大智度論 善達品Dazhidulun — Mahāprajñāpāramitā-upadeśa · Thorough Penetration

Thorough Penetration: Why Thoroughly Penetrating the Marks of Dharmas Must Be Answered by Means of a Conjured Person and Not Said Directly; Why How a Conjured Person Has Cultivation of the Path Is the Most Crucial Pressing Question; Why, If All Dharmas Are like a Conjuration, What Work the Bodhisattva Has to Do Is the Pivotal Objection of the Whole Chapter; Why the Buddha Asks in Return Whether Any Beings Were Seen to Obtain Liberation from the Five Destinies; Why Beings' Not Knowing for Themselves Is the Whole Reason for the Bodhisattva's Practising the Path; Why Where Beings Abide Is Answered with within Names and Marks and the False Recollection, Imagining, and Discrimination; Why the Name Is a Forced and Provisional Setting-up and Why the Mark Is Divided into the Two Kinds of Form and the Formless; Why Because of Signlessness, Stacked Thirteen Times in a Row, Becomes the Sole Ground for Making the Perfections Complete; Why, If All Dharmas Are Signless and without Recollecting, the Four Kinds of Dharmas Are Still Counted; Why Training in the Three Gates of Liberation Is Precisely Being Able to Train in the Five Aggregates, the Twelve Sense-fields, the Eighteen Elements, the Four Truths, and the Twelve Links of Causes and Conditions; Why the Marks of the Five Aggregates of Clinging Need the Five Similes of Foam, Bubble, Mirage, Plantain, and Conjured Troops, Each Speaking of Arising and Ceasing and of Suchness; Why Knowing Dharmas by Discriminating Each One Separately Does Not Destroy the Nature of Dharmas; Why Training in the Nature of Dharmas Is Not Training in Nothing; Why the Nineteen Successive Questions of Why Train Are Not Disbelief but a Pressing Out of the Real Meaning; Why the Simile of the Skilled Conjurer Must Set Side by Side the Two Views of Those with Wisdom and Those without Wisdom; Why the Nature of Dharmas Being without Difference Before, After, and in the Middle Is the Ground for Bringing Beings to Accomplishment; Why the Treatise-Author First Asks Why Subhūti Asks Again and Answers with the Calf and the Sweet Milk; Why the Conjured Person, without Mind and without Mental Factors yet Able to Do Things, Is Exactly the Mark of the Bodhisattva's Body; Why Subhūti's Not Daring to Speak of Emptiness Because He Prizes the Buddha-dharma Must Be Explained by the Lion Not Prizing Its Own Strength; Why the Blind Son Drinking Poison Is Whence the Mind of Great Compassion Arises; Why Seeing a Person in the Dark and the Evil Dog Barking at Its Shadow Are Ready-made Specimens of the Falseness and Deception of Names and Marks; Why Breaking the Body Down to Atoms Must Go On to Refute the Atom; Why, If the Atom Is Form, It Must Have Ten Parts; Why the Divine Eye's Seeing the Minute Is Still a False and Deceptive Seeing; Why, of Name and Mark, the Mark Is the Root and the Name the Branch; Why a Nature Fixed and Really Existent Turns on the Contrary into Non-arising, Non-ceasing, and No Sin or Merit; Why the Objection That Three of the Four Truths Have Marks Is Answered by the Dharma of the Mahāyāna Differing from the Dharma of the Śrāvakas; Why the Three Truths All Following the Truth of Cessation Is the Proof of Being Signless and without Recollecting; Why the Three Vehicles Not Differing from the Signless Dharma Does Not Hinder There Being the Paths of the Three Vehicles; Why the Three Gates of Liberation Are the Real Dharma and the Rest Is All Spoken as Skilful Means; Why Training in the Three Gates of Liberation Being Precisely Training in the Five Aggregates Is Not Training in the Signless by Means of Marks; Why, the Real Mark of All Dharmas Being Named the Nature of Dharmas, the Nature of Form Cannot Destroy the Nature of Dharmas; Why the Nature of Dharmas Being without Nature Becomes on the Contrary the Reason for Training in All Dharmas Throughout; Why Seeing Some Dharma Gone Out from the Nature of Dharmas Is the Inversion of Permanence and Ignorance; Why the Conjurer Being the Bodhisattva and the Conjuring Dharmas Being the Six Perfections Is the Gathering-up of the Whole Chapter; Why, Whether the Nature of Dharmas Were First Non-existent and Afterwards Existent or First Existent and Afterwards Non-existent, Neither Road Establishes Practice; and Why From the Very Beginning Always Empty, Now Nothing Is Lost Is the Last Sentence with Which One Who Thoroughly Penetrates Teaches Beings

What Is Being Asked

The title of this chapter is 「善達」 tr. "Thorough Penetration", and what it asks is only one sentence: how must the bodhisattva be in order to count as thoroughly penetrating the marks of dharmas? The whole chapter starts from this question and is gathered in by the sentence 「今無所失」 tr. "now nothing is lost"; all the twists and turns in between are the unfolding of this one question.

To understand this chapter, one must first see clearly its way of answering. The Buddha does not say directly that the marks of dharmas are thus and thus; instead he first brings up a conjured person: a person made by conjuration does not practise lust, anger, and delusion, does not practise form and so on up to consciousness, does not practise inner and outer dharmas, does not practise the afflictions and fetters, does not practise with outflows or without outflows, worldly or world-transcending, conditioned or unconditioned, and has no holy fruit either; the bodhisattva too is like this, has none of these matters, and also does not discriminate these dharmas. The answer comes to rest on the six Chinese characters 「亦不分別是法」 tr. "nor does he discriminate these dharmas"—thorough penetration is not arriving at some special knowing; it is no longer placing discrimination upon dharmas. Therefore from beginning to end this chapter turns over and over on one and the same matter: since it is like a conjuration, what then does everything the bodhisattva does still amount to?

This pressing question appears three times in this chapter, each time pressing harder than the last. The first time is Subhūti asking 「化人云何有修道」 tr. "how does a conjured person have cultivation of the path"—since the conjured person practises nothing at all, from where can cultivation of the path be spoken of? The second time is: since it is known that all form, feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness are like a conjuration, the conjured person then has no five aggregates, no stain or purity, no birth and death or liberation, so 「菩薩有何等功用」 tr. "what kind of work does the bodhisattva have to do". The third time is: since one sees and knows all dharmas as like an illusion, like a conjuration, why does one still practise the six perfections, the four dhyānas, the four immeasurables, the four formless absorptions, the thirty-seven dharmas that aid the path, and so on up to purifying buddha-lands and bringing beings to accomplishment? The Buddha's answers too go deeper each time: first he answers that the conjured person's cultivation of the path is neither stained nor pure and is not within the five destinies; next he asks in return whether, when originally practising the bodhisattva path, one ever saw any beings obtain liberation from the five destinies, and Subhūti himself answers that he never did; finally he speaks out the most crucial reason of the whole chapter—if beings themselves knew that dharmas are like an illusion, like a conjuration, the bodhisattva would never practise the bodhisattva path for the sake of beings through asaṃkhyeya kalpas; it is precisely because beings themselves do not know that the bodhisattva through immeasurable asaṃkhyeya kalpas practises the six perfections, brings beings to accomplishment, and purifies buddha-lands. The reason the bodhisattva practises lies not in dharmas but in beings' not knowing.

The middle section turns to name and mark. Subhūti asks in what place beings abide, that the bodhisattva pulls them out, and the Buddha answers that they abide only within names and marks and the false recollection, imagining, and discrimination; thereupon the Buddha himself sets up the teaching on names and marks: a name is a forced provisional setting-up, and all dharmas of coming together are provisional names; marks are of two kinds, the mark of form and the mark of the formless, both being a clinging mind born of recollection, imagining, and discrimination within the empty dharma. Since there are only names and marks, Subhūti then objects: how then can the bodhisattva benefit himself and benefit others and make the grounds complete? The Buddha's answer uses this the other way round: precisely because dharmas have no real root-substance and have only names and marks, therefore he can make the perfections complete—thirteen times in a row 「無相故」 tr. "because of signlessness" is stacked up, establishing 「無相」 tr. "signlessness" as the sole ground of making complete; and he adds a sentence of proof by the contrary: if the marks of dharmas really existed even so much as a hair's breadth, the bodhisattva could not obtain awakening, nor could he cause beings to obtain the dharmas without outflows.

The latter section is the nature of dharmas. From the five aggregates and five similes of 「知色相，知色生滅，知色如」 tr. "he knows the mark of form, knows the arising and ceasing of form, knows the suchness of form", to whether knowing dharmas by discrimination destroys the nature of dharmas, to whether training in the nature of dharmas is training in nothing, to by what causes and conditions all dharmas are precisely the nature of dharmas, it is pushed all the way to Subhūti's great question with its nineteen successive 「何以學」 tr. "why train"—if all dharmas are precisely the nature of dharmas, why still train in the six perfections, train in the dhyānas, train in the grounds, train in the thirty-two marks, train in the omniscience of all kinds? The Buddha's answer does not deny his premise; it only adds one distinction: one who sees some dharma outside the nature of dharmas is not seeking awakening; knowing that the nature of all dharmas is precisely awakening, he then 「以無名相之法以名相說」 tr. "speaks of the nameless and signless dharma by means of names and marks". Then comes the simile of the skilled conjurer—the conjurer conjures men and women, elephants and horses, and so on up to the thirty-two marks of a Buddha's body; people without wisdom praise him as very capable, while those with wisdom know that there is no real matter in it and yet it can entertain the crowd. Finally it concludes with the nature of dharmas being without difference before, after, and in the middle: precisely because it is without difference can the bodhisattva by the power of skilful means display the nature of dharmas and bring beings to accomplishment.

The treatise-author's explanation goes along two roads. One road follows the text and explains the meaning, supplying for each turn of the sūtra section its reason why: the reason for asking again, the reason the conjured person can act, the reason Subhūti does not dare to speak of emptiness, the reason the bodhisattva gives rise to great compassion, and ready-made specimens of the falseness and deception of names and marks. The other road sets up seven rounds of question and answer, pressing out one place after another the doubts not yet voiced in the reader's mind—among them the two rounds refuting the atom and distinguishing name and mark have no text in the sūtra; they are two investigations the treatise-author brings out of his own, and they are exactly what is most worth reading in the treatise section of this chapter. The final section is gathered into one sentence: beings and dharmas are not empty only when they enter nirvāṇa without remainder; from the very beginning they have always been empty, and therefore 「今無所失」 tr. "now nothing is lost".

Passage by Passage

1. Subhūti asks how the bodhisattva thoroughly penetrates the marks of dharmas. At the head of the chapter there is only one question: 「世尊！云何菩薩善達諸法相？」 tr. "World-Honored One! How does the bodhisattva thoroughly penetrate the marks of dharmas?" What is asked is how the two Chinese characters 「善達」 tr. "thorough penetration" are to be made real. This question was already spoken of in the preceding chapters; it is asked again here, and at the very opening of the treatise section a question and answer is set up for this, from which one can see that the sūtra text itself knows this is a repeated question. In reading this sentence one must first take note that what it asks is not ‘what are the marks of dharmas’, but ‘how must the bodhisattva be to count as thoroughly penetrating’—what is asked lies in the person, not in dharmas, and only so does the answer come to rest on the bodhisattva.

2. The Buddha answers with the conjured person: not practising lust, anger, and delusion, and so on up to having no holy fruit; the bodhisattva too is like this. The Buddha does not speak of the marks head-on; first he brings up the conjured person. The conjured person does not practise lust, anger, and delusion, does not practise form and so on up to consciousness, does not practise inner and outer dharmas, does not practise the afflictions and fetters, does not practise dharmas with outflows or without outflows, worldly or world-transcending, conditioned or unconditioned, and has no holy fruit either. This string of negations begins from the coarsest, the three poisons, and is ranged all the way to the subtlest, the holy fruit, levelling in between the three pairs of stained and pure, worldly and world-transcending, and conditioned and unconditioned. Then follows the sentence 「菩薩亦如是，無有是事，亦不分別是法，是名善達諸法相」 tr. "the bodhisattva too is like this: there is no such matter, nor does he discriminate these dharmas; this is named thoroughly penetrating the marks of dharmas". What is crucial is the clause that the last sentence adds—the conjured person does not practise from the first, while the bodhisattva 「不分別是法」 tr. "does not discriminate these dharmas". The conjured person's not practising comes from having no mind; the bodhisattva's not discriminating comes from thorough penetration; the two are alike but not from the same source, and this dividing line the treatise section below will speak of again.

3. Subhūti presses: how does a conjured person have cultivation of the path? Subhūti at once seizes on the loose point of this simile: since the conjured person practises nothing at all, where then can the matter of cultivating the path be established? This question is asked with great precision—if one reasons from the letter of the simile, then since the bodhisattva is like a conjured person, the six perfections and the grounds have nowhere to hang. The 「菩薩有何等功用」 tr. "what kind of work does the bodhisattva have to do" that appears again and again later in the whole chapter has its root in this question. Reading the sūtra up to here one need not hurry to smooth things over for the Buddha; first take this question in firmly, and only then will the answer that follows have somewhere to land.

4. The Buddha answers that the conjured person's cultivation of the path is neither stained nor pure and is not within the five destinies, and asks in return whether the person conjured has a real root-substance, has stain or purity. The Buddha's answer is in two parts. The first part acknowledges head-on that the conjured person too has cultivation of the path, only this cultivation of the path is 「不垢不淨，亦不在五道生死」 tr. "neither stained nor pure, nor within the birth and death of the five destinies"—that is, cultivating the path need not be tied to a really existent one who cultivates. In the second part he suddenly asks Subhūti in return: does the person conjured by the Buddha have a real root-substance, does he have stain or purity? This turn is a way of teaching often used in this chapter: not stating the conclusion himself, but pressing the questioner to state it himself. Wherever the Buddha asks in return, he is handing the power of judgement back to the questioner.

5. Subhūti himself answers: no real root-substance, without stain and without purity, not within the birth and death of the five destinies. Subhūti answers cleanly: no, the person conjured by the Buddha has no real root-substance, is also without stain and without purity, and is also not within the birth and death of the five destinies. This answer is spoken by himself; it is not laid on him by the Buddha. That the later 「菩薩亦如是」 tr. "the bodhisattva too is like this" can be established depends wholly on this premise acknowledged by the questioner's own mouth. In teaching, this step may not be skipped—if a conclusion is spoken by the learner himself, then however deep things go afterwards, he will not fall back.

