俱舍論俱生·心心所Abhidharmakośabhāṣya · Co-Arising · Mind and Mental Factors

〔T29 0018b10〕

心要Essence

界品是就「體」說一切法，這一卷是就「用」重看一遍。一句『有沒有非得一起生的法』問出五品之綱——七十五法的全表自此鋪開，而心從一團感覺變成一張數得出來的表。

一句話：法不孤起——最小的一粒物質要八樣事才站得住，最小的一念心要二十二個心所才成一個善念；而「我有」這件事，在這裡被立成了一個法。

來歷（先立）

本卷是玄奘譯本的卷四，也是真諦舊譯卷三的開頭——二譯各自分卷，卻在同一句上斷開，都以極微聚一頌為卷首。四家古疏在此也齊聲：普光、法寶、圓暉、神泰都把它標作根品的第二大段。尤可注意的是神泰疏——他的殘本正缺卷三，也就是根品的前一卷，本卷卻逐段標數、科文最細，還時時取大乘名相來對照。這一卷是四疏俱全的一卷。

三個眼目

分類的判準是範圍，不是價值。心所分五品，樞紐在一個「地」字——地就是行處。大地法是遍一切心的，大善地法是既遍善心又唯善心的，大煩惱地法是既遍染心又唯染心的，大不善地法要遍且唯不善，小煩惱地法只與少分染心相應。所以一品只裝兩個法（無慚無愧）也照樣立品——不是湊數，是兩個條件同時卡住的結果。古來諸師分五品有立五義、八義、九義的，本論只用一義就分乾淨了；普光為此下了一句話：此乃論之能，非關人之解。
心是同時亮起的一叢燈。心與心所必定俱生，闕一則餘不起；相應之義有五——所依、所緣、行相、時、事，五者平等才叫相應。心意識三名所詮義異而體是一：集起故名心，思量故名意，了別故名識。於是一念心可以被數：欲界善心二十二，不善不共二十，有覆無記十八，無覆無記十二，睡眠隨品各增一。『這一念有幾個心所』在這裡是一個有答案的問題。要留意「見不增」——見不是第十一個法，只是慧的作用差別。
「擁有」被立成了一個法。斷了煩惱、得了戒、證了滅——這些說法背後，有部立了一個「得」來承擔；沒有得到聖法的那個「沒有」，就是異生性。於是本卷末段展開全論最長的一場對論：經部說得無體可知、無用可知，說差別在所依身的轉變，於是「種子」第一次被定義出來——名與色於生自果所有展轉隣近功能，由相續、轉變、差別而成。毘婆沙師堅持得是實有別物。論主的收束是一句雙印——二途皆為善說，因為一者不違理、一者是我所宗。這句話裡放了兩宗的位置，沒有判勝負。

一義（附）：上界心所的遞減，是一張修定的地形圖

初靜慮除去唯不善的（瞋、七小煩惱、無慚無愧）以及惡作、睡眠；中間靜慮再除尋；二禪以上再除伺，連諂與誑也除。而每一項脫落都有所以然——色界離憂所以無惡作，色界無段食所以無睡眠，二禪以上沒有君臣尊卑相待的結構所以無諂誑。論還為此引了一段故事：馬勝苾芻上問大梵王四大何處滅盡，梵王不知而當眾自誇，事後把人拉到眾外道歉，請他回去問佛。有些煩惱不是被斷掉的，是到了那一地就無處可依。

通於全論

本卷所立五品，就是後來百法五位的底圖——數同而序異，心一開為八、心所四十六對五十一、色法同為十一、不相應十四對二十四、無為三對六。法寶在大地法下就已自作對照，說有部十法遍行而大乘唯五遍行；神泰在相應五義下引《瑜伽》三同為對，還以見相二分相配。列其異同，不判優劣——這是本編一貫的分寸。

另外，本卷第一次完整示範了俱舍通用的五門分別法式——三世、三性、界繫、三學、三斷。往後每遇一法，都可以照這五門追問一遍。

The Chapter on the Elements stated all dharmas in terms of “entity”; this fascicle looks at them once more in terms of “function.” A single question—‘are there dharmas that must arise together?’—brings out the framework of the five classes, and with it the whole table of the seventy-five dharmas; and mind turns from a mass of feeling into a table that can be counted.

In one sentence: no dharma arises alone—the smallest particle of matter needs eight entities to stand, and the smallest wholesome thought needs twenty-two mental factors to be one; and here “I have” is itself set up as a dharma.

Provenance (Established First)

This fascicle is Fascicle Four of Xuanzang’s version and also the opening of Fascicle Three of Paramārtha’s older translation—the two translations divide their fascicles independently and yet break at the same sentence, both taking the stanza on the minute aggregate as the first root stanza of the fascicle. The four ancient commentaries speak here with one voice as well: Puguang, Fabao, Yuanhui, and Shentai all mark it as the second major section of the Chapter on the Faculties. What is especially to be noted is Shentai’s commentary—his surviving text lacks precisely Fascicle Three, the fascicle preceding this one in the Chapter on the Faculties, whereas for this fascicle he numbers each passage, has the finest outline, and from time to time takes Mahāyāna terminology for comparison. This is a fascicle for which all four commentaries are present.

Three Points to Watch

The criterion of classification is scope, not value. Mental factors fall into five classes, and the pivot is the single word “ground”—a ground is a place of activity. The factors of the great ground pervade every mind; the factors of the great wholesome ground both pervade wholesome minds and belong to them alone; the factors of the great defiled ground both pervade defiled minds and belong to them alone; the factors of the great unwholesome ground must both pervade the unwholesome and belong to it alone; the factors of the small defiled ground are associated only with a small portion of defiled minds. So a class holding only two dharmas (non-conscience and shamelessness) is set up all the same—not to make up numbers, but as the result of two conditions clamping down at once. The masters of old divided the five classes by five senses, by eight, by nine; this treatise divides them cleanly by one sense alone, and Puguang set down a sentence for it: this is the treatise’s own capacity, and not a matter of anyone’s interpretation.
Mind is a cluster of lamps lit at the same moment. Mind and mental factors necessarily arise together, and if one is lacking the rest do not arise; association has five senses—support, object, mode of apprehension, time, and entity—and only when all five are even is there association. The three names mind, thought, and consciousness convey different senses and are one in entity: because it gathers and gives rise it is called mind, because it deliberates it is called thought, because it discerns it is called consciousness. A single thought can therefore be counted: a wholesome mind of the desire realm has twenty-two, an unwholesome mind of the independent class twenty, an obscured-indeterminate mind eighteen, an unobscured-indeterminate mind twelve, and sleep adds one to whichever class it is in. ‘How many mental factors are in this thought’ is here a question with an answer. Note that “view does not add to the count”—view is not an eleventh dharma but only a difference of operation of discernment.
“Having” is set up as a dharma. Afflictions cut off, precepts acquired, cessation realized—behind these ways of speaking the Sarvāstivādins set up an “acquisition” to bear them; and the “not having” of not having obtained the noble dharmas is ordinary-being status. The closing section of the fascicle then opens the longest debate in the whole treatise: the Sautrāntikas say that acquisition has no entity that can be known and no operation that can be known, and that the difference lies in the transformation of the supporting body—whereupon “seed” receives its first definition, as the capability—serially transmitted or immediately proximate—that name and form have with respect to producing their own result, constituted by continuum, transformation, and distinctiveness. The Vaibhāṣikas hold firmly that acquisition is a real separate thing. The author of the treatise closes with a double endorsement—both roads are well stated, because the one does not conflict with reason and the other is what his own school holds. That sentence sets the place of both schools within it, and pronounces no victor.

One Further Point (Appended): The Reduction of Mental Factors in the Upper Realms Is a Topographical Map for Cultivating Absorption

The first meditative absorption removes what is unwholesome alone (hatred, the seven small afflictions, non-conscience, and shamelessness) together with regret and sleep; the intermediate absorption further removes applied thought; from the second absorption upward sustained thought is removed, and flattery and deception with it. And every item that falls away has its reason—the form realm is free of sorrow and so has no regret; the form realm has no food taken in portions and so has no sleep; above the second absorption there is no structure of ruler and subject, higher and lower, and so there is no flattery or deception. The treatise even cites a story for it: the monk Aśvajit asked the Great Brahmā King where the four great elements cease, the Brahmā King did not know and praised himself before the assembly, and afterwards drew the man outside the assembly to apologize and send him back to ask the Buddha. Some afflictions are not cut off; they simply have nowhere to rest once a given level is reached.

Bearing on the Treatise as a Whole

The five classes established in this fascicle are the ground plan of the later five positions of the hundred dharmas—the same in number and different in order: mind opens from one into eight, forty-six mental factors against fifty-one, eleven dharmas of form in both, fourteen unassociated against twenty-four, three unconditioned against six. Fabao already drew the comparison for himself under the factors of the great ground, saying that in the Sarvāstivāda ten dharmas are omnipresent while in the Mahāyāna only five are; Shentai under the five senses of association cited the three samenesses of the Yogācārabhūmi for comparison and matched them further with the two aspects, image and perceiving. Their agreements and differences are listed and no verdict of merit is passed—this is the constant measure of the present edition.

Besides this, the fascicle demonstrates in full for the first time the Kośa’s general formula of analysis by five gates—the three times, the three ethical qualities, realm affiliation, the three kinds of training, and the three modes of abandonment. Every dharma one meets thereafter may be put to the same five questions.

原典Canonical · verbatim

阿毘達磨俱舍論卷第四　〔T29 0018b10〕

分別根品第二之二　〔T29 0018b14〕

今應思擇，一切有為如相不同，生亦各異，為有諸法決定俱生、有定俱生。謂一切法略有五品：一色、二心、三心所、四心不相應行、五無為。無為無生，此中不說。今先辯色決定俱生。頌曰：

〔頌·正23　T29 0018b20〕　　欲微聚無聲，無根有八事，
　　有身根九事，十事有餘根。
論曰：色聚極細立微聚名，為顯更無細於此者。此在欲界無聲無根，八事俱生隨一不減。云何八事？謂四大種及四所造色、香、味、觸。無聲有根諸極微聚，此俱生事或九或十。有身根聚九事俱生，八事如前，身為第九。有餘根聚十事俱生，九事如前，加眼等一。眼耳鼻舌必不離身，展轉相望處各別故。於前諸聚若有聲生，如次數增九十十一，以有聲處不離根生，謂有執受大種因起。若四大種不相離生，於諸聚中堅濕煖動，云何隨一可得非餘？於彼聚中勢用增者明了可得，餘體非無。如覺針鋒與籌合觸，如甞鹽味與麨合味。云何於彼知亦有餘？由有攝熟長持業故。有說：遇緣堅等便有流等相故，如水聚中由極冷故有煖相起，雖不相離而冷用增，如受及聲用有勝劣。有餘師說：於此聚中餘有種子未有體相，故契經說：於木聚中有種種界。界謂種子。如何風中知有顯色？此義可信，不可比知。或所合香現可取故，香與顯色不相離故。前說色界香味並無，故彼無聲有六七八，有聲有七八九俱生。此可准知，故不別說。此中言事為依體說、為依處說？若爾何過？二俱有過。若依體說，八九十等便為太少，由諸微聚必有形色，有多極微共積集故。重性輕性定隨有一，滑性澁性隨一亦然。或處有冷有飢有渴，是則所言有太少過。若依處說，八九十等便為太多，由四大種觸處攝故應說四等，是則所言有太多失。二俱無過。應知此中所言事者，一分依體說，謂所依大種；一分依處說，謂能依造色。若爾，大種事應成多，造色各別，依一四大種故。應知此中依體類說，諸四大種類無別故。何用分別如是語為？語隨欲生，義應思擇。如是已辯色定俱生。餘定俱生今次當辯。頌曰：

〔頌·正24前半　T29 0018c29〕　　心心所必俱，諸行相或得。
〔T29 0019a〕論曰：心與心所必定俱生，隨闕一時餘則不起。諸行即是一切有為，謂色、心、心所、心不相應行。前必俱言流至於此，謂色心等諸行生時，必與有為四相俱起。言或得者，謂諸行內唯有情法與得俱生；餘法不然，是故言或。向言心所，何者是耶？頌曰：

〔頌·正24後半　T29 0019a07〕　　心所且有五，大地法等異。
論曰：諸心所法且有五品。何等為五？一、大地法；二、大善地法；三、大煩惱地法；四、大不善地法；五、小煩惱地法。地謂行處，若此是彼所行處，即說此為彼法地。大法地故名為大地，此中若法大地所有名大地法，謂法恒於一切心有。彼法是何？頌曰：

〔頌·正25　T29 0019a14〕　　受想思觸欲，慧念與作意，
　　勝解三摩地，遍於一切心。
論曰：傳說：如是所列十法，諸心剎那和合遍有。此中受謂三種領納：苦、樂、俱非，有差別故。想謂於境取差別相。思謂能令心有造作。觸謂根境識和合生，能有觸對。欲謂希求所作事業。慧謂於法能有簡擇。念謂於緣明記不忘。作意謂能令心警覺。勝解謂能於境印可。三摩地謂心一境性。諸心心所異相微細，一一相續分別尚難，況一剎那俱時而有。有色諸藥色根所取，其味差別尚難了知，況無色法唯覺慧取。如是已說十大地法。大善法地名大善地，此中若法大善地所有名大善地法，謂法恒於諸善心有。彼法是何？頌曰：

〔頌·正26　T29 0019a29〕　　信及不放逸，輕安捨慚愧，
　　二根及不害，勤唯遍善心。
論曰：如是諸法唯遍善心。此中信者令心澄淨。有說：於諦寶業果中現前忍許故名為信。不放逸者，修諸善法離諸不善法。復何名修？謂此於善專注為性。餘部經中有如是釋。能守護心名不放逸。輕安者謂心堪任性。豈無經亦說有身輕安耶？雖非無說，此如身受應知亦爾，如何可立此為覺支？應知此中身輕安者身堪任性。復如何說此為覺支？能順覺支故無有失。以身輕安能引覺支心輕安故。於餘亦見有是說耶？有，如經說：喜及順喜法名喜覺支。瞋及瞋因緣名瞋恚蓋。正見、正思惟、正勤名慧蘊。思惟及勤雖非慧性，隨順慧故亦得慧名，故身輕安順覺支故得名無失。心平等性、無警覺性說名為捨。如何可說於一心中有警覺性、無警覺性？作意與捨二相應起。豈不前說諸心心所其相微細難可了知。有雖難了，由審推度而復可知。此最難知，謂相違背而不乖反。此有警覺於餘則無，二既懸殊有何乖反？若爾，不應同緣一境，或應一切皆互相應。如是種類所餘諸法，此中應求，如彼理趣，今於此中應知亦爾。慚、愧二種如後當釋。二根者，謂無貪、無瞋，無癡善根慧為性，故前已說在大地法中，不重說為大善地法。言不害者，謂無損惱。勤謂令心勇悍為性。如是已說大善地法。大煩惱法地名大煩惱地，此中若法大煩惱地所有名大煩惱地法，謂法恒於染污心有。彼法是何？頌曰：

〔頌·正27前半　T29 0019c03〕　　癡逸怠不信，惛掉恒唯染。
論曰：此中癡者所謂愚癡，即是無明無智無顯。逸謂放逸，不修諸善，是修諸善所對治法。怠謂懈怠，心不勇悍，是前所說勤所對治。不信者謂心不澄淨，是前所說信所對治。惛謂惛沈。對法中說：云何惛沈？謂身重性、心重性，身無堪任性、心無堪任性，身惛沈性、心惛沈性，是名惛沈。此是心所。如何名身？如身受言，故亦無失。掉謂掉舉，令心不靜。唯有如是六種，名大煩惱地法。豈不根本阿毘達磨中說有十種大煩惱地法，又於彼論不說惛沈。何者十？謂不信、懈怠、失念、心亂、無明、不正知、非理作意、邪勝解、掉舉、放逸。天愛！汝今但知言，至不閑意旨。意旨者何？謂失念、心亂、不正知、非理作意、邪勝解，已說彼在大地法中，不應重立為大煩惱地法。如無癡善根慧為體故，非大善地法，彼亦應爾。即染污念名為失念，染污等持名為心亂，諸染污慧名不正知，染污作意勝解名為非理作意及邪勝解故說。若是大地法亦大煩惱地法耶？應作四句。第一句，謂受、想、思、觸、欲。第二句，謂不信、懈怠、無明、掉舉、放逸。第三句，謂如前說念等五法。第四句，謂除前相。有執邪等持非即是心亂，彼作四句與此不同。又許惛沈通與一切煩惱相應，不說在大煩惱地法。於誰有過？有作是言：應說在此，而不說者順等持故。彼謂諸有惛沈行者速發等持，非掉舉行。誰惛沈行非掉舉行？誰掉舉行非惛沈行？此二未嘗不俱行故。雖爾，應知隨增說行。雖知說行隨用偏增，而依有體建立地法，故此地法唯六義成，此唯遍染心俱起非餘故。如是已說大煩惱地法。大不善法地名大不善地，此中若法大不善地所有名大不善地法，謂法恒於不善心有。彼法是何？頌曰。

〔頌·正27後半　T29 0020a09〕　　唯遍不善心，無慚及無愧。
論曰：唯二心所但與一切不善心俱，謂無慚、愧，故唯二種名此地法。此二法相如後當辯。如是已說大不善地法。小煩惱法地名小煩惱地，此中若法小煩惱地所有名小煩惱地法，謂法少分染污心俱。彼法是何？頌曰：

〔頌·正28　T29 0020a16〕　　忿覆慳嫉惱，害恨諂誑憍，
　　如是類名為，小煩惱地法。
論曰：如是類法唯修所斷，意識地起、無明相應、各別現行，故名為小煩惱地法。此法如後隨煩惱中當廣分別。如是已說五品心所。復有此餘不定心所，惡作、睡眠、尋、伺等法，此中應說。於何心品有幾心所決定俱生？頌曰：

〔頌·正29–31　T29 0020a24〕　　欲有尋伺故，於善心品中，
　　二十二心所，有時增惡作。
　　於不善不共，見俱唯二十，
　　四煩惱忿等，惡作二十一，
　　有覆有十八，無覆許十二，
　　睡眠遍不違，若有皆增一。
〔T29 0020b〕論曰：且欲界中心品有五，謂善唯一。不善有二，謂不共無明相應及餘煩惱等相應。無記有二，謂有覆無記及無覆無記。然欲界心定有尋伺故，善心品必二十二心所俱生，謂十大地法、十大善地法，及不定二，謂尋與伺。非諸善心皆有惡作，有時增數至二十三。惡作者何？惡所作體名為惡作。應知此中緣惡作法說名惡作，謂緣惡作心追悔性，如緣空解脫門說名為空，緣不淨無貪說為不淨。又見世間約所依處說能依事，如言一切村邑國土皆來集會。惡作即是追悔所依，故約所依說為惡作。又於果體假立因名，如說此六觸處應知名宿作業。若緣未作事，云何名惡作？於未作事亦立作名，如追悔言我先不作如是事業，是我惡作。何等惡作說名為善？謂於善惡不作作中心追悔性。與此相違名為不善。此二各依二處而起，若於不善不共心品，必有二十心所俱生，謂十大地法、六大煩惱地法、二大不善地法，并二不定，謂尋與伺。何等名為不共心品？謂此心品唯有無明，無有所餘貪煩惱等。於不善見相應心品，亦有二十心所俱生，名即如前不共品說。非見增故有二十一，以即於十大地法中慧用差別說為見故。言不善見相應心者，謂此心中或有邪見、或有見取、或戒禁取。於四不善貪、瞋、慢、疑煩惱心品，有二十一心所俱生，二十如不共，加貪等隨一。於前所說忿等相應隨煩惱品，亦二十一心所俱生，二十如不共，加忿等隨一。不善惡作相應心品，亦二十一心所俱生，謂即惡作第二十一。略說不善不共及見相應品中唯有二十，餘四煩惱及隨煩惱相應品中有二十一。若於無記有覆心品唯有十八心所俱生，謂十大地法、六大煩惱地法，并二不定，謂尋與伺。欲界無記有覆心者，謂與薩迦耶見及邊執見相應，此中見不增，應知如前釋。於餘無記無覆心品，許唯十二心所俱生，謂十大地法并不定尋伺。外方諸師欲令惡作亦通無記，此相應品便有十三心所俱起。應知睡眠與前所說一切心品皆不相違，通善不善無記性故。隨何品有即說此增，謂二十二至二十三，若二十三至二十四。不善無記如例應知。已說欲界心所俱生諸品定量，當說上界。頌曰：

〔頌·正32　T29 0020c17〕　　初定除不善，及惡作睡眠，
　　中定又除尋，上兼除伺等。
論曰：初靜慮中於前所說諸心所法，除唯不善、惡作、睡眠，餘皆具有。唯不善者，謂瞋煩惱，除諂、誑、憍所餘忿等及無慚愧。餘皆有者，如欲界說。中間靜慮除前所除，又更除尋，餘皆具有。第二靜慮以上乃至無色界中除前所除，又除伺等。等者顯除諂、誑，餘皆如前具有。經說：諂誑極至梵天，眾相依故，上地無有。以大梵王處自梵眾，忽被馬勝苾芻問言：此四大種當於何位盡滅無餘？梵王不知無餘滅位，便矯亂答：我於此梵眾是大梵，自在作者、化者、生者、養者，是一切父。作是語已，引出眾外諂言愧謝，令還問佛。如是已說於諸界地諸心品中心所數量，今次當說於前所辯諸心所中少分差別。無慚無愧、愛之與敬差別云何？頌曰：

〔頌·正33　T29 0021a05〕　　無慚愧不重，於罪不見怖，
　　愛敬謂信慚，唯於欲色有。
論曰：此中無慚無愧別者，於諸功德及有德者，無敬無崇、無所忌難、無所隨屬，說名無慚，即是恭敬所敵對法。為諸善士所訶厭法說名為罪，於此罪中不見怖畏說名無愧。此中怖言，顯非愛果能生怖故。不見怖言欲顯何義？為見而不怖名不見怖、為不見彼怖名不見怖？若爾何失？二俱有過。若見而不怖應顯智慧，若不見彼怖應顯無明。此言不顯見與不見，何所顯耶？此顯有法是隨煩惱為彼二因，說名無愧。有餘師說：於所造罪自觀無恥名曰無慚，觀他無恥說名無愧。若爾，此二所觀不同，云何俱起？不說此二一時俱起別觀自他。然有無恥，觀自時勝說名無慚。復有無恥，觀他時增說為無愧。慚愧差別翻此應知，謂翻初釋有敬有崇、有所忌難、有所隨屬說名為慚，於罪見怖說名為愧。翻第二釋，於所造罪自觀有恥說名為慚，觀他有恥說名為愧。已說無慚無愧差別。愛敬別者，愛謂愛樂，體即是信。然愛有二：一有染污、二無染污。有染謂貪，如愛妻子等。無染謂信，如愛師長等。有信非愛，謂緣苦集信。有愛非信，謂諸染污愛。有通信愛，謂緣滅道信。有非信愛，謂除前三相。有說：信者忍許有德，由此為先方生愛樂，故愛非信。敬謂敬重，體即是慚，如前解慚謂有敬等。有慚非敬，謂緣苦集慚。有通慚敬，謂緣滅道慚。有說：敬者有所崇重，由此為先方生慚恥，故敬非慚。望所緣境補特伽羅，愛敬有無應作四句。有愛無敬，謂於妻子共住門人等。有敬無愛，謂於他師有德貴人等。有愛有敬，謂於自師父母伯叔等。無愛無敬，謂除前三相。如是愛敬欲色界有，無色界無。豈不信慚大善地法無色亦有？愛敬有二，謂緣於法補特伽羅，緣法愛敬通三界有。此中意說緣補特伽羅者，故欲色有，無色界無。如是已說愛敬差別。尋、伺、慢、憍差別云何？頌曰：

〔頌·正34　T29 0021b16〕　　尋伺心麁細，慢對他心舉，
　　憍由染自法，心高無所顧。
論曰：尋伺別者，謂心麁細，心之麁性名尋，心之細性名伺。云何此二一心相應？有作是釋：如冷水上浮以熟酥，上烈日光之所照觸，酥因水日非釋非凝。如是一心有尋有伺，心由尋伺不遍細麁，故於一心俱有作用。若爾，尋伺是麁細因，非麁細體，如水日光是凝釋，日體非凝釋。又麁細性相待而立，界地品別上下相形，乃至有頂應有尋伺。又麁細性無別體類，不可依之以別尋伺。復有釋言：尋伺二法是語言行，故契經言：要有尋伺方有語言，非無尋伺此語言行。麁者名尋，細者名伺，於一心內別法是麁、別法是細，於理何違？若有別體類，理實無違；然無別體類，故成違理，一體類中無容上下俱時起故。若言體類亦有差別，應說體類別相云何。此二體類別相難說，但由上下顯其別相，非由上下能顯別相，一一類中有上下故。由是應知，尋伺二法定不可執一心相應。若爾，云何契經中說：於初靜慮具足五支。具五支言就一地說，非一剎那，故無有過。如是已說尋伺差別。慢憍別者，慢謂對他心自舉性，稱量自他德類差別，心自舉恃𣣋蔑於他故名為慢。憍謂染著自法為先，令心傲逸無所顧性。有餘師說：如因酒生欣舉差別說名為醉，如是貪生欣舉差別說名為憍。是謂慢憍差別之相。如是已說諸心心所品類不同俱生異相。然心心所於契經中隨義建立種種名想，今當辯此名義差別。頌曰：

〔頌·正35　T29 0021c18〕　　心意識體一，心心所有依，
　　有緣有行相，相應義有五。
論曰：集起故名心，思量故名意，了別故名識。復有釋言：淨不淨界種種差別故名為心，即此為他作所依止故名為意，作能依止故名為識。故心、意、識三名所詮，義雖有異而體是一。如心意識三名所詮義異體一，諸心心所名有所依所緣、行相相應亦爾，名義雖殊而體是一。謂心心所皆名有所依，託所依根故。或名有所緣，取所緣境故。或名有行相，即於所緣品類差別等起行相故。或名相應，等和合故。依何義故名等和合？有五義故，謂心心所五義平等故說相應，所依所緣行相時事皆平等故。事平等者，一相應中如心體一，諸心所法各各亦爾。已說心心所廣分別義。心不相應行何者是耶？頌曰：

〔頌·正36　T29 0022a06〕　　心不相應行，得非得同分，
　　無想二定命，相名身等類。
論曰：如是諸法心不相應，非色等性，行蘊所攝，是故名心不相應行。於中且辯得非得相。頌曰：

〔頌·正37　T29 0022a11〕　　得謂獲成就，非得此相違，
　　得非得唯於，自相續二滅。
論曰：得有二種，一者未得已失今獲、二者得已不失成就，應知非得與此相違。於何法中有得非得？於自相續及二滅中。謂有為法若有墮在自相續中有得非得，非他相續，無有成就他身法故。非非相續，無有成就非情法故。且有為法決定如是，無為法中唯於二滅有得非得。一切有情無不成就非擇滅者，故對法中傳說如是：誰成無漏法？謂一切有情，除初剎那具縛聖者及餘一切具縛異生，諸餘有情皆成擇滅。決定無有成就虛空，故於虛空不言有得，以得無故非得亦無。宗明得非得，相翻而立故。諸有得者亦有非得，義准可知，故不別釋。何緣知有別物名得？契經說故。如契經言：聖者於彼十無學法，以生以得以成就故，已斷五支，乃至廣說。若爾，非情及他相續亦應成就。所以者何？契經說故。如契經說：苾芻當知，有轉輪王成就七寶，乃至廣說。此中自在說名成就，謂轉輪王於彼七寶有自在力，隨樂轉故。此既自在說名成就，餘復何因知有別物？許有別物有何非理？如是非理，謂所執得無體可知，如色聲等或貪瞋等；無用可知，如眼耳等，故無容有別物名得。執有別物，是為非理。若謂此得亦有作用，謂作所得諸法生因，是則無為應無有得。又所得法未得已捨，界地轉易及離染故。彼現無得，當云何生？若俱生得為生因者，生與生生復何所作？又非情法應定不生。又具縛者，下中上品煩惱現起差別應無，得無別故。若由餘因有差別者，即應由彼諸法得生，得復何用？故彼所言得有作用，謂作所得諸法生因，理不成立。誰言此得作法生因？若爾，此得有何作用？謂於差別為建立因。所以者何？若無有得，異生聖者起世俗心，應無異生及諸聖者建立差別。豈不煩惱已斷、未斷有差別故，應有差別？若執無得，如何可說煩惱已斷及與未斷？許有得者斷未斷成，由煩惱得離未離故。此由所依有差別故，煩惱已斷未斷義成。謂諸聖者見修道力，令所依身轉變異本，於彼二道所斷惑中無復功能令其現起。猶如種子火所焚燒，轉變異前無能生用。如是聖者所依身中無生惑能名煩惱斷。或世間道損所依中煩惱種子亦名為斷，與上相違名為未斷。諸未斷者說名成就，諸已斷者名不成就，如是二種但假非實。善法有二：一者不由功力修得、二者要由功力修得，即名生得及加行得。不由功力而修得者，若所依中種未被損名為成就，若所依中種已被損名不成就。謂斷善者由邪見力損所依中善根種子應知名斷，非所依中善根種子畢竟被害說名為斷。要由功力而修得者，若所依中彼法已起生彼功力自在無損說名成就，與此相違名不成就。如是二種亦假非實。故所依中唯有種子未拔未損增長自在，於如是位立成就名，無有別物。此中何法名為種子？謂名與色於生自果所有展轉隣近功能，此由相續轉變差別。何名轉變？謂相續中前後異性。何名相續？謂因果性三世諸行。何名差別？謂有無間生果功能。然有處說，若成就貪便不能修四念住者。彼說：耽著貪煩惱者，不能厭捨，故名成就。由隨耽著貪愛時分，於四念住必不能修。如是成就遍一切種，唯假非實。唯遮於此名不成就，亦假非實。毘婆沙師說：此二種皆有別物實而非假。如是二途皆為善說。所以者何？不違理故、我所宗故。已辯自性，差別云何？且應辯得。頌曰：

〔頌·正38·正39前半　T29 0022c24〕　　三世法各三，善等唯善等，
　　有繫自界得，無繫得通四，
　　非學無學三，非所斷二種。
論曰：三世法得各有三種，謂過去法有過去得、有未來得、有現在得，如是未來及現在法各有三得。又善等法得唯善等，謂善不善及無記法，如其次第，有善不善無記三得。又有繫法得唯自界，謂欲色界無色界法，如其次第唯有欲色無色三得。若無繫法得通四種，謂無漏法總而言之得有四種，即三界得及無漏得。別分別者，非擇滅得，通三界繫。若擇滅得，色無色繫及與無漏。道諦得，唯無漏故。無繫法得，有四種。又有學法得唯有學，若無學法得唯無學，非學非無學得有差別，謂此法得總說有三，別分別者一切有漏及三無為皆名非學非無學法。且有漏法唯有非學非無學得，非擇滅得。及非聖道所引擇滅得亦如是，若有學道所引擇滅得即有學，若無學道所引擇滅得即無學。又見修所斷法，如其次第有見修所斷得。非所斷法得有差別，謂此法得總說有二，別分別者，諸無漏法名非所斷，非擇滅得唯修所斷。若非聖道所引擇滅得亦如是。聖道所引擇滅之得及道諦得，皆非所斷。前雖總說三世法各三，今應簡別其中差別相。頌曰：

〔頌·正39後半·正40前半　T29 0023a20〕　　無記得俱起，除二通變化，
　　有覆色亦俱，欲色無前起。
論曰：無覆無記得唯俱起，無前後生，勢力劣故。法若過去得亦過去，法若未來得亦未來，法若現在得亦現在。一切無覆無記法得皆如是耶？不爾。云何？除眼耳通及能變化。謂眼耳通慧及能變化心，勢力強故、加行差別所成辦故，雖是無覆無記性收，而有前後及俱起得。若工巧處及威儀路極數習者，得亦許爾。唯有無覆無記法得但俱起耶？不爾。云何？有覆無記色得亦爾。謂諸有覆無記表色得亦如前，但有俱起。雖有上品而亦不能發無表故勢力微劣，由此定無法前後得。如無記法得有別異，善不善得亦有異耶？亦有。云何？謂欲界繫善不善色得無前起，唯有俱生及後起得。非得如得，亦有如上品類別耶？不爾。云何？頌曰：

〔頌·正40後半·正41　T29 0023b08〕　　非得淨無記，去來世各三，
　　三界不繫三，許聖道非得，
　　說名異生性，得法易地捨。
論曰：性差別者，一切非得皆唯無覆無記性攝。世差別者，過去未來各有三種，謂現在法決定無有現在非得，唯有過去未來非得，過去未來一一各有三世非得。界差別者，三界繫法及不繫法各三非得，謂欲界繫法有三界非得，色無色界繫及不繫亦爾。定無非得是無漏者。所以者何？由許聖道非得，說名異生性故。如本論言：云何異生性？謂不獲聖法。不獲即是非得異名，非說異生性是無漏應理。不獲何聖法名異生性？謂不獲一切，不別說故。此不獲言，表離於獲。若異此者，諸佛世尊亦不成就聲聞獨覺種性聖法，應名異生。若爾，彼論應說純言不要須說，此一句中含純義故，如說此類食水食風。有說：不獲苦法智忍及俱生法名異生性。不可難言道類智時捨此法故應成非聖，前已永害彼非得故。若爾，此性既通三乘，不獲何等名異生性？此亦應言不獲一切。若爾，此應同前有難。此難復應如前通釋。若爾，重說唐捐其功。如經部師，所說為善。經部所說其義云何？謂曾未生聖法相續分位差別名異生性。如是非得何時當捨？此法非得，得此法時或轉易地捨此非得。如聖道非得說名異生性，得此聖道時或易地便捨。餘法非得，類此應思。若非得得斷，非得非得生，如是名為捨於非得。得與非得，豈復有餘得與非得？應言此二各復有餘得及非得。若爾，豈不有無窮過？無無窮過，許得展轉更相成故。以法生時并其自體三法俱起，第一本法、第二法得、第三得得。謂相續中法得起故成就本法及與得得，得得起故成就法得，是故此中無無窮過。如是若善若染污法，一一自體初生起時并其自體三法俱起，第二剎那六法俱起，謂三法得及三得得，第三剎那十八俱起，謂於第一第二剎那所生諸法，有九法得及九得得。如是諸得後後轉增。一切過去未來煩惱及隨煩惱并生得善剎那剎那相應，俱有無始無終生死輪轉有無邊得，且一有情生死相續剎那剎那起無邊得，如是一切有情相續一一各別，剎那剎那無量無邊諸得俱起。如是諸得極多集會，無對礙故互相容受。若不爾者，一有情得虛空不容，況第二等。

The canonical text stands in Chinese only. This edition renders the essence, the plain reading, the exposition and the apparatus into English — never the sūtra itself. Switch to 漢讀本 or 並行雙語 above to read it.

