大智度論 義疏通講 · 冊14Dazhidulun — Mahāprajñāpāramitā-upadeśa · Exposition Throughout · Vol. 14
願樂品Aspiration and Delight
全文五層 →Full five layers →願樂品：願樂二字何以是本品的總題，帝釋何以不先讚佛而先念發心者出一切眾生之上，隨喜心何以能以一髮渧海之喻格量到不可數知，不隨喜何以竟被判為魔眷屬，隨喜迴向何以要說不一不二相，非心非離心何以不是兩可之辭，須菩提何以在功德正盛時忽以心如幻詰佛，三番問答何以層層皆答不也，二離中云何有所得何以是全品最硬的一問，畢竟離何以反成能得菩提之由，佛說難而須菩提說不難何以師弟不相違，虛空幻人鏡像化人木人諸喻何以都落在無分別，一切法無分別何以仍有六道與四果之別，論主何以以胎中太子未即位王子歌羅頻伽鳥與沙彌四喻釋發心之勝，小乘人言與摩訶衍論中或有人言何以同名二邊
在問什麼
這一品問的是一件看似很淺、其實很硬的事：我看見別人行道有成，我這一念歡喜，有沒有分量？
品名「願樂」二字，出自品首帝釋的一念——他見菩薩行六波羅蜜乃至十八不共法時已出一切眾生之上，便說能發菩提意的這些眾生，「其餘眾生應當願樂」。願樂不是羨慕，也不是空泛的祝福，它在本品中有一個很具體的形狀：散華、發願、隨喜、迴向。帝釋把這四件事一氣做完，然後問佛一個數量上的問題——對初發意、久發意、阿鞞跋致、一生補處這幾位菩薩的功德起隨喜心，各得多少福德？佛的回答不是給一個數，是給兩重格量：四天下乃至三千大千世界都可稱知斤兩，隨喜心的福德不可稱量；三千大千世界滿中海水，取一髮破為百分、以一分髮渧取，尚可知渧數，隨喜心的福德不可數知。所比的是最大的量與最細的量，而所顯的只有一件事——這福德不在量的一路上。
帝釋接著把話說得極重：心不隨喜阿耨多羅三藐三菩提的，皆是魔眷屬，從魔中來生。一個看似柔軟的心行，何以判得這樣嚴？帝釋自己給了因——發心菩薩是為破魔境界而生的，所以隨喜心與魔境界正相對治。而他所教的隨喜有一個限制語：「以不一不二相故」。本品從這裡開始轉硬。
轉到最硬處的是須菩提。經文功德正盛之際，他忽然以「是心如幻」詰佛：心既如幻，云何能得菩提？佛不直答，反問三番，須菩提三答皆「不也」——初答自陳不見幻、不見心如幻，次答但言「不也！世尊！」，第三答自陳不見離幻離心如幻更有法得菩提。三番之後須菩提自出結論：一切法畢竟離，畢竟離則不應修不應壞，「二離中云何能有所得」。佛的回答出人意表：正因為畢竟離，所以能得；若非畢竟離，就不名般若乃至一切種智。全品的骨在此一轉。
其後是三段收尾。其一，佛說菩薩行深義而不證二乘是「能為難事」，須菩提卻說不為難——師弟之言相反，論主以世諦、第一義諦分判，並指出佛之所以說難、說不難，都是就聽者而設。其二，須菩提廣出虛空、幻人、鏡中像、佛所化人、工匠木人諸喻，諸喻皆落在無分別，末二喻（佛所化人、工匠木人）更添「能有所作」。其三，舍利弗承此而問：若一切法無分別，六道與四果之差別從何而來？須菩提報以顛倒受身、賢聖亦因無分別而有，末歸一句——菩薩應行無分別般若，行無分別般若已，便得無分別阿耨多羅三藐三菩提。
論段則是隨文而釋。論主先釋發心何以勝一切眾生，以胎中太子、未即位王子、歌羅頻伽鳥、六神通阿羅漢與沙彌四喻層層申之；並舉小乘人言與摩訶衍論中或有人言兩說，判為二邊而取中道。次釋善利、壽命中最、散華、罪福不可與人之問答、隨喜福田、破魔界、不一不二、非心不離心；再隨經文釋空心如幻之三番反問、指觸虛空之喻、定相則無四諦三寶之過；末釋難與不難之二諦分判、木人成事之喻、四河入海之喻、三結即顛倒與世諦假名。一頭一尾看：本品起於一念隨喜，終於無分別般若——隨喜之所以無量，正因為它是無分別的。
逐段解明
一、帝釋念發菩提意者出一切眾生之上，其餘眾生應當願樂。 品首不是佛說，是帝釋作念。他先舉菩薩行般若、禪、毘梨耶、羼提、尸羅、檀六波羅蜜乃至十八不共法之時，已「出一切眾生之上」，何況得菩提時；次說聞薩婆若而信者得人中善利、壽命中最，何況發菩提意者；末句纔落到品名——其餘眾生應當願樂。此處先問一句：何以把『聞而信』與「發意」分成兩級來說？答在層層遞進的句法裡——信是入門，發意是決定，而願樂是第三者對前二者的態度。讀者莫把願樂讀成旁觀者的客套：帝釋是把它列在信與發意之後，作為同一條路上的一階。
二、帝釋散曼陀羅華發願，並問四位菩薩隨喜幾許福德。 帝釋隨念而行：以天曼陀羅華散佛上，發願令求菩提者具足佛法、一切種智、自然法，令求聲聞者具足聲聞法；自誓終不生一念令菩薩轉還、亦不令其轉還墮二乘地；又願諸菩薩倍復精進，並代述菩薩之願——「我既自度，亦當度未度者」乃至「我既滅度，當使未入滅度者得滅度」；末乃發問：於初發意、久發意、阿鞞跋致、一生補處菩薩功德隨喜心，各得幾許福德？此段須看清帝釋的次第：先散華，次發願，次自誓不退他人之心，末纔問福德。問福德放在最後，不是求報，是求解——他要知道自己這一念的分量。
三、佛以稱斤兩與一髮渧海二喻格量隨喜福德。 佛的答不給數目，給兩個格量。前者取大：四天下世界、三千大千世界皆可稱知斤兩，而隨喜心福德不可稱量。後者取細：三千大千世界滿中海水，取一髮破為百分，以一分髮渧取海水，猶可知渧數，而隨喜心福德不可數知。此處先排一個誤解：這不是說隨喜的福『非常大』。若只是非常大，仍在可稱可數的一路上；經文所舉的正是可稱與可數之極，而以「不可稱」「不可數」別之——所別者是類，不是量。落到行上：計較自己隨喜得多少福的心，本身就不在這一類裡。
四、帝釋言不隨喜者皆魔眷屬，當生隨喜迴向，以不一不二相故。 帝釋承佛之答而更進一層，判語極重：眾生心不隨喜菩提者皆是魔眷屬，諸心不隨喜者從魔中來生。何以判得這樣嚴？帝釋自出其因——是諸發心菩薩「為破魔境界故生」。既然發心菩薩之生正為破魔，那麼對發心菩薩不生歡喜的心，其向背便自明白。末句最要緊：欲愛敬三尊者應生隨喜心，隨喜已應迴向菩提，「以不一不二相故」——隨喜與迴向不是兩件可以邀功的善事，它們要在不一不二相中行。三尊之目，本品未出，論亦未釋，此處不補。
五、佛可其言，說隨喜迴向者常值諸佛乃至疾近菩提，非心非離心。 佛印可帝釋之語，並廣說果相：常值諸佛，終不見惡色、聞惡聲、嗅惡香、食惡味、觸惡觸、隨惡念，終不遠離諸佛，從一佛界至一佛界親近諸佛種善根。次出其因：為無量阿僧祇初發意菩薩乃至第二地、第三地乃至第十地、一生補處諸菩薩善根隨喜迴向，故疾近菩提，得菩提已度無量眾生。末句忽然轉硬——「非心、非離心」。讀者於此莫急著求解：佛把最實在的果報與最空的簡別放在同一段裡，正是要行人知道，果報之所以無盡，是因為它不繫於一個可執的心。
六、須菩提以心如幻詰佛。 場景一轉，說者由帝釋換為須菩提。他所問的只有一句：是心如幻，云何能得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提？此問來得極突然——上文正說隨喜迴向的無邊果報，他偏在此時問心之虛幻。何以是此時？正因為上文末句是「非心、非離心」；佛既自己說心不可執，須菩提便就此徹問到底。讀經遇見這樣的急轉，先找上一句的末語，多半接得上。
七、佛反問：汝見是心如幻不。 佛不正面答，先反問：於汝意云何？汝見是心如幻不？此是本品三番問答的第一番。佛的答法值得留意：須菩提問的是『如幻之心云何得菩提』，佛卻先問他『你見到那個如幻的心了嗎』。這一問把論題從『能不能得』移到『有沒有所見』——凡是難問，先問所依之事是否成立，這是本經常法。
八、須菩提答：不見幻，亦不見心如幻。 第一番之答：不也，世尊！我不見幻，亦不見心如幻。此答分兩截：幻本身不見，心之如幻亦不見。要排一個誤解——這不是說『我還沒看到』，而是說幻與如幻皆無可見之相。若有可見，便是實法，也就不名為幻了。
九、佛再問：若無幻亦無心如幻，汝見是心不。 第二番。佛順須菩提之答而推：既然幻與心如幻俱不可見，那麼你見到這個心嗎？此問是在收退路——前答只否掉了「如幻」這一層，還留著一個「心」；佛此問直取其心。讀論當學這種步步收拾的問法：破一層而留一層，等於沒破。
十、須菩提答：不也。 第二番之答只兩字。經文不加解釋，直下斷絕。短答處往往是心行最實處——說得越多，越像在解釋；此處連理由也不出，正顯其不見之真。
十一、佛三問：離幻、離心如幻，汝見更有法得菩提不。 第三番。佛再退一步設問：撇開幻、撇開心如幻，另外還有法可得菩提嗎？此問是最後一道門——前二問破的是心與如幻，此問破的是『別有一法』。凡人於心外求法之念，正在此處被問住。
十二、須菩提答不見，並自申畢竟離故二離中無所得。 第三番之答最長，也是經段的樞紐。須菩提先答不見，次自陳所以：不見更有法、何等法可說若有若無；法相畢竟離故不墮有、不墮無；若法畢竟離則不能得菩提，無所有法亦不應得；一切法無所有，其中無垢者、無淨者；故般若乃至菩提皆畢竟離；畢竟離則不應修、不應壞；末以一問收束——「若般若波羅蜜畢竟離者，云何因般若波羅蜜得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提？」「二離中云何能有所得？」此段須看清須菩提不是在唱空調：他是順著佛前三問的答案推到底，推出一個真實的僵局。全品之硬，硬在此僵局是誠實推出來的，不是設難。
十三、佛答：正以畢竟離故能得，非不因般若，亦不以離得離。 佛的答語有三節。其一、印可：善哉！善哉！般若乃至一切種智畢竟離。其二、翻轉：正因為畢竟離，「以是故能得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提」；若非畢竟離，則不名般若乃至一切種智。其三、雙遮：非不因般若波羅蜜得菩提，亦不以離得離而得菩提。此處最易讀錯：佛不是說「離」是一個可以拿來當因的東西，末節「亦不以離得離」正防此失。畢竟離不是另一條路，是這條路的實相；因之而得，不是以之為工具。
十四、須菩提歎所行義甚深。 須菩提聞答而歎：菩薩摩訶薩所行義甚深。一句歎語，是前段論辯的收束記號。讀經見歎語，當回頭看它歎的是哪一句——此處所歎的正是『以畢竟離故能得』之翻轉，而非泛歎般若。
十五、佛言能為難事，行深義而不證二乘。 佛順其歎而加一義：諸菩薩摩訶薩能為難事，所謂行是深義而不證聲聞、辟支佛地。難處不在深義之難解，在深入而不取證。先問一句：深入空而取證，本是二乘之所成，何以在此判為失？答在所發之心——菩薩之行不為自出，故雖至可證之處而不證。落到行上：凡於靜境中覺得『到此可以歇了』的一念，正是此段所說之關。
十六、須菩提言不為難，以無所得行故。 須菩提卻說不為難，並自出理由：菩薩不得是義可作證，不得般若作證，亦無作證者；若一切法不可得，則何等是義可證、何等是般若作證、何等是作證者、作證已得菩提？故名「菩薩摩訶薩無所得行」，菩薩行是，於一切法皆得明了。此處先排一個誤解：須菩提不是在跟佛抬槓。他所說的「不難」是就法體說——既無能證所證，難從何立；佛所說的「難」是就行人說。二說各據一諦，論段自有分判。
十七、聞深法不驚不沒不怖不畏是名行般若。 須菩提承前而說行相：菩薩聞是深法，心不驚、不沒、不怖、不畏，是名為行般若；行時不見我行般若，不見般若，不見我當得菩提，不作「聲聞、辟支佛地去我遠，薩婆若去我近」之念。四個「不」經文並列而未別其相，論段所申者亦只是「不驚、不沒、通達無礙者，是名行般若波羅蜜」一語。四事能過，纔說得上行。末句最要緊——不作遠近之念，是說行人心中不可有一張進度表。
十八、虛空、幻人、鏡中像、佛無愛憎、佛分別想斷諸喻。 須菩提廣出喻證：虛空不作「有法去我遠、去我近」之念，以虛空無分別故；幻人不作「幻師去我近，觀人去我遠」之念，以幻人無分別故；鏡中像不作「所因者去我近，餘者去我遠」之念，以像無分別故；又如佛無愛無憎，行般若菩薩亦無愛無憎，以般若中無憎無愛故；又如佛一切分別想斷，行般若菩薩亦一切分別想斷，畢竟空故。諸喻同取一義：虛空、幻人、鏡中像三喻，經文一律只出「無分別故」一由，未別其照。讀喻不可只記喻材之異，要看諸喻所同歸的那一句。
十九、佛所化人與工匠木人二喻：無分別而能有所作。 末二喻轉出新義：佛所化人不作遠近之念，以化人無分別故；有所為故作化，化所作事無分別；又如工匠或工匠弟子有所為故作木人，若男、若女、象、馬、牛、羊，是所作亦能有所作，而亦無分別。所以般若亦如是，有所為故說是事成就，而般若亦無分別。此處先問：前諸喻說無分別，何以此二喻要添「能有所作」？答在防一邊之失——無分別若讀成無所能，便成木石之空。故此二喻是全段的收口：無分別不礙成事，正因無分別纔能成無盡之事。
二十、舍利弗問：但般若無分別，餘度亦無分別耶。 說者第三轉：舍利弗問須菩提。所問甚短——只有般若無分別，還是禪波羅蜜乃至檀波羅蜜也無分別？此問看似求證一個常識，其實是要把「無分別」的範圍逼出來。經中凡以『但……亦……』為問者，多是此意。
廿一、須菩提答：五度亦無分別。 須菩提語舍利弗：禪波羅蜜無分別，乃至檀波羅蜜亦無分別。答得直截，不作分疏。此處要接住一個後果：既然六度同是無分別，則六度之名相差別何以成立？舍利弗下問正踩此處，可見短答之後必有進逼。
廿二、舍利弗續問：一切法無分別，何以有六道與四果之別。 舍利弗把範圍推到底：色乃至識、眼乃至意、色乃至法、眼識觸乃至意識觸、眼觸因緣生受乃至意觸因緣生受，四禪、四無量心、四無色定，四念處乃至八聖道分，空、無相、無作，佛十力、四無所畏、四無礙智、大慈大悲、十八不共法、菩提、無為性，亦無分別耶？若一切法無分別，云何分別有六道生死——地獄、餓鬼、畜生、天、人、阿修羅？云何分別是須陀洹、斯陀含、阿那含、阿羅漢、辟支佛、諸佛？此問是全經段最大的一問，也是讀者心中必然生起的一問。要看清它的結構：前半窮舉諸法，後半舉出兩組差別——一是六道之染，一是賢聖之淨。染淨兩頭都要交代，問纔算問全。六道之目經文自列於此，四禪、四無量心、四無色定、十八不共法等之目本品未出，不補。
廿三、須菩提報：顛倒受身、無分別故有賢聖，應行無分別般若得無分別菩提。 須菩提之答分三節。其一、釋六道：眾生顛倒因緣故造作身口意業，隨欲本業報受六道身。其二、釋賢聖：須陀洹即是無分別故有，須陀洹果亦是無分別故有，乃至阿羅漢、阿羅漢果、辟支佛、辟支佛道、佛、佛道亦是無分別故有；過去諸佛亦是無分別、斷分別故有。其三、總結並勸行：當知一切法無有分別、不壞相，如法如、法性、實際故；菩薩應行無分別般若，行已便得無分別菩提。此答之妙在兩路分立：染之差別從顛倒來，淨之差別從無分別來——前者是錯覺造出來的別，後者是斷別而後有的別。末節的「便得」二字接得極穩：行無分別之因，得無分別之果，因果同一味。
廿四、釋曰：論段起。 論主以「釋曰」領起全論段，不另立科目。此二字是全論段唯一的總標，其下逐段隨經而釋，不另分章。讀論當以此為界：此前是經，此後是論主之語；經中之語若再出現，皆是論主牒經。
廿五、釋提桓因及會中人歡喜作念。 論主先補經文未明之情境：是時釋提桓因及會中人皆共歡喜，釋提桓因作是念——是菩薩行菩薩道時所有功德尚勝一切眾生，何況成菩提！論主為何要補「皆共歡喜」？因為經文只記帝釋一人之念，論主指出這一念出於大眾共感，非帝釋私見。讀論常見此種補筆：它不是添事，是還原場景。
廿六、眾生二種：發心與未發心，發心者勝。 論主立第一義：眾生有二種，一者發心、二者未發心；發心菩薩勝一切未發心者。所以者何？是人種無量無上佛法因緣，欲度一切眾生令離苦得樂；其餘眾生但自求樂，欲與他苦。此處先排一個誤解：所勝不在能力，在所向。論主給的理由自始至終只有一個——向自與向他。落到行上：檢查自己是否在「發心」這一邊，不必看成就，看這一念是為誰。
廿七、問曰：阿羅漢辟支佛五通皆離欲，發心者未離欲，云何得勝。 論主自設第一問，問得極合情理：諸阿羅漢、辟支佛及五通是離欲人，發心者或有未離欲但發心，云何得勝？此問的分量在「離欲」二字——那是實實在在的證量，而發心者可能一無所有。凡讀到『發心便勝』之語而心中不服者，此問正是替你問的。五通之目本品未出，不補。
廿八、答曰：先品已答，如胎中太子、未即位之王子。 論主答有三節。其一、指路：是事先品中已種種答，不重出。其二、正答：阿羅漢等雖漏盡，不如初發心菩薩。其三、二喻：如轉輪聖王太子雖在胎中已勝餘子，如國王太子雖未即位勝諸大臣有位富貴者。二喻同取一義而所照不同：胎中太子照其未生而已定，未即位之太子照其未任而已貴。所貴者在種姓與所紹之位，不在現前之能——這正是第廿六段『所向』一義的形象化。
廿九、發心菩薩二種：行菩薩道者與但空發心者，如歌羅頻伽鳥在𣫘中。 論主隨即補一個要緊的簡別：發心菩薩有二種，一者行諸波羅蜜等菩薩道，二者但空發心，而特言此中所說者是「行菩薩道者」。何以要補這一句？因為第廿八段之答若無此限，便成『凡發心者皆勝阿羅漢』之濫。次出喻：如歌羅頻伽鳥在𣫘中未發聲已能勝諸鳥；菩薩雖未成佛，行菩薩道，說諸法實相音聲，破諸外道及魔民戲論，何況成佛！此喻之照處在「聲」——鳥以聲勝，菩薩以說實相之聲勝，喻與所喻相扣得極緊。
三十、有人言：一發心言我當作佛滅一切眾生苦，以心口業重故勝。 此段是他說，非論主自語。有人言：若有能一發心言「我當作佛，滅一切眾生苦」，雖未斷煩惱、未行難事，以心、口業重故勝於一切眾生；一切眾生皆自求樂、自為身故愛其所親，阿羅漢、辟支佛雖不貪世樂，自為滅苦故求涅槃樂，不能為眾生；菩薩心生、口言為度一切，是故勝。讀者於此要記住一個分際：此說把「勝」的根據下到心業、口業之重，較論主所立的『所向』更進一步落到業上。論主錄之而不判，讀者亦不必急判。
卅一、六神通阿羅漢與沙彌之喻。 論主出一段長喻。一六神通阿羅漢將一沙彌令負衣鉢循路而行；沙彌思惟當以何乘入涅槃，即發心以佛乘入涅槃；師知其念，即取衣鉢自擔，推沙彌在前行。沙彌復思佛道甚難、久住生死受無量苦，且以小乘早入涅槃；師復以衣鉢囊還與沙彌令擔，語在後行。如是至三。沙彌怪師如小兒戲，師答：汝初念發心作佛，是心貴重，則住我師道中；如是人諸辟支佛尚應供養，何況阿羅漢，以是故推汝在前；汝心還悔欲取小乘而未便得，汝去我懸遠，是故令汝在後。沙彌聞已驚悟——我師能知我心，我一發意已勝阿羅漢，何況成就——即自堅固住大乘法。此喻的好處在於它把「勝」放進一個可以反覆的日用場景：前後之位隨念而易，三度改易而師不厭。落到行上：發心之勝不是一次授與的名分，是隨念而現、隨悔而失的實況。
卅二、勝不必一切事中皆勝，如以飛言鳥勝人。 論主隨即自守分寸：勝名不必一切事中皆勝，但以「一發心，欲作佛，度眾生」是事為勝；諸餘禪定、解脫等猶尚未有，何得言勝？譬如以飛言之，鳥則勝人。未來當得功德，此事不論。此段是全論段最重要的一道剎車。先問：既已說發心勝阿羅漢，何以又自限？答在防濫——若不限，則發心者可以據此輕慢一切有實證的人，而那正是本論所破的另一邊。落到行上：以發心自勵可，以發心自高不可；所勝者唯在一事，其餘諸事仍須從頭修起。
卅三、小乘人言：補處菩薩尚不勝得無量律儀之小沙彌。 論主舉出第一邊之說：小乘人言，乃至補處菩薩尚不勝小沙彌得無量律儀者。此說之據在戒體——沙彌受戒得無量律儀，是現前可指之功德；補處菩薩若就律儀論，未必過之。論主錄其言而不加駁語，讀者當如實看其所據，纔知下文「二邊」之判從何而來。
卅四、摩訶衍論中或有人言：發大乘心者雖在弊惡小人中猶勝二乘得解脫者。 論主舉出第二邊之說，且明其出處在摩訶衍論中：或有人如是言，其有發大乘心者，雖復在弊惡小人中，猶勝二乘得解脫者。此說與前說正相反：前說以現前戒體為準，此說以所發之心為準而不問其人之弊惡。兩說各執一端，各自成理——論主之所以要把兩說並舉，正為顯出執一端之失不在於錯，而在於偏。
卅五、二邊與中道，故說初發心時勝一切眾生。 論主下判語：是名二邊，離是二邊名為中道；中道義如上說，以其有義理實故應當取；是故說「初發心時，勝一切眾生，何況成佛！」此處要看清中道不是折衷。論主給的取捨標準只有一句——「以其有義理實故」；取的是義理之實，不是兩說之間的中間值。落到行上：遇見兩種都有道理而互相排斥的說法，先問各自所據為何，再問哪一說站在義理之實上，不要先算比例。
卅六、釋經句「聞薩婆若信者，得人中善利」。 論主轉釋經文第一段之語，提出「聞薩婆若信者，得人中善利」一句而未即解，留待下文諸說。論主為何在此立目？因為此句在經文中只是一個連帶語，未曾界定何謂「善利」；凡經中出一名相而未界定者，論主多為之立目而集諸說——見此格式，即知下文是並陳而非定判。
卅七、有人言：六波羅蜜是利。 第一說。以六波羅蜜自身為利——即所行之法就是所得之利，不待果報。此說最直，所守者在因行。
卅八、有人言：六波羅蜜果報是利，所謂轉輪聖王、釋梵天王、人王、法王等。 第二說。以六波羅蜜之果報為利，並列其目——轉輪聖王、釋梵天王、人王、法王等。此說與前說正相對：前說取因，此說取果。
卅九、有人言：得阿鞞跋致，不墮惡道，常生人天富貴處。 第三說。以位不退為利，兼取其相——不墮惡道，常生人天富貴處。此說所取者在『保』，即修行的安全線。
四十、有人言：菩薩住果報神通，遊至十方供養諸佛、教化眾生，得如是等大利。 第四說。以果報神通之用為利：遊至十方供養諸佛，種種方便教化眾生，信受因緣教化眾生。此說所取者在『用』。四說並陳，由因而果、由保而用，論主一概不判。讀者不必於四說中選一，而當看出「善利」一語在本論中容得下這樣寬的解——它本就不是一個窄名相。
四一、釋「壽命中最」：二種命與智慧命。 論主釋經文第二語：眾生有二種命，一者命根，二者智慧命；是人得智慧命故說「壽命中最」。次接經意：何況發心！發心者可敬可貴，所以者何？如先說因緣——「能捨自樂、與他樂；不自憂苦，憂他人苦故。」此段先問：壽命何以能有兩種？答在論主自立之目——命根是形壽，智慧命是聞薩婆若而信者所得之命。二命之目出於本論此處。落到行上：形壽之長短不可求，智慧命之續斷卻在自己一念取捨之間。
四二、釋提桓因散天文陀羅花，如經廣說。 論主以一句帶過經文散華一段：爾時釋提桓因欲現歡喜相，以天文陀羅花散佛上，如經廣說。「如經廣說」四字是論主的省筆——經文已明者不重述。讀論見此四字，當回經文自讀，不可以為論主略而不重。
四三、問曰：罪福不可與人，帝釋何以言以此福德令求佛道者具足佛法。 論主設第二問。此問極實：罪福是各人自造自受，不可以與人，雖欲與亦不得；那麼帝釋「以此福德令求佛道者具足佛法」一語豈不是空話？凡讀經見迴向之語而心中生『這到底有沒有用』之疑者，此問正是替你問的。
四四、答曰：雖不可與人，然自令心好；又顯不著福。 論主之答有兩節，皆不從『能不能給』上答。其一、雖不可與人，然自令心好——迴向的實效先落在自心。其二、釋提桓因顯此不著福，是故以隨喜心與求佛道者，與聲聞人亦爾。此答要看清所轉之處：問的是『給得成嗎』，答的是『給的這一念做了什麼』。落到行上：迴向之益在能捨，不在能給；若計較給不給得到，反成著福。
四五、帝釋自陳雖得聲聞道亦不生一念令菩薩轉還。 論主牒經而釋帝釋之語：我雖得聲聞道，亦不生一念令菩薩轉還向二乘心；所以者何？諸菩薩見眾生在生死中有種種苦，欲利益一切世間故，作是願「未度者我當等度」。此段的分量在說者的身分——一個已得聲聞道的人，為菩薩守住不退二乘之願。先問：自己走的是這條路，何以不願他人也走？答在所見之苦——帝釋所舉的理由不是路之高下，是眾生之苦尚待度者。
四六、會中眾生作念：初發心人隨喜與久發心人隨喜有何差別。 論主又補一段經文未明的情境：會中眾生有作是念——若如上說隨喜有功德，初發心人隨喜、於久發心人隨喜，有何差別？此念是下文帝釋發問的由來。論主補之，是為了說明帝釋之問不是私問，是代眾人解疑。讀論見此種補筆，當知經文中一句突兀的問話，背後多有會眾之疑。
四七、帝釋欲解眾人疑故問佛，如經廣說。 論主明帝釋問佛之意：釋提桓因欲解眾人疑故問佛言「世尊！於初發心菩薩功德隨喜得幾許福德？」如經廣說。此處要記住問者的位置：帝釋不是為自己問。凡代眾發問者，所問必求其明白可用，不求其深奧——這也是本品之答何以用格量而不用玄談的原因。
四八、福田無量無邊故福德不可數知，近佛道者隨喜福轉多。 論主釋佛之答：是福德無量無邊，以種無量無邊田中；人不能數知，故說譬喻令解，如經中廣說。次補一義：隨喜之德雖無量無邊，於近佛道者隨喜福德轉多。此段有兩層，勿併作一層讀。其一、福之所以不可數，是因為所種之田無量無邊——重點在田，不在心之大小。其二、雖同是無量，於近佛道者隨喜其福轉多——無量之中仍有多少。二義並存不相礙，正如本品前說「不可稱量」而此說「轉多」。
四九、帝釋言不隨喜者是魔民從魔天來，在魔境界積集惡心故。 論主釋帝釋之重語：是時帝釋歡喜故白佛言，諸有聞是功德不隨喜者則是魔民，從魔天來；所以者何？在魔境界積集惡心故不隨喜。經明言「諸心不隨喜者，從魔中來生」，語涉來處；論主所給之因則是「在魔境界，積集惡心故不隨喜」，語涉積集。經論二語並存，本品未合為一說。落到行上：不隨喜的心若任其積集，境界自然隨之；此語是警，不是判。
五十、此中說因緣：隨喜心能破魔界，故當以隨喜心迴向菩提。 論主指出經文自帶的因緣：隨喜心能破魔界，是故求佛道者，欲愛敬三尊不捨者，當以隨喜心迴向阿耨多羅三藐三菩提。此段與第四十九段正是一正一反：不隨喜則積集魔境，隨喜則破魔界。二段合看，纔知本品何以把一念隨喜說得如此要緊——它是與魔境界直接相對的那一念。
五一、釋「不一不二相」。 論主訓釋經中之語：不見諸法有一定相不屬因緣者，故言「不一」；不分別隨喜心、迴向心，是名「不二」，畢竟空故。此訓要逐字看：「不一」破的是定相，「不二」破的是能所之隔——隨喜心與迴向心若分作兩物，便有能迴向者與所迴向法。落到行上：隨喜而後迴向，不是兩道手續，是一念之相續。
五二、佛更稱說隨喜功德：疾得見佛、六情不受惡塵、終不離見佛。 論主釋佛可帝釋意已更稱說隨喜功德之語：是人常憶念十方諸佛功德隨喜故疾得見佛；又以深心於一切眾生欲令離苦得樂，是故往來生死，六情初不受惡塵；終不離生諸佛前，以不斷種見佛行故。此段的次第值得留意：先說憶念諸佛之隨喜，次說於眾生之深心，二者合而得「六情初不受惡塵」之果。所護者是六情，而所行者在憶佛與念眾生兩頭——不是另立一個護根門的法。
五三、佛自說因緣：隨喜初發心乃至一生補處菩薩故疾成佛道。 論主指出此中佛自說因緣：是人於無央數阿僧祇初發心菩薩乃至無量一生補處菩薩皆隨喜故，得如上果報，疾成佛道，度無量阿僧祇眾生。此段接第五十二段的果而補其因——所隨喜者不是一人一事，是自初發心至一生補處的全部。落到行上：隨喜若只及於自己喜歡的一類人，便不是此中所說的隨喜。
五四、如實相迴向故說非心亦不離心。 論主釋經末之簡別：是菩薩因是福德如諸法實相迴向；於實相中心不可得，是故說「非心，亦不離心」；如上說「不一不二」義，以事異故更說。此段解開了第五段留下的難處。先問：何以要說非心而又說不離心？答在實相中心不可得——既不可得，故不得以心為所依而言迴向，是名非心；然迴向非離此心別有一事，是名不離心。論主更指出此義即是前文「不一不二」，只因所對之事不同而更說一遍。讀論見「以事異故更說」一類語，即知前後二語同一義，不必別立新解。
五五、須菩提取空無有心相難佛。 論主釋經文之轉：須菩提聞已，取是空無有心相難佛——是心非心，空、無所有、如幻，云何能得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提？此處論主一字點出須菩提之所本：他所取以為難的，正是佛自己所說的「非心」。讀經段時若覺此問突兀，看論主這一句便通：難者所執之刃，是佛親手遞的。
五六、佛反問：汝見是空心定相如幻不。 論主牒佛之第一反問：汝見是空心定相如幻不？論主在牒經時加了「定相」二字之意——所問者是有沒有一個可指的、決定的如幻之心相。此二字是論段釋經文第一番問答的關鍵：佛問的不是『你信不信心如幻』，是『你指得出那個如幻之心嗎』。
五七、須菩提作念：心若空如幻云何可見，是故答不。 論主補出須菩提答前的心行：心若空如幻，云何可見？若可見，則非空。是故答言「不」。此段是論主替經文補一個推理：經文只有一個「不也」，論主把這「不」字後面的理由寫了出來——可見即非空，此是最簡明的判準。落到行上：凡自覺『見到空了』者，以此一句自照即可。
五八、佛再問：心若空無所有，汝見是中有若有若無戲論不。 論主牒佛第二問：心若空、無所有，汝見是中有是若有若無戲論不？此問所破者不是心，是心上之戲論——有與無兩頭之議。先問：既已答不見心，何須再問有無？答在人心之習——心雖不可見，而『它是有』『它是無』之論仍會自起。此問正是收這一層。
五九、答言不也。 第二番之答仍是兩字。經與論皆不加解釋。讀論至此可以看出一個節奏：問步步深，答始終一味——不是不能說，是無可說。
六十、佛三問：離是空無所有如幻心，汝見更有法能得無上道不。 論主牒佛第三問：離開這空、無所有、如幻之心，另有法能得無上道嗎？此問所破者是『別有一法』之見。三問合看成一次第：一破心相，二破有無之論，三破心外別法——三路俱斷，然後纔有下文之難。
六一、答言不見。 第三番之答。至此三問三答俱畢，須菩提所立之地已無可退，下段之難自然而起。短答之為短，正因為前路已盡。
六二、不見不可得故畢竟離畢竟空，不可得見修斷證。 論主申其義：不見、不可得故，何有法若有、若無？一切諸法畢竟離故、畢竟空故，不墮有、不墮無；若法不墮有無中，是則畢竟無所有，不應得無上道；以是因緣故般若波羅蜜畢竟離相，見有、無二俱過故；禪波羅蜜乃至阿耨多羅三藐三菩提亦如是畢竟離相；若法畢竟離，則不可得見、不可得修、不可得斷、不可得證；行是法則更無所得，畢竟離故。此段把難處推到最盡：見、修、斷、證四事俱不可得。要排一個誤解——這不是說修行無用，而是說於畢竟離之法上不得作能見能修能斷能證之想。末句「行是法則更無所得」之「行」字不可略：法仍是要行的。
六三、須菩提難：云何以畢竟離得畢竟離，如以指觸虛空。 論主釋須菩提之正難：今般若波羅蜜畢竟離，阿耨多羅三藐三菩提畢竟離，云何以畢竟離得畢竟離？若一法畢竟離尚不應有所得，何況二離！次出喻：譬如以指觸虛空，虛空無觸故指不能觸，何況二皆無觸！亦如虛空、涅槃。此喻極精：一頭無觸尚且不成，二頭俱無觸則更不成。喻中所照者是『相待而成』之不可得——能得所得若俱無自性，得之一事從何安立。此難是全品最硬的一問，讀者不妨在此停一停，先讓難成立，再看佛答。
六四、佛可其言，即說因緣：以畢竟離故可得。 論主釋佛之可與答：佛知須菩提隨諸法實相說故，可其言「善哉！善哉！」，即說因緣——若般若波羅蜜畢竟離、阿耨多羅三藐三菩提畢竟離，以是因緣故可得。此處先問：佛何以先印可一個難？答在論主所加之語——「隨諸法實相說故」。須菩提之難本身是順實相而發，所以先可；可其所據，然後翻其所執。讀論見佛先可後翻，當知所可者是據，所翻者是執。
六五、若法定有相非空則無四諦三寶乃至無一切法。 論主出佛答之理據，用的是反證：若一法定有相非空者，則是常法、不生相；若無實生相則無滅相，若無生滅則無四諦，若無四諦則無法寶，法寶無故亦無阿耨多羅三藐三菩提——法寶即是阿耨多羅三藐三菩提故；若無法寶則無佛寶，若無佛法則無僧寶，若無三寶則無一切諸法——有如是等過罪故。末句轉回：畢竟離相，則通達無礙。此段是本品最完整的一條推鏈，讀時要一環一環扣：定相則不生，不生則不滅，無生滅則無四諦，無四諦則無法寶，無法寶則無菩提、無佛寶、無僧寶、無一切法。四諦與三結之目本品未出，不補；三寶之目此段自列——法寶、佛寶、僧寶。
六六、畢竟離當知亦離空，故經說不以二離得二離。 論主更守一層：若說畢竟離，當知亦離空；若不離空，不名畢竟離。次牒經以證：是故經說言「般若波羅蜜畢竟離故，能得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提；雖不離般若波羅蜜得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提，亦不以二離而得二離」，畢竟空故不應難。此段是全品防執之最後一道：離若不離空，則「離」自身又成一法可執，須菩提之難便又成立。落到行上：凡以「空」為所得者，此段正對治之。
六七、須菩提知佛所說甚深相而歎。 論主釋經文之轉：須菩提知佛所說甚深相，是故白佛言——若菩薩能如是行，則是行甚深義。論主在此加「知佛所說甚深相」一句，是點明歎語之來歷：歎不是客套，是解後之語。
六八、佛可其言：能行甚深義而不證二乘，以利智深入空而不證涅槃為難。 論主釋佛之可與所以然：是菩薩能為難事——能行如是甚深義，而不證二乘；所以者何？是菩薩一心以利智深入空而不證涅槃，是則為難。此處要看清「難」之所在：不在空之難入，正在利智深入而仍不取證。論主加「利智」二字最要緊——鈍者入不深，自然無證可取；深入而不證，纔是難。
六九、須菩提言不為難：無所得行故照明一切法。 論主牒須菩提之反說：如我解佛所說義，是不為難；何以故？是人不得是甚深義一定相可作證，不得般若波羅蜜，不得證者，誰當以甚深義得證？若不證是甚深義，誰當得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提？是名菩薩無所得行，行是道則照明一切法。此段所據與第十六段同：無能證所證，則難無所立。二處並讀，可知須菩提之說前後一貫，不是臨時的巧辯。
七十、問曰：佛說難、須菩提說不難，師弟子義應同，何以相違。 論主設第三問，問得極正：佛說言「難」，須菩提言「不難」，師弟子義應同，何以各相違背？此問是全論段最重要的一問，因為它涉及的是說法之體例，不只是一段文義。凡讀經見佛與弟子所說相反而心中不安者，此問正是替你問的。
七一、答曰：佛以世諦說，須菩提以第一義諦說；又隨聽者之機。 論主之答有兩層。其一、二諦分判：佛以世諦故說，須菩提以第一義諦故說；佛說菩薩得是甚深義，須菩提說菩薩亦不得是甚深義。其二、隨機而說：佛以須菩提為眾生故說——有人聞難事則發心，故說難事；有人聞難事而廢退，故說無難。二層合看纔完整：不只是所據之諦不同，還有所對之機不同。落到行上：聞「難」而志氣一振者，取難之說；聞「難」而退心者，取不難之說——二說皆是為你設的，不必拿來互相攻破。
七二、是名無所得行，住是行中於一切法通達無礙。 論主收束此節：是名菩薩無所得行；住是行中，於一切法通達無礙。「住」字是此段之眼——無所得不是一過即了的見解，是可住之行。落到行上：通達無礙不是另求一種本事，是住在無所得中自然之相。
七三、須菩提言：聞畢竟離而不驚不沒通達無礙，是名真行深行。 論主牒須菩提之語並加判：若菩薩聞如是說畢竟離，無法可證、無取證者、亦無般若及阿耨多羅三藐三菩提，是時不驚、不沒、通達無礙者，是名行般若波羅蜜；行般若波羅蜜者，是名真行、深行。此處與第十七段經文之「不驚、不沒、不怖、不畏」相接而更簡，只舉不驚、不沒二事。論主末句加「真行、深行」之判，是把前文所說的行相定為一個名目。
七四、不見般若、不見我行、不作二乘遠佛道近之分別。 論主申其相：是菩薩不見般若波羅蜜，亦不見我行般若波羅蜜，不見阿耨多羅三藐三菩提，亦不見是法可得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提，都無所分別；是菩薩安住一切諸法實相中，故不作是分別言「二乘離我遠，佛道離我近」。此段與經段第十七、十八諸段正相應，而論主加了一句最要緊的——「安住一切諸法實相中」。不作遠近之分別不是壓住不想，是所住之處本無遠近。
七五、虛空等譬喻為明畢竟空，般若雖空而有所修能成其事。 論主總釋諸喻：此中說虛空等譬喻，此諸譬喻為明了畢竟空義故；般若波羅蜜雖空，若有所修，能成其事；乃至如木人，隨作何事，皆能成就。此段是諸喻的收口，與經段第十九段所防者同一失。先問：既說畢竟空，何以又說能成其事？答在「若有所修」四字——空不礙修，修不礙空。落到行上：以空為由而不修，正是此段所破。
七六、舍利弗問但般若無分別耶，並申其難：五事皆空則無六名無可修行。 論主牒舍利弗之問並申其難意：若但般若空無分別，餘波羅蜜應是有相，是則菩薩道有別異、不平等；又初品中說「行檀波羅蜜時，無施者、受者、亦無財物」，今云何言別？若五事皆空，則無分別，無有六名，亦無可修行。此段之妙在難得兩頭俱到：說別則菩薩道不平等，說不別則六度之名與修行俱失。論主引本論初品之語為證，是以本論自身之文相質——讀論見引「初品中說」，當知是論主自引前文，非引他書。
七七、須菩提言五度亦空無分別：未得無生忍者有分別，如四河未會大海。 論主牒須菩提之答並補其義：五波羅蜜亦空、無有分別；初發心、未得無生法忍者有分別。次出喻：譬如四河未會大海則有別名，既入大海則無差別；菩薩亦如是，世俗諦中有差別，第一義諦則無分別。此喻最能解第七十六段之兩難：別名非虛，入海非無——四河在未入海時，其名其水其流皆實有可指；既入大海，則不待破而自無差別。落到行上：未得無生忍而見有差別，不是錯，是位；不必因聞無分別之教而強抹自己現前的分別。四河之目本品未出，不補。
七八、舍利弗續問：一切法無分別，云何有六道與四果之別。 論主牒舍利弗之續問：色乃至阿耨多羅三藐三菩提，乃至無為性，亦無分別？若此法空無差別，云何有六道別異？云何有分別須陀洹乃至佛道？此問即經段第廿二段之問，論主重牒者，是因為下文之答要分兩路——染之別與淨之別，所以問也要重舉兩頭。讀論見重牒經問，當知下文必有新解，不是重複。
七九、須菩提答：顛倒起業受報，貪欲是本，六道之別由顛倒不實。 論主釋第一路——染之別：諸法雖畢竟空、無分別，而是眾生狂顛倒心而起身口意業，隨業受身業報；貪欲是本，但為欲所逼而生著心，諸法無有定相；業果報者所謂六道；以是故知空、無所分別是其實本，但以顛倒不實故有六道差別。此段論主加了一個經文所無的字眼——「貪欲是本」，把顛倒之根再往下指一層。要看清結論的方向：實本是空無分別，差別是顛倒所加；不是空之上另有一個六道，是顛倒把無別看成有別。
八十、賢聖亦因無分別法生：斷三結即斷顛倒，世諦假名故有果。 論主釋第二路——淨之別：又須陀洹等賢聖，亦因畢竟空無分別法生，所謂斷三結法名須陀洹果；三結使即是顛倒，覺顛倒除却名為斷，是故斷法即是空、無有分別；世諦故假名人，得是法故名須陀洹果；是故當知須陀洹人及果畢竟空、無分別；乃至佛、佛道亦如是。此段是全論段最緊的一環。先問：賢聖之別既真實可證，何以也說無分別？答在論主的兩步——其一，所斷之三結即是顛倒，斷顛倒之法即是空無分別；其二，所謂『得果之人』是世諦假名。故果之所以立，正因為斷了分別；人之所以名，正因為世諦假立。三結之目本品未出，不補。
八一、此中說因緣：過去諸佛亦斷分別入無餘涅槃，故言因緣法甚深。 論主指出經文自帶之因緣：非但現在無分別，過去如恒河沙諸佛一切分別斷故，入無餘涅槃，無有少許法定相可分別；一切法畢竟空，入是如、法性、實際門故；是故言「因緣法甚深」，入是三昧門故。此段把無分別從現在推到過去諸佛，所證者不是一時之理，是諸佛共由之門。末句「入是三昧門故」是論主自加的落腳處——甚深不止是義理之深，是有門可入。
八二、菩薩應行無分別般若，得無分別阿耨多羅三藐三菩提。 全品末段，經與論同歸此一句：菩薩應如是行無分別般若波羅蜜，行無分別般若波羅蜜故得無分別法，所謂阿耨多羅三藐三菩提。此句與第廿三段經文之結語同，論主重舉而不更釋——因與果同一無分別，無可更說。回看全品：起處是帝釋一念隨喜，結處是無分別般若；隨喜之所以不可稱量，正因為它若行得徹底，就是此處所說的無分別。一頭一尾原是一事。
不要讀錯
不要把「隨喜」讀成一件容易的小善。本品把隨喜放在與魔境界正相對的位置上——帝釋說不隨喜者是魔眷屬，論主釋其因為「在魔境界，積集惡心故不隨喜」，又指出經文自帶之因緣是「隨喜心能破魔界」。既是破魔之心，便不是隨口說句好話。而且經文所隨喜的對象是自初發心菩薩乃至一生補處菩薩的全部，論主更明說是「無央數阿僧祇」；若隨喜只及於自己親近的、順眼的一類人，就不是本品所說的隨喜。
不要把一髮渧海之喻讀成『福德非常大』。喻中所舉的正是可稱之極與可數之極——大千世界可稱知斤兩，一分髮渧取海水猶可知渧數；而隨喜心福德說的是「不可稱量」「不可數知」。所別者是類，不是量。若把它讀成一個極大的數字，則下文「非心、非離心」與「不一不二相」諸語便全無著落。論主釋福之所以無量，也不在心之大小，而在「以種無量無邊田中」——重點在田。
不要把『發心勝阿羅漢』讀成可以輕慢有實證的人。論主自己立了三道限：其一，此中所說者是「行菩薩道者」，不是但空發心者；其二，「勝名不必一切事中皆勝」，所勝者唯在一發心欲作佛度眾生一事，「諸餘禪定、解脫等，猶尚未有」；其三，小乘人言與摩訶衍論中或有人言兩說並舉而同判為二邊。三道限俱在，可見此語是用來自勵的，不是用來論人高下的。沙彌之喻中師父三度改易其位，正說明這個「勝」隨念而現、隨悔而失。
不要把「畢竟離」讀成什麼都不必修。須菩提由畢竟離推出「不可得見、不可得修、不可得斷、不可得證」，看似斷了行門；但論主同一段末句作「行是法則更無所得，畢竟離故」——「行是法」三字未曾撤。其後論主更說「般若波羅蜜雖空，若有所修，能成其事」，並以木人隨作何事皆能成就為喻。所遮的是於修上作能修之想，不是遮修。以空為由而不修，正是本品明破的一邊。
不要把佛說「難」與須菩提說「不難」讀成師弟相違。論主的答語有兩層：一是二諦——佛以世諦說，須菩提以第一義諦說；二是隨機——有人聞難事則發心，故說難事；有人聞難事而廢退，故說無難。二說並非一真一假，而是各對一機、各據一諦。讀者當依自己的現況取用，不必在兩說之間定勝負。
不要把「一切法無分別」讀成差別全是假的、修證全屬虛設。須菩提的答語分兩路：六道之別由顛倒不實而有，四果之別則是「因畢竟空無分別法生」——前者是錯覺所加，後者是斷分別而後成立。二路不可混為一談。論主又以四河入海為喻並明說「初發心、未得無生法忍者有分別」，可見未到其位而見有差別不是過失。若以「無分別」之名抹去自己現前的階位與功課，正是論主此段所要防的。
修行作用
第一件受用，是把隨喜當作一門可以隨時起修的行。本品所示的次第極具體：見他人行道有成而心生歡喜，繼以發願，繼以迴向，而迴向時不分別隨喜心與迴向心。這一串不需要道場、不需要時間，念起即可行。論主更指出其實效先落在自心——「雖不可與人，然自令心好」；所以不必先解決『福德能不能給人』這個疑問，先把這一念做出來。
第二件受用，是以「破魔界」三字自檢。論主釋不隨喜之因為「在魔境界，積集惡心」，釋隨喜之能為「隨喜心能破魔界」。日用中見同行人得法、得名、得助緣，心中若起一絲不快，即可就此一念自照：這一念是在積集，還是在破。積集是無聲的，久之自成境界；破也是無聲的，久之自成習氣。本品把最細的一念與最大的境界連在一起，正是要人於細處著力。
第三件受用，是用論主的三道限守住發心之勝。以發心自勵時，先問自己是「行諸波羅蜜等菩薩道」的那一種，還是「但空發心」的那一種；次記住所勝者唯在一事，禪定解脫等「猶尚未有」；再記住沙彌之喻中位次隨念而易。三事並持，則發心可以生力而不生慢。
第四件受用，是把「不驚、不沒、不怖、不畏」當作聞深法時的四道檢查。經文但列此四事而未別其相，論段所申者亦只是「不驚、不沒、通達無礙者，是名行般若波羅蜜」一語。四事不是一次過完的，每聞一次深法便可自照一次。經文在四關之後緊接的是「不見我行般若」——可見過關的樣子不是心中踏實，是連『我在行』的念也不立。
第五件受用，是四河入海之喻可以安放現前的階位。未得無生法忍而見有分別，論主明說是位次使然，不是過失。行人於是可以兩手並行：一手照舊分別善惡、分別法門、分別次第而修；一手知道這些別名終將在大海中無別。若因聞無分別之教而先廢了分別，便是未入海而先棄河名，兩頭落空。
承衍
本品的骨幹是一段經文與一段論釋。經①自釋提桓因作念發菩提意者出一切眾生之上、其餘眾生應當願樂起，次散曼陀羅華發願、自誓不令菩薩轉還、並問四位菩薩功德隨喜幾許福德；佛以稱斤兩與一髮破為百分渧取海水二喻格量隨喜福德不可稱量、不可數知；帝釋言不隨喜者皆魔眷屬、當生隨喜迴向以不一不二相故，佛可其言而廣說常值諸佛乃至疾近菩提、非心非離心。次轉入須菩提以心如幻詰佛，佛三番反問而須菩提三答不見，末自申一切法畢竟離、二離中云何有所得；佛答正以畢竟離故能得、非不因般若、亦不以離得離。次須菩提歎所行義甚深，佛言能行深義而不證二乘是為難事，須菩提以無所得行故言不為難，並說聞深法不驚不沒不怖不畏是名行般若，廣出虛空、幻人、鏡中像、佛無愛憎、佛分別想斷、佛所化人、工匠木人諸喻明無分別而能有所作。末轉入舍利弗問須菩提但般若無分別抑五度亦無分別、一切法無分別云何有六道與四果之別，須菩提報以顛倒受身、賢聖亦因無分別故有，結以菩薩應行無分別般若、行已便得無分別阿耨多羅三藐三菩提。論①以釋曰隨文而釋：先補會中共喜之情境，立眾生二種、發心者勝之義；設第一問答（阿羅漢等離欲何以不勝發心者）而以胎中太子、未即位王子二喻答之；次簡別發心二種而出歌羅頻伽鳥在𣫘中之喻；錄有人言以心口業重為勝之說；出六神通阿羅漢與沙彌之長喻；次自守分寸而言勝不必一切事中皆勝、如以飛言鳥勝人；舉小乘人言與摩訶衍論中或有人言兩說，判為二邊而取中道。次釋經句善利而並陳四說，釋壽命中最而立命根、智慧命二種命；帶過散華一段，設第二問答（罪福不可與人而帝釋何以言以此福德令求佛道者具足佛法）；釋帝釋自陳不令菩薩轉還，補會中眾生疑差別之念，釋帝釋代眾發問與福田無量無邊、近佛道者隨喜福轉多；釋不隨喜者是魔民與隨喜心能破魔界，訓「不一不二相」，釋佛更稱說隨喜功德與自說因緣，釋如實相迴向故說非心亦不離心。次隨經釋須菩提取空無有心相難佛、佛三番反問與須菩提之作念與答，申畢竟離故不可得見修斷證，釋指觸虛空之難與佛可其言、若法定有相非空則無四諦三寶乃至無一切法之反證、畢竟離當知亦離空；設第三問答（佛說難、須菩提說不難何以相違）而以世諦、第一義諦並隨機而說答之；釋真行深行、安住實相故不作遠近之分別、諸喻為明畢竟空而般若雖空能成其事；末釋舍利弗之難與四河入海之喻、顛倒起業受六道報、斷三結即斷顛倒而世諦假名故有果、過去諸佛亦斷分別入無餘涅槃，結以菩薩應行無分別般若得無分別菩提。
品名之異，本帙底本作願樂品，而諸本別有淨願、願樂隨喜、願行三名，詳考據層。古德之釋，本品可誌者二家。吉藏疏本品即用「淨願品」之名，並自陳作名之由云：「從初作名云淨願品，上已二品教學平等，此復是更教菩薩，今見化他行成，宜應更生隨喜發願供養，勿起癈忘之心也。」其科本品為二云：「就初段中為二：第一明隨喜功德無邊大果報，二明正觀成就得菩提果。」——以隨喜與正觀二分本品，與本論論段先釋發心隨喜、後釋無分別般若之次第相合。其釋經文「出一切眾生之上」一句，所舉之二說與本論所判之二邊如出一轍：「出一切眾生之上者，小乘人言補處菩薩猶是凡夫，不及沙彌無量律儀；大乘弊惡，下劣人一發菩提心勝辟支佛羅漢，此二皆失也。」而其自立之解則云：「今明若初發大心大願，則發心為勝、二乘為劣；若就戒定慧行為論，則二乘為勝、發心為劣。」——此以所論之面分勝劣，與本論「勝名不必一切事中皆勝」一語所守之分寸相近而措辭各出，並錄不判。其釋二離之難亦自出喻云：「如指觸空，空無觸故，指不能觸，況無二物而欲觸耶？」與本論指觸虛空之喻同。慧影釋此品，用名與本帙底本同，開章云：「第六十三品者，名為願樂品。」其品次與本帙底本相差一位。其釋次第之由云：「所以次等學品後明此品者，上品明菩薩具於生法二忍，內德既充，外為世間人天所樂，及為一切眾聖愛念，此品之生正以於此，故次等學品後明願樂品。」其科本品亦為二分云：「爾時釋提桓因已下，就此品中大有二分：第一明嘆美波若行般若德，及隨喜迴向功德無量無邊；第二從須菩提白佛已下，明無分別波若不可思議，雖復冥懸而無方大用。」——二分之界正落在須菩提白佛之處，與本論經段之轉折相合。其釋「非心、非離心」云：「心相即寂，心無心相，故云非心。雖心相即寂，亦不離此心而得迴向，故云不離也。」與本論「於實相中心不可得」一語所取之義相發而語各不同。其釋難與不難之相違云：「如來為益一類眾生故說難，善吉為益一徒眾生故說易，雖云難易其理實冥」——以益物分二說，與本論二諦並隨機之判相近而不立二諦之名。其釋歌羅頻伽鳥之喻云：「在㲉中者，喻菩薩在生死無明㲉藏中心力已勝也。」（所用之字與本帙底本所作者形異，詳考據層。）又慧影疏章題與總目二處皆作「釋願樂品第十四」，較同書校注所訂之「釋願樂品第六十四」少「六十」二字，屬抄錄之脫，誌錄不判。均正疏及天台家著述於本品品題與本品獨有之喻句，本次所掃皆〔查無〕，據實標闕，不以他處之文充之。
Aspiration and Delight: Why the Two Chinese Characters Rendered Here as ‘Aspiration and Delight’ Are the Overall Title of This Chapter; Why Śakra Does Not First Praise the Buddha but First Thinks That Those Who Arouse the Mind Go Above All Beings; Why the Mind of Rejoicing Can Be Weighed, by the Simile of a Single Hair Drawing Drops from the Sea, to the Point Where It Cannot Be Known by Number; Why Not Rejoicing Is Actually Judged to Be Māra's Retinue; Why Rejoicing and Dedication Must Speak of the Mark of Neither One nor Two; Why Not Mind and Not Apart from Mind Is Not an Equivocation; Why Subhūti, Just When the Merit Is at Its Height, Suddenly Challenges the Buddha with the Mind Being Like an Illusion; Why Every Layer of the Three Rounds of Question and Answer Is Answered ‘No’; Why ‘Within Two Separations How Can There Be Anything Attained’ Is the Hardest Question of the Whole Chapter; Why Ultimate Separation Becomes Instead the Reason One Can Obtain Awakening; Why the Buddha Saying It Is Hard and Subhūti Saying It Is Not Hard Is No Contradiction between Master and Disciple; Why the Similes of Space, the Illusory Person, the Image in a Mirror, the Conjured Person, and the Wooden Puppet All Come Down on Non-discrimination; Why, If All Dharmas Are without Discrimination, There Are Still the Distinctions of the Six Destinies and the Four Fruits; Why the Treatise-Author Explains the Superiority of Arousing the Mind by the Four Similes of the Crown Prince in the Womb, the Prince Not Yet Enthroned, the Kalaviṅka Bird, and the Śrāmaṇera; and Why What People of the Small Vehicle Say and What Some Say in the Treatises of the Mahāyāna Are Alike Called the Two Extremes
What Is Being Asked
What this chapter asks about is a matter that looks very shallow and is in fact very hard: when I see another person accomplish something in practising the path, does this single thought of gladness in me have any weight?
The two Chinese characters of the chapter's name, 「願樂」 tr. "aspiration and delight," come from a single thought of Śakra at the head of the chapter—he sees that when the bodhisattva practises the six perfections and so on up to the eighteen unshared dharmas he has already gone above all beings, and so says that, as for these beings who can arouse the intent of awakening, 「其餘眾生應當願樂」 tr. "the remaining beings should aspire to it and delight in it." Aspiration and delight is not envy, nor is it an empty blessing; in this chapter it has a very concrete shape: scattering flowers, making a vow, rejoicing, and dedicating. Śakra does these four things all in one breath, and then asks the Buddha a question about quantity—giving rise to the mind of rejoicing toward the meritorious virtue of the bodhisattvas of these several stages, the one who has first aroused intent, the one who has long aroused intent, the avaivartika, and the one bound to buddhahood in one more birth, how much merit does one obtain for each? The Buddha's answer does not give a number; it gives a twofold weighing: the four continents, and so on up to the three-thousand great-thousand world, can all be weighed and their weight known, but the merit of the mind of rejoicing cannot be weighed; were the three-thousand great-thousand world filled with sea-water, and one took a single hair, split it into a hundred parts, and with one part of the hair drew up drops, the number of drops could still be known, but the merit of the mind of rejoicing cannot be known by number. What is compared is the greatest measure and the finest measure, and what is shown is only one thing—this merit does not lie along the road of measure at all.
Śakra then puts the words very heavily: those who do not rejoice in anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi are all Māra's retinue, born having come from within Māra. How can a mental act that looks so soft be judged so severely? Śakra himself gives the cause: the bodhisattvas who arouse the mind are born for the sake of breaking Māra's domain, and so the mind of rejoicing and Māra's domain stand directly against each other as cure and sickness. And the rejoicing he teaches carries a limiting phrase: 「以不一不二相故」 tr. "because of the mark of neither one nor two." From here the chapter begins to turn hard.
