大智度論 義疏通講 · 冊26Dazhidulun — Mahāprajñāpāramitā-upadeśa · Exposition Throughout · Vol. 26
平等品Equality
全文五層 →Full five layers →平等品：垢淨之問何以要從一切法性無所有起，佛何以不答垢淨而答一個淨字，諸法平等相既名為淨何以又說是世諦，如夢如化之法何以仍能發願具足諸度，助道法何以能助道而不能益果，但為眾生不為己身何以是般若之行相，二法無道無果而不二法何以亦無道無果，平等何以凡夫聖人乃至諸佛皆不能行不能到，一平等無二何以不壞三寶之現於世間，佛於諸法等中不動而分別諸法何以稱為大恩力，諸法各各相異之難何以用色相空一句即解，平等何以非有為非無為，論主指月之喻與金貿草之喻何以並出，功德何以不可如財物與人，平等出過一切法何以只出於凡夫行而不出於法體，自性不能自性中行到何以非以佛智慧少故，牛法眾分不一不異何以是如實得牛相之門，破有為即是無為何以不成斷滅
在問什麼
這一品問的是一個極容易被說成玄談、其實極貼身的問題：若一切法本來平等，修行所立的種種分別還算不算數。
須菩提起手所問的是垢淨。上文已說如實見的人與不如實見的人同樣不垢不淨，他便把這句話推到底：既然一切法性無所有，無所有之中談不上垢淨，有所有之中也談不上垢淨，那麼「如實語者」與「不實語者」之分又安放在哪裡。這個問題表面上問的是兩種人，骨子裡問的是——分別還有沒有立足之地。
佛的答語不順著垢淨兩字走，而是換了一個字：「是諸法平等相，我說是淨。」此處要留意兩層。其一，佛不是在垢與淨之間選了淨，而是把淨重新定義在平等相上，並隨即以如、不異、不誑、法相、法性、法住、法位、實際、有佛無佛法性常住一串來指實它。其二，佛說完隨即自作限定：「世諦故說，非最第一義」。答語剛立，立處即空——這一收一放是本品全篇的句法，後文凡佛有所說，幾乎都帶著這一句世諦的尾巴。
其下經文由垢淨轉入一個更硬的難處：法既如夢如嚮如焰如影如幻如化，菩薩何以能發願具足六度乃至十八不共法。佛先反問確認，再答以不實虛妄法確實不能得菩提，卻不因此否定所作善業——「是一切法能助道法，不能益其果」一句是全品的樞紐之一。接著又轉入世諦與第一義之辨：佛得菩提是世諦故得，二法無道無果，不二法亦無道無果，「無戲論相，是諸法平等」。既說平等，須菩提便追問何等是平等，於是出了本品最觸目的一句：平等者，凡夫、聖人皆不能行、不能到，乃至諸佛亦爾。此語一出，隨之而來的是三重難問——佛既不能行到，何以稱自在；凡夫與佛既一平等，三寶何以現於世間；諸法各各相異，菩薩何以能不作分別而行般若。佛答此三難，一用「一平等無二」，一用「於諸法等中不動，而分別諸法」，一用「是色相空不」的反問。末後以平等非有為非無為、二法不合不散一相無相收束，歸到菩薩於第一義中不動而饒益眾生。
論主的釋文比經文更長，而其用力處在兩件事。一是替讀者把須菩提的問意還原：他何以問垢淨，是因為斷見與常見兩頭都不許有垢淨；他何以問發願，是「為諸新發意菩薩故問」。二是把經中一收一放的句法說破，出了兩個著名的喻——如人以指指月而觀指不視月，以金貿草而不知者以為以貴易賤。其下八番問答，逐一拆開行布施之用、但為眾生之所以為上、功德不可與人、不二法門之會通、平等出過一切法之分際、自性不能自性中行到、二種知之別、破有為即是無為之相待義；中間又出一個牛法之喻，並錄了「有人言」之異說而加以駁正。全篇末句仍落在「菩薩於第一義中不動而利益眾生」——與經段之末所收處同一句，可見經論兩段所走的是同一條路。
逐段解明
一、須菩提問：見實者不垢不淨，見不實者亦不垢不淨，一切法性無所有故。 品首之問要先看清它的層次。須菩提先立一對人——見實者與見不實者，說二者同樣不垢不淨；次出理由「一切法性無所有故」；次把無所有與所有兩邊窮盡：無所有中無垢無淨，所有中亦無垢無淨，無所有中有所有中亦無垢無淨；末乃回頭出難：既然如此，「云何如實語者不垢不淨，不實語者亦不垢不淨」。讀此段勿把它讀作單純的疑問，它是一個逼問：若垢淨一概不立，則如實與不如實之分亦當一概不立；而經中處處分別如實與不如實，兩者不能並存。凡讀經遇連立數問而末句回到原處者，先看它所窮盡的是哪幾邊，纔知道答語要從哪一邊破。
二、佛答：是諸法平等相我說是淨，所謂如不異不誑法相法性法住法位實際有佛無佛法性常住，世諦故說非最第一義。 佛之答不在垢淨兩字上作分疏，而是把「淨」一字重新安在平等相上。這一步極要緊：淨不再是垢的對面，而是諸法本相之名。佛自設問自作答——「何等是淨是諸法平等」——隨即出一串名目：如、不異、不誑，法相、法性、法住、法位、實際，有佛、無佛法性常住。八九個名目所指是一事，列而不判，是本論常見的體例：以多名圍出一實，令讀者不得執一名。末後一句「世諦故說，非最第一義」是答語的自我限定；第一義「過一切語言論議音聲」，故凡可說者皆屬世諦。讀者於此當立一個讀經的常則：佛說某法是某法，未必即許此說為究竟，要看他隨後有無此類限定之語。
三、須菩提設難：一切法空不可說如夢如嚮如焰如影如幻如化，云何能發菩提心作願具足諸波羅蜜乃至十八不共法。 此難由前段之「非最第一義」逼出。既然所說皆屬世諦，所修所證豈非全在夢中。須菩提把菩薩的願心逐項鋪開——檀波羅蜜乃至般若，神通與智，四禪四無量心四無色定四念處乃至八聖道分，三解脫門八背捨九次第定，佛十力乃至十八不共法，三十二相八十隨形好，陀隣尼門三昧門，乃至放光照十方、知眾生心如應說法。鋪得愈全，難處愈重：這樣一整套的發願，如何安放在「無有根本定實」之上。讀此段當留意須菩提不是在懷疑六度的價值，他是在問一個無根之物如何承載這樣的重量。
四、佛反詰：汝所說諸法如夢如嚮如焰如影如幻如化不。 佛不正面答，先反問一句，把須菩提所立的前提交還給他自己確認。反問之法在本品用了四次，此為第一次。其效力在於：答語若由問者自己說出，後面的推論就再無退路。讀論者於此可記一則體例——佛之反問多不是質疑對方，而是要把對方所立之前提坐實，然後就此前提說法。
五、須菩提認可，仍疑不實虛妄法云何能具足檀波羅蜜乃至十八不共法。 須菩提答「爾」，坐實了前提，卻沒有就此罷問，反而把難處說得更直：「是夢乃至如化，虛妄不實」，「不應用不實虛妄法能具足檀波羅蜜乃至十八不共法」。這一問比前一問更緊：前問問的是發願之可能，此問問的是修行之效驗。經文如此步步收緊，是要逼出下文那個看似讓步而實為關鍵的答語。
六、佛答：不實虛妄法不能得菩提，一切法皆是憶想思惟作法，不能得一切種智。 佛的第一句是完全的認可——「如是！如是！」不實虛妄法確實不能具足六度，行不實虛妄法確實不能得菩提。讀者若只讀到此處，會以為佛否定了菩薩之行。要緊的是佛接著把範圍推廣：「是一切法皆是憶想思惟作法，用是思惟憶想作法，不能得一切種智。」所否定的不是布施持戒這些事，而是以憶想思惟所作之法為能得之因的那個想法。凡讀經見佛認可難者之語，先看他認可的究竟是哪一句，往往認可之處正是轉語之所自出。
七、佛出樞紐一句：是一切法能助道法不能益其果，菩薩知諸法如夢而仍以所作善業成就眾生淨佛國土。 此段是全品第一個樞紐。佛說這些法「能助道法，不能益其果」，隨即出其所以然：「所謂是諸法無生、無出、無相」——果既是無生無出無相，便不是可以被增益之物。然而佛並不因此廢行：菩薩從初發意以來所作善業，檀波羅蜜乃至一切種智，若不具足便「不能得成就眾生、淨佛國土、得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提」。一面說不能益果，一面說不具足則不能成就——兩句並立而不相礙，關鍵在「助」與「益」二字所指不同：助者助其行，益者增其果。其下又說菩薩知所作善業如夢如化，亦知一切眾生如夢中行；因「不取般若波羅蜜是有法」，「用是不取故，得一切種智」。不取而得——這是本品自始至終的同一條理路，此處第一次明說。
八、佛說知一切法不可取相已方發心，用不可取相法不能得不可取相法，但為眾生故求菩提不為己身。 此段的次第值得逐字看。經文說「知一切法是不可取相已，發心求阿耨多羅三藐三菩提」——知在前，發心在後。何以不是先發心後知？因為若不先知不可取相，所發之心即是有所得之心。其下又補一句「用不可取相法不能得不可取相法」，把能得所得一併除盡；既然如此，發心所為者何？經文自答：「但以眾生不知不見如是諸法相」故。於是菩薩之所以發心，不繫於自己有所得，而繫於眾生之不知。末乃推廣至一切行門：「從初發意已來所有布施，為一切眾生故；乃至有所修智慧，皆為一切眾生，不為己身。」讀此段當知本品所說之無所得，不是行門之取消，是行門之重新繫屬——由繫於己身轉而繫於眾生。
九、佛說行般若見眾生無眾生令離顛倒置甘露性中，自無所著亦教眾生無所著，世諦故非第一義。 此段說般若行時的實況。「見眾生無眾生，但眾生相中住」——見與住並舉，不是不見，是見而不執其實。乃至「無知者、無見者，知見相中住」，句法相同。其效在「令眾生遠離顛倒；遠離已，置甘露性中」；住此中者「無有妄相」。菩薩自身則是「動心、念心、戲論心皆捨，常行不動心、不念心、不戲論心」。末後仍以「世諦故，非第一義」收——第二次出現這個尾巴，可見佛每說一段所行，必隨手把所說之語歸還世諦。讀者當習慣這個節奏，纔不至於在讀到第一義時以為前說作廢。
十、須菩提問：佛得菩提是以世諦故得抑以第一義中得。 須菩提此問極銳。他抓住的正是前段那條尾巴：佛既每說必云世諦，那麼佛自身之得菩提，是屬哪一邊。此問若不解，則全部佛法之成立俱成疑問。讀論見弟子抓住師說之語尾而反問者，當知此是最要緊的一類問——它問的不是義理之枝節，是所說之語的效力。
十一、佛答：以世諦故說佛得是法，第一義中無有法可得無人得法，用二法即無道無果。 佛答分三節。其一直承：「以世諦故說佛得是法」。其二破：「是法中無有法可得、是人得是法」。其三出所以然：「是人得是法，是為大有所得；用二法，無道無果。」所謂二法，即得法之人與所得之法對立而成兩橛；一落二法，道與果俱不可立。讀者當注意此處所破者不是得，是二——能所對立的那個結構。
十二、佛答二法不二法皆無道無果，若無二法亦無不二法即是道即是果，無戲論相是諸法平等。 須菩提順勢設一句：行不二法有道有果不。這是最自然的反應，也是最常見的錯路——既二法不行，便執不二。佛答得斬截：「行二法無道無果，行不二法亦無道無果」；其下纔出正義：「若無二法、無不二法，即是道、即是果。」其所以然在戲論二字：說用此法得道得果、用此法不得道不得果，這一整套計較即是戲論；「諸平等法中，無有戲論；無戲論相，是諸法平等」。至此「平等」一名纔正式立起來，而它的定義是負面的——無戲論。凡讀論遇正義出在兩番否定之後者，當知前二番不是廢話，是必須走盡的兩條歧路。
十三、須菩提問何等是平等，佛答除平等更無餘法離一切法平等相，平等者凡夫聖人皆不能行不能到。 須菩提追問「是中何等是平等」，佛答分兩截。前截：「若無有法、無有無法，亦不說諸法平等相；除平等，更無餘法離一切法平等相」——平等不是諸法之外別有一法，故不可離一切法而求之。後截即全品最觸目的一句：「平等者，若凡夫、若聖人，不能行、不能到。」行與到是修證之語，此語等於說平等不在修證所能及的範圍之內。讀者初讀必生疑，此疑正是經文所要引出的，其下三番問答皆由此而起。
十四、佛答凡夫乃至佛皆一平等無二，一切法平等中皆不可得。 須菩提驚問「乃至佛亦不能行、亦不能到」，佛先坐實：一切聖人——須陀洹、斯陀含、阿那含、阿羅漢、辟支佛、諸菩薩摩訶薩及諸佛——皆不能行不能到。須菩提再問：佛於一切諸法中行力自在，何以亦不能。佛之答語是本品義理的正面所在：「若諸法平等與佛有異，應當如是問。」——難之所以成難，是因為問者先把佛與平等看作兩物；若佛即是平等，則無所謂行到。其下遂說凡夫人平等、四果辟支佛菩薩諸佛及聖法皆平等，「是一平等無二」，而「是凡夫人、是須陀洹乃至佛，是一切法平等中皆不可得」。讀此段當把「不能行、不能到」一語從貶義中拔出來——它不是說佛的能力有所不及，是說能所之間根本無距離可行、無彼岸可到。
十五、須菩提問凡夫乃至佛為無有分別，佛可之，須菩提復以三寶現世間為難，佛反問三寶與諸法等異不，須菩提自答無異而稱佛能分別無相諸法處所。 此段是一小段完整的往復，須合看纔明其勢。須菩提先問「凡夫人、須陀洹乃至佛為無有分別」，佛認可；須菩提隨即出難：若無分別，「云何分別有三寶現於世間」。這是把前義推到現前的宗教事實上——三寶若不成立，全部佛法無所依。佛不正面答，第二次用反問：「佛寶、法寶、僧寶與諸法等異不」。須菩提乃自答：依所聞義，三寶與諸法等無異；三寶即是平等，「是法皆不合、不散，無色、無形、無對，一相，所謂無相」。而他自己接著補出關鍵的一句：「佛有是力，能分別無相諸法處所」——三寶之現於世間，不在平等之外，而在佛能於無相中分別。難者自解其難，所得比佛直答更牢。
十六、佛以反問令須菩提自承不知，乃出大恩力之判：於諸法等中不動而分別諸法。 佛承須菩提之語而第三次反問：諸佛得菩提若不分別諸法，「當知是地獄、是餓鬼、是畜生」乃至「是十八不共法不」。須菩提答「不知也」，其意是：不分別則我輩無由得知。佛乃結出本品最要緊的判語：「當知佛有大恩力，於諸法等中不動，而分別諸法。」不動與分別並立於一句，而以「大恩力」三字繫屬之——可見這分別不是佛的所知障，是佛的悲用。讀者於此可解前文「不能行、不能到」之疑：不能行到者，就平等自身說；能分別者，就大恩力說。兩不相礙。
十七、須菩提以諸法各各相異設難：若不作分別則不能行般若入菩薩位淨佛國土。 須菩提的末一難最長，也最貼近修行人的實感。他先立一個對稱：佛於諸法等中不動，凡夫、須陀洹乃至辟支佛也同樣於諸法平等中不動——既然不動是共有的，佛之所以為佛便無從說起。其次列舉諸法各各之相：色與受想行識相異，六根相異，地水火風空識相異，欲瞋癡邪見相異，禪與無量心無色定相異，四念處乃至八聖道分相異，六波羅蜜相異，三解脫門、十八空相異，十力四無所畏四無礙智十八不共法相異，有為法性與無為法性異，凡夫相乃至佛相異。末乃出一串連鎖：不作分別則不能行般若，不行般若則不能從一地至一地，不能從一地至一地則不能入菩薩位，不入菩薩位則不能過二乘地，不過二乘地則不能具足神通波羅蜜，乃至不能供養諸佛、成就眾生、淨佛國土。這串連鎖是本品中最長的一段推論，其力量在於它不談玄理，只把修行的實際次第一節一節接起來給人看。
十八、佛先牒問而後以反問答：色相空不乃至諸佛相空不，須菩提答實空，佛復問空中各各相法可得不，須菩提答不可得。 佛之答先復述須菩提之問——今本標點以內層引號標出所牒之語，牒而後答，令問者知所答不誤。其後佛不說理，只問一句：「是色相空不？乃至諸佛相空不？」須菩提答「實空」。佛再問：「空中各各相法可得不？」須菩提答「不可得」。兩問兩答，長難即解。其法之所以有效，在於須菩提所立的難處全繫於「各各相異」四字，而各各之相唯在不空的前提下纔能成立；前提一鬆，連鎖自解。讀者當學此一著：遇繁複之難，不必逐節分疏，只須驗其所立之根。
十九、佛結：諸法平等中非凡夫人亦不離凡夫人乃至非佛亦不離佛；復答平等非有為非無為，二法不合不散一相無相即是第一義，菩薩於第一義中不動而行菩薩事。 佛以『非……亦不離……』的句式作結，四字兩番，既不許同一，也不許相離。其下須菩提末問「是平等，為是有為法？為是無為法」，佛答「非有為法，非無為法」，並出其所以然：「離有為法，無為法不可得；離無為法，有為法不可得」——兩者相待而立，故不可執一為平等之體。二法「不合、不散，無色、無形、無對，一相，所謂無相」。而佛隨即又加一句限定：「佛亦以世諦故說，非以第一義」，並說第一義中無身口意行，亦不離身口意行而得第一義。經段末句是「菩薩摩訶薩行般若波羅蜜時，第一義中不動，而行菩薩事，饒益眾生」——與第十六段之「於諸法等中不動，而分別諸法」同一句法，一屬佛、一屬菩薩，可見不動而有所行正是本品所立的行門。
二十、論主釋須菩提之問意：無所有是斷滅見故不應有垢淨，所有是常見故亦不應有垢淨。 論段起手，論主先還原須菩提的心行：他是聽了佛答「實見者、妄見者無異，垢淨見無故」，思惟已而後問。其所思惟的內容，論主替他說出：無所有一邊，「斷滅見故，不應有垢淨」；所有一邊，「常見故，不應有垢淨」；並補足常見之理路——「所有若決定是有，則不從因緣生，不從因緣生故常，常故無垢無淨」。這是論主之釋最見功力處：經文只見問句，論主指出問句背後是斷常二見的雙難。讀論者當知，論主釋經之第一事往往不是解答，是把問者的處境交代清楚。
二十一、論主釋佛答：垢淨雖無別相可說，諸法平等故是名為淨；若分別說垢淨相是事不然。 論主把佛答壓成兩句：其一，垢淨無別相可說；其二，以諸法平等故說名為淨。中間那一層——何以無別相可說卻仍可名為淨——論主以「一切法平等故，我說名淨」作結。要看清此處之「淨」與凡夫所對之垢淨不是同一層：凡夫之淨對垢而立，此中之淨對平等而立，故雖同用一字而不相犯。凡讀論遇一字兩用者，須先判它所對之物是什麼。其下論主復引佛語以實此淨之所指：「諸法實相，如、法性、法住、法位、實際是平等」，而繫其行相於一句——「菩薩入是平等中，心無憎愛」；次釋常住之義：「作法皆是虛誑」，故所常住者是「無作法，有佛、無佛常住」。以無憎愛釋入平等，是把一句法性之語落到心行上，讀者不可輕輕讀過。
二十二、論主出指月之喻與金貿草之喻：聽者取相著平等，故佛說平等相亦是世諦。 此段是論段第一個要緊處。論主先描出聽法者的通病：「聽者心即取相，著是諸法平等」——連平等二字也能成為所著。其喻曰「如人以指指月，不知者但觀其指而不視月」，是就能指與所指之錯位說。其下佛之對治即是把話收回世諦：「諸法平等相亦如是，皆是世諦；世諦非實，但為成辦事故說。」既云非實，何以仍說？論主續出第二喻：「譬如以金貿草」，旁人譏其以貴易賤，答曰「我事須用故」。兩喻並出而分工不同：指月喻說聽者之病，金貿草喻說說者之權。讀者若只記指月而忘金貿草，便會把一切言說都看成累贅，那正是本品所要防的另一邊。
二十三、論主釋平等義不可說：一切名字語言音聲悉斷，以覺觀散心中有語言故有所說。 此段釋經文「最第一義，過一切語言論議音聲」一句。論主的理由是「諸法平等是無戲論寂滅相」；而所以仍有言說者，「但覺觀散心中有語言故有所說」。這一句把言說之所自出說得極平實——語言是覺觀散心的產物，不是實相之影。讀者由此可知：不可說不是禁止言說，是指明言說的出身；知其出身，則說而不執。
二十四、論主釋須菩提為新發意菩薩故問，佛以反問令其自悟不礙萬行。 論主指出須菩提此問並非自疑——他「從佛聞諸法平等相，解其旨趣」，是「為諸新發意菩薩故問」。這一筆繫屬極要緊：問者的身分決定了答語的分量。其下論主敘佛以反問答之——布施等乃至陀羅尼門說法等，「此諸法非如幻、如夢等耶」——須菩提答「實爾」，並補一句「是諸法雖有利益，不出於如夢法」。須菩提復問：夢等虛妄，菩薩為求實法而行般若得佛道，云何行不實法。佛乃可之：布施等法「皆是思惟、憶想分別、作起生法，不得住如是法中成一切種智」。論主於此處加一筆現場的描述：「即時眾中聽者心生懈怠」——聽者一聽便洩了氣，於是佛纔說「是一切法皆是助道因緣」。有此一筆，助道之說纔知是對治之語，不是泛論。其下論主自釋助與益之分際：邪行謬錯是名不實，直行不謬即是助道；「是法為助道故，不為果」；布施等是有為，道亦有為，「同相故相益」；道果則是「諸法實無出生，一相無相，寂滅涅槃」，故「於涅槃不能有益」。末出一喻：「如時雨能益草木，不益虛空。」有為可益有為，無為則非可益之物——第七段那一句樞紐至此纔算說透。
二十五、問①答①：若知諸法實相何用行布施，答以布施等為成就眾生。 第一番問答所問極直，也是讀者最容易自問的一句。論主之答先引佛語為據——「布施等不具足，不能成就眾生」——次說其用：菩薩莊嚴身及音聲語言，得佛神通力，以種種方便力引導眾生。於是布施之用不在自得，而在成就他人之具。其下又補行時之心：「亦不取檀波羅蜜若有、若無相，亦不戲論如夢等諸法，直行乃至得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提」。有用而不取相，此即無相之布施。讀者當留意論主此處給出的是理由而非折衷：不是說雖空亦須修，是說正因所成者是眾生，故雖知空而行不廢。
二十六、問②答②：何以但說利益眾生不說自利，答以入道人有下中上三品，上者但為眾生。 此問問的是經文的偏處——經中只說為眾生，不說自利。論主答以「菩薩行善道為一切眾生，此是實義」，而餘處所說「自利，亦利益眾生」是「為凡夫人作是說，然後能行菩薩道」。一句判定兩種說法的用處：一是實義，一是方便引導。其下立三品：「下者，但為自度故行善法；中者，自為亦為他；上者，但為他人故行善法。」此三品之判是本段的骨。讀論遇論主判高下者，先看他所依的是什麼——此處所依不是功德之多寡，是發心之所繫。
二十七、問③答③：若但利他不能自利云何言上，答以世間法爾自供養不得福，能捨己樂唯為眾生者是上人。 第三番問答是論中少見的反駁，而且反駁得有力：一般的次第應是自利為下、自他俱利為上，論主何以倒過來。論主先以世間常法作證：「自供養者不得其福，自害其身而不得罪」——福罪之成立本繫於他，故為自身行道「名為下人」。次出其病：「若自為身行道，是則斷滅，自為愛著故。」次正立：「若自能捨己樂，但為一切眾生故行善法，是名上人，與一切眾生異故。」次解自利之疑：「若但為眾生故行善法，眾生未成就，自利則為具足」——不求自利而自利自足。次判中品：「若自利益，又為眾生，是為雜行。」末以三種求佛道之人收之：但愛念佛而自為己身成佛者、為己身亦為眾生者、但為眾生者，第三者「是人清淨行道，破我顛倒故」。全段的判準在末句——所破者是我之顛倒，故但為他人不是道德上的高尚，是我執上的清淨。
二十八、問④答④：既說但利益眾生何以又說自得無所著方能利人，答以不得已故，功德不可如財物與人。 問答之前，論主先釋經中甘露一節：菩薩行般若時「無眾生乃至無知者、見者」，安住其中而「拔出眾生着甘露性中」；並自釋其名——「甘露性者，所謂一切助道法」，其所以名甘露者，「行是法得至涅槃，涅槃名甘露」；住此性中則「我等妄想不復生」。末結一句：菩薩「自得無所著，亦令眾生得無所著，是名第一利益眾生」。以助道法為甘露之性，正與第七段助道不益果之義相接——助道法之為甘露，不在它能增益涅槃，在它能至涅槃。此問是對前答的順勢追究：既判自利為下，經中又說「自無所著，亦教一切眾生令得無所著」，豈非自相違。論主答得極老實：「不得已故！若自無智慧，何能利人？」次出其理：「若是功德可得與他如財物者，諸佛、大菩薩所有功德皆應與他，乃至調達、怨賊皆可與之」，然而「不可我作而他得」。此喻是全論中最能破人僥倖之想的一節——功德之不可授受，正是自修之所以不可免。而論主用「不得已」三字定其分際：先自無所著不是回到自利，是利他的必要條件。其下論主又把此段歸還世諦：「是亦世俗說，非第一義」，因第一義中「無眾生、無一無異等分別諸法相」；並補一句「如先說『不可說相是第一義』，此中可說故是世俗」。
二十九、論主牒經而釋世諦得第一義得之問：二法皆是世諦故有，得第一義者雖分別諸法非是虛妄。 此段非新設之問答，是論主重牒經中須菩提問佛答一段而為之釋。論主先代須菩提出其兩難之意：「若以世諦故得，即是虛妄不實；若以第一義故得，第一義中無得、無得者，不可說、不可受。」次釋佛答：以世俗語言故說佛得菩提，而「是中無得者、無有得法」；其所以然在二法——「是菩薩、是得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提」，能所兩立即是二法，「二法中，無道、無果」。次解一個要緊的疑：既然二法皆是世諦故有，佛法豈不也落虛妄。論主分判：「若有人不得第一義，但以二法分別諸法，是則虛妄；諸佛、大菩薩得第一義故，為度眾生令得第一義，雖分別諸法，非是虛妄。」同樣是分別，虛妄與否繫於分別者是否已得第一義——此一判與第十六段佛之「大恩力」正相發明。
三十、問⑤答⑤：餘處說二法是凡夫法不二法是賢聖法，如何與此中不二亦無道果相會，答以不二入是真實聖法而佛遮二邊說中道。 此問所引為《毘摩羅詰經》不二入法門，是本品中唯一明引他經之處，所問者是經教之間的相違。論主之答分三節。其一先肯定：「不二入是真實聖法」，不因此中之說而廢彼經。其二出所以有毀有讚之故：「或有新發意菩薩未得諸法實相，聞是不二法，取相生著。是故或稱讚不二法，或時毀呰。」讚與毀皆是對治，不是義理之自相違。其三出正義：「佛遮二邊、說中道，所謂非二、非不二」，並說其次第——「二法名各各別相；不二名一空相。以是一空相破各各別異相；破已，事訖，還捨不二相」，然後纔是「即是道、是果」。末補一句所以然：「諸賢聖雖讚歎無二法，為不著故。」讀者於此可得一則通則：凡對治之語，其效在所破未破之時；破已而仍持之，對治即成新病。此番問答之後，論主收回經文之語作結：「用是法得道、得果，用是法無道、無果——即是戲論；無戲論是平等法。」次重牒須菩提「若諸法無所有性，何等是平等」之問與佛答，而把佛答之七事逐一列出：「若離有性、無性，假名為平等」；菩薩不說一切法有——不說其性、其相等顯示；亦不說無法——不說無法性、無法相等顯示；亦不說離二邊更有平等相；「一切處不取平等相」；「亦不言無是平等」；而「不妨行諸善法」。七事之中前六皆遮，末一獨表——不妨行諸善法一句，是全品一路遮撥之末所留的行門，不可略過。其下論主又轉出一句：「復次，諸法平等者，所謂出過一切法」，即是下一番問答之所自起。
三十一、問⑥答⑥：先說平等即是諸法實名異義同，今何以說平等出過一切法，答以法有體與行二種，平等於凡夫邪行中出非於法體中出。 此問是全品最細的一處分際。前文既說平等即諸法實相、名異而義同，又引「色如，非色、非離色」為證，則平等與諸法不相離；今經中卻說「諸法平等者，所謂出過一切法」，出過即是超出，兩說相違。論主答以一切法有二種：「一者、色等諸法體；二者、色等法中行——凡夫邪行，賢聖正行。」平等所出過者是凡夫之邪行，不是色等之法體。一分為二而難自解。讀者當記住這個分法：本論凡言超出、言離、言過者，多半是就行說而不是就體說；不作此分，則處處成相違。
三十二、論主釋平等無能行無能到：自性不能自性中行到，唯應他性中行到，非以佛智慧少故。 此段釋經中最觸目的一句。論主先描須菩提之情狀——「於是須菩提驚問：『佛亦不能行、不能到？』」，並代出其意：「是法雖甚深微妙難行，是事佛應當得！」佛答則「從須陀洹乃至佛皆無能行、無能到」，論主再代佛出意：「三世十方佛不能行、不能到，何況一佛！平等性自爾故。」須菩提復問佛行力自在、無礙智慧無處不到，佛答之要在一句假設：「若佛與平等異，應有是難」。其下論主出正理：「是凡夫乃至佛，自性不能自性中行、不能自性中到；自性應他性中行。」行與到之成立必待能所有異，佛即是平等，故無異可行。末句是全段的保險栓：「但佛即是平等故，不行、不到，非以智慧少故。」讀者切勿把此段讀成佛有所不能——經論兩處都已把這條退路堵死。
三十三、論主釋平等中無差別而世諦故有差別，三寶大現世間即是平等法之分別施設。 須菩提由前義生第二疑：若凡夫乃至佛不可得異，則「今凡夫、聖人不應有差別」。佛認可其問而作分判：「平等中無差別，世諦故凡夫法中有差別。」須菩提再以三寶為難，佛答「平等即是法寶，法寶即是佛寶、僧寶」，並出其所以然：「未得法時，不名為佛；得平等法故名為佛；得是平等法故，分別有須陀洹等差別。」此一節極要緊：三寶之差別不在平等之外，正由得平等法而立。須菩提隨即受教而自述：「是法皆無合、無散，無色、無形、無對，一相，所謂無相。唯佛有是力，於空、無相中，分別是凡夫、是聖人。」難者再一次自解其難。
三十四、問⑦答⑦：諸佛如日出但照明萬物，何須佛說方知，答以知有凡夫虛妄知與如實知二種。 此問設得極漂亮：諸佛如日出，「不能令高者下、下者高，但能照明萬物，令有眼者別識」；諸佛「亦不轉諸法相，但以一切智照，為人演說令知」。既然如此，畜生等現前目所能見，人皆識知，何須佛說。論主之答只立一個分別：「知有二種：一者、凡夫虛妄知，二者、如實知。」凡夫所知畜生等相是虛妄知，佛所知者是實相，故經文所謂「佛不分別諸法，云何知有地獄等」，所爭的是如實知而非世俗之識別。讀論遇此等以日喻佛之設問，當看論主是否承認其喻——此處論主並不否定日喻，只在「知」字上分層，難便自消。
三十五、論主釋諸佛法寂滅無戲論而能分別諸法，出牛法之喻，並錄有人言之異說而駁之。 此段先出一個更深的難處：「諸佛法寂滅相、無戲論；此中若分別有地獄等相，不名為『寂滅』、『不二』、『無戲論法』。」論主之答是本品的正面判語：「佛雖知寂滅、不二相，亦能於寂滅相中分別諸法，而不墮戲論。」其下出牛法之喻以明如實知之難：離諸法實相者雖眼見畜生亦不能如實知其相；「如牛，角、足、尾等諸分邊和合，更有牛法生，是為一。諸分多、牛法一，一不作多、多不作一。」此處論主錄入一則異說——「有人言：此說非也！除此諸分，應更有牛法力用可見。」論主隨即駁之：「牛法眾分和合生，而牛法不異眾分」，其證在「見此眾分合故名為見牛，更不見餘物為牛」。次以四句破盡：「異者破一，一者破異，不一不異破一異；若無一異，云何有不一不異？」末歸：「若入是諸法平等中，爾時，始如實得牛相。」讀者於此可見本論錄異說之體例——並錄而後駁，不掩其說；而所駁者正是『離眾分別有一物可見』的那個實體之見。
三十六、論主釋於平等不動而分別諸法不著一異相，並重牒經中色等相空一段而解其難。 論主承牛法之喻而歸結：「若佛不分別諸法相、不說二諦，云何善說畜生等？所謂於平等不動而分別諸法。」並釋不動二字：「分別諸法時，不著一異相。」其下重牒經中須菩提之長難與佛之反問——推尋色等相為是空不，答實空；空中有異相法不，答不。論主於此代須菩提補出理由：「是畢竟空，以無相智慧可解，是中云何有異相？」次代佛出責問之意：「若空中無異相，空便是實，是故汝云何於空中分別諸法作是難？」並推一層：「畢竟空中，空亦不可得，各各相亦不可得，汝云何以空、各各相為難？」——連空也不可得，則以空為難者自無立足之地。末乃結出經義：平等中「無分別故無凡夫人；但凡夫人，非實相、不離實相，凡夫實相即是聖人相」，故言「不但凡夫、不離凡夫，乃至佛亦如是」。凡夫之實相即是聖人之相一句，是本品對修行者最直接的一句安慰，也是最嚴的一句要求。
三十七、論主釋平等非有為非無為：有為皆虛誑作法，無為無生住滅故無法，因有為故有無為，如離長無短是相待義。 論主先交代須菩提發此問之心：「以平等相大利益，欲知平等定相」——問的是平等有沒有一個可定之相。佛答「非有為、非無為」，論主為之出兩邊之過：若是有為，「皆是虛誑作法」；若是無為，「無為法無生住滅故無法，無法故不得名無為」。其下出正理：「因有為故有無為」，並引經為證——「如經中說：『離有為，無為不可得。』」末出喻與判：「如離長無短，是相待義。」相待二字是本段的關鑰：有為無為不是兩個各自獨立的法，是相待而立的兩名，故平等不可繫於其中任何一邊。
三十八、問⑧答⑧：有為無常無為常，云何言離有為無為不可得；答以無為無分別故無相，破有為即是無為，結以觀平等而於第一義中不動利益眾生。 末一番問答所據是最通行的教說——有為無常、無為常——若無為是常，則自有其體，何須待有為。論主之答先破常相之說：「無為法無分別故無相；若說常相，不得言無相。」次正立：「破有為法故名無為，更無異法。」次出全論中最顯豁的一喻：「如人閉在牢獄，穿牆得出；破壁是空，更無異空，空亦不從因緣生。」牆破處即是空，不是牆外另有一空——無為之於有為亦然。次應用：「有為法中先有無為性，破有為即是無為」，故「離有為，無為不可得」。次收：「是有為、無為性皆不合不散，一相，所謂『無相』。」次仍把佛語歸還世諦：「佛以世諦故說是事，非第一義」，並引佛自說之因緣——「第一義中無身、口、意行；有為、無為法平等，即是第一義。」末句是全品之結：「觀是有為、無為法平等，亦不著一相。菩薩於第一義中不動而利益眾生；方便力故，種種因緣為眾生說法也。」自品首之垢淨不立起，至此歸於不動而利益眾生——所立之平等自始不曾離開行門一步。
不要讀錯
不要把「平等」讀成一切都一樣。經中所立之平等，其定義是「無戲論相」，不是把凡夫與佛拉成同一個東西。故佛纔要說「於諸法等中不動，而分別諸法」，並稱此為大恩力；論主也說「平等中無差別，世諦故凡夫法中有差別」。若平等即是抹平，則三寶不能現於世間，須陀洹乃至佛之名俱成虛設，而經文偏偏在同一段裡把這些名目一一列出。平等所除的是戲論，不是差別的施設。
不要把「不能行、不能到」讀成佛有所不能。經文自己已經把這條退路堵死兩次：一次在佛答「若諸法平等與佛有異，應當如是問」，一次在論主釋「非以智慧少故」。不能行到的理由是能所之間無異可行——佛即是平等，故無一個在外的平等待佛去到。若讀成佛的智慧尚有不及，則後文「佛有大恩力，於諸法等中不動，而分別諸法」無處安放。
不要把「世諦故說」讀成所說作廢。本品之中佛幾乎每答必帶這條尾巴，若每帶一次便廢一次，則全品無一句可存。論主以金貿草之喻解之：旁人譏其以貴易賤，答曰「我事須用故」——世諦之說是為成辦事而設，非實而有用。與此相對的是指月之喻，所戒者是取指為月。兩喻須合看：一戒執言，一戒廢言。
不要把「一切法能助道法，不能益其果」讀成修行無用。此語所遮的是以有為之行增益無為之果的那個想法，其理由經文自出——「所謂是諸法無生、無出、無相」，論主更以「如時雨能益草木，不益虛空」明之。而同一段經文裡，佛說若不具足檀波羅蜜乃至一切種智，「不能得成就眾生、淨佛國土、得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提」。助道與益果是兩件事，經文並列而不相礙。
不要把『但為眾生故，不為己身』讀成不必自修。論主已就此設了專問，答曰「不得已故！若自無智慧，何能利人？」並以功德不可如財物與人為證。故先自無所著不是回頭自利，是利他的條件。反過來也不可讀成自修既不可免，則自利仍是正途——論主判「若自利益，又為眾生，是為雜行」，判得很明白。
不要把「破有為即是無為」讀成斷滅。論主的喻是牢獄穿牆——破壁處即是空，不是滅去了牆而別得一物。若讀作破盡有為之後一無所有，則「有為法中先有無為性」一句無所依；若讀作破有為之外別有一無為可得，則「更無異法」一句無所依。兩邊皆有經文擋著。
修行作用
第一件受用，是把「無戲論相，是諸法平等」當作一把日用的尺。凡心中起『用此法可得、用此法不可得』的計較，即是經中所指的戲論。此尺極簡便：不必判所計之內容對錯，只看有無能得所得的對立在其中；有則知此時不在平等，隨即放下計較而仍舊行事。
第二件受用，是以「知一切法是不可取相已，發心求阿耨多羅三藐三菩提」的次第自檢發心。經文把知放在發心之前，其用意在使所發之心不成有所得之心。日用中可如此操持：每起一願，先問此願之成立是否需要一個可得之物作抵押；若是，則此願尚在取相中。而經文同時給出了發心不落空的憑據——「但以眾生不知不見如是諸法相」故求菩提，發心之根繫於他人之不知，故不隨自己之得失而動搖。
第三件受用，是三品入道人之判可作一年一度的自照。下者但為自度，中者自為亦為他，上者但為他人。論主又給了一句極平實的驗法：「若但為眾生故行善法，眾生未成就，自利則為具足。」故不必擔心但為他人會失自利。自照時不看行了多少善法，只看發心所繫在哪一邊。
第四件受用，是指月之喻可用在聽法與讀經上。聽一段法而心中生『這個說法真好』之念時，即已在觀指；此時當回頭問所說者是什麼。論主特別指出連平等二字也能成為所著之物——愈是究竟之語，愈容易被取相。故凡遇自己特別受用的一句法語，當格外留心是否已把它當作一物收藏起來。
第五件受用，是「於平等不動而分別諸法」可作處事之則。不動者，論主自釋為「分別諸法時，不著一異相」。日用中分別善惡、揀擇取捨，事事須分別；而分別之時能不把所分別者看作各自獨立之實體，即是不動。此則之可貴在於它不要求人停止分別——停止分別既不可能，也非佛之所行。
第六件受用，是牢獄穿牆之喻可去人對「無為」的幻想。修行人常把涅槃想成別有一處清淨之地，故一面修行一面向外張望。此喻直截：破壁處即是空，更無異空。故所當用功者只在破有為之執，不在別覓一無為。同理，「凡夫實相即是聖人相」一句亦當時時提起——所求者不在別處。
承衍
本品的骨幹，是一段經文與一段論釋。經①自須菩提以垢淨設問起——見實者不垢不淨、見不實者亦不垢不淨、一切法性無所有故、無所有中所有中皆無垢無淨；佛答諸法平等相即是淨，以如、不異、不誑、法相、法性、法住、法位、實際、有佛無佛法性常住指實之，而以世諦故說非最第一義自限；次由須菩提以如夢如嚮如焰如影如幻如化設難發願具足諸度，佛以反問坐實其前提，答以不實虛妄法不能得菩提、一切法皆是憶想思惟作法、一切法能助道法而不能益其果、菩薩知諸法如夢而仍以所作善業成就眾生淨佛國土、不取般若故得一切種智、知一切法不可取相已方發心、但為眾生不為己身、行般若時見眾生無眾生而令離顛倒置甘露性中、自無所著亦教眾生無所著而歸之世諦；次由須菩提問佛得菩提為世諦得為第一義得，佛答世諦故說佛得是法而第一義中無有法可得、用二法無道無果、行不二法亦無道無果、若無二法無不二法即是道即是果、無戲論相是諸法平等；次問何等是平等，佛答除平等更無餘法離一切法平等相、平等者凡夫聖人皆不能行不能到，乃至四果辟支佛菩薩諸佛皆爾、凡夫乃至佛是一平等無二而於平等中皆不可得；次以三寶現世間為難，佛以反問令須菩提自答三寶與諸法等無異、三寶即是平等、無合無散無色無形無對一相無相、而佛有是力能分別無相諸法處所；次佛以反問令須菩提自承不知，乃出佛有大恩力於諸法等中不動而分別諸法之判；次由須菩提以諸法各各相異設長難，列色受想行識乃至有為無為法性之異，而以不作分別則不能行般若入菩薩位淨佛國土為結，佛牒其問而以色相空乃至諸佛相空之反問答之，須菩提自答實空、空中各各相法不可得，佛乃結以諸法平等中非凡夫人亦不離凡夫人乃至非佛亦不離佛；末問平等為有為為無為，佛答非有為非無為、離有為無為不可得、離無為有為不可得、二法不合不散一相無相、佛亦以世諦故說非以第一義、第一義中無身口意行亦不離身口意行得第一義、有為無為平等相即是第一義，而以菩薩行般若時第一義中不動而行菩薩事饒益眾生收之。論①先還原須菩提之問意為斷常二見之雙難，釋佛答以平等故名淨而分別垢淨則不然，出指月之喻與金貿草之喻以明世諦非實而有用，釋平等義不可說而覺觀散心中有語言故有所說，敘須菩提為新發意菩薩故問與佛之反問、聽者生懈怠而佛說一切法皆是助道因緣、助道與益果之分際而以時雨益草木不益虛空為喻；其下八番問答：一問知實相何用行布施而答以成就眾生，二問何以但說利他而答以入道人三品、上者但為他人，三問但利他何以言上而答以自供養不得福、捨己樂者是上人、自利益又為眾生是為雜行，四問何以又說自得無所著而答以不得已故、功德不可如財物與人；中間重牒經中世諦第一義之問答而判得第一義者雖分別諸法非是虛妄，五問《毘摩羅詰經》不二法門與此中不二亦無道果之異而答以不二入是真實聖法、佛遮二邊說中道、破已還捨不二相，六問平等出過一切法與平等即諸法實相之異而答以法有體行二種、出於凡夫邪行非出於法體，七問諸佛如日出何須佛說而答以凡夫虛妄知與如實知二種，八問有為無常無為常云何言離有為無為不可得而答以無為無分別故無相、破有為即是無為、如穿牆得出破壁是空；其間又釋自性不能自性中行到而非以智慧少故、平等即是法寶而法寶即是佛寶僧寶、諸佛法寂滅無戲論而能於寂滅中分別諸法、牛法眾分不一不異而錄有人言之異說並駁之、於平等不動而分別諸法不著一異相、畢竟空中空亦不可得而各各相亦不可得、凡夫實相即是聖人相；末以觀有為無為平等亦不著一相、菩薩於第一義中不動而利益眾生、方便力故種種因緣為眾生說法收束全品。