白話Plain reading

〔卷首〕一切法分五品，本卷先辨前四品之同起

論：現在應當思擇這樣一個問題——一切「有為法」（由眾多條件聚合而造作出來的法）既然各自的相狀不同，生起時也就各各有別；那麼，有沒有哪些法是決定要一起生起的呢？答：有決定一起生起的。總說起來，一切法簡略分為五品（五大類）：第一是色（物質性的法）、第二是心（心王，即識的本身）、第三是心所（依附於心而起的種種心理作用）、第四是心不相應行（既不是色也不是心、卻依色心分位而假立的法）、第五是無為（不由眾緣造作、無生無滅之法）。無為法本來就沒有「生」，所以在這裡不談。如今先辨明色法是怎樣決定一起生起的。頌說：

〔正23〕色法決定俱生：八事、九事、十事

頌：欲界中最細的色聚，若不含聲、也不含根，就有八事同時俱生；若含身根，便是九事；若含眼等其餘的根，便是十事。

論：色的聚合到了最細微處，就立「微聚」這個名——用來顯示再沒有比它更細的了。這微聚若在欲界，其中沒有聲、也沒有根，那就是八事俱生，八者缺一不可。哪八事呢？就是四大種（地、水、火、風四種能造之體）以及四種所造之色——色、香、味、觸。若是沒有聲而有根的那些極微聚，其中俱生之事就或是九、或是十：含身根的聚，是九事俱生——八事如前，加上身根為第九；含其餘之根的聚，是十事俱生——九事如前，再加上眼等其中一根。眼、耳、鼻、舌一定不離身根〔所以含眼根處必也含身根〕；而眼耳鼻舌四根彼此相望，各自所處之位不同〔所以不會同在一聚中互相累加〕。以上諸聚，若其中有聲生起，就依次增為九、十、十一——因為有聲之處，聲必不離根而生，也就是由『有執受的大種』（有心識執持的身內大種）為因而發起的。

問：若說四大種是不相離而生的，那麼在諸多色聚裡，堅、濕、煖、動為什麼只能察覺到其中一種、察覺不到其餘？答：在那個聚中，勢用偏強的那一大顯得明了可得，其餘三大的體並非沒有。就像感覺針尖與竹籌合在一起去觸〔只覺針而不覺籌〕，又像嘗鹽與麵粉合成的味〔只覺鹹而不覺麵〕。問：那又怎麼知道那裡確實還有其餘三大呢？答：因為那裡有攝（水之收攝）、熟（火之成熟）、長（風之增長）、持（地之任持）這四種業用在。另有一說：遇到適當的緣時，堅硬之物便顯出流動、濕潤等相，可見本來就有；譬如水聚之中因為極冷的緣故而有煖相現起——雖然四大不相離，只是冷的作用偏強罷了；就像受與聲，其作用也有強有弱。又有其餘論師說：在這樣的聚中，其餘幾大只有種子（能生之功能）而尚未現起體相，所以契經說「於木聚中有種種界」——這裡的「界」就是種子。

問：風裡怎麼知道有顯色呢？〔風不可見〕答：這一義只能依教而信，不能靠推比得知。或者說：與風相合的香既然現前可以嗅得，而香與顯色又是不相離的〔所以可知風中有顯色〕。前面說過色界中沒有香與味，所以色界之聚若無聲便是六、七、八〔事俱生〕，有聲便是七、八、九俱生；這可以依前類推，所以不另外說。

問：這裡所說的「事」，是就體（法的自體）來說，還是就處（十二處的歸類）來說？答：若這樣問，有什麼過失？答：兩邊都有過失。若依體來說，八、九、十等就太少了——因為諸微聚必定有形色，是由許多極微共同積集而成的；重性與輕性一定隨有其一，滑性與澁性也隨有其一；有的地方還有冷、有飢、有渴。這樣一來，所說的數目就有太少之過。若依處來說，八、九、十等又太多了——因為四大種都歸「觸處」所攝，那就應該說成四等；這樣一來，所說的數目就有太多之失。答：其實兩邊都無過失。應知此中所說的「事」，一分是依體說的，指的是所依的大種；一分是依處說的，指的是能依的所造色。問：若是這樣，大種之「事」就該成很多了——因為所造之色各各不同，各自依著一組四大種。答：應知此處是依體類而說的，因為諸四大種其類別無有差異〔所以合說為四〕。問：何必作這樣的分別語呢？答：語言是隨人之欲而生起的，義理才是應當思擇的。以上已經辨明色法決定俱生。其餘諸法的決定俱生，接下來當辨。頌說：

〔正24前半〕心與心所必定同時生起

頌：心與心所必定同起；一切有為諸行必與四相同起，並且或與「得」同起。

論：心與心所必定同時生起，隨便缺少其中一個，另一個就不會現起。所謂「諸行」，就是一切有為法，也就是色、心、心所、心不相應行。前一句中「必俱」二字之義流貫到這裡——是說色、心等諸行生起時，必定與有為四相（生、住、異、滅）一同現起。說「或得」，是指諸行之中唯有有情之法會與「得」（成就的那一種力）同起；其餘〔非情之〕法則不然，所以用一個「或」字。前面說到「心所」，那什麼是心所呢？頌說：

〔正24後半〕心所總分五品

頌：心所且分五品，就是大地法等五類之別。

論：諸心所法且分五品。哪五品？第一是大地法、第二是大善地法、第三是大煩惱地法、第四是大不善地法、第五是小煩惱地法。「地」就是行處（活動所依之場所）：若此法是彼法所活動之處，就說此法是彼法的「地」。「大法」之地所以叫大地〔這裡的大地指心王，因為受等十法遍一切心，故名大法〕；此中若有某法是大地所有的，就叫大地法——也就是恒常在一切心中都有的那些法。那些法是什麼？頌說：

〔正25〕大地法十：受、想、思、觸、欲、慧、念、作意、勝解、三摩地

頌：受、想、思、觸、欲，慧、念與作意，勝解、三摩地——這十法遍於一切心。

論：傳說是這樣的：如上所列的十法，在心的每一剎那和合而普遍地都有。此中——受，就是三種領納：苦、樂、非苦非樂，因為有這樣的差別。想，就是在境上攝取差別之相〔分辨這是什麼、不是什麼〕。思，就是能令心有所造作〔推動心去作業〕。觸，就是根、境、識三者和合而生，能有觸對〔心與境的接上〕。欲，就是希求所要作的事業。慧，就是對於諸法能有簡擇〔分別抉擇〕。念，就是對於所緣明白記持而不忘失。作意，就是能令心警覺〔把心喚起來趣向境〕。勝解，就是能對於境作出印可〔確認『就是這樣、不是那樣』〕。三摩地，就是心專注於一境之性。諸心心所的行相極其微細，一一相續地去分別尚且困難，何況要分辨同一剎那中同時俱有？譬如有色的諸藥為色根所取，它們味道的差別尚且難以了知，何況無色之法只能靠覺慧去取。以上已說十種大地法。「大善法」之地叫大善地；此中若有某法是大善地所有的，就叫大善地法——也就是恒常在一切善心中都有的那些法。那些法是什麼？頌說：

〔正26〕大善地法十：信、不放逸、輕安、捨、慚、愧、無貪、無瞋、不害、勤

頌：信與不放逸，輕安、捨、慚、愧，無貪無瞋二根及不害，還有勤——這些唯遍於善心。

論：如上諸法唯遍一切善心。此中信，就是令心澄淨〔像清水珠投入濁水，濁水便澄清〕。另有一說：對於四諦、三寶、業果，當下能忍可認許，所以叫作信。不放逸，就是修習諸善法、遠離諸不善法。問：那什麼叫「修」呢？答：就是對於善法專注不移為其體性。其餘部派的經中有這樣的解釋——能守護心，就叫不放逸。輕安，就是心的堪任性〔心變得柔軟、可用〕。

問：豈不是也有經說「身輕安」嗎？答：雖然不是沒有這樣說，但這就像「身受」一樣〔受本是心所，若與五識相應就叫身受〕，應知輕安也是如此。問：〔若身輕安是五識相應的有漏法，〕怎能立它為覺支（七覺支之一）呢？答：應知此處所說的身輕安，是身的堪任性〔即輕安之觸〕。問：那又怎能說它是覺支呢？答：因為它能隨順覺支，所以無過——由於身的輕安能引發覺支中的心輕安。問：在別處也見有這樣〔相隨順而立名〕的說法嗎？答：有。如經中說：喜以及順喜之法，都名為喜覺支；瞋以及瞋的因緣，都名為瞋恚蓋；正見、正思惟、正勤，合名為慧蘊——思惟與勤雖然本身不是慧的體性，但因為隨順於慧，也得了慧之名。所以身輕安因為隨順覺支，得覺支之名並無過失。

心的平等性、無警覺性，就叫作捨〔不偏不倚、不再刻意提起〕。問：怎能說在同一個心中既有〔作意的〕警覺性、又有〔捨的〕無警覺性？作意與捨二者竟能相應而起？答：前面不是已經說過諸心心所其相微細、難可了知嗎？問：有些難了之事，經過審細推度還是可以知道的；這一件卻最難知——說它們相違背，卻又不相乖反。答：這一個〔作意〕有警覺，在那一個〔捨〕上則沒有；二者既然懸殊，有什麼乖反可言？問：若是這樣，它們就不該同緣一境；否則一切〔性質相違之法〕都該互相相應了。答：像這樣的種類，其餘諸法此中都應當拿來一併思求；照著那些法的理趣去看，如今在此處應知也是一樣。慚與愧二種，如後面當說。二根，就是無貪、無瞋〔三善根中的兩個〕；無癡這一善根是以慧為體性的，前面已經把它說在大地法中了，所以不重複立為大善地法。說不害，就是沒有損惱〔他人之心〕。勤，就是令心勇悍為其體性。以上已說大善地法。「大煩惱法」之地叫大煩惱地；此中若有某法是大煩惱地所有的，就叫大煩惱地法——也就是恒常在染污心中都有的那些法。那些法是什麼？頌說：

〔正27前半〕大煩惱地法六：癡、放逸、懈怠、不信、惛沈、掉舉

頌：癡、放逸、懈怠、不信、惛沈、掉舉——這六法恒常而且唯獨在染污心中。

論：此中癡，就是所謂愚癡，也就是無明、無智、無顯〔照不明、決不斷、彰不了〕。逸就是放逸，不修諸善——它正是「修諸善」〔即不放逸〕所對治之法。怠就是懈怠，心不勇悍——它正是前面所說的「勤」所對治之法。不信，就是心不澄淨——正是前面所說的「信」所對治之法。惛就是惛沈；對法論中說：什麼是惛沈？就是身重性、心重性，身無堪任性、心無堪任性，身惛沈性、心惛沈性——這叫惛沈。問：這〔惛沈〕是心所，怎麼會叫「身」呢？答：就像「身受」那樣說，所以也沒有過失。掉就是掉舉，令心不能安靜。唯有這樣六種，才叫大煩惱地法。

問：豈不是根本的《阿毘達磨》〔本論〕中說有十種大煩惱地法，而且那部論裡並不說惛沈？哪十種呢——就是不信、懈怠、失念、心亂、無明、不正知、非理作意、邪勝解、掉舉、放逸。答：天愛呀〔西方戲稱愚人之語〕！你如今只知道那論的字面，卻不明白它的用意。問：用意是什麼？答：失念、心亂、不正知、非理作意、邪勝解這五個，已經說在大地法中了〔它們分別以念、定、慧、作意、勝解為體〕，不應該重複立為大煩惱地法；就像無癡以慧為體，所以〔在大善地法中〕不另立，那五個也應當如此。染污的「念」就叫失念，染污的「等持」就叫心亂，諸染污的「慧」叫不正知，染污的作意與勝解就叫非理作意與邪勝解——所以才那樣說。

問：那麼『是大地法的，也就是大煩惱地法嗎？』答：應作四句分別：第一句〔是大地法而非大煩惱地法〕，就是受、想、思、觸、欲；第二句〔是大煩惱地法而非大地法〕，就是不信、懈怠、無明、掉舉、放逸；第三句〔二者皆是〕，就是前面說的念等五法；第四句〔二者皆非〕，就是除去前三句所餘。另有人主張「邪等持」並不就是「心亂」，他所作的四句與此不同。

又問：你們〔有部〕既然承認惛沈通於一切煩惱相應，卻不把它說在大煩惱地法中，這是誰的過失呢？有人這樣說：本該說在此處，而不說的原因是它隨順等持——他們認為凡以惛沈為行相的人容易發起等持，不像掉舉行的人。問：誰是惛沈行而非掉舉行？誰是掉舉行而非惛沈行？這二者未曾不同時而行。答：雖然如此，應知是就其偏增而說「行」的。答：雖然知道說「行」是隨其作用偏增而說，但建立「地法」是要依有體之法而立的，所以這一地法唯有六個才在義理上說得通——因為這六個唯獨遍與染心同起，不通於其餘。以上已說大煩惱地法。「大不善法」之地叫大不善地；此中若有某法是大不善地所有的，就叫大不善地法——也就是恒常在不善心中都有的那些法。那些法是什麼？頌說：

〔正27後半〕大不善地法二：無慚、無愧

頌：唯遍於一切不善心的，是無慚與無愧。

論：唯有兩個心所是只與一切不善心同起的，就是無慚與無愧，所以唯此二種名為大不善地法。這二法的相狀，如後面當辨。以上已說大不善地法。「小煩惱法」之地叫小煩惱地；此中若有某法是小煩惱地所有的，就叫小煩惱地法——也就是只與一小部分染污心同起的那些法。那些法是什麼？頌說：

〔正28〕小煩惱地法十：忿、覆、慳、嫉、惱、害、恨、諂、誑、憍

頌：忿、覆、慳、嫉、惱，害、恨、諂、誑、憍——像這一類，就叫小煩惱地法。

論：像這一類法，唯是修道所斷〔不是見道所斷〕、唯在意識地生起、唯與無明相應、各別現行〔不會兩個同時起〕，所以叫小煩惱地法。這些法如後面說隨煩惱時當廣分別。以上已說五品心所。此外還有其餘的不定心所——惡作、睡眠、尋、伺等法，此處應當說。那麼，在哪一類心之中，有幾個心所是決定俱生的？頌說：

〔正29–31〕欲界五類心各具幾心所

頌：欲界必有尋與伺，所以善心品中有二十二心所；有時再增惡作〔為二十三〕。不善心中的不共無明品與見相應品，唯有二十；四煩惱品、忿等隨煩惱品、惡作品，各二十一。有覆無記品有十八，無覆無記品許有十二。睡眠遍與諸品不相違，若有睡眠，各品皆增一。

論：且說欲界之中，心分五類：善心唯一類；不善心有二類——與「不共無明」相應的，和與其餘煩惱等相應的；無記心有二類——有覆無記與無覆無記。而欲界之心必定有尋、有伺，所以善心品必有二十二個心所俱生，就是十大地法、十大善地法，加上不定二法之尋與伺。並不是一切善心都有惡作，若有時就增到二十三。

問：什麼是惡作？答：所作的惡事之體叫作「惡作」。應知此處是以『緣惡作之法』而立名為惡作的——就是緣著自己所作之惡而心生追悔的那個性質。譬如緣「空」的解脫門就叫作「空解脫門」〔它的體其實是定〕，緣「不淨」的無貪就叫作「不淨〔觀〕」〔它的體其實是無貪〕。又如世間常就所依之處說能依之事，好比說『一切村邑國土都來集會』〔其實來的是人〕；惡作正是追悔所依之處，所以就所依而名為惡作。又如在果體上假立因之名，好比說『這六觸處應知名為宿作業』〔六處是果，宿業是因〕。

問：若所緣的是「未作」的事，怎麼也叫惡作？答：對於未作之事也可以立「作」之名，好比追悔時說：『我先前沒有作這樣的事業，這是我的惡作。』問：什麼樣的惡作叫作善？答：就是對於『該作的善沒作、不該作的惡卻作了』而心生追悔——這是善的惡作；與此相違的〔悔自己作了善、悔自己沒作惡〕就叫不善。這二種各各依善、惡二處而起。

若是不善的不共無明品，必有二十個心所俱生，就是十大地法、六大煩惱地法、二大不善地法，並二不定之尋與伺。問：什麼叫不共心品？答：就是這一類心中只有無明，沒有其餘的貪等煩惱。在不善的見相應心品中，也有二十個心所俱生，名數就如前面不共品所說；並不因為多了「見」而成二十一——因為「見」就是十大地法中「慧」的作用差別而已。所說「不善見相應心」，是指這心中或有邪見、或有見取、或有戒禁取。在貪、瞋、慢、疑四種不善煩惱心品中，有二十一個心所俱生——二十如不共品，再加貪等其中之一。在前面所說忿等隨煩惱相應品中，也有二十一個心所俱生——二十如不共品，再加忿等其中之一。不善惡作相應心品中，也有二十一個心所俱生——就是把惡作算作第二十一。簡略地說：不善心中的不共品與見相應品唯有二十，其餘四煩惱與隨煩惱相應品有二十一。

若在無記有覆心品，唯有十八個心所俱生，就是十大地法、六大煩惱地法，並二不定之尋與伺。欲界的無記有覆心，是指與薩迦耶見（身見）及邊執見相應的心；此中也不因「見」而增數，應知理由如前所釋。在其餘的無記無覆心品，許有十二個心所俱生，就是十大地法並不定之尋、伺。外方諸師主張惡作也通於無記，那麼此相應品便有十三個心所俱起。應知睡眠與前面所說的一切心品都不相違，因為它通於善、不善、無記三性；隨哪一品有睡眠，就說那一品增一——即由二十二增為二十三、由二十三增為二十四；不善與無記依此類推。以上已說欲界心所俱生諸品之定量；接著當說上界。頌說：

〔正32〕上界心所之遞減

頌：初靜慮除去唯不善者以及惡作、睡眠；中間靜慮又除去尋；再往上還兼除伺等。

論：初靜慮中，於前面所說的諸心所法，除去「唯不善」者以及惡作、睡眠，其餘都具有。所謂「唯不善」者，就是瞋煩惱，以及除去諂、誑、憍之外其餘的忿等〔七個小煩惱〕，還有無慚、無愧。說『其餘都有』，就如欲界中所說。中間靜慮除去前面所除的，又再除去尋，其餘都具有。第二靜慮以上乃至無色界中，除去前面所除的，又除去「伺等」——「等」字是顯示還要除去諂與誑；其餘都如前具有。

經中說：諂與誑最高只到梵天，因為那裡還有「眾相依」〔君臣尊卑相待〕的緣故，再往上就沒有了。曾有這樣一事：大梵王正處在自己的梵眾之中，忽然被馬勝苾芻問道：『這四大種要到哪一位次才會滅盡無餘？』梵王不知道無餘滅的位次，便含糊詭亂地答道：『我在這梵眾之中是大梵，是自在者、作者、化者、生者、養者，是一切〔眾生〕之父。』說完這話，就把馬勝引出眾外，諂媚地說慚愧話道歉，叫他回去問佛。以上已說於諸界諸地各種心品中心所之數量；接著當說前面所辨諸心所中的少分差別。無慚與無愧、愛與敬，它們的差別是什麼？頌說：

〔正33〕無慚無愧之別；愛與敬之別

頌：無慚是不尊重〔功德與有德者〕，無愧是於罪不見怖畏；愛就是信、敬就是慚，這二者唯在欲界與色界有。

論：此中無慚與無愧的分別是——對於諸功德以及有德之人，沒有恭敬、沒有推崇，沒有什麼顧忌畏難，沒有什麼隨順依屬，這叫作無慚，它正是「恭敬」的敵對之法。被諸善士所訶責厭棄之法叫作罪；對於這樣的罪不見有可怖畏〔之果〕，就叫作無愧。此中說「怖」，是顯示由非可愛之果能生怖畏。

問：說「不見怖」是要顯什麼義？是『見了卻不怖』叫不見怖，還是『不見其怖〔果〕』叫不見怖？答：若這樣問有什麼失？答：兩邊都有過失——若是見了而不怖，那就該顯出的是〔邪〕智慧；若是不見其怖果，那就該顯出的是無明。答：這句話並不是要顯示見或不見。問：那要顯什麼？答：這是要顯示另有一法是隨煩惱，它是那〔邪智與無明〕二者之因，這才叫無愧。

另有其他論師說：對於自己所造之罪，就自身來看而不覺羞恥，叫作無慚；就他人來看而不覺羞恥，叫作無愧。問：若是這樣，這二者所觀不同，怎能同時俱起？答：並不是說這二者是同一時間分別去觀自與他；而是說：那「無恥」在觀自己時作用偏勝，就叫無慚；那「無恥」在觀他人時作用偏增，就叫無愧。慚與愧的差別把上面翻轉過來就知道了：翻第一釋，就是有恭敬、有推崇，有所顧忌畏難、有所隨順依屬，叫作慚；於罪見到怖畏，叫作愧。翻第二釋，就是對於所造之罪，就自身看而有羞恥叫作慚，就他人看而有羞恥叫作愧。以上已說無慚無愧的差別。

愛與敬的分別是——「愛」就是愛樂，它的體就是信。然而愛有二種：一是有染污的、二是無染污的。有染污的就是貪，好比愛妻子等；無染污的就是信，好比愛師長等。〔以信與愛作四句〕：有信而非愛的，就是緣苦諦、集諦的信〔忍可其為苦集，卻不可愛樂〕；有愛而非信的，就是諸染污之愛；信愛俱通的，就是緣滅諦、道諦的信〔既忍可又欣樂〕；信愛俱非的，就是除去前三句所餘。另有一說：信是忍可認許有德，由此在先，然後才生愛樂，所以愛不是信。

「敬」就是敬重，它的體就是慚——如前面解慚時說到「有敬」等。〔以慚與敬作句〕：有慚而非敬的，就是緣苦諦、集諦的慚；慚敬俱通的，就是緣滅諦、道諦的慚。另有一說：敬是有所崇重，由此在先，然後才生慚恥，所以敬不是慚。

若就所緣之境是補特伽羅（有情、人）來說，愛與敬的有無應作四句：有愛無敬的，如對妻子、同住的門人等；有敬無愛的，如對他人之師、有德的貴人等；有愛有敬的，如對自己的師父、父母、伯叔等；無愛無敬的，就是除去前三句所餘。這樣的愛與敬，欲界、色界有，無色界沒有。問：豈不是信與慚屬大善地法，無色界也有嗎？答：愛敬有二種——緣「法」的與緣「補特伽羅」的；緣法的愛敬三界都有，此處所說的是緣補特伽羅的，所以欲界色界有、無色界沒有。以上已說愛敬之別。尋、伺、慢、憍的差別是什麼？頌說：

〔正34〕尋伺之別；慢憍之別

頌：尋伺就是心的麁與細；慢是對他人而心自高舉，憍是因染著自身之法而心高、無所顧忌。

論：尋伺的分別是——就是心之麁與細：心的麁性叫尋，心的細性叫伺。問：這二者怎能與同一個心相應〔麁細相違〕？有人這樣解釋：好比冷水上浮著熟酥，上面又被烈日之光照觸——酥因為水與日的作用，既不凝結也不融釋；同樣，一個心中有尋有伺，心由於尋伺之故，不至於太細也不至於太麁，所以在一個心中二者俱有作用。

〔論主難：〕若是這樣，尋伺就只是麁細之「因」，不是麁細之「體」；就像水與日光是凝與釋之因，日之體本身並不是凝或釋。又，麁細之性是相待而立的——依界、依地、依品類的高下互相對照〔上比下細、下比上麁〕，那麼乃至有頂天也該有尋伺了。又，麁細之性並沒有各別的體類，不能依它來分別尋與伺。

又有解釋說：尋伺二法是語言行（發語的原因），所以契經說『要有尋伺才有語言，沒有尋伺就沒有這語言行』；其中麁者名尋、細者名伺——在一個心之內，有一個別法是麁、另一個別法是細，在理上有什麼相違？〔論主難：〕若真有各別的體類，理上實在無違；然而並沒有各別的體類，所以就成了違理——因為在同一體類之中，不容有上下〔麁細〕同時生起。若說體類也有差別，那就該說出體類的別相是什麼。答：這二者的體類別相很難說，只能由上下〔相形〕來顯其別相。〔論主難：〕並不是由上下就能顯出別相——因為在每一類之中都各有上下。由此應知，尋伺二法決定不可執為與同一心相應。問：若是這樣，契經中為什麼說初靜慮具足五支〔尋、伺、喜、樂、定〕？答：說「具五支」是就一地而說，不是就一剎那而說，所以沒有過失。以上已說尋伺之別。

慢憍的分別是——慢，就是對著他人而心自高舉之性：稱量自己與他人在德行品類上的差別，心中自高自恃、輕蔑他人，所以叫作慢。憍，就是以染著自身之法為先，令心傲逸而無所顧忌之性。另有論師說：好比因酒而生的欣悅高舉之差別叫作「醉」，同樣，因貪而生的欣悅高舉之差別就叫作「憍」。這就是慢與憍差別之相。以上已說諸心心所品類不同、俱生互異之相。然而心與心所在契經中隨義建立了種種名稱，如今當辨這些名義的差別。頌說：

〔正35〕心意識體一；心心所之四名與相應五義

頌：心、意、識三名其體是一；心與心所都名有所依、有所緣、有行相、相應——而「相應」之義有五。

論：集起的緣故叫作心，思量的緣故叫作意，了別的緣故叫作識。另有解釋說：淨與不淨之界種種差別，所以叫作心；就是這個〔心〕為其他〔識〕作所依止，所以叫作意；作能依止的，所以叫作識。所以心、意、識三個名所詮之義雖有不同，而體是一個。

如同心意識三名義異而體一，諸心心所名為「有所依」「有所緣」「有行相」「相應」也是一樣——名義雖殊而體是一。就是說：心心所都叫有所依，因為要託所依之根〔才能生起〕；或叫有所緣，因為要攝取所緣之境；或叫有行相，就是在所緣境的品類差別上等起行相〔心上現起的境之影像〕；或叫相應，因為是平等和合的。

問：依什麼義叫作「等和合」？答：因為有五義：心心所在五義上平等，所以說相應——就是所依、所緣、行相、時、事都平等。所謂事平等，是說在一個相應之中，如同心之體只是一個，諸心所法也各各只是一個。以上已說心心所的廣分別義。心不相應行是什麼？頌說：

〔正36〕心不相應行十四之總標

頌：心不相應行，就是得、非得、同分、無想果、二定〔無想定與滅盡定〕、命根、四相、名身等這一類。

論：像這些法與心不相應，也不是色等之性，而為行蘊所攝，所以叫作心不相應行。其中且先辨得與非得之相。頌說：

〔正37〕得與非得的自性與所依

頌：「得」就是獲與成就，「非得」與此相違；得與非得只在自身相續以及二滅之上。

論：得有二種：一是從來未得、或已得而失，如今獲到——這叫「獲」；二是得了而不失、相續下來——這叫「成就」。應知非得與此相違〔就是不獲與不成就〕。

問：在哪些法之中有得與非得？答：在自身相續以及二滅（擇滅、非擇滅）之中。就是說：有為法之中，若是墮在自身相續裡的，才有得與非得；不在他人相續裡，因為沒有誰能成就他身之法；也不在非相續〔外在非情〕之上，因為沒有誰能成就非情之法。且說有為法決定如此。至於無為法，唯有在二滅之上有得與非得。一切有情沒有不成就非擇滅的，所以對法論中「傳說」如此：誰成就無漏法？就是一切有情——除了〔見道〕最初剎那那位具縛的聖者、以及其餘一切具縛的異生之外，其餘有情都成就擇滅。決定沒有誰成就虛空，所以對虛空不說有得；既然沒有得，非得也就沒有——因為本宗說得與非得是相翻而立的。凡是有得的也就有非得，這由義理可以比准而知，所以不另作解釋。

問：憑什麼知道另有一個別物叫作「得」？答：因為契經這樣說。如契經說：『聖者對於那十無學法，由生、由得、由成就的緣故，已斷五支……』乃至廣說。問：若是這樣，非情以及他人相續也該可以成就了。答：為什麼這樣說？問：因為契經這樣說。如契經說：『苾芻應當知道，有轉輪王成就七寶……』乃至廣說。答：此處是把「自在」說作成就——就是轉輪王對於那七寶有自在之力，隨其所樂而運轉〔所以說成就〕。問：這裡既然把自在說作成就，其餘〔經文〕又憑什麼知道另有別物？答：承認另有別物有什麼不合理？

問：這樣就是不合理——所執的「得」，沒有體可知，不像色、聲等〔可由五識現量取〕，也不像貪、瞋等〔可由他心智取〕；也沒有作用可知，不像眼、耳等〔可由見聞之用比知有根〕。所以不容有一個別物叫作得；執有別物，這就是不合理。

若說這「得」也有作用——就是作所得諸法生起之因；那麼無為法〔不生〕就該沒有得了。又，所得之法在尚未得、或已捨〔因為界地轉換以及離染〕的時候，那時現前並沒有得，那將來要怎麼生起呢？若說是『俱生之得』作生起之因，那麼〔四相中的〕生與生生又還有什麼可作？又，非情之法〔沒有得〕就該決定不生了。又，具縛的〔凡夫〕，其下品、中品、上品煩惱現起的差別就該沒有了——因為得沒有差別。若說是由其餘的因才有差別，那就應該由那個〔餘因〕使諸法得生，「得」還有什麼用？所以他們所說『得有作用、就是作所得諸法生因』，在理上不能成立。

問：誰說這「得」是作法之生因？問：若是這樣，這得有什麼作用？答：是作為「差別」的建立之因。問：為什麼這樣說？答：若沒有得，那麼異生與聖者起世俗心的時候，就沒法建立異生與諸聖者的差別了。問：豈不是煩惱有已斷、未斷的差別，就該有差別了嗎？答：若執沒有得，怎能說煩惱已斷及未斷？承認有得的人，斷與未斷才說得通——因為煩惱之得已離、未離的緣故。答：這是由所依〔身〕有差別的緣故，煩惱已斷未斷之義就成立了：諸聖者由見道、修道之力，令所依身轉變得與本來不同，對於那二道所斷之惑，再沒有能力令它現起——好比種子被火燒過，轉變得與從前不同，沒有能生之用；同樣，聖者所依身中沒有生惑之能，就叫煩惱斷。或者由世間道損伏所依身中的煩惱種子，也叫作斷；與此相違就叫未斷。凡未斷的就說名成就，凡已斷的就名不成就——這二種都只是假立，不是實有。

善法有二種：一是不由功力而修得的、二是要由功力才修得的，也就是生得善與加行善。不由功力而修得的，若所依身中種子沒有被損，就名成就；若種子已被損，就名不成就——譬如斷善根的人，由邪見之力損壞所依身中的善根種子，應知這就名為斷，並不是所依身中的善根種子被畢竟殺害才叫斷。要由功力才修得的，若所依身中那法已經生起過、生起它的功力自在而無損，就名成就；與此相違就名不成就。這二種也是假立而非實有。所以所依身中只是有種子未被拔除、未被損傷而增長自在，在這樣的位次上立「成就」之名，並沒有一個別物。

問：此中什麼法叫作種子？答：就是名與色〔五蘊〕在生自果上所有的展轉隣近之功能；這是由相續、轉變、差別而成的。問：什麼叫轉變？答：就是相續之中前後有異之性。問：什麼叫相續？答：就是因果性的三世諸行。問：什麼叫差別？答：就是有無間生果的功能。

然而有處經中說「若成就貪便不能修四念住」——那經的意思是說：耽著貪煩惱的人不能厭捨〔現行之貪〕，所以叫作成就；在隨順耽著貪愛的那段時分，對於四念住必定不能修〔並非說種子成就就不能修〕。像這樣的「成就」，遍一切種類都唯是假立而非實有；唯遮遣此〔成就〕而名為「不成就」的，也是假立而非實有。毘婆沙師說：這二種都另有別物，是實而非假。〔論主說：〕這樣看來二條路都可算是善說。問：為什麼？答：〔經部之說〕不違於理，〔有部之說〕是我所宗。以上已辨得與非得的自性；它們的差別怎樣？且先辨「得」。頌說：

〔正38·正39前半〕得的五門差別

頌：三世之法各有三世之得；善等之法唯有善等之得。有繫之法其得唯在自界，無繫之法其得通於四種。非學非無學之法其得有三，非所斷之法其得有二。

論：三世門——三世之法，其得各有三種：過去之法有過去之得、有未來之得、有現在之得；未來與現在之法也各有三種得。

三性門——又善等之法其得也唯是善等：就是善、不善以及無記之法，依其次第各有善、不善、無記三種得。

界繫門——又有繫之法其得唯在自界：就是欲界、色界、無色界之法，依其次第唯有欲、色、無色三種得。若是無繫〔無漏〕之法，其得通於四種：就是說無漏法總的來說有四種得，即三界之得以及無漏之得。分別來說：非擇滅之得通於三界繫；擇滅之得是色界、無色界繫以及無漏；道諦之得唯是無漏。所以無繫之法其得有四種。

三學門——又有學之法其得唯是有學，無學之法其得唯是無學；非學非無學之得則有差別：總說有三種。分別來說：一切有漏法以及三種無為都叫非學非無學法。且有漏之法唯有非學非無學之得；非擇滅之得，以及不由聖道所引的擇滅之得，也是如此。若是由有學道所引的擇滅，其得就是有學；若是由無學道所引的擇滅，其得就是無學。

三斷門——又見所斷、修所斷之法，依其次第有見所斷、修所斷之得。非所斷之法其得則有差別：總說有二種。分別來說：諸無漏法名為非所斷；非擇滅之得唯是修所斷，不由聖道所引的擇滅之得也是如此；由聖道所引的擇滅之得以及道諦之得，都是非所斷。前面雖然總說『三世之法各三』，如今應當簡別其中的差別之相。頌說：

〔正39後半·正40前半〕無記等法之得於三世的差別

頌：無記之得唯是俱起，但要除去二通與變化；有覆〔無記〕之色其得也是俱起；欲界的〔善不善色〕沒有法前之得。

論：無覆無記之得唯是與法俱起，沒有前生後生的——因為勢力微劣：法若在過去，得也在過去；法若在未來，得也在未來；法若在現在，得也在現在。

問：一切無覆無記法之得都是這樣嗎？答：不是。問：怎樣？答：要除去眼耳二通以及能變化〔之心〕。就是說：眼通、耳通之慧以及能變化之心，因為勢力強盛、又是由加行差別所成辦的緣故，雖然攝在無覆無記性中，卻有前得、後得以及俱起之得。若是工巧處與威儀路而極為數習的，其得也許是如此。

問：唯有無覆無記法之得才只是俱起嗎？答：不是。問：怎樣？答：有覆無記之色，其得也是如此——就是說諸有覆無記的表色，其得也如前面所說，只有俱起。雖然〔發它的煩惱〕有上品，卻仍不能發起無表色，可見勢力微劣，因此決定沒有法前、法後之得。

問：如同無記法之得有這樣的別異，善與不善之得也有差異嗎？答：也有。問：怎樣？答：就是欲界所繫的善色與不善色，其得沒有「法前」的，唯有俱生之得以及法後之得。問：非得是否也像得那樣，有如上這些品類的差別？答：不是。問：怎樣？頌說：

〔正40後半·正41〕非得之差別及其捨

頌：非得唯是無覆無記；過去未來各有三世之非得。三界法與不繫法各有三界之非得；由於承認聖道之非得就叫異生性〔可知非得不通無漏〕。得到那法或轉易地時，便捨那非得。

論：三性差別——一切非得都唯攝在無覆無記性中。

三世差別——過去與未來各有三種：就是說現在之法決定沒有現在的非得，唯有過去的非得與未來的非得；而過去、未來之法一一各有三世的非得。

界繫差別——三界所繫之法以及不繫之法，各有三界的非得：就是說欲界所繫之法有三界的非得〔隨所依身在何界〕，色界、無色界所繫以及不繫之法也是如此。決定沒有哪個非得是無漏的。為什麼？因為承認『聖道之非得』就叫作異生性〔凡夫之性〕的緣故。如本論所說：『什麼是異生性？就是不獲聖法。』「不獲」正是非得的異名；若說異生性是無漏，於理不通。

問：不獲哪些聖法才叫異生性？答：就是不獲一切〔三乘聖法〕——因為本論並沒有分別地說。這個「不獲」之言，是表示離於「獲」；若不是這樣〔而說只要有所不獲就是異生〕，那麼諸佛世尊也不成就聲聞、獨覺種性的聖法，就該叫作異生了。問：若是這樣，那本論應該加上一個「純」字〔說「純不獲聖法」〕。答：不必加說，因為這一句話中已含有「純」之義了——好比說『這一類〔眾生〕食水、食風』〔雖不說純，也知是純食水風〕。

另有一說：不獲苦法智忍以及與它俱生之法，才叫異生性。〔對此〕不可以難說：『到道類智時捨了這法，豈不該成為非聖？』——因為先前已經永害了那〔苦法忍的〕非得。問：若是這樣，這〔苦法忍之〕性既然通於三乘，那不獲哪一乘的才叫異生性？答：這也應當說「不獲一切」。問：若是這樣，這就與前面同樣有難了。答：這個難也應當像前面那樣通釋。問：若是這樣，重複說一遍豈不白費工夫？〔論主說：〕還是像經部師所說的為善。問：經部所說是什麼義？答：就是『曾經未生起過聖法』的那個相續分位之差別，叫作異生性。

問：這樣的非得什麼時候當捨？答：對於某法的非得，在得到那法時、或者轉易地時，就捨這個非得。好比聖道之非得叫作異生性，得到這聖道時、或者易地時便捨它。其餘諸法之非得，依此類推應當思擇。若非得之得斷了，非得的非得生起，這就叫作捨了非得。

問：得與非得，難道還另有得與非得嗎？答：應當說這二者各各還有其餘的得與非得。問：若是這樣，豈不是有無窮之過？答：沒有無窮之過，因為承認諸得可以展轉互相成就。就是說：法生起時，連同它自體共三法俱起——第一是本法、第二是法得〔大得〕、第三是得得〔小得〕。在相續之中，由法得生起而成就了本法以及得得；由得得生起而成就了法得，所以此中沒有無窮之過。像這樣，若善、若染污之法，一一自體最初生起時，連同自體共三法俱起；第二剎那便有六法俱起，就是三個法得與三個得得；第三剎那有十八法俱起，就是對第一、第二剎那所生的〔九〕法，有九個法得與九個得得。像這樣，諸得後後展轉增多。

一切過去未來的煩惱與隨煩惱以及生得善，剎那剎那相應〔而起〕，加上俱有〔諸法〕，在無始無終的生死輪轉中就有無邊之得——只一個有情在生死相續中，剎那剎那便起無邊之得；像這樣一切有情的相續一一各別，剎那剎那便有無量無邊的諸得同時俱起。這樣眾多的得極多地集會在一處，因為沒有質礙的緣故，可以互相容受。若不是這樣，一個有情的得，虛空就已容不下了，何況第二個有情等等。

〔Head of the Fascicle〕All Dharmas Fall into Five Classes; This Fascicle Analyzes the Joint Arising of the First Four

Treatise: It should now be pondered whether, since all “conditioned dharmas” (dharmas fabricated by the coming together of many conditions) differ in their characteristics and therefore differ severally in their arising, there are any dharmas that must arise together. Answer: there are dharmas that definitely arise together. Stated in general, all dharmas fall in brief into five classes: first, form (dharmas that are material); second, mind (mind as sovereign, that is, consciousness itself); third, mental factors (the various mental operations that arise in dependence on mind); fourth, formations not associated with mind (dharmas that are neither form nor mind, provisionally set up upon the stations of form and mind); fifth, the unconditioned (dharmas not fabricated by conditions, without arising or cessation). The unconditioned has no “arising” at all, and so is not discussed here. Now the way in which form definitely arises together will be analyzed first. The stanza says:

〔Stanza 23〕Form Definitely Arises Together: Eight Entities, Nine Entities, Ten Entities

Stanza: In the desire realm the finest aggregate of form, if it contains no sound and no faculty, has eight entities arising together; if it contains the body faculty, nine; if it contains the eye or another of the remaining faculties, ten.

Treatise: When the aggregation of form reaches its finest, the name minute aggregate is established for it—to show that there is nothing finer than this. If such a minute aggregate is in the desire realm and has in it neither sound nor faculty, then eight entities arise together, and not one of the eight may be lacking. Which eight? The four great elements (earth, water, fire, and wind, the four that can produce) together with four kinds of derived form—color, odor, flavor, and the tangible. As for those aggregates of ultimate atoms that have no sound but do have a faculty, the entities arising together in them are either nine or ten: an aggregate containing the body faculty has nine entities arising together—the eight as before with the body faculty as the ninth; an aggregate containing one of the remaining faculties has ten entities arising together—the nine as before with one of the faculties beginning with the eye added. Eye, ear, nose, and tongue are never apart from the body faculty〔so an aggregate containing the eye faculty must contain the body faculty as well〕; while the four faculties eye, ear, nose, and tongue, set against one another, each occupy a different place〔so they are not heaped one upon another in a single aggregate〕. In all the aggregates above, if sound arises within them, the count rises in order to nine, ten, or eleven—for where there is sound, sound never arises apart from a faculty, being produced with appropriated great elements (great elements held by consciousness within the body) for its cause.

Question: if the four great elements are said to arise inseparably, why is it that in the many aggregates of form only one among hardness, wetness, warmth, and motion can be perceived and not the rest? Answer: in such an aggregate the element whose force predominates is clearly perceptible, while the entities of the other three are not absent. It is like feeling a needle-point and a bamboo tally bound together〔only the needle is felt, not the tally〕, or like tasting the flavor of salt mixed with flour〔only the saltiness is tasted, not the flour〕. Question: how then is it known that the other three are really there? Answer: because there are present the four operations of gathering (water’s drawing together), ripening (fire’s bringing to maturity), increasing (wind’s growth), and sustaining (earth’s upholding). There is another account: when a fitting condition is met, a hard thing displays the characteristics of flowing and moistening, which shows that they were there all along; just as in an aggregate of water a characteristic of warmth appears on account of extreme cold—though the four elements are inseparable, it is only that the operation of cold predominates, just as with feeling and with sound the operation may be strong or weak. And certain other masters say that within such an aggregate the remaining elements have only their seed (the capability of producing) and have not yet manifested their entity and characteristic, which is why the sūtra says 「於木聚中有種種界」 tr. “within an aggregate of wood there are various elements”—and 「界」 tr. “element” here means seed.

Question: how is it known that there is visible form within wind?〔Wind is not visible.〕 Answer: this point can only be accepted on the authority of the teaching and cannot be arrived at by inference. Or else: since the odor combined with wind is present and can be smelled, and since odor and visible form are inseparable〔it is known that there is visible form within wind〕. It was said above that in the form realm there is no odor and no flavor; therefore an aggregate in the form realm, if without sound, has six, seven, or eight〔entities arising together〕, and if with sound has seven, eight, or nine arising together. This may be inferred from the foregoing and is therefore not stated separately.

Question: is the word “entity” used here with reference to substance (a dharma’s own entity) or to sense field (the classification into twelve sense fields)? Answer: if you ask thus, what fault follows? Answer: fault follows on either side. If it is stated with reference to substance, then eight, nine, or ten is too few—for the minute aggregates must have shape, being an accumulation of many ultimate atoms together; heaviness or lightness necessarily accompanies them, and smoothness or roughness likewise; in some places there is also cold, hunger, and thirst. On this reckoning the number stated is at fault by being too few. If it is stated with reference to sense field, then eight, nine, or ten is too many—for the four great elements are all included in the sense field of the tangible, so that four and the rest should have been said. On this reckoning the number stated is at fault by being too many. Answer: in fact there is no fault on either side. It should be known that the word “entity” here is in one part stated with reference to substance, namely the great elements that are the support, and in one part stated with reference to sense field, namely the derived form that is supported. Question: if so, the “entities” of the great elements would come to be very many—for the several kinds of derived form each differ and each depend upon their own set of four great elements. Answer: it should be known that the statement here is made with reference to kinds of substance, since the several sets of four great elements are without difference of kind〔and so are stated together as four〕. Question: what need is there for such distinguishing talk? Answer: speech arises as one pleases; it is the sense that should be pondered. The definite co-arising of form has now been analyzed. The definite co-arising of the remaining dharmas should be analyzed next. The stanza says:

〔Stanza 24, First Half〕Mind and Mental Factors Necessarily Arise Together

Stanza: Mind and mental factors necessarily arise together; all conditioned formations arise together with the four characteristics, and some with acquisition.

Treatise: Mind and mental factors necessarily arise together: should either of them be lacking, the other does not appear. What is meant by “formations” is all conditioned dharmas, that is, form, mind, mental factors, and the formations not associated with mind. The two words “necessarily together” in the preceding line flow down to this line—meaning that when the formations of form, mind, and the rest arise, they necessarily appear together with the four conditioned characteristics (arising, abiding, change, and cessation). The words “and some with acquisition” mean that among the formations only dharmas belonging to a sentient being arise together with acquisition (that force by which something is possessed); dharmas〔belonging to what is not sentient〕are not so, and hence the word “some.” Mental factors were mentioned above; what, then, is a mental factor? The stanza says:

〔Stanza 24, Second Half〕Mental Factors Divided in General into Five Classes

Stanza: Mental factors fall provisionally into five classes, that is, the five distinguished as the factors of the great ground and the rest.

