大智度論 三慧品之下Dazhidulun — Mahāprajñāpāramitā-upadeśa · The Three Wisdoms, Part 3 of 3

The Three Wisdoms, Last Part: The Doubt about Distinguishing the Three Vehicles, the Equal Merit of the Conjured Buddha and the True Buddha, Names and Marks and the Middle Way, the Difference of the Three Knowledges, the Difference in Cutting Off and in Habitual Residues, the Meaning and the Power of Prajñā, the Knowledge of Things as They Really Are, Benefit and Non-benefit, and Nothing to Be Attained

What Is Being Asked

The First Part and the Middle Part have already set in place the questions of the whole chapter: how prajñā should be practised, how given rise to, how cultivated; the Buddha answers that it is because form is quiescent, because it arises like space, because one cultivates the breaking up of dharmas; further, he presses with the four alternatives—cultivating, does one obtain sarvajñā or not; not cultivating, does one obtain it or not; cultivating and not cultivating, does one obtain it or not; neither cultivating nor not cultivating, does one obtain it or not—and answers ‘No’ to all alike, returning to 「菩薩摩訶薩得薩婆若，如如相」 tr. "the bodhisattva-mahāsattva obtains sarvajñā like the mark of suchness"; like the mark of suchness is like the limit of reality, like the nature of dharmas, and so it is pushed all the way to the place of nothing to be attained. In the Middle Part the sūtra turns out still more pressing difficulties: since all dharmas have nothing they are done for and nothing they make, from where are the distinctions of the three vehicles set up? Since beings are unfindable, on what are the names of the three groups spoken? Why are the merits of the conjured Buddha and the true Buddha equal? If names and marks have no real matter, is not the teaching of the Dharma false? The difference of the three knowledges, the difference in cutting off and in habitual residues, why prajñā is named prajñā, the double giving up of benefit and non-benefit—the sūtra asks all the way to the bottom. The Last Part is the treatise-author's explanation of this whole stretch of sūtra; it belongs entirely to the treatise section, with no sūtra passage set out within it.

What the Last Part has to answer is a threefold question. The first layer is ‘how can there be distinction within what is non-existent’: since dharmas are without making and without rising, why are the three vehicles, the three groups, the three knowledges, and the three kinds of cutting off distinguished? The treatise-author's answer runs through on one thread—distinctions are all set up as worldly names and marks, established in order to break the inversions, and they do not ruin the highest meaning; the one sentence 「皆以世俗法故說，非最第一義」 tr. "all this is spoken according to worldly dharmas; it is not the very highest meaning" has already fixed its tone. The second layer is ‘not abiding, how can one obtain’: since the Buddha abides neither in the conditioned nor in the unconditioned, how does he obtain anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi? The treatise-author takes as simile the conjured Buddha who comes and goes expounding the Dharma, takes as proof Subhūti's own 「我無所住而得漏盡」 tr. "with nowhere to abide I obtained the exhaustion of the outflows", and pushes 「無所得即是得」 tr. "nothing to be attained is precisely attaining" into the knot in which the whole chapter ends. The third layer is ‘within emptiness, how can there be superior and inferior’: the merits of the true Buddha and the conjured Buddha are equal, and yet the cutting off of the two vehicles and of the Buddha is with remainder and without remainder; the knowledge of things as they really are is obtained only by the Buddha, and yet the two vehicles and the bodhisattvas also have the knowledge of things as they really are—superior and inferior are plainly there, and yet the real mark is without difference; the treatise-author divides their bounds with two similes, the sharpness and bluntness of a knife and the first and later lamps. Beneath the three layers of question and answer there is further hidden a single thread running through: wherever there is distinction, one may not cling to it, and yet not clinging does not obstruct the use of distinction—this is precisely why the three wisdoms set up in the First Part are wisdom.

Passage by Passage

1. The opening stroke of the explanation—the doubt about distinguishing the three vehicles. The treatise-author carries on from the preceding sūtra and opens the explanation. Subhūti asks the World-Honored One again: 「若一切法無作、無起相，云何分別有三乘？」 tr. "If all dharmas are of the mark of non-action and non-rising, why are the three vehicles distinguished?" This question comes directly on from the meaning at the end of the sūtra in the Middle Part: non-action and non-rising are the utmost talk of the gate of emptiness, the three vehicles are the real matter of the gate of transforming beings; the two press on each other, and the doubt arises right from here. The Buddha 「可其意，更說因緣」 tr. "approved his intent and went on to state the causes and conditions"—first approving the question as fitting, then setting it out for him. The reason he approves it is that this doubt is not a false doubt; it is a pass through which everyone who hears of emptiness must go.

2. Where the doubt comes from lies in clinging—with the five eyes they are still not found; a mad person without eyes wishes to find them. The treatise-author explains the causes and conditions the Buddha states: the ordinary person who has not yet obtained the path clings to the five aggregates, and also clings to 「是空、無作、無起法故生疑」 tr. "this dharma of emptiness, non-action, and non-rising, and therefore gives rise to doubt"; but Subhūti has already obtained the path, clinging neither to the five aggregates nor to emptiness, non-action, and non-rising—why does he too give rise to doubt? This one question lays bare the root of the doubt: doubt does not arise from emptiness, it arises from clinging—clinging to existence surely brings doubt, and clinging to emptiness brings doubt too. The Buddha then himself states the causes and conditions: 「我以五眼尚不得色等諸法，狂人無眼而欲得！」 tr. "I, with the five eyes, do not even find form and the other dharmas; a mad person without eyes, and yet he wishes to find them!" Even one complete in the five eyes does not see any dharma that can be found, how much less one who has no eyes and wishes to find them by force. The phrase ‘a mad person without eyes’ is extremely weighty: it does not reproach his seeking, it reproaches him for setting up the notion of something findable in the place where nothing can be found.

3. The three groups of beings—assured of rightness, assured of wrongness, unassured. Subhūti presses one layer further: 「若無法、無眾生，云何說有三聚眾生？」 tr. "If there are no dharmas and no beings, why is it said that there are three groups of beings?" The Buddha answers: 「我觀眾生一聚不可得，云何有三？」 tr. "I contemplate beings and one group is unfindable; how could there be three?" Since not even one group is findable, the setting up of the three groups is purely a response to the sickness: 「但為欲破顛倒故，分別有三：……」 tr. "It is only for the sake of wishing to break the inversions that three are distinguished: …" Below, three marks are set out—those who can break the inversions are named assured of rightness; those who definitely cannot break them are assured of wrongness; those who, obtaining the causes and conditions, can break them, and not obtaining them cannot, are named unassured. The judgement of the three groups takes ‘whether or not one can break the inversions’ as its standard, not one's station; so the judgement lies in whether the mind can or cannot, not in whether the name is or is not. The last sentence gathers it up cleanly: 「皆以世俗法故說，非最第一義。」 tr. "All this is spoken according to worldly dharmas; it is not the very highest meaning." The household register of every name of distinction lies in the worldly—this is the general rule for all the distinctions of the whole fascicle.

4. The question raised: the Buddha really abides in the highest meaning, so why does he answer ‘no’? The treatise-author sets up a question: the Buddha really obtained the path abiding within the highest meaning; why does he answer Subhūti 「不」 tr. "no"? This question comes on from the question and answer about the place of abiding in Sūtra ② of the Middle Part—Subhūti asks 「非住第一義得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提耶」 tr. "is it not by abiding in the highest meaning that one obtains anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi?", and the Buddha says 「不也」 tr. "No"; he asks 「住顛倒得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提耶」 tr. "is it by abiding in the inversions that one obtains anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi?", and the Buddha again says 「不也」 tr. "No". If the highest meaning is where the Buddha abides, why is even abiding not allowed? The question is asked with the utmost solidity, and only in the answer below does its measure show.

5. For the sake of those newly aroused in intent who cling—neither of the two places may be abided in. Answer: 「須菩提為新發意著者故問，是故佛言「不」。」 tr. "Subhūti asked for the sake of those who have newly aroused the mind and cling, and therefore the Buddha said ‘No’." Since the question was put for the sake of those who cling, the answer is set up for the breaking of clinging. Below, its principle is given: 「顛倒有法中尚不可住，何況第一義無所有中住！」 tr. "Even within the inverted existent dharmas one may not abide; how much less abide within the highest meaning, which is without anything existent!" Existent dharmas are false and deceptive and may not be abided in; the dharma without anything existent has no place to abide in—it is not that he is unwilling to abide, it is that there is no abiding to abide in. This passage is the settled foundation of the single meaning of ‘not abiding’ throughout the whole fascicle.

6. Abiding in neither of the two places, can it be that he did not obtain right awakening—he really obtained, and yet with nowhere to abide. From this Subhūti raises a doubt: 「若二處不住，將無世尊不得正覺耶？」 tr. "If one abides in neither of these two places, can it be that the World-Honored One did not obtain right awakening?" The doubt follows the principle: since there is nowhere abided in, what is obtained should also be nothing. The Buddha answers: 「實得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提道，但無所住。」 tr. "I really did obtain the path of anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi; only, it is with nowhere to abide." Obtaining and abiding are divided into two matters—this is the vital point of the answer. He further explains the reason himself: 「有為性虛誑不實，無為性空無所有，故不可住。」 tr. "The nature of the conditioned is false and deceptive, not real; the nature of the unconditioned is empty, without anything existent; therefore neither may be abided in." Each of the two natures, by its own mark, may not be abided in—one false and deceptive, one empty and non-existent; it is not that the Buddha does not abide, it is that dharmas from the first have no mark of abiding.

7. The simile of the conjured Buddha—not abiding, and yet able to come and go expounding the Dharma. The treatise-author marks out why the Buddha states a simile here: 「此中佛欲明了是事故，說化佛譬喻：……」 tr. "Here the Buddha wishes to make this matter clear, and so states the simile of the conjured Buddha: …" The simile says: 「如化佛不住有為性、不住無為性，而能來去說法。」 tr. "Just as a conjured Buddha does not abide in the conditioned nature and does not abide in the unconditioned nature, and yet is able to come and go expounding the Dharma." The skill of the simile lies in the two not obstructing each other: the conjured Buddha has no real substance to abide in, and yet his coming and going and expounding the Dharma are plainly there; the Buddha has neither of the two natures to abide in, and yet his obtaining the path and expounding the Dharma are plainly there. For all who doubt that ‘without abiding there is no use’, this simile is precisely the remedy.

8. The question raised: how can a conjured person practise the six perfections? Question: 「化人來去說法可爾，云何能行檀波羅蜜等？」 tr. "That a conjured person comes and goes expounding the Dharma may pass; how can he practise dānapāramitā and the rest?" Coming and going and expounding the Dharma can still be said to be what appears of marks; giving and upholding the precepts need a mind that can give up and a thing that is given up—so he asks. This question pushes the simile to its utmost, precisely in order to find out the bounds of the simile.

9. It is not said that a conjured person can really practise—the eyes see what seems to be something practised. Answer: 「不言化人能實行，眾生眼見似有所行。」 tr. "It is not said that the conjured person can really practise; the eyes of beings see what seems to be something practised." One sentence draws the boundary clearly: the simile takes its single meaning of ‘not abiding and yet having use’, and does not take ‘really practising the six perfections’; the use of a simile stops at the point being compared, and to go beyond this becomes idle discourse. The treatise-author further proves it from the sūtra itself: 「是化事，如經中說，乃至「須扇多」。」 tr. "This matter of conjuring is as spoken of in the sūtra, and so on up to ‘Suśānta’." He cites the sūtra and stops at its heading, without spreading it out again—this is this treatise's constant way of citing the sūtra.

10. Making offerings to the conjured Buddha and to the true Buddha, the merit is not different. Subhūti 「意已信伏」 tr. "in his mind already believed and submitted", yet 「今猶少疑」 tr. "now still had a little doubt", and so asks: one who makes offerings to the true Buddha, even up to nirvāṇa without remainder, has merit that is still not exhausted; is it so too for the conjured Buddha? The Buddha answers: 「供養化佛、真佛，其福不異。」 tr. "Making offerings to the conjured Buddha and to the true Buddha, the merit is not different." The reason it is not different is 「佛得諸法實相故，供養，福無盡；化佛亦不離實相故」 tr. "because the Buddha has obtained the real mark of all dharmas, one who makes offerings has merit without end; because the conjured Buddha too is not apart from the real mark"—what merit relies on lies in the real mark, not in form and substance; so at the end he adds a turning phrase: 「若供養者心能不異，其福亦等。」 tr. "If the mind of the one making offerings can be without difference, the merit too is equal." If the mind differs the merit differs; if the mind does not differ the merit is equal—the field of merit is without distinction while the mind has distinction; this phrase lays the ground for the ‘because the mind is equal the merit is equal’ below.

11. The question raised: the conjured Buddha has no ten powers, so how is he equal to the true Buddha? Question: 「化佛無十力等諸功德，云何與真佛等？」 tr. "The conjured Buddha does not have the ten powers and all such merits; how can he be equal to the true Buddha?" Merits are the Buddha's real virtue; the conjured Buddha lacks them and yet his merit is said to be equal—the principle is not yet settled. What this question takes up is ‘virtue’, what the Buddha's answer takes up is ‘the real mark’; once the two layers are set apart, the meaning shows.

12. The ten powers and the rest all enter the real mark of all dharmas. Answer: 「十力等諸功德皆入諸法實相」 tr. "the ten powers and all such merits all enter into the real mark of all dharmas"—merits are not outside the real mark; below, it is shown from the reverse: 「若十力等離諸法實相，則非佛法，墮顛倒邪見。」 tr. "If the ten powers and the rest were apart from the real mark of all dharmas, they would not be the Buddha's Dharma, and would fall into inverted wrong views." This phrase is extremely strict: to speak of merits apart from the real mark is for merits to become wrong views. So although the conjured Buddha lacks the marks of the ten powers, he is not apart from the real mark, and the merit of offerings is therefore equal.

