肇論 般若無知論
般若既無知，何以又無所不知？僧肇所遮的不是照見，而是把境相抓成『我所知道的東西』：有所知，便有所不知；聖心無取相之知，才不被一相限制。故虛不失照，照不失虛；知不是先取後捨，而是知即不取、不取而知。真諦不作有相的所緣，真智也不成依境取相之知；無是無當，不是不能分辨，正因不先固定一個所是、所當，才物無不是、物無不當。若捨有奔無，把無相再立成相，只如逃峰赴谷，兩邊同患。般若之無知又不同惑智之知無：前者本無惑取，後者是已有取相之知而知其性空。到最後，用即寂、寂即用；寂不是離用的空殼，用不是離寂的動作。於是，無知不是無照，正是不住相的照；無所不知也不是占有一切知識，而是照萬法而無所取。
If prajñā is without knowing, how can there be nothing it does not know? What Sengzhao denies is not illumination, but the grasping of an object's mark as “something I know”: wherever something is fixed as known, something else remains unknown; only because the sage's mind has no knowing that grasps marks is it not confined by any one mark. Thus emptiness does not lose illumination, and illumination does not lose emptiness. Knowing is not first grasping and then relinquishing; knowing itself is non-grasping, and it knows without grasping. Ultimate truth does not become an object marked by characteristics, and true wisdom does not become a knowing that grasps marks in dependence on an object. Having no fixed “this is so” and no fixed “this corresponds” does not mean an inability to discern. Precisely because it fixes in advance neither what a thing must be nor what it must correspond to, nothing fails to show itself as it is and nothing fails to be met as appropriate. To abandon being and rush toward non-being, making the signless into yet another mark, is only to flee a peak and plunge into a valley; both extremes carry the same danger. Prajñā's being without knowing also differs from knowing that knowing is empty: the former never contains deluded grasping, while the latter begins with a knowing that grasps marks and then knows its nature to be empty. In the end, functioning itself is stillness and stillness itself is functioning. Stillness is not an empty shell apart from functioning, and functioning is not an activity apart from stillness. Without knowing, then, is not without illumination: it is illumination that abides in no mark. Nor does “there is nothing it does not know” mean possessing all knowledge; it means illuminating all dharmas while grasping nothing.
《肇論》一卷〈般若無知論第三〉· 大正藏 T45n1858〔起 T45 0153a07〕。段/行首〔T45 …〕＝大正藏頁·欄·行錨。
〔T45 0153a07〕般若無知論第三 夫般若虛玄者，蓋是三乘之宗極也。誠真一之無差，然異端之論，紛然久矣。有天竺沙門鳩摩羅什者，少踐大方，研機斯趣。獨拔於言象之表，妙契於希夷之境；齊異學於迦夷，揚湻風於東扇。將爰燭殊方而匿糴涼土者，所以道不虛應，應必有由矣。弘始三年，歲次星紀，秦乘入國之謀，舉師以來之意也。北天之運，數其然也。大秦天王者，道契百王之端，德洽千載之下，游刃萬機，弘道終日，信季俗蒼生之所天，釋迦遺法之所仗也。時乃集義學沙門五百餘人於逍遙觀，躬執秦文，與什公參定方等。其所開拓者，豈謂當時之益，乃累劫之津梁矣。余以短乏，曾廁嘉會，以為上聞異要，始於時也。然則聖智幽微，深隱難測。無相無名，乃非言象之所得。為試罔象其懷，寄之狂言耳，豈曰聖心而可辨哉！試論之曰： 《放光》云：「般若無所有相，無生滅相。」《道行》云：「般若無所知、無所見。」此辨智照之用，而曰無相、無知者，何耶？果有無相之知、不知之照，明矣。何者？夫有所知，則有所不知。以聖心無知，故無所不知。不知之知，乃曰一切知。故經云：「聖心無所知，無所不知。」信矣！是以聖人虛其心而實其照，終日知而未嘗知也。故能默耀韜光虛心玄鑒，閉智塞聰而獨覺冥冥者矣。然則智有窮幽之鑒而無知焉，神有應會之用而無慮焉。神無慮，故能獨王於世表；智無知，故能玄照於事外。智雖事外，未始無事；神雖世表，終日域中。所以俯仰順化應接無窮，無幽不察而無照功。斯則無知之所知，聖神之所會也。然其為物也，實而不有、虛而不無。存而不可論者，其唯聖智乎。何者？欲言其有，無狀無名；欲言其無，聖以之靈。聖以之靈，故虛不失照；無狀無名，故照不失虛。照不失虛，故混而不渝；虛不失照，故動以接麁。是以聖智之用，未始暫廢；求之形相，未暫可得。故《寶積》曰：「以無心意而現行。」《放光》云：「不動等覺而建立諸法。」所以聖迹萬端，其致一而已矣。是以般若可虛而照，真諦可亡而知，萬動可即而靜，聖應可無而為。斯則不知而自知，不為而自為矣！復何知哉？復何為哉？ 難曰：夫聖人真心獨朗，物物斯照；應接無方，動與事會。物物斯照，故知無所遺；動與事會，故會不失機。會不失機，故必有會於可會；知無所遺，故必有知於可知。必有知於可知，故聖不虛知；必有會於可會；故聖不虛會。既知既會，而曰無知無會者。何耶？若夫忘知遺會者，則是聖人無私於知會，以成其私耳。斯可謂不自有其知，安得無知哉？ 答曰：夫聖人功高二儀而不仁，明逾日月而彌昏，豈曰木石瞽其懷？其於無知而已哉。誠以異於人者神明，故不可以事相求之耳。子意欲令聖人不自有其知，而聖人未嘗不有知，無乃乖於聖心、失於文旨者乎！何者？經云：「真般若者，清淨如虛空，無知無見，無作無緣。」斯則知自無知矣，豈待返照然後無知哉？若有知性空而稱淨者，則不辨於惑智，三毒四倒亦皆清淨，有何獨尊於般若？若以所知美般若，所知非般若，所知自常淨，故般若未嘗淨，亦無緣致淨歎於般若。然經云「般若清淨」者，將無以般若體性真淨，本無惑取之知。本無惑取之知，不可以知名哉。豈唯無知名無知，知自無知矣！是以聖人以無知之般若，照彼無相之真諦。真諦無兔馬之遺，般若無不窮之鑒，所以會而不差、當而無是。寂怕、無知，而無不知者矣。 難曰：夫物無以自通，故立名以通物。物雖非名，果有可名之物當於此名矣。是以即名求物，物不能隱。而論云「聖心無知」，又云「無所不知」。意謂無知未嘗知，知未嘗無知。斯則名教之所通，立言之本意也。然論者欲一於聖心，異於文旨。尋文求實，未見其當。何者？若知得於聖心，無知無所辨；若無知得於聖心，知亦無所辨；若二都無得，無所復論哉！ 答曰：經云：「般若義者，無名無說，非有非無，非實非虛。」虛不失照，照不失虛，斯則無名之法，故非言所能言也。言雖不能言，然非言無以傳，是以聖人終日言而未嘗言也。今試為子狂言辨之。夫聖心者，微妙無相，不可為有；用之彌勤，不可為無。不可為無，故聖智存焉；不可為有，故名教絕焉。是以言知不為知，欲以通其鑒；不知非不知，欲以辨其相。辨相，不為無；通鑒，不為有。非有，故知而無知；非無；故無知而知。是以知即無知，無知即知。無以言異而異於聖心也。 〔T45 0154a05〕難曰：夫真諦深玄，非智不測。聖智之能，在茲而顯。故經云：「不得般若，不見真諦。」真諦，則般若之緣也。以緣求智，智則知矣。 答曰：以緣求智，智非知也。何者？放光云：「不緣色生識，是名不見色。」又云：「五陰清淨故，般若清淨。」般若即能知也，五陰即所知也。所知，即緣也。夫知與所知，相與而有、相與而無。相與而無，故物莫之有；相與而有，故物莫之無。物莫之無，故為緣之所起；物莫之有，故則緣所不能生。緣所不能生，故照緣而非知；為緣之所起，故知、緣相因而生。是以知與無知，生於所知矣。何者？夫智以知所知，取相故名知。真諦自無相，真智何由知？所以然者，夫所知非所知，所知生於知；所知既生知，知亦生所知。所、知既相生，相生即緣法，緣法故非真。非真，故非真諦也。故《中觀》云：「物從因緣有，故不真。不從因緣有，故即真。」今真諦曰真，真則非緣。真非緣，故無物從緣而生也。故經云：「不見有法無緣而生。」是以真智觀真諦，未嘗取所知。智不取所知，此智何由知？然智非無知，但真諦非所知，故真智亦非知。而子欲以緣求智，故以智為知。緣自非緣，於何而求知？ 難曰：論云「不取」者，為無知故不取？為知然後不取耶？若無知故不取，聖人則冥若夜游，不辨緇素之異耶！若知然後不取，知則異於不取矣！ 答曰：非無知，故不取；又非知，然後不取。知即不取，故能不取而知。 難曰：論云「不取」者，誠以聖心不物於物，故無惑取也。無取則無是，無是則無當。誰當聖心，而云聖心無所不知耶？ 答曰：然。無是、無當者。夫無當，則物無不當；無是；則物無不是。物無不是，故是而無是；物無不當，故當而無當。故經云：「盡見諸法而無所見。」 難曰：聖心非不能是，誠以無是可是。雖無是可是，故當是於無是矣。是以經云「真諦無相故般若無知」者，誠以般若無有有相之知。若以無相為無相，有何累於真諦耶？ 答曰：聖人無無相也。何者？若以無相為無相，無相即為相。捨有而之無，譬猶逃峰而赴[堅-臣+(虍-七+(一/谷))]，俱不免於患矣。是以至人處有而不有，居無而不無。雖不取於有無，然亦不捨於有無。所以和光塵勞，周旋五趣，寂然而往，怕爾而來，恬淡無為而無不為。 難曰：聖心雖無知，然其應會之道不差。是以可應者應之，不可應者存之。然則聖心有時而生、有時而滅。可得然乎？ 答曰：生滅者，生滅心也。聖人無心，生滅焉起？然非無心，但是無心心耳；又非不應，但是不應應耳。是以聖人應會之道，則信若四時之質。直以虛無為體，斯不可得而生、不可得而滅也。 難曰：聖智之無、惑智之無，俱無生滅。何以異之？ 答曰：聖智之無者，無知；惑智之無者，知無。其無雖同，所以無者，異也。何者？夫聖心虛靜，無知可無，可曰無知，非謂知無。惑智有知，故有知可無，可謂知無，非曰無知也。無知，即般若之無也；知無，即真諦之無也。是以般若之與真諦，言用，即同而異；言寂，即異而同。同，故無心於彼此；異，故不失於照功。是以辨同者同於異，辨異者異於同，斯則不可得而異、不可得而同也。何者？內有獨鑒之明，外有萬法之實。萬法雖實，然非照不得。內外相與以成其照功，此則聖所不能同；用也。內雖照而無知，外雖實而無相。內外寂然，相與俱無，此則聖所不能異；寂也。是以經云「諸法不異」者，豈曰續鳧截鶴、夷嶽盈[堅-臣+(虍-七+(一/谷))]，然後無異哉？誠以不異於異，故雖異而不異也。故經云：「甚奇，世尊！於無異法中而說諸法異。」又云：「般若與諸法，亦不一相，亦不異相。」信矣。 難曰：論云「言用則異，言寂則同。」未詳般若之內，則有用寂之異乎？ 答曰：用即寂、寂即用，用寂體一，同出而異名；更無無用之寂而主於用也。是以智彌昧，照逾明；神彌靜，應逾動。豈曰明昧動靜之異哉？故《成具》云：「不為而過為。」《寶積》曰：「無心無識，無不覺知。」斯則窮神盡智，極象外之談也。即之明文，聖心可知矣。 般若無知論
The canonical text stands in Chinese only. This edition renders the essence, the plain reading, the exposition and the apparatus into English — never the sūtra itself. Switch to 漢讀本 or 並行雙語 above to read it.
