大智度論 問相品Dazhidulun — Mahāprajñāpāramitā-upadeśa · Asking about Marks

Asking about Marks: Why, Emptiness, the Signless, and Non-action Having Been Spoken of Everywhere, the Gods Ask Again about the Mark of Prajñā; Why, a Mark Being Unable to Break a Mark, It Is Also Said That a Mark Cannot Know a Mark or Know the Markless; Why Speaking of Emptiness, When to Speak Is Already to Have a Mark, Does Not Amount to Contradicting Oneself; Why, Prajñā Being Ultimately Empty, the Buddha Instead Relies on It, Honours It, and Makes Offerings to It; Why, Prajñā Being Able to Give Birth to the Buddhas, It Is Also Said That in All Dharmas There Is No Knower and No Seer; Why, the World Having Been Shown as Empty, Nine Gates from the Inconceivable to Solitary Emptiness Are Further Opened; Why That Which Is Equal to the Unequalled Is Called Both Nirvāṇa and the Real Mark of All Dharmas; and Why, When This Chapter Was Spoken, Those among the Bhikṣuṇīs and the Bodhisattvas Who Obtained the Path Were Few

What Is Being Asked

The name of this chapter is its very way of asking: asking about marks. The gods of the desire realm and the form realm scatter flowers and incense from afar and come, bow their heads at the Buddha’s feet, and what they ask is a single sentence—the prajñāpāramitā that is spoken of is very deep; what is the mark of deep prajñāpāramitā? The question looks ordinary, yet the treatise-author, opening the chapter, first blocks it on the reader’s behalf: emptiness, the signless, non-action, and so on up to non-origination and without anything existent, are the mark of prajñā—this has already been said everywhere above; why do the gods still ask? From this one can see that what this chapter deals with is not the question of knowledge, ‘what is prajñā?’, but a harder question: ‘since prajñā has no fixed mark, does the mark that is spoken of still count as a mark?’

And so the whole chapter asks three times and answers three times. The first time, the gods ask about the mark; the Buddha answers with the ten marks, the mark of emptiness and the rest, and at once exposes it himself: these words are spoken for beings, in accord with worldly dharmas; they are not the highest meaning. Then he presses on all the way to a mark cannot break a mark, a mark cannot know a mark, a mark cannot know the markless, the markless cannot know a mark, sweeping away knower and known together, and finally comes home to ‘whether there is a Buddha or no Buddha, the mark and the nature abide always’. The second time, the Buddha of his own accord tells Subhūti: prajñā is the mother of the buddhas and can show the mark of the world; being the mother and being able to show, it is yet said that in all dharmas there is no knower and no seer, and with nine gates he opens up, layer by layer, the world as empty, inconceivable, separate, quiescent, ultimately empty, empty of nature, empty of non-existent dharmas, empty of non-existent and existent dharmas, and as solitary emptiness. The third time, Subhūti raises five matters—the great matter, the inconceivable matter, the unweighable matter, the matter without measure, the matter equal to the unequalled—and asks for the sake of what prajñā arises; the Buddha answers each one, then extends these four kinds of inconceivable dharmas to form and all other dharmas, and finally concludes with the assembly obtaining the path.

The three rounds of question and answer are in fact three faces of one question: mark, mother, matter. To speak of the mark is to ask about the substance of prajñā; to speak of the mother is to ask about its capacity; to speak of the matter is to ask about its function. And all three faces run up against the same pass—prajñā is ultimately empty, with no fixed mark that can be grasped; then how is it that speaking of it, relying on it, praising it, and even the buddhas’ appearing in the world because of it—how is all of this established? This chapter’s answer lies not in any single conclusion, but in the measure the Buddha himself lays down: emptiness and the other marks are spoken of from the standpoint of worldly truth, not from the standpoint of the truth of the highest meaning. Once this sentence stands, the chapter’s many instances of ‘speaking with nothing spoken’ become readable.

Passage by Passage

1. The gods come to ask. The chapter opens with a scene: all the gods of the desire realm and the form realm in the three-thousand great-thousand world scatter flowers and incense from afar, come to where the Buddha is, bow their heads at the Buddha’s feet, stand to one side, and then ask. Look first at this 「遙散華香」 tr. "scattered flowers and incense from afar"—to set out offerings before asking about the Dharma is the rite of hearing the Dharma; look next at the words of the question: the gods first acknowledge 「所說般若波羅蜜甚深」 tr. "the prajñāpāramitā that is spoken of is very deep," and only then ask about the mark. They do not ask out of disbelief; having believed, they seek its fixed reality. Once this layer is clearly distinguished first, the three causes of the question that the treatise-author explains later will have somewhere to land.

2. The Buddha answers with ten marks and himself breaks his own words. The Buddha’s answer first lists the marks: the mark of emptiness, the signless, non-action, non-origination, no arising and no ceasing, without stain and without purity, the dharma without anything existent, the signless, no support, the mark of space—marks of every kind such as these are the mark of deep prajñā. Having listed them, he at once lays down the measure himself: this is spoken for beings, in accord with worldly dharmas; it is not the highest meaning. Then he presses forward: these marks cannot be broken or ruined by any of the world’s gods, humans, and asuras, because they themselves are also marks; a mark cannot break a mark, a mark cannot know a mark, a mark cannot know the markless, the markless cannot know a mark; the person who knows and the dharma known are both unfindable. Further on, he says that these marks are not made by the five aggregates, not made by the six perfections, not made by the emptinesses, not made by the four foundations of mindfulness and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds, nor are they possessed by humans or non-humans; they are neither worldly nor world-transcending, neither with outflows nor without outflows, neither conditioned nor unconditioned. What must be seen is the direction of this passage: first he gives you the marks, then he pulls away the marks in your hand—the giving is worldly truth; the pulling away is the highest meaning.

3. The question about the mark of space: a right question or not. The Buddha does not state the principle directly; he first sets a question: suppose someone asks 「何等是虛空相」 tr. "What is the mark of space?"—does this person count as asking rightly? The gods answer themselves: it is not asking rightly, because space has no mark that can be spoken of; space is unconditioned and without origination. This one question and answer is the model of the whole chapter: asking about ‘the mark of deep prajñā’ has the same form as asking about 「虛空相」 tr. "the mark of space"; since the gods have already judged that the latter does not make a question, their way of asking the former breaks of itself. The Buddha does not refute their question; he makes the questioners see for themselves that their question does not hold—this is the move in this chapter that most shows his skill.

4. Whether there is a Buddha or no Buddha, the mark and the nature abide always. Next the Buddha sets up a positive sentence: whether there is a Buddha or no Buddha, the mark and the nature abide always; because the Buddha obtains the mark and the nature as they really are, he is called the Tathāgata. Since the preceding passage has swept everything away, here there must be a sentence to hold it up; otherwise one falls into annihilation. The key point is that the two Chinese characters 「常住」 tr. "abide always" do not set up a permanent dharma: that the mark and the nature abide always means that it does not wait for a Buddha’s appearing before it exists, and does not cease to exist when a Buddha passes away; the Buddha is the Tathāgata not by making this mark and nature, but by obtaining it as it really is. Setting up and breaking are joined here.

5. The gods praise twice. Having heard, the gods praise, in two layers: first they praise the nature of the marks the World-Honored One has obtained as very deep—by obtaining these marks he obtains unobstructed knowledge, and abiding in these marks he gathers with prajñā the specific marks of dharmas; then they praise this deep prajñā as the place where the buddhas constantly walk: walking this path they obtain anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi, and having obtained it they penetrate the marks of all dharmas, from the mark of form up to the mark of the omniscience of all kinds. The first layer praises where the Buddha abides; the second praises what the Buddha walks and what he penetrates—the praise is no pleasantry; it restates what the Buddha answered as their own understanding and hands it back before the Buddha, asking for his seal.

6. The Buddha approves their praise, sets out the marks one against another, and returns to the markless. The Buddha answers ‘Just so! Just so!’, and then sets them out one by one: what vexes and ruins is the mark of form; what perceives is the mark of feeling; what grasps is the mark of perception; what initiates and makes is the mark of constructions; what discerns is the mark of consciousness; what can relinquish is the mark of dānapāramitā; being without the burning of vexation is śīla, not changing is kṣānti, not being subdued is vīrya, collecting the mind is dhyāna, relinquishing and leaving is prajñā; the mind free of harassment and vexation is the mark of the four dhyānas, the four immeasurable minds, and the four formless absorptions; transcending the world is the mark of the thirty-seven limbs of the path; suffering is the mark of the gate of liberation of non-action, separation the mark of the gate of liberation of emptiness, quiescence the mark of the gate of liberation of the signless; victory is the mark of the ten powers, not being frightened the mark of fearlessness, knowing universally the mark of the four unobstructed knowledges, what others cannot obtain the mark of the eighteen unshared dharmas; pitying beings is the mark of great kindness and great compassion, reality is the mark of being without error, grasping nothing is the mark of constant equanimity, knowing fully in the present is the mark of the omniscience of all kinds. After each group he adds the sentence ‘the Buddha obtains this as markless’. The teaching of this passage is extremely plain: each dharma has its own mark, each distinct and not confused; and what the Buddha obtains is the marklessness of all these marks. It is not erasing distinctions; it is obtaining their marklessness within the distinctions—and so the last sentence says: the Buddha obtains all dharmas as markless, and for this reason he is called unobstructed knowledge.