13. The question raised: why is the conjured Buddha not spoken of in drawing blood from the Buddha's body? Question: since within the true Buddha and the conjured Buddha alike there is definitely the real mark of all dharmas, why does the sūtra say 「惡心出佛身血得逆罪」 tr. "drawing blood from the Buddha's body with an evil mind incurs a heinous sin" and not speak of the conjured Buddha? This question turns over from the side of merit to the side of sin: since the merit is equal, the sin too should be equal. The sharpness of this way of asking lies precisely in turning a person's own principle back to question him.

14. The sūtra does not distinguish true and conjured—drawing blood with an evil mind incurs a heinous sin. Answer: 「經中但說「惡心出佛身血」，不辯真、化。」 tr. "The sūtra says only ‘drawing blood from the Buddha's body with an evil mind’, and does not distinguish the true from the conjured." Since the sūtra has not divided them, one may not divide them on the sūtra's behalf. Below, sin is likened to merit: 「若供養化佛得具足福者，惡心毀謗亦應得逆罪。」 tr. "If making offerings to a conjured Buddha can obtain complete merit, then slandering him with an evil mind should also incur a heinous sin." Further, he settles it on the matter itself: 「惡人定謂化佛是真而惡心出血，血則為出，便得逆罪。」 tr. "The evil person firmly holds that the conjured Buddha is the true one and with an evil mind draws his blood; the blood is then drawn, and he incurs the heinous sin." The standard of judgement lies in both matters being accomplished together, ‘the mind firmly holds that he is the true one’ and ‘the blood is then drawn’—mind and matter answering to each other, the sin is accomplished.

15. The question raised: why does the Vinaya say that killing a conjured person is not a violation? Question: if it is so, why is it said in the Vinaya 「殺化人不犯殺戒」 tr. "killing a conjured person does not violate the precept against killing"? The text of the Vinaya and the meaning of the treatise run against each other; this question presses out the difference of their fields.

16. The precepts laid down in the Vinaya do not discuss the real mark—the precepts are laid down in accordance with provisional names. Answer: 「毘尼中皆為世間事、攝眾僧故結戒，不論實相。」 tr. "In the Vinaya the precepts are all laid down for the sake of worldly matters and for holding the Saṅgha together; the real mark is not discussed." What the precepts are for lies in holding the Saṅgha together and protecting the Dharma, not in judging the real mark. So 「毘尼中有人、有眾生，逐假名而結戒，為護佛法故，不觀後世罪多少」 tr. "in the Vinaya there are persons and there are beings; the precepts are laid down in accordance with provisional names, for the sake of protecting the Buddha's Dharma, and the greater or lesser sin of later lives is not considered". One sentence lays bare the division of offices between the Vinaya and the treatise: the Vinaya is grounded in provisional names and in censure, the treatise is grounded in the real mark and the deed of mind—it is not that the Vinaya is wrong, it is that what they are grounded in is different.

17. Cases where the precept is heavy and the sin light, and the sin heavy and the precept light. The treatise-author brings up two cases to prove the meaning above: 「有後世罪重、戒中便輕，如道人鞭打殺牛羊等，罪重而戒輕。」 tr. "There are cases where the sin of later lives is heavy while under the precepts it is light: as when one who has gone forth flogs or kills cattle and sheep and the like, the sin is heavy and the precept light." The reverse case is 「讚歎女人，戒中重、後世罪輕」 tr. "praising women is heavy under the precepts, while the sin of later lives is light". The two cases, one rising and one falling, show exactly that the judgement of the Vinaya and the judgement of the retribution for sin in later lives do not from the first run on the same track. What is most worth savouring in this passage: one who keeps the precepts may not judge the weight of a sin by the weight of the precept, nor may he make light of the precept because of the weight of the sin.

18. Killing conjured cattle and sheep—one only incurs a sin of the mind for oneself. On the matter of killing a conjuration, he divides and judges: 「殺化牛羊，則眾人不嫌、不譏、不論，但自得心罪」 tr. "when conjured cattle and sheep are killed, the people do not loathe it, do not censure it, do not discuss it; one only incurs a sin of the mind for oneself"; if one kills real cattle and sheep and conjured cattle and sheep, 「心不異者，得罪等」 tr. "if the mind is not different, the sin incurred is equal". The first half speaks in terms of the world's censure, and so the precept is light; the second half speaks in terms of the deed of mind, and so the sins are equal. And the intent of establishing the precepts is 「為眾人譏嫌故為重」 tr. "it is judged heavy because of the people's censure"—the scales on which the Vinaya weighs heavy and light are the people's censure; this phrase says the worldly nature of the precepts through to the end.

19. The deed of mind is greatest—the cases of the samādhi of kindness and of cutting off the roots of goodness. The treatise-author cites the sūtra as proof: 「意業最大，非身、口業。」 tr. "The deed of mind is greatest, not the deeds of body and speech." Below, two matters prove it from both sides: 「如人大行布施不及行慈三昧；行慈三昧，眾生無所得，而自得無量福」 tr. "as when a person practises giving on a great scale, it does not equal practising the samādhi of kindness; practising the samādhi of kindness, beings obtain nothing, and yet he himself obtains immeasurable merit"—the samādhi of kindness gives beings not one thing and yet its merit is immeasurable, which shows that merit lies in the mind; 「邪見斷善根人，不惱眾生而入阿鼻地獄」 tr. "the person of wrong views who cuts off his roots of goodness does not trouble beings, and yet he enters the Avīci hell"—one who cuts off his roots of goodness has never inflicted harm on a single person and yet falls into the unremitting hell, which shows that sin too lies in the mind. With one merit and one sin settling it from both directions, he then concludes the passage above: 「是故供養化佛、真佛，以心等故，其福不異。」 tr. "Therefore, in making offerings to a conjured Buddha or to the true Buddha, because the mind is equal, the merit is not different."

20. Setting aside the conjured Buddha—keeping the Buddha in mind with a mind of kindness before an image of stone or clay. The treatise-author cites the Buddha's words and lowers it one layer further: 「置是化佛光相具足，有人見石泥像等，慈心念佛，是人乃至畢苦其福不盡。」 tr. "Set aside this conjured Buddha complete in light and marks; if someone sees an image of stone or clay and the like, and keeps the Buddha in mind with a mind of kindness, this person's merit is not exhausted, even up to the ending of suffering." The conjured Buddha still has light and marks complete, while an image of stone or clay is wholly different in form and substance; yet the one matter of keeping the Buddha in mind with a mind of kindness does not change, and the merit is not exhausted. The word ‘set aside’ is a word of yielding step by step: it does not contend with you over light and marks; it looks only at your mind.

21. Setting aside the clay image as well—flowers scattered in space, calling once namo Buddha. The Buddha further says: 「復置泥像，若有恭敬心，雖不見佛像，念佛故，以華散空中，其福亦得畢苦。」 tr. "Set aside further the image of clay; if one has a respectful mind, then although one does not see an image of the Buddha, because one keeps the Buddha in mind one scatters flowers in space, and the merit too reaches the ending of suffering." A further step back: not even an image is seen, there is only a respectful mind scattering flowers into space. 「復置散華，但一稱南無佛，是人亦得畢苦其福不盡。」 tr. "Set aside further the scattering of flowers; if one only calls out once namo Buddha, this person too reaches the ending of suffering, and his merit is not exhausted." The third step back comes down to a single calling of the name—the more simple the object, the more the merit remains inexhaustible as before. The threefold word ‘set aside’ strips what merit relies on, all the way from the marks down to the mind.

22. The question raised: why is the merit not exhausted merely by calling the name with an empty mouth? Question: 「云何但空稱佛名字，便得畢苦其福不盡？」 tr. "Why is it that merely calling on the Buddha's name with an empty mouth reaches the ending of suffering, with merit not exhausted?" This question is raised on behalf of ordinary feeling: calling the name is too easy, the reward of merit too great, and the principle seems not to match. The more urgent the question, the more plainly the answer shows the meaning of the field of merit.

23. Because the field of merit is immeasurable—giving with a soft mind, the merit too is without end. Answer: 「是人曾聞佛功德，能度人老、病、死。」 tr. "This person has formerly heard of the Buddha's merits, that he can deliver people from old age, sickness, and death." Why calling the name has power lies in there having been, within his mind, the hearing of the Buddha's merits—the name is not an empty name; beneath the name there is the virtue of delivering from old age, sickness, and death. So 「若多若少供養及稱名字，得無量福，亦至畢苦不盡」 tr. "whether the offering and the calling of the name be much or little, he obtains immeasurable merit, and it is not exhausted right up to the ending of suffering". The concluding words set up its general rule: 「是故福田無量故，雖濡心布施，其福亦無盡。」 tr. "Therefore, because the field of merit is immeasurable, even though one gives with a soft mind, the merit too is without end." The measure of merit is fixed by the field, not entirely by how thick or thin the power of the mind is; though the mind be soft and weak, since the field is immeasurable, the merit too is without end. Only when this phrase is read together with the ‘because the mind is equal the merit is equal’ above does one see that the two meanings of mind and field complete each other and do not take from each other.

24. The general conclusion: true and conjured are without difference. 「如是種種因緣譬喻故，真佛、化佛無異；於佛福田供養者，其福無量，以一切法實相無別無異故。」 tr. "Because of such causes and conditions and similes of every kind, the true Buddha and the conjured Buddha are without difference; one who makes offerings upon the field of merit that is the Buddha has merit that is immeasurable, because the real mark of all dharmas is without distinction and without difference." The conclusion of the section returns to its root in the real mark's being without distinction and without difference—all the discussions that came before, of the ten powers, the heinous sin, the Vinaya, the deed of mind, and the field of merit, serve as footing for this one sentence.

25. The Buddha distinguishes and speaks of dharmas—can it be that this ruins the marks of dharmas? The sūtra turns into the second layer of difficulty. Subhūti asks: 「若諸法實相無壞故二佛無異，今佛分別說諸法——是色，是受、想、行、識，乃至是有為、是無為法，將無壞諸法相耶？」 tr. "If, because the real mark of all dharmas is not ruined, the two Buddhas are without difference, now the Buddha distinguishes and speaks of dharmas—this is form, this is feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness, and so on up to this is the conditioned, this is the unconditioned dharma—can it be that this ruins the marks of dharmas?" The sharpness of this difficulty lies in using the principle the Buddha himself speaks to challenge the matter the Buddha himself speaks: since the real mark is not ruined, distinguishing seems to ruin it.

26. He only uses speech to make beings understand; the mind has nothing it clings to. The Buddha answers: 「佛雖種種分別說諸法，但以言說欲令眾生得解，心無所著。」 tr. "Although the Buddha distinguishes and speaks of dharmas in every way, he only uses speech wishing to make beings understand, and in his mind there is nothing clung to." The rightness or wrongness of distinguishing lies not in distinguishing itself, but in whether the speaker's mind clings or does not cling. This answer sets up the general pattern by which the whole fascicle judges language: language may be used; grasping and clinging may not.

27. Two Buddhas speaking together would need no names—the simile of the burning house as a lure. The treatise-author extends it: 「若二佛共語，不應說諸法名字。」 tr. "If two Buddhas were speaking together, they would not need to speak the names of dharmas." Names are set up for those who do not reach; between Buddha and Buddha they are of no use. 「以眾生無及佛者，欲牽引令解故，說「是善、是惡」。」 tr. "Because among beings there is none who reaches the Buddha, it is wishing to draw them on and make them understand that he says ‘this is wholesome, this is evil’." Further, he cites the burning house of the Lotus Sūtra as simile, 「以三乘引出諸子」 tr. "using the three vehicles to lead the children out". The intent of the simile lies in the word ‘lead’: the names of the three vehicles are like the three carts, the means of getting out of the burning house; once out, the carts are of no use. So he concludes: 「但以名相說諸法，不壞第一義。」 tr. "He only uses names and marks to speak of dharmas, and does not ruin the highest meaning."

28. Speaking by names and marks, is it not false—the sages speak in accordance with worldly convention. Subhūti presses again: 「雖以名相為眾生說，無有實事，將無虛妄耶？」 tr. "Although he speaks for beings by means of names and marks, there is no real matter; can it be that it is not false?" To speak without reality seems to be deception. The Buddha answers: 「聖人隨世俗言說，於中無有名相著處。」 tr. "The sages speak in accordance with worldly convention, and within it there is no place where names and marks are clung to." The falseness is accomplished in clinging, not in speaking; speaking in accordance with convention, with not one place within it that can be clung to, speaking is then not deception.

29. Ordinary persons cling to names and grasp at marks—one who clings is not named the noble truth of suffering. The treatise-author cites the causes and conditions the Buddha himself states to make it plain: 「如凡夫說苦，著名、取相；諸佛及弟子口說苦而心不著；若著，不名苦聖諦。」 tr. "As when ordinary persons speak of suffering, they cling to the name and grasp at the mark; the buddhas and their disciples speak of suffering with the mouth and the mind does not cling; if they clung, it would not be named the noble truth of suffering." Speaking the same one word ‘suffering’, the difference between the ordinary and the noble lies only in clinging and not clinging; and with that single move of ‘clinging’, the truth of suffering loses its being a noble truth. This phrase is extremely keen: the nobility of the noble truth lies not in the dharma spoken, but in the mind that speaks.

30. Within empty names and marks, how could one cling to empty names and marks? The treatise-author follows out its principle: 「苦諦即是名相等，無有定實；凡夫著者亦是名相，無有定實，云何空名相中著空名相？」 tr. "The truth of suffering is names and marks and the like, and has no fixed reality; what ordinary persons cling to is also names and marks, and has no fixed reality—how could one, within empty names and marks, cling to empty names and marks?" What is clung to and what clings are both names and marks, both without fixed reality; for two empties to cling to each other is a principle that cannot be established. Below, he exhausts it by pressing from the reverse: 「若空名相中著名相者，空亦應著空，無相亦應著無相，無作亦應著無作，乃至無為性亦應著無為性。」 tr. "If within empty names and marks one could cling to names and marks, then emptiness too should cling to emptiness, the signless too should cling to the signless, non-action too should cling to non-action, and so on up to the unconditioned nature too should cling to the unconditioned nature." Pushing on layer by layer, it shows that clinging cannot be established.