本品與前後諸品的義脈，可見者有三線。其一、承前：前品〈七喻品第八十五〉以夢、鏡中像、嚮、焰、揵闥婆城、幻、化七事為喻，明諸法性無所有而業果修證不廢；本品即就其所喻之法性追到底——七喻之所以能立而不成斷滅，正因諸法平等而佛能於等中不動而分別；故本品非於七喻之外別立一義，是為七喻之所示立其法性之根。其二、品內自成一轉：前半自垢淨之問轉入夢化之難，所辨在「說」與「行」之能否成立；後半自平等不能行到之語轉入三寶、各各相異兩難，所辨在「分別」之能否成立；兩半以「於諸法等中不動，而分別諸法」一句為樞——不動而分別，正是前半『助道而不益果』之理在分別門上的再說一遍。其三、垂後：本品結於有為無為平等即是第一義、菩薩於第一義中不動而利益眾生；次品〈涅槃如化品第八十七〉開卷即承此語而問「若諸法平等、無所為作，云何菩薩摩訶薩行般若波羅蜜，於平等中不動而行菩薩事，以布施、愛語、利益、同事？」，其下更推至「云何言涅槃一法非如化？」，由平等之法性推到涅槃一法亦不留，兩品相次而讀，可見法性之義推到極處而猶不廢菩薩之事。
古德之釋，本品可誌者二家。吉藏科判本品，先定其在全經中的地位云：「此下第二明諸法畢竟平等不二。」其分品為七段云：「品開七段：第一因須菩提問略說平等體，第二益平等之行，第三明平等果，四釋平等義，第五明故有一切教門，第六明一切法平等，第七出平等相。」——以平等之體、行、果、義、教門、法、相為序，與本論經段之次第大體相應，可並觀。其科品首之問為三云：「問中為三：第一領悟無垢淨，二重難無垢淨，三漸遣垢淨兩人。」而釋重難一節，正與論主所出之斷常雙難同揆：「無所有斷見，此中何有垢淨？有所有中是常見，亦無垢淨。」其科佛答云：「佛答中為二：初、正答；二、破著。」——以「破著」判世諦故說一節，與論主指月之喻所對治者相同而所取之名不同，並錄不判。其釋三品入道人云：「論云有三種人：下品人自利，中品人自利利他，上品但為利他也。」是直引本論而稍易其文，可見其所據。至釋平等非有為非無為一節，吉藏云：「有為無為因緣義，因有為故無為則非無為，由為故有為則非有為，是平等也。」又云：「今此中明平等非有為無為，非真非俗也。」以非真非俗判之，與本論以相待義釋之者，所取之路不同而所指之分際相近，並錄不判。又此疏於本品之末一大段，續藏本排版有誤而置於〈如化品〉，CBETA 依真福寺寫本改置回本品，其事屬版本，誌錄不判。均正之書為依主題橫說之玄義體裁，不隨品次而釋，其論二諦一節引及本品云：「故大品經？平等品云：諸法平等相，一切聖人皆不能行、不能到。」所引與本經作「是諸法平等，一切聖人皆不能行、不能到」者字句小異，是古德轉引之隱括，誌錄不判；文中之符號照錄底本，不改。慧影之疏現存文本不及本品所在之卷，本品闕釋，如實誌錄，非謂其無說。本品之異名、諸本品次之出入與校勘諸條，詳考據層。
Equality: Why the Question of Stain and Purity Must Start from the Nature of All Dharmas Being without Anything Existent; Why the Buddha Does Not Answer Stain and Purity but Answers with the Single Character ‘Purity’; Why, the Mark of the Equality of Dharmas Being Named Purity, It Is Further Said to Be Worldly Truth; Why Dharmas like a Dream and like a Conjuration Can Still Vow to Make the Perfections Complete; Why the Dharmas That Aid the Path Can Aid the Path but Cannot Add to Its Fruit; Why Being Only for the Sake of Beings and Not for Oneself Is the Practising Mark of Prajñā; Why, Two Dharmas Having No Path and No Fruit, the Dharma of Non-duality Too Has No Path and No Fruit; Why of Equality Ordinary People, Sages, and So On up to the Buddhas All Cannot Practise It and Cannot Reach It; Why One Equality without Duality Does Not Destroy the Appearing of the Three Jewels in the World; Why the Buddha's Not Moving within the Equality of Dharmas and yet Distinguishing Dharmas Is Called the Great Power of Kindness; Why the Objection That Dharmas Each Differ in Mark Is Resolved at Once by the One Sentence on the Mark of Form Being Empty; Why Equality Is Neither Conditioned nor Unconditioned; Why the Treatise-Author's Simile of Pointing at the Moon with a Finger and Simile of Trading Gold for Grass Are Brought Out Together; Why Merit Cannot Be Given to Others like Wealth and Goods; Why Equality's Passing Beyond All Dharmas Passes Beyond Only the Practice of Ordinary People and Not the Substance of Dharmas; Why Self-nature's Not Being Able to Practise and Reach within Self-nature Is Not Because the Buddha's Wisdom Is Small; Why the Ox-dharma and Its Parts Being Neither One nor Different Is the Gate to Obtaining the Mark of the Ox as It Truly Is; and Why to Break the Conditioned Is Precisely the Unconditioned Does Not Amount to Annihilation
What Is Being Asked
What this chapter asks is a question that is very easily spoken of as abstruse talk but is in fact very close to one's own person: if all dharmas are originally equal, do the various discriminations set up by practice still count?
What Subhūti asks at the outset is stain and purity. Above it has already been said that the person who sees as it truly is and the person who does not see as it truly is are alike neither stained nor pure, and he pushes this sentence to the end: since the nature of all dharmas is without anything existent, and within what is without anything existent stain and purity cannot be spoken of, and within what has something existent stain and purity cannot be spoken of either, then where is the distinction between 「如實語者」 tr. "the one who speaks as it truly is" and 「不實語者」 tr. "the one who does not speak truly" to be placed? On the surface this question asks about two kinds of people; in its bones it asks—does discrimination still have any footing?
The Buddha's answer does not follow along the two Chinese characters stain and purity, but changes to another word: 「是諸法平等相，我說是淨。」 tr. "This mark of the equality of dharmas—I say this is purity." Here two layers should be noted. First, the Buddha is not choosing purity between stain and purity; he newly defines purity upon the mark of equality, and at once makes it concrete with a string—suchness, not-different, not-deceiving, the mark of dharmas, the nature of dharmas, the abiding of dharmas, the position of dharmas, the limit of reality, and whether there is a Buddha or no Buddha the nature of dharmas abides constantly. Second, having said this, the Buddha at once limits it himself: 「世諦故說，非最第一義」 tr. "said because of worldly truth, not the very highest meaning". No sooner is the answer set up than the place where it stands is emptied—this one gathering-in and one letting-go is the syntax of the whole chapter, and later, whenever the Buddha says something, it almost always carries this tail of worldly truth.
Below this the sūtra text turns from stain and purity into a harder difficulty: since dharmas are like a dream, like an echo, like a mirage, like a shadow, like an illusion, like a conjuration, how can the bodhisattva vow to make complete the six perfections and so on up to the eighteen unshared dharmas? The Buddha first asks in return to confirm, and then answers that unreal, false dharmas truly cannot obtain awakening, yet he does not on that account deny the wholesome deeds that have been done—the sentence 「是一切法能助道法，不能益其果」 tr. "all these dharmas can aid the dharmas of the path; they cannot add to its fruit" is one of the pivots of the whole chapter. Next it turns again into the discernment of worldly truth and the highest meaning: the Buddha's obtaining of awakening is obtained because of worldly truth; with two dharmas there is no path and no fruit, and with the dharma of non-duality too there is no path and no fruit; 「無戲論相，是諸法平等」 tr. "the mark of being without idle discourse—this is the equality of dharmas". Since equality has been spoken of, Subhūti then presses on to ask what equality is, and so comes the most striking sentence of this chapter: as for equality, ordinary people and sages all cannot practise it, cannot reach it, and so on up to the buddhas likewise. Once this is said, what follows is a threefold objection—since the Buddha cannot practise and reach it, why is he called sovereign; since ordinary people and the Buddha are of one equality, why do the Three Jewels appear in the world; since dharmas each differ in mark, how can the bodhisattva practise prajñā without making distinctions? The Buddha answers these three objections, one with 「一平等無二」 tr. "one equality without duality", one with 「於諸法等中不動，而分別諸法」 tr. "within the equality of dharmas he does not move, and yet he distinguishes dharmas", one with the counter-question 「是色相空不」 tr. "is this mark of form empty?" At the end it gathers in with equality being neither conditioned nor unconditioned, and the two dharmas being neither joined nor dispersed, of one mark, the signless, and comes back to the bodhisattva's not moving within the highest meaning and yet enriching beings.
The treatise-author's explanation is longer than the sūtra text, and its effort lies in two matters. One is restoring for the reader the intent of Subhūti's questions: why he asks about stain and purity—because neither end, the view of annihilation nor the view of permanence, allows stain and purity; why he asks about vowing—it is that 「為諸新發意菩薩故問」 tr. "he asks for the sake of all the bodhisattvas who have newly aroused the mind". The other is speaking out plainly the syntax of gathering-in and letting-go in the sūtra, bringing out two famous similes—as a person points at the moon with a finger and one looks at the finger and does not look at the moon, and trading gold for grass, which one who does not understand takes for trading the precious for the cheap. The eight rounds of question and answer below take apart one by one the use of practising giving, why being only for beings is the highest, that merit cannot be given to others, the reconciliation with the Dharma gate of non-duality, the boundary of equality's passing beyond all dharmas, self-nature's not practising and reaching within self-nature, the difference between the two kinds of knowing, and the meaning of standing over against each other in breaking the conditioned being precisely the unconditioned; in between it also brings out a simile of the ox-dharma, and records the divergent opinion of 「有人言」 tr. "someone says" and corrects it by refutation. The last sentence of the whole text still lands on 「菩薩於第一義中不動而利益眾生」 tr. "the bodhisattva does not move within the highest meaning and yet benefits beings"—the same sentence as the place where the end of the sūtra section gathers in, from which one can see that the sūtra and treatise sections walk one and the same road.
Passage by Passage
1. Subhūti asks: the one who sees the real is neither stained nor pure, and the one who does not see the real is also neither stained nor pure, because the nature of all dharmas is without anything existent. The question at the head of the chapter must first be seen clearly in its layers. Subhūti first sets up a pair of persons—the one who sees the real and the one who does not see the real—and says the two are alike neither stained nor pure; next he gives the reason, 「一切法性無所有故」 tr. "because the nature of all dharmas is without anything existent"; next he exhausts the two sides of without anything existent and existent: within what is without anything existent it is without stain and without purity, within what is existent it is also without stain and without purity, and within what is without anything existent and within what is existent it is likewise without stain and without purity; finally he turns back and raises the objection: since it is so, 「云何如實語者不垢不淨，不實語者亦不垢不淨」 tr. "how is it that the one who speaks as it truly is is neither stained nor pure, and the one who does not speak truly is also neither stained nor pure?" In reading this passage, do not read it as a simple question of doubt; it is a pressing question: if stain and purity are in no case set up, then the distinction between as it truly is and not as it truly is should also in no case be set up; yet everywhere in the sūtras as it truly is and not as it truly is are distinguished, and the two cannot stand together. Whenever, in reading a sūtra, one meets several questions set up in a row with the last sentence returning to the starting place, first see which sides it has exhausted; only then does one know from which side the answer must break it.
2. The Buddha answers: this mark of the equality of dharmas—I say this is purity, namely suchness, not-different, not-deceiving, the mark of dharmas, the nature of dharmas, the abiding of dharmas, the position of dharmas, the limit of reality, and whether there is a Buddha or no Buddha the nature of dharmas abides constantly; it is said because of worldly truth, not the very highest meaning. The Buddha's answer does not make a division upon the two Chinese characters stain and purity, but newly sets the one Chinese character 「淨」 tr. "purity" upon the mark of equality. This step is extremely crucial: purity is no longer the opposite of stain but the name of the original mark of dharmas. The Buddha himself sets the question and himself answers—「何等是淨是諸法平等」 tr. "what is purity, what is this equality of dharmas"—and at once brings out a string of names: suchness, not-different, not-deceiving; the mark of dharmas, the nature of dharmas, the abiding of dharmas, the position of dharmas, the limit of reality; whether there is a Buddha or no Buddha the nature of dharmas abides constantly. What the eight or nine names point to is one matter; they are listed and not ranked, which is a form common in this treatise: surrounding one reality with many names, so that the reader cannot cling to any one name. The last sentence, 「世諦故說，非最第一義」 tr. "said because of worldly truth, not the very highest meaning", is the answer's self-limitation; the highest meaning 「過一切語言論議音聲」 tr. "passes beyond all words, discussion, and sound", therefore whatever can be said belongs to worldly truth. Here the reader should establish a constant rule for reading the sūtras: when the Buddha says that a certain dharma is such-and-such, he does not necessarily grant this saying as ultimate; one must see whether he follows it with words of limitation of this kind.
3. Subhūti raises an objection: all dharmas are empty and unspeakable, like a dream, like an echo, like a mirage, like a shadow, like an illusion, like a conjuration; how can one arouse the mind of awakening and vow to make complete the perfections and so on up to the eighteen unshared dharmas? This objection is pressed out by the 「非最第一義」 tr. "not the very highest meaning" of the preceding passage. Since all that is said belongs to worldly truth, is not all that is cultivated and realised entirely within a dream? Subhūti spreads out the bodhisattva's vowing mind item by item—dānapāramitā and so on up to prajñā, the supernormal powers and knowledge, the four dhyānas, the four immeasurable minds, the four formless absorptions, the four foundations of mindfulness, and so on up to the eightfold noble path, the three gates of liberation, the eight liberations, the nine successive absorptions, the ten powers of the Buddha and so on up to the eighteen unshared dharmas, the thirty-two marks and the eighty minor marks, the dhāraṇī gates and the samādhi gates, and so on up to emitting light to shine throughout the ten directions, knowing the minds of beings, and teaching the Dharma according to what suits them. The more completely it is spread out, the heavier the difficulty: how can such a whole set of vows be placed upon 「無有根本定實」 tr. "having no root and nothing fixed and real"? In reading this passage one should note that Subhūti is not doubting the value of the six perfections; he is asking how a rootless thing can bear such a weight.
4. The Buddha asks in return: the dharmas you have spoken of as like a dream, like an echo, like a mirage, like a shadow, like an illusion, like a conjuration—are they so or not? The Buddha does not answer head-on; first he asks one question in return, handing back the premise Subhūti set up for him to confirm himself. The method of asking in return is used four times in this chapter, and this is the first. Its force lies in this: if the answer is spoken by the questioner himself, the reasoning that follows has no further road of retreat. Here the reader of the treatise can note a form—the Buddha's counter-questions are mostly not a questioning of the other party, but a making firm of the premise the other party has set up, and then teaching the Dharma upon that premise.
5. Subhūti assents, yet still doubts how unreal, false dharmas can make complete dānapāramitā and so on up to the eighteen unshared dharmas. Subhūti answers 「爾」 tr. "They are", making the premise firm, yet he does not stop asking there; instead he states the difficulty more directly: 「是夢乃至如化，虛妄不實」 tr. "this dream and so on up to like a conjuration is false and unreal", 「不應用不實虛妄法能具足檀波羅蜜乃至十八不共法」 tr. "one should not be able, by means of unreal, false dharmas, to make complete dānapāramitā and so on up to the eighteen unshared dharmas". This question is tighter than the previous one: the previous question asked about the possibility of vowing; this question asks about the efficacy of practice. The sūtra text tightens step by step like this in order to press out the answer below, which looks like a concession but is in fact the key.
6. The Buddha answers: unreal, false dharmas cannot obtain awakening; all dharmas are dharmas made by recollection and reflection, and cannot obtain the omniscience of all kinds. The Buddha's first sentence is a complete assent—「如是！如是！」 tr. "Just so! Just so!" Unreal, false dharmas truly cannot make the six perfections complete, and practising unreal, false dharmas one truly cannot obtain awakening. If the reader reads only up to here, he will think that the Buddha has denied the bodhisattva's practice. What is crucial is that the Buddha then widens the scope: 「是一切法皆是憶想思惟作法，用是思惟憶想作法，不能得一切種智。」 tr. "All these dharmas are dharmas made by recollection and reflection; by means of these dharmas made by reflection and recollection one cannot obtain the omniscience of all kinds." What is denied is not such matters as giving and keeping morality, but the idea that takes dharmas made by recollection and reflection as the cause able to obtain it. Whenever in reading the sūtras one sees the Buddha assenting to the objector's words, first see which sentence exactly he assents to; often the very place of assent is where the turning word comes from.