The one who turns it to its hardest point is Subhūti. Just when the merit in the sūtra text is at its height, he suddenly challenges the Buddha with 「是心如幻」 tr. "this mind is like an illusion": if the mind is like an illusion, how can it obtain awakening? The Buddha does not answer directly but asks back three times, and all three of Subhūti's answers are 「不也」 tr. "no"—the first answer states that he does not see the illusion and does not see the mind that is like an illusion; the second answer says only 「不也！世尊！」 tr. "No, World-Honored One!"; the third answer states that he does not see that, apart from the illusion and apart from the mind that is like an illusion, there is some further dharma that obtains awakening. After the three rounds Subhūti draws his own conclusion: all dharmas are ultimately separated, and if they are ultimately separated they should not be cultivated and should not be destroyed; 「二離中云何能有所得」 tr. "within two separations how can there be anything attained." The Buddha's answer goes beyond all expectation: precisely because of ultimate separation one can obtain; were it not ultimate separation, it would not be called prajñā, and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds. The bone of the whole chapter lies in this one turn.
After this come three closing passages. First, the Buddha says that the bodhisattva practising the deep meaning and not realising the two vehicles 「能為難事」 tr. "is able to do what is hard," while Subhūti says it is not hard—the words of master and disciple are opposite; the treatise-author divides them by worldly truth and the truth of the highest meaning, and points out that the Buddha's saying it is hard and saying it is not hard are both set up with respect to the hearer. Second, Subhūti brings out at length the similes of space, the illusory person, the image in a mirror, the person conjured by the Buddha, and the craftsman's wooden puppet; all the similes come down on non-discrimination, and the last two (the person conjured by the Buddha and the craftsman's wooden puppet) further add 「能有所作」 tr. "can have something it does." Third, Śāriputra, taking this up, asks: if all dharmas are without discrimination, from where do the differences of the six destinies and the four fruits come? Subhūti answers with receiving bodies through inversion, and with the worthies and sages too existing because of non-discrimination, and ends with one sentence—the bodhisattva should practise the prajñā of non-discrimination, and having practised the prajñā of non-discrimination, he then obtains the anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi of non-discrimination.
The treatise section explains following the text. The treatise-author first explains why arousing the mind surpasses all beings, extending it layer upon layer with four similes: the crown prince in the womb, the prince not yet enthroned, the kalaviṅka bird, and the arhat of the six supernormal powers with the śrāmaṇera; and he brings up the two accounts, what people of the Small Vehicle say and what some say in the treatises of the Mahāyāna, judging them to be the two extremes and taking the middle way. Next he explains the good benefit, the foremost among lives, the scattering of flowers, the question and answer on sin and merit not being able to be given to others, the field of merit of rejoicing, breaking Māra's realm, neither one nor two, and not mind yet not apart from mind; then, following the sūtra text, he explains the three rounds of counter-question on the empty mind being like an illusion, the simile of touching space with a finger, and the fault that with a fixed mark there would be no four truths and no Three Jewels; at the end he explains the division by the two truths of hard and not hard, the simile of the wooden puppet accomplishing matters, the simile of the four rivers entering the sea, and the three fetters being inversion together with worldly truth and provisional names. Look at the head and the tail together: this chapter rises from a single thought of rejoicing and ends in the prajñā of non-discrimination—the reason rejoicing is immeasurable is precisely that it is without discrimination.
Passage by Passage
1. Śakra thinks that those who arouse the intent of awakening go above all beings, and that the remaining beings should aspire to it and delight in it. The head of the chapter is not the Buddha speaking; it is Śakra having a thought. He first cites that when the bodhisattva practises the six perfections, prajñā, meditation, vigour, patience, morality, and giving, and so on up to the eighteen unshared dharmas, he has already 「出一切眾生之上」 tr. "gone above all beings," how much more when he obtains awakening; next he says that those who hear of sarvajñā and have faith obtain the good benefit among humans and the foremost among lives, how much more those who arouse the intent of awakening; only the last sentence arrives at the chapter's name—the remaining beings should aspire to it and delight in it. First ask a question here: why is ‘hearing and having faith’ set apart from 「發意」 tr. "arousing intent" and spoken of as two grades? The answer lies in the sentence-form that advances step by step—faith is the entrance, arousing intent is the decision, and aspiration and delight is a third party's attitude toward the first two. Let the reader not read aspiration and delight as a bystander's courtesy: Śakra sets it after faith and arousing intent, as one step on the same road.
2. Śakra scatters māndārava flowers and makes a vow, and asks how much merit rejoicing in the four kinds of bodhisattvas brings. Śakra acts upon his thought: he scatters heavenly māndārava flowers over the Buddha and vows that those who seek awakening may be fully endowed with the dharmas of a Buddha, the omniscience of all kinds, and the dharmas of the one who is so of himself, and that those who seek to be śrāvakas may be fully endowed with the dharmas of a śrāvaka; he swears of himself that he will never give rise to a single thought to make a bodhisattva turn back, nor make him turn back and fall to the ground of the two vehicles; he further vows that the bodhisattvas may redouble their vigour, and states on their behalf the bodhisattvas' vow—「我既自度，亦當度未度者」 tr. "Having delivered myself, I shall also deliver those not yet delivered," and so on up to 「我既滅度，當使未入滅度者得滅度」 tr. "Having myself passed into extinction, I shall cause those who have not yet entered extinction to attain extinction"; only at the end does he put his question: giving rise to the mind of rejoicing toward the meritorious virtue of the bodhisattvas who have first aroused intent, who have long aroused intent, the avaivartika, and the one bound to buddhahood in one more birth, how much merit does one obtain for each? In this passage one must see Śakra's order clearly: first he scatters the flowers, next he makes the vow, next he swears not to turn back another's mind, and only at the end does he ask about merit. Putting the question about merit last is not seeking a reward; it is seeking understanding—he wants to know the weight of this single thought of his own.
3. The Buddha weighs the merit of rejoicing by the two similes of weighing by the pound and of a single hair drawing drops from the sea. The Buddha's answer gives no figure; it gives two weighings. The first takes the great: the world of the four continents and the three-thousand great-thousand world can all be weighed and their weight known, but the merit of the mind of rejoicing cannot be weighed. The second takes the fine: were the three-thousand great-thousand world filled with sea-water, and one took a single hair, split it into a hundred parts, and with one part of the hair drew up the sea-water drop by drop, the number of drops could still be known, but the merit of the mind of rejoicing cannot be known by number. Here first dispel a misunderstanding: this does not say that the merit of rejoicing is ‘very great’. If it were only very great, it would still be on the road of what can be weighed and counted; what the sūtra text cites is precisely the utmost of the weighable and the countable, and it sets them apart with 「不可稱」 tr. "cannot be weighed" and 「不可數」 tr. "cannot be counted"—what is set apart is a kind, not a quantity. Brought down to practice: the mind that reckons how much merit its own rejoicing obtains is itself not within this kind.
4. Śakra says that those who do not rejoice are all Māra's retinue, and that one should give rise to rejoicing and dedication, because of the mark of neither one nor two. Śakra takes up the Buddha's answer and goes a layer further, and his verdict is very heavy: beings whose minds do not rejoice in awakening are all Māra's retinue; minds that do not rejoice are born having come from within Māra. How can it be judged so severely? Śakra himself gives its cause—these bodhisattvas who arouse the mind are 「為破魔境界故生」 tr. "born for the sake of breaking Māra's domain." Since the birth of the bodhisattvas who arouse the mind is precisely for breaking Māra, then which way a mind that gives rise to no gladness toward them is facing is self-evident. The last sentence matters most: those who wish to love and revere the Three Honoured Ones should give rise to the mind of rejoicing, and having rejoiced should dedicate it to awakening, 「以不一不二相故」 tr. "because of the mark of neither one nor two"—rejoicing and dedication are not two good deeds one can claim credit for; they must be practised within the mark of neither one nor two. The list of the Three Honoured Ones is not given in this chapter, nor does the treatise explain it; it is not supplied here.
5. The Buddha approves his words, and says that one who rejoices and dedicates constantly meets the buddhas and so on up to quickly drawing near to awakening, not mind and not apart from mind. The Buddha approves Śakra's words and speaks at length of the marks of the fruit: he constantly meets the buddhas, never sees evil forms, hears evil sounds, smells evil scents, eats evil tastes, touches evil tangibles, or follows evil thoughts, is never far from the buddhas, and from one buddha-realm to another buddha-realm draws near to the buddhas and plants roots of goodness. Next he brings out the cause: because he rejoices and dedicates the roots of goodness of immeasurable asaṃkhyeya bodhisattvas who have first aroused intent, and so on up to those of the second ground, the third ground, and so on up to the tenth ground, and the bodhisattvas bound to buddhahood in one more birth, he quickly draws near to awakening, and having obtained awakening delivers immeasurable beings. The last sentence suddenly turns hard—「非心、非離心」 tr. "not mind, and not apart from mind." Let the reader not hurry here to seek an explanation: the Buddha places the most substantial retribution and the emptiest distinction in the same passage precisely so that the practitioner may know that the reason the retribution is inexhaustible is that it is not tied to a mind that can be clung to.
6. Subhūti challenges the Buddha with the mind being like an illusion. The scene turns, and the speaker changes from Śakra to Subhūti. What he asks is only one sentence: this mind is like an illusion; how can it obtain anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi? This question comes very suddenly—the text above has just been speaking of the boundless retribution of rejoicing and dedication, and he, of all moments, asks at this moment about the illusoriness of the mind. Why at this moment? Precisely because the last sentence above is 「非心、非離心」 tr. "not mind, and not apart from mind"; since the Buddha himself has said that the mind cannot be clung to, Subhūti thereupon questions it through to the bottom. When one meets such a sudden turn in reading the sūtra, first look for the last words of the sentence before; most often it connects.
7. The Buddha asks in return: do you see this mind that is like an illusion? The Buddha does not answer head-on; he first asks back: what do you think? Do you see this mind that is like an illusion? This is the first round of the chapter's three rounds of question and answer. The Buddha's way of answering deserves attention: what Subhūti asked was ‘how does a mind like an illusion obtain awakening’, yet the Buddha first asks him ‘have you seen that mind which is like an illusion?’ This question moves the topic from ‘can it obtain or not’ to ‘is there anything seen or not’—whenever there is a hard question, first ask whether the matter it relies on holds; this is the constant method of this sūtra.
8. Subhūti answers: he does not see the illusion, nor does he see the mind that is like an illusion. The answer of the first round: No, World-Honored One! I do not see the illusion, nor do I see the mind that is like an illusion. This answer has two halves: the illusion itself is not seen, and the mind's being like an illusion is also not seen. A misunderstanding must be dispelled—this does not say ‘I have not yet seen it’, but that neither the illusion nor being like an illusion has any mark that can be seen. If there were something that could be seen, it would be a real dharma, and so would not be called an illusion.
9. The Buddha asks again: if there is no illusion and no mind like an illusion, do you see this mind? The second round. The Buddha follows Subhūti's answer and pushes on: since the illusion and the mind that is like an illusion are both not to be seen, do you see this mind? This question is cutting off the line of retreat—the previous answer negated only the layer of 「如幻」 tr. "like an illusion," and still left a 「心」 tr. "mind"; this question of the Buddha's goes straight for the mind. In reading the treatise one should learn this manner of questioning that clears away step by step: to break one layer and leave one layer is the same as not having broken anything.
10. Subhūti answers: No. The answer of the second round is only the two Chinese characters rendered here as ‘No’. The sūtra text adds no explanation and cuts off at once. The place of a short answer is often where the mental act is most real—the more one says, the more it resembles an explanation; here not even a reason is given, which precisely shows the truth of his not seeing.
11. The Buddha asks a third time: apart from the illusion and apart from the mind that is like an illusion, do you see some further dharma that obtains awakening? The third round. The Buddha steps back once more and sets up a question: leaving aside the illusion and leaving aside the mind that is like an illusion, is there some other dharma that can obtain awakening? This question is the last gate—the first two questions broke the mind and being like an illusion; this question breaks ‘there is a separate dharma’. The ordinary person's thought of seeking a dharma outside the mind is brought to a halt precisely here.
12. Subhūti answers that he does not see it, and states of himself that because of ultimate separation there is nothing attained within two separations. The answer of the third round is the longest, and is also the pivot of the sūtra section. Subhūti first answers that he does not see it, then states of himself the reason: he does not see some further dharma, nor what dharma could be said to be either existent or non-existent; because the mark of dharmas is ultimately separated, it does not fall into existence and does not fall into non-existence; if a dharma is ultimately separated, it cannot obtain awakening, and a dharma without anything existent should also not obtain it; all dharmas are without anything existent, and within them there is no one stained and no one pure; therefore prajñā and so on up to awakening are all ultimately separated; if they are ultimately separated, they should not be cultivated and should not be destroyed; and at the end he closes with a question—「若般若波羅蜜畢竟離者，云何因般若波羅蜜得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提？」 tr. "If prajñāpāramitā is ultimately separated, how is anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi obtained because of prajñāpāramitā?" 「二離中云何能有所得？」 tr. "Within two separations how can there be anything attained?" In this passage one must see clearly that Subhūti is not chanting a tune of emptiness: he pushes the answers to the Buddha's previous three questions through to the bottom, and pushes out a real deadlock. The hardness of the whole chapter lies in this deadlock's having been pushed out honestly, not set up as a difficulty.
13. The Buddha answers: precisely because of ultimate separation one can obtain; it is not that it is not because of prajñā, nor is it that by separation one obtains separation. The Buddha's answer has three parts. First, approval: Excellent! Excellent! Prajñā and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds are ultimately separated. Second, the turning-over: precisely because of ultimate separation, 「以是故能得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提」 tr. "for this reason one can obtain anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi"; were it not ultimate separation, it would not be called prajñā, and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds. Third, the double negation: it is not that awakening is obtained not because of prajñāpāramitā, nor is awakening obtained by obtaining separation through separation. This is the place most easily misread: the Buddha is not saying that 「離」 tr. "separation" is a thing that can be taken up and used as a cause; the last part, 「亦不以離得離」 tr. "nor by separation does one obtain separation," guards precisely against this error. Ultimate separation is not another road; it is the real mark of this road; obtaining because of it is not taking it as a tool.
14. Subhūti sighs that the meaning practised is very deep. Subhūti, hearing the answer, sighs: the meaning practised by the bodhisattva-mahāsattva is very deep. A single sentence of sighing is the closing mark of the preceding passage of debate. When one sees a sigh in reading the sūtra, one should look back at which sentence it sighs at—what is sighed at here is precisely the turning-over, ‘because of ultimate separation one can obtain’, and not a general sigh at prajñā.
15. The Buddha says he is able to do what is hard, practising the deep meaning and not realising the two vehicles. The Buddha, following his sigh, adds a meaning: the bodhisattva-mahāsattvas are able to do what is hard, namely practising this deep meaning and not realising the grounds of the śrāvaka and the pratyekabuddha. The hardness lies not in the difficulty of understanding the deep meaning, but in entering deeply and not taking realisation. First ask a question: entering emptiness deeply and taking realisation is what the two vehicles properly accomplish; why here is it judged a failing? The answer lies in the mind that has been aroused—the bodhisattva's practice is not for his own getting out, so although he arrives at the place where he could realise, he does not realise. Brought down to practice: the single thought, in a still state, that ‘here I can rest’ is precisely the pass this passage speaks of.
16. Subhūti says it is not hard, because of the practice with nothing to be attained. Subhūti, however, says it is not hard, and gives his own reason: the bodhisattva does not find a meaning that can be realised, does not find prajñā realising, and there is also no one who realises; if all dharmas are unfindable, then what is the meaning that can be realised, what is the prajñā that realises, what is the one who realises, and, having realised, obtains awakening? Therefore it is called 「菩薩摩訶薩無所得行」 tr. "the bodhisattva-mahāsattva's practice with nothing to be attained"; the bodhisattva practising this becomes clear about all dharmas. Here first dispel a misunderstanding: Subhūti is not arguing against the Buddha. His 「不難」 tr. "not hard" is said with respect to the substance of dharmas—since there is neither one who realises nor what is realised, where would hardness be established? The Buddha's 「難」 tr. "hard" is said with respect to the practitioner. The two accounts each rest on one truth, and the treatise section has its own division of them.
17. Hearing the deep Dharma and being not startled, not sinking, not terrified, not afraid, is called practising prajñā. Subhūti, continuing from the above, speaks of the marks of practice: when the bodhisattva hears this deep Dharma, his mind is not startled, does not sink, is not terrified, is not afraid; this is called practising prajñā; while practising he does not see ‘I practise prajñā’, does not see prajñā, does not see ‘I shall obtain awakening’, and does not have the thought 「聲聞、辟支佛地去我遠，薩婆若去我近」 tr. "the grounds of the śrāvaka and the pratyekabuddha are far from me, sarvajñā is near to me." The sūtra text sets the four 「不」 tr. "not" side by side and does not distinguish their marks, and what the treatise section extends is likewise only the one sentence 「不驚、不沒、通達無礙者，是名行般若波羅蜜」 tr. "one who is not startled, does not sink, and penetrates without obstruction—this is called practising prajñāpāramitā." Only when the four matters can be passed can one speak of practising. The last sentence matters most—not having the thought of far and near means that there may not be a progress chart in the practitioner's mind.
18. The similes of space, the illusory person, the image in a mirror, the Buddha having no love and no hate, and the Buddha's discriminating notions being severed. Subhūti brings out similes at length as proof: space does not have the thought 「有法去我遠、去我近」 tr. "there is a dharma far from me, near to me," because space is without discrimination; the illusory person does not have the thought 「幻師去我近，觀人去我遠」 tr. "the conjurer is near to me, the onlookers are far from me," because the illusory person is without discrimination; the image in a mirror does not have the thought 「所因者去我近，餘者去我遠」 tr. "that on which I depend is near to me, the rest are far from me," because the image is without discrimination; again, as the Buddha has no love and no hate, the bodhisattva who practises prajñā also has no love and no hate, because within prajñā there is no hate and no love; again, as all the Buddha's discriminating notions are severed, all the discriminating notions of the bodhisattva who practises prajñā are also severed, because of ultimate emptiness. The similes all take one meaning: for the three similes of space, the illusory person, and the image in a mirror, the sūtra text uniformly gives only the one reason 「無分別故」 tr. "because it is without discrimination," and does not distinguish what each illuminates. In reading the similes one may not remember only the differences in the material of the similes; one must look at the one sentence to which all the similes return alike.
19. The two similes of the person conjured by the Buddha and the craftsman's wooden puppet: without discrimination and yet able to have something it does. The last two similes turn out a new meaning: the person conjured by the Buddha does not have the thought of far and near, because the conjured person is without discrimination; it is because there is something to be done that the conjuring is made, and the matter the conjured person does is without discrimination; again, as a craftsman or a craftsman's apprentice, because there is something to be done, makes a wooden puppet, whether man or woman, elephant, horse, ox, or sheep, this that is made can also have something it does, and yet is also without discrimination. So prajñā too is like this: because there is something to be done, it is said that this matter is accomplished, and yet prajñā too is without discrimination. Here first ask: the earlier similes spoke of non-discrimination; why must these two similes add 「能有所作」 tr. "can have something it does"? The answer lies in guarding against the failing of one extreme—if non-discrimination is read as being able to do nothing, it becomes the emptiness of wood and stone. So these two similes are the closing of the whole passage: non-discrimination does not obstruct accomplishing matters; precisely because of non-discrimination one can accomplish inexhaustible matters.
20. Śāriputra asks: is it only prajñā that is without discrimination, or are the other perfections also without discrimination? The third change of speaker: Śāriputra asks Subhūti. What he asks is very short—is only prajñā without discrimination, or are dhyānapāramitā and so on up to dānapāramitā also without discrimination? This question seems to seek confirmation of a commonplace, but in fact it is meant to force out the scope of 「無分別」 tr. "non-discrimination." Whenever a question in the sūtra takes the form ‘only … also …’, this is most often its intent.
21. Subhūti answers: the five perfections are also without discrimination. Subhūti says to Śāriputra: dhyānapāramitā is without discrimination, and so on up to dānapāramitā too is without discrimination. The answer is direct and makes no further analysis. Here one must catch a consequence: since the six perfections are alike without discrimination, how are the differences in the names and marks of the six perfections established? Śāriputra's next question steps exactly on this place; from which one can see that after a short answer there is bound to be a pressing forward.
22. Śāriputra asks further: if all dharmas are without discrimination, why are there the distinctions of the six destinies and the four fruits? Śāriputra pushes the scope to the bottom: form and so on up to consciousness, the eye and so on up to the mind, forms and so on up to dharmas, eye-consciousness contact and so on up to mind-consciousness contact, the feeling born from the condition of eye-contact and so on up to the feeling born from the condition of mind-contact; the four dhyānas, the four immeasurable minds, the four formless absorptions; the four foundations of mindfulness and so on up to the eightfold noble path; emptiness, the signless, non-action; the ten powers of the Buddha, the four fearlessnesses, the four unobstructed knowledges, great kindness and great compassion, the eighteen unshared dharmas, awakening, the unconditioned nature—are these also without discrimination? If all dharmas are without discrimination, how is it discriminated that there is the birth and death of the six destinies—hells, hungry ghosts, animals, gods, humans, and asuras? How is it discriminated that this is a srota-āpanna, a sakṛdāgāmin, an anāgāmin, an arhat, a pratyekabuddha, the buddhas? This question is the greatest question of the whole sūtra section, and is also the question that is bound to arise in the reader's mind. One must see its structure clearly: the first half exhausts all dharmas, the second half brings out two groups of differences—one the defilement of the six destinies, the other the purity of the worthies and sages. Both ends, defiled and pure, must be accounted for; only then is the question fully asked. The list of the six destinies the sūtra text itself gives here; the lists of the four dhyānas, the four immeasurable minds, the four formless absorptions, the eighteen unshared dharmas, and so on are not given in this chapter, and are not supplied.
23. Subhūti replies: bodies are received through inversion; because of non-discrimination there are the worthies and sages; one should practise the prajñā of non-discrimination and obtain the awakening of non-discrimination. Subhūti's answer has three parts. First, explaining the six destinies: because of the causes and conditions of inversion beings perform deeds of body, speech, and mind, and according to the retribution of the original deeds of their desire they receive the bodies of the six destinies. Second, explaining the worthies and sages: the srota-āpanna exists because of non-discrimination, the fruit of srota-āpanna too exists because of non-discrimination, and so on up to the arhat and the fruit of arhatship, the pratyekabuddha and the pratyekabuddha path, the Buddha and the Buddha path—these too exist because of non-discrimination; the buddhas of the past too exist because of non-discrimination, because discrimination is severed. Third, concluding and exhorting to practice: one should know that all dharmas are without discrimination and of indestructible mark, because they are like the suchness of dharmas, the nature of dharmas, and the limit of reality; the bodhisattva should practise the prajñā of non-discrimination, and having practised it he then obtains the awakening of non-discrimination. The wonder of this answer lies in the two roads standing apart: the differences of defilement come from inversion, the differences of purity come from non-discrimination—the former are distinctions produced by delusion, the latter are distinctions that exist after distinction is severed. The two Chinese characters 「便得」 tr. "then obtains" in the last part connect very steadily: practising the cause of non-discrimination, one obtains the fruit of non-discrimination; cause and fruit are of one flavour.
24. The explanation says: the treatise section begins. The treatise-author leads off the whole treatise section with 「釋曰」 tr. "The explanation says," and sets up no separate headings. These two Chinese characters are the only general heading of the whole treatise section; below them he explains passage by passage following the sūtra, without dividing it into further sections. In reading the treatise one should take this as the boundary: before it is the sūtra, after it are the words of the treatise-author; if words of the sūtra appear again, they are all the treatise-author restating the sūtra.
25. Śakra Devānām Indra and the people in the assembly are glad and have a thought. The treatise-author first supplies the setting the sūtra text leaves unclear: at that time Śakra Devānām Indra and the people in the assembly were all glad together, and Śakra Devānām Indra had this thought—the merit this bodhisattva has while practising the bodhisattva path still surpasses all beings, how much more when he achieves awakening! Why must the treatise-author supply 「皆共歡喜」 tr. "all were glad together"? Because the sūtra text records only the thought of Śakra alone; the treatise-author points out that this thought came out of what the great assembly felt together, and is not Śakra's private view. In reading the treatise one often sees this kind of supplementary stroke: it does not add events; it restores the scene.
26. Beings are of two kinds, those who have aroused the mind and those who have not; those who have aroused the mind surpass. The treatise-author establishes the first meaning: beings are of two kinds, first those who have aroused the mind, second those who have not aroused the mind; the bodhisattvas who have aroused the mind surpass all who have not aroused the mind. Why is this? These people plant the causes and conditions of the immeasurable and unsurpassed dharmas of a Buddha, and wish to deliver all beings, causing them to be free of suffering and obtain happiness; the other beings only seek happiness for themselves and wish to give suffering to others. Here first dispel a misunderstanding: what surpasses lies not in ability but in direction. The reason the treatise-author gives is, from beginning to end, only one—facing toward oneself or facing toward others. Brought down to practice: to examine whether one stands on the side of 「發心」 tr. "arousing the mind," one need not look at accomplishment; look at whom this single thought is for.
27. Question: arhats, pratyekabuddhas, and those with the five powers have all left desire behind, while one who arouses the mind has not left desire behind; how can he surpass them? The treatise-author sets his own first question, and asks it very reasonably: the arhats, the pratyekabuddhas, and those with the five powers are people who have left desire behind, while one who arouses the mind may not yet have left desire behind and only have aroused the mind; how can he surpass them? The weight of this question lies in the two Chinese characters 「離欲」 tr. "leaving desire behind"—that is realisation of a solid, real kind, while one who arouses the mind may have nothing at all. Whoever reads the words ‘arousing the mind surpasses’ and is not convinced at heart—this question is asked precisely on your behalf. The list of the five powers is not given in this chapter, and is not supplied.
28. Answer: it has already been answered in an earlier chapter; like the crown prince in the womb, and the prince not yet enthroned. The treatise-author's answer has three parts. First, pointing the way: this matter has already been answered in various ways in earlier chapters, and is not brought out again. Second, the proper answer: although the arhats and the rest have exhausted their outflows, they are not equal to the bodhisattva of the first arousing of the mind. Third, two similes: as the crown prince of a wheel-turning sage king, though still in the womb, already surpasses the other sons; as the crown prince of a king of a country, though not yet enthroned, surpasses the great ministers who have rank, wealth, and honour. The two similes take one meaning but illuminate different things: the crown prince in the womb illuminates his being already settled before he is born; the crown prince not yet enthroned illuminates his being already honoured before he holds office. What is honoured lies in lineage and in the position to be inherited, not in present ability—this is exactly the meaning of ‘direction’ in Passage 26 given visible form.
29. Bodhisattvas who have aroused the mind are of two kinds, those who practise the bodhisattva path and those who only emptily arouse the mind; like the kalaviṅka bird in the shell. The treatise-author at once supplies an important distinction: bodhisattvas who have aroused the mind are of two kinds, first those who practise the bodhisattva path of the perfections and the rest, second those who only emptily arouse the mind; and he specifically says that the ones spoken of here are 「行菩薩道者」 tr. "those who practise the bodhisattva path." Why must this sentence be supplied? Because if the answer of Passage 28 lacked this limit, it would become the excess ‘all who arouse the mind surpass the arhats’. Next he brings out a simile: as the kalaviṅka bird in the shell, before it has uttered a sound, can already surpass all birds; the bodhisattva, though he has not yet become a Buddha, practises the bodhisattva path, utters the sound of the real mark of all dharmas, and breaks the idle discourse of all the outside paths and of Māra's people, how much more when he becomes a Buddha! The place this simile illuminates is 「聲」 tr. "sound"—the bird surpasses by its sound, the bodhisattva surpasses by the sound of speaking the real mark; simile and what it likens interlock very tightly.
30. Someone says: whoever arouses the mind a single time saying, ‘I shall become a Buddha and extinguish the suffering of all beings,’ surpasses because the deeds of mind and mouth are weighty. This passage is another's account, not the treatise-author speaking for himself. Someone says: if there is one who can, with a single arousing of the mind, say 「我當作佛，滅一切眾生苦」 tr. "I shall become a Buddha and extinguish the suffering of all beings," then although he has not yet cut off the afflictions and has not yet practised hard deeds, because the deeds of mind and mouth are weighty he surpasses all beings; all beings seek happiness for themselves, and for their own sake love those close to them; the arhats and the pratyekabuddhas, though they do not crave worldly happiness, seek the happiness of nirvāṇa for the sake of extinguishing their own suffering and cannot act for beings; the bodhisattva's mind gives rise to it and his mouth says it for the sake of delivering all, and therefore he surpasses. Here the reader must remember a boundary: this account sets the ground of 「勝」 tr. "surpassing" down in the weightiness of the deeds of mind and mouth, going one step further than the treatise-author's ‘direction’, down to the level of deeds. The treatise-author records it without judging, and the reader need not hurry to judge either.
31. The simile of the arhat of the six supernormal powers and the śrāmaṇera. The treatise-author brings out a long simile. An arhat of the six supernormal powers had a śrāmaṇera carry his robe and bowl and walk along the road; the śrāmaṇera reflected by what vehicle he should enter nirvāṇa, and at once aroused the mind to enter nirvāṇa by the Buddha vehicle; the master knew his thought, at once took the robe and bowl and shouldered them himself, and pushed the śrāmaṇera to walk in front. The śrāmaṇera again reflected that the Buddha path is very hard, and that one abides long in birth and death and receives immeasurable suffering, and that he would rather enter nirvāṇa early by the Small Vehicle; the master again gave the robe-and-bowl bag back to the śrāmaṇera to carry and told him to walk behind. So it went three times. The śrāmaṇera found it strange that his master behaved like a child at play, and the master answered: when you first thought of arousing the mind to become a Buddha, that mind was precious and weighty, and so you abode within the path of my teacher; such a person even the pratyekabuddhas ought to make offerings to, how much more an arhat, and for this reason I pushed you in front; your mind turned back in regret, wishing to take the Small Vehicle, yet you had not yet obtained it, and you were far removed from me, and therefore I made you walk behind. The śrāmaṇera, on hearing this, was startled into understanding—my master can know my mind; with a single arousing of intent I have already surpassed the arhat, how much more on accomplishing it—and at once firmly abode of himself in the Dharma of the Great Vehicle. The merit of this simile is that it places 「勝」 tr. "surpassing" in an everyday scene that can repeat back and forth: the positions of front and behind change with the thought, three times changed, and the master does not weary of it. Brought down to practice: the surpassing of arousing the mind is not a title conferred once and for all; it is a living fact that appears with the thought and is lost with regret.
32. To surpass need not be to surpass in all matters, as in terms of flying the bird surpasses the human. The treatise-author at once keeps his own measure: the name surpassing need not be surpassing in all matters; it is only in the matter of 「一發心，欲作佛，度眾生」 tr. "a single arousing of the mind, wishing to become a Buddha and deliver beings" that he surpasses; as for all the other things, meditative concentration, liberation, and so on, he does not yet have them—how could it be said that he surpasses? As, speaking in terms of flying, the bird surpasses the human. The merit he will obtain in the future—this matter is not discussed. This passage is the most important brake of the whole treatise section. First ask: since it has already been said that arousing the mind surpasses the arhat, why does he limit himself again? The answer lies in guarding against excess—if it were not limited, then one who arouses the mind could on this ground slight all people with real realisation, and that is precisely the other extreme this treatise breaks. Brought down to practice: to spur oneself on by arousing the mind is permissible; to exalt oneself by arousing the mind is not; what surpasses is only in one matter, and all the other matters must still be cultivated from the beginning.
33. People of the Small Vehicle say: even a bodhisattva bound to buddhahood does not surpass a small śrāmaṇera who has obtained immeasurable restraints. The treatise-author brings up the account of the first extreme: people of the Small Vehicle say that even a bodhisattva bound to buddhahood does not surpass a small śrāmaṇera who has obtained immeasurable restraints. The ground of this account lies in the substance of the precepts—the śrāmaṇera receives the precepts and obtains immeasurable restraints, a merit that can be pointed to in the present; the bodhisattva bound to buddhahood, if discussed in terms of restraints, need not exceed him. The treatise-author records his words and adds no refutation; the reader should look at its ground as it really is, and only then will he know from where the judgement of 「二邊」 tr. "the two extremes" below comes.
34. Some say in the treatises of the Mahāyāna: one who arouses the mind of the Great Vehicle, even among base and evil petty people, still surpasses those of the two vehicles who have obtained liberation. The treatise-author brings up the account of the second extreme, and makes clear that its source is in the treatises of the Mahāyāna: some people speak thus—one who has aroused the mind of the Great Vehicle, even though he is among base and evil petty people, still surpasses those of the two vehicles who have obtained liberation. This account is exactly opposite to the former: the former takes the substance of the precepts in the present as its standard, this takes the mind that has been aroused as its standard and does not ask about the person's baseness and evil. The two accounts each hold one end and each make sense of their own—the reason the treatise-author sets the two accounts side by side is precisely to show that the failing of holding one end lies not in being wrong but in being one-sided.
35. The two extremes and the middle way; therefore it is said that at the time of the first arousing of the mind one surpasses all beings. The treatise-author gives his verdict: these are called the two extremes; to be apart from these two extremes is called the middle way; the meaning of the middle way is as said above, and because it has the reality of meaning and principle it should be taken; therefore it is said, 「初發心時，勝一切眾生，何況成佛！」 tr. "At the time of the first arousing of the mind he surpasses all beings, how much more when he becomes a Buddha!" Here one must see clearly that the middle way is not a compromise. The standard of taking and rejecting the treatise-author gives is only one sentence—「以其有義理實故」 tr. "because it has the reality of meaning and principle"; what is taken is the reality of meaning and principle, not a median value between two accounts. Brought down to practice: when one meets two accounts that both make sense and exclude each other, first ask what each rests on, then ask which account stands on the reality of meaning and principle; do not first calculate proportions.
36. Explaining the sūtra phrase 「聞薩婆若信者，得人中善利」 tr. "those who hear of sarvajñā and have faith obtain the good benefit among humans." The treatise-author turns to explaining the words of the first passage of the sūtra text, bringing up the sentence 「聞薩婆若信者，得人中善利」 tr. "those who hear of sarvajñā and have faith obtain the good benefit among humans" without explaining it at once, leaving it for the several accounts below. Why does the treatise-author set up a heading here? Because in the sūtra text this sentence is only an attendant phrase, and never defines what 「善利」 tr. "the good benefit" is; wherever the sūtra brings out a name and mark without defining it, the treatise-author mostly sets up a heading for it and gathers the several accounts—when one sees this format, one knows that what follows is a laying-out side by side and not a fixed judgement.
37. Someone says: the six perfections are the benefit. The first account. It takes the six perfections themselves as the benefit—that is, the dharma practised is itself the benefit obtained, without waiting for retribution. This account is the most direct; what it holds to lies in the causal practice.
38. Someone says: the retribution of the six perfections is the benefit, namely wheel-turning sage kings, Śakra and the Brahmā kings, kings of humans, kings of the Dharma, and so on. The second account. It takes the retribution of the six perfections as the benefit, and lists its items side by side—wheel-turning sage kings, Śakra and the Brahmā kings, kings of humans, kings of the Dharma, and so on. This account stands exactly opposite to the former: the former takes the cause, this takes the fruit.
39. Someone says: to obtain the state of the avaivartika, not to fall into the evil destinies, and to be constantly born among humans and gods in places of wealth and honour. The third account. It takes the position of non-retrogression as the benefit, together with its marks—not falling into the evil destinies, and being constantly born among humans and gods in places of wealth and honour. What this account takes lies in ‘safety’, that is, the safety line of practice.
40. Someone says: the bodhisattva, abiding in the supernormal powers of retribution, travels to the ten directions making offerings to the buddhas and teaching and transforming beings, and obtains great benefits such as these. The fourth account. It takes the use of the supernormal powers of retribution as the benefit: travelling to the ten directions making offerings to the buddhas, teaching and transforming beings by various skilful means, teaching and transforming beings by the causes and conditions of faith and acceptance. What this account takes lies in ‘use’. The four accounts are laid out side by side, from cause to fruit, from safety to use, and the treatise-author judges none of them. The reader need not choose one of the four accounts, but should see that the phrase 「善利」 tr. "the good benefit" in this treatise can hold so broad an explanation—it was never a narrow name and mark.
41. Explaining 「壽命中最」 tr. "the foremost among lives": two kinds of life, and the life of wisdom. The treatise-author explains the second phrase of the sūtra text: beings have two kinds of life, first the life-faculty, second the life of wisdom; because this person obtains the life of wisdom it is said, 「壽命中最」 tr. "the foremost among lives." Next he connects the sūtra's intent: how much more one who arouses the mind! One who arouses the mind is worthy of reverence and worthy of honour; why is this? As the causes and conditions said before—「能捨自樂、與他樂；不自憂苦，憂他人苦故。」 tr. "Because he can give up his own happiness and give happiness to others; because he does not grieve over his own suffering but grieves over the suffering of others." Of this passage first ask: how can life be of two kinds? The answer lies in the headings the treatise-author himself sets up—the life-faculty is the span of the bodily life, the life of wisdom is the life obtained by those who hear of sarvajñā and have faith. The headings of the two lives come from this place in this treatise. Brought down to practice: the length of the bodily span cannot be sought, but the continuance or severance of the life of wisdom lies in one's own single thought of taking or rejecting.
42. Śakra Devānām Indra scatters heavenly māndārava flowers, as the sūtra says at length. The treatise-author passes over the sūtra's passage of scattering flowers in a single sentence: at that time Śakra Devānām Indra, wishing to show the mark of gladness, scattered heavenly māndārava flowers over the Buddha, as the sūtra says at length. The four Chinese characters 「如經廣說」 tr. "as the sūtra says at length" are the treatise-author's abbreviating stroke—what the sūtra text has already made clear is not retold. When one sees these four Chinese characters in reading the treatise, one should go back to the sūtra text and read it oneself, and may not suppose that the treatise-author abbreviates because he does not value it.
43. Question: sin and merit cannot be given to others; why does Śakra say that by this merit those who seek the Buddha path may be fully endowed with the dharmas of a Buddha? The treatise-author sets the second question. This question is very solid: sin and merit are made and received by each person himself and cannot be given to others; even if one wished to give them one could not; then is Śakra's phrase 「以此福德令求佛道者具足佛法」 tr. "by this merit may those who seek the Buddha path be fully endowed with the dharmas of a Buddha" not empty words? Whoever, reading the words of dedication in the sūtra, gives rise at heart to the doubt ‘does this really have any use’—this question is asked precisely on your behalf.
44. Answer: though it cannot be given to others, yet one makes one's own mind good; and it shows not clinging to merit. The treatise-author's answer has two parts, and neither answers from ‘can it be given or not’. First, though it cannot be given to others, yet one makes one's own mind good—the real effect of dedication falls first on one's own mind. Second, Śakra Devānām Indra shows by this that he does not cling to merit, and therefore gives the mind of rejoicing to those who seek the Buddha path, and to the śrāvakas likewise. In this answer one must see clearly where it turns: what is asked is ‘can the giving succeed’, what is answered is ‘what this single thought of giving has done’. Brought down to practice: the benefit of dedication lies in being able to let go, not in being able to give; if one reckons whether the giving arrives or not, it becomes instead clinging to merit.
45. Śakra states of himself that though he has obtained the śrāvaka path he does not give rise to a single thought to make a bodhisattva turn back. The treatise-author restates the sūtra and explains Śakra's words: though I have obtained the śrāvaka path, I do not give rise to a single thought to make a bodhisattva turn back toward the mind of the two vehicles; why is this? The bodhisattvas see that beings in birth and death have all kinds of suffering, and, wishing to benefit all the world, make this vow: 「未度者我當等度」 tr. "Those not yet delivered I shall deliver equally." The weight of this passage lies in the standing of the speaker—a person who has already obtained the śrāvaka path keeps guard, for the bodhisattvas, over the vow not to retreat to the two vehicles. First ask: the road he himself walks is this one; why does he not wish others to walk it too? The answer lies in the suffering he sees—the reason Śakra gives is not the height of the roads but that the suffering of beings still waits to be delivered.
46. Beings in the assembly have a thought: what difference is there between rejoicing in a person who has first aroused the mind and rejoicing in a person who has long aroused the mind? The treatise-author supplies another setting the sūtra text leaves unclear: among the beings in the assembly some had this thought—if, as said above, rejoicing has merit, what difference is there between rejoicing in a person who has first aroused the mind and rejoicing in a person who has long aroused the mind? This thought is the origin of Śakra's question below. The treatise-author supplies it in order to make clear that Śakra's question is not a private question but resolves a doubt on behalf of the many. When one sees this kind of supplementary stroke in reading the treatise, one should know that behind an abrupt question in the sūtra text there is most often a doubt of the assembly.
47. Śakra, wishing to resolve the doubt of the many, asks the Buddha, as the sūtra says at length. The treatise-author makes clear Śakra's intent in asking the Buddha: Śakra Devānām Indra, wishing to resolve the doubt of the many, asked the Buddha, 「世尊！於初發心菩薩功德隨喜得幾許福德？」 tr. "World-Honored One! Rejoicing in the meritorious virtue of the bodhisattva of the first arousing of the mind, how much merit does one obtain?" as the sūtra says at length. Here one must remember the position of the one asking: Śakra is not asking for himself. Whoever asks on behalf of the many, what he asks must seek to be clear and usable, not to be profound—this too is the reason this chapter's answer uses weighing and not abstruse talk.
48. Because the field of merit is immeasurable and boundless the merit cannot be known by number; rejoicing in those near the Buddha path brings still greater merit. The treatise-author explains the Buddha's answer: this merit is immeasurable and boundless, because it is planted in an immeasurable and boundless field; people cannot know it by number, and so similes are spoken to make it understood, as the sūtra says at length. Next he supplies a meaning: though the virtue of rejoicing is immeasurable and boundless, toward those who are near the Buddha path the merit of rejoicing is greater still. This passage has two layers; do not read them merged into one. First, the reason the merit cannot be counted is that the field in which it is planted is immeasurable and boundless—the emphasis is on the field, not on the size of the mind. Second, though it is alike immeasurable, rejoicing toward those near the Buddha path brings greater merit—within the immeasurable there is still more and less. The two meanings stand together without obstructing each other, just as this chapter earlier says 「不可稱量」 tr. "cannot be weighed" and here says 「轉多」 tr. "greater still."
49. Śakra says that those who do not rejoice are Māra's people come from the heaven of Māra, because in Māra's domain they have accumulated evil minds. The treatise-author explains Śakra's heavy words: at that time Śakra, because he was glad, said to the Buddha that all who hear of this merit and do not rejoice are Māra's people, come from the heaven of Māra; why is this? Because in Māra's domain they have accumulated evil minds, they do not rejoice. The sūtra says plainly 「諸心不隨喜者，從魔中來生」 tr. "minds that do not rejoice are born having come from within Māra," words that concern the place of origin; the cause the treatise-author gives is 「在魔境界，積集惡心故不隨喜」 tr. "being in Māra's domain, because they have accumulated evil minds they do not rejoice," words that concern accumulation. The two phrases of sūtra and treatise stand together, and this chapter does not merge them into one account. Brought down to practice: if the mind that does not rejoice is left to accumulate, the domain naturally follows it; these words are a warning, not a verdict.
50. Here the causes and conditions are spoken: the mind of rejoicing can break Māra's realm, and so one should dedicate the mind of rejoicing to awakening. The treatise-author points out the causes and conditions the sūtra text carries with it: the mind of rejoicing can break Māra's realm; therefore those who seek the Buddha path, those who wish to love and revere the Three Honoured Ones and not abandon them, should dedicate the mind of rejoicing to anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi. This passage and Passage 49 are exactly one positive and one negative: not rejoicing, one accumulates Māra's domain; rejoicing, one breaks Māra's realm. Only when the two passages are seen together does one know why this chapter speaks of a single thought of rejoicing as so important—it is the single thought that stands directly against Māra's domain.
51. Explaining 「不一不二相」 tr. "the mark of neither one nor two." The treatise-author glosses the words in the sūtra: he does not see that dharmas have any one fixed mark that does not belong to causes and conditions, and so it says 「不一」 tr. "not one"; he does not discriminate between the mind of rejoicing and the mind of dedication, and this is called 「不二」 tr. "not two," because of ultimate emptiness. This gloss must be read word by word: 「不一」 tr. "not one" breaks the fixed mark; 「不二」 tr. "not two" breaks the partition between agent and object—if the mind of rejoicing and the mind of dedication are split into two things, there comes to be one who dedicates and a dharma that is dedicated. Brought down to practice: rejoicing and then dedicating are not two procedures; they are the continuation of a single thought.
52. The Buddha further extols the meritorious virtue of rejoicing: quickly obtaining the sight of the buddhas, the six faculties not receiving evil sense-objects, and never being apart from the sight of the buddhas. The treatise-author explains the words in which the Buddha, having approved Śakra's intent, further extols the meritorious virtue of rejoicing: because this person constantly recollects the merits of the buddhas of the ten directions and rejoices, he quickly obtains the sight of the buddhas; again, because with a deep mind he wishes all beings to be free of suffering and obtain happiness, therefore, going and coming within birth and death, his six faculties from the first do not receive evil sense-objects; he is never apart from being born before the buddhas, because he does not cut off the practice of planting the seed of seeing the buddhas. The order of this passage deserves attention: first it speaks of the rejoicing that recollects the buddhas, next of the deep mind toward beings, and the two together obtain the fruit 「六情初不受惡塵」 tr. "the six faculties from the first do not receive evil sense-objects." What is protected is the six faculties, and what is practised lies at the two ends of recollecting the buddhas and keeping beings in mind—it is not setting up a separate dharma of guarding the doors of the faculties.
53. The Buddha himself speaks the causes and conditions: because one rejoices in the bodhisattvas of the first arousing of the mind and so on up to those bound to buddhahood in one more birth, one quickly accomplishes the Buddha path. The treatise-author points out that here the Buddha himself speaks the causes and conditions: because this person rejoices in all the bodhisattvas, from countless asaṃkhyeya bodhisattvas of the first arousing of the mind up to immeasurable bodhisattvas bound to buddhahood in one more birth, he obtains the retribution above, quickly accomplishes the Buddha path, and delivers immeasurable asaṃkhyeya beings. This passage takes up the fruit of Passage 52 and supplies its cause—what is rejoiced in is not one person or one matter; it is the whole, from the first arousing of the mind up to the one bound to buddhahood in one more birth. Brought down to practice: if rejoicing reaches only the kind of people one likes oneself, it is not the rejoicing spoken of here.
54. Because one dedicates according to the real mark, it is said: not mind, and also not apart from mind. The treatise-author explains the distinction at the end of the sūtra passage: this bodhisattva, by reason of this merit, dedicates it according to the real mark of all dharmas; within the real mark the mind is unfindable, and therefore it is said, 「非心，亦不離心」 tr. "not mind, and also not apart from mind"; it is the meaning of 「不一不二」 tr. "neither one nor two" spoken above, spoken again because the matter is different. This passage unties the difficulty left over by Passage 5. First ask: why must it say not mind and yet also say not apart from mind? The answer lies in the mind's being unfindable within the real mark—since it is unfindable, one may not take the mind as a support and speak of dedicating, and this is called not mind; yet dedicating is not a separate matter apart from this mind, and this is called not apart from mind. The treatise-author further points out that this meaning is precisely the 「不一不二」 tr. "neither one nor two" of the earlier text, only spoken once more because what it faces is a different matter. When one sees words such as 「以事異故更說」 tr. "spoken again because the matter is different" in reading the treatise, one knows that the earlier and later phrases are one meaning, and there is no need to set up a separate new explanation.
55. Subhūti takes up the emptiness in which there is no mark of mind and challenges the Buddha. The treatise-author explains the turn in the sūtra text: Subhūti, having heard this, took up this emptiness in which there is no mark of mind and challenged the Buddha—this mind is not mind, empty, without anything existent, like an illusion; how can it obtain anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi? Here the treatise-author points out in a word what Subhūti relies on: what he takes up to make his challenge is precisely the 「非心」 tr. "not mind" that the Buddha himself spoke. If in reading the sūtra section this question feels abrupt, look at this sentence of the treatise-author's and it becomes clear: the blade the challenger holds was handed to him by the Buddha's own hand.
56. The Buddha asks in return: do you see this fixed mark of the empty mind as like an illusion? The treatise-author restates the Buddha's first counter-question: do you see this fixed mark of the empty mind as like an illusion? The treatise-author, in restating the sūtra, adds the two Chinese characters 「定相」 tr. "fixed mark" with the intent that what is asked is whether there is a determinate mind-mark like an illusion that can be pointed to. These two Chinese characters are the key to the treatise section's explanation of the first round of question and answer in the sūtra text: what the Buddha asks is not ‘do you believe the mind is like an illusion’, but ‘can you point out that mind which is like an illusion?’
57. Subhūti has a thought: if the mind is empty like an illusion, how can it be seen? And so he answers no. The treatise-author supplies the mental act before Subhūti's answer: if the mind is empty like an illusion, how can it be seen? If it can be seen, then it is not empty. Therefore he answered, 「不」 tr. "No." This passage is the treatise-author supplying a line of reasoning for the sūtra text: the sūtra text has only a single 「不也」 tr. "no"; the treatise-author writes out the reason behind this 「不」 tr. "no"—what can be seen is not empty; this is the simplest and clearest criterion. Brought down to practice: whoever feels ‘I have seen emptiness’ need only hold this one sentence up to himself.
58. The Buddha asks again: if the mind is empty and without anything existent, do you see within it any idle discourse of either existence or non-existence? The treatise-author restates the Buddha's second question: if the mind is empty and without anything existent, do you see within it any idle discourse of either existence or non-existence? What this question breaks is not the mind but the idle discourse upon the mind—the debate between the two ends of existence and non-existence. First ask: since he has already answered that he does not see the mind, why further ask about existence and non-existence? The answer lies in the habit of the human mind—although the mind cannot be seen, the discourse ‘it exists’, ‘it does not exist’ still arises of itself. This question gathers up precisely this layer.
59. He answers: No. The answer of the second round is again only the two Chinese characters rendered here as ‘No’. Neither sūtra nor treatise adds any explanation. Reading the treatise to this point one can see a rhythm: the questions deepen step by step, while the answer is of one flavour throughout—not that it cannot be said, but that there is nothing to be said.
60. The Buddha asks a third time: apart from this empty mind without anything existent and like an illusion, do you see some further dharma that can obtain the unsurpassed path? The treatise-author restates the Buddha's third question: apart from this empty mind, without anything existent and like an illusion, is there some other dharma that can obtain the unsurpassed path? What this question breaks is the view ‘there is a separate dharma’. The three questions seen together form one sequence: the first breaks the mark of mind, the second breaks the discourse of existence and non-existence, the third breaks a separate dharma outside the mind—once all three roads are cut, only then comes the challenge below.
61. He answers that he does not see it. The answer of the third round. At this point the three questions and three answers are all finished, and the ground on which Subhūti stands leaves no retreat; the challenge of the next passage arises naturally. The short answer is short precisely because the road ahead is exhausted.
62. Because it is not seen and unfindable, it is ultimately separated and ultimately empty; seeing, cultivating, severing, and realising are unfindable. The treatise-author extends its meaning: because it is not seen and is unfindable, how could there be a dharma that either exists or does not exist? Because all dharmas are ultimately separated and ultimately empty, they do not fall into existence and do not fall into non-existence; if a dharma does not fall within existence and non-existence, then it is ultimately without anything existent, and should not obtain the unsurpassed path; for these causes and conditions prajñāpāramitā has the mark of ultimate separation, because to see existence and non-existence are both faults; dhyānapāramitā and so on up to anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi likewise have the mark of ultimate separation; if a dharma is ultimately separated, then it cannot be found to be seen, cannot be found to be cultivated, cannot be found to be severed, cannot be found to be realised; practising this dharma, there is further nothing attained, because of ultimate separation. This passage pushes the difficulty to its very end: the four matters of seeing, cultivating, severing, and realising are all unfindable. A misunderstanding must be dispelled—this does not say that practice is useless, but that upon a dharma of ultimate separation one may not form the notion of one who can see, can cultivate, can sever, can realise. In the last sentence, 「行是法則更無所得」 tr. "practising this dharma, there is further nothing attained," the word 「行」 tr. "practising" may not be passed over: the dharma must still be practised.
63. Subhūti challenges: how does one obtain ultimate separation by ultimate separation? It is like touching space with a finger. The treatise-author explains Subhūti's proper challenge: now prajñāpāramitā is ultimately separated, and anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi is ultimately separated; how does one obtain ultimate separation by ultimate separation? If one dharma being ultimately separated should still not have anything attained, how much less two separations! Next he brings out a simile: as when one touches space with a finger—because space has no contact, the finger cannot touch it; how much less when both have no contact! It is also like space and nirvāṇa. This simile is extremely fine: when one end has no contact it already fails; when both ends have no contact it fails all the more. What the simile illuminates is the unfindability of ‘being accomplished in mutual dependence’—if what obtains and what is obtained are both without self-nature, where could the single matter of obtaining be set up? This challenge is the hardest question of the whole chapter; the reader may well pause here, first let the challenge stand, and then look at the Buddha's answer.
64. The Buddha approves his words and at once speaks the causes and conditions: because of ultimate separation it can be obtained. The treatise-author explains the Buddha's approval and answer: the Buddha, knowing that Subhūti spoke in accord with the real mark of all dharmas, approved his words, 「善哉！善哉！」 tr. "Excellent! Excellent!" and at once spoke the causes and conditions—if prajñāpāramitā is ultimately separated and anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi is ultimately separated, for these causes and conditions it can be obtained. Here first ask: why does the Buddha first approve a challenge? The answer lies in the words the treatise-author adds—「隨諸法實相說故」 tr. "because he spoke in accord with the real mark of all dharmas." Subhūti's challenge itself arose in accord with the real mark, and so it is first approved; approving its ground, he then turns over its clinging. When one sees in reading the treatise that the Buddha first approves and then turns over, one should know that what is approved is the ground, and what is turned over is the clinging.
65. If a dharma definitely had a mark and were not empty, there would be no four truths, no Three Jewels, and so on up to no dharmas at all. The treatise-author brings out the grounds of the Buddha's answer, using a proof from the contrary: if one dharma definitely had a mark and were not empty, it would be a permanent dharma, with the mark of non-arising; if there is no real mark of arising, there is no mark of ceasing; if there is no arising and ceasing, there are no four truths; if there are no four truths, there is no Dharma Jewel; because there is no Dharma Jewel, there is also no anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi—because the Dharma Jewel is anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi; if there is no Dharma Jewel, there is no Buddha Jewel; if there is no Buddha and Dharma, there is no Saṅgha Jewel; if there are no Three Jewels, there are no dharmas at all—there are such faults and offences as these. The last sentence turns back: with the mark of ultimate separation, one penetrates without obstruction. This passage is the most complete chain of reasoning in this chapter, and in reading it one must fasten it link by link: with a fixed mark there is no arising; with no arising there is no ceasing; with no arising and ceasing there are no four truths; with no four truths there is no Dharma Jewel; with no Dharma Jewel there is no awakening, no Buddha Jewel, no Saṅgha Jewel, no dharmas at all. The lists of the four truths and of the three fetters are not given in this chapter, and are not supplied; the list of the Three Jewels this passage itself gives—the Dharma Jewel, the Buddha Jewel, the Saṅgha Jewel.
66. Ultimate separation, know that it is also separated from emptiness; therefore the sūtra says one does not obtain two separations by two separations. The treatise-author guards one layer further: if ultimate separation is spoken of, know that it is also separated from emptiness; if it is not separated from emptiness, it is not called ultimate separation. Next he restates the sūtra as proof: therefore the sūtra says, 「般若波羅蜜畢竟離故，能得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提；雖不離般若波羅蜜得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提，亦不以二離而得二離」 tr. "because prajñāpāramitā is ultimately separated, one can obtain anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi; though it is not apart from prajñāpāramitā that one obtains anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi, neither does one obtain two separations by two separations"; because of ultimate emptiness one should not raise the challenge. This passage is the last line of defence against clinging in the whole chapter: if 「離」 tr. "separation" is not separated from 「空」 tr. "emptiness," then separation itself becomes again a dharma that can be clung to, and Subhūti's challenge would stand once more. Brought down to practice: whoever takes emptiness as something attained—this passage is precisely its cure.
67. Subhūti, knowing that what the Buddha says is of a very deep mark, sighs. The treatise-author explains the turn in the sūtra text: Subhūti knew that what the Buddha said was of a very deep mark, and therefore said to the Buddha: if the bodhisattva can practise thus, then this is practising the very deep meaning. The treatise-author here adds the phrase 「知佛所說甚深相」 tr. "knew that what the Buddha said was of a very deep mark," pointing out the origin of the sigh: the sigh is not a courtesy; it is words after understanding.
68. The Buddha approves his words: to be able to practise the very deep meaning and not realise the two vehicles, entering deeply into emptiness with sharp wisdom and not realising nirvāṇa, is what is hard. The treatise-author explains the Buddha's approval and its reason: this bodhisattva is able to do what is hard—able to practise such a very deep meaning and yet not realise the two vehicles; why is this? This bodhisattva, single-mindedly, with sharp wisdom enters deeply into emptiness and does not realise nirvāṇa; this is what is hard. Here one must see clearly where the 「難」 tr. "hardness" lies: not in emptiness being hard to enter, but precisely in entering deeply with sharp wisdom and still not taking realisation. The two Chinese characters 「利智」 tr. "sharp wisdom" that the treatise-author adds matter most—the dull do not enter deeply, and naturally have no realisation to take; to enter deeply and not realise is what is hard.
69. Subhūti says it is not hard: because of the practice with nothing to be attained, all dharmas are illuminated. The treatise-author restates Subhūti's contrary account: as I understand the meaning the Buddha speaks, this is not hard; why? This person does not find any one fixed mark of this very deep meaning that can be realised, does not find prajñāpāramitā, does not find one who realises; who would realise by the very deep meaning? If he does not realise this very deep meaning, who would obtain anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi? This is called the bodhisattva's practice with nothing to be attained; practising this path, he illuminates all dharmas. The ground of this passage is the same as Passage 16: with neither one who realises nor what is realised, hardness has nowhere to be established. Read the two places together, and one can know that Subhūti's account is consistent from first to last, not an ingenious argument of the moment.
70. Question: the Buddha says it is hard and Subhūti says it is not hard; the meaning of master and disciple should be the same; why do they contradict each other? The treatise-author sets the third question, and asks it most properly: the Buddha says 「難」 tr. "hard," Subhūti says 「不難」 tr. "not hard"; the meaning of master and disciple should be the same; why do they each contradict the other? This question is the most important question of the whole treatise section, because what it concerns is the pattern of teaching the Dharma, not merely the meaning of one passage. Whoever, reading the sūtra, sees that what the Buddha and a disciple say is opposite and is uneasy at heart—this question is asked precisely on your behalf.
71. Answer: the Buddha speaks by worldly truth, Subhūti speaks by the truth of the highest meaning; and each follows the capacity of the hearer. The treatise-author's answer has two layers. First, the division by the two truths: the Buddha speaks by reason of worldly truth, Subhūti speaks by reason of the truth of the highest meaning; the Buddha says that the bodhisattva obtains this very deep meaning, Subhūti says that the bodhisattva also does not obtain this very deep meaning. Second, speaking according to capacity: the Buddha, on Subhūti's account, speaks for the sake of beings—there are people who, hearing of a hard matter, arouse the mind, and so the hard matter is spoken of; there are people who, hearing of a hard matter, give up and retreat, and so it is said there is no hardness. Only when the two layers are seen together is it complete: it is not only that the truths they rest on differ, but also that the capacities they face differ. Brought down to practice: one who, hearing 「難」 tr. "hard," has his resolve roused, takes the account of hardness; one who, hearing 「難」 tr. "hard," has his mind retreat, takes the account of not hard—both accounts are set up for you, and need not be taken up to attack and break each other.