序一：般若深隱，卻是三乘所共同歸向的究竟
般若的義理虛寂幽玄，是聲聞、緣覺、菩薩三乘所共同尊奉的根本與究竟。它確實是真實而純一、沒有差別的法；可是各種偏向一端的議論，早已紛紛出現很久了。
有一位從天竺來的出家人，名叫鳩摩羅什。他年少時便進入大乘廣大的法門，深入鑽研其中微妙的旨趣。他獨自超越語言與形象所能表達的範圍，巧妙契入那無聲無形、幽微難見的境地；在西方折服各種不同的學說，又把純正的教化傳揚到東方。他原本將要照亮異域，卻一度隱藏光彩，滯留在涼州。由此可知，正道不會沒有因緣便自行感應；有了感應，也一定有它的來由。
弘始三年，歲在星紀。後秦出兵，使呂隆歸入秦國，原意就在迎請羅什到來；佛法從北方展轉東傳的時運，大概本來就應如此。後秦天王姚興，所行的道超越歷代君王，德澤更流及千載之後。他處理繁多政務十分從容，又終日以弘揚佛道為務，確實是末世百姓所仰望的人，也是釋迦牟尼佛遺教所倚仗的人。
當時，姚興召集五百多位研究義理的出家人到逍遙觀，親自拿著漢文經本，與羅什共同參詳審定方等大乘經典。他們由此開拓的法門，豈只利益當時的人？那更是未來累劫眾生得以渡過生死的橋梁。我才學短淺，也曾有幸列席這場盛會；我認為，自己聽聞前所未聞的殊勝法要，就是從那時開始的。
序二：只能寄託言語，試著追尋不可言說的聖智
然而，聖人的智慧幽微深隱，很難測量。它沒有可取的形相，也沒有固定的名稱，本來不是語言與形象所能得到的。我只好試著以不存心求取的方式，貼近它所含的意義，再把心中所領會的寄託在近乎放言的文字中。這哪裡是說，聖人的心真能由我辨明呢？現在姑且試著論說如下。
《放光般若經》說，般若沒有任何可據為實有的形相，也沒有生起和消滅的形相。《道行般若經》說，般若沒有一個可以取著為所知、所見的對象。這兩處明明是在說智慧觀照的作用，卻又稱它無相、無知，究竟是什麼意思？由此可知，確實有一種不取相的知，也有一種不把照見立成知見的照。
為什麼？只要把某些對象確定為『我所知道的』，便一定另有不知道的事物。聖人的心沒有這種取相的知，所以沒有不能照知的事物。不立一個能知而又無所不照的知，才可稱為一切知。因此經中說，聖人的心沒有可取著的所知，卻又沒有不能照知的事物。這句話確實可信。
一、虛心而實照：終日知，卻不把知立成取著
所以，聖人使自己的心不取任何形相，卻使觀照真實而周遍；他整日都在照知，卻從未把所照立成一個可執取的知。正因如此，他能在沉默中照耀而不顯示自己的光明，虛明地觀照幽微；看似關閉分別之智、堵住耳目的聰明，卻獨自覺悟那幽深寂靜的義理。
這樣看來，聖智有窮盡幽微的鑒照，卻沒有取相之知；聖人的神妙作用能與一切因緣相應，卻沒有預先安排的思慮。正因神妙的作用沒有思慮，所以能超然自在於世間之外；正因智慧沒有取相之知，所以能在事相之外幽微地照見。智慧雖超出事相，卻從來沒有離開一切事；神妙作用雖超出世間，卻整天都在世間之中。因此，聖人隨順教化而俯仰應現，接引眾生沒有窮盡；沒有任何幽微處不被察見，他卻不把觀照立為自己的功勞。這就是無知之知所照見的，也是聖人的神妙智慧所契會的。
二、實而不有，虛而不無：照與虛互不相失
說到聖智本身，它真實而不是一個實有之物，虛寂而不是斷滅的無。它確實存在，卻不能被說成固定的有或無；大概只有聖智才是如此。為什麼？想說它有，它又沒有固定的形狀和名稱；想說它無，聖人卻正是依它而有神妙的照用。聖人依它而靈明，所以虛寂並不失去照用；它沒有形狀和名稱，所以照用也不失去虛寂。
照用不失虛寂，所以即使混同於萬法之中，也不改變它不取相的本性；虛寂不失照用，所以能起作用，應接粗顯的事物。因此，聖智的作用從未暫時廢止；可是若要從形相中尋找它，又從未有一刻能夠得到。《佛說維摩詰經》中寶積讚佛，說祂不以心意分別而示現種種行；《放光般若經》也說，不動於平等正覺，卻為一切法建立其所在。所以，聖人的事迹雖有千萬種不同形態，所到達的旨趣只有一個。
由此可知，般若可以虛寂而照見，真諦可以不存形相而為智慧所契知，一切動作可以就在動中顯出寂靜，聖人的應化可以無所造作而成辦一切。這就是不把知立為知而自然照知，不把作為立為作為而自然成辦。既然如此，還有哪一個固定的知？又有哪一個固定的作為？
三、第一難：既然無所遺漏地知與應，怎能說無知無會？
有人問：聖人的真心獨自明朗，一一照見所有事物；他應接沒有固定方式，動靜都與事情的機宜相合。一一照見，所以知道一切而沒有遺漏；動靜與事情相合，所以應會從不錯失時機。既然不失時機，就一定有相應的作用去契會可以契會的事；既然所知沒有遺漏，就一定有能知之智去知道可以知道的對象。有能知去知所知，所以聖人不會徒然地知；有能會去會所會，所以聖人不會徒然地應會。既然確實有知、有會，為什麼又說無知、無會？
如果所謂忘掉知、遺下會，只是說聖人不把知與會占為己有，那麼，他只是藉著不自私地占有知與會，反而成就了自己的知與會。這只能說聖人不認為那是自己所有的知，怎麼能說根本無知？
回答：聖人的功業高過天地，卻不把仁德據為己有；他的明照超過日月，卻顯得更加幽暗。這豈是說，聖人的心像木石一樣閉塞盲昧，這才叫作無知？實在是因為聖人的靈明異於常人，所以不能用普通事相去尋求他。
你的意思是，聖人不把知當成自己所有，但他仍然未嘗沒有知。這恐怕既違背聖人的本心，也失去經文的旨意。為什麼？經中說，真實般若清淨得像虛空，沒有可取的知與見，也沒有造作和攀緣。這就表明，這個知本來就是不取著的無知，哪裡需要先有一個取相之知，再回頭觀照自己，把那個知忘掉，才稱為無知？
如果因為知的體性是空，便把它稱為清淨，那麼般若就無法與迷惑之智區別；貪、瞋、癡三毒以及常、樂、我、淨四種顛倒，它們的體性也都是空，又為什麼只尊稱般若清淨？如果只是因為所知的真諦清淨，便用它讚美能知的般若，那麼所知不是般若。所知之境本來清淨，般若自身便從未被說明為清淨，也沒有理由把所知的清淨轉過來讚歎般若。
經中之所以說般若清淨，應當是因為般若的本性真實清淨，本來就沒有迷惑、取著的知。既然本來沒有迷惑取著之知，便不能用通常的取相之知來稱呼它。不只是完全沒有知才叫無知；般若之知本身就是無知。
因此，聖人以無取相之知的般若，照見沒有形相可取的真諦。真諦不像兔、馬渡河那樣仍有不能窮盡的深處，般若也沒有不能照到底的地方，所以聖人契會事理而不差失，恰當地回應卻不把任何一物定為『就是這個』。他寂靜淡泊，沒有取相之知，卻沒有任何事物不能照知。
四、第二難：『知』與『無知』既是兩個名稱，怎會同是一顆聖心？
又有人問：事物不能自己把自己傳達出來，所以要建立名稱，藉名稱通達事物。事物雖然不等於名稱，終究有一個可以命名的事物與名稱相當。因此，循著名稱去尋找事物，事物就不能隱藏。可是論中一方面說聖心無知，一方面又說無所不知。照文意看來，無知不曾是知，知也不曾是無知；這正是名教得以通達事物、立言得以成立的本意。論主卻想把這兩者統一在同一顆聖心，反而與文字表面的旨意不同。順著文字尋求實義，還看不出這種統一如何恰當。
為什麼？如果『知』契合聖心，『無知』便沒有可安立之處；如果『無知』契合聖心，『知』也沒有可安立之處；如果兩者都不能契合聖心，那又沒有什麼可以議論了。
回答：經中說，般若的義理沒有固定名稱，也不能由言說說盡；不能定為有，也不能定為無；不能定為實，也不能定為虛。虛寂不失照用，照用也不失虛寂，這是沒有固定名稱的法，所以不是言語所能說盡。然而，雖然言語不能說盡它，若完全不用言語，又無法把它傳達給人。因此，聖人整天說法，卻從未把所說的名稱當成真實本身。現在我姑且再用放言來替你辨明。
聖人的心微妙無相，不能說它是有；它的作用愈用愈勤，也不能說它是無。不能說無，所以聖智確實存在；不能說有，所以固定的名言無法套住它。因此，說『知』並不是把它定為取相之知，而是要表明它確有鑒照；說『不知』也不是說它像木石般全無知覺，而是要辨明它無相的本性。辨明無相，所以它不是斷滅的無；通達鑒照，所以它不是固定的有。正因不是固定的有，所以知就是無知；正因不是斷滅的無，所以無知就是知。不要因為『知』與『無知』兩種說法不同，就把聖心也分成兩個相異的實體。
五、第三難之一：真諦既是所緣，般若不就成了能知嗎？
又有人問：真諦深奧幽玄，不憑智慧便不能測知，聖智的能力也正是在這裡顯現。因此經中說，若不能得到般若，就不能看見真諦。真諦正是般若所照的境緣。既然可以循著所緣之境尋求能照之智，那麼這個智便是有知。
回答：循著所緣之境尋求智慧，並不能因此把真智判為取相之知。為什麼？《放光般若經》說，不攀緣色而生起識，才叫作不見色相；又說，因五蘊清淨，所以般若清淨。般若是能知的智慧，五蘊是所知的對象；所知就是所緣。
能知與所知相互依待，才有『知』與『所知』的成立；也正因相互依待，所以從真實處說，兩者都沒有可以獨立自存的實體。說它們相依而有，是說凡夫取相的境與智；說它們相依而無，是說真諦無相、真智無取。凡夫的境與智相依生起，不能硬說它全無；真諦與真智不可被執取，也不能硬說它是有。正因所緣不能生起真智，真智雖照所緣，卻不是取相之知；正因凡夫的知由所緣生起，凡夫的知與境便互相依待而生。因此，所稱的知與無知，都隨所知之境的有相或無相而得名。
再說得明白些：凡夫之智把所知當作一個可取的對象，所以叫作知。真諦本來無相，真智又能從哪裡取到一個形相而成為這種知？所謂『所知』，並不是自己就叫所知，而是相對於能知才得此名；能知同樣相對於所知而得名。所知由能知而立，能知又由所知而立，兩者既然互相依待生起，就是因緣法；既是因緣法，就不是真實自立之法；既非真實，便不是真諦。
所以《中觀》說，事物從因緣而有，因此不真；不從因緣而有，才是真。現在把真諦稱作真，正因它不是一個依緣而生、可被執取的對象。經中也說，沒有一個實有的法不是從因緣而生。因此，真智觀照真諦時，從不把一個所知形相取為對象。智慧既不取所知，這種智慧又怎能被稱為通常的取相之知？然而它並非全無知覺，只因真諦不是有相的所知，所以真智也不是取相之知。你想從所緣尋求能知，才把真智判為有知；可是這個緣本身就不是可取之緣，又能向哪裡尋求一個取相的知？
六、第三難之二：到底是先不知而不取，還是先知道再不取？
又有人問：論中所說的『不取』，是因為全無知覺，所以不能取得對象；還是先知道對象，然後才不取著它？如果因為無知所以不取，聖人便像在黑夜中行走，連黑白的差別都不能分辨。如果先知道然後才不取，知與不取便是兩個先後不同的作用；在知道的當下仍然有取，之後才放下它。
回答：並不是因為全無知覺，所以不取；也不是先有一個取相之知，然後才做到不取。知的當下就是不取，所以能夠不取而又照知。
七、第三難之三：既然無取、無是、無當，怎能無所不知？
又有人問：論中所說的不取，確實是指聖心不把事物執定為實物，所以沒有迷惑的取著。可是沒有取著，便沒有哪一物可以判為『是』；沒有可判為是的事物，也就沒有哪一物與聖心相當。既然沒有事物能與聖心相當，為什麼還說聖心無所不知？
回答：確實沒有一個固定的『是』，也沒有一個固定的『當』。正因沒有固定的相當，所以沒有一物不能恰當地應對；正因沒有固定的是，所以沒有一物不能如實地顯現為它自己。萬物無不是，所以面對一切是而不執定一個是；萬物無不相當，所以應對一切當而不執定一個當。因此經中說，遍見一切法，卻沒有一個可取著的所見。
八、第三難之四：若把無相認作真相，應該沒有妨礙吧？
又有人問：聖心不是沒有判斷事物的能力，只因沒有一個實物可被判定為是，所以才不立一個是。既然沒有實物可判為是，至少應當把『無是』判為真實的答案。因此經中說，真諦無相，所以般若無知；這只是說般若沒有取著有相的知。如果把無相如實認作無相，對真諦又會造成什麼妨礙？
回答：聖人連『無相』也不執著。為什麼？若把無相固定地認作一種無相，無相本身就成了另一個形相。捨棄有而奔向無，就像為躲避山峰而投入深谷，兩邊都不能免除禍患。
因此，至人身處有而不執有，安住無而不執無。他雖然不取著有與無，也不捨棄有與無。所以，他能收斂自己的光芒，和同塵勞，周旋於五道眾生之中；他寂然地往，淡泊地來，恬淡無為，卻沒有不能成辦的事。
九、第四難之一：聖人的應現有時起、有時止，聖心也有生滅嗎？
又有人問：聖心雖然無知，它應接因緣的作用卻從不差失；可以回應的，便回應它，不可回應的，便暫且保留。這樣一來，聖心豈不是有時生起、有時消滅？可以這樣說嗎？
回答：生起和消滅，都是有取著之心的生滅。聖人沒有這種取著之心，生滅又從哪裡生起？然而，這不是像木石那樣全然無心，而是無取著之心的心；也不是完全不回應，而是不執著回應的回應。因此，聖人的應會之道，確實如春夏秋冬四時那樣，因緣到時必定相應。只是他以虛寂無相為體，所以不能說它實有生起，也不能說它實有消滅。
十、第四難之二：聖智之無與惑智性空，有何差別？
又有人問：聖智所說的無，以及迷惑之智所說的無，都沒有固定的生滅，兩者怎樣區別？
回答：聖智之無，是沒有取相之知；迷惑之智之無，是那個取相之知的體性本空。兩者雖然都稱為無，之所以稱無的理由卻不同。為什麼？聖心虛寂，原本沒有一個取著的知可以再被消除，所以可稱為無知，不能稱為先有一個知、再知道它是無。迷惑之智有取著的知，所以有一個知可說其體性為無；這叫知道那個知是空，不能叫作無知。
因此，無知是般若之智沒有取相；知無則是真諦所顯的空寂。般若與真諦，從作用上說，同一照境活動中仍有能照與所照的不同；從寂靜本性上說，兩者本有差別卻同樣無相。因為同樣無相，所以聖人不在彼此之間起分別心；因為作用有別，所以般若的照用又不會消失。從同的一面辨明，它是在差異中同；從異的一面辨明，它又在同一空寂中異，所以不能固定地說兩者相異，也不能固定地說兩者相同。
內在有獨自鑒照的明智，外在有萬法的真實義。萬法的真實義雖在，若沒有般若照見便不能顯明；內外相互成就觀照的作用，這是聖人也不能把它們混成全無分別的作用。可是內在的般若雖照而不取相，外在的真實義雖真而沒有形相；內外同歸寂然，彼此都不可執取，這是聖人也不能把它們說成兩個不同的寂靜本體。
所以，經中說一切法不異，並不是把野鴨的短腳接長、把鶴的長腳截短，也不是把高山削平、把深谷填滿，然後才叫沒有差異；實在是說，萬法正有差異時，其無相本性並不相異，所以雖有差異而不成固定的異。經中又說，希有啊，世尊，在沒有固定差異的法中，卻分別說諸法的差異；也說般若與諸法既不是固定的一相，也不是固定的異相。這些話確實可信。
十一、第四難之三：般若內部另有一個用與一個寂嗎？
最後又有人問：論中說，從作用看便有差別，從寂靜看便相同。那麼，般若內部是不是還有用與寂兩種不同的東西？
回答：作用就是寂靜，寂靜就是作用；用與寂的本體是一，只因觀察角度不同而有兩個名稱。並沒有一個脫離作用、全無作用的寂靜，躲在背後作為作用的主體。因此，智慧愈不顯示自己，觀照反而愈明；神妙作用愈寂靜，應化反而愈活潑。這哪裡是把明與昧、動與靜分成彼此隔絕的兩件事？所以《成具光明定意經》說，不把作為立成作為，反而超過一切有意造作；《佛說維摩詰經》中寶積所說的義理也表明，沒有取著的心識，卻沒有不能覺知的事物。這些話窮盡了神妙與智慧，也把言語形象之外的義理說到極處。就著這些明白的經文，聖心無知的意思便可以理解了。
Preface I: Prajñā is hidden and profound, yet it is the ultimate end shared by the three vehicles
The principle of prajñā is empty, still, hidden, and profound. It is the root and ultimate end honored in common by the three vehicles of śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas. It is indeed a true, pure, undivided Dharma; yet arguments that lean toward one extreme or another have long proliferated.