7. The Buddha brings out the pivotal sentence: all these dharmas can aid the dharmas of the path and cannot add to its fruit; the bodhisattva knows dharmas to be like a dream and still, by the wholesome deeds he has done, brings beings to accomplishment and purifies buddha-lands. This passage is the first pivot of the whole chapter. The Buddha says these dharmas 「能助道法，不能益其果」 tr. "can aid the dharmas of the path; cannot add to its fruit", and at once gives the reason: 「所謂是諸法無生、無出、無相」 tr. "namely, these dharmas are non-arising, non-emerging, and signless"—since the fruit is non-arising, non-emerging, and signless, it is not a thing that can be added to. Yet the Buddha does not on that account abandon practice: the wholesome deeds the bodhisattva has done since his first arousing of intent, dānapāramitā and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds, if they are not made complete, then 「不能得成就眾生、淨佛國土、得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提」 tr. "he cannot bring beings to accomplishment, purify buddha-lands, or obtain anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi". On one side it says it cannot add to the fruit, on the other that without completeness one cannot accomplish—the two sentences stand side by side without hindering each other, and the key lies in the different things pointed to by the two Chinese characters 「助」 tr. "aid" and 「益」 tr. "add to": to aid is to aid its practice; to add to is to increase its fruit. Below this it further says that the bodhisattva knows the wholesome deeds he does to be like a dream, like a conjuration, and also knows that all beings practise as within a dream; because 「不取般若波羅蜜是有法」 tr. "he does not grasp prajñāpāramitā as an existent dharma", 「用是不取故，得一切種智」 tr. "because of this not grasping he obtains the omniscience of all kinds". Obtaining by not grasping—this is one and the same line of reasoning of this chapter from beginning to end, and here it is said plainly for the first time.
8. The Buddha says that only after knowing all dharmas to be of the mark of being ungraspable does one arouse the mind; by means of dharmas of the mark of being ungraspable one cannot obtain a dharma of the mark of being ungraspable; one seeks awakening only for the sake of beings, not for oneself. The sequence of this passage deserves to be looked at word by word. The sūtra text says 「知一切法是不可取相已，發心求阿耨多羅三藐三菩提」 tr. "having known that all dharmas are of the mark of being ungraspable, he arouses the mind and seeks anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi"—knowing comes first, arousing the mind after. Why is it not first arousing the mind and then knowing? Because if one does not first know the mark of being ungraspable, the mind that is aroused is a mind with something to be attained. Below this it adds the sentence 「用不可取相法不能得不可取相法」 tr. "by means of dharmas of the mark of being ungraspable one cannot obtain a dharma of the mark of being ungraspable", removing entirely both what obtains and what is obtained; since it is so, for what is the mind aroused? The sūtra text answers itself: it is because 「但以眾生不知不見如是諸法相」 tr. "only because beings do not know and do not see such marks of dharmas". Thus the reason the bodhisattva arouses the mind is not tied to his own having something to be attained, but to beings' not knowing. Finally it extends this to all the gates of practice: 「從初發意已來所有布施，為一切眾生故；乃至有所修智慧，皆為一切眾生，不為己身。」 tr. "All the giving he has done since his first arousing of intent is for the sake of all beings; and so on up to whatever wisdom he cultivates, that too is all for the sake of all beings, not for his own single self." In reading this passage one should know that the nothing to be attained spoken of in this chapter is not the cancelling of the gates of practice, but the re-attaching of the gates of practice—turning from being tied to one's own self to being tied to beings.
9. The Buddha says that, practising prajñā, one sees beings and yet there are no beings, makes them far from inversion and sets them in the nature of ambrosia; he himself clings to nothing and also teaches beings to cling to nothing; this is because of worldly truth, not the highest meaning. This passage speaks of the actual state when practising prajñā. 「見眾生無眾生，但眾生相中住」 tr. "he sees beings and yet there are no beings, and only abides within the mark of beings"—seeing and abiding are set side by side: it is not not seeing; it is seeing and not grasping its reality. And so on up to 「無知者、無見者，知見相中住」 tr. "there is no knower and no seer, and he abides within the mark of knowing and seeing", the same syntax. Its effect lies in 「令眾生遠離顛倒；遠離已，置甘露性中」 tr. "making beings far from inversion; having made them far from it, he sets them within the nature of ambrosia"; for one who abides within this 「無有妄相」 tr. "there is no false mark". As for the bodhisattva himself, 「動心、念心、戲論心皆捨，常行不動心、不念心、不戲論心」 tr. "the moving mind, the thinking mind, and the mind of idle discourse are all relinquished, and he constantly practises the unmoving mind, the mind of not thinking, and the mind without idle discourse". At the end it still gathers in with 「世諦故，非第一義」 tr. "because of worldly truth, not the highest meaning"—the second appearance of this tail, from which one can see that whenever the Buddha speaks of a stretch of practice, he surely returns at once the words he has spoken to worldly truth. The reader should grow used to this rhythm, and only then will he not, on reading of the highest meaning, think that what was said before is cancelled.
10. Subhūti asks: is the Buddha's obtaining of awakening obtained because of worldly truth, or obtained within the highest meaning? This question of Subhūti's is extremely sharp. What he seizes on is exactly that tail of the preceding passage: since whenever the Buddha speaks he says worldly truth, then to which side does the Buddha's own obtaining of awakening belong? If this question is not resolved, the establishment of the whole Buddha-dharma comes into question. In reading the treatise, when one sees a disciple seize on the tail of the teacher's words and ask in return, one should know this is the most crucial kind of question—what it asks is not a side branch of the meaning but the force of the words spoken.
11. The Buddha answers: it is because of worldly truth that the Buddha is said to obtain this dharma; within the highest meaning there is no dharma to be obtained and no person obtaining a dharma; by means of two dharmas there is no path and no fruit. The Buddha's answer is in three parts. The first takes it up directly: 「以世諦故說佛得是法」 tr. "it is because of worldly truth that the Buddha is said to obtain this dharma". The second breaks: 「是法中無有法可得、是人得是法」 tr. "within this dharma there is no dharma to be obtained, nor this person obtaining this dharma". The third gives the reason: 「是人得是法，是為大有所得；用二法，無道無果。」 tr. "This person obtains this dharma—this would be greatly with something to be attained; by means of two dharmas there is no path and no fruit." What are called two dharmas is the person who obtains the dharma and the dharma that is obtained set against each other into two separate pieces; once one falls into two dharmas, neither path nor fruit can be set up. The reader should note that what is broken here is not obtaining but two—the structure in which what obtains and what is obtained are set against each other.
12. The Buddha answers that with two dharmas and with the dharma of non-duality alike there is no path and no fruit; if there are no two dharmas and also no dharma of non-duality, this is precisely the path, precisely the fruit; the mark of being without idle discourse is the equality of dharmas. Subhūti follows on and sets up a sentence: by practising the dharma of non-duality is there a path and a fruit or not? This is the most natural reaction, and also the most common wrong road—since two dharmas will not do, one clings to non-duality. The Buddha answers decisively: 「行二法無道無果，行不二法亦無道無果」 tr. "by practising two dharmas there is no path and no fruit, and by practising the dharma of non-duality there is also no path and no fruit"; only below this does the right meaning come out: 「若無二法、無不二法，即是道、即是果。」 tr. "If there are no two dharmas and no dharma of non-duality, this is precisely the path, this is precisely the fruit." Its reason lies in the words idle discourse: to say that by means of this dharma one obtains the path and obtains the fruit, and that by means of this dharma one does not obtain the path and does not obtain the fruit—this whole set of calculations is precisely idle discourse; 「諸平等法中，無有戲論；無戲論相，是諸法平等」 tr. "within all equal dharmas there is no idle discourse; the mark of being without idle discourse—this is the equality of dharmas". Only here is the name 「平等」 tr. "equality" formally set up, and its definition is negative—being without idle discourse. Whenever in reading the treatise one meets the right meaning coming out after two rounds of negation, one should know that the first two rounds are not idle words but two forks in the road that must be walked to their end.
13. Subhūti asks what equality is; the Buddha answers that apart from equality there is no other dharma that can be apart from the mark of the equality of all dharmas, and that as for equality, ordinary people and sages all cannot practise it, cannot reach it. Subhūti presses on with 「是中何等是平等」 tr. "within this, what is equality?", and the Buddha's answer is in two parts. The first part: 「若無有法、無有無法，亦不說諸法平等相；除平等，更無餘法離一切法平等相」 tr. "if there is no existent dharma and no non-existent dharma, then one does not speak of the mark of the equality of dharmas either; apart from equality there is no other dharma that can be apart from the mark of the equality of all dharmas"—equality is not a separate dharma outside dharmas, therefore it cannot be sought apart from all dharmas. The second part is the most striking sentence of the whole chapter: 「平等者，若凡夫、若聖人，不能行、不能到。」 tr. "As for equality, whether ordinary people or sages, none can practise it, none can reach it." Practising and reaching are words of cultivation and realisation; this sentence amounts to saying that equality is not within the range that cultivation and realisation can reach. On first reading the reader is sure to have a doubt, and this doubt is exactly what the sūtra text means to draw out; the three rounds of question and answer below all arise from it.
14. The Buddha answers that ordinary people and so on up to the Buddha are all one equality without duality, and that within the equality of all dharmas all are unfindable. Subhūti asks in alarm 「乃至佛亦不能行、亦不能到」 tr. "and so on up to the Buddha—can he too not practise it, too not reach it?", and the Buddha first makes it firm: all the sages—the srota-āpanna, the sakṛdāgāmin, the anāgāmin, the arhats, the pratyekabuddhas, all the bodhisattva-mahāsattvas, and the buddhas—all cannot practise it and cannot reach it. Subhūti asks again: the Buddha is sovereign in the power of practice among all dharmas, so why can he not either? The Buddha's answer is where the meaning of this chapter stands face-on: 「若諸法平等與佛有異，應當如是問。」 tr. "Only if the equality of dharmas were different from the Buddha should one ask thus."—the reason the objection becomes an objection is that the questioner has first regarded the Buddha and equality as two things; if the Buddha is precisely equality, there is no practising or reaching to speak of. Below this it then says that ordinary people are equality, that the four fruits, the pratyekabuddhas, the bodhisattvas, the buddhas, and the holy Dharma are all equality, 「是一平等無二」 tr. "this is one equality and without duality", and 「是凡夫人、是須陀洹乃至佛，是一切法平等中皆不可得」 tr. "this is an ordinary person, this is a srota-āpanna, and so on up to the Buddha—within this equality of all dharmas, all are unfindable". In reading this passage one should pull the phrase 「不能行、不能到」 tr. "cannot practise, cannot reach" out of a disparaging sense—it does not say that the Buddha's ability falls short of something; it says that between the one who acts and what is acted upon there is fundamentally no distance to practise across and no further shore to reach.
15. Subhūti asks whether there is no discrimination of ordinary people and so on up to the Buddha, and the Buddha assents; Subhūti again raises the objection of the Three Jewels appearing in the world; the Buddha asks in return whether the Three Jewels differ from the equality of dharmas; Subhūti himself answers that they do not differ, and declares that the Buddha can distinguish the places of the signless dharmas. This passage is one small complete exchange, and must be read together for its momentum to be clear. Subhūti first asks 「凡夫人、須陀洹乃至佛為無有分別」 tr. "is there no discrimination of ordinary people, the srota-āpanna, and so on up to the Buddha?", and the Buddha assents; Subhūti at once raises an objection: if there is no discrimination, 「云何分別有三寶現於世間」 tr. "why does one distinguish that there are the Three Jewels appearing in the world?" This pushes the foregoing meaning onto the religious fact before us—if the Three Jewels are not established, the whole Buddha-dharma has nothing to rely on. The Buddha does not answer head-on, and uses a counter-question for the second time: 「佛寶、法寶、僧寶與諸法等異不」 tr. "are the Buddha Jewel, the Dharma Jewel, and the Saṅgha Jewel different from the equality of dharmas?" Subhūti then answers himself: according to the meaning he has heard, the Three Jewels are not different from the equality of dharmas; the Three Jewels are precisely equality, 「是法皆不合、不散，無色、無形、無對，一相，所謂無相」 tr. "this dharma is all neither joined nor dispersed, without form, without shape, without resistance, of one mark, namely the signless". And he himself goes on to add the key sentence: 「佛有是力，能分別無相諸法處所」 tr. "the Buddha has this power, that he can distinguish the places of the signless dharmas"—the appearing of the Three Jewels in the world lies not outside equality, but in the Buddha's being able to distinguish within the signless. The objector resolves his own objection, and what is gained is firmer than if the Buddha had answered directly.
16. By a counter-question the Buddha makes Subhūti admit for himself that he would not know, and then brings out the judgement of the great power of kindness: within the equality of dharmas he does not move, and yet he distinguishes dharmas. The Buddha takes up Subhūti's words and asks in return for the third time: if the buddhas, on obtaining awakening, did not distinguish dharmas, 「當知是地獄、是餓鬼、是畜生」 tr. "would they know: this is the hells, this is the hungry ghosts, this is the animals", and so on up to 「是十八不共法不」 tr. "this is the eighteen unshared dharmas—or not?" Subhūti answers 「不知也」 tr. "One would not know", his meaning being: without distinguishing, we would have no way of knowing. The Buddha then ties up the most crucial judgement of this chapter: 「當知佛有大恩力，於諸法等中不動，而分別諸法。」 tr. "You should know that the Buddha has the great power of kindness: within the equality of dharmas he does not move, and yet he distinguishes dharmas." Not moving and distinguishing stand side by side in one sentence, and the three Chinese characters 「大恩力」 tr. "the great power of kindness" attach them both—from which one can see that this distinguishing is not an obstruction of the knowable in the Buddha, but the working of his compassion. Here the reader can resolve the doubt about the earlier 「不能行、不能到」 tr. "cannot practise, cannot reach": not being able to practise and reach is said with respect to equality itself; being able to distinguish is said with respect to the great power of kindness. The two do not hinder each other.
17. Subhūti raises the objection that dharmas each differ in mark: if one does not make distinctions, one cannot practise prajñā, enter the bodhisattva's position, or purify buddha-lands. Subhūti's last objection is the longest, and also the closest to what a practitioner actually feels. He first sets up a symmetry: the Buddha does not move within the equality of dharmas, and ordinary people, the srota-āpanna, and so on up to the pratyekabuddhas likewise do not move within the equality of dharmas—since not moving is shared, what makes the Buddha the Buddha has no way of being spoken of. Next he lists the separate marks of dharmas: form differs in mark from feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness; the six faculties differ in mark; earth, water, fire, wind, space, and consciousness differ in mark; desire, anger, delusion, and wrong views differ in mark; dhyāna differs in mark from the immeasurable minds and the formless absorptions; the four foundations of mindfulness and so on up to the eightfold noble path differ in mark; the six perfections differ in mark; the three gates of liberation and the eighteen emptinesses differ in mark; the ten powers, the four fearlessnesses, the four unobstructed knowledges, and the eighteen unshared dharmas differ in mark; the nature of conditioned dharmas differs from the nature of unconditioned dharmas; the mark of ordinary people and so on up to the mark of the Buddha differ. Finally he brings out a chain: if one does not make distinctions one cannot practise prajñā; if one does not practise prajñā one cannot go from one ground to another ground; if one cannot go from one ground to another ground one cannot enter the bodhisattva's position; if one does not enter the bodhisattva's position one cannot pass beyond the grounds of the two vehicles; if one does not pass beyond the grounds of the two vehicles one cannot make complete the perfection of the supernormal powers; and so on up to being unable to make offerings to the buddhas, bring beings to accomplishment, and purify buddha-lands. This chain is the longest piece of reasoning in this chapter; its strength lies in its not talking of abstruse principles, only joining the actual sequence of practice link by link for people to see.
18. The Buddha first restates the question and then answers with counter-questions: is the mark of form empty, and so on up to is the mark of the buddhas empty; Subhūti answers that it is truly empty; the Buddha asks further whether within emptiness dharmas of separate marks are findable; Subhūti answers that they are unfindable. The Buddha's answer first restates Subhūti's question—the present punctuation marks with inner quotation marks the words restated; restating and then answering lets the questioner know that the answer does not miss. After that the Buddha does not reason, but asks only one sentence: 「是色相空不？乃至諸佛相空不？」 tr. "Is this mark of form empty? And so on up to: is the mark of the buddhas empty?" Subhūti answers 「實空」 tr. "It is truly empty". The Buddha asks again: 「空中各各相法可得不？」 tr. "Within emptiness, are dharmas of separate marks findable?" Subhūti answers 「不可得」 tr. "They are unfindable". Two questions, two answers, and the long objection is at once resolved. The reason this method works is that the difficulty Subhūti set up hangs entirely on the four Chinese characters 「各各相異」 tr. "each differs in mark", and separate marks can be established only on the premise of not being empty; once the premise is loosened, the chain undoes itself. The reader should learn this move: when meeting an intricate objection, there is no need to divide it link by link; one need only test the root on which it is set up.
19. The Buddha concludes: within the equality of dharmas it is not ordinary people and also not apart from ordinary people, and so on up to not the Buddha and also not apart from the Buddha; he answers further that equality is neither conditioned nor unconditioned, that the two dharmas are neither joined nor dispersed, of one mark, the signless, which is precisely the highest meaning, and that the bodhisattva does not move within the highest meaning and yet practises the bodhisattva's business. The Buddha concludes with the sentence pattern ‘not … and also not apart from …’, four characters, twice over, allowing neither sameness nor separation. Below this comes Subhūti's last question, 「是平等，為是有為法？為是無為法」 tr. "this equality—is it a conditioned dharma? or is it an unconditioned dharma?"; the Buddha answers 「非有為法，非無為法」 tr. "it is not a conditioned dharma, nor an unconditioned dharma", and gives the reason: 「離有為法，無為法不可得；離無為法，有為法不可得」 tr. "apart from conditioned dharmas, unconditioned dharmas are unfindable; apart from unconditioned dharmas, conditioned dharmas are unfindable"—the two stand by standing over against each other, so neither can be clung to as the substance of equality. The two dharmas are 「不合、不散，無色、無形、無對，一相，所謂無相」 tr. "neither joined nor dispersed, without form, without shape, without resistance, of one mark, namely the signless". And the Buddha at once adds a further limiting sentence: 「佛亦以世諦故說，非以第一義」 tr. "the Buddha too speaks according to worldly truth, not according to the highest meaning", and says that within the highest meaning there is no bodily, verbal, or mental action, nor is the highest meaning obtained apart from bodily, verbal, and mental action. The last sentence of the sūtra section is 「菩薩摩訶薩行般若波羅蜜時，第一義中不動，而行菩薩事，饒益眾生」 tr. "when the bodhisattva-mahāsattva practises prajñāpāramitā, he does not move within the highest meaning, and yet he practises the bodhisattva's business and enriches beings"—the same syntax as the 「於諸法等中不動，而分別諸法」 tr. "within the equality of dharmas he does not move, and yet he distinguishes dharmas" of passage 16, one belonging to the Buddha, one to the bodhisattva, from which one can see that not moving and yet acting is exactly the gate of practice this chapter sets up.
20. The treatise-author explains the intent of Subhūti's question: because without anything existent is the view of annihilation, there should be no stain or purity; because the existent is the view of permanence, there should also be no stain or purity. At the start of the treatise section, the treatise-author first restores Subhūti's mental process: having heard the Buddha answer that 「實見者、妄見者無異，垢淨見無故」 tr. "the one who sees truly and the one who sees falsely are not different, because there is neither a view of stain nor a view of purity", he reflected and then asked. The content of his reflection the treatise-author speaks out for him: on the side of without anything existent, 「斷滅見故，不應有垢淨」 tr. "because it is the view of annihilation, there should be no stain or purity"; on the side of the existent, 「常見故，不應有垢淨」 tr. "because it is the view of permanence, there should be no stain or purity"; and he fills out the line of reasoning of the view of permanence—「所有若決定是有，則不從因緣生，不從因緣生故常，常故無垢無淨」 tr. "if what is existent were definitely existent, it would not arise from causes and conditions; because it does not arise from causes and conditions it is permanent, and because it is permanent it is without stain and without purity". This is where the treatise-author's explanation most shows its skill: in the sūtra text only a question is seen; the treatise-author points out that behind the question is the double objection of the two views of annihilation and permanence. The reader of the treatise should know that the first thing the treatise-author does in explaining a sūtra is often not to resolve it, but to make clear the questioner's situation.
21. The treatise-author explains the Buddha's answer: although stain and purity have no separate marks that can be spoken of, because all dharmas are equal it is named purity; if one discriminates and speaks of the marks of stain and purity, this matter is not so. The treatise-author presses the Buddha's answer into two sentences: first, stain and purity have no separate marks that can be spoken of; second, because all dharmas are equal it is said to be named purity. The layer in between—why, having no separate marks that can be spoken of, it can still be named purity—the treatise-author concludes with 「一切法平等故，我說名淨」 tr. "because all dharmas are equal, I say it is named purity". One must see clearly that the 「淨」 tr. "purity" here and the stain and purity that ordinary people face are not on the same level: the purity of ordinary people is set up against stain; the purity here is set up against equality—so though the same word is used, they do not collide. Whenever in reading the treatise one meets one word used in two ways, one must first judge what it is set up against. Below this the treatise-author further cites the Buddha's words to make concrete what this purity points to: 「諸法實相，如、法性、法住、法位、實際是平等」 tr. "the real mark of all dharmas, namely suchness, the nature of dharmas, the abiding of dharmas, the position of dharmas, the limit of reality—this is equality", and attaches its practising mark to one sentence—「菩薩入是平等中，心無憎愛」 tr. "when the bodhisattva enters into this equality, there is no hatred and no love in his mind"; next he explains the meaning of abiding constantly: 「作法皆是虛誑」 tr. "dharmas that are made are all false and deceptive", so what abides constantly is 「無作法，有佛、無佛常住」 tr. "the dharma without making, whether there is a Buddha or no Buddha, abides constantly". Explaining entering equality by being without hatred and love brings a sentence about the nature of dharmas down onto the workings of the mind; the reader must not read past it lightly.
22. The treatise-author brings out the simile of pointing at the moon with a finger and the simile of trading gold for grass: the hearer grasps at marks and clings to equality, therefore the Buddha says that the mark of equality too is worldly truth. This passage is the first crucial point of the treatise section. The treatise-author first depicts the common sickness of those who hear the Dharma: 「聽者心即取相，著是諸法平等」 tr. "the hearer's mind at once grasps at marks and clings to this equality of dharmas"—even the two Chinese characters equality can become something clung to. Its simile says 「如人以指指月，不知者但觀其指而不視月」 tr. "as when a person points at the moon with a finger, one who does not understand looks only at his finger and does not look at the moon", which speaks of the mismatch between what points and what is pointed at. Below this, the Buddha's remedy is to take the words back into worldly truth: 「諸法平等相亦如是，皆是世諦；世諦非實，但為成辦事故說。」 tr. "The mark of the equality of dharmas is also like this; it is all worldly truth; worldly truth is not real, and is spoken only for the sake of getting things done." Since it is said to be not real, why still say it? The treatise-author goes on to bring out the second simile: 「譬如以金貿草」 tr. "it is like trading gold for grass"; a bystander mocks him for trading the precious for the cheap, and he answers 「我事須用故」 tr. "because I have a matter for which I need it". The two similes come out together but divide the work differently: the simile of the finger and the moon speaks of the hearer's sickness; the simile of gold for grass speaks of the speaker's expedient. If the reader remembers only the finger and the moon and forgets the gold for grass, he will regard all speech as an encumbrance, and that is exactly the other side this chapter means to guard against.
23. The treatise-author explains that the meaning of equality is unspeakable: all names, words, and sounds are entirely cut off; because within the scattered mind of initial and sustained thought there are words, there is something said. This passage explains the sūtra sentence 「最第一義，過一切語言論議音聲」 tr. "the very highest meaning passes beyond all words, discussion, and sound". The treatise-author's reason is 「諸法平等是無戲論寂滅相」 tr. "the equality of dharmas is the mark of quiescence without idle discourse"; and the reason there is still speech is 「但覺觀散心中有語言故有所說」 tr. "only because within the scattered mind of initial and sustained thought there are words, is there anything said". This sentence speaks of where speech comes from extremely plainly—language is a product of the scattered mind of initial and sustained thought, not a shadow of the real mark. From this the reader can know: being unspeakable does not forbid speech; it points out the origin of speech; knowing its origin, one speaks and does not cling.
24. The treatise-author explains that Subhūti asks for the sake of the bodhisattvas who have newly aroused the mind, and that the Buddha, by a counter-question, makes him awaken for himself that this does not hinder the myriad practices. The treatise-author points out that this question of Subhūti's is not doubt on his own part—he 「從佛聞諸法平等相，解其旨趣」 tr. "has heard from the Buddha the mark of the equality of dharmas and understood its purport", and it is that he 「為諸新發意菩薩故問」 tr. "asks for the sake of all the bodhisattvas who have newly aroused the mind". This attribution is extremely crucial: the identity of the questioner determines the weight of the answer. Below this the treatise-author narrates that the Buddha answered with a counter-question—giving and the rest, and so on up to the dhāraṇī gates, teaching the Dharma, and the rest: 「此諸法非如幻、如夢等耶」 tr. "are these dharmas not like an illusion, like a dream, and so on?"—Subhūti answers 「實爾」 tr. "It is truly so", and adds a sentence: 「是諸法雖有利益，不出於如夢法」 tr. "although these dharmas have benefit, they do not go beyond dharmas that are like a dream". Subhūti asks again: dreams and the like are false; the bodhisattva practises prajñā to seek a real dharma and obtains the Buddha path—how can he practise unreal dharmas? The Buddha then assents: giving and such dharmas 「皆是思惟、憶想分別、作起生法，不得住如是法中成一切種智」 tr. "are all dharmas that arise from reflection, recollection, discrimination, and making; one cannot abide in such dharmas and accomplish the omniscience of all kinds". Here the treatise-author adds a stroke describing the scene: 「即時眾中聽者心生懈怠」 tr. "at that time, among the assembly, the minds of those hearing gave rise to slackness"—the hearers, on hearing it, at once lost heart, and so only then did the Buddha say 「是一切法皆是助道因緣」 tr. "all these dharmas are causes and conditions that aid the path". With this stroke, one knows that the teaching of aiding the path is a word of remedy, not a general discussion. Below this the treatise-author himself explains the boundary between aiding and adding to: practising wrongly and erring is named unreal; practising straight without error is precisely aiding the path; 「是法為助道故，不為果」 tr. "this dharma is for the sake of aiding the path, not for the sake of the fruit"; giving and the rest are conditioned, and the path too is conditioned, 「同相故相益」 tr. "because they are of the same mark they benefit each other"; the fruit of the path is 「諸法實無出生，一相無相，寂滅涅槃」 tr. "that all dharmas really have no coming forth into birth; of one mark, the signless, quiescent extinction, nirvāṇa", therefore 「於涅槃不能有益」 tr. "nothing can be added to nirvāṇa". Finally it brings out a simile: 「如時雨能益草木，不益虛空。」 tr. "As a timely rain can benefit grass and trees, but does not benefit space." The conditioned can benefit the conditioned; the unconditioned is not a thing that can be benefited—only here is the pivotal sentence of passage 7 said all the way through.
25. Question ① and Answer ①: if one knows the real mark of all dharmas, what use is practising giving? The answer: giving and the rest are for bringing beings to accomplishment. The question of the first round is extremely direct, and it is also the sentence the reader most easily asks himself. The treatise-author's answer first cites the Buddha's words as ground—「布施等不具足，不能成就眾生」 tr. "if giving and the rest are not complete, one cannot bring beings to accomplishment"—and next states its use: the bodhisattva adorns his body and his voice and speech, obtains the Buddha's power of the supernormal powers, and by all kinds of power of skilful means leads beings on. Thus the use of giving lies not in obtaining for oneself, but in being the means for accomplishing others. Below this it adds the mind with which one practises: 「亦不取檀波羅蜜若有、若無相，亦不戲論如夢等諸法，直行乃至得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提」 tr. "nor does he grasp the mark of dānapāramitā being existent or being non-existent, nor does he make idle discourse about dharmas like a dream and the rest; he goes straight on, even until he obtains anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi". Having a use and yet not grasping marks—this is signless giving. The reader should note that what the treatise-author gives here is a reason, not a compromise: he does not say that although it is empty one must still cultivate; he says that precisely because what is accomplished is beings, therefore although one knows emptiness one does not give up practice.
26. Question ② and Answer ②: why is only benefiting beings spoken of and not benefiting oneself? The answer: those who enter the path are of three grades, lowest, middle, and highest, and the highest are only for beings. This question asks about the one-sidedness of the sūtra text—the sūtra speaks only of being for beings and does not speak of benefiting oneself. The treatise-author answers with 「菩薩行善道為一切眾生，此是實義」 tr. "that the bodhisattva practises the wholesome path for the sake of all beings—this is the real meaning", while what is said elsewhere, 「自利，亦利益眾生」 tr. "benefiting oneself, and also benefiting beings", is 「為凡夫人作是說，然後能行菩薩道」 tr. "said thus for ordinary people, so that afterwards they can practise the bodhisattva path". One sentence settles the use of the two kinds of saying: one is the real meaning, the other is a skilful leading-on. Below this it sets up three grades: 「下者，但為自度故行善法；中者，自為亦為他；上者，但為他人故行善法。」 tr. "The lowest practise wholesome dharmas only for the sake of delivering themselves; the middle do so for themselves and also for others; the highest practise wholesome dharmas only for the sake of others." This judgement of three grades is the bone of this passage. When in reading the treatise one meets the treatise-author judging high and low, first see on what he relies—what is relied on here is not the amount of merit, but where the arousing of the mind is tied.
27. Question ③ and Answer ③: if one only benefits others and cannot benefit oneself, how can one be called the highest? The answer: such is the way of the world, one who makes offerings to himself obtains no merit; one who can relinquish his own happiness and act only for beings is a superior person. The third round of question and answer is a rebuttal rarely seen in the treatise, and a forceful one: the ordinary sequence should be that benefiting oneself is the lowest and benefiting both oneself and others is the highest—why does the treatise-author turn it around? The treatise-author first takes the ordinary way of the world as proof: 「自供養者不得其福，自害其身而不得罪」 tr. "one who makes offerings to himself obtains no merit from it, and one who harms his own body incurs no sin"—the establishment of merit and sin is from the first tied to another, so practising the path for oneself 「名為下人」 tr. "is named an inferior person". Next it brings out the sickness: 「若自為身行道，是則斷滅，自為愛著故。」 tr. "If one practises the path for oneself, this is annihilation, because it is for the sake of one's own love and clinging." Next it sets up the right view: 「若自能捨己樂，但為一切眾生故行善法，是名上人，與一切眾生異故。」 tr. "If one can relinquish one's own happiness and practise wholesome dharmas only for the sake of all beings, this is named a superior person, because he is not the same as all beings." Next it resolves the doubt about benefiting oneself: 「若但為眾生故行善法，眾生未成就，自利則為具足」 tr. "if one practises wholesome dharmas only for the sake of beings, while beings are not yet brought to accomplishment, one's own benefit is already complete"—not seeking to benefit oneself, one's own benefit is of itself sufficient. Next it judges the middle grade: 「若自利益，又為眾生，是為雜行。」 tr. "If one both benefits oneself and acts for beings, this is mixed practice." Finally it gathers it in with three kinds of people who seek the Buddha path: those who only love and cherish the Buddha and seek to become a Buddha for their own single selves, those who do so for themselves and also for beings, and those who do so only for beings; of the third, 「是人清淨行道，破我顛倒故」 tr. "this person practises the path purely, because he has broken the inversion of self". The criterion of the whole passage lies in the last sentence—what is broken is the inversion of self, so being only for others is not moral loftiness but purity with respect to self-clinging.
