute.

Treatise: Form, odor, taste, and the tangible constitute the axe, the firewood, and the like, and this is named what cuts and what is cut. What is meant by cutting? An aggregation of form such as firewood arises in unbroken continuity, and the axe and the like separate it so that each arises in its own continuity—this is named cutting. The faculties of form such as the body are not named what is cut—it is impossible to sever one entirely into two: the body faculty and the rest cannot become two portions, for once a limb is separated from the body the faculty is no longer within it. The body faculty and the rest are also not what cuts—because they are pure and refined, like the light of a jewel 〔light cannot chop anything〕. As what cuts and what is cut are only the four outer elements, so too are what is burned and what does the weighing—only the four outer elements are named what is burned and what does the weighing; the faculties of form such as the body are likewise not these two, being pure and refined like the light of a jewel; and the sound element is entirely none of them—because it is not continuous 〔sound perishes as it arises, and has no continuous substance to be burned or weighed〕. As for what can burn and what is weighed, there are differing disputes: some say that what can burn and what is weighed are likewise, as before, only the four outer elements; others again say that only the fire element may be named what can burn, and that what is weighed is only heaviness. Cutting and being cut and the rest have now been stated. Among the eighteen elements, how many are maturation-born, how many nourished, how many of homogeneous nature, how many possessed of a real entity, how many momentary? The stanza says:

〔Principal 33–34, first half〕The Gate of the Five Classes

Stanza: The five inner elements (the five faculties) are maturation-born and nourished; sound is not maturation-born; the eight nonresistant elements (the seven mind elements and dharmas) are of homogeneous nature and also of maturation-born nature; the rest (form, odor, taste, and the tangible) extend to all three; real is only the element of dharmas; momentary is only the last three elements.

Treatise: The five inner ones are the five elements beginning with the eye; they are maturation-born and nourished, and are not of homogeneous nature—because apart from maturation-born and nourished they have no separate substance. Maturation-born: what is produced by a maturation cause is named maturation-born, as a cart drawn by an ox is named an ox-cart, the middle word being dropped. Or else: the action performed, on reaching the time of yielding its result, “alters and is able to ripen,” and so is named maturation, and the result arising from it is named maturation-born. Or else: the result obtained from it is of a different class from its cause and is what is ripened, and so is named maturation. Or else: the name of the result is provisionally established upon the cause—just as the name of the cause is provisionally established upon the result, as a sūtra says: ‘the six sense fields of contact now present should be known to be the actions performed of old’ 〔an instance of establishing the name of the cause upon the result〕. Nourished: what is augmented by excellent conditions such as food and drink, assistance (anointing and bathing), sleep, and concentration (absorption) is named nourished. Some say that celibate conduct can also nourish. 〔Assessment:〕 Celibate conduct is merely non-injury, and is not a separate augmenting. The continuum of what is nourished constantly protects the continuum of maturation, as an outer wall guards an inner city. Sound is of homogeneous nature and nourished, and is not maturation-born. Why? Because it proceeds according to wish 〔one makes a sound when one wishes to, whereas a maturation does not follow a present wish〕. 〔Objection:〕 If so, it ought not to be as the Treatise of Designations says, that through well cultivating the avoidance of harsh speech one obtains the mark of the great man’s voice of Brahmā 〔is sound then not a result of action?〕. 〔First answer:〕 Some say: because sound belongs to a third remove, it arises from that action yet is not a maturation—that is, from that action the great elements arise, and from the great elements, being struck, sound is produced. 〔Second answer:〕 Some say: because sound belongs to a fifth remove, it arises from that action yet is not a maturation—that is, that action produces maturation-born great elements, from these are produced in turn nourished great elements, from these in turn homogeneous great elements, and these then produce sound. 〔Assessment:〕 If so, bodily feeling also arises from great elements produced by action, and would also have to be no maturation; and if feeling were treated like sound, correct principle would be contradicted. The eight nonresistant (the seven mind elements and the element of dharmas) are of homogeneous nature and of maturation-born nature: what is produced by the homogeneous cause and the all-pervading cause is of homogeneous nature, and what is drawn forth by the maturation cause is named maturation-born; and the nonresistant dharmas, having no accumulation, are not nourished. The rest means the remaining four—form, odor, taste, and the tangible—which all extend to the three kinds: some maturation-born, some nourished, some of homogeneous nature. Real is only dharmas: real means the unconditioned, on account of its firmness and solidity; and the unconditioned is included only in the element of dharmas, and so only the element of dharmas is named possessed of a real entity. Momentary: mind, dharmas, and mind consciousness are named the last three (being stated last within the three classes of the six elements); only these three elements have a momentary dharma, namely the class of the first receptivity to the cognition of dharma concerning suffering, which is without outflows—because it is not of homogeneous nature it is named momentary 〔nothing homogeneous precedes it, and it arises alone for a single moment〕. This is said of what is definitively not homogeneous; among the remaining conditioned dharmas there is none that is not homogeneous. The mind associated with the receptivity to the cognition of dharma concerning suffering is named the mind element and the mind consciousness element; the remaining dharmas arising together with it are named the element of dharmas. Maturation-born and the rest have now been stated. Now it should be considered: if the eye element was not previously accomplished and is now accomplished, is eye consciousness likewise? If the eye consciousness element was not previously accomplished and is now accomplished, is the eye element likewise? Questions of this kind should now be answered briefly. The stanza says:

〔Principal 34, second half〕The Acquisition and Possession of the Eye Element and the Eye Consciousness Element: A Fourfold Distinction

Stanza: Of the eye element and the eye consciousness element there is acquisition of one alone, of both, and of neither; possession should likewise, as the word and the rest indicates, be worked out in a fourfold distinction.

Treatise: Acquisition of one alone: there are cases where the eye element was not previously accomplished and is now accomplished while eye consciousness is not—as when one born in the realm of desire gradually acquires the eye faculty, or when one dies in the formless realm and is born in the second, third, or fourth meditative absorption levels 〔where eye consciousness must be borrowed from the first absorption〕. And there are cases where eye consciousness was not previously accomplished and is now accomplished while the eye element is not—as when one born in the second, third, or fourth absorption levels has eye consciousness arise, or dies there and is born in a lower level. Acquisition of both: there are cases where the two elements were both previously unaccomplished and are now both acquired—as when one dies in the formless realm and is born in the realm of desire or in the Brahmā world. Acquisition of neither: apart from the preceding cases. And the rest means: if one possesses the eye element, does one also possess eye consciousness? A fourfold distinction should be made: the first case (possessing the eye element but not eye consciousness) is one born in the second, third, or fourth absorption levels when eye consciousness is not arising; the second case (possessing eye consciousness but not the eye element) is one born in the realm of desire who has not yet acquired the eye faculty, or who acquired it and has lost it again; the third case (possessing both) is one born in the realm of desire who has acquired the eye and not lost it, one born in the Brahmā world, and one born in the second, third, or fourth absorption levels while actually seeing form; the fourth case (possessing neither) is apart from the preceding cases. The acquisition and possession of the eye element and the form element, and of eye consciousness and the form element, should be thought through on the same principle—and to gather in these unstated senses the stanza says the single word and the rest. Acquisition and possession and the rest have now been stated. Among the eighteen elements, how many are inner and how many outer? The stanza says:

〔Principal 35, first half〕The Gate of Inner and Outer

Stanza: Inner are the twelve elements beginning with the eye (six faculties and six consciousnesses); the six objects beginning with form are outer.

Treatise: The six faculties and six consciousnesses, twelve elements, are named inner; the remaining six objects beginning with form are outer. 〔Question:〕 Inner and outer are established with reference to a self (what the self depends on is named inner, and what is other than this is outer); since there is no substance of a self, whence are inner and outer? 〔Answer:〕 Because it is what the grasping of a self rests upon, mind is provisionally spoken of as the self. Thus a sūtra says:

〔Cited stanza〕Through well taming the self, the wise attain birth in heaven.

While the World-Honored One says elsewhere that it is mind that is tamed, as a sūtra says:

〔Cited stanza〕One should well tame the mind; mind tamed can draw on ease.

So it is only with respect to mind that a self is provisionally spoken of. The faculties beginning with the eye are what this provisional self (mind) depends on and are near to it, and so are named inner; form and the rest are its objects of consciousness and are remote, and so are named outer. 〔Objection:〕 If so, the six consciousnesses ought not to be named inner—they have not yet reached the position of mind (have not yet become past) and are not what mind (as mind element) depends on. 〔Answer:〕 When the six consciousnesses reach the position of mind they do not lose the nature of the six consciousness elements, and before they reach that position they have never departed from the mark of mind 〔their very nature is to be the mind that is to come〕. Were it not so, the mind element would exist only in the past and the six consciousnesses only in the present and future, contradicting our own school’s tenet that the eighteen elements all extend to the three times. Moreover, if the future and present six consciousnesses lacked the mark of the mind element, the past mind element could not be established either—for the marks of a dharma do not alter across the three times. Inner and outer have now been stated. Among the eighteen elements, how many are participating and how many corresponding nonparticipants? The stanza says:

〔Principal 35, second half〕The Gate of Participating and Corresponding Nonparticipant

Stanza: The element of dharmas alone is participating; the remaining seventeen elements extend to both, participating and corresponding nonparticipant—divided according to whether they perform their own work or not.

Treatise: The participating element of dharmas: the single element of dharmas alone is throughout participating. If an object is definitely made an object of consciousness by a consciousness, and a consciousness has already arisen or will certainly arise upon it (a dharma that arises), then that object is named participating. And there is no portion whatever of the element of dharmas upon which boundless mind consciousnesses have not arisen, are not arising, and will not arise—because the noble ones certainly give rise to the mind that “contemplates all dharmas as being without self”; this mind, apart from its own substance and the dharmas coexisting with it, takes all dharmas as its objects, and the portion excluded is in turn the object of the second moment of mind. These two successive moments of mind take all objects without exception, and therefore the element of dharmas is always named participating. The remaining two: the remaining seventeen elements all have both participation and corresponding nonparticipation. What is meant by participating and corresponding nonparticipant? What performs its own work is named participating; what does not perform its own work is named a corresponding nonparticipant. Here the eye element with respect to visible form that it has seen, is seeing, or will see is named a participating eye; and so on at length up to the mind element, each with respect to its own object, of which its own function should be stated. The Vaibhāṣikas of Kaśmīra say that the corresponding nonparticipant eye is of four kinds only—that which does not see form and has already ceased, is ceasing, or will cease, and that which definitively will not arise. The masters of the West say there are five kinds: dividing what will not arise further into two—that which has an accompanying consciousness (that once had consciousness with it) and that which has none. And so on down to the body element, as should be known; the corresponding nonparticipant of the mind element is only what will not arise 〔mind must have something it cognizes; when it arises it performs its work〕. The form element (the object of form) that the eye has seen, is seeing, or will see is named participating form; the corresponding nonparticipant form is likewise of four kinds—that which is not seen by an eye and has already ceased, is ceasing, or will cease, and that which will not arise. And so on at length to the tangible element likewise—each with respect to its own faculty, of which its own function should be stated. The extent 〔and the limits〕 of participation and corresponding nonparticipation should be known: if an eye is participating with respect to one sentient being, it is participating with respect to all other sentient beings as well, and the same holds for the corresponding nonparticipant—and so on at length to the mind element likewise. Form is not so: with respect to one who sees it, it is participating; with respect to one who does not see it, it is a corresponding nonparticipant. Why? Because with form there is the case of being seen by one person and also seen in common by many—as when people gaze together at the moon, at dancing, at wrestling and the like; whereas with the eye there is no case of one eye faculty seeing form for two continua. The eye is not held in common, and participation and corresponding nonparticipation are established with respect to a single continuum (a single sentient being); form is held in common, and they are established with respect to many continua. As stated for the form element, so should it be known for sound, odor, taste, and the tangible. 〔Question:〕 Sound may indeed be like form (heard in common); but the three of odor, taste, and the tangible must reach the faculty to be grasped and are not held in common—if one person grasps them another cannot, and so in principle they should be like the eye and the rest 〔established with respect to a single continuum〕 and should not be stated as with form. 〔Answer:〕 Although there is that principle, they still admit of being held in common: the three elements of odor and the rest have, with respect to this person and to others, the sense of being able to give rise to nose consciousness and the rest 〔the possibility is common〕; the eye and the rest are not so 〔this eye will never generate consciousness for another person〕, and so they are still stated as with form. As for the six consciousnesses beginning with the eye, they are 〔divided into participating and corresponding nonparticipant〕 according to whether they are dharmas that arise or dharmas that do not arise, as was said of the mind element. What is the word-sense of participating and corresponding nonparticipant? Faculty, object, and consciousness, all three, interact with one another, and this is named a share; or share is the function already performed; or share is the contact produced—having this share in common, it is named participating. The contrary of this is named a corresponding nonparticipant—because this nonparticipant shares a class in common with what participates 〔being of the same class of element〕, it is named a corresponding nonparticipant. Participating and corresponding nonparticipant have now been stated. Among the eighteen elements, how many are abandoned through seeing, how many abandoned through cultivation, how many not subject to abandonment? The stanza says:

〔Principal 36〕The Gate of the Three Abandonings

Stanza: Fifteen elements are abandoned only through cultivation; the last three extend to all three kinds; dharmas that are undefiled, what is not born of the sixth, and form are definitively not abandoned through seeing.

Treatise: The fifteen elements (the ten elements of form and the five consciousness elements) are abandoned only through cultivation. The last three (mind, dharmas, mind consciousness) each extend to the three kinds: the eighty-eight latent tendencies together with the dharmas coexisting with them and the acquisitions that accompany them are all abandoned through seeing; the remaining dharmas with outflows are all abandoned through cultivation; all dharmas without outflows are not subject to abandonment. 〔Objection:〕 Are there not further dharmas abandoned through seeing? Such as ordinary-being status, and the bodily and vocal actions that bring on evil destinies—these are utterly contrary to the noble path 〔and so in principle should be abandoned by the path of seeing〕. 〔Answer:〕 Although they are contrary, these dharmas are not abandoned through seeing. Briefly stated, their marks are: dharmas that are undefiled, what is not born of the sixth, and form are definitively not abandoned through seeing. Ordinary-being status is undefiled and is included in the indeterminate—for both one who has left desire behind and one who has severed the wholesome roots still possess it 〔which shows it is not defiled〕; and if this ordinary-being status were abandoned through seeing, then one in the position of the receptivity to the cognition of dharma concerning suffering would still be an ordinary being 〔since at the first moment of the path of seeing it has not yet been discarded〕. The sixth means the mind sense field; what is born otherwise than from this is named not born of the sixth, that is, born from the five faculties beginning with the eye, namely the five consciousnesses and the like. Form means all bodily and vocal action and the like. The first two 〔undefiled dharmas and what is not born of the sixth〕 together with this form are definitively not abandoned through seeing. Why? Because they are not directly set in motion by delusion about the principle of the truths. Abandonment through seeing and the rest have now been stated. Among the eighteen elements, how many are seeing and how many are not? The stanza says:

〔Principal 37–38〕The Gate of Seeing and Not Seeing; the Dispute over Whether the Eye Sees or Consciousness Sees

Stanza: The eye element and eight kinds within one portion of the element of dharmas are said to be seeing; the discernment arising together with the five consciousnesses is not seeing—because it cannot make a decisive judgment. What sees form is the participating eye 〔that sees〕, and not the consciousness that depends on it 〔that sees〕; it is transmitted that 〔if consciousness saw〕 it ought not to fail to see forms that are screened off.

Treatise: The eye 〔element〕 is wholly seeing; eight kinds within one portion of the element of dharmas are seeing; the rest are all not seeing. Which eight? The five defiled views beginning with the view of self (the view of a real person, the extreme view, wrong view, adherence to views, adherence to observances and vows), worldly right view, the right view of one in training, and the right view of one beyond training. The five beginning with the view of self will be spoken of in due course in the chapter on the latent tendencies. Worldly right view is the wholesome discernment with outflows associated with mind consciousness. The right view of one in training is the views without outflows in the continuum of one in training; the right view of one beyond training is the views without outflows in the continuum of one beyond training. Just as by night and by day, with clouds and without, the multitude of forms and images are seen with differing clarity and dimness—so too do worldly views defiled and undefiled, and the views of those in training and beyond training, differ in the clarity and dimness with which they observe the marks of dharmas. Why is worldly right view restricted to what is associated with mind consciousness? Because the discernment arising together with the five consciousnesses cannot make a decisive judgment—only what deliberates first and then judges decisively is named seeing; the discernment arising with the five consciousnesses has no such capacity, being without discrimination, and so it is not seeing. Extending the principle from this, it should be known that the remaining discernments, defiled and undefiled, and the remaining dharmas are not seeing.

〔The consciousness-sees party objects:〕 If so, the eye faculty likewise cannot make a decisive judgment—on what ground is it named seeing? 〔The eye-sees party answers:〕 Because it can clearly and sharply illuminate and observe forms, it too is named seeing. 〔The consciousness-sees party objects:〕 If it is the eye that sees, then when another consciousness is operating 〔the eye being still present〕 it too ought to be named seeing 〔why does it not see then?〕. 〔The eye-sees party answers:〕 Not every eye is able to see actually. 〔The consciousness-sees party presses:〕 Which is able to see actually? 〔The eye-sees party explains:〕 The participating eye in the state of being joined with consciousness (the eye that is arising together with eye consciousness) is able to see, and no other. 〔The consciousness-sees party objects:〕 If so, it must be the dependent consciousness that sees form, and not the eye. 〔The eye-sees party answers:〕 Not so; eye consciousness is definitively not what sees. 〔The consciousness-sees party presses:〕 Why? 〔The eye-sees party explains:〕 It is transmitted: 〔if consciousness saw〕 it could not fail to observe forms that are screened off—yet it is directly observed that forms screened off by a wall and the like cannot be seen. 〔The eye-sees party presses back:〕 If it is consciousness that sees, then since consciousness is nonresistant a wall cannot obstruct it, and it ought to see the screened-off forms 〔and since in fact it cannot see them, it is evident that consciousness does not see〕. 〔The consciousness-sees party answers:〕 With respect to a screened-off form, eye consciousness simply does not arise; and since consciousness does not arise, how should it see? 〔The eye-sees party presses in summary:〕 Why does eye consciousness not arise with respect to it?—We who hold that the eye sees can say: the eye is resistant, and with respect to a screened-off form it has no capacity for seeing; and since consciousness proceeds upon the same object as its support, it may be said that eye consciousness does not arise there. But you who hold that consciousness sees—for what reason does it not arise? 〔The consciousness-sees party objects:〕 Is the eye then like the body faculty, grasping only when it meets its object, that you say it does not see the screened-off because it is resistant? Moreover, why can forms screened off by crystal, beryl, mica, water and the like be seen? So it is not because the eye is resistant that it has no capacity for seeing screened-off form. 〔The eye-sees party asks in return:〕 If so, what of the eye consciousness that you maintain 〔which does not arise〕? 〔The consciousness-sees party answers:〕 Where the brightness is not cut off, eye consciousness does arise with respect to the screened-off form 〔one can see through crystal〕; where the brightness is cut off, eye consciousness does not arise. And since consciousness does not arise, it cannot see. 〔The consciousness-sees party reconciles the sūtra:〕 But the sūtra says “the eye can see form”—how so?—The eye is what seeing depends on, and so it is said to see. As that sūtra says, “the mind can cognize dharmas”: in fact it is not the mind that cognizes (the mind has already passed), but mind consciousness; the mind is what consciousness depends on, and so it is said to cognize. Or else it is stating the action of the dependent in terms of what it depends on—as the world says of a bench that “the bench is talking” 〔one who sits on the bench talks, and it is said that the bench talks〕. Again the sūtra says “forms cognized by the eye are lovely and delightful”—yet such lovely forms are not what the eye cognizes. Again the sūtra says: ‘Brahmin, know that the eye is the gate, and it is solely for seeing form’—from which it is evident that eye consciousness sees by way of the gate that is the eye; one surely cannot say that ‘the gate is the seeing.’ How could the sūtra say ‘taking the eye as the seeing, solely for seeing form’? 〔The eye-sees party objects:〕 If consciousness can see, then who does the cognizing? And how do the two functions of seeing and cognizing differ? 〔The consciousness-sees party explains:〕 To see form is to cognize form—just as a certain portion of discernment is named able to see and is also able to discern, so a certain portion of consciousness is named able to see and is also able to cognize. 〔Some others object:〕 If the eye can see, the eye is the seer—then what is the act of seeing? 〔The eye-sees party answers:〕 This makes no objection: just as all grant that consciousness can cognize while there is no separate cognizer—the cognizing and the act are not separate—so it should be with seeing. 〔Some others further say:〕 It is eye consciousness that sees; and because the eye is what the seeing (eye consciousness) depends on, the eye too is named able to see—as a bell is what the ringing depends on, and so the bell is said to be able to ring. 〔The eye-sees party objects:〕 If so, then since the eye faculty is what consciousness depends on, it ought also to be named able to cognize. 〔The consciousness-sees party answers:〕 There is no such fault: the world commonly grants that eye consciousness is the seeing—when eye consciousness arises one says ‘I have seen the form,’ not ‘I have cognized the form’; and the Mahāvibhāṣā also says thus: 「若眼所得、眼識所受說名所見」 tr. “what is obtained by the eye and received by eye consciousness is called what is seen,” and so one says only that the eye can see and not that the eye can cognize; only when consciousness is present does one say ‘it cognizes form’—as one says that the sun ‘makes the day’ 〔the sun’s shining is the day, as consciousness’s presence is the cognizing of form〕. The Sautrāntika masters then say thus: why all this trouble—a crowd gathered to clutch at empty space! Eye, form, and the rest as conditions give rise to eye consciousness; within this, which is the seer and which the seen? There are only dharmas as cause and result, and in fact no agent function; it is merely to accord with worldly feeling that expressions are provisionally set up—“the eye is named able to see, consciousness is named able to cognize”—and the wise should not fasten upon them. As the World-Honored One said: ‘The words of a region are not to be held to rigidly; the name-ideations of convention are not to be insisted upon.’ Yet the Vaibhāṣika school of Kaśmīra says: the eye can see, the ear can hear, the nose can smell, the tongue can taste, the body can feel, the mind can cognize.

〔Question:〕 When form is seen, is it one eye that sees or do two eyes see together? There is no fixed rule. The stanza says:

〔Principal 39, first half〕The Two Eyes See Together

Stanza: Sometimes two eyes see together—because 〔with two eyes open〕 form is seen distinctly.

Treatise: The great masters of Abhidharma all say: sometimes two eyes see together—because when both eyes are open form is seen distinctly, and when only one is open it is not distinct; moreover, when one eye is open and one presses the other with the hand, one then sees two moons and the like before one, whereas closing one eye and pressing one has no such effect—therefore sometimes two eyes see together. 〔Question:〕 If the support is divided into two places, does consciousness not become two pieces? 〔Answer:〕 Consciousness does not become two portions because its support is divided—consciousness abides in no location, and is unlike resistant form 〔consciousness is not a dharma of form and has no spatial parts to be split〕. 〔Question:〕 If, according to this school, the eye sees, the ear hears, and so on to the mind cognizing, then when the faculties actually grasp their objects, do they grasp by reaching the object or without reaching it? The stanza says:

〔Principal 39, second half〕The Gate of Reaching and Not Reaching the Object; the Debate on Whether Ultimate Atoms Touch

Stanza: The three faculties of eye, ear, and mind grasp objects not reached; the other three are the contrary of this 〔grasping only objects reached〕.

Treatise: The faculties of eye, ear, and mind grasp objects not reached: the eye can see forms at a distance, whereas eye-salve and the like within the eye 〔forms that have reached the eye〕 are on the contrary not seen; the ear too can hear sounds at a distance, whereas what is pressed close against the ear faculty is on the contrary not heard. If eye and ear grasped only objects reached, then one who cultivates absorption would have no need to cultivate the production of the divine eye and divine ear—like the nose faculty and the rest 〔faculties of objects reached, which need no distant range〕. 〔Objection:〕 If the eye can see form not reached, why can it not see all distant forms, or forms screened off and otherwise not reached? 〔Answer:〕 Why does a lodestone that draws iron not reached not draw all iron not reached? The claim that seeing grasps objects reached has the same difficulty—why can it not see all forms that have reached the eye, such as eye-salve, a stick and the like? And likewise the nose and the rest, which grasp objects reached, cannot grasp all the odors and the rest that are present together with the faculty. Therefore, though the eye sees what is not reached, it does not see everything, and so with the ear. The mind has no substance of form, and so of it there is no reaching at all. Some hold: the ear faculty grasps both reached and not-reached objects—since one can also hear the sound within one’s own ear. The remaining three faculties possessing form, nose, tongue, and body, are the contrary of the above, grasping only objects reached. How is it known that the nose grasps only odor reached? Because when the breath is held one cannot smell an odor. What is meant by reached? Arising without interval 〔with nothing intervening between them〕. 〔Appended debate:〕 Then do ultimate atoms touch one another or not? The Vaibhāṣikas of Kaśmīra say they do not touch. Why? If ultimate atoms touched throughout their whole substance, there would be the fault of the substances of real things being commingled 〔two atoms merging into one〕; if they touched only in one portion, there would be the fault of having parts—yet an ultimate atom has no finer parts. 〔Objection:〕 If they do not touch, why does striking them produce sound? 〔Answer:〕 Only because ultimate atoms arise without interval 〔they come close without touching〕. If touching were granted, then in striking stones or clapping hands the substances of the two would have to be commingled. 〔Objection:〕 If they do not touch, why does an aggregation of form not scatter when struck? 〔Answer:〕 Because the wind element holds it, it does not scatter—some wind elements can destroy and scatter (as at the destruction of an aeon), and some can form and hold together (as at the formation of an aeon). 〔Question:〕 Then how are the three faculties said to grasp objects reached by arising without interval? 〔Answer:〕 Just this without interval is named reaching—there being nothing whatever in between. Moreover, conjoined form is granted to have parts, and to say that it touches involves no fault. On this principle the sense of the Mahāvibhāṣā’s text is well established. Thus that treatise asks: ‘Whatever thing touches, is it produced with touching as its cause or with non-touching as its cause? And of things not touching, the question is the same.’ And on this principle it gives an indeterminate answer: sometimes touching produces non-touching (when a conjoined thing is in the act of separating), sometimes non-touching produces touching (when separated things are in the act of conjoining), sometimes touching produces touching (when a conjoined thing conjoins again), sometimes non-touching produces non-touching (as with floating motes of dust continuing in their own kind). The venerable Vasumitra says: if ultimate atoms touched one another, they would have to abide into the following moment 〔touching implies resistance and abiding, contradicting momentary cessation〕. And the venerable one (Dharmatrāta) says: no ultimate atoms in fact touch one another; the name touching is merely provisionally established upon their being without interval. 〔The author:〕 This venerable one’s intent should be found agreeable 〔the author declares himself〕. Were it not so, there would have to be gaps between the ultimate atoms—and the space between being empty, what obstructs their movement, that they should be granted to be resistant? Moreover, apart from ultimate atoms there is no conjoined form, and for a conjoined form to touch is for ultimate atoms to touch 〔if the conjoined touches, the atoms touch, and the difficulty is the same〕. As with the sense of being liable to resistant deformation 〔which is in the aggregation and not in the atom, and yet the atom is said to be resistant〕, so it should be here too with 〔touching〕〔spoken provisionally of the aggregation〕. Moreover, if ultimate atoms are granted to have spatial parts, then whether they touch or not there is the fault of having parts; if they have no spatial parts, then even granting that they touch there is no such fault. Again, do the faculties beginning with the eye grasp only an object equal in measure to themselves (the measure of the faculty matching the measure of the object)—because they revolve so swiftly, like a whirling firebrand 〔which is a single point, yet whirled swiftly appears as a wheel〕—so that they seem able to see a great mountain and the like? Or do they grasp objects both equal and unequal in measure? The stanza says:

〔Principal 40, first half〕Objects of Equal Measure; the Arrangement of the Ultimate Atoms of the Faculties

Stanza: It should be known that the three faculties beginning with the nose grasp only objects of equal measure.

Treatise: The three faculties of nose, tongue, and body, which were said above to grasp objects reached, should be known to grasp only objects of equal measure—as is the measure of the faculty’s atoms, so is the measure of the object’s atoms, and matching one another they conjoin and produce consciousness. Eye and ear are not fixed: the eye with respect to form sometimes grasps something small (as in seeing the tip of a hair), sometimes something large (as in briefly opening the eyes and seeing a great mountain), sometimes something equal (as in seeing a grape); the ear hears sounds of all sizes, of a mosquito, of thunder and the rest, grasping as is fitting something small, large, or equal. The mind has no resistant substance, and no distinction of shape or measure can be told of it. 〔Appended:〕 How are the ultimate atoms of the faculties beginning with the eye arranged? The ultimate atoms of the eye faculty abide spread out over the pupil, like a coriander blossom, with a clear membrane covering them so that they do not scatter; some say they abide heaped up like a ball—being clear in substance, they do not obstruct one another, like crystal. The ultimate atoms of the ear faculty abide coiled round within the ear cavity, like a rolled sheet of birch bark. The ultimate atoms of the nose faculty abide within the bridge of the nose, back upward and face downward, like a pair of fingernails. These three faculties are set out crosswise in a row, their places without high and low, like a garland of flowers on a crown. The ultimate atoms of the tongue faculty are spread over the tongue, in the shape of a half-moon; it is transmitted that there is within the tongue a point the measure of a hair’s tip that the ultimate atoms of the tongue faculty do not cover. The ultimate atoms of the body faculty abide throughout the parts of the body, as the body’s shape and measure. The ultimate atoms of the female faculty have the shape of 「鼓𣞙」 tr. “a drum-shape,” and those of the male faculty the shape of 「指𩎽」 tr. “a finger-shape” 〔the two rare graphs are reproduced exactly as in the original〕. The ultimate atoms of the eye faculty are sometimes all participating, sometimes all corresponding nonparticipants, sometimes one portion corresponding nonparticipants and the rest participating; and so on down to the ultimate atoms of the tongue faculty likewise. The ultimate atoms of the body faculty are never all participating—even in the hottest hell, with fierce flames wrapping the body, there are still measureless ultimate atoms of the body faculty that are corresponding nonparticipants 〔for if the whole body faculty generated consciousness at once, the body would break apart〕. It is transmitted: if the body faculty were to generate consciousness throughout, the body would break apart. Moreover, there is no case in which a faculty and an object, each by a single ultimate atom, serve as support and object of consciousness so as to generate body consciousness—the five consciousnesses definitively require an accumulation of many ultimate atoms before the nature of support and object is constituted. And it is by this very principle that ultimate atoms are said to have an invisible substance—because they cannot be seen 〔a single atom does not generate eye consciousness〕. As was said above, consciousness is of six kinds; then—the five consciousnesses take only the present as object while mind consciousness takes the three times and what is beyond time (the unconditioned) as object—are the supports of the consciousnesses likewise 〔of the same time as the consciousness〕? They are not. How then? The stanza says:

〔Principal 40, second half〕The Times of Consciousness and Its Support

Stanza: The support of the last consciousness (mind consciousness) is only past; the supports of the five consciousnesses are either simultaneous 〔or past〕.

Treatise: Mind consciousness depends only on the mind that has ceased without interval (the past); the supports of the five consciousnesses beginning with the eye are either simultaneous—the word either indicates that they also depend on the past. The eye is the support arising together with eye consciousness, and so on to the body being the support arising together with body consciousness, both being in the present world; while the mind that has ceased without interval is their past support. Therefore the supports of the five bodies of consciousness are two each: the five faculties beginning with the eye are their several separate supports, and the mind faculty is the support common to the five. 〔Question:〕 Is whatever is a support of eye consciousness also the immediately antecedent condition of eye consciousness? And granting something is its immediately antecedent condition, must it be its support? A fourfold distinction should be made: the first case (a support but not an immediately antecedent condition)—the eye faculty arising together with it; the second case (an immediately antecedent condition but not a support)—the element of dharmas of mental factors that has ceased without interval; the third case (both)—the past mind faculty; the fourth case (neither)—apart from the dharmas just stated. And so on down to body consciousness likewise, each with its own faculty to be stated. For mind consciousness a following-antecedent answer should be made: whatever is a support of mind consciousness is definitively its immediately antecedent condition; but there is what is its immediately antecedent condition and not its support—the element of dharmas of mental factors that has ceased without interval. 〔Question:〕 Consciousness arises depending at once on the two conditions of faculty and object; why then does the name support fall on the faculty and not on the object? The stanza says:

〔Principal 41, first half〕The Name Support Falls on the Faculty

Stanza: Consciousness differs as the faculty alters, and therefore the eye and the rest are named its support.