31. Names and marks too do not abide within names and marks—abiding in this prajñā of names and marks. Concluding the above, he gives the place of practice: 「是法皆如凡夫苦諦相，但有名相；名相亦不住名相中。」 tr. "These dharmas are all like the mark of the truth of suffering of ordinary persons: they have only names and marks; and names and marks too do not abide within names and marks." Since names and marks do not even abide in themselves, where is there any ground to cling to? So the bodhisattva's place of practice is here: 「菩薩入是名相等諸法門中，住是名相般若中，應觀一切法無有實。」 tr. "The bodhisattva enters into these gates of dharmas, names and marks and the like, abides within this prajñā of names and marks, and should contemplate that all dharmas are without reality." The six Chinese characters rendered here as ‘abiding, and contemplating that it is without reality’ are the gate of practice of this passage—it is not doing away with names and marks and then entering prajñā; it is, right at names and marks, contemplating that they are without reality.

32. If all dharmas have only names and marks, for what does the bodhisattva arouse the mind? Subhūti raises a difficulty again: 「若一切法但有名相，菩薩為何等故發心？」 tr. "If all dharmas have only names and marks, for what does the bodhisattva arouse the mind?" This difficulty is the most pressing and real: since names and marks are empty, the arousing of the mind is empty too; where would the great vow stand? The treatise-author notes 「如經中說」 tr. "as is said in the sūtra", showing that the text of the question is all there in the sūtra, and does not spread it out again.

33. Within names and marks, names and marks are also empty—therefore one can arouse the mind and deliver beings. The Buddha answers: 「若一切法但有名相者，名相中名相亦空，是法皆畢竟空，入如、法性、實際中；是故菩薩能發阿耨多羅三藐三菩提，乃至能以三乘度眾生。」 tr. "If all dharmas have only names and marks, then the names and marks within names and marks are also empty; these dharmas are all ultimate emptiness, and enter into suchness, the nature of dharmas, and the limit of reality; therefore the bodhisattva is able to arouse anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi, and so on up to being able to deliver beings by means of the three vehicles." This answer overturns the questioner's assumption: it is not ‘although empty, one can still arouse the mind’, it is ‘precisely because of ultimate emptiness one can arouse the mind’—because it is empty it can turn, and because it can turn there is the matter of arousing the mind and delivering beings.

34. Fixed reality is without arising and ceasing, and pure emptiness is also without arising and ceasing—neither can deliver. The treatise-author settles it between two difficulties. The first: 「若諸法有定實、非名相者，即是無生滅；無生滅故，無苦、無集、無盡、無道，云何以三乘度眾生？」 tr. "If dharmas had a fixed reality and were not names and marks, that would be without arising and ceasing; because there is no arising and ceasing, there would be no suffering, no accumulation, no exhaustion, no path—how could beings be delivered by means of the three vehicles?" With fixed reality, the four truths are not established. The second: 「若諸法但是空名相、無實者，亦無生滅；無生滅故，無苦、集、盡、道，亦云何可度？」 tr. "If dharmas were only empty names and marks, without reality, that too would be without arising and ceasing; because there is no arising and ceasing, there would be no suffering, accumulation, exhaustion, or path—and again how could they be delivered?" Taking one-sidedly an emptiness of annihilation, the four truths are not established either. Both extremes alike fall, and the middle way then shows.

35. Leaving existence and leaving non-existence, dwelling in the middle way—the bodhisattva practising the prajñā of the middle way obtains the omniscience of all kinds. He sets up the middle way squarely: 「今菩薩知一切法名相等空，則離世間顛倒；亦知名相空，亦離名相空。」 tr. "Now the bodhisattva knows that the names and marks and the like of all dharmas are empty, and so leaves the inversions of the world; he also knows that names and marks are empty, and also leaves the emptiness of names and marks." Leaving the inversions is leaving existence; leaving the emptiness of names and marks is leaving non-existence—the second ‘leaving’ is the most vital: only by not taking even emptiness is it named leaving non-existence. So 「如是離有離無、處中道，能度眾生」 tr. "thus leaving existence and leaving non-existence, and dwelling in the middle way, he is able to deliver beings". At the end the treatise-author gives the Buddha's intent: 「菩薩行是中道般若，得一切種智。」 tr. "The bodhisattva practises this prajñā of the middle way and obtains the omniscience of all kinds." This sentence both concludes the section on names and marks and lays the ground for the three knowledges below.

36. Wishing to raise a difficulty, he first fixes the Buddha's words—does the World-Honored One speak of the omniscience of all kinds? The sūtra turns into the section on the three knowledges. The treatise-author points out Subhūti's intent: 「爾時，須菩提欲難故，先定佛語，乃問：「世尊說一切種智耶？」」 tr. "At that time Subhūti, because he wished to raise a difficulty, first fixed the Buddha's words, and so asked: ‘Does the World-Honored One speak of the omniscience of all kinds?’" First fixing his words and only afterwards raising the difficulty is the constant method of debate; the treatise-author marks it out specially so that the reader does not mistake this question for asking out of not knowing.

37. The Buddha says: I speak of the omniscience of all kinds. The Buddha says: 「我說一切種智。」 tr. "I speak of the omniscience of all kinds." With one word he acknowledges it himself, and the ground for the difficulty is then set up. This one question and answer is itself a point of teaching: the names of the three knowledges are spoken by the Buddha himself, not set up by force by people of later times.

38. What difference is there among the three kinds of knowledge—sarvajñā is the knowledge of the two vehicles. He asks further: 「佛常說三種智，三種智有何差別？」 tr. "The Buddha constantly speaks of three kinds of knowledge; what difference is there among the three kinds of knowledge?" The Buddha answers: 「薩婆若是聲聞、辟支佛智。」 tr. "Sarvajñā is the knowledge of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas." The treatise-author explains the reason: 「一切名內外十二入，是法，聲聞、辟支佛總相知，皆是無常、苦、空、無我等。」 tr. "‘All’ names the inner and outer twelve sense-fields; these dharmas the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas know by the general mark—that all are impermanent, suffering, empty, non-self, and so on." What ‘all’ points to is the inner and outer twelve sense-fields, and the two vehicles know these only by the general mark—sarvajñā is judged to belong to the two vehicles precisely in terms of this knowing by the general mark. Here the reader must remember: the names and meanings of the three knowledges in this treatise rest on different grounds from other places where sarvajñā is taken as the Buddha's knowledge; each should be understood according to its own text.

39. The knowledge of the kinds of paths is the knowledge of the bodhisattvas—the paths are of four kinds. 「道種智，是諸菩薩摩訶薩智。」 tr. "The knowledge of the kinds of paths is the knowledge of the bodhisattva-mahāsattvas." The treatise-author explains the four kinds of paths: 「一者、人天中受福樂道，所謂種福德；并三乘道為四。」 tr. "The first is the path of receiving the happiness of merit among humans and gods, namely the planting of merit; together with the paths of the three vehicles, they make four." Below, he makes plain the sequence in which the bodhisattva uses the paths: 「應引導眾生著大道中；若不任入大道者，著二乘中；若不任入涅槃者，著人天福樂中，作涅槃因緣。」 tr. "He should lead beings and settle them within the great path; those who are not equal to entering the great path he settles within the two vehicles; those who are not equal to entering nirvāṇa he settles within the happiness of merit among humans and gods, as a cause and condition for nirvāṇa." Further, he points to the substance of each: 「世間福樂道，是十善、布施諸福德；三十七品是二乘道；三十七品及六波羅蜜是菩薩道。」 tr. "The worldly path of the happiness of merit is the ten wholesome paths, giving, and all such merit; the thirty-seven limbs of the path are the path of the two vehicles; the thirty-seven limbs of the path together with the six perfections are the bodhisattva path." Under the name of each of the four paths there is a real dharma; they are not names set up in vain. At the end he gives its bounds: 「菩薩以佛道自為、為人，以餘三道但為眾生是菩薩道種智。」 tr. "The bodhisattva uses the Buddha path both for himself and for others, and uses the other three paths solely for beings—this is the bodhisattva's knowledge of the kinds of paths." The Buddha path is for both self and others, the other three paths are solely for beings—the meaning of the word ‘kinds’ in the knowledge of the kinds of paths lies here: not merely knowing the path, but knowing what befits every path.

40. Why is the knowledge of the kinds of paths the bodhisattva's matter? Subhūti asks: 「何以道種智為菩薩事？」 tr. "Why is the knowledge of the kinds of paths the bodhisattva's matter?" Since the omniscience of all kinds is the Buddha's knowledge, why does the bodhisattva not take the omniscience of all kinds directly as his matter? What this question wishes to press out is the proper matter at the bodhisattva's station.

41. Fulfilling all paths and not taking realisation—only afterwards sitting at the seat of awakening does he take realisation. The Buddha answers: 「菩薩應具足一切道，以是道化眾生。」 tr. "The bodhisattva should fulfil all paths, and with these paths transform beings." Below, the difficult point is given: 「雖出入是道，未教化眾生、淨佛國土而不取證；具足是事已，然後坐道場乃取證。」 tr. "Although he goes in and out of these paths, before he has taught and transformed beings and purified buddha-lands he does not take realisation; after he has fulfilled these matters, he then sits at the seat of awakening and only then takes realisation." Going in and out of the paths and not taking realisation is where the whole of the bodhisattva's work lies—able to realise and not realising, for the sake of beings; so he concludes: 「是故，須菩提！道種智是菩薩事。」 tr. "Therefore, Subhūti! the knowledge of the kinds of paths is the bodhisattva's matter."

42. Abiding where does he realise the limit of reality—Subhūti's two faults. Subhūti asks again: 「是菩薩住何處實際作證？」 tr. "Abiding where does this bodhisattva realise the limit of reality?" The treatise-author explains the intent of the question: 「若住道中作證，是事不然，有二過故：……」 tr. "If he abides in the path and realises it, this is not so, because there are two faults: …" This is the treatise-author setting out on Subhūti's behalf the structure of his doubt, not setting up a separate view of his own.

43. The two faults in detail—a person with fetters should not have pure right knowledge; conditioned dharmas are all false and deceptive. 「一者、有結使人不應有畢竟清淨正智；若有，則與佛無異；若異者，有煩惱習氣故應有錯謬。」 tr. "First, a person who has fetters should not have the right knowledge of ultimate purity; if he had it, he would be no different from the Buddha; if he is different, then because he has the habitual residues of the afflictions, he should have error." This fault is spoken in terms of the person: to speak of ultimate purity while the fetters are not yet exhausted is to be no different from the Buddha; if one says there is a difference, then his knowledge has error and cannot be named ultimately pure. 「二者、一切有為法皆是虛誑，和合故有，假名，無有定實。」 tr. "Second, all conditioned dharmas are false and deceptive; they exist through coming together, are provisional names, and have no fixed reality." This fault is spoken in terms of dharmas: the path is conditioned, false and deceptive, a provisional name, with no place to abide. The two faults, one of person and one of dharma—abiding in it cannot be accomplished.

44. The Buddha says ‘No’—all four alternatives dismissed. 「是故佛言：「不也！」」 tr. "Therefore the Buddha says: ‘No!’" The treatise-author pushes it further: 「若住「道」中尚不得，何況「非道」！」 tr. "If even abiding in ‘the path’ he does not obtain it, how much less in ‘what is not the path’!" The path cannot even be abided in; what is not the path is still less to be discussed. 「「道非道」，亦有二過故」 tr. "‘The path and what is not the path’ also has the two faults"—taking both, one incurs both faults. 「「非道非不道」，以著心取相故，亦言「不也！」」 tr. "‘Neither the path nor not the path’—because it is grasping at marks with a clinging mind, to this too he says ‘No!’" The dismissal of the fourth alternative lies not in its meaning but in the mind—to set up the double negation is still grasping at marks, and so it too is not allowed. The dismissal of the four alternatives is here complete.

45. The path the Buddha obtained is very deep—he asks again where one abides to realise it. 「爾時，須菩提意或作是念：「佛所得道甚深，不可得底。」是故復問：「菩薩住何處實際作證？」」 tr. "At that time Subhūti perhaps had this thought in his mind: ‘The path the Buddha has obtained is very deep; its bottom cannot be reached.’ Therefore he asked again: ‘Abiding where does the bodhisattva realise the limit of reality?’" The treatise-author marks it with ‘perhaps had this thought’ as a word of conjecture and does not firmly decide what was in his mind—this is this treatise's sense of measure in recording the mental movements of others; the reader may not read it as a settled statement.

46. The Buddha asks Subhūti in return. 「佛反問須菩提。」 tr. "The Buddha asked Subhūti in return." Not answering but asking in return is the pivot of this passage; the two questions and two answers below are all born from this one turn.

47. The question raised: why does he not answer directly but ask in return? Question: 「佛何以故不直答而反問須菩提？」 tr. "Why does the Buddha not answer directly, but asks Subhūti in return?" This question is raised on the reader's behalf: since there is a straight answer, why the roundabout way? The answer is in the next passage, and its method is precisely the single meaning of ‘not abiding’ of the whole fascicle shown in the flesh.

48. He asks in return by what Subhūti himself had realised—when you obtained the path, did you realise it abiding in the four alternatives? Answer: 「須菩提自於所得道中了了無或，貴尚佛所證故，四句戲論，如有著心不了故問；……」 tr. "Subhūti himself, within the path he had obtained, was clear and plain and without bewilderment; because he honoured and exalted what the Buddha had realised, he put the four alternatives as idle discourse, as though he asked with a clinging mind, not understanding; …" Subhūti was clear and without bewilderment about his own realisation; the reason he put the question of the four alternatives came from honouring and exalting the Buddha's realisation, not from his own being unclear. 「是故佛以須菩提所得證反問：「汝得道時住四句中得證耶？」」 tr. "Therefore the Buddha used the realisation Subhūti had obtained to ask him in return: ‘When you obtained the path, was it abiding within the four alternatives that you obtained realisation?’" He takes the questioner's own realisation as a mirror—the wonder of this way of answering lies in making the questioner see the answer within his own portion.