28. Question ④ and Answer ④: since it is said that one only benefits beings, why is it further said that only by oneself obtaining non-clinging can one benefit people? The answer: because there is no other way; merit cannot be given to others like wealth and goods. Before the question and answer, the treatise-author first explains the passage on ambrosia in the sūtra: when the bodhisattva practises prajñā, 「無眾生乃至無知者、見者」 tr. "there are no beings and so on up to no knower and no seer"; abiding securely within this he 「拔出眾生着甘露性中」 tr. "pulls beings out and sets them within the nature of ambrosia"; and he himself explains the name—「甘露性者，所謂一切助道法」 tr. "what is called the nature of ambrosia is all the dharmas that aid the path"; the reason it is named ambrosia is that 「行是法得至涅槃，涅槃名甘露」 tr. "by practising these dharmas one can reach nirvāṇa, and nirvāṇa is named ambrosia"; when one abides within this nature, 「我等妄想不復生」 tr. "the false thoughts of ‘I’ and the like no longer arise". Finally it concludes with one sentence: the bodhisattva 「自得無所著，亦令眾生得無所著，是名第一利益眾生」 tr. "himself obtains non-clinging and also makes beings obtain non-clinging; this is named the foremost benefiting of beings". Taking the dharmas that aid the path as the nature of ambrosia joins exactly with the meaning in passage 7 that aiding the path does not add to the fruit—the dharmas that aid the path are ambrosia not because they can add to nirvāṇa, but because they can reach nirvāṇa. This question pursues the previous answer in its natural course: since benefiting oneself has been judged the lowest, and the sūtra further says 「自無所著，亦教一切眾生令得無所著」 tr. "he himself clings to nothing, and also teaches all beings so that they obtain non-clinging", is this not self-contradictory? The treatise-author answers very honestly: 「不得已故！若自無智慧，何能利人？」 tr. "Because there is no other way! If one has no wisdom oneself, how can one benefit others?" Next it gives the reason: 「若是功德可得與他如財物者，諸佛、大菩薩所有功德皆應與他，乃至調達、怨賊皆可與之」 tr. "if this merit could be given to others like wealth and goods, all the merit possessed by the buddhas and the great bodhisattvas ought to be given to others, and it could be given even to Devadatta and to the enemy and thief", and yet 「不可我作而他得」 tr. "it cannot be that I do it and another obtains it". This simile is the section in the whole treatise most able to break people's thoughts of a lucky windfall—that merit cannot be handed over is precisely why cultivating for oneself cannot be avoided. And the treatise-author uses the three Chinese characters 「不得已」 tr. "there is no other way" to fix its boundary: first being without clinging oneself is not going back to benefiting oneself; it is the necessary condition for benefiting others. Below this the treatise-author again returns this passage to worldly truth: 「是亦世俗說，非第一義」 tr. "this too is a worldly saying, not the highest meaning", because within the highest meaning 「無眾生、無一無異等分別諸法相」 tr. "there are no beings, no marks of one and different and the like that discriminate dharmas"; and he adds a sentence: 「如先說『不可說相是第一義』，此中可說故是世俗」 tr. "as said before, ‘the mark of the unspeakable is the highest meaning’; since herein it can be spoken of, it is therefore the worldly".
29. The treatise-author restates the sūtra and explains the question whether it is obtained in worldly truth or obtained in the highest meaning: two dharmas all exist because of worldly truth; one who has obtained the highest meaning, though he distinguishes dharmas, is not false. This passage is not a newly set question and answer; it is the treatise-author restating the passage in the sūtra of Subhūti's question and the Buddha's answer, and explaining it. The treatise-author first brings out on Subhūti's behalf the intent of his dilemma: 「若以世諦故得，即是虛妄不實；若以第一義故得，第一義中無得、無得者，不可說、不可受。」 tr. "If it were obtained because of worldly truth, then it would be false and unreal; if it were obtained because of the highest meaning, within the highest meaning there is no obtaining and no one who obtains; it is unspeakable and cannot be received." Next he explains the Buddha's answer: it is by worldly words that the Buddha is said to obtain awakening, and 「是中無得者、無有得法」 tr. "herein there is no one who obtains and no dharma that is obtained"; the reason lies in two dharmas—「是菩薩、是得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提」 tr. "this is the bodhisattva, this is the anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi that is obtained": what obtains and what is obtained standing as two is precisely two dharmas, and 「二法中，無道、無果」 tr. "within two dharmas there is no path and no fruit". Next he resolves a crucial doubt: since two dharmas all exist because of worldly truth, does the Buddha's Dharma not also fall into falsehood? The treatise-author distinguishes: 「若有人不得第一義，但以二法分別諸法，是則虛妄；諸佛、大菩薩得第一義故，為度眾生令得第一義，雖分別諸法，非是虛妄。」 tr. "If someone does not obtain the highest meaning and only distinguishes dharmas by means of two dharmas, this is false; because the buddhas and the great bodhisattvas have obtained the highest meaning, in order to deliver beings and make them obtain the highest meaning, although they distinguish dharmas, it is not false." The same distinguishing, and yet whether it is false is tied to whether the one who distinguishes has already obtained the highest meaning—this judgement and the Buddha's 「大恩力」 tr. "great power of kindness" in passage 16 exactly illuminate each other.
30. Question ⑤ and Answer ⑤: elsewhere it is said that two dharmas are the dharmas of ordinary people and the dharma of non-duality is the dharma of the worthy and the sages; how is that reconciled with non-duality here also having no path and no fruit? The answer: entering non-duality is the real holy Dharma, and the Buddha negates the two extremes and speaks the middle way. What this question cites is the Dharma gate of entering non-duality of the Vimalakīrti Sūtra, the only place in this chapter that explicitly cites another sūtra; what it asks about is a contradiction between scriptural teachings. The treatise-author's answer is in three parts. The first affirms first: 「不二入是真實聖法」 tr. "entering non-duality is the real holy Dharma", not abandoning that sūtra because of what is said here. The second gives the reason why there is disparagement and praise: 「或有新發意菩薩未得諸法實相，聞是不二法，取相生著。是故或稱讚不二法，或時毀呰。」 tr. "It may be that there are bodhisattvas who have newly aroused the mind, who have not yet obtained the real mark of all dharmas, and who, hearing this dharma of non-duality, grasp at marks and give rise to clinging. Therefore at times he praises the dharma of non-duality, and at times disparages it." Praise and disparagement are both remedies, not a self-contradiction of the meaning. The third brings out the right meaning: 「佛遮二邊、說中道，所謂非二、非不二」 tr. "the Buddha negates the two extremes and speaks the middle way, namely not two and not non-dual", and states its sequence—「二法名各各別相；不二名一空相。以是一空相破各各別異相；破已，事訖，還捨不二相」 tr. "two dharmas speaks of the separate marks of each; non-duality speaks of the mark of a single emptiness. By means of this mark of a single emptiness one breaks the marks of each being separate and different; once the breaking is done and the matter is finished, one still relinquishes the mark of non-duality", and only then is it 「即是道、是果」 tr. "precisely the path, the fruit". Finally it adds the reason: 「諸賢聖雖讚歎無二法，為不著故。」 tr. "Although the worthy and the sages praise the dharma without duality, it is so that people may not cling." Here the reader can obtain a general rule: the effect of any word of remedy lies in the time when what is to be broken is not yet broken; once it is broken, if one still holds on to it, the remedy becomes a new sickness. After this round of question and answer, the treatise-author takes back the sūtra's words to conclude: 「用是法得道、得果，用是法無道、無果——即是戲論；無戲論是平等法。」 tr. "To say that by means of this dharma one obtains the path and obtains the fruit, and that by means of this dharma there is no path and no fruit—this is precisely idle discourse; being without idle discourse is the equal dharma." Next he restates Subhūti's question, 「若諸法無所有性，何等是平等」 tr. "if all dharmas are of a nature without anything existent, what is equality?", together with the Buddha's answer, and lists the seven items of the Buddha's answer one by one: 「若離有性、無性，假名為平等」 tr. "if one is apart from existent nature and non-existent nature, it is provisionally named equality"; the bodhisattva does not say that all dharmas are existent—does not speak of their nature, their marks, and other such displays; nor does he say that they are a non-existent dharma—does not speak of the nature of non-existent dharmas, the marks of non-existent dharmas, and other such displays; nor does he say that apart from the two extremes there is a further mark of equality; 「一切處不取平等相」 tr. "in every place he does not grasp the mark of equality"; 「亦不言無是平等」 tr. "nor does he say that there is no such equality"; and 「不妨行諸善法」 tr. "this does not hinder him from practising all wholesome dharmas". Of the seven items the first six all negate and the last alone discloses—the sentence that it does not hinder practising all wholesome dharmas is the gate of practice left at the end of the whole chapter's course of negating and sweeping away, and must not be passed over. Below this the treatise-author again turns out a sentence: 「復次，諸法平等者，所謂出過一切法」 tr. "Again, what is called the equality of dharmas is precisely passing beyond all dharmas", which is where the next round of question and answer arises from.
31. Question ⑥ and Answer ⑥: before it was said that equality is precisely the reality of dharmas, the names differing and the meaning the same; why is it now said that equality passes beyond all dharmas? The answer: dharmas are of two kinds, substance and practice; equality passes beyond within the wrong practice of ordinary people, not within the substance of dharmas. This question is the finest boundary in the whole chapter. Earlier it was said that equality is precisely the real mark of all dharmas, the names differing and the meaning the same, and 「色如，非色、非離色」 tr. "the suchness of form is not form and not apart from form" was cited as proof, so equality and dharmas are not apart from each other; yet now the sūtra says 「諸法平等者，所謂出過一切法」 tr. "what is called the equality of dharmas is precisely passing beyond all dharmas"; passing beyond is going beyond, and the two sayings contradict each other. The treatise-author answers that all dharmas are of two kinds: 「一者、色等諸法體；二者、色等法中行——凡夫邪行，賢聖正行。」 tr. "First, the substance of form and the other dharmas; second, practice within form and the other dharmas—the wrong practice of ordinary people and the right practice of the worthy and the sages." What equality passes beyond is the wrong practice of ordinary people, not the substance of dharmas such as form. Once it is divided into two, the objection resolves itself. The reader should remember this division: whenever this treatise speaks of going beyond, of being apart, of passing beyond, it is mostly said with respect to practice and not with respect to substance; without making this division, there would be contradiction everywhere.
32. The treatise-author explains that of equality there is none who can practise it and none who can reach it: self-nature cannot practise and reach within self-nature, and should only practise and reach within other-nature; it is not because the Buddha's wisdom is small. This passage explains the most striking sentence in the sūtra. The treatise-author first depicts Subhūti's state—「於是須菩提驚問：『佛亦不能行、不能到？』」 tr. "Thereupon Subhūti asks in astonishment: ‘Can the Buddha too not practise it and not reach it?’"—and brings out his meaning for him: 「是法雖甚深微妙難行，是事佛應當得！」 tr. "Although this dharma is very deep and subtle and hard to practise, this matter the Buddha ought to be able to obtain!" The Buddha's answer is that 「從須陀洹乃至佛皆無能行、無能到」 tr. "from the srota-āpanna up to the Buddha, none can practise it and none can reach it", and the treatise-author again brings out the Buddha's meaning for him: 「三世十方佛不能行、不能到，何況一佛！平等性自爾故。」 tr. "The buddhas of the three times and the ten directions cannot practise it and cannot reach it, how much less a single Buddha! Because the nature of equality is so of itself." Subhūti asks again about the Buddha, sovereign in the power of practice, whose unobstructed wisdom reaches every place; the key of the Buddha's answer lies in one hypothetical sentence: 「若佛與平等異，應有是難」 tr. "only if the Buddha were different from equality should there be such an objection". Below this the treatise-author brings out the right principle: 「是凡夫乃至佛，自性不能自性中行、不能自性中到；自性應他性中行。」 tr. "These ordinary people and so on up to the Buddha—self-nature cannot practise within self-nature, cannot reach within self-nature; self-nature should practise within other-nature." The establishment of practising and reaching must wait upon a difference between the one who acts and what is acted upon; the Buddha is precisely equality, so there is no difference to practise across. The last sentence is the safety pin of the whole passage: 「但佛即是平等故，不行、不到，非以智慧少故。」 tr. "But because the Buddha is precisely equality, he does not practise and does not reach—not because his wisdom is small." The reader must never read this passage as the Buddha being unable to do something—both the sūtra and the treatise have already blocked this road of retreat.
33. The treatise-author explains that within equality there is no distinction, yet because of worldly truth there is distinction; the Three Jewels' greatly appearing in the world is precisely the distinguishing and setting-up of the equal dharma. From the foregoing meaning Subhūti gives rise to a second doubt: if ordinary people and so on up to the Buddha are unfindable as different, then 「今凡夫、聖人不應有差別」 tr. "now ordinary people and sages ought not to have distinction". The Buddha assents to his question and makes a distinction: 「平等中無差別，世諦故凡夫法中有差別。」 tr. "Within equality there is no distinction; it is because of worldly truth that there is distinction within the dharmas of ordinary people." Subhūti again objects with the Three Jewels, and the Buddha answers 「平等即是法寶，法寶即是佛寶、僧寶」 tr. "equality is precisely the Dharma Jewel, and the Dharma Jewel is precisely the Buddha Jewel and the Saṅgha Jewel", and gives the reason: 「未得法時，不名為佛；得平等法故名為佛；得是平等法故，分別有須陀洹等差別。」 tr. "When he had not yet obtained the dharma, he was not named Buddha; because he obtained the equal dharma he is named Buddha; because he obtained this equal dharma, he distinguishes that there are distinctions such as the srota-āpanna." This point is extremely crucial: the distinctions of the Three Jewels lie not outside equality, but are set up precisely through obtaining the equal dharma. Subhūti at once receives the teaching and states for himself: 「是法皆無合、無散，無色、無形、無對，一相，所謂無相。唯佛有是力，於空、無相中，分別是凡夫、是聖人。」 tr. "This dharma is all without joining and without dispersing, without form, without shape, without resistance, of one mark, namely the signless. Only the Buddha has this power, that within emptiness and the signless he distinguishes: this is an ordinary person, this is a sage." The objector once again resolves his own objection.
34. Question ⑦ and Answer ⑦: the buddhas are like the sun coming out, only illuminating the myriad things; why must the Buddha speak for one to know? The answer: knowing is of two kinds, the false knowing of ordinary people and knowing as it truly is. This question is set up very handsomely: the buddhas are like the sun coming out, which 「不能令高者下、下者高，但能照明萬物，令有眼者別識」 tr. "cannot make the high low or the low high, but can only illuminate the myriad things and let those with eyes distinguish and recognise them"; the buddhas 「亦不轉諸法相，但以一切智照，為人演說令知」 tr. "too do not transform the marks of dharmas, but only illuminate them with omniscience and expound them for people to let them know". Since it is so, animals and the like can be seen by the eye before one, and everyone recognises and knows them; what need is there for the Buddha to speak? The treatise-author's answer sets up only one distinction: 「知有二種：一者、凡夫虛妄知，二者、如實知。」 tr. "Knowing is of two kinds: first, the false knowing of ordinary people; second, knowing as it truly is." What ordinary people know of the marks of animals and the like is false knowing; what the Buddha knows is the real mark; therefore what is at issue in the sūtra's 「佛不分別諸法，云何知有地獄等」 tr. "if the Buddha did not distinguish dharmas, how could it be known that there are the hells and the rest" is knowing as it truly is, not worldly recognition. In reading the treatise, when one meets such a question likening the Buddha to the sun, one should see whether the treatise-author accepts the simile—here the treatise-author does not deny the simile of the sun, but only divides the word 「知」 tr. "knowing" into levels, and the objection dissolves of itself.
35. The treatise-author explains that the dharma of the buddhas is quiescent extinction without idle discourse and yet can distinguish dharmas; he brings out the simile of the ox-dharma, and records the divergent opinion of ‘someone says’ and refutes it. This passage first brings out a deeper difficulty: 「諸佛法寂滅相、無戲論；此中若分別有地獄等相，不名為『寂滅』、『不二』、『無戲論法』。」 tr. "The dharma of the buddhas is the mark of quiescence, without idle discourse; if herein one distinguished that there are the marks of the hells and the like, it would not be named ‘quiescent extinction’, ‘non-duality’, ‘the dharma without idle discourse’." The treatise-author's answer is this chapter's face-on judgement: 「佛雖知寂滅、不二相，亦能於寂滅相中分別諸法，而不墮戲論。」 tr. "Although the Buddha knows the mark of quiescent extinction and non-duality, he can yet distinguish dharmas within the mark of quiescence, and does not fall into idle discourse." Below this it brings out the simile of the ox-dharma to show the difficulty of knowing as it truly is: one who is apart from the real mark of all dharmas, though his eyes see animals, cannot know their marks as they truly are; 「如牛，角、足、尾等諸分邊和合，更有牛法生，是為一。諸分多、牛法一，一不作多、多不作一。」 tr. "As with an ox: the horns, feet, tail, and the other parts come together at their edges, and there further arises an ox-dharma, and this is one. The parts are many, the ox-dharma is one; the one does not make the many, the many do not make the one." Here the treatise-author records a divergent opinion—「有人言：此說非也！除此諸分，應更有牛法力用可見。」 tr. "Someone says: this is not right! Apart from these parts there should further be a function of the ox-dharma that can be seen." The treatise-author at once refutes it: 「牛法眾分和合生，而牛法不異眾分」 tr. "the ox-dharma is born from the coming together of its parts, and yet the ox-dharma is not different from the parts"; his proof lies in 「見此眾分合故名為見牛，更不見餘物為牛」 tr. "seeing these parts come together is named seeing an ox, and no other thing is further seen to be the ox". Next he refutes completely by the four alternatives: 「異者破一，一者破異，不一不異破一異；若無一異，云何有不一不異？」 tr. "Different refutes one, one refutes different, neither-one-nor-different refutes one-and-different; if there is no one-and-different, how can there be neither-one-nor-different?" Finally it returns: 「若入是諸法平等中，爾時，始如實得牛相。」 tr. "If one enters into this equality of dharmas, at that time one first obtains the mark of the ox as it truly is." Here the reader can see this treatise's form for recording divergent opinions—recording them together and then refuting, not concealing the opinion; and what is refuted is exactly that view of an entity, ‘apart from the parts there is separately one thing that can be seen’.
36. The treatise-author explains not moving within equality and yet distinguishing dharmas, not clinging to the marks of one and different, and restates the passage in the sūtra on the marks of form and the rest being empty, and resolves its difficulty. The treatise-author takes up the simile of the ox-dharma and draws the conclusion: 「若佛不分別諸法相、不說二諦，云何善說畜生等？所謂於平等不動而分別諸法。」 tr. "If the Buddha did not distinguish the marks of dharmas and did not speak of the two truths, how could he speak well of animals and the like? This is what is called not moving within equality and yet distinguishing dharmas." And he explains the two Chinese characters not moving: 「分別諸法時，不著一異相。」 tr. "When one distinguishes dharmas one does not cling to the marks of one and different." Below this he restates Subhūti's long objection in the sūtra and the Buddha's counter-questions—investigating and searching out whether the marks of form and the rest are empty, the answer is that they are truly empty; whether within emptiness there are dharmas of differing marks, the answer is that there are not. Here the treatise-author supplies on Subhūti's behalf the reason: 「是畢竟空，以無相智慧可解，是中云何有異相？」 tr. "This is ultimate emptiness, which can be understood with the wisdom of the signless; how could there be differing marks within it?" Next he brings out on the Buddha's behalf the intent of the rebuke: 「若空中無異相，空便是實，是故汝云何於空中分別諸法作是難？」 tr. "If within emptiness there are no differing marks, emptiness would then be the real; therefore how is it that you distinguish dharmas within emptiness and raise such an objection?" And he pushes it one layer further: 「畢竟空中，空亦不可得，各各相亦不可得，汝云何以空、各各相為難？」 tr. "Within ultimate emptiness, emptiness too is unfindable, and the separate marks too are unfindable; how can you use emptiness and the separate marks to raise an objection?"—since even emptiness is unfindable, one who raises an objection by means of emptiness has of himself no ground to stand on. Finally he ties up the meaning of the sūtra: within equality, 「無分別故無凡夫人；但凡夫人，非實相、不離實相，凡夫實相即是聖人相」 tr. "because there is no discrimination, there are no ordinary people; yet ordinary people are not the real mark, nor are they apart from the real mark; the real mark of ordinary people is precisely the mark of the sage", therefore it says 「不但凡夫、不離凡夫，乃至佛亦如是」 tr. "not only ordinary people, and also not apart from ordinary people, and so on up to the Buddha, it is likewise". The sentence that the real mark of ordinary people is precisely the mark of the sage is this chapter's most direct consolation for practitioners, and also its strictest demand.
37. The treatise-author explains that equality is neither conditioned nor unconditioned: the conditioned is all false and deceptive dharmas that are made; the unconditioned, having no arising, abiding, and ceasing, is a non-existent dharma; because there is the conditioned there is the unconditioned, as apart from long there is no short—this is the meaning of standing over against each other. The treatise-author first states the mind with which Subhūti raises this question: 「以平等相大利益，欲知平等定相」 tr. "because the mark of equality has great benefit, he wishes to know the fixed mark of equality"—what is asked is whether equality has a mark that can be fixed. The Buddha answers 「非有為、非無為」 tr. "neither conditioned nor unconditioned", and the treatise-author brings out the fault of each side for him: if it were conditioned, 「皆是虛誑作法」 tr. "all would be false and deceptive dharmas that are made"; if it were unconditioned, 「無為法無生住滅故無法，無法故不得名無為」 tr. "an unconditioned dharma, because it has no arising, abiding, and ceasing, would be a non-existent dharma, and because it is a non-existent dharma, it could not be named unconditioned". Below this he brings out the right principle: 「因有為故有無為」 tr. "it is because there is the conditioned that there is the unconditioned", and cites the sūtra as proof—「如經中說：『離有為，無為不可得。』」 tr. "As is said in the sūtra: ‘Apart from the conditioned, the unconditioned is unfindable.’" Finally he brings out the simile and the judgement: 「如離長無短，是相待義。」 tr. "As apart from long there is no short—this is the meaning of standing over against each other." The words standing over against each other are the key of this passage: the conditioned and the unconditioned are not two dharmas each independent on its own, but two names set up by standing over against each other, so equality cannot be tied to either side of them.
38. Question ⑧ and Answer ⑧: the conditioned is impermanent and the unconditioned permanent; why is it said that apart from the conditioned the unconditioned is unfindable? The answer: the unconditioned, because it is without discrimination, is signless; to break the conditioned is precisely the unconditioned; it concludes with contemplating equality and not moving within the highest meaning and benefiting beings. The last round of question and answer relies on the most widely current teaching—the conditioned is impermanent, the unconditioned is permanent—if the unconditioned is permanent, then it has its own substance, so why must it wait upon the conditioned? The treatise-author's answer first refutes the saying of a mark of permanence: 「無為法無分別故無相；若說常相，不得言無相。」 tr. "Unconditioned dharmas, because they are without discrimination, are signless; if one spoke of a mark of permanence, one could not say they are signless." Next it sets up the right view: 「破有為法故名無為，更無異法。」 tr. "It is because conditioned dharmas are broken that it is named the unconditioned; there is no other dharma." Next it brings out the clearest simile in the whole treatise: 「如人閉在牢獄，穿牆得出；破壁是空，更無異空，空亦不從因緣生。」 tr. "As when a person shut in a prison bores through the wall and gets out: the broken wall is space, and there is no other space, and this space too does not arise from causes and conditions." The place where the wall is broken is precisely space; it is not that outside the wall there is another space—the unconditioned in relation to the conditioned is likewise. Next it applies this: 「有為法中先有無為性，破有為即是無為」 tr. "within conditioned dharmas there is first the unconditioned nature, and to break the conditioned is precisely the unconditioned", therefore 「離有為，無為不可得」 tr. "apart from the conditioned, the unconditioned is unfindable". Next it gathers in: 「是有為、無為性皆不合不散，一相，所謂『無相』。」 tr. "These natures of the conditioned and the unconditioned are both neither joined nor dispersed, of one mark, namely ‘the signless’." Next it still returns the Buddha's words to worldly truth: 「佛以世諦故說是事，非第一義」 tr. "the Buddha speaks this matter because of worldly truth; it is not the highest meaning", and cites the causes and conditions the Buddha himself states—「第一義中無身、口、意行；有為、無為法平等，即是第一義。」 tr. "Within the highest meaning there is no bodily, verbal, or mental action; the equality of conditioned and unconditioned dharmas is precisely the highest meaning." The last sentence is the conclusion of the whole chapter: 「觀是有為、無為法平等，亦不著一相。菩薩於第一義中不動而利益眾生；方便力故，種種因緣為眾生說法也。」 tr. "Contemplating the equality of these conditioned and unconditioned dharmas, one also does not cling to a single mark. The bodhisattva does not move within the highest meaning and yet benefits beings; because of the power of skilful means, by means of all kinds of causes and conditions he teaches the Dharma for beings." From the not setting up of stain and purity at the head of the chapter up to here, it returns to not moving and yet benefiting beings—the equality that is set up never from the start departs one step from the gate of practice.
Do Not Misread
Do not read 「平等」 tr. "equality" as everything being the same. The equality set up in the sūtra has as its definition 「無戲論相」 tr. "the mark of being without idle discourse"; it is not pulling ordinary people and the Buddha into one and the same thing. Therefore the Buddha must say 「於諸法等中不動，而分別諸法」 tr. "within the equality of dharmas he does not move, and yet he distinguishes dharmas", and calls this the great power of kindness; the treatise-author too says 「平等中無差別，世諦故凡夫法中有差別」 tr. "within equality there is no distinction; because of worldly truth there is distinction within the dharmas of ordinary people". If equality were levelling flat, the Three Jewels could not appear in the world, and the names srota-āpanna and so on up to Buddha would all become empty settings; yet the sūtra text, in the very same passage, lists these names one by one. What equality removes is idle discourse, not the setting-up of distinctions.
Do not read 「不能行、不能到」 tr. "cannot practise, cannot reach" as the Buddha being unable to do something. The sūtra text itself has already blocked this road of retreat twice: once in the Buddha's answer 「若諸法平等與佛有異，應當如是問」 tr. "only if the equality of dharmas were different from the Buddha should one ask thus", once in the treatise-author's explanation 「非以智慧少故」 tr. "not because his wisdom is small". The reason for not being able to practise and reach is that between the one who acts and what is acted upon there is no difference to practise across—the Buddha is precisely equality, so there is no equality outside waiting for the Buddha to reach it. If it is read as the Buddha's wisdom still falling short, then the later 「佛有大恩力，於諸法等中不動，而分別諸法」 tr. "the Buddha has the great power of kindness: within the equality of dharmas he does not move, and yet he distinguishes dharmas" has nowhere to be placed.
Do not read 「世諦故說」 tr. "said because of worldly truth" as what is said being cancelled. In this chapter the Buddha almost always carries this tail with his answers; if each time it were carried it cancelled something, not one sentence of the whole chapter could remain. The treatise-author resolves it with the simile of trading gold for grass: a bystander mocks him for trading the precious for the cheap, and he answers 「我事須用故」 tr. "because I have a matter for which I need it"—the saying of worldly truth is set up for getting things done; it is not real and yet useful. Opposite to it is the simile of pointing at the moon, which warns against taking the finger for the moon. The two similes must be read together: one warns against clinging to words, one warns against discarding words.
Do not read 「一切法能助道法，不能益其果」 tr. "all dharmas can aid the dharmas of the path; they cannot add to its fruit" as practice being useless. What this sentence negates is the idea of adding to the unconditioned fruit by conditioned practice; its reason the sūtra text itself gives—「所謂是諸法無生、無出、無相」 tr. "namely, these dharmas are non-arising, non-emerging, and signless", and the treatise-author further makes it clear with 「如時雨能益草木，不益虛空」 tr. "as a timely rain can benefit grass and trees, but does not benefit space". And in the very same passage of sūtra text, the Buddha says that if dānapāramitā and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds are not made complete, 「不能得成就眾生、淨佛國土、得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提」 tr. "he cannot bring beings to accomplishment, purify buddha-lands, or obtain anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi". Aiding the path and adding to the fruit are two matters, which the sūtra text sets side by side without their hindering each other.
Do not read ‘only for the sake of beings, not for oneself’ as there being no need to cultivate oneself. The treatise-author has already set a special question on this, answering 「不得已故！若自無智慧，何能利人？」 tr. "Because there is no other way! If one has no wisdom oneself, how can one benefit others?", and proves it by merit not being something that can be given to others like wealth and goods. So first being without clinging oneself is not turning back to benefiting oneself; it is the condition for benefiting others. Conversely, it must not be read either as: since cultivating oneself cannot be avoided, benefiting oneself is still the right road—the treatise-author judges 「若自利益，又為眾生，是為雜行」 tr. "if one both benefits oneself and acts for beings, this is mixed practice", and judges it very clearly.
Do not read 「破有為即是無為」 tr. "to break the conditioned is precisely the unconditioned" as annihilation. The treatise-author's simile is boring through the wall of a prison—the place where the wall is broken is precisely space; it is not that the wall is destroyed and some other thing is obtained. If it is read as there being nothing at all after the conditioned is entirely broken, then the sentence 「有為法中先有無為性」 tr. "within conditioned dharmas there is first the unconditioned nature" has nothing to rest on; if it is read as there being, outside the breaking of the conditioned, a separate unconditioned to be obtained, then the sentence 「更無異法」 tr. "there is no other dharma" has nothing to rest on. On both sides the sūtra text stands in the way.
Bearing on Practice
The first use is to take 「無戲論相，是諸法平等」 tr. "the mark of being without idle discourse—this is the equality of dharmas" as a ruler for daily use. Whenever the calculation ‘by this dharma one can obtain, by this dharma one cannot obtain’ arises in the mind, that is precisely the idle discourse the sūtra points to. This ruler is extremely handy: there is no need to judge whether the content calculated is right or wrong; only see whether there is within it the opposition of what obtains and what is obtained; if there is, one knows that at this time one is not in equality, and at once lets go of the calculation and still goes on doing the work.
The second use is to examine one's own arousing of the mind by the sequence of 「知一切法是不可取相已，發心求阿耨多羅三藐三菩提」 tr. "having known that all dharmas are of the mark of being ungraspable, he arouses the mind and seeks anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi". The sūtra text puts knowing before arousing the mind; its intent is that the mind aroused should not become a mind with something to be attained. In daily use one can hold to it thus: each time a vow arises, first ask whether the establishment of this vow needs a thing to be obtained as its pledge; if so, this vow is still within grasping at marks. And the sūtra text at the same time gives the ground on which the arousing of the mind does not fall into emptiness—one seeks awakening because 「但以眾生不知不見如是諸法相」 tr. "only because beings do not know and do not see such marks of dharmas"; the root of the arousing of the mind is tied to others' not knowing, so it is not shaken by one's own gain and loss.