Treatise: The dharmas that are mental factors fall provisionally into five classes. Which five? First, the factors of the great ground; second, the factors of the great wholesome ground; third, the factors of the great defiled ground; fourth, the factors of the great unwholesome ground; fifth, the factors of the small defiled ground. “Ground” means the place of activity: if this dharma is the place in which that dharma is active, this dharma is said to be the “ground” of that. The ground of the “great dharmas” is therefore called the great ground〔the great ground here is mind as sovereign, and feeling and the other ten are called great dharmas because they pervade every mind〕; and any dharma here that belongs to the great ground is called a factor of the great ground—that is, those dharmas present in every mind at all times. What are they? The stanza says:

〔Stanza 25〕The Ten Factors of the Great Ground: Feeling, Perception, Volition, Contact, Desire, Discernment, Mindfulness, Attention, Resolve, Concentration

Stanza: Feeling, perception, volition, contact, and desire; discernment, mindfulness, and attention; resolve and concentration—these ten pervade every mind.

Treatise: It is transmitted thus: the ten dharmas listed above are present together and pervasively in every moment of mind. Among them—feeling is the three kinds of reception: painful, pleasant, and neither painful nor pleasant, since it has these distinctions. Perception is the taking up of the distinguishing characteristics of an object〔discriminating what a thing is and is not〕. Volition is what causes mind to fabricate〔driving mind to act〕. Contact is what arises from the coming together of faculty, object, and consciousness, and is able to make touch〔the meeting of mind with its object〕. Desire is seeking after the work to be done. Discernment is the ability to select among dharmas〔to distinguish and decide〕. Mindfulness is holding the object clearly in mind without losing it. Attention is what causes mind to be alert〔rousing mind and turning it toward an object〕. Resolve is the ability to endorse an object〔to settle that ‘it is thus and not otherwise’〕. Concentration is mind’s being one-pointed upon a single object. The modes of apprehension of mind and mental factors are exceedingly subtle: it is hard enough to distinguish them one by one as they succeed one another, still more so to distinguish those simultaneously present within one and the same moment. It is as with the various medicines that have form and are grasped by the faculties that are form: even the differences of their flavors are hard to know—how much more so dharmas without form, which can be grasped only by awakened discernment. The ten factors of the great ground have now been stated. The ground of the “great wholesome dharmas” is called the great wholesome ground; and any dharma here that belongs to the great wholesome ground is called a factor of the great wholesome ground—that is, those dharmas present in every wholesome mind at all times. What are they? The stanza says:

〔Stanza 26〕The Ten Factors of the Great Wholesome Ground: Confidence, Heedfulness, Pliancy, Equanimity, Conscience, Shame, Non-Greed, Non-Hatred, Non-Harming, Diligence

Stanza: Confidence and heedfulness, pliancy, equanimity, conscience, and shame, the two roots non-greed and non-hatred, and non-harming, together with diligence—these pervade wholesome minds alone.

Treatise: The dharmas above pervade every wholesome mind alone. Among them, confidence is what makes mind clear and settled〔like a water-clearing gem dropped into turbid water, whereupon the turbid water becomes clear〕. There is another account: it is the immediate acceptance and endorsement of the four truths, the three jewels, and karma and its results, and for that reason is called confidence. Heedfulness is the cultivating of wholesome dharmas and the keeping apart from unwholesome dharmas. Question: what then is “cultivating”? Answer: its very nature is the unwavering focus upon wholesome dharmas. In the scriptures of the other schools there is this explanation—guarding the mind is called heedfulness. Pliancy is mind’s workability〔mind become supple and usable〕.

Question: does not a sūtra also speak of “bodily pliancy”? Answer: although it is not the case that this is never said, it is like “bodily feeling”〔feeling is properly a mental factor, and when associated with the five consciousnesses is called bodily feeling〕; pliancy should be understood in the same way. Question:〔if bodily pliancy is a dharma with outflows associated with the five consciousnesses,〕how can it be established as a factor of awakening (one of the seven factors of awakening)? Answer: it should be known that the bodily pliancy spoken of here is the body’s workability〔that is, the contact of pliancy〕. Question: how then can it be called a factor of awakening? Answer: because it conforms to the factors of awakening there is no fault—since bodily pliancy can give rise to mental pliancy among the factors of awakening. Question: is such a way of speaking〔naming by conformity〕found elsewhere as well? Answer: it is. As the sūtra says: joy and the dharmas conducive to joy are alike called the awakening factor of joy; hatred and the causes and conditions of hatred are alike called the hindrance of ill will; right view, right intention, and right effort are together called the aggregate of discernment—and although intention and effort are not in themselves of the nature of discernment, they acquire the name of discernment because they conform to it. Therefore there is no fault in bodily pliancy acquiring the name of a factor of awakening because it conforms to the factors of awakening.

Mind’s evenness, its being without alertness, is called equanimity〔neither leaning to one side nor deliberately rousing itself〕. Question: how can it be said that within one and the same mind there is both alertness〔of attention〕and the absence of alertness〔of equanimity〕? Can attention and equanimity really be associated together? Answer: was it not already said above that the characteristics of mind and mental factors are subtle and hard to know? Question: some things that are hard to know can still be known when carefully examined; but this one is the hardest of all—to say that they are contrary and yet that they do not conflict. Answer: this one〔attention〕has alertness; upon that one〔equanimity〕there is none; the two being thus quite distinct, what conflict can there be? Question: if so, they should not take one and the same object; otherwise all〔dharmas of contrary nature〕would have to be associated with one another. Answer: with such a class of cases, the remaining dharmas here should all be sought out together; and following the tenor of those dharmas, the same should be understood here now. Conscience and shame, the two, will be stated below. The two roots are non-greed and non-hatred〔two of the three wholesome roots〕; the wholesome root non-delusion has discernment for its nature and has already been stated above among the factors of the great ground, and so is not again established as a factor of the great wholesome ground. Non-harming is the absence of harm and distress〔toward others〕. Diligence has for its nature the making of mind vigorous. The factors of the great wholesome ground have now been stated. The ground of the “great defiled dharmas” is called the great defiled ground; and any dharma here that belongs to the great defiled ground is called a factor of the great defiled ground—that is, those dharmas present in a defiled mind at all times. What are they? The stanza says:

〔Stanza 27, First Half〕The Six Factors of the Great Defiled Ground: Delusion, Heedlessness, Indolence, Lack of Confidence, Torpor, Restlessness

Stanza: Delusion, heedlessness, indolence, lack of confidence, torpor, and restlessness—these six are constant and belong to defiled minds alone.

Treatise: Among them, delusion is what is called folly and delusion, that is, ignorance, absence of cognition, absence of manifestation〔not illuminating, not deciding, not making clear〕. Heedless means heedlessness, not cultivating what is wholesome—and it is precisely what “cultivating what is wholesome”〔that is, heedfulness〕counteracts. Indolent means indolence, mind not vigorous—and it is precisely what the “diligence” stated above counteracts. Lack of confidence is mind not clear and settled—precisely what the “confidence” stated above counteracts. Torpid means torpor; the Abhidharma treatise says: what is torpor? It is heaviness of body and heaviness of mind, unworkability of body and unworkability of mind, torpidness of body and torpidness of mind—this is called torpor. Question: this〔torpor〕is a mental factor; how then is it called “bodily”? Answer: it is said as “bodily feeling” is said, and so there is no fault. Restless means restlessness, which makes mind unable to be still. Only such six as these are called factors of the great defiled ground.

Question: does not the root Abhidharma〔the root treatise〕say that there are ten factors of the great defiled ground, and does that treatise not omit torpor? Which ten?—lack of confidence, indolence, lost mindfulness, distracted mind, ignorance, incorrect knowing, improper attention, wrong resolve, restlessness, and heedlessness. Answer: Beloved of the gods!〔a westerners’ jesting term for a fool〕You now know only the letter of that treatise and do not grasp its intent. Question: what is the intent? Answer: the five—lost mindfulness, distracted mind, incorrect knowing, improper attention, and wrong resolve—have already been stated among the factors of the great ground〔having respectively mindfulness, concentration, discernment, attention, and resolve for their entity〕, and should not be established a second time as factors of the great defiled ground; just as non-delusion, having discernment for its entity, is not established separately〔among the factors of the great wholesome ground〕, so it should be with those five. Defiled “mindfulness” is called lost mindfulness, defiled “concentration” is called distracted mind, defiled “discernment” is called incorrect knowing, and defiled attention and resolve are called improper attention and wrong resolve—and that is why it was so stated.

Question: then is it the case that ‘whatever is a factor of the great ground is also a factor of the great defiled ground’? Answer: a fourfold analysis should be made. The first case〔a factor of the great ground but not of the great defiled ground〕is feeling, perception, volition, contact, and desire; the second case〔a factor of the great defiled ground but not of the great ground〕is lack of confidence, indolence, ignorance, restlessness, and heedlessness; the third case〔both〕is the five beginning with mindfulness stated above; the fourth case〔neither〕is whatever remains when the first three are set aside. Another master maintains that “wrong concentration” is not the same as “distracted mind,” and the fourfold analysis he makes differs from this.

A further question: since you〔Sarvāstivādins〕grant that torpor extends to association with every affliction, and yet do not state it among the factors of the great defiled ground, whose is the fault? Some speak thus: it ought to have been stated here, and the reason it was not is that it conforms to concentration—they hold that one whose mode is torpor readily gives rise to concentration, unlike one whose mode is restlessness. Question: who is of the mode of torpor and not of restlessness? Who is of the mode of restlessness and not of torpor? These two have never failed to operate at the same time. Answer: even so, it should be known that “mode” is said with reference to what predominates. Answer: granted that “mode” is said according to the predominance of operation, the establishing of a “ground-factor” must be made in dependence on a dharma that has its own entity, and so it is only as six that this ground-factor holds good in reasoning—because these six alone arise pervasively together with a defiled mind and do not extend elsewhere. The factors of the great defiled ground have now been stated. The ground of the “great unwholesome dharmas” is called the great unwholesome ground; and any dharma here that belongs to the great unwholesome ground is called a factor of the great unwholesome ground—that is, those dharmas present in an unwholesome mind at all times. What are they? The stanza says:

〔Stanza 27, Second Half〕The Two Factors of the Great Unwholesome Ground: Non-Conscience and Shamelessness

Stanza: What pervade every unwholesome mind alone are non-conscience and shamelessness.

Treatise: Only two mental factors arise together with every unwholesome mind alone, namely non-conscience and shamelessness, and so these two alone are called factors of the great unwholesome ground. The characteristics of these two dharmas will be analyzed below. The factors of the great unwholesome ground have now been stated. The ground of the “small defiled dharmas” is called the small defiled ground; and any dharma here that belongs to the small defiled ground is called a factor of the small defiled ground—that is, those dharmas that arise together only with a small portion of defiled minds. What are they? The stanza says:

〔Stanza 28〕The Ten Factors of the Small Defiled Ground: Rage, Concealment, Avarice, Envy, Vexation, Harmfulness, Resentment, Flattery, Deception, Self-Intoxication

Stanza: Rage, concealment, avarice, envy, vexation; harmfulness, resentment, flattery, deception, and self-intoxication—dharmas of this class are called factors of the small defiled ground.

Treatise: Dharmas of this class are abandoned through cultivation alone〔not through seeing〕, arise only on the ground of mental consciousness, are associated with ignorance alone, and operate each separately〔never two at once〕, and are therefore called factors of the small defiled ground. These dharmas will be analyzed at length below when the secondary afflictions are stated. The five classes of mental factors have now been stated. Besides these there are also the remaining indeterminate mental factors—regret, sleep, applied thought, sustained thought, and the like—which should be stated here. In which class of mind, then, how many mental factors definitely arise together? The stanza says:

〔Stanzas 29–31〕How Many Mental Factors Each of the Five Classes of Mind in the Desire Realm Has

Stanza: In the desire realm applied thought and sustained thought are necessarily present, and so the wholesome class has twenty-two mental factors, with regret sometimes added〔making twenty-three〕. Among unwholesome minds, the class associated with independent ignorance and the class associated with view have twenty only; the class of the four afflictions, the class of the secondary afflictions such as rage, and the class of regret have twenty-one each. The obscured-indeterminate class has eighteen; the unobscured-indeterminate class is granted twelve. Sleep is not incompatible with any class, and where there is sleep every class gains one.

Treatise: Taking the desire realm, mind falls into five classes: wholesome mind is a single class; unwholesome mind is of two classes—that associated with “independent ignorance,” and that associated with the remaining afflictions and the rest; indeterminate mind is of two classes—obscured-indeterminate and unobscured-indeterminate. And since mind in the desire realm necessarily has applied thought and sustained thought, the wholesome class necessarily has twenty-two mental factors arising together, namely the ten factors of the great ground, the ten factors of the great wholesome ground, and the two indeterminate dharmas applied thought and sustained thought. Not every wholesome mind has regret; where it is present the count rises to twenty-three.

Question: what is regret? Answer: the entity of an evil deed done is called “an evil deed done.” It should be known that the name regret is here established from ‘the dharma that takes an evil deed done as its object’—that is, the nature that regrets and repents in taking one’s own evil deed as its object. Just as the door of liberation that takes “emptiness” as its object is called the “emptiness door of liberation”〔though its entity is in fact concentration〕, and the non-greed that takes “the unclean” as its object is called “the unclean〔contemplation〕”〔though its entity is in fact non-greed〕. Again, just as the world commonly names what is supported by the place that supports it, as when it is said that ‘all villages, towns, and lands are assembling’〔though what assemble are people〕; and regret is precisely the place upon which repentance depends, and so takes its name from that support. Again, as when the name of a cause is provisionally set up upon the entity of a result, as when it is said that ‘these six sense fields of contact should be known as karma done in the past’〔the six sense fields being the result and past karma the cause〕.

Question: if the object is a thing “not done,” how can it also be called regret? Answer: the name “done” may be established even for what is not done, as when in repenting one says: ‘I did not formerly do such work; this is my regret.’ Question: what kind of regret is wholesome? Answer: repenting over ‘not having done the good that should be done, and having done the evil that should not be done’—this is wholesome regret; the contrary〔repenting having done good, repenting not having done evil〕is called unwholesome. These two arise respectively in dependence upon the two grounds, the wholesome and the evil.

If it is the unwholesome class associated with independent ignorance, twenty mental factors necessarily arise together, namely the ten factors of the great ground, the six factors of the great defiled ground, the two factors of the great unwholesome ground, and the two indeterminate dharmas applied thought and sustained thought. Question: what is meant by the independent class of mind? Answer: it is the class of mind in which there is only ignorance, without the remaining afflictions such as greed. In the unwholesome class of mind associated with view twenty mental factors likewise arise together, the names and numbers being as stated for the independent class above; it does not become twenty-one because view has been added—for “view” is only a difference of operation belonging to “discernment” among the ten factors of the great ground. By “unwholesome mind associated with view” is meant a mind in which there is either wrong view, or the grasping at views, or the grasping at rules and observances. In the class of mind of the four unwholesome afflictions, greed, hatred, pride, and doubt, twenty-one mental factors arise together—twenty as in the independent class, plus one of greed and the rest. In the class associated with the secondary afflictions such as rage spoken of above, twenty-one mental factors likewise arise together—twenty as in the independent class, plus one of rage and the rest. In the unwholesome class of mind associated with regret, twenty-one mental factors likewise arise together—that is, with regret counted as the twenty-first. Stated in brief: among unwholesome minds the independent class and the class associated with view have twenty only, while the classes associated with the remaining four afflictions and with the secondary afflictions have twenty-one.

If it is the obscured-indeterminate class of mind, only eighteen mental factors arise together, namely the ten factors of the great ground and the six factors of the great defiled ground, together with the two indeterminate dharmas applied thought and sustained thought. Obscured-indeterminate mind in the desire realm means the mind associated with the view of a real person (the view of self) and with the extreme view; here too the count is not increased on account of “view,” the reason being as explained above. In the remaining unobscured-indeterminate class of mind, twelve mental factors are granted to arise together, namely the ten factors of the great ground together with the indeterminate applied thought and sustained thought. The masters abroad maintain that regret extends to the indeterminate as well, in which case this associated class would have thirteen mental factors arising together. It should be known that sleep is not incompatible with any of the classes of mind stated above, since it extends to all three ethical qualities—wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate; whichever class has sleep is said to gain one, so that twenty-two becomes twenty-three and twenty-three becomes twenty-four, and the unwholesome and indeterminate are to be reckoned in the same way. The fixed measure of the classes of mental factors arising together in the desire realm has now been stated; the upper realms should be stated next. The stanza says:

〔Stanza 32〕The Progressive Reduction of Mental Factors in the Upper Realms

Stanza: The first meditative absorption removes what is unwholesome alone, together with regret and sleep; the intermediate absorption further removes applied thought; higher still there is the further removal of sustained thought and the rest.

Treatise: In the first meditative absorption, of the mental factors stated above, what is “unwholesome alone” is removed, together with regret and sleep, and the rest are all present. By “what is unwholesome alone” is meant the affliction of hatred, together with the remaining ones such as rage〔the seven small afflictions〕apart from flattery, deception, and self-intoxication, and also non-conscience and shamelessness. The words ‘the rest are all present’ are as stated for the desire realm. The intermediate absorption removes what was removed above and further removes applied thought, the rest being all present. From the second meditative absorption upward as far as the formless realm, what was removed above is removed and “sustained thought and the rest” is removed besides—the word “and the rest” showing that flattery and deception are removed too; the rest are all present as before.

The sūtra says that flattery and deception reach at most as high as the Brahmā heaven, because there there is still “mutual dependence among the multitude”〔the ordering of ruler and subject, of higher and lower〕, and above that they are not found. There was once this event: the Great Brahmā King was in the midst of his own Brahmā assembly when he was suddenly asked by the monk Aśvajit, ‘At what station do these four great elements cease without remainder?’ The Brahmā King did not know the station of cessation without remainder, and so answered evasively and confusedly: ‘Here in this Brahmā assembly I am the Great Brahmā, the sovereign, the maker, the transformer, the producer, the nourisher, the father of all〔beings〕.’ Having said this, he drew Aśvajit outside the assembly and, speaking flatteringly, made a shamefaced apology and told him to go back and ask the Buddha. The number of mental factors in the several classes of mind in the several realms and levels has now been stated; there should next be stated a few of the distinctions among the mental factors analyzed above. What is the difference between non-conscience and shamelessness, and between love and respect? The stanza says:

〔Stanza 33〕The Difference between Non-Conscience and Shamelessness; the Difference between Love and Respect

Stanza: Non-conscience is not honoring〔qualities and those who have them〕; shamelessness is seeing no fear in wrongdoing; love is confidence and respect is conscience, and these two exist only in the desire and form realms.

Treatise: Among them the difference between non-conscience and shamelessness is this—to have, toward qualities and toward those who possess them, no reverence and no esteem, nothing that gives one pause, and nothing to which one submits oneself, is called non-conscience, and it is precisely the adversary of “reverence.” A dharma reproved and rejected by the good is called wrongdoing; to see nothing to fear〔in the results〕of such wrongdoing is called shamelessness. The word “fear” here shows that fear can arise from an undesired result.

Question: what is the “seeing no fear” meant to show? Is it ‘seeing and yet not fearing’ that is called seeing no fear, or is it ‘not seeing its fearsome〔result〕’ that is called seeing no fear? Answer: what fault follows if you ask thus? Answer: fault follows on either side—if it is seeing and yet not fearing, then what is shown must be〔wrong〕cognition; if it is not seeing its fearsome result, then what is shown must be ignorance. Answer: this phrase is not meant to show either seeing or not seeing. Question: what then is it meant to show? Answer: it is meant to show that there is another dharma, a secondary affliction, which is the cause of those two〔wrong cognition and ignorance〕, and this is what is called shamelessness.

Certain other masters say: to feel no disgrace regarding the wrongdoing one has committed, in respect of oneself, is called non-conscience; and to feel no disgrace in respect of others is called shamelessness. Question: if so, the two differ in what they regard—how can they arise together? Answer: it is not being said that the two regard self and other separately at one and the same time; rather, that “shamelessness” whose operation predominates in regarding oneself is called non-conscience, and that shamelessness whose operation predominates in regarding others is called shamelessness. The difference between conscience and shame is known by reversing the above: reversing the first explanation, to have reverence and esteem, something that gives one pause, and something to which one submits oneself, is called conscience; and to see fear in wrongdoing is called shame. Reversing the second explanation, to feel disgrace in respect of oneself for the wrongdoing committed is called conscience, and to feel disgrace in respect of others is called shame. The difference between non-conscience and shamelessness has now been stated.

The difference between love and respect is this—“love” is loving delight, and its entity is confidence. Yet love is of two kinds: defiled and undefiled. The defiled is greed, as in love for wife and children; the undefiled is confidence, as in love for teachers and elders.〔Making a fourfold analysis of confidence and love:〕confidence and not love is the confidence that takes the truths of suffering and origin as its object〔accepting them as suffering and origin, and yet not delighting in them〕; love and not confidence is every defiled love; both confidence and love is the confidence that takes the truths of cessation and the path as its object〔both accepting and delighting〕; neither confidence nor love is whatever remains when the first three are set aside. There is another account: confidence is the acceptance and endorsement of what has qualities, and it is upon this that loving delight arises afterwards, and so love is not confidence.

“Respect” is reverent regard, and its entity is conscience—as was said above in explaining conscience, ‘having reverence’ and the rest.〔Making cases of conscience and respect:〕conscience and not respect is the conscience that takes the truths of suffering and origin as its object; both conscience and respect is the conscience that takes the truths of cessation and the path as its object. There is another account: respect is holding something in esteem, and it is upon this that conscience and disgrace arise afterwards, and so respect is not conscience.

If the object is a pudgala (a sentient being, a person), the presence or absence of love and respect should be set out in four cases: love without respect, as toward wife and children and toward disciples living together; respect without love, as toward another’s teacher and toward men of quality and rank; both love and respect, as toward one’s own teacher, one’s parents, one’s uncles; neither love nor respect, whatever remains when the first three are set aside. Love and respect of this sort exist in the desire and form realms and not in the formless realm. Question: are not confidence and conscience factors of the great wholesome ground, and are they not present in the formless realm as well? Answer: love and respect are of two kinds—those that take dharmas as their object and those that take a pudgala as their object; those that take dharmas as their object exist in all three realms, while what is spoken of here are those that take a pudgala as their object, and so they exist in the desire and form realms and not in the formless realm. The difference between love and respect has now been stated. What is the difference between applied thought and sustained thought, and between pride and self-intoxication? The stanza says:

〔Stanza 34〕The Difference between Applied and Sustained Thought; the Difference between Pride and Self-Intoxication

Stanza: Applied and sustained thought are the coarseness and fineness of mind; pride is mind exalting itself against another, and self-intoxication is mind grown high and unrestrained through attachment to what belongs to oneself.

Treatise: The difference between applied and sustained thought is this—they are the coarseness and fineness of mind: mind’s coarse nature is called applied thought, and mind’s fine nature is called sustained thought. Question: how can these two be associated with one and the same mind〔coarse and fine being contrary〕? Some explain thus: it is like clarified butter floating on cold water with the light of a blazing sun striking it from above—by the working of the water and of the sun the butter neither congeals nor melts; just so, in one mind there is applied thought and sustained thought, and by reason of them mind becomes neither too fine nor too coarse, so that both have their operation within one mind.

〔The author of the treatise objects:〕if so, applied and sustained thought are only the cause of coarseness and fineness and not their entity; just as water and sunlight are the cause of congealing and melting, while the entity of the sun is not itself congealing or melting. Again, the natures of coarse and fine are established relatively—by comparing realms, levels, and grades of high and low against one another〔the upper being fine relative to the lower, the lower coarse relative to the upper〕—so that even the summit of existence would then have applied and sustained thought. Again, the natures of coarse and fine have no separate kinds of entity, and applied and sustained thought cannot be distinguished by them.

There is another explanation, that the two dharmas applied thought and sustained thought are verbal formations (the cause of utterance), and that the sūtra therefore says ‘there is speech only where there are applied and sustained thought, and where there are none there is no such verbal formation’; among them the coarse is called applied thought and the fine sustained thought—within a single mind, one distinct dharma being coarse and another distinct dharma fine, what conflict is there in reason?〔The author of the treatise objects:〕if there really were separate kinds of entity there would indeed be no conflict in reason; but there are no separate kinds of entity, and so a conflict with reason does follow—for within a single kind of entity it is not admissible that high and low〔coarse and fine〕arise at the same time. If it be said that the kinds of entity do differ, then the distinguishing characteristic of those kinds should be stated. Answer: the distinguishing characteristic of the kinds of these two is hard to state, and their distinguishing characteristic can be shown only by higher and lower〔set against each other〕.〔The author of the treatise objects:〕a distinguishing characteristic cannot be shown by higher and lower—for within each kind there are again higher and lower. From this it should be known that the two dharmas applied and sustained thought definitely may not be held to be associated with one and the same mind. Question: if so, why does the sūtra say that the first meditative absorption is complete with five limbs〔applied thought, sustained thought, joy, pleasure, and concentration〕? Answer: “complete with five limbs” is said with reference to a level and not with reference to a single moment, and so there is no fault. The difference between applied and sustained thought has now been stated.

The difference between pride and self-intoxication is this—pride is the nature of mind exalting itself against another: weighing the difference in the qualities and classes of oneself and of another, mind exalts and relies upon itself and slights another, and so it is called pride. Self-intoxication is the nature of mind grown haughty and unrestrained, preceded by attachment to what belongs to oneself. Another master says: just as the difference of elated exaltation produced by liquor is called “drunkenness,” so the difference of elated exaltation produced by greed is called “self-intoxication.” Such is the characteristic difference between pride and self-intoxication. The differences among the classes of mind and mental factors and the ways in which they arise together have now been stated. Yet mind and mental factors are given various names in the sūtras according to the sense intended, and the differences of these names and senses should now be analyzed. The stanza says:

〔Stanza 35〕Mind, Thought, and Consciousness Are One in Entity; the Four Names of Mind and Mental Factors and the Five Senses of Association

Stanza: The three names mind, thought, and consciousness are one in entity; mind and mental factors are alike called “having a support,” “having an object,” “having a mode of apprehension,” and “associated”—and “associated” has five senses.

Treatise: Because it gathers and gives rise, it is called mind; because it deliberates, it is called thought; because it discerns, it is called consciousness. There is another explanation: because of the various differences of pure and impure elements it is called mind; because this very thing〔mind〕serves as the support of another〔consciousness〕it is called thought; and because it is what does the depending, it is called consciousness. Therefore, although the senses conveyed by the three names mind, thought, and consciousness differ, the entity is one.

Just as the three names mind, thought, and consciousness differ in sense and are one in entity, so it is with mind and mental factors being called “having a support,” “having an object,” “having a mode of apprehension,” and “associated”—the names and senses differ and the entity is one. That is: mind and mental factors are all called having a support, because they must rely on a supporting faculty〔in order to arise〕; or having an object, because they must take up an object; or having a mode of apprehension, because upon the distinctions among the classes of the object they raise up a mode of apprehension〔the image of the object appearing upon mind〕; or associated, because they are evenly conjoined.

Question: in what sense are they called “evenly conjoined”? Answer: because of five senses: mind and mental factors are even in five senses, and are therefore said to be associated—namely, support, object, mode of apprehension, time, and entity are all even. What is meant by evenness of entity is that within a single association, just as the entity of mind is only one, so each of the dharmas that are mental factors is only one. The extensive analysis of mind and mental factors has now been stated. What are the formations not associated with mind? The stanza says:

〔Stanza 36〕The General Enumeration of the Fourteen Formations Not Associated with Mind

Stanza: The formations not associated with mind are acquisition, non-acquisition, commonality, the result of non-perception, the two absorptions〔the absorption without perception and the absorption of cessation〕, the life faculty, the four characteristics, the name-bodies and the rest—dharmas of this class.

Treatise: Dharmas such as these are not associated with mind and are not of the nature of form and the rest, yet are included in the aggregate of formations, and are therefore called formations not associated with mind. Among them the characteristics of acquisition and non-acquisition will be analyzed first. The stanza says:

〔Stanza 37〕The Nature of Acquisition and Non-Acquisition, and What They Rest Upon

Stanza: “Acquisition” is obtaining and possession; “non-acquisition” is the contrary of this; acquisition and non-acquisition rest only upon one’s own continuum and upon the two cessations.

Treatise: Acquisition is of two kinds: first, what has never been acquired, or has been acquired and lost, being now obtained—this is called “obtaining”; second, what has been acquired and not lost, continuing on—this is called “possession.” It should be known that non-acquisition is the contrary of these〔that is, non-obtaining and non-possession〕.

Question: in which dharmas are acquisition and non-acquisition found? Answer: in one’s own continuum and in the two cessations (cessation through discernment and cessation independent of discernment). That is: among conditioned dharmas, only those falling within one’s own continuum have acquisition and non-acquisition; not those in another’s continuum, since no one can possess a dharma belonging to another’s body; nor upon what is not a continuum〔external and insentient〕, since no one can possess a dharma of what is insentient. So it is definitely with conditioned dharmas. As for unconditioned dharmas, acquisition and non-acquisition are found only upon the two cessations. There is no sentient being that does not possess cessation independent of discernment, and so in the Abhidharma treatise it is transmitted thus: who possesses dharmas without outflows? All sentient beings—and apart from the noble one still fully bound in the first moment〔of the path of seeing〕and all remaining fully bound ordinary beings, the rest of sentient beings possess cessation through discernment. There is definitely no one who possesses space, and so no acquisition is spoken of with regard to space; and since there is no acquisition, neither is there non-acquisition—for this school holds that acquisition and non-acquisition are established as the reverse of one another. That whatever has acquisition also has non-acquisition may be inferred by reasoning, and so is not separately explained.

Question: on what ground is it known that there is a separate thing called “acquisition”? Answer: because the sūtra so says. As the sūtra says: ‘A noble one, with regard to those ten dharmas of one beyond training, by their arising, by their acquisition, by their possession, has cut off the five limbs …’ and so on at length. Question: if so, then what is insentient and another’s continuum should also be possessed. Answer: why do you say so? Question: because the sūtra so says. As the sūtra says: ‘Monks, you should know that there is a wheel-turning monarch who possesses the seven treasures …’ and so on at length. Answer: here sovereignty is spoken of as possession—that is, the wheel-turning monarch has sovereign power over those seven treasures and sets them in motion as he pleases〔and so is said to possess them〕. Question: since here sovereignty is spoken of as possession, on what ground is it known from the remaining〔sūtra passages〕that there is a separate thing? Answer: what is unreasonable in granting that there is a separate thing?

Question: this is what is unreasonable—the “acquisition” you posit has no entity that can be known, as color and sound and the rest can be〔known by direct perception through the five consciousnesses〕or as greed and hatred and the rest can be〔known by the cognition of others’ minds〕; nor has it any operation that can be known, as the eye and ear and the rest have〔whose presence is inferred from the operation of seeing and hearing〕. Therefore it is not admissible that there be a separate thing called acquisition; and to posit a separate thing is precisely what is unreasonable.

If it be said that this “acquisition” does have an operation—namely, being the cause of the arising of the dharmas acquired—then an unconditioned dharma〔which does not arise〕should have no acquisition. Again, when a dharma to be acquired has not yet been acquired, or has been relinquished〔through change of realm and level or through freedom from defilement〕, at that time no acquisition is present—how then is it to arise in the future? If it be said that a ‘co-arising acquisition’ is the cause of arising, then what work is left for arising and the arising of arising〔among the four characteristics〕? Again, an insentient dharma〔having no acquisition〕would then definitely never arise. Again, for one fully bound〔an ordinary being〕there could be no difference between the appearing of afflictions of the lower, middling, and higher grades—since acquisition has no differences. And if it be said that the difference comes from some other cause, then it is by that〔other cause〕that the dharmas should arise, and what use is “acquisition”? Therefore what they say—that acquisition has an operation, namely being the cause of the arising of the dharmas acquired—does not hold good in reason.

Question: who says that this “acquisition” is the cause of the arising of a dharma? Question: if so, what operation has this acquisition? Answer: it is the cause by which differences are established. Question: why do you say so? Answer: if there were no acquisition, then when an ordinary being and a noble one give rise to a worldly mind there would be no way of establishing the difference between an ordinary being and the noble ones. Question: is there not a difference already, in that afflictions have been cut off or not cut off? Answer: if you hold that there is no acquisition, how can you say that afflictions are cut off or not cut off? Only for one who grants acquisition do cutting off and not cutting off make sense—because the acquisition of the affliction has been separated from or not separated from. Answer: it is because of a difference in the support〔the body〕that the sense of afflictions being cut off or not cut off is established: the noble ones, by the power of the paths of seeing and of cultivation, cause the supporting body to be transformed and made other than it was, so that with regard to the afflictions abandoned by those two paths there is no longer any power to make them appear—just as a seed burnt by fire is transformed and made other than before and has no power to produce; so too, when in the noble one’s supporting body there is no capacity to produce an affliction, that is called the affliction’s being cut off. Or when by the mundane path the seeds of affliction in the supporting body are subdued, that too is called cutting off; the contrary is called not cut off. Whatever is not cut off is said to be possessed, and whatever is cut off is said not to be possessed—and both of these are merely provisional and not real.

Wholesome dharmas are of two kinds: those cultivated without effort and those cultivated only by effort, that is, wholesome acquired by birth and wholesome acquired through preparation. As for what is cultivated without effort: if the seed in the supporting body has not been damaged, it is said to be possessed; if the seed has been damaged, it is said not to be possessed—as with one whose wholesome roots are cut off, who by the force of wrong view has damaged the seeds of wholesome roots in his supporting body; it should be known that this is what is called cutting off, and it is not that the seeds of wholesome roots in the supporting body must be utterly slain for it to be called cutting off. As for what is cultivated only by effort: if that dharma has already arisen in the supporting body and the effort producing it is sovereign and undamaged, it is said to be possessed; the contrary is said not to be possessed. These two also are provisional and not real. Therefore the name “possession” is established simply at the station in which, in the supporting body, a seed is unuprooted, undamaged, and grown sovereign, and there is no separate thing at all.

Question: what dharma here is called a seed? Answer: it is the capability—serially transmitted or immediately proximate—that name and form〔the five aggregates〕have with respect to producing their own result; and this is constituted by continuum, transformation, and distinctiveness. Question: what is transformation? Answer: it is the nature of being other before and after within a continuum. Question: what is continuum? Answer: it is the formations of the three times in their causal and resultant nature. Question: what is distinctiveness? Answer: it is the capability of producing a result without interval.

Yet in one place a sūtra says ‘if one possesses greed one cannot cultivate the four foundations of mindfulness’—the sense of that sūtra being that one who indulges in the affliction of greed cannot turn away from it〔as it is actually occurring〕, and so is said to possess it; and during the time when he is disposed to indulge in greed and craving he certainly cannot cultivate the four foundations of mindfulness〔it is not that mere possession of the seed prevents cultivation〕. “Possession” of this sort is in every kind merely provisional and not real; and “non-possession,” which is named simply by the negation of this〔possession〕, is likewise provisional and not real. The Vaibhāṣikas say: both of these are separate things, real and not provisional.〔The author of the treatise says:〕viewing the matter thus, both roads may be reckoned well stated. Question: why? Answer:〔the Sautrāntika account〕does not conflict with reason;〔the Sarvāstivāda account〕is what my own school holds. The nature of acquisition and non-acquisition has now been analyzed; what are their differences? Acquisition will be analyzed first. The stanza says:

〔Stanzas 38 and 39, First Half〕The Five Gates of Difference in Acquisition

Stanza: Dharmas of the three times each have acquisitions of the three times; dharmas that are wholesome and the rest have acquisitions that are wholesome and the rest only. A dharma bound to a realm has its acquisition in its own realm only; a dharma unbound has acquisitions extending to four kinds. A dharma neither of training nor beyond training has three kinds of acquisition, and a dharma not subject to abandonment has two.

Treatise: The gate of the three times—dharmas of the three times each have three kinds of acquisition: a past dharma has a past acquisition, a future acquisition, and a present acquisition; future and present dharmas likewise each have three kinds of acquisition.

The gate of the three ethical qualities—again, dharmas that are wholesome and the rest have acquisitions that are wholesome and the rest only: that is, wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate dharmas have respectively wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate acquisitions.

The gate of realm affiliation—again, a dharma bound to a realm has its acquisition in its own realm only: that is, dharmas of the desire, form, and formless realms have respectively acquisitions of the desire, form, and formless realms only. If a dharma is unbound〔without outflows〕, its acquisition extends to four kinds: that is, dharmas without outflows have, in general, four kinds of acquisition—acquisitions of the three realms together with an acquisition without outflows. Taken separately: the acquisition of cessation independent of discernment extends to all three realms; the acquisition of cessation through discernment belongs to the form and formless realms and is also without outflows; the acquisition of the truth of the path is without outflows alone. Therefore an unbound dharma has four kinds of acquisition.

The gate of the three kinds of training—again, a dharma of training has an acquisition of training only, and a dharma beyond training an acquisition beyond training only; the acquisition of what is neither of training nor beyond training admits of a distinction: in general there are three kinds. Taken separately: all dharmas with outflows and the three unconditioned dharmas are called dharmas neither of training nor beyond training. Dharmas with outflows have acquisitions neither of training nor beyond training only; and so it is with the acquisition of cessation independent of discernment and with the acquisition of a cessation through discernment not induced by the noble path. If it is a cessation through discernment induced by the path of training, its acquisition is of training; if induced by the path beyond training, its acquisition is beyond training.

The gate of the three modes of abandonment—again, dharmas abandoned through seeing and abandoned through cultivation have respectively acquisitions abandoned through seeing and abandoned through cultivation. The acquisition of a dharma not subject to abandonment admits of a distinction: in general there are two kinds. Taken separately: the dharmas without outflows are called not subject to abandonment; the acquisition of cessation independent of discernment is abandoned through cultivation only, and so is the acquisition of a cessation through discernment not induced by the noble path; the acquisition of a cessation through discernment induced by the noble path, and the acquisition of the truth of the path, are both not subject to abandonment. Though it was stated above in general that ‘dharmas of the three times each have three,’ the distinguishing characteristics within this should now be sorted out. The stanza says:

〔Stanza 39, Second Half, and Stanza 40, First Half〕The Differences in the Three Times of the Acquisition of Indeterminate and Other Dharmas

Stanza: The acquisition of what is indeterminate arises only together with it, save for the two superknowledges and transformation; the acquisition of obscured〔indeterminate〕form likewise arises only together with it; in the desire realm〔wholesome and unwholesome form〕has no acquisition preceding the dharma.

Treatise: The acquisition of what is unobscured-indeterminate arises only together with the dharma and is neither earlier nor later—because its force is feeble: if the dharma is past, the acquisition is past; if the dharma is future, the acquisition is future; if the dharma is present, the acquisition is present.

Question: is the acquisition of every unobscured-indeterminate dharma like this? Answer: no. Question: how so? Answer: the two superknowledges of the eye and the ear are to be excepted, and also what is capable of transformation〔that is, the mind〕. That is: the discernment that is the superknowledge of the eye and of the ear, and the mind capable of transformation, being of strong force and accomplished through the distinctions of preparatory practice, though included within the unobscured-indeterminate quality, have acquisitions preceding, following, and arising together with them. If the field of craft and the mode of deportment are practiced to an extreme degree, their acquisitions too may perhaps be like this.

Question: is it only the acquisition of an unobscured-indeterminate dharma that arises together with it alone? Answer: no. Question: how so? Answer: obscured-indeterminate form has its acquisition likewise—that is, obscured-indeterminate manifest form has its acquisition, as stated above, arising together with it alone. For although〔the affliction that produces it〕may be of the higher grade, it still cannot give rise to nonmanifest form, which shows that its force is feeble; and therefore it definitely has no acquisition preceding or following the dharma.

Question: as the acquisition of an indeterminate dharma has such distinctions, do the acquisitions of the wholesome and the unwholesome have differences too? Answer: they do. Question: how so? Answer: wholesome form and unwholesome form belonging to the desire realm have no acquisition “preceding the dharma,” but have only a co-arising acquisition and an acquisition following the dharma. Question: does non-acquisition, like acquisition, have all these classes of difference? Answer: no. Question: how so? The stanza says:

〔Stanza 40, Second Half, and Stanza 41〕The Differences of Non-Acquisition and Its Relinquishing

Stanza: Non-acquisition is unobscured-indeterminate alone; past and future dharmas each have non-acquisitions of the three times. Dharmas of the three realms and unbound dharmas each have non-acquisitions of the three realms; since the non-acquisition of the noble path is granted to be ordinary-being status〔it is known that non-acquisition does not extend to what is without outflows〕. When that dharma is acquired, or when the level is changed, that non-acquisition is relinquished.