49. With nowhere to abide I obtained the exhaustion of the outflows—the bodhisattva too is thus. 「答言：「不也！我無所住而得漏盡。」」 tr. "He answered: ‘No! With nowhere to abide I obtained the exhaustion of the outflows.’" Subhūti answers himself, and the difficulty of the four alternatives then resolves of itself. The Buddha at once goes along with it and seals it: 「汝以無所住而心得解脫，當知菩薩摩訶薩亦如是，不住四句而證實際。」 tr. "As you, with nowhere to abide, have had your mind obtain liberation, you should know that the bodhisattva-mahāsattva too is thus: not abiding in the four alternatives, he realises the limit of reality." He takes what Subhūti himself realised as the pattern for what the bodhisattva realises—the one phrase 「是故佛反問」 tr. "this is why the Buddha asked in return" concludes why he asked in return: it is not that he did not answer; it is that he made him answer himself.

50. Among the four kinds of answer, this is named the answer by counter-question. 「復有人言：四種答中，是名反問答。」 tr. "Again, someone says: among the four kinds of answer, this is named the answer by counter-question." The treatise-author records the view of another school, which, by the four kinds of pattern for answering, judges this passage to belong to the pattern of the answer by counter-question. This entry is a record of form, not a judgement of doctrine; it is recorded alongside and does not take anything from the passage above.

51. The question raised: abiding in the vajra samādhi, how can it be said that he does not abide in the path? Question: 「須菩提住金剛三昧，心得解脫，云何言「不住道中」？」 tr. "Subhūti abides in the vajra samādhi and his mind obtains liberation; how can it be said that he ‘does not abide in the path’?" Since it says ‘abides in the vajra samādhi’, that is abiding; since it says he does not abide, before and after contradict each other. What this question presses on is the double sense of the one word ‘abide’.

52. Abiding is a name for grasping at marks—because he does not use it, he does not abide in it. Answer: 「住名取相，定有是法；……」 tr. "Abiding is a name for grasping at marks, holding that this dharma definitely exists; …" First the meaning of ‘abide’ is fixed: one who abides must grasp at marks, and one who grasps at marks must hold that this dharma is there. 「是人更求無為勝法故，不名為住有為法，為不用故，不於中住。」 tr. "This person seeks further the surpassing dharma of the unconditioned, and so he is not named as abiding in conditioned dharmas; because he does not use it, he does not abide in it." The vajra samādhi is a surpassing conditioned dharma, while that person's aim is the unconditioned; he neither takes it up nor uses it, so though he is placed within it, it is not named abiding. The ‘abide’ of the sūtra is a word of place, the ‘abide’ of the treatise-author is a word of grasping and clinging—once the double sense is divided, the contradiction resolves of itself.

53. Again, someone says—having obtained the signless dharma, there is nothing to discriminate. 「復有人言：住是名相凡夫法中，便有分別是金剛，是解脫。得無相法，則無所分別。」 tr. "Again, someone says: it is abiding within this dharma of ordinary persons, names and marks, that there is discrimination—this is the vajra, this is liberation. Having obtained the signless dharma, there is nothing to discriminate." This school explains it from the point of discrimination between subject and object: discriminating the vajra from liberation is itself a matter within names and marks; once the signless is obtained, discrimination dissolves of itself. It stands together with the explanation above; both suffice to explain ‘not abiding’.

54. The Buddha asks in return for the sake of the signless dharma—one should not raise a difficulty by means of names and marks. 「佛為無相法故，反問須菩提：「汝不應以名相故問，汝不應以名相為難。」」 tr. "For the sake of the signless dharma the Buddha asked Subhūti in return: ‘You should not ask by means of names and marks; you should not raise a difficulty by means of names and marks.’" This sentence points out one layer further the intent of the counter-question: the counter-question is not only a skill in the method of answering, it is a blocking with respect to the two Chinese characters ‘names and marks’—since the question is set up by names and marks, the answer may not repay it with names and marks; so by the counter-question he breaks the place from which the question is asked.

55. The omniscience of all kinds is the Buddha's knowledge—penetrating without obstruction within all dharmas of the three times. The treatise-author properly explains the third knowledge: 「一切種智是佛智。」 tr. "The omniscience of all kinds is the Buddha's knowledge." Its meaning is: 「一切種智名一切三世法中通達無礙，知大小、精麁，無事不知。」 tr. "The omniscience of all kinds means penetrating without obstruction within all dharmas of the three times, knowing the great and the small, the fine and the coarse, with no matter unknown." Look at it against the ‘knowing by the general mark’ of the two vehicles above: they have only the general mark, whereas this knows the great and small, fine and coarse, with no matter unknown—the superiority and inferiority of the three knowledges is judged by whether what is known is pervasive or not, not by setting up a separate substance.

56. The two marks of the omniscience of all kinds—the mark of quiescence and the mark of penetration. 「佛自說「一切種智」義，有二種相：……」 tr. "The Buddha himself states the meaning of ‘the omniscience of all kinds’: it has two kinds of marks: …" The first: 「通達諸法實相故寂滅相。」 tr. "Because it penetrates the real mark of all dharmas, it is the mark of quiescence." The simile says: 「如大海水中風不能動，以其深故波浪不起；一切種智亦如是，戲論風所不能動。」 tr. "As in the waters of the great sea the wind cannot stir it, because it is deep, and no waves rise; the omniscience of all kinds too is thus—the wind of idle discourse cannot stir it." Being deep and so unmoved is the meaning of quiescence. The second: 「一切諸法可以名相文字言說，了了通達無礙。」 tr. "All dharmas that can be spoken of by names, marks, letters, and words it penetrates clearly and plainly without obstruction." So he concludes: 「攝有、無二事故名「一切種智」。」 tr. "Because it gathers together the two matters of existence and non-existence, it is named ‘the omniscience of all kinds’." One of quiescence and one of penetration, one of non-existence and one of existence—only when both matters are gathered together is it named the omniscience of all kinds; this answers exactly to the general principle above of ‘not clinging and yet not obstructing distinction’.

57. Someone says—the ten powers and the rest together are named the omniscience of all kinds. 「有人言：十力、四無所畏、四無礙法、十八不共法，盡是智慧相，和合名為一切種智。」 tr. "Someone says: the ten powers, the four fearlessnesses, the four unobstructed knowledges, and the eighteen unshared dharmas are all marks of wisdom; coming together, they are named the omniscience of all kinds." This school sets up the meaning from the coming together of the items of virtue; the treatise-author records it and adds neither approval nor rejection.

58. Again, someone says—by the vajra samādhi, in sequence, unobstructed liberation is obtained. 「復有人言：金剛三昧次第得無礙解脫故，若大小、近遠、深淺、難易，無事不知。」 tr. "Again, someone says: because by the vajra samādhi, in sequence, unobstructed liberation is obtained, whether great or small, near or far, deep or shallow, difficult or easy, there is no matter unknown." This school sets up the meaning from the sequence of realisation. The two schools above and below, one in terms of virtue and one in terms of realisation, stand side by side with the two marks the Buddha himself speaks. At the end the treatise-author gathers them with one sentence: 「如是等種種無量因緣，名一切種智。」 tr. "By such immeasurable causes and conditions of every kind, it is named the omniscience of all kinds." Keeping the various views side by side without judging is this treatise's constant method where a name has many gates of meaning.

59. Wisdom has higher, middle, and lower—is there difference in the cutting off of the afflictions? 「須菩提聞是已，問佛：「智慧故有上、中、下分別，煩惱斷復有差別不？」」 tr. "Subhūti, having heard this, asked the Buddha: ‘Because wisdom is distinguished as higher, middle, and lower, is there then also a difference in the cutting off of the afflictions?’" Since knowledge has three grades, the cutting off should have three degrees—this question comes along the line of principle, and the answer below goes beyond what one would expect.

60. At the time of cutting off there is difference, once cut off there is no difference—the sharpness and bluntness of a knife. 「佛言：「無差別。」」 tr. "The Buddha said: ‘There is no difference.’" The treatise-author explains it: 「斷時有差別，斷已無差別；……」 tr. "At the time of cutting off there is a difference; once cut off there is no difference; …" The simile says: 「譬如刀有利鈍，斷時有遲速，斷已無差別。」 tr. "It is like a knife that may be sharp or blunt: at the time of cutting there is slowness or swiftness, but once cut there is no difference." The process of cutting off belongs to the conditioned and so has superior and inferior; what cutting off accomplishes belongs to the unconditioned and so has no difference. He further divides the reality of it: 「如來煩惱及習都盡；聲聞、辟支佛但煩惱盡，而習氣有餘。」 tr. "The Tathāgata's afflictions and habitual residues are all entirely exhausted; the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas have only the afflictions exhausted, while the habitual residues still remain." This sentence sets up the guiding thread of the latter half of the Last Part—the division between the afflictions and the habitual residues is where the three vehicles come to be with remainder and without remainder.

61. Are the three kinds of cutting off conditioned or unconditioned—all are unconditioned. 「須菩提問佛：「世尊！三種斷，是有為、是無為？」佛答：「皆是無為。」」 tr. "Subhūti asked the Buddha: ‘World-Honored One! These three kinds of cutting off—are they conditioned or unconditioned?’ The Buddha answered: ‘All are unconditioned.’" Since all are unconditioned, the principle of there being no difference grows firmer still; and yet the talk of with remainder and without remainder then seems hard to get through—the several questions below press precisely on this point.

62. Within the unconditioned dharma can a difference be found—signless and immeasurable. 「復問：「世尊！無為法中可得差別不？」佛答：「是法無相、無量，云何可得差別？」」 tr. "He asked further: ‘World-Honored One! Within the unconditioned dharma can a difference be found?’ The Buddha answered: ‘This dharma is signless and immeasurable; how could a difference be found?’" Being signless, it has no mark that can be compared; being immeasurable, it has no measure that can be weighed—the setting up of difference must rely on mark and on measure, and since both are absent, difference has no ground on which to stand.

63. Why is it said that there is remainder and no remainder—this habitual residue is not named a true affliction. 「復問：「世尊！若無差別，云何說是斷中有餘、是斷中無餘？」」 tr. "He asked further: ‘World-Honored One! If there is no difference, why is it said that in this cutting off there is a remainder and in that cutting off there is no remainder?’" The Buddha answers: 「須菩提！是習，不名真煩惱。」 tr. "Subhūti! This habitual residue is not named a true affliction." One sentence unties the knot: in what has a remainder, what remains is habitual residue, not true affliction; in the cutting off of true affliction, the three vehicles alike are unconditioned and alike without difference. The name of difference is placed upon the residues, not upon the cutting off.

64. The habitual residues of the two vehicles are not exhausted—the monkey's leaping, the calling of ‘little slave-girl’. The treatise-author brings up matters to give it substance: 「有人雖斷一切煩惱，身、口中亦有煩惱相出；凡人見聞是相已，則起不清淨心。」 tr. "There are those who, although they have cut off all afflictions, still show marks of affliction in body and in speech; ordinary people, having seen and heard these marks, then give rise to an impure mind." Below, two matters are brought up. The first is the arhat Madhuvāsiṣṭha, 「五百世在獼猴中，今雖得阿羅漢，猶騰跳樹木」 tr. "who for five hundred lives was among monkeys; now, although he has obtained arhatship, he still leaps and bounds among the trees"; foolish people seeing it make light of him, and the treatise-author specially distinguishes: 「是阿羅漢無煩惱心而猶有本習。」 tr. "This arhat has no mind of affliction, and yet he still has his original habits." The second is the arhat Pilindavatsa, 「五百世生婆羅門中，習輕蔑心故」 tr. "who for five hundred lives was born among brahmins, because a mind of disdain had become habitual"; although he had obtained arhatship, he still spoke to the spirit of the river Ganges, saying 「小婢！止流！」 tr. "Little slave-girl! Stop the flow!"; the god of the Ganges was angered and went to the Buddha to lay a complaint, and 「佛教懺悔，猶稱「小婢」」 tr. "the Buddha taught him to repent, and he still called her ‘little slave-girl’". Having repented and yet the habit of the mouth unchanged—this shows exactly that habitual residue is not affliction: the mind is without pride and yet the mouth brings it out of itself; these two matters are the most apt to wake one up from the error of ‘seeing marks and doubting the sage’. So he concludes: 「如是等身、口業煩惱習氣，二乘不盡。」 tr. "Such habitual residues of the afflictions in deeds of body and speech the two vehicles do not exhaust."

65. The Buddha's habitual residues are exhausted—five hundred matters of reviling, five hundred matters of praise. 「佛無如是事。」 tr. "The Buddha has no such matters." Below, a long string of matters is brought up as proof. The first: 「如一婆羅門惡口，一時以五百事罵佛，佛無慍色；婆羅門心乃歡喜，即復一時以五百善事讚歎於佛，佛亦無喜色。」 tr. "As when a brahmin, foul-mouthed, at one time reviled the Buddha with five hundred matters, and the Buddha had no look of displeasure; the brahmin's mind then became glad, and straightaway at one time he praised the Buddha with five hundred good matters, and the Buddha also had no look of joy." Blame and praise came alike from one person's mouth and the Buddha's countenance did not move, so 「當知佛煩惱習氣盡故，好、惡無異」 tr. "one should know that because the Buddha's habitual residues of the afflictions are exhausted, good and ill are no different to him".

66. Good name and evil name—Sundarī's slander. The second: 「佛初得道，實功德中出好名聲充滿十方，唯佛自知；而孫陀梨梵志女，殺身謗佛，惡名流布。佛於此二事，心無有異，亦不憂喜。」 tr. "When the Buddha first obtained the path, from his real merits a good name went forth filling the ten directions, which the Buddha alone knew of himself; and Sundarī, a woman of the brahmin ascetics, slandered the Buddha by her being killed, and an evil name spread abroad. Toward these two matters the Buddha's mind had no difference, and he neither sorrowed nor rejoiced." The good name came from real virtue, the evil name from false contrivance; one real and one false, and yet the mind was not two—this is in terms of the one pass of name.

