大智度論 夢中入三昧品Dazhidulun — Mahāprajñāpāramitā-upadeśa · Entering Samādhi in a Dream

Entering Samādhi in a Dream: Why Entering the Three Samādhi in a Dream Is Asked About as Beneficial or Not; Why Day, Night, and Dream Being Equal and without Difference Does Not Say That Dream and Waking Are the Same; Why the Deed in a Dream Is Said to Be Unable to Gather and Come to Completion; Why Deed and construction Are Tied to There Being a Condition or No Condition; Why Grasping at Marks Is the Pivot of the Arising of Deeds; Why the Dedication in a Dream Is Turned into a Question Put to Maitreya; Why Maitreya Neither Answers nor Realises; Why the Buddha Seals It by Śāriputra's Not Seeing; Why the Vows of Purifying Buddha-Worlds Arise from Seeing the Marks of Beings' Suffering; Why the Vows, One by One, Cannot Be Compressed; Why the Last Vow Alone Needs a Brief Explanation; and Why the Mind of Exhaustion and Weariness Is Wrong Recollection

What Is Being Asked

What the first half of this chapter asks is a question that looks obscure but that in fact everyone can use: does it count when one is asleep? Śāriputra opens by asking whether, if a bodhisattva enters in a dream the three samādhi, the emptiness samādhi, the signless samādhi, and the non-action samādhi, there is any benefit to prajñāpāramitā or not. Once this question is put, three further rounds are pushed forward along its momentum: whether a deed in a dream gathers and comes to completion or not; whether the dedication made from what is done in the six perfections in a dream is real or not; whether the one who can speak this meaning has thereby already realised it. The three rounds draw steadily closer to the gate of practice—the first round asks whether the merit counts in the account, the second whether the retribution comes to completion or not, the third whether the direction of practice can be held steady or not. Subhūti's answer is utterly plain: day, night, and dream are equal and without difference. What matters is that this sentence does not say that the dream-world and the waking world are equally real; it says that prajñā does not discriminate according to day and night, and so benefit and non-benefit are not decided by day and night. The treatise-author at once lays bare Subhūti's position: to say there is benefit will not do, and to say there is no benefit will not do either; therefore he leaves these two extremes and answers by the real mark of all dharmas.

The depth of the first half lies in the section where Maitreya appears. The third difficulty is too deep, and Subhūti yields the question to Maitreya; but Maitreya takes apart the whole framework on which the question rests—shall I answer by the name, shall I answer by form, shall I answer by the emptiness of form—questioning all the way through to not seeing one who can answer, not seeing a dharma that is answered, not seeing a place of the prediction. Śāriputra presses with one sentence: speaking thus, is this obtaining the dharma and realising it or not? Maitreya answers: thus I do not realise it. To be able to say it and yet not take realisation—this is the first crux of this chapter. The close does not rest with Maitreya; it rests with the Buddha: the Buddha does not explain for Maitreya, but asks Śāriputra in return whether, when he himself obtained arhatship, he saw this dharma; Śāriputra answers that he does not see it; the Buddha at once seals it by this—not seeing and yet not doubting is precisely the mark of the bodhisattva practising prajñā.

The latter half of the chapter puts on a different face. The Buddha tells Subhūti: when the bodhisattva practises the six perfections, he sees beings in hunger and cold, breaking the precepts, in hatred and harm, in laziness, under the five hindrances, in folly and delusion; he sees the hells and the hungry ghosts, sees the great earth foul and evil, sees the four castes and the six destinies, sees short life and the absence of light; and for each one he should make a vow that in my land there be no such matter. The vow-words are ranged in parallel passage after passage, the form so regular as to be nearly repetitive. The two halves seem not to belong together, and the treatise-author's very first question at the opening of his explanation asks precisely about this seam: by what order is it that the bodhisattva is said to see beings in hunger and cold, freezing and starvation, and the like? The answer sews the two halves together—after the bodhisattva has passed beyond the śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha grounds and obtained the acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas and the prediction, he has no other matter left; he practises only purifying buddha-worlds and bringing beings to accomplishment. What the first half speaks of is the mind that does not see and yet does not doubt; what the latter half speaks of is the whole of the work carried out holding this mind. In the final passage the sūtra text speaks not of a vow but of a thought: the limit of birth and death is like space, and the limit of the nature of beings is also like space. The treatise-author gives a brief explanation for this passage alone, pointing out that the mind of exhaustion and weariness is wrong recollection, and that only right recollection is the support for travelling this long road.

Passage by Passage

1. The question whether entering the three samādhi in a dream benefits prajñā. Śāriputra opens by asking: if a bodhisattva-mahāsattva in a dream enters the three samādhi—the emptiness samādhi, the signless samādhi, and the non-action samādhi—is there any benefit to prajñāpāramitā or not? In reading this, one must first see clearly where the question lies—what is asked is not whether one can enter concentration in a dream, but whether the concentration entered in a dream counts. Ordinary readers easily read this as a strange tale about dreams, but what is in fact asked about is real dharmas and retribution: the three samādhi are real dharmas, the dream is false and deceptive; when a real dharma enters a false and deceptive realm, does it still remain a real dharma? Once this question is set up, the three rounds of difficulty that follow have somewhere to land.

2. The answer that day, night, and dream are equal and without difference. Subhūti replies with a single principle: if entering the three samādhi by day benefits prajñā, then at night in a dream it should also benefit; why? 「晝、夜夢中等無異故」 tr. "because day, night, and dream are equal and without difference." This answer is the easiest to read lopsidedly. He is not saying that the dream-world and the waking world are the same in experience—if they were the same, killing someone in a dream would be the same as killing someone when awake, and Śāriputra further on would not set up a separate question about gathering and coming to completion. What he is saying is that prajñāpāramitā does not discriminate between day and night, and so whether there is benefit or not is not decided from the side of day and night. In reading the prajñā sūtras and treatises, whenever one meets the three Chinese characters rendered here as 「等無異」 tr. "equal and without difference," first ask one question: with respect to which dharma is it said to be equal?

3. The question whether the deed performed in a dream gathers and comes to completion or not. Śāriputra turns to the second round: a deed performed in a dream—does this deed gather and come to completion or not? He himself first lays out the two sides—the Buddha says that all dharmas are like a dream, so it should not gather and come to completion; in a dream there is no dharma that gathers and comes to completion; and yet if at the time of waking one recollects, imagines, and discriminates, it should gather and come to completion. This passage is the skeleton of the whole chapter's teaching on deeds: the deed in a dream has no strength of itself; the recollection, imagining, and discrimination after waking is the real gate. The questioner is no outsider; he hands over his own difficulty together with its line of reasoning.

4. The case of killing in a dream, put as a question. Subhūti does not answer directly, but sets up a question in return: if a person in a dream kills a being and, upon waking, recalls it, grasps at the mark and discriminates—"was my killing a pleasure?"—how is this matter to be judged? This is the finest piece of teaching method in this chapter—it exchanges the abstract question of 「集成」 tr. "gathering and coming to completion" for a concrete case of killing in a dream, and presses the questioner to state the criterion himself. When a reader meets a doctrine he cannot make clear, he can learn this method: ask himself by way of the most concrete case.

5. The criterion of having a condition or no condition. Śāriputra answers at once: 「無緣業不生，無緣思不生；有緣業生，有緣思生。」 tr. "Without a condition, no deed arises; without a condition, no construction arises. With a condition, a deed arises; with a condition, a construction arises." One sentence ties whether there is a deed or not to the condition, not to dreaming or waking. This is the pivot of the whole chapter's teaching on deeds; the treatise-author's word-by-word glosses further on all unfold from here. Note: the criterion is stated by Śāriputra himself, not imposed by Subhūti, and so below Subhūti need only approve his words.

6. The mind arises among the dharmas of seeing, hearing, sensing, and knowing. Subhūti seals it and pushes one layer further: the mind arises among the dharmas of seeing, hearing, sensing, and knowing, and does not arise from dharmas not seen, heard, sensed, or known; within this, the mind has purity and has stain. In reading this, know that 「緣」 tr. "condition" is not another name for the outer realm; it is seeing, hearing, sensing, and knowing—what the mind has already come into contact with. The conditions that appear in a dream have all entered the mind before; a dream does not create new conditions, it only turns over old ones.

7. The difficulty that all deeds and all constructions are separated from their own marks. Śāriputra objects again from emptiness: the Buddha says that all deeds and all constructions are separated from their own marks; how then is it said that because there is a condition a deed arises, and without a condition it does not arise? This difficulty has force, and its force lies in the two sentences both coming from the Buddha's mouth and yet opposing each other—one is a statement of the real mark within the gate of prajñā, the other a statement of arising within the gate of cause and effect. Anyone who, reading the sūtras and treatises, sees two statements in conflict and does not dare to ask may look at Śāriputra here: he states the contradiction outright.

8. The answer that deeds arise because of grasping at marks. Subhūti resolves this contradiction by the two Chinese characters rendered here as ‘grasping at marks’: because of grasping at marks, with a condition a deed arises, and it does not arise from no condition; construction is likewise. A condition cannot give rise to a deed on its own; grasping at marks is where it arises. This answer is of the utmost importance: it sets the teaching of arising from causes and conditions on the level of ordinary people's grasping at marks, and so it does not contend with the meaning that all deeds are separated from their own marks—being separated is the mark of the dharma itself; arising is the affair of the one who grasps at marks.

9. The question whether the dedication in a dream is real or not. Śāriputra's third difficulty turns to dedication: if in a dream one gives, keeps the precepts, is patient, is vigorous, meditates, and cultivates wisdom, and dedicates these roots of goodness and merit to anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi, is this a real dedication or not? The three difficulties push forward in sequence—first asking whether there is benefit or not, next asking whether it gathers and comes to completion or not, now asking whether the dedication is real or not, each difficulty closer to the gate of practice than the last. Dedication is the steering wheel of the bodhisattva path, and so this question weighs most.