Treatise: The difference of the three ethical qualities—every non-acquisition is included within the unobscured-indeterminate quality alone.

The difference of the three times—past and future each have three kinds: that is, a present dharma definitely has no present non-acquisition but only a past non-acquisition and a future non-acquisition; while past and future dharmas each have non-acquisitions of all three times.

The difference of realm affiliation—dharmas bound to the three realms and unbound dharmas each have non-acquisitions of the three realms: that is, a dharma bound to the desire realm has non-acquisitions of the three realms〔according to the realm in which the supporting body is〕, and so it is with dharmas bound to the form and formless realms and with unbound dharmas. There is definitely no non-acquisition that is without outflows. Why? Because it is granted that ‘the non-acquisition of the noble path’ is what is called ordinary-being status〔the status of a worldling〕. As the root treatise says: ‘What is ordinary-being status? It is not obtaining the noble dharmas.’ “Not obtaining” is precisely another name for non-acquisition; and to say that ordinary-being status is without outflows does not hold good in reason.

Question: the non-obtaining of which noble dharmas is called ordinary-being status? Answer: the non-obtaining of all〔the noble dharmas of the three vehicles〕—since the root treatise states no distinction. These words “not obtaining” express separation from “obtaining”; were it otherwise〔and did merely failing to obtain something make one an ordinary being〕, then the Buddhas, the World-Honored Ones, who also do not possess the noble dharmas of the śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha lineages, would have to be called ordinary beings. Question: if so, the root treatise ought to have added the word “wholly”〔saying “wholly not obtaining the noble dharmas”〕. Answer: there is no need to add it, for the sense of “wholly” is already contained in this one phrase—just as when it is said that ‘this class〔of beings〕feeds on water, feeds on wind’〔though “wholly” is not said, it is understood that they feed on water and wind alone〕.

There is another account: it is the non-obtaining of receptivity to the cognition of dharma concerning suffering and of the dharmas arising together with it that is called ordinary-being status. 〔Against this〕it cannot be objected that ‘at the subsequent cognition concerning the path this dharma is relinquished—must one not then become a non-noble one?’—because the non-acquisition of that〔receptivity concerning suffering〕has already been permanently destroyed before. Question: if so, since this〔nature of receptivity concerning suffering〕extends to all three vehicles, the non-obtaining of which vehicle’s is called ordinary-being status? Answer: here too it should be said “the non-obtaining of all.” Question: if so, then the same objection as before arises. Answer: this objection too should be resolved as before. Question: if so, is the second statement not made to no purpose?〔The author of the treatise says:〕what the Sautrāntika masters say is better. Question: what is the Sautrāntika sense? Answer: it is that the difference of station within a continuum in which noble dharmas ‘have never yet arisen’ is what is called ordinary-being status.

Question: when is such a non-acquisition relinquished? Answer: the non-acquisition of a dharma is relinquished when that dharma is acquired, or when the level is changed. Just as the non-acquisition of the noble path is called ordinary-being status and is relinquished when this noble path is acquired or when the level is changed. The non-acquisitions of the other dharmas should be pondered in the same way. When the acquisition of a non-acquisition is cut off and the non-acquisition of the non-acquisition arises, this is called relinquishing the non-acquisition.

Question: do acquisition and non-acquisition have further acquisitions and non-acquisitions of their own? Answer: it should be said that these two each have a further acquisition and non-acquisition. Question: if so, does not an infinite regress follow? Answer: no infinite regress follows, since it is granted that acquisitions may reciprocally cause one another to be possessed. That is: when a dharma arises, three dharmas arise together with its own entity—first, the root dharma; second, the acquisition of the dharma〔the major acquisition〕; third, the acquisition of the acquisition〔the minor acquisition〕. Within the continuum, the arising of the acquisition of the dharma causes the root dharma and the acquisition of the acquisition to be possessed; and the arising of the acquisition of the acquisition causes the acquisition of the dharma to be possessed—so that no infinite regress follows here. In this way, when the entity of a wholesome or a defiled dharma first arises, three dharmas arise together with that entity; at the second moment six dharmas arise together, namely three acquisitions of dharmas and three acquisitions of acquisitions; at the third moment eighteen dharmas arise together, namely, with respect to the〔nine〕dharmas produced at the first and second moments, nine acquisitions of dharmas and nine acquisitions of acquisitions. In this way the acquisitions increase further and further one after another.

All past and future afflictions and secondary afflictions, together with the wholesome acquired by birth, being associated moment by moment〔as they arise〕and together with the coexistent〔dharmas〕, produce in the turning of birth and death without beginning or end acquisitions without limit—in a single sentient being alone, moment by moment in the continuum of birth and death, acquisitions without limit arise; and in this way the continua of all sentient beings, each of them separate, produce moment by moment immeasurable and limitless acquisitions arising all together. Acquisitions so many as this gather in one place in the greatest number, and because they are without resistance they can contain one another. Were it not so, space would already not contain the acquisitions of a single sentient being, still less those of a second and the rest.

義疏Exposition

翻開這一卷，世親先不立宗、不破他，只問了一句：

「今應思擇，一切有為如相不同，生亦各異，為有諸法決定俱生、有定俱生。」

一切有為法相狀各別、生起各異——這是常識。既然各異，就不該綁在一起；那麼，有沒有哪些法是非得一起生不可的？答案給得極快：有。而答案一出口，全論的骨架就跟著出來了——「謂一切法略有五品：一色、二心、三心所、四心不相應行、五無為。」

五品之立，就是後世所稱七十五法的綱。無為不生，所以本卷不談；剩下四品，一品一品地問『你們是怎麼一起生的』。光記把這一段標作當品的第二大段，說它是「即約俱生辨用」——前面界品是就體說一切法，這裡是就用說一切法。同一批法，換一個角度重看一遍。

下面十九個義理節點，就是這一次重看的全部內容。

一、一粒最小的物質，也不是一個東西

先問：世間最小的一塊物質，最少要幾樣東西才站得住？

論答：「色聚極細立微聚名，為顯更無細於此者。此在欲界無聲無根，八事俱生隨一不減。」八事就是四大種——地水火風——加上四樣所造色：顏色、香、味、觸。若這一聚裡含身根，就是九事；若含眼耳鼻舌其中一根，就是十事（含眼根處必也含身根，所以九加一）。若其中有聲，各再加一，成九、十、十一。

最容易讀錯的是「微聚」二字。它不是「極微」。光記在此分得很清楚：「應知微有二種：一色聚微，即極少八事俱生不可減也，此論據斯說。二極微微，即色極少更不可分，《正理》據此說。」本論說的是最小的一聚，不是最小的一粒；所以光記又說「微聚是假，假必依實」——這個名字底下本來就有八樣實法在。頌疏把「欲」字也點出來：「欲謂欲界，微是細義，非極微也。」

第二個易誤處：既然四大不相離，為什麼摸金子只覺堅、摸水只覺濕？論的答覆不是『其餘三大不在』，而是「於彼聚中勢用增者明了可得，餘體非無」——並舉了兩個日常譬喻：針尖與竹籌綁在一起去觸，只覺得針；鹽與麵粉合在一起去嘗，只嘗得鹹。顯不顯是勢用的事，有沒有是體的事，兩件事不可混。再問一步『怎麼知道其餘三大真的在』，論答「由有攝熟長持業故」——水收攝、火成熟、風增長、地任持，四種業用都還在作，所以四大都在。

落到讀法上：這一節是全卷的定調。它先在物質上示範一次『法不孤起』，後面心法的「必俱」才不是新說，而是同一條理路推到心上。而末後一問尤堪玩味——「事」到底依體說還是依處說？論答一分依體、一分依處，而後逕自止諍：「何用分別如是語為？語隨欲生，義應思擇。」名言之數目可以爭，義理不在數目上。

二、心與心所，闕一不起

先問：一個念頭裡，是心先起，然後帶出受想思，還是它們一起亮？

論答：「心與心所必定俱生，隨闕一時餘則不起。」沒有先後。頌的下半句「諸行相或得」，講的是另外兩件事：一切有為諸行生起時，必與生住異滅四相同起；而諸行之中「唯有情法與得俱生」，非情之法則不然——所以只能說「或」。

這裡有一個讀頌的機關。「諸行相或得」五字看起來像三個詞並列，其實不是。頌疏把它點破了：「故前句『必俱』二字流至於此，應言『諸行相必俱』。」也就是說，上句的「必俱」要一路貫下來讀——諸行與四相是必俱，諸行與得只是或俱。一個「或」字不是含糊，是簡別：石頭也是行，石頭沒有得。

落地處在哪裡？在於它取消了一種很自然的想像——以為有一個叫「心」的主體，先站在那裡，然後生出種種心理活動。論說沒有這回事：心王與心所是同一叢裡同時亮起的燈，抽掉任何一盞，整叢都不亮。後面全卷數心所的數目、辨心所的品類，都建立在這一句上；若心所可以離心而有、心可以離心所而起，那些數目就全無意義了。

三、心所為什麼分五品——「地」是一個範圍詞

先問：心所何止幾十個，為什麼偏偏分成五品？依什麼分？

論答：「諸心所法且有五品。何等為五？一、大地法；二、大善地法；三、大煩惱地法；四、大不善地法；五、小煩惱地法。」而分品的樞紐在一個「地」字：「地謂行處，若此是彼所行處，即說此為彼法地。」

最容易誤解的是「大地」二字。它不是廣大之地，它指心王。光記把三個層次拆得很細——單說「大」，指受等十法；說「大地」，指心王；說「大地法」，又回到受等十法。所以「大地法」的意思是：在『大法所行之地』上出現的那些法。同理，大善地就是善心、大煩惱地就是染污心、大不善地就是不善心、小煩惱地就是一小部分染污心。

第二個易誤處：五品不是價值排序，也不是善惡分類。它是按出現範圍分的。光記於此有一句很要緊的話：「今依此論，各以一義廢立大地法等。此乃論能，非關人解。」古來諸師分五品，有立五義的、八義的、九義的（神泰疏把這些古師之數都記了下來），本論只用一義——遍不遍、唯不唯——就把五品分乾淨了。

落地：這是一套心理分類學的方法論。它不問『這個心所好不好』，只問『它出現在多大的範圍裡』。懂了這一層，下面五節的每一個「唯」字、每一個「遍」字，都不再是修辭，而是判準。

四、大地法十——每一念都有的十個面

先問：哪些心所是每一個心、每一剎那都少不了的？

論列十法：「受謂三種領納：苦、樂、俱非」「想謂於境取差別相」「思謂能令心有造作」「觸謂根境識和合生，能有觸對」「欲謂希求所作事業」「慧謂於法能有簡擇」「念謂於緣明記不忘」「作意謂能令心警覺」「勝解謂能於境印可」「三摩地謂心一境性」。

這一節有四處最容易讀走。其一，論在列十法之前先下了兩個字：「傳說：如是所列十法，諸心剎那和合遍有。」一個「傳」字，古德一致讀為論主與所述之說留了距離：光記於本段直判「毘婆沙師傳說如是：所列十法」……「論主意朋經部，非信十法皆有別體，故言傳說」，寶疏亦云「謂傳婆沙師說，故言傳說」。這一讀法出自唐疏，非論文自道；讀俱舍要對這類字眼保持敏感。其二，「慧」不是道德意義上的智慧，只是簡擇——所以它能與「疑」同時在一個心裡；正因為在猶豫的兩邊都作了推度，才叫猶豫。其三，「三摩地」不等於入定；頌疏釋作「三摩地者，此云等持，平等持心於一境轉，亦持心所，從強說心」——散亂心裡也有它，只是弱。其四，十法不是十個步驟，是同一剎那的十個側面；論自己已預先擋住這個誤讀：「諸心心所異相微細，一一相續分別尚難，況一剎那俱時而有。」

落地：這十個名字給了你一副拆解自心的工具。任取當下一念，都可以問：這一念領納到的是苦是樂還是不苦不樂（受）？取了什麼相（想）？把心推向哪裡（思）？碰上了什麼（觸）？想要什麼（欲）？在分辨什麼（慧）？記著什麼（念）？被什麼喚醒（作意）？認定了什麼（勝解）？心停在哪一境上（三摩地）？——十問問完，這一念就攤開了。

五、大善地法十——善心的十個指標

先問：一個心憑什麼算作善心？

論答：唯有十法是『遍善心而且唯善心』的——信、不放逸、輕安、捨、慚、愧、無貪、無瞋、不害、勤。逐一：「信者令心澄淨」，或說是「於諦寶業果中現前忍許」；不放逸是「修諸善法離諸不善法」，而所謂修，是「於善專注為性」；輕安是「心堪任性」；捨是「心平等性、無警覺性」；無貪無瞋名為二根；不害是「無損惱」；勤是「令心勇悍為性」。

信最容易被讀成『相信某個對象』。論給的第一義不是對象，是狀態——令心澄淨。頌疏設了一個很好的譬喻來說這件事：「信者，澄淨也，如水清珠能清濁水，心有信珠，令心澄淨。」光記引《入阿毘達磨》的同一喻更具：「如水清珠置於池內，令濁穢水皆即澄淨。如是信珠在心池內，心諸濁穢皆即除遣。」——信是那顆珠，不是那池水裡的某一樣東西。

第二個易誤處：「捨」不是無所謂、不是冷漠，是心的平等性；而它與「作意」（有警覺性）同在一心，論自己也覺得難，特地設了一番問答：「如何可說於一心中有警覺性、無警覺性？作意與捨二相應起。」答覆是「此有警覺於餘則無，二既懸殊有何乖反」——警覺屬作意，不警覺屬捨，各在各的體上，不在同一體上打架。

第三個易誤處：三善根少了無癡，不是因為無癡不算善根。論說得明白：「無癡善根慧為性，故前已說在大地法中，不重說為大善地法。」它以慧為體，慧已經在大地法裡了，不重複立。

落地：這十個字可以當成一張自查表。心是不是澄的（信）？有沒有在守（不放逸）？身心是否堪用（輕安）？有沒有偏（捨）？對己知恥否（慚）？對罪知怖否（愧）？不黏（無貪）不惱（無瞋）不損他（不害）？有沒有在使力（勤）？——十項齊，才叫善心；缺一項，那一念就不是完整的善。

六、大煩惱地法六——一切染心的共同底色

先問：不論貪心、瞋心、邪見心，凡是染污的心，共同的底色是什麼？

論答只有六個：「癡逸怠不信，惛掉恒唯染。」癡就是無明、無智、無顯；逸是放逸，正是不放逸所對治；怠是懈怠，正是勤所對治；不信正是信所對治；惛是惛沈——論引本論定義「身重性、心重性，身無堪任性、心無堪任性」；掉是掉舉，「令心不靜」。

這裡有一個看似矛盾的地方，必須解開。根本《阿毘達磨》說大煩惱地法有十，還不說惛沈；本論說六，還加了惛沈——看起來又減又增。論主的回答不客氣：「天愛！汝今但知言，至不閑意旨。」（「天愛」是西方戲稱愚人的話，光記與神泰疏都記了這個俗語。）意旨在哪裡？在於那十個裡的失念、心亂、不正知、非理作意、邪勝解根本就是大地法的染污分——染污的念叫失念，染污的等持叫心亂，染污的慧叫不正知，染污的作意與勝解叫非理作意與邪勝解。既已在大地法中說過，不該重立。所以不是減了四個，是把重複的五個歸位了。

第二個易誤處：惛沈之說「身」。論設問「此是心所。如何名身」，自答「如身受言，故亦無失」——受本是心所，與五識相應時就叫身受；惛沈也如此。「身」是就相應之識說，不是說它是色法。

第三個易誤處在末尾一段。有人主張惛沈該入而不入，是因為它順等持；論主追問「誰惛沈行非掉舉行？誰掉舉行非惛沈行？」——二者從不單行。對方退一步說是「隨增說行」。論主的收束極要緊：「雖知說行隨用偏增，而依有體建立地法，故此地法唯六義成。」說『某人是惛沈行者』可以隨偏強說，但立「地法」必須依有體之法立——描述可以粗略，建制不可以。

落地：修行時要盯的常駐者只有六個。貪瞋等是客，來了又走；這六個是主，只要心一染，它們就在。

七、大不善地法二——羞恥心是最後一道門

先問：染污的心不見得都是惡的（比如與身見相應的有覆無記心），那麼使「染」升級為「惡」的，是什麼？

論答只有兩個：「唯二心所但與一切不善心俱，謂無慚、愧，故唯二種名此地法。」

這一節極短，卻最容易被輕輕帶過。要點在於「唯遍」二字同時成立：無慚無愧既遍一切不善心，又唯在不善心。前面六個大煩惱地法遍一切染心，卻不唯不善（有覆無記心也染）；忿等唯不善，卻不遍。兩個條件同時滿足的，全部心所裡只有這兩個。這就是為什麼一品只裝兩個法，仍要單獨立一品——不是湊數，是判準逼出來的結果。

第二個易誤處：「無慚無愧」不是『沒有禮貌』。論在後面正頌三十三會詳釋，此處只說「此二法相如後當辯」。而正因為它是不善心的充要標記，它反過來說明了一件事：善心裡的慚與愧，不是附加的修養，是善心之所以成立的門檻。

落地：一切惡行，追到最裡面，都要通過『不覺得羞、不覺得怕』這一關。守住這一關，惡心就起不來——所以慚愧在經中被稱為世間二白法，不是修辭。

八、小煩惱地法十——為什麼叫「小」

先問：忿、覆、慳、嫉、惱、害、恨、諂、誑、憍，這十個明明兇得很，為什麼叫「小」？

論答給了三個條件：「如是類法唯修所斷，意識地起、無明相應、各別現行，故名為小煩惱地法。」頌疏把它列成三義：「謂有三義：一唯修所斷、二意識地起與無明相應、三各別現行。」

「小」不是輕，是範圍小。這是本節的第一個排誤。與大煩惱地法對照就清楚了：那六個遍一切染心，這十個只與「少分染污心」相應。論在立名時就說了：「此中若法小煩惱地所有名小煩惱地法，謂法少分染污心俱。」

第二個易誤處是「各別現行」。它的意思是一次只起一個——忿起時恨不同時起，慳起時嫉不同時起。這一條後面在數心所時會直接用到：忿等相應品之所以是「二十如不共，加忿等隨一」，正因為只加一個。

第三個易誤處：為什麼慢與疑不算小煩惱地法？光記依本論之判說得乾淨：「今依此論，一義廢立少煩惱地法十，謂唯修所斷。」慢通見修二斷、疑唯見斷，都不合「唯修所斷」；惡作雖唯修所斷，卻通善性、不唯與無明相應。三義缺一即出局，所以只有十個。

落地：既然各別現行，就可以逐個對治——這十個不是一團亂麻，是十個可以一個一個拆的結。論也預告了「此法如後隨煩惱中當廣分別」，此處只給坐標。

九、一個念頭裡到底有幾個心所

先問：說了半天品類，具體到欲界的一念心，究竟有幾個心所同時在？

論把欲界心分五類，逐類報數：善心必二十二（十大地法、十大善地法、尋、伺），有惡作時二十三；不善的不共無明品與見相應品各二十（十大地法、六大煩惱地法、二大不善地法、尋、伺）；貪瞋慢疑四煩惱品、忿等隨煩惱品、不善惡作品各二十一；有覆無記品十八；無覆無記品十二；睡眠通三性，隨在哪一品都增一。

第一個排誤在『見不增數』。不善見相應心裡明明多了一個邪見，為什麼還是二十？論答「非見增故有二十一，以即於十大地法中慧用差別說為見故」——見不是第十一個法，是慧的作用差別。這一條同時解釋了為什麼有覆無記品（與身見邊見相應）也只有十八。

第二個排誤在「惡作」二字。惡作不是「作惡」，也不是追悔本身的行相。論給了三重解釋：從所緣立名（「應知此中緣惡作法說名惡作，謂緣惡作心追悔性」，如緣空之定叫空解脫門、緣不淨之無貪叫不淨）；從所依立名（如說一切村邑國土都來集會，其實來的是人）；從果體假立因名（如說六觸處名宿作業）。頌疏把第一義點得最直白：「惡作是境，非追悔也。今名追悔為惡作者，從境為名也。」而且所緣未作之事也可以叫惡作——「如追悔言我先不作如是事業，是我惡作」。

第三個排誤在「不共無明」。它不是『不與人共有的無明』，是獨頭的無明——「謂此心品唯有無明，無有所餘貪煩惱等」。

落地：這一節把心從一團感覺變成一張可以數的表。它的教學價值不在背下數字，而在建立一個習慣——問一念心『有幾個心所』是一個有答案的問題。至於外方諸師許惡作通無記而成十三，論如實記下而不判，這也是讀法的一課。

十、上界心所的遞減——修定的地圖

先問：進了禪定，心所會變多還是變少？

論答是遞減：「初靜慮中於前所說諸心所法，除唯不善、惡作、睡眠，餘皆具有。」「唯不善者」指瞋，以及除諂誑憍之外的忿等七個小煩惱，加上無慚無愧。中間靜慮再除尋。第二靜慮以上乃至無色界再除「伺等」——「等」字所除是諂與誑。

易誤處一：遞減不等於心變弱。減掉的是不能在那一地存在的心所，不是心的功能被削。光記把理由說得很清楚：「定所滋潤，無瞋等惑不善法故無不善，無憂根故無惡作，無叚食故無睡眠。」頌疏更把兩條對應點明：「除惡作者，惡作與憂根相應，色界離憂，故無惡作。除睡眠者，色界無段食，故無睡眠也。」——每一項脫落都有它的所以然，不是憑空規定。

易誤處二：諂誑「極至梵天」不是在說梵王壞。論引了一段極生動的經：馬勝苾芻問大梵王「此四大種當於何位盡滅無餘」，梵王不知道，當眾「便矯亂答：我於此梵眾是大梵，自在作者、化者、生者、養者，是一切父」，說完把人拉出眾外，「引出眾外諂言愧謝，令還問佛」。這一段是要證成一件事——只要還有君臣尊卑「眾相依」的結構，就還有諂誑的餘地；二禪以上沒有這結構，所以沒有這兩個心所。

落地：這是一張修定的地形圖。它告訴修行人：某些煩惱不是靠對治斷掉的，是到了某一地它就無處可依。反過來說，若還在欲界而想要初靜慮的心相，那就要看瞋、惡作、睡眠這三樣還在不在。

十一、無慚無愧與愛敬——對人的心與對法的心

先問：慚與愧到底差在哪裡？愛與敬又差在哪裡？

論給無慚無愧兩重解釋。第一重就境分：「於諸功德及有德者，無敬無崇、無所忌難、無所隨屬，說名無慚」——對的是德與有德者；「為諸善士所訶厭法說名為罪，於此罪中不見怖畏說名無愧」——對的是罪與罪果。第二重是「有餘師說」：自觀無恥名無慚，觀他無恥名無愧。

易誤處一：「不見怖」不是在說見或不見。論設了一個很細的問答：若是『見了而不怖』，那顯的該是邪智；若是『不見其怖果』，那顯的該是無明——兩邊都有過。論主的答覆是：「此言不顯見與不見……此顯有法是隨煩惱為彼二因，說名無愧。」這句話是要指出另有一個法在，它是邪智與無明的近因，不是在描述見不見。

易誤處二：愛不等於貪。論說「愛謂愛樂，體即是信」，隨即分二：「有染謂貪，如愛妻子等。無染謂信，如愛師長等。」並作四句：緣苦集之信是有信非愛（忍可它是苦，卻不可愛樂）；諸染污愛是有愛非信；緣滅道之信是信愛俱通；除此為第四句。同一個「愛」字，染與不染要分開讀。

易誤處三：愛敬「唯於欲色有」，不是說信與慚在無色界沒有。論自己設難自答：「愛敬有二，謂緣於法補特伽羅，緣法愛敬通三界有。此中意說緣補特伽羅者，故欲色有，無色界無。」——緣人的愛敬才受界限，緣法的不受。

落地：論在此處把「對人」與「對法」分成兩軌，還就人作了四句——於妻子有愛無敬、於他師有敬無愛、於自師父母有愛有敬、餘為第四句。這四句不是分類遊戲，是提醒：敬與愛可以各自單獨出現，一段關係裡有沒有敬，和有沒有愛，是兩個問題。

十二、尋伺與慢憍——一個「不許」與一個『對誰』

先問：尋是心之麁、伺是心之細，麁細相違，怎能在同一個心裡？

論記了兩家的解釋。第一家設喻：冷水上浮著熟酥，上面又有烈日照著，「酥因水日非釋非凝」——一個心也如此，由尋故不太細、由伺故不太麁。第二家說尋伺是語言行，引經「要有尋伺方有語言」，麁者名尋、細者名伺。

這一節最要緊的，是論主對兩家都不放過。對第一家：水與日只是凝釋之因，「日體非凝釋」——那麼尋伺也只是麁細之因，不是麁細之體。又麁細是相待而立的，界地上下互相對照，「乃至有頂應有尋伺」。對第二家：若真有麁細二別體類，理上無違；「然無別體類，故成違理，一體類中無容上下俱時起故」。最後收成一句：「由是應知，尋伺二法定不可執一心相應。」有人再引經「初靜慮具足五支」來反問，論答「具五支言就一地說，非一剎那」。

易誤處在這裡：不要把尋伺讀成『思考』與「專注」。論定的是麁細二性，不是兩種功能；正因為只是麁細，論主才能用「相待而立」把它問倒。

慢與憍是另一對。「慢謂對他心自舉性，稱量自他德類差別」；「憍謂染著自法為先，令心傲逸無所顧性」。分別只在一個字：慢對他，憍對自。慢要有比較的對象，憍不必——自己染著自己的種姓、色力就夠了。論還記了餘師一個譬喻：「如因酒生欣舉差別說名為醉，如是貪生欣舉差別說名為憍。」

落地：這兩對合看，教的是同一件事——讀論要留意「有作是釋」「有餘師說」「有說」這些字。本節四家之說俱在，論主取捨分明；不辨這些標記，就會把某一家的話當成論的定說。

十三、心意識體一，相應之義有五

先問：心、意、識是三個東西，還是一個東西的三個名字？

論答得極簡：「集起故名心，思量故名意，了別故名識。」又記第二說：「淨不淨界種種差別故名為心，即此為他作所依止故名為意，作能依止故名為識。」結論是「故心、意、識三名所詮，義雖有異而體是一」。

同樣的道理再推一次：心心所也有四個名字——有所依（託所依根）、有所緣（取所緣境）、有行相（於所緣品類差別等起行相）、相應（等和合）。而「相應」之義有五：「謂心心所五義平等故說相應，所依所緣行相時事皆平等故。」

易誤處一：「體一」不是說沒有分工。三個名字各有所詮之義，只是不另立三個體。神泰疏用一個樹喻來說「集起」：「集起故名心，如樹有心能集起枝條花果」——樹心不是另一樣東西，卻是枝條花果所從出。

易誤處二：「行相」不是「所緣」。這是本節最易走的一步。光記設了一個鏡喻把它分開：「猶如明鏡對眾色相皆現鏡面，此所現像而非所照，然約像現說鏡能照」——鏡面上現的像，不是鏡所照的那個物；「此所現者名為行相」。頌疏說得更直白：「如緣青境心及心所，皆帶青上影像，此識上相名為行相。」行相在能緣這一邊，所緣在那一邊。

易誤處三：「事平等」不是數目相等。論自己補了一句：「事平等者，一相應中如心體一，諸心所法各各亦爾。」意思是各各都只有一個——一個相應之中不會有兩個受、兩個想。

落地：五義平等是有部判定「相應」的定義式。往後凡遇『某法與某法相應』，都可以回頭用這五條驗一遍：同依、同緣、同行相、同時、各一。

十四、既不是色也不是心的那一類

先問：得、非得、同分這些既非色又非心的東西，到底算什麼？

論答：「如是諸法心不相應，非色等性，行蘊所攝，是故名心不相應行。」頌先總列：「心不相應行，得非得同分，無想二定命，相名身等類。」頌疏把十四個名字列全：得、非得、同分、無想果、無想定、滅盡定、命根、生、住、異、滅、名身、句身、文身。

易誤處一：「不相應」不是『與心無關』。它是說不與心相應——即不具備上一節那五義平等。它們仍然依心色分位而立，仍在有為法中，只是不入心所之列。

易誤處二：不要把它讀成無為。論在此已明說「行蘊所攝」，是有為；無為是第五品，本卷開頭就說了「無為無生，此中不說」。

易誤處三：本卷只總標，不遍釋。論總列十四之後，立刻收縮：「於中且辯得非得相」——後面十四個裡只講頭兩個，其餘留到下卷。一個「且」字要看見。

落地：這一品是有部法系裡最受質疑的一位——把『有沒有』『同不同類』『活不活著』這些關係與狀態，都立成了獨立的法。也正因為它最受質疑，本卷接下來才會用極長的篇幅，只為辯護頭一個「得」。讀懂了得，就讀懂了這一整品的立法動機。

十五、「得」是什麼——擁有這件事被立成了一個法

先問：說『我有戒』『我有慧』，那個「有」是什麼？

論答：「得有二種，一者未得已失今獲、二者得已不失成就。」今時到手叫獲（未曾得、或得而復失者），保持不失叫成就，兩者合稱得；非得與此相違。至於它在哪裡有：「於自相續及二滅中。」

易誤處一：得不是所得之法。得是另一個法，它使某法「屬於」某個相續。所以論要問「於何法中有得非得」，而不是問『什麼法是得』。

易誤處二：範圍極嚴。只在自己的相續裡——「非他相續，無有成就他身法故」；不在非情上——「非非相續，無有成就非情法故」。無為法裡也只有擇滅、非擇滅二者有得，虛空沒有：「決定無有成就虛空，故於虛空不言有得，以得無故非得亦無。」理由是本宗「宗明得非得，相翻而立故」——沒有得，就連非得也不能說。

易誤處三：一切有情都成就非擇滅。論引對法論說：除了見道最初剎那那位具縛聖者、以及一切具縛異生之外，「諸餘有情皆成擇滅」；而非擇滅則「一切有情無不成就」——因為每一剎那都有法因缺緣而永不生。

落地：這一節在做一件很大的事——把「擁有」從一個描述詞變成一個實法。斷了煩惱、得了戒、證了滅，這些說法在有部這裡都不再只是說法，而各有一個「得」在承擔。理解了這個動機，下一節那場長諍才有分量。

十六、別物之諍——同一段裡的兩宗與論主的雙印

先問：憑什麼說另有一個東西叫「得」？

有部先舉聖言：「契經說故。如契經言：聖者於彼十無學法，以生以得以成就故，已斷五支。」經部立刻反難：那麼「有轉輪王成就七寶」怎麼說？輪寶珠寶是非情、象馬女主是他相續，難道也成就？有部退到「自在」：「此中自在說名成就，謂轉輪王於彼七寶有自在力，隨樂轉故。」經部追一句：既然那裡「自在」就夠了，別處為什麼要另立一物？

接著經部改用量破：「所執得無體可知，如色聲等或貪瞋等；無用可知，如眼耳等，故無容有別物名得。」——看不到，也推不出。再破『得是生因』之說：若得是生因，無為不生就該沒有得；界地轉易、離染時法無得，將來又怎麼生；若說俱生得是生因，那四相中的生與生生還作什麼；非情無得就該永不生；具縛者三品煩惱現起的差別也該沒有，因為得無差別。有部退守到「於差別為建立因」——沒有得，就沒法區分異生與聖者。經部答：差別在所依身，不在得——「令所依身轉變異本」，「猶如種子火所焚燒，轉變異前無能生用」，所以「如是二種但假非實」。

於是「種子」一詞被逼了出來：「此中何法名為種子？謂名與色於生自果所有展轉隣近功能，此由相續轉變差別。」論還逐字自釋三義——轉變是「相續中前後異性」，相續是「因果性三世諸行」，差別是「有無間生果功能」。

最要緊的一步在收尾。毘婆沙師堅持二種「皆有別物實而非假」，而論主下了一句雙印：「如是二途皆為善說。所以者何？不違理故、我所宗故。」——不違理，說的是經部；我所宗，說的是有部。

易誤處：這一段常被讀成『論主破了有部』。論文並沒有這樣說。它給的是兩個理由並列，一句話裡放了兩宗的位置。至於這一句到底偏向誰、偏多少，是後代四疏各自著力之處，此處不判。

落地：這是全卷最值得慢讀的一段。它示範了一種論辯體例——立、難、退、再難、再退、雙印。而「種子」在這裡第一次以正式定義出現，它後來走了多遠，是另一段公案；本卷只要記住：它是在為「擁有」找一個不必立實法的解釋時被逼出來的。

十七、得的五門差別——一張通用的分別法式

先問：得本身是什麼性、屬什麼世、繫什麼界？

論用五門作答。三世門：「三世法得各有三種，謂過去法有過去得、有未來得、有現在得」，未來現在亦爾。三性門：「善等法得唯善等」。界繫門：「有繫法得唯自界」，而「無繫法得通四種」——三界得加無漏得。三學門：有學法得唯有學，無學法得唯無學，非學非無學之得則通三。三斷門：見修所斷法各有見修所斷之得，非所斷法之得則通二。

易誤處一：『得隨所得判性』不是唯一規則。論在界繫門裡就分了三路：「非擇滅得，通三界繫。若擇滅得，色無色繫及與無漏。道諦得，唯無漏故。」為什麼不一致？因為擇滅本身無作用，它的得隨能證之道判；非擇滅也無作用，它的得隨所依身判；有為法的得才隨所得之法判。光記把這三條並列而說，正是為了防止讀者把一條規則推到底。

易誤處二：頌文與長行不等量。頌只說「非學無學三，非所斷二種」，長行卻把三學、三斷都具說了。這不是長行多說，是頌文字窄——讀頌要知道它省了什麼。

落地：三世、三性、界繫、三學、三斷——這五門是俱舍全論通用的分別法式。此處第一次完整示範，後面每遇一法都可以照這五門追問一遍。

十八、無記之得為何只能俱起

先問：既然說三世法各有三世之得，是不是每一法都如此？

論立刻簡別：「無覆無記得唯俱起，無前後生，勢力劣故。」法在過去得也過去，法在現在得也現在。但有例外：「除眼耳通及能變化」——天眼通、天耳通之慧與能變化之心，「勢力強故、加行差別所成辦故」，雖是無覆無記，卻有前後得與俱起得。工巧處、威儀路若極為數習者，也許如此。有覆無記的表色之得也只有俱起，因為「雖有上品而亦不能發無表故勢力微劣」。欲界繫的善色不善色則「無前起」，只有俱生與後起之得。

易誤處一：「除二通變化」不是說二通不屬無記。它們仍是無覆無記，只是勢力強，所以在得的三世上例外。

易誤處二：「勢力」是一個解釋槓桿，不是一個玄詞。論用它來區分兩類無記：任運而起的（異熟生等）勢力劣，加行修來的（二通變化、極數習的工巧威儀）勢力強。強弱之別落在『是不是靠功夫得來的』上。

落地：這一節示範了論的一種手法——先立通則，再逐一簡別例外，而每個例外都給得出理由。這種『通則加簡別』的寫法，往後在業品、隨眠品裡會反覆出現。

十九、非得、異生性，與那個「無窮過」

先問：凡夫之所以是凡夫，是多了什麼，還是少了什麼？

論的答案是：少了。「由許聖道非得，說名異生性故。」異生性不是一個實德，是聖道的非得——沒有得到聖法的那個「沒有」，被立成了一個法。論引本論為證：「云何異生性？謂不獲聖法。」並補一句「不獲即是非得異名」。

非得本身的差別也用門說：三性上「一切非得皆唯無覆無記性攝」；三世上「過去未來各有三種，謂現在法決定無有現在非得」——因為法既現在，必是所得者，必有得；界繫上三界法與不繫法「各三非得」，隨所依身而定。

易誤處一：「不獲一切」與「純」字。有人問：不獲哪些聖法才算？論答「謂不獲一切，不別說故」，並解釋「此不獲言，表離於獲」——若不是這樣，諸佛也不成就聲聞獨覺種性聖法，豈不也叫異生。又有人說本論該加個「純」字，論答不必：「此一句中含純義故，如說此類食水食風。」——說某類眾生食水食風，不加「純」字也知道是純食。

易誤處二：論主此處印可的是經部。第二家說不獲苦法智忍及俱生法名異生性，論主評「若爾，重說唐捐其功」，隨即說「如經部師，所說為善」，並記其義：「謂曾未生聖法相續分位差別名異生性。」——這是論文直說的取捨，不是後人的推斷。

易誤處三：「無窮過」不是真的無窮。得復有得、非得復有非得，豈不無窮？論答不無窮，因為「許得展轉更相成故」——法生時三法俱起：「第一本法、第二法得、第三得得」；法得成就本法與得得，得得成就法得，互相成就，鏈條就收住了。光記把兩個名字分開：「法之得故名為法得，即是大得。大得之得名為得得，即小得也。」第二剎那六法、第三剎那十八法，「如是諸得後後轉增」。論末以一句收：諸得「無對礙故互相容受。若不爾者，一有情得虛空不容，況第二等」。神泰疏於此設了一個很美的喻——如秋細霧遍滿十方。

落地：這一節把凡與聖之別，安在一個「沒有」上；而經部把同一件事改說成相續的分位差別，論主印可了。同一個問題，兩種安法：一種要立法，一種只要說位。這一組對照，是本卷留給往後讀者最長的一條線。

承衍：四疏與二造之鏡

以上是本卷自身之義。此下另以古德之疏與同系之論旁照——鏡非論，只是換幾種讀法看同一卷。

四疏的分工。普光《俱舍論記》逐句牒釋，最詳，遇異說必記；法寶《俱舍論疏》好作四句簡別，且不憚評前人；圓暉《俱舍論頌疏》科文最清、譬喻最便初學；神泰《俱舍論疏》逐段標數，科文最細，且時取大乘名相為對照。四家同標本卷為當品大文第二，唯法寶與神泰逕標二十七頌之量。

四疏互異最烈的一處，是一段舊案。論說欲界微聚『無聲有八事』，而《發智論》說欲色界恒成就聲——二文如何相容？舊時念法師取一折衷之解，神泰疏斥之為大謬，普光記下這場爭執並自判「今詳二德互有是非」。法寶則反過來把兩家都駁了，說「泰師、光師妄解念法師意」，又斷言「念法師義既順論文，泰、光二師即謬破耳」。四家之中此處分歧最深。三家之判並錄，不判是非。

微聚是假是實，四家亦不齊。普光存二微之分而判本論據色聚微；法寶逕判「二釋之中後釋為善」；圓暉不涉假實，只釋「微是細義」；神泰引《順正理論》體用之辨而不作判。體增用增一節亦然：普光記《正理》取體增、本論取用增，法寶則兩非之——「然詳體增、用增，未為盡理」，又下一句「故知法性隨緣不定」。

輕安一段的歸屬也有異解。普光於「應知此中身輕安者身堪任性」處明判「諸師多解此文是說一切有部答者，此解謬矣」；法寶則對經部之難自下按語「今詳此難非為切當」；神泰把全段判為薩婆多與經部往復九番；圓暉此段從略不出。

翻對之數是另一組互異。神泰疏記古師之說『翻八有體、翻二無體』而斥其不然，主張「翻十皆有體」，並引舊譯《俱舍》為證。普光與法寶則各作正翻十、傍翻十一之大表，二表法目全同，唯法寶作「翻掉舉為行捨」而普光作「翻掉舉為捨」。

眾賢之破，集中在四處。其一，破經部先軌上座之「大地唯三」——上座主張經只說俱起受想思，故大地法唯三；眾賢斥為「上座所言大地唯三，極為迷謬」，並引經證欲等實有別體。其二，回護作意與捨之相違——眾賢以「捨如持稱進止平等」為解，而後說「經主所難，謂有警覺無警覺性，作意與捨應互相違，如是善成」。其三，責世親於無慚無愧處橫申過難——「經主此中誤取彼情橫申過難」。其四，於得與種子處著力最重：既答「經主此中作如是問：何緣知有別物名得」，又斷「經主於中雖隨自執多有所說而無所成，所執種子理不成故」，並把種子的異名一一列出——或名隨界、或名熏習、或名功能、或名不失、或名增長；於異生性則說「若異生性無別有體，便違此經」。一義二宗，並錄不判勝負。

真諦舊譯之異，本卷有五處值得並看。其一，五品之立，二譯數同序同，唯第三第四之名異（心所與心法、心不相應行與不相應）。其二，大地法十，法數同而三名異、列序亦異。其三，無慚與無愧二名在二譯中互易。其四，小煩惱地法十，法數同而逐名之配當諸本無明文，列而不判。其五，非得之世——玄奘本作「謂現在法決定無有現在非得」，舊譯則作相反之說；普光、圓暉、神泰三家於此皆逕標舊譯為翻譯之謬，法寶於此無評。三家之判並錄，二譯優劣之裁不在此處。

七十五法與百法之對照，古德已自為之。法寶於大地法十下逕作對照——「有部之宗十法遍行，大乘之中唯五遍行」；又於小煩惱地法下記假實之異——「又此忿等，大乘中說謂嗔分等，故是假法。此宗皆是實有性」。神泰於相應五義下引《瑜伽》為對，說「故瑜伽論云：所依同、所緣同、行相不同」，末更以見相二分相配——「行相如大乘相分，事平等如大乘見分也」。本卷所立五品，與後出百法之五位，數同而序異；心一開為八，心所四十六對五十一，色法同十一，不相應十四對二十四，無為三對六。列其異同，不判優劣。

心意識體一與後代八識之立，是同一問題的兩個時代。本卷說三名一體，是就名義差別而說；後來唯識於同一處立八識之別，所依的是另一組問題。二者並錄為坐標，關係之定性不在此節。

以上諸鏡，皆四疏與同系諸論所增，非本卷頌與長行之原話。並錄不判，各還其位。

Opening this fascicle, Vasubandhu neither establishes his own position nor refutes another’s; he asks a single question:

“It should now be pondered whether, since all conditioned dharmas differ in their characteristics and therefore differ severally in their arising, there are any dharmas that must arise together—there are dharmas that definitely arise together.”