67. The empty bowl and the offerings of the gods, horse-barley and heavenly food. The third and fourth are in terms of the pass of gain and offerings: 「入婆羅門聚落中，空鉢而出；天人種種供養。」 tr. "He entered a village of brahmins and came out with an empty bowl; gods and humans made offerings of every kind." 「又復三月食馬麥；釋提桓因恭敬，以天食供養。」 tr. "Again, for three months he ate horse-barley; Śakra Devānām Indra reverently made offerings of heavenly food." Utmost poverty and utmost offering are brought up together, and the mind neither increases nor decreases.

68. Thorns and cold wind, and the heavenly white jewel-stone. The fifth is in terms of the pass of dwelling-place: 「阿羅婆伽林中，棘刺寒風，佛在中宿；又於歡喜園中，在天白寶石上，柔濡滑澤，又敷天臥具。於此好惡事中，心無憂喜。」 tr. "In the Aluopojia forest, among thorns and a cold wind, the Buddha passed the night; again, in the Garden of Joy, he was upon the heavenly white jewel-stone, soft and smooth and glossy, and heavenly bedding was spread as well. Among these good and ill matters his mind had neither sorrow nor joy." A place of suffering and a place of pleasure, the two extremes, and yet the mind neither takes nor rejects.

69. Rolling a rock with a hateful mind and bowing at the feet with a reverent mind—as one loves one's two eyes. The sixth is in terms of the pass of persons: 「提婆達瞋心以石堆佛，羅睺羅敬心合手禮佛；於此二人，其心平等，如愛兩眼。」 tr. "Devadatta with a hateful mind rolled a rock at the Buddha; Rāhula with a reverent mind joined his hands and bowed to the Buddha; toward these two persons his mind was equal, as one loves one's two eyes." Enemy and kin at their utmost, and yet equal as the two eyes—this simile is extremely intimate: the two eyes are not divided into this and that, and the Buddha's regard for enemy and kin too is not divided into this and that. The treatise-author gathers it all up: 「如是等種種干亂，無有異想；譬如真金，燒磨鍛截，其色不變。佛經此眾事，心無增減，是故可知諸佛愛恚等諸煩惱習氣都盡。」 tr. "Through such disturbances of every kind, he had no different thought; it is like true gold: burned, ground, forged, and cut, its colour does not change. The Buddha passed through these many matters and his mind neither increased nor decreased; therefore one can know that the buddhas' habitual residues of the afflictions, love and hatred and all the others, are entirely exhausted." Look at the simile of true gold against the simile of the knife above: the knife simile concerns the slowness or swiftness of cutting, the gold simile concerns passing through matters without changing—one in terms of that which cuts, one in terms of what is passed through.

70. Within the real mark there is no path and no nirvāṇa—why distinguish residues exhausted and not exhausted? 「須菩提意：「若諸法實相中，若道、若涅槃無所有；若無所有，何以分別是須陀洹乃至辟支佛習氣未盡、佛習氣盡？」」 tr. "Subhūti's meaning: ‘If within the real mark of all dharmas, whether the path or nirvāṇa, there is nothing existent; if there is nothing existent, why is it distinguished that from the srota-āpanna up to the pratyekabuddha the habitual residues are not yet exhausted, and the Buddha's habitual residues are exhausted?’" Since the preceding passage spoke to the utmost of the difference between the residues of the Buddha and of the two vehicles, this question turns from the place where the real mark is without anything existent to challenge what that difference relies on.

71. The sages of the three vehicles all have their difference by means of the unconditioned dharma. 「佛言：「三乘聖人皆以無為法而有差別。」」 tr. "The Buddha said: ‘The sages of the three vehicles all have their difference by means of the unconditioned dharma.’" The treatise-author adds a turning phrase: 「雖因無為有差別，而有為法中可得說。」 tr. "Although it is by reason of the unconditioned that there is difference, it can be spoken of within conditioned dharmas." The cause of the difference lies in the portion and measure of what is realised of the unconditioned; the speaking of the difference lies in the verbal expression of the conditioned—cause and speaking belong to two places, and the meaning is then without obstruction.

72. Wishing to fix the Buddha's words—is it really by reason of the unconditioned dharma that there is difference? 「須菩提欲定佛語，故問：「世尊！實以無為法故有差別耶？」」 tr. "Subhūti, wishing to fix the Buddha's words, therefore asked: ‘World-Honored One! Is it really by reason of the unconditioned dharma that there is difference?’" It is the same method as ‘wishing to raise a difficulty, he first fixes the Buddha's words’ above. The treatise-author marks its intent again, showing that Subhūti's questions are all raised with a purpose.

73. Worldly names and marks can be distinguished, within the foremost dharma there is no discrimination—the later limit is nirvāṇa without remainder. The Buddha answers: 「世俗法語言名相故可分別，第一法中無分別。」 tr. "By reason of the words, names, and marks of worldly dharmas, distinctions can be made; within the foremost dharma there is no discrimination." Why? 「第一義中一切語言道斷，以一切心所行斷故。」 tr. "Within the highest meaning all the ways of words are cut off, because all that the mind moves in is cut off." The way of words cut off and the place of the mind's movement extinguished, discrimination has nowhere to be applied. 「但以諸聖人結使斷故，說有後際。」 tr. "It is only because the fetters of the sages have been cut off that it is said there is a later limit." The treatise-author explains it: 「後際者，所謂無餘涅槃。」 tr. "The later limit means nirvāṇa without remainder." This explanatory phrase is extremely vital: the later limit is not the last stretch of time; it is another name for the place where the fetters are cut off and exhausted.

74. Because of the emptiness of specific marks the prior limit is unfindable, how much less the later limit. 「須菩提問：「世尊！諸法自相空故，前際不可得，何況後際！」」 tr. "Subhūti asked: ‘World-Honored One! Because of the emptiness of specific marks of dharmas, even the prior limit is unfindable, how much less the later limit!’" The treatise-author supplies its reason: 「因前際故有後際。」 tr. "It is by reason of the prior limit that there is a later limit." Since the prior limit is unfindable, the later limit, which is set up in dependence on it, has still less to rely on—this difficulty breaks it by the meaning of mutual dependence.

75. The Buddha approves his meaning—birth and old age and death are unfindable before, after, and at one time. 「佛可其意，以眾生不知諸法自相空故，說是前際、是後際；自相空諸法中，前、後際不可得。」 tr. "The Buddha approved his meaning: it is because beings do not know the emptiness of specific marks of dharmas that it is said this is the prior limit, this is the later limit; within dharmas empty of specific marks, the prior and later limits are unfindable." Below, he pushes it through the three passes of birth, old age, and death: 「若先有生，則後有老死；若離老死有生，是則不死而生，是生無因無緣」 tr. "If there is birth first, then afterwards there is old age and death; if there were birth apart from old age and death, that would be being born without dying, and this birth would be without cause and without condition"—the claim of birth first and death after becomes causeless at the point of a birth apart from death. 「若先老死後有生者，不生云何有老死？」 tr. "If there were old age and death first and birth afterwards, when there is no birth how could there be old age and death?"—the claim of death first and birth after has no old age and death to set up at the point where there is not yet birth. 「先後既不可得，一時亦不可得」 tr. "Since before and after are unfindable, at one time is also unfindable"—all three times are broken. So he concludes: 「自相空法中，無有前後際。」 tr. "Within dharmas empty of specific marks, there is no prior and later limit."

76. The bodhisattva should practise prajñā by means of the dharma of the emptiness of specific marks. 「佛言：「如是！須菩提！菩薩應以自相空法行般若，內外法乃至佛法不著故。」」 tr. "The Buddha said: ‘Just so! Subhūti! The bodhisattva should practise prajñā by means of the dharma of the emptiness of specific marks, because he does not cling to inner and outer dharmas and so on up to the Buddha's dharmas.’" The meaning of the emptiness of specific marks here turns from the discussion that breaks the limits into the support of the gate of practice; and the phrase ‘and so on up to not clinging to the Buddha's dharmas’ is especially weighty: only when not clinging reaches even to the Buddha's dharmas is it named prajñā.

77. The question raised: the mark of prajñā has been spoken of constantly above, so why is it asked again now? Question: 「上來常說般若波羅蜜相，今何以更問？」 tr. "Above, the mark of prajñāpāramitā has been spoken of constantly; why is it asked again now?" The whole treatise speaks again and again of the mark of prajñā, and asking again here seems a repetition. The reason this question is set up is precisely to press out the division below between ‘asking about the mark’ and ‘asking about the meaning’.

78. Not only asking about the mark—by what meaning is it named prajñā. Answer: 「不但問相，人常說般若波羅蜜，般若波羅蜜以何義故名般若。」 tr. "It is not only the mark that is asked about; people constantly speak of prajñāpāramitā, and by what meaning is prajñāpāramitā named prajñā?" What was spoken before was the mark; what is asked now is where the name and its meaning come from—since what is asked is different, it is not a repetition. The long stretch below explaining how prajñāpāramitā gets its name is all born from this one question.

79. Reaching the further shore by the foremost crossing—the crossing by lower, middle, and higher knowledge. 「佛言：「以第一度，一切法到彼岸，名般若波羅蜜。」」 tr. "The Buddha said: ‘By the foremost crossing, reaching the further shore in all dharmas, it is named prajñāpāramitā.’" The treatise-author explains the first meaning of ‘the foremost crossing’: 「聲聞人以下智度；辟支佛以中智度；菩薩以上智度，故名第一度。」 tr. "The śrāvaka crosses by lower knowledge; the pratyekabuddha crosses by middle knowledge; the bodhisattva crosses by higher knowledge; therefore it is named the foremost crossing." The three vehicles are alike named crossing and yet their knowledge is lower, middle, and higher; the bodhisattva stands at the higher, and so it is called foremost.

80. The afflictions of nine kinds, wisdom of nine kinds—crossing by the upper-upper knowledge. 「復次，煩惱有九種，上、中、下各有三品。智慧亦有九種：……」 tr. "Again, the afflictions are of nine kinds, upper, middle, and lower each having three grades. Wisdom too is of nine kinds: …" Below, he lists their grades: 「下下智慧從鈍根須陀洹來，乃至上下是第一聲聞舍利弗等；上中是大辟支佛；上上是菩薩。以上上智慧度，故名第一度。」 tr. "The lower-lower wisdom is counted from the srota-āpanna of dull faculties, and so on up to the upper-lower, which is the foremost of the śrāvakas, Śāriputra and others; the upper-middle is the great pratyekabuddha; the upper-upper is the bodhisattva. Because one crosses by the upper-upper wisdom, it is named the foremost crossing." Nine grades are matched with nine grades, and the bodhisattva alone stands at the upper-upper—this is the second meaning.

81. Knowing both the general mark and the specific marks clearly. 「聲聞、辟支佛但總相度，於別相少；菩薩一切法總相、別相皆了了知，故名第一度。」 tr. "The śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas cross only by the general mark, and of the specific marks they have little; the bodhisattva knows clearly and plainly both the general mark and the specific marks of all dharmas; therefore it is named the foremost crossing." This is the third meaning, and it answers head to tail to the judgement above of ‘the two vehicles knowing by the general mark’: knowing by the general mark is not failing to know, but it does not reach round the specific marks, and so it is not named foremost.

82. Wisdom pervading the knowable dharmas. 「復次，菩薩度時，智慧遍滿可知法中；二乘人可知法中不能遍滿。是故名第一度。」 tr. "Again, when the bodhisattva crosses, his wisdom pervades the knowable dharmas; persons of the two vehicles cannot pervade the knowable dharmas. Therefore it is named the foremost crossing." This fourth meaning is set up on the word ‘pervade’: the realm of the dharmas known is the same, while whether the knowing pervades or not differs.

83. A crossing of peace and security—the simile of the ship of the seven jewels and the raft of grass. 「復次，第一度者，大乘福德、智慧、六波羅蜜、三十七品具足滿，故安隱度。」 tr. "Again, the foremost crossing means that the merit, the wisdom, the six perfections, and the thirty-seven limbs of the path of the Great Vehicle are fulfilled and complete, and so it is a crossing of peace and security." Further, he adds the outer conditions: 「又十方諸佛、大菩薩、諸天皆來佐助，安隱得度。」 tr. "Moreover, the buddhas of the ten directions, the great bodhisattvas, and the gods all come to assist, and one crosses in peace and security." The simile says: 「如人乘七寶船，牢治行具，上有種種好食、有好導師，遇隨意好風，則為好度；若人乘草栰度恐怖，不名好度。」 tr. "As a person rides a ship of the seven jewels, with the gear for the journey made firm and ready; on it there are all kinds of good food, there is a good guide, and he meets a good wind as he would wish—then it is a good crossing; if a person crosses riding a raft of grass in terror, it is not named a good crossing." The ship has four matters complete—the vessel firm, the provisions sufficient, the guide good, the wind favourable; this fifth meaning is set up on ‘peace and security’, showing that the foremost crossing lies not only in the height of knowledge but also in the readiness of the provisions and the help of good friends.

84. The three vehicles alike cross to the further shore, nirvāṇa, and extinguish all sorrow and suffering. 「復次，佛說：「三乘人以是般若波羅蜜度到彼岸涅槃，滅一切憂苦，以是義故，名般若波羅蜜。」」 tr. "Again, the Buddha says: ‘Persons of the three vehicles, by this prajñāpāramitā, cross to the further shore, nirvāṇa, and extinguish all sorrow and suffering; by reason of this meaning it is named prajñāpāramitā.’" This sixth meaning is set up on the fruit to which one crosses: prajñā is prajñā in that it can extinguish sorrow and suffering and reach the further shore; it is not merely a name for contemplative understanding.