10. The question is turned over to Maitreya. Subhūti does not answer himself, but passes it to Maitreya: the bodhisattva Maitreya is now present before us; the Buddha gave him the prediction of non-retrogression, that he will become a Buddha; we should ask Maitreya. Do not read this as evasion. The treatise-author himself explains the reason further on—because these two difficulties are deep and hard to answer. It is the ordinary way in the sūtras that when one higher in station is present, a deep question is yielded; yielding the question is not having no answer; it is handing the question into the hands of the one who can answer it most securely.

11. Śāriputra in turn addresses Maitreya. Śāriputra, as he was told, addresses Maitreya and repeats Subhūti's words. The repetition is not word for word: it leaves out the sentence 「當問彌勒」 tr. "we should ask Maitreya," and the character 「授」 tr. "give" is written in the base text as 「受」 tr. "receive" (the variant reading is in the apparatus layer); what is repeated is still Subhūti's words, so that the reader sees that the question has been truly handed over—Maitreya's answer is directed at the original question, not at a new topic. When reading a long sūtra text and meeting a passage of repetition, one must not skip it; it is the evidence of the handover.

12. Maitreya answers that both the one who can and what is done are unfindable. Maitreya's answer is the deepest passage of the first half: shall I answer by the name Maitreya? or by form, feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness? or by the emptiness of form? or by the emptiness of feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness? This form cannot answer, and the emptiness of form cannot answer either; I see no dharma that can answer, see no one who can answer, see no person who is given the prediction, nor see a dharma that can be given the prediction, nor see a place of the prediction: 「是一切法皆無二無別」 tr. "all these dharmas are without duality and without difference." This is not a refusal to answer; it takes apart the entire framework on which the question rests—the one who can answer and what is answered, the one who predicts and what is predicted. If the question is set up on the one who can and what is done, the answer can only be set up on the one who can and what is done; to answer ultimately, one must first see that the one who can and what is done are from the start not two.

13. Is this obtaining the dharma and realising it or not? Śāriputra at once presses with one sentence on this: as you, kind sir, have said—speaking thus, is this obtaining the dharma and realising it or not? This question is exactly on target—having spoken as far as without duality and without difference, has one not already realised this dharma? The first doubt that arises when people hear a lofty Dharma is exactly this doubt: since you can say it, you must surely have realised it.

14. Thus I do not realise it. Maitreya answers: as is the Dharma I have spoken, just so I do not realise it. Speaking and not realising is the first crux of this chapter. It is not modest withdrawal; it is that the Dharma spoken has from the start no mark that can be realised: if there were a mark that could be realised, the without duality and without difference that is spoken would destroy itself. In reading this, one must look at 「說」 tr. "speaking" and 「證」 tr. "realising" separately—the one who speaks follows the road of words; the one who realises grasps at and clings to a real dharma.

15. Śāriputra has the thought: his wisdom is very deep. Śāriputra has this thought in his mind: Maitreya's wisdom is very deep; he has long practised dānapāramitā and so on up to prajñāpāramitā; 「用無所得故，能如是說」 tr. "because he uses nothing to be attained, he can speak thus." This is the sūtra text's own comment—the depth does not lie in skill of words, but in nothing to be attained. This one sentence can serve as the key to reading the whole chapter: wherever an answer is seen to be clean-cut and not to fall into the two extremes, its root lies in nothing to be attained.

16. The Buddha questions Śāriputra in return. The Buddha steps in at this moment, not explaining for Maitreya, but asking Śāriputra in return: what do you think? By this dharma you obtained arhatship—do you see this dharma? The Buddha's way of teaching is to hand the question back to the questioner's own realised experience—you yourself have walked this road; what did you see at the time? This is the most personal question in the whole chapter.

17. I do not see it. Śāriputra answers: I do not see it. The three Chinese characters rendered here as ‘I do not see it’, no more, and yet they are where the whole chapter's confirmation lies. The fruit he himself personally obtained was also not obtained by seeing some one dharma; this being so, the road of pressing the bodhisattva with seeing and not seeing that was taken before loosens of itself.

18. The Buddha seals it by not seeing and not doubting. The Buddha at once seals it by this: the bodhisattva practising prajñā is also thus; he does not have the thought—this dharma will obtain the prediction, this dharma has been given the prediction, this dharma will obtain the unsurpassed path; and yet 「不疑我若得、若不得，自知實得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提」 tr. "he does not doubt whether I obtain it or do not obtain it; he knows of himself that he really obtains anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi." Not seeing and not doubting existing together—only this is the essential point of this passage: not seeing, therefore nothing is grasped; not doubting, therefore no retrogression. Lacking the first half, it becomes clinging; lacking the latter half, it becomes doubt.

19. The treatise-author sets up a question: why Śāriputra poses the difficulty of the three samādhi in a dream. The treatise-author begins his explanation, and his first question asks about Śāriputra's way of questioning: for what reason does Śāriputra pose the difficulty to the bodhisattva's three samādhi by way of a dream? This question is worth learning—not first answering the question, but first asking how this question could arise. If the reader can put this question to a doubt he himself has raised, the doubt often loosens of itself.

20. The dream is false and deceptive, while the three samādhi are real. The treatise-author answers: because a dream is false and deceptive, like madness, not a real seeing; and these three samādhi are real dharmas. The difficulty becomes a difficulty because the two things are opposite in nature: on one side a realm of madness and delusion, not real; on the other side a real dharma. Once the opposition is made clear, the skeleton of the difficulty shows.

21. The three kinds in a dream, and the full form of the question. The treatise-author further cites what is said elsewhere: in a dream too there are three kinds—wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate. The meaning of the three natures must first be made clear: the wholesome is the mind that accords with principle, benefits people, and brings a desirable retribution; the unwholesome runs counter to the wholesome, arises in accord with the afflictions, and brings a painful retribution; the indeterminate is neither wholesome nor unwholesome, such as the mind of the deportments of walking, standing, sitting, and lying, the mind of work and craft, and the mind manifested by transformation; its nature does not fall on either side of wholesome and unwholesome, and so its retribution cannot be determined—this treatise says elsewhere that the indeterminate has no retribution, and so does not bring birth in the heavens above or among humans, and this is exactly what is meant. Among the three natures, the item of the indeterminate is the most crucial for this passage: if the dream-mind belongs to the portion of the indeterminate, then there is from the start no retribution to speak of; the ground on which the treatise-author below can answer that the dream-mind is feeble and cannot gather and come to completion was already in these three divisions. A wholesome mind practising the three samādhi should obtain merit; yet a dream is a dharma of madness and delusion, and one should not practise a real dharma within it and obtain a retribution; if there were a real dharma, it would not be called a dream. Thereupon the full form of Śāriputra's question appears: does practising the three samādhi in a dream increase the merit of prajñā, gather roots of goodness, and draw near to the Buddha path or not? Here 「三種」 tr. "three kinds" is a heading the treatise's own text lists, not to be sought from outside; when the reader meets a numbered set of dharmas, let him first look whether this treatise itself lists the names.

22. Leaving the two extremes and answering by the real mark. The treatise-author explains Subhūti's meaning: to say there is benefit—a dream is false and deceptive while prajñā is real; how can it increase it? To say there is no benefit—in a dream there is the wholesome; how can there be no benefit? Neither side can be answered, and so Subhūti leaves these two extremes and answers by the real mark of all dharmas—it refutes even what is practised by day, how much more what is in a dream. That is why he says that if practising prajñā by day has benefit, at night too it should have benefit, while even by day there is no benefit, how much less in a dream. It closes with one sentence: 「般若波羅蜜，不分別有晝、夜。」 tr. "Prajñāpāramitā does not discriminate between day and night." Only at this point does that sentence of the second passage, day and night are equal and without difference, come to land.

23. Since he knows there is neither increase nor decrease, he should not raise the difficulty again. The treatise-author records a transitional sentence: Śāriputra, hearing what Subhūti said, since he knows that prajñā has neither increase nor decrease, should not raise the difficulty again. This sentence is the joint of the passage—the first difficulty is finished, and the question below is not the old difficulty raised again, but a separate matter raised. In reading long passages of question and answer, one must watch for such joining sentences, or else it is easy to mistake a later difficulty for an entanglement of the earlier one.

24. The gloss on gathering and coming to completion. The treatise-author glosses 「集成」 tr. "gathering and coming to completion" word by word: does this deed really gather and become able to complete a retribution or not? The gloss here is not superfluous text—if the two characters were not glossed, the whole debate that follows would hang in the air. In reading this treatise, one should form a habit: when the treatise-author stops to gloss a word, that word is certainly the key to that passage.

25. The dream-mind is feeble and cannot gather and come to completion. The treatise-author argues: if a deed were real, then since the Buddha constantly says 「一切法空如夢」 tr. "all dharmas are empty, like a dream," it should not be able to gather and come to completion; why? Because this dream-mind is feeble, it cannot gather and come to completion. He pushes one layer further—even the feeble mind of the daytime cannot gather and come to completion, how much less in a dream; and yet after waking from the dream, when one discriminates the wholesome and unwholesome minds that arose in the dream, this should gather and come to completion. At this point both sides that Śāriputra laid out in the third passage have received the treatise-author's placement: the mind in a dream has no strength; the discrimination after waking has strength.