That conditioned dharmas differ in characteristic and differ in arising is common sense. Being severally different, they ought not to be bound together; so then, are there dharmas that cannot but arise together? The answer comes very fast: there are. And with the answer the skeleton of the whole treatise comes out with it—“all dharmas fall in brief into five classes: first form, second mind, third mental factors, fourth formations not associated with mind, fifth the unconditioned.”

The establishing of the five classes is the framework of what later ages call the seventy-five dharmas. The unconditioned does not arise, and so is not treated in this fascicle; of the remaining four, each is asked in turn, ‘how do you arise together?’ Puguang marks this passage as the chapter’s second major section, saying that it is “analyzing function in terms of co-arising”—the preceding Chapter on the Elements stated all dharmas in terms of entity, and here they are stated in terms of function. The same body of dharmas, looked at once again from another angle.

The nineteen doctrinal nodes below are the whole content of that second look.

1. Even the Smallest Particle of Matter Is Not a Single Thing

Ask first: how many things at least does the smallest piece of matter in the world require in order to stand?

The treatise answers: “when the aggregation of form reaches its finest, the name minute aggregate is established for it, to show that there is nothing finer than this. In the desire realm, having neither sound nor faculty, eight entities arise together and not one may be lacking.” The eight entities are the four great elements—earth, water, fire, and wind—together with four kinds of derived form: color, odor, flavor, and the tangible. If the aggregate contains the body faculty it is nine entities; if it contains one of the eye, ear, nose, or tongue it is ten (an aggregate containing the eye faculty must contain the body faculty as well, hence nine plus one). If sound is present, one more is added to each, making nine, ten, or eleven.

What is most easily misread are the two words “minute aggregate.” It is not “ultimate atom.” Puguang distinguishes this very sharply: “it should be known that ‘minute’ is of two kinds: first, the minute that is an aggregate of form, namely the least possible eight entities arising together, which cannot be reduced—this treatise speaks on that basis; second, the minute that is an ultimate atom, namely the least possible form, which cannot be divided further—the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle speaks on that basis.” What this treatise speaks of is the smallest aggregate, not the smallest particle; and so Puguang also says, “a minute aggregate is provisional, and what is provisional must rest on what is real”—beneath this name there are eight real dharmas from the start. Yuanhui brings out the word “desire” as well: “‘desire’ means the desire realm; ‘minute’ has the sense of fine and does not mean the ultimate atom.”

A second point easily mistaken: if the four great elements are inseparable, why does touching gold give only hardness, and touching water only wetness? The treatise’s reply is not that ‘the other three are absent,’ but that “in that aggregate the one whose force predominates is clearly perceptible, while the entities of the others are not absent”—and it offers two everyday similes: a needle-point bound together with a bamboo tally, where only the needle is felt; salt mixed with flour, where only the saltiness is tasted. Whether a thing shows is a matter of force; whether it is there is a matter of entity, and the two must not be run together. Pressed a step further—‘how is it known that the other three are really there?’—the treatise answers, “because there are the operations of gathering, ripening, increasing, and sustaining”: water gathers, fire ripens, wind increases, earth upholds; all four operations are still at work, and so all four elements are present.

As to how this is to be read: this section sets the key of the whole fascicle. It first demonstrates upon matter that ‘no dharma arises alone,’ so that the later “necessarily together” of mind is not a new doctrine but the same line of reasoning carried up to mind. And the last question is especially worth savoring—is “entity” said with reference to substance or to sense field? The treatise answers that it is in one part with reference to substance and in one part to sense field, and then closes off the dispute itself: “what need is there for such distinguishing talk? Speech arises as one pleases; it is the sense that should be pondered.” The number attaching to a term may be argued over; the doctrine does not rest on the number.

2. Mind and Mental Factors: Lacking One, None Arises

Ask first: within a single thought, does mind arise first and then bring feeling, perception, and volition along with it, or do they light up together?

The treatise answers: “mind and mental factors necessarily arise together; should any one be lacking, the rest do not arise.” There is no before and after. The stanza’s second half, “formations, marks, and some with acquisition,” speaks of two further matters: when all conditioned formations arise they necessarily arise together with the four marks of arising, abiding, change, and cessation; and among the formations “only dharmas of a sentient being arise together with acquisition,” dharmas of what is insentient being otherwise—which is why only “some” can be said.

There is a mechanism here for reading stanzas. The five characters “formations, marks, and some with acquisition” look like three coordinate terms, but they are not. Yuanhui breaks it open: “the two words ‘necessarily together’ in the preceding line flow down to this, and it should read ‘formations and marks necessarily together.’” That is, the “necessarily together” of the previous line is to be read straight through—formations and the four marks are necessarily together, while formations and acquisition are only sometimes together. The word “some” is not vagueness but a discrimination: a stone too is a formation, and a stone has no acquisition.

Where does this land? In its cancelling of a very natural picture—that there is a subject called “mind” standing there first and then producing various mental activities. The treatise says there is no such thing: mind as sovereign and the mental factors are lamps in one cluster lit at the same moment, and pull out any one of them and the whole cluster goes dark. Everything later in the fascicle—the counting of mental factors, the analysis of their classes—is built on this sentence; if mental factors could exist apart from mind, or mind arise apart from mental factors, those numbers would mean nothing at all.

3. Why Mental Factors Fall into Five Classes—“Ground” Is a Word of Scope

Ask first: mental factors are dozens in number; why exactly five classes, and on what basis?

The treatise answers: “the dharmas that are mental factors fall provisionally into five classes. Which five? First, the factors of the great ground; second, the factors of the great wholesome ground; third, the factors of the great defiled ground; fourth, the factors of the great unwholesome ground; fifth, the factors of the small defiled ground.” And the pivot of the division lies in the single word “ground”: “ground means the place of activity; if this dharma is the place in which that dharma is active, this dharma is said to be the ground of that.”

What is most easily misunderstood are the two words “great ground.” It does not mean a vast expanse; it refers to mind as sovereign. Puguang separates three layers very finely—“great” alone refers to feeling and the other ten dharmas; “great ground” refers to mind as sovereign; “factors of the great ground” returns again to feeling and the other ten. So “factors of the great ground” means: those dharmas that appear upon ‘the ground in which the great dharmas are active.’ In the same way the great wholesome ground is the wholesome mind, the great defiled ground the defiled mind, the great unwholesome ground the unwholesome mind, and the small defiled ground a small portion of defiled minds.

A second point easily mistaken: the five classes are not a ranking of value nor a sorting into good and bad. They are divided by scope of appearance. Puguang has a very important sentence here: “following this treatise now, the factors of the great ground and the rest are established and rejected each by a single sense. This is the treatise’s own capacity, and is not a matter of anyone’s interpretation.” The masters of old divided the five classes by five senses, by eight, by nine (Shentai’s commentary records all these numbers of the old masters); this treatise uses one sense only—pervading or not pervading, exclusively or not exclusively—and with that the five classes are cleanly divided.

Where it lands: this is a methodology for a psychology of classification. It does not ask ‘is this mental factor good?’ but only ‘over how wide a scope does it appear?’ Once this layer is grasped, every “only” and every “pervading” in the five sections below stops being rhetoric and becomes a criterion.

4. The Ten Factors of the Great Ground—The Ten Faces Present in Every Thought

Ask first: which mental factors are indispensable to every mind, in every moment?

The treatise lists ten dharmas: “feeling is the three kinds of reception: painful, pleasant, and neither”; “perception is the taking up of the distinguishing characteristics of an object”; “volition is what causes mind to fabricate”; “contact arises from the coming together of faculty, object, and consciousness, and is able to make touch”; “desire is seeking after the work to be done”; “discernment is the ability to select among dharmas”; “mindfulness is holding the object clearly in mind without losing it”; “attention is what causes mind to be alert”; “resolve is the ability to endorse an object”; “concentration is mind’s being one-pointed upon a single object.”

There are four places in this section where a reader most easily goes astray. First, before listing the ten dharmas the treatise sets down two characters: “it is transmitted that the ten dharmas listed are present together and pervasively in every moment of mind.” The single word “transmitted” is read by the ancient masters with one voice as marking the author’s distance from the account he reports: Puguang judges outright in this very passage that “the Vaibhāṣikas transmit thus: the ten dharmas listed …” and that “the author of the treatise inclines to the Sautrāntikas and does not credit that all ten dharmas have separate entities, and therefore says ‘it is transmitted’”; Fabao likewise says, “it means that he is transmitting the Vaibhāṣika masters’ account, and therefore says ‘it is transmitted.’” This reading comes from the Tang commentaries and is not said by the treatise itself; in reading the Kośa one must stay alert to such wording. Second, “discernment” is not wisdom in the moral sense but merely selecting—which is why it can be present in one mind together with “doubt”: it is precisely because reckoning is made on both sides of a hesitation that the hesitation is what it is. Third, “concentration” is not the same as entering an absorption; Yuanhui explains it as “concentration, here rendered ‘even holding,’ evenly holds mind as it turns upon a single object, and holds the mental factors too, being named from what is strongest, namely mind”—it is present even in a scattered mind, only weakly. Fourth, the ten dharmas are not ten steps but ten aspects of one and the same moment; the treatise itself has forestalled this misreading: “the characteristics of mind and mental factors are subtle: it is hard enough to distinguish them one by one as they succeed one another, still more so those simultaneously present within one moment.”

Where it lands: these ten names give you a set of tools for taking your own mind apart. Take any present thought and you may ask: what does this thought receive—pain, pleasure, or neither (feeling)? What characteristic has it taken up (perception)? Where is mind being pushed (volition)? What has it met (contact)? What does it want (desire)? What is it distinguishing (discernment)? What is it holding in mind (mindfulness)? By what was it roused (attention)? What has it settled upon (resolve)? On which object does mind rest (concentration)?—ask the ten questions through and the thought lies open.

5. The Ten Factors of the Great Wholesome Ground—Ten Indicators of a Wholesome Mind

Ask first: on what grounds does a mind count as a wholesome mind?

The treatise answers: ten dharmas alone both ‘pervade wholesome minds and belong to wholesome minds alone’—confidence, heedfulness, pliancy, equanimity, conscience, shame, non-greed, non-hatred, non-harming, and diligence. One by one: “confidence is what makes mind clear and settled,” or else it is “the immediate acceptance and endorsement of the truths, the jewels, and karma and its results”; heedfulness is “the cultivating of wholesome dharmas and the keeping apart from unwholesome dharmas,” and what is called cultivating is “the unwavering focus upon what is wholesome”; pliancy is “mind’s workability”; equanimity is “mind’s evenness, its being without alertness”; non-greed and non-hatred are called the two roots; non-harming is “the absence of harm and distress”; diligence has for its nature “the making of mind vigorous.”

Confidence is most easily read as ‘believing in some object.’ The first sense the treatise gives is not an object but a state—making mind clear and settled. Yuanhui offers a very good simile for it: “confidence is clarifying; as a water-clearing gem can clear turbid water, so the gem of confidence in mind makes mind clear and settled.” Puguang cites the same simile more fully from the Entrance into Abhidharma: “as a water-clearing gem placed in a pool makes all the turbid and foul water at once clear, so the gem of confidence within the pool of mind at once expels all mind’s turbidity and foulness.”—Confidence is that gem, not one of the things floating in the pool.

A second point easily mistaken: “equanimity” is not indifference and not coldness but mind’s evenness; and that it should be present in one mind together with “attention” (which has alertness) the treatise itself finds hard, and so sets out a question and answer expressly: “how can it be said that within one mind there is alertness and the absence of alertness? For attention and equanimity arise in association.” The reply is “this one has alertness, upon that one there is none; the two being thus quite distinct, what conflict can there be?”—alertness belongs to attention, non-alertness to equanimity, each upon its own entity, not contending upon one and the same entity.

A third point easily mistaken: the missing third wholesome root, non-delusion, is absent not because non-delusion is not a wholesome root. The treatise says so plainly: “the wholesome root non-delusion has discernment for its nature, and so has already been stated above among the factors of the great ground and is not stated a second time as a factor of the great wholesome ground.” Its entity is discernment, and discernment is already among the factors of the great ground; it is not established twice.

Where it lands: these ten words may be taken as a checklist. Is mind clear (confidence)? Is it on guard (heedfulness)? Are body and mind workable (pliancy)? Does it lean (equanimity)? Does it know disgrace before itself (conscience)? Does it know fear of wrongdoing (shame)? Unsticking (non-greed), unvexed (non-hatred), not harming others (non-harming)? Is effort being put out (diligence)?—only with all ten present is it a wholesome mind; lacking one, that thought is not a complete wholesome one.

6. The Six Factors of the Great Defiled Ground—The Ground Tone Common to Every Defiled Mind

Ask first: greedy mind, hating mind, mind of wrong view—whatever is defiled, what is its common ground tone?

The treatise answers with only six: “delusion, heedlessness, indolence, lack of confidence, torpor, and restlessness are constant and belong to defiled minds alone.” Delusion is ignorance, absence of cognition, absence of manifestation; heedlessness is precisely what heedfulness counteracts; indolence is precisely what diligence counteracts; lack of confidence is precisely what confidence counteracts; torpor the treatise defines by citing the root treatise—“heaviness of body and of mind, unworkability of body and of mind”; restlessness “makes mind unable to be still.”

There is an apparent contradiction here that must be untied. The root Abhidharma says there are ten factors of the great defiled ground and does not include torpor; this treatise says six and adds torpor—it looks like both a subtraction and an addition. The author of the treatise answers without ceremony: “Beloved of the gods! You now know only the letter and do not grasp the intent.” (“Beloved of the gods” is a westerners’ jesting term for a fool; both Puguang and Shentai record the idiom.) Where is the intent? In this: that among those ten, lost mindfulness, distracted mind, incorrect knowing, improper attention, and wrong resolve are simply the defiled portion of the factors of the great ground—defiled mindfulness is called lost mindfulness, defiled concentration distracted mind, defiled discernment incorrect knowing, and defiled attention and resolve improper attention and wrong resolve. Having already been stated among the factors of the great ground, they are not to be established a second time. So four were not subtracted; five that were duplicates were put back in their places.

A second point easily mistaken: torpor being spoken of as “bodily.” The treatise sets the question, “this is a mental factor; how then is it called bodily?” and answers itself, “it is said as ‘bodily feeling’ is said, and so there is no fault”—feeling is properly a mental factor and is called bodily feeling when associated with the five consciousnesses; so it is with torpor. “Bodily” is said with reference to the consciousness it is associated with, and does not mean that it is form.

A third point easily mistaken lies in the closing passage. Some maintain that torpor ought to have been included and was not because it conforms to concentration; the author of the treatise presses: “who is of the mode of torpor and not of restlessness? Who is of the mode of restlessness and not of torpor?”—the two never operate singly. The other side falls back on ‘mode is said according to what predominates.’ The author of the treatise’s conclusion is of the first importance: “granted that ‘mode’ is said according to the predominance of operation, the establishing of a ground-factor must be made in dependence on a dharma that has its own entity, and so it is only as six that this ground-factor holds good.” To say ‘such a person is of the mode of torpor’ may be said according to what predominates, but establishing a ‘ground-factor’ must rest on a dharma with its own entity—description may be rough; institution may not.

Where it lands: in practice there are only six permanent residents to watch. Greed, hatred, and the rest are guests, coming and going; these six are the hosts, and the moment mind is defiled they are there.

7. The Two Factors of the Great Unwholesome Ground—A Sense of Disgrace Is the Last Door

Ask first: not every defiled mind is evil (an obscured-indeterminate mind associated with the view of self, for instance); what, then, raises “defiled” to “evil”?

The treatise answers with only two: “only two mental factors arise together with every unwholesome mind, namely non-conscience and shamelessness, and so these two alone are called factors of this ground.”

This section is extremely short and is for that reason most easily passed over lightly. The point is that “pervading” and “only” hold at the same time: non-conscience and shamelessness both pervade every unwholesome mind and belong to unwholesome minds alone. The six factors of the great defiled ground above pervade every defiled mind but are not only unwholesome (an obscured-indeterminate mind is defiled too); rage and the rest are only unwholesome but do not pervade. Among all the mental factors, only these two satisfy both conditions at once. That is why a class holding only two dharmas is nonetheless set up as a class of its own—not to make up numbers, but as what the criterion forces.

A second point easily mistaken: “non-conscience and shamelessness” is not ‘bad manners.’ The treatise will explain them fully below at Root Stanza 33, and here says only that “the characteristics of these two dharmas will be analyzed below.” And precisely because they are the necessary and sufficient mark of an unwholesome mind, they say something in return: conscience and shame within a wholesome mind are not an added refinement but the threshold on which a wholesome mind stands at all.

Where it lands: every evil deed, traced to its innermost point, must pass the gate of ‘not feeling disgrace, not feeling fear.’ Hold that gate and an evil mind cannot arise—which is why conscience and shame are called in scripture the two bright dharmas of the world, and that is not a figure of speech.

8. The Ten Factors of the Small Defiled Ground—Why They Are Called “Small”

Ask first: rage, concealment, avarice, envy, vexation, harmfulness, resentment, flattery, deception, and self-intoxication are plainly fierce enough—why are they called “small”?

The treatise gives three conditions in answer: “dharmas of this class are abandoned through cultivation alone, arise on the ground of mental consciousness, are associated with ignorance, and operate each separately, and are therefore called factors of the small defiled ground.” Yuanhui sets them out as three senses: “there are three senses: first, abandoned through cultivation alone; second, arising on the ground of mental consciousness and associated with ignorance; third, operating each separately.”

“Small” does not mean slight; it means small in scope. This is the section’s first correction. Set against the factors of the great defiled ground it becomes clear: those six pervade every defiled mind, while these ten are associated only with “a small portion of defiled minds.” The treatise says so in establishing the name: “any dharma here that belongs to the small defiled ground is called a factor of the small defiled ground, that is, a dharma arising together with a small portion of defiled minds.”

A second point easily mistaken is “operating each separately.” It means that only one arises at a time—when rage arises resentment does not arise with it, when avarice arises envy does not. This condition will be used directly later in counting mental factors: the class associated with rage and the rest is “twenty as in the independent class, plus one of rage and the rest” precisely because only one is added.

A third point easily mistaken: why are pride and doubt not counted among the factors of the small defiled ground? Puguang, following the treatise’s own criterion, states it cleanly: “following this treatise now, the ten factors of the small defiled ground are established and rejected by a single sense, namely being abandoned through cultivation alone.” Pride extends to abandonment through both seeing and cultivation, and doubt is abandoned through seeing alone; neither fits “abandoned through cultivation alone.” Regret, though abandoned through cultivation alone, extends to the wholesome quality and is not associated with ignorance alone. Lacking any one of the three senses puts a dharma out, and so there are only ten.

Where it lands: since they operate each separately, they can be counteracted one by one—these ten are not a tangle but ten knots that can be untied one at a time. The treatise also announces that “these dharmas will be analyzed at length below among the secondary afflictions,” giving only the coordinates here.

9. How Many Mental Factors Are Actually Present in a Single Thought

Ask first: after all this talk of classes, in one concrete thought of the desire realm, how many mental factors are present at once?

The treatise divides desire-realm mind into five classes and reports the count of each: a wholesome mind necessarily has twenty-two (the ten factors of the great ground, the ten of the great wholesome ground, applied thought, and sustained thought), and twenty-three when regret is present; the unwholesome class associated with independent ignorance and the class associated with view have twenty each (the ten of the great ground, the six of the great defiled ground, the two of the great unwholesome ground, applied thought, and sustained thought); the classes of the four afflictions greed, hatred, pride, and doubt, of the secondary afflictions such as rage, and of unwholesome regret have twenty-one each; the obscured-indeterminate class has eighteen; the unobscured-indeterminate class twelve; and sleep, extending to all three qualities, adds one to whichever class it is in.

The first correction is that ‘view does not add to the count.’ An unwholesome mind associated with view plainly has wrong view in addition—why is it still twenty? The treatise answers, “it does not become twenty-one because view is added, since view is spoken of as a difference of operation belonging to discernment among the ten factors of the great ground”—view is not an eleventh dharma but a difference of operation of discernment. The same point explains why the obscured-indeterminate class (associated with the view of self and the extreme view) likewise has only eighteen.

The second correction is in the word “regret.” Regret is neither ‘doing evil’ nor the mode of repenting itself. The treatise gives three layers of explanation: naming from the object (“it should be known that the name regret is here established from the dharma that takes an evil deed done as its object, that is, the nature that regrets in taking an evil deed as its object”—as the concentration that takes emptiness as its object is called the emptiness door of liberation, and the non-greed that takes the unclean as its object is called the unclean); naming from the support (as when it is said that all villages, towns, and lands are assembling, though what assemble are people); and provisionally setting the name of a cause upon the entity of a result (as when the six sense fields of contact are called karma done in the past). Yuanhui states the first sense most plainly: “the evil deed done is the object, not the repenting; repenting is now called ‘the evil deed done’ because it is named from its object.” And a thing not done may also be the object of regret—“as when in repenting one says, ‘I did not formerly do such work; this is my regret.’”

The third correction is in “independent ignorance.” It does not mean ‘an ignorance not shared with others’ but solitary ignorance—“in this class of mind there is only ignorance, without the remaining afflictions such as greed.”

Where it lands: this section turns mind from a mass of feeling into a table that can be counted. Its teaching value is not in memorizing the numbers but in establishing a habit—asking ‘how many mental factors are in this thought’ is a question with an answer. As for the masters abroad who grant that regret extends to the indeterminate and so make thirteen, the treatise records this faithfully without adjudicating, and that too is a lesson in how to read.

10. The Reduction of Mental Factors in the Upper Realms—A Map for Cultivating Absorption

Ask first: on entering an absorption, do mental factors become more or fewer?

The treatise answers with a reduction: “in the first meditative absorption, of the mental factors stated above, what is unwholesome alone, together with regret and sleep, is removed, and the rest are all present.” “What is unwholesome alone” means hatred, together with the seven small afflictions such as rage apart from flattery, deception, and self-intoxication, and non-conscience and shamelessness besides. The intermediate absorption further removes applied thought. From the second absorption upward as far as the formless realm, “sustained thought and the rest” is further removed—the word “and the rest” removing flattery and deception.

First point easily mistaken: reduction does not mean mind grows weaker. What is dropped are mental factors that cannot exist on that level; mind’s functioning is not pared away. Puguang states the reasons very clearly: “moistened by concentration, there are no unwholesome dharmas such as the affliction of hatred, and so no unwholesome; there is no sorrow faculty, and so no regret; there is no food taken in portions, and so no sleep.” Yuanhui makes the two correspondences even plainer: “as for removing regret, regret is associated with the sorrow faculty, and the form realm is free of sorrow, and so there is no regret. As for removing sleep, the form realm has no food taken in portions, and so there is no sleep.”—Every item that falls away has its own reason, and none is laid down arbitrarily.

Second point easily mistaken: flattery and deception “reaching at most as high as the Brahmā heaven” is not a slur upon the Brahmā King. The treatise cites an extremely vivid passage of scripture: the monk Aśvajit asked the Great Brahmā King, ‘at what station do these four great elements cease without remainder?’, the Brahmā King did not know and before the whole assembly “answered evasively and confusedly: here in this Brahmā assembly I am the Great Brahmā, the sovereign, the maker, the transformer, the producer, the nourisher, the father of all,” and having said this drew the man outside the assembly, “drew him outside the assembly, spoke flatteringly, made a shamefaced apology, and told him to go back and ask the Buddha.” This passage is there to establish one thing—so long as a structure of ‘mutual dependence among the multitude,’ of ruler and subject, higher and lower, remains, there is still room for flattery and deception; above the second absorption there is no such structure, and so these two mental factors are absent.

Where it lands: this is a topographical map for cultivating absorption. It tells the practitioner that certain afflictions are not cut off by counteraction but have nowhere to rest once a given level is reached. Conversely, one still in the desire realm who wants the mental character of the first absorption should look at whether hatred, regret, and sleep are still present.

11. Non-Conscience and Shamelessness, Love and Respect—The Mind toward Persons and the Mind toward Dharmas

Ask first: where exactly do conscience and shame differ? And love and respect?

The treatise gives two explanations of non-conscience and shamelessness. The first divides them by object: “to have, toward qualities and toward those who possess them, no reverence and no esteem, nothing that gives one pause, and nothing to which one submits, is called non-conscience”—its object being qualities and those who have them; “a dharma reproved and rejected by the good is called wrongdoing, and to see nothing to fear in such wrongdoing is called shamelessness”—its object being wrongdoing and its result. The second is that of “certain other masters”: feeling no disgrace in regard to oneself is called non-conscience, and feeling none in regard to others is called shamelessness.

First point easily mistaken: “seeing no fear” is not about seeing or not seeing. The treatise sets out a very fine question and answer: if it is ‘seeing and yet not fearing,’ then what is shown must be wrong cognition; if it is ‘not seeing its fearsome result,’ then what is shown must be ignorance—fault on either side. The author of the treatise’s reply is: “this phrase does not show either seeing or not seeing … it shows that there is a dharma, a secondary affliction, which is the cause of those two, and this is called shamelessness.” The sentence is meant to point out that another dharma is present, the proximate cause of wrong cognition and of ignorance, and is not describing seeing or not seeing.

Second point easily mistaken: love is not the same as greed. The treatise says “love is loving delight, and its entity is confidence,” and at once divides it in two: “the defiled is greed, as in love for wife and children; the undefiled is confidence, as in love for teachers and elders.” It then makes four cases: confidence taking the truths of suffering and origin as its object is confidence and not love (accepting them as suffering, yet not delighting in them); every defiled love is love and not confidence; confidence taking the truths of cessation and the path as its object is both; whatever remains is the fourth case. One and the same word “love” must be read differently defiled and undefiled.

Third point easily mistaken: love and respect existing “in the desire and form realms only” does not mean that confidence and conscience are absent in the formless realm. The treatise sets and answers the objection itself: “love and respect are of two kinds, those taking dharmas and those taking a pudgala as object; those taking dharmas as object exist in all three realms. What is meant here are those taking a pudgala as object, and so they exist in the desire and form realms and not in the formless realm.”—Only love and respect toward persons are bounded by realm; those toward dharmas are not.

Where it lands: the treatise here splits “toward persons” and “toward dharmas” into two tracks, and with regard to persons makes four cases—love without respect toward wife and children, respect without love toward another’s teacher, both toward one’s own teacher and parents, and the fourth case for the remainder. These four cases are not a classifying game but a reminder: respect and love can each appear alone, and whether a relationship has respect in it and whether it has love in it are two separate questions.

12. Applied and Sustained Thought, Pride and Self-Intoxication—One “Not Admissible” and One ‘Toward Whom’

Ask first: applied thought is mind’s coarseness and sustained thought its fineness; coarse and fine are contrary, so how can they be in one and the same mind?

The treatise records two masters’ explanations. The first offers a simile: clarified butter floating on cold water with a blazing sun shining upon it, so that “by the working of water and sun the butter neither melts nor congeals”—so too with a single mind, which by applied thought is not too fine and by sustained thought not too coarse. The second says that applied and sustained thought are verbal formations, citing the sūtra, “there is speech only where there are applied and sustained thought,” the coarse being called applied thought and the fine sustained thought.

What matters most in this section is that the author of the treatise lets neither master pass. Against the first: water and sun are only the cause of congealing and melting, and “the entity of the sun is not congealing or melting”—so applied and sustained thought would be only the cause of coarseness and fineness and not their entity. Again, coarse and fine are established relatively, realms and levels being compared high against low, so that “even the summit of existence would have applied and sustained thought.” Against the second: if there really were two separate kinds of entity, coarse and fine, there would be no conflict in reason; “but there are no separate kinds of entity, and so a conflict does follow, for within a single kind of entity high and low cannot arise at the same time.” He closes in one sentence: “from this it should be known that the two dharmas applied and sustained thought definitely may not be held to be associated with one and the same mind.” When someone cites the sūtra’s “the first meditative absorption is complete with five limbs” in reply, the treatise answers, “‘complete with five limbs’ is said with reference to a level, not a single moment.”

The point easily mistaken lies here: do not read applied and sustained thought as ‘thinking’ and “concentrating.” What the treatise fixes is the two natures of coarse and fine, not two functions; and it is precisely because they are only coarse and fine that the author of the treatise can overthrow the position by ‘established relatively.’

Pride and self-intoxication are another pair. “Pride is the nature of mind exalting itself against another, weighing the difference in the qualities and classes of self and other”; “self-intoxication is the nature of mind grown haughty and unrestrained, preceded by attachment to what belongs to oneself.” The difference lies in a single word: pride is toward another, self-intoxication toward oneself. Pride requires an object of comparison; self-intoxication does not—attachment to one’s own lineage or bodily strength is enough. The treatise also records another master’s simile: “just as the difference of elated exaltation produced by liquor is called drunkenness, so the difference of elated exaltation produced by greed is called self-intoxication.”

Where it lands: read together, these two pairs teach one and the same thing—in reading a treatise, attend to the words “some explain thus,” “certain other masters say,” “some say.” In this section four masters’ accounts stand together and the author of the treatise chooses among them plainly; without discriminating these markers, one takes some one master’s words for the treatise’s settled doctrine.

13. Mind, Thought, and Consciousness Are One in Entity; Association Has Five Senses

Ask first: are mind, thought, and consciousness three things, or three names for one thing?

The treatise answers with the utmost brevity: “because it gathers and gives rise it is called mind; because it deliberates it is called thought; because it discerns it is called consciousness.” It records a second account as well: “because of the various differences of pure and impure elements it is called mind; because this very thing serves as the support of another it is called thought; because it is what does the depending it is called consciousness.” The conclusion is that “although the senses conveyed by the three names mind, thought, and consciousness differ, the entity is one.”

The same reasoning is then carried once more: mind and mental factors likewise have four names—having a support (relying on a supporting faculty), having an object (taking up an object), having a mode of apprehension (raising up a mode of apprehension upon the distinctions among the classes of the object), and associated (evenly conjoined). And “associated” has five senses: “mind and mental factors are even in five senses and are therefore said to be associated—support, object, mode of apprehension, time, and entity are all even.”

First point easily mistaken: “one in entity” does not mean there is no division of labor. Each of the three names conveys its own sense; it is only that three entities are not set up. Shentai uses a tree simile for “gathering and giving rise”: “because it gathers and gives rise it is called mind, as a tree has a heart that can gather and give rise to branches, flowers, and fruit”—the heart of a tree is not another thing, and yet branches, flowers, and fruit come from it.

Second point easily mistaken: “mode of apprehension” is not “object.” This is the step most easily missed in this section. Puguang separates them with a mirror simile: “as a bright mirror facing many forms has them all appear on its face, what so appears is not what is illumined, and yet from the appearing of the image the mirror is said to illumine”—the image appearing on the mirror’s face is not the thing the mirror illumines; “what so appears is called the mode of apprehension.” Yuanhui puts it still more plainly: “as when mind and mental factors take a blue object, they all carry the image of blue upon them, and this characteristic upon consciousness is called the mode of apprehension.” The mode of apprehension is on the side of what apprehends; the object is on the other side.

Third point easily mistaken: “evenness of entity” is not equality of number. The treatise adds a sentence itself: “evenness of entity means that within one association, just as the entity of mind is one, so each of the mental factors is likewise one.” The sense is that each is only one—within a single association there will not be two feelings or two perceptions.

Where it lands: evenness in five senses is the Sarvāstivāda definitional formula for “association.” Whenever one meets ‘such a dharma is associated with such a dharma,’ one may go back and test it by these five: same support, same object, same mode of apprehension, same time, one of each.

14. The Class That Is Neither Form nor Mind

Ask first: acquisition, non-acquisition, commonality, and the rest are neither form nor mind—what are they to be counted as?

The treatise answers: “dharmas such as these are not associated with mind and are not of the nature of form and the rest, yet are included in the aggregate of formations, and are therefore called formations not associated with mind.” The stanza first lists them in general: “the formations not associated with mind are acquisition, non-acquisition, commonality, the result of non-perception, the two absorptions, the life faculty, the marks, the name-bodies and the rest.” Yuanhui lists all fourteen names: acquisition, non-acquisition, commonality, the result of non-perception, the absorption without perception, the absorption of cessation, the life faculty, arising, abiding, change, cessation, name-body, phrase-body, syllable-body.

First point easily mistaken: “not associated” does not mean ‘nothing to do with mind.’ It means not associated with mind—that is, not possessing the five kinds of evenness of the previous section. They are still established upon the stations of form and mind and are still among conditioned dharmas; they simply do not fall in the list of mental factors.

Second point easily mistaken: do not read them as unconditioned. The treatise has already said here that they are “included in the aggregate of formations,” hence conditioned; the unconditioned is the fifth class, and the fascicle said at its opening that “the unconditioned has no arising and is not discussed here.”

Third point easily mistaken: this fascicle only enumerates in general and does not explain them all. Having listed the fourteen, the treatise at once narrows: “among them the characteristics of acquisition and non-acquisition will be analyzed for the present”—of the fourteen only the first two are treated, the rest being left to the next fascicle. The word “for the present” must be seen.

Where it lands: this class of dharmas is the most questioned member of the Sarvāstivāda system—it establishes ‘having or not having,’ ‘being of the same class or not,’ and ‘being alive or not,’ these relations and states, as independent dharmas. And precisely because it is the most questioned, the fascicle will next spend an extremely long stretch defending only the first of them, “acquisition.” Understand acquisition and you understand the legislative motive of this whole class.

15. What “Acquisition” Is—Having Is Set Up as a Dharma

Ask first: when one says ‘I have the precepts,’ ‘I have discernment,’ what is that “have”?

The treatise answers: “acquisition is of two kinds: first, what has never been acquired, or has been acquired and lost, being now obtained; second, what has been acquired and not lost, which is possession.” Coming into it now is called obtaining, keeping without losing is called possession, and the two together are called acquisition; non-acquisition is the contrary. As to where it is found: “in one’s own continuum and in the two cessations.”

First point easily mistaken: acquisition is not the dharma acquired. Acquisition is another dharma, and it is what makes some dharma “belong to” some continuum. That is why the treatise asks “in which dharmas are acquisition and non-acquisition found,” and not ‘which dharma is acquisition.’

Second point easily mistaken: the scope is extremely strict. Only within one’s own continuum—“not in another’s continuum, since no one can possess a dharma belonging to another’s body”; not upon what is insentient—“not upon what is not a continuum, since no one can possess a dharma of what is insentient.” Among unconditioned dharmas too, only cessation through discernment and cessation independent of discernment have acquisition, and space does not: “there is definitely no one who possesses space, and so no acquisition is spoken of with regard to space; and since there is no acquisition, neither is there non-acquisition.” The reason is that this school “holds acquisition and non-acquisition to be established as the reverse of one another”—where there is no acquisition, non-acquisition cannot even be spoken of.

Third point easily mistaken: every sentient being possesses cessation independent of discernment. The treatise cites the Abhidharma treatise: apart from the noble one still fully bound in the first moment of the path of seeing and every fully bound ordinary being, “the rest of sentient beings possess cessation through discernment”; whereas of cessation independent of discernment “there is no sentient being that does not possess it”—since in every moment some dharma, for want of a condition, will never arise.

Where it lands: this section does something very large—it turns “having” from a descriptive term into a real dharma. Afflictions cut off, precepts acquired, cessation realized: in the Sarvāstivāda these are no longer merely ways of speaking, but each has an “acquisition” bearing it. Grasp this motive and the long dispute of the next section carries its weight.

16. The Dispute over a Separate Thing—Two Schools in One Passage and the Author’s Double Endorsement

Ask first: on what ground is it said that there is a separate thing called “acquisition”?

The Sarvāstivādins first adduce the word of the noble ones: “because the sūtra so says. As the sūtra says: a noble one, with regard to those ten dharmas of one beyond training, by their arising, by their acquisition, by their possession, has cut off the five limbs.” The Sautrāntikas at once press back: then how is ‘there is a wheel-turning monarch who possesses the seven treasures’ to be taken? The wheel treasure and the jewel treasure are insentient, and the elephant, the horse, and the queen belong to another’s continuum—are these possessed too? The Sarvāstivādins fall back on “sovereignty”: “here sovereignty is spoken of as possession, that is, the wheel-turning monarch has sovereign power over those seven treasures and sets them in motion as he pleases.” The Sautrāntikas press one more step: since “sovereignty” suffices there, why must a separate thing be posited elsewhere?

The Sautrāntikas then shift to a refutation by means of knowledge: “the acquisition you posit has no entity that can be known, as color and sound and the rest have, or greed and hatred and the rest; and no operation that can be known, as the eye and ear and the rest have; therefore it is not admissible that there be a separate thing called acquisition.”—It cannot be seen, and it cannot be inferred. Next they refute the claim that ‘acquisition is the cause of arising’: if acquisition were the cause of arising, the unconditioned, which does not arise, should have no acquisition; when the level changes or defilement is left behind, the dharma has no acquisition, and how then is it to arise in future; if a co-arising acquisition is the cause of arising, what work is left for arising and the arising of arising among the four characteristics; an insentient dharma, having no acquisition, should then never arise; and for one fully bound there should be no difference in the appearing of afflictions of the lower, middling, and higher grades, since acquisition has no differences. The Sarvāstivādins fall back upon acquisition as “the cause by which differences are established”—without acquisition there would be no distinguishing an ordinary being from a noble one. The Sautrāntikas answer that the difference is in the supporting body and not in acquisition—“causing the supporting body to be transformed and made other than it was,” “just as a seed burnt by fire is transformed and made other than before and has no power to produce,” and therefore “both of these are merely provisional and not real.”

At this point the word “seed” is forced out: “what dharma here is called a seed? It is the capability—serially transmitted or immediately proximate—that name and form have with respect to producing their own result; and this is constituted by continuum, transformation, and distinctiveness.” The treatise even glosses the three senses word by word—transformation is “the nature of being other before and after within a continuum,” continuum is “the formations of the three times in their causal and resultant nature,” and distinctiveness is “the capability of producing a result without interval.”

The most important step is at the close. The Vaibhāṣikas hold firmly that both are “separate things, real and not provisional,” and the author of the treatise sets down a double endorsement: “thus both roads are well stated. Why? Because it does not conflict with reason; because it is what my own school holds.”—‘Does not conflict with reason’ speaks of the Sautrāntikas; ‘what my own school holds’ speaks of the Sarvāstivādins.

A point easily mistaken: this passage is often read as ‘the author of the treatise has refuted the Sarvāstivādins.’ The text does not say so. What it gives is two reasons standing side by side, with the place of both schools set within one sentence. Just how far and to which side it leans is where the four later commentaries each expend their strength; it is not adjudicated here.

Where it lands: this is the passage in the whole fascicle most worth reading slowly. It exhibits a formal mode of debate—establish, object, retreat, object again, retreat again, endorse both. And “seed” appears here for the first time with a formal definition; how far it later traveled is another case; of this fascicle one need only remember that it was forced out in the search for an account of “having” that need not posit a real dharma.