6. The Buddha concludes: the bodhisattva-mahāsattva's thorough penetration of the marks of dharmas is also like this. The Buddha takes it up with only one sentence, 「如是，須菩提！菩薩摩訶薩善達諸法相，亦如是」 tr. "Like this, Subhūti! The bodhisattva-mahāsattva's thorough penetration of the marks of dharmas is also like this", adding no further explanation. Here the sūtra text does not give the speaker's name; it follows on from the Buddha's preceding words, and in reading one should not mistake it for Subhūti continuing to speak. What is called "also like this" moves the three items of the preceding answer—no real root-substance, no stain or purity, not within the five destinies—all together onto the one who thoroughly penetrates.

7. Subhūti asks whether all form and feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness are like a conjuration. From the conjured person he pushes on to dharmas: is all form like a conjuration? Are all feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness like a conjuration? This question raises the simile into a general rule. Above, it was only said 「譬如化人」 tr. "it is as a conjured person", which is a simile; what is asked here is whether the five aggregates themselves are like a conjuration, which is the dharma. This step between simile and dharma Subhūti takes on the reader's behalf.

8. The Buddha answers that all form is like a conjuration and all feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness are like a conjuration. The Buddha's answer is almost the same in wording as the question, only with the questioning removed. This way of answering is common in this treatise: if the sentence the questioner has framed is already without error, the Buddha approves it just as it is and does not word it otherwise. The reader can save a layer here—whenever one sees an answer in the same wording as the question, one knows that this sentence is already a settled statement and can serve as the ground for the reasoning that follows.

9. Subhūti objects: since all is like a conjuration, and the conjured person has no five aggregates, no stain or purity, no birth and death or liberation, what kind of work does the bodhisattva have to do? This is the pivotal objection of the whole chapter. He puts the two preceding parts together and reasons: since all dharmas are like a conjuration, and the conjured person has no form, no feeling, perception, constructions, or consciousness, is without stain and without purity, has no birth and death in the five destinies and also no place of liberation, then what use is there still in everything the bodhisattva does? If this objection is not broken, everything from the six perfections downward falls into emptiness; if this objection is broken too quickly, it falls into the muddled talk of ‘though empty, yet existent’. The Buddha below uses three sections to finish answering, from which one can see its weight.

10. The Buddha asks in return: when originally practising the bodhisattva path, did he ever see any beings obtain liberation from the five destinies? The Buddha does not directly answer whether there is work or not; first he asks in return about a matter of fact: when the bodhisattva at first practised the bodhisattva path, did he ever see any beings obtain liberation from among the hells, the hungry ghosts, the animals, humans, and gods? What is asked is 「見」 tr. "seeing"—whether one has seen a really existing one who is delivered. This question moves the point of dispute from ‘whether there is work’ to ‘whether there is something seen’; it is the first move in this chapter's answering of objections.

11. Subhūti answers that he never did. Subhūti answers truthfully: no, World-Honored One. This answer, like passage 5, is spoken by the questioner himself. Since he acknowledges that he never saw any beings obtain liberation, when the Buddha below says that he does not see beings obtain liberation from the three realms, it is not a newly added meaning; it is taking up his own words and speaking on from them.

12. The Buddha approves and brings out the reason: he does not see beings obtain liberation from the three realms, because he sees and knows all dharmas as like an illusion, like a conjuration. The Buddha says 「如是」 tr. "just so" twice in a row to approve, and at once points out the reason why: the bodhisattva-mahāsattva does not see beings obtain liberation from the three realms—why?—because he sees and knows all dharmas as like an illusion, like a conjuration. Here one must see clearly the direction of cause and effect: it is not that he does not see because there are no beings; it is that he does not see because he sees and knows them as like an illusion, like a conjuration. What is broken is the view ‘I see that real beings are delivered by me’, not the matter of delivering beings.

13. Subhūti objects again: since he sees and knows them as like an illusion, like a conjuration, for the sake of what matter does he practise the six perfections and so on up to purifying buddha-lands and bringing beings to accomplishment? This is the second appearance of the pivotal objection, closer to the bone than the first: no longer asking whether there is work, it asks directly about the motive for practising the path. Since he sees and knows them as like an illusion, like a conjuration—the six perfections, the four dhyānas, the four immeasurable minds, the four formless absorptions, the thirty-seven dharmas that aid the path, and so on up to great kindness and great compassion, purifying buddha-lands, and bringing beings to accomplishment—for the sake of what matter are these practised? Asked up to here, there is no road of retreat; the Buddha must state head-on the reason for practising the path.

14. The Buddha answers: beings themselves do not know that dharmas are like an illusion, like a conjuration; therefore the bodhisattva through immeasurable asaṃkhyeya kalpas practises the six perfections, brings beings to accomplishment, and purifies buddha-lands. The Buddha's answer uses a supposition: if beings themselves already knew that dharmas are like an illusion, like a conjuration, the bodhisattva would never practise the bodhisattva path for the sake of beings through asaṃkhyeya kalpas. Put the other way round: precisely because beings themselves do not know, the bodhisattva through immeasurable asaṃkhyeya kalpas practises the six perfections, brings beings to accomplishment, purifies buddha-lands, and obtains anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi. This sentence is where the ground of the whole chapter's gate of practice lies: the reason for the bodhisattva's practising the path is not placed in dharmas; it is placed in beings' not knowing. In dharmas there is nothing to practise—because they are like a conjuration; in beings one cannot but practise—because they do not know. Only when both sides stand does one not fall into annihilation.

15. Subhūti asks in what place beings abide, that the bodhisattva pulls them out. Following on from the answer above: since beings do not know, then what is called pulling out—from where, after all, are they pulled out? Since all dharmas are like a dream, like an echo, like a shadow, like a mirage, like an illusion, like a conjuration, beings must have some place where they abide before one can speak of pulling. This question turns the topic from ‘why practise’ to ‘where the practice is done’; it is the turning point in this chapter from principle into matters.

16. The Buddha answers: beings abide only within names and marks and the false recollection, imagining, and discrimination; therefore the bodhisattva pulls beings out from within the falseness of names and marks. The Buddha's answer is only one sentence: beings abide only within names and marks and the false recollection, imagining, and discrimination. Since where they abide is names and marks and recollection, imagining, and discrimination, what they are pulled out of likewise lies within the falseness of names and marks. This answer is extremely crucial—it gives the bodhisattva's practising of the path a definite place. Above it was said that dharmas, being like a conjuration, are unfindable; here it is said that beings have a solid place of clinging; although the place of clinging is not a real dharma, it is a real sickness. The bodhisattva practising prajñā does not work upon suchness; he works upon people's grasping at names and marks.

17. Subhūti asks what is a name and what is a mark. Since the Buddha has set up the two Chinese characters ‘name’ and ‘mark’ as the place out of which one is pulled, Subhūti at once asks for definitions: what is a name? What is a mark? In this treatise, whenever a load-bearing word appears in the sūtra without being defined, there is sure to be this question. The reader can learn its method here: when one meets a crucial point, first seek the definition, and do not explain it oneself from common sense.

18. The Buddha explains name: a forced and provisional setting-up; all dharmas of coming together are provisional names. The Buddha first explains name. A name is 「強作假施設」 tr. "a forced and provisional setting-up"—the two Chinese characters ‘forced’ are the weightiest; they say that a name is not originally present in the thing, but is forcibly added by people. Then he lists what is set up: this form, this feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness; this man, this woman; this large, this small; this hell, this animal, this hungry ghost; this human, this god; this conditioned, this unconditioned; these four fruits of the śramaṇa, the path of the pratyekabuddha, this Buddha path. This string starts from the five aggregates, passes through man and woman, large and small, the rising and sinking of the six destinies, the conditioned and the unconditioned, and is ranged all the way to the four fruits and the Buddha path—even the most honoured of names are among the provisional settings-up. Next comes the general rule: all dharmas of coming together are provisional names; by the name one takes dharmas, therefore it is a name. Next comes the form of the sickness: all conditioned dharmas have only names and marks, and ordinary foolish people give rise to clinging within them. Last comes the bodhisattva's use: practising prajñā, because of the power of skilful means, he teaches them within names to be far from them, and the words of his teaching are recorded: 「諸眾生！是名但有空名，虛妄憶想分別中生，汝等莫著虛妄憶想！此事本末皆無，自性空故，智者所不著。」 tr. "Beings! This name has only an empty name; it is born within false recollection, imagining, and discrimination. Do not cling to false recollection! This matter is entirely without root or branch; because it is empty of self-nature, the wise do not cling to it." There are two parts to look at in these words: the first part breaks the reality of names; the latter part points out what the wise do not cling to—what they do not cling to is false recollection, not the speaking of names.

19. The Buddha explains mark: the two kinds, the mark of form and the mark of the formless; he teaches beings to be far from the two marks and abide within the signless nature. Next he explains mark. Marks are of two kinds, the places where ordinary people cling: first, the mark of form; second, the mark of the formless. What is called the mark of form is that all form, whether coarse or subtle, whether fair or ugly, is empty, and yet within this empty dharma, by recollection, imagining, and discrimination, a clinging mind arises; what is called the mark of the formless is that the formless dharmas are recollected, imagined, and discriminated, and because one grasps at marks with a clinging mind, afflictions arise. The definitions of the two kinds of marks use the same frame—both are empty, both arise from the clinging mind of recollection, imagining, and discrimination; the difference lies only in whether the object is form or not form. Therefore one knows that the sickness of marks lies not in the object, but in the clinging mind that takes the object. Finally it is said that the bodhisattva, by the power of skilful means, teaches beings to be far from these marks and settles them within the signless dharma, so that they do not fall into the two dharmas 「是相、是無相」 tr. "of mark and of signlessness", and abide within the signless nature. Here one must take note: what one is far from is marks, and what one abides in is the signless nature; if one sets up signlessness as a separate thing to abide in, that is exactly the 「墮二法」 tr. "falling into the two dharmas" that the sūtra text blocks.

20. Subhūti objects: if all dharmas have only names and marks, how does he benefit himself, teach others to obtain the good benefit, and make the grounds complete so that they obtain the three vehicles? Once the teaching on names and marks is set up, a difficulty at once arises. Since all dharmas are only names and marks, how can the bodhisattva practising prajñā himself obtain benefit, and also teach others to obtain the good benefit? And how can he make the grounds complete, going from one ground to another ground, teaching and transforming beings so that they obtain the three vehicles? This objection has the same frame as passage 9 but lands on matters and marks: the earlier objection asked about the work of practising the path; this objection asks about the effect of practising the path.

21. The Buddha answers: precisely because there is no real root-substance and only names and marks, he can make the perfections complete—thirteen times in a row, because of signlessness. The Buddha's way of answering is to use the difficulty the other way round. First he sets up the negative side: if dharmas at root were fixedly existent and not only names and marks, then when practising prajñā he could not benefit himself, nor could he benefit others. Next he sets up the positive side: dharmas have no real root-substance and have only names and marks; therefore he can make complete dhyānapāramitā, because of signlessness; vīrya, kṣānti, śīla, and dāna, because of signlessness; the four dhyānas, the four immeasurable minds, the four formless absorptions, because of signlessness; the four foundations of mindfulness and so on up to the eightfold noble path, because of signlessness; inner emptiness and so on up to the emptiness of non-existent and existent dharmas, because of signlessness; the eight liberations, the nine successive absorptions, because of signlessness; the ten powers of the Buddha and so on up to the eighteen unshared dharmas, because of signlessness. In this section the phrase 「無相故」 tr. "because of signlessness" is stacked up thirteen times, each sentence returning the ground of making complete to one and the same place. Here the reader should see the intent of the sūtra text: it is not saying that signlessness does not hinder making complete; it is saying that only because of signlessness can one make complete. At the end a sentence of proof by the contrary is added: if the marks of dharmas really existed even so much as a hair's breadth, the bodhisattva practising prajñā could not know that dharmas are signless and without recollecting and so obtain awakening, nor could he teach beings so that they obtain the dharmas without outflows; why?—because all dharmas without outflows are signless and without recollecting. The two Chinese characters ‘a hair's breadth’ speak of measuring down to the smallest point, meaning that if even a trace of real existence is left, the whole does not hold.

22. Subhūti objects: if all dharmas are signless and without recollecting, how is it that one counts out: this is the dharma of the śrāvakas, the dharma of the pratyekabuddhas, the dharma of the bodhisattvas, the dharma of the Buddha? Once signlessness has become the general rule, the names of the stations become a problem: if all dharmas are signless and without recollecting, then from where are the differences of the four kinds of dharmas established? This objection is not forced argument; it is the doubt that anyone who reads up to 「一切法無相」 tr. "all dharmas are signless" will give rise to—if they are truly signless, would not the distinction between sage and ordinary become empty talk?

23. The Buddha asks in return whether the signless dharma differs from the dharma of the śrāvakas, and Subhūti twice answers that it does not. The Buddha still uses questions in return. First he asks whether the signless dharma differs from the dharma of the śrāvakas, and the answer is that it does not; then he asks whether the signless dharma differs from the dharma of the pratyekabuddhas, the dharma of the bodhisattvas, the dharma of the Buddha, and the answer is again that it does not. Between the two questions and two answers not a single word of explanation is placed. Here the sūtra text does not give the speakers' names; the Buddha and Subhūti follow on from each other. The reader should take note that these two 「不也」 tr. "it does not" are spoken by the questioner himself—so the conclusion below is not added from outside.

24. The Buddha asks further whether the signless dharma is precisely the four fruits and so on up to the dharma of the Buddha, and Subhūti answers that it is so. The two questions above asked 「異不」 tr. "does it differ"; this question asks ‘is it precisely’. Advancing from not differing to being precisely is one layer more. Subhūti answers 「如是！世尊！」 tr. "It is so! World-Honored One!". At this point, between signlessness and the three vehicles and four fruits, both faces, differing and being precisely, have been settled by the questioner's own mouth.

25. The Buddha concludes: all dharmas are signless; training in the signlessness of all dharmas, one obtains the increase of wholesome dharmas; training in the three gates of liberation, one can train in the five aggregates and so on up to the eighteen unshared dharmas. The Buddha concludes on the basis of what came above: by reason of these causes and conditions, one should know that all dharmas are signless. At once he turns out the gate of practice: the bodhisattva trains in this signlessness of all dharmas and obtains the increase of wholesome dharmas—the six perfections, the four dhyānas, the four immeasurable minds, the four formless absorptions, the four foundations of mindfulness and so on up to the eighteen unshared dharmas. Why? The bodhisattva does not take the other dharmas as essential, as he does the three gates of liberation, namely emptiness, the signless, and non-action. What is the reason? All wholesome dharmas enter into the three gates of liberation. Next he defines the three gates one by one: all dharmas are empty of specific marks: this is called the gate of liberation of emptiness; all dharmas are signless: this is called the gate of liberation of the signless; all dharmas have the mark of being without making and non-rising: this is called the gate of liberation of non-action. Finally he says that if one trains in the three gates of liberation, then at this time one can train in the marks of the five aggregates, the marks of the twelve sense-fields, the marks of the eighteen elements, the four noble truths, the dharma of the twelve-part causes and conditions, inner emptiness and so on up to the emptiness of non-existent and existent dharmas, the six perfections, the four foundations of mindfulness and so on up to the eightfold noble path, the ten powers of the Buddha and so on up to the eighteen unshared dharmas. This section is the bridge in this chapter by which 「無相」 tr. "signlessness" leads through to 「遍學」 tr. "training in all": signlessness is not paring away what is trained in; it is gathering all that is trained in into the three gates. That the three gates are essential has its ground in the sentence 「一切善法皆入」 tr. "all wholesome dharmas enter", not in the three gates themselves being higher.

