大智度論 義疏通講 · 冊9Dazhidulun — Mahāprajñāpāramitā-upadeśa · Exposition Throughout · Vol. 9
佛母品The Mother of the Buddhas
全文五層 →Full five layers →佛母品：諸佛既行寂滅何以守護持經者，母子喻何以立般若為母，須菩提問四而佛答三何以不為缺，餘經說五眾破壞而此說不破不壞何以不相違，畢竟空中無心心數法佛何以能知眾生心，廣大無量不可見四心何以皆以無定相釋，五眼不見心何以反成如實知，出沒屈申何以攝盡十四難，外道世性微塵自然天主諸說何以同名邪因，諸法如相層層相即何以終歸一如不二
在問什麼
前品說十方諸佛及大菩薩擁護般若、不令魔得其便。論主替聽者讀出了一個疑：諸佛的菩提是寂滅之相，對諸法及眾生無憎無愛，既然無憎無愛，為什麼要偏偏擁護書寫受持般若的人？本品開篇的母子喻，就是佛為這個疑所設的答。一位母親生了五個、十個乃至一千個兒子，母親病了，兒子們各各勤求救療，怕風寒冷熱、蚊虻蛇蚖侵犯母身，常求樂具供養其母——為什麼？因為她「生育我等，示我世間」。諸佛之於般若，正是諸子之於母：般若能生諸佛、能與諸佛一切智、能示世間相，所以諸佛雖行寂滅，仍以佛眼常視深般若，並及於書持般若的人。品名「佛母」，立處在此。
一個喻立起來，隨即帶出全品的兩條主脈。其一是「能生諸佛」：般若中出生十力乃至十八不共法、一切種智，得是諸法故名為佛。其二是「能示世間相」：五眾是世間相，而般若示五眾不破不壞、不生不滅、不垢不淨、不增不減、不入不出、不在三世——這一句立刻與餘經「五眾破壞，故名世間。」相撞，論主也就在此自設一問；論主答之以大小乘說法之異。
第二脈再往下走，便是全品分量最重的一段：佛因般若「悉知無量無邊阿僧祇眾生心所行」。深般若中無眾生、無色乃至無一切智，而佛偏能如實知一切眾生的心——攝心亂心、染心瞋心癡心、無染無瞋無癡心、廣心、大心、無量心、不可見心，卷七十續以出、沒、屈、申收盡。須菩提一事一事地問，佛一事一事地答，答語幾乎全是同一個句法：不見這個、不見那個，因為心性無故。這正是本品最需要看清的地方——佛的「如實知」，知的不是心的某一種相，而是心的無定相。
卷七十轉入出沒屈申，經文以依色、依受、依想、依行、依識的格式，把神及世間常、無常、亦常亦無常、非常非無常四句逐陰重列，又列世間有邊無邊四句、神即身異身、死後如去四句——即外道十四難。論主隨之廣列外道各家：神常神無常之二論、常無常與非常非無常之折衷、世性、微塵、自然、天主四種世間本源說、八方上下之有邊無邊諸說、神如芥子如米與神遍滿虛空之兩極、如去不如去之四句。列得極詳，收得極簡：佛言皆緣五眾、依止五眾，無神、無常。末後以「如」收束一切：五眾如即一切法如，六波羅蜜如、三十七品如乃至諸佛如，皆是一如相，不二不別；得是如相故，佛名如來。開篇問的是『般若何以能生諸佛、能示世間相』，結尾答的就是這個「如」。
逐段解明
一、母人有子喻——全品之根。 佛不先說道理，先說一位母親。子有五、十乃至千，數目一路加上去，是要顯出無論多少兒子都同出一母；母中得病，諸子各各勤求救療，怕的是風寒冷熱、蚊虻蛇蚖。這個喻的樞紐在諸子自道的理由：「生育我等，示我世間。」生育是「能生」，示世間是「能示」——喻的兩個支點，正是下文般若的兩種功德。於是佛翻出所喻：佛常以佛眼視是深般若波羅蜜，十方現在諸佛亦以佛眼常視，因為般若能生諸佛、能與諸佛一切智、能示世間相。再往下推一層：般若能生禪波羅蜜乃至檀波羅蜜、能生內空乃至無法有法空、能生四念處乃至八聖道分、能生佛十力乃至一切種智，乃至能生須陀洹、斯陀含、阿那含、阿羅漢、辟支佛、諸佛；三世諸佛之得菩提，皆因深般若因緣故得。最後落到人身上：書是深般若乃至正憶念者，諸佛常以佛眼視是人；求菩薩道者，十方佛常守護，令不退轉。喻起於母病、終於護人——守護行般若的人，就是諸子救母。
二、須菩提問四。 須菩提牒佛所說而問四事：般若云何能生諸佛、云何能示世間相、云何諸佛從般若生、云何諸佛說世間相。問得這樣分細，是因為「能生」與『從生』在語法上是兩個方向，聽者容易當成兩件事。這四問是下文論主一段問答的張本。
三、佛答能生諸佛、五眾是世間相。 佛答得極省：深般若中生佛十力乃至十八不共法、一切種智，得是諸法故名為佛——「佛」不是一個先在的人得了般若，而是得此諸法方名為佛，所以說般若能生諸佛。世間相則一句點出：諸佛說五眾是世間相。不說天地，不說眾生，只說五眾——世間的實際內容就是這五樣。
四、示五眾相之問與答——不示破壞。 須菩提再問：般若中云何說五眾相、云何示五眾？佛的答語全是遮遣：不示五眾破、不示五眾壞，不示生滅、不示垢淨、不示增減、不示入出、不示過去未來現在。何以如此？佛自說因緣：空相不破不壞，無相相、無作相不破不壞，不起法、不生法、無所有法性法不破不壞——所示的相就是這樣。要緊的是那句「相如是示」：不是不示，是所示之相本來如此。般若示世間，示的是世間的不破不壞相。
五、般若中無眾生無色乃至不示一切種智。 佛續說：諸佛因深般若悉知無量無邊阿僧祇眾生心所行；而這深般若中無眾生、無眾生名，無色、無色名，無受想行識及名，無眼乃至無意，無眼識乃至無意識，無眼觸乃至無意觸，乃至無一切智、無一切智名——如是能示世間相。接著再進一步：深般若亦不示色、不示受想行識乃至不示一切種智，因為「是深般若波羅蜜中尚無般若波羅蜜，何況色乃至一切種智」。一面說悉知，一面說無、說不示，這不是自語相違：無所示故無所不示，正因為般若中連般若都不可得，它所示的世間相才不落在任何一法上。
六、如實知攝心亂心——以法相故知。 佛列眾生名數：若有色、若無色，若有想、若無想、若非有想非無想，若此間世界、若遍十方世界；是諸眾生若攝心、若亂心，佛如實知。云何知？佛自答：以法相故知。再自設一問用何等法相，佛答：是法相中尚無法相相，何況有攝心亂心。這是全品答語的定式初現——所謂『以法相知』，不是拿一把尺去量心，是那把尺自身也無相；無相故不妨知一切相。
七、盡無染滅斷寂離六門。 佛又換一路說知心之相：以盡相故知、以無染相故知、以滅相、斷相、寂相、離相故知。六個門看似並列，實則是一條路的六段——由觀無常而盡，由盡而不染，由世間道遮滅，由無漏道斷，由斷而寂，由寂而離。論主後文自有逐字之釋（見第廿三段），此處先記其名目。
八、染心瞋心癡心如實知。 佛言因般若知眾生染心，如實知染心；瞋心癡心亦如實知。須菩提請問其義，佛答：「染心如實相，則無染心相。」何以故？如實相中心心數法尚不可得，何況當得染心不染心。瞋癡同此。此處要看清「如實知染心」的語法：所知的是染心的如實相，而染心的如實相中無染心——知的是它的無，不是知的它的有。
九、無染無瞋無癡心——二心不俱。 佛續說如實知眾生無染心、無瞋心、無癡心。須菩提又問，佛答：是心無染相中，染相不染相俱不可得；何以故？「二心不俱故。」這四字是本段的眼。心念次第而生，一時只有一心；無染心現前時染心已不在，染心既無，與它相待而立的不染心也無——所以無染實相中，染與不染兩頭都立不住。
十、廣心。 佛言如實知眾生廣心。須菩提問，佛答：知諸眾生心相不廣不狹、不增不減、不來不去；心相離故，是心不廣乃至不來不去。何以故？「是心性無故」，誰作廣、誰作狹乃至來去？所謂如實知廣心，是知這心根本無廣可說——廣狹是相待之名，心性既無，能作廣狹的那個主也就沒有。
十一、大心。 同一格式再走一遍：佛不見眾生心的來相去相，不見生相滅相住相異相。何以故？是諸心性無故，誰來誰去、誰生滅住異？「大」與「廣」在世俗語裡幾乎同義，經文卻分作兩段，各自配一組相：廣配廣狹增減來去，大配來去生滅住異。分開說，是要讓人知道所遮的不是一個詞，是一整套取相的方式。
十二、無量心。 佛答：知是眾生心，不見住、不見不住。何以故？「是無量心相無依止故」，誰有住不住處？前兩段遮的是廣狹與生滅，此段遮的是住處。無所依止故無住處，無住處故無量——無量不是量得很大，是根本無處可安下一個量。
十三、不可見心——自相空、五眼不見。 末一心最險：既說不可見，又說如實知。佛答兩重：其一，眾生心是無相，佛如實知其無相，自相空故；其二，佛知眾生心，五眼不能見。這兩句合看，才見「如實知不可見心」不是矛盾語——正因為五眼所見皆是取相之見，不見反而是知其實。經①至此收束，論①將對這一句另設問答（見第廿八、廿九段）。
十四、論主標釋——承前品之疑與知恩之喻。 論主開釋，第一著就把本品接回前品：上說十方諸佛及大菩薩擁護般若乃至正憶念，不令魔得其便。會中聽者聞已或作是念——諸佛菩提是寂滅相，於諸法及眾生無憎無愛，何以故擁護書持般若者？疑立起來了，佛的母子喻就是答。論主把喻的意思說得比經文更直白：「如子知恩故，守護其母。般若是十方諸佛母故」，若有魔等留難欲破壞般若者，諸佛雖行寂滅相，憐愍眾生故、知恩分故，用慈悲心常念、用佛眼常見，守護是行般若者，令得增益，不失佛道。寂滅與守護不相妨——寂滅是無憎無愛，守護是知恩憐愍，兩者在佛分上同時成立。
十五、諸賢聖及賢聖法皆從般若生。 論主指出佛在喻後自說的因緣：「諸賢聖及賢聖法皆從般若中生。」經文那一長串『能生禪波羅蜜乃至一切種智、能生須陀洹乃至諸佛』，論主一句收攝：人與法兩面都出於般若。這一句也是「佛母」二字的論證：不是尊稱，是出生關係。
十六、四問三答——生與從生義無異。 論主自設一問：須菩提問四種，佛何以止答三事，而不說「諸佛從般若中生」？答曰：般若生諸佛，諸佛從般若生，義無異。接著論主分疏何以有人會當成兩事：「有人言：諸法和合故能生般若波羅蜜，般若波羅蜜能生諸佛；有人行般若波羅蜜及眾行，得成佛。初謂作者，二謂法。」一從作者說，一從法說，說法雖二，事體是一。論主再出一喻決之：若言「墮枝殺人」，若言「墮樹殺人」——枝與樹的說法不同，殺人這件事同，所以不須別答。說般若能生諸佛，即已說了諸佛從般若生。少答一問不是漏答，是義無二故。
十七、餘經說五眾破壞而此說不破不壞。 第二問更硬：如餘經說「五眾破壞，故名世間」，此中何以言般若示五眾無破壞生滅等？論主答以宗途之異：彼是小乘事，此是大乘事。小乘法多說無常，大乘法多說法空；小乘先說無常後說法空，大乘初便說法空；小乘說無常是要令眾生怖畏，大乘則不然，是故說無破壞等。並引佛自說因緣為證：「空、無相、無作，終不破、不壞。」兩經是兩種下手處——一是從壞處驚人，一是從本無壞處直示；論主唯判小乘大乘之異，不言二經相諍與否。
十八、五眾名世間·心數難知·方便力能知。 論主再釋：五眾名世間，眾生身形色易知，餘心數法無形故難知；是故佛語須菩提「無量阿僧祇眾生心所行皆知」。隨即點出那個關鍵的轉折——深般若中雖無眾生及色等法乃至一切種智，卻「以般若方便力而能知眾生心所行」；而是般若中畢竟空故，不示色等法乃至一切種智。「無」與「能知」的接榫處，就在「方便力」三字。論主又拈出佛自說的因緣：「般若波羅蜜中尚無般若相，何況色等法！」
十九、示世間者——眾生名數逐項分疏。 論主把經文那一串眾生名數逐項配定：色者，欲、色界眾生；無色者，無色界眾生。有想者，除無想天及非有想非無想天，其餘是有想；無想者是無想眾生；非有想非無想者是有頂處天。此間世界者是三千大千世界；遍十方者是餘無量無邊阿僧祇世界。末句收：是世界六道中三世眾生，佛悉知其攝心亂心。這一段是全品少見的純分疏文字，讀時不必求玄——它只是把「一切眾生」四字的外延數清楚，好讓下文「佛悉知」有一個確定的分母。
二十、須菩提之疑與佛答實相智慧。 論主替須菩提說出心中的怪異：「諸佛常樂行寂滅諸法空，今云何遍知無始無邊眾生攝心、亂心？佛心一，眾生心無量種，云何一時知一切眾生心？」——一與無量的難處，論主說得比經文顯豁。故問「佛云何知」。佛答：以諸法實相智慧故，知眾生攝心亂心。須菩提再問何等是諸法實相，答曰：所謂畢竟空；是畢竟空，畢竟空性亦不可得，何況攝心亂心。
廿一、畢竟空中云何知心。 論主再自設一問，把難處逼到極處：諸法實相畢竟空中，無分別心心數法，佛云何知其心？答語分兩截。前截以佛自說為據：諸法實相性亦不可得，以是智慧知眾生攝心亂心；何以故？「若空性可得，應有難；空性不可得，云何作難？」——難是建立在『空是一個可得的東西』這個前提上的，前提既不成立，難自然落空。後截正面說知的所以然：今佛過一切憶想分別虛妄法，安住實相，如實知一切眾生心；眾生心住虛妄法中故，不能知他眾生如實。佛之能知與眾生之不能知，差別不在心量大小，在住實相與住虛妄。
廿二、先略後廣之科。 論主插入一句科判：先略說「知他心」，次分別眾生攝心亂心，所謂三毒、無三毒者，廣、大，無量，不可見，出、沒，屈、申等。這一句把經①經②的整個目次一口氣列了出來，是讀本品最方便的一張地圖——下文所有問答，都在這張目次之內。
廿三、盡無染滅斷寂離六門之釋。 論主逐字釋六門：須菩提事事問，初答以諸法實相故知攝心亂心；次以盡、無染、滅、斷、寂、離故知。「盡者，無常慧」；菩薩行是無常慧心，離一切世間染——是為無染。用世間道遮滅結使，是名滅。用無漏道斷，故名斷。斷諸結使已，觀涅槃寂滅、離相——是為寂、離。以是因緣得諸法實相；以諸法實相，知他攝心亂心皆是實相。六門於是不是六種知法，是一條由無常入實相的路，走通了自然知他心。
廿四、念念生滅不可知·盡門觀·染心實相。 論主續申盡門：是心念念生滅，未來無故不可知；現在念念滅，住時無故不可知。凡夫人取相分別，於三世中憶想妄見，謂知心念——凡夫所謂知心，知的只是自己造出來的相。以盡門觀即是畢竟空，畢竟空故無所著，是時得道，知諸法實相，於一切法不妄想分別，則如實知他心。隨後轉入染心：一切法入法性中皆清淨，是故說「染心實相，是中無染心。何以故？如實中無心無心數法，何況染心！」瞋心癡心亦如是。
廿五、無染心相·二心不俱·相待法無。 論主釋無染一段：無染心相中無有染心相，染心從本來無故；亦無不染心，無染心是寂滅相，無所分別。此中佛自說因緣：「須菩提！二心不俱故。」論主把這四字展開成一段極清楚的推理：眾生法，心心次第生，無染心時則無染心；過去染心已滅，未來未有，現在無染心，則無有染心；染心無故，亦無不染心，相待法無故。是故無染實相中無有染心、不染心。無瞋無癡亦如是。這一段是全品說『二法相待』最直白處——破一頭，另一頭自倒。
廿六、廣狹增減無定相。 論主釋廣大一段：廣狹、增減心，皆是眾生取相分別，佛不如是知。何以故？是心無色無形、無住處、念念滅，則無廣狹增減差別。此中佛自說因緣：「心性相無故，廣狹等不可得。」論主又標出參見之處：廣狹、增減、大小義，如四無量心中說——不在本品重出。
廿七、無量心四義與眼識無住處喻。 論主釋無量，給出四義：廣心大心即是無量；緣無量眾生故名無量；緣涅槃無量法故名無量；心相不可取故名無量。四義由粗入細，末一義才是正意。隨即出喻：如有眼、有色因緣故眼識生，是識不在眼、不在色、不在中間、不在此、不在彼，是故無住處；若實無住處，云何能有所作？若好若醜，如夢所見事，不可求其實定相。心亦如是，無依止故無定相，故名無量。眼識之喻最堪用功——識明明生起了，卻指不出它在哪裡；心之「無量」正是這種無處可指。末句補：廣、大亦應如是隨義分別說。
廿八、不可見心之問答——坐禪人之虛妄見。 論主自問：若知心不可見，佛何以故說「如實知不可見心」？答語先舉病相：有坐禪人憶想分別，見是心如清淨珠中縷；觀白骨人中，見心次第相續生；或時見心在身；或見在緣，如無邊識處，但見識無量無邊。這四種都是禪中實有的境界，也都是取相。破如是等虛妄故，佛言「如實知眾生心，眾生心自相空故無相相」。可見「如實知不可見」一語是對治語：對治的正是用功人以為自己看見了心的那種見。
廿九、五眼觀心不可得。 論主再以五眼逐一勘：肉眼、天眼緣色故不見；慧眼緣涅槃故不見；法眼初覺時分別知諸法善不善、有漏無漏等，入實相中則無所分別，如先說「一切法無知者、無見者」，是故不應見；佛眼觀寂滅相故不應見。然後下一轉語：眾生心，見者，如實見；不如凡夫人憶想分別見。末更補一理：五眼因緣和合生，皆是作法，虛誑不實，佛不信不用，是故言「不以五眼見」。五眼不見不是能力不足，是不用那種見——卷六十九至此而終。
三十、出沒屈申之標問。 卷七十重標品題之餘，經文接住前卷的目次，續說第五類：佛因深般若，於眾生心數出、沒、屈、申如實知。須菩提依例請問。前此所說是心的體段（攝亂、染淨、廣大、無量、可見不可見），出沒屈申說的是心的動向——眾生在生死中浮沉進退的那個勢。
卅一、十四難之依五眾——常無常四句逐陰重列。 佛答先立總則：一切眾生心數出沒屈申等皆依色、受、想、行、識生。隨即以極整齊的格式逐條鋪開：神及世間常是事實、餘妄語，是見依色；無常、亦常亦無常、非常非無常各一條，同依於色；然後依受、依想、依行、依識，各各再走一遍四句。經文不厭其煩地重列二十條，用意全在那個不變的尾巴——『是見依某』。邪見的內容儘管翻花樣，出處只有一個：五眾。讀這一段不可跳行，跳了就看不見這種重複本身即是說法。
卅二、世間有邊無邊四句。 次列：世間有邊、無邊、有邊無邊、非有邊非無邊，四句皆是見依色；依受想行識亦如是。格式同前，只換了論題——從時間上的常無常，換到空間上的有邊無邊。
卅三、神即是身、神異身異。 再列一對：神即是身，是見依色；神異身異，是見依色；依受想行識亦如是。此對不是四句而是二句，因為身神一異只有相即相離兩種。
卅四、死後如去四句。 末列：死後有如去、無如去、或有或無如去、非有非無如去，四句皆是見依色；依受想行識亦如是。所問是後世的有無，所依仍是五眾。
卅五、結——如實知出沒屈申。 佛結曰：如是，佛因般若波羅蜜，眾生出、沒、屈、申如實知。一長串邪見數完，結語只一句——佛知的不是這些見之中哪一個對，佛知的是這些見如何依五眾而起、如何令人沉浮。
卅六、佛知色相與諸法如相層層相即。 經文陡然一轉，從邪見轉到「如」。佛知色相，云何知？如如不壞、無分別、無相、無憶、無戲論、無得，色相亦如是；受想行識相亦如是。於是佛知眾生如相及眾生心數出沒屈申如相。接著是全品最著名的一串相即：五眾如相、諸行如相即是一切法如相；一切法如相者，六波羅蜜如相即是三十七品如相，三十七品如相即是十八空如相，十八空即八背捨，八背捨即九次第定，九次第定即佛十力，佛十力即四無所畏、四無礙智、大慈大悲乃至十八不共法，十八不共法即一切種智，一切種智即善法不善法、世間法出世間法、有漏法無漏法，無漏法即過去未來現在法，三世法即有為法無為法，有為無為即須陀洹果，須陀洹果即斯陀含果，斯陀含果即阿那含果，阿那含果即阿羅漢果，阿羅漢果即辟支佛道，辟支佛道即阿耨多羅三藐三菩提，阿耨多羅三藐三菩提如相即是諸佛如相——諸佛如相皆是一如相，不二不別、不盡不壞，是名一切諸法如相。佛因般若得是如相，以是因緣故般若能生諸佛、能示世間相；知一切法如相、非不如相、不異相，得是如相故佛名如來。上文說五眾是世間相、說示五眾不破不壞，至此才交代所示究竟是什麼：所示者，如也。
卅七、如相甚深·誰能信解。 須菩提歎其甚深，並問誰能信解，自答：唯有阿鞞跋致菩薩及具足正見人、漏盡阿羅漢；何以故？是法甚深故。佛答其所以深：「是如無盡相故甚深。」須菩提再問何法無盡相故甚深，佛言：一切法無盡故；佛得是一切諸法如已，為眾生說。經②以此終——甚深不在難懂，在無盡；無盡故無處可窮，無處可窮故非取相者所能信。
卅八、論主總釋出沒屈申。 論②開釋：佛悉知一切眾生所作所行、六十二邪見等諸邪見、九十八結使等諸煩惱，是故說「佛知眾生心心數法出、沒、屈、申」。論主一下筆就把經文那二十條、四句、二句安置進了六十二見與九十八結使的舊帳——經文列的不是新事，是一切眾生心行的總目。
卅九、沒與出、屈與申之訓。 論主逐字出訓。「沒」：在家者為愛等諸煩惱所沒；「出」：九十六種邪見出家者名出。復次，常著世樂故名為沒；或知無常，怖畏，求道，故名出。復次，受九十六種道法，不能得正道故，還沒在世間。「屈」者不離欲界，「申」者離欲界；色界離、不離亦如是。訓得極要緊的一點是：出家、求道也可以還沒——出之後未必不沒，這是下一段魚喻的伏筆。
四十、清池見魚喻。 論主出喻：如人立清池上見魚，或有常在水中，或有暫出還沒，或有出觀四方，或有出欲渡者近岸還沒。隨即合喻：佛以佛眼觀十方六道眾生——有常著五欲、諸煩惱覆心、不求出者；或有好心，能布施、能持戒，而以邪疑覆心故還沒；有人出五欲，能得煖法、頂法等，觀四諦，未得實法故還沒；有人離五欲乃至無所有處，不得涅槃故還沒。四等人由粗至細，最後一等已到無所有處，仍是還沒。此喻是全品給行人最切身的一面鏡子：出得愈高，沒得愈可惜，而所以沒者，皆因未得實法。
卌一、何等是出沒屈申相——神之計執。 論主接問：何等是出沒屈申相？此中佛說，所謂「神及世間常」。隨即釋神：神者，凡夫人憶想分別，隨我心取相故計有神。並標外道神論之二分：一者常，二者無常。要看清論主這句話的次第——先有「我心取相」，後有「計有神」；神不是先有而後被認識，是取相之心造出來的。
卌二、神常、神無常、常無常、非常非無常四家。 論主逐家陳其所以。計神常者，常修福德，後受果報故，或由行道故，神得解脫——立常是為了立業果與解脫的載體。謂神無常者，為今世名利故有所作——落到現世的打算。常無常者，有人謂神有二種：一者細微常住，二者現有所作；現有所作者身死時無常，細神是常——折中兩家。至於非常非無常，論主引其自陳之理：「有人言：神非常非無常。」其理由是常無常中俱有過——若神無常，即無罪福；若常，亦無罪福。何以故？若常則苦樂不異，譬如虛空，雨不能濕、風日不能乾；若無常則苦樂變異，譬如風雨，在牛皮中則爛壞。末句露出病根：「以我心故，說必有神，但非常非無常。」四家說法儘管相反，同出一個「我心」。
卌三、四種邪見皆緣五眾。 論主引佛語斷之：「四種邪見，皆緣五眾，但於五眾謬計為神。」四句之爭是在爭一個本來沒有的東西的屬性，所以爭不出結果——這一句也正是經文反覆說「是見依色」、「依受、想、行、識亦如是」的意思。
卌四、三種世間與世間四見。 論主釋「神及世間」之世間：世間有三種，一者五眾世間，二者眾生世間，三者國土世間。此中說二種：五眾世間、國土世間；眾生世間即是神。於世間相中亦有四種邪見。分疏之功在此：經文「神及世間」四字裡，神已攝眾生世間，所餘乃五眾與國土。
卌五、神本無而世間是有之難。 論主設一問，是本段最有力的一問：神從本已來無故應錯，世間是有，云何同神邪見？答曰：但破於世間起常無常相，不破世間。隨出一喻：譬如無目人得蛇以為瓔珞，有目人語是蛇，非是瓔珞——所破者是「以為瓔珞」的錯認，不是把蛇也否掉。論主再正面申之：佛破世間常顛倒，不破世間；何以故？現見無常故。亦不得言無無常，罪福不失故，因過去事有所作故。常無常二俱有過故；非常非無常，著世間過故。四句一一破過，而世間自在。
卌六、世間有邊——求本不得始。 論主轉入有邊無邊，先陳「有邊」者之理路：有人求世間根本，不得其始；不得其始則無中、無後；若無初中後則無世間；是故世間應有始，始即是邊。這是一個從『必須有』推出『一定有』的推論——本品列外道說從不譏誚，只是把他的理路照樣說出來，讓人自見其推論的著力處。
卌七、世性論——覺、我、五微塵、四大、五根。 論主詳述一家。得禪者以宿命智力乃見八萬劫事，過是已往不復能知，但見身始中陰識，而自思惟：「此識不應無因無緣，必應有因緣，宿命智所不能知。」於是憶想分別：有法名世性，非五情所知，極微細故。於世性中初生覺，覺即是中陰識；從覺生我；從我生五種微塵，所謂色聲香味觸；從聲微塵生空大，從聲觸生風大，從色聲觸生火大，從色聲觸味生水大，從色聲觸味香生地大；從空生耳根，從風生身根，從火生眼根，從水生舌根，從地生鼻根——如是漸漸從細至麁。世性者，從世性已來至麁，從麁轉細，還至世性。復出泥丸之喻：譬如泥丸中具有瓶、瓫等性，以泥為瓶，破瓶為瓫，如是轉變，都無所失；世性亦如是，轉變為麁。世性是常法，無所從來，如《僧佉經》廣說。論主記其所出，不加詆訶——要看的是這一家何以會立世性：因為宿命智到八萬劫就到頭了，見不到頭的地方，人便要造一個開頭。
卌八、微塵常法。 復次，有人說世間初邊名微塵。微塵常法，不可破、不可燒、不可爛、不可壞，以微細故；但待罪福因緣和合故有身，若天、若地獄等；以無父母故，罪福因緣盡則散壞。與世性一家同病而異形：一個把開頭推到極細的「性」，一個推到極細的「塵」。
卌九、自然與天主二說、邪因是邊。 又二家：有人以自然為世界始，貧富貴賤非願行所得；有人言天主即是世界始，造作吉凶禍福、天地萬物，此法滅時天還攝取。論主一句總斷：「如是邪因，是世界邊。」四家——世性、微塵、自然、天主——同歸一名：邪因。所謂有邊之見，其實是為世間找一個開頭而找錯了因。
五十、苦樂盡自到邊·縷丸喻。 又一說：眾生世世受苦樂盡，自到邊；譬如山上投縷丸，縷盡自止。受罪受福，會歸於盡，精進、懈怠無異。此說之害，論主藉其自陳已顯出來——結論是修與不修一樣，這正是邊見落到行門上的後果。
五一、國土世間之有邊諸說。 再列二說：有人說國土世間八方有邊，唯上下無邊；有人說下至十八地獄、上至有頂，上下有邊，八方無邊。論主結曰：如是種種說世界邊。兩說恰恰相反，而同是把邊安在某一組方位上。
五二、眾生世間有邊——神如芥子如米。 又一說：眾生世間有邊。如說神在體中，如芥子、如米，或言一寸；大人則神大，小人則神小。論主點其所以：說神是色法、有分，故言神有邊。把神當作有體積的東西，有邊之說便隨之而來。
五三、無邊——神遍滿虛空。 「無邊」者：有人說神遍滿虛空，無處不有，得身處能覺苦樂，是名神無邊。與前說恰成兩極：一個把神縮成芥子，一個把神放到遍虛空，同是把神當作一個有分量的存在。
五四、國土世間無始·十方無邊。 又：有人言國土世間無始；若有始則無因緣，後亦無窮，常受身，是則破涅槃，是名無邊。復次，說國土世間十方無邊。如是等，說神世間、國土世間無邊。此家之立無始，理由是怕有始則墮無因——推論的方向與第卌六段的有邊家恰恰相反，而同是就有無兩頭立說。
五五、亦有邊亦無邊。 「有邊」與「無邊」相配便出第三句：有人言神世間無邊、國土世間有邊；或言神世間有邊、國土世間無邊，如上說神是色故；或言上下有邊、八方無邊。論主結曰：如是總上二法，名為「有邊無邊」。第三句不是新見，是前二句的拼合。
五六、非有邊非無邊。 第四句：有人見世間有邊有過、無邊亦有過，故不說有邊、不說無邊，著「非有邊非無邊」以為世間實。論主用了一個「著」字——避開兩邊之後仍要立一個實，所以第四句不是出離，是更隱的執。
五七、神即是身。 轉入身神一異。有人言身即是神，所以者何？分折此身，求神不可得故；復次，受好醜苦樂皆是身，是故言身即是神。此家的理據其實是找不到神——找不到便索性把身當作神。
五八、身異神異——邪見與邊見。 有人言神微細，五情所不得，亦非凡夫人所見，攝心清淨、得禪定人乃能得見，是故言身異神異。論主更為分判二見之異：若身即是神，身滅神亦滅，是邪見；說身異神異，身滅神常在，是邊見。同是計神，落處不同——一個斷，一個常。
五九、死後如去之別說。 論主標「死後有如去」者，隨即設問：先說常無常等，即是後世或有或無，今何以別說如去四句？答曰：上總說一切世間常非常，「後世有無」事要故別說。並釋如去之名：「如去」者，如人來此間生，去至後世亦如是。所以別立一門，是因為後世有無於行人最關切要——常無常是理上的爭，如去不如去是命上的事。
六十、如去不如去與非去非不去。 逐家陳之：有人言先世無所從來，滅亦無所去；有人言身、神和合為人，死後神去、身不去，是名「如去不如去」；「非有如去非無如去」者，見去、不去有失故說非去非不去。論主再下一針：「是人不能捨神，而著『非去非不去』。」與第五六段同一判法——第四句的病不在句，在捨不掉那個神。
六一、十四事之結——欲出而沒。 論主收束：如是諸邪見煩惱等，是名「心出、沒、屈、伸」。所以者何？邪見者種種道求出不得故，欲出而沒；邪見力多難解，故說常、無常等十四事。「欲出而沒」四字是全段的判語，也回應了第四十段魚喻——出而復沒者，正是這些見。
六二、佛言皆緣五眾·五眾如。 論主引佛語總斷外道：外道雖復種種憶想分別，佛言「皆緣五眾、依止五眾，無神、無常」。又進一層：佛知五眾空、無相、無作、無戲論，但知五眾如，不如凡夫虛誑顛倒見。破邪見到此為止，下文即由「五眾如」轉入一切法如——破與立的接榫處就在這一句。
六三、五眾如即一切法如。 論主釋經之相即：如五眾如，一切法如亦如是。何以故？二法攝一切法，所謂有為、無為；五眾是有為法，五眾如即是無為法。又出行門之由：觀察、籌量、思惟五眾能行六波羅蜜，是故說「五眾如即是一切法如，一切法如即是六波羅蜜如」。經文那一長串相即所以能成立，論主給的理由極簡：有為無為二法已攝一切，而五眾與五眾如恰是這二法。
六四、行六度者之次第與善不善法如。 論主續釋：行六波羅蜜菩薩求實道，觀五眾無常、空，生三十七品、八背捨、九次第等，是聲聞道；知已直過，行十八空、十力等諸佛法；皆正觀五眾、五眾如，無分別故，皆是一切諸法如。是故說「善法如即是不善法如，不善法如即是善法如」。此段須看清「知已直過」四字——聲聞道諸法不是不修，是修而不住。世間、出世間法亦如是。
六五、不得著善法·皆是一如相。 論主下一轉語：是以行者不得著善法，乃至阿耨多羅三藐三菩提，佛如相亦如是，皆是一如相，不二不別。所以者何？求諸法實，到畢竟空，無復異。連菩提、連佛如相都不許著——因為所以無異者，不是把差別抹平，是求到實處自然無異。
六六、般若能生諸佛、能示世間相之結。 論主結：如是等諸法如，佛因般若波羅蜜得，是故言「般若波羅蜜能生諸佛、能示世間相」。全品開篇之語，至此有了完整的解釋——所生者，得如相之佛；所示者，諸法之如。
六七、須菩提歎未曾有·誰能信。 論主釋須菩提之歎：一切諸法如甚深，隨順不相違；三世十方諸佛如即是諸法如，解是諸法如故為眾生種種說法。並分疏能信之機：是甚深如，難解難信；阿鞞跋致菩薩入法位受記者能信；「具足正見人」者三道人；漏盡阿羅漢不受一切法故能信。又補一義：其有信者，近阿鞞跋致故，皆攝在阿鞞跋致中，故不別說——經文只列三種，不是漏了其餘，是已攝在內。
六八、一切法無盡故如無盡。 論主釋佛答：佛語須菩提「一切法無盡故，是如無盡」；如無盡故，得聖道者能信。又釋何以聖者能信而凡夫不能：無為法中差別故有須陀洹諸道，聞自所得法故能信；凡夫人著虛誑顛倒法故不能信。能信的根據不是聰慧，是自己嘗過——聞的是自所得法。
六九、得是諸法如故名為如來。 全品末句：佛告須菩提，諸佛得是諸法如故，名為如來，名為一切智人，能教眾生令至涅槃。三個名相一線貫下：得如故名如來，如無不盡故名一切智人，得而能與人故能教眾生至涅槃。品始於『般若能生諸佛』，終於『得是如故名如來』——所生之佛，即是如之所成。
不要讀錯
不要把「佛母」讀成一個尊崇的比喻而已。論主立此喻的用處，是解一個真實的疑：諸佛寂滅、無憎無愛，何以守護持經之人？答語不是『佛很慈悲』，而是「知恩分故」——般若生佛、與佛一切智、示佛世間相，諸佛之於般若有出生之恩；守護行般若者，即是諸子救母。若把母子喻讀成文學上的親切說法，這個「知恩」的實義便丟了。反過來說，也不要把「母」讀成有一個能生的實體：經文緊接著就說深般若中無眾生、無色乃至無一切智，連般若波羅蜜自身也無——能生而無自性，這才是佛母二字的分寸。
不要把『般若示五眾不破不壞』讀成與說無常的經相違。論主答得分明：彼是小乘事，此是大乘事；小乘多說無常、先無常後法空、說無常令眾生怖畏，大乘多說法空、初便說法空。兩處所對的機不同、所立的門不同，不是兩種主張在相爭。更不可據此以為大乘不說無常——第六四段論主正說菩薩「觀五眾無常、空」而生三十七品，無常仍是入處，只是不停在那裡。
不要把「如實知眾生心」讀成一種高強的他心通。經文每一答都在遮：不示、不見、不可得、無定相、無住處、五眼不能見。論主更把凡夫所謂知心點破——凡夫人取相分別，於三世中憶想妄見，謂知心念。佛之知，是住實相而知其無定相；若讀成佛以憶想取相的方式一一照見眾生心裡的內容，恰恰落在經文所破的那一邊——所破的是取相之知，不是「如實知」「悉知」本身；論主下文明說佛悉知眾生所作所行、邪見煩惱，兩面並存。第廿八段所舉坐禪人四種見心之相——見心如清淨珠中縷、見心次第相續生、見心在身、見心在緣——正是這種誤讀在用功上的現形。
不要把『五眼不見』讀成貶低五眼。論主逐一說明各眼之所緣：肉眼天眼緣色故不見，慧眼緣涅槃故不見，法眼入實相則無所分別故不應見，佛眼觀寂滅相故不應見——每一句都是『因其所緣而不見』，不是『無能故不見』。末更明言：眾生心，見者，如實見。不見的是取相之見，如實見自在。
不要把論②那一長串外道說讀成雜錄。世性、微塵、自然、天主、縷丸、芥子之神、遍虛空之神——列得再多，論主的判語只有幾處，且每一處都指向同一根：憶想分別，隨我心取相故計有神；如是邪因，是世界邊；是人不能捨神。讀時若只記住了各家說法的奇特，就漏掉了論主真正要人看的東西——這些見的分歧再大，起處是同一個取相之心。也不要因論主詳陳其說而以為他在採納：陳說與判釋分得很清，陳說用「有人言」「有人說」，判釋用「佛言」「是故說」。
不要把「諸法如相」那一串相即讀成一種等同的宣告。論主給了理由：二法攝一切法，所謂有為、無為；五眾是有為法，五眾如即是無為法。相即之所以成立，是因為所說的一直是「如」，不是那些法本身；而末後「不得著善法，乃至阿耨多羅三藐三菩提」一句，正防人把『一如不二』拿來作不辨是非的口實。一如是求實到畢竟空處自然無異，不是修行上的平鋪。
修行作用
第一件受用，在母子喻給出的一個位置感。行般若的人常覺孤單——法深、少人共語、境界難說。本品告訴你：你所守的這一法，是諸佛之母；諸佛以佛眼常視此法，也常視持此法的人。經文說得極具體：書是深般若乃至正憶念者，諸佛常以佛眼視是人；求菩薩道者，十方佛常守護，令不退轉。這不是安慰語，是本品開宗立喻所要說的第一件事。
第二件受用，是一套勘心的法。本品所問之心相，論主自科為「先略說「知他心」，次分別眾生攝心、亂心，所謂三毒、無三毒者，廣、大，無量，不可見，出、沒，屈、申等」，而每一問的答語都是同一個做法：不見那個相，因為心性無故。日用中起心動念時可以照此回勘——我此刻認定的『我心很亂』『我心很廣』『我心很小』，是心本有的相，還是我取來的相？論主說得明白：廣狹、增減心，皆是眾生取相分別。勘破一個取相，就少一重自縛。
第三件受用，在「二心不俱」四字。行人最苦的是與煩惱相持——一面染心現前，一面又要立一個不染的心去對治，於是兩心交戰終日。論主的推理可以直接拿來用：心心次第生，無染心時則無染心；染心無故，亦無不染心，相待法無故。染心現前時不必另造一個對手，看它次第而生、次第而滅，相待的兩頭自然一齊落下。
第四件受用，是清池見魚喻的自照。四等人：全然不求出的、能施能戒而以邪疑還沒的、得煖頂觀四諦而未得實法還沒的、離五欲乃至無所有處而不得涅槃還沒的。愈往後愈像用功有得之人，卻仍是「還沒」。這一喻宜常記：出不是一次的事，所以沒者皆因未得實法；用功到某一階段的安穩，正是最容易近岸還沒的時候。
第五件受用，是坐禪見心之誡。見心如珠中縷、見心相續生、見心在身、見心在緣——這四相論主列得如此具體，可見是禪中實有之境。用功人若在靜中見得一個心的模樣而生歡喜，此段可作當下的回勘：佛正是為破這等虛妄，才說「如實知眾生心，眾生心自相空故無相相」。見得的都不是它。
第六件受用，在「欲出而沒」一語的警策。論主說邪見人種種道求出不得，欲出而沒。求出本身是好的，出不去的原因在見——見不正則力愈大而陷愈深，這也就是外道諸家愈推愈精而愈離的緣故。行人於此當知揀擇見地重於用功之勤。
第七件受用，是「知已直過」與「不得著善法」一對。菩薩觀五眾無常空而生三十七品、八背捨、九次第，這些法要修；修而不住，故曰知已直過。再往上，連菩提、連佛如相都不許著。日用中的用法是：於一切所修之善，修時盡力，過時不留——留則善法自身成了新的所得。
承衍
本品的骨幹，是兩段經文與兩段論釋。經①自母人有子喻起，立般若能生諸佛、能示世間相，諸佛以佛眼常視深般若並及於書持之人；須菩提問四，佛答三事，標五眾是世間相；次說般若示五眾不破不壞、不生不滅乃至不在三世；次說深般若中無眾生無色乃至無一切智而佛悉知眾生心所行；然後逐一開示如實知攝心亂心、以法相知、以盡無染滅斷寂離六門知、知染心瞋心癡心、知無染無瞋無癡心、知廣心、大心、無量心、不可見心，末以五眼不能見收。論①先替聽者立疑——諸佛寂滅何以守護持經者——而以知恩守護母之譬答之；次引佛自說「諸賢聖及賢聖法皆從般若中生」；答四問三答之難，出墮枝墮樹之喻；答餘經說五眾破壞之難，判大小乘說法之異；釋五眾名世間、心數難知、方便力能知，分疏眾生名數；替須菩提說出一與無量之疑，答以諸法實相智慧，再答畢竟空中云何知心；立先略後廣之科；逐字釋六門，釋念念生滅與盡門觀，釋染心實相、無染心相與二心不俱、相待法無，釋廣狹增減無定相，釋無量心四義並出眼識無住處喻；末設不可見心之問答，舉坐禪人四種虛妄見，以五眼逐一勘而明不見即如實見。卷六十九至此而終，卷七十重標品題之餘。經②續說心數出沒屈申，以依色受想行識之格式逐條列神及世間常無常四句、世間有邊無邊四句、神即身異身二句、死後如去四句，結以如實知；次說佛知色相如如不壞乃至諸法如相層層相即、皆是一如相不二不別，得是如相故佛名如來；末由須菩提歎其甚深，佛答如無盡相故甚深。論②釋出沒屈申，繫之於六十二見、九十八結使，出沒出屈申之訓，設清池見魚喻並合四等眾生；釋神之計執與外道二論，逐陳神常、神無常、常無常、非常非無常四家，引佛語斷以皆緣五眾；分三種世間，答『神本無而世間是有』之難，出無目人以蛇為瓔珞之喻；廣列有邊無邊諸說——求本不得始、世性與泥丸喻、微塵、自然、天主、縷丸喻、八方上下諸說、神如芥子與神遍滿虛空、國土世間無始——並判邪因是邊；釋神即是身、身異神異之邪見邊見，別釋死後如去四句，結以欲出而沒、故說十四事；末由五眾如轉入一切法如，明有為無為二法攝一切，釋善法如即不善法如，誡不得著善法乃至菩提，結以般若能生諸佛能示世間相、得是諸法如故名為如來。
本品與前後諸品的義脈，可見者有三線。其一，論主開篇即自標承接：上說十方諸佛及大菩薩擁護般若乃至正憶念、不令魔得其便——那正是前品守護之義；本品所答者，是『既行寂滅何以守護』這一問，故母子喻不是新起爐灶，是接著前品的守護說下來的。其二，本品『般若能生諸佛』一軸，與此前諸品反覆申明的般若總攝諸度、出生一切賢聖之義相貫；而經文把「能生」與「能示」並列，又為前此諸品所說的世間相、五眾義下一轉語——所示者非五眾之破壞，乃五眾之如。其三，本品末所立的「如」，在其後諸品續有開展：經②既說一切法如相不二不別、得是如相故名如來，後文問相之教即承此而來；讀者可合前後觀之，以見佛母之義與如相之教的一貫。
古德於本品之科判，另有一線可誌。吉藏《大品經義疏》釋本品，立三義科之——一者能生、二者報行護、三者能成——並取《維摩詰所說經》「智度菩薩母，方便以為父」與其所引「大論云：般若以為母，般舟三昧以為父」相參（論本原文在卷一百作「佛以般若為母、般舟三昧為父」，吉藏係約引），以明慧為父母之義；其科次品〈問相品〉為三，第二科即「明佛知般若恩故報恩」，本品報恩之義於彼續說。此一「報恩」之科與本品傳本中某一系品題作「報恩品」之異名相應，本疏並錄而不判孰正；品題異稱、傳本分卷、諸本兩造之全帳，詳考據層。
The Mother of the Buddhas: Why the Buddhas, Already Practising Quiescence, Guard Those Who Uphold the Sūtra; Why the Simile of Mother and Sons Establishes Prajñā as the Mother; Why It Is No Omission That Subhūti Asks Four and the Buddha Answers Three; Why Other Sūtras’ Saying That the Five Aggregates Are Broken and Ruined Does Not Contradict This Chapter’s Saying That They Are Neither Broken nor Ruined; Why, There Being No Mind or Mental-Factor Dharmas within Ultimate Emptiness, the Buddha Can Know the Minds of Beings; Why the Four Minds—Broad, Great, Immeasurable, and Invisible—Are All Explained by the Absence of Fixed Marks; Why the Five Eyes’ Not Seeing the Mind Becomes Instead Knowing It as It Really Is; Why Emerging, Sinking, Bending, and Stretching Gather Up All the Fourteen Difficult Questions; Why the Outside Paths’ Theories of the Nature of the World, of Atoms, of Spontaneity, and of the Lord of Heaven Are Alike Called Wrong Causes; and Why the Marks of Suchness of All Dharmas, Identical Layer upon Layer, Return in the End to One Suchness, Not Two
What Is Being Asked
The preceding chapter said that the buddhas of the ten directions and the great bodhisattvas guard prajñā and do not let Māra find an opening. The treatise-author reads out a doubt on the hearers’ behalf: the awakening of the buddhas is of the mark of quiescence, and towards dharmas and beings they have neither hatred nor love; since they have neither hatred nor love, why do they single out for guarding the people who write out, receive, and uphold prajñā? The simile of mother and sons with which this chapter opens is the answer the Buddha sets up for this doubt. A mother gives birth to five sons, ten, and so on up to a thousand; the mother falls ill, and the sons each diligently seek her cure and treatment, fearing that wind and cold and heat, mosquitoes, gadflies, snakes, and vipers might harm their mother’s body, and always seek things of comfort with which to make offerings to their mother—why? Because 「生育我等，示我世間」 tr. "she gave us birth and raised us; she showed us the world." The buddhas stand towards prajñā exactly as the sons towards their mother: prajñā can give birth to the buddhas, can give the buddhas omniscience, can show the mark of the world; therefore, though the buddhas practise quiescence, they still watch the deep prajñā constantly with the Buddha-eye, and this extends to the people who write out and uphold prajñā. The chapter’s name, 「佛母」 tr. "the Mother of the Buddhas," is established here.
Once the one simile is set up, it at once brings out the two main veins of the whole chapter. The first is 「能生諸佛」 tr. "can give birth to the buddhas": within prajñā are born the ten powers and so on up to the eighteen unshared dharmas and the omniscience of all kinds, and because one obtains these dharmas one is called a Buddha. The second is 「能示世間相」 tr. "can show the mark of the world": the five aggregates are the mark of the world, and prajñā shows the five aggregates as not broken and not ruined, not arising and not ceasing, not defiled and not pure, not increasing and not decreasing, not entering and not leaving, not within the three times—and this sentence at once collides with other sūtras’ 「五眾破壞，故名世間。」 tr. "The five aggregates are broken and ruined; therefore they are called the world." And so right here the treatise-author raises a question himself; the treatise-author answers it with the difference between the ways the Small Vehicle and the Great Vehicle speak the Dharma.
Following the second vein further down brings the passage of greatest weight in the whole chapter: because of prajñā the Buddha 「悉知無量無邊阿僧祇眾生心所行」 tr. "fully knows the workings of the minds of measureless, boundless, asaṃkhyeya beings." Within the deep prajñā there are no beings, no form, and so on up to no omniscience, and yet the Buddha, of all things, can know as it really is the mind of every being—the collected mind and the distracted mind, the stained mind, the hateful mind, and the deluded mind, the unstained mind, the mind without hatred, and the mind without delusion, the broad mind, the great mind, the immeasurable mind, the invisible mind, and in fascicle seventy these are continued and gathered up entirely with emerging, sinking, bending, and stretching. Subhūti asks matter by matter, and the Buddha answers matter by matter, and the answers are almost all in one and the same sentence-pattern: he does not see this, he does not see that, because the nature of the mind is non-existent. This is exactly the place in this chapter that most needs to be seen clearly—the Buddha’s 「如實知」 tr. "knowing as it really is" knows not some one mark of the mind, but the mind’s absence of fixed marks.
Fascicle seventy turns to emerging, sinking, bending, and stretching. The sūtra text, in the pattern of resting on form, resting on feeling, resting on perception, resting on constructions, resting on consciousness, sets out again, aggregate by aggregate, the four propositions that the soul and the world are permanent, impermanent, both permanent and impermanent, neither permanent nor impermanent; and further sets out the four propositions that the world has a limit or has no limit, that the soul is the body or other than the body, and the four propositions of going on thus after death—that is, the fourteen difficult questions of the outside paths. The treatise-author then sets out broadly the various schools of the outside paths: the two theories that the soul is permanent and that the soul is impermanent; the compromises of both permanent and impermanent and of neither permanent nor impermanent; the four theories of the origin of the world—the nature of the world, atoms, spontaneity, and the lord of heaven; the various theories of the eight directions and above and below having a limit or no limit; the two extremes of the soul being like a mustard seed or like a grain of rice and of the soul pervading all of space; and the four propositions of going on thus and not going on thus. They are set out with the greatest detail and gathered up with the greatest simplicity: the Buddha says that all take the five aggregates as their object and rest on the five aggregates, that there is no soul and nothing permanent. At the very end everything is gathered up with 「如」 tr. "suchness": the suchness of the five aggregates is the suchness of all dharmas; the suchness of the six perfections, the suchness of the thirty-seven limbs of the path, and so on up to the suchness of the buddhas are all one mark of suchness, not two and not different; because he obtains this mark of suchness, the Buddha is called the Tathāgata. What the opening asked was ‘how prajñā can give birth to the buddhas and can show the mark of the world’, and what the close answers is precisely this 「如」 tr. "suchness."
Passage by Passage
1. The simile of a mother who has sons—the root of the whole chapter. The Buddha does not first speak the principle; first he speaks of a mother. The sons are five, ten, and so on up to a thousand; the number keeps climbing in order to show that however many sons there are, they all come from one mother; the mother falls ill, and the sons each diligently seek her cure and treatment, and what they fear is wind and cold and heat, mosquitoes, gadflies, snakes, and vipers. The pivot of this simile is the reason the sons give in their own words: 「生育我等，示我世間。」 tr. "She gave us birth and raised us; she showed us the world." Giving birth and raising is 「能生」 tr. "can give birth"; showing the world is 「能示」 tr. "can show"—the two fulcrums of the simile are exactly the two merits of prajñā in what follows. Then the Buddha turns over to what the simile stands for: the Buddha always watches this deep prajñāpāramitā with the Buddha-eye, and the buddhas now present in the ten directions also watch it constantly with the Buddha-eye, because prajñā can give birth to the buddhas, can give the buddhas omniscience, can show the mark of the world. It is pushed one layer further: prajñā can give birth to dhyānapāramitā and so on up to dānapāramitā, can give birth to inner emptiness and so on up to the emptiness of non-existent and existent dharmas, can give birth to the four foundations of mindfulness and so on up to the eight limbs of the noble path, can give birth to the ten powers of a Buddha and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds, and so on up to being able to give birth to the srota-āpanna, the sakṛdāgāmin, the anāgāmin, the arhat, the pratyekabuddha, and the buddhas; the buddhas of the three times all obtain awakening because of the causes and conditions of the deep prajñā. Finally it comes down to persons: those who write out this deep prajñā, and so on up to those who rightly recollect it—the buddhas always watch these people with the Buddha-eye; those who seek the bodhisattva path the buddhas of the ten directions always guard, so that they do not turn back. The simile rises from the mother’s illness and ends in guarding persons—to guard the one who practises prajñā is precisely the sons saving their mother.
2. Subhūti asks four. Subhūti takes up what the Buddha has said and asks about four matters: how prajñā can give birth to the buddhas, how it can show the mark of the world, how the buddhas are born from prajñā, how the buddhas speak of the mark of the world. He asks so finely because 「能生」 tr. "can give birth" and ‘being born from’ run in two directions in the grammar, and the hearer easily takes them as two matters. These four questions are the groundwork for a passage of question and answer by the treatise-author further on.
3. The Buddha answers that it can give birth to the buddhas, and that the five aggregates are the mark of the world. The Buddha answers with the greatest economy: within the deep prajñā are born the ten powers of a Buddha and so on up to the eighteen unshared dharmas and the omniscience of all kinds, and because one obtains these dharmas one is called a Buddha—「佛」 tr. "Buddha" is not a person already there who then obtains prajñā; it is by obtaining these dharmas that one is called a Buddha, and therefore it is said that prajñā can give birth to the buddhas. The mark of the world is pointed out in a single sentence: the buddhas say that the five aggregates are the mark of the world. He does not speak of heaven and earth, he does not speak of beings; he speaks only of the five aggregates—the actual content of the world is just these five.
4. The question and answer about showing the mark of the five aggregates—it does not show them as broken or ruined. Subhūti asks again: within prajñā, how is the mark of the five aggregates spoken of, and how are the five aggregates shown? The Buddha’s answer is all negation: it does not show the five aggregates as broken, it does not show the five aggregates as ruined, it does not show arising and ceasing, it does not show defilement and purity, it does not show increase and decrease, it does not show entering and leaving, it does not show past, future, and present. Why is it so? The Buddha himself speaks the cause and condition: the mark of emptiness is not broken and not ruined, the mark of the signless and the mark of non-action are not broken and not ruined, the non-originating dharma, the non-arising dharma, and the nature of dharmas of the dharma without anything existent are not broken and not ruined—the mark that is shown is just so. What matters is the sentence 「相如是示」 tr. "the mark is shown thus": it is not that nothing is shown; it is that the mark shown is originally just so. When prajñā shows the world, what it shows is the world’s mark of being not broken and not ruined.
5. Within prajñā there are no beings and no form, and so on up to its not showing the omniscience of all kinds. The Buddha goes on to say: because of the deep prajñā the buddhas fully know the workings of the minds of measureless, boundless, asaṃkhyeya beings; and yet within this deep prajñā there are no beings and no name of beings, no form and no name of form, no feeling, perception, constructions, or consciousness, nor their names, no eye and so on up to no mind, no eye-consciousness and so on up to no mind-consciousness, no eye-contact and so on up to no mind-contact, and so on up to no omniscience and no name of omniscience—in this way it can show the mark of the world. Then he goes a step further: the deep prajñā also does not show form, does not show feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness, and so on up to does not show the omniscience of all kinds, because 「是深般若波羅蜜中尚無般若波羅蜜，何況色乃至一切種智」 tr. "within this deep prajñāpāramitā there is not even prajñāpāramitā, how much less form and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds." On one side it says he fully knows; on the other it says there is nothing and that it does not show—this is not self-contradiction: because nothing is shown, there is nothing that is not shown; precisely because within prajñā even prajñā is unfindable, the mark of the world that it shows does not fall upon any single dharma.
6. Knowing as it really is the collected mind and the distracted mind—knowing by the mark of dharmas. The Buddha sets out the enumeration of beings: whether with form or without form, whether with perception, without perception, or neither with perception nor without perception, whether in this world or throughout the worlds of the ten directions; whether these beings have a collected mind or a distracted mind, the Buddha knows as it really is. How does he know? The Buddha answers himself: he knows by the mark of dharmas. He further raises a question himself—by what mark of dharmas?—and the Buddha answers: in this mark of dharmas there is not even the mark of the mark of dharmas, how much less a collected mind or a distracted mind. This is the first appearance of the fixed form of the answers of the whole chapter—the so-called ‘knowing by the mark of dharmas’ is not taking a ruler to measure the mind; that ruler itself is also markless; because it is markless, nothing hinders it from knowing all marks.
7. The six gates of exhaustion, no staining, cessation, severance, quiescence, and separation. The Buddha again takes another road in speaking of the marks by which the mind is known: he knows by the mark of exhaustion, he knows by the mark of no staining, he knows by the marks of cessation, severance, quiescence, and separation. The six gates seem to stand side by side, but in fact they are six stages of a single road—from contemplating impermanence to exhaustion, from exhaustion to not being stained, by the worldly path holding back and extinguishing, by the path without outflows severing, from severance to quiescence, from quiescence to separation. The treatise-author has his own word-by-word explanation later (see passage 23); here we first record their names.
8. Knowing as it really is the stained mind, the hateful mind, and the deluded mind. The Buddha says that because of prajñā he knows the stained minds of beings, knows the stained mind as it really is; the hateful mind and the deluded mind he likewise knows as they really are. Subhūti asks its meaning, and the Buddha answers: 「染心如實相，則無染心相。」 tr. "The stained mind, in its real mark as it is, has no mark of a stained mind." Why? Within the real mark as it is, even mind and mental-factor dharmas are unfindable, how much less could one find a stained mind or an unstained mind. Hatred and delusion are the same as this. Here one must see clearly the grammar of 「如實知染心」 tr. "knowing the stained mind as it really is": what is known is the stained mind’s real mark as it is, and within the stained mind’s real mark as it is there is no stained mind—what is known is its non-existence, not its existence.
9. The unstained mind, the mind without hatred, the mind without delusion—two minds are not together. The Buddha goes on to say that he knows as it really is the unstained mind, the mind without hatred, and the mind without delusion of beings. Subhūti asks again, and the Buddha answers: within this mind’s mark of no staining, the mark of staining and the mark of not staining are both unfindable; why? 「二心不俱故。」 tr. "Because two minds are not together." These four Chinese characters are the eye of this passage. Thoughts arise in succession, and at one time there is only one mind; when the unstained mind is present the stained mind is already gone, and since the stained mind does not exist, the unstained mind that stands in dependence on it as its counterpart does not exist either—so within the real mark of no staining, neither end, stained or unstained, can stand.
10. The broad mind. The Buddha says he knows as it really is the broad minds of beings. Subhūti asks, and the Buddha answers: he knows that the mark of the minds of beings is neither broad nor narrow, neither increases nor decreases, neither comes nor goes; because the mark of the mind is separate, this mind is not broad, and so on up to it neither comes nor goes. Why? 「是心性無故」 tr. "because the nature of this mind is non-existent," who makes it broad, who makes it narrow, and so on to coming and going? The so-called knowing the broad mind as it really is is knowing that of this mind there is from the root no broadness to speak of—broad and narrow are names that depend on their counterparts, and since the nature of the mind is non-existent, the master who could make it broad or narrow does not exist either.
11. The great mind. The same pattern is walked once more: the Buddha does not see a mark of coming or a mark of going of the minds of beings, does not see a mark of arising, a mark of ceasing, a mark of abiding, or a mark of changing. Why? Because the nature of these minds is non-existent, who comes, who goes, who arises, ceases, abides, or changes? 「大」 tr. "Great" and 「廣」 tr. "broad" are almost synonyms in ordinary speech, yet the sūtra text divides them into two passages, each matched with its own set of marks: broad is matched with broad and narrow, increase and decrease, coming and going; great is matched with coming and going, arising, ceasing, abiding, and changing. Speaking of them separately is meant to let people know that what is negated is not one word but a whole way of grasping at marks.
12. The immeasurable mind. The Buddha answers: he knows these minds of beings, and sees neither abiding nor not abiding. Why? 「是無量心相無依止故」 tr. "because the mark of this immeasurable mind has no support," who has a place of abiding or not abiding? The two preceding passages negated broad and narrow and arising and ceasing; this passage negates a place of abiding. Because there is nothing to rest on, there is no place of abiding; because there is no place of abiding, it is immeasurable—the immeasurable is not being measured as very great; it is that there is from the root no place where a measure could be set down.
13. The invisible mind—empty of specific marks; the five eyes do not see. The last mind is the most perilous: it says both that it is invisible and that he knows it as it really is. The Buddha answers on two levels: first, the minds of beings are markless, and the Buddha knows as it really is their marklessness, because they are empty of specific marks; second, the Buddha knows the minds of beings, and the five eyes cannot see them. Only when these two sentences are seen together does one see that 「如實知不可見心」 tr. "knowing the invisible mind as it really is" is not a contradiction in terms—precisely because what the five eyes see is all a seeing that grasps at marks, not seeing becomes instead knowing its reality. Sūtra ① is gathered up at this point, and Treatise ① will set up a separate question and answer on this sentence (see passages 28 and 29).
14. The treatise-author’s opening explanation—taking up the doubt from the preceding chapter, and the simile of knowing the debt of kindness. When the treatise-author opens his explanation, his first move is to link this chapter back to the preceding one: above it was said that the buddhas of the ten directions and the great bodhisattvas guard prajñā, and so on up to the one who rightly recollects it, and do not let Māra find an opening. Hearing this, a hearer in the assembly might think—the awakening of the buddhas is of the mark of quiescence, and towards dharmas and beings they have neither hatred nor love; why do they guard those who write out and uphold prajñā? Once the doubt is set up, the Buddha’s simile of mother and sons is the answer. The treatise-author states the sense of the simile more plainly than the sūtra text: 「如子知恩故，守護其母。般若是十方諸佛母故」 tr. "As sons who know their debt of kindness guard their mother—because prajñā is the mother of the buddhas of the ten directions"; if Māra and the like make hindrances wishing to spoil and ruin prajñā, then the buddhas, although they practise the mark of quiescence, out of pity for beings and because they know their share of the debt of kindness, keep them constantly in thought with a mind of kindness and compassion and constantly see them with the Buddha-eye, guarding those who practise prajñā, so that they gain increase and do not lose the path of the Buddha. Quiescence and guarding do not hinder each other—quiescence is having neither hatred nor love, guarding is knowing the debt of kindness and pity, and in the Buddha’s case both hold at the same time.
15. All the worthies and sages and the dharmas of the worthies and sages are born from prajñā. The treatise-author points out the cause and condition the Buddha himself speaks after the simile: 「諸賢聖及賢聖法皆從般若中生。」 tr. "All the worthies and sages and the dharmas of the worthies and sages are born from within prajñā." That long string in the sūtra text—‘can give birth to dhyānapāramitā and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds, can give birth to the srota-āpanna and so on up to the buddhas’—the treatise-author gathers up in one sentence: both sides, persons and dharmas, come from prajñā. This sentence is also the proof of the two Chinese characters 「佛母」 tr. "the Mother of the Buddhas": it is not an honorific; it is a relation of birth.
16. Four questions and three answers—giving birth and being born from do not differ in meaning. The treatise-author raises a question himself: Subhūti asked about four kinds of things; why does the Buddha answer only three matters and not say 「諸佛從般若中生」 tr. "the buddhas are born from within prajñā"? Answer: that prajñā gives birth to the buddhas and that the buddhas are born from prajñā do not differ in meaning. The treatise-author then distinguishes why some take them as two matters: 「有人言：諸法和合故能生般若波羅蜜，般若波羅蜜能生諸佛；有人行般若波羅蜜及眾行，得成佛。初謂作者，二謂法。」 tr. "Someone says: because dharmas come together they can give birth to prajñāpāramitā, and prajñāpāramitā can give birth to the buddhas; someone practises prajñāpāramitā and the many practices, and attains buddhahood. The first speaks of the maker, the second speaks of the dharma." One speaks from the side of the maker, one from the side of the dharma; though the ways of speaking are two, the matter itself is one. The treatise-author then settles it with another simile: whether one says 「墮枝殺人」 tr. "a falling branch killed a man" or says 「墮樹殺人」 tr. "a falling tree killed a man"—the way of speaking of branch and tree differs, but the event of killing a man is the same, and so no separate answer is needed. To say that prajñā can give birth to the buddhas is already to have said that the buddhas are born from prajñā. To answer one question fewer is not an omission in answering; it is because the meaning is not two.
17. Other sūtras say that the five aggregates are broken and ruined, and here it is said that they are neither broken nor ruined. The second question is harder: as other sūtras say, 「五眾破壞，故名世間」 tr. "the five aggregates are broken and ruined; therefore they are called the world," why is it said here that prajñā shows the five aggregates as without breaking, ruin, arising, ceasing, and the like? The treatise-author answers with the difference of their lines of teaching: that is the matter of the Small Vehicle; this is the matter of the Great Vehicle. The Dharma of the Small Vehicle speaks much of impermanence, the Dharma of the Great Vehicle speaks much of the emptiness of dharmas; the Small Vehicle first speaks of impermanence and afterwards of the emptiness of dharmas, the Great Vehicle speaks of the emptiness of dharmas from the very start; the Small Vehicle speaks of impermanence in order to make beings fear, and the Great Vehicle is not so, and therefore it speaks of there being no breaking, ruin, and the like. And he cites as proof the cause and condition the Buddha himself speaks: 「空、無相、無作，終不破、不壞。」 tr. "Emptiness, the signless, non-action are never broken, never ruined." The two sūtras are two places to set one’s hand—one startles people from the side of ruin, one shows directly from the side where there was never any ruin; the treatise-author judges only the difference between the Small Vehicle and the Great Vehicle, and does not say whether or not the two sūtras contend with each other.
18. The five aggregates are called the world; mental factors are hard to know; by the power of skilful means he can know. The treatise-author explains further: the five aggregates are called the world; the bodies, shapes, and forms of beings are easy to know, while the other mental-factor dharmas, having no shape, are hard to know; therefore the Buddha tells Subhūti 「無量阿僧祇眾生心所行皆知」 tr. "the workings of the minds of measureless asaṃkhyeya beings he knows all." He then points out that crucial turn—within the deep prajñā, though there are no beings and no form and such dharmas, and so on up to no omniscience of all kinds, yet it is 「以般若方便力而能知眾生心所行」 tr. "by the power of the skilful means of prajñā that he can know the workings of the minds of beings"; and because within this prajñā there is ultimate emptiness, it does not show form and such dharmas, and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds. The joint where 「無」 tr. "there is nothing" meets 「能知」 tr. "he can know" lies in the three Chinese characters 「方便力」 tr. "the power of skilful means." The treatise-author further takes up the cause and condition the Buddha himself speaks: 「般若波羅蜜中尚無般若相，何況色等法！」 tr. "Within prajñāpāramitā there is not even the mark of prajñā, how much less form and such dharmas!"
19. What shows the world—the enumeration of beings distinguished item by item. The treatise-author assigns that string of the enumeration of beings in the sūtra text item by item: ‘with form’ means beings of the desire realm and the form realm; ‘without form’ means beings of the formless realm. As to ‘with perception’, apart from the Heaven of No Perception and the Heaven of Neither Perception nor Non-perception, the rest are with perception; ‘without perception’ means the beings without perception; ‘neither with perception nor without perception’ means the gods of the place of the Summit of Existence. ‘This world’ means the three-thousand great-thousand world; ‘throughout the ten directions’ means the remaining measureless, boundless, asaṃkhyeya worlds. The last sentence gathers it up: of the beings of the three times in the six destinies of these worlds, the Buddha fully knows their collected minds and distracted minds. This passage is one of the rare passages of pure distinction in the whole chapter, and in reading it one need not seek anything recondite—it only counts out clearly the extension of the four Chinese characters 「一切眾生」 tr. "all beings," so that the following 「佛悉知」 tr. "the Buddha fully knows" has a definite denominator.
20. Subhūti’s doubt, and the Buddha’s answer of the wisdom of the real mark. The treatise-author speaks out on Subhūti’s behalf the strangeness in his mind: 「諸佛常樂行寂滅諸法空，今云何遍知無始無邊眾生攝心、亂心？佛心一，眾生心無量種，云何一時知一切眾生心？」 tr. "The buddhas always delight in practising the quiescence and emptiness of dharmas; how now do they know throughout the collected minds and distracted minds of beginningless, boundless beings? The Buddha’s mind is one, the minds of beings are of measureless kinds; how does he know the minds of all beings at one time?"—the difficulty of one and the measureless the treatise-author states more plainly than the sūtra text. Hence the question 「佛云何知」 tr. "how does the Buddha know?" The Buddha answers: because of the wisdom of the real mark of all dharmas he knows the collected minds and distracted minds of beings. Subhūti asks again what the real mark of all dharmas is, and Answer: namely, ultimate emptiness; of this ultimate emptiness even the nature of ultimate emptiness is unfindable, how much less a collected mind or a distracted mind.
21. Within ultimate emptiness, how does he know the mind? The treatise-author raises a question himself once more, pressing the difficulty to its extreme: within the ultimate emptiness of the real mark of all dharmas there are no discriminating mind and mental-factor dharmas; how does the Buddha know their minds? The answer is in two parts. The first part takes as its ground what the Buddha himself says: the nature of the real mark of all dharmas is also unfindable, and with this wisdom he knows the collected minds and distracted minds of beings; why? 「若空性可得，應有難；空性不可得，云何作難？」 tr. "If the nature of emptiness were findable, there should be a difficulty; the nature of emptiness being unfindable, how can a difficulty be made?"—the difficulty is built on the premise that ‘emptiness is a findable thing’; once the premise does not hold, the difficulty naturally falls empty. The second part states positively why he knows: now the Buddha has passed beyond all the false dharmas of recollection, imagining, and discrimination, and abiding securely in the real mark, knows the minds of all beings as they really are; because the minds of beings abide within false dharmas, they cannot know other beings as they really are. The difference between the Buddha’s being able to know and beings’ not being able to know lies not in the size of the mind but in abiding in the real mark and abiding in falsity.