72. This is called the practice with nothing to be attained; abiding in this practice, one penetrates all dharmas without obstruction. The treatise-author closes this section: this is called the bodhisattva's practice with nothing to be attained; abiding in this practice, he penetrates all dharmas without obstruction. The word 「住」 tr. "abiding" is the eye of this passage—nothing to be attained is not a view that is done with once it has passed; it is a practice one can abide in. Brought down to practice: penetrating without obstruction is not seeking some further skill; it is the natural mark of abiding within nothing to be attained.
73. Subhūti says: hearing of ultimate separation and not being startled, not sinking, and penetrating without obstruction—this is called true practice and deep practice. The treatise-author restates Subhūti's words and adds a judgement: if the bodhisattva, hearing ultimate separation spoken of thus—that there is no dharma to be realised, no one who takes realisation, and also no prajñā and no anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi—is at that time not startled, does not sink, and penetrates without obstruction, this is called practising prajñāpāramitā; one who practises prajñāpāramitā—this is called true practice and deep practice. This connects with the 「不驚、不沒、不怖、不畏」 tr. "not startled, does not sink, not terrified, not afraid" of the sūtra text in Passage 17 and is simpler still, naming only the two matters of not being startled and not sinking. The judgement 「真行、深行」 tr. "true practice and deep practice" that the treatise-author adds in the last sentence fixes the marks of practice spoken of earlier under a single name.
74. Not seeing prajñā, not seeing that I practise, not making the discrimination that the two vehicles are far and the Buddha path near. The treatise-author extends its marks: this bodhisattva does not see prajñāpāramitā, and also does not see that I practise prajñāpāramitā, does not see anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi, and also does not see that this dharma can obtain anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi; he is altogether without discrimination; this bodhisattva abides securely within the real mark of all dharmas, and therefore does not make this discrimination, saying 「二乘離我遠，佛道離我近」 tr. "the two vehicles are far from me, the Buddha path is near to me." This passage corresponds exactly to Passages 17 and 18 and the others of the sūtra section, and the treatise-author adds one sentence that matters most—「安住一切諸法實相中」 tr. "abides securely within the real mark of all dharmas." Not making the discrimination of far and near is not pressing thought down; it is that the place where one abides has from the first no far and near.
75. The similes of space and the rest are to make clear ultimate emptiness; though prajñā is empty, if there is something cultivated it can accomplish its matter. The treatise-author explains the similes as a whole: here the similes of space and the rest are spoken; these similes are for the sake of making clear the meaning of ultimate emptiness; though prajñāpāramitā is empty, if there is something cultivated, it can accomplish its matter; and so on up to: like the wooden puppet, whatever matter it is made to do, it can accomplish it all. This passage is the closing of the similes, and guards against the same failing as Passage 19 of the sūtra section. First ask: since ultimate emptiness has been spoken of, why say again that it can accomplish its matter? The answer lies in the four Chinese characters 「若有所修」 tr. "if there is something cultivated"—emptiness does not obstruct cultivation, cultivation does not obstruct emptiness. Brought down to practice: not to cultivate on the pretext of emptiness is precisely what this passage breaks.
76. Śāriputra asks whether only prajñā is without discrimination, and extends his challenge: if the five matters are all empty, there are no six names and nothing to be practised. The treatise-author restates Śāriputra's question and extends the intent of his challenge: if only prajñā is empty and without discrimination, the other perfections should have marks, and then the bodhisattva path would have separate differences and not be equal; again, in the first chapter it is said, 「行檀波羅蜜時，無施者、受者、亦無財物」 tr. "when practising dānapāramitā there is no giver, no receiver, and also no goods"; how then is a difference now spoken of? If the five matters are all empty, then there is no discrimination, there are no six names, and there is also nothing to be practised. The wonder of this passage lies in the challenge reaching both ends at once: to say they differ makes the bodhisattva path unequal; to say they do not differ loses both the names of the six perfections and practice. The treatise-author cites the words of this treatise's first chapter as proof, questioning it by this treatise's own text—when one sees in reading the treatise the citation 「初品中說」 tr. "it is said in the first chapter," one should know that it is the treatise-author citing his own earlier text, not citing another book.
77. Subhūti says the five perfections too are empty and without discrimination; those who have not obtained the acceptance of non-arising have discrimination, as the four rivers before they have met the great sea. The treatise-author restates Subhūti's answer and supplies its meaning: the five perfections too are empty and without discrimination; those of the first arousing of the mind, who have not obtained the acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas, have discrimination. Next he brings out a simile: as the four rivers, before they have met the great sea, have separate names, and once they have entered the great sea are without difference; the bodhisattva too is like this—within the truth of worldly convention there are differences, in the truth of the highest meaning there is no discrimination. This simile best resolves the double difficulty of Passage 76: the separate names are not false, and entering the sea is not nothingness—the four rivers, before they enter the sea, have names, waters, and currents all really there to be pointed to; once they have entered the great sea, they are without difference of themselves without waiting to be broken. Brought down to practice: to see differences while not yet having obtained the acceptance of non-arising is not a mistake; it is a stage; there is no need, on hearing the teaching of non-discrimination, to force oneself to wipe out one's present discriminations. The list of the four rivers is not given in this chapter, and is not supplied.
78. Śāriputra asks further: if all dharmas are without discrimination, how are there the distinctions of the six destinies and the four fruits? The treatise-author restates Śāriputra's further question: form and so on up to anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi, and so on up to the unconditioned nature—are these also without discrimination? If these dharmas are empty and without difference, how are there the separate differences of the six destinies? How is it discriminated that there are the srota-āpanna and so on up to the Buddha path? This question is the question of Passage 22 of the sūtra section; the reason the treatise-author restates it is that the answer below is to be divided into two roads—the differences of defilement and the differences of purity—and so the question too must bring up both ends again. When one sees the treatise restate a question of the sūtra, one should know that below there is bound to be a new explanation, not a repetition.
79. Subhūti answers: from inversion deeds arise and retribution is received, craving is the root; the differences of the six destinies come from inversion and are not real. The treatise-author explains the first road—the differences of defilement: although all dharmas are ultimately empty and without discrimination, these beings, from their mad and inverted minds, give rise to deeds of body, speech, and mind, and according to their deeds receive bodies as the retribution of those deeds; craving is the root; only because they are pressed by desire do they give rise to clinging minds, while dharmas have no fixed mark; the retribution of deeds is what is called the six destinies; for this reason one knows that emptiness and being without anything discriminated is their real root, and only because of inversion, which is not real, are there the differences of the six destinies. In this passage the treatise-author adds a phrase the sūtra text does not have—「貪欲是本」 tr. "craving is the root"—pointing the root of inversion one layer further down. One must see clearly the direction of the conclusion: the real root is emptiness without discrimination, and difference is what inversion adds; it is not that there is a further six destinies on top of emptiness; it is that inversion sees the undifferentiated as differentiated.
80. The worthies and sages too are born from the dharma of non-discrimination: severing the three fetters is severing inversion, and because of worldly truth and provisional names there are fruits. The treatise-author explains the second road—the differences of purity: again, the worthies and sages, the srota-āpanna and the rest, are also born from the dharma of ultimate emptiness and non-discrimination; namely, the dharma of severing the three fetters is called the fruit of srota-āpanna; the three fetters are precisely inversion; recognising inversion and removing it is called severing; therefore the dharma of severing is emptiness and without discrimination; because of worldly truth a person is provisionally named, and because he obtains this dharma it is called the fruit of srota-āpanna; therefore one should know that the srota-āpanna person and the fruit are ultimately empty and without discrimination; and so on up to the Buddha and the Buddha path, which are likewise. This passage is the tightest link of the whole treatise section. First ask: since the differences of the worthies and sages can truly be realised, why say they too are without discrimination? The answer lies in the treatise-author's two steps—first, the three fetters that are severed are precisely inversion, and the dharma that severs inversion is emptiness without discrimination; second, the so-called ‘person who obtains the fruit’ is a provisional name of worldly truth. So the reason a fruit is established is precisely that discrimination has been severed; the reason a person is named is precisely that worldly truth provisionally sets him up. The list of the three fetters is not given in this chapter, and is not supplied.
81. Here the causes and conditions are spoken: the buddhas of the past too severed discrimination and entered nirvāṇa without remainder; therefore it is said that the dharma of causes and conditions is very deep. The treatise-author points out the causes and conditions the sūtra text carries with it: not only is there no discrimination in the present; the buddhas of the past, as many as the sands of the Ganges, because all discrimination was severed, entered nirvāṇa without remainder, and there is not the least dharma with a fixed mark that can be discriminated; all dharmas are ultimately empty, because they enter the gate of suchness, the nature of dharmas, and the limit of reality; therefore it is said, 「因緣法甚深」 tr. "the dharma of causes and conditions is very deep," because one enters this gate of samādhi. This passage pushes non-discrimination from the present back to the buddhas of the past; what is realised is not a principle of one time, but the gate through which all the buddhas alike pass. The last phrase, 「入是三昧門故」 tr. "because one enters this gate of samādhi," is the footing the treatise-author himself adds—the very deep is not only the depth of meaning and principle; there is a gate that can be entered.
82. The bodhisattva should practise the prajñā of non-discrimination and obtain the anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi of non-discrimination. The last passage of the whole chapter, where sūtra and treatise return alike to this one sentence: the bodhisattva should practise thus the prajñāpāramitā of non-discrimination; because he practises the prajñāpāramitā of non-discrimination he obtains the dharma of non-discrimination, namely anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi. This sentence is the same as the concluding words of the sūtra text in Passage 23; the treatise-author brings it up again and does not explain it further—because cause and fruit are one and the same non-discrimination, there is nothing more that can be said. Looking back over the whole chapter: its rising place is Śakra's single thought of rejoicing, its closing place is the prajñā of non-discrimination; the reason rejoicing cannot be weighed is precisely that, if it is practised thoroughly, it is the non-discrimination spoken of here. Head and tail were from the first one matter.
Do Not Misread
Do not read 「隨喜」 tr. "rejoicing" as an easy small good. This chapter places rejoicing in the position that stands directly against Māra's domain—Śakra says that those who do not rejoice are Māra's retinue; the treatise-author explains its cause as 「在魔境界，積集惡心故不隨喜」 tr. "being in Māra's domain, because they have accumulated evil minds they do not rejoice," and further points out that the causes and conditions the sūtra text carries with it are 「隨喜心能破魔界」 tr. "the mind of rejoicing can break Māra's realm." Since it is the mind that breaks Māra, it is not casually saying a kind word. Moreover, the object of rejoicing in the sūtra text is the whole of the bodhisattvas, from the bodhisattvas of the first arousing of the mind up to the bodhisattvas bound to buddhahood in one more birth, and the treatise-author states plainly that they are 「無央數阿僧祇」 tr. "countless asaṃkhyeya"; if rejoicing reaches only the kind of people one is close to and finds agreeable, it is not the rejoicing this chapter speaks of.
Do not read the simile of a single hair drawing drops from the sea as ‘the merit is very great’. What the simile cites is precisely the utmost of the weighable and the utmost of the countable—the great-thousand world can be weighed and its weight known, and drawing up the sea-water drop by drop with one part of a hair, the number of drops can still be known; while what is said of the merit of the mind of rejoicing is 「不可稱量」 tr. "cannot be weighed" and 「不可數知」 tr. "cannot be known by number." What is set apart is a kind, not a quantity. If it is read as an extremely large figure, then the words below, 「非心、非離心」 tr. "not mind, and not apart from mind" and 「不一不二相」 tr. "the mark of neither one nor two," have nothing at all to rest on. The treatise-author's explanation of why the merit is immeasurable likewise lies not in the size of the mind but in 「以種無量無邊田中」 tr. "because it is planted in an immeasurable and boundless field"—the emphasis is on the field.
Do not read ‘arousing the mind surpasses the arhat’ as licence to slight people with real realisation. The treatise-author himself sets up three limits: first, the ones spoken of here are 「行菩薩道者」 tr. "those who practise the bodhisattva path," not those who only emptily arouse the mind; second, 「勝名不必一切事中皆勝」 tr. "the name surpassing need not be surpassing in all matters"—what surpasses is only in the one matter of a single arousing of the mind wishing to become a Buddha and deliver beings, and 「諸餘禪定、解脫等，猶尚未有」 tr. "all the other things, meditative concentration, liberation, and so on, he does not yet have"; third, what people of the Small Vehicle say and what some say in the treatises of the Mahāyāna are brought up side by side and judged alike to be the two extremes. With all three limits in place, one can see that these words are for spurring oneself on, not for ranking people high and low. In the simile of the śrāmaṇera, the master changes his position three times, which shows exactly that this 「勝」 tr. "surpassing" appears with the thought and is lost with regret.
Do not read 「畢竟離」 tr. "ultimate separation" as there being nothing at all that needs to be cultivated. From ultimate separation Subhūti pushes out 「不可得見、不可得修、不可得斷、不可得證」 tr. "it cannot be found to be seen, cannot be found to be cultivated, cannot be found to be severed, cannot be found to be realised," which seems to cut off the gate of practice; but in the last sentence of that same passage the treatise-author writes 「行是法則更無所得，畢竟離故」 tr. "practising this dharma, there is further nothing attained, because of ultimate separation"—the three Chinese characters 「行是法」 tr. "practising this dharma" have never been withdrawn. After that the treatise-author further says 「般若波羅蜜雖空，若有所修，能成其事」 tr. "though prajñāpāramitā is empty, if there is something cultivated, it can accomplish its matter," and takes as simile the wooden puppet, which, whatever matter it is made to do, can accomplish it all. What is excluded is forming the notion of one who cultivates upon cultivation, not cultivation. Not to cultivate on the pretext of emptiness is precisely the extreme this chapter plainly breaks.
Do not read the Buddha's saying 「難」 tr. "hard" and Subhūti's saying 「不難」 tr. "not hard" as master and disciple contradicting each other. The treatise-author's answer has two layers: one is the two truths—the Buddha speaks by worldly truth, Subhūti speaks by the truth of the highest meaning; the other is capacity—there are people who, hearing of a hard matter, arouse the mind, and so the hard matter is spoken of; there are people who, hearing of a hard matter, give up and retreat, and so it is said there is no hardness. The two accounts are not one true and one false, but each faces one capacity and each rests on one truth. The reader should take them up according to his own present condition, and need not settle victory and defeat between the two accounts.
Do not read 「一切法無分別」 tr. "all dharmas are without discrimination" as differences being entirely false and cultivation and realisation being wholly an empty setting-up. Subhūti's answer divides into two roads: the differences of the six destinies exist from inversion, which is not real, while the differences of the four fruits are 「因畢竟空無分別法生」 tr. "born from the dharma of ultimate emptiness and non-discrimination"—the former are what delusion adds, the latter are established after discrimination is severed. The two roads may not be lumped together. The treatise-author further takes the four rivers entering the sea as simile and states plainly 「初發心、未得無生法忍者有分別」 tr. "those of the first arousing of the mind, who have not obtained the acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas, have discrimination," from which it can be seen that to see differences before reaching that stage is not a fault. To wipe out one's present stage and work in the name of 「無分別」 tr. "non-discrimination" is precisely what the treatise-author means to guard against in this passage.
Bearing on Practice
The first use is to take rejoicing as a practice that can be taken up at any time. The order this chapter shows is very concrete: seeing another accomplish something in practising the path and giving rise to gladness in the mind, followed by making a vow, followed by dedicating, and in dedicating not discriminating between the mind of rejoicing and the mind of dedication. This whole string needs no seat of practice and needs no time; as soon as the thought arises it can be practised. The treatise-author further points out that its real effect falls first on one's own mind—「雖不可與人，然自令心好」 tr. "though it cannot be given to others, yet one makes one's own mind good"; so there is no need first to settle the doubt ‘can merit be given to others or not’; first do this single thought.
The second use is to examine oneself by the three Chinese characters 「破魔界」 tr. "break Māra's realm." The treatise-author explains the cause of not rejoicing as 「在魔境界，積集惡心」 tr. "being in Māra's domain, having accumulated evil minds," and the power of rejoicing as 「隨喜心能破魔界」 tr. "the mind of rejoicing can break Māra's realm." In daily life, when one sees a fellow practitioner obtain the Dharma, obtain a name, obtain favourable conditions, if a trace of displeasure arises in the mind, one can at once hold this single thought up to oneself: is this thought accumulating, or is it breaking? Accumulating is silent, and in time it becomes a domain of itself; breaking is also silent, and in time it becomes a habit of itself. This chapter links the finest single thought to the greatest domain precisely so that people may apply their effort in the fine places.
The third use is to guard the surpassing of arousing the mind with the treatise-author's three limits. When spurring oneself on by arousing the mind, first ask whether one is of the kind that 「行諸波羅蜜等菩薩道」 tr. "practises the bodhisattva path of the perfections and the rest," or of the kind that 「但空發心」 tr. "only emptily arouses the mind"; next remember that what surpasses is only in one matter, and that meditative concentration, liberation, and the rest one 「猶尚未有」 tr. "does not yet have"; and remember further that in the simile of the śrāmaṇera the order of positions changes with the thought. Holding the three together, arousing the mind can give rise to strength and not give rise to pride.
The fourth use is to take 「不驚、不沒、不怖、不畏」 tr. "not startled, does not sink, not terrified, not afraid" as four checks for when one hears the deep Dharma. The sūtra text only lists these four matters and does not distinguish their marks, and what the treatise section extends is likewise only the one sentence 「不驚、不沒、通達無礙者，是名行般若波羅蜜」 tr. "one who is not startled, does not sink, and penetrates without obstruction—this is called practising prajñāpāramitā." The four matters are not passed through once and for all; each time one hears the deep Dharma one can examine oneself once. What the sūtra text sets immediately after the four passes is 「不見我行般若」 tr. "does not see ‘I practise prajñā’"—from which it can be seen that the look of having passed is not the mind feeling settled, but not setting up even the thought ‘I am practising’.
The fifth use is that the simile of the four rivers entering the sea can give a place to one's present stage. To see discriminations while not yet having obtained the acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas, the treatise-author states plainly, is due to the stage one is at, not a fault. The practitioner can thereupon work with both hands together: with one hand, discriminating as before between good and evil, between Dharma-gates, between stages, and so cultivating; with the other, knowing that these separate names will in the end be without separation in the great sea. If, on hearing the teaching of non-discrimination, one first abandons discrimination, it is abandoning the river's name before entering the sea, and both ends fall into emptiness.
Further Resonances
The backbone of this chapter is one passage of sūtra text and one passage of treatise explanation. Sūtra ① begins from Śakra Devānām Indra's thought that those who arouse the intent of awakening go above all beings and that the remaining beings should aspire to it and delight in it; next come the scattering of māndārava flowers and the vow, the oath not to make a bodhisattva turn back, and the question how much merit rejoicing in the meritorious virtue of the four kinds of bodhisattvas brings; the Buddha, with the two similes of weighing by the pound and of a single hair split into a hundred parts drawing drops of sea-water, weighs the merit of rejoicing as not able to be weighed and not able to be known by number; Śakra says that those who do not rejoice are all Māra's retinue, and that one should give rise to rejoicing and dedication because of the mark of neither one nor two; the Buddha approves his words and speaks at length of constantly meeting the buddhas and so on up to quickly drawing near to awakening, not mind and not apart from mind. Next it turns to Subhūti challenging the Buddha with the mind being like an illusion; the Buddha asks back three times and Subhūti three times answers that he does not see, at the end stating of himself that all dharmas are ultimately separated, and within two separations how can there be anything attained; the Buddha answers that precisely because of ultimate separation one can obtain, that it is not that it is not because of prajñā, nor that by separation one obtains separation. Next Subhūti sighs that the meaning practised is very deep; the Buddha says that to be able to practise the deep meaning and not realise the two vehicles is doing what is hard; Subhūti, because of the practice with nothing to be attained, says it is not hard, and says that hearing the deep Dharma and being not startled, not sinking, not terrified, not afraid is called practising prajñā, bringing out at length the similes of space, the illusory person, the image in a mirror, the Buddha having no love and no hate, the Buddha's discriminating notions being severed, the person conjured by the Buddha, and the craftsman's wooden puppet, making clear that being without discrimination one can yet have something one does. At the end it turns to Śāriputra asking Subhūti whether only prajñā is without discrimination or the five perfections too, and, if all dharmas are without discrimination, how there are the distinctions of the six destinies and the four fruits; Subhūti replies with receiving bodies through inversion, and with the worthies and sages too existing because of non-discrimination, and concludes that the bodhisattva should practise the prajñā of non-discrimination and, having practised it, then obtains the anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi of non-discrimination. Treatise ① explains following the text under "The explanation says": first it supplies the setting of the assembly's shared gladness and establishes the meaning of the two kinds of beings and that those who arouse the mind surpass; it sets the first question and answer (why the arhats and the rest, who have left desire behind, do not surpass those who arouse the mind) and answers it with the two similes of the crown prince in the womb and the prince not yet enthroned; next it distinguishes the two kinds of arousing the mind and brings out the simile of the kalaviṅka bird in the shell; it records what someone says, that surpassing lies in the weightiness of the deeds of mind and mouth; it brings out the long simile of the arhat of the six supernormal powers and the śrāmaṇera; next, keeping its own measure, it says that to surpass need not be to surpass in all matters, as in terms of flying the bird surpasses the human; it brings up the two accounts, what people of the Small Vehicle say and what some say in the treatises of the Mahāyāna, judging them to be the two extremes and taking the middle way. Next it explains the sūtra phrase ‘the good benefit’, laying out four accounts side by side, and explains ‘the foremost among lives’, establishing the two kinds of life, the life-faculty and the life of wisdom; it passes over the passage of scattering flowers and sets the second question and answer (sin and merit cannot be given to others, so why does Śakra say that by this merit those who seek the Buddha path may be fully endowed with the dharmas of a Buddha); it explains Śakra's statement of himself that he will not make bodhisattvas turn back, supplies the thought of the beings in the assembly who doubted the difference, and explains Śakra's asking the Buddha on behalf of the many, together with the field of merit being immeasurable and boundless and rejoicing in those near the Buddha path bringing still greater merit; it explains that those who do not rejoice are Māra's people and that the mind of rejoicing can break Māra's realm, glosses 「不一不二相」 tr. "the mark of neither one nor two," explains the Buddha's further extolling of the meritorious virtue of rejoicing and his own speaking of the causes and conditions, and explains that because one dedicates according to the real mark it is said, not mind and also not apart from mind. Next, following the sūtra, it explains Subhūti's taking up the emptiness in which there is no mark of mind to challenge the Buddha, the Buddha's three rounds of counter-question, and Subhūti's thought and answers, and extends it that because of ultimate separation seeing, cultivating, severing, and realising are unfindable; it explains the challenge of touching space with a finger and the Buddha's approving his words, the proof from the contrary that if a dharma definitely had a mark and were not empty there would be no four truths, no Three Jewels, and so on up to no dharmas at all, and that ultimate separation, one should know, is also separated from emptiness; it sets the third question and answer (why the Buddha saying it is hard and Subhūti saying it is not hard contradict each other) and answers it with worldly truth and the truth of the highest meaning, together with speaking according to capacity; it explains true practice and deep practice, not making the discrimination of far and near because one abides securely in the real mark, and that the similes are to make clear ultimate emptiness and that prajñā, though empty, can accomplish its matter; at the end it explains Śāriputra's challenge and the simile of the four rivers entering the sea, deeds arising from inversion and receiving the retribution of the six destinies, that severing the three fetters is severing inversion and that because of worldly truth and provisional names there are fruits, and that the buddhas of the past too severed discrimination and entered nirvāṇa without remainder, concluding that the bodhisattva should practise the prajñā of non-discrimination and obtain the awakening of non-discrimination.
As for differences in the chapter's name: the base text of this edition has "Aspiration and Delight," while the various texts have separately the three names "Pure Vow," "Aspiration, Delight, and Rejoicing," and "Vow and Practice"; see the Apparatus for details. Of the ancient masters' explanations, two schools can be recorded for this chapter. Jizang, in his commentary on this chapter, uses the name 「淨願品」 tr. "the chapter Pure Vow," and states of himself the reason for the name, saying: 「從初作名云淨願品，上已二品教學平等，此復是更教菩薩，今見化他行成，宜應更生隨喜發願供養，勿起癈忘之心也。」 tr. "The name is made from the beginning, calling it the chapter Pure Vow. The two chapters above have already taught training in equality; this is again a further teaching of the bodhisattva: now, seeing the practice of transforming others accomplished, one should further give rise to rejoicing, making vows, and offerings, and not give rise to a mind of neglect and forgetting." He divides this chapter into two, saying: 「就初段中為二：第一明隨喜功德無邊大果報，二明正觀成就得菩提果。」 tr. "Within the first section there are two: the first makes clear the boundless great retribution of the meritorious virtue of rejoicing; the second makes clear that right contemplation is accomplished and the fruit of awakening obtained."—dividing this chapter in two by rejoicing and right contemplation, which accords with the order of this treatise's treatise section, first explaining arousing the mind and rejoicing, then explaining the prajñā of non-discrimination. His explanation of the sūtra phrase 「出一切眾生之上」 tr. "goes above all beings" cites two accounts that are as if from one mould with the two extremes this treatise judges: 「出一切眾生之上者，小乘人言補處菩薩猶是凡夫，不及沙彌無量律儀；大乘弊惡，下劣人一發菩提心勝辟支佛羅漢，此二皆失也。」 tr. "As for ‘goes above all beings’: people of the Small Vehicle say that the bodhisattva bound to buddhahood is still an ordinary person and does not match the immeasurable restraints of a śrāmaṇera; in the Great Vehicle, a base and evil, inferior person, with a single arousing of the mind of awakening, surpasses the pratyekabuddhas and arhats. These two are both mistaken." And the explanation he sets up himself says: 「今明若初發大心大願，則發心為勝、二乘為劣；若就戒定慧行為論，則二乘為勝、發心為劣。」 tr. "Now it is made clear: if it is a matter of first arousing the great mind and the great vow, then arousing the mind is superior and the two vehicles inferior; if the discussion is in terms of the practice of morality, concentration, and wisdom, then the two vehicles are superior and arousing the mind inferior."—this divides superior and inferior by the aspect under discussion, and is close to the measure kept by this treatise's sentence 「勝名不必一切事中皆勝」 tr. "the name surpassing need not be surpassing in all matters," while each words it in its own way; recorded side by side without judgement. His explanation of the challenge of the two separations also brings out a simile of his own, saying: 「如指觸空，空無觸故，指不能觸，況無二物而欲觸耶？」 tr. "As a finger touches space: because space has no contact, the finger cannot touch it; how much less, when there are not two things, could one wish to touch?"—the same as this treatise's simile of touching space with a finger. Huiying, explaining this chapter, uses the same name as the base text of this edition, opening the chapter by saying: 「第六十三品者，名為願樂品。」 tr. "The sixty-third chapter is named the chapter Aspiration and Delight." His chapter sequence differs by one place from the base text of this edition. He explains the reason for the sequence, saying: 「所以次等學品後明此品者，上品明菩薩具於生法二忍，內德既充，外為世間人天所樂，及為一切眾聖愛念，此品之生正以於此，故次等學品後明願樂品。」 tr. "The reason this chapter is set forth next after the chapter Equal Training is that the chapter above made clear that the bodhisattva is endowed with the two acceptances, of beings and of dharmas; his inner virtue being full, outwardly he is delighted in by the humans and gods of the world and is lovingly kept in mind by all the sages; the arising of this chapter is precisely due to this, and therefore the chapter Aspiration and Delight is set forth next after the chapter Equal Training." He too divides this chapter into two parts, saying: 「爾時釋提桓因已下，就此品中大有二分：第一明嘆美波若行般若德，及隨喜迴向功德無量無邊；第二從須菩提白佛已下，明無分別波若不可思議，雖復冥懸而無方大用。」 tr. "From ‘At that time Śakra Devānām Indra’ onward, within this chapter there are broadly two parts: the first makes clear the praise of the virtue of prajñā and of practising prajñā, and that the meritorious virtue of rejoicing and dedication is immeasurable and boundless; the second, from ‘Subhūti said to the Buddha’ onward, makes clear that the prajñā of non-discrimination is inconceivable, and though it is hidden and remote, it has a great function without bounds."—the boundary between the two parts falls exactly at the place where Subhūti addresses the Buddha, which accords with the turning-point of this treatise's sūtra section. His explanation of 「非心、非離心」 tr. "not mind, and not apart from mind" says: 「心相即寂，心無心相，故云非心。雖心相即寂，亦不離此心而得迴向，故云不離也。」 tr. "The mark of mind is itself quiescent; the mind has no mark of mind; therefore it says not mind. Though the mark of mind is itself quiescent, yet it is not apart from this mind that dedication is obtained; therefore it says not apart."—this and the meaning taken by this treatise's sentence 「於實相中心不可得」 tr. "within the real mark the mind is unfindable" illuminate each other, while their words are each different. His explanation of the contradiction between hard and not hard says: 「如來為益一類眾生故說難，善吉為益一徒眾生故說易，雖云難易其理實冥」 tr. "The Tathāgata, to benefit one kind of beings, says it is hard; Subhūti, to benefit one group of beings, says it is easy; though it is called hard and easy, their principle is in truth one in the hidden depth"—dividing the two accounts by benefiting beings, which is close to this treatise's judgement by the two truths together with capacity, but without setting up the name of the two truths. His explanation of the simile of the kalaviṅka bird says: 「在㲉中者，喻菩薩在生死無明㲉藏中心力已勝也。」 tr. "‘In the shell’ likens the bodhisattva, within the shell-store of birth, death, and ignorance, his strength of mind already surpassing." (The character he uses differs in form from the one the base text of this edition has; see the Apparatus for details.) Further, the chapter heading and the general table of contents of Huiying's commentary both have 「釋願樂品第十四」 tr. "Explaining the Fourteenth Chapter, Aspiration and Delight," which, compared with 「釋願樂品第六十四」 tr. "Explaining the Sixty-fourth Chapter, Aspiration and Delight" as fixed by the collation notes of the same book, lacks the two Chinese characters 「六十」 tr. "sixty"; this belongs to an omission in copying, and is recorded without judgement. In Junzheng's commentary and in the writings of the Tiantai school, for this chapter's title and for the similes and phrases found only in this chapter, all that was swept this time is 〔not found〕; the gap is marked as it really is, and it is not filled with text from elsewhere.
稱揚品Extolling
全文五層 →Full five layers →稱揚品：行般若何以是行無真實法，度眾生如度虛空何以不是取消眾生，眾生空與法空何以要分兩重，佛何以問弟子而不自說，成就二法何以魔不能壞，日月相須何以是本品最要之喻，諸佛何以稱揚未得無生忍而能信解的菩薩，如中住何以就是畢竟空中住，仰射空中何以勢盡自墮非為空盡
在問什麼
這一品問的是稱揚——誰稱揚，稱揚誰，憑什麼稱揚。從品名看，答案像是在第二段纔出現的那句「十方現在無量阿僧祇諸佛在大眾中說法時，自讚歎稱揚是菩薩摩訶薩名姓」；但經文真正費力處，不在稱揚本身，而在被稱揚的那個人究竟站在什麼地方。
品首是一個極刺人的問。舍利弗問須菩提：行般若波羅蜜，是行真實法還是行無真實法？這問題把行人逼到牆角——答真實，則般若成了可取可著之物；答不真實，則所行豈不成了虛誑妄語。須菩提答得毫不遲疑：行般若就是行無真實法，因為般若乃至一切種智都無真實；而且「無真實不可得，何況真實」。論主替這兩個詞下了訓：真實者，審定、不變異，即是可取、可著；不真實者，即是虛誑妄語。一問一答之間，本品的地基已經打好——稱揚所歎的，是一個不在真實一邊、也不落虛誑一邊的人。
接著諸天子作禮，而須菩提立刻把「難」字挪了位置。諸天所敬的是不作實際證、不墮二乘地；須菩提說那還不算難，難的是明知眾生畢竟不可得而仍然度眾生——「是人欲度眾生，如欲度虛空」。論主為此設了全品第一個問答：兩件事同樣畢竟空，何以一難一不難？答語只分兩個字——著與不著。平等法是無為，本非所著處，於此不著不算本事；眾生是虛誑假名，正是眾生歷劫所著之處，於此不著纔是難行。隨後論主出調馬自見影而不驚之喻，又把不驚分成兩重：上文所聞是眾生空故不畏，此處所聞是法空故不畏，二空俱不畏，纔是真行般若。
論①後半是四番問答，問的全是說法之席何以在須菩提身上——佛是一切智人何以問弟子，何以不自作說主，何以不令大菩薩說，何以不命智慧第一的舍利弗。四問一路推下去，答的其實是同一件事：說空之座要交給偏善說空的人。問答之後，論主重述經文以收卷七十八，把諸天作禮之因與諸佛憶念之果各安其位。
卷七十九入第二段經。佛出二法——觀一切法空、不捨一切眾生——說成就此二法者魔不能壞；又出第二組二法——所作如所言、亦為諸佛所念。論主釋前一組，用了本品最要的一個喻：日月相須。有月無日則萬物濕壞，有日無月則萬物燋爛；悲而無空則沒在有眾生的顛倒中，空而捨悲則墮斷滅中。此下經文正面說稱揚：諸天親近諮問而記其不久作佛，十方諸佛說法時稱揚菩薩名姓，釋迦自稱揚寶相、尸棄二菩薩。須菩提問何等菩薩得此稱揚，佛答阿鞞跋致；又答一類更希有的人——信解一切法無生、空、虛誑不實不堅固而未得無生忍法的菩薩。末後轉入「如中住」，須菩提以除如更無法可得反覆推問，佛全部印可並補一刀：如之生、滅、住異皆不可得。釋提桓因歎其甚難，須菩提反問諸法空中誰驚誰沒，帝釋以仰射空中歎其說法無礙——箭勢盡自墮而非空盡，這就是全品的收句。
逐段解明
一、舍利弗問行真實法為行無真實法。 品首不從讚歎起，從一個兩難之問起。舍利弗問菩薩摩訶薩行般若波羅蜜，是行真實法，還是行無真實法。先要看清這一問的形狀：它不是求知識，是設兩難——凡答其一，必落其一之過。論主補出問者的來歷：舍利弗是聽了上文無分別相法而心大歡喜纔問的，可見此問出於歡喜而非刁難。讀經遇兩難之問，先不急著站隊，先看問者把哪兩個詞對立起來——此處對立的是真實與無真實，而不是有與無。這一步認清了，後面須菩提的答語纔不會被讀成否定般若。
二、須菩提答行無真實法，無真實尚不可得何況真實。 須菩提答得極快：行般若波羅蜜為行無真實法；理由是般若波羅蜜乃至一切種智皆無真實。要緊的是他沒有停在這裡，還加了一句——行般若波羅蜜時，「無真實不可得，何況真實」。此語是防止行人把「無真實」再立為一個真實。最易讀錯處正在這裡：以為答無真實就是主張一切虛無。經文自己堵死了這條路——連無真實這一頭也不可得。落到用上，這一句是給修觀的人的：所觀之空若還可執，那個空仍是所著。
三、欲色界諸天子作念禮敬發心不證之人。 說者由人間轉向諸天。欲界、色界諸天子心中作念：凡發阿耨多羅三藐三菩提意、如深般若所說義行於等法、不作實際證、不墮聲聞辟支佛地的人，應當為他作禮。此段須看準三件事：其一，這是心念而非出聲對話，經文作「作是念」；其二，所禮的不是已證者而是不證者；其三，禮的理由是不墮二乘地。諸天之所以能作此念，是因為他們也懂得證與不證之別。行人讀此，可知一件事——在般若門中，忍住不取證是一種功德，而不是懈怠。
四、須菩提移「難」之所在——度畢竟空之眾生乃為難。 諸天所歎的，須菩提偏說「不為難」。他把難字挪到另一處：菩薩大誓莊嚴要度無量無邊阿僧祇眾生，卻又知眾生畢竟不可得而仍然去度，這纔為難。經文接著自出譬喻：這人欲度眾生，如欲度虛空；虛空離故眾生亦離，虛空空故眾生亦空，虛空無堅固故眾生亦無堅固，虛空虛誑故眾生亦虛誑。四句一路比下去，不是為了取消眾生，是為了說明所度之境與能度之誓同樣無可執捉。末後更狠一句——結誓已而不得眾生，卻仍為眾生結誓。行門上的用處是：發願不必等到看見一個實有的所度者纔敢發。
五、聞諸法離相心不驚不沒不怖不畏，是為行般若。 此段是本品第一個判準句。經文由眾生離推到法離——色離即是眾生離，受想行識離即是眾生離；色離即是六波羅蜜離，乃至一切種智離即是六波羅蜜離。然後下判語：若菩薩聞是一切諸法離相而心不驚、不沒、不怖、不畏，當知是行般若波羅蜜。此處四個「不」字底本未一一分訓，今亦不強為分釋；唯「沒」字論主後文自有著落——「深處應當沒而不沒」，可知沒者是於深處之下墜。判準不在於懂不懂，在於聞而不動。讀者可自驗：聽到『所修的六波羅蜜也離』時，心裡是否要抓一把。抓的那一下，就是經文所說的驚與沒。
六、佛問須菩提何因緣故於深般若中心不沒。 說者轉為佛，而所問的是原因。佛問菩薩摩訶薩於深般若波羅蜜中心何以不沒。此問表面向須菩提，實則為大眾發。要注意經文用的是「不沒」而非「不驚」——論主後文自釋其故：「深處應當沒而不沒」，可知所防者是於深處之下墜，深般若中最危險的正是這一著。問句本身已含一個前提：於深處而不沒，是需要理由的。論主後文專為此問設四番問答，可見這一問在本品的份量。
七、須菩提答無所有故離故寂滅故不沒，沒者沒事沒處皆不可得。 答語分兩截。前截給三個理由：般若波羅蜜無所有故不沒、離故不沒、寂滅故不沒。後截釜底抽薪：是菩薩不得沒者、不得沒事、不得沒處，是一切法皆不可得故。前截說的是所行之法，後截說的是能沒之人與所沒之處。三事俱不可得，則「沒」這件事根本無從成立——不是強忍著不沒，是找不到一個可以沈沒的地方。讀者若把此語當作勉勵，便失其力；它是一個事實陳述。末後須菩提補上一句作禮之文，正好接住下一段佛語。
八、佛說光音等諸天亦禮、十方諸佛亦念、恒沙等魔不能留難。 佛把作禮的範圍往上推：不但釋提桓因諸天、梵王及諸天、世界主及諸天禮此菩薩，過此以上的光音天、遍淨天、廣果天、淨居天也都作禮。再往上推一層——十方無量諸佛亦念是菩薩，當知是菩薩為如佛。最後一句是防護的保證：恒河沙等世界眾生盡為魔，一一魔復化作魔，如是一切魔不能留難菩薩行般若波羅蜜。三句連讀可見一個次第：天禮之、佛念之、魔不能壞之。所以稱揚不是一句好話，是一種實際的護持格局。
九、成就二法魔不能壞——觀一切法空、不捨一切眾生。 卷七十九之經接住上文的魔不能壞，正面出其所以。佛說菩薩摩訶薩成就二法，魔不能壞；何等二？觀一切法空，不捨一切眾生。這是本品的骨句。二法之名經文自出其目，不待旁求。要看清二者是並列而非先後：不是先觀空再起悲，也不是先度生再學空。單取其一，經文即不許稱為成就。行人若覺自己偏於一邊，此句便是最直接的照鏡處。
十、第二組二法與諸天親近諮問、十方諸佛稱揚名姓。 經文續出第二組二法：所作如所言，亦為諸佛所念。此二法看似平實，卻是前二法的落地保證——觀空不捨生若不見於言行，便只是見解。隨後經文說諸天來至菩薩所，親近、諮問、勸喻、安慰，並列出「無護眾生汝為作護」以下逐項為作之事——為作護、為作依、為作救、為作究竟道、為作歸、為作洲、冥者為作明、盲者為作眼。再後纔是本品品名所繫之句：十方現在無量阿僧祇諸佛在大眾中說法時，自讚歎稱揚是菩薩摩訶薩名姓，並舉釋迦自稱揚寶相菩薩、尸棄菩薩與阿閦佛世界中菩薩為例。讀此段當注意稱揚的場合——是在大眾說法之時，不是私下嘉許。
十一、須菩提問何等菩薩得稱揚，佛答阿鞞跋致。 經文轉為問答。須菩提問何等菩薩摩訶薩為諸佛說法時自讚歎稱揚，佛答阿鞞跋致菩薩。此答看似已盡，其實只是第一層。須菩提立刻再問何等阿鞞跋致菩薩為佛所讚——可見他聽出了佛答中仍有未定之處。讀經遇到答而復問，不要以為是重複；問者往往是替聽眾把一個籠統的名目再逼緊一步。本品後文論主專為此一再問設問答，正是看準了這一點。
十二、佛列阿鞞跋致之所行所學，並及未得無生忍而信解者。 佛的第二層答有兩支。一支是如阿閦佛為菩薩時所行所學，諸菩薩亦如是學者。另一支更要緊：有菩薩行般若波羅蜜，信解一切法無生而未得無生忍法，信解一切法空而未得無生忍法，信解一切法虛誑不實不堅固而未得無生忍法——這一類佛說法時也歡喜自讚歎稱揚名姓。後一支之所以要緊，是因為它把稱揚的門檻從已證者放寬到信解者。經文並給出果報：是菩薩滅聲聞辟支佛地，當得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提記，當住阿鞞跋致地，住是地已當得薩婆若。
十三、聞深般若心明利不疑不悔者，當於阿閦佛及諸菩薩所廣聞。 第三支說的是聞法之人。若菩薩摩訶薩聞是深般若波羅蜜，其心明利、不疑不悔，作是念「是事如佛所說」，這菩薩亦當於阿閦佛及諸菩薩所廣聞般若而信解，如佛所說當住阿鞞跋致地。末後經文自作格量：但聞般若波羅蜜已得大利益，何況信解；信解已如說住、如說行，如說住行已，住一切種智中。此處的次第極清楚——聞、信解、如說住行、住一切種智。行人可自問今日在哪一節上，不必躐等。
十四、如中住之推問、佛之逐字印可與釋提桓因之歎。 末段是全品最險的一節。須菩提兩度推問：若菩薩摩訶薩無所得法，云何住薩婆若？佛答住諸法如中。須菩提再推，一氣三詰：除如更無法可得，誰住如中？誰住如中已當得菩提？誰住如中當說法？佛不但不駁，反而逐字重述其語而印可，並補出理由——是如生不可得、滅不可得、住異不可得，若法生滅住異不可得，是中誰當住如。釋提桓因隨即歎諸菩薩所為甚難，而須菩提反問憍尸迦：諸法空中誰驚誰沒、誰怖誰畏、誰疑誰悔。帝釋乃以仰射空中箭去無礙歎其說法無礙。推問、印可、補刀、歎難、反詰、設譬相次而下，這一節把「住」字徹底掏空，而說法之事仍然成立。
十五、論主釋來意與真實不真實之訓。 論①起首，論主先補經文的來歷：舍利弗是聞上文無分別相法而心大歡喜纔發此問。次下訓詁：真實法者，審定、不變異，即是可取、可著；若不真實，即是虛誑妄語。這兩句訓是全品閱讀的鑰匙。要看清論主如何處理這個兩難——他不是否認二者的對立，而是指出般若不在這條對立線上。次答須菩提何以敢答無真實：須菩提常樂行深空，心無障礙，故答行般若即是行無真實，因般若波羅蜜空、無定相、無分別故。讀此可知，答語之所以能出，繫於答者之所行，不只繫於其所知。
十六、觀虛誑因緣生法尚不可得，世諦故說真實。 論主續申其義：菩薩先來生死中所習所著的虛誑有為法尚不可得，何況後來所觀虛誑因緣生的般若波羅蜜這非所著之法而可得。這是一個由重推輕的比量——連粗重的所著尚且不可得，何況本非所著者。結句最要緊：世諦故說真實，第一義中真實不可得，何況不真實。此句立二諦之分而不使二諦相爭——說真實者，就世諦說；第一義中則連真實一詞也無立足處。行人遇經論中真實與不真實之語相違時，先查它站在哪一諦上說，勿急判前後矛盾。與此一義相須者，尚有論主緊接諸天歡喜語後之一句訓詁——「第一義即是平等法，但以異名說」。上文論中忽言「第一深義」，忽言「平等法」，讀者易疑為二法；論主一句即斷其疑：二者同體而異名。有此一訓，後文「於平等法而不證」與「行第一深義而不作證」纔讀得成同一件事，而不致把難處錯認在名目上。
十七、問答一：一難一不難之分在著與不著。 論主設第一問：於平等法而不證、眾生畢竟空而度眾生，此二俱畢竟空，云何言一難一不難？答語分三節：眾生虛誑假名故是所著處，平等法無為故非所著處；眾生從有為法假名而生，無為法是第一義；於顛倒著處而能不著為難，於無著處不著是不為難。此答之妙，在於它不從空的深淺上分高下，而從所對之境是否為習氣所著處上分難易。行人可即此自驗：於靜坐中放下一個念頭不難，於最在意的人事上放下纔難——難處從來不在法上，在著處。
十八、調馬自見影而不驚之喻。 論主先引一句總說——「眾生空故，大莊嚴亦空；若大莊嚴空而能發心為難」，次出譬喻。譬如調馬，自見影而不驚，何以故？自知影從身出故。菩薩亦如是，知畢竟空乃是因有為和合虛妄法生，故聞是事不驚不沒。此喻的關鍵在「自知」二字：馬之不驚，不是因為影子消失，是因為知道影從何來。畢竟空亦然——菩薩並非看不見緣起之相，是知道這些相從何而生。讀者若把不驚理解為麻木，便失此喻；不驚出於知，不出於鈍。
十九、眾生空與法空二重不畏纔是真行般若。 論主此段作分判。色等法離故眾生亦離，離名為空。若眾生空而法不空，應有怖畏；若法亦空，則無生怖畏之處。末後總收：上聞眾生空故不畏，今聞法空故不畏，若聞是二空不畏，是為真行般若。此處不可草草讀過——經文在前段已說不驚不沒，論主在此把它拆成兩重，正是要防行人以第一重冒充第二重。我空易許，法空難安；許多修行上的怖畏，正出在法空這一重。自驗之法極簡：聽到『你所修的法也空』時，心是否比聽到『你所度的人也空』時更緊。
二十、問答二：佛是一切智人何以問弟子。 論主設第二問：佛是一切智人，何以問弟子心不驚不沒。答有三重。其一，以眾會有疑，敬難故不敢問，是以佛問——佛代大眾發問。其二，是第一平等義甚深難得，深處應當沒而不沒，故試問須菩提。其三，佛以須菩提為說法主，聽者法應問難。三重層層不同：第一重為聽眾，第二重為顯法之深，第三重為立說法之體例。讀論遇一問三答，不要只取第一個；三答往往是三個不同的層面，不是同義反覆。
二十一、問答三：何以不自為說主而令須菩提說。 第三問更進一步：佛為一切智，何以不自為說主。答曰：眾中有人以佛智慧無量無邊，我等智力有量，若心有所疑，不敢發問；為是人故，命須菩提說。此答之要，在於它把說法之席的安排歸於聽者的根性，而非說者的高下。佛不自說，不是佛不能說，是為了讓不敢問佛的人有處可問。此義於今日仍用得著：法席之設，先看聽者能否開口，不只看說者能否開演。
二十二、問答四：何以不令大菩薩說，兼出有人言。 第四問：若爾者，何以不令大菩薩說？答曰：大菩薩智慧亦大，不可思議，威德重故，亦不敢問難。此與上一問同一理路——威重則人不敢問。其下論主出一異說：有人言，阿羅漢、辟支佛、佛，三界繫無明永盡無餘故能如實說法；諸菩薩雖廣集福德，漏未盡故或不可信，是故不命。此說在本品中是唯一一處「有人言」，全品僅此一見。讀者須看清它的身分——這是論主所錄的他家之說，不是論主自立之判；論主錄而不駁，亦不加印可。
二十三、問答五：何以不命舍利弗等大弟子。 第五問：舍利弗智慧第一，及餘大弟子，何以不命？答曰：是事先已答，所謂須菩提樂於空行，偏善說空；般若波羅蜜多說空故，令須菩提說。答語自承「先已答」，可見論主並不諱言重出。要點在「偏善」二字——不是須菩提智慧勝過舍利弗，是他所長正與所說之法相應。此中有一個一貫的分寸：法席之命，取相應不取高下。四番問答至此收束，所解的始終是同一件事——說空之座何以在須菩提身上。
二十四、論主重述經文以結卷七十八——諸天作禮之因與諸佛憶念之果。 此段在論①之內，而文體是牒經。論主重述須菩提白佛之語：一切法畢竟空、無所有，無所有故自相離，離相故常寂滅，常寂滅故無憶想分別，故菩薩不應驚、不應沒，沒者沒處沒法皆不可得。次重述須菩提答已白佛之語。再下逐目分疏作禮之諸天：地神、虛空中神、四天王、忉利天以帝釋為主；梵天王是初禪中梵世界眾生主；世界主者，欲界餘天主——此即論主所說之三種天，其目論主自出，不待旁求。作禮之理由亦自出：是菩薩捨自樂欲利益眾生，是三種天但自求樂故。次分貴賤：欲界諸天著婬欲心多故禮不足為貴，初禪天有覺觀散亂亦不足為妙，上諸天心清淨而作禮，爾乃為難。末結諸佛憶念之果報——當知是菩薩為如佛，以其必至佛道不退故，如恒河沙等魔不能壞。讀此段當認清其身分：這是論主重述經文以總結上卷，不是另起一段新的對話。
二十五、論②釋二法魔不能壞——日月因緣與二道偏執之失。 卷七十九之論起首，論主先立眾會之疑：菩薩何因緣故得如是力，魔不能壞。次述佛答之二因緣：一者觀諸法空，二者不捨一切眾生。隨後出本品最要之喻——以日月因緣故萬物潤生；但有月而無日則萬物濕壞，但有日而無月則萬物燋爛，日月和合故萬物成熟。合法處論主說得極明白：菩薩亦有二道，一者悲，二者空；若但有憐愍心而無智慧，則心沒在「無眾生而有眾生」的顛倒中；若但有空心而捨憐愍度眾生心，則墮斷滅中。此喻之力，在於它不說二者互補，說二者互救——缺一不是少了一半，是壞了全體。
二十六、二事兼用——空亦空故不著空，不取眾生相故不妨空。 上段說偏執之失，此段說兼用之法。論主釋曰：觀一切法空，空亦空故不著空，是故不妨憐愍眾生；觀憐愍眾生，亦不著眾生、不取眾生相，但憐愍眾生引導入空，是故雖行憐愍而不妨空；雖行空亦不取空相故，不妨憐愍心，如日月相須。要看清兩邊各有一個防護鍵：空邊的鍵是「空亦空」，悲邊的鍵是「不取眾生相」。二鍵一鬆，便落回上段之失。行門上最可用的一句是「引導入空」——憐愍不是停在安慰，是把人往空處引；此語一立，慈悲與般若便非兩事。
二十七、所作如所言與為諸佛所念——五種執金剛神與魚子不為母念之喻。 論主釋第二組二法，兩邊各出一果。反面：諸神天輕賤妄語人，若菩薩不如所說行，則五種執金剛神捨離不復守護，惡鬼得便；是人喜生惡心，惡心故生惡業，生惡業故墮惡道。此是一條完整的下墜鏈，起點只是言行不符。另一邊：菩薩不為諸佛所念者則善根朽壞，如魚子不為母念則爛壞不生。此喻極切——魚子之壞不由外力，只由無所憶念。末結引經語「所作如所言，亦為諸佛所念。得此二法故，不可破壞」。二法一內一外，而樞紐都在言行之實。
二十八、問答六：諸天未得一切智何以能與菩薩授記。 論主設問：諸天未得一切智，云何能與菩薩授記。答有兩支。其一，諸天長壽，從過去諸佛聞如是行得記，今見菩薩有如是行故說——這是以前例比今事，非以神通知未來。論主自加一句判準：見因知有果故。其二，諸天見是菩薩行三解脫門印，亦兼行慈悲心於眾生，是故說言「不久作佛」。要注意第二支所舉的兩項，正是上文二法的另一種說法——三解脫門是空邊，兼行慈悲是悲邊。可見諸天之記，所據仍是本品的骨句。
二十九、佛稱揚之所以——大將破敵之喻與諸佛讚善毀惡之意。 論主先以「無守護眾生汝為作守護，無歸與作歸」等義指歸前文，次釋稱揚之事。喻曰：如大國王有大將，不惜身命，有方便能破怨敵，常為國王所稱譽；菩薩亦如是，觀畢竟空，不惜我身，破煩惱賊，有方便而不作證，教化眾生，諸佛所稱譽。喻中四事一一對法：不惜身命對不惜我身，破怨敵對破煩惱賊，有方便對有方便而不作證，為王稱譽對為諸佛稱譽。次解一疑——諸佛雖無著心，無分別善不善法，視諸阿羅漢外道亦無憎愛，何以仍讚善毀惡？論主答得乾脆：為利益眾生故，欲使眾生依附好人、心隨善法、令出世間故。稱揚是教化的手段，不是佛有所偏愛。此段之前，論主另出一則稱揚之實例：十方諸佛說法時，亦以能如所說應諸法實相的菩薩為譬喻，作是言：「某方某世界菩薩雖未作佛，能如是行甚深般若波羅蜜，功德希有故。」最可注意者在「雖未作佛」四字——所稱揚的不是果位已圓之人，是行中之人；而稱揚的方式是舉之為喻，使他方聞法者有一個現成的樣子可循。本品品名之稱揚，於此見其實際用處。
三十、問答七：何經中說二菩薩為佛所讚歎。 論主設一個看似枝節而實不枝節的問：何經中說此二菩薩為佛所讚歎。答曰佛經無量；佛涅槃後諸惡邪見王出，焚燒經法，破壞塔寺，害諸沙門；五百歲後像法不淨，諸阿羅漢、神通菩薩難可得見故，諸深經不盡在閻浮提，行者受者少故，諸天龍神持去。此答的分寸極好——不強指一經，不諱言查不到，而給出查不到的原因。讀論遇此等答語，當知這是誠實之答而非推諉；論主寧可說經已不在此土，不肯隨口指一部經以塞問。
三十一、問答八：遍吉觀世音等何以不歎而但稱譽二菩薩。 論主設問：如遍吉菩薩、觀世音菩薩、大力勢菩薩、文殊尸利、彌勒菩薩等，何以故不讚歎而但稱譽二菩薩。答有三重。其一，是二菩薩未得無生忍法而能似無生忍法行，一切魔民所不能壞，是故佛歎希有——所歎者在『未得而能似』。其二，是二菩薩清淨大願行、深大慈悲心，不期疾作佛，為度眾生故。其三，遍吉、觀世音菩薩等功德極大，人皆知；是二菩薩人未知，故稱揚。第三重最可玩味：稱揚是為了讓人知道，人已盡知者便不必再標。可見稱揚之用在接引，不在排位。
三十二、問答九：總稱揚與別稱揚——須菩提何以更問。 論主先牒經云：「何等菩薩，佛說法時，稱揚讚歎說其名字？」，次設問：佛已先說，須菩提何以更問。答曰：佛初說「大菩薩」，後稱說「一切菩薩，從初發意乃至十地」，是故須菩提疑問佛。此答把須菩提之問的由來說得極清楚——前後兩個範圍不同，一個極狹一個極寬，故須再問以定其目。佛之答亦隨之而定：佛雖皆愛念一切菩薩，其中有德行勝者，稱揚其名字。愛念是普遍的，稱名是別立的；此一分判，正是本品品名之所繫。
三十三、三門與三解脫門之三種差別，並出柔順法忍未得無生法忍之希有。 論主釋佛所稱之第二類菩薩：未得無生法忍、未入菩薩位，行般若波羅蜜力故常思惟籌量，求諸法實相，能信解、忍，通一切法無生相、空、虛誑、不堅固。次逐項配屬：虛誑、不實、不堅固者，皆是無常、苦、無我門；一切法空者，即是空門；一切法無生者，即是諸法實相，滅諸觀。再以三解脫門另配一遍：虛誑不實不堅固即無作解脫門，一切法空即空解脫門，一切法無生即無相解脫門——論主自結曰「如是等三種差別」。二組之目論主皆自出，不待旁求。末後點出此人之所以希有：出柔順法忍、未得無生法忍，出凡夫法、未入聖法，而能信受聖法，似得聖法人；如佛所稱譽阿鞞跋致菩薩能斷二地、得受記，是人亦如是。此段是全品對凡夫行人最有力的一節——尚未入位而能信解者，已在佛所稱揚之列。
三十四、信力智慧力兩路得如阿鞞跋致，並釋如中住與仰射空中之喻。 末段收三事。其一，論主設問：是菩薩已信解般若，何以更從阿閦佛及諸菩薩邊聞？答曰是人聞阿閦佛作菩薩時所行清淨而欲效之，於此得信力、於彼得智慧力，故當住阿鞞跋致地——二力並舉，一得於自聞，一得於他行。其二，釋如中住：須菩提問一切法空相無所得云何住薩婆若，佛言如中住；論主只加一句訓——如者即是空，菩薩住是畢竟空中，名為住薩婆若。又釋佛可須菩提所語而說如亦空之因緣：是如生滅住異不可得，若法無三相即是畢竟空，云何可住。其三，釋末後之喻。釋提桓因欲取般若一定相，聞佛共須菩提說無相亦不可得，故歎希有；須菩提反詰若諸法畢竟空無所有則疑從何生；帝釋心歡喜而知須菩提所說皆趣向空、若有難問不能作礙，以空亦空故。論主乃逐字訓其喻：虛空即是畢竟空，箭是須菩提智慧；如箭於空無礙，勢盡自墮，非為空盡——須菩提說法因緣事辦故便止，非為法盡。反面亦出一喻：人雖有利箭，射壁不能過；人雖有利智慧，邪見著有則礙而不能通。全品自「行無真實法」起，至「無障無礙法」結，首尾說的是同一件事——無所著處，纔無所礙。
不要讀錯
不要把「行無真實法」讀成行虛誑妄語。論主的訓詁已先堵住這條路：真實者審定不變異、可取可著，不真實者即是虛誑妄語——若須菩提之答是取後一頭，論主便不必再說「世諦故說真實」。經文自己也補了一刀：無真實尚不可得，何況真實。連無真實這一頭都不可執，可見所答不是二者取一，是二者俱不立。讀成虛無論，則後文諸佛稱揚、諸天作禮之事全無著落。
不要把『度眾生如度虛空』讀成不必度眾生。經文說這話的當下，正在推崇大誓莊嚴為難行；譬喻是用來顯難，不是用來取消。論主更以著與不著分難易，明說於顛倒著處而能不著纔為難。全品第二段又立「不捨一切眾生」為二法之一，與觀一切法空並列。若讀成眾生既空則度亦可廢，正落在論主所破的斷滅一邊。
不要把「心不驚、不沒」讀成情緒上的鎮定。論主把它拆成兩重——眾生空故不畏、法空故不畏，並說二空俱不畏纔是真行般若；又以調馬自見影而不驚為喻，明說馬之不驚出於「自知影從身出」。可見不驚繫於知，不繫於忍。若把它讀成一種心理素質，則自驗之法失據：真正的檢查點不是聞法時臉色如何，是聽到所修之法亦空時，心裡是否要抓一把。
不要把「有人言」讀成論主的判語。本品全篇只有一處有人言，出在何以不令大菩薩說之答後，所述是諸菩薩漏未盡故或不可信之說。論主錄而不駁，也不加印可。讀論須分清三種身分：論主自立之義、論主所錄他家之說、論主所牒之經文。此三者一混，便會把他家之說當作本論之判，甚至反過來以此貶抑菩薩——而本品通篇正在稱揚菩薩。
不要把論①後段的牒經讀成另一場新的對話。從須菩提白佛一切法畢竟空一節起，至諸佛憶念之果報為止，文體雖作經文之貌，其實是論主重述經文以總結上卷，並於其中逐目分疏三種天與貴賤之別。若當作新起之對話讀，則會誤以為此處另有一番問答，並把論主自出的分疏之語誤繫於經中說者。所繫既錯，後文諸天作禮之因果便讀不成一條線。
不要把「如中住」讀成另有一個可住之處。須菩提三度推問除如更無法可得而誰住如中，佛不但不駁，反而逐字重述其語而印可，並補出如之生滅住異皆不可得。論主的訓更直接：如者即是空，住是畢竟空中名為住薩婆若。所以「住」字在此是無住之住。若讀成先證得一個如、再安住其中，則佛所補的那一刀便無處落。
不要把仰射空中之喻讀成說法終有窮盡。論主已先分判：勢盡自墮，非為空盡；說法因緣事辦故便止，非為法盡。喻中所盡者是箭勢，不是虛空；所止者是因緣，不是般若。論主又出反喻——射壁不能過者，是因為壁礙，不是因為箭鈍；人有利智慧而邪見著有則礙而不能通。二喻合看，所論的始終是有無障礙，不是有無窮盡。
修行作用
第一件受用，是把難處認回到著處上。論主分難易不從法之深淺分，從所對之境是否為習氣所著處分——平等法無為故非所著處，眾生虛誑假名故是所著處。行人可即此立一條日用的自檢：今日所放下的，是本來就不太在意的，還是最在意的那一件。前者不必記功，後者纔是經中所說的難行。此一條可以把修行從『坐上功夫』挪回到『著處功夫』。
第二件受用，是二空分兩重的自驗法。先問自己：聽到所度的人畢竟不可得時，心動不動？再問：聽到自己所修的六波羅蜜、乃至一切種智也離時，心動不動？論主明說上聞眾生空故不畏、今聞法空故不畏，二空俱不畏纔是真行般若。多數怖畏出在第二重，因為所修之法是行人最後的立足處。此問可作每一段用功之後的收尾。
第三件受用，是日月相須之喻可作兩輪的校準。論主說得極重——但有月無日則萬物濕壞，但有日無月則萬物燋爛；悲而無空則沒在有眾生的顛倒中，空而捨悲則墮斷滅中。校準之法有二鍵：空邊自問有無「空亦空」，悲邊自問有無「不取眾生相」。二鍵在，則觀空不礙憐愍，憐愍不礙觀空；二鍵失其一，便知今日偏在哪一輪。
第四件受用，是言行相符為護持之本。論主給的是一條完整的鏈：不如所說行則神天輕賤、執金剛神捨離、惡鬼得便、喜生惡心、生惡業、墮惡道。鏈的起點極小，只是所言與所作不符。反過來看，經文所說的護持也起於同一處——所作如所言，亦為諸佛所念。行人不必先求感應，先把已說出口的話行完；魚子不為母念則爛壞之喻，說的正是這件事不可假手他人。
第五件受用，是未入位者亦在稱揚之列。本品最可安慰而又最不使人懈怠的一節，是論主所釋的第二類菩薩——出柔順法忍而未得無生法忍，出凡夫法而未入聖法，卻能信受聖法，似得聖法人，故為希有。所憑的只是信解與忍，不是已證。行人由此可知兩事：其一，未得無生忍不是被排除在外的理由；其二，所稱揚的是「能信解、忍，通一切法無生相、空、虛誑、不堅固」這一份，而不是一個名位。日用中把這四項當作所思惟籌量的題目，便是走在此段所指的路上。
承衍
本品的骨幹，是兩段經文與兩段論釋。經①自舍利弗問行真實法為行無真實法起，須菩提答行無真實而云無真實尚不可得何況真實；次欲色界諸天子作念禮敬發心不證之人，須菩提移難之所在而以度眾生如度虛空為喻，歷陳虛空離空無堅固虛誑四句，結以聞諸法離相心不驚不沒不怖不畏是為行般若；次佛問何因緣故於深般若中心不沒，須菩提答無所有故離故寂滅故不沒而沒者沒事沒處皆不可得，末說諸天及釋提桓因梵天王世界主皆為作禮；末由佛說光音遍淨廣果淨居諸天亦禮、十方諸佛亦念、當知是菩薩為如佛、恒河沙等魔不能留難。經②自成就二法魔不能壞起——觀一切法空、不捨一切眾生；次出第二組二法，所作如所言、亦為諸佛所念，並說諸天親近諮問勸喻安慰與為作護依救歸洲明眼之事，次說十方諸佛說法時自稱揚菩薩名姓並舉寶相尸棄二菩薩與阿閦佛世界中菩薩；次須菩提問何等菩薩得稱揚，佛答阿鞞跋致，復答信解一切法無生空虛誑不實不堅固而未得無生忍法者，並說其滅二乘地當得受記當住阿鞞跋致地；次說聞深般若心明利不疑不悔者當於阿閦佛及諸菩薩所廣聞，格量但聞已得大利益何況信解；末以如中住之推問與佛之逐字印可收，釋提桓因歎所為甚難，須菩提反詰諸法空中誰驚誰沒，帝釋以仰射空中歎其說法無礙。論①以釋曰隨文而釋：先補來意而訓真實不真實，次釋須菩提何以答無真實，次申觀虛誑因緣生法尚不可得而立世諦第一義之分；次設五番問答——一難一不難之分、佛何以問弟子、何以不自為說主、何以不令大菩薩說並出有人言、何以不命舍利弗等；其間出調馬自見影之喻與二空不畏之判；末段重述經文以結上卷，逐目分疏作禮之三種天與清淨諸天之貴賤，結以諸佛憶念之果報。論②釋二法魔不能壞，出日月因緣之喻與二道偏執之失，次說二事兼用之法；次釋所作如所言與為諸佛所念，出五種執金剛神與魚子不為母念之喻；次設五番問答——諸天何以能授記、何經中說二菩薩、遍吉觀世音等何以不歎、須菩提何以更問總別稱揚、已信解般若何以更從阿閦佛及諸菩薩邊聞；其間出大將破敵之喻與諸佛讚善毀惡之意；次釋三門與三解脫門之三種差別並出柔順法忍未得無生法忍之希有；末釋信力智慧力二路、如中住即畢竟空中住、仰射空中勢盡自墮非為空盡，並出射壁不能過之反喻。
本品與前後諸品的義脈，可見者有三線。其一、承前：上品所明是願樂之行，本品承其勢而問諸佛何以稱揚——由眾生之愛樂轉為眾聖之嘆美，故經文起手仍以行般若真實不真實為接榫，非別起爐灶。其二、品內自成一轉：前半說不驚不沒之所以，後半說稱揚之所歸，兩半以卷末重述經文一節為樞——諸天作禮之因既立，則諸佛稱揚便非別事，仍是同一段開示的果。其三、垂後：本品結於稱揚菩薩名姓，次品轉入囑累之事，二品相次而立，讀者可合觀以見稱揚與付囑之別。
古德之釋，本品可誌者二家。吉藏於本品科釋之首，逕以品名立義云：「此下明度眾生如度空」——其所用之品名作度空，與本帙底本作稱揚者不同；其釋此名之由云：「空有不二，但惑者聞度眾生皆言度有，故今言度空耳」，是以度空之名為對治惑者之執有而立。其釋品首之問則云：「上品雖復廣辨前理空寂，未明智體無相，是以遣之也」——以智體無相釋舍利弗之問，與本論以審定不變異訓真實者所取之角度不同，並錄不判。其釋二空不畏云：「若眾生空法不空，是可怖耳。今眾生空法復空，無有不空者，何所怖耶」，又云：「色離即眾生離者，明空無二無礙，故色空即眾生空也」——此二語與本論「上聞眾生空故不畏，今聞法空故不畏」一節所守之分寸相合，可為佐證。其釋二法不壞云：「又以解空故不退為凡夫，不捨眾生不退為聲聞也」——以二法各對一退，與本論日月相須之喻所取之義相近而所立之語不同。其釋佛口業稱歎則科為三人云：「凡三人得歎：一者、得無生忍現前；二者、深信無生隣於不退必爾無疑；三者、從初發軫其心屈也」——以三人分稱揚之目，此三之數出於吉藏自家之科，非本論之文，錄以備覽。慧影釋此品，標其次第之意云：「上明菩薩脩平等行，具生法二忍，故為一切眾生愛樂。今次明為諸天人所敬，眾聖嘆美，故次明此品」——以愛樂與嘆美判前品與本品之次，正與上文所說承前一線相發。其科判本品云：「就此品中大有二分：第一、明菩薩行不二法，不證實際，而廣度眾生；第二、從何以故去，明十方諸佛稱揚菩薩」，又於稱揚一段云：「就稱揚中有通有別」——以通別二門收經文所列之數類菩薩，與本論以總說大菩薩與別稱其名字分判者所取之義相近。其釋生法二空之相即云：「眾生離即是色離者，當知生空即是法空，但從詮為異也」；其釋二法不壞云：「今以菩薩慈悲從實相生，屬無緣慈悲，故無窮盡所度無極」；其釋言行相符云：「若不能如說行者，則是大妄語人，故為天神輕也」；其釋斷二地云：「能斷二地者，經論多云離二乘地也」——四語皆隨文而釋，與本論所說各相發明。慧影疏中又自稱本品為「第六十四品者，名為稱揚品」，其品次與本帙底本相差一位。其品目異稱、品序差階、諸本分卷與卷末夾註所涉之訖品不同，詳考據層。
Extolling: Why Practising Prajñā Is Practising a Dharma without True Reality; Why Delivering Beings Is Like Delivering Space and Yet Does Not Abolish Beings; Why the Emptiness of Beings and the Emptiness of Dharmas Must Be Divided into Two Layers; Why the Buddha Asks His Disciple and Does Not Speak Himself; Why, When Two Dharmas Are Accomplished, Māra Cannot Break Him; Why the Sun and Moon Needing One Another Is the Most Essential Simile of This Chapter; Why the Buddhas Extol the Bodhisattva Who Has Not Yet Obtained the Acceptance of Non-arising and yet Can Have Faith and Understanding; Why Abiding within Suchness Is Precisely Abiding within Ultimate Emptiness; and Why, in Shooting Upward into Space, the Arrow Falls of Itself When Its Force Is Exhausted and Not Because Space Is Exhausted
What Is Being Asked
What this chapter asks about is extolling—who extols, whom he extols, and on what grounds he extols. Judging from the chapter's name, the answer seems to be that sentence which appears only in the second section, 「十方現在無量阿僧祇諸佛在大眾中說法時，自讚歎稱揚是菩薩摩訶薩名姓」 tr. "when the immeasurable asaṃkhyeya buddhas now present in the ten directions teach the Dharma in the great assembly, they themselves praise and extol the name and clan of this bodhisattva-mahāsattva"; but where the sūtra truly spends its effort is not in the extolling itself, but in where, after all, the person who is extolled is standing.