There was a monk who came from India named Kumārajīva. In his youth he entered the vast gate of the Great Vehicle and deeply investigated its subtle purport. Alone he passed beyond what words and images can express and skillfully entered the silent, formless, hidden realm. In the West he subdued divergent teachings, then spread the pure teaching eastward. He had been about to illumine distant lands, yet for a time concealed his radiance and was detained in Liangzhou. From this one may know that the right way does not respond without conditions, and that when a response comes it necessarily has its cause.
In the third year of Hongshi, when the year-star stood at Xingji, Later Qin sent out its army and brought Lü Long into submission. Its intention was precisely to welcome Kumārajīva. The time for the Dharma to pass eastward from the north must already have been so ordained. Yao Xing, heavenly king of Later Qin, followed a way surpassing former rulers, while his beneficence extended to generations a thousand years after him. He handled the press of affairs with ease and devoted each day to spreading the Buddha's way. He was truly one whom the people of the latter age looked up to, and one on whom the teaching left by Śākyamuni Buddha depended.
At that time Yao Xing summoned more than five hundred monks learned in doctrine to the Xiaoyao Monastery. Holding the Chinese scripture-texts himself, he joined Kumārajīva in examining and settling the Great Vehicle Vaipulya scriptures. Could the Dharma-gate they opened have benefited only those then alive? It became a bridge by which beings through future kalpas might cross birth and death. Though my learning was shallow, I too was fortunate enough to be present at that great assembly. I believe that it was then that I first heard the supreme Dharma I had never heard before.
Preface II: Words can only be entrusted with an attempt to trace a wisdom beyond words
Yet the wisdom of the sage is hidden and subtle, difficult to fathom. It has no mark that can be grasped and no fixed name; from the first it cannot be reached by words or images. I can only try, without setting my mind on acquisition, to approach what its meaning contains, then entrust what I have understood to words almost recklessly spoken. How could this mean that I can truly discriminate the sage's mind? For now, let me attempt the following account.
The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra says that prajñā has no mark that can be established as existing and no mark of arising or ceasing. The Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra says that prajñā has no object that can be grasped as what is known or seen. Both passages plainly concern the functioning of wisdom's illumination, yet call it markless and without knowing. What can this mean? There must indeed be a knowing that does not grasp marks, and an illumination that does not establish what it sees as a view.
Why? Once certain objects are fixed as “what I know,” there must be other things that remain unknown. The sage's mind has no such knowing that grasps marks; therefore there is nothing it does not know. A knowing that establishes no knower and yet leaves nothing unillumined may be called all-knowing. Thus the scriptures say: the sage's mind is without knowing, therefore there is nothing it does not know; a knowing that is not knowing—this is called all-knowing. These words are indeed trustworthy.
I. An empty mind and real illumination: knowing all day without establishing knowing as grasping
The sage therefore empties his mind of every grasped mark while making his illumination real and all-pervading. All day he knows, yet he never establishes what he illuminates as a knowing that can be appropriated. For this reason he can shine in silence without displaying his radiance, and in empty clarity illumine what is hidden. He seems to close discriminative wisdom and stop up the cleverness of eye and ear, yet alone awakens to the deep and still principle.
Seen in this way, sacred wisdom has an illumination that exhausts what is subtle, yet it has no knowing that grasps marks. The sage's numinous functioning can respond to every condition, yet it has no prearranged thought. Because this numinous functioning has no deliberation, it moves freely beyond the world. Because wisdom has no knowing that grasps marks, it illumines subtly beyond phenomena. Though wisdom transcends phenomena, it has never left any affair. Though numinous functioning transcends the world, it spends the whole day within the world. Thus the sage bends and rises in response to the teaching, receiving and guiding beings without end. No subtle place escapes his discernment, yet he does not claim illumination as his own achievement. This is what the knowing that is not knowing illumines, what the sage's numinous wisdom encounters.
II. Real yet not existent, empty yet not nonexistent: illumination and emptiness never lose one another
As for sacred wisdom itself, it is real yet not an existent thing, empty and still yet not the non-being of annihilation. It truly is, yet cannot be fixed as either being or non-being. Perhaps sacred wisdom alone is like this. Why? If one wishes to say it exists, it has no fixed form or name. If one wishes to say it does not exist, it is precisely through it that the sage has numinous illumination. Because the sage is numinously bright through it, emptiness does not lose illumination. Because it has no form or name, illumination does not lose emptiness.
Because illumination does not lose emptiness, even when mingled among the myriad dharmas it does not change its nature of non-grasping. Because emptiness does not lose illumination, it can function and respond to coarse and manifest things. Thus the functioning of sacred wisdom is never suspended even for a moment; yet if one seeks it among forms, there has never been a moment in which it could be obtained. In the Vimalakīrti Sūtra, Ratnākara praises the Buddha for manifesting manifold activities without discriminating through mind or thought. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra likewise says that he does not move from complete and equal awakening, yet establishes a place for every dharma. The sage's deeds may therefore take ten thousand different forms, but the purport at which they arrive is one.
From this one may know that prajñā can be empty and still yet illumine; ultimate truth can be known by wisdom without retaining any form; every movement can disclose stillness in the very movement; and the sage's responsive transformations can accomplish everything without intentional contrivance. This is naturally knowing without establishing knowing as knowing, and naturally accomplishing without establishing action as action. If so, what fixed knowing could remain? What fixed action could remain?
III. First objection: if knowing and response omit nothing, how can they be without knowing or encounter?
Someone asks: the sage's true mind shines alone and illumines every single thing. His responses have no fixed pattern, and both movement and stillness accord with the occasion. Because every thing is illumined, he knows all without omission. Because movement and stillness accord with the matter, his responsive encounter never misses its time. If it never misses its time, there must be a corresponding functioning that encounters what can be encountered. If nothing known is omitted, there must be a knowing wisdom that knows what can be known. Because a knower knows the known, the sage does not know in vain. Because one that encounters meets what is encountered, the sage does not respond in vain. Since there truly are knowing and encounter, why speak of no knowing and no encounter?
If “forgetting knowing and leaving encounter behind” merely means that the sage does not appropriate knowing and encounter as his own, then by not privately possessing them he only succeeds in making his knowing and encounter his own. This would mean merely that he does not regard knowing as his personal possession. How could it mean that he is without knowing at all?
The reply: the sage's achievements rise above heaven and earth, yet he does not appropriate benevolence as his own. His illumination surpasses the sun and moon, yet appears still more hidden and dark. Could this mean that the sage's mind is blocked and blind like wood or stone, and that only this should be called without knowing? It is precisely because the sage's numinous brightness differs from that of ordinary people that he cannot be sought through ordinary phenomena.
You say that although the sage does not take knowing as his own, he has never been without knowing. This, I fear, both contradicts the sage's original mind and loses the purport of the scriptures. Why? The scriptures say that true prajñā is pure like empty space, with no graspable knowing or seeing, no contrivance, and no object to be climbed upon. This shows that its knowing is originally the without-knowing of non-grasping. Why would it first need a knowing that grasps marks and only afterward turn back to watch itself and forget that knowing before it could be called without knowing?
If it were called pure merely because the nature of knowing is empty, prajñā could not be distinguished from deluded wisdom. The three poisons of greed, hatred, and delusion and the four inversions of permanence, pleasure, self, and purity are also empty in nature. Why, then, would prajñā alone be honored as pure? If prajñā were praised only because its object, ultimate truth, is pure, then the object known would not itself be prajñā. The object may originally be pure, but prajñā's own purity would remain unexplained, and there would be no reason to transfer the purity of the object into praise of prajñā.
The scriptures must call prajñā pure because prajñā's own nature is truly pure and originally has no deluded, grasping knowing. Since it originally has no deluded grasping knowing, it cannot be named by the ordinary knowing that takes marks. It is not only total absence of awareness that can be called without knowing; the knowing of prajñā is itself without knowing.
Therefore the sage, with the prajñā that has no knowing which grasps marks, illumines ultimate truth in which no form can be grasped. Ultimate truth is not like a river whose depths remain beyond the rabbit and the horse, and prajñā has nowhere its illumination cannot reach. The sage thus meets things and principles without error, responds appropriately yet fixes nothing as “this alone,” and remains still, serene, and without grasping knowing, while there is nothing he does not know.
IV. Second objection: if “knowing” and “without knowing” are two names, how can they belong to one sage's mind?
Someone asks again: things cannot communicate themselves, so names are established to reach them. Although a thing is not identical with its name, there must finally be some nameable thing to which the name corresponds. Follow the name in search of the thing, and the thing cannot remain concealed. Yet the treatise says on one side that the sage's mind is without knowing, and on the other that there is nothing it does not know. Taken according to the words, without knowing has never been knowing, nor has knowing ever been without knowing. This is the very point by which the teaching of names reaches things and discourse is established. The author nevertheless wishes to unite both in the same sage's mind, contrary to the apparent purport of the words. Following the words in search of the real meaning, I still cannot see how this union is fitting.
Why? If “knowing” accords with the sage's mind, “without knowing” has nowhere to stand. If “without knowing” accords with the sage's mind, “knowing” has nowhere to stand. If neither accords with the sage's mind, nothing remains to be discussed.
The reply: the scriptures say that the principle of prajñā has no fixed name and cannot be exhausted by speech. It cannot be fixed as being or non-being, as real or empty. Emptiness does not lose illumination, and illumination does not lose emptiness. This is a Dharma without a fixed name, so words cannot exhaust it. Yet although words cannot exhaust it, without words it could not be conveyed to others. Thus the sage teaches all day without ever taking the names spoken to be reality itself. Let me now again use unrestrained words to distinguish the matter for you.
The sage's mind is subtle and formless, so it cannot be said to exist. Its functioning becomes more diligent the more it is used, so it cannot be said not to exist. Because it cannot be called nonexistent, sacred wisdom truly is. Because it cannot be called existent, fixed names cannot bind it. Thus to say “knowing” is not to fix it as a knowing that grasps marks, but to show that it truly illuminates. To say “without knowing” is not to say it is utterly insentient like wood or stone, but to distinguish its formless nature. Because this makes formlessness clear, it is not annihilating non-being. Because it communicates illumination, it is not fixed being. Precisely because it is not fixed being, knowing is without knowing. Precisely because it is not annihilating non-being, without knowing is knowing. Do not divide the sage's mind into two different entities merely because “knowing” and “without knowing” are two different expressions.
V. Third objection, part one: if ultimate truth is an object, does prajñā not become a knowing subject?
Someone asks again: ultimate truth is profound and hidden. Without wisdom it cannot be fathomed, and the power of sacred wisdom is manifest precisely here. The scriptures therefore say that without attaining prajñā one cannot see ultimate truth. Ultimate truth is the object illumined by prajñā. If the illuminating wisdom can be sought by following its object, then this wisdom must possess knowing.
The reply: seeking wisdom by following its object does not therefore make true wisdom a knowing that grasps marks. Why? The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra says that only when consciousness does not arise by climbing upon form is the mark of form not seen. It also says that because the five aggregates are pure, prajñā is pure. Prajñā is the wisdom that knows; the five aggregates are the objects known. What is known is the object.
