肇論 不真空論

Emptiness is not the nothingness left after the myriad things have been cleared away, nor is it a stillness found by shutting out sight and hearing and fleeing beyond things. Because the myriad things depend on conditions in order to be, they are not true being established on their own. Because they do appear as conditions come together, they are not annihilative non-being. Thus one speaks of being and yet not being, non-being and yet not non-being. No-mind quiets the mind without yet seeing that things are unreal; Matter-as-such sees that form does not make itself form without yet exhausting the point that form is not truly form; Fundamental-Non-being draws both “not being” and “not non-being” toward non-being. Sengzhao, by contrast, discerns the unreal in phenomena themselves. The illusory person shows this most clearly: one cannot say that no illusory person appears, yet no real person can be found. Appearance blocks annihilation; unreality blocks true existence. Names, too, are established only according to convention. “This” and “that” can exchange places; a name cannot acquire the real thing, and the real thing does not become true through its name. Ultimate truth is therefore not outside the myriad things, and emptiness is not added to them from elsewhere. No other nothingness is borrowed in order to make things empty; one sees that the myriad things are already conditionally constituted, provisionally designated, and unreal. The Way is therefore not far away: the place of establishment is itself the true, and in encountering affairs one meets the true.

Preface I: What prajñā illumines lies on neither side of being and non-being

Utter quiescence and non-arising must be where the subtle illumination of prajñā comes to rest and the final ground of the myriad things. Unless one were a sage whose understanding penetrated completely, how could one bring the spirit into accord between being and non-being? The spirit of the consummate person therefore reaches without limit, and no principle, however hidden, can impede him. His ears may hear to their fullest and his eyes may look to their utmost, yet sound and form cannot command him. Is this not because he sees, in the very midst of the myriad things, that they are originally unreal, so that they cannot burden his illumination?

The sage therefore relies upon a true mind and follows the patterns of affairs, so there is no obstruction he cannot pass through. He examines the myriad things as sharing one vital current and watches their many transformations, so whatever he meets he can respond to appropriately. Because there is no obstruction he cannot pass through, he can bring all confusion back to unity. Because whatever he meets he can respond to appropriately, the moment he touches a thing he sees it return to one principle. The forms of the myriad appearances differ, yet they cannot fix themselves as differences cut off from one another. Since they cannot fix themselves as separate, one knows that the forms before one are not fixed, real forms. Because a form is not a fixed, real form, although it appears as form, it is not a form that can be held fast.

Things and self thus issue from one root, while right and wrong share one vital current. This meaning is hidden, subtle, deep, and obscure; it is probably not something ordinary feeling can exhaust. In recent times, therefore, those who discuss the teaching whose thesis is quiescence have offered divergent accounts. But if differing understandings are used to seek one principle, what can genuinely remain the same? The arguments of the schools have consequently arisen in competition, while the principle they understand has not been one.

Preface II: Each of the three schools sees one aspect

Why say this? Those who maintain No-mind hold that emptiness means only that the mind does not become attached to the myriad things, while the things themselves have never been absent. The strength of this teaching lies in its ability to quiet the spirit. Its shortcoming lies in not seeing that things themselves are unreal.

Those who maintain Matter-as-such say that form cannot make itself into fixed form; therefore, although form appears, it is not fixed form. Yet when speaking of form, one should understand it in the very form before one. Must one wait for some other form to turn it into form before it becomes form? This teaching shows only that form cannot make itself form. It has not yet understood that form itself is not real, fixed form.

Those who maintain Fundamental-Non-being incline their minds toward non-being. Whenever they meet a scriptural sentence, they tend to draw it toward non-being. On seeing “not being,” they understand it to mean that this being must be wholly eliminated; on seeing “not non-being,” they understand it to mean that that non-being must also be wholly eliminated. Yet when one seeks the scripture’s intent, “not being” says only that being is not fixed and real, while “not non-being” says only that non-being is not fixed and real. Why understand “not being” as annihilating this being, and “not non-being” as annihilating that non-being? This is merely a discourse partial to non-being. How can it be called following facts to comprehend them and meeting things themselves in their true condition?

Preface III: A name cannot replace a thing; speech can only approach the true

If the name “thing” is used to speak of what appears as a fixed, real thing, then what is called a thing will be grasped as something that can be fixed. If one understands that what is called a thing is not a fixed, real thing, then although it appears as a thing, it is not something that can be held fast. A thing therefore cannot arrive at its true condition merely through a name, and a name cannot enter reality merely through a thing. True truth thus remains solitary and quiescent beyond names, appearances, and verbal teaching. How could written words and speech discriminate it completely? Yet I cannot close my mouth and remain silent, so I will provisionally arrange a few words to approach it. Let the discussion now begin.