85. Investigated down to the atom, nothing firm and real is found—the two dharmas of mind and form broken up. 「復次，是般若波羅蜜中，一切法，內外、大小，思惟、籌量、分別、推求，乃至如微塵，不得堅實。」 tr. "Again, within this prajñāpāramitā, all dharmas, inner and outer, great and small, when reflected on, weighed, distinguished, and investigated, and so on down to the size of an atom, are not found to be firm and real." Dharmas of form, pushed to the atom, cannot be divided further; dharmas of mind, pushed to a single thought, cannot be analysed further: 「既到微塵，則不可分別；心心數法，乃至一念中，亦不可分別。」 tr. "Once one has reached the atom, it cannot be distinguished; mind and mental-factor dharmas, and so on down to within a single thought, also cannot be distinguished." So 「是般若波羅蜜中，心、色二法破壞，推求不得堅實」 tr. "within this prajñāpāramitā, the two dharmas of mind and form are broken up; investigated, they are not found to be firm and real". This meaning is set up on ‘investigated and not found’—the name prajñā is gained from the place where it searches to the end and finds nothing.

86. The further shore names exhausting the limit of all wisdom—suchness, the nature of dharmas, and the limit of reality gathered into prajñā. 「復次，般若名慧，波羅蜜，到彼岸。彼岸名盡一切智慧邊。」 tr. "Again, prajñā names wisdom; pāramitā, reaching the further shore. The further shore names exhausting the limit of all wisdom." Next he explains the mark of wisdom: 「智慧名不可破壞相，不可破壞相即是如、法性、實際，以其實故不可破壞。」 tr. "Wisdom names the mark that cannot be broken up; the mark that cannot be broken up is precisely suchness, the nature of dharmas, and the limit of reality, which, because they are real, cannot be broken up." So 「是三事攝入般若中故，名為般若波羅蜜」 tr. "because these three matters are gathered into prajñā, it is named prajñāpāramitā". This passage gathers the three names of suchness, the nature of dharmas, and the limit of reality, which have run through the whole chapter since the First Part, under the one name of prajñā—the three names are not something separate outside prajñā; they are prajñā's mark that cannot be broken up.

87. Without joining and without dispersing, of one mark, which is to say the signless. 「復次，般若波羅蜜，無有法與法有合有散，畢竟空故。」 tr. "Again, in prajñāpāramitā there is no dharma that with another dharma is joined or dispersed, because of ultimate emptiness." Further, he cites the earlier text: 「是般若無色、無形、無對，一相，所謂無相」 tr. "this prajñā is without form, without shape, without resistance, of one mark, which is to say the signless", and notes 「是義如先說」 tr. "this meaning is as spoken of earlier". He cites it without spreading it out, showing that it is a meaning already spoken. The general conclusion in one sentence: 「如是等種種因緣，故名般若義。」 tr. "By such causes and conditions of every kind, therefore, it is named the meaning of prajñā." With the eight meanings above set side by side, the naming of prajñā is here complete.

88. The power of prajñā—it can illuminate what the sun and moon do not illuminate. 「今當說般若力，……」 tr. "Now the power of prajñā should be spoken of: …" Its power is threefold: 「般若能生一切智慧、禪定等諸法」 tr. "prajñā can give rise to all wisdom, meditative concentration, and such dharmas"—this is the power of giving rise to dharmas; 「能生一切樂說辯才；以般若力故演說一句，種種莊嚴窮劫不盡」 tr. "it can give rise to all the eloquence of delighting in speech; because of the power of prajñā, one expounds a single phrase with every kind of adornment, and though the kalpas be exhausted it is not exhausted"—this is the power of giving rise to eloquence; 「星宿日月不能照處，般若能照，能破邪見、無明黑闇故」 tr. "where the stars, the sun, and the moon cannot illuminate, prajñā can illuminate, because it can break the darkness of wrong views and ignorance"—this is the power of illuminating darkness. The sun and moon illuminate the darkness of form and cannot illuminate the darkness of the mind; prajñā illuminates the darkness of the mind—since what is illuminated is different, the sun and moon are not taken as its measure.

89. The evils cannot break it up—within prajñā they are all unfindable. 「魔若魔人、求聲聞辟支佛人、外道、惡人所不能壞。」 tr. "Māra or Māra's people, those who seek the śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha, those of the outside paths, and evil persons cannot break it up." The reason they cannot break it up: 「菩薩行般若，此諸惡人於般若中皆不可得故。」 tr. "Because when the bodhisattva practises prajñā, these evil persons are all unfindable within prajñā." It is not that its power can withstand them; it is that within prajñā there is nothing of them to be found—read against the deeds of Māra spoken of in the chapters above, this phrase shows most clearly how prajñā is the ultimate protection of the person: the one who could break it up and what would be broken up are both unfindable.

90. With a single mind believing, receiving, and reciting it, the evils find no opening. 「復次，若行者一心信受、諷誦，諸惡不能得便，何況正憶念、如說行！」 tr. "Again, if the practitioner with a single mind believes and receives it and recites it, the evils find no opening, how much less when he rightly recollects it and practises as it says!" From the shallow to the deep, from the lesser to the greater: if believing, receiving, and reciting are already so, one who rightly recollects and practises as it says need not even be spoken of. So he concludes: 「如是，須菩提！菩薩應行般若義。」 tr. "Just so, Subhūti! The bodhisattva should practise the meaning of prajñā."

91. The meaning of prajñā—the four noble practices beginning with impermanence, and the ten knowledges. 「般若義者，所謂無常義，苦、空、無我義，四諦智、盡智、無生智、法智、比智、世智、知他心智、如實智義故，應行般若。」 tr. "What is called the meaning of prajñā is the meaning of impermanence; the meaning of suffering, emptiness, and non-self; the meaning of the knowledges of the four truths, the knowledge of exhaustion, the knowledge of non-arising, dharma-knowledge, subsequent knowledge, worldly knowledge, the knowledge of others' minds, and the knowledge of things as they really are—for the sake of these one should practise prajñā." The simile says: 「是般若如大海有種種寶物，或大、或小，唯一是如意寶；般若波羅蜜亦有種種諸智慧寶——無常等四聖行、十智，唯有如實智如如意寶。」 tr. "This prajñā is like the great sea, in which there are all kinds of jewels, some great and some small, and only one is the wish-fulfilling jewel; prajñāpāramitā too has all kinds of jewels of wisdom—the four noble practices beginning with impermanence, and the ten knowledges—and only the knowledge of things as they really are is like the wish-fulfilling jewel." Though the jewels of the sea are many, the wish-fulfilling jewel alone is honoured—the knowledges go together, and the knowledge of things as they really are is their eye; this simile lays the ground for the special explanation of the knowledge of things as they really are below.

92. The question raised: an earlier chapter said that practising by permanence and impermanence is not named practising prajñā. Question: 「如先品說：「若常、若無常等行，不名行般若波羅蜜。」今何以言「行無常等義故，應行般若波羅蜜」？」 tr. "As is said in an earlier chapter: ‘Practising by way of permanence or impermanence and the like is not named practising prajñāpāramitā.’ Why is it now said, ‘Because one practises the meaning of impermanence and the like, one should practise prajñāpāramitā’?" The two statements, earlier and later, are opposite; this question is right to the point.

93. Impermanence is of two kinds—idle discourse with a clinging mind, and breaking the inversion without clinging. Answer: 「我已先答，無常有二種：若著心，戲論無常，是不名行般若；若以無著心，不戲論無常，為破常倒，又不自生著心，是名行般若。」 tr. "I have already answered this earlier: impermanence is of two kinds. If with a clinging mind one makes idle discourse of impermanence, this is not named practising prajñā; if with a mind without clinging one does not make idle discourse of impermanence, and, in order to break the inversion of permanence, also does not of oneself give rise to a clinging mind, this is named practising prajñā." The same practice of impermanence is judged by clinging and not clinging—exactly the same as the judgement above of ‘the ordinary and the noble alike speaking the one word suffering’. Wherever throughout the whole treatise the reader comes upon places where earlier and later seem to contradict each other, this one word ‘clinging’ should mostly be taken as the key.

94. The question raised: the three baskets have only the ten knowledges, so why is there here the knowledge of things as they really are? Question: 「三藏中但有十智，此中何以有如實智？」 tr. "In the three baskets there are only the ten knowledges; why is there here the knowledge of things as they really are?" The number of the ten knowledges is the fixed number of the teaching of the Small Vehicle; adding now the knowledge of things as they really are goes beyond that number. This question is a difficulty of doctrinal classification.

95. The great Dharma can receive the small dharma. Answer: 「是故名大乘！大法能受小法，小不能受大。」 tr. "That is why it is named the Great Vehicle! The great Dharma can receive the small dharma; the small cannot receive the great." He does not argue about the increase or decrease of the number; he points only to the greatness or smallness of the capacity: the Great Vehicle has room for the ten knowledges, the ten knowledges have no room for the Great Vehicle. This answer is short and decisive.

96. The question raised: what mark does the knowledge of things as they really are have? Question: 「十智各各有體相，如實智有何等相？」 tr. "The ten knowledges each have their own substance and mark; what mark does the knowledge of things as they really are have?" Since it is listed as one knowledge, it should have its mark. This question presses out the proper explanation below.

97. Someone says—knowing the real mark of all dharmas is the mark of the knowledge of things as they really are. Answer: 「有人言：能知諸法實相，所謂如、法性、實際，是名如實智相。」 tr. "Someone says: being able to know the real mark of all dharmas—namely suchness, the nature of dharmas, and the limit of reality—this is named the mark of the knowledge of things as they really are." The treatise-author first records another school's view, explaining it by the three names of suchness, the nature of dharmas, and the limit of reality—which throws light on, and is thrown light on by, the ‘three matters gathered into prajñā’ above.

98. The Buddha says that the knowledge of things as they really are is obtained only by the buddhas. 「佛此中說：「如實智唯是諸佛所得。」」 tr. "Here the Buddha says: ‘The knowledge of things as they really are is obtained only by the buddhas.’" The treatise-author explains the reason: 「煩惱未盡者猶有無明故，不能知如實。」 tr. "Those whose afflictions are not yet exhausted still have ignorance, and so cannot know things as they really are." One layer further: 「二乘及大菩薩習未盡故，不能遍知一切法、一切種，不名如實智；……」 tr. "The two vehicles and the great bodhisattvas, because their habitual residues are not yet exhausted, cannot know pervasively all dharmas and all kinds, and theirs is not named the knowledge of things as they really are; …" At the end he sets it up squarely: 「但諸佛於一切無明盡無遺餘故，能如實知。」 tr. "Only the buddhas, because in them all ignorance is exhausted with nothing left over, can know things as they really are." The standard of judgement lies in the four Chinese characters rendered here as ‘exhausted with nothing left over’—it is not said that the two vehicles know nothing at all; it is said that what they know is not pervasive.

99. The question raised: if only the Buddha knows things as they really are, how do the two vehicles obtain nirvāṇa? Question: 「若除佛更無如實知者，二乘云何得涅槃、大菩薩得無生忍？」 tr. "If apart from the Buddha there is no other who knows things as they really are, how do the two vehicles obtain nirvāṇa, and the great bodhisattvas obtain the acceptance of non-arising?" Since they lack the knowledge of things as they really are, on what does the realisation of their fruits rely? This question is extremely vital; if it were not set out, the preceding words would amount to cutting off the realisation of the two vehicles.

100. The knowledge of things as they really are is of two kinds—the pervading and complete, and the not yet complete. Answer: 「如實智有二種：一者、遍滿具足，二者、未具足。具足者，佛；不具足者，二乘及大菩薩。」 tr. "The knowledge of things as they really are is of two kinds: the first is pervading and complete, the second is not yet complete. The complete is the Buddha's; the incomplete is that of the two vehicles and the great bodhisattvas." With one name divided into two, the difficulty resolves of itself: what is obtained only by the Buddha is the pervading and complete knowledge of things as they really are; it is not said that the two vehicles have none at all.

101. The simile of the two lamps in a dark room—one may not say that the first lamp gave no illumination. The simile says: 「譬如闇室中，為有所作故然燈，所為已辦；後來燈，其明益增。黑闇有二分：一分，初燈已除；第二分，後燈所除。第二分闇與初燈明和合；若不爾，第二燈則無所用。」 tr. "It is as in a dark room, because there is something to be done, a lamp is lit, and what was to be done is already accomplished; with the lamp that comes afterwards, the brightness increases still more. The darkness has two portions: one portion the first lamp has already removed; the second portion is what the later lamp removes. The second portion of darkness was together with the brightness of the first lamp; if it were not so, the second lamp would be of no use." The fineness of the simile lies in the sentence ‘the second portion of darkness was together with the brightness of the first lamp’: the brightness of the first lamp and the darkness not yet removed are in one room together, and so the later lamp has its use; if the first lamp had removed it all, the later lamp would be set up for nothing. So he joins it to the dharma: 「二乘及大菩薩智慧雖已破無明，佛智慧所除無明分是諸人所不能除。」 tr. "Although the wisdom of the two vehicles and the great bodhisattvas has already broken ignorance, the portion of ignorance that the Buddha's wisdom removes is what these persons cannot remove." A twofold warning follows from it: 「不得言初燈無照」 tr. "one may not say that the first lamp gave no illumination"—one may not, because it is not exhausted, say that there is no realisation; 「不得言二乘及菩薩智慧是遍如實智」 tr. "one may not say that the wisdom of the two vehicles and the bodhisattvas is the pervading knowledge of things as they really are"—nor may one, because there is realisation, say that it already pervades. At the end he concludes: 「遍如實智，是佛；但如實智，二乘及菩薩所共。」 tr. "The pervading knowledge of things as they really are is the Buddha's; the knowledge of things as they really are simply is shared by the two vehicles and the bodhisattvas." One name and yet divided in two—the two meanings of superior and inferior and of what is shared are both complete.

102. Within deep prajñā benefit and non-benefit are unfindable—how is one to practise for the sake of benefit? 「爾時，須菩提問佛：「世尊！若深般若中義、非義不可得，云何言『菩薩為深般若義故行般若』？」」 tr. "At that time Subhūti asked the Buddha: ‘World-Honored One! If within deep prajñā benefit and non-benefit are unfindable, why is it said that “the bodhisattva practises prajñā for the sake of the benefit of deep prajñā”?’" The sūtra turns into the last section. This question has the same structure as the first question of the whole fascicle: how can there be distinction within what is non-existent—that one about the three vehicles, this one about benefit and non-benefit.

