大智度論 平等品Dazhidulun — Mahāprajñāpāramitā-upadeśa · Equality

Equality: Why the Question of Stain and Purity Must Start from the Nature of All Dharmas Being without Anything Existent; Why the Buddha Does Not Answer Stain and Purity but Answers with the Single Character ‘Purity’; Why, the Mark of the Equality of Dharmas Being Named Purity, It Is Further Said to Be Worldly Truth; Why Dharmas like a Dream and like a Conjuration Can Still Vow to Make the Perfections Complete; Why the Dharmas That Aid the Path Can Aid the Path but Cannot Add to Its Fruit; Why Being Only for the Sake of Beings and Not for Oneself Is the Practising Mark of Prajñā; Why, Two Dharmas Having No Path and No Fruit, the Dharma of Non-duality Too Has No Path and No Fruit; Why of Equality Ordinary People, Sages, and So On up to the Buddhas All Cannot Practise It and Cannot Reach It; Why One Equality without Duality Does Not Destroy the Appearing of the Three Jewels in the World; Why the Buddha's Not Moving within the Equality of Dharmas and yet Distinguishing Dharmas Is Called the Great Power of Kindness; Why the Objection That Dharmas Each Differ in Mark Is Resolved at Once by the One Sentence on the Mark of Form Being Empty; Why Equality Is Neither Conditioned nor Unconditioned; Why the Treatise-Author's Simile of Pointing at the Moon with a Finger and Simile of Trading Gold for Grass Are Brought Out Together; Why Merit Cannot Be Given to Others like Wealth and Goods; Why Equality's Passing Beyond All Dharmas Passes Beyond Only the Practice of Ordinary People and Not the Substance of Dharmas; Why Self-nature's Not Being Able to Practise and Reach within Self-nature Is Not Because the Buddha's Wisdom Is Small; Why the Ox-dharma and Its Parts Being Neither One nor Different Is the Gate to Obtaining the Mark of the Ox as It Truly Is; and Why to Break the Conditioned Is Precisely the Unconditioned Does Not Amount to Annihilation

What Is Being Asked

What this chapter asks is a question that is very easily spoken of as abstruse talk but is in fact very close to one's own person: if all dharmas are originally equal, do the various discriminations set up by practice still count?

What Subhūti asks at the outset is stain and purity. Above it has already been said that the person who sees as it truly is and the person who does not see as it truly is are alike neither stained nor pure, and he pushes this sentence to the end: since the nature of all dharmas is without anything existent, and within what is without anything existent stain and purity cannot be spoken of, and within what has something existent stain and purity cannot be spoken of either, then where is the distinction between 「如實語者」 tr. "the one who speaks as it truly is" and 「不實語者」 tr. "the one who does not speak truly" to be placed? On the surface this question asks about two kinds of people; in its bones it asks—does discrimination still have any footing?

The Buddha's answer does not follow along the two Chinese characters stain and purity, but changes to another word: 「是諸法平等相，我說是淨。」 tr. "This mark of the equality of dharmas—I say this is purity." Here two layers should be noted. First, the Buddha is not choosing purity between stain and purity; he newly defines purity upon the mark of equality, and at once makes it concrete with a string—suchness, not-different, not-deceiving, the mark of dharmas, the nature of dharmas, the abiding of dharmas, the position of dharmas, the limit of reality, and whether there is a Buddha or no Buddha the nature of dharmas abides constantly. Second, having said this, the Buddha at once limits it himself: 「世諦故說，非最第一義」 tr. "said because of worldly truth, not the very highest meaning". No sooner is the answer set up than the place where it stands is emptied—this one gathering-in and one letting-go is the syntax of the whole chapter, and later, whenever the Buddha says something, it almost always carries this tail of worldly truth.

Below this the sūtra text turns from stain and purity into a harder difficulty: since dharmas are like a dream, like an echo, like a mirage, like a shadow, like an illusion, like a conjuration, how can the bodhisattva vow to make complete the six perfections and so on up to the eighteen unshared dharmas? The Buddha first asks in return to confirm, and then answers that unreal, false dharmas truly cannot obtain awakening, yet he does not on that account deny the wholesome deeds that have been done—the sentence 「是一切法能助道法，不能益其果」 tr. "all these dharmas can aid the dharmas of the path; they cannot add to its fruit" is one of the pivots of the whole chapter. Next it turns again into the discernment of worldly truth and the highest meaning: the Buddha's obtaining of awakening is obtained because of worldly truth; with two dharmas there is no path and no fruit, and with the dharma of non-duality too there is no path and no fruit; 「無戲論相，是諸法平等」 tr. "the mark of being without idle discourse—this is the equality of dharmas". Since equality has been spoken of, Subhūti then presses on to ask what equality is, and so comes the most striking sentence of this chapter: as for equality, ordinary people and sages all cannot practise it, cannot reach it, and so on up to the buddhas likewise. Once this is said, what follows is a threefold objection—since the Buddha cannot practise and reach it, why is he called sovereign; since ordinary people and the Buddha are of one equality, why do the Three Jewels appear in the world; since dharmas each differ in mark, how can the bodhisattva practise prajñā without making distinctions? The Buddha answers these three objections, one with 「一平等無二」 tr. "one equality without duality", one with 「於諸法等中不動，而分別諸法」 tr. "within the equality of dharmas he does not move, and yet he distinguishes dharmas", one with the counter-question 「是色相空不」 tr. "is this mark of form empty?" At the end it gathers in with equality being neither conditioned nor unconditioned, and the two dharmas being neither joined nor dispersed, of one mark, the signless, and comes back to the bodhisattva's not moving within the highest meaning and yet enriching beings.

The treatise-author's explanation is longer than the sūtra text, and its effort lies in two matters. One is restoring for the reader the intent of Subhūti's questions: why he asks about stain and purity—because neither end, the view of annihilation nor the view of permanence, allows stain and purity; why he asks about vowing—it is that 「為諸新發意菩薩故問」 tr. "he asks for the sake of all the bodhisattvas who have newly aroused the mind". The other is speaking out plainly the syntax of gathering-in and letting-go in the sūtra, bringing out two famous similes—as a person points at the moon with a finger and one looks at the finger and does not look at the moon, and trading gold for grass, which one who does not understand takes for trading the precious for the cheap. The eight rounds of question and answer below take apart one by one the use of practising giving, why being only for beings is the highest, that merit cannot be given to others, the reconciliation with the Dharma gate of non-duality, the boundary of equality's passing beyond all dharmas, self-nature's not practising and reaching within self-nature, the difference between the two kinds of knowing, and the meaning of standing over against each other in breaking the conditioned being precisely the unconditioned; in between it also brings out a simile of the ox-dharma, and records the divergent opinion of 「有人言」 tr. "someone says" and corrects it by refutation. The last sentence of the whole text still lands on 「菩薩於第一義中不動而利益眾生」 tr. "the bodhisattva does not move within the highest meaning and yet benefits beings"—the same sentence as the place where the end of the sūtra section gathers in, from which one can see that the sūtra and treatise sections walk one and the same road.

Passage by Passage

1. Subhūti asks: the one who sees the real is neither stained nor pure, and the one who does not see the real is also neither stained nor pure, because the nature of all dharmas is without anything existent. The question at the head of the chapter must first be seen clearly in its layers. Subhūti first sets up a pair of persons—the one who sees the real and the one who does not see the real—and says the two are alike neither stained nor pure; next he gives the reason, 「一切法性無所有故」 tr. "because the nature of all dharmas is without anything existent"; next he exhausts the two sides of without anything existent and existent: within what is without anything existent it is without stain and without purity, within what is existent it is also without stain and without purity, and within what is without anything existent and within what is existent it is likewise without stain and without purity; finally he turns back and raises the objection: since it is so, 「云何如實語者不垢不淨，不實語者亦不垢不淨」 tr. "how is it that the one who speaks as it truly is is neither stained nor pure, and the one who does not speak truly is also neither stained nor pure?" In reading this passage, do not read it as a simple question of doubt; it is a pressing question: if stain and purity are in no case set up, then the distinction between as it truly is and not as it truly is should also in no case be set up; yet everywhere in the sūtras as it truly is and not as it truly is are distinguished, and the two cannot stand together. Whenever, in reading a sūtra, one meets several questions set up in a row with the last sentence returning to the starting place, first see which sides it has exhausted; only then does one know from which side the answer must break it.

2. The Buddha answers: this mark of the equality of dharmas—I say this is purity, namely suchness, not-different, not-deceiving, the mark of dharmas, the nature of dharmas, the abiding of dharmas, the position of dharmas, the limit of reality, and whether there is a Buddha or no Buddha the nature of dharmas abides constantly; it is said because of worldly truth, not the very highest meaning. The Buddha's answer does not make a division upon the two Chinese characters stain and purity, but newly sets the one Chinese character 「淨」 tr. "purity" upon the mark of equality. This step is extremely crucial: purity is no longer the opposite of stain but the name of the original mark of dharmas. The Buddha himself sets the question and himself answers—「何等是淨是諸法平等」 tr. "what is purity, what is this equality of dharmas"—and at once brings out a string of names: suchness, not-different, not-deceiving; the mark of dharmas, the nature of dharmas, the abiding of dharmas, the position of dharmas, the limit of reality; whether there is a Buddha or no Buddha the nature of dharmas abides constantly. What the eight or nine names point to is one matter; they are listed and not ranked, which is a form common in this treatise: surrounding one reality with many names, so that the reader cannot cling to any one name. The last sentence, 「世諦故說，非最第一義」 tr. "said because of worldly truth, not the very highest meaning", is the answer's self-limitation; the highest meaning 「過一切語言論議音聲」 tr. "passes beyond all words, discussion, and sound", therefore whatever can be said belongs to worldly truth. Here the reader should establish a constant rule for reading the sūtras: when the Buddha says that a certain dharma is such-and-such, he does not necessarily grant this saying as ultimate; one must see whether he follows it with words of limitation of this kind.

3. Subhūti raises an objection: all dharmas are empty and unspeakable, like a dream, like an echo, like a mirage, like a shadow, like an illusion, like a conjuration; how can one arouse the mind of awakening and vow to make complete the perfections and so on up to the eighteen unshared dharmas? This objection is pressed out by the 「非最第一義」 tr. "not the very highest meaning" of the preceding passage. Since all that is said belongs to worldly truth, is not all that is cultivated and realised entirely within a dream? Subhūti spreads out the bodhisattva's vowing mind item by item—dānapāramitā and so on up to prajñā, the supernormal powers and knowledge, the four dhyānas, the four immeasurable minds, the four formless absorptions, the four foundations of mindfulness, and so on up to the eightfold noble path, the three gates of liberation, the eight liberations, the nine successive absorptions, the ten powers of the Buddha and so on up to the eighteen unshared dharmas, the thirty-two marks and the eighty minor marks, the dhāraṇī gates and the samādhi gates, and so on up to emitting light to shine throughout the ten directions, knowing the minds of beings, and teaching the Dharma according to what suits them. The more completely it is spread out, the heavier the difficulty: how can such a whole set of vows be placed upon 「無有根本定實」 tr. "having no root and nothing fixed and real"? In reading this passage one should note that Subhūti is not doubting the value of the six perfections; he is asking how a rootless thing can bear such a weight.

4. The Buddha asks in return: the dharmas you have spoken of as like a dream, like an echo, like a mirage, like a shadow, like an illusion, like a conjuration—are they so or not? The Buddha does not answer head-on; first he asks one question in return, handing back the premise Subhūti set up for him to confirm himself. The method of asking in return is used four times in this chapter, and this is the first. Its force lies in this: if the answer is spoken by the questioner himself, the reasoning that follows has no further road of retreat. Here the reader of the treatise can note a form—the Buddha's counter-questions are mostly not a questioning of the other party, but a making firm of the premise the other party has set up, and then teaching the Dharma upon that premise.