I. Seeing neither being nor non-being in the very midst of the myriad things

The Mahāyāna Treatise says that dharmas possess neither a fixed characteristic of being nor a fixed characteristic of non-being. The Madhyamaka Treatise says that dharmas are neither fixed being nor fixed non-being, and that this is ultimate truth. When we inquire into “neither being nor non-being,” can it mean that the myriad things must be washed away, sight and hearing shut off, and a vacant desolation left before us before ultimate truth can be reached? No. Precisely because one can follow the true condition of things and comprehend it in the things themselves, nothing conflicts with this principle. Precisely because one sees the true in unreal appearances, the nature of things need not be exchanged for something else.

Because the nature of things need not be exchanged, even when one calls a thing non-being, it still appears as being. Because nothing conflicts with this principle, even when a thing appears as being, it can still be called non-being. Appearing as being and yet being non-being is what is meant by “not being.” Being non-being and yet appearing as being is what is meant by “not non-being.” This does not say that no thing appears at all. It says that a thing is not a fixed, real thing. Since a thing is not a fixed, real thing, where could it be grasped as a real entity?

The scripture therefore says that the nature of form is empty; it does not become empty only after form has been destroyed. This shows that the sage sees things by seeing, in the very midst of the myriad things, that they are originally unreal. Why would he need to cut them apart and destroy them before finding comprehension? Zhi Qian’s Vimalakīrti accordingly speaks of the unreal in its dialogue concerning illness, while the Sūtra of the Samādhi of Radiance Surpassing the Sun calls the four great elements originally empty. Though the writings of scripture, discipline, and treatise differ, their purport converges as one.

The Fangguang Prajñā-pāramitā Sūtra says that, from the standpoint of ultimate truth, there is no accomplishment and no attainment; only in accordance with conventional truth are there accomplishment and attainment. What is called “attainment” is the provisional name for non-attainment; what is called “non-attainment” is the true name toward which attainment points. Because it is a true name, although it is true, it is not a truly existent entity. Because it is a provisional name, although it is provisional, it is not sheer absence. To say “true,” therefore, does not indicate that there has ever been a real thing; to say “provisional” does not indicate that everything is wholly absent. “True” and “provisional” have never been the same name, yet the principle to which they point has never been divided into two things.

The scripture therefore asks again whether ultimate truth and conventional truth differ. The answer is that they do not differ. This passage uses ultimate truth to show that things are not truly existent and conventional truth to show that they are not wholly absent. Why should the two names of truth split one thing into two?

II. There is a reason things are not truly existent, and a reason they are not wholly absent

It follows that the myriad things truly have a reason for not being truly existent and a reason for not being wholly absent. Because they have a reason for not being truly existent, although they appear as being, they are not truly existent. Because they have a reason for not being wholly absent, although they are empty, they are not annihilative non-being. Because they are empty without being annihilative non-being, their “non-being” does not cut everything off into nothingness. Because they appear as being without being truly existent, their “being” is not fixed, real being. If being is not fixed, real being, and non-being need not erase every trace left by appearance, then although the names being and non-being differ, the purport they reach is one.

The young man in Kumārajīva’s Vimalakīrti therefore praises the teaching of dharmas as neither fixed being nor fixed non-being, because dharmas arise through conditions. The Bodhisattva Garland Sūtra likewise says that turning the Dharma-wheel is neither a fixedly existent turning nor the total absence of turning; this is called turning without anything turned. These are subtle words found throughout the scriptures.

Why? If things were wholly absent, the false view of annihilation should not count as confusion. If things were fixedly and truly existent, the view that they endure permanently should be correct. Precisely because things are not wholly absent, the false view remains confused. Precisely because things are not truly existent, the view of permanence cannot stand. One may therefore know that “neither being nor non-being” is indeed the language of ultimate truth.

III. Dependent on conditions, things are not truly existent; able to arise, they are not wholly absent

The Daoxing Prajñā-pāramitā Sūtra says that mind is neither fixed being nor fixed non-being. The Madhyamaka Treatise says that things come together through conditions and are therefore not truly existent, while because they arise through conditions they are not wholly absent. When the reasoning is pursued, it is indeed so.