103. Dharmas in three divisions—benefit, non-benefit, and neither benefit nor non-benefit. The explanation of the Buddha's answer: 「貪欲等煩惱非義不應行者，諸法有三分：貪欲等諸煩惱是非義；六波羅蜜等諸善法是義；色等法，無記故，非義非非義。」 tr. "As for greed and the other afflictions being non-benefit and not to be practised: dharmas have three divisions—greed and the other afflictions are non-benefit; the six perfections and the other wholesome dharmas are benefit; form and such dharmas, because they are indeterminate, are neither benefit nor non-benefit." The judgement of the three divisions takes the wholesome, the evil, and the indeterminate as its bones—this is the common classification of the teaching, which the treatise-author borrows to lay the ground for the three poisons below.

104. From each of the three divisions arises one of the three poisons—from pleasure greed, from suffering hatred, from neither suffering nor pleasure delusion. 「若人於煩惱及行煩惱者中，生怨憎心；於六波羅蜜等諸善法及行善法者中，生愛念心；於色等無記法及行無記法者中，即生癡心。」 tr. "If a person gives rise to a mind of resentment and hatred toward the afflictions and toward those who practise the afflictions; gives rise to a mind of love toward the six perfections and the other wholesome dharmas and toward those who practise wholesome dharmas; and toward form and such indeterminate dharmas and toward those who practise indeterminate dharmas, then gives rise to a deluded mind." Each of the three divisions answers to one poison: evil dharmas raise hatred, wholesome dharmas raise love, the indeterminate raises delusion—the most worth heeding is the middle item: to give rise to love toward wholesome dharmas and toward those who practise wholesome dharmas is also among what is blocked. The treatise-author cites the sūtra as proof: 「凡人得受樂時生貪心，受苦時生瞋心，受不苦不樂時生癡心。」 tr. "When ordinary people receive pleasure, a greedy mind arises; when they receive suffering, a hating mind arises; when they receive what is neither suffering nor pleasure, a deluded mind arises." The three marks of feeling are matched with the three divisions of dharmas, and the source of the sickness is then plain.

105. Within the mark of the one suchness there is neither benefit nor non-benefit. 「是故說：「菩薩應作是念：『欲貪等非義，不應念以為非。』」如經廣說。」 tr. "Therefore it is said: ‘The bodhisattva should have this thought: “Desire, greed, and the like are non-benefit; one should not think of them as wrong.”’ As is said at length in the sūtra." Not thinking of them as wrong means that even the thought of ‘judging them to be wrong’ should not be kept—the blocking reaches its utmost here. 「此中自說因緣：「惡法、善法、無記法，一如相，無有義、非義，如相無二無分別故。」」 tr. "Here he himself states the causes and conditions: ‘Evil dharmas, wholesome dharmas, and indeterminate dharmas are of the one mark of suchness, without benefit and non-benefit, because the mark of suchness is without duality and without discrimination.’" The judgement of the three divisions here returns to the one suchness: the judgement is set up to break the sickness, and the one suchness is its original state.

106. When the Buddha obtained the path he did not see a single dharma that was benefit or non-benefit. 「復次，佛得道時，不見一法若義、若非義。」 tr. "Again, when the Buddha obtained the path, he did not see a single dharma that was benefit or was non-benefit." The Buddha's own realisation is taken as proof: at the moment of obtaining the path, the marks of benefit and non-benefit both do not appear—it is not that he does not know good and evil; it is that he does not see any benefit or non-benefit of fixed reality that can be found.

107. The real mark of all dharmas always abides, whether there is a Buddha or no Buddha. 「諸法實相，有佛無佛常住，不作義、非義。若如是知，即是義；但破分別心故，說：「義、非義不應行。」」 tr. "The real mark of all dharmas, whether there is a Buddha or there is no Buddha, always abides; it does not make benefit or non-benefit. If one knows it thus, that is benefit; it is only in order to break the discriminating mind that it is said: ‘Benefit and non-benefit should not be practised.’" This passage has two meanings together: first, the ever-abiding of the real mark does not exist or not exist according to whether a Buddha appears in the world; second, the words ‘should not be practised’ were set up from the first to break the discriminating mind, not to add a further block on the real mark. To know that it is thus is precisely the true benefit—within the blocking there is an affirming, and the reader may not see only its blocking.

108. One should practise the prajñā apart from benefit and non-benefit. 「「如是，須菩提！菩薩應行是離義非義般若波羅蜜。」」 tr. "‘Just so, Subhūti! The bodhisattva should practise this prajñāpāramitā that is apart from benefit and non-benefit.’" One sentence gathers up the passage above into a gate of practice: what is practised is the prajñā ‘apart from benefit and non-benefit’—the one word ‘apart’ is a place of practice, not a place of abandoning.

109. For what reason is prajñā neither benefit nor non-benefit—being without making and without rising, there is nothing it can make. 「須菩提復問：「何緣故般若非義非非義？」佛答：「一切法無作無起相故無所能作，云何般若波羅蜜作義以非義？」」 tr. "Subhūti asked further: ‘For what reason is prajñā neither benefit nor non-benefit?’ The Buddha answered: ‘Because all dharmas are of the mark of non-action and non-rising, there is nothing they can make; how could prajñāpāramitā make benefit or non-benefit?’" The answer fastens onto the ‘non-action and non-rising’ of the first question of the whole fascicle—head and tail hold together: there, non-action and non-rising made one doubt the division of the three vehicles; here, non-action and non-rising make plain that benefit and non-benefit are not established.

110. The sages take the unconditioned dharma as benefit, so why is it said that it cannot make it—no increase and no decrease. 「須菩提復問：「世尊！若一切諸佛及弟子皆以無為法為義，佛何以說般若波羅蜜不能作義以非義？」佛答：「一切聖人雖以無為法為義，不作義以非義，無增無損故。」」 tr. "Subhūti asked further: ‘World-Honored One! If all the buddhas and their disciples take the unconditioned dharma as benefit, why does the Buddha say that prajñāpāramitā cannot make benefit or non-benefit?’ The Buddha answered: ‘Although all the sages take the unconditioned dharma as benefit, they do not make benefit or non-benefit, because there is no increase and no decrease.’" Taking the unconditioned as benefit and yet not making benefit—‘taking as benefit’ is that toward which one returns and tends, ‘making benefit’ is adding something; the unconditioned dharma neither increases nor decreases anything for beings, and so it cannot be said to make.

111. The simile of space—a non-existent dharma, and yet the world by means of it has something it does. 「此中說譬喻：「如虛空如不能益眾生、不能損眾生，虛空無法故，無有義以非義，何況虛空如！」」 tr. "Here a simile is stated: ‘As the suchness of space cannot benefit beings and cannot harm beings—space, because it is a non-existent dharma, is without benefit or non-benefit; how much less the suchness of space!’" Space is still a non-existent dharma; the suchness of space is still less to be discussed. And the treatise-author at once turns out its use: 「虛空雖無法，一切世間因虛空故得有所作；般若波羅蜜亦如是，雖無相、無為，而因般若能行五波羅蜜等一切佛道法。」 tr. "Although space is a non-existent dharma, all the world, by reason of space, is able to have something it does; prajñāpāramitā too is thus: although it is signless and unconditioned, yet by reason of prajñā one can practise the five perfections and all the dharmas of the Buddha path." Non-existent and yet able to contain, containing and yet having use—this simile is woven on the same loom as the earlier simile of the conjured Buddha: both make plain ‘with nowhere to abide and yet having something done’. At the end he divides by the two truths to gather it up: 「以著心故，說「般若無義非義」；無著心故，說「第一實義」。以世諦故說言義，第一義中無有義。」 tr. "Because of the clinging mind it is said that ‘prajñā is without benefit and non-benefit’; because of the mind without clinging, ‘the foremost real meaning’ is spoken of. By reason of worldly truth it is said that there is benefit; within the highest meaning there is no benefit."

112. Prajñā of two kinds—the conditioned prajñā and the unconditioned prajñā. 「復次，般若有二種：一者、有為，二者、無為。學有為般若，能具足六波羅蜜，住十地中；學無為般若，滅一切煩惱習，成佛道。」 tr. "Again, prajñā is of two kinds: the first is conditioned, the second is unconditioned. Training in the conditioned prajñā, one can fulfil the six perfections and abide within the ten grounds; training in the unconditioned prajñā, one extinguishes all the afflictions and their habitual residues and accomplishes the Buddha path." One name divided in two, in the same way as the twofold division of the knowledge of things as they really are above: the conditioned accomplishes the stations of practice, the unconditioned accomplishes the ultimate fruit.

113. Training in the unconditioned prajñā one obtains omniscience—so why is it said to be without benefit? 「今須菩提問佛：「世尊！菩薩學無為般若，得一切智，云何言無義？」佛答：「雖得薩婆若，不以二法故得。」」 tr. "Now Subhūti asked the Buddha: ‘World-Honored One! The bodhisattva trains in the unconditioned prajñā and obtains omniscience; why is it said to be without benefit?’ The Buddha answered: ‘Although he obtains sarvajñā, he does not obtain it by reason of two dharmas.’" The treatise-author explains ‘two dharmas’: 「分別取相者，是名二法。」 tr. "Discriminating and grasping at marks is named two dharmas." Obtaining and yet not obtaining by two dharmas—what is blocked is obtaining by grasping at marks, not obtaining itself.

114. Can the non-dual dharma obtain the non-dual dharma—No. 「復問：「不二法能得不二法耶？」佛答：「不也！」」 tr. "He asked further: ‘Can the non-dual dharma obtain the non-dual dharma?’ The Buddha answered: ‘No!’" The treatise-author explains the reason: 「不二法即是無為；無為無有得不得相，是無為法不可行故。」 tr. "The non-dual dharma is precisely the unconditioned; the unconditioned has no mark of obtaining or not obtaining, because this unconditioned dharma cannot be practised." Upon the unconditioned there is no mark of obtaining and no mark of practising either; to obtain the non-dual by the non-dual, neither the obtainer nor the obtained is established.

115. Can one obtain the non-dual dharma by two dharmas—No. 「復問：「若以不二法不得，可以二法得不二法不？」答言：「不也！」」 tr. "He asked further: ‘If one does not obtain it by the non-dual dharma, can one obtain the non-dual dharma by two dharmas?’ The answer was: ‘No!’" The explanation: 「二法虛誑不實故，云何行不實而得實法？」 tr. "Because two dharmas are false and deceptive, not real—how could one practise the unreal and obtain the real dharma?" Since the two dharmas are false and deceptive, if they are taken as what obtains, what is obtained becomes false and deceptive too. Both roads are blocked, and the question below then comes to its end.

116. If neither by duality nor by non-duality, how is one to obtain it—nothing to be attained is precisely attaining. 「復問：「世尊！若不以二、不以不二，云何當得一切種智？」佛答：「無所得即是得。」」 tr. "He asked further: ‘World-Honored One! If it is neither by duality nor by non-duality, how is one to obtain the omniscience of all kinds?’ The Buddha answered: ‘Nothing to be attained is precisely attaining.’" This is the knot in which the whole chapter ends. The dismissal of the four alternatives, not abiding in the two places, not clinging to names and marks, the double giving up of benefit and non-benefit—all that came before serves to press out this one sentence; and this sentence does not set up a separate mysterious attaining; it only moves the meaning of the word ‘attaining’ from the place of grasping at marks to the place of not grasping at marks.

117. Duality and non-duality are both nothing to be attained—practising in accord with emptiness, the signless, and non-action. At the end the treatise-author explains: 「此中二、不二，即是無分別，皆無所得。是無所得，不以有所得為行。」 tr. "The duality and non-duality here are non-discrimination, and are all nothing to be attained. This nothing to be attained is not practised by way of something to be attained." Next he blocks a doubt: since there is nothing to be attained, is practice then abandoned? 「雖行有為法得是無所得，心不取相故無所得。」 tr. "Although one practises conditioned dharmas and obtains this nothing to be attained, because the mind does not grasp at marks, it is nothing to be attained." Practice is not abandoned and yet what is obtained is nothing to be attained—how this can be so: 「與空、無相、無作合行故。」 tr. "Because one practises in accord with emptiness, the signless, and non-action." The three gates of liberation joined with practice are the real place to set one's hand to ‘practising with nothing to be attained’. The whole fascicle stops here, and the whole chapter too stops here.

Do Not Misread

Do not misread 「皆以世俗法故說，非最第一義」 tr. "all this is spoken according to worldly dharmas; it is not the very highest meaning" as saying that the three vehicles and the three groups need not be distinguished. When the treatise-author says that distinctions come from the worldly, he is saying that their household register lies in the worldly, not that they are without use; the judgement of assured of rightness, assured of wrongness, and unassured, the setting up of the three vehicles, the difference of the three knowledges, are all practical distinctions set up to break the inversions. Between abolishing distinctions and not clinging to distinctions lies precisely the boundary between the ordinary and the noble.

Do not misread 「無所得即是得」 tr. "nothing to be attained is precisely attaining" as saying that there is no need to practise. In the last passage the treatise-author has already blocked this doubt in advance: 「雖行有為法得是無所得，心不取相故無所得。」 tr. "Although one practises conditioned dharmas and obtains this nothing to be attained, because the mind does not grasp at marks, it is nothing to be attained." The reason attaining is nothing to be attained lies in the mind's not grasping at marks, not in the matter's not being done; the practices of the six perfections, the thirty-seven limbs of the path, and the ten grounds are not reduced by a single item—what is reduced is only the mind that grasps at marks.

Do not misread the cutting off of the Buddha and of the two vehicles as saying that there is high and low upon the unconditioned dharma. The sūtra says plainly that the three kinds of cutting off 「皆是無為」 tr. "are all unconditioned", and that the unconditioned is 「無相、無量，云何可得差別」 tr. "signless and immeasurable; how could a difference be found"; the name of difference is placed upon the habitual residues, not upon the unconditioned cutting off. The sharpness or bluntness of the knife is a matter of the time of cutting; once cut there is no difference—to misread this place is to set up grades upon nirvāṇa.