Only through mutual dependence do knowing and known, subject and object, become established. Precisely because they depend on each other, neither has an independently existing entity in truth. To say that they exist through mutual dependence is to speak of the ordinary person's object and wisdom, both of which grasp marks. To say that through mutual dependence they are absent is to speak of ultimate truth without marks and true wisdom without grasping. The ordinary person's object and wisdom arise dependently and cannot simply be declared nonexistent. Ultimate truth and true wisdom cannot be appropriated and cannot simply be declared existent. Because the object cannot give rise to true wisdom, true wisdom may illumine it without becoming a knowing that grasps marks. Because ordinary knowing arises from its object, ordinary knowing and its object arise in mutual dependence. What are called knowing and without knowing thus receive their names according to whether the known object has marks or is without marks.
More plainly: ordinary wisdom makes what is known into an object that can be grasped, and so is called knowing. Ultimate truth is originally without marks; from where could true wisdom obtain a mark and become that kind of knowing? What is called the “known” is not the known by itself, but receives that name in relation to a knower. The knower likewise receives its name in relation to the known. The known is established by the knower, and the knower by the known. Since both arise in mutual dependence, they are conditioned dharmas. Because they are conditioned dharmas, they do not truly stand on their own. Because they are not real, they are not ultimate truth.
Thus the Madhyamaka says that things which exist through causes and conditions are therefore unreal, while what does not exist through causes and conditions is real. Ultimate truth is here called real precisely because it is not a dependently arisen object that can be appropriated. The scriptures also say that there is no truly existent dharma that does not arise through causes and conditions. Therefore, when true wisdom illumines ultimate truth, it never takes the mark of a known object. Since wisdom does not appropriate a known, how could this wisdom be called ordinary knowing that grasps marks? Yet it is not utterly without awareness. Only because ultimate truth is not a marked known is true wisdom not a knowing that grasps marks. You wish to seek the knowing subject from the object and so judge true wisdom to have knowing; but this object itself is not a graspable object. Where, then, could a grasping knowing be sought?
VI. Third objection, part two: is one first without knowing and therefore unable to grasp, or does one know first and then refrain from grasping?
Someone asks again: when the treatise speaks of “not grasping,” does it mean that, because there is no awareness at all, an object cannot be grasped? Or does one first know the object and only then refrain from grasping it? If there is no grasping because there is no knowing, the sage is like someone walking at night, unable even to distinguish black from white. If one first knows and then does not grasp, knowing and non-grasping become two successive functions: at the moment of knowing there is still grasping, and only afterward is it released.
The reply: it is not because there is no awareness that there is no grasping; nor is there first a knowing that grasps marks, followed by non-grasping. Knowing itself is non-grasping, and therefore it can know without grasping.
VII. Third objection, part three: if there is no grasping, no fixed “is,” and no fixed correspondence, how can there be nothing unknown?
Someone asks again: the non-grasping spoken of in the treatise surely means that the sage's mind does not fix things as real entities and therefore has no deluded attachment. Yet if there is no attachment, nothing can be judged as fixedly “so.” If nothing can be fixed as so, nothing corresponds to the sage's mind. Since no thing can correspond to it, why say that there is nothing the sage's mind does not know?
The reply: there truly is no fixed “so” and no fixed “correspondence.” Precisely because there is no fixed correspondence, there is no thing to which it cannot respond appropriately. Precisely because there is no fixed “so,” there is no thing that cannot manifest as itself. Nothing among the myriad things is not so; therefore the sage faces every “so” without fixing one “so.” Nothing among the myriad things fails to correspond; therefore he meets every correspondence without fixing one correspondence. The scriptures therefore say that he sees all dharmas everywhere, yet there is no seen object that can be grasped.
VIII. Third objection, part four: if the signless is recognized as the true mark, what harm could there be?
Someone asks again: the sage's mind is not incapable of judging things. It establishes no fixed “so” only because there is no real entity that can be judged so. If no real entity can be judged so, at least “there is no fixed so” should be judged the true answer. Thus the scriptures say that ultimate truth is without marks and prajñā is without knowing. This merely means that prajñā has no knowing that grasps marked things. If the signless is known exactly as signless, what obstruction could this cause to ultimate truth?
The reply: the sage does not cling even to “the signless.” Why? If the signless is fixedly known as a certain signlessness, signlessness itself becomes another mark. To abandon being and run toward non-being is like fleeing a mountain peak only to plunge into a deep valley; neither side escapes calamity.
Therefore the consummate person dwells amid being without grasping being, and abides in non-being without grasping non-being. Though he appropriates neither being nor non-being, he does not abandon either. He can therefore gather in his radiance and mingle with the dust, moving among beings of the five paths. He goes in stillness and comes in serene calm, tranquil and without contrivance, yet there is nothing he cannot accomplish.
IX. Fourth objection, part one: the sage's responses sometimes arise and sometimes cease; does the sage's mind also arise and cease?
Someone asks again: although the sage's mind is without knowing, its functioning in response to conditions never errs. What can be answered, it answers; what cannot, it keeps in reserve. Would this not mean that the sage's mind sometimes arises and sometimes ceases? Can this be said?
The reply: arising and ceasing belong to a mind that grasps. The sage has no such grasping mind; from where could arising and ceasing arise? Yet this is not total mindlessness like wood or stone; it is the mind of no grasping mind. Nor is it complete absence of response; it is a response that does not grasp response. Thus the sage's way of responsive encounter is truly like the substance of the four seasons, spring, summer, autumn, and winter: when conditions arrive, it certainly responds. Yet because empty, formless stillness is its substance, it cannot be said truly to arise, nor can it be said truly to cease.
X. Fourth objection, part two: how does sacred wisdom's absence differ from the empty nature of deluded wisdom?
Someone asks again: the absence spoken of in sacred wisdom and the absence spoken of in deluded wisdom both have no fixed arising or ceasing. How are they distinguished?
The reply: sacred wisdom's absence is the absence of knowing that grasps marks. Deluded wisdom's absence is the emptiness in nature of that very knowing which grasps marks. Although both are called absence, the reasons for that name differ. Why? The sage's mind is empty and still. Originally there is no grasping knowing that must later be removed, so it may be called without knowing; it cannot be called first having a knowing and then knowing that it is empty. Deluded wisdom has a grasping knowing, so there is a knowing whose nature may be called empty. This is knowing that knowing is empty; it cannot be called without knowing.
Thus without knowing means that prajñā's wisdom has no grasping of marks, while knowing emptiness means the emptiness and stillness disclosed by ultimate truth. In terms of functioning, prajñā and ultimate truth remain respectively illuminator and illuminated within one activity of illumination. In terms of their still nature, they differ yet are equally without marks. Because both are without marks, the sage does not raise a discriminating mind between them. Because their functions differ, prajñā's illumination does not disappear. Seen from their sameness, they are the same within difference. Seen from their difference, they differ within the same emptiness and stillness. They can therefore be fixed neither as different nor as the same.
Within there is the bright wisdom that illumines alone; without there is the true meaning of the myriad dharmas. Though the true meaning of the myriad dharmas is present, it cannot become manifest without prajñā's illumination. Inner and outer together accomplish illumination's functioning, and not even the sage can collapse them into a function without any distinction. Yet inward prajñā illumines without grasping marks, and outward true meaning is real without form. Inner and outer return together to stillness and can neither be grasped, and not even the sage can make them two different substances of stillness.
Therefore the scriptures say that all dharmas are not different. This does not mean lengthening a wild duck's short legs, cutting short a crane's long legs, leveling high mountains, or filling deep valleys before calling things without difference. It means that just where the myriad dharmas differ, their formless nature is not different; thus they differ without becoming fixedly different. The scriptures also say: how rare, World-Honored One, that differences among dharmas are distinguished within dharmas that have no fixed difference. They also say that prajñā and the dharmas are neither fixedly one in characteristic nor fixedly different in characteristic. These words are indeed trustworthy.
XI. Fourth objection, part three: are there a separate functioning and stillness inside prajñā?
Someone asks at last: the treatise says that from the perspective of functioning there is difference, while from that of stillness there is sameness. Does this mean that within prajñā there are two different things, functioning and stillness?
The reply: functioning itself is stillness, and stillness itself is functioning. Functioning and stillness are one in substance, receiving two names only from different standpoints. There is no stillness wholly devoid of functioning, detached from functioning and hidden behind it as the subject that controls it. Therefore the less wisdom displays itself, the brighter its illumination; the stiller numinous functioning is, the more alive its response. How could brightness and obscurity, movement and stillness, be divided into two mutually isolated things? Thus the Samādhi of Perfected Radiance Sūtra says that by not establishing action as action one surpasses every intentional contrivance. The purport of Ratnākara's words in the Vimalakīrti Sūtra likewise shows that although there is no grasping consciousness, there is nothing that cannot be known. These statements exhaust the numinous and the wise and carry meaning to the limit beyond words and images. In light of these clear scriptural statements, the meaning of the sage's mind being without knowing can be understood.
經證先開：無知，是沒有照見，還是沒有取著？
〈般若無知論〉把兩句看似相反的經言並列在開頭。《放光》說：「般若無所有相，無生滅相。」《道行》又說：「般若無所知、無所見。」般若既是智慧，為什麼不說它知得更多、看得更清楚，反而先說無相、無知、無見？
論主的回答不是把般若降成昏暗，也不是讓聖人像木石般全無知覺。他要問的是：照見一件事時，是否一定要把它抓成一個『我所知道的東西』？若必須取相才叫知，取了這一相，便遺漏其餘；若照見而不把任何相據為己有，這種無取的照反而不受一相限制。因此全論最銳利的一句是：「聖心無知，故無所不知。不知之知，乃曰一切知。」
元康把這條界線說成無取相之知。這四字是全論的門：『無』所除去的是取相，不是照見；『知』所保留的是鑒照，不是占有。門若守住，後面的九番問答便不會被讀成自相矛盾。
先看論從哪裡發聲：逍遙觀譯場中的一次追問
本論不是離開翻經現場而憑空造出的玄談。僧肇先追述鳩摩羅什：少年進入大乘，超越言象，從西方來到東土；又追述姚興迎什入關，召集五百餘位義學沙門，在逍遙觀共同參定方等經典。僧肇自稱才學短乏，卻曾親自列席盛會，前所未聞的法要由此而聞。
這段序文有兩重作用。第一，它交代般若之問從譯經與聞法中生起，不是論主離經自說。第二，它先承認聖智幽微、無相無名，不是言象所能得到；接下來的一切語言都只是『寄之狂言』，是用不得不用的名字，指向不能被名字框住的聖心。
因此，讀者也要帶著這層自限往下讀。『知』不是最後實體，『無知』也不是最後實體；兩個名稱都為通達聖智而設，不能反過來把聖智切成兩塊。
虛心不等於空白：照得愈周遍，愈不立照功
論主先從聖人的現前作用說起。他虛其心而實其照，終日知而未嘗知。虛心，是不把所照形相納為己有；實照，是對萬法沒有幽微處不察。正因沒有取相，他的光明不必自我顯示；正因沒有自我顯示，照用反而不受限制。
論主自己的語言很準確：智慧窮幽而無知，神妙應會而無慮；在事外照，卻從未離事；在世表應，卻終日在世間。元康因此提醒，事外不是離色另有空。若把虛心理解成一片空白，便漏掉實照；若只抓住實照，又會把照見立成可占有的知。
所以聖智是「實而不有、虛而不無」。若只說有，便會尋找它的形狀與名稱；若只說無，又無法解釋聖人何以靈明應物。虛不失照，照不失虛：虛與照不是交替開關，而是同一聖智的兩面。
第一難：既然真的知、真的應，何以說無知無會？
第一位問難者抓住最直接的經驗：聖人一一照物，知無所遺；應接萬事，會不失機。既有可知、可會，也有能知、能會，怎能說無知無會？即使聖人不把知會占為私有，也只能叫『不自有其知』，不能叫無知。
論主先排除木石之無知。聖人的功高過天地，明超過日月，無知絕不是心懷盲瞽。真正的差別在於：凡夫之知取相，聖人之照不取相。若說聖人先有一個完整的取相知，後來謙遜地不說『這是我的知』，那只是忘知，不是般若本身無取。
元康在這裡落下利刃：般若本來沒有惑取之知。不是先把一物抓在手中，再提醒自己放下；而是接觸之初便不把它據為實相。這就是為何論主能說，知本身即是無知，不必另作一次回頭觀照才變成無知。