5. Subhūti assents, yet still doubts how unreal, false dharmas can make complete dānapāramitā and so on up to the eighteen unshared dharmas. Subhūti answers 「爾」 tr. "They are", making the premise firm, yet he does not stop asking there; instead he states the difficulty more directly: 「是夢乃至如化，虛妄不實」 tr. "this dream and so on up to like a conjuration is false and unreal", 「不應用不實虛妄法能具足檀波羅蜜乃至十八不共法」 tr. "one should not be able, by means of unreal, false dharmas, to make complete dānapāramitā and so on up to the eighteen unshared dharmas". This question is tighter than the previous one: the previous question asked about the possibility of vowing; this question asks about the efficacy of practice. The sūtra text tightens step by step like this in order to press out the answer below, which looks like a concession but is in fact the key.

6. The Buddha answers: unreal, false dharmas cannot obtain awakening; all dharmas are dharmas made by recollection and reflection, and cannot obtain the omniscience of all kinds. The Buddha's first sentence is a complete assent—「如是！如是！」 tr. "Just so! Just so!" Unreal, false dharmas truly cannot make the six perfections complete, and practising unreal, false dharmas one truly cannot obtain awakening. If the reader reads only up to here, he will think that the Buddha has denied the bodhisattva's practice. What is crucial is that the Buddha then widens the scope: 「是一切法皆是憶想思惟作法，用是思惟憶想作法，不能得一切種智。」 tr. "All these dharmas are dharmas made by recollection and reflection; by means of these dharmas made by reflection and recollection one cannot obtain the omniscience of all kinds." What is denied is not such matters as giving and keeping morality, but the idea that takes dharmas made by recollection and reflection as the cause able to obtain it. Whenever in reading the sūtras one sees the Buddha assenting to the objector's words, first see which sentence exactly he assents to; often the very place of assent is where the turning word comes from.

7. The Buddha brings out the pivotal sentence: all these dharmas can aid the dharmas of the path and cannot add to its fruit; the bodhisattva knows dharmas to be like a dream and still, by the wholesome deeds he has done, brings beings to accomplishment and purifies buddha-lands. This passage is the first pivot of the whole chapter. The Buddha says these dharmas 「能助道法，不能益其果」 tr. "can aid the dharmas of the path; cannot add to its fruit", and at once gives the reason: 「所謂是諸法無生、無出、無相」 tr. "namely, these dharmas are non-arising, non-emerging, and signless"—since the fruit is non-arising, non-emerging, and signless, it is not a thing that can be added to. Yet the Buddha does not on that account abandon practice: the wholesome deeds the bodhisattva has done since his first arousing of intent, dānapāramitā and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds, if they are not made complete, then 「不能得成就眾生、淨佛國土、得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提」 tr. "he cannot bring beings to accomplishment, purify buddha-lands, or obtain anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi". On one side it says it cannot add to the fruit, on the other that without completeness one cannot accomplish—the two sentences stand side by side without hindering each other, and the key lies in the different things pointed to by the two Chinese characters 「助」 tr. "aid" and 「益」 tr. "add to": to aid is to aid its practice; to add to is to increase its fruit. Below this it further says that the bodhisattva knows the wholesome deeds he does to be like a dream, like a conjuration, and also knows that all beings practise as within a dream; because 「不取般若波羅蜜是有法」 tr. "he does not grasp prajñāpāramitā as an existent dharma", 「用是不取故，得一切種智」 tr. "because of this not grasping he obtains the omniscience of all kinds". Obtaining by not grasping—this is one and the same line of reasoning of this chapter from beginning to end, and here it is said plainly for the first time.

8. The Buddha says that only after knowing all dharmas to be of the mark of being ungraspable does one arouse the mind; by means of dharmas of the mark of being ungraspable one cannot obtain a dharma of the mark of being ungraspable; one seeks awakening only for the sake of beings, not for oneself. The sequence of this passage deserves to be looked at word by word. The sūtra text says 「知一切法是不可取相已，發心求阿耨多羅三藐三菩提」 tr. "having known that all dharmas are of the mark of being ungraspable, he arouses the mind and seeks anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi"—knowing comes first, arousing the mind after. Why is it not first arousing the mind and then knowing? Because if one does not first know the mark of being ungraspable, the mind that is aroused is a mind with something to be attained. Below this it adds the sentence 「用不可取相法不能得不可取相法」 tr. "by means of dharmas of the mark of being ungraspable one cannot obtain a dharma of the mark of being ungraspable", removing entirely both what obtains and what is obtained; since it is so, for what is the mind aroused? The sūtra text answers itself: it is because 「但以眾生不知不見如是諸法相」 tr. "only because beings do not know and do not see such marks of dharmas". Thus the reason the bodhisattva arouses the mind is not tied to his own having something to be attained, but to beings' not knowing. Finally it extends this to all the gates of practice: 「從初發意已來所有布施，為一切眾生故；乃至有所修智慧，皆為一切眾生，不為己身。」 tr. "All the giving he has done since his first arousing of intent is for the sake of all beings; and so on up to whatever wisdom he cultivates, that too is all for the sake of all beings, not for his own single self." In reading this passage one should know that the nothing to be attained spoken of in this chapter is not the cancelling of the gates of practice, but the re-attaching of the gates of practice—turning from being tied to one's own self to being tied to beings.

9. The Buddha says that, practising prajñā, one sees beings and yet there are no beings, makes them far from inversion and sets them in the nature of ambrosia; he himself clings to nothing and also teaches beings to cling to nothing; this is because of worldly truth, not the highest meaning. This passage speaks of the actual state when practising prajñā. 「見眾生無眾生，但眾生相中住」 tr. "he sees beings and yet there are no beings, and only abides within the mark of beings"—seeing and abiding are set side by side: it is not not seeing; it is seeing and not grasping its reality. And so on up to 「無知者、無見者，知見相中住」 tr. "there is no knower and no seer, and he abides within the mark of knowing and seeing", the same syntax. Its effect lies in 「令眾生遠離顛倒；遠離已，置甘露性中」 tr. "making beings far from inversion; having made them far from it, he sets them within the nature of ambrosia"; for one who abides within this 「無有妄相」 tr. "there is no false mark". As for the bodhisattva himself, 「動心、念心、戲論心皆捨，常行不動心、不念心、不戲論心」 tr. "the moving mind, the thinking mind, and the mind of idle discourse are all relinquished, and he constantly practises the unmoving mind, the mind of not thinking, and the mind without idle discourse". At the end it still gathers in with 「世諦故，非第一義」 tr. "because of worldly truth, not the highest meaning"—the second appearance of this tail, from which one can see that whenever the Buddha speaks of a stretch of practice, he surely returns at once the words he has spoken to worldly truth. The reader should grow used to this rhythm, and only then will he not, on reading of the highest meaning, think that what was said before is cancelled.

10. Subhūti asks: is the Buddha's obtaining of awakening obtained because of worldly truth, or obtained within the highest meaning? This question of Subhūti's is extremely sharp. What he seizes on is exactly that tail of the preceding passage: since whenever the Buddha speaks he says worldly truth, then to which side does the Buddha's own obtaining of awakening belong? If this question is not resolved, the establishment of the whole Buddha-dharma comes into question. In reading the treatise, when one sees a disciple seize on the tail of the teacher's words and ask in return, one should know this is the most crucial kind of question—what it asks is not a side branch of the meaning but the force of the words spoken.

11. The Buddha answers: it is because of worldly truth that the Buddha is said to obtain this dharma; within the highest meaning there is no dharma to be obtained and no person obtaining a dharma; by means of two dharmas there is no path and no fruit. The Buddha's answer is in three parts. The first takes it up directly: 「以世諦故說佛得是法」 tr. "it is because of worldly truth that the Buddha is said to obtain this dharma". The second breaks: 「是法中無有法可得、是人得是法」 tr. "within this dharma there is no dharma to be obtained, nor this person obtaining this dharma". The third gives the reason: 「是人得是法，是為大有所得；用二法，無道無果。」 tr. "This person obtains this dharma—this would be greatly with something to be attained; by means of two dharmas there is no path and no fruit." What are called two dharmas is the person who obtains the dharma and the dharma that is obtained set against each other into two separate pieces; once one falls into two dharmas, neither path nor fruit can be set up. The reader should note that what is broken here is not obtaining but two—the structure in which what obtains and what is obtained are set against each other.

12. The Buddha answers that with two dharmas and with the dharma of non-duality alike there is no path and no fruit; if there are no two dharmas and also no dharma of non-duality, this is precisely the path, precisely the fruit; the mark of being without idle discourse is the equality of dharmas. Subhūti follows on and sets up a sentence: by practising the dharma of non-duality is there a path and a fruit or not? This is the most natural reaction, and also the most common wrong road—since two dharmas will not do, one clings to non-duality. The Buddha answers decisively: 「行二法無道無果，行不二法亦無道無果」 tr. "by practising two dharmas there is no path and no fruit, and by practising the dharma of non-duality there is also no path and no fruit"; only below this does the right meaning come out: 「若無二法、無不二法，即是道、即是果。」 tr. "If there are no two dharmas and no dharma of non-duality, this is precisely the path, this is precisely the fruit." Its reason lies in the words idle discourse: to say that by means of this dharma one obtains the path and obtains the fruit, and that by means of this dharma one does not obtain the path and does not obtain the fruit—this whole set of calculations is precisely idle discourse; 「諸平等法中，無有戲論；無戲論相，是諸法平等」 tr. "within all equal dharmas there is no idle discourse; the mark of being without idle discourse—this is the equality of dharmas". Only here is the name 「平等」 tr. "equality" formally set up, and its definition is negative—being without idle discourse. Whenever in reading the treatise one meets the right meaning coming out after two rounds of negation, one should know that the first two rounds are not idle words but two forks in the road that must be walked to their end.

13. Subhūti asks what equality is; the Buddha answers that apart from equality there is no other dharma that can be apart from the mark of the equality of all dharmas, and that as for equality, ordinary people and sages all cannot practise it, cannot reach it. Subhūti presses on with 「是中何等是平等」 tr. "within this, what is equality?", and the Buddha's answer is in two parts. The first part: 「若無有法、無有無法，亦不說諸法平等相；除平等，更無餘法離一切法平等相」 tr. "if there is no existent dharma and no non-existent dharma, then one does not speak of the mark of the equality of dharmas either; apart from equality there is no other dharma that can be apart from the mark of the equality of all dharmas"—equality is not a separate dharma outside dharmas, therefore it cannot be sought apart from all dharmas. The second part is the most striking sentence of the whole chapter: 「平等者，若凡夫、若聖人，不能行、不能到。」 tr. "As for equality, whether ordinary people or sages, none can practise it, none can reach it." Practising and reaching are words of cultivation and realisation; this sentence amounts to saying that equality is not within the range that cultivation and realisation can reach. On first reading the reader is sure to have a doubt, and this doubt is exactly what the sūtra text means to draw out; the three rounds of question and answer below all arise from it.