26. The treatise-author restates the question of killing in a dream. The treatise-author restates, following the text, the case Subhūti set up: as when a person in a dream kills someone and, upon waking, discriminates, "was my killing a pleasure?"—how is this deed? does it gather and come to completion or not? This is the treatise-author repeating the sūtra text; it is not another speaker asking on the spot; in reading the style of the Expository Treatise, one must distinguish which sentence is sūtra and which is the treatise-author citing the sūtra.

27. The treatise-author restates Śāriputra's answer. The treatise-author repeats Śāriputra's words: all deeds, whether by day or in a dream, arise from causes and conditions; without causes and conditions they do not arise. The sūtra text originally says no condition and with a condition; the treatise-author cites it as causes and conditions—the same in meaning and smoother in wording; this is the ordinary way the treatise-author explains the sūtra following the text.

28. Subhūti approves his words. The treatise-author records Subhūti's words of approval: a deed arises with causes and conditions and does not arise without causes and conditions; a construction arises with causes and conditions and does not arise without causes and conditions. The three Chinese characters rendered here as ‘approves his words’ are important—since the criterion was set up by the questioner himself, the one answering need only approve it, and the debate need not be dragged further.

29. The gloss on deed and construction, and the four dharmas that are the causes of the three deeds. This passage is the densest in doctrine of the whole chapter; the treatise-author glosses four layers in one breath. First, he distinguishes deed and construction: 「業者，身口業；思者，但意業。」 tr. "Deeds are the deeds of body and speech; construction is only the deed of the mind." Second, he judges weight: construction is the true deed; the deeds of body and speech are called deeds because of construction. Third, the place of origin: the causes of these three deeds are four dharmas—seeing, hearing, sensing, and knowing; because of these four the mind arises; the mind arises following causes and conditions, either pure or impure; the impure is sinful deed, the pure is meritorious deed. Fourth, it lands on the dream: what is seen in a dream is all because of prior seeing, hearing, sensing, and knowing; the wholesome and evil done in a dream, 「為眠覆心、不自在故，無有勢力，不能集成果報」 tr. "because sleep covers the mind and it is not free, has no strength and cannot gather to complete a retribution"; if this deed is obtained at the time of waking, then because the wholesome or evil mind comes together with it, it can help to complete a retribution. The headings of the four dharmas are listed by the treatise's own text, and need not be sought from outside; and the four each have what they belong to: seeing belongs to what eye-consciousness takes up, hearing to what ear-consciousness takes up, sensing covers what the three consciousnesses of nose, tongue, and body touch and receive, and knowing belongs to the discernment of mind-consciousness. This treatise elsewhere asks itself why eye, ear, and mind are each given a separate name while the three consciousnesses of nose, tongue, and body are combined into the one of sensing, and answers that their use in aiding the path is more or less, and that what they know is either only of the world or reaches also to what transcends the world—because the use differs, they are spoken of separately; because the use is the same, they are spoken of together. Outside these four gates, the mind has no condition from which to arise; that what is seen in a dream is all because of prior seeing, hearing, sensing, and knowing is precisely because, apart from these four gates, there is nothing that can be the material of a dream. The measure of the whole passage lies in the last sentence: the dream-deed cannot complete a retribution by itself, yet it can be helped to completion by the mind after waking—this is exactly the right understanding of what Śāriputra doubted in the third passage.

30. Subhūti's meaning is that the deed in a dream really does gather and come to completion. The treatise-author brings out Subhūti's meaning: the deed in a dream really does gather and come to completion; why? Because it arises from causes and conditions; the mind by day and the mind in a dream are without difference; both arise because of the four kinds. Here it must be read together with the preceding passage—the preceding passage says the dream-deed has no strength; this passage says the dream-deed has causes and conditions; what has no strength cannot complete a retribution alone; what has causes and conditions is not wholly nothing. The two statements do not contradict each other; the dividing line lies in whether it can complete a retribution alone or not.

31. Śāriputra objects from emptiness. The treatise-author restates Śāriputra's difficulty: as the Buddha says, all deeds are separated from their own marks; how do you say for certain that deeds arise with causes and conditions and do not arise without causes and conditions? The difficulty lies in the one character rendered here as ‘for certain’—it is not objecting to the teaching of causes and conditions itself; it is objecting to clinging to the teaching of causes and conditions as a fixed teaching.

32. Because ordinary people grasp at marks, deeds arise. The treatise-author brings out Subhūti's answer: though dharmas are empty and separated from marks, ordinary people grasp at marks, and because there are causes and conditions, deeds arise; if they do not grasp at marks, then without causes and conditions they do not arise; therefore all deeds exist because they arise from the causes and conditions of grasping at marks, and by day and in a dream there is no difference. At this point the two characters rendered as ‘grasping at marks’ in the eighth passage receive their full placement: emptiness and cause and effect are not spoken on the same level; emptiness is the mark of the dharma itself, cause and effect are the affair of the one who grasps at marks.

33. The question of dedication comes out again. The treatise-author restates Śāriputra's third question: when the bodhisattva practises the six perfections in a dream and dedicates it to the unsurpassed path, is this a real dedication or not? The sūtra text speaks of six matters, giving, keeping the precepts, and the rest; the treatise-author cites them as the six perfections—a gathering-up according to the meaning, not a change of meaning.

34. The two sides of the difficulty about dedication. The treatise-author states Śāriputra's difficulty in full: if in a dream and by day there is no difference, then this dedication in a dream should be real; and again, if by day a clinging mind that grasps at marks is still not called dedication, how much less when sleep covers the mind. This difficulty attacks from both sides—pushed along equal and without difference, the dedication in a dream becomes real; pushed along grasping at marks not being called dedication, in a dream it is even less so. Wherever a difficulty has two sides, if the one answering breaks only one side, the difficulty still stands.

35. Because the two difficulties are deep, the question is yielded. The treatise-author explains why Subhūti yields the question: because these two difficulties are deep and hard to answer, he tells Śāriputra that he should ask Maitreya. This sentence is exactly the right understanding of the tenth passage—the reason for yielding the question lies in the depth of the difficulty, not in evasion.

36. The treatise-author sets up a question: why Maitreya only speaks of emptiness and does not answer. The treatise-author raises a question for the second time, and what he asks about is Maitreya's silence: why does Maitreya only speak of emptiness and not answer? If the reader too has had this doubt in his mind, he has read it rightly; the treatise-author's questions are often asked on the reader's behalf.

37. The two great disciples each have something they cling to. The treatise-author answers: these two great disciples, for the sake of benefiting bodhisattvas, discriminate whether waking and dreaming are the same or different; because the Buddha constantly says 「一切法如夢」 tr. "all dharmas are like a dream," if one practises the path by day, one should also practise the path in a dream. This answer first speaks of the intent of the two men's question and answer—it is to discriminate sameness and difference for the sake of benefiting bodhisattvas, not to contend for victory.

38. Maitreya knows what they cling to, and so does not answer. The treatise-author goes on to bring out the reason for not answering: because Maitreya knows and sees that the two men each have something they cling to and cannot penetrate it, therefore Maitreya does not answer. This is a way of teaching: while what is clung to has not loosened, answering same or answering different both fall into the clinging, and so he does not answer. Not answering is not having no answer; it is not giving an answer that will be seized and held.

39. Again someone says: Maitreya answers by emptiness. The treatise-author records another view: again someone says that Maitreya answers by this emptiness. The two views are set side by side without judgement—one says he does not answer, one says he takes emptiness as the answer. The reader keeps both; the treatise-author does not adopt or reject here, and in reading this treatise, wherever views are set side by side, one must not make the ruling in the treatise-author's place.

40. Śāriputra asks whether this is taken as realisation. The treatise-author restates Śāriputra's question: as you speak of emptiness, do you take this as realisation or not? This question comes from the preceding view—since it is said that Maitreya answers by emptiness, one can press further whether this emptiness is what is realised.

41. The two horns in Śāriputra's intent. The treatise-author brings out Śāriputra's intent: if you take this dharma as realisation, I would raise the difficulty of how it is realisation; if you do not realise it, you yourself have not obtained it and do not know it; how can you speak it? Both ends are blocked: saying one realises it invites the difficulty; saying one does not realise it forfeits the standing to speak. This is a pincer common in debate, and its form is worth noting.

42. Maitreya's intent: because nirvāṇa too is empty, he does not realise it. The treatise-author brings out Maitreya's intent: you take nirvāṇa as realisation; I, because nirvāṇa too is empty and there is nothing to be attained, do not realise it. This answer undoes the pincer—not realising is not failing to obtain; it is that the so-called place of realisation is itself also empty, and so there is nothing that can be taken as realisation. The not realising of the fourteenth passage here receives its reason.

43. Someone says: because he has not yet fulfilled the dharmas of a Buddha, he does not realise it. The treatise-author records one more view: someone says that because Maitreya has not yet fulfilled the dharmas of a Buddha, he says he does not realise it; the bodhisattva's dharma should know the dharmas of emptiness, the signless, and non-action, and should not realise them. This view assigns not realising to the portion of the bodhisattva's station—knowing and not realising is the bodhisattva's dharma. It is set side by side with the preceding view, still without judgement.

44. The reason for the depth, and Śāriputra's own statement of causes and conditions. The treatise-author explains Śāriputra's thought: to be able to know the mark of nirvāṇa and not take realisation is called very deep. He also records Śāriputra's own statement of causes and conditions: 「久行六波羅蜜故，其智甚深。」 tr. "Because he has long practised the six perfections, his wisdom is very deep." At the end he brings out a turn in Śāriputra's mind: Maitreya will be the next to become a Buddha; he ought to be able to answer, and yet now he does not answer. This turn is the lead-in to the Buddha's coming forward in the next passage—the doubt has not ceased, and so the Buddha takes it over himself.