Treatise: The eye and the rest means the six elements beginning with the eye. Because the faculties beginning with the eye undergo alteration (augmentation or damage), the consciousnesses alter accordingly—when the faculty is clear and sharp the consciousness is clear, when the faculty is damaged the consciousness is dim; whereas alteration in the objects beginning with form does not make the consciousness differ—consciousness follows the faculty, not the object. Therefore the name support falls only on the eye and the rest, and not on the others. 〔Question:〕 It is form and the rest that are the objects cognized; why then is consciousness called eye consciousness and so on to mind consciousness, and not form consciousness and so on to dharma consciousness? The stanza says:

〔Principal 41, second half〕Consciousness Named after the Faculty; the Levels of the Four Things, Same or Different

Stanza: By the sense of support stated above, and by the cause of not being held in common, consciousness is named after the faculty.

Treatise: Those refers to the eye and the rest named support above—the faculty is what is depended on, and so consciousness is named after the faculty. Not held in common: the eye is the support only of one’s own eye consciousness; whereas form may be grasped by another’s eye consciousness and by the mind consciousness of oneself and of others—and so on to the body and the tangible, as should be known. By the two causes of the excellence of the support and not being held in common, consciousness takes its name from the faculty and not from the object—as with the sound of a drum (named after the drum) and a barley sprout (named after the barley). 〔Appended discussion of the levels of the four things:〕 According to the level in which the body dwells, when the eye sees form, are the levels to which the four things—body, eye, form, and consciousness—belong the same or different? It should be said that these four are either different or the same. Born in the realm of desire: if one sees form of one’s own level with an eye of one’s own level, all four are of one’s own level; if one sees form of the realm of desire with the eye of the first meditative absorption, body and form belong to the realm of desire and eye and consciousness to the first absorption; if one sees form of the first absorption, the body belongs to the realm of desire and the other three to the first absorption. If one sees form of the realm of desire with the eye of the second absorption, body and form belong to the realm of desire, the eye to the second absorption, and consciousness to the first; if one sees form of the first absorption, the body belongs to the realm of desire, the eye to the second absorption, and form and consciousness to the first; if one sees form of the second absorption, the body belongs to the realm of desire, eye and form to the second absorption, and consciousness to the first. Likewise, if one sees lower-level or own-level form with the eye of the third or fourth absorption levels, it should be thought out on the same principle. Born in the first meditative absorption: seeing form of one’s own level with an eye of one’s own level, all four are of the same level; seeing form of the realm of desire, three belong to the first absorption and the form to the realm of desire. If one sees form of the first absorption with the eye of the second, three belong to the first absorption and the eye to the second; seeing form of the realm of desire, body and consciousness belong to the first absorption, form to the realm of desire, and the eye to the second; seeing form of the second absorption, body and consciousness belong to the first absorption and eye and form to the second. Likewise, seeing form of one’s own level or of lower or higher levels with the eye of the third or fourth absorption levels, it should be thought out on the same principle. Born in the second, third, or fourth absorptions, seeing form of one’s own or another level with an eye of one’s own or another level, it should be thought out on the same principle. The remaining elements (ear and sound and the rest) should be distinguished likewise. Now the decisive marks of this are stated briefly together. The stanza says:

〔Principal 42–43〕The Decisive Marks of the Levels of the Four Things

Stanza: The eye is not lower than the body; form and consciousness are not higher than the eye; form with respect to consciousness may be any 〔equal, higher, or lower〕; form and consciousness with respect to the body are likewise. The ear follows the pattern of the eye; the three of nose, tongue, and body are all only of their own level; body consciousness belongs to its own level or a lower one; the mind is not fixed, as should be known.

Treatise: Body, eye, and form all extend over five levels (the realm of desire and the four meditative absorptions); eye consciousness exists only in the realm of desire and the first absorption. Here the eye faculty, with respect to the level in which the body is born, is either equal or higher, and is never lower; form and consciousness with respect to the eye are either equal or lower, and never higher—a lower-level eye cannot see higher-level form, and a higher-level consciousness does not depend on a lower-level eye; form with respect to consciousness extends to equal, higher, and lower; and form and consciousness with respect to the body are as form is with respect to consciousness 〔extending to equal, higher, and lower〕. The ear element expounded at length should be known as with the eye: the ear is not lower than the body, sound and consciousness are not higher than the ear, sound with respect to consciousness may be any, and the two with respect to the body likewise, as is fitting, expounded at length as with the eye. The three of nose, tongue, and body are all of their own level; among them the distinction is that body and the tangible must be of the same level; consciousness with respect to the tangible and the body is either of its own level or of a lower one—own meaning one born in the realm of desire or the first absorption 〔where consciousness is of its own level〕, while one born in the three higher absorptions has consciousness of a lower level (the first absorption). It should be known that the four things of the mind element (body, mind, dharmas, mind consciousness) are not fixed: sometimes all four are of the same level, sometimes higher and lower—the body extends over five levels only, the other three over all levels; and in ranging through the attainments (entering the absorptions) and in taking birth, they are the same or different as is fitting, as will be distinguished at length in the later chapter on absorption. To save prolixity, no detailed distinction is made here—repeating before and after costs much effort and yields little benefit. The incidental discussion being complete, the principal discussion should now be taken up. Now it should be considered: among the eighteen elements, which is cognized by how many of the six consciousnesses? How many are permanent and how many impermanent? How many are faculties and how many not faculties? The stanza says:

〔Principal 44〕Three Gates: What Is Cognized · The Permanent · The Faculties (End of the Chapter)

Stanza: The five outer object fields are cognized by two consciousnesses; the permanent is the unconditioned within the element of dharmas; one portion of the element of dharmas is faculty, together with the inner twelve elements 〔in part〕.

Treatise: Among the eighteen elements, the five elements beginning with form are, in order, each cognized by one of the five consciousnesses beginning with the eye, and are also cognized collectively by mind consciousness—and so these five elements are each cognized by two of the six consciousnesses. Knowing this, it may be inferred that the remaining thirteen elements are all cognized only by mind consciousness—because they are not the objects of the five bodies of consciousness. Among the eighteen elements there is no element that is wholly permanent; only the unconditioned within one portion of the element of dharmas is permanent—extending the principle, the remaining dharmas and the remaining elements are all impermanent. Again, the sūtras speak of twenty-two faculties: the eye faculty, the ear faculty, the nose faculty, the tongue faculty, the body faculty, the mind faculty, the female faculty, the male faculty, the life faculty, the faculty of pleasure, the faculty of pain, the faculty of gladness, the faculty of sorrow, the faculty of equanimity, the faculty of confidence, the faculty of diligence, the faculty of mindfulness, the faculty of concentration, the faculty of discernment, the faculty of coming to know what is not yet known, the faculty of what is known, and the faculty of full knowledge. The great masters of Abhidharma all pass over the sūtras’ sequence of the six sense fields and speak of the mind faculty only after the life faculty—because it has an object of consciousness 〔being unlike the life faculty and the rest in class, it is assigned to the dharmas of mind〕. These twenty-two faculties are, among the eighteen elements, included in the inner twelve elements and one portion of the element of dharmas: one portion of dharmas means the life faculty and the ten others—the life faculty, the five feeling faculties of pleasure, pain, gladness, sorrow, and equanimity, and the five wholesome faculties of confidence, diligence, mindfulness, concentration, and discernment (in the ancient masters’ commentaries: life, pleasure, pain, gladness, sorrow, equanimity, confidence, diligence, mindfulness, concentration, discernment)—together with one portion of the last three faculties (coming to know what is not yet known, what is known, full knowledge), which belong to the element of dharmas; the inner twelve: the five faculties beginning with the eye are included as their own names indicate; the mind faculty is included in the seven mind elements throughout; one portion of the last three faculties is included in the mind element and the mind consciousness element; and the female and male faculties are one portion of the body element—as will be distinguished later 〔in the Chapter on the Faculties〕. Extending the principle, it may be known that the remaining five elements beginning with form and one portion of the element of dharmas are in substance not faculties.

義疏Exposition

這一卷只做一件事

界品前半把十八界立了起來——十八個名字、十八個位子。後半整整一卷，只做一件事：拿一個又一個問題，把這十八界從頭到尾問過一遍。幾有見、幾無見？幾有對、幾無對？幾善、幾不善、幾無記？一直問到品末。光記於此下標「此下大文第三諸門分別，總有二十二門分別十八界」；頌疏亦作「從此第三，諸門分別，總有二十二門，分別十八界」——後人習稱之『二十二門』，其名即出於此。

論文自己留了記號。每問完一門，就下一句「如是已說」某某，然後起下一問：「如是已說有見無見」「已說善等」「已說界繫」「如是已說有尋伺等」「如是已說可積集等」「如是已說得成就等」……這些短句不是文飾，是科段的釘子。讀者只要跟著釘子走，一卷的骨架自然分明。

為什麼在「界」上問，不在蘊、處上問？光記引《正理》答之：「界中具顯根、境、識故。諸門義類易可了知，故今且約十八界辨。由斯蘊、處義類已成。」——十八界是根、境、識三事俱全的座標系；在這個座標系裡問清楚了，蘊與處的義類連帶而成。

所問之門，依論文次第是：有見無見、有對無對、善不善無記、三界繫、有漏無漏、有尋有伺、有無分別、有所緣無所緣、有執受無執受、大種與所造、可積集非積集、能斫所斫與能燒所燒能稱所稱、五類分別、得與成就、內外、同分彼同分、見修非所斷、是見非見；此下轉入傍論——二眼俱見、至境不至境與極微相觸、等量境與諸根極微之安布、識依之世、依名在根、隨根說識、四事之地；傍論既周，末以所識、常無常、根非根三門收卷。

下面一門一門看。阿毘達磨的力量不在某一門特別精彩，在於同一批法被放到每一個維度上都不含糊——所以要逐門看下去，才看得見這部論的體格。

有見無見：只有一界可以被指出『在這裡』

先問：十八界中，哪一界叫有見？答只有一個——色界，也就是眼所對的色境。論給的理由只有一句：「十八界中色界有見，以可示現此彼差別。」能指著說『在此』『在彼』、可以標出方位差別的，唯有顏色形狀。其餘十七界不必逐一交代，論說「由此義准，說餘無見」——由這一條類推下去就是了。

這裡最容易誤會的是把『有見』讀成『看得見』。若作看得見解，聲音耳朵聽得見、香味鼻舌嘗得見，豈不都成有見？更麻煩的是眼根：眼是能見者，反倒被判為無見，豈不顛倒？關鍵在於此處的「見」不作能見解，而作可示現解——被指得出方位差別的才叫有見。眼根自己指不出「在此在彼」，故無見；聲香味觸亦然。

落到讀法上：這是全卷第一課，也是最要緊的一課——一個字在此處的定義，要從論自己給的訓釋裡取，不從日常語感裡取。後面二十一門，門門如此。

有對無對：三種「礙」，與一張四句表

第二問：幾有對？論答「唯色蘊攝十界有對」——五根五境十界。何謂有對？「對是礙義。」但礙有三種，論隨即分開：「此復三種：障礙、境界、所緣異故。」

障礙有對是最樸素的一種：「自於他處被礙不生，如手礙手或石礙石或二相礙。」兩個有質礙之物占不了同一個位子。境界有對指諸有境之法被自己的境界所限——論在此引《施設論》舉了一整串眼睛為例：魚眼於水中有礙而陸上不然，人眼於陸上有礙而水中不然，畢舍遮、鱷與捕魚人、蝦蟇之眼水陸俱礙，其餘俱非；又有夜有礙而晝不然者如蝙蝠鵂鶹，晝有礙而夜不然者如人，晝夜俱礙者如狗、野干、馬、豹、豺、狼、貓、狸。所緣有對則指心心所被自己的所緣所限。

境界與所緣有何分別？論下了兩句極清楚的界說：「若於彼法此有功能，即說彼為此法境界」「心心所法執彼而起，彼於心等名為所緣」。境界是就能力所及說，所緣是就執取而起說——所以五根有境界而無所緣，心心所則二者俱有。

那為什麼『在自己的境界上轉』反而叫「有礙」？論答：「越彼於餘此不轉故」——越出這個範圍它就轉不動了，這正是一種限制。論又給了第二種讀法：「或復礙者是和會義」，礙即是會合，眼等於自境自所緣和會而轉。一個字兩種訓，論不擇一，並存。

三種有對既立，頌文說的是哪一種？論自己收口：「應知此中唯就障礙有對而說」，所以頌只說「十有色有對」。這一句是全門的樞紐——不點明，讀者必以為十八界中有十二界是有對（境界有對之數），與頌相牴。

最後論還排了兩張表：境界有對與障礙有對作四句分別——七心界與法界一分相應法是第一句，色等五境是第二句，眼等五根是第三句，法界一分非相應法是第四句；境界有對與所緣有對則作「順後句」，凡所緣有對定是境界有對，而五根是境界有對非所緣有對。

門末，論引了大德鳩摩邏多一頌作結：

「是處心欲生，他礙令不起，　應知是有對，無對此相違。」

心本要在此生起，被他物礙住而生不起來——這就是有對。論對這頌只下四個字：「此是所許。」這是全卷第一次出現的『他家之語而我許之』，往後論主的取捨姿態，於此已見端倪。

善不善無記：八界不可記，十界通三性

第三問：幾善、幾不善、幾無記？論答分兩截。十有對中除色與聲，其餘八界唯無記——「謂五色根、香、味、觸境，不可記為善不善性，故名無記」。其餘十界通善等三：七心界與無貪等相應名善、與貪等相應名不善，餘名無記；法界隨其相應等起而判；「色界聲界若善不善心力等起身語表攝，是善不善，餘是無記」。

這裡藏著一句常被讀漏的旁論。有人另出一解：「有說：不能記異熟果故名無記。」論立刻回他一句：「若爾，無漏應唯無記」——無漏法也不感異熟果，難道無漏也成無記？一句話就照見這個定義太寬。訓釋之嚴，於此可見。

古德在此處把『善』與『不善』開得更細。光記於善開七種——生得、聞、思、修、學、無學、勝義；不善唯一；無記開七——有覆一而無覆六（異熟、威儀、工巧、通果、自性、勝義）；法界則四善（自性、相應、等起、勝義）三不善。光記並替讀者解一個疑：此中何以不說勝義不善？其答是「勝義不善，體通三性。……若說勝義，即無差別」。寶疏同其科而分段更詳。

色與聲何以能通善惡，是本門最實用的一點。頌疏說得最直白：「由色、聲二非自性善惡，約能發心判成善惡。」顏色與聲音本身沒有善惡，善惡在發動它的那個心——同一句話、同一個手勢，善心發之即善，惡心發之即惡。這是後來一切談身語業者的起點。

三界繫：色界為何少了四界——一場關於鼻舌的長辯

第四問轉到三界。頌答得乾脆：欲界具足十八，色界唯十四，無色界唯後三。論先訓門名：「繫謂繫屬，即被縛義」——『繫』不是分類的標籤，是被縛住。

色界少了哪四界？除香、味二境與鼻、舌二識。理由分兩層：「除香味者，段食性故，離段食欲方得生彼」——香味是段食之體性，離了段食之欲才生得上去；「除鼻舌識，無所緣故」——所緣既無，識自不起。

問題就從這裡開始滾。若香味以段食性故除，觸也是段食性，觸豈不也該除？論答：彼界所有之觸不是段食性。那香味也可以留下非段食的部分啊？論答：「香味離食無別受用」，而「觸有別用持根衣等」——觸還要執持諸根、承載衣物，用處不因離食而失。又有餘師別出一解：住此依彼靜慮等至而見色聞聲時，「輕安俱起有殊勝觸攝益於身」，故色聲觸三者隨逐生彼，香味不爾。

真正的難處在後頭：香味既無，鼻舌二根為何還在？以下十餘回合，各句誰問誰答，光記逐句標得極明白——發難的是論主，護根的是有部前師（光記「論主難前師」「前師解」「論主復難」「前師復救」）。論主先難：鼻舌於彼無用，應同香味一併除去。前師解曰：「二根於彼有用，謂起言說及莊嚴身。」論主復難：「若為嚴身及起說用，但須依處，何用二根？」——要好看、要說話，有鼻舌之形（依處）就夠了，何必要根？前師復救：彼界既無男根，連男根依處也一併沒有；依處猶在，正顯根有用。論主又難：男根依處於彼無用故可無，鼻舌依處於彼有用，離了根也自該有，仍不須根。前師又釋，轉出一例：「有雖無用而有根生，如處胞胎定當死者」——胎中注定夭折者，諸根照樣生，可見有根不待有用；而且「有雖無用而非無因」。論主別徵：無用而生，總該有因吧？前師答其因在愛：「於根有愛發殊勝業。」論主又以理難：既已離境愛，於根之愛也該一併離，那彼界連鼻舌都不該有；不然男根也該生。若說男根醜陋故不生——論主反問：「陰藏隱密何容醜陋？」而且「諸根生非由有用，若有因力無用亦生」。最後前師搬出契經（光記標「前師出聖教相違」）：彼界眾生「彼無支缺，不減諸根」，你說無鼻舌豈非違經？論主為通：經意是隨彼地應可有者說為不減。

十餘回合之後，論主自己落錘，判準只有一句：「以六根愛依內身生，非依境界而得現起」——六根之愛是依內身而起的，不依境界；而男根之愛依婬觸生，婬觸彼無，男根非有。根的有無，不看它有沒有用，看愛從哪裡起。

無色界則簡單：「要離色欲於彼得生，故無色中無十色界」；十色界既無，「依緣無故五識亦無」——所依所緣俱缺，五識自然不起，唯剩意、法、意識三界。

古德在此補了兩件事。光記引《雜心》釋色界無段食之由，作「彼無揣食性、以身微妙故」，並誌一條異部之說：「若依《宗輪論》，大眾部等，色、無色界具六識身」——一義二宗，並錄不判。寶疏則把門名再訓一遍：「欲界繫法，被欲界貪等繫縛，名欲界繫。」

這一門是讀俱舍辯難文體的最好入門：一問一答並非為了熱鬧，而是把一條判準逼到窮處。讀者若只記結論『色界十四』，這一卷最好的東西就漏掉了。

有漏無漏：三界通二，十五界唯有漏

第五問極短，卻不可略。頌答：「意法意識通，所餘唯有漏。」論釋：「意及意識道諦攝者，名為無漏，餘名有漏」；法界之中，「若是道諦無為，名為無漏，餘名有漏」；「餘十五界唯名有漏」。

先排一個誤會：無漏不是另外一批法，是同一批法之中被道諦與無為所攝的那一分。意界與意識界並沒有分成兩種意界，是同一個意界隨其所攝而通有漏無漏。法界更明白——法界一分是無為，無為非道諦所攝而亦無漏，所以法界的無漏有二路：道諦與無為。

再排第二個誤會：五根五境五識十五界唯有漏，並不是說修行時眼睛就不用了。它說的是：那十五界的體性，沒有一分屬於道諦或無為。聖者仍以肉眼見色，那個見仍是有漏；令他成聖的，是意識中相應的無漏慧。

落地一句：十八界之中，能承載出離的門只有三個。這一門雖短，卻替全論的修證論定了口徑——修行不是換一套感官，是在意識這一路上換一種相應。

有尋有伺：三品之外，何以逼出第四品

第六問：幾有尋有伺、幾無尋唯伺、幾無尋無伺？頌答「五識唯尋伺，後三三餘無」。論釋：「眼等五識有尋有伺，由與尋伺恒共相應」，其因是「以行相麁外門轉故、顯義決定，故說唯言」。後三界（意、法、意識）皆通三品；其餘十色界「尋伺俱無，常與尋伺不相應故」。

三品是就地而分的：欲界與初靜慮有尋有伺，靜慮中間無尋唯伺，第二靜慮以上乃至有頂無尋無伺。尋粗伺細，粗者先落，細者後落，這是定地深淺的次第。

本門最漂亮的一著，是尋與伺自己怎麼歸類。尋不與第二個尋相應——「無第二尋故、但伺相應故」——所以「尋」這個法自身是無尋唯伺。那伺呢？伺要分地看。靜慮中間之伺，論已隨非相應法一併判過——「法界所攝非相應法，靜慮中間伺亦如是」，該地本無尋，伺又不與第二個伺相應，故是無尋無伺；寶疏於此標得最明，說非相應法「及靜慮中間伺，俱是無尋無伺」，並釋其故曰「中間伺無第二伺故，及地法無尋故」。獨有欲界與初靜慮之伺，三品都收它不進——「伺在欲界初靜慮中三品不收，應名何等」——依同一條理路，它不與第二個伺相應而但與尋相應，於是逼出三品之外的第四品：「此應名曰無伺唯尋，無第二伺故、但尋相應故。」論遂立「有尋伺地有四品法」：一有尋有伺（除尋伺外之相應法）、二無尋唯伺（即尋）、三無尋無伺（一切非相應法）、四無伺唯尋（即伺）。

分類法在自己身上也不打折——這是阿毘達磨最值得敬重的地方。多數人立完三品就收工，因為第四品在教理上『用不著』；論卻寧可多開一品，也不讓自己的規則對自己例外。讀到這裡，讀者可以回頭檢查自己所用的任何分類：它容得下自己嗎？

三分別：五識為何叫「無分別」

第七問是替讀者問的，而且問得很兇：五識既然「有尋有伺」，尋伺就是分別，那五識怎麼還說是無分別？

論答之前先開名相，而且開頭就下了一個傳疑的記號：「傳說，分別略有三種：一自性分別、二計度分別、三隨念分別。」自性分別體即是尋，就是心對境的當下觸取；計度分別是「意識相應散慧」；隨念分別是「若定若散意識相應諸念」——一個是推度，一個是追憶，二者都唯在意識。

於是答案出來了：五識有自性分別而無後二，所以說它無分別。論給了一個極好的比喻：「由五識身雖有自性而無餘二，說無分別，如一足馬名為無足。」一足之馬仍叫無足馬——不是真的沒有腳，是不足以稱為有腳。

這裡要排一個大誤會：說五識無分別，不是說五識是一片混沌。眼識明明白白地取到青黃，那個取就是自性分別。它所無者，是回頭推度與追憶前事。你看見一團顏色，那是五識；認出『這是我昨天買的杯子』，那已經是意識的隨念與計度了。

落地：日常所謂『我一眼就看出他不懷好意』，在此論的口徑裡至少是三重疊起來的——五識取色，意識推度，隨念比對舊事。把這三層拆開，是後面一切觀行的基本功。

有所緣無所緣：能取境者，才有所緣

第八問：幾有所緣、幾無所緣？論答：「六識意界及法界攝諸心所法，名有所緣，能取境故」；「餘十色界及法界攝不相應法，名無所緣，義准成故」。七心界加法界之一分（心所法）有所緣，十色界加法界另一分（不相應行等）無所緣。

判準只有一條：能不能取境。能取者有所緣，不能取者無所緣。色不取任何東西，色只是被取，所以色無所緣；眼根雖有境界（有其功能所及之範圍），卻不執取，所以眼根亦無所緣——這一點在有對門已先立過，此處是它的正面落實。

要排的誤會是：『無所緣』不等於『不被緣』。色是眼識的所緣，卻自己不緣任何法；被緣與能緣是兩回事。論在此只用「義准成故」四字帶過，正因為前門的四句表已把界限畫清了。

落地：這一門與上一門合看，可得一條讀心之法——凡談心，先問它取的是什麼；凡談色，先問它被誰取。問錯方向，整段就讀岔了。

有執受無執受：什麼叫『覺得痛』

第九問是同一頌的後半：幾有執受、幾無執受？論答：七心界與法界全、加上聲界，共九界無執受；其餘九界（五根與色香味觸）「各通二門」。

分界的關鍵在時與位。「眼等五根住現在世名有執受，過去未來名無執受」；色香味觸則須現在世且不離五根者才有執受。論舉了一串極生活的例子：身內「除與根合，髮毛爪齒大小便利洟唾血等」，以及身外地水等中的色香味觸，「雖在現世而無執受」——頭髮指甲雖長在身上，卻不覺痛癢。

那『執受』究竟是什麼？論的界說在此：「心心所法共所執持攝為依處名有執受，損益展轉更相隨故」——被心心所執持而作依處，且與心互相損益者，才叫有執受。論隨即以世間語印證：「即諸世間說有覺觸，眾緣所觸覺樂等故。」能覺苦樂，就是有執受的實測。

古德在此通了一個要緊的妨難。若說五根須與識合方名有執受，那識不依它的時候呢？光記答：「現在五根，識不依時亦名執受，執受類故。……去、來五根無容發識，名無執受」——現在的五根縱使當下無識依，仍屬執受之類；過去未來的五根根本無從發識，才真是無執受。寶疏則引《正理》開執受為二義：一為有愛與身見執為己有，二為能作因而生苦樂。

落地：這一門把『我的身體』這件事說得極準——身體之為我的，不在它長在我身上，在它與心互相損益。剪下的指甲一離身即無執受，這是人人可驗的事。

大種與所造：覺天之說何以不立

第十問：幾是大種性、幾是所造性？頌答「觸界中有二，餘九色所造」。論釋：「觸界通二，謂大種及所造」——「大種有四，謂堅性等。所造有七，謂滑性等，依大種生故名所造」；其餘九色界（五根與色聲香味四境）唯是所造；法界一分之無表色亦唯所造。

此門的重頭在一場駁論。尊者覺天另立一宗：「十種色處唯大種性」——五根五境全是大種。論的破在四層：其一，「契經唯說堅等四相為大種故」；其二，四大種唯觸所攝，「非堅濕等眼等所取，非色聲等身根所覺」——眼睛看不到堅濕暖動，身根覺不到色聲，二路不通；其三，正面引經，經中逐處說「眼謂內處四大種所造淨色」乃至香味二處皆爾，而唯有觸處說「觸謂外處，是四大種及四大種所造」——經文自己把觸處與其餘色處分開了；其四，通妨：經中又說眼肉團中有堅性堅類，豈非眼即大種？論答「彼說不離眼根肉團有堅性等，無相違過」——肉團中的堅性是與眼根俱在的觸，不是眼根本身。

論又順手處理了《入胎經》唯說六界為士夫的問難：那是「為顯能成士夫本事」，並非說士夫只有這六件——同經下文還說六觸處呢。

排誤：所造之『造』不是製造，是依大種而有。所造之七觸——本品前半已列其目，謂「滑性、澁性、重性、輕性及冷、飢、渴」——依四大而立；眼耳鼻舌身之淨色亦依四大而立。四大是所依，不是工匠。

落地：這一門示範了論主怎麼破一個宗——不從義理喜好上破，從經文的分佈上破。經在何處說了什麼、在何處偏偏不說，本身就是證據。

可積集非積集：極微聚成者十

第十一問極簡，卻是後面極微一段的伏筆。論答：「五根、五境十有色界是可積集，極微聚故」，「義准餘八非可積集，非極微故」。

判準只有一條：是不是極微聚成的。十色界由極微聚成，故可積集；七心界與法界（無表色除外）非極微所成，故不可積集。心不是一顆一顆堆起來的。

要排的誤會是把『積集』讀成『很多』。心所法也可以很多，但多不等於積集——積集特指極微之聚，是一個關於體量的判準，不是關於數目的判準。

落地：這一條一立，後面『極微相觸嗎』『一極微能不能發識』兩場辯論才有立足處；同時也預先斷了一條路——凡不可積集者，談它的相觸與方分都不成問題。

能斫所斫與能燒所稱：一把斧頭問出來的界限

第十二問忽然變得非常具體：十八界中幾能斫、幾所斫？幾能燒、幾所燒？幾能稱、幾所稱？

論答只在外四界（色香味觸）：「色香味觸成斧薪等，此即名為能斫所斫。」何謂斫？論給了一個極精細的定義：「薪等色聚相逼續生，斧等分隔令各續起，此法名斫」——斫不是把一個東西弄斷，是使原本相逼而續生的色聚，分開來各自續起。

身等色根為何不算所斫？兩個理由：「非可全斷令成二故」——根不能一斷為二，「支分離身則無根故」，肢體一離身，根就不在那裡了；再者根「以淨妙故如珠寶光」，斧刃切不到光。同理根亦非能斫。聲界則「總非，不相續故」——聲音不相續，既不能斫也不受斫。

所燒與能稱同此——亦唯外四界。但論在末尾誠實地留了一個未決處：「能燒所稱有異諍論」。一說能燒所稱亦如前，唯外四界；另一說則「唯有火界可名能燒，所稱唯重」——只有火界能燒，能稱的只有重觸。論不判，兩說並錄。

排誤：這一門看似談物理，實則談界限。它問的是：日常語裡那些及物動詞——砍、燒、稱——落到十八界上時，主詞與受詞各是誰？答案是：都只落在外四界，落不到根上，也落不到心上。

落地：往後凡遇『誰在做這件事』之問，此門已給了範式——先問這個動作能落在哪幾界上。這正是下文「眼見識見」大諍所用的同一把尺。

五類分別：異熟生·所長養·等流·有實·一剎那

第十三問一口氣問五類：幾異熟生、幾所長養、幾等流性、幾有實事、幾一剎那？

異熟生——論給了四種訓釋，一層比一層深。其一：「異熟因所生名異熟生，如牛所駕車名曰牛車，略去中言故作是說」，牛車不是牛做的車，是牛駕的車，中間省了字。其二：「或所造業至得果時變而能熟，故名異熟。」其三：果與因別類而是所熟。其四：於因上假立果名，如經說今之六觸處即是昔所造業。四訓並存，論不擇一。

所長養——「飲食資助眠睡等持勝緣所益，名所長養」。有人主張梵行亦能長養，論給了一句極省的評語：「有說：梵行亦能長養。此唯無損，非別有益。」隨後是全門最動人的一喻：「長養相續常能護持異熟相續，猶如外郭防援內城」——異熟是內城，長養是外郭；飲食睡眠與定，不生出新的果報身，只是替它守住城牆。

聲是本門最好看的一案。論斷「聲有等流及所長養無異熟生」，因為「隨欲轉故」——想發就發，異熟不由現欲。難者立刻引《施設論》：善修遠離麁惡語故，「感得大士梵音聲相」——梵音豈非業感之果？諸師曲為之解：有說聲屬第三傳（業生大種，大種擊發聲），有說屬第五傳（業生異熟大種，傳生長養大種，傳生等流大種，此乃生聲）。論一句反例便見其窮：「若爾，身受從業所生大種生故，應非異熟。若受如聲，便違正理。」——按你這算法，身受也該不是異熟了。

八無礙（七心界與法界）通等流與異熟生：「同類遍行因所生者是等流性」，異熟因所引者名異熟生；「諸無礙法無積集故非所長養」——不是極微聚，自然談不上長養。其餘色香味觸四界三類俱通。有實唯法界：「實謂無為，以堅實故」。一剎那唯後三：「謂初無漏苦法忍品，非等流故名一剎那」——見道初念前無同類，孤起一剎那。

古德在此把五類的排他性點破。頌疏說：「五類明義，體各不同，互不相攝」，並開四種長養（飲食、資助、睡眠、等持），又出一條要緊的簡別——「能長養通三性，所長養唯無記」。光記則於每類下作『泛明有二』之簡（長養有體增與用勝之二、等流有二、剎那有二、實有二），把每個名相再切一刀。寶疏另引《正理》替聲界作答：「何緣聲界非異熟生？數數間斷復還生故」——時斷時續者，不是異熟之相。

落地：五類不是五個可以隨手貼的標籤，是一套互不相攝的譜系。眼等五根唯熟養二類攝盡，便不再立等流；聲唯等流長養，便不許異熟。讀者每見一法，可試自問：它從哪一類因來？

得與成就：眼與眼識，何時各自到手

第十四問轉了一個彎，不再問法的體性，改問行者身上這些界什麼時候到手。頌答只十個字：「眼與眼識界，獨俱得非等。」

獨得有兩路。得眼界而不得眼識：「謂生欲界漸得眼根，及無色沒生二三四靜慮地時」——生欲界而諸根漸具，眼根先得而眼識未起；又從無色歿生二三四靜慮地，彼地無自地眼識，故得眼界而眼識未得。得眼識而不得眼界：生二三四靜慮而眼識現起（須借初定眼識），及從彼歿生下地時。俱得：從無色歿生欲界或梵世，二界同時到手。俱非：「非者俱非，謂除前相。」

頌末一個「等」字，論說是為攝更多未說之義——於是又展一張四句表：成就眼界而不成就眼識者，生二三四靜慮而眼識不起；成就眼識而不成就眼界者，「謂生欲界未得眼根及得已失」——眼睛壞了的人仍成就眼識；俱成就者，生欲界得眼不失、生梵世、及生二三四靜慮正見色時；俱不成就者除前相。