22. The division into first in brief and then in full. The treatise-author inserts a sentence of sectional division: first it speaks in brief of 「知他心」 tr. "knowing the minds of others," next it distinguishes the collected minds and distracted minds of beings, namely those with the three poisons and those without the three poisons, broad, great, immeasurable, invisible, emerging, sinking, bending, stretching, and so on. This sentence lists in one breath the whole table of contents of Sūtra ① and Sūtra ②, and it is the most convenient map for reading this chapter—every question and answer below falls within this table of contents.
23. The explanation of the six gates of exhaustion, no staining, cessation, severance, quiescence, and separation. The treatise-author explains the six gates word by word: Subhūti asks about matter after matter; first he is answered that it is because of the real mark of all dharmas that the Buddha knows the collected mind and the distracted mind; next, that he knows by exhaustion, no staining, cessation, severance, quiescence, and separation. 「盡者，無常慧」 tr. "Exhaustion is the wisdom of impermanence"; the bodhisattva practises this mind of the wisdom of impermanence and separates from all worldly staining—this is no staining. To use the worldly path to hold back and extinguish the fetters is called cessation. To sever with the path without outflows is therefore called severance. Having severed the fetters, one contemplates nirvāṇa’s marks of quiescence and separation—this is quiescence and separation. By these causes and conditions one obtains the real mark of all dharmas; by the real mark of all dharmas, one knows that the collected minds and distracted minds of others are all the real mark. The six gates, then, are not six kinds of knowing; they are one road that enters the real mark from impermanence, and once one has walked it through, one naturally knows the minds of others.
24. The mind arising and ceasing thought by thought cannot be known; contemplation by the gate of exhaustion; the real mark of the stained mind. The treatise-author goes on to set forth the gate of exhaustion: this mind arises and ceases thought by thought; the future does not exist and so cannot be known; the present ceases thought by thought, and because there is no time of abiding it cannot be known. Ordinary people grasp at marks and discriminate, and within the three times recollect, imagine, and see falsely, and say that they know the thoughts of the mind—what ordinary people call knowing the mind knows only the marks they themselves have made. Contemplating by the gate of exhaustion is precisely ultimate emptiness; because of ultimate emptiness there is nothing to be attached to, and at that time one obtains the path, knows the real mark of all dharmas, does not falsely think and discriminate about any dharma, and then knows the minds of others as they really are. He then turns to the stained mind: all dharmas, entering into the nature of dharmas, are pure, and therefore it says: 「染心實相，是中無染心。何以故？如實中無心無心數法，何況染心！」 tr. "The real mark of the stained mind—within it there is no stained mind. Why? Within the real as it is there is no mind and there are no mental-factor dharmas, how much less a stained mind!" The hateful mind and the deluded mind are also thus.
25. The mark of the unstained mind; two minds are not together; dharmas that depend on their counterparts do not exist. The treatise-author explains the passage on no staining: within the mark of the unstained mind there is no mark of a stained mind, because the stained mind is from the beginning non-existent; nor is there a not-stained mind, for the unstained mind is of the mark of quiescence and has nothing to discriminate. Here the Buddha himself speaks the cause and condition: 「須菩提！二心不俱故。」 tr. "Subhūti! Because two minds are not together." The treatise-author unfolds these four Chinese characters into a most lucid piece of reasoning: it is the dharma of beings that mind after mind arises in succession, and when there is the unstained mind, then there is no stained mind; the past stained mind has already ceased, the future one is not yet, and in the present there is the unstained mind, so there is no stained mind; because there is no stained mind, there is also no not-stained mind, because dharmas that depend on their counterparts do not exist. Therefore within the real mark of no staining there is neither a stained mind nor a not-stained mind. The mind without hatred and the mind without delusion are also thus. This passage is where the whole chapter speaks most plainly of ‘two dharmas depending on each other as counterparts’—break one end, and the other end falls of itself.
26. Broad and narrow, increase and decrease, have no fixed mark. The treatise-author explains the passage on broad and great: the broad and narrow, increasing and decreasing mind are all beings’ grasping at marks and discriminating; the Buddha does not know in this way. Why? This mind has no form and no shape, no place of abiding, and ceases thought by thought, so there is no difference of broad and narrow, increase and decrease. Here the Buddha himself speaks the cause and condition: 「心性相無故，廣狹等不可得。」 tr. "Because the nature and mark of the mind are non-existent, broad and narrow and the like are unfindable." The treatise-author further marks the place to consult: the meaning of broad and narrow, increase and decrease, great and small, is as spoken of among the four immeasurable minds—it is not repeated in this chapter.
27. The four meanings of the immeasurable mind, and the simile of eye-consciousness having no place of abiding. The treatise-author explains the immeasurable and gives four meanings: the broad mind and the great mind are precisely immeasurable; because it takes measureless beings as its object it is called immeasurable; because it takes the measureless dharma of nirvāṇa as its object it is called immeasurable; because the mark of the mind cannot be grasped it is called immeasurable. The four meanings go from coarse to subtle, and only the last is the true intent. He then brings out a simile: as eye-consciousness arises from the causes and conditions of there being an eye and there being form, this consciousness is not in the eye, not in the form, not in between, not here, not there, and therefore it has no place of abiding; if it truly has no place of abiding, how can it have anything that it does? Whether fine or ugly, like things seen in a dream, one cannot seek a real, fixed mark in them. The mind is also thus: because it has no support it has no fixed mark, and so it is called 「無量」 tr. "immeasurable." The simile of eye-consciousness best repays effort—consciousness has plainly arisen, yet one cannot point out where it is; the mind’s being ‘immeasurable’ is exactly this having nowhere that can be pointed to. The last sentence adds: broad and great should also be explained in this way, distinguished according to their meaning.
28. The question and answer on the invisible mind—the false seeing of people who sit in meditation. The treatise-author asks himself: if one knows that the mind is invisible, why does the Buddha say 「如實知不可見心」 tr. "he knows the invisible mind as it really is"? The answer first sets out the marks of the sickness: there are people who sit in meditation who recollect, imagine, and discriminate, and see this mind as like a thread within a pure jewel; people who contemplate the white skeleton see the mind arising in successive continuity; or at times they see the mind as being in the body; or they see it as being in its object, as in the sphere of boundless consciousness, where one sees only consciousness as measureless and boundless. These four are all states that really occur in meditation, and all are grasping at marks. In order to break such falsity as this, the Buddha says 「如實知眾生心，眾生心自相空故無相相」 tr. "he knows the minds of beings as they really are; because the minds of beings are empty of specific marks, they are of the mark of the signless." It can be seen that the phrase 「如實知不可見」 tr. "knowing the invisible as it really is" is a word of remedy: what it remedies is precisely the kind of seeing in which the one who applies effort takes himself to have seen the mind.
29. Contemplated with the five eyes, the mind is unfindable. The treatise-author then examines with the five eyes one by one: the fleshly eye and the divine eye take form as their object and so do not see; the wisdom-eye takes nirvāṇa as its object and so does not see; the Dharma-eye, at the time of first awakening, discriminates and knows dharmas as wholesome and unwholesome, with outflows and without outflows, and so on, but on entering the real mark it has nothing to discriminate, as was said before, 「一切法無知者、無見者」 tr. "all dharmas have no knower and no seer," and therefore it should not see; the Buddha-eye contemplates the mark of quiescence and so should not see. Then comes the turning word: the minds of beings, where there is one who sees, are seen as they really are; not seen in the way ordinary people see by recollection, imagining, and discrimination. At the end he adds one more principle: the five eyes arise from the coming together of causes and conditions and are all made dharmas, false and deceptive, not real; the Buddha does not trust them and does not use them, and therefore it says 「不以五眼見」 tr. "he does not see with the five eyes." The five eyes’ not seeing is not a lack of ability; it is not using that kind of seeing—fascicle sixty-nine ends here.
30. The heading question of emerging, sinking, bending, and stretching. Fascicle seventy, after heading the chapter title again, takes up the sūtra text’s table of contents from the previous fascicle and goes on to speak of the fifth class: because of the deep prajñā the Buddha knows as it really is the emerging, sinking, bending, and stretching of the mental factors of beings. Subhūti asks according to precedent. What was spoken of before this is the substance of the mind (collected and distracted, stained and pure, broad and great, immeasurable, visible and invisible); emerging, sinking, bending, and stretching speak of the movements of the mind—the momentum by which beings rise and sink, advance and retreat, within birth and death.
31. The fourteen difficult questions rest on the five aggregates—the four propositions of permanent and impermanent set out again aggregate by aggregate. The Buddha’s answer first sets out a general rule: the emerging, sinking, bending, stretching, and so on of the mental factors of all beings all arise resting on form, feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness. Then, in the most regular pattern, it spreads them out item by item: ‘the soul and the world are permanent; this is true and the rest is false speech’—this view rests on form; impermanent, both permanent and impermanent, neither permanent nor impermanent, one item each, alike rest on form; then resting on feeling, resting on perception, resting on constructions, resting on consciousness, each walks through the four propositions once more. The sūtra text, never tiring of it, sets out twenty items, and the whole intent lies in that unchanging tail—‘this view rests on such-and-such’. However the content of wrong views may change its patterns, the place they come from is only one: the five aggregates. In reading this passage one may not skip lines; skip them and one cannot see that this repetition is itself the speaking of the Dharma.
32. The four propositions that the world has a limit or has no limit. Next it sets out: the world has a limit, has no limit, both has a limit and has no limit, neither has a limit nor has no limit—the four propositions are all views that rest on form; resting on feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness is also thus. The pattern is the same as before; only the topic is changed—from permanent and impermanent in time to having a limit and having no limit in space.
33. The soul is the body; the soul is other and the body is other. Again it sets out a pair: ‘the soul is the body’—this view rests on form; ‘the soul is other and the body is other’—this view rests on form; resting on feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness is also thus. This pair is not four propositions but two, because the sameness or difference of body and soul has only the two kinds, identical or separate.
34. The four propositions of going on thus after death. Lastly it sets out: after death there is one who goes on thus, there is not one who goes on thus, there both is and is not one who goes on thus, there neither is nor is not one who goes on thus—the four propositions are all views that rest on form; resting on feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness is also thus. What is asked about is the existence or non-existence of later lives; what they rest on is still the five aggregates.
35. Conclusion—knowing emerging, sinking, bending, and stretching as they really are. The Buddha concludes: thus, because of prajñāpāramitā, the Buddha knows as they really are the emerging, sinking, bending, and stretching of beings. After a long string of wrong views has been counted out, the conclusion is only one sentence—what the Buddha knows is not which of these views is right; what the Buddha knows is how these views arise resting on the five aggregates and how they make people sink and float.
36. The Buddha knows the mark of form, and the marks of suchness of all dharmas are identical layer upon layer. The sūtra text turns abruptly, from wrong views to 「如」 tr. "suchness." The Buddha knows the mark of form—how does he know it? As suchness is suchness and is not ruined, without discrimination, without mark, without recollection, without idle discourse, without attainment, so too is the mark of form; so too are the marks of feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness. And so the Buddha knows the mark of the suchness of beings and the mark of the suchness of the emerging, sinking, bending, and stretching of the mental factors of beings. Next comes the most famous string of identities in the whole chapter: the mark of the suchness of the five aggregates and the mark of the suchness of all formations are precisely the mark of the suchness of all dharmas; as for the mark of the suchness of all dharmas, the mark of the suchness of the six perfections is precisely the mark of the suchness of the thirty-seven limbs of the path, the mark of the suchness of the thirty-seven limbs of the path is precisely the mark of the suchness of the eighteen emptinesses, the eighteen emptinesses are precisely the eight liberations, the eight liberations are precisely the nine successive absorptions, the nine successive absorptions are precisely the ten powers of a Buddha, the ten powers of a Buddha are precisely the four fearlessnesses, the four unobstructed knowledges, great loving-kindness and great compassion, and so on up to the eighteen unshared dharmas, the eighteen unshared dharmas are precisely the omniscience of all kinds, the omniscience of all kinds is precisely wholesome dharmas and unwholesome dharmas, worldly dharmas and world-transcending dharmas, dharmas with outflows and dharmas without outflows, dharmas without outflows are precisely past, future, and present dharmas, the dharmas of the three times are precisely conditioned dharmas and unconditioned dharmas, the conditioned and the unconditioned are precisely the fruit of the srota-āpanna, the fruit of the srota-āpanna is precisely the fruit of the sakṛdāgāmin, the fruit of the sakṛdāgāmin is precisely the fruit of the anāgāmin, the fruit of the anāgāmin is precisely the fruit of the arhat, the fruit of the arhat is precisely the path of the pratyekabuddha, the path of the pratyekabuddha is precisely anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi, the mark of the suchness of anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi is precisely the mark of the suchness of the buddhas—the marks of the suchness of the buddhas are all one mark of suchness, not two and not different, not exhausted and not ruined; this is called the mark of the suchness of all dharmas. Because of prajñā the Buddha obtains this mark of suchness, and for this cause and condition prajñā can give birth to the buddhas and can show the mark of the world; he knows the mark of the suchness of all dharmas, the mark that is not not-such, the mark that is not different, and because he obtains this mark of suchness the Buddha is called the Tathāgata. Above it was said that the five aggregates are the mark of the world, and that it shows the five aggregates as not broken and not ruined; only here is it made clear what, in the end, is shown: what is shown is suchness.
37. The mark of suchness is very deep; who can believe and understand it? Subhūti marvels at its great depth, and asks who can believe and understand it, and answers himself: only avaivartika bodhisattvas and persons complete in right view, and arhats whose outflows are exhausted; why? Because this dharma is very deep. The Buddha answers why it is deep: 「是如無盡相故甚深。」 tr. "This suchness is very deep because it is of the mark of inexhaustibility." Subhūti asks again what dharma is very deep because it is of the mark of inexhaustibility, and the Buddha says: because all dharmas are inexhaustible; the Buddha, having obtained this suchness of all dharmas, speaks it for beings. Sūtra ② ends with this—the great depth lies not in being hard to understand but in being inexhaustible; because it is inexhaustible there is no place where it can be exhausted, and because there is no place where it can be exhausted it is not something that those who grasp at marks can believe.
38. The treatise-author’s general explanation of emerging, sinking, bending, and stretching. Treatise ② opens its explanation: the Buddha fully knows all that all beings do and practise, the various wrong views such as the sixty-two wrong views, and the various afflictions such as the ninety-eight fetters, and therefore it says 「佛知眾生心心數法出、沒、屈、申」 tr. "the Buddha knows the emerging, sinking, bending, and stretching of the mind and mental-factor dharmas of beings." With his first stroke of the brush the treatise-author places those twenty items, the four propositions, and the two propositions of the sūtra text into the old account of the sixty-two views and the ninety-eight fetters—what the sūtra text lists is not something new; it is the general register of the mental activity of all beings.
39. The glosses on sinking and emerging, bending and stretching. The treatise-author gives the glosses word by word. 「沒」 tr. "Sinking": householders are sunk by craving and the various afflictions; 「出」 tr. "emerging": those who go forth into the ninety-six kinds of wrong view are called emerging. Again, because one is always attached to worldly pleasure it is called sinking; or one knows impermanence, fears, and seeks the path, and so it is called emerging. Again, one receives the dharmas of the ninety-six kinds of path, and because one cannot obtain the right path one sinks back into the world. 「屈」 tr. "Bending" is not leaving the desire realm; 「申」 tr. "stretching" is leaving the desire realm; leaving and not leaving the form realm is also thus. The most important point in these glosses is this: going forth and seeking the path can also sink back—after emerging one does not necessarily not sink, and this is the foreshadowing of the fish simile in the next passage.
40. The simile of watching fish from above a clear pool. The treatise-author brings out a simile: like a person standing above a clear pool watching fish—some are always in the water, some come out for a moment and sink again, some come out and look at the four quarters, some come out wishing to cross, come near the bank, and sink again. He then applies the simile: the Buddha with the Buddha-eye contemplates the beings of the six destinies of the ten directions—there are those who are always attached to the five desires, whose minds are covered by the afflictions, and who do not seek to get out; or there are those who have a good mind, can give and can keep the precepts, but because wrong doubt covers the mind they sink again; there are those who get out of the five desires and can obtain the dharma of warmth, the dharma of the summit, and so on, and contemplate the four truths, but because they have not obtained the real dharma they sink again; there are those who leave the five desires and so on up to the sphere of nothing whatsoever, but because they do not obtain nirvāṇa they sink again. The four kinds of people go from coarse to subtle, and the last kind has already reached the sphere of nothing whatsoever and still sinks again. This simile is the mirror in the whole chapter closest to the practitioner’s own person: the higher one emerges, the more to be regretted the sinking, and the reason for sinking is in every case not yet having obtained the real dharma.
41. What are the marks of emerging, sinking, bending, and stretching?—the reckoning of a soul. The treatise-author next asks: what are the marks of emerging, sinking, bending, and stretching? Here the Buddha says, namely, 「神及世間常」 tr. "the soul and the world are permanent." He then explains the soul: as for the soul, ordinary people recollect, imagine, and discriminate, and because they grasp at marks following the mind of self, they reckon that there is a soul. And he marks the twofold division of the outside paths’ theories of the soul: first, permanent; second, impermanent. One must see clearly the order of this sentence of the treatise-author—first there is 「我心取相」 tr. "the mind of self grasping at marks," and afterwards 「計有神」 tr. "reckoning that there is a soul"; the soul is not there first and then recognised; it is made by the mind that grasps at marks.
42. The four schools: the soul is permanent, the soul is impermanent, both permanent and impermanent, neither permanent nor impermanent. The treatise-author sets out the reasons of each school in turn. Those who reckon the soul permanent always cultivate merit and virtue, because afterwards they receive its fruit and retribution, or because by practising the path the soul obtains liberation—the permanent is set up in order to set up a bearer for karmic fruit and for liberation. Those who say the soul is impermanent act for the sake of fame and gain in this life—it comes down to the reckonings of the present life. As for both permanent and impermanent, someone holds that the soul is of two kinds: first, subtle and abiding permanently; second, presently acting; that which presently acts is impermanent at the time the body dies, and the subtle soul is permanent—a compromise between the two schools. As for neither permanent nor impermanent, the treatise-author cites the reasoning they state themselves: 「有人言：神非常非無常。」 tr. "Someone says: the soul is neither permanent nor impermanent." Their reason is that in both permanent and impermanent there are faults—if the soul were impermanent, there would be no sin and merit; if permanent, there would also be no sin and merit. Why? If permanent, then suffering and pleasure would not differ, just as space cannot be wetted by rain nor dried by wind and sun; if impermanent, then suffering and pleasure would change, just as wind and rain, inside an ox-hide, make it rot and fall apart. The last sentence exposes the root of the sickness: 「以我心故，說必有神，但非常非無常。」 tr. "Because of the mind of self, they say there must be a soul, only it is neither permanent nor impermanent." However contrary the four schools’ ways of speaking, they all come from one 「我心」 tr. "mind of self."
43. The four kinds of wrong view all take the five aggregates as their object. The treatise-author cites the Buddha’s words to settle it: 「四種邪見，皆緣五眾，但於五眾謬計為神。」 tr. "The four kinds of wrong view all take the five aggregates as their object; they only mistakenly reckon the five aggregates to be a soul." The contention of the four propositions is a contention over the attributes of something that originally does not exist, and so the contention can reach no result—this sentence is also exactly the meaning of the sūtra text’s saying again and again 「是見依色」 tr. "this view rests on form" and 「依受、想、行、識亦如是」 tr. "resting on feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness is also thus."
44. The three kinds of world and the four views about the world. The treatise-author explains the ‘world’ of 「神及世間」 tr. "the soul and the world": there are three kinds of world—first, the five-aggregate world; second, the world of beings; third, the world of lands. Here two kinds are spoken of: the five-aggregate world and the world of lands; the world of beings is precisely the soul. Within the mark of the world there are also four kinds of wrong view. The merit of this distinction lies here: within the four Chinese characters of the sūtra text 「神及世間」 tr. "the soul and the world," the soul already includes the world of beings, and what remains is the five aggregates and lands.
45. The difficulty that the soul is originally non-existent while the world exists. The treatise-author sets up a question, and it is the most forceful question of this passage: because the soul has from the beginning been non-existent, it should be wrong; the world exists—how can it be the same as the wrong view of a soul? Answer: it only refutes the marks of permanence and impermanence raised upon the world; it does not refute the world. He then brings out a simile: it is like a blind man who gets hold of a snake and takes it for a necklace, and a man with eyes tells him that this is a snake, not a necklace—what is refuted is the mistaken recognition of 「以為瓔珞」 tr. "taking it for a necklace," not a denial of the snake as well. The treatise-author then sets it forth positively: the Buddha refutes the inversion of the world’s permanence; he does not refute the world; why? Because impermanence is seen directly. Nor may one say that there is no impermanence, because sin and merit are not lost, because what is done comes from past deeds. Permanent and impermanent both have faults; neither permanent nor impermanent has the fault of attachment to the world. The four propositions are each refuted for their faults, and the world remains as it is.
46. The world has a limit—seeking the origin and not finding a beginning. The treatise-author turns to having a limit and having no limit, first setting out the line of reasoning of those who hold 「有邊」 tr. "has a limit": someone seeks the root of the world and does not find its beginning; if its beginning is not found, then there is no middle and no end; if there is no beginning, middle, or end, then there is no world; therefore the world should have a beginning, and the beginning is precisely a limit. This is an inference from ‘there must be’ to ‘there certainly is’—in setting out the theories of the outside paths, this chapter never mocks; it only states their line of reasoning as it is, letting people see for themselves where the weight of the inference falls.
47. The theory of the nature of the world—awareness, self, the five subtle atoms, the four great elements, the five faculties. The treatise-author describes one school in detail. One who has obtained dhyāna, by the power of the knowledge of former lives, sees the events of eighty thousand kalpas, and beyond that can no longer know; he sees only the consciousness of the intermediate existence at the beginning of the body, and reflects to himself: 「此識不應無因無緣，必應有因緣，宿命智所不能知。」 tr. "This consciousness should not be without cause and without condition; it must have causes and conditions, which the knowledge of former lives cannot know." And so he recollects, imagines, and discriminates: there is a dharma called the nature of the world, which is not known by the five faculties, because it is extremely subtle. Within the nature of the world, awareness first arises, and awareness is precisely the consciousness of the intermediate existence; from awareness arises self; from self arise the five kinds of subtle atoms, namely form, sound, smell, taste, and touch; from the atom of sound arises the great element of space, from sound and touch arises the great element of wind, from form, sound, and touch arises the great element of fire, from form, sound, touch, and taste arises the great element of water, from form, sound, touch, taste, and smell arises the great element of earth; from space arises the ear faculty, from wind arises the body faculty, from fire arises the eye faculty, from water arises the tongue faculty, from earth arises the nose faculty—thus gradually from the subtle to the coarse. As for the nature of the world, from the nature of the world it comes to the coarse, and from the coarse it turns back to the subtle and returns to the nature of the world. He further brings out the simile of a lump of clay: just as a lump of clay contains within it the natures of pots, jars, and the like, clay is made into a pot, the pot is broken into a jar, and in such transformation nothing at all is lost; the nature of the world is also thus, transforming into the coarse. The nature of the world is a permanent dharma and comes from nowhere, as the Sāṃkhya Scripture explains at length. The treatise-author records where it comes from without adding reproach—what is to be seen is why this school sets up a nature of the world: because the knowledge of former lives reaches its end at eighty thousand kalpas, and where one cannot see the beginning, one makes a beginning.
48. Atoms are a permanent dharma. Again, someone asserts that the first limit of the world is called atoms. Atoms are a permanent dharma; they cannot be broken, cannot be burnt, cannot be rotted, cannot be destroyed, because they are subtle; only by waiting upon the coming together of the causes and conditions of sin and merit is there a body, whether of a god or of the hells and so on; because they have no father and mother, when the causes and conditions of sin and merit are exhausted, they scatter and are destroyed. It has the same sickness as the school of the nature of the world, in a different shape: one pushes the beginning to an extremely subtle 「性」 tr. "nature," the other to an extremely subtle 「塵」 tr. "atom."
49. The two theories of spontaneity and the lord of heaven; wrong causes are the limit. Two more schools: someone takes spontaneity as the beginning of the world, and poverty and wealth, nobility and baseness are not obtained by vows and practice; someone says the lord of heaven is precisely the beginning of the world, making auspiciousness and inauspiciousness, misfortune and fortune, heaven and earth and the myriad things, and when this dharma ceases, the god takes them back again. The treatise-author settles them all in one sentence: 「如是邪因，是世界邊。」 tr. "Such wrong causes are the limit of the world." The four schools—the nature of the world, atoms, spontaneity, the lord of heaven—return alike to one name: wrong causes. The so-called view of having a limit is in fact seeking a beginning for the world and seeking the wrong cause.
50. Suffering and pleasure exhaust themselves and reach the limit of their own accord; the simile of the ball of thread. One more theory: beings, receiving suffering and pleasure life after life until it is exhausted, reach the limit of their own accord; as when a ball of thread is thrown from a mountain-top, it stops of itself when the thread runs out. Receiving sin and receiving merit, all come together in the end to exhaustion, and vigour and slackness make no difference. The harm of this theory the treatise-author has already made visible by means of its own statement—its conclusion is that cultivating and not cultivating are the same, and this is exactly the consequence of the view of limits coming down upon the gate of practice.
51. The various theories that the world of lands has a limit. Two more theories are set out: someone asserts that the world of lands has a limit in the eight directions and only above and below has no limit; someone asserts that down to the eighteen hells and up to the Summit of Existence, above and below have a limit, and the eight directions have no limit. The treatise-author concludes: thus in various ways they speak of the limit of the world. The two theories are exactly opposite, and alike they set the limit in some one set of directions.
52. The world of beings has a limit—the soul like a mustard seed, like a grain of rice. One more theory: the world of beings has a limit. As it is said that the soul is in the body, like a mustard seed, like a grain of rice, or, some say, one inch; in a large person the soul is large, in a small person the soul is small. The treatise-author points out the reason: they say the soul is a form dharma and has parts, and so they say the soul has a limit. When the soul is taken as something with volume, the theory of having a limit follows along.
53. No limit—the soul pervading all of space. As for 「無邊」 tr. "has no limit": someone asserts that the soul pervades all of space, is present everywhere, and where it obtains a body it can perceive suffering and pleasure; this is called the soul having no limit. With the previous theory it forms exactly the two extremes: one shrinks the soul to a mustard seed, one expands the soul to pervade all of space; alike they take the soul as an existent thing with extent.
54. The world of lands is beginningless; the ten directions have no limit. Again: someone says the world of lands is beginningless; if it had a beginning, then it would be without causes and conditions, and afterwards it would also be endless, one would always receive bodies, and this would break nirvāṇa; this is called having no limit. Again, they say the world of lands has no limit in the ten directions. In such ways as these, they say the world of the soul and the world of lands have no limit. This school’s reason for setting up beginninglessness is the fear that having a beginning would fall into being without cause—the direction of the inference is exactly opposite to that of the school of having a limit in passage 46, and alike they set up their theory on one of the two ends of existence and non-existence.
55. Both has a limit and has no limit. When 「有邊」 tr. "has a limit" and 「無邊」 tr. "has no limit" are paired, the third proposition comes out: someone says the world of the soul has no limit and the world of lands has a limit; or says the world of the soul has a limit and the world of lands has no limit, because, as said above, the soul is form; or says above and below have a limit and the eight directions have no limit. The treatise-author concludes: thus, putting together the above two dharmas, it is called 「有邊無邊」 tr. "both has a limit and has no limit." The third proposition is not a new view; it is a patching together of the first two.
56. Neither has a limit nor has no limit. The fourth proposition: someone sees that having a limit has faults and having no limit also has faults, and so does not say it has a limit and does not say it has no limit, and clings to 「非有邊非無邊」 tr. "neither has a limit nor has no limit" as the reality of the world. The treatise-author uses the word 「著」 tr. "clings"—having avoided both extremes, one still wants to set up something real, so the fourth proposition is not a way out; it is a more hidden grasping.
57. The soul is the body. It turns to the sameness or difference of body and soul. Someone says the body is precisely the soul; why is this? Because when this body is analysed, the soul is sought and cannot be found; again, receiving fine and ugly, suffering and pleasure, is all the body, and therefore they say the body is precisely the soul. This school’s ground is in fact not finding the soul—not finding it, they simply take the body as the soul.
58. The body is other and the soul is other—wrong view and extreme view. Someone says the soul is subtle, is not reached by the five faculties, and is not seen by ordinary people either; only people who collect the mind, are pure, and obtain dhyāna and concentration can see it, and therefore they say the body is other and the soul is other. The treatise-author further distinguishes the difference between the two views: if the body is precisely the soul, then when the body ceases the soul also ceases—this is wrong view; to say the body is other and the soul is other, that when the body ceases the soul remains permanently—this is extreme view. Alike they reckon a soul, but where they fall is different—one annihilation, one permanence.
59. The separate account of going on thus after death. The treatise-author heads those who hold 「死後有如去」 tr. "after death there is one who goes on thus," and then sets up a question: before, permanent, impermanent, and so on were spoken of, which is precisely later lives existing or not existing; why now speak separately of the four propositions of going on thus? Answer: above, the permanence or impermanence of the whole world was spoken of in general; because the matter of 「後世有無」 tr. "the existence or non-existence of later lives" is important, it is spoken of separately. And he explains the name ‘going on thus’: 「如去」 tr. "going on thus" means that as a person comes here and is born, so in going on to a later life it is likewise. The reason a separate gate is set up is that the existence or non-existence of later lives is of the most urgent concern to the practitioner—permanent and impermanent are a contention over principle; going on thus and not going on thus are a matter of one’s own life.
60. Going on thus and not going on thus; neither going nor not going. He sets them out school by school: someone says that in a former life one came from nowhere, and at cessation also goes nowhere; someone says that the body and the soul come together to make a person, and after death the soul goes on and the body does not go on—this is called 「如去不如去」 tr. "both going on thus and not going on thus"; as for 「非有如去非無如去」 tr. "neither is there one who goes on thus nor is there not one who goes on thus," because they see faults in going and in not going, they say neither going nor not going. The treatise-author then puts in one more needle: 「是人不能捨神，而著『非去非不去』。」 tr. "This person cannot relinquish the soul, and clings to ‘neither going nor not going’." It is the same way of judging as in passage 56—the sickness of the fourth proposition lies not in the proposition but in being unable to relinquish that soul.
61. The conclusion of the fourteen matters—wishing to emerge, one sinks. The treatise-author gathers it up: such wrong views, afflictions, and so on as these are called 「心出、沒、屈、伸」 tr. "the emerging, sinking, bending, and stretching of the mind." Why is this? Because those of wrong view seek by various paths to emerge and cannot, wishing to emerge they sink; because the power of wrong view is great and hard to dissolve, the fourteen matters of permanent, impermanent, and so on are spoken of. The four Chinese characters 「欲出而沒」 tr. "wishing to emerge, one sinks" are the verdict on the whole passage, and they also answer the fish simile of passage 40—those who emerge and sink again are precisely these views.
62. The Buddha says all take the five aggregates as their object; the suchness of the five aggregates. The treatise-author cites the Buddha’s words to settle the outside paths as a whole: although the outside paths recollect, imagine, and discriminate in every kind of way, the Buddha says they 「皆緣五眾、依止五眾，無神、無常」 tr. "all take the five aggregates as their object and rest on the five aggregates; there is no soul and nothing permanent." And he goes a layer further: the Buddha knows the five aggregates as empty, signless, of non-action, without idle discourse; he only knows the suchness of the five aggregates, not as ordinary people see, falsely, deceptively, and invertedly. The refutation of wrong views stops here, and what follows turns from 「五眾如」 tr. "the suchness of the five aggregates" to the suchness of all dharmas—the joint between refuting and establishing lies in this sentence.
63. The suchness of the five aggregates is precisely the suchness of all dharmas. The treatise-author explains the identities of the sūtra: as the suchness of the five aggregates, so too is the suchness of all dharmas. Why? Two dharmas include all dharmas, namely the conditioned and the unconditioned; the five aggregates are conditioned dharmas, and the suchness of the five aggregates is precisely an unconditioned dharma. He further brings out the reason from the side of practice: by examining, reckoning, and considering the five aggregates one can practise the six perfections, and therefore it says 「五眾如即是一切法如，一切法如即是六波羅蜜如」 tr. "the suchness of the five aggregates is precisely the suchness of all dharmas, and the suchness of all dharmas is precisely the suchness of the six perfections." The reason the treatise-author gives why that long string of identities in the sūtra text can hold is extremely simple: the two dharmas of the conditioned and the unconditioned already include everything, and the five aggregates and the suchness of the five aggregates are exactly these two dharmas.
64. The order of those who practise the six perfections, and the suchness of wholesome and unwholesome dharmas. The treatise-author goes on to explain: the bodhisattva who practises the six perfections seeks the real path, contemplates the five aggregates as impermanent and empty, and gives rise to the thirty-seven limbs of the path, the eight liberations, the nine successive absorptions, and so on—this is the śrāvaka path; knowing them, he passes straight on, and practises the eighteen emptinesses, the ten powers, and the other dharmas of the buddhas; all are right contemplation of the five aggregates and the suchness of the five aggregates, and because they are without discrimination, all are the suchness of all dharmas. Therefore it says 「善法如即是不善法如，不善法如即是善法如」 tr. "the suchness of wholesome dharmas is precisely the suchness of unwholesome dharmas; the suchness of unwholesome dharmas is precisely the suchness of wholesome dharmas." In this passage the four Chinese characters 「知已直過」 tr. "knowing them, he passes straight on" must be seen clearly—the dharmas of the śrāvaka path are not left uncultivated; they are cultivated and not dwelt in. Worldly and world-transcending dharmas are also thus.
65. One may not cling to wholesome dharmas; all are one mark of suchness. The treatise-author gives a turning word: therefore the practitioner may not cling to wholesome dharmas, and so on up to anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi; the mark of the suchness of the Buddha is also thus; all are one mark of suchness, not two and not different. Why is this? Seeking the reality of dharmas, one reaches ultimate emptiness, and there is no further difference. Not even awakening, not even the mark of the suchness of the Buddha, may be clung to—because the reason there is no difference is not that differences are smoothed away; it is that when one seeks through to the real, there is naturally no difference.
66. The conclusion that prajñā can give birth to the buddhas and can show the mark of the world. The treatise-author concludes: the suchness of all dharmas such as these the Buddha obtains because of prajñāpāramitā, and therefore it says 「般若波羅蜜能生諸佛、能示世間相」 tr. "prajñāpāramitā can give birth to the buddhas and can show the mark of the world." The words with which the whole chapter opened here receive their complete explanation—what is born is the Buddha who obtains the mark of suchness; what is shown is the suchness of all dharmas.
67. Subhūti marvels at what has never been; who can believe? The treatise-author explains Subhūti’s marvelling: the suchness of all dharmas is very deep, accords with them and does not go against them; the suchness of the buddhas of the three times and the ten directions is precisely the suchness of all dharmas, and because they understand this suchness of all dharmas they speak the Dharma in various ways for beings. And he distinguishes the capacities that can believe: this very deep suchness is hard to understand and hard to believe; avaivartika bodhisattvas, who have entered the position of dharmas and received the prediction, can believe; 「具足正見人」 tr. "persons complete in right view" are the persons of the three paths; arhats whose outflows are exhausted can believe because they do not accept any dharma. He adds one more meaning: those who have faith, being near to the avaivartika, are all included among the avaivartika, and so are not spoken of separately—the sūtra text lists only three kinds, not because it omitted the rest, but because they are already included within them.
68. Because all dharmas are inexhaustible, suchness is inexhaustible. The treatise-author explains the Buddha’s answer: the Buddha tells Subhūti 「一切法無盡故，是如無盡」 tr. "because all dharmas are inexhaustible, this suchness is inexhaustible"; because suchness is inexhaustible, those who have obtained the noble path can believe. He further explains why the noble ones can believe and ordinary people cannot: because of differences within the unconditioned dharma there are the paths of the srota-āpanna and the rest, and because they hear the dharma they themselves have obtained, they can believe; ordinary people are attached to false, deceptive, and inverted dharmas and so cannot believe. The ground of being able to believe is not cleverness; it is having tasted it oneself—what they hear is the dharma they themselves have obtained.
69. Because they obtain this suchness of all dharmas they are called Tathāgatas. The last sentence of the whole chapter: the Buddha tells Subhūti that because the buddhas obtain this suchness of all dharmas, they are called Tathāgatas, are called the omniscient ones, and can teach beings and bring them to nirvāṇa. Three names run through in one line: because they obtain suchness they are called Tathāgatas; because suchness leaves nothing unexhausted they are called the omniscient ones; because they obtain it and can give it to others they can teach beings and bring them to nirvāṇa. The chapter begins with ‘prajñā can give birth to the buddhas’ and ends with ‘because they obtain this suchness they are called Tathāgatas’—the Buddha who is born is precisely what suchness brings to completion.
Do Not Misread
Do not read 「佛母」 tr. "the Mother of the Buddhas" as merely a reverent simile. The use to which the treatise-author puts this simile is to resolve a real doubt: the buddhas are quiescent, with neither hatred nor love; why do they guard the people who uphold the sūtra? The answer is not ‘the Buddha is very compassionate’ but 「知恩分故」 tr. "because they know their share of the debt of kindness"—prajñā gives birth to the buddhas, gives the buddhas omniscience, shows the buddhas the mark of the world, and the buddhas owe prajñā the kindness of birth; to guard those who practise prajñā is precisely the sons saving their mother. If the simile of mother and sons is read as a warm literary way of speaking, the real meaning of this 「知恩」 tr. "knowing the debt of kindness" is lost. Conversely, do not read 「母」 tr. "mother" as there being a substantial entity that gives birth either: the sūtra text goes straight on to say that within the deep prajñā there are no beings, no form, and so on up to no omniscience, and not even prajñāpāramitā itself—it can give birth and yet has no self-nature; this is the true measure of the two Chinese characters rendered here as ‘mother of the buddhas’.
Do not read ‘prajñā shows the five aggregates as not broken and not ruined’ as contradicting the sūtras that speak of impermanence. The treatise-author answers clearly: that is the matter of the Small Vehicle; this is the matter of the Great Vehicle; the Small Vehicle speaks much of impermanence, first of impermanence and afterwards of the emptiness of dharmas, and speaks of impermanence to make beings fear; the Great Vehicle speaks much of the emptiness of dharmas and speaks of the emptiness of dharmas from the very start. The capacities the two places address are different, and the gates they set up are different; it is not two positions contending with each other. Still less may one conclude from this that the Great Vehicle does not speak of impermanence—in passage 64 the treatise-author says precisely that the bodhisattva 「觀五眾無常、空」 tr. "contemplates the five aggregates as impermanent and empty" and gives rise to the thirty-seven limbs of the path; impermanence is still the place of entry, only one does not stop there.
Do not read 「如實知眾生心」 tr. "knowing the minds of beings as they really are" as some formidable power of knowing the minds of others. Every answer in the sūtra text negates: does not show, does not see, unfindable, without fixed mark, without place of abiding, the five eyes cannot see. The treatise-author further exposes what ordinary people call knowing the mind—ordinary people grasp at marks and discriminate, and within the three times recollect, imagine, and see falsely, and say that they know the thoughts of the mind. The Buddha’s knowing is knowing, while abiding in the real mark, the mind’s absence of fixed marks; if one reads it as the Buddha illuminating one by one, in the manner of recollection and grasping at marks, the contents of the minds of beings, one falls precisely on the side that the sūtra text refutes—what is refuted is the knowing that grasps at marks, not 「如實知」 tr. "knowing as it really is" and 「悉知」 tr. "fully knowing" themselves; the treatise-author says plainly later on that the Buddha fully knows what beings do and practise, their wrong views and afflictions, and both sides stand together. The four marks of seeing the mind of the people who sit in meditation cited in passage 28—seeing the mind as like a thread within a pure jewel, seeing the mind arising in successive continuity, seeing the mind as being in the body, seeing the mind as being in its object—are exactly this misreading appearing in the work of practice.
Do not read ‘the five eyes do not see’ as disparaging the five eyes. The treatise-author explains one by one what each eye takes as its object: the fleshly eye and the divine eye take form as their object and so do not see, the wisdom-eye takes nirvāṇa as its object and so does not see, the Dharma-eye on entering the real mark has nothing to discriminate and so should not see, the Buddha-eye contemplates the mark of quiescence and so should not see—each sentence is ‘not seeing because of what it takes as its object’, not ‘not seeing because it is unable’. At the end he states it clearly: the minds of beings, where there is one who sees, are seen as they really are. What does not see is the seeing that grasps at marks; seeing as it really is remains as it is.
Do not read that long string of the outside paths’ theories in Treatise ② as a miscellany. The nature of the world, atoms, spontaneity, the lord of heaven, the ball of thread, the soul like a mustard seed, the soul pervading space—however many are listed, the treatise-author’s verdicts are only a few, and each points to the same root: recollecting, imagining, and discriminating, grasping at marks following the mind of self, they reckon that there is a soul; such wrong causes are the limit of the world; this person cannot relinquish the soul. If in reading one remembers only the strangeness of each school’s theory, one misses what the treatise-author really wants people to see—however great the divergence of these views, where they arise is one and the same mind that grasps at marks. Nor, because the treatise-author sets out their theories in detail, should one suppose that he is adopting them: setting out and judging are kept quite distinct—setting out uses 「有人言」 tr. "someone says" and 「有人說」 tr. "someone asserts," judging uses 「佛言」 tr. "the Buddha says" and 「是故說」 tr. "therefore it says."
Do not read that string of identities of 「諸法如相」 tr. "the marks of suchness of all dharmas" as a declaration of equivalence. The treatise-author gives the reason: two dharmas include all dharmas, namely the conditioned and the unconditioned; the five aggregates are conditioned dharmas, and the suchness of the five aggregates is precisely an unconditioned dharma. The identities hold because what is spoken of all along is 「如」 tr. "suchness," not those dharmas themselves; and the closing sentence 「不得著善法，乃至阿耨多羅三藐三菩提」 tr. "one may not cling to wholesome dharmas, and so on up to anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi" guards precisely against people taking ‘one suchness, not two’ as a pretext for not distinguishing right from wrong. One suchness is that when one seeks the real through to ultimate emptiness there is naturally no difference; it is not a levelling out in practice.
Bearing on Practice
The first use is the sense of position that the simile of mother and sons gives. The person who practises prajñā often feels alone—the Dharma is deep, few can speak of it together, and its states are hard to tell. This chapter tells you: this one Dharma that you keep is the mother of the buddhas; the buddhas constantly watch this Dharma with the Buddha-eye, and constantly watch the person who upholds this Dharma too. The sūtra text says it most concretely: those who write out this deep prajñā, and so on up to those who rightly recollect it—the buddhas always watch these people with the Buddha-eye; those who seek the bodhisattva path the buddhas of the ten directions always guard, so that they do not turn back. These are not words of consolation; they are the first thing that this chapter, in opening its theme and setting up its simile, sets out to say.
The second use is a method of examining the mind. The marks of the mind asked about in this chapter the treatise-author himself divides as 「先略說「知他心」，次分別眾生攝心、亂心，所謂三毒、無三毒者，廣、大，無量，不可見，出、沒，屈、申等」 tr. "first it speaks in brief of ‘knowing the minds of others’, next it distinguishes the collected minds and distracted minds of beings, namely those with the three poisons and those without the three poisons, broad, great, immeasurable, invisible, emerging, sinking, bending, stretching, and so on," and the answer to each question takes one and the same approach: it does not see that mark, because the nature of the mind is non-existent. In daily life, when the mind stirs and thoughts move, one can examine by this—what I am certain of at this moment, ‘my mind is very distracted’, ‘my mind is very broad’, ‘my mind is very small’: is it a mark the mind originally has, or a mark I have taken up? The treatise-author says it clearly: the broad and narrow, increasing and decreasing mind are all beings’ grasping at marks and discriminating. See through one grasping at marks, and there is one layer less of binding oneself.
The third use lies in the four Chinese characters 「二心不俱」 tr. "two minds are not together." What is most painful for the practitioner is the standoff with the afflictions—on one side the stained mind is present, on the other one wants to set up an unstained mind to counteract it, and so two minds battle all day long. The treatise-author’s reasoning can be taken up and used directly: mind after mind arises in succession, and when there is the unstained mind, then there is no stained mind; because there is no stained mind, there is also no not-stained mind, because dharmas that depend on their counterparts do not exist. When the stained mind is present one need not make another opponent; watch it arise in succession and cease in succession, and the two ends that depend on each other fall away together of themselves.
The fourth use is turning the simile of watching fish from above a clear pool upon oneself. The four kinds of people: those who do not seek to get out at all; those who can give and keep the precepts but, because wrong doubt covers the mind, sink again; those who obtain warmth and the summit and contemplate the four truths but, not having obtained the real dharma, sink again; those who leave the five desires and so on up to the sphere of nothing whatsoever but, not obtaining nirvāṇa, sink again. The further along, the more they resemble people who have gained something by their effort, and yet they are still 「還沒」 tr. "sinking again." This simile should be kept always in mind: emerging is not a matter of once only, and the reason for sinking is in every case not yet having obtained the real dharma; the ease that comes at some stage of one’s effort is exactly when it is easiest to come near the bank and sink again.
The fifth use is the admonition about seeing the mind in sitting meditation. Seeing the mind as like a thread within a jewel, seeing the mind arising in continuity, seeing the mind as being in the body, seeing the mind as being in its object—the treatise-author lists these four marks so concretely that it can be seen they are states that really occur in meditation. If one who applies effort, in stillness, sees some shape of the mind and gives rise to delight, this passage can serve as an examination on the spot: it is precisely to break such falsity that the Buddha says 「如實知眾生心，眾生心自相空故無相相」 tr. "he knows the minds of beings as they really are; because the minds of beings are empty of specific marks, they are of the mark of the signless." What is seen is never it.
The sixth use lies in the spur of the phrase 「欲出而沒」 tr. "wishing to emerge, one sinks." The treatise-author says that those of wrong view seek by various paths to emerge and cannot, and wishing to emerge, they sink. Seeking to emerge is itself good; the reason one cannot get out lies in view—if view is not right, then the greater the strength the deeper the sinking, and this is also why the schools of the outside paths, the more finely they reason, the further they stray. Here the practitioner should know that choosing one’s view matters more than the diligence of one’s effort.
The seventh use is the pair 「知已直過」 tr. "knowing them, he passes straight on" and 「不得著善法」 tr. "one may not cling to wholesome dharmas." The bodhisattva contemplates the five aggregates as impermanent and empty and gives rise to the thirty-seven limbs of the path, the eight liberations, the nine successive absorptions; these dharmas must be cultivated; they are cultivated and not dwelt in, and so it is said, knowing them, he passes straight on. Going further up, not even awakening, not even the mark of the suchness of the Buddha, may be clung to. The use in daily life is this: in all the good one cultivates, give it one’s full strength while cultivating it, and do not keep it once it is past—if kept, the wholesome dharma itself becomes a new attainment.
Further Resonances
The backbone of this chapter is two passages of sūtra and two passages of treatise explanation. Sūtra ① begins from the simile of a mother who has sons, establishes that prajñā can give birth to the buddhas and can show the mark of the world, and that the buddhas constantly watch the deep prajñā with the Buddha-eye, extending to those who write out and uphold it; Subhūti asks four, the Buddha answers three matters, marking out that the five aggregates are the mark of the world; next it says that prajñā shows the five aggregates as not broken and not ruined, not arising and not ceasing, and so on up to not within the three times; next it says that within the deep prajñā there are no beings and no form, and so on up to no omniscience, and yet the Buddha fully knows the workings of the minds of beings; then it shows one by one knowing as it really is the collected mind and the distracted mind, knowing by the mark of dharmas, knowing by the six gates of exhaustion, no staining, cessation, severance, quiescence, and separation, knowing the stained mind, the hateful mind, and the deluded mind, knowing the unstained mind, the mind without hatred, and the mind without delusion, knowing the broad mind, the great mind, the immeasurable mind, and the invisible mind, and gathers them up at the end with the five eyes being unable to see. Treatise ① first sets up the doubt on the hearers’ behalf—the buddhas being quiescent, why do they guard the people who uphold the sūtra?—and answers it with the simile of guarding the mother out of knowing the debt of kindness; next it cites what the Buddha himself says, 「諸賢聖及賢聖法皆從般若中生」 tr. "all the worthies and sages and the dharmas of the worthies and sages are born from within prajñā"; it answers the difficulty of four questions and three answers, bringing out the simile of the falling branch and the falling tree; it answers the difficulty that other sūtras speak of the five aggregates as broken and ruined, judging the difference between the ways the Small Vehicle and the Great Vehicle speak the Dharma; it explains that the five aggregates are called the world, that mental factors are hard to know, that by the power of skilful means he can know, and distinguishes the enumeration of beings; it speaks out on Subhūti’s behalf the doubt of the one and the measureless, answering with the wisdom of the real mark of all dharmas, and answers again how, within ultimate emptiness, he knows the mind; it sets up the division into first in brief and then in full; it explains the six gates word by word, explains arising and ceasing thought by thought and contemplation by the gate of exhaustion, explains the real mark of the stained mind, the mark of the unstained mind and two minds not being together, dharmas that depend on their counterparts not existing, explains broad and narrow, increase and decrease having no fixed mark, explains the four meanings of the immeasurable mind and brings out the simile of eye-consciousness having no place of abiding; at the end it sets up the question and answer on the invisible mind, cites the four kinds of false seeing of people who sit in meditation, examines with the five eyes one by one, and makes clear that not seeing is precisely seeing as it really is. Fascicle sixty-nine ends here, and fascicle seventy heads the chapter title again for the remainder. Sūtra ② goes on to speak of the emerging, sinking, bending, and stretching of the mental factors, setting out item by item, in the pattern of resting on form, feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness, the four propositions of the soul and the world being permanent or impermanent, the four propositions of the world having a limit or having no limit, the two propositions of the soul being the body or other than the body, and the four propositions of going on thus after death, concluding with knowing as it really is; next it says that the Buddha knows the mark of form, as suchness is suchness and is not ruined, and so on up to the marks of suchness of all dharmas being identical layer upon layer, all one mark of suchness, not two and not different, and that because he obtains this mark of suchness the Buddha is called the Tathāgata; at the end Subhūti marvels at its great depth, and the Buddha answers that suchness is very deep because of its mark of inexhaustibility. Treatise ② explains emerging, sinking, bending, and stretching, ties them to the sixty-two views and the ninety-eight fetters, gives the glosses of sinking and emerging, bending and stretching, sets up the simile of watching fish from above a clear pool and applies it to the four kinds of beings; it explains the reckoning of a soul and the outside paths’ twofold theory, sets out in turn the four schools of the soul being permanent, impermanent, both permanent and impermanent, and neither permanent nor impermanent, and cites the Buddha’s words to settle that all take the five aggregates as their object; it divides the three kinds of world, answers the difficulty of ‘the soul being originally non-existent while the world exists’, and brings out the simile of the blind man taking a snake for a necklace; it sets out broadly the various theories of having a limit and having no limit—seeking the origin and not finding a beginning, the nature of the world and the simile of the lump of clay, atoms, spontaneity, the lord of heaven, the simile of the ball of thread, the various theories of the eight directions and above and below, the soul like a mustard seed and the soul pervading all of space, the world of lands being beginningless—and judges that wrong causes are the limit; it explains the wrong view and the extreme view of the soul being the body and the body being other and the soul other, explains separately the four propositions of going on thus after death, and concludes with wishing to emerge and sinking, and so speaking of the fourteen matters; at the end it turns from the suchness of the five aggregates into the suchness of all dharmas, makes clear that the two dharmas of the conditioned and the unconditioned include everything, explains that the suchness of wholesome dharmas is precisely the suchness of unwholesome dharmas, admonishes that one may not cling to wholesome dharmas and so on up to awakening, and concludes that prajñā can give birth to the buddhas and can show the mark of the world, and that because they obtain this suchness of all dharmas they are called Tathāgatas.
In the vein of meaning linking this chapter with the chapters before and after it, three lines can be seen. First, the treatise-author at the very opening marks for himself what he carries on from: above it was said that the buddhas of the ten directions and the great bodhisattvas guard prajñā, and so on up to the one who rightly recollects it, and do not let Māra find an opening—that is exactly the meaning of guarding in the preceding chapter; what this chapter answers is the question ‘being already quiescent, why do they guard?’, and so the simile of mother and sons is not starting a new fire; it continues speaking on from the guarding of the preceding chapter. Second, this chapter’s axis of ‘prajñā can give birth to the buddhas’ runs through with the meaning, set forth again and again in the preceding chapters, that prajñā gathers up all the perfections and gives birth to all the worthies and sages; and the sūtra text, setting 「能生」 tr. "can give birth" side by side with 「能示」 tr. "can show," also gives a turning word on the mark of the world and the meaning of the five aggregates spoken of in the chapters before this—what is shown is not the breaking and ruin of the five aggregates but the suchness of the five aggregates. Third, the 「如」 tr. "suchness" established at the end of this chapter is developed further in the chapters that follow: since Sūtra ② has said that the marks of suchness of all dharmas are not two and not different, and that because he obtains this mark of suchness he is called the Tathāgata, the teaching of asking about marks later on comes on from this; the reader may view the preceding and following chapters together, to see the single continuity of the meaning of the mother of the buddhas and the teaching of the mark of suchness.
On the ancient masters’ sectional division of this chapter there is one further line that may be recorded. Jizang, in his Commentary on the Larger Sūtra, explaining this chapter, divides it by three meanings—first, being able to give birth; second, guarding in repayment of practice; third, being able to bring to completion—and, to make clear the meaning of wisdom as father and mother, compares the Vimalakīrti Sūtra’s 「智度菩薩母，方便以為父」 tr. "the perfection of wisdom is the bodhisattva’s mother, skilful means is taken as the father" with what he cites, 「大論云：般若以為母，般舟三昧以為父」 tr. "The Great Treatise says: prajñā is taken as the mother, the pratyutpanna samādhi is taken as the father" (the original text of the treatise, in fascicle one hundred, reads 「佛以般若為母、般舟三昧為父」 tr. "the Buddha has prajñā as mother and the pratyutpanna samādhi as father"; Jizang cites it in abridged form); he divides the next chapter, "Asking about Marks," into three, the second division being precisely 「明佛知般若恩故報恩」 tr. "making clear that the Buddha, knowing the kindness of prajñā, therefore repays the kindness," and the meaning of repaying kindness in this chapter is continued there. This division of 「報恩」 tr. "repaying kindness" corresponds to the variant name 「報恩品」 tr. "Chapter of Repaying Kindness" under which one line of this chapter’s transmitted texts titles it; this exposition records them side by side without judging which is correct; the full account of the variant chapter titles, of the division of fascicles in the transmitted texts, and of the witnesses on both sides is detailed in the Apparatus.