Why? If being were fixed, real being, it should exist forever on its own from the outset. Why would it need to wait for conditions before it existed? In the same way, if genuine non-being were permanently fixed non-being, why would it wait for conditions before becoming absent? A thing cannot exist by itself and must wait for conditions to arise. From this one knows that its being is not true being. Since it is not true being, even though it appears as being, it cannot be called fixed, real being.

Consider next “not non-being.” If something were wholly absent, it should remain still forever and never arise at all; only then could it be called non-being. If the myriad things were wholly absent, they should not arise. Yet they do arise, so they are not wholly absent. This shows precisely that, because things arise in dependence on conditions, they are not annihilative non-being.

The Mahāyāna Treatise says that all dharmas, because of all conditions, should be; all dharmas, because of all conditions, should not be held as truly existent; all dharmas that were originally absent, because of all conditions, should arise; and all dharmas that appear, because of all conditions, should not be held as truly existent. Are these statements of being and non-being merely contrary assertions made for effect? If “should be” meant truly existent, the text should not say non-being. If “should be absent” meant wholly absent, it should not say being. Here “being” uses provisional being to show that there is not total absence; “non-being” distinguishes what is not truly existent. One thing receives two designations, and the words appear different. Once their common destination is understood, one knows that they do not conflict.

IV. The illusory person: not a real person, yet not without appearance

Dharmas therefore have a reason for not being truly existent, so they cannot be grasped as truly existent. They also have a reason for not being wholly absent, so they cannot be erased into annihilative non-being. Why? If one tries to call them truly existent, they have not genuinely arisen by themselves. If one tries to call them wholly absent, their many things and forms have already appeared. Since forms have appeared, one cannot say that they are wholly absent. Since they have not truly arisen by themselves, they are not fixed, real being. The meaning of unreal, therefore empty has now become clear.

The Fangguang Prajñā-pāramitā Sūtra therefore offers the simile of an illusory person. Dharmas are only names provisionally established and are not real, just like a person conjured by illusion. One cannot say that no illusory person appears at all, yet the illusory person is not a real person. The illusory person truly appears before one, blocking the interpretation of emptiness as total absence. The illusory person is not a real person, blocking the grasping of appearance as true existence.

V. Names and real things cannot replace one another

Search for a thing by means of its name, and within the thing there is no fixed entity wholly corresponding to that name. Search for a name by means of the thing, and the name has not acquired the function of the thing itself. Because the thing has no fixed entity corresponding to the name, it is not a real object that a name can lock in place. Because the name has not acquired the function of the thing itself, the name is not the thing. A name therefore cannot correspond completely to a real thing, nor can a real thing correspond completely to a name. Since names and realities cannot fully correspond, where could the myriad things be fixedly established?

The Madhyamaka Treatise therefore says that things possess no fixed “that” or “this.” A person on this side calls where he stands “this” and the opposite side “that.” The person opposite likewise calls this side “that” and where he stands “this.” “That” and “this” cannot be fixed under a single name, yet confused people take their own designations to be necessarily so. Fixed “that” and “this” were never established, while the confused mind certainly exists. Once one awakens to the fact that “that” and “this” are not fixedly real, what thing remains that could be grasped as truly existent? One may therefore know that the myriad things are not fixedly real but only borrow their names, and that this has long been the case.

The Sūtra of the Samādhi of Fully Accomplished Radiance therefore says that dharmas originally possess nothing and that names are only forcibly established for them. Zhuangzi’s finger and horse in the lacquer garden likewise show that “this” and “that,” right and wrong, change with the position from which one points. Seen in this way, where are profound words not present?

VI. Conclusion: There is no need to leave the things before us in order to seek the true

The sage therefore passes through a thousand transformations without being changed by them and walks among ten thousand confusions while remaining comprehending throughout. The reason is that he directly sees the myriad things as originally unreal. He does not construct a separate emptiness and then use it to make things empty. The scripture therefore marvels that the reality-limit does not move and yet can be the place where all dharmas are established. It is not that one leaves the reality-limit and finds another place in which to establish the myriad dharmas. The very place in which dharmas are established is the reality-limit.

If this is so, is the Way far away? In touching any affair before one, one can see the true within it. Is the sage far away? If one personally realizes this principle, one immediately accords with the spirit’s illumination.

The scriptural question first: Does emptiness turn everything before us into nothing?

The desk is before you, sounds enter your ears, and the body is now feeling heat and cold. If all dharmas are empty, must these first be excluded—must one wait until nothing can be seen or heard—before reaching ultimate truth? If not, then the myriad things before us plainly appear. From where, exactly, is their emptiness spoken?