The third use is that the judgement of the three grades of those who enter the path can serve as a once-a-year self-examination. The lowest are only for delivering themselves; the middle are for themselves and also for others; the highest are only for others. The treatise-author also gives an extremely plain test: 「若但為眾生故行善法，眾生未成就，自利則為具足。」 tr. "If one practises wholesome dharmas only for the sake of beings, while beings are not yet brought to accomplishment, one's own benefit is already complete." So there is no need to worry that being only for others will lose one's own benefit. When examining oneself, do not look at how many wholesome dharmas one has practised; look only at which side the arousing of the mind is tied to.
The fourth use is that the simile of pointing at the moon can be applied to hearing the Dharma and reading the sūtras. When, on hearing a passage of Dharma, the thought ‘this saying is really good’ arises in the mind, one is already looking at the finger; at this time one should turn back and ask what is being said. The treatise-author points out in particular that even the two Chinese characters equality can become something clung to—the more ultimate the words, the more easily they are grasped as marks. So whenever one meets a sentence of Dharma that one finds especially useful, one should take special care whether one has already stored it away as a thing.
The fifth use is that 「於平等不動而分別諸法」 tr. "not moving within equality and yet distinguishing dharmas" can serve as a rule for handling affairs. Not moving the treatise-author himself explains as 「分別諸法時，不著一異相」 tr. "when one distinguishes dharmas, one does not cling to the marks of one and different". In daily use one distinguishes good and evil and sorts out what to take and what to leave; every matter needs distinguishing; and when distinguishing, to be able not to regard what is distinguished as separately independent real entities is precisely not moving. What is precious in this rule is that it does not require people to stop distinguishing—to stop distinguishing is neither possible nor what the Buddha practises.
The sixth use is that the simile of boring through the prison wall can remove people's fantasy about 「無為」 tr. "the unconditioned". Practitioners often imagine nirvāṇa as a separate pure place, and so while practising they keep looking outward. This simile is direct: the place of the broken wall is precisely space; there is no other space. So where one should apply effort is only in breaking the clinging to the conditioned, not in seeking a separate unconditioned. In the same way, the sentence 「凡夫實相即是聖人相」 tr. "the real mark of ordinary people is precisely the mark of the sage" should also be brought up time and again—what is sought is not elsewhere.
Further Resonances
The backbone of this chapter is one passage of sūtra text and one passage of treatise explanation. Sūtra ① begins with Subhūti's question on stain and purity—the one who sees the real is neither stained nor pure, the one who does not see the real is also neither stained nor pure, because the nature of all dharmas is without anything existent, and within what is without anything existent and within what is existent it is all without stain and without purity; the Buddha answers that the mark of the equality of dharmas is precisely purity, makes it concrete with suchness, not-different, not-deceiving, the mark of dharmas, the nature of dharmas, the abiding of dharmas, the position of dharmas, the limit of reality, and whether there is a Buddha or no Buddha the nature of dharmas abides constantly, and limits it himself by its being said because of worldly truth and not the very highest meaning; next, Subhūti raises the objection, by like a dream, like an echo, like a mirage, like a shadow, like an illusion, like a conjuration, to vowing to make the perfections complete, and the Buddha makes his premise firm by a counter-question, and answers that unreal, false dharmas cannot obtain awakening, that all dharmas are dharmas made by recollection and reflection, that all dharmas can aid the dharmas of the path and cannot add to its fruit, that the bodhisattva knows dharmas to be like a dream and still, by the wholesome deeds he has done, brings beings to accomplishment and purifies buddha-lands, that because he does not grasp prajñā he obtains the omniscience of all kinds, that only after knowing all dharmas to be of the mark of being ungraspable does one arouse the mind, that it is only for beings and not for oneself, that practising prajñā one sees beings and yet there are no beings and makes them far from inversion and sets them in the nature of ambrosia, and that he himself clings to nothing and also teaches beings to cling to nothing, returning this to worldly truth; next, Subhūti asks whether the Buddha's obtaining of awakening is obtained in worldly truth or obtained in the highest meaning, and the Buddha answers that because of worldly truth the Buddha is said to obtain this dharma while within the highest meaning there is no dharma to be obtained, that by means of two dharmas there is no path and no fruit, that by practising the dharma of non-duality there is also no path and no fruit, that if there are no two dharmas and no dharma of non-duality this is precisely the path and precisely the fruit, and that the mark of being without idle discourse is the equality of dharmas; next, he asks what equality is, and the Buddha answers that apart from equality there is no other dharma that can be apart from the mark of the equality of all dharmas, that as for equality ordinary people and sages all cannot practise it and cannot reach it, and that so too are the four fruits, the pratyekabuddhas, the bodhisattvas, and the buddhas, and that ordinary people and so on up to the Buddha are one equality without duality and within equality are all unfindable; next, he raises the objection of the Three Jewels appearing in the world, and the Buddha by a counter-question makes Subhūti himself answer that the Three Jewels are not different from the equality of dharmas, that the Three Jewels are precisely equality, without joining and without dispersing, without form, without shape, without resistance, of one mark, the signless, and that the Buddha has this power, that he can distinguish the places of the signless dharmas; next, the Buddha by a counter-question makes Subhūti admit for himself that he would not know, and then brings out the judgement that the Buddha has the great power of kindness, not moving within the equality of dharmas and yet distinguishing dharmas; next, Subhūti raises the long objection that dharmas each differ in mark, listing the differences of form, feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness and so on up to the natures of conditioned and unconditioned dharmas, and concluding that if one does not make distinctions one cannot practise prajñā, enter the bodhisattva's position, or purify buddha-lands; the Buddha restates his question and answers with the counter-question whether the mark of form and so on up to the mark of the buddhas is empty; Subhūti himself answers that it is truly empty and that within emptiness dharmas of separate marks are unfindable, and the Buddha then concludes that within the equality of dharmas it is not ordinary people and also not apart from ordinary people, and so on up to not the Buddha and also not apart from the Buddha; finally he asks whether equality is conditioned or unconditioned, and the Buddha answers that it is neither conditioned nor unconditioned, that apart from the conditioned the unconditioned is unfindable, that apart from the unconditioned the conditioned is unfindable, that the two dharmas are neither joined nor dispersed, of one mark, the signless, that the Buddha too speaks because of worldly truth and not because of the highest meaning, that within the highest meaning there is no bodily, verbal, or mental action, nor is the highest meaning obtained apart from bodily, verbal, and mental action, and that the mark of the equality of the conditioned and the unconditioned is precisely the highest meaning; and it gathers in with the bodhisattva, when practising prajñā, not moving within the highest meaning and yet practising the bodhisattva's business and enriching beings. Treatise ① first restores the intent of Subhūti's question as the double objection of the two views of annihilation and permanence; explains the Buddha's answer, that it is named purity because of equality while to discriminate stain and purity is not so; brings out the simile of pointing at the moon and the simile of trading gold for grass to show that worldly truth is not real and yet useful; explains that the meaning of equality is unspeakable, yet because within the scattered mind of initial and sustained thought there are words there is something said; narrates that Subhūti asks for the sake of the bodhisattvas who have newly aroused the mind, the Buddha's counter-question, that the hearers gave rise to slackness and the Buddha said that all dharmas are causes and conditions that aid the path, and the boundary between aiding the path and adding to the fruit, with the simile of a timely rain benefiting grass and trees and not benefiting space; below this come eight rounds of question and answer: the first asks what use is practising giving if one knows the real mark, and is answered with bringing beings to accomplishment; the second asks why only benefiting others is spoken of, and is answered with the three grades of those who enter the path, the highest being only for others; the third asks how being only for the benefit of others can be called the highest, and is answered that one who makes offerings to himself obtains no merit, that one who relinquishes his own happiness is a superior person, and that benefiting oneself and also acting for beings is mixed practice; the fourth asks why it is further said that one oneself obtains non-clinging, and is answered that it is because there is no other way and that merit cannot be given to others like wealth and goods; in between, the question and answer in the sūtra on worldly truth and the highest meaning is restated, and it is judged that one who has obtained the highest meaning, though he distinguishes dharmas, is not false; the fifth asks about the difference between the Dharma gate of non-duality of the Vimalakīrti Sūtra and the non-duality here which also has no path and no fruit, and is answered that entering non-duality is the real holy Dharma, that the Buddha negates the two extremes and speaks the middle way, and that once the breaking is done one still relinquishes the mark of non-duality; the sixth asks about the difference between equality passing beyond all dharmas and equality being precisely the real mark of all dharmas, and is answered that dharmas are of two kinds, substance and practice, and that it passes beyond the wrong practice of ordinary people and not the substance of dharmas; the seventh asks, since the buddhas are like the sun coming out, why the Buddha must speak, and is answered with the two kinds, the false knowing of ordinary people and knowing as it truly is; the eighth asks, since the conditioned is impermanent and the unconditioned permanent, how it can be said that apart from the conditioned the unconditioned is unfindable, and is answered that the unconditioned, because it is without discrimination, is signless, that to break the conditioned is precisely the unconditioned, as when one bores through the wall and gets out and the broken wall is space; in between it further explains that self-nature cannot practise and reach within self-nature and that this is not because the wisdom is small, that equality is precisely the Dharma Jewel and the Dharma Jewel precisely the Buddha Jewel and the Saṅgha Jewel, that the dharma of the buddhas is quiescent extinction without idle discourse and yet can distinguish dharmas within quiescent extinction, that the ox-dharma and its parts are neither one nor different, recording the divergent opinion of ‘someone says’ and refuting it, that one does not move within equality and yet distinguishes dharmas without clinging to the marks of one and different, that within ultimate emptiness emptiness too is unfindable and the separate marks too are unfindable, and that the real mark of ordinary people is precisely the mark of the sage; finally it gathers in the whole chapter with contemplating the equality of the conditioned and the unconditioned and also not clinging to a single mark, the bodhisattva not moving within the highest meaning and yet benefiting beings, and, by the power of skilful means, teaching the Dharma for beings by all kinds of causes and conditions.
The thread of meaning between this chapter and the chapters before and after it can be seen in three lines. First, inheriting from what comes before: the previous chapter, "The Seven Similes" (Chapter 85), takes the seven matters of dream, image in a mirror, echo, mirage, city of the gandharvas, illusion, and conjuration as similes, to show that the nature of dharmas is without anything existent while deeds and fruits, cultivation and realisation are not abandoned; this chapter pursues to the end the nature of dharmas that those similes illustrate—that the seven similes can be set up without becoming annihilation is precisely because dharmas are equal and the Buddha can not move within equality and yet distinguish; so this chapter does not set up a separate meaning outside the seven similes, but sets up the root in the nature of dharmas for what the seven similes show. Second, a turn complete within the chapter itself: the first half turns from the question of stain and purity into the objection of the dream and the conjuration, and what it discerns is whether 「說」 tr. "speaking" and 「行」 tr. "practising" can be established; the latter half turns from the words that equality cannot be practised and reached into the two objections of the Three Jewels and of each differing in mark, and what it discerns is whether 「分別」 tr. "distinguishing" can be established; the two halves have as their pivot the sentence 「於諸法等中不動，而分別諸法」 tr. "within the equality of dharmas he does not move, and yet he distinguishes dharmas"—not moving and yet distinguishing is precisely the principle of the first half's ‘aiding the path and not adding to the fruit’ said over once more at the gate of distinguishing. Third, reaching to what comes after: this chapter concludes with the equality of the conditioned and the unconditioned being precisely the highest meaning, and the bodhisattva's not moving within the highest meaning and yet benefiting beings; the next chapter, "Nirvāṇa Is Like a Conjuration" (Chapter 87), opens by taking up these words and asking 「若諸法平等、無所為作，云何菩薩摩訶薩行般若波羅蜜，於平等中不動而行菩薩事，以布施、愛語、利益、同事？」 tr. "If all dharmas are equal and there is nothing done or made, how does the bodhisattva-mahāsattva, practising prajñāpāramitā, not move within equality and yet practise the bodhisattva's business—by giving, kind speech, beneficial action, and shared endeavour?", and below this it pushes further to 「云何言涅槃一法非如化？」 tr. "why is it said that the one dharma nirvāṇa is not like a conjuration?", pushing from the nature of dharmas of equality to nirvāṇa, the one dharma, not being kept either; reading the two chapters in succession, one can see that the meaning of the nature of dharmas, pushed to its utmost, still does not abandon the bodhisattva's business.
Of the ancient masters' explanations, two can be recorded for this chapter. Jizang, dividing this chapter into sections, first fixes its place in the whole sūtra, saying: 「此下第二明諸法畢竟平等不二。」 tr. "Below this, the second clarifies that all dharmas are ultimately equal and non-dual." He divides the chapter into seven sections, saying: 「品開七段：第一因須菩提問略說平等體，第二益平等之行，第三明平等果，四釋平等義，第五明故有一切教門，第六明一切法平等，第七出平等相。」 tr. "The chapter opens into seven sections: first, because of Subhūti's question, it briefly speaks of the substance of equality; second, the practice that benefits equality; third, it clarifies the fruit of equality; fourth, it explains the meaning of equality; fifth, it clarifies that therefore there are all the gates of teaching; sixth, it clarifies that all dharmas are equal; seventh, it brings out the mark of equality."—ordering them by the substance, practice, fruit, meaning, gates of teaching, dharmas, and mark of equality, which broadly corresponds with the sequence of this treatise's sūtra section and can be viewed alongside it. He divides the question at the head of the chapter into three, saying: 「問中為三：第一領悟無垢淨，二重難無垢淨，三漸遣垢淨兩人。」 tr. "Within the question there are three: first, understanding that there is no stain or purity; second, objecting again that there is no stain or purity; third, gradually dismissing the two persons of stain and purity." And his explanation of the section of the renewed objection is of exactly the same measure as the double objection of annihilation and permanence brought out by the treatise-author: 「無所有斷見，此中何有垢淨？有所有中是常見，亦無垢淨。」 tr. "Without anything existent is the view of annihilation—how could there be stain and purity in it? Within what has something existent is the view of permanence, and there is likewise no stain or purity." His division of the Buddha's answer says: 「佛答中為二：初、正答；二、破著。」 tr. "Within the Buddha's answer there are two: first, the direct answer; second, breaking clinging."—judging the section said because of worldly truth as 「破著」 tr. "breaking clinging", which is the same as what the treatise-author's simile of pointing at the moon remedies, while the name taken is different; they are recorded side by side without judgement. His explanation of the three grades of those who enter the path says: 「論云有三種人：下品人自利，中品人自利利他，上品但為利他也。」 tr. "The treatise says there are three kinds of people: the person of the lowest grade benefits himself; the person of the middle grade benefits himself and benefits others; the highest grade only benefits others."—this directly cites this treatise with its wording slightly changed, from which one can see what he relied on. As for the explanation of the section on equality being neither conditioned nor unconditioned, Jizang says: 「有為無為因緣義，因有為故無為則非無為，由為故有為則非有為，是平等也。」 tr. "The conditioned and the unconditioned are of the meaning of causes and conditions: the unconditioned that is because of the conditioned is then not the unconditioned, and the conditioned that is by reason of making is then not the conditioned—this is equality." And he says: 「今此中明平等非有為無為，非真非俗也。」 tr. "Now herein it clarifies that equality is neither conditioned nor unconditioned, neither real nor worldly." Judging it as neither real nor worldly, compared with this treatise's explaining it by the meaning of standing over against each other, the road taken is different while the boundary pointed to is close; they are recorded side by side without judgement. Further, of a large section at the end of this chapter in this commentary, the typesetting of the Supplement to the Canon edition is in error and places it in "Like a Conjuration"; CBETA, following the Shinpukuji manuscript, has moved it back to this chapter; the matter belongs to the editions, and it is recorded without judgement. Junzheng's book is in the form of a profound-meaning treatise that discourses across topics, and does not explain chapter by chapter; in its discussion of the two truths it cites this chapter, saying: 「故大品經？平等品云：諸法平等相，一切聖人皆不能行、不能到。」 tr. "Therefore the Larger Sūtra? the chapter Equality says: The mark of the equality of dharmas—all sages cannot practise it, cannot reach it." Compared with this sūtra's 「是諸法平等，一切聖人皆不能行、不能到」 tr. "this equality of dharmas, all sages cannot practise, cannot reach", what is cited differs slightly in wording; it is an ancient master's summarising re-citation, recorded without judgement; the symbol in the text is copied as in the base text, not altered. Huiying's Commentary, in its extant text, does not reach the fascicle in which this chapter lies, and for this chapter the explanation is lacking; this is recorded as it is, and does not mean he had nothing to say. The variant names of this chapter, the differences of chapter order among the editions, and the collation entries are detailed in the Apparatus layer.
涅槃如化品Nirvāṇa Is Like a Conjuration
全文五層 →Full five layers →涅槃如化品：平等無所為作與利益眾生何以不相違，何以要用化人作化人來答一切法空，空空故空何以不是空上加空，出世間法與賢聖人何以也是化，六種變化何以要分成聲聞辟支佛菩薩佛煩惱業因緣，生滅相何以就是變化的判準，無誑相涅槃何以獨被拈出而說非變化，性空既即是涅槃何以又說涅槃一法不如化，為新發意菩薩故分別何以不是兩套法，煩惱是惡法何以能生善業無動業，我心無記柔軟一語何以是這一難的關鍵，業變化何以要開出六道果報，何以不但說業變化而分淨垢凡聖，著涅槃而起煩惱何以要說涅槃如化，小乘大乘二道論議何以二說無咎，諸法先有今無耶一問何以能除新發意者的恐怖