17. The Five Gates of Difference in Acquisition—A General Formula of Analysis

Ask first: what quality is acquisition itself, to what time does it belong, to what realm is it bound?

The treatise answers with five gates. The gate of the three times: “dharmas of the three times each have three kinds of acquisition, that is, a past dharma has a past acquisition, a future acquisition, and a present acquisition,” and future and present likewise. The gate of the three qualities: “dharmas that are wholesome and the rest have acquisitions that are wholesome and the rest only.” The gate of realm affiliation: “a dharma bound to a realm has its acquisition in its own realm only,” while “an unbound dharma has acquisitions extending to four kinds”—the acquisitions of the three realms plus an acquisition without outflows. The gate of the three kinds of training: a dharma of training has an acquisition of training only, a dharma beyond training an acquisition beyond training only, and the acquisition of what is neither extends to three. The gate of the three modes of abandonment: dharmas abandoned through seeing and through cultivation have respectively such acquisitions, and the acquisition of a dharma not subject to abandonment extends to two.

First point easily mistaken: ‘acquisition takes its quality from what is acquired’ is not the only rule. Within the gate of realm affiliation the treatise already divides three ways: “the acquisition of cessation independent of discernment extends to all three realms; the acquisition of cessation through discernment belongs to the form and formless realms and is also without outflows; the acquisition of the truth of the path is without outflows alone.” Why the inconsistency? Because cessation through discernment has no operation of its own, and its acquisition is judged by the path that realizes it; cessation independent of discernment likewise has no operation, and its acquisition is judged by the supporting body; only the acquisition of a conditioned dharma is judged by the dharma acquired. Puguang sets these three side by side precisely to keep a reader from pushing one rule all the way through.

Second point easily mistaken: the stanza and the prose are not of equal extent. The stanza says only “neither of training nor beyond training, three; not subject to abandonment, two kinds,” while the prose sets out both the three kinds of training and the three modes of abandonment in full. This is not the prose saying more; it is the stanza being narrow in its letter—in reading a stanza one must know what it has left out.

Where it lands: the three times, the three qualities, realm affiliation, the three kinds of training, the three modes of abandonment—these five gates are the general formula of analysis used throughout the Kośa. Here they are demonstrated in full for the first time, and thereafter every dharma one meets may be put to the same five questions.

18. Why the Acquisition of the Indeterminate Can Only Arise Together with It

Ask first: since it is said that dharmas of the three times each have acquisitions of the three times, is this so of every dharma?

The treatise at once discriminates: “the acquisition of what is unobscured-indeterminate arises only together with it, neither earlier nor later, because its force is feeble.” If the dharma is past the acquisition is past, if present the acquisition is present. But there are exceptions: “save for the two superknowledges of the eye and ear and what is capable of transformation”—the discernment of the divine eye and divine ear and the mind capable of transformation, being “of strong force and accomplished through the distinctions of preparatory practice,” though unobscured-indeterminate have acquisitions preceding, following, and arising together with them. The field of craft and the mode of deportment, if practiced to an extreme degree, may perhaps be so too. The acquisition of obscured-indeterminate manifest form likewise arises only together with it, since “although there may be a higher grade, it still cannot give rise to nonmanifest form, and so its force is feeble.” Wholesome and unwholesome form bound to the desire realm have “no acquisition preceding,” only a co-arising and a following acquisition.

First point easily mistaken: “save for the two superknowledges and transformation” does not mean that the two superknowledges are not indeterminate. They remain unobscured-indeterminate; it is only that their force is strong, and so they are an exception with regard to the three times of acquisition.

Second point easily mistaken: “force” is a lever of explanation and not a mystifying word. The treatise uses it to divide two kinds of indeterminate: what arises spontaneously (the maturation-born and the like) is feeble in force, and what is cultivated by preparatory practice (the two superknowledges and transformation, and craft and deportment practiced to an extreme) is strong. The difference of strong and weak falls upon ‘whether it was got by effort.’

Where it lands: this section demonstrates one of the treatise’s techniques—first establish a general rule, then discriminate the exceptions one by one, giving a reason for each exception. This way of writing, ‘general rule plus discrimination,’ will recur again and again in the chapters on karma and on the latent tendencies.

19. Non-Acquisition, Ordinary-Being Status, and That “Infinite Regress”

Ask first: is an ordinary being an ordinary being because of something added or something lacking?

The treatise’s answer is: something lacking. “Because it is granted that the non-acquisition of the noble path is what is called ordinary-being status.” Ordinary-being status is not a positive quality; it is the non-acquisition of the noble path—the “not having” of not having obtained the noble dharmas, set up as a dharma. The treatise cites the root treatise in evidence: “what is ordinary-being status? It is not obtaining the noble dharmas,” and adds that “‘not obtaining’ is precisely another name for non-acquisition.”

The differences of non-acquisition itself are also stated by gates: in the three qualities, “every non-acquisition is included within the unobscured-indeterminate quality alone”; in the three times, “past and future each have three kinds, that is, a present dharma definitely has no present non-acquisition”—because a dharma that is present must be one acquired and must have an acquisition; in realm affiliation, dharmas of the three realms and unbound dharmas “each have three non-acquisitions,” determined by the supporting body.

First point easily mistaken: “not obtaining all” and the word “wholly.” Someone asks: the non-obtaining of which noble dharmas counts? The treatise answers, “the non-obtaining of all, since no distinction is stated,” and explains that “these words ‘not obtaining’ express separation from obtaining”—were it otherwise, the Buddhas too, who do not possess the noble dharmas of the śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha lineages, would have to be called ordinary beings. Someone else says the root treatise ought to add the word “wholly”; the treatise answers that it need not: “the sense of ‘wholly’ is already contained in this one phrase, just as when it is said that this class feeds on water and feeds on wind.”—To say that a class of beings feeds on water and wind is understood as feeding on them alone, though “wholly” is not said.

Second point easily mistaken: what the author of the treatise endorses here is the Sautrāntikas. A second master says that ordinary-being status is the non-obtaining of receptivity to the cognition of dharma concerning suffering and of the dharmas arising with it; the author of the treatise remarks, “if so, the restatement is made to no purpose,” and immediately says, “what the Sautrāntika masters say is better,” recording their sense: “the difference of station within a continuum in which noble dharmas have never yet arisen is what is called ordinary-being status.”—This is a choice stated outright in the text, not a later inference.

Third point easily mistaken: the “infinite regress” is not really infinite. If acquisition has a further acquisition and non-acquisition a further non-acquisition, is that not endless? The treatise answers that it is not, “since it is granted that acquisitions may reciprocally cause one another to be possessed”—when a dharma arises, three dharmas arise together: “first, the root dharma; second, the acquisition of the dharma; third, the acquisition of the acquisition”; the acquisition of the dharma causes the root dharma and the acquisition of the acquisition to be possessed, and the acquisition of the acquisition causes the acquisition of the dharma to be possessed, and so the chain closes upon itself. Puguang separates the two names: “because it is the acquisition of the dharma it is called the acquisition of the dharma, which is the major acquisition; the acquisition of the major acquisition is called the acquisition of the acquisition, which is the minor acquisition.” At the second moment six dharmas, at the third eighteen, and “in this way the acquisitions increase further and further one after another.” The treatise closes with a sentence: acquisitions, “because they are without resistance, can contain one another. Were it not so, space would not contain the acquisitions of a single sentient being, still less those of a second and the rest.” Shentai here offers a very beautiful simile—like a fine autumn mist filling all ten directions.

Where it lands: this section sets the difference between ordinary being and noble one upon a “not having”; and the Sautrāntikas restate the same matter as a difference of station within a continuum, which the author of the treatise endorses. One and the same question, two ways of setting it up: one must legislate a dharma, the other need only state a station. This contrast is the longest thread the fascicle leaves for its later readers.

Further Resonances: A Mirror of the Four Commentaries and of Both Parties

The above is the sense of this fascicle in itself. What follows illuminates it from the side with the ancient masters’ commentaries and with a treatise of the same lineage—a mirror is not the treatise, only a change of reading upon the same fascicle.

The division of labor among the four commentaries. Puguang’s Record of the Kośa explains lemma by lemma, most fully, and never fails to record an alternative account; Fabao’s Commentary on the Kośa is fond of fourfold discriminations and does not shrink from criticizing his predecessors; Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary on the Kośa has the clearest outline and the similes handiest for a beginner; Shentai’s Commentary on the Kośa numbers each passage, has the finest outline, and from time to time takes Mahāyāna terminology for comparison. All four mark this fascicle as the chapter’s second major section, and only Fabao and Shentai state outright its extent of twenty-seven stanzas.

The place where the four commentaries differ most fiercely is an old case. The treatise says that a minute aggregate of the desire realm ‘has eight entities without sound,’ while the Treatise on the Development of Wisdom says that sound is constantly possessed in the desire and form realms—how are the two texts to be reconciled? In earlier times Master Nian took a compromise solution; Shentai’s commentary denounces it as a gross error; Puguang records the quarrel and judges for himself that “examined now, the two worthies are each partly right and partly wrong.” Fabao in turn refutes them both, saying that “Master Tai and Master Guang wrongly construe Master Nian’s intent,” and asserting that “since Master Nian’s sense accords with the treatise’s text, Masters Tai and Guang refute him erroneously.” Among the four, the divergence is deepest here. The three judgments are recorded together, without a verdict of right and wrong.

On whether a minute aggregate is provisional or real, the four are likewise not agreed. Puguang preserves the distinction of the two “minutes” and judges that this treatise speaks on the basis of the minute that is an aggregate of form; Fabao judges outright that “of the two explanations the later is the better”; Yuanhui does not touch on provisional or real and explains only that “‘minute’ has the sense of fine”; Shentai cites the discussion of entity and function in the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle and makes no judgment. So too with the passage on increase of entity and increase of operation: Puguang records that the Correct Principle takes increase of entity while this treatise takes increase of operation; Fabao rejects both—“yet examined closely, increase of entity and increase of operation have not exhausted the reasoning”—and adds, “hence it is known that the nature of dharmas is indeterminate as conditions vary.”

The assigning of the passage on pliancy also has divergent readings. At “it should be known that the bodily pliancy spoken of here is the body’s workability,” Puguang judges outright that “many masters explain this text as the Sarvāstivādins’ answer; this explanation is erroneous”; Fabao sets down his own note on the Sautrāntika objection—“examined now, this objection is not quite to the point”; Shentai construes the whole passage as nine rounds of question and answer between the Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas; Yuanhui passes over the passage.

The number of counteracting pairs is another set of divergences. Shentai’s commentary records the old masters’ account that ‘eight of the counterparts have entity and two do not,’ rejects it as untrue, and maintains that “all ten counterparts have entity,” citing the old translation of the Kośa in evidence. Puguang and Fabao each draw up a large table of ten direct counterparts and eleven indirect ones; the dharma-headings of the two tables agree entirely, save that Fabao writes “the counterpart of restlessness is equanimity as a formation” while Puguang writes “the counterpart of restlessness is equanimity.”

Saṅghabhadra’s refutations are concentrated in four places. First, the refutation of the Elder of the Sautrāntika forerunners on ‘the great ground being three only’—the Elder maintained that the sūtra speaks only of feeling, perception, and volition arising together, so that the factors of the great ground are three only; Saṅghabhadra denounces this as “the Elder’s statement that the great ground is three only is exceedingly deluded and mistaken,” and cites scripture to prove that desire and the rest really have separate entities. Second, the defense of the contrariety of attention and equanimity—Saṅghabhadra explains that “equanimity, like holding a balance, is even in advancing and halting,” and then says that “the objection of the Sūtra-master, that having alertness and being without alertness make attention and equanimity mutually contrary, is thus well disposed of.” Third, the charge that Vasubandhu pressed a crosswise objection at non-conscience and shamelessness—“the Sūtra-master here mistakes their meaning and presses a crosswise objection.” Fourth, and with the greatest force, at acquisition and the seed: he answers that “the Sūtra-master here asks thus: on what ground is it known that there is a separate thing called acquisition,” and judges that “the Sūtra-master, though he says much here according to his own position, accomplishes nothing, for the seed he posits does not hold good in reason,” listing the seed’s alternative names one by one—accompanying element, perfuming, capability, non-loss, increase; and on ordinary-being status he says, “if ordinary-being status had no separate entity, this sūtra would be contradicted.” One meaning and two schools, recorded together with no verdict as to which prevails.

In Paramārtha’s older translation there are five differences in this fascicle worth viewing together. First, in the establishing of the five classes the two translations agree in number and order, and differ only in the names of the third and fourth (mental factors and mental dharmas; formations not associated with mind and the unassociated). Second, among the ten factors of the great ground the number of dharmas is the same while three names and the order of listing differ. Third, the two names non-conscience and shamelessness are interchanged in the two translations. Fourth, among the ten factors of the small defiled ground the number is the same, while no text states the matching of the individual names, which are listed without adjudication. Fifth, the times of non-acquisition—Xuanzang’s version reads “a present dharma definitely has no present non-acquisition,” while the older translation states the contrary; Puguang, Yuanhui, and Shentai all three mark the older translation outright as an error of translation, and Fabao offers no remark. The three judgments are recorded together; the weighing of the two translations does not belong in this place.

The comparison of the seventy-five dharmas with the hundred dharmas the ancient masters made for themselves. Fabao under the ten factors of the great ground draws the comparison outright—“the position of the Sarvāstivādins is that ten dharmas are omnipresent, while in the Mahāyāna only five are omnipresent”; and under the factors of the small defiled ground he records the difference of provisional and real—“moreover, rage and the rest are in the Mahāyāna said to be portions of hatred and the like, and so are provisional dharmas; in this school they are all of a really existent nature.” Shentai under the five senses of association cites the Yogācārabhūmi for comparison, saying that “therefore the Yogācārabhūmi says: the support is the same, the object is the same, the mode of apprehension is not the same,” and at the end matches them with the two aspects, image and perceiving—“the mode of apprehension is like the image aspect in the Mahāyāna, and evenness of entity like the perceiving aspect in the Mahāyāna.” The five classes established in this fascicle and the five positions of the later hundred dharmas agree in number and differ in order: mind opens from one into eight; forty-six mental factors against fifty-one; eleven dharmas of form in both; fourteen unassociated against twenty-four; three unconditioned against six. Their agreements and differences are listed, with no verdict as to merit.

That mind, thought, and consciousness are one in entity, and the later establishing of eight consciousnesses, are two ages of one question. This fascicle’s statement that the three names are one entity is made with reference to differences of name and sense; the Yogācāra tradition later established the distinction of eight consciousnesses at the same place, and it did so upon another set of questions. The two are recorded together as coordinates, and the character of their relation is not settled in this section.

All the mirrors above are supplied by the four commentaries and by the treatises of the same lineage, and are not the original words of this fascicle’s stanzas and prose. Recorded together without adjudication, each returned to its own place.

考據Apparatus

當品大文第二：從「諸法決定俱生」一問開出五品法之綱——色定俱生（極微聚八事九事十事）、心心所必俱、五品心所（大地法十·大善地法十·大煩惱地法六·大不善地法二·小煩惱地法十）與不定心所、上界增減、四對心所之別、心意識體一，而後入心不相應行，先辯得與非得。七十五法之全列自此立。

一、科判定位

科判系統	此段之位
玄奘 T1558 三十卷	分別根品第二之二〔T29 0018b14〕——本子（子2）＝卷四全〔0018b10–0024a01〕。卷五題「阿毘達磨俱舍論卷第五」〔0024a02〕·續題「分別根品第二之三」〔0024a06〕
三家大科	光記標「此下當品大文第二明俱生法，即約俱生辨用」〔T41n1821 0070a24〕·又分「就中，一正明俱起、二廣辨差別」〔0070a25〕；寶疏標「此品大文第二，有二十七頌明俱生法」〔T41n1822 0524c18〕；頌疏標「從此大文第二，明俱生諸法」〔T41n1823 0839c22〕；神泰疏標「自下二十七行頌明三聚法」〔X53n0836 0033b03〕——四家同標當品大文第二，唯寶疏與泰疏逕標二十七頌之量
品內科段（逐段唯標起錨·收界即次段之起錨前·不作減一之推）	甲　色定俱生起〔0018b14〕（正23）→ 乙　心心所必俱·四品同起起〔0018c29〕（正24）→ 丙　五品心所起〔0019a14〕（正25–28）→ 丁　定俱生之數起〔0020a24〕（正29–32）→ 戊　四對心所之別起〔0021a02〕（正33–34）→ 己　心心所眾名起〔0021c18〕（正35）→ 庚　心不相應行總標起〔0022a06〕（正36）→ 辛　得與非得起〔0022a11〕（正37–41）·收於卷末〔0023c26〕（該行末即卷尾題「說一切有部俱舍論卷第四」）
子內承轉句（供分節）	`0018c27`〔已辯〕色定俱生 → 餘定俱生 · `0019a25`〔如是已說〕大地法 → 大善地法 · `0019b28` → 大煩惱地法 · `0020a06` → 大不善地法 · `0020a12` → 小煩惱地法 · `0020a20`〔如是已說〕五品心所 → 不定心所 · `0020c15`〔已說〕欲界 → 上界 · `0021a02`〔如是已說〕心所數量 → 少分差別 · `0021b14` → 尋伺慢憍 · `0021c15` → 名義差別 · `0022a04`〔已說〕心心所 → 心不相應行 · `0022c22`〔已辯〕自性 → 得非得

開卷承轉句（逐字）〔T29 0018b15〕：「今應思擇，一切有為如相不同，生亦各異，為有諸法決定俱生、有定俱生。」

五品之立（②橋主錨·逐字）〔T29 0018b16〕：「為有諸法決定俱生、有定俱生。謂一切法略有五品：一色、二心、三心所、四心不相應行、五無為。」——續云「無為無生，此中不說。今先辯色決定俱生。」故本子唯辯前四品。光記釋此取捨云「此品明諸法用，所以但明前四品法」〔T41n1821 0070b07〕。

頌／長行體例：本頌（五言·T1560 定頌界）＋長行自釋，「頌曰……論曰……」整頌先出。本子含正頌二十三至四十一，牒釋塊十八。遭拆半之頌計四首——正24（前半〔0018c29〕·後半〔0019a07〕）、正27（前半〔0019c03〕·後半〔0020a09〕）、正39（前半在〔0022c24〕塊·後半在〔0023a20〕塊）、正40（前半在〔0023a20〕塊·後半在〔0023b08〕塊）。末三塊為連環：〔0022c24〕＝正38＋正39前半（三十字）·〔0023a20〕＝正39後半＋正40前半（二十字）·〔0023b08〕＝正40後半＋正41（三十字）。長行內無引頌。頌次一律據原典層重建標記與品科段圖，不據源檔抽取序號。

二、術語（名相）

漢（玄奘）	真諦異名（首出）	本論定義句
微聚	隣虛〔T29n1559 0177c17〕「極細色聚說名隣虛，欲令知無餘物細於彼者」	「色聚極細立微聚名，為顯更無細於此者」〔T29 0018b22〕
事（八事九事十事）	物（八物九物十物）〔諦 0177c16〕「偈曰：於欲界八物，無聲根隣虛」	「云何八事？謂四大種及四所造色、香、味、觸」〔T29 0018b24〕；體處二說見長行末「一分依體說……一分依處說」〔0018c22〕
心所	心法〔諦 0178b03〕「所說名心法。何者是耶？偈曰：心法五，大地等別故」	「心與心所必定俱生，隨闕一時餘則不起」〔T29 0019a01〕
大地法	大地〔諦 0178b04〕	「地謂行處，若此是彼所行處，即說此為彼法地。大法地故名為大地，此中若法大地所有名大地法，謂法恒於一切心有」〔T29 0019a10〕
大善地法	善大地〔諦 0178b19〕「是諸法善為大地，說名善大地」	「大善法地名大善地……謂法恒於諸善心有」〔T29 0019a26〕
大煩惱地法	惑大地〔諦 0178c20〕「惑是彼大地故，說彼為惑大地」	「大煩惱法地名大煩惱地……謂法恒於染污心有」〔T29 0019b28〕
大不善地法	惡大地〔諦 0179a23〕「立此二法為惡大地」	「大不善法地名大不善地……謂法恒於不善心有」〔T29 0020a06〕
小煩惱地法	小惑地〔諦 0179a24〕「偈曰：嫌恨諂嫉妬、佷覆及慳悋、誑醉并逼惱，是十小惑地」	「小煩惱法地名小煩惱地……謂法少分染污心俱」〔T29 0020a12〕；三義見「唯修所斷，意識地起、無明相應、各別現行」〔0020a18〕
不定心所	不定心法〔諦 0179a28〕「有餘心法不定，謂覺觀、惡作、睡等」	「復有此餘不定心所，惡作、睡眠、尋、伺等法」〔T29 0020a21〕
惡作	惡作·後燋〔諦 0179b08〕「何法名惡作？於所作惡心生後燋」	「惡所作體名為惡作。應知此中緣惡作法說名惡作，謂緣惡作心追悔性」〔T29 0020b07〕
尋·伺	覺·觀〔諦 0180b06〕「偈曰：覺觀謂麁細」	「心之麁性名尋，心之細性名伺」〔T29 0021b18〕
慢·憍	慢·醉〔諦 0180b25〕「偈曰：心高說為慢，醉愛著自法，心起變異亂」	「慢謂對他心自舉性」·「憍謂染著自法為先，令心傲逸無所顧性」〔T29 0021c12〕
無慚·無愧	無羞·無慚〔諦 0180a03〕「偈曰：無羞不重德」——二名互易（諦「無羞」＝奘「無慚」·諦「無慚」＝奘「無愧」）	「於諸功德及有德者，無敬無崇、無所忌難、無所隨屬，說名無慚」·「於此罪中不見怖畏說名無愧」〔T29 0021a10〕
愛·敬	愛樂·尊重〔諦 0180a19〕「愛樂及信此二異相云何」	「愛謂愛樂，體即是信」·「敬謂敬重，體即是慚」〔T29 0021b03〕
心·意·識	同〔諦 0180c02〕「偈曰：心意識一義」	「集起故名心，思量故名意，了別故名識」〔T29 0021c20〕
行相	相〔諦 0180c09〕「或說有相，是所緣境隨類差別能分別故」	「或名有行相，即於所緣品類差別等起行相故」〔T29 0021c28〕
相應（五義平等）	相應（五平等類）〔諦 0180c12〕「有五種平等類為相應義，謂依止境界取相時物平等等」	「有五義故，謂心心所五義平等故說相應，所依所緣行相時事皆平等故」〔T29 0022a01〕
心不相應行	不相應諸行〔諦 0180c15〕「偈曰：不相應諸行，至非至同分，無想處二定，壽命及諸相名聚等」	「如是諸法心不相應，非色等性，行蘊所攝，是故名心不相應行」〔T29 0022a08〕
得（獲·成就）	至得〔諦 0180c18〕「偈曰：於中至得及同隨」	「得有二種，一者未得已失今獲、二者得已不失成就」〔T29 0022a13〕
非得	非至〔諦 0180c20〕「翻此名非至，義至自成」	「應知非得與此相違」〔T29 0022a14〕
異生性	凡夫性〔諦 0182a12〕「偈曰：許聖道非至凡夫性」	「由許聖道非得，說名異生性故」〔T29 0023b17〕；本論所引本論文「云何異生性？謂不獲聖法」〔0023b18〕
種子（相續·轉變·差別）	種子〔諦 0181b13〕「何法名種子？是名色於生果有能」	「謂名與色於生自果所有展轉隣近功能，此由相續轉變差別」〔T29 0022c12〕
得得（小得）·法得（大得）	至得至得〔諦 0182b06〕「第一本法，第二本法至得，第三至得至得」	「第一本法、第二法得、第三得得」〔T29 0023c11〕

本子諸名相皆有本論自釋句，故不別出古德音寫；梵語羅馬字唯繫古德所傳可徵者，本子無新增，從闕不補。真諦異名之全表見目四。

三、校勘（大正原書校記·卷四全枚舉）

此 CBETA T29n1558 本之校勘記全在卷末校注區（正文區零出現）。錨落本子範圍〔0018b10–0024a01〕者共八四枚，其中梵語對音註五三——依本帙體例，梵音註非異讀，不入表；異讀三一，全枚舉如下。底本從大正【大】讀；CBETA 回改五處（0019002·0019011·0020010·0021012·0022012），其字已入正文流，並錄大正原印。

註號	錨	底本【大】／異讀	語境（該字所在句·逐字）
0018013	0018c10	種界【大】，界種【宮】	「於木聚中有種種界。界謂種子」——涉經文引語之字序
0019001	0019a06	何【大】，向【宮】	「向言心所，何者是耶？」
0019002	0019a06	耶【CB】【麗-CB】【宋】【元】【明】【宮】，邪【大】	同上句末助字·邪耶通用
0019011	0019b03	寶【CB】【石】，實【大】	「有說：於諦寶業果中現前忍許故名為信」——信之所緣列諦寶業果·涉義
0019013	0019b04	不【大】，〔－〕【宮】【石】	「不放逸者，修諸善法離諸不善法」——宮石本無「不」字·涉義
0019014	0019b07	耶【大】＊，邪【石】＊	「豈無經亦說有身輕安耶？」
0019017	0019b23	求【大】，未【宮】，來【石】	「如是種類所餘諸法，此中應求，如彼理趣」
0019022	0019c06	悍【大】，悼【石】	「怠謂懈怠，心不勇悍」
0019025	0019c14	十【大】，為十【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「何者十？謂不信、懈怠、失念、心亂……」——牒本論十大煩惱地法之數
0019026	0019c28	不【大】，不許【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「不說在大煩惱地法。於誰有過？」
0020010	0020c11	三【CB】【宮-CB】【宋】【元】【明】【宮】【石】，二【大】	「此相應品便有十三心所俱起」——外方諸師許惡作通無記之數·涉義
0021001	0021a07	無【大】，〔－〕【宮】	「論曰：此中無慚無愧別者，於諸功德及有德者」
0021009	0021b22	遍【大】，過【宋】【元】【明】【宮】【石】	「心由尋伺不遍細麁，故於一心俱有作用」——涉義
0021012	0021b24	曰【大】，因【宋】【元】【明】【宮】【石】，日【麗-CB】【CB】	「如水日光是凝釋，日體非凝釋」——喻中之日·涉義
0021013	0021c11	𣣋【大】，陵【宋】【元】【宮】，凌【明】【石】	「心自舉恃𣣋蔑於他故名為慢」——異體字
0021015	0021c17	想【大】，相【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「然心心所於契經中隨義建立種種名想」
0022005	0022a16	有【大】，有有【宮】	「謂有為法若有墮在自相續中有得非得」
0022006	0022a20	傳【大】，得傳【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「故對法中傳說如是：誰成無漏法？」——傳疑標記所在·涉義
0022007	0022b15	作【大】，何【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「故彼所言得有作用，謂作所得諸法生因」
0022010	0022c06	知【大】，如【宮】	「謂斷善者由邪見力損所依中善根種子應知名斷」
0022011	0022c15	差【大】，善【宋】【元】	「何名差別？謂有無間生果功能」——種子三義之第三·涉義
0022012	0022c17	耽【CB】【宋】【元】【明】【宮】【石】，既【大】，躭【麗-CB】	「彼說：耽著貪煩惱者，不能厭捨，故名成就」·涉義
0023001	0023a06	道【大】，其道【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「道諦得，唯無漏故」
0023002	0023a07	無【大】，有無【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「唯無漏故。無繫法得，有四種」
0023003	0023a08	非【大】，〔－〕【宮】【石】	「若無學法得唯無學，非學非無學得有差別」——宮石本少一「非」·涉義
0023004	0023a25	耳通【大】，起道【宮】	「除眼耳通及能變化」——頌「除二通變化」之牒釋·涉義
0023005	0023a27	收【大】，故【宋】【元】【明】	「雖是無覆無記性收，而有前後及俱起得」
0023006	0023b23	性【大】＊，姓【宮】＊	「諸佛世尊亦不成就聲聞獨覺種性聖法，應名異生」
0023007	0023c03	位【大】，別【石】	「謂曾未生聖法相續分位差別名異生性」——經部立異生性之句·涉義
0023008	0023c09	復【大】，得【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「應言此二各復有餘得及非得」
0023009	0023c18	諸【大】，謂【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「如是諸得後後轉增」

校勘結語：三一條中涉義者十二（0018013·0019011·0019013·0020010·0021009·0021012·0022006·0022011·0022012·0023003·0023004·0023007），餘為助字與異體。無一條升定本案——無『古德牒文與異讀相合＋義理雙證』二支俱備者；諸疏牒文皆與大正底本讀同。異讀並錄備考，取捨屬義理之判。大正原註以【三】統稱宋元明者，此表依校本記號展開分列。

四、異譯對勘（真諦《阿毘達磨俱舍釋論》T1559 ★）

對勘基座：玄奘本卷四〔T29n1558 0018b10–0024a01〕↔ 真諦本〔T29n1559 0177c11–0182b19〕。

卷界之驗（二譯獨立分卷而此界同）：真諦《釋論》卷第三題〔T29n1559 0177c07〕下即出「釋論中分別根品之二」〔0177c11〕，緊接「偈曰：於欲界八物，無聲根隣虛」〔0177c16〕——恰與玄奘卷四首正23「欲微聚無聲，無根有八事」〔T29 0018b20〕同起。然二本卷尾不同界：真諦卷三續至「何法名同分」〔0182b20〕以下，含同分·無想·二定諸目，總至卷尾題〔0184b26〕；玄奘則於「況第二等」〔0023c24〕收卷四，同分以下入卷五。故二譯於本子之首同界、於尾不同界。

體例基差：玄奘「頌曰／論曰」整頌先出；真諦「偈曰／釋曰」逐句嵌釋，一頌常拆二至四處分引（本子正25 真諦作「受作意想欲、觸慧念思惟，相了定十法，遍於一切心」〔0178b09〕，十法之列序與玄奘「受想思觸欲，慧念與作意，勝解三摩地」〔T29 0019a14〕不同）。

對勘要目（義理承重者九）：

五品之立：「謂一切法略有五品：一色、二心、三心所、四心不相應行、五無為」〔奘 0018b16〕‖「一切法有五品，一色、二心、三心法、四不相應、五無為」〔諦 0177c14〕——五品之數與序全同，唯第三第四之名異（心所／心法·心不相應行／不相應）。
微聚：「色聚極細立微聚名」〔奘 0018b22〕‖「極細色聚說名隣虛」〔諦 0177c17〕——奘取「微聚」為聚名·諦取「隣虛」為極細之名；諦本無「事／處」之辨名，而作「約物說物、為約入說物」〔0178a13〕。
心心所必俱：「心心所必俱，諸行相或得」〔奘 0018c29〕‖「偈曰：心心法必俱」〔諦 0178a26〕＋「偈曰：一切共行相」〔0178a27〕＋「偈曰：與得」〔0178b01〕——一頌拆三處。
大地法十：奘列「受想思觸欲，慧念與作意，勝解三摩地」‖諦列「受作意想欲、觸慧念思惟，相了定十法」〔0178b09〕——法數同十，名有三異（思／思惟·勝解／相了·三摩地／定），且列序不同。
大善地法十：「信及不放逸，輕安捨慚愧，二根及不害，勤唯遍善心」〔奘 0019a29〕‖「信不放逸安、捨羞及慚愧、二根非逼惱、精進恒於善」〔諦 0178b21〕——輕安／安·不害／非逼惱·勤／精進。
大煩惱地法六：「癡逸怠不信，惛掉恒唯染」〔奘 0019c03〕‖「癡放逸懈怠、無信無安掉，恒在染」〔諦 0178c22〕——惛沈／無安（諦以「安」之反立名）。
大不善地法二：「唯遍不善心，無慚及無愧」〔奘 0020a09〕‖「偈曰：若惡，及無羞無慚」〔諦 0179a21〕——二名互易（見目二）。
小煩惱地法十：「忿覆慳嫉惱，害恨諂誑憍」〔奘 0020a16〕‖「嫌恨諂嫉妬、佷覆及慳悋、誑醉并逼惱」〔諦 0179a24〕——法數同十，逐名互當之判非本目所斷（諦「醉」當奘「憍」·諦「逼惱」當奘「害」，然「嫌／佷」與奘「忿／恨」之配當諸本無明文，列而不判）。
非得之世：「謂現在法決定無有現在非得，唯有過去未來非得」〔奘 0023b12〕‖「現世法非至得但現世，若過去、未來法非至得各有三世」〔諦 0182a07〕——二本文義正相反。此處三疏皆有評語，見目六與承衍；本目唯錄不判。

譯名對照（本子範圍·逐字所見）：微聚／隣虛 · 事／物 · 心所／心法 · 大地法／大地 · 大善地法／善大地 · 大煩惱地法／惑大地 · 大不善地法／惡大地 · 小煩惱地法／小惑地 · 輕安／安 · 不害／非逼惱 · 勤／精進 · 惛沈／無安 · 掉舉／掉 · 失念／忘念 · 不正知／不了別 · 非理作意／不正思惟 · 邪勝解／邪相了 · 尋伺／覺觀 · 慢憍／慢醉 · 無慚無愧／無羞無慚 · 愛敬／愛樂尊重 · 勝解／相了 · 三摩地／定 · 作意／作意 · 心不相應行／不相應諸行 · 得／至得 · 非得／非至 · 異生性／凡夫性 · 同分／同分 · 頌曰論曰／偈曰釋曰 · 苾芻／比丘 · 馬勝／阿輸實 · 補特伽羅／人 · 毘婆沙師／毘婆沙師 · 經部師／經部師——各附首出行（目二與本目）。

異讀取捨與二譯優劣屬義理之判，本目唯錄不判。禁以奘詞搜諦本——真諦譯語自成一系，跨本一律取場景結構（誰、對誰、問什麼、依何理、得何答）。

五、系內對辯（眾賢《順正理論》T1562 ★·有則錄）

眾賢《順正理論》「辯差別品第二」對應本子之段，起於「欲微聚無聲」之牒〔T29n1562 0383c08〕，終於「非得淨無記」之牒〔0399a17〕以下。眾賢稱世親為「經主」，稱經部先軌為「上座」。本子範圍內「經主」明標六處、「上座」十五處、「譬喻者」三處——擇義理承重者七，全錄。

大地法之數（對上座「唯三」之破）——眾賢：「彼上座言：無如所計十大地法，此但三種，經說俱起受想思故」〔T1562 0384b12〕；破云：「上座所言大地唯三，極為迷謬」〔0388b23〕，並以經證欲等實有別體：「由此契經現證欲等實有別體，是大地法」〔0388c03〕。所對俱舍段：正25 十大地法之列〔T29 0019a14〕。
作意與捨之相違（對經主之難）——眾賢：「經主所難，謂有警覺無警覺性，作意與捨應互相違，如是善成」〔T1562 0392b12〕；其解在前文「捨如持稱進止平等，故捨與勤更相隨順」〔0392b10〕。所對俱舍段：「如何可說於一心中有警覺性、無警覺性？作意與捨二相應起」〔T29 0019b17〕。
惛沈何以不入本論十數——眾賢：「然此惛沈無明覆故，本論不說為大煩惱地法」〔T1562 0391c14〕。所對俱舍段：「又於彼論不說惛沈」〔T29 0019c13〕以下之詰。
一切心所皆實有——眾賢：「如前所說，一切心所應知其性皆是實有」〔T1562 0392a10〕。此為眾賢於五品心所總結之立宗。
無慚無愧之自他別觀（責經主橫難）——眾賢：「由此已釋，經主此中誤取彼情橫申過難」〔T1562 0393b23〕，所指即俱舍「若爾，此二所觀不同，云何俱起？」〔T29 0021a18〕之難。
得是否別有實物——眾賢：「經主此中作如是問：何緣知有別物名得」〔T1562 0397a12〕，答以契經「應知如是補特伽羅，成就善法及不善法」〔0397a14〕，並辨轉輪王七寶之難：「王於七寶自在無礙，名成就故」〔0397a16〕。所對俱舍段〔T29 0022a29〕以下之長諍。
種子與異生性——眾賢：「經主於中雖隨自執多有所說而無所成，所執種子理不成故」〔T1562 0398b20〕，並列種子之異名「或名隨界、或名熏習、或名功能、或名不失、或名增長」〔0398b27〕；於異生性則云：「若異生性無別有體，便違此經」〔0399b21〕。所對俱舍段：種子三義〔T29 0022c12〕與經部異生性說〔0023c02〕。

「一義二宗」並錄，勝負不判（不入部派諍）。眾賢於本子之反破密集於得非得一段（0397a–0399b），與俱舍此段長諍之量相稱。《顯宗論》T1563 於本子相應段亦有全文〔T29n1563 0799a22–0805b19〕，起於同一「欲微聚無聲，無根有八事」之頌、止於得非得段末（次段同分已入子3）；然其體例為正面立宗之縮寫，通段無「經主」「上座」之標（逐字掃：「經主」〇處·「上座」〇處），故無別立之反破可繫。本目所錄反破唯出《順正理論》。

六、諸家異釋（光記·寶疏·頌疏·神泰疏）

（一）色定俱生·微聚

微聚是假是實——光記：「微聚是假，假必依實」〔T41n1821 0070b13〕，並分二微：「應知微有二種：一色聚微，即極少八事俱生不可減也，此論據斯說。二極微微，即色極少更不可分，《正理》據此說」〔0070b24〕。寶疏取後說為善：「極微非聚，微是七微，聚色之中微聚最細」〔T41n1822 0525a05〕，並判「二釋之中後釋為善」〔0525a11〕。頌疏直取論文而別標「欲」字：「欲謂欲界，微是細義，非極微也」〔T41n1823 0840a04〕。
體增用增——光記記《正理》取體增而破用增，並記論主用增為自宗〔T41n1821 0071b17〕以下。寶疏則兩非之：「然詳體增、用增，未為盡理」〔T41n1822 0526a26〕，又云「故知法性隨緣不定」〔0526a29〕。
內身有聲無聲——光記引《婆沙》評家「雖一身中必有聲界，非諸身分皆悉遍發聲」〔T41n1821 0071a03〕以通《發智》定成就聲與本論八事無聲之違。神泰疏更引《成實論》為助〔X53n0836 0033c10〕以下。

（二）五品心所之廢立

一義廢立（本論之能）——光記：「今依此論，各以一義廢立大地法等。此乃論能，非關人解」〔T41n1821 0074a07〕；於大地法云「有古德五義廢立，今依此論一義廢立大地法者，謂遍於一切心，名大地法」〔0074a09〕；於大煩惱地法云「恒染，顯遍染心。唯染，顯不通淨」〔0076c28〕；於小煩惱地法云「今依此論，一義廢立少煩惱地法十，謂唯修所斷」〔0078a24〕。
神泰疏同軌並記古師之數——「今依俱舍，但一義立，謂通於一切心」〔X53n0836 0035b19〕；其上記古師曰「如猶論師五義建立通大地」·「長耳三藏具八通，無八居，立通大地。烋法師具九義，立通大地」〔0035b18〕——古師五義八義九義之異，唯泰疏具列。
頌疏之二義式——大地法：「此十心所遍三性等一切心品，諸餘心所即不能遍，故於此獨名大地法」〔T41n1823 0840c09〕；大煩惱地法：「此上六種，一則唯染、二則遍染，具此兩義，獨得大煩惱地法名」〔0841a25〕；小煩惱地法：「謂有三義：一唯修所斷、二意識地起與無明相應、三各別現行」〔0841b23〕。寶疏則於各地法皆作四句簡別，如大善地法「有，唯是善不遍善心，謂欣、厭也。有遍善心非唯是善，謂大地法」〔T41n1822 0528a20〕。