“On the Emptiness of the Unreal” places the question between being and non-being. The Mahāyāna Treatise says that dharmas have neither the characteristic of being nor the characteristic of non-being. The Madhyamaka sentence says that dharmas are neither being nor non-being, and that this is ultimate truth. This does not stir being and non-being together into a vague third thing. It first refuses two fixed views: because the myriad things appear, they must not be grasped as truly existent; because they lack intrinsic nature, they must not be driven into total absence.

At the outset, Yuankang reminds us that this treatise clarifies that dharmas are unreal and are therefore not truly existent; precisely because they are unreal, they are empty. Emptiness is not a “non-being” established beside “being,” nor is it the result left after being has been annihilated. To read emptiness as annihilation is to fall into the very extreme view the treatise seeks to break.

First consider the three schools: The problem lies neither only in the mind nor only in the word “non-being”

Why does Sengzhao begin with No-mind, Matter-as-such, and Fundamental-Non-being? Because when emptiness takes hold of only one side, it moves farther and farther from the things before us.

The No-mind teaching emphasizes not raising an attached mind toward the myriad things, while it still holds that the things themselves have never been absent. Sengzhao acknowledges that it can quiet the spirit, yet points out that it has not seen the unreality of the things themselves. Yuankang puts the gain and loss clearly: because it remains without attachment toward dharmas, it is a gain; because it does not know that the nature of things is empty, it is a loss. If emptiness means only “my mind does not cling,” then things are still preserved as fixedly real. Emptiness treats only the mind and has not illumined the dharmas.

The Matter-as-such teaching sees that form cannot make itself into form and must depend on conditions. It therefore says that form, though appearing, is not fixed form. But the treatise asks: once one knows that form does not make itself form, has one already seen that form is not truly form? Yuankang says its shortcoming is that it does not know that form is fundamentally empty and still preserves provisional being. This does not deny conditional constitution. It presses it one step further: precisely because form waits upon conditions, it has no independent and unchanging real body.

The Fundamental-Non-being teaching, meanwhile, readily draws every sentence toward non-being. It reads “not being” as eliminating being and “not non-being” as eliminating even non-being. Sengzhao asks why “not being” must mean making this being absent, and “not non-being” must mean making that non-being absent. The scripture’s intent is simply that being is not true being and non-being is not true non-being. A one-sided love of non-being does not follow facts to comprehend them and does not see their true condition in the things themselves.

The treatise gives clear judgments on all three schools. This exposition unfolds only the treatise author’s own questions and answers; it does not rank the schools anew from outside the treatise. What matters is to see where the three missteps occur. Merely quieting the mind, merely seeing that form does not form itself, or merely drawing scriptural language toward non-being has not yet fully reached appearance that is present without being truly existent.

No need to cut apart the myriad things: Emptiness is present while form appears

The treatise next presents a misreading that is easy to recognize. Must one wash away the myriad things, block sight and hearing, and enter vacant desolation before reaching ultimate truth? If emptiness can be established only after things disappear, then it becomes another state that follows their destruction. Being and emptiness would remain two opposed things arranged before and after.

The scripture says that the nature of form is empty and that form does not become empty only when it is destroyed. While form appears, it already stands through manifold conditions and possesses no body of its own apart from them. There is not first a solid, real form that must later be smashed before emptiness can emerge from the pieces. Yuankang’s sharp sentence cuts off the misunderstanding: form itself is empty; it need not first be cut apart and destroyed before emptiness is reached.

A mirror-image can help make this clear. When a person stands before a mirror, an image appears distinctly; one cannot say that no image appears. Yet apart from the face, the mirror, the light, and the distance between them, no independently existing mirror-image can be found. The image does not become empty only when the mirror breaks. While appearing, it has no fixed body of its own. This is precisely “although being, non-being”: it has appearance, yet lacks truly existent intrinsic nature.

Conversely, because the image does appear when conditions come together, one cannot say that it is wholly absent. This is “although non-being, being”: absent in intrinsic nature, present through conditional constitution. “Not being” does not erase appearance, and “not non-being” does not preserve a substantial entity. Together the two statements remain faithful to what stands before us without allowing it to be grasped as truly existent.

Conditions as the measure: True being would not wait for conditions; true non-being could never arise

How do we judge that something is not truly existent? Sengzhao does not tell us to rely on feeling alone. He tests it by conditions.

If a thing were fixed, real being, it should exist forever by itself from the outset. Why would it need to wait for conditions before arising? If a sprout appears only when seed, soil, water, and season are present, then the sprout is not true being established on its own apart from conditions. It arises, but its arising cannot be mistaken for existence by intrinsic nature.