26. Subhūti asks how one can train in the marks of the five aggregates of clinging. Since the Buddha has said that training in the three gates of liberation one can train in the marks of the five aggregates, Subhūti asks for the details: when the bodhisattva practises prajñāpāramitā, how can he train in the marks of the five aggregates of clinging? This question opens out the long section below teaching the five aggregates—the most concrete section of this chapter, and also the one most convenient to rely on in cultivating contemplation.

27. The Buddha answers: he knows the mark of form, knows the arising and ceasing of form, knows the suchness of form, and brings out the simile of foam and the teaching that suchness means true to reality and not false. The Buddha breaks 「學五陰相」 tr. "training in the marks of the five aggregates" into three matters: knowing the mark, knowing the arising and ceasing, knowing the suchness. Knowing the mark of form is knowing that form is ultimately empty, its inner parts differing, hollow and without substance, as foam on water has no solidity. Knowing the arising and ceasing of form is that when form arises it comes from nowhere, and when it goes it arrives nowhere; if it neither comes nor goes, this is knowing the mark of the arising and ceasing of form. Knowing the suchness of form is that this suchness of form is unarisen and unceasing, neither coming nor going, neither increasing nor decreasing, neither stained nor pure. At the end a sentence is added explaining the word ‘suchness’: 「如名如實不虛，如前，後、中亦爾，常不異」 tr. "what is called suchness is true to reality and not false; as it is before, so it is after and in the middle, constantly not differing"—the meaning of suchness lies in not differing in the three limits of before, after, and middle, and this phrase will be used again at the end of the chapter, when the nature of dharmas is discussed as without difference before, after, and in the middle. The order of the three matters may not be reversed: first know the emptiness of its mark, next know that its arising and ceasing have no coming and going, and last know the immovability of its suchness.

28. He knows the mark of feeling as like a bubble on water, one arising, one ceasing. The simile for feeling takes the bubble on water: one arising, one ceasing, it breaks of itself without waiting for any outside force. The sickness of the mark of feeling lies in the speed of its arising and ceasing, which people do not notice; therefore the simile takes the bubble. The two matters of arising and ceasing and of suchness are worded as in the section on form—coming from nowhere, going and arriving nowhere; suchness is unarisen and unceasing and so on up to neither stained nor pure. From here on the sūtra text uses the same frame for the following four aggregates, changing only the simile; on this basis the reader can know for himself: the sicknesses of the five aggregates are different, but the way of contemplating them is the same.

29. He knows the mark of perception as like a mirage: water is unfindable, and yet falsely one gives rise to the perception of water. The simile for perception takes the mirage: seen from afar it looks like water; hurry towards it and it is not there; and yet within it people falsely give rise to the perception of water. This simile fits the sickness of perception most closely—perception does not arise with nothing to rely on; it arises relying on a mark that seems to exist; what it resembles never existed, yet what is perceived seems vividly present. The suchness in the section on perception has one sentence more, 「不轉於實相」 tr. "does not turn away from the real mark", which says that although perception turns, suchness does not turn with it.

30. He knows the mark of constructions as like a plantain: stripping it away leaf by leaf, one does not find a solid core. The simile for constructions takes the plantain: stripping it away one leaf after another, in the end no solid core is to be found. What this simile breaks is the view ‘within constructions there is a doer’. The action of stripping is itself the method of contemplation—it is not cutting it off with one stroke, but removing layer after layer and then knowing that there is no heart.

31. He knows the mark of consciousness as like a conjurer conjuring the four kinds of troops, which have no substance. The simile for consciousness takes the conjured troops: a conjurer conjures the four kinds of troops, elephants, horses, chariots, and foot-soldiers; their forms seem vividly present and yet they have no substance; consciousness too is like this. With this the five aggregates and five similes are complete: foam, bubble, mirage, plantain, conjured troops, going from outer to inner, from coarse to fine, and ending with conjuration—echoing from afar the simile of the conjured person at the head of the chapter, and also laying in advance the simile of the skilled conjurer at the end of the chapter.

32. He knows the sense-fields: the eye and so on up to the mind are empty of nature; form and so on up to dharmas are empty of nature. The five aggregates being done, he turns to the twelve sense-fields. The sūtra text is extremely brief: the eye, the nature of the eye is empty; and so on up to the mind, the nature of the mind is empty. Form, the nature of form is empty; and so on up to dharmas, the nature of dharmas is empty. Here no separate simile is set up; it is threaded through only with the one phrase ‘empty of nature’. The reason no further simile is needed is that the section on the five aggregates has already given a full account of the method of contemplation; the sense-fields and elements only change the object.

33. He knows the elements: the eye-element is empty, the form-element is empty, the eye-consciousness element is empty, and so on up to the mind-consciousness element. The eighteen elements are the same: the eye, the eye-element is empty; form, the form-element is empty; eye-consciousness, the eye-consciousness element is empty; and so on up to the mind-consciousness element, it is likewise. Faculty, object, and consciousness are each spoken of as empty, not allowing a meeting-place among the three to be left over as real. Taking this section together with the one above, one can know that what is called training in signlessness is, in matters, illuminating the emptiness of nature of the aggregates, sense-fields, and elements one by one; it is not that there is some separate signless realm to tend toward.

34. He knows the four noble truths: knowing the truth of suffering, he is far from two dharmas, not two and not different; the noble truth of suffering is precisely suchness. The way of speaking in the section on the four truths takes a turn. First it says that when knowing the noble truth of suffering he is far from two dharmas and knows the truth of suffering as not two and not different: this is called the noble truth of suffering; origination, cessation, and the path are likewise. Next it speaks of knowing the suchness of suffering—the noble truth of suffering is precisely suchness; suchness is precisely the noble truth of suffering. What is crucial in this section lies in the four Chinese characters 「遠離二法」 tr. "far from two dharmas": what one is far from is opposition such as suffering and non-suffering, knower and known; it is not that one may not speak of suffering. The noble truths at first sight are established by discrimination; here they are gathered in by non-duality, and yet their being truths is not abolished.

35. He knows the twelve links of causes and conditions: knowing the unarisen mark of the twelve links of causes and conditions. The twelve links of causes and conditions have only one sentence: knowing the unarisen mark of the twelve links of causes and conditions: this is called knowing the twelve links of causes and conditions. The dharma of causes and conditions originally takes arising as its meaning, and yet here it is known by the unarisen mark. One must see clearly that what is known is the 「相」 tr. "mark"—it is knowing that its mark of arising does not arise; it does not mean that there are no causes and conditions. This sentence is very short, yet it is the gathering-up of the preceding sections on the aggregates, sense-fields, and elements: even of the dharma most fit to be called arising, the mark of arising does not arise.

36. Subhūti objects: knowing dharmas by discriminating each one separately, will he not destroy the nature of dharmas by the nature of form, and so on up to destroying the nature of dharmas by the nature of the omniscience of all kinds? All the way above, he knows by discriminating each one separately—knowing form, knowing feeling, knowing the sense-fields, knowing the elements, knowing the truths, knowing dependent arising—and so Subhūti raises a doubt: discriminating each one separately like this, does one not destroy the nature of dharmas by the nature of form, and so on up to destroying the nature of dharmas by the nature of the omniscience of all kinds? This objection carries great weight: since it is said that all dharmas are signless and all enter signlessness, why are so many separate knowings allowed? The discussion of the nature of dharmas in the latter half of the whole chapter begins from this objection.

37. The Buddha answers: dharmas outside the nature of dharmas are unfindable, therefore it is not destroyed; the buddhas and the buddhas' disciples do not say that there are dharmas outside the nature of dharmas. The Buddha's answer uses a conditional sentence: if outside the nature of dharmas there were some further dharma, it ought to destroy the nature of dharmas. But dharmas outside the nature of dharmas are unfindable; therefore it is not destroyed. One must see clearly the form of this answer—it does not deny 「分別知」 tr. "knowing by discrimination"; it only denies 「法性外有法」 tr. "there being dharmas outside the nature of dharmas". The reason discrimination does not destroy the nature of dharmas is that of what is discriminated not one lies outside the nature of dharmas. Next comes the proof: because the buddhas and the buddhas' disciples know that dharmas outside the nature of dharmas are unfindable, they do not say that there are dharmas outside the nature of dharmas. Last comes the exhortation: the bodhisattva practising prajñā should train in the nature of dharmas. This phrase 「應學法性」 tr. "should train in the nature of dharmas" is precisely the cause of the next objection.

38. Subhūti objects: if one trains in the nature of dharmas, it is training in nothing. Since all dharmas do not go out of the nature of dharmas, and the nature of dharmas in turn has no nature to be found, is not what is called training in the nature of dharmas training in nothing? This objection is very sharp. It does not question the nature of dharmas; it questions whether the word 「學」 tr. "train" can still be established.

39. The Buddha answers: training in the nature of dharmas is training in all dharmas, because all dharmas are precisely the nature of dharmas. The Buddha's answer is only two sentences: if the bodhisattva trains in the nature of dharmas, he trains in all dharmas; why?—all dharmas are precisely the nature of dharmas. This turns the objection of 「無所學」 tr. "training in nothing" into the answer of 「遍學」 tr. "training in all": what is trained in has not become less; it cannot become any less.

40. Subhūti asks by reason of what causes and conditions all dharmas are precisely the nature of dharmas. Subhūti does not let go of that 「何以故」 tr. "why", and goes on to ask its causes and conditions. This question looks trivial, but in fact is necessary—if 「一切法即是法性」 tr. "all dharmas are precisely the nature of dharmas" is only made as a bare assertion, the hearer has no way to set his mind at rest; only with the following sentence of causes and conditions does one know the reason why.

41. The Buddha answers: all dharmas enter into the signless, unconditioned nature. The Buddha answers with great economy: all dharmas enter into the signless, unconditioned nature; by reason of these causes and conditions, training in the nature of dharmas is training in all dharmas. This answer joins the nature of dharmas to the signlessness of the first half of the chapter—the nature of dharmas is not another entity in a high place; it is precisely the signless, unconditioned nature spoken of all along above. Here the former and latter halves of the whole chapter unite into one meaning.

42. Subhūti's great question: if all dharmas are precisely the nature of dharmas, why train in the six perfections and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds—nineteen questions in a row—and he himself states that within the nature of dharmas there are no such distinctions and that form is precisely the nature of dharmas. This is the longest question in the sūtra section of this chapter. He lists the items to be trained in all the way through: the six perfections, the four dhyānas, the four immeasurables, the four formless absorptions, the four foundations of mindfulness and so on up to the eightfold noble path, the three gates of liberation, the eight liberations and the nine successive absorptions, the ten powers of the Buddha, the four fearlessnesses, the four unobstructed knowledges, and the eighteen unshared dharmas, the six supernormal powers, the thirty-two marks and the eighty minor marks, being born into great kṣatriya, brahmin, and householder families, being born in the six heavens of desire, being born in the Brahmā heaven and so on up to the Pure Abodes, being born in the sphere of boundless space · of boundless consciousness · of nothing whatsoever · of neither perception nor non-perception, the ground of the first arousing of intent and so on up to the tenth ground, the śrāvaka ground, the pratyekabuddha ground, and the bodhisattva's Dharma-position, bringing beings to accomplishment and purifying buddha-lands, all the dhāraṇī, delight in speaking, anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi and the omniscience of all kinds—the three Chinese characters 「何以學」 tr. "why train" are asked nineteen times in a row. Having finished asking, he himself states his grounds: within the nature of dharmas of all dharmas there are no such distinctions, so is the bodhisattva not falling into what is not the path? Within the nature of dharmas there is no form, no feeling, perception, constructions, or consciousness, and yet the nature of dharmas is also not far from form, feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness; form is precisely the nature of dharmas, the nature of dharmas is precisely form, and feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness are likewise. The length of this question is not wordiness: the wider the items listed, the less room there is to evade the objection ‘since they are precisely the nature of dharmas, why must one train further’. And the sentence 「色即是法性」 tr. "form is precisely the nature of dharmas" that he himself speaks at the end leaves exactly the place for the Buddha's answer to approve.

43. The Buddha approves his words and brings out a distinction: one who sees some dharma outside the nature of dharmas is not seeking awakening; knowing that the nature of all dharmas is precisely awakening, he speaks of the nameless and signless dharma by means of names and marks. The Buddha first approves with a repeated ‘just so’, and restates his words word for word: 「色即是法性，受、想、行、識即是法性。」 tr. "Form is precisely the nature of dharmas; feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness are precisely the nature of dharmas." Next he brings out the distinction—when the bodhisattva practises prajñā, if he sees some dharma outside the nature of dharmas, then he is not seeking anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi. Then he brings out the positive side: he knows that the nature of all dharmas is precisely anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi; for this reason, having known that all dharmas are precisely the nature of dharmas, 「以無名相之法以名相說」 tr. "he speaks of the nameless and signless dharma by means of names and marks", namely: this is form, this is feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness, and so on up to: this is anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi. This sentence is the whole chapter's proper answer to the objection ‘since they are precisely the nature of dharmas, why must one train further’: the items to be trained in are not set up separately outside the nature of dharmas; rather, the nameless and signless dharma is spoken of by means of names and marks. Here names and marks are no longer a sickness; they are an instrument for teaching the Dharma—read against the first half of the chapter's ‘ordinary people give rise to clinging within names and marks’, one can know that the sickness of names and marks lies not in names and marks but in clinging.