14. The Buddha answers that ordinary people and so on up to the Buddha are all one equality without duality, and that within the equality of all dharmas all are unfindable. Subhūti asks in alarm 「乃至佛亦不能行、亦不能到」 tr. "and so on up to the Buddha—can he too not practise it, too not reach it?", and the Buddha first makes it firm: all the sages—the srota-āpanna, the sakṛdāgāmin, the anāgāmin, the arhats, the pratyekabuddhas, all the bodhisattva-mahāsattvas, and the buddhas—all cannot practise it and cannot reach it. Subhūti asks again: the Buddha is sovereign in the power of practice among all dharmas, so why can he not either? The Buddha's answer is where the meaning of this chapter stands face-on: 「若諸法平等與佛有異，應當如是問。」 tr. "Only if the equality of dharmas were different from the Buddha should one ask thus."—the reason the objection becomes an objection is that the questioner has first regarded the Buddha and equality as two things; if the Buddha is precisely equality, there is no practising or reaching to speak of. Below this it then says that ordinary people are equality, that the four fruits, the pratyekabuddhas, the bodhisattvas, the buddhas, and the holy Dharma are all equality, 「是一平等無二」 tr. "this is one equality and without duality", and 「是凡夫人、是須陀洹乃至佛，是一切法平等中皆不可得」 tr. "this is an ordinary person, this is a srota-āpanna, and so on up to the Buddha—within this equality of all dharmas, all are unfindable". In reading this passage one should pull the phrase 「不能行、不能到」 tr. "cannot practise, cannot reach" out of a disparaging sense—it does not say that the Buddha's ability falls short of something; it says that between the one who acts and what is acted upon there is fundamentally no distance to practise across and no further shore to reach.

15. Subhūti asks whether there is no discrimination of ordinary people and so on up to the Buddha, and the Buddha assents; Subhūti again raises the objection of the Three Jewels appearing in the world; the Buddha asks in return whether the Three Jewels differ from the equality of dharmas; Subhūti himself answers that they do not differ, and declares that the Buddha can distinguish the places of the signless dharmas. This passage is one small complete exchange, and must be read together for its momentum to be clear. Subhūti first asks 「凡夫人、須陀洹乃至佛為無有分別」 tr. "is there no discrimination of ordinary people, the srota-āpanna, and so on up to the Buddha?", and the Buddha assents; Subhūti at once raises an objection: if there is no discrimination, 「云何分別有三寶現於世間」 tr. "why does one distinguish that there are the Three Jewels appearing in the world?" This pushes the foregoing meaning onto the religious fact before us—if the Three Jewels are not established, the whole Buddha-dharma has nothing to rely on. The Buddha does not answer head-on, and uses a counter-question for the second time: 「佛寶、法寶、僧寶與諸法等異不」 tr. "are the Buddha Jewel, the Dharma Jewel, and the Saṅgha Jewel different from the equality of dharmas?" Subhūti then answers himself: according to the meaning he has heard, the Three Jewels are not different from the equality of dharmas; the Three Jewels are precisely equality, 「是法皆不合、不散，無色、無形、無對，一相，所謂無相」 tr. "this dharma is all neither joined nor dispersed, without form, without shape, without resistance, of one mark, namely the signless". And he himself goes on to add the key sentence: 「佛有是力，能分別無相諸法處所」 tr. "the Buddha has this power, that he can distinguish the places of the signless dharmas"—the appearing of the Three Jewels in the world lies not outside equality, but in the Buddha's being able to distinguish within the signless. The objector resolves his own objection, and what is gained is firmer than if the Buddha had answered directly.

16. By a counter-question the Buddha makes Subhūti admit for himself that he would not know, and then brings out the judgement of the great power of kindness: within the equality of dharmas he does not move, and yet he distinguishes dharmas. The Buddha takes up Subhūti's words and asks in return for the third time: if the buddhas, on obtaining awakening, did not distinguish dharmas, 「當知是地獄、是餓鬼、是畜生」 tr. "would they know: this is the hells, this is the hungry ghosts, this is the animals", and so on up to 「是十八不共法不」 tr. "this is the eighteen unshared dharmas—or not?" Subhūti answers 「不知也」 tr. "One would not know", his meaning being: without distinguishing, we would have no way of knowing. The Buddha then ties up the most crucial judgement of this chapter: 「當知佛有大恩力，於諸法等中不動，而分別諸法。」 tr. "You should know that the Buddha has the great power of kindness: within the equality of dharmas he does not move, and yet he distinguishes dharmas." Not moving and distinguishing stand side by side in one sentence, and the three Chinese characters 「大恩力」 tr. "the great power of kindness" attach them both—from which one can see that this distinguishing is not an obstruction of the knowable in the Buddha, but the working of his compassion. Here the reader can resolve the doubt about the earlier 「不能行、不能到」 tr. "cannot practise, cannot reach": not being able to practise and reach is said with respect to equality itself; being able to distinguish is said with respect to the great power of kindness. The two do not hinder each other.

17. Subhūti raises the objection that dharmas each differ in mark: if one does not make distinctions, one cannot practise prajñā, enter the bodhisattva's position, or purify buddha-lands. Subhūti's last objection is the longest, and also the closest to what a practitioner actually feels. He first sets up a symmetry: the Buddha does not move within the equality of dharmas, and ordinary people, the srota-āpanna, and so on up to the pratyekabuddhas likewise do not move within the equality of dharmas—since not moving is shared, what makes the Buddha the Buddha has no way of being spoken of. Next he lists the separate marks of dharmas: form differs in mark from feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness; the six faculties differ in mark; earth, water, fire, wind, space, and consciousness differ in mark; desire, anger, delusion, and wrong views differ in mark; dhyāna differs in mark from the immeasurable minds and the formless absorptions; the four foundations of mindfulness and so on up to the eightfold noble path differ in mark; the six perfections differ in mark; the three gates of liberation and the eighteen emptinesses differ in mark; the ten powers, the four fearlessnesses, the four unobstructed knowledges, and the eighteen unshared dharmas differ in mark; the nature of conditioned dharmas differs from the nature of unconditioned dharmas; the mark of ordinary people and so on up to the mark of the Buddha differ. Finally he brings out a chain: if one does not make distinctions one cannot practise prajñā; if one does not practise prajñā one cannot go from one ground to another ground; if one cannot go from one ground to another ground one cannot enter the bodhisattva's position; if one does not enter the bodhisattva's position one cannot pass beyond the grounds of the two vehicles; if one does not pass beyond the grounds of the two vehicles one cannot make complete the perfection of the supernormal powers; and so on up to being unable to make offerings to the buddhas, bring beings to accomplishment, and purify buddha-lands. This chain is the longest piece of reasoning in this chapter; its strength lies in its not talking of abstruse principles, only joining the actual sequence of practice link by link for people to see.

18. The Buddha first restates the question and then answers with counter-questions: is the mark of form empty, and so on up to is the mark of the buddhas empty; Subhūti answers that it is truly empty; the Buddha asks further whether within emptiness dharmas of separate marks are findable; Subhūti answers that they are unfindable. The Buddha's answer first restates Subhūti's question—the present punctuation marks with inner quotation marks the words restated; restating and then answering lets the questioner know that the answer does not miss. After that the Buddha does not reason, but asks only one sentence: 「是色相空不？乃至諸佛相空不？」 tr. "Is this mark of form empty? And so on up to: is the mark of the buddhas empty?" Subhūti answers 「實空」 tr. "It is truly empty". The Buddha asks again: 「空中各各相法可得不？」 tr. "Within emptiness, are dharmas of separate marks findable?" Subhūti answers 「不可得」 tr. "They are unfindable". Two questions, two answers, and the long objection is at once resolved. The reason this method works is that the difficulty Subhūti set up hangs entirely on the four Chinese characters 「各各相異」 tr. "each differs in mark", and separate marks can be established only on the premise of not being empty; once the premise is loosened, the chain undoes itself. The reader should learn this move: when meeting an intricate objection, there is no need to divide it link by link; one need only test the root on which it is set up.

19. The Buddha concludes: within the equality of dharmas it is not ordinary people and also not apart from ordinary people, and so on up to not the Buddha and also not apart from the Buddha; he answers further that equality is neither conditioned nor unconditioned, that the two dharmas are neither joined nor dispersed, of one mark, the signless, which is precisely the highest meaning, and that the bodhisattva does not move within the highest meaning and yet practises the bodhisattva's business. The Buddha concludes with the sentence pattern ‘not … and also not apart from …’, four characters, twice over, allowing neither sameness nor separation. Below this comes Subhūti's last question, 「是平等，為是有為法？為是無為法」 tr. "this equality—is it a conditioned dharma? or is it an unconditioned dharma?"; the Buddha answers 「非有為法，非無為法」 tr. "it is not a conditioned dharma, nor an unconditioned dharma", and gives the reason: 「離有為法，無為法不可得；離無為法，有為法不可得」 tr. "apart from conditioned dharmas, unconditioned dharmas are unfindable; apart from unconditioned dharmas, conditioned dharmas are unfindable"—the two stand by standing over against each other, so neither can be clung to as the substance of equality. The two dharmas are 「不合、不散，無色、無形、無對，一相，所謂無相」 tr. "neither joined nor dispersed, without form, without shape, without resistance, of one mark, namely the signless". And the Buddha at once adds a further limiting sentence: 「佛亦以世諦故說，非以第一義」 tr. "the Buddha too speaks according to worldly truth, not according to the highest meaning", and says that within the highest meaning there is no bodily, verbal, or mental action, nor is the highest meaning obtained apart from bodily, verbal, and mental action. The last sentence of the sūtra section is 「菩薩摩訶薩行般若波羅蜜時，第一義中不動，而行菩薩事，饒益眾生」 tr. "when the bodhisattva-mahāsattva practises prajñāpāramitā, he does not move within the highest meaning, and yet he practises the bodhisattva's business and enriches beings"—the same syntax as the 「於諸法等中不動，而分別諸法」 tr. "within the equality of dharmas he does not move, and yet he distinguishes dharmas" of passage 16, one belonging to the Buddha, one to the bodhisattva, from which one can see that not moving and yet acting is exactly the gate of practice this chapter sets up.

20. The treatise-author explains the intent of Subhūti's question: because without anything existent is the view of annihilation, there should be no stain or purity; because the existent is the view of permanence, there should also be no stain or purity. At the start of the treatise section, the treatise-author first restores Subhūti's mental process: having heard the Buddha answer that 「實見者、妄見者無異，垢淨見無故」 tr. "the one who sees truly and the one who sees falsely are not different, because there is neither a view of stain nor a view of purity", he reflected and then asked. The content of his reflection the treatise-author speaks out for him: on the side of without anything existent, 「斷滅見故，不應有垢淨」 tr. "because it is the view of annihilation, there should be no stain or purity"; on the side of the existent, 「常見故，不應有垢淨」 tr. "because it is the view of permanence, there should be no stain or purity"; and he fills out the line of reasoning of the view of permanence—「所有若決定是有，則不從因緣生，不從因緣生故常，常故無垢無淨」 tr. "if what is existent were definitely existent, it would not arise from causes and conditions; because it does not arise from causes and conditions it is permanent, and because it is permanent it is without stain and without purity". This is where the treatise-author's explanation most shows its skill: in the sūtra text only a question is seen; the treatise-author points out that behind the question is the double objection of the two views of annihilation and permanence. The reader of the treatise should know that the first thing the treatise-author does in explaining a sūtra is often not to resolve it, but to make clear the questioner's situation.

21. The treatise-author explains the Buddha's answer: although stain and purity have no separate marks that can be spoken of, because all dharmas are equal it is named purity; if one discriminates and speaks of the marks of stain and purity, this matter is not so. The treatise-author presses the Buddha's answer into two sentences: first, stain and purity have no separate marks that can be spoken of; second, because all dharmas are equal it is said to be named purity. The layer in between—why, having no separate marks that can be spoken of, it can still be named purity—the treatise-author concludes with 「一切法平等故，我說名淨」 tr. "because all dharmas are equal, I say it is named purity". One must see clearly that the 「淨」 tr. "purity" here and the stain and purity that ordinary people face are not on the same level: the purity of ordinary people is set up against stain; the purity here is set up against equality—so though the same word is used, they do not collide. Whenever in reading the treatise one meets one word used in two ways, one must first judge what it is set up against. Below this the treatise-author further cites the Buddha's words to make concrete what this purity points to: 「諸法實相，如、法性、法住、法位、實際是平等」 tr. "the real mark of all dharmas, namely suchness, the nature of dharmas, the abiding of dharmas, the position of dharmas, the limit of reality—this is equality", and attaches its practising mark to one sentence—「菩薩入是平等中，心無憎愛」 tr. "when the bodhisattva enters into this equality, there is no hatred and no love in his mind"; next he explains the meaning of abiding constantly: 「作法皆是虛誑」 tr. "dharmas that are made are all false and deceptive", so what abides constantly is 「無作法，有佛、無佛常住」 tr. "the dharma without making, whether there is a Buddha or no Buddha, abides constantly". Explaining entering equality by being without hatred and love brings a sentence about the nature of dharmas down onto the workings of the mind; the reader must not read past it lightly.