問相品Asking about Marks
全文五層 →Full five layers →問相品：處處已說空無相無作何以諸天子復問般若相，相不能破相何以並相不能知相知無相，說空而說即有相何以不成自語相違，般若畢竟空何以佛反依止尊重供養，般若能生諸佛何以又說一切法無知者無見者，示世間空何以復開不可思議乃至獨空九門，無等等何以既名涅槃又名諸法實相，說是品時何以比丘尼與菩薩得道者少
在問什麼
本品的品名就是它的問法：問相。欲界、色界的天子遙散華香而來，頂禮佛足，所問的只有一句——所說的般若波羅蜜甚深，何等是深般若波羅蜜相？這一問看似平常，論主開卷卻先替讀者把它擋回來：空、無相、無作乃至無起、無所有是般若相，上面處處已經說過了，天子為什麼還要問？可見本品要處理的不是『般若是什麼』這個知識問題，而是『般若既無定相，所說出來的相還算不算相』這個更難的問題。
於是全品三度發問、三度而答。第一度是諸天子問相，佛以空相等十相作答，隨即自己揭破：這些話是為眾生、順世間法而說，不是第一義；接著一路推到相不能破相、相不能知相、相不能知無相、無相不能知相，把能知與所知一齊掃盡，最後歸於『有佛無佛，相性常住』。第二度是佛主動告須菩提：般若是諸佛母、能示世間相；既是母、既能示，卻又說一切法無知者、無見者，並以九門逐層開示世間之空、不可思議、離、寂滅、畢竟空、性空、無法空、無法有法空、獨空。第三度是須菩提舉五事——大事、不可思議事、不可稱事、無量事、無等等事——問般若為何而起，佛逐一作答，再把這四種不可思議之法推廣到色等一切法上，最後以會眾得道作結。
三度問答其實是一個問題的三個面向：相、母、事。說相，是問般若的體；說母，是問般若的能；說事，是問般若的用。而三面都撞在同一個關口上——般若畢竟空，無定相可取；那麼說它、依止它、讚歎它、乃至因它而有諸佛出世，這一切是怎麼成立的？本品的答案不在任何一句結論，而在佛自己交代的那個分寸：以世諦故說空等諸相，不是以第一義諦說。這一句立起來，全品的種種『說而無所說』纔讀得下去。
逐段解明
一、諸天子來問。 開卷是一個場景：三千大千世界中所有欲界、色界的天子遙散華香，來至佛所，頂禮佛足，一面而住，然後發問。先看這個「遙散華香」——問法之前先設供，是聞法的儀軌；再看所問之語，天子先承認「所說般若波羅蜜甚深」，然後纔問相。不是不信而問，是已信而求其定實。這一層先分清楚，後面論主所釋的三種問因纔有著落。
二、佛答十相，並自破其說。 佛的回答先列相：空相、無相、無作、無起、無生無滅、無垢無淨、無所有法、無相、無依止、虛空相——像這樣種種相是深般若相。列完隨即自己交代分寸：這是為眾生、順世間法而說，不是第一義。然後推進：這些相，一切世間天、人、阿修羅都不能破壞，因為他們自身也就是相；相不能破相，相不能知相，相不能知無相，無相不能知相；能知的人與所知的法都不可得。再往下，說這些相不是五眾所作、不是六波羅蜜所作、不是諸空所作、不是四念處乃至一切種智所作，也不是人與非人所有，不是世間出世間、不是有漏無漏、不是有為無為。要看的是這一段的走向：先給你相，再抽掉你手裡的相——給，是世諦；抽，是第一義。
三、虛空相之問，正問不正問。 佛不直接說理，先設一問：譬如有人問「何等是虛空相」，這人算不算正問？天子自己答：不是正問，因為虛空無相可說，虛空無為無起。這一問一答是全品的模型：問『深般若相』與問「虛空相」同一格式，天子既然已經判定後者不成問，前者的問法也就自破。佛不駁其問，而令問者自見其問之不成——這是本品最見手段的一著。
四、有佛無佛，相性常住。 接著佛立一句正面之語：有佛無佛，相性常住；佛得如實相性的緣故，名為如來。前段既然一路掃盡，此處便須有一句撐住，否則墮入斷滅。要點在「常住」二字不是立一個常法：相性常住是說它不待佛出而後有、不隨佛滅而後無；佛之所以為如來，不是造出這個相性，是如實得之。立與破在此接榫。
五、諸天子兩番讚歎。 天子聞已而讚，分兩層：先讚世尊所得諸相之性甚深，得是相故得無礙智，住是相中以般若集諸法自相；再讚這深般若是諸佛常所行處，行是道得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提，得已通達一切法相，從色相乃至一切種智相。前一層讚的是佛的所住，後一層讚的是佛的所行與所通達——讚歎不是客套，是把佛答的內容複述成自己的理解，交還佛前請印。
六、佛可其讚，逐相對舉而歸無相。 佛答『如是如是』，然後逐一對舉：惱壞的是色相，能覺的是受相，能取的是想相，能起造的是行相，能了別的是識相；能捨的是檀波羅蜜相，無熱惱是尸羅，不變異是羼提，不可屈伏是毘梨耶，攝心是禪，捨離是般若；心無所嬈惱是四禪四無量心四無色定相，出世間是三十七品相，苦是無作脫門相、離是空脫門相、寂滅是無相脫門相；勝是十力相，不恐怖是無所畏相，遍知是四無礙智相，餘人無得是十八不共法相；愍念眾生是大慈大悲相，實是無謬錯相，無所取是常捨相，現了知是一切種智相。每舉一組，便接一句『佛得是無相』。這一段的教法極為顯豁：諸法各有其相，一一分明不亂；而佛所得者是這一切相的無相。不是抹去差別，是於差別中得其無相——末句因此說，佛得一切諸法無相，以是因緣故名無礙智。
七、何以復問般若相。 論主開釋，先答那個攔路的問題：上面處處已說空、無相、無作乃至無起、無所有是般若相，天子何以復問？三種答：其一，佛雖處處說般若，或說空等、或說有、或說果報、或說罪福，並不決定，所以現在要問哪一個決定是般若相。其二，般若如幻如化，似乎可得而無定相可取，唯有諸佛能正遍知，天子雖有利智而不能了知。其三，有人說：天子之中有後來者，不曾聽聞，所以問。三答由淺入深又回到淺：不定故問、不能知故問、不曾聞故問——讀者若自問『我為何還要問』，這三條大體也就夠用了。
八、空等是般若相：三解脫門之訓。 論主隨文釋佛答。空相，指內空外空等諸空；諸法若空，就沒有男女、長短、好醜等相，這名為無相相；若空、若無相，便不再生起願求貪著後世之身，這名為無作相。一路訓下來，空、無相、無作三者不是三個東西，是一事的三重推移。末句要緊：三解脫門是初入般若波羅蜜相，三乘共有——是初入，不是究竟；是共法，不是不共。這一句替下文的「深相」留了位置。
九、深相與空之差別說。 既說初入之相，便說深相：不生不滅、不垢不淨、無所依止、虛空等，是般若的深相。論主又分辨前後兩個「無相」：三解脫門中的無相，是無男女等外相；「無所有」以下的無相相，是無一切法相。一個除粗，一個除細。然後解釋何以同一個空要說得這麼多樣——空雖是一，人根有利鈍、入有深淺的緣故，纔差別說空。法無多門，門為人設。至於無生無滅等論議，論主言如先說，不再重出。
十、佛先知其疑，故自為說。 論主點出一個關節：佛知道天子必定會起這個念頭——般若若空、無所有、如虛空相，怎麼還可以說？若說，就是有相了。天子因佛威德大而不敢發難，所以佛自己代他說破：佛憐愍眾生，以世諦故說空等諸相，不是以第一義諦。論主隨即把判準立死：若以第一義說，這一難可以成立；以世諦說，這一難就不應當發。全品最易滑過去的自語相違之疑，在此一句解開。
十一、雖說空而不取相。 又一重：雖然說空，卻不以著心取相，不顯示法是或是非，一切法同一相、無有分別；正因如此，佛纔又了了地說「無所有」「如虛空相」。此處可見「說」的兩種用法：取相而說，愈說愈縛；不取相而說，愈說愈了。差別不在說與不說，在說者的心。
十二、一切世間無能破壞：水火與盲人二喻。 沒有一法不入這相，所以說一切世間無能破壞；因為天、人、阿修羅自身就是相。論主給兩個喻：異法相違纔有可破，如水能滅火，火不能自滅火——同類不相破。又如盲人踩踏珍寶，口說這不是珍寶，終究不能使它成為非珍寶——口說不能改物。合起來就是一句：相與相同類，故不相破；世間之言不及實相，故無能壞。
十三、相不能破相之三釋。 論主給三個層次。其一，佛自說的理由：般若畢竟空無相故，相不能破相。其二，有人說：所謂能破，其實只是解散——諸法和合而成，斧頭劈柴，一分一分解開，終究無所失，何嘗有所破。其三，諸法本無定相，如樹是根莖枝葉和合而名為樹，樹既無定相，也就無所破。三釋收為一句：如是等名為相不能破相。三釋中，第二釋最可用來對治日用中『我把它破掉了』的錯覺——所謂破，多半只是拆散。
十四、心數法是知相，何以說不知。 論主自設一難：色等諸法不是覺知，說它們不相知還講得通；心數法本身就是知相，怎麼也說不知？答得極要緊：此中是就實相說，不是說凡夫那種虛妄之知。這智慧是有為法，因緣和合而生，虛妄之法不能真實有所知，所以捨之而入無餘涅槃；若說智慧能知常、無常乃至空、寂滅等，上來已經廣破，滅盡無所有。既然如此，哪裡還有知？所以說相不知相。要看清這一句的分寸：不是說人不能知，是說以有為虛妄之知去取實相，那個「知」不成立。
十五、刀不破空，無刀不斫。 兩句各一喻。相不能知無相者：內裡雖有智慧，外境空故無法可知；外無所緣，智慧從何而生——譬如刀雖鋒利，不能斬破虛空。無相不能知相者：有人說內智無定相而外緣有定相，心隨緣生，所以說無相不應知相——譬如沒有刀，雖然有物，也無刀可砍。兩喻一正一反，把能所之間的門封死：無所緣則智不生，無能緣則境不被知。
十六、相與所相相待不定。 再往裡推三層。其一，相不入相，因為先已有相；相不入無相，因為無相無入處；離此二者更無可入之處。其二，相與所相都不決定，因所相故有相：若先有相而無所相，則無相可言，無所因故；若先有所相而無相，則所相亦不成立，無所因待故。其三，相有時作所相，所相有時是相，彼此輾轉，故相不定不實則所相亦無，所相不定不實則相亦無。結論就是經文那句：是相、是無相、是相無相不可得。此段是全品義理的骨節——凡是相待而成的，都不是定實。
十七、空等諸相是實：非作、非人、非二邊，佛乃設喻。 論主回到正面：如先所說，空等諸相是實。何以故？這相非五眾所作，非六波羅蜜乃至一切種智所作；是無為故，無法可作，也無若人若非人能作——人指菩薩諸佛等，非人指諸天等；畢竟空故，非有漏非無漏，非世間非出世間。接著補一句最要緊的自警：先前雖說無為相，只是為破有為纔說無為，無為也沒有定相。然後交代佛何以說虛空之喻：聽者容易起念——若沒有佛就聽不到這相，佛於眾生最上，應當是佛作出這相；所以佛說有佛無佛此相常住，佛能知是相故名為佛。破『佛造此相』之計，正是此段設喻的用意。
十八、諸天子歡喜與佛之印可。 天子歡喜復白：這些相甚深，雖不可取相而可行，能與人無上果報；佛得是相故於一切法得無礙智。論主插一句反顯：若分別諸法有定相，那就是有礙智。接著天子申明世尊住此實相中則通達無礙，能說諸法各各別相。佛可其意，為分別諸相：凡夫所知諸相各異，佛知皆是空相，空相即是無相，佛得是無相。論主又訓一個「得」字——得就是知，無比遍知故名得。末句最堪玩味：是諸法相，今轉名般若波羅蜜。諸法之相與般若之相，到此不是兩個。
十九、般若是諸佛母、能示世間相。 佛轉告須菩提，另起一段。先立宗：般若是諸佛母，能示世間相；所以佛依止是法而住，供養恭敬尊重讚歎是法。自問自答：何等是法？所謂般若波羅蜜。理由是般若出生諸佛。接著說佛知於己有恩者：若人正問誰是知恩者，正答無過於佛；佛所乘來之法、所從來之道，得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提，這乘這道佛還恭敬供養尊重讚歎受持守護。再轉一層：佛知一切法無作相，作者無所有故；一切法無起，形事不可得故——佛因般若知一切法無作相，也以此因緣故名知恩。一段之中，報恩與無作並立，不相妨礙，這是下文論主要專門處理的。
二十、因般若得一切法不生。 一句收前啟後：佛因般若波羅蜜得一切法不生，以無所得故；以是因緣，般若能生諸佛，亦能示世間相。「不生」與「能生」放在同一句裡——正因所得者是一切法不生，所以般若纔能生諸佛。這不是文字遊戲：能生之「生」，是就世諦說；不生之「不生」，是就第一義說。前文的分寸在此再度起作用。
廿一、無知者無見者之難。 須菩提立難：若一切法無知者、無見者，般若怎能生諸佛、示世間相？佛先答『如是如是』認可其前提，再自說兩重因緣：其一，一切法空、虛誑、不堅固，故無知者無見者；其二，一切法無依止、無所繫，故無知者無見者。然後把結論接回來：般若能生諸佛、能示世間相——不見色故示世間相，不見受想行識故示，乃至不見一切種智故示。『不見故示』四字是本段的眼目：所示者不是見到了什麼，正是不見。
廿二、不見即不緣生識。 須菩提再問何謂不見色故示。佛答得很具體：若不緣色而生識，這名為不見色相故示；不緣受想行識乃至一切種智而生識，名為不見一切種智相故示。到這裡「不見」有了確切的定義——不是閉目不看，是識不緣彼而生。這一句可以防住把「不見」讀成麻木無知的誤解。
廿三、示世間空：二十餘目逐一開列。 佛自問般若云何能生諸佛、示世間相，自答：能示世間空。然後逐目開列——五眾、十二入、十八界、十二因緣、我見根本六十二見；十善道、四禪四無量心四無色定；三十七品、六波羅蜜；內空、外空、內外空；無法空、有法空、無法有法空；有為性、無為性；佛十力、十八不共法，乃至一切種智，一一示其世間空。要看它的次第：從凡夫的身心世界起，經外道見，歷人天善法與禪定，入道品與大乘行，最後連空本身、連佛法功德都列進來。所謂示世間空，是連能空之法也一併空掉，纔叫窮盡。
廿四、佛之五用與佛世間空。 接著兩轉。其一，佛因般若示世間空、知世間空、覺世間空、思惟世間空、分別世間空——示、知、覺、思惟、分別五者並列，說明佛對此空不是懸說，是親證而後示。其二，般若示佛世間空，仍以五眾乃至一切種智為目。前者說佛的能，後者說所示的境，兩面都收在同一結語裡。
廿五、不可思議、離、寂滅三門。 九門開始逐一推：示佛世間不可思議，示佛世間離，示佛世間寂滅——每一門都以五眾乃至一切種智為所示之目。三門是順著一個方向走：不可思議，是心不能到；離，是法自遠離；寂滅，是言語道斷。門雖轉而所示不變，這正是本段體例。
廿六、畢竟空、性空、無法空、無法有法空四門。 再推四門。畢竟空是究竟窮盡，性空是就法之自性說；無法空與無法有法空，論主於卷三十一釋十八空時自訓：無法空，破一切法滅時——法既滅無，此「無」亦空，不可執一個「無」為實；無法有法空，生、滅一時俱破——不但破有法之生，並破無法之滅，有無兩邊一時遣。又引一說：過去未來法空是名無法空，現在及無為法空是名有法空。四門之中此二門最細：前者遣『滅後之無』，後者遣『有無對立』。四門一路收緊，把「空」由總說推入分說，讀時不必逐名強分深淺——論主在下文自會說明何以要差別說空。
廿七、獨空一門。 九門之末是獨空。此名在諸空之中最為特出，經文於此並不解釋，只照前例列目；論主留到後面專設問答來訓。經不解而論解，正是本論的體例，讀到此處不必急。
廿八、不生今世後世相。 佛總結：般若能生諸佛、能示世間相；而所示的世間相，是不生今世、後世相，因為諸法沒有可用來生今世後世相的緣故。此語承前九門而來：既然世間畢竟空，今世後世的相也就無所從生。要注意這不是否認業果——論主下文會明說，這是離斷常二邊的中道，不是撥無因果。
廿九、諸佛依止般若而住。 論主開釋第二段，先承宗：般若是諸佛母，以此因緣諸佛依止般若住。引其餘經所說「諸佛依止法，以法為師」，再點明佛此中告須菩提「法者，即是般若波羅蜜」。兩句相接，把泛說的「以法為師」落實到般若上——這是本段全部議論的起點。
三十、知恩最上。 論主由依止轉入報恩：一切不善法中沒有超過邪見的，因為邪見故不識恩分，只道是我自然應當如此。知恩之人在世間善法中最上，今世與好名聲，後世與上妙果報。所以佛自說於知恩報恩中第一：「我尚知布施、持戒等恩，何況般若波羅蜜！」這一句把佛的尊重供養說成知恩，不是說佛有所欠缺，是立一個最上的身教。
卅一、何以貴般若、何以似貪著。 兩重疑，論主逐一解。其一，天子或念般若畢竟空無定相，恐有人不貪不貴，所以佛說「我為三界尊，尚供養般若波羅蜜，何況餘人！」其二，又有人疑佛於一切世間如虛空無所著，何以獨貪般若、尊重供養，像是貪著？佛答得分明：我無貪心，只是分別知諸法好醜、力用多少；知般若能斷一切戲論、開三乘道、能滅眾苦，有無量無邊功德，所以讚歎尊重供養。論主給一喻收束：如人行安穩之道，免諸患難，常念此道而指示於人。分別功德而讚，與取相而貪，判然二事。
卅二、知作人與不知作人。 這是本段的專題訓釋。所謂「佛知作人」，是知他人於己作了恩。別處經中卻說「佛不知作人」，恐人生疑，所以此處說「佛知一切法無作相」——因為知一切法無作相故說無作人，並不是因為不知恩分纔說不知作人。末句斷得極乾淨：言知作人、不知作人，無咎。兩處經文看似相違，一在世諦說恩、一在第一義說無作，分層而讀便無所諍。
卅三、須菩提以畢竟空發難。 須菩提難：若一切法畢竟空故無知者、無作者，般若云何能生諸佛、能示諸佛世間？佛可其問，自說因緣：一切法空、虛誑、無堅固。論主又替兩邊各補一句意思：須菩提的意思是一切法鈍相、無見無知，般若怎能獨有知見；佛的意思是一切法不只無知無見，連那無知者、無見者也不可得，所以這一難不應當發。難者執『唯般若有知』而難，佛則連能難的立足處一併撤掉。
卅四、無依止無繫故無知見。 論主續釋第二重因緣：一切法無所依止、無繫故，無知者無見者。中間插一段入空之法的總覽——或破常，行無常而入空；或破實而入空；或以畢竟盡故入空；或以一切法遠離故入空。如今所用的是另一條路：一切法無住處故無依止無繫，無依止故無生無滅，無生滅即是空。又訓「不繫」：一切法實相不繫，出於三界，因為三界虛誑。入空之門甚多，本段所取的是『無住』一門，這一點分清楚，纔不會把諸經論的入空之說攪成一團。
卅五、識不生則色不生。 論主釋『不見故示』：般若不見色等諸法故示世間，因為色等法無依止、無繫、虛誑故不見；佛自說不見的因緣，就是不生緣色之識乃至不生緣一切種智之識。隨即自設一難：識可以說不生，色怎麼說不生？答有二：其一，惱壞的是色，要因識纔分別而知，無識也就無惱壞之相。其二，一切諸法從因緣和合而生相，沒有自性——如身、識、觸諸緣和合，纔知地之堅相，堅相不離身識。故諸法皆由和合生，無有自性。這一段是全品少見的正面論證，可以用來解釋「不見」何以不是抹殺色法。
卅六、示世間空之訓與佛非愛法故說。 三重。其一訓經語「般若波羅蜜示世間空」：世間指五眾乃至一切種智；菩薩行般若時，觀是法若大若小、若內若外無不空者，這名為示世間空。其二解「佛示世間空」何以要別說：或有人疑佛愛著法故如此說，並非諸法常實之相；所以佛說我非愛法故說，我知諸法之相，本末籌量思惟分別，無有法出於空者，而且不是但憑讀誦、從他聞而說，是以內心覺知思惟分別而說。其三是一條體例的說明：這一段說示世間空，上文廣說離六十二見等，此處但說五眾乃至一切種智——廣略不同，不是前後相違。
卅七、不可思議即畢竟空亦不可得。 論主釋九門中的第二門，先指出病源：當時會中人以為般若是畢竟空，心中起想而取著，所以佛說不可思議。所謂不可思議，是連畢竟空也不可得。又訓「離」與「寂滅」二名：畢竟空或名離、或名寂滅；離是分散，諸法久後無有遺餘，又自離其性；知畢竟空已，無心數法、無語言，故名寂滅。末以一句帶過其餘：畢竟空等如先說。此段最堪注意者，是『取著畢竟空』竟然是一種病——空亦不可作所得。
卅八、獨空。 經中列而不釋，論主此處專設問答。問：云何是獨空？答：十八空都是因緣相待，如內空因內法故名內空，若無內法則無內空，十八空皆然；這獨空無因無待，所以名獨空。又補一釋：獨空者，如虛空、如、法性、實際、涅槃。要領在「無因無待」四字——前列諸空皆對所空之法而立，獨空則不對任何法而立，所以與如、法性、實際、涅槃同列。
卅九、非今世非後世相：離斷常之中道。 論主釋末句。有外道但說今世不說後世，這是邪見，墮斷滅；有人說有今世後世而言今世之神入於後世，這也是邪見，墮常見。般若離此二邊而說中道：雖空而不著空，所以還為眾生說罪福；雖說罪福，卻不生常見，也於空無礙。末引佛自說的因緣：此中畢竟空故，云何有今世後世見，若斷若常。空與罪福並行不悖，正是此段要立的分寸——這也是防止把前文「世間空」讀成撥無因果的關鍵一段。
四十、五事之問與佛之印可。 第三段起於須菩提的白佛：般若為大事故起，為不可思議事故起，為不可稱事故起，為無量事故起，為無等等事故起。佛答『如是如是』，逐句重述五事。這裡的「起」字要看準：不是般若忽然生起，是般若為此五事之故而興於世——問的是般若出世的所為。
四十一、大事。 佛自問自答：云何般若為大事故起？諸佛大事者，所謂救一切眾生，不捨一切眾生。經文說得極短，卻定住了全段的方向：所謂大，不在境界高遠，在所荷擔者眾、在不捨。
四十二、不可思議事。 佛答：不可思議事者，所謂諸佛法、如來法、自然人法、一切智人法。此四名是本段的樞紐，往下三事都以這四法為所稱、所量、所等之對象，論主後文也將逐名訓釋。此處先記住四名，不必求解。
四十三、不可稱、無量、無等等。 三事同一句法。不可稱者，一切眾生中無有能思惟稱佛法乃至一切智人法者；無量者，一切眾生中無有能量此四法者；無等等者，一切眾生中無有能與佛等者，何況能過。三者的差別只在動詞——稱是衡，量是度，等是比。所遮的是三種不同的攀附方式。
四十四、但四法耶：推至色等一切法。 須菩提再問：只有這四法是為不可思議乃至無等等之事而起嗎？佛答『如是如是』，先肯定四法，隨即推廣：色亦不可思議、不可稱、無有量、無等等，受想行識亦然，乃至一切種智、法性、法相亦然；這其中心、心數法不可得。又進一步：色不可思議，這「不可思議」也不可得；乃至色無等等，這「無等等」也不可得。此處是全段的轉關——不可思議不是佛法獨有的尊號，是一切法的實況；而且連這個名目本身也不可得。
四十五、三重追問，量不可得。 須菩提兩度以「何因緣」追問，佛兩度作答，最後反問。問一：何因緣色不可思議乃至無等等，而這也不可得？答：色量不可得故，乃至一切種智量不可得故。問二：何因緣色量不可得乃至一切種智量不可得？答：色不可思議故乃至色無等等故，量不可得。答一以「量不可得」釋「不可得」，答二又以「不可思議乃至無等等」釋「量不可得」——看似循環，實則是說這兩面本是一事，無可更求外因。佛於是反問：不可思議乃至無等等之中，寧可得色受想行識乃至一切種智不？須菩提答：不可得。連環之問到此自解。
四十六、諸佛法不可思議之總結。 佛作長段收束，凡四重。其一，一切法不可思議乃至無等等，諸佛法亦爾。其二，出其所以：不可思議者過思議相故，不可稱者過稱故，無有量者過量故，無等等者過等等故——「過」字是關鍵，不是沒有，是超過。其三，名與義相稱：不可思議之名，其義也不可思議，乃至無等等之名，其義也無等等。其四，以虛空為喻：不可思議如虛空不可思議，乃至無等等如虛空無等等；佛法如是無量，一切世間天、人、阿修羅無能思議籌量者。四重由法而理、由理而名、由名而喻，層層可循。
四十七、說是品時得道之眾。 經段以會眾得益作結：說此諸佛法不可思議、不可稱、無有量、無等等品時，五百比丘以一切法不受故漏盡心得解脫得阿羅漢；二十比丘尼亦以不受一切法故漏盡得阿羅漢；六萬優婆塞、三萬優婆夷於諸法中遠塵離垢、法眼生；二十菩薩摩訶薩得無生法忍，於賢劫中當受記。四眾得益而數目懸殊，這一組數字本身就是問題，論主在全品之末會專門回答。
四十八、須菩提何以能發此問，大事之訓。 論主開釋第三段：須菩提深解般若之相，於諸法中無著無礙，心生歡喜，故白佛言般若為大事故起等。先訓「大事」：破一切眾生大苦惱，能與佛無上大法，故名大事。一破一與，正與經文「救一切眾生，不捨一切眾生」相應——破苦是救，與法是不捨。
四十九、不可思議先已答。 論主只用一句帶過：不可思議，先已答。這是本論的體例——前品已詳者不復重解。讀者若於此處覺得太簡，正該回看本品論②所答，不必於此強求。
五十、不可稱之四釋。 論主訓「稱」為智慧，然後四釋：其一，般若定實之相甚深極重而智慧輕薄，所以稱它不起。其二，般若多而智慧少，所以不能稱。其三，般若利益處廣——未成時能與世間果報，成已與道果報。其四，究竟盡知纔叫稱，而般若無能稱知者：若常若無常、若實若虛、若有若無，皆不能定。四釋之中，前二用秤喻，第三說其量廣，第四歸於不可定執——由喻入理。
五十一、無量之四釋。 其一，有人說「稱」就是「量」，二名一義。其二，有人說取相名為量，般若不可取相故無量。其三，菩薩以四無量心行般若故名無量。其四，量指智慧，凡夫、二乘、菩薩之智慧皆不能量得般若邊際，故名無量。四釋並陳而不強判孰是——論主於此類名義之訓，向來是列而不斷，讀者取其可用者用之。
五十二、無等等之四釋與結。 其一，「無等」指涅槃，一切有為法無與涅槃等者；涅槃有三分——聲聞涅槃、辟支佛涅槃、佛涅槃；般若能與大乘涅槃，故名無等等。其二，一切眾生無與佛等，故佛名無等；般若利益眾生令與佛相似，故名無等等。其三，諸佛法第一微妙，無能與等、無能及、無可為疋；般若能令眾生得是心，故名無等等。其四，「無等」指諸法實相，諸觀諸行無能及者，無戲論、無能破壞，故名無等；菩薩得是無等，能於眾生中生慈悲心，故名無等等。末以一句結：是名無等等義。四釋之中，涅槃與實相為「無等」，佛與菩薩為「等」之者——「無等等」三字之所以難讀，就在它是『與無等者相等』的意思，四釋皆循此格。
五十三、佛何以可其所說，佛自說五事。 論主補一筆：須菩提是聲聞人，沒有一切智，卻能說出這不可思議的般若等，所以佛可其所說。接著標出下文：佛自說五事。這一句是科段的轉折標記，提示以下所釋是佛自己對五事的開示，不再是須菩提之語。
五十四、大事之廣釋與菩薩所受五事。 論主廣釋大事：眾生無量無邊，多於十方恒河沙等世界中的微塵，諸佛以十力等法盡欲救濟，這名大事。又有菩薩久得無生法忍，因不捨眾生故不入無餘涅槃。再者，這菩薩得佛道時為眾生故受五事——一受諸勞苦，二捨寂定樂，三與惡人共事，四與人接對，五入大眾會。佛深得離欲之樂，卻為眾生甘受這五事等種種疲苦，如同受功德一般，這就是大事。要看的是末一句的口氣：「如受功德」——不是忍耐，是以之為所得。
五十五、四種法逐名訓釋。 不可思議者，即佛法、如來法、自然人法、一切智人法。佛法者，佛名為覺，於一切無明睡眠中最初覺，故名為覺。如來者，如過去諸佛行六波羅蜜得諸法如相而來至佛道，今佛亦如是道來，如諸佛來，故名如來。自然人法者，聲聞人也有覺、也有知，卻是從他聞來，那是弟子法；佛則是自然人，不從他聞。一切智人法者，辟支佛也自然而得、不從他聞，卻無一切智；所以說佛是一切智人所得。四名層層相簡：覺簡於不覺，如來簡於非由如相而來，自然簡於從他聞，一切智簡於自然而無一切智。末以一句總收：是四種法無有人能思惟稱量，故名不可思議、不可稱、不可量；更無有法與是法相似，故名無等等。四法與四名至此扣合。
五十六、恐新學著四法。 論主點出須菩提再問的用意：恐怕新學菩薩執著這四法，所以白佛但是四法不可思議、無有與等耶。佛答色等諸法亦不可思議、無稱、無量、無等等，並自說因緣：色等一切法不可得故。這一問的價值在於防護——四法本是尊號，一旦被新學執成獨有的高處，反成障礙；佛以一切法平等不可得答之，尊號便不成所執。
五十七、結句、名字與虛空喻。 三小節。其一，經文「如是，須菩提！諸佛法不可思議」是指上事，「是名不可思議」是結句；論者先已廣解，佛此中則略說——不可思議是過思議相、過等等相。其二，就義趣說，涅槃法不可思議；就名字說，因世諦故可思議。其三，「如虛空不可思議」者，如先品中說虛空相不可思議，所以說不可思議；乃至無等等如虛空，因虛空無可喻故名無等等。第二小節尤可記：同一個不可思議，約義則絕思，約名則可說——不然這一品本身也說不出來。
五十八、般若相即佛法相，六道但說三道。 論主收束：般若波羅蜜之相就是佛法之相；不可思議、無量、無稱、無等等就是佛法之相。又釋經文何以只說天、人、阿修羅：六道之中但說三道，是因為三善道眾生尚且不能稱量，何況三惡道。這是舉勝以攝劣的說法，不是漏說三惡道。
五十九、得道者何以多少不同。 論主自設一問：說是品時，何以比丘尼、菩薩得道者少？答分數層。其一，此中多讚歎諸佛法——不可思議、無稱、無量、無等等，聞者多增益信根，所以白衣得道者多。其二，女人雖然信多而智慧少，故得道者亦少；白衣貪著世事、智慧淺薄、鈍根，不能盡漏。其三，諸比丘信、慧諸根平等，一心求道，故漏盡者多；比丘尼智慧少故只二十人得漏盡——雖多得初道、數目超過白衣，因不盡漏故與白衣無異，此中不說。要看清論主的判準：讚歎之教增信，故信強者得益顯；盡漏須慧，故慧勝者得果深。四眾數目之異，是根器之異，不是法有所偏。
六十、無生忍何以得者少。 論主續答菩薩一邊：入無生忍法甚深難得故少，又於此法種因緣者少。一難於法本身，一難於宿因——二十菩薩之數所以如此，於此可解。
六十一、賢劫受記之二說並存。 品末一語「賢劫中當受記」，論主列二說：或有人言賢劫中千佛除四佛當與受記；或有人言釋迦文佛與受記，於賢劫中在餘世界作佛。二說並列而不判，這是本論一貫的體例——古有異說則誌之，不強為裁定。全品至此而終。
不要讀錯
不要把『說空即是有相』讀成佛自語相違。本品的重心正在化解這一疑，而所用的辦法不是辯解，是分層：佛自說這些相是為眾生、順世間法而說，不是第一義；論主接著把判準說死——若以第一義故，這一難應當發；以世諦故說，這一難就不應當發。凡是覺得『既說畢竟空，何以又說一大堆相』的地方，都要回到這一分寸上讀，不可以拿第一義去難世諦之說，也不可以拿世諦之說去證第一義有相。
不要把「相不能破相」讀成諸法不可破斥。論主三釋說得分明：一是般若畢竟空無相故；二是所謂破其實只是解散，如斧析薪，分分解散而竟無所失；三是諸法本無定相，如樹是根莖枝葉和合，無定相故無所破。所遮的是『以一相去破另一相』這種操作，不是說不必觀破煩惱。同樣，「相不能知相」遮的是以有為虛妄之知去取實相，不是說行人不必修智慧——論主特地加了一句，此中以實相故說，不說如凡夫人虛妄知。
不要把「一切法無知者、無見者」讀成斷滅或不可知論。佛的兩重因緣是：一切法空、虛誑、不堅固，一切法無依止、無所繫。論主更補一句要緊的——不只是無知無見，連那個無知者、無見者也不可得。若把它讀成『有一個什麼都不知的狀態』，便又立了一個所得。而且緊接著佛就說般若能生諸佛、能示世間相：無知者無見者與能生能示，同時成立而不相礙。
不要把「不見色故示世間相」讀成閉目不觀。佛自己下了定義：不緣色而生識，名為不見色相故示。是識不緣彼而生，不是見而不看，更不是否認色法存在。論主隨後還正面說明色何以亦不生——惱壞相是色，因識故分別知，無識亦無惱壞相；又說諸法從因緣和合生相，無有自性，如身識觸和合纔知地之堅相。這兩段是正面的說理，不可略過。
不要把「示世間空」乃至「獨空」九門讀成九種不同的空。論主已經先說過，空雖是一，人根有利鈍、入有深淺故差別說空。九門是同一空的九種說法，對治九種不同的取著；尤其「不可思議」一門，論主明言是因為會中人以為般若是畢竟空、心想取著，所以纔說不可思議——連畢竟空也不可得。把九門排成高下次第而求其孰深孰淺，是讀錯了方向。
不要把「不生今世、後世相」讀成撥無因果。論主在此處特別立了斷常二邊：但說今世不說後世是斷見，說今世之神入於後世是常見；般若離此二邊而說中道——雖空而不著空故，仍為眾生說罪福；雖說罪福，卻不生常見，亦於空無礙。這一段是全品防護最嚴的地方，正因前文把世間空說得極盡，此處必須把罪福接回來。
不要把「佛知作人」與「佛不知作人」看成經文自相矛盾。論主已經合會：知作人是知他於己作恩，就報恩一面說；不知作人是因知一切法無作相、作者無所有，就第一義一面說。末句斷得乾淨——言知作人、不知作人，無咎。同理，佛尊重供養般若也不可讀成貪著：佛自說我無貪心，但分別知諸法好醜、力用多少。分別功德而讚歎，與取相而貪著，是兩件事。
不要把「無等等」拆成「無等」加「等」而失其義。論主四釋都循同一格式：先指出「無等」是誰——或涅槃、或佛、或諸佛法、或諸法實相；再指出「等」之者是誰——般若能與大乘涅槃、能令眾生與佛相似、能令眾生得是心、能令菩薩於眾生中生慈悲心。四釋雖異，格式不異。若只把它當作一個表示至高的形容詞，這四釋便全落空。
不要把品末「比丘尼、菩薩得道者少」讀成貶抑。論主的答語是就根器與宿因說的：讚歎之教增長信根，故白衣得益者眾；盡漏須慧力，故智慧勝者得果深；無生法忍甚深難得，又於此法種因緣者少。經文既如實記其數，論主亦如實釋其故，不諱亦不加。讀時當看的是它所立的因果——信與慧各有所至。
修行作用
第一件受用，是一個問法的糾正。天子問何等是深般若相，佛先正答以空相等諸相，隨即反問：有人問何等是虛空相，這一問算不算正問？天子自答不是正問，於是自己先前的問也就站不住了。用功人日常最常犯的，正是拿『這是什麼』的格式去問無定相之法——什麼是空？什麼是實相？什麼是實際？本品教的不是不許問，是問了以後要回看自己的問法：我這一問，是不是已經預設了有一個定相可取？這一回看，往往比答案更得力。
第二件受用，是說與不說的分寸。佛說了空相等十相，隨即自道這是世諦之說、不是第一義；論主又補一句，雖說空而不以著心取相、不示法若是若非。行人讀經、聽法、乃至自己向人說法，都可以拿這一條自檢：我此刻所說的，是安放在世諦而自知其為世諦，還是把它當成第一義而執持不放？同一句話，前者是方便，後者就成所知障。
第三件受用，是對『我破掉了』這個錯覺的對治。相不能破相之第二釋說得極好：所謂能破，其實只是解散，如斧析薪，分分解散而竟無所失。用功中每有一時之豁然，便以為某個煩惱已被破盡；此喻可作回勘——那多半只是把和合之相拆開了一層，未必有一法真被破去。知此則不驕，亦不因煩惱復起而自疑。
第四件受用，是防『取著畢竟空』之病。論主明說，會中人以為般若是畢竟空、心想取著，所以佛纔說不可思議——連畢竟空也不可得。稍解空義的人最易把「空」握成一個新的所得，把「無所有」當作一個可安住之處。此條可作日課之勘：我此刻的空觀，是在離著，還是在把空當作一件東西持著？並可合『無所有下無相相——無一切法相』一句同讀。
第五件受用，是知恩的身教。佛是三界之尊，尚且依止般若而住、恭敬供養尊重讚歎，並自說於知恩報恩中第一；論主更以邪見不識恩分為一切不善之最。行人於法、於師、於教授己者，此條可以直接落地——不識恩分往往不是薄情，是那句「我自然應爾」的邪見在作主。論主給的喻也很切：如人行安穩道，免諸患難，常念此道以示於人；受益而不忘其所由來，並且轉示於人，這就是報恩。
第六件受用，是罪福與空的並行。前文把世間空說到極處，末後卻立中道：雖空而不著空故為說罪福，雖說罪福而不生常見、亦於空無礙。用功人於空觀得力時，最易輕忽持戒與因果；於持戒精嚴時，又易落常見而不能空。此條是兩邊的繩索：以空離常，以罪福離斷，兩手同時執住纔是中道。
第七件受用，是四種法之簡與新學之防。佛法、如來法、自然人法、一切智人法四名層層相簡——覺簡不覺，如相而來簡非如而來，自然簡從他聞，一切智簡自然而無一切智；而須菩提立刻擔心新學執著這四法，佛便答色等一切法亦不可思議。修行路上每遇尊勝之法目，此一問一答可作提醒：認取其勝，是為策發；執取其勝，便成新縛。
第八件受用，是四眾得道之數的自照。同一座法會，五百比丘漏盡、二十比丘尼漏盡、六萬優婆塞三萬優婆夷法眼生、二十菩薩得無生忍。論主的解釋是：讚歎增信，故信強者得益顯；盡漏須慧，故慧勝者得果深；無生忍甚深，又種因緣者少。行人可據此自量今日所缺者是信是慧，缺信則當多親近讚歎之教，缺慧則當多用觀行——不必羨他人之果，但問自己所少之根。
承衍
本品的骨幹是三經三論相間。經①自諸天子遙散華香而問深般若相起，佛答空相等十相，自道以世諦故說、非第一義，推至一切世間無能破壞、相不能破相知相知無相、諸相非五眾六度諸空道品所作，設虛空相之問，立有佛無佛相性常住，末以逐相對舉而歸於佛得一切諸法無相。論①先答何以復問之三因，訓三解脫門為初入之相、三乘共有，分深相與初相、內外二種無相，釋佛先知其疑而自為說，出水火與盲人二喻，立相不能破相三釋、相不知相之辨、刀不破空與無刀不斫二喻、相與所相相待不定三層，末釋諸天子之讚與佛之印可，訓「得」為知，收於諸法相今轉名般若。經②轉告須菩提，立般若是諸佛母、能示世間相，說佛知於己有恩者與一切法無作相，答無知者無見者之難，定「不見」為不緣生識，逐開世間空、佛世間空、不可思議、離、寂滅、畢竟空、性空、無法空、無法有法空、獨空諸門，末立不生今世後世相。論②承依止而訓知恩報恩，解何以貴般若、何以似貪著，合會知作人與不知作人，釋畢竟空之難與無依止無繫之空，答識不生色云何不生，訓示世間空與佛非愛法故說，釋不可思議即畢竟空亦不可得，專設問答訓獨空之無因無待，末立離斷常之中道。經③起於須菩提舉五事之問，佛逐一釋大事、不可思議事、不可稱事、無量事、無等等事，推至色等一切法亦爾，三重追問而歸於量不可得，總結過思議相乃至過等等相，以虛空為喻，末記四眾得道之數。論③訓大事、不可稱四釋、無量四釋、無等等四釋，釋佛何以可須菩提所說，廣釋菩薩為眾生所受五事，逐名訓釋四種法，答恐新學著四法之問，分義趣與名字二面，末答比丘尼與菩薩得道者少之故，並列賢劫受記二說而不判。
本品與前後諸品的義脈，可見者有三線。其一，經②「般若波羅蜜是諸佛母」「能示世間相」一軸，正是前品〈佛母品〉所立之義的續說：前品廣明佛依般若而知世間相，本品則轉入『所示的世間相究竟是何相』，答以世間空乃至獨空九門，末歸於不生今世後世相。母之義在前品已立，示之義在本品乃詳。其二，本品開卷論主自標其承接——上處處已說空、無相、無作乃至無起、無所有是般若相；可見『般若之相』一題並非本品新起，本品所加者是『說相而不成有相』的分寸，以及相與所相相待不定的一層推究。其三，論③於「如虛空不可思議」一節自言如先品中說虛空相不可思議，又於「不可思議」一目逕言先已答；論①釋差別說空竟，於「無生無滅等論議」亦逕言如先說——凡此皆是本論前品已詳而此處從略之例，讀者當合前品觀之，不必於本品強求其備。
後來古德於本品各有所取。吉藏於其疏中就品名自釋，謂「明般若相中有問有答，後諸問作作，名云問相品也」——以有問有答釋「問相」二字，是就品之體裁立名，與本品經文以「相」為所問之義互為表裡。同疏又於本品之首設一品際之問，問上〈佛母品〉既已明世間相，與本品所明者有何分別；此問正點在前品與本品的接榫處，可與上文第一線義脈參看。慧影一系判《大品》全經為三分，其中一分逕以本品為終點，謂「從魔事已下至問相品，就留難門說波若」——依此科，自〈魔事品〉以下至本品為「留難門」之所收。此判是就全經品目的結構坐標而立，非就本品逐句之義而發，錄以備一說，本品經論自身並無留難之文（其品題兩造、傳本卷次之異、經錄品目之標記與後世徵引之考，詳考據層）。
Asking about Marks: Why, Emptiness, the Signless, and Non-action Having Been Spoken of Everywhere, the Gods Ask Again about the Mark of Prajñā; Why, a Mark Being Unable to Break a Mark, It Is Also Said That a Mark Cannot Know a Mark or Know the Markless; Why Speaking of Emptiness, When to Speak Is Already to Have a Mark, Does Not Amount to Contradicting Oneself; Why, Prajñā Being Ultimately Empty, the Buddha Instead Relies on It, Honours It, and Makes Offerings to It; Why, Prajñā Being Able to Give Birth to the Buddhas, It Is Also Said That in All Dharmas There Is No Knower and No Seer; Why, the World Having Been Shown as Empty, Nine Gates from the Inconceivable to Solitary Emptiness Are Further Opened; Why That Which Is Equal to the Unequalled Is Called Both Nirvāṇa and the Real Mark of All Dharmas; and Why, When This Chapter Was Spoken, Those among the Bhikṣuṇīs and the Bodhisattvas Who Obtained the Path Were Few
What Is Being Asked
The name of this chapter is its very way of asking: asking about marks. The gods of the desire realm and the form realm scatter flowers and incense from afar and come, bow their heads at the Buddha’s feet, and what they ask is a single sentence—the prajñāpāramitā that is spoken of is very deep; what is the mark of deep prajñāpāramitā? The question looks ordinary, yet the treatise-author, opening the chapter, first blocks it on the reader’s behalf: emptiness, the signless, non-action, and so on up to non-origination and without anything existent, are the mark of prajñā—this has already been said everywhere above; why do the gods still ask? From this one can see that what this chapter deals with is not the question of knowledge, ‘what is prajñā?’, but a harder question: ‘since prajñā has no fixed mark, does the mark that is spoken of still count as a mark?’
And so the whole chapter asks three times and answers three times. The first time, the gods ask about the mark; the Buddha answers with the ten marks, the mark of emptiness and the rest, and at once exposes it himself: these words are spoken for beings, in accord with worldly dharmas; they are not the highest meaning. Then he presses on all the way to a mark cannot break a mark, a mark cannot know a mark, a mark cannot know the markless, the markless cannot know a mark, sweeping away knower and known together, and finally comes home to ‘whether there is a Buddha or no Buddha, the mark and the nature abide always’. The second time, the Buddha of his own accord tells Subhūti: prajñā is the mother of the buddhas and can show the mark of the world; being the mother and being able to show, it is yet said that in all dharmas there is no knower and no seer, and with nine gates he opens up, layer by layer, the world as empty, inconceivable, separate, quiescent, ultimately empty, empty of nature, empty of non-existent dharmas, empty of non-existent and existent dharmas, and as solitary emptiness. The third time, Subhūti raises five matters—the great matter, the inconceivable matter, the unweighable matter, the matter without measure, the matter equal to the unequalled—and asks for the sake of what prajñā arises; the Buddha answers each one, then extends these four kinds of inconceivable dharmas to form and all other dharmas, and finally concludes with the assembly obtaining the path.
The three rounds of question and answer are in fact three faces of one question: mark, mother, matter. To speak of the mark is to ask about the substance of prajñā; to speak of the mother is to ask about its capacity; to speak of the matter is to ask about its function. And all three faces run up against the same pass—prajñā is ultimately empty, with no fixed mark that can be grasped; then how is it that speaking of it, relying on it, praising it, and even the buddhas’ appearing in the world because of it—how is all of this established? This chapter’s answer lies not in any single conclusion, but in the measure the Buddha himself lays down: emptiness and the other marks are spoken of from the standpoint of worldly truth, not from the standpoint of the truth of the highest meaning. Once this sentence stands, the chapter’s many instances of ‘speaking with nothing spoken’ become readable.
Passage by Passage
1. The gods come to ask. The chapter opens with a scene: all the gods of the desire realm and the form realm in the three-thousand great-thousand world scatter flowers and incense from afar, come to where the Buddha is, bow their heads at the Buddha’s feet, stand to one side, and then ask. Look first at this 「遙散華香」 tr. "scattered flowers and incense from afar"—to set out offerings before asking about the Dharma is the rite of hearing the Dharma; look next at the words of the question: the gods first acknowledge 「所說般若波羅蜜甚深」 tr. "the prajñāpāramitā that is spoken of is very deep," and only then ask about the mark. They do not ask out of disbelief; having believed, they seek its fixed reality. Once this layer is clearly distinguished first, the three causes of the question that the treatise-author explains later will have somewhere to land.
2. The Buddha answers with ten marks and himself breaks his own words. The Buddha’s answer first lists the marks: the mark of emptiness, the signless, non-action, non-origination, no arising and no ceasing, without stain and without purity, the dharma without anything existent, the signless, no support, the mark of space—marks of every kind such as these are the mark of deep prajñā. Having listed them, he at once lays down the measure himself: this is spoken for beings, in accord with worldly dharmas; it is not the highest meaning. Then he presses forward: these marks cannot be broken or ruined by any of the world’s gods, humans, and asuras, because they themselves are also marks; a mark cannot break a mark, a mark cannot know a mark, a mark cannot know the markless, the markless cannot know a mark; the person who knows and the dharma known are both unfindable. Further on, he says that these marks are not made by the five aggregates, not made by the six perfections, not made by the emptinesses, not made by the four foundations of mindfulness and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds, nor are they possessed by humans or non-humans; they are neither worldly nor world-transcending, neither with outflows nor without outflows, neither conditioned nor unconditioned. What must be seen is the direction of this passage: first he gives you the marks, then he pulls away the marks in your hand—the giving is worldly truth; the pulling away is the highest meaning.
3. The question about the mark of space: a right question or not. The Buddha does not state the principle directly; he first sets a question: suppose someone asks 「何等是虛空相」 tr. "What is the mark of space?"—does this person count as asking rightly? The gods answer themselves: it is not asking rightly, because space has no mark that can be spoken of; space is unconditioned and without origination. This one question and answer is the model of the whole chapter: asking about ‘the mark of deep prajñā’ has the same form as asking about 「虛空相」 tr. "the mark of space"; since the gods have already judged that the latter does not make a question, their way of asking the former breaks of itself. The Buddha does not refute their question; he makes the questioners see for themselves that their question does not hold—this is the move in this chapter that most shows his skill.
4. Whether there is a Buddha or no Buddha, the mark and the nature abide always. Next the Buddha sets up a positive sentence: whether there is a Buddha or no Buddha, the mark and the nature abide always; because the Buddha obtains the mark and the nature as they really are, he is called the Tathāgata. Since the preceding passage has swept everything away, here there must be a sentence to hold it up; otherwise one falls into annihilation. The key point is that the two Chinese characters 「常住」 tr. "abide always" do not set up a permanent dharma: that the mark and the nature abide always means that it does not wait for a Buddha’s appearing before it exists, and does not cease to exist when a Buddha passes away; the Buddha is the Tathāgata not by making this mark and nature, but by obtaining it as it really is. Setting up and breaking are joined here.
5. The gods praise twice. Having heard, the gods praise, in two layers: first they praise the nature of the marks the World-Honored One has obtained as very deep—by obtaining these marks he obtains unobstructed knowledge, and abiding in these marks he gathers with prajñā the specific marks of dharmas; then they praise this deep prajñā as the place where the buddhas constantly walk: walking this path they obtain anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi, and having obtained it they penetrate the marks of all dharmas, from the mark of form up to the mark of the omniscience of all kinds. The first layer praises where the Buddha abides; the second praises what the Buddha walks and what he penetrates—the praise is no pleasantry; it restates what the Buddha answered as their own understanding and hands it back before the Buddha, asking for his seal.
6. The Buddha approves their praise, sets out the marks one against another, and returns to the markless. The Buddha answers ‘Just so! Just so!’, and then sets them out one by one: what vexes and ruins is the mark of form; what perceives is the mark of feeling; what grasps is the mark of perception; what initiates and makes is the mark of constructions; what discerns is the mark of consciousness; what can relinquish is the mark of dānapāramitā; being without the burning of vexation is śīla, not changing is kṣānti, not being subdued is vīrya, collecting the mind is dhyāna, relinquishing and leaving is prajñā; the mind free of harassment and vexation is the mark of the four dhyānas, the four immeasurable minds, and the four formless absorptions; transcending the world is the mark of the thirty-seven limbs of the path; suffering is the mark of the gate of liberation of non-action, separation the mark of the gate of liberation of emptiness, quiescence the mark of the gate of liberation of the signless; victory is the mark of the ten powers, not being frightened the mark of fearlessness, knowing universally the mark of the four unobstructed knowledges, what others cannot obtain the mark of the eighteen unshared dharmas; pitying beings is the mark of great kindness and great compassion, reality is the mark of being without error, grasping nothing is the mark of constant equanimity, knowing fully in the present is the mark of the omniscience of all kinds. After each group he adds the sentence ‘the Buddha obtains this as markless’. The teaching of this passage is extremely plain: each dharma has its own mark, each distinct and not confused; and what the Buddha obtains is the marklessness of all these marks. It is not erasing distinctions; it is obtaining their marklessness within the distinctions—and so the last sentence says: the Buddha obtains all dharmas as markless, and for this reason he is called unobstructed knowledge.
7. Why the mark of prajñā is asked again. The treatise-author opens his explanation by first answering the question that blocks the road: above, emptiness, the signless, non-action, and so on up to non-origination and without anything existent, have been said everywhere to be the mark of prajñā; why do the gods ask again? There are three answers. First, although the Buddha speaks of prajñā everywhere, sometimes he speaks of emptiness and the like, sometimes of existence, sometimes of the fruit of retribution, sometimes of sin and merit, and it is not fixed; so now they ask which is definitely the mark of prajñā. Second, prajñā is like an illusion, like a transformation, seemingly to be got hold of, yet with no fixed mark that can be grasped; only the buddhas can rightly and fully know it, and the gods, though of keen wisdom, cannot fully know it. Third, someone says: among the gods there are latecomers who had not heard it, and so they ask. The three answers go from shallow to deep and come back to the shallow: they ask because it is not fixed, they ask because they cannot know, they ask because they have not heard—if readers ask themselves ‘why do I still ask?’, these three will by and large be enough.
8. Emptiness and the rest are the mark of prajñā: a gloss on the three gates of liberation. The treatise-author explains the Buddha’s answer following the text. The mark of emptiness refers to inner emptiness, outer emptiness, and the other emptinesses; if dharmas are empty, there are no marks such as male and female, long and short, fair and ugly—this is called the mark of the signless; if empty and signless, one no longer gives rise to wishing, seeking, craving, and clinging to a body in later lives—this is called the mark of non-action. Glossed all the way down, emptiness, the signless, and non-action are not three things; they are a threefold shift of one matter. The last sentence is essential: the three gates of liberation are the mark of first entering prajñāpāramitā, held in common by the three vehicles—first entering, not the ultimate; a shared dharma, not an unshared one. This sentence keeps a place for the 「深相」 tr. "deep marks" that follow.
9. The deep marks, and the teaching of emptiness with distinctions. Having spoken of the mark of first entering, he then speaks of the deep marks: neither arising nor ceasing, neither stained nor pure, without support, space and the like, are the deep marks of prajñā. The treatise-author further distinguishes the two instances of 「無相」 tr. "the signless," earlier and later: the signless within the three gates of liberation is being without outer marks such as male and female; the mark of the signless from 「無所有」 tr. "without anything existent" onward is being without the marks of all dharmas. The one removes the coarse; the other removes the subtle. Then he explains why one and the same emptiness must be spoken of in so many ways—though emptiness is one, because people’s faculties are keen or dull and their entry is deep or shallow, emptiness is taught with distinctions. The Dharma has no many gates; the gates are set up for people. As for the discussion of no arising and no ceasing and the rest, the treatise-author says it is as said before, and does not repeat it.
10. The Buddha knew their doubt beforehand, and so spoke of it himself. The treatise-author points out a hinge: the Buddha knew the gods would surely give rise to this thought—if prajñā is empty, without anything existent, like the mark of space, how can it still be spoken of? If it is spoken of, it has a mark. Because the Buddha’s majestic virtue was great, the gods did not dare raise the objection, so the Buddha spoke it out himself on their behalf: the Buddha, out of pity for beings, speaks of emptiness and the other marks from the standpoint of worldly truth, not from the standpoint of the truth of the highest meaning. The treatise-author at once fixes the criterion firmly: if it were spoken from the standpoint of the highest meaning, this objection could stand; since it is spoken from the standpoint of worldly truth, this objection should not be raised. The doubt of self-contradiction, the easiest in the whole chapter to slide past, is untied here by one sentence.
11. Though emptiness is spoken of, marks are not grasped. One layer further: although emptiness is spoken of, marks are not grasped with a clinging mind, it is not shown that a dharma is right or wrong, all dharmas are of one mark, without discrimination; precisely because of this, the Buddha then speaks clearly of 「無所有」 tr. "without anything existent" and 「如虛空相」 tr. "like the mark of space." Here two uses of 「說」 tr. "speaking" can be seen: speaking while grasping at marks binds the more one speaks; speaking without grasping at marks clarifies the more one speaks. The difference lies not in speaking or not speaking, but in the mind of the one who speaks.
12. Nothing in all the world can break or ruin it: the two similes of water and fire and of the blind man. There is no dharma that does not enter this mark, and so it is said that nothing in all the world can break or ruin it; because gods, humans, and asuras are themselves marks. The treatise-author gives two similes: only dharmas of different kinds that oppose each other can be broken, as water can quench fire, but fire does not itself quench fire—like kinds do not break each other. Again, it is like a blind man who treads on precious things and says with his mouth that they are not precious, and in the end cannot make them not precious—saying with the mouth cannot change the thing. Taken together it is one sentence: mark and mark are of one kind, so they do not break each other; the words of the world do not reach the real mark, so nothing can ruin it.
13. Three explanations of why a mark cannot break a mark. The treatise-author gives three levels. First, the Buddha’s own reason: because prajñā is ultimately empty and markless, a mark cannot break a mark. Second, someone says: what is called breaking is in fact only dissolving—dharmas are formed by coming together; when an axe splits firewood, it is dissolved piece by piece, and in the end nothing is lost, so when has anything been broken? Third, dharmas have no fixed mark in the first place: as with a tree, root, trunk, branches, and leaves come together and it is called a tree; since the tree has no fixed mark, there is nothing to break. The three explanations gather into one sentence: things such as these are called a mark cannot break a mark. Of the three, the second is the most usable for curing the illusion, in daily life, that ‘I have broken it’—what is called breaking is mostly only taking apart.
14. Mental-factor dharmas are marks of knowing; why say they do not know? The treatise-author raises an objection himself: form and the other dharmas are not perceiving or knowing, so to say they do not know each other still makes sense; but mental-factor dharmas are themselves marks of knowing—how can they too be said not to know? The answer is most essential: here it is spoken with regard to the real mark, not of the false knowing of ordinary people. This wisdom is a conditioned dharma, born from the coming together of causes and conditions; a false dharma cannot truly know anything, and so it is relinquished and one enters nirvāṇa without remainder; and if it is said that wisdom can know permanence, impermanence, and so on up to emptiness, quiescence, and the like, this has already been widely refuted above, extinguished and exhausted, without anything existent. That being so, where is there any knowing? Therefore it is said that a mark does not know a mark. See clearly the measure of this sentence: it is not saying that people cannot know; it is saying that when conditioned, false knowing is used to grasp the real mark, that 「知」 tr. "knowing" does not hold.
15. A knife does not break space; without a knife nothing is cut. Two sentences, a simile for each. That a mark cannot know the markless: though there is wisdom within, the outer object is empty, so there is no dharma to be known; with no object without, from where would wisdom arise?—like a knife that, however sharp, cannot cut space. That the markless cannot know a mark: someone says that inner wisdom has no fixed mark while outer objects have fixed marks, and the mind arises following its object, so it is said that the markless should not know a mark—like having no knife: though there is a thing, there is no knife to cut it. The two similes, one direct and one reversed, seal shut the door between knower and known: with no object, wisdom does not arise; with nothing that takes an object, the object is not known.
16. The mark and the marked depend on each other and are not fixed. Pressing three layers further in. First, a mark does not enter a mark, because there already is a mark; a mark does not enter the markless, because the markless has no place to enter; apart from these two there is no further place that can be entered. Second, neither the mark nor the marked is fixed; there is a mark because of the marked: if there were first a mark and no marked, there would be no mark to speak of, because there would be nothing on which it rests; if there were first the marked and no mark, the marked also would not stand, because there would be nothing on which it rests and against which it stands. Third, the mark sometimes serves as the marked, and the marked is sometimes the mark, turning back and forth between each other; so if the mark is not fixed and not real, the marked too does not exist; if the marked is not fixed and not real, the mark too does not exist. The conclusion is that sentence of the sūtra: this mark, this markless, this mark-and-markless are unfindable. This passage is the joint of the whole chapter’s meaning—whatever is formed by mutual dependence is not fixed and real.
17. Emptiness and the other marks are real: not made, not of persons, on neither side; and so the Buddha sets up a simile. The treatise-author returns to the positive: as said before, emptiness and the other marks are real. Why? This mark is not made by the five aggregates, not made by the six perfections and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds; because it is unconditioned, there is no dharma that can make it, nor can any human or non-human make it—humans means bodhisattvas, buddhas, and the like; non-humans means the gods and the like; because it is ultimately empty, it is neither with outflows nor without outflows, neither worldly nor world-transcending. Then he adds a most essential self-warning: though the unconditioned mark was spoken of before, the unconditioned was spoken of only to break the conditioned; the unconditioned too has no fixed mark. Then he explains why the Buddha speaks the simile of space: hearers easily give rise to the thought—if there were no Buddha we would not hear of this mark, and the Buddha is supreme among beings, so surely it is the Buddha who makes this mark; therefore the Buddha says that whether there is a Buddha or no Buddha this mark abides always, and because the Buddha can know this mark he is called the Buddha. Breaking the notion that ‘the Buddha creates this mark’ is exactly the intent of setting up the simile in this passage.
18. The gods’ joy and the Buddha’s seal of approval. The gods rejoice and speak again: these marks are very deep; though they cannot be grasped as marks, they can be practised, and can give people the unsurpassed fruit of retribution; because the Buddha obtains these marks, he obtains unobstructed knowledge in all dharmas. The treatise-author inserts a sentence showing the converse: if one distinguished dharmas as having fixed marks, that would be obstructed knowledge. Next the gods declare that the World-Honored One, abiding in this real mark, penetrates without obstruction and can speak of the distinct marks of each dharma. The Buddha approves their meaning and distinguishes the marks for them: the marks known by ordinary people are each different; the Buddha knows them all as the mark of emptiness; the mark of emptiness is the markless; the Buddha obtains this as markless. The treatise-author further glosses the single character 「得」 tr. "obtain"—to obtain is to know; because of incomparable universal knowing it is called obtaining. The last sentence most repays savouring: these marks of dharmas are now renamed prajñāpāramitā. The mark of dharmas and the mark of prajñā are, at this point, not two.
19. Prajñā is the mother of the buddhas and can show the mark of the world. The Buddha turns and tells Subhūti, beginning a new passage. First he sets forth the thesis: prajñā is the mother of the buddhas and can show the mark of the world; therefore the Buddha abides relying on this Dharma, and makes offerings to this Dharma, reveres, honours, and praises it. He asks and answers himself: what is this Dharma? It is prajñāpāramitā. The reason is that prajñā gives birth to the buddhas. Next he speaks of the Buddha as knowing those who have been kind to him: if someone rightly asks who is one who knows kindness, the right answer is that none surpasses the Buddha; the Dharma the Buddha rode in on and the path by which he came, by which he obtained anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi—this vehicle and this path the Buddha still reveres, makes offerings to, honours, praises, receives and upholds, and guards. It turns one layer further: the Buddha knows all dharmas as having the mark of non-action, because a maker is non-existent; all dharmas are without origination, because shape and matter are unfindable—the Buddha, because of prajñā, knows all dharmas as having the mark of non-action, and for this reason too is called one who knows kindness. Within one passage, repaying kindness and non-action stand side by side without hindering each other; this is what the treatise-author will deal with specifically below.
20. Because of prajñā, all dharmas are obtained as non-arising. One sentence gathers up what went before and opens what follows: because of prajñāpāramitā, the Buddha obtains all dharmas as non-arising, with nothing to be attained; for this reason prajñā can give birth to the buddhas and can also show the mark of the world. 「不生」 tr. "Non-arising" and 「能生」 tr. "can give birth" are placed in the same sentence—precisely because what is obtained is the non-arising of all dharmas, prajñā can give birth to the buddhas. This is no play on words: the 「生」 tr. "birth" of giving birth is spoken from worldly truth; the 「不生」 tr. "non-arising" of non-arising is spoken from the highest meaning. The measure of the earlier passage comes into effect here once again.
21. The objection of no knower and no seer. Subhūti raises an objection: if in all dharmas there is no knower and no seer, how can prajñā give birth to the buddhas and show the mark of the world? The Buddha first answers ‘Just so! Just so!’, granting its premise, then himself speaks of two causes and conditions: first, all dharmas are empty, false and deceptive, and not solid, and so there is no knower and no seer; second, all dharmas are without support and without anything they are bound to, and so there is no knower and no seer. Then he connects the conclusion back: prajñā can give birth to the buddhas and can show the mark of the world—it shows the mark of the world because it does not see form; it shows because it does not see feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness; and so on up to: it shows because it does not see the omniscience of all kinds. The four Chinese characters rendered here as ‘shows because it does not see’ are the eye of this passage: what is shown is not something that has been seen; it is precisely not seeing.
22. Not seeing is consciousness not arising in taking it as object. Subhūti asks again what is meant by showing because form is not seen. The Buddha’s answer is very concrete: if consciousness does not arise taking form as its object, this is called showing because the mark of form is not seen; if consciousness does not arise taking feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness, and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds, as its object, this is called showing because the mark of the omniscience of all kinds is not seen. Here 「不見」 tr. "not seeing" receives a precise definition—not shutting the eyes and not looking, but consciousness not arising in taking that as its object. This sentence can guard against the misunderstanding that reads 「不見」 tr. "not seeing" as numb ignorance.
23. Showing the world as empty: more than twenty items set out one by one. The Buddha asks himself how prajñā can give birth to the buddhas and show the mark of the world, and answers himself: it can show the world as empty. Then he sets out the items one by one—the five aggregates, the twelve sense-fields, the eighteen elements, the twelve links of dependent origination, the sixty-two views rooted in the view of self; the ten wholesome paths, the four dhyānas, the four immeasurable minds, the four formless absorptions; the thirty-seven limbs of the path, the six perfections; inner emptiness, outer emptiness, inner-and-outer emptiness; the emptiness of non-existent dharmas, the emptiness of existent dharmas, the emptiness of non-existent and existent dharmas; the nature of the conditioned, the nature of the unconditioned; the Buddha’s ten powers, the eighteen unshared dharmas, and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds—showing the world of each one as empty. See its order: it begins from the body-and-mind world of ordinary people, passes through the views of the outside paths, goes through the wholesome dharmas of humans and gods and the meditative concentrations, enters the limbs of the path and the practice of the Great Vehicle, and finally lists even emptiness itself, even the merits of the Buddha-dharma. What is called showing the world as empty is emptying together even the dharmas that do the emptying; only this is called exhausting it.
24. The Buddha’s five functions, and the Buddha’s world as empty. Next come two turns. First, the Buddha, because of prajñā, shows the world as empty, knows the world as empty, awakens to the world as empty, considers the world as empty, and discriminates the world as empty—showing, knowing, awakening, considering, and discriminating set side by side, making clear that the Buddha’s relation to this emptiness is not speculative talk, but personal realisation followed by showing. Second, prajñā shows the Buddha the world as empty, again taking the five aggregates and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds as its items. The former speaks of the Buddha’s capacity, the latter of the object shown; both sides are gathered into the same concluding sentence.
25. The three gates of the inconceivable, the separate, and the quiescent. The nine gates begin to unfold one by one: it shows the Buddha the world as inconceivable, shows the Buddha the world as separate, shows the Buddha the world as quiescent—each gate taking the five aggregates and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds as the items shown. The three gates move in one direction: inconceivable—the mind cannot reach it; separate—dharmas are of themselves far apart; quiescent—the path of words is cut off. Though the gates turn, what is shown does not change; this is precisely the pattern of this passage.
26. The four gates of ultimate emptiness, emptiness of nature, emptiness of non-existent dharmas, and emptiness of non-existent and existent dharmas. Four more gates. Ultimate emptiness is exhausting to the very end; emptiness of nature is spoken with regard to the self-nature of dharmas; as for the emptiness of non-existent dharmas and the emptiness of non-existent and existent dharmas, the treatise-author glosses them himself in fascicle thirty-one when explaining the eighteen emptinesses: the emptiness of non-existent dharmas breaks all dharmas at the time of their ceasing—since the dharma has ceased into non-existence, this 「無」 tr. "non-existence" is also empty, and one may not hold a 「無」 tr. "non-existence" as real; the emptiness of non-existent and existent dharmas breaks arising and ceasing at one time—breaking not only the arising of existent dharmas but also the ceasing of non-existent dharmas, dismissing both sides, existence and non-existence, at one time. He also cites another explanation: the emptiness of past and future dharmas is called the emptiness of non-existent dharmas; the emptiness of present and unconditioned dharmas is called the emptiness of existent dharmas. Of the four gates these two are the subtlest: the former dismisses ‘the non-existence after ceasing’; the latter dismisses ‘the opposition of existence and non-existence’. The four gates tighten all the way, pushing 「空」 tr. "emptiness" from the general statement into the particular statement; in reading one need not force a distinction of deep and shallow name by name—the treatise-author will himself explain below why emptiness is taught with distinctions.
27. The one gate of solitary emptiness. Last of the nine gates is solitary emptiness. This name is the most singular among the emptinesses; the sūtra text does not explain it here, but only lists the item as in the preceding pattern; the treatise-author keeps it for later, setting up a question and answer specifically to gloss it. The sūtra does not explain and the treatise explains—this is precisely the pattern of this treatise; reading here, there is no need to hurry.
28. It does not give rise to the mark of this life or of later lives. The Buddha concludes: prajñā can give birth to the buddhas and can show the mark of the world; and the mark of the world that it shows does not give rise to the mark of this life or of later lives, because dharmas have nothing by which the mark of this life and later lives could arise. This follows from the nine gates before it: since the world is ultimately empty, the mark of this life and later lives has nowhere to arise from. Note that this is not denying karmic fruit—the treatise-author will say plainly below that this is the middle way that leaves the two extremes of annihilation and permanence, not a denial of cause and effect.
29. The buddhas abide relying on prajñā. The treatise-author opens his explanation of the second passage, first taking up the thesis: prajñā is the mother of the buddhas, and for this reason the buddhas abide relying on prajñā. He cites what other sūtras say, 「諸佛依止法，以法為師」 tr. "The buddhas rely on the Dharma and take the Dharma as their teacher," and then points out that here the Buddha tells Subhūti 「法者，即是般若波羅蜜」 tr. "The Dharma is precisely prajñāpāramitā." Joining the two sentences brings the general statement 「以法為師」 tr. "take the Dharma as their teacher" down onto prajñā—this is the starting point of all the discussion in this passage.
30. Knowing kindness is supreme. The treatise-author turns from relying to repaying kindness: among all unwholesome dharmas there is none worse than wrong view, because of wrong view one does not recognise a debt of kindness, and thinks only that it is naturally owed to oneself. The person who knows kindness is supreme among the wholesome dharmas of the world; in this life he is given a good name, in later lives the highest and most wondrous fruit of retribution. Therefore the Buddha says of himself that he is first in knowing kindness and repaying kindness: 「我尚知布施、持戒等恩，何況般若波羅蜜！」 tr. "I know even the kindness of giving, keeping the precepts, and the rest; how much more that of prajñāpāramitā!" This sentence describes the Buddha’s honouring and making offerings as knowing kindness; it does not say that the Buddha lacks anything, but sets up a supreme teaching by example.
31. Why prajñā is held precious, and why it seems like craving. Two doubts, which the treatise-author resolves one by one. First, the gods might think that prajñā is ultimately empty and has no fixed mark, and fear that some would neither crave it nor hold it precious; so the Buddha says 「我為三界尊，尚供養般若波羅蜜，何況餘人！」 tr. "I am the honoured one of the three realms, and even I make offerings to prajñāpāramitā; how much more should others!" Second, someone further doubts: the Buddha, toward all the world, is like space, attached to nothing—why does he alone crave prajñā, honouring it and making offerings to it, as if craving and clinging? The Buddha’s answer is clear: I have no craving mind; I simply know by discrimination the good and ugly of dharmas and how much power and use they have; I know that prajñā can cut off all idle discourse, open the paths of the three vehicles, and extinguish every suffering, and has immeasurable, boundless merits, and so I praise it, honour it, and make offerings to it. The treatise-author closes with a simile: like a person who walks a safe road, escapes every trouble and danger, and constantly keeps this road in mind and points it out to others. Praising by discriminating merits and craving by grasping at marks are two entirely different things.
32. Knowing what has been done for him and not knowing a doer. This is the special gloss of this passage. What is called 「佛知作人」 tr. "the Buddha knows what has been done for him" is knowing that others have done him a kindness. Elsewhere, however, a sūtra says 「佛不知作人」 tr. "the Buddha does not know a doer"; fearing that people would give rise to doubt, it is said here 「佛知一切法無作相」 tr. "the Buddha knows all dharmas as having the mark of non-action"—because he knows all dharmas as having the mark of non-action, he speaks of there being no doer; it is not because he does not know the debt of kindness that it is said he does not know a doer. The last sentence cuts extremely clean: to say that he knows what has been done for him, or that he does not know a doer, is without fault. The two sūtra passages look contradictory, but one speaks of kindness in worldly truth and the other of non-action in the highest meaning; read by layers, there is nothing to dispute.
33. Subhūti’s objection from ultimate emptiness. Subhūti objects: if, because all dharmas are ultimately empty, there is no knower and no maker, how can prajñā give birth to the buddhas and show the world of the buddhas? The Buddha grants his question and himself states the causes and conditions: all dharmas are empty, false and deceptive, and without solidity. The treatise-author further supplies a sentence of meaning for each side: Subhūti’s meaning is that all dharmas have the mark of dullness, with no seeing and no knowing—how could prajñā alone have knowing and seeing? The Buddha’s meaning is that all dharmas are not only without knowing and without seeing; even that no-knower and that no-seer are unfindable, and so this objection should not be raised. The objector objects by holding that ‘only prajñā has knowing’, while the Buddha withdraws even the ground on which the objection stands.
34. Without support and without bonds, therefore without knowing and seeing. The treatise-author continues with the second cause and condition: because all dharmas are without support and without bonds, there is no knower and no seer. In between he inserts an overview of the ways of entering emptiness—some break permanence and practise impermanence to enter emptiness; some break reality to enter emptiness; some enter emptiness because of ultimate exhaustion; some enter emptiness because all dharmas are far apart. What is used now is another road: because all dharmas have no place of abiding, they are without support and without bonds; because they are without support, there is no arising and no ceasing; no arising and ceasing is precisely emptiness. He also glosses 「不繫」 tr. "not bound": the real mark of all dharmas is not bound, it goes beyond the three realms, because the three realms are false and deceptive. The gates for entering emptiness are very many; what this passage takes is the one gate of ‘non-abiding’; only when this is clearly distinguished will one not stir the accounts of entering emptiness in the various sūtras and treatises together into a single mass.
35. When consciousness does not arise, form does not arise. The treatise-author explains ‘shows because it does not see’: prajñā shows the world because it does not see form and the other dharmas, since form and the other dharmas are without support, without bonds, false and deceptive, and so are not seen; the causes and conditions of not seeing that the Buddha himself speaks of are just the non-arising of consciousness that takes form as its object, and so on up to the non-arising of consciousness that takes the omniscience of all kinds as its object. He at once raises an objection himself: consciousness can be said not to arise, but how can form be said not to arise? There are two answers: first, what vexes and ruins is form, and it is discriminated and known only by way of consciousness; without consciousness there is no mark of vexation and ruin. Second, all dharmas produce their marks from the coming together of causes and conditions and have no self-nature—as when body, consciousness, contact, and the other conditions come together, one then knows the mark of hardness of earth; the mark of hardness is not apart from body and consciousness. Therefore all dharmas arise from coming together and have no self-nature. This passage is a rare piece of positive argument within the chapter, and can be used to explain why 「不見」 tr. "not seeing" does not wipe out the dharma of form.
36. A gloss on showing the world as empty, and the Buddha not speaking out of love of dharmas. Three layers. First, it glosses the sūtra words 「般若波羅蜜示世間空」 tr. "prajñāpāramitā shows the world as empty": the world refers to the five aggregates and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds; when the bodhisattva practises prajñā, he contemplates these dharmas, whether great or small, whether inner or outer, and none is not empty—this is called showing the world as empty. Second, it explains why 「佛示世間空」 tr. "the Buddha shows the world as empty" must be said separately: someone might doubt that the Buddha speaks thus because he loves and clings to dharmas, and that this is not the permanent, real mark of dharmas; so the Buddha says, I do not speak out of love of dharmas; I know the mark of dharmas, reckoning, considering, and discriminating from root to branch, and there is no dharma that goes beyond emptiness; and I do not speak merely on the strength of reading and reciting or of hearing from others, but speak having perceived, known, considered, and discriminated in my own mind. Third, a note on pattern: this passage speaks of showing the world as empty; above, leaving the sixty-two views and the rest was spoken of at length, while here only the five aggregates and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds are mentioned—the difference is one of fullness and brevity, not a contradiction between earlier and later.
37. The inconceivable: even ultimate emptiness is unfindable. The treatise-author explains the second of the nine gates, first pointing out the source of the sickness: people in the assembly at that time took prajñā to be ultimate emptiness, gave rise to thoughts in their minds and grasped and clung to it, so the Buddha spoke of the inconceivable. What is called inconceivable is that even ultimate emptiness is unfindable. He further glosses the two names 「離」 tr. "separate" and 「寂滅」 tr. "quiescent": ultimate emptiness is sometimes called separate and sometimes quiescent; separate is dispersing—dharmas, after a long time, leave nothing remaining, and moreover are of themselves separate from their nature; once ultimate emptiness is known, there are no mental-factor dharmas and no speech, and so it is called quiescent. He passes over the rest with one sentence: ultimate emptiness and the rest are as said before. What is most noteworthy in this passage is that ‘grasping and clinging to ultimate emptiness’ turns out to be a kind of sickness—emptiness too cannot be made something attained.
38. Solitary emptiness. The sūtra lists it without explaining it; here the treatise-author specially sets up a question and answer. Question: what is solitary emptiness? Answer: the eighteen emptinesses all depend on causes and conditions and on their counterparts, as inner emptiness is called inner emptiness because of inner dharmas, and if there were no inner dharmas there would be no inner emptiness—so with all eighteen emptinesses; this solitary emptiness has no cause and no counterpart, and so it is called solitary emptiness. He adds a further explanation: solitary emptiness is like space, suchness, the nature of dharmas, the limit of reality, nirvāṇa. The essential point lies in the four Chinese characters 「無因無待」 tr. "no cause and no counterpart"—the emptinesses listed before are all set up against the dharmas they empty, whereas solitary emptiness is set up against no dharma at all; this is why it is listed together with suchness, the nature of dharmas, the limit of reality, and nirvāṇa.
39. The mark neither of this life nor of later lives: the middle way that leaves annihilation and permanence. The treatise-author explains the last sentence. There are outside paths that speak only of this life and not of later lives—this is wrong view, falling into annihilation; there are those who say there is this life and later lives and claim that the soul of this life enters later lives—this too is wrong view, falling into the view of permanence. Prajñā leaves these two extremes and speaks the middle way: though empty, it is not attached to emptiness, and so it still speaks of sin and merit for beings; though it speaks of sin and merit, it does not give rise to the view of permanence, and it is unobstructed with regard to emptiness. At the end he cites the causes and conditions the Buddha himself speaks of: here, because of ultimate emptiness, how could there be a view of this life and later lives, whether of annihilation or of permanence? Emptiness and sin and merit go together without contradiction—this is exactly the measure this passage sets up; it is also the key passage for keeping the earlier 「世間空」 tr. "world as empty" from being read as a denial of cause and effect.
40. The question of the five matters and the Buddha’s approval. The third passage begins with Subhūti addressing the Buddha: prajñā arises for the sake of the great matter, arises for the sake of the inconceivable matter, arises for the sake of the unweighable matter, arises for the sake of the matter without measure, arises for the sake of the matter equal to the unequalled. The Buddha answers ‘Just so! Just so!’, and restates the five matters sentence by sentence. The character 「起」 tr. "arise" here must be read exactly: it is not that prajñā suddenly arises, but that prajñā comes forth in the world for the sake of these five matters—what is asked about is what prajñā appears in the world to do.
41. The great matter. The Buddha asks and answers himself: how does prajñā arise for the sake of the great matter? The great matter of the buddhas is to save all beings and not to abandon any being. The sūtra says it very briefly, but it fixes the direction of the whole passage: what is called great lies not in a lofty realm, but in the multitude of those one carries on one’s shoulders, in not abandoning.
42. The inconceivable matter. The Buddha answers: the inconceivable matter is the dharmas of the buddhas, the dharmas of the Tathāgata, the dharmas of the one who is so of himself, the dharmas of the omniscient one. These four names are the pivot of this passage; the three matters that follow all take these four dharmas as what is weighed, measured, and equalled, and the treatise-author will later gloss them name by name. Here, first remember the four names; there is no need to seek their explanation.
43. The unweighable, the matter without measure, that which is equal to the unequalled. The three matters share one sentence pattern. The unweighable: among all beings there is none who can conceive and weigh the dharmas of the buddhas and so on up to the dharmas of the omniscient one; without measure: among all beings there is none who can measure these four dharmas; that which is equal to the unequalled: among all beings there is none who can equal the Buddha, how much less surpass him. The difference among the three lies only in the verb—weighing is balancing, measuring is gauging, equalling is comparing. What is barred are three different ways of reaching up to take hold.
44. Only the four dharmas? Extended to form and all dharmas. Subhūti asks again: is it only these four dharmas for the sake of which, as inconceivable matters and so on up to matters equal to the unequalled, it arises? The Buddha answers ‘Just so! Just so!’, first affirming the four dharmas, then at once extending it: form too is inconceivable, unweighable, without measure, equal to the unequalled; so too feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness; and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds, the nature of dharmas, and the mark of dharmas; within these, mind and mental-factor dharmas are unfindable. And a step further: form is inconceivable, and this 「不可思議」 tr. "inconceivable" too is unfindable; and so on up to: form is equal to the unequalled, and this 「無等等」 tr. "equal to the unequalled" too is unfindable. Here is the turning point of the whole passage—inconceivability is not an honorific belonging only to the dharmas of the buddhas; it is the actual condition of all dharmas; and even this designation itself is unfindable.
45. A threefold pursuit: the measure is unfindable. Twice Subhūti presses with 「何因緣」 tr. "by what cause and condition," twice the Buddha answers, and finally he asks back. Question one: by what cause and condition is form inconceivable and so on up to equal to the unequalled, and this too unfindable? Answer: because the measure of form is unfindable, and so on up to because the measure of the omniscience of all kinds is unfindable. Question two: by what cause and condition is the measure of form unfindable, and so on up to the measure of the omniscience of all kinds unfindable? Answer: because form is inconceivable, and so on up to because form is equal to the unequalled, the measure is unfindable. Answer one uses 「量不可得」 tr. "the measure is unfindable" to explain 「不可得」 tr. "unfindable"; answer two in turn uses 「不可思議乃至無等等」 tr. "inconceivable and so on up to equal to the unequalled" to explain 「量不可得」 tr. "the measure is unfindable"—it looks circular, but what it says is that these two faces are really one matter, and no further outside cause can be sought. The Buddha then asks back: within the inconceivable and so on up to that which is equal to the unequalled, can form, feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness, and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds, be found or not? Subhūti answers: they are unfindable. At this point the chain of questions unties itself.
46. The conclusion that the dharmas of the buddhas are inconceivable. The Buddha closes with a long passage in four layers. First, all dharmas are inconceivable and so on up to equal to the unequalled, and so too are the dharmas of the buddhas. Second, he gives the reason: inconceivable because they pass beyond the mark of conceiving; unweighable because they pass beyond weighing; without measure because they pass beyond measure; equal to the unequalled because they pass beyond equalling—the character 「過」 tr. "pass beyond" is the key: it is not absence; it is surpassing. Third, name and meaning match: the name inconceivable, its meaning too is inconceivable, and so on up to the name equal to the unequalled, its meaning too is equal to the unequalled. Fourth, he takes space as the simile: inconceivable as space is inconceivable, and so on up to equal to the unequalled as space is equal to the unequalled; the dharmas of the buddhas are thus without measure, and none among all the world’s gods, humans, and asuras can conceive or reckon them. The four layers go from dharma to principle, from principle to name, from name to simile, layer upon layer to be followed.
47. The assembly who obtained the path when this chapter was spoken. The sūtra passage concludes with the assembly obtaining benefit: when this chapter on the dharmas of the buddhas being inconceivable, unweighable, without measure, and equal to the unequalled was spoken, five hundred bhikṣus, because they received no dharma, exhausted their outflows, their minds attained liberation, and they became arhats; twenty bhikṣuṇīs likewise, because they received no dharma, exhausted their outflows and became arhats; sixty thousand upāsakas and thirty thousand upāsikās, amid dharmas, were far from dust and free of defilement, and the Dharma-eye arose; twenty bodhisattva-mahāsattvas obtained the acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas and will receive the prediction in the Auspicious Kalpa. The four assemblies obtained benefit, but the numbers differ widely; this set of numbers is itself a question, which the treatise-author will answer specifically at the end of the chapter.
48. Why Subhūti could raise this question; a gloss on the great matter. The treatise-author opens his explanation of the third passage: Subhūti deeply understood the mark of prajñā; among dharmas he was without clinging and without obstruction, and his mind gave rise to joy, so he said to the Buddha that prajñā arises for the sake of the great matter and the rest. First he glosses 「大事」 tr. "the great matter": because it breaks the great suffering and vexation of all beings and can give the Buddha’s unsurpassed great Dharma, it is called the great matter. One breaking and one giving answer exactly to the sūtra text 「救一切眾生，不捨一切眾生」 tr. "to save all beings and not to abandon any being"—breaking suffering is saving; giving the Dharma is not abandoning.
49. The inconceivable has already been answered. The treatise-author passes it over with a single sentence: the inconceivable has already been answered. This is the pattern of this treatise—what an earlier chapter has detailed is not explained again. If readers find it too brief here, they should look back at what was answered in this chapter’s Treatise ②, rather than insisting on it here.