7. Why the mark of prajñā is asked again. The treatise-author opens his explanation by first answering the question that blocks the road: above, emptiness, the signless, non-action, and so on up to non-origination and without anything existent, have been said everywhere to be the mark of prajñā; why do the gods ask again? There are three answers. First, although the Buddha speaks of prajñā everywhere, sometimes he speaks of emptiness and the like, sometimes of existence, sometimes of the fruit of retribution, sometimes of sin and merit, and it is not fixed; so now they ask which is definitely the mark of prajñā. Second, prajñā is like an illusion, like a transformation, seemingly to be got hold of, yet with no fixed mark that can be grasped; only the buddhas can rightly and fully know it, and the gods, though of keen wisdom, cannot fully know it. Third, someone says: among the gods there are latecomers who had not heard it, and so they ask. The three answers go from shallow to deep and come back to the shallow: they ask because it is not fixed, they ask because they cannot know, they ask because they have not heard—if readers ask themselves ‘why do I still ask?’, these three will by and large be enough.

8. Emptiness and the rest are the mark of prajñā: a gloss on the three gates of liberation. The treatise-author explains the Buddha’s answer following the text. The mark of emptiness refers to inner emptiness, outer emptiness, and the other emptinesses; if dharmas are empty, there are no marks such as male and female, long and short, fair and ugly—this is called the mark of the signless; if empty and signless, one no longer gives rise to wishing, seeking, craving, and clinging to a body in later lives—this is called the mark of non-action. Glossed all the way down, emptiness, the signless, and non-action are not three things; they are a threefold shift of one matter. The last sentence is essential: the three gates of liberation are the mark of first entering prajñāpāramitā, held in common by the three vehicles—first entering, not the ultimate; a shared dharma, not an unshared one. This sentence keeps a place for the 「深相」 tr. "deep marks" that follow.

9. The deep marks, and the teaching of emptiness with distinctions. Having spoken of the mark of first entering, he then speaks of the deep marks: neither arising nor ceasing, neither stained nor pure, without support, space and the like, are the deep marks of prajñā. The treatise-author further distinguishes the two instances of 「無相」 tr. "the signless," earlier and later: the signless within the three gates of liberation is being without outer marks such as male and female; the mark of the signless from 「無所有」 tr. "without anything existent" onward is being without the marks of all dharmas. The one removes the coarse; the other removes the subtle. Then he explains why one and the same emptiness must be spoken of in so many ways—though emptiness is one, because people’s faculties are keen or dull and their entry is deep or shallow, emptiness is taught with distinctions. The Dharma has no many gates; the gates are set up for people. As for the discussion of no arising and no ceasing and the rest, the treatise-author says it is as said before, and does not repeat it.

10. The Buddha knew their doubt beforehand, and so spoke of it himself. The treatise-author points out a hinge: the Buddha knew the gods would surely give rise to this thought—if prajñā is empty, without anything existent, like the mark of space, how can it still be spoken of? If it is spoken of, it has a mark. Because the Buddha’s majestic virtue was great, the gods did not dare raise the objection, so the Buddha spoke it out himself on their behalf: the Buddha, out of pity for beings, speaks of emptiness and the other marks from the standpoint of worldly truth, not from the standpoint of the truth of the highest meaning. The treatise-author at once fixes the criterion firmly: if it were spoken from the standpoint of the highest meaning, this objection could stand; since it is spoken from the standpoint of worldly truth, this objection should not be raised. The doubt of self-contradiction, the easiest in the whole chapter to slide past, is untied here by one sentence.

11. Though emptiness is spoken of, marks are not grasped. One layer further: although emptiness is spoken of, marks are not grasped with a clinging mind, it is not shown that a dharma is right or wrong, all dharmas are of one mark, without discrimination; precisely because of this, the Buddha then speaks clearly of 「無所有」 tr. "without anything existent" and 「如虛空相」 tr. "like the mark of space." Here two uses of 「說」 tr. "speaking" can be seen: speaking while grasping at marks binds the more one speaks; speaking without grasping at marks clarifies the more one speaks. The difference lies not in speaking or not speaking, but in the mind of the one who speaks.

12. Nothing in all the world can break or ruin it: the two similes of water and fire and of the blind man. There is no dharma that does not enter this mark, and so it is said that nothing in all the world can break or ruin it; because gods, humans, and asuras are themselves marks. The treatise-author gives two similes: only dharmas of different kinds that oppose each other can be broken, as water can quench fire, but fire does not itself quench fire—like kinds do not break each other. Again, it is like a blind man who treads on precious things and says with his mouth that they are not precious, and in the end cannot make them not precious—saying with the mouth cannot change the thing. Taken together it is one sentence: mark and mark are of one kind, so they do not break each other; the words of the world do not reach the real mark, so nothing can ruin it.

13. Three explanations of why a mark cannot break a mark. The treatise-author gives three levels. First, the Buddha’s own reason: because prajñā is ultimately empty and markless, a mark cannot break a mark. Second, someone says: what is called breaking is in fact only dissolving—dharmas are formed by coming together; when an axe splits firewood, it is dissolved piece by piece, and in the end nothing is lost, so when has anything been broken? Third, dharmas have no fixed mark in the first place: as with a tree, root, trunk, branches, and leaves come together and it is called a tree; since the tree has no fixed mark, there is nothing to break. The three explanations gather into one sentence: things such as these are called a mark cannot break a mark. Of the three, the second is the most usable for curing the illusion, in daily life, that ‘I have broken it’—what is called breaking is mostly only taking apart.

14. Mental-factor dharmas are marks of knowing; why say they do not know? The treatise-author raises an objection himself: form and the other dharmas are not perceiving or knowing, so to say they do not know each other still makes sense; but mental-factor dharmas are themselves marks of knowing—how can they too be said not to know? The answer is most essential: here it is spoken with regard to the real mark, not of the false knowing of ordinary people. This wisdom is a conditioned dharma, born from the coming together of causes and conditions; a false dharma cannot truly know anything, and so it is relinquished and one enters nirvāṇa without remainder; and if it is said that wisdom can know permanence, impermanence, and so on up to emptiness, quiescence, and the like, this has already been widely refuted above, extinguished and exhausted, without anything existent. That being so, where is there any knowing? Therefore it is said that a mark does not know a mark. See clearly the measure of this sentence: it is not saying that people cannot know; it is saying that when conditioned, false knowing is used to grasp the real mark, that 「知」 tr. "knowing" does not hold.

15. A knife does not break space; without a knife nothing is cut. Two sentences, a simile for each. That a mark cannot know the markless: though there is wisdom within, the outer object is empty, so there is no dharma to be known; with no object without, from where would wisdom arise?—like a knife that, however sharp, cannot cut space. That the markless cannot know a mark: someone says that inner wisdom has no fixed mark while outer objects have fixed marks, and the mind arises following its object, so it is said that the markless should not know a mark—like having no knife: though there is a thing, there is no knife to cut it. The two similes, one direct and one reversed, seal shut the door between knower and known: with no object, wisdom does not arise; with nothing that takes an object, the object is not known.

16. The mark and the marked depend on each other and are not fixed. Pressing three layers further in. First, a mark does not enter a mark, because there already is a mark; a mark does not enter the markless, because the markless has no place to enter; apart from these two there is no further place that can be entered. Second, neither the mark nor the marked is fixed; there is a mark because of the marked: if there were first a mark and no marked, there would be no mark to speak of, because there would be nothing on which it rests; if there were first the marked and no mark, the marked also would not stand, because there would be nothing on which it rests and against which it stands. Third, the mark sometimes serves as the marked, and the marked is sometimes the mark, turning back and forth between each other; so if the mark is not fixed and not real, the marked too does not exist; if the marked is not fixed and not real, the mark too does not exist. The conclusion is that sentence of the sūtra: this mark, this markless, this mark-and-markless are unfindable. This passage is the joint of the whole chapter’s meaning—whatever is formed by mutual dependence is not fixed and real.

17. Emptiness and the other marks are real: not made, not of persons, on neither side; and so the Buddha sets up a simile. The treatise-author returns to the positive: as said before, emptiness and the other marks are real. Why? This mark is not made by the five aggregates, not made by the six perfections and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds; because it is unconditioned, there is no dharma that can make it, nor can any human or non-human make it—humans means bodhisattvas, buddhas, and the like; non-humans means the gods and the like; because it is ultimately empty, it is neither with outflows nor without outflows, neither worldly nor world-transcending. Then he adds a most essential self-warning: though the unconditioned mark was spoken of before, the unconditioned was spoken of only to break the conditioned; the unconditioned too has no fixed mark. Then he explains why the Buddha speaks the simile of space: hearers easily give rise to the thought—if there were no Buddha we would not hear of this mark, and the Buddha is supreme among beings, so surely it is the Buddha who makes this mark; therefore the Buddha says that whether there is a Buddha or no Buddha this mark abides always, and because the Buddha can know this mark he is called the Buddha. Breaking the notion that ‘the Buddha creates this mark’ is exactly the intent of setting up the simile in this passage.