可是另一個疑問隨即出現：若只因知性空便叫清淨，一切迷惑之智的體性不也空嗎？若只因所知的真諦清淨便讚般若，清淨又只屬境，不屬智。論主因此把般若的清淨收在『本無惑取』：不是所有知都叫般若，也不是只要說知性空便完成辨別。
最後，象、馬、兔渡河的譬喻把這一答推到盡處。兔馬涉水，仍有不能到底的深處；般若照真諦，沒有遺下的深處，真諦也沒有剩餘的相可供取著。全照與無取在這裡同時成立：會而不差，當而無是；寂然無知，卻無所不知。
第二難：兩個名字怎能落在同一顆聖心？
第二難轉向語言。名稱雖不是事物本身，總要有相應之物；知與無知既是相反的兩個名字，若知契合聖心，無知便無處可立；若無知契合聖心，知也無處可立。若兩者都不契合，論說又有什麼意義？
論主沒有丟棄語言，而是限定語言。般若無名無說，卻不能不用言語傳達。說『知』，是為了通達它確有鑒照；說『不知』，是為了辨明它不取形相。前者不把般若落成斷無，後者不把般若落成實有。兩個名稱各遮一邊，不代表聖心內有兩個相反本體。
所以論主說：「知即無知，無知即知。」這不是把兩個字任意交換，而是說同一個照知在其作用上名知，在其無取上名無知。若循名字找到聖心，應看見同一照中有兩種說法；若守著名字互相排斥，反而永遠到不了所指之心。
第三難之一：真諦既是境，般若豈不是有知？
第三組問難都圍繞境與智。第一問說：真諦非般若不能測，真諦便是般若所緣；既有一個所知之緣，怎會沒有能知之智？
論主的回答先分兩種境智關係。凡夫把境相立成所知，能知與所知彼此相待而生；既相待而生，就是因緣法。真諦之所以稱真，卻不是一個依能知而成立、可被抓取的對象；真智照它，也不由一個有相之緣生出取相分別。
這裡最容易誤成『真智什麼都不知道』。論主已明說，真智並非全無知覺，只因真諦不是有相的所知，所以真智不是取相的知。不取，不等於不見；正因沒有把所見固定為所知，真智才沒有被一個境相轉成凡夫分別。
《中觀》的因緣語在此成為利刃：能知與所知若互相生起，便屬緣法；緣法沒有自性。真諦不作可取之緣，真智也不作依相而生之知。以緣去逼出一個取相知，從一開始便把真諦改成了俗諦之境。
第三難之二：到底是不知道所以不取，還是知道以後再不取？
第二問設下一個兩難：若因無知所以不取，聖人便像夜行者，不能分黑白；若先知後不取，知道的當下仍有取，只是後來放下。
論主兩邊都不接受，直接回答：「非無知，故不取；又非知，然後不取。知即不取，故能不取而知。」不取不是知之前的昏暗，也不是知之後的第二動作；知的方式本身就是不取。
不取與照知不是前後兩步。若分成兩步，第一步仍是惑取，第二步只是事後放下；本論所說的般若，則在照知當下便不把境相變成自己的存物。
第三難之三：無是無當，還能恰當地應物嗎？
第三問把不取推到判斷：不取便無是，無是便無當。既沒有一物可被定為『這就是』，又沒有一物能與聖心相當，何以說無所不知？
論主回答，正因不先固定哪一物為唯一的當，才沒有一物不能如實相當；正因不先固定哪一物為唯一的是，才沒有一物不能如其所是地顯現。因此「無當，則物無不當；無是；則物無不是。」
這不是取消分辨，而是取消預設。若先固定一個所是，萬物都會被逼進同一答案；若不預立所當，便能隨物如實相應。論主因此說：盡見諸法而無所見，遍應萬法而無固定所當。
第三難之四：把無相當作真實答案，不就好了嗎？
第四問仍想留下最後一個立足點：既然有相之知是病，那便把無相認作真正的相。論主說，這仍然不免取著。元康指出，若以無相為相，無相本身就成了另一個相。
本論用的譬喻很重：為了逃離山峰，卻一頭投入深谷。執有像困在峰上，執無像墜入谷中；從一邊奔向另一邊，兩邊的禍患都沒有解除。真正的不取，是處有而不有，居無而不無；不取有無，也不捨有無。
因此，聖人能和光同塵，周旋五趣，寂然而往，泊然而來。他沒有在有為世界之外另找一片無為空地；正因不住有無，才能在塵勞中無為而無不為。
第四難之一：應時而現，是否表示聖心也有生滅？
最後三問轉到生滅。第一問說：可應便應，不可應便存；應現有起止，聖心豈不有時生、有時滅？
論主先分心與應。生滅屬取著之心；聖人無此心，不能從應迹的出沒推成聖心本體的生滅。但這也不是全無心、全不應，所以說無心之心、不應之應。
四時之喻最能顯出這一層。春來草木生，秋至葉落，四時從不錯失其信；不能因春景有來去，便說四時之理是一件忽生忽滅的物。聖應隨緣而現，正如四時應期；其體無相，所以不可執取為生，也不可執取為滅。
第四難之二：聖智無知，與惑智性空有何差別？
第二問很尖銳：般若無知，惑智的體性也空；兩者都可說無生滅，如何區別？
論主區分無知與知無。無知，是聖心本無惑取之知，沒有一個知等著被消除；知無，是惑智已有取相，再說這個知的體性空。元康總結得最清楚：般若無取相，所以叫無知；惑智體性空，所以叫知無。
所以，不能只因兩者都可說無，便抹去『本無惑取』與『已有惑取而知其空』的差別。所無不同，無知與知無便不能混稱。
接著，本論從用與寂觀察般若和真諦。從用說，內有能照的般若，外有所照的真諦，照功不失，所以同中有異；從寂說，內智無知，外境無相，兩者同無可取，所以異中有同。固定說同，會抹掉照功；固定說異，又會把境智各立自性。只能在異中辨同、同中辨異，不能把任何一句鎖成實體。
野鴨與鶴的譬喻進一步說明：不必把野鴨短腳接長，也不必把鶴的長腳截短；不必削平高山、填滿深谷，才叫不異。差別相仍在，性無可取，所以異而不異。般若與諸法也不是先被加工成同一形狀，才得到平等。
第四難之三：用與寂是不是般若裡的兩個部分？
最後一問說：若從用看有異，從寂看相同，般若內部是否藏著一個用和一個寂？
論主收束全篇：「用即寂、寂即用，用寂體一，同出而異名」；寂不是作用停盡後留下的空殼，用也不是離開寂靜另起的忙動。若另立一個無用之寂作為用的主人，便又在聖心內造出主從兩物。
所以，智慧愈不自顯，照見愈明；神妙愈靜，應化愈動。明與昧、動與靜只是從不同方向指出同一聖智：照時不取，所以照即寂；寂而不斷，所以寂即照。全論至此回到篇首——無知不是照的反面，正是不取相的照。
承衍
〈般若無知論〉由逍遙觀譯場而生，呈羅什後，什公肯定其解義與文辭；劉遺民讀後又致書發問，僧肇逐條答覆。本篇自身已有九番問答，後附書問再把聖心、定慧、寂用之疑推深。到唐代，元康以三章、五段、四難九番的科判，替後人保存了不失論勢的讀路。
這條承衍最重要的，不是把『無知』變成一個新名相，而是守住論主的問法：照見時，是否必須取相？若不取相，照見是否就消失？僧肇的回答始終不落兩邊——不是木石無知，不是取相有知；不是捨有赴無，不是離用求寂。能在知的當下看見不取，在不取之中看見照用，『般若無知』才不再是一句悖論，而成為一條不把聖智物化的讀路。
The scriptural opening: does “without knowing” mean without illumination, or without grasping?
On Prajñā Without Knowing opens by placing side by side two scriptural statements that seem contrary. The Fangguang Prajñā Sūtra says that prajñā has no existent mark and no mark of arising or ceasing. The Daoxing Prajñā Sūtra says that prajñā has nothing it knows and nothing it sees. If prajñā is wisdom, why do the scriptures not say that it knows more and sees more clearly? Why do they begin instead with no mark, no knowing, and no seeing?
Sengzhao's answer does not reduce prajñā to darkness, nor does it make the sage insentient like wood or stone. His question is this: when something is illuminated, must it be seized as “something I know”? If knowing requires grasping a mark, then grasping this mark leaves other marks behind. But if illumination does not appropriate any mark, that non-grasping illumination is no longer limited by one mark. Hence the treatise's sharpest sentence: the sage's mind is without knowing, therefore there is nothing it does not know; a knowing that is not knowing—this is called all-knowing.
Yuankang calls this “knowing without grasping marks.” The entire treatise turns on that phrase. What “without” removes is grasping, not illumination. What “knowing” preserves is discernment, not possession. Keep this gate, and the nine exchanges that follow will not read as self-contradiction.
First hear where the treatise speaks from: a question born in the Xiaoyao translation hall
This treatise is not detached metaphysical conversation invented away from the work of translating scripture. Sengzhao first recalls Kumārajīva: entering the Great Vehicle while young, passing beyond words and images, traveling from the West to China. He then recalls Yao Xing bringing Kumārajīva into the passes and assembling more than five hundred learned monks at the Xiaoyao Monastery to settle the Vaipulya scriptures together. Sengzhao calls his own learning meager, yet says that he personally sat in this gathering and there heard the Dharma he had never heard before.
The preface does two things. First, it shows that the question of prajñā arises from translation and hearing the scriptures, not from speaking apart from them. Second, it admits from the outset that sacred wisdom is subtle, formless, and nameless, beyond the reach of words and images. Everything that follows is therefore language “recklessly entrusted” to what cannot be enclosed by language.
The reader must carry this self-limitation forward. “Knowing” is not a final entity, and “without knowing” is not a final entity. Both names are established to communicate sacred wisdom; neither may be turned back upon it to cut the sage's mind in two.
An empty mind is not a blank: the more complete the illumination, the less it establishes illumination as its achievement
Sengzhao begins with the sage's present functioning. The sage empties his mind and makes his illumination real; he knows all day and yet never establishes knowing. To empty the mind is not to appropriate the marks illumined. To make illumination real is to leave no subtlety among the myriad dharmas unseen. Precisely because he does not grasp marks, his radiance need not display itself. Precisely because it does not display itself, illumination remains unrestricted.
The treatise's language is exact: wisdom exhausts what is hidden without knowing; numinous response encounters things without deliberation. It illumines beyond phenomena but never leaves phenomena, and responds beyond the world but spends the whole day within the world. Yuankang therefore warns that “beyond phenomena” does not mean an emptiness existing elsewhere than form. If empty-mindedness is read as a blank, real illumination is lost. If real illumination alone is seized, illumination becomes a knowing one can possess.
Sacred wisdom is therefore real yet not existent, empty yet not nonexistent. To call it simply existent is to seek its form and name. To call it simply nonexistent is to make the sage's numinous response unintelligible. Emptiness does not lose illumination; illumination does not lose emptiness. They are not switches taking turns, but two aspects of the same sacred wisdom.
The first objection: if the sage truly knows and responds, why call him without knowing or encounter?
The first objector begins from the most direct experience. The sage illumines things one by one and omits nothing from knowing; he responds to the myriad matters without missing the occasion. Since there are things that can be known and encountered, and a capacity that knows and encounters them, how can knowing and encounter be denied? Even if the sage does not privately appropriate them, that would mean only that he does not own his knowing, not that he is without knowing.
Sengzhao first excludes the without-knowing of wood and stone. The sage's achievement surpasses heaven and earth, and his illumination surpasses the sun and moon. Without knowing cannot mean blindness. The real distinction is that ordinary knowing grasps marks, while the sage's illumination does not. If the sage first possessed a complete knowing that grasped marks and afterward modestly declined to call it “mine,” this would only be forgetting knowing; it would not mean that prajñā is itself without grasping.
Here Yuankang brings down the ancient commentator's blade: prajñā originally has no deluded knowing that grasps. It does not first seize a thing and then remind itself to release it. At the very first encounter it does not appropriate the thing as a fixed reality. This is why Sengzhao can say that knowing itself is without knowing; no second reflexive act is needed to turn it into something else.
Yet another question follows. If knowing were called pure merely because its nature is empty, would not every deluded knowing also have an empty nature? If prajñā were praised only because its object, ultimate truth, is pure, purity would belong only to the object and not to wisdom. Sengzhao therefore locates prajñā's purity in its originally lacking deluded grasping. Not every knowing is prajñā, and saying that knowing is empty does not by itself complete the distinction.
At the end, the image of elephant, horse, and rabbit crossing a river presses the answer to its limit. A rabbit or horse can enter the water and still fail to reach its deepest floor. When prajñā illumines ultimate truth, there is no depth left unexhausted, yet ultimate truth leaves no residual mark to be grasped. Complete illumination and non-grasping stand together: encounter without error, correspondence without fixing a “this”; still and without knowing, yet with nothing unknown.
The second objection: how can two names belong to one sage's mind?
The second objection turns to language. A name is not the thing itself, but it must correspond to something. Since knowing and without knowing are contrary names, if knowing fits the sage's mind, without knowing has nowhere to stand; if without knowing fits it, knowing has nowhere to stand. If neither fits, discourse has lost its purpose.
Sengzhao does not discard language. He limits it. Prajñā is nameless and unsayable, yet it cannot be communicated without words. “Knowing” is said to convey that illumination is truly present. “Without knowing” is said to distinguish its freedom from grasped marks. The former prevents prajñā from falling into annihilating non-being; the latter prevents it from becoming fixed being. The two names each block one extreme. They do not place two contrary substances inside the sage's mind.
Thus knowing itself is without knowing, and without knowing itself is knowing. This is not an arbitrary exchange of two words. The same illumination is named knowing with respect to its functioning, and without knowing with respect to its non-grasping. If names lead us to the sage's mind, we find two expressions within one illumination. If we cling to the names as mutually exclusive, we never reach what they indicate.
The third objection, part one: if ultimate truth is an object, must prajñā not possess knowing?
The third group of objections concerns object and wisdom. The first asks: ultimate truth cannot be fathomed without prajñā, and therefore ultimate truth is prajñā's object. If an object known exists, must there not be a knowing wisdom?
Sengzhao first distinguishes two relations between object and wisdom. Ordinary people establish an object's mark as what is known. Knower and known then arise by depending on one another, and what arises in mutual dependence is conditioned. Ultimate truth is called true precisely because it is not an object established by dependence on a knower and available for grasping. True wisdom illumines it without being generated by a marked object into grasping discrimination.
This is easily misheard as “true wisdom knows nothing.” Sengzhao says plainly that true wisdom is not insentient. It is not a knowing that grasps marks because ultimate truth is not a marked known. Not grasping does not mean not seeing. Precisely because it does not fix what is seen as a possessed known, true wisdom is not converted by one object's mark into ordinary discrimination.
The Madhyamaka statement about causes and conditions cuts here: if knower and known produce each other, they belong to conditioned dharmas, which have no intrinsic nature. Ultimate truth does not serve as a graspable condition, and true wisdom does not become a knowing produced by marks. To force a grasping knowing from the existence of an object has already changed ultimate truth into an object of conventional truth.
The third objection, part two: is there no grasping because there is no awareness, or does one know first and relinquish afterward?
The second question sets a dilemma. If non-grasping follows from a lack of awareness, the sage becomes a traveler at night who cannot distinguish black from white. If one first knows and later refrains from grasping, the moment of knowing still contains grasping, with release added only afterward.
