俱舍論 六因·五果Abhidharmakośabhāṣya · Six Causes · Five Results

The opening of the third major division of the Chapter on the Faculties. The three preceding fascicles said which dharmas there are; this one says what these dharmas arise by — causes opened out into six, results into five, the taking and the giving of a result fixing their times, and the four classes of dharmas arising from causes closing off the field. Causes end and the fascicle breaks off; the four conditions begin again elsewhere.

In one sentence: “Dharmas arise from causes” is taken apart to its last grain in order to say the one line that comes at the end — a dharma produced by a single cause definitely does not exist.

Provenance (established first)

Three commentators cut at the same place at the head of the fascicle: Puguang writes, “From here begins the third major division of this chapter, explaining causes and conditions”; Fabao writes, “From here begins the third major division of this chapter, explaining cause and also condition”; Yuanhui writes, “From here, the third major division, explaining causes and conditions.” Shentai instead sets up a fivefold outline, yet the boundary does not shift. At the fascicle’s end Yuanhui concludes, “All the distinctions above belong in sum to the first part; the explanation of causes is complete” — a commentator’s closing words falling precisely on the line along which Xuanzang divided the fascicle. Root Stanza 62 straddles cause and condition; the translator gave up the stanza boundary and followed the doctrinal one, and so the end of this fascicle is marked as Root 61 together with the first half of Root 62.

Three eyes

1. Five words — “the Abhidharma masters allow” — set the posture of the whole fascicle. The treatise lists six causes, and the closing sentence reads, “The Abhidharma masters allow that causes are only these six kinds.” What is set down is “allow,” not “the Buddha said.” Yuanhui at once records the Sautrāntika counter-question: the four conditions they allow, because scripture states them; the six causes they do not, because scripture does not. Fabao likewise records that the four conditions have textual warrant while the six causes have none. Saṅghabhadra holds the contrary, adducing scripture item by item and ruling, “These six causes the Buddha stated everywhere.” Whether there is scriptural warrant this treatise does not adjudicate; both parties are recorded. Whether the six causes serve well is a question of whether they can state without remainder what dharmas arise by. The first lesson in reading Abhidharma is to tell apart what the treatise itself says outright and what later hands have decided on its behalf.

2. The enabling cause counts even “not getting in the way” as a cause. The criterion is three words — abiding without obstructing: at the moment a given dharma arises, all other dharmas are there without blocking it, and that is enough. Even nirvāṇa and dharmas that will never arise at all are counted, on the ground of “like a king without power” — he has no capacity to do harm, and the people of the realm still say, “Because of our sovereign we obtain ease.” The lower limit of causation is set this low so that the arising of one dharma may draw in the whole realm of dharmas; yet its result, the dominant result, is restricted to the conditioned — a wide cause with a narrow result, and exactly the foreshadowing of that great dispute further on over “the unconditioned has neither cause nor result.”

3. Simultaneous cause and result, and the vacancy left for the continuum. The coexistent cause holds that cause and result are simultaneous and are moreover each the other’s; the Sautrāntikas counter at once, “No such simultaneous cause and result has ever been seen.” At the other end the maturation cause is stated with complete rigidity — a maturation result is neither simultaneous with the action nor immediately subsequent to it; it can be brought about only when a continuum has transformed. One end asserts simultaneity, the other insists on separation; what carries the stretch of “continuum” in between, the treatise does not answer here. That vacancy is the largest single bequest this fascicle leaves to later ages.

One meaning (appended): Is the unconditioned a thing?

Beneath the stanza “Results are the conditioned and release from bondage; the unconditioned has neither cause nor result” lies the longest dispute in the fascicle. The Sautrāntikas say that no unconditioned dharma is really existent — space is merely the absence of anything tangible, and cessation through discernment is merely the non-recurrence of what is left over, brought about by the force of selection. The Sarvāstivādins say it has a separate real entity, realized inwardly and severally by the noble ones. The author of the treatise records the words of both parties and closes with “The Vaibhāṣikas do not allow this explanation,” passing no overall judgment of his own. Saṅghabhadra is in no way equivocal: he announces outright, “I now refute the Sūtra-master’s slander of causes,” and concludes, “Thus the Sūtra-master’s slander of causes has been refuted, and it is established that nirvāṇa is real in its entity.” The point at issue is not the wording but the entity: both sides grant that scripture calls nirvāṇa foremost; what they contest is whether this foremost is one really existent thing, or is utterly non-existent.

Through the whole treatise

The names of the five results — maturation, homogeneous, release from bondage, human effort, dominant — were taken over intact by later ages without the change of a single word; the enabling cause was afterwards opened out into ten causes and twenty causes; and the place where a continuum must intervene between the maturation cause and its result, while this treatise posits no separate entity to carry it, is exactly the vacancy that the maturation consciousness would later be established to fill. Fabao had already drawn this line out at the end of the section on the six causes, leaving a question behind: from what scriptural text does the sense of the Mahāyāna ten causes, six causes, and four conditions come? The ancient masters did not answer it, nor is it answered here on their behalf; it is recorded only as a coordinate.

〔Root 50〕General Listing of the Six Causes

Carrying forward: The formations not associated with mind have now been explained. Earlier, when the arising-mark was said to produce what is to arise, it was noted that this is not accomplished by the arising-mark alone, apart from the remaining causes and conditions. Which dharmas here, then, are called causes and conditions? Causes are stated first. There are six kinds of cause. Which six? The stanza says:

Stanza: The enabling cause and the coexistent cause, the homogeneous cause and the associated cause, the all-pervading cause and the maturation cause — the Abhidharma masters allow that there are only these six kinds of cause.

Treatise: There are six kinds of cause: first the enabling cause, second the coexistent cause, third the homogeneous cause, fourth the associated cause, fifth the all-pervading cause, sixth the maturation cause. The masters of Abhidharma allow that there are only these six kinds of cause. Now the first question: what is the character of the first, the enabling cause? The stanza says:

〔Root 51〔Line 1〕〕The Enabling Cause: Not Obstructing Is Itself Being a Cause

Stanza: Apart from the dharma itself, all other dharmas are its enabling causes.

Treatise: When any conditioned dharma arises, only its own entity is excluded, and all other dharmas are its enabling causes — because at the time it arises those dharmas abide without adding any obstruction. Although the remaining five causes also, by their very nature, act upon a result and may be called enabling, each of those five has a name of its own, while this one alone has no other name available, and so the general name is given to it — just as “sense field of visible form” and the rest are properly general terms yet are used as particular names.

Someone objects: is it not said that, so long as the truths have not been known, the outflows are about to arise, and that because they have been known the outflows do not arise? Then cognition does obstruct the arising of the outflows; and again, sunlight obstructs a person from seeing the stars before him. How then can it be said that when a conditioned dharma arises, all dharmas apart from its own entity are its enabling causes? — It should be understood that what is said is that at the time this dharma arises, those dharmas all abide without obstruction, and that it is on this account that they are enabling causes of it. (When cognition arises, and when sunlight arises, the outflows and the seeing of stars simply do not arise; only when cognition and sunlight are not present is it the time for the outflows and the seeing of stars to arise, and at that time those very dharmas abide without obstructing them.)

A further question: if a dharma had the power to obstruct this dharma when it arises and yet did not obstruct it, it might be established as a cause — just as the people of a realm, because their sovereign does them no harm, all say, “It is because of our sovereign that we obtain ease.” But if a dharma has no obstructing operation at all with respect to the arising of this dharma (not even the capacity to obstruct), then, however much it does not obstruct, on what ground is it a cause? — Take nirvāṇa and dharmas that will never arise, with respect to the arising of any conditioned dharma; or the continuum of beings in the hells and elsewhere, with respect to the arising of the aggregates of the formless realm: their being present amounts to their being absent, and they have no obstructing operation whatever. The answer: although they have no obstructing operation, they are still established as causes, just as with a king who has no power — the people of the realm may say, exactly as before, “Because of our sovereign we obtain ease.”

This is said of all enabling causes in general, taking only the one sense of not obstructing. Where the more excellent among them are concerned, the enabling cause is not wholly without power to produce a result: the eye faculty and the visible object, for instance, with respect to the arising of visual consciousness and the rest; food with respect to the body; seeds and the rest with respect to sprouts and the rest — these do genuinely have productive power.