（三）逐法之釋

信——頌疏設喻：「信者，澄淨也，如水清珠能清濁水，心有信珠，令心澄淨」〔T41n1823 0840c20〕。光記引《入阿毘達磨》同喻：「如水清珠置於池內，令濁穢水皆即澄淨。如是信珠在心池內，心諸濁穢皆即除遣」〔T41n1821 0075a18〕——喻同源，頌疏簡而光記具。
三摩地——頌疏：「三摩地者，此云等持，平等持心於一境轉，亦持心所，從強說心」〔T41n1823 0840c07〕。
心之名——光記：「梵名質多，此云心，是集起義」〔T41n1821 0083b05〕。神泰疏設喻：「集起故名心，如樹有心能集起枝條花果」〔X53n0836 0040c02〕；又釋心所之名云「如自在名我，我必有所，於所自在，心自在故」〔0035a17〕。
行相——頌疏：「如緣青境心及心所，皆帶青上影像，此識上相名為行相」〔T41n1823 0843c18〕。光記設鏡喻：「此所現者名為行相」〔T41n1821 0083c01〕·「猶如明鏡對眾色相皆現鏡面，此所現像而非所照，然約像現說鏡能照」〔0083c03〕。
惡作——頌疏：「惡作是境，非追悔也。今名追悔為惡作者，從境為名也」〔T41n1823 0841c28〕。
上界所除之由——光記：「定所滋潤，無瞋等惑不善法故無不善，無憂根故無惡作，無叚食故無睡眠」〔T41n1821 0080c05〕。頌疏同軌而更明：「除惡作者，惡作與憂根相應，色界離憂，故無惡作。除睡眠者，色界無段食，故無睡眠也」〔T41n1823 0842c11〕。
天愛——光記：「西方相弄呼為天愛，非能自活天愛得存」〔T41n1821 0077b03〕。神泰疏：「西方呼愚痴人為天愛養，名天愛也」〔X53n0836 0036c07〕。
得得（小得）——光記：「法之得故名為法得，即是大得。大得之得名為得得，即小得也」〔T41n1821 0092a13〕。神泰疏於諸得無邊處設喻：「如秋細霧遍滿十方」〔X53n0836 0046c07〕。
異生性之名——頌疏引《婆沙》：「尊者世友作如是說：『能令有情起異類見、異類煩惱，造異類業，受異類生，故名異生。』」〔T41n1823 0847c03〕。
補特伽羅——頌疏：「此云數取趣，謂數取諸趣也」〔T41n1823 0843b11〕。

（四）四疏互異（並錄不判）

一切四大是否必不離聲（念法師之解）——光記記泰法師破念法師：「泰法師解云：念法師若作斯釋，此大謬也」〔T41n1821 0071a17〕，而光記自判「今詳二德互有是非」〔0071a25〕。寶疏反破光記與泰疏二家：「泰師、光師妄解念法師意」〔T41n1822 0525c23〕·「念法師義既順論文，泰、光二師即謬破耳」〔0526a08〕。四家之中，此為互異最烈之處。
微聚假實——光記存二微並判此論據色聚微〔T41n1821 0070b24〕；寶疏逕判「後釋為善」〔T41n1822 0525a11〕；頌疏不涉假實而唯釋「微是細義」〔T41n1823 0840a05〕；泰疏引《正理》體用之辨而不判〔X53n0836 0034a12〕以下。
輕安身心之屬——光記於「應知此中身輕安者身堪任性」一段，明判「諸師多解此文是說一切有部答者，此解謬矣」〔T41n1821 0075b20〕；寶疏則於經部之難自下一按語「今詳此難非為切當」〔T41n1822 0528b16〕；泰疏將全段判為薩婆多與經部九番問答〔X53n0836 0035c25〕以下；頌疏此段從略不出。
翻對之數——泰疏：「自古諸師皆云：翻八有體……翻二無體，謂輕安無不輕安，翻捨無不捨者。不然。今依俱舍、正理論釋，翻十皆有體」〔X53n0836 0036b11〕，並引舊譯為證：「故舊俱舍云：翻安為不安，不立煩惱大地，於誰有失」〔0036b13〕。光記與寶疏則作正翻十·傍翻十一之大表〔T41n1821 0078c12〕·〔T41n1822 0531a22〕，二表法目全同而寶疏「翻掉舉為行捨」〔0531b04〕、光記作「翻掉舉為捨」〔0078c21〕。
舊譯「非得」一句——三疏同標為翻譯之失（詳承衍與目八）：光記「舊《俱舍》云「現在法有現在非得者」，此翻謬矣」〔T41n1821 0090a09〕；頌疏「舊云現在法有非得者，此翻謬矣」〔T41n1823 0847a28〕；神泰疏「舊俱舍云：現在法有現在非得者，翻譯謬也」〔X53n0836 0045c03〕。寶疏於此無評，據實標闕。

（五）神泰疏（殘本·卷四正釋「分別根品第二之二」）

神泰《俱舍論疏》卷四〔X53n0836 0033a21–0046c12〕正釋本子全段，逐文可繫——與子1 泰疏卷三闕釋相反。其體例特徵有三：一、逐段標數（「一、問……二、答……三、總舉……」），科文最細；二、逐處引《正理》與《婆沙》原文為對；三、時取大乘名相為對照（見目七）。子1 所立『泰疏殘·存 X』之標記於本子不用。

七、互讀（唯識根系掛鏈·②橋）

本子即②橋之主錨：五品之立〔T29 0018b16〕「謂一切法略有五品：一色、二心、三心所、四心不相應行、五無為」，與《大乘百法明門論》T31n1614「一切法者略有五種：一者心法、二者心所有法、三者色法、四者心不相應行法、五者無為法」〔T31 0855b16〕——五位之數同，序異（俱舍色先心後，百法心先色後）。以下逐位列異同，唯列不判。

位	俱舍七十五法（本子所出）	百法（T31n1614）	開合之差
心（心法）	一心（心意識體一〔T29 0021c18〕）	八識	一開為八
心所（心所有法）	四十六——大地法十〔0019a14〕·大善地法十〔0019a29〕·大煩惱地法六〔0019c03〕·大不善地法二〔0020a09〕·小煩惱地法十〔0020a16〕·不定八〔0020a21 等〕	五十一——遍行五·別境五·善十一·煩惱六·隨煩惱二十·不定四	分位法之名目異：俱舍以「地」（遍一切心／遍善／遍染／遍不善／少分染）為分位判準，百法以「遍行／別境」分大地法十為二
色	十一（界品已列·本子唯辯極微聚之事數八九十〔0018b20〕）	十一	數同
心不相應行	十四（總標〔T29 0022a06〕「得非得同分，無想二定命，相名身等類」）	二十四	十四開為二十四
無為	三（界品已列）	六	三開為六

古德自身之互讀（citation·非今人所造）：

寶疏於大地法十下逕作對照：「有部之宗十法遍行，大乘之中唯五遍行」〔T41n1822 0528a13〕——十大地法對五遍行之差，法寶已明標。
寶疏又於小煩惱地法下記假實之異：「又此忿等，大乘中說謂嗔分等，故是假法。此宗皆是實有性」〔T41n1822 0531a07〕。
神泰疏於相應五義下引《瑜伽》為對：「大乘影像相是蘊界處攝，得為所緣緣」〔X53n0836 0040c13〕·「故瑜伽論云：所依同、所緣同、行相不同」〔0040c14〕；末更以見相二分相配：「行相如大乘相分，事平等如大乘見分也」〔0040c20〕——有部五義平等與大乘三同之異，泰疏已標。

本子之經部伏線（③橋所繫）：本論於得非得一段引經部種子說——「謂名與色於生自果所有展轉隣近功能，此由相續轉變差別」〔T29 0022c12〕，並判「如是二途皆為善說」〔0022c21〕。眾賢反破時列種子之異名五〔T1562 0398b27〕。此段為經部種子與後之阿賴耶識間之座標——《成唯識論》於名色相依處逕作「眼等轉識，攝在名中，此識若無，說誰為識」〔T31n1585 0017a28〕而立第八。二系並錄，不判優劣、不作大小之判。

八、譯史

全論之譯人、譯年、譯場、二譯先後與造論緣起，已具子1 考據目八，此不重出。本子所繫之譯史事實三條：

二譯分卷之界於本子首相合——玄奘《俱舍論》卷第四〔T29n1558 0018b10〕與真諦《俱舍釋論》卷第三〔T29n1559 0177c07〕各為獨立分卷，而二本皆以「分別根品第二之二」起〔奘 0018b14〕·「釋論中分別根品之二」起〔諦 0177c11〕，且皆以極微聚一頌為卷首正頌〔奘 0018b20〕·〔諦 0177c16〕。二譯獨立分卷而此界相合，卷尾則不同界（見目四）。
舊譯一句三疏同標為翻誤——玄奘本作「謂現在法決定無有現在非得」〔T29 0023b12〕，真諦本作「現世法非至得但現世」〔T29n1559 0182a07〕。光記〔T41n1821 0090a09〕、頌疏〔T41n1823 0847a28〕、神泰疏〔X53n0836 0045c03〕三家皆逕標舊譯此句為翻譯之謬。三家所判並錄，優劣不判；本目唯錄此為譯史之事實。
新譯前之舊俱舍學統可徵——神泰疏兩處引「舊俱舍」原文為證〔X53n0836 0036b13·0045c03〕；光記與寶疏並記「念法師」「泰法師」之說與互破〔T41n1821 0071a06 起〕·〔T41n1822 0525b19 起〕。此可徵玄奘新譯以前，漢地已有依真諦本與《雜心》之俱舍學統，而新譯後諸疏猶引之為對。

九、校本定位

玄奘 T1558 卷四（底本·本子全）：卷題〔T29 0018b10〕·品續題 0018b14 · 五品之立 0018b16 · 正23 色定俱生 0018b20 · 正24前半 0018c29 · 正24後半 0019a07 · 正25 大地法 0019a14 · 正26 大善地法 0019a29 · 正27前半大煩惱地法 0019c03 · 正27後半大不善地法 0020a09 · 正28 小煩惱地法 0020a16 · 正29–31 定俱生 0020a24 · 正32 上界 0020c17 · 正33 無慚愧愛敬 0021a05 · 正34 尋伺慢憍 0021b16 · 正35 心意識體一 0021c18 · 正36 心不相應行 0022a06 · 正37 得非得 0022a11 · 正38·正39前半 0022c24 · 正39後半·正40前半 0023a20 · 正40後半·正41 0023b08 · 卷末 0023c24。源檔：原典層。
真諦 T1559：對應段 0177c11–0182b19（卷三前半）；卷三題 0177c07 · 卷尾題 0184b26 · 同分起 0182b20（已入玄奘卷五之界）。
眾賢 T1562：本子對辯段 0383c08–0399b22；品題「辯差別品第二」諸見 0383b24 · 0389c16 · 0396c06。逐條引 loc 見目五。
眾賢 T1563：本子相應段 0799a22–0805b19（欲微聚頌 0799a22 · 得非得段末 0805b19；次段同分 0805b20 起，屬子3）。體例為正面立宗之縮寫，通段無「經主」「上座」之標，無別立之反破可繫。
光記 T1821 卷四：0070a20（卷題）·正釋 0070a23–0092c02（卷尾題）；卷五題 0092c07。逐條 loc 見目六。
寶疏 T1822 卷四：0524c14（卷題）–0540c25（卷尾題）；卷五題 0541a02。逐條 loc 見目六。
頌疏 T1823 卷四：0839c20（卷題）–0847c18（卷尾題）；卷五題 0847c21。逐條 loc 見目六。
神泰疏 X53n0836 卷四：0033a21（卷題）·品題 0033a23 –0046c12（卷尾題）·續品題「分別根品第二之三」0046c22。本子泰疏具足，非殘缺段。
百法 T31n1614：五位之列 0855b16（②橋對錨）。
校勘：卷四校記錨八四枚（異讀三一·梵音註五三）；異讀三一條全枚舉見目三·無升定本案。

The chapter’s second major section: from the single question 「諸法決定俱生」 tr. “do dharmas definitely arise together?” the framework of the five classes of dharmas opens out—form definitely arising together (eight, nine, or ten entities in an aggregate of ultimate atoms), mind and mental factors necessarily together, the five classes of mental factors (ten factors of the great ground · ten of the great wholesome ground · six of the great defiled ground · two of the great unwholesome ground · ten of the small defiled ground) together with the indeterminate mental factors, the reduction in the upper realms, the differences among four pairs of mental factors, and mind, thought, and consciousness as one in entity; and thereafter the formations not associated with mind are entered, acquisition and non-acquisition being analyzed first. The full enumeration of the seventy-five dharmas is established from here.

I. Doctrinal Outline and Placement

Outline system	Placement of this passage
Xuanzang’s thirty fascicles, T1558	Chapter Two, Analyzing the Faculties, part two〔T29 0018b14〕—this unit (Unit 2) is the whole of Fascicle Four〔0018b10–0024a01〕. Fascicle Five is titled 「阿毘達磨俱舍論卷第五」 tr. “Abhidharmakośa, Fascicle Five”〔0024a02〕 · with the continued title 「分別根品第二之三」 tr. “Chapter Two, Analyzing the Faculties, part three”〔0024a06〕
Major outlines of the four commentaries	Puguang marks 「此下當品大文第二明俱生法，即約俱生辨用」 tr. “from here begins the chapter’s second major section, setting out the dharmas that co-arise, that is, analyzing function in terms of co-arising”〔T41n1821 0070a24〕, and further divides it 「就中，一正明俱起、二廣辨差別」 tr. “within it: first, directly setting out co-arising; second, analyzing the differences at length”〔0070a25〕; Fabao marks 「此品大文第二，有二十七頌明俱生法」 tr. “the chapter’s second major section has twenty-seven stanzas setting out the dharmas that co-arise”〔T41n1822 0524c18〕; Yuanhui marks 「從此大文第二，明俱生諸法」 tr. “from here, the second major section, setting out the dharmas that co-arise”〔T41n1823 0839c22〕; Shentai marks 「自下二十七行頌明三聚法」 tr. “the twenty-seven lines of stanza below set out the dharmas of the three collections”〔X53n0836 0033b03〕—all four alike mark the chapter’s second major section, and only Fabao and Shentai state outright its extent of twenty-seven stanzas
Divisions within the chapter (each division marked by its opening anchor only · the close of one lies just before the opening anchor of the next · no inference by subtracting one is made)	A　Form definitely arising together, from〔0018b14〕(Root 23) → B　Mind and mental factors necessarily together · the four classes arising together, from〔0018c29〕(Root 24) → C　The five classes of mental factors, from〔0019a14〕(Roots 25–28) → D　The number that definitely arise together, from〔0020a24〕(Roots 29–32) → E　The differences among four pairs of mental factors, from〔0021a02〕(Roots 33–34) → F　The several names of mind and mental factors, from〔0021c18〕(Root 35) → G　General enumeration of the formations not associated with mind, from〔0022a06〕(Root 36) → H　Acquisition and non-acquisition, from〔0022a11〕(Roots 37–41) · closing at the end of the fascicle〔0023c26〕(at the end of that line stands the fascicle-end title 「說一切有部俱舍論卷第四」 tr. “Kośa of the Sarvāstivāda, Fascicle Four”)
Transitional sentences within the unit (for sectioning)	`0018c27`〔having analyzed〕form definitely arising together → the remainder definitely arising together · `0019a25`〔thus having stated〕the factors of the great ground → the factors of the great wholesome ground · `0019b28` → the factors of the great defiled ground · `0020a06` → the factors of the great unwholesome ground · `0020a12` → the factors of the small defiled ground · `0020a20`〔thus having stated〕the five classes of mental factors → the indeterminate mental factors · `0020c15`〔having stated〕the desire realm → the upper realms · `0021a02`〔thus having stated〕the number of mental factors → a few of the differences · `0021b14` → applied thought, sustained thought, pride, self-intoxication · `0021c15` → the differences of name and sense · `0022a04`〔having stated〕mind and mental factors → the formations not associated with mind · `0022c22`〔having analyzed〕their nature → acquisition and non-acquisition

Opening transitional sentence (verbatim)〔T29 0018b15〕: 「今應思擇，一切有為如相不同，生亦各異，為有諸法決定俱生、有定俱生。」 tr. “It should now be pondered: since all conditioned dharmas differ in their characteristics and differ severally in their arising, are there dharmas that definitely arise together? There are dharmas that definitely arise together.”

The establishing of the five classes (principal anchor of Bridge ② · verbatim)〔T29 0018b16〕: 「為有諸法決定俱生、有定俱生。謂一切法略有五品：一色、二心、三心所、四心不相應行、五無為。」 tr. “Are there dharmas that definitely arise together? There are dharmas that definitely arise together. That is, all dharmas fall in brief into five classes: first form, second mind, third mental factors, fourth formations not associated with mind, fifth the unconditioned.”—and it continues 「無為無生，此中不說。今先辯色決定俱生。」 tr. “The unconditioned has no arising and is not stated here. Form’s definite co-arising will now be analyzed first.” Hence this unit analyzes only the first four classes. Puguang explains this exclusion: 「此品明諸法用，所以但明前四品法」 tr. “this chapter sets out the functions of dharmas, and therefore sets out only the dharmas of the first four classes”〔T41n1821 0070b07〕.

Stanza and prose format: root stanzas (five syllables to the line · stanza boundaries fixed by T1560) with prose self-commentary, the whole stanza given first as 「頌曰……論曰……」 tr. “the stanza says … the treatise says …”. This unit contains Root Stanzas 23 through 41, in eighteen explanatory blocks. Four stanzas are broken in half—Root 24 (first half〔0018c29〕· second half〔0019a07〕), Root 27 (first half〔0019c03〕· second half〔0020a09〕), Root 39 (first half in the〔0022c24〕block · second half in the〔0023a20〕block), Root 40 (first half in the〔0023a20〕block · second half in the〔0023b08〕block). The last three blocks form a chain:〔0022c24〕= Root 38 plus the first half of Root 39 (thirty characters) ·〔0023a20〕= the second half of Root 39 plus the first half of Root 40 (twenty characters) ·〔0023b08〕= the second half of Root 40 plus Root 41 (thirty characters). There is no quoted stanza within the prose. Stanza numbering is throughout rebuilt from the canonical-source layer’s markers and the chapter’s outline diagram, and not from serial numbers extracted from a source file.

II. Terminology (Technical Terms)

Xuanzang’s term	Paramārtha’s alternative name (first occurrence)	Definitional sentence in this treatise
minute aggregate	next to the void〔T29n1559 0177c17〕「極細色聚說名隣虛，欲令知無餘物細於彼者」 tr. “the finest aggregate of form is called ‘next to the void,’ so that one may know there is nothing finer than it”	「色聚極細立微聚名，為顯更無細於此者」 tr. “when the aggregation of form is finest the name minute aggregate is established, to show that there is nothing finer than this”〔T29 0018b22〕
entity (eight, nine, or ten entities)	thing (eight, nine, or ten things)〔Paramārtha 0177c16〕「偈曰：於欲界八物，無聲根隣虛」 tr. “the verse says: in the desire realm eight things, the next-to-the-void without sound or faculty”	「云何八事？謂四大種及四所造色、香、味、觸」 tr. “what are the eight entities? The four great elements together with four derived forms: color, odor, flavor, and the tangible”〔T29 0018b24〕; for the two accounts by substance and by sense field see the end of the prose, 「一分依體說……一分依處說」 tr. “in one part stated with reference to substance … in one part stated with reference to sense field”〔0018c22〕
mental factor	mental dharma〔Paramārtha 0178b03〕「所說名心法。何者是耶？偈曰：心法五，大地等別故」 tr. “what is spoken of is called mental dharmas. What are they? The verse says: mental dharmas are five, by the distinction of the great ground and the rest”	「心與心所必定俱生，隨闕一時餘則不起」 tr. “mind and mental factors necessarily arise together; should either be lacking, the other does not arise”〔T29 0019a01〕
factors of the great ground	great ground〔Paramārtha 0178b04〕	「地謂行處，若此是彼所行處，即說此為彼法地。大法地故名為大地，此中若法大地所有名大地法，謂法恒於一切心有」 tr. “ground means the place of activity; if this is the place in which that is active, this is said to be the ground of that dharma. Because it is the ground of the great dharmas it is called the great ground; and any dharma here belonging to the great ground is called a factor of the great ground, that is, a dharma present in every mind at all times”〔T29 0019a10〕
factors of the great wholesome ground	wholesome great ground〔Paramārtha 0178b19〕「是諸法善為大地，說名善大地」 tr. “these dharmas have the wholesome for their great ground, and are called the wholesome great ground”	「大善法地名大善地……謂法恒於諸善心有」 tr. “the ground of the great wholesome dharmas is called the great wholesome ground … that is, a dharma present in every wholesome mind at all times”〔T29 0019a26〕
factors of the great defiled ground	affliction great ground〔Paramārtha 0178c20〕「惑是彼大地故，說彼為惑大地」 tr. “because affliction is their great ground, they are called the affliction great ground”	「大煩惱法地名大煩惱地……謂法恒於染污心有」 tr. “the ground of the great defiled dharmas is called the great defiled ground … that is, a dharma present in a defiled mind at all times”〔T29 0019b28〕
factors of the great unwholesome ground	evil great ground〔Paramārtha 0179a23〕「立此二法為惡大地」 tr. “these two dharmas are established as the evil great ground”	「大不善法地名大不善地……謂法恒於不善心有」 tr. “the ground of the great unwholesome dharmas is called the great unwholesome ground … that is, a dharma present in an unwholesome mind at all times”〔T29 0020a06〕
factors of the small defiled ground	small affliction ground〔Paramārtha 0179a24〕「偈曰：嫌恨諂嫉妬、佷覆及慳悋、誑醉并逼惱，是十小惑地」 tr. “the verse says: dislike, resentment, flattery, envy; obstinacy, concealment, and stinginess; deception, intoxication, and oppression—these ten are the small affliction ground”	「小煩惱法地名小煩惱地……謂法少分染污心俱」 tr. “the ground of the small defiled dharmas is called the small defiled ground … that is, a dharma arising together with a small portion of defiled minds”〔T29 0020a12〕; for the three senses see 「唯修所斷，意識地起、無明相應、各別現行」 tr. “abandoned through cultivation alone, arising on the ground of mental consciousness, associated with ignorance, and operating each separately”〔0020a18〕
indeterminate mental factors	indeterminate mental dharmas〔Paramārtha 0179a28〕「有餘心法不定，謂覺觀、惡作、睡等」 tr. “there are further mental dharmas that are indeterminate, namely apprehension and examination, regret, sleep, and the rest”	「復有此餘不定心所，惡作、睡眠、尋、伺等法」 tr. “there are besides these the remaining indeterminate mental factors: regret, sleep, applied thought, sustained thought, and the like”〔T29 0020a21〕
regret	regret · after-burning〔Paramārtha 0179b08〕「何法名惡作？於所作惡心生後燋」 tr. “what dharma is called regret? Mind’s burning afterwards over the evil it has done”	「惡所作體名為惡作。應知此中緣惡作法說名惡作，謂緣惡作心追悔性」 tr. “the entity of an evil deed done is called an evil deed done. It should be known that here the dharma taking an evil deed done as its object is called regret, that is, the nature that repents in taking an evil deed done as its object”〔T29 0020b07〕
applied thought · sustained thought	apprehension · examination〔Paramārtha 0180b06〕「偈曰：覺觀謂麁細」 tr. “the verse says: apprehension and examination are the coarse and the fine”	「心之麁性名尋，心之細性名伺」 tr. “mind’s coarse nature is called applied thought, mind’s fine nature sustained thought”〔T29 0021b18〕
pride · self-intoxication	pride · drunkenness〔Paramārtha 0180b25〕「偈曰：心高說為慢，醉愛著自法，心起變異亂」 tr. “the verse says: mind grown high is called pride; drunkenness is attachment to what is one’s own, mind arising altered and disordered”	「慢謂對他心自舉性」 tr. “pride is the nature of mind exalting itself against another” · 「憍謂染著自法為先，令心傲逸無所顧性」 tr. “self-intoxication is the nature of mind grown haughty and unrestrained, preceded by attachment to what is one’s own”〔T29 0021c12〕
non-conscience · shamelessness	want of disgrace · want of conscience〔Paramārtha 0180a03〕「偈曰：無羞不重德」 tr. “the verse says: want of disgrace is not honoring qualities”—the two names are interchanged (Paramārtha’s 「無羞」 tr. “want of disgrace” = Xuanzang’s 「無慚」 tr. “non-conscience” · Paramārtha’s 「無慚」 tr. “want of conscience” = Xuanzang’s 「無愧」 tr. “shamelessness”)	「於諸功德及有德者，無敬無崇、無所忌難、無所隨屬，說名無慚」 tr. “to have toward qualities and toward those who possess them no reverence and no esteem, nothing that gives one pause, and nothing to which one submits, is called non-conscience” · 「於此罪中不見怖畏說名無愧」 tr. “to see nothing to fear in such wrongdoing is called shamelessness”〔T29 0021a10〕
love · respect	loving delight · reverent regard〔Paramārtha 0180a19〕「愛樂及信此二異相云何」 tr. “what is the difference of characteristic between loving delight and confidence?”	「愛謂愛樂，體即是信」 tr. “love is loving delight, and its entity is confidence” · 「敬謂敬重，體即是慚」 tr. “respect is reverent regard, and its entity is conscience”〔T29 0021b03〕
mind · thought · consciousness	the same〔Paramārtha 0180c02〕「偈曰：心意識一義」 tr. “the verse says: mind, thought, and consciousness are one in sense”	「集起故名心，思量故名意，了別故名識」 tr. “because it gathers and gives rise it is called mind; because it deliberates it is called thought; because it discerns it is called consciousness”〔T29 0021c20〕
mode of apprehension	characteristic〔Paramārtha 0180c09〕「或說有相，是所緣境隨類差別能分別故」 tr. “or they are said to have a characteristic, because they can distinguish the object according to the differences of its classes”	「或名有行相，即於所緣品類差別等起行相故」 tr. “or they are called having a mode of apprehension, because upon the distinctions among the classes of the object they raise up a mode of apprehension”〔T29 0021c28〕
associated (even in five senses)	associated (five kinds of evenness)〔Paramārtha 0180c12〕「有五種平等類為相應義，謂依止境界取相時物平等等」 tr. “there are five kinds of evenness constituting the sense of association, namely evenness of support, of object, of the taking of a characteristic, of time, and of thing”	「有五義故，謂心心所五義平等故說相應，所依所緣行相時事皆平等故」 tr. “because of five senses: mind and mental factors are even in five senses and are therefore said to be associated, since support, object, mode of apprehension, time, and entity are all even”〔T29 0022a01〕
formations not associated with mind	the unassociated formations〔Paramārtha 0180c15〕「偈曰：不相應諸行，至非至同分，無想處二定，壽命及諸相名聚等」 tr. “the verse says: the unassociated formations—attainment, non-attainment, commonality, the non-percipient state, the two absorptions, lifespan, the characteristics, the name-collections, and the rest”	「如是諸法心不相應，非色等性，行蘊所攝，是故名心不相應行」 tr. “dharmas such as these are not associated with mind and are not of the nature of form and the rest, yet are included in the aggregate of formations, and are therefore called formations not associated with mind”〔T29 0022a08〕
acquisition (obtaining · possession)	attainment〔Paramārtha 0180c18〕「偈曰：於中至得及同隨」 tr. “the verse says: within it, attainment and what follows along”	「得有二種，一者未得已失今獲、二者得已不失成就」 tr. “acquisition is of two kinds: first, what has not been acquired or has been acquired and lost, now obtained; second, what has been acquired and not lost, possessed”〔T29 0022a13〕
non-acquisition	non-attainment〔Paramārtha 0180c20〕「翻此名非至，義至自成」 tr. “the reverse of this is called non-attainment, the sense of which follows of itself”	「應知非得與此相違」 tr. “it should be known that non-acquisition is the contrary of this”〔T29 0022a14〕
ordinary-being status	worldling’s status〔Paramārtha 0182a12〕「偈曰：許聖道非至凡夫性」 tr. “the verse says: the non-attainment of the noble path is granted to be the worldling’s status”	「由許聖道非得，說名異生性故」 tr. “because the non-acquisition of the noble path is granted to be what is called ordinary-being status”〔T29 0023b17〕; the root treatise as cited here reads 「云何異生性？謂不獲聖法」 tr. “what is ordinary-being status? It is not obtaining the noble dharmas”〔0023b18〕
seed (continuum · transformation · distinctiveness)	seed〔Paramārtha 0181b13〕「何法名種子？是名色於生果有能」 tr. “what dharma is called a seed? It is name and form having the capability of producing a result”	「謂名與色於生自果所有展轉隣近功能，此由相續轉變差別」 tr. “it is the capability—serially transmitted or immediately proximate—that name and form have with respect to producing their own result; and this is by continuum, transformation, and distinctiveness”〔T29 0022c12〕
acquisition of the acquisition (minor acquisition) · acquisition of the dharma (major acquisition)	attainment of the attainment〔Paramārtha 0182b06〕「第一本法，第二本法至得，第三至得至得」 tr. “first the root dharma, second the attainment of the root dharma, third the attainment of the attainment”	「第一本法、第二法得、第三得得」 tr. “first the root dharma, second the acquisition of the dharma, third the acquisition of the acquisition”〔T29 0023c11〕

All the technical terms of this unit have the treatise’s own explanatory sentences, and so the ancient transcriptions are not set out separately; romanized Sanskrit is attached only where attested by ancient transmission, and this unit adds none, so the column is left empty and nothing is supplied. The full table of Paramārtha’s alternative names appears in Section IV.

III. Textual Collation (Taishō Original Notes · Complete Enumeration for Fascicle Four)

In this CBETA copy of T29n1558 the collation notes stand entirely in the end-of-fascicle note area (zero occurrences in the main text). Anchors falling within the compass of this unit〔0018b10–0024a01〕number eighty-four, of which fifty-three are notes on Sanskrit sound-values—by this apparatus’s convention phonetic notes are not variants and do not enter the table—and thirty-one are variant readings, fully enumerated below. The base follows the Taishō 【大】 reading; CBETA emends in five places (0019002 · 0019011 · 0020010 · 0021012 · 0022012), whose characters have entered the main text stream, the Taishō printing being recorded alongside.

Note no.	Anchor	Base text 【大】 / variants	Context (verbatim sentence containing the character)
0018013	0018c10	種界【大】，界種【宮】	「於木聚中有種種界。界謂種子」 tr. “within an aggregate of wood there are various elements; element means seed”—the order of characters in a scriptural citation
0019001	0019a06	何【大】，向【宮】	「向言心所，何者是耶？」 tr. “mental factors were spoken of above; what are they?”
0019002	0019a06	耶【CB】【麗-CB】【宋】【元】【明】【宮】，邪【大】	the final particle of the same sentence · the two graphs used interchangeably
0019011	0019b03	寶【CB】【石】，實【大】	「有說：於諦寶業果中現前忍許故名為信」 tr. “some say: it is called confidence because of the immediate acceptance and endorsement of the truths, the jewels, and karma and its results”—the objects of confidence are listed as truths, jewels, karma and result · consequential
0019013	0019b04	不【大】，〔－〕【宮】【石】	「不放逸者，修諸善法離諸不善法」 tr. “heedfulness is cultivating wholesome dharmas and keeping apart from unwholesome dharmas”—the Palace and Stone witnesses lack the character 「不」 tr. “not” · consequential
0019014	0019b07	耶【大】＊，邪【石】＊	「豈無經亦說有身輕安耶？」 tr. “does not a sūtra also speak of bodily pliancy?”
0019017	0019b23	求【大】，未【宮】，來【石】	「如是種類所餘諸法，此中應求，如彼理趣」 tr. “with such a class of cases the remaining dharmas should here be sought out, following the tenor of those”
0019022	0019c06	悍【大】，悼【石】	「怠謂懈怠，心不勇悍」 tr. “indolent means indolence, mind not vigorous”
0019025	0019c14	十【大】，為十【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「何者十？謂不信、懈怠、失念、心亂……」 tr. “which ten? Lack of confidence, indolence, lost mindfulness, distracted mind …”—the lemma citing the root treatise’s ten factors of the great defiled ground
0019026	0019c28	不【大】，不許【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「不說在大煩惱地法。於誰有過？」 tr. “it is not stated among the factors of the great defiled ground. Whose is the fault?”
0020010	0020c11	三【CB】【宮-CB】【宋】【元】【明】【宮】【石】，二【大】	「此相應品便有十三心所俱起」 tr. “this associated class would then have thirteen mental factors arising together”—the number under the masters abroad who grant that regret extends to the indeterminate · consequential
0021001	0021a07	無【大】，〔－〕【宮】	「論曰：此中無慚無愧別者，於諸功德及有德者」 tr. “the treatise says: the difference here between non-conscience and shamelessness is, toward qualities and toward those who possess them”
0021009	0021b22	遍【大】，過【宋】【元】【明】【宮】【石】	「心由尋伺不遍細麁，故於一心俱有作用」 tr. “mind, by applied and sustained thought, is not throughout fine or coarse, and so both have operation within one mind”—consequential
0021012	0021b24	曰【大】，因【宋】【元】【明】【宮】【石】，日【麗-CB】【CB】	「如水日光是凝釋，日體非凝釋」 tr. “as water and sunlight are congealing and melting, the entity of the sun is not congealing or melting”—the sun in the simile · consequential
0021013	0021c11	𣣋【大】，陵【宋】【元】【宮】，凌【明】【石】	「心自舉恃𣣋蔑於他故名為慢」 tr. “mind exalts and relies upon itself and slights another, and so it is called pride”—a variant graph
0021015	0021c17	想【大】，相【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「然心心所於契經中隨義建立種種名想」 tr. “yet mind and mental factors are given various names and designations in the sūtras according to the sense”
0022005	0022a16	有【大】，有有【宮】	「謂有為法若有墮在自相續中有得非得」 tr. “that is, among conditioned dharmas, those falling within one’s own continuum have acquisition and non-acquisition”
0022006	0022a20	傳【大】，得傳【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「故對法中傳說如是：誰成無漏法？」 tr. “and so in the Abhidharma it is transmitted thus: who possesses dharmas without outflows?”—the site of the marker of transmitted doubt · consequential
0022007	0022b15	作【大】，何【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「故彼所言得有作用，謂作所得諸法生因」 tr. “therefore what they say, that acquisition has an operation, namely being the cause of the arising of the dharmas acquired”
0022010	0022c06	知【大】，如【宮】	「謂斷善者由邪見力損所依中善根種子應知名斷」 tr. “that is, one whose wholesome roots are cut off, who by the force of wrong view damages the seeds of wholesome roots in his support—this should be known as cutting off”
0022011	0022c15	差【大】，善【宋】【元】	「何名差別？謂有無間生果功能」 tr. “what is called distinctiveness? The capability of producing a result without interval”—the third of the seed’s three senses · consequential
0022012	0022c17	耽【CB】【宋】【元】【明】【宮】【石】，既【大】，躭【麗-CB】	「彼說：耽著貪煩惱者，不能厭捨，故名成就」 tr. “that says: one who indulges in the affliction of greed cannot turn away from it, and so is said to possess it” · consequential
0023001	0023a06	道【大】，其道【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「道諦得，唯無漏故」 tr. “the acquisition of the truth of the path is without outflows alone”
0023002	0023a07	無【大】，有無【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「唯無漏故。無繫法得，有四種」 tr. “without outflows alone. An unbound dharma’s acquisition is of four kinds”
0023003	0023a08	非【大】，〔－〕【宮】【石】	「若無學法得唯無學，非學非無學得有差別」 tr. “a dharma beyond training has an acquisition beyond training only; the acquisition of what is neither of training nor beyond training admits of a distinction”—the Palace and Stone witnesses lack one 「非」 tr. “not” · consequential
0023004	0023a25	耳通【大】，起道【宮】	「除眼耳通及能變化」 tr. “save for the superknowledges of the eye and ear and what is capable of transformation”—the lemma on the stanza’s 「除二通變化」 tr. “save for the two superknowledges and transformation” · consequential
0023005	0023a27	收【大】，故【宋】【元】【明】	「雖是無覆無記性收，而有前後及俱起得」 tr. “though included in the unobscured-indeterminate quality, it has acquisitions preceding, following, and arising together”
0023006	0023b23	性【大】＊，姓【宮】＊	「諸佛世尊亦不成就聲聞獨覺種性聖法，應名異生」 tr. “the Buddhas, the World-Honored Ones, also do not possess the noble dharmas of the śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha lineages, and should be called ordinary beings”
0023007	0023c03	位【大】，別【石】	「謂曾未生聖法相續分位差別名異生性」 tr. “the difference of station within a continuum in which noble dharmas have never yet arisen is called ordinary-being status”—the sentence establishing the Sautrāntika ordinary-being status · consequential
0023008	0023c09	復【大】，得【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「應言此二各復有餘得及非得」 tr. “it should be said that these two each have a further acquisition and non-acquisition”
0023009	0023c18	諸【大】，謂【宋】【元】【明】【宮】	「如是諸得後後轉增」 tr. “in this way the acquisitions increase further and further one after another”

Collation conclusion: of the thirty-one items, twelve are doctrinally consequential (0018013 · 0019011 · 0019013 · 0020010 · 0021009 · 0021012 · 0022006 · 0022011 · 0022012 · 0023003 · 0023004 · 0023007), the rest being particles and variant graphs. Not one rises to a case for emending the established text—none has both supports of ‘an ancient master’s lemma agreeing with the variant’ and doctrinal reasoning; the commentaries’ lemmas all read with the Taishō base. Variants are recorded alongside for reference, and the choice among them is a doctrinal judgment. Where the Taishō original note gathers the Song, Yuan, and Ming under 【三】, this table sets them out separately according to the witness sigla.

IV. Comparison with Paramārtha’s Earlier Translation (Expository Treatise on the Treasury of Abhidharma, T1559 ★)

Base of comparison: Xuanzang’s Fascicle Four〔T29n1558 0018b10–0024a01〕↔ Paramārtha’s text〔T29n1559 0177c11–0182b19〕.

Verification of the fascicle boundary (the two translations divide independently, and here the boundary agrees): beneath the title of Fascicle Three of Paramārtha’s Expository Treatise〔T29n1559 0177c07〕 there follows at once 「釋論中分別根品之二」 tr. “within the Expository Treatise, the Chapter Analyzing the Faculties, part two”〔0177c11〕, immediately followed by 「偈曰：於欲界八物，無聲根隣虛」 tr. “the verse says: in the desire realm eight things, the next-to-the-void without sound or faculty”〔0177c16〕—exactly the same opening as Xuanzang’s Root Stanza 23 at the head of Fascicle Four, 「欲微聚無聲，無根有八事」 tr. “in the desire realm a minute aggregate without sound and without faculty has eight entities”〔T29 0018b20〕. The two versions do not, however, agree at the fascicle’s end: Paramārtha’s Fascicle Three continues past 「何法名同分」 tr. “what dharma is called commonality”〔0182b20〕 and further, containing the topics of commonality, non-perception, and the two absorptions, down to the fascicle-end title〔0184b26〕; whereas Xuanzang closes Fascicle Four at 「況第二等」 tr. “still less those of a second and the rest”〔0023c24〕, commonality and what follows entering Fascicle Five. Hence the two translations agree at the head of this unit and differ at its end.

Basic difference of format: Xuanzang gives 「頌曰／論曰」 tr. “the stanza says / the treatise says” with the whole stanza first; Paramārtha gives 「偈曰／釋曰」 tr. “the verse says / the explanation says,” embedding the explanation line by line, so that one stanza is often broken and cited in two to four places (for Root 25 of this unit Paramārtha reads 「受作意想欲、觸慧念思惟，相了定十法，遍於一切心」 tr. “feeling, attention, perception, desire; contact, discernment, mindfulness, deliberation; characteristic-discernment and concentration—these ten dharmas pervade every mind”〔0178b09〕, the order of the ten dharmas differing from Xuanzang’s 「受想思觸欲，慧念與作意，勝解三摩地」 tr. “feeling, perception, volition, contact, desire; discernment, mindfulness, and attention; resolve and concentration”〔T29 0019a14〕).