50. Four explanations of the unweighable. The treatise-author glosses 「稱」 tr. "weighing" as wisdom, and then gives four explanations: first, the fixed, real mark of prajñā is very deep and extremely heavy, while wisdom is light and thin, so it cannot weigh it. Second, prajñā is much and wisdom is little, so it cannot weigh it. Third, the places where prajñā brings benefit are broad—before it is complete it can give the fruits of retribution of the world, and once complete it gives the fruit of the path. Fourth, only knowing completely to the very end is called weighing, and there is no one who can weigh and know prajñā: whether permanent or impermanent, whether real or false, whether existent or non-existent—none of these can be fixed. Of the four explanations, the first two use the simile of the scale, the third speaks of its breadth, and the fourth returns to what cannot be fixed and held—from simile into principle.
51. Four explanations of without measure. First, someone says that 「稱」 tr. "weighing" is simply 「量」 tr. "measuring", two names with one meaning. Second, someone says that grasping at marks is called measuring, and prajñā cannot be grasped as a mark, so it is without measure. Third, the bodhisattva practises prajñā with the four immeasurable minds, so it is called without measure. Fourth, measure refers to wisdom: the wisdom of ordinary people, of the two vehicles, and of bodhisattvas cannot measure the limits of prajñā, so it is called without measure. The four explanations are laid side by side without forcing a judgement as to which is right—in glossing names and meanings of this kind, the treatise-author always lists without deciding; readers take what is usable and use it.
52. Four explanations of that which is equal to the unequalled, and the conclusion. First, 「無等」 tr. "the unequalled" refers to nirvāṇa: among all conditioned dharmas there is none equal to nirvāṇa; nirvāṇa has three portions—the nirvāṇa of the śrāvakas, the nirvāṇa of the pratyekabuddhas, the nirvāṇa of the Buddha; prajñā can give the nirvāṇa of the Great Vehicle, so it is called equal to the unequalled. Second, among all beings there is none equal to the Buddha, so the Buddha is called the unequalled; prajñā benefits beings and makes them resemble the Buddha, so it is called equal to the unequalled. Third, the dharmas of the buddhas are first and most subtle and wondrous; none can equal them, none can reach them, none can be their match; prajñā can cause beings to obtain this mind, so it is called equal to the unequalled. Fourth, 「無等」 tr. "the unequalled" refers to the real mark of all dharmas, which none of the contemplations and practices can reach, without idle discourse, and which nothing can break or ruin, so it is called the unequalled; the bodhisattva who obtains this unequalled can give rise to the mind of kindness and compassion among beings, so it is called equal to the unequalled. It concludes with one sentence: this is called the meaning of equal to the unequalled. Among the four explanations, nirvāṇa and the real mark are 「無等」 tr. "the unequalled," and the Buddha and the bodhisattva are those who 「等」 tr. "equal" it—the reason the three Chinese characters 「無等等」 tr. "equal to the unequalled" are hard to read is precisely that they mean ‘equal to the unequalled’; all four explanations follow this pattern.
53. Why the Buddha approved what he said; the Buddha himself speaks of the five matters. The treatise-author adds a stroke: Subhūti is a śrāvaka and does not have omniscience, yet he could speak of this inconceivable prajñā and the rest, so the Buddha approved what he said. Then he marks what follows: the Buddha himself speaks of the five matters. This sentence is a turning marker in the division of the text, signalling that what is explained below is the Buddha’s own disclosure of the five matters, no longer Subhūti’s words.
54. The broad explanation of the great matter, and the five things the bodhisattva accepts. The treatise-author broadly explains the great matter: beings are immeasurable and boundless, more than the atoms in world-systems equal to the sands of the Ganges in the ten directions, and the buddhas, with the ten powers and other dharmas, wish to save them all—this is called the great matter. Further, there are bodhisattvas who long ago obtained the acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas and, because they do not abandon beings, do not enter nirvāṇa without remainder. Again, when this bodhisattva attains the path of the Buddha, for the sake of beings he accepts five things—first, he accepts every toil and hardship; second, he gives up the pleasure of quiet concentration; third, he shares his undertakings with evil people; fourth, he deals with people face to face; fifth, he enters great assemblies. The Buddha has deeply obtained the pleasure of freedom from desire, yet for the sake of beings he gladly accepts these five things and every kind of weariness and hardship, as if receiving merit—this is the great matter. What must be seen is the tone of the last sentence: 「如受功德」 tr. "as if receiving merit"—not endurance, but taking it as something gained.
55. The four kinds of dharmas glossed name by name. The inconceivable is the dharmas of the buddhas, the dharmas of the Tathāgata, the dharmas of the one who is so of himself, the dharmas of the omniscient one. The dharmas of the buddhas: Buddha means awakened; amid all the sleep of ignorance he is the first to awaken, so he is called awakened. The Tathāgata: as the buddhas of the past practised the six perfections, obtained the mark of suchness of dharmas, and came to the path of the Buddha, so the present Buddha too has come by this path, coming as the buddhas came, and so he is called the Tathāgata. The dharmas of the one who is so of himself: śrāvakas too have awakening and knowing, but it comes from hearing from others—that is the dharma of disciples; the Buddha, however, is the one who is so of himself, not hearing from others. The dharmas of the omniscient one: the pratyekabuddha too obtains of himself, not hearing from others, but he lacks omniscience; therefore it is said that the Buddha is what is obtained by the omniscient one. The four names distinguish one another layer by layer: awakened is distinguished from not awakened; the Tathāgata from not having come by the mark of suchness; the one who is so of himself from hearing from others; omniscience from being so of oneself yet lacking omniscience. A sentence at the end gathers it all: these four kinds of dharmas no one can conceive, weigh, or measure, so they are called inconceivable, unweighable, immeasurable; there is further no dharma resembling these dharmas, so they are called equal to the unequalled. The four dharmas and the four names here lock together.
56. Fearing that those new to the training will cling to the four dharmas. The treatise-author points out the intent of Subhūti’s second question: fearing that bodhisattvas new to the training would cling to these four dharmas, he said to the Buddha, are only these four dharmas inconceivable, with none equal to them? The Buddha answers that form and the other dharmas too are inconceivable, unweighable, without measure, equal to the unequalled, and himself states the cause and condition: because form and all dharmas are unfindable. The value of this question lies in protection—the four dharmas are in origin honorific names; once bodhisattvas new to the training cling to them as a height belonging to them alone, they become an obstacle instead; the Buddha answers with the equality and unfindability of all dharmas, and the honorific names no longer become something clung to.
57. The concluding sentence, the name, and the simile of space. Three small sections. First, in the sūtra text, 「如是，須菩提！諸佛法不可思議」 tr. "Just so, Subhūti! The dharmas of the buddhas are inconceivable" refers to the matter above, and 「是名不可思議」 tr. "this is called inconceivable" is the concluding sentence; the treatise-author has already explained it at length before, and here the Buddha speaks briefly—the inconceivable passes beyond the mark of conceiving, passes beyond the mark of equalling. Second, in terms of meaning and intent, the dharma of nirvāṇa is inconceivable; in terms of the name, because of worldly truth it can be conceived. Third, 「如虛空不可思議」 tr. "inconceivable as space is inconceivable": as said in an earlier chapter, the mark of space is inconceivable, and so it is said to be inconceivable; and so on up to equal to the unequalled like space—because space has nothing it can be compared to, it is called equal to the unequalled. The second small section especially deserves to be remembered: the same inconceivable, in terms of meaning, cuts off conceiving; in terms of name, can be spoken—otherwise this very chapter could not be spoken at all.
58. The mark of prajñā is the mark of the dharmas of the buddhas; of the six destinies only three are mentioned. The treatise-author gathers it up: the mark of prajñāpāramitā is precisely the mark of the dharmas of the buddhas; inconceivable, without measure, unweighable, equal to the unequalled are precisely the marks of the dharmas of the buddhas. He further explains why the sūtra text mentions only gods, humans, and asuras: of the six destinies only three are mentioned, because even the beings of the three good destinies cannot weigh and measure them, how much less those of the three evil destinies. This is a way of speaking that names the superior to include the inferior; it is not an omission of the three evil destinies.
59. Why those who obtained the path differed in number. The treatise-author sets himself a question: when this chapter was spoken, why were the bhikṣuṇīs and bodhisattvas who obtained the path few? The answer comes in several layers. First, here the dharmas of the buddhas are much praised—inconceivable, unweighable, without measure, equal to the unequalled—and the hearers mostly increased their root of faith, so among the white-robed those who obtained the path were many. Second, women, though their faith is much, have little wisdom, so those who obtained the path were also few; the white-robed crave and cling to worldly affairs, their wisdom is shallow and thin, their faculties dull, and they cannot exhaust their outflows. Third, the bhikṣus’ faculties of faith and wisdom are balanced, and they seek the path single-mindedly, so those who exhausted their outflows were many; the bhikṣuṇīs have little wisdom, so only twenty exhausted their outflows—though many obtained the first path, and in number exceeded the white-robed, because they did not exhaust their outflows they were no different from the white-robed, and so they are not mentioned here. See clearly the treatise-author’s criterion: the teaching of praise increases faith, so those strong in faith obtain conspicuous benefit; exhausting the outflows requires wisdom, so those superior in wisdom obtain a deep fruit. The difference in the numbers of the four assemblies is a difference of faculties and capacities, not a partiality in the Dharma.
60. Why few obtained the acceptance of non-arising. The treatise-author goes on to answer for the bodhisattvas: the dharma of entering the acceptance of non-arising is very deep and hard to obtain, so they were few; and further, those who have planted causes and conditions for this dharma are few. One difficulty lies in the dharma itself, one in past causes—why the number of bodhisattvas was twenty can be understood from this.
61. Two accounts of the prediction in the Auspicious Kalpa, kept side by side. The last words of the chapter, 「賢劫中當受記」 tr. "will receive the prediction in the Auspicious Kalpa," the treatise-author meets with two accounts: someone says that of the thousand buddhas of the Auspicious Kalpa, all except four buddhas will give them the prediction; someone says that Śākyamuni Buddha gives them the prediction, and in the Auspicious Kalpa they will become buddhas in other worlds. The two accounts are set side by side without judgement; this is the consistent pattern of this treatise—where the ancients held different views, they are recorded, not forcibly decided. Here the whole chapter ends.
Do Not Misread
Do not read ‘to speak of emptiness is already to have a mark’ as the Buddha contradicting himself. The centre of this chapter lies precisely in dissolving this doubt, and the method used is not argument but layering: the Buddha himself says these marks are spoken for beings, in accord with worldly dharmas, not the highest meaning; the treatise-author then fixes the criterion firmly—if it were from the standpoint of the highest meaning, this objection should be raised; since it is spoken from the standpoint of worldly truth, this objection should not be raised. Wherever one feels ‘since ultimate emptiness is spoken of, why speak of a whole heap of marks?’, one must go back to this measure to read it; one may not use the highest meaning to object to what is said in worldly truth, nor use what is said in worldly truth to prove that the highest meaning has marks.
Do not read 「相不能破相」 tr. "a mark cannot break a mark" as meaning that dharmas cannot be refuted. The treatise-author’s three explanations say it plainly: first, because prajñā is ultimately empty and markless; second, what is called breaking is in fact only dissolving, as an axe splits firewood, dissolving it piece by piece, and yet in the end nothing is lost; third, dharmas have no fixed mark in the first place, as a tree is the coming together of root, trunk, branches, and leaves, and having no fixed mark, there is nothing to break. What is barred is the operation of ‘using one mark to break another mark’; it is not saying that one need not contemplate and break the afflictions. Likewise, 「相不能知相」 tr. "a mark cannot know a mark" bars grasping the real mark with conditioned, false knowing; it is not saying that the practitioner need not cultivate wisdom—the treatise-author specifically adds a sentence: here it is spoken with regard to the real mark, not of the false knowing of ordinary people.
Do not read 「一切法無知者、無見者」 tr. "in all dharmas there is no knower and no seer" as annihilationism or agnosticism. The Buddha’s two causes and conditions are: all dharmas are empty, false and deceptive, and not solid; all dharmas are without support and without anything they are bound to. The treatise-author further adds an essential sentence—not only is there no knowing and no seeing; even that no-knower and that no-seer are unfindable. If one reads it as ‘there is a state of knowing nothing’, one has again set up something attained. And immediately after, the Buddha says that prajñā can give birth to the buddhas and can show the mark of the world: there being no knower and no seer, and being able to give birth and to show, hold at the same time without hindering each other.
Do not read 「不見色故示世間相」 tr. "it shows the mark of the world because it does not see form" as shutting the eyes and not contemplating. The Buddha himself gave the definition: consciousness not arising taking form as its object is called showing because the mark of form is not seen. It is consciousness not arising in taking that as its object; it is not seeing yet refusing to look, much less a denial that the dharma of form exists. The treatise-author then explains positively why form too does not arise—the mark of vexation and ruin is form, discriminated and known by way of consciousness, and without consciousness there is no mark of vexation and ruin; he also says that dharmas produce their marks from the coming together of causes and conditions and have no self-nature, as only when body, consciousness, and contact come together is the mark of hardness of earth known. These two passages are positive reasoning and must not be skipped.
Do not read the nine gates from 「示世間空」 tr. "showing the world as empty" up to 「獨空」 tr. "solitary emptiness" as nine different emptinesses. The treatise-author has already said beforehand that though emptiness is one, because people’s faculties are keen or dull and their entry is deep or shallow, emptiness is taught with distinctions. The nine gates are nine ways of speaking of the same emptiness, curing nine different kinds of grasping; in particular, of the gate of 「不可思議」 tr. "the inconceivable" the treatise-author states plainly that it was because people in the assembly took prajñā to be ultimate emptiness and grasped and clung to it in thought that the inconceivable was spoken of—even ultimate emptiness is unfindable. To arrange the nine gates into a ladder of high and low and seek which is deeper and which shallower is to read in the wrong direction.
Do not read 「不生今世、後世相」 tr. "it does not give rise to the mark of this life or of later lives" as a denial of cause and effect. Here the treatise-author specifically sets up the two extremes of annihilation and permanence: speaking only of this life and not of later lives is the view of annihilation; saying that the soul of this life enters later lives is the view of permanence; prajñā leaves these two extremes and speaks the middle way—because, though empty, it is not attached to emptiness, it still speaks of sin and merit for beings; though it speaks of sin and merit, it does not give rise to the view of permanence, and it is unobstructed with regard to emptiness. This passage is the most closely guarded place in the whole chapter; precisely because the preceding text has spoken of the world as empty to the utmost, here sin and merit must be connected back.
Do not regard 「佛知作人」 tr. "the Buddha knows what has been done for him" and 「佛不知作人」 tr. "the Buddha does not know a doer" as the sūtras contradicting themselves. The treatise-author has already reconciled them: knowing what has been done for him is knowing that others have done him a kindness, spoken from the side of repaying kindness; not knowing a doer is because he knows all dharmas as having the mark of non-action and a maker as non-existent, spoken from the side of the highest meaning. The last sentence cuts clean—to say that he knows what has been done for him, or that he does not know a doer, is without fault. In the same way, the Buddha’s honouring and making offerings to prajñā may not be read as craving: the Buddha himself says, I have no craving mind; I simply know by discrimination the good and ugly of dharmas and how much power and use they have. Praising by discriminating merits and clinging by grasping at marks are two different matters.
Do not split 「無等等」 tr. "equal to the unequalled" into 「無等」 tr. "unequalled" plus 「等」 tr. "equal" and so lose its meaning. The treatise-author’s four explanations all follow the same pattern: first they point out who 「無等」 tr. "the unequalled" is—whether nirvāṇa, or the Buddha, or the dharmas of the buddhas, or the real mark of all dharmas; then they point out who it is that 「等」 tr. "equals" it—prajñā can give the nirvāṇa of the Great Vehicle, can make beings resemble the Buddha, can cause beings to obtain this mind, can cause the bodhisattva to give rise to the mind of kindness and compassion among beings. Though the four explanations differ, the pattern does not. If one takes it only as an adjective expressing the highest, these four explanations all fall empty.
Do not read 「比丘尼、菩薩得道者少」 tr. "the bhikṣuṇīs and bodhisattvas who obtained the path were few" at the end of the chapter as disparagement. The treatise-author’s answer speaks of faculties and past causes: the teaching of praise increases the root of faith, so among the white-robed those who benefited were many; exhausting the outflows requires the power of wisdom, so those superior in wisdom obtain a deep fruit; the acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas is very deep and hard to obtain, and those who have planted causes and conditions for this dharma are few. The sūtra records the numbers as they were, and the treatise-author explains their reasons as they were, neither concealing nor adding. What one should look at in reading is the cause and effect it sets up—faith and wisdom each have where they reach.
Bearing on Practice
The first benefit is the correction of a way of asking. The gods ask what the mark of deep prajñā is; the Buddha first answers rightly with the mark of emptiness and the other marks, and then asks back: if someone asks what the mark of space is, does that count as asking rightly? The gods answer themselves that it is not asking rightly, and so their own earlier question can no longer stand. What practitioners most often commit in daily life is exactly this: using the form ‘what is this?’ to ask about dharmas that have no fixed mark—what is emptiness? what is the real mark? what is the limit of reality? What this chapter teaches is not that asking is forbidden, but that after asking one should look back at one’s way of asking: does this question of mine already presuppose that there is a fixed mark to be grasped? This looking back often gives more strength than the answer.
The second benefit is the measure of speaking and not speaking. The Buddha spoke of the ten marks, the mark of emptiness and the rest, and at once said himself that this is speaking in worldly truth, not the highest meaning; the treatise-author adds that though emptiness is spoken of, marks are not grasped with a clinging mind, and it is not shown that a dharma is right or wrong. Practitioners reading the sūtras, listening to the Dharma, and even expounding the Dharma to others themselves can examine themselves by this: is what I am saying now placed in worldly truth and known by me to be worldly truth, or am I taking it as the highest meaning and holding on to it without letting go? The same sentence is, in the former case, skilful means; in the latter, it becomes the obstruction of the knowable.
The third benefit is the cure for the illusion ‘I have broken it’. The second explanation of why a mark cannot break a mark puts it excellently: what is called breaking is in fact only dissolving, as an axe splits firewood, dissolving it piece by piece, and yet in the end nothing is lost. In practice there is often a moment of sudden openness, and one then thinks some affliction has been broken completely; this simile can serve as a re-examination—mostly that is only one layer of a coming-together of marks taken apart; it is not certain that any dharma has truly been broken away. Knowing this, one is not proud, nor does one doubt oneself when afflictions arise again.
The fourth benefit is guarding against the sickness of ‘grasping and clinging to ultimate emptiness’. The treatise-author says plainly that because people in the assembly took prajñā to be ultimate emptiness and grasped and clung to it in thought, the Buddha then spoke of the inconceivable—even ultimate emptiness is unfindable. Those who understand a little of the meaning of emptiness most easily grip 「空」 tr. "emptiness" into a new thing attained, and take 「無所有」 tr. "without anything existent" as a place where one can settle and abide. This can serve as a daily check: is my present contemplation of emptiness leaving clinging, or holding emptiness as a thing? And it may be read together with the sentence ‘the mark of the signless from without anything existent onward—being without the marks of all dharmas’.
The fifth benefit is the teaching by example of knowing kindness. The Buddha is the honoured one of the three realms, yet he still abides relying on prajñā, reveres it, makes offerings to it, honours and praises it, and says of himself that he is first in knowing kindness and repaying kindness; the treatise-author further names wrong view, which does not recognise a debt of kindness, as the worst of all unwholesome dharmas. Toward the Dharma, toward one’s teacher, toward those who have instructed one, practitioners can bring this straight down to the ground—failing to recognise a debt of kindness is often not coldness of heart, but that wrong view, 「我自然應爾」 tr. "it is naturally owed to me," being in charge. The simile the treatise-author gives is also apt: like a person who walks a safe road, escapes every trouble and danger, and constantly keeps this road in mind to show it to others; receiving benefit without forgetting where it came from, and passing it on to others—this is repaying kindness.
The sixth benefit is sin and merit going together with emptiness. The preceding text has spoken of the world as empty to the utmost, and yet at the end it sets up the middle way: though empty, it is not attached to emptiness, and so it speaks of sin and merit; though it speaks of sin and merit, it does not give rise to the view of permanence, and it is unobstructed with regard to emptiness. When practitioners gain strength in the contemplation of emptiness, they most easily neglect keeping the precepts and cause and effect; when they are strict in keeping the precepts, they easily fall into the view of permanence and cannot be empty. This is the rope between the two sides: with emptiness leave permanence, with sin and merit leave annihilation; only holding both with two hands at the same time is the middle way.
The seventh benefit is the distinguishing of the four kinds of dharmas and the guarding of those new to the training. The four names—the dharmas of the buddhas, the dharmas of the Tathāgata, the dharmas of the one who is so of himself, the dharmas of the omniscient one—distinguish one another layer by layer: awakened is distinguished from not awakened, coming by the mark of suchness from not coming by suchness, being so of oneself from hearing from others, omniscience from being so of oneself yet lacking omniscience; and Subhūti at once worried that those new to the training would cling to these four dharmas, and the Buddha answered that form and all dharmas too are inconceivable. Whenever on the path of practice one meets honoured and superior names of dharmas, this question and answer can serve as a reminder: recognising their superiority spurs one on; grasping their superiority becomes a new bondage.
The eighth benefit is reflecting on oneself through the numbers of the four assemblies who obtained the path. At one and the same Dharma assembly, five hundred bhikṣus exhausted their outflows, twenty bhikṣuṇīs exhausted their outflows, in sixty thousand upāsakas and thirty thousand upāsikās the Dharma-eye arose, and twenty bodhisattvas obtained the acceptance of non-arising. The treatise-author’s explanation is: praise increases faith, so those strong in faith obtain conspicuous benefit; exhausting the outflows requires wisdom, so those superior in wisdom obtain a deep fruit; the acceptance of non-arising is very deep, and those who have planted causes and conditions for it are few. On this basis practitioners can measure whether what they lack today is faith or wisdom: lacking faith, they should draw closer to the teaching of praise; lacking wisdom, they should make more use of contemplative practice—there is no need to envy others’ fruits, but only to ask which root one lacks oneself.
Further Resonances
The backbone of this chapter is three sūtra sections alternating with three treatise sections. Sūtra ① begins with the gods scattering flowers and incense from afar and asking about the mark of deep prajñā; the Buddha answers with the ten marks, the mark of emptiness and the rest, says himself that they are spoken from the standpoint of worldly truth and are not the highest meaning, pushes on to nothing in all the world being able to break or ruin them, to a mark being unable to break a mark, to know a mark, or to know the markless, and to the marks not being made by the five aggregates, the six perfections, the emptinesses, or the limbs of the path; sets up the question of the mark of space, establishes that whether there is a Buddha or no Buddha the mark and the nature abide always, and at the end, setting out the marks one against another, comes home to the Buddha’s obtaining all dharmas as markless. Treatise ① first answers the three causes of asking again, glosses the three gates of liberation as the mark of first entering, held in common by the three vehicles, distinguishes the deep marks from the marks of first entering and the two kinds of signless, outer and inner, explains that the Buddha knew their doubt beforehand and spoke of it himself, gives the two similes of water and fire and of the blind man, sets up the three explanations of why a mark cannot break a mark, the discussion of why a mark does not know a mark, the two similes of the knife not breaking space and of nothing cut without a knife, and the three layers of the mark and the marked depending on each other and not being fixed; at the end it explains the gods’ praise and the Buddha’s seal, glosses 「得」 tr. "obtain" as knowing, and gathers up in these marks of dharmas now being renamed prajñā. Sūtra ② turns to tell Subhūti, establishes that prajñā is the mother of the buddhas and can show the mark of the world, speaks of the Buddha knowing those who have been kind to him and of all dharmas having the mark of non-action, answers the objection of no knower and no seer, defines 「不見」 tr. "not seeing" as consciousness not arising in taking an object, opens one by one the gates of the world as empty, the Buddha’s world as empty, the inconceivable, the separate, the quiescent, ultimate emptiness, emptiness of nature, emptiness of non-existent dharmas, emptiness of non-existent and existent dharmas, and solitary emptiness, and at the end establishes not giving rise to the mark of this life or of later lives. Treatise ②, taking up relying, glosses knowing and repaying kindness, explains why prajñā is held precious and why it seems like craving, reconciles knowing what has been done for him and not knowing a doer, explains the objection from ultimate emptiness and the emptiness of being without support and without bonds, answers how form does not arise when consciousness does not arise, glosses showing the world as empty and the Buddha not speaking out of love of dharmas, explains that the inconceivable is that even ultimate emptiness is unfindable, specially sets up a question and answer glossing solitary emptiness as having no cause and no counterpart, and at the end establishes the middle way that leaves annihilation and permanence. Sūtra ③ begins with Subhūti’s question raising the five matters; the Buddha explains one by one the great matter, the inconceivable matter, the unweighable matter, the matter without measure, and the matter equal to the unequalled, extends it to form and all dharmas being likewise, through a threefold pursuit comes home to the measure being unfindable, concludes with passing beyond the mark of conceiving and so on up to passing beyond the mark of equalling, takes space as the simile, and at the end records the numbers of the four assemblies who obtained the path. Treatise ③ glosses the great matter, gives four explanations of the unweighable, four explanations of without measure, and four explanations of that which is equal to the unequalled, explains why the Buddha approved what Subhūti said, broadly explains the five things the bodhisattva accepts for the sake of beings, glosses the four kinds of dharmas name by name, answers the question arising from the fear that those new to the training will cling to the four dharmas, distinguishes the two aspects of meaning and intent and of the name, at the end answers why so few bhikṣuṇīs and bodhisattvas obtained the path, and sets side by side the two accounts of the prediction in the Auspicious Kalpa without judgement.
In the vein of meaning linking this chapter with the chapters before and after it, three lines can be seen. First, the axis of Sūtra ②, 「般若波羅蜜是諸佛母」 tr. "prajñāpāramitā is the mother of the buddhas" and 「能示世間相」 tr. "can show the mark of the world," is exactly the continuation of the meaning established in the preceding chapter, "The Mother of the Buddhas": the preceding chapter made clear at length that the Buddha, relying on prajñā, knows the mark of the world, while this chapter turns to ‘what mark, in the end, is the mark of the world that is shown’, answers with the nine gates from the world as empty up to solitary emptiness, and at the end comes home to not giving rise to the mark of this life or of later lives. The meaning of the mother was established in the preceding chapter; the meaning of showing is detailed only in this chapter. Second, at the opening of this chapter the treatise-author himself marks what it carries on from—above, emptiness, the signless, non-action, and so on up to non-origination and without anything existent, have been said everywhere to be the mark of prajñā; this shows that the topic of ‘the mark of prajñā’ is not newly raised in this chapter; what this chapter adds is the measure of ‘speaking of marks without its becoming having marks’, and a further layer of inquiry into the mark and the marked depending on each other and not being fixed. Third, in Treatise ③, at the section 「如虛空不可思議」 tr. "inconceivable as space is inconceivable," the treatise-author says himself that it is as said in an earlier chapter that the mark of space is inconceivable, and at the item 「不可思議」 tr. "the inconceivable" says directly that it has already been answered; in Treatise ①, having finished explaining why emptiness is taught with distinctions, he likewise says directly of 「無生無滅等論議」 tr. "the discussion of no arising and no ceasing and the rest" that it is as said before—these are all instances of this treatise abbreviating here what an earlier chapter has detailed; readers should view them together with the earlier chapters, and need not insist on completeness within this chapter.
Later ancient masters each took something from this chapter. Jizang, in his commentary, explains the chapter name himself, saying 「明般若相中有問有答，後諸問作作，名云問相品也」 tr. "In making clear the mark of prajñā there are questions and there are answers; after that the questions are made one upon another; hence it is named the Chapter of Asking about Marks"—explaining the two Chinese characters 「問相」 tr. "asking about marks" by there being questions and answers, which sets the name by the chapter’s form, and stands as inside and outside with this chapter’s sūtra text taking 「相」 tr. "mark" as what is asked about. The same commentary further sets, at the head of this chapter, a question on the boundary between chapters, asking, since the preceding chapter, "The Mother of the Buddhas", has already made clear the mark of the world, what difference there is from what this chapter makes clear; this question points exactly at the joint between the preceding chapter and this one, and can be read together with the first line of the vein of meaning above. The line of Huiying divides the whole Larger Sūtra into three parts, one of which takes this chapter directly as its end point, saying 「從魔事已下至問相品，就留難門說波若」 tr. "From the Deeds of Māra onward to the Chapter of Asking about Marks, prajñā is spoken of by way of the gate of hindrance"—according to this division, from "The Deeds of Māra" onward to this chapter is what is included in the 「留難門」 tr. "gate of hindrance". This division is set by the structural coordinates of the chapter-list of the whole sūtra, not issued from the meaning of this chapter sentence by sentence; it is recorded to preserve one account; the sūtra and treatise of this chapter themselves have no text on hindrance (the two sides of its chapter title, the differences in the fascicle division of the transmitted texts, the markup of the chapter-list in the sūtra catalogues, and the examination of later citations are detailed in the Apparatus).
大事起品The Great Matter Arises
全文五層 →Full five layers →大事起品：般若何以說為大事故起乃至無等等事故起，含受五波羅蜜何以不礙五度各有異相，灌頂王委事大臣何以是般若與佛之喻，不取不著何以反成能成辦，佛反問而須菩提答不也何以即是印可，不見故不取何以是全品樞紐，賢聖智斷既即是菩薩無生法忍何以又說不如，即時信解者何以必從先世聞持而來，先世聞而不問中事何以今世疑悔難悟，聞而不問又不行何以其心如輕毛隨風而當墮二地，甚深因緣已說何以復重說，深淺無定何以不壞甚深之名，行般若人上中下三品何以判在問與行
在問什麼
本品起頭的一句，是須菩提的一聲讚歎：這深般若波羅蜜為大事故起、不可思議事故起、不可稱事故起、無有量事故起、無等等事故起。『起』字是本品的題眼——般若不是憑空自有的一件事物，它是有所為而興起的。為什麼而起？為了大事。什麼是大事？須菩提沒有自己答，佛接過來答。這一問一答，就把全品的骨架立定了。
佛的答有兩層。第一層是『含受』：般若中含受五波羅蜜，含受內空乃至無法有法空，含受四念處乃至八聖道分，含受佛十力乃至一切種智；一切聲聞辟支佛法、菩薩法、佛法都在般若之中，般若能成辦其事。緊接著佛就設了本品最有名的一喻：灌頂王在國中最尊，一切官事都交託大臣去辦，國王自己安樂無事。第二層是『不取不著』：般若不取色、不著色故能成辦，乃至於阿耨多羅三藐三菩提不取、不著故能成辦。兩層合起來才是完整的答——般若之所以能為大事而起，一在它無所不含，二在它無所執取。
須菩提沒有放過第二層。他追問：怎麼叫不取不著故能成辦？佛不作正面解釋，改用反問：你可曾見到色是可取可著的嗎？須菩提答『不也』。佛再問受想行識乃至阿耨多羅三藐三菩提，須菩提再答『不也』。佛便讚一聲「善哉」，並自陳：我也不見，「不見故不取，不取故不著」。一句十字，是全品的樞紐——不取不著不是用力去捨，是因為根本無所見。
一喻一問答之後，經文換了說者。欲色界諸天子插進來讚歎般若甚深，並立一則校量：三千大千世界眾生盡作信行、法行乃至阿羅漢、辟支佛，他們的智與斷，不如菩薩一日行深般若。理由給得極重——這些賢聖的智與斷，「即是菩薩摩訶薩無生法忍」。佛印可了這句話，又補一則校量：書持般若者疾得涅槃，勝過遠離般若而行餘經的求二乘人。天子們再歎一輪五名，說般若「亦不增、亦不減」，然後頂禮遶佛而去。
天子退場，須菩提接回主軸，問出全品後半的關鍵：聞深般若即時信解的菩薩，是從哪裡命終來生此間的？佛答了三處來處——人中、他方世界、彌勒菩薩處——並設『新生犢子不離其母』之喻明其常隨法師之相。答完能信解的，佛就翻到反面，逐條說不能信解的：先世雖聞而不問中事者，今世聞般若疑悔難悟；先世聞五度、聞諸空、聞道品而不問者，同樣疑悔難悟；先世既聞、既問而不行者，其心如輕毛隨風，一日至五日堅固，離時便退，終至不書不持、不為般若所護，於聲聞、辟支佛二地中當墮一地。
論主接手，開口就替讀者問了一個最實在的疑：甚深因緣前面已經說過多次，今天何以重說？答語是全品最溫暖的一段——大國王久求得子，使者十度來報，王十度歡喜不答，只因「久來願滿故，喜心內悅，樂聞不已」。不是重語，是話中有利益。論主由此推出一條通則：深淺無定，解者無深，不解者謂為深。接著逐段釋經：含受義何以不礙五度各有異相，灌頂王喻中誰是王誰是臣，「初染曰取，生愛曰著」之訓，佛何以於四種答中用反問。末後論主再自問：賢聖智斷既然就是菩薩無生忍，何以又說不如？三喻作答——水勢湊急、大臣不及太子、小乘大乘初門——並歸結於所緣同而利鈍異、悲願異。全品以行般若人上中下三品收束，並預告後品將以大海破船之喻續明此義。
逐段解明
一、五種「故起」之問。 須菩提開口不是問法，是稱歎：深般若「為大事故起」，乃至「無等等事故起」。五句排下來，前四句是一氣，第五句「無等等事故起」須菩提另起一稱「世尊」再說——這一頓，經文自身留了語氣。五名之中，「大」是總，「不可思議」就其不可以心量測說，「不可稱」就智慧不能稱量般若說（論主前品自訓：稱名智慧，般若甚深極重而智慧輕薄，故不能稱），「無有量」就其無邊際說，「無等等」就其無可比類說。須菩提何以先歎而後問？因為般若之德他已聽了許多品，至此已不是不知道般若好，而是要問清楚：它究竟為了什麼而興起。
二、含受義與灌頂王喻。 佛先印可「如是！如是！」，再說因緣。因緣只有一個字：含。般若中含受五波羅蜜、含受內空乃至無法有法空、含受四念處乃至八聖道分、含受佛十力乃至一切種智——由六度而諸空、而道品、而佛果功德，層層都在般若裡面。隨即出喻：「譬如灌頂王，國土中尊，諸有官事皆委大臣，國王安樂無事」——喻的著力處不在王之尊，在王之『無事』——正因為事都能辦，所以王可以不辦。合喻之語佛也親自說出：一切聲聞辟支佛法、菩薩法、佛法都在般若中，「般若波羅蜜能成辦其事」。所以般若為大事故起，乃至無等等事故起。
三、不取不著故能成辦。 同一段裡佛又轉一層：「復次」以下，說般若不取色、不著色故能成辦，受想行識乃至一切種智不取、不著故能成辦，須陀洹果乃至阿耨多羅三藐三菩提不取、不著故能成辦。這一轉極要緊。方纔說的是『含』，此處說的是『不取』——若只聽前半，容易把般若想成一個大容器，什麼都裝得下；後半立刻把容器也拆了：它之所以能含受一切，正因為它於一切法無取無著。能成辦與不取著，在這裡是同一件事的兩面。
四、須菩提再問成辦之所以。 須菩提追問：「云何色不取、不著故般若波羅蜜能成辦？」並把問題推到阿耨多羅三藐三菩提。他問的是一個實在的疑難：不取不著是遮遣的話，成辦是成就的話，遮遣何以成就？此問不問，後面那一組反問便無處安放。
五、佛之反問與須菩提之答。 佛不正面說理，改問須菩提：「於汝意云何？頗見是色可取、可著不？」須菩提答：「不也！世尊！」佛再問受想行識乃至阿耨多羅三藐三菩提可取可著不，須菩提再答：「不也！世尊！」這一組問答在經文裡佔了四段，說者四度交替，卻只有兩句答語，兩句一模一樣。讀者若嫌其重複，恰恰錯過了經意——佛要的不是解釋，是讓須菩提自己在自己的智慧眼裡照一遍。答不出「可取」，疑難就自己散了。
六、不見故不取，不取故不著。 佛聞答而讚：「善哉！善哉！」隨即自陳：我也不見色可取可著，「不見故不取，不取故不著」；我也不見受想行識乃至阿耨多羅三藐三菩提及一切種智可取可著，不見故不取，不取故不著；我也不見佛法、如來法、自然人法、一切智人法可取可著，不見故不取，不取故不著。三重舉例層層上推，末後連佛自身之法也不留。結語是勸誡：諸菩薩摩訶薩於色乃至一切智人法「亦不應取、亦不應著」。十個字的次第要看清：先有不見，纔有不取；先有不取，纔有不著。不是先立一個不取的規矩去守，是見處空了，取自然無從下手。
七、諸天子讚歎般若甚深，並立賢聖智斷之校量。 說者換了。欲色界諸天子稱般若「甚深、難見、難解、不可思惟比類知」，而「微妙、善巧、智慧、寂滅者可知」——難與可並舉，不是絕人於外。又說能信般若者當知是菩薩多供養諸佛、多種善根、與善知識相隨：信之所以可貴，在它背後有極長的因緣。接著立校量：三千大千世界眾生盡作信行人、法行人、八人，乃至得四果、辟支佛，他們的若智若斷，不如菩薩一日行深般若的忍、欲、思惟、籌量。理由一句到底：這些賢聖的智與斷，「即是菩薩摩訶薩無生法忍」。此句是本品後半一切論議的引線。
八、佛印可，並補書持者之校量。 佛答「如是！如是！」承認天子所說。隨後補出另一則校量：聞深般若而書、持受、讀、誦、說、正憶念的善男子善女人疾得涅槃，勝過遠離深般若而行餘經的求二乘人「若一劫、若減一劫」。何以能勝？因為「是深般若波羅蜜中廣說上妙法」，這上妙法是信行、法行乃至辟支佛所應學，菩薩亦所應學，學已得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提。一部經而三乘同學，所學同而所至異——分別只在學者的心量。
九、諸天子重歎五名，並明不增不減。 天子們「俱發聲言」，把須菩提開頭的五名再歎一遍：摩訶波羅蜜、不可思議、不可稱、無有量、無等等。而後說信行法行人、八人學之得成就，四果、辟支佛學之得成，菩薩於中學得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提，末句要緊：「是深般若波羅蜜亦不增、亦不減。」三乘同學而般若不增，無人學而般若不減——所增減者是學人之得，不是般若之體。
十、諸天子禮佛而去。 「是時諸欲、色界天子頂禮佛足，遶佛而去；去是不遠，忽然不現，各還本處。」這一段無問無答，是一段純敘事。它的作用是換場：讚歎一輪已足，說者要交還須菩提，經文後半的主題隨之從『般若是什麼』轉為『什麼人能受般若』。
十一、即時信解者從何處來。 須菩提問得極具體：聞深般若「即時信解者，從何處終來生是間」？他問的不是道理，是來歷。這一問把全品後半打開——般若既是如此甚深，則今日座中能當下信解的人，必不是偶然。
十二、新生犢子喻與人中還生人中。 佛先描出即時信解者的相：「不沒、不却、不難、不疑、不悔」，歡喜樂聽，聽已憶念，行住坐臥終不廢忘，「常隨法師」。隨即出喻：「譬如新生犢子不離其母」——喻意極素樸——初生之犢不是因為懂得道理才不離母，是一種自然的相依；初信般若者之隨法師亦然。而後佛答其來處：是從人道中命終還生人中。何以故？因為前世聞深般若，並且書、持、恭敬、尊重、讚歎，以華香乃至幡蓋供養。信解之所以『即時』，是因為功課早已做在前世；今世之快，是宿世之久。
十三、他方來者與先世功德成就。 須菩提再問：可有菩薩在他方世界供養諸佛，於彼命終來生此間，聞深般若即時信解的？佛直答「有」，並重述其相：聞即信解，書、持、讀、誦、說、正憶念。理由仍歸到來歷——是從他方諸佛所聞般若而信解書持，於彼間終來生此間，「當知是人是先世功德成就」。兩問兩答格式相同，所答之處不同：一在人道，一在他方；同歸一義，即時信解必有前因。
十四、從彌勒所聞者；先世不問則今世疑悔——般若與五度。 佛續說第三處來處：有菩薩從彌勒菩薩摩訶薩聞是深般若，以此善根因緣來生此間。三處來處說畢，經文即翻到反面，這一翻是本品最細的一段。先說總相：先世雖聞深般若而「不問中事」，來生人中聞般若則「心有疑悔，難悟」。而後逐一鋪開：先世雖聞禪波羅蜜不問中事，今世聞般若不問故續生疑悔；毘梨耶、羼提、尸羅、檀，五度各一條，句式一同。此處不可嫌其重複而併省——五度各是一門，先世所欠者在哪一門，今世所礙者就在哪一門；經文逐門點出，正是要行人自照是欠在何處。要看清這一段的判準：不是『沒聽過』，是『聽了不問』。聞而不問，等於沒有把法接進自己身上。
十五、諸空不問亦同。 「復次」另起一條：先世雖聞內空、外空、內外空乃至無法有法空而不問中事，來生人中聞深般若，不問故續復疑悔難悟。空門與度門並列為二，各自成條。
十六、道品等不問亦同。 又一「復次」：先世雖聞四念處乃至八聖道分、四禪、四無量心、四無色定、五神通、佛十力乃至一切種智而不問中事，來生人中聞深般若，不問故續復疑悔難悟。此條與前條起句全同，所列法目不同——前條舉諸空，此條舉道品與功德法；經文分作兩條而不合為一，是因為所欠之門本不相同。三條合觀，凡先世於六度、諸空、道品任一門聞而不問者，今世遇般若皆成疑悔，病根只是一個「不問」。
十七、聞而不行——輕毛隨風與當墮二地。 最後一條病最重。先世聞深般若，「不問中事而不行」——此句底本如此，元、明、聖、石諸本無「不」字，作「問中事而不行」；下文「何以故」又云「雖問中事，不如說行」。異本並錄，不作判定。這樣的人今世聞般若，一日至五日之間其心堅固無能壞者，「若離所聞時便退失」。佛出喻：「譬如輕毛隨風東西。」心輕不固、志亂不定，所以有時欲聞、有時不欲聞。佛隨即層層說出他的欠缺：發意不久，不與善知識相隨，不多供養諸佛，先世不書不讀不誦不正憶念，不學六度、不學諸空、不學道品乃至一切種智。因此今世是「新發大乘意」，少信少樂，不能書持讀誦。而後佛把後果說到底：不書不持者不為深般若所護，乃至不為一切種智所護，亦不如說行，「是人或墮二地——若聲聞地、若辟支佛地」，末句再申「於二地中當墮一地」。要注意佛所說的因果次第：不書不持在前，不為所護在次，不如說行在次，墮二地在後——不是般若不護人，是人自己先站到護不著的地方去了。
十八、何以重說甚深——大國王喻。 論主開篇即自設一問：「上來數說是般若波羅蜜甚深因緣，今何以復重說？」答語先立通則：「處處說甚深，多有所益；凡人不知，謂為重說。」隨即出全品最生動的一喻：大國王久無嫡子，禱祝多年無應；一日王出行，夫人產男，遣信告王「大夫人產男」，王聞喜而不答，如是十返。使者問王是否未聞，王答：「我即聞之，久來願滿故，喜心內悅，樂聞不已耳！」隨即賜金百萬兩，一語十萬兩。論主收喻：王聞使者之語，「語中有利益，非重語，不知者謂為重」。合法時再分三邊說：佛與菩薩、須菩提知其大有利益；須菩提聞深般若「不能得底，轉覺甚深」；聽者處處聞甚深而得禪定智慧等利益——唯有凡夫人才謂為重說。重與不重，判在聞者，不在說者。
十九、深淺無定。 論主再進一層：「深淺無定，隨眾生，解者無深，不解者謂為深。」那麼「甚深」二字何以常說？因為般若「除佛無能遍知故」。佛是為眾生而說甚深，並「無定甚深相」；若甚深是一個定相，「無人能行」。所以說：「菩薩謂般若甚深，為不行般若波羅蜜。」這一條最要謹慎領會——不是說般若不深，是說深不是般若的定相。把「甚深」握成一件實有的難處，反而正是不行般若。
二十、甚深因緣即是五種故起。 論主點題：所謂甚深因緣，就是「為大事故起，乃至無等等事故起」，並註明「大事等義如先說」——大事、不可思議、不可稱、無有量、無等等諸名之義前品已釋，此處不重出。論主行文之儉，正見其不作重語。
廿一、佛自說大事之因緣。 論主再點——「此中佛自說大事等因緣」，所指即「般若波羅蜜含受五波羅蜜等諸法。」此是把經①佛答的第一層標出，作為下一問的所依。
廿二、五度各異相何以言含受——灌頂王喻申論與投火喻。 論主自設難——「五波羅蜜等各異相」，云何言「般若波羅蜜中含受」？難得極準：布施是捨，持戒是防，各有各的行相，如何說都在般若裡？答分兩截。第一截：「是中說經中含受」——此處所說是就經文而言的含受，即般若經中廣說諸度之法。第二截纔是義理：五波羅蜜等諸法與般若和合，以方便迴向故，「得至佛道」。含受不是空間上的容納，是諸度須得般若和合方便迴向，纔能走到佛道上去；離了般若，五度只是五度。論主隨即把經①的灌頂王喻逐項配定：「灌頂王如佛，國事是種種度眾生法，大臣是般若波羅蜜。」佛委仗般若成辦種種法，所以能「安處禪定，快樂無事」。配定之後再補一喻：「又如欲除乾薪草木，以火投中，則火力能燒令盡，人便無事。」兩喻同明一義——不是佛不作事，是所託得人、所投得火；般若之於佛，如大臣之於王、如火之於薪。
廿三、不取不著故名含受；初染曰取，生愛曰著。 論主再轉：「是般若波羅蜜不取、不著色等諸法故名含受」——把經①的第二層接回第一層，明言不取不著正是含受之所以然。隨後出一句訓詁：「初染曰取，生愛曰著。」八字分判取與著的先後淺深：心初染上叫取，染而生愛叫著。取是攀緣之始，著是黏住之成。知其為二，纔知經文「不見故不取，不取故不著」的次第是一路退到底的。
廿四、經文重牒：四種答中反問答之意。 這一段論主不另起問曰答曰，是把經①的問答場景複述一遍再加釋。先牒須菩提之問：「云何般若為色等諸法不取、不著故名含受？」次牒佛之答法，並點出它的體例——「佛於四答中以反問答」，所問即「於汝意云何？以智慧眼見是色等法可取、可著不？」四答者，答問之四式，本論前文謂「四事答中，此是反問答」；此處論主點明佛所用即反問答一式。再牒須菩提心中所思：「若智慧眼見空、無相、無作、無量、不可思議相，云何當答色等法定相可取、可著？」須菩提之所以答「不也」，理由在此：智慧眼所見是空、無相、無作，本無定相可取。末牒佛之印可：「汝未得一切智，不見色等諸法；我一切智人亦不見色等諸法」，因此歎言「善哉！」。師資兩邊同是不見，故答與問相契。論主又順勢牒出諸天子之讚歎，其中兩個名相之注與牒語同在一引之中：「智者，十智。斷者，二種斷：有殘斷、無殘斷；學人有殘斷，無學人無殘斷。」經文只說「若智、若斷」四字，論主把它的內容補足。十智者，論主於卷二十三自列：法智、比智、他心智、世智、苦智、集智、滅智、道智、盡智、無生智。依論主自訓：法智，緣欲界繫法及其因、滅、道之無漏智；比智，緣色無色界之同類無漏智；他心智，知欲界色界現在他心心數法及無漏心少分——緣有漏心是有漏，緣無漏心是無漏，故論主言「一當分別」；世智，諸有漏智慧，是十智中唯一有漏者；苦智、集智、滅智、道智，觀四諦各四行相時所得無漏智；盡智，「我見苦已，斷集已，盡證已，修道已」之無漏見明；無生智，「不復更見、不復更斷、不復更證、不復更修」之無漏見明。論主總結：「十智，一有漏，八無漏，一當分別。」二斷者，斷煩惱有兩種：有殘斷，煩惱斷而未盡，尚有餘者，是學人之斷；無殘斷，煩惱斷盡無餘，是無學人之斷。論主之意：賢聖之智與斷已如是圓具，菩薩一日行般若尚勝之——下文即釋何以勝，末仍歸到那句引線——「是諸賢聖智、斷，皆是菩薩無生法忍。」
廿五、既即是無生忍，何以言不如——水勢湊急喻。 論主自設第三問：「若諸賢聖智、斷即是無生忍者，何以言不如？」問得極尖：既說是同一件事，怎麼又分高下？答語先舉二失：「信行等人無大悲、捨眾生故不如」，又「無方便力，不能於涅槃自反」。一失在悲，一失在方便。隨即出喻：「譬如眾水會恒河俱入大海，欲入海時水勢湊急，眾生在中無能自反，惟有大力者乃能自出。」喻中「入海」是入涅槃，水勢湊急是趣寂之勢，無能自反是到此已不能回身度生，大力者能自出即是菩薩之方便力。所以不如之處不在所證之法，在能不能回得來。
廿六、初忍勝於已成之智斷——大臣不及太子喻。 「復次」再答一重：其餘賢聖的智與斷雖已成就，「菩薩始得無生忍而力能過之，是故勝」。智斷功德雖成就，「不及菩薩初忍」。出喻：「譬如大臣功業雖大，不及太子。」大臣之功已成，太子之功未著，而位分自別——所比者不是現前的功業量，是所在的位。此喻與本品經①灌頂王喻同出一套君臣之象，而所明不同：彼喻明佛委般若，此喻明賢聖不及初忍。
廿七、小乘初門與大乘初門。 「復次」三答：「煖、頂、忍法是小乘初門，菩薩法忍是大乘初門」；聲聞、辟支佛雖終究有成，「尚不及菩薩初入道門，何況成佛！」前喻以位分說，此條以門戶說——兩乘的入處本自不同，故不待論其終成，才入門時高下已判。三答合觀：一約悲與方便，一約位，一約門，層層逼近而所歸是一。
廿八、二乘智斷何以即是菩薩無生忍。 論主自設第四問，方向與第三問相反——「聲聞、辟支佛法是小乘，菩薩是大乘」，云何言「二乘智斷即是菩薩無生忍」？前問怪其同中說異，此問怪其異中說同。答語極簡：「所緣同，如、法性、實際亦同。利鈍智慧為異，又有無量功德及大悲心守護故勝。」同在所緣與如、法性、實際；異在智之利鈍、在功德與大悲。同者是法，異者是人——兩問一答，前後夾定，同異之際就無可誤會了。
廿九、餘種種說是讚般若。 論主一句帶過：「餘種種說，是讚般若波羅蜜。」經文中天子重歎五名、明不增不減諸語，論主不逐句再釋，判為讚歎之辭。此是論主取捨之例——當釋者釋，當略者略，略亦是判。
三十、行般若人上、中、下三品。 全品收束於一個分品。下品：聞般若「直信聽受，不問中義」。中品：「既聞已，問義而不能行」。上品：「聞、解、能行」。判準只有兩件——問與不問、行與不行。而後論主把三品與經①後半的三種相一一對上：下者雖得人身，聞般若疑悔難悟，因「根鈍、福薄」——正是經文中先世不問者。中者得人身，一心信樂，能知義趣，「從一日至四、五日，心能堅固」，過此便不能信樂，或欲聞或不欲聞，因宿世「雖解義而不能行」——正是經文中輕毛隨風者。上者得人身，聞般若「心即深解，信樂不捨，常隨法師」——正是經文中新生犢子不離其母者。經文散說於前，論主收之於後，三條一一相扣，無一落空。
卅一、當墮二乘與後品破船之喻。 末句判果：上面所說中、下二種菩薩「不能得上地故，當墮二乘，不為般若所守護故」。而後論主預告下文——「為更明了是事故，佛於後品中為作譬喻」，喻語即「如大海水中船破，若得所依則能渡，不得所依則不能渡。」以此接續次品。全品以般若『為大事故起』開端，以人之能渡不能渡收尾——大事所為者，正是這一渡。
不要讀錯
不要把『含受』讀成般若把諸法收在自己裡面。論主的問答說得分明：五波羅蜜等各有異相，所以含受不是把異相消融為一。答語兩截，第一截說「是中說經中含受」，是就經文廣說而言；第二截纔是義理所在——五度與般若和合、方便迴向，故得至佛道。含受是『和合而得至』，不是『收攝而歸一』。若讀成般若一法既已具足，五度可以不修，恰好與論意相反：正因為五度須得般若纔到得了佛道，五度纔非修不可。
不要把灌頂王喻讀成佛不作事。喻的合法論主親自配定：王如佛，國事是種種度眾生法，大臣是般若。王之「安樂無事」，是因為事都在辦，不是因為沒有事。後面補的投火除薪一喻更把這一點說死了——火投薪中，薪盡人無事；無事是功成之後的相，不是起手時的態度。行人若把「快樂無事」取作自己用功的樣子，就把喻讀顛倒了。
不要把「不見故不取，不取故不著」讀成閉眼不看。經文的次第是佛以智慧眼照而不見，不是不去照。論主替須菩提補出的心念說得清楚：智慧眼所見是空、無相、無作、無量、不可思議相，所以答不出色等法有定相可取。是照得徹底纔不見定相，不是不照而說無。同理，須菩提兩句「不也！世尊！」不是敷衍的應聲，是他在自己的見處照過之後的實答；佛歎「善哉」，歎的正是這一照。
不要把「甚深」讀成一個可以握住的難度。論主明說「深淺無定」「無定甚深相」，並說：「菩薩謂般若甚深，為不行般若波羅蜜。」把甚深當作定相，行人就會在法前先立一道門檻，反成不行。但也不可倒向另一邊，說般若不深——常言甚深是因為「除佛無能遍知」，這是實說。深是就眾生之未解說，不是就法自身立一個相。
不要把先世不問一段讀成宿命之論。經文逐條所責的是「不問中事」，不是根器天定。五度、諸空、道品三條並列，正是要行人自照欠在何門；而中品之病更明白——「雖解義而不能行」。病因在問與行，兩者都是現前可作的事。讀成『今生疑悔是宿業所定』，就把經文開給人的那道門關上了。
不要把賢聖智斷「即是菩薩摩訶薩無生法忍」與「不如是菩薩一日行深般若」讀成前後矛盾。論主用兩問夾定了它：前問「即是無生忍者，何以言不如」，答在悲與方便、在位、在門；後問「二乘智斷即是菩薩無生忍」何以得說，答在所緣同、如法性實際同。同者是所證之法，異者是能證之人的利鈍與悲願。經論並不自相違。
不要把『當墮二地』讀成呵責。經文所說的次第是：不書不持，故不為般若所護；不為所護，故不如說行；不如說行，故二地中當墮一地。墮是不受護的自然結果，不是罰。論主末後預告後品的破船之喻，更把這一層點透——「若得所依則能渡，不得所依則不能渡」，通篇所說只是所依有無，不是誰在降罪。
修行作用
本品給用功人的第一件受用，是把『問』立為一個修行項目。經文三條並列——先世聞六度不問、聞諸空不問、聞道品不問——今世皆成疑悔難悟；論主的三品判也以「不問中義」判為下品。日用中讀經聽法，聽過而不生疑、不追問，看似順適，其實法並沒有進來。此處可作一個現成的自檢：我對今日所聞，問得出問題嗎？問不出，未必是已懂，可能只是還沒碰到它。
第二件受用，是輕毛隨風之喻可作退心之鏡。經文說得極細：一日、二日乃至五日其心堅固無能壞者，「若離所聞時便退失」；有時欲聞、有時不欲聞。凡用功而覺得自己時進時退、聞法時發心而離座即忘者，此喻正照著這個相。論主給的病名不是懶，是「雖解義而不能行」——救法也就不在多聽，在把已解的一分行出來。
第三件受用，是新生犢子喻給出的正面樣子。上品之人的相，經文列得具體：不沒、不却、不難、不疑、不悔，歡喜樂聽，聽已憶念，行住坐臥終不廢忘，常隨法師。犢子之不離母，不靠道理支撐，是一種自然的親近。行人可以此自量：我於深法，是勉強靠近，還是自然不離？而佛所給的因由也很實在——前世書、持、恭敬、尊重、讚歎、供養。今生的親切感，是可以從今日的書持恭敬開始積的。
第四件受用，是大國王喻對治『聽厭了』的心。同一法反覆聽聞而生厭，是用功人常有的事；論主的診斷很不客氣——「凡人不知，謂為重說」。王十度聞報而十度歡喜，是因為所報之事正中久願。所以厭與不厭的分野，不在說者重複，在聽者心中那件事是不是自己真正的願。若覺得重複，不妨回頭問一句：般若所說的這件事，是我真正要的嗎？
第五件受用，是「初染曰取，生愛曰著」可作觀心的刻度。取與著是兩個階段，取在初染之際，著在生愛之後。日用中境界現前，若等到已經著了纔想放，已經費力；此訓給出的是更早的一刻——心剛染上的那一下。而經文給的根治之方更在其前：「不見故不取」——先在見處用功，取自然減；只在取處著力，往往按下葫蘆起了瓢。
第六件受用，是水勢湊急喻對趣寂之誡。論主說信行等人「無方便力，不能於涅槃自反」，喻以入海之水勢。用功稍得力時，寂靜之樂極易成為新的歸宿；此喻提醒的是：要在還能回身的時候就備好大悲與方便，不要等到勢已湊急。大臣不及太子、小乘大乘初門二喻並讀，所勸的是同一件事——初發心時的方向，比中途的功業量更決定終處。
承衍
本品的骨幹，是一段經文與一段論釋。經①自須菩提歎般若五種故起起，佛以含受五波羅蜜乃至一切種智答之，設灌頂王委事大臣之喻；復以不取不著故能成辦為第二義，須菩提追問，佛反問而須菩提答不也，佛歎善哉並自陳不見故不取、不取故不著，乃至佛法如來法自然人法一切智人法皆不應取著。次由欲色界諸天子讚歎般若甚深，立賢聖智斷不如菩薩一日行深般若之校量，明其智斷即是菩薩無生法忍；佛印可之，並補書持般若者勝於遠離般若行餘經之求二乘人；天子重歎五名、明般若不增不減，頂禮遶佛而去。次須菩提問即時信解者從何處來，佛答人中還生人中、他方世界供養諸佛而來、從彌勒菩薩所聞而來，設新生犢子不離其母之喻；復翻說先世聞般若、聞五度、聞諸空、聞道品而不問中事者今世疑悔難悟，聞而不行者心如輕毛隨風、一日至五日而退，終不書不持、不為般若所護，於二地中當墮一地。論①先答何以重說甚深，設大國王久願得子、聞報十返而樂聞不已之喻，明語中有利益非重語；次明深淺無定、無定甚深相；次牒五種故起與佛自說含受之因緣，答五度各異相何以言含受，配定灌頂王喻之王臣，補投火除薪之喻；次出「初染曰取，生愛曰著」之訓，重牒經文反問答之場景並注十智二斷；次答賢聖智斷既即無生忍何以言不如，出水勢湊急、大臣不及太子、小乘大乘初門三喻，復答二乘智斷何以即是無生忍，歸於所緣同而利鈍悲願異；末以行般若人上中下三品收束，判中下二種當墮二乘，並預告後品大海破船之喻。
古德於本品之科判，有一線可誌。吉藏《大品經義疏》釋本品，品題作「成辦品第五十」，其起首云：「第二、歎般若成辦因行故以目品。」——即以『成辦』義訓品名，謂本品所歎者是般若能成辦菩薩之因行。其科本品為二：「此章二：先、須菩五歎；二、佛述。」與本品經文之須菩提五歎、佛承之而述成一線相合。吉藏又自設一問，與論①開篇之問同軸：「問：以五歎，今何更以作五歎？答：般若甚深故重歎無過，如王聞身子，喻聞聞無厭足也。」——以聞喜無厭釋重歎之無過，與本論大國王聞報十返而樂聞不已之喻同一機杼。其分前後兩重之歎云：「今五歎歎般若能成自行，以重利益故重歎也。」此一「成辦」之科與本品傳本中一系品題作「成辦品」之異名相應，本疏並錄而不判孰正；品題異稱、諸本兩造之全帳，詳考據層。
本品與前後諸品的義脈，可見者有三線。其一，本品開端之五歎承前品讚般若之德而來，而所問者由『般若有何德』轉為『般若為何而起』——歎德與問起，是一事的兩問法；論主明言大事等義「如先說」，正見其承接。其二，本品後半論人之能受不能受，與前此諸品所說書持讀誦、為般若所護之義互為表裡：般若之德愈明，則受法者之堪與不堪愈須分別；三品判與經文三種相一一相扣，即是此一分別的收束。其三，本品未竟之義在下品：論主末句預告佛於後品中作大海破船之喻，以明所依有無而能渡不能渡；讀者可合前後觀之，以見『為大事故起』之教與『得所依則能渡』之教的一貫（其品目異稱、傳本兩造與後世徵引之考，詳考據層）。
The Great Matter Arises: Why Prajñā Is Said to Arise for the Sake of the Great Matter and So On up to for the Sake of the Matter Equal to the Unequalled; Why Containing and Receiving the Five Perfections Does Not Hinder Each of the Five Perfections Having Its Distinct Mark; Why the Consecrated King Entrusting Affairs to His Great Minister Is a Simile for Prajñā and the Buddha; Why Not Grasping and Not Clinging Instead Become the Power to Accomplish; Why the Buddha's Counter-question and Subhūti's Answer ‘No’ Are Precisely a Confirmation; Why Not Seeing and Therefore Not Grasping Is the Pivot of the Whole Chapter; Why, the Knowledge and Severance of the Worthy and Holy Being Precisely the Bodhisattva's Acceptance of the Non-arising of Dharmas, It Is Nevertheless Said That They Do Not Equal It; Why Those Who Believe and Understand at Once Must Come from Hearing and Upholding in a Former Life; Why Those Who Heard in a Former Life but Did Not Ask about What Was in It Are in This Life Doubtful, Regretful, and Hard to Awaken; Why One Who Heard, Did Not Ask, and Did Not Practise Has a Mind like a Light Feather Following the Wind and Will Fall into One of the Two Grounds; Why the Very Deep Causes and Conditions, Already Spoken of, Are Spoken of Again; Why Deep and Shallow Not Being Fixed Does Not Spoil the Name of the Very Deep; and Why the Highest, Middle, and Lowest Grades of Those Who Practise Prajñā Are Judged by Asking and Practising
What Is Being Asked
The opening sentence of this chapter is a cry of praise from Subhūti: this deep prajñāpāramitā arises for the sake of the great matter, arises for the sake of the inconceivable matter, arises for the sake of the unweighable matter, arises for the sake of the matter without measure, arises for the sake of the matter equal to the unequalled. The word ‘arises’ is the eye of this chapter's title—prajñā is not a thing that exists of itself out of nowhere; it arises for a purpose. For the sake of what does it arise? For the sake of the great matter. What is the great matter? Subhūti does not answer this himself; the Buddha takes it up and answers. This one question and one answer set the frame of the whole chapter firmly in place.
The Buddha's answer has two layers. The first layer is ‘containing and receiving’: within prajñā the five perfections are contained and received; inner emptiness and so on up to the emptiness of non-existent and existent dharmas are contained and received; the four foundations of mindfulness and so on up to the eightfold noble path are contained and received; the Buddha's ten powers and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds are contained and received; all the dharmas of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, the dharmas of bodhisattvas, and the dharmas of the buddhas are within prajñā, and prajñā can accomplish their matter. Immediately the Buddha sets out the most famous simile of this chapter: a consecrated king is the most honoured in his land; all the affairs of state are entrusted to his great minister to carry out, and the king himself is at ease and without a care. The second layer is ‘not grasping and not clinging’: because prajñā does not grasp form and does not cling to form, it can accomplish; and so on up to: because it does not grasp and does not cling to anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi, it can accomplish. Only the two layers together make the complete answer—the reason prajñā can arise for the sake of the great matter lies, first, in there being nothing it does not contain, and second, in there being nothing it grasps.
Subhūti does not let the second layer pass. He presses: what does it mean that by not grasping and not clinging it can accomplish? The Buddha gives no direct explanation, but instead asks a counter-question: have you ever seen form as something that can be grasped or clung to? Subhūti answers ‘No’. The Buddha asks again of feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness, and so on up to anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi, and Subhūti again answers ‘No’. Then the Buddha praises him with 「善哉」 tr. "Good," and states of himself: I too do not see it—「不見故不取，不取故不著」 tr. "because I do not see it I do not grasp it; because I do not grasp it I do not cling to it." A single sentence of ten characters is the pivot of the whole chapter—not grasping and not clinging is not a forceful letting go; it is because there is fundamentally nothing seen.
After the one simile and the one exchange of question and answer, the sūtra text changes speaker. The gods of the desire and form realms break in to praise prajñā as very deep, and set up a comparison of worth: if all the beings of the three-thousand great-thousand world became persons who practise in faith, persons who practise by the Dharma, and so on up to arhats and pratyekabuddhas, their knowledge and severance would not equal a bodhisattva's practising deep prajñā for a single day. The reason given is extremely weighty—the knowledge and severance of these worthy and holy ones 「即是菩薩摩訶薩無生法忍」 tr. "are precisely the bodhisattva-mahāsattva's acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas." The Buddha confirms this statement, and adds a further comparison: one who writes out and upholds prajñā swiftly attains nirvāṇa, surpassing those seeking the two vehicles who stay far from prajñā and practise other sūtras. The gods praise the five names in another round, say that prajñā 「亦不增、亦不減」 tr. "neither increases nor decreases," and then bow their heads, circle the Buddha, and depart.
When the gods have left the scene, Subhūti takes up the main thread again and asks the key question of the latter half of the chapter: the bodhisattvas who, hearing deep prajñā, believe and understand it at once—from where have they ended their lives to come and be born here? The Buddha answers with three places of origin—among humans, world-systems of other quarters, and the presence of the bodhisattva Maitreya—and sets out the simile ‘a new-born calf that does not leave its mother’ to make plain their mark of constantly following the teacher of the Dharma. Having answered on those who can believe and understand, the Buddha turns to the other side and tells, item by item, of those who cannot believe and understand: those who in a former life heard it but did not ask about what was in it, in this life, hearing prajñā, are doubtful and regretful and hard to awaken; those who in a former life heard the five perfections, heard the emptinesses, heard the limbs of the path, and did not ask, are likewise doubtful and regretful and hard to awaken; those who in a former life both heard and asked but did not practise have minds like a light feather that follows the wind—firm for one day up to five days, falling away when parted from it, until in the end they do not write out and do not uphold, are not guarded by prajñā, and of the two grounds, the śrāvaka ground and the pratyekabuddha ground, will fall into one.
The treatise-author takes over, and the first thing he does is ask on the reader's behalf a most down-to-earth doubt: the very deep causes and conditions have already been spoken of many times before; why are they spoken of again today? The answer is the warmest passage of the whole chapter—a great king had long sought a son; a messenger came ten times to report it, and ten times the king rejoiced without answering, only because 「久來願滿故，喜心內悅，樂聞不已」 tr. "my long-cherished wish is fulfilled, my heart rejoices within, and I delight in hearing it without end." It is not repeated words; there is benefit in the words. From this the treatise-author draws a general rule: deep and shallow are not fixed; to one who understands there is nothing deep; one who does not understand calls it deep. Then he explains the sūtra passage by passage: why containing and receiving does not hinder each of the five perfections having its distinct mark; who in the simile of the consecrated king is the king and who the minister; the gloss 「初染曰取，生愛曰著」 tr. "the first staining is called grasping; the arising of love is called clinging"; why, among the four kinds of answer, the Buddha uses the counter-question. At the end the treatise-author again questions himself: since the knowledge and severance of the worthy and holy are precisely the bodhisattva's acceptance of non-arising, why is it said that they do not equal it? He answers with three similes—the force of the water gathering and quickening, the great minister not reaching the crown prince, the first gates of the Small Vehicle and the Great Vehicle—and concludes that the object is the same while keenness and dullness differ, and compassion and vow differ. The whole chapter is gathered up with the highest, middle, and lowest grades of those who practise prajñā, and announces that the following chapter will continue this meaning with the parable of a ship breaking up in the great sea.
Passage by Passage
1. The question of the five 「故起」 tr. "arises for the sake of" . When Subhūti opens his mouth it is not to ask about the Dharma but to praise: deep prajñā 「為大事故起」 tr. "arises for the sake of the great matter," and so on up to 「無等等事故起」 tr. "arises for the sake of the matter equal to the unequalled." The five sentences are laid out in a row; the first four go in one breath, and for the fifth, 「無等等事故起」 tr. "arises for the sake of the matter equal to the unequalled," Subhūti starts afresh with a separate address, 「世尊」 tr. "World-Honored One," before saying it—in this pause the sūtra text itself preserves a tone of voice. Among the five names, 「大」 tr. "great" is the general one; 「不可思議」 tr. "inconceivable" speaks of its not being measurable by the mind; 「不可稱」 tr. "unweighable" speaks of wisdom being unable to weigh prajñā (the treatise-author glosses it himself in the preceding chapter: weighing means wisdom; prajñā is very deep and extremely heavy while wisdom is light and thin, and so it cannot weigh it); 「無有量」 tr. "without measure" speaks of its having no bounds; 「無等等」 tr. "equal to the unequalled" speaks of there being nothing comparable to it. Why does Subhūti first praise and then ask? Because he has heard of the virtues of prajñā through many chapters; by now it is not that he does not know that prajñā is good, but that he wants to ask clearly: for the sake of what, in the end, does it arise?
2. The meaning of containing and receiving, and the simile of the consecrated king. The Buddha first confirms, 「如是！如是！」 tr. "Just so! Just so!" and then gives the causes and conditions. The causes and conditions come down to a single Chinese character, rendered here as ‘contain’. Within prajñā the five perfections are contained and received; inner emptiness and so on up to the emptiness of non-existent and existent dharmas are contained and received; the four foundations of mindfulness and so on up to the eightfold noble path are contained and received; the Buddha's ten powers and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds are contained and received—from the six perfections to the emptinesses, to the limbs of the path, to the merits of the fruit of buddhahood, layer upon layer, all are within prajñā. Straight away comes the simile: 「譬如灌頂王，國土中尊，諸有官事皆委大臣，國王安樂無事」 tr. "It is like a consecrated king, honoured in the land, who entrusts all the affairs of state to his great minister, and the king is at ease and without a care"—the weight of the simile falls not on the king's being honoured but on his being ‘without a care’—precisely because all the affairs can be carried out, the king can leave them undone himself. The words that apply the simile the Buddha also speaks himself: all the dharmas of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, the dharmas of bodhisattvas, and the dharmas of the buddhas are within prajñā; 「般若波羅蜜能成辦其事」 tr. "prajñāpāramitā can accomplish its matter." Therefore prajñā arises for the sake of the great matter, and so on up to arising for the sake of the matter equal to the unequalled.