Another objection is raised: if all dharmas become enabling causes because they do not obstruct, why do not all dharmas arise all at once? When one person kills, why does not everyone alike incur the act of killing as that killer does? — The objection does not stand. It is only on the one point of not obstructing that all dharmas are allowed to be enabling causes; it is not said that they all have an intimate productive force with respect to the arising of the result. (The intimate cause and the mind that equally instigates are not present, and so there is no arising all at once and no shared offense.)

Another class of masters says: all enabling causes have an enabling power with respect to the arising of the result. To them one may put the question: what enabling power has nirvāṇa and the rest with respect to the arising of visual consciousness? The answer: mental consciousness arises taking nirvāṇa and the rest as its object, and becomes either a wholesome or an unwholesome mind; and because that mental consciousness has occurred, visual consciousness afterwards obtains its arising in due sequence — for they are causes of one another in a chain. So nirvāṇa and the rest do have an enabling power with respect to the arising of visual consciousness. The remaining dharmas are to be inferred on this same model, and all should be known to have productive power in a chain.

The character of the enabling cause has been explained. Second, what is the character of the coexistent cause? The stanza says:

〔Root 51〔Lines 2–4〕〕The Coexistent Cause: Serving as One Another’s Results

Stanza: Serving as one another’s results is the coexistent cause — as with the four great elements among themselves, as with what marks and what is marked, as with mind and the dharmas that follow mind.

Treatise: If two dharmas serve as one another’s results of human effort (the result obtained through the force of the cause’s operation), then those two dharmas are one another’s coexistent causes. What is their character? Just as the four great elements — earth, water, fire, wind — are reciprocally coexistent causes with respect to one another; and likewise the marks (the four marks of arising, abiding, change, and cessation) and the dharma they mark, and mind and the dharmas that follow mind, are all causes of one another. In this way the coexistent cause, by the single sense of being one another’s results, gathers in all conditioned dharmas accordingly.

One exception, however, must be sorted out: a primary dharma and its secondary marks (the four lesser marks) are not one another’s results — the primary dharma is not a result produced by the secondary marks — and yet the primary dharma is still a coexistent cause of the secondary marks (the secondary marks follow the primary dharma), while conversely the secondary marks are not coexistent causes of the primary dharma. This point should be argued out here.

What, then, are called the dharmas that follow mind? The stanza says:

〔Root 52〔Lines 1–3〕〕The Entities of the Dharmas That Follow Mind

Stanza: The mental factors, the two disciplines of absorption and of the without-outflows, and the marks of these together with mind itself — these are the dharmas that follow mind.

Treatise: All dharmas associated with mind (the mental factors), the two disciplines — the discipline of absorption and the discipline without outflows — and the marks of arising, abiding, change, and cessation belonging to these dharmas and to mind itself: all of these are called dharmas that follow mind. (The two disciplines are nonmanifest form that exists when one enters absorption and is absent when one leaves it, and so they follow mind.)

Why, then, are these dharmas called followers of mind? The stanza says:

〔Root 52〔Line 4〕〕Ten Reasons Adjudicate Following: Time, Result, Ethical Quality, and the Rest

Stanza: Because time is the same, result is the same, and the three ethical qualities, wholesome and the rest, are the same.

Treatise: Stated briefly, it is because time is the same, result and the rest are the same, and the wholesome and the rest are the same, that these dharmas are said to follow mind.

First, as to time: these dharmas have one arising, one abiding, and one cessation with mind, and they fall together into one time-period (past, present, or future, all belonging to one period). These four items together make the gate of time, showing that only what is simultaneous with mind is called a follower.

Second, as to result and the rest: these dharmas obtain one result with mind, call forth one maturation with mind, and obtain one homogeneous outflow with mind.

It should be understood that the “one” stated first here (one arising, one abiding, one cessation) shows simultaneity, while the “one” stated afterwards (one result, one maturation, one homogeneous outflow) shows commonality — one and the same word, with a different meaning in the two places.

Third, as to the wholesome and the rest: these dharmas are, together with mind, wholesome in quality, or unwholesome in quality, or indeterminate in quality.

From the four items of time, the three of result, and the three of quality, ten reasons are reckoned in all, and hence the name dharmas that follow mind.

Here, stated in terms of dharma-numbers: mind as sovereign is a reciprocal coexistent cause with at least fifty-eight dharmas — namely the ten factors of the great ground, their forty primary marks, and mind’s own four primary marks and four secondary marks, eight in all, making fifty-eight dharmas together. Conversely, among these fifty-eight, once mind’s four secondary marks are removed, the remaining fifty-four are the coexistent causes of mind.

Another master says: only fourteen dharmas are causes of mind — that is, the ten factors of the great ground together with mind’s four primary marks (not taking in the forty primary marks upon the factors of the great ground). This position is not good. Why? Because it contradicts the express words of the Treatise on Categories of Dharmas. As that treatise says: “There are dharmas of the truth of suffering that have the view of a real person as their cause and are not causes of the view of a real person — that is, apart from the future view of a real person and the arising, aging, abiding, and impermanence of the dharmas associated with it, the remaining defiled dharmas of the truth of suffering”; and, “There are dharmas of the truth of suffering that have the view of a real person as their cause and are also causes of the view of a real person — that is, the dharmas just excluded.” (Since what is excluded includes the four marks of the associated dharmas, it is evident that the primary marks upon the factors of the great ground are also reciprocal coexistent causes with mind.) Some transmitted versions, however, do not recite the five characters “and the dharmas associated with it.” The Vaibhāṣikas of Kaśmīra say that the passage must certainly be recited thus; or that even without those characters one should know from the sense that the statement is abbreviated.

Next it must be sorted out that coexisting and the coexistent cause are not the same thing. Whatever is a cause by way of the coexistent cause certainly coexists; but there are also things that coexist and yet are not causes by way of the coexistent cause — namely: the secondary marks with respect to their own primary dharma; the secondary marks with respect to one another; the secondary marks of the dharmas that follow mind with respect to mind; those secondary marks with respect to one another; all simultaneously arisen resistant derived forms with respect to one another; some simultaneously arisen nonresistant derived forms with respect to one another; all simultaneously arisen derived forms and great elements with respect to one another; and all simultaneously arisen acquisitions and what is acquired with respect to one another. These dharmas, though called coexistent, are not causes by way of the coexistent cause — because they do not take one result, one maturation, and one homogeneous outflow together. As for an acquisition and what is acquired, they do not even necessarily proceed at the same time, but may be earlier, later, or co-arisen, and so are all the less coexistent causes.

These points may be granted for the moment. But — in the causation universally acknowledged in the world, the seed is earlier and the sprout later; simultaneous cause and result of the sort you speak of has never been seen. So it must now be made clear: among a mass of dharmas arising at the same time, how can there be any sense of cause and result?

The Sarvāstivādins answer: Is it not evident to sight? A lamp flame and its light, a sprout and its shadow, are simultaneous and yet are one another’s cause and result.

The Sautrāntikas counter: This is exactly what should be argued out in detail — are the lamp flame and its light one another’s cause and result, or do the causes and conditions conjoined in the preceding moment (human effort, the lamp vessel, the oil, the wick) make flame and light arise together? As for the shadow, it appears because something else blocks the light; how can that shadow be said to have the sprout as its cause? (If the sprout produced the shadow, then where there is a sprout but no sunlight there should still be a shadow.)

The Sarvāstivādins defend the position: Your denial of our simultaneous cause and result does not stand to reason — because whether the result’s entity exists or not is settled by whether the cause exists or not. Those skilled in reasoning state the character of cause and result thus: if, when this cause exists the result exists, and when this cause does not exist the result does not exist, then this is definitely the cause and that definitely the result. And among coexistent dharmas, when one exists all exist and when one does not exist none does — which accords exactly with the principle of cause and result.

The Sautrāntikas ask again: Granting that things arising at the same time may be said to have the principle of cause and result, how can they be said to be one another’s cause and result? The Sarvāstivādins answer: By what was said just above (that when this exists that exists and when this does not exist that does not, which runs both ways), there is no contradiction in their being one another’s cause and result.

If that is so, then should not the derived forms spoken of above as inseparable from one another also be one another’s causes? Likewise derived forms and the great elements, and the secondary marks of what follows mind together with mind and the rest, are all inseparable from one another; should they not all be one another’s causes?