44. The simile of the skilled conjurer conjuring men and women, elephants and horses, and so on up to the thirty-two marks of a Buddha's body: those without wisdom praise him as very capable; those with wisdom know that there is no real matter. The Buddha goes on to bring out a great simile. A skilled conjurer, or a conjurer's disciple, standing in a place where many people are, conjures all kinds of shapes and colours: men and women, elephants and horses, gardens, lodging-halls, flowing springs and bathing pools, clothing and bedding, incense and flowers and necklaces, delicacies and food and drink, and many kinds of music to entertain the crowd; again he conjures people and causes them to practise the six perfections; again he conjures great kṣatriya, brahmin, and householder families, the gods of the six heavens of desire, the Heaven of the Brahmā Assembly and so on up to the heaven of neither perception nor non-perception, the four fruits and the pratyekabuddhas. Next the bodhisattva is set alongside it: from the first arousing of intent he practises the six perfections, practises the first ground and so on up to the tenth ground, enters the bodhisattva's position, sports in the supernormal powers, brings beings to accomplishment, purifies buddha-lands, sports in the dhyānas, liberations, and samādhis, practises the ten powers, the four fearlessnesses, the four unobstructed knowledges, the eighteen unshared dharmas, and great kindness and great compassion, and makes complete the thirty-two marks and eighty minor marks of a Buddha's body to show to the crowd. Last, two kinds of view are set side by side: people without wisdom praise him: 「未曾有！是人多能，巧為眾事，娛樂眾人，種種形色，乃至三十二相、八十隨形好莊嚴佛身。」 tr. "Such a thing has never been! This person is very capable, skilful at many things; he entertains the crowd with all kinds of shapes and colours, and so on up to adorning the body of a Buddha with the thirty-two marks and the eighty minor marks." Those with wisdom, however, reflect: 「未曾有也！是中無有實事，而以無所有法娛樂眾人，令有形相，無事事相，無有有相。」 tr. "Such a thing has never been! Herein there is no real matter, and yet with dharmas without anything existent he entertains the crowd, making there be shapes and marks; the mark of a matter where there is no matter, the mark of existence where there is no existence." Both sides say ‘such a thing has never been’, yet what they praise are two matters: one praises his capability, the other praises his being able though without substance. The sūtra text adds neither praise nor blame, and yet high and low show of themselves—this is a ready-made specimen in this chapter that teaches one to distinguish two kinds of praise.

45. The Buddha concludes: not seeing that there is any dharma apart from the nature of dharmas, he practises the six perfections, the ten wholesome paths, the five precepts, the eight precepts of the fast, the dhyānas, and the gates; because the nature of dharmas is without difference before, after, and in the middle, he can bring beings to accomplishment. The final section gathers up the sūtra. The bodhisattva does not see that apart from the nature of dharmas there is any dharma; practising prajñā, because of the power of skilful means, although he does not find beings, he himself practises and teaches others—giving, keeping morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom, each one practising himself, teaching others, praising its dharma, and joyfully praising those who practise it; again he himself practises the ten wholesome paths, the five precepts, and the eight precepts of the fast, himself practises the four dhyānas, kindness, compassion, joy, and equanimity, the sphere of boundless space · of boundless consciousness · of nothing whatsoever · of neither perception nor non-perception, the four foundations of mindfulness and so on up to the eightfold noble path, the three gates of liberation, the ten powers and so on up to the eighteen unshared dharmas, and also teaches others to practise them. The sentence pattern of this section is stacked up again and again, and what is stacked is exactly the four matters ‘practising oneself—teaching others—praising the dharma—praising the people’, which is the complete form of the bodhisattva's benefiting of others. Last comes the concluding sentence: if the nature of dharmas differed before, after, or in the middle, the bodhisattva could not by the power of skilful means display the nature of dharmas and bring beings to accomplishment; because the nature of dharmas is without difference before, after, and in the middle, therefore he practises prajñā and, for the sake of benefiting beings, practises the bodhisattva path. This answers head and tail to the phrase 「如前，後、中亦爾，常不異」 tr. "as it is before, so it is after and in the middle, constantly not differing" of passage 27—the not differing of suchness is exactly what makes practising the path possible.

46. The treatise-author asks: in chapter after chapter the Buddha speaks of penetrating the marks of dharmas; now why does Subhūti ask again? The treatise section sets up a question at its very start. What the treatise-author takes note of is the matter of asking again itself: in chapter after chapter the Buddha speaks of 「通達諸法相」 tr. "penetrating the marks of dharmas"; why does Subhūti in this chapter still ask again? Whenever one sees the treatise-author set up a question about a repeated phrase, one knows that the phrase is a load-bearing phrase in this collection, not a chance repetition.

47. The treatise-author answers: prajñā has no fixed mark and is without words and speech, so although heard repeatedly it is still not enough; and he brings out the simile of the calf and the sweet milk. The answer has two parts. The proper statement: prajñāpāramitā has no fixed mark; because it is without words and speech, although one hears it repeatedly it is still not enough; therefore he asks again. Next the simile: it is as a calf, though it has grown up, when the mother is good and her milk sweet, drinks and still does not stop; the Buddha's great kindness and compassion is like a good mother, prajñāpāramitā is like the sweet milk, Subhūti is like the calf: though he has heard the marks of dharmas repeatedly, he is still not sated. The four items in the simile are matched one by one, matched very neatly. The intent of this simile is not to say that Subhūti is greedy for more, but that the thing drunk itself has no principle of satiety—the Dharma has no fixed mark, so hearing has no place where it ends.

48. The treatise-author furthermore: only the Buddha's omniscience can penetrate the real mark of all dharmas; others, though they penetrate, cannot exhaust it to the end. The second reason is said by another road: only the Buddha's omniscience can penetrate the real mark of all dharmas; others, though they penetrate, cannot exhaust it to the end; therefore he asks. At the end a sentence of rhetorical question is added—the other bodhisattvas have not yet become buddhas; how could they penetrate it? This part and the preceding part do not hinder each other: the preceding part speaks of the inexhaustibility of the Dharma, this part of the incompleteness of the person. Only taking the two parts together does one know that the asking again is not for want of understanding, but because the understanding is not yet complete.

49. The treatise-author explains the Buddha's answering with a simile: the conjured person has no three poisons and no mind or mental factors and yet can do things; the bodhisattva's body too is like this. The treatise-author explains the simile of the conjured person at the head of the chapter. First he describes the mark of the conjured person: it has no three poisons, afflictions, or fetters, has no mind or mental-factor dharmas, is not included among inner or outer dharmas or among dharmas with or without outflows, does not fall among the dharmas of ordinary people nor among the holy fruits, and one cannot say it is a srota-āpanna and so on. Next he turns out a part the sūtra text does not state openly: the conjured person 「亦能發他心善惡，所為變化事，必能令成就」 tr. "can also stir the good and evil in other people's minds, and the matters of conjuration it performs it can surely bring to accomplishment"—although the conjured person has no mind, it can stir the minds of others, and the conjurations it performs are sure to be accomplished. Last he sets the bodhisattva alongside it: the bodhisattva's body too is like this, without afflictions such as the three poisons; knowing that these mind and mental-factor dharmas are all born from the causes and conditions of the false, deceptive, and inverted dharmas of former lives, he does not believe them and does not follow after them; one who can practise thus thoroughly penetrates the marks of dharmas. This part fills out the most crucial side of the simile of the conjured person—the conjured person is not wholly unable to act; it is without mind and yet able to act. The solution to the objection of passage 9, 「菩薩有何等功用」 tr. "what kind of work does the bodhisattva have to do", is already laid down in advance here.

50. The treatise-author explains Subhūti's question: though he knows emptiness well, he asks because he prizes, reveres, and honours the Buddha-dharma and cannot set a measure to the Buddha-dharma. The treatise-author goes on to explain the reason for Subhūti's question in the sūtra whether all dharmas such as form are empty and like a conjuration. He says that Subhūti, though he knows emptiness well, asks the Buddha because he prizes, reveres, and honours the Buddha-dharma and cannot set a measure to the Buddha-dharma. These words are very fine: it is not that Subhūti does not know emptiness; it is that he does not dare to state in full on the Buddha's behalf the measure of the Buddha-dharma. The motive of the question lies in reverence, not in doubt.

51. The treatise-author explains the Buddha's answer and brings out the simile of the lion not prizing its own strength. Having stated the Buddha's answer 「一切色等法皆如化」 tr. "all dharmas such as form are like a conjuration", the treatise-author at once explains one layer of meaning in it: you, because you prize the Buddha-dharma, do not dare to say that they are empty; I, because of omniscience, can say that dharmas are empty. And he brings out a simile: as other people prize the lion's strength, while the lion itself does not prize its strength. What the simile points to is very precise—the one who can speak need not esteem his own ability, precisely because it is his proper business. Here the reader can know this treatise's way of explaining the sūtra: it explains not only the meaning of what is said, but also the mind of the one who speaks.

52. The treatise-author states Subhūti's objection: if all dharmas are ultimately empty and all like a conjuration, why does the Buddha praise the bodhisattva's merits in all kinds of ways? Here the treatise-author changes the face of the objection in the sūtra: he does not ask 「菩薩有何等功用」 tr. "what kind of work does the bodhisattva have to do", but asks 「佛何以種種讚菩薩功德」 tr. "why does the Buddha praise the bodhisattva's merits in all kinds of ways", and adds of his own the items praised—that because of the bodhisattva the three evil destinies are cut off, and he can pull beings out and cause them to obtain nirvāṇa. This question is a framed question the treatise-author sets up in taking up the sūtra, not the sūtra's own sentence; its intent is to turn the objection in the sūtra toward praise, so that the answer that follows comes closer to human feeling.

53. The treatise-author states the Buddha's question in return: when the bodhisattva originally practised the bodhisattva path, did he see any fixed beings pulled out from among the five destinies? The treatise-author states it according to the question in return in the sūtra, only the wording reads 「見定有眾生」 tr. "see any fixed beings"—adding one character 「定」 tr. "fixed", which places the weight of the question on whether there is a fixed, really existing one who is delivered. This character is the treatise-author's pen in explaining the sūtra; on its basis the reader can know what the question 「頗見有眾生」 tr. "did he ever see any beings" in the sūtra is asking.

54. Subhūti answers ‘No’; the treatise-author states that the Buddha approves his meaning and brings out that when obtaining the acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas he knows and sees all dharmas as like an illusion, like a conjuration. The treatise-author states that Subhūti answers 「無也」 tr. "No", and that the Buddha approves his meaning and says why—when the bodhisattva obtains the acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas, he knows and sees all dharmas as like an illusion, like a conjuration. Here there is one part more than in the sūtra text, 「得無生法忍時」 tr. "when he obtains the acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas", which is the treatise-author pointing out where the rank of this knowing lies: it does not speak broadly of all bodhisattvas; it speaks of those who have obtained the acceptance. With a rank given, the earlier 「見知一切法如幻、如化」 tr. "sees and knows all dharmas as like an illusion, like a conjuration" will not be read as ready-made in everyone.

55. Subhūti asks again for the sake of what matter the bodhisattva practises the six perfections and so on; the treatise-author states the Buddha's answer that if beings themselves knew, the bodhisattva would have nowhere to apply his effort. The treatise-author states the third objection in the sūtra and the Buddha's answer, the wording reading 「菩薩則無功夫」 tr. "the bodhisattva would have nowhere to apply his effort"—the two Chinese characters ‘effort’ are the treatise-author's present-day word, meaning the place where effort is applied. This answer has the same meaning as the sūtra text's 「終不於阿僧祇劫為眾生行菩薩道」 tr. "would never practise the bodhisattva path for the sake of beings through asaṃkhyeya kalpas", and is plainer.

56. The treatise-author furthermore: dharmas are neither real nor empty, passing beyond all paths of words; beings, not knowing, produce evil deeds; the bodhisattva, knowing the real mark, gives rise to the mind of great compassion; and he brings out the simile of the blind son drinking poison. Beyond the sūtra's answer the treatise-author brings out a layer of his own. First he sets up a sentence of very strict measure: if dharmas were fixedly of the mark of emptiness, then the bodhisattva would have nowhere to apply his effort; one should know that dharmas are neither real nor empty, passing beyond all paths of words, the mark of ultimate emptiness and quiescence. These words are the most crucial blocking statement in the treatise section of this chapter—they block at once both sides, 「實」 tr. "real" and 「決定空」 tr. "fixedly empty", so that the earlier ‘like a conjuration’ does not fall into an annihilating emptiness. Next he describes beings' sickness: not knowing this matter, they give rise to the mind of I and self, produce evil and sinful deeds, and receive immeasurable suffering. Next he brings out the bodhisattva's mind: knowing the real mark of all dharmas, he gives rise to the mind of great compassion. Last he brings out the simile: as an elder has a son who is blind and drinks poison; the elder knows he will surely die, and sets up all kinds of skilful means to block him and stop him drinking; the bodhisattva, seeing that beings, because they are blinded by inversion and ignorance, drink the three poisons, then gives rise to the mind of great compassion, and through immeasurable asaṃkhyeya kalpas cultivates the six perfections, purifies buddha-lands, and teaches and transforms beings. The three items in the simile each have their match: the blindness is ignorance, the poison is the three poisons, the elder's skilful means are the six perfections and the purifying of lands and teaching and transforming. This simile makes the phrase of passage 14, 「眾生自不知」 tr. "beings themselves do not know", solid as a visible scene.

57. The treatise-author states Subhūti's further question in what place beings abide, and explains his meaning as a person sunk in deep mud being pulled out. The treatise-author states the question in the sūtra, and adds a sentence about the working of his mind in asking so: Subhūti's meaning is as a person sunk in deep mud being pulled out. This added sentence is very useful—it shows that in Subhūti's mind there was originally an image of ‘something really sunk, something really pulled out’, and only then does the Buddha's answer below, 「但住名相虛誑憶想分別中」 tr. "abide only within names and marks and false, deceptive recollection, imagining, and discrimination", show its power as a remedy.

58. The treatise-author states the Buddha's answer that beings abide only within names and marks and false, deceptive recollection, imagining, and discrimination. The treatise-author states it according to the sūtra, only where the sūtra reads 「虛妄」 tr. "false" this reads 「虛誑」 tr. "false and deceptive". The two words point to the same thing but differ on the surface, and in the treatise section from here on several places all use ‘false and deceptive’. Here the reader need not suspect a mismatch—the treatise-author's writing has its own habitual words, and what they point to is still the meaning in the sūtra.

59. The treatise-author explains the Buddha's meaning and brings out the two similes of seeing a person in the dark and the evil dog barking at its shadow. The treatise-author explains the meaning of this answer of the Buddha: within all dharmas there is nothing fixed and real; it is only because ordinary people are false and deceptive that they cling. Next he brings out two similes. The first: as a person in the dark sees something resembling a person, takes it for a real person, and gives rise to fear—what is feared never existed, yet the fear arises of itself. The second: as an evil dog facing a well barks at its own shadow; there is no dog in the water, only its image, yet it gives rise to an evil mind, throws itself into the well, and dies—what it hates is its own shadow, and yet the harm reaches its own body. Of the two similes one is fear and one is hatred, matching exactly the two kinds of sickness of ordinary people's clinging to marks. Last he sets body and consciousness alongside them: because of the coming together of the four elements it is named a body; from causes and conditions consciousness arises, and because of coming together there is movement and speech; ordinary people give rise within this to the mark of a person, give rise to craving, give rise to hatred, produce sinful deeds, and fall into the three evil destinies. From simile into dharma, what is broken is the view ‘where things come together there is a person’.