Do not misread 「如實智唯是諸佛所得」 tr. "the knowledge of things as they really are is obtained only by the buddhas" as saying that the two vehicles and the bodhisattvas have no real knowledge. The treatise-author at once divides it into two kinds: the pervading and complete is the Buddha's, the not yet complete is that of the two vehicles and the great bodhisattvas; and with the two lamps in the dark room he plainly sets up a warning—「不得言初燈無照」 tr. "one may not say that the first lamp gave no illumination". One sentence blocks going too far, one sentence blocks falling short; the two warnings must be read together.

Do not misread the equal merit of offerings to the conjured Buddha and the true Buddha as saying that images are no different from the true Buddha, so that images may be slighted. The treatise-author's judgement lies in the two meanings of ‘because the mind is equal the merit is equal’ and ‘the field of merit is immeasurable’: what merit relies on is the real mark and the mind, and so an image of stone or clay, scattering flowers, and calling the name all reach the ending of suffering; and yet one who injures it with an evil mind likewise 「便得逆罪」 tr. "then incurs a heinous sin"—merit and sin alike, in both directions, are set up by mind and matter answering to each other; it is not saying that an image may be slighted.

Do not move the sentence that assigns sarvajñā to the two vehicles elsewhere and read it into other places. This treatise says plainly in this passage 「薩婆若是聲聞、辟支佛智」 tr. "sarvajñā is the knowledge of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas", and what it rests on is the knowing by the general mark of 「一切名內外十二入」 tr. "‘all’ names the inner and outer twelve sense-fields"; yet elsewhere in this chapter and in the other chapters there are also texts that take sarvajñā as the Buddha's knowledge—the name is the same while the portion and measure of what it points to differ with the text; each should be understood according to what its own text sets up, and one may not use this sentence to do away with those texts.

Do not misread 「不住四句而證實際」 tr. "not abiding in the four alternatives, he realises the limit of reality" as saying that the Buddha never obtained the path. The Buddha's own answer is perfectly plain: 「實得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提道，但無所住。」 tr. "I really did obtain the path of anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi; only, it is with nowhere to abide." Obtaining is real obtaining, abiding is no abiding; Subhūti's words of his own realisation, 「我無所住而得漏盡」 tr. "with nowhere to abide I obtained the exhaustion of the outflows", are precisely the living proof. To read not abiding as not obtaining is to fall into the view of annihilation that the sūtra of the First Part blocks.

Do not misread ‘apart from benefit and non-benefit’ as not distinguishing good and evil. The treatise-author first sets up the three divisions—the afflictions are non-benefit, wholesome dharmas are benefit, the indeterminate is neither benefit nor non-benefit—and further points out that giving rise to love toward wholesome dharmas is also a sickness; what is left behind is the mark of benefit and non-benefit held fixedly, not the teaching of good and evil. The last words, the one sentence 「若如是知，即是義」 tr. "if one knows it thus, that is benefit", show exactly that within the blocking there is an affirming.

Bearing on Practice

Take 「皆以世俗法故說，非最第一義」 tr. "all this is spoken according to worldly dharmas; it is not the very highest meaning" and set every name and mark in its place. The names of stages, of dharma-numbers, of grades used in practice are each a setting-up within worldly dharmas—use them without contending, practise them without holding on. Whenever calculations of high and low arise because of names and marks, first bring up this one sentence.

Take ‘clinging to emptiness also gives rise to doubt’ and examine the one-sidedness of your own effort. The treatise-author points out that the ordinary person surely gives rise to doubt by clinging to the five aggregates, and 「亦著是空、無作、無起法故生疑」 tr. "also clings to this dharma of emptiness, non-action, and non-rising, and therefore gives rise to doubt". One who hears of emptiness and thinks he has obtained it has precisely a new place of clinging; where doubt arises is often not in not yet having heard of emptiness, but in having heard of emptiness and holding on to it.

Take 「心不取相故無所得」 tr. "because the mind does not grasp at marks, it is nothing to be attained" as the gate of practice in daily use. Giving, keeping the precepts, and meditative concentration are each done as before; done, nothing is kept, no merit reckoned, no doer and done set up—this is practising with nothing to be attained. Only when practice and not grasping at marks run together at one time is it 「與空、無相、無作合行」 tr. "practising in accord with emptiness, the signless, and non-action".

Take the passage on keeping the Buddha in mind with a mind of kindness, scattering flowers, and calling the name, and settle where you yourself set your hand. With the threefold word ‘set aside’ the treatise-author has already lowered the threshold to the very lowest: not seeing an image of the Buddha and keeping the Buddha in mind with respect will do, and calling once namo Buddha will do as well. Because the field of merit is immeasurable, 「雖濡心布施，其福亦無盡」 tr. "even though one gives with a soft mind, the merit too is without end"—not to give oneself up because of the softness and weakness of one's own mind is the kindness this passage bestows on those new to the mind.

Take the two similes, the sharpness or bluntness of the knife and the first and later lamps, and measure your own portion. At the time of cutting there is slowness or swiftness, and once cut there is no difference; so do not shrink back because your own effort is slow. The illumination of the first lamp is not no illumination and yet is not yet pervading illumination; so do not, because you are in accord in a small portion, call yourself already sufficient. One simile spurs one on, one simile restrains pride.

Take the monkey's leaping and the calling of ‘little slave-girl’ and put to rest contempt toward others. To see the marks of habitual residue in someone and at once give rise to an impure mind is precisely the sickness the treatise-author brings up, 「愚人見之即生輕慢」 tr. "foolish people seeing it at once give rise to contempt". Habitual residue is not affliction, and the mark is not the same as the mind—toward the shortcomings of good friends who practise alongside you, first remember this passage.

Take the Buddha's three pairs—blame and praise, suffering and pleasure, enemy and kin—as the touchstone of your state. The five hundred matters of reviling and the five hundred matters of praise, the empty bowl and the offerings of the gods, the thorns and the jewel-stone, the thrown rock and the bowing at the feet—each is a miniature of what we meet every day. When a state comes, ask only one question: does this mind increase or decrease? 「譬如真金，燒磨鍛截，其色不變」 tr. "it is like true gold: burned, ground, forged, and cut, its colour does not change" is the mark to be hoped for.

Take 「不住四句而證實際」 tr. "not abiding in the four alternatives, he realises the limit of reality" and examine every notion of attainment. If in the course of effort the thought arises, ‘I abide in such a place, I obtain such a dharma’, shine the four alternatives on it: abiding in the path, abiding in what is not the path, abiding in both, abiding in neither—to all four alternatives the answer is No. Move the answer from ‘where one abides’ to ‘nowhere to abide’, and only then is the road not blocked.

Take the simile of the ship of the seven jewels and put your own provisions in order. The vessel firm, the provisions sufficient, the guide good, the wind favourable—these answer to the fulfilment of merit and wisdom, the cultivation of the six perfections and the thirty-seven limbs of the path, reliance on the good friend, and the assistance of the buddhas and bodhisattvas. What is called crossing in peace and security is not a crossing by luck; only when the four matters are ready is it steady.

Further Resonances

What the Last Part carries on from the Middle Part is a stretch of explanation that gathers the difficulties of the sūtra one by one back into the meaning of the treatise. The First Part set up the substance of the three wisdoms: the three questions of practising, giving rise to, and cultivating; practising because form is quiescent, giving rise because it arises like space, cultivating because one cultivates the breaking up of dharmas; and with the four alternatives it dismissed the mark of ‘obtaining sarvajñā’, returning to like the mark of suchness, like the limit of reality, like the nature of dharmas. The Middle Part turned out the doubts about the three vehicles and beings, the discussion of the conjured Buddha and the true Buddha, the difficulty of names and marks and speech, and the questions of the three knowledges and the three kinds of cutting off, the sūtra pressing all the way to the double giving up of benefit and non-benefit. The Last Part is wholly the treatise-author's explanation: with ‘clinging to emptiness also brings doubt’ he picks out the root of doubt; with not finding by the five eyes and the mad person without eyes he cuts off the seeking; with the three groups coming from breaking the inversions and all spoken according to worldly dharmas he fixes their pattern; with the conjured Buddha abiding in neither of the two natures and yet coming and going expounding the Dharma he unties the knot of ‘not abiding and yet obtaining’; with the three layers of the ten powers entering the real mark, the Vinaya following provisional names, and the deed of mind being greatest, he resolves the doubt about the equal merit of true and conjured; with the threefold word ‘set aside’—images of stone and clay, scattering flowers, calling the name—he shows the immeasurability of the field of merit; with the burning house and the lure he makes plain that distinguishing and speaking of dharmas does not ruin the highest meaning; with leaving existence and leaving non-existence and dwelling in the middle way he concludes the section on names and marks; with knowing by the general mark, the four paths, and fulfilling all paths he divides the bounds of the three knowledges; with the sharpness or bluntness of the knife he divides the time of cutting from after the cutting, with habitual residue not being true affliction he divides with remainder from without remainder, with the monkey and the little slave-girl he proves what remains of the habitual residues of the two vehicles, with blame and praise, suffering and pleasure, enemy and kin he proves that the Buddha's habitual residues are entirely exhausted; with the emptiness of specific marks he breaks the prior and later limits; with eight meanings he explains how prajñā gets its name, with three powers he shows the use of prajñā; with the wish-fulfilling jewel alone honoured he draws out the knowledge of things as they really are, with the two lamps in the dark room he divides the pervading from the not yet pervading; at the end, with the three divisions and the three poisons, the one mark of suchness, and the simile of space, he gathers up benefit and non-benefit, and returns to the one sentence 「無所得即是得」 tr. "nothing to be attained is precisely attaining".

Among the explanations of the ancient masters, one school can be recorded for what this fascicle touches on. Jizang divides this chapter into three, and of the division this fascicle falls under he says: 「爾時須菩提下，第三、明三智。為二：初、明智優劣；次、明斷不明。」 tr. "From ‘At that time Subhūti’ onward is the third, making plain the three knowledges. It is in two: first, making plain the superiority and inferiority of knowledge; next, making plain whether the cutting off is clear or not." Dividing the section on the three knowledges into the two divisions of the superiority and inferiority of knowledge and whether the cutting off is clear or not, he answers to this treatise's order of first explaining the difference of the three knowledges and afterwards explaining that the three kinds of cutting off are without difference. On the difference in cutting off he says: 「佛與二乘智有利鈍故斷時有差別，斷後俱無正使故斷後無別也。」 tr. "Because the knowledge of the Buddha and of the two vehicles is sharp or blunt, at the time of cutting off there is a difference; after the cutting off, both are without the actual fetters, and so after the cutting off there is no difference." Explaining the difference at the time of cutting by sharp and blunt, and the sameness after the cutting by both being without the actual fetters, he shares exactly the bounds of this treatise's single simile of the sharpness or bluntness of the knife. He further says: 「此中先明無為差別，據所悟無為無異，無為即實相也。」 tr. "Here first the difference in the unconditioned is made plain: in terms of the unconditioned that is awakened to, there is no difference; the unconditioned is the real mark." Dividing it into two layers, that which is awakened to and that which awakens, he sheds light on this treatise's setting out that 「三乘聖人皆以無為法而有差別」 tr. "the sages of the three vehicles all have their difference by means of the unconditioned dharma" and yet 「有為法中可得說」 tr. "it can be spoken of within conditioned dharmas". On the later limit he says: 「道斷結說後際者，聖斷結盡故得無餘，無餘即後際也。」 tr. "As for saying that the fetters are cut off and speaking of the later limit: because the sages' fetters are cut off and exhausted, they obtain the without-remainder, and the without-remainder is the later limit." What it points to agrees completely with this treatise's one sentence 「後際者，所謂無餘涅槃」 tr. "the later limit means nirvāṇa without remainder". Coming to the explanation of the section on prajñā, Jizang sets up four gates of his own, and first answers this fascicle's doubt, 「上來常說般若波羅蜜相，今何以更問」 tr. "above, the mark of prajñāpāramitā has been spoken of constantly; why is it asked again now", saying: 「上離波若為三慧，今合三慧為波若。」 tr. "Above, prajñā was separated into the three wisdoms; now the three wisdoms are joined into prajñā." Explaining by separating and joining why the earlier and later questions are not a repetition, he takes a different path from this treatise's answer, ‘not only asking about the mark, but asking where its name comes from’, while the doubt dispelled is the same; they are recorded side by side without judgement. On the foremost crossing he says: 「第一度者，聲聞下度、緣覺中度、菩薩第一度也。」 tr. "As for the foremost crossing: the śrāvaka's is the lower crossing, the pratyekabuddha's the middle crossing, the bodhisattva's the foremost crossing." This agrees completely with this treatise's first meaning. Of the section on benefit and non-benefit he judges: 「義非義下，第四兩捨也。」 tr. "From ‘benefit and non-benefit’ onward is the fourth, the double giving up." Judging it as the double giving up, he answers to this treatise's words ‘apart from benefit and non-benefit’. Further, on the conditioned and unconditioned of prajñā he says: 「實相是無為般若，觀照文字是有為般若也。」 tr. "The real mark is the unconditioned prajñā; contemplative illumination and letters are the conditioned prajñā." He matches the three—the real mark, contemplative illumination, and letters—to the conditioned and the unconditioned, whereas this treatise divides only the two kinds, conditioned and unconditioned, and does not reach the heading of letters—this is Jizang's own division, differing in breadth from what this treatise sets up; both are kept, and his explanation is not used to replace this text. As for Jizang's whole division of the sections of this chapter, the choices among the divergent explanations of the various schools, and the sources of his citations, these are examined in detail in the apparatus layer.

The chapter ends here. The First Part asked about the practising, giving rise to, and cultivating of the three wisdoms, the Middle Part raised difficulties over the distinctions of the three vehicles and the three knowledges, the Last Part explains that all distinctions are worldly settings-up and returns them to nothing to be attained—though the name of the three wisdoms is set up on practising, giving rise to, and cultivating, in reality it accomplishes only one matter: with nothing to be attained in any dharma, and yet not obstructing practice. The next chapter, "The Tree of the Path", should make plain the marks of arousing the mind and cultivating practice, setting off precisely from this place of nothing to be attained.