18. The gods’ joy and the Buddha’s seal of approval. The gods rejoice and speak again: these marks are very deep; though they cannot be grasped as marks, they can be practised, and can give people the unsurpassed fruit of retribution; because the Buddha obtains these marks, he obtains unobstructed knowledge in all dharmas. The treatise-author inserts a sentence showing the converse: if one distinguished dharmas as having fixed marks, that would be obstructed knowledge. Next the gods declare that the World-Honored One, abiding in this real mark, penetrates without obstruction and can speak of the distinct marks of each dharma. The Buddha approves their meaning and distinguishes the marks for them: the marks known by ordinary people are each different; the Buddha knows them all as the mark of emptiness; the mark of emptiness is the markless; the Buddha obtains this as markless. The treatise-author further glosses the single character 「得」 tr. "obtain"—to obtain is to know; because of incomparable universal knowing it is called obtaining. The last sentence most repays savouring: these marks of dharmas are now renamed prajñāpāramitā. The mark of dharmas and the mark of prajñā are, at this point, not two.

19. Prajñā is the mother of the buddhas and can show the mark of the world. The Buddha turns and tells Subhūti, beginning a new passage. First he sets forth the thesis: prajñā is the mother of the buddhas and can show the mark of the world; therefore the Buddha abides relying on this Dharma, and makes offerings to this Dharma, reveres, honours, and praises it. He asks and answers himself: what is this Dharma? It is prajñāpāramitā. The reason is that prajñā gives birth to the buddhas. Next he speaks of the Buddha as knowing those who have been kind to him: if someone rightly asks who is one who knows kindness, the right answer is that none surpasses the Buddha; the Dharma the Buddha rode in on and the path by which he came, by which he obtained anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi—this vehicle and this path the Buddha still reveres, makes offerings to, honours, praises, receives and upholds, and guards. It turns one layer further: the Buddha knows all dharmas as having the mark of non-action, because a maker is non-existent; all dharmas are without origination, because shape and matter are unfindable—the Buddha, because of prajñā, knows all dharmas as having the mark of non-action, and for this reason too is called one who knows kindness. Within one passage, repaying kindness and non-action stand side by side without hindering each other; this is what the treatise-author will deal with specifically below.

20. Because of prajñā, all dharmas are obtained as non-arising. One sentence gathers up what went before and opens what follows: because of prajñāpāramitā, the Buddha obtains all dharmas as non-arising, with nothing to be attained; for this reason prajñā can give birth to the buddhas and can also show the mark of the world. 「不生」 tr. "Non-arising" and 「能生」 tr. "can give birth" are placed in the same sentence—precisely because what is obtained is the non-arising of all dharmas, prajñā can give birth to the buddhas. This is no play on words: the 「生」 tr. "birth" of giving birth is spoken from worldly truth; the 「不生」 tr. "non-arising" of non-arising is spoken from the highest meaning. The measure of the earlier passage comes into effect here once again.

21. The objection of no knower and no seer. Subhūti raises an objection: if in all dharmas there is no knower and no seer, how can prajñā give birth to the buddhas and show the mark of the world? The Buddha first answers ‘Just so! Just so!’, granting its premise, then himself speaks of two causes and conditions: first, all dharmas are empty, false and deceptive, and not solid, and so there is no knower and no seer; second, all dharmas are without support and without anything they are bound to, and so there is no knower and no seer. Then he connects the conclusion back: prajñā can give birth to the buddhas and can show the mark of the world—it shows the mark of the world because it does not see form; it shows because it does not see feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness; and so on up to: it shows because it does not see the omniscience of all kinds. The four Chinese characters rendered here as ‘shows because it does not see’ are the eye of this passage: what is shown is not something that has been seen; it is precisely not seeing.

22. Not seeing is consciousness not arising in taking it as object. Subhūti asks again what is meant by showing because form is not seen. The Buddha’s answer is very concrete: if consciousness does not arise taking form as its object, this is called showing because the mark of form is not seen; if consciousness does not arise taking feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness, and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds, as its object, this is called showing because the mark of the omniscience of all kinds is not seen. Here 「不見」 tr. "not seeing" receives a precise definition—not shutting the eyes and not looking, but consciousness not arising in taking that as its object. This sentence can guard against the misunderstanding that reads 「不見」 tr. "not seeing" as numb ignorance.

23. Showing the world as empty: more than twenty items set out one by one. The Buddha asks himself how prajñā can give birth to the buddhas and show the mark of the world, and answers himself: it can show the world as empty. Then he sets out the items one by one—the five aggregates, the twelve sense-fields, the eighteen elements, the twelve links of dependent origination, the sixty-two views rooted in the view of self; the ten wholesome paths, the four dhyānas, the four immeasurable minds, the four formless absorptions; the thirty-seven limbs of the path, the six perfections; inner emptiness, outer emptiness, inner-and-outer emptiness; the emptiness of non-existent dharmas, the emptiness of existent dharmas, the emptiness of non-existent and existent dharmas; the nature of the conditioned, the nature of the unconditioned; the Buddha’s ten powers, the eighteen unshared dharmas, and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds—showing the world of each one as empty. See its order: it begins from the body-and-mind world of ordinary people, passes through the views of the outside paths, goes through the wholesome dharmas of humans and gods and the meditative concentrations, enters the limbs of the path and the practice of the Great Vehicle, and finally lists even emptiness itself, even the merits of the Buddha-dharma. What is called showing the world as empty is emptying together even the dharmas that do the emptying; only this is called exhausting it.

24. The Buddha’s five functions, and the Buddha’s world as empty. Next come two turns. First, the Buddha, because of prajñā, shows the world as empty, knows the world as empty, awakens to the world as empty, considers the world as empty, and discriminates the world as empty—showing, knowing, awakening, considering, and discriminating set side by side, making clear that the Buddha’s relation to this emptiness is not speculative talk, but personal realisation followed by showing. Second, prajñā shows the Buddha the world as empty, again taking the five aggregates and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds as its items. The former speaks of the Buddha’s capacity, the latter of the object shown; both sides are gathered into the same concluding sentence.

25. The three gates of the inconceivable, the separate, and the quiescent. The nine gates begin to unfold one by one: it shows the Buddha the world as inconceivable, shows the Buddha the world as separate, shows the Buddha the world as quiescent—each gate taking the five aggregates and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds as the items shown. The three gates move in one direction: inconceivable—the mind cannot reach it; separate—dharmas are of themselves far apart; quiescent—the path of words is cut off. Though the gates turn, what is shown does not change; this is precisely the pattern of this passage.

26. The four gates of ultimate emptiness, emptiness of nature, emptiness of non-existent dharmas, and emptiness of non-existent and existent dharmas. Four more gates. Ultimate emptiness is exhausting to the very end; emptiness of nature is spoken with regard to the self-nature of dharmas; as for the emptiness of non-existent dharmas and the emptiness of non-existent and existent dharmas, the treatise-author glosses them himself in fascicle thirty-one when explaining the eighteen emptinesses: the emptiness of non-existent dharmas breaks all dharmas at the time of their ceasing—since the dharma has ceased into non-existence, this 「無」 tr. "non-existence" is also empty, and one may not hold a 「無」 tr. "non-existence" as real; the emptiness of non-existent and existent dharmas breaks arising and ceasing at one time—breaking not only the arising of existent dharmas but also the ceasing of non-existent dharmas, dismissing both sides, existence and non-existence, at one time. He also cites another explanation: the emptiness of past and future dharmas is called the emptiness of non-existent dharmas; the emptiness of present and unconditioned dharmas is called the emptiness of existent dharmas. Of the four gates these two are the subtlest: the former dismisses ‘the non-existence after ceasing’; the latter dismisses ‘the opposition of existence and non-existence’. The four gates tighten all the way, pushing 「空」 tr. "emptiness" from the general statement into the particular statement; in reading one need not force a distinction of deep and shallow name by name—the treatise-author will himself explain below why emptiness is taught with distinctions.

27. The one gate of solitary emptiness. Last of the nine gates is solitary emptiness. This name is the most singular among the emptinesses; the sūtra text does not explain it here, but only lists the item as in the preceding pattern; the treatise-author keeps it for later, setting up a question and answer specifically to gloss it. The sūtra does not explain and the treatise explains—this is precisely the pattern of this treatise; reading here, there is no need to hurry.

28. It does not give rise to the mark of this life or of later lives. The Buddha concludes: prajñā can give birth to the buddhas and can show the mark of the world; and the mark of the world that it shows does not give rise to the mark of this life or of later lives, because dharmas have nothing by which the mark of this life and later lives could arise. This follows from the nine gates before it: since the world is ultimately empty, the mark of this life and later lives has nowhere to arise from. Note that this is not denying karmic fruit—the treatise-author will say plainly below that this is the middle way that leaves the two extremes of annihilation and permanence, not a denial of cause and effect.