Can we then say that the sprout is wholly absent? No. Fixed and genuine non-being would have to remain forever quiescent and could never arise when conditions became complete. Since the sprout does emerge through conditions, it is not annihilative non-being. Precisely because it waits upon conditions, it is not truly existent; precisely because it can arise, it is not wholly absent.

This is the treatise’s double reason: the myriad things have a reason for not being truly existent and a reason for not being wholly absent. To say only the first readily pushes emptiness into annihilation. To say only the second readily turns dependent arising into substantial existence. Only when the two hold together does the emptiness of the unreal become visible.

The illusory person: A human form appears, yet no real person can be found

The treatise’s clearest simile is the illusory person. Dharmas are provisionally designated and not real, like a person conjured by illusion. It is not that no illusory person appears, yet that illusory person is not a real person.

When the illusion is performed, a human form and movements can be seen, so one cannot say it is wholly absent. Yet when one asks where the real person is, none can be obtained. “It is not that no illusory person appears” blocks annihilation. “The illusory person is not a real person” blocks true existence. The two statements do not cancel one another; together they identify the status of appearance.

This also resolves the relation between “unreal” and “empty.” Unreal does not mean that phenomena have no operation at all. Empty does not add a layer of nothingness outside phenomena. Unreal means that what appears possesses no real body that can be fixed and grasped. Precisely for this reason, it is called empty. Yuankang’s summary is exact: because it is not truly existent, it is called unreal; because it is not truly existent, it is therefore called empty. The treatise receives its title from this reasoning.

A name is not a real thing: Why can “this” and “that” exchange places?

The argument now moves from conditions to names and realities. If a name were genuinely the real thing, saying “fire” should burn the mouth. If a real thing naturally carried one unique and unchanging name, then people looking at the same place from different directions should not call it “this” at one moment and “that” at another.

Yet a person on this side calls his own position “this” and the opposite side “that.” Once he stands opposite, “this” and “that” exchange places. Names help us indicate things in daily life, but they do not thereby become the things themselves. The treatise says that names do not correspond to realities, realities do not correspond to names, and when neither corresponds, where can the myriad things be fixed? This does not ask us to discard language. It asks us not to mistake an expediently established name for the fixed and unchanging body of a thing.

“Provisional designation” should be understood in the same way. “Provisional” means established in dependence on conditions, convention, and indication; it does not mean fictitious to the point of total absence. “Designation” is the name that lets people speak, distinguish, and understand one another; it is not the true body of the thing. Names can be used but not grasped. Appearances can be seen but not fixed. From both sides, name and reality return us to “unreal.”

True truth is not outside things: Encountering affairs and meeting the true

One final question remains. If names are not realities and the myriad things are unreal, is ultimate truth still hidden somewhere far from ordinary use?

The treatise answers in exactly the opposite way. The sage does not take a separate emptiness and use it to make the myriad things empty. He directly sees that they are empty of themselves and does not borrow emptiness in order to empty them. Emptiness is not a method he imposes on the world. The fact that the myriad things are conditioned, provisionally designated, and without intrinsic nature is how they already are. He passes through a thousand transformations without changing and walks among ten thousand confusions while remaining comprehending, not because he escapes transformation and confusion, but because he no longer fixes any dharma within them as truly existent.

The close therefore says that the place where dharmas are established does not depart from the true; that very place is the true. The Way is not elsewhere but is met in the affairs one touches. Yuankang states it without hesitation: in encountering any affair, all is the Way; there is no separate Way. Eating, walking, seeing form, and hearing sound need not first be removed. What must be loosened is the mind that fixes conditionally constituted things as truly existent and then mistakes emptiness for total absence.

Continuation / what carries forward

The Southern Dynasties Catalogue of Dharma Treatises already recorded “On the Emptiness of the Unreal” as an independent work beside the Prajñā writings of Zhi Daolin and others. In the Tang, Yuankang divided the whole into preface-three and main-six and carefully distinguished the positions of the three schools from Sengzhao’s criticisms of them. What this continuation preserves is not merely a string of school names. It preserves a reusable way of reading: first ask whether what appears before us is truly existent; then ask whether emptiness means total absence; finally test each answer through conditions, illusion, and names and realities.

After the test, the myriad things have not disappeared and sight and hearing have not been shut off. What remains is precisely a world that appears without being real and arises through conditions without being absent. When one can avoid both substantial existence and annihilative non-being in each particular thing, the emptiness of the unreal is no longer an abstract term in the distance. It is the true that can be seen in the very affair one now encounters.