在問什麼
這一品問的是一個極容易被略過、卻攔在每一個學般若的人面前的問題：既然一切法平等、無所為作，那麼「作」還有什麼立足之地？須菩提起手就把這一問擺明——諸法平等、無所為作，菩薩行般若波羅蜜，怎麼能在平等之中不動，而又行布施、愛語、利益、同事之事？平等是無作之相，利益眾生卻明明是有作之相，兩者一放在一起，就成了難。
佛的答法不是調停兩邊，而是把「化」字提出來。若有化人又作化人，這化有沒有實事而不空的？答案是沒有。既然沒有，那麼空與化二事「不合不散」，也不必分別哪個是空、哪個是化。由這一喻推開去，色乃至一切種智都是化；再推開去，出世間的三十七品、三解脫門、十力無畏不共法，以至須陀洹乃至諸佛，也都是化。須菩提追到最後一步，問：那麼有沒有一法不是變化？佛答得極簡：「若法無生無滅，是非變化。」——「無誑相涅槃，是法非變化。」
問題到這裡纔真正立起來。須菩提立刻引佛自己說過的話回難：諸法平等，非聲聞作乃至非諸佛作，有佛無佛諸法性常空，而「性空即是涅槃」；既然性空就是涅槃，性空又明明是一切法的通相，那麼何以單說涅槃一法不如化？佛的答語只一句，卻是全品的樞紐：若新發意菩薩聽聞一切法畢竟性空乃至涅槃亦皆如化，心則驚怖，「為是新發意菩薩故，分別生滅者如化、不生滅者不如化」。也就是說，「涅槃不如化」不是與『一切法如化』並立的另一個判斷，而是一句對人說的話。
論主接下來所作的，是把這一句『對人說的話』的分寸逐層守住。他一面說明何以要用對治悉檀教化眾生而不壞第一義，一面把「化」的內容開成六種變化逐目落實，又分出近因遠因以解煩惱何以能生善業，末後回到涅槃一段，給出『著涅槃者說涅槃如化、無著心者說涅槃非如化』與『小乘以涅槃為實、大乘觀色等諸法皆如涅槃』兩重解釋，斷之曰「是故二說無咎」。全品最後落在一個反問上——「諸法先有今無耶？」新發意者所怖畏的，是修行到頭一場空；佛只用這一問，把「先有今無」的前提抽掉：本來自無，何處可失。
逐段解明
一、須菩提問平等無所為作，云何於平等中不動而行菩薩事。 品首即是全品之難。須菩提所問並非疑佛，是把兩句都出自佛口的話並排放出：一句「諸法平等、無所為作」，一句菩薩「行菩薩事，以布施、愛語、利益、同事」。讀經遇此等問，先要看出問者是拿佛語問佛語，不是拿己見問佛——這樣的問，答語必落在兩語如何並行，而不落在誰對誰錯。
二、佛可其言，說眾生自知則佛不用神力，末以無為性相即是空收。 佛先印可「是諸法平等、無所作」一句，隨即給出關鍵的假設語：「若是眾生自知諸法平等，佛不用神力」——利益眾生之所以有，正因眾生不自知。次歷數所拔所度：吾我想、五道生死乃至知者見者相、色相乃至識相、眼相乃至意相、地種相乃至識種相，末歸「遠離有為性相，令得無為性相，無為性相即是空」。此段須看住末句：所令得的無為性相仍是空，故拔度之事並未在平等之外別立一法。
三、須菩提問用何等空故一切法空。 須菩提不問『空不空』，問的是「用何等空」。此問極有分量：空之一字人人會說，而所依之空各各不同——這正是下文論主要展開的地方。讀者於此可先自問一句：我所說的空，是哪一種空？
四、佛答遠離一切法相，並設化人作化人之問。 佛的答語分兩截：先正答「菩薩遠離一切法相，用是空故一切法空」，再立喻反問——「若有化人作化人，是化頗有實事不空者不？」此處不作說理而作設問，是要問者自己說出答案；凡經中佛反問處，讀者宜先停下自答，再看下文。
五、須菩提答是化人無有實事而不空。 須菩提答得乾脆：沒有。此答看似平常，實則已把全品的結論先說了一半——所化者無實，能化者亦無實，化上加化仍是無實。下文一切法皆是化之說，所依者即此一答。
六、空及化人二事不合不散，以空空故空，色乃至一切種智即是化。 佛承其答而出三層：其一、空與化「不合不散」，不是兩物相合，也不是兩物分離；其二、「以空空故空，不應分別是空、是化」，連「空」這一邊也不許執取；其三、由是推至「色即是化，受、想、行、識即是化，乃至一切種智即是化」。三層一路收緊，末層已把佛果之智也收入化中。
七、須菩提問出世間法及賢聖人亦是化不。 須菩提聽出了推論的走向，立刻舉出最不容易被說成「化」的一批法：四念處乃至十八不共法、並諸法果，以及須陀洹乃至諸佛。他不是不信，是要佛把話說到底。讀經至此當學此種問法：把結論推到自己最不願放手之處，再請問。
八、佛答一切法皆是化，並開聲聞辟支佛菩薩諸佛煩惱業因緣六種變化。 佛不但答「一切法皆是化」，還隨即把「化」開成六類：聲聞法變化、辟支佛法變化、菩薩摩訶薩法變化、諸佛法變化、煩惱法變化、業因緣法變化。此處要看出佛的用意：說一切皆化，不是把種種法混作一團，種種差別仍在化中歷然，這正是下文論主答『何以有種種別異』之所本。
九、須菩提問諸煩惱斷皆是變化不。 須菩提再退一步問「斷」：四沙門果、辟支佛、佛道斷諸煩惱習——這些「斷」也是變化嗎？所以特問斷者，因為斷是無為之相，不同於有為之生。此問問得準，故引出下文以生滅相為判準的一答。
十、佛答若有法生滅相者皆是變化。 佛不逐條答那些斷，只給判準：「若有法生滅相者，皆是變化。」一句判準勝過百條列舉——凡有生有滅，即是變化。讀者得此一語，前面所列一切法皆可自判，不必更問。
十一、須菩提問何等法非變化。 既有判準，須菩提便反向追問：那麼何等法不是變化？此問是全品最關鍵的一轉——前此所說皆是「是」，自此而下要說一個「非」。
十二、佛答若法無生無滅是非變化。 佛仍以判準作答，只把前語反過來說：無生無滅者非變化。此答仍未指名任何一法，只給界說；讀經者宜留意：佛在此處守得極穩，不肯先出名目。
十三、須菩提問何等是不生不滅非變化。 須菩提追問名目：究竟哪一法是不生不滅、不是變化的？這一問是他親手把下文的難題引出來的——名目一出，執取便有處可著。
十四、佛答無誑相涅槃是法非變化。 佛至此纔出名目：「無誑相涅槃，是法非變化。」此句有一限定語不可略過——所說的是「無誑相」之涅槃，不是一個與生死相對而別有自體的涅槃。下文論主釋此語云「是法無生故無滅，無滅故不能令人生憂」，正是順此限定語而說。
十五、須菩提引佛自說性空即是涅槃為難。 須菩提立刻以佛語難佛語：佛自說諸法平等非聲聞作乃至非諸佛作、有佛無佛諸法性常空，而「性空即是涅槃」；既然如此，何以又說涅槃一法不如化？此難極正——若性空即是涅槃，涅槃便不能在性空之外別有一席。
十六、佛答為新發意菩薩故，分別生滅者如化、不生滅者不如化。 佛先全盤承認難者所引之語皆是佛說，然後說出所以然：新發意菩薩聞一切法畢竟性空乃至涅槃亦皆如化，心則驚怖，所以纔作此分別。此答要讀準：佛沒有收回「涅槃亦皆如化」，只是說對某一種人先不這樣說。
十七、須菩提問云何教新發意菩薩令知是性空。 得此一答，須菩提的問題便自然轉向教法：既然分別是為新發意者而設，那麼究竟該怎樣教他，纔能令他知道性空而不驚怖？全品由義理之辯轉入教化之方，樞紐在此一問。
十八、佛反問諸法本有今無耶。 經段以佛的一個反問作結，不作陳述：「諸法本有今無耶？」此語不是問須菩提，是把新發意者心中的錯誤前提點出來——他所以怖畏，是先認定諸法本有而今說為無。經文至此戛然而止，其義由論主接說。
十九、問答一之問：佛先已答，須菩提今何以更問。 論主起釋，第一問即問須菩提何以重問。所重問者，論主逐字牒出：「世尊！若諸法平等，無所作為，云何菩薩於諸法平等中不動而大利益眾生？」凡論主為一問立問，即是提示讀者此問並非閒文，下文必有著落。
二十、問答一之答：以是事難解故，雖先說而更問。 答語只一句，卻立下一條讀經的通則：難解之事，經中容許重問，重問不是文字重出。讀者遇經中同一義再三出現，當先想此語，不宜輕判為繁複。
廿一、又經將訖，佛說深空凡夫聖人所不能行不能到，故有此難。 論主補出重問的第二層來歷：經將終了時，佛說「深空，凡夫、聖人所不能行、所不能到」，須菩提由此知一切法平等相決定是空，纔更覺菩薩住此而利益眾生為難。末二句是論主把難處說到最白：「平等法無作相，利益是有作相。」——全品之難，此十二字盡之。
廿二、佛可須菩提意，還以其問而答，出病人自知將適則藥師無功之喻。 論主釋佛答之法：不另立新義，就用問者自己的話答他——可其平等，答其利益眾生。所答之理是一個假設：若眾生自知諸法平等畢竟空，佛便無恩力可施。次出喻：「若病人自知將適，則藥師無功。」此喻要看清所比：藥師之功不在藥中，在病人之不自知；菩薩之作不在平等法上添一物，在眾生之不自知。
廿三、須菩提復問：若用平等利益眾生，則壞實相。 論主重牒須菩提之難而說得更盡：諸法實相畢竟空、無所能作，菩薩若拿這平等去利益眾生，豈不壞了實相？此難比經文所問更進一層——前問是「云何能」，此問是『若能則壞』。
廿四、佛答不以實相利益眾生，論主判為對治悉檀與第一義悉檀之別。 佛答菩薩不是以諸法實相去利益眾生，只因眾生不知畢竟空，故教誨令知。論主隨即判定兩邊所據：菩薩教化眾生是對治悉檀，須菩提所難是以第一義悉檀中無所利益而難。一難一答本不同層，此判一出，難自消。讀論遇兩說相持，先問兩說各據何層，往往不必判是非。
廿五、佛答眾生顛倒不知，佛但破其顛倒，是名眾生空。 論主續釋：佛所作者只是破顛倒，並不說『這是實』。菩薩住平等相中，遠離我相乃至知者見者相，論主標其名曰「眾生空」，並說以此一切無吾我之法教化眾生。此段要記住一句：破顛倒不等於立真實——利益眾生之事全在破的一邊。
廿六、眾生有愛多見多二種，故次說五眾十二入十八界，是名法空。 論主分眾生為二類以釋經文次第：愛多者得無我法即生厭離，作念「若無我，何用餘物！」；見多者雖知無我，仍於色等法中戲論常與無常，故經文次說色相、五眾、十二入、十八界，乃至遠離有為性相而得無為性相，論主標其名曰「法空」。二空之名至此分明：前段對治愛，此段對治見。
廿七、問答二之問：須菩提何以作是問「用何等空故一切法空」。 論主第二問，問的正是經文第三段的那一問。此問看似問經文，實則是要引出當時諸家對「空」的不同說法——論主設問的用意，常在為下文的並陳鋪路。
廿八、問答二之答：空有種種，或眾生空或法空，或言色空中有微塵根本在。 論主答以「空有種種」，先舉粗喻：火中無水、水中無火，是一種空；五眾中無我，也是一種空。次分眾生空與法空。再出一家異說：「諸法雖空，亦不盡空，如色空中有微塵根本在。」——空到微塵而止，仍留一個根本。須菩提之問，正為簡別此等說法而發。此說並陳而不判，讀者可自照：我所說的空，有沒有留下一個不肯空的根本？
廿九、佛答以無所得畢竟空故遠離一切相，二空故一切法無不空。 論主引佛答為斷：「以無所得畢竟空故，遠離一切相。」並收前文二空——以眾生空、法空二者故，一切法無不空。此處「無所得」三字是關鍵：空之所以能盡，正因不於空中更有所得。
三十、問答三之問：若爾者，此中何以說「離一切法相」。 論主第三問，問得極細：既說一切法空，何以經文又說「離一切法相」？——空是法本來如此，離卻像是另作一番工夫，兩語似不相順。凡讀經覺兩語不相順處，正是要處。
卅一、問答三之答：一切法不可盡壞，但離其邪憶想，一切法自離。 論主答得斬截：法不是被人壞掉的，所離者是邪憶想，邪憶想一離，一切法自離。次出二證：如有神通的人壞色相故石壁無礙；如佛說「汝等當於五眾中修正憶念，斷貪欲，得正解脫」。此段最可救一種誤修——以為修空是把法一件件除掉；論主明說所除者在憶想一邊。
卅二、須菩提聞是心驚，謂聖人應有少許實，亦為新發意菩薩故問。 論主補出須菩提聽到此處的心境：一切法若大若小都無本實，凡夫虛妄可說無實，聖人總該有少許實罷？論主隨即為他分解：須菩提雖是阿羅漢而深貴佛法，此問亦為新發意菩薩而發。讀者於此可放心承認自己的『總該有一點實』之心——連須菩提處也記下了這一念。
卅三、佛知其意，故說譬喻，反問如化人復作化。 論主釋佛何以在此處出喻：因知須菩提心中所疑，欲明了此事，故設譬而反問——「於汝意云何？如化人復作化，是化有本實不空不？」譬喻不是修辭，是為破一個具體的心念而設；凡見佛出喻，宜先找出所破之念。
卅四、答言不也，空及化人二事不合不散，用空空故空。 論主牒出答語：「不也！是化無有實事而不空者。空及化人二事，不合不散，皆空故，用空空故空。」此答之要在「不合不散」四字——不說空與化是一，也不說是二；一則失其差別，二則立其對待。
卅五、問答四之問：何以名為「空空故空」。 論主第四問，專問「空空」一名。此名最易被讀成空上再加一層空，論主單獨立問，正為防此誤。
卅六、問答四之答：為破十八事實故有十八空，破眾生心中變化空法故用空空。 論主答出空空的來歷：十八空原是為破十八事之實而立，而眾生於「變化是空」這一法上又起執著，故更用空空破之。可見空空所破者不是法，是人於空上所起之著。
卅七、世間人知幻化不久住故名空，凡夫以餘法為實故以化為喻，聖人則不得以化為喻。 論主續說以化為喻的分際：世人本來就知道幻化不久住、無所能作而名之為空，只是仍以其餘之法為實，所以纔拿化來作比，令他知道餘法與化無異。若如聖人所解，則連這個喻也不得用了，因為聖人無所分別。末引佛語收束：「色、受、想、行、識無不是化，以空故。」此段給了譬喻一條退場的路：喻為破執而設，執去則喻亦不留。
卅八、須菩提白佛：凡夫法虛妄應如化，出世間法及其果與能行之人亦如化耶。 論主牒經文之問而說得更有層次：四念處等從因緣邊生故如化，那麼此法之果——涅槃，也如化嗎？能起此行的人——須陀洹乃至佛，也如化嗎？三層一問到底：法、果、人。此處已先伏下涅槃一難的種子。
卅九、佛答有為無為及諸賢聖皆是化，此義從初品已來處處廣說。 論主引佛答而加一句判語：此義從初品以來處處廣說，故言「一切法空，皆如化」。此語提醒讀者：本品所說並非新出之義，是全論一貫之說在此處收結。
四十、問答五之問：若一切法皆空如化，何以故有種種諸法別異。 論主第五問，問的是最實際的疑：既然皆空如化，眼前種種差別從何而來？此問不答，則空之說便與所見相違。
四一、問答五之答：化有形像別異，夢中所見、鏡中之像亦然，諸法雖空而各各有因緣。 論主連出三喻：佛所化與餘人所化雖不實而形像各異；夢中好惡之事有令人喜者、有令人怖者；鏡中之像雖無實事而隨本形有好有醜。末結一句：「諸法亦如是，雖空而各各有因緣。」三喻同指一義——不實與差別可以並存，差別出於因緣，不出於實體。
四二、如佛此中說六種變化。 論主回牒經文六變化之語為下文逐目之綱：「是化法中，有聲聞變化、有辟支佛變化、有菩薩變化、有佛變化、有煩惱變化、有業變化。是故一切法皆是變化。」以下四段即逐目解之。
四三、聲聞變化者，三十七品四聖諦乃至三解脫門。 論主先釋聲聞變化，並說其所以為化之理：聲聞人住持戒中，以禪定攝心而求涅槃，觀內外身不淨是為身念處，如是等法為涅槃故勤精進而生起。斷語在末一句：「是法本無而今有、已有還無，是為聲聞變化。」——判為化者，正因其本無今有、已有還無。
四四、辟支佛變化、菩薩變化、佛法變化、煩惱變化逐目。 論主接說其餘四目：辟支佛變化者，觀十二因緣等諸法，所以與聲聞分者，因其智慧深於聲聞；菩薩變化者，六波羅蜜及報得、修得二種神通；佛法變化者，三十二相、八十隨形好、十力、一切種智等無量佛法；煩惱變化者，煩惱起種種業——善業、不善業、無記業，畢定業、不畢定業，善業、不善業、無動業等無量諸業。四目所舉皆是本論明文，讀者可逐目自檢：所列之法無一不是本無今有。
四五、問答六之問：諸煩惱是惡法，云何能生善業無動業。 論主第六問，問的是煩惱變化一目留下的難處：煩惱既是惡法，末目卻說它能起善業與無動業，惡因何以得善果？
四六、問答六之答：有近因遠因二種。 論主答以二因：人有我心，為後身當得常樂而修布施，這是近因；為離欲界衰惱不淨之身而修禪定，這是遠因。二因之立，是把『煩惱生善業』說成有次第的兩重——所生的不是善本身，是趣善之行；而發動此行者仍是我心。
四七、復有人言：一切凡夫皆以我心和合故起業。 論主引第一則異說以廣其義：凡夫起業，無不以我心和合為緣。此說並陳而不判，其作用在把上答的「人有我心」推為通說。
四八、有人言：無有離我心起第六識，我心即是諸煩惱根本。 第二則異說更進一層：第六識之起不能離我心，住我心故起第六識，故我心即是諸煩惱之根本。二說相次而列，一說其緣，一說其本。讀論遇連出之「有人言」，當看其相次之勢，不必急著選取一說。
四九、問答七之問：垢淨不得和合，何以言住我心中能起善業。 論主第七問，把難處逼到極處：煩惱是垢心，善心是淨心，垢淨既不得和合，何以說住在我心之中能起善業？此問若不破，前答之近因遠因便無立足之地。
五十、問答七之答：一切心皆與慧俱生，無明心中亦應有慧。 論主答以一個現成的反例：一切心都與慧俱生，那麼無明心中也應當有慧——慧與無明正是相違之法，卻在一心之中生起。既有此例，則相違二法同起於一心並非不可能。此答之法可記：破『必不相容』之斷言，只須舉出一個實有的同在。
五一、淨垢亦如是，我心無記柔軟故，煩惱心中生善業無動業無咎。 論主由慧與無明推至淨與垢，並補出凡夫的實情：未得聖道者，怎能離我心而行善？在瞋等煩惱之中固然不得行善，而我心「無記柔軟」，不同於瞋等之剛強，所以煩惱心中生起善業、無動業並無過咎。「無記柔軟」四字是此一難的關竅——所以能容善者，正因其不定於惡。
五二、業變化者生一切果報法，所謂六道，上中下各有分別。 論主釋業變化一目：業生一切果報之法，所謂六道——惡業果報是三惡道，善業果報是三善道。惡業有上中下，上者地獄、中者畜生、下者餓鬼；善業亦有上中下，上者天、中者人、下者阿修羅等。上善業有種種輕重等分別，上惡業亦有輕重差別。末以「次第輕重，如地獄中說；餘道亦如〈分別業品〉中說」指路，不在此重出。六道之義解一一皆依本論此段明文，不假他說。
五三、問答八之問：若從業有，何以言變化。 論主第八問：果報既是從業而有，有因有果歷然，何以又說是變化？此問代讀者而發——業果之實感，是最難說成如化的一處。
五四、問答八之答：聖人以天眼觀眾生皆無有終、始、中間，如化主遠處作變化。 論主答分兩層：凡夫見諸法不如化，聖人知畢竟空相故，以天眼觀眾生「皆無有終、始、中間」。次出喻：如化主在遠處作變化，業亦如是，在過去世中作今身的變化。此喻極精——化主與所化之間隔著距離，故所化者不自知其所從來；眾生於前世之業亦然。
五五、如變化事令人生憂喜怖畏，智者觀之皆無有實。 論主續申前喻：變化之事能種種令人生憂、生喜、生怖畏，而智者觀之都無有實，人卻橫生憂喜，「是人可笑」。末結「業亦如是，是故說業變化」。此段把譬喻落到心行上——所笑者不是業，是對著無實之事而生的那一番憂喜。
五六、問答九之問：是諸變化皆業所作，何以不但說業變化。 論主第九問，問經文何以不把六變化併作一項：既然種種變化皆由業作，只說「業變化」豈不簡明？
五七、問答九之答：業有淨業垢業二種。 論主先以淨垢分之：淨業者，聲聞變化乃至佛變化；垢業就是煩惱變化。一分之下，六目已可收為兩類。
五八、復次，有凡夫業聖人業二種。 論主再出一分法：凡夫業是煩惱變化；聖人業，須陀洹乃至佛。二分與前一分所取之義不同——前者分業之性，此者分作業之人。並列二分而不判其優劣，是本論常法。
五九、是故雖皆是業變化而廣分別無咎，結一切法空皆如化。 論主收此一問：既可分而分，廣說並無過咎。末引經文為結：「是故，須菩提！當知一切法空皆如化。」廣與略各有其用——略以顯其一貫，廣以顯其差別，兩不相礙。
六十、須菩提復問諸聖人煩惱斷是諸斷皆如化不。 論主重牒經文之問：須陀洹果乃至阿羅漢果、辟支佛道，斷一切煩惱習——這些斷都如化嗎？此處所問者與第九段所問同一事，而在論中重出，是因下文論主要為這一問補出問者的心念。
六一、須菩提意：有為虛誑故如化，無為真實無作故不應是化。 論主點出問者心中所據：有為法虛誑所以如變化，無為法真實無作所以不應是化。此一念是全品後半一切難問的根——把「無作」讀成了『有一個真實無作的東西在』。
六二、佛答一切法若生若滅皆如化，論主釋以無自性故畢竟空。 論主引佛答而自釋其理：所以如化者，本無今有、今有後無，誑惑人心故；又申佛意——一切從因緣生法皆無自性，無自性故畢竟空，畢竟空故皆如化。此處給出的是一條完整的理路：因緣生、無自性、畢竟空、皆如化，四事相貫，可作全品的骨。
六三、須菩提求諸法實相意猶未息，問何等法不如化。 論主再點問者之心：須菩提意謂有一決定實法不如化，可依此法而精進求。此語說得極體貼——求道者總想尋一個可依可靠之處，這不是過失，而是一個必須被看破的念。
六四、佛答有，若法無生無滅即是非化，唯有涅槃一法非如化。 論主牒佛答並自問自答其名目：「何者是？所謂無誑相涅槃。」次釋其相：是法無生故無滅，無滅故不能令人生憂。末以一句總斷：佛分別一切有為法畢竟空皆如化，唯有涅槃一法非如化。此段須與第十六段合看——此處所立，正是下文所要重新安頓的。
六五、爾時須菩提引佛說平等法非佛所作、性空相即是涅槃。 論主重牒須菩提之難語：如佛所說「平等法，非佛所作，非聲聞、辟支佛所作，有佛、無佛諸法常住性空相」，而性空相就是涅槃。引佛語難佛語，其力最大——所引既是佛自說，答者不能以『非我所說』推之。
六六、須菩提意：涅槃亦空，上品中處處說，今何以說唯一涅槃不如化。 論主補出難者的全副心思：深入般若之中，涅槃亦空，這是上品處處說過的；如今忽說唯一涅槃不如化，便與前說相違。故引佛語為難——性空者即是涅槃，何以於生滅法中別說無誑相涅槃不如化？此段把難處說得毫無餘地，正是要逼出下文那一句「為新發意菩薩故」。
六七、佛答諸法平等常住非賢聖所作，為新學菩薩恐怖故分別說。 論主牒佛答：諸法平等常住，非賢聖所作；若新學菩薩聞則恐怖，是故分別說生滅者如化、不生滅者不如化。答語中沒有一字收回前說，只多出一個所為之人。凡佛語前後似相違處，先找這個『為誰而說』。
六八、問答十之問：佛是無誑人，何以說一切法都空或說不都空。 論主第十問，問得最重：唯佛一人是無誑之人，一切人都到佛這裡求實事，如今忽說都空、忽說不都空，豈不令人無所適從？此問代一切疑者而發，不可略過。
六九、問答十之答：佛此中自說因緣，為新發意菩薩故說涅槃不如化。 論主答得極省：不必別求解釋，佛在這裡面自己說出了因緣——「為新發意菩薩故，說涅槃不如化。」凡經中自帶因緣語處，論主必先指出，不另立解；讀者亦當先向經文自身求答。
七十、問答十一之問：可為人故轉諸法相耶。 論主第十一問，把難處推到最後一步：即使是為人而說，難道可以為了人而把諸法之相轉掉嗎？——若法相可隨人而轉，佛語便無定準。這是全品最尖的一問。
七一、問答十一之答：性空云何可轉，佛初得實相時心趣涅槃，諸佛諸天請佛住世，故知隨事為說。 論主先正破：佛於此中說「諸法相者性空」，性空既是性空，如何可轉？法相本身動不得。次以佛自身的一段事為證：佛初得諸法實相時，心但趣向涅槃寂滅，是時十方諸佛、諸天請佛莫入涅槃——「一切眾生苦惱，當度脫之！」佛即受請，但為度眾生故住。由此可知，所隨者是事，不是法相。此段答得極好：不轉法相而仍可隨事為說，兩事並行不悖。
七二、有新發意菩薩著涅槃而起煩惱，為斷是著故說涅槃如化。 論主給出第一重解釋，並且把方向倒過來說：觀諸有為法虛誑故，涅槃為實、不變不異；有新發意菩薩因此著於涅槃，因著而起諸煩惱，為斷此著故說涅槃如化；若無著心，這時則說涅槃非如化。前文所說是『為怖畏者說不如化』，此處所說是『為執著者說如化』——兩說相反而同出一法，所隨者唯在聞者之病。
七三、復次，有小乘大乘二道，小乘以涅槃為實，大乘觀色等諸法皆如涅槃。 論主給出第二重解釋：二道論議不同——小乘論議以涅槃為實，大乘論議以利智慧深入故，觀色等諸法皆如涅槃。此語的方向亦要看準：不是說大乘把涅槃拉下來同於諸法，是說大乘把諸法看作皆如涅槃。
七四、是故二說無咎。 論主以四字收全段。「二說無咎」不是含糊兩可，是前文已逐一指出兩說各為何人、各據何道；所以無咎者，因其各有所對，而非因其可以不辨。
七五、須菩提復問云何教化新發意菩薩令知平等性空。 經文之末問在論中重出，論主由此轉入全品最後一段——教法。義理之辯至此已畢，剩下的是怎樣把這法給得出去。
七六、須菩提意：性空是凡夫大怖畏處，如臨深坑。 論主補出此問的心境：性空是凡夫人的大怖畏處，聞性空無所有，如臨深坑。何以故？一切未得道者我心深著，故怖畏空法，作是念——「佛教人勤修善行，終歸入無所有中！」此一念說得極真切：怖畏空者所怕的不是空，是修行到頭一場落空。
七七、佛答諸法先有今無耶。 佛不作安慰之語，只還他一問：「諸法先有今無耶？」凡人之怖，多起於一個未經檢查的前提；佛所作的，是把前提提出來令他自看。
七八、佛意：以新發意者怖畏後當無故說。 論主釋佛此問之意：新發意者所怖畏的是「後當無」，故以「先有今無耶」一問直指其病。問之所以為答，正在此處——病在何念，問即指何念。
七九、須菩提自了了知諸法先自無今亦無，為除顛倒故不應恐怖。 論主以須菩提之知見收束全品：諸法先自無、今亦無，只因新發意者為我見心所覆而生驚怖；為除顛倒，令得實見，畢竟無所失；知諸煩惱顛倒之實相即是性空，這時便沒有恐怖。末以一段教誨之語作結：若諸法先有，因行道故無，那纔應當恐怖；本來自無，就不應恐怖，「但為除顛倒耳」。全品自「諸法平等、無所為作」起，至「但為除顛倒耳」止——所作者唯在除顛倒，此外無一法可得可失。
不要讀錯
不要把「一切法皆是化」讀成一切法都不存在。論主已把差別與不實並列說明：化人所化雖不實而有種種形像別異，夢中所見有令人喜者、有令人怖者，鏡中之像隨本形而有好有醜，末結「諸法亦如是，雖空而各各有因緣」。所破者是實體之見，不是眼前的差別。若讀成一切都無，則六種變化之逐目、六道果報之上中下，通通失去著落。
不要把「涅槃一法非如化」讀成涅槃是一個實有的東西。佛所立的名目帶著限定語——「無誑相涅槃」；論主釋之亦只說「是法無生故無滅，無滅故不能令人生憂」，並未說它有自體。更要緊的是佛自己給出的因緣：「為新發意菩薩故，說涅槃不如化。」既是為人而說，便不可反過來當作一個獨立的判斷來守。
不要把『為新發意菩薩故分別』讀成佛說了兩套法。論主給的兩重解釋正好方向相反：為怖畏一切皆空者，說不生滅者不如化；為著於涅槃而起煩惱者，說涅槃如化。若是兩套法，二者必相礙；正因所治者是二病而所依者是一法，纔能說「是故二說無咎」。讀者若自守一句而斥另一句，恰恰落在論主所破之處。
不要把『煩惱能生善業』讀成惡法可以直接成善。論主的答語有嚴密的層次：近因遠因所說的是我心為緣而起趣善之行；「一切心皆與慧俱生」所破的是垢淨必不相容的斷言；末句所依的是「我心無記柔軟」——所以能容善者，是因其無記而不定，不是因為煩惱本身是善。若略去「無記柔軟」四字，此段便成了惡能生善的濫說。
不要把「離一切法相」讀成把法一件件除掉。論主明說「一切法不可盡壞，但離其邪憶想，一切法自離」，並引佛語「汝等當於五眾中修正憶念，斷貪欲，得正解脫」為證。所斷者是貪欲，所修者是正憶念，法本身不在所壞之列。此一分寸若失，修行便成與境相角，愈角愈牢。
不要把末段的「不應恐怖」讀成一句安慰。佛所給的不是安慰，是一個反問——「諸法先有今無耶？」論主釋得極清楚：若諸法先有，因行道故無，那纔應當恐怖；初自無故，不應恐怖。恐怖之所以能除，是因為「先有」這個前提根本不成立，不是因為有人來寬慰。
修行作用
第一件受用，是把「生滅相」當作現成的判準用。佛在本品給的判準只一句——有生滅相者皆是變化，無生無滅者非變化。日用之中凡覺得某一法特別真實、特別靠得住時，可就此一問：它有沒有生、有沒有滅？本無今有、已有還無者，即在化中。此判準不須學問，隨處可驗。
第二件受用，是認出自己心中那個『總該有一點實』的念。須菩提聞一切法無本實而心驚，謂凡夫虛妄可無實事、聖人應有少許實；論主不但不呵，還為他分解。行人於此可放心承認此念之有，而後看住它：它一起，便會為自己尋一個決定實法「可依是法而精進求」——第六三段所說的，正是這一念的去處。
第三件受用，是學論主分層的答法。須菩提以第一義悉檀無利益為難，菩薩教化眾生是對治悉檀，兩者本不同層，論主一判而難自消。日常與人論法，遇兩說相持不下時，可先不論是非，只問兩說各據何層、各為何人而發；分層一明，爭處多半自息。
第四件受用，是把譬喻用完就放下。論主說世人本知幻化不久住，故以化為喻令知餘法與化無異；又說如聖人所解，則不得以化為喻，以無所分別故。譬喻是為破執而設的方便，不是所修之法。行人修觀時借喻入手，觀成之後不必守喻——守喻即成新執。
第五件受用，是把末段那一問拿來自問。聞空而生怖者，心裡實有一個「先有」的底子——以為自己本有些什麼，修到後來都要失去。可持佛所問自照：諸法先有今無耶？若本來自無，則所謂失者何在？論主說得明白：為除顛倒，令得實見，「竟無所失」。此一照，正是本品給行人最切近的用處。
承衍
本品的骨幹，是一段經文與一段論釋。經①自須菩提問諸法平等無所為作云何於平等中不動而行菩薩事起，佛可其言而說眾生自知則佛不用神力、拔吾我想度諸相、遠離有為性相令得無為性相即是空；次問用何等空故一切法空，佛以化人作化人設喻，須菩提答是化無有實事而不空，佛說空與化二事不合不散、以空空故空、色乃至一切種智即是化；須菩提舉出世間法與賢聖人而問亦是化不，佛答一切法皆是化並開聲聞辟支佛菩薩諸佛煩惱業因緣六種變化；又問諸煩惱斷皆是變化不，佛以生滅相為判準而答有生滅者皆是變化、無生無滅者非變化、無誑相涅槃是法非變化；須菩提引佛自說性空即是涅槃為難，佛答為新發意菩薩故分別生滅者如化不生滅者不如化；末問云何教新發意菩薩令知是性空，佛反問諸法本有今無耶而止。論①以問答十一番為骨，間以牒經重釋：先答佛先已答何以更問而出平等無作相與利益有作相之難、藥師無功之喻、對治與第一義二悉檀之判、眾生空與法空之分；次答用何等空之問而陳空有種種與色空中有微塵根本在之異說；次答離一切法相之問而立但離邪憶想一義；次答空空故空之名而說破變化空法；次答一切法皆化何以有別異而出化人形像、夢中好惡、鏡中好醜三喻，並逐目釋六種變化；次答煩惱云何生善業而立近因遠因、引二則有人言、破垢淨不得和合而歸於我心無記柔軟；次釋業變化與六道上中下之果報，答從業有何以言變化而出化主遠處作變化之喻；次答何以不但說業變化而分淨垢二業、凡夫聖人二業；次重牒須菩提問諸斷如化與求一決定實法之意，釋佛答唯涅槃一法非如化；次答佛何以或說都空或說不都空而指佛自說之因緣，答可為人故轉諸法相耶而破性空不可轉、引佛初得實相諸天請住一事為證，並出著涅槃故說如化與小乘大乘二道二重解釋，斷以二說無咎；末釋新發意者怖畏性空如臨深坑，而以諸法先自無今亦無、但為除顛倒收全品。
本品與前後諸品的義脈，可見者有二線。其一、承前：上品明諸法平等之義，本品即以「若諸法平等、無所為作」起問，是承平等之說而問其用，故經文起手不別立端緒。其二、垂後：本品結於教新發意者知性空而不恐怖，次品乃入求法之事，讀者可合觀二品以見知見既正而後行事之次第。
古德之釋，本品可誌者二家。吉藏於《大品經義疏》中以此品為第二明涅槃果，其科判云：「此下第二、明涅槃果。」並陳一家之說云：「有人言：差別品明菩提即智果，謂般若也。」而自立其解云：「今明此品，即是總明三德為涅槃果也。」其科本品經文之大分云：「須菩提於意云何下第二正明諸法如化不如化。文為四：初、明一切如化無化差別；第二、明一切法如化差別；第三、明涅槃不如化；第四、明涅槃如化。」四分之中，第三、第四兩分正對本品後半兩重解釋；其標第三分云：「白佛下，第三、明一往，明無為法不如化。」標第四分云：「世尊如佛自設下，第四、論涅槃如化也。」其釋六種變化，則以凡聖二果分之云：「論云：凡聖德論皆是變化，垢果是凡化，淨果是聖化。」此與本論以淨業垢業、凡夫業聖人業二分者取義相近而所立之名不同，並錄不判。其釋末段之反問云：「本有今無耶者，始行人聞涅槃亦空，故生斷見，亦明涅槃本不有今不無，何斷之有？生死亦然。」——以斷見釋始行人之怖，與本論以我見心覆釋之者各取一義，亦並錄不判。又吉藏所標品名作「如化品第八十七」，無「涅槃」二字，與本論本品之題不同，其所依者是經本一系之品目。均正於《大乘四論玄義》中明點本品之名而約引其義云：「故大論釋大品，如化品云：為新發意菩薩說涅槃是真實善妙有也。」——所引非本品逐字之文，是就「為新發意菩薩故，說涅槃不如化」一義而以自家之語轉述，繫屬既明，誌錄不判。慧影之疏現存部分止於本論前段，未及本品，故本品無其釋文可引，據實標闕，不以他處之文充之。本品品題諸本異稱——聖本以本品為第八十六、石本題作「涅槃不如化」而與本論「涅槃如化」語意相對——及經本一系品目之異，詳考據層。
Nirvāṇa Is Like a Conjuration: Why Equality with Nothing to Be Done and Benefiting Beings Do Not Contradict Each Other; Why a Conjured Person Conjuring a Conjured Person Must Be Used to Answer That All Dharmas Are Empty; Why Empty Because of the Emptiness of Emptiness Is Not Adding Emptiness on Top of Emptiness; Why World-Transcending Dharmas and the Noble and Holy Persons Are Also Conjuration; Why the Six Kinds of Transformation Must Be Divided into Those of the Śrāvakas, the Pratyekabuddhas, the Bodhisattvas, the Buddhas, the Afflictions, and the Causes and Conditions of Deeds; Why the Mark of Arising and Ceasing Is Precisely the Criterion of Transformation; Why Nirvāṇa with the Mark of Non-deception Alone Is Singled Out and Said Not to Be Transformation; Why, Since the Emptiness of Nature Is Precisely Nirvāṇa, It Is Further Said That the One Dharma, Nirvāṇa, Is Not like a Conjuration; Why Distinguishing for the Sake of Bodhisattvas Who Have Newly Aroused the Mind Is Not Two Sets of Dharma; Why the Afflictions, Being Evil Dharmas, Can Give Rise to Wholesome Deeds and Unmoving Deeds; Why the Phrase the Mind of Self Is Indeterminate and Soft Is the Key to This Difficulty; Why the Transformation of Deeds Must Open Out into the Retribution of the Six Destinies; Why It Does Not Speak Only of the Transformation of Deeds but Divides Pure and Stained, Ordinary and Holy; Why, Because Some Cling to Nirvāṇa and Raise Up Afflictions, It Must Be Said That Nirvāṇa Is like a Conjuration; Why the Discussions of the Two Paths of the Small Vehicle and the Great Vehicle Have Two Sayings without Fault; and Why the One Question Did Dharmas Exist Before and Now Not Exist Can Remove the Fear of Those Who Have Newly Aroused the Mind
What Is Being Asked
The question this chapter asks is one that is extremely easy to pass over, yet it stands in the way of everyone who studies prajñā: since all dharmas are equal and there is nothing to be done, what footing is left for 「作」 tr. "doing"? Subhūti lays this question out plainly at the very start—dharmas are equal and there is nothing to be done; how can the bodhisattva practising prajñāpāramitā not move within equality and yet carry out the business of giving, kind speech, beneficial action, and shared endeavour? Equality has the mark of non-doing, while benefiting beings plainly has the mark of doing; as soon as the two are put side by side, they become a difficulty.
The Buddha's way of answering is not to mediate between the two sides, but to bring forward the word 「化」 tr. "conjuration". If there is a conjured person who in turn conjures a conjured person, does this conjuration have any real matter that is not empty? The answer is: none. Since there is none, then the two things, emptiness and conjuration, are 「不合不散」 tr. "neither joined nor dispersed", and there is no need to discriminate which is emptiness and which is conjuration. Pushing outward from this simile, form and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds are all conjuration; pushing further still, the world-transcending thirty-seven limbs of the path, the three gates of liberation, the ten powers, the fearlessnesses, and the unshared dharmas, and even the srota-āpanna and so on up to the buddhas, are also all conjuration. Subhūti pursues it to the last step and asks: then is there any one dharma that is not transformation? The Buddha answers with the utmost brevity: 「若法無生無滅，是非變化。」 tr. "If a dharma is without arising and without ceasing, it is not transformation."—「無誑相涅槃，是法非變化。」 tr. "Nirvāṇa with the mark of non-deception: this dharma is not transformation."
Only here does the question truly stand up. Subhūti at once cites words the Buddha himself had spoken to turn the difficulty back on him: dharmas are equal, not made by śrāvakas and so on up to not made by the buddhas; whether there is a Buddha or no Buddha, the nature of dharmas is ever empty; and 「性空即是涅槃」 tr. "the emptiness of nature is precisely nirvāṇa". Since the emptiness of nature is precisely nirvāṇa, and the emptiness of nature is plainly the common mark of all dharmas, why is the one dharma, nirvāṇa, alone said not to be like a conjuration? The Buddha's answer is a single sentence, yet it is the pivot of the whole chapter: if a bodhisattva who has newly aroused the mind hears that all dharmas are ultimately empty of nature, and so on up to nirvāṇa too being all like a conjuration, his mind is startled and afraid; 「為是新發意菩薩故，分別生滅者如化、不生滅者不如化」 tr. "it is for the sake of these bodhisattvas who have newly aroused the mind that I distinguish what arises and ceases as like a conjuration and what does not arise or cease as not like a conjuration". That is to say, 「涅槃不如化」 tr. "nirvāṇa is not like a conjuration" is not another judgement standing alongside ‘all dharmas are like a conjuration’, but a sentence spoken to people.
What the treatise-author does next is to keep, layer by layer, the measure of this one ‘sentence spoken to people’. On the one hand he explains why beings are taught and transformed by means of the siddhānta of counteraction without destroying the highest meaning; on the other he opens the content of 「化」 tr. "conjuration" into the six kinds of transformation and settles them item by item, and also distinguishes a near cause and a far cause to explain how the afflictions can give rise to wholesome deeds. At the end, returning to the section on nirvāṇa, he gives two layers of explanation—‘for one who clings to nirvāṇa it is said that nirvāṇa is like a conjuration; for one without a clinging mind it is said that nirvāṇa is not like a conjuration’ and ‘the Small Vehicle takes nirvāṇa as real; the Great Vehicle contemplates form and the other dharmas as all like nirvāṇa’—and settles it with 「是故二說無咎」 tr. "therefore the two sayings are without fault". The whole chapter finally comes to rest on a counter-question—「諸法先有今無耶？」 tr. "Did dharmas exist before and now not exist?" What those who have newly aroused the mind fear is that practice, at its end, comes to nothing; with this one question alone the Buddha draws away the premise of 「先有今無」 tr. "existing before and not existing now": from the first they are non-existent of themselves; where is there anything that can be lost?
Passage by Passage
1. Subhūti asks: dharmas are equal and there is nothing to be done; how does one, within equality, not move and yet carry out the bodhisattva's business? The head of the chapter is precisely the difficulty of the whole chapter. What Subhūti asks is not a doubt about the Buddha; he sets side by side two sayings that both came from the Buddha's mouth: one, 「諸法平等、無所為作」 tr. "dharmas are equal and there is nothing to be done"; the other, that the bodhisattva 「行菩薩事，以布施、愛語、利益、同事」 tr. "practises the bodhisattva's business, by giving, kind speech, beneficial action, and shared endeavour". When reading a sūtra and meeting a question of this kind, one must first see that the questioner is questioning the Buddha's words with the Buddha's words, not questioning the Buddha with his own views—for such a question, the answer is bound to come to rest on how the two sayings proceed together, not on who is right and who is wrong.