The chapter opens with an extremely piercing question. Śāriputra asks Subhūti: in practising prajñāpāramitā, is one practising a true and real dharma, or practising a dharma without true reality? This question drives the practitioner into a corner—if he answers that it is true and real, then prajñā becomes a thing that can be taken hold of and can be clung to; if he answers that it is not true and real, then does not what he practises become false and deceptive, lying speech? Subhūti answers without the least hesitation: practising prajñā is practising a dharma without true reality, because prajñā and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds are all without true reality; and moreover, 「無真實不可得，何況真實」 tr. "what is without true reality is unfindable, how much less the true and real." The treatise-author gives these two words their glosses: a true and real dharma is settled and certain and does not change, that is, it can be taken hold of and can be clung to; what is not true and real is false and deceptive, lying speech. Between one question and one answer, the foundation of this chapter has already been laid—what the extolling praises is a person who does not stand on the side of the true and real and does not fall to the side of the false and deceptive either.
Next the gods bow, and Subhūti at once moves the word 「難」 tr. "hard" from its position. What the gods revere is not realising the limit of reality and not falling to the ground of the two vehicles; Subhūti says that this does not yet count as hard—what is hard is knowing clearly that beings are ultimately unfindable and still delivering beings: 「是人欲度眾生，如欲度虛空」 tr. "this person's wishing to deliver beings is like wishing to deliver space." For this the treatise-author sets up the first question and answer of the whole chapter: the two matters are equally ultimately empty; why is one hard and one not hard? The answer divides them by only the two Chinese characters rendered here as ‘clinging’ and ‘not clinging’. The equal dharma is unconditioned and from the outset not a place of clinging, and not to cling there is no real accomplishment; beings are false and deceptive provisional names, precisely the place where beings have clung kalpa after kalpa, and only not to cling there is hard to practise. After this the treatise-author brings out the simile of the tamed horse that sees its own shadow and is not startled, and further divides not being startled into two layers: what was heard above is the emptiness of beings, and so he is not afraid; what is heard here is the emptiness of dharmas, and so he is not afraid; only to be unafraid of both emptinesses is truly practising prajñā.
The latter half of Treatise ① is four rounds of question and answer, and what they all ask is why the seat of teaching the Dharma rests upon Subhūti—why the Buddha, the omniscient one, asks his disciple; why he does not himself act as the master of the teaching; why he does not have the great bodhisattvas speak; why he does not command Śāriputra, foremost in wisdom. The four questions push straight on down, and what they answer is in fact one and the same matter: the seat for teaching emptiness is to be handed to the one who is especially good at teaching emptiness. After the questions and answers, the treatise-author retells the sūtra text to close fascicle 78, setting in its own place the cause of the gods' bowing and the fruit of the buddhas' keeping him in mind.
Fascicle 79 enters the second section of sūtra. The Buddha brings out two dharmas—contemplating all dharmas as empty, and not abandoning any being—and says that one who accomplishes these two dharmas cannot be broken by Māra; he further brings out a second pair of two dharmas—what he does is as what he says, and he is also kept in mind by the buddhas. The treatise-author, explaining the first pair, uses the most essential simile of this chapter: the sun and moon need one another. With the moon and no sun, the ten thousand things are wet and ruined; with the sun and no moon, the ten thousand things are scorched and spoiled; compassion without emptiness sinks into the inversion of there being beings, and emptiness that abandons compassion falls into annihilation. Below this the sūtra speaks of extolling directly: the gods draw near and enquire and declare that before long he will become a Buddha; when the buddhas of the ten directions teach the Dharma they extol the bodhisattva's name and clan; Śākyamuni himself extols the two bodhisattvas Jewel Mark and Śikhin. Subhūti asks what kind of bodhisattva obtains this extolling, and the Buddha answers: the avaivartika; he answers further with a still rarer kind of person—the bodhisattva who has faith in and understands that all dharmas are non-arising, empty, false and deceptive, not real, and not firm, and has not yet obtained the dharma of the acceptance of non-arising. At the end it turns into 「如中住」 tr. "abiding within suchness": Subhūti, on the ground that apart from suchness there is no further dharma to be found, presses his questions again and again; the Buddha approves all of it and adds one more cut: the arising, ceasing, and abiding-and-changing of suchness are all unfindable. Śakra Devānām Indra sighs at how very hard it is, and Subhūti asks in return who, within the emptiness of all dharmas, is startled and who sinks; Śakra, by shooting upward into space, praises his teaching of the Dharma as unobstructed—the arrow's force is exhausted and it falls of itself, and not because space is exhausted: this is the closing sentence of the whole chapter.
Passage by Passage
1. Śāriputra asks whether one practises a true and real dharma or practises a dharma without true reality. The chapter does not begin from praise; it begins from a question that sets up a dilemma. Śāriputra asks whether the bodhisattva-mahāsattva practising prajñāpāramitā is practising a true and real dharma, or practising a dharma without true reality. First one must see clearly the shape of this question: it does not seek knowledge; it sets up a dilemma—whichever of the two one answers, one must fall into the fault of that one. The treatise-author supplies where the questioner is coming from: Śāriputra asked only after hearing the dharma of the mark of non-discrimination above and greatly rejoicing in his mind, from which it can be seen that this question comes from joy and not from captiousness. When in reading the sūtra one meets a question that sets up a dilemma, do not hurry to take a side; first see which two words the questioner has set against each other—what is set against each other here is the true and real and what is without true reality, not existence and non-existence. Once this step is recognised, Subhūti's answer that follows will not be read as a denial of prajñā.
2. Subhūti answers that one practises a dharma without true reality; what is without true reality is still unfindable, how much less the true and real. Subhūti answers very quickly: practising prajñāpāramitā is practising a dharma without true reality; the reason is that prajñāpāramitā and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds are all without true reality. What matters is that he does not stop here, but adds one more sentence—when practising prajñāpāramitā, 「無真實不可得，何況真實」 tr. "what is without true reality is unfindable, how much less the true and real." This sentence guards against the practitioner setting up 「無真實」 tr. "without true reality" once again as something true and real. The place most easily misread is exactly here: thinking that to answer that it is without true reality is to assert that everything is void nothingness. The sūtra itself blocks this road completely—even this end, without true reality, is unfindable. Brought down to use, this sentence is for the person who cultivates contemplation: if the emptiness he contemplates can still be grasped, that emptiness is still something clung to.
3. The gods of the desire and form realms have the thought to bow in reverence to the person who arouses the mind and does not realise. The speakers turn from the human world to the gods. The gods of the desire realm and the form realm have this thought in their minds: whoever arouses the intent of anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi, practises the dharma of equality according to the meaning spoken of in the deep prajñā, does not realise the limit of reality, and does not fall to the śrāvaka or pratyekabuddha ground—to such a person we should bow. In this passage three things must be seen accurately: first, this is a thought in the mind and not a spoken dialogue—the sūtra says 「作是念」 tr. "had this thought"; second, the one bowed to is not one who has realised but one who does not realise; third, the reason for the bowing is that he does not fall to the ground of the two vehicles. The gods can have this thought because they too understand the difference between realising and not realising. The practitioner reading this can know one thing—within the gate of prajñā, holding back from taking realisation is a merit, not laziness.
4. Subhūti moves where 「難」 tr. "hard" lies—it is delivering beings who are ultimately empty that is hard. What the gods praise, Subhūti deliberately says 「不為難」 tr. "is not hard." He moves the word hard to another place: the bodhisattva, with the great adornment of the oath, would deliver immeasurable, boundless asaṃkhyeya beings, and yet, knowing that beings are ultimately unfindable, still goes to deliver them—this is what is hard. The sūtra then brings out a simile of its own: this person's wishing to deliver beings is like wishing to deliver space; because space is separated, beings too are separated; because space is empty, beings too are empty; because space is without firmness, beings too are without firmness; because space is false and deceptive, beings too are false and deceptive. The four clauses compare straight on down, not in order to abolish beings, but to make clear that the realm to be delivered and the oath that delivers are equally without anything to grasp. At the end there is a still more severe sentence—having bound himself by oath, he does not find beings, and yet he still binds himself by oath for the sake of beings. Its use in the gate of practice is this: one need not wait until one sees a really existing being to be delivered before daring to make the vow.
5. Hearing that all dharmas are separated from marks, the mind is not startled, does not sink, is not terrified, is not afraid: this is practising prajñā. This passage is the first sentence of judgement in this chapter. The sūtra pushes from beings being separated to dharmas being separated—form's being separated is beings' being separated, and feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness being separated is beings' being separated; form's being separated is the six perfections' being separated, and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds being separated is the six perfections' being separated. Then it gives its verdict: if the bodhisattva, hearing that all these dharmas are separated from marks, has a mind that is not startled, does not sink, is not terrified, is not afraid, know that this is practising prajñāpāramitā. The four instances of 「不」 tr. "not" here are not glossed one by one in the base text, and here too they are not forcibly explained separately; only the word 「沒」 tr. "sink" has its own landing-place in the treatise-author's later text—「深處應當沒而不沒」 tr. "in the deep place one would be expected to sink, and yet one does not sink"—from which it can be known that sinking is a falling-down in the deep place. The standard of judgement lies not in whether one understands or not, but in hearing and not being moved. The reader can test this himself: on hearing ‘the six perfections one cultivates are also separated’, does the mind want to grab hold? That one grab is exactly what the sūtra calls being startled and sinking.
6. The Buddha asks Subhūti by what causes and conditions the mind does not sink within the deep prajñā. The speaker turns to the Buddha, and what he asks is the cause. The Buddha asks why the bodhisattva-mahāsattva's mind does not sink within the deep prajñāpāramitā. On the surface this question is addressed to Subhūti; in fact it is raised for the great assembly. Note that the sūtra uses 「不沒」 tr. "does not sink" and not 「不驚」 tr. "is not startled"—the treatise-author later explains the reason himself: 「深處應當沒而不沒」 tr. "in the deep place one would be expected to sink, and yet one does not sink," from which it can be known that what is guarded against is falling down in the deep place, and within the deep prajñā the most dangerous move is exactly this. The question itself already contains a premise: not to sink in the deep place needs a reason. The treatise-author later sets up four rounds of question and answer specifically for this question, from which one can see the weight this question carries in this chapter.
7. Subhūti answers that it does not sink because it is without anything existent, because it is separated, because it is quiescent; one who sinks, the matter of sinking, and the place of sinking are all unfindable. The answer is in two parts. The first part gives three reasons: prajñāpāramitā does not sink because it is without anything existent, does not sink because it is separated, does not sink because it is quiescent. The latter part takes the firewood from under the cauldron: this bodhisattva does not find one who sinks, does not find a matter of sinking, does not find a place of sinking, because all dharmas are unfindable. The first part speaks of the dharma that is practised; the latter part speaks of the person who could sink and the place into which one would sink. When all three are unfindable, then the matter of 「沒」 tr. "sinking" cannot be established at all—it is not forcibly enduring so as not to sink; it is that no place can be found in which to sink. If the reader takes this as encouragement, it loses its force; it is a statement of fact. At the end Subhūti adds a sentence about bowing in reverence, which receives exactly the Buddha's words in the next passage.
8. The Buddha says that the gods of Light-Sound and the others also bow, the buddhas of the ten directions also keep him in mind, and Māras as many as the sands of the Ganges cannot hinder him. The Buddha pushes the range of those who bow upward: not only do Śakra Devānām Indra and the gods, the Brahmā king and the gods, and the lords of the world and the gods bow to this bodhisattva, but beyond these and above them the heaven of Light-Sound, the heaven of Universal Purity, the heaven of Abundant Fruit, and the Pure Abodes all bow as well. He pushes one layer further up—the immeasurable buddhas of the ten directions also keep this bodhisattva in mind; know that this bodhisattva is as a Buddha. The last sentence is a guarantee of protection: if the beings in worlds as many as the sands of the Ganges all became Māras, and each one of these Māras in turn conjured up Māras, all such Māras could not hinder the bodhisattva who practises prajñāpāramitā. Reading the three sentences together, one can see a sequence: the gods bow to him, the buddhas keep him in mind, Māra cannot break him. So extolling is not merely a kind word; it is a real pattern of protection.
9. Accomplishing two dharmas, he cannot be broken by Māra—contemplating all dharmas as empty, and not abandoning any being. The sūtra of fascicle 79 takes up the statement above that Māra cannot break him, and brings out directly its reason. The Buddha says that the bodhisattva-mahāsattva accomplishes two dharmas and Māra cannot break him; what are the two? Contemplating all dharmas as empty, and not abandoning any being. This is the bone-sentence of this chapter. The items of the two dharmas the sūtra gives itself; there is no need to look elsewhere. One must see clearly that the two are parallel and not one before the other: it is not first contemplating emptiness and then arousing compassion, nor first delivering beings and then training in emptiness. If one takes only one of them, the sūtra does not allow it to be called accomplishing. If the practitioner feels himself leaning to one side, this sentence is the most direct mirror in which to look.
10. The second pair of two dharmas; the gods draw near and enquire; the buddhas of the ten directions extol his name and clan. The sūtra goes on to bring out the second pair of two dharmas: what he does is as what he says, and he is also kept in mind by the buddhas. These two dharmas look plain and ordinary, yet they are the guarantee that the first two dharmas land on the ground—contemplating emptiness and not abandoning beings, if not seen in word and deed, is only a view. After this the sūtra says that the gods come to where the bodhisattva is, draw near, enquire, exhort, and comfort him, and it lists item by item the things he is to be for them, beginning from 「無護眾生汝為作護」 tr. "for beings without protection you will be a protection"—be a protection, be a support, be a rescue, be the ultimate path, be a refuge, be an island, for those in darkness be a light, for the blind be eyes. Only after this comes the sentence to which the name of this chapter is tied: when the immeasurable asaṃkhyeya buddhas now present in the ten directions teach the Dharma in the great assembly, they themselves praise and extol the name and clan of this bodhisattva-mahāsattva; and as examples it raises Śākyamuni himself extolling the bodhisattva Jewel Mark, the bodhisattva Śikhin, and the bodhisattvas in the world of Akṣobhya Buddha. In reading this passage, note the occasion of the extolling—it is at the time of teaching the Dharma in the great assembly, not a private commendation.
11. Subhūti asks which bodhisattvas obtain extolling, and the Buddha answers: the avaivartika. The sūtra turns to question and answer. Subhūti asks which bodhisattva-mahāsattvas the buddhas, when teaching the Dharma, themselves praise and extol; the Buddha answers: the avaivartika bodhisattvas. This answer seems already complete, but it is in fact only the first layer. Subhūti at once asks again which avaivartika bodhisattvas are praised by the Buddha—from which one can see that he heard something still unsettled in the Buddha's answer. When in reading the sūtra one meets an answer followed again by a question, do not take it for repetition; the questioner is often pressing a general label one step tighter on behalf of the listeners. In the later text of this chapter the treatise-author sets up a question and answer specifically for this repeated question, precisely because he saw this point.
12. The Buddha lists what the avaivartika practises and trains in, and extends it to those who have not yet obtained the acceptance of non-arising and yet have faith and understanding. The Buddha's second-layer answer has two branches. One branch is those bodhisattvas who train just as Akṣobhya Buddha practised and trained when he was a bodhisattva. The other branch is more important: there are bodhisattvas who practise prajñāpāramitā, who have faith in and understand that all dharmas are non-arising and have not yet obtained the dharma of the acceptance of non-arising, who have faith in and understand that all dharmas are empty and have not yet obtained the dharma of the acceptance of non-arising, who have faith in and understand that all dharmas are false and deceptive, not real, and not firm, and have not yet obtained the dharma of the acceptance of non-arising—of this kind too the Buddha, when teaching the Dharma, gladly himself praises and extols the name and clan. The latter branch is more important because it widens the threshold of extolling from those who have realised to those who have faith and understanding. The sūtra also gives the fruit: this bodhisattva extinguishes the śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha grounds, will obtain the prediction of anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi, will abide on the ground of the avaivartika, and having abided on this ground will obtain sarvajñā.
13. One who hears the deep prajñā with a mind clear and keen, without doubt and without regret, will hear it widely in the presence of Akṣobhya Buddha and the bodhisattvas. The third branch speaks of the person who hears the Dharma. If the bodhisattva-mahāsattva hears this deep prajñāpāramitā and his mind is clear and keen, without doubt and without regret, and he has this thought, 「是事如佛所說」 tr. "this matter is as the Buddha has said," this bodhisattva too will hear prajñā widely in the presence of Akṣobhya Buddha and the bodhisattvas and have faith in and understand it, and, as the Buddha has said, will abide on the ground of the avaivartika. At the end the sūtra itself makes a weighing: merely to hear prajñāpāramitā already brings great benefit, how much more to have faith and understanding; having faith and understanding, to abide as it teaches and practise as it teaches; having abided and practised as it teaches, to abide within the omniscience of all kinds. The sequence here is extremely clear—hearing, faith and understanding, abiding and practising as it teaches, abiding within the omniscience of all kinds. The practitioner may ask himself at which link he stands today; there is no need to skip steps.
14. The pressing questions on abiding within suchness, the Buddha's word-for-word approval, and Śakra Devānām Indra's sigh. The final passage is the most perilous section of the whole chapter. Subhūti presses his questions twice: if the bodhisattva-mahāsattva has the dharma of nothing to be attained, how does he abide in sarvajñā? The Buddha answers: he abides within the suchness of all dharmas. Subhūti presses again, three challenges in one breath: apart from suchness there is no further dharma to be found—who abides within suchness? Who, having abided within suchness, will obtain awakening? Who, abiding within suchness, will teach the Dharma? The Buddha not only does not refute him but restates his words word for word and approves them, and supplies the reason—because of this suchness, arising is unfindable, ceasing is unfindable, abiding-and-changing is unfindable; if the arising, ceasing, and abiding-and-changing of a dharma are unfindable, who within this will abide in suchness? Śakra Devānām Indra at once sighs that what the bodhisattvas do is very hard, and Subhūti asks Kauśika in return: within the emptiness of all dharmas, who is startled, who sinks, who is terrified, who is afraid, who doubts, who regrets? Śakra then, by shooting upward into space and the arrow going without obstruction, praises his teaching of the Dharma as unobstructed. Pressing questions, approval, the added cut, sighing at the difficulty, the counter-question, and the setting-up of a simile follow one after another, and this section hollows out the word 「住」 tr. "abide" completely, while the matter of teaching the Dharma still stands.
15. The treatise-author explains the intent of the question and glosses the true and real and the not true and real. At the beginning of Treatise ①, the treatise-author first supplies where the sūtra text is coming from: Śāriputra raised this question only after hearing the dharma of the mark of non-discrimination above and greatly rejoicing in his mind. Next come the glosses: a true and real dharma is settled and certain and does not change, that is, it can be taken hold of and can be clung to; if it is not true and real, it is false and deceptive, lying speech. These two glosses are the key to reading the whole chapter. See clearly how the treatise-author handles this dilemma—he does not deny the opposition of the two, but points out that prajñā does not lie on this line of opposition. Next he answers why Subhūti dared to answer that it is without true reality: Subhūti constantly delights in practising deep emptiness and his mind is without hindrance, and so he answers that practising prajñā is practising what is without true reality, because prajñāpāramitā is empty, without a fixed mark, and without discrimination. Reading this, one can know that the answer could come forth because it rests on what the answerer practises, not only on what he knows.
16. Even the dharma born of false and deceptive causes and conditions that is contemplated is unfindable; by reason of worldly truth the true and real is spoken of. The treatise-author continues to extend the meaning: the false and deceptive conditioned dharmas which the bodhisattva formerly trained in and clung to within birth and death are still unfindable—how much less can prajñāpāramitā, born of false and deceptive causes and conditions and contemplated later, a dharma that is not a place of clinging, be found. This is an inference from the heavy to the light—even the coarse and heavy objects of clinging are unfindable, how much less what was never an object of clinging. The concluding sentence is most important: by reason of worldly truth the true and real is spoken of; within the highest meaning the true and real is unfindable, how much less the not true and real. This sentence sets up the division of the two truths without letting the two truths contend—to speak of the true and real is to speak in terms of worldly truth; within the highest meaning even the word true and real has no place to stand. When the practitioner meets words about the true and real and the not true and real in the sūtras and treatises that contradict each other, let him first check on which truth each stands, and not hasten to judge that earlier and later contradict. Needing one another with this meaning, there is further a gloss by the treatise-author immediately after the gods' joyful words—「第一義即是平等法，但以異名說」 tr. "the highest meaning is precisely the equal dharma, only spoken of under a different name." Above, the treatise now says 「第一深義」 tr. "the foremost deep meaning," now says 「平等法」 tr. "the equal dharma," and the reader easily suspects them to be two dharmas; with one sentence the treatise-author cuts off the doubt: the two are one in substance and different in name. With this gloss, the later 「於平等法而不證」 tr. "not realising within the equal dharma" and 「行第一深義而不作證」 tr. "practising the foremost deep meaning and not realising it" can only then be read as one and the same matter, and one does not mistake where the difficulty lies for a matter of names.
17. Question and answer one: the distinction between one hard and one not hard lies in clinging and not clinging. The treatise-author sets up the first question: not realising within the equal dharma, and delivering beings though beings are ultimately empty—these two are both ultimately empty; why is it said that one is hard and one is not hard? The answer has three sections: beings, because they are false and deceptive provisional names, are a place of clinging, while the equal dharma, because it is unconditioned, is not a place of clinging; beings arise as provisional names from conditioned dharmas, while the unconditioned dharma is the highest meaning; to be able not to cling at the place of inverted clinging is hard, while not to cling at the place where there is no clinging is not hard. The subtlety of this answer is that it does not rank high and low by the depth of emptiness, but divides hard and easy by whether the object faced is a place clung to by habitual residues. The practitioner can test himself right here: in sitting meditation, to let go of a thought is not hard; only to let go of the person or matter one cares about most is hard—the hard place was never in the dharma; it is in the place of clinging.
18. The simile of the tamed horse that sees its own shadow and is not startled. The treatise-author first cites a general statement—「眾生空故，大莊嚴亦空；若大莊嚴空而能發心為難」 tr. "because beings are empty, the great adornment too is empty; if the great adornment is empty and yet one can arouse the mind, this is hard"—and then brings out the simile. It is as a tamed horse that sees its own shadow and is not startled. Why? Because it knows of itself that the shadow comes out of its body. The bodhisattva is likewise: he knows that ultimate emptiness arises by reason of the false dharmas of the coming together of the conditioned, and so on hearing this matter he is not startled and does not sink. The key to this simile lies in the two Chinese characters 「自知」 tr. "knows of itself": the horse is not startled not because the shadow has disappeared but because it knows where the shadow comes from. Ultimate emptiness is likewise—it is not that the bodhisattva cannot see the marks of dependent arising; it is that he knows from where these marks arise. If the reader understands not being startled as numbness, he loses this simile; not being startled comes from knowing, not from dullness.
19. Only by being unafraid in the two layers of the emptiness of beings and the emptiness of dharmas is one truly practising prajñā. Here the treatise-author makes a division. Because form and the other dharmas are separated, beings too are separated; to be separated is called empty. If beings were empty and dharmas were not empty, there ought to be terror and fear; if dharmas too are empty, there is no place for terror and fear to arise. At the end he gathers it all in: above, because he heard of the emptiness of beings, he was not afraid; now, because he hears of the emptiness of dharmas, he is not afraid; if on hearing these two emptinesses he is not afraid, this is truly practising prajñā. This place must not be read hastily—the sūtra in the preceding passage already said not startled and not sinking; the treatise-author here breaks it into two layers precisely to guard against the practitioner passing off the first layer as the second. The emptiness of the self is easy to grant; the emptiness of dharmas is hard to settle into; many of the terrors and fears in practice arise exactly at this layer of the emptiness of dharmas. The method of self-testing is extremely simple: on hearing ‘the dharma you cultivate is also empty’, does the mind tighten more than on hearing ‘the people you deliver are also empty’?
20. Question and answer two: why the Buddha, the omniscient one, asks his disciple. The treatise-author sets up the second question: the Buddha is the omniscient one; why does he ask his disciple about the mind not being startled and not sinking? The answer has three layers. First, because there were doubts in the assembly, and out of respect and awe they did not dare to ask, therefore the Buddha asks—the Buddha raises the question on behalf of the great assembly. Second, this foremost meaning of equality is very deep and hard to obtain; in the deep place one would be expected to sink and yet one does not sink, and so he tests Subhūti by asking. Third, the Buddha has made Subhūti the master of the teaching, and by rule the listener should question and challenge. The three layers are each different: the first is for the listeners, the second is to show the depth of the Dharma, the third is to establish the form of teaching the Dharma. When in reading the treatise one meets one question with three answers, do not take only the first; the three answers are often three different levels, not repetition of the same meaning.
21. Question and answer three: why he does not himself act as master of the teaching but has Subhūti speak. The third question goes a step further: the Buddha is omniscient; why does he not himself act as master of the teaching? The answer says: in the assembly there are people who think that the Buddha's wisdom is immeasurable and boundless while our power of knowledge has a measure, and if their minds have doubts they do not dare to ask; for the sake of these people he commands Subhūti to speak. The essential point of this answer is that it attributes the arrangement of the seat of teaching to the faculties of the listeners, not to the superiority or inferiority of the speaker. That the Buddha does not speak himself is not because the Buddha cannot speak; it is so that those who do not dare to ask the Buddha have somewhere to ask. This meaning can still be used today: in setting up a seat of the Dharma, first see whether the listeners can open their mouths, not only whether the speaker can expound.
22. Question and answer four: why he does not have the great bodhisattvas speak, together with what someone says. The fourth question: if so, why does he not have the great bodhisattvas speak? The answer says: the great bodhisattvas' wisdom too is great and inconceivable, and because their majestic virtue is weighty, people also do not dare to question and challenge them. This follows the same line of reasoning as the previous question—where majesty is weighty, people do not dare to ask. Below this the treatise-author brings out a different account: someone says that the arhat, the pratyekabuddha, and the Buddha, because their ignorance bound to the three realms is exhausted forever without remainder, can teach the Dharma as it really is; the bodhisattvas, though they have widely gathered merit, have not exhausted their outflows and so may perhaps not be believed; therefore he does not command them. This account is, in this chapter, the only place of 「有人言」 tr. "someone says"; in the whole chapter it appears only this once. The reader must see its standing clearly—this is another school's account recorded by the treatise-author, not a judgement set up by the treatise-author himself; the treatise-author records it without refuting it and also without giving it his approval.
23. Question and answer five: why he does not command Śāriputra and the other great disciples. The fifth question: Śāriputra is foremost in wisdom, and there are the other great disciples; why are they not commanded? The answer says: this matter has already been answered before, namely, Subhūti delights in the practice of emptiness and is especially good at teaching emptiness; because prajñāpāramitā speaks much of emptiness, he has Subhūti speak. The answer itself admits 「先已答」 tr. "already answered before," from which it can be seen that the treatise-author does not shy from saying something again. The key point lies in the two Chinese characters 「偏善」 tr. "especially good"—it is not that Subhūti's wisdom surpasses Śāriputra's, but that what he excels in corresponds precisely to the Dharma being taught. In this there is a consistent sense of measure: in commanding the seat of the Dharma, correspondence is taken, not rank. The four rounds of question and answer close here, and what they resolve throughout is one and the same matter—why the seat for teaching emptiness rests upon Subhūti.
24. The treatise-author retells the sūtra text to conclude fascicle 78—the cause of the gods' bowing and the fruit of the buddhas' keeping him in mind. This passage lies within Treatise ①, yet its form is a retelling of the sūtra. The treatise-author retells Subhūti's words to the Buddha: all dharmas are ultimately empty and without anything existent; because they are without anything existent, their own marks are separated; because they are separated from marks, they are constantly quiescent; because they are constantly quiescent, there is no recollection, imagining, and discrimination; therefore the bodhisattva should not be startled and should not sink; one who sinks, the place of sinking, and the dharma of sinking are all unfindable. Next he retells the words Subhūti spoke to the Buddha after he had answered. Further on he divides item by item the gods who bow: the earth spirits, the spirits in space, the Four Heavenly Kings, and the Trāyastriṃśa heaven, with Śakra as their chief; the Brahmā king is the lord of the beings of the Brahmā world in the first dhyāna; the lords of the world are the lords of the remaining gods of the desire realm—these are what the treatise-author calls the three kinds of gods, whose items the treatise-author gives himself; there is no need to look elsewhere. The reason for the bowing he also gives himself: this bodhisattva gives up his own pleasure and desire to benefit beings, whereas these three kinds of gods only seek pleasure for themselves. Next he distinguishes the noble and the base: the gods of the desire realm, because their minds are much given to clinging to sexual desire, their bowing is not worth prizing; the gods of the first dhyāna have initial and sustained thought and are scattered, and are also not wondrous enough; the gods above, whose minds are pure, bow, and only this is hard. At the end he concludes with the fruit of the buddhas' keeping him in mind—know that this bodhisattva is as a Buddha, because he will certainly reach the Buddha's path without retrogressing, and Māras as many as the sands of the Ganges cannot break him. In reading this passage, recognise its standing: this is the treatise-author retelling the sūtra text to sum up the preceding fascicle, not starting another, new passage of dialogue.
25. Treatise ② explains the two dharmas by which Māra cannot break him—the causes and conditions of the sun and moon, and the fault of one-sided clinging to either of the two paths. At the beginning of the treatise of fascicle 79, the treatise-author first sets out the doubt of the assembly: by what causes and conditions does the bodhisattva obtain such power that Māra cannot break him? Next he relates the two causes and conditions of the Buddha's answer: first, contemplating all dharmas as empty; second, not abandoning any being. After this comes the most essential simile of this chapter—by the causes and conditions of the sun and the moon, the ten thousand things are moistened and grow; with only the moon and no sun, the ten thousand things are wet and ruined; with only the sun and no moon, the ten thousand things are scorched and spoiled; because the sun and moon come together, the ten thousand things ripen. Where it is matched to the Dharma, the treatise-author speaks with the utmost clarity: the bodhisattva too has two paths, the first compassion, the second emptiness; if he has only the mind of pity and has no wisdom, then his mind sinks into the inversion of 「無眾生而有眾生」 tr. "there being beings where there are no beings"; if he has only the mind of emptiness and abandons the mind of pitying and delivering beings, then he falls into annihilation. The force of this simile lies in that it does not say the two complement each other; it says the two rescue each other—lacking one is not lacking a half; it is ruining the whole.
26. Using the two matters together—because emptiness too is empty he does not cling to emptiness; because he does not take hold of the mark of beings it does not hinder emptiness. The previous passage spoke of the fault of one-sided clinging; this passage speaks of the method of using both together. The treatise-author explains: he contemplates all dharmas as empty, and because emptiness too is empty he does not cling to emptiness; therefore it does not hinder pitying beings; he contemplates pitying beings, and yet does not cling to beings and does not take hold of the mark of beings; he only pities beings and leads them into emptiness; therefore, though he practises pity, it does not hinder emptiness; though he practises emptiness, because he also does not take hold of the mark of emptiness, it does not hinder the mind of pity—as the sun and moon need one another. See clearly that each side has a safety-key: the key on the side of emptiness is 「空亦空」 tr. "emptiness too is empty"; the key on the side of compassion is 「不取眾生相」 tr. "not taking hold of the mark of beings." If either key loosens, one falls back into the fault of the previous passage. The most usable sentence in the gate of practice is 「引導入空」 tr. "leads them into emptiness"—pity does not stop at consoling; it leads people toward emptiness; once this sentence is established, kindness and compassion and prajñā are not two matters.
27. What he does is as what he says, and he is kept in mind by the buddhas—the similes of the five kinds of vajra-holding spirits and of fish-roe not kept in mind by the mother. The treatise-author explains the second pair of two dharmas, bringing out a result on each side. On the negative side: the spirits and gods despise people who speak falsely; if the bodhisattva does not practise as he says, then the five kinds of vajra-holding spirits abandon him and no longer guard him, and evil ghosts find an opening; this person readily gives rise to evil thoughts; because of evil thoughts he produces evil deeds; because he produces evil deeds he falls into the evil destinies. This is a complete chain of falling, whose starting point is only that word and deed do not match. On the other side: the bodhisattva who is not kept in mind by the buddhas has his roots of goodness rot and be ruined, as fish-roe not kept in mind by the mother rot and are ruined and do not come to life. This simile is extremely apt—the ruin of the fish-roe does not come from an outside force but only from there being no one keeping it in mind. At the end he concludes by citing the sūtra's words: 「所作如所言，亦為諸佛所念。得此二法故，不可破壞」 tr. "What he does is as what he says, and he is also kept in mind by the buddhas. Because he obtains these two dharmas, he cannot be broken." The two dharmas are one inner and one outer, and yet the pivot of both lies in the reality of word and deed.
28. Question and answer six: how the gods, who have not obtained omniscience, can give the bodhisattva the prediction. The treatise-author sets up a question: the gods have not obtained omniscience; how can they give the bodhisattva the prediction? The answer has two branches. First, the gods are long-lived; from past buddhas they heard that those who practised in this way obtained the prediction, and now, seeing that the bodhisattva has such practice, they say it—this is comparing the present matter with former examples, not knowing the future by supernormal power. The treatise-author himself adds a criterion: because, seeing the cause, one knows there is the fruit. Second, the gods see that this bodhisattva practises the seal of the three gates of liberation, and also practises the mind of kindness and compassion toward beings, and therefore they say 「不久作佛」 tr. "before long he will become a Buddha." Note that the two items raised in the second branch are precisely another way of saying the two dharmas above—the three gates of liberation are the side of emptiness, and also practising kindness and compassion is the side of compassion. From this one can see that what the gods' prediction relies on is still the bone-sentence of this chapter.
29. Why the Buddha extols—the simile of the great general defeating the enemy, and the intent of the buddhas' praising the good and disparaging the evil. The treatise-author first points back to the preceding text with the meaning of 「無守護眾生汝為作守護，無歸與作歸」 tr. "for beings without protection and guarding you will be a protection and guard; for those without refuge be a refuge" and the rest, and then explains the matter of extolling. The simile says: it is as a great king has a great general who does not spare his body or life and has the skilful means to defeat hostile enemies, and is constantly praised by the king; the bodhisattva is likewise: he contemplates ultimate emptiness, does not spare his own body, defeats the thieves of the afflictions, has skilful means and does not realise, and teaches and transforms beings, and is praised by the buddhas. The four matters in the simile each match the Dharma one by one: not sparing body and life matches not sparing his own body; defeating the hostile enemies matches defeating the thieves of the afflictions; having skilful means matches having skilful means and not realising; being praised by the king matches being praised by the buddhas. Next he resolves a doubt—the buddhas, though they have no clinging mind, do not discriminate wholesome and unwholesome dharmas, and look upon the arhats and those of the outside paths also without hate or love; why do they still praise the good and disparage the evil? The treatise-author answers crisply: for the sake of benefiting beings, wishing to make beings rely on and attach themselves to good people, their minds following wholesome dharmas, so as to have them go out from the world. Extolling is a means of teaching and transforming, not a partiality on the Buddha's side. Before this passage, the treatise-author brings out another real example of extolling: the buddhas of the ten directions, when teaching the Dharma, also take as an example the bodhisattva who can, as it is said, accord with the real mark of all dharmas, and say these words: 「某方某世界菩薩雖未作佛，能如是行甚深般若波羅蜜，功德希有故。」 tr. "In such-and-such a direction, in such-and-such a world, there is a bodhisattva who, though he has not yet become a Buddha, can practise very deep prajñāpāramitā in this way, because his merit is rare." What is most worth noting lies in the four Chinese characters 「雖未作佛」 tr. "though he has not yet become a Buddha"—the one extolled is not a person whose fruition is already complete, but a person in the midst of practice; and the manner of extolling is to raise him as an example, so that those hearing the Dharma in other directions have a ready model to follow. The extolling of this chapter's name here shows its actual use.
30. Question and answer seven: in which sūtra it is said that these two bodhisattvas are praised by the Buddha. The treatise-author sets up a question that looks like a side-branch and is not a side-branch: in which sūtra is it said that these two bodhisattvas are praised by the Buddha? The answer says that the Buddha's sūtras are immeasurable; after the Buddha's nirvāṇa, evil kings of wrong views appeared, burned the scriptures, destroyed stūpas and monasteries, and killed the śramaṇas; after five hundred years the semblance Dharma became impure, and because the arhats and the bodhisattvas with supernormal powers were hard to meet, the deep sūtras were not all in Jambudvīpa; because few practised and received them, the gods, nāgas, and spirits took them away. The measure of this answer is excellent—it does not forcibly point to one sūtra, does not hide that it cannot be found, and gives the reason why it cannot be found. When in reading the treatise one meets such an answer, know that it is an honest answer and not an evasion; the treatise-author would rather say that the sūtra is no longer in this land than point casually to some sūtra to stop the question.
31. Question and answer eight: why Samantabhadra, Avalokiteśvara, and the others are not praised, and only the two bodhisattvas are commended. The treatise-author sets up a question: such as the bodhisattva Samantabhadra, the bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara, the bodhisattva Great Power and Might, Mañjuśrī, the bodhisattva Maitreya, and the others—why are they not praised, and only the two bodhisattvas commended? The answer has three layers. First, these two bodhisattvas have not obtained the dharma of the acceptance of non-arising, and yet can practise in a way resembling the dharma of the acceptance of non-arising, and cannot be broken by any of Māra's people; therefore the Buddha praises them as rare—what is praised lies in ‘not yet obtaining and yet being able to resemble’. Second, these two bodhisattvas have pure great vows and practice and a deep, great mind of kindness and compassion, and do not expect to become Buddhas quickly, for the sake of delivering beings. Third, the merits of the bodhisattvas Samantabhadra, Avalokiteśvara, and the rest are extremely great, and people all know them; these two bodhisattvas people do not yet know, and therefore they are extolled. The third layer is most worth savouring: extolling is in order to let people know; for one whom people already fully know, there is no need to mark him again. From this one can see that the use of extolling lies in guiding and receiving, not in ranking.
32. Question and answer nine: general extolling and particular extolling—why Subhūti asks again. The treatise-author first cites the sūtra: 「何等菩薩，佛說法時，稱揚讚歎說其名字？」 tr. "Which bodhisattvas, when the Buddha teaches the Dharma, does he extol and praise, speaking their names?"—and then sets up a question: the Buddha has already spoken of this earlier; why does Subhūti ask again? The answer says: the Buddha at first spoke of 「大菩薩」 tr. "great bodhisattvas," and later spoke of 「一切菩薩，從初發意乃至十地」 tr. "all bodhisattvas, from the first arousing of intent up to the ten grounds," and therefore Subhūti doubted and asked the Buddha. This answer explains very clearly where Subhūti's question came from—the two ranges, earlier and later, differ, one extremely narrow and one extremely wide, and so he must ask again to settle the items. The Buddha's answer is settled accordingly: though the Buddha loves and keeps in mind all bodhisattvas, among them are those whose virtue and practice excel, and he extols their names. Loving and keeping in mind is universal; naming is set apart; this one division is exactly what the name of this chapter is tied to.
33. The three kinds of difference between the three gates and the three gates of liberation, with the rarity of one who has gone out from the compliant acceptance of dharmas and has not yet obtained the acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas. The treatise-author explains the second kind of bodhisattva extolled by the Buddha: he has not yet obtained the acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas and has not yet entered the bodhisattva's position; by the power of practising prajñāpāramitā he constantly considers and reckons, seeks the real mark of all dharmas, can have faith and understanding, can accept, and penetrates the mark of non-arising of all dharmas, emptiness, falseness and deception, and not being firm. Next he assigns them item by item: false and deceptive, not real, not firm—these are all the gate of impermanence, suffering, and non-self; all dharmas being empty is the gate of emptiness; all dharmas being non-arising is the real mark of all dharmas, the cessation of all contemplations. Then he assigns them once more to the three gates of liberation: false and deceptive, not real, not firm is the gate of liberation of non-action; all dharmas being empty is the gate of liberation of emptiness; all dharmas being non-arising is the gate of liberation of the signless—the treatise-author himself concludes, 「如是等三種差別」 tr. "such are the three kinds of difference." The items of both sets the treatise-author gives himself; there is no need to look elsewhere. At the end he points out why this person is rare: he has gone out from the compliant acceptance of dharmas and has not yet obtained the acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas, has gone out from the dharma of ordinary people and has not yet entered the dharma of the sages, and yet can believe and accept the dharma of the sages, like a person who has obtained the dharma of the sages; as the Buddha praises the avaivartika bodhisattva who can sever the two grounds and receive the prediction, this person is likewise. This passage is the most powerful section of the whole chapter for the ordinary practitioner—one who has not yet entered the position and yet can have faith and understanding is already among those the Buddha extols.
34. By the two roads of the power of faith and the power of wisdom one obtains being like an avaivartika; with the explanation of abiding within suchness and of the simile of shooting upward into space. The final passage gathers three matters. First, the treatise-author sets up a question: this bodhisattva already has faith in and understands prajñā; why does he further hear it from Akṣobhya Buddha and the bodhisattvas? The answer says that this person hears that what Akṣobhya Buddha practised when he was a bodhisattva was pure and wishes to emulate it; here he obtains the power of faith, there he obtains the power of wisdom; therefore he will abide on the ground of the avaivartika—the two powers are raised together, one obtained from his own hearing, one obtained from another's practice. Second, he explains abiding within suchness: Subhūti asks how, since all dharmas have the mark of emptiness and there is nothing to be attained, one abides in sarvajñā; the Buddha says: abiding within suchness. The treatise-author adds only one gloss—suchness is emptiness; the bodhisattva abiding within this ultimate emptiness is called abiding in sarvajñā. He also explains the causes and conditions by which the Buddha approves Subhūti's words and says that suchness too is empty: the arising, ceasing, and abiding-and-changing of this suchness are unfindable; if a dharma is without the three marks, it is ultimate emptiness; how can it be abided in? Third, he explains the final simile. Śakra Devānām Indra wished to take hold of a fixed mark of prajñā, and, hearing the Buddha and Subhūti together say that even the signless is unfindable, he sighed at its rarity; Subhūti asks in return: if all dharmas are ultimately empty and without anything existent, from where does doubt arise? Śakra's mind rejoiced, and he knew that all Subhūti teaches tends toward emptiness, and that if there were difficult questions they could not obstruct him, because emptiness too is empty. The treatise-author then glosses his simile word by word: space is ultimate emptiness; the arrow is Subhūti's wisdom; as an arrow in space is without obstruction, and when its force is exhausted it falls of itself, not because space is exhausted—Subhūti, when the matter of the causes and conditions for teaching the Dharma is accomplished, then stops, not because the Dharma is exhausted. On the reverse side he brings out a simile too: though a person has a sharp arrow, if he shoots at a wall it cannot pass through; though a person has sharp wisdom, if by wrong views he clings to existence, then he is obstructed and cannot get through. The whole chapter, beginning from 「行無真實法」 tr. "practising a dharma without true reality" and concluding with 「無障無礙法」 tr. "the dharma without hindrance and without obstruction," speaks from beginning to end of one and the same matter—only where there is no place of clinging is there nothing that obstructs.
Do Not Misread
Do not read 「行無真實法」 tr. "practising a dharma without true reality" as practising false and deceptive, lying speech. The treatise-author's gloss has already blocked this road in advance: the true and real is settled and certain, does not change, and can be taken hold of and can be clung to; the not true and real is false and deceptive, lying speech—if Subhūti's answer had taken the latter end, the treatise-author would not have needed to say further 「世諦故說真實」 tr. "by reason of worldly truth the true and real is spoken of." The sūtra itself also adds a cut: what is without true reality is still unfindable, how much less the true and real. Since not even the end of without true reality may be grasped, it can be seen that the answer is not taking one of the two but setting up neither. Read as nihilism, the later matters of the buddhas' extolling and the gods' bowing would have nothing to rest on.
Do not read ‘delivering beings is like delivering space’ as meaning that there is no need to deliver beings. At the very moment the sūtra says this, it is exalting the great adornment of the oath as hard to practise; the simile is used to show the difficulty, not to abolish. The treatise-author further divides hard and easy by clinging and not clinging, saying plainly that only to be able not to cling at the place of inverted clinging is hard. The second section of the whole chapter further sets up 「不捨一切眾生」 tr. "not abandoning any being" as one of the two dharmas, parallel with contemplating all dharmas as empty. If one reads it as meaning that since beings are empty the delivering too may be abandoned, one falls exactly on the side of annihilation which the treatise-author refutes.
Do not read 「心不驚、不沒」 tr. "the mind is not startled and does not sink" as emotional composure. The treatise-author breaks it into two layers—not afraid because beings are empty, not afraid because dharmas are empty—and says that only to be unafraid of both emptinesses is truly practising prajñā; and with the simile of the tamed horse that sees its own shadow and is not startled, he says plainly that the horse is not startled because 「自知影從身出」 tr. "it knows of itself that the shadow comes out of its body." From this it can be seen that not being startled is tied to knowing, not to endurance. If it is read as a psychological quality, the method of self-testing loses its ground: the real checkpoint is not what one's face looks like on hearing the Dharma, but whether, on hearing that the dharma one cultivates is also empty, the mind wants to grab hold.
Do not read 「有人言」 tr. "someone says" as the treatise-author's verdict. In the whole chapter there is only one place where someone says, coming after the answer to why he does not have the great bodhisattvas speak, and what it states is the account that the bodhisattvas, not having exhausted their outflows, may perhaps not be believed. The treatise-author records it without refuting it, and also without giving it his approval. In reading the treatise one must distinguish three standings: the meaning the treatise-author himself establishes, another school's account recorded by the treatise-author, and the sūtra text the treatise-author cites. Once these three are mixed, one will take another school's account as this treatise's verdict, and even turn it round to belittle the bodhisattvas—while this chapter throughout is precisely extolling the bodhisattvas.
Do not read the retelling of the sūtra in the latter part of Treatise ① as another, new dialogue. From the section where Subhūti tells the Buddha that all dharmas are ultimately empty, up to the fruit of the buddhas' keeping him in mind, although the form of the text has the appearance of sūtra text, it is in fact the treatise-author retelling the sūtra text to sum up the preceding fascicle, and within it dividing item by item the three kinds of gods and the distinction of noble and base. If it is read as a newly begun dialogue, one would mistakenly think that there is another round of question and answer here, and would attach the treatise-author's own divisions to the speakers in the sūtra. Once the attribution is wrong, the cause and effect of the gods' bowing in the later text cannot be read as one line.
Do not read 「如中住」 tr. "abiding within suchness" as there being some other place in which to abide. Subhūti three times presses the question that, apart from suchness, there is no further dharma to be found, so who abides within suchness; the Buddha not only does not refute him but restates his words word for word and approves them, and supplies that the arising, ceasing, and abiding-and-changing of suchness are all unfindable. The treatise-author's gloss is more direct: suchness is emptiness; abiding within this ultimate emptiness is called abiding in sarvajñā. So the word 「住」 tr. "abide" here is the abiding of non-abiding. If one reads it as first realising a suchness and then settling within it, the cut the Buddha added has nowhere to land.
Do not read the simile of shooting upward into space as saying that teaching the Dharma must in the end be exhausted. The treatise-author has already made the division: when its force is exhausted it falls of itself, not because space is exhausted; when the matter of the causes and conditions for teaching the Dharma is accomplished he then stops, not because the Dharma is exhausted. What is exhausted in the simile is the arrow's force, not space; what stops is the causes and conditions, not prajñā. The treatise-author also brings out a reverse simile—that one who shoots at a wall cannot pass through is because the wall obstructs, not because the arrow is blunt; a person has sharp wisdom and yet, clinging to existence through wrong views, is obstructed and cannot get through. Seen together, what the two similes discuss is always whether there is obstruction or not, not whether there is exhaustion or not.
Bearing on Practice
The first benefit is to recognise the hard place as lying back in the place of clinging. The treatise-author divides hard and easy not by the depth of the dharma but by whether the object faced is a place clung to by habitual residues—the equal dharma, being unconditioned, is not a place of clinging; beings, being false and deceptive provisional names, are a place of clinging. From this the practitioner can set up a daily self-check: what I let go of today—was it something I did not much care about to begin with, or the very thing I care about most? The former need not be counted as merit; only the latter is the hard practice of which the sūtra speaks. This one point can move practice from ‘effort on the cushion’ back to ‘effort at the place of clinging’.
The second benefit is the method of self-testing by dividing the two emptinesses into two layers. First ask yourself: on hearing that the people to be delivered are ultimately unfindable, does the mind move or not? Then ask: on hearing that the six perfections one cultivates, and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds, are also separated, does the mind move or not? The treatise-author says plainly that above, because he heard of the emptiness of beings, he was not afraid; now, because he hears of the emptiness of dharmas, he is not afraid; only to be unafraid of both emptinesses is truly practising prajñā. Most terror and fear arise at the second layer, because the dharma one cultivates is the practitioner's last foothold. This question can serve as the close of every stretch of effort.