29. The buddhas abide relying on prajñā. The treatise-author opens his explanation of the second passage, first taking up the thesis: prajñā is the mother of the buddhas, and for this reason the buddhas abide relying on prajñā. He cites what other sūtras say, 「諸佛依止法，以法為師」 tr. "The buddhas rely on the Dharma and take the Dharma as their teacher," and then points out that here the Buddha tells Subhūti 「法者，即是般若波羅蜜」 tr. "The Dharma is precisely prajñāpāramitā." Joining the two sentences brings the general statement 「以法為師」 tr. "take the Dharma as their teacher" down onto prajñā—this is the starting point of all the discussion in this passage.

30. Knowing kindness is supreme. The treatise-author turns from relying to repaying kindness: among all unwholesome dharmas there is none worse than wrong view, because of wrong view one does not recognise a debt of kindness, and thinks only that it is naturally owed to oneself. The person who knows kindness is supreme among the wholesome dharmas of the world; in this life he is given a good name, in later lives the highest and most wondrous fruit of retribution. Therefore the Buddha says of himself that he is first in knowing kindness and repaying kindness: 「我尚知布施、持戒等恩，何況般若波羅蜜！」 tr. "I know even the kindness of giving, keeping the precepts, and the rest; how much more that of prajñāpāramitā!" This sentence describes the Buddha’s honouring and making offerings as knowing kindness; it does not say that the Buddha lacks anything, but sets up a supreme teaching by example.

31. Why prajñā is held precious, and why it seems like craving. Two doubts, which the treatise-author resolves one by one. First, the gods might think that prajñā is ultimately empty and has no fixed mark, and fear that some would neither crave it nor hold it precious; so the Buddha says 「我為三界尊，尚供養般若波羅蜜，何況餘人！」 tr. "I am the honoured one of the three realms, and even I make offerings to prajñāpāramitā; how much more should others!" Second, someone further doubts: the Buddha, toward all the world, is like space, attached to nothing—why does he alone crave prajñā, honouring it and making offerings to it, as if craving and clinging? The Buddha’s answer is clear: I have no craving mind; I simply know by discrimination the good and ugly of dharmas and how much power and use they have; I know that prajñā can cut off all idle discourse, open the paths of the three vehicles, and extinguish every suffering, and has immeasurable, boundless merits, and so I praise it, honour it, and make offerings to it. The treatise-author closes with a simile: like a person who walks a safe road, escapes every trouble and danger, and constantly keeps this road in mind and points it out to others. Praising by discriminating merits and craving by grasping at marks are two entirely different things.

32. Knowing what has been done for him and not knowing a doer. This is the special gloss of this passage. What is called 「佛知作人」 tr. "the Buddha knows what has been done for him" is knowing that others have done him a kindness. Elsewhere, however, a sūtra says 「佛不知作人」 tr. "the Buddha does not know a doer"; fearing that people would give rise to doubt, it is said here 「佛知一切法無作相」 tr. "the Buddha knows all dharmas as having the mark of non-action"—because he knows all dharmas as having the mark of non-action, he speaks of there being no doer; it is not because he does not know the debt of kindness that it is said he does not know a doer. The last sentence cuts extremely clean: to say that he knows what has been done for him, or that he does not know a doer, is without fault. The two sūtra passages look contradictory, but one speaks of kindness in worldly truth and the other of non-action in the highest meaning; read by layers, there is nothing to dispute.

33. Subhūti’s objection from ultimate emptiness. Subhūti objects: if, because all dharmas are ultimately empty, there is no knower and no maker, how can prajñā give birth to the buddhas and show the world of the buddhas? The Buddha grants his question and himself states the causes and conditions: all dharmas are empty, false and deceptive, and without solidity. The treatise-author further supplies a sentence of meaning for each side: Subhūti’s meaning is that all dharmas have the mark of dullness, with no seeing and no knowing—how could prajñā alone have knowing and seeing? The Buddha’s meaning is that all dharmas are not only without knowing and without seeing; even that no-knower and that no-seer are unfindable, and so this objection should not be raised. The objector objects by holding that ‘only prajñā has knowing’, while the Buddha withdraws even the ground on which the objection stands.

34. Without support and without bonds, therefore without knowing and seeing. The treatise-author continues with the second cause and condition: because all dharmas are without support and without bonds, there is no knower and no seer. In between he inserts an overview of the ways of entering emptiness—some break permanence and practise impermanence to enter emptiness; some break reality to enter emptiness; some enter emptiness because of ultimate exhaustion; some enter emptiness because all dharmas are far apart. What is used now is another road: because all dharmas have no place of abiding, they are without support and without bonds; because they are without support, there is no arising and no ceasing; no arising and ceasing is precisely emptiness. He also glosses 「不繫」 tr. "not bound": the real mark of all dharmas is not bound, it goes beyond the three realms, because the three realms are false and deceptive. The gates for entering emptiness are very many; what this passage takes is the one gate of ‘non-abiding’; only when this is clearly distinguished will one not stir the accounts of entering emptiness in the various sūtras and treatises together into a single mass.

35. When consciousness does not arise, form does not arise. The treatise-author explains ‘shows because it does not see’: prajñā shows the world because it does not see form and the other dharmas, since form and the other dharmas are without support, without bonds, false and deceptive, and so are not seen; the causes and conditions of not seeing that the Buddha himself speaks of are just the non-arising of consciousness that takes form as its object, and so on up to the non-arising of consciousness that takes the omniscience of all kinds as its object. He at once raises an objection himself: consciousness can be said not to arise, but how can form be said not to arise? There are two answers: first, what vexes and ruins is form, and it is discriminated and known only by way of consciousness; without consciousness there is no mark of vexation and ruin. Second, all dharmas produce their marks from the coming together of causes and conditions and have no self-nature—as when body, consciousness, contact, and the other conditions come together, one then knows the mark of hardness of earth; the mark of hardness is not apart from body and consciousness. Therefore all dharmas arise from coming together and have no self-nature. This passage is a rare piece of positive argument within the chapter, and can be used to explain why 「不見」 tr. "not seeing" does not wipe out the dharma of form.

36. A gloss on showing the world as empty, and the Buddha not speaking out of love of dharmas. Three layers. First, it glosses the sūtra words 「般若波羅蜜示世間空」 tr. "prajñāpāramitā shows the world as empty": the world refers to the five aggregates and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds; when the bodhisattva practises prajñā, he contemplates these dharmas, whether great or small, whether inner or outer, and none is not empty—this is called showing the world as empty. Second, it explains why 「佛示世間空」 tr. "the Buddha shows the world as empty" must be said separately: someone might doubt that the Buddha speaks thus because he loves and clings to dharmas, and that this is not the permanent, real mark of dharmas; so the Buddha says, I do not speak out of love of dharmas; I know the mark of dharmas, reckoning, considering, and discriminating from root to branch, and there is no dharma that goes beyond emptiness; and I do not speak merely on the strength of reading and reciting or of hearing from others, but speak having perceived, known, considered, and discriminated in my own mind. Third, a note on pattern: this passage speaks of showing the world as empty; above, leaving the sixty-two views and the rest was spoken of at length, while here only the five aggregates and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds are mentioned—the difference is one of fullness and brevity, not a contradiction between earlier and later.

37. The inconceivable: even ultimate emptiness is unfindable. The treatise-author explains the second of the nine gates, first pointing out the source of the sickness: people in the assembly at that time took prajñā to be ultimate emptiness, gave rise to thoughts in their minds and grasped and clung to it, so the Buddha spoke of the inconceivable. What is called inconceivable is that even ultimate emptiness is unfindable. He further glosses the two names 「離」 tr. "separate" and 「寂滅」 tr. "quiescent": ultimate emptiness is sometimes called separate and sometimes quiescent; separate is dispersing—dharmas, after a long time, leave nothing remaining, and moreover are of themselves separate from their nature; once ultimate emptiness is known, there are no mental-factor dharmas and no speech, and so it is called quiescent. He passes over the rest with one sentence: ultimate emptiness and the rest are as said before. What is most noteworthy in this passage is that ‘grasping and clinging to ultimate emptiness’ turns out to be a kind of sickness—emptiness too cannot be made something attained.

38. Solitary emptiness. The sūtra lists it without explaining it; here the treatise-author specially sets up a question and answer. Question: what is solitary emptiness? Answer: the eighteen emptinesses all depend on causes and conditions and on their counterparts, as inner emptiness is called inner emptiness because of inner dharmas, and if there were no inner dharmas there would be no inner emptiness—so with all eighteen emptinesses; this solitary emptiness has no cause and no counterpart, and so it is called solitary emptiness. He adds a further explanation: solitary emptiness is like space, suchness, the nature of dharmas, the limit of reality, nirvāṇa. The essential point lies in the four Chinese characters 「無因無待」 tr. "no cause and no counterpart"—the emptinesses listed before are all set up against the dharmas they empty, whereas solitary emptiness is set up against no dharma at all; this is why it is listed together with suchness, the nature of dharmas, the limit of reality, and nirvāṇa.

39. The mark neither of this life nor of later lives: the middle way that leaves annihilation and permanence. The treatise-author explains the last sentence. There are outside paths that speak only of this life and not of later lives—this is wrong view, falling into annihilation; there are those who say there is this life and later lives and claim that the soul of this life enters later lives—this too is wrong view, falling into the view of permanence. Prajñā leaves these two extremes and speaks the middle way: though empty, it is not attached to emptiness, and so it still speaks of sin and merit for beings; though it speaks of sin and merit, it does not give rise to the view of permanence, and it is unobstructed with regard to emptiness. At the end he cites the causes and conditions the Buddha himself speaks of: here, because of ultimate emptiness, how could there be a view of this life and later lives, whether of annihilation or of permanence? Emptiness and sin and merit go together without contradiction—this is exactly the measure this passage sets up; it is also the key passage for keeping the earlier 「世間空」 tr. "world as empty" from being read as a denial of cause and effect.