3. Because it does not grasp and does not cling, it can accomplish. Within the same passage the Buddha turns a further layer: from 「復次」 tr. "Again" onward, he says that prajñā can accomplish because it does not grasp form and does not cling to form; it can accomplish because it does not grasp and does not cling to feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds; it can accomplish because it does not grasp and does not cling to the fruit of the srota-āpanna and so on up to anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi. This turn is extremely important. What was just said was ‘containing’; what is said here is ‘not grasping’—if one listened only to the first half, it would be easy to imagine prajñā as a great container that can hold everything; the second half at once dismantles the container too: the reason it can contain and receive everything is precisely that it neither grasps nor clings to any dharma. Being able to accomplish and not grasping or clinging are, here, two faces of one and the same matter.
4. Subhūti asks again the reason for accomplishing. Subhūti presses: 「云何色不取、不著故般若波羅蜜能成辦？」 tr. "How is it that, because form is not grasped and not clung to, prajñāpāramitā can accomplish?" and pushes the question as far as anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi. What he asks is a real difficulty: not grasping and not clinging are words of negation; accomplishing is a word of achievement—how can negation achieve? Had this question not been asked, the set of counter-questions that follows would have nowhere to rest.
5. The Buddha's counter-questions and Subhūti's answers. The Buddha does not reason directly, but instead asks Subhūti: 「於汝意云何？頗見是色可取、可著不？」 tr. "What do you think? Do you see any form that can be grasped or clung to?" Subhūti answers: 「不也！世尊！」 tr. "No, World-Honored One!" The Buddha asks again whether feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness and so on up to anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi can be grasped or clung to, and Subhūti answers again: 「不也！世尊！」 tr. "No, World-Honored One!" This exchange occupies four passages in the sūtra text; the speakers alternate four times, yet there are only two answering sentences, and the two are exactly the same. A reader who finds it repetitive misses precisely the sūtra's intent—what the Buddha wants is not an explanation, but for Subhūti to shine the light through once in his own wisdom-eye. When he cannot answer 「可取」 tr. "it can be grasped," the difficulty disperses of itself.
6. Because one does not see, one does not grasp; because one does not grasp, one does not cling. Hearing the answer, the Buddha praises: 「善哉！善哉！」 tr. "Good, good!" and then at once states of himself: I too do not see form as something that can be grasped or clung to; 「不見故不取，不取故不著」 tr. "because I do not see it I do not grasp it; because I do not grasp it I do not cling to it"; I too do not see feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness and so on up to anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi and the omniscience of all kinds as something that can be grasped or clung to—because I do not see them I do not grasp them, because I do not grasp them I do not cling to them; I too do not see the dharmas of the buddhas, the dharmas of the Tathāgata, the dharmas of the one who is so of himself, and the dharmas of the omniscient one as something that can be grasped or clung to—because I do not see them I do not grasp them, because I do not grasp them I do not cling to them. The three rounds of examples push upward layer by layer, and at the end not even the Buddha's own dharmas are left standing. The conclusion is an exhortation: bodhisattva-mahāsattvas, with regard to form and so on up to the dharmas of the omniscient one, 「亦不應取、亦不應著」 tr. "should also not grasp and should also not cling." The order of these ten characters must be seen clearly: first there is not seeing, and only then not grasping; first there is not grasping, and only then not clinging. It is not that one first sets up a rule of not grasping and keeps to it; it is that where one sees has become empty, and grasping naturally has nowhere to set its hand.
7. The gods praise prajñā as very deep, and set up the comparison of the knowledge and severance of the worthy and holy. The speaker has changed. The gods of the desire and form realms call prajñā 「甚深、難見、難解、不可思惟比類知」 tr. "very deep, hard to see, hard to understand, not to be known by thinking and comparison," and yet 「微妙、善巧、智慧、寂滅者可知」 tr. "it can be known by the subtle, the skilful, the wise, and the quiescent"—the hard and the possible are set side by side; people are not shut out. They say further that one who can believe prajñā should be known to be a bodhisattva who has made many offerings to the buddhas, planted many roots of goodness, and kept company with good friends: faith is precious because behind it there are extremely long causes and conditions. Next they set up the comparison: if all the beings in the three-thousand great-thousand world became persons who practise in faith, persons who practise by the Dharma, persons of the eight, and so on up to those who attain the four fruits and pratyekabuddhas, their knowledge and severance would not equal a bodhisattva's accepting, wishing, considering, and reckoning in practising deep prajñā for a single day. The reason goes all the way in one sentence: the knowledge and severance of these worthy and holy ones 「即是菩薩摩訶薩無生法忍」 tr. "are precisely the bodhisattva-mahāsattva's acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas." This sentence is the fuse for all the discussion in the latter half of the chapter.
8. The Buddha confirms, and adds the comparison of those who write out and uphold. The Buddha answers 「如是！如是！」 tr. "Just so! Just so!" acknowledging what the gods have said. Then he adds another comparison: good men and good women who hear deep prajñā and write it out, receive and uphold it, read, recite, expound, and rightly recollect it swiftly attain nirvāṇa, surpassing those seeking the two vehicles who stay far from deep prajñā and practise other sūtras 「若一劫、若減一劫」 tr. "for a kalpa or for somewhat less than a kalpa." Why can they surpass them? Because 「是深般若波羅蜜中廣說上妙法」 tr. "within this deep prajñāpāramitā the supreme and wondrous Dharma is taught at length," and this supreme and wondrous Dharma is what persons who practise in faith, persons who practise by the Dharma, and so on up to pratyekabuddhas should learn, and what bodhisattvas too should learn; having learned it they attain anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi. One sūtra, learned in common by the three vehicles; what is learned is the same while where one arrives differs—the distinction lies only in the capacity of the learner's mind.
9. The gods again praise the five names, and make plain that it neither increases nor decreases. The gods 「俱發聲言」 tr. "raised their voices together and said," praising once more the five names with which Subhūti began: the great perfection, inconceivable, unweighable, without measure, equal to the unequalled. Then they say that persons who practise in faith, persons who practise by the Dharma, and persons of the eight learn it and achieve accomplishment; those of the four fruits and pratyekabuddhas learn it and achieve; bodhisattvas learn within it and attain anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi; and the last sentence is the important one: 「是深般若波羅蜜亦不增、亦不減。」 tr. "This deep prajñāpāramitā neither increases nor decreases." The three vehicles learn it together and prajñā does not increase; no one learns it and prajñā does not decrease—what increases and decreases is what the learners attain, not the substance of prajñā.
10. The gods bow to the Buddha and depart. 「是時諸欲、色界天子頂禮佛足，遶佛而去；去是不遠，忽然不現，各還本處。」 tr. "At that time the gods of the desire and form realms bowed their heads at the Buddha's feet, circled the Buddha, and departed; not far from there, they suddenly vanished, each returning to his own place." This passage has no question and no answer; it is pure narrative. Its function is to change the scene: one round of praise is enough, and the speaking role is to be handed back to Subhūti; with this the theme of the latter half of the sūtra text turns from ‘what prajñā is’ to ‘what person can receive prajñā’.
11. Where those who believe and understand at once come from. Subhūti's question is extremely concrete: those who, hearing deep prajñā, 「即時信解者，從何處終來生是間」 tr. "believe and understand it at once—from where have they ended their lives to come and be born here?" What he asks about is not a principle but a history. This question opens up the whole latter half of the chapter—since prajñā is so very deep, those in today's assembly who can believe and understand it on the spot are surely not there by chance.
12. The simile of the new-born calf, and returning from among humans to be born among humans. The Buddha first depicts the mark of one who believes and understands at once: 「不沒、不却、不難、不疑、不悔」 tr. "does not sink, does not shrink back, finds no difficulty, has no doubt, has no regret"; he gladly delights in hearing it, and having heard, recollects it; walking, standing, sitting, or lying down, he never sets it aside or forgets it, 「常隨法師」 tr. "constantly following the teacher of the Dharma." Then comes the simile: 「譬如新生犢子不離其母」 tr. "like a new-born calf that does not leave its mother"—the sense of the simile is very plain—a newly born calf does not stay by its mother because it understands a principle; it is a natural leaning of one on the other; the one who first believes prajñā follows the teacher of the Dharma in the same way. Then the Buddha answers where he comes from: at the end of his life on the human path he is born again among humans. Why? Because in a former life he heard deep prajñā, and wrote out and upheld it, revered, honoured, and praised it, and made offerings of flowers and incense and so on up to banners and canopies. The reason his believing and understanding is ‘at once’ is that the work was done long before, in a former life; the swiftness of this life is the length of past lives.
13. Those who come from other quarters, and merits accomplished in a former life. Subhūti asks again: are there bodhisattvas who made offerings to the buddhas in world-systems of other quarters, ended their lives there, came to be born here, and on hearing deep prajñā believe and understand it at once? The Buddha answers directly, 「有」 tr. "There are," and restates their mark: on hearing they believe and understand, and write out, uphold, read, recite, expound, and rightly recollect. The reason again comes back to their history—having heard prajñā in the presence of the buddhas of other quarters and believed, understood, written out, and upheld it, they ended their lives there and came to be born here; 「當知是人是先世功德成就」 tr. "know that this person's merits were accomplished in a former life." The two questions and two answers have the same form, and the places answered differ: one on the human path, one in other quarters; they come back to one meaning—believing and understanding at once must have a prior cause.
14. Those who heard it from Maitreya; not asking in a former life brings doubt and regret in this life—prajñā and the five perfections. The Buddha goes on to state the third place of origin: there are bodhisattvas who heard this deep prajñā from the bodhisattva-mahāsattva Maitreya and, through the causes and conditions of this root of goodness, have come to be born here. The three places of origin having been told, the sūtra text at once turns to the other side, and this turn is the finest passage of the chapter. First the general mark: though in a former life one heard deep prajñā, one 「不問中事」 tr. "did not ask about what was in it"; being born among humans and hearing prajñā, 「心有疑悔，難悟」 tr. "the mind has doubt and regret, and is hard to awaken." Then it is spread out one by one: though in a former life one heard dhyānapāramitā, one did not ask about what was in it, and in this life, hearing prajñā, because one did not ask, doubt and regret keep arising; vīrya, kṣānti, śīla, dāna—the five perfections, one item each, in identical sentence form. Here one must not find it repetitive and merge or abridge it—each of the five perfections is a gate of its own; in whichever gate one fell short in a former life, in that very gate one is obstructed in this life; the sūtra text points out gate by gate precisely so that the practitioner may look at himself and see where he fell short. The criterion of this passage must be seen clearly: it is not ‘never having heard’, it is ‘having heard and not asked’. To hear without asking is as good as not having taken the Dharma into oneself.
15. Not asking about the emptinesses is the same. 「復次」 tr. "Again" begins another item: though in a former life one heard inner emptiness, outer emptiness, inner-and-outer emptiness, and so on up to the emptiness of non-existent and existent dharmas, and did not ask about what was in it, being born among humans and hearing deep prajñā, because one did not ask, one is again doubtful and regretful and hard to awaken. The gate of the emptinesses and the gate of the perfections stand side by side as two, each forming its own item.
16. Not asking about the limbs of the path and the rest is the same. Another 「復次」 tr. "Again": though in a former life one heard the four foundations of mindfulness and so on up to the eightfold noble path, the four dhyānas, the four immeasurable minds, the four formless absorptions, the five superknowledges, the Buddha's ten powers and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds, and did not ask about what was in them, being born among humans and hearing deep prajñā, because one did not ask, one is again doubtful and regretful and hard to awaken. The opening of this item is entirely the same as that of the previous one, while the dharmas listed differ—the previous item cited the emptinesses; this item cites the limbs of the path and the dharmas of merit; the sūtra text makes them two items rather than combining them into one because the gates in which one fell short are not the same to begin with. Viewing the three items together: whoever in a former life heard in any one gate—the six perfections, the emptinesses, or the limbs of the path—and did not ask, in this life on meeting prajñā becomes doubtful and regretful; the root of the sickness is just one: 「不問」 tr. "not asking."
17. Hearing and not practising—the light feather following the wind, and falling into one of the two grounds. The last item is the gravest sickness. In a former life one heard deep prajñā and 「不問中事而不行」 tr. "did not ask about what was in it, and did not practise"—so the base text reads here; the Yuan and Ming editions, the Shōgozō manuscript, and the Ishiyama-dera manuscript lack the character 「不」 tr. "not," reading 「問中事而不行」 tr. "asked about what was in it, but did not practise"; and the 「何以故」 tr. "Why?" that follows also says 「雖問中事，不如說行」 tr. "though he asked about what was in it, he did not practise as it teaches." The variant readings are recorded side by side, without judgement. Such a person, hearing prajñā in this life, is firm in mind for one day up to five days and nothing can break him, 「若離所聞時便退失」 tr. "but when he is parted from what he has heard, he falls away." The Buddha gives a simile: 「譬如輕毛隨風東西。」 tr. "It is like a light feather that follows the wind east and west." The mind light and unfixed, the resolve scattered and unsettled—therefore sometimes he wishes to hear and sometimes he does not. The Buddha then tells his shortcomings layer by layer: it is not long since he set his mind on it; he has not kept company with good friends; he has not made many offerings to the buddhas; in former lives he did not write out, did not read, did not recite, did not rightly recollect; he did not learn the six perfections, did not learn the emptinesses, did not learn the limbs of the path and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds. Therefore in this life he has 「新發大乘意」 tr. "newly set his mind on the Great Vehicle," with little faith and little delight, and cannot write out, uphold, read, or recite. Then the Buddha tells the consequence to the end: one who does not write out and does not uphold is not guarded by deep prajñā, and so on up to not being guarded by the omniscience of all kinds, and also does not practise as it teaches; 「是人或墮二地——若聲聞地、若辟支佛地」 tr. "this person may fall into one of the two grounds—either the śrāvaka ground or the pratyekabuddha ground," and the last sentence states it again: 「於二地中當墮一地」 tr. "of the two grounds he will fall into one." Note the order of cause and effect the Buddha gives: not writing out and not upholding comes first, not being guarded comes next, not practising as it teaches comes next, falling into one of the two grounds comes last—it is not that prajñā does not guard people; it is that the person himself first goes and stands where guarding cannot reach.
18. Why the very deep is spoken of again—the simile of the great king. The treatise-author opens by setting a question himself: 「上來數說是般若波羅蜜甚深因緣，今何以復重說？」 tr. "Above, the very deep causes and conditions of this prajñāpāramitā have been spoken of several times; why are they now spoken of again?" The answer first sets a general rule: 「處處說甚深，多有所益；凡人不知，謂為重說。」 tr. "To speak of the very deep in place after place brings much benefit; ordinary people do not know this and call it repetition." Then comes the most vivid simile of the whole chapter: a great king had long had no legitimate son, and prayed for many years without response; one day, while the king was away travelling, his consort gave birth to a boy and sent a message to tell the king, 「大夫人產男」 tr. "The great consort has given birth to a boy"; the king heard it with joy and did not answer, and so it went ten times over. The messenger asked whether the king had not heard, and the king answered: 「我即聞之，久來願滿故，喜心內悅，樂聞不已耳！」 tr. "I heard it at once; my long-cherished wish is fulfilled, my heart rejoices within, and I delight in hearing it without end!" He then rewarded him with a million taels of gold, a hundred thousand taels for each telling. The treatise-author gathers up the simile: the king heard the messenger's words, and 「語中有利益，非重語，不知者謂為重」 tr. "in the words there was benefit; it was not repetition, and only one who does not know calls it repetition." In applying it to the Dharma he speaks from three sides: the Buddha, the bodhisattvas, and Subhūti know that there is great benefit in it; Subhūti, hearing deep prajñā, 「不能得底，轉覺甚深」 tr. "cannot reach its bottom, and feels it ever more very deep"; the hearers, hearing of the very deep in place after place, obtain benefits such as meditative concentration and wisdom—only ordinary people call it repetition. Repetition or not is judged in the hearer, not in the speaker.
19. Deep and shallow are not fixed. The treatise-author goes a step further: 「深淺無定，隨眾生，解者無深，不解者謂為深。」 tr. "Deep and shallow are not fixed; they follow beings: to one who understands there is nothing deep; one who does not understand calls it deep." Then why are the two Chinese characters 「甚深」 tr. "very deep" constantly spoken? Because prajñā is such that 「除佛無能遍知故」 tr. "apart from the Buddha no one can know it fully." The Buddha speaks of the very deep for the sake of beings, and it 「無定甚深相」 tr. "has no fixed mark of being very deep"; if the very deep were a fixed mark, 「無人能行」 tr. "no one could practise it." Hence it says: 「菩薩謂般若甚深，為不行般若波羅蜜。」 tr. "For a bodhisattva to take prajñā to be very deep is not to practise prajñāpāramitā." This item must be taken in with the greatest care—it does not say that prajñā is not deep; it says that depth is not a fixed mark of prajñā. To grasp 「甚深」 tr. "very deep" as a really existent difficulty is, on the contrary, precisely not to practise prajñā.
20. The very deep causes and conditions are precisely the five kinds of arising. The treatise-author points to the theme: the so-called very deep causes and conditions are precisely 「為大事故起，乃至無等等事故起」 tr. "arising for the sake of the great matter, and so on up to arising for the sake of the matter equal to the unequalled," and he notes, 「大事等義如先說」 tr. "the meaning of the great matter and the rest is as explained before"—the meanings of the names great matter, inconceivable, unweighable, without measure, and equal to the unequalled were explained in the preceding chapter, and are not set out again here. The economy of the treatise-author's writing shows precisely that he does not deal in repetition.
21. The Buddha himself tells the causes and conditions of the great matter. The treatise-author points again—「此中佛自說大事等因緣」 tr. "here the Buddha himself tells the causes and conditions of the great matter and the rest," and what is meant is 「般若波羅蜜含受五波羅蜜等諸法。」 tr. "Prajñāpāramitā contains and receives the five perfections and the other dharmas." This marks out the first layer of the Buddha's answer in Sūtra ①, as the basis for the next question.
22. How the five perfections, each with a distinct mark, can be said to be contained and received—the simile of the consecrated king developed, and the simile of throwing fire. The treatise-author raises an objection himself—「五波羅蜜等各異相」 tr. "the five perfections and the rest each have a distinct mark"; how then can one say 「般若波羅蜜中含受」 tr. "they are contained and received within prajñāpāramitā"? The objection is extremely precise: giving is relinquishing, keeping the precepts is guarding, each has its own mark of practice—how can they all be said to be within prajñā? The answer comes in two parts. The first part: 「是中說經中含受」 tr. "what is spoken of here is containing and receiving within the sūtra"—the containing and receiving spoken of here is in terms of the sūtra text, that is, the dharmas of the perfections set forth at length in the prajñā sūtra. Only the second part is the doctrinal meaning: the five perfections and the other dharmas come together with prajñā, and because of dedication by skilful means they 「得至佛道」 tr. "are able to reach the path of the Buddha." Containing and receiving is not accommodation in space; it is that the perfections must come together with prajñā and be dedicated by skilful means before they can travel onto the path of the Buddha; apart from prajñā, the five perfections are only five perfections. The treatise-author then matches the simile of the consecrated king in Sūtra ① item by item: 「灌頂王如佛，國事是種種度眾生法，大臣是般若波羅蜜。」 tr. "The consecrated king is like the Buddha; the affairs of state are the various dharmas for delivering beings; the great minister is prajñāpāramitā." The Buddha entrusts and relies on prajñā to accomplish the various dharmas, and so he can 「安處禪定，快樂無事」 tr. "dwell at ease in meditative concentration, joyful and without a care." After matching it he adds another simile: 「又如欲除乾薪草木，以火投中，則火力能燒令盡，人便無事。」 tr. "Again, it is like one who wishes to clear away dry firewood, grass, and trees: he throws fire into them, and the power of the fire can burn them up entirely, and the person then has no more to do." The two similes make plain one meaning—it is not that the Buddha does no work; it is that what he entrusts goes to the right person, and what he throws in is fire; prajñā is to the Buddha as the great minister is to the king, as fire is to firewood.
23. Because it does not grasp and does not cling it is called containing and receiving; the first staining is called grasping, the arising of love is called clinging. The treatise-author turns again: 「是般若波羅蜜不取、不著色等諸法故名含受」 tr. "because this prajñāpāramitā does not grasp and does not cling to form and the other dharmas, it is called containing and receiving"—joining the second layer of Sūtra ① back to the first, and stating outright that not grasping and not clinging is precisely why there is containing and receiving. Then comes a gloss: 「初染曰取，生愛曰著。」 tr. "The first staining is called grasping; the arising of love is called clinging." These eight characters divide grasping from clinging in sequence and in depth: when the mind first becomes stained, it is called grasping; when the staining gives rise to love, it is called clinging. Grasping is the beginning of clambering after objects; clinging is the completion of sticking fast. Only when one knows them to be two does one know that the order in the sūtra text, 「不見故不取，不取故不著」 tr. "because one does not see, one does not grasp; because one does not grasp, one does not cling," is a single road of withdrawal that goes all the way to the end.
24. The sūtra text restated: the intent of the counter-question among the four kinds of answer. In this passage the treatise-author does not start a separate question and answer; he retells the scene of question and answer in Sūtra ① and adds an explanation. First he restates Subhūti's question: 「云何般若為色等諸法不取、不著故名含受？」 tr. "How is it that prajñā is called containing and receiving because it does not grasp and does not cling to form and the other dharmas?" Next he restates the Buddha's manner of answering and points out its form—「佛於四答中以反問答」 tr. "among the four answers the Buddha answers by counter-question"; what he asks is 「於汝意云何？以智慧眼見是色等法可取、可著不？」 tr. "What do you think? Do you, with the wisdom-eye, see these dharmas such as form as something that can be grasped or clung to?" The four answers are the four forms of answering a question; earlier in this treatise it is said, 「四事答中，此是反問答」 tr. "among the four kinds of answer, this is the answer by counter-question"; here the treatise-author points out that what the Buddha uses is precisely that one form, the answer by counter-question. Next he restates what Subhūti thought in his mind: 「若智慧眼見空、無相、無作、無量、不可思議相，云何當答色等法定相可取、可著？」 tr. "If the wisdom-eye sees the mark of emptiness, the signless, non-action, the immeasurable, and the inconceivable, how should I answer that dharmas such as form have a fixed mark that can be grasped or clung to?" The reason Subhūti answers 「不也」 tr. "No" lies here: what the wisdom-eye sees is emptiness, the signless, non-action; there is from the first no fixed mark to grasp. Lastly he restates the Buddha's confirmation: 「汝未得一切智，不見色等諸法；我一切智人亦不見色等諸法」 tr. "You have not yet obtained omniscience, and do not see form and the other dharmas; I, the omniscient one, also do not see form and the other dharmas," and therefore he praises, saying 「善哉！」 tr. "Good!" Teacher and disciple on both sides alike do not see, and so the answer and the question accord. Following on, the treatise-author also restates the gods' praise, and his gloss on two terms stands within the same quotation as the restated words: 「智者，十智。斷者，二種斷：有殘斷、無殘斷；學人有殘斷，無學人無殘斷。」 tr. "Knowledge is the ten knowledges. Severance is two kinds of severance: severance with remainder and severance without remainder; those in training have severance with remainder, those beyond training have severance without remainder." The sūtra text says only the four characters 「若智、若斷」 tr. "knowledge and severance"; the treatise-author fills in their content. As for the ten knowledges, the treatise-author himself lists them in fascicle twenty-three: dharma-knowledge, the subsequent knowledge, the knowledge of others' minds, worldly knowledge, the knowledge of suffering, the knowledge of origination, the knowledge of cessation, the knowledge of the path, the knowledge of exhaustion, and the knowledge of non-arising. According to the treatise-author's own glosses: dharma-knowledge is knowledge without outflows that takes as its object the dharmas bound to the desire realm together with their cause, their cessation, and the path; the subsequent knowledge is knowledge without outflows of the same kind that takes the form and formless realms as its object; the knowledge of others' minds knows the mind and mental-factor dharmas of others at present in the desire realm and the form realm, and a small portion of minds without outflows—when it takes a mind with outflows as its object it is with outflows, and when it takes a mind without outflows as its object it is without outflows, and so the treatise-author says 「一當分別」 tr. "one is to be distinguished"; worldly knowledge is all wisdom with outflows, the only one of the ten knowledges that has outflows; the knowledge of suffering, the knowledge of origination, the knowledge of cessation, and the knowledge of the path are knowledges without outflows obtained in contemplating the four aspects of each of the four truths; the knowledge of exhaustion is the insight and clarity without outflows of 「我見苦已，斷集已，盡證已，修道已」 tr. "I have seen suffering, I have severed origination, I have realised exhaustion, I have cultivated the path"; the knowledge of non-arising is the insight and clarity without outflows of 「不復更見、不復更斷、不復更證、不復更修」 tr. "there is no more seeing again, no more severing again, no more realising again, no more cultivating again." The treatise-author sums up: 「十智，一有漏，八無漏，一當分別。」 tr. "Of the ten knowledges, one is with outflows, eight are without outflows, and one is to be distinguished." As for the two severances, the severing of the afflictions is of two kinds: severance with remainder, where the afflictions are severed but not exhausted and something still remains, is the severance of those in training; severance without remainder, where the afflictions are severed completely with nothing remaining, is the severance of those beyond training. The treatise-author's intent: the knowledge and severance of the worthy and holy are complete in this way, and yet a bodhisattva's practising prajñā for a single day still surpasses them—what follows explains why it surpasses, and in the end it comes back again to that fuse-sentence: 「是諸賢聖智、斷，皆是菩薩無生法忍。」 tr. "The knowledge and severance of all these worthy and holy ones are all the bodhisattva's acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas."
25. If it is precisely the acceptance of non-arising, why say that it does not equal it—the simile of the water's force gathering and quickening. The treatise-author sets his third question himself: 「若諸賢聖智、斷即是無生忍者，何以言不如？」 tr. "If the knowledge and severance of the worthy and holy are precisely the acceptance of non-arising, why is it said that they do not equal it?" The question is extremely sharp: having said they are one and the same thing, how can one then distinguish higher and lower? The answer first names two failings: 「信行等人無大悲、捨眾生故不如」 tr. "persons who practise in faith and the rest have no great compassion and abandon beings, and so do not equal him," and also 「無方便力，不能於涅槃自反」 tr. "they have no power of skilful means and cannot turn themselves back from nirvāṇa." One failing lies in compassion, one in skilful means. Then comes the simile: 「譬如眾水會恒河俱入大海，欲入海時水勢湊急，眾生在中無能自反，惟有大力者乃能自出。」 tr. "It is like the many waters that meet in the Ganges and together enter the great sea: when they are about to enter the sea the force of the water gathers and quickens, and no being within it can turn itself back; only one of great strength can get himself out." In the simile, 「入海」 tr. "entering the sea" is entering nirvāṇa; the force of the water gathering and quickening is the momentum toward quiescence; being unable to turn oneself back is that, having come this far, one can no longer turn round to deliver beings; the one of great strength who can get himself out is the bodhisattva's power of skilful means. So where they do not equal him lies not in the dharma realised, but in whether one can come back.
26. The first acceptance surpasses knowledge and severance already accomplished—the simile of the great minister not reaching the crown prince. 「復次」 tr. "Again" gives a further answer: although the knowledge and severance of the other worthy and holy ones are already accomplished, 「菩薩始得無生忍而力能過之，是故勝」 tr. "the bodhisattva who has just obtained the acceptance of non-arising has the strength to pass beyond them, and therefore he is superior." Though the merits of knowledge and severance are accomplished, they 「不及菩薩初忍」 tr. "do not reach the bodhisattva's first acceptance." The simile: 「譬如大臣功業雖大，不及太子。」 tr. "It is like a great minister whose achievements, however great, do not reach the crown prince." The great minister's merit is already accomplished and the crown prince's merit not yet manifest, yet their stations are distinct of themselves—what is compared is not the present measure of achievement but the station one occupies. This simile comes from the same set of images of sovereign and minister as the simile of the consecrated king in Sūtra ① of this chapter, but what it makes plain is different: that simile makes plain that the Buddha entrusts prajñā; this simile makes plain that the worthy and holy do not reach the first acceptance.
27. The first gate of the Small Vehicle and the first gate of the Great Vehicle. 「復次」 tr. "Again" gives the third answer: 「煖、頂、忍法是小乘初門，菩薩法忍是大乘初門」 tr. "the dharmas of warmth, summit, and acceptance are the first gate of the Small Vehicle; the bodhisattva's acceptance of dharmas is the first gate of the Great Vehicle"; though the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas do in the end have their accomplishment, they 「尚不及菩薩初入道門，何況成佛！」 tr. "still do not reach the gate by which the bodhisattva first enters the path—how much less his becoming a Buddha!" The previous simile spoke in terms of station; this item speaks in terms of gate—the places of entry of the two vehicles are different from the start, so without waiting to discuss their final accomplishment, high and low are already settled at the moment of entering the gate. Viewing the three answers together: one concerns compassion and skilful means, one concerns station, one concerns gate; layer by layer they close in, and where they come back to is one.
28. How the knowledge and severance of the two vehicles are precisely the bodhisattva's acceptance of non-arising. The treatise-author sets his fourth question himself, facing the opposite way from the third—「聲聞、辟支佛法是小乘，菩薩是大乘」 tr. "the dharmas of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas are the Small Vehicle; the bodhisattva is the Great Vehicle"; how then can one say 「二乘智斷即是菩薩無生忍」 tr. "the knowledge and severance of the two vehicles are precisely the bodhisattva's acceptance of non-arising"? The previous question wondered at speaking of difference within sameness; this question wonders at speaking of sameness within difference. The answer is extremely brief: 「所緣同，如、法性、實際亦同。利鈍智慧為異，又有無量功德及大悲心守護故勝。」 tr. "The object is the same; suchness, the nature of dharmas, and the limit of reality are also the same. The wisdom differs in keenness and dullness, and further there is the guarding of immeasurable merits and the mind of great compassion, and so it is superior." The sameness lies in the object and in suchness, the nature of dharmas, and the limit of reality; the difference lies in the keenness or dullness of knowledge, and in merit and great compassion. What is the same is the Dharma; what differs is the person—two questions answered, clamping it from front and back, and then there is no room for misunderstanding where sameness and difference meet.
29. The various other statements are praise of prajñā. The treatise-author passes over it in one sentence: 「餘種種說，是讚般若波羅蜜。」 tr. "The various other statements are praise of prajñāpāramitā." The words in the sūtra text in which the gods again praise the five names and make plain that it neither increases nor decreases the treatise-author does not explain again sentence by sentence, but judges them to be words of praise. This is an instance of the treatise-author's choosing and leaving aside—what should be explained he explains, what should be passed over he passes over, and passing over is also a judgement.
30. The highest, middle, and lowest grades of those who practise prajñā. The whole chapter is gathered up into a grading. The lowest grade: hearing prajñā, 「直信聽受，不問中義」 tr. "simply believes and receives it, and does not ask about the meaning in it." The middle grade: 「既聞已，問義而不能行」 tr. "having heard, asks about the meaning but cannot practise." The highest grade: 「聞、解、能行」 tr. "hears, understands, and can practise." There are only two criteria—asking or not asking, practising or not practising. Then the treatise-author matches the three grades one by one with the three kinds of mark in the latter half of Sūtra ①: the lowest, though he obtains a human body, hearing prajñā is doubtful and regretful and hard to awaken, because he is 「根鈍、福薄」 tr. "dull in faculties and thin in merit"—precisely those in the sūtra text who did not ask in a former life. The middle obtains a human body, believes and delights single-mindedly, can know the meaning and intent, and 「從一日至四、五日，心能堅固」 tr. "from one day up to four or five days, his mind can be firm"; beyond this he cannot believe and delight, sometimes wishing to hear and sometimes not, because in past lives 「雖解義而不能行」 tr. "though he understood the meaning, he could not practise"—precisely the one in the sūtra text like a light feather following the wind. The highest obtains a human body, hears prajñā, and 「心即深解，信樂不捨，常隨法師」 tr. "his mind at once understands it deeply; he believes and delights and does not let go, and constantly follows the teacher of the Dharma"—precisely the one in the sūtra text like a new-born calf that does not leave its mother. The sūtra text speaks of them scattered in front; the treatise-author gathers them up behind; the three items interlock one to one, and not one falls empty.
31. Falling into the two vehicles, and the parable of the broken ship in the following chapter. The last sentence judges the outcome: the middle and lower two kinds of bodhisattva spoken of above 「不能得上地故，當墮二乘，不為般若所守護故」 tr. "cannot obtain the higher ground, and so will fall into the two vehicles, because they are not guarded by prajñā." Then the treatise-author announces what follows—「為更明了是事故，佛於後品中為作譬喻」 tr. "to make this matter clearer still, the Buddha in the following chapter makes a parable," and the words of the parable are 「如大海水中船破，若得所依則能渡，不得所依則不能渡。」 tr. "As when a ship breaks up in the waters of the great sea: one who gets something to hold on to can cross, and one who gets nothing to hold on to cannot cross." With this it links to the next chapter. The whole chapter begins with prajñā ‘arising for the sake of the great matter’ and closes with whether a person can cross or cannot cross—what the great matter is for is precisely this crossing.
Do Not Misread
Do not read ‘containing and receiving’ as prajñā gathering all dharmas up inside itself. The treatise-author's question and answer say it clearly: the five perfections and the rest each have a distinct mark, so containing and receiving is not dissolving distinct marks into one. The answer has two parts; the first part says 「是中說經中含受」 tr. "what is spoken of here is containing and receiving within the sūtra," which is in terms of the sūtra's setting forth at length; only the second part is where the doctrinal meaning lies—the five perfections come together with prajñā and are dedicated by skilful means, and so are able to reach the path of the Buddha. Containing and receiving is ‘coming together and so being able to reach’, not ‘gathering in and returning to one’. To read it as meaning that prajñā, a single dharma, is already complete, so that the five perfections need not be cultivated, is exactly contrary to the treatise's meaning: precisely because the five perfections need prajñā to reach the path of the Buddha, the five perfections must by all means be cultivated.
Do not read the simile of the consecrated king as the Buddha doing no work. The application of the simile the treatise-author matches himself: the king is like the Buddha, the affairs of state are the various dharmas for delivering beings, the great minister is prajñā. The king's being 「安樂無事」 tr. "at ease and without a care" is because the affairs are all being carried out, not because there are no affairs. The simile of throwing fire to clear away firewood, added afterward, settles this point completely—fire thrown into firewood, the firewood exhausted, the person has no more to do; having nothing more to do is the mark after the work is accomplished, not the attitude at the outset. If a practitioner takes 「快樂無事」 tr. "joyful and without a care" as the manner of his own effort, he has read the simile upside down.
Do not read 「不見故不取，不取故不著」 tr. "because one does not see, one does not grasp; because one does not grasp, one does not cling" as closing one's eyes and not looking. The order in the sūtra text is that the Buddha illuminates with the wisdom-eye and does not see, not that he does not go to illuminate. The thought the treatise-author supplies for Subhūti says it clearly: what the wisdom-eye sees is the mark of emptiness, the signless, non-action, the immeasurable, and the inconceivable, and so he cannot answer that dharmas such as form have a fixed mark to grasp. It is because the illumination is thorough that no fixed mark is seen; it is not that one does not illuminate and says there is nothing. In the same way, Subhūti's two answers, 「不也！世尊！」 tr. "No, World-Honored One!" are not perfunctory responses but real answers given after he has shone the light through in his own seeing; when the Buddha praises, 「善哉」 tr. "Good," it is precisely this illumination he praises.
Do not read 「甚深」 tr. "very deep" as a degree of difficulty that can be grasped. The treatise-author says plainly 「深淺無定」 tr. "deep and shallow are not fixed" and 「無定甚深相」 tr. "it has no fixed mark of being very deep," and says: 「菩薩謂般若甚深，為不行般若波羅蜜。」 tr. "For a bodhisattva to take prajñā to be very deep is not to practise prajñāpāramitā." If the very deep is taken as a fixed mark, the practitioner sets up a threshold before the Dharma and instead does not practise. But one must not fall to the other side either and say that prajñā is not deep—it is constantly said to be very deep because 「除佛無能遍知」 tr. "apart from the Buddha no one can know it fully," and this is a true statement. Depth is spoken of in terms of beings' not yet understanding, not by setting up a mark in the Dharma itself.
Do not read the passage on not asking in a former life as a doctrine of fate. What the sūtra text reproaches item by item is 「不問中事」 tr. "not asking about what was in it," not faculties fixed by heaven. The three items—the five perfections, the emptinesses, and the limbs of the path—are set side by side precisely so that the practitioner may look at himself and see in which gate he fell short; and the sickness of the middle grade is plainer still—「雖解義而不能行」 tr. "though he understood the meaning, he could not practise." The cause of the sickness lies in asking and in practising, and both are things that can be done now. To read it as ‘doubt and regret in this life are fixed by past karma’ is to shut the door that the sūtra text opens for people.
Do not read the knowledge and severance of the worthy and holy being 「即是菩薩摩訶薩無生法忍」 tr. "precisely the bodhisattva-mahāsattva's acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas," and their 「不如是菩薩一日行深般若」 tr. "not equalling this bodhisattva's practising deep prajñā for a single day," as a contradiction between front and back. The treatise-author clamps it with two questions: the earlier question, 「即是無生忍者，何以言不如」 tr. "if they are precisely the acceptance of non-arising, why say that they do not equal it," is answered in compassion and skilful means, in station, and in gate; the later question, how one can say 「二乘智斷即是菩薩無生忍」 tr. "the knowledge and severance of the two vehicles are precisely the bodhisattva's acceptance of non-arising," is answered in the object being the same and suchness, the nature of dharmas, and the limit of reality being the same. What is the same is the dharma realised; what differs is the keenness or dullness and the compassion and vow of the person who realises it. The sūtra and the treatise do not contradict themselves.
Do not read ‘will fall into one of the two grounds’ as a rebuke. The order the sūtra text gives is: not writing out and not upholding, therefore not guarded by prajñā; not guarded, therefore not practising as it teaches; not practising as it teaches, therefore of the two grounds he will fall into one. Falling is the natural result of not receiving guarding, not a punishment. The treatise-author's announcement at the end of the parable of the broken ship in the following chapter makes this point thoroughly—「若得所依則能渡，不得所依則不能渡」 tr. "one who gets something to hold on to can cross, and one who gets nothing to hold on to cannot cross"; all that is said throughout is whether there is something to hold on to, not that anyone is sending down punishment.
Bearing on Practice
The first use of this chapter for one who applies effort is that it establishes ‘asking’ as an item of practice. The sūtra text sets three items side by side—in a former life hearing the six perfections and not asking, hearing the emptinesses and not asking, hearing the limbs of the path and not asking—and in this life all become doubt and regret, hard to awaken; the treatise-author's three-grade judgement also judges 「不問中義」 tr. "not asking about the meaning in it" to be the lowest grade. In daily life, reading the sūtras and hearing the Dharma, to hear without any doubt arising and without pressing further seems smooth and agreeable, but in fact the Dharma has not come in. Here one can make a ready self-check: about what I heard today, can I ask a question? If I cannot, it is not necessarily because I have already understood; it may only be that I have not yet touched it.
The second use is that the simile of the light feather following the wind can serve as a mirror for a retreating mind. The sūtra text speaks very finely: for one day, two days, up to five days one's mind is firm and nothing can break it, 「若離所聞時便退失」 tr. "but when parted from what one has heard, one falls away"; sometimes one wishes to hear, sometimes one does not. Whoever applies effort and feels himself advancing at times and retreating at times, setting his mind on it when hearing the Dharma and forgetting it as soon as he leaves his seat—this simile shines exactly on that mark. The name of the sickness the treatise-author gives is not laziness; it is 「雖解義而不能行」 tr. "though one understands the meaning, one cannot practise"—and so the cure lies not in hearing more but in putting into practice the portion one has already understood.
The third use is the positive pattern that the simile of the new-born calf gives. The mark of the person of the highest grade the sūtra text lists concretely: does not sink, does not shrink back, finds no difficulty, has no doubt, has no regret, gladly delights in hearing, having heard recollects it, walking, standing, sitting, or lying down never sets it aside or forgets it, constantly follows the teacher of the Dharma. The calf's not leaving its mother is not propped up by any principle; it is a natural closeness. The practitioner can measure himself by this: toward the deep Dharma, am I drawing near by force, or naturally not leaving? And the cause the Buddha gives is very concrete—in a former life writing out, upholding, revering, honouring, praising, making offerings. The sense of intimacy in this life can be accumulated beginning from today's writing out, upholding, and reverence.
The fourth use is that the simile of the great king counters the mind that is ‘tired of hearing it’. To hear the same Dharma over and over and grow weary of it is common among those who apply effort; the treatise-author's diagnosis is quite blunt—「凡人不知，謂為重說」 tr. "ordinary people do not know this and call it repetition." The king heard the report ten times and rejoiced ten times because the matter reported hit squarely on his long-held wish. So the line between weariness and non-weariness lies not in the speaker's repeating, but in whether that matter in the hearer's mind is his own true wish. If it feels repetitive, one might turn back and ask: this matter that prajñā speaks of—is it what I truly want?
The fifth use is that 「初染曰取，生愛曰著」 tr. "the first staining is called grasping; the arising of love is called clinging" can serve as a graduated scale for contemplating the mind. Grasping and clinging are two stages: grasping is at the moment of first staining, clinging after love arises. In daily life, when an object appears, if one waits until one is already clinging before thinking to let go, it already takes effort; this gloss gives an earlier moment—the instant the mind has just been stained. And the root cure the sūtra text gives lies earlier still: 「不見故不取」 tr. "because one does not see, one does not grasp"—first apply effort where one sees, and grasping naturally lessens; putting force only where one grasps, one often presses down the gourd only for the ladle to bob up.
The sixth use is that the simile of the water's force gathering and quickening is a warning against tending toward quiescence. The treatise-author says that persons who practise in faith and the rest 「無方便力，不能於涅槃自反」 tr. "have no power of skilful means and cannot turn themselves back from nirvāṇa," with the simile of the force of the water entering the sea. When one's effort has begun to gain some strength, the pleasure of stillness very easily becomes a new resting place; what this simile reminds is: prepare great compassion and skilful means while one can still turn round, and do not wait until the force has already gathered and quickened. Read the two similes—the great minister not reaching the crown prince, and the first gates of the Small and Great Vehicles—together, and what they urge is the same thing: the direction at the time of first setting the mind decides where one ends more than the measure of achievement along the way.
Further Resonances
The backbone of this chapter is one passage of sūtra and one passage of treatise explanation. Sūtra ① begins from Subhūti's praise of prajñā as arising in five ways for the sake of matters; the Buddha answers that it contains and receives the five perfections and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds, and sets out the simile of the consecrated king who entrusts affairs to his great minister; again he gives, as a second meaning, that because it does not grasp and does not cling it can accomplish; Subhūti presses, the Buddha asks counter-questions and Subhūti answers ‘No’; the Buddha praises ‘Good’ and states of himself that because he does not see he does not grasp, because he does not grasp he does not cling, and so on up to the dharmas of the buddhas, the dharmas of the Tathāgata, the dharmas of the one who is so of himself, and the dharmas of the omniscient one, none of which should be grasped or clung to. Next the gods of the desire and form realms praise prajñā as very deep, set up the comparison that the knowledge and severance of the worthy and holy do not equal a bodhisattva's practising deep prajñā for a single day, and make plain that their knowledge and severance are precisely the bodhisattva-mahāsattva's acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas; the Buddha confirms it, and adds that those who write out and uphold prajñā surpass those seeking the two vehicles who stay far from prajñā and practise other sūtras; the gods again praise the five names, make plain that prajñā neither increases nor decreases, bow their heads, circle the Buddha, and depart. Next Subhūti asks where those who believe and understand at once come from; the Buddha answers that they come from among humans to be born again among humans, that they come from making offerings to the buddhas in world-systems of other quarters, and that they come from hearing it in the presence of the bodhisattva Maitreya, and sets out the simile of the new-born calf that does not leave its mother; turning, he tells that those who in a former life heard prajñā, heard the five perfections, heard the emptinesses, heard the limbs of the path, and did not ask about what was in them are in this life doubtful and regretful and hard to awaken, and that those who heard but did not practise have minds like a light feather following the wind, falling away after one day up to five, until in the end they do not write out and do not uphold, are not guarded by prajñā, and of the two grounds will fall into one. Treatise ① first answers why the very deep is spoken of again, setting out the simile of the great king whose long wish for a son is fulfilled, who hears the report ten times over and delights in hearing it without end, to make plain that there is benefit in the words and they are not repetition; next it makes plain that deep and shallow are not fixed and that there is no fixed mark of being very deep; next it restates the five kinds of arising and the causes and conditions of containing and receiving told by the Buddha himself, answers how the five perfections, each with a distinct mark, can be said to be contained and received, matches the king and the minister in the simile of the consecrated king, and adds the simile of throwing fire to clear away firewood; next it gives the gloss 「初染曰取，生愛曰著」 tr. "the first staining is called grasping; the arising of love is called clinging," restates the scene of the answer by counter-question in the sūtra text, and glosses the ten knowledges and the two severances; next it answers why, if the knowledge and severance of the worthy and holy are precisely the acceptance of non-arising, it is said that they do not equal it, giving the three similes of the water's force gathering and quickening, the great minister not reaching the crown prince, and the first gates of the Small and Great Vehicles, and again answers how the knowledge and severance of the two vehicles are precisely the acceptance of non-arising, concluding that the object is the same while keenness and dullness, compassion and vow, differ; at the end it gathers up with the highest, middle, and lowest grades of those who practise prajñā, judges that the middle and lower two kinds will fall into the two vehicles, and announces the parable of the ship breaking up in the great sea in the following chapter.
Among the ancient masters' structural divisions of this chapter, one thread may be recorded. Jizang, explaining this chapter in his Commentary on the Larger Sūtra, gives the chapter title as 「成辦品第五十」 tr. "Chapter Fifty, Accomplishing," and at its opening says: 「第二、歎般若成辦因行故以目品。」 tr. "Second: because it praises prajñā as accomplishing the causal practices, the chapter is named by this."—that is, he glosses the chapter name by the meaning of ‘accomplishing’, saying that what this chapter praises is prajñā's power to accomplish the bodhisattva's causal practices. He divides this chapter into two: 「此章二：先、須菩五歎；二、佛述。」 tr. "This section has two parts: first, Subhūti's five praises; second, the Buddha's declaration."—which accords in a single line with this chapter's sūtra text, Subhūti's five praises and the Buddha taking them up to declare and confirm. Jizang also sets a question himself, on the same axis as the question at the opening of Treatise ①: 「問：以五歎，今何更以作五歎？答：般若甚深故重歎無過，如王聞身子，喻聞聞無厭足也。」 tr. "Question: the five praises having already been made, why are the five praises made again now? Answer: because prajñā is very deep, praising it again is no fault; it is like the king hearing of the son of his body—a simile for hearing and hearing again without satiety."—explaining the faultlessness of repeated praise by the joy of hearing without weariness, woven on the same loom as this treatise's simile of the great king who heard the report ten times over and delighted in hearing it without end. Of the two rounds of praise, earlier and later, he says: 「今五歎歎般若能成自行，以重利益故重歎也。」 tr. "The present five praises praise prajñā as able to accomplish one's own practice; because its benefit is weighty, it is praised again." This division by 「成辦」 tr. "accomplishing" corresponds to the variant name 「成辦品」 tr. "Accomplishing" under which one line of the transmitted texts titles this chapter; this exposition records them side by side and does not judge which is correct; the full account of the variant forms of the chapter title and of the two sides among the texts is detailed in the Apparatus.
In the vein of meaning linking this chapter with the chapters before and after it, three lines can be seen. First, the five praises at the opening of this chapter follow from the preceding chapter's praise of the virtues of prajñā, but what is asked turns from ‘what virtues prajñā has’ to ‘for the sake of what prajñā arises’—praising the virtues and asking about the arising are two ways of asking about one matter; the treatise-author's plain statement that the meaning of the great matter and the rest is 「如先說」 tr. "as explained before" shows precisely this continuity. Second, the latter half of this chapter's discussion of whether people can or cannot receive it stands as inside and outside with the meaning, told in the chapters before this one, of writing out, upholding, reading, and reciting and of being guarded by prajñā: the plainer the virtues of prajñā become, the more the fitness or unfitness of those who receive the Dharma must be distinguished; the three-grade judgement interlocking one to one with the three kinds of mark in the sūtra text is precisely the conclusion of this distinction. Third, the meaning left unfinished in this chapter lies in the next chapter: the treatise-author's last sentence announces that the Buddha in the following chapter makes the parable of the ship breaking up in the great sea, to make plain that crossing or not crossing depends on whether there is something to hold on to; the reader may view the preceding and following chapters together, to see the single continuity of the teaching of ‘arising for the sake of the great matter’ and the teaching of ‘one who gets something to hold on to can cross’ (the examination of the chapter's variant names, of the two sides among the transmitted texts, and of later citations is detailed in the Apparatus).
譬喻品Parables
全文五層 →Full five layers →譬喻品：八法既具何以仍中道衰耗，浮囊死屍何以與木器並取，坏瓶熟瓶之別何在，船未莊治何以喪寶，老病人何以能起而不能遠行，兩健人何以是般若與方便，我我所心行六度何以反成自高，此岸彼岸何以說遠離乃是波羅蜜相，佛既已說無方便之義何以復命須菩提問其名，守護何以分為福慧二力
在問什麼
這一品全篇只有一個問題，而這個問題是修行人最不願面對的一個：發心是真的，信是真的，忍、淨心、深心、欲、解、捨、精進也都是真的——八樣都有了，為什麼還會半路壞掉？
經文不從理上答，先從事上打了五個比方。大海裡船破了，人若不伸手去取木頭、器物、浮囊、死屍，就沉在海裡；取了，就到彼岸。未燒熟的瓶盛水，水沒運到，瓶先化回泥土；燒熟的瓶盛水，無論河井池泉，盛得安穩。海邊的船還沒整治就裝上財物，船沉在一處、財物沉在另一處，商人喪失重寶；整治好了再下水載寶，必定安穩到岸。最後一個比方最不留情面：一百二十歲的老人，諸根已熟，又兼風冷熱雜病，佛問須菩提，這人能從床上起來嗎？須菩提答不能；佛再追一句，若是他也能起來，那又如何？須菩提答，起得來，卻走不了十里二十里。而同是這位老人，兩個健壯的人一邊一個扶住他的腋下，說隨你要去哪裡，我們兩人終究不捨你——他就能到他要去的地方。
五個比方指的是同一件事：八法是所載之寶，行者身是船，而般若波羅蜜與方便力是浮囊、是火候、是莊治、是扶腋的兩個人。少了這一層，八法不是假的，只是沒有被護持；沒有被護持的功德，在中途就衰耗掉，這人沒有到一切種智，卻先在聲聞地、辟支佛地上取了證。經文用同一個詞說這件事：中道衰耗。
論主接手之後，把問題再往裡推一層。他先分菩薩為二種，一種已得諸法實相，一種未得實相而有信等八法——五譬所說的正是第二種人。再把八法逐一訓出次第：信而後忍，忍而後淨，淨而後有淺深，四事具足而後有欲、有解、有捨、有精進。然後他說出全品的樞紐一句：此中佛自說五譬喻——比方不是譬喻家的巧思，是佛自己開的鎖；論主要做的只是把每一件器物還原到它所表的法上去：船是行者身，浮囊等物是般若方便，瓶是菩薩道，火是般若方便，不補治船是菩薩無方便，老病人是有信等功德的菩薩，二人是般若及方便。
品的後半，佛把同一件事從比方轉入正面。以我、我所之心行六度的人，布施時念著我是施主、我施是人、我施是物，乃至修慧時念著這是我的慧——這人不但不得護持，還要以每一度自高。佛先說其失，繼而自設一問：什麼是無方便？答完了，又設一問：什麼是有方便？答的關鍵處只有一句——六度之相是遠離此岸彼岸，而他偏要分別此岸彼岸，這就是失。論主末後收束成一個乾淨的公式：內裡無我我所心，外面觀一切法空不取相，於是般若、方便乃至一切種智守護著他，名為有方便；而所謂守護，是五波羅蜜那邊得功德力，般若波羅蜜這邊得智慧力——福與慧二力具足，所以不失道。
逐段解明
一、第一譬·大海船破，取與不取。 先看比方本身的講法。船破了，經文沒有說去造一條新船，只說取木、取器物、取浮囊、取死屍。這四件都是破船之後手邊還抓得到的東西，連死屍都算進去——可見所重不在物之貴賤，在它能不能浮得住人。不取，經文說得斬截：不到彼岸，沒海中死；取了，經文也說得斬截：終不沒死，安隱無礙，得到彼岸。合到法上，求佛道的人若只是有信樂，卻不依止深般若波羅蜜而書寫、讀、誦、正憶念，不依止五度乃至一切種智，這人就是不取浮囊的人：他不是沒上船，他是船破時空著手。反過來，為阿耨多羅三藐三菩提而有信、忍、淨心、深心、欲、解、捨、精進，又依止深般若波羅蜜書、持、讀、誦、說、正憶念，被深般若乃至一切種智所護，就終不中道衰耗，過聲聞、辟支佛地，能淨佛世界、成就眾生。這裡要留意經文的次第：有信樂是起點，不是保險；八法是本錢，般若是浮囊。本錢再厚，不浮。
二、第二譬·坏瓶取水，未熟故還歸於地。 經文自己設問自己答：為什麼未燒熟的瓶盛水必爛？因為是瓶未熟故，還歸於地。這一句要慢讀。瓶不是被外力打破的，是它本來的土性沒有經火定住，遇水就回到泥土去——壞的因緣不在水，在瓶自身未成。合法：菩薩雖有菩提心，雖有信等八法，不為般若波羅蜜、方便力所守護，不為六度所守護，不為內空乃至無法有法空、四念處乃至八聖道分、佛十力乃至一切種智所守護，當知這人中道衰耗，墮聲聞、辟支佛地。莫把這一譬讀成外魔來壞：此處連一個外緣都沒有提，壞的機關全在自身未經火煉。這是全品五譬之中唯一從內部說壞的一喻，最切近用功人的實際。
三、第三譬·熟瓶取水，河井池泉皆安隱。 前譬的反面。經文仍自問自答：何以安隱？是瓶成熟故。特別要看那一串河、井、池、泉——境有種種，而瓶是同一個瓶；已成熟的瓶，換到哪一處水邊都盛得住。合法上，有諸信、忍、淨心、深心、欲、解、捨、精進，為般若波羅蜜、方便力所護，為禪定、精進、忍、戒、施乃至一切種智所護，於是不中道衰耗，過聲聞、辟支佛地，能淨世界、成就眾生，得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提。二三兩譬合看，「熟」字是全品最要緊的一個工夫字：同樣八法、同樣發心，火候到與不到，是兩種結局。而火是什麼，論主後面自會點出。
四、第四譬·船未莊治載寶與莊治載寶。 這一譬比前三譬多出一層：不但人沉，寶也沉，而且沉得分開——船與財物各在一處。經文於此明點病因：是估客無方便力故，亡其重寶。再合到法上，佛自己把兩個關鍵詞訓了出來：大珍寶者，所謂一切種智；衰耗者，墮聲聞、辟支佛地。所以這一譬所重，不在行人自身的死活，在那一船本來要運到彼岸的功德之寶落了空。反面亦然：有智方便莊治海邊大船，然後推著水中，載寶而去，必得安隱到所至處。莊治是下水以前的事——方便不是出事以後的救急手段，是起行以前就該修的工夫。
五、第五譬·老病人設問，能起而不能遠行。 此譬是全品唯一不由佛獨說、而由佛與須菩提往復兩番問答帶出的一喻，故須順著問答讀。佛先設人：年百二十歲，年耆根熟，又有風、冷、熱病、若雜病；然後問須菩提，是人能從床起不。須菩提答得乾脆：不能。佛卻不肯就此放過，追一句：是人或能起者，云何。須菩提於是補足了那半句要緊的話：是人雖能起，不能遠行若十里、若二十里，以其老病故。這一往復把譬喻的鋒刃磨了出來——若只答不能起，喻意便止於全然無力；佛再問一句，逼出的是更貼切的實情：起得來，走不遠。用功的人少有全然起不了床的，多的是起得來而走不遠。這兩番問答不是點綴，是佛自己把喻意校準到毫釐。
六、老病人之合法與兩健人扶腋。 佛以此合法：雖有菩提心與八法，不為般若波羅蜜、方便力所守護，乃至不為一切種智所守護，當知是人中道墮聲聞、辟支佛地；且把理由重說一遍——何以故，不為般若波羅蜜、方便力所守護故。接著是全品最溫暖的一轉：同是這位老人，欲起行時有兩健人各扶一腋，對他說莫有所難，隨所欲至，我等二人終不相捨。於是他到得了要去的地方。要看清這一轉的分寸：經文不說先待老病痊癒，只說有了扶持，隨所欲至。般若與方便之於行人，正是如此——扶持先於到達，扶著這副老病之身走到所謂阿耨多羅三藐三菩提。
七、論主開釋·菩薩有二種。 到此經文五譬說畢，論主開口解釋。他第一句不是釋喻，是先立分科：菩薩有二種，一者得諸法實相，二者雖未得實相，於佛道中有信、有忍、有淨心、有深心、有欲、有解、有捨、有精進。這一分科解決了讀者最容易生的一個疑：佛既說菩薩，何以說得如此危脆？答：五譬所論者是第二種人。已得實相的，如熟瓶、如莊治之船，本不在此譬的範圍；正在路上而未得實相的，纔是佛憂念之所在。先立此科再釋喻，全品的對象就不會讀錯。
八、信忍淨心深心欲解捨精進之次第。 論主逐字訓八法，而訓得極有次第。信，是信罪福業因緣果報，信行六波羅蜜得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提。有人雖信佛道，一思惟籌量，心不能忍——故說有忍。有人雖忍，邪疑未斷故心濁不淨——故說有淨。有人雖信、忍、心淨，而有淺有深——故說深心。四事因緣故一心欲得無上道，不欲餘事——故說有欲。了了決定知無上道為大、世間餘事為小——故說有解。以欲、解定心故，捨財及捨諸惡心、慳、恚等煩惱——故說捨。為捨故常能精進。八法不是八件並列的美德，是一條前後相生的路：信是門，忍是承當得住，淨是疑斷，深是不退於淺，欲是志一，解是量定，捨是實行，精進是持久。讀到這裡再回看五譬，就知道佛所憂的不是行人功德太少，而是這樣一條已然成形的路，仍會因為缺一味而崩。
九、何以八法仍失·不得般若則失菩薩道。 論主在此點出病所：若不得般若波羅蜜，則或於身壞命終時、或被惡知識沮壞，即失菩薩道；所修既是世間功德，便受世間果報，然後墮聲聞、辟支佛地，不能至無上道。這一句把前面五譬的失處都收在一處了。要特別看「世間功德故受世間果報」一句：八法所成的功德不會白費，它照樣結果，只是結在世間——不是消失，是轉向。中道衰耗之所以可畏，正在於它看起來像是有收成的。
十、此中佛自說五譬喻。 論主此句是全品的樞紐：這五個比方的解法，不是後人配的，是佛自己說的。於是以下四段逐一還原，每一段都只做一件事——把器物歸位到法上。此處依論主之文作五，不改其計。
十一、船與浮囊等物。 論主釋得極簡：「船」是行者身。「浮囊等物」即是般若、方便。兩句而已，卻一下把第一譬的重心挪正了。破船之譬，人最容易把船當成所依；論主偏說船就是行者自己這個身——身本來就是要破的，指望它不破是妄想。真正的所依是手裡抓得住的浮囊，就是般若與方便。回頭再看經文為何連死屍都許取：所取者不必貴重，只要浮得住；而於行人，浮得住的只有般若方便這一件。
十二、瓶與火與水。 這一段是四段配法中最密的：「瓶」是菩薩道。般若、方便是火。未與般若、方便和合故，不能受持六波羅蜜功德水至無上道。三樣東西一齊落位——瓶是所行之道，火是般若方便，水是六波羅蜜的功德。於是坏瓶熟瓶之別有了確解：不是功德水有多少的差別，是這條道有沒有經般若方便的火煉過。前面第二三兩譬留下的「熟」字，到此得解。也要順帶排一個誤：火在此不是燒毀之義，是成器之義——般若之火不是來燒掉六度功德的，是使那個能盛功德的器皿立得住。
十三、不補治船與寶異處。 論主於第四譬配得最細，一連四項：「不補治船」，是菩薩無方便；信等功德寶物，是五波羅蜜等諸善法船；寶異處者，與本願乖異，或受人天樂、或墮二乘；大利者，所謂一切智等佛法寶。要看出此處與第一譬的分工：第一譬的船是行者身，此譬的船卻是五波羅蜜等諸善法——同一個「船」字，論主兩處所配不同——一配行者身，一配諸善法——讀者不可混併。而「寶異處」三字尤其要緊：財物並沒有消失，只是落到了別處，論主直接訓為與本願乖異——所修的功德受了人天之樂、或落在二乘，那正是船與財物各在一處的實況。
十四、老病人與二人。 末一段配法最長，論主逐字拆開：「老病人」是有信等功德菩薩；不斷六十二邪見故名老；不斷百八等諸煩惱故名病；從床起者，從三界床起，我當作佛；以邪見煩惱因緣故不能成菩薩道；二人者，般若及方便。最後又補出二人之分工：般若波羅蜜能滅諸邪見、煩惱、戲論，將至畢竟空中；方便將出畢竟空。這兩句是全品義理的頂點。老與病既訓為邪見與煩惱，則「從床起」自然不是身之起，是從三界之床起而發我當作佛之願；願雖已發，邪見煩惱在身，故不能成菩薩道——非不肯行，是行不遠。而所扶的兩人分工判然：般若把人帶進畢竟空，方便把人帶出畢竟空。少了前者，行人出不了邪見戲論；少了後者，行人就停在空裡——那正是墮二乘之處。經文說兩人各扶一腋、終不相捨，義理上的分量就在這裡：缺一邊，人一樣走不到。
十五、佛讚須菩提·以我我所心行六度。 經文轉入後半。佛先讚歎：善哉善哉，須菩提，汝為諸菩薩摩訶薩問佛是事——可見以下所說是應前問而起，非另立一事。所說者，是從初發意已來以我我所心行六度的人：布施時作念我是施主、我施是人、我施是物，持戒修忍精進入禪修慧一一皆然，乃至念有是慧、是我慧。佛隨即給出判準，而判準只有一句：檀波羅蜜中無如是分別，遠離此彼岸是檀波羅蜜相；尸羅乃至般若亦然。於是結論來得極自然：是人不知此岸、不知彼岸，不為檀波羅蜜乃至一切種智所護，墮聲聞、辟支佛地，不能到薩婆若。這裡要排一個誤：佛所訶的不是布施持戒本身，是行六度時那個我我所的分別心；分別心一在，六度就只是六事，不成波羅蜜——因為波羅蜜之相正是遠離此彼岸。
十六、云何無方便·六度皆成自高。 佛自設問：云何求佛道人無方便。答語與前段幾乎同文而更進一層——前段說念有是施、是我施，此段在每一度之後都加上三個字：以是施自高、以是戒自高、以是忍自高、以是精進自高、以是禪定自高、以是慧自高。六度逐一，一無倖免。這一層遞進要看清：我我所心是病根，自高是病相；有我則所修之善反過來長我，度愈多我愈高。經文於此又把六度之相重說一遍——遠離此彼岸是檀波羅蜜相，乃至遠離此彼岸是般若波羅蜜相；何以故，般若波羅蜜中無如是憶念分別——然後結成：不知此岸、不知彼岸，不為六度乃至一切種智所護，或墮聲聞道中、或墮辟支佛道中，不能得到薩婆若。末句把它接回全品之主脈：菩薩摩訶薩不為般若波羅蜜、方便力所守護故，或墮聲聞地、或墮辟支佛道中——與五譬的結語一字不易。
十七、云何有方便·不自高而知此岸彼岸。 正面一段，句法與前段相對而反。菩薩從初已來以方便力布施，無我、我所心布施，乃至無我、我所心修智慧；不作念我有是施、是我施，不以是施自高，乃至般若波羅蜜亦如是。經文接著一連七個「不念」，把布施、與誰施、用何物施、持戒、忍辱、精進、禪定、修智慧逐一否掉——不是不行，是行而不念。理由仍是那一句：是檀波羅蜜中無如是分別，遠離此彼岸是檀波羅蜜相，乃至般若波羅蜜中無如是憶想分別。於是結果全反：是菩薩摩訶薩知此岸、知彼岸，為六度乃至一切種智所護故，不墮聲聞、辟支佛地，得到薩婆若，疾得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提。此處有一處極易讀漏：無方便者「不知此岸、不知彼岸」，有方便者「知此岸、知彼岸」——而波羅蜜之相卻是「遠離此彼岸」。可見所謂知，不是把此岸彼岸認作兩個實在的地方去分別，恰恰是知其遠離；不知者所以不知，正因為他把它們當作可分別之物。一「知」一「不知」的對揚，全繫於這一層。
十八、論主釋佛更說失行因緣。 論主開釋後半，先定其位：爾時佛可須菩提意，更說失行因緣。可字要緊——佛是印可了須菩提的問意才續說的，故後半不是新起話頭，是前問之所以得深答處。所說失行因緣即是：菩薩雖行信等善法，亦不得無上道，所謂以我、我所心行六波羅蜜故。論主隨即點出癥結所在：是中無分別此岸、彼岸，以遠離相是般若波羅蜜；而分別著行，是為失。一句話把前半五譬與後半正說接成了一條：五譬所說的『不為般若方便所護』，落到心行上，就是這個分別著行。
十九、說義未說名，故命須菩提問。 論主此段解一個結構上的疑：佛在前段已經把無方便的義說盡了，何以又另起一問云何有方便、無方便？論主答：上佛雖說無方便義，不說無方便名；欲令是事明了故，命須菩提問。義是所指之實，名是可持之目；實已指出而目未立，聽者便無從執持傳誦。故佛不憚重複，向須菩提設此一問，把名字立起來。此處亦見一重教法之方便：經文中問與答皆出佛口，論主謂之命須菩提，是佛以問告當機者——一問一答不為增義，只為使人明了。讀經至此不必疑其重沓。
二十、有方便之正義與福慧二護。 論主末段，是全品的收束，也是最可執持的一段：內無我、我所心，外觀一切法空不取相，般若、方便乃至一切種智守護菩薩故，名有方便。內外兩句對舉——內斷我我所，外觀法空而不取相；缺內則有能修之我，缺外則有所修之相。然後論主再把「守護」二字拆開作結：守護者，五波羅蜜邊得功德力，般若波羅蜜邊得智慧力——以二因緣故不失道。全品至此得一總答：八法既具而仍失者，失在偏得功德力而無智慧力；五波羅蜜是所載之寶，般若是浮囊、是火、是莊治、是扶腋之人。二力並行，纔是那條到得了彼岸的船。
不要讀錯
不要把五譬讀成訶責八法。經文說得明白，這些人有信、有忍、有淨心、有深心、有欲、有解、有捨、有精進，論主又逐一訓其次第、稱為諸功德。八法不但不是病，正是這一品所憂惜的本錢——猶如船上的財物，喪失了才叫可惜。所訶者只是無方便、不為般若所護，不是訶其有信有捨。若讀成信等既不可恃，不如不修，便與經意全反。
不要把「不為般若波羅蜜、方便力所守護」讀成外護。守護二字，論主末段訓得清楚：五波羅蜜邊得功德力，般若波羅蜜邊得智慧力——是自身所成的二種力，不是身外另有一位守護者。兩健人扶腋之喻最易被讀成外來的救援，然而論主直說二人者般若及方便，仍是行人自己要修得的法。喻中作人形，是就扶持之相立喻，非謂別有能所。
不要把畢竟空當作終點。論主於二人分工處說得極細：般若波羅蜜能滅諸邪見、煩惱、戲論，將至畢竟空中；方便將出畢竟空。入空是般若的事，出空是方便的事，兩事並非一事。少了出空這一邊，行人正可能因為得力於空而止息——那恰恰就是全品反覆說的墮聲聞、辟支佛地。讀般若諸品，於此一句尤當著眼。
不要把「知此岸、知彼岸」與「遠離此彼岸」讀成相違。經文一面說遠離此彼岸是波羅蜜相，一面說有方便的菩薩知此岸、知彼岸，二語看似相扞。實則所知者正是其遠離：不知者把此岸彼岸執作二物而分別之，故雖行六度而不成波羅蜜；知者了其本不可分別，故行而不著。若把「知」讀成多認得了兩個處所，就把全段讀反了。
不要把坏瓶之壞歸咎於外緣。第二譬通篇不曾提到任何外來的打擊，經文自問自答只給一個理由：是瓶未熟故，還歸於地。合到法上，是未與般若、方便和合。用功人遇退轉，總習慣向外尋找壞的緣由；此譬偏不許如此讀——火候不到，無人打破它也要自己化回泥土去。
修行作用
第一件受用，是一張自檢的表。八法可以逐條問自己：信有沒有落到罪福業因緣果報上，忍有沒有承當得住思惟籌量，淨有沒有斷去邪疑，深有沒有過於淺，欲有沒有一心不欲餘事，解有沒有了了決定知大小，捨有沒有從捨財進到捨慳恚，精進有沒有因捨而能持久。這八條答下來都算有，這一品仍要再問一句：這八樣，有沒有被般若與方便護持著。前八問是有無之問，後一問是成敗之問——本品的全部警策，就在這後一問上。
第二件受用，是「熟」字的工夫。坏瓶熟瓶之別不在盛了多少水，在瓶自身經沒經火。日用中若見自己所修之善遇境即散、遇違即退，不必先怪水多水少，先問火候：所行的六度有沒有與般若方便和合過。而火之為火，是成器不是燒器——修空觀不是要把功德修沒了，是要把那個盛功德的器皿定住。
第三件受用，是老病人之喻的安心處。此喻最堪為久修不得力者說。老是六十二邪見未斷，病是百八煩惱未除——論主既如此訓，則今日行人之老病，正是自己的實況，不必諱。而喻中並沒有等老病痊癒才許起行：兩健人來扶的，就是這副老病之身；他們說的是隨所欲至，我等二人終不相捨。所以用功的方向，是把般若與方便這兩位扶持者請到手裡；起行與扶持同時，經文不立先後。起得來而走不遠，是實情；扶著走得到，也是實情。
第四件受用，是自高之勘。本品給了一個極便於日用的診法：行一度之後，看看心裡有沒有添出一句『這是我的』。念有是施、是我施，繼之以自高；戒、忍、精進、禪定、智慧，無一不可自高。六度都會長我慢，而且修得愈勤、可高之處愈多。日課之後回光一照，若覺得比昨日的自己高出一截，此喻正可用：船已載寶，卻還沒有莊治。
第五件受用，是二力並修的取捨。五波羅蜜邊得功德力，般若波羅蜜邊得智慧力——用功人多半兩邊有所偏。偏於前者，則善事日多而心相日粗，這是坏瓶、是未莊治之船；偏於後者，則見解日高而行持日薄，這是入了畢竟空而出不來。本品的藥方是同時的：內無我我所心，外觀一切法空不取相。內外並用，福慧並得，然後纔說得上不失道。
承衍
本品之骨幹，是兩段經文與兩段論釋。經①佛以五譬明八法之有護無護：大海船破而取與不取浮囊等物，坏瓶取水而未熟還歸於地，熟瓶取水而河井池泉皆安隱，海邊船未莊治而載寶則船與財物各在一處、莊治而載寶則安隱到所至處，末以百二十歲老病人能起而不能遠行、得兩健人扶腋則能至所欲至——五譬皆以『中道衰耗、墮聲聞辟支佛地』與『過二乘地、得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提』兩端對顯。論①先分菩薩為得實相與未得實相二種，次逐字訓信、忍、淨心、深心、欲、解、捨、精進之次第，次明不得般若則世間功德受世間果報而墮二乘，然後標「此中佛自說五譬喻」，逐一配法：船是行者身、浮囊等物是般若方便，瓶是菩薩道、火是般若方便、水是六波羅蜜功德，不補治船是菩薩無方便、寶物是信等功德、善法船是五波羅蜜、寶異處是與本願乖異、大利是一切智等佛法寶，老病人是有信等功德菩薩、老是六十二邪見、病是百八煩惱、從床起是從三界床起、二人是般若及方便而般若將至畢竟空中、方便將出畢竟空。經②佛讚須菩提之問，說以我我所心行六度者不知此岸彼岸而不能到薩婆若，次自設云何無方便之問而明六度皆成自高，次自設云何有方便之問而明無我我所心、不自高、知此岸彼岸則疾得無上道。論②釋佛可須菩提意而更說失行因緣，明分別著行是為失；釋佛說義未說名故命須菩提問；末以內無我我所心、外觀法空不取相結有方便之義，並以五波羅蜜邊得功德力、般若波羅蜜邊得智慧力二因緣收全品。
本品與前後諸品之義脈，可見者有二線。其一，本品承前品所說般若與方便並行之義而專以譬喻出之：前此諸品廣明般若之體與行相，本品則轉就行人中途之成敗立論，故全品不別立新法目，八法、六度、二乘地皆是舊目，所新者唯在『有護無護』一判。其二，本品所立之『無方便／有方便』一對，其名至本品之末方由佛向須菩提設問而正式標出——論主明言上佛雖說無方便義、不說無方便名，故本品實為此一名目之立處；其後諸品凡言方便力守護者，皆可溯此。
古德於本品之科判，有一處與論文計數不同，並錄如次，不作判定。本論論①明言「此中佛自說五譬喻」，其下配法之目亦依五；而吉藏《大品經義疏》釋本品則歸為四譬，謂第一譬明依二慧不依二慧故度生死海不度生死海，第二譬明得二慧未得二慧故得諸功德不得功德，第三明得二慧不得二慧故遂本願不遂本願，第四明有二慧無二慧故能至佛道不能至佛。吉藏於此自設問答以通之：若就得失為論應有八譬，得失合論則應四譬，云何五譬？其自答謂論開老人一譬為二，故成五。是則四之與五，繫於得失合論與老人一譬開合之異，非謂經文有二本。今本帙依論主之文作五，吉藏之四譬科及其自通之說，並錄於此，其傳本品題異稱與校勘諸事，詳考據層。
又，吉藏疏於本品之前更立一重品組之科：以本品為其下四品之首，謂此下廣明中下二根人之行相，本品舉法譬而勸其推失修得，其後三品次第明憑善知識、標大果、如如而學。此為古德判釋，誌其說而不判其是非，讀者可合前後諸品觀之。
Parables: Why, the Eight Dharmas Being Complete, One Still Wastes Away Midway; Why the Float and the Corpse Are Taken Together with the Plank and the Vessel; Where the Difference between the Unfired Pot and the Fired Pot Lies; Why the Ship Not Yet Fitted Out and Repaired Loses Its Treasure; Why the Old Sick Man Can Get Up but Cannot Travel Far; Why the Two Strong Men Are Prajñā and Skilful Means; Why Practising the Six Perfections with a Mind of I and Mine Instead Becomes Self-Exaltation; Why Being Far from This Shore and the Further Shore Is Said to Be the Mark of the Perfections; Why, the Buddha Having Already Spoken the Meaning of Being without Skilful Means, He Again Commands Subhūti to Ask Its Name; and Why Guarding Is Divided into the Two Powers of Merit and Wisdom
What Is Being Asked
This whole chapter has only one question, and it is the one question practitioners least wish to face: the resolve is real, the faith is real, and acceptance, a pure mind, a deep mind, wish, understanding, relinquishment, and vigour are all real as well—all eight are present; why, then, does one still break down halfway?