The third benefit is that the simile of the sun and moon needing one another can serve to calibrate the two wheels. The treatise-author speaks very weightily—with only the moon and no sun the ten thousand things are wet and ruined; with only the sun and no moon the ten thousand things are scorched and spoiled; compassion without emptiness sinks into the inversion of there being beings, and emptiness that abandons compassion falls into annihilation. The method of calibration has two keys: on the side of emptiness, ask yourself whether there is 「空亦空」 tr. "emptiness too is empty"; on the side of compassion, ask yourself whether there is 「不取眾生相」 tr. "not taking hold of the mark of beings." With the two keys present, contemplating emptiness does not hinder pity, and pity does not hinder contemplating emptiness; if one of the two keys is lost, one knows on which wheel one is leaning today.
The fourth benefit is that the matching of word and deed is the root of protection. The treatise-author gives a complete chain: if one does not practise as one says, then the spirits and gods despise one, the vajra-holding spirits abandon one, evil ghosts find an opening, one readily gives rise to evil thoughts, produces evil deeds, and falls into the evil destinies. The starting point of the chain is extremely small—only that what is said and what is done do not match. Seen the other way round, the protection the sūtra speaks of also arises from the same place—what he does is as what he says, and he is also kept in mind by the buddhas. The practitioner need not first seek a response; let him first carry through the words already spoken aloud; the simile of fish-roe that rot and are ruined when not kept in mind by the mother speaks of exactly this: the matter cannot be handed over to another.
The fifth benefit is that those who have not yet entered the position are also among the extolled. The most consoling and yet least laziness-inducing section of this chapter is the second kind of bodhisattva the treatise-author explains—he has gone out from the compliant acceptance of dharmas and has not yet obtained the acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas, has gone out from the dharma of ordinary people and has not yet entered the dharma of the sages, yet can believe and accept the dharma of the sages, like a person who has obtained the dharma of the sages, and therefore is rare. What he relies on is only faith and understanding and acceptance, not having realised. From this the practitioner can know two things: first, not yet having obtained the acceptance of non-arising is no reason to be excluded; second, what is extolled is the portion 「能信解、忍，通一切法無生相、空、虛誑、不堅固」 tr. "can have faith and understanding, can accept, and penetrates the mark of non-arising of all dharmas, emptiness, falseness and deception, and not being firm," not a name or a rank. In daily use, to take these four items as the topics one considers and reckons is to walk the road this passage points to.
Further Resonances
The backbone of this chapter is two sections of sūtra text and two sections of treatise explanation. Sūtra ① begins from Śāriputra asking whether one practises a true and real dharma or practises a dharma without true reality; Subhūti answers that one practises what is without true reality, and says that what is without true reality is still unfindable, how much less the true and real; next the gods of the desire and form realms have the thought to bow in reverence to the person who arouses the mind and does not realise; Subhūti moves where the difficulty lies and takes delivering beings as like delivering space for his simile, setting out the four clauses of space being separated, empty, without firmness, and false and deceptive, and concludes that when, hearing that all dharmas are separated from marks, the mind is not startled, does not sink, is not terrified, is not afraid, this is practising prajñā; next the Buddha asks by what causes and conditions the mind does not sink within the deep prajñā, and Subhūti answers that it does not sink because it is without anything existent, because it is separated, because it is quiescent, and that one who sinks, the matter of sinking, and the place of sinking are all unfindable, and at the end says that the gods and Śakra Devānām Indra, the Brahmā king, and the lords of the world all bow to him; finally the Buddha says that the gods of Light-Sound, Universal Purity, Abundant Fruit, and the Pure Abodes also bow, that the buddhas of the ten directions also keep him in mind, that one should know this bodhisattva is as a Buddha, and that Māras as many as the sands of the Ganges cannot hinder him. Sūtra ② begins from accomplishing two dharmas so that Māra cannot break him—contemplating all dharmas as empty, and not abandoning any being; next it brings out the second pair of two dharmas, what he does is as what he says and he is also kept in mind by the buddhas, and tells of the gods drawing near, enquiring, exhorting, and comforting, and of the matters of being for them a protection, a support, a rescue, a refuge, an island, a light, and eyes; next it tells that when the buddhas of the ten directions teach the Dharma they themselves extol the bodhisattva's name and clan, and raises the two bodhisattvas Jewel Mark and Śikhin and the bodhisattvas in the world of Akṣobhya Buddha; next Subhūti asks which bodhisattvas obtain extolling, and the Buddha answers the avaivartika, and answers again with those who have faith in and understand that all dharmas are non-arising, empty, false and deceptive, not real, and not firm, and have not yet obtained the dharma of the acceptance of non-arising, and says that they extinguish the grounds of the two vehicles, will receive the prediction, and will abide on the ground of the avaivartika; next it tells that one who hears the deep prajñā with a mind clear and keen, without doubt and without regret, will hear it widely in the presence of Akṣobhya Buddha and the bodhisattvas, weighing that merely hearing already brings great benefit, how much more faith and understanding; finally it closes with the pressing questions on abiding within suchness and the Buddha's word-for-word approval; Śakra Devānām Indra sighs that what they do is very hard, Subhūti asks in return who within the emptiness of all dharmas is startled and who sinks, and Śakra, by shooting upward into space, praises his teaching of the Dharma as unobstructed. Treatise ① explains following the text with its explanation: first it supplies the intent of the question and glosses the true and real and the not true and real; next it explains why Subhūti answers that it is without true reality; next it extends the point that even the dharma born of false and deceptive causes and conditions that is contemplated is unfindable, and sets up the division between worldly truth and the highest meaning; next it sets up five rounds of question and answer—the distinction of one hard and one not hard, why the Buddha asks his disciple, why he does not himself act as master of the teaching, why he does not have the great bodhisattvas speak (bringing out what someone says), and why he does not command Śāriputra and the others; in between it brings out the simile of the tamed horse that sees its own shadow and the judgement of being unafraid of the two emptinesses; the final passage retells the sūtra text to conclude the preceding fascicle, divides item by item the three kinds of gods who bow and the noble and base among the pure gods, and concludes with the fruit of the buddhas' keeping him in mind. Treatise ② explains the two dharmas by which Māra cannot break him, brings out the simile of the causes and conditions of the sun and moon and the fault of one-sided clinging to either of the two paths, and next tells the method of using both matters together; next it explains what he does being as what he says and his being kept in mind by the buddhas, bringing out the similes of the five kinds of vajra-holding spirits and of fish-roe not kept in mind by the mother; next it sets up five rounds of question and answer—how the gods can give the prediction, in which sūtra the two bodhisattvas are spoken of, why Samantabhadra, Avalokiteśvara, and the others are not praised, why Subhūti asks again about general and particular extolling, and why one who already has faith in and understands prajñā further hears it from Akṣobhya Buddha and the bodhisattvas; in between it brings out the simile of the great general defeating the enemy and the intent of the buddhas' praising the good and disparaging the evil; next it explains the three kinds of difference between the three gates and the three gates of liberation and brings out the rarity of one who has gone out from the compliant acceptance of dharmas and has not yet obtained the acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas; finally it explains the two roads of the power of faith and the power of wisdom, that abiding within suchness is abiding within ultimate emptiness, and that in shooting upward into space the arrow falls of itself when its force is exhausted and not because space is exhausted, and brings out the reverse simile of shooting at a wall and being unable to pass through.
Of the veins of meaning between this chapter and the chapters before and after it, three lines can be seen. First, inheriting from what precedes: what the preceding chapter made clear is the practice of aspiration and delight; this chapter carries on its momentum and asks why the buddhas extol—turning from the love and delight of beings to the admiring praise of all the sages; therefore the sūtra at its start still takes practising prajñā, true and real or not true and real, as its joint, and does not set up a separate stove. Second, within the chapter a turn is completed of itself: the first half speaks of why one is not startled and does not sink, the latter half speaks of where extolling returns; the two halves have as their pivot the section at the end of the fascicle that retells the sūtra text—once the cause of the gods' bowing is established, the buddhas' extolling is not a separate matter but still the fruit of the same passage of teaching. Third, passing on to what follows: this chapter ends with extolling the bodhisattva's name and clan, and the next chapter turns into the matter of entrustment; the two chapters stand one after the other, and the reader may view them together to see the difference between extolling and entrusting.
Of the ancient masters' explanations, two schools can be recorded for this chapter. Jizang, at the head of his sectional explanation of this chapter, directly establishes its meaning by the chapter name, saying: 「此下明度眾生如度空」 tr. "From here on it makes clear that delivering beings is like delivering space"—the chapter name he uses is "Delivering Space", which differs from the base text of this edition, which has "Extolling"; his explanation of the origin of this name says: 「空有不二，但惑者聞度眾生皆言度有，故今言度空耳」 tr. "Emptiness and existence are not two; it is only that the deluded, hearing of delivering beings, all say it is delivering something existent; therefore it now says delivering space"—thus the name "Delivering Space" is established as a remedy for the deluded ones' clinging to existence. His explanation of the question at the head of the chapter says: 「上品雖復廣辨前理空寂，未明智體無相，是以遣之也」 tr. "Although the preceding chapter widely discussed the principle above as empty and quiescent, it had not yet made clear that the substance of wisdom is signless; therefore it dispels this"—explaining Śāriputra's question by the signlessness of the substance of wisdom, which differs in angle from this treatise's glossing of the true and real as settled and certain and not changing; they are recorded side by side without judgement. His explanation of being unafraid of the two emptinesses says: 「若眾生空法不空，是可怖耳。今眾生空法復空，無有不空者，何所怖耶」 tr. "If beings were empty and dharmas not empty, that would be something to fear. Now beings are empty and dharmas too are empty; there is nothing that is not empty—what is there to fear?" and he also says: 「色離即眾生離者，明空無二無礙，故色空即眾生空也」 tr. "That form's being separated is beings' being separated makes clear that emptiness is without duality and without obstruction; therefore the emptiness of form is the emptiness of beings"—these two sayings accord with the measure kept by this treatise's section 「上聞眾生空故不畏，今聞法空故不畏」 tr. "above, because he heard of the emptiness of beings, he was not afraid; now, because he hears of the emptiness of dharmas, he is not afraid," and can serve as supporting evidence. His explanation of the two dharmas that cannot be broken says: 「又以解空故不退為凡夫，不捨眾生不退為聲聞也」 tr. "Further, because he understands emptiness he does not retrogress into an ordinary person; because he does not abandon beings he does not retrogress into a śrāvaka"—matching each of the two dharmas with one retrogression, which is close in meaning to what is taken by this treatise's simile of the sun and moon needing one another, though the words it sets up differ. His explanation of the Buddha's verbal praise divides it into three persons, saying: 「凡三人得歎：一者、得無生忍現前；二者、深信無生隣於不退必爾無疑；三者、從初發軫其心屈也」 tr. "In all, three persons receive praise: first, one in whom the acceptance of non-arising has been obtained and is present; second, one who deeply believes in non-arising, is near to non-retrogression, and will surely be so without doubt; third, one whose mind is bent from the time of first setting out"—dividing the items of extolling by three persons; this number three comes from Jizang's own sectional division, not from the text of this treatise, and is recorded for reference. Huiying, explaining this chapter, marks the intent of its sequence, saying: 「上明菩薩脩平等行，具生法二忍，故為一切眾生愛樂。今次明為諸天人所敬，眾聖嘆美，故次明此品」 tr. "Above it made clear that the bodhisattva cultivates the practice of equality and is endowed with the two acceptances of beings and of dharmas, and therefore is loved and delighted in by all beings. Next it now makes clear that he is revered by gods and humans and admired and praised by all the sages; therefore this chapter is set forth next"—judging the sequence of the preceding chapter and this one by love and delight and by admiring praise, which bears exactly on the line of inheriting from what precedes spoken of above. His sectional division of this chapter says: 「就此品中大有二分：第一、明菩薩行不二法，不證實際，而廣度眾生；第二、從何以故去，明十方諸佛稱揚菩薩」 tr. "Within this chapter there are broadly two parts: first, it makes clear that the bodhisattva practises the non-dual Dharma, does not realise the limit of reality, and widely delivers beings; second, from 'why?' onward, it makes clear that the buddhas of the ten directions extol the bodhisattva"; and further, on the section on extolling, he says: 「就稱揚中有通有別」 tr. "Within the extolling there is the general and the particular"—gathering by the two gates of general and particular the several kinds of bodhisattvas listed in the sūtra, which is close in meaning to what is taken by this treatise's division into the general statement of great bodhisattvas and the particular naming of their names. His explanation of the identity of the two emptinesses of beings and of dharmas says: 「眾生離即是色離者，當知生空即是法空，但從詮為異也」 tr. "That beings' being separated is form's being separated: know that the emptiness of beings is the emptiness of dharmas; they differ only by way of expression"; his explanation of the two dharmas that cannot be broken says: 「今以菩薩慈悲從實相生，屬無緣慈悲，故無窮盡所度無極」 tr. "Now, because the bodhisattva's kindness and compassion arise from the real mark, they belong to kindness and compassion without object; therefore they are inexhaustible, and those delivered are without limit"; his explanation of the matching of word and deed says: 「若不能如說行者，則是大妄語人，故為天神輕也」 tr. "If one cannot practise as one says, one is a person of great false speech; therefore he is slighted by the gods and spirits"; his explanation of severing the two grounds says: 「能斷二地者，經論多云離二乘地也」 tr. "As to being able to sever the two grounds: the sūtras and treatises mostly say it is leaving the ground of the two vehicles"—these four sayings all explain following the text, and each illuminates what this treatise says. In Huiying's Commentary he also himself calls this chapter 「第六十四品者，名為稱揚品」 tr. "The sixty-fourth chapter is named the chapter Extolling"; its chapter number differs by one place from the base text of this edition. The study of the variant names of the chapter title, the differing steps of the chapter sequence, the division of fascicles among the texts, and the differing chapters at which the interlinear notes at the fascicle ends conclude, is detailed in the Apparatus.
囑累品第六十六Entrustment (Chapter 66)
全文五層 →Full five layers →囑累品：囑累二字何以要放在般若說盡之處，帝釋何以自疑所說而佛何以印可，須菩提行空何以與菩薩空行百分不及一，同是行空何以有分有量與無分無量之別，八百比丘何以獨取供養佛而佛何以微笑授記，忘失般若一句何以其過甚大而忘失他經何以其過小小，受持般若何以就是受持三世諸佛菩提，六波羅蜜何以是菩薩母而又倍復囑累，教一菩薩一句何以勝教三千大千世界眾生得阿羅漢，現神足見阿閦佛會而復攝何以正是一切法不與眼作對之證，佛既無所著何以慇懃囑累似如貪惜，般若何以無量無盡而又以有盡之語言囑累，出覆面舌相何以不是神通力所現，文字陀羅尼與聞持陀羅尼何以有終不忘失與久則忘失之別，般若何以又名陀羅尼
在問什麼
這一品問的是託付。前此諸品廣說般若之深、之廣、之不可思議，說的是法本身；到了這一品，鏡頭一轉，落在法與人之間——這樣的一部法，佛要交給誰、怎麼交、交的時候說了些什麼話。品名「囑累」二字就是這一問的名目：囑是叮嚀，累是委付；一部經說到要把它交出去，便是說法之事將了。
起頭處還不是託付，是格量。釋提桓因先自疑所說是否隨順、是否正答，佛印可之後，帝釋讚歎須菩提所樂說皆歸於空；佛便就這一句展開一段極長的格量——須菩提行空之時，檀波羅蜜乃至八十隨形好一一不可得，何況行者、得者；這樣的所行，拿來比菩薩摩訶薩的般若波羅蜜行，百分不及一。此處第一個難處就出現了：同樣是行空，同樣是得諸法實相，何以竟差到算數譬喻所不能及？論主的解答分三層——智慧有利鈍故所入有深淺、二乘無慈悲無度眾生之願、二乘所得之空有分有量而佛菩薩無分無量，並自出渴者飲河與毛孔之空比十方空二喻。
接著場景一變。三十三天散華，八百比丘從座而起、以華散佛，發願行此無上行；佛知其心行而微笑，色光遍照，阿難問笑的因緣，佛便授記八百比丘於星宿劫中同時作佛、佛名皆同「散華」。授記之後，佛順勢讚般若，說能行深般若的人是從人道或兜率天而來，是面從佛聞、從諸佛種善根。到這裡，全品的正題纔出來：「是故，阿難！我以般若波羅蜜囑累汝！」
囑累既立，佛便層層說其所以。忘失他法其過小小，忘失般若一句其過甚大；受持般若就是受持三世諸佛的阿耨多羅三藐三菩提，供養般若就是供養三世諸佛；又以六波羅蜜倍復囑累，因為六波羅蜜是菩薩摩訶薩母、是諸佛無盡法藏。次設一格量：教三千大千世界眾生盡得阿羅漢，不如以般若相應之一句教一菩薩。次現神足變化，令大眾見阿閦佛會，旋即收攝，以此證成「一切法不與眼作對」。次說般若無量無盡，如欲得虛空邊際。末後佛出覆面舌相，令阿難於四眾中廣演分別，並說深般若是一切字門、能入陀羅尼門、是三世諸佛妙法、是行者足。
論主釋此，最要緊的是兩個疑與兩個喻。兩疑：佛於一切種智猶尚不貪，何以獨於般若慇懃囑累，似如貪惜？般若既是真無盡，何以又要以有盡的名字語言句眾來囑累？兩喻：大富長者臨終以如意寶珠慇懃囑累其兒——所以答第一疑；人以香油瓶囑累子弟、不惜瓶而惜香油——所以答第二疑。兩喻一前一後，把「囑累」二字的裡外都說盡了：所重者是寶不是盒，然而寶必須在盒裡交出去。
逐段解明
一、帝釋自疑所說：為隨順法不？為正答不？ 品首不是佛說，是帝釋自陳。他把自己方纔的說與答提到佛前，請佛判一句：是隨順於法嗎？是正答嗎？讀此先要看清他問的不是『我說得好不好』，是『我說得對不對』——隨順是不違法相，正答是應其所問。一個已得初道的天主，在大眾前自己先把話收回來請佛勘定，這一著是全品開端最要緊的身段：說法之事，先論其真，不先論其能。
二、佛可其言：汝所說、所答，實皆隨順。 佛的印可極簡，只一句「汝所說、所答，實皆隨順」，不加褒獎，也不添一字。讀者此處易起一疑：既然說得對，何必請印？下文論主專為此立問。此處只須記住經文的次第——先有請印，纔有印可；印可之後帝釋纔敢往下讚歎。凡經中人物自請勘定而佛逕可者，所印的是法不是人。
三、帝釋讚歎希有：須菩提所樂說皆為空、無相、無作乃至阿耨多羅三藐三菩提。 得了印可，帝釋纔說出他真正要說的話：希有啊，須菩提所樂說的，無一不歸於空、無相、無作，乃至歸於阿耨多羅三藐三菩提。此語是後文一整段格量的引子。讀時勿把「所樂說」讀成偏好，它說的是這位尊者所說之法自然而然的去向——凡有所說，皆趣向於此。
四、佛就須菩提行空而作格量：一一不可得，何況行者得者；比菩薩般若行百分不及一。 佛順帝釋之語而展開，把六波羅蜜、四念處乃至八聖道分、禪解脫三昧定、佛十力、四無所畏、四無礙智、大慈大悲、十八不共法、阿耨多羅三藐三菩提、一切智、如來、無生法、三十二相、八十隨形好逐項排列，一一說「不可得」，並且每一項都追加一句「何況行是法者」。這是本品第一個難處：所排列的既是佛法之全帳，何以說不可得？要看住佛自己給的理由——須菩提比丘是一切法離行、無所得行、空行、無相行、無作行；不可得是就其所行之相而言，不是說法不成立。次句更要緊：這樣的所行，比菩薩摩訶薩的般若行，百分不及一乃至算數譬喻所不能及；而佛隨即自註其故——除佛之所行，菩薩行般若於二乘諸行中最尊最妙最上，能過二地、入菩薩位、具足佛法、得一切種智、斷一切煩惱習而作佛。格量的落點不在貶抑須菩提，在指出一條道路的長短。
五、三十三天散華，八百比丘起座散華而發無上行之願。 經文忽然插入一段動作：諸三十三天以天文陀羅花散佛及僧；八百比丘從座而起，以華散佛，偏袒右肩、合掌、右膝著地，發願當行這無上之行，是聲聞、辟支佛所不能行。此段看似插敘，其實是上段格量的現場回應——法會中有人聽懂了『比菩薩行百分不及一』這句話的分量，當下轉身。讀經遇此等處，勿作場面文字略過：經文記下誰在什麼時候動了心，正是在指示這一段法對什麼樣的根器起作用。
六、佛知諸比丘心行而微笑，種種色光遍照三千大千世界。 佛不先說話，先微笑；色光青、黃、赤、白、紅、縹從口中出，遍照三千大千世界，繞佛三匝，還從頂入。讀此當知微笑是有法的——經文明說「佛知諸比丘心行」在先，笑在後；笑不是隨喜之態，是知其心已轉而印之於相。光之出入有處有數，亦非鋪陳；下文論主特別指出笑之義另有出處，此處經文只記其相而不解其義。
七、阿難問笑的因緣：諸佛不以無因緣而笑。 阿難的問法值得學：他不問『世尊何故歡喜』，他先立一個通則——諸佛不以無因緣而笑——再據以發問。這是本論所處處示範的問法：問之前先確定所問之事必有其理，然後求其理。若無此一句，笑便只是一個表情；有了此一句，笑就成了可問之法。
八、佛授記八百比丘於星宿劫中作佛，佛名皆同「散華」，同時作佛。 佛答笑之因緣，即是授記：這八百比丘於星宿劫中當得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提，佛名散華，都同一個字，比丘僧、世界、壽命皆等，各各過十萬歲出家作佛，那時諸世界常雨五色天花。此記有兩處奇特：一是同名，二是同時。同名由其所獻之華而來，同時由其所修之同而來——下文論主明說這八百人是善知識、行同心等、世世共修，故一時作佛。讀授記文當看其因，不當只看其果。
九、行深般若者從人中或兜率天來，是面從佛聞、從諸佛種善根，非聲聞所種。 授記既畢，佛轉而說能行深般若之人的來處與根源：若有人能行這深般若，當知是從人中命終生此，或從兜率天命終來生此間；能受持讀誦親近正憶念、又轉教他人行菩薩道的，當知是面從佛聞，亦從諸佛所種善根；並教他自作念——「我等非聲聞所種善根，亦不從聲聞所聞是深般若波羅蜜。」此段是後文囑累的地基：所託付的法，其受者原不是偶然而來。讀時勿讀成血統之論，經文所指的是修學的來歷，不是身分的貴賤。
十、於佛福田種善根雖不虛誑，要深了了行六波羅蜜乃至一切種智；佛以般若囑累阿難，忘失一句其過甚大。 全品的正題在此出現。佛先立一個轉語：在諸佛福田中種善根固然不虛誑，但要得聲聞、辟支佛、佛而得解脫，仍應當深深了了而行六波羅蜜乃至一切種智；若如此行而竟住二乘不得菩提，無有是處。立定此理，佛纔說「我以般若波羅蜜囑累汝」，並立刻給出輕重之別：受持一切法而忘失，其過小小、無有大罪；受持深般若而忘失一句，其過甚大。此一輕一重是本品全部教誡的樞紐，下文論主為它專設一問。
十一、受持般若即受持三世諸佛菩提，供養般若即供養三世諸佛；種種因緣囑累汝般若。 佛繼而說出所以甚大之故：受持般若波羅蜜，就是受持過去、未來、現在諸佛的阿耨多羅三藐三菩提；供養般若，就是供養我，也就是已供養三世諸佛；聞說深般若而信心清淨恭敬愛樂，就是已於三世諸佛信心清淨恭敬愛樂。末後佛自道其囑累之情：「如我為世尊，般若波羅蜜亦是世尊」，因此在一切世間人、天、阿修羅眾中囑累於汝。本品品名之義，至此纔第一次在經文中正面落實。讀此段當看住其中的等式——所等的是般若與諸佛之菩提，不是經卷與佛身。
十二、六波羅蜜是菩薩摩訶薩母、是諸佛無盡法藏，故以六波羅蜜倍復囑累。 佛把囑累的範圍再擴一層：能受持深般若、又為他人廣說其義者疾得菩提，因為般若中出生諸佛之菩提；既然如此，欲得菩提者應當學六波羅蜜——六波羅蜜是菩薩摩訶薩母，因為它生諸菩薩；是諸佛無盡法藏，因為十方諸佛現在說法皆從其中出，三世諸佛及弟子皆從其中學而得度。所以佛說「我以六波羅蜜倍復囑累汝」。讀者易疑：方纔囑累般若，此處何以又囑累六度？要看住二者的關係——般若是六度之一而又總攝六度，囑累六度不是改囑他法，是把同一件事說得更備。
十三、格量：教一菩薩以般若相應一句，勝教三千大千世界眾生令得阿羅漢。 佛設本品最重的一個格量：阿難若為諸聲聞人說法，令三千大千世界眾生盡得阿羅漢果證，猶未為我弟子事；若以般若相應之一句教一位菩薩摩訶薩，則為我弟子事，我亦歡喜。此語極重，重到會令人誤讀為輕視阿羅漢。要看住佛所用的衡量單位——「我弟子事」，衡的是所作是否合佛之本懷，不是衡人之果位高下。下文論主為此專設一問，並自答其故。
十四、阿難言「甚多」；佛廣說教菩薩之福，乃至半日、一食頃、須臾間說。 佛先問阿難：三千大千世界眾生一時皆得阿羅漢，其布施、持戒、禪定功德多不多？阿難答「甚多！世尊！」佛便就此層層遞減而益顯其勝：不如以般若相應法為菩薩說乃至一日；置一日但半日，置半日但一食頃，置一食頃但須臾間說，其福更多。並自出其故——菩薩善根勝一切二乘，且菩薩自欲得菩提亦示教利喜他人令得。讀此段要看住遞減之法：所減的是時間，所顯的是法的分量；時間愈短而福愈顯，正見所較量者不在時之久暫。
十五、說是〈般若波羅蜜品〉時現神足變化，大眾皆見阿閦佛及其眷屬。 說法至此，佛在四眾及天、人、龍、鬼神、甄陀羅、摩睺羅伽等之前現神足變化：一切大眾皆見阿閦佛，比丘僧圍繞說法，大眾譬如大海水皆是阿羅漢，漏盡無煩惱、得好解脫、心好解脫、慧好解脫，其心調柔譬如大象，所作已辦、逮得己利、盡諸有結、正智得解脫，於一切心心數法中得自在，及諸菩薩摩訶薩無量功德成就。此一現不是助興，是下一段教法的教具——先令見，纔好說不見。
十六、佛攝神足，大眾不復見，不與眼作對。 現而復攝，是此段的關鍵動作。佛收攝神足，一切大眾便不再見阿閦佛、聲聞人、菩薩摩訶薩及其世界，經文以五字斷之：「不與眼作對」，並自問自答其故——因佛攝神足故。讀者此時應當警覺：同一境界，方纔見、此刻不見，而境界本身未曾增減；所增減者唯在作對與不作對之間。此正是下文所要說的一切法之相。
十七、一切法不與眼作對、法法不相見不相知；如是學名第一學最上學微妙學；般若無有量如虛空邊際不可得。 佛就上事而說通則：一切法不與眼作對，法與法不相見、不相知；因為一切法無知、無見、無作、無動、不可捉、不可思議，如幻人無受、無覺、無真實。菩薩如是行為行般若而不著諸法，如是學名為第一學、最上學、微妙學，安樂利益一切世間、為無護者作護，是諸佛所學；諸佛住此學中能以右手舉三千大千世界還著本處而眾生無覺知者。末說般若無有量——名眾、句眾、字眾是有量的，般若波羅蜜無有量；欲得其邊際者，即是欲得虛空邊際。此段自『不見』說到「無量」，一路都在拆讀者以眼度法的習氣。
十八、阿難問：般若波羅蜜何以故無有量？ 阿難於此發問，問得極準：不問般若有多大，問它何以無量。讀者可學此一問的位置——佛方說「我初不說般若波羅蜜量」，阿難便就這一句追其所以然，不旁及他事。凡聽法而能就說者最後一句追問者，是聽在法上，不是聽在事上。
十九、佛答：無盡故、離故無有量；三世諸佛皆學而不盡，如欲盡虛空；一切法無生，云何有盡。 佛給的理由是兩重：因無盡故無有量，因離故無有量。次以三世為證——過去、未來、現在諸佛皆學般若而得度，而般若不盡，已不盡、今不盡、當不盡；欲盡般若即是欲盡虛空。末後一句是全段的根：一切法皆無生，若法無生，云何有盡。讀此當知「無量」不是大到無法計算，是根本不落在生盡的軸上；凡以大小久暫求般若者，所求皆非。
二十、佛出覆面舌相，令從今廣演分別；深般若是一切字門、能入陀羅尼門，是三世諸佛妙法、是行者足。 經段末後，佛出覆面舌相而告阿難：從今日於四眾中廣演、開示、分別般若波羅蜜，當令分明易解；因為深般若中廣說諸法相，求三乘者皆當於中學而各得成就。次說深般若即是一切字門，行之能入陀羅尼門，學此陀羅尼門則得一切樂說辯才；般若是三世諸佛妙法，受持讀誦親近者則能持三世諸佛之菩提；般若是行者足，持此陀羅尼故能持一切諸法。經段至此而止——所託付者已交，所以交者已說，交法之相亦已現。
廿一、論主釋帝釋何以自疑：非一切智人、眾中有疑其資格者、求佛印可使聽者信受。 論段起手第一問，正問經首那一句自疑。論主給了三層理由，層層不同：其一、帝釋非一切智人，雖得初道而三毒未盡，自己籌量所說或能錯謬而不自覺知；其二、會中大有阿鞞跋致菩薩、漏盡阿羅漢及離欲諸天，見他與佛及須菩提共問難而心不怯弱，或疑其漏未盡何能盡諸法邊，故他以此事問佛；其三、他自知所說無違錯，求佛印可以使聽者信受。讀此三層當分清各自的所對——第一對自己，第二對眾人，第三對法。同一個動作而有三重用心，這是論主釋經最常用的手法。
廿二、論主釋佛何以印可：常從佛聞、誦讀力強；三種慧之分與乘船隨流喻。 第二問轉到佛這一邊。論主答：帝釋雖非一切智人，但常從佛聞、誦讀力強，故所說有理，佛便印可。並引一義以明其可能——佛說有「三種慧：聞慧、思慧、修慧」，有人聞慧、思慧明了故，能與修慧人問難；譬如乘船隨流，不自用力而疾於陸行。末以阿難為現成之例：阿難雖未離欲、未得甚深禪定，而能與佛及漏盡阿羅漢等論議，隨法無違。此段所立的義極有用——所說之法的高下，不必等同於說者所證之位次；然其所以能不違，仍繫於聞思之力有所從來。
廿三、論主述佛語帝釋：須菩提是行畢竟空人，世世修集，以空解脫門入道亦以此門教化眾生。 論主隨經而釋佛所以印成須菩提：他是行畢竟空的人，且世世修集而非但今世；以空解脫門入道，也以此門教化眾生；這樣的人入深空法尚且不得法，何況行是法者——論主並引經文「檀波羅蜜不可得，何況行檀者！乃至八十隨形好不可得，何況得八十種隨形好者！」為證。讀此當看住「世世修集」四字：須菩提之樂說空，不是一世之偏好，是久修所成之門路，故其說空自然而然。
廿四、須菩提所行空行，欲比菩薩空行，百分不及一。 論主把經中格量之語提出來單立一句，作為下文設問的靶。此一句之所以要單提，是因為它最易生疑——空既無二，行空何以有差？論主不急著解，先讓這一句突兀地立著。讀論遇此等單提之句，當知下文必有問答隨之；若逕自越過，後面的辨析便無所附。
廿五、問答三：法空眾生空復有何不盡？論主先明諸法實相種種名字，次以利鈍深淺、二乘無度生之願、有分有量三義答之，並出破闇然燈、渴者飲河、毛孔之空比十方空三喻。 這是論段最長也最要緊的一答。論主先引佛自說「除佛，諸聲聞、辟支佛無有及菩薩」，次說諸法實相有種種名字——或說空、或說畢竟空、或說般若波羅蜜、或名阿耨多羅三藐三菩提；此中所說的實相名為空行。次立第一義：智慧分別利鈍、入有深淺，雖皆名得諸法實相，而利根者得之了了；並出燈喻——破闇然燈，更有大燈則明轉勝；當知先燈雖照而微闇不盡，若盡則後燈無用；行空者亦如是，雖俱得道而無明有盡不盡，唯佛智能盡諸無明。次立第二義：二乘無慈悲心、無度眾生心、無淨佛世界、無無量佛法願、無轉法輪度眾生、亦無入無餘涅槃乃至遺法度眾生願、無三世度眾生心，非但以空行故與菩薩等。次立第三義：二乘得空有分有量，佛菩薩無分無量；如渴者飲河不過自足，又如毛孔之空欲比十方空，無有是理。三義三喻合起來纔是完整的答語——所差者不在空之為空，在證空之智、發空之心、用空之量。
廿六、論主述佛勸修：欲於一切眾生最上當行般若；學空行不取空相故過二地、得無生忍、入菩薩位，空行為根本。 分別已畢，論主隨經轉入勸修，並引佛自說之因緣：菩薩學此般若空行，不取空相故過於二地，得無生忍法而入菩薩位；入菩薩位故具足佛法，佛法即是菩薩道，菩薩道具足故當得一切種智，得一切種智故名為佛、是斷一切煩惱習人。論主末加一句總收：「是諸事，空行為根本。」讀此當看住「不取空相」四字——上文說空行有分量之別，此處說其所以能無分量，正在不取；取則有分，不取則無量。
廿七、問答四：涅槃是無量，何以言二乘所得有量？論主以智慧有分有量非法性有量答，並出大水器喻與量無量相待之義。 此問極細：涅槃既是無量，二乘所證即是涅槃，何以說其所得有量？論主一句撥開：所說的是「智慧有分有量」，不是說「諸法法性有量」；並反詰「不聞說大水喻耶？器有量，非水有量。」次更進一層：量與無量本是相待之法，於凡人是無量而佛皆能量——爾所分是須陀洹，乃至爾所分是阿羅漢、辟支佛、菩薩，餘殘究盡法性是佛。讀此段當把「有量」二字的所繫看清：繫於能證之智，不繫於所證之法；此一分別若含糊，前段一切格量都會讀成貶法。
廿八、問答五：華供養佛及僧，八百比丘何以獨取供養佛？論主答以見其色香甚妙、因而發心。 此問看似瑣細，實則問的是發心之緣。論主的答語樸實：諸天所散之華，諸比丘各依所分而墮衣上者，見其色香甚妙，因以發心供養於佛，並自陳「我從今日，當行是無上行，所謂畢竟空、無相、無作等，為度一切眾生故，如佛所說，二乘所不及。」讀者當看住這一著——發心的觸機可以極小，一片墮在衣上的華；而所發之願可以極大，畢竟空、無相、無作而為度一切眾生。論主不把小緣說成高遠，也不因小緣而輕其願。
廿九、佛微笑之義如〈恒伽提婆品〉中說；八百比丘皆善知識、世世共修，故一時作佛皆同一字。 論主釋笑，只以一句指路：笑義如〈恒伽提婆品〉中說。這是本論的常例——已釋之義不重出，只標其處。次釋授記之奇：這八百比丘皆是善知識，行同心等，世世共修集功德，故一時作佛、皆同一字；又因以五色天華供養佛，故其世界中常雨五色天曼陀羅華。讀此當知同名同時不是偶合，是共行之果；讀經遇齊一之相，當回頭尋其共同之因。
三十、論主釋佛因是事讚般若，並逐一辨三惡道、諸天、鬼神道何以不能行深般若，而人道與兜率天何以能行。 論主隨經而釋佛之讚般若，並就「人道中來，或兜率天上來」一句作逐項排除：三惡道罪苦多故不得行；欲界天著淨妙五欲、心則狂惑故不能行；色界天深著禪定味故不能行；無色界無形故不能行；鬼神道眼根等雖利而諸煩惱覆心故不能專行。次說其所以能行：人道中苦差三惡道、樂不如諸天，眼等諸根濁重、身多地種，故能制苦樂意而行般若；兜率天上常有一生補處菩薩，彼中諸天常聞說般若，五欲雖多而法力勝。又補一路：或從他方佛世界來，或從此間有般若處來。末釋佛常以佛眼見能問能信受持正憶念者，此等人當自念是面從佛受、從佛發心種善根而不從二乘發。這一段是全論最切於行人的排除法——太苦不能行，太樂亦不能行；能行者在苦樂之間而有制之之力。
卅一、問答六：從佛種善根必以三乘入涅槃不虛，何用常行般若難知難得空行？論主答以要了了行六波羅蜜乃至一切種智。 論主設一極實際之問，並自引《法華》之語為難——「有人或以一華，或以少香供養於佛，乃至一稱南無佛，如是等人皆當作佛。」若如此，則有人作念：「但行五波羅蜜，欲作佛時乃觀空，何用常行般若波羅蜜，難知難得空行？」論主答此不另立新義，逕引佛自答阿難之語：於佛福田中雖不虛誑，要得三乘入涅槃，應當了了行六波羅蜜乃至一切種智了了行故，疾得佛道，不久受生死苦。讀此當看清所爭者是遲速與久暫，不是成與不成——少善根供佛非不作佛，然其道遠而生死長；此答不破前說而自立其所以要行。
卅二、問答七：佛猶尚不貪，何以慇懃囑累似如貪惜？論主答以利益眾生無過般若，並出大富長者以如意寶珠慇懃囑累其兒之喻。 這是本品最要緊的一問，也是「囑累」二字之所以要被追問的地方。論主答：諸佛為利益眾生而出世，現三十二相、八十種隨形好、無量光明、神足變化皆為眾生；第一利益眾生者無過般若，能盡諸苦故；而般若須因語言、文字、章句可得其義，是故佛以般若經卷慇懃囑累阿難。次出第二層：有人見佛慇懃囑累，便說佛大事已辦猶尚尊重般若，是法必尊必妙。次出本品第一核心譬喻——譬如大富長者臨命終時以眾寶與兒，偏以如意寶珠慇懃囑累：「汝勿以此寶自無定色、質如虛空、微妙難識故而不守護！若失餘寶為可，此寶不可失也！」長者即是佛，以般若囑累阿難：「汝好受持守護，無令忘失！」讀此喻當看住寶之難識——正因其無定色、質如虛空而微妙難識，纔最容易被當作不值錢之物棄置，所以纔需要慇懃。慇懃不出於貪，出於知其易失。
卅三、除般若若忘失他經其過尚少，失般若一句其過太多；般若法藏是十方三世諸佛母。 論主接著釋輕重之別，說得比經文更直：除了般若，雖有十二部經盡皆忘失，其過尚少；若失般若一句，其過太多。所以然者，這深般若法藏是十方三世諸佛母，能令人疾至佛道。論主並以「三世諸佛皆從般若得」乃至「為聲聞人說法」一段，總判其中皆是讚般若之事。此處所舉的十二部經，論文只言其總數而未出其目，讀者不必外求其名相；所要看住的是論主立輕重的判準——不在經卷之多寡，在能否生佛。
卅四、問答八：令眾生盡得阿羅漢，云何不如以般若一句教菩薩？論主答以自度不中作佛，並出種如意樹喻、大小乘差別四項與金剛雖小喻。 論主自承此事先已答過，今更略說：三千大千世界眾生雖皆得阿羅漢，自度其身而不中作佛；若說般若一句，聞者得作佛故。次出喻：如人種眾果樹，不如一人種一如意樹，能隨人所願如意皆得。次逐項辨大小乘之別——為聲聞說法中無大慈悲心，大乘法中一句雖少而有大慈悲；聲聞法中皆自為身，大乘法中廣為眾生；聲聞法中無欲廣知諸法心、但欲疾離老病死，大乘法中欲了了知一切法；聲聞法功德有限量，大乘法中欲盡諸功德無有遺餘。次出第二喻：譬如金剛雖小能勝一切寶，不得言少故不如多。末乃總結其格量。讀此四項當逐條自看，不要只記結論——所別者是心之廣狹、所為者之自他、所知者之盡不盡、所修者之有量無量，四項各是一條，合起來纔是「不如」二字的內容。
卅五、佛自說因緣：自欲得菩提亦教人令得，自行六波羅蜜亦為人說，集二處功德必得佛道。 論主引佛自說之因緣以收上段：這人自己欲得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提，也教人令得；自行六波羅蜜諸功德，也為人說。菩薩集此二處功德而不得佛道，無有是處。讀此當知所謂二處，即自行與化他兩面；上文格量所以重在教一菩薩，正因為教他之事本身即是菩薩自己的功德，非獨為他人作。
卅六、佛引神足變化為證，亦證一切法空而不著空法；肉眼天眼所見皆虛誑，慧眼法眼佛眼無相無為不可見不可知。 論主釋現神足之意：佛欲明了此事故引證，亦欲證一切法空、不著是空法，但憐愍眾生故囑累。次隨經而推：如阿閦佛、大眾、莊嚴不與眼作對，一切法不與眼作對亦如是；肉眼、天眼所見皆是作法，虛誑不實；慧眼、法眼、佛眼皆是無相無為法故不可見，若不可見亦不可知；無作等亦如是。所見阿閦佛會如幻如夢，能如是觀諸法是名菩薩行般若、名無所著。讀此段當看住兩路並破——前二眼所見者破其實，後三眼所見者破其可見；不是說後三眼不如前二眼，是說凡立能所而求見者，皆非般若之見。
卅七、佛所囑累亦無所著，但以大慈悲故讚般若；般若無量相故不可盡，名字語言章句有量而義無量。 論主回過頭來替「囑累」一事本身解粘：佛所囑累的也無所著，只以大慈悲故讚是般若；一切法雖是不可思議相，而以利益眾生故讚歎。次說無量之義：若佛智慧不可盡，般若功德亦不可盡，因般若波羅蜜無量相故；名眾等言語章句、卷數是有量的——如《小品》、《放光》、《光讚》等般若經卷章句有限有量，而般若之義無量。讀此段是全品最要緊的分際：所囑累者是有量的卷帙，所欲傳者是無量的義；二者不可混同，亦不可相離。
卅八、問答：般若云何無量？佛答相自離，不生不集故不盡不滅；三世度生而般若不盡，如欲盡虛空；諸法本無生，云何當盡。 論主隨經記阿難之問與佛之答：「般若波羅蜜相自離。」離故從本已來不生不集，不生不集故不盡不滅。次引佛自說之因緣：過去無量阿僧祇諸佛及弟子用是般若照明十方、度無量眾生皆共入無餘涅槃，而般若不盡，未來現在亦如是；譬如有人欲盡虛空而虛空不可盡。論主末補一句讀者之病：有人知過去不盡而謂未來、現在有盡，是故說三世不可盡；所以然者，諸法本無生，云何當盡。讀此當知「不盡」之所以成立，根在「無生」；若只記得用之不竭一義，便成有量之無量。
卅九、佛知般若真無盡，為名字語言句眾有盡故囑累——香油瓶囑累子弟喻；出舌相覆面，非以神通力所現。 此為本品第二核心譬喻所在，也是「囑累」二字的最後一解。論主說：佛知般若是真無盡，為名字語言句眾有盡故囑累；如人以香油瓶囑累子弟，雖不惜瓶，為受持香油故；語言能持義亦如是，若失語言則義不可得。次釋出舌相之事：佛為人信受般若故出舌相覆面，告阿難於四眾中囑累而當為眾生解說顯示分別；所以現舌相者，世間相法舌能覆鼻即是不妄語相，何況覆面。論主更說其分際：佛所示者是我從父母生身有此舌相，欲令未得一切智者生信，並非以神通力所現；佛於甚深妙法、智慧、禪定中猶尚不著，何況為世間八法、供養利故而作虛誑——此處論文舉世間八法之總名而未出其目。於一切法中如鳥飛虛空無所觸礙，但以本願誓度眾生、大悲心憐愍一切故慇懃囑累。讀此段當把兩件事分開：不妄語之相是身上本有，神通所現是臨時所作；佛特意不用後者，正為所欲取信之事不可倚仗奇特。
四十、能入一切文字陀羅尼、一門城喻、受持般若即受持三世諸佛菩提、般若是行者足；問答九與十——聞持陀羅尼與從般若得陀羅尼之別、般若何以名為陀羅尼而出如意珠隨前物色變名之喻。 論段末後總收。論主先釋文字陀羅尼：因一字即入畢竟空，是名文字陀羅尼；諸文字法皆因般若得，餘聞持等諸陀羅尼亦皆從學般若得；菩薩得諸陀羅尼已得種種樂說辯才，無量阿僧祇劫說一句義不可盡，是名三世諸佛真法，更無異法。次出一喻：般若是十方三世諸佛妙法，如一門城，四方來者無異門入。次引經而釋般若是行者足——菩薩得是般若，能行菩薩道。末設二問：其一、既以聞持陀羅尼力故能持，何以言得般若故能持一切諸佛法？論主答：聞持陀羅尼能持有數有量法，世間亦有，如須尸摩外道亦得聞持陀羅尼，是人雖少時得而久則忘失；從般若得陀羅尼則廣受持諸法終不忘失，以是為差別。其二、般若便是波羅蜜，何以名為陀羅尼？論主答：諸法實相是般若，能種種利益，眾生愛念故作種種名——如佛有十號等文字；能到一切諸智慧邊是名般若波羅蜜，菩薩行般若作佛已變名為阿耨多羅三藐三菩提，若在小乘心中但名為三十七品、三解脫門，若人欲得聞而不忘則在是人心中名為陀羅尼；是故佛說如意珠譬喻，隨前物色變為名。此處論文所舉的三十七品、三解脫門亦只舉其總名而未出其目。末一句「佛如是種種說般若大功德」收束全論。讀此總收當看住一義：異名之所以多，不是法有多種，是眾生所求各異而法隨之得名——如意珠隨前物之色而現色，珠未嘗變。
不要讀錯
不要把「囑累」讀成佛捨不得。本品論主已為此設專問——佛於一切種智、無礙解脫猶尚不貪，何以獨於般若慇懃囑累似如貪惜。所給的答語是：第一利益眾生者無過般若，能盡諸苦故；佛所囑累的也無所著，但以大慈悲故讚是般若。故慇懃二字所繫的是所託之法的難識與易失，不是能託之人的貪惜。大富長者以如意寶珠囑累其兒，所以慇懃者，正因此寶「自無定色、質如虛空、微妙難識」；若讀成佛有所吝，則長者喻中最要緊的那一句便落空了。
不要把『忘失一句其過甚大』只讀成記誦之責，也不要因此撇開護持文句之責。論主說得明白：所以過大者，是因為「深般若法藏是十方三世諸佛母，能令人疾至佛道」。論主更明言囑累正為「名字語言句眾有盡」而設，「若失語言，則義不可得」；文句是持義之器，失文則義失，所以成過者是失其義而斷其路。經文自己也把重心放在受持、讀誦、親近、正憶念、隨義隨法行的一整串上，不單說記憶。若只讀成背不全便得大罪，則失了論主所立的判準——能否生佛；若讀成文句無關，又失了「若失語言，則義不可得」之義。二者相須。
不要把教一菩薩勝教三千大千世界眾生得阿羅漢讀成輕視阿羅漢。佛所用的衡量單位是「我弟子事」，論主所出的理由是「自度其身，不中作佛」與四項大小乘之別——慈悲之有無、所為之自他、所知之盡不盡、功德之有量無量。四項所辨的都是法門之趣向，不是果位之貴賤。本品經文自身即記八百比丘、諸漏盡阿羅漢同在會中而見聞得益；若讀成經許人輕聖果，則同一品中的授記與現阿閦佛會二段便無處安放。
不要把「一切法不與眼作對」讀成一切都不存在。此語的出處極要緊——它是在佛現神足令大眾得見阿閦佛會、旋即收攝之後說的。所破的是以眼度法之習，不是破法。論主隨即分兩路說：肉眼、天眼所見皆是作法而虛誑不實；慧眼、法眼、佛眼皆無相無為故不可見。兩路合起來是說見之一事在般若中無可安立，不是說所見之境曾有而今無。若讀成斷無，則下文『菩薩如是行為行般若』一句便成行於斷見。
不要把般若無量讀成數量極大。佛自說其故是『無盡故無有量，離故無有量』，末後歸到「一切法皆無生；若法無生，云何有盡」。論主更點出讀者之病：有人知過去不盡而謂未來現在有盡。可見無量之所以成立，根在無生，不在計數之外。若以大到不可計數解之，則仍是把般若放在量的軸上，正是佛所說「我初不說般若波羅蜜量」所遮的。
不要把香油瓶之喻讀成輕語言文字。論主立此喻的前提是「佛知般若是真無盡，為名字語言句眾有盡故囑累」，而喻的落點是「語言能持義亦如是，若失語言，則義不可得」。瓶雖非所惜，卻是香油所以能傳之具。故本品既說名眾句眾字眾有量、般若義無量，又說佛以般若經卷慇懃囑累——兩句並存纔是全義。若因義無量而輕其卷帙，則本品囑累之事自壞；若因囑累經卷而以文句為究竟，則又落在有量之中。
不要把出覆面舌相讀成示現神通。論主特別分別：所現者是「我從父母生身，有此舌相」，是世間相法中不妄語之相，「非以神通力所現」。並給出理由——佛於甚深妙法、智慧、禪定中猶尚不著，何況為世間八法、供養利故而作虛誑。故此相所證的是佛語不虛，不是佛力廣大。若讀成神變取信，則與同品中現神足而復攝、以明不與眼作對的那一段自相牴牾。
修行作用
第一件受用，是把囑累之事看成自己受託。本品經文所囑累的對象是阿難，而所託之事是受持、讀誦、令利、為他人解說顯示分別。凡今日讀此一品的人，所處的位置正是當年那一句囑累所指向的後來之人。行門上可立一個極簡的自檢：我於般若之文句，是持而不失，還是聞而即過？我於所解之義，是能為人分別開示，還是止於自曉？二問若都答不上來，則本品所說的受持二字尚未落在身上。
第二件受用，是以四項大小乘之別自照發心。論主所列的四項——有無大慈悲心、所為是自身還是廣為眾生、有無欲廣知諸法之心、所修功德是有限量還是無有遺餘——每一項都可以就當下一念自問。這不是要人自判位次，是要人看清此刻所行之法的趣向。日用之中，凡起一善念、作一善事，皆可以此四問掂一掂：所重者是離苦，還是兼欲知法度人。
第三件受用，是空行之上再加不取空相。本品格量之所以說行空有百分不及一之別，論主給的關鍵是「不取空相故，過於二地」。故修習空觀者於此當有一警：所觀之空若被執成一個所得之相，便自有分、自有量。行門上可持一句自守——凡覺得自己『有空可得』之時，便是取相之時。渴者飲河不過自足，飲而知足是二乘之量；知河之無盡而不以所飲為河，纔是本品所說的無分無量。
第四件受用，是把排除諸道之說反過來作自己的處境之觀。論主逐一說三惡道苦多、欲界天狂惑、色界天著禪味、無色界無形、鬼神道煩惱覆心皆不能行深般若，而人道能制苦樂意而行。這一段最實在的用處，是令人知道此身此處正是可行之地：苦不至於奪心，樂不至於溺志。凡以身世之苦或順境之樂為不能修學之由者，論主此段正是對治——所缺的不是境，是制苦樂意之力。
第五件受用，是守住瓶與油的分際。論主以香油瓶囑累子弟之喻，把文句與義理的關係說得極平實。行人於此可立兩手：一手老實受持文句——讀誦、親近、令利，因為「若失語言，則義不可得」；一手不以文句為究竟——因為『名眾等言語章句、卷數是有量』而義無量。兩手並行，則讀經不成執文，亦不成輕教。本品末後所說的文字陀羅尼正是這兩手合成之處：因一字而入畢竟空，字未廢而空已現。
承衍
本品的骨幹，是一段經文與一段論釋。經①自釋提桓因自疑所說是否隨順正答、佛可其言起，帝釋讚須菩提所樂說皆歸空無相無作，佛因之而作長段格量——須菩提行空時檀波羅蜜乃至八十隨形好一一不可得、何況行者得者，其所行比菩薩般若行百分不及一，除佛之行則菩薩般若行於二乘諸行中最尊最妙最上；次記三十三天散華、八百比丘發無上行之願，佛知其心行而微笑、色光遍照，阿難問笑因緣而佛授記八百比丘於星宿劫中同時作佛皆名散華；次讚能行深般若者從人中或兜率天來、是面從佛聞而從諸佛種善根；次入正題，說於佛福田種善根雖不虛誑而要深了了行六波羅蜜乃至一切種智，遂以般若囑累阿難，立忘失他法其過小小與忘失般若一句其過甚大之別，說受持般若即受持三世諸佛菩提、供養般若即供養三世諸佛，又以六波羅蜜倍復囑累而明六波羅蜜是菩薩母、是諸佛無盡法藏；次設格量，教一菩薩以般若相應一句勝教三千大千世界眾生令得阿羅漢，阿難答甚多而佛更以一日、半日、一食頃、須臾遞減而顯其勝；次現神足變化令大眾見阿閦佛會而復攝之，以證一切法不與眼作對、法法不相見不相知，如是學名第一學最上學微妙學，般若無有量如虛空邊際不可得；次阿難問何以無量而佛答無盡故離故、三世諸佛皆學而不盡、一切法無生云何有盡；末佛出覆面舌相，令從今於四眾中廣演開示分別，並說深般若是一切字門、能入陀羅尼門、是三世諸佛妙法、是行者足。論①隨文而釋：先設二問以釋帝釋自疑與佛印可之由，出三種慧之分與乘船隨流喻；次述佛印成須菩提而引經文為證，提出行空比菩薩百分不及一一句，設問而先明諸法實相種種名字，次以利鈍深淺、二乘無度生之願、有分有量三義答之，出破闇然燈、渴者飲河、毛孔之空比十方空三喻；次述勸修而明不取空相故過二地、空行為根本；次設問辨涅槃無量與二乘所得有量之異，出大水器喻與量無量相待之義；次設問釋八百比丘獨供養佛之由，指笑義出於他品，釋同時同名之因；次釋佛因是事讚般若而逐一排除諸道、獨取人道與兜率天；次設問難以少善根供佛亦當作佛而何用常行般若，答以了了行六波羅蜜乃至一切種智；次設問釋佛慇懃囑累似如貪惜，出大富長者如意寶珠囑累之喻，並明失般若一句其過太多之故；次設問釋教一菩薩之勝，出種如意樹喻、大小乘差別四項與金剛雖小喻；次釋引神足為證而明肉眼天眼所見虛誑、慧眼法眼佛眼不可見不可知；次明佛所囑累亦無所著、名字語言章句有量而般若義無量；次隨經釋相自離、不生不集故不盡不滅與欲盡虛空之喻；次出香油瓶囑累子弟喻以明何以無盡之法要以有盡之語言囑累，並釋出舌相非以神通力所現；末總收文字陀羅尼、一門城喻、聞持陀羅尼與從般若得陀羅尼之別，及般若何以名為陀羅尼而出如意珠隨前物色變名之喻，結以佛如是種種說般若大功德。全論以問答貫串，逐段可回經文對讀；其中問答之數，依本論本品文中「問曰」「答曰」逐處點之，各得十處。
本品與前後諸品的義脈，可見者有三線。其一、承前：上品說度空之義，本品承其行空之勢而問行空者之差等，故經文起手仍以帝釋校量須菩提所樂說為接榫，非別起爐灶。其二、品內自成一轉：前半說格量與授記，後半說囑累與無盡，兩半以「是故，阿難！我以般若波羅蜜囑累汝！」一句為樞——格量所顯的是法之貴重，囑累所作的是貴重之法的交付，兩事實為一事之首尾。其三、垂後：本品結於般若是一切字門、能入陀羅尼門，而次品開於無盡方便，兩品相次而立，讀者可合觀以見持法與行法之際。又本帙品九十亦題〈囑累品〉，與本品同名而異處、所釋之經文各別，讀時當以品次為斷，勿以名同而牽合。
古德之釋，本品可誌者三家。吉藏科判此品，以之屬流通之分而云：「此中第二、流通實相般若也。」其釋所以付囑流通，分為利現在與利來世二意，並自出一喻云：「如父臨終付子如意珠，則知無價物」——此喻與本論大富長者以如意寶珠囑累其兒之喻取意相近而所設之人不同，並錄不判。其釋品名云：「累即憑累，委付為累。」以憑累、委付訓「累」字，與本論不別作字訓者各取一途。其於生法二空何異一問，答云：「二乘智劣故見空淺，菩薩智深故見空亦深也。」又云：「又二乘但見於空不見不空，菩薩見空不空也。」——前語與本論「智慧分別利鈍，入有深淺故」一義相應，後語則出本論所無之空與不空一對，是吉藏自家之釋，兩存之。其釋出舌相云：「不現通力令舌大者，恐舌非實大，通力使大也，故但出覆面舌也。」與本論「非以神通力所現」一句所守之分際相合，可為佐證。慧影釋此品，判其為流通分而云：「此即是波若道中第三大分流通分也。」其疏中自稱本品為「第六十五品者，名為囑累品」，其品次與本帙底本相差一位。其釋所以慇懃而引羅什之解云：「所以慇懃囑累者，以寶重故防深；所以校量廣濶者，以功高故校廣。」以寶重釋慇懃、以功高釋校廣，正與本論長者寶珠之喻同一著眼，並錄不判。其釋「是行者足」云：「足是身之本，明此波若是法身之本，故云足也。」——本論於此句只釋為「菩薩得是般若，能行菩薩道」，慧影更進一層以法身之本釋之，是其自家之義，兩存之。又均正《大乘四論玄義》引本論此品之文而云：「累教品云：須菩提所得空，如毛穴之空；菩薩空，如十方空也。」其所引即本品「又如毛孔之空欲比十方空，無有是理」一段之意，而所用之品名作『累教品』，與本帙底本題作「囑累品」者不同——古德稱引本品之名有兩造，此其一證，並錄不判。其餘品題諸本異稱、石本卷次之差、以及此二疏之起訖與所據卷第，詳考據層。
Entrustment: Why the Two Chinese Characters Rendered Here as ‘Entrustment’ Must Be Placed Where the Teaching of Prajñā Has Been Spoken to the End; Why Śakra Doubts What He Himself Has Said and Why the Buddha Gives His Approval; Why Subhūti's Practising of Emptiness Does Not Reach One in a Hundred of the Bodhisattva's Practice of Emptiness; Why, Though Both Alike Practise Emptiness, There Is the Difference between With Parts and With Measure and Without Parts and Without Measure; Why the Eight Hundred Bhikṣus Choose to Make Offerings to the Buddha Alone and Why the Buddha Smiles and Gives the Prediction; Why Forgetting or Losing a Single Phrase of Prajñā Is a Very Great Fault while Forgetting or Losing Other Sūtras Is a Very Small Fault; Why Receiving and Upholding Prajñā Is Itself Receiving and Upholding the Awakening of the Buddhas of the Three Times; Why the Six Perfections Are the Mother of the Bodhisattvas and Are Moreover Entrusted Twice Over; Why Teaching a Single Bodhisattva a Single Phrase Surpasses Teaching the Beings of the Three-Thousand Great-Thousand World to Attain Arhatship; Why Displaying the Supernormal Power of Travel so that the Assembly of Akṣobhya Buddha Is Seen, and Then Withdrawing It, Is Precisely the Proof that All Dharmas Do Not Stand as an Object to the Eye; Why the Buddha, Being without Clinging, Earnestly Entrusts as Though Craving and Begrudging; Why Prajñā Is Without Measure and Inexhaustible and Yet Is Entrusted by Means of Exhaustible Words and Speech; Why Putting Forth the Mark of the Tongue That Covers the Face Is Not Displayed by the Power of the Supernormal Powers; Why the Dhāraṇī of Letters and the Dhāraṇī of Hearing and Retaining Differ as Never Forgetting or Losing and Forgetting or Losing after a Long Time; and Why Prajñā Is Also Named Dhāraṇī
What Is Being Asked
What this chapter asks about is entrusting. The chapters before this one have spoken broadly of the depth of prajñā, of its breadth, of its inconceivability—what they spoke of was the Dharma itself; on arriving at this chapter the lens turns, and settles between the Dharma and people—to whom the Buddha will hand over such a Dharma, how he hands it over, and what words he speaks as he hands it over. The two Chinese characters of the chapter's name, 「囑累」 tr. "entrustment," are the very heading of this question: the first, zhu, is to charge with urgent instructions; the second, lei, is to commit and hand over; when a sūtra has been spoken up to the point of handing it over, the matter of teaching the Dharma is about to come to its end.