If it be said: just as three staves standing by leaning on one another, so the sense of cause and result among coexistent dharmas is established — then this too must be thought through again: do those three staves stand by the force of leaning on one another at the same time, or do the causes and conditions conjoined in a preceding moment make those three staves arise together and so stand? And besides, cords, hooks, the ground, and the like are there as well, holding and supporting them so that they stand. The answer: here too there are likewise the homogeneous cause and the rest (other supporting conditions) at work, and therefore the sense of the coexistent cause is still established.

The character of the coexistent cause has been explained. Third, what is the character of the homogeneous cause? The stanza says:

〔Root 53 · First Half of Root 54〕The Homogeneous Cause: Similar, of One’s Own Category and Level, Arisen Before

Stanza: The homogeneous cause is what is similar; it is confined to the same category and the same level, and must be a dharma arisen before. The path without outflows, however, is reciprocally a cause across the nine levels, though only what is equal or superior is its result. Dharmas arising from preparation are likewise — that is, what is formed through hearing, what is formed through reflection, and the rest.

Treatise: The homogeneous cause is similar dharmas being one another’s homogeneous causes. For instance, wholesome five aggregates and wholesome five aggregates are reciprocally homogeneous causes with respect to one another; and the defiled with the defiled, and the indeterminate with the indeterminate, the five aggregates considered reciprocally, should be known in the same way.

Here there are divergent views: some masters say that, of the pure indeterminate aggregates, all five aggregates are results of the aggregate of form〔form can be a cause of the five aggregates〕and the four aggregates are not causes of form; some masters say that all five aggregates are results of the four aggregates〔the four aggregates can be causes of the five aggregates〕and form is not a cause of the four aggregates; and still other masters say that form and the four aggregates, considered reciprocally, are in neither direction causes.

Again: within one and the same body, the first embryonic stage, the kalala, can be a homogeneous cause of the ten stages that follow; and each of the nine stages beginning with the second, the arbuda, excluding the stages before itself, is a cause of the remaining stages. With respect to the ten like stages in another’s body, each stage can be a cause of all ten. On this same model, the self-same production of barley, rice, and the rest in the external world should also be widely considered.

If one does not allow that form can be a homogeneous cause of form, that position contradicts the express words of the root treatise — for the root treatise says, “past great elements are causes and dominant conditions of future great elements,” and so on.

Are all similar dharmas, then, to be called homogeneous causes of similar dharmas? They are not. How so? Only what is of one’s own category and one’s own level is a cause for that same category and level, and so the stanza says “the same category and level.” Category means the five categories — that is, what is abandoned by seeing suffering, what is abandoned by seeing origination, what is abandoned by seeing cessation, what is abandoned by seeing the path, and what is abandoned by cultivation. Level means the nine levels — that is, the desire realm reckoned as one level, plus the four absorptions and the four formless attainments, eight in all. Here, dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering are homogeneous causes only for what is abandoned by seeing suffering and are not causes for the other four categories; and so on up to what is abandoned by cultivation being a homogeneous cause only for what is abandoned by cultivation. And within each single category, the level of the desire realm is a homogeneous cause only for the desire realm, the level of the first absorption only for the first absorption, and so on up to the level of the summit of existence being a homogeneous cause only for the summit of existence — between different levels there is no principle of being a cause at all.

Nor is that all. What more? The stanza says “arisen before”: only a dharma already arisen earlier is a homogeneous cause of a later dharma that is similar to it, whether that later dharma is imminently arising or not yet arisen. How is this known to be so? Because the root treatise says so. As the Treatise on the Development of Wisdom says: “What is the homogeneous cause? Previously arisen wholesome roots are homogeneous causes of subsequently arisen wholesome roots of their own realm and of the dharmas associated with them.” In this way the past with respect to the other two time-periods, and past and present with respect to the future, and so forth, should all be stated at length accordingly.

That treatise, however, also contains this question: “If a dharma is a cause of another dharma, is there ever a time when it is not a cause of that dharma?” And its author answers: “There is no time when it is not a cause.” — This was said covertly with respect to the three causes of coexistence, association, and maturation (those three extending to the future), and so there is no fault.

Someone says instead: a future dharma at the stage of imminent arising can certainly be a homogeneous cause for it, and so that passage was answered covertly on the basis of the final stage, the stage of imminent arising. This explanation is not a good resolution of the objection raised — because a future dharma is not a homogeneous cause before the stage of imminent arising, and becomes a homogeneous cause only after that stage (so that there still is a time when it is not a cause). Moreover, on his reading, when the treatise goes on to ask, “If a dharma is immediately antecedent to another dharma, is there ever a time when it is not immediately antecedent to it?”, its author answers, “When this dharma has not yet reached the state of having arisen.” On his explanation, that place too ought to have been answered, “There is no time when it is not a condition”; why then does it answer, “When this dharma has not yet reached the state of having arisen”?

He then repairs his position by saying: this was to display the two modes of question and answer, one covert and one plain — as it is stated there, so it might have been stated here, and as it is stated here, so it might have been stated there. — And what merit is gained by composing the text so? It only shows that the treatise’s author was not skilled in composition. Hence it should be known that the earlier explanation, the covert reference to the three causes, is the good one.

If that is so, why then does the Treatise on Categories of Dharmas say, “There are dharmas of the truth of suffering that have the view of a real person as their cause and are not causes of the view of a real person — that is, apart from the future view of a real person and the dharmas of the truth of suffering associated with it, the remaining defiled dharmas of the truth of suffering; and there are dharmas of the truth of suffering that have the view of a real person as their cause and are also causes of the view of a real person — that is, the dharmas just excluded”? (If there is no homogeneous cause in the future, why exclude “the future dharmas of the truth of suffering associated with the view of a real person”?) The answer: that passage should be stated as “apart from the future dharmas of the truth of suffering associated with the view of a real person” (that is, merely associated, and not included under the homogeneous cause). And even if the recitation really were as he says, one should know from the sense that it is not so (not evidence for a homogeneous cause in the future).

And how is the Treatise of Designations to be reconciled? That treatise says that dharmas have four determinate matters — namely cause, result, support, and object. It should be known that the word “cause” in that passage refers to the enabling cause, the coexistent cause, the associated cause, and the maturation cause (the four that extend to the future); “result” refers to the dominant result, the result of human effort, and the maturation result; “support” refers to the six faculties, the eye and the rest; and “object” refers to the six objects, visible form and the rest. (The homogeneous cause and the homogeneous result are not included there, and so no difficulty arises.)

If that is so, does not the homogeneous cause then become something that was not and comes to be? — This is allowed, and there is no fault: it is stated with respect to position and not with respect to entity; the result is established by the position of conjunction and operation, and not established with respect to entity.

Then supposing the homogeneous cause did exist in the future as well, as the maturation cause does, what fault would there be? The answer: if it existed in the future, the root treatise should have said so; but the root treatise speaks only of those homogeneous causes that can take a result and give a result (that is, in past and present), and so there is no fault.

Furthermore, on principle it cannot exist there: for the homogeneous cause draws forth a homogeneous result, and to say that this cause exists already in the future is by all reasoning impossible — future dharmas have no division into earlier and later. And it should not be said that an already arisen dharma is the homogeneous outflow of a not yet arisen dharma, just as a past dharma is not a result of a present one; otherwise there would be the fault of the result being earlier and the cause later. Therefore there is no homogeneous cause in the future.

If that is so, should not the maturation cause likewise be absent in the future? — It should not, because a maturation result is never earlier than its cause and never simultaneous with it (the result must be later than the cause). The answer: since future dharmas have no earlier and later, the fault just stated does not follow, because the maturation cause and its result are not similar. That is to say: the homogeneous cause and its result are similar, and if there were no earlier and later they would be one another’s causes; and being one another’s causes they would be one another’s results, and to be one another’s cause and result contradicts reason. The maturation cause and its result are not similar, and so even apart from the distinction of earlier and later the fault stated above does not arise. Therefore the homogeneous cause is established with respect to position, and so is absent in the future; the maturation cause is established with respect to character, and so is not absent in the future either.

On what basis is it said that the homogeneous cause is “only of one’s own level”? It is said with respect to what has outflows. In the case of the path without outflows, considered reciprocally, the path of each level can be a cause for all nine levels — that is, access concentration, intermediate absorption, the four fundamental absorptions, and the three fundamental formless attainments: the truth of the path in these nine levels is reciprocally a cause. Why? Because the path without outflows abides in every level like a guest lodging for a time, is not included within any realm, and is not appropriated as its own by the craving belonging to any level; so the paths of the nine levels, though the levels differ, can be reciprocally causes — for they are alike of the one class, the without-outflows.