The sūtra text does not answer from principle; it first strikes five comparisons from matters of fact. When a ship breaks up in the great sea, if a person does not reach out to take hold of a plank, a vessel, a float, or a corpse, he sinks in the sea; if he takes hold, he reaches the further shore. When water is carried in an unfired pot, before the water has been brought anywhere the pot has already turned back into mud; when water is carried in a fired pot, whether from river, well, pond, or spring, it carries it safely. When a ship at the seashore, not yet fitted out and repaired, is loaded with goods, the ship sinks in one place and the goods sink in another, and the merchant loses his heavy treasure; when it is fitted out and repaired and only then put into the water to carry the treasure, it is sure to reach the shore safely. The last comparison spares no one's face: an old man a hundred and twenty years old, his faculties already ripe, and in addition with illnesses of wind, cold, and heat, or mixed illnesses; the Buddha asks Subhūti, can this man get up from his bed? Subhūti answers that he cannot; the Buddha presses once more: suppose he too could get up—what then? Subhūti answers: he could get up, but he could not walk ten leagues or twenty. And this same old man—when two strong men support him under the arms, one on each side, and say, go wherever you wish, we two will never leave you—is able to reach the place he wishes to go.
The five comparisons point to the same thing: the eight dharmas are the treasure carried, the practitioner's body is the ship, and prajñāpāramitā and the power of skilful means are the float, the firing, the fitting out, and the two men who support him under the arms. Without this layer, the eight dharmas are not false; they are only unguarded; and merit that is unguarded wastes away midway: this person, not having reached the omniscience of all kinds, first takes realisation on the śrāvaka ground or the pratyekabuddha ground. The sūtra text uses one phrase for this: wasting away midway.
When the treatise-author takes over, he pushes the question one layer further in. He first divides bodhisattvas into two kinds: one kind has already obtained the real mark of all dharmas; the other has not yet obtained the real mark but has faith and the other eight dharmas—and it is exactly this second kind of person that the five parables speak of. Then he glosses the eight dharmas one by one in their sequence: faith, and after it acceptance; acceptance, and after it purity; purity, and after it shallow and deep; when the four matters are complete, then there is wish, there is understanding, there is relinquishment, there is vigour. Then he utters the pivotal sentence of the whole chapter: here the Buddha himself speaks five parables—the comparisons are not the clever invention of a maker of parables; they are a lock the Buddha himself has opened; all the treatise-author has to do is restore each implement to the dharma it stands for: the ship is the practitioner's body, the float and the other things are prajñā and skilful means, the pot is the bodhisattva path, the fire is prajñā and skilful means, not repairing the ship is the bodhisattva without skilful means, the old sick man is the bodhisattva who has faith and the other merits, and the two persons are prajñā and skilful means.
In the latter half of the chapter the Buddha turns the same matter from comparison to direct statement. A person who practises the six perfections with a mind of I and mine, when giving, thinks: I am the giver, I give to this person, I give this thing; and so on up to thinking, when cultivating wisdom, this is my wisdom—this person is not only unguarded but will also exalt himself by each perfection. The Buddha first states the loss, and then himself sets a question: what is being without skilful means? Having answered it, he sets another question: what is having skilful means? The crux of the answer is only one sentence—the mark of the six perfections is being far from this shore and the further shore, yet this person insists on discriminating this shore and the further shore, and this is the loss. At the end the treatise-author gathers it into a clean formula: within, no mind of I and mine; without, contemplating all dharmas as empty and not grasping at marks; and so prajñā, skilful means, and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds guard him, and this is called having skilful means; and what is called guarding is this: on the side of the five perfections over there one obtains the power of merit, on the side of prajñāpāramitā here one obtains the power of wisdom—the two powers of merit and wisdom are complete, and therefore one does not lose the path.
Passage by Passage
1. The first parable—a ship breaks up in the great sea: taking hold and not taking hold. First look at how the comparison itself is told. The ship has broken up; the sūtra text does not say to go and build a new ship, only to take hold of a plank, take hold of a vessel, take hold of a float, take hold of a corpse. These four are all things still within reach after the ship breaks up, and even a corpse is counted among them—clearly what matters is not whether the thing is precious or worthless but whether it can keep a person afloat. Of not taking hold, the sūtra text speaks decisively: they will not reach the further shore; they sink in the sea and die. Of taking hold, it speaks just as decisively: they will never sink and die; safe and unhindered, they reach the further shore. Matched to the Dharma: if a person who seeks the path of the Buddha has only faith and delight, but does not rely on deep prajñāpāramitā to write it out, read it, recite it, and rightly recollect it, and does not rely on the five perfections and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds, this person is one who does not take hold of the float: it is not that he never boarded the ship; it is that his hands are empty when the ship breaks up. Conversely, one who for the sake of anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi has faith, acceptance, a pure mind, a deep mind, wish, understanding, relinquishment, and vigour, and further relies on deep prajñāpāramitā to write out, uphold, read, recite, expound, and rightly recollect it, and is guarded by deep prajñā and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds, will never waste away midway; he passes beyond the śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha grounds and can purify buddha-worlds and bring beings to maturity. Here one should note the sequence of the sūtra text: having faith and delight is the starting point, not an insurance; the eight dharmas are the capital, prajñā is the float. However thick the capital, it does not float.
2. The second parable—water carried in an unfired pot: because it is not yet fired, it returns to the earth. The sūtra text sets its own question and answers it: why does an unfired pot that carries water surely crumble? Because this pot is not yet fired, and so it returns to the earth. This sentence should be read slowly. The pot is not broken by an outside force; its original earthen nature has not been fixed by fire, and on meeting water it goes back to mud—the cause and condition of its ruin lies not in the water but in the pot itself not yet being finished. Matched to the Dharma: though the bodhisattva has the mind of awakening, though he has faith and the other eight dharmas, if he is not guarded by prajñāpāramitā and the power of skilful means, not guarded by the six perfections, not guarded by inner emptiness and so on up to the emptiness of non-existent and existent dharmas, by the four foundations of mindfulness and so on up to the eight limbs of the noble path, by the ten powers of the Buddha and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds, know that this person wastes away midway and falls to the śrāvaka or pratyekabuddha ground. Do not read this parable as an outer Māra coming to ruin him: here not a single outer condition is even mentioned; the whole mechanism of ruin lies in the self not yet having been tempered by fire. Of the five parables of the whole chapter this is the only one that speaks of ruin from within, and it comes closest to the actual situation of one who applies himself.
3. The third parable—water carried in a fired pot: river, well, pond, and spring are all safe. The reverse of the preceding parable. The sūtra text again asks and answers itself: why is it safe? Because this pot is fully fired. Look particularly at that string of river, well, pond, and spring—the settings are of every kind, but the pot is one and the same pot; a pot fully fired can hold water at whatever waterside it is taken to. Matched to the Dharma: one who has faith, acceptance, a pure mind, a deep mind, wish, understanding, relinquishment, and vigour, and is guarded by prajñāpāramitā and the power of skilful means, guarded by meditative concentration, vigour, patience, morality, giving, and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds, does not therefore waste away midway; he passes beyond the śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha grounds, can purify worlds and bring beings to maturity, and attains anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi. Taking the second and third parables together, the word 「熟」 tr. "fired" is the most important word of practice in the whole chapter: the same eight dharmas, the same resolve—whether the firing has been reached or not makes two different endings. And what the fire is, the treatise-author will point out later of himself.
4. The fourth parable—loading treasure on a ship not yet fitted out and repaired, and on one fitted out and repaired. This parable has one layer more than the first three: not only does the person sink, the treasure sinks too, and they sink apart—ship and goods each in a different place. Here the sūtra text names the cause of the illness plainly: because this merchant has no power of skilful means, he loses his heavy treasure. Matching it to the Dharma, the Buddha himself glosses the two key terms: the great precious treasure is the omniscience of all kinds; wasting away is falling to the śrāvaka or pratyekabuddha ground. So what this parable stresses is not whether the practitioner himself lives or dies, but that the treasure of merit the ship was meant to carry to the further shore comes to nothing. The reverse holds as well: one who has wisdom and skilful means fits out and repairs a great ship at the edge of the sea, then pushes it into the water, loads the treasure, and sets off, and is sure to arrive safely where he is going. Fitting out and repairing belongs to the time before the ship goes into the water—skilful means is not an emergency measure after something has gone wrong; it is a practice that should be cultivated before setting out.
5. The fifth parable—the question about the old sick man: he can get up but cannot travel far. This is the only parable in the whole chapter that is not spoken by the Buddha alone but brought out through two rounds of question and answer between the Buddha and Subhūti, and so it must be read following the questions and answers. The Buddha first sets up the person: a hundred and twenty years old, aged in years and ripe in faculties, and moreover having illnesses of wind, cold, and heat, or mixed illnesses; then he asks Subhūti whether this person can get up from his bed. Subhūti answers crisply: he cannot. But the Buddha will not let it rest there, and presses once more: suppose this person could get up—what then? Subhūti thereupon supplies the crucial other half: though this person could get up, he could not travel far, ten leagues or twenty, because of his age and illness. This back-and-forth grinds the edge of the parable sharp—had the answer been only that he cannot get up, the parable's meaning would stop at utter powerlessness; the Buddha's one further question forces out the more exact reality: he can get up but cannot walk far. Few who apply themselves are utterly unable to get out of bed; many can get up but cannot walk far. These two rounds of question and answer are no ornament; the Buddha himself is calibrating the parable's meaning to a hair's breadth.
6. The matching of the old sick man to the Dharma, and the two strong men who support him under the arms. The Buddha matches this to the Dharma: though one has the mind of awakening and the eight dharmas, if one is not guarded by prajñāpāramitā and the power of skilful means, and so on up to not being guarded by the omniscience of all kinds, know that this person falls midway to the śrāvaka or pratyekabuddha ground; and he states the reason once more—why? Because he is not guarded by prajñāpāramitā and the power of skilful means. Then comes the warmest turn in the whole chapter: this same old man, when he wishes to get up and go, has two strong men who each support him under one arm and say to him: have no fear of difficulty; go wherever you wish; we two will never leave you. And so he reaches the place he wants to go. The measure of this turn must be seen clearly: the sūtra text does not say he must first wait for his age and illness to be cured; it only says that, having support, he goes wherever he wishes. So it is with prajñā and skilful means for the practitioner—support comes before arrival; supported, this old and sick body walks all the way to what is called anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi.
7. The treatise-author's explanation—bodhisattvas are of two kinds. Here the five parables of the sūtra text are finished, and the treatise-author begins to explain. His first sentence does not explain the parables; it first establishes a division: bodhisattvas are of two kinds—first, those who have obtained the real mark of all dharmas; second, those who, though they have not yet obtained the real mark, have within the path of the Buddha faith, acceptance, a pure mind, a deep mind, wish, understanding, relinquishment, and vigour. This division resolves the doubt a reader most easily gives rise to: since the Buddha is speaking of bodhisattvas, why does he speak of them as so precarious and fragile? Answer: what the five parables discuss is the second kind of person. Those who have obtained the real mark are like the fired pot, like the ship fitted out and repaired, and lie outside the scope of these parables from the start; it is those who are on the road and have not yet obtained the real mark who are the object of the Buddha's concern. With this division set up first and the parables explained after, the object of the whole chapter will not be misread.
8. The sequence of faith, acceptance, a pure mind, a deep mind, wish, understanding, relinquishment, and vigour. The treatise-author glosses the eight dharmas word by word, and glosses them in a most orderly sequence. Faith is faith in sin and merit, karma, causes and conditions, and their fruits and retribution, faith that by practising the six perfections one attains anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi. Some, though they have faith in the path of the Buddha, once they consider and reckon, cannot accept it in their minds—hence it speaks of having acceptance. Some, though they accept, have not cut off wrong doubts, so the mind is turbid and impure—hence it speaks of having purity. Some, though they have faith, acceptance, and a pure mind, are shallow or deep—hence it speaks of a deep mind. Because of the causes and conditions of the four matters, with one mind they wish to attain the unsurpassed path and wish for nothing else—hence it speaks of having wish. Clearly and decisively they know that the unsurpassed path is great and the other matters of the world are small—hence it speaks of having understanding. Because wish and understanding fix the mind, they relinquish wealth and relinquish evil minds, miserliness, anger, and the other afflictions—hence it speaks of relinquishment. Because of relinquishing, they can always be vigorous. The eight dharmas are not eight virtues set side by side; they are one road on which each gives rise to the next: faith is the gate, acceptance is being able to bear it, purity is doubt cut off, depth is not retreating into the shallow, wish is resolve made one, understanding is the measure settled, relinquishment is actual practice, vigour is endurance. Reading to here and looking back at the five parables, one knows that what the Buddha is concerned about is not that the practitioner's merits are too few, but that such a road, already taking shape, can still collapse for lack of one ingredient.
9. Why, with the eight dharmas, one still loses—without prajñā one loses the bodhisattva path. Here the treatise-author points out where the illness lies: if one does not obtain prajñāpāramitā, then either when the body breaks up and life ends, or when spoiled and ruined by an evil friend, one loses the bodhisattva path; since what one has cultivated is worldly merit, one receives worldly fruits and retribution, and then falls to the śrāvaka or pratyekabuddha ground and cannot reach the unsurpassed path. This one sentence gathers the losses of all five parables above into one place. Look especially at the sentence 「世間功德故受世間果報」 tr. "because of worldly merit one receives worldly fruits and retribution": the merit formed by the eight dharmas does not go to waste; it bears fruit just the same, only the fruit is borne in the world—it does not vanish; it turns aside. What makes wasting away midway so fearsome lies precisely in its looking like a harvest.
10. Here the Buddha himself speaks five parables. This sentence of the treatise-author's is the pivot of the whole chapter: the way these five comparisons are to be understood was not matched to them by later people; the Buddha himself spoke it. And so the four sections below each restore them in turn, and each section does only one thing—returns the implements to their places in the Dharma. Here the count follows the treatise-author's text as five, and his reckoning is not altered.
11. The ship, the float, and the other things. The treatise-author's gloss is extremely brief: 「船」 tr. "the ship" is the practitioner's body. 「浮囊等物」 tr. "the float and the other things" are prajñā and skilful means. Two sentences, no more, yet at a stroke they set the centre of gravity of the first parable right. In the parable of the broken ship, people most easily take the ship as what they rely on; the treatise-author insists that the ship is this very body of the practitioner himself—the body was always going to break, and to count on its not breaking is a false thought. What one truly relies on is the float that the hand can hold, that is, prajñā and skilful means. Looking back once more at why the sūtra text allows even a corpse to be taken hold of: what is taken need not be precious, so long as it floats; and for the practitioner, the one thing that floats is prajñā and skilful means.
12. The pot, the fire, and the water. Of the four sections of matching, this one is the densest: 「瓶」 tr. "the pot" is the bodhisattva path. Prajñā and skilful means are the fire. Because it has not come together with prajñā and skilful means, it cannot receive and hold the water of the merits of the six perfections up to the unsurpassed path. Three things fall into place at once—the pot is the path one walks, the fire is prajñā and skilful means, the water is the merit of the six perfections. And so the difference between the unfired pot and the fired pot receives a sure explanation: it is not a difference in how much water of merit there is, but whether this path has been tempered by the fire of prajñā and skilful means. The word 「熟」 tr. "fired" left over from the second and third parables finds its explanation here. One misreading must also be cleared away in passing: fire here does not mean burning up; it means making into a vessel—the fire of prajñā does not come to burn away the merits of the six perfections; it lets the vessel that can hold merit stand firm.
13. Not repairing the ship, and the treasure in a different place. The treatise-author's matching of the fourth parable is the most detailed, four items in a row: 「不補治船」 tr. "not fitting out and repairing the ship" is the bodhisattva without skilful means; faith and the other merits are the treasure goods, and the five perfections and the other wholesome dharmas are the ship; the treasure in a different place is going against the original vow, either receiving the pleasures of humans and gods or falling into the two vehicles; the great benefit is the treasure of the dharmas of the Buddha, omniscience and the rest. One must see the division of labour between this and the first parable: the ship of the first parable is the practitioner's body, while the ship of this parable is the five perfections and the other wholesome dharmas—the same word 「船」 tr. "ship," which the treatise-author matches differently in the two places—once to the practitioner's body, once to the wholesome dharmas—and the reader must not merge them. And the three Chinese characters 「寶異處」 tr. "the treasure in a different place" are especially important: the goods have not vanished, they have only landed somewhere else, and the treatise-author glosses this directly as going against the original vow—the merit one has cultivated receives the pleasures of humans and gods or ends up in the two vehicles, and that is exactly the actual state of ship and goods each being in a different place.
14. The old sick man and the two persons. The last section of matching is the longest, and the treatise-author takes it apart word by word: 「老病人」 tr. "the old sick man" is the bodhisattva who has faith and the other merits; because he has not cut off the sixty-two wrong views he is called old; because he has not cut off the hundred and eight and the other afflictions he is called sick; getting up from the bed is getting up from the bed of the three realms: I shall become a Buddha; because of the causes and conditions of wrong views and afflictions he cannot complete the bodhisattva path; the two persons are prajñā and skilful means. Last he adds the division of labour between the two persons: prajñāpāramitā can extinguish all wrong views, afflictions, and idle discourse, and bring one into ultimate emptiness; skilful means brings one out of ultimate emptiness. These two sentences are the summit of the doctrine of the whole chapter. Since old and sick have been glossed as wrong views and afflictions, then 「從床起」 tr. "getting up from the bed" is naturally not the getting up of the body; it is getting up from the bed of the three realms and making the vow, I shall become a Buddha; though the vow has been made, wrong views and afflictions are still in him, and so he cannot complete the bodhisattva path—not that he is unwilling to go, but that he cannot go far. And the two who support him divide their work clearly: prajñā brings the person into ultimate emptiness, skilful means brings the person out of ultimate emptiness. Without the former, the practitioner cannot get out of wrong views and idle discourse; without the latter, the practitioner stops within emptiness—and that is exactly the place of falling into the two vehicles. The sūtra text says the two men each support him under one arm and will never leave him; the doctrinal weight lies right here: lacking either side, the person still cannot get there.
15. The Buddha praises Subhūti—practising the six perfections with a mind of I and mine. The sūtra text turns to its latter half. The Buddha first praises: Good, good, Subhūti! You have asked the Buddha about this matter for the sake of the bodhisattva-mahāsattvas—which shows that what follows arises in response to the earlier question and is not a separate matter. What he speaks of is the person who, from the time of first setting his mind on it, has practised the six perfections with a mind of I and mine: when giving he thinks, I am the giver, I give to this person, I give this thing; in keeping the precepts, cultivating patience, vigour, entering meditation, and cultivating wisdom, it is the same with each, and so on up to thinking, there is this wisdom, this is my wisdom. The Buddha at once gives the criterion, and the criterion is only one sentence: in dānapāramitā there is no such discrimination; being far from this shore and the further shore is the mark of dānapāramitā; śīla and so on up to prajñā are likewise. And so the conclusion comes quite naturally: this person does not know this shore and does not know the further shore; he is not guarded by dānapāramitā and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds; he falls to the śrāvaka or pratyekabuddha ground and cannot reach sarvajñā. Here one misreading must be cleared away: what the Buddha rebukes is not giving and keeping the precepts themselves, but the discriminating mind of I and mine present in practising the six perfections; so long as the discriminating mind is there, the six perfections are merely six activities and do not become perfections—because the mark of a perfection is precisely being far from this shore and the further shore.
16. What is being without skilful means—all six perfections become self-exaltation. The Buddha sets his own question: what is it for a person who seeks the path of the Buddha to be without skilful means? The answer is almost identical in wording to the preceding section and goes one layer further—the preceding section said he thinks there is this giving, this is my giving; this section adds three more Chinese characters after every perfection: by this giving exalting oneself, by these precepts exalting oneself, by this patience exalting oneself, by this vigour exalting oneself, by this meditative concentration exalting oneself, by this wisdom exalting oneself. The six perfections one by one—not one escapes. This step forward must be seen clearly: the mind of I and mine is the root of the illness, self-exaltation is its symptom; where there is a self, the good one cultivates turns round and swells the self, and the more perfections, the higher the self. Here the sūtra text states the mark of the six perfections once more—being far from this shore and the further shore is the mark of dānapāramitā, and so on up to being far from this shore and the further shore is the mark of prajñāpāramitā; why? Because in prajñāpāramitā there is no such recollection and discrimination—and then concludes: he does not know this shore and does not know the further shore; he is not guarded by the six perfections and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds; he either falls into the path of the śrāvaka or falls into the path of the pratyekabuddha, and cannot reach sarvajñā. The final sentence joins it back to the main vein of the whole chapter: because the bodhisattva-mahāsattva is not guarded by prajñāpāramitā and the power of skilful means, he either falls to the śrāvaka ground or falls into the path of the pratyekabuddha—not one word different from the conclusion of the five parables.
17. What is having skilful means—not exalting oneself, and knowing this shore and the further shore. The positive section, its syntax paired with the preceding section and reversed. The bodhisattva from the very beginning gives with the power of skilful means, gives without a mind of I and mine, and so on up to cultivating wisdom without a mind of I and mine; he does not think, I have this giving, this is my giving; he does not exalt himself by this giving; and so on up to prajñāpāramitā, likewise. The sūtra text then sets seven 「不念」 tr. "does not think" in a row, negating one by one giving, to whom one gives, with what thing one gives, keeping the precepts, patience, vigour, meditative concentration, and cultivating wisdom—not that he does not practise, but that he practises without thinking of it. The reason is still that one sentence: in this dānapāramitā there is no such discrimination; being far from this shore and the further shore is the mark of dānapāramitā; and so on up to: in prajñāpāramitā there is no such recollection, imagining, and discrimination. And so the result is wholly reversed: this bodhisattva-mahāsattva knows this shore and knows the further shore; because he is guarded by the six perfections and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds, he does not fall to the śrāvaka or pratyekabuddha ground, reaches sarvajñā, and swiftly attains anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi. Here there is one point extremely easy to miss: the one without skilful means 「不知此岸、不知彼岸」 tr. "does not know this shore and does not know the further shore"; the one with skilful means 「知此岸、知彼岸」 tr. "knows this shore and knows the further shore"—yet the mark of a perfection is 「遠離此彼岸」 tr. "being far from this shore and the further shore." Clearly what is called knowing is not taking this shore and the further shore as two real places and discriminating them; it is precisely knowing that one is far from them; and the one who does not know fails to know precisely because he treats them as things to be discriminated. The contrast of 「知」 tr. "knowing" with 「不知」 tr. "not knowing" rests wholly on this layer.
18. The treatise-author explains the Buddha's further speaking of the causes and conditions of failing in practice. Opening up the latter half, the treatise-author first fixes its place: at that time the Buddha approved Subhūti's intent and spoke further of the causes and conditions of failing in practice. The word approved matters—the Buddha continued only after approving the intent of Subhūti's question, and so the latter half does not open a new topic; it is where the earlier question receives its deep answer. The causes and conditions of failing in practice spoken of are these: though the bodhisattva practises faith and the other wholesome dharmas, he still does not attain the unsurpassed path, namely because he practises the six perfections with a mind of I and mine. The treatise-author at once points out where the knot lies: here there is no discriminating this shore and the further shore, for the mark of being far from them is prajñāpāramitā; but to practise with discrimination and clinging is the loss. One sentence joins the five parables of the first half and the direct teaching of the second half into a single thread: what the five parables call ‘not being guarded by prajñā and skilful means’, when it comes down to the mind's practice, is exactly this practising with discrimination and clinging.
19. The meaning spoken but not the name, and so Subhūti is commanded to ask. In this section the treatise-author resolves a structural doubt: in the preceding section the Buddha has already fully spoken the meaning of being without skilful means; why does he open a separate question, what is having skilful means and what is being without skilful means? The treatise-author answers: above, the Buddha, though he spoke the meaning of being without skilful means, did not speak the name of being without skilful means; wishing to make this matter clear, he commanded Subhūti to ask. The meaning is the reality pointed to; the name is the heading one can hold; when the reality has been pointed out but the heading not yet established, the hearers have nothing by which to hold it and hand it on in recitation. So the Buddha does not shrink from repetition, and sets this question toward Subhūti, establishing the name. Here, too, a layer of the skilful means of teaching can be seen: in the sūtra text both question and answer come from the Buddha's mouth, and the treatise-author calls it commanding Subhūti—the Buddha uses a question to address the listener the occasion is meant for; the question and answer are not to add meaning, only to make people understand clearly. Reading the sūtra to this point, one need not suspect it of redundancy.
20. The true meaning of having skilful means, and the two guardings of merit and wisdom. The treatise-author's final section is the conclusion of the whole chapter and also the section most worth holding on to: within, having no mind of I and mine; without, contemplating all dharmas as empty and not grasping at marks; because prajñā and skilful means and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds guard the bodhisattva, this is called having skilful means. The inner and outer sentences are set against each other—within, cutting off I and mine; without, contemplating dharmas as empty and not grasping at marks; lacking the inner, there is a self that cultivates; lacking the outer, there are marks of what is cultivated. Then the treatise-author takes apart the two Chinese characters 「守護」 tr. "guarding" to conclude: as for guarding, on the side of the five perfections one obtains the power of merit, on the side of prajñāpāramitā one obtains the power of wisdom—by these two causes and conditions one does not lose the path. Here the whole chapter receives its overall answer: why those who have the eight dharmas complete still lose is that they have one-sidedly obtained the power of merit and are without the power of wisdom; the five perfections are the treasure carried, prajñā is the float, the fire, the fitting out, the persons who support one under the arms. Only when the two powers go together is it the ship that can reach the further shore.
Do Not Misread
Do not read the five parables as a rebuke of the eight dharmas. The sūtra text says clearly that these people have faith, have acceptance, have a pure mind, have a deep mind, have wish, have understanding, have relinquishment, have vigour, and the treatise-author further glosses their sequence one by one and calls them merits. Far from being an illness, the eight dharmas are precisely the capital this chapter is anxious to preserve—like the goods on the ship, whose loss alone is what makes it a pity. What is rebuked is only being without skilful means and not being guarded by prajñā; it is not a rebuke of having faith and having relinquishment. If one reads it as: since faith and the rest cannot be relied on, better not to cultivate them—that is the exact opposite of the sūtra's intent.
Do not read 「不為般若波羅蜜、方便力所守護」 tr. "not guarded by prajñāpāramitā and the power of skilful means" as protection from outside. The treatise-author's final section glosses the two characters for guarding clearly: on the side of the five perfections one obtains the power of merit, on the side of prajñāpāramitā one obtains the power of wisdom—these are two kinds of power formed in oneself, not some other guardian outside the body. The simile of the two strong men supporting him under the arms is most easily read as a rescue arriving from outside, yet the treatise-author says straight out that the two persons are prajñā and skilful means, which are still dharmas the practitioner himself must cultivate and attain. That the simile takes human form is to set up the simile on the mark of support; it does not mean there is, apart from him, a supporter and a supported.
Do not take ultimate emptiness as the end point. On the division of labour between the two persons the treatise-author speaks very finely: prajñāpāramitā can extinguish all wrong views, afflictions, and idle discourse, and bring one into ultimate emptiness; skilful means brings one out of ultimate emptiness. Entering emptiness is the work of prajñā, leaving emptiness is the work of skilful means, and the two works are not one work. Lacking the side of leaving emptiness, the practitioner may well come to rest precisely because he has gained strength from emptiness—and that is exactly the falling to the śrāvaka or pratyekabuddha ground that the whole chapter repeats again and again. In reading the prajñā chapters, this sentence above all deserves attention.
Do not read 「知此岸、知彼岸」 tr. "knows this shore and knows the further shore" and 「遠離此彼岸」 tr. "being far from this shore and the further shore" as contradicting each other. The sūtra text on the one hand says that being far from this shore and the further shore is the mark of a perfection, and on the other says that the bodhisattva with skilful means knows this shore and knows the further shore; the two statements seem to clash. In fact what is known is precisely their being far off: the one who does not know grasps this shore and the further shore as two things and discriminates them, and so, though he practises the six perfections, they do not become perfections; the one who knows understands that they were never to be discriminated, and so practises without clinging. If one reads 「知」 tr. "knowing" as having come to recognise two more places, one has read the whole section backwards.
Do not blame the ruin of the unfired pot on outer conditions. The second parable throughout never mentions any blow from outside; the sūtra text, asking and answering itself, gives only one reason: because this pot is not yet fired, it returns to the earth. Matched to the Dharma, it is not having come together with prajñā and skilful means. When those who apply themselves meet with regression, they habitually look outside for the cause of the ruin; this parable refuses precisely that reading—if the firing has not been reached, even with no one breaking it, it will of itself turn back into mud.
Bearing on Practice
The first use is a checklist for examining oneself. The eight dharmas can be put to oneself item by item: has faith come down to sin and merit, karma, causes and conditions, and their fruits and retribution; can acceptance bear up under considering and reckoning; has purity cut off wrong doubts; has depth gone beyond the shallow; is wish single-minded, wishing for nothing else; does understanding clearly and decisively know the great and the small; has relinquishment advanced from relinquishing wealth to relinquishing miserliness and anger; is vigour, through relinquishment, able to endure. Even if all eight are answered yes, this chapter still asks one more question: are these eight guarded by prajñā and skilful means? The first eight questions ask whether one has them; the last asks whether one succeeds or fails—the chapter's entire admonition lies in this last question.
The second use is the practice of the word 「熟」 tr. "fired." The difference between the unfired pot and the fired pot lies not in how much water it holds but in whether the pot itself has been through the fire. In daily life, if one sees that the good one cultivates scatters on meeting circumstances and retreats on meeting opposition, one need not first blame the water for being more or less; first ask about the firing: have the six perfections one practises ever come together with prajñā and skilful means? And the fire, as fire, makes the vessel rather than burning it—cultivating the contemplation of emptiness is not meant to cultivate the merit away; it is meant to fix firm the vessel that holds the merit.
The third use is the place of ease in the simile of the old sick man. This simile is best told to those who have long practised without gaining strength. Old is the sixty-two wrong views not yet cut off; sick is the hundred and eight afflictions not yet removed—since the treatise-author glosses it so, the age and illness of today's practitioner is just his own actual condition, and there is no need to hide it. And in the simile there is no waiting for age and illness to be cured before he is allowed to get up and go: what the two strong men come to support is this very old and sick body; what they say is, go wherever you wish; we two will never leave you. So the direction of practice is to take these two supporters, prajñā and skilful means, into one's hands; getting up and going and being supported happen together, and the sūtra text sets no before and after. Able to get up but unable to walk far—that is the actual condition; supported, one gets there—that too is the actual condition.
The fourth use is the examination of self-exaltation. This chapter gives a diagnostic most convenient for daily life: after practising one perfection, see whether one's mind has added a sentence, ‘this is mine’. One thinks there is this giving, this is my giving, and follows it with self-exaltation; morality, patience, vigour, meditative concentration, and wisdom—there is not one by which one cannot exalt oneself. All six perfections can swell self-conceit, and the more diligently one cultivates them, the more there is to be exalted by. After the day's practice, turn the light back once: if one feels a notch higher than one's self of yesterday, this simile is just the one to use: the ship has already been loaded with treasure but has not yet been fitted out and repaired.
The fifth use is the weighing of cultivating the two powers together. On the side of the five perfections one obtains the power of merit, on the side of prajñāpāramitā one obtains the power of wisdom—most who apply themselves lean to one side. Leaning to the former, good deeds grow daily more numerous while the marks of the mind grow daily coarser: this is the unfired pot, the ship not yet fitted out and repaired. Leaning to the latter, views grow daily loftier while practice and observance grow daily thinner: this is having entered ultimate emptiness and being unable to come out. This chapter's prescription is simultaneous: within, no mind of I and mine; without, contemplating all dharmas as empty and not grasping at marks. Using inner and outer together, obtaining merit and wisdom together—only then can one speak of not losing the path.
Further Resonances
The backbone of this chapter is two passages of sūtra and two passages of treatise. In Sūtra ① the Buddha, with five parables, makes clear whether the eight dharmas are guarded or unguarded: when a ship breaks up in the great sea, taking hold or not taking hold of the float and the other things; carrying water in an unfired pot, which, not yet fired, returns to the earth; carrying water in a fired pot, safe at river, well, pond, and spring; loading treasure on a ship at the edge of the sea not yet fitted out and repaired, so that ship and goods are each in a different place, and loading treasure on one fitted out and repaired, so that it arrives safely where it is going; and lastly the old sick man of a hundred and twenty, who can get up but cannot travel far, and who, supported under the arms by two strong men, can reach where he wishes to go—all five parables set out, in contrast, the two ends of ‘wasting away midway and falling to the śrāvaka or pratyekabuddha ground’ and ‘passing beyond the grounds of the two vehicles and attaining anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi’. Treatise ① first divides bodhisattvas into two kinds, those who have obtained the real mark and those who have not yet obtained it; next glosses word by word the sequence of faith, acceptance, a pure mind, a deep mind, wish, understanding, relinquishment, and vigour; next makes clear that without prajñā worldly merit receives worldly fruits and retribution and one falls into the two vehicles; and then, marking 「此中佛自說五譬喻」 tr. "here the Buddha himself speaks five parables," matches them to the Dharma one by one: the ship is the practitioner's body, the float and the other things are prajñā and skilful means; the pot is the bodhisattva path, the fire is prajñā and skilful means, the water is the merit of the six perfections; not repairing the ship is the bodhisattva without skilful means, the treasure goods are faith and the other merits, the ship of wholesome dharmas is the five perfections, the treasure in a different place is going against the original vow, the great benefit is the treasure of the dharmas of the Buddha, omniscience and the rest; the old sick man is the bodhisattva who has faith and the other merits, old is the sixty-two wrong views, sick is the hundred and eight afflictions, getting up from the bed is getting up from the bed of the three realms, and the two persons are prajñā and skilful means, prajñā bringing one into ultimate emptiness and skilful means bringing one out of ultimate emptiness. In Sūtra ② the Buddha praises Subhūti's question and says that one who practises the six perfections with a mind of I and mine does not know this shore or the further shore and cannot reach sarvajñā; next he himself sets the question of what is being without skilful means and makes clear that all six perfections become self-exaltation; next he himself sets the question of what is having skilful means and makes clear that with no mind of I and mine, not exalting oneself, and knowing this shore and the further shore, one swiftly attains the unsurpassed path. Treatise ② explains that the Buddha approved Subhūti's intent and spoke further of the causes and conditions of failing in practice, making clear that to practise with discrimination and clinging is the loss; explains that the Buddha spoke the meaning but not the name, and so commanded Subhūti to ask; and at the end concludes the meaning of having skilful means with within, no mind of I and mine, and without, contemplating dharmas as empty and not grasping at marks, and gathers up the whole chapter with the two causes and conditions of obtaining the power of merit on the side of the five perfections and obtaining the power of wisdom on the side of prajñāpāramitā.
In the vein of meaning linking this chapter with the chapters before and after it, two lines can be seen. First, this chapter carries on the meaning, spoken in the preceding chapter, that prajñā and skilful means go together, and sets it out purely by way of parable: the chapters before this set forth at length the substance of prajñā and the marks of its practice, while this chapter turns to the success or failure of the practitioner midway; hence the whole chapter sets up no new dharma headings—the eight dharmas, the six perfections, the grounds of the two vehicles are all old headings, and what is new lies only in the one judgement of ‘guarded or unguarded’. Second, the pair ‘without skilful means / having skilful means’ set up in this chapter has its name formally marked out only at the end of this chapter, when the Buddha sets the question toward Subhūti—the treatise-author says plainly that above, the Buddha, though he spoke the meaning of being without skilful means, did not speak the name of being without skilful means, and so this chapter is in fact where this heading is established; wherever the later chapters speak of being guarded by the power of skilful means, it can be traced back here.
On the division of this chapter by the ancient masters, there is one place where the count differs from the treatise's text; both are recorded below, without judgement. Treatise ① of this treatise says explicitly 「此中佛自說五譬喻」 tr. "here the Buddha himself speaks five parables," and the headings of the matching beneath it also follow five; but Jizang, explaining this chapter in his Commentary on the Larger Sūtra, groups it into four parables, saying that the first parable makes clear that relying or not relying on the two wisdoms is why one crosses or does not cross the sea of birth and death; the second makes clear that having obtained or not yet obtained the two wisdoms is why one obtains the merits or does not obtain merit; the third makes clear that obtaining or not obtaining the two wisdoms is why one fulfils or does not fulfil the original vow; the fourth makes clear that having or not having the two wisdoms is why one can or cannot reach the path of the Buddha. Jizang here sets his own question and answer to reconcile it: if one discusses it in terms of gain and loss, there should be eight parables; if gain and loss are discussed together, there should be four; how then are there five? His own answer is that the treatise opens the one parable of the old man into two, and so there are five. Thus four and five hinge on the difference in whether gain and loss are discussed together and whether the one parable of the old man is opened or joined; it does not mean that the sūtra text exists in two versions. This edition follows the treatise-author's text in counting five; Jizang's four-parable division and his own reconciling account are recorded here side by side; the variant names of this chapter in the transmitted texts and matters of collation are detailed in the Apparatus.
Further, Jizang's Commentary sets up, before this chapter, one more layer of division by groups of chapters: taking this chapter as the head of the four chapters below it, it says that from here on it sets forth at length the marks of practice of people of middling and lower faculties; this chapter raises dharma and parable to urge them to push away loss and cultivate gain, and the three chapters after it make clear in turn relying on the good friend, marking out the great fruit, and learning in accordance with suchness. This is an ancient master's judgement and interpretation; his account is recorded without judging it right or wrong, and the reader may view it together with the chapters before and after.
善知識品The Good Friend
全文五層 →Full five layers →善知識品：問新學所行何以答久行微妙事，性空何以分大小二種，善知識何以先教供養而後說五度，金翅鳥子初生何以能從一須彌至一須彌，於性空中求菩提何以是難事，九事何以皆名利世，說無依處何以又說依止，究竟相中無分別何以不即是人人皆得，四邊水斷何以名洲，九事之後何以獨於趣中廣說，未得無生忍何以得言斷三毒
在問什麼
這一品從一個極平實的問題起頭。須菩提向佛稟白：新學的菩薩摩訶薩，應當怎樣學般若波羅蜜，怎樣學禪、精進、忍、戒、檀波羅蜜？問的是入門處——一個剛發心的人，第一步該把力氣放在哪裡。
佛的回答出人意表，卻正是本品得名之處：先當親近、供養能宣說這深般若波羅蜜的善知識。不是先教你觀什麼、坐什麼，是先教你找對人。而善知識所教的內容更出人意表：一切布施、持戒、忍辱、精進、禪定、智慧，都迴向阿耨多羅三藐三菩提；然後是一長串的「莫以」——莫以色是菩提，莫以受想行識是菩提，莫以六波羅蜜是菩提，莫以內空乃至無法有法空是菩提，莫以三十七品是菩提，莫以四禪四無量心四無色定五神通是菩提，莫以佛十力乃至十八不共法是菩提；接著又是一長串的「莫貪」，一路貪到不可貪處，收在一句「諸法性空故」。
問題就在這裡：須菩提問的是新學所行，佛答的卻是不取一切法、一切法性空——這是久行菩薩的微妙境界。論主開卷第一問，問的正是這件事。全品的第一條義脈由此拉開：新學與久行之間，究竟是隔開的兩段路，還是同一條路的兩處？
第二段由須菩提的一句讚歎轉入：諸菩薩摩訶薩能做難做的事——在一切自性空的法中求阿耨多羅三藐三菩提。既然一切法性空，所求的菩提也空，能求的人也空，那麼這「求」是怎麼成立的？佛可其言，隨即列出九件事來答：菩薩為安隱世間、安樂世間、救世間、作世間歸、作世間依處、作世間洲、作世間將導、作世間究竟道、作世間趣向，而發阿耨多羅三藐三菩提心。九件事逐一開示，中間兩次被須菩提追問打斷——一問「云何一切法無依處」，一問『若一切法如究竟相，諸菩薩豈不都應得菩提』。第九事「趣」被留到最後，然後廣說得極長極密：一切法趣空、趣無相、趣無作、趣無起，趣夢、趣幻、趣嚮、趣影、趣化，趣我乃至知者見者，趣常樂淨我、趣無常苦不淨無我，趣六波羅蜜、趣諸空、趣三十七品、趣佛十力乃至一切種智，趣須陀洹乃至佛——句句都結在同一句：是趣不過。
末後一轉最要緊。這樣的法，誰信得了？佛答：久行六波羅蜜、善根純熟、供養無數諸佛、與善知識相隨的人。四樣之中的最後一樣，正是本品開頭的那一樣——善知識。首尾在此扣合：善知識不是新學的臨時扶手，是一路到能信深般若為止的同行者。再問這樣的人有什麼相貌，佛答：欲、瞋、癡斷離，就是他的性、相、貌。論主末後替我們問了最後一個難處：這人還沒得無生法忍，怎麼談得上「斷三毒」？
逐段解明
一、問新學之所行。 須菩提所問，措辭極有次第：般若、禪、毘梨耶、羼提、尸羅、檀——從般若倒數回布施。問的不是六度各自的修法，是新學的人面對這六件事該從何下手。要留意發問的人是誰：須菩提是深達空義的長老，他替新學者問，不是自己不會；這是為初心人問路。
二、佛答之第一著：先當親近供養善知識。 佛不先答觀法，先指人：先當親近、供養能宣說這深般若波羅蜜的善知識。這裡有一道限定不可略過——「能說是深般若波羅蜜者」。善知識之為善知識，不在名位、不在親厚，在他能不能把深般若說出來。這一句是全品的定盤星：本品講的善知識，是以所說之法為判準的。
三、善知識所教之一：一切迴向。 善知識開口教的第一件事，不是空，是迴向：所有布施，一切迴向阿耨多羅三藐三菩提；所有持戒、忍辱、精進、禪定、智慧，一切迴向阿耨多羅三藐三菩提。要看見這個次序：先把六度的果實整個交出去，指向無上菩提，然後纔說不取。先有迴向之大，纔堪受不取之空；若無迴向而先聞不取，便成斷滅。
四、善知識所教之二：莫以諸法是菩提。 接著是一串否定：莫以色、受、想、行、識是菩提，莫以六波羅蜜是菩提，莫以內空乃至無法有法空是菩提，莫以四念處乃至八聖道分是菩提，莫以四禪、四無量心、四無色定、五神通是菩提，莫以佛十力乃至十八不共法是菩提。所否定的不是這些法，是把這些法當成菩提本身這件事。佛隨即給出理由，而且理由是正面的：不取色便得菩提，不取受想行識便得菩提，不取六度、不取諸空、不取三十七品乃至十八不共法便得菩提。「不取」不是不修，是修而不執為所得。
五、善知識所教之三：莫貪，乃至莫貪菩提。 第三串更進一層，從「莫以」轉成「莫貪」：行深般若時莫貪色，因為色不是可貪的；莫貪受想行識、莫貪六度、莫貪諸空、莫貪三十七品、莫貪四禪四無量四無色五神通、莫貪佛十力乃至一切種智；再往上，莫貪須陀洹果乃至阿羅漢果，莫貪辟支佛道，莫貪菩薩法位，莫貪阿耨多羅三藐三菩提。連菩薩法位與無上菩提都列在莫貪之內——這一串不留餘地。理由只有一句：諸法性空故。要看清這裡的「非可貪者」四字：不是說貪它不好，是說它根本不是一件可貪之物；貪心落空，不是被禁止，是無處可落。
六、論主之問：問新學何以答久行？ 論主開卷即問：須菩提問的是新學所行，佛為什麼回答菩薩久行的微妙之事——所謂「不取一切法，一切法性空故」？這一問問得極準，也極替讀者著想：新學的人聽到『連菩提都莫貪』，第一反應必是無從下手。若不先立此問，後文的分判便無處安放。
七、答：性空有大小二種。 論主的答語是一個分判：諸法性空有兩種，一是大菩薩所證得的，二是小菩薩所學的柔順忍、以智慧發心的；這裡只說小菩薩所學的空。一詞兩義，難處立解——同說「性空」，久行者是所得，新學者是所學；同一個字，在兩個階位上有兩種分量。佛答的不是久行境界，是新學可學的那一分空。
八、實智氣分與頂法之喻。 論主再進一解：有真實智慧的氣分，佛便把他算入菩薩之數；沒有，雖久行其餘功德也不算入菩薩之數。隨即引聲聞法中的頂法為喻：於三寶之中有少分信名為頂法；這信超過煖法，由修禪定而生，以色界心而得；對佛的無礙解脫來說是小，對凡夫來說是大。喻意極貼切：頂法之信在凡夫為大、在佛為小，新發意菩薩得般若之氣味亦然——他超過五波羅蜜的功德，於凡夫為大，於佛為小。「氣分」「氣味」二字是這一段的關鍵：不是已得，是已沾；而已沾便已入數。
九、何以先教供養親近，及金翅鳥子與小火二喻。 論主第三解，正面回答本品的體例：佛不直接說諸法性空，先教供養、親近善知識；善知識為他說五波羅蜜的功德。要注意這裡的分工——善知識說的是五度功德，佛所稱許的只是其中不壞之法，所謂對色等諸法不貪、不著、不取。善知識種種教化是入手，佛所印可的是那一味不壞。隨後兩喻，是全品最有力的兩句：金翅鳥的雛鳥才生下來，就能從一座須彌飛到另一座須彌——菩薩初學便能生起這樣的深智，何況久學；小火也能燒，何況大火——菩薩新學時就能以般若轉世間法令它畢竟空、燒諸煩惱，何況力量具足之時。二喻所立的是同一個道理：種性一旦是那個種性，初生之力已不可以小視。答佛何以答久行事者，至此圓滿——不是佛答非所問，是新學者本來就承得起。
十、須菩提歎難事，佛可其言。 第二段經文由須菩提的讚歎起：諸菩薩摩訶薩能做難做的事——在一切自性空的法中求阿耨多羅三藐三菩提，想要得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提。佛直接可其言：如是！如是！並把這句話原樣重說一遍。要留意這裡的難處落在哪裡：不在事相之勞苦，在義理之相違——所求既空，而求心不歇。
十一、九事之總標。 佛隨即列出九事：為安隱世間、為安樂世間、為救世間、為世間歸、為世間依處、為世間洲、為世間將導、為世間究竟道、為世間趣，發阿耨多羅三藐三菩提心。九事是一組答語：性空中何以有求？因為所求不在自身，在世間。九事的共同結構是『為……故發心』，主語始終是菩薩，受益始終是眾生。
十二、安隱世間。 第一事：菩薩得菩提時，拔出六道眾生，安著在無畏彼岸的涅槃之處。「六道」與「無畏岸」相對——所拔的是輪轉，所安的是無畏。
十三、安樂世間。 第二事與第一事只差一字，所拔者不同：拔出眾生種種憂苦愁惱，安著無畏岸涅槃處。前一事拔其處所，此一事拔其受苦。安隱與安樂之別在此，不可讀成重複。
十四、救世間。 第三事多出一段：菩薩救眾生生死中種種苦，並且為了斷此苦的緣故而為他們說法；眾生聞法，漸漸依三乘而得度脫。要看見「亦為斷是苦故而為說法」一句——救不止於拔苦之事，更在於授斷苦之法；也要看見「漸以三乘而得度脫」——所度是三乘之機，不是一概齊等。
十五、世間歸。 第四事所拔者又不同：拔出眾生生老病死之相、憂悲愁惱之法。生老病死是相，憂悲愁惱是法；歸處之所以為歸處，正因為它能接住這兩樣。
十六、世間依處，與「一切法無依處」之問答。 第五事說得最短，也最奇：菩薩得菩提時，為眾生說一切法無依處。說「無依處」而名為「依處」——須菩提立刻追問：世尊！云何一切法無依處？佛的答語是一串相即：色不相續就是色無生，色無生就是色不滅，色不滅就是色無依處；受想行識乃至一切種智也是如此。四句層層相即，把「無依處」從一個否定詞落實成一串法義：不相續故無生，無生故不滅，不滅故無所依。所謂依處，是指出一切法本無可依——這正是最穩的依處。
十七、世間究竟道之經說。 第六事：菩薩得菩提時，為眾生說這樣的法——色的究竟相不是色，受想行識乃至一切種智的究竟相不是一切種智；如同究竟相，一切法相也是如此。「究竟相非是色」一句是全段的樞紐：一法推到究竟，所得的不是那一法。
十八、須菩提之難：究竟相中無分別，豈不人人皆得？ 須菩提就此設難：若一切法如同究竟相，那麼諸菩薩摩訶薩都應當得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提。理由是：色的究竟相中沒有分別，受想行識乃至一切種智的究竟相中都沒有分別——所謂這是色、這是受想行識、乃至這是一切種智，這些分別在究竟相中都立不住。這一難提得極利：若究竟相中無分別，則得與未得之分別亦不應立。
十九、佛可其難而轉出難事：觀寂滅而心不沒不却。 佛不駁這一難，反而先承認：如是！如是！究竟相中確實無有分別。然後把落點一轉：須菩提！這就是菩薩摩訶薩的難事——這樣觀諸法寂滅之相而心不沈沒、不退却。難事之所以為難事，正在此處：見了寂滅還肯發心。佛並說出菩薩此時的心念：這些深法，我應當這樣了知而得菩提；這樣寂滅微妙的法，應當為眾生宣說。難處不在理不通，在見理之後不逃——理上人人皆是究竟相，事上肯不退轉的纔叫菩薩。
二十、世間洲。 第七事立一新喻：若江河大海，四邊的水斷絕，這名為洲。色也是如此前後際斷，受想行識乃至一切種智前後際斷；因為前後際斷的緣故，一切法也斷；一切法前後際斷的緣故，就是寂滅、就是妙寶——所謂空、無所得、愛盡無餘、離欲、涅槃。菩薩得菩提時，以此寂滅微妙之法為眾生說。要看清這個喻的巧處：洲之所以為洲，不是因為它比水多了什麼，是因為水在它四邊斷了。前後際斷之處，就是可以立足之處。
二十一、世間將導。 第八事以「不生不滅、不垢不淨」貫穿一切法目：色、受想行識、十二處、十八界、四念處乃至八聖道分、四禪、四無量心、四無色定、五神通、須陀洹果乃至阿羅漢果、辟支佛道、佛十力乃至一切種智，一概不生不滅、不垢不淨。將導者，是在前引路的人；所引的路，就是這一句四不。
二十二、論主起釋，並第三人稱重述問答。 論主以「釋曰」起論，隨即以第三人稱重述前段經文：須菩提生起希有之心而白佛——諸菩薩未斷煩惱、大悲未具、未得阿鞞跋致，卻知諸法本性空而能發無上道心，這事甚難；佛許可他的話，說是這樣；又更讚歎菩薩希有的因緣，所謂菩薩為安穩世間故發心。這三句要合看：論主替經文標出了難事的三個所以然——煩惱未斷、大悲未具、阿鞞跋致未得。三樣都還沒有，卻已知本性空而肯發心，難處正在這個「未」字上。
二十三、「安穩」之訓與良藥之喻。 論主逐門訓釋，第一門是「安穩」：能破一切煩惱，究竟不變失。喻為良藥能破病，不問它是甘是苦，只因它能究竟除病、使人安穩。這一喻的用力處在「不問甘苦」四字——判斷一法好不好，不看入口的滋味，看它能不能究竟除病。佛能使眾生常安穩，不只期於一世、二世；又分辨：有的法雖安穩而不樂，有的法今世苦而後世樂，如服苦藥，腹中安穩而口中不美。所以說：「佛能與今世、後世樂。」最後收在一句：六道是無常之相所以不是安穩，因此說出離六道名為安穩。
二十四、樂之訓：世間樂與涅槃樂。 論主續釋第二門：世間的樂因為貪著的因緣，久後必定生起憂惱，所以不名為樂；涅槃之樂始終沒有變異，所以說離憂苦為樂。判樂不判樂的準繩，在「始終無變」四字，不在當下的受用強弱。
二十五、「救世間」之訓與怨賊追逐之喻。 第三門：如同人被怨賊追逐，若是親戚、若是官府之力便能救他；眾生也是如此，被惡罪諸煩惱的因緣以及魔民所追逐，唯有諸佛能說法救護。喻中有兩層：追逐者分內外——惡罪煩惱是自內，魔民是自外；能救者卻只有一種，就是說法。
二十六、「世間歸」之訓與暴風歸舍之喻。 第四門：如同人遇到暴風疾雨，必定歸向房舍。所歸之處要能擋得住風雨；世間種種邪見煩惱、身心內外的苦惱老病死諸憂苦，若歸向佛，佛便以種種因緣拔其憂悲苦惱。歸的動作是急難中的本能，這一喻把歸依說得極平實——不是儀式，是風雨中人自然的一步。
二十七、「依處」之訓。 第五門說得最深：一切有為法都從和合因緣而生的緣故，沒有自力、不可依止。眾生被苦所逼而來依止佛，佛卻為他說無依止之法。無依止的法纔是真實，所謂無餘涅槃——色等五眾滅盡，不再相續；不相續就是不生不滅，不生不滅就是畢竟空，無依止處。眾生來求一個可靠的東西，佛給他的是『沒有一個東西可靠』這件真實。
二十八、夾問答：若無依止處，何以說依止？ 論主在此門中自設一問，這是本段唯一的一組問曰答曰：若沒有依止之處，為什麼又說依止？答語是分判：依止有兩種，一是以愛、見等諸煩惱依止有為法，二是以清淨智慧說依止涅槃；因為煩惱見的緣故說無依止。一字兩用，難處即解——所破的是煩惱之依，所存的是清淨智慧之依。讀「無依處」而以為連涅槃也不可依，是把兩種依止混成一種。
二十九、「究竟道」之訓。 第六門：究竟道就是諸法實相、畢竟空。論主以三世推之：色等法前際之中沒有，後際之中也沒有；在現在之中，凡夫以憶想分別、因業果報諸情之力而有顛倒見，聖人以智慧眼觀之都是虛誑不實。隨後一句是全段的骨：如同前際後際，中間也是如此；若沒有先後，怎麼會有中間？能這樣為眾生說法，便是安置眾生於究竟第一之道中。前後既無，中間自倒——這是本品最簡淨的一個推法。
三十、「世間洲」之訓與「水」之訓。 第七門承前而立：如同洲的四邊沒有地，色等法也是如此，前際後際都不可得；中間，如同在究竟道中所破的——進入前後皆空的緣故，中間也空。論主又特別訓「水」字：所謂水，是三漏、四流諸煩惱以及業果報中的一切法。三漏，論主於卷二十三自列：欲漏、有漏、無明漏——欲界煩惱、色無色界煩惱、及貫三界之無明；四流，論主此處未開其目，經中通說欲流、有流、見流、無明流：欲流是欲界之貪等煩惱，有流是色無色界之愛著於有，見流是諸邪見，無明流是貫三界之癡——即同一煩惱從『漂流眾生』一面立名。漏是漏泄不止，流是漂沒不停：兩名合說，正是「水」之所以為水。畢竟空、無所取，所謂涅槃，這就是洲。經文只說洲，論主補出水；有水纔顯洲，煩惱業報之流不解，涅槃之為洲便無著落。
三十一、「將導」之訓與四流之船。 第八門收在一個動作上：眾生沈沒在四流之水中，佛以八正道之船引導他們到涅槃洲上；像這樣種種因緣接引度脫眾生名為「將導」。洲、水、船三喻至此接成一串——前門立洲，此門立船；所立之洲是涅槃，所乘之船是八正道。
三十二、第九事「趣」之經說起：色趣空，非趣非不趣。 第三段經文承前段佛的開示續說第九事。菩薩得菩提時為眾生說色趣空，說受想行識趣空，乃至說一切種智趣空；又說色非趣非不趣，因為色是空相的緣故；受想行識乃至一切種智亦然。一句之中先說「趣空」再說「非趣非不趣」，不是自相矛盾：說趣空，是就一切法的歸處說；說非趣非不趣，是就空相之中無有趣相說。前句遣其散，後句遣其執。
三十三、趣空、無相、無作、無起、無所有——是趣不過。 接著是本品最長的一串排比，句式固定：一切法趣某某，是趣不過；何以故？某某之中，趣、非趣不可得故。先列空、無相、無作三解脫門，再加無起，再加無所有、不生不滅、不垢不淨。「是趣不過」四字是全段的眼：趣到這裡就沒有再往前的了。不是被攔住，是無處可過——因為所趣之處本身無有趣相。
三十四、趣夢、幻、嚮、影、化，趣無量無邊。 排比續行，改以喻法為所趣：一切法趣夢，是趣不過，因為夢中趣、非趣不可得；趣幻、趣嚮、趣影、趣化亦然，因為這化等之中趣、非趣不可得。再列無量、無邊。從三解脫門轉到夢幻嚮影化，所趣之物換了，結論一字不改——這正是排比體的用意：法目千變，理只一條。
三十五、趣不與不取、不舉不下、不增不減、不來不去、不入不出不合不散不著不斷。 排比再進，所趣者全是成對的遮詞。這一組值得單看：不與不取、不舉不下、不增不減、不來不去、不入不出、不合不散、不著不斷——每一對都是把兩端同時否掉。一切法趣向這樣的兩端俱遣之處，而在這樣的地方，連趣與非趣也不可得。
三十六、趣我、眾生、壽命乃至知者見者。 這一條換了理由的措辭：一切法趣我、眾生、壽命、人、起、使起、作、使作、知者、見者，是趣不過；何以故？我乃至知者見者畢竟不可得，何況還會有趣與非趣。前面諸條說「趣、非趣不可得」，此條先說所趣者本身「畢竟不可得」，再用「何況」推進一層。所趣既是假名，趣之有無更無從談起。
三十七、趣常樂淨我、趣無常苦不淨無我，趣欲瞋癡見事。 這一組最堪玩味：一切法趣有常、趣樂淨我，是趣不過；一切法趣無常、苦、不淨、無我，也是趣不過。四倒與四聖行的對治語被放在同一個句式裡同樣遣除。接著是趣欲事、趣瞋事、癡事、見事，理由同前——畢竟不可得。連煩惱之事也在「是趣不過」之列，可見此處說的不是價值高下，是一切法的歸處。
三十八、趣如、法性、實際、不可思議性、平等、不動相。 這一組的理由換了說法：一切法趣如，是趣不過，因為如中無來無去；趣法性、實際、不可思議性亦然，因為其中無來無去。趣平等、趣不動相，則仍用「趣、非趣不可得」。「無來無去」是就實相自身說，「趣、非趣不可得」是就趣這件事說；兩種理由並存，不必強為劃一。
三十九、趣色受想行識、十二處十八界，趣六波羅蜜。 排比回到最基本的法目：趣色、趣受想行識，因為色與受想行識畢竟不可得；十二處、十八界也是如此。再逐一列六波羅蜜：趣檀、趣尸羅、趣羼提、趣毘梨耶、趣禪、趣般若，每一條都以該度「畢竟不可得故」為由。六度一一點名而不用「乃至」略過，這是本經行文的莊重處——所修之法，一件也不含糊地放進這句話裡。
四十、趣內空、外空、內外空乃至無法有法空，趣四念處乃至八聖道分。 諸空門與三十七品同樣入列：趣內空、趣外空、趣內外空，乃至趣無法有法空，皆是趣不過，因為諸空畢竟不可得；趣四念處乃至八聖道分，亦是趣不過，因為三十七品畢竟不可得。連「空」本身也在所趣而不可得之列——這是本段不可略讀的一句。
四十一、趣佛十力乃至一切種智，趣四果、辟支佛道乃至佛。 排比收束於果地：趣佛十力乃至一切種智，是趣不過，因為一切種智之中趣、非趣不可得；趣須陀洹果、斯陀含果、阿那含果、阿羅漢果、辟支佛道，趣阿耨多羅三藐三菩提，趣須陀洹乃至佛，皆是趣不過。從最初的色一路排到佛，句式始終不變。一部排比讀下來，所得的不是法目的清單，是一個貫徹到底的結論：任一法推到極處，都到同一個沒有趣相的地方。
四十二、誰能信解——四相之答。 須菩提在此收問：世尊！這深般若波羅蜜有誰能信解？佛答出四樣：先於諸佛所久行六波羅蜜、善根純熟、供養無數百千萬億諸佛、與善知識相隨。四樣之中，前三樣是自己的行與福，第四樣是外緣——而這外緣，正是本品起頭佛所教的第一著。首尾至此相扣：善知識不是新學階段的過渡，是能信深般若者的常隨之緣。
四十三、性、相、貌之問與三毒斷離之答。 須菩提再問：能信解的人有什麼樣的性、什麼樣的相、什麼樣的貌？佛答得極短：欲、瞋、癡斷離就是他的性、相、貌。問了三樣，答只一樣；三毒之離，既是他的體性，也是他的表相，也是他的容貌。信深般若的驗處不在言說，在三毒的分量。
四十四、論主之問：九事皆略說，何以獨於趣中廣說？ 第三段論釋起於一問：上面諸事之中都是略說，如今在「趣」之中為什麼廣說？這一問替讀者問出了讀經時的實際困惑——前八事各只數行，第九事卻鋪排了整整一大段。論主的答語只一句：「趣」是總攝上面九事的會歸之處，所以說得多。安隱、安樂、救、歸、依處、究竟道、洲、將導，八事說的都是菩薩對世間所作的事；趣說的是一切法的歸處——歸處既總攝，文字自然獨多。
四十五、復次：諸事同一義，趣最在後故廣說。 論主再補一解：安樂等事以及趣都是同一個意義，都是拔出眾生、安著於涅槃的緣故——此「著」與經文「著無畏岸涅槃處」之「著」同，是安置義；若事事都廣說便說不能盡，「趣」排在最後的緣故所以廣說；應當知道其餘的也都應當廣說。這一句解除了一個可能的誤會：不是趣比前八事重要，是文字之勢須有一處鋪開；前八事之略，讀者當以趣之廣例知。
四十六、「色等法趣空」之訓與虛空但有名之喻。 論主訓釋經文的第一句：所謂色等法趣空，如同虛空只有名稱而沒有實法；色等法也是如此，終究歸於空。因為諸法的究竟相必定是空的緣故，其餘的都是虛妄。隨即一個極平常的人事之喻：如同人起初雖然有善言，久久之後纔知道他的實情；色等諸法也是如此，進入無餘涅槃的時候與虛空沒有差別，應當知道先前也是如此，只是凡夫因為顛倒果報的緣故而見得有異。這個喻最值得記：不是入涅槃時色法纔變成空，是本來如此而久後方知——如同人的實情本來如此，只是初時未見。末後又以虛空立一反證：一切法沒有能超出空等諸相的，如同人想要超出虛空之外也不可得。經文「是趣不過」四字，至此得一正解。
四十七、我等十六名，五眾和合假有。 論主釋經文中「趣我、眾生、壽命」一組：我等十六個名字，都是因為五眾和合而假有這些名字，沒有實法，怎麼會有趣與非趣。經文舉我、眾生、壽命、人、起、使起、作、使作、知者、見者為例，論主以「十六名」總之，判為五眾和合上的假名。名既是假，趣之有無自然無從說起。
四十八、四顛倒破四聖行，常與無常俱不可得。 論主釋經文「趣常等、趣無常等」一組：若是常、淨、樂、我等四顛倒便破壞四聖行。如同常等四法不可得，是因為顛倒的緣故；色等諸法也是如此。再進一層：如同常等不可得，無常等是從常等而出的緣故所以也不可得。所以說：「一切法趣常等、趣無常等。」這一段是本品最精微的一轉——無常之所以也不可得，不是因為它不對，是因為它是對著常說的；能治之藥依所治之病而立，病空則藥亦空。
四十九、論主以敘事體重述末段問答。 論主末後不用問曰答曰的格式，改以第三人稱重述經文的問答：須菩提問佛，這法甚深微細，誰能信解；佛回答說，久行等因緣的人能信；又更問，久行等人有什麼樣的相；佛回答，這人離了三毒之心，也不見有這個離，因為深入諸法實相的緣故。要留意論主在佛的答語上補出的一句——「亦不見是離」。經文只說欲瞋癡斷離，論主點出：若見有一個「離」，那就還沒真離。深入實相故不見離，這一句是全品收束前最要緊的一筆。
五十、末問答：未得無生忍，何以言斷三毒？斷有二種。 論主替讀者提出最後一難：這人還沒有得無生忍法，怎麼說「斷三毒」？答語是本品最後一個分判：斷有兩種，一是根本斷，二是薄少斷；這裡說的是薄少斷。隨即說出薄少斷的相狀：行者不分別這是斷、這是煩惱；因為煩惱之相顛倒不定的緣故，煩惱就是斷，所以說離。一難一答收全品：斷不是先斷盡了纔算，是不再於煩惱上作實有之分別；煩惱相既顛倒不定，於此不取，即名為離。與本品開頭善知識所教的「莫貪」「不取」一線相通——全品始於不取，終於不取。
不要讀錯
不要把「先當親近、供養善知識」讀成把責任交給別人。經文的限定在「能說是深般若波羅蜜者」——善知識之為善知識，判在他所說之法，不判在關係。論主又特地說明：善知識雖種種教化，佛但稱其不壞法，所謂於色等諸法不貪、不著、不取。親近善知識不是把判斷權讓渡出去，是去領受那一味不壞之法；學人自己仍須認得哪一句是不壞的。末後佛答能信解者的四相，善知識只居其一，前三樣仍是自己的久行、善根與供養。
不要把『莫以諸法是菩提』『莫貪諸法』讀成不必修六度、三十七品。經文的正面理由說得明白：不取色便得菩提，不取六度乃至十八不共法便得菩提——是『不取而得』，不是『不修而得』。而且善知識所教的第一件事是把六度的果實一切迴向菩提，先有這一步，纔有後面的莫以與莫貪。若讀成六度可廢，則迴向無物可迴，全段自壞。
不要把性空的兩種讀成高下之爭。論主分出大菩薩所得之空與小菩薩所學柔順忍之空，是為了安頓新學者的下手處，不是判一真一假。頂法之喻已把分寸說盡：同一分信，於凡夫為大、於佛為小。金翅鳥子初生能從一須彌至一須彌，正是說新學之力不可小視——分大小是為了讓人肯下手，不是讓人自輕。
不要把「一切法無依處」讀成連涅槃也不可依。論主在此門中自設的那一組問答，正是為防這一誤：依止有二種，以愛見等煩惱依止有為法者，是所破；以清淨智慧說依止涅槃者，是所立；「煩惱見故說無依止」。經文說無依處，破的是有為法上的倚靠，不是把眾生推到無處可去。同理，「究竟相中無有分別」也不可讀成得與未得無別——佛可其言之後隨即轉出「是為菩薩摩訶薩難事」，落點在觀寂滅而心不沒不却，正是在無分別中不失發心。
不要把那一長串「是趣不過」讀成單調的重複而跳過。句式雖同，所趣之物層層更換，理由也有兩式：一式說「趣、非趣不可得」，一式說所趣者「畢竟不可得，何況當有趣、非趣」，趣如、法性一組又別作「無來無去」。尤其不可把趣常樂淨我與趣無常苦不淨無我等量讀過即算——論主特為此立一釋：無常等從常等出故亦不可得。能治之法隨所治而立，這一句若跳過，本品最精微的一轉便失了。
不要把「欲、瞋、癡斷離」讀成已斷盡無餘。論主末後的問答正為此設：這人未得無生忍法，所說的是薄少斷，不是根本斷。而薄少斷的相狀也不在分量上計較，在「不分別是斷、是煩惱」——煩惱相顛倒不定故，煩惱即是斷。再合論主前面補出的「亦不見是離」一句同讀：若心中存著一個已離的相，那正是還未離。本品說斷說離，處處指向不取，不指向計量。
修行作用
本品給用功人的第一件受用，是把『找對人』擺回第一位。佛答新學所問的第一句不是觀法，是先當親近、供養能說深般若的善知識。日用中揀擇親近之處，可用經文自帶的那把尺：他說不說得出深般若？他所教的，是不是把一切所行迴向無上菩提、而於諸法不貪不著不取？尺子不在名望與熱鬧上，在所說之法上。而末後佛列能信解者的四相，仍把「與善知識相隨」放在裡面——這不是入門一時之事，是長劫同行之事。
第二件受用，是新學者的自信與分寸。論主的頂法之喻、金翅鳥子之喻、小火之喻，三喻同教一事：初發心而得般若氣味者，其力已不可小視——鳥子初生已能從一須彌至一須彌，小火已能燒。用功人常以『我還不夠』而遲遲不肯下手深法；此三喻正可作回勘：所欠的是久行，不是資格。同時分寸也在：於凡夫為大，於佛為小——不自輕，亦不自足。
第三件受用，是九事可作發心的自檢。安隱、安樂、救、歸、依處、究竟道、洲、將導、趣——這九樣全是對著世間說的。日用中發心若乾了、行門若變成自家的事業，可以把這九句逐一問過：我此刻所行，於眾生是安隱嗎？是安樂嗎？是救嗎？能作歸、作依、作道、作洲、作將導嗎？九事之設，本就是佛用來回答『性空中何以有求』的——求心不在自身有所得，在世間有所濟。
第四件受用，在洲、水、船三喻的合看。眾生沒在四流水中，佛以八正道船引到涅槃洲上；而洲之所以為洲，是四邊水斷。行人日用中若覺無處著力，此三喻可作方向：不必先問腳下有沒有地，先問四邊之水是什麼——三漏四流諸煩惱及業果報中的一切法；水識得了，斷處即是洲，而渡去的船是八正道，不是別的。
第五件受用，是「是趣不過」可作止心之處。一切法趣空、趣無相、趣無作，乃至趣色、趣六度、趣諸空、趣三十七品、趣佛果，句句結在是趣不過。用功人心念奔逐時，可用這句回勘：此念所趣何處？趣到那裡，還有得過沒有？若所趣之處本身趣、非趣不可得，奔逐自然歇下。而論主的虛空之喻更給出一個平常的下手法：一切法無有過出空等諸相，如人欲出過虛空不可得——不是壓住念頭，是認得它無處可出。
第六件受用，是三毒之驗與「不見是離」之戒。佛說能信解深般若者的性相貌，只是欲瞋癡斷離；判自己於般若有沒有相應，最實在的驗處就在三毒的分量，不在解得多少。而論主兩句話同時防住兩邊：一邊是『未得無生忍云何言斷』——答以薄少斷，用功人不必因未斷根本而自廢；一邊是「亦不見是離」——用功人也不可因稍薄而自以為了。行者不分別是斷、是煩惱，煩惱相顛倒不定故，煩惱即是斷；於此不取，便是本品從頭教到尾的那一味。
承衍
本品的骨幹，是三段經文與三段論釋。經①自須菩提問新學菩薩云何學六波羅蜜起，佛答以先當親近、供養能說深般若之善知識，並出善知識所教三事：一切迴向、莫以諸法是菩提而不取便得、莫貪諸法乃至莫貪菩提，結以諸法性空故。論①先設一問——問新學所行何以答久行微妙事，答以性空二種：大菩薩所得、小菩薩所學柔順忍；次以實智氣分與頂法之喻明新學已入菩薩之數；末釋佛何以先教供養親近、佛但稱其不壞法，出金翅鳥子與小火二喻。經②自須菩提歎於性空中求菩提為難事起，佛可其言而總標九事，逐條開示安隱世間、安樂世間、救世間、世間歸、世間依處（中夾須菩提問一切法無依處，佛答色不相續即無生無滅無依處）、世間究竟道（中夾須菩提難究竟相中無分別，佛可其言而轉出難事：觀寂滅相而心不沒不却）、世間洲、世間將導。論②以「釋曰」起論，第三人稱重述須菩提希有心之白佛與佛之可許，逐門訓釋安穩（良藥喻）、樂、救世間（怨賊追逐喻）、世間歸（暴風歸舍喻）、依處（中夾一組問曰答曰：依止二種）、究竟道、世間洲與水、將導（四流八正道船喻）。經③承前續說第九事世間趣，先立色趣空與非趣非不趣，次以「是趣不過」句式廣列空無相無作無起無所有、夢幻嚮影化、無量無邊、不與不取、不舉不下、不增不減、不來不去、不入不出不合不散不著不斷、我等十六名、常樂淨我與無常苦不淨無我、欲瞋癡見事、如法性實際不可思議性平等不動相、色受想行識十二處十八界、六波羅蜜、諸空、三十七品、佛十力乃至一切種智、四果辟支佛道乃至佛，末以誰能信解之問答與性相貌之問答收束。論③問答釋趣何以獨廣說（趣為九事之會歸、趣最在後故廣說），訓「色等法趣空」出虛空但有名與善言久知情實二喻，釋我等十六名之假有、常等四顛倒與無常等俱不可得，末以敘事體重述信解之問答並補「亦不見是離」一句，終以未得無生忍云何言斷三毒之問答、斷有二種之分判收全品。
本品與前後諸品的義脈，可見者有三線。其一，本品承前此諸品廣明般若功德與魔事之後，轉入最切近行人的一事：入門者從何下手。前品所說中道衰耗之相多而可畏，本品所答只一著——先得能說深般若的善知識；而末後所列能信解深般若之四相，仍以與善知識相隨居其一。說難與說入手，前後相待。其二，九事利世之說，與此前諸品反覆申明的般若不離大悲、觀空而不捨眾生之義互為表裡：正因所求畢竟空，發心之所以能立，全在為世間故；「於一切性空法中求阿耨多羅三藐三菩提」之為難事，其解不在理上通不通，在肯不肯不退。其三，本品唯第九事「趣」廣說，前八事從略——論主明言「當知餘者亦皆應廣說」，是把前八事之略交給讀者以趣例知；斷有二種之分判，論主於本品只說薄少斷。讀者可合前後觀之，以見善知識之教與畢竟空之教的一貫。
本品品題於諸本之間有異稱，古德之疏亦有以異名稱引本品者——如慧影於其疏中回指本品，稱「上善知識品中已廣釋也」，可證古德所見本品之名；諸本品題異同與其次第之差、卷帙分合與後世徵引之考，並錄不判，詳考據層。
The Good Friend: Why, Asked What Those New to the Training Practise, the Buddha Answers with the Subtle Matters of Long Practice; Why the Emptiness of Nature Is Divided into Two Kinds, Great and Small; Why, in the Matter of the Good Friend, Making Offerings Is Taught First and the Five Perfections Spoken of Afterwards; Why the Chick of the Golden-winged Bird, Just Born, Can Go from One Mount Sumeru to Another; Why Seeking Awakening within the Emptiness of Nature Is a Hard Thing; Why the Nine Matters Are All Called Benefiting the World; Why, Having Spoken of No Place of Support, He Speaks Again of Support; Why, There Being No Discrimination within the Ultimate Mark, It Does Not Follow That Everyone Obtains It; Why Water Cut Off on Four Sides Is Called an Island; Why, after the Nine Matters, Tending Alone Is Spoken of at Length; and Why One Who Has Not Yet Obtained the Acceptance of Non-arising Can Be Said to Have Severed the Three Poisons
What Is Being Asked
This chapter begins from an exceedingly plain question. Subhūti addresses the Buddha: how should bodhisattva-mahāsattvas new to the training train in prajñāpāramitā, and how should they train in meditation, vigour, patience, morality, and dānapāramitā? What he asks about is the place of entry—where a person who has only just aroused the mind should put his strength at the first step.