At the outset it is not yet entrusting; it is weighing. Śakra Devānām Indra first doubts whether what he has said is in accord, whether he has answered rightly; after the Buddha gives his approval, Śakra praises Subhūti, that what he delights to teach all returns to emptiness; and the Buddha, taking up this one sentence, unfolds an extremely long weighing—when Subhūti practises emptiness, dānapāramitā and so on up to the eighty minor marks are one by one unfindable, how much less one who practises them or one who obtains them; such a practice, compared with the bodhisattva-mahāsattva's practice of prajñāpāramitā, does not reach one in a hundred. Here the first difficulty appears: both alike practise emptiness, both alike obtain the real mark of all dharmas—how can they differ to the point of being beyond the reach of calculation and simile? The treatise-author's answer is divided into three layers—because wisdom is keen or dull, what is entered is deep or shallow; the two vehicles have no kindness and compassion and no vow to deliver beings; the emptiness obtained by the two vehicles has parts and has measure, while the buddhas and bodhisattvas are without parts and without measure—and he himself brings out two similes, the thirsty man drinking from a river and the space of a pore compared with the space of the ten directions.
Then the scene changes. The gods of the Heaven of the Thirty-three scatter flowers; eight hundred bhikṣus rise from their seats, scatter flowers over the Buddha, and vow to practise this unsurpassed practice; the Buddha, knowing the workings of their minds, smiles, and lights of many colours shine everywhere; Ānanda asks the causes and conditions of the smile, and the Buddha gives the eight hundred bhikṣus the prediction that in the Constellation Kalpa they will become Buddhas at the same time, their Buddha-names all alike 「散華」 tr. "Scattering Flowers." After the prediction, the Buddha, following on, praises prajñā, saying that the people who can practise the deep prajñā have come from the human destiny or from the Tuṣita heaven, have heard it face to face from the Buddha, and have planted roots of goodness under the buddhas. Only at this point does the proper theme of the whole chapter come out: 「是故，阿難！我以般若波羅蜜囑累汝！」 tr. "Therefore, Ānanda! I entrust prajñāpāramitā to you!"
Once the entrustment has been set up, the Buddha explains its reasons layer upon layer. To forget or lose other dharmas is a very small fault; to forget or lose a single phrase of prajñā is a very great fault; to receive and uphold prajñā is to receive and uphold the anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi of the buddhas of the three times, and to make offerings to prajñā is to make offerings to the buddhas of the three times; and again he entrusts the six perfections twice over, because the six perfections are the mother of the bodhisattva-mahāsattvas and the inexhaustible Dharma treasury of the buddhas. Next he sets up a weighing: to teach the beings of the three-thousand great-thousand world so that all attain arhatship is not as good as teaching a single bodhisattva with a single phrase in accord with prajñā. Next he displays transformations of the supernormal power of travel, letting the great assembly see the assembly of Akṣobhya Buddha, and at once withdraws them, and by this proves 「一切法不與眼作對」 tr. "all dharmas do not stand as an object to the eye." Next he speaks of prajñā as without measure and inexhaustible, like wishing to obtain the boundary of space. At the end the Buddha puts forth the mark of the tongue that covers the face, bids Ānanda expound and distinguish it widely in the fourfold assembly, and says that the deep prajñā is the gate of all letters, can enter the dhāraṇī gate, is the wondrous Dharma of the buddhas of the three times, and is the practitioner's feet.
In the treatise-author's explanation of this, what matters most is two doubts and two similes. The two doubts: the Buddha does not crave even the omniscience of all kinds; why, toward prajñā alone, does he earnestly entrust it, as though craving and begrudging? Since prajñā is truly inexhaustible, why must it moreover be entrusted by means of the exhaustible collections of names, words and speech, and phrases? The two similes: a very rich elder, at the end of his life, earnestly entrusts his son with the wish-fulfilling jewel—with which he answers the first doubt; a person entrusts a jar of fragrant oil to his sons and younger brothers, not begrudging the jar but begrudging the fragrant oil—with which he answers the second doubt. The two similes, one before and one after, say out to the end the inside and the outside of the two Chinese characters 「囑累」 tr. "entrustment": what is valued is the jewel, not the casket; yet the jewel must be handed over inside the casket.
Passage by Passage
1. Śakra doubts what he himself has said: is it in accord with the Dharma or not? Is it answering rightly or not? At the head of the chapter it is not the Buddha who speaks; it is Śakra setting out his own case. He brings what he has just said and answered before the Buddha and asks the Buddha to judge it in one sentence: is it in accord with the Dharma? Is it answering rightly? In reading this one must first see clearly that what he asks is not ‘did I speak well or not’, but ‘did I speak rightly or not’—being in accord is not going against the marks of the Dharma; answering rightly is responding to what was asked. A lord of the gods who has already obtained the first path, before the great assembly, first himself draws back his words and asks the Buddha to examine and settle them—this move is the most important bearing at the opening of the whole chapter: in the matter of teaching the Dharma, one first considers whether it is true, not first whether one is able.
2. The Buddha approves his words: what you have said and what you have answered are really all in accord. The Buddha's approval is utterly brief, only the one sentence 「汝所說、所答，實皆隨順」 tr. "what you have said and what you have answered are really all in accord," adding no praise and not one word more. Here a doubt easily arises in the reader: if he spoke rightly, why need he ask for approval? Below, the treatise-author sets up a question specifically for this. Here one need only remember the sequence of the sūtra text—first there is the request for approval, and only then the approval; only after the approval does Śakra dare go on to praise. Wherever a figure in a sūtra himself asks to be examined and settled and the Buddha straightforwardly approves, what is approved is the Dharma, not the person.
3. Śakra praises it as rare: what Subhūti delights to teach is all for the sake of emptiness, the signless, and non-action, and so on up to anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi. Having obtained the approval, only then does Śakra speak the words he really wished to say: how rare—what Subhūti delights to teach, without a single exception, returns to emptiness, the signless, and non-action, and so on up to returning to anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi. These words are the lead-in to a whole passage of weighing that follows. In reading, do not read 「所樂說」 tr. "what he delights to teach" as a personal preference; it speaks of the natural direction of the Dharma this venerable one teaches—whatever he teaches all tends toward this.
4. The Buddha makes a weighing on Subhūti's practising of emptiness: one by one unfindable, how much less one who practises or one who obtains; compared with the bodhisattva's practice of prajñā, it does not reach one in a hundred. The Buddha, following Śakra's words, unfolds it, setting out item by item the six perfections, the four foundations of mindfulness and so on up to the eightfold noble path, meditation, liberation, samādhi, and concentration, the ten powers of the Buddha, the four fearlessnesses, the four unobstructed knowledges, great kindness and great compassion, the eighteen unshared dharmas, anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi, omniscience, the Tathāgata, the dharma of non-arising, the thirty-two marks, and the eighty minor marks, saying of each one 「不可得」 tr. "unfindable," and to every item adding a further sentence, 「何況行是法者」 tr. "how much less one who practises this dharma." This is the first difficulty of this chapter: since what is set out is the full account of the Buddha's dharmas, why say it is unfindable? One must keep hold of the reason the Buddha himself gives—the bhikṣu Subhūti's is the practice of the separation of all dharmas, the practice of nothing to be attained in all dharmas, the practice of the emptiness of all dharmas, the practice of the signlessness of all dharmas, the practice of the non-action of all dharmas; unfindability is said with respect to the mark of what he practises, not saying that the dharmas are not established. The next sentence matters more: such a practice, compared with the bodhisattva-mahāsattva's practice of prajñā, does not reach one in a hundred, and so on up to being beyond the reach of calculation and simile; and the Buddha at once annotates the reason himself—excepting the Buddha's practice, the bodhisattva's practice of prajñā is, among all the practices of the two vehicles, the most honoured, the most wondrous, and the highest, able to pass beyond the two grounds, enter the bodhisattva's position, fulfil the Buddha's dharmas, obtain the omniscience of all kinds, and sever all afflictions and their habitual residues and become a Buddha. The point where the weighing lands is not in disparaging Subhūti; it is in pointing out the length of a road.
5. The gods of the Heaven of the Thirty-three scatter flowers; eight hundred bhikṣus rise from their seats, scatter flowers, and vow the unsurpassed practice. The sūtra text suddenly inserts a passage of action: the gods of the Heaven of the Thirty-three scatter heavenly māndārava flowers over the Buddha and the Saṅgha; eight hundred bhikṣus rise from their seats, scatter flowers over the Buddha, bare the right shoulder, join their palms, set the right knee on the ground, and vow that they will practise this unsurpassed practice, which the śrāvaka and the pratyekabuddha cannot practise. This passage looks like an interpolated narrative, but it is in fact the on-the-spot response to the weighing of the passage above—someone in the Dharma assembly has understood the weight of the sentence ‘compared with the bodhisattva's practice it does not reach one in a hundred’, and there and then turns round. When reading the sūtra and meeting such places, do not skip over them as scene-setting text: the sūtra text records who was moved in mind at what moment precisely to indicate on what kind of capacity this passage of the Dharma works.
6. The Buddha, knowing the workings of the bhikṣus' minds, smiles, and lights of many colours shine everywhere over the three-thousand great-thousand world. The Buddha does not first speak; he first smiles; lights of blue, yellow, red, white, crimson, and pale blue come forth from his mouth, shine everywhere over the three-thousand great-thousand world, circle the Buddha three times, and enter back in at the crown of his head. In reading this, know that the smile has its dharma—the sūtra text says plainly that 「佛知諸比丘心行」 tr. "the Buddha knew the workings of the bhikṣus' minds" comes first, and the smile after; the smile is not an attitude of rejoicing; it is knowing that their minds have turned and sealing it in a mark. The coming out and going in of the light has its places and its numbers, and is not mere spreading of description either; below, the treatise-author points out specially that the meaning of the smile has its source elsewhere; here the sūtra text records only its mark and does not explain its meaning.
7. Ānanda asks the causes and conditions of the smile: the buddhas do not smile without causes and conditions. Ānanda's way of asking is worth learning: he does not ask ‘why is the World-Honored One glad’; he first sets up a general rule—the buddhas do not smile without causes and conditions—and then asks on that basis. This is the way of asking that this treatise demonstrates everywhere: before asking, first establish that what is asked about must have its principle, and then seek its principle. Without this sentence, the smile would be only an expression; with this sentence, the smile becomes a dharma that can be asked about.
8. The Buddha gives the eight hundred bhikṣus the prediction that they will become Buddhas in the Constellation Kalpa, their Buddha-names all alike 「散華」 tr. "Scattering Flowers," becoming Buddhas at the same time. The Buddha's answer to the causes and conditions of the smile is itself the prediction: these eight hundred bhikṣus will in the Constellation Kalpa obtain anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi, their Buddha-name Scattering Flowers, all the same one name; their saṅghas of bhikṣus, their worlds, and their lifespans all equal; each of them, after a hundred thousand years, leaves home and becomes a Buddha; and at that time heavenly flowers of five colours constantly rain down in all those worlds. This prediction has two remarkable points: one is the same name, the second is the same time. The same name comes from the flowers they offered; the same time comes from the sameness of what they cultivated—below, the treatise-author says plainly that these eight hundred are good friends, alike in practice and equal in mind, cultivating together life after life, and therefore become Buddhas at one time. In reading a text of prediction one should look at its cause, and should not look only at its fruit.
9. Those who practise the deep prajñā come from among humans or from the Tuṣita heaven; they have heard it face to face from the Buddha and planted roots of goodness under the buddhas, not planted under the śrāvakas. When the prediction is finished, the Buddha turns to speak of where the people who can practise the deep prajñā come from and of their roots: if there are people able to practise this deep prajñā, it should be known that they ended their lives among humans and were born here, or ended their lives in the Tuṣita heaven and came to be born here; those who can receive and uphold, read, recite, draw near to, and rightly recollect it, and moreover in turn teach others to practise the bodhisattva path, it should be known have heard it face to face from the Buddha, and have also planted roots of goodness under the buddhas; and he teaches them themselves to have this thought—「我等非聲聞所種善根，亦不從聲聞所聞是深般若波羅蜜。」 tr. "Our roots of goodness are not ones planted under śrāvakas, nor did we hear this deep prajñāpāramitā from śrāvakas." This passage is the foundation of the entrustment that follows: those who receive the Dharma that is entrusted did not originally come by chance. In reading, do not read it as a theory of lineage; what the sūtra text points to is the history of one's cultivation and study, not the nobility or baseness of one's status.
10. Though planting roots of goodness in the Buddha's field of merit is not false and deceptive, one must deeply and clearly practise the six perfections and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds; the Buddha entrusts prajñā to Ānanda, and to forget or lose a single phrase is a very great fault. The proper theme of the whole chapter appears here. The Buddha first sets up a turning phrase: planting roots of goodness in the field of merit of the buddhas is indeed not false and deceptive, but to attain liberation as a śrāvaka, a pratyekabuddha, or a Buddha, one should still deeply and clearly practise the six perfections and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds; that one should practise thus and yet end up abiding in the two vehicles and not obtain awakening—there is no such possibility. Having settled this principle, only then does the Buddha say 「我以般若波羅蜜囑累汝」 tr. "I entrust prajñāpāramitā to you," and at once gives the distinction of light and heavy: to receive and uphold all dharmas and forget or lose them is a very small fault, without great sin; to receive and uphold the deep prajñā and forget or lose a single phrase is a very great fault. This one light and one heavy is the pivot of all the admonitions of this chapter, and below the treatise-author sets up a question specially for it.
11. To receive and uphold prajñā is to receive and uphold the awakening of the buddhas of the three times; to make offerings to prajñā is to make offerings to the buddhas of the three times; for all kinds of causes and conditions I entrust prajñā to you. The Buddha goes on to state why it is so very great: to receive and uphold prajñāpāramitā is to receive and uphold the anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi of the buddhas of the past, the future, and the present; to make offerings to prajñā is to make offerings to me, and is already to have made offerings to the buddhas of the three times; to hear the deep prajñā spoken and have a mind of faith that is pure, reverent, loving, and delighting is already to have, toward the buddhas of the three times, a mind of faith that is pure, reverent, loving, and delighting. At the end the Buddha himself speaks of the feeling in his entrustment: 「如我為世尊，般若波羅蜜亦是世尊」 tr. "as I am the World-Honored One, prajñāpāramitā too is the World-Honored One," and therefore, amid all the worldly assemblies of gods, humans, and asuras, he entrusts it to you. The meaning of this chapter's name here for the first time comes squarely to rest in the sūtra text. In reading this passage keep hold of the equation in it—what is equated is prajñā and the awakening of the buddhas, not the scroll of the sūtra and the Buddha's body.
12. The six perfections are the mother of the bodhisattva-mahāsattvas and the inexhaustible Dharma treasury of the buddhas, and therefore he entrusts the six perfections twice over. The Buddha widens the range of the entrustment by a further layer: those who can receive and uphold the deep prajñā and moreover widely expound its meaning to others quickly obtain awakening, because the awakening of the buddhas is born from within prajñā; this being so, those who wish to obtain awakening should train in the six perfections—the six perfections are the mother of the bodhisattva-mahāsattvas, because they give birth to the bodhisattvas; they are the inexhaustible Dharma treasury of the buddhas, because the buddhas of the ten directions now teaching the Dharma all come forth from within them, and the buddhas of the three times and their disciples all train within them and obtain deliverance. Therefore the Buddha says 「我以六波羅蜜倍復囑累汝」 tr. "I entrust the six perfections to you twice over." The reader easily doubts: a moment ago he entrusted prajñā; why here does he further entrust the six perfections? Keep hold of the relation between the two—prajñā is one of the six perfections and yet comprehends all six; entrusting the six perfections is not changing the entrustment to another dharma; it is saying the same one matter more completely.
13. The weighing: teaching a single bodhisattva a single phrase in accord with prajñā surpasses teaching the beings of the three-thousand great-thousand world so that they attain arhatship. The Buddha sets up the weightiest weighing of this chapter: if Ānanda were to teach the Dharma for the śrāvakas and cause the beings of the three-thousand great-thousand world all to attain the realisation of the fruit of arhatship, this still would not be the work of my disciple; if with a single phrase in accord with prajñā he teaches one bodhisattva-mahāsattva, then that is the work of my disciple, and I too am glad. These words are extremely weighty, weighty enough to lead people to misread them as slighting the arhat. Keep hold of the unit of measure the Buddha uses—「我弟子事」 tr. "the work of my disciple": what it weighs is whether what is done accords with the Buddha's original intent, not the height or lowness of a person's fruit or position. Below, the treatise-author sets up a question specially for this and himself answers its reason.
14. Ānanda says 「甚多」 tr. "very much"; the Buddha speaks at length of the merit of teaching a bodhisattva, down to speaking for half a day, for the space of a meal, for an instant. The Buddha first asks Ānanda: if the beings of the three-thousand great-thousand world all at once attained arhatship, would the merit of their giving, keeping the precepts, and meditative concentration be much or not? Ānanda answers, 「甚多！世尊！」 tr. "Very much, World-Honored One!" The Buddha then, on this basis, reduces it layer by layer and makes its superiority all the more apparent: it is not as good as speaking the dharma in accord with prajñā for a bodhisattva even for one day; set aside one day, only half a day; set aside half a day, only for the space of a meal; set aside the space of a meal, speaking only for an instant—the merit is greater still. And he himself gives the reason—the bodhisattva's roots of goodness surpass all those of the two vehicles, and moreover the bodhisattva, himself wishing to obtain awakening, also shows, teaches, benefits, and gladdens others, causing them to obtain it. In reading this passage keep hold of the method of reduction: what is reduced is time; what is shown is the weight of the Dharma; the shorter the time, the more apparent the merit—which shows exactly that what is being weighed does not lie in the length or brevity of time.
15. When this "Prajñāpāramitā" chapter is being spoken, he displays transformations of the supernormal power of travel, and the great assembly all see Akṣobhya Buddha and his retinue. The teaching having reached this point, the Buddha, before the fourfold assembly and the gods, humans, nāgas, ghosts and spirits, kiṃnara, mahoraga, and others, displays transformations of the supernormal power of travel: all the great assembly see Akṣobhya Buddha, surrounded by the saṅgha of bhikṣus, teaching the Dharma, an assembly like the waters of the great sea, all arhats—their outflows exhausted, without afflictions, having obtained good liberation, their minds well liberated, their wisdom well liberated, their minds tamed and pliant like a great elephant, what was to be done already done, their own benefit attained, all the fetters of existence exhausted, liberated through right knowledge, having obtained mastery among all mind and mental-factor dharmas—and the bodhisattva-mahāsattvas, accomplished in measureless merit. This one display is not for added entertainment; it is the teaching aid for the next passage of teaching—first letting them see, so as better to speak of not seeing.
16. The Buddha withdraws the supernormal power of travel; the great assembly no longer see, and it does not stand as an object to the eye. Displaying and then withdrawing is the key action of this passage. The Buddha withdraws the supernormal power of travel, and all the great assembly no longer see Akṣobhya Buddha, the śrāvakas, the bodhisattva-mahāsattvas, and their world; the sūtra text settles it with five Chinese characters, 「不與眼作對」 tr. "does not stand as an object to the eye," and itself asks and answers its reason—because the Buddha withdrew the supernormal power of travel. At this point the reader should be alert: the same realm, seen a moment ago, not seen at this moment, and the realm itself has neither increased nor decreased; what increases or decreases lies only between standing as an object and not standing as an object. This is exactly the mark of all dharmas that the passage below is going to speak of.
17. All dharmas do not stand as an object to the eye; dharma does not see dharma and dharma does not know dharma; training thus is called the foremost training, the supreme training, the subtle and wondrous training; prajñā is without measure, like the boundary of space, unfindable. On the basis of the event above, the Buddha speaks the general rule: all dharmas do not stand as an object to the eye; dharma and dharma do not see each other and do not know each other; because all dharmas are without knowing, without seeing, without making, without movement, cannot be grasped, and are inconceivable, like an illusory person, without feeling, without awareness, without true reality. The bodhisattva who practises thus is practising prajñā and does not cling to the dharmas; training thus is called the foremost training, the supreme training, the subtle and wondrous training, bringing peace, joy, benefit, and gain to all the world and being a protection for those without protection; it is what the buddhas train in; the buddhas, abiding in this training, can with the right hand lift the three-thousand great-thousand world and set it back in its original place, and beings have no awareness of it. At the end he says that prajñā is without measure—the collection of names, the collection of phrases, and the collection of letters have measure; prajñāpāramitā is without measure; one who wishes to obtain its boundary is wishing to obtain the boundary of space. This passage speaks from ‘not seeing’ through to 「無量」 tr. "without measure," and all along the way it is dismantling the reader's habit of measuring the Dharma with the eye.
18. Ānanda asks: why is prajñāpāramitā without measure? Ānanda raises the question here, and asks it with great precision: he does not ask how great prajñā is; he asks why it is without measure. The reader can learn the placement of this question—the Buddha has just said 「我初不說般若波羅蜜量」 tr. "I have never at all spoken of a measure of prajñāpāramitā," and Ānanda at once, on this sentence, pursues why it is so, without turning aside to other matters. One who, hearing the Dharma, can pursue the question on the speaker's last sentence is listening to the Dharma, not listening to the event.
19. The Buddha answers: because it is inexhaustible and because it is separated, it is without measure; the buddhas of the three times all train in it and do not exhaust it, like wishing to exhaust space; all dharmas are non-arising—how could there be exhaustion? The reason the Buddha gives is twofold: because it is inexhaustible it is without measure; because it is separated it is without measure. Next he takes the three times as proof—the buddhas of the past, the future, and the present all train in prajñā and obtain deliverance, and prajñā is not exhausted: it was not exhausted, is not exhausted, will not be exhausted; to wish to exhaust prajñā is to wish to exhaust space. The last sentence is the root of the whole passage: all dharmas are non-arising; if a dharma is non-arising, how could there be exhaustion? In reading this, know that 「無量」 tr. "without measure" is not being so large as to be incalculable; it is not falling on the axis of arising and exhaustion at all; whoever seeks prajñā by largeness or smallness, length or brevity, is in all that he seeks mistaken.
20. The Buddha puts forth the mark of the tongue that covers the face and bids him from now on expound and distinguish it widely; the deep prajñā is the gate of all letters, can enter the dhāraṇī gate, is the wondrous Dharma of the buddhas of the three times, and is the practitioner's feet. At the end of the sūtra section, the Buddha puts forth the mark of the tongue that covers the face and tells Ānanda: from today, in the fourfold assembly, widely expound, open up and display, and distinguish prajñāpāramitā, and make it clear and easy to understand; because within the deep prajñā the marks of dharmas are widely spoken, and those who seek the three vehicles should all train within it and each attain accomplishment. Next he says that the deep prajñā is the gate of all letters; practising it one can enter the dhāraṇī gate, and training in this dhāraṇī gate one obtains all the eloquence of delighting in speech; prajñā is the wondrous Dharma of the buddhas of the three times, and those who receive and uphold, read, recite, and draw near to it can uphold the awakening of the buddhas of the three times; prajñā is the practitioner's feet, and because one upholds this dhāraṇī, one can uphold all dharmas. The sūtra section stops here—what is entrusted has been handed over, why it is handed over has been said, and the mark of handing over the Dharma has also been displayed.
21. The treatise-author explains why Śakra doubts himself: he is not a person of omniscience; in the assembly there are those who doubt his qualification; and he seeks the Buddha's approval so that the listeners may believe and accept. The first question with which the treatise section begins asks precisely about that sentence of self-doubt at the head of the sūtra. The treatise-author gives three layers of reasons, each layer different: first, Śakra is not a person of omniscience; though he has obtained the first path, the three poisons are not yet exhausted, and weighing it himself, what he has said may contain errors of which he is not aware; second, in the assembly there are many avaivartika bodhisattvas, arhats whose outflows are exhausted, and gods free of desire, who, seeing him question and raise difficulties together with the Buddha and Subhūti without timidity of mind, perhaps doubt how, his outflows not yet exhausted, he could exhaust the limits of dharmas; and so he asks the Buddha about this matter; third, he himself knows that what he has said is without contradiction or error, and seeks the Buddha's approval so that the listeners may believe and accept it. In reading these three layers, distinguish clearly what each faces—the first faces himself, the second faces the assembly, the third faces the Dharma. One and the same action with a threefold intention—this is the method the treatise-author most often uses in explaining the sūtra.
22. The treatise-author explains why the Buddha approves: he constantly hears from the Buddha and his power of reciting and reading is strong; the division of the three kinds of wisdom, and the simile of riding a boat downstream. The second question turns to the Buddha's side. The treatise-author answers: though Śakra is not a person of omniscience, he constantly hears from the Buddha and his power of reciting and reading is strong, so that what he says has its principle, and the Buddha then approves it. And he cites a meaning to make clear how this is possible—the Buddha speaks of 「三種慧：聞慧、思慧、修慧」 tr. "three kinds of wisdom: the wisdom of hearing, the wisdom of reflection, the wisdom of cultivation"; some people, because their wisdom of hearing and wisdom of reflection are clear, are able to question and raise difficulties with people of the wisdom of cultivation; just as, riding a boat downstream, one does not use one's own strength and yet goes faster than travelling by land. At the end he takes Ānanda as a ready example: though Ānanda is not yet free of desire and has not obtained very deep meditative concentration, he is able to discuss with the Buddha and with arhats whose outflows are exhausted, following the Dharma without contradiction. The meaning set up in this passage is extremely useful—the height of the Dharma spoken need not equal the rank realised by the speaker; yet that he is able not to go against it still depends on the power of hearing and reflection having a source from which it comes.
23. The treatise-author recounts the Buddha's words to Śakra: Subhūti is a person who practises ultimate emptiness, has cultivated and accumulated it life after life, and entered the path by the gate of liberation of emptiness and also teaches and transforms beings by this gate. Following the sūtra, the treatise-author explains why the Buddha confirms Subhūti: he is a person who practises ultimate emptiness, and has cultivated and accumulated it life after life, not only in this present life; he entered the path by the gate of liberation of emptiness, and also teaches and transforms beings by this gate; such a person, entering the deep dharma of emptiness, still does not obtain a dharma, how much less one who practises this dharma—and the treatise-author cites the sūtra text as proof: 「檀波羅蜜不可得，何況行檀者！乃至八十隨形好不可得，何況得八十種隨形好者！」 tr. "Dānapāramitā is unfindable, how much less one who practises giving! And so on up to: the eighty minor marks are unfindable, how much less one who obtains the eighty kinds of minor marks!" In reading this keep hold of the four Chinese characters 「世世修集」 tr. "cultivated and accumulated life after life": Subhūti's delight in teaching emptiness is not a preference of one life; it is a way formed by long cultivation, so that his teaching of emptiness comes naturally.
24. The practice of emptiness practised by Subhūti, if one wishes to compare it with the bodhisattva's practice of emptiness, does not reach one in a hundred. The treatise-author takes the weighing words of the sūtra out and sets them up alone as one sentence, to serve as the target of the question below. The reason this sentence must be raised alone is that it most easily gives rise to doubt—since emptiness is not two, how can the practising of emptiness differ? The treatise-author is in no hurry to resolve it; he first lets this sentence stand abruptly. When reading the treatise and meeting a sentence raised alone like this, know that a question and answer must follow below; if one simply passes over it, the analysis that comes after will have nothing to attach to.
25. The third question and answer: in the emptiness of dharmas and the emptiness of beings, what further is not exhausted? The treatise-author first makes clear the various names of the real mark of all dharmas, then answers with three meanings—keenness and dullness, depth and shallowness; the two vehicles' lack of the vow to deliver beings; and having parts and having measure—and brings out three similes: lighting a lamp to break the darkness, the thirsty man drinking from a river, and the space of a pore compared with the space of the ten directions. This is the longest and most important answer in the treatise section. The treatise-author first cites the Buddha's own words, 「除佛，諸聲聞、辟支佛無有及菩薩」 tr. "Excepting the Buddha, none of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas reaches the bodhisattva," and then says that the real mark of all dharmas has all kinds of names—sometimes called emptiness, sometimes called ultimate emptiness, sometimes called prajñāpāramitā, sometimes named anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi; the real mark spoken of here is named the practice of emptiness. Next he sets up the first meaning: wisdom distinguishes keen and dull, and what is entered is deep or shallow; though all are called obtaining the real mark of all dharmas, those of keen faculties obtain it clearly; and he brings out the simile of the lamp—a lamp is lit to break the darkness, and when there is further a great lamp, the brightness becomes greater still; know that although the earlier lamp illuminates, the faint darkness is not exhausted; if it were exhausted, the later lamp would be of no use; those who practise emptiness are likewise: though all alike obtain the path, ignorance is either exhausted or not exhausted, and only the Buddha's wisdom can exhaust all ignorance. Next he sets up the second meaning: the two vehicles have no mind of kindness and compassion, no mind of delivering beings, no purifying of buddha-worlds, no vow for the measureless dharmas of the Buddha, no turning of the wheel of the Dharma to deliver beings, nor the vow to deliver beings through entering nirvāṇa without remainder and so on up to the Dharma left behind, no mind of delivering beings in the three times; they are not equal to the bodhisattva merely by reason of the practice of emptiness. Next he sets up the third meaning: the emptiness obtained by the two vehicles has parts and has measure; the buddhas and bodhisattvas are without parts and without measure; as a thirsty man drinking from a river takes no more than suffices himself; and again, as for the space of a pore wishing to compare itself with the space of the ten directions, there is no such principle. Only the three meanings and three similes taken together make the complete answer—what differs lies not in emptiness being emptiness, but in the wisdom that realises emptiness, the mind with which emptiness is aroused, and the measure with which emptiness is used.
26. The treatise-author recounts the Buddha's exhortation to cultivate: one who wishes to be the highest among all beings should practise prajñā; training in the practice of emptiness and not grasping the mark of emptiness, one passes beyond the two grounds, obtains the acceptance of non-arising, and enters the bodhisattva's position; the practice of emptiness is the root. The distinctions finished, the treatise-author, following the sūtra, turns into the exhortation to cultivate, and cites the causes and conditions the Buddha himself spoke: the bodhisattva who trains in this practice of emptiness of prajñā, because he does not grasp the mark of emptiness, passes beyond the two grounds, obtains the dharma of the acceptance of non-arising, and enters the bodhisattva's position; because he enters the bodhisattva's position he fulfils the Buddha's dharmas; the Buddha's dharmas are the bodhisattva path; because the bodhisattva path is fulfilled he will obtain the omniscience of all kinds; because he obtains the omniscience of all kinds he is named a Buddha, a person who has severed all afflictions and their habitual residues. At the end the treatise-author adds one sentence that gathers it all up: 「是諸事，空行為根本。」 tr. "Of all these matters, the practice of emptiness is the root." In reading this keep hold of the four Chinese characters 「不取空相」 tr. "not grasping the mark of emptiness"—above it was said that the practice of emptiness has differences of parts and measure; here it says why it can be without parts and measure, which lies precisely in not grasping; grasping, there are parts; not grasping, it is without measure.
27. The fourth question and answer: nirvāṇa is without measure; why is it said that what the two vehicles obtain has measure? The treatise-author answers that it is wisdom that has parts and measure, not that the nature of dharmas has measure, and brings out the simile of the vessel of great water and the meaning that measure and the measureless depend on each other. This question is very fine: since nirvāṇa is without measure, and what the two vehicles realise is nirvāṇa, why is it said that what they obtain has measure? The treatise-author clears it away with one sentence: what is spoken of is 「智慧有分有量」 tr. "wisdom has parts and has measure," not saying 「諸法法性有量」 tr. "the nature of dharmas in all dharmas has measure"; and he retorts: 「不聞說大水喻耶？器有量，非水有量。」 tr. "Have you not heard the simile of the great water spoken? The vessel has measure; it is not that the water has measure." Next he goes a layer further: measure and the measureless are originally dharmas that depend on each other; for ordinary people it is measureless, yet the Buddha can measure it all—so many parts is the srota-āpanna, and so on up to so many parts is the arhat, the pratyekabuddha, the bodhisattva; the remainder, exhausting the nature of dharmas to the very end, is the Buddha. In reading this passage see clearly what the two Chinese characters 「有量」 tr. "has measure" are attached to: attached to the wisdom that realises, not to the dharma realised; if this one distinction is blurred, all the weighing of the previous passage will be read as disparaging the Dharma.
28. The fifth question and answer: the flowers were offered to the Buddha and the Saṅgha; why do the eight hundred bhikṣus choose to make offerings to the Buddha alone? The treatise-author answers that, seeing their colour and fragrance to be very wondrous, they were thereby moved to arouse the mind. This question looks trivial, but in fact it asks about the conditions for arousing the mind. The treatise-author's answer is plain: of the flowers scattered by the gods, those that fell on the robes of the bhikṣus, each according to his share—seeing their colour and fragrance to be very wondrous, they thereby aroused the mind to make offerings to the Buddha, and themselves declared: 「我從今日，當行是無上行，所謂畢竟空、無相、無作等，為度一切眾生故，如佛所說，二乘所不及。」 tr. "From today I shall practise this unsurpassed practice, namely ultimate emptiness, the signless, non-action, and so on, for the sake of delivering all beings, as the Buddha has said, which the two vehicles do not reach." The reader should keep hold of this move—the trigger for arousing the mind can be extremely small, a single flower fallen on a robe; and the vow aroused can be extremely great, ultimate emptiness, the signless, and non-action, for the sake of delivering all beings. The treatise-author neither makes the small condition out to be lofty, nor, because of the small condition, makes light of the vow.
29. The meaning of the Buddha's smile is as explained in the "Gaṅgadevī" chapter; the eight hundred bhikṣus are all good friends and have cultivated together life after life, and therefore become Buddhas at one time, all with the same name. In explaining the smile the treatise-author points the way with only one sentence: the meaning of the smile is as explained in the "Gaṅgadevī" chapter. This is this treatise's constant practice—a meaning already explained is not brought out again; only its place is marked. Next he explains what is remarkable in the prediction: these eight hundred bhikṣus are all good friends, alike in practice and equal in mind, cultivating and accumulating merit together life after life, and therefore become Buddhas at one time, all with the same name; and again, because they made offerings to the Buddha with heavenly flowers of five colours, heavenly māndārava flowers of five colours constantly rain down in their worlds. In reading this, know that the same name and the same time are not coincidence; they are the fruit of practising together; when reading a sūtra and meeting marks of uniformity, one should turn back and look for their common cause.
30. The treatise-author explains that the Buddha, because of this event, praises prajñā, and discerns one by one why the three evil destinies, the gods, and the destiny of ghosts and spirits cannot practise the deep prajñā, and why the human destiny and the Tuṣita heaven can. Following the sūtra, the treatise-author explains the Buddha's praise of prajñā, and on the sentence 「人道中來，或兜率天上來」 tr. "come from within the human destiny, or come from up in the Tuṣita heaven" makes an item-by-item exclusion: the three evil destinies, because their sin and suffering are many, cannot practise it; the gods of the desire realm cling to the pure and wondrous five desires, and their minds are then mad and confused, so they cannot practise it; the gods of the form realm cling deeply to the taste of meditative concentration, so they cannot practise it; the formless realm is without form, so it cannot practise it; in the destiny of ghosts and spirits, although the eye-faculty and the others are keen, the afflictions cover the mind, so they cannot practise it single-mindedly. Next he says why they can practise it: in the human destiny suffering is less than in the three evil destinies and pleasure is not as great as among the gods; the eye and the other faculties are turbid and heavy, and the body has much of the earth element, so one can restrain the mind of suffering and pleasure and practise prajñā; in the Tuṣita heaven there is always a bodhisattva bound to buddhahood in one more birth, and the gods there constantly hear prajñā taught; though the five desires are many, the power of the Dharma prevails. And he adds a further route: or they come from the buddha-worlds of other directions, or come from places in this world where there is prajñā. At the end he explains that the Buddha constantly sees with the Buddha-eye those who can ask, can believe, receive and uphold, and rightly recollect; such people should themselves think that they received it face to face from the Buddha, aroused the mind and planted roots of goodness under the Buddha, and did not arouse it under the two vehicles. This passage is the method of exclusion in the whole treatise section that most closely touches the practitioner—with too much suffering one cannot practise; with too much pleasure one also cannot practise; the one who can practise is between suffering and pleasure and has the power to restrain them.
31. The sixth question and answer: planting roots of goodness under the Buddha, one will certainly enter nirvāṇa by the three vehicles, and this is not in vain; what need is there constantly to practise the practice of emptiness of prajñā, hard to know and hard to obtain? The treatise-author answers that one must clearly practise the six perfections and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds. The treatise-author sets up a very practical question, and himself cites words of the Lotus to pose the difficulty—「有人或以一華，或以少香供養於佛，乃至一稱南無佛，如是等人皆當作佛。」 tr. "Someone, perhaps with a single flower, perhaps with a little incense, makes offerings to the Buddha, and so on up to saying ‘Namo Buddha’ a single time—such people will all become Buddhas." If so, then someone may think: 「但行五波羅蜜，欲作佛時乃觀空，何用常行般若波羅蜜，難知難得空行？」 tr. "Just practise the five perfections, and when about to become a Buddha, only then contemplate emptiness; what need is there constantly to practise prajñāpāramitā, the practice of emptiness hard to know and hard to obtain?" In answering this the treatise-author does not set up any new meaning, but straightforwardly cites the Buddha's own answer to Ānanda: though in the Buddha's field of merit it is not false and deceptive, to obtain nirvāṇa by the three vehicles one should clearly practise the six perfections and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds; because one practises clearly, one quickly obtains the path of the Buddha and does not long undergo the suffering of birth and death. In reading this see clearly that what is contested is slowness and speed, length and brevity, not becoming or not becoming a Buddha—offering to the Buddha with small roots of goodness is not failing to become a Buddha, but its road is far and its birth and death are long; this answer does not break the earlier saying, but itself establishes why one must practise.
32. The seventh question and answer: the Buddha is still without craving; why does he earnestly entrust, as though craving and begrudging? The treatise-author answers that in benefiting beings nothing surpasses prajñā, and brings out the simile of the very rich elder who earnestly entrusts his son with the wish-fulfilling jewel. This is the most important question of this chapter, and the very place where the two Chinese characters 「囑累」 tr. "entrustment" have to be pursued. The treatise-author answers: the buddhas appear in the world for the sake of benefiting beings; their displaying the thirty-two marks, the eighty kinds of minor marks, measureless light, and transformations of the supernormal power of travel are all for beings; of what benefits beings foremost, nothing surpasses prajñā, because it can exhaust all suffering; and prajñā must depend on words and speech, letters, and sections and phrases for its meaning to be obtained; therefore the Buddha earnestly entrusts the scroll of the prajñā sūtra to Ānanda. Next he brings out a second layer: someone, seeing the Buddha earnestly entrust it, then says that the Buddha, his great work already done, still reveres prajñā, so this Dharma must be honoured and must be wondrous. Next he brings out the first core simile of this chapter—just as a very rich elder, when his life is about to end, gives his many jewels to his son, and of the wish-fulfilling jewel in particular earnestly entrusts him: 「汝勿以此寶自無定色、質如虛空、微妙難識故而不守護！若失餘寶為可，此寶不可失也！」 tr. "Do not, because this jewel has of itself no fixed colour, has a substance like space, and is subtle and hard to recognise, fail to guard it! If you lose the other jewels, that may be allowed; this jewel must not be lost!" The elder is the Buddha, who entrusts prajñā to Ānanda: 「汝好受持守護，無令忘失！」 tr. "Receive and uphold it well and guard it; do not let it be forgotten or lost!" In reading this simile keep hold of how hard the jewel is to recognise—precisely because it has no fixed colour, has a substance like space, and is subtle and hard to recognise, it is most easily taken for a thing of no value and cast aside, and therefore earnestness is needed. Earnestness does not come from craving; it comes from knowing that it is easily lost.
33. Except for prajñā, if one forgets or loses other sūtras the fault is still small; to lose a single phrase of prajñā is too great a fault; the Dharma treasury of prajñā is the mother of the buddhas of the ten directions and the three times. The treatise-author goes on to explain the difference of light and heavy, speaking even more directly than the sūtra text: except for prajñā, even if the twelve divisions of the scriptures were all forgotten and lost, the fault would still be small; if one loses a single phrase of prajñā, the fault is too great. The reason is that this deep Dharma treasury of prajñā is the mother of the buddhas of the ten directions and the three times, able to bring people quickly to the path of the Buddha. And the treatise-author takes the passage from 「三世諸佛皆從般若得」 tr. "the buddhas of the three times all obtain it from prajñā" and so on up to 「為聲聞人說法」 tr. "teaching the Dharma for the śrāvakas," and judges as a whole that all within it are matters of praising prajñā. As for the twelve divisions of the scriptures mentioned here, the treatise text states only their total number and does not bring out their list, and the reader need not seek their names and marks from outside; what should be kept hold of is the criterion by which the treatise-author establishes light and heavy—it lies not in the quantity of scrolls of scripture, but in whether they can give birth to Buddhas.
34. The eighth question and answer: to cause beings all to attain arhatship—how is it not as good as teaching a bodhisattva with a single phrase of prajñā? The treatise-author answers that they deliver themselves and are not fit to become Buddhas, and brings out the simile of planting a wish-fulfilling tree, the four items of the difference between the Great and Small Vehicles, and the simile of the vajra, small though it is. The treatise-author acknowledges that this matter has already been answered before, and now speaks of it briefly again: although the beings of the three-thousand great-thousand world all attain arhatship, they deliver their own persons and are not fit to become Buddhas; if one speaks a single phrase of prajñā, the hearer is able to become a Buddha. Next he brings out a simile: a person who plants many fruit trees is not as good as one person who plants a single wish-fulfilling tree, which can grant everything as people wish. Next he distinguishes item by item the difference between the Great and Small Vehicles—in teaching the Dharma for the śrāvakas there is no mind of great kindness and compassion, while in the Dharma of the Great Vehicle a single phrase, though small, has great kindness and compassion; in the Dharma of the śrāvakas all is for their own persons, while in the Dharma of the Great Vehicle it is widely for beings; in the Dharma of the śrāvakas there is no mind wishing to know the dharmas widely, only the wish to be quickly free of old age, sickness, and death, while in the Dharma of the Great Vehicle one wishes to know all dharmas clearly; the merit of the Dharma of the śrāvakas has limit and measure, while in the Dharma of the Great Vehicle one wishes to exhaust all merit without anything left over. Next he brings out the second simile: just as the vajra, though small, can surpass all jewels, it cannot be said that because it is small it is not as good as the many. At the end he sums up the weighing. In reading these four items examine each one for yourself; do not remember only the conclusion—what is distinguished is the breadth or narrowness of the mind, whether what is done is for self or for others, whether what is known is exhaustive or not, whether what is cultivated has measure or is without measure; each of the four items is one item, and only taken together do they make the content of the two Chinese characters 「不如」 tr. "not as good as."
35. The causes and conditions the Buddha himself speaks: he himself wishes to obtain awakening and also teaches others to obtain it; he himself practises the six perfections and also speaks them for others; gathering the merit of these two places, he will certainly obtain the path of the Buddha. The treatise-author cites the causes and conditions the Buddha himself spoke to close the passage above: this person himself wishes to obtain anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi, and also teaches others to obtain it; he himself practises the merits of the six perfections, and also speaks them for others. That the bodhisattva should gather the merit of these two places and yet not obtain the path of the Buddha—there is no such possibility. In reading this, know that what are called the two places are the two sides of one's own practice and the transforming of others; the reason the weighing above rests on teaching one bodhisattva is precisely that the work of teaching others is itself the bodhisattva's own merit, not something done solely for others.
36. The Buddha cites the transformations of the supernormal power of travel as proof, which also prove that all dharmas are empty and yet one does not cling to the dharma of emptiness; what the fleshly eye and the divine eye see is all false and deceptive; the wisdom-eye, the Dharma-eye, and the Buddha-eye are signless and unconditioned, cannot be seen, and cannot be known. The treatise-author explains the intent of displaying the supernormal power of travel: the Buddha wishes to make this matter clear and so cites a proof, and also wishes to prove that all dharmas are empty and not to cling to this dharma of emptiness, and only out of pity for beings does he entrust it. Next, following the sūtra, he infers: as Akṣobhya Buddha, the great assembly, and the adornments do not stand as an object to the eye, so all dharmas likewise do not stand as an object to the eye; what the fleshly eye and the divine eye see are all made dharmas, false and deceptive and unreal; the wisdom-eye, the Dharma-eye, and the Buddha-eye are all signless, unconditioned dharmas and so cannot be seen; if they cannot be seen, they also cannot be known; non-action and the rest are likewise. The assembly of Akṣobhya Buddha that was seen is like an illusion, like a dream; to be able to contemplate the dharmas thus is called the bodhisattva practising prajñā, is called being without clinging. In reading this passage keep hold of the two routes both broken—what the first two eyes see is broken as to its reality; what the last three eyes see is broken as to its being seeable; it is not saying that the last three eyes are inferior to the first two; it is saying that whoever sets up a seer and a seen and seeks to see does not have the seeing of prajñā.
37. What the Buddha entrusts is also without clinging; only because of great kindness and compassion does he praise prajñā; because prajñā has the mark of the measureless it cannot be exhausted; names, words and speech, and sections and phrases have measure, but the meaning is measureless. The treatise-author turns back to loosen the stickiness from the matter of 「囑累」 tr. "entrustment" itself: what the Buddha entrusts is also without clinging; only because of great kindness and compassion does he praise this prajñā; though all dharmas have the mark of the inconceivable, for the sake of benefiting beings he praises it. Next he speaks of the meaning of the measureless: if the Buddha's wisdom cannot be exhausted, the merit of prajñā too cannot be exhausted, because prajñāpāramitā has the mark of the measureless; the collection of names and the like, words and speech, sections and phrases, and the number of scrolls have measure—as the Smaller Sūtra, Emission of Light Prajñāpāramitā, Praise of Light Prajñāpāramitā, and the other scrolls of prajñā sūtras have sections and phrases that are limited and have measure, while the meaning of prajñā is measureless. This passage is the most important boundary of the whole chapter: what is entrusted is the scrolls, which have measure; what is to be transmitted is the meaning, which is measureless; the two must not be confused, nor may they be separated.
38. Question and answer: how is prajñā without measure? The Buddha answers that its mark is of itself separated, and because it neither arises nor gathers, it is neither exhausted nor ceases; the buddhas of the three times deliver beings and prajñā is not exhausted, like wishing to exhaust space; the dharmas are originally non-arising—how could they be exhausted? Following the sūtra, the treatise-author records Ānanda's question and the Buddha's answer: 「般若波羅蜜相自離。」 tr. "The mark of prajñāpāramitā is of itself separated." Because it is separated, from the very beginning it does not arise and does not gather; because it does not arise and does not gather, it is not exhausted and does not cease. Next he cites the causes and conditions the Buddha himself spoke: the buddhas of the past, measureless asaṃkhyeya of them, and their disciples used this prajñā to illuminate the ten directions and deliver measureless beings, who all together entered nirvāṇa without remainder, and yet prajñā was not exhausted; the future and the present are likewise; as a person who wishes to exhaust space, and space cannot be exhausted. At the end the treatise-author adds a sentence on the reader's sickness: some people know that it was not exhausted in the past but say that in the future and the present it has exhaustion; therefore it is said that in the three times it cannot be exhausted; the reason is that the dharmas are originally non-arising—how could they be exhausted? In reading this, know that the reason 「不盡」 tr. "not exhausted" is established has its root in 「無生」 tr. "non-arising"; if one remembers only the one meaning of being inexhaustible in use, it becomes a measureless that has measure.
39. The Buddha knows prajñā is truly inexhaustible, and because the collections of names, words and speech, and phrases are exhaustible, he entrusts it—the simile of entrusting a jar of fragrant oil to one's sons and younger brothers; putting forth the mark of the tongue that covers the face is not displayed by the power of the supernormal powers. This is where the second core simile of this chapter lies, and also the final explanation of the two Chinese characters 「囑累」 tr. "entrustment." The treatise-author says: the Buddha knows that prajñā is truly inexhaustible; it is because the collections of names, words and speech, and phrases are exhaustible that he entrusts it; as a person entrusts a jar of fragrant oil to his sons and younger brothers: though he does not begrudge the jar, it is for the sake of receiving and holding the fragrant oil; that words and speech can hold the meaning is likewise; if the words and speech are lost, the meaning cannot be obtained. Next he explains the matter of putting forth the mark of the tongue: in order that people might believe and accept prajñā, the Buddha put forth the mark of the tongue that covers the face, and told Ānanda that he entrusts it in the fourfold assembly and that Ānanda should for the sake of beings explain, display, and distinguish it; the reason he displays the mark of the tongue is that in the worldly dharma of reading marks, a tongue able to cover the nose is the mark of not speaking falsely, how much more one that covers the face. The treatise-author further states the boundary: what the Buddha shows is that the body I was born with from father and mother has this mark of the tongue, wishing to make those who have not yet obtained omniscience give rise to faith; it is not displayed by the power of the supernormal powers; the Buddha does not cling even to the very deep and wondrous Dharma, to wisdom, and to meditative concentration, how much less would he, for the sake of the eight worldly dharmas and for the gain of offerings, make something false and deceptive—here the treatise text gives the general name of the eight worldly dharmas and does not bring out their list. Among all dharmas, like a bird flying in space, he has nothing that touches or obstructs him, and only because of his original vow, the oath to deliver beings, and the mind of great compassion pitying all, does he earnestly entrust it. In reading this passage keep the two matters apart: the mark of not speaking falsely is something the body has by nature; what the supernormal powers display is something made for the occasion; the Buddha deliberately does not use the latter precisely because the matter he wishes to have believed must not rely on the extraordinary.
40. Able to enter all the dhāraṇī of letters; the simile of the city with one gate; to receive and uphold prajñā is to receive and uphold the awakening of the buddhas of the three times; prajñā is the practitioner's feet; the ninth and tenth questions and answers—the difference between the dhāraṇī of hearing and retaining and the dhāraṇī obtained from prajñā, and why prajñā is named dhāraṇī, bringing out the simile of the wish-fulfilling jewel changing its name according to the colour of the thing before it. The final general gathering-up of the treatise section. The treatise-author first explains the dhāraṇī of letters: through a single letter one enters ultimate emptiness; this is called the dhāraṇī of letters; the dharmas of letters are all obtained through prajñā, and the other dhāraṇī, such as hearing and retaining, are all likewise obtained from training in prajñā; the bodhisattva, having obtained the dhāraṇī, obtains all kinds of eloquence of delighting in speech, and speaking the meaning of a single phrase through measureless asaṃkhyeya kalpas cannot exhaust it; this is called the true Dharma of the buddhas of the three times, and there is no other Dharma. Next he brings out a simile: prajñā is the wondrous Dharma of the buddhas of the ten directions and the three times, like a city with one gate; those who come from the four directions enter by no other gate. Next he cites the sūtra to explain that prajñā is the practitioner's feet—the bodhisattva who obtains this prajñā can practise the bodhisattva path. At the end he sets up two questions: first, since it is by the power of the dhāraṇī of hearing and retaining that one can uphold, why say that it is by obtaining prajñā that one can uphold all the dharmas of the buddhas? The treatise-author answers: the dhāraṇī of hearing and retaining can uphold dharmas that have number and measure, and the world too has it—as Susīma of the outside paths also obtained the dhāraṇī of hearing and retaining; though this person obtained it for a short time, after a long time he forgot and lost it; the dhāraṇī obtained from prajñā widely receives and upholds the dharmas and never forgets or loses them; this is taken as the difference. Second, since prajñā is itself a pāramitā, why is it named dhāraṇī? The treatise-author answers: the real mark of all dharmas is prajñā; it can benefit in all kinds of ways, and because beings love and keep it in mind, all kinds of names are made—as the Buddha has the letters of the ten epithets and so on; when it can reach the limit of all wisdoms, it is called prajñāpāramitā; when the bodhisattva practises prajñā and becomes a Buddha, its name changes to anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi; if it is in the mind of the Small Vehicle, it is named only the thirty-seven limbs of the path and the three gates of liberation; if a person wishes to hear and not forget, then in that person's mind it is named dhāraṇī; therefore the Buddha speaks the simile of the wish-fulfilling jewel, which changes according to the colour of the thing before it, and that is taken as its name. Here too the thirty-seven limbs of the path and the three gates of liberation mentioned in the treatise text are given only by their general names, and their lists are not brought out. The final sentence, 「佛如是種種說般若大功德」 tr. "The Buddha in all these ways speaks of the great merit of prajñā," closes the whole treatise section. In reading this general gathering-up keep hold of one meaning: that the different names are many is not because the Dharma is of many kinds; it is because what beings seek differs, and the Dharma receives its names according to it—as the wish-fulfilling jewel displays a colour according to the colour of the thing before it; the jewel has never changed.
Do Not Misread
Do not read 「囑累」 tr. "entrustment" as the Buddha being unable to let go. In this chapter the treatise-author has already set up a special question for this—the Buddha does not crave even the omniscience of all kinds or unobstructed liberation; why is it that toward prajñā alone he earnestly entrusts it, as though craving and begrudging? The answer given is: of what benefits beings foremost, nothing surpasses prajñā, because it can exhaust all suffering; what the Buddha entrusts is also without clinging; only because of great kindness and compassion does he praise this prajñā. So what the two Chinese characters rendered here as ‘earnestly’ are attached to is how hard to recognise and how easily lost the entrusted Dharma is, not craving and begrudging in the one who entrusts. The very rich elder earnestly entrusts his son with the wish-fulfilling jewel precisely because this jewel 「自無定色、質如虛空、微妙難識」 tr. "has of itself no fixed colour, has a substance like space, and is subtle and hard to recognise"; if one reads it as the Buddha having something he withholds, then the most important sentence in the simile of the elder falls empty.
Do not read ‘to forget or lose a single phrase is a very great fault’ only as a duty of memorisation, and do not on that account put aside the duty of guarding and upholding the words and phrases either. The treatise-author says it plainly: the reason the fault is great is that 「深般若法藏是十方三世諸佛母，能令人疾至佛道」 tr. "the deep Dharma treasury of prajñā is the mother of the buddhas of the ten directions and the three times, able to bring people quickly to the path of the Buddha." The treatise-author further states plainly that the entrustment is made precisely because 「名字語言句眾有盡」 tr. "the collections of names, words and speech, and phrases are exhaustible," and that 「若失語言，則義不可得」 tr. "if the words and speech are lost, the meaning cannot be obtained"; the words and phrases are the vessel that holds the meaning; when the words are lost the meaning is lost, and what makes it a fault is losing the meaning and cutting off the road. The sūtra text itself also places the weight on the whole series of receiving and upholding, reading, reciting, drawing near to, rightly recollecting, and practising in accord with the meaning and in accord with the Dharma, and does not speak only of memory. If one reads it only as incurring great sin for not reciting it completely by heart, one loses the criterion the treatise-author set up—whether it can give birth to Buddhas; if one reads it as the words and phrases being irrelevant, one loses in turn the meaning of 「若失語言，則義不可得」 tr. "if the words and speech are lost, the meaning cannot be obtained." The two need each other.
Do not read teaching one bodhisattva surpassing teaching the beings of the three-thousand great-thousand world to attain arhatship as slighting the arhat. The unit of measure the Buddha uses is 「我弟子事」 tr. "the work of my disciple," and the reasons the treatise-author brings out are 「自度其身，不中作佛」 tr. "they deliver their own persons and are not fit to become Buddhas" and the four items of the difference between the Great and Small Vehicles—the presence or absence of kindness and compassion, whether what is done is for self or for others, whether what is known is exhaustive or not, whether merit has measure or is without measure. What the four items discern is all the direction of the Dharma-gate, not the nobility or baseness of fruit or position. The sūtra text of this very chapter records that the eight hundred bhikṣus and the arhats whose outflows are exhausted were together in the assembly and gained benefit by seeing and hearing; if one reads it as the sūtra permitting people to slight the noble fruits, then the two passages of the prediction and of the display of the assembly of Akṣobhya Buddha in the same chapter would have nowhere to be placed.
Do not read 「一切法不與眼作對」 tr. "all dharmas do not stand as an object to the eye" as everything not existing at all. Where these words come from matters greatly—they are spoken after the Buddha displays the supernormal power of travel, letting the great assembly see the assembly of Akṣobhya Buddha, and then at once withdraws it. What is broken is the habit of measuring the Dharma with the eye, not the dharmas. The treatise-author at once speaks along two routes: what the fleshly eye and the divine eye see are all made dharmas, false and deceptive and unreal; the wisdom-eye, the Dharma-eye, and the Buddha-eye are all signless and unconditioned and so cannot be seen. The two routes taken together say that the one matter of seeing has nowhere to be set up within prajñā, not that the realm seen once existed and now does not. If one reads it as annihilation, then the sentence below, ‘the bodhisattva who practises thus is practising prajñā’, becomes practising in the view of annihilation.
Do not read the measurelessness of prajñā as an extremely large quantity. The Buddha himself gives its reason as ‘because it is inexhaustible it is without measure; because it is separated it is without measure’, and at the end brings it back to 「一切法皆無生；若法無生，云何有盡」 tr. "all dharmas are non-arising; if a dharma is non-arising, how could there be exhaustion?" The treatise-author further points out the reader's sickness: some people know that it was not exhausted in the past but say that in the future and the present it has exhaustion. From this it can be seen that the reason measurelessness is established has its root in non-arising, not in lying beyond counting. If one explains it as being so large that it cannot be counted, one is still placing prajñā on the axis of quantity, which is exactly what the Buddha's words 「我初不說般若波羅蜜量」 tr. "I have never at all spoken of a measure of prajñāpāramitā" exclude.
Do not read the simile of the jar of fragrant oil as making light of words, speech, and letters. The premise on which the treatise-author sets up this simile is 「佛知般若是真無盡，為名字語言句眾有盡故囑累」 tr. "the Buddha knows that prajñā is truly inexhaustible; it is because the collections of names, words and speech, and phrases are exhaustible that he entrusts it," and the point where the simile lands is 「語言能持義亦如是，若失語言，則義不可得」 tr. "that words and speech can hold the meaning is likewise; if the words and speech are lost, the meaning cannot be obtained." Though the jar is not what is begrudged, it is the instrument by which the fragrant oil can be passed on. So this chapter both says that the collection of names, the collection of phrases, and the collection of letters have measure while the meaning of prajñā is measureless, and also says that the Buddha earnestly entrusts the scroll of the prajñā sūtra—only with the two sentences standing together is the whole meaning there. If, because the meaning is measureless, one makes light of the scrolls, then the entrustment of this chapter destroys itself; if, because the scroll of the sūtra is entrusted, one takes the words and phrases as the ultimate, one falls again within what has measure.