Yet it is a cause only for what is equal or superior, and cannot be a cause of what is inferior, because it arises from preparation, that is, from applied effort. Thus an already arisen receptivity to the cognition of dharma concerning suffering is still a homogeneous cause of a future receptivity to the cognition of dharma concerning suffering, and this is called “equal”; and that same receptivity can also be a homogeneous cause of everything thereafter, from the cognition of dharma concerning suffering up to the knowledge of non-arising, and this is called “superior.” Stated at length in this way, up to the point where already arisen knowledges of non-arising are homogeneous causes only for what is equal to them, since there is nothing more excellent than they.

Again: the already arisen path of seeing, path of cultivation, and path beyond training are homogeneous causes for three, for two, and for one respectively (the path of seeing being a cause for all three paths, the path of cultivation for the two paths of cultivation and beyond training, and the path beyond training only for the path beyond training). And here a path of dull faculties is a homogeneous cause both for dull and for sharp faculties, whereas a path of sharp faculties is a cause only for a path of sharp faculties. Thus the paths of the three noble persons of dull faculties — one who follows through faith, one resolute through faith, and one whose liberation depends on circumstance — are homogeneous causes for six, for four, and for two respectively; and the paths of the three noble persons of sharp faculties — one who follows the dharma, one attained through view, and one whose liberation does not depend on circumstance — are homogeneous causes for three, for two, and for one respectively.

A further question: a path of a higher level may be a cause of a lower level; how then is it still said to be “equal or superior” (a higher level being superior and a lower inferior, so that it becomes a cause for what is inferior)? The answer: this is said by the two senses of increase in the cause and of faculty. Increase in the cause means that among the nine grades of the path of seeing and the rest, the lowest of the low and the others increase in causal force at each successive stage (so that a lower grade of a higher level may still be a cause for a higher grade of a lower level without being inferior). By faculty is meant that a path of dull faculties at a higher level is a cause for a path of sharp faculties at a lower level. And although within one continuum it is impossible for both the path of one who follows through faith and the path of one who follows the dharma to arise, an already arisen path may be a cause for a future path of the other class.

“Dharmas arising from preparation are likewise”: not only the noble path, but any worldly dharma that arises from preparation is likewise a cause only for what is equal or superior and not for what is inferior. What are the entities of dharmas arising from preparation? They are discernment formed through hearing, discernment formed through reflection, and the rest. The word “rest” takes in discernment formed through cultivation — the qualities produced by hearing, reflection, and cultivation are called “formed by them,” and because they arise only through applied effort they are causes for what is equal or superior and not for what is inferior.

Thus, as belonging to the desire realm: what is formed through hearing can be a homogeneous cause of what is formed through hearing and of what is formed through reflection within its own realm, and is not a cause of what is formed through cultivation (the desire realm has nothing formed through cultivation); what is formed through reflection is a homogeneous cause of what is formed through reflection and is not a cause of what is formed through hearing, since hearing is inferior to reflection. As belonging to the form realm: what is formed through hearing can be a homogeneous cause of what is formed through hearing and of what is formed through cultivation within its own realm, and is not a cause of what is formed through reflection (the form realm has nothing formed through reflection, for as soon as the mind sets itself to consider, it enters absorption); what is formed through cultivation is a homogeneous cause only of what is formed through cultivation in its own realm and is not a cause of what is formed through hearing, since hearing is inferior. As belonging to the formless realm: what is formed through cultivation is a homogeneous cause only of what is formed through cultivation in its own realm, and is not a cause of what is formed through hearing or reflection — there being no hearing there (no ear faculty), and reflection being inferior.

These dharmas further have nine grades each: the lowest of the low can be a cause for all nine grades; the low-middle for eight grades; and so on up to the highest of the high, which is a cause only for the highest of the high, since all the grades inferior to it are excluded. As for wholesome dharmas acquired by birth, the nine grades may be reciprocally causes for one another (not restricted to equal or superior); and it is the same with defiled dharmas.

The unobscured-indeterminate is of four kinds in all: those co-arisen with the maturation-born, with the mode of deportment, with the field of craft, and with the transformation mind; and these are causes for four, for three, for two, and for one respectively (each later one being more excellent). Moreover the transformation mind of the desire realm has the four absorptions as its results, but the transformation mind that is the result of a lower absorption is not a cause of the transformation mind that is the result of a higher absorption — because a dharma arising from preparation does not obtain an inferior result, just as one who diligently applies effort to sowing rice and barley does not toil in vain and reap nothing at all.

Because this is so, someone asks: is there an already arisen dharma without outflows that is not a cause of a dharma without outflows still at the stage of not having arisen? There is — for instance an already arisen class of the cognition of dharma concerning suffering with respect to the not yet arisen class of the receptivity concerning suffering (cognition being superior to receptivity, and so not a cause of the inferior); and, generally, any superior dharma with respect to any inferior dharma. Is there a dharma without outflows already determinately obtained within one continuum that is not a cause of what arises later? There is — for instance the future class of the receptivity concerning suffering with respect to the class of the cognition of dharma concerning suffering already arisen after it (a result never being earlier than its cause); or else, because there is no homogeneous cause in the future. Is there a previously arisen dharma without outflows that is not a cause of a dharma without outflows arising later? There is — for instance a previously arisen superior dharma without outflows with respect to an inferior dharma without outflows arising later, as when one falls back from a higher fruit and the lower fruit becomes present. And likewise the previously arisen acquisition of the cognition of dharma concerning suffering is not a homogeneous cause of the subsequently arisen acquisition of the receptivity concerning suffering, since the latter is inferior to the former.

The character of the homogeneous cause has been explained. Fourth, what is the character of the associated cause? The stanza says:

〔Second Half of Root 54〕The Associated Cause: Equal in Five Senses and Sharing One Support

Stanza: The associated cause is settled as mind and mental factors alone, and they must have one and the same support.

Treatise: Only mind and mental factors are associated causes.

If that is so, should not mind and mental factors whose objects and modes of apprehension differ also be one another’s associated causes? — They should not. Only those whose object and mode of apprehension are the same may be said to be in association.

If that is so, should not those whose objects and modes of apprehension are the same but whose times differ also be said to be associated causes? — They should not. Only when object, mode of apprehension, and time are all the same is it called association.

If that is so, should not those in different bodies whose object, mode of apprehension, and time are all the same (as when a crowd looks together at the new moon at the same moment) also be said to be in association? — In order to bar all these difficulties in a single phrase, the stanza says “the same support”: only mind and mental factors having one and the same support can be one another’s associated causes. Here the word “same” shows that the support is a single one — for instance, visual consciousness takes the eye faculty of this one moment as its support, and the feeling and other mental factors associated with it take that same eye faculty as their support; and so on up to mental consciousness and its associated dharmas taking the mental faculty as their common support, which should be understood in the same way.

The entity of the associated cause is in fact the coexistent cause; what difference in meaning, then, is there between the two causes? The answer: the coexistent cause is established by the sense of being one another’s results, like a company of merchants relying on one another and passing together through a dangerous road; the associated cause is established by the sense of being associated together in five equalities, like that same company of merchants eating together and working together at the business of food and drink and the rest, where if one man among them is missing none of them is in association — and so the sense of being one another’s causes is most fully established.

The character of the associated cause has been explained. Fifth, what is the character of the all-pervading cause? The stanza says:

〔First Half of Root 55〕The All-Pervading Cause: Previously Arisen All-Pervading Afflictions as the General Cause of Defiled Dharmas on the Same Level

Stanza: The all-pervading cause means the all-pervading dharmas arisen before, which are causes of all defiled dharmas on one and the same level.

Treatise: The all-pervading cause is the previously arisen all-pervading dharmas being all-pervading causes of subsequently arisen defiled dharmas of the same level. As for which dharmas the all-pervading dharmas are (the eleven all-pervading latent tendencies together with the dharmas associated and coexistent with them), this will be analyzed at length in the chapter on latent tendencies, where the sense of pervasion is treated.

Why must this cause be established separately from the homogeneous cause? Because it is the general cause of all defiled dharmas — the homogeneous cause is a cause only within its own category, whereas the all-pervading cause is a cause not only of defiled dharmas of its own category but also of the defiled dharmas of every other category; and by its force the afflictions of the other categories, together with their retinues (the dharmas associated and coexistent with them), grow along with it.