排誤：『得』與『成就』不是同一件事。得是到手的那一剎那，成就是持續繫屬於身。所以會有得而復失、失而未斷之種種差別；四句表所排的正是這些交錯。

落地：這一門把前面十三門所立的名相，一次放回具體的一個人、一個生處、一個時點上。讀阿毘達磨若只讀到體性而不讀到得捨，便只得半部。

內外：無我之中，何以仍說內外

第十五問：幾內、幾外？論答：「六根、六識十二名內，外謂所餘色等六境。」

但論隨即自問一句最要命的：內外是相對於誰說的？「我依名內，外謂此餘。我體既無，內外何有？」——內外之名依我而立，我既無體，內外豈不落空？

論的答法極漂亮：「我執依止故，假說心為我。」我執所依止的是心，故就心假說為我。並引契經二偈為證：

「由善調伏我，智者得生天。」

「應善調伏心，心調能引樂。」

同一件事，經一處說調伏我、一處說調伏心——可見經中所謂我，就是心的假名。於是內外之名有了立處：「眼等為此所依親近，故說名內。色等為此所緣踈遠，故說名外。」內是所依而親，外是所緣而疏。

還有一難：六識既通三世，未至意位時不作心之所依，豈不該判為外？論答：「至意位時不失六識界，未至意位亦非越意相」——未落入意位的六識並沒有越出意的相；若不許此，則意界只在過去、六識只在現在未來，「便違自宗許十八界皆通三世」。

落地：這一段是全卷少見的正面涉及無我之處，其手法值得記住——不是先否定我，再收回一個小我來用；是明說我體本無，內外只是依我執所依的心而假立的方位名。名字仍照常用，用時知其為假。

同分彼同分：作自業與不作自業，並一句『法界恒同分』

第十六問，門名生僻而義極要：幾是同分、幾是彼同分？

先立通則：「若作自業名為同分，不作自業名彼同分。」眼於有見色已見、正見、當見者，是同分眼；不作此業者，是彼同分眼。乃至意界各於自境應說自用。同分不是相同的部分，是『在做本行』；彼同分則是『沒在做本行、而與做本行者同類』——論末自釋此名：「由非同分與彼同分種類分同，名彼同分。」論並釋『分』字有三讀：「根境識三更相交涉故名為分」，或分即已作用，或分即所生觸。

彼同分眼有幾種？此處有一條二部異說，論並錄不判：迦濕彌羅國毘婆沙師說四種——不見色而已滅、正滅、當滅及不生法；「西方諸師說有五種：謂不生法復開為二，一有識屬、二無識屬」。

本門最深的一句在開頭：「法同分者，謂一法界唯是同分」——法界永遠在做本行。理由是：「無一法界不於其中已正當生無邊意識，由諸聖者決定生心，觀一切法皆為無我。」聖者必起遍緣一切法的無我觀，此心「彼除自體及俱有法，餘一切法皆為所緣」，而所除的那一分，第二念心又緣之；「此二念心緣一切境無不周遍，是故法界恒名同分」。一切法之中，沒有一法永遠不被心觀照。

論還細辨了一處不對稱：眼與色的同分不能同樣算。「眼不共故，依一相續建立同分及彼同分。色是共故，依多相續建立同分及彼同分」——一色可為多人所見（如共觀月、觀舞、觀相撲），一眼卻不能為二人所用。香味觸三雖亦不共，但論說「雖有是理而容有共」，因為香等於此人彼人皆有可生鼻等識之義，故仍如色說。

古德於此補得最實用。寶疏引《正理》釋法界何以恒同分：「且如法界與彼意識為定所緣，是不共故」，並判五境是共而非定所緣。頌疏出「定」之二義，並釋彼同分眼之四種。光記則辨一組容易混的口徑——根與識是就『能取境』說同分，外境是就『被取為境』說同分，二者方向相反，不可混為一談。

落地：這一門把『在用』與『沒在用』立成一對範疇，貫穿全論。而『法界恒同分』一句，是全卷最安靜也最深的一處——它說的是：無一法逃得過被觀照。

見修非所斷：什麼定非見所斷

第十七問：幾見所斷、幾修所斷、幾非所斷？頌答「十五唯修斷，後三界通三」。論釋：十色界與五識界唯修所斷；意、法、意識三界各通三種——「八十八隨眠及彼俱有法并隨行得，皆見所斷」，「諸餘有漏皆修所斷，一切無漏皆非所斷」。

隨後是一場要緊的辨。難者說：異生性與招惡趣的身語業等「此與聖道極相違故」，豈非亦是見所斷？論答不然，並給出一條總判——不染污法、非六生、色，定非見斷。三者是並列之三相，不是『非六生之色』一相：寶疏作「非見斷法略有三相」，頌疏作「略說非見斷，總有三種」，二家同判。

三個名詞逐一落實。異生性何以非見斷？「其異生性是不染污，無記性攝，已離欲者斷善根者猶成就故」——離欲者與斷善根者都還帶著它，可見它不是染污法；而且「此異生性若見所斷，苦法忍位應是異生」——若異生性屬見所斷，則見道第一念（苦法忍位）猶未斷之，行者豈不仍是異生？何謂『六生』？「六謂意處，異此而生名非六生」，即從眼等五根生者，論逕指為「即五識等」。『色』則指一切身語業等。這三類為何定非見斷？「非迷諦理親發起故」——不是迷於諦理而親自發起的，就不由見道所斷。

古德在此把名相拆得更細。頌疏開列八十八隨眠之數（苦諦十、集滅各七、道諦八，上二界各除瞋為二十八），並出一個依主釋替『見所斷』正名：「見謂見諦，見是能斷，惑是所斷，見之所斷，名見所斷」——見是能斷者，惑是所斷者，三字之中主客分明。光記於此「略開三章顯非見斷」，並說明論文何以偏舉。寶疏則另判自性斷與所緣斷之別。

落地：這一門給修行下了一條硬界線——理上的迷由見道一斷而永斷，事上的習氣要靠修道長養對治。把後者誤認為前者，是修行人最常見的誤估。

是見非見：「眼見」還是「識見」——一場千年之諍

第十八問問到了全卷的重心：幾是見、幾非見？

論先立『見』的定義。「眼全是見，法界一分八種是見，餘皆非見。」八種是哪八種？「謂身見等五染污見、世間正見、有學正見、無學正見」——五種染污見加三種正見。論並以一喻分其明昧：「譬如夜分晝分有雲無雲，覩眾色像明昧有異」，世間見有染無染、學無學見觀察法相明昧不同，如同晝夜陰晴之下看同一批色像。

那為什麼世間正見唯在意識？因為「五識俱生慧不能決度」——決度是見的體性。論給的定義句只有八個字：「審慮為先決度名見。」先審慮而後決斷，才叫見；「五識俱慧無如是能，以無分別是故非見」。

可是難處立刻來了：眼根也不能決度，何以又叫見？論答：「以能明利觀照諸色故亦名見」——見有兩路：一路是推度之見，一路是觀照之見。光記把這兩路標得極清楚：「一者觀照名見，所謂眼根。……不舒光至境，不同燈日；亦非影現，不同水鏡……二者推度名見」——眼根之見既不是放光出去照，也不是把境映進來，這兩個現成的比喻都不能用。

界說既立，真正的大諍爆發了：到底是眼在見，還是識在見？

以下往復諸句各屬哪一家，係依光記、寶疏之科文而分。眼見家先立：眼是見。識見家隨即反難：「若眼見者，餘識行時亦應名見」——別的識現行時眼也在，何以那時不叫見？眼見家答：「非一切眼皆能現見。」識見家再徵：「誰能現見？」眼見家釋曰：「謂同分眼與識合位能見非餘」——唯正與眼識俱起的那一分眼能見。識見家順勢逼進：既須與識合方見，「則應彼能依識見色非眼」。眼見家總非之：「不爾，眼識定非能見。」識見家徵：「所以者何？」——答語裡出現了全論最著名的兩個字：「傳說，不能觀障色故，現見壁等所障諸色則不能觀。」論主轉錄有部這條理由時，前面加了『傳說』。

底下往復十數回合，句句見血。眼見家就勢反徵識見家：「若識見者，識無對故，壁等不礙應見障色」——識沒有質礙，牆擋不住它，那該看得見牆後之色才對〔光記於此標「復反徵識見家」，寶疏標「反難識見家」——這一句是眼見家在逼問對方，不是識見家自陳其宗〕。識見家答：「於被障色眼識不生，識既不生如何當見？」——被障之色上眼識根本不生，識既不生，哪來的見？眼見家於是總徵：「眼識於彼何故不生？」並先自陳本宗說得通：「許眼見者眼有對故，於彼障色無見功能。識與所依一境轉故，可言於彼眼識不生」——眼有質礙，識又隨所依同緣一境，所以那裡眼識不生；隨即反擲一問：「許識見者何緣不起？」你們主張識見的，倒說說看它為什麼不生。識見家又難：「眼豈如身根境合方取而言有對故不見彼耶？」——眼又不像身根那樣要碰到才取，你憑什麼拿有對說事？並引事為證：「又頗胝迦、瑠璃、雲母、水等所障云何得見？」——隔著水晶、琉璃、雲母、水，明明看得見；末後總結：「是故不由眼有對故，於彼障色無見功能。」輪到眼見家却問：「若爾，所執眼識云何？」——那你們那個眼識，又該怎麼交代？識見家這才把界限劃在光上：「若於是處光明無隔，於彼障色眼識亦生。若於是處光明有隔，於彼障色眼識不生。識既不生，故不能見。」

識見家又搬出經文：「然經說眼能見色者，是見所依，故說能見。」經中也說意能識法，然而意是過去的，能識者實是意識；意只是識之所依，故說能識。同一個修辭用在眼上：眼是見之所依，故說眼能見。識見家並舉世俗語為例：「或就所依說能依業，如世間說床座言聲」；又引經「梵志當知，以眼為門唯為見色」——眼是門，門豈是見？（此下引例引經數句，光記、寶疏皆判屬識見家通經。）

再下來是一組互相為難。眼見家難：「若識能見誰復了別？見與了別二用何異？」——你既說識能見，那還有誰去了別？見與了別二用又有何分別？識見家釋：以即見色名了色，如少分慧既名能見亦能簡擇，少分識亦如是。此下另起一節：「有餘難言：若眼能見，眼是見者，誰是見用？」——此一「有餘」是誰，光記存疑兩解（或是別執異師、或是識見家之異師），寶疏引泰法師逕定為犢子部之難。眼見家答：「此言非難，如共許識是能了別，然無了者」——大家都許識能了別而沒有一個『了者』，見也一樣。再下「有餘復言：眼識能見，是見所依故，眼亦名能見。如鳴所依故，亦說鍾能鳴」——此節光記判為識見家異師復通前經，寶疏引泰法師定為曇摩多羅部。眼見家於是再難：若如此，眼根既是識之所依，豈不也該叫能識？彼家答「無如是失」，並引《毘婆沙》自證：「若眼所得、眼識所受說名所見」，故但說眼能見，不說眼能識；「唯識現前說能識色，譬如說日名能作晝」。寶疏於此標得分明：「此是曇摩多羅部引有部《婆沙》通難」——引婆沙者是諍中一造為自宗取證，不是論主為兩家斷案。

到這裡，經部師出手了，而且是一句橫掃兩造的話：「如何共聚楂掣虛空眼色等緣生於眼識？」——你們湊在一起抓撮虛空。眼、色等緣生起眼識，這裡面哪有什麼能見所見？「唯法因果實無作用，為順世情假興言說，眼名能見、識名能了，智者於中不應封著。」並引世尊之語為據：「方域言詞不應堅執，世俗名想不應固求。」論主隨後補記一句：「然迦濕彌羅國毘婆沙宗，說眼能見、耳能聞、鼻能嗅、舌能嘗、身能覺、意能了。」

古德替這一段留下了完整的譜。四家之計，光記記得最全：「尊者世友眼見，尊者法救眼識見，尊者妙音眼識相應慧見，譬喻者眼識同時心、心所法和合見」；寶疏增出第五家「又說犢子部心、心所和合見」，並標明「尊者世友眼見，此是有部正義」。既有四家，論文為何只破識見一家？光記並存四解（意樂所在、兼破慧見、和合分同經部、從強破識而三家俱破），並引《雜心》一頌為據：「同分眼見色，非彼眼識見，非慧非和合，不見障色故」；寶疏則逕依《雜心》一解定之——「破一，例亦破餘」。至於論中往復諸問各屬哪一家，光記逐句判屬，寶疏亦同其科，並指出「論『傳說不能觀障色故』，此立因也」——那不是論主自己的斷語，是眼見家在立因。

這一門不判勝負。二造各說什麼、依何理而說，上面已具；誰勝誰負，論不判，此處亦不判。讀者只需看清諍點所在：爭的不是眼睛有沒有用，是『見』這個動作該掛在誰名下——而經部師的回答是：它誰也掛不上，因為根本沒有一個作用者。

二眼俱見：識住無方

「見」諍既了，論放任傍論展開。第一問極可愛：見色之時，是一眼見還是二眼見？論說「此無定准」，然後給出諸大論師的意見：「阿毘達磨諸大論師咸言：或時二眼俱見，以開二眼見色分明，開一眼時不分明故。」還有一個人人可做的實驗：「又開一眼觸一眼時，便於現前見二月等，閉一觸一此事則無」——開一眼而以指壓另一眼，眼前便見二月；閉起來再壓就沒有這回事。

隨即是一句要緊的通妨：所依既有二處，識豈不成了兩半？論答：「非所依別識成二分，住無方故不同礙色。」——識不佔方位，不像有質礙的色那樣可以被切開。所依儘管有二，識仍是一。

排誤：這一段不是生理學。它要立的是識與色在存在方式上的根本差別——色有方分故可分割，識無方分故不可分割。前面「可積集」一門所立的判準，到這裡開花結果。

落地：往後凡遇『一個心能不能同時緣兩處』之類的問題，此句即是答案的根：先問它有沒有方分。

至境不至境，與極微相觸嗎

第二個傍論：根取境時，是取到了才取，還是不到而取？頌答「眼耳意根境，不至三相違」——眼、耳、意取不至之境，鼻、舌、身取至境。

論的理由都在經驗上：「眼耳意根取非至境」，眼能見遠處諸色而「眼中藥等則不能觀」——藥膏抹在眼上反而看不見；耳能聞遠處聲而「逼耳根者則不能聞」。若眼耳唯取至境，「則修定者應不修生天眼、耳根」——修得的天眼天耳正是遠見遠聞。難者問：既能見不至之色，何不普見一切遠處與被障之色？論以磁石為答：「如何磁石吸不至鐵，非吸一切不至鐵耶？」——磁石吸不接觸的鐵，卻不吸一切不接觸的鐵。至於意，「意無色故，非能有至」，根本談不上到不到。另有一執：耳通取至與不至，因為自己耳中的聲也聽得見。鼻舌身三則唯取至境，論並給了一個乾淨的驗證：「由斷息時不嗅香故」——閉氣就聞不到香。何謂至？「云何名至？謂無間生。」

一個「至」字，把論帶進了本卷最像自然哲學的一段：極微到底相不相觸？

迦濕彌羅國毘婆沙師說不相觸，理由是兩難：「若諸極微遍體相觸，即有實物體相雜過。若觸一分，成有分失，然諸極微更無細分」——全體相觸則兩微相雜成一，只觸一分則極微有了部分，而極微依定義無分。那不相觸，為何相擊能發聲？論答：「若爾，何故相擊發聲？但由極微無間生故」——只是逼近到無間，並非真觸；若真相觸，「若許相觸，擊石拊手體應相糅」，擊石拍手時兩者就該混成一團了。又問：不相觸，聚色相擊何以不散？答：「風界攝持故令不散」——風界有能壞散者如劫壞時，有能成攝者如劫成時。

諸說並出。「尊者世友說：諸極微相觸即應住至後念」；而大德法救另出一說：「然大德說：一切極微實不相觸，但由無間假立觸名。」論對此下了一句罕見的評語：「此大德意應可愛樂。」並替它補理由：若非如此，「若異此者，是諸極微應有間隙。中間既空，誰障其行許為有對？」——中間若真是空的，什麼東西擋住了它，還說它有對？末了論再收一句總判：「又許極微若有方分，觸與不觸皆應有分。若無方分，設許相觸亦無斯過。」

神泰疏替這一句補了一段身世：「敘大德達摩多羅，此云法救。為敬其德，不稱其名。彼說一切極微實不相觸，但由中間無空隙間，假立觸名」——論文只稱『大德』而不出名，是敬其德。

落地：這一段的價值不在結論，在方法。『觸』這個日常語一旦下推到極微，就自我瓦解——不是極微藏著什麼奧秘，是這個詞本來只在粗色的尺度上有意義。這與經部師在見諍中所說『唯法因果，實無作用』，是同一路的看法用在兩個地方。

等量境與諸根極微之安布

第三個傍論：諸根取境，是唯取與自己等量的，還是大小不定？頌答「應知鼻等三，唯取等量境」。論釋：鼻舌身三唯取等量，「如根微量，境微亦然，相稱合生鼻等識故」——根微與境微相稱，才合生識。眼耳則不定：「謂眼於色有時取小如見毛端，有時取大如暫開目見大山等，有時取等如見蒲桃」——看毛端是取小，一睜眼見大山是取大，看一顆蒲桃恰是取等；耳聽蚊聲雷聲亦隨其小大。意則「意無質礙，不可辯其形量差別」。

論隨即描摹五根極微的安布，全是形象語：眼根極微「在眼星上傍布而住，如香荾花清澈映覆令無分散」——另有一說作重累如丸而住；耳根極微「居耳穴內旋環而住，如卷樺皮」；鼻根極微「居鼻頞內背上面下，如雙爪甲」；舌根極微「布在舌上，形如半月」；身根極微「遍住身分，如身形量」。女男二根之極微，論亦各出其形。

其後兩句最有分量。其一：「身根極微定無一切皆是同分，乃至極熱捺落迦中猛焰纏身，猶有無量身根極微是彼同分」——縱在猛焰纏身的地獄裡，仍有無量身根極微不在作用。其二：「傳說：身根設遍發識身應散壞」，因為「五識決定積集多微，方成所依所緣性故」——沒有單一極微能作所依所緣，識必依多微之聚而起。論並由此推得一句：「即由此理亦說極微名無見體，不可見故。」

排誤：這一段不是解剖學。花、樺皮、爪甲、半月，都是取其安布之勢，不是說根長成那個樣子。讀者若把它當成器官描述，這一段就白讀了。

落地：與前門合看，可得一句總持——根與境要相稱才生識；相稱二字，往後說緣、說障、說增上，都用得著。

識依之世：五識之依或俱，意識之依唯過去

第四個傍論：五識唯緣現在、意識通緣三世，那所依也是這樣嗎？頌答「後依唯過去，五識依或俱」。

論釋：「意識唯依無間滅意」——意識的所依，是剛剛滅去的那一念，故唯過去。五識則「所依或俱」，而且論特別點明頌中『或』字的作用：「或言表此亦依過去」——五識既依俱生之根（眼是眼識俱生所依，乃至身是身識俱生所依，同在現世），也依那個無間滅的意。所以「此五識身所依各二」：五根是各別所依，「意根為五通所依性」。

論隨後排了一張四句表，辨『所依』與『等無間緣』之異：「第一句，謂俱生眼根」——是所依而非等無間緣；「第二句，謂無間滅心所法界」——是等無間緣而非所依；「第三句，謂過去意根」——二者俱是；第四句除前所說。意識則「應作順前句答」：凡是意識所依定是其等無間緣，而是其等無間緣者未必是所依（如無間滅之心所法界）。

排誤：『所依』與『等無間緣』不是同一件事。前者是識賴以生起的憑託，後者是為後念讓位的前念。俱生眼根是憑託而不讓位，無間滅的心所是讓位而非憑託——四句表所排的正是這個交叉。

落地：意識的所依永在過去，這一句看似技術，實則要緊——當下這一念心，所憑託的是已經滅去的那一念。心之相續，不靠一個常住的依託，靠的是前念交棒。

依名唯在根：識隨根轉，不隨境轉

第五個傍論問得很尖：識起時同時依託根與境二緣，為什麼『所依』之名只給根，不給境？

頌答「隨根變識異，故眼等名依」。論釋：「由眼等根有轉變故。諸識轉異，隨根增損識明昧故」——根明利則識明，根損則識昧；而「非色等變令識有異，以識隨根不隨境故」。結論一句：「依名唯在眼等非餘。」

這條理由是可驗的。同一朵花，眼力好的人看得清、眼翳者看得糊；換一朵花來看，識的明昧並不隨之改變。識的清濁繫於根，不繫於境——這就是『依』名唯在根的實據。

排誤：說識不隨境變，不是說境對識毫無影響。境變則所緣之相變（看見的是花還是石），但識之明昧不因境變。所緣之相與識之明昧，是兩件事。

落地：這一條在修行上極有用——所對之境好壞是一回事，能緣之根明昧是另一回事。境不可全擇，根卻可養。

隨根說識：所依殊勝與不共

第六個傍論接著問：色等才是所識的對象，為什麼識叫「眼識」乃至「意識」，不叫「色識」乃至「法識」？

頌答「彼及不共因，故隨根說識」——兩個理由。其一即前門所立：「彼謂前說眼等名依，根是依故隨根說識。」其二是不共：「謂眼唯自眼識所依，色亦通為他身眼識及通自他意識所取」——眼只作自己這一路眼識的所依，色卻可以被他人的眼識取、也可以被自他的意識取；乃至身與觸亦然。根是專屬的，境是公用的；名字要跟著專屬的走才分得清。

論並舉了兩個世俗語為例：「由所依勝及不共因故識得名。隨根非境，如名鼓聲及麥牙等」——鼓聲隨鼓立名不隨聲相立名，麥芽隨麥立名不隨芽相立名。

排誤：這不是命名習慣的偶然。若隨境立名，則你我同看一朵花時所起之識同名『花識』，二人之識便無從分別；隨根立名，則我的眼識與你的眼識各有其依，界限自明。

落地：這一門與上一門合成一組——上一門說識的品質繫於根，這一門說識的身分繫於根。二者合起來，就是十八界為什麼以根為首排列的理由。

四事之地：身、眼、色、識，誰上誰下

第七個傍論：一個人身在某地，以某地之眼見某地之色而起某地之識——這四事的地是同是異？

論先把可能的組合逐一列盡（生欲界以自地眼見自地色則四皆自地；以初靜慮眼見欲界色則身色屬欲界而眼識屬初定……乃至生二三四靜慮以自他地眼見自他地色），然後說「今當略辯此決定相」，以兩頌收之。

決定相是：「身眼色三皆通五地，謂在欲界四靜慮中，眼識唯在欲界初定。」其次是三條不等式——「此中眼根望身生地，或等或上終不居下」，眼不會低於身；色與識望眼則「色識望眼等下非上」，理由是「下眼不能見上色故、上識不依下地眼故」；色望於識則通等上下。耳界廣說如眼。「鼻舌身三總皆自地，於中別者，謂身與觸其地必同」——鼻舌身三唯自地，而身與所觸之地必同；識望觸身或自或下。至於意，「應知意界四事不定」，有時四皆同地，有時上下。

論在此處還說了一句寫作上的老實話：這些差別到定品當廣分別，此處不辨，因為「前後再述用少功多」。隨後便是那句收束全部傍論的話：「傍論已周，應辯正論。」

排誤：這一段不是繁瑣的排列遊戲。它要立的是一條原則——上地之法可以取下地之境，下地之法不能取上地之境。修定者以初禪之眼見欲界色，可；以欲界之眼見初禪色，不可。

落地：這一門把十八界從『有哪些』推到『在哪一層』。同一個眼識，其地位由身生何地、眼屬何地、色屬何地三事共決——修行的階位不是一個籠統的高低，是這樣一格一格算出來的。

傍論已周：品末三門——所識、常、根

傍論收束，論以一頌問三事作結：十八界中誰為幾識所識？幾常幾無常？幾根幾非根？

所識門：「十八界中色等五界，如其次第眼等五識各一所識，又總皆是意識所識。如是五界各六識中二識所識。」色為眼識所識，又為意識所識，故是二識所識；乃至觸亦然。「由此准知，餘十三界一切唯是意識所識，非五識身所緣境故」——除五境外，其餘十三界只有意識能緣。眼根自己看不見眼根，意識卻緣得到它。

常門極短而極重：「十八界中無有一界全是常者，唯法一分無為是常」，其餘義准無常。沒有任何一界整個是常的——連法界也只有其中無為的那一分是常。這句話把十八界這整套座標系放回了無常之下。

根門則替下一品開門：經中所說二十二根，在十八界中「內十二界法一分攝」。法之一分者，命根等十一與後三根之一分；內十二者，眼等五根如其名所攝，「意根通是七心界攝」，後三根之一分為意與意識所攝，而「女根、男根即是身界一分所攝」。「義准所餘，色等五界法界一分皆體非根。」論並記下一條體例上的差異：「阿毘達磨諸大論師，皆越經中六處次第，於命根後方說意根，有所緣故」——論師排二十二根的次第與經不同，把意根移到命根之後。

古德於此下了收卷之語。光記引《雜心》為證：「色界二識識，乃至觸亦然。諸餘十三界，一向意識緣」。寶疏標明門數之收：「下一頌有三門……加前二十二門」；頌疏則逕標此三為第二十、第二十一、第二十二門。

落地：全卷以三門收尾，看似隨手，實則是接榫。所識門把十八界接回認識；常門把它接回無常；根門把它接到下一品的二十二根。界品至此門戶兩開、內外通透。

承衍：三疏與泰疏之鏡

以上是本卷自身之義。此下另以古德之判、系內之辯、異譯之異三面鏡子旁照——鏡非論，是換幾種眼光看同一卷文字。並錄不判。

三疏之判與互異

大科與門數的算法，三家就不一致。光記標「此下大文第三諸門分別，總有二十二門分別十八界」；寶疏標「此下大文第二，有一十九行頌，義門分別十八界也」，而於品末說「下一頌有三門……加前二十二門」；頌疏標「從此第三，諸門分別，總有二十二門，分別十八界」，並於品末逕標第二十至第二十二。同一卷文字，標次與計法各成一家。

論主究竟朋向哪一邊，三疏的態度截然不同。光記直判：「上來雖復眼見、識見兩家異諍，看其文勢，論主意朋識見」，並替經部之義作釋：「諸法但有功能，實無作用。世尊為順世情，假說見耳。」寶疏則不下判語，只科其文為「論主此述有部宗也」。頌疏引經部之說收結，亦不出判語。又，光記於有見門下另有「論主意朋經部」之判——二門各判，並存備考。

「有餘難言」「有餘復言」兩節出自哪一家，亦無定說。寶疏引泰法師之說，作「太法師云犢子難」「曇摩多羅部通前經說眼能見色」；光記則存疑兩解；頌疏不涉此問。

論文何以只破識見一家，三疏亦異。光記四解並存，並引《雜心》一頌為據；寶疏依《雜心》一解定之，作「破一，例亦破餘」；頌疏逕標而不設此問。

四處互異，此處唯錄，不判孰是。

系內之辯：眾賢的逐句反破

眾賢《順正理論》於本卷所對之處極密，凡稱「經主」處多針對俱舍此卷，錄其要者。

其一，『傳說』二字的讀法。眾賢寫道：「復有餘師，以別道理成立眼識定非是見，謂不能觀被障色故。然經主意不忍彼因，故於頌中摽傳說語」——論主心裡不服這條理由，才在頌中標上『傳說』。同一處文字，光記另有其判，見上節。二家之讀並列於此，不作合會。

其二，破『境合方取』之徵難。論主曾問「眼豈如身根境合方取」，眾賢答：「經主於此復徵難言：眼豈如身根境合方取，而言有對故不見彼耶？此難不然，不了所說有對義故」；又責之曰：「此應責言：若根能取不合境者，則應能取一切不合。」

其三，破『是見所依』與床座之喻。眾賢：「又經主言：然經說眼能見色者，是見所依故說能見。何緣經主起此執耶？……此不成證，意與意識種類一故」；又詰其立言之由：「經主何因起斯定執？餘言餘解，不可無因。」

其四，極微與大德之觸論。論主贊法救之說為「應可愛樂」，眾賢連這一句讚語也不放過：「經主此中顯彼勝德作如是言，此大德意應可愛樂。……今說大德如是意趣，非即可樂亦非可惡，但應尋究如何無間仍不相觸？」又破方分之難：「有分、方分，名異義同。立無分言，已遮方分。」

其五，破尋伺門之因。論主以「行相麁外門轉」立五識恒與尋伺相應，眾賢不許：「此因非理，現見意識內門轉時亦常與彼共相應故。應作是釋：五識唯於尋伺所隨地中有故。」

其六，破『無第二尋』之為證。眾賢：「設有第二，許相應耶？有第二受而不相應。無第二言，非為定證。」

其七，破界繫門鼻舌之答。眾賢：「起說嚴身但須依處，根非有見，何所莊嚴？」

其八，一條引而不破者。眾賢引述論主「假說心為我」之釋並援餘經敷釋，未下破語，誌錄備考。

又，《顯宗論》於本卷相應之段唯飾存彼頌，無獨立反破。二造之文並列如上，勝負不判。

二譯之異：玄奘與真諦

真諦舊譯與玄奘新譯逐門相對，門名與譯語多有不同，亦有二本全同者（如八十八隨眠、等流、經部）。錄其承重者。

開門一問，玄奘作「幾有見、幾無見」，真諦作「幾有顯、幾無顯」——有見／有顯。有對之三種，玄奘作「障礙、境界、所緣」，真諦作「一障礙、二塵礙、三緣緣礙」；所引之論，玄奘作《施設論》而真諦作《假名論》，同論異名。界繫一門的訓釋二本全異：玄奘訓「繫謂繫屬，即被縛義」，真諦則訓「相應是有義、不相離義」——同一門而訓釋全異。尋伺，真諦作覺觀，其頌作「有覺亦有觀，定是五識界」。五類之名，真諦作果報生、增長生、有實物。同分門，真諦作等分、非等分，其訓為「由於塵自功能立名等分」——玄奘以作不作自業訓，真諦以塵之自功能訓。

最堪注意的是傳疑標記在頌中的安置。玄奘以「傳說」二字入頌；真諦本此頌作「由色非可見，被障彼執爾」，以「彼執」入頌——二本各有其標記法，而標記之位置皆在頌內。經部結語處亦有一異：真諦本作「經部說：何故共聚破空？……罽賓國毘婆沙師悉檀判如此」，末句標出宗判之語，玄奘本無對應之句。

其餘承重譯名之對照：有對／有礙、境界有對／塵礙、所緣有對／緣緣礙、不善／惡、有所緣／有緣緣、執受／執、內外／我依及我依外、見修非所斷／見諦滅及修道滅與非所滅、隨行得／至得、俱生慧／共生智、迦濕彌羅／罽賓、計度與隨念分別／顯示與憶念分別、所識／所知、常／常住、鳩摩邏多／鳩摩羅羅多。二本結構亦異：玄奘此段自成一卷而有收卷之句，真諦本無卷界，界品訖即接根品。

異讀取捨屬譯者，此處唯錄不判。

異讀：卷中二十九條校記

本卷所繫之校記共二十九條，無一條足以改動底本，異讀並錄備考。其中與義理相涉者數條可記：頌文「後三三餘無」之第二「三」字，宋、元、明、宮四本作「二」；「傳說不能觀，彼障諸色故」之「彼」字，四本作「被」，而長行「於彼障色無見功能」之「彼」，三本亦作「被」——眾賢引文正作『被障色』，二讀之別於此可見。經部師語「共聚楂掣虛空」之「楂」，明本作「摣」、宮本作「植」；「唯法因果實無作用」之「因」，元、明二本作「內」。二眼門「或時二眼俱見」之「二」，宋、元、明三本作「一」。眼根極微「如香荾花清澈映覆」，「澈」四本作「徹」、「映」四本作「膜」——作『膜』則與眼膜之解相涉，備考。其餘如「已說界繫」之「說」宮本作「設」、「義准成故」之「准」作「唯」、「如見蒲桃」之「桃」明本作「萄」、「如名鼓聲及麥牙等」之「牙」四本作「芽」等，多屬字形通用，不繫義理。

承接之座標

本卷所立數事，後世論書多有承用，其異同並錄不判。

其一，三分別。「一自性分別、二計度分別、三隨念分別」之三分立，為後出瑜伽唯識一系論書所承用，此處是它的毘曇原座標。

其二，見之定義。「審慮為先決度名見」——見既以審慮決度為體，此一界說在後出論書中轉為見分與慧心所之辨的起點。

其三，同分。本門所立之界類同分（作自業與不作自業），與後來眾同分入不相應行之義，其開合異同，俟根品五位全列時並勘。

其四，經部師那段話。「唯法因果實無作用」——見者了者皆是假名安立；『見』既只是因果相續上的假說，所見之境復當如何，正是後出一系論書接續追問之處，二者可相對讀。

最後回到那兩個字。論主把有部一條理由寫進頌時加了「傳說」，眾賢讀出「經主意不忍彼因」，光記讀出「論主意朋識見」，寶疏只科其文，頌疏引經部收尾。四種讀法並存，此處不判。讀者但記得一事：在阿毘達磨的世界裡，一個傳疑副詞放在什麼位置，足以引出一部針鋒相對的大論。

This Fascicle Does One Thing Only

The first half of the Chapter on the Elements set up the eighteen elements—eighteen names, eighteen places. The whole of the second half does one thing only: it takes one question after another and puts them to those eighteen elements from beginning to end. How many are visible, how many invisible? How many resistant, how many nonresistant? How many wholesome, how many unwholesome, how many indeterminate? And so on to the end of the chapter. Puguang marks here that “from here begins the third major division, distinction through the several gates: there are in all twenty-two gates distinguishing the eighteen elements,” and Yuanhui likewise writes, “from here comes the third division, distinction through the several gates: in all twenty-two gates distinguishing the eighteen elements”—the name later readers habitually use, the twenty-two gates, comes from these.