45. The Buddha in turn questions Śāriputra. The treatise-author explains the Buddha's question: therefore the Buddha in turn questions Śāriputra—what do you think? do you see the dharma by which you obtained arhatship or not? The two Chinese characters rendered here as ‘in turn questions’ point out the Buddha's intent—not resolving it from Maitreya's side, but from the questioner's own realised state.

46. The gloss on not seeing. The treatise-author glosses Śāriputra's not seeing word by word: this dharma is empty, signless, and without action; how could it be seen? If it were seen, that would be having a mark. He also speaks by way of the three eyes: the fleshly eye and the divine eye discriminate and grasp at marks, and so should not see it; the wisdom-eye has no mark of discrimination, and so also does not see it. By both roads it is not seen, yet the reasons for not seeing differ—the former is not fit to see, the latter has no mark to be seen. This gloss is best read closely; otherwise one will misread the not seeing of the noble one as the not seeing of an ordinary person.

47. The Buddha seals it by the acceptance of non-arising. The treatise-author explains the Buddha's closing words: when the bodhisattva obtains the acceptance of non-arising, he does not say, I see this dharma, I obtain the prediction, I shall obtain the unsurpassed path; though he does not have this view, he also does not give rise to the doubt that I shall not obtain the unsurpassed path; just as you, though you do not see the dharma, also do not doubt whether I have become an arhat or have not become an arhat. Taking Śāriputra's own realisation as the simile, he seals the bodhisattva's practice, and the first half closes here.

48. The vow of giving—hunger and cold and freezing and starvation, clothes worn out and ruined. Sūtra ② rises with a changed face: the Buddha tells Subhūti that when the bodhisattva practises dānapāramitā, if he sees beings in hunger and cold and freezing and starvation, with clothes worn out and ruined, the bodhisattva should make this vow—for however long I practise dānapāramitā, when I obtain anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi, may the beings in my land have no such matter; may their clothing, food and drink, and necessities of life be like those of the Heaven of the Four Heavenly Kings and so on up to the heaven of the gods Sovereign over Others' Transformations; it closes by saying that he can fulfil dānapāramitā and draws near to anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi. This first vow is at the same time the sample of the form for the whole passage, with three clear sections: seeing the marks of beings' suffering; making the vow according to the perfection being practised; closing with fulfilling this perfection and drawing near to awakening. All the vows that follow keep to these three sections, and the reader can hold this as his measuring rule. Further: the passages ranged in parallel in the sentence-form 「當作是願」 tr. "should make this vow" number twenty-nine in the sūtra text, and at the end there is one more passage in the form 「當作是念」 tr. "should have this thought"; in his explanation the treatise-author takes that passage as 「最後願」 tr. "the last vow"—so by the word "vow" in the sūtra text there are twenty-nine, and by the treatise-author's naming there are thirty; here both are recorded as they are, without forcing a single number.

49. The vow of morality—the retributions of killing and so on up to wrong view. When the bodhisattva practises śīlapāramitā, he sees beings who kill and so on up to hold wrong view, short-lived, much ill, of poor complexion, without majesty and virtue, poor in wealth, born into low and mean families, maimed and ugly in form, and should make the vow that the beings in my land have no such matter. In this vow one must see a line of cause and effect: the marks listed are all retributions of breaking the precepts, and so what the vow remedies lies not in the mark but in the cause. The reader must not read it as the bodhisattva despising ugly people.

50. The vow of patience—hatred and abuse, harm by knives and staves. When the bodhisattva practises kṣāntipāramitā, he sees beings in hatred and abuse toward one another, harming one another and taking life with knives and staves, tiles and stones, and should make the vow that the beings in my land have no such matter; and it goes a layer further: 「相視如父、如母，如兄、如弟，如姊、如妹，如善知識，皆行慈悲。」 tr. "May they look on one another as father, as mother, as elder brother, as younger brother, as elder sister, as younger sister, as good friends, all practising kindness and compassion." This vow does not stop at removing evil; it also establishes the wholesome mark that is wished for—the fruit of the perfection of patience is not that no one contends, but that everyone looks on everyone as kin.

51. The vow of vigour—laziness and abandoning the three vehicles. When the bodhisattva practises vīryapāramitā, he sees beings who are lazy, not diligent in vigour, and abandon the three vehicles, and should make the vow that the beings in my land have no such matter, that all beings diligently cultivate vigour and each obtain deliverance in the paths of the three vehicles. Here the heading 「三乘」 tr. "three vehicles" is listed by the sūtra text itself—the śrāvaka, the pratyekabuddha, and the Buddha vehicle. The difference among the three this treatise elsewhere judges by three matters: the condition by which one enters the path, the depth of awakening to emptiness, and the breadth of compassion for beings: the śrāvaka enters by hearing the Dharma from another, and from first entering the path up to the arhat all belong to this; it is the dharma of disciples; the pratyekabuddha does not hear from another, but either awakens by contemplating causes and conditions or awakens by himself in this life and accomplishes the path; his awakening to emptiness is somewhat deeper, but his mind of compassion for beings is still small; the Buddha vehicle, from the first arousing of the mind, makes the vow to deliver all beings, practises the six perfections, and gives rise to great kindness and great compassion, and its knowledge of the general mark and the specific mark knows all without exception. That the three each form one vehicle lies not in the height of the name of the fruit-station, but in the breadth of the arousing of the mind and in how far the knowledge reaches. What the vow grants is that each obtains deliverance, not that all equally enter one vehicle; it stands together with the later vow of purely the one Great Vehicle without obstruction, each spoken according to what it remedies.

52. The vow of meditation—the mind covered by the five hindrances, the meditative concentrations lost. When the bodhisattva practises dhyānapāramitā, he sees beings covered by the five hindrances, and should make the vow that the beings in my land have no such matter. The headings of the five hindrances are listed by the sūtra text itself: lust, hatred, sloth and torpor, restlessness and remorse, doubt—lust is the mind greedily stained by the realm of the five desires, fastening on what it loves and unable to draw back; hatred is the mind giving rise to loathing, anger, vexation, and harm toward an adverse realm; sleep is body and mind sunk in torpor and dull darkness, the power of clear illumination wholly lost, no different from death; restlessness and remorse are two joined into one: agitation is the mind floating, moving, scattered, and disordered, and cannot be held; regret is recalling what one has done or left undone and being vexed, as if an arrow were in the heart; the two alike have disturbance as their nature, and so are set up together as one hindrance; doubt is hesitating over the Dharma without deciding, the mind with nothing fixed, like entering a mountain of treasure with no hands to take it. That the five are called hindrances lies precisely in the single character 「覆」 tr. "cover"—they do not make people do evil; they keep the mind from clarity, and so what is lost is all the dharmas of concentration. What is lost is also listed by the text itself: the first dhyāna and so on up to the fourth dhyāna; kindness, compassion, joy, and equanimity; the sphere of boundless space, the sphere of boundless consciousness, the sphere of nothing whatsoever, the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception. Kindness, compassion, joy, and equanimity this treatise elsewhere glosses word by word: kindness is loving and holding beings in mind, always seeking matters of safety and happiness to benefit them—it is the mind that gives happiness; compassion is pitying and holding in mind the various sufferings of body and suffering of mind that beings undergo in the five destinies—it is the mind that removes suffering; joy is wishing that beings, from the happiness they have obtained, should give rise to further gladness, not stopping at giving them happiness; equanimity is letting go even of the preceding three minds, only keeping beings in mind without hating and without loving, keeping only equality. The four formless spheres too have their own sequence: constantly contemplating the emptiness of the body, keeping it in mind and not letting go, one passes beyond form and no longer sees the body, and what is contemplated is immeasurable and boundless—this is the sphere of boundless space; since space is boundless, taking it as object by consciousness makes the objects many and scattered, and so one gives up the object of space and takes only consciousness as object, with the one consciousness now present taking as object throughout the immeasurable consciousnesses of past and future—this is the sphere of boundless consciousness; the mark of consciousness too is like an illness, like a boil; breaking all the marks of consciousness, one binds the mind to nothing whatsoever—this is the sphere of nothing whatsoever; as for the highest sphere, because perception is already subtle and hard to be aware of, it is called not having perception, and because perception is really not yet severed, it is also called not without perception. These eight are none of them the doing of evil; they are precisely what the mind is able to obtain—once the five hindrances cover it, all eight are lost. What this vow sees is the subtlest—not seeing people do evil, but seeing people's minds covered and losing what they could obtain.

53. The vow of prajñā—folly and delusion and the loss of right view. When the bodhisattva practises prajñāpāramitā, he sees beings in folly and delusion, having lost the worldly and the world-transcending right view, some saying there are no deeds and no causes and conditions of deeds, some saying the soul is permanent, some saying annihilation, some saying there is nothing existent, and should make the vow of purifying buddha-worlds and bringing beings to accomplishment. What this vow remedies is view, not conduct; the wrong views listed also come from the sūtra text itself. From this vow on, the phrase 「淨佛世界、成就眾生」 tr. "purifying buddha-worlds and bringing beings to accomplishment" appears in the vow-words, and the closing words too mostly become drawing near to the omniscience of all kinds—yet the change of form is not uniform: after it, the two vows of no attachment and of the four castes still close with 「近阿耨多羅三藐三菩提」 tr. "draws near to anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi," and the vows further on no longer show the phrase 「淨佛世界、成就眾生」 tr. "purifying buddha-worlds and bringing beings to accomplishment." The reader should take note, and must not hold to one pattern to cover the whole passage.