Question: do the defiled dharmas within the continuum of a noble one (the defilements abandoned by cultivation) also take these all-pervading dharmas abandoned by seeing as their cause? Answer: the Vaibhāṣikas of Kaśmīra say that all defiled dharmas take what is abandoned by seeing as their cause. So the Treatise on Categories of Dharmas says: “What are the dharmas that have what is abandoned by seeing as their cause? They are the defiled dharmas, together with the maturation called forth by dharmas abandoned by seeing.” And again: “What are the dharmas that have the indeterminate as their cause? They are all indeterminate conditioned dharmas together with the unwholesome dharmas.” And again: “There are dharmas of the truth of suffering that have the view of a real person as their cause and are not causes of the view of a real person . . . that is, apart from the future view of a real person and the arising, aging, abiding, and impermanence of the dharmas associated with it, the remaining defiled dharmas of the truth of suffering.” (All three passages attest that what is abandoned by seeing is a general cause of every defiled dharma.)

If that is so, how is the Treatise of Designations to be reconciled? That treatise says: “Is there a dharma that is unwholesome and has only the unwholesome as its cause? There is — the first defiled volition arising when a noble one falls back from freedom from desire.” (If every defiled dharma has what is abandoned by seeing as its cause, why is only the unwholesome stated here as its cause?) Answer: that was said covertly with respect to a cause not yet abandoned — what is abandoned by seeing is also a cause of that volition, but the noble one has already abandoned the defilements of seeing, and so it is passed over unstated.

The character of the all-pervading cause has been explained. Sixth, what is the character of the maturation cause? The stanza says:

〔Second Half of Root 55〕The Maturation Cause: the Unwholesome and the Wholesome with Outflows

Stanza: The maturation cause is the unwholesome dharmas, together with those wholesome dharmas that have outflows alone.

Treatise: Only unwholesome dharmas and wholesome dharmas with outflows are maturation causes, because they are dharmas that can call forth maturation.

Question: why do indeterminate dharmas not call forth maturation? Answer: because their force is too weak, like a rotted seed. Question: why do dharmas without outflows not call forth maturation? Answer: because there is no craving to moisten them, like a sound seed with no water to irrigate it (which likewise cannot sprout); and moreover the without-outflows does not belong to any of the levels bound within the three realms, so how could it call forth a maturation belonging to a bound level? The remaining dharmas (the unwholesome and the wholesome with outflows) have both senses complete — they have the moistening of craving and they belong to a bound level — and so can call it forth, like a sound seed that has also received the moisture of water.

How is the name “maturation cause” to be understood? Is it “the cause of maturation” (a dependent-determinative analysis), or is it “maturation which is itself the cause” (an appositional-determinative analysis)? Answer: both explanations hold, and what fault is there in that? — If it were only “the cause of maturation,” the holy teaching should not say “the maturation-born eye” (which speaks of maturation with respect to the result); if it were only “maturation which is itself the cause,” the holy teaching should not say “the maturation of an action” (which speaks of maturation with respect to the cause). That both explanations hold has already been argued above.

What, then, is the meaning of the two words “maturation”? The Vaibhāṣikas explain it thus: ripening as a different kind is the sense of maturation — the maturation cause alone ripens as a different kind (the cause being wholesome or unwholesome and the result indeterminate); the coexistent cause and the rest ripen only as the same kind; and the one enabling cause extends to both same kind and different kind. Therefore this one alone is named the maturation cause.

(The author argues that this is insufficient): the result called “ripening” should not be a result obtained by the other causes. To deserve the name “ripening” a result must have two senses complete. First, its entity must arise only through the transformation and differentiation of a continuum (after an action is done the result is not called forth at once, and only when the continuum is about to call forth the result is it called transformation and differentiation). Second, its duration must have a definite limit in accordance with the relative strength of the cause’s force (ten years, say, or a hundred). Now the entities of the results produced by the coexistent and associated causes do not need to arise through the transformation and differentiation of a continuum, since they give the result at the very time they take it (the first sense is lacking); and the results of the enabling, homogeneous, and all-pervading causes do not have a temporal limit in accordance with the relative strength of the cause’s force, since to the very end of birth-and-death the results of wholesome and unwholesome actions and the rest still arise again and again with no limit of time (the second sense is lacking). Therefore it should be explained thus: ripening through transformation is the sense of maturation; and one should not distinguish it from the other causes by the single word “different” (which does not cover the sense fully).

Next, how many aggregates the maturation cause takes to call forth one result together. Within the desire realm: sometimes one aggregate is the maturation cause calling forth one result together — namely a determinate acquisition within the aggregate of formations, together with its four marks of arising and the rest; sometimes two aggregates are the maturation cause calling forth one result together — namely wholesome or unwholesome bodily and verbal action (the aggregate of form) together with their arising and the rest (the aggregate of formations); sometimes four aggregates are the maturation cause calling forth one result together — namely wholesome or unwholesome mind and mental factors together with their arising and the rest.

Within the form realm: sometimes one aggregate calls forth one result together — namely a determinate acquisition, or the attainment of non-perception, together with their arising and the rest; sometimes two aggregates call forth one result together — namely wholesome manifest action of the first absorption together with its arising and the rest; sometimes four aggregates call forth one result together — namely wholesome mind and mental factors not in equipoise (a scattered mind) together with their arising and the rest; sometimes five aggregates call forth one result together — namely mind and mental factors in equipoise (a concentrated mind) together with the form that follows them and with their arising and the rest.

Within the formless realm: sometimes one aggregate calls forth one result together — namely a determinate acquisition, or the attainment of cessation, together with their arising and the rest; sometimes four aggregates call forth one result together — namely all wholesome mind and mental factors together with their arising and the rest.

Next, the number of sense fields of maturation called forth by a single action. There is action that calls forth maturation in one sense field only — that is, it calls forth the sense field of dharmas, such as the life faculty. If it calls forth the mental sense field, it certainly calls forth two sense fields at once — the mental sense field and the sense field of dharmas. If it calls forth the sense field of the tangible, it should be known to be the same (the tangible and dharmas). If it calls forth the sense field of the body, it certainly calls forth three — the body, the tangible, and dharmas. Calling forth visible form, odor, and taste should be known in the same way. If it calls forth the sense field of the eye, it certainly calls forth four — the eye together with body, tangible, and dharmas. Calling forth the ear, nose, and tongue should be known in the same way. And there is action that can call forth five, or six, or seven, or eight, or nine, or ten, or eleven sense fields — because some actions have few results and some many, just as among the seeds of the outer world some bear few fruits and some many: few, as with grain and barley; many, as with the lotus, the pomegranate, and the banyan tree.

Again: there is action of one lifetime that calls forth maturation in three lifetimes, but no action of three lifetimes that calls forth maturation in one — for one does not toil in vain and get a result smaller than the cause. There is action of one moment that calls forth maturation in many moments, but no action of many moments that calls forth maturation in one, on the same reasoning.

A maturation result, however, is never simultaneous with the action, since at the very time of acting the result is not undergone; nor is it undergone immediately, in the very next moment, since the next moment is drawn forth by the force of the immediately antecedent condition (which is homogeneous outflow, not maturation). Moreover, since what the maturation cause calls forth is a result of a different kind, it can be brought about only when a continuum has transformed.

The particular characters of the six causes have now been explained. In which time-period, then, are these six causes determinately located? A cause’s residence in a time-period is determinate. Though this principle has already been stated, it has not yet been gathered into a stanza, and so it should be sorted out once more. The stanza says:

〔First Half of Root 56〕The Determinate Time-Periods of the Six Causes

Stanza: The all-pervading cause and the homogeneous cause extend to two time-periods; the associated, coexistent, and maturation causes extend to all three.

Treatise: The all-pervading cause and the homogeneous cause reside only in the two time-periods of past and present and are absent in the future — for the reason stated above, that they are established with respect to position. The three causes of association, coexistence, and maturation are present throughout all three time-periods. Since the stanza does not state in which time-period the enabling cause resides, one may infer from the class of the sense that the enabling cause extends to the three time-periods and also to what is outside time (unconditioned dharmas are enabling causes too).