The text leaves its own markers. Whenever a gate has been asked through, it sets down a sentence, “such and such has now been stated,” and then raises the next question: “visible and invisible have now been stated,” “wholesome and the rest have now been stated,” “realm affiliation has now been stated,” “applied and sustained thought and the rest have now been stated,” “accumulable and the rest have now been stated,” “acquisition and possession and the rest have now been stated” . . . These short sentences are not ornament; they are the nails of the outline. A reader who simply follows the nails will find the skeleton of the fascicle plain.

Why are the questions put to the elements and not to the aggregates or sense fields? Puguang answers by citing the Correct Principle: “because the elements display faculty, object, and consciousness together, the classes of meaning under the several gates are easily understood, and so for now the distinctions are made with respect to the eighteen elements; and by this the classes of meaning of aggregate and sense field are already accomplished.” The eighteen elements are a coordinate system in which faculty, object, and consciousness are all three present; once matters are made clear within that system, the classes of meaning of aggregate and sense field follow along.

The gates asked, in the order of the text, are: visible and invisible; resistant and nonresistant; wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate; affiliation with the three realms; with and without outflows; applied and sustained thought; having and lacking discrimination; having and lacking an object of consciousness; appropriated and unappropriated; the great elements and derived form; accumulable and not accumulable; what cuts and what is cut, what burns and what is burned, what weighs and what is weighed; the five classes; acquisition and possession; inner and outer; participating and corresponding nonparticipant; abandoned through seeing, through cultivation, and not subject to abandonment; and what is seeing and what is not. From there the text turns to the incidental discussions—two eyes seeing together; objects reached and not reached, and whether ultimate atoms touch; objects of equal measure and the arrangement of the faculties’ ultimate atoms; the time of consciousness’s support; the name support falling on the faculty; consciousness named after the faculty; the levels of the four things. The incidental discussions complete, the fascicle closes with the three gates of what is cognized, permanent and impermanent, and faculty and non-faculty.

What follows takes the gates one at a time. The power of Abhidharma lies not in any one gate being especially brilliant, but in the same set of dharmas being placed on every dimension without vagueness—so one must read gate by gate to see this treatise’s constitution.

Visible and Invisible: Only One Element Can Be Pointed Out as Here

Ask first: among the eighteen elements, which is called visible? There is only one—the form element, that is, the object of form facing the eye. The treatise gives one sentence of reason only: “among the eighteen elements the form element is visible, since the distinction of being here or there can be pointed out in it.” What can be pointed at and said to be here or there, whose difference of place can be marked out, is color and shape alone. For the other seventeen elements no account need be given one by one; the treatise says, “extending the principle from this, the rest are invisible”—extend this one rule and it is done.

What is most easily misunderstood here is reading visible as able to be seen. If it meant that, sound can be heard by the ear and odor and taste by nose and tongue, so would they not all become visible? More awkward still is the eye faculty: the eye is what sees, and yet it is judged invisible—is that not upside down? The point is that seeing here is not taken as able to see but as able to be pointed out—what can be pointed out in its difference of place is what is called visible. The eye faculty cannot itself be pointed out as here or there, and so is invisible; so too sound, odor, taste, and the tangible.

As a matter of reading: this is the first lesson of the fascicle and the most important—a word’s definition here is to be taken from the gloss the treatise itself gives, not from ordinary usage. So it is with each of the remaining twenty-one gates.

Resistant and Nonresistant: Three Kinds of Obstruction, and a Table of Four Cases

The second question: how many are resistant? The treatise answers, “only the ten elements included in the aggregate of form are resistant”—five faculties and five objects, ten elements. What is resistant? “Resistance has the sense of obstruction.” But obstruction is of three kinds, and the treatise at once separates them: “and it is further of three kinds, since obstruction, object field, and object of consciousness differ.”

Resistance as obstruction is the plainest kind: “being obstructed where another thing occupies a place, so that it cannot arise there, as hand obstructs hand, or stone obstructs stone, or hand and stone obstruct one another.” Two things possessing resistance cannot occupy one place. Resistance of the object field refers to dharmas possessing an object field being bounded by their own object field—and here the treatise cites the Treatise of Designations with a whole string of examples about eyes: the eyes of fish are obstructed in water and not on land, the eyes of humans on land and not in water; the eyes of piśācas, of crocodiles, of fishermen and frogs are obstructed both in water and on land, and some are neither; and again some are obstructed at night and not by day, such as the eyes of bats and horned owls, some by day and not at night, such as the eyes of humans, and some both by day and at night, such as the eyes of dogs, jackals, horses, leopards, dholes, wolves, cats, and wildcats. Resistance of the object of consciousness refers to mind and mental factors being bounded by their own object of consciousness.

What is the difference between object field and object of consciousness? The treatise lays down two extremely clear definitions: “if this dharma has a capacity with respect to that dharma, that is said to be this dharma’s object field,” and “if mind and mental factors arise grasping that, then that, with respect to mind and the rest, is named their object of consciousness.” Object field is stated in terms of the range of capacity; object of consciousness in terms of what is grasped in arising—so the five faculties have an object field but no object of consciousness, while mind and mental factors have both.

Then why is proceeding upon one’s own object field on the contrary called being obstructed? The treatise answers: “because, once past that field, it cannot proceed anywhere else”—step outside that range and it cannot move, which is precisely a limitation. The treatise then gives a second reading: “or else obstruction has the sense of meeting and joining,” obstruction being coming together, the eye and the rest proceeding by meeting and joining with their own object field and object of consciousness. One word, two glosses, and the treatise chooses neither but preserves both.

The three kinds of resistance being set up, which does the stanza speak of? The treatise closes the matter itself: “it should be known that here the statement is made solely with respect to resistance as obstruction,” and so the stanza says only that the ten possessing form are resistant. This sentence is the pivot of the whole gate—without it the reader would inevitably suppose that twelve of the eighteen elements are resistant (the number for resistance of the object field), which contradicts the stanza.

At the end the treatise also sets out two tables: resistance of the object field and resistance as obstruction are worked into a fourfold distinction—the seven mind elements and the associated dharmas of one portion of the element of dharmas are the first case, the five objects beginning with form the second, the five faculties beginning with the eye the third, the non-associated dharmas of one portion of the element of dharmas the fourth; while resistance of the object field and resistance of the object of consciousness are given a following-consequent answer: whatever has resistance of the object of consciousness certainly has resistance of the object field, while the five faculties have resistance of the object field and not of the object of consciousness.

At the close of the gate, the treatise cites a stanza of the venerable Kumāralāta by way of conclusion:

Where mind would arise, but another thing obstructs it so that it cannot arise— 　know that this is what is resistant; the nonresistant is the contrary of this.

Mind was about to arise here and is blocked by another thing so that it cannot arise—this is the resistant. On this stanza the treatise sets down four characters only: “this is accepted.” This is the first appearance in the fascicle of another’s words that the author accepts as his own, and from here on the author’s posture of choosing and rejecting is already visible in outline.

Wholesome, Unwholesome, Indeterminate: Eight Elements Cannot Be Determined, Ten Extend to All Three

The third question: how many are wholesome, how many unwholesome, how many indeterminate? The treatise answers in two parts. Of the ten resistant, apart from form and sound the remaining eight elements are only indeterminate—“the five faculties of form and the objects of odor, taste, and the tangible cannot be determined as wholesome or unwholesome in nature, and so they are named indeterminate.” The remaining ten elements extend to all three, wholesome and the rest: the seven mind elements are named wholesome when associated with non-greed and the rest, unwholesome when associated with greed and the rest, and the remainder indeterminate; the element of dharmas is judged according to its association and co-origination; and “the form element and the sound element, when they are co-originated by the force of a wholesome or unwholesome mind and are included in bodily or vocal manifest action, are wholesome or unwholesome, and the remainder is indeterminate.”

Hidden here is one aside that is often read past. Someone offers another explanation: “some say: because they cannot determine a result of maturation, they are named indeterminate.” The treatise answers him at once: “if that were so, dharmas without outflows would all have to be indeterminate”—dharmas without outflows also bring on no maturation; are they then to become indeterminate too? One sentence exposes the definition as too wide. The strictness of its glossing may be seen here.

The ancient masters open out wholesome and unwholesome more finely at this point. Puguang opens wholesome into seven—innate, from hearing, from reflection, from cultivation, of one in training, of one beyond training, and ultimate; unwholesome is one alone; indeterminate opens into seven—one obscured and six unobscured (maturation, deportment, craft, supernormal result, intrinsic nature, ultimate); while the element of dharmas has four wholesome (intrinsic nature, association, co-origination, ultimate) and three unwholesome. Puguang also resolves a doubt for the reader: why is the ultimately unwholesome not spoken of here? His answer is that “the ultimately unwholesome extends in substance to all three ethical qualities. . . . If the ultimate is spoken of, there is then no distinction.” Fabao divides the passage the same way with fuller subdivision.

How form and sound can extend to good and bad is the most practical point of this gate. Yuanhui states it most bluntly: “because form and sound are not wholesome or unwholesome by their own nature, they are judged wholesome or unwholesome with reference to the mind that sets them in motion.” Color and sound have of themselves no good or bad; the good or bad is in the mind that sets them going—the same sentence, the same gesture, is wholesome when a wholesome mind issues it and unwholesome when an unwholesome mind does. This is the starting point for everything later said about bodily and vocal action.

Affiliation with the Three Realms: Why the Realm of Form Lacks Four Elements—A Long Debate about Nose and Tongue

The fourth question turns to the three realms. The stanza answers briskly: the realm of desire has all eighteen, the realm of form only fourteen, the formless realm only the last three. The treatise first glosses the name of the gate: “affiliation means belonging, that is, the sense of being bound”—affiliation is not a label of classification, it is being bound.

Which four elements does the realm of form lack? The two objects of odor and taste and the two consciousnesses of nose and tongue. The reason has two layers: “odor and taste are excluded because they have the nature of morsel food, and one must be free of the desire for morsel food to be born there”—odor and taste are of the substance of morsel food, and only one free of the desire for morsel food is born upward; “the nose and tongue consciousnesses are excluded because they have no object”—the object being absent, the consciousness does not arise.

From here the question rolls on. If odor and taste are excluded because they are of the nature of morsel food, the tangible is of that nature too—should it not also be excluded? The treatise answers: the tangibles that exist in that realm are not of the nature of morsel food. Then may not the non-morsel-food portion of odor and taste be left behind as well? The treatise answers: “odor and taste have no other use apart from eating,” whereas “the tangible has other uses, maintaining the faculties, serving as clothing, and the like”—the tangible must still maintain the faculties and carry clothing, and its use is not lost when eating is left behind. And some other masters offer a further explanation: when one dwells here and, in dependence on that realm’s meditative absorption and attainment, sees form and hears sound, “the excellent tangible that arises together with pliancy benefits the body,” and so form, sound, and the tangible follow along when one is born there, while odor and taste do not.

The real difficulty comes next: odor and taste being absent, why do the two faculties of nose and tongue remain? In the dozen or more rounds that follow, Puguang marks with great clarity who asks and who answers at every turn—the one raising the objections is the author, and the one defending the faculties is an earlier master of the Sarvāstivādins (Puguang: “the author objects to the earlier master,” “the earlier master explains,” “the author objects again,” “the earlier master defends again”). The author objects first: nose and tongue have no use there and should be excluded along with odor and taste. The earlier master explains: “the two faculties do have a use there, namely giving rise to speech and adorning the bodily form.” The author objects again: “if it is for adorning the body and giving rise to speech, the bases alone suffice; what need is there for the faculties?”—to look well and to speak, the shapes of nose and tongue (the bases) are enough; why the faculties? The earlier master defends again: that realm having no male faculty, the base of the male faculty is absent along with it; the bases remaining is precisely what shows the faculties have their use. The author objects once more: the base of the male faculty may be absent there because it is useless, but the bases of nose and tongue are useful there and should exist apart from the faculties—so the faculties are still not needed. The earlier master explains again, producing an instance: “there are also cases where the faculty arises although it has no use, as with one who is destined to die while in the womb”—one fated to die in the womb still has his faculties arise, which shows that having a faculty does not wait upon having a use; and moreover “arising without use is still not arising without a cause.” The author challenges further: granted it arises without use, there must still be a cause. The earlier master answers that the cause is craving: “from craving for the faculties, which sets an excellent action in motion.” The author objects again on principle: craving for the objects having been left behind, craving for the faculties should be left behind with it, and then that realm should have no nose or tongue at all; otherwise the male faculty too should arise. And if it be said that the male faculty does not arise because it is unseemly—the author retorts, “the private organ is concealed; where is the unseemliness?”—and further, “the arising of the faculties is not on account of their being useful: if the force of a cause is present, they arise even without use.” At last the earlier master brings out a sūtra (Puguang marks it, “the earlier master produces a contradiction with scripture”): the beings of that realm are “without deficiency of limb, with no diminution of the faculties”—does your denial of nose and tongue not contradict the sūtra? The author resolves it: the sūtra’s intent is that whatever faculties may properly be had at that level are said to be undiminished.

After a dozen rounds the author himself brings down the hammer, and the criterion is a single sentence: “because craving for the six faculties arises in dependence on the inner body and does not appear in dependence on objects”—craving for the six faculties arises in dependence on the inner body and not on objects; while craving for the male faculty arises in dependence on sexual touch, and sexual touch being absent there, the male faculty is not present. Whether a faculty is there is decided not by whether it has a use but by where the craving arises from.

The formless realm is simple: “one must be free of desire for form to be born there, and so in the formless realm the ten elements of form are absent”; and the ten elements of form being absent, “the supports and objects being absent, the five consciousnesses are absent too”—support and object both lacking, the five consciousnesses do not arise, and only the three elements of mind, dharmas, and mind consciousness remain.

The ancient masters supply two things here. Puguang cites the Miscellaneous Heart Treatise for the reason there is no morsel food in the realm of form, “there is no nature of morsel food there, because the body is subtle,” and records a divergent school’s account: “according to the Treatise on the Wheel of Tenets, for the Mahāsāṃghikas and others the realms of form and formlessness possess all six bodies of consciousness”—one meaning and two schools, recorded together without adjudication. Fabao glosses the name of the gate once more: “dharmas affiliated with the realm of desire are bound by the greed and the rest of the realm of desire, and so are named affiliated with the realm of desire.”

This gate is the best introduction to the Kośa’s style of objection and answer: a question and an answer are not for liveliness but to press a criterion to its limit. A reader who remembers only the conclusion, the realm of form has fourteen, has let the best thing in the fascicle slip away.

With and Without Outflows: Three Elements Extend to Both, Fifteen Are Only with Outflows

The fifth question is very short and yet not to be skipped. The stanza answers: “the three elements of mind, dharmas, and mind consciousness extend to both; the rest are only with outflows.” The treatise glosses: “of mind and mind consciousness, what is included in the truth of the path is named without outflows, and the rest with outflows”; within the element of dharmas, “what is the truth of the path and what is unconditioned is named without outflows, and the rest with outflows”; “the remaining fifteen elements are named only with outflows.”

First clear away one misunderstanding: without outflows is not a separate batch of dharmas, but that portion of the same dharmas which is included in the truth of the path and the unconditioned. The mind element and the mind consciousness element are not split into two mind elements; it is one and the same mind element extending to both, according to what includes it. The element of dharmas is plainer still—one portion of the element of dharmas is the unconditioned, which is not included in the truth of the path and yet is without outflows, so that the element of dharmas has two routes to being without outflows: the truth of the path and the unconditioned.

Then clear away a second misunderstanding: that the fifteen elements of five faculties, five objects, and five consciousnesses are only with outflows does not mean the eyes are of no further use in practice. What is said is that in the very nature of those fifteen elements there is no portion belonging to the truth of the path or to the unconditioned. A noble one still sees form with fleshly eyes, and that seeing is still with outflows; what makes him noble is the discernment without outflows associated with his mind consciousness.

One sentence for practice: among the eighteen elements, only three are gates that can carry emergence. Short as it is, this gate sets the register for the whole treatise’s account of practice and realization—practice is not exchanging one set of senses for another, but exchanging one kind of association along the single route of mind consciousness.

Applied and Sustained Thought: Why a Fourth Class Is Forced Out beyond the Three

The sixth question: how many have applied and sustained thought, how many have sustained thought only without applied thought, how many have neither? The stanza answers, “the five consciousnesses have only applied and sustained thought; the last three extend to the three; the rest have neither.” The treatise glosses: “the five consciousnesses beginning with the eye have applied and sustained thought, because they are always associated with applied and sustained thought,” the reason being “their mode is coarse and turns toward the outer gate, and this sense being fixed, the word only is said.” The last three elements (mind, dharmas, mind consciousness) all extend to the three classes; the remaining ten elements of form “have neither applied nor sustained thought, because they are never associated with applied and sustained thought.”

The three classes are divided by level: the realm of desire and the first meditative absorption have applied and sustained thought; the intermediate meditative absorption has sustained thought only without applied thought; from the second absorption upward to the summit of existence there is neither. Applied thought is coarse and sustained thought subtle, and the coarse falls away first while the subtle falls away later; this is the order of depth among the levels of absorption.

The finest stroke of this gate is how applied and sustained thought are themselves classified. Applied thought is not associated with a second applied thought—“because there is no second applied thought, and because it is associated only with sustained thought”—and so applied thought as a dharma is itself without applied thought and with sustained thought only. And sustained thought? Sustained thought must be considered by level. The sustained thought of the intermediate meditative absorption the treatise has already judged along with the non-associated dharmas—“the non-associated dharmas included in the element of dharmas, and the sustained thought of the intermediate meditative absorption, are likewise”; that level has no applied thought at all, and sustained thought is not associated with a second sustained thought, so it is without applied and without sustained thought. Fabao marks this most plainly, saying that the non-associated dharmas “and the sustained thought of the intermediate meditative absorption are both without applied and without sustained thought,” and giving the reason: “because the intermediate sustained thought has no second sustained thought, and because the dharmas of that stage have no applied thought.” The sustained thought of the realm of desire and the first meditative absorption alone is received by none of the three classes—“what should the sustained thought of the realm of desire and the first absorption be called, since the three classes do not receive it?”—and by the same line of reasoning, being unassociated with a second sustained thought and associated only with applied thought, it forces out a fourth class beyond the three: “this should be named without sustained thought and with applied thought only, since there is no second sustained thought and it is associated only with applied thought.” The treatise thereupon sets up “four classes of dharma in the stage that has applied and sustained thought”: first, with applied and sustained thought (the associated dharmas other than applied and sustained thought); second, without applied thought and with sustained thought only (applied thought itself); third, without applied and without sustained thought (all non-associated dharmas); fourth, without sustained thought and with applied thought only (sustained thought itself).

A taxonomy grants itself no discount either—this is the most admirable thing in Abhidharma. Most people would set up three classes and stop, since a fourth class is doctrinally unnecessary; the treatise would rather open one class more than let its own rule make an exception of itself. Reaching this point, the reader may turn back and inspect any classification of his own: can it accommodate itself?

The Three Kinds of Discrimination: Why the Five Consciousnesses Are Called Without Discrimination

The seventh question is asked on the reader’s behalf, and asked fiercely: if the five consciousnesses “have applied and sustained thought,” and applied and sustained thought are discrimination, how can the five consciousnesses still be said to be without discrimination?

Before answering, the treatise opens out the terms, and it opens them with a mark of reported doubt at the very start: “it is transmitted: discrimination is briefly of three kinds—first intrinsic discrimination, second conceptual discrimination, third recollective discrimination.” Intrinsic discrimination has applied thought as its very substance, the mind’s immediate taking hold of its object; conceptual discrimination is “the diffuse discernment associated with mind consciousness”; recollective discrimination is “the forms of mindfulness associated with mind consciousness, whether in absorption or diffuse”—the one is inferring and judging, the other is recalling, and both belong only to mind consciousness.

So the answer emerges: the five consciousnesses have intrinsic discrimination and lack the other two, and are therefore said to be without discrimination. The treatise gives an excellent simile: “the five bodies of consciousness, though they have the intrinsic kind and lack the other two, are said to be without discrimination, as a horse with one leg is named legless.” A one-legged horse is still called legless—not that it has no legs at all, but that what it has does not amount to having legs.

A large misunderstanding must be cleared away here: to say the five consciousnesses are without discrimination is not to say they are a blur. Eye consciousness takes hold of blue and yellow perfectly plainly, and that taking hold is intrinsic discrimination. What it lacks is turning back to infer and judge and recalling what went before. You see a patch of color: that is the five consciousnesses. To recognize this is the cup I bought yesterday is already the recollective and conceptual discrimination of mind consciousness.

For practice: the everyday remark I saw at a glance that he meant no good is, on this treatise’s register, at least three layers folded together—the five consciousnesses take the color, mind consciousness infers and judges, and recollection matches it against what has gone before. Taking these three layers apart is the basic skill for all later contemplative practice.

Having and Lacking an Object of Consciousness: Only What Can Grasp an Object Has One

The eighth question: how many have an object of consciousness and how many have none? The treatise answers: “the six consciousnesses, the mind element, and the mental factors included in the element of dharmas are named having an object of consciousness, because they can grasp an object”; “the remaining ten elements of form and the non-associated dharmas included in the element of dharmas are named having no object of consciousness, which is established by extending the principle.” The seven mind elements plus one portion of the element of dharmas (the mental factors) have an object of consciousness; the ten elements of form plus the other portion of the element of dharmas (the unassociated formations and the rest) have none.

There is one criterion only: whether it can grasp an object. What can grasp has an object of consciousness; what cannot, has none. Form grasps nothing at all, form is only grasped, and so form has no object of consciousness; the eye faculty has an object field (a range within which its capacity reaches), yet it does not grasp, and so the eye faculty has no object of consciousness either—a point already established under the gate of the resistant, of which this is the positive application.

The misunderstanding to be cleared away: having no object of consciousness is not the same as not being taken as an object. Form is the object of eye consciousness, yet it itself takes nothing as object; being taken as object and being able to take as object are two different things. Here the treatise passes over the matter with the four words “established by extending the principle,” precisely because the table of four cases in the previous gate has already drawn the boundary.

For practice: read this gate together with the last and one obtains a rule for reading the mind—whenever mind is discussed, first ask what it grasps; whenever form is discussed, first ask by what it is grasped. Ask in the wrong direction and the whole passage goes astray.

Appropriated and Unappropriated: What Feeling Pain Means

The ninth question is the second half of the same stanza: how many are appropriated and how many unappropriated? The treatise answers: the seven mind elements and the whole element of dharmas, together with the sound element—nine elements in all—are unappropriated; the remaining nine elements (the five faculties and form, odor, taste, the tangible) “each extend to both gates.”

The key to the division is time and position. “The five faculties beginning with the eye are named appropriated when they abide in the present, and unappropriated when past or future”; form, odor, taste, and the tangible must both abide in the present and be inseparable from the five faculties to be appropriated. The treatise gives a string of thoroughly everyday examples: within the body, “apart from what is joined to the faculties, the hair, body-hair, nails, teeth, excrement and urine, mucus, saliva, blood and the rest,” and the form, odor, taste, and tangible in the earth and water outside the body, “though present, are unappropriated”—hair and nails grow on the body, and yet feel neither pain nor itch.

Then what is appropriation? The treatise’s definition stands here: “what mind and mental factors together hold and take as their base is named appropriated, because benefit and injury are passed back and forth between them”—only what is held by mind and mental factors and made their base, and what benefits and injures mind reciprocally, is appropriated. The treatise at once confirms this with ordinary language: “this is also what the world calls having felt contact, since when touched by an assemblage of conditions there is a feeling of pleasure and the rest.” To be able to feel pleasure and pain is the practical test of the appropriated.

The ancient masters resolve one important difficulty here. If the five faculties must be joined with consciousness to be called appropriated, what of the times when consciousness does not depend on them? Puguang answers: “the five faculties in the present, even when consciousness does not depend on them, are still named appropriated, since they are of the class of the appropriated. . . . Past and future five faculties have no capacity to generate consciousness, and are named unappropriated”—present faculties, even with no consciousness depending on them at this instant, still belong to the class of the appropriated; past and future faculties, which cannot generate consciousness at all, are the truly unappropriated. Fabao cites the Correct Principle to open appropriation into two senses: first, being grasped as one’s own by craving and the view of self; second, being a cause able to produce pleasure and pain.

For practice: this gate states the matter of my body with great precision—what makes the body mine is not that it grows on me, but that it and mind benefit and injure one another. A clipped nail, once off the body, is unappropriated: a thing anyone can verify.

The Great Elements and Derived Form: Why Juetian’s Doctrine Does Not Stand

The tenth question: how many have the nature of great elements and how many the nature of derived form? The stanza answers, “within the tangible element there are two; the remaining nine of form are derived.” The treatise glosses: “the tangible element extends to both, namely the great elements and the derived”—“there are four great elements, namely hardness and the rest; there are seven derived, namely smoothness and the rest, named derived because they arise in dependence on the great elements”; the remaining nine elements of form (the five faculties and the four objects of form, sound, odor, taste) are only derived; and the nonmanifest form of one portion of the element of dharmas is likewise only derived.

The weight of this gate falls on a refutation. The venerable Juetian sets up another position: “all ten sense fields of form have only the nature of great elements”—the five faculties and five objects are all great elements. The treatise’s refutation has four layers. First, “because the sūtras say only that the four marks of hardness and the rest are the great elements.” Second, the four great elements are included only in the tangible, “hardness, moisture and the rest are not what the eye and the rest can grasp, and form, sound and the rest are not what the body faculty can feel”—the eye cannot see hardness, moisture, warmth, and motion, and the body faculty cannot feel form and sound; neither road is passable. Third, the sūtra is cited positively: the sūtra says of each place that “the eye is an inner sense field, subtle form derived from the four great elements,” and so on to the two sense fields of odor and taste; and only of the tangible does it say, “the tangible is an outer sense field, being the four great elements and what is derived from the four great elements”—the sūtra itself separates the tangible from the remaining sense fields of form. Fourth, a difficulty is resolved: the sūtra also says that within the fleshy lump of the eye there is hardness and a class of hardness—is the eye then a great element? The treatise answers, “that sūtra says that hardness and the rest are within the fleshy lump not separate from the eye faculty, and there is no fault of contradiction”—the hardness in the fleshy lump is the tangible present together with the eye faculty, and is not the eye faculty itself.

The treatise also disposes in passing of the objection from the Sūtra on Entry into the Womb speaking only of six elements as constituting a person: that is “in order to display the root items that can constitute a person,” and not a claim that a person consists of these six alone—the same sūtra goes on to speak of the six sense fields of contact.

Clearing away a misunderstanding: the derived in derived form does not mean manufactured, but existing in dependence on the great elements. The seven derived tangibles—their names already listed in the first half of this chapter, “smoothness, roughness, heaviness, lightness, and cold, hunger, thirst”—are established in dependence on the four great elements; and the subtle form of eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body is likewise established in dependence on them. The four great elements are what is depended upon, not craftsmen.

For practice: this gate demonstrates how the author refutes a position—not from a preference in doctrine but from the distribution of the scriptural text. Where a sūtra says a thing and where it pointedly does not say it is itself evidence.

Accumulable and Not Accumulable: Ten Are Aggregated of Ultimate Atoms

The eleventh question is extremely brief, and yet it is the seed of the passage on ultimate atoms below. The treatise answers: “the ten elements possessing form, the five faculties and five objects, are accumulable, because they are aggregations of ultimate atoms”; “extending the principle, the remaining eight are not accumulable, because they are not ultimate atoms.”

There is one criterion only: whether it is aggregated of ultimate atoms. The ten elements of form are aggregated of ultimate atoms and so are accumulable; the seven mind elements and the element of dharmas (nonmanifest form aside) are not constituted of ultimate atoms and so are not accumulable. Mind is not stacked up grain by grain.

The misunderstanding to be cleared away is reading accumulable as many. Mental factors too may be many, but many is not accumulation—accumulation specifically means an aggregation of ultimate atoms, and it is a criterion about bulk and substance, not about number.

For practice: once this rule is set, the two later debates—do ultimate atoms touch and can a single ultimate atom generate consciousness—have ground to stand on; and at the same time one road is closed in advance—for whatever is not accumulable, questions of its touching and of its spatial parts do not arise at all.

Cutting and Being Cut, What Burns and What Is Weighed: A Limit Discovered by an Axe

The twelfth question suddenly becomes very concrete: among the eighteen elements, how many can cut and how many are cut? How many can burn and how many are burned? How many can weigh and how many are weighed?

The treatise answers that it lies only in the four outer elements (form, odor, taste, the tangible): “form, odor, taste, and the tangible constitute the axe, the firewood, and the like, and this is named what cuts and what is cut.” What is cutting? The treatise gives an extremely precise definition: “an aggregation of form such as firewood arises in unbroken continuity, and the axe and the like separate it so that each arises in its own continuity—this dharma is named cutting”—cutting is not breaking a thing in two, it is making an aggregation of form that had been arising in unbroken continuity separate and each continue on its own.

Why do the faculties of form such as the body not count as what is cut? Two reasons: “it is impossible to sever one entirely into two”—a faculty cannot be cut in two, and “once a limb is separated from the body the faculty is no longer within it”; and further, the faculty is “pure and refined, like the light of a jewel,” and an axe-blade cannot cut light. By the same reasoning the faculty is not what cuts either. The sound element is “entirely none of them, because it is not continuous”—sound is not continuous, and so neither cuts nor is cut.

What is burned and what does the weighing are the same—also only the four outer elements. But at the end the treatise honestly leaves a matter undecided: “as for what can burn and what is weighed, there are differing disputes.” One account says that what can burn and what is weighed are also, as before, only the four outer elements; another says that “only the fire element may be named what can burn, and what is weighed is only heaviness”—only the fire element burns, and only the heavy tangible is weighed. The treatise does not adjudicate, and both accounts are recorded.

Clearing away a misunderstanding: this gate seems to speak of physics, but in fact it speaks of limits. What it asks is: when the everyday transitive verbs—cut, burn, weigh—are brought down onto the eighteen elements, who is the subject and who the object? The answer is: they fall only on the four outer elements, never on a faculty and never on mind.

For practice: hereafter, whenever the question who is doing this arises, this gate has already given the pattern—first ask on which elements the action can fall. This is the very measure used in the great dispute below over whether the eye sees or consciousness sees.

The Five Classes: Maturation-Born · Nourished · Homogeneous · Possessed of a Real Entity · Momentary

The thirteenth question asks five classes at one breath: how many are maturation-born, how many nourished, how many of homogeneous nature, how many possessed of a real entity, how many momentary?

Maturation-born—the treatise gives four glosses, each deeper than the last. First: “what is produced by a maturation cause is named maturation-born, as a cart drawn by an ox is named an ox-cart, the middle word being dropped in speaking this way”—an ox-cart is not a cart made of ox but a cart drawn by an ox, with a word left out in the middle. Second: “or the action performed, on reaching the time of yielding its result, alters and is able to ripen, and so is named maturation.” Third: the result is of a different class from its cause and is what is ripened. Fourth: the name of the result is provisionally established upon the cause, as a sūtra says that the six sense fields of contact now present are the actions performed of old. Four glosses stand together, and the treatise chooses none.