Do not read putting forth the mark of the tongue that covers the face as a display of supernormal powers. The treatise-author makes a special distinction: what is displayed is 「我從父母生身，有此舌相」 tr. "the body I was born with from father and mother has this mark of the tongue," the mark of not speaking falsely in the worldly dharma of reading marks, 「非以神通力所現」 tr. "not displayed by the power of the supernormal powers." And he gives the reason—the Buddha does not cling even to the very deep and wondrous Dharma, to wisdom, and to meditative concentration, how much less would he, for the sake of the eight worldly dharmas and for the gain of offerings, make something false and deceptive. So what this mark proves is that the Buddha's words are not false, not that the Buddha's power is vast. If one reads it as seeking faith by a supernormal transformation, it contradicts that passage in the same chapter where the supernormal power of travel is displayed and then withdrawn to make clear that it does not stand as an object to the eye.
Bearing on Practice
The first benefit is to see the matter of entrustment as one's own being entrusted. The one to whom the sūtra text of this chapter entrusts is Ānanda, and what is entrusted is receiving and upholding, reading, reciting, making it keen, and explaining, displaying, and distinguishing it for others. Whoever reads this chapter today stands precisely in the position of the later people toward whom that sentence of entrustment pointed. In practice one can set up an extremely simple self-examination: toward the words and phrases of prajñā, do I uphold them and not lose them, or do I hear them and at once let them pass? Toward the meaning I have understood, can I distinguish and open it up for others, or do I stop at understanding it myself? If neither question can be answered, then the two Chinese characters rendered here as ‘receiving and upholding’ that this chapter speaks of have not yet come to rest on one's own person.
The second benefit is to illuminate one's own arousing of the mind by the four items of the difference between the Great and Small Vehicles. The four items the treatise-author lists—whether or not there is a mind of great kindness and compassion, whether what is done is for oneself or widely for beings, whether or not there is a mind wishing to know the dharmas widely, whether the merit cultivated has limit and measure or leaves nothing left over—each can be asked of oneself with respect to the present thought. This is not to have people judge their own rank; it is to have them see clearly the direction of the Dharma they are practising at this moment. In daily life, whenever one gives rise to a wholesome thought or does a wholesome deed, one can weigh it with these four questions: is what I value leaving suffering, or also wishing to know the Dharma and deliver people?
The third benefit is to add, on top of the practice of emptiness, not grasping the mark of emptiness. As to why the weighing of this chapter says that the practising of emptiness has a difference of not reaching one in a hundred, the key the treatise-author gives is 「不取空相故，過於二地」 tr. "because he does not grasp the mark of emptiness, he passes beyond the two grounds." So one who cultivates the contemplation of emptiness should here take a warning: if the emptiness contemplated is clung to as a mark that is obtained, it of itself has parts and of itself has measure. In practice one can keep to a single sentence: whenever one feels that ‘there is emptiness to be obtained’, that is the moment of grasping a mark. The thirsty man drinking from a river takes no more than suffices himself; to drink and know sufficiency is the measure of the two vehicles; to know that the river is inexhaustible and not take what one drinks as the river is what this chapter calls without parts and without measure.
The fourth benefit is to turn the teaching of excluding the destinies back into a contemplation of one's own circumstances. The treatise-author says one by one that the three evil destinies, with their much suffering, the gods of the desire realm, with their madness and confusion, the gods of the form realm, with their clinging to the taste of meditation, the formless realm, being without form, and the destiny of ghosts and spirits, with afflictions covering the mind, all cannot practise the deep prajñā, while the human destiny can restrain the mind of suffering and pleasure and practise it. The most practical use of this passage is to let people know that this body and this place are precisely the ground where it can be practised: suffering does not reach the point of seizing the mind, and pleasure does not reach the point of drowning the will. Whoever takes the suffering of his lot in life or the pleasure of favourable circumstances as a reason he cannot cultivate and study—for him this passage of the treatise-author is precisely the remedy: what is lacking is not the circumstance but the power to restrain the mind of suffering and pleasure.
The fifth benefit is to keep the boundary between the jar and the oil. With the simile of entrusting a jar of fragrant oil to one's sons and younger brothers, the treatise-author speaks very plainly of the relation between words and phrases and the meaning. The practitioner can here set up two hands: one hand honestly receives and upholds the words and phrases—reading, reciting, drawing near to, making them keen—because 「若失語言，則義不可得」 tr. "if the words and speech are lost, the meaning cannot be obtained"; the other hand does not take the words and phrases as the ultimate—because ‘the collection of names and the like, words and speech, sections and phrases, and the number of scrolls have measure’, while the meaning is measureless. With the two hands working together, reading the sūtra neither becomes clinging to the letter nor becomes making light of the teaching. The dhāraṇī of letters spoken of at the end of this chapter is precisely where these two hands come together: through a single letter one enters ultimate emptiness; the letter is not discarded, and yet emptiness already appears.
Further Resonances
The backbone of this chapter is one section of sūtra text and one section of treatise explanation. Sūtra ① begins from Śakra Devānām Indra doubting whether what he has said is in accord and is answering rightly, and the Buddha approving his words; Śakra praises Subhūti, that what he delights to teach all returns to emptiness, the signless, and non-action, and on this the Buddha makes a long weighing—when Subhūti practises emptiness, dānapāramitā and so on up to the eighty minor marks are one by one unfindable, how much less one who practises or one who obtains them, and what he practises, compared with the bodhisattva's practice of prajñā, does not reach one in a hundred; excepting the Buddha's practice, the bodhisattva's practice of prajñā is, among the practices of the two vehicles, the most honoured, the most wondrous, and the highest; next it records the gods of the Heaven of the Thirty-three scattering flowers and the eight hundred bhikṣus vowing the unsurpassed practice; the Buddha, knowing the workings of their minds, smiles, and lights of many colours shine everywhere; Ānanda asks the causes and conditions of the smile, and the Buddha gives the eight hundred bhikṣus the prediction that in the Constellation Kalpa they will become Buddhas at the same time, all named Scattering Flowers; next it praises those who can practise the deep prajñā as coming from among humans or from the Tuṣita heaven, having heard it face to face from the Buddha and planted roots of goodness under the buddhas; next it enters the proper theme, saying that planting roots of goodness in the Buddha's field of merit, though not false and deceptive, one must deeply and clearly practise the six perfections and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds, and so entrusts prajñā to Ānanda, setting up the distinction that to forget or lose other dharmas is a very small fault and to forget or lose a single phrase of prajñā is a very great fault, saying that to receive and uphold prajñā is to receive and uphold the awakening of the buddhas of the three times and to make offerings to prajñā is to make offerings to the buddhas of the three times, and again entrusting the six perfections twice over and making clear that the six perfections are the mother of the bodhisattvas and the inexhaustible Dharma treasury of the buddhas; next it sets up a weighing, that teaching one bodhisattva a single phrase in accord with prajñā surpasses teaching the beings of the three-thousand great-thousand world so that they attain arhatship; Ānanda answers that it is very much, and the Buddha further, reducing through one day, half a day, the space of a meal, and an instant, shows its superiority; next he displays transformations of the supernormal power of travel, letting the great assembly see the assembly of Akṣobhya Buddha, and then withdraws them, to prove that all dharmas do not stand as an object to the eye, that dharma does not see dharma and dharma does not know dharma, that training thus is called the foremost training, the supreme training, the subtle and wondrous training, and that prajñā is without measure, like the boundary of space, unfindable; next Ānanda asks why it is without measure, and the Buddha answers: because it is inexhaustible, because it is separated; the buddhas of the three times all train in it and do not exhaust it; all dharmas are non-arising, how could there be exhaustion; at the end the Buddha puts forth the mark of the tongue that covers the face, bids him from now on, in the fourfold assembly, widely expound, open up and display, and distinguish it, and says that the deep prajñā is the gate of all letters, can enter the dhāraṇī gate, is the wondrous Dharma of the buddhas of the three times, and is the practitioner's feet. Treatise ① explains it following the text: first it sets up two questions to explain the grounds of Śakra's self-doubt and of the Buddha's approval, bringing out the division of the three kinds of wisdom and the simile of riding a boat downstream; next it recounts the Buddha's confirming of Subhūti and cites the sūtra text as proof, raises the sentence that practising emptiness, compared with the bodhisattva, does not reach one in a hundred, sets up a question and first makes clear the various names of the real mark of all dharmas, then answers with the three meanings of keenness and dullness, depth and shallowness, of the two vehicles' lack of the vow to deliver beings, and of having parts and having measure, bringing out the three similes of lighting a lamp to break the darkness, the thirsty man drinking from a river, and the space of a pore compared with the space of the ten directions; next it recounts the exhortation to cultivate and makes clear that because one does not grasp the mark of emptiness one passes beyond the two grounds, and that the practice of emptiness is the root; next it sets up a question to discern the difference between nirvāṇa being measureless and what the two vehicles obtain having measure, bringing out the simile of the vessel of great water and the meaning that measure and the measureless depend on each other; next it sets up a question to explain why the eight hundred bhikṣus make offerings to the Buddha alone, points out that the meaning of the smile appears in another chapter, and explains the cause of the same time and the same name; next it explains that the Buddha, because of this event, praises prajñā, excludes the destinies one by one, and takes only the human destiny and the Tuṣita heaven; next it sets up a question posing the difficulty that, since offering to the Buddha with small roots of goodness one will also become a Buddha, what need is there constantly to practise prajñā, and answers with clearly practising the six perfections and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds; next it sets up a question to explain the Buddha's earnest entrusting as though craving and begrudging, bringing out the simile of the very rich elder entrusting the wish-fulfilling jewel, and makes clear why losing a single phrase of prajñā is too great a fault; next it sets up a question to explain the superiority of teaching one bodhisattva, bringing out the simile of planting a wish-fulfilling tree, the four items of the difference between the Great and Small Vehicles, and the simile of the vajra, small though it is; next it explains the citing of the supernormal power of travel as proof and makes clear that what the fleshly eye and the divine eye see is false and deceptive, and that the wisdom-eye, the Dharma-eye, and the Buddha-eye cannot be seen and cannot be known; next it makes clear that what the Buddha entrusts is also without clinging, and that names, words and speech, and sections and phrases have measure while the meaning of prajñā is measureless; next, following the sūtra, it explains that its mark is of itself separated, that because it neither arises nor gathers it is neither exhausted nor ceases, and the simile of wishing to exhaust space; next it brings out the simile of entrusting a jar of fragrant oil to one's sons and younger brothers to make clear why an inexhaustible Dharma must be entrusted by means of exhaustible words and speech, and explains that putting forth the mark of the tongue is not displayed by the power of the supernormal powers; at the end it gathers up the dhāraṇī of letters, the simile of the city with one gate, the difference between the dhāraṇī of hearing and retaining and the dhāraṇī obtained from prajñā, and why prajñā is named dhāraṇī, bringing out the simile of the wish-fulfilling jewel changing its name according to the colour of the thing before it, and concludes with the Buddha in these many ways speaking of the great merit of prajñā. The whole treatise section is threaded through with questions and answers, and passage by passage it can be read back against the sūtra text; as for the number of its questions and answers, counting them place by place according to 「問曰」 tr. "Question" and 「答曰」 tr. "Answer" in the text of this chapter of this treatise, each comes to ten places.
The lines of meaning between this chapter and the chapters before and after it can be seen in three threads. First, continuing what precedes: the preceding chapter speaks of the meaning of delivering space; this chapter continues its momentum of practising emptiness and asks about the grades among those who practise emptiness; so the sūtra text at its outset still takes Śakra's weighing of what Subhūti delights to teach as the joint, and does not set up a separate stove. Second, a turn complete within the chapter: the first half speaks of weighing and prediction, the second half of entrustment and inexhaustibility, and the two halves have as their pivot the one sentence 「是故，阿難！我以般若波羅蜜囑累汝！」 tr. "Therefore, Ānanda! I entrust prajñāpāramitā to you!"—what the weighing shows is the preciousness of the Dharma; what the entrustment does is the handing over of the precious Dharma; the two matters are in fact the head and tail of one matter. Third, reaching to what follows: this chapter ends on prajñā being the gate of all letters and able to enter the dhāraṇī gate, and the next chapter opens on inexhaustible skilful means; the two chapters stand in sequence, and the reader can view them together to see where upholding the Dharma and practising the Dharma meet. Again, Chapter 90 of this text is also titled "Entrustment"; it has the same name as this chapter but a different place, and the sūtra text it explains is different; in reading, one should decide by the chapter sequence, and not force them together because the names are the same.
Of the explanations of the ancient masters, three can be recorded for this chapter. Jizang, in his sectional division of this chapter, assigns it to the section of circulation, saying: 「此中第二、流通實相般若也。」 tr. "Here, second, is the circulation of the prajñā of the real mark." In explaining why it is entrusted and circulated, he divides it into two intents, benefiting the present and benefiting ages to come, and himself brings out a simile, saying: 「如父臨終付子如意珠，則知無價物」 tr. "As a father at the end of his life hands his son a wish-fulfilling jewel, one then knows it is a priceless thing"—this simile and this treatise's simile of the very rich elder entrusting his son with the wish-fulfilling jewel are close in intent but set up different persons; they are recorded side by side without judgement. In explaining the chapter's name he says: 「累即憑累，委付為累。」 tr. "Lei means to lean upon and entrust; to commit and hand over is lei." He glosses the character 「累」 tr. "lei" by leaning upon and entrusting and by committing and handing over, while this treatise makes no separate gloss of the character; each takes its own way. To the question how the emptiness of beings and the emptiness of dharmas differ, he answers: 「二乘智劣故見空淺，菩薩智深故見空亦深也。」 tr. "Because the knowledge of the two vehicles is inferior, their seeing of emptiness is shallow; because the bodhisattva's knowledge is deep, his seeing of emptiness is also deep." He further says: 「又二乘但見於空不見不空，菩薩見空不空也。」 tr. "Again, the two vehicles see only emptiness and do not see non-emptiness; the bodhisattva sees emptiness and non-emptiness."—the former words correspond to this treatise's meaning 「智慧分別利鈍，入有深淺故」 tr. "because wisdom distinguishes keen and dull, and what is entered is deep or shallow"; the latter words bring out the pair of emptiness and non-emptiness, which this treatise does not have; this is Jizang's own explanation, and both are kept. In explaining the putting forth of the mark of the tongue he says: 「不現通力令舌大者，恐舌非實大，通力使大也，故但出覆面舌也。」 tr. "That he does not display supernormal power to make the tongue large is lest it be thought that the tongue is not truly large but that supernormal power made it large; therefore he only puts forth the tongue that covers the face." This accords with the boundary kept by this treatise's sentence 「非以神通力所現」 tr. "not displayed by the power of the supernormal powers," and can serve as supporting evidence. Huiying, explaining this chapter, judges it to be the section of circulation, saying: 「此即是波若道中第三大分流通分也。」 tr. "This is the section of circulation, the third great division within the path of prajñā." In his commentary he himself calls this chapter 「第六十五品者，名為囑累品」 tr. "the sixty-fifth chapter, named the chapter of Entrustment"; his chapter sequence differs by one place from the base text of this edition. In explaining why it is earnest, he cites Kumārajīva's explanation, saying: 「所以慇懃囑累者，以寶重故防深；所以校量廣濶者，以功高故校廣。」 tr. "The reason he earnestly entrusts it is that, because the jewel is weighty, the guarding is deep; the reason the weighing is broad and wide is that, because the merit is high, the weighing is broad." Explaining earnestness by the weightiness of the jewel and the breadth of the weighing by the height of the merit has exactly the same focus as this treatise's simile of the elder's jewel; they are recorded side by side without judgement. In explaining 「是行者足」 tr. "is the practitioner's feet," he says: 「足是身之本，明此波若是法身之本，故云足也。」 tr. "The feet are the root of the body; this makes clear that this prajñā is the root of the Dharma body, and therefore it says feet."—this treatise explains this sentence only as 「菩薩得是般若，能行菩薩道」 tr. "the bodhisattva who obtains this prajñā can practise the bodhisattva path"; Huiying goes a layer further and explains it by the root of the Dharma body, which is his own meaning; both are kept. Again, Junzheng, in the Profound Meaning of the Four Mahāyāna Treatises, cites the text of this chapter of this treatise and says: 「累教品云：須菩提所得空，如毛穴之空；菩薩空，如十方空也。」 tr. "The chapter Entrusting the Teaching says: the emptiness obtained by Subhūti is like the space of a pore; the bodhisattva's emptiness is like the space of the ten directions." What he cites is the sense of this chapter's passage 「又如毛孔之空欲比十方空，無有是理」 tr. "and again, as for the space of a pore wishing to compare itself with the space of the ten directions, there is no such principle," but the chapter name he uses is ‘Entrusting the Teaching’, which differs from the base text of this edition, titled 「囑累品」 tr. "Entrustment"—the ancient masters' citing of this chapter's name has two sides, and this is one piece of evidence for it; recorded side by side without judgement. The variant names of the chapter title among the texts, the difference of fascicle number in the Ishiyama-dera manuscript, and the beginning and end of these two commentaries and the fascicles they rely on are detailed in the Apparatus.
無盡方便品Inexhaustible Skilful Means
全文五層 →Full five layers →無盡方便品：般若不可盡何以要用虛空來答，色不可盡故般若應生何以是生而不是求，十二支空不可盡何以能生般若，十二因緣何以是獨菩薩法，坐道場時應如是觀何以不是初學所行，轉還與不轉還何以只差一個方便力，無所得般若何以令惡魔如箭入心，具足六度何以只在迴向薩婆若一句，取如相與取畢竟空相何以同是非，虛空無所有何以還能生般若，破色生四句何以歸到色真相即般若相，離斷常二邊何以要說十二因緣空而假名中道，觸念不在內外中間何以癡實相即是智慧，說十二因緣何以要分三種，老法何以畢竟空無定相，畢竟空中觀老何以還要生大悲，第三觀何以唯坐道場者能具足，退與不退何以繫於此觀，安住畢竟空何以連般若亦不見，軟根利根二種人何以皆不能具足檀度，信力慧力等何以是迴向之樞
在問什麼
這一品問的是一個極短的問題：般若波羅蜜可不可盡。問的人是須菩提，起因是他先起了一個念——諸佛的阿耨多羅三藐三菩提甚深。深到何處他不說，只把「不可盡」三字提出來請佛決定。佛的答語更短：因為虛空不可盡，所以般若不可盡。一問一答之間，本品的骨架已經立好。
但接著出來的第二問纔是全品的重心：既然不可盡，那麼「云何應生般若波羅蜜」。這一問很要緊。若般若如虛空一般無所有，它便像是個沒有著手處的東西；沒有著手處，行人便無從下手。論主在論段把這個難處明白說出來——般若波羅蜜若如虛空無所有故不可盡，菩薩怎能生起它？怎樣在心中生起能行、能得？本品自此以下所說的一切，都是在回答這一難。
佛的回答分兩路走。第一路是就色、受想行識、六波羅蜜乃至一切種智說：它們不可盡，所以般若應生。第二路是就十二因緣說：癡空、行空、識空、名色空、六處空、六觸空、受空、愛空、取空、有空、生空、老死憂悲苦惱空，一一不可盡，所以般若應生。兩路之中，第二路纔是本品用力最深的地方——經文緊接著說「是十二因緣，是獨菩薩法」，並囑坐道場時應如是觀。論段幾乎全部篇幅，都花在解釋十二因緣何以能作般若的所生之門。
十二因緣本是三乘共觀之法，何以此處說它是獨菩薩法？論主的答案是分三種來說：凡夫肉眼所見的一種、賢聖法眼分別的一種、菩薩大智利根究盡根本相的一種。前二種都在十二因緣之內用功，第三種是把十二因緣推到不可得處——以「老」為樣本，逐層推求老之定相不可得，老既不可得，乃至無明亦不可得，於是十二支一一如虛空而不可盡。不可盡的不是有一個永遠用不完的東西，是根本沒有一個可盡之法。此義一立，「云何應生」之難即解：般若不從有中生，是從一切法不可得處生。
品名所標的「方便」二字，義在後半。以虛空不可盡法觀十二因緣者不墮二乘，求菩薩道而轉還者皆不得是方便力，不轉還者皆得是方便力——退與不退的分水嶺，經文明說只是一個方便力。論段末後又把這方便落到六波羅蜜上：能行無所得般若，煩惱折薄，魔不得便，六度乃得具足；而具足的樞紐只在一句——所有布施持戒忍辱精進禪定智慧皆迴向薩婆若。全品自「不可盡」起，至「迴向薩婆若」結，是從最高處的無盡義，一路落到最平實的行門上。
逐段解明
一、須菩提作念菩提甚深，白佛問般若波羅蜜不可盡。 品首先記須菩提的心行：他先作念「是諸佛阿耨多羅三藐三菩提甚深，我當問佛」，作念已纔白佛。讀者此處當問：為何經文要把未出口的念頭也記下來？因為此念是全品之因——所問的是般若不可盡，所感的卻是菩提甚深。深與不可盡是一事之兩面：深故不可測其底，不可測故不可盡。勿把這一問讀成好奇之問，它是從實見深法而起的請決之問。
二、佛答虛空不可盡故般若波羅蜜不可盡。 佛不解釋般若何以不可盡，只換一個所依：虛空不可盡，所以般若不可盡。此答的力量全在「虛空」二字上。虛空之不可盡，不是量大到用不完，是根本無法可盡——無有一物在其中可以減損。讀者若把虛空讀成廣大無邊之物，這一答便落成誇飾；若讀成無所有，這一答纔是實說。下文論段所釋的「如虛空，無有法，但有名字」，正是為防此誤。
三、須菩提續問云何應生般若波羅蜜。 接得極快：既然如虛空不可盡，那麼應當怎樣生起它？經文此處未再標「白佛言」，只以「世尊」呼格承接，仍是須菩提在問。這一問看似轉了話題，其實是把上答逼到行門上——凡聞一法之高深而不問其入處者，聞與不聞同。讀經至此可自檢：我讀到「不可盡」時，心中生的是讚歎，還是「云何應生」。
四、佛答色乃至一切種智不可盡故般若波羅蜜應生。 佛的第一路答語從最粗近處起：色不可盡故般若應生，受想行識亦然；檀波羅蜜不可盡故般若應生，尸羅、羼提、毘梨耶、禪、般若亦然；乃至一切種智不可盡故般若應生。此處要看清句式——不是『觀色不可盡』而後般若生，是色之不可盡即般若之所以生。所舉三重由粗至細：五眾是所緣之法，六波羅蜜是能行之法，一切種智是所得之果；三重都不可盡，故無一處不是般若生處。
五、佛答十二支空不可盡故般若應生，是獨菩薩法，坐道場應如是觀，觀之則不墮二乘，轉還不轉還皆繫方便力。 第二路答語轉入十二因緣，逐支而說：癡空、行空、識空、名色空、六處空、六觸空、受空、愛空、取空、有空、生空、老死憂悲苦惱空，一一不可盡故般若應生。其下連出四義：是獨菩薩法、能除諸邊顛倒、坐道場時應如是觀當得一切種智、以虛空不可盡法觀之則不墮二乘地而住阿耨多羅三藐三菩提。末後說退轉之由：求菩薩道而轉還者皆離般若波羅蜜念，不知云何以虛空不可盡法觀十二因緣，皆不得是方便力；不轉還者皆得是方便力。此段是全品之骨，論段所釋十之八九都在這裡。讀者當先記住一事：經文說的不是『觀十二因緣之空』，是「以虛空不可盡法觀十二因緣」——所用之法先是無盡，然後纔觀。
六、佛說觀十二因緣時不見諸相，於色乃至菩提亦不見，一切法不可得故是為應般若波羅蜜行。 佛續說此觀之相，全用遮遣：不見法無因緣生，不見法常不滅，不見法有我人壽者命者眾生知者見者，不見法無常、苦、無我、寂滅非寂滅。要緊處在第一句與第二句之對——既不見無因緣生，又不見常不滅：前遮無因，後遮常因，論主下文釋此段正以此二重相對。其下不見我人，不見無常苦無我，亦是兩頭都遮，纔不是以無常破常、以無我破我的對治之觀。其下推至色與受想行識、般若乃至菩提皆不見，末結「一切法不可得故，是為應般若波羅蜜行」。勿把「不見」讀成閉目不觀，它是觀到定相不可得處的自然結果。
七、佛說行無所得般若時惡魔愁毒如箭入心、譬如人新喪父母。 經文忽然從觀法轉到魔事，並自出兩喻：如箭入心、如人新喪父母。此段位置很值得注意——它緊接在「一切法不可得」之後。魔之所以愁毒，正因為菩薩已行到無所得處；有所得處魔尚有下手之地，無所得處則無地可下手。兩喻都取切身之痛而不取威猛之相，是說魔的無可奈何，不是說魔的憤怒。
八、須菩提問但一魔愁毒，抑三千大千世界中魔亦復愁毒。 須菩提的追問看似計較數目，其實是問範圍：一人行般若所動搖的，是一魔之境，還是一大千之境。凡讀經見有問數者，先看他問的是數還是勢。此問問的是勢。
九、佛答三千大千世界諸惡魔皆愁毒各不能自安，天人阿修羅不能得其便，行般若時具足修六波羅蜜。 佛的答語三節。其一、諸惡魔皆愁毒如箭入心，各於其坐不能自安——「各於其坐」四字最見情狀：不是起身來攻，是坐著坐不住。其二、一切世間天及人、阿修羅不能得其便令其憂惱——魔既無下手處，餘者更無。其三、轉出正面利益：行般若波羅蜜時具足修六波羅蜜，具足諸波羅蜜。此第三節是下段之引。
十、須菩提問行般若時云何具足六波羅蜜。 又是一個「云何」。本品兩個大問都由須菩提問出，第一問是「云何應生」，此問是「云何具足」——一問入處，一問果地。兩問合看，可見須菩提之問法：聞高義必求其行，聞行必求其成。
十一、佛答所有布施持戒忍辱精進禪定智慧皆迴向薩婆若，是為具足六波羅蜜。 佛的答案出人意料地平實：所有布施皆迴向薩婆若，即具足檀波羅蜜；持戒、忍辱、精進、禪定、智慧一一亦然，末結「具足六波羅蜜」。要看清「所有」與「皆」二字——不是施得多纔具足，是所施無一不迴向纔具足。具足之義在無漏在外，不在量之滿。此段是全品行門之落腳處，前面一切無盡之義，最後都繫在這一句上。
十二、釋曰：須菩提聞般若種種相，般若義無量而名字句眾有量。 論主起釋，先補出須菩提發問的來歷：他從佛聞般若種種相——初聞「畢竟空相」，中聞「囑累」如似有，後還聞說「空」。三番所聞前後似異，故有此問。論主隨即點出所以異之故：般若義無量，而名、字、句眾有量。此一句是讀一切經論的鑰匙——同一無量之義，用有量之名句說，必然前後看似不齊。讀者遇經中前後語似相違，先取此義，勿急判為矛盾。
十三、須菩提作念問所以甚深。 論主重述須菩提之念：諸佛菩提甚深，我當問佛所以甚深。此處加了「所以」二字，與經段首句相較更進一層——不只問其深，且問其何以深。讀經當學此一問：知其然之後必問其所以然，否則所知者只是一句判語。
十四、論主釋佛說菩提少許分，取如相與取畢竟空相皆非。 論主答何以甚深：佛所說的菩提只是少許一分，但為破眾生顛倒而說，不具足說，以無能受者故。次出兩重簡別：若人取「如」之相，佛言「如亦空，無生住滅故；若法無生住滅，是法即無」，法性、實際亦如是；若有取畢竟空者，亦言非也，以畢竟空若是定相可取，即非畢竟空。此段最要緊——取空與取有同是取，故同是非。行人多知不可取有，少知不可取空；論主把「畢竟空」自己也放進所破之列，這是本論一貫的守法。
十五、須菩提念三世諸佛用般若得道、般若不盡，故但問不盡義。 論主補出須菩提所以只問「不盡」的來歷：如佛自說「三世諸佛用般若波羅蜜得道，般若故不盡——已不盡、今不盡、當不盡」，故今但問不盡之義。三世皆不盡，是從用處證其不盡：若般若可盡，則先佛用盡而後佛無用。讀此段可知須菩提之問不是憑空發，是承佛先語而請其義。
十六、論主釋佛答如虛空不盡故般若亦不盡，並自出難：無所有云何能生。 論主釋佛之譬答：如虛空，無有法，但有名字；般若波羅蜜亦如是。釋畢即自出一難——般若若如虛空無所有故不可盡，云何菩薩能生是般若？所謂能生者，菩薩云何心中生能行、能得？這一難提得極好，它把讀者心中未成形的疑替他問出來了。凡讀論見論主自出難，當知下文所答即是本段之正義；此難以下至品末，皆是答此一難。
十七、論主釋佛答色無盡故般若應生：破色生而歸色真相即般若相。 論主釋第一路答語，先破色之生：色的初生、後生、中生皆不可得；色即生色不可得，離色生色不可得；生不可得，生生不可得，如先「破生」中說。生既不可得，色亦不可得；色不可得故色生不可得。二法俱不可得，故色如幻如夢，但誑人眼。末出正義：若色有生必有盡，以無生故亦無盡；色真相即是般若波羅蜜相，是故說「色不可盡，般若波羅蜜亦不可盡」。受想行識、檀波羅蜜乃至一切種智亦如是。此段的推法要看清方向——不是說色空所以般若空，是說色之真相即般若之相，故色之無盡即般若之無盡。
十八、論主出第二路：無明虛空不可盡故應生般若，離斷常二邊而說十二因緣空，假名中道。 論主轉入十二因緣，先說何以要從此處說：若人但觀畢竟空，多墮斷滅邊；若觀有，多墮常邊。離是二邊故說十二因緣空。何以十二因緣能離二邊？法從因緣和合生則無定性，無定性即是畢竟空寂滅相——因緣生故不斷，無定性故不常。離二邊故假名為中道。末以論主自牒之語「十二因緣如虛空，無法故不盡」收歸，並釋癡亦從因緣和合生故無自相，無自相故畢竟空如虛空。此段是全論段之樞：十二因緣在此不是流轉之相，是離二邊之門。
十九、論主釋因緣生故無實，觸念不可得，癡實相即是智慧。 論主續證因緣生法之無實，引經語「因眼緣色生觸念，觸念從癡生」，隨即推之：觸念不在眼中、不在色中，不在內、不在外、不在中間，亦不從十方三世來，是法定相不可得，以一切法入「如」故。既不可得，則若得是無明定相即是智慧，不名為癡。故癡相智慧相無異，癡實相即是智慧，而取著智慧相即是癡。末歸癡實相畢竟清淨如虛空無生無滅，故迴向菩提即名般若波羅蜜。此段最易讀錯——不是說癡就是智慧可以不斷，是說推癡至其實相處便無癡可得，而取著所得之智慧則又成癡。
二十、問曰：若無無明亦無諸行等，云何說十二因緣。 本品論段唯一的一番問答在此發問。難得極正：既然癡的定相不可得，無明既無，行識乃至老死一併無，那麼經中說十二因緣豈非虛設？凡讀空義而生此疑者甚多，論主不迴避，逕立此問而後答。讀論遇問曰，當先自答一遍再看論主之答，纔知其答之所以然。
廿一、答曰：說十二因緣有三種，一者凡夫肉眼所見。 論主的答法不是直破此難，是分三種而說——一難之所以成難，往往因為把三種混作一種。第一種是凡夫肉眼所見：顛倒、著我心，起諸煩惱、業，往來生死中。此種只是身在其中而不自知，於十二因緣不求是非。讀者可自照：日用之中順著愛取有而行，未嘗一念回看的，即是此種。
廿二、二者賢聖以法眼分別，逆推老死至煩惱無明，但滅苦入涅槃而不究盡求諸苦相。 第二種是賢聖法眼所觀：見老病死而心厭欲出世間，逆推老死由生、生由煩惱業、煩惱因緣是無明。無明之相在此說得極切——應捨而取、應取而捨：老病諸苦因緣之煩惱應捨，卻以少分顛倒之樂而取；持戒禪定智慧諸善根本是涅槃樂因緣，應取而反捨。次明是中無知者見者作者，但從虛誑因緣相續生；行者知虛誑不實則不生戲論，但滅苦故入於涅槃，不究盡求諸苦相。末一句是第二種與第三種的分界——不是不能求，是不究盡求。
廿三、三者菩薩大智利根但求究盡根本相，老法畢竟空、老是心不相應行而相不可得。 第三種是諸菩薩摩訶薩：大智人利根故，但求究盡十二因緣根本相，不以憂怖自沒。此處「不以憂怖自沒」六字對第二種是一個簡別——第二種是因厭苦而求出，厭苦之心一急，便止於滅苦而不再推。菩薩推之，則求時不得定相，老法畢竟空，但從虛誑假名有。論主隨即取一家之說為例：分別諸法相者說「老是心不相應行」，然此相不可得；頭白等是色相，非老相；二事不可得故無老相。以「老」為推求之樣本，是本論的方便——十二支之中老死最切身，最切身者尚且無定相，餘支可知。
廿四、復次：世人所名老相皆非定相，諸法和合假名為老，如假輪軸轅輻等為車。 論主再從世情處破。世人名老相者，髮白、齒離，面皺、身曲，羸瘦、力薄，諸根闇塞。論主一一破之：髮白非唯老者，有年壯而白、老年而黑者；羸瘦皺曲亦爾；有人老而諸根明利、少而闇塞者；又服還年藥雖老而壯。故老無定相，無定相故諸法和合假名為老。末出車喻：如假輪、軸、轅、輻等為車，是假名非實。此喻要看清所比——不是說車不可用，是說車之名下無一物是車。老亦如是：老之事宛然可見，老之相求之不得。
廿五、復次：有人言說果報五眾故相名為老，論主破以念念生滅不住則無故無老。 有人另立一說：果報五眾之故相即名為老。論主判曰是亦不然，其破有二節。其一、一切有為法念念生滅不住，若不住則無故，無故則無老——「故」是對「新」而立的，念念不住則無所謂故舊。其二、一切有為法若有住則無無常，若無無常即是常，若常則無老；何況非常非無常畢竟空中而有老。兩節合看是一個兩難：立住則成常而無老，立不住則無故而無老。讀論遇此等兩難之破，當知論主不是各個擊破，是把對方所有可立之地一併封住。
廿六、復次：畢竟空中生相不可得何況有老，如老乃至無明亦如是。 論主收束老義：諸法畢竟空中生相尚不可得，何況有老。如是種種因緣求老法不可得，不可得故無相，如虛空不可盡。末一句把樣本推廣——如老，乃至無明亦如是，破無明如上說。至此十二支一一如虛空不可盡之義乃成，經文『癡空不可盡故般若應生』一段的所以然也就全出來了。
廿七、菩薩觀諸法實相畢竟空無所有無所得而不著是事故生大悲。 論主在最空處補一句最暖的話：菩薩觀諸法實相畢竟空、無所有、無所得，亦不著是事故，於眾生中而生大悲——眾生愚癡故，於不實、顛倒、虛妄法中受諸苦惱。要看清悲心的出處：不是觀空之後另起一念慈悲，是因為連空亦不著，纔有餘地生悲。若著於所觀之空，則悲心無從發。此段是本品從義理轉入行持的關節。
廿八、三種十二因緣各有其所觀之人。 論主回頭為三種定其人：初十二因緣但是凡夫人故，於是中不求是非；第二十二因緣，是二乘人及未得無生忍法菩薩所觀；第三十二因緣，是從得無生忍法乃至坐道場菩薩所觀。此段極要緊，它把上文的三種從『三種說法』落實為『三等行人』。讀者於此當自知所在——未得無生忍者所觀仍屬第二種，不必以第三種自居；而第三種既是坐道場所觀，經文說「坐道場時，應如是觀」也就不是懸談。
廿九、是故說無明虛空不可盡乃至憂悲苦惱虛空不可盡故菩薩行般若波羅蜜。 論主以「是故說」三字回牒經文，把上來所推的老義、無明義一併結到經句上。凡見論主用「是故說」回牒，即知上文之釋已完，此是驗收之語。讀論可持此為段落之標識：回牒句之前是釋，之後另起新義。
三十、論主訓離諸邊顛倒：邊與顛倒之目，及二種煩惱之分。 論主釋經文「能除諸邊、顛倒」一語，逐字出其目。邊者，常邊、斷滅邊，有邊、無邊，實邊、空邊，世間有邊等著諸邊；顛倒者，於無常中起常等諸顛倒煩惱。觀十二因緣法則諸邊顛倒滅。次分諸煩惱為二分：一者外道邪見人名為邊，二者餘眾生煩惱名為顛倒。此一分別很有用——邊是見上的偏，顛倒是情上的錯；見偏多在立論處，情錯多在日用處。一觀而二皆滅，是因為二者同出於定相之執。
卅一、第三觀甚深唯坐道場者能觀，引《城譬喻經》為證。 論主申明第三種十二因緣觀之甚深：唯諸菩薩坐道場者能觀，先雖能觀未能具足。次引《城譬喻經》為證，經中佛自述本未得道時如是思惟——眾生可愍，深入嶮道，數數生、數數老、數數死，往來世間不知出處；又作念「何因緣有老死」，如是求覓時得實智慧，知生因緣是老死等。論主據此斷曰：第三觀，坐道場乃得。此證用得極有分量——佛自己的成道歷程即是此觀之實例，故非虛說。讀者於此當存一分審慎：能觀與能具足觀不是一事，先能而後具足，非一蹴而至。
卅二、又復觀如是因緣法過於二乘得一切種智，退不退皆繫此觀。 論主接經文之利益：觀如是因緣法過於二乘，得一切種智。次釋退轉之由：若有人於佛道退者，皆不得是甚深觀故；若得是觀則不退。何以故？深入畢竟空中則不見聲聞辟支佛地，不見故不於是中住。此答把『不墮二乘』解得極乾淨——不是見了二乘地而勉力不入，是根本不見有此地可住。凡以意志力守住不退者，其退終有時；以不見故不住者，乃真不退。
卅三、復次：不見一法定自在無因緣而生，破邪因緣微塵世性。 論主續釋經文「不見法無因緣生」一句，並補出其反面。能如是觀者，不見有一法定自在無因緣而生，一切法不自在皆屬因緣生。次破一類人：雖見一切法從因緣生，卻謂為從邪因緣生——邪因緣者，微塵、世性等。是故經說「不見法無因緣生」，論主更推其反面：亦不見法從常因緣（微塵、世性）生。末以虛空為例破常因緣：如虛空常，常故則無生，虛空亦不與物作因，故無有法從常因緣生。此段之要在分兩重——先破無因，次破邪因；破無因易，破邪因難，因為邪因亦是因，形似而實非。
卅四、復次：菩薩觀一切法屬因緣生不自在故無我乃至無知者見者。 承上一轉，把因緣義落到無我上：一切法屬因緣生而不自在，不自在故無我，乃至無知者、見者。此處的推法很直——不自在即是無我之定義，非另有一個我可破。讀者若曾苦於「我」之難破，可從此處入手——不必先尋我在何處，只須看所作所受是否自在。
卅五、爾時菩薩安住畢竟空十二因緣中而不見般若，是名無所得般若波羅蜜。 論主釋經文之觀相：菩薩安住畢竟空十二因緣中，不見一切色等法若有若無等，亦不見般若，亦不見用是法行般若，乃至阿耨多羅三藐三菩提亦如是；是名菩薩無所得般若波羅蜜。末一句最要緊——得是無所得般若，於一切法中便得無所障礙般若。無所得是因，無障礙是果。連能行之般若與所行之法都不見，纔真無所礙；若留一法不見而自以為見，即此一法便是礙處。
卅六、爾時諸魔極大愁毒，捕魚人之喻。 論主釋魔愁之所以然：以是菩薩深入十二因緣畢竟空中，不著有、無、非有非無等六十二諸邪見魔網——此諸邪見之目，本論此段未出，讀者不必代為擬補。魔既無法可得菩薩之便，故極大愁毒。論主自出一喻：譬如捕魚人見一魚深入大水，鉤網所不及，則絕望憂愁；亦如新喪父母。喻中所比是魔之絕望而非魔之能為，讀者勿把此段讀成魔勢可畏。所可畏者反在其對面——魔之所以無法可施，只因菩薩不著一法；一著即成網眼。
卅七、復次：能行無所得般若則六波羅蜜得具足。 論主釋六度具足之所以然：行如是法，諸煩惱障般若之法皆折薄，諸魔人民不能得便，故諸波羅蜜得具足；先來雖行六波羅蜜，未能得如是具足。此段解釋了經段第九條的第三節——何以行般若時六度自具足。答案不在多行，在障薄；障薄則本有之行自然成就。讀者可持此自檢：所行之度不具足，多半不在功夫不勤，在煩惱與魔事未除。
卅八、須菩提問云何能行如是般若而具足諸波羅蜜。 論主以敘述之體重牒經文之問：須菩提問世尊，菩薩云何能行如是般若波羅蜜，能具足檀波羅蜜等諸波羅蜜。此處雖作問答之形，卻是論主複述經段第十條，非另立一番問答。讀論當分清論主自設之問與複述經問二者——前者是論主要破要立，後者只是隨經文而釋。
卅九、佛答二種人：軟根取相迴向、利根戲論空法，皆不能具足檀波羅蜜。 論主釋經文「所有布施皆迴向薩婆若」一句，指出未能具足者有二種人：軟根者，少多布施皆取相而迴向阿耨多羅三藐三菩提；利根者，破是取相而戲論空法，信力轉薄，不用薩婆若，但求諸法實相。二種人皆不能具足檀波羅蜜——一者信力多而慧力少，二者慧力多而信力少。此段是全品最切於今人之處：取相行善與談空廢行，論主一併判為不具足，且判得極平——不說軟根者劣、利根者勝，只說各偏一邊。
四十、佛今說信力慧力等故能迴向薩婆若，念薩婆若是信力、如薩婆若迴向是智力。 末段出正答：信力、慧力等故，能迴向薩婆若。論主隨即訓其名義——念薩婆若者是信力，如薩婆若迴向者是智力；乃至般若波羅蜜亦如是。此二句當合看：信是把心繫在薩婆若上，慧是如薩婆若之實相而迴向，不取其相。二者等而後迴向成，迴向成而後六度具足，六度具足而後無所得般若之行圓。全品自『般若不可盡』問起，答到此處落地——不可盡之般若，行處只在信慧相等的一念迴向之中。
不要讀錯
不要把「不可盡」讀成無限之多。佛的答語是以虛空為喻，而論主明說虛空「無有法，但有名字」。若把不可盡讀成有一個取之不竭的量，則般若便成所得之物，正落在論主所破的『取畢竟空相』之中。不可盡之所以不可盡，是因為本無可盡之法——無生故無滅，無滅故無盡。此義在論主釋色無盡一段說得最明白：若色有生必有盡，以無生故亦無盡。
不要把十二因緣是獨菩薩法讀成二乘不觀十二因緣。經文所標的是「以虛空不可盡法觀十二因緣」這一種觀，不是十二因緣本身。論主分三種而說，第一種是凡夫所見，第二種正是賢聖法眼所分別——二乘不但觀，且逆推老死至於無明，條理分明。所差者只在末一句：但滅苦故入於涅槃，不究盡求諸苦相。獨之所以為獨，在究盡與不究盡，不在觀與不觀。
不要把癡實相即是智慧讀成不必斷癡。論主此語的前提是「若得是無明定相，即是智慧」——是推求無明至於定相不可得處，方說癡相智慧相無異。若略去這個前提而直取結論，便成縱癡之見。況且論主在同一段隨即補上一句：取著智慧相即是癡。可見他所守的分寸極嚴——不但不許執癡為實，連執智慧為實也一併遮了。
不要把破老相讀成否認老。論主所破的是「老」有定相可得，不是老之事不現。他所舉的髮白、齒離、面皺、身曲、羸瘦、力薄、諸根闇塞，件件是人所共見；他的破法也不是說這些不存在，是說這些不能定屬於老——有年壯而白者，有老而諸根明利者。末後以車喻收之：假輪軸轅輻等為車，是假名非實。車仍可乘，老仍會至；所無者只是那個可以指定的老相。
不要把畢竟空之觀讀成與大悲不相干。論主在推破老相、無明之後，緊接的一段不是更空，是生大悲——菩薩觀諸法實相畢竟空無所有無所得，亦不著是事故，於眾生中而生大悲。可見空觀若行得正，其相貌是悲心轉厚而非轉薄。若觀空之後於眾生轉冷，當回看是否著在所觀之空上；著空即是取相，取相即非畢竟空。
不要把軟根利根之判讀成勸人學利根。論主判二種人皆不能具足檀波羅蜜，所判的是偏，不是根。軟根者信多慧少而取相，利根者慧多信少而戲論空法、信力轉薄乃至不用薩婆若——後者之失更近於本論處處所誡的取空。佛所示的正路是「信力、慧力等」，一個等字是全段的判準。讀者若因此段而自輕其信，或自負其慧，兩邊都落在所破之中。
修行作用
第一件受用，是把「云何應生」四字當作讀法來用。須菩提聞般若不可盡而即問云何應生，是不肯讓高義停在讚歎上。日用讀經聞法，凡遇一句高妙之語，可立刻自問一句：此處我應當如何生起、如何下手。答不出來便記著待參，不必先起讚歎。本品全部論段都是對這一問的答覆，可見此問之分量。
第二件受用，是三種十二因緣可作三道自照。今日之中，我於順逆境裡是隨著愛取有而走、未嘗一念回看的嗎——這是第一種。我雖能逆推苦之來處，卻只求離苦便止、不再窮究其根本相嗎——這是第二種。我於老病死之事，是否肯推到『老之定相在何處』而不以憂怖自沒——這是第三種。論主明說第二種是二乘及未得無生忍菩薩所觀，第三種是得無生忍乃至坐道場菩薩所觀，故第三道之照只是識其方向，不必以之自居。
第三件受用，是以老為樣本的推求法可以現前施行。論主不取十二支中最玄遠者，偏取最切身的老來推：先問世人所指的老相是什麼，一一列出；次問這些相是否定屬於老，一一反例；末問去此諸相之外可還有一個老，答曰求之不得。此一套推法可移用於任何一件心上放不下的事——先列其相，次求其定，末看所餘。所餘為空，則執自鬆。
第四件受用，是把『不著是事故生大悲』立為空觀是否走偏的檢驗。行人用功日久，最易生的病是冷。論主給了一個現成的驗方：觀畢竟空而於眾生中生大悲者，是行得正；觀畢竟空而於眾生轉冷、轉輕者，是著在所觀之空上。此驗方不必等到坐道場纔用，日用之中一照即知。
第五件受用，是六度具足的路徑可以立即改換方向。論主說得明白：所以未具足，不是行得少，是諸煩惱障般若之法未折薄、諸魔得便。故欲具足六度者，不必先加倍其行，先看所行是否迴向薩婆若、是否取相、是否戲論空法。而迴向之成，論主又歸到信慧相等——念薩婆若者是信力，如薩婆若迴向者是智力。行人可持此二句自校：我於所作之善，念得到薩婆若嗎；念到之後，是取其相而求報，還是如其實相而迴向。二者俱備，纔是本品所說的具足。
承衍
本品的骨幹，是一段經文與一段論釋。經①自須菩提作念諸佛菩提甚深而白佛問般若波羅蜜不可盡起，佛以虛空不可盡答；次問云何應生，佛以色受想行識、六波羅蜜乃至一切種智不可盡故般若應生答，復以癡空、行空、識空、名色空、六處空、六觸空、受空、愛空、取空、有空、生空、老死憂悲苦惱空一一不可盡故般若應生答，並標十二因緣是獨菩薩法、能除諸邊顛倒、坐道場時應如是觀當得一切種智，以虛空不可盡法觀之則不墮二乘地，轉還者皆離般若波羅蜜念而不得方便力、不轉還者皆得方便力；次說觀十二因緣時不見法無因緣生、不見法常不滅、不見我人壽者命者眾生知者見者、不見無常苦無我寂滅非寂滅，於色受想行識乃至阿耨多羅三藐三菩提亦不見，結以一切法不可得故是為應般若波羅蜜行；次說行無所得般若時惡魔愁毒如箭入心、譬如人新喪父母；須菩提問但一魔抑三千大千世界中魔亦愁毒，佛答諸惡魔皆愁毒各於其坐不能自安、天人阿修羅不能得其便，並說行般若時具足修六波羅蜜；末問云何具足六波羅蜜，佛答所有布施持戒忍辱精進禪定智慧皆迴向薩婆若，結以具足六波羅蜜。論①以釋曰隨文而釋：先補須菩提聞般若種種相之來歷而出般若義無量、名字句眾有量之判；次釋佛說菩提少許分以無能受者，並簡取如相與取畢竟空相皆非；次釋但問不盡義之由；次釋虛空之譬而自出『無所有云何能生』之難，以下皆答此難；次破色之初後中生與生生而歸色真相即般若波羅蜜相；次出無明虛空不可盡一路，明離斷常二邊而說十二因緣空、因緣和合無定性即畢竟空寂滅相、假名中道；次引經語釋觸念不在內外中間而癡實相即是智慧、取著智慧相即是癡；其間立一番問答——問若無無明亦無諸行等云何說十二因緣，答以說十二因緣有三種，一者凡夫肉眼所見，二者賢聖法眼分別而但滅苦入涅槃不究盡求諸苦相，三者菩薩大智利根但求究盡根本相；次以老為樣本逐層推破——老是心不相應行而相不可得、世人所名諸老相皆非定相而諸法和合假名為老如假輪軸轅輻為車、有人言說果報五眾故相名為老而破以念念不住則無故無老、畢竟空中生相不可得何況有老，結以如老乃至無明亦如是；次出菩薩不著是事故於眾生中生大悲；次定三種十二因緣各屬凡夫、二乘及未得無生忍菩薩、得無生忍乃至坐道場菩薩；次回牒經文而訓離諸邊顛倒之目並分諸煩惱為邊與顛倒二分；次明第三觀甚深唯坐道場者能具足而引《城譬喻經》為證；次釋過於二乘得一切種智與退不退皆繫此觀；次破無因與邪因微塵世性，並以虛空常故無生、不與物作因為例；次明屬因緣生不自在故無我乃至無知者見者；次釋安住畢竟空而不見般若是名無所得般若、得是無所得般若則於一切法中得無所障礙般若；次釋諸魔極大愁毒之由而出捕魚人之喻；次釋能行無所得般若則煩惱折薄魔不得便故六波羅蜜得具足；末複述經文之問答，判軟根取相迴向與利根戲論空法二種人皆不能具足檀波羅蜜，結以信力慧力等故能迴向薩婆若、念薩婆若者是信力、如薩婆若迴向者是智力。
本品與前後諸品的義脈，可見者有二線。其一、承前：上品已說三世諸佛用般若得道而般若不盡，本品即承此語而問不可盡之義，故論主釋須菩提之念時逕引「三世諸佛用般若波羅蜜得道，般若故不盡——已不盡、今不盡、當不盡」為其所承，非別起爐灶。其二、垂後：本品末段說行無所得般若則六波羅蜜得具足，而具足之樞在迴向薩婆若與信慧相等；次品即就六度相攝而廣說之，兩品相次，讀者可合觀以見「具足」二字之所指。
古德之釋，本品可誌者二家。吉藏科判此品，以之為般若道與方便道之分界，云：「此下第二明方便道」，並自分其方便道之文云：「初二十三品正明方便因果大用」；其釋品名之由云：「無盡品者，上品已般若無盡，今須菩提更問明此義」，並引論義為據云：「般若若有和有集故有滅有盡，無和無集故無滅無盡」。其釋十二因緣獨菩薩法一句云：「凡夫直順十二不求是非邪正，二乘但知其過盡無我我所，欲滅之入無餘，並不窮因緣之實，菩薩知其本自不生今亦無滅，故非凡夫行非賢聖行，獨菩薩行故名為獨也」——以凡夫、二乘、菩薩三分而釋獨義，與本論所分三種十二因緣同其骨而異其語，並錄不判。其釋離二邊之義云：「就名作空觀即墮斷見中，若作有觀即墮常中，今作因緣觀甚深，便妙悟中道不著斷常，為方便慧體也」；其釋坐道場應如是觀云：「未得無生已來亦作此觀，而未明了具足，得無生觀解明了具足，故云坐道場應如是觀也」——此語與本論「先雖能觀，未能具足」一句相發，兩存之。其釋色無盡云：「色若生故有滅，滅即名盡，以色無生故無滅，所以言無盡也」，與本論破色生一段所歸相近。
慧影釋此品，亦以般若道方便道判之，云：「上來至此明菩薩波若道，自此品已下訖於經末明菩薩方便道」，並引論語為據云：「波若能將菩薩入畢竟空，方便能將菩薩出畢竟空」——此二道之判與吉藏所立同其大勢，而二家各自為語，並錄不判。其釋品名之由云：「上品云：三世諸佛學波若波羅蜜悉皆不盡，已不盡、今不盡、當不盡」，「今此品來為接上文生於下意，明方便道中不可盡義，故名不盡品」——所承與本論釋須菩提之念者同。其釋虛空之譬，別立二種云：「如虗空者有二種：一者世間虗空，二者法性虗空」，是慧影自家之開合，本論未作此分，誌而不判。其釋頭白等非老相云：「此並非老相，乃屬老相家法，非老相也」；其釋捕魚人之喻云：「捕魚人喻魔也，一魚者喻菩薩也」，「深入大水者，喻見菩薩深入諸法實相水也」——皆隨本論之文而配其喻，可與上文逐段解明第三十六段合觀。慧影疏中又自稱本品為「第六十六品者，名為不盡品」，其品次與本帙底本相差一位，而其所用品名又與底本「無盡方便」之全稱、諸異本「無盡」之略稱皆異，成三系並存之局；其品目異稱、諸本分卷與明本所附「經作不可盡品」之夾註，詳考據層，此處不判。
Inexhaustible Skilful Means: Why Space Must Be Used to Answer That Prajñā Is Inexhaustible; Why, When Prajñā Should Arise Because Form Is Inexhaustible, It Is Arising and Not Seeking; Why the Inexhaustibility of the Emptiness of the Twelve Links Can Give Rise to Prajñā; Why the Twelve Links of Causes and Conditions Are a Dharma of the Bodhisattvas Alone; Why Contemplating Thus When Sitting at the Seat of Awakening Is Not What the Beginner Practises; Why Turning Back and Not Turning Back Differ Only by One Power of Skilful Means; Why the Prajñā with Nothing to Be Attained Makes the Evil Māra Feel as Though an Arrow Had Entered His Heart; Why Fulfilling the Six Perfections Lies Only in the One Sentence of Dedicating to Sarvajñā; Why Grasping the Mark of Suchness and Grasping the Mark of Ultimate Emptiness Are Alike Wrong; Why, Space Being without Anything Existent, It Can Still Give Rise to Prajñā; Why Breaking the Four Alternatives of the Arising of Form Comes Back to the True Mark of Form Being the Mark of Prajñā; Why, to Leave the Two Extremes of Annihilation and Permanence, the Emptiness of the Twelve Links of Causes and Conditions Must Be Taught and Provisionally Named the Middle Way; Why, Contact-Thought Being Neither Within nor Without nor in Between, the Real Mark of Delusion Is Precisely Wisdom; Why the Teaching of the Twelve Links of Causes and Conditions Must Be Divided into Three Kinds; Why the Dharma of Old Age Is Ultimately Empty and without a Fixed Mark; Why Contemplating Old Age within Ultimate Emptiness Must Still Give Rise to Great Compassion; Why Only Those Sitting at the Seat of Awakening Can Fulfil the Third Contemplation; Why Retreating and Not Retreating Depend on This Contemplation; Why, Abiding Securely in Ultimate Emptiness, One Does Not See Even Prajñā; Why the Two Kinds of People, of Soft Faculties and of Keen Faculties, Both Cannot Fulfil Dānapāramitā; and Why the Equality of the Power of Faith and the Power of Wisdom Is the Pivot of Dedication
What Is Being Asked
What this chapter asks is an extremely short question: can prajñāpāramitā be exhausted or not? The one who asks is Subhūti, and the occasion is that he first gave rise to a thought—the anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi of the buddhas is very deep. How deep, to what point, he does not say; he only brings forward the three Chinese characters 「不可盡」 tr. "inexhaustible" and asks the Buddha to decide. The Buddha's answer is shorter still: because space is inexhaustible, prajñā is inexhaustible. Between one question and one answer, the frame of this chapter is already set up.
But the second question that comes out next is the real centre of gravity of the whole chapter: since it is inexhaustible, then 「云何應生般若波羅蜜」 tr. "how should one give rise to prajñāpāramitā?" This question matters very much. If prajñā is, like space, without anything existent, it seems a thing with no place to put one's hand; with no place to put one's hand, the practitioner has no way to begin. In the treatise section the treatise-author states this difficulty plainly—if prajñāpāramitā is inexhaustible because, like space, it is without anything existent, how can the bodhisattva give rise to it? How does he give rise, in his mind, to being able to practise and being able to attain? All that this chapter says from here on is an answer to this one difficulty.
The Buddha's answer goes by two roads. The first road speaks of form, of feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness, of the six perfections, and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds: they are inexhaustible, and therefore prajñā should arise. The second road speaks of the twelve links of causes and conditions: the emptiness of delusion, the emptiness of constructions, the emptiness of consciousness, the emptiness of name-and-form, the emptiness of the six sense-bases, the emptiness of the six contacts, the emptiness of feeling, the emptiness of craving, the emptiness of grasping, the emptiness of existence, the emptiness of birth, the emptiness of old age and death, sorrow, grief, suffering, and vexation—each one is inexhaustible, and therefore prajñā should arise. Of the two roads, the second is where this chapter puts its deepest effort—the sūtra text follows at once with 「是十二因緣，是獨菩薩法」 tr. "these twelve links of causes and conditions are a dharma of the bodhisattvas alone," and enjoins that when sitting at the seat of awakening one should contemplate thus. Almost the whole length of the treatise section is spent explaining why the twelve links of causes and conditions can serve as the gate from which prajñā arises.
The twelve links of causes and conditions are originally a dharma contemplated in common by the three vehicles; why are they said here to be a dharma of the bodhisattvas alone? The treatise-author's answer is to speak of them in three kinds: the kind seen by the ordinary person's fleshly eye, the kind distinguished by the Dharma-eye of the worthies and sages, and the kind in which the bodhisattva, with great knowledge and keen faculties, goes through to the end of the root-mark. The first two kinds both work within the twelve links of causes and conditions; the third kind pushes the twelve links of causes and conditions to the place where they are unfindable—taking 「老」 tr. "old age" as the sample, it seeks layer by layer and finds the fixed mark of old age unfindable; old age being unfindable, so on up to ignorance too is unfindable, and thereupon each of the twelve links is like space and inexhaustible. What is inexhaustible is not some thing that can never be used up; it is that there is at root no dharma that could be exhausted. Once this meaning stands, the difficulty of 「云何應生」 tr. "how should one give rise to it?" is resolved: prajñā does not arise out of what exists; it arises from the place where all dharmas are unfindable.
The meaning of the two Chinese characters 「方便」 tr. "skilful means" marked in the chapter's name lies in the latter half. One who contemplates the twelve links of causes and conditions by the dharma of the inexhaustibility of space does not fall to the two vehicles; those who seek the bodhisattva path and turn back all do not obtain this power of skilful means, and those who do not turn back all obtain this power of skilful means—the watershed between retreating and not retreating, the sūtra text says plainly, is only one power of skilful means. At the end of the treatise section this skilful means is further brought down onto the six perfections: one who can practise the prajñā with nothing to be attained has his afflictions broken and thinned, Māra finds no opening, and only then are the six perfections fulfilled; and the pivot of that fulfilment lies in just one sentence—all giving, upholding the precepts, patience, vigour, meditative concentration, and wisdom are dedicated to sarvajñā. The whole chapter begins from 「不可盡」 tr. "inexhaustible" and ends at 「迴向薩婆若」 tr. "dedicating to sarvajñā": from the meaning of inexhaustibility at the highest place, it comes down all the way onto the most plain and solid gate of practice.