54. The vow of the three groups—the rightly assured, the wrongly assured, the unassured. When the bodhisattva practises the six perfections, he sees beings abiding in the three groups, and should make the vow that the beings in my land have no wrongly assured group, not even its name. The headings of the three groups are listed by the sūtra text itself: first, the rightly assured group; second, the wrongly assured group; third, the unassured group—those of the rightly assured group have roots of goodness already fixed, and though they meet adverse conditions they will in the end surely tend toward the right path and not retrogress; those of the wrongly assured group have wrong view already firm, and though they meet good conditions they do not turn their minds, and are certain to fall into the evil destinies; those of the unassured group are fixed in neither direction: meeting good conditions they enter the right, meeting evil conditions they enter the wrong, their going and taking wholly bound to what they meet. The division of the three lies not in the good or evil of a single moment, but in whether their facing toward or turning away is already fixed or not yet fixed. The vow removes only the wrongly assured group, not the rightly assured group or the unassured group—the wording is most carefully measured; 「乃至無其名」 tr. "not even its name" is a sentence-form seen again and again from this passage on—what is wished for is that not even the name is set up.

55. The vow of the three evil destinies—the hells, the animals, the hungry ghosts. When the bodhisattva practises the six perfections, he sees the beings in the hells, the beings among the animals and the hungry ghosts, and should make the vow that in my land there be not even the name of the three evil destinies. What is seen is the place of beings; what is vowed is that there be not even the name of the place. The power of the vow lies here: it is not moving the beings of the evil destinies away, but making the land have no such kind to begin with.

56. The vow of the mark of the ground—stumps and thorns, hills and ditches. The bodhisattva sees the great earth with stumps and thorns, hills and ditches, foul and evil places, and should make the vow that my land have no such evil: 「地平如掌」 tr. "the ground level as the palm of a hand." From here, for several vows, what is seen turns from beings to the vessel-world—the mark of the land too is within the vow. The reader must not read the vows of the pure land only as delivering beings; the mark of the vessel-realm is equally gathered into the bodhisattva's practice.

57. The vow of the jewelled ground—the great earth of pure soil, without gold, silver, or precious things. The bodhisattva sees the great earth of pure soil, without gold, silver, or precious things, and should make the vow that my land be spread with golden sand. This vow is easily read as greed and love for precious things, but read together with what comes before and after, it is plain: the vow above removes foulness and evil, this vow establishes adornment; both are so that the mark of the land accords with the path, not for enjoyment.

58. The vow of no attachment—seeing beings with something they are attached to. The bodhisattva sees beings with something they are attached to, and should make the vow that the beings in my land have nothing they are attached to. The two vows above have just established the adornment of golden sand spread on the ground, and this vow at once removes attachment—adornment and non-attachment standing together is precisely where the vows of the pure land differ from worldly wealth and pleasure. Read the two vows in succession, and the doubt about the earlier vow unties itself.

59. The vow of the four castes—kṣatriya and so on up to śūdra. The bodhisattva sees beings of the four castes, and should make the vow that the beings in my land have no name of the four castes. The headings of the four castes are listed by the sūtra text itself: kṣatriya, brahmin, vaiśya, śūdra—the kṣatriya is the royal clan that rules; the brahmin is the clan that by hereditary practice performs sacrifices and recites the scriptures; the vaiśya is the clan that trades and works at business; the śūdra is the clan that serves and labours. The four are a worldly institution that judges people high and low by the place of birth, not divided by conduct and deeds, and so what is vowed lies not in changing their conduct, but in letting the name of this discrimination have nothing to stand on. What is removed is the name, which is to remove its discrimination; the vow lies not in changing people's bodies, but in letting the name of discrimination have nothing to stand on.

60. The vow of superior and inferior—low, middle, and high, and the families one is born into. The bodhisattva sees beings who are low, middle, and high, born into low, middle, and high families, and should make the vow that the beings in my land have no such superior and inferior. This vow goes a layer deeper than the vow above: the vow above removes the name of clan and caste; this vow removes high and low between person and person. Read the two vows together, and one sees that the equality the bodhisattva vows for lies not only in institutions, but in the marks the mind takes as object.

61. The vow of wondrous form—all kinds of different forms. The bodhisattva sees beings with all kinds of different forms, and should make the vow that the beings in my land have no such different forms, that all beings be upright, pure, and clean, accomplished in wondrous form. The measure of this vow lies in no difference, not in no form—what is removed is the mark of difference; what is established is one and the same wondrous form.

62. The vow of no master—seeing beings who have masters. The bodhisattva sees beings who have masters, and should make the vow that the beings in my land have not even the name of master, and not even its form and image: 「除佛法王」 tr. "except the Buddha, the Dharma King." The four Chinese characters rendered here as ‘except the Buddha, the Dharma King’ are most important: what is removed is the master of worldly rule and subjection, not having nothing to revere. The vow-words themselves keep this one exception, and the reader must not pass over it.

63. The vow of the six destinies—the hells and so on up to humans. The bodhisattva sees beings with the differences of the six destinies, and should make the vow that the beings in my land have no name of the six destinies. The headings of the six destinies are listed by the sūtra text itself: these are the hells, these the animals, these the hungry ghosts, these the spirits, these the gods, these humans—each of the six has its mark: those in the hells, in great suffering and with minds disordered, cannot receive the Dharma; the animals, their minds covered by folly and delusion, cannot receive transformation; the hungry ghosts, their bodies burned by the fire of hunger and thirst, cannot receive the Dharma; these three are wholly places of sin. The spirits are the destiny of ghosts and spirits; this treatise does not set up the asuras separately as the name of a destiny, but includes them under ghosts and spirits; all ghosts and spirits are included within the destiny of ghosts and spirits, while the nāga kings enter the destiny of animals; where the treatise itself discusses the opening and combining of five destinies and six destinies, it says that the three evil destinies are wholly places of sin, while those whose merit is much and sin little, such as the asuras, the gandharvas, and the like, should have a separate place of birth, and therefore one should speak of six destinies—so this fourth, 「神」 tr. "spirits," is precisely a class in which sin and merit are combined and a separate place of birth is set up; it is not the preceding hungry ghosts. The treatise says elsewhere too that in the destiny of ghosts and spirits the eye-faculty and the rest are keen, yet the afflictions cover the mind, and so they cannot single-mindedly practise deep prajñā—from which it can be seen that it is a place where merit and wisdom are not matched. As for the gods, among the six destinies the destiny of the gods is highest, and receives the most excellent merit; humans have suffering and happiness combined—their suffering less than that of the three evil destinies, their happiness not equal to that of the gods, their faculties turbid and heavy, yet able to restrain the thoughts of suffering and happiness so as to practise prajñā, and so theirs is the body fit for cultivation. In the vow a practice to be wished for is further established: all beings alike share one and the same deed, cultivating the four foundations of mindfulness and so on up to the eightfold noble path—no name of the six destinies, yet one and the same deed of the path.

64. The vow of birth by transformation—from eggs, from wombs, from moisture, by transformation. The bodhisattva sees beings with the four kinds of birth, and should make the vow that the beings in my land have none of the three kinds of birth, all alike born by transformation. The headings of the four kinds of birth are listed by the sūtra text itself: birth from eggs, birth from wombs, birth from moisture, birth by transformation—the marks of the four this treatise elsewhere brings out by events: birth from eggs is first forming an egg and then breaking the egg and coming out in bodily form, as when Viśākhā the Mother in one birth bore thirty-two eggs, and the eggs broke and thirty-two sons were born; birth from wombs is like the birth of ordinary people, dwelling in the womb and then coming out; birth from moisture is having bodily form by the condition of moisture and warmth, like the birth of the courtesan Āmrapālī and of the wheel-turning sage king Crown-born; birth by transformation is suddenly forming a body without anything to rely on, like the bhikṣuṇī Aluopo born by transformation from within the earth, and like people at the beginning of the kalpa, who were all born by transformation. The treatise further matches these four to the five destinies: the gods and the hells are wholly born by transformation; the hungry ghosts share the two kinds of womb and transformation; only the human destiny and the animals have all four kinds of birth. The reason birth by transformation alone is kept is that birth by transformation does not depend on the conditions of womb, moisture, and egg; at birth the body is formed and at once full-grown, without the suffering of gestation and nurture, and without the stage of weakness waiting to grow. Three are removed and one is kept; this vow is of one pattern with the vow above—removing difference and establishing equality.

65. The vow of supernormal powers—seeing beings without the five supernormal powers. The bodhisattva sees beings without the five supernormal powers, and should make the vow that the beings in my land all obtain the five supernormal powers. From this vow on, the closing words are mostly the abbreviation 「乃至近一切種智」 tr. "and so on up to drawing near to the omniscience of all kinds"—the sūtra text gathers it up with "and so on up to," abbreviating by carrying on the earlier wording of fulfilling the six perfections; it is not that the vow is lacking.

66. The vow of taking Dharma-joy as food—the trouble of excretion. The bodhisattva sees beings with the trouble of excretion, and should make the vow that the beings in my land all take Dharma-joy as food, without the trouble of excretion. What this vow sees is utterly ordinary, yet precisely shows the bodhisattva's fine-grained mind: the burdens of the body too are within the vow. What is established is not having no food, but changing the food into Dharma-joy.

67. The vow of light—seeing beings without light. The bodhisattva sees beings without light, and should make the vow that the beings in my land all have light. The vow-words are very short, and the meaning is of the same pattern as before; the reader may note that from here, for several vows, the sūtra text grows increasingly concise, what is seen and what is vowed each only a single sentence—the parallel ranging having come this far, the form is established, and the sūtra text no longer repeats the full pattern.

68. The vow of no sun and moon—the sun and moon, the seasons, and the years. The bodhisattva sees that there are the sun and moon, the seasons, and the years, and should make the vow that in my land there be no name of sun and moon, seasons, and years. What this vow removes is the measure of time. Viewed together with the vow below, measure and the measureless are precisely the theme of the several vows after this.