The particular characters of the six causes and the determination of their time-periods have been explained. What dharma, then, is a result, with respect to which something is established as a cause? The stanza says:

〔Second Half of Root 56〕Results Are Only the Conditioned and Release from Bondage; the Unconditioned Has Neither Cause nor Result

Stanza: Results are all conditioned dharmas together with release from bondage (cessation through discernment); unconditioned dharmas themselves have neither cause nor result.

Treatise: As the root treatise says: “What are result-dharmas? They are all conditioned dharmas together with cessation through discernment.”

If that is so, then since the unconditioned (cessation through discernment) is allowed to be a result, it ought to have a cause — for only with respect to that cause can it be called a result; and since this unconditioned is also allowed to be a cause (an enabling cause), it ought to have a result — for only with respect to that result can it be called a cause. Answer: only conditioned dharmas have causes and results, and unconditioned dharmas do not. Why? Because the unconditioned has none of the six causes and none of the five results.

Question: why is it not allowed that the paths of unimpeded progress are enabling causes of the result of release from bondage? Answer: an enabling cause is established with respect to not obstructing the arising of something; but the unconditioned has no arising at all, so what can the path enable in it?

Question: whose result, then, is it? And wherein lies the sense of “result”? Answer: it is the result of the path, because it is realized by the force of the path.

Question: if that is so, then the result of the path should be only that acquisition (the acquisition of cessation through discernment), since the path has productive power with respect to the acquisition and none with respect to cessation through discernment itself. Answer: it is not so. The path’s function with respect to the acquisition and its function with respect to the cessation differ: with respect to the acquisition its function is to produce, and with respect to the cessation its function is to realize. On this principle, although the path is not a producing cause of the cessation, one may still say that cessation through discernment is a result of the path.

Question: since unconditioned dharmas have no dominant result, how can they still be said to be enabling causes? Answer: because unconditioned dharmas do not obstruct the arising of other dharmas, they are established as enabling causes; yet they are said to have no result because, apart from the dharmas of the world, there is no operation of taking a result and giving a result (the unconditioned is not within the three time-periods and so has no taking or giving).

(What follows is the Sautrāntika and Sarvāstivāda debate over whether the unconditioned is really existent; the treatise records the words of both parties at length.)

The Sautrāntika masters say: The unconditioned is not a cause. For no sūtra says that a cause is unconditioned, while there is a sūtra saying that causes are conditioned only.

Question: which sūtra says so? Answer: as a sūtra says, “Whatever causes and conditions produce form are all impermanent. Forms produced by impermanent causes and conditions — how could they be permanent?” And so on at length up to consciousness.

Counter: if that is so, then the unconditioned should also be unable to serve as an object condition for a consciousness that takes it as object (since the sūtra says that causes and conditions are all impermanent). Answer: the sūtra says only that what produces is impermanent, and so the unconditioned may still be an object condition — the sūtra says only that “whatever causes and conditions produce consciousness are all impermanent,” and does not say that everything that serves as a condition of consciousness is impermanent; so no difficulty arises.

Counter again: in that case the sūtra likewise says only that a productive cause is impermanent, and so it has not ruled out the unconditioned being an enabling cause merely by not obstructing. Answer: there is a scripture saying that unconditioned dharmas are object conditions, but no scripture saying that unconditioned dharmas are enabling causes; and so they should not be established as causes merely by not obstructing. Rejoinder: though no sūtra says so, neither is there any place where a sūtra forbids it; and immeasurable sūtras have by now been lost, so how can it be decided that no sūtra says so?

Question: what dharma, then, is called release from bondage? Answer: cessation through discernment, as stated in the root treatise. Counter: was it not asked earlier what cessation through discernment is, and answered that it is release from bondage? And now, when it is asked what release from bondage is, the answer is that it is cessation through discernment — with the two answers thus leaning on each other, its intrinsic nature is in the end never displayed. Another gate should therefore be opened to display its intrinsic nature.

(The Sarvāstivādins answer): The intrinsic nature of this dharma is really existent and beyond words; only the noble ones know it, each by inward realization. One can only say by way of expedient, in general terms, that it is wholesome and permanent, and that there is a separate real thing named cessation through discernment, also named release from bondage.

The Sautrāntika masters say: No unconditioned dharma is really existent — there is no separate real thing there as there is with form, feeling, and the rest, because what is indicated here is precisely an absence.

Question: if that is so, why are they still called space and the like? Answer: it is merely the absence of anything tangible that is named space — as in the dark, where nothing is met with by touch, and people say, “This is space.” And when an arisen latent tendency together with the seed that produces it has reached the stage of ceasing, and by the force of selection the remainder (suffering and the defilements) does not arise again, that is named cessation through discernment; while when, apart from the force of selection, the remainder does not arise again merely through the lack of a condition, that is named cessation independent of discernment — as with the remaining aggregates of one who dies untimely in the midst of the commonality of a lifespan (aggregates that should have arisen and do not).

Some masters of another school say: it is by the capacity of discernment that latent tendencies do not arise, and this is named cessation through discernment; while when latent tendencies lack a condition so that subsequent suffering does not arise, and this is not by the capacity of discernment, it is named cessation independent of discernment. (The Sautrāntikas refute this): apart from the force of selection this cessation cannot be established at all, and so this non-arising too should be included under cessation through discernment.

Others say: dharmas, once arisen, naturally come to a subsequent absence, and this is named cessation independent of discernment. (Refutation): if it is grasped in this way, the entity of cessation independent of discernment becomes impermanent — for before a dharma has ceased, this cessation independent of discernment does not exist. Counter: is it not the same with your cessation through discernment? It has selection as its antecedent, and so it too first is not and afterwards is, and should likewise be impermanent. Answer: cessation through discernment is not something that first has selection and only then comes to be. Why? It is not that only after selection has occurred does a not yet arisen dharma acquire its non-arising — that non-arising was there all along; it is only that without selection the dharmas would arise, and once selection has arisen the dharmas never arise again. With respect to this non-arising, selection does have a capacity — that is to say, previously there was nothing to obstruct arising, and now selection has become what obstructs arising; it has not manufactured a non-arising.

(The Sarvāstivādins object again): If mere non-arising is taken to be nirvāṇa, how is this passage of scripture to be reconciled? The sūtra says, “The five faculties, if cultivated, if practiced, if much practiced, can cause the sufferings of past, future, and present to be forever cut off.” The entity of this “forever cut off” is nirvāṇa; but the sense of non-arising applies only to the future and not to past and present — is this not a contradiction?

(The Sautrāntikas answer): Though there is such a passage, it does not contradict the principle. The sense of this sūtra is that the afflictions that take past and present suffering as their object are cut off, and therefore it is called the cutting off of the sufferings. Just as the World-Honored One said: “With respect to form you should cut off desire and craving; when desire and craving are cut off, that is called the cutting off of form and the full understanding of form.” And so on at length up to consciousness. The “cutting off” of past and present suffering should be understood in the same sense. And if there is some other sūtra that says “cutting off past, future, and present afflictions,” explained on the foregoing principle its sense likewise does not contradict.

Or else this sūtra has another intent: past afflictions means the afflictions arisen in past lives, and present afflictions means the afflictions arisen in the present life. So among the modes of craving, the eighteen modes of craving spoken of there as arisen in the past time-period are spoken of with respect to past lives, and the future and present should be known in the same way. And the afflictions arisen in these two time-periods, in order to produce future afflictions, have drawn forth seeds within the present continuum; when those seeds are cut off, those afflictions are called cut off — just as when the maturation result is exhausted the action too is called exhausted. Future sufferings and afflictions, having no seed, definitely do not arise, and so are said to be cut off. If it were not explained thus, on what ground would past and present (already ceased, presently ceasing) still need to be cut off? For what has already ceased and what is presently ceasing, one need not exert further effort to make it cease.

(The Sarvāstivādins object again): If the entity of unconditioned dharmas is wholly an absence, why does a sūtra say, “Among all dharmas, whether conditioned or unconditioned, freedom from defilement is foremost”? How can a “foremost” be established within an absence?

(The Sautrāntikas answer): Neither do I say that the entity of unconditioned dharmas is wholly an absence; it is only that they should “be” in the way I have described. For instance, it is said, “This sound has a prior non-existence and has a subsequent non-existence” — that non-existence may not be spoken of as really existent, and yet the use of the word “has” in that sentence still stands. To say “there is an unconditioned” should be understood in the same way. And though it is non-existent it can still be extolled — thus calamities and misfortunes are utterly non-existent, and this is named freedom from defilement; among all that exists and does not exist this is the most excellent, and in order that those to be trained may conceive deep gladness in it, it should be extolled as foremost.