The Buddha’s answer is unexpected, and yet it is exactly where this chapter gets its name: he should first draw near to and make offerings to a good friend who can expound this deep prajñāpāramitā. He is not first taught what to contemplate or how to sit; he is first taught to find the right person. And what the good friend teaches is more unexpected still: all giving, keeping of precepts, patience, vigour, meditative concentration, and wisdom are dedicated to anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi; then comes a long run of 「莫以」 tr. "do not take … to be"—do not take form to be awakening, do not take feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness to be awakening, do not take the six perfections to be awakening, do not take inner emptiness and so on up to the emptiness of non-existent and existent dharmas to be awakening, do not take the thirty-seven limbs of the path to be awakening, do not take the four dhyānas, the four immeasurable minds, the four formless absorptions, and the five supernormal powers to be awakening, do not take the ten powers of a Buddha and so on up to the eighteen unshared dharmas to be awakening; and after that comes another long run of 「莫貪」 tr. "do not crave," craving pursued all the way to the place that cannot be craved, closing in the one sentence 「諸法性空故」 tr. "because all dharmas are empty of nature."
The problem lies right here: what Subhūti asks about is what those new to the training practise, but what the Buddha answers is the not-grasping of all dharmas and the emptiness of nature of all dharmas—and this is the subtle realm of bodhisattvas of long practice. The treatise-author’s first question at the opening of the treatise section asks precisely about this. The first vein of meaning of the whole chapter unrolls from here: between those new to the training and those of long practice, are there after all two separate stretches of road, or two places on one and the same road?
The second passage turns in by way of a single exclamation of praise from Subhūti: the bodhisattva-mahāsattvas can do what is hard to do—within dharmas that are all empty of self-nature they seek anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi. Since all dharmas are empty of nature, the awakening that is sought is empty too, and the person who can seek is empty too; how then is this 「求」 tr. "seeking" established? The Buddha approves his words and at once lists nine matters in answer: the bodhisattva arouses the mind of anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi to make the world safe, to make the world at ease, to save the world, to be the world’s refuge, to be the world’s place of support, to be the world’s island, to be the world’s guide, to be the world’s ultimate path, and to be that toward which the world tends. The nine matters are set forth one by one, and in the middle they are twice interrupted by Subhūti’s pressing questions—once asking 「云何一切法無依處」 tr. "how are all dharmas without a place of support," once asking ‘if all dharmas are like the ultimate mark, should not the bodhisattvas all obtain awakening?’ The ninth matter, 「趣」 tr. "tending," is kept to the very last, and then it is spoken of at great length and in great density: all dharmas tend toward emptiness, tend toward the signless, tend toward non-action, tend toward non-origination; tend toward a dream, tend toward an illusion, tend toward an echo, tend toward a shadow, tend toward a transformation; tend toward self and so on up to the knower and the seer; tend toward permanence, happiness, purity, and self, tend toward impermanence, suffering, impurity, and non-self; tend toward the six perfections, tend toward the emptinesses, tend toward the thirty-seven limbs of the path, tend toward the ten powers of a Buddha and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds, tend toward the srota-āpanna and so on up to the Buddha—and every sentence ties off in the same sentence: this tending does not pass beyond.
The last turn at the end matters most. Such a Dharma—who can believe it? The Buddha answers: a person who has long practised the six perfections, whose roots of goodness are fully ripened, who has made offerings to countless buddhas, and who keeps company with good friends. The last of the four is exactly the one thing at the beginning of this chapter—the good friend. Head and tail clasp together here: the good friend is not a temporary handrail for those new to the training; he is the companion on the road all the way to the point of being able to believe deep prajñā. Asked further what appearance such a person has, the Buddha answers: the severance and separation from desire, hatred, and delusion is his nature, mark, and appearance. At the very end the treatise-author asks on our behalf the last difficulty: this person has not yet obtained the acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas; how can one speak of 「斷三毒」 tr. "severing the three poisons"?
Passage by Passage
1. The question about what those new to the training practise. The wording of Subhūti’s question has a strict order: prajñā, dhyāna, vīrya, kṣānti, śīla, dāna—counting backwards from prajñā to giving. What he asks about is not the way each of the six perfections is cultivated, but where a person new to the training, facing these six things, should set his hand. One must notice who the questioner is: Subhūti is an elder who has deeply penetrated the meaning of emptiness; he asks on behalf of those new to the training, not because he himself does not know; this is asking the way for those at the beginning of the mind.
2. The first move of the Buddha’s answer: he should first draw near to and make offerings to a good friend. The Buddha does not first answer with a method of contemplation; first he points to a person: he should first draw near to and make offerings to a good friend who can expound this deep prajñāpāramitā. There is a qualification here that must not be passed over—「能說是深般若波羅蜜者」 tr. "one who can expound this deep prajñāpāramitā." What makes a good friend a good friend lies not in name and rank, not in closeness and warmth, but in whether he can speak deep prajñā out. This sentence is the fixed star of the whole chapter: the good friend spoken of in this chapter takes the Dharma he speaks as the criterion.
3. The first thing the good friend teaches: dedicating everything. The first thing the good friend opens his mouth to teach is not emptiness but dedication: all one’s giving, all of it dedicated to anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi; all one’s keeping of precepts, patience, vigour, meditative concentration, and wisdom, all of it dedicated to anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi. One must see this order: first the fruits of the six perfections are handed over entire, pointed toward unsurpassed awakening, and only then is not-grasping spoken of. Only when there is first the greatness of dedication can one bear to receive the emptiness of not-grasping; if one first hears of not-grasping without dedication, it becomes annihilation.
4. The second thing the good friend teaches: do not take the dharmas to be awakening. Next comes a run of negations: do not take form, feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness to be awakening, do not take the six perfections to be awakening, do not take inner emptiness and so on up to the emptiness of non-existent and existent dharmas to be awakening, do not take the four foundations of mindfulness and so on up to the eightfold noble path to be awakening, do not take the four dhyānas, the four immeasurable minds, the four formless absorptions, and the five supernormal powers to be awakening, do not take the ten powers of a Buddha and so on up to the eighteen unshared dharmas to be awakening. What is negated is not these dharmas; it is the taking of these dharmas to be awakening itself. The Buddha at once gives the reason, and the reason is positive: not grasping form, one obtains awakening; not grasping feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness, one obtains awakening; not grasping the six perfections, not grasping the emptinesses, not grasping the thirty-seven limbs of the path and so on up to the eighteen unshared dharmas, one obtains awakening. 「不取」 tr. "Not grasping" is not not cultivating; it is cultivating without clinging to anything as attained.
5. The third thing the good friend teaches: do not crave, and so on up to: do not crave awakening. The third run goes one layer further, turning from 「莫以」 tr. "do not take … to be" to 「莫貪」 tr. "do not crave": when practising deep prajñā, do not crave form, because form is not something that can be craved; do not crave feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness, do not crave the six perfections, do not crave the emptinesses, do not crave the thirty-seven limbs of the path, do not crave the four dhyānas, the four immeasurables, the four formless absorptions, and the five supernormal powers, do not crave the ten powers of a Buddha and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds; and further up, do not crave the fruit of the srota-āpanna and so on up to the fruit of the arhat, do not crave the path of the pratyekabuddha, do not crave the bodhisattva’s Dharma-position, do not crave anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi. Even the bodhisattva’s Dharma-position and unsurpassed awakening are listed within ‘do not crave’—this run leaves nothing over. The reason is only one sentence: because all dharmas are empty of nature. One must see clearly the four Chinese characters 「非可貪者」 tr. "not something that can be craved" here: it is not saying that craving it is bad; it is saying that it is not at all a thing that can be craved; the craving mind falls into emptiness, not because it is forbidden, but because it has nowhere to land.
6. The treatise-author’s question: asked about those new to the training, why answer about long practice? At the opening of the treatise section the treatise-author asks at once: what Subhūti asks about is what those new to the training practise; why does the Buddha answer with the subtle matters of bodhisattvas of long practice—what is called 「不取一切法，一切法性空故」 tr. "not grasping all dharmas, because all dharmas are empty of nature"? This question is asked with great precision, and with great consideration for the reader: a person new to the training who hears ‘do not crave even awakening’ will surely react first by having nowhere to set his hand. If this question were not first set up, the division that follows would have nowhere to rest.
7. The answer: the emptiness of nature is of two kinds, great and small. The treatise-author’s answer is a division: the emptiness of nature of all dharmas is of two kinds—one, what the great bodhisattvas realise and attain; two, what the small bodhisattvas train in, compliant acceptance, arousing the mind by wisdom; here only the emptiness that the small bodhisattvas train in is spoken of. One word, two meanings, and the difficulty resolves at the hard place—both speak of 「性空」 tr. "the emptiness of nature," but for one of long practice it is what is attained, and for one new to the training it is what is trained in; the same word, at two stations, has two different weights. What the Buddha answers with is not the realm of long practice, but that share of emptiness which one new to the training can train in.
8. A share of real wisdom, and the simile of the dharma of the summit. The treatise-author advances a further explanation: one who has a share of real wisdom the Buddha counts among the bodhisattvas; one who has none, though he has long practised the other merits, is not counted among the bodhisattvas. At once he takes as a simile the dharma of the summit in the śrāvaka teaching: having a small measure of faith in the Three Jewels is called the dharma of the summit; this faith passes beyond the dharma of warmth, is born from cultivating meditative concentration, and is obtained with a mind of the form realm; beside the Buddha’s unobstructed liberation it is small, and beside the ordinary person it is great. The point of the simile fits exactly: the faith of the dharma of the summit is great beside the ordinary person and small beside the Buddha, and so it is with a bodhisattva who has newly aroused the mind obtaining the flavour of prajñā—it passes beyond the merit of the five perfections, is great beside the ordinary person, and is small beside the Buddha. The two words 「氣分」 tr. "share" and 「氣味」 tr. "flavour" are the key to this passage: it is not yet attained, it is already tasted; and once tasted, he is already counted.
9. Why making offerings and drawing near are taught first, and the two similes of the chick of the golden-winged bird and the small fire. The treatise-author’s third explanation answers head-on the pattern of this chapter: the Buddha does not directly expound the emptiness of nature of all dharmas; he first teaches making offerings to and drawing near to a good friend; the good friend expounds for him the merits of the five perfections. One must notice the division of labour here—what the good friend expounds is the merit of the five perfections, while what the Buddha commends is only the indestructible dharma within it, that is, not craving, not clinging to, and not grasping form and the other dharmas. The good friend’s various teachings are the way in; what the Buddha seals is that single flavour of the indestructible. The two similes that follow are the two most powerful sentences in the whole chapter: the chick of the golden-winged bird, just born, can fly from one Mount Sumeru to another—if a bodhisattva, at the beginning of his training, can give rise to such deep knowledge, how much more one long in the training; a small fire too can burn, how much more a great fire—a bodhisattva, when new to the training, can already with prajñā turn worldly dharmas and make them ultimately empty and burn up the afflictions, how much more when his strength is complete. The two similes establish one and the same principle: once the lineage is that lineage, the strength at first birth is not to be made light of. The answer to why the Buddha answered with matters of long practice is complete here—it is not that the Buddha answers beside the question; it is that one new to the training can bear it from the start.
10. Subhūti exclaims at the hard thing, and the Buddha approves his words. The second passage of the sūtra begins from Subhūti’s praise: the bodhisattva-mahāsattvas can do what is hard to do—within dharmas that are all empty of self-nature they seek anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi, wishing to obtain anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi. The Buddha approves his words directly: Just so! Just so!—and says the sentence over again just as it was. One must notice where the hardness here falls: not in the toil and suffering of affairs, but in the contradiction in principle—what is sought is already empty, and yet the seeking mind does not rest.
11. The general heading of the nine matters. The Buddha at once lists the nine matters: to make the world safe, to make the world at ease, to save the world, to be the world’s refuge, to be the world’s place of support, to be the world’s island, to be the world’s guide, to be the world’s ultimate path, to be that toward which the world tends—for these the bodhisattva arouses the mind of anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi. The nine matters are a single answer: why, within the emptiness of nature, is there seeking? Because what is sought does not lie in oneself; it lies in the world. The shared structure of the nine matters is ‘arousing the mind for the sake of …’; the subject is always the bodhisattva, the one who benefits is always beings.
12. Making the world safe. The first matter: when the bodhisattva obtains awakening, he draws out the beings of the six destinies and sets them in the place of nirvāṇa, the shore of fearlessness. 「六道」 tr. "The six destinies" and 「無畏岸」 tr. "the shore of fearlessness" stand over against each other—what is drawn out of is the turning round, what is set in is fearlessness.
13. Making the world at ease. The second matter differs from the first by only one Chinese character, and what is drawn out of is different: he draws beings out of all kinds of sorrow, suffering, grief, and vexation, and sets them in the place of nirvāṇa, the shore of fearlessness. The former matter draws them out of their place; this matter draws them out of their suffering. The difference between safety and ease lies here, and it must not be read as repetition.
14. Saving the world. The third matter has a passage more: the bodhisattva saves beings from all the various sufferings within birth and death, and moreover, for the sake of severing this suffering, expounds the Dharma for them; beings hear the Dharma and, gradually relying on the three vehicles, obtain crossing over and liberation. One must see the sentence 「亦為斷是苦故而為說法」 tr. "and also, for the sake of severing this suffering, expounds the Dharma for them"—saving does not stop at the act of drawing out of suffering; it lies further in handing over the Dharma that severs suffering; and one must also see 「漸以三乘而得度脫」 tr. "gradually, by the three vehicles, they obtain crossing over and liberation"—those crossed over are of the capacities of the three vehicles, not all levelled as one.
15. Being the world’s refuge. In the fourth matter what is drawn out of is different again: he draws beings out of the marks of birth, old age, sickness, and death and the dharmas of sorrow, grief, distress, and vexation. Birth, old age, sickness, and death are marks; sorrow, grief, distress, and vexation are dharmas; a place of refuge is a place of refuge precisely because it can catch these two things.
16. Being the world’s place of support, and the question and answer on 「一切法無依處」 tr. "all dharmas are without a place of support" . The fifth matter is spoken of most briefly, and most strangely: when the bodhisattva obtains awakening, he expounds for beings that all dharmas are without a place of support. It speaks of 「無依處」 tr. "without a place of support" and calls it 「依處」 tr. "a place of support"—Subhūti at once presses: World-Honored One! How are all dharmas without a place of support? The Buddha’s answer is a chain of identities: form not continuing is form’s non-arising, form’s non-arising is form’s non-ceasing, form’s non-ceasing is form’s being without a place of support; feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds are likewise. The four clauses, identical layer upon layer, bring 「無依處」 tr. "without a place of support" down from a word of negation into a chain of Dharma-meaning: because it does not continue, it does not arise; because it does not arise, it does not cease; because it does not cease, there is nothing for it to rest on. What is called a place of support is pointing out that all dharmas have from the first nothing that can be relied on—and this is precisely the steadiest place of support.
17. The sūtra’s account of being the world’s ultimate path. The sixth matter: when the bodhisattva obtains awakening, he expounds for beings such a Dharma as this—the ultimate mark of form is not form, the ultimate mark of feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds is not the omniscience of all kinds; like the ultimate mark, so too is the mark of all dharmas. The sentence 「究竟相非是色」 tr. "the ultimate mark is not form" is the pivot of the whole passage: when one dharma is pushed to the ultimate, what is obtained is not that dharma.
18. Subhūti’s difficulty: if there is no discrimination within the ultimate mark, does not everyone obtain it? Subhūti on this sets a difficulty: if all dharmas are like the ultimate mark, then the bodhisattva-mahāsattvas should all obtain anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi. The reason: within the ultimate mark of form there is no discrimination, and within the ultimate mark of feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds there is no discrimination—the discriminations called ‘this is form, this is feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness, and so on up to this is the omniscience of all kinds’ cannot stand within the ultimate mark. This difficulty is raised very sharply: if there is no discrimination within the ultimate mark, then the discrimination between obtaining and not yet obtaining ought not to stand either.
19. The Buddha approves the difficulty and turns out the hard thing: contemplating quiescence while the mind does not sink and does not shrink back. The Buddha does not refute this difficulty; on the contrary, he first acknowledges it: Just so! Just so! Within the ultimate mark there is indeed no discrimination. Then he turns the point of landing: Subhūti! This is the hard thing of the bodhisattva-mahāsattva—to contemplate in this way the mark of quiescence of all dharmas while the mind does not sink and does not shrink back. The hard thing is a hard thing precisely here: having seen quiescence, one is still willing to arouse the mind. The Buddha also states the bodhisattva’s thought at this time: these deep dharmas I should know in this way and obtain awakening; such a quiescent and subtle Dharma should be proclaimed for beings. The hardness lies not in the principle failing to go through, but in not fleeing after seeing the principle—in principle everyone is the ultimate mark; in fact, only one who is willing not to retrogress is called a bodhisattva.
20. Being the world’s island. The seventh matter sets up a new simile: as with rivers and the great sea, when the water on four sides is cut off, this is called an island. Form too is thus, with its prior and later limits cut off; feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds have their prior and later limits cut off; because the prior and later limits are cut off, all dharmas are cut off too; because the prior and later limits of all dharmas are cut off, it is quiescence, it is the wondrous treasure—that is, emptiness, nothing to be attained, the exhaustion of love without remainder, separation from desire, nirvāṇa. When the bodhisattva obtains awakening, he expounds this quiescent and subtle Dharma for beings. One must see clearly the skill of this simile: an island is an island not because it has something more than the water, but because the water is cut off on its four sides. The place where the prior and later limits are cut off is exactly the place where one can stand.
21. Being the world’s guide. The eighth matter runs 「不生不滅、不垢不淨」 tr. "non-arising and non-ceasing, neither stained nor pure" through every heading of the dharmas: form, feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness, the twelve sense-fields, the eighteen elements, the four foundations of mindfulness and so on up to the eightfold noble path, the four dhyānas, the four immeasurable minds, the four formless absorptions, the five supernormal powers, the fruit of the srota-āpanna and so on up to the fruit of the arhat, the path of the pratyekabuddha, the ten powers of a Buddha and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds—all alike non-arising and non-ceasing, neither stained nor pure. The guide is the one who leads the way in front; the road he leads along is precisely this one sentence of four negations.
22. The treatise-author begins his explanation, and retells the question and answer in the third person. The treatise-author opens the treatise section with 「釋曰」 tr. "The explanation says," and at once retells the preceding sūtra text in the third person: Subhūti gave rise to a mind of wonder and addressed the Buddha—the bodhisattvas have not yet severed the afflictions, their great compassion is not yet complete, they have not yet obtained avaivartika, and yet they know that all dharmas are empty in their original nature and can arouse the mind of the unsurpassed path; this is very hard; the Buddha approved his words, saying it is so; and further praised the rare causes and conditions of the bodhisattva, namely that the bodhisattva arouses the mind to make the world safe. These three sentences must be read together: the treatise-author marks out for the sūtra text the three reasons for the hardness—the afflictions not yet severed, great compassion not yet complete, avaivartika not yet obtained. None of the three is yet there, and yet he already knows the original nature is empty and is willing to arouse the mind; the hardness lies precisely in this word 「未」 tr. "not yet."
23. The gloss on 「安穩」 tr. "safety" , and the simile of good medicine. The treatise-author glosses gate by gate, and the first gate is 「安穩」 tr. "safety": it can break all afflictions and is ultimately unchanging and unfailing. The simile is a good medicine that can break an illness, regardless of whether it is sweet or bitter, simply because it can ultimately remove the illness and make a person safe. The force of this simile lies in the four Chinese characters 「不問甘苦」 tr. "regardless of whether it is sweet or bitter"—in judging whether a dharma is good, one does not look at its taste in the mouth; one looks at whether it can ultimately remove the illness. The Buddha can make beings always safe, not looking only to one life or two; he also distinguishes: some dharmas are safe but not pleasant, some dharmas are suffering in this life and happiness in later lives, as when one takes bitter medicine, the belly is settled, but the mouth is not pleased. Therefore it says: 「佛能與今世、後世樂。」 tr. "The Buddha can give the happiness of this life and of later lives." At the end it closes in one sentence: the six destinies are of the mark of impermanence and therefore are not safety; therefore leaving the six destinies is said to be safety.
24. The gloss on ease: worldly happiness and the happiness of nirvāṇa. The treatise-author goes on to explain the second gate: the happiness of the world, because of the causes and conditions of craving and clinging, is sure after long to give rise to sorrow and vexation, and therefore is not called happiness; the happiness of nirvāṇa is without change from beginning to end, and therefore separation from sorrow and suffering is said to be happiness. The measure for judging what is happiness and what is not lies in the four Chinese characters 「始終無變」 tr. "without change from beginning to end," not in the strength or weakness of present enjoyment.
25. The gloss on 「救世間」 tr. "saving the world" , and the simile of pursuit by an enemy and thief. The third gate: as when a person is pursued by an enemy and thief, either kin or the power of officials can save him; beings too are thus, pursued by the causes and conditions of evil sins and the afflictions and by Māra’s people, and only the buddhas can expound the Dharma to save and protect them. The simile has two layers: the pursuers are of within and without—evil sins and the afflictions come from within, Māra’s people come from without; but the one who can save is of only one kind, namely expounding the Dharma.
26. The gloss on 「世間歸」 tr. "the world’s refuge" , and the simile of taking refuge in a house from violent wind. The fourth gate: as when a person meets violent wind and sudden rain, he is sure to take refuge in a house. The place of refuge must be able to keep out the wind and rain; the various wrong views and afflictions of the world, the suffering and vexation within and without body and mind, old age, sickness, death, and all sorrow and suffering—if one takes refuge in the Buddha, the Buddha with various causes and conditions draws out his sorrow, grief, suffering, and vexation. The act of taking refuge is an instinct in the midst of danger; this simile speaks of taking refuge very plainly—it is not a ceremony; it is a person’s natural step in wind and rain.
27. The gloss on 「依處」 tr. "place of support" . The fifth gate is spoken of most deeply: because all conditioned dharmas are born from the coming together of causes and conditions, they have no power of their own and cannot be taken as support. Beings, pressed by suffering, come to take support in the Buddha, but the Buddha expounds for them the dharma without support. Only the dharma without support is real, namely nirvāṇa without remainder—form and the rest of the five aggregates are extinguished entirely and do not continue again; not continuing is non-arising and non-ceasing, non-arising and non-ceasing is ultimate emptiness, with no place of support. Beings come seeking something reliable, and what the Buddha gives them is the reality that ‘there is not one thing that is reliable’.
28. An interposed question and answer: if there is no place of support, why speak of support? Within this gate the treatise-author sets a question himself; this is the only pair of Question: and Answer: in this passage: if there is no place of support, why speak again of support? The answer is a division: support is of two kinds—one, taking support in conditioned dharmas by way of the afflictions, love, views, and the rest; two, pure wisdom speaks of taking support in nirvāṇa; it is because of the afflictions and views that no support is spoken of. One word, two uses, and the difficulty resolves at once—what is broken is the support of the afflictions; what is kept is the support of pure wisdom. To read 「無依處」 tr. "without a place of support" and take it that even nirvāṇa cannot be relied on is to mix the two kinds of support into one.
29. The gloss on 「究竟道」 tr. "the ultimate path" . The sixth gate: the ultimate path is the real mark of all dharmas, ultimate emptiness. The treatise-author pushes it through the three times: form and the other dharmas are not within the prior limit, nor within the later limit; in the present, ordinary people, through recollection, imagining, and discrimination and through the power of the faculties that are the retribution of deeds as causes, have inverted views, while the sages, contemplating them with the eye of wisdom, see them all as false, deceptive, and unreal. The sentence that follows is the bone of the whole passage: as with the prior limit and the later limit, so too is the middle; if there is no before and after, how could there be a middle? To be able to expound the Dharma for beings in this way is to set beings in the ultimate and foremost path. Before and after being absent, the middle falls of itself—this is the most simple and clean of the lines of reasoning in this chapter.
30. The gloss on 「世間洲」 tr. "the world’s island" , and the gloss on 「水」 tr. "water" . The seventh gate is set up carrying on from the one before: as there is no land on the four sides of an island, so too with form and the other dharmas, whose prior limit and later limit are both unfindable; as for the middle, it is as broken in the ultimate path—because one enters the emptiness of before and after, the middle is empty too. The treatise-author further glosses the word 「水」 tr. "water" in particular: what is called water is the afflictions of the three outflows and the four floods and all the dharmas within the retribution of deeds. The three outflows the treatise-author himself lists in fascicle twenty-three: the outflow of desire, the outflow of existence, and the outflow of ignorance—the afflictions of the desire realm, the afflictions of the form and formless realms, and the ignorance that runs through the three realms; the four floods the treatise-author does not open out here; the sūtras commonly speak of the flood of desire, the flood of existence, the flood of views, and the flood of ignorance: the flood of desire is craving and the other afflictions of the desire realm, the flood of existence is the love and clinging to existence of the form and formless realms, the flood of views is the various wrong views, and the flood of ignorance is the delusion that runs through the three realms—that is, the same afflictions named from the side of ‘sweeping beings away’. An outflow leaks without stopping; a flood sweeps away and submerges without ceasing: the two names spoken together are precisely why 「水」 tr. "water" is water. Ultimate emptiness, nothing grasped, namely nirvāṇa—this is the island. The sūtra text speaks only of the island; the treatise-author supplies the water; only where there is water does the island show, and if the flood of the afflictions and of the retribution of deeds is not understood, nirvāṇa’s being an island has nothing to rest on.
31. The gloss on 「將導」 tr. "guide" , and the ship on the four floods. The eighth gate closes on a single action: beings are sunk in the waters of the four floods, and the Buddha, with the ship of the eightfold noble path, guides them onto the island of nirvāṇa; drawing in and ferrying beings across by various causes and conditions like this is called 「將導」 tr. "guiding." The three similes of island, water, and ship here join into one string—the preceding gate set up the island, this gate sets up the ship; the island set up is nirvāṇa, the ship boarded is the eightfold noble path.
32. The sūtra’s account of the ninth matter, 「趣」 tr. "tending" , begins: form tends toward emptiness, neither tends nor does not tend. The third passage of the sūtra carries on from the Buddha’s teaching in the preceding passage and continues with the ninth matter. When the bodhisattva obtains awakening, he expounds for beings that form tends toward emptiness, expounds that feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness tend toward emptiness, and so on up to expounding that the omniscience of all kinds tends toward emptiness; he also expounds that form neither tends nor does not tend, because form is of the mark of emptiness; feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds are likewise. Within one sentence, first saying 「趣空」 tr. "tends toward emptiness" and then saying 「非趣非不趣」 tr. "neither tends nor does not tend" is not self-contradiction: saying it tends toward emptiness is spoken from the side of where all dharmas return; saying it neither tends nor does not tend is spoken from the side of there being no mark of tending within the mark of emptiness. The former sentence dispels their scattering; the latter dispels clinging.
33. Tending toward emptiness, the signless, non-action, non-origination, and being without anything existent—this tending does not pass beyond. Next comes the longest run of parallel sentences in this chapter, in a fixed pattern: all dharmas tend toward such-and-such; this tending does not pass beyond; why? Because within such-and-such, tending and not tending are unfindable. First the three gates of liberation—emptiness, the signless, and non-action—are listed, then non-origination is added, then being without anything existent, non-arising and non-ceasing, and neither stained nor pure are added. The four Chinese characters 「是趣不過」 tr. "this tending does not pass beyond" are the eye of the whole passage: tending, having come here, has nowhere further to go. It is not that it is blocked; it is that there is nowhere to pass—because the place tended toward itself has no mark of tending.
34. Tending toward a dream, an illusion, an echo, a shadow, a transformation; tending toward being without measure and without limit. The run continues, now taking similes as what is tended toward: all dharmas tend toward a dream; this tending does not pass beyond, because within a dream tending and not tending are unfindable; tending toward an illusion, tending toward an echo, tending toward a shadow, tending toward a transformation are likewise, because within transformation and the rest tending and not tending are unfindable. Then without measure and without limit are listed. From the three gates of liberation it turns to dream, illusion, echo, shadow, and transformation; the thing tended toward has changed, and the conclusion does not change by one word—this is exactly the purpose of the parallel style: the headings of the dharmas change a thousand ways, the principle is only one.
35. Tending toward not given and not taken, not raised and not lowered, not increased and not decreased, not coming and not going, not entering and not leaving, not joined and not scattered, not clinging and not severed. The run advances again, and what is tended toward is entirely paired negations. This group deserves to be looked at on its own: not given and not taken, not raised and not lowered, not increased and not decreased, not coming and not going, not entering and not leaving, not joined and not scattered, not clinging and not severed—each pair denies both ends at once. All dharmas tend toward such a place where both ends are dispelled together, and in such a place even tending and not tending are unfindable.
36. Tending toward self, being, life, and so on up to the knower and the seer. This entry changes the wording of the reason: all dharmas tend toward self, being, life, person, the one who initiates, the one who causes to initiate, the maker, the one who causes to make, the knower, the seer; this tending does not pass beyond; why? Self and so on up to the knower and the seer are ultimately unfindable—how much less could there be tending and not tending. The preceding entries say 「趣、非趣不可得」 tr. "tending and not tending are unfindable"; this entry first says that what is tended toward is itself 「畢竟不可得」 tr. "ultimately unfindable," and then with 「何況」 tr. "how much less" pushes one layer further. What is tended toward being a provisional name, whether there is tending or not is still less to be spoken of.
37. Tending toward permanence, happiness, purity, and self, tending toward impermanence, suffering, impurity, and non-self, tending toward the matters of desire, hatred, delusion, and views. This group is the most worth savouring: all dharmas tend toward permanence, tend toward happiness, purity, and self; this tending does not pass beyond; all dharmas tend toward impermanence, suffering, impurity, and non-self; this too is a tending that does not pass beyond. The four inversions and the counteracting words of the four noble practices are placed in the same sentence-pattern and dispelled alike. Next come tending toward the matters of desire, tending toward the matters of hatred, the matters of delusion, the matters of views, with the same reason as before—ultimately unfindable. Even the matters of the afflictions are within the range of 「是趣不過」 tr. "this tending does not pass beyond"; from this it can be seen that what is spoken of here is not a ranking of value but the place where all dharmas return.
38. Tending toward suchness, the nature of dharmas, the limit of reality, the nature of the inconceivable, equality, the mark of immovability. The reason in this group is put another way: all dharmas tend toward suchness; this tending does not pass beyond, because within suchness there is no coming and no going; tending toward the nature of dharmas, the limit of reality, and the nature of the inconceivable are likewise, because within them there is no coming and no going. Tending toward equality and tending toward the mark of immovability still use 「趣、非趣不可得」 tr. "tending and not tending are unfindable." 「無來無去」 tr. "No coming and no going" is spoken from the side of the real mark itself; 「趣、非趣不可得」 tr. "tending and not tending are unfindable" is spoken from the side of the matter of tending; the two kinds of reason stand side by side, and there is no need to force them into one.
39. Tending toward form, feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness, the twelve sense-fields and the eighteen elements, tending toward the six perfections. The run returns to the most basic headings of the dharmas: tending toward form, tending toward feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness, because form and feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness are ultimately unfindable; the twelve sense-fields and the eighteen elements are likewise. Then the six perfections are listed one by one: tending toward dāna, tending toward śīla, tending toward kṣānti, tending toward vīrya, tending toward dhyāna, tending toward prajñā, each entry taking 「畢竟不可得故」 tr. "because it is ultimately unfindable" of that perfection as the reason. The six perfections are named one by one without skipping over them with 「乃至」 tr. "and so on up to"; this is the gravity of this sūtra’s writing—the dharmas that are cultivated are put into this sentence one by one, not one of them left vague.
40. Tending toward inner emptiness, outer emptiness, inner-and-outer emptiness, and so on up to the emptiness of non-existent and existent dharmas; tending toward the four foundations of mindfulness and so on up to the eightfold noble path. The gates of the emptinesses and the thirty-seven limbs of the path enter the list alike: tending toward inner emptiness, tending toward outer emptiness, tending toward inner-and-outer emptiness, and so on up to tending toward the emptiness of non-existent and existent dharmas—all are a tending that does not pass beyond, because the emptinesses are ultimately unfindable; tending toward the four foundations of mindfulness and so on up to the eightfold noble path is also a tending that does not pass beyond, because the thirty-seven limbs of the path are ultimately unfindable. Even 「空」 tr. "emptiness" itself is within the range of what is tended toward and unfindable—this is a sentence in this passage that must not be read lightly.
41. Tending toward the ten powers of a Buddha and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds; tending toward the four fruits, the path of the pratyekabuddha, and so on up to the Buddha. The run closes on the grounds of fruition: tending toward the ten powers of a Buddha and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds is a tending that does not pass beyond, because within the omniscience of all kinds tending and not tending are unfindable; tending toward the fruit of the srota-āpanna, the fruit of the sakṛdāgāmin, the fruit of the anāgāmin, the fruit of the arhat, the path of the pratyekabuddha, tending toward anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi, tending toward the srota-āpanna and so on up to the Buddha—all are a tending that does not pass beyond. From form at the very beginning all the way to the Buddha, the sentence-pattern never changes. Reading the whole run through, what one obtains is not a list of the headings of the dharmas but a conclusion carried through to the end: any dharma, pushed to its extreme, arrives at the same place that has no mark of tending.
42. Who can believe and understand—the answer of four marks. Here Subhūti draws in his question: World-Honored One! Who can believe in and understand this deep prajñāpāramitā? The Buddha answers with four things: having long practised the six perfections under the buddhas of the past, roots of goodness fully ripened, having made offerings to countless hundreds of thousands of myriads of koṭi of buddhas, and keeping company with good friends. Of the four, the first three are one’s own practice and merit; the fourth is an outer condition—and this outer condition is exactly the first move the Buddha taught at the beginning of this chapter. Head and tail clasp together here: the good friend is not a transition for the stage of the new trainee; he is the constant condition accompanying the one who can believe deep prajñā.
43. The question about nature, mark, and appearance, and the answer of the severance and separation from the three poisons. Subhūti asks again: what kind of nature, what kind of mark, what kind of appearance does the person who can believe and understand have? The Buddha answers very briefly: the severance and separation from desire, hatred, and delusion is his nature, mark, and appearance. Three things are asked, and only one is answered; separation from the three poisons is at once his substance and nature, his outward mark, and his appearance. The proof of believing deep prajñā lies not in words but in the weight of the three poisons.
44. The treatise-author’s question: the nine matters are all spoken of briefly; why is tending alone spoken of at length? The third passage of the treatise section begins from a question: among the matters above all are spoken of briefly; why now within 「趣」 tr. "tending" is it spoken of at length? This question asks out for the reader the actual puzzlement of reading the sūtra—the first eight matters have only a few lines each, while the ninth matter is laid out in a whole great passage. The treatise-author’s answer is only one sentence: 「趣」 tr. "tending" is the place where the nine matters above are gathered up and return, and therefore much is said of it. Safety, ease, saving, refuge, place of support, the ultimate path, island, guide—what the eight matters speak of are all things the bodhisattva does for the world; tending speaks of the place where all dharmas return—since the place of return gathers up everything, the words are naturally many.
45. Furthermore: the matters are all of one meaning, and tending, being last, is spoken of at length. The treatise-author supplies one more explanation: ease and the other matters, and tending, are all of one and the same meaning, all for the sake of drawing beings out and setting them in nirvāṇa—this 「著」 tr. "set" is the same as in the sūtra text’s 「著無畏岸涅槃處」 tr. "sets them in the place of nirvāṇa, the shore of fearlessness"—its 「著」 tr. "set"—with the meaning of placing; if every matter were spoken of at length, the speaking could not be exhausted, and because 「趣」 tr. "tending" is placed last, it is spoken of at length; one should know that the rest too all ought to be spoken of at length. This sentence removes a possible misunderstanding: it is not that tending is more important than the first eight matters; it is that the momentum of the writing needs one place where it spreads out; the brevity of the first eight matters the reader should know by analogy from the breadth of tending.
46. The gloss on 「色等法趣空」 tr. "form and the other dharmas tend toward emptiness" , and the simile of space that has only a name. The treatise-author glosses the first sentence of the sūtra text: what is called form and the other dharmas tending toward emptiness is as space has only a name and no real dharma; form and the other dharmas are likewise, and in the end return to emptiness. Because the ultimate mark of all dharmas is necessarily empty, all the rest is false. At once comes a very ordinary simile from human affairs: as with a person who at first, though he has good words, only after a long time has his real disposition known; form and the other dharmas are likewise: at the time of entering nirvāṇa without remainder they are no different from space, and one should know that before too they were thus, only ordinary people, because of the retribution of inversion, see them as different. This simile is most worth remembering: it is not that form becomes empty only at the time of entering nirvāṇa; it is that it was so from the first and is known only after long—as a person’s real disposition was so from the first and only at first was not seen. At the end he sets up a counter-proof with space: no dharma can pass out beyond the marks of emptiness and the rest, as a person who wishes to pass out beyond space cannot do so. The four Chinese characters of the sūtra text, 「是趣不過」 tr. "this tending does not pass beyond," here obtain a right explanation.
47. The sixteen names, such as self, provisionally existing through the coming together of the five aggregates. The treatise-author explains the group in the sūtra text, 「趣我、眾生、壽命」 tr. "tending toward self, being, life": the sixteen names, such as self, are all names provisionally existing because of the coming together of the five aggregates, with no real dharma; how could there be tending and not tending? The sūtra text gives as examples self, being, life, person, the one who initiates, the one who causes to initiate, the maker, the one who causes to make, the knower, the seer; the treatise-author sums them up as 「十六名」 tr. "the sixteen names," and judges them provisional names upon the coming together of the five aggregates. The names being provisional, whether there is tending or not naturally cannot be spoken of.
48. The four inversions break the four noble practices; permanence and impermanence are alike unfindable. The treatise-author explains the group in the sūtra text, 「趣常等、趣無常等」 tr. "tending toward permanence and the rest, tending toward impermanence and the rest": if one holds the four inversions—permanence, purity, happiness, self, and the rest—they break the four noble practices. As the four dharmas, permanence and the rest, are unfindable because they are inversions, so too are form and the other dharmas. Going one layer further: as permanence and the rest are unfindable, impermanence and the rest, because they come out of permanence and the rest, are also unfindable. Therefore it says: 「一切法趣常等、趣無常等。」 tr. "All dharmas tend toward permanence and the rest, tend toward impermanence and the rest." This passage is the subtlest turn in this chapter—the reason impermanence too is unfindable is not that it is wrong, but that it is spoken over against permanence; the medicine that cures is set up according to the illness it cures, and when the illness is empty, the medicine too is empty.
49. The treatise-author retells the question and answer of the last passage in narrative form. At the end the treatise-author does not use the form of Question: and Answer:, but retells in the third person the question and answer of the sūtra text: Subhūti asked the Buddha, this Dharma is very deep and subtle; who can believe and understand it? The Buddha answered that those with causes and conditions such as long practice can believe it; he asked further, what marks do those of long practice and the rest have? The Buddha answered, this person has separated from the mind of the three poisons, and also does not see this separation, because he has deeply entered the real mark of all dharmas. One must notice the sentence the treatise-author supplies to the Buddha’s answer—「亦不見是離」 tr. "and also does not see this separation." The sūtra text says only the severance and separation from desire, hatred, and delusion; the treatise-author points out: if one sees that there is a 「離」 tr. "separation," then one has not yet truly separated. Because he has deeply entered the real mark, he does not see separation—this sentence is the most important stroke before the whole chapter closes.
50. The last question and answer: one who has not yet obtained the acceptance of non-arising—how can he be said to sever the three poisons? Severance is of two kinds. The treatise-author raises for the reader the last difficulty: this person has not yet obtained the dharma of the acceptance of non-arising; how can one say 「斷三毒」 tr. "he severs the three poisons"? The answer is the last division in this chapter: severance is of two kinds—one, severance at the root; two, severance that thins and lessens; what is spoken of here is severance that thins and lessens. At once he states the aspect of severance that thins and lessens: the practitioner does not discriminate that this is severance and this is affliction; because the mark of the afflictions is inverted and not fixed, the afflictions are themselves severance, and so it says separation. One difficulty and one answer close the whole chapter: severance does not count only after everything has been severed first; it is no longer making, upon the afflictions, the discrimination that they really exist; the mark of the afflictions being inverted and not fixed, not grasping here is called separation. It runs through in one line with the 「莫貪」 tr. "do not crave" and 「不取」 tr. "not grasping" taught by the good friend at the beginning of this chapter—the whole chapter begins in not-grasping and ends in not-grasping.
Do Not Misread
Do not read 「先當親近、供養善知識」 tr. "he should first draw near to and make offerings to a good friend" as handing over responsibility to someone else. The qualification in the sūtra text lies in 「能說是深般若波羅蜜者」 tr. "one who can expound this deep prajñāpāramitā"—what makes a good friend a good friend is judged by the Dharma he speaks, not by the relationship. The treatise-author also makes a point of explaining: though the good friend teaches in various ways, the Buddha commends only his indestructible dharma, namely not craving, not clinging to, and not grasping form and the other dharmas. Drawing near to a good friend is not ceding the power of judgement; it is going to receive that single flavour of the indestructible dharma; the learner himself must still recognise which sentence is the indestructible one. At the end, among the four marks of the one who can believe and understand that the Buddha answers with, the good friend occupies only one; the first three are still one’s own long practice, roots of goodness, and offerings.
Do not read ‘do not take the dharmas to be awakening’ and ‘do not crave the dharmas’ as meaning there is no need to cultivate the six perfections and the thirty-seven limbs of the path. The positive reason in the sūtra text is stated plainly: not grasping form, one obtains awakening; not grasping the six perfections and so on up to the eighteen unshared dharmas, one obtains awakening—it is ‘obtaining by not grasping’, not ‘obtaining by not cultivating’. And the first thing the good friend teaches is to dedicate the fruits of the six perfections entirely to awakening; only with this step first is there afterwards ‘do not take … to be’ and ‘do not crave’. If one reads it as meaning the six perfections can be abandoned, then dedication has nothing to dedicate, and the whole passage destroys itself.
Do not read the two kinds of the emptiness of nature as a contest of high and low. The treatise-author divides the emptiness attained by the great bodhisattvas from the emptiness of compliant acceptance trained in by the small bodhisattvas in order to settle the place where those new to the training set their hand, not to judge one true and one false. The simile of the dharma of the summit has already said the measure fully: the same share of faith is great beside the ordinary person and small beside the Buddha. The chick of the golden-winged bird, just born, can go from one Mount Sumeru to another—this says precisely that the strength of one new to the training is not to be made light of; the division into great and small is to make people willing to set their hand, not to make people belittle themselves.
Do not read 「一切法無依處」 tr. "all dharmas are without a place of support" as meaning that even nirvāṇa cannot be relied on. The question and answer the treatise-author sets himself within this gate are there precisely to prevent this mistake: support is of two kinds; taking support in conditioned dharmas by way of the afflictions, love, views, and the rest is what is broken; pure wisdom speaking of taking support in nirvāṇa is what is established; 「煩惱見故說無依止」 tr. "it is because of the afflictions and views that no support is spoken of." When the sūtra text says without a place of support, what it breaks is leaning upon conditioned dharmas, not pushing beings out to where there is nowhere to go. In the same way, 「究竟相中無有分別」 tr. "within the ultimate mark there is no discrimination" must not be read as meaning there is no difference between obtaining and not yet obtaining—after the Buddha approves the words, he at once turns out 「是為菩薩摩訶薩難事」 tr. "this is the hard thing of the bodhisattva-mahāsattva," landing on contemplating quiescence while the mind does not sink and does not shrink back, which is precisely not losing the arousing of the mind within non-discrimination.
Do not read that long run of 「是趣不過」 tr. "this tending does not pass beyond" as monotonous repetition and skip it. Though the sentence-pattern is the same, the things tended toward change layer upon layer, and the reason too takes two forms: one form says 「趣、非趣不可得」 tr. "tending and not tending are unfindable," one form says that what is tended toward is 「畢竟不可得，何況當有趣、非趣」 tr. "ultimately unfindable—how much less could there be tending and not tending," and the group of tending toward suchness and the nature of dharmas further puts it as 「無來無去」 tr. "no coming and no going." Above all, one must not read tending toward permanence, happiness, purity, and self and tending toward impermanence, suffering, impurity, and non-self as of equal weight and count it done—the treatise-author sets up an explanation especially for this: impermanence and the rest, because they come out of permanence and the rest, are also unfindable. The dharma that cures is set up according to what it cures; if this sentence is skipped, the subtlest turn in this chapter is lost.
Do not read 「欲、瞋、癡斷離」 tr. "the severance and separation from desire, hatred, and delusion" as already severed entirely without remainder. The treatise-author’s question and answer at the end are set up precisely for this: this person has not yet obtained the dharma of the acceptance of non-arising, and what is spoken of is severance that thins and lessens, not severance at the root. And the aspect of severance that thins and lessens also does not lie in reckoning quantities, but in 「不分別是斷、是煩惱」 tr. "not discriminating that this is severance and this is affliction"—because the mark of the afflictions is inverted and not fixed, the afflictions are themselves severance. Read this together with the sentence the treatise-author supplied earlier, 「亦不見是離」 tr. "and also does not see this separation": if the mind keeps a mark of already having separated, that is exactly not yet having separated. Wherever this chapter speaks of severance and of separation, it points toward not-grasping, not toward measuring.
Bearing on Practice
The first benefit this chapter gives the one who applies himself is to put ‘finding the right person’ back in first place. The Buddha’s first sentence in answer to the question of those new to the training is not a method of contemplation; it is that he should first draw near to and make offerings to a good friend who can expound deep prajñā. In daily life, in choosing whom to draw near to, one can use the measuring-rod the sūtra text carries with it: can he speak deep prajñā out or not? What he teaches—is it dedicating all that is practised to unsurpassed awakening, while not craving, not clinging to, and not grasping any dharma? The rod lies not in reputation and bustle but in the Dharma spoken. And at the end, among the four marks the Buddha lists of the one who can believe and understand, he still includes 「與善知識相隨」 tr. "keeping company with good friends"—this is not a matter of a moment at the entrance; it is a matter of walking together through long kalpas.
The second benefit is the confidence and the measure of one new to the training. The treatise-author’s simile of the dharma of the summit, simile of the chick of the golden-winged bird, and simile of the small fire—the three similes teach one and the same thing: one who has first aroused the mind and obtained the flavour of prajñā already has a strength not to be made light of—the chick, just born, can already go from one Mount Sumeru to another; the small fire can already burn. Those who apply themselves often put off setting their hand to the deep Dharma with ‘I am not yet good enough’; these three similes can serve exactly as a check against this: what is lacking is long practice, not qualification. At the same time the measure is there too: great beside the ordinary person, small beside the Buddha—neither belittling oneself nor being self-satisfied.
The third benefit is that the nine matters can serve as a self-examination of the arousing of the mind. Safety, ease, saving, refuge, place of support, the ultimate path, island, guide, tending—these nine are all spoken with the world in view. In daily life, if the aroused mind has dried up, if the gate of practice has turned into one’s own enterprise, one can ask through these nine sentences one by one: what I am practising at this moment—is it safety for beings? Is it ease? Is it saving? Can it be a refuge, a support, a path, an island, a guide? The setting-up of the nine matters was from the first what the Buddha used to answer ‘why is there seeking within the emptiness of nature’—the seeking mind lies not in attaining something for oneself but in bringing relief to the world.
The fourth benefit lies in reading together the three similes of island, water, and ship. Beings are sunk in the water of the four floods, and the Buddha, with the ship of the eightfold noble path, leads them onto the island of nirvāṇa; and the island is an island because the water on its four sides is cut off. If the practitioner in daily life feels he has nowhere to apply his strength, these three similes can serve as a direction: there is no need first to ask whether there is ground under one’s feet; first ask what the water on the four sides is—the afflictions of the three outflows and the four floods and all the dharmas within the retribution of deeds; once the water is recognised, the place where it is cut off is the island, and the ship that crosses over is the eightfold noble path and nothing else.
The fifth benefit is that 「是趣不過」 tr. "this tending does not pass beyond" can serve as a place for stilling the mind. All dharmas tend toward emptiness, tend toward the signless, tend toward non-action, and so on up to tending toward form, tending toward the six perfections, tending toward the emptinesses, tending toward the thirty-seven limbs of the path, tending toward the fruit of buddhahood—every sentence ties off in this tending does not pass beyond. When the thoughts of one who applies himself are racing, he can check them with this sentence: where is this thought tending? Having tended there, is there still any passing beyond? If in the place tended toward itself tending and not tending are unfindable, the racing naturally comes to rest. And the treatise-author’s simile of space gives an ordinary way to set one’s hand: no dharma passes out beyond the marks of emptiness and the rest, as a person who wishes to pass out beyond space cannot do so—it is not pressing the thought down; it is recognising that it has nowhere to get out to.
The sixth benefit is the test of the three poisons and the warning of 「不見是離」 tr. "not seeing this separation." The nature, mark, and appearance the Buddha gives for the one who can believe and understand deep prajñā are only the severance and separation from desire, hatred, and delusion; in judging whether one accords with prajñā or not, the most solid proof lies in the weight of the three poisons, not in how much one understands. And the treatise-author’s two sentences guard both sides at once: on one side is ‘not having obtained the acceptance of non-arising, how can it be said that he severs?’—answered with severance that thins and lessens, so that the one who applies himself need not give himself up because he has not severed at the root; on the other side is 「亦不見是離」 tr. "and also does not see this separation"—so that the one who applies himself must also not, because the poisons have thinned a little, take himself to have finished. The practitioner does not discriminate that this is severance and this is affliction; because the mark of the afflictions is inverted and not fixed, the afflictions are themselves severance; not grasping here is the single flavour this chapter teaches from beginning to end.
Further Resonances
The backbone of this chapter is three passages of sūtra text and three passages of treatise explanation. Sūtra ① begins from Subhūti asking how bodhisattvas new to the training train in the six perfections; the Buddha answers that one should first draw near to and make offerings to a good friend who can expound deep prajñā, and gives the three things the good friend teaches: dedicating everything, not taking the dharmas to be awakening and obtaining it by not grasping, and not craving the dharmas and so on up to not craving awakening, concluding with because all dharmas are empty of nature. Treatise ① first sets a question—asked about what those new to the training practise, why answer with the subtle matters of long practice—and answers with the two kinds of the emptiness of nature: what the great bodhisattvas attain, and the compliant acceptance the small bodhisattvas train in; next, with a share of real wisdom and the simile of the dharma of the summit, it makes clear that one new to the training has already entered the count of bodhisattvas; last, it explains why the Buddha first teaches making offerings and drawing near, and that the Buddha commends only the indestructible dharma, and gives the two similes of the chick of the golden-winged bird and the small fire. Sūtra ② begins from Subhūti exclaiming that seeking awakening within the emptiness of nature is a hard thing; the Buddha approves his words and gives the general heading of the nine matters, setting forth one by one making the world safe, making the world at ease, saving the world, being the world’s refuge, being the world’s place of support (with Subhūti’s question interposed on how all dharmas are without a place of support, and the Buddha’s answer that form not continuing is non-arising, non-ceasing, and without a place of support), being the world’s ultimate path (with Subhūti’s difficulty interposed that there is no discrimination within the ultimate mark, and the Buddha approving his words and turning out the hard thing: contemplating the mark of quiescence while the mind does not sink and does not shrink back), being the world’s island, and being the world’s guide. Treatise ② opens with 「釋曰」 tr. "The explanation says," retells in the third person Subhūti’s addressing the Buddha with a mind of wonder and the Buddha’s approval, and glosses gate by gate safety (the simile of good medicine), ease, saving the world (the simile of pursuit by an enemy and thief), the world’s refuge (the simile of taking refuge in a house from violent wind), place of support (with one pair of Question: and Answer: interposed: the two kinds of support), the ultimate path, the world’s island and water, and guide (the simile of the ship of the eightfold noble path on the four floods). Sūtra ③ carries on to continue with the ninth matter, being that toward which the world tends: first it establishes that form tends toward emptiness and neither tends nor does not tend; next, in the pattern of 「是趣不過」 tr. "this tending does not pass beyond," it lists broadly emptiness, the signless, non-action, non-origination, being without anything existent; dream, illusion, echo, shadow, and transformation; without measure and without limit; not given and not taken; not raised and not lowered; not increased and not decreased; not coming and not going; not entering and not leaving, not joined and not scattered, not clinging and not severed; the sixteen names, such as self; permanence, happiness, purity, and self, and impermanence, suffering, impurity, and non-self; the matters of desire, hatred, delusion, and views; suchness, the nature of dharmas, the limit of reality, the nature of the inconceivable, equality, and the mark of immovability; form, feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness, the twelve sense-fields, and the eighteen elements; the six perfections; the emptinesses; the thirty-seven limbs of the path; the ten powers of a Buddha and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds; the four fruits, the path of the pratyekabuddha, and so on up to the Buddha; and it closes at the end with the question and answer on who can believe and understand and the question and answer on nature, mark, and appearance. Treatise ③ explains by question and answer why tending alone is spoken of at length (tending is where the nine matters return; tending, being last, is spoken of at length), glosses 「色等法趣空」 tr. "form and the other dharmas tend toward emptiness" and gives the two similes of space having only a name and of good words whose real disposition is known after long, explains the provisional existence of the sixteen names, such as self, and that the four inversions, permanence and the rest, and impermanence and the rest are alike unfindable, retells at the end in narrative form the question and answer on believing and understanding and supplies the sentence 「亦不見是離」 tr. "and also does not see this separation," and finally closes the whole chapter with the question and answer on how one who has not yet obtained the acceptance of non-arising can be said to sever the three poisons, and the division of severance into two kinds.
In the vein of meaning linking this chapter with the chapters before and after it, three lines can be seen. First, after the preceding chapters have set forth broadly the merits of prajñā and the deeds of Māra, this chapter turns to the one matter closest to the practitioner: where the one entering is to set his hand. The marks of wasting away midway spoken of in the preceding chapter are many and fearful; this chapter answers with only one move—first obtain a good friend who can expound deep prajñā; and at the end, among the four marks listed of the one who can believe deep prajñā, keeping company with good friends still occupies one place. Speaking of the difficulty and speaking of setting one’s hand depend on each other, before and after. Second, the teaching of the nine matters that benefit the world and the meaning, set forth again and again in the preceding chapters, that prajñā is not apart from great compassion and that one contemplates emptiness without abandoning beings, are outside and inside of each other: precisely because what is sought is ultimately empty, the arousing of the mind can stand entirely because it is for the sake of the world; that 「於一切性空法中求阿耨多羅三藐三菩提」 tr. "within all dharmas empty of nature, seeking anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi" is a hard thing finds its resolution not in whether the principle goes through, but in whether one is willing not to retrogress. Third, in this chapter only the ninth matter, 「趣」 tr. "tending," is spoken of at length, and the first eight are abbreviated—the treatise-author says plainly 「當知餘者亦皆應廣說」 tr. "one should know that the rest too all ought to be spoken of at length," handing the brevity of the first eight matters over to the reader to know by analogy from tending; as for the division of severance into two kinds, the treatise-author in this chapter speaks only of severance that thins and lessens. The reader may view the chapters before and after together, to see the single continuity of the teaching of the good friend and the teaching of ultimate emptiness.
The title of this chapter has variant names among the texts, and the ancient masters’ commentaries also cite this chapter under a variant name—for example Huiying, in his commentary, pointing back to this chapter, says 「上善知識品中已廣釋也」 tr. "It has already been explained at length above in the chapter on the Good Friend," which can attest the name of this chapter as the ancient masters saw it; the differences in the chapter titles among the texts and the discrepancies in their order, the division and joining of fascicles, and the account of later citations are recorded side by side without judgement, and are detailed in the Apparatus.