69. The vow of lifespan—seeing beings with short life. The bodhisattva sees beings with short life, and should make the vow that the beings in my land have a lifespan of immeasurable kalpas. The vow above removes the name of time; this vow establishes the measurelessness of life; the two vows follow on each other and do not contradict—what is removed is the discrimination of reckoning time; what is established is that life is not bounded by it.

70. The vow of the marks and minor signs—seeing beings without the marks and minor signs. The bodhisattva sees beings without the marks and minor signs, and should make the vow that the beings in my land all be accomplished in the thirty-two marks. The number of the marks comes from the sūtra text itself; what is vowed lies not in beings being handsome, but in their bodies being vessels of the path—the marks and minor signs are formed by merit, and so this vow is really a vow that beings be accomplished in merit.

71. The vow of roots of goodness—seeing beings apart from roots of goodness. The bodhisattva sees beings apart from roots of goodness, and should make the vow that the beings in my land be accomplished in roots of goodness, and by this merit make offerings to the buddhas. This vow goes a step further than the vow before: not only accomplishing roots of goodness, but making offerings to the buddhas with their merit—only when the use of roots of goodness has somewhere to return does it not become merit enjoyed for oneself.

72. The vow of no illness—the three poisons, the four illnesses. The bodhisattva sees beings with the three poisons and the four illnesses, and should make the vow that the beings in my land have none of the four kinds of illness or the illness of the three poisons. The headings of the four illnesses are listed by the sūtra text itself: cold, heat, wind illness, and the three kinds of mixed illness—this treatise elsewhere itself raises these four as the root of bodily illness, and matches them with the four elements: the four elements form the body and constantly harm one another; in each element one hundred and one illnesses arise, together making the four hundred and four sicknesses; among them the two hundred and two cold illnesses arise from the two elements of water and wind, and the two hundred and two heat illnesses arise from the two elements of earth and fire. Wind illness is when the wind element is out of balance and the whole body is thrown into disorder by it; the treatise says elsewhere that when wind illness and heat illness are severe they can make a person go mad, from which it can be seen that their power reaches even to the mind. Mixed illness is not arising from one element alone, but cold, heat, and wind breaking out together, and so the sūtra calls it the three kinds of mixed illness; when this treatise cites the sūtra it also has the words mixed heat, wind, and cold illness, meaning precisely that the three mix to form it. Removing bodily illness and the poisons of the mind together is what stands out in this vow—in terms of the body, the four illnesses; in terms of the mind, the three poisons; both within a single vow.

73. The vow of one vehicle—seeing beings with three vehicles. The bodhisattva sees beings with three vehicles, and should make the vow that the beings in my land have no name of the two vehicles: 「純一大乘」 tr. "purely the one Great Vehicle." Read this vow together with the earlier vow of vigour, in which each obtains deliverance in the three vehicles, and one sees that they do not contradict: that vow remedies the laziness that abandons the three vehicles; what this vow establishes is the mark of the land. What the two vows remedy differs, and so what they say differs; they stand together without judgement.

74. The vow of no overweening pride. The bodhisattva sees beings with overweening pride, and should make the vow that the beings in my land have no name of overweening pride. Overweening pride is the illness of practitioners, not the illness of ordinary people; placed in the last section of the vows, it shows precisely that the land to be purified is without even the subtle illness of practitioners.

75. The vow of light, lifespan, and the number of the Saṅgha. In this vow the form turns: it does not start from seeing beings, but from self-examination—the bodhisattva should make this vow: if my light and lifespan are measured and the number of my Saṅgha is limited, he should make the vow that my light and lifespan be immeasurable and the number of my Saṅgha unlimited. All the vows before this were made facing the marks of beings; this vow is made facing the marks of his own body at the time of becoming a Buddha. There is a vow within the vow—a layering the sūtra text itself has.

76. The vow of a measureless land. Of the same pattern as before: if my land is measured, he should make the vow that my one land be like buddha-worlds as many as the sands of the Ganges. This vow and the vow above are both vows of self-examination, and what they vow is all measurelessness. At this point, the vow-words counted by the word "vow" in the sūtra text are exhausted.

77. Right recollection—the limit of birth and death is like space. The final passage speaks not of a vow but of a thought: when the bodhisattva practises the six perfections, he should have this thought—though the path of birth and death is long and the natures of beings are many, at that time he should rightly recollect thus: 「生死邊如虛空，眾生性邊亦如虛空，是中實無生死往來，亦無解脫者」 tr. "the limit of birth and death is like space, and the limit of the nature of beings is also like space; within this there is really no going and coming in birth and death, and no one who is liberated either." What the vows before remedied are the marks of beings and of the land; what this passage remedies is the mind-strength of the very one who practises the vows. Having come this far, the reader should look back at the first half of the chapter: the words birth and death are like space run on one road with what is seen in a dream not being real—the two halves of the whole chapter here close their seam.

78. The treatise-author sets up a question: by what order? Treatise ② at its very opening asks about the seam: by what order is it that the bodhisattva is said to see beings in hunger and cold, freezing and starvation, and the like? This question is exactly the doubt in the reader's mind on reaching Sūtra ②—the first half speaks of dreams and samādhi, the latter half suddenly speaks of the vows of the pure land; why do they follow one another? The treatise-author does not avoid it; he asks first and then answers.

79. He practises only purifying buddha-worlds and bringing beings to accomplishment. The treatise-author answers: the bodhisattva has passed beyond the śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha grounds and obtained the acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas and the prediction; he has no other matter left, and practises only purifying buddha-worlds and bringing beings to accomplishment; now the causes and conditions of purifying buddha-worlds are spoken of—seeing the marks of impure worlds, he vows that my land have no such matter—and therefore these matters are spoken of in order. The one phrase, he has no other matter left, sews the two halves into one matter: the mind that does not see and yet does not doubt, sealed in the first half, and what is practised in the latter half is precisely the whole of the work done holding this mind.

80. The extended explanation of the vow of giving. The treatise-author gives an extended explanation for the first vow alone, from which it can be seen that this vow is the sample for the whole passage. The bodhisattva sees beings in hunger and thirst, with clothes worn out and ruined, and at once has the thought: my merit and wisdom are now not yet accomplished, and I cannot supply in full what beings need; if I only practise the mind of kindness and compassion, it is of no benefit to beings. Therefore for however long it takes, 「深行三種福德，住三種福德中」 tr. "he deeply practises the three kinds of merit and abides within the three kinds of merit," and can make poor beings all obtain fulfilment—becoming a wheel-turning sage king, or becoming a king of the gods, or becoming a sage with supernormal powers, he can then guide beings in great numbers, break their firm greed, and make them abide in giving. As for the so-called three kinds of merit, the treatise's text does not list their names separately here; what comes out afterward is the use of the three kinds of body, and the reader must not supply a set of headings in the treatise-author's place. At the end the general principle is brought out: all conditioned dharmas belong to causes and conditions; because the wholesome causes and conditions are fulfilled, all obtain their retribution as wished—the reason the vows can be accomplished lies in this principle.

81. The brief explanation of the vow of morality. The treatise-author explains the second vow in only one sentence: because of the causes and conditions of beings breaking śīlapāramitā, they are short-lived, much ill, without majesty and virtue, and the like; the bodhisattva makes this vow: 「我自具足持戒，亦教眾生令持戒」 tr. "I myself fully keep the precepts, and also teach beings to keep the precepts." Keeping them oneself and teaching others raised together is the full form of the vow of the perfection of morality—only wishing that others keep the precepts while not keeping them oneself, the vow is not accomplished.

82. The remaining vows are to be discriminated according to their meaning. The treatise-author says plainly here: the remaining vows are likewise; discriminate them according to their meaning. These words are a rule of explanation the treatise-author sets for himself—not a passing-over, but showing people an example, so that the reader, by the pattern of the first two vows, explains the rest himself. In reading this treatise, meeting words of this kind, one must oneself push through the remaining vows one by one according to the pattern; only then does it count as having read it through.

83. Because the meaning of the last vow is not clear, it is explained briefly. The treatise-author singles out the last vow: the meaning of the last vow is not clear; now I shall explain it briefly. The marks of the earlier vows are evident; the words of this passage are hidden, and so it must be explained separately. Here too the treatise-author's naming can be seen—the sūtra text in this passage says should have this thought, and the treatise-author calls it a vow; this is recorded as it is, without forcing them to agree.

84. The mind of exhaustion and weariness is wrong recollection. The treatise-author first writes out the actual state of the mind of exhaustion and weariness: after the bodhisattva has made vows such as those above, a mind of exhaustion and weariness arises—the Buddha path can be obtained only after practising all the merits for immeasurable, countless asaṃkhyeya kalpas; yet the years of a single kalpa already cannot be counted, which is why the Buddha shows it to people by similes, how much more passing through birth and death and undergoing all sufferings and vexations for immeasurable, boundless asaṃkhyeya kalpas; beings too are immeasurable and boundless; beings equal to the atoms of the three-thousand great-thousand world are already hard to deliver, how much more beings equal to the atoms of the immeasurable worlds of the ten directions. Because of these matters, the mind may give rise to retreat and sinking: 「是名邪憶念」 tr. "this is called wrong recollection." What matters is that the treatise-author does not rebuke this mind; he first describes it with the utmost truth, and only then judges it to be wrong recollection—the wrongness lies not in the feeling of suffering and vexation, but in retreating and sinking because of it.