22. The treatise-author brings out the simile of pointing at the moon with a finger and the simile of trading gold for grass: the hearer grasps at marks and clings to equality, therefore the Buddha says that the mark of equality too is worldly truth. This passage is the first crucial point of the treatise section. The treatise-author first depicts the common sickness of those who hear the Dharma: 「聽者心即取相，著是諸法平等」 tr. "the hearer's mind at once grasps at marks and clings to this equality of dharmas"—even the two Chinese characters equality can become something clung to. Its simile says 「如人以指指月，不知者但觀其指而不視月」 tr. "as when a person points at the moon with a finger, one who does not understand looks only at his finger and does not look at the moon", which speaks of the mismatch between what points and what is pointed at. Below this, the Buddha's remedy is to take the words back into worldly truth: 「諸法平等相亦如是，皆是世諦；世諦非實，但為成辦事故說。」 tr. "The mark of the equality of dharmas is also like this; it is all worldly truth; worldly truth is not real, and is spoken only for the sake of getting things done." Since it is said to be not real, why still say it? The treatise-author goes on to bring out the second simile: 「譬如以金貿草」 tr. "it is like trading gold for grass"; a bystander mocks him for trading the precious for the cheap, and he answers 「我事須用故」 tr. "because I have a matter for which I need it". The two similes come out together but divide the work differently: the simile of the finger and the moon speaks of the hearer's sickness; the simile of gold for grass speaks of the speaker's expedient. If the reader remembers only the finger and the moon and forgets the gold for grass, he will regard all speech as an encumbrance, and that is exactly the other side this chapter means to guard against.

23. The treatise-author explains that the meaning of equality is unspeakable: all names, words, and sounds are entirely cut off; because within the scattered mind of initial and sustained thought there are words, there is something said. This passage explains the sūtra sentence 「最第一義，過一切語言論議音聲」 tr. "the very highest meaning passes beyond all words, discussion, and sound". The treatise-author's reason is 「諸法平等是無戲論寂滅相」 tr. "the equality of dharmas is the mark of quiescence without idle discourse"; and the reason there is still speech is 「但覺觀散心中有語言故有所說」 tr. "only because within the scattered mind of initial and sustained thought there are words, is there anything said". This sentence speaks of where speech comes from extremely plainly—language is a product of the scattered mind of initial and sustained thought, not a shadow of the real mark. From this the reader can know: being unspeakable does not forbid speech; it points out the origin of speech; knowing its origin, one speaks and does not cling.

24. The treatise-author explains that Subhūti asks for the sake of the bodhisattvas who have newly aroused the mind, and that the Buddha, by a counter-question, makes him awaken for himself that this does not hinder the myriad practices. The treatise-author points out that this question of Subhūti's is not doubt on his own part—he 「從佛聞諸法平等相，解其旨趣」 tr. "has heard from the Buddha the mark of the equality of dharmas and understood its purport", and it is that he 「為諸新發意菩薩故問」 tr. "asks for the sake of all the bodhisattvas who have newly aroused the mind". This attribution is extremely crucial: the identity of the questioner determines the weight of the answer. Below this the treatise-author narrates that the Buddha answered with a counter-question—giving and the rest, and so on up to the dhāraṇī gates, teaching the Dharma, and the rest: 「此諸法非如幻、如夢等耶」 tr. "are these dharmas not like an illusion, like a dream, and so on?"—Subhūti answers 「實爾」 tr. "It is truly so", and adds a sentence: 「是諸法雖有利益，不出於如夢法」 tr. "although these dharmas have benefit, they do not go beyond dharmas that are like a dream". Subhūti asks again: dreams and the like are false; the bodhisattva practises prajñā to seek a real dharma and obtains the Buddha path—how can he practise unreal dharmas? The Buddha then assents: giving and such dharmas 「皆是思惟、憶想分別、作起生法，不得住如是法中成一切種智」 tr. "are all dharmas that arise from reflection, recollection, discrimination, and making; one cannot abide in such dharmas and accomplish the omniscience of all kinds". Here the treatise-author adds a stroke describing the scene: 「即時眾中聽者心生懈怠」 tr. "at that time, among the assembly, the minds of those hearing gave rise to slackness"—the hearers, on hearing it, at once lost heart, and so only then did the Buddha say 「是一切法皆是助道因緣」 tr. "all these dharmas are causes and conditions that aid the path". With this stroke, one knows that the teaching of aiding the path is a word of remedy, not a general discussion. Below this the treatise-author himself explains the boundary between aiding and adding to: practising wrongly and erring is named unreal; practising straight without error is precisely aiding the path; 「是法為助道故，不為果」 tr. "this dharma is for the sake of aiding the path, not for the sake of the fruit"; giving and the rest are conditioned, and the path too is conditioned, 「同相故相益」 tr. "because they are of the same mark they benefit each other"; the fruit of the path is 「諸法實無出生，一相無相，寂滅涅槃」 tr. "that all dharmas really have no coming forth into birth; of one mark, the signless, quiescent extinction, nirvāṇa", therefore 「於涅槃不能有益」 tr. "nothing can be added to nirvāṇa". Finally it brings out a simile: 「如時雨能益草木，不益虛空。」 tr. "As a timely rain can benefit grass and trees, but does not benefit space." The conditioned can benefit the conditioned; the unconditioned is not a thing that can be benefited—only here is the pivotal sentence of passage 7 said all the way through.

25. Question ① and Answer ①: if one knows the real mark of all dharmas, what use is practising giving? The answer: giving and the rest are for bringing beings to accomplishment. The question of the first round is extremely direct, and it is also the sentence the reader most easily asks himself. The treatise-author's answer first cites the Buddha's words as ground—「布施等不具足，不能成就眾生」 tr. "if giving and the rest are not complete, one cannot bring beings to accomplishment"—and next states its use: the bodhisattva adorns his body and his voice and speech, obtains the Buddha's power of the supernormal powers, and by all kinds of power of skilful means leads beings on. Thus the use of giving lies not in obtaining for oneself, but in being the means for accomplishing others. Below this it adds the mind with which one practises: 「亦不取檀波羅蜜若有、若無相，亦不戲論如夢等諸法，直行乃至得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提」 tr. "nor does he grasp the mark of dānapāramitā being existent or being non-existent, nor does he make idle discourse about dharmas like a dream and the rest; he goes straight on, even until he obtains anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi". Having a use and yet not grasping marks—this is signless giving. The reader should note that what the treatise-author gives here is a reason, not a compromise: he does not say that although it is empty one must still cultivate; he says that precisely because what is accomplished is beings, therefore although one knows emptiness one does not give up practice.

26. Question ② and Answer ②: why is only benefiting beings spoken of and not benefiting oneself? The answer: those who enter the path are of three grades, lowest, middle, and highest, and the highest are only for beings. This question asks about the one-sidedness of the sūtra text—the sūtra speaks only of being for beings and does not speak of benefiting oneself. The treatise-author answers with 「菩薩行善道為一切眾生，此是實義」 tr. "that the bodhisattva practises the wholesome path for the sake of all beings—this is the real meaning", while what is said elsewhere, 「自利，亦利益眾生」 tr. "benefiting oneself, and also benefiting beings", is 「為凡夫人作是說，然後能行菩薩道」 tr. "said thus for ordinary people, so that afterwards they can practise the bodhisattva path". One sentence settles the use of the two kinds of saying: one is the real meaning, the other is a skilful leading-on. Below this it sets up three grades: 「下者，但為自度故行善法；中者，自為亦為他；上者，但為他人故行善法。」 tr. "The lowest practise wholesome dharmas only for the sake of delivering themselves; the middle do so for themselves and also for others; the highest practise wholesome dharmas only for the sake of others." This judgement of three grades is the bone of this passage. When in reading the treatise one meets the treatise-author judging high and low, first see on what he relies—what is relied on here is not the amount of merit, but where the arousing of the mind is tied.

27. Question ③ and Answer ③: if one only benefits others and cannot benefit oneself, how can one be called the highest? The answer: such is the way of the world, one who makes offerings to himself obtains no merit; one who can relinquish his own happiness and act only for beings is a superior person. The third round of question and answer is a rebuttal rarely seen in the treatise, and a forceful one: the ordinary sequence should be that benefiting oneself is the lowest and benefiting both oneself and others is the highest—why does the treatise-author turn it around? The treatise-author first takes the ordinary way of the world as proof: 「自供養者不得其福，自害其身而不得罪」 tr. "one who makes offerings to himself obtains no merit from it, and one who harms his own body incurs no sin"—the establishment of merit and sin is from the first tied to another, so practising the path for oneself 「名為下人」 tr. "is named an inferior person". Next it brings out the sickness: 「若自為身行道，是則斷滅，自為愛著故。」 tr. "If one practises the path for oneself, this is annihilation, because it is for the sake of one's own love and clinging." Next it sets up the right view: 「若自能捨己樂，但為一切眾生故行善法，是名上人，與一切眾生異故。」 tr. "If one can relinquish one's own happiness and practise wholesome dharmas only for the sake of all beings, this is named a superior person, because he is not the same as all beings." Next it resolves the doubt about benefiting oneself: 「若但為眾生故行善法，眾生未成就，自利則為具足」 tr. "if one practises wholesome dharmas only for the sake of beings, while beings are not yet brought to accomplishment, one's own benefit is already complete"—not seeking to benefit oneself, one's own benefit is of itself sufficient. Next it judges the middle grade: 「若自利益，又為眾生，是為雜行。」 tr. "If one both benefits oneself and acts for beings, this is mixed practice." Finally it gathers it in with three kinds of people who seek the Buddha path: those who only love and cherish the Buddha and seek to become a Buddha for their own single selves, those who do so for themselves and also for beings, and those who do so only for beings; of the third, 「是人清淨行道，破我顛倒故」 tr. "this person practises the path purely, because he has broken the inversion of self". The criterion of the whole passage lies in the last sentence—what is broken is the inversion of self, so being only for others is not moral loftiness but purity with respect to self-clinging.