(The Sarvāstivādins object again): If unconditioned dharmas are merely non-existent, then, being non-existent, they should not be named the noble truth of cessation.

(The Sautrāntikas answer): First state what “noble truth” means — does it not belong to the sense of being without inversion? The noble one’s seeing is without inversion both toward what exists and toward what does not: toward suffering he sees that it is just suffering, and toward the non-existence of suffering he sees that it is just non-existence. What in this contradicts the sense of a noble truth?

(Objection again): Since it is non-existent, how can it be established as the third noble truth? (Answer): Because it is what the noble ones see and state immediately after the second truth, the truth of origination, it becomes the third.

(Objection again): If the entity of unconditioned dharmas is nothing but an absence, then the consciousness that takes space or nirvāṇa as its object becomes a consciousness with a non-existent object. (Answer): There is no fault in a non-existent object; this point should be considered where the past and the future are examined.

(The Sautrāntikas ask in return): If one allows that the unconditioned has a separate real entity, what is lost and what is gained? — Allowing it makes it possible to defend the Vaibhāṣika school, and this may count as the gain; and if there really were something worth defending, the gods would surely know it and would come to defend it themselves. Yet allowing it to be really existent displays a false and constructed grasping, and this is the loss. Why? Because it is neither something whose entity can be found, as with form and feeling, nor something whose function can be found, as with the eye and the ear.

Again: if the unconditioned had a separate real entity, how could one use the sixth case-ending, the genitive, and say “the cessation of that thing”? For the cessation and that thing do not belong to one another — the two are not related as cause and result. Only if it is merely the negating of that thing can the sixth case-ending stand: the absence of that thing is named its cessation, and so one says “the cessation of that thing.”

(The Sarvāstivādins answer): Although cessation has a separate real entity, it is at the time when that thing obtains its cutting off that this cessation is obtained, and so this cessation may be said to belong to that thing. (The Sautrāntikas object): What is it that makes this cessation belong to this one acquisition? (The Sarvāstivādins reconcile the objection by citing scripture): As a sūtra says, “A bhikṣu obtains nirvāṇa in the present life” — if it were non-existent, how could “obtains” be said? (The Sautrāntikas answer): Because one obtains the antidote, one obtains a permanent separation from the afflictions and from the body that is the basis of further existence, and this is named obtaining nirvāṇa.

(The Sautrāntikas cite the holy teaching): There is moreover holy teaching that shows nirvāṇa to have non-existence alone as its intrinsic nature. As a sūtra says: “All sufferings are cut off without remainder, severally relinquished, exhausted, freed from defilement, ceased, stilled, forever gone; the remaining suffering does not continue, is not appropriated, does not arise. This is utterly at peace, this is utterly excellent — that is, the casting off of all the bases together with the exhaustion of all craving, freedom from defilement, and cessation, which is named nirvāṇa.”

(The Sarvāstivādins press): Why not allow that “what is said to be non-arising is non-arising in dependence on this really existent nirvāṇa, and is therefore called non-arising”? (The Sautrāntikas answer): Looking at this seventh case-ending, the locative, in “in dependence on this,” we find it has no force at all with respect to the existence of the cessation realized. Why should it be said to be “non-arising in dependence on this”? If “in dependence on this” belongs to the sense of what already exists, then there should have been no arising from the beginning (since nirvāṇa is permanent); and if “in dependence on this” belongs to the sense of what has been obtained, then it should be allowed to be “in dependence on the acquisition of the path” — so one can say only that it is in dependence on the path, or on the acquisition of the path, that suffering does not arise. This you should accept.

By this one can rightly understand the simile stated in the sūtra: as with the nirvāṇa of a lamp flame, so it is with the liberation of mind. The sense of that passage is that the nirvāṇa of a lamp is merely the passing away of the flame and is not some further thing; and so it is with the World-Honored One’s mind attaining liberation — it is merely the ceasing of the aggregates, and there is nothing else there at all.

The Abhidharma too says: “What are dharmas without entity? They are the unconditioned dharmas.” And “without entity” means without intrinsic nature.

(The Sarvāstivādins answer): The Vaibhāṣikas do not allow this explanation. If they are asked what “entity” means, they say that entity is of five kinds in brief. First, entity as intrinsic nature — as where it is said, “If one has obtained this entity, one possesses this entity.” Second, entity as object — as where it is said, “All dharmas are known by cognition, each according to its entity.” Third, entity as bondage — as where it is said, “If one is bound by the fetter of craving with respect to this entity, is one also bound by the fetter of hatred with respect to this entity?” Fourth, entity as cause — as where it is said, “What are dharmas possessed of entity? They are the conditioned dharmas.” Fifth, entity as what is included — as where it is said, “the entity that is a field, the entity that is a house, the entities that are wife and children.” The “entity” spoken of here takes the fourth sense (cause being named entity), and shows that unconditioned dharmas have no cause; so the unconditioned, though a really existent thing, is without cause and without result because it is permanently without operation.

The general discussion ends here. Among the results, then, which result should be said to be obtained by which cause? The stanza says:

〔Root 57〕Which Result Each of the Six Causes Obtains

Stanza: The last cause (the maturation cause) obtains the maturation result, and the first cause (the enabling cause) obtains the dominant result; the homogeneous cause and the all-pervading cause obtain the homogeneous result; the coexistent cause and the associated cause obtain the result of human effort.

Treatise: What is called “the last cause” is the maturation cause — among the six causes it stands last, and so is called last; and the first of the five results, the maturation result, is what this cause obtains. What is called “the first cause” is the enabling cause — among the six causes it stands first, and so is called first; and the last of the five results, the dominant result, is what this cause obtains. A “dominant result” is a result of dominance.

Question: the enabling cause merely abides without obstructing; what dominance can be spoken of? Answer: it is on this very point of not obstructing that it obtains the name of dominance. Or else, the enabling cause also has excellent power: as the ten sense fields and ten elements have with respect to the five bodies of consciousness, and the actions of sentient beings with respect to the receptacle world; and the ear faculty and the rest with respect to the arising of visual consciousness, and so on, also have a productive power that is dominant in a chain — for on hearing of something one conceives the wish to see it (and so visual consciousness arises). Dominance of this kind should all be considered according to reason.

The homogeneous cause and the all-pervading cause obtain the homogeneous result, because the results of these two causes both resemble their causes. The coexistent cause and the associated cause obtain the result of human effort — and it is not that there is a separate “human effort” apart from the entity of the “person”〔the agent〕; it is simply that the result obtained by the operation of these two causes is named the result of human effort.

Question: what dharma does the name “human effort” refer to? Answer: it refers to the operation belonging to dharmas — like the doings of a person, and so it obtains the name of human effort. The name is established from a simile, just as the world speaks of the crow’s-foot herb and the drunken-elephant general (the herb resembling a crow’s foot, the general entering the ranks like a drunken elephant).

Question: do only these two causes have the result of human effort, or do the others as well? Some masters say: the other causes also have this result, excepting only the maturation cause — because a result of human effort either arises simultaneously with its cause or arises immediately after it, whereas a maturation result does not. And other masters say: the maturation cause too has a result of human effort separated by a long interval, as with the harvest a farmer gathers.

What are the characters of the five results, maturation and the rest? The stanza says:

〔Root 58 · Root 59〕The Characters of Each of the Five Results

Stanza: The maturation result is an indeterminate dharma, belonging only to sentient beings, and produced by the determinate, that is, by the wholesome and the unwholesome. The homogeneous result resembles its own cause. The result of release from bondage is exhaustion through discernment, that is, cessation through discernment. If a dharma arises through the force of another, that result is named the result of human effort. Apart from conditioned dharmas already arisen before, the remaining conditioned dharmas are the dominant result of those earlier dharmas.

Treatise: A maturation result is found only among unobscured-indeterminate dharmas.

Question: does it then extend also to what is not counted among sentient beings (the outer receptacle world), or is it restricted to sentient beings? And does it extend to the homogeneous and to the nourished? Answer: it should be known that a maturation result is only “produced by the determinate” — all unwholesome dharmas and wholesome dharmas with outflows can determine, that is, call forth, maturation, and so are named determinate; and maturation arises only after that determinate action, neither simultaneously nor immediately, and so is named “produced by the determinate.” This is the character of a maturation result. (Since it is produced by the determinate alone, it follows that it does not extend to the homogeneous or to the nourished, for those two are produced by all three ethical qualities.)