85. The three roads of right recollection. The treatise-author brings out the right recollection the Buddha teaches, speaking of it along three roads. First, though birth and death are long, all this is empty, 「如虛空、如夢中所見」 tr. "like space, like what is seen in a dream," not really long and far, and one should not give rise to a mind of weariness—this is exactly in accord with the first half of the chapter. Second, the future age too is what a single thought takes as object, and it too is not long and far—the feeling of length and distance arises from the mark taken as object. Third, because of the bodhisattva's power of immeasurable merit and wisdom, he can pass beyond immeasurable kalpas. Each of the three roads cures one illness: the first cures his clinging to length as real; the second cures his fear formed from the mark taken as object; the third cures his doubt that his own power to deliver is weak.

86. The Buddha speaks the great causes and conditions: delivering them is not hard either. The whole chapter closes with the great causes and conditions the Buddha himself speaks: 「生死如虛空，眾生亦如是；眾生雖多，亦無定實眾生。如眾生無量無邊，佛智慧亦無量無邊，度亦不難，是故菩薩不應生疲厭心。」 tr. "Birth and death are like space, and beings likewise; though beings are many, there are no fixed, real beings either. As beings are without measure and without limit, the Buddha's wisdom too is without measure and without limit, and delivering them is not hard either; therefore the bodhisattva should not give rise to a mind of exhaustion and weariness." This close has two layers. First, the beings to be delivered are not fixed and real, and so their being without measure does not become an obstruction. Second, the Buddha's wisdom that can deliver is also without measure, and so without measure matches without measure. The question at the chapter's head, whether the samādhi in a dream is beneficial or not, is by now far behind; yet one thread is unbroken—not taking what is seen as real, therefore not grasping; not taking the measureless as hard, therefore not retrogressing. Not grasping and not retrogressing are precisely the head and the tail of the whole chapter.

Do Not Misread

Do not read 「晝、夜夢中等無異」 tr. "day, night, and dream are equal and without difference" as the dream being as real as waking. If it were equally real, then killing someone in a dream would have the same retribution as killing someone when awake; yet the treatise-author goes on to explain that the wholesome and evil done in a dream 「無有勢力，不能集成果報」 tr. "have no strength and cannot gather to complete a retribution," precisely because the dream-mind is covered by sleep and is not free. From this it can be seen that equal and without difference is said with respect to prajñā not discriminating between day and night, not with respect to the reality of the dream-world. In reading the prajñā sūtras and treatises, whenever one meets words such as equal and without difference, without duality and without difference, one must first ask one question: with respect to which dharma is it said to be equal?

Do not read 「夢中無有法集成」 tr. "in a dream there is no dharma that gathers and comes to completion" as doing evil in a dream having no bearing at all. The treatise-author's gloss distinguishes most finely: because sleep covers the mind and it is not free, the deed in a dream has no strength and cannot complete a retribution by itself; yet when, after waking, one discriminates, recollects, imagines, and grasps at marks, and the wholesome or evil mind comes together with it, it can help to complete a retribution. So the dream itself does not form sin or merit; the grasping and clinging toward the dream after waking is the real gate. If a practitioner reproaches himself because of an evil dream, or congratulates himself because of a good dream, he falls exactly into the recollection, imagining, and discrimination at the time of waking of which the treatise-author speaks.

Do not read Maitreya's 「如是不證」 tr. "thus I do not realise it" as his not having obtained the Dharma or being unwilling to answer. The treatise-author himself answers the reason: Maitreya knows that the two men each have something they cling to and cannot penetrate it, and so does not answer; and he records two further views: one says Maitreya answers by this emptiness, one says that because he has not yet fulfilled the dharmas of a Buddha he says he does not realise it. The three views are set side by side and the treatise-author does not judge; the reader must not take one view as settled in the treatise-author's place. As for the meaning of not realising, the treatise-author himself brings out its principle: because nirvāṇa too is empty and there is nothing to be attained, he does not realise it—it is that the place of realisation itself has no mark that can be grasped, not that there is no realisation to be attained. The sūtra text itself is also clear: Śāriputra, hearing it, praises his wisdom as very deep; he does not mock his inability.

Do not read Śāriputra's 「不見」 tr. "not seeing" as knowing nothing at all. The treatise-author separates two roads word by word: the fleshly eye and the divine eye discriminate and grasp at marks, and so should not see; the wisdom-eye has no mark of discrimination, and so also does not see. The former is not fit to see; the latter has no mark to be seen. Śāriputra states of himself that he does not see, and the Buddha at once seals the bodhisattva's practice by this—not seeing and yet not doubting. If not seeing is read as bewilderment, then the latter half of the sentence, he knows of himself that he really obtains anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi, has nothing to rest on.

Do not read the vows of purifying buddha-worlds as the bodhisattva loathing the beings of defiled lands. The first half of every vow is seeing the marks of beings' suffering; the latter half is vowing that his land have no such matter; what is tied in between is the perfection being practised—seeing hunger and cold, he practises giving; seeing the breaking of precepts, he practises morality; seeing hatred and harm, he practises patience. What is removed is the marks of suffering and their causes, not the people who suffer; and in the vows the wholesome marks that are wished for are established again and again, such as looking on one another as father, mother, brothers, and sisters, all practising kindness and compassion, and being accomplished in roots of goodness so as to make offerings to the buddhas. The treatise-author further explains the first vow at length as the bodhisattva being ashamed that his merit and wisdom are not yet accomplished and deeply practising merit—the starting point of the vow is one's own insufficiency, not finding fault with others.

Do not read 「餘殘諸願亦如是，隨義分別」 tr. "the remaining vows are likewise; discriminate them according to their meaning" as meaning the other vows can be passed over. The treatise-author explains the first two vows and establishes their pattern, and then shows people the example, wanting the reader to explain the rest himself by the pattern. If these words are read as an abridgement, the specific marks of the twenty-odd vows are thrown away along with it—and that the marks of suffering seen in each vow differ, and the wholesome marks established differ, is precisely what is richest in this passage.

Do not read the mind of exhaustion and weariness as a fault and hurry to rebuke it. The treatise-author first writes out in full the reasons for the mind of exhaustion and weariness—the number of kalpas cannot be calculated, beings cannot be counted, beings equal to atoms are already hard to deliver—and only then judges it to be wrong recollection. The wrongness lies not in finding it hard, but in retreating and sinking because of the hardness. If the reader is right now troubled by this mind, let him see that what the treatise-author gives is three roads of right recollection, not a sentence of blame.

Bearing on Practice

The first use: dreams can be taken up for self-examination without self-reproach. The treatise-author says it plainly: what is seen in a dream is all because of prior seeing, hearing, sensing, and knowing; a dream does not create new conditions, it only turns over old ones. So the greed and hatred that appear in a dream are shadows of what was practised in the daytime. The one who applies himself can make a gentle self-inquiry here—not asking what I did in the dream, but asking from which seeing, hearing, sensing, and knowing this shadow came. As for what is done in a dream, because sleep covers the mind it has no strength and from the start does not form a retribution; what must really be watched is that one thought of recollection, imagining, and discrimination after waking.

The second use: the two characters rendered as ‘grasping at marks’ can serve as a daily watchfulness. The treatise-author lands the pivot of deeds arising from causes and conditions on grasping at marks: because of grasping at marks, with a condition a deed arises; if one does not grasp at marks, then without causes and conditions it does not arise. Its use at the gate of practice is very simple—when a realm comes, first do not hurry to judge it good or bad; look back to see whether one has already seized something on the mark. If one has seized it, the deed arises from there; if one does not seize it, the same realm passes, and passes away. By day and in a dream there is no difference—what this says is exactly this one place of no difference.

The third use: being able to say it and having realised it must be kept apart. Maitreya speaks most deeply and yet says of himself that he does not realise it, and Śāriputra for this reason praises his wisdom as very deep. What those who study the Dharma most easily fall into is taking speaking for realising—once they can explain clearly, they think they have arrived. The criterion this chapter gives lies not in eloquence but in nothing to be attained: whenever one feels one has seized some insight and will not let it go, that is exactly grasping at marks; only when one speaks the Dharma and the mind does not grasp a place of realisation is it Maitreya's kind of speaking.

The fourth use: not seeing and yet not doubting can be put to use directly. After long practice two illnesses often arise: either one seeks a clear proof of realisation and does not get it, and so gives rise to a retreating mind; or one fabricates a proof of realisation oneself and abides clinging within it. What the Buddha gives is two sentences standing together—he does not have the thought, this dharma will obtain the prediction; and he also does not give rise to the doubt that I shall not obtain the unsurpassed path. The first sentence takes down the fabricated proof; the latter sentence holds up the faith that does not retrogress. Lacking either of the two, it is either clinging or doubt.

The fifth use: the vows can be taken one by one as samples for making vows. Every vow follows the same method: seeing a mark of suffering, tying it to the perfection one is now cultivating, vowing that in the future land there be no such matter, and closing with this practice being able to fulfil this perfection and draw near to awakening. In daily use the making of vows is often vague and floating; this passage gives a most concrete pattern—what is the mark of suffering I have seen today, which perfection am I now cultivating, what is to be removed in the vow and what is to be established. Even such matters as the trouble of excretion and the absence of light are within the vows, from which it can be seen that there is no mark of suffering that cannot enter a vow.

The sixth use: when the mind of exhaustion and weariness comes, there are three roads to walk. What the treatise-author gives is not a single sentence about endurance: first, contemplate birth and death as like space, like what is seen in a dream, not really long and far—length is the mark taken as object, not the reality taken as object. Second, contemplate the future age too as what a single thought takes as object, and it too is not long and far—the length of the future appears only in this present thought. Third, recall that because of the bodhisattva's power of immeasurable merit and wisdom he can pass beyond immeasurable kalpas—do not measure the journey to come by the strength of the present. The three roads can be taken up as occasion requires; and at the very end there are also the great causes and conditions the Buddha himself speaks, to hold to: though beings are many, there are no fixed, real beings either; the Buddha's wisdom too is without measure and without limit; delivering them is not hard either.