60. The treatise-author states that the bodhisattva by all kinds of causes and conditions teaches and transforms them, causing them to know the empty dharma, and so pulls them out. The treatise-author describes the bodhisattva's practice: when practising prajñā he pities beings, teaches and transforms them by all kinds of causes and conditions, causes them to know the empty dharma and so pulls them out, and speaks thus—these dharmas are all ultimately empty, without anything existent; because beings are inverted and false, they see them as seeming to exist, like a conjuration, like an illusion, like a city of the gandharvas, without any real matter, only deceiving people's eyes. Here the four Chinese characters 「見似如有」 tr. "see them as seeming to exist" come from the preceding simile of seeing something resembling a person in the dark; simile and dharma are dovetailed here. The last phrase 「但誑惑人眼」 tr. "only deceiving people's eyes" says that what is deceived lies in the eye, not in the thing—the sickness is still returned to the one who sees.

61. The treatise-author furthermore: all dharmas come only from the coming together of names, and there are further other names; he breaks the body down to atoms. The treatise-author starts another layer, specifically explaining the provisionality of names. He uses a method of taking apart layer by layer: because head, feet, belly, and spine come together, it is provisionally named a body; because head-hair, eyes, ears, nose, mouth, skin, and bone come together, it is provisionally named a head; because many hairs come together, it is named head-hair; because part upon part comes together, it is provisionally named a hair; because atoms come together, it is named a part of a hair; and again because parts come together, it is named an atom. From body to head to head-hair to hair to part of a hair to atom, he analyses all the way down to the finest point. What is essential in this section lies not in the analysing but in what to do with that ‘finest point’ after analysing to the bottom—the two rounds of question and answer below are set up for exactly this.

62. The treatise-author asks: the atom is the most minute and cannot be divided into parts; having no parts, it has no coming together; this then is a fixed dharma. This is the first investigation, which the sūtra text does not have and the treatise-author sets up himself. The objector says: because the atom is the most minute, it cannot be further divided into parts; having no parts, it has no coming together; this then is a fixed dharma; since there is a fixed dharma, one cannot say that all is empty and there is no fixed dharma. This objection is very sharp—since above all things were broken by coming together and provisional naming, if the very last item cannot be broken further, then the whole method of breaking snaps off at its end. The treatise-author does not evade it but takes it head-on.

63. The treatise-author answers: if the atom is form it ought to have parts; because it has the ten directions it has ten parts; if it has no parts, it is not form. The answer uses two cuts. The first cut: if the atom is form, it ought to have parts; why?—all forms are within space and all have the ten directions; if the atom is form, it has ten parts; if it has ten parts, how could it be the ultimately minute? The second cut: if, as you say, the atom has no parts, then it is not form; why?—because it has gone out from the mark of form. The two cuts close into a dilemma: say it is form, and it has ten directions and ten parts and does not make an ultimate minimum; say it has no parts, and it is not form and does not make a particle. This section's reasoning does not borrow from other sūtras; it uses only the one principle ‘form necessarily has directional parts’, and so it is extremely simple and extremely tight.

64. The treatise-author again furthermore: form is what the five sense-faculties apprehend; if the atom is not what the five sense-faculties apprehend, one cannot know it is form; even coarse form can be broken, how much more what cannot be seen or touched. The third cut comes down from the side of cognition. That form is form is because the five sense-faculties can apprehend it; if the atom is not apprehended by the five sense-faculties, from where would one know that it is form? Therefore the atom has only an empty name. At the end a sentence is added reasoning from the coarse to the fine: even the coarse form the eye sees can be broken and made empty—how much more what cannot be seen and cannot be touched. These words are the treatise-author's habitual method of raising the heavy to show the light—once the heavy case raised has been broken, the light one does not wait to be broken separately.

65. The treatise-author asks: because the atom is minute the five sense-faculties cannot apprehend it; sages who obtain the divine eye then see it. The second investigation. The objector steps back a pace; he no longer speaks of the five sense-faculties but brings up the divine eye instead: because the atom is minute the five sense-faculties cannot apprehend it, but sages who obtain the divine eye then see it. This objection moves the point of dispute to the height or lowness of the one who sees—you say the five sense-faculties do not apprehend it; what about a higher eye?

66. The treatise-author answers: since what the divine eye sees is the mark of form, it ought to have parts; if it has no parts it is not form and the divine eye does not see it; therefore the sages contemplate the world with the wisdom-eye and only then obtain the path. The answer still uses the same principle and does not set up a new one: although what the divine eye sees is minute, because it is the mark of form, it ought to have parts; if it has no parts it is not form, and if it is not form the divine eye does not see it. Therefore the divine eye too is a false and deceptive seeing. Last comes the positive side: for this reason the sages contemplate the world with the wisdom-eye, and then obtain the path. The measure of this answer must be seen clearly—what is broken is not whether the divine eye exists, but taking what the divine eye sees as real. The difference between the wisdom-eye and the divine eye lies not in seeing more finely, but in not taking what is seen as real.

67. The treatise-author concludes: the atom has only a name and no substance, so all dharmas, from the coming together of names, further have provisional names; if one gives up false and deceptive names and marks and does not cling to the empty dharma, one receives the permanence and bliss of nirvāṇa. The two investigations finished, the treatise-author gathers up: the atom, as said before, has only a name and no substance; since the atom does not exist, all dharmas, because of the coming together of names, further have provisional names; there is nothing real and fixed, and yet beings falsely give rise to greed and clinging; because of the causes and conditions of greed and hatred they produce evil deeds and through immeasurable asaṃkhyeya kalpas suffer in the three evil destinies. Next, with one sentence, he shows their folly by contrast: if dharmas were real and fixed, still one ought not to make them the sinful causes and conditions of greed and hatred—how much less what is false, deceptive, and without substance. Last comes the way out: one who can give up false and deceptive names and marks and does not cling to the empty dharma then receives the permanence and bliss of nirvāṇa. This last sentence has a twofold distinction—both giving up names and marks and not clinging to the empty dharma; giving up only one side does not count.

68. The treatise-author asks: what difference is there between name and mark? The third round of question and answer, again one the sūtra text does not have and the treatise-author sets up himself. In the sūtra the Buddha has already explained name and mark separately, but has not said how the two differ; the treatise-author asks out this seam on the reader's behalf. Wherever this treatise asks the difference between two terms raised side by side, it is mostly a fine and essential point of that section.

69. The treatise-author answers: a name is the designation of a crowd of things; a mark is as seeing smoke and knowing fire; heat is the substance of fire. The answer takes fire as the example and divides three matters. A name is the designation of a crowd of things, as a hot thing is designated fire—a name is a designation added onto the thing. A mark is as when one sees smoke and knows the mark of fire—a mark is the sign by which the thing is known. Heat is the substance of fire—substance is the thing itself. Name, mark, and substance, the three, are made clear at one time: the name lies in speech, the mark in the sign, the substance in the thing. This example is extremely shallow yet divides things extremely clearly.

70. The treatise-author furthermore: within the coming together of the five aggregates, man and woman are the name; that the bodily appearance can be distinguished is the mark; because one sees the mark one makes a name. The second example takes a person. Within the coming together of the five aggregates, man and woman are the name; by the bodily appearance one can distinguish man and woman, and this is the mark; because one sees this mark one makes a name, naming it man or woman. This example goes one step further than the example of fire—it points out where a name arises from: first there is a mark that can be distinguished, and afterwards a name is set up. The judgement below, 「相為本，名為末」 tr. "the mark is the root, the name the branch", comes out from here.

71. The treatise-author asks: if so, name and mark have no difference; because one sees the mark one obtains the name, because one knows the name one obtains the mark. The objector seizes on the example above and reasons back: since because one sees the mark one obtains the name, and because one knows the name one obtains the mark, the two are causes of each other, and so there is no difference. This objection is set up following the form of the answer; it is not a forced objection—wherever a relation of mutually giving rise appears in an answer, this objection is there.

72. The treatise-author answers: first one sees the appearance of man or woman, and afterwards names it man or woman; the mark is the root, the name the branch. The answer is only one rhetorical question plus one judgement: do you not understand what I said? First one sees the appearance of man or woman, and afterwards names it man or woman; the mark is the root, the name the branch. What is broken is the symmetry within ‘being causes of each other’: obtaining the mark by knowing the name is a later matter; obtaining the name by seeing the mark is the original order. Once root and branch are divided, the difference of the two is established.

73. The treatise-author again furthermore: when a person's eye sees form, he partially grasps the mark of what he likes and gives rise to clinging; what can give rise to a stained and clinging mind is named a mark. The treatise-author adds one more meaning, moving the definition of mark from cognition onto the afflictions: as when a person's eye sees form, he partially grasps the mark of what he likes and gives rise to clinging, while for other people it is not so; because it can give rise to a stained and clinging mind, it is named a mark. This meaning is very crucial—with one and the same form, clinging arises in this person and does not arise in that one, from which one can know that the mark is not fixed upon the thing; it is named by reference to the place where a stained and clinging mind can arise. This sentence and the sūtra's 「是空法中憶想分別著心，是名為色相」 tr. "within this empty dharma, recollecting, imagining, and discriminating, one gives rise to a clinging mind: this is called the mark of form" seal each other exactly.

74. The treatise-author furthermore: herein the Buddha himself states the distinction between name and mark; a name is a provisional name, by the name one takes dharmas. At the end the treatise-author returns to the sūtra: herein the Buddha himself states the distinction between name and mark—「名者假名，以名取諸法。」 tr. "A name is a provisional name; by the name one takes dharmas." As spoken of at length in the sūtra. Whenever the treatise-author has brought out several explanations of his own, he is sure to settle them by the sūtra text; this is his constant method. Here the reader can know that the three preceding explanations are all auxiliary, and what the Buddha himself states in the sūtra is primary.

75. The treatise-author states Subhūti's question how, if there are only names and marks, he benefits himself and benefits others, and the Buddha's answer that if dharmas were at root fixedly existent he could not. The treatise-author takes up the objection and answer in the sūtra and slightly abridges them: Subhūti asks, if all dharmas have only names and marks, how the bodhisattva benefits himself and benefits others; the Buddha answers that if dharmas were at root fixedly existent, the bodhisattva practising prajñā could not benefit himself and benefit others. Here the speaker labels are set according to the sūtra, but the words taken up are already the treatise-author's abridged statement, not the sūtra text word for word.

76. The treatise-author explains why: if the nature were fixed and really existent, that would be non-arising; because of non-arising there would be non-ceasing; because of non-ceasing there would be no sin or merit. This is the tightest piece of reasoning in the treatise section of this chapter. If the nature of dharmas were fixedly and really existent, that would be non-arising—because the nature would already be fixedly existent beforehand. If this dharma arises from the coming together of causes and conditions, then it has no fixed nature. If the nature were fixedly existent, it would not need the coming together of causes and conditions; if so, there would be non-arising; because of non-arising there would be non-ceasing; because of non-ceasing there would be no sin or merit. Next he speaks from the reverse side of why practice is possible: because one knows impermanence, one gives up sin and cultivates merit; if it were permanent, there would be no bondage and release, no world, no nirvāṇa, and so on. Last he cites the sūtra to settle it: therefore the Buddha tells Subhūti 「若法定有、非但名相者，菩薩不行般若波羅蜜自利、利人，不行禪波羅蜜等自利、利人。無相故，是菩薩自具足是善法，亦以善法利益眾生，以無相故。」 tr. "If dharmas were fixedly existent and not only names and marks, the bodhisattva could not practise prajñāpāramitā and benefit himself and benefit others, could not practise dhyānapāramitā and the rest and benefit himself and benefit others. Because of signlessness, this bodhisattva himself makes complete these wholesome dharmas, and also benefits beings with wholesome dharmas, all because of signlessness." The direction of this section must be seen accurately: it is not saying that if fixedly existent the dharma would not be established; it is saying that if fixedly existent, practice would not be established—with no arising and no ceasing, there is no sin or merit to turn; with no sin or merit to turn, the two matters of benefiting oneself and benefiting others are both cut off.

77. The treatise-author takes up the Buddha's words about a hair's breadth and explains sitting at the seat of awakening contemplating the foremost true reality: with the slightest error one would not obtain awakening. The treatise-author takes up the passage about a hair's breadth in the sūtra as 「佛告須菩提」 tr. "the Buddha tells Subhūti" and states its meaning, then at once explains it himself: when this bodhisattva sits at the seat of awakening, he contemplates all dharmas as the foremost true reality; if there were the slightest error, he ought not to obtain anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi, nor could he proclaim this empty and signless dharma for beings. At the end a rhetorical question is added: if dharmas were fixedly existent, how would the Buddha deceive beings, saying 「一切法無漏、無相、無憶念」 tr. "All dharmas are without outflows, signless, and without recollecting"? This rhetorical question pushes the point of dispute to its extreme—if dharmas were fixedly existent, what the Buddha says would become a deceiving word; since the Buddha does not deceive, dharmas are not fixedly existent.

78. The treatise-author asks: among the four truths three truths all have marks; only the truth of cessation is signless, and it too has recollecting; why say that all dharmas without outflows are signless and without recollecting? The fourth round of question and answer, an objection put very solidly. The objector says: the truth of suffering has the mark of suffering, the truth of origination has the mark of origination, the truth of the path has the mark of the path; only the truth of cessation is signless; and the truth of cessation too has recollecting—it is the signless nirvāṇa. This being so, how can one say that all dharmas without outflows are signless and without recollecting? What this objection relies on is the common teaching of the four truths, so it may not be answered lightly with a sentence about the meaning of emptiness.

79. The treatise-author answers: the dharma of the Mahāyāna differs from the dharma of the śrāvakas; within the dharma of the Mahāyāna it is said that all dharmas without outflows are signless and without recollecting. The first answer first divides the schools: the dharma of the Mahāyāna differs from the dharma of the śrāvakas; within the dharma of the Mahāyāna it is said 「一切無漏法，無相、無憶念」 tr. "All dharmas without outflows are signless and without recollecting". This answer is not suppressing the objection by school; it first points out that the teaching the objector relies on comes from the dharma of the śrāvakas, while what this treatise establishes lies in the dharma of the Mahāyāna—what the two sides rely on is different, and this must first be made clear before reasons can be discussed. The two furthermores below are the positive reasons.