28. Question ④ and Answer ④: since it is said that one only benefits beings, why is it further said that only by oneself obtaining non-clinging can one benefit people? The answer: because there is no other way; merit cannot be given to others like wealth and goods. Before the question and answer, the treatise-author first explains the passage on ambrosia in the sūtra: when the bodhisattva practises prajñā, 「無眾生乃至無知者、見者」 tr. "there are no beings and so on up to no knower and no seer"; abiding securely within this he 「拔出眾生着甘露性中」 tr. "pulls beings out and sets them within the nature of ambrosia"; and he himself explains the name—「甘露性者，所謂一切助道法」 tr. "what is called the nature of ambrosia is all the dharmas that aid the path"; the reason it is named ambrosia is that 「行是法得至涅槃，涅槃名甘露」 tr. "by practising these dharmas one can reach nirvāṇa, and nirvāṇa is named ambrosia"; when one abides within this nature, 「我等妄想不復生」 tr. "the false thoughts of ‘I’ and the like no longer arise". Finally it concludes with one sentence: the bodhisattva 「自得無所著，亦令眾生得無所著，是名第一利益眾生」 tr. "himself obtains non-clinging and also makes beings obtain non-clinging; this is named the foremost benefiting of beings". Taking the dharmas that aid the path as the nature of ambrosia joins exactly with the meaning in passage 7 that aiding the path does not add to the fruit—the dharmas that aid the path are ambrosia not because they can add to nirvāṇa, but because they can reach nirvāṇa. This question pursues the previous answer in its natural course: since benefiting oneself has been judged the lowest, and the sūtra further says 「自無所著，亦教一切眾生令得無所著」 tr. "he himself clings to nothing, and also teaches all beings so that they obtain non-clinging", is this not self-contradictory? The treatise-author answers very honestly: 「不得已故！若自無智慧，何能利人？」 tr. "Because there is no other way! If one has no wisdom oneself, how can one benefit others?" Next it gives the reason: 「若是功德可得與他如財物者，諸佛、大菩薩所有功德皆應與他，乃至調達、怨賊皆可與之」 tr. "if this merit could be given to others like wealth and goods, all the merit possessed by the buddhas and the great bodhisattvas ought to be given to others, and it could be given even to Devadatta and to the enemy and thief", and yet 「不可我作而他得」 tr. "it cannot be that I do it and another obtains it". This simile is the section in the whole treatise most able to break people's thoughts of a lucky windfall—that merit cannot be handed over is precisely why cultivating for oneself cannot be avoided. And the treatise-author uses the three Chinese characters 「不得已」 tr. "there is no other way" to fix its boundary: first being without clinging oneself is not going back to benefiting oneself; it is the necessary condition for benefiting others. Below this the treatise-author again returns this passage to worldly truth: 「是亦世俗說，非第一義」 tr. "this too is a worldly saying, not the highest meaning", because within the highest meaning 「無眾生、無一無異等分別諸法相」 tr. "there are no beings, no marks of one and different and the like that discriminate dharmas"; and he adds a sentence: 「如先說『不可說相是第一義』，此中可說故是世俗」 tr. "as said before, ‘the mark of the unspeakable is the highest meaning’; since herein it can be spoken of, it is therefore the worldly".

29. The treatise-author restates the sūtra and explains the question whether it is obtained in worldly truth or obtained in the highest meaning: two dharmas all exist because of worldly truth; one who has obtained the highest meaning, though he distinguishes dharmas, is not false. This passage is not a newly set question and answer; it is the treatise-author restating the passage in the sūtra of Subhūti's question and the Buddha's answer, and explaining it. The treatise-author first brings out on Subhūti's behalf the intent of his dilemma: 「若以世諦故得，即是虛妄不實；若以第一義故得，第一義中無得、無得者，不可說、不可受。」 tr. "If it were obtained because of worldly truth, then it would be false and unreal; if it were obtained because of the highest meaning, within the highest meaning there is no obtaining and no one who obtains; it is unspeakable and cannot be received." Next he explains the Buddha's answer: it is by worldly words that the Buddha is said to obtain awakening, and 「是中無得者、無有得法」 tr. "herein there is no one who obtains and no dharma that is obtained"; the reason lies in two dharmas—「是菩薩、是得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提」 tr. "this is the bodhisattva, this is the anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi that is obtained": what obtains and what is obtained standing as two is precisely two dharmas, and 「二法中，無道、無果」 tr. "within two dharmas there is no path and no fruit". Next he resolves a crucial doubt: since two dharmas all exist because of worldly truth, does the Buddha's Dharma not also fall into falsehood? The treatise-author distinguishes: 「若有人不得第一義，但以二法分別諸法，是則虛妄；諸佛、大菩薩得第一義故，為度眾生令得第一義，雖分別諸法，非是虛妄。」 tr. "If someone does not obtain the highest meaning and only distinguishes dharmas by means of two dharmas, this is false; because the buddhas and the great bodhisattvas have obtained the highest meaning, in order to deliver beings and make them obtain the highest meaning, although they distinguish dharmas, it is not false." The same distinguishing, and yet whether it is false is tied to whether the one who distinguishes has already obtained the highest meaning—this judgement and the Buddha's 「大恩力」 tr. "great power of kindness" in passage 16 exactly illuminate each other.

30. Question ⑤ and Answer ⑤: elsewhere it is said that two dharmas are the dharmas of ordinary people and the dharma of non-duality is the dharma of the worthy and the sages; how is that reconciled with non-duality here also having no path and no fruit? The answer: entering non-duality is the real holy Dharma, and the Buddha negates the two extremes and speaks the middle way. What this question cites is the Dharma gate of entering non-duality of the Vimalakīrti Sūtra, the only place in this chapter that explicitly cites another sūtra; what it asks about is a contradiction between scriptural teachings. The treatise-author's answer is in three parts. The first affirms first: 「不二入是真實聖法」 tr. "entering non-duality is the real holy Dharma", not abandoning that sūtra because of what is said here. The second gives the reason why there is disparagement and praise: 「或有新發意菩薩未得諸法實相，聞是不二法，取相生著。是故或稱讚不二法，或時毀呰。」 tr. "It may be that there are bodhisattvas who have newly aroused the mind, who have not yet obtained the real mark of all dharmas, and who, hearing this dharma of non-duality, grasp at marks and give rise to clinging. Therefore at times he praises the dharma of non-duality, and at times disparages it." Praise and disparagement are both remedies, not a self-contradiction of the meaning. The third brings out the right meaning: 「佛遮二邊、說中道，所謂非二、非不二」 tr. "the Buddha negates the two extremes and speaks the middle way, namely not two and not non-dual", and states its sequence—「二法名各各別相；不二名一空相。以是一空相破各各別異相；破已，事訖，還捨不二相」 tr. "two dharmas speaks of the separate marks of each; non-duality speaks of the mark of a single emptiness. By means of this mark of a single emptiness one breaks the marks of each being separate and different; once the breaking is done and the matter is finished, one still relinquishes the mark of non-duality", and only then is it 「即是道、是果」 tr. "precisely the path, the fruit". Finally it adds the reason: 「諸賢聖雖讚歎無二法，為不著故。」 tr. "Although the worthy and the sages praise the dharma without duality, it is so that people may not cling." Here the reader can obtain a general rule: the effect of any word of remedy lies in the time when what is to be broken is not yet broken; once it is broken, if one still holds on to it, the remedy becomes a new sickness. After this round of question and answer, the treatise-author takes back the sūtra's words to conclude: 「用是法得道、得果，用是法無道、無果——即是戲論；無戲論是平等法。」 tr. "To say that by means of this dharma one obtains the path and obtains the fruit, and that by means of this dharma there is no path and no fruit—this is precisely idle discourse; being without idle discourse is the equal dharma." Next he restates Subhūti's question, 「若諸法無所有性，何等是平等」 tr. "if all dharmas are of a nature without anything existent, what is equality?", together with the Buddha's answer, and lists the seven items of the Buddha's answer one by one: 「若離有性、無性，假名為平等」 tr. "if one is apart from existent nature and non-existent nature, it is provisionally named equality"; the bodhisattva does not say that all dharmas are existent—does not speak of their nature, their marks, and other such displays; nor does he say that they are a non-existent dharma—does not speak of the nature of non-existent dharmas, the marks of non-existent dharmas, and other such displays; nor does he say that apart from the two extremes there is a further mark of equality; 「一切處不取平等相」 tr. "in every place he does not grasp the mark of equality"; 「亦不言無是平等」 tr. "nor does he say that there is no such equality"; and 「不妨行諸善法」 tr. "this does not hinder him from practising all wholesome dharmas". Of the seven items the first six all negate and the last alone discloses—the sentence that it does not hinder practising all wholesome dharmas is the gate of practice left at the end of the whole chapter's course of negating and sweeping away, and must not be passed over. Below this the treatise-author again turns out a sentence: 「復次，諸法平等者，所謂出過一切法」 tr. "Again, what is called the equality of dharmas is precisely passing beyond all dharmas", which is where the next round of question and answer arises from.

31. Question ⑥ and Answer ⑥: before it was said that equality is precisely the reality of dharmas, the names differing and the meaning the same; why is it now said that equality passes beyond all dharmas? The answer: dharmas are of two kinds, substance and practice; equality passes beyond within the wrong practice of ordinary people, not within the substance of dharmas. This question is the finest boundary in the whole chapter. Earlier it was said that equality is precisely the real mark of all dharmas, the names differing and the meaning the same, and 「色如，非色、非離色」 tr. "the suchness of form is not form and not apart from form" was cited as proof, so equality and dharmas are not apart from each other; yet now the sūtra says 「諸法平等者，所謂出過一切法」 tr. "what is called the equality of dharmas is precisely passing beyond all dharmas"; passing beyond is going beyond, and the two sayings contradict each other. The treatise-author answers that all dharmas are of two kinds: 「一者、色等諸法體；二者、色等法中行——凡夫邪行，賢聖正行。」 tr. "First, the substance of form and the other dharmas; second, practice within form and the other dharmas—the wrong practice of ordinary people and the right practice of the worthy and the sages." What equality passes beyond is the wrong practice of ordinary people, not the substance of dharmas such as form. Once it is divided into two, the objection resolves itself. The reader should remember this division: whenever this treatise speaks of going beyond, of being apart, of passing beyond, it is mostly said with respect to practice and not with respect to substance; without making this division, there would be contradiction everywhere.

32. The treatise-author explains that of equality there is none who can practise it and none who can reach it: self-nature cannot practise and reach within self-nature, and should only practise and reach within other-nature; it is not because the Buddha's wisdom is small. This passage explains the most striking sentence in the sūtra. The treatise-author first depicts Subhūti's state—「於是須菩提驚問：『佛亦不能行、不能到？』」 tr. "Thereupon Subhūti asks in astonishment: ‘Can the Buddha too not practise it and not reach it?’"—and brings out his meaning for him: 「是法雖甚深微妙難行，是事佛應當得！」 tr. "Although this dharma is very deep and subtle and hard to practise, this matter the Buddha ought to be able to obtain!" The Buddha's answer is that 「從須陀洹乃至佛皆無能行、無能到」 tr. "from the srota-āpanna up to the Buddha, none can practise it and none can reach it", and the treatise-author again brings out the Buddha's meaning for him: 「三世十方佛不能行、不能到，何況一佛！平等性自爾故。」 tr. "The buddhas of the three times and the ten directions cannot practise it and cannot reach it, how much less a single Buddha! Because the nature of equality is so of itself." Subhūti asks again about the Buddha, sovereign in the power of practice, whose unobstructed wisdom reaches every place; the key of the Buddha's answer lies in one hypothetical sentence: 「若佛與平等異，應有是難」 tr. "only if the Buddha were different from equality should there be such an objection". Below this the treatise-author brings out the right principle: 「是凡夫乃至佛，自性不能自性中行、不能自性中到；自性應他性中行。」 tr. "These ordinary people and so on up to the Buddha—self-nature cannot practise within self-nature, cannot reach within self-nature; self-nature should practise within other-nature." The establishment of practising and reaching must wait upon a difference between the one who acts and what is acted upon; the Buddha is precisely equality, so there is no difference to practise across. The last sentence is the safety pin of the whole passage: 「但佛即是平等故，不行、不到，非以智慧少故。」 tr. "But because the Buddha is precisely equality, he does not practise and does not reach—not because his wisdom is small." The reader must never read this passage as the Buddha being unable to do something—both the sūtra and the treatise have already blocked this road of retreat.