Further Resonances

The backbone of this chapter is two sūtra sections and two treatise sections. Sūtra ① begins from Śāriputra's asking whether entering the three samādhi in a dream benefits prajñā or not, and Subhūti's answer that day, night, and dream are equal and without difference; next he asks whether the deed performed in a dream gathers and comes to completion or not; Subhūti sets up the case of killing someone in a dream and asks in return; Śāriputra himself brings out the criterion of having a condition or no condition; Subhūti approves it and extends it to the mind arising among the dharmas of seeing, hearing, sensing, and knowing, and the mind having purity and stain; Śāriputra objects that all deeds and all constructions are separated from their own marks, and Subhūti answers that because of grasping at marks, with a condition a deed arises; at the end he asks whether the dedication of the six perfections in a dream is real or not, and Subhūti, because Maitreya is present before them and the Buddha gave him the prediction of non-retrogression, yields the question to Maitreya. Maitreya answers that the name, form, and the emptiness of form all cannot answer; he does not see one who can answer, does not see a dharma that can be given the prediction, does not see a place of the prediction; all dharmas are without duality and without difference; Śāriputra presses whether speaking thus is obtaining the dharma and realising it or not, and Maitreya answers thus I do not realise it; Śāriputra has the thought praising his wisdom as very deep, able to speak thus because he uses nothing to be attained. The Buddha then asks Śāriputra in return whether, by this dharma, he obtained arhatship and saw this dharma; Śāriputra answers that he does not see it, and the Buddha at once seals, by not seeing and yet not doubting, the mark of the bodhisattva practising prajñā. Treatise ① first sets up the question why Śāriputra poses the difficulty of the three samādhi by way of a dream, answering that a dream is false and deceptive, like madness, not a real seeing, while the three samādhi are real; it cites what is said elsewhere, that in a dream there are the three kinds, wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate; brings out Subhūti's meaning of leaving the two extremes and answering by the real mark of all dharmas; and closes with prajñā not discriminating between day and night; next, following the text, it glosses gathering and coming to completion, makes clear that the dream-mind is feeble and cannot gather and come to completion while discrimination after waking should gather and come to completion, restates the question of killing in a dream and the answer of having a condition or no condition, glosses word by word deed and construction, the four dharmas of seeing, hearing, sensing, and knowing as the causes of the three deeds, and that the wholesome and evil in a dream, because sleep covers the mind, have no strength, while at the time of waking the coming together can help to complete a retribution; next it brings out Śāriputra's difficulty from emptiness and Subhūti's answer of grasping at marks, restates the question of dedication and the two-sided difficulty, and makes clear that because the two difficulties are deep the question is yielded; again it sets up the question why Maitreya only speaks of emptiness and does not answer, brings out the meaning that he does not answer because the two great disciples each have something they cling to, and records together the two views, again someone saying he answers by emptiness and someone saying he does not realise because he has not yet fulfilled the dharmas of a Buddha; it brings out the facing of Śāriputra's intent and Maitreya's intent, and at the end explains the intent of the Buddha's questioning Śāriputra in return, glosses word by word the not seeing of the fleshly eye, the divine eye, and the wisdom-eye, and closes with the Buddha sealing the bodhisattva of the acceptance of non-arising who does not see and yet does not doubt. In Sūtra ② the Buddha tells Subhūti that the bodhisattva, when practising the six perfections, sees the various marks of suffering, lack, and foulness of beings and vows one by one to purify his land—from the vow of giving with hunger and cold and freezing and starvation, the vow of morality with the retributions of broken precepts, the vow of patience with hatred and harm, the vow of vigour with laziness and abandoning the three vehicles, the vow of meditation with the five hindrances and loss of concentration, the vow of prajñā with folly and wrong view, to the three groups, the three evil destinies, the mark of the ground, the jewelled ground, no attachment, the four castes, superior and inferior, wondrous form, no master, the six destinies, the four kinds of birth, the five supernormal powers, taking Dharma-joy as food, light, no sun and moon, seasons, and years, lifespan, the marks and minor signs, roots of goodness, no illness, one vehicle, no overweening pride; at the end come the two vows of self-examination, light, lifespan, and the number of the Saṅgha being measureless, and the land being like the sands of the Ganges; and it closes with the passage of right recollection in the form should have this thought. Treatise ② first sets up the question by what order, answering that after the bodhisattva has passed beyond the grounds of the two vehicles and obtained the acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas and the prediction he has no other matter left and practises only purifying buddha-worlds and bringing beings to accomplishment; next it explains at length the vow of giving, bringing out the marks of the bodhisattva being ashamed that his merit and wisdom are not yet accomplished, deeply practising the three kinds of merit, and becoming a wheel-turning sage king, a king of the gods, or a sage with supernormal powers to guide beings and break their firm greed, closing with conditioned dharmas belonging to causes and conditions and so obtaining their retribution as wished; it briefly explains the vow of morality as keeping the precepts oneself and teaching others, and makes clear that the remaining vows are to be discriminated according to their meaning; at the end it explains the last vow alone, writes out in full the actual state of the mind of exhaustion and weariness and judges it to be wrong recollection, and brings out the three roads of right recollection—birth and death are all empty, like space, like what is seen in a dream; the future age too is what a single thought takes as object; the bodhisattva's power of merit and wisdom can pass beyond immeasurable kalpas—closing the whole chapter at last with the great causes and conditions the Buddha himself speaks, 「度亦不難」 tr. "delivering them is not hard either."

The doctrinal veins between this chapter and the chapters before and after can be seen along three lines. First, continuing what came before: the opening sentence of Sūtra ① continues the previous chapter's matter of the bodhisattva entering the three samādhi and poses the difficulty by way of a dream, and so the first half of this chapter does not separately establish the meaning of the three samādhi, but only asks about its bounds within a dream. Second, the seam within the chapter: the first half discusses dream and reality, the latter half discusses the vows of the pure land; they seem not to belong together, and the treatise-author's very first question at the opening of his explanation mends this seam—after obtaining the acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas and the prediction, there is no other matter left; he practises only purifying buddha-worlds and bringing beings to accomplishment; so the mind sealed in the first half is precisely the support of the work practised in the latter half. Third, reaching ahead: the 「生死邊如虛空，眾生性邊亦如虛空」 tr. "the limit of birth and death is like space, and the limit of the nature of beings is also like space" of the final passage of right recollection runs in one line with what is seen in a dream not being real at the chapter's head, and the meaning that the bodhisattva should not give rise to a mind of exhaustion and weariness is also what the chapters after this rest on when they speak at length of the places of the bodhisattva's practice.

Of the explanations of the ancient masters, two houses are worth recording for this chapter. The first is Jizang. His Commentary titles this chapter 「夢行品第五十八」 tr. "Chapter Fifty-eight: Dream Conduct," differing from the title in this treatise's base text; explaining the chapter's name, he says: 「若凡夫覺果夢，覺行是行，夢行非行。菩薩了夢覺不二，夢覺既行，覺夢亦行」 tr. "For ordinary people, waking bears fruit and dreaming does not: practice while awake is practice, practice in a dream is not practice. The bodhisattva understands that dream and waking are not two; since he practises in dream and in waking, in waking and in dream alike he practises," and again: 「今正明菩薩夢覺不二行，故云夢行亦」 tr. "Now it is precisely making clear the bodhisattva's practice in which dream and waking are not two; therefore it is called Dream Conduct"—explaining why the chapter bears its name by dream and waking being not two. His sectional division of this chapter says: 「又此亦文中具論三種義：一步論夢中行有益無益，二論夢中行集成不集成，三論夢迴向非迴向」 tr. "Further, this text fully discusses three meanings: first, it discusses whether practice in a dream is beneficial or not beneficial; second, whether practice in a dream gathers and comes to completion or does not; third, whether dedication in a dream is dedication or not dedication"—the three divisions correspond exactly to the three rounds of question and answer in this treatise's Sūtra ① and Treatise ①. This is Jizang's own division and explanation, and it and this treatise-author's explanation following the text each have their own emphasis; they are recorded together without judgement. The second is Huiying. His Commentary titles it 「釋夢中入三昧品第五十八」 tr. "Explaining Chapter Fifty-eight: Entering Samādhi in a Dream," identical character for character with the title in this treatise's base text; his sectional division of this chapter says: 「爾時舍利弗已下，就此品中大有二意：第一明乘於前品入三三昧廣化眾生，則因生論義齊於夢覺；第二從佛告須菩提有菩薩摩訶薩行檀波羅蜜時已下竟品，明菩薩之行淨佛國願」 tr. "From ‘At that time Śāriputra’ onward, within this chapter there are broadly two intentions: the first makes clear that, carrying on from the previous chapter's entering the three samādhi and widely transforming beings, a discussion arises in which dream and waking are made equal; the second, from ‘the Buddha told Subhūti: there is a bodhisattva-mahāsattva who, when practising dānapāramitā’ onward to the end of the chapter, makes clear the bodhisattva's practice of the vow to purify the buddha-land"—dividing this chapter in two, the first half making dream and waking equal and the latter half the vow to purify the buddha-land, which corresponds exactly to this treatise's division into Sūtra ① and Treatise ①, Sūtra ② and Treatise ②. Explaining the intent of Śāriputra's first question, he says: 「意謂夢是誑法，三昧是實」 tr. "The idea is that a dream is a deceptive dharma, while samādhi is real"—the same line of reasoning as this treatise-author's answer that the dream is false and deceptive while the three samādhi are real. The two houses use different chapter names; the examination of the variant names of the chapter, the division into fascicles in the various editions, and the collation of the starred notes are given in detail in the apparatus layer.