Sengzhao accepts neither side. It is not because there is no awareness that there is no grasping, and it is not that knowing comes first and non-grasping second. Knowing itself is non-grasping; therefore it knows without grasping.
Non-grasping and illumination are not two successive steps. Divided into two steps, the first remains deluded grasping and the second only releases it after the fact. Prajñā, as this treatise speaks of it, does not turn the object's mark into its possession in the very act of knowing.
The third objection, part three: without a fixed “is” or correspondence, can the sage still respond appropriately?
The third question presses non-grasping into judgment. With no grasping, there is no fixed “this is so”; with no fixed “is,” there is no fixed correspondence. If nothing can be determined as what it is or made to correspond to the sage's mind, how can nothing remain unknown?
Sengzhao replies that precisely because the sage does not fix one thing in advance as the only possible correspondence, there is nothing to which he cannot respond as appropriate. Precisely because he does not fix one thing as the only possible “is,” there is nothing that cannot appear as what it is. No fixed correspondence means that every thing can be met in correspondence; no fixed “is” means that every thing can be seen as it is.
This does not abolish discernment. It abolishes preconception. Fix one “is” beforehand, and the myriad things are forced into one answer. Establish no correspondence in advance, and each thing can be met as it is. Sengzhao therefore speaks of seeing all dharmas and yet seeing no graspable seen, responding everywhere without setting up a fixed object of response.
The third objection, part four: why not take the signless as the final true mark?
The fourth question still seeks one last foothold. If knowing marked things is the illness, why not recognize the signless as the true mark? Sengzhao answers that this still has not escaped grasping. Yuankang points out that if signlessness is made a mark, signlessness itself has become another mark.
The treatise's image is severe: one flees a mountain peak and throws oneself into a deep valley. Grasping being is confinement on the peak; grasping non-being is falling into the valley. Rushing from one side to the other leaves the danger of both extremes untouched. Genuine non-grasping dwells in being without possessing being, and in non-being without possessing non-being. It neither grasps being and non-being nor abandons them.
The sage can therefore gather in his radiance, mingle with the dust, and move among the five destinies. He has not sought an unconditioned emptiness elsewhere than the conditioned world. Because he abides in neither being nor non-being, he can remain without contrivance amid the dust and yet leave nothing undone.
The fourth objection, part one: if response appears in season, does the sage's mind also arise and cease?
The final three questions turn to arising and ceasing. The first says: what can be answered is answered, and what cannot is held in reserve. If responsive manifestation begins and ends, must the sage's mind not sometimes arise and sometimes cease?
Sengzhao first distinguishes mind from response. Arising and ceasing belong to a grasping mind. The sage is without that mind, so the appearing and disappearing of responsive traces cannot establish that the sage's mind itself arises and ceases. Yet this does not make him entirely mindless or unresponsive. It is a mind without a grasping mind, a response that does not grasp response.
The image of the four seasons clarifies the point. Spring comes and plants grow; autumn arrives and leaves fall. The seasons never fail their appointed time. But one cannot infer from the coming and going of spring's appearances that the principle of the seasons is itself a thing suddenly born and suddenly destroyed. The sage's responses appear according to conditions just as the seasons arrive on time. Their substance is formless, so it cannot be seized as arising or ceasing.
The fourth objection, part two: how does prajñā without knowing differ from the empty nature of deluded knowing?
The second question is sharp. Prajñā is without knowing, yet deluded wisdom too is empty in nature; both may be said to have no fixed arising or ceasing. How can they be distinguished?
Sengzhao distinguishes being without knowing from knowing that knowing is empty. To be without knowing means that the sage's mind originally has no deluded grasping knowing; there is no knowing waiting to be removed. To know that knowing is empty begins with deluded wisdom already grasping marks and then says that this knowing is empty in nature. Yuankang states the distinction most clearly: prajñā does not grasp marks and therefore is called without knowing; deluded wisdom is empty in nature and therefore is called knowing emptiness.
The shared word “empty” cannot erase the difference between originally having no deluded grasping and already grasping before knowing that grasping to be empty. What is absent differs, so the two expressions cannot be merged.
The treatise then observes prajñā and ultimate truth through functioning and stillness. In functioning, inward prajñā illumines and outward ultimate truth is illumined; illumination's efficacy is not lost, so there is difference within sameness. In stillness, inner wisdom is without knowing and outer object is without marks; neither can be grasped, so there is sameness within difference. Fix them as the same, and illumination's efficacy disappears. Fix them as different, and wisdom and object each acquire an intrinsic nature. Their sameness must be discerned within difference, and their difference within sameness; neither sentence may be locked into an entity.
The wild duck and crane make this plain. One need not lengthen the duck's short legs or cut short the crane's long legs, level a mountain or fill a valley, before speaking of no difference. Their differing appearances remain, while their nature cannot be grasped. Prajñā and the dharmas likewise need not first be processed into one uniform shape in order to be equal.
The fourth objection, part three: are functioning and stillness two parts hidden inside prajñā?
The last question asks whether, if functioning differs while stillness is the same, prajñā contains one part called functioning and another called stillness.
Sengzhao gathers the entire treatise into one answer: functioning itself is stillness, stillness itself is functioning; they are one in substance, issuing together under different names. Stillness is not an empty husk left when functioning has stopped, nor is functioning a busy activity that departs from stillness. To posit a nonfunctioning stillness as the master behind functioning would be to create another pair of subject and servant inside the sage's mind.
The less wisdom displays itself, the brighter its illumination. The stiller the numinous, the more alive its response. Bright and obscure, moving and still, indicate the same sacred wisdom from different directions: when illuminating, it does not grasp, and so illumination itself is still; being still, it is not cut off, and so stillness itself illumines. The treatise has returned to its opening point. Without knowing is not the opposite of illumination. It is illumination without grasping marks.
Continuation / what carries forward
On Prajñā Without Knowing was born in the Xiaoyao translation hall. After Sengzhao presented it to Kumārajīva, his teacher approved both its understanding and its words. Liu Yimin later read it and sent a letter of inquiry, to which Sengzhao replied point by point. The treatise itself already contains nine exchanges; the appended correspondence presses further into questions of the sage's mind, concentration and wisdom, stillness and functioning. In the Tang, Yuankang's three chapters, five divisions, and four objections in nine exchanges preserved for later readers a path through the argument that does not lose its momentum.
What most matters in this continuation is not turning “without knowing” into a new technical object. It is preserving Sengzhao's question: must illumination grasp a mark? If it does not grasp, does illumination disappear? His answer refuses both sides throughout. The sage is neither insentient like wood or stone nor possessed of a knowing that grasps marks; he neither abandons being for non-being nor seeks stillness apart from functioning. Only when one sees non-grasping in the very act of knowing, and illumination within non-grasping, does “prajñā without knowing” cease to be a verbal contradiction and become a way of reading that does not turn sacred wisdom into a thing.
考據Apparatus
一、科判定位
〈般若無知論〉是《肇論》八段脊的第四單元、四論的第三論。底本範圍為〔T45 0153a07–0154c23〕，共三千二百三十九字；唐元康《肇論疏》的逐文疏釋範圍為〔T45 0174c20–0181c13〕。
元康先定本論的宗旨：「此論第三明因申般若教也。」〔T45 0174c21〕又把〈般若無知論〉本篇、劉遺民致問、僧肇答書合判三章；就本篇自身再說：「本論之中。文有三章。」〔T45 0174c27–0174c28〕三章依次是序般若因由、正標無知宗旨、問答料簡。
序中另判四段：「序中。文有四段。」〔T45 0174c29–0175a01〕依次標宗旨、序羅什、歎秦王、明作論意。正標宗旨又判五段：「文有五段。第一標宗。第二辨相。第三融會。第四明體。第五總結。」〔T45 0177b02–0177b03〕最後的問答料簡則是：「文有九番。然有四難。」〔T45 0178b02〕其四難為一番能所難、一番名體難、四番境智難、三番生滅難，合為九番難答。本檔依此骨架解說，不另造科目。
二、本論釋要
全論所辨的『無知』，不是昏闇、木石或全無知覺，而是不把所照境界取成固定形相之知。元康一開篇便定義為：「無有取相之知耳。」〔T45 0174c22〕又說般若「無取無緣。雖證真諦。而不取相。故云無知。」〔T45 0174c24–0174c25〕
僧肇的核心句是：「聖心無知，故無所不知。不知之知，乃曰一切知。」〔T45 0153a27–0153a28〕若有所知，便以取此相而遺彼相；聖心不以一相自限，所以不把照見立成可占有的知，卻又沒有不能照知之處。這不是先有取相之知，再回頭忘知；而是知的本性即不取相。
全論由此展成兩組不能割裂的關係。第一組是虛與照：聖智「實而不有、虛而不無」〔T45 0153b08〕，故虛寂而不失照用，照用而不失虛寂。第二組是知與不取：論主直接答道：「知即無知，無知即知。」〔T45 0154a03〕又說：「知即不取，故能不取而知。」〔T45 0154b02〕
九番問答逐步排除四種誤讀：把無知看成木石般不辨黑白；把知與無知立成兩個互斥實體；由真諦是所緣便推成般若必有取相；把無相再抓成一個可取的無相。末後歸結用與寂：「用即寂、寂即用，用寂體一，同出而異名」〔T45 0154c16–0154c17〕。沒有離開作用的寂，也沒有離開寂的作用。
三、經論宗依
（一）《放光般若經》與《道行般若經》的篇首兩引
本論開篇引《放光》：「般若無所有相，無生滅相。」〔T45 0153a24〕又引《道行》：「般若無所知、無所見。」〔T45 0153a24–0153a25〕現存 T08n0221《放光般若經》及 T08n0224《道行般若經》均已開卷親核；兩句的逐字連文未在所標經本中核得，故本檔只按《肇論》保存的引文及元康所繫經名誌錄，不把相近經文冒充同文。
《放光般若經》現文有一段與第二句義脈相近：「諸法無所知、無所見、無所出生。」〔T08n0221 0078a16〕但主語是諸法，不是般若，並且還有『無所出生』，所以只列同經語脈，不合併兩句。此歸屬差異已入存疑錄。
（二）《佛說維摩詰經》寶積偈
本論稱《寶積》而引：「以無心意而現行。」〔T45 0153b14〕元康指出這是《維摩經》中長者子寶積讚佛的偈。吳支謙譯《佛說維摩詰經》現文逐字正作：「以無心意而現行」〔T14n0474 0519c21〕。這裡的『寶積』是說偈者，不是另一部題名為《寶積》的經。
（三）《放光般若經》不動而立法
本論又引《放光》：「不動等覺而建立諸法。」〔T45 0153b14–0153b15〕現存《放光般若經》對應處作：「不動於等覺法，為諸法立處。」〔T08n0221 0140c15〕二句義旨接近而字面不同；本檔分別保存，不把現存經文改成本論的引句。
（四）《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》與《放光般若經》的境智語
本論在境智難中引《放光》『不緣色生識』。現存《放光般若經》未核得同文；後秦鳩摩羅什譯《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》現文作：「若不緣色生識，是名不見色相故示。」〔T08n0223 0326b09–0326b10〕本論所繫《放光》與現存逐字所在不同，故兩讀並錄，不判其傳本成因，並已入存疑錄。
同一段又引五陰與般若清淨；《放光般若經》現文可逐字核得：「以五陰清淨故，般若波羅蜜清淨。」〔T08n0221 0067a07〕這使本論『能知與所知相與而無』的論證有了現存經文座標。
（五）《中論》因緣語
本論引《中觀》：「物從因緣有，故不真。不從因緣有，故即真。」〔T45 0154a20–0154a21〕元康明記這是「引中論意。非全文。」〔T45 0180a22–0180a23〕《中論》現文相應偈作：「眾因緣生法，我說即是無」〔T30n1564 0033b11〕，又說：「未曾有一法，不從因緣生」〔T30n1564 0033b13〕。因此，本論句應作取義之引，不標作《中論》逐字原句。
（六）大品般若的無異、非一非異
本論引：「甚奇，世尊！於無異法中而說諸法異。」〔T45 0154c12–0154c13〕《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》〈六喻品〉現文問：「世尊！云何無異法中而分別說異相？」〔T08n0223 0390a04–0390a05〕兩句同旨而字面不同。