趣一切智品Tending toward Omniscience
全文五層 →Full five layers →趣一切智品：般若非趣非不趣何以問趣答趣，趣一切種智何以不是取得一個地方，能趣者何以反成眾生的歸趣，修般若何以即是修一切法，無所修與不受修與壞修何以同是修般若，壞修何以不是毀法，阿鞞跋致何以要在深般若中驗著不著，未得一切種智何以能隨順，順畢竟空何以即順一切種智，不行色乃至不行一切種智何以不是斷絕，色即是薩婆若何以不是混同
在問什麼
這一品只有一個字在動：趣。須菩提起問，問得極短：解了甚深般若波羅蜜的菩薩摩訶薩，應當趣向何處？佛答得也極短：當趣一切種智。問答俱短，難處卻立刻現前——前面諸品一路申明般若畢竟空、諸法無所從來亦無所去，既然如此，還有什麼可趣、有誰在趣、趣到哪裡去？論主開卷第一問，問的正是這個：般若波羅蜜非趣、非不趣，須菩提何以要問趣，佛何以要答趣？
論主的答案不在辯論裡，在一個對照裡。外道說「諸法從因趣果、從先世入今世、從今世趣後世」——趣在他們口中是一條實有的線，線上有實有的東西在移動。為破這種常見的顛倒，般若門中纔說「無趣不趣」。然而「無趣不趣」一旦被握成一個結論，行道便無下手處。所以此品的問答另有分寸：須菩提是以無著之心問，佛是以無著之心答；問趣答趣而心不著趣，趣字便不再是一條線，而是因果相似的自然承接——般若是因，一切種智是果，因中已有果的味道，故說解深般若者趣一切種智。
品的後半把這個「趣」落到人身上。佛囑咐：在這甚深般若波羅蜜之中，阿鞞跋致菩薩應當驗知——驗的不是他能說多少，是他在深般若中著、還是不著。論主接得極準：上一品末尾說了阿鞞跋致的性、相、貌，今應驗試知。於是經文廣列驗知之相：不以他人語為堅要、不為欲瞋癡所牽、不遠離六波羅蜜、聞深般若心不驚不怖而歡喜樂聞。須菩提再追一層：既然般若無定相，這人究竟是怎麼行的？佛答：隨順一切種智心。此答又生一難——人尚未得一切種智，如何能順它？論主的解答是全品的樞紐：順畢竟空之心，就是順一切種智之心。收束處，佛自說因緣：色等諸法即是薩婆若，色如即是薩婆若如，是如無二無別。趣之一字，至此還歸於如。
逐段解明
一、趣何所之問。 須菩提問：解深般若波羅蜜者，當趣何所。此問看似尋常，位置卻要緊：前品廣說善知識、廣說菩薩之相，讀者心中自然生起一個方向感的疑問——這樣行下去，是行到哪裡去？須菩提不問『得什麼』而問「趣何所」，問的是行道的歸向，不是所得之物。讀此一句先要立定：問的是向，不是取。
二、佛答當趣一切種智。 佛答：當趣一切種智。答語與問語同一格式，不添一字解釋。此處最易讀錯的是把「一切種智」想成一個遠方的處所，彷彿般若是路、薩婆若是終點站。論主後文將明白遮掉這個讀法：所以此刻只須記住答語的形式——佛順著須菩提的問法答，是隨順問者的言路，不是為趣立一個實有的所。
三、能趣者反成歸趣——修般若即修一切法、無所修與不受修與壞修。 須菩提聞答即申論，且一連翻出四層。第一層是一個漂亮的翻轉：能趣向一切種智的人，自身便成為一切眾生所歸趣之處——因為他修般若波羅蜜的緣故。趣的人成了被趣的地方，可見趣不是離開此處去到彼處。第二層：修般若波羅蜜即是修一切諸法。第三層：無所修是修般若波羅蜜。第四層：不受修、壞修是修般若波羅蜜。四層一氣而下，後三層都在拆「修」字：修而無所修、修而不受、修而見其壞——若把修解作累積，這三句便全成矛盾語。
四、佛設問何等法壞。 佛不直接印可，先反問：何等法壞故，般若波羅蜜為壞修？這一問是全品教學法的樣本——須菩提說出一個極簡的判語，佛便要他把判語落到具體法上去。凡讀般若經論遇見簡語，可學佛此問：這話說的是哪些法？
五、須菩提歷數所壞之法。 須菩提逐項答：色壞故，受、想、行、識、十二處、十八界壞故，我乃至知者、見者壞故；檀波羅蜜乃至般若波羅蜜壞故；內空乃至無法有法空、四念處乃至十八不共法、須陀洹果乃至一切種智壞故——般若波羅蜜為壞修。此答的次第不可輕看：從五眾、十二處、十八界的世間法，到我與知者見者的人我法，到六波羅蜜的行法，到諸空與四念處乃至十八不共法的觀法，直到須陀洹果乃至一切種智的果法，一路無所遺漏。連般若波羅蜜自身、連一切種智都在所壞之列——所壞既無例外，壞修之義纔真正成立。
六、佛印可。 佛言：如是！如是！並重牒首尾兩端——色壞故乃至一切種智壞故。論主後文以一句斷之：佛可須菩提所說。印可之所以要重牒，是因為此義最易被讀成毀法，故佛親口把首尾再說一遍，令人不得抽換其中任何一項。
七、阿鞞跋致應驗知——著不著為準。 佛於此轉入全品後半：在這深般若波羅蜜中，阿鞞跋致菩薩摩訶薩應當驗知。驗的標準只有一條——不著。深般若中不著，當知是阿鞞跋致；禪波羅蜜乃至檀波羅蜜中不著、四念處乃至一切種智中不著，當知是阿鞞跋致。要緊的是所驗之處：不在世間法上驗，正在最深最勝的法上驗。人於粗法不著易，於深法不著難；故驗知之場，選在深般若。
八、論主設問——非趣非不趣，何以問趣答趣。 論主起首便把讀者心中最尖的一問提出來：般若波羅蜜非趣、非不趣，須菩提何以故問「行般若者趣至何處」？又佛何以答「趣薩婆若」？此問若不先立，後文一切解說都成無的放矢。論主的教學法在此可見：先替讀者把矛盾說到最尖銳，纔開始解。
九、答語之標。 論主以答曰起下文。此標非贅文——本論之體，問與答各自成段，讀者循標即知何者是難、何者是釋，不致把設難之辭誤作正義。
十、外道從因趣果之破——故言無趣不趣。 論主先出所破：外道言「諸法從因趣果、從先世入今世、從今世趣後世」。此中的病不在說因果，在把因果之間看成一個常住之物在移轉——今世的我搬到後世去。破這常顛倒的緣故，般若門中纔說「無趣不趣」。讀此段須看清：無趣不趣是對治語，不是一個新的定論。立此一義，後文纔說得通——佛答「趣一切種智」並不違「無趣不趣」，因為所破的是常顛倒，不是因果相續本身。
十一、無著心問無著心答——畢竟空故無障無礙、因果相似故說趣。 論主給出全品第一個正面解答，分三節。其一、此中須菩提以無著心問，佛以無著心答——同樣的趣字，著心說之則成外道的線，無著心說之則無過。其二、般若波羅蜜畢竟空，於諸法無障無礙；得無障無礙解脫故無障無礙——般若既不與任何法相礙，說趣亦不礙於畢竟空。其三、因果相似故，故言：「解深般若者，趣一切種智。」此第三節是趣字的正解：般若與一切種智因果相似，如種與果同一類，所以說趣；不是有個東西走過去。日用中可作此勘：說『我在趣向菩提』時，心裡若有一段路、一個到達者，便落外道；若只是因中修習、果自相似，趣字無過。
十二、歸趣如子趣父母。 論主牒經句「菩薩知般若波羅蜜者為一切眾生所歸趣」，隨即出喻：如子為苦惱所逼，則趣父母。這是論主自出之第一個譬喻，喻得極平實——孩子受苦時奔向父母，不是父母設了一條路要他走，是苦逼之下自然歸投。眾生歸趣菩薩亦如是：不因號召，因苦而投。此喻同時回應了第三段的翻轉——能趣者何以反成歸趣：因為所趣的從來不是地方，是可依可投之處。
十三、問何以但菩薩為眾生歸趣。 論主再設一問：何以故但菩薩解深般若波羅蜜為眾生所歸趣？此問問得細——解深般若的不只菩薩，二乘亦有其解；何以獨歸菩薩？設此問是為逼出下文的答眼，不是為難。
十四、答語之標。 論主以答曰起下文，格式同第九段，標出以下是釋而非難。
十五、大悲故常修、修故解一切法皆入般若。 答有兩節相扣。其一、菩薩於眾生中大悲心故，常修習般若波羅蜜——歸趣之所以獨在菩薩，根在大悲；二乘有解而無此心，眾生無可投處。其二、以修故，能解一切諸法皆入般若波羅蜜，是故「修般若波羅蜜即修一切法」。此節正解第三段的第二層：修般若即修一切法，不是說般若之外還去修一切法，是說一切法皆入般若，修此即修彼。讀者常誤以為此句在誇大般若的功用，其實它在說範圍——般若不是諸法中的一法，是諸法所入之處。
十六、三句之訓並所壞之量——無所修、不受修、壞修、可破壞法。 論主逐字訓釋須菩提的三句判語。無所修者：般若無定實法可得，故經中說「無所修是修般若波羅蜜」——無所修不是不修，是所修之法無定實可得。不受修者：般若波羅蜜中，一切諸觀有過故不受——連能觀之觀也不取為實。壞修者：一切法無常散壞，故名壞修——壞是法自身的無常相，不是修行人去毀壞它。末出所壞之量：可破壞法者，所謂色等乃至一切種智。此段是全品最易讀錯之處，論主的訓解把三句一齊從『否定修行』的誤讀中救出：三句所否定的是對所修之法的實執，不是修習之事。
十七、佛可須菩提所說。 論主以一句承轉：佛可須菩提所說。此句短，作用大——它告訴讀者，上面四義不是須菩提的私見，是經佛印可之義，可以依之而行。
十八、承上品性相貌、今應驗試。 論主點出經②的來歷：上品末說阿鞞跋致菩薩性、相、貌，今應驗試知。說相是給人認識，驗試是實地勘驗——知相而不驗，相只是知識。驗的方法論主立得斬截：於深般若波羅蜜中著不？若著，則非；若不著，則是其相。
十九、行般若菩薩二種。 論主分出二機：一者、因般若波羅蜜觀一切法畢竟空，般若亦自空；二者、不能觀般若亦空。是故經中試知著不。分際只在一處——般若自身空不空。能觀般若亦自空的，是真不著；只觀諸法空而留般若為所依的，仍是著。這一分科是全品驗知之義的實際刻度，也是第十六段「無所修」之訓的行門落處。
二十、驗知之相廣示——他語、欲心瞋心癡心、六度、聞深般若不驚不怖。 經②佛廣列諸相。其一、行深般若時不以他人語為堅要，亦不隨他教行。其二、不為欲心、瞋心、癡心所牽。其三、不遠離六波羅蜜。其四、聞說深般若時，心不驚、不沒、不怖、不畏、不悔，歡喜樂聞，受持、讀、誦、正憶念、如說行。佛並說其宿因：是菩薩先世已問是深般若波羅蜜中事已，受持、讀、誦、說、正憶念；有大威德故，聞深般若不驚不怖。此段之相，一半是心不被外奪，一半是心於法歡喜——兩半合起來纔是驗知之相，缺一不可。
廿一、須菩提問云何行。 須菩提承相而問：這樣不驚不怖乃至正憶念的菩薩，云何行般若波羅蜜？此問是從相問到行——認得了外顯之相，還要問內在的行法。凡讀諸經見說行者功德之相，皆可學此一問：他是怎麼行的？
廿二、佛答隨順一切種智心。 佛答：隨順一切種智心，是菩薩摩訶薩應如是行般若波羅蜜。此答與第二段的「當趣一切種智」遙相呼應——彼處說趣，此處說順；趣是遠望，順是當下。要緊處在「隨順」二字：不說得、不說證、不說到，只說順。
廿三、重問何名隨順。 須菩提再問：云何名隨順一切種智心。此重問極重要，因為「隨順」若不落到具體，便是一句空話。經中問答之所以層層追下，正為不讓術語停在名相上。
廿四、以空乃至如夢幻隨順。 佛答出隨順的實內容：以空隨順；以無相、無作、無所有、不生不滅、不垢不淨隨順；以如夢、幻、炎、嚮、化隨順。三組並列——第一組是空門，第二組是空門所開之諸義，第三組是五喻。至此「隨順一切種智心」有了確切所指：順的是畢竟空，不是順一個尚未得到的智。
廿五、須菩提問行何法。 須菩提把問題推到最後一步：既以空乃至如夢如幻隨順，那麼這菩薩究竟是行什麼法——是色，是受、想、行、識，乃至一切種智？此問問得老實，也問得險：他把所有可能的所行之法一一舉出來，逼佛作答。
廿六、佛答不行——行處七義、色即是薩婆若、一如無二無別。 佛答：不行色，不行受、想、行、識，乃至不行一切種智。隨即出所以然，是本品義理最密之處，共有七義並一結。七義者：是菩薩行處，無作法、無壞法、無所從來、亦無所去、無住處、不可數、無有量。一結者：若無數、無量，是法不可得——不可以色得，乃至不可以一切種智得。末以因緣收：色即是薩婆若，乃至一切種智即是薩婆若；色如相乃至一切種智如相皆是一如，無二無別。讀「不行」二字勿作斷絕會，下文第四十段論主自有訓解；此處先記住結語的方向——不行，是因為所行與能行本自是一如。
廿七、釋曰之標。 論②以釋曰起。此標與前文之問曰答曰不同：問答是設難而釋，釋曰是隨經文次第逐句解。體例一變，讀法亦當隨之——以下諸段皆是貼著經②的句子走。
廿八、於他語不生實不實之念——他人二種、心安重不移轉。 論主釋第一相。阿鞞跋致於他人語言中不生念：「是中有實、不實。」何以故？他人有二種：在家人，著五欲樂，虛誑不淨；出家外道，著諸邪見不實——此等所說皆無實事，是故不信。論主更推到極處：自得諸法實相故，乃至佛身來說破諸法實相者亦不信；得無為法故，心則安重，不復移轉。此段最見分寸：所謂不信，不是頑固，是已自得實相而不隨言轉；連現佛身而說破實相者也不隨，正因所依是法不是人。讀者於此勿學其形而失其實——未得實相而先學不信他語，是增長我慢，不是阿鞞跋致相。
廿九、煩惱折薄故不為所牽。 論主釋第二相：是菩薩雖未得佛道，貪欲等諸煩惱折薄故，不為所牽。此釋極誠實——不說煩惱已斷，只說折損稀薄。驗知之相從來不是聖位的滿相，是行道途中可驗的實相；煩惱薄到不被牽走，便是此相。
三十、不離六度——知善法果報味故心常愛樂。 論主釋第三相：心常不離六波羅蜜，知善法果報味故，心常愛樂，不離六波羅蜜。所以不離，不是靠持守之力硬繫，是嘗到味道而自然愛樂。行門之要在此一「味」字：知味則不待督責，不知味則守亦易失。
卅一、雷霆孔雀喻。 論主釋第四相，並自出第二個譬喻。如是等種種因緣故，聞深般若不怖、不畏，歡喜欲聞，讀、誦、問義、修習。喻曰：如雷霆，小鳥則怖畏悶死；孔雀大鳥歡喜舞戲。般若波羅蜜亦如是，邪見凡夫聞則恐怖；阿鞞跋致菩薩聞則歡喜，心無厭足，是故說「歡喜樂聞」。此喻的鋒芒在於：雷是同一個雷。法無二法，聞者有二機——同一句畢竟空，在此為悶死之雷，在彼為舞戲之樂。故聞深法而生怖，不必怨法，當自省是何等機。
卅二、佛自說大威德之因緣。 論主引經中佛語：「是菩薩於過去世已聞深般若波羅蜜，多集諸福德、智慧故有大威德，有大威德故不怖畏。」不怖畏之所以可能，不是一時膽氣，是宿世聞法與福慧積集的現行。此義與第廿九段相配：一說煩惱之減，一說福慧之增，驗知之相從這兩面同時長成。
卅三、須菩提問般若無定相云何應行。 論主以第三人稱重述須菩提之問：是菩薩聞深般若波羅蜜雖不怖畏，是般若無定相，云何應行？此問把難處挑明——不怖畏是心境，行是下手；般若既無定相，下手處何在？
卅四、佛言隨順一切種智心。 論主重述佛答：隨順一切種智心。此處與經②第廿二段是同一句，論主重出之，是為引起下文的正難——重述不是重複，是把答語擺上台面好加以推問。
卅五、正難——未得一切種智云何能順。 論主設全品最尖的一問：是菩薩未得一切種智，云何能順？此難極有力：隨順總要有個所順之物；智未得，順誰？若答不了此問，「隨順一切種智心」便只是勸勉之辭。
卅六、答語之標。 論主以答曰起下文，標出以下為正解。
卅七、順畢竟空則順一切種智。 論主的解答分三節。其一、是故說：「隨順畢竟空心則順一切種智心。」——順的下手處是畢竟空，不是那個尚未得到的智。其二、出其理據：一切種智是寂滅相，佛後品中說：「一切寂滅相是一切種智。」——一切種智的體相既是寂滅，則順寂滅即順它，不必先得它。其三、結成並推廣：是故言：「順畢竟空則順一切種智。」無相、無作、虛空、無生無滅、無垢無淨、如夢等亦如是——第廿四段佛所列的三組隨順，於此一齊得解。此段是全品的樞紐：趣一切種智之所以不落外道的線，正因所趣者是寂滅相；而寂滅相當下可順，故趣而無所趣。
卅八、問觀何等法。 論主重述須菩提之問：順畢竟空心，觀何等法？順既已有著落，隨之而來的是所觀。此問與第廿五段經文之問同一脈，論主重述之以承下文的訓解。
卅九、佛答不觀色乃至一切種智。 論主重述佛答：不觀色乃至一切種智。答語仍是一個「不」字。至此讀者必然追問：不觀，那還觀什麼？下段即是論主逐字的訓解。
四十、逐字訓七義——實法過有為、無作無壞無所從來無所去不住無數無量、語言道斷。 論主先出總理：智慧欲求實事，色等有為作法皆虛妄，一切種智是實法；實法故，過有為法。所以不觀色等，不是拒絕觀察，是智慧所求在實事，而有為作法非實。既過有為，便逐字訓經②的七義——論主以「無數、無量」一語總收經側「不可數」「無有量」二目，故標目六條而義仍七。「無作」，是無作者。「無壞法」，是無壞者。是法不從六波羅蜜來，故言「無所從來」——連六度也不是它的來處。不入佛法中，故言「無所去」——連佛法也不是它的去處。「不住」有二釋：有為，虛誑故不住；無為法中，無憶想分別故亦不住——兩邊皆無可住。「無數、無量」者：五眾和合故有六道數，壞五眾相續故則無數、無量——數本從五眾和合而立，五眾相續一壞，數量自無所施。末以語言結：無數、無量故則語言道斷，語言道斷故不可以行色等諸法得。七義逐字訓下來，「不行」「不觀」的真義乃明：不是不作觀行，是所行之處本無可執之相可作所緣。
四一、佛自說因緣——色等即是薩婆若、如無二無別。 全品收於佛自說之因緣：「色等諸法即是薩婆若，薩婆若即是色等諸法。何以故？色等諸法如即是薩婆若如，薩婆若如即是色等諸法如，以是故說如，是如無二無別。」此結有三層。其一、雙向說即：色等即薩婆若，薩婆若即色等——不是色被取消，也不是薩婆若下降為色。其二、即在何處：在如。色之如與薩婆若之如是同一個如，故說即。其三、無二無別：如既無二，則能趣所趣、能順所順、能觀所觀，於如中本自不隔。品首之問「當趣何所」，至此得其究竟答——所趣者即在能趣之處，趣而無所趣，故名趣一切智。
不要讀錯
不要把「無趣不趣」讀成行道無方向。論主立此語時把所破說得分明：外道言「諸法從因趣果、從先世入今世、從今世趣後世」，破是常顛倒故，言「無趣不趣」。所破的是把因果之間看成一個常住之物在移轉，不是因果相續本身。所以佛照樣答「當趣一切種智」，論主照樣說「因果相似故」。若讀成連方向都不許立，則本品的驗知、隨順、行處諸段全無安立處，也違論主自己的解釋。
不要把「壞修」讀成毀壞佛法。經文所列的可壞之法，從色、受想行識、十二處十八界，一路到六波羅蜜、諸空、四念處乃至十八不共法、須陀洹果乃至一切種智——若壞修是行人去破壞，那便是把四念處乃至一切種智都毀了，佛豈會答「如是！如是！」論主的訓解直截：壞修者，一切法無常散壞，故名壞修。壞是法自身的無常相，是行人於此諸法上見其無常散壞而不生實執，故名為修般若。同理，「無所修」是所修之法無定實可得，「不受修」是連能觀之觀亦有過故不取，三句皆在遣執，不在廢行。
不要把『不行色乃至不行一切種智』讀成斷絕觀行。論主逐字訓過：智慧欲求實事，色等有為作法皆虛妄，一切種智是實法——不行不是不作，是不以虛妄有為法為所行之實。七義之訓尤須合看：無作、無壞、無所從來、無所去、不住、無數、無量，句句是遮所緣之實相可執，不是遮修習之事。經文自身正勸人受持、讀、誦、正憶念、如說行——若「不行」是斷絕，經文便自相違。
不要把「色即是薩婆若」讀成凡聖混同、無須修行。佛自說所以然，落在一個如字：色等諸法如即是薩婆若如，以是故說如，是如無二無別。所即者是如，不是相。若讀成色與一切種智全無分際，則本品前半的驗知之教——於深般若中著不著、二種行般若菩薩之分——便無從安立。即而不壞其相，故仍須驗、仍須順、仍須行。
不要把阿鞞跋致「不以他人語為堅要」讀成可以不聽人言。論主的理由說得清楚：他人有二種，在家著五欲樂而虛誑不淨，出家外道著諸邪見而不實，此等所說皆無實事，是故不信；而其所以能不信，是「自得諸法實相故」「得無為法故，心則安重」。所依是已證之法，不是自己的意氣。未得實相而先學不受人語，正是本品所驗的「著」，不是阿鞞跋致之相。
修行作用
第一件受用，是把「趣」字用對。日用中發心、迴向、立志趣菩提，心裡若浮出一段路、一個到達的我，便已落在論主所破的常顛倒裡。本品給的正解極簡：因果相似故說趣。行門上的用法是——只管在因地修習般若，果自相似而至；不必在心中預造一個終點的景象，也不必焦慮自己走到了哪一段。趣者向也，向而不取，纔是般若門中的趣。
第二件受用，是驗知之法可以自用。佛立的驗處在深般若，標準只一條：著不著。論主更把它刻細成二機——能觀般若亦自空的，與只觀諸法空而留般若為所依的。用功人於此可自勘：我所依的「空」，是不是又成了一個不肯放的東西？凡見自己對某一法門、某一見地生起不可動搖之感，便可持此一問回照。此驗不是為評判他人，是為自省——經文明言是「驗知」，不是『論斷』。
第三件受用，是雷霆孔雀喻的自處之道。聞深法而心生怖畏、或生無味、或想避開，本品給的不是責備，是分機：同一雷聲，小鳥悶死，孔雀舞戲。遇此境時可作二事——其一、不怨法，知是自機未熟；其二、依第三十段所示之路，從「知善法果報味」入手，於六波羅蜜中嘗到味道，愛樂自生，機自漸熟。心無厭足是果，不是起點。
第四件受用，是「隨順」給了未證者一個當下可行的下手處。人常被「未得一切種智，云何能順」這類疑難攔住，遂以為高深法門與己無關。論主的答是全品最切用之語：順畢竟空心則順一切種智心。一切種智是寂滅相，寂滅相當下可順——於日用中不取諸相為實、不於所修法上生定執，便已是順。不必等得果纔學順，順本身就是因地之行。
第五件受用，是七義可作觀行的口訣。行處無作、無壞、無所從來、無所去、無住處、不可數、無有量——這七句不是玄談，是七個回照的角度。作意時可逐句自問：我所緣的這一法，有沒有被我看成有人在作、有物可壞、從某處來、往某處去、可住可據、可計可量？七句一一過去，所緣之實執便鬆。末句尤須記得：語言道斷故不可以行色等諸法得——觀到說不出處，不要急著替它安一個名字。
承衍
本品的骨幹，是兩段經文與兩段論釋。經①自須菩提問「解深般若波羅蜜者，當趣何所」起，佛答「當趣一切種智」；須菩提申論能趣者為一切眾生所歸趣，並出修般若即修一切法、無所修、不受修、壞修四義；佛設問「何等法壞」，須菩提歷數色、受想行識、十二處十八界、我乃至知者見者、六波羅蜜、內空乃至無法有法空、四念處乃至十八不共法、須陀洹果乃至一切種智；佛印可，末囑阿鞞跋致應於深般若中驗知著不著。論①先設『非趣非不趣何以問趣答趣』之難，出外道從因趣果之破而立「無趣不趣」，次明無著心問答、畢竟空無障無礙、因果相似故說趣，出子趣父母喻釋歸趣，再設『何以但菩薩為眾生歸趣』之問而答以大悲常修、諸法皆入般若，逐字訓無所修、不受修、壞修與可破壞法，末承上品性相貌而立驗試之義，分行般若菩薩二種。經②廣示阿鞞跋致驗知之相——不以他人語為堅要、不為欲心瞋心癡心所牽、不遠離六波羅蜜、聞深般若不驚不怖而歡喜樂聞、宿世已問而有大威德；須菩提問云何行，佛答隨順一切種智心，重問而出以空、無相無作無所有不生不滅不垢不淨、如夢幻炎嚮化三組隨順；末問行何法，佛答不行色乃至不行一切種智，出行處七義與「色即是薩婆若」「一如，無二無別」之結。論②以釋曰隨文釋驗知諸相：他人二種故不信、自得實相故心安重不移轉、煩惱折薄故不為所牽、知善法果報味故不離六度、雷霆孔雀喻釋歡喜樂聞、佛自說大威德因緣；次設「未得一切種智，云何能順」之難，答以順畢竟空則順一切種智並引後品「一切寂滅相是一切種智」為據；末重述問答而逐字訓無作、無壞法、無所從來、無所去、不住、無數無量與語言道斷，終以佛自說「色等諸法如即是薩婆若如」之如無二無別收束全品，接卷七十一之卷尾。
本品與前後諸品的義脈，可見者有三線。其一、承前：論主明言「上品末說阿鞞跋致菩薩性、相、貌，今應驗試知」——前品說相，本品驗相，說與驗是一事之兩節；本品後半經文之所以全在阿鞞跋致身上，根由在此。其二、承前而轉：般若非趣非不趣之義，前此諸品已反覆申明，本品不重立此義，而是問它與「趣一切種智」如何並行——故本品之新意不在破趣，在還趣字以無過之用法。其三、垂後：論主引佛後品中說「一切寂滅相是一切種智」為據，明白指向本品之後將詳說之義；讀者可合後諸品觀之，以見『順畢竟空即順一切種智』一語的全幅。
古德之釋，本品可誌者一家。吉藏科判此品，其起段云：「此第三明中下根人者，標大果。文三：第一明由般若故趣薩婆若果，二識驗信般若人相，三明能如所驗釋法不著秤順薩婆若也」——以趣果、驗人相、釋法不著三分本品，與本論經①論①明趣、經②論②明驗知與隨順之次第相應。其釋問趣答趣之意又云：「已上明非趣不趣，今所以問趣答趣著，以明非趣不趣乃是趣道耳，故見趣不趣皆名不趣」——此是吉藏自家之判釋，與論主『因果相似故說趣』一路各有所重，並錄不判，讀者兩存之。其品目異稱、諸本分卷與後世徵引之考，詳考據層。
Tending toward Omniscience: Why, Prajñā Neither Tending nor Not Tending, the Question Is about Tending and the Answer Is about Tending; Why Tending toward the Omniscience of All Kinds Is Not Taking Possession of a Place; Why the One Who Tends Turns Instead into That toward Which Beings Return and Tend; Why Practising Prajñā Is Precisely Practising All Dharmas; Why Practising Nothing, the Practice of Not Receiving, and the Practice of Ruin Are Alike Practising Prajñā; Why the Practice of Ruin Is Not Destroying Dharmas; Why the Avaivartika Must Be Tested within Deep Prajñā for Clinging or Not Clinging; Why One Who Has Not Yet Obtained the Omniscience of All Kinds Can Accord with It; Why According with Ultimate Emptiness Is Precisely According with the Omniscience of All Kinds; Why Not Practising Form and So On up to Not Practising the Omniscience of All Kinds Is Not Cutting Off; and Why ‘Form Is Sarvajñā’ Is Not Confounding the Two
What Is Being Asked
In this chapter only one Chinese character is in motion: the one rendered here as ‘tending’. Subhūti raises the question, and asks it very briefly: the bodhisattva-mahāsattvas who have understood the very deep prajñāpāramitā—toward what place should they tend? The Buddha answers just as briefly: they should tend toward the omniscience of all kinds. Question and answer are both short, yet the difficulty at once appears before us—the chapters before this have made clear all along that prajñā is ultimately empty and that dharmas come from nowhere and also go nowhere; this being so, what is there still to tend toward, who is it that tends, and where does the tending go? The treatise-author's first question at the opening of the fascicle asks exactly this: prajñāpāramitā neither tends nor does not tend; why must Subhūti ask about tending, and why must the Buddha answer with tending?
The treatise-author's answer does not lie in argument; it lies in a contrast. The outside paths say 「諸法從因趣果、從先世入今世、從今世趣後世」 tr. "dharmas tend from cause to fruit, enter this life from the former life, and tend from this life to the next life"—tending, in their mouths, is a really existent line, and along the line something really existent is moving. It is to break this inversion of the view of permanence that within the gate of prajñā 「無趣不趣」 tr. "no tending, not tending" is spoken. Yet once 「無趣不趣」 tr. "no tending, not tending" is gripped as a conclusion, the practice of the path has nowhere to set its hand. Therefore the question and answer of this chapter have a further measure: Subhūti asks with a mind without clinging, and the Buddha answers with a mind without clinging; the question is about tending and the answer is about tending, yet the mind does not cling to tending, and so the word tending is no longer a line but the natural succession in which cause and fruit resemble each other—prajñā is the cause, the omniscience of all kinds is the fruit, and within the cause there is already the flavour of the fruit; therefore it is said that one who understands deep prajñā tends toward the omniscience of all kinds.
The second half of the chapter sets this 「趣」 tr. "tending" down upon persons. The Buddha instructs: within this very deep prajñāpāramitā, one should test and know the avaivartika bodhisattva—what is tested is not how much he can say, but whether, within deep prajñā, he clings or does not cling. The treatise-author takes it up with great precision: at the end of the preceding chapter the nature, mark, and appearance of the avaivartika were spoken of; now they should be tested and known. And so the sūtra text lists at length the marks by which he is tested and known: he does not take others' words as what is firm and essential; he is not dragged by desire, hatred, and delusion; he does not stray far from the six perfections; hearing deep prajñā, his mind is not startled and not terrified, and he gladly delights in hearing it. Subhūti presses one layer further: since prajñā has no fixed mark, how, in the end, does this person practise? The Buddha answers: in accord with the mind of the omniscience of all kinds. This answer in turn gives rise to a difficulty—a person who has not yet obtained the omniscience of all kinds, how can he accord with it? The treatise-author's solution is the pivot of the whole chapter: the mind that accords with ultimate emptiness is precisely the mind that accords with the omniscience of all kinds. At the close, the Buddha himself speaks the cause and condition: form and the other dharmas are sarvajñā (omniscience); the suchness of form is the suchness of sarvajñā; this suchness is without duality and without difference. The one Chinese character rendered here as ‘tending’ here returns at last to suchness.
Passage by Passage
1. The question, toward what place to tend. Subhūti asks: the one who understands deep prajñāpāramitā, toward what place should he tend? This question looks ordinary, but its position is important: the preceding chapter spoke at length of the good friend and at length of the marks of the bodhisattva, and in the reader's mind a question about direction naturally arises—going on practising like this, where does one go? Subhūti does not ask ‘what is obtained’ but asks 「趣何所」 tr. "toward what place to tend"; what he asks about is where the practice of the path is directed, not a thing to be obtained. In reading this one sentence one must first stand firm: what is asked is a direction, not a taking.
2. The Buddha answers that one should tend toward the omniscience of all kinds. The Buddha answers: one should tend toward the omniscience of all kinds. The answer has the same pattern as the question and adds not one word of explanation. What is most easily misread here is to imagine 「一切種智」 tr. "the omniscience of all kinds" as a distant place, as though prajñā were the road and sarvajñā the terminal station. Further on, the treatise-author will plainly screen off this reading; so at this moment one need only remember the form of the answer—the Buddha answers following Subhūti's way of asking; he follows the questioner's path of words, and is not setting up a really existent place for tending.
3. The one who tends turns instead into that toward which others return and tend—practising prajñā is practising all dharmas; practising nothing, the practice of not receiving, and the practice of ruin. Hearing the answer, Subhūti at once expands on it, and turns out four layers in a row. The first layer is a fine reversal: the person who can tend toward the omniscience of all kinds himself becomes the place toward which all beings return and tend—because he practises prajñāpāramitā. The one who tends has become the place tended toward; hence one can see that tending is not leaving here to go over there. The second layer: practising prajñāpāramitā is practising all dharmas. The third layer: practising nothing is practising prajñāpāramitā. The fourth layer: the practice of not receiving and the practice of ruin are practising prajñāpāramitā. The four layers come down in one breath, and the last three are all taking apart the Chinese character 「修」 tr. "practise": practising and yet practising nothing, practising and yet not receiving, practising and yet seeing its ruin—if practice is understood as accumulating, these three sentences all become contradictions.
4. The Buddha sets the question: by the ruin of which dharmas? The Buddha does not approve directly; first he asks back: by the ruin of which dharmas is prajñāpāramitā the practice of ruin? This question is a model of the teaching method of the whole chapter—Subhūti speaks an extremely brief judgement, and the Buddha then requires him to set the judgement down upon concrete dharmas. Whenever, in reading the prajñā sūtras and treatises, one meets brief words, one may learn from this question of the Buddha's: which dharmas are these words speaking of?
5. Subhūti counts through the dharmas that are ruined. Subhūti answers item by item: because form is ruined, because feeling, perception, constructions, consciousness, the twelve sense-fields, and the eighteen elements are ruined, because the self and so on up to the knower and the seer are ruined; because dānapāramitā and so on up to prajñāpāramitā are ruined; because inner emptiness and so on up to the emptiness of non-existent and existent dharmas, the four foundations of mindfulness and so on up to the eighteen unshared dharmas, and the fruit of the srota-āpanna and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds are ruined—prajñāpāramitā is the practice of ruin. The order of this answer must not be taken lightly: from the worldly dharmas of the five aggregates, the twelve sense-fields, and the eighteen elements, to the dharmas of person and self, the self and the knower and seer, to the dharmas of practice, the six perfections, to the dharmas of contemplation, the emptinesses and the four foundations of mindfulness and so on up to the eighteen unshared dharmas, all the way to the dharmas of fruit, the fruit of the srota-āpanna and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds—nothing whatever is left out along the way. Even prajñāpāramitā itself, even the omniscience of all kinds, are among what is ruined—since what is ruined has no exception, only then is the meaning of the practice of ruin truly established.
6. The Buddha approves. The Buddha says: Just so! Just so! and restates both ends, the first and the last—because form is ruined, and so on up to because the omniscience of all kinds is ruined. Further on, the treatise-author settles it in one sentence: the Buddha approved what Subhūti said. The approval needs the restatement because this meaning is most easily read as destroying dharmas; therefore the Buddha with his own mouth says the first and the last once more, so that no one may swap out any single item among them.
7. One should test and know the avaivartika—clinging or not clinging is the standard. Here the Buddha turns into the second half of the whole chapter: within this deep prajñāpāramitā, one should test and know the avaivartika bodhisattva-mahāsattva. The standard of the test is only one—not clinging. If within deep prajñā he does not cling, know that he is avaivartika; if within dhyānapāramitā and so on up to dānapāramitā he does not cling, and within the four foundations of mindfulness and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds he does not cling, know that he is avaivartika. What matters is the place of testing: he is not tested on worldly dharmas; he is tested precisely on the deepest and most excellent dharma. For a person, not clinging to coarse dharmas is easy, and not clinging to deep dharmas is hard; therefore the field of testing and knowing is chosen in deep prajñā.
8. The treatise-author sets a question—neither tending nor not tending; why is the question about tending and the answer about tending? Right at the start the treatise-author brings out the sharpest question in the reader's mind: prajñāpāramitā neither tends nor does not tend; for what reason does Subhūti ask 「行般若者趣至何處」 tr. "the one who practises prajñā tends to what place"? And why does the Buddha answer 「趣薩婆若」 tr. "he tends toward sarvajñā"? If this question were not first set up, all the explanation that follows would be shooting arrows with no target. The treatise-author's teaching method can be seen here: he first states the contradiction at its sharpest on the reader's behalf, and only then begins to resolve it.
9. The mark of the answer. The treatise-author opens what follows with the mark Answer:. This mark is not superfluous—in the form of this treatise, question and answer each make a paragraph of their own; following the marks, the reader knows which is the difficulty and which the explanation, and does not mistake the words that set a difficulty for the proper meaning.
10. The refutation of the outside paths' tending from cause to fruit—therefore it is said, no tending, not tending. The treatise-author first brings out what is refuted: the outside paths say 「諸法從因趣果、從先世入今世、從今世趣後世」 tr. "dharmas tend from cause to fruit, enter this life from the former life, and tend from this life to the next life." The illness here is not in speaking of cause and fruit; it is in seeing, between cause and fruit, a permanently abiding thing being moved across—the self of this life carried over into the next life. It is for the sake of breaking this inversion of permanence that within the gate of prajñā 「無趣不趣」 tr. "no tending, not tending" is spoken. In reading this passage one must see clearly: no tending, not tending is a word of remedy, not a new fixed conclusion. Only when this one meaning is established does what follows make sense—the Buddha's answer 「趣一切種智」 tr. "tend toward the omniscience of all kinds" does not go against 「無趣不趣」 tr. "no tending, not tending," because what is broken is the inversion of permanence, not the continuity of cause and fruit itself.
11. Asking with a mind without clinging, answering with a mind without clinging—because of ultimate emptiness, no obstruction and no hindrance; because cause and fruit resemble each other, tending is spoken of. The treatise-author gives the first positive resolution of the whole chapter, in three sections. First: here Subhūti asks with a mind without clinging, and the Buddha answers with a mind without clinging—the same word tending, spoken with a clinging mind, becomes the line of the outside paths; spoken with a mind without clinging, it is without fault. Second: prajñāpāramitā is ultimately empty and is without hindrance and without obstruction toward all dharmas; because one obtains the liberation without hindrance and without obstruction, one is without hindrance and without obstruction—since prajñā does not obstruct any dharma, speaking of tending also does not obstruct ultimate emptiness. Third: because cause and fruit resemble each other, therefore it is said: 「解深般若者，趣一切種智。」 tr. "One who understands deep prajñā tends toward the omniscience of all kinds." This third section is the proper explanation of the word tending: prajñā and the omniscience of all kinds resemble each other as cause and fruit, as seed and fruit are of one kind, and therefore tending is spoken of; it is not that some thing walks over there. In daily use this check can be made: when saying ‘I am tending toward awakening’, if in the mind there is a stretch of road and one who arrives, one has fallen into the outside paths; if there is only practice and training in the causal stage, while the fruit of itself resembles it, the word tending is without fault.
12. Returning and tending, as a child tends toward its father and mother. The treatise-author cites the sūtra sentence 「菩薩知般若波羅蜜者為一切眾生所歸趣」 tr. "the bodhisattva who knows prajñāpāramitā is that toward which all beings return and tend," and at once brings out a simile: as a child, pressed by pain and distress, tends toward its father and mother. This is the first simile the treatise-author brings out himself, and it is a very plain one—a child running to its father and mother when it suffers is not the father and mother laying down a road for it to walk; it is turning to them naturally under the pressure of suffering. Beings returning and tending toward the bodhisattva are likewise: not because of a summons, but because of suffering they turn to him. This simile at the same time answers the reversal of Passage 3—why the one who tends turns instead into that toward which others return and tend: because what is tended toward was never a place; it is somewhere one can rely on and turn to.
13. The question why the bodhisattva alone is that toward which beings return and tend. The treatise-author sets one more question: for what reason is it only the bodhisattva who understands deep prajñāpāramitā that is that toward which beings return and tend? This question is finely asked—it is not only bodhisattvas who understand deep prajñā; the two vehicles also have their understanding; why do beings return to the bodhisattva alone? The question is set to press out the eye of the answer below, not to make a difficulty.
14. The mark of the answer. The treatise-author opens what follows with the mark Answer:, in the same format as Passage 9, marking that what follows is explanation and not difficulty.
15. Constantly practising because of great compassion; because of practice, understanding that all dharmas enter prajñā. The answer has two sections that lock together. First: because of the bodhisattva's mind of great compassion toward beings, he constantly practises and trains in prajñāpāramitā—that returning and tending lies with the bodhisattva alone has its root in great compassion; the two vehicles have understanding but not this mind, and in them beings have nowhere to turn. Second: because he practises, he can understand that all dharmas enter prajñāpāramitā; therefore 「修般若波羅蜜即修一切法」 tr. "practising prajñāpāramitā is practising all dharmas." This section properly explains the second layer of Passage 3: that practising prajñā is practising all dharmas does not mean that besides prajñā one goes on to practise all dharmas; it means that all dharmas enter prajñā, and practising this is practising that. Readers often mistakenly think this sentence exaggerates the function of prajñā; in fact it is speaking of scope—prajñā is not one dharma among dharmas; it is the place into which dharmas enter.
16. The glosses on the three sentences, together with the extent of what is ruined—practising nothing, the practice of not receiving, the practice of ruin, the dharmas that can be broken and ruined. The treatise-author glosses Subhūti's three judgements word by word. Practising nothing: in prajñā no fixed, real dharma can be found, and therefore the sūtra says 「無所修是修般若波羅蜜」 tr. "practising nothing is practising prajñāpāramitā"—practising nothing is not not practising; it is that no fixed reality can be found in the dharmas practised. The practice of not receiving: within prajñāpāramitā, all contemplations have faults and so are not received—even the contemplation that contemplates is not taken as real. The practice of ruin: all dharmas are impermanent, scatter, and fall to ruin; therefore it is called the practice of ruin—ruin is the mark of impermanence of the dharmas themselves, not the practitioner going to destroy them. At the end he brings out the extent of what is ruined: the dharmas that can be broken and ruined are form and the rest, and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds. This passage is the place in the whole chapter most easily misread; the treatise-author's glosses rescue all three sentences at once from the misreading ‘negating practice’: what the three sentences negate is the grasping at reality in the dharmas practised, not the work of practising and training.
17. The Buddha approved what Subhūti said. The treatise-author turns with one sentence: the Buddha approved what Subhūti said. The sentence is short and its work is great—it tells the reader that the four meanings above are not Subhūti's private view but a meaning approved by the Buddha, on which one may rely in practice.
18. Carrying on the nature, mark, and appearance of the preceding chapter; now they should be tested. The treatise-author points out where Sūtra ② comes from: at the end of the preceding chapter the nature, mark, and appearance of the avaivartika bodhisattva were spoken of; now they should be tested and known. Speaking the marks is to let people recognise him; testing is examining him on the ground—to know the marks without testing them is to have the marks only as knowledge. The method of testing the treatise-author sets down decisively: within deep prajñāpāramitā, does he cling or not? If he clings, then it is not; if he does not cling, then that is his mark.
19. Two kinds of bodhisattva who practise prajñā. The treatise-author distinguishes two capacities: the first, by means of prajñāpāramitā, contemplates all dharmas as ultimately empty, and prajñā too as empty of itself; the second cannot contemplate prajñā as empty as well. Therefore the sūtra tests whether he clings or not. The dividing line lies in one place only—whether prajñā itself is empty or not. The one who can contemplate prajñā too as empty of itself truly does not cling; the one who contemplates only dharmas as empty and keeps prajñā as what he relies on still clings. This division is the actual measuring mark of the meaning of testing and knowing in the whole chapter, and is also where the gloss on 「無所修」 tr. "practising nothing" in Passage 16 comes to land in the gate of practice.
20. The marks of testing and knowing shown at length—others' words; the mind of desire, the mind of hatred, and the mind of delusion; the six perfections; not startled and not terrified on hearing deep prajñā. In Sūtra ② the Buddha lists the marks at length. First: when practising deep prajñā he does not take others' words as what is firm and essential, nor does he practise following others' teaching. Second: he is not dragged by the mind of desire, the mind of hatred, or the mind of delusion. Third: he does not stray far from the six perfections. Fourth: hearing deep prajñā spoken, his mind is not startled, does not sink, is not terrified, is not afraid, has no regret; he gladly delights in hearing it, receives and upholds it, reads, recites, rightly recollects, and practises as it is spoken. The Buddha also speaks of its cause in former lives: this bodhisattva in a former life already asked about the matters within this deep prajñāpāramitā, and received and upheld, read, recited, expounded, and rightly recollected; because he has great majestic virtue, hearing deep prajñā he is not startled and not terrified. Of the marks in this passage, half is the mind not being seized from outside, and half is the mind rejoicing in the Dharma—only the two halves together make the marks of testing and knowing; neither can be missing.
21. Subhūti asks how he practises. Subhūti takes up the marks and asks: this bodhisattva, who is not startled and not terrified and so on up to rightly recollecting—how does he practise prajñāpāramitā? This question goes from marks to practice—having recognised the marks that show outwardly, one must still ask about the inner way of practice. Whenever one reads in the sūtras of the marks of a practitioner's merit, one may learn this one question: how did he practise?
22. The Buddha answers: in accord with the mind of the omniscience of all kinds. The Buddha answers: in accord with the mind of the omniscience of all kinds—so should this bodhisattva-mahāsattva practise prajñāpāramitā. This answer echoes from afar the 「當趣一切種智」 tr. "one should tend toward the omniscience of all kinds" of Passage 2—there it speaks of tending, here of according; tending is looking into the distance, according is the present moment. What matters lies in the two Chinese characters 「隨順」 tr. "in accord with": it does not speak of obtaining, does not speak of realising, does not speak of arriving; it speaks only of according.
23. The repeated question: what is called according? Subhūti asks again: what is called in accord with the mind of the omniscience of all kinds? This repeated question is extremely important, because if 「隨順」 tr. "according" is not set down upon something concrete, it is an empty phrase. The questions and answers in the sūtra press down layer by layer precisely so as not to let the technical terms stop at names and marks.
24. According by emptiness, and so on up to according by being like a dream and an illusion. The Buddha answers with the real content of according: he accords by emptiness; he accords by the signless, non-action, being without anything existent, non-arising and non-ceasing, neither stained nor pure; he accords by being like a dream, an illusion, a mirage, an echo, a transformation. Three groups are set side by side—the first group is the gate of emptiness, the second the meanings that the gate of emptiness opens, the third the five similes. Here 「隨順一切種智心」 tr. "in accord with the mind of the omniscience of all kinds" has its exact referent: what is accorded with is ultimate emptiness, not some knowledge not yet obtained.
25. Subhūti asks what dharma he practises. Subhūti pushes the question to its last step: since he accords by emptiness and so on up to being like a dream and an illusion, what dharma, in the end, does this bodhisattva practise—form, or feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness, and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds? The question is honestly asked, and also perilously asked: he holds up one by one every possible dharma that could be practised, pressing the Buddha to answer.
26. The Buddha answers that he does not practise—the seven meanings of the place of practice; form is sarvajñā; one suchness, without duality and without difference. The Buddha answers: he does not practise form, does not practise feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness, and so on up to does not practise the omniscience of all kinds. Then at once he brings out the reason why, which is the densest place of meaning in this chapter, with seven meanings and one conclusion in all. The seven meanings: this bodhisattva's place of practice is a dharma without making, a dharma without ruin, coming from nowhere, and also going nowhere, with no place of abiding, it cannot be counted, and it is without measure. The one conclusion: if it is without number and without measure, this dharma is unfindable—it cannot be found by way of form, and so on up to it cannot be found by way of the omniscience of all kinds. At the end he gathers it with the cause and condition: form is sarvajñā, and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds is sarvajñā; the mark of suchness of form and so on up to the mark of suchness of the omniscience of all kinds are all one suchness, without duality and without difference. In reading the two Chinese characters 「不行」 tr. "does not practise," do not understand them as cutting off; below, in Passage 40, the treatise-author has his own gloss; here first remember the direction of the concluding words—he does not practise because what is practised and the one who practises are originally one suchness.
27. The mark of the explanation. Treatise ② opens with the mark Explanation:. This mark differs from the Question: and Answer: above: question and answer set a difficulty and explain it; the explanation follows the order of the sūtra text and explains it sentence by sentence. When the form changes, the way of reading should change with it—the passages below all walk close beside the sentences of Sūtra ②.
28. Not giving rise to the thought of real and unreal in others' words—the two kinds of others; the mind settled and weighty, not shifting. The treatise-author explains the first mark. The avaivartika, in the words of others, does not give rise to the thought: 「是中有實、不實。」 tr. "In this there is what is real and what is not real." Why? There are two kinds of others: householders, who cling to the pleasures of the five desires and are false, deceptive, and impure; and those of the outside paths who have gone forth, who cling to wrong views and are not real—what such people say is all without any real matter, and therefore he does not believe it. The treatise-author pushes it further to the extreme: because he himself has obtained the real mark of all dharmas, even if one came in the body of a Buddha to speak in breaking the real mark of all dharmas, he would not believe; because he has obtained the unconditioned dharma, his mind is settled and weighty and no longer shifts. This passage shows its measure most of all: what is called not believing is not stubbornness; it is having himself obtained the real mark and not turning with words; he does not follow even one who manifests the body of a Buddha and speaks in breaking the real mark, precisely because what he relies on is the Dharma, not the person. Readers here should not learn its form and lose its reality—to learn not to believe others' words before having obtained the real mark is to increase the conceit of self, and is not the mark of the avaivartika.
29. Because the afflictions are broken and thinned, he is not dragged by them. The treatise-author explains the second mark: though this bodhisattva has not yet obtained the Buddha path, because craving and the other afflictions are broken and thinned, he is not dragged by them. This explanation is most honest—it does not say the afflictions are already severed; it says only that they are broken and thinned. The marks of testing and knowing were never the full marks of the station of a sage; they are real marks that can be tested midway along the path; when the afflictions are thin enough not to drag him away, that is this mark.
30. Not straying from the six perfections—because he knows the flavour of the fruit and reward of wholesome dharmas, his mind always loves and delights in them. The treatise-author explains the third mark: his mind never strays from the six perfections; because he knows the flavour of the fruit and reward of wholesome dharmas, his mind always loves and delights in them, and he does not stray from the six perfections. That he does not stray is not a matter of being forcibly bound by the strength of holding fast; it is having tasted the flavour and naturally loving and delighting in them. The crux of the gate of practice lies in this one Chinese character 「味」 tr. "flavour": knowing the flavour, one needs no supervising or urging; not knowing the flavour, even what is held fast is easily lost.
31. The simile of the thunderclap and the peacock. The treatise-author explains the fourth mark, and brings out his second simile himself. Because of such various causes and conditions, hearing deep prajñā he is not terrified and not afraid, gladly wishes to hear it, reads, recites, asks about its meaning, practises and trains in it. The simile says: as with a thunderclap, small birds are terrified and die of fright, while the peacock, a great bird, rejoices and dances. Prajñāpāramitā is also like this: ordinary people of wrong view hear it and are terrified; the avaivartika bodhisattva hears it and rejoices, his mind never sated; therefore it is said 「歡喜樂聞」 tr. "he gladly delights in hearing it." The edge of this simile is this: the thunder is the same thunder. The Dharma is not two dharmas; the hearers have two capacities—the same ultimate emptiness is here the thunder that kills with fright, and there the joy of dancing. Therefore, when one hears the deep Dharma and fear arises, one need not blame the Dharma; one should examine oneself as to what kind of capacity one is.
32. The Buddha himself speaks the cause and condition of great majestic virtue. The treatise-author cites the Buddha's words in the sūtra: 「是菩薩於過去世已聞深般若波羅蜜，多集諸福德、智慧故有大威德，有大威德故不怖畏。」 tr. "This bodhisattva in past lives has already heard deep prajñāpāramitā; because he has gathered much merit and wisdom he has great majestic virtue; because he has great majestic virtue he is not terrified or afraid." That fearlessness is possible is not the nerve of a single moment; it is the present working of hearing the Dharma in former lives and of the gathering of merit and wisdom. This meaning matches Passage 29: the one speaks of the lessening of the afflictions, the other of the increase of merit and wisdom; the marks of testing and knowing grow from these two sides at once.
33. Subhūti asks: prajñā has no fixed mark; how should one practise? The treatise-author restates Subhūti's question in the third person: though this bodhisattva, hearing deep prajñāpāramitā, is not terrified or afraid, this prajñā has no fixed mark; how should he practise? This question lays the difficulty bare—not being terrified or afraid is a state of mind; practice is setting one's hand to the work; since prajñā has no fixed mark, where is the place to set one's hand?
34. The Buddha says: in accord with the mind of the omniscience of all kinds. The treatise-author restates the Buddha's answer: in accord with the mind of the omniscience of all kinds. This is the same sentence as Passage 22 in Sūtra ②; the treatise-author brings it out again in order to draw out the proper difficulty below—the restatement is not repetition; it is setting the answer out on the table so that it can be pressed with questions.
35. The proper difficulty—not having obtained the omniscience of all kinds, how can he accord with it? The treatise-author sets the sharpest question in the whole chapter: this bodhisattva has not yet obtained the omniscience of all kinds; how can he accord with it? This difficulty is very forceful: according always needs something that is accorded with; the knowledge not yet obtained, whom does he accord with? If this question cannot be answered, 「隨順一切種智心」 tr. "in accord with the mind of the omniscience of all kinds" is merely words of encouragement.
36. The mark of the answer. The treatise-author opens what follows with the mark Answer:, marking that what follows is the proper resolution.
37. According with ultimate emptiness is according with the omniscience of all kinds. The treatise-author's resolution is in three sections. First: therefore it is said: 「隨順畢竟空心則順一切種智心。」 tr. "The mind in accord with ultimate emptiness accords with the mind of the omniscience of all kinds."—the place to set one's hand in according is ultimate emptiness, not that knowledge not yet obtained. Second: he brings out the ground of reason: the omniscience of all kinds is the mark of quiescence, and the Buddha says in a later chapter: 「一切寂滅相是一切種智。」 tr. "The mark of all quiescence is the omniscience of all kinds."—since the substance and mark of the omniscience of all kinds is quiescence, to accord with quiescence is to accord with it, with no need first to obtain it. Third: he concludes and extends it: therefore it is said: 「順畢竟空則順一切種智。」 tr. "According with ultimate emptiness is according with the omniscience of all kinds." The signless, non-action, space, non-arising and non-ceasing, without stain and without purity, being like a dream, and so on, are also like this—the three groups of according that the Buddha listed in Passage 24 are here resolved all together. This passage is the pivot of the whole chapter: tending toward the omniscience of all kinds does not fall into the line of the outside paths precisely because what is tended toward is the mark of quiescence; and the mark of quiescence can be accorded with right now, and therefore one tends and yet there is nothing tended toward.
38. The question: what dharmas does he contemplate? The treatise-author restates Subhūti's question: with the mind in accord with ultimate emptiness, what dharmas does he contemplate? According now having its footing, what follows it is what is contemplated. This question is of one vein with the sūtra's question in Passage 25; the treatise-author restates it to lead into the glosses that follow.
39. The Buddha answers: he does not contemplate form, and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds. The treatise-author restates the Buddha's answer: he does not contemplate form and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds. The answer is still one Chinese character, 「不」 tr. "not." At this point the reader will inevitably press: not contemplating, then what does he contemplate? The next passage is the treatise-author's word-by-word gloss.
40. Glossing the seven meanings word by word—the real dharma passes beyond the conditioned; without making, without ruin, coming from nowhere, going nowhere, not abiding, without number, without measure; the way of words is cut off. The treatise-author first brings out the general principle: wisdom wishes to seek the real matter; form and the other conditioned, made dharmas are all false, and the omniscience of all kinds is a real dharma; being a real dharma, it passes beyond conditioned dharmas. So not contemplating form and the rest is not refusing to observe; it is that what wisdom seeks lies in the real matter, and conditioned, made dharmas are not real. Having passed beyond the conditioned, he then glosses word by word the seven meanings of Sūtra ②—the treatise-author, with the single phrase 「無數、無量」 tr. "without number, without measure," gathers together the two headings on the sūtra side, 「不可數」 tr. "cannot be counted" and 「無有量」 tr. "is without measure," and so the headings are six and yet the meanings are still seven. 「無作」 tr. "Without making" means there is no maker. 「無壞法」 tr. "A dharma without ruin" means there is no one who ruins. This dharma does not come from the six perfections, and therefore it is said 「無所從來」 tr. "coming from nowhere"—not even the six perfections are its place of coming. It does not enter into the Buddha's dharmas, and therefore it is said 「無所去」 tr. "going nowhere"—not even the Buddha's dharmas are its place of going. 「不住」 tr. "Not abiding" has two explanations: the conditioned, being false and deceptive, does not abide; within the unconditioned dharma, because there is no recollection, imagining, and discrimination, it also does not abide—on both sides there is nothing to abide in. 「無數、無量」 tr. "Without number, without measure": because the five aggregates come together there is the count of the six destinies; because the continuity of the five aggregates is broken, there is then no number and no measure—number is originally set up from the coming together of the five aggregates; once the continuity of the five aggregates is broken, number and measure of themselves have nowhere to be applied. At the end he concludes with words: because there is no number and no measure, the way of words is cut off; because the way of words is cut off, it cannot be found by practising form and the other dharmas. When the seven meanings have been glossed word by word, the true meaning of 「不行」 tr. "not practising" and 「不觀」 tr. "not contemplating" becomes clear: it is not that he does no practice of contemplation; it is that in the place of practice there is originally no graspable mark to serve as an object.
41. The Buddha himself speaks the cause and condition—form and the rest are sarvajñā; suchness is without duality and without difference. The whole chapter is gathered in the cause and condition the Buddha himself speaks: 「色等諸法即是薩婆若，薩婆若即是色等諸法。何以故？色等諸法如即是薩婆若如，薩婆若如即是色等諸法如，以是故說如，是如無二無別。」 tr. "Form and the other dharmas are sarvajñā; sarvajñā is form and the other dharmas. Why? The suchness of form and the other dharmas is the suchness of sarvajñā; the suchness of sarvajñā is the suchness of form and the other dharmas; for this reason suchness is spoken of; this suchness is without duality and without difference." This conclusion has three layers. First, identity spoken in both directions: form and the rest are sarvajñā, sarvajñā is form and the rest—it is not that form is cancelled, nor that sarvajñā descends to become form. Second, where the identity lies: in suchness. The suchness of form and the suchness of sarvajñā are one and the same suchness; therefore identity is spoken of. Third, without duality and without difference: since suchness is not two, the one who tends and what is tended toward, the one who accords and what is accorded with, the one who contemplates and what is contemplated, are within suchness originally not separated. The question at the head of the chapter, 「當趣何所」 tr. "toward what place should one tend," here receives its ultimate answer—what is tended toward is right in the place of the one who tends; one tends and yet there is nothing tended toward, and therefore it is called Tending toward Omniscience.
Do Not Misread
Do not read 「無趣不趣」 tr. "no tending, not tending" as the practice of the path having no direction. When the treatise-author set up these words he stated clearly what is refuted: the outside paths say 「諸法從因趣果、從先世入今世、從今世趣後世」 tr. "dharmas tend from cause to fruit, enter this life from the former life, and tend from this life to the next life," and to break this inversion of permanence it is said 「無趣不趣」 tr. "no tending, not tending." What is refuted is seeing, between cause and fruit, a permanently abiding thing being moved across, not the continuity of cause and fruit itself. So the Buddha answers all the same 「當趣一切種智」 tr. "one should tend toward the omniscience of all kinds," and the treatise-author says all the same 「因果相似故」 tr. "because cause and fruit resemble each other." If it is read as not permitting even a direction to be set up, then the passages of this chapter on testing and knowing, on according, and on the place of practice have nowhere at all to stand, and it also goes against the treatise-author's own explanation.
Do not read 「壞修」 tr. "the practice of ruin" as destroying the Buddha's Dharma. The dharmas that can be ruined listed in the sūtra text run from form, feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness, the twelve sense-fields and the eighteen elements, all the way to the six perfections, the emptinesses, the four foundations of mindfulness and so on up to the eighteen unshared dharmas, and the fruit of the srota-āpanna and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds—if the practice of ruin were the practitioner going to break them, that would be destroying the four foundations of mindfulness and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds; how could the Buddha answer 「如是！如是！」 tr. "Just so! Just so!"? The treatise-author's gloss is direct: the practice of ruin means that all dharmas are impermanent, scatter, and fall to ruin; therefore it is called the practice of ruin. Ruin is the mark of impermanence of the dharmas themselves; it is the practitioner seeing, in these dharmas, their impermanence, scattering, and ruin, and not giving rise to grasping at reality, that is called practising prajñā. By the same principle, 「無所修」 tr. "practising nothing" means that no fixed reality can be found in the dharmas practised, and 「不受修」 tr. "the practice of not receiving" means that even the contemplation that contemplates has faults and so is not taken; all three sentences are dispelling grasping, not abolishing practice.
Do not read ‘not practising form and so on up to not practising the omniscience of all kinds’ as cutting off the practice of contemplation. The treatise-author has glossed it word by word: wisdom wishes to seek the real matter; form and the other conditioned, made dharmas are all false, and the omniscience of all kinds is a real dharma—not practising is not not doing; it is not taking false, conditioned dharmas as the reality of what is practised. The glosses on the seven meanings must especially be read together: without making, without ruin, coming from nowhere, going nowhere, not abiding, without number, without measure—every phrase screens off the object's having a real mark that can be grasped, not the work of practice and training. The sūtra text itself urges people precisely to receive and uphold, read, recite, rightly recollect, and practise as it is spoken—if 「不行」 tr. "not practising" were cutting off, the sūtra text would contradict itself.
Do not read 「色即是薩婆若」 tr. "form is sarvajñā" as confounding the ordinary and the sage, with no need to practise. The Buddha himself speaks the reason, and it falls on the one Chinese character rendered here as ‘suchness’: the suchness of form and the other dharmas is the suchness of sarvajñā; for this reason suchness is spoken of; this suchness is without duality and without difference. What the identity lies in is suchness, not marks. If it is read as form and the omniscience of all kinds having no distinction whatever, then the teaching of testing and knowing in the first half of this chapter—clinging or not clinging within deep prajñā, the distinction between the two kinds of bodhisattva who practise prajñā—has no way to stand. Identity without ruining their marks: therefore one must still test, must still accord, must still practise.
Do not read the avaivartika's 「不以他人語為堅要」 tr. "not taking others' words as what is firm and essential" as being free not to listen to what people say. The treatise-author states his reason clearly: there are two kinds of others—householders cling to the pleasures of the five desires and are false, deceptive, and impure; those of the outside paths who have gone forth cling to wrong views and are not real; what such people say is all without any real matter, and therefore he does not believe it; and that he can refrain from believing is 「自得諸法實相故」 tr. "because he himself has obtained the real mark of all dharmas," and 「得無為法故，心則安重」 tr. "because he has obtained the unconditioned dharma, his mind is settled and weighty." What he relies on is the Dharma already realised, not his own temper. To learn not to accept what people say before obtaining the real mark is precisely the 「著」 tr. "clinging" that this chapter tests, not the mark of the avaivartika.
Bearing on Practice
The first benefit is to use the word 「趣」 tr. "tending" rightly. In daily use, in arousing the mind, in dedicating, in resolving to tend toward awakening, if there floats up in the mind a stretch of road and a self who arrives, one has already fallen into the inversion of permanence that the treatise-author refutes. The proper explanation this chapter gives is extremely simple: because cause and fruit resemble each other, tending is spoken of. Its use in the gate of practice is this—simply practise and train in prajñā in the causal stage, and the fruit, resembling it, arrives of itself; there is no need to construct beforehand in the mind a picture of a terminal point, nor to be anxious about which stretch one has reached. To tend is to face toward; facing toward and not taking—only this is tending in the gate of prajñā.
The second benefit is that the method of testing and knowing can be used on oneself. The place of testing the Buddha sets is deep prajñā, and the standard is only one: clinging or not clinging. The treatise-author carves it further into two capacities—the one who can contemplate prajñā too as empty of itself, and the one who contemplates only dharmas as empty and keeps prajñā as what he relies on. One who applies effort can check himself here: has the 「空」 tr. "emptiness" I rely on become once again something I will not let go of? Whenever one sees arising in oneself a feeling of unshakeable certainty toward some gate of the Dharma or some view, one can hold up this one question to shine back on it. This test is not for judging others but for examining oneself—the sūtra text says plainly 「驗知」 tr. "test and know," not ‘pass verdict’.
The third benefit is the way of placing oneself given by the simile of the thunderclap and the peacock. When, hearing the deep Dharma, fear arises in the mind, or it seems flavourless, or one wants to avoid it, what this chapter gives is not reproach but a distinction of capacities: the same sound of thunder—the small bird dies of fright, the peacock dances. On meeting this state two things can be done—first, do not blame the Dharma; know that one's own capacity is not yet ripe; second, following the road shown in Passage 30, enter by way of 「知善法果報味」 tr. "knowing the flavour of the fruit and reward of wholesome dharmas": taste the flavour within the six perfections, and love and delight arise of themselves, and the capacity of itself gradually ripens. A mind never sated is the fruit, not the starting point.
The fourth benefit is that 「隨順」 tr. "according" gives one not yet realised a place to set one's hand that can be practised right now. People are often stopped by such difficulties as 「未得一切種智，云何能順」 tr. "not having obtained the omniscience of all kinds, how can he accord with it," and so think that the lofty gates of the Dharma have nothing to do with them. The treatise-author's answer is the most practically useful sentence in the whole chapter: the mind that accords with ultimate emptiness accords with the mind of the omniscience of all kinds. The omniscience of all kinds is the mark of quiescence, and the mark of quiescence can be accorded with right now—in daily use, not taking marks as real and not giving rise to fixed grasping on the dharmas one practises is already according. There is no need to wait until the fruit is obtained to learn according; according is itself the practice of the causal stage.
The fifth benefit is that the seven meanings can serve as a mnemonic for the practice of contemplation. The place of practice is without making, without ruin, coming from nowhere, going nowhere, with no place of abiding, cannot be counted, is without measure—these seven phrases are not abstruse talk; they are seven angles for shining back. When bringing the mind to bear, one may ask oneself phrase by phrase: this dharma that I take as object—have I seen it as having someone who makes it, a thing that can be ruined, coming from somewhere, going somewhere, able to be abided in and relied on, able to be counted and measured? When the seven phrases have been gone through one by one, the grasping at the reality of the object loosens. The last phrase especially must be remembered: because the way of words is cut off, it cannot be found by practising form and the other dharmas—when contemplation reaches the place that cannot be spoken, do not hurry to fit a name onto it.
Further Resonances
The skeleton of this chapter is two sūtra passages and two treatise explanations. Sūtra ① begins with Subhūti asking 「解深般若波羅蜜者，當趣何所」 tr. "the one who understands deep prajñāpāramitā, toward what place should he tend," and the Buddha answering 「當趣一切種智」 tr. "he should tend toward the omniscience of all kinds"; Subhūti expands that the one who tends is that toward which all beings return and tend, and brings out four meanings: practising prajñā is practising all dharmas, practising nothing, the practice of not receiving, and the practice of ruin; the Buddha sets the question 「何等法壞」 tr. "which dharmas are ruined," and Subhūti counts through form, feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness, the twelve sense-fields and the eighteen elements, the self and so on up to the knower and the seer, the six perfections, inner emptiness and so on up to the emptiness of non-existent and existent dharmas, the four foundations of mindfulness and so on up to the eighteen unshared dharmas, and the fruit of the srota-āpanna and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds; the Buddha approves, and at the end instructs that the avaivartika be tested and known within deep prajñā for clinging or not clinging. Treatise ① first sets the difficulty ‘neither tending nor not tending; why is the question about tending and the answer about tending?’, brings out the refutation of the outside paths' tending from cause to fruit and establishes 「無趣不趣」 tr. "no tending, not tending," next makes clear the question and answer with a mind without clinging, ultimate emptiness without hindrance and without obstruction, and tending spoken of because cause and fruit resemble each other, brings out the simile of the child tending toward its father and mother to explain returning and tending, then sets the question ‘why is the bodhisattva alone that toward which beings return and tend?’ and answers it with constant practice out of great compassion and all dharmas entering prajñā, glosses word by word practising nothing, the practice of not receiving, the practice of ruin, and the dharmas that can be broken and ruined, and at the end, carrying on the nature, mark, and appearance of the preceding chapter, establishes the meaning of testing, and distinguishes two kinds of bodhisattva who practise prajñā. Sūtra ② shows at length the marks by which the avaivartika is tested and known—not taking others' words as what is firm and essential, not being dragged by the mind of desire, the mind of hatred, or the mind of delusion, not straying far from the six perfections, not startled and not terrified on hearing deep prajñā but gladly delighting in hearing it, having asked in former lives and having great majestic virtue; Subhūti asks how he practises, and the Buddha answers: in accord with the mind of the omniscience of all kinds; asked again, he brings out three groups of according—by emptiness; by the signless, non-action, being without anything existent, non-arising and non-ceasing, neither stained nor pure; by being like a dream, an illusion, a mirage, an echo, a transformation; at the end, asked what dharma he practises, the Buddha answers that he does not practise form and so on up to does not practise the omniscience of all kinds, and brings out the seven meanings of the place of practice and the conclusion of 「色即是薩婆若」 tr. "form is sarvajñā" and 「一如，無二無別」 tr. "one suchness, without duality and without difference." Treatise ②, with the mark of explanation, explains the marks of testing and knowing following the text: not believing because of the two kinds of others, the mind settled and weighty and not shifting because he himself has obtained the real mark, not dragged because the afflictions are broken and thinned, not straying from the six perfections because he knows the flavour of the fruit and reward of wholesome dharmas, the simile of the thunderclap and the peacock explaining the glad delight in hearing, and the Buddha himself speaking the cause and condition of great majestic virtue; next it sets the difficulty 「未得一切種智，云何能順」 tr. "not having obtained the omniscience of all kinds, how can he accord with it," answers that according with ultimate emptiness is according with the omniscience of all kinds, and cites the later chapter's 「一切寂滅相是一切種智」 tr. "the mark of all quiescence is the omniscience of all kinds" as its ground; at the end it restates the question and answer and glosses word by word without making, a dharma without ruin, coming from nowhere, going nowhere, not abiding, without number and without measure, and the way of words cut off, and finally closes the whole chapter with the suchness without duality and without difference of the cause and condition the Buddha himself speaks, 「色等諸法如即是薩婆若如」 tr. "the suchness of form and the other dharmas is the suchness of sarvajñā," and so reaches the end of fascicle seventy-one.
In the vein of meaning linking this chapter with the chapters before and after it, three lines can be seen. First, carrying on from before: the treatise-author says plainly 「上品末說阿鞞跋致菩薩性、相、貌，今應驗試知」 tr. "at the end of the preceding chapter the nature, mark, and appearance of the avaivartika bodhisattva were spoken of; now they should be tested and known"—the preceding chapter speaks of the marks, this chapter tests the marks; speaking and testing are two sections of one matter; the root of why the sūtra text in the second half of this chapter is wholly about the avaivartika lies here. Second, carrying on and turning: the meaning that prajñā neither tends nor does not tend has been set forth again and again in the chapters before this; this chapter does not establish this meaning anew, but asks how it goes together with 「趣一切種智」 tr. "tending toward the omniscience of all kinds"—so the new meaning of this chapter lies not in refuting tending but in giving the word tending back its faultless use. Third, handing on to what follows: the treatise-author cites what the Buddha says in a later chapter, 「一切寂滅相是一切種智」 tr. "the mark of all quiescence is the omniscience of all kinds," as his ground, plainly pointing toward a meaning to be explained in detail after this chapter; the reader may view the following chapters together, to see the full breadth of the sentence ‘according with ultimate emptiness is according with the omniscience of all kinds’.
Among the ancient masters' explanations, one school can be recorded for this chapter. Jizang, dividing this chapter into sections, says at its opening section: 「此第三明中下根人者，標大果。文三：第一明由般若故趣薩婆若果，二識驗信般若人相，三明能如所驗釋法不著秤順薩婆若也」 tr. "This third makes clear the persons of middling and lower faculties, and sets forth the great fruit. The text is threefold: first, it makes clear that because of prajñā one tends toward the fruit of sarvajñā; second, it recognises and tests the marks of the person who believes in prajñā; third, it makes clear that one who is able to be as tested explains that dharmas are not clung to and accords with sarvajñā"—dividing this chapter into three parts, tending toward the fruit, testing the marks of the person, and explaining that dharmas are not clung to, which corresponds to the order in this treatise, where Sūtra ① and Treatise ① make clear tending, and Sūtra ② and Treatise ② make clear testing and knowing and according. On the meaning of asking about tending and answering with tending he also says: 「已上明非趣不趣，今所以問趣答趣著，以明非趣不趣乃是趣道耳，故見趣不趣皆名不趣」 tr. "Above, it made clear neither tending nor not tending; the reason it now asks about tending and answers with tending is to make clear that neither tending nor not tending is precisely the path of tending; therefore seeing tending and seeing not tending are both called not tending"—this is Jizang's own judgement and explanation, and it and the treatise-author's road of ‘because cause and fruit resemble each other, tending is spoken of’ each have their own emphasis; they are recorded side by side without judgement, and the reader keeps both. The study of the variant chapter titles, of the division of fascicles in the witnesses, and of later citations is detailed in the Apparatus.