Nourished—“what is augmented by excellent conditions such as food and drink, assistance, sleep, and concentration is named nourished.” Some hold that celibate conduct can also nourish, and the treatise gives an extremely economical comment: “some say celibate conduct can also nourish; this is merely non-injury, and is not a separate augmenting.” There follows the most moving simile of the gate: “the continuum of what is nourished constantly protects the continuum of maturation, as an outer wall guards an inner city”—maturation is the inner city and nourishing the outer wall; food, sleep, and absorption do not produce a new body of retribution, they only hold the wall for it.

Sound is the finest case in this gate. The treatise judges that “sound is of homogeneous nature and nourished, and is not maturation-born,” because it “proceeds according to wish”—one makes a sound when one wishes to, and a maturation does not follow a present wish. The objector at once cites the Treatise of Designations: through well cultivating the avoidance of harsh speech one “obtains the mark of the great man’s voice of Brahmā”—is the voice of Brahmā then not a result brought on by action? The masters explain it as best they may: some say sound belongs to a third remove (action produces great elements, and the great elements, being struck, produce sound); some say a fifth remove (action produces maturation-born great elements, these produce nourished great elements, these produce homogeneous great elements, and these then produce sound). The treatise exposes the poverty of this with a single counter-instance: “if so, bodily feeling also arises from great elements produced by action, and would also have to be no maturation; and if feeling were treated like sound, correct principle would be contradicted.”—by your reckoning, bodily feeling too would have to be no maturation.

The eight nonresistant (the seven mind elements and the element of dharmas) extend to homogeneity and to maturation-born: “what is produced by the homogeneous cause and the all-pervading cause is of homogeneous nature,” and what is drawn forth by the maturation cause is named maturation-born; “the nonresistant dharmas, having no accumulation, are not nourished”—not being aggregations of ultimate atoms, there can be no question of nourishing. The remaining four elements of form, odor, taste, and the tangible extend to all three classes. Possessed of a real entity is only the element of dharmas: “real means the unconditioned, on account of its firmness and solidity.” Momentary is only the last three: “namely the class of the first receptivity to the cognition of dharma concerning suffering, which is without outflows; because it is not of homogeneous nature it is named momentary”—the first thought of the path of seeing has nothing homogeneous before it, and arises alone for a single moment.

The ancient masters here bring out the mutual exclusiveness of the five classes. Yuanhui says: “the five classes make their sense plain, their substances each differing, and they do not include one another,” and opens four kinds of nourishing (food and drink, assistance, sleep, concentration), and brings out one important distinction—“what nourishes extends to all three ethical qualities, while what is nourished is only indeterminate.” Puguang, under each class, draws the distinction of in general there are two (nourishing has two, by increase of substance and by superiority of function; homogeneity has two; momentariness has two; the real has two), cutting each term once more. Fabao cites the Correct Principle to answer for the sound element: “on what ground is the sound element not maturation-born? Because it is repeatedly interrupted and then arises again”—what breaks off and resumes is not the mark of a maturation.

For practice: the five classes are not five labels to be stuck on at will but a lineage of classes that do not include one another. The five faculties beginning with the eye are exhausted by the two classes of maturation and nourishing, and no homogeneity is set up for them; sound is only homogeneous and nourished, and maturation is not allowed it. Whenever the reader meets a dharma, he may try asking himself: from which class of cause does it come?

Acquisition and Possession: When the Eye and Eye Consciousness Each Come to Hand

The fourteenth question makes a turn: it no longer asks about the nature of dharmas but about when these elements come to hand in the practitioner. The stanza answers in ten characters: “of the eye element and the eye consciousness element there is acquisition of one alone, of both, of neither, and the rest.”

Acquisition of one alone has two routes. Acquiring the eye element without eye consciousness: “when one born in the realm of desire gradually acquires the eye faculty, and when one dies in the formless realm and is born in the second, third, or fourth meditative absorption levels”—one born in the realm of desire acquires his faculties gradually, so the eye faculty comes first and eye consciousness has not yet arisen; and one who dies in the formless realm and is born in the second, third, or fourth absorption levels finds no eye consciousness of that level, so he acquires the eye element while eye consciousness is not yet acquired. Acquiring eye consciousness without the eye element: one born in the second, third, or fourth absorptions when eye consciousness arises (which must be borrowed from the first absorption), and one who dies there and is born in a lower level. Acquisition of both: dying in the formless realm and being born in the realm of desire or the Brahmā world, both elements come to hand at once. Acquisition of neither: “as for neither, it is neither of them, that is, apart from the preceding cases.”

The word and the rest at the end of the stanza the treatise says is to gather in further unstated senses—and so another table of four cases is spread out: possessing the eye element but not eye consciousness, one born in the second, third, or fourth absorptions when eye consciousness is not arising; possessing eye consciousness but not the eye element, “one born in the realm of desire who has not yet acquired the eye faculty, or who acquired it and has lost it again”—a person whose eyes are ruined still possesses eye consciousness; possessing both, one born in the realm of desire who has acquired the eye and not lost it, one born in the Brahmā world, and one born in the second, third, or fourth absorptions while actually seeing form; possessing neither, apart from the preceding cases.

Clearing away a misunderstanding: acquisition and possession are not the same thing. Acquisition is the instant of coming to hand; possession is continuing to belong to one’s continuum. Hence there are all the differences of acquiring and losing again, of losing without being severed; and it is precisely these interlockings that the table of four cases sets out.

For practice: this gate takes the terms established in the preceding thirteen gates and puts them back, once, onto a particular person, a particular place of birth, a particular moment. To read Abhidharma only down to the nature of dharmas and not down to acquiring and discarding is to have only half of it.

Inner and Outer: Why Inner and Outer Are Still Spoken of Where There Is No Self

The fifteenth question: how many are inner and how many outer? The treatise answers: “the six faculties and six consciousnesses, twelve, are named inner; outer means the remaining six objects beginning with form.”

But the treatise at once asks itself the most dangerous question: relative to whom are inner and outer said? “What the self depends on is named inner, and what is other than this is outer. Since there is no substance of a self, whence are inner and outer?”—the names inner and outer are established with reference to a self; the self having no substance, do they not fall to the ground?

The treatise’s way of answering is very fine: “because it is what the grasping of a self rests upon, mind is provisionally spoken of as the self.” What the grasping of a self rests upon is mind, and so with reference to mind a self is provisionally spoken of. And two sūtra verses are cited in proof:

Through well taming the self, the wise attain birth in heaven.

One should well tame the mind; mind tamed can draw forth ease.

One and the same matter, and the sūtra speaks in one place of taming the self and in another of taming the mind—from which it is evident that what the sūtras call a self is a provisional name for mind. And so the names inner and outer have a place to stand: “the faculties beginning with the eye are what this depends on and are near to it, and so are named inner; form and the rest are its objects and are remote, and so are named outer.” Inner is what is depended on and near; outer is what is taken as object and remote.

There is a further objection: the six consciousnesses extend to the three times, and when they have not yet reached the position of mind they are not what mind depends on—should they not then be judged outer? The treatise answers: “when they reach the position of mind they do not lose the nature of the six consciousness elements, and before they reach that position they have never departed from the mark of mind”—the six consciousnesses that have not fallen into the position of mind have not departed from the mark of mind; and were this not granted, the mind element would exist only in the past and the six consciousnesses only in the present and future, which “contradicts our own school’s tenet that the eighteen elements all extend to the three times.”

For practice: this passage is one of the few places in the fascicle that touches no-self head on, and its manner is worth remembering—it does not first deny the self and then take back a little self for use; it says plainly that the self has no substance, and that inner and outer are only names of position provisionally established with reference to the mind on which the grasping of a self rests. The names go on being used, and while they are used one knows them to be provisional.

Participating and Corresponding Nonparticipant: Performing or Not Performing One’s Own Work, and One Sentence on the Element of Dharmas Being Always Participating

The sixteenth question: the name of the gate is unfamiliar and its sense is essential—how many are participating and how many corresponding nonparticipants?

First the general rule is set: “what performs its own work is named participating; what does not perform its own work is named a corresponding nonparticipant.” The eye that with respect to visible form has seen, is seeing, or will see is a participating eye; the eye that does not perform this work is a corresponding nonparticipant eye. And so on to the mind element, each with respect to its own object, of which its own function should be stated. Participating does not mean a portion that is alike; it means being at one’s proper work; and a corresponding nonparticipant is what is not at its proper work while being of the same class as what is—the treatise glosses the name itself at the end: “because this nonparticipant shares a class in common with what participates, it is named a corresponding nonparticipant.” The treatise also gives three readings of the word share: “faculty, object, and consciousness, all three, interact with one another, and this is named a share,” or a share is the function already performed, or a share is the contact produced.

How many kinds of corresponding nonparticipant eye are there? Here there is a divergence between two groups, which the treatise records without adjudicating: the Vaibhāṣikas of Kaśmīra say four kinds—that which does not see form and has already ceased, is ceasing, or will cease, and that which will not arise; “the masters of the West say there are five kinds: dividing what will not arise further into two, one having an accompanying consciousness and one having none.”

The deepest sentence of this gate is at its beginning: “the participating element of dharmas: the single element of dharmas alone is throughout participating”—the element of dharmas is always at its proper work. The reason is: “there is no portion whatever of the element of dharmas upon which boundless mind consciousnesses have not arisen, are not arising, and will not arise, because the noble ones certainly give rise to the mind that contemplates all dharmas as being without self.” A noble one must give rise to the contemplation of no-self that takes everything as its object, and this mind, “apart from its own substance and the dharmas coexisting with it, takes all dharmas as its objects,” while the portion excluded becomes the object of a second moment of mind; “these two successive moments of mind take all objects without exception, and therefore the element of dharmas is always named participating.” Among all dharmas there is not one that is forever unobserved by mind.

The treatise also distinguishes finely one asymmetry: the participation of the eye and of form cannot be reckoned in the same way. “The eye is not held in common, and participation and corresponding nonparticipation are established with respect to a single continuum; form is held in common, and they are established with respect to many continua”—one form can be seen by many people (as when people gaze together at the moon, at dancing, at wrestling), whereas one eye cannot be used by two people. Odor, taste, and the tangible, though also not held in common, are nevertheless said by the treatise to “admit of being held in common,” since with respect to this person and that, odor and the rest have the sense of being able to give rise to nose consciousness and the rest, and so they too are stated as with form.

The ancient masters supply what is most useful here. Fabao cites the Correct Principle on why the element of dharmas is always participating: “for instance the element of dharmas is the fixed object of that mind consciousness, since it is not held in common,” and judges the five objects to be held in common and not fixed objects. Yuanhui brings out two senses of fixed and explains the four kinds of corresponding nonparticipant eye. Puguang distinguishes a pair of registers easily confused—faculty and consciousness are called participating with reference to their capacity to grasp an object, while an outer object is called participating with reference to its being taken as an object—the two facing in opposite directions and not to be run together.

For practice: this gate sets up in use and not in use as a pair of categories running through the whole treatise. And the sentence that the element of dharmas is always participating is the quietest and deepest place in the fascicle—what it says is that no dharma escapes being observed.

Abandoned through Seeing, through Cultivation, Not Subject to Abandonment: What Is Definitively Not Abandoned through Seeing

The seventeenth question: how many are abandoned through seeing, how many through cultivation, how many not subject to abandonment? The stanza answers, “fifteen are abandoned only through cultivation; the last three extend to the three.” The treatise glosses: the ten elements of form and the five consciousness elements are abandoned only through cultivation; the three elements of mind, dharmas, and mind consciousness each extend to the three kinds—“the eighty-eight latent tendencies together with the dharmas coexisting with them and the acquisitions that accompany them are all abandoned through seeing,” “the remaining dharmas with outflows are all abandoned through cultivation, and all dharmas without outflows are not subject to abandonment.”

There follows an important distinction. An objector says that ordinary-being status and the bodily and vocal actions that bring on evil destinies “are utterly contrary to the noble path”—are they not then also abandoned through seeing? The treatise answers no, and produces a comprehensive judgment: dharmas that are undefiled, what is not born of the sixth, and form are definitively not abandoned through seeing. The three are three marks standing side by side, not a single mark form not born of the sixth: Fabao writes, “dharmas not abandoned through seeing have briefly three marks,” and Yuanhui, “stated briefly, what is not abandoned through seeing has in all three kinds”—the two judge alike.

The three terms are each made concrete. Why is ordinary-being status not abandoned through seeing? “That ordinary-being status is undefiled and included in the indeterminate, since one who has left desire behind and one who has severed the wholesome roots still possess it”—both the desire-free and those who have severed the wholesome roots still carry it, which shows it is not a defiled dharma; and moreover “if this ordinary-being status were abandoned through seeing, one in the position of the receptivity to the cognition of dharma concerning suffering would still be an ordinary being”—if ordinary-being status were abandoned through seeing, then at the first thought of the path of seeing it would not yet be abandoned, and would the practitioner not still be an ordinary being? What is born of the sixth? “The sixth means the mind sense field; what is born otherwise than from this is named not born of the sixth,” that is, what is born from the five faculties beginning with the eye, which the treatise names outright as “the five consciousnesses and the like.” And form means all bodily and vocal action and the like. Why are these three definitively not abandoned through seeing? “Because they are not directly set in motion by delusion about the principle of the truths”—what is not directly set in motion by delusion about the principle of the truths is not abandoned by the path of seeing.

The ancient masters take the terms apart more finely here. Yuanhui enumerates the eighty-eight latent tendencies (ten for the truth of suffering, seven each for origin and cessation, eight for the path; in the two higher realms twenty-eight each, hatred being excluded), and brings out a dependent-determinative analysis to set the name abandoned through seeing right: “seeing means seeing the truths; seeing is what abandons, defilement is what is abandoned; what is abandoned by seeing is named abandoned through seeing”—seeing is what abandons, defilement is what is abandoned, and within three words subject and object are plain. Puguang here “briefly opens three headings to display what is not abandoned through seeing,” and explains why the treatise cites only a part. Fabao separately distinguishes abandonment by intrinsic nature from abandonment by object.

For practice: this gate lays down a hard boundary for cultivation—delusion at the level of principle is cut once and for all by the path of seeing, while habitual tendencies at the level of the concrete must be counteracted by the long nourishing of the path of cultivation. To mistake the second for the first is the commonest miscalculation among practitioners.

Seeing and Not Seeing: Does the Eye See or Does Consciousness See—A Thousand-Year Dispute

The eighteenth question reaches the center of gravity of the fascicle: how many are seeing and how many not?

The treatise first establishes the definition of seeing. “The eye is wholly seeing; eight kinds within one portion of the element of dharmas are seeing; the rest are all not seeing.” Which eight? “The five defiled views beginning with the view of self, worldly right view, the right view of one in training, the right view of one beyond training”—five defiled views plus three right views. And the treatise divides their clarity and dimness by a simile: “just as by night and by day, with clouds and without, the multitude of forms and images are seen with differing clarity and dimness”—worldly views defiled and undefiled, and the views of those in training and beyond training, observe the marks of dharmas with differing clarity and dimness, as one looks at the same forms under day and night, cloud and clear.

Then why is worldly right view only in mind consciousness? Because “the discernment arising together with the five consciousnesses cannot make a decisive judgment”—decisive judgment is the very substance of seeing. The definition the treatise gives runs to eight characters only: “what deliberates first and then judges decisively is named seeing.” Only what deliberates first and then decides is called seeing; “the discernment arising with the five consciousnesses has no such capacity, being without discrimination, and so it is not seeing.”

But a difficulty arises at once: the eye faculty cannot make a decisive judgment either—why then is it called seeing? The treatise answers: “because it can clearly and sharply illuminate and observe forms, it too is named seeing”—seeing has two routes: one is the seeing of inferring and judging, the other the seeing of illuminating and observing. Puguang marks these two routes with great clarity: “first, illuminating and observing is named seeing, namely the eye faculty. . . . It does not stretch out light to the object, unlike a lamp or the sun; nor does it receive an image, unlike water or a mirror. . . . Second, inferring and judging is named seeing”—the eye’s seeing is neither a shining out nor a receiving in, and both of these ready-made similes are unusable.

The definitions being set, the great dispute breaks out: is it the eye that sees, or consciousness that sees?

To which party each of the exchanges below belongs is assigned according to the division of the text in Puguang and Fabao. The eye-sees party sets up first: the eye is the seeing. The consciousness-sees party at once objects: “if the eye sees, then when another consciousness is operating it too ought to be named seeing”—when another consciousness is operating the eye is still there, so why is it not called seeing then? The eye-sees party answers: “not every eye is able to see actually.” The consciousness-sees party presses again: “which is able to see actually?” The eye-sees party explains: “the participating eye in the state of being joined with consciousness is able to see, and no other”—only that portion of eye which is arising together with eye consciousness sees. The consciousness-sees party presses the advantage: if it must be joined with consciousness to see, “then it must be the dependent consciousness that sees form, and not the eye.” The eye-sees party denies it altogether: “not so, eye consciousness is definitively not what sees.” The consciousness-sees party presses: “why?”—and in the answer appear the two most famous words in the treatise: “it is transmitted that it cannot observe screened-off form, since it is directly observed that forms screened off by a wall and the like cannot be observed.” In transcribing this Sarvāstivāda reason the author prefixes it with it is transmitted.

Below, a dozen or more rounds follow, every sentence drawing blood. The eye-sees party seizes the moment and presses back at the consciousness-sees party: “if consciousness sees, then since consciousness is nonresistant a wall cannot obstruct it, and it ought to see screened-off form”—consciousness has no resistance, a wall cannot block it, so it ought to be able to see the form behind the wall 〔Puguang marks here, “again he presses back at the consciousness-sees party,” and Fabao marks, “he objects back to the consciousness-sees party”—this sentence is the eye-sees party interrogating its opponent, not the consciousness-sees party stating its own position〕. The consciousness-sees party answers: “with respect to a screened-off form eye consciousness does not arise; and since consciousness does not arise, how should it see?”—upon screened-off form eye consciousness simply does not arise, and consciousness not arising, whence any seeing? The eye-sees party then presses in summary: “why does eye consciousness not arise with respect to it?” and first states that its own school can account for it: “we who hold that the eye sees can say the eye is resistant, and with respect to that screened-off form it has no capacity for seeing; and since consciousness proceeds upon the same object as its support, it may be said that eye consciousness does not arise there”—the eye has resistance, and consciousness follows its support in taking the same object, and so eye consciousness does not arise there; and then it throws back a question: “you who hold that consciousness sees—for what reason does it not arise?” The consciousness-sees party objects again: “is the eye then like the body faculty, grasping only when it meets its object, that you should say it does not see the screened-off because it is resistant?”—the eye is not like the body faculty, which must make contact to grasp; on what ground do you make resistance the issue? And it cites a fact in evidence: “moreover, why can forms screened off by crystal, beryl, mica, water and the like be seen?”—through crystal, beryl, mica, and water one plainly sees; and it concludes: “therefore it is not because the eye is resistant that it has no capacity for seeing screened-off form.” It is now the eye-sees party’s turn to ask in return: “if so, what of the eye consciousness that you maintain?”—then how do you account for that eye consciousness of yours? Only now does the consciousness-sees party draw the boundary at light: “where the brightness is not cut off, eye consciousness arises with respect to the screened-off form; where the brightness is cut off, eye consciousness does not arise. And since consciousness does not arise, it cannot see.”

The consciousness-sees party then brings out the scriptural text: “as for the sūtra’s saying that the eye can see form, the eye is what seeing depends on, and so it is said to see.” The sūtras also say that the mind can cognize dharmas; yet the mind is past, and what cognizes is in fact mind consciousness—the mind is only what consciousness depends on, and so it is said to cognize. The same figure of speech is applied to the eye: the eye is what seeing depends on, and so the eye is said to see. And the consciousness-sees party cites ordinary usage as an example: “or it is stating the action of the dependent in terms of what it depends on, as the world says of a bench that the bench is talking”; and it cites the sūtra, “Brahmin, know that the eye is the gate, and it is solely for seeing form”—the eye is the gate, and is the gate the seeing? (The several instances and sūtra passages that follow are all assigned by Puguang and Fabao to the consciousness-sees party reconciling the scriptures.)

Next comes a pair of mutual objections. The eye-sees party objects: “if consciousness can see, who does the cognizing? And how do the two functions of seeing and cognizing differ?”—if you say consciousness sees, who is left to cognize, and what difference is there between the two functions? The consciousness-sees party explains: to see form is to cognize form, just as a certain portion of discernment is named able to see and also able to discern, so a certain portion of consciousness is likewise. From here a separate section begins: “some others object: if the eye can see, the eye is the seer—then what is the act of seeing?”—who these some others are Puguang leaves open with two explanations (either a separate master of another position, or another master of the consciousness-sees party), while Fabao, citing Master Tai, fixes them outright as an objection of the Vātsīputrīyas. The eye-sees party answers: “this makes no objection: just as all grant that consciousness can cognize while there is no cognizer”—all grant that consciousness can cognize without there being a cognizer, and it is the same with seeing. Then follows, “some others further say: it is eye consciousness that sees; and because the eye is what the seeing depends on, the eye too is named able to see, as a bell is what the ringing depends on, and so the bell is said to be able to ring”—this section Puguang judges to be another master of the consciousness-sees party reconciling the earlier sūtra, while Fabao, citing Master Tai, fixes it as the Dharmatrāta school. The eye-sees party objects again: if so, then since the eye faculty is what consciousness depends on, ought it not to be called able to cognize? That party answers, “there is no such fault,” and cites the Mahāvibhāṣā in its own support: “what is obtained by the eye and received by eye consciousness is called what is seen,” and so one says only that the eye can see and not that the eye can cognize; “only when consciousness is present does one say it cognizes form, as one says that the sun makes the day.” Fabao marks this plainly: “this is the Dharmatrāta school citing the Sarvāstivādins’ Mahāvibhāṣā to resolve the objection”—the one citing the Mahāvibhāṣā is one party in the dispute fetching proof for its own position, not the author adjudicating between the two.

At this point the Sautrāntika masters step in, and with a sentence that sweeps both parties away: “why do you gather together and clutch at empty space, when it is eye, form, and the rest as conditions that give rise to eye consciousness?”—you have gathered together to clutch at empty space. Eye, form and the rest as conditions give rise to eye consciousness; where within this is there any seer or seen? “There are only dharmas as cause and result, and in fact no agent function; it is merely to accord with worldly feeling that expressions are provisionally set up—the eye is named able to see, consciousness is named able to cognize—and the wise should not fasten upon them.” And they cite the World-Honored One’s words as ground: “the words of a region are not to be held to rigidly; the name-ideations of convention are not to be insisted upon.” The author then adds a note: “yet the Vaibhāṣika school of Kaśmīra says the eye can see, the ear can hear, the nose can smell, the tongue can taste, the body can feel, the mind can cognize.”

The ancient masters have left a complete score for this passage. Of the four masters’ positions Puguang records the fullest: “the venerable Vasumitra holds that the eye sees; the venerable Dharmatrāta that eye consciousness sees; the venerable Ghoṣa that the discernment associated with eye consciousness sees; the masters of similes that the assemblage of mind and mental factors simultaneous with eye consciousness sees”; Fabao adds a fifth, “it is also said that for the Vātsīputrīyas the assemblage of mind and mental factors sees,” and states plainly that “the venerable Vasumitra’s ‘the eye sees’ is the correct sense of the Sarvāstivādins.” There being four positions, why does the text refute only the one that consciousness sees? Puguang preserves four explanations side by side (where the interest lies, refuting the discernment position along with it, the assemblage position partly agreeing with the Sautrāntikas, and refuting the strongest, consciousness, so that all three fall), citing a stanza of the Miscellaneous Heart Treatise as ground: “the participating eye sees form, not that eye consciousness, nor discernment, nor an assemblage, because screened-off form is not seen”; Fabao settles it outright by the single explanation of that Heart Treatise—“refuting one, the rest are refuted by parity.” As to which party each of the exchanges in the treatise belongs to, Puguang assigns them sentence by sentence, Fabao divides the text the same way, and he points out that “the treatise’s ‘it is transmitted that it cannot observe screened-off form’—this is the setting out of the reason”—that is not the author’s own verdict; it is the eye-sees party setting out its reason.

This gate does not adjudicate. What both parties say and on what grounds they say it has been set out above; who prevails the treatise does not judge, and it is not judged here either. The reader need only see clearly where the dispute lies: what is contested is not whether the eyes have a use, but under whose name the act of seeing should be filed—and the Sautrāntika answer is that it can be filed under nobody’s, because there is no agent of the function at all.

Two Eyes Seeing Together: Consciousness Abides in No Location

The dispute over seeing being finished, the treatise lets the incidental discussions unfold. The first question is delightful: when form is seen, does one eye see or do two? The treatise says, “there is no fixed rule,” and then gives the great masters’ opinion: “the great masters of Abhidharma all say: sometimes two eyes see together, because when both eyes are open form is seen distinctly and when one is open it is not distinct.” And there is an experiment anyone may perform: “moreover, when one eye is open and one presses the other with the hand, one then sees two moons and the like before one, whereas closing one eye and pressing one has no such effect”—press one eye with a finger while the other is open, and two moons appear before you; close it and press, and nothing of the kind happens.

There follows at once an important resolution of difficulty: the support being in two places, does consciousness not become two halves? The treatise answers: “consciousness does not become two portions because its support is divided, since it abides in no location and is unlike resistant form.”—Consciousness occupies no place, and is not, like form possessing resistance, something that can be cut in two. The support may be twofold, and consciousness is still one.

Clearing away a misunderstanding: this passage is not physiology. What it establishes is a fundamental difference in the mode of existence of consciousness and of form—form has spatial parts and so can be divided; consciousness has none and so cannot. The criterion set up in the earlier gate of the accumulable flowers and bears fruit here.

For practice: hereafter, whenever a question of the type can one mind take two places as object at once arises, this sentence is the root of the answer: first ask whether it has spatial parts.

Objects Reached and Not Reached, and Whether Ultimate Atoms Touch

The second incidental discussion: when a faculty grasps its object, does it grasp having reached it, or without reaching it? The stanza answers, “the objects of the faculties of eye, ear, and mind are not reached; the three are the contrary”—eye, ear, and mind grasp objects not reached; nose, tongue, and body grasp objects reached.

The treatise’s reasons all lie in experience: “the faculties of eye, ear, and mind grasp objects not reached”—the eye can see distant forms, while “salve and the like within the eye cannot be observed”—ointment smeared on the eye is on the contrary not seen; the ear can hear distant sounds, while “what is pressed close against the ear faculty cannot be heard.” If eye and ear grasped only objects reached, “then one who cultivates absorption would have no need to cultivate the production of the divine eye and divine ear”—the divine eye and divine ear that are cultivated are precisely for seeing and hearing at a distance. The objector asks: if it can see form not reached, why does it not see all distant and screened-off forms? The treatise answers with the lodestone: “why does a lodestone that draws iron not reached not draw all iron not reached?”—a lodestone draws iron it does not touch, and yet does not draw all the iron it does not touch. As for the mind, “the mind has no substance of form, and so of it there is no reaching,” and the question does not arise. Another holds that the ear grasps both reached and not reached, since one can hear the sound within one’s own ear. Nose, tongue, and body grasp only objects reached, and the treatise gives a clean verification: “because when the breath is held one cannot smell an odor”—hold your breath and you cannot smell. What is reached? “What is meant by reached? Arising without interval.”

That one word reached carries the treatise into the passage in the fascicle that most resembles natural philosophy: do ultimate atoms touch one another or not?

The Vaibhāṣikas of Kaśmīra say they do not touch, on the ground of a dilemma: “if ultimate atoms touched throughout their whole substance, there would be the fault of the substances of real things being commingled; if they touched in one portion, there would be the fault of having parts, and yet ultimate atoms have no finer parts”—touching throughout, two atoms merge into one; touching in part, the atom has parts, and by definition it has none. Then, if they do not touch, why does striking them produce sound? The treatise answers: “if so, why does striking produce sound? Only because ultimate atoms arise without interval”—they merely come close enough to be without interval, and do not truly touch; if they truly touched, “if touching were granted, in striking stones or clapping hands the substances would be commingled,” and striking stones or clapping hands the two would blend into one mass. It is asked again: if they do not touch, why does an aggregation of form not scatter when struck? The answer: “because the wind element holds it, it does not scatter”—some wind elements can destroy and scatter, as at the destruction of an aeon, and some can form and hold together, as at the formation of an aeon.

Several accounts are put forward. “The venerable Vasumitra says: if ultimate atoms touched one another, they would have to abide into the following moment”; while the venerable Dharmatrāta offers another: “yet the venerable one says that no ultimate atoms in fact touch one another, and that the name touch is merely provisionally established upon their being without interval.” On this the treatise sets down a rare comment: “this venerable one’s intent should be found agreeable.” And it supplies a reason on his behalf: were it not so, “if it were otherwise, there would have to be gaps between the ultimate atoms; and the space between being empty, what obstructs their movement, that they should be granted to be resistant?”—if the space between were truly empty, what is it that blocks them, and yet they are called resistant? At the end the treatise adds a summarizing judgment: “moreover, if ultimate atoms are granted to have spatial parts, then whether they touch or not there is the fault of having parts; if they have no spatial parts, then even granting that they touch there is no such fault.”

Shentai’s commentary supplies this sentence with a piece of its history: “this reports the venerable Dharmatrāta, whose name here means ‘Dharma-rescued.’ Out of respect for his virtue his name is not spoken. He says that no ultimate atoms in fact touch one another, and that only because there is no empty gap between them is the name touch provisionally established”—the text says only the venerable one and does not give the name, out of respect for his virtue.

For practice: the value of this passage is not in its conclusion but in its method. Once the everyday word touch is pushed down to the level of the ultimate atom, it dissolves of itself—not because the ultimate atom hides some mystery, but because the word had meaning only at the scale of coarse form. This is the same line of view as the Sautrāntikas’ “there are only dharmas as cause and result, and in fact no agent function” in the dispute over seeing, applied in two different places.

Objects of Equal Measure and the Arrangement of the Faculties’ Ultimate Atoms

The third incidental discussion: when the faculties grasp their objects, do they grasp only what is equal to themselves in measure, or is the size unfixed? The stanza answers, “it should be known that the three beginning with the nose grasp only objects of equal measure.” The treatise glosses: nose, tongue, and body grasp only what is equal in measure, “as is the measure of the faculty’s atoms, so is the measure of the object’s atoms, and matching one another they conjoin and produce nose consciousness and the rest”—faculty-atoms and object-atoms must match for consciousness to be produced conjointly. Eye and ear are not fixed: “the eye with respect to form sometimes grasps something small, as in seeing the tip of a hair; sometimes something large, as in briefly opening the eyes and seeing a great mountain; sometimes something equal, as in seeing a grape”—seeing a hair-tip is grasping something small, opening the eyes on a great mountain is grasping something large, and looking at a single grape is grasping something equal; and the ear hears the sound of a mosquito or of thunder, small or large as is fitting. Of the mind, “the mind has no resistant substance, and no distinction of shape or measure can be told of it.”

The treatise then describes the arrangement of the ultimate atoms of the five faculties, all in figurative language: the ultimate atoms of the eye faculty “abide spread out over the pupil, like a coriander blossom, clear and covering over so that they do not scatter”—with another account that they abide heaped up like a ball; those of the ear faculty “abide coiled round within the ear cavity, like a rolled sheet of birch bark”; those of the nose faculty “abide within the bridge of the nose, back upward and face downward, like a pair of fingernails”; those of the tongue faculty are “spread over the tongue, in the shape of a half-moon”; those of the body faculty “abide throughout the parts of the body, as the body’s shape and measure.” Of the ultimate atoms of the female and male faculties the treatise likewise gives each its shape.

The two sentences that follow carry the most weight. First: “the ultimate atoms of the body faculty are never all participating—even in the hottest naraka, with fierce flames wrapping the body, there are still measureless ultimate atoms of the body faculty that are corresponding nonparticipants”—even in a hell where fierce flames wrap the body, measureless ultimate atoms of the body faculty are still not at work. Second: “it is transmitted: if the body faculty were to generate consciousness throughout, the body would break apart,” because “the five consciousnesses definitively require an accumulation of many atoms before the nature of support and object is constituted”—no single ultimate atom can serve as support and object; consciousness must arise in dependence on an aggregation of many atoms. And from this the treatise draws a further sentence: “it is by this very principle that ultimate atoms are said to have an invisible substance, because they cannot be seen.”

Clearing away a misunderstanding: this passage is not anatomy. Blossom, birch bark, fingernails, half-moon are all taken for the posture of their arrangement, and do not say that the faculties are shaped so. A reader who takes it for a description of organs has read the passage for nothing.