本論接著引：「般若與諸法，亦不一相，亦不異相。」〔T45 0154c13–0154c14〕《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》現文作：「諸法無相，非一相、非異相。」〔T08n0223 0382c23–0382c24〕本論把經中『諸法』的非一非異轉入般若與諸法的關係，故仍分列兩文。
（七）《思益梵天所問經》的無所得而得
元康以《思益》義說明『聖智無知』的經脈；姚秦鳩摩羅什譯《思益梵天所問經》現文說：「以無所得故得，以無所知故知」〔T15n0586 0039b11–0039b12〕。這不是把『無知』說成全無照見，而是在無所得、無所知中說得與知。
（八）其餘無題經句
本論另引：「真般若者，清淨如虛空，無知無見，無作無緣。」〔T45 0153c02–0153c03〕以及：「般若義者，無名無說，非有非無，非實非虛。」〔T45 0153c23–0153c24〕元康均按大品般若義解，現存經本尚未核得同文連句。可核的相近語是《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》所說：「如虛空無見無聞、無覺無識。」〔T08n0223 0262c24–0262c25〕相近不等於逐字相同，故原始品位仍列存疑。
四、古德疏釋
（一）無知就是無取相之知
元康把全論第一道界線說得很清楚：「聖智窮盡幽微而不取相。故曰無知。」〔T45 0177c08〕因此，無知不是取消聖智的鑒照，而是否定鑒照中有惑取。元康又說：「無心取相而能知萬物者。乃是聖人一切智之所知也。」〔T45 0177b18–0177b19〕
（二）事外而不離事
本論說聖智玄照事外，元康隨即封住離事求空的讀法：「非謂離色有空也。」〔T45 0177c13–0177c14〕所以『事外』不是搬到色法之外另立空境，而是面對色法而不取色相。
（三）知不是先有而後忘
釋第一難時，元康指出般若「般若體性真淨本無惑取之知」〔T45 0179a19–0179a20〕。這一句排除了『先有知、後忘知』：惑取從一開始便不是般若的構成。
（四）無當而無不當
釋本論『無是、無當』時，元康說：「無當乃當真理。無是乃是真理也。」〔T45 0180b23–0180b24〕無當不是不能應物，而是不先固定一個所當；正因如此，物來皆能如實相應。
（五）不可把無相再做成相
元康直指第四番境智難的陷阱：「若謂聖人以無相為相。有此無相之知。此則無相乃成相。」〔T45 0180c08–0180c10〕若把無相當成最後可執的答案，只是從有相移到另一種相，仍未離取著。
（六）無知與知無不可混同
元康區分兩種『無』：「般若無取相。故曰無知。惑智體性空。故曰知無。」〔T45 0181a25–0181a26〕前者說般若本無惑取，後者說已有取相之知而觀其性空；同名為無，所無者不同。
（七）權智與實智
元康在〈宗本義〉疏中解漚和與般若說：「方便者權智也。智慧者實智也。」〔T45 0166b06–0166b07〕又界定：「觀空是實智也。涉有是權智也。」〔T45 0166b23〕〈般若無知論〉所說聖智事外而未始無事、世表而終日域中，正須以此二用互攝來讀；但本論末段更進一步，將能照與所照、用與寂都收回非定同非定異。
五、術語
| 術語 | 本論義界 |
|---|---|
| 般若 | 智慧；在本論專指不取相、不攀緣而能照見真諦的聖智，不是日常分別計度。 |
| 無知／無所不知 | 無知是無取相之知，不是昏昧；無所不知是沒有被固定所知限制，並非累積一切對象知識。 |
| 照／寂 | 照是應物鑒境的作用，寂是不取能所之相；本論以用即寂、寂即用封住兩者分離。 |
| 權智／實智 | 元康以涉有利生為權智、觀空不染為實智；二者是同一聖智隨用所分，不是兩顆相離之心。 |
| 無當／無是 | 不先立一個固定對象為『當』或『是』；正因無固定取著，所以能隨物皆當、見物皆是而不住是。 |
| 不取 | 不是先知後捨，也不是全無知覺；是照知當下不把境相據為所知。 |
| 無知／知無 | 無知屬般若，本無惑取之知；知無屬惑智性空，是已有取相之知而知其無。 |
| 用／寂 | 用指照境應物，寂指境智俱無可取；從作用看有差別，從寂靜看同無相，究竟不可定同定異。 |
六、譬喻
（一）兔馬渡河
本論說：「真諦無兔馬之遺，般若無不窮之鑒」〔T45 0153c12〕。元康解釋，象、馬、兔渡河深淺不同，兔馬不能窮盡河底；本論反用此喻，說真諦沒有餘深未盡，般若的鑒照也沒有窮不到之處。此喻表全照而無取，不表對境占有。
（二）逃峰赴谷
論主警告執無者：「捨有而之無，譬猶逃峰而赴」〔T45 0154b14〕深谷。離開有相而把無相立成實相，只是換一邊受困；山峰與深谷皆有患，正如執有與執無都不免取著。
（三）續鳧截鶴
本論問：「豈曰續鳧截鶴、夷嶽盈」〔T45 0154c11〕深谷，然後才無異？萬法之不異不靠抹平現象差別；野鴨腳短、鶴腳長仍各如其相，所明的是差異之法同樣無自性相。
（四）四時之質
論主以「聖人應會之道，則信若四時之質」〔T45 0154b23–0154b24〕說明應物不差。春夏秋冬因時而至，喻聖應隨緣而現；不因應有出沒，便推成聖心本體也有生滅。
七、史傳
慧皎《高僧傳》記《大品》譯出後，僧肇作〈波若無知論〉二千餘言呈羅什。什公讀後稱：「吾解不謝子。辭當相挹。」〔T50n2059 0365a25–0365a26〕劉遺民讀論又歎：「不意方袍，復有平叔。」〔T50n2059 0365a27〕遠公亦撫案歎賞，遂有其後的書問往復。
僧傳作『波若』，本論題作『般若』，引用時各守原字，不互改。僧傳同時把成論時點繫於《大品》譯出後；本論序自述參與逍遙觀五百餘人譯場，兩處共同構成此論在什門譯場中生成的古傳材料。
陸澄《法論目錄》現存條目未核得〈般若無知論〉之名，而〈物不遷論〉、〈不真空論〉、〈涅槃無名論〉均各有著錄。此處只記現存目錄的缺載，不推斷成書或流傳情形。
八、校本定位
- 底本：T45n1858〈般若無知論第三〉〔0153a07–0154c23〕；原典層三千二百三十九字，已由八單元連續切分及整卷逐字驗證，原典不改。
- 鏡疏：唐元康《肇論疏》T45n1859〔0174c20–0181c13〕；科判、無取相義、九番問答與權實二智均依現存疏文逐字定位。
- 序文底本的秦乘入國之謀在〔T45 0153a14〕。元康記諸本有八國之文，而依古本判作入國〔T45 0176b18–0176b19〕；原典仍守 T1858 本文，不據疏改字。
- 底本總結段的真諦可亡而知在〔T45 0153b18〕。元康說此亡取亡失之義，並記諸本有忘字〔T45 0178a22–0178a23〕；兩字層次分列，不把疏記倒寫入原典。
- 論內所引經句常有取義、縮寫或古本異文。凡可在現存經本逐字核得者，另列全藏號與行位；只能核得近義文者，明標字面不同；未核得者只守 T1858 引文，不強繫。
- 存疑：篇首《放光》《道行》兩句的現存同文、境智難中『不緣色生識』所繫《放光》與現存《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》的歸屬差異、兩條無題般若經句的原始品位，均已附記於本論存疑錄。
I. Doctrinal-structural placement
On Prajñā Without Knowing is the fourth unit in the eight-unit spine of The Zhaolun and the third of its four treatises. The base-text range is 〔T45 0153a07–0154c23〕, comprising 3,239 characters. The range of Yuankang's line-by-line exegesis in the Tang Zhaolun Shu is 〔T45 0174c20–0181c13〕.
Yuankang first defines the treatise's purpose: 「此論第三明因申般若教也。」〔T45 0174c21〕 ["This third treatise clarifies the cause and thereby unfolds the teaching of prajñā."] He then judges On Prajñā Without Knowing itself, Liu Yimin's inquiry, and Sengzhao's reply to form three chapters; of the present treatise itself he says: 「本論之中。文有三章。」〔T45 0174c27–0174c28〕 ["Within the root treatise, the text has three chapters."] These three respectively introduce the causes for the prajñā teaching, properly establish the thesis of without-knowing, and analyze it through objections and replies.
Within the introduction he further distinguishes four divisions: 「序中。文有四段。」〔T45 0174c29–0175a01〕 ["Within the introduction, the text has four divisions."] They respectively state the thesis, introduce Kumārajīva, praise the King of Qin, and explain the intention behind composing the treatise. The proper statement of the thesis is again divided into five: 「文有五段。第一標宗。第二辨相。第三融會。第四明體。第五總結。」〔T45 0177b02–0177b03〕 ["The text has five divisions: first, stating the thesis; second, distinguishing its characteristics; third, integrating them; fourth, clarifying the substance; fifth, the general conclusion."] The final analysis through objections and replies is described as follows: 「文有九番。然有四難。」〔T45 0178b02〕 ["The text has nine exchanges, yet there are four objections."] These are one subject-and-object objection, one name-and-substance objection, four object-and-wisdom objections, and three arising-and-ceasing objections, making nine exchanges of challenge and reply. This apparatus follows that structure and creates no new division.
II. The treatise's central teaching
The “without knowing” distinguished throughout the treatise is not darkness, insensibility like wood or stone, or total lack of awareness. It is knowing that does not turn the illumined object into a fixed mark. Yuankang defines it at the outset: 「無有取相之知耳。」〔T45 0174c22〕 ["There is only no knowing that grasps marks."] He further says that prajñā is 「無取無緣。雖證真諦。而不取相。故云無知。」〔T45 0174c24–0174c25〕 ["without grasping and without an object to climb upon; although it realizes ultimate truth, it does not grasp marks, and therefore is said to be without knowing."]
Sengzhao's central sentence is: 「聖心無知，故無所不知。不知之知，乃曰一切知。」〔T45 0153a27–0153a28〕 ["The sage's mind is without knowing, therefore there is nothing it does not know; a knowing that is not knowing—this is called all-knowing."] If something is established as known, grasping this mark leaves another behind. Because the sage's mind is not confined by any single mark, it does not establish illumination as a knowing that can be possessed, yet nothing remains unillumined. This is not first having a knowing that grasps marks and afterward forgetting it; the nature of knowing itself does not grasp marks.
From this point the entire treatise unfolds two inseparable relations. The first is between emptiness and illumination. Sacred wisdom is 「實而不有、虛而不無」〔T45 0153b08〕 ["real yet not existent, empty yet not nonexistent"], and therefore is empty without losing illumination and illuminating without losing emptiness. The second is between knowing and non-grasping. The author answers directly: 「知即無知，無知即知。」〔T45 0154a03〕 ["Knowing itself is without knowing; without knowing itself is knowing."] He also says: 「知即不取，故能不取而知。」〔T45 0154b02〕 ["Knowing itself is non-grasping; therefore it can know without grasping."]
The nine exchanges progressively remove four misreadings: treating without-knowing as an inability to distinguish black from white, like wood or stone; making knowing and without-knowing two mutually exclusive entities; inferring from ultimate truth's being an object that prajñā must grasp a mark; and grasping the signless itself as a signless mark. The closing gathers functioning and stillness together: 「用即寂、寂即用，用寂體一，同出而異名」〔T45 0154c16–0154c17〕 ["Functioning itself is stillness, stillness itself is functioning; functioning and stillness are one in substance, issuing together under different names."] There is no stillness apart from functioning and no functioning apart from stillness.
III. Scriptural and treatise foundations
1. The two opening citations assigned to the Fangguang Prajñā Sūtra and the Daoxing Prajñā Sūtra
The treatise opens by citing the Fangguang: 「般若無所有相，無生滅相。」〔T45 0153a24〕 ["Prajñā has no existent mark and no mark of arising or ceasing."] It then cites the Daoxing: 「般若無所知、無所見。」〔T45 0153a24–0153a25〕 ["Prajñā has nothing it knows and nothing it sees."] The extant T08n0221 Fangguang Bore Jing and T08n0224 Daoxing Bore Jing have both been checked directly. The continuous wording of neither sentence has been located in the scripture named, so this apparatus records only the citations as preserved in The Zhaolun and the scripture-attributions supplied by Yuankang. It does not substitute a merely similar passage as though it were identical.
The extant Fangguang Prajñā Sūtra contains a passage close in purport to the second sentence: 「諸法無所知、無所見、無所出生。」〔T08n0221 0078a16〕 ["Dharmas have nothing they know, nothing they see, and nothing from which they are produced."] Here the subject is dharmas, not prajñā, and the sentence adds “nothing from which they are produced.” It is therefore listed only as a line of thought in the same scripture, not merged with the two citations. This difference of attribution remains recorded as an open textual question.
2. Ratnākara's verse in the Vimalakīrti Sūtra
The treatise names Ratnākara and cites: 「以無心意而現行。」〔T45 0153b14〕 ["With no mind or thought, he manifests conduct."] Yuankang identifies this as the verse in which the householder's son Ratnākara praises the Buddha in the Vimalakīrti Sūtra. The extant wording in Zhi Qian's Wu translation, the Foshuo Weimojie Jing, is exactly: 「以無心意而現行」〔T14n0474 0519c21〕 ["With no mind or thought, he manifests conduct."] “Ratnākara” here names the speaker of the verse, not another scripture entitled Ratnākara.
3. Establishing dharmas without moving from awakening in the Fangguang Prajñā Sūtra
The treatise again cites the Fangguang: 「不動等覺而建立諸法。」〔T45 0153b14–0153b15〕 ["Without moving from equal awakening, he establishes all dharmas."] The corresponding extant passage in the Fangguang Prajñā Sūtra reads: 「不動於等覺法，為諸法立處。」〔T08n0221 0140c15〕 ["Without moving from the dharma of equal awakening, he establishes a place for all dharmas."] Their purport is close but their wording differs; both readings are preserved separately, and the extant scripture is not rewritten into the form of the treatise's citation.
4. Object and wisdom in the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra and the Fangguang Prajñā Sūtra
In the objection concerning object and wisdom, the treatise cites the Fangguang for “consciousness not arising in dependence on form.” No identical wording has been found in the extant Fangguang Prajñā Sūtra. Kumārajīva's Later Qin translation, the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra, contains: 「若不緣色生識，是名不見色相故示。」〔T08n0223 0326b09–0326b10〕 ["If consciousness does not arise by climbing upon form, this is called demonstrating that the mark of form is not seen."] The scripture-attribution in The Zhaolun and the extant location of the exact wording differ. Both readings are therefore recorded without deciding the cause in their textual transmission; the issue remains in the record of open questions.
The same passage cites the purity of the five aggregates and prajñā. The exact wording can be verified in the extant Fangguang Prajñā Sūtra: 「以五陰清淨故，般若波羅蜜清淨。」〔T08n0221 0067a07〕 ["Because the five aggregates are pure, prajñā-pāramitā is pure."] This gives an extant scriptural locus for the treatise's claim that knower and known are mutually dependent and therefore absent in truth.