Question: what is not counted among sentient beings (mountains, rivers, the great earth) also arises from action; why is it not named maturation? Answer: because it is held in common — others can enjoy it just the same. Whereas a maturation result has no sense whatever of being enjoyed in common by others: it never happens that one person acts and another thereby undergoes the maturation result. Question: the dominant result too is produced by action; how then can it be enjoyed in common? Answer: because it arises from action held in common.

A dharma resembling its own cause is named the homogeneous result — that is, resembling the two causes, homogeneous and all-pervading.

Question: if the all-pervading cause also obtains a homogeneous result, why is it not allowed simply to be called a homogeneous cause? Answer: because the result obtained by the all-pervading cause resembles its cause only in belonging to the same level and being alike defiled in nature, and not by resemblance of kind〔category〕; only where the result resembles the cause by kind is the cause of that result named a homogeneous cause. Hence this question is raised: “If something is a homogeneous cause, is it also an all-pervading cause?” Four alternatives should be distinguished. First alternative: a non-all-pervading dharma acting as a homogeneous cause (a homogeneous cause but not an all-pervading cause). Second alternative: an all-pervading dharma of another category acting as an all-pervading cause (an all-pervading cause but not a homogeneous cause). Third alternative: an all-pervading dharma of its own category acting as an all-pervading cause (both at once). Fourth alternative: apart from the characters of the preceding three (neither of the two).

A dharma whose defilements are exhausted by discernment is named the result of release from bondage: because it is cessation it is called exhaustion, and because it is selection it is called discernment — that is to say, cessation through discernment is named the result of release from bondage.

If a dharma arises through the force of another dharma, that dharma is said to be named the result of human effort. For instance, when by the force of a preparatory mind of a lower level an absorption of a higher level, with or without outflows, is made to arise, and when by the force of a pure mind of meditative absorption a transformation mind is made to arise — such cases are all of this kind. As for cessation through discernment, it should be said to be obtained by the force of the path (and not to be a result of human effort produced by it).

Among conditioned dharmas, apart from those already arisen before, the remaining conditioned dharmas are the dominant result of those earlier dharmas. (For a result is either simultaneous with its cause or later than it, and is never earlier.)

Question: what difference is there between the result of human effort and the dominant result? Answer: the name “result of human effort” is established only with respect to the agent; the designation “dominant result” extends to everything other than that agent. For instance, a thing made by a craftsman: with respect to the craftsman who made it, it takes both names, result of human effort and dominant result; with respect to anyone other than the craftsman, it is only a dominant result.

Among the six causes stated above, at which stage does which cause take a result and give a result? The stanza says:

〔Root 60〕The Times of Taking and Giving a Result

Stanza: Five causes take their result only in the present; the coexistent and associated causes give their result likewise. The homogeneous and all-pervading causes give their result in past and present; the one maturation cause gives its result only in the past.

Treatise: The five causes (excluding the enabling cause) take their result only in the present, and certainly not in the past — because they have already taken it; nor in the future — because the future has no operation. (The enabling cause should likewise be said to take its result in the present, but since the enabling cause does not necessarily have a result, this stanza does not state it.)

The giving of a result by the coexistent cause and the associated cause is likewise only in the present — because these two causes necessarily take their result and give it at the same time.

The giving of a result by the homogeneous cause and the all-pervading cause extends to both past and present. Giving in the past is readily understood; how is it said that they give in the present as well? Because some homogeneous results arise immediately, right after the cause. And once the result has arisen the cause becomes past, and that is “having already given the result,” and it should not give again.

For a wholesome homogeneous cause there are cases of taking the result without giving it, and four alternatives should be distinguished. First alternative (takes but does not give): the last acquisition relinquished at the time when wholesome roots are cut off. Second alternative (gives but does not take): the first acquisition obtained at the time when wholesome roots are restored — and it should be said that at that time it is the prior acquisition of what is restored (that is, the acquisition relinquished earlier). Third alternative (both takes and gives): all the other stages at which wholesome roots are not cut off. Fourth alternative (neither takes nor gives): apart from the characters of the preceding three.

Among unwholesome homogeneous causes there are likewise four alternatives. First alternative: the last acquisition relinquished at the time of becoming free from craving for the desire realm. Second alternative: the first acquisition obtained at the time of falling back into craving for the desire realm — and it should be said that at that time it is the prior acquisition of the one who falls back. Third alternative: all the other stages at which one is not yet free from craving for the desire realm. Fourth alternative: apart from the preceding three characters.

Among obscured-indeterminate homogeneous causes there are likewise four alternatives — at the time of obtaining the fruit of an arhat, at the time of falling back, at the time of not yet having obtained it, and at the other stages, to be assigned according to reason.

Among unobscured-indeterminate homogeneous causes there is a following-consequent clause: whenever it gives a result it certainly also takes one; and there are cases of taking a result without giving one — namely the last aggregates of an arhat (at entry into nirvāṇa without remainder, taking with nothing given).

Considered in terms of the momentary distinctions among what has an object (mind and mental factors), a wholesome homogeneous cause likewise has four alternatives. First alternative (takes but does not give): a wholesome mind immediately followed by the arising of a defiled or indeterminate mind. Second alternative (gives but does not take): the reverse of the first. Third alternative (both takes and gives): a wholesome mind immediately followed by another wholesome mind. Fourth alternative: apart from the preceding three characters. For an unwholesome mind and the rest there are likewise four alternatives, each as applicable, to be known on the same pattern.

Question: what is the meaning of taking a result and giving a result? Answer: because a cause can serve as the seed of a result it is named taking the result; because it is presently giving that result the power to become manifest it is named giving the result.

The maturation cause gives its result only in the past, because a maturation result is neither simultaneous with its cause nor arisen immediately after it.

There are also other masters who, beyond the preceding five results, separately state four results. First, the establishment result — as the water disc is a result of the wind disc, and so on up to grasses and trees being results of the great earth. Second, the preparatory result — as the knowledge of non-arising and the rest are results obtained remotely from the preparation of the contemplation of impurity and the like. Third, the conjunction result — as visual consciousness and the rest are results of the eye faculty and the rest in conjunction. Fourth, the cultivation result — as transformation minds and the rest are results of the cultivation of the meditative absorptions. All four of these results are included within the result of human effort and the dominant result.

The statement of causes and results is complete. Next it should be considered: which dharmas here are produced by how many causes? Dharmas are of four classes in brief — defiled dharmas, maturation-born dharmas, the first dharmas without outflows, and the remaining dharmas other than those three. Question: what are the remaining dharmas? Answer: the remaining indeterminate dharmas apart from maturation, and the remaining wholesome dharmas apart from the first without outflows. From how many causes does each of these four classes arise? The stanza says:

〔Root 61 · First Half of Root 62〕From How Many Causes Each of the Four Classes Arises

Stanza: Defiled dharmas, maturation-born dharmas, the remaining dharmas, and the first noble dharmas without outflows — excluding, in that order, the maturation cause, the all-pervading cause, the two causes of maturation and all-pervasion, and further the homogeneous cause, are produced by the remaining causes. This is stated with respect to mind and mental factors; as for form and the formations not associated with mind, the associated cause must further be excluded.

Treatise: Defiled dharmas, excluding the maturation cause, arise from the remaining five causes (a defiled dharma is not a result produced by the maturation cause). Maturation-born dharmas, excluding the all-pervading cause, arise from the remaining five causes (what the all-pervading cause produces is defiled only). The third class, the remaining dharmas, excluding both the maturation and the all-pervading causes, arise from the remaining four causes. The first dharmas without outflows, excluding both those causes and the homogeneous cause as well, arise from the remaining three causes (before the first without-outflows there is no dharma of the same kind).

Question: with respect to what are these four classes of dharmas stated? Answer: they are stated with respect to mind and mental factors.

Question: and from how many causes do these four classes arise in the case of the formations not associated with mind and of form? Answer: beyond the causes excluded for mind and mental factors, the associated cause is further excluded — it should be known that the remaining dharmas arise from four causes, three causes, and two causes, these being the remaining causes. Here defiled and maturation-born form and formations not associated with mind arise from the remaining four causes; the third class, the remaining dharmas, arise from the remaining three causes; and the first dharmas without outflows arise from the remaining two causes. As for a dharma produced by a single cause, there definitely is none.