80. The treatise-author furthermore: whatever has marks and has recollecting is all false, deceptive, and not real; this is the outflow of the afflictions—how could it be without outflows? The second answer starts from the meaning of ‘without outflows’: whatever has marks and has recollecting is all false, deceptive, and not real; if false, deceptive, and not real, it is the outflow of the afflictions—how could it be without outflows? This reasoning is extremely simple and extremely sharp—it does not dispute whether the three truths have marks or not, but asks straight out: since whatever has marks and recollecting belongs to the false and deceptive, and the false and deceptive is outflow, the phrase ‘a dharma without outflows that has marks’ contradicts itself.

81. The treatise-author furthermore: the three truths all follow the truth of cessation; seeing suffering one gives it up, seeing origination one severs it, seeing the path one tends toward cessation and does not abide in the path; the cessation of exhaustion is the master. The third answer deals head-on with the three truths. The three truths all follow the truth of cessation—seeing suffering one gives it up, seeing origination one severs it, and one does not say that it is real and fixed; seeing the path is for the sake of tending toward cessation, and one does not abide in this path either; the cessation of exhaustion is the master. Since each of the three truths does not stop at itself, its mark is not a mark that can be abided in. Next he explains the truth of cessation's being without recollecting: it is the dharma of the cessation of exhaustion, signless and without object—how could it have recollecting? Recollecting all takes marks as its object and clings to dharmas. This sentence states fixedly the conditions under which recollecting is established: recollecting must take marks as its object and cling to dharmas; since there is neither mark nor object, recollecting has nothing from which to arise. What the objector called ‘the truth of cessation too has recollecting’ is resolved of itself here.

82. The treatise-author concludes: therefore dharmas without outflows are all signless and without recollecting. The three answers being complete, the treatise-author gathers up with one sentence: therefore dharmas without outflows are all signless and without recollecting. This sentence is very short but its position is crucial—it is the verdict on the whole preceding round of question and answer, and also the premise on which Subhūti's meaning in the next section rests.

83. The treatise-author explains Subhūti's meaning: if the dharma without outflows is the foremost reality and signless, then the nature of all dharmas too ought to be signless; it is because ordinary people are inverted that there are marks. Here the treatise-author states not his words but his meaning: Subhūti's meaning is that if the dharma without outflows is the foremost reality, signless and without recollecting, then the nature of all dharmas too ought to be signless and without recollecting; only because ordinary people are inverted are there marks and recollecting. This is the treatise-author supplying on the reader's behalf the line of reasoning behind a question in the sūtra. With this part, the question in the sūtra, 「云何數是聲聞法、是辟支佛法、是菩薩法、是佛法」 tr. "how is it that one counts out: this is the dharma of the śrāvakas, this is the dharma of the pratyekabuddhas, this is the dharma of the bodhisattvas, this is the dharma of the Buddha", does not arise out of nowhere; it is a doubt born from following the preceding conclusion through to the end.

84. The treatise-author states the Buddha's question in return whether the dharmas of the three vehicles differ from the signless dharma, and Subhūti's answer that the three vehicles do not differ from the signless dharma. The treatise-author takes up the question in return in the sūtra, and supplies on Subhūti's behalf the reason for his answer: the extinction of the afflictions is severance, severance is the unconditioned dharma, and he also knows that the truth of cessation and the truth of the path are without outflows and signless; therefore he says 「三乘不異無相法」 tr. "the three vehicles do not differ from the signless dharma". In the sūtra there are only the two Chinese characters 「不也」 tr. "it does not"; the treatise-author supplies the ground behind these two characters—from the extinction of the afflictions he reasons to severance, from severance to the unconditioned, from the unconditioned to being without outflows and signless. Supplying without altering is this treatise's constant measure in explaining the sūtra.

85. The treatise-author states the Buddha's further question whether the srota-āpanna and so on up to the Buddha are precisely the signless dharma, the answer ‘yes’, and himself brings out that it is precisely because of signlessness that there are the paths of the three vehicles. The treatise-author takes up the second question and answer in the sūtra, and at the end of the answer adds a distinction the sūtra text does not have: if they are signless, how do you object that there are the paths? It is precisely because of signlessness that there are the paths of the three vehicles. These words are the most crucial turnabout of this chapter—the objector thinks that if there is signlessness there are no paths; the treatise-author answers that only precisely because of signlessness are there paths. Its principle is the meaning of the thirteenfold stacking of 「無相故」 tr. "because of signlessness" in passage 21 above: if there were fixed marks, one could not go from one ground to another ground, and the four fruits could not be established in sequence.

86. The treatise-author states the Buddha's words that training in the signless dharma one increases all wholesome dharmas, and explains why one abides only in the three gates of liberation. The treatise-author takes up the Buddha's words: if the bodhisattva can train in the signless dharma in this way, he can increase wholesome dharmas, namely the six perfections and so on up to the eighteen unshared dharmas. Next he cites the causes and conditions the sūtra itself states: 「菩薩唯住三解脫門，不以餘法為要。」 tr. "The bodhisattva abides only in the three gates of liberation and does not take other dharmas as essential." And he himself explains why—the three gates of liberation are the real dharma; the other dharmas such as the four foundations of mindfulness, though real, are all spoken as skilful means. This judgement carries great weight: it does not say that the four foundations of mindfulness and the rest are not real; it says that their reality lies in skilful means, while the reality of the three gates lies in the dharma itself. Next he adds a sentence: the three gates of liberation are near to nirvāṇa and can also gather in all real wholesome dharmas; therefore it is said that the bodhisattva should train in them. The two Chinese characters ‘near’ and ‘gather’ come out together; the one speaks of their direction, the other of their capacity.

87. The treatise-author asks: the three gates of liberation are empty, signless, and without discrimination; the five aggregates and the rest have marks and discrimination; how, by training in the three gates, does one train in the other dharmas? The fifth round of question and answer. The objector points out that the two sides are opposite in nature: the three gates of liberation are all empty, signless, and without discrimination, while the five aggregates, the twelve sense-fields, the eighteen elements, and the rest are all dharmas with marks and with discrimination; since they are opposite, how can one, because of training in the three gates, train in the other dharmas? What this objection attacks is the phrase of the preceding section, ‘training in the three gates of liberation one can train in the marks of the five aggregates’; it is asked very squarely.

88. The treatise-author answers: training in the three gates one goes out of the three realms and exhausts the three outflows, obtains real wisdom within dharmas, with nothing it does not penetrate; formerly within the five aggregates all was false and wrong practice, now one penetrates rightly. The answer does not argue over nature but speaks instead from effect: because the bodhisattva, training in these three gates of liberation, goes out of the three realms and exhausts the three outflows, he obtains real wisdom within dharmas, with nothing it does not penetrate. Next comes the contrast of before and after: formerly, within the five aggregates, all was false and wrong practice; now, because he has obtained these three gates of liberation, he penetrates rightly. This answer makes clear the meaning of the word 「學」 tr. "train"—what is called training in the five aggregates is not training once more in the marks of the five aggregates; it is changing the former false knowing into the knowing of right penetration. The five aggregates are the same, but the one who knows them differs; therefore there is no contradiction.

89. The treatise-author cites the causes and conditions the Buddha himself states: practising the signless dharma of the three gates of liberation, he knows the arising, ceasing, and suchness of form, and so on up to consciousness. At the end the treatise-author returns to the sūtra as proof: herein the Buddha himself states the causes and conditions—「菩薩行是三解脫門無相法時，知色生、知色滅、知色如，乃至識亦爾。」 tr. "When the bodhisattva practises the signless dharma of these three gates of liberation, he knows the arising of form, knows the ceasing of form, knows the suchness of form, and so on up to consciousness, it is likewise." As spoken of at length in the sūtra. This citation connects exactly back to the teaching on the five aggregates in passages 27 to 31 of the sūtra section: what is called training in the five aggregates by training in the three gates has as its ready-made form exactly the knowing of mark, knowing of arising and ceasing, and knowing of suchness of those five sections.

90. The treatise-author states Subhūti's further question: if one thus discriminates and knows the mark, arising, ceasing, and suchness of form and the rest, does not the nature of form then destroy the nature of dharmas? The treatise-author takes up the objection in the sūtra and makes it slightly more detailed, listing one by one what is discriminated: knowing the marks of form and the rest, knowing the arising of form and the rest, knowing the ceasing of form and the rest, knowing the suchness of form and the rest. With the discriminating listed so finely, the doubt ‘does it not destroy the nature of dharmas’ appears all the more reasonable.

91. The treatise-author states the Buddha's answer: only if there were some dharma that went out from the nature of dharmas ought the nature of form to destroy the nature of dharmas. The treatise-author takes up the Buddha's answer, which uses a conditional sentence pattern. One must see clearly that the weight of this sentence lies in 「若有法出法性者」 tr. "if there were some dharma that went out from the nature of dharmas"—it first sets up a condition that does not hold, and then says that only under that condition would there be destruction. Since the condition does not hold, the conclusion naturally does not arise.

92. The treatise-author explains: the real mark of all dharmas is named the nature of dharmas; the real mark of the nature of form is precisely the nature of dharmas, one and the same nature; and he cites that the buddhas and the worthies and sages do not see any further dharma gone out from the nature of dharmas. The treatise-author himself explains its principle: the real mark of all dharmas is named the nature of dharmas; therefore all dharmas enter into the nature of dharmas; the real mark of the nature of form is precisely the nature of dharmas, one and the same nature—how could the nature of form destroy the nature of dharmas? Here the three Chinese characters 「同一性」 tr. "one and the same nature" are the pivot of the whole section: it is not that the nature of form and the nature of dharmas are two things at peace with each other; it is that the real mark of the nature of form is the nature of dharmas itself. Next he cites the sūtra to settle it: the Buddha further states the causes and conditions—the buddhas and the worthies and sages do not see that, gone out from the nature of dharmas, there is any further dharma; because it is unfindable they do not speak of it. Last a judgement is added: the buddhas and the worthies and sages are the most trustworthy; the bodhisattva should train in the nature of dharmas in this way. What this judgement relies on is the measure of those who have realised, not a principle the treatise-author sets up himself; therefore it accords with this collection's order of grounds.

93. The treatise-author states Subhūti's words to the Buddha: if one trains in the nature of dharmas, this is training in nothing, because the nature of dharmas is without nature. The treatise-author takes up the objection in the sūtra and supplies on his behalf the reason—what is the reason? Because the nature of dharmas is without nature. In the sūtra it reads only 「若學法性，為無所學」 tr. "if one trains in the nature of dharmas, is it not training in nothing", the reason not given; the treatise-author supplies the four Chinese characters 「法性無性」 tr. "the nature of dharmas is without nature", and the difficulty thereby becomes clear.

94. The treatise-author states the Buddha's answer: because the nature of dharmas is without nature, training in the nature of dharmas is training in all dharmas; if it had a separate nature or took having no nature as its nature, one ought to train only in the nature of dharmas. The form of the Buddha's answer is to take the objector's words and use them: the nature of dharmas being without nature, if the bodhisattva trains in the nature of dharmas, he trains in all dharmas. Next come two reverse suppositions: if the nature of dharmas had some separate nature, or if having no nature were its nature, one ought to train only in the nature of dharmas and not train in all dharmas. Neither supposition holds—now, because the nature of dharmas truly has no separate nature and also has no absence of nature, therefore one trains in all dharmas throughout. Last he returns to one sentence: only because the real mark of dharmas is the nature of dharmas, therefore, having obtained the real mark, one rightly trains in all dharmas throughout. The subtlety of this section is in taking over the objector's premise exactly as it is and reaching the opposite conclusion: precisely because the nature of dharmas is without nature, one cannot train in it alone.

95. The treatise-author states Subhūti's words to the Buddha: if all dharmas are precisely the nature of dharmas, why train in the six perfections and so on up to the dhāraṇī—is he not about to fall into inversion? The treatise-author takes up that long objection of nineteen questions in the sūtra and condenses it into one section, supplying two layers of grounds: first, the real mark of dharmas is precisely the nature of dharmas; if all dharmas are precisely the nature of dharmas, what further does the bodhisattva seek? Second, within the nature of dharmas there is no discriminating that this is the six perfections and so on up to the dhāraṇī; now the bodhisattva discriminates and practises these dharmas—is he not about to fall into inversion? The treatise-author's condensing is not cutting out; it is gathering the long list of items into two sentences of reason why, so that the backbone of the objection shows.

96. The treatise-author states that the Buddha approves his meaning and answers: one who, gone out from the nature of dharmas, sees some dharma does not seek awakening; this is the inversion of permanence and ignorance; the bodhisattva knows that all dharmas are ultimately empty, the mark of constant quiescence, and speaks by means of names and marks. The treatise-author states the Buddha's answer, the wording reading 「佛可須菩提意而答」 tr. "the Buddha approves Subhūti's meaning and answers"—first approving his meaning and then bringing out a distinction, the same rhythm as in the sūtra, where he first approves 「色即是法性」 tr. "form is precisely the nature of dharmas" and then brings out a distinction. The meaning brought out is: if the bodhisattva, gone out from the nature of dharmas, sees some dharma, he does not seek anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi; why?—whatever has a dharma gone out from the nature of dharmas is the inversion of permanence and ignorance, which cannot be turned and made real; since it cannot be turned, how could one sever the ignorance within all dharmas and become a Buddha? Next comes the positive side: the bodhisattva knows that all dharmas are precisely ultimate emptiness, the mark of constant quiescence, without idle discourse, without names; pitying beings, because of the power of skilful means he speaks by means of names and marks, namely: this is form, this is feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness, and so on up to anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi. This section makes clear that the motive of 「以名相說」 tr. "speaking by means of names and marks" lies in pity—the reason names and marks can be used is that they are instruments for benefiting others.

97. The treatise-author explains the simile of conjuration: the conjurer is the bodhisattva, the conjuring dharmas are the six perfections and the rest, practising dharmas without a clinging mind; those with wisdom are the buddhas and the great bodhisattvas, those without wisdom are ordinary people and those who have newly aroused the mind. The treatise-author matches and explains item by item the simile of the skilled conjurer in the sūtra: the conjurer is the bodhisattva, the conjuring dharmas are the six perfections and the other dharmas; although he practises these dharmas, he has no clinging mind—as the conjurer, though he conjures all kinds of things, knows they are without substance and does not cling. Next he matches the two kinds of people: those with wisdom are the buddhas and the great bodhisattvas; those without wisdom are ordinary people and those who have newly aroused the mind, who greatly rejoice and exclaim that such a thing has never been. This matching is very crucial—the sūtra text says only 「無智之人」 tr. "people without wisdom", and the treatise-author points out that among them are included bodhisattvas who have newly aroused the mind. Exclaiming that such a thing has never been is not in itself a bad thing, yet if what is praised lies in the capability and not in the being without substance, it is still the praise of those without wisdom.