2. The Buddha approves his words, says that if beings knew of themselves the Buddha would not use his supernormal power, and at the end gathers it up with the marks of the unconditioned nature being precisely emptiness. The Buddha first approves the sentence 「是諸法平等、無所作」 tr. "these dharmas are equal and there is nothing to be done", and at once gives the key hypothetical: 「若是眾生自知諸法平等，佛不用神力」 tr. "if these beings themselves knew that dharmas are equal, the Buddha would not use his supernormal power"—benefiting beings exists precisely because beings do not know of themselves. Next he enumerates what they are pulled out of and delivered from: the notion of I and self; the birth and death of the five destinies and so on up to the marks of a knower and a seer; the mark of form and so on up to the mark of consciousness; the mark of the eye and so on up to the mark of the mind; the mark of the earth element and so on up to the mark of the consciousness element; at the end it comes home to 「遠離有為性相，令得無為性相，無為性相即是空」 tr. "he makes them far from the marks of the conditioned nature and makes them obtain the marks of the unconditioned nature; the marks of the unconditioned nature are precisely emptiness". In this passage one must keep one's eye on the last sentence: the marks of the unconditioned nature that they are made to obtain are still emptiness, so the business of pulling out and delivering does not set up a separate dharma outside equality.
3. Subhūti asks by what emptiness all dharmas are empty. Subhūti does not ask ‘empty or not empty’; what he asks is 「用何等空」 tr. "by what emptiness". This question carries great weight: everyone can say the one Chinese character ‘emptiness’, but the emptiness each relies on differs from one to another—and this is exactly what the treatise-author will unfold below. Here the reader may first ask himself one question: the emptiness I speak of, which kind of emptiness is it?
4. The Buddha answers with being far from the marks of all dharmas, and sets the question of a conjured person conjuring a conjured person. The Buddha's answer is in two parts: first he answers directly, 「菩薩遠離一切法相，用是空故一切法空」 tr. "the bodhisattva is far from the marks of all dharmas; by this emptiness all dharmas are empty", and then sets up a simile and asks in return—「若有化人作化人，是化頗有實事不空者不？」 tr. "If there were a conjured person who conjured a conjured person, would this conjuration have any real matter that is not empty?" Here he does not reason but poses a question, wanting the questioner to speak the answer himself; wherever the Buddha asks in return in the sūtras, the reader should first stop and answer for himself, and then look at what follows.
5. Subhūti answers that this conjured person has no real matter that is not empty. Subhūti answers cleanly: none. This answer looks ordinary, but in fact it has already spoken half of the conclusion of the whole chapter in advance—what is conjured is unreal, what conjures is also unreal, and conjuration added onto conjuration is still unreal. The teaching below that all dharmas are conjuration relies on precisely this one answer.
6. The two things, emptiness and the conjured person, are neither joined nor dispersed; empty because of the emptiness of emptiness; form and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds are precisely conjuration. The Buddha takes up his answer and brings out three layers. First, emptiness and conjuration are 「不合不散」 tr. "neither joined nor dispersed"—not two things joined together, nor two things separated. Second, 「以空空故空，不應分別是空、是化」 tr. "because of the emptiness of emptiness they are empty, and one should not discriminate: this is emptiness, this is conjuration"—not even the side of 「空」 tr. "emptiness" may be grasped. Third, from this it is pushed on to 「色即是化，受、想、行、識即是化，乃至一切種智即是化」 tr. "form is precisely conjuration; feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness are precisely conjuration; and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds, which is precisely conjuration". The three layers tighten all the way, and the last layer has already taken even the knowledge of the fruit of buddhahood into conjuration.
7. Subhūti asks whether world-transcending dharmas and the noble and holy persons are also conjuration. Subhūti hears where the reasoning is heading and at once brings forward the group of dharmas least easily said to be 「化」 tr. "conjuration": the four foundations of mindfulness and so on up to the eighteen unshared dharmas, together with the fruits of these dharmas, and the srota-āpanna and so on up to the buddhas. It is not that he does not believe; he wants the Buddha to say it through to the end. Reading the sūtra to this point, one should learn this way of asking: push the conclusion to the place where one is least willing to let go, and then ask.
8. The Buddha answers that all dharmas are conjuration, and opens out the six kinds of transformation: of the śrāvakas, the pratyekabuddhas, the bodhisattvas, the buddhas, the afflictions, and the causes and conditions of deeds. The Buddha not only answers 「一切法皆是化」 tr. "all dharmas are conjuration", but at once opens 「化」 tr. "conjuration" into six classes: the transformation of the śrāvaka dharmas, the transformation of the pratyekabuddha dharmas, the transformation of the bodhisattva-mahāsattva dharmas, the transformation of the dharmas of the buddhas, the transformation of the dharmas of the afflictions, and the transformation of the dharmas of the causes and conditions of deeds. Here one must see the Buddha's intention: to say that all is conjuration is not to mix all kinds of dharmas into one lump; all kinds of distinctions remain clear and distinct within conjuration, and this is exactly what the treatise-author's answer below to ‘why there are all kinds of distinctions’ is based on.
9. Subhūti asks whether the severings of the afflictions are all transformation. Subhūti steps back once more and asks about 「斷」 tr. "severing": the four fruits of the śramaṇa, the pratyekabuddha, and the Buddha path sever the afflictions and their habitual residues—are these 「斷」 tr. "severings" also transformation? He asks specially about severing because severing has the mark of the unconditioned, unlike the arising of the conditioned. This question is precisely aimed, and so it draws out the answer below that takes the mark of arising and ceasing as the criterion.
10. The Buddha answers that if there is a dharma that has the mark of arising and ceasing, it is all transformation. The Buddha does not answer about those severings one by one; he gives only the criterion: 「若有法生滅相者，皆是變化。」 tr. "If there is a dharma that has the mark of arising and ceasing, it is all transformation." One sentence of criterion is worth more than a hundred items of enumeration—whatever has arising and has ceasing is transformation. Having gained this one saying, the reader can judge for himself all the dharmas listed earlier, with no need to ask further.
11. Subhūti asks what dharma is not transformation. Since there is a criterion, Subhūti then pursues it in the opposite direction: then what dharma is not transformation? This question is the most crucial turn of the whole chapter—everything said before this was 「是」 tr. "is", and from here on an 「非」 tr. "is not" has to be spoken.
12. The Buddha answers that if a dharma is without arising and without ceasing, this is not transformation. The Buddha still answers with the criterion, only stating the former words in reverse: what is without arising and without ceasing is not transformation. This answer still names no dharma; it gives only a definition. The reader should note: here the Buddha holds very steady and will not bring out a name first.
13. Subhūti asks what it is that is unarisen and unceasing and is not transformation. Subhūti presses for the name: which dharma, after all, is unarisen and unceasing and not transformation? It is by this question that he himself draws out the difficulty below—once a name appears, grasping has somewhere to attach.
14. The Buddha answers that nirvāṇa with the mark of non-deception is a dharma that is not transformation. Only here does the Buddha bring out the name: 「無誑相涅槃，是法非變化。」 tr. "Nirvāṇa with the mark of non-deception: this dharma is not transformation." This sentence has a qualifier that must not be passed over—what is spoken of is the nirvāṇa of 「無誑相」 tr. "the mark of non-deception", not a nirvāṇa that stands opposite birth and death and has a separate self-substance of its own. Below, the treatise-author explains this saying as 「是法無生故無滅，無滅故不能令人生憂」 tr. "because this dharma is without arising it is without ceasing; because it is without ceasing it cannot make people give rise to sorrow", speaking precisely in accord with this qualifier.
15. Subhūti cites the Buddha's own saying that the emptiness of nature is precisely nirvāṇa to make a difficulty. Subhūti at once makes a difficulty of the Buddha's words with the Buddha's words: the Buddha himself said that dharmas are equal, not made by śrāvakas and so on up to not made by the buddhas, that whether there is a Buddha or no Buddha the nature of dharmas is ever empty, and that 「性空即是涅槃」 tr. "the emptiness of nature is precisely nirvāṇa"; since that is so, why is it further said that the one dharma, nirvāṇa, is not like a conjuration? This difficulty is perfectly correct—if the emptiness of nature is precisely nirvāṇa, nirvāṇa cannot have a separate seat outside the emptiness of nature.
16. The Buddha answers that for the sake of bodhisattvas who have newly aroused the mind he distinguishes what arises and ceases as like a conjuration and what does not arise or cease as not like a conjuration. The Buddha first admits wholesale that the words the objector cites are all spoken by the Buddha, and then states why it is so: when a bodhisattva who has newly aroused the mind hears that all dharmas are ultimately empty of nature and so on up to nirvāṇa too being all like a conjuration, his mind is startled and afraid, and that is why this distinction is made. This answer must be read accurately: the Buddha has not taken back 「涅槃亦皆如化」 tr. "nirvāṇa too being all like a conjuration"; he is only saying that to a certain kind of person he does not speak this way first.
17. Subhūti asks how a bodhisattva who has newly aroused the mind is to be taught so that he knows this emptiness of nature. Having received this answer, Subhūti's question naturally turns toward the method of teaching: since the distinction is set up for those who have newly aroused the mind, how after all should he be taught so that he may know the emptiness of nature without being startled and afraid? The whole chapter turns from the debate on meaning to the means of teaching and transforming, and the pivot lies in this one question.
18. The Buddha asks in return whether dharmas existed from the first and now do not exist. The sūtra section ends with a counter-question of the Buddha's, not with a statement: 「諸法本有今無耶？」 tr. "Did dharmas exist from the first and now not exist?" These words are not asking Subhūti; they point out the mistaken premise in the mind of one who has newly aroused the mind—the reason he is afraid is that he has first taken it as settled that dharmas existed from the first and are now said to be non-existent. The sūtra text stops abruptly here, and its meaning is carried on by the treatise-author.
19. Question-and-answer one, the question: the Buddha has already answered before; why does Subhūti now ask again? The treatise-author begins his explanation, and his first question asks why Subhūti asks again. What is asked again, the treatise-author cites word for word: 「世尊！若諸法平等，無所作為，云何菩薩於諸法平等中不動而大利益眾生？」 tr. "World-Honored One! If dharmas are equal and there is nothing to be done, how can the bodhisattva not move within the equality of dharmas and yet greatly benefit beings?" Whenever the treatise-author sets up a question about a question, he is signalling to the reader that this question is not idle text, and below there will certainly be a place where it comes to rest.
20. Question-and-answer one, the answer: because this matter is hard to understand, although it was spoken of before he asks again. The answer is only one sentence, yet it lays down a general rule for reading the sūtras: in matters hard to understand, the sūtras permit asking again, and asking again is not a repetition of text. When the reader meets the same meaning appearing again and again in a sūtra, he should first think of these words, and should not lightly judge it to be redundant.
21. Again, the sūtra being about to end, the Buddha said that deep emptiness is where ordinary people and sages cannot go and cannot reach; hence this difficulty. The treatise-author supplies the second layer of the origin of the repeated question: when the sūtra was about to end, the Buddha said 「深空，凡夫、聖人所不能行、所不能到」 tr. "deep emptiness, where ordinary people and sages cannot go and cannot reach"; from this Subhūti knew that the mark of the equality of all dharmas is certainly empty, and only then felt all the more how difficult it is for the bodhisattva to abide in this and benefit beings. The last two sentences are where the treatise-author states the difficulty most plainly: 「平等法無作相，利益是有作相。」 tr. "The equal dharma has the mark of non-doing; benefiting has the mark of doing."—the difficulty of the whole chapter is exhausted in these twelve Chinese characters.
22. The Buddha approves Subhūti's meaning, answers with his own question, and brings out the simile that if the patient knows of himself how to tend himself, the physician has no work. The treatise-author explains the Buddha's method of answering: he does not set up a separate new meaning, but answers him with the questioner's own words—approving his equality and answering his benefiting of beings. The principle of the answer is a hypothesis: if beings themselves knew that dharmas are equal and ultimately empty, the Buddha would have no power of kindness to exert. Next comes the simile: 「若病人自知將適，則藥師無功。」 tr. "If the patient knows of himself how to tend himself, the physician has no work." In this simile one must see clearly what is being compared: the physician's work lies not in the medicine but in the patient's not knowing of himself; the bodhisattva's doing does not lie in adding one thing on top of the equal dharma, but in beings' not knowing of themselves.
23. Subhūti asks again: if equality is used to benefit beings, the real mark is destroyed. The treatise-author cites Subhūti's difficulty again and states it more fully: the real mark of all dharmas is ultimate emptiness and there is nothing it can do; if the bodhisattva takes this equality and uses it to benefit beings, would he not destroy the real mark? This difficulty goes one layer further than what the sūtra text asks—the former question was 「云何能」 tr. "how can he", while this question is ‘if he can, then it is destroyed’.
24. The Buddha answers that it is not by the real mark that beings are benefited, and the treatise-author judges it as the distinction between the siddhānta of counteraction and the siddhānta of the highest meaning. The Buddha answers that the bodhisattva does not benefit beings by the real mark of all dharmas; it is only because beings do not know ultimate emptiness that he teaches and instructs them so that they know it. The treatise-author at once judges what each side rests on: the bodhisattva teaching and transforming beings is the siddhānta of counteraction; Subhūti's difficulty is made on the ground that within the siddhānta of the highest meaning there is no benefit. The difficulty and the answer are from the first not on the same level; once this judgement is given, the difficulty dissolves of itself. When reading a treatise and meeting two sayings holding out against each other, first ask on which level each saying rests; often there is no need to judge right and wrong.
25. The Buddha answers that beings are inverted and do not know, and the Buddha only breaks their inversion; this is called the emptiness of beings. The treatise-author continues the explanation: what the Buddha does is only to break inversion; he does not say ‘this is real’. The bodhisattva abides within the mark of equality, far from the mark of a self and so on up to the marks of a knower and a seer; the treatise-author labels it by name as 「眾生空」 tr. "the emptiness of beings", and says that with this dharma, in which there is no I and self at all, he teaches and transforms beings. In this passage one sentence should be remembered: breaking inversion is not the same as setting up the true and real—the business of benefiting beings lies wholly on the side of breaking.
26. Beings are of two kinds, those in whom craving predominates and those in whom views predominate; hence next it speaks of the five aggregates, the twelve sense-fields, and the eighteen elements, and this is called the emptiness of dharmas. The treatise-author divides beings into two classes to explain the order of the sūtra text. Those in whom craving predominates, on obtaining the dharma of non-self, at once give rise to weariness and parting, and have the thought 「若無我，何用餘物！」 tr. "If there is no self, what use are the other things!" Those in whom views predominate, although they know non-self, still engage in idle discourse about form and the other dharmas as permanent and as impermanent; therefore the sūtra text next speaks of the mark of form, the five aggregates, the twelve sense-fields, the eighteen elements, and so on up to being far from the marks of the conditioned nature and obtaining the marks of the unconditioned nature, and the treatise-author labels it by name as 「法空」 tr. "the emptiness of dharmas". The names of the two emptinesses are now clear: the former passage counteracts craving; this passage counteracts views.
27. Question-and-answer two, the question: why does Subhūti ask this question, 「用何等空故一切法空」 tr. "by what emptiness are all dharmas empty" ? The treatise-author's second question asks about exactly the question in the third passage of the sūtra text. This question seems to be asking about the sūtra text, but in fact it is meant to draw out the different sayings about 「空」 tr. "emptiness" among the schools of the time—the intention behind the treatise-author's setting up a question is often to pave the way for the side-by-side presentation below.
28. Question-and-answer two, the answer: emptiness is of all kinds—sometimes the emptiness of beings, sometimes the emptiness of dharmas, or someone says that within the emptiness of form the root atoms remain. The treatise-author answers with 「空有種種」 tr. "emptiness is of all kinds", and first gives a coarse example: there is no water in fire and no fire in water—that is one kind of emptiness; there is no self in the five aggregates—that too is one kind of emptiness. Next he divides the emptiness of beings and the emptiness of dharmas. Then he brings out the different saying of one school: 「諸法雖空，亦不盡空，如色空中有微塵根本在。」 tr. "Though dharmas are empty, they are not wholly empty; as within the emptiness of form the root atoms remain."—emptiness stops at the atoms, and a root is still kept back. Subhūti's question is raised precisely to sift out sayings of this sort. This saying is set out side by side without judgement, and the reader may hold it up to himself: the emptiness I speak of, has it kept back a root that refuses to be empty?
29. The Buddha answers that by the ultimate emptiness of nothing to be attained one is far from all marks; because of the two emptinesses, there is no dharma that is not empty. The treatise-author cites the Buddha's answer as the settlement: 「以無所得畢竟空故，遠離一切相。」 tr. "By the ultimate emptiness of nothing to be attained, far from all marks." And he gathers in the two emptinesses of the preceding text—because of these two, the emptiness of beings and the emptiness of dharmas, there is no dharma that is not empty. Here the three Chinese characters 「無所得」 tr. "nothing to be attained" are the key: the reason emptiness can be complete is precisely that one does not, within emptiness, have something further to be attained.
30. Question-and-answer three, the question: if so, why does it say here 「離一切法相」 tr. "far from the marks of all dharmas" ? The treatise-author's third question is asked with great fineness: since it has said that all dharmas are empty, why does the sūtra text further say 「離一切法相」 tr. "far from the marks of all dharmas"? Emptiness is how dharmas are from the first, whereas being far from seems like doing a separate piece of work; the two sayings seem not to fit each other. Wherever, in reading a sūtra, one feels that two sayings do not fit each other, that is exactly the essential place.
31. Question-and-answer three, the answer: all dharmas cannot be wholly destroyed; only leave their wrong recollection and imagining, and all dharmas are left of themselves. The treatise-author answers decisively: dharmas are not something people destroy; what is left behind is wrong recollection and imagining, and once wrong recollection and imagining is left, all dharmas are left of themselves. Next he brings out two proofs: as when a person of supernormal power destroys the mark of form, stone walls do not obstruct him; and as the Buddha said, 「汝等當於五眾中修正憶念，斷貪欲，得正解脫」 tr. "You should cultivate right recollection within the five aggregates, sever greed and desire, and obtain right liberation". This passage can best rescue one kind of mistaken practice—thinking that to cultivate emptiness is to remove dharmas one by one; the treatise-author says plainly that what is removed lies on the side of recollection and imagining.
32. Subhūti, hearing this, is startled in mind, saying that sages should have a little reality; he also asks for the sake of bodhisattvas who have newly aroused the mind. The treatise-author supplies Subhūti's state of mind on hearing this: if all dharmas, whether great or small, have no root reality at all, ordinary people, being false, may be said to have no reality, but surely sages should have a little reality? The treatise-author at once explains it for him: although Subhūti is an arhat, he deeply values the dharmas of the Buddha, and this question too is raised for the sake of bodhisattvas who have newly aroused the mind. Here the reader can, at ease, admit his own mind of ‘there must surely be a little reality’—even in Subhūti this thought was recorded.
33. The Buddha knows his meaning, and so speaks a simile and asks in return about a conjured person who makes a further conjuration. The treatise-author explains why the Buddha brings out a simile at this point: because he knows what Subhūti doubts in his mind and wishes to make this matter clear, he sets up a comparison and asks in return—「於汝意云何？如化人復作化，是化有本實不空不？」 tr. "What do you think? If a conjured person makes a further conjuration, does this conjuration have a root reality that is not empty, or not?" A simile is not rhetoric; it is set up to break one concrete thought; whenever one sees the Buddha bring out a simile, one should first find the thought that is being broken.
34. He answers: no; the two things, emptiness and the conjured person, are neither joined nor dispersed; they are empty by the emptiness of emptiness. The treatise-author cites the answer: 「不也！是化無有實事而不空者。空及化人二事，不合不散，皆空故，用空空故空。」 tr. "No! This conjuration has no real matter that is not empty. The two things, emptiness and the conjured person, are neither joined nor dispersed; because both are empty, they are empty by the emptiness of emptiness." The essence of this answer lies in the four Chinese characters 「不合不散」 tr. "neither joined nor dispersed"—it does not say that emptiness and conjuration are one, nor that they are two; to say one would lose their distinction, to say two would set them up as opposites.
35. Question-and-answer four, the question: why is it named 「空空故空」 tr. "empty because of the emptiness of emptiness" ? The treatise-author's fourth question asks specifically about the name 「空空」 tr. "the emptiness of emptiness". This name is most easily read as adding one more layer of emptiness on top of emptiness; the treatise-author sets up a separate question precisely to guard against this misreading.
36. Question-and-answer four, the answer: to refute the eighteen matters as real there are the eighteen emptinesses; to refute the dharma of transformation and emptiness in the minds of beings one uses the emptiness of emptiness. The treatise-author answers with the origin of the emptiness of emptiness: the eighteen emptinesses were set up in the first place to refute the eighteen matters as real, but beings again give rise to clinging on the one dharma of 「變化是空」 tr. "transformation is empty", so the emptiness of emptiness is used further to refute it. From this it can be seen that what the emptiness of emptiness refutes is not dharmas, but the clinging a person gives rise to on top of emptiness.
37. Worldly people know that illusion and conjuration do not abide long and so name them empty; because ordinary people take the other dharmas as real, conjuration is used as a simile; for sages, conjuration cannot be used as a simile. The treatise-author goes on to state the limits of using conjuration as a simile: worldly people already know that illusion and conjuration do not abide long and have nothing they can do, and name them empty; only, they still take the other dharmas as real, and so conjuration is taken up as a comparison, so that they may know the other dharmas are no different from conjuration. As for the way sages understand, even this simile cannot be used, because sages are without discrimination. At the end he gathers it up with the Buddha's words: 「色、受、想、行、識無不是化，以空故。」 tr. "Form, feeling, perception, constructions, and consciousness are none of them other than conjuration, because they are empty." This passage gives the simile a way to leave the stage: a simile is set up to break clinging; once the clinging is gone, the simile too is not kept.
38. Subhūti says to the Buddha: the dharmas of ordinary people are false and should be like a conjuration; are world-transcending dharmas, their fruit, and the persons who can practise them also like a conjuration? The treatise-author cites the question of the sūtra text and states it with more layers: the four foundations of mindfulness and the like arise from the side of causes and conditions and so are like a conjuration; then is the fruit of these dharmas—nirvāṇa—also like a conjuration? Are the persons who can give rise to this practice—the srota-āpanna and so on up to the Buddha—also like a conjuration? Three layers asked through to the bottom in one question: the dharma, the fruit, and the person. Here the seed of the difficulty about nirvāṇa has already been sown in advance.
39. The Buddha answers that the conditioned, the unconditioned, and all the noble and holy ones are all conjuration; this meaning has been spoken of at length everywhere from the first chapter onward. The treatise-author cites the Buddha's answer and adds one sentence of judgement: this meaning has been spoken of at length everywhere from the first chapter onward, and therefore it says 「一切法空，皆如化」 tr. "all dharmas are empty, all like a conjuration". These words remind the reader: what this chapter says is not a newly appearing meaning; it is the consistent teaching of the whole treatise being brought to a close here.
40. Question-and-answer five, the question: if all dharmas are empty and like a conjuration, why are there the distinctions of all kinds of dharmas? The treatise-author's fifth question asks the most practical doubt: since all are empty and like a conjuration, where do all the kinds of distinctions before our eyes come from? If this question is not answered, the teaching of emptiness contradicts what is seen.
41. Question-and-answer five, the answer: conjurations have distinctions of shapes and images, and so too what is seen in a dream and images in a mirror; though dharmas are empty, each has its causes and conditions. The treatise-author brings out three similes in a row: what the Buddha conjures and what other people conjure, though unreal, differ in shape and image; among the good and bad things in a dream there are some that make people joyful and some that make people afraid; images in a mirror, though without real matter, follow the original form and are fair or ugly. At the end he concludes with one sentence: 「諸法亦如是，雖空而各各有因緣。」 tr. "Dharmas too are like this: though empty, each has its own causes and conditions." The three similes point to one meaning—unreality and distinction can stand together; distinction comes from causes and conditions, not from a real substance.
42. As the Buddha speaks herein of the six kinds of transformation. The treatise-author cites again the sūtra's words on the six transformations as the headings for the item-by-item explanation below: 「是化法中，有聲聞變化、有辟支佛變化、有菩薩變化、有佛變化、有煩惱變化、有業變化。是故一切法皆是變化。」 tr. "Within these dharmas of conjuration there is the śrāvaka transformation, there is the pratyekabuddha transformation, there is the bodhisattva transformation, there is the Buddha transformation, there is the transformation of the afflictions, there is the transformation of deeds. Therefore all dharmas are transformation." The four passages that follow explain them item by item.
43. The śrāvaka transformation is the thirty-seven limbs of the path, the four noble truths, and so on up to the three gates of liberation. The treatise-author first explains the śrāvaka transformation, and states the reason it counts as conjuration: the śrāvaka abides within the keeping of the precepts, gathers his mind by meditative concentration and seeks nirvāṇa, and contemplates the inner and outer body as impure, which is the foundation of mindfulness of the body; such dharmas as these arise from vigorous effort for the sake of nirvāṇa. The judgement lies in the last sentence: 「是法本無而今有、已有還無，是為聲聞變化。」 tr. "This dharma was from the first non-existent and now exists, and having existed returns to non-existence: this is the śrāvaka transformation."—it is judged to be conjuration precisely because it was from the first non-existent and now exists, and having existed returns to non-existence.
44. The pratyekabuddha transformation, the bodhisattva transformation, the transformation of the dharmas of the Buddha, and the transformation of the afflictions, item by item. The treatise-author goes on to speak of the remaining four items. The pratyekabuddha transformation is contemplating the twelve links of causes and conditions and other such dharmas; the reason it is separated from the śrāvaka is that its wisdom is deeper than the śrāvaka's. The bodhisattva transformation is the six perfections together with the two kinds of supernormal power, obtained as retribution and obtained through cultivation. The transformation of the dharmas of the Buddha is the thirty-two marks, the eighty minor marks, the ten powers, the omniscience of all kinds, and the other immeasurable dharmas of the Buddha. The transformation of the afflictions is the afflictions giving rise to all kinds of deeds—wholesome deeds, unwholesome deeds, indeterminate deeds; fixed deeds, unfixed deeds; wholesome deeds, unwholesome deeds, unmoving deeds; and other immeasurable deeds. What the four items list is all the explicit text of this treatise, and the reader can check them item by item for himself: of the dharmas listed, not one is not from the first non-existent and now existent.
45. Question-and-answer six, the question: the afflictions are evil dharmas; how can they give rise to wholesome deeds and unmoving deeds? The treatise-author's sixth question asks about the difficulty left behind by the item of the transformation of the afflictions: since the afflictions are evil dharmas, yet the last item says that they can give rise to wholesome deeds and unmoving deeds, how can an evil cause obtain a good fruit?
46. Question-and-answer six, the answer: there are two kinds, the near cause and the far cause. The treatise-author answers with two causes: a person has the mind of self, and for the sake of obtaining permanence and happiness in a later body he cultivates giving—this is the near cause; for the sake of leaving the decaying, vexed, and impure body of the desire realm he cultivates meditative concentration—this is the far cause. Setting up the two causes turns ‘the afflictions give rise to wholesome deeds’ into two layers in sequence—what is given rise to is not goodness itself but conduct that tends toward goodness, and what sets this conduct in motion is still the mind of self.
47. Again, someone says: all ordinary people give rise to deeds because of coming together with the mind of self. The treatise-author cites the first different saying to broaden its meaning: when ordinary people give rise to deeds, none does so without coming together with the mind of self as a condition. This saying is set out side by side without judgement; its function is to extend the 「人有我心」 tr. "a person has the mind of self" of the answer above into a general statement.
48. Someone says: there is no sixth consciousness that arises apart from the mind of self; the mind of self is the root of all the afflictions. The second different saying goes a layer further: the arising of the sixth consciousness cannot be apart from the mind of self; it is by abiding in the mind of self that the sixth consciousness arises, and therefore the mind of self is the root of all the afflictions. The two sayings are listed one after the other, one speaking of its condition, the other of its root. When reading a treatise and meeting 「有人言」 tr. "someone says" brought out one after another, one should look at the momentum of their succession, and need not hurry to choose one saying.
49. Question-and-answer seven, the question: stain and purity cannot come together; why is it said that abiding in the mind of self one can give rise to wholesome deeds? The treatise-author's seventh question presses the difficulty to its extreme: the afflictions are a stained mind and a wholesome mind is a pure mind; since stain and purity cannot come together, why is it said that abiding within the mind of self one can give rise to wholesome deeds? If this question is not broken, the near cause and far cause of the earlier answer have no ground to stand on.
50. Question-and-answer seven, the answer: every mind arises together with wisdom; within the mind of ignorance too there should be wisdom. The treatise-author answers with a counter-example ready to hand: every mind arises together with wisdom, so within the mind of ignorance too there should be wisdom—wisdom and ignorance are precisely mutually contrary dharmas, yet they arise within one mind. Since there is this example, it is not impossible for two contrary dharmas to arise together in one mind. The method of this answer is worth remembering: to break the assertion ‘they are bound to be incompatible’, one need only bring forward one actual case of their being together.
51. Purity and stain are also like this; because the mind of self is indeterminate and soft, there is no fault in wholesome deeds and unmoving deeds arising within the afflicted mind. From wisdom and ignorance the treatise-author pushes on to purity and stain, and supplies the actual condition of ordinary people: those who have not yet obtained the holy path—how could they part from the mind of self and practise good? Within anger and the other afflictions one certainly cannot practise good, but the mind of self is 「無記柔軟」 tr. "indeterminate and soft", unlike the hardness of anger and the like, and so wholesome deeds and unmoving deeds arising within the afflicted mind is without fault. The four Chinese characters 「無記柔軟」 tr. "indeterminate and soft" are the crux of this difficulty—the reason it can accommodate the good is precisely that it is not fixed in evil.
52. The transformation of deeds gives birth to all dharmas of retribution, namely the six destinies, each with its distinctions of highest, middle, and lowest. The treatise-author explains the item of the transformation of deeds: deeds give birth to all dharmas of retribution, namely the six destinies—the retribution of evil deeds is the three evil destinies, the retribution of wholesome deeds is the three good destinies. Evil deeds are of the highest, the middle, and the lowest: the highest are the hells, the middle are the animals, the lowest are the hungry ghosts; wholesome deeds are also of the highest, the middle, and the lowest: the highest are the gods, the middle are humans, the lowest are the asuras and the like. The highest wholesome deeds have all kinds of distinctions of light and heavy and so on, and the highest evil deeds also have differences of light and heavy. At the end it points the way with 「次第輕重，如地獄中說；餘道亦如〈分別業品〉中說」 tr. "the sequence of light and heavy is as spoken of within the hells; the other destinies too are as spoken of in the chapter on Distinguishing Deeds", and does not repeat it here. The explanation of the meaning of the six destinies rests in every point on the explicit text of this passage of the treatise, and borrows no other saying.
53. Question-and-answer eight, the question: if it exists from deeds, why is it said to be transformation? The treatise-author's eighth question: since retribution exists from deeds, with cause and fruit clearly there, why is it further said to be transformation? This question is raised on the reader's behalf—the felt reality of deeds and their fruits is the one place hardest to speak of as like a conjuration.