33. The treatise-author explains that within equality there is no distinction, yet because of worldly truth there is distinction; the Three Jewels' greatly appearing in the world is precisely the distinguishing and setting-up of the equal dharma. From the foregoing meaning Subhūti gives rise to a second doubt: if ordinary people and so on up to the Buddha are unfindable as different, then 「今凡夫、聖人不應有差別」 tr. "now ordinary people and sages ought not to have distinction". The Buddha assents to his question and makes a distinction: 「平等中無差別，世諦故凡夫法中有差別。」 tr. "Within equality there is no distinction; it is because of worldly truth that there is distinction within the dharmas of ordinary people." Subhūti again objects with the Three Jewels, and the Buddha answers 「平等即是法寶，法寶即是佛寶、僧寶」 tr. "equality is precisely the Dharma Jewel, and the Dharma Jewel is precisely the Buddha Jewel and the Saṅgha Jewel", and gives the reason: 「未得法時，不名為佛；得平等法故名為佛；得是平等法故，分別有須陀洹等差別。」 tr. "When he had not yet obtained the dharma, he was not named Buddha; because he obtained the equal dharma he is named Buddha; because he obtained this equal dharma, he distinguishes that there are distinctions such as the srota-āpanna." This point is extremely crucial: the distinctions of the Three Jewels lie not outside equality, but are set up precisely through obtaining the equal dharma. Subhūti at once receives the teaching and states for himself: 「是法皆無合、無散，無色、無形、無對，一相，所謂無相。唯佛有是力，於空、無相中，分別是凡夫、是聖人。」 tr. "This dharma is all without joining and without dispersing, without form, without shape, without resistance, of one mark, namely the signless. Only the Buddha has this power, that within emptiness and the signless he distinguishes: this is an ordinary person, this is a sage." The objector once again resolves his own objection.

34. Question ⑦ and Answer ⑦: the buddhas are like the sun coming out, only illuminating the myriad things; why must the Buddha speak for one to know? The answer: knowing is of two kinds, the false knowing of ordinary people and knowing as it truly is. This question is set up very handsomely: the buddhas are like the sun coming out, which 「不能令高者下、下者高，但能照明萬物，令有眼者別識」 tr. "cannot make the high low or the low high, but can only illuminate the myriad things and let those with eyes distinguish and recognise them"; the buddhas 「亦不轉諸法相，但以一切智照，為人演說令知」 tr. "too do not transform the marks of dharmas, but only illuminate them with omniscience and expound them for people to let them know". Since it is so, animals and the like can be seen by the eye before one, and everyone recognises and knows them; what need is there for the Buddha to speak? The treatise-author's answer sets up only one distinction: 「知有二種：一者、凡夫虛妄知，二者、如實知。」 tr. "Knowing is of two kinds: first, the false knowing of ordinary people; second, knowing as it truly is." What ordinary people know of the marks of animals and the like is false knowing; what the Buddha knows is the real mark; therefore what is at issue in the sūtra's 「佛不分別諸法，云何知有地獄等」 tr. "if the Buddha did not distinguish dharmas, how could it be known that there are the hells and the rest" is knowing as it truly is, not worldly recognition. In reading the treatise, when one meets such a question likening the Buddha to the sun, one should see whether the treatise-author accepts the simile—here the treatise-author does not deny the simile of the sun, but only divides the word 「知」 tr. "knowing" into levels, and the objection dissolves of itself.

35. The treatise-author explains that the dharma of the buddhas is quiescent extinction without idle discourse and yet can distinguish dharmas; he brings out the simile of the ox-dharma, and records the divergent opinion of ‘someone says’ and refutes it. This passage first brings out a deeper difficulty: 「諸佛法寂滅相、無戲論；此中若分別有地獄等相，不名為『寂滅』、『不二』、『無戲論法』。」 tr. "The dharma of the buddhas is the mark of quiescence, without idle discourse; if herein one distinguished that there are the marks of the hells and the like, it would not be named ‘quiescent extinction’, ‘non-duality’, ‘the dharma without idle discourse’." The treatise-author's answer is this chapter's face-on judgement: 「佛雖知寂滅、不二相，亦能於寂滅相中分別諸法，而不墮戲論。」 tr. "Although the Buddha knows the mark of quiescent extinction and non-duality, he can yet distinguish dharmas within the mark of quiescence, and does not fall into idle discourse." Below this it brings out the simile of the ox-dharma to show the difficulty of knowing as it truly is: one who is apart from the real mark of all dharmas, though his eyes see animals, cannot know their marks as they truly are; 「如牛，角、足、尾等諸分邊和合，更有牛法生，是為一。諸分多、牛法一，一不作多、多不作一。」 tr. "As with an ox: the horns, feet, tail, and the other parts come together at their edges, and there further arises an ox-dharma, and this is one. The parts are many, the ox-dharma is one; the one does not make the many, the many do not make the one." Here the treatise-author records a divergent opinion—「有人言：此說非也！除此諸分，應更有牛法力用可見。」 tr. "Someone says: this is not right! Apart from these parts there should further be a function of the ox-dharma that can be seen." The treatise-author at once refutes it: 「牛法眾分和合生，而牛法不異眾分」 tr. "the ox-dharma is born from the coming together of its parts, and yet the ox-dharma is not different from the parts"; his proof lies in 「見此眾分合故名為見牛，更不見餘物為牛」 tr. "seeing these parts come together is named seeing an ox, and no other thing is further seen to be the ox". Next he refutes completely by the four alternatives: 「異者破一，一者破異，不一不異破一異；若無一異，云何有不一不異？」 tr. "Different refutes one, one refutes different, neither-one-nor-different refutes one-and-different; if there is no one-and-different, how can there be neither-one-nor-different?" Finally it returns: 「若入是諸法平等中，爾時，始如實得牛相。」 tr. "If one enters into this equality of dharmas, at that time one first obtains the mark of the ox as it truly is." Here the reader can see this treatise's form for recording divergent opinions—recording them together and then refuting, not concealing the opinion; and what is refuted is exactly that view of an entity, ‘apart from the parts there is separately one thing that can be seen’.

36. The treatise-author explains not moving within equality and yet distinguishing dharmas, not clinging to the marks of one and different, and restates the passage in the sūtra on the marks of form and the rest being empty, and resolves its difficulty. The treatise-author takes up the simile of the ox-dharma and draws the conclusion: 「若佛不分別諸法相、不說二諦，云何善說畜生等？所謂於平等不動而分別諸法。」 tr. "If the Buddha did not distinguish the marks of dharmas and did not speak of the two truths, how could he speak well of animals and the like? This is what is called not moving within equality and yet distinguishing dharmas." And he explains the two Chinese characters not moving: 「分別諸法時，不著一異相。」 tr. "When one distinguishes dharmas one does not cling to the marks of one and different." Below this he restates Subhūti's long objection in the sūtra and the Buddha's counter-questions—investigating and searching out whether the marks of form and the rest are empty, the answer is that they are truly empty; whether within emptiness there are dharmas of differing marks, the answer is that there are not. Here the treatise-author supplies on Subhūti's behalf the reason: 「是畢竟空，以無相智慧可解，是中云何有異相？」 tr. "This is ultimate emptiness, which can be understood with the wisdom of the signless; how could there be differing marks within it?" Next he brings out on the Buddha's behalf the intent of the rebuke: 「若空中無異相，空便是實，是故汝云何於空中分別諸法作是難？」 tr. "If within emptiness there are no differing marks, emptiness would then be the real; therefore how is it that you distinguish dharmas within emptiness and raise such an objection?" And he pushes it one layer further: 「畢竟空中，空亦不可得，各各相亦不可得，汝云何以空、各各相為難？」 tr. "Within ultimate emptiness, emptiness too is unfindable, and the separate marks too are unfindable; how can you use emptiness and the separate marks to raise an objection?"—since even emptiness is unfindable, one who raises an objection by means of emptiness has of himself no ground to stand on. Finally he ties up the meaning of the sūtra: within equality, 「無分別故無凡夫人；但凡夫人，非實相、不離實相，凡夫實相即是聖人相」 tr. "because there is no discrimination, there are no ordinary people; yet ordinary people are not the real mark, nor are they apart from the real mark; the real mark of ordinary people is precisely the mark of the sage", therefore it says 「不但凡夫、不離凡夫，乃至佛亦如是」 tr. "not only ordinary people, and also not apart from ordinary people, and so on up to the Buddha, it is likewise". The sentence that the real mark of ordinary people is precisely the mark of the sage is this chapter's most direct consolation for practitioners, and also its strictest demand.

37. The treatise-author explains that equality is neither conditioned nor unconditioned: the conditioned is all false and deceptive dharmas that are made; the unconditioned, having no arising, abiding, and ceasing, is a non-existent dharma; because there is the conditioned there is the unconditioned, as apart from long there is no short—this is the meaning of standing over against each other. The treatise-author first states the mind with which Subhūti raises this question: 「以平等相大利益，欲知平等定相」 tr. "because the mark of equality has great benefit, he wishes to know the fixed mark of equality"—what is asked is whether equality has a mark that can be fixed. The Buddha answers 「非有為、非無為」 tr. "neither conditioned nor unconditioned", and the treatise-author brings out the fault of each side for him: if it were conditioned, 「皆是虛誑作法」 tr. "all would be false and deceptive dharmas that are made"; if it were unconditioned, 「無為法無生住滅故無法，無法故不得名無為」 tr. "an unconditioned dharma, because it has no arising, abiding, and ceasing, would be a non-existent dharma, and because it is a non-existent dharma, it could not be named unconditioned". Below this he brings out the right principle: 「因有為故有無為」 tr. "it is because there is the conditioned that there is the unconditioned", and cites the sūtra as proof—「如經中說：『離有為，無為不可得。』」 tr. "As is said in the sūtra: ‘Apart from the conditioned, the unconditioned is unfindable.’" Finally he brings out the simile and the judgement: 「如離長無短，是相待義。」 tr. "As apart from long there is no short—this is the meaning of standing over against each other." The words standing over against each other are the key of this passage: the conditioned and the unconditioned are not two dharmas each independent on its own, but two names set up by standing over against each other, so equality cannot be tied to either side of them.

38. Question ⑧ and Answer ⑧: the conditioned is impermanent and the unconditioned permanent; why is it said that apart from the conditioned the unconditioned is unfindable? The answer: the unconditioned, because it is without discrimination, is signless; to break the conditioned is precisely the unconditioned; it concludes with contemplating equality and not moving within the highest meaning and benefiting beings. The last round of question and answer relies on the most widely current teaching—the conditioned is impermanent, the unconditioned is permanent—if the unconditioned is permanent, then it has its own substance, so why must it wait upon the conditioned? The treatise-author's answer first refutes the saying of a mark of permanence: 「無為法無分別故無相；若說常相，不得言無相。」 tr. "Unconditioned dharmas, because they are without discrimination, are signless; if one spoke of a mark of permanence, one could not say they are signless." Next it sets up the right view: 「破有為法故名無為，更無異法。」 tr. "It is because conditioned dharmas are broken that it is named the unconditioned; there is no other dharma." Next it brings out the clearest simile in the whole treatise: 「如人閉在牢獄，穿牆得出；破壁是空，更無異空，空亦不從因緣生。」 tr. "As when a person shut in a prison bores through the wall and gets out: the broken wall is space, and there is no other space, and this space too does not arise from causes and conditions." The place where the wall is broken is precisely space; it is not that outside the wall there is another space—the unconditioned in relation to the conditioned is likewise. Next it applies this: 「有為法中先有無為性，破有為即是無為」 tr. "within conditioned dharmas there is first the unconditioned nature, and to break the conditioned is precisely the unconditioned", therefore 「離有為，無為不可得」 tr. "apart from the conditioned, the unconditioned is unfindable". Next it gathers in: 「是有為、無為性皆不合不散，一相，所謂『無相』。」 tr. "These natures of the conditioned and the unconditioned are both neither joined nor dispersed, of one mark, namely ‘the signless’." Next it still returns the Buddha's words to worldly truth: 「佛以世諦故說是事，非第一義」 tr. "the Buddha speaks this matter because of worldly truth; it is not the highest meaning", and cites the causes and conditions the Buddha himself states—「第一義中無身、口、意行；有為、無為法平等，即是第一義。」 tr. "Within the highest meaning there is no bodily, verbal, or mental action; the equality of conditioned and unconditioned dharmas is precisely the highest meaning." The last sentence is the conclusion of the whole chapter: 「觀是有為、無為法平等，亦不著一相。菩薩於第一義中不動而利益眾生；方便力故，種種因緣為眾生說法也。」 tr. "Contemplating the equality of these conditioned and unconditioned dharmas, one also does not cling to a single mark. The bodhisattva does not move within the highest meaning and yet benefits beings; because of the power of skilful means, by means of all kinds of causes and conditions he teaches the Dharma for beings." From the not setting up of stain and purity at the head of the chapter up to here, it returns to not moving and yet benefiting beings—the equality that is set up never from the start departs one step from the gate of practice.