5. The statement on causes and conditions assigned to the Madhyamaka
The treatise cites the Madhyamaka: 「物從因緣有，故不真。不從因緣有，故即真。」〔T45 0154a20–0154a21〕 ["Things exist through causes and conditions and therefore are not real; what does not exist through causes and conditions is real."] Yuankang expressly notes: 「引中論意。非全文。」〔T45 0180a22–0180a23〕 ["It cites the purport of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, not the full wording."] The corresponding verses in the extant Mūlamadhyamakakārikā read: 「眾因緣生法，我說即是無」〔T30n1564 0033b11〕 ["Dharmas born from the multitude of causes and conditions, I say, are precisely without intrinsic being"], and: 「未曾有一法，不從因緣生」〔T30n1564 0033b13〕 ["There has never been a single dharma that did not arise from causes and conditions."] The sentence in The Zhaolun should therefore be treated as a citation of the treatise's purport, not as the exact wording of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā.
6. The Great Prajñā teaching on no difference and neither one nor different
The treatise cites: 「甚奇，世尊！於無異法中而說諸法異。」〔T45 0154c12–0154c13〕 ["How rare, World-Honored One! Within dharmas that have no difference, you speak of the differences among dharmas."] In the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra, the extant wording in the Chapter on Six Similes asks: 「世尊！云何無異法中而分別說異相？」〔T08n0223 0390a04–0390a05〕 ["World-Honored One! How, within dharmas without difference, are different characteristics distinguished and spoken of?"] The two sentences share a purport but differ in wording.
The treatise then cites: 「般若與諸法，亦不一相，亦不異相。」〔T45 0154c13–0154c14〕 ["Prajñā and the dharmas are neither of one characteristic nor of different characteristics."] The extant Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra reads: 「諸法無相，非一相、非異相。」〔T08n0223 0382c23–0382c24〕 ["Dharmas are without marks, neither of one characteristic nor of different characteristics."] The Zhaolun turns the scripture's “dharmas” being neither one nor different toward the relation between prajñā and the dharmas; the two texts are therefore still listed separately.
7. Attaining and knowing through non-attainment in the Brahmā's Questions Sūtra
Yuankang uses the purport of the Brahmā's Questions Sūtra to clarify the scriptural current behind sacred wisdom's being without knowing. Kumārajīva's Later Qin translation, the Brahmā's Questions Sūtra, says: 「以無所得故得，以無所知故知」〔T15n0586 0039b11–0039b12〕 ["Because there is nothing attained, there is attainment; because there is nothing known, there is knowing."] This does not make without-knowing a total absence of illumination. It speaks of attaining and knowing precisely where there is no acquisition and no object fixed as known.
8. Other unnamed scriptural sentences
The treatise further cites: 「真般若者，清淨如虛空，無知無見，無作無緣。」〔T45 0153c02–0153c03〕 ["True prajñā is pure like empty space, without knowing or seeing, without contrivance or an object to climb upon."] It also cites: 「般若義者，無名無說，非有非無，非實非虛。」〔T45 0153c23–0153c24〕 ["The meaning of prajñā has no name and no speech; it is neither being nor non-being, neither real nor empty."] Yuankang explains both according to the meaning of the Great Prajñā scriptures, but the continuous wording has not yet been located in the extant scriptures. A verifiable related passage in the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra says: 「如虛空無見無聞、無覺無識。」〔T08n0223 0262c24–0262c25〕 ["Like empty space, without seeing or hearing, without sensing or consciousness."] Similarity is not identity, so the original chapter-locations of the two unnamed prajñā citations remain open questions.
IV. The ancient commentator's exegesis
1. Without knowing means knowing without grasping marks
Yuankang draws the treatise's first boundary with precision: 「聖智窮盡幽微而不取相。故曰無知。」〔T45 0177c08〕 ["Sacred wisdom exhausts what is hidden without grasping marks; therefore it is said to be without knowing."] Without-knowing therefore does not cancel sacred wisdom's illumination; it denies deluded grasping within illumination. Yuankang adds: 「無心取相而能知萬物者。乃是聖人一切智之所知也。」〔T45 0177b18–0177b19〕 ["To know the myriad things without a mind that grasps marks—this is what the sage's all-knowing knows."]
2. Beyond phenomena without leaving phenomena
When the treatise says sacred wisdom illumines beyond phenomena, Yuankang immediately forecloses the reading that seeks emptiness apart from things: 「非謂離色有空也。」〔T45 0177c13–0177c14〕 ["It does not mean that emptiness exists apart from form."] “Beyond phenomena” does not move to a separate empty realm beyond form; it faces form without grasping the mark of form.
3. Knowing is not first present and then forgotten
In explaining the first objection, Yuankang says that prajñā has 「般若體性真淨本無惑取之知」〔T45 0179a19–0179a20〕 ["a truly pure essential nature, originally without the deluded knowing that grasps."]. This excludes “knowing first, forgetting later”: deluded grasping was never a constituent of prajñā.
4. With no fixed correspondence, nothing fails to correspond
Explaining the treatise's “no fixed so, no fixed correspondence,” Yuankang says: 「無當乃當真理。無是乃是真理也。」〔T45 0180b23–0180b24〕 ["No fixed correspondence is precisely correspondence to true principle; no fixed 'is' is precisely true principle."] No fixed correspondence does not mean inability to respond. It means that no object of response has been predetermined; therefore whatever comes can be met just as it is.
5. The signless cannot be made into another mark
Yuankang points directly to the trap in the fourth objection concerning object and wisdom: 「若謂聖人以無相為相。有此無相之知。此則無相乃成相。」〔T45 0180c08–0180c10〕 ["If one says that the sage takes the signless, having no marks, as a mark and has this knowing of the signless, then the signless has thereby become a mark."] To take the signless as the final graspable answer merely moves from one mark to another and does not leave grasping behind.
6. Being without knowing must not be confused with knowing that knowing is empty
Yuankang distinguishes two absences: 「般若無取相。故曰無知。惑智體性空。故曰知無。」〔T45 0181a25–0181a26〕 ["Prajñā has no grasping of marks and therefore is said to be without knowing; deluded wisdom is empty in nature and therefore is said to know emptiness."] The former says that prajñā originally has no deluded grasping. The latter says that a knowing which already grasps marks is contemplated as empty in nature. Both use the language of absence, but what is absent differs.
7. Expedient wisdom and real wisdom
In his commentary on The Fundamental Thesis, Yuankang explains skillful means and prajñā: 「方便者權智也。智慧者實智也。」〔T45 0166b06–0166b07〕 ["Skillful means is expedient wisdom; wisdom is real wisdom."] He further defines them: 「觀空是實智也。涉有是權智也。」〔T45 0166b23〕 ["Contemplating emptiness is real wisdom; engaging with being is expedient wisdom."] On Prajñā Without Knowing must be read through the mutual inclusion of these two functions when it says that sacred wisdom illumines beyond phenomena yet never lacks affairs, and responds beyond the world yet spends the whole day within it. The treatise's closing goes further still, gathering illuminator and illuminated, functioning and stillness, into what can be fixed neither as the same nor as different.
V. Terms
| Term | Delimitation in this treatise |
|---|---|
| prajñā | Wisdom; here specifically sacred wisdom that illumines ultimate truth without grasping marks or climbing upon an object, not ordinary discriminative calculation. |
| without knowing / nothing it does not know | Without knowing means no knowing that grasps marks, not darkness. Nothing it does not know means that illumination is not limited by a fixed known; it does not mean accumulating knowledge of every object. |
| illumination / stillness | Illumination is the functioning that responds to things and discerns objects; stillness is not grasping the marks of subject and object. The treatise's “functioning itself is stillness; stillness itself is functioning” prevents their separation. |
| expedient wisdom / real wisdom | Yuankang calls engagement with being for the benefit of beings expedient wisdom and contemplation of emptiness without defilement real wisdom. They are two functions of one sacred wisdom, not two separate minds. |
| no fixed correspondence / no fixed ‘is’ | Not establishing beforehand one fixed object as what corresponds or what is so. Because there is no fixed grasping, the sage can meet every thing appropriately and see each thing as it is without abiding in any “is.” |
| non-grasping | Neither knowing first and relinquishing later nor total lack of awareness. In the very act of illuminating, it does not appropriate the object's mark as what is known. |
| without knowing / knowing emptiness | Without knowing belongs to prajñā, originally without deluded grasping. Knowing emptiness belongs to deluded wisdom's empty nature: a knowing already grasps marks and then knows that knowing to be empty. |
| functioning / stillness | Functioning illumines objects and responds to things; stillness means that object and wisdom alike cannot be grasped. In functioning there is distinction; in stillness both are without marks. Ultimately they can be fixed neither as the same nor as different. |
VI. Similes
1. Rabbit and horse crossing a river
The treatise says: 「真諦無兔馬之遺，般若無不窮之鑒」〔T45 0153c12〕 ["Ultimate truth leaves no depth beyond the rabbit or horse, and prajñā has no illumination that fails to reach the bottom."] Yuankang explains that elephant, horse, and rabbit cross a river to different depths; rabbit and horse cannot exhaust its bottom. The treatise reverses the image: ultimate truth leaves no residual depth unexhausted, and prajñā's illumination has nowhere it cannot reach. The simile expresses complete illumination without grasping, not possession of the object.
2. Fleeing a peak and rushing into a valley
The author warns those who grasp non-being: 「捨有而之無，譬猶逃峰而赴」〔T45 0154b14〕 ["To abandon being and go toward non-being is like fleeing a peak and rushing toward"] a deep valley. To leave marked being and establish signlessness as a real mark only becomes trapped on the other side. Mountain peak and deep valley are both dangerous, just as grasping being and grasping non-being both fail to escape appropriation.
3. Lengthening the duck and cutting the crane
The treatise asks: 「豈曰續鳧截鶴、夷嶽盈」〔T45 0154c11〕 ["Could it mean lengthening the duck's legs, cutting the crane's, leveling mountains, and filling"] deep valleys before things can be called without difference? The myriad dharmas are not made nondifferent by erasing phenomenal differences. The wild duck's legs remain short and the crane's long, each exactly as it is. What is clarified is that dharmas in their difference are alike without a graspable intrinsic mark.
4. The substance of the four seasons
The author says: 「聖人應會之道，則信若四時之質」〔T45 0154b23–0154b24〕 ["The sage's way of responsive encounter is truly like the substance of the four seasons."] Spring, summer, autumn, and winter arrive according to their times, illustrating the sage's response manifesting according to conditions. The appearing and disappearing of responses does not establish that the sage's mind itself arises and ceases.
VII. Historical transmission
Huijiao's Biographies of Eminent Monks records that after the translation of the Great Prajñā scripture, Sengzhao composed On Prajñā Without Knowing, more than two thousand words long, and presented it to Kumārajīva. After reading it, Kumārajīva said: 「吾解不謝子。辭當相挹。」〔T50n2059 0365a25–0365a26〕 ["My understanding does not yield to yours; in words I should draw from you."] Liu Yimin read the treatise and exclaimed: 「不意方袍，復有平叔。」〔T50n2059 0365a27〕 ["I did not expect that among those in square robes there would again be a Pingshu."] Huiyuan also struck the table in admiration, and the subsequent exchange of letters followed.
The biography writes the title with the graph bo in its older form, while the treatise-title uses the standard graph ban; each citation preserves the graph of its own source and does not alter one into the other. The biography also places the treatise's composition after the Great Prajñā scripture was translated. The treatise's preface says that Sengzhao attended the Xiaoyao Monastery translation assembly of more than five hundred. Together these two passages form the ancient transmitted evidence for the treatise's emergence within Kumārajīva's translation community.
No entry titled On Prajñā Without Knowing has been located in the extant entries of Lu Cheng's Catalogue of Treatises, while On the Immutability of Things, On the Emptiness of the Unreal, and On Nirvāṇa Being Nameless are each recorded. This apparatus notes only the absence from the extant catalogue and draws no inference about composition or transmission.
VIII. Witness collation
- Base text: T45n1858, On Prajñā Without Knowing, 〔0153a07–0154c23〕. The source layer contains 3,239 characters and has been verified through the continuous division of all eight units and against the complete scroll. The source text is not emended.
- Mirror commentary: Yuankang's Tang Zhaolun Shu, T45n1859, 〔0174c20–0181c13〕. The structural divisions, the meaning of non-grasping, the nine exchanges, and expedient and real wisdom are all located verbatim in the extant commentary.
- The Qin campaign to bring Kumārajīva into the country occurs in the base preface at 〔T45 0153a14〕. Yuankang records a reading concerning eight countries in other copies but judges the old copy's reading “enter the country” at 〔T45 0176b18–0176b19〕. The source layer retains T1858 and is not altered from the commentary.
- The base text's conclusion uses the graph meaning “lose” in its statement on ultimate truth and knowing at 〔T45 0153b18〕. Yuankang explains it in the sense of losing grasping and loss, and records that other copies have the graph meaning “forget” at 〔T45 0178a22–0178a23〕. The two graph-readings are recorded separately; the commentary's variant is not written backward into the source text.
- Scriptural sentences cited within the treatise often reflect citations by purport, abbreviation, or variants in an older witness. Where exact wording is verifiable in an extant scripture, the complete canon number and line locus are given. Where only close sense is verifiable, the difference in wording is stated. Where nothing exact has been located, the citation preserved in T1858 is retained without forced attribution.
- Open questions: the extant exact wording of the two opening Fangguang and Daoxing sentences; the difference between the treatise's attribution of “consciousness not arising in dependence on form” to the Fangguang and its extant wording in the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra; and the original chapter-locations of the two unnamed prajñā citations. All remain noted in this treatise's record of open questions.