For practice: read together with the preceding gate, one obtains a single holding sentence—faculty and object must match for consciousness to arise; and that word match will serve later in speaking of conditions, of obstruction, and of dominance.

The Time of Consciousness’s Support: The Supports of the Five Consciousnesses Are Simultaneous, the Support of Mind Consciousness Only Past

The fourth incidental discussion: the five consciousnesses take only the present as object while mind consciousness takes all three times—are their supports likewise? The stanza answers, “the support of the last is only past; the supports of the five consciousnesses are either simultaneous.”

The treatise glosses: “mind consciousness depends only on the mind that has ceased without interval”—what mind consciousness depends on is the thought that has just ceased—and so it is only past. The five consciousnesses “have supports either simultaneous,” and the treatise points out expressly the work done by the word either in the stanza: “the word either indicates that they also depend on the past”—the five consciousnesses depend both on the faculty arising with them (the eye being the support arising together with eye consciousness, and so on to the body with body consciousness, both in the present world) and on that mind which has ceased without interval. Therefore “the supports of these five bodies of consciousness are two each”: the five faculties are their several separate supports, and “the mind faculty is the support common to the five.”

The treatise then sets out a table of four cases distinguishing support from immediately antecedent condition: “the first case, the eye faculty arising together with it”—a support but not an immediately antecedent condition; “the second case, the element of dharmas of mental factors that has ceased without interval”—an immediately antecedent condition but not a support; “the third case, the past mind faculty”—both; and the fourth apart from the foregoing. For mind consciousness “a following-antecedent answer should be made”: whatever is a support of mind consciousness is definitively its immediately antecedent condition, while what is its immediately antecedent condition need not be its support (as with the element of dharmas of mental factors that has ceased without interval).

Clearing away a misunderstanding: support and immediately antecedent condition are not the same thing. The former is what consciousness leans on to arise; the latter is the preceding thought that yields its place to the succeeding one. The eye faculty arising together leans without yielding place; the mental factors that have ceased without interval yield place without being leaned on—and the table of four cases sets out precisely this crossing.

For practice: that the support of mind consciousness is always in the past looks technical and is in fact essential—the thought of mind at this instant leans upon a thought that has already ceased. The continuity of mind does not rest on an abiding support; it rests on the preceding thought handing over the baton.

The Name Support Falls Only on the Faculty: Consciousness Turns with the Faculty, Not with the Object

The fifth incidental discussion asks sharply: consciousness arises depending at once on the two conditions of faculty and object—why is the name support given to the faculty and not to the object?

The stanza answers, “consciousness differs as the faculty alters, and therefore the eye and the rest are named its support.” The treatise glosses: “because the faculties beginning with the eye undergo alteration, the consciousnesses alter accordingly, being clear or dim as the faculty is augmented or damaged”—when the faculty is clear and sharp the consciousness is clear, and when the faculty is damaged the consciousness is dim—whereas “alteration in form and the rest does not make the consciousness differ, since consciousness follows the faculty and not the object.” And the conclusion in one sentence: “the name support falls only on the eye and the rest, and not on the others.”

This reason is verifiable. Looking at the same flower, one with good sight sees clearly and one with a clouded eye sees blurred; change the flower and the clarity or dimness of the consciousness does not change with it. The clarity or turbidity of consciousness is bound to the faculty and not to the object—which is the concrete evidence that the name support falls only on the faculty.

Clearing away a misunderstanding: to say consciousness does not alter with the object is not to say the object has no effect on consciousness at all. When the object changes, the mark of what is taken as object changes (whether one sees a flower or a stone), but the clarity or dimness of consciousness does not change with the object. The mark of what is taken as object and the clarity or dimness of consciousness are two different matters.

For practice: this is of great use in cultivation—whether the object one faces is good or bad is one matter; whether the faculty that takes it is clear or dim is another. Objects cannot all be chosen; the faculty can be nourished.

Consciousness Named after the Faculty: The Excellence of the Support and Not Being Held in Common

The sixth incidental discussion asks next: it is form and the rest that are the objects cognized—why is consciousness called eye consciousness and so on to mind consciousness, and not form consciousness and so on to dharma consciousness?

The stanza answers, “by those and by the cause of not being held in common, consciousness is named after the faculty”—two reasons. The first is what the preceding gate established: “those means the eye and the rest named support above; the faculty is what is depended on, and so consciousness is named after the faculty.” The second is not being held in common: “the eye is the support only of one’s own eye consciousness, whereas form may be grasped by another’s eye consciousness and by the mind consciousness of oneself and of others”—the eye is the support only of one’s own line of eye consciousness, while form may be grasped by another’s eye consciousness and by one’s own and another’s mind consciousness; and so on to body and the tangible. The faculty is exclusive, the object is shared; and a name must follow the exclusive if it is to distinguish.

The treatise also gives two examples from ordinary usage: “by the excellence of the support and by the cause of not being held in common consciousness receives its name; it follows the faculty and not the object, as with the names ‘sound of a drum’ and ‘barley sprout’ and the like”—the sound of a drum is named after the drum and not after the character of the sound; a barley sprout is named after the barley and not after the character of the sprout.

Clearing away a misunderstanding: this is no accident of naming habit. If the name followed the object, then when you and I looked together at one flower the consciousnesses that arose would share the name flower consciousness, and the two could not be told apart; naming after the faculty, my eye consciousness and yours each have their own support, and the boundary is plain.

For practice: this gate and the last form a pair—the last says that the quality of consciousness is bound to the faculty, this one that the identity of consciousness is bound to the faculty. The two together are the reason the eighteen elements are arranged with the faculties at their head.

The Levels of the Four Things: Body, Eye, Form, Consciousness—Which Is Higher and Which Lower

The seventh incidental discussion: a person dwelling in one level sees form of some level with an eye of some level, and consciousness of some level arises—are the levels of these four things the same or different?

The treatise first lists every possible combination exhaustively (born in the realm of desire, seeing form of one’s own level with an eye of one’s own level, all four are of one’s own level; seeing form of the realm of desire with the eye of the first absorption, body and form belong to the realm of desire while eye and consciousness belong to the first absorption . . . and so on to those born in the second, third, and fourth absorptions seeing form of their own or another level with an eye of their own or another level), and then says, “now the decisive marks of this are stated briefly,” gathering it into two stanzas.

The decisive marks are: “body, eye, and form all extend over five levels, namely the realm of desire and the four meditative absorptions; eye consciousness exists only in the realm of desire and the first absorption.” Next are three inequalities—“here the eye faculty, with respect to the level in which the body is born, is either equal or higher and never lower,” the eye is never lower than the body; form and consciousness with respect to the eye are “either equal or lower and never higher,” the reason being “a lower-level eye cannot see higher-level form, and a higher-level consciousness does not depend on a lower-level eye”; while form with respect to consciousness extends to equal, higher, and lower. The ear element expounded at length is as with the eye. “The three of nose, tongue, and body are all of their own level; among them the distinction is that body and the tangible must be of the same level”—nose, tongue, and body are only of their own level, and body and its tangible must be of the same level; consciousness with respect to the tangible and the body is of its own level or a lower one. As for the mind, “it should be known that the four things of the mind element are not fixed,” sometimes all four of the same level, sometimes higher and lower.

Here the treatise also says one honest thing about its own composition: these differences will be distinguished at length in the chapter on absorption and are not distinguished here, because “repeating before and after costs much effort and yields little benefit.” And then comes the sentence that closes all the incidental discussions: “the incidental discussion being complete, the principal discussion should now be taken up.”

Clearing away a misunderstanding: this passage is not a tedious game of permutations. What it establishes is one principle—a dharma of a higher level may take an object of a lower level, and a dharma of a lower level may not take an object of a higher. One who cultivates absorption may see form of the realm of desire with the eye of the first absorption; he may not see form of the first absorption with the eye of the realm of desire.

For practice: this gate pushes the eighteen elements from which there are to on which storey. One and the same eye consciousness has its standing decided jointly by three things—the level in which the body is born, the level to which the eye belongs, and the level to which the form belongs—and the stages of practice are not a vague higher and lower but are reckoned out square by square in just this way.

The Incidental Discussion Complete: The Three Gates at the End of the Chapter—What Is Cognized, the Permanent, the Faculties

The incidental discussions closed, the treatise concludes with one stanza asking three things: among the eighteen elements, which is cognized by how many consciousnesses? How many are permanent and how many impermanent? How many are faculties and how many not?

The gate of what is cognized: “among the eighteen elements the five beginning with form are, in order, each cognized by one of the five consciousnesses beginning with the eye, and are also all cognized collectively by mind consciousness; thus these five elements are each cognized by two of the six consciousnesses.” Form is cognized by eye consciousness and also by mind consciousness, and so is cognized by two consciousnesses; and so on to the tangible. “Knowing this, it may be inferred that the remaining thirteen elements are all cognized only by mind consciousness, because they are not the objects of the five bodies of consciousness”—apart from the five objects, the remaining thirteen elements can be taken as object only by mind consciousness. The eye faculty cannot see itself, yet mind consciousness reaches it.

The gate of the permanent is extremely short and extremely weighty: “among the eighteen elements there is no element that is wholly permanent; only the unconditioned within one portion of the element of dharmas is permanent,” the rest being impermanent by extension of the principle. No element is permanent as a whole—even the element of dharmas has only that portion of it which is unconditioned. This sentence puts the whole coordinate system of the eighteen elements back under impermanence.

The gate of the faculties opens the door to the next chapter: of the twenty-two faculties spoken of in the sūtras, among the eighteen elements they are “included in the inner twelve elements and one portion of the element of dharmas.” One portion of dharmas means the life faculty and ten others together with one portion of the last three faculties; the inner twelve means the five faculties beginning with the eye included as their own names indicate, “the mind faculty included in the seven mind elements throughout,” one portion of the last three faculties included in mind and mind consciousness, and “the female and male faculties being one portion of the body element.” “Extending the principle, it may be known that the remaining five elements beginning with form and one portion of the element of dharmas are in substance not faculties.” The treatise also records a difference of practice: “the great masters of Abhidharma all pass over the sūtras’ sequence of the six sense fields and speak of the mind faculty only after the life faculty, because it has an object of consciousness”—the masters’ sequence of the twenty-two faculties differs from the sūtras’, moving the mind faculty to a position after the life faculty.

The ancient masters set down words to close the fascicle. Puguang cites the Miscellaneous Heart Treatise in proof: “the form element is cognized by two consciousnesses, and so on to the tangible likewise; the remaining thirteen elements are throughout taken as object by mind consciousness alone.” Fabao marks the closing of the count of gates: “the following single stanza has three gates . . . added to the preceding, twenty-two gates”; Yuanhui marks these three outright as the twentieth, twenty-first, and twenty-second.

For practice: the fascicle ends with three gates, which look casual and are in fact joints. The gate of what is cognized joins the eighteen elements back to cognition; the gate of the permanent joins them back to impermanence; the gate of the faculties joins them to the twenty-two faculties of the next chapter. With this the Chapter on the Elements has both its doors open and is transparent within and without.

Further Resonances: A Mirror of the Three Commentaries and Shentai’s

The above is the sense of this fascicle itself. What follows sets three mirrors alongside it—the ancient masters’ judgments, the debate within the lineage, and the differences of the alternative translation. A mirror is not the treatise; it is a few other ways of looking at the same fascicle of text. Recorded together without adjudication.

The Three Commentaries’ Judgments and Divergences

Even the major outline and the counting of the gates are not agreed among the three. Puguang marks, “from here begins the third major division, distinction through the several gates: there are in all twenty-two gates distinguishing the eighteen elements”; Fabao marks, “from here begins the second major division, in nineteen lines of stanza, distinguishing the eighteen elements by gates of meaning,” and at the end of the chapter says, “the following single stanza has three gates . . . added to the preceding, twenty-two gates”; Yuanhui marks, “from here comes the third division, distinction through the several gates: in all twenty-two gates distinguishing the eighteen elements,” and at the end of the chapter marks them outright as the twentieth through twenty-second. One and the same fascicle of text, and the numbering and the counting each form a house of their own.

On which side the author inclines, the three commentaries take wholly different attitudes. Puguang judges outright: “although the two parties, the eye-sees and the consciousness-sees, dispute above, looking at the momentum of the text, the author inclines toward the view that consciousness sees,” and he explains the Sautrāntika sense on their behalf: “dharmas have only capacities and in fact no agent function; the World-Honored One, to accord with worldly feeling, merely speaks provisionally of seeing.” Fabao passes no judgment and only divides the text: “here the author is stating the Sarvāstivāda position.” Yuanhui closes by citing the Sautrāntika account and likewise issues no judgment. Moreover Puguang, under the gate of the visible, has a separate judgment that “the author inclines toward the Sautrāntikas”—two gates, two judgments, both preserved for reference.

From which party the two passages some others object and some others further say come is likewise unsettled. Fabao, citing Master Tai, writes, “Master Tai says it is the Vātsīputrīya objection” and “the Dharmatrāta school reconciles the earlier sūtra saying that the eye can see form”; Puguang leaves two explanations open; Yuanhui does not enter the question.

Why the text refutes only the position that consciousness sees is also treated differently by the three. Puguang preserves four explanations side by side and cites a stanza of the Miscellaneous Heart Treatise as ground; Fabao settles it by that Heart Treatise’s single explanation, “refuting one, the rest are refuted by parity”; Yuanhui marks the passage directly and raises no such question.

Four divergences: here they are only recorded, and which is right is not adjudicated.

Debate within the Lineage: Saṅghabhadra’s Sentence-by-Sentence Counter-Refutation

Saṅghabhadra’s Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle addresses this fascicle very densely, and where he says “the Sūtra-master” he mostly has this fascicle of the Kośa in view; the principal passages are recorded.

First, how the two words it is transmitted are to be read. Saṅghabhadra writes: “there are further masters who, by a separate line of reasoning, establish that eye consciousness is definitively not what sees, namely because it cannot observe screened-off form. But the Sūtra-master’s mind cannot accept that reason, and so in the stanza he marks it with the words ‘it is transmitted’”—the author does not inwardly accept that reason, and therefore marks it is transmitted in the stanza. On the same passage Puguang has a different judgment, given in the section above. The two readings are set side by side here and are not harmonized.

Second, the refutation of the challenge about grasping only when the object is met. The author had asked, “is the eye then like the body faculty, grasping only when it meets its object,” and Saṅghabhadra answers: “here the Sūtra-master presses further, saying: is the eye then like the body faculty, grasping only when it meets its object, that one should say it does not see the screened-off because it is resistant? This objection is not right, because he has not understood the sense of resistant as stated”; and he further reproves him: “here one should challenge him: if a faculty can grasp objects it does not meet, then it ought to grasp everything it does not meet.”

Third, the refutation of what seeing depends on and of the bench simile. Saṅghabhadra: “again the Sūtra-master says: as for the sūtra’s saying that the eye can see form, it is because the eye is what seeing depends on that it is said to see. On what ground does the Sūtra-master raise this holding? . . . This does not amount to proof, since mind and mind consciousness are of one class”; and he further questions the ground of his statement: “on what cause does the Sūtra-master raise this fixed holding? Other words and other explanations cannot be without a cause.”

Fourth, ultimate atoms and the venerable one’s doctrine of touch. The author praised Dharmatrāta’s account as “to be found agreeable,” and Saṅghabhadra does not let even this word of praise pass: “here the Sūtra-master, displaying that man’s excellence, says thus: this venerable one’s intent should be found agreeable. . . . Now I say that the venerable one’s intent in this is neither simply agreeable nor to be disliked; one should only investigate how, being without interval, they still do not touch.” And he refutes the objection about spatial parts: “having parts and having spatial parts differ in name and agree in sense; to say ‘without parts’ has already excluded spatial parts.”

Fifth, the refutation of the reason in the gate of applied and sustained thought. The author established that the five consciousnesses are always associated with applied and sustained thought on the ground that “their mode is coarse and turns toward the outer gate,” and Saṅghabhadra does not allow it: “this reason is not sound, since it is directly observed that mind consciousness, when it turns toward the inner gate, is also always associated with them. The explanation should be: the five consciousnesses exist only in the stages that applied and sustained thought accompany.”

Sixth, the refutation of there is no second applied thought as a proof. Saṅghabhadra: “supposing there were a second, would association be granted? There is a second feeling, and yet they are not associated. The words ‘there is no second’ do not constitute a decisive proof.”

Seventh, the refutation of the answer about nose and tongue in the gate of realm affiliation. Saṅghabhadra: “for giving rise to speech and adorning the body the bases alone suffice; the faculty is not visible—what does it adorn?”

Eighth, one passage cited without refutation. Saṅghabhadra cites the author’s explanation that “mind is provisionally spoken of as the self” and expands it with other sūtras, setting down no refutation; recorded here for reference.

Further, the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine only preserves that stanza in ornamented form in the corresponding passage of this fascicle, with no independent counter-refutation. The texts of both parties are set side by side as above, and neither is judged the winner.

The Difference of the Two Translations: Xuanzang and Paramārtha

Paramārtha’s old translation stands gate for gate against Xuanzang’s new one, with many differences in the names of the gates and in the rendering of terms, and with some items identical in both (as with the eighty-eight latent tendencies, homogeneity, and the Sautrāntikas). The weight-bearing items are recorded.

In the opening question Xuanzang has “how many are visible and how many invisible,” Paramārtha “how many are manifest and how many non-manifest”—visible against manifest. Of the three kinds of resistance Xuanzang has “obstruction, object field, object of consciousness,” Paramārtha “first resistance as obstruction, second resistance of the dust, third resistance of the object condition”; and of the treatise cited, Xuanzang has the Treatise of Designations while Paramārtha has the Treatise of Provisional Names, one treatise under two names. The gloss of the gate of realm affiliation differs entirely in the two: Xuanzang glosses “affiliation means belonging, that is, the sense of being bound,” while Paramārtha glosses “correspondence has the sense of possessing and the sense of not being separate”—the same gate, glossed in wholly different ways. For applied and sustained thought Paramārtha has awareness and observation, his stanza reading “having awareness and also observation, these are definitely the five consciousness elements.” For the names of the five classes Paramārtha has retribution-produced, growth-produced, possessed of a real thing. In the gate of participation Paramārtha has equal share and unequal share, glossed as “from the object’s own capacity the name equal share is established”—Xuanzang glosses by performing or not performing one’s own work, Paramārtha by the object’s own capacity.

Most notable is the placing of the mark of reported doubt within the stanza. Xuanzang puts the two words it is transmitted into the stanza; Paramārtha’s version of this stanza reads “since the form is not visible when screened off, such is their holding,” putting their holding into the stanza—each version has its own way of marking, and in both the mark stands inside the stanza. At the Sautrāntika conclusion there is a further difference: Paramārtha’s text reads, “the Sautrāntikas say: why gather together to break up space? . . . Such is the Vaibhāṣika masters of Jibin’s doctrinal judgment,” the last phrase explicitly marking a judgment of the school’s position, for which Xuanzang’s text has nothing corresponding.

The remaining weight-bearing correspondences of translated terms: resistant / obstructive, resistance of the object field / resistance of the dust, resistance of the object of consciousness / resistance of the object condition, unwholesome / evil, having an object of consciousness / having an object condition, appropriation / grasping, inner and outer / what the self depends on and what is outside it, abandoned through seeing, through cultivation, and not subject to abandonment / extinguished by seeing the truths, by the path of cultivation, and not extinguished, the accompanying acquisition / attainment, the discernment arising together / the knowledge arising together, Kaśmīra / Jibin, conceptual and recollective discrimination / displaying and remembering discrimination, what is cognized / what is known, permanent / permanently abiding, Kumāralāta and Jiumoluoluoduo. The two versions also differ in structure: Xuanzang’s passage forms a fascicle by itself and has a sentence closing the fascicle, while Paramārtha’s has no fascicle boundary and passes from the end of the Chapter on the Elements straight into the Chapter on the Faculties.

The adoption or rejection of a variant belongs to the translator, and here it is only recorded, not adjudicated.

Variant Readings: The Twenty-Nine Collation Notes within the Fascicle

The collation notes attached to this fascicle number twenty-nine in all, and not one suffices to alter the base text; the variants are recorded together for reference. Several touch on doctrine and may be noted. In the stanza 「後三三餘無」 tr. “the last three extend to the three; the rest have neither”, the second 「三」 tr. “three” reads 「二」 tr. “two” in the Song, Yuan, Ming, and Palace witnesses. In 「傳說不能觀，彼障諸色故」 tr. “it is transmitted that it cannot observe, because of those screened-off forms”, the graph 「彼」 tr. “those” reads 「被」 tr. “is screened” in the four witnesses; and in the prose 「於彼障色無見功能」 tr. “with respect to that screened-off form it has no capacity for seeing”, the same 「彼」 tr. “those” likewise reads 「被」 tr. “is screened” in three—and Saṅghabhadra’s own citation carries the second reading, so the difference between the two may be seen right there. In the Sautrāntika phrase 「共聚楂掣虛空」 tr. “a crowd gathered to clutch at empty space”, 「楂」 tr. “clutch” reads 「摣」 tr. “zhā, a variant graph” in the Ming witness and 「植」 tr. “zhí, as the Palace witness writes” there. In 「唯法因果實無作用」 tr. “there are only dharmas as cause and result, and in fact no agent function”, 「因」 tr. “cause” reads 「內」 tr. “inner” in the Yuan and Ming witnesses. In the gate of the two eyes, in 「或時二眼俱見」 tr. “sometimes two eyes see together”, 「二」 tr. “two” reads 「一」 tr. “one” in the Song, Yuan, and Ming witnesses. Of the eye faculty’s ultimate atoms, in 「如香荾花清澈映覆」 tr. “like a coriander blossom, clear and covering over”, 「澈」 tr. “clear” reads 「徹」 tr. “chè, a variant graph” in the four witnesses and 「映」 tr. “covering” reads 「膜」 tr. “membrane”—and the reading membrane bears on the explanation by the membrane of the eye—kept for reference. The rest—in 「已說界繫」 tr. “realm affiliation has now been stated” the 「說」 tr. “stated” reading 「設」 tr. “shè, as the Palace witness writes”; in 「義准成故」 tr. “established by extension of principle” the 「准」 tr. “by extension” reading 「唯」 tr. “only”; in 「如見蒲桃」 tr. “as in seeing a grape” the 「桃」 tr. “táo, the plain graph” reading 「萄」 tr. “táo, the fuller graph” in the Ming witness; in 「如名鼓聲及麥牙等」 tr. “as with the names ‘sound of a drum’ and ‘barley sprout’ and the like” the 「牙」 tr. “yá, the plain graph” reading 「芽」 tr. “yá with the grass radical” in the four witnesses—mostly belong to interchangeable graphic forms and bear on no doctrine.

Coordinates of Continuation

Several matters established in this fascicle were carried on by later treatises, and their agreements and differences are recorded together without adjudication.

First, the three kinds of discrimination. The threefold setting up of “first intrinsic discrimination, second conceptual discrimination, third recollective discrimination” was carried on by the later treatises of the Yogācāra lineage, and this is its original Abhidharma coordinate.

Second, the definition of seeing. “What deliberates first and then judges decisively is named seeing”—seeing having deliberation and decisive judgment as its substance, this definition became in later treatises the starting point for the distinction of the perceiving aspect and the mental factor of discernment.

Third, participation. The participation as a class of elements established in this gate (performing or not performing one’s own work), and the later sense of commonality of sentient beings entering the formations not associated with mind, agree and differ in how they are opened out, and await collation when the five positions are fully enumerated in the Chapter on the Faculties.

Fourth, that passage of the Sautrāntika masters. “There are only dharmas as cause and result, and in fact no agent function”—seer and cognizer alike are provisional names established; and since seeing is only a provisional statement upon a continuity of cause and result, what then of the object seen? That is precisely the question the later lineage of treatises went on to press, and the two may be read against each other.

Last, back to those two words. The author wrote it is transmitted into the stanza when he set down a Sarvāstivāda reason; Saṅghabhadra read out of it “the Sūtra-master’s mind cannot accept that reason”; Puguang read out of it “the author inclines toward the view that consciousness sees”; Fabao only divided the text; Yuanhui closed by citing the Sautrāntikas. Four readings stand together, and here it is not adjudicated. The reader need only remember one thing: in the world of Abhidharma, where an adverb of reported doubt is placed is enough to draw forth a whole treatise in opposition.

考據Apparatus

界品後半、卷二全帙：以二十二門逐一分別十八界——而「眼見識見」一諍於此爆發，玄奘以「傳說」二字入頌，眾賢直指「經主意不忍彼因」；一部論的抉擇性格，於此門全幅顯露。

一、科判定位

科判系統	此段之位
玄奘 T1558	分別界品第一之二（卷二〔T29 0007a06〕續題）——本子（子2）＝卷二全帙〔0007a02–0013b05〕：五言正頌二十六至四十四
三家大科	諸門分別（二十二門分別十八界）：光記「此下大文第三諸門分別，總有二十二門分別十八界」〔T41n1821 0034b06–07〕；寶疏「此下大文第二，有一十九行頌，義門分別十八界也」〔T41n1822 0495a18–19〕；頌疏「從此第三，諸門分別，總有二十二門，分別十八界」〔T41n1823 0826b25〕——標次與門數計法三家有異（目六互異一）
品內科段	二十二門：有見·有對·三性〔正26〕→ 界繫〔正27〕→ 有漏無漏·尋伺〔正28〕→ 分別〔正29〕→ 所緣·執受〔正30〕→ 大種所造·積集〔正31〕→ 斫燒稱〔正32〕→ 五類〔正33–34前〕→ 得成就〔正34後〕→ 內外〔正35前〕→ 同分彼同分〔正35後〕→ 三斷〔正36〕→ 見非見（眼見識見諍）〔正37–38〕→ 傍論（二眼俱見·至不至·極微·等量·根極微·識依·隨根）〔正39–41〕→ 四事地決定相〔正42–43〕→「傍論已周，應辯正論」〔0013a10〕→ 所識·常·根三門〔正44〕品末
何以約界不約蘊處	光記引：「《正理》第四云『界中具顯根、境、識故。諸門義類易可了知，故今且約十八界辨。由斯蘊、處義類已成。』」〔T1821 0034b08–10〕

切界：0007a06「復次於前所說十八界中」——卷界·三家大科界·品續題三重重合（科段圖）。頌／長行：正頌二十六至四十四（T1560 定界）；長行引頌三塊（鳩摩邏多頌 0007b12·契經二偈 0009c20·0009c22）非本頌。

二、術語（名相）

漢（玄奘）	真諦異名（首出）	古德音寫所徵（羅馬字＝發音輔助）	本論定義句
有見／無見	有顯／無顯〔T29 0167a12〕	—	「色界有見，以可示現此彼差別」〔T29 0007a11〕
有對（三種）	有礙；境界有對＝塵礙·所緣有對＝緣緣礙〔0167a14–17〕	—	「對是礙義。此復三種：障礙、境界、所緣異故」〔0007a13–14〕；或「礙者是和會義」〔0007b01〕
界繫	相應（訓「有義、不相離義」）〔0167b27–29〕	—	「繫謂繫屬，即被縛義」〔0007b28〕——門名訓釋二本全異
尋·伺	覺·觀〔0168a11–12〕	—	「五識唯尋伺」〔0008a11〕；四品法（有尋有伺·無尋唯伺·無尋無伺·無伺唯尋）〔0008a21–26〕
三分別	（計度＝）顯示分別·（隨念＝）憶念分別〔0168b07–08〕	—	「分別略有三種：一自性分別、二計度分別、三隨念分別」〔0008b02–03〕；自性分別體唯是尋
執受	執（訓「執以覺義」）〔0168b14·b23〕	—	「心心所法共所執持攝為依處名有執受，損益展轉更相隨故」〔0008b24–25〕
異熟生	果報生〔0169a19〕	—	「異熟因所生名異熟生，如牛所駕車名曰牛車」〔0009a24–25〕（四釋並出）
所長養	增長生〔0169a20〕	—	「飲食資助眠睡等持勝緣所益，名所長養」〔0009b01–04〕；「長養相續常能護持異熟相續，猶如外郭防援內城」
同分·彼同分	等分·非等分〔0169c29–0170a02〕	—	「若作自業名為同分，不作自業名彼同分」〔0010a14–15〕——二譯全異
見·修·非所斷	見諦滅·修道滅·非所滅〔0170b09–10〕	—	「八十八隨眠及彼俱有法并隨行得，皆見所斷」〔0010b20–21〕（隨行得／真諦「至得」）
見（八種）	同（見）	—	「眼法界一分，八種說名見」〔0010c04〕：五染污見＋世間·有學·無學正見；「審慮為先決度名見」〔0010c18〕
傳說（傳疑標記）	彼執（入頌）〔0170c16「被障彼執爾」〕	—	玄奘以「傳說」入頌〔0010c07「傳說不能觀」〕——毘婆沙師傳疑標記之頌內安置，二本各異；眾賢讀法見目五
迦濕彌羅	罽賓〔0171a25–26〕	音寫「迦濕彌羅」〔T29 0011b06〕	「然迦濕彌羅國毘婆沙宗，說眼能見……意能了」〔0011b06–08〕
鳩摩邏多	鳩摩羅羅多〔0167b12〕	音寫「鳩摩邏多」〔T29 0007b11〕	大德鳩摩邏多有對頌〔0007b12–13〕

梵語羅馬字唯繫古德音寫可徵者（迦濕彌羅·鳩摩邏多等音寫名）；義譯名相從闕，不據現代校本擬補。真諦異名全表（二十七項）見源檔備料。

三、校勘（大正原書校記·卷二全枚舉）

校勘條目錨在卷二（0007a02–0013b05）者共二九條，全枚舉（大正原書梵語對音註五四見非異讀，不入表）。底本從大正【大】讀；CBETA 回改三處（0010003·0009a2801·0010b1001；後二處繫於 CBETA 自加之錨，不在大正校記二九條之數，以 ⟨CB⟩ 標而依錨次入表），並錄大正原印。

註號	錨	底本【大】	異讀	語境
0007008	0007b14	說	緣【宋】【元】【明】	「於此所說十有對中」
0007009	0007b29	十	下【宮】	「色界所繫唯十四種」
0008001	0008a03	說	設【宮】	「已說界繫」
0008002	0008a11	唯	有【明】	頌「五識唯尋伺」
0008003	0008a11	三	二【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	頌「後三三餘無」之第二「三」
0008008	0008a23	地	他【宮】	「有尋伺地有四品法」
0008009	0008b01	諸	識【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	頌「意諸念為體」
0008012	0008b15	准	唯【元】【明】	「義准成故」
0008014	0008c28	准	唯【宮】	「義准餘八非可積集」
0009a2801 ⟨CB⟩	0009a28	土	上【CB】【麗-CB】；CBETA 從【麗】回改作「上」	「或於因上假立果名，如於果上假立因名」（大正原印「土」·下句「於果上」以「上」對稱一貫）
0009010	0009b03	相	有【明】	「長養相續常能護持異熟相續」
0009014	0009c06	除	染【宮】	「非者俱非，謂除前相」
0009016	0009c18	何有	根不【明】	「我體既無，內外何有」
0010003	0010b07	知	如【CB】【麗】【宮】；CBETA 從【麗】【宮】作「如」	「眼等不然，故如色說」（大正原印「知」）
0010b1001 ⟨CB⟩	0010b10	己	已【CB】；CBETA 依《俱舍論記》〔T41n1821 0047b28〕與《俱舍論頌疏》〔T41n1823 0830c09〕回改作「已」	「或復分者是已作用」（大正原印「己」·己／已形近換用之習見者，不涉義）
0010011	0010c07	彼	被【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	頌「彼障諸色故」
0011003	0011a05	彼	被【宋】【元】【宮】	「於彼障色無見功能」
0011004	0011a19	簡	揀【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「亦能簡擇」
0011005	0011a24	說	識【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「亦說鍾能鳴」
0011007	0011a28	受	了【元】【明】【宮】	「眼識所受說名所見」
0011008	0011b02	楂	摣【明】；植【宮】	「共聚楂掣虛空」
0011009	0011b03	因	內【元】【明】	「唯法因果實無作用」
0011010	0011b11	二	一【宋】【元】【明】	「或時二眼俱見」
0011011	0011c07	失	夫【宮】	「成有分失」
0011012	0011c12	生	至【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「云何三根由無間生名取至境」
0012001	0012a09	桃	萄【明】	「如見蒲桃」
0012003	0012a13	澈	徹【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「如香荾花清澈映覆」
0012004	0012a13	映	膜【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	同句之「映」（膜字之讀與眼膜之解相涉，備考）
0012008	0012c02	牙	芽【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「如名鼓聲及麥牙等」
0012009	0012c18	二	一【宮】	「如是生二三四靜慮」
0012010	0012c23	三	二【宮】	頌「次三皆自地」