Do Not Misread

Do not read 「平等」 tr. "equality" as everything being the same. The equality set up in the sūtra has as its definition 「無戲論相」 tr. "the mark of being without idle discourse"; it is not pulling ordinary people and the Buddha into one and the same thing. Therefore the Buddha must say 「於諸法等中不動，而分別諸法」 tr. "within the equality of dharmas he does not move, and yet he distinguishes dharmas", and calls this the great power of kindness; the treatise-author too says 「平等中無差別，世諦故凡夫法中有差別」 tr. "within equality there is no distinction; because of worldly truth there is distinction within the dharmas of ordinary people". If equality were levelling flat, the Three Jewels could not appear in the world, and the names srota-āpanna and so on up to Buddha would all become empty settings; yet the sūtra text, in the very same passage, lists these names one by one. What equality removes is idle discourse, not the setting-up of distinctions.

Do not read 「不能行、不能到」 tr. "cannot practise, cannot reach" as the Buddha being unable to do something. The sūtra text itself has already blocked this road of retreat twice: once in the Buddha's answer 「若諸法平等與佛有異，應當如是問」 tr. "only if the equality of dharmas were different from the Buddha should one ask thus", once in the treatise-author's explanation 「非以智慧少故」 tr. "not because his wisdom is small". The reason for not being able to practise and reach is that between the one who acts and what is acted upon there is no difference to practise across—the Buddha is precisely equality, so there is no equality outside waiting for the Buddha to reach it. If it is read as the Buddha's wisdom still falling short, then the later 「佛有大恩力，於諸法等中不動，而分別諸法」 tr. "the Buddha has the great power of kindness: within the equality of dharmas he does not move, and yet he distinguishes dharmas" has nowhere to be placed.

Do not read 「世諦故說」 tr. "said because of worldly truth" as what is said being cancelled. In this chapter the Buddha almost always carries this tail with his answers; if each time it were carried it cancelled something, not one sentence of the whole chapter could remain. The treatise-author resolves it with the simile of trading gold for grass: a bystander mocks him for trading the precious for the cheap, and he answers 「我事須用故」 tr. "because I have a matter for which I need it"—the saying of worldly truth is set up for getting things done; it is not real and yet useful. Opposite to it is the simile of pointing at the moon, which warns against taking the finger for the moon. The two similes must be read together: one warns against clinging to words, one warns against discarding words.

Do not read 「一切法能助道法，不能益其果」 tr. "all dharmas can aid the dharmas of the path; they cannot add to its fruit" as practice being useless. What this sentence negates is the idea of adding to the unconditioned fruit by conditioned practice; its reason the sūtra text itself gives—「所謂是諸法無生、無出、無相」 tr. "namely, these dharmas are non-arising, non-emerging, and signless", and the treatise-author further makes it clear with 「如時雨能益草木，不益虛空」 tr. "as a timely rain can benefit grass and trees, but does not benefit space". And in the very same passage of sūtra text, the Buddha says that if dānapāramitā and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds are not made complete, 「不能得成就眾生、淨佛國土、得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提」 tr. "he cannot bring beings to accomplishment, purify buddha-lands, or obtain anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi". Aiding the path and adding to the fruit are two matters, which the sūtra text sets side by side without their hindering each other.

Do not read ‘only for the sake of beings, not for oneself’ as there being no need to cultivate oneself. The treatise-author has already set a special question on this, answering 「不得已故！若自無智慧，何能利人？」 tr. "Because there is no other way! If one has no wisdom oneself, how can one benefit others?", and proves it by merit not being something that can be given to others like wealth and goods. So first being without clinging oneself is not turning back to benefiting oneself; it is the condition for benefiting others. Conversely, it must not be read either as: since cultivating oneself cannot be avoided, benefiting oneself is still the right road—the treatise-author judges 「若自利益，又為眾生，是為雜行」 tr. "if one both benefits oneself and acts for beings, this is mixed practice", and judges it very clearly.

Do not read 「破有為即是無為」 tr. "to break the conditioned is precisely the unconditioned" as annihilation. The treatise-author's simile is boring through the wall of a prison—the place where the wall is broken is precisely space; it is not that the wall is destroyed and some other thing is obtained. If it is read as there being nothing at all after the conditioned is entirely broken, then the sentence 「有為法中先有無為性」 tr. "within conditioned dharmas there is first the unconditioned nature" has nothing to rest on; if it is read as there being, outside the breaking of the conditioned, a separate unconditioned to be obtained, then the sentence 「更無異法」 tr. "there is no other dharma" has nothing to rest on. On both sides the sūtra text stands in the way.

Bearing on Practice

The first use is to take 「無戲論相，是諸法平等」 tr. "the mark of being without idle discourse—this is the equality of dharmas" as a ruler for daily use. Whenever the calculation ‘by this dharma one can obtain, by this dharma one cannot obtain’ arises in the mind, that is precisely the idle discourse the sūtra points to. This ruler is extremely handy: there is no need to judge whether the content calculated is right or wrong; only see whether there is within it the opposition of what obtains and what is obtained; if there is, one knows that at this time one is not in equality, and at once lets go of the calculation and still goes on doing the work.

The second use is to examine one's own arousing of the mind by the sequence of 「知一切法是不可取相已，發心求阿耨多羅三藐三菩提」 tr. "having known that all dharmas are of the mark of being ungraspable, he arouses the mind and seeks anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi". The sūtra text puts knowing before arousing the mind; its intent is that the mind aroused should not become a mind with something to be attained. In daily use one can hold to it thus: each time a vow arises, first ask whether the establishment of this vow needs a thing to be obtained as its pledge; if so, this vow is still within grasping at marks. And the sūtra text at the same time gives the ground on which the arousing of the mind does not fall into emptiness—one seeks awakening because 「但以眾生不知不見如是諸法相」 tr. "only because beings do not know and do not see such marks of dharmas"; the root of the arousing of the mind is tied to others' not knowing, so it is not shaken by one's own gain and loss.

The third use is that the judgement of the three grades of those who enter the path can serve as a once-a-year self-examination. The lowest are only for delivering themselves; the middle are for themselves and also for others; the highest are only for others. The treatise-author also gives an extremely plain test: 「若但為眾生故行善法，眾生未成就，自利則為具足。」 tr. "If one practises wholesome dharmas only for the sake of beings, while beings are not yet brought to accomplishment, one's own benefit is already complete." So there is no need to worry that being only for others will lose one's own benefit. When examining oneself, do not look at how many wholesome dharmas one has practised; look only at which side the arousing of the mind is tied to.

The fourth use is that the simile of pointing at the moon can be applied to hearing the Dharma and reading the sūtras. When, on hearing a passage of Dharma, the thought ‘this saying is really good’ arises in the mind, one is already looking at the finger; at this time one should turn back and ask what is being said. The treatise-author points out in particular that even the two Chinese characters equality can become something clung to—the more ultimate the words, the more easily they are grasped as marks. So whenever one meets a sentence of Dharma that one finds especially useful, one should take special care whether one has already stored it away as a thing.

The fifth use is that 「於平等不動而分別諸法」 tr. "not moving within equality and yet distinguishing dharmas" can serve as a rule for handling affairs. Not moving the treatise-author himself explains as 「分別諸法時，不著一異相」 tr. "when one distinguishes dharmas, one does not cling to the marks of one and different". In daily use one distinguishes good and evil and sorts out what to take and what to leave; every matter needs distinguishing; and when distinguishing, to be able not to regard what is distinguished as separately independent real entities is precisely not moving. What is precious in this rule is that it does not require people to stop distinguishing—to stop distinguishing is neither possible nor what the Buddha practises.

The sixth use is that the simile of boring through the prison wall can remove people's fantasy about 「無為」 tr. "the unconditioned". Practitioners often imagine nirvāṇa as a separate pure place, and so while practising they keep looking outward. This simile is direct: the place of the broken wall is precisely space; there is no other space. So where one should apply effort is only in breaking the clinging to the conditioned, not in seeking a separate unconditioned. In the same way, the sentence 「凡夫實相即是聖人相」 tr. "the real mark of ordinary people is precisely the mark of the sage" should also be brought up time and again—what is sought is not elsewhere.