98. The treatise-author states that the bodhisattva, though he sees no further dharma gone out from the nature of dharmas and does not see a single fixed being, greatly benefits himself and others; and he cites the sūtra's text on practising oneself and teaching others. The treatise-author goes on: the bodhisattva practises the bodhisattva path; although he sees no further dharma gone out from the nature of dharmas, and also does not see a single fixed being, yet he greatly benefits himself and beings. Next he cites the sūtra: 「是菩薩自行布施等，亦教他人，讚歎布施法，歡喜讚歎行布施者。乃至十八不共法亦如是。」 tr. "This bodhisattva himself practises giving and so on, and also teaches other people, praises the dharma of giving, and joyfully praises those who practise giving. And so on up to the eighteen unshared dharmas, it is likewise." What is cited is exactly the form of the four matters stacked again and again in passage 45 of the sūtra section. Here 「不見有一定眾生」 tr. "does not see a single fixed being" and 「大利益」 tr. "greatly benefits" stand side by side without hindering each other—this is precisely the settled outcome of the whole chapter's answering of objections.

99. The treatise-author cites the causes and conditions the Buddha himself states, and explains that if the nature of dharmas were first non-existent and afterwards existent it would be the same as the dharmas of ordinary people, and if first existent and afterwards non-existent it would fall into annihilation. In the final section the treatise-author cites the causes and conditions the sūtra itself states: 「若法性先無後有，菩薩不能得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提，亦不能以方便力說。」 tr. "If the nature of dharmas were first non-existent and afterwards existent, the bodhisattva could not obtain anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi, nor could he speak by the power of skilful means." At once he himself explains the two roads. First, if the nature of dharmas were first non-existent and afterwards existent, arising from causes and conditions, it would be no different from the dharmas shared with ordinary people—if the nature of dharmas were a dharma that is produced, it would stand in the same rank as the arising and ceasing dharmas and would not suffice as what is relied on. Second, if the nature of dharmas were first existent and afterwards non-existent, beings and dharmas would fall into annihilation. Of the two roads one breaks permanent arising and one breaks annihilation, and what is established between them is: the nature of dharmas is empty at first, and so in the middle and after. At the end a very crucial distinction is added—it is not made empty by the power of wisdom. Emptiness is not contemplated into being; it is so from the first, and wisdom only knows it.

100. The treatise-author concludes: beings and dharmas are not empty only when they enter nirvāṇa without remainder; from the very beginning they have always been empty. Following on from the sentence above, he speaks to the end: beings and dharmas are not empty only at the time of entering nirvāṇa without remainder; from the very beginning they have always been empty. These words cut off completely the misunderstanding on the side of time—if one thinks things become empty only after extinction, emptiness becomes a fruit to be attained; now it is said that from the first they have always been empty, so emptiness is not something attained. Together with the phrase 「如前，後、中亦爾，常不異」 tr. "as it is before, so it is after and in the middle, constantly not differing" of passage 27 and 「法性前、後、中無異」 tr. "the nature of dharmas is without difference before, after, and in the middle" of passage 45, these three places run through one another; this is the one meaning of this chapter from head to tail.

101. The treatise-author states the words of the bodhisattva's teaching to beings: why do you not contemplate the real nature but cling to inversion? If you contemplate the ultimately empty nature, you know that from the very beginning it has always been empty and now nothing is lost. The final section of the whole chapter. The bodhisattva teaches beings: why do you not contemplate the real nature of dharmas, but cling to inversion? If you contemplate the ultimately empty nature of dharmas, you know that from the very beginning they have always been empty, and now nothing is lost. The four Chinese characters of the last phrase, 「今無所失」 tr. "now nothing is lost", are where the whole chapter comes to rest—the reason beings do not dare to contemplate emptiness is the fear that with one contemplation everything they have will be lost; and the result of the contemplation is: they never had it from the first, so now too nothing is lost. At the end the treatise-author adds one sentence as a conclusion: the bodhisattva who practises prajñāpāramitā in this way can assist and benefit beings. The two Chinese characters ‘assist and benefit’ answer to 「善達」 tr. "thorough penetration" at the head of the chapter—one who thoroughly penetrates does not merely settle his own affair; it is precisely for assisting and benefiting.

Do Not Misread

Do not read the simile of the conjured person as the bodhisattva doing nothing. The sūtra text says that the conjured person does not practise lust, anger, and delusion and so on up to having no holy fruit; this says that it does not practise and does not discriminate, not that it cannot act; and when the treatise-author explains this simile he specially adds a part—the conjured person 「亦能發他心善惡，所為變化事，必能令成就」 tr. "can also stir the good and evil in other people's minds, and the matters of conjuration it performs it can surely bring to accomplishment". From this one can see that what the simile takes lies in acting without mind, not in not acting. If one takes only the first half, then the six perfections, the grounds, bringing beings to accomplishment, and purifying buddha-lands in the chapter have nowhere at all to land, and yet the sūtra text stacks up again and again exactly practising oneself and teaching others.

Do not read 「不見眾生從三界得解脫」 tr. "does not see beings obtain liberation from the three realms" as there being no beings to deliver. The sūtra text says it very plainly: the reason for not seeing is 「見知一切法如幻、如化」 tr. "he sees and knows all dharmas as like an illusion, like a conjuration"; what is broken is that view which sees real beings really delivered by me. The same passage of sūtra text says immediately afterwards that the bodhisattva through immeasurable asaṃkhyeya kalpas practises the six perfections, brings beings to accomplishment, and purifies buddha-lands. Not seeing and not delivering are two matters; the sūtra text sets them side by side without their hindering each other.

Do not read 「一切法但有名相」 tr. "all dharmas have only names and marks" as names and marks being something to abolish. Having finished the teaching on names and marks, the Buddha himself at once says that the bodhisattva 「以無名相之法以名相說」 tr. "speaks of the nameless and signless dharma by means of names and marks", namely: this is form, this is feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness, and so on up to: this is anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi. From this one can see that the sickness of names and marks lies not in names and marks, but in ordinary people's giving rise to clinging within them. After breaking the body down to atoms, the treatise-author too is not teaching people not to speak of the body; he is teaching people to know that it has only a provisional name. To abolish names and marks runs exactly counter to the Buddha's teaching the Dharma for beings.

Do not read 「無相」 tr. "signlessness" as a realm that can be abided in. In the sūtra, in teaching beings to be far from the two marks, it says plainly 「令不墮二法，所謂是相、是無相」 tr. "so that they do not fall into the two dharmas, namely mark and signlessness". If one sets up signlessness as a separate thing and abides in it, that is the second dharma that is blocked. By the same principle, the Buddha says that the bodhisattva abides only in the three gates of liberation, and the definitions of the three gates are all said with respect to all dharmas—all dharmas are empty of specific marks, all dharmas are signless, all dharmas have the mark of being without making and non-rising; if one seeks the three gates separately apart from all dharmas, the three gates become a realm taken as object.

Do not read 「一切法皆是無相」 tr. "all dharmas are signless" as the distinctions of the three vehicles and four fruits being something to abolish. At the end of the answer the treatise-author says it very squarely: if they are signless, how do you object that there are the paths? It is precisely because of signlessness that there are the paths of the three vehicles. If dharmas had fixed marks, one could not go from one ground to another ground, and the four fruits could not be established in sequence. Signlessness is not erasing distinctions; it is what enables distinctions to be established.

Do not read the section breaking the atom as the treatise-author denying the finest form. What is broken is the judgement ‘the atom is fixedly existent and cannot be broken further’, and its method uses only one principle—form necessarily has directional parts. Therefore its conclusion is 「微塵但有虛名」 tr. "the atom has only an empty name", not that there is no fine form before one's eyes. Likewise, what the section breaking the divine eye's seeing of the atom breaks is taking what the divine eye sees as real, not that the divine eye does not see; the treatise-author at once points out that the right road lies in contemplating the world with the wisdom-eye.

Do not pass lightly over the sentence 「若諸法決定空相，則菩薩無功夫」 tr. "if dharmas were fixedly of the mark of emptiness, then the bodhisattva would have nowhere to apply his effort". This sentence is where the measure of the treatise section lies—it does not contradict the earlier 「一切法畢竟空」 tr. "all dharmas are ultimately empty": ultimate emptiness blocks the real; fixed emptiness sets up yet another emptiness as real. The treatise-author goes straight on to say that dharmas are 「非實非空，過諸語言道，畢竟空寂滅相」 tr. "neither real nor empty, passing beyond all paths of words, the mark of ultimate emptiness and quiescence", blocking both sides. If in reading this chapter one takes only the side of emptiness, one falls exactly into what this sentence blocks.

Do not read 「法性無性」 tr. "the nature of dharmas is without nature" as the nature of dharmas being nothing. The treatise-author's reasoning is: if the nature of dharmas had a separate nature, or took having no nature as its nature, one ought to train only in the nature of dharmas and not train in all dharmas; now neither is so, therefore one trains in all dharmas throughout. From this one can see that what the phrase ‘without nature’ blocks is the nature of dharmas making itself into a thing, and what it establishes is the principle of training in all throughout. If one reads it as the nature of dharmas being a nothing, then the following 「得實相則正遍學一切法」 tr. "having obtained the real mark, one rightly trains in all dharmas throughout" has no way to be established.

Do not read 「從本已來常空」 tr. "from the very beginning they have always been empty" as realisation through cultivation being of no benefit. Before this sentence the treatise-author first says 「非智慧力故令空」 tr. "it is not made empty by the power of wisdom"—emptiness is so from the first, and wisdom knows it; the difference between knowing and not knowing is exactly the difference between beings and the bodhisattva, and is exactly the reason for practising the path established by the whole chapter's phrase 「眾生自不知」 tr. "beings themselves do not know". If one abolishes contemplative practice because things have always been empty from the first, one contradicts the very people that the last sentence, 「今無所失」 tr. "now nothing is lost", is meant to reassure: that sentence is spoken to those who do not dare to contemplate emptiness, not to those who need not contemplate emptiness.

Bearing on Practice

The first use is to take 「不分別是法」 tr. "does not discriminate these dharmas" as the practical test of thorough penetration. The sūtra text says that the bodhisattva, like a conjured person, 「無有是事，亦不分別是法，是名善達諸法相」 tr. "there is no such matter, nor does he discriminate these dharmas; this is named thoroughly penetrating the marks of dharmas". In daily life one can take this sentence to examine oneself: meeting favourable and adverse circumstances, does the mind at once divide out fair and ugly, right and wrong, and abide in that discrimination? What is tested is not whether there are thoughts or not, but whether there is abiding. This examination is extremely simple and can be used in walking, standing, sitting, and lying down.

The second use is to place the reason for practising the path in beings' not knowing. The sūtra text gives an extremely clear reason—if beings themselves knew that dharmas are like an illusion, like a conjuration, the bodhisattva would never practise the bodhisattva path; precisely because beings themselves do not know, the bodhisattva through immeasurable asaṃkhyeya kalpas practises the six perfections. If a practitioner, from contemplating emptiness, gives rise to the retreating mind of ‘since it is like an illusion, why take such pains’, he can return to this sentence: the reason one must practise is not that there is something findable in dharmas, but that there is something not yet known in people. The treatise-author further makes it solid with the simile of the blind son drinking poison—the elder knows the son will surely die and sets up all kinds of skilful means, not because the poison really exists, but because the son really is about to die.

The third use is to work upon names and marks and not upon suchness. The sūtra text says that beings abide only within names and marks and the false recollection, imagining, and discrimination, and the bodhisattva pulls beings out from within the falseness of names and marks. The practitioner's place of effort thereby becomes definite: there is no need to look elsewhere for a suchness to accord with; only, where the mind arises in daily life, watch how that name and that mark combine into a really existent realm. The treatise-author's section breaking the body down to atoms can serve as a ready-made procedure—from body to head to head-hair to hair to atom, watch layer by layer at which layer that ‘whole thing’ can still stand.

The fourth use is that the five similes of the five aggregates can be contemplated one by one. Form is like foam, feeling like a bubble, perception like a mirage, constructions like a plantain, consciousness like conjured troops, and each aggregate is divided into the three steps of knowing the mark, knowing the arising and ceasing, and knowing the suchness. In sitting meditation one can follow this sequence: first see that this aggregate is hollow and not real, next see that when it arises it comes from nowhere and when it ceases it arrives nowhere, and last see that its suchness is unarisen and unceasing, neither coming nor going, neither increasing nor decreasing, neither stained nor pure. The three steps may not be skipped—if one does not first see its hollowness, then what is called suchness is only imagination.

The fifth use is to examine the perfections one practises by 「無相故」 tr. "because of signlessness". The sūtra text returns the ground of making the perfections complete to signlessness thirteen times in a row. When the practitioner practises giving, practises morality, practises patience, practises vigour, practises meditation, practises wisdom, after each matter he can ask himself one sentence: within this, is there a really existing doer, a dharma practised, a fruit aimed at, squatting there? If there is, then what is practised, though good, is still a practice with marks; if there is not, then though he practises he does not abide, and this is exactly the making complete spoken of in the sūtra.

The sixth use is to distinguish two kinds of exclaiming that such a thing has never been. In the simile of the skilled conjurer, people without wisdom praise his being very capable, while those with wisdom praise his being without any real matter and yet able to entertain the crowd. When the practitioner sees the merits of a good friend, sees the adornment of a place of practice, sees that his own cultivation has attained something, he can take this one examination: is what I praise the capability of that matter, or that matter's being without substance and yet able? The treatise-author further points out that 「無智者」 tr. "those without wisdom" include people who have newly aroused the mind—this examination is not set up for outsiders.

The seventh use is to hold 「今無所失」 tr. "now nothing is lost" as the steadying phrase when contemplating emptiness. When people first contemplate ultimate emptiness, they often give rise to an indescribable dread, as though all they rely on and have were about to be lost at once. The last sentence of the whole chapter is set up exactly for this: if you contemplate the ultimately empty nature of dharmas, you know that from the very beginning they have always been empty, and now nothing is lost. From the first it was never obtained, so now too nothing is lost; since nothing is lost, contemplating emptiness is not giving something up; it is seeing something clearly. Holding this sentence, contemplative practice can last.