Passage by Passage
1. Subhūti has the thought that awakening is very deep, and asks the Buddha whether prajñāpāramitā is inexhaustible. The head of the chapter first records the working of Subhūti's mind: he first thinks 「是諸佛阿耨多羅三藐三菩提甚深，我當問佛」 tr. "this anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi of the buddhas is very deep; I should ask the Buddha," and only after having the thought does he speak to the Buddha. The reader should ask here: why does the sūtra text record even a thought not yet spoken aloud? Because this thought is the cause of the whole chapter—what he asks about is that prajñā is inexhaustible, yet what moves him is that awakening is very deep. Depth and inexhaustibility are two faces of one matter: being deep, its bottom cannot be fathomed; being unfathomable, it cannot be exhausted. Do not read this question as a question of curiosity; it is a question asking for a decision, arising from really seeing a deep dharma.
2. The Buddha answers that because space is inexhaustible, prajñāpāramitā is inexhaustible. The Buddha does not explain why prajñā is inexhaustible; he only changes what it rests on: space is inexhaustible, and therefore prajñā is inexhaustible. The whole force of this answer lies in the two Chinese characters 「虛空」 tr. "space." The inexhaustibility of space is not that its quantity is so great it cannot be used up; it is that there is at root no dharma to be exhausted—there is not a single thing within it that could be diminished. If the reader reads space as something vast and boundless, this answer falls into exaggeration; only if he reads it as without anything existent is this answer a real statement. The words the treatise section explains below, 「如虛空，無有法，但有名字」 tr. "like space, which has no dharma and has only a name," are there precisely to guard against this mistake.
3. Subhūti goes on to ask how one should give rise to prajñāpāramitā. It follows on extremely fast: since it is, like space, inexhaustible, then how should one give rise to it? At this point the sūtra text does not again mark 「白佛言」 tr. "said to the Buddha"; it follows on only with the vocative 「世尊」 tr. "World-Honored One," and it is still Subhūti asking. This question seems to change the subject, but in fact it presses the preceding answer onto the gate of practice—whoever hears of the height and depth of a dharma and does not ask where to enter it has heard and not heard alike. Reading the sūtra up to here, one can examine oneself: when I read 「不可盡」 tr. "inexhaustible," what arose in my mind—was it praise, or was it 「云何應生」 tr. "how should one give rise to it?"
4. The Buddha answers that because form and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds are inexhaustible, prajñāpāramitā should arise. The Buddha's first road of answer begins from the coarsest and nearest place: because form is inexhaustible, prajñā should arise, and feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness likewise; because dānapāramitā is inexhaustible, prajñā should arise, and morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and prajñā likewise; and so on up to: because the omniscience of all kinds is inexhaustible, prajñā should arise. Here one must see the sentence pattern clearly—it is not that one ‘contemplates form as inexhaustible’ and afterwards prajñā arises; it is that the inexhaustibility of form is itself the reason prajñā arises. The three layers set out go from coarse to fine: the five aggregates are the dharmas taken as object, the six perfections are the dharmas that practise, and the omniscience of all kinds is the fruit attained; all three layers are inexhaustible, and therefore there is not a single place that is not a place where prajñā arises.
5. The Buddha answers that because the emptiness of the twelve links is inexhaustible, prajñā should arise; that this is a dharma of the bodhisattvas alone; that when sitting at the seat of awakening one should contemplate thus; that one who contemplates them does not fall to the two vehicles; and that turning back and not turning back both depend on the power of skilful means. The second road of answer turns into the twelve links of causes and conditions and speaks of them link by link: the emptiness of delusion, the emptiness of constructions, the emptiness of consciousness, the emptiness of name-and-form, the emptiness of the six sense-bases, the emptiness of the six contacts, the emptiness of feeling, the emptiness of craving, the emptiness of grasping, the emptiness of existence, the emptiness of birth, the emptiness of old age and death, sorrow, grief, suffering, and vexation—each one is inexhaustible, and therefore prajñā should arise. Below this four meanings come out in succession: that it is a dharma of the bodhisattvas alone; that it is able to remove the extremes and the inversions; that when sitting at the seat of awakening one should contemplate thus and will obtain the omniscience of all kinds; and that one who contemplates it by the dharma of the inexhaustibility of space does not fall to the ground of the two vehicles and abides in anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi. At the end it speaks of the reason for turning back: those who seek the bodhisattva path and turn back have all departed from the thought of prajñāpāramitā, do not know how to contemplate the twelve links of causes and conditions by the dharma of the inexhaustibility of space, and all do not obtain this power of skilful means; those who do not turn back all obtain this power of skilful means. This passage is the bone of the whole chapter; eight or nine tenths of what the treatise section explains lies here. The reader should first remember one thing: what the sūtra text says is not ‘contemplating the emptiness of the twelve links of causes and conditions’; it is 「以虛空不可盡法觀十二因緣」 tr. "contemplating the twelve links of causes and conditions by the dharma of the inexhaustibility of space"—the dharma used is first inexhaustibility, and only then does one contemplate.
6. The Buddha says that in contemplating the twelve links of causes and conditions one does not see any of the marks, does not see even form and so on up to awakening, and that because all dharmas are unfindable this is the practice that corresponds to prajñāpāramitā. The Buddha goes on to speak of the marks of this contemplation, entirely by way of negation: he does not see any dharma that arises without causes and conditions, does not see any dharma that is permanent and does not cease, does not see any dharma that has a self, a person, a life, a living one, a being, a knower, a seer, does not see any dharma as impermanent, suffering, non-self, quiescent or not quiescent. The crucial point is the pairing of the first sentence with the second—he neither sees arising without causes and conditions, nor sees what is permanent and does not cease: the former negates the absence of a cause, the latter negates a permanent cause, and the treatise-author, explaining this passage below, does so precisely by setting these two layers against each other. Below this, not seeing a self or a person and not seeing impermanence, suffering, and non-self likewise negate at both ends, and only so is it not the contemplation of antidotes that breaks permanence with impermanence and breaks self with non-self. Below this it is pushed on to not seeing form and feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness, prajñā, and so on up to awakening, and it closes with 「一切法不可得故，是為應般若波羅蜜行」 tr. "because all dharmas are unfindable, this is the practice that corresponds to prajñāpāramitā." Do not read 「不見」 tr. "does not see" as closing the eyes and not contemplating; it is the natural result of contemplating to the place where the fixed mark is unfindable.
7. The Buddha says that when one practises the prajñā with nothing to be attained, the evil Māra is grieved and pained, as though an arrow had entered his heart, as when a person has newly lost his father and mother. The sūtra text suddenly turns from the dharma of contemplation to the deeds of Māra, and itself brings out two similes: as though an arrow had entered the heart, and as when a person has newly lost his father and mother. The position of this passage is well worth noticing—it comes immediately after 「一切法不可得」 tr. "all dharmas are unfindable." The reason Māra is grieved and pained is precisely that the bodhisattva has already practised to the place where there is nothing to be attained; where there is something to be attained, Māra still has ground on which to put his hand; where there is nothing to be attained, there is no ground on which to put his hand. Both similes take a pain that touches the body closely and do not take an appearance of might and ferocity; they speak of Māra's helplessness, not of Māra's anger.
8. Subhūti asks whether only one Māra is grieved and pained, or whether the Māras in the three-thousand great-thousand world are grieved and pained as well. Subhūti's follow-up question seems to haggle over a number, but in fact it asks about range: what one person's practice of prajñā shakes—is it the realm of one Māra, or the realm of a great-thousand world? Whenever, in reading a sūtra, one sees someone ask about a number, first see whether what he asks about is number or reach. What this question asks about is reach.
9. The Buddha answers that all the evil Māras of the three-thousand great-thousand world are grieved and pained, each unable to be at ease, that gods, humans, and asuras cannot find an opening, and that when practising prajñā one fulfils the cultivation of the six perfections. The Buddha's answer has three parts. First: all the evil Māras are grieved and pained, as though an arrow had entered their hearts, and each upon his own seat cannot be at ease—the four Chinese characters 「各於其坐」 tr. "each upon his own seat" show the state of things most clearly: it is not rising up to attack; it is sitting and being unable to sit still. Second: none in all the world, gods and humans, asuras, can find an opening to cause him sorrow and vexation—since Māra has no place to put his hand, the rest have still less. Third: it turns out the positive benefit: when practising prajñāpāramitā one fulfils the cultivation of the six perfections and fulfils the perfections. This third part is the lead-in to the next passage.
10. Subhūti asks how, when practising prajñā, one fulfils the six perfections. Again a 「云何」 tr. "how." Both of this chapter's great questions are brought out by Subhūti; the first question is 「云何應生」 tr. "how should one give rise to it?", and this question is 「云何具足」 tr. "how does one fulfil them?"—one asks where to enter, one asks about the ground of fruition. Looking at the two questions together, one can see Subhūti's way of asking: hearing a lofty meaning, he must seek its practice; hearing of practice, he must seek its completion.
11. The Buddha answers that all giving, upholding the precepts, patience, vigour, meditative concentration, and wisdom are dedicated to sarvajñā, and this is fulfilling the six perfections. The Buddha's answer is unexpectedly plain and solid: all giving is dedicated to sarvajñā, and this is fulfilling dānapāramitā; upholding the precepts, patience, vigour, meditative concentration, and wisdom are each likewise, and it closes with 「具足六波羅蜜」 tr. "fulfils the six perfections." One must see clearly the two Chinese characters 「所有」 tr. "all" and 「皆」 tr. "every one"—it is not that one fulfils only by giving much; it is that one fulfils only when there is nothing given that is not dedicated. The meaning of fulfilment lies in there being no leakage outside, not in the fullness of quantity. This passage is where the practice of the whole chapter lands; all the meanings of inexhaustibility before it are in the end tied to this one sentence.
12. The treatise explains: Subhūti has heard all kinds of marks of prajñā; the meaning of prajñā is immeasurable, while the collections of names, letters, and phrases are measured. The treatise-author begins his explanation by first supplying the background of Subhūti's question: he has heard all kinds of marks of prajñā from the Buddha—at first he heard 「畢竟空相」 tr. "the mark of ultimate emptiness," in the middle he heard 「囑累」 tr. "entrustment," which seems to be something existent, and later he again heard 「空」 tr. "emptiness" spoken of. What he heard on the three occasions seems to differ from first to last, and therefore there is this question. The treatise-author at once points out the reason for the difference: the meaning of prajñā is immeasurable, while the collections of names, letters, and phrases are measured. This one sentence is the key to reading all sūtras and treatises—one and the same immeasurable meaning, spoken in measured names and phrases, must seem uneven from first to last. When the reader meets words in a sūtra that seem to contradict each other from first to last, let him first take up this meaning and not hastily judge it a contradiction.
13. Subhūti has the thought to ask the reason why it is very deep. The treatise-author restates Subhūti's thought: the awakening of the buddhas is very deep; I should ask the Buddha the reason why it is very deep. Here the two Chinese characters 「所以」 tr. "the reason why" are added, going one layer further than the first sentence of the sūtra section—not only asking about its depth, but asking why it is deep. In reading the sūtras one should learn this question: after knowing that a thing is so, one must ask why it is so; otherwise what one knows is only a sentence of verdict.
14. The treatise-author explains that what the Buddha speaks is a small portion of bodhi, and that grasping the mark of suchness and grasping the mark of ultimate emptiness are both wrong. The treatise-author answers why it is very deep: the awakening the Buddha has spoken of is only a small portion of bodhi, spoken only to break the inversions of beings, not spoken in full, because there is no one able to receive it. Next he brings out two layers of distinction: if someone grasps the mark of 「如」 tr. "suchness," the Buddha says 「如亦空，無生住滅故；若法無生住滅，是法即無」 tr. "suchness too is empty, because it is without arising, abiding, and ceasing; if a dharma is without arising, abiding, and ceasing, this dharma is nothing," and the nature of dharmas and the limit of reality are likewise; if there is someone who grasps ultimate emptiness, he too is said to be wrong, because if ultimate emptiness were a fixed mark that could be grasped, it would not be ultimate emptiness. This passage matters most—grasping emptiness and grasping existence are alike grasping, and are therefore alike wrong. Practitioners mostly know that existence must not be grasped, and few know that emptiness must not be grasped; the treatise-author places 「畢竟空」 tr. "ultimate emptiness" itself among what is broken, and this is the guarding of the Dharma that runs through this treatise throughout.
15. Subhūti keeps in mind that the buddhas of the three times attain the path by prajñā and that prajñā is not exhausted, and therefore asks only about the meaning of not being exhausted. The treatise-author supplies the background of why Subhūti asks only about 「不盡」 tr. "not exhausted": as the Buddha himself says, 「三世諸佛用般若波羅蜜得道，般若故不盡——已不盡、今不盡、當不盡」 tr. "the buddhas of the three times attain the path by means of prajñāpāramitā; because of prajñā it is not exhausted—it has not been exhausted, it is not now exhausted, it will not be exhausted," and therefore he now asks only about the meaning of not being exhausted. That it is not exhausted in any of the three times proves its inexhaustibility from its use: if prajñā could be exhausted, the earlier buddhas would have used it up and the later buddhas would have none to use. Reading this passage, one can know that Subhūti's question does not come out of nowhere; it takes up the Buddha's earlier words and asks for their meaning.
16. The treatise-author explains the Buddha's answer, that as space is not exhausted so prajñā too is not exhausted, and himself raises a difficulty: being without anything existent, how can it give rise? The treatise-author explains the Buddha's answer by simile: like space, which has no dharma and has only a name; prajñāpāramitā is also thus. Having explained this, he at once raises a difficulty himself—if prajñā is inexhaustible because, like space, it is without anything existent, how can the bodhisattva give rise to this prajñā? What is called being able to give rise: how does the bodhisattva give rise, in his mind, to being able to practise and being able to attain? This difficulty is raised extremely well; it asks, on the reader's behalf, the doubt not yet formed in the reader's mind. Whenever, in reading a treatise, one sees the treatise-author raise a difficulty himself, one should know that what is answered below is the proper meaning of this passage; from this difficulty down to the end of the chapter, all is the answer to this one difficulty.
17. The treatise-author explains the Buddha's answer, that because form is inexhaustible prajñā should arise: breaking the arising of form, he comes back to the true mark of form being precisely the mark of prajñā. The treatise-author explains the first road of answer, first breaking the arising of form: the prior arising, the later arising, and the middle arising of form are all unfindable; form as itself arisen form is unfindable, and apart from form, arisen form is unfindable; arising is unfindable, and the arising of arising is unfindable, as was said earlier in 「破生」 tr. "breaking arising." Arising being unfindable, form too is unfindable; because form is unfindable, the arising of form is unfindable. The two dharmas are both unfindable, and therefore form is like an illusion, like a dream, and only deceives the human eye. At the end he brings out the proper meaning: if form had arising, it would certainly have exhaustion; because it is without arising, it is also without exhaustion; the true mark of form is precisely the mark of prajñāpāramitā, and therefore it is said, 「色不可盡，般若波羅蜜亦不可盡」 tr. "form is inexhaustible; prajñāpāramitā too is inexhaustible." Feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness, dānapāramitā, and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds are also thus. One must see clearly the direction of the reasoning in this passage—it is not saying that form is empty and therefore prajñā is empty; it is saying that the true mark of form is precisely the mark of prajñā, and therefore the inexhaustibility of form is precisely the inexhaustibility of prajñā.
18. The treatise-author brings out the second road: because ignorance as space is inexhaustible one should give rise to prajñā; leaving the two extremes of annihilation and permanence, the emptiness of the twelve links of causes and conditions is taught, and it is provisionally named the middle way. The treatise-author turns into the twelve links of causes and conditions, and first says why one must speak from this place: if a person contemplates only ultimate emptiness, he mostly falls into the extreme of annihilation; if he contemplates existence, he mostly falls into the extreme of permanence. In order to leave these two extremes, the emptiness of the twelve links of causes and conditions is spoken of. Why can the twelve links of causes and conditions leave the two extremes? If a dharma arises from the coming together of causes and conditions, it has no fixed nature, and having no fixed nature is precisely the mark of ultimate emptiness and quiescence—because it arises from causes and conditions it is not annihilated; because it has no fixed nature it is not permanent. Because it leaves the two extremes, it is provisionally named the middle way. At the end it is gathered back by the treatise-author's own citing words, 「十二因緣如虛空，無法故不盡」 tr. "the twelve links of causes and conditions are like space: because there is no dharma, they are not exhausted," and he explains that delusion too arises from the coming together of causes and conditions and therefore has no specific mark of its own, and because it has no specific mark of its own it is ultimately empty, like space. This passage is the pivot of the whole treatise section: here the twelve links of causes and conditions are not the marks of flowing on in birth and death; they are the gate of leaving the two extremes.
19. The treatise-author explains that because it arises from causes and conditions it is without reality, that contact-thought is unfindable, and that the real mark of delusion is precisely wisdom. The treatise-author continues to prove that dharmas arisen from causes and conditions are without reality, citing the words of the sūtra, 「因眼緣色生觸念，觸念從癡生」 tr. "in dependence on the eye and conditioned by form, contact-thought arises; contact-thought arises from delusion," and at once pushes it further: contact-thought is not in the eye, not in form, not within, not without, nor in between, nor does it come from the ten directions and the three times; the fixed mark of this dharma is unfindable, because all dharmas enter 「如」 tr. "suchness." Since it is unfindable, then if one obtains the fixed mark of this ignorance, this is precisely wisdom, and it is not called delusion. Therefore the mark of delusion and the mark of wisdom are without difference; the real mark of delusion is precisely wisdom, and to grasp and cling to the mark of wisdom is precisely delusion. At the end it returns to this: the real mark of delusion is of ultimate purity, like space, without arising and without ceasing, and therefore dedicating to awakening is called prajñāpāramitā. This passage is the easiest to misread—it is not saying that delusion simply is wisdom and so need not be cut off; it is saying that when delusion is pushed to its real mark, there is no delusion to be found, while grasping and clinging to the wisdom attained becomes delusion again.
20. Question: If there is no ignorance, and also no constructions and the rest, how can the twelve links of causes and conditions be spoken of? The only exchange of question and answer in this chapter's treatise section is raised here. The difficulty is posed quite rightly: since the fixed mark of delusion is unfindable, and ignorance is not there, then constructions, consciousness, and so on up to old age and death are all not there together—so are not the twelve links of causes and conditions in the sūtras set up in vain? Many who read the meaning of emptiness give rise to this doubt; the treatise-author does not avoid it, but sets up this question directly and then answers. When, in reading a treatise, one meets a ‘Question:’, one should first answer it oneself once and then look at the treatise-author's answer; only then does one know why his answer is so.
21. Answer: The twelve links of causes and conditions are spoken of in three kinds; the first is what the ordinary person sees with the fleshly eye. The treatise-author's way of answering is not to break this difficulty directly but to speak of three kinds—the reason a difficulty becomes a difficulty is often that three kinds have been mixed into one. The first kind is what the ordinary person sees with the fleshly eye: inverted, clinging to the mind of self, he gives rise to the afflictions and deeds, and goes and comes within birth and death. This kind is only being within it bodily without knowing it oneself, and it does not seek out right and wrong in the twelve links of causes and conditions. The reader can shine this on himself: one who, in daily life, goes along with craving, grasping, and existence and has never for a single thought turned back to look—that is this kind.
22. The second: the worthies and sages distinguish with the Dharma-eye, tracing old age and death back to the afflictions and ignorance; they only extinguish suffering and enter nirvāṇa, and do not seek the marks of the sufferings through to the end. The second kind is what the worthies and sages contemplate with the Dharma-eye: seeing old age, sickness, and death, their minds weary of them and they wish to leave the world; they trace back that old age and death come from birth, birth from the afflictions and deeds, and the cause and condition of the afflictions is ignorance. The mark of ignorance is stated here very pointedly—what should be given up is taken, and what should be taken is given up: the afflictions that are the causes and conditions of old age, sickness, and the sufferings should be given up, yet one takes them for the sake of a slight pleasure of inversion; upholding the precepts, meditative concentration, wisdom, and the roots of goodness are originally the causes and conditions of the bliss of nirvāṇa, and should be taken, yet one instead gives them up. Next it makes clear that within this there is no knower, no seer, no maker, but only arising in continuity from false and deceptive causes and conditions; the practitioner, knowing that it is false, deceptive, and unreal, does not give rise to idle discourse, but only extinguishes suffering and so enters nirvāṇa, and does not seek the marks of the sufferings through to the end. The last sentence is the boundary between the second kind and the third—it is not that they cannot seek; it is that they do not seek through to the end.
23. The third: the bodhisattvas, with great knowledge and keen faculties, only seek to go through to the end of the root-mark; the dharma of old age is ultimately empty, and old age as a construction not associated with mind has a mark that is unfindable. The third kind is the bodhisattva-mahāsattvas: because they are people of great knowledge with keen faculties, they only seek to go through to the end of the root-mark of the twelve links of causes and conditions, and 「不以憂怖自沒」 tr. "do not sink themselves in sorrow and fear." Here these six Chinese characters are a distinction set against the second kind—the second kind seeks to leave because it wearies of suffering, and once the mind that wearies of suffering becomes urgent, it stops at extinguishing suffering and pushes no further. The bodhisattva pushes it on, and when he seeks he does not find a fixed mark: the dharma of old age is ultimately empty, and is only provisionally named existent out of what is false and deceptive. The treatise-author at once takes the teaching of one school as an example: those who distinguish the marks of dharmas say 「老是心不相應行」 tr. "old age is a construction not associated with mind," yet this mark is unfindable; a white head and the rest are marks of form, not the mark of old age; the two matters are unfindable, and therefore there is no mark of old age. Taking 「老」 tr. "old age" as the sample for seeking is this treatise's skilful means—among the twelve links, old age and death touch the body most closely; if even what touches the body most closely has no fixed mark, the other links can be known.
24. Again: the marks that the people of the world call old age are none of them fixed marks; dharmas come together and are provisionally named old age, as wheels, axle, shafts, spokes, and the rest are borrowed and named a cart. The treatise-author breaks it again, from the place of worldly feeling. What the people of the world call the marks of old age are hair white, teeth falling out, face wrinkled, body bent, emaciated, strength thin, the faculties dark and blocked. The treatise-author breaks them one by one: white hair is not had only by the old; there are those in the prime of their years whose hair is white and those in old age whose hair is black; emaciation, wrinkling, and bending are likewise; there are people who are old and whose faculties are bright and keen, and who are young and whose faculties are dark and blocked; and again, one who takes the medicine that restores the years, though old, is vigorous. Therefore old age has no fixed mark, and because it has no fixed mark, dharmas come together and are provisionally named old age. At the end comes the simile of the cart: as wheels, axle, shafts, spokes, and the rest are borrowed and named a cart, this is a provisional name and not real. One must see clearly what this simile compares—it is not saying that the cart cannot be used; it is saying that under the name ‘cart’ there is not a single thing that is the cart. Old age is also thus: the matter of old age can be plainly seen, but the mark of old age, when sought, is not found.
25. Again: someone says that the mark of the oldness of the five aggregates of retribution is named old age; the treatise-author breaks this: arising and ceasing thought after thought and not abiding, there is no oldness, and without oldness there is no old age. Someone sets up another teaching: the mark of oldness of the five aggregates of retribution is named old age. The treatise-author judges that this too is not so, and his breaking has two parts. First: all conditioned dharmas arise and cease thought after thought and do not abide; if they do not abide there is no oldness, and without oldness there is no old age—「故」 tr. "oldness" is set up over against 「新」 tr. "new," and if thought after thought nothing abides, there is nothing to be called old. Second: if all conditioned dharmas had abiding, there would be no impermanence; if there were no impermanence, they would be permanent; if they were permanent, there would be no old age—how much less could there be old age within what is neither permanent nor impermanent, within ultimate emptiness! Looked at together, the two parts are one dilemma: set up abiding, and it becomes permanent and there is no old age; set up not-abiding, and there is no oldness and no old age. When reading a treatise one meets such a breaking by dilemma, one should know that the treatise-author is not striking down each point separately; he is sealing off at once every ground on which the other side could stand.
26. Again: within ultimate emptiness even the mark of arising is unfindable, how much less is there old age; as with old age, so on up to ignorance it is likewise. The treatise-author gathers up the meaning of old age: within the ultimate emptiness of dharmas even the mark of arising is unfindable, how much less is there old age. By all kinds of causes and conditions such as these, the dharma of old age is sought and is unfindable; because it is unfindable it is signless, like space, inexhaustible. The last sentence extends the sample—as with old age, so on up to ignorance it is likewise, and breaking ignorance is as said above. At this point the meaning that each of the twelve links is like space and inexhaustible is completed, and the reason behind the sūtra's passage ‘because the emptiness of delusion is inexhaustible, prajñā should arise’ comes out in full.
27. The bodhisattva contemplates the real mark of all dharmas as ultimately empty, without anything existent, with nothing to be attained, and because he does not cling to this matter either, he gives rise to great compassion. At the emptiest place the treatise-author adds one sentence that is the warmest: the bodhisattva contemplates the real mark of all dharmas as ultimately empty, without anything existent, with nothing to be attained, and because he does not cling to this matter either, amid beings he gives rise to great compassion—because beings, through folly and delusion, undergo sufferings and vexations within dharmas that are unreal, inverted, and false. One must see clearly where the compassionate mind comes from: it is not that after contemplating emptiness one separately raises a thought of kindness and compassion; it is because one does not cling even to emptiness that there is room for compassion to arise. If one clings to the emptiness contemplated, the compassionate mind has no way to come forth. This passage is the joint at which this chapter turns from principle into practice.
28. The three kinds of the twelve links of causes and conditions each have the people who contemplate them. The treatise-author turns back to fix the people for the three kinds: the first twelve links of causes and conditions are only for the sake of ordinary people, and within them one does not seek out right and wrong; the second twelve links of causes and conditions are what is contemplated by people of the two vehicles and by bodhisattvas who have not yet obtained the dharma of the acceptance of non-arising; the third twelve links of causes and conditions are what is contemplated by bodhisattvas from the obtaining of the dharma of the acceptance of non-arising and so on up to sitting at the seat of awakening. This passage matters very much: it makes the three kinds above concrete, from ‘three ways of speaking’ into ‘three grades of practitioners’. Here the reader should know for himself where he stands—what is contemplated by one who has not yet obtained the acceptance of non-arising still belongs to the second kind, and he need not take the third kind for his own place; and since the third kind is what is contemplated at the seat of awakening, the sūtra's words 「坐道場時，應如是觀」 tr. "when sitting at the seat of awakening, one should contemplate thus" are not empty talk either.
29. Therefore it is said: because ignorance as space is inexhaustible, and so on up to sorrow, grief, suffering, and vexation as space being inexhaustible, the bodhisattva practises prajñāpāramitā. With the three Chinese characters 「是故說」 tr. "therefore it is said," the treatise-author cites the sūtra text back, tying the meaning of old age and the meaning of ignorance traced out above together to the sūtra's sentence. Whenever one sees the treatise-author cite back with 「是故說」 tr. "therefore it is said," one knows that the explanation above is complete and this is the word of inspection and acceptance. In reading a treatise one can hold this as a marker of paragraphs: before the citing-back sentence is explanation; after it a new meaning begins.
30. The treatise-author glosses leaving the extremes and the inversions: the items of the extremes and the inversions, and the division of the afflictions into two. The treatise-author explains the sūtra's words 「能除諸邊、顛倒」 tr. "able to remove the extremes and the inversions," bringing out their items word by word. The extremes: the extreme of permanence and the extreme of annihilation, the extreme of existence and the extreme of non-existence, the extreme of reality and the extreme of emptiness, the world's having an end, and the like—clinging to the extremes; the inversions: giving rise, within the impermanent, to permanence and the like—the afflictions of the inversions. When one contemplates the dharma of the twelve links of causes and conditions, the extremes and the inversions cease. Next he divides the afflictions into two divisions: first, the people of the outside paths with wrong views are called the extremes; second, the afflictions of the remaining beings are called the inversions. This one distinction is very useful—the extremes are a lopsidedness in views, the inversions are an error in feeling; lopsided views are mostly in the place where one sets up a thesis, errors of feeling are mostly in the place of daily life. That one contemplation extinguishes both is because both alike come from the clinging to fixed marks.
31. The third contemplation is very deep and only those sitting at the seat of awakening can contemplate it; the Sūtra of the Simile of the City is cited as proof. The treatise-author makes plain the great depth of the third contemplation of the twelve links of causes and conditions: only the bodhisattvas sitting at the seat of awakening can contemplate it; though earlier they could contemplate it, they could not yet fulfil it. Next he cites the Sūtra of the Simile of the City as proof; in that sūtra the Buddha relates himself that when he had not yet attained the path he reflected thus—beings are to be pitied, having gone deep into a perilous road, being born again and again, growing old again and again, dying again and again, going and coming in the world without knowing the way out; and further he thought 「何因緣有老死」 tr. "by what causes and conditions is there old age and death?"; as he sought and examined in this way he obtained real wisdom, and knew that birth is the cause and condition of old age and death and the rest. On this basis the treatise-author concludes: the third contemplation is obtained only on sitting at the seat of awakening. This proof is used with great weight—the Buddha's own course of attaining the path is itself a real instance of this contemplation, and so it is not empty talk. Here the reader should keep a measure of caution: being able to contemplate and being able to fulfil the contemplation are not one matter; first one is able and afterwards one fulfils, and it is not reached in a single step.
32. Again, contemplating such a dharma of causes and conditions, one passes beyond the two vehicles and obtains the omniscience of all kinds; retreating and not retreating both depend on this contemplation. The treatise-author takes up the sūtra's benefit: contemplating such a dharma of causes and conditions, one passes beyond the two vehicles and obtains the omniscience of all kinds. Next he explains the reason for retreating: if there are those who retreat from the Buddha path, it is all because they do not obtain this very deep contemplation; if they obtain this contemplation, they do not retreat. Why? Entering deep into ultimate emptiness, one does not see the ground of the śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha, and because one does not see it, one does not abide in it. This answer explains ‘not falling to the two vehicles’ very cleanly—it is not that one sees the ground of the two vehicles and by effort refrains from entering it; it is that one does not see at root that there is such a ground to abide in. Whoever holds to not retreating by the power of will will in the end have a time of retreating; one who does not abide because he does not see—that is truly not retreating.
33. Again: not seeing a single dharma that is fixed and autonomous and arises without causes and conditions; breaking wrong causes and conditions—atoms and the nature of the world. The treatise-author goes on to explain the sūtra's sentence 「不見法無因緣生」 tr. "does not see any dharma that arises without causes and conditions," and supplies its reverse side. One who can contemplate in this way does not see that there is a single dharma, fixed and autonomous, that arises without causes and conditions; all dharmas are not autonomous and all belong to arising from causes and conditions. Next he breaks a class of people: though they see that all dharmas arise from causes and conditions, they hold that they arise from wrong causes and conditions—wrong causes and conditions being atoms, the nature of the world, and the like. Therefore the sūtra says 「不見法無因緣生」 tr. "does not see any dharma that arises without causes and conditions," and the treatise-author further pushes on to its reverse side: nor does one see a dharma arising from permanent causes and conditions (atoms, the nature of the world). At the end he takes space as an example to break permanent causes and conditions: as space is permanent, and because it is permanent it has no arising, and space also does not act as a cause for things, therefore no dharma arises from permanent causes and conditions. The key point of this passage is in dividing two layers—first breaking the absence of a cause, next breaking a wrong cause; breaking the absence of a cause is easy, breaking a wrong cause is hard, because a wrong cause is also a cause, alike in form but not in reality.
34. Again: the bodhisattva contemplates all dharmas as belonging to arising from causes and conditions and not autonomous, and therefore there is no self, and so on up to no knower and no seer. Taking up what precedes with one turn, he brings the meaning of causes and conditions down onto non-self: all dharmas belong to arising from causes and conditions and are not autonomous; because they are not autonomous there is no self, and so on up to no knower and no seer. The reasoning here is very direct—not being autonomous is precisely the definition of non-self; there is not some other self to be broken. If the reader has ever suffered over how hard 「我」 tr. "self" is to break, he can enter from this place—he need not first look for where the self is; he need only see whether what is done and what is undergone are autonomous.
35. At that time the bodhisattva abides securely in the twelve links of causes and conditions of ultimate emptiness and does not see prajñā; this is called the prajñāpāramitā with nothing to be attained. The treatise-author explains the marks of contemplation in the sūtra text: the bodhisattva abides securely in the twelve links of causes and conditions of ultimate emptiness; he does not see all dharmas such as form as existent or non-existent and the like, nor does he see prajñā, nor see practising prajñā by means of this dharma, and so on up to anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi, likewise; this is called the bodhisattva's prajñāpāramitā with nothing to be attained. The last sentence matters most—having obtained this prajñā with nothing to be attained, he then obtains, in all dharmas, the prajñā without any obstruction. Having nothing to be attained is the cause; being without obstruction is the fruit. Only when neither the prajñā that practises nor the dharma practised is seen is there truly nothing obstructing; if one leaves one dharma not seen through and yet takes oneself to have seen, that one dharma is the place of obstruction.
36. At that time the Māras are extremely grieved and pained: the simile of the fisherman. The treatise-author explains why Māra grieves: because this bodhisattva enters deep into the ultimate emptiness of the twelve links of causes and conditions and does not cling to Māra's net of the sixty-two wrong views of existence, non-existence, neither existence nor non-existence, and the rest—the items of these wrong views are not set out in this passage of this treatise, and the reader need not draw them up and supply them on its behalf. Since Māra has no dharma by which to find an opening in the bodhisattva, he is extremely grieved and pained. The treatise-author himself brings out a simile: it is as when a fisherman sees a fish go deep into the great water, where hook and net cannot reach, and he despairs and grieves; it is also like having newly lost father and mother. What the simile compares is Māra's despair and not what Māra is able to do; the reader should not read this passage as Māra's power being fearful. What is fearful lies rather on its opposite side—the only reason Māra has nothing he can do is that the bodhisattva does not cling to a single dharma; the moment he clings, it becomes a mesh of the net.
37. Again: one who can practise the prajñā with nothing to be attained fulfils the six perfections. The treatise-author explains why the six perfections are fulfilled: in practising such a dharma, the afflictions and the dharmas that obstruct prajñā are all broken and thinned, and the people of the Māras cannot find an opening, and therefore the perfections come to be fulfilled; though earlier he practised the six perfections, he had not yet been able to obtain such fulfilment. This passage explains the third part of passage 9 of the sūtra section—why, when practising prajñā, the six perfections are fulfilled of themselves. The answer lies not in practising more, but in the obstructions being thin; when the obstructions are thin, the practice one already has is accomplished naturally. The reader can hold this to examine himself: when the perfections one practises are not fulfilled, most often it is not that one's effort is not diligent, but that the afflictions and the deeds of Māra have not yet been removed.
38. Subhūti asks how one can practise such prajñā and fulfil the perfections. The treatise-author, in the form of narration, cites back the sūtra's question: Subhūti asks the World-Honored One how the bodhisattva can practise such prajñāpāramitā and can fulfil dānapāramitā and the other perfections. Although this takes the form of question and answer, it is the treatise-author restating passage 10 of the sūtra section, not setting up a separate exchange of question and answer. In reading a treatise one should keep apart two things, the question the treatise-author sets up himself and the restated question of the sūtra—in the former the treatise-author means to break and to establish; in the latter he only explains following the sūtra text.
39. The Buddha answers of two kinds of people: those of soft faculties who grasp at marks in dedicating, and those of keen faculties who make idle discourse of the dharma of emptiness, both cannot fulfil dānapāramitā. The treatise-author explains the sūtra's sentence 「所有布施皆迴向薩婆若」 tr. "all giving is dedicated to sarvajñā," and points out that there are two kinds of people who cannot yet fulfil it: those of soft faculties, whether they give little or much, all grasp at marks and dedicate it to anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi; those of keen faculties break this grasping at marks yet make idle discourse of the dharma of emptiness, their power of faith turns thin, they do not use sarvajñā, and only seek the real mark of all dharmas. These two kinds of people both cannot fulfil dānapāramitā—the first because the power of faith is much and the power of wisdom little, the second because the power of wisdom is much and the power of faith little. This passage is the place in the whole chapter that bears most closely on people today: doing good while grasping at marks, and talking of emptiness while abandoning practice—the treatise-author judges both alike as not fulfilling, and judges very evenly—he does not say that those of soft faculties are inferior and those of keen faculties superior; he only says that each leans to one side.
40. The Buddha now says that because the power of faith and the power of wisdom and the rest are equal one can dedicate to sarvajñā: keeping sarvajñā in mind is the power of faith; dedicating in the manner of sarvajñā is the power of knowledge. The last passage brings out the proper answer: because the power of faith and the power of wisdom and the rest are equal, one is able to dedicate to sarvajñā. The treatise-author at once glosses their names and meanings—keeping sarvajñā in mind is the power of faith; dedicating in the manner of sarvajñā is the power of knowledge; and so on up to prajñāpāramitā, likewise. These two sentences should be looked at together: faith is tying the mind to sarvajñā; wisdom is dedicating in accordance with the real mark of sarvajñā, not grasping at its mark. Only when the two are equal is dedication accomplished; only when dedication is accomplished are the six perfections fulfilled; only when the six perfections are fulfilled is the practice of the prajñā with nothing to be attained complete. The whole chapter begins its questioning from ‘prajñā is inexhaustible’, and in its answer lands at this point—the inexhaustible prajñā is practised only within a single thought of dedication in which faith and wisdom are equal.
Do Not Misread
Do not read 「不可盡」 tr. "inexhaustible" as infinitely many. The Buddha's answer uses space as its simile, and the treatise-author says plainly that space 「無有法，但有名字」 tr. "has no dharma and has only a name." If one reads inexhaustible as there being a quantity that can never be drawn dry, then prajñā becomes a thing attained, and falls exactly into ‘grasping the mark of ultimate emptiness’, which the treatise-author breaks. The reason the inexhaustible is inexhaustible is that there is originally no dharma to be exhausted—without arising, therefore without ceasing; without ceasing, therefore without exhaustion. This meaning is said most clearly in the treatise-author's passage explaining the inexhaustibility of form: if form had arising, it would certainly have exhaustion; because it is without arising, it is also without exhaustion.
Do not read ‘the twelve links of causes and conditions are a dharma of the bodhisattvas alone’ as meaning that the two vehicles do not contemplate the twelve links of causes and conditions. What the sūtra text marks out is the one contemplation 「以虛空不可盡法觀十二因緣」 tr. "contemplating the twelve links of causes and conditions by the dharma of the inexhaustibility of space," not the twelve links of causes and conditions themselves. The treatise-author speaks of three kinds; the first kind is what the ordinary person sees, and the second kind is precisely what the worthies and sages distinguish with the Dharma-eye—the two vehicles not only contemplate it but trace old age and death back to ignorance, in clear order. What they lack lies only in the last sentence: they only extinguish suffering and so enter nirvāṇa, and do not seek the marks of the sufferings through to the end. What makes ‘alone’ alone lies in going through to the end or not going through to the end, not in contemplating or not contemplating.
Do not read ‘the real mark of delusion is precisely wisdom’ as meaning that delusion need not be cut off. The premise of the treatise-author's words is 「若得是無明定相，即是智慧」 tr. "if one obtains the fixed mark of this ignorance, this is precisely wisdom"—only when ignorance has been sought to the place where its fixed mark is unfindable does he say that the mark of delusion and the mark of wisdom are without difference. If one leaves out this premise and takes the conclusion directly, it becomes a view that indulges delusion. Moreover, in the same passage the treatise-author at once adds a sentence: to grasp and cling to the mark of wisdom is precisely delusion. One can see that the measure he keeps is very strict—not only does he not allow clinging to delusion as real; he also negates clinging to wisdom as real.
Do not read the breaking of the marks of old age as denying old age. What the treatise-author breaks is that 「老」 tr. "old age" has a fixed mark that can be found, not that the matter of old age does not appear. The hair white, teeth falling out, face wrinkled, body bent, emaciated, strength thin, the faculties dark and blocked that he lists are each things everyone sees; nor is his way of breaking them to say that these do not exist; it is to say that these cannot be fixedly assigned to old age—there are those in the prime of their years who are white, there are those who are old and whose faculties are bright and keen. At the end he gathers it with the simile of the cart: wheels, axle, shafts, spokes, and the rest are borrowed and named a cart; this is a provisional name and not real. The cart can still be ridden, and old age will still come; what is not there is only that mark of old age that could be pointed to and fixed.
Do not read the contemplation of ultimate emptiness as having nothing to do with great compassion. After the treatise-author has broken the mark of old age and ignorance, the passage that follows immediately is not something emptier; it is giving rise to great compassion—the bodhisattva contemplates the real mark of all dharmas as ultimately empty, without anything existent, with nothing to be attained, and because he does not cling to this matter either, amid beings he gives rise to great compassion. One can see that if the contemplation of emptiness is practised rightly, its appearance is that the compassionate mind grows thicker, not thinner. If after contemplating emptiness one grows cold toward beings, one should look back and see whether one is clinging to the emptiness contemplated; clinging to emptiness is precisely grasping at marks, and grasping at marks is not ultimate emptiness.
Do not read the judgement on soft faculties and keen faculties as urging people to learn to be of keen faculties. The treatise-author judges that both kinds of people cannot fulfil dānapāramitā; what he judges is the leaning, not the faculties. Those of soft faculties have much faith and little wisdom, and grasp at marks; those of keen faculties have much wisdom and little faith, make idle discourse of the dharma of emptiness, and their power of faith turns thin, to the point of not using sarvajñā—the fault of the latter is nearer to the grasping at emptiness that this treatise warns against everywhere. The right road the Buddha shows is 「信力、慧力等」 tr. "the power of faith and the power of wisdom are equal," and the one word ‘equal’ is the standard of judgement for the whole passage. If, because of this passage, the reader belittles his own faith or prides himself on his own wisdom, either way he falls within what is broken.
Bearing on Practice
The first use is to take the four Chinese characters 「云何應生」 tr. "how should one give rise to it?" as a way of reading. Subhūti, hearing that prajñā is inexhaustible, at once asks how one should give rise to it; he is unwilling to let a lofty meaning stop at praise. In daily life, reading the sūtras and hearing the Dharma, whenever one meets a lofty and wondrous sentence, one can at once ask oneself: here, how should I give rise to it, and where should I begin? If one cannot answer, keep it in mind to be investigated, and do not first give rise to praise. The whole treatise section of this chapter is the reply to this one question, and from this one can see the weight of this question.
The second use is that the three kinds of the twelve links of causes and conditions can serve as three ways of shining on oneself. Today, in favourable and adverse circumstances, did I go along with craving, grasping, and existence and never for a single thought turn back to look—this is the first kind. Though I can trace back where suffering comes from, do I seek only to leave suffering and then stop, no longer searching to the end for its root-mark—this is the second kind. In the matter of old age, sickness, and death, am I willing to push on to ‘where is the fixed mark of old age’ and not sink myself in sorrow and fear—this is the third kind. The treatise-author says plainly that the second kind is what is contemplated by the two vehicles and by bodhisattvas who have not yet obtained the acceptance of non-arising, and the third kind is what is contemplated by bodhisattvas from obtaining the acceptance of non-arising and so on up to sitting at the seat of awakening; so the third way of shining is only for recognising its direction, and one need not take it as one's own place.
The third use is that the method of seeking with old age as the sample can be put into practice here and now. The treatise-author does not take the most remote and abstruse of the twelve links, but deliberately takes old age, which touches the body most closely, to push through: first he asks what the marks of old age pointed to by the people of the world are, and lists them one by one; next he asks whether these marks are fixedly assigned to old age, and gives counter-examples one by one; last he asks whether, apart from these marks, there is still an old age, and answers that when sought it is not found. This whole method of pushing through can be transferred to any matter the mind cannot let go of—first list its marks, next seek whether they are fixed, last look at what remains. If what remains is empty, the clinging loosens of itself.
The fourth use is to set up ‘because he does not cling to this matter, he gives rise to great compassion’ as the test of whether the contemplation of emptiness has gone astray. When a practitioner has applied effort for a long time, the sickness most easily arising is coldness. The treatise-author has given a ready-made test: one who contemplates ultimate emptiness and amid beings gives rise to great compassion is practising rightly; one who contemplates ultimate emptiness and grows colder and lighter toward beings is clinging to the emptiness contemplated. This test need not wait until one sits at the seat of awakening to be used; in daily life one shines it and at once knows.
The fifth use is that the path to fulfilling the six perfections can change direction at once. The treatise-author says it plainly: the reason they are not yet fulfilled is not that one has practised too little; it is that the afflictions and the dharmas that obstruct prajñā have not yet been broken and thinned, and the Māras find an opening. Therefore one who wishes to fulfil the six perfections need not first double his practice; let him first see whether what he practises is dedicated to sarvajñā, whether it grasps at marks, whether it makes idle discourse of the dharma of emptiness. And the accomplishment of dedication the treatise-author further returns to the equality of faith and wisdom—keeping sarvajñā in mind is the power of faith; dedicating in the manner of sarvajñā is the power of knowledge. The practitioner can take these two sentences to check himself: in the good I do, does my mind reach to sarvajñā? And having reached it, do I grasp at its mark and seek a reward, or do I dedicate in accordance with its real mark? Only when both are present is it the fulfilment of which this chapter speaks.
Further Resonances
The backbone of this chapter is one section of sūtra text and one section of treatise explanation. Sūtra ① begins from Subhūti having the thought that the awakening of the buddhas is very deep and asking the Buddha whether prajñāpāramitā is inexhaustible, and the Buddha answers with space being inexhaustible; next he asks how one should give rise to it, and the Buddha answers that because form, feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness, the six perfections, and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds are inexhaustible, prajñā should arise, and further answers that because the emptiness of delusion, the emptiness of constructions, the emptiness of consciousness, the emptiness of name-and-form, the emptiness of the six sense-bases, the emptiness of the six contacts, the emptiness of feeling, the emptiness of craving, the emptiness of grasping, the emptiness of existence, the emptiness of birth, and the emptiness of old age and death, sorrow, grief, suffering, and vexation are each inexhaustible, prajñā should arise, and marks out that the twelve links of causes and conditions are a dharma of the bodhisattvas alone, able to remove the extremes and the inversions, that when sitting at the seat of awakening one should contemplate thus and will obtain the omniscience of all kinds, that one who contemplates them by the dharma of the inexhaustibility of space does not fall to the ground of the two vehicles, and that those who turn back have all departed from the thought of prajñāpāramitā and do not obtain the power of skilful means, while those who do not turn back all obtain the power of skilful means; next it says that in contemplating the twelve links of causes and conditions one does not see any dharma arising without causes and conditions, does not see any dharma permanent and not ceasing, does not see a self, a person, a life, a living one, a being, a knower, a seer, does not see impermanence, suffering, non-self, quiescence or non-quiescence, and does not see form, feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness, and so on up to anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi either, closing with: because all dharmas are unfindable, this is the practice that corresponds to prajñāpāramitā; next it says that when one practises the prajñā with nothing to be attained the evil Māra is grieved and pained, as though an arrow had entered his heart, as when a person has newly lost his father and mother; Subhūti asks whether only one Māra, or also the Māras in the three-thousand great-thousand world, are grieved and pained, and the Buddha answers that all the evil Māras are grieved and pained, each upon his own seat unable to be at ease, that gods, humans, and asuras cannot find an opening, and says that when practising prajñā one fulfils the cultivation of the six perfections; at the end he asks how one fulfils the six perfections, and the Buddha answers that all giving, upholding the precepts, patience, vigour, meditative concentration, and wisdom are dedicated to sarvajñā, closing with fulfilling the six perfections. Treatise ① explains following the text with ‘The treatise explains’: first it supplies the background of Subhūti's having heard all kinds of marks of prajñā, and brings out the judgement that the meaning of prajñā is immeasurable while the collections of names, letters, and phrases are measured; next it explains that the Buddha speaks a small portion of bodhi because there is no one able to receive it, and distinguishes that grasping the mark of suchness and grasping the mark of ultimate emptiness are both wrong; next it explains why only the meaning of not being exhausted is asked; next it explains the simile of space and itself raises the difficulty ‘being without anything existent, how can it give rise?’, all that follows answering this difficulty; next it breaks the prior, later, and middle arising of form and the arising of arising, and comes back to the true mark of form being precisely the mark of prajñāpāramitā; next it brings out the road of ignorance as space being inexhaustible, making clear that to leave the two extremes of annihilation and permanence the emptiness of the twelve links of causes and conditions is taught, that the coming together of causes and conditions, having no fixed nature, is precisely the mark of ultimate emptiness and quiescence, and that it is provisionally named the middle way; next it cites the words of the sūtra to explain that contact-thought is not within, without, or in between and that the real mark of delusion is precisely wisdom, while grasping and clinging to the mark of wisdom is precisely delusion; in between it sets up one exchange of question and answer—the question, if there is no ignorance and also no constructions and the rest, how can the twelve links of causes and conditions be spoken of; the answer, that the twelve links of causes and conditions are spoken of in three kinds: first, what the ordinary person sees with the fleshly eye; second, what the worthies and sages distinguish with the Dharma-eye, who only extinguish suffering and enter nirvāṇa and do not seek the marks of the sufferings through to the end; third, the bodhisattvas with great knowledge and keen faculties, who only seek to go through to the end of the root-mark; next, with old age as the sample, it breaks layer by layer—that old age is a construction not associated with mind and yet its mark is unfindable; that the marks of old age named by the people of the world are none of them fixed marks, and that dharmas come together and are provisionally named old age, as wheels, axle, shafts, spokes are borrowed and named a cart; that someone says the mark of the oldness of the five aggregates of retribution is named old age, broken by: not abiding thought after thought, there is no oldness and no old age; that within ultimate emptiness even the mark of arising is unfindable, how much less is there old age—closing with: as with old age, so on up to ignorance it is likewise; next it brings out that the bodhisattva, because he does not cling to this matter, gives rise to great compassion amid beings; next it fixes the three kinds of the twelve links of causes and conditions as belonging respectively to ordinary people; to the two vehicles and bodhisattvas who have not yet obtained the acceptance of non-arising; and to bodhisattvas from obtaining the acceptance of non-arising and so on up to sitting at the seat of awakening; next it cites the sūtra text back and glosses the items of leaving the extremes and the inversions, dividing the afflictions into the two divisions of the extremes and the inversions; next it makes clear that the third contemplation is very deep and only those sitting at the seat of awakening can fulfil it, citing the Sūtra of the Simile of the City as proof; next it explains passing beyond the two vehicles and obtaining the omniscience of all kinds, and that retreating and not retreating both depend on this contemplation; next it breaks the absence of a cause and the wrong causes of atoms and the nature of the world, taking as an example that space, because permanent, has no arising and does not act as a cause for things; next it makes clear that because they belong to arising from causes and conditions and are not autonomous, there is no self, and so on up to no knower and no seer; next it explains that abiding securely in ultimate emptiness and not seeing prajñā is called the prajñā with nothing to be attained, and that having obtained this prajñā with nothing to be attained one obtains, in all dharmas, the prajñā without any obstruction; next it explains the reason the Māras are extremely grieved and pained, and brings out the simile of the fisherman; next it explains that one who can practise the prajñā with nothing to be attained has his afflictions broken and thinned, Māra finds no opening, and therefore the six perfections come to be fulfilled; at the end it restates the sūtra's question and answer, judges that the two kinds of people—those of soft faculties who grasp at marks in dedicating and those of keen faculties who make idle discourse of the dharma of emptiness—both cannot fulfil dānapāramitā, and closes with: because the power of faith and the power of wisdom and the rest are equal one is able to dedicate to sarvajñā; keeping sarvajñā in mind is the power of faith; dedicating in the manner of sarvajñā is the power of knowledge.
The lines of meaning between this chapter and the chapters before and after it can be seen in two threads. First, continuing what precedes: the preceding chapter has already said that the buddhas of the three times attain the path by prajñā and that prajñā is not exhausted; this chapter takes up these words and asks about the meaning of being inexhaustible, and so the treatise-author, explaining Subhūti's thought, directly cites 「三世諸佛用般若波羅蜜得道，般若故不盡——已不盡、今不盡、當不盡」 tr. "the buddhas of the three times attain the path by means of prajñāpāramitā; because of prajñā it is not exhausted—it has not been exhausted, it is not now exhausted, it will not be exhausted" as what it continues from, not setting up a separate stove. Second, reaching to what follows: the last section of this chapter says that one who practises the prajñā with nothing to be attained fulfils the six perfections, and that the pivot of fulfilment lies in dedicating to sarvajñā and in the equality of faith and wisdom; the next chapter speaks broadly of this in terms of the six perfections containing one another; the two chapters stand in sequence, and the reader can view them together to see what the two Chinese characters 「具足」 tr. "fulfil" point to.
Of the explanations of the ancient masters, two can be recorded for this chapter. Jizang, in his division of this chapter, takes it as the boundary between the path of prajñā and the path of skilful means, saying: 「此下第二明方便道」 tr. "From here on, the second makes clear the path of skilful means," and himself divides the text of his path of skilful means, saying: 「初二十三品正明方便因果大用」 tr. "The first twenty-three chapters properly make clear the great function of cause and fruit of skilful means"; explaining the reason for the chapter's name he says: 「無盡品者，上品已般若無盡，今須菩提更問明此義」 tr. "As for the chapter ‘The Inexhaustible’: the preceding chapter has already said that prajñā is inexhaustible, and now Subhūti asks further to make this meaning clear," and cites the meaning of the treatise as grounds, saying: 「般若若有和有集故有滅有盡，無和無集故無滅無盡」 tr. "If prajñā had combining and had gathering, it would therefore have ceasing and have exhaustion; being without combining and without gathering, it is without ceasing and without exhaustion." Explaining the sentence ‘the twelve links of causes and conditions are a dharma of the bodhisattvas alone’, he says: 「凡夫直順十二不求是非邪正，二乘但知其過盡無我我所，欲滅之入無餘，並不窮因緣之實，菩薩知其本自不生今亦無滅，故非凡夫行非賢聖行，獨菩薩行故名為獨也」 tr. "Ordinary people simply go along with the twelve and do not seek out right and wrong, false and correct; the two vehicles only know their faults, exhaust self and what belongs to self, wish to extinguish them and enter the remainderless, and do not search out the reality of causes and conditions; the bodhisattva knows that they originally do not arise and now also do not cease; therefore it is not the practice of ordinary people, not the practice of the worthies and sages; being the practice of the bodhisattva alone, it is called ‘alone’."—explaining the meaning of ‘alone’ by the threefold division of ordinary people, the two vehicles, and bodhisattvas, it shares its bone with the three kinds of the twelve links of causes and conditions divided in this treatise but differs in wording; they are recorded side by side without judgement. Explaining the meaning of leaving the two extremes, he says: 「就名作空觀即墮斷見中，若作有觀即墮常中，今作因緣觀甚深，便妙悟中道不著斷常，為方便慧體也」 tr. "If, going by the name, one makes the contemplation of emptiness, one falls into the view of annihilation; if one makes the contemplation of existence, one falls into permanence; now one makes the contemplation of causes and conditions, which is very deep, and then wondrously awakens to the middle way, not clinging to annihilation or permanence; this is the substance of the wisdom of skilful means." Explaining ‘when sitting at the seat of awakening one should contemplate thus’, he says: 「未得無生已來亦作此觀，而未明了具足，得無生觀解明了具足，故云坐道場應如是觀也」 tr. "From before obtaining non-arising one also makes this contemplation, but not yet clearly and fully; on obtaining non-arising, the understanding of the contemplation is clear and full; therefore it says that when sitting at the seat of awakening one should contemplate thus."—these words and this treatise's sentence 「先雖能觀，未能具足」 tr. "though earlier they could contemplate it, they could not yet fulfil it" bring each other out; both are kept. Explaining the inexhaustibility of form, he says: 「色若生故有滅，滅即名盡，以色無生故無滅，所以言無盡也」 tr. "If form arises, it therefore has ceasing, and ceasing is called exhaustion; because form is without arising it is without ceasing, and that is why it is said to be inexhaustible," which is close to where this treatise's passage breaking the arising of form comes back to.
Huiying, explaining this chapter, also judges it by the path of prajñā and the path of skilful means, saying: 「上來至此明菩薩波若道，自此品已下訖於經末明菩薩方便道」 tr. "From the beginning up to here makes clear the bodhisattva's path of prajñā; from this chapter down to the end of the sūtra makes clear the bodhisattva's path of skilful means," and cites the words of the treatise as grounds, saying: 「波若能將菩薩入畢竟空，方便能將菩薩出畢竟空」 tr. "Prajñā can lead the bodhisattva into ultimate emptiness; skilful means can lead the bodhisattva out of ultimate emptiness"—this judgement of the two paths shares its broad direction with what Jizang sets up, while the two masters each speak in their own words; they are recorded side by side without judgement. Explaining the reason for the chapter's name, he says: 「上品云：三世諸佛學波若波羅蜜悉皆不盡，已不盡、今不盡、當不盡」 tr. "The preceding chapter says: the buddhas of the three times train in prajñāpāramitā, and all of it is not exhausted—it has not been exhausted, it is not now exhausted, it will not be exhausted," and 「今此品來為接上文生於下意，明方便道中不可盡義，故名不盡品」 tr. "Now this chapter comes in order to join the text above and give rise to the meaning below, making clear the meaning of inexhaustibility within the path of skilful means; therefore it is named the chapter ‘Not Exhausted’"—what it continues from is the same as what this treatise continues from in explaining Subhūti's thought. Explaining the simile of space, he sets up two kinds of his own, saying: 「如虗空者有二種：一者世間虗空，二者法性虗空」 tr. "As for ‘like space’, there are two kinds: first, worldly space; second, the space of the nature of dharmas"; this is Huiying's own opening and closing, and this treatise does not make this division; it is recorded and not judged. Explaining that a white head and the rest are not the mark of old age, he says: 「此並非老相，乃屬老相家法，非老相也」 tr. "These are none of them the mark of old age; they belong to the dharmas of the house of the mark of old age, and are not the mark of old age"; explaining the simile of the fisherman, he says: 「捕魚人喻魔也，一魚者喻菩薩也」 tr. "The fisherman stands for Māra; the one fish stands for the bodhisattva," and 「深入大水者，喻見菩薩深入諸法實相水也」 tr. "‘Going deep into the great water’ stands for seeing the bodhisattva go deep into the water of the real mark of all dharmas"—in all of these he follows the text of this treatise and matches the similes to it, and they can be looked at together with passage 36 of the Passage by Passage above. In his commentary Huiying also himself calls this chapter 「第六十六品者，名為不盡品」 tr. "the sixty-sixth chapter, named the chapter ‘Not Exhausted’"; his chapter sequence differs by one place from the base text of this edition, and the chapter name he uses differs again both from the base text's full name 「無盡方便」 tr. "Inexhaustible Skilful Means" and from the variant texts' short name 「無盡」 tr. "The Inexhaustible," forming a situation in which three lines stand side by side; the variant names of the chapter heading, the division of fascicles among the texts, and the interlinear note appended in the Ming edition, 「經作不可盡品」 tr. "the sūtra has the chapter ‘Cannot Be Exhausted’," are examined in detail in the Apparatus, and are not judged here.