Further Resonances

The backbone of this chapter is one passage of sūtra text and one passage of treatise explanation. Sūtra ① begins with Subhūti's question on stain and purity—the one who sees the real is neither stained nor pure, the one who does not see the real is also neither stained nor pure, because the nature of all dharmas is without anything existent, and within what is without anything existent and within what is existent it is all without stain and without purity; the Buddha answers that the mark of the equality of dharmas is precisely purity, makes it concrete with suchness, not-different, not-deceiving, the mark of dharmas, the nature of dharmas, the abiding of dharmas, the position of dharmas, the limit of reality, and whether there is a Buddha or no Buddha the nature of dharmas abides constantly, and limits it himself by its being said because of worldly truth and not the very highest meaning; next, Subhūti raises the objection, by like a dream, like an echo, like a mirage, like a shadow, like an illusion, like a conjuration, to vowing to make the perfections complete, and the Buddha makes his premise firm by a counter-question, and answers that unreal, false dharmas cannot obtain awakening, that all dharmas are dharmas made by recollection and reflection, that all dharmas can aid the dharmas of the path and cannot add to its fruit, that the bodhisattva knows dharmas to be like a dream and still, by the wholesome deeds he has done, brings beings to accomplishment and purifies buddha-lands, that because he does not grasp prajñā he obtains the omniscience of all kinds, that only after knowing all dharmas to be of the mark of being ungraspable does one arouse the mind, that it is only for beings and not for oneself, that practising prajñā one sees beings and yet there are no beings and makes them far from inversion and sets them in the nature of ambrosia, and that he himself clings to nothing and also teaches beings to cling to nothing, returning this to worldly truth; next, Subhūti asks whether the Buddha's obtaining of awakening is obtained in worldly truth or obtained in the highest meaning, and the Buddha answers that because of worldly truth the Buddha is said to obtain this dharma while within the highest meaning there is no dharma to be obtained, that by means of two dharmas there is no path and no fruit, that by practising the dharma of non-duality there is also no path and no fruit, that if there are no two dharmas and no dharma of non-duality this is precisely the path and precisely the fruit, and that the mark of being without idle discourse is the equality of dharmas; next, he asks what equality is, and the Buddha answers that apart from equality there is no other dharma that can be apart from the mark of the equality of all dharmas, that as for equality ordinary people and sages all cannot practise it and cannot reach it, and that so too are the four fruits, the pratyekabuddhas, the bodhisattvas, and the buddhas, and that ordinary people and so on up to the Buddha are one equality without duality and within equality are all unfindable; next, he raises the objection of the Three Jewels appearing in the world, and the Buddha by a counter-question makes Subhūti himself answer that the Three Jewels are not different from the equality of dharmas, that the Three Jewels are precisely equality, without joining and without dispersing, without form, without shape, without resistance, of one mark, the signless, and that the Buddha has this power, that he can distinguish the places of the signless dharmas; next, the Buddha by a counter-question makes Subhūti admit for himself that he would not know, and then brings out the judgement that the Buddha has the great power of kindness, not moving within the equality of dharmas and yet distinguishing dharmas; next, Subhūti raises the long objection that dharmas each differ in mark, listing the differences of form, feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness and so on up to the natures of conditioned and unconditioned dharmas, and concluding that if one does not make distinctions one cannot practise prajñā, enter the bodhisattva's position, or purify buddha-lands; the Buddha restates his question and answers with the counter-question whether the mark of form and so on up to the mark of the buddhas is empty; Subhūti himself answers that it is truly empty and that within emptiness dharmas of separate marks are unfindable, and the Buddha then concludes that within the equality of dharmas it is not ordinary people and also not apart from ordinary people, and so on up to not the Buddha and also not apart from the Buddha; finally he asks whether equality is conditioned or unconditioned, and the Buddha answers that it is neither conditioned nor unconditioned, that apart from the conditioned the unconditioned is unfindable, that apart from the unconditioned the conditioned is unfindable, that the two dharmas are neither joined nor dispersed, of one mark, the signless, that the Buddha too speaks because of worldly truth and not because of the highest meaning, that within the highest meaning there is no bodily, verbal, or mental action, nor is the highest meaning obtained apart from bodily, verbal, and mental action, and that the mark of the equality of the conditioned and the unconditioned is precisely the highest meaning; and it gathers in with the bodhisattva, when practising prajñā, not moving within the highest meaning and yet practising the bodhisattva's business and enriching beings. Treatise ① first restores the intent of Subhūti's question as the double objection of the two views of annihilation and permanence; explains the Buddha's answer, that it is named purity because of equality while to discriminate stain and purity is not so; brings out the simile of pointing at the moon and the simile of trading gold for grass to show that worldly truth is not real and yet useful; explains that the meaning of equality is unspeakable, yet because within the scattered mind of initial and sustained thought there are words there is something said; narrates that Subhūti asks for the sake of the bodhisattvas who have newly aroused the mind, the Buddha's counter-question, that the hearers gave rise to slackness and the Buddha said that all dharmas are causes and conditions that aid the path, and the boundary between aiding the path and adding to the fruit, with the simile of a timely rain benefiting grass and trees and not benefiting space; below this come eight rounds of question and answer: the first asks what use is practising giving if one knows the real mark, and is answered with bringing beings to accomplishment; the second asks why only benefiting others is spoken of, and is answered with the three grades of those who enter the path, the highest being only for others; the third asks how being only for the benefit of others can be called the highest, and is answered that one who makes offerings to himself obtains no merit, that one who relinquishes his own happiness is a superior person, and that benefiting oneself and also acting for beings is mixed practice; the fourth asks why it is further said that one oneself obtains non-clinging, and is answered that it is because there is no other way and that merit cannot be given to others like wealth and goods; in between, the question and answer in the sūtra on worldly truth and the highest meaning is restated, and it is judged that one who has obtained the highest meaning, though he distinguishes dharmas, is not false; the fifth asks about the difference between the Dharma gate of non-duality of the Vimalakīrti Sūtra and the non-duality here which also has no path and no fruit, and is answered that entering non-duality is the real holy Dharma, that the Buddha negates the two extremes and speaks the middle way, and that once the breaking is done one still relinquishes the mark of non-duality; the sixth asks about the difference between equality passing beyond all dharmas and equality being precisely the real mark of all dharmas, and is answered that dharmas are of two kinds, substance and practice, and that it passes beyond the wrong practice of ordinary people and not the substance of dharmas; the seventh asks, since the buddhas are like the sun coming out, why the Buddha must speak, and is answered with the two kinds, the false knowing of ordinary people and knowing as it truly is; the eighth asks, since the conditioned is impermanent and the unconditioned permanent, how it can be said that apart from the conditioned the unconditioned is unfindable, and is answered that the unconditioned, because it is without discrimination, is signless, that to break the conditioned is precisely the unconditioned, as when one bores through the wall and gets out and the broken wall is space; in between it further explains that self-nature cannot practise and reach within self-nature and that this is not because the wisdom is small, that equality is precisely the Dharma Jewel and the Dharma Jewel precisely the Buddha Jewel and the Saṅgha Jewel, that the dharma of the buddhas is quiescent extinction without idle discourse and yet can distinguish dharmas within quiescent extinction, that the ox-dharma and its parts are neither one nor different, recording the divergent opinion of ‘someone says’ and refuting it, that one does not move within equality and yet distinguishes dharmas without clinging to the marks of one and different, that within ultimate emptiness emptiness too is unfindable and the separate marks too are unfindable, and that the real mark of ordinary people is precisely the mark of the sage; finally it gathers in the whole chapter with contemplating the equality of the conditioned and the unconditioned and also not clinging to a single mark, the bodhisattva not moving within the highest meaning and yet benefiting beings, and, by the power of skilful means, teaching the Dharma for beings by all kinds of causes and conditions.

The thread of meaning between this chapter and the chapters before and after it can be seen in three lines. First, inheriting from what comes before: the previous chapter, "The Seven Similes" (Chapter 85), takes the seven matters of dream, image in a mirror, echo, mirage, city of the gandharvas, illusion, and conjuration as similes, to show that the nature of dharmas is without anything existent while deeds and fruits, cultivation and realisation are not abandoned; this chapter pursues to the end the nature of dharmas that those similes illustrate—that the seven similes can be set up without becoming annihilation is precisely because dharmas are equal and the Buddha can not move within equality and yet distinguish; so this chapter does not set up a separate meaning outside the seven similes, but sets up the root in the nature of dharmas for what the seven similes show. Second, a turn complete within the chapter itself: the first half turns from the question of stain and purity into the objection of the dream and the conjuration, and what it discerns is whether 「說」 tr. "speaking" and 「行」 tr. "practising" can be established; the latter half turns from the words that equality cannot be practised and reached into the two objections of the Three Jewels and of each differing in mark, and what it discerns is whether 「分別」 tr. "distinguishing" can be established; the two halves have as their pivot the sentence 「於諸法等中不動，而分別諸法」 tr. "within the equality of dharmas he does not move, and yet he distinguishes dharmas"—not moving and yet distinguishing is precisely the principle of the first half's ‘aiding the path and not adding to the fruit’ said over once more at the gate of distinguishing. Third, reaching to what comes after: this chapter concludes with the equality of the conditioned and the unconditioned being precisely the highest meaning, and the bodhisattva's not moving within the highest meaning and yet benefiting beings; the next chapter, "Nirvāṇa Is Like a Conjuration" (Chapter 87), opens by taking up these words and asking 「若諸法平等、無所為作，云何菩薩摩訶薩行般若波羅蜜，於平等中不動而行菩薩事，以布施、愛語、利益、同事？」 tr. "If all dharmas are equal and there is nothing done or made, how does the bodhisattva-mahāsattva, practising prajñāpāramitā, not move within equality and yet practise the bodhisattva's business—by giving, kind speech, beneficial action, and shared endeavour?", and below this it pushes further to 「云何言涅槃一法非如化？」 tr. "why is it said that the one dharma nirvāṇa is not like a conjuration?", pushing from the nature of dharmas of equality to nirvāṇa, the one dharma, not being kept either; reading the two chapters in succession, one can see that the meaning of the nature of dharmas, pushed to its utmost, still does not abandon the bodhisattva's business.

Of the ancient masters' explanations, two can be recorded for this chapter. Jizang, dividing this chapter into sections, first fixes its place in the whole sūtra, saying: 「此下第二明諸法畢竟平等不二。」 tr. "Below this, the second clarifies that all dharmas are ultimately equal and non-dual." He divides the chapter into seven sections, saying: 「品開七段：第一因須菩提問略說平等體，第二益平等之行，第三明平等果，四釋平等義，第五明故有一切教門，第六明一切法平等，第七出平等相。」 tr. "The chapter opens into seven sections: first, because of Subhūti's question, it briefly speaks of the substance of equality; second, the practice that benefits equality; third, it clarifies the fruit of equality; fourth, it explains the meaning of equality; fifth, it clarifies that therefore there are all the gates of teaching; sixth, it clarifies that all dharmas are equal; seventh, it brings out the mark of equality."—ordering them by the substance, practice, fruit, meaning, gates of teaching, dharmas, and mark of equality, which broadly corresponds with the sequence of this treatise's sūtra section and can be viewed alongside it. He divides the question at the head of the chapter into three, saying: 「問中為三：第一領悟無垢淨，二重難無垢淨，三漸遣垢淨兩人。」 tr. "Within the question there are three: first, understanding that there is no stain or purity; second, objecting again that there is no stain or purity; third, gradually dismissing the two persons of stain and purity." And his explanation of the section of the renewed objection is of exactly the same measure as the double objection of annihilation and permanence brought out by the treatise-author: 「無所有斷見，此中何有垢淨？有所有中是常見，亦無垢淨。」 tr. "Without anything existent is the view of annihilation—how could there be stain and purity in it? Within what has something existent is the view of permanence, and there is likewise no stain or purity." His division of the Buddha's answer says: 「佛答中為二：初、正答；二、破著。」 tr. "Within the Buddha's answer there are two: first, the direct answer; second, breaking clinging."—judging the section said because of worldly truth as 「破著」 tr. "breaking clinging", which is the same as what the treatise-author's simile of pointing at the moon remedies, while the name taken is different; they are recorded side by side without judgement. His explanation of the three grades of those who enter the path says: 「論云有三種人：下品人自利，中品人自利利他，上品但為利他也。」 tr. "The treatise says there are three kinds of people: the person of the lowest grade benefits himself; the person of the middle grade benefits himself and benefits others; the highest grade only benefits others."—this directly cites this treatise with its wording slightly changed, from which one can see what he relied on. As for the explanation of the section on equality being neither conditioned nor unconditioned, Jizang says: 「有為無為因緣義，因有為故無為則非無為，由為故有為則非有為，是平等也。」 tr. "The conditioned and the unconditioned are of the meaning of causes and conditions: the unconditioned that is because of the conditioned is then not the unconditioned, and the conditioned that is by reason of making is then not the conditioned—this is equality." And he says: 「今此中明平等非有為無為，非真非俗也。」 tr. "Now herein it clarifies that equality is neither conditioned nor unconditioned, neither real nor worldly." Judging it as neither real nor worldly, compared with this treatise's explaining it by the meaning of standing over against each other, the road taken is different while the boundary pointed to is close; they are recorded side by side without judgement. Further, of a large section at the end of this chapter in this commentary, the typesetting of the Supplement to the Canon edition is in error and places it in "Like a Conjuration"; CBETA, following the Shinpukuji manuscript, has moved it back to this chapter; the matter belongs to the editions, and it is recorded without judgement. Junzheng's book is in the form of a profound-meaning treatise that discourses across topics, and does not explain chapter by chapter; in its discussion of the two truths it cites this chapter, saying: 「故大品經？平等品云：諸法平等相，一切聖人皆不能行、不能到。」 tr. "Therefore the Larger Sūtra? the chapter Equality says: The mark of the equality of dharmas—all sages cannot practise it, cannot reach it." Compared with this sūtra's 「是諸法平等，一切聖人皆不能行、不能到」 tr. "this equality of dharmas, all sages cannot practise, cannot reach", what is cited differs slightly in wording; it is an ancient master's summarising re-citation, recorded without judgement; the symbol in the text is copied as in the base text, not altered. Huiying's Commentary, in its extant text, does not reach the fascicle in which this chapter lies, and for this chapter the explanation is lacking; this is recorded as it is, and does not mean he had nothing to say. The variant names of this chapter, the differences of chapter order among the editions, and the collation entries are detailed in the Apparatus layer.