Further Resonances

The backbone of this chapter is one section of sūtra text and one section of treatise explanation. Sūtra ① begins from Subhūti's asking how the bodhisattva thoroughly penetrates the marks of dharmas, and the Buddha answers with the conjured person, who does not practise lust, anger, and delusion and so on up to having no holy fruit, and does not discriminate these dharmas; in sequence it opens out whether the conjured person has cultivation of the path, that all form, feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness are like a conjuration, that since all is like a conjuration, what kind of work the bodhisattva has to do, whether when originally practising the bodhisattva path he saw any beings obtain liberation from the five destinies, and since he sees and knows them as like an illusion, like a conjuration, why he still practises the six perfections and so on up to purifying buddha-lands and bringing beings to accomplishment—and answers that it is because beings themselves do not know; next it asks in what place beings abide, that the bodhisattva pulls them out, and answers that they abide only within names and marks and the false recollection, imagining, and discrimination, whereupon the Buddha himself sets up the teaching on names and marks—a name is a forced provisional setting-up, and all dharmas of coming together are provisional names; marks are of the two kinds, the mark of form and the mark of the formless, both being the clinging mind of recollection, imagining, and discrimination within emptiness—and he teaches beings to be far from the two marks and abide within the signless nature; next comes the objection that if there are only names and marks, how one benefits oneself and benefits others and makes the grounds complete, and the Buddha answers that precisely because there is no real root-substance and only names and marks one can make the perfections complete, calling out ‘because of signlessness’ thirteen times in a row, and settles it with the proof by the contrary of so much as a hair's breadth; next comes the objection that if signless and without recollecting, how the four kinds of dharmas are counted, and the Buddha asks twice whether they differ and once whether it is precisely so, and concludes that all dharmas are signless, that training in signlessness one obtains the increase of wholesome dharmas, and that training in the three gates of liberation one can train in the five aggregates, the twelve sense-fields, the eighteen elements, the four truths, the twelve links of causes and conditions, and so on up to the eighteen unshared dharmas; next it asks how one trains in the marks of the five aggregates of clinging, and the Buddha brings out the five similes of foam, bubble, mirage, plantain, and conjured troops, each speaking of knowing the mark, knowing the arising and ceasing, and knowing the suchness, and next reaches the sense-fields, the elements, the four noble truths, and the twelve links of causes and conditions; next comes the objection that knowing dharmas by discriminating each one separately may destroy the nature of dharmas, and the Buddha answers that dharmas outside the nature of dharmas are unfindable and therefore it is not destroyed; next comes the objection that training in the nature of dharmas is training in nothing, and the Buddha answers that training in the nature of dharmas is training in all dharmas; next it asks by what causes and conditions all dharmas are precisely the nature of dharmas, and the Buddha answers that all enter into the signless, unconditioned nature; next comes the great question of nineteen successive ‘why train’ with his own statement that form is precisely the nature of dharmas, and the Buddha approves his words and distinguishes that one who sees some dharma outside the nature of dharmas is not seeking awakening, and that knowing the nature of all dharmas to be precisely awakening one speaks of the nameless and signless dharma by means of names and marks; next comes the great simile of the skilled conjurer conjuring men and women, elephants and horses, and so on up to the thirty-two marks of a Buddha's body, setting side by side the praise of those without wisdom and the reflection of those with wisdom; finally it concludes that the bodhisattva does not see any dharma apart from the nature of dharmas and yet practises himself, teaches others, praises the dharma, and praises the people, and because the nature of dharmas is without difference before, after, and in the middle he can display the nature of dharmas and bring beings to accomplishment. Treatise ① explains following the text by question and answer: first it asks why, when the Buddha in chapter after chapter has already spoken of penetrating the marks of dharmas, he asks again now, answering that because prajñā has no fixed mark and is without words and speech, although heard repeatedly it is still not enough, and bringing out the simile of the calf and the sweet milk, and furthermore that he asks because only the Buddha can exhaust it to the end; next it explains that the conjured person has no mind or mental factors and yet can stir the good and evil in others' minds, and the conjurations it performs it can surely bring to accomplishment, as an example for the bodhisattva's body; next it explains that Subhūti, because he prizes, reveres, and honours the Buddha-dharma, does not dare to speak of emptiness, and brings out the simile of the lion not prizing its own strength; next it takes up the three objections in the sūtra and explains that when the bodhisattva obtains the acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas he knows and sees them as like an illusion, like a conjuration, and furthermore sets up that dharmas are neither real nor empty, passing beyond all paths of words, and brings out the simile of the blind son drinking poison; next it explains that beings abide only within names and marks and false, deceptive recollection, imagining, and discrimination, and brings out the two similes of seeing a person in the dark and the evil dog barking at its shadow; next, by the coming together of names, it breaks the body down layer by layer to atoms, whereupon it sets up of its own two rounds of question and answer, refuting the fixed existence of the atom and the divine eye's seeing the minute, and concludes that the atom has only a name and no substance, and that if one gives up false and deceptive names and marks and does not cling to the empty dharma one receives the permanence and bliss of nirvāṇa; next it sets up of its own two rounds of question and answer, on what difference there is between name and mark and on name and mark having no difference, distinguishing them layer by layer by the name, mark, and substance of fire, the name and mark of man and woman within the five aggregates, the mark being the root and the name the branch, and what can give rise to a stained and clinging mind being named a mark, and returns to the Buddha's own statement that a name is a provisional name and by the name one takes dharmas; next it explains that if the nature were fixed and really existent there would be no arising, no ceasing, no sin or merit, and takes up the Buddha's words about a hair's breadth to explain sitting at the seat of awakening contemplating the foremost true reality; next it sets up the objection that three of the four truths all have marks, answering that the dharma of the Mahāyāna differs from the dharma of the śrāvakas, that having marks and having recollecting is precisely the outflows, and that the three truths all follow the truth of cessation and the cessation of exhaustion is signless and without object, concluding that dharmas without outflows are all signless and without recollecting; next it explains Subhūti's meaning and states the Buddha's question in return whether the dharmas of the three vehicles differ from the signless dharma, supplying the ground that the extinction of the afflictions is severance and severance is the unconditioned, and brings out of its own the phrase that it is precisely because of signlessness that there are the paths of the three vehicles; next it explains why one abides only in the three gates of liberation—the three gates are the real dharma and the rest is all spoken as skilful means; the three gates are near to nirvāṇa and can also gather in all real wholesome dharmas; next it sets up the question and answer on why training in the three gates is precisely training in the five aggregates, answering that because one goes out of the three realms and exhausts the three outflows, one obtains real wisdom within dharmas, with nothing it does not penetrate; next it explains that the real mark of all dharmas is named the nature of dharmas and that the real mark of the nature of form is precisely the nature of dharmas, one and the same nature, citing as proof that the buddhas and the worthies and sages do not see any further dharma gone out from the nature of dharmas; next it explains that because the nature of dharmas is without nature one trains in all dharmas throughout; next it explains that seeing some dharma gone out from the nature of dharmas is the inversion of permanence and ignorance, and that the bodhisattva by the power of skilful means speaks by means of names and marks; finally it matches and explains the simile of conjuration item by item—the conjurer is the bodhisattva, the conjuring dharmas are the six perfections and the rest, those with wisdom are the buddhas and the great bodhisattvas, those without wisdom are ordinary people and those who have newly aroused the mind—and explains that if the nature of dharmas were first non-existent and afterwards existent it would be the same as the dharmas shared with ordinary people, and if first existent and afterwards non-existent it would fall into annihilation, concluding that the nature of dharmas is empty at first, and so in the middle and after, that it is not made empty by the power of wisdom, that from the very beginning it has always been empty, and finally citing the bodhisattva's teaching beings to contemplate the ultimately empty nature, whereby now nothing is lost and he can assist and benefit beings.

The thread of meaning between this chapter and the chapters before and after it can be seen in three lines. First, inheriting from what precedes: the preceding chapter speaks of the matter of the bodhisattva entering all paths throughout, and this chapter takes up its momentum and asks about thorough penetration—able to enter throughout and yet not be stained, the reason for this lies in thoroughly penetrating the marks of dharmas; therefore the sūtra text at its very start takes the conjured person as a simile and does not light a separate stove. Second, a turn complete within the chapter: the first half takes the conjured person and names and marks as its main theme, speaking of the signlessness of dharmas; the latter half takes the nature of dharmas as its main theme, speaking of why signlessness can make for training in all throughout; the two halves have the sentence 「一切法皆入無相無為性中」 tr. "all dharmas enter into the signless, unconditioned nature" as their pivot—this sentence both inherits the signlessness of the first half and opens the nature of dharmas of the latter half, and thereby the whole chapter unites into one meaning. Third, handing down to what follows: this chapter concludes with 「從本已來常空，今無所失」 tr. "from the very beginning they have always been empty, and now nothing is lost", and the next chapter takes the limit of reality as its title; the two chapters follow one upon the other, one speaking of the original suchness of constant emptiness, the other of the indestructibility of the limit of reality; the reader can view the two chapters together to see that emptiness and the limit of reality are not two.

Of the explanations of the ancient masters, there is one house worth recording for this chapter. Jizang's sectional division of this chapter says: 「此下第二、明為化之能。」 tr. "From here on, the second: it clarifies the ability to transform." And he explains the reason for its name, saying: 「善達者雖遍化六道而無心云化也。」 tr. "One who thoroughly penetrates, though he transforms throughout the six destinies, transforms without mind; this is what is meant." The reason he attaches this chapter after the preceding chapter, he says, is 「以善達法性故能無心而化」 tr. "because he thoroughly penetrates the nature of dharmas, he can transform without mind"—taking thorough penetration of the nature of dharmas as the root of the ability to transform; compared with this treatise's taking thorough penetration of the marks of dharmas as the utmost of non-discrimination, the meaning taken is close while the road of entry differs; they are recorded side by side without judgement. He divides this chapter into seven sections, saying: 「品為七段，第一乘前品明菩薩善達法相故起行，第二明菩薩出化處，第三明菩薩解法化名相堪得大利益，第四明菩薩解法無相故增益善根，第五明學法性名學一切法，第六明諸法雖是法性要須修行，第七略釋法性成上修行立義也。」 tr. "The chapter is in seven sections: the first, following the preceding chapter, clarifies that the bodhisattva gives rise to practice because he thoroughly penetrates the marks of dharmas; the second clarifies the places the bodhisattva comes forth to transform; the third clarifies that the bodhisattva, understanding that dharmas are conjured names and marks, is fit to obtain great benefit; the fourth clarifies that the bodhisattva, understanding that dharmas are signless, therefore increases the roots of goodness; the fifth clarifies that training in the nature of dharmas is called training in all dharmas; the sixth clarifies that although dharmas are the nature of dharmas, one must still cultivate practice; the seventh briefly explains the nature of dharmas to complete the meaning established above of cultivating practice." This sevenfold sectioning differs in format from this treatise's treatise section, which explains following the text—this treatise makes its divisions by question and answer, Jizang makes his by sections; each takes one method, and both are kept. His explanation of the reason for asking again says: 「般若甚深無定相，聞無厭足，是故問也。」 tr. "Prajñā is very deep and has no fixed mark; one hears it without satiety; therefore he asks." And again he says: 「又唯佛究盡法性，降佛已還未能具知，是故問之。」 tr. "Again, only the Buddha exhausts the nature of dharmas to the end; those below the Buddha cannot yet know it completely; therefore he asks about it." These two sayings correspond to the two answers this treatise brings out, while the simile and the wording both differ. His explanation of the question about the conjured person's cultivation of the path says: 「上明化人不行前境，今明化人內無所修也。」 tr. "Above it clarified that the conjured person does not practise the objects before him; now it clarifies that the conjured person inwardly has nothing to cultivate." Dividing it into two questions, earlier and later, by objects before one and inner cultivation is a sectioning this treatise does not state openly, and it can help the reader in dividing the passages. His explanation of the section on benefiting oneself and benefiting others says: 「無定性故罪可捨、福可修，故有自利利人也。」 tr. "Because there is no fixed nature, sin can be given up and merit can be cultivated; therefore there is benefiting oneself and benefiting others." And his explanation of the meaning of a hair's breadth says: 「若有一豪相可得者，則坐道場不見諸法相應是僻悟，以坐道場無有小悟故得佛，是知諸法無一豪相也。」 tr. "If there were a single hair's-breadth mark that could be found, then sitting at the seat of awakening and not seeing the marks of dharmas ought to be a lopsided awakening; because in sitting at the seat of awakening there is no small awakening, therefore one obtains buddhahood; from this one knows that dharmas have not a single hair's-breadth mark." These two sayings bring out each other with the meaning this treatise explains, while the last sentence brings out of its own the judgement 「無一豪相」 tr. "not a single hair's-breadth mark"; its character is written with the variant form read háo that also means ‘hero’, differing from this treatise, which writes the form háo meaning ‘fine hair’; it is recorded side by side and not altered. His explanation of the effect of training in the three gates of liberation says: 「菩薩學空，出三界，盡三漏相，破一切法中無明起，知一切法也。」 tr. "The bodhisattva trains in emptiness, goes out of the three realms, exhausts the marks of the three outflows, breaks the arising of ignorance within all dharmas, and knows all dharmas." This is almost the same in its bones as this treatise's answer. His explanation of the final section says: 「第七、略釋法性以釋上修行義。」 tr. "Seventh: it briefly explains the nature of dharmas in order to explain the meaning of cultivating practice above." And he says: 「法性先無後有同是凡夫法，不成脩行義。」 tr. "If the nature of dharmas were first non-existent and afterwards existent, it would likewise be a dharma of ordinary people, and the meaning of cultivating practice would not be established." 「若法性先有後無，則墮斷見，亦不成修行義。」 tr. "If the nature of dharmas were first existent and afterwards non-existent, one would fall into the view of annihilation, and the meaning of cultivating practice would not be established either." At the end he concludes: 「今法性前後中皆清淨」 tr. "Now the nature of dharmas is pure before, after, and in the middle"—explaining the being without difference before, after, and in the middle by purity, while this treatise explains it by constant emptiness; the meaning taken is different, while the two sides blocked are the same; they are recorded side by side without judgement. His explanation of the section on discriminating dharmas further says: 「雖分別諸法不壞性法也。」 tr. "Although one discriminates dharmas, one does not destroy the dharma of the nature." His word order reads ‘nature-dharma’ while this treatise reads ‘dharma-nature’; the characters differ; it is recorded side by side and not altered. Of Huiying's Commentary, what is extant does not reach this fascicle of this treatise, and this chapter's explanation is lacking; Junzheng's book is not in the form of a chapter-by-chapter commentary, and for this chapter 〔not found〕; in the treatises and commentaries of the Tiantai line too there is 〔not found〕 any specific citation of this chapter. The variant names of this chapter's title, the differences of chapter order, and what is seen in the interlinear note at the end of the fascicle are detailed in the Apparatus layer.