40. The question of the five matters and the Buddha’s approval. The third passage begins with Subhūti addressing the Buddha: prajñā arises for the sake of the great matter, arises for the sake of the inconceivable matter, arises for the sake of the unweighable matter, arises for the sake of the matter without measure, arises for the sake of the matter equal to the unequalled. The Buddha answers ‘Just so! Just so!’, and restates the five matters sentence by sentence. The character 「起」 tr. "arise" here must be read exactly: it is not that prajñā suddenly arises, but that prajñā comes forth in the world for the sake of these five matters—what is asked about is what prajñā appears in the world to do.

41. The great matter. The Buddha asks and answers himself: how does prajñā arise for the sake of the great matter? The great matter of the buddhas is to save all beings and not to abandon any being. The sūtra says it very briefly, but it fixes the direction of the whole passage: what is called great lies not in a lofty realm, but in the multitude of those one carries on one’s shoulders, in not abandoning.

42. The inconceivable matter. The Buddha answers: the inconceivable matter is the dharmas of the buddhas, the dharmas of the Tathāgata, the dharmas of the one who is so of himself, the dharmas of the omniscient one. These four names are the pivot of this passage; the three matters that follow all take these four dharmas as what is weighed, measured, and equalled, and the treatise-author will later gloss them name by name. Here, first remember the four names; there is no need to seek their explanation.

43. The unweighable, the matter without measure, that which is equal to the unequalled. The three matters share one sentence pattern. The unweighable: among all beings there is none who can conceive and weigh the dharmas of the buddhas and so on up to the dharmas of the omniscient one; without measure: among all beings there is none who can measure these four dharmas; that which is equal to the unequalled: among all beings there is none who can equal the Buddha, how much less surpass him. The difference among the three lies only in the verb—weighing is balancing, measuring is gauging, equalling is comparing. What is barred are three different ways of reaching up to take hold.

44. Only the four dharmas? Extended to form and all dharmas. Subhūti asks again: is it only these four dharmas for the sake of which, as inconceivable matters and so on up to matters equal to the unequalled, it arises? The Buddha answers ‘Just so! Just so!’, first affirming the four dharmas, then at once extending it: form too is inconceivable, unweighable, without measure, equal to the unequalled; so too feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness; and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds, the nature of dharmas, and the mark of dharmas; within these, mind and mental-factor dharmas are unfindable. And a step further: form is inconceivable, and this 「不可思議」 tr. "inconceivable" too is unfindable; and so on up to: form is equal to the unequalled, and this 「無等等」 tr. "equal to the unequalled" too is unfindable. Here is the turning point of the whole passage—inconceivability is not an honorific belonging only to the dharmas of the buddhas; it is the actual condition of all dharmas; and even this designation itself is unfindable.

45. A threefold pursuit: the measure is unfindable. Twice Subhūti presses with 「何因緣」 tr. "by what cause and condition," twice the Buddha answers, and finally he asks back. Question one: by what cause and condition is form inconceivable and so on up to equal to the unequalled, and this too unfindable? Answer: because the measure of form is unfindable, and so on up to because the measure of the omniscience of all kinds is unfindable. Question two: by what cause and condition is the measure of form unfindable, and so on up to the measure of the omniscience of all kinds unfindable? Answer: because form is inconceivable, and so on up to because form is equal to the unequalled, the measure is unfindable. Answer one uses 「量不可得」 tr. "the measure is unfindable" to explain 「不可得」 tr. "unfindable"; answer two in turn uses 「不可思議乃至無等等」 tr. "inconceivable and so on up to equal to the unequalled" to explain 「量不可得」 tr. "the measure is unfindable"—it looks circular, but what it says is that these two faces are really one matter, and no further outside cause can be sought. The Buddha then asks back: within the inconceivable and so on up to that which is equal to the unequalled, can form, feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness, and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds, be found or not? Subhūti answers: they are unfindable. At this point the chain of questions unties itself.

46. The conclusion that the dharmas of the buddhas are inconceivable. The Buddha closes with a long passage in four layers. First, all dharmas are inconceivable and so on up to equal to the unequalled, and so too are the dharmas of the buddhas. Second, he gives the reason: inconceivable because they pass beyond the mark of conceiving; unweighable because they pass beyond weighing; without measure because they pass beyond measure; equal to the unequalled because they pass beyond equalling—the character 「過」 tr. "pass beyond" is the key: it is not absence; it is surpassing. Third, name and meaning match: the name inconceivable, its meaning too is inconceivable, and so on up to the name equal to the unequalled, its meaning too is equal to the unequalled. Fourth, he takes space as the simile: inconceivable as space is inconceivable, and so on up to equal to the unequalled as space is equal to the unequalled; the dharmas of the buddhas are thus without measure, and none among all the world’s gods, humans, and asuras can conceive or reckon them. The four layers go from dharma to principle, from principle to name, from name to simile, layer upon layer to be followed.

47. The assembly who obtained the path when this chapter was spoken. The sūtra passage concludes with the assembly obtaining benefit: when this chapter on the dharmas of the buddhas being inconceivable, unweighable, without measure, and equal to the unequalled was spoken, five hundred bhikṣus, because they received no dharma, exhausted their outflows, their minds attained liberation, and they became arhats; twenty bhikṣuṇīs likewise, because they received no dharma, exhausted their outflows and became arhats; sixty thousand upāsakas and thirty thousand upāsikās, amid dharmas, were far from dust and free of defilement, and the Dharma-eye arose; twenty bodhisattva-mahāsattvas obtained the acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas and will receive the prediction in the Auspicious Kalpa. The four assemblies obtained benefit, but the numbers differ widely; this set of numbers is itself a question, which the treatise-author will answer specifically at the end of the chapter.

48. Why Subhūti could raise this question; a gloss on the great matter. The treatise-author opens his explanation of the third passage: Subhūti deeply understood the mark of prajñā; among dharmas he was without clinging and without obstruction, and his mind gave rise to joy, so he said to the Buddha that prajñā arises for the sake of the great matter and the rest. First he glosses 「大事」 tr. "the great matter": because it breaks the great suffering and vexation of all beings and can give the Buddha’s unsurpassed great Dharma, it is called the great matter. One breaking and one giving answer exactly to the sūtra text 「救一切眾生，不捨一切眾生」 tr. "to save all beings and not to abandon any being"—breaking suffering is saving; giving the Dharma is not abandoning.

49. The inconceivable has already been answered. The treatise-author passes it over with a single sentence: the inconceivable has already been answered. This is the pattern of this treatise—what an earlier chapter has detailed is not explained again. If readers find it too brief here, they should look back at what was answered in this chapter’s Treatise ②, rather than insisting on it here.

50. Four explanations of the unweighable. The treatise-author glosses 「稱」 tr. "weighing" as wisdom, and then gives four explanations: first, the fixed, real mark of prajñā is very deep and extremely heavy, while wisdom is light and thin, so it cannot weigh it. Second, prajñā is much and wisdom is little, so it cannot weigh it. Third, the places where prajñā brings benefit are broad—before it is complete it can give the fruits of retribution of the world, and once complete it gives the fruit of the path. Fourth, only knowing completely to the very end is called weighing, and there is no one who can weigh and know prajñā: whether permanent or impermanent, whether real or false, whether existent or non-existent—none of these can be fixed. Of the four explanations, the first two use the simile of the scale, the third speaks of its breadth, and the fourth returns to what cannot be fixed and held—from simile into principle.

51. Four explanations of without measure. First, someone says that 「稱」 tr. "weighing" is simply 「量」 tr. "measuring", two names with one meaning. Second, someone says that grasping at marks is called measuring, and prajñā cannot be grasped as a mark, so it is without measure. Third, the bodhisattva practises prajñā with the four immeasurable minds, so it is called without measure. Fourth, measure refers to wisdom: the wisdom of ordinary people, of the two vehicles, and of bodhisattvas cannot measure the limits of prajñā, so it is called without measure. The four explanations are laid side by side without forcing a judgement as to which is right—in glossing names and meanings of this kind, the treatise-author always lists without deciding; readers take what is usable and use it.