校勘結語：無一條升定本案，異讀並錄備考。同一校記於多處復用者（0010011·0012003）按註號計一。

四、異譯對勘（真諦 T1559 ★）

對勘基座：玄奘卷二〔T29n1558 0007a02–0013b05〕↔ 真諦〔T29n1559 0167a11 末起–0173a04〕。結構差：玄奘子2 自成卷二、卷末收題；真諦無卷界，界品訖「成立非根」〔0173a02〕直接根品品題——玄奘有收卷句、真諦無對應。

對勘要目（詳十六對見源檔；此錄義理承重者八）：

開門句：「復次於前所說十八界中，幾有見、幾無見？」〔奘 0007a07〕‖「說攝義已。是前所說十八界，於中幾有顯、幾無顯？」〔諦 0167a11–12〕——有見／有顯。
有對三種：「障礙、境界、所緣」〔奘 0007a14〕‖「一障礙、二塵礙、三緣緣礙」〔諦 0167a17〕；《施設論》〔奘 0007a17〕‖《假名論》〔諦 0167a19–20〕同論異名。
界繫門名：「繫謂繫屬，即被縛義」〔奘 0007b28〕‖「相應是有義、不相離義」〔諦 0167b28–29〕——同門而訓釋全異。
尋伺：「五識唯尋伺」〔奘 0008a11〕‖「有覺亦有觀，定是五識界」〔諦 0168a12–13〕——尋伺／覺觀。
五類：異熟生／果報生·所長養／增長生·有實事／有實物〔奘 0009a17–21‖諦 0169a19–25〕；牛車喻二本同。
同分門：「法同分餘二，作不作自業」〔奘 0010a04〕‖「法界等分」·「由於塵自功能立名等分」〔諦 0170a01–0170a12〕——同分·彼同分／等分·非等分；玄奘以作不作自業訓、真諦以塵自功能訓。
眼見識見諍·傳疑入頌：「眼見色同分，非彼能依識，傳說不能觀，彼障諸色故」〔奘 0010c06–07〕‖「偈曰：眼見色……等分……非能依眼識。……由色非可見，被障彼執爾」〔諦 0170c10–16，一頌拆五處〕——玄奘「傳說」入頌、真諦作「彼執」入頌，傳疑標記之頌內安置二本各異。
經部結語·宗判：「經部諸師有作是說：如何共聚楂掣虛空……然迦濕彌羅國毘婆沙宗，說眼能見……意能了」〔奘 0011b01–08〕‖「經部說：何故共聚破空？……罽賓國毘婆沙師悉檀判如此」〔諦 0171a20–26〕——真諦出「悉檀判如此」標宗判語，玄奘無對應。

譯名對照（子2 承重·逐字所見）：有見／有顯 · 有對／有礙 · 境界有對／塵礙 · 所緣有對／緣緣礙 · 不善／惡 · 繫／相應 · 尋伺／覺觀 · 有所緣／有緣緣 · 執受／執 · 異熟生／果報生 · 所長養／增長生 · 有實事／有實物 · 內外／我依·我依外 · 同分彼同分／等分·非等分 · 見修非所斷／見諦滅·修道滅·非所滅 · 隨行得／至得 · 俱生慧／共生智 · 傳說／彼執 · 迦濕彌羅／罽賓 · 計度·隨念分別／顯示·憶念分別 · 所識／所知 · 常／常住 · 鳩摩邏多／鳩摩羅羅多 · 《施設論》／《假名論》——「八十八隨眠」「等流」「經部」二本同（全表二十七項見源檔）。

異讀取捨屬義理之判，本目唯錄不判。

五、系內對辯（眾賢《順正理論》T1562 ★·卷二＝反破密集段）

「經主」明標句與俱舍卷二實有對辯者七條（＋引述一條），眼見識見諍最重：

「傳說」入頌之讀——眾賢：「復有餘師，以別道理成立眼識定非是見，謂不能觀被障色故。然經主意不忍彼因，故於頌中摽傳說語」〔T29n1562 0365a09–12〕。所對俱舍頌：「傳說不能觀，彼障諸色故」〔T29 0010c07〕。
「境合方取」徵難之破——眾賢：「經主於此復徵難言：眼豈如身根境合方取，而言有對故不見彼耶？此難不然，不了所說有對義故」〔T1562 0365b19–22〕；又「此應責言：若根能取不合境者，則應能取一切不合」〔0365c26–29〕。所對俱舍句〔T29 0011a03〕。
「是見所依」「床座言聲」之破——眾賢：「又經主言：然經說眼能見色者，是見所依故說能見。何緣經主起此執耶？……此不成證，意與意識種類一故」〔T1562 0366c18–22〕；又「經主何因起斯定執？餘言餘解，不可無因」〔0367a07–08〕。所對俱舍句〔T29 0011a09–13〕。
極微相觸·大德觸論——眾賢：「經主此中顯彼勝德作如是言，此大德意應可愛樂。……今說大德如是意趣，非即可樂亦非可惡，但應尋究如何無間仍不相觸？」〔T1562 0373b14–18〕；又破方分難：「有分、方分，名異義同。立無分言，已遮方分」〔0373c07–09〕。所對俱舍句〔T29 0011c24–28〕。
尋伺門「行相麁外門轉」因——眾賢：「此因非理，現見意識內門轉時亦常與彼共相應故。應作是釋：五識唯於尋伺所隨地中有故」〔T1562 0350a08–10〕。所對俱舍句〔T29 0008a13〕。
「無第二尋」非定證——眾賢：「設有第二，許相應耶？有第二受而不相應。無第二言，非為定證」〔T1562 0350a20–23〕。所對俱舍句〔T29 0008a20〕。
界繫門鼻舌之辯——眾賢：「起說嚴身但須依處，根非有見，何所莊嚴？」〔T1562 0349b25–26〕。所對俱舍句〔T29 0007c19–22〕。
（引述·非顯破）「假說心為我」——眾賢引述經主之釋並援餘經敷釋〔T1562 0360b21–24〕，無破語，誌錄備考。

《顯宗論》對應段飾存彼頌·無獨立反破（「經主」句錨在此段者僅 0786a21 一處，所對為卷一末六根依處段，屬子1 邊界）。

『一義二宗』並錄，勝負不判。又：T1562 0344a–0346a·0355b–c 內另有七處「經主」句所對為俱舍卷一（蘊處界廢立·次第·大種諍）——屬子1 承重，已誌回補線索（尤 0345a10 對 0005b28）。

六、諸家異釋（光記·寶疏·頌疏·神泰疏）

（一）三性·界繫

善不善無記之開——光記：善七（生得·聞·思·修·學·無學·勝義）、不善一、無記七（有覆＋無覆六：異熟·威儀·工巧·通果·自性·勝義）〔T41n1821 0035c15–28〕；法界四善（自性·相應·等起·勝義）三不善，並釋此中不說勝義不善之由：「勝義不善，體通三性。……若說勝義，即無差別」〔0036b17–19〕。寶疏同科而詳分段〔T41n1822 0496a18–0496b06〕。頌疏釋色聲約等起判善惡：「由色、聲二非自性善惡，約能發心判成善惡」〔T41n1823 0827b29–0827c03〕。
界繫——光記引《雜心》「彼無揣食性、以身微妙故」並誌異部：「若依《宗輪論》，大眾部等，色、無色界具六識身」〔T1821 0037a02–0037a09〕。寶疏釋繫義：「欲界繫法，被欲界貪等繫縛，名欲界繫」〔T1822 0496b13–15〕。

（二）五類·執受·同分

五類互不相攝——光記總釋五類，逐一出『泛明有二』之簡（「泛明長養有二」「泛明等流有二」等句式）（長養體增／用勝·二種等流·二種剎那·二種實）〔T1821 0040c25–0041a14〕。頌疏：「五類明義，體各不同，互不相攝」並出四種長養（飲食·資助·睡眠·等持）、「能長養通三性，所長養唯無記」〔T1823 0829b02–0829c06〕。寶疏引《正理》：「何緣聲界非異熟生？數數間斷復還生故」〔T1822 0500b01–02〕。
執受——光記通妨：「現在五根，識不依時亦名執受，執受類故。……去、來五根無容發識，名無執受」〔T1821 0039b22–26〕。寶疏引《正理》執受二種（有愛身見執為己有·為因能生苦樂）〔T1822 0498c04–12〕。
法界恒同分——寶疏引《正理》「且如法界與彼意識為定所緣，是不共故」，判五境是共非定所緣〔T1822 0504b15–26〕。頌疏出「定」二義並釋彼同分眼四種〔T1823 0830b07–29〕。光記辨『根識據能取境名同分·外境約為境名同分』〔T1821 0046a14–0046b11〕。

（三）三斷·見非見（眼見識見諍·主錨）

三斷——頌疏開列八十八隨眠（苦十·集滅各七·道八·上二界各除瞋二十八）並出依主釋：「見謂見諦，見是能斷，惑是所斷，見之所斷，名見所斷」〔T1823 0831a01–0831a16〕。光記「略開三章顯非見斷」並明偏說之簡〔T1821 0048a18–0048b05〕。寶疏判自性斷／所緣斷〔T1822 0506a12–26〕。
四家計（或五家）——光記：「尊者世友眼見，尊者法救眼識見，尊者妙音眼識相應慧見，譬喻者眼識同時心、心所法和合見」〔T1821 0048c05–07〕；寶疏增第五家「又說犢子部心、心所和合見」並明「尊者世友眼見，此是有部正義」〔T1822 0507b12–15〕。
唯破識見之由——光記四解並存（意樂破·兼破慧·和合分同經部·從強破識具破三種），引《雜心》「同分眼見色，非彼眼識見，非慧非和合，不見障色故」〔T1821 0048c14–16〕；寶疏以《雜心》一解定：「破一，例亦破餘」〔T1822 0507b15–19〕。
見有二種——光記：「一者觀照名見，所謂眼根。……不舒光至境，不同燈日；亦非影現，不同水鏡……二者推度名見」〔T1821 0049a14–23〕。
兩家問答之科——光記逐句判屬（「傳說不能至應見障色」＝眼見家為釋反徵）〔T1821 0049c01–13〕；寶疏同科：「論『傳說不能觀障色故』，此立因也」〔T1822 0507b26–0507c04〕。
論主朋向——光記：「上來雖復眼見、識見兩家異諍，看其文勢，論主意朋識見」，並釋經部義：「諸法但有功能，實無作用。世尊為順世情，假說見耳」〔T1821 0050b22–0050c09〕。
「有餘難言」「有餘復言」二節屬家——寶疏引泰法師：「太法師云犢子難」「曇摩多羅部通前經說眼能見色」〔T1822 0508a06–09〕（「太」字照錄）；光記存疑兩解〔T1821 0050a11–20〕。
卷末三門——光記引《雜心》「色界二識識，乃至觸亦然。諸餘十三界，一向意識緣」〔T1821 0055b19–23〕；寶疏「下一頌有三門……加前二十二門」〔T1822 0511c27–29〕；頌疏標「第二十……第二十一……第二十二」〔T1823 0833b02–09〕。

（四）三疏互異（並錄不判）

大科標次與門數計法：光記『大文第三·二十二門』〔0034b06〕／寶疏『大文第二·十九行頌』·末三門「加前二十二門」〔0495a18·0511c28〕／頌疏『第三·二十二門』·末三門即第二十至二十二〔0826b25·0833b02〕。
論主朋向之判：光記直判「意朋識見」〔0050b24〕／寶疏唯科文：「論主此述有部宗也」〔0508a18〕／頌疏引經部收結不出判語〔0831b15–18〕。（又光記於有見門下別有「論主意朋經部」之判〔0034b28–0034c02〕——二門各判，並存備考。）
「有餘難言」「有餘復言」二節屬家：光記存疑〔0050a11–20〕／寶疏引泰法師定犢子·曇摩多羅部〔0508a05–09〕／頌疏不涉。
唯破識見之由：光記四解並存〔0048c08–16〕／寶疏《雜心》一解定〔0507b15–19〕／頌疏逕標不設問〔0831b02–03〕。

靜慮中間之伺屬第三品（無尋無伺）——本論「法界所攝非相應法，靜慮中間伺亦如是」〔T29 0008a18〕之「亦如是」所承者為無尋無伺，非無尋唯伺。寶疏逐字：「第二明非相應法及靜慮中間伺，俱是無尋無伺」，並出其故「中間伺無第二伺故，及地法無尋故，所以伺是無尋無伺」，末釋第四句云「伺在中間禪無尋無伺，在欲界初禪有尋無伺」〔T41n1822 0497c11–23〕。光記同判，作「非相應法界及靜慮中間伺，亦同第三品」〔T41n1821 0038b12〕。⇒ 論文之四品法，「無伺唯尋」唯限欲界·初靜慮之伺〔T29 0008a25〕，中間靜慮之伺不在其列。

（五）神泰疏（殘本·卷二正釋「分別界品第一之二」）

神泰《俱舍論疏》卷二釋「分別界品第一之二」〔X53n0836 0020c11〕〔卷末題〔0033a15〕〕，與本子逐卷相當。此前本子未錄泰疏，今就『至不至·極微』段補一條。

極微相觸·法救之說——本論「大德說一切極微實不相觸……此大德意應可愛樂」〔T29 0011c23–24〕，泰疏釋云：「敘大德達摩多羅，此云法救。為敬其德，不稱其名。彼說一切極微實不相觸，但由中間無空隙間，假立觸名」〔X53n0836 0031a07–14〕。泰疏並牒《正理》反破之文（「經主此中顯彼勝德」）——與目五眾賢對辯條同軌，並錄不判。

七、互讀（唯識根系掛鏈）

眼見識見諍 → 唯識『依根之識』：本門四家之諍與經部「唯法因果實無作用」之收〔T29 0011b01–05〕，此問於大乘阿毘達磨系仍就『依根立名』而答：「何故但名眼等識不名色等識耶？答：以依眼等五種解釋道理成就，非於色等」〔T31n1606 0703a28〕。
三分別 → 唯識三分別：「一自性分別、二計度分別、三隨念分別」〔T29 0008b02–03〕——《大乘阿毘達磨雜集論》承此三名不改：「三分別者，謂自性分別、隨念分別、計度分別」〔T31n1606 0703a14〕。〔誠實記：《瑜伽師地論》無此三分別之目，其八分別（自性·差別·總執·我·我所·愛·非愛·彼俱相違）〔T30n1579 0489c15〕另是一系，勿相混。〕
同分彼同分 → 百法不相應：同分（眾同分）於百法入不相應行——本門「作自業、不作自業」之界類同分義與彼眾同分義之開合，屆根品五位全列並勘。
見（審慮決度）→ 唯識見分之辨：「審慮為先決度名見」〔T29 0010c18〕——見之定義以「審慮」「決度」二事為體，此為後系論見分·慧心所時所承之毘曇原文。

八、譯史

子2 無獨立譯史事項（全論譯史見子1 考據目八：玄奘永徽二年至五年譯訖·元瑜筆受·真諦天嘉四年出·二錄「同本異譯」）。本子相關者一事：真諦本此段（0167a12–0173a04）與玄奘卷二逐門對應而無卷界——二本分卷體例之異（22 卷／30 卷開合）於此得見一斑（目四）。

九、校本定位

玄奘 T1558 卷二（底本）：品續題〔T29 0007a06〕· 有見有對三性 0007a09 · 界繫 0007b26 · 尋伺 0008a11 · 三分別 0008b02 · 執受 0008b24 · 大種所造 0008c01 · 斫燒稱 0009a03 · 五類 0009a19 · 得成就 0009b28 · 內外 0009c16 · 同分 0010a04 · 三斷 0010b15 · 見非見·眼見諍 0010c04–0011b08 · 二眼 0011b10 · 至不至·極微 0011b18–0011c28 · 等量·根極微 0012a04 · 識依 0012b04 · 隨根 0012b20 · 四事地 0012c21 · 傍論已周 0013a11 · 三門結 0013a13 · 收卷 0013b03。源檔：原典層（漢字序列對藏經原檔核訖）。
真諦 T1559：對應段 0167a11–0173a04（無卷界·根品題 0173a04）。
眾賢 T1562：0349b22 · 0350a07–23 · 0360b21 · 0365a10–0365c29 · 0366c18–0367a08 · 0373b13–0373c09；T1563：0786a21（子1 邊界）。
光記 T1821 卷二（0034b02–0055c12）：0034b06 · 0035c15 · 0036b07 · 0036c28 · 0039b17 · 0040c25 · 0046a14–0046b11 · 0048a18 · 0048c05–16 · 0049a11 · 0049c01 · 0050a11 · 0050b22–0050c09 · 0055b17。
寶疏 T1822 卷二（0495a14–0512a18）：0495a18 · 0496a18–0496b15 · 0498c04 · 0499b18 · 0500b01 · 0504b15 · 0506a12 · 0507b12–0507c04 · 0508a05–20 · 0511c27。
頌疏 T1823 論本第二（0826b23–0833c09）：0826b25 · 0827b16–0827c15 · 0828c06 · 0829a25–0829c06 · 0830b07–29 · 0830c21–0831a16 · 0831a24–0831b18 · 0833b02–09。
神泰疏 X53n0836 卷二（0020c09–0033a21·正釋界品之二）：0031a07–09。泰疏殘·存 X。
校勘：卷二校勘條目二九條全枚舉（目三·無升定本案）。

The second half of the Chapter on the Elements, the whole of Fascicle Two: twenty-two gates distinguish the eighteen elements one by one—and here the dispute over 「眼見識見」 tr. “whether the eye sees or consciousness sees” breaks out, Xuanzang putting the two words 「傳說」 tr. “it is transmitted” into the stanza and Saṅghabhadra pointing straight at it: 「經主意不忍彼因」 tr. “the Sūtra-master’s mind cannot accept that reason.” The judging character of the treatise is displayed here at full breadth.

I. Doctrinal Outline and Placement

Outline system	Placement of this passage
Xuanzang, T1558	Analysis of the Elements, Chapter One, Part Two (the continued title at the head of Fascicle Two〔T29 0007a06〕)—this unit (Unit 2) = the whole of Fascicle Two〔0007a02–0013b05〕: Principal Stanzas 26 through 44 in five-character lines
The major outline in the three commentaries	Distinction through the several gates (twenty-two gates distinguishing the eighteen elements): Puguang, 「此下大文第三諸門分別，總有二十二門分別十八界」 tr. “from here begins the third major division, distinction through the several gates: there are in all twenty-two gates distinguishing the eighteen elements”〔T41n1821 0034b06–07〕; Fabao, 「此下大文第二，有一十九行頌，義門分別十八界也」 tr. “from here begins the second major division, in nineteen lines of stanza, distinguishing the eighteen elements by gates of meaning”〔T41n1822 0495a18–19〕; Yuanhui, 「從此第三，諸門分別，總有二十二門，分別十八界」 tr. “from here comes the third division, distinction through the several gates: in all twenty-two gates distinguishing the eighteen elements”〔T41n1823 0826b25〕—the three differ in how they number the division and count the gates (Section VI, divergence 1)
Divisions within the chapter	Twenty-two gates: visible · resistant · the three ethical qualities〔Principal 26〕→ realm affiliation〔Principal 27〕→ with and without outflows · applied and sustained thought〔Principal 28〕→ discrimination〔Principal 29〕→ object of consciousness · appropriation〔Principal 30〕→ great elements and derived form · accumulation〔Principal 31〕→ cutting, burning, weighing〔Principal 32〕→ the five classes〔Principal 33–34a〕→ acquisition and possession〔Principal 34b〕→ inner and outer〔Principal 35a〕→ participating and corresponding nonparticipant〔Principal 35b〕→ the three abandonings〔Principal 36〕→ seeing and not seeing (the dispute over whether the eye sees or consciousness sees)〔Principal 37–38〕→ the incidental discussions (two eyes seeing together · objects reached and not reached · ultimate atoms · equal measure · the faculties’ ultimate atoms · the support of consciousness · naming after the faculty)〔Principal 39–41〕→ the decisive marks of the levels of the four things〔Principal 42–43〕→ 「傍論已周，應辯正論」 tr. “the incidental discussion being complete, the principal discussion should now be taken up”〔0013a10〕→ the three gates of what is cognized, the permanent, and the faculties〔Principal 44〕at the end of the chapter
Why the distinctions are made on the elements and not on aggregates or sense fields	Puguang cites: 「《正理》第四云『界中具顯根、境、識故。諸門義類易可了知，故今且約十八界辨。由斯蘊、處義類已成。』」 tr. “the fourth fascicle of the Correct Principle says: ‘because the elements display faculty, object, and consciousness together, the classes of meaning under the several gates are easily understood, and so for now the distinctions are made with respect to the eighteen elements; and by this the classes of meaning of aggregate and sense field are already accomplished.’”〔T1821 0034b08–10〕

The boundary of the unit: 0007a06, 「復次於前所說十八界中」 tr. “furthermore, among the eighteen elements stated above”—the fascicle boundary, the boundary of the major outline in the three commentaries, and the continued chapter title coincide threefold (see the division chart). Stanza and prose: Principal Stanzas 26 through 44 (boundaries fixed by T1560); the three blocks of stanza cited within the prose (Kumāralāta’s stanza 0007b12 · two sūtra verses 0009c20 · 0009c22) are not root stanzas.

II. Terminology (Technical Terms)

Chinese (Xuanzang)	Paramārtha’s alternative name (first occurrence)	Ancient phonetic transcription attested (romanization = pronunciation aid)	Defining sentence in this treatise
visible / invisible	manifest / non-manifest〔T29 0167a12〕	—	「色界有見，以可示現此彼差別」 tr. “the form element is visible, since the distinction of being here or there can be pointed out in it”〔T29 0007a11〕
resistant (three kinds)	obstructive; resistance of the object field = resistance of the dust · resistance of the object of consciousness = resistance of the object condition〔0167a14–17〕	—	「對是礙義。此復三種：障礙、境界、所緣異故」 tr. “resistance has the sense of obstruction; and it is further of three kinds, since obstruction, object field, and object of consciousness differ”〔0007a13–14〕; or 「礙者是和會義」 tr. “obstruction has the sense of meeting and joining”〔0007b01〕
realm affiliation	correspondence (glossed as 「有義、不相離義」 tr. “the sense of possessing and the sense of not being separate”)〔0167b27–29〕	—	「繫謂繫屬，即被縛義」 tr. “affiliation means belonging, that is, the sense of being bound”〔0007b28〕—the two versions gloss the gate’s name in wholly different ways
applied thought · sustained thought	awareness · observation〔0168a11–12〕	—	「五識唯尋伺」 tr. “the five consciousnesses have only applied and sustained thought”〔0008a11〕; the four classes of dharma (with applied and sustained thought · without applied thought and with sustained thought only · without applied and without sustained thought · without sustained thought and with applied thought only)〔0008a21–26〕
the three kinds of discrimination	(conceptual =) displaying discrimination · (recollective =) remembering discrimination〔0168b07–08〕	—	「分別略有三種：一自性分別、二計度分別、三隨念分別」 tr. “discrimination is briefly of three kinds: first intrinsic discrimination, second conceptual discrimination, third recollective discrimination”〔0008b02–03〕; the substance of intrinsic discrimination is applied thought alone
appropriation	grasping (glossed as 「執以覺義」 tr. “grasping in the sense of feeling”)〔0168b14·b23〕	—	「心心所法共所執持攝為依處名有執受，損益展轉更相隨故」 tr. “what mind and mental factors together hold and take as their base is named appropriated, because benefit and injury are passed back and forth between them”〔0008b24–25〕
maturation-born	retribution-produced〔0169a19〕	—	「異熟因所生名異熟生，如牛所駕車名曰牛車」 tr. “what is produced by a maturation cause is named maturation-born, as a cart drawn by an ox is named an ox-cart”〔0009a24–25〕(four explanations are given together)
nourished	growth-produced〔0169a20〕	—	「飲食資助眠睡等持勝緣所益，名所長養」 tr. “what is augmented by excellent conditions such as food and drink, assistance, sleep, and concentration is named nourished”〔0009b01–04〕;「長養相續常能護持異熟相續，猶如外郭防援內城」 tr. “the continuum of what is nourished constantly protects the continuum of maturation, as an outer wall guards an inner city”
participating · corresponding nonparticipant	equal share · unequal share〔0169c29–0170a02〕	—	「若作自業名為同分，不作自業名彼同分」 tr. “what performs its own work is named participating; what does not perform its own work is named a corresponding nonparticipant”〔0010a14–15〕—the two translations differ entirely
abandoned through seeing · through cultivation · not subject to abandonment	extinguished by seeing the truths · extinguished by the path of cultivation · not extinguished〔0170b09–10〕	—	「八十八隨眠及彼俱有法并隨行得，皆見所斷」 tr. “the eighty-eight latent tendencies together with the dharmas coexisting with them and the acquisitions that accompany them are all abandoned through seeing”〔0010b20–21〕(the accompanying acquisition / Paramārtha’s 「至得」 tr. “attainment”)
seeing (eight kinds)	the same (seeing)	—	「眼法界一分，八種說名見」 tr. “the eye and eight kinds within one portion of the element of dharmas are said to be seeing”〔0010c04〕: the five defiled views + worldly, in-training, and beyond-training right view;「審慮為先決度名見」 tr. “what deliberates first and then judges decisively is named seeing”〔0010c18〕
it is transmitted (a mark of reported doubt)	they hold (placed in the stanza)〔0170c16, 「被障彼執爾」 tr. “as for the screened-off, such is their holding”〕	—	Xuanzang puts 「傳說」 tr. “it is transmitted” into the stanza〔0010c07, 「傳說不能觀」 tr. “it is transmitted that it cannot observe”〕—the placement within the stanza of the Vaibhāṣika mark of reported doubt differs in the two versions; for Saṅghabhadra’s reading see Section V
Kaśmīra	Jibin〔0171a25–26〕	phonetic transcription 「迦濕彌羅」 tr. “Kaśmīra”〔T29 0011b06〕	「然迦濕彌羅國毘婆沙宗，說眼能見……意能了」 tr. “yet the Vaibhāṣika school of Kaśmīra says that the eye can see . . . and the mind can cognize”〔0011b06–08〕
Kumāralāta	Kumāralāta in an alternative transcription〔0167b12〕	phonetic transcription 「鳩摩邏多」 tr. “Kumāralāta”〔T29 0007b11〕	the venerable Kumāralāta’s stanza on the resistant〔0007b12–13〕

Romanized Sanskrit is attached only where an ancient phonetic transcription can be attested (Kaśmīra · Kumāralāta and other transcribed names); for terms translated by meaning it is left absent and is not conjecturally supplied from any later edition. The complete table of Paramārtha’s alternative terms (twenty-seven items) is in the source-file preparation.

III. Textual Collation (Taishō Original Notes · Complete Enumeration for Fascicle 2)

The collation entries anchored within Fascicle Two (0007a02–0013b05) number twenty-nine, completely enumerated below (the fifty-four phonetic notes on Indic terms in the Taishō original are not variants and are not entered in the table). The base follows the Taishō reading 【大】; CBETA emends in three places (0010003 · 0009a2801 · 0010b1001; the latter two stand on anchors added by CBETA itself and are not among the twenty-nine Taishō collation entries — they are marked ⟨CB⟩ and entered in the table in anchor order), recording the original Taishō print as well.

Note no.	Anchor	Base text 【大】 / variants	Context
0007008	0007b14	說【大】，緣【宋】【元】【明】	「於此所說十有對中」 tr. “among these ten that are said to be resistant.”
0007009	0007b29	十【大】，下【宮】	「色界所繫唯十四種」 tr. “affiliated with the realm of form are only fourteen kinds.”
0008001	0008a03	說【大】，設【宮】	「已說界繫」 tr. “realm affiliation has now been stated.”
0008002	0008a11	唯【大】，有【明】	Stanza: 「五識唯尋伺」 tr. “the five consciousnesses have only applied and sustained thought.”
0008003	0008a11	三【大】，二【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	In the stanza 「後三三餘無」 tr. “the last three extend to the three; the rest have neither,” the second 「三」 tr. “three.”
0008008	0008a23	地【大】，他【宮】	「有尋伺地有四品法」 tr. “in the stage that has applied and sustained thought there are four classes of dharma.”
0008009	0008b01	諸【大】，識【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	Stanza: 「意諸念為體」 tr. “the forms of mindfulness of the mind stage are their substance.”
0008012	0008b15	准【大】，唯【元】【明】	「義准成故」 tr. “because it is established by extending the principle.”
0008014	0008c28	准【大】，唯【宮】	「義准餘八非可積集」 tr. “extending the principle, the remaining eight are not accumulable.”
0009a2801 ⟨CB⟩	0009a28	土【大】，上【CB】【麗-CB】; CBETA follows【麗】in restoring 「上」 tr. “upon”	「或於因上假立果名，如於果上假立因名」 tr. “or the name of the result is provisionally set upon the cause, as the name of the cause is provisionally set upon the result” (the original Taishō print has 「土」 tr. “earth”; the following clause 「於果上」 tr. “upon the result” keeps the balance with 「上」 tr. “upon”).
0009010	0009b03	相【大】，有【明】	「長養相續常能護持異熟相續」 tr. “the continuum of what is nourished constantly protects the continuum of maturation.”
0009014	0009c06	除【大】，染【宮】	「非者俱非，謂除前相」 tr. “as for neither, it is neither of them, that is, apart from the preceding cases.”
0009016	0009c18	何有【大】，根不【明】	「我體既無，內外何有」 tr. “since there is no substance of a self, whence are inner and outer?”
0010003	0010b07	知【大】，如【CB】【麗】【宮】; CBETA follows【麗】【宮】in reading 「如」 tr. “like”	「眼等不然，故如色說」 tr. “the eye and the rest are not so, and therefore they are stated as with form” (the original Taishō print has 「知」 tr. “know”).
0010b1001 ⟨CB⟩	0010b10	己【大】，已【CB】; CBETA restores 「已」 tr. “already” on the authority of Puguang’s Record of the Abhidharmakośa〔T41n1821 0047b28〕and the Commentary on the Verses of the Abhidharmakośa〔T41n1823 0830c09〕	「或復分者是已作用」 tr. “or again, ‘share’ means what has already exercised its function” (the original Taishō print has 「己」 tr. “oneself”; the two are a familiar pair of graphs close in shape and used interchangeably, and the difference does not bear on the sense).
0010011	0010c07	彼【大】，被【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	Stanza: 「彼障諸色故」 tr. “because of those forms that are screened off.”
0011003	0011a05	彼【大】，被【宋】【元】【宮】	「於彼障色無見功能」 tr. “with respect to that screened-off form it has no capacity for seeing.”
0011004	0011a19	簡【大】，揀【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「亦能簡擇」 tr. “it is also able to discern.”
0011005	0011a24	說【大】，識【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「亦說鍾能鳴」 tr. “one also says that the bell can ring.”
0011007	0011a28	受【大】，了【元】【明】【宮】	「眼識所受說名所見」 tr. “what is received by eye consciousness is called what is seen.”
0011008	0011b02	楂【大】，摣【明】; 植【宮】	「共聚楂掣虛空」 tr. “a crowd gathered to clutch at empty space.”
0011009	0011b03	因【大】，內【元】【明】	「唯法因果實無作用」 tr. “there are only dharmas as cause and result, and in fact no agent function.”
0011010	0011b11	二【大】，一【宋】【元】【明】	「或時二眼俱見」 tr. “sometimes two eyes see together.”
0011011	0011c07	失【大】，夫【宮】	「成有分失」 tr. “there results the fault of having parts.”
0011012	0011c12	生【大】，至【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「云何三根由無間生名取至境」 tr. “how are the three faculties, by arising without interval, said to grasp objects reached?”
0012001	0012a09	桃【大】，萄【明】	「如見蒲桃」 tr. “as in seeing a grape.”
0012003	0012a13	澈【大】，徹【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「如香荾花清澈映覆」 tr. “like a coriander blossom, clear and covering over.”
0012004	0012a13	映【大】，膜【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	The 「映」 tr. “covering over” in the same sentence (the reading membrane bears on the explanation by the membrane of the eye; kept for reference).
0012008	0012c02	牙【大】，芽【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「如名鼓聲及麥牙等」 tr. “as with the names ‘sound of a drum’ and ‘barley sprout’ and the like.”
0012009	0012c18	二【大】，一【宮】	「如是生二三四靜慮」 tr. “likewise for one born in the second, third, or fourth meditative absorption.”
0012010	0012c23	三【大】，二【宮】	Stanza: 「次三皆自地」 tr. “the next three are all of their own level.”