54. Question-and-answer eight, the answer: sages contemplate beings with the divine eye as all without end, beginning, or middle, as the master of conjuration makes transformations from a distant place. The treatise-author's answer is in two layers: ordinary people see dharmas as not like a conjuration; sages, because they know the mark of ultimate emptiness, contemplate beings with the divine eye as 「皆無有終、始、中間」 tr. "all without end, without beginning, and without middle". Next comes the simile: as the master of conjuration makes transformations from a distant place, deeds too are like this, making the transformation of the present body from within the past world. This simile is extremely fine—between the master of conjuration and what he conjures there lies a distance, so what is conjured does not itself know where it comes from; and so it is with beings and the deeds of former lives.
55. As transformed things make people give rise to sorrow, joy, fear, and dread, while the wise contemplate them as all without reality. The treatise-author goes on to extend the preceding simile: transformed things can in all kinds of ways make people give rise to sorrow, give rise to joy, give rise to fear and dread, while the wise contemplate them as all without reality, yet people perversely give rise to sorrow and joy—「是人可笑」 tr. "such people are laughable". At the end it concludes: 「業亦如是，是故說業變化」 tr. "deeds too are like this; therefore it speaks of the transformation of deeds". This passage brings the simile down to the workings of the mind—what is laughed at is not deeds, but the sorrow and joy that arise in the face of things without reality.
56. Question-and-answer nine, the question: all these transformations are made by deeds; why does it not speak only of the transformation of deeds? The treatise-author's ninth question asks why the sūtra text does not merge the six transformations into one item: since all kinds of transformation are made by deeds, would it not be simple and clear to say only 「業變化」 tr. "the transformation of deeds"?
57. Question-and-answer nine, the answer: deeds are of two kinds, pure deeds and stained deeds. The treatise-author first divides them by pure and stained: pure deeds are the śrāvaka transformation and so on up to the Buddha transformation; stained deeds are precisely the transformation of the afflictions. With one division, the six items can already be gathered into two classes.
58. Again, there are two kinds: the deeds of ordinary people and the deeds of sages. The treatise-author brings out a further way of dividing: the deeds of ordinary people are the transformation of the afflictions; the deeds of sages are the srota-āpanna and so on up to the Buddha. The meaning taken by this second division differs from the first—the former divides the nature of deeds, this one divides the persons who do the deeds. To set two divisions side by side without judging which is better is the constant way of this treatise.
59. Therefore, although all are the transformation of deeds, there is no fault in distinguishing them broadly; it concludes that all dharmas are empty and all like a conjuration. The treatise-author closes this question: since they can be divided, they are divided, and speaking broadly carries no fault. At the end he cites the sūtra text as the conclusion: 「是故，須菩提！當知一切法空皆如化。」 tr. "Therefore, Subhūti! Know that all dharmas are empty and all like a conjuration." The broad and the brief each have their use—the brief to show what runs through all, the broad to show their distinctions; the two do not hinder each other.
60. Subhūti asks again whether the severings of the afflictions by the sages are all like a conjuration. The treatise-author cites again the question of the sūtra text: the fruit of the srota-āpanna and so on up to the fruit of the arhat, and the pratyekabuddha path, sever all the afflictions and their habitual residues—are these severings all like a conjuration? What is asked here is the same matter as what is asked in the ninth passage, yet it reappears within the treatise because the treatise-author below wants to supply, for this question, the thought in the questioner's mind.
61. Subhūti's meaning: the conditioned is false and deceptive and so like a conjuration; the unconditioned is real and without making and so should not be conjuration. The treatise-author points out what the questioner relies on in his mind: conditioned dharmas are false and deceptive and therefore like transformation; unconditioned dharmas are real and without making and therefore should not be conjuration. This one thought is the root of all the difficulties and questions in the latter half of the whole chapter—reading 「無作」 tr. "without making" as ‘there is a thing that is real and without making’.
62. The Buddha answers that all dharmas, whether arising or ceasing, are like a conjuration; the treatise-author explains it as ultimate emptiness because they are without self-nature. The treatise-author cites the Buddha's answer and explains its principle himself: the reason they are like a conjuration is that from the first non-existent they now exist, and now existent they afterwards do not exist, and so they deceive and delude people's minds; and he further sets out the Buddha's meaning—all dharmas born from causes and conditions are without self-nature; because they are without self-nature they are ultimately empty; because they are ultimately empty they are all like a conjuration. What is given here is a complete line of reasoning: born from causes and conditions, without self-nature, ultimately empty, all like a conjuration—four matters threaded together, which can serve as the backbone of the whole chapter.
63. Subhūti's intention of seeking the real mark of all dharmas has not yet come to rest, and he asks what dharma is not like a conjuration. The treatise-author again points to the questioner's mind: Subhūti's meaning is that there is one fixed, real dharma that is not like a conjuration, on which one may rely and seek it with vigour. These words are spoken with great understanding—one who seeks the path always wants to find a place he can rely on and depend on; this is not a fault, but a thought that has to be seen through.
64. The Buddha answers that there is: if a dharma is without arising and without ceasing, it is not conjuration; only the one dharma, nirvāṇa, is not like a conjuration. The treatise-author cites the Buddha's answer and asks and answers its name himself: 「何者是？所謂無誑相涅槃。」 tr. "Which is it? It is, namely, nirvāṇa with the mark of non-deception." Next he explains its mark: because this dharma is without arising it is without ceasing; because it is without ceasing it cannot make people give rise to sorrow. At the end he settles it with one sentence: the Buddha distinguishes that all conditioned dharmas are ultimately empty and all like a conjuration; only the one dharma, nirvāṇa, is not like a conjuration. This passage must be read together with the sixteenth passage—what is set up here is exactly what is to be resettled below.
65. At that time Subhūti cites the Buddha's saying that the equal dharma is not made by the Buddha, and that the mark of the emptiness of nature is precisely nirvāṇa. The treatise-author cites again Subhūti's words of difficulty: as the Buddha said, 「平等法，非佛所作，非聲聞、辟支佛所作，有佛、無佛諸法常住性空相」 tr. "the equal dharma is not made by the Buddha, not made by śrāvakas or pratyekabuddhas; whether there is a Buddha or no Buddha, dharmas abide ever with the mark of the emptiness of nature", and the mark of the emptiness of nature is precisely nirvāṇa. To make a difficulty of the Buddha's words with the Buddha's words has the greatest force—since what is cited is the Buddha's own saying, the one who answers cannot push it aside with ‘that is not what I said’.
66. Subhūti's meaning: nirvāṇa too is empty, as is said everywhere in the earlier chapters; why is it now said that only nirvāṇa alone is not like a conjuration? The treatise-author supplies the whole of the objector's thinking: deep within prajñā, nirvāṇa too is empty—this was said everywhere in the earlier chapters; now it is suddenly said that only nirvāṇa alone is not like a conjuration, which contradicts what was said before. Therefore he cites the Buddha's words to make the difficulty—the emptiness of nature is precisely nirvāṇa; why, among the dharmas that arise and cease, is nirvāṇa with the mark of non-deception separately said not to be like a conjuration? This passage states the difficulty leaving no room at all, precisely in order to force out the sentence below, 「為新發意菩薩故」 tr. "for the sake of bodhisattvas who have newly aroused the mind".
67. The Buddha answers that dharmas are equal and abide ever and are not made by the noble and holy ones, and that because bodhisattvas new to the training are afraid he speaks with distinctions. The treatise-author cites the Buddha's answer: dharmas are equal and abide ever, not made by the noble and holy ones; if bodhisattvas new to the training hear this they are afraid, and therefore he distinguishes and says that what arises and ceases is like a conjuration, and what does not arise or cease is not like a conjuration. In the answer there is not one word taking back what was said before; there is only, in addition, a person for whose sake it is spoken. Wherever the Buddha's words seem to contradict each other earlier and later, first look for this ‘for whom it is spoken’.
68. Question-and-answer ten, the question: the Buddha is one who does not deceive; why does he say that all dharmas are empty, or say that they are not all empty? The treatise-author's tenth question is asked with the greatest weight: the Buddha alone is the one who does not deceive, and all people come to the Buddha seeking the real matter; now he suddenly says all are empty and suddenly says not all are empty—would that not leave people with nothing to follow? This question is raised on behalf of everyone who doubts, and must not be passed over.
69. Question-and-answer ten, the answer: herein the Buddha himself states the causes and conditions—for the sake of bodhisattvas who have newly aroused the mind he says that nirvāṇa is not like a conjuration. The treatise-author answers with the utmost economy: there is no need to seek an explanation elsewhere; the Buddha has himself stated the causes and conditions within this—「為新發意菩薩故，說涅槃不如化。」 tr. "For the sake of bodhisattvas who have newly aroused the mind, I say that nirvāṇa is not like a conjuration." Wherever a sūtra carries its own words of causes and conditions, the treatise-author always points them out first and does not set up a separate explanation; the reader too should first seek the answer in the sūtra text itself.
70. Question-and-answer eleven, the question: may the marks of dharmas be turned for the sake of people? The treatise-author's eleventh question pushes the difficulty to its last step: even if it is spoken for the sake of people, can the marks of dharmas be turned around for the sake of people?—if the marks of dharmas could turn according to the person, the Buddha's words would have no fixed standard. This is the sharpest question of the whole chapter.
71. Question-and-answer eleven, the answer: how could the emptiness of nature be turned? When the Buddha first obtained the real mark, his mind tended toward nirvāṇa, and the buddhas and the gods begged the Buddha to abide in the world; hence we know that he speaks according to the matter. The treatise-author first refutes it directly: herein the Buddha says 「諸法相者性空」 tr. "the marks of dharmas are empty of nature"; since the emptiness of nature is the emptiness of nature, how could it be turned? The marks of dharmas themselves cannot be moved. Next he takes an episode of the Buddha's own as proof: when the Buddha first obtained the real mark of all dharmas, his mind tended only toward nirvāṇa and quiescent extinction; at that time the buddhas of the ten directions and the gods begged the Buddha not to enter nirvāṇa—「一切眾生苦惱，當度脫之！」 tr. "All beings are suffering and vexed; you should deliver them!" The Buddha then accepted the request, and abides only in order to deliver beings. From this it can be known that what he follows is the matter, not the marks of dharmas. This passage is answered extremely well: without turning the marks of dharmas he can still speak according to the matter, and the two proceed together without conflict.
72. There are bodhisattvas who have newly aroused the mind who cling to nirvāṇa and raise up afflictions; to sever this clinging it is said that nirvāṇa is like a conjuration. The treatise-author gives the first layer of explanation, and states it in the reverse direction: contemplating that conditioned dharmas are false and deceptive, nirvāṇa is real, unchanging and not different; there are bodhisattvas who have newly aroused the mind who for this reason cling to nirvāṇa, and because of the clinging raise up the afflictions; to sever this clinging it is said that nirvāṇa is like a conjuration; if there is no clinging mind, at that time it is said that nirvāṇa is not like a conjuration. What the earlier text said was ‘for those who fear, it is said that it is not like a conjuration’; what is said here is ‘for those who cling, it is said that it is like a conjuration’—the two sayings are opposite yet come out of one dharma, and what they follow lies only in the sickness of the hearer.
73. Again, there are the two paths of the Small Vehicle and the Great Vehicle; the Small Vehicle takes nirvāṇa as real, the Great Vehicle contemplates form and the other dharmas as all like nirvāṇa. The treatise-author gives the second layer of explanation: the discussions of the two paths differ—the discussion of the Small Vehicle takes nirvāṇa as real; the discussion of the Great Vehicle, because it enters deeply with keen wisdom, contemplates form and the other dharmas as all like nirvāṇa. The direction of these words too must be seen accurately: it is not saying that the Great Vehicle pulls nirvāṇa down to be the same as all dharmas, but that the Great Vehicle sees all dharmas as all like nirvāṇa.
74. Therefore the two sayings are without fault. The treatise-author closes the whole section with four Chinese characters. 「二說無咎」 tr. "the two sayings are without fault" is not a vague both-ways; it is that the preceding text has already pointed out one by one for whom each of the two sayings is spoken and on which path each rests; the reason they are without fault is that each has what it addresses, not that they need not be distinguished.
75. Subhūti asks again how bodhisattvas who have newly aroused the mind are to be taught and transformed so that they know that the emptiness of nature is equal. The last question of the sūtra text reappears within the treatise, and from here the treatise-author turns into the final section of the whole chapter—the method of teaching. The debate on meaning is finished here; what remains is how to hand this Dharma on.
76. Subhūti's meaning: the emptiness of nature is the place of great fear for ordinary people, like standing at the edge of a deep pit. The treatise-author supplies the state of mind behind this question: the emptiness of nature is the place of great fear for ordinary people; hearing that the emptiness of nature is without anything existent is like standing at the edge of a deep pit. Why? All those who have not yet obtained the path cling deeply with the mind of self, and so they fear the dharma of emptiness and have this thought—「佛教人勤修善行，終歸入無所有中！」 tr. "The Buddha teaches people to cultivate good conduct diligently, and in the end it returns into what is without anything existent!" This thought is stated with great truthfulness: what the one who fears emptiness fears is not emptiness but that practice, at its end, comes to nothing.
77. The Buddha answers: did dharmas exist before and now not exist? The Buddha speaks no words of comfort; he only gives him back a question: 「諸法先有今無耶？」 tr. "Did dharmas exist before and now not exist?" People's fear mostly arises from a premise that has not been examined; what the Buddha does is to bring the premise out and let him look at it himself.
78. The Buddha's meaning: he says this because those who have newly aroused the mind fear that afterwards there will be nothing. The treatise-author explains the meaning of the Buddha's question: what those who have newly aroused the mind fear is 「後當無」 tr. "afterwards there will be nothing", and so with the one question 「先有今無耶」 tr. "did they exist before and now not exist" he points straight at their sickness. The reason the question is an answer lies precisely here—whatever thought the sickness lies in, the question points to that thought.
79. Subhūti himself knows clearly that dharmas were non-existent of themselves before and are non-existent now too; to remove inversion one should not be afraid. The treatise-author closes the whole chapter with Subhūti's knowing and seeing: dharmas were non-existent of themselves before and are non-existent now too; it is only because those who have newly aroused the mind are covered by the mind of the view of self that they become startled and afraid; to remove inversion and make them obtain true seeing, in the end nothing is lost; when one knows that the real mark of the afflictions and inversions is precisely the emptiness of nature, at that time there is no fear. At the end he concludes with words of instruction: if dharmas existed before and became non-existent because of practising the path, then indeed one should be afraid; since from the first they are non-existent of themselves, one should not be afraid—「但為除顛倒耳」 tr. "it is only in order to remove inversion". The whole chapter begins from 「諸法平等、無所為作」 tr. "dharmas are equal and there is nothing to be done" and ends at 「但為除顛倒耳」 tr. "it is only in order to remove inversion"—what is done lies only in removing inversion; beyond this there is not one dharma that can be gained or lost.
Do Not Misread
Do not read 「一切法皆是化」 tr. "all dharmas are conjuration" as all dharmas not existing. The treatise-author has already set distinction and unreality side by side and explained them: what conjured persons conjure, though unreal, has all kinds of distinctions of shape and image; among what is seen in a dream there are things that make people joyful and things that make people afraid; images in a mirror follow the original form and are fair or ugly; and at the end he concludes 「諸法亦如是，雖空而各各有因緣」 tr. "dharmas too are like this: though empty, each has its own causes and conditions". What is broken is the view of a real substance, not the distinctions before our eyes. If it is read as everything being non-existent, then the item-by-item account of the six kinds of transformation and the highest, middle, and lowest of the retribution of the six destinies all lose their footing.
Do not read 「涅槃一法非如化」 tr. "the one dharma, nirvāṇa, is not like a conjuration" as nirvāṇa being a really existent thing. The name the Buddha sets up carries a qualifier—「無誑相涅槃」 tr. "nirvāṇa with the mark of non-deception"; and in explaining it the treatise-author says only 「是法無生故無滅，無滅故不能令人生憂」 tr. "because this dharma is without arising it is without ceasing; because it is without ceasing it cannot make people give rise to sorrow", and does not say that it has a self-substance. More important still are the causes and conditions the Buddha himself gives: 「為新發意菩薩故，說涅槃不如化。」 tr. "For the sake of bodhisattvas who have newly aroused the mind, I say that nirvāṇa is not like a conjuration." Since it is spoken for the sake of people, it must not be turned round and held as an independent judgement.
Do not read ‘distinguishing for the sake of bodhisattvas who have newly aroused the mind’ as the Buddha having spoken two sets of dharma. The two layers of explanation the treatise-author gives run in exactly opposite directions: for those who fear that all is empty, it is said that what does not arise or cease is not like a conjuration; for those who cling to nirvāṇa and raise up afflictions, it is said that nirvāṇa is like a conjuration. If these were two sets of dharma, the two would be bound to obstruct each other; it is precisely because what is treated is two sicknesses while what is relied on is one dharma that it can be said 「是故二說無咎」 tr. "therefore the two sayings are without fault". If the reader keeps one sentence for himself and rejects the other, he falls exactly into the place the treatise-author refutes.
Do not read ‘the afflictions can give rise to wholesome deeds’ as an evil dharma being able to become good directly. The treatise-author's answer has strict layers: what the near cause and the far cause speak of is the mind of self serving as a condition for giving rise to conduct that tends toward goodness; what 「一切心皆與慧俱生」 tr. "every mind arises together with wisdom" breaks is the assertion that stain and purity are bound to be incompatible; what the last sentence relies on is 「我心無記柔軟」 tr. "the mind of self is indeterminate and soft"—the reason it can accommodate the good is that it is indeterminate and not fixed, not that the afflictions themselves are good. If the four Chinese characters 「無記柔軟」 tr. "indeterminate and soft" are left out, this passage becomes the loose saying that evil can give birth to good.
Do not read 「離一切法相」 tr. "far from the marks of all dharmas" as removing dharmas one by one. The treatise-author says plainly 「一切法不可盡壞，但離其邪憶想，一切法自離」 tr. "all dharmas cannot be wholly destroyed; only leave their wrong recollection and imagining, and all dharmas are left of themselves", and cites the Buddha's words 「汝等當於五眾中修正憶念，斷貪欲，得正解脫」 tr. "you should cultivate right recollection within the five aggregates, sever greed and desire, and obtain right liberation" as proof. What is severed is greed and desire, what is cultivated is right recollection; dharmas themselves are not among what is destroyed. If this measure is lost, practice becomes a wrestling with objects, and the more one wrestles, the tighter the hold.
Do not read the 「不應恐怖」 tr. "one should not be afraid" of the last section as a word of comfort. What the Buddha gives is not comfort but a counter-question—「諸法先有今無耶？」 tr. "Did dharmas exist before and now not exist?" The treatise-author explains it very clearly: if dharmas existed before and became non-existent because of practising the path, then indeed one should be afraid; since from the beginning they are non-existent of themselves, one should not be afraid. The reason fear can be removed is that the premise 「先有」 tr. "existing before" does not hold at all, not that someone has come to console.
Bearing on Practice
The first benefit is to use 「生滅相」 tr. "the mark of arising and ceasing" as a ready-made criterion. The criterion the Buddha gives in this chapter is only one sentence—whatever has the mark of arising and ceasing is transformation; whatever is without arising and without ceasing is not transformation. In daily life, whenever one feels that some dharma is especially real and especially reliable, one can ask just this one question of it: does it have arising, does it have ceasing? What was from the first non-existent and now exists, and having existed returns to non-existence, is within conjuration. This criterion needs no learning and can be tested anywhere.
The second benefit is to recognise in one's own mind the thought ‘there must surely be a little reality’. Subhūti, hearing that all dharmas have no root reality, was startled in mind, saying that ordinary people, being false, may have no real matter, but sages should have a little reality; the treatise-author not only does not rebuke him but explains it for him. Here the practitioner can, at ease, admit that this thought is there, and then keep watch on it: once it arises, it will look for a fixed, real dharma for itself, 「可依是法而精進求」 tr. "on which one may rely and seek it with vigour"—what the sixty-third passage speaks of is exactly where this thought goes.
The third benefit is to learn the treatise-author's layered way of answering. Subhūti makes his difficulty on the ground that in the siddhānta of the highest meaning there is no benefit, while the bodhisattva teaching and transforming beings is the siddhānta of counteraction; the two are from the first not on the same level, and with one judgement of the treatise-author the difficulty dissolves of itself. In daily discussion of the Dharma with others, when two sayings are locked against each other, one can first set aside right and wrong and ask only on which level each saying rests and for whom each is spoken; once the levels are clear, the points of contention mostly subside of themselves.
The fourth benefit is to put a simile down once it has been used up. The treatise-author says that worldly people already know that illusion and conjuration do not abide long, and so conjuration is used as a simile to make them know that the other dharmas are no different from conjuration; he also says that as for the way sages understand, conjuration cannot be used as a simile, because there is no discrimination. A simile is a skilful means set up to break clinging; it is not the dharma to be cultivated. When cultivating contemplation, the practitioner may enter by way of a simile, and once the contemplation is accomplished need not keep the simile—keeping the simile becomes a new clinging.
The fifth benefit is to take the question of the last section and ask it of oneself. One who gives rise to fear on hearing of emptiness really has, in his mind, a foundation of 「先有」 tr. "existing before"—thinking that he originally has something, and that by cultivating to the end he will lose it all. One can hold up the Buddha's question to oneself: did dharmas exist before and now not exist? If from the first they are non-existent of themselves, where is what is called losing? The treatise-author says it plainly: to remove inversion and make them obtain true seeing, 「竟無所失」 tr. "in the end nothing is lost". This one holding-up is exactly the closest use this chapter gives to the practitioner.
Further Resonances
The backbone of this chapter is one sūtra section and one treatise section. Sūtra ① begins with Subhūti asking how, since dharmas are equal and there is nothing to be done, one does not move within equality and yet carries out the bodhisattva's business; the Buddha approves his words and says that if beings knew of themselves the Buddha would not use his supernormal power, that he pulls them out of the notion of I and self and delivers them from the marks, makes them far from the marks of the conditioned nature and makes them obtain the marks of the unconditioned nature, which are precisely emptiness. Next Subhūti asks by what emptiness all dharmas are empty; the Buddha sets up the simile of a conjured person conjuring a conjured person; Subhūti answers that this conjuration has no real matter that is not empty; the Buddha says that the two things, emptiness and conjuration, are neither joined nor dispersed, empty because of the emptiness of emptiness, and that form and so on up to the omniscience of all kinds are precisely conjuration. Subhūti brings forward world-transcending dharmas and the noble and holy persons and asks whether they too are conjuration; the Buddha answers that all dharmas are conjuration and opens out the six kinds of transformation: of the śrāvakas, the pratyekabuddhas, the bodhisattvas, the buddhas, the afflictions, and the causes and conditions of deeds. Again he asks whether the severings of the afflictions are all transformation; the Buddha answers with the mark of arising and ceasing as the criterion: whatever has arising and ceasing is all transformation, what is without arising and without ceasing is not transformation, and nirvāṇa with the mark of non-deception is a dharma that is not transformation. Subhūti cites the Buddha's own saying that the emptiness of nature is precisely nirvāṇa to make a difficulty; the Buddha answers that for the sake of bodhisattvas who have newly aroused the mind he distinguishes what arises and ceases as like a conjuration and what does not arise or cease as not like a conjuration. Finally he asks how a bodhisattva who has newly aroused the mind is to be taught so that he knows this emptiness of nature, and the Buddha asks in return whether dharmas existed from the first and now do not exist, and stops there. Treatise ① takes eleven rounds of question and answer as its backbone, interspersed with re-explanations citing the sūtra. First it answers why, when the Buddha had already answered, he asks again, and brings out the difficulty of the mark of non-doing of equality and the mark of doing of benefiting, the simile of the physician having no work, the judgement between the two siddhānta of counteraction and of the highest meaning, and the division between the emptiness of beings and the emptiness of dharmas. Next it answers the question by what emptiness, and sets out the different saying that emptiness is of all kinds and that within the emptiness of form the root atoms remain. Next it answers the question of being far from the marks of all dharmas, and establishes the one meaning of only leaving wrong recollection and imagining. Next it answers the name of being empty because of the emptiness of emptiness, and speaks of refuting the dharma of transformation and emptiness. Next it answers why, if all dharmas are conjuration, there are distinctions, and brings out the three similes of the shapes and images of conjured persons, the good and bad in a dream, and the fair and ugly in a mirror, and explains the six kinds of transformation item by item. Next it answers how the afflictions give rise to wholesome deeds, setting up the near cause and the far cause, citing the two sayings introduced as what someone says, breaking the claim that stain and purity cannot come together, and coming home to the mind of self being indeterminate and soft. Next it explains the transformation of deeds and the retribution of the highest, middle, and lowest of the six destinies, and, answering why what exists from deeds is said to be transformation, brings out the simile of the master of conjuration making transformations from a distant place. Next it answers why it does not speak only of the transformation of deeds, and divides the two deeds of pure and stained, and the two deeds of ordinary people and sages. Next it cites again Subhūti's question whether the severings are like a conjuration and his intention of seeking one fixed, real dharma, and explains the Buddha's answer that only the one dharma, nirvāṇa, is not like a conjuration. Next it answers why the Buddha sometimes says all are empty and sometimes says not all are empty, and points to the causes and conditions the Buddha himself states; it answers whether the marks of dharmas may be turned for the sake of people, breaking it with the emptiness of nature being unturnable and citing as proof the episode of the Buddha first obtaining the real mark and the gods begging him to abide; and it brings out the two layers of explanation—speaking of nirvāṇa as like a conjuration because of clinging to nirvāṇa, and the two paths of the Small Vehicle and the Great Vehicle—settling it with the two sayings being without fault. Finally it explains how those who have newly aroused the mind fear the emptiness of nature as though standing at the edge of a deep pit, and gathers in the whole chapter with dharmas being non-existent of themselves before and non-existent now too, and with its being only to remove inversion.
The vein of meaning between this chapter and the chapters before and after it can be seen in two lines. First, carrying on from what precedes: the previous chapter made clear the meaning of the equality of dharmas, and this chapter raises its question precisely with 「若諸法平等、無所為作」 tr. "if dharmas are equal and there is nothing to be done"; it carries on the teaching of equality and asks about its function, and so the sūtra text does not set up a separate starting point at its outset. Second, passing on to what follows: this chapter concludes with teaching those who have newly aroused the mind to know the emptiness of nature without being afraid, and the next chapter then enters into the matter of seeking the Dharma; the reader may look at the two chapters together to see the sequence in which, once knowing and seeing are right, one then acts.
Of the explanations of the ancient masters, two may be recorded for this chapter. Jizang, in his Commentary on the Larger Sūtra, takes this chapter as the second, making clear the fruit of nirvāṇa; his sectioning says: 「此下第二、明涅槃果。」 tr. "From here below is the second: making clear the fruit of nirvāṇa." He sets out the saying of one school: 「有人言：差別品明菩提即智果，謂般若也。」 tr. "Someone says: the chapter "Difference" makes clear awakening, which is the fruit of knowledge, namely prajñā." And he sets up his own explanation: 「今明此品，即是總明三德為涅槃果也。」 tr. "Now I make clear that this chapter, precisely, makes clear in general the three virtues as the fruit of nirvāṇa." His sectioning of the major divisions of this chapter's sūtra text says: 「須菩提於意云何下第二正明諸法如化不如化。文為四：初、明一切如化無化差別；第二、明一切法如化差別；第三、明涅槃不如化；第四、明涅槃如化。」 tr. "From ‘Subhūti, what do you think’ below is the second, properly making clear that dharmas are like a conjuration and not like a conjuration. The text is in four: first, making clear that all is like a conjuration and that in conjuration there is no distinction; second, making clear the distinctions of all dharmas being like a conjuration; third, making clear that nirvāṇa is not like a conjuration; fourth, making clear that nirvāṇa is like a conjuration." Of the four divisions, the third and the fourth correspond exactly to the two layers of explanation in the latter half of this chapter. His heading of the third division says: 「白佛下，第三、明一往，明無為法不如化。」 tr. "From ‘said to the Buddha’ below is the third, making clear the first approach: making clear that unconditioned dharmas are not like a conjuration." His heading of the fourth division says: 「世尊如佛自設下，第四、論涅槃如化也。」 tr. "From ‘World-Honored One, as the Buddha himself has set out’ below is the fourth, discussing that nirvāṇa is like a conjuration." His explanation of the six kinds of transformation divides them by the two fruits of the ordinary and the holy, saying: 「論云：凡聖德論皆是變化，垢果是凡化，淨果是聖化。」 tr. "The treatise says: the virtues of the ordinary and the holy, as discussed, are all transformation; the stained fruit is the transformation of the ordinary, the pure fruit is the transformation of the holy." This is close in the meaning taken to this treatise's two divisions by pure deeds and stained deeds and by the deeds of ordinary people and the deeds of sages, while the names set up differ; it is recorded side by side without judgement. His explanation of the counter-question of the last section says: 「本有今無耶者，始行人聞涅槃亦空，故生斷見，亦明涅槃本不有今不無，何斷之有？生死亦然。」 tr. "As for ‘did they exist from the first and now not exist’: beginning practitioners, hearing that nirvāṇa too is empty, therefore give rise to the view of annihilation; it also makes clear that nirvāṇa did not exist from the first and does not not exist now—what annihilation is there? Birth and death are likewise."—explaining the fear of beginning practitioners by the view of annihilation, while this treatise explains it by being covered by the mind of the view of self; each takes one meaning, and these too are recorded side by side without judgement. Further, the chapter name Jizang marks is 「如化品第八十七」 tr. "the eighty-seventh chapter, Like a Conjuration", without the two Chinese characters 「涅槃」 tr. "nirvāṇa", differing from this treatise's title for this chapter; what it relies on is the chapter list of the sūtra-text line. Junzheng, in his Profound Meaning of the Four Mahāyāna Treatises, names this chapter explicitly and cites its meaning in summary, saying: 「故大論釋大品，如化品云：為新發意菩薩說涅槃是真實善妙有也。」 tr. "Therefore the Great Treatise, explaining the Larger Sūtra, says in the chapter Like a Conjuration: for the sake of bodhisattvas who have newly aroused the mind it is said that nirvāṇa is a true, real, good, and wondrous existence."—what he cites is not the word-for-word text of this chapter, but a retelling in his own words of the one meaning 「為新發意菩薩故，說涅槃不如化」 tr. "for the sake of bodhisattvas who have newly aroused the mind, I say that nirvāṇa is not like a conjuration"; its attribution being clear, it is recorded without judgement. The extant part of Huiying's Commentary stops at the early part of this treatise and does not reach this chapter, so for this chapter there is no text of his explanation that can be cited; the gap is marked according to the facts, and it is not filled with text from elsewhere. The variant names of this chapter's title among the editions—the Shōgozō manuscript takes this chapter as the eighty-sixth, and the Ishiyama-dera manuscript titles it 「涅槃不如化」 tr. "Nirvāṇa Is Not like a Conjuration", which stands opposite in meaning to this treatise's 「涅槃如化」 tr. "Nirvāṇa Is Like a Conjuration"—and the differences of the chapter list of the sūtra-text line are detailed in the Apparatus layer.