52. Four explanations of that which is equal to the unequalled, and the conclusion. First, 「無等」 tr. "the unequalled" refers to nirvāṇa: among all conditioned dharmas there is none equal to nirvāṇa; nirvāṇa has three portions—the nirvāṇa of the śrāvakas, the nirvāṇa of the pratyekabuddhas, the nirvāṇa of the Buddha; prajñā can give the nirvāṇa of the Great Vehicle, so it is called equal to the unequalled. Second, among all beings there is none equal to the Buddha, so the Buddha is called the unequalled; prajñā benefits beings and makes them resemble the Buddha, so it is called equal to the unequalled. Third, the dharmas of the buddhas are first and most subtle and wondrous; none can equal them, none can reach them, none can be their match; prajñā can cause beings to obtain this mind, so it is called equal to the unequalled. Fourth, 「無等」 tr. "the unequalled" refers to the real mark of all dharmas, which none of the contemplations and practices can reach, without idle discourse, and which nothing can break or ruin, so it is called the unequalled; the bodhisattva who obtains this unequalled can give rise to the mind of kindness and compassion among beings, so it is called equal to the unequalled. It concludes with one sentence: this is called the meaning of equal to the unequalled. Among the four explanations, nirvāṇa and the real mark are 「無等」 tr. "the unequalled," and the Buddha and the bodhisattva are those who 「等」 tr. "equal" it—the reason the three Chinese characters 「無等等」 tr. "equal to the unequalled" are hard to read is precisely that they mean ‘equal to the unequalled’; all four explanations follow this pattern.

53. Why the Buddha approved what he said; the Buddha himself speaks of the five matters. The treatise-author adds a stroke: Subhūti is a śrāvaka and does not have omniscience, yet he could speak of this inconceivable prajñā and the rest, so the Buddha approved what he said. Then he marks what follows: the Buddha himself speaks of the five matters. This sentence is a turning marker in the division of the text, signalling that what is explained below is the Buddha’s own disclosure of the five matters, no longer Subhūti’s words.

54. The broad explanation of the great matter, and the five things the bodhisattva accepts. The treatise-author broadly explains the great matter: beings are immeasurable and boundless, more than the atoms in world-systems equal to the sands of the Ganges in the ten directions, and the buddhas, with the ten powers and other dharmas, wish to save them all—this is called the great matter. Further, there are bodhisattvas who long ago obtained the acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas and, because they do not abandon beings, do not enter nirvāṇa without remainder. Again, when this bodhisattva attains the path of the Buddha, for the sake of beings he accepts five things—first, he accepts every toil and hardship; second, he gives up the pleasure of quiet concentration; third, he shares his undertakings with evil people; fourth, he deals with people face to face; fifth, he enters great assemblies. The Buddha has deeply obtained the pleasure of freedom from desire, yet for the sake of beings he gladly accepts these five things and every kind of weariness and hardship, as if receiving merit—this is the great matter. What must be seen is the tone of the last sentence: 「如受功德」 tr. "as if receiving merit"—not endurance, but taking it as something gained.

55. The four kinds of dharmas glossed name by name. The inconceivable is the dharmas of the buddhas, the dharmas of the Tathāgata, the dharmas of the one who is so of himself, the dharmas of the omniscient one. The dharmas of the buddhas: Buddha means awakened; amid all the sleep of ignorance he is the first to awaken, so he is called awakened. The Tathāgata: as the buddhas of the past practised the six perfections, obtained the mark of suchness of dharmas, and came to the path of the Buddha, so the present Buddha too has come by this path, coming as the buddhas came, and so he is called the Tathāgata. The dharmas of the one who is so of himself: śrāvakas too have awakening and knowing, but it comes from hearing from others—that is the dharma of disciples; the Buddha, however, is the one who is so of himself, not hearing from others. The dharmas of the omniscient one: the pratyekabuddha too obtains of himself, not hearing from others, but he lacks omniscience; therefore it is said that the Buddha is what is obtained by the omniscient one. The four names distinguish one another layer by layer: awakened is distinguished from not awakened; the Tathāgata from not having come by the mark of suchness; the one who is so of himself from hearing from others; omniscience from being so of oneself yet lacking omniscience. A sentence at the end gathers it all: these four kinds of dharmas no one can conceive, weigh, or measure, so they are called inconceivable, unweighable, immeasurable; there is further no dharma resembling these dharmas, so they are called equal to the unequalled. The four dharmas and the four names here lock together.

56. Fearing that those new to the training will cling to the four dharmas. The treatise-author points out the intent of Subhūti’s second question: fearing that bodhisattvas new to the training would cling to these four dharmas, he said to the Buddha, are only these four dharmas inconceivable, with none equal to them? The Buddha answers that form and the other dharmas too are inconceivable, unweighable, without measure, equal to the unequalled, and himself states the cause and condition: because form and all dharmas are unfindable. The value of this question lies in protection—the four dharmas are in origin honorific names; once bodhisattvas new to the training cling to them as a height belonging to them alone, they become an obstacle instead; the Buddha answers with the equality and unfindability of all dharmas, and the honorific names no longer become something clung to.

57. The concluding sentence, the name, and the simile of space. Three small sections. First, in the sūtra text, 「如是，須菩提！諸佛法不可思議」 tr. "Just so, Subhūti! The dharmas of the buddhas are inconceivable" refers to the matter above, and 「是名不可思議」 tr. "this is called inconceivable" is the concluding sentence; the treatise-author has already explained it at length before, and here the Buddha speaks briefly—the inconceivable passes beyond the mark of conceiving, passes beyond the mark of equalling. Second, in terms of meaning and intent, the dharma of nirvāṇa is inconceivable; in terms of the name, because of worldly truth it can be conceived. Third, 「如虛空不可思議」 tr. "inconceivable as space is inconceivable": as said in an earlier chapter, the mark of space is inconceivable, and so it is said to be inconceivable; and so on up to equal to the unequalled like space—because space has nothing it can be compared to, it is called equal to the unequalled. The second small section especially deserves to be remembered: the same inconceivable, in terms of meaning, cuts off conceiving; in terms of name, can be spoken—otherwise this very chapter could not be spoken at all.

58. The mark of prajñā is the mark of the dharmas of the buddhas; of the six destinies only three are mentioned. The treatise-author gathers it up: the mark of prajñāpāramitā is precisely the mark of the dharmas of the buddhas; inconceivable, without measure, unweighable, equal to the unequalled are precisely the marks of the dharmas of the buddhas. He further explains why the sūtra text mentions only gods, humans, and asuras: of the six destinies only three are mentioned, because even the beings of the three good destinies cannot weigh and measure them, how much less those of the three evil destinies. This is a way of speaking that names the superior to include the inferior; it is not an omission of the three evil destinies.

59. Why those who obtained the path differed in number. The treatise-author sets himself a question: when this chapter was spoken, why were the bhikṣuṇīs and bodhisattvas who obtained the path few? The answer comes in several layers. First, here the dharmas of the buddhas are much praised—inconceivable, unweighable, without measure, equal to the unequalled—and the hearers mostly increased their root of faith, so among the white-robed those who obtained the path were many. Second, women, though their faith is much, have little wisdom, so those who obtained the path were also few; the white-robed crave and cling to worldly affairs, their wisdom is shallow and thin, their faculties dull, and they cannot exhaust their outflows. Third, the bhikṣus’ faculties of faith and wisdom are balanced, and they seek the path single-mindedly, so those who exhausted their outflows were many; the bhikṣuṇīs have little wisdom, so only twenty exhausted their outflows—though many obtained the first path, and in number exceeded the white-robed, because they did not exhaust their outflows they were no different from the white-robed, and so they are not mentioned here. See clearly the treatise-author’s criterion: the teaching of praise increases faith, so those strong in faith obtain conspicuous benefit; exhausting the outflows requires wisdom, so those superior in wisdom obtain a deep fruit. The difference in the numbers of the four assemblies is a difference of faculties and capacities, not a partiality in the Dharma.

60. Why few obtained the acceptance of non-arising. The treatise-author goes on to answer for the bodhisattvas: the dharma of entering the acceptance of non-arising is very deep and hard to obtain, so they were few; and further, those who have planted causes and conditions for this dharma are few. One difficulty lies in the dharma itself, one in past causes—why the number of bodhisattvas was twenty can be understood from this.

61. Two accounts of the prediction in the Auspicious Kalpa, kept side by side. The last words of the chapter, 「賢劫中當受記」 tr. "will receive the prediction in the Auspicious Kalpa," the treatise-author meets with two accounts: someone says that of the thousand buddhas of the Auspicious Kalpa, all except four buddhas will give them the prediction; someone says that Śākyamuni Buddha gives them the prediction, and in the Auspicious Kalpa they will become buddhas in other worlds. The two accounts are set side by side without judgement; this is the consistent pattern of this treatise—where the ancients held different views, they are recorded, not forcibly decided. Here the whole chapter ends.

Do Not Misread

Do not read ‘to speak of emptiness is already to have a mark’ as the Buddha contradicting himself. The centre of this chapter lies precisely in dissolving this doubt, and the method used is not argument but layering: the Buddha himself says these marks are spoken for beings, in accord with worldly dharmas, not the highest meaning; the treatise-author then fixes the criterion firmly—if it were from the standpoint of the highest meaning, this objection should be raised; since it is spoken from the standpoint of worldly truth, this objection should not be raised. Wherever one feels ‘since ultimate emptiness is spoken of, why speak of a whole heap of marks?’, one must go back to this measure to read it; one may not use the highest meaning to object to what is said in worldly truth, nor use what is said in worldly truth to prove that the highest meaning has marks.