Conclusion of the collation: not one entry rises to a case for changing the base text; the variants are recorded together for reference. Where one and the same collation note is used again in more than one place (0010011 · 0012003), it is counted once by note number.

IV. Comparison with Paramārtha’s Earlier Translation (Paramārtha · T1559 ★)

Base of comparison: Xuanzang’s Fascicle Two〔T29n1558 0007a02–0013b05〕↔ Paramārtha〔T29n1559 from the end of 0167a11 to 0173a04〕. Difference of structure: Xuanzang’s Unit 2 forms Fascicle Two by itself and closes with a fascicle-end title; Paramārtha has no fascicle boundary, and the Chapter on the Elements, ending at 「成立非根」 tr. “establishing what is not a faculty”〔0173a02〕, runs straight into the title of the Chapter on the Faculties—Xuanzang has a closing sentence for the fascicle and Paramārtha nothing corresponding.

Principal points of comparison (the sixteen detailed pairs are in the source file; the eight that bear doctrinal weight are recorded here):

The opening question: 「復次於前所說十八界中，幾有見、幾無見？」 tr. “furthermore, among the eighteen elements stated above, how many are visible and how many invisible?”〔Xuanzang 0007a07〕‖「說攝義已。是前所說十八界，於中幾有顯、幾無顯？」 tr. “the sense of inclusion having been stated: among the eighteen elements stated above, how many are manifest and how many non-manifest?”〔Paramārtha 0167a11–12〕—visible against manifest.
The three kinds of resistance: 「障礙、境界、所緣」 tr. “obstruction, object field, object of consciousness”〔Xuanzang 0007a14〕‖「一障礙、二塵礙、三緣緣礙」 tr. “first resistance as obstruction, second resistance of the dust, third resistance of the object condition”〔Paramārtha 0167a17〕; the Treatise of Designations〔Xuanzang 0007a17〕‖the Treatise of Provisional Names〔Paramārtha 0167a19–20〕, one treatise under two names.
The name of the realm-affiliation gate: 「繫謂繫屬，即被縛義」 tr. “affiliation means belonging, that is, the sense of being bound”〔Xuanzang 0007b28〕‖「相應是有義、不相離義」 tr. “correspondence has the sense of possessing and the sense of not being separate”〔Paramārtha 0167b28–29〕—the same gate, glossed in wholly different ways.
Applied and sustained thought: 「五識唯尋伺」 tr. “the five consciousnesses have only applied and sustained thought”〔Xuanzang 0008a11〕‖「有覺亦有觀，定是五識界」 tr. “having awareness and also observation, these are definitely the five consciousness elements”〔Paramārtha 0168a12–13〕—applied and sustained thought against awareness and observation.
The five classes: maturation-born / retribution-produced · nourished / growth-produced · possessed of a real entity / possessed of a real thing〔Xuanzang 0009a17–21 ‖ Paramārtha 0169a19–25〕; the ox-cart simile is the same in both.
The gate of participation: 「法同分餘二，作不作自業」 tr. “the element of dharmas is participating, the rest are both, according to performing or not performing their own work”〔Xuanzang 0010a04〕‖「法界等分」 tr. “the element of dharmas is of equal share” and 「由於塵自功能立名等分」 tr. “from the object’s own capacity the name equal share is established”〔Paramārtha 0170a01–0170a12〕—participating and corresponding nonparticipant against equal share and unequal share; Xuanzang glosses by performing or not performing one’s own work, Paramārtha by the object’s own capacity.
The dispute over whether the eye sees or consciousness sees · the mark of reported doubt within the stanza: 「眼見色同分，非彼能依識，傳說不能觀，彼障諸色故」 tr. “what sees form is the participating eye, not the consciousness that depends on it; it is transmitted that it cannot observe, because of those forms that are screened off”〔Xuanzang 0010c06–07〕‖「偈曰：眼見色……等分……非能依眼識。……由色非可見，被障彼執爾」 tr. “the verse says: the eye sees form . . . of equal share . . . not the dependent eye consciousness. . . . Since the form is not visible when screened off, such is their holding”〔Paramārtha 0170c10–16, one stanza broken into five places〕—Xuanzang puts 「傳說」 tr. “it is transmitted” into the stanza while Paramārtha puts 「彼執」 tr. “their holding” into it; the placement of the mark of reported doubt within the stanza differs in the two versions.
The Sautrāntika conclusion · the marking of the school’s position: 「經部諸師有作是說：如何共聚楂掣虛空……然迦濕彌羅國毘婆沙宗，說眼能見……意能了」 tr. “the Sautrāntika masters say thus: why a crowd gathered to clutch at empty space? . . . Yet the Vaibhāṣika school of Kaśmīra says that the eye can see . . . and the mind can cognize”〔Xuanzang 0011b01–08〕‖「經部說：何故共聚破空？……罽賓國毘婆沙師悉檀判如此」 tr. “the Sautrāntikas say: why gather together to break up space? . . . Such is the Vaibhāṣika masters of Jibin’s doctrinal judgment”〔Paramārtha 0171a20–26〕—Paramārtha produces the phrase 「悉檀判如此」 tr. “such is the doctrinal judgment,” marking a judgment of the school’s position, for which Xuanzang has nothing corresponding.

Correspondence of translated terms (bearing weight in Unit 2 · as attested word for word): visible / manifest · resistant / obstructive · resistance of the object field / resistance of the dust · resistance of the object of consciousness / resistance of the object condition · unwholesome / evil · affiliation / correspondence · applied and sustained thought / awareness and observation · having an object of consciousness / having an object condition · appropriation / grasping · maturation-born / retribution-produced · nourished / growth-produced · possessed of a real entity / possessed of a real thing · inner and outer / what the self depends on and what is outside what the self depends on · participating and corresponding nonparticipant / equal share and unequal share · abandoned through seeing, through cultivation, and not subject to abandonment / extinguished by seeing the truths, by the path of cultivation, and not extinguished · the accompanying acquisition / attainment · the discernment arising together / the knowledge arising together · it is transmitted / they hold · Kaśmīra / Jibin · conceptual and recollective discrimination / displaying and remembering discrimination · what is cognized / what is known · permanent / permanently abiding · Kumāralāta in Xuanzang’s transcription / the same name in Paramārtha’s transcription · Treatise of Designations / Treatise of Provisional Names—while 「八十八隨眠」 tr. “the eighty-eight latent tendencies”, 「等流」 tr. “homogeneous”, and 「經部」 tr. “Sautrāntika” are the same in both versions (the complete table of twenty-seven items is in the source file).

The adoption or rejection of a variant reading is a doctrinal judgment; this section only records and does not adjudicate.

V. Debate within the Abhidharma Lineage (Saṅghabhadra · Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle · T1562 ★ · Fascicle Two = the passage where counter-refutation is dense)

Of the passages explicitly marked 「經主」 tr. “the Sūtra-master,” seven stand in real debate with Fascicle Two of the Kośa (plus one that only cites him), the dispute over whether the eye sees or consciousness sees weighing heaviest:

How 「傳說」 tr. “it is transmitted” in the stanza is to be read—Saṅghabhadra: 「復有餘師，以別道理成立眼識定非是見，謂不能觀被障色故。然經主意不忍彼因，故於頌中摽傳說語」 tr. “there are further masters who, by a separate line of reasoning, establish that eye consciousness is definitively not what sees, namely because it cannot observe screened-off form. But the Sūtra-master’s mind cannot accept that reason, and so in the stanza he marks it with the words ‘it is transmitted’”〔T29n1562 0365a09–12〕. The stanza of the Kośa addressed: 「傳說不能觀，彼障諸色故」 tr. “it is transmitted that it cannot observe, because of those forms that are screened off”〔T29 0010c07〕.
The refutation of the challenge 「境合方取」 tr. “grasping only when the object is met”—Saṅghabhadra: 「經主於此復徵難言：眼豈如身根境合方取，而言有對故不見彼耶？此難不然，不了所說有對義故」 tr. “here the Sūtra-master presses further, saying: is the eye then like the body faculty, grasping only when it meets its object, that one should say it does not see the screened-off because it is resistant? This objection is not right, because he has not understood the sense of resistant as stated”〔T1562 0365b19–22〕; and 「此應責言：若根能取不合境者，則應能取一切不合」 tr. “here one should challenge him: if a faculty can grasp objects it does not meet, then it ought to grasp everything it does not meet”〔0365c26–29〕. The sentence of the Kośa addressed〔T29 0011a03〕.
The refutation of 「是見所依」 tr. “what seeing depends on” and of 「床座言聲」 tr. “the bench that talks”—Saṅghabhadra: 「又經主言：然經說眼能見色者，是見所依故說能見。何緣經主起此執耶？……此不成證，意與意識種類一故」 tr. “again the Sūtra-master says: as for the sūtra’s saying that the eye can see form, it is because the eye is what seeing depends on that it is said to see. On what ground does the Sūtra-master raise this holding? . . . This does not amount to proof, since mind and mind consciousness are of one class”〔T1562 0366c18–22〕; and 「經主何因起斯定執？餘言餘解，不可無因」 tr. “on what cause does the Sūtra-master raise this fixed holding? Other words and other explanations cannot be without a cause”〔0367a07–08〕. The sentence of the Kośa addressed〔T29 0011a09–13〕.
Ultimate atoms touching · the venerable one’s doctrine of touch—Saṅghabhadra: 「經主此中顯彼勝德作如是言，此大德意應可愛樂。……今說大德如是意趣，非即可樂亦非可惡，但應尋究如何無間仍不相觸？」 tr. “here the Sūtra-master, displaying that man’s excellence, says thus: this venerable one’s intent should be found agreeable. . . . Now I say that the venerable one’s intent in this is neither simply agreeable nor to be disliked; one should only investigate how, being without interval, they still do not touch”〔T1562 0373b14–18〕; and against the objection about spatial parts: 「有分、方分，名異義同。立無分言，已遮方分」 tr. “having parts and having spatial parts differ in name and agree in sense; to say ‘without parts’ has already excluded spatial parts”〔0373c07–09〕. The sentence of the Kośa addressed〔T29 0011c24–28〕.
The reason 「行相麁外門轉」 tr. “the mode is coarse and turns toward the outer gate” in the gate of applied and sustained thought—Saṅghabhadra: 「此因非理，現見意識內門轉時亦常與彼共相應故。應作是釋：五識唯於尋伺所隨地中有故」 tr. “this reason is not sound, since it is directly observed that mind consciousness, when it turns toward the inner gate, is also always associated with them. The explanation should be: the five consciousnesses exist only in the stages that applied and sustained thought accompany”〔T1562 0350a08–10〕. The sentence of the Kośa addressed〔T29 0008a13〕.
That 「無第二尋」 tr. “there is no second applied thought” is no decisive proof—Saṅghabhadra: 「設有第二，許相應耶？有第二受而不相應。無第二言，非為定證」 tr. “supposing there were a second, would association be granted? There is a second feeling, and yet they are not associated. The words ‘there is no second’ do not constitute a decisive proof”〔T1562 0350a20–23〕. The sentence of the Kośa addressed〔T29 0008a20〕.
The debate over nose and tongue in the realm-affiliation gate—Saṅghabhadra: 「起說嚴身但須依處，根非有見，何所莊嚴？」 tr. “for giving rise to speech and adorning the body the bases alone suffice; the faculty is not visible—what does it adorn?”〔T1562 0349b25–26〕. The sentence of the Kośa addressed〔T29 0007c19–22〕.
(a citation, not an explicit refutation) 「假說心為我」 tr. “mind is provisionally spoken of as the self”—Saṅghabhadra cites the Sūtra-master’s explanation and expands it with other sūtras〔T1562 0360b21–24〕, with no words of refutation; recorded here for reference.

The corresponding passage of the Treatise Revealing the Doctrine only preserves that stanza in ornamented form, with no independent counter-refutation (the only passage marked 「經主」 tr. “the Sūtra-master” anchored in this section is at 0786a21, and what it addresses is the passage on the bases of the six faculties at the end of Fascicle One, which belongs to the boundary of Unit 1).

『一義二宗』, one meaning and two schools—both are recorded and neither is judged the winner. Further: within T1562 0344a–0346a · 0355b–c there are seven more passages marked 「經主」 tr. “the Sūtra-master” which address Fascicle One of the Kośa (the establishing and dismissing of aggregate, sense field, and element · sequence · the dispute over the great elements)—these bear weight for Unit 1, and the leads for filling them in have been recorded (especially 0345a10, addressing 0005b28).

VI. Divergent Interpretations of the Commentators (Puguang · Fabao · Yuanhui · Shentai)

(1) The Three Ethical Qualities · Realm Affiliation

The opening out of wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate—Puguang: wholesome sevenfold (innate · from hearing · from reflection · from cultivation · of one in training · of one beyond training · ultimate), unwholesome onefold, indeterminate sevenfold (one obscured plus six unobscured: maturation · deportment · craft · supernormal result · intrinsic nature · ultimate)〔T41n1821 0035c15–28〕; the element of dharmas has four wholesome (intrinsic nature · association · co-origination · ultimate) and three unwholesome, and he explains why the ultimately unwholesome is not spoken of here: 「勝義不善，體通三性。……若說勝義，即無差別」 tr. “the ultimately unwholesome extends in substance to all three ethical qualities. . . . If the ultimate is spoken of, there is then no distinction”〔0036b17–19〕. Fabao divides the passage in the same way with fuller subdivisions〔T41n1822 0496a18–0496b06〕. Yuanhui explains that form and sound are judged wholesome or unwholesome by co-origination: 「由色、聲二非自性善惡，約能發心判成善惡」 tr. “because form and sound are not wholesome or unwholesome by their own nature, they are judged wholesome or unwholesome with reference to the mind that sets them in motion”〔T41n1823 0827b29–0827c03〕.
Realm affiliation—Puguang cites the Miscellaneous Heart Treatise, 「彼無揣食性、以身微妙故」 tr. “there is no nature of morsel food there, because the body is subtle,” and records a divergent school: 「若依《宗輪論》，大眾部等，色、無色界具六識身」 tr. “according to the Treatise on the Wheel of Tenets, for the Mahāsāṃghikas and others the realms of form and formlessness possess all six bodies of consciousness”〔T1821 0037a02–0037a09〕. Fabao glosses the sense of affiliation: 「欲界繫法，被欲界貪等繫縛，名欲界繫」 tr. “dharmas affiliated with the realm of desire are bound by the greed and the rest of the realm of desire, and so are named affiliated with the realm of desire”〔T1822 0496b13–15〕.

(2) The Five Classes · Appropriation · Participation

The five classes do not include one another—Puguang explains the five classes as a whole, drawing in each case the distinction of in general there are two (the recurring phrases 「泛明長養有二」 tr. “in general, nourishing is of two kinds” and 「泛明等流有二」 tr. “in general, homogeneity is of two kinds”): nourishing by increase of substance or by superiority of function · two kinds of homogeneity · two kinds of momentariness · two kinds of the real〔T1821 0040c25–0041a14〕. Yuanhui: 「五類明義，體各不同，互不相攝」 tr. “the five classes make their sense plain, their substances each differing, and they do not include one another,” and he brings out four kinds of nourishing (food and drink · assistance · sleep · concentration) and 「能長養通三性，所長養唯無記」 tr. “what nourishes extends to all three ethical qualities, while what is nourished is only indeterminate”〔T1823 0829b02–0829c06〕. Fabao cites the Correct Principle: 「何緣聲界非異熟生？數數間斷復還生故」 tr. “on what ground is the sound element not maturation-born? Because it is repeatedly interrupted and then arises again”〔T1822 0500b01–02〕.
Appropriation—Puguang resolves a difficulty: 「現在五根，識不依時亦名執受，執受類故。……去、來五根無容發識，名無執受」 tr. “the five faculties in the present, even when consciousness does not depend on them, are still named appropriated, since they are of the class of the appropriated. . . . Past and future five faculties have no capacity to generate consciousness, and are named unappropriated”〔T1821 0039b22–26〕. Fabao cites the Correct Principle for two senses of appropriation (grasped as one’s own by craving and the view of self · being a cause able to produce pleasure and pain)〔T1822 0498c04–12〕.
The element of dharmas is always participating—Fabao cites the Correct Principle, 「且如法界與彼意識為定所緣，是不共故」 tr. “for instance the element of dharmas is the fixed object of that mind consciousness, since it is not held in common,” and judges the five objects to be held in common and not fixed objects〔T1822 0504b15–26〕. Yuanhui brings out two senses of 「定」 tr. “fixed” and explains the four kinds of corresponding nonparticipant eye〔T1823 0830b07–29〕. Puguang distinguishes that faculty and consciousness are named participating with reference to their capacity to grasp an object, while an outer object is named participating with reference to its being taken as an object〔T1821 0046a14–0046b11〕.

(3) The Three Abandonings · Seeing and Not Seeing (the Dispute over Whether the Eye Sees or Consciousness Sees · the Principal Anchor)

The three abandonings—Yuanhui enumerates the eighty-eight latent tendencies (ten for suffering · seven each for origin and cessation · eight for the path; in the two higher realms twenty-eight each, hatred being excluded) and brings out a dependent-determinative analysis: 「見謂見諦，見是能斷，惑是所斷，見之所斷，名見所斷」 tr. “seeing means seeing the truths; seeing is what abandons, defilement is what is abandoned; what is abandoned by seeing is named abandoned through seeing”〔T1823 0831a01–0831a16〕. Puguang 「略開三章顯非見斷」 tr. “briefly opens three headings to display what is not abandoned through seeing” and explains why the treatise cites only a part〔T1821 0048a18–0048b05〕. Fabao distinguishes abandonment by intrinsic nature from abandonment by object〔T1822 0506a12–26〕.
The four masters’ positions (or five)—Puguang: 「尊者世友眼見，尊者法救眼識見，尊者妙音眼識相應慧見，譬喻者眼識同時心、心所法和合見」 tr. “the venerable Vasumitra holds that the eye sees; the venerable Dharmatrāta that eye consciousness sees; the venerable Ghoṣa that the discernment associated with eye consciousness sees; the masters of similes that the assemblage of mind and mental factors simultaneous with eye consciousness sees”〔T1821 0048c05–07〕; Fabao adds a fifth, 「又說犢子部心、心所和合見」 tr. “it is also said that for the Vātsīputrīyas the assemblage of mind and mental factors sees,” and states plainly that 「尊者世友眼見，此是有部正義」 tr. “the venerable Vasumitra’s ‘the eye sees’ is the correct sense of the Sarvāstivādins”〔T1822 0507b12–15〕.
Why only the position that consciousness sees is refuted—Puguang preserves four explanations side by side (refutation where the interest lies · refuting the discernment position along with it · the assemblage position partly agreeing with the Sautrāntikas · refuting the strongest, consciousness, and thereby all three), citing the Miscellaneous Heart Treatise: 「同分眼見色，非彼眼識見，非慧非和合，不見障色故」 tr. “the participating eye sees form, not that eye consciousness, nor discernment, nor an assemblage, because screened-off form is not seen”〔T1821 0048c14–16〕; Fabao settles it by the single explanation of that Heart Treatise: 「破一，例亦破餘」 tr. “refuting one, the rest are refuted by parity”〔T1822 0507b15–19〕.
Seeing is of two kinds—Puguang: 「一者觀照名見，所謂眼根。……不舒光至境，不同燈日；亦非影現，不同水鏡……二者推度名見」 tr. “first, illuminating and observing is named seeing, namely the eye faculty. . . . It does not stretch out light to the object, unlike a lamp or the sun; nor does it receive an image, unlike water or a mirror. . . . Second, inferring and judging is named seeing”〔T1821 0049a14–23〕.
The division of the two parties’ questions and answers—Puguang assigns each sentence in turn (「傳說不能至應見障色」 tr. “from ‘it is transmitted that it cannot’ down to ‘it ought to see screened-off form’” = the eye-sees party pressing back by way of explanation)〔T1821 0049c01–13〕; Fabao divides it in the same way: 「論『傳說不能觀障色故』，此立因也」 tr. “the treatise’s ‘it is transmitted that it cannot observe, because of screened-off forms’—this is the setting out of the reason”〔T1822 0507b26–0507c04〕.
Where the author inclines—Puguang: 「上來雖復眼見、識見兩家異諍，看其文勢，論主意朋識見」 tr. “although the two parties, the eye-sees and the consciousness-sees, dispute above, looking at the momentum of the text, the author inclines toward the view that consciousness sees,” and he explains the Sautrāntika sense: 「諸法但有功能，實無作用。世尊為順世情，假說見耳」 tr. “dharmas have only capacities and in fact no agent function; the World-Honored One, to accord with worldly feeling, merely speaks provisionally of seeing”〔T1821 0050b22–0050c09〕.
To which party the two passages 「有餘難言」 tr. “some others object” and 「有餘復言」 tr. “some others further say” belong—Fabao cites Master Tai: 「太法師云犢子難」 tr. “Master Tai says it is the Vātsīputrīya objection” and 「曇摩多羅部通前經說眼能見色」 tr. “the Dharmatrāta school reconciles the earlier sūtra saying that the eye can see form”〔T1822 0508a06–09〕(the character 「太」 tr. “Tai” is reproduced as printed); Puguang leaves two explanations open〔T1821 0050a11–20〕.
The three gates at the end of the fascicle—Puguang cites the Miscellaneous Heart Treatise: 「色界二識識，乃至觸亦然。諸餘十三界，一向意識緣」 tr. “the form element is cognized by two consciousnesses, and so on to the tangible likewise; the remaining thirteen elements are throughout taken as object by mind consciousness alone”〔T1821 0055b19–23〕; Fabao: 「下一頌有三門……加前二十二門」 tr. “the following single stanza has three gates . . . added to the preceding, twenty-two gates”〔T1822 0511c27–29〕; Yuanhui marks them as 「第二十……第二十一……第二十二」 tr. “the twentieth . . . the twenty-first . . . the twenty-second”〔T1823 0833b02–09〕.

(4) Divergences among the Three Commentaries (Recorded Together, Not Adjudicated)

The numbering of the major division and the counting of the gates: Puguang, the third major division · twenty-two gates〔0034b06〕/ Fabao, the second major division · nineteen lines of stanza, with the final three gates 「加前二十二門」 tr. “added to the preceding, twenty-two gates”〔0495a18 · 0511c28〕/ Yuanhui, the third · twenty-two gates, the final three being the twentieth through twenty-second〔0826b25 · 0833b02〕.
The judgment of where the author inclines: Puguang judges outright that 「意朋識見」 tr. “he inclines toward the view that consciousness sees”〔0050b24〕/ Fabao only divides the text: 「論主此述有部宗也」 tr. “here the author is stating the Sarvāstivāda position”〔0508a18〕/ Yuanhui closes by citing the Sautrāntikas and issues no judgment〔0831b15–18〕. (Puguang moreover has, under the gate of the visible, a separate judgment that 「論主意朋經部」 tr. “the author inclines toward the Sautrāntikas”〔0034b28–0034c02〕—two gates, two judgments, both preserved for reference.)
To which party the two passages 「有餘難言」 tr. “some others object” and 「有餘復言」 tr. “some others further say” belong: Puguang leaves it open〔0050a11–20〕/ Fabao, citing Master Tai, fixes them as the Vātsīputrīyas and the Dharmatrāta school〔0508a05–09〕/ Yuanhui does not enter the question.
Why only the position that consciousness sees is refuted: Puguang preserves four explanations〔0048c08–16〕/ Fabao settles it by the single explanation of the Miscellaneous Heart Treatise〔0507b15–19〕/ Yuanhui marks it directly and raises no question〔0831b02–03〕.

The sustained thought of the intermediate meditative absorption belongs to the third class (without applied and without sustained thought)—in this treatise’s 「法界所攝非相應法，靜慮中間伺亦如是」 tr. “the non-associated dharmas included in the element of dharmas, and the sustained thought of the intermediate meditative absorption, are likewise”〔T29 0008a18〕, what the phrase 「亦如是」 tr. “are likewise” carries over is without applied and without sustained thought, not without applied thought and with sustained thought only. Fabao word for word: 「第二明非相應法及靜慮中間伺，俱是無尋無伺」 tr. “the second clarifies that the non-associated dharmas and the sustained thought of the intermediate meditative absorption are both without applied and without sustained thought,” giving the reason, 「中間伺無第二伺故，及地法無尋故，所以伺是無尋無伺」 tr. “because the intermediate sustained thought has no second sustained thought, and because the dharmas of that stage have no applied thought, this sustained thought is without applied and without sustained thought,” and explaining the fourth case at the end, 「伺在中間禪無尋無伺，在欲界初禪有尋無伺」 tr. “sustained thought in the intermediate absorption is without applied and without sustained thought; in the realm of desire and the first absorption it has applied thought and no sustained thought”〔T41n1822 0497c11–23〕. Puguang judges the same, writing 「非相應法界及靜慮中間伺，亦同第三品」 tr. “the non-associated element of dharmas and the sustained thought of the intermediate meditative absorption are likewise of the third class”〔T41n1821 0038b12〕. ⇒ In the treatise’s four classes of dharma, 「無伺唯尋」 tr. “without sustained thought and with applied thought only” is restricted to the sustained thought of the realm of desire and the first meditative absorption〔T29 0008a25〕, and the sustained thought of the intermediate absorption is not among them.

(5) Shentai’s Commentary (Fragmentary Witness · Fascicle Two, Direct Explanation of 「分別界品第一之二」 tr. “Analysis of the Elements, Chapter One, Part Two”)

Shentai’s Commentary on the Abhidharmakośa, Fascicle Two explaining 「分別界品第一之二」 tr. “Analysis of the Elements, Chapter One, Part Two”〔X53n0836 0020c11〕〔with the end-of-fascicle title at〔0033a15〕〕, corresponds fascicle for fascicle with this unit. Shentai’s commentary had not been recorded in this unit before; one entry is now supplied for the passage on objects reached and not reached and on ultimate atoms.

Ultimate atoms touching · Dharmatrāta’s doctrine—on this treatise’s 「大德說一切極微實不相觸……此大德意應可愛樂」 tr. “the venerable one says that no ultimate atoms in fact touch one another . . . this venerable one’s intent should be found agreeable”〔T29 0011c23–24〕, Shentai explains: 「敘大德達摩多羅，此云法救。為敬其德，不稱其名。彼說一切極微實不相觸，但由中間無空隙間，假立觸名」 tr. “this reports the venerable Dharmatrāta, whose name here means ‘Dharma-rescued.’ Out of respect for his virtue his name is not spoken. He says that no ultimate atoms in fact touch one another, and that only because there is no empty gap between them is the name touch provisionally established”〔X53n0836 0031a07–14〕. Shentai also cites the counter-refutation of the Correct Principle (「經主此中顯彼勝德」 tr. “here the Sūtra-master, displaying that man’s excellence”)—running along the same track as the entry on Saṅghabhadra’s debate in Section V; both are recorded without adjudication.

VII. Cross-Reading with the Yogācāra Root Lineage (links to the root system)

The dispute over whether the eye sees or consciousness sees → consciousness dependent on a faculty in Yogācāra: the four masters’ dispute in this gate and its close in the Sautrāntika 「唯法因果實無作用」 tr. “there are only dharmas as cause and result, and in fact no agent function”〔T29 0011b01–05〕—in the Mahāyāna Abhidharma lineage this question is still answered by naming after the support: 「何故但名眼等識不名色等識耶？答：以依眼等五種解釋道理成就，非於色等」 tr. “why is it named only eye consciousness and the rest, and not form consciousness and the rest? Answer: because the five kinds of explanatory reasoning are established with respect to the eye and the rest, and not with respect to form and the rest”〔T31n1606 0703a28〕.
The three kinds of discrimination → the three kinds of discrimination in Yogācāra: 「一自性分別、二計度分別、三隨念分別」 tr. “first intrinsic discrimination, second conceptual discrimination, third recollective discrimination”〔T29 0008b02–03〕—the Mahāyāna Abhidharma Compendium with Commentary carries on these three names unchanged: 「三分別者，謂自性分別、隨念分別、計度分別」 tr. “the three kinds of discrimination are intrinsic discrimination, recollective discrimination, and conceptual discrimination”〔T31n1606 0703a14〕. 〔Honestly recorded: the Yogācārabhūmi has no such heading of three kinds of discrimination; its eight kinds of discrimination (intrinsic · differentiating · collective grasping · self · what belongs to self · the liked · the disliked · what is contrary to both)〔T30n1579 0489c15〕belong to another lineage and should not be confused with these.〕
Participating and corresponding nonparticipant → the unassociated of the hundred dharmas: participation (commonality of sentient beings) enters the formations not associated with mind among the hundred dharmas—the expansion and compression between the sense of participation as a class of elements in this gate, glossed by 「作自業、不作自業」 tr. “performing or not performing one’s own work,” and the sense of commonality of sentient beings, will be collated when the five positions are fully enumerated in the Chapter on the Faculties.
Seeing (deliberating and judging decisively) → the discrimination of the seeing part in Yogācāra: 「審慮為先決度名見」 tr. “what deliberates first and then judges decisively is named seeing”〔T29 0010c18〕—the definition of seeing takes the two things 「審慮」 tr. “deliberation” and 「決度」 tr. “decisive judgment” as its substance, and this is the Abhidharma text carried on by the later lineage in discussing the seeing part and the mental factor of discernment.

VIII. Translation History

Unit 2 has no independent items of translation history (for the translation history of the whole treatise see Section VIII of Unit 1’s apparatus: Xuanzang translated from the second to the fifth year of Yonghui, Yuanyu taking it down; Paramārtha issued his in the fourth year of Tianjia; both catalogues call them 「同本異譯」 tr. “different translations of the same text”). One matter belongs to this unit: Paramārtha’s corresponding passage (0167a12–0173a04) corresponds gate by gate with Xuanzang’s Fascicle Two while having no fascicle boundary—the difference in the two versions’ practice of dividing fascicles (twenty-two against thirty) may be glimpsed here (Section IV).

IX. Edition Location Register

Xuanzang, T1558, Fascicle Two (base text): the continued chapter title〔T29 0007a06〕· visible, resistant, and the three ethical qualities 0007a09 · realm affiliation 0007b26 · applied and sustained thought 0008a11 · the three kinds of discrimination 0008b02 · appropriation 0008b24 · great elements and derived form 0008c01 · cutting, burning, weighing 0009a03 · the five classes 0009a19 · acquisition and possession 0009b28 · inner and outer 0009c16 · participation 0010a04 · the three abandonings 0010b15 · seeing and not seeing, the dispute over whether the eye sees 0010c04–0011b08 · two eyes 0011b10 · objects reached and not reached, ultimate atoms 0011b18–0011c28 · equal measure, the faculties’ ultimate atoms 0012a04 · the support of consciousness 0012b04 · naming after the faculty 0012b20 · the levels of the four things 0012c21 · the incidental discussion complete 0013a11 · the concluding three gates 0013a13 · the close of the fascicle 0013b03. Source file: canonical layer (the sequence of Chinese characters checked against the original canon file).
Paramārtha, T1559: the corresponding passage 0167a11–0173a04 (no fascicle boundary; the title of the Chapter on the Faculties at 0173a04).
Saṅghabhadra, T1562: 0349b22 · 0350a07–23 · 0360b21 · 0365a10–0365c29 · 0366c18–0367a08 · 0373b13–0373c09; T1563: 0786a21 (at the boundary of Unit 1).
Puguang, T1821, Fascicle Two (0034b02–0055c12): 0034b06 · 0035c15 · 0036b07 · 0036c28 · 0039b17 · 0040c25 · 0046a14–0046b11 · 0048a18 · 0048c05–16 · 0049a11 · 0049c01 · 0050a11 · 0050b22–0050c09 · 0055b17.
Fabao, T1822, Fascicle Two (0495a14–0512a18): 0495a18 · 0496a18–0496b15 · 0498c04 · 0499b18 · 0500b01 · 0504b15 · 0506a12 · 0507b12–0507c04 · 0508a05–20 · 0511c27.
Yuanhui, T1823, Treatise Text Two (0826b23–0833c09): 0826b25 · 0827b16–0827c15 · 0828c06 · 0829a25–0829c06 · 0830b07–29 · 0830c21–0831a16 · 0831a24–0831b18 · 0833b02–09.
Shentai, X53n0836, Fascicle Two (0020c09–0033a21 · direct explanation of Part Two of the Chapter on the Elements): 0031a07–09. Shentai’s commentary is fragmentary and survives in the X collection.
Collation: the twenty-nine collation entries of Fascicle Two completely enumerated (Section III · no case for changing the base text).

俱舍論 諸門分別·結Abhidharmakośabhāṣya · Distinctions through the Several Gates · Conclusion