Principal items of comparison (nine doctrinally load-bearing):

The establishing of the five classes: 「謂一切法略有五品：一色、二心、三心所、四心不相應行、五無為」 tr. “that is, all dharmas fall in brief into five classes: first form, second mind, third mental factors, fourth formations not associated with mind, fifth the unconditioned”〔Xuanzang 0018b16〕 ‖ 「一切法有五品，一色、二心、三心法、四不相應、五無為」 tr. “all dharmas are of five classes: first form, second mind, third mental dharmas, fourth the unassociated, fifth the unconditioned”〔Paramārtha 0177c14〕—the number and order of the five classes agree entirely, only the names of the third and fourth differing (mental factors / mental dharmas · formations not associated with mind / the unassociated).
The minute aggregate: 「色聚極細立微聚名」 tr. “when the aggregation of form is finest the name minute aggregate is established”〔Xuanzang 0018b22〕 ‖ 「極細色聚說名隣虛」 tr. “the finest aggregate of form is called next to the void”〔Paramārtha 0177c17〕—Xuanzang takes 「微聚」 tr. “minute aggregate” as the name of the aggregate, Paramārtha takes 「隣虛」 tr. “next to the void” as the name of what is finest; and Paramārtha’s text has no analysis of the names 「事／處」 tr. “entity / sense field,” reading instead 「約物說物、為約入說物」 tr. “are things stated with reference to things, or with reference to the entrances?”〔0178a13〕.
Mind and mental factors necessarily together: 「心心所必俱，諸行相或得」 tr. “mind and mental factors necessarily together; formations, characteristics, and some with acquisition”〔Xuanzang 0018c29〕 ‖ 「偈曰：心心法必俱」 tr. “the verse says: mind and mental dharmas are necessarily together”〔Paramārtha 0178a26〕 plus 「偈曰：一切共行相」 tr. “the verse says: all together with the characteristics”〔0178a27〕 plus 「偈曰：與得」 tr. “the verse says: with attainment”〔0178b01〕—one stanza broken into three places.
The ten factors of the great ground: Xuanzang lists 「受想思觸欲，慧念與作意，勝解三摩地」 tr. “feeling, perception, volition, contact, desire; discernment, mindfulness, and attention; resolve and concentration” ‖ Paramārtha lists 「受作意想欲、觸慧念思惟，相了定十法」 tr. “feeling, attention, perception, desire; contact, discernment, mindfulness, deliberation; characteristic-discernment and concentration—these ten dharmas”〔0178b09〕—the count of dharmas is the same ten, three names differ (volition / deliberation · resolve / characteristic-discernment · concentration in Xuanzang’s transcription against Paramārtha’s rendering), and the order of listing differs as well.
The ten factors of the great wholesome ground: 「信及不放逸，輕安捨慚愧，二根及不害，勤唯遍善心」 tr. “confidence and heedfulness, pliancy, equanimity, conscience, and shame, the two roots and non-harming, and diligence—these pervade wholesome minds alone”〔Xuanzang 0019a29〕 ‖ 「信不放逸安、捨羞及慚愧、二根非逼惱、精進恒於善」 tr. “confidence, heedfulness, ease; equanimity, disgrace, and conscience and shame; the two roots, non-oppression; vigor—constantly upon the wholesome”〔Paramārtha 0178b21〕—pliancy / ease · non-harming / non-oppression · diligence / vigor.
The six factors of the great defiled ground: 「癡逸怠不信，惛掉恒唯染」 tr. “delusion, heedlessness, indolence, lack of confidence, torpor, restlessness—constant and defiled alone”〔Xuanzang 0019c03〕 ‖ 「癡放逸懈怠、無信無安掉，恒在染」 tr. “delusion, heedlessness, indolence; lack of confidence, want of ease, restlessness—constantly in the defiled”〔Paramārtha 0178c22〕—torpor / want of ease (Paramārtha names it by the reverse of 「安」 tr. “ease”).
The two factors of the great unwholesome ground: 「唯遍不善心，無慚及無愧」 tr. “pervading unwholesome minds alone: non-conscience and shamelessness”〔Xuanzang 0020a09〕 ‖ 「偈曰：若惡，及無羞無慚」 tr. “the verse says: if evil, then want of disgrace and want of conscience”〔Paramārtha 0179a21〕—the two names are interchanged (see Section II).
The ten factors of the small defiled ground: 「忿覆慳嫉惱，害恨諂誑憍」 tr. “rage, concealment, avarice, envy, vexation; harmfulness, resentment, flattery, deception, self-intoxication”〔Xuanzang 0020a16〕 ‖ 「嫌恨諂嫉妬、佷覆及慳悋、誑醉并逼惱」 tr. “dislike, resentment, flattery, envy; obstinacy, concealment, and stinginess; deception, intoxication, and oppression”〔Paramārtha 0179a24〕—the count of dharmas is the same ten, and the matching of the individual names is not adjudicated in this section (Paramārtha’s 「醉」 tr. “intoxication” answers to Xuanzang’s 「憍」 tr. “self-intoxication” · Paramārtha’s 「逼惱」 tr. “oppression” answers to Xuanzang’s 「害」 tr. “harmfulness,” but no text states the matching of 「嫌／佷」 tr. “dislike / obstinacy” with Xuanzang’s 「忿／恨」 tr. “rage / resentment,” and so they are listed without adjudication).
The times of non-acquisition: 「謂現在法決定無有現在非得，唯有過去未來非得」 tr. “that is, a present dharma definitely has no present non-acquisition, but only a past and a future non-acquisition”〔Xuanzang 0023b12〕 ‖ 「現世法非至得但現世，若過去、未來法非至得各有三世」 tr. “the non-attainment of a present dharma is present only; the non-attainment of past and future dharmas each has the three times”〔Paramārtha 0182a07〕—the sense of the two texts is exactly opposite. All three commentaries have remarks here; see Section VI and the Further Resonances. This section records only and does not adjudicate.

Table of rendered names (within the compass of this unit, as attested word for word): minute aggregate / next to the void · entity / thing · mental factor / mental dharma · factors of the great ground / great ground · factors of the great wholesome ground / wholesome great ground · factors of the great defiled ground / affliction great ground · factors of the great unwholesome ground / evil great ground · factors of the small defiled ground / small affliction ground · pliancy / ease · non-harming / non-oppression · diligence / vigor · torpor / want of ease · restlessness / disturbance · lost mindfulness / forgotten mindfulness · incorrect knowing / non-discernment · improper attention / improper deliberation · wrong resolve / wrong characteristic-discernment · applied and sustained thought / apprehension and examination · pride and self-intoxication / pride and drunkenness · non-conscience and shamelessness / want of disgrace and want of conscience · love and respect / loving delight and reverent regard · resolve / characteristic-discernment · concentration in transcription / concentration rendered · attention / attention · formations not associated with mind / the unassociated formations · acquisition / attainment · non-acquisition / non-attainment · ordinary-being status / worldling’s status · commonality / commonality · “the stanza says, the treatise says” / “the verse says, the explanation says” · monk in Xuanzang’s transcription / monk in Paramārtha’s · Aśvajit in Xuanzang’s rendering by sense / Aśvajit in Paramārtha’s transcription · pudgala / person · Vaibhāṣika masters / Vaibhāṣika masters · Sautrāntika masters / Sautrāntika masters—each with its first occurrence attached (Section II and this section).

The choice among variant readings and the weighing of the two translations are doctrinal judgments; this section records only and does not adjudicate. Xuanzang’s wording may not be used to search Paramārtha’s text—Paramārtha’s renderings form a system of their own, and comparison across the two texts is made throughout by the structure of the scene (who, to whom, asking what, on what ground, receiving what answer).

V. Debate within the Abhidharma Lineage (Saṅghabhadra’s Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle T1562 ★ · Recorded Where Present)

The passage of Saṅghabhadra’s Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle, 「辯差別品第二」 tr. “Chapter Two, Analyzing the Differences,” answering to this unit begins at the lemma on 「欲微聚無聲」 tr. “in the desire realm a minute aggregate without sound”〔T29n1562 0383c08〕 and ends below the lemma on 「非得淨無記」 tr. “non-acquisition is pure and indeterminate”〔0399a17〕. Saṅghabhadra calls Vasubandhu 「經主」 tr. “the Sūtra-master,” and calls the Sautrāntika forerunner 「上座」 tr. “the Elder.” Within the compass of this unit 「經主」 tr. “the Sūtra-master” is expressly marked in six places, 「上座」 tr. “the Elder” in fifteen, and 「譬喻者」 tr. “the masters of similes” in three—seven doctrinally load-bearing items are selected and all are recorded.

The number of the factors of the great ground (the refutation of the Elder’s 「唯三」 tr. “three only”)—Saṅghabhadra: 「彼上座言：無如所計十大地法，此但三種，經說俱起受想思故」 tr. “that Elder says: there are no ten factors of the great ground as reckoned; these are of three kinds only, since the sūtra speaks of feeling, perception, and volition arising together”〔T1562 0384b12〕; and he refutes: 「上座所言大地唯三，極為迷謬」 tr. “the Elder’s statement that the great ground is three only is exceedingly deluded and mistaken”〔0388b23〕, proving by scripture that desire and the rest really have separate entities: 「由此契經現證欲等實有別體，是大地法」 tr. “by this sūtra it is directly proved that desire and the rest really have separate entities and are factors of the great ground”〔0388c03〕. The Kośa passage opposed: the list of the ten factors of the great ground at Root 25〔T29 0019a14〕.
The contrariety of attention and equanimity (against the Sūtra-master’s objection)—Saṅghabhadra: 「經主所難，謂有警覺無警覺性，作意與捨應互相違，如是善成」 tr. “the objection of the Sūtra-master, that having alertness and being without alertness make attention and equanimity mutually contrary, is thus well disposed of”〔T1562 0392b12〕; his solution stands in the preceding text, 「捨如持稱進止平等，故捨與勤更相隨順」 tr. “equanimity, like holding a balance, is even in advancing and halting, and so equanimity and diligence conform to one another”〔0392b10〕. The Kośa passage opposed: 「如何可說於一心中有警覺性、無警覺性？作意與捨二相應起」 tr. “how can it be said that within one mind there is alertness and the absence of alertness? Attention and equanimity arising in association”〔T29 0019b17〕.
Why torpor is not among the root treatise’s ten—Saṅghabhadra: 「然此惛沈無明覆故，本論不說為大煩惱地法」 tr. “yet because this torpor is covered by ignorance, the root treatise does not state it as a factor of the great defiled ground”〔T1562 0391c14〕. The Kośa passage opposed: the challenge from 「又於彼論不說惛沈」 tr. “and further, that treatise does not state torpor”〔T29 0019c13〕 onward.
All mental factors are really existent—Saṅghabhadra: 「如前所說，一切心所應知其性皆是實有」 tr. “as stated above, it should be known that the nature of every mental factor is really existent”〔T1562 0392a10〕. This is Saṅghabhadra’s concluding thesis upon the five classes of mental factors.
The separate regard of self and other in non-conscience and shamelessness (charging the Sūtra-master with a crosswise objection)—Saṅghabhadra: 「由此已釋，經主此中誤取彼情橫申過難」 tr. “by this it is already explained: the Sūtra-master here mistakes their meaning and presses a crosswise objection”〔T1562 0393b23〕, referring to the Kośa’s objection 「若爾，此二所觀不同，云何俱起？」 tr. “if so, the two differ in what they regard; how can they arise together?”〔T29 0021a18〕.
Whether acquisition is a separate real thing—Saṅghabhadra: 「經主此中作如是問：何緣知有別物名得」 tr. “the Sūtra-master here asks thus: on what ground is it known that there is a separate thing called acquisition”〔T1562 0397a12〕, answering by the sūtra 「應知如是補特伽羅，成就善法及不善法」 tr. “it should be known that such a pudgala possesses wholesome and unwholesome dharmas”〔0397a14〕, and disposing of the objection about the wheel-turning monarch’s seven treasures: 「王於七寶自在無礙，名成就故」 tr. “because the king has unobstructed sovereignty over the seven treasures, this is called possession”〔0397a16〕. The Kośa passage opposed: the long dispute from〔T29 0022a29〕onward.
Seed and ordinary-being status—Saṅghabhadra: 「經主於中雖隨自執多有所說而無所成，所執種子理不成故」 tr. “the Sūtra-master, though he says much here according to his own position, accomplishes nothing, for the seed he posits does not hold good in reason”〔T1562 0398b20〕, and lists the seed’s alternative names 「或名隨界、或名熏習、或名功能、或名不失、或名增長」 tr. “it is called accompanying element, or perfuming, or capability, or non-loss, or increase”〔0398b27〕; and on ordinary-being status he says 「若異生性無別有體，便違此經」 tr. “if ordinary-being status had no separate entity, this sūtra would be contradicted”〔0399b21〕. The Kośa passages opposed: the three senses of seed〔T29 0022c12〕and the Sautrāntika account of ordinary-being status〔0023c02〕.

「一義二宗」 tr. “one meaning and two schools” are recorded together, with no verdict as to which prevails (no entering into sectarian dispute). Saṅghabhadra’s counter-refutations upon this unit are densest in the passage on acquisition and non-acquisition (0397a–0399b), matching the extent of the Kośa’s long dispute there. The Treatise Revealing the Doctrine T1563 also has a full text for the passage answering to this unit〔T29n1563 0799a22–0805b19〕, beginning at the same stanza 「欲微聚無聲，無根有八事」 tr. “in the desire realm a minute aggregate without sound and without faculty has eight entities” and stopping at the end of the passage on acquisition and non-acquisition (the following passage on commonality already belonging to Unit 3); its manner, however, is an abridgment stating the school’s position positively, and throughout the passage there is no marking of 「經主」 tr. “the Sūtra-master” or 「上座」 tr. “the Elder” (swept word by word: 「經主」 tr. “the Sūtra-master,” zero occurrences · 「上座」 tr. “the Elder,” zero occurrences), so that no separately established counter-refutation can be attached from it. The counter-refutations recorded in this section come from the Treatise Conforming to Correct Principle alone.

VI. Divergent Interpretations of the Commentators (Puguang · Fabao · Yuanhui · Shentai)

(i) Form Definitely Arising Together · The Minute Aggregate

Whether the minute aggregate is provisional or real—Puguang: 「微聚是假，假必依實」 tr. “a minute aggregate is provisional, and what is provisional must rest on what is real”〔T41n1821 0070b13〕, and he distinguishes two “minutes”: 「應知微有二種：一色聚微，即極少八事俱生不可減也，此論據斯說。二極微微，即色極少更不可分，《正理》據此說」 tr. “it should be known that ‘minute’ is of two kinds: first, the minute that is an aggregate of form, namely the least possible eight entities arising together, which cannot be reduced—this treatise speaks on that basis; second, the minute that is an ultimate atom, namely the least possible form, which cannot be divided further—the Correct Principle speaks on that basis”〔0070b24〕. Fabao takes the second as better: 「極微非聚，微是七微，聚色之中微聚最細」 tr. “an ultimate atom is not an aggregate; a ‘minute’ is seven atoms, and among aggregated form the minute aggregate is finest”〔T41n1822 0525a05〕, and judges 「二釋之中後釋為善」 tr. “of the two explanations the later is the better”〔0525a11〕. Yuanhui takes the treatise’s text directly and marks the word 「欲」 tr. “desire” separately: 「欲謂欲界，微是細義，非極微也」 tr. “‘desire’ means the desire realm; ‘minute’ has the sense of fine and does not mean the ultimate atom”〔T41n1823 0840a04〕.
Increase of entity and increase of operation—Puguang records that the Correct Principle takes increase of entity and refutes increase of operation, and records that the author of the treatise takes increase of operation as his own school’s position〔T41n1821 0071b17〕onward. Fabao rejects both: 「然詳體增、用增，未為盡理」 tr. “yet examined closely, increase of entity and increase of operation have not exhausted the reasoning”〔T41n1822 0526a26〕, and further says 「故知法性隨緣不定」 tr. “hence it is known that the nature of dharmas is indeterminate as conditions vary”〔0526a29〕.
Whether there is sound within the body—Puguang cites the assessors of the Mahāvibhāṣā, 「雖一身中必有聲界，非諸身分皆悉遍發聲」 tr. “though within one body there is necessarily the element of sound, not every part of the body emits sound throughout”〔T41n1821 0071a03〕, to reconcile the Treatise on the Development of Wisdom’s constant possession of sound with this treatise’s eight entities without sound. Shentai’s commentary cites the Treatise Establishing the Real in support besides〔X53n0836 0033c10〕onward.

(ii) The Establishing and Rejecting of the Five Classes of Mental Factors

Establishing and rejecting by a single sense (the treatise’s own capacity)—Puguang: 「今依此論，各以一義廢立大地法等。此乃論能，非關人解」 tr. “following this treatise now, the factors of the great ground and the rest are established and rejected each by a single sense. This is the treatise’s own capacity and is not a matter of anyone’s interpretation”〔T41n1821 0074a07〕; on the factors of the great ground he says 「有古德五義廢立，今依此論一義廢立大地法者，謂遍於一切心，名大地法」 tr. “there are ancient masters who establish and reject by five senses; following this treatise now, the factors of the great ground are established and rejected by one sense, namely pervading every mind, and are called factors of the great ground”〔0074a09〕; on the factors of the great defiled ground, 「恒染，顯遍染心。唯染，顯不通淨」 tr. “‘constantly defiled’ shows that they pervade defiled minds; ‘defiled alone’ shows that they do not extend to the pure”〔0076c28〕; on the factors of the small defiled ground, 「今依此論，一義廢立少煩惱地法十，謂唯修所斷」 tr. “following this treatise now, the ten factors of the small defiled ground are established and rejected by one sense, namely being abandoned through cultivation alone”〔0078a24〕.
Shentai follows the same track and records the old masters’ numbers—「今依俱舍，但一義立，謂通於一切心」 tr. “following the Kośa now, they are established by one sense only, namely extending to every mind”〔X53n0836 0035b19〕; above this he records the old masters: 「如猶論師五義建立通大地」 tr. “the treatise master Ruyou establishes what pervades the great ground by five senses” · 「長耳三藏具八通，無八居，立通大地。烋法師具九義，立通大地」 tr. “the Tripiṭaka Master Chang’er, with eight extending senses and without eight seats, establishes what pervades the great ground; Master Xiu, with nine senses, establishes what pervades the great ground”〔0035b18〕—the divergence of the old masters’ five, eight, and nine senses is fully listed only in Shentai’s commentary.
Yuanhui’s two-sense form—on the factors of the great ground: 「此十心所遍三性等一切心品，諸餘心所即不能遍，故於此獨名大地法」 tr. “these ten mental factors pervade every class of mind of the three qualities and the rest, while the remaining mental factors cannot so pervade, and so these alone are called factors of the great ground”〔T41n1823 0840c09〕; on the factors of the great defiled ground: 「此上六種，一則唯染、二則遍染，具此兩義，獨得大煩惱地法名」 tr. “these six above are, first, defiled alone and, second, pervading the defiled; possessing both senses, they alone receive the name of factors of the great defiled ground”〔0841a25〕; on the factors of the small defiled ground: 「謂有三義：一唯修所斷、二意識地起與無明相應、三各別現行」 tr. “there are three senses: first, abandoned through cultivation alone; second, arising on the ground of mental consciousness and associated with ignorance; third, operating each separately”〔0841b23〕. Fabao instead makes a fourfold discrimination for each ground-factor, as with the factors of the great wholesome ground: 「有，唯是善不遍善心，謂欣、厭也。有遍善心非唯是善，謂大地法」 tr. “there are those wholesome alone that do not pervade wholesome minds, namely gladness and aversion. There are those pervading wholesome minds that are not wholesome alone, namely the factors of the great ground”〔T41n1822 0528a20〕.

(iii) Explanations of the Individual Dharmas

Confidence—Yuanhui sets a simile: 「信者，澄淨也，如水清珠能清濁水，心有信珠，令心澄淨」 tr. “confidence is clarifying: as a water-clearing gem can clear turbid water, so mind having the gem of confidence is made clear and settled”〔T41n1823 0840c20〕. Puguang cites the same simile from the Entrance into Abhidharma more fully: 「如水清珠置於池內，令濁穢水皆即澄淨。如是信珠在心池內，心諸濁穢皆即除遣」 tr. “as a water-clearing gem placed in a pool makes all the turbid and foul water at once clear, so the gem of confidence within the pool of mind at once expels all mind’s turbidity and foulness”〔T41n1821 0075a18〕—the simile is of one source, Yuanhui’s brief and Puguang’s full.
Concentration—Yuanhui: 「三摩地者，此云等持，平等持心於一境轉，亦持心所，從強說心」 tr. “concentration is here rendered ‘even holding’: it evenly holds mind as it turns upon a single object, and holds the mental factors too, being spoken of as mind from what is strongest”〔T41n1823 0840c07〕.
The name of mind—Puguang: 「梵名質多，此云心，是集起義」 tr. “its Sanskrit name is citta, here rendered mind, having the sense of gathering and giving rise”〔T41n1821 0083b05〕. Shentai sets a simile: 「集起故名心，如樹有心能集起枝條花果」 tr. “because it gathers and gives rise it is called mind, as a tree has a heart that can gather and give rise to branches, flowers, and fruit”〔X53n0836 0040c02〕; and he explains the name mental factor thus: 「如自在名我，我必有所，於所自在，心自在故」 tr. “as what is sovereign is called ‘self,’ and a self necessarily has what belongs to it and is sovereign over what belongs to it, so mind is sovereign”〔0035a17〕.
Mode of apprehension—Yuanhui: 「如緣青境心及心所，皆帶青上影像，此識上相名為行相」 tr. “as when mind and mental factors take a blue object, they all carry the image of blue upon them, and this characteristic upon consciousness is called the mode of apprehension”〔T41n1823 0843c18〕. Puguang sets a mirror simile: 「此所現者名為行相」 tr. “what so appears is called the mode of apprehension”〔T41n1821 0083c01〕 · 「猶如明鏡對眾色相皆現鏡面，此所現像而非所照，然約像現說鏡能照」 tr. “as a bright mirror facing many forms has them all appear on its face, what so appears is not what is illumined, and yet from the appearing of the image the mirror is said to illumine”〔0083c03〕.
Regret—Yuanhui: 「惡作是境，非追悔也。今名追悔為惡作者，從境為名也」 tr. “the evil deed done is the object, not the repenting; repenting is now called an evil deed done because it is named from its object”〔T41n1823 0841c28〕.
The grounds for what is removed in the upper realms—Puguang: 「定所滋潤，無瞋等惑不善法故無不善，無憂根故無惡作，無叚食故無睡眠」 tr. “moistened by concentration, there are no unwholesome dharmas such as the affliction of hatred and so nothing unwholesome; there is no sorrow faculty and so no regret; there is no food taken in portions and so no sleep”〔T41n1821 0080c05〕. Yuanhui follows the same track more plainly: 「除惡作者，惡作與憂根相應，色界離憂，故無惡作。除睡眠者，色界無段食，故無睡眠也」 tr. “as for removing regret: regret is associated with the sorrow faculty, and the form realm is free of sorrow, and so there is no regret. As for removing sleep: the form realm has no food taken in portions, and so there is no sleep”〔T41n1823 0842c11〕.
“Beloved of the gods”—Puguang: 「西方相弄呼為天愛，非能自活天愛得存」 tr. “in the western regions they call one another in jest ‘beloved of the gods,’ meaning one who cannot keep himself alive but survives by the gods’ love”〔T41n1821 0077b03〕. Shentai: 「西方呼愚痴人為天愛養，名天愛也」 tr. “in the western regions a foolish person is called ‘nurtured by the gods’ love,’ and so is named ‘beloved of the gods’”〔X53n0836 0036c07〕.
The acquisition of the acquisition (the minor acquisition)—Puguang: 「法之得故名為法得，即是大得。大得之得名為得得，即小得也」 tr. “because it is the acquisition of the dharma it is called the acquisition of the dharma, which is the major acquisition; the acquisition of the major acquisition is called the acquisition of the acquisition, which is the minor acquisition”〔T41n1821 0092a13〕. Shentai sets a simile at the passage on acquisitions without limit: 「如秋細霧遍滿十方」 tr. “like a fine autumn mist filling all ten directions”〔X53n0836 0046c07〕.
The name ordinary-being status—Yuanhui cites the Mahāvibhāṣā: 「尊者世友作如是說：『能令有情起異類見、異類煩惱，造異類業，受異類生，故名異生。』」 tr. “the Venerable Vasumitra speaks thus: ‘because it causes sentient beings to give rise to views of differing classes and afflictions of differing classes, to do karma of differing classes and to take birth of differing classes, it is called an ordinary being.’”〔T41n1823 0847c03〕.
Pudgala—Yuanhui: 「此云數取趣，謂數取諸趣也」 tr. “here rendered ‘one who repeatedly takes up destinies,’ meaning that he repeatedly takes up the several destinies”〔T41n1823 0843b11〕.

(iv) The Four Commentaries at Variance (Recorded Together, Not Adjudicated)

Whether all four great elements are necessarily inseparable from sound (Master Nian’s explanation)—Puguang records Master Tai’s refutation of Master Nian: 「泰法師解云：念法師若作斯釋，此大謬也」 tr. “Master Tai explains: if Master Nian makes such an explanation, this is a gross error”〔T41n1821 0071a17〕, while Puguang judges for himself 「今詳二德互有是非」 tr. “examined now, the two worthies are each partly right and partly wrong”〔0071a25〕. Fabao refutes both Puguang and Shentai in turn: 「泰師、光師妄解念法師意」 tr. “Master Tai and Master Guang wrongly construe Master Nian’s intent”〔T41n1822 0525c23〕 · 「念法師義既順論文，泰、光二師即謬破耳」 tr. “since Master Nian’s sense accords with the treatise’s text, Masters Tai and Guang refute him erroneously”〔0526a08〕. Among the four commentaries, this is the fiercest divergence.
Whether the minute aggregate is provisional or real—Puguang preserves the two “minutes” and judges that this treatise speaks on the basis of the minute that is an aggregate of form〔T41n1821 0070b24〕; Fabao judges outright that 「後釋為善」 tr. “the later explanation is the better”〔T41n1822 0525a11〕; Yuanhui does not touch on provisional and real and explains only that 「微是細義」 tr. “‘minute’ has the sense of fine”〔T41n1823 0840a05〕; Shentai cites the Correct Principle’s analysis of entity and operation and makes no judgment〔X53n0836 0034a12〕onward.
The assignment of pliancy to body and mind—Puguang, on the passage 「應知此中身輕安者身堪任性」 tr. “it should be known that the bodily pliancy spoken of here is the body’s workability,” judges outright that 「諸師多解此文是說一切有部答者，此解謬矣」 tr. “many masters explain this text as the Sarvāstivādins’ answer; this explanation is erroneous”〔T41n1821 0075b20〕; Fabao sets down his own note on the Sautrāntika objection, 「今詳此難非為切當」 tr. “examined now, this objection is not quite to the point”〔T41n1822 0528b16〕; Shentai construes the whole passage as nine rounds of question and answer between the Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas〔X53n0836 0035c25〕onward; Yuanhui passes over the passage.
The number of counteracting pairs—Shentai: 「自古諸師皆云：翻八有體……翻二無體，謂輕安無不輕安，翻捨無不捨者。不然。今依俱舍、正理論釋，翻十皆有體」 tr. “all the masters of old say: eight of the counterparts have entity … two of the counterparts have no entity, namely that pliancy has no non-pliancy and equanimity no non-equanimity. This is not so. Following the Kośa and the Correct Principle now in explanation, all ten counterparts have entity”〔X53n0836 0036b11〕, citing the older translation in evidence: 「故舊俱舍云：翻安為不安，不立煩惱大地，於誰有失」 tr. “therefore the old Kośa says: the counterpart of ease is unease, and it is not established as a factor of the great defiled ground—whose is the fault?”〔0036b13〕. Puguang and Fabao instead draw up large tables of ten direct counterparts and eleven indirect ones〔T41n1821 0078c12〕·〔T41n1822 0531a22〕, the dharma-headings of the two tables agreeing entirely save that Fabao writes 「翻掉舉為行捨」 tr. “the counterpart of restlessness is equanimity as a formation”〔0531b04〕 while Puguang writes 「翻掉舉為捨」 tr. “the counterpart of restlessness is equanimity”〔0078c21〕.
The older translation’s sentence on 「非得」 tr. “non-acquisition”—three commentaries alike mark it as an error of translation (see the Further Resonances and Section VIII): Puguang, 「舊《俱舍》云「現在法有現在非得者」，此翻謬矣」 tr. “the old Kośa reads ‘a present dharma has a present non-acquisition’; this translation is erroneous”〔T41n1821 0090a09〕; Yuanhui, 「舊云現在法有非得者，此翻謬矣」 tr. “the old version reads ‘a present dharma has a non-acquisition’; this translation is erroneous”〔T41n1823 0847a28〕; Shentai, 「舊俱舍云：現在法有現在非得者，翻譯謬也」 tr. “the old Kośa reads: ‘a present dharma has a present non-acquisition’—the translation is erroneous”〔X53n0836 0045c03〕. Fabao has no remark here; the gap is marked as it stands.

(v) Shentai’s Commentary (Incomplete Text · Fascicle Four Directly Explains 「分別根品第二之二」 tr. “Chapter Two, Analyzing the Faculties, part two”)

Fascicle Four of Shentai’s Commentary on the Kośa〔X53n0836 0033a21–0046c12〕directly explains the whole of this unit and can be attached passage by passage—the reverse of the missing explanation of Fascicle Three in Unit 1. Three features mark its manner: first, it numbers each passage (「一、問……二、答……三、總舉……」 tr. “first, the question … second, the answer … third, the general statement …”), the outline being the finest; second, it cites the original text of the Correct Principle and the Mahāvibhāṣā at each point for comparison; third, it takes Mahāyāna terminology for comparison from time to time (see Section VII). The mark established in Unit 1, ‘Shentai’s commentary is incomplete and survives in X,’ is not used for this unit.

VII. Cross-Reading with the Yogācāra Root Lineage (Linkage · Bridge ②)

This unit is itself the principal anchor of Bridge ②: the establishing of the five classes〔T29 0018b16〕「謂一切法略有五品：一色、二心、三心所、四心不相應行、五無為」 tr. “that is, all dharmas fall in brief into five classes: first form, second mind, third mental factors, fourth formations not associated with mind, fifth the unconditioned,” set against the Treatise on the Hundred Dharmas of the Mahāyāna T31n1614, 「一切法者略有五種：一者心法、二者心所有法、三者色法、四者心不相應行法、五者無為法」 tr. “all dharmas are in brief of five kinds: first, dharmas that are mind; second, dharmas belonging to mind; third, dharmas that are form; fourth, dharmas that are formations not associated with mind; fifth, unconditioned dharmas”〔T31 0855b16〕—the number of the five positions agrees and the order differs (the Kośa puts form first and mind after; the hundred dharmas put mind first and form after). Below, the agreements and differences are listed position by position, listed only and not adjudicated.

Position	The Kośa’s seventy-five dharmas (as set out in this unit)	The hundred dharmas (T31n1614)	Difference of opening and closing
mind (dharmas that are mind)	one mind (mind, thought, and consciousness one in entity〔T29 0021c18〕)	eight consciousnesses	one opened into eight
mental factors (dharmas belonging to mind)	forty-six—ten factors of the great ground〔0019a14〕· ten of the great wholesome ground〔0019a29〕· six of the great defiled ground〔0019c03〕· two of the great unwholesome ground〔0020a09〕· ten of the small defiled ground〔0020a16〕· eight indeterminate〔0020a21 and elsewhere〕	fifty-one—five omnipresent · five object-specific · eleven wholesome · six afflictions · twenty secondary afflictions · four indeterminate	the headings of the dharmas by station differ: the Kośa takes 「地」 tr. “ground” (pervading every mind / pervading the wholesome / pervading the defiled / pervading the unwholesome / a small portion of the defiled) as its criterion of station, while the hundred dharmas take 「遍行／別境」 tr. “omnipresent / object-specific” to divide the ten factors of the great ground into two
form	eleven (already listed in the Chapter on the Elements · this unit analyzes only the count of eight, nine, or ten entities in an aggregate of ultimate atoms〔0018b20〕)	eleven	the number agrees
formations not associated with mind	fourteen (general enumeration〔T29 0022a06〕「得非得同分，無想二定命，相名身等類」 tr. “acquisition, non-acquisition, commonality; the result of non-perception, the two absorptions, life; the characteristics, the name-bodies, and the like”)	twenty-four	fourteen opened into twenty-four
unconditioned	three (already listed in the Chapter on the Elements)	six	three opened into six

Cross-reading by the ancient masters themselves (citations · not made by anyone today):

Fabao, under the ten factors of the great ground, draws the comparison outright: 「有部之宗十法遍行，大乘之中唯五遍行」 tr. “the position of the Sarvāstivādins is that ten dharmas are omnipresent; in the Mahāyāna only five are omnipresent”〔T41n1822 0528a13〕—the difference between the ten factors of the great ground and the five omnipresent factors is already expressly marked by Fabao.
Fabao further records the difference of provisional and real under the factors of the small defiled ground: 「又此忿等，大乘中說謂嗔分等，故是假法。此宗皆是實有性」 tr. “moreover, rage and the rest are in the Mahāyāna said to be portions of hatred and the like, and so are provisional dharmas; in this school they are all of a really existent nature”〔T41n1822 0531a07〕.
Shentai, under the five senses of association, cites the Yogācārabhūmi for comparison: 「大乘影像相是蘊界處攝，得為所緣緣」 tr. “in the Mahāyāna the image-characteristic is included in the aggregates, elements, and sense fields, and can serve as the object condition”〔X53n0836 0040c13〕 · 「故瑜伽論云：所依同、所緣同、行相不同」 tr. “therefore the Yogācārabhūmi says: the support is the same, the object is the same, the mode of apprehension is not the same”〔0040c14〕; and at the end he matches them further with the two aspects, image and perceiving: 「行相如大乘相分，事平等如大乘見分也」 tr. “the mode of apprehension is like the image aspect in the Mahāyāna, and evenness of entity like the perceiving aspect in the Mahāyāna”〔0040c20〕—the difference between the Sarvāstivāda five evennesses and the Mahāyāna three samenesses is already marked by Shentai.

The Sautrāntika thread laid in this unit (what Bridge ③ hangs upon): in the passage on acquisition and non-acquisition the treatise cites the Sautrāntika doctrine of seeds—「謂名與色於生自果所有展轉隣近功能，此由相續轉變差別」 tr. “it is the capability—serially transmitted or immediately proximate—that name and form have with respect to producing their own result; and this is by continuum, transformation, and distinctiveness”〔T29 0022c12〕—and judges 「如是二途皆為善說」 tr. “both roads such as these are well stated”〔0022c21〕. In refuting, Saṅghabhadra lists five alternative names of the seed〔T1562 0398b27〕. This passage is the coordinate between the Sautrāntika seed and the later store-consciousness—the Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only, at the place where name and form depend on one another, says outright 「眼等轉識，攝在名中，此識若無，說誰為識」 tr. “the evolving consciousnesses beginning with the eye are included within ‘name’; if this consciousness were absent, what would be called consciousness?”〔T31n1585 0017a28〕 and thereby establishes the eighth. The two lineages are recorded together, with no verdict of merit and no judgment of great and small.

VIII. Translation History

The translator, the year, the translation bureau, the order of the two translations, and the occasion of the treatise’s composition are all set out in Section VIII of Unit 1’s apparatus and are not repeated here. Three facts of translation history attach to this unit:

The fascicle boundaries of the two translations coincide at the head of this unit—Fascicle Four of Xuanzang’s Kośa〔T29n1558 0018b10〕and Fascicle Three of Paramārtha’s Expository Treatise on the Kośa〔T29n1559 0177c07〕are each independent divisions, and yet both begin with 「分別根品第二之二」 tr. “Chapter Two, Analyzing the Faculties, part two”〔Xuanzang 0018b14〕 · 「釋論中分別根品之二」 tr. “within the Expository Treatise, the Chapter Analyzing the Faculties, part two”〔Paramārtha 0177c11〕, and both take the stanza on the aggregate of ultimate atoms as the first root stanza of the fascicle〔Xuanzang 0018b20〕·〔Paramārtha 0177c16〕. The two translations divide their fascicles independently and yet this boundary coincides; the end of the fascicle does not coincide (see Section IV).
One sentence of the older translation is alike marked by three commentaries as a mistranslation—Xuanzang’s version reads 「謂現在法決定無有現在非得」 tr. “that is, a present dharma definitely has no present non-acquisition”〔T29 0023b12〕, and Paramārtha’s reads 「現世法非至得但現世」 tr. “the non-attainment of a present dharma is present only”〔T29n1559 0182a07〕. Puguang〔T41n1821 0090a09〕, Yuanhui〔T41n1823 0847a28〕, and Shentai〔X53n0836 0045c03〕all three mark this sentence of the older translation outright as an error of translation. The three judgments are recorded together, with no verdict of merit; this section records this only as a fact of translation history.
The tradition of Kośa study before the new translation is attested—Shentai’s commentary twice cites the original text of the 「舊俱舍」 tr. “old Kośa” in evidence〔X53n0836 0036b13·0045c03〕; and Puguang and Fabao alike record the accounts of 「念法師」 tr. “Master Nian” and 「泰法師」 tr. “Master Tai” and their mutual refutations〔T41n1821 0071a06 onward〕·〔T41n1822 0525b19 onward〕. This attests that before Xuanzang’s new translation there was already in the Han lands a tradition of Kośa study based on Paramārtha’s version and on the Miscellaneous Heart Treatise, and that after the new translation the commentators still cited it for comparison.

IX. Edition Location Register

Xuanzang’s T1558, Fascicle Four (base text · the whole of this unit): fascicle title〔T29 0018b10〕· continued chapter title 0018b14 · the establishing of the five classes 0018b16 · Root 23, form definitely arising together, 0018b20 · Root 24 first half 0018c29 · Root 24 second half 0019a07 · Root 25, factors of the great ground, 0019a14 · Root 26, factors of the great wholesome ground, 0019a29 · Root 27 first half, factors of the great defiled ground, 0019c03 · Root 27 second half, factors of the great unwholesome ground, 0020a09 · Root 28, factors of the small defiled ground, 0020a16 · Roots 29–31, definite co-arising, 0020a24 · Root 32, the upper realms, 0020c17 · Root 33, non-conscience, shamelessness, love, respect, 0021a05 · Root 34, applied thought, sustained thought, pride, self-intoxication, 0021b16 · Root 35, mind, thought, and consciousness one in entity, 0021c18 · Root 36, formations not associated with mind, 0022a06 · Root 37, acquisition and non-acquisition, 0022a11 · Root 38 and Root 39 first half 0022c24 · Root 39 second half and Root 40 first half 0023a20 · Root 40 second half and Root 41 0023b08 · end of the fascicle 0023c24. Source file: the canonical-source layer.
Paramārtha’s T1559: the answering passage 0177c11–0182b19 (the first half of Fascicle Three); Fascicle Three title 0177c07 · fascicle-end title 0184b26 · commonality begins 0182b20 (already within the boundary of Xuanzang’s Fascicle Five).
Saṅghabhadra’s T1562: the debating passage for this unit 0383c08–0399b22; the chapter title 「辯差別品第二」 tr. “Chapter Two, Analyzing the Differences” appears at 0383b24 · 0389c16 · 0396c06. Item-by-item citation loci are in Section V.
Saṅghabhadra’s T1563: the passage answering to this unit 0799a22–0805b19 (the stanza on the minute aggregate of the desire realm 0799a22 · end of the passage on acquisition and non-acquisition 0805b19; the following passage on commonality begins at 0805b20 and belongs to Unit 3). Its manner is an abridgment stating the school’s position positively, and throughout the passage there is no marking of 「經主」 tr. “the Sūtra-master” or 「上座」 tr. “the Elder,” so no separately established counter-refutation can be attached.
Puguang’s Record, T1821, Fascicle Four: 0070a20 (fascicle title) · direct explanation 0070a23–0092c02 (fascicle-end title); Fascicle Five title 0092c07. Item-by-item loci are in Section VI.
Fabao’s Commentary, T1822, Fascicle Four: 0524c14 (fascicle title)–0540c25 (fascicle-end title); Fascicle Five title 0541a02. Item-by-item loci are in Section VI.
Yuanhui’s Verse Commentary, T1823, Fascicle Four: 0839c20 (fascicle title)–0847c18 (fascicle-end title); Fascicle Five title 0847c21. Item-by-item loci are in Section VI.
Shentai’s Commentary, X53n0836, Fascicle Four: 0033a21 (fascicle title) · chapter title 0033a23 –0046c12 (fascicle-end title) · continued chapter title 「分別根品第二之三」 tr. “Chapter Two, Analyzing the Faculties, part three” 0046c22. Shentai’s commentary is complete for this unit and this is not an incomplete stretch.
The hundred dharmas, T31n1614: the list of the five positions 0855b16 (the answering anchor of Bridge ②).
Collation: eighty-four collation anchors in Fascicle Four (thirty-one variants · fifty-three phonetic notes); all thirty-one variants are fully enumerated in Section III · no case for emending the established text.

俱舍論 俱生·心心所Abhidharmakośabhāṣya · Co-Arising · Mind and Mental Factors