Do not read 「相不能破相」 tr. "a mark cannot break a mark" as meaning that dharmas cannot be refuted. The treatise-author’s three explanations say it plainly: first, because prajñā is ultimately empty and markless; second, what is called breaking is in fact only dissolving, as an axe splits firewood, dissolving it piece by piece, and yet in the end nothing is lost; third, dharmas have no fixed mark in the first place, as a tree is the coming together of root, trunk, branches, and leaves, and having no fixed mark, there is nothing to break. What is barred is the operation of ‘using one mark to break another mark’; it is not saying that one need not contemplate and break the afflictions. Likewise, 「相不能知相」 tr. "a mark cannot know a mark" bars grasping the real mark with conditioned, false knowing; it is not saying that the practitioner need not cultivate wisdom—the treatise-author specifically adds a sentence: here it is spoken with regard to the real mark, not of the false knowing of ordinary people.

Do not read 「一切法無知者、無見者」 tr. "in all dharmas there is no knower and no seer" as annihilationism or agnosticism. The Buddha’s two causes and conditions are: all dharmas are empty, false and deceptive, and not solid; all dharmas are without support and without anything they are bound to. The treatise-author further adds an essential sentence—not only is there no knowing and no seeing; even that no-knower and that no-seer are unfindable. If one reads it as ‘there is a state of knowing nothing’, one has again set up something attained. And immediately after, the Buddha says that prajñā can give birth to the buddhas and can show the mark of the world: there being no knower and no seer, and being able to give birth and to show, hold at the same time without hindering each other.

Do not read 「不見色故示世間相」 tr. "it shows the mark of the world because it does not see form" as shutting the eyes and not contemplating. The Buddha himself gave the definition: consciousness not arising taking form as its object is called showing because the mark of form is not seen. It is consciousness not arising in taking that as its object; it is not seeing yet refusing to look, much less a denial that the dharma of form exists. The treatise-author then explains positively why form too does not arise—the mark of vexation and ruin is form, discriminated and known by way of consciousness, and without consciousness there is no mark of vexation and ruin; he also says that dharmas produce their marks from the coming together of causes and conditions and have no self-nature, as only when body, consciousness, and contact come together is the mark of hardness of earth known. These two passages are positive reasoning and must not be skipped.

Do not read the nine gates from 「示世間空」 tr. "showing the world as empty" up to 「獨空」 tr. "solitary emptiness" as nine different emptinesses. The treatise-author has already said beforehand that though emptiness is one, because people’s faculties are keen or dull and their entry is deep or shallow, emptiness is taught with distinctions. The nine gates are nine ways of speaking of the same emptiness, curing nine different kinds of grasping; in particular, of the gate of 「不可思議」 tr. "the inconceivable" the treatise-author states plainly that it was because people in the assembly took prajñā to be ultimate emptiness and grasped and clung to it in thought that the inconceivable was spoken of—even ultimate emptiness is unfindable. To arrange the nine gates into a ladder of high and low and seek which is deeper and which shallower is to read in the wrong direction.

Do not read 「不生今世、後世相」 tr. "it does not give rise to the mark of this life or of later lives" as a denial of cause and effect. Here the treatise-author specifically sets up the two extremes of annihilation and permanence: speaking only of this life and not of later lives is the view of annihilation; saying that the soul of this life enters later lives is the view of permanence; prajñā leaves these two extremes and speaks the middle way—because, though empty, it is not attached to emptiness, it still speaks of sin and merit for beings; though it speaks of sin and merit, it does not give rise to the view of permanence, and it is unobstructed with regard to emptiness. This passage is the most closely guarded place in the whole chapter; precisely because the preceding text has spoken of the world as empty to the utmost, here sin and merit must be connected back.

Do not regard 「佛知作人」 tr. "the Buddha knows what has been done for him" and 「佛不知作人」 tr. "the Buddha does not know a doer" as the sūtras contradicting themselves. The treatise-author has already reconciled them: knowing what has been done for him is knowing that others have done him a kindness, spoken from the side of repaying kindness; not knowing a doer is because he knows all dharmas as having the mark of non-action and a maker as non-existent, spoken from the side of the highest meaning. The last sentence cuts clean—to say that he knows what has been done for him, or that he does not know a doer, is without fault. In the same way, the Buddha’s honouring and making offerings to prajñā may not be read as craving: the Buddha himself says, I have no craving mind; I simply know by discrimination the good and ugly of dharmas and how much power and use they have. Praising by discriminating merits and clinging by grasping at marks are two different matters.

Do not split 「無等等」 tr. "equal to the unequalled" into 「無等」 tr. "unequalled" plus 「等」 tr. "equal" and so lose its meaning. The treatise-author’s four explanations all follow the same pattern: first they point out who 「無等」 tr. "the unequalled" is—whether nirvāṇa, or the Buddha, or the dharmas of the buddhas, or the real mark of all dharmas; then they point out who it is that 「等」 tr. "equals" it—prajñā can give the nirvāṇa of the Great Vehicle, can make beings resemble the Buddha, can cause beings to obtain this mind, can cause the bodhisattva to give rise to the mind of kindness and compassion among beings. Though the four explanations differ, the pattern does not. If one takes it only as an adjective expressing the highest, these four explanations all fall empty.

Do not read 「比丘尼、菩薩得道者少」 tr. "the bhikṣuṇīs and bodhisattvas who obtained the path were few" at the end of the chapter as disparagement. The treatise-author’s answer speaks of faculties and past causes: the teaching of praise increases the root of faith, so among the white-robed those who benefited were many; exhausting the outflows requires the power of wisdom, so those superior in wisdom obtain a deep fruit; the acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas is very deep and hard to obtain, and those who have planted causes and conditions for this dharma are few. The sūtra records the numbers as they were, and the treatise-author explains their reasons as they were, neither concealing nor adding. What one should look at in reading is the cause and effect it sets up—faith and wisdom each have where they reach.

Bearing on Practice

The first benefit is the correction of a way of asking. The gods ask what the mark of deep prajñā is; the Buddha first answers rightly with the mark of emptiness and the other marks, and then asks back: if someone asks what the mark of space is, does that count as asking rightly? The gods answer themselves that it is not asking rightly, and so their own earlier question can no longer stand. What practitioners most often commit in daily life is exactly this: using the form ‘what is this?’ to ask about dharmas that have no fixed mark—what is emptiness? what is the real mark? what is the limit of reality? What this chapter teaches is not that asking is forbidden, but that after asking one should look back at one’s way of asking: does this question of mine already presuppose that there is a fixed mark to be grasped? This looking back often gives more strength than the answer.

The second benefit is the measure of speaking and not speaking. The Buddha spoke of the ten marks, the mark of emptiness and the rest, and at once said himself that this is speaking in worldly truth, not the highest meaning; the treatise-author adds that though emptiness is spoken of, marks are not grasped with a clinging mind, and it is not shown that a dharma is right or wrong. Practitioners reading the sūtras, listening to the Dharma, and even expounding the Dharma to others themselves can examine themselves by this: is what I am saying now placed in worldly truth and known by me to be worldly truth, or am I taking it as the highest meaning and holding on to it without letting go? The same sentence is, in the former case, skilful means; in the latter, it becomes the obstruction of the knowable.

The third benefit is the cure for the illusion ‘I have broken it’. The second explanation of why a mark cannot break a mark puts it excellently: what is called breaking is in fact only dissolving, as an axe splits firewood, dissolving it piece by piece, and yet in the end nothing is lost. In practice there is often a moment of sudden openness, and one then thinks some affliction has been broken completely; this simile can serve as a re-examination—mostly that is only one layer of a coming-together of marks taken apart; it is not certain that any dharma has truly been broken away. Knowing this, one is not proud, nor does one doubt oneself when afflictions arise again.

The fourth benefit is guarding against the sickness of ‘grasping and clinging to ultimate emptiness’. The treatise-author says plainly that because people in the assembly took prajñā to be ultimate emptiness and grasped and clung to it in thought, the Buddha then spoke of the inconceivable—even ultimate emptiness is unfindable. Those who understand a little of the meaning of emptiness most easily grip 「空」 tr. "emptiness" into a new thing attained, and take 「無所有」 tr. "without anything existent" as a place where one can settle and abide. This can serve as a daily check: is my present contemplation of emptiness leaving clinging, or holding emptiness as a thing? And it may be read together with the sentence ‘the mark of the signless from without anything existent onward—being without the marks of all dharmas’.

The fifth benefit is the teaching by example of knowing kindness. The Buddha is the honoured one of the three realms, yet he still abides relying on prajñā, reveres it, makes offerings to it, honours and praises it, and says of himself that he is first in knowing kindness and repaying kindness; the treatise-author further names wrong view, which does not recognise a debt of kindness, as the worst of all unwholesome dharmas. Toward the Dharma, toward one’s teacher, toward those who have instructed one, practitioners can bring this straight down to the ground—failing to recognise a debt of kindness is often not coldness of heart, but that wrong view, 「我自然應爾」 tr. "it is naturally owed to me," being in charge. The simile the treatise-author gives is also apt: like a person who walks a safe road, escapes every trouble and danger, and constantly keeps this road in mind to show it to others; receiving benefit without forgetting where it came from, and passing it on to others—this is repaying kindness.

The sixth benefit is sin and merit going together with emptiness. The preceding text has spoken of the world as empty to the utmost, and yet at the end it sets up the middle way: though empty, it is not attached to emptiness, and so it speaks of sin and merit; though it speaks of sin and merit, it does not give rise to the view of permanence, and it is unobstructed with regard to emptiness. When practitioners gain strength in the contemplation of emptiness, they most easily neglect keeping the precepts and cause and effect; when they are strict in keeping the precepts, they easily fall into the view of permanence and cannot be empty. This is the rope between the two sides: with emptiness leave permanence, with sin and merit leave annihilation; only holding both with two hands at the same time is the middle way.

The seventh benefit is the distinguishing of the four kinds of dharmas and the guarding of those new to the training. The four names—the dharmas of the buddhas, the dharmas of the Tathāgata, the dharmas of the one who is so of himself, the dharmas of the omniscient one—distinguish one another layer by layer: awakened is distinguished from not awakened, coming by the mark of suchness from not coming by suchness, being so of oneself from hearing from others, omniscience from being so of oneself yet lacking omniscience; and Subhūti at once worried that those new to the training would cling to these four dharmas, and the Buddha answered that form and all dharmas too are inconceivable. Whenever on the path of practice one meets honoured and superior names of dharmas, this question and answer can serve as a reminder: recognising their superiority spurs one on; grasping their superiority becomes a new bondage.

The eighth benefit is reflecting on oneself through the numbers of the four assemblies who obtained the path. At one and the same Dharma assembly, five hundred bhikṣus exhausted their outflows, twenty bhikṣuṇīs exhausted their outflows, in sixty thousand upāsakas and thirty thousand upāsikās the Dharma-eye arose, and twenty bodhisattvas obtained the acceptance of non-arising. The treatise-author’s explanation is: praise increases faith, so those strong in faith obtain conspicuous benefit; exhausting the outflows requires wisdom, so those superior in wisdom obtain a deep fruit; the acceptance of non-arising is very deep, and those who have planted causes and conditions for it are few. On this basis practitioners can measure whether what they lack today is faith or wisdom: lacking faith, they should draw closer to the teaching of praise; lacking wisdom, they should make more use of contemplative practice—there is no need to envy others’ fruits, but only to ask which root one lacks oneself.

Further Resonances

The backbone of this chapter is three sūtra sections alternating with three treatise sections. Sūtra ① begins with the gods scattering flowers and incense from afar and asking about the mark of deep prajñā; the Buddha answers with the ten marks, the mark of emptiness and the rest, says himself that they are spoken from the standpoint of worldly truth and are not the highest meaning, pushes on to nothing in all the world being able to break or ruin them, to a mark being unable to break a mark, to know a mark, or to know the markless, and to the marks not being made by the five aggregates, the six perfections, the emptinesses, or the limbs of the path; sets up the question of the mark of space, establishes that whether there is a Buddha or no Buddha the mark and the nature abide always, and at the end, setting out the marks one against another, comes home to the Buddha’s obtaining all dharmas as markless. Treatise ① first answers the three causes of asking again, glosses the three gates of liberation as the mark of first entering, held in common by the three vehicles, distinguishes the deep marks from the marks of first entering and the two kinds of signless, outer and inner, explains that the Buddha knew their doubt beforehand and spoke of it himself, gives the two similes of water and fire and of the blind man, sets up the three explanations of why a mark cannot break a mark, the discussion of why a mark does not know a mark, the two similes of the knife not breaking space and of nothing cut without a knife, and the three layers of the mark and the marked depending on each other and not being fixed; at the end it explains the gods’ praise and the Buddha’s seal, glosses 「得」 tr. "obtain" as knowing, and gathers up in these marks of dharmas now being renamed prajñā. Sūtra ② turns to tell Subhūti, establishes that prajñā is the mother of the buddhas and can show the mark of the world, speaks of the Buddha knowing those who have been kind to him and of all dharmas having the mark of non-action, answers the objection of no knower and no seer, defines 「不見」 tr. "not seeing" as consciousness not arising in taking an object, opens one by one the gates of the world as empty, the Buddha’s world as empty, the inconceivable, the separate, the quiescent, ultimate emptiness, emptiness of nature, emptiness of non-existent dharmas, emptiness of non-existent and existent dharmas, and solitary emptiness, and at the end establishes not giving rise to the mark of this life or of later lives. Treatise ②, taking up relying, glosses knowing and repaying kindness, explains why prajñā is held precious and why it seems like craving, reconciles knowing what has been done for him and not knowing a doer, explains the objection from ultimate emptiness and the emptiness of being without support and without bonds, answers how form does not arise when consciousness does not arise, glosses showing the world as empty and the Buddha not speaking out of love of dharmas, explains that the inconceivable is that even ultimate emptiness is unfindable, specially sets up a question and answer glossing solitary emptiness as having no cause and no counterpart, and at the end establishes the middle way that leaves annihilation and permanence. Sūtra ③ begins with Subhūti’s question raising the five matters; the Buddha explains one by one the great matter, the inconceivable matter, the unweighable matter, the matter without measure, and the matter equal to the unequalled, extends it to form and all dharmas being likewise, through a threefold pursuit comes home to the measure being unfindable, concludes with passing beyond the mark of conceiving and so on up to passing beyond the mark of equalling, takes space as the simile, and at the end records the numbers of the four assemblies who obtained the path. Treatise ③ glosses the great matter, gives four explanations of the unweighable, four explanations of without measure, and four explanations of that which is equal to the unequalled, explains why the Buddha approved what Subhūti said, broadly explains the five things the bodhisattva accepts for the sake of beings, glosses the four kinds of dharmas name by name, answers the question arising from the fear that those new to the training will cling to the four dharmas, distinguishes the two aspects of meaning and intent and of the name, at the end answers why so few bhikṣuṇīs and bodhisattvas obtained the path, and sets side by side the two accounts of the prediction in the Auspicious Kalpa without judgement.

In the vein of meaning linking this chapter with the chapters before and after it, three lines can be seen. First, the axis of Sūtra ②, 「般若波羅蜜是諸佛母」 tr. "prajñāpāramitā is the mother of the buddhas" and 「能示世間相」 tr. "can show the mark of the world," is exactly the continuation of the meaning established in the preceding chapter, "The Mother of the Buddhas": the preceding chapter made clear at length that the Buddha, relying on prajñā, knows the mark of the world, while this chapter turns to ‘what mark, in the end, is the mark of the world that is shown’, answers with the nine gates from the world as empty up to solitary emptiness, and at the end comes home to not giving rise to the mark of this life or of later lives. The meaning of the mother was established in the preceding chapter; the meaning of showing is detailed only in this chapter. Second, at the opening of this chapter the treatise-author himself marks what it carries on from—above, emptiness, the signless, non-action, and so on up to non-origination and without anything existent, have been said everywhere to be the mark of prajñā; this shows that the topic of ‘the mark of prajñā’ is not newly raised in this chapter; what this chapter adds is the measure of ‘speaking of marks without its becoming having marks’, and a further layer of inquiry into the mark and the marked depending on each other and not being fixed. Third, in Treatise ③, at the section 「如虛空不可思議」 tr. "inconceivable as space is inconceivable," the treatise-author says himself that it is as said in an earlier chapter that the mark of space is inconceivable, and at the item 「不可思議」 tr. "the inconceivable" says directly that it has already been answered; in Treatise ①, having finished explaining why emptiness is taught with distinctions, he likewise says directly of 「無生無滅等論議」 tr. "the discussion of no arising and no ceasing and the rest" that it is as said before—these are all instances of this treatise abbreviating here what an earlier chapter has detailed; readers should view them together with the earlier chapters, and need not insist on completeness within this chapter.

Later ancient masters each took something from this chapter. Jizang, in his commentary, explains the chapter name himself, saying 「明般若相中有問有答，後諸問作作，名云問相品也」 tr. "In making clear the mark of prajñā there are questions and there are answers; after that the questions are made one upon another; hence it is named the Chapter of Asking about Marks"—explaining the two Chinese characters 「問相」 tr. "asking about marks" by there being questions and answers, which sets the name by the chapter’s form, and stands as inside and outside with this chapter’s sūtra text taking 「相」 tr. "mark" as what is asked about. The same commentary further sets, at the head of this chapter, a question on the boundary between chapters, asking, since the preceding chapter, "The Mother of the Buddhas", has already made clear the mark of the world, what difference there is from what this chapter makes clear; this question points exactly at the joint between the preceding chapter and this one, and can be read together with the first line of the vein of meaning above. The line of Huiying divides the whole Larger Sūtra into three parts, one of which takes this chapter directly as its end point, saying 「從魔事已下至問相品，就留難門說波若」 tr. "From the Deeds of Māra onward to the Chapter of Asking about Marks, prajñā is spoken of by way of the gate of hindrance"—according to this division, from "The Deeds of Māra" onward to this chapter is what is included in the 「留難門」 tr. "gate of hindrance". This division is set by the structural coordinates of the chapter-list of the whole sūtra, not issued from the meaning of this chapter sentence by sentence; it is recorded to preserve one account; the sūtra and treatise of this chapter themselves have no text on hindrance (the two sides of its chapter title, the differences in the fascicle division of the transmitted texts, the markup of the chapter-list in the sūtra catalogues, and the examination of later citations are detailed in the Apparatus).