大乘起信論 對治邪執

〔T32 0579c26〕
心要Essence

五種誤讀之中,最深的是第四種。而它與正解之間,只差一個字的位置。

論主自己說過:「一切世間生死染法皆依如來藏而有」

而讀的人聽成了:如來藏的自體裡,具有一切世間生死等法。

——生死既然依它而有,那生死豈不就在它裡面?

論主的反證

「若如來藏體有妄法,而使證會永息妄者,則無是處故。」

若妄法真的在體裡,那麼證悟之後也永遠息不了妄——因為那是它自己的成分。

修行之所以可能,正因為妄不在體裡。

而如來藏裡有的是什麼?「唯有過恒沙等諸淨功德,不離、不斷、不異真如義故。」

至於那些煩惱染法:「唯是妄有,性自本無,從無始世來未曾與如來藏相應故。」

不曾相應——不是後來被清掉的,是從來沒有進去過。

而這五種誤讀,不是外道的

有一種讀法把話說得很直:這五種人我見,「此是佛法內初學大乘人迷教妄起。非是外道等所起也」。

是佛法之內、初學大乘的人,因為對教理理解偏了才生的。

所以這一段是這部論回過頭來,對自己的讀者說話。

而每一執的句式都一樣:聽到經說什麼 → 不知那是為破執而說 → 於是認定成什麼 → 云何對治。

每一個都是聽對了一半的人才會有的。

另外四種,各執一端

執虛空為如來性——經說法身「猶如虛空」,那是譬;他當成了定義。而虛空本身「以對色故有」,是最依賴對比才成立的東西。

執真如涅槃唯是空——經說畢竟空,是遮;他當成了全部。對治只有一句:「明真如法身自體不空,具足無量性功德故。」

執如來藏有色心差別——經說體備一切功德,他以為裡面一樣一樣擺著。而那是「唯依真如義說」,說差別則是「因生滅染義示現」。

執眾生有始、涅槃有終——凡有依託必有起點,凡有起點必有終點:這是很本能的時間想像。論主從兩頭堵:如來藏無前際,故無明無始;如來藏無後際,故涅槃無終。

無始,所以不必去找當初怎麼會迷;無終,所以不必擔心到了會退。

二乘的那一種:怕與求是同一件事

「怖畏生死、妄取涅槃。」

因為只被說了人無我,於是見五陰確有生滅。

對治:「以五陰法自性不生則無有滅,本來涅槃故。」

本來就是涅槃,不必另取一個。

怕的心與求的心,其實是同一件事的兩頭。

最後,連藥也要放下

「當知染法、淨法皆悉相待,無有自相可說」

連前面用來對治的那些淨功德,也不是可以獨立握住的東西。

那前面說了那麼多,算什麼?論主自己答:「而有言說者,當知如來善巧方便,假以言說引導眾生,其旨趣者皆為離念歸於真如」

五種誤讀,每一種都是把某一句教說抓成了一個東西。

而問題從來不在抓錯了哪一樣,在『抓』本身。

Of the five misreadings, the fourth goes deepest. Between it and the correct reading, only one relation has shifted.

The author himself has said: “All defiled mundane dharmas of birth and death exist in dependence on the Tathāgata-womb.”

The reader hears instead: all mundane dharmas such as birth and death exist within the substance of the Tathāgata-womb.

If birth and death depend upon it to exist, must they not be inside it?

The Author’s Reductio

“If the substance of the Tathāgata-womb contained deluded dharmas, it would be impossible for one who realizes it to bring delusion forever to rest.”

If delusion were truly inside the substance, realization could never bring it to rest—for delusion would be one of the substance’s own constituents.

Practice is possible precisely because delusion is not within the substance.

What, then, is within the Tathāgata-womb? “Only the various pure qualities exceeding the sands of the Ganges, inseparable, unbroken, and not different from the meaning of suchness.”

As for the defiled dharmas of the afflictions, they “exist only deludedly; their nature has never existed, and from beginningless time they have never been associated with the Tathāgata-womb.”

Never associated: they were not admitted and later cleared away. They were never inside.

Yet These Five Misreadings Do Not Belong to Outsiders

One old reading speaks without qualification: the five kinds of the view of a self in persons are “deludedly raised by beginners in the Great Vehicle within the Buddhadharma who have misunderstood the teaching. They are not raised by followers of non-Buddhist paths and the like.”

They arise within the Buddhadharma, in beginners in the Great Vehicle whose understanding of the teaching has gone awry.

This passage is therefore the treatise turning back to speak to its own readers.

Every attachment follows the same sequence: hearing a scripture say something → failing to understand that it was said to break attachment → turning it into a fixed conclusion → asking how it is countered.

Each is a mistake available only to someone who has heard half correctly.

The Other Four Each Seize One End

Taking empty space to be the nature of the Tathāgata. The scripture says the dharma-body is “like empty space.” That is a simile; the listener turns it into a definition. Yet empty space itself “exists only in contrast to form”—it is the very thing most dependent on contrast for its existence.

Taking suchness and nirvāṇa to be mere emptiness. The scripture speaks of ultimate emptiness as a negation; the listener takes the negation for the whole. The countermeasure needs only one sentence: “Understand that the substance of the dharma-body of suchness is not empty, being complete in immeasurable qualities of its own nature.”

Taking the Tathāgata-womb to contain distinctions of form and mind. The scripture says its substance is complete in all qualities, and the listener imagines them arranged inside it one by one. But completeness is spoken “solely in dependence on the meaning of suchness”; distinctions are “shown in dependence on the defiled meaning of arising and ceasing.”

Taking sentient beings to have a beginning and nirvāṇa an end. Whatever depends on something must have a first moment; whatever has a first moment must have a final one—this is an instinctive picture of time. The author closes both ends: the Tathāgata-womb has no former limit, and so ignorance has no beginning; it has no latter limit, and so nirvāṇa has no end.

No beginning, so there is no first moment of delusion to find. No end, so arrival need not be shadowed by fear of falling back.

The Attachment of the Two Vehicles: Fear and Grasping Are One Movement

“Fearing birth and death, they deludedly grasp nirvāṇa.”

They have been taught that there is no self in persons, and so still see the five aggregates as truly arising and ceasing.

The countermeasure: “Because the dharmas of the five aggregates do not arise in their own nature, neither do they cease—they are originally nirvāṇa.”

Originally nirvāṇa: there is no other nirvāṇa to seize.

The mind that fears and the mind that grasps are the two ends of one movement.

At the End, the Medicine Too Is Put Down

“Know that defiled dharmas and pure dharmas all exist in mutual dependence and have no intrinsic marks that can be spoken.”

Even the pure qualities used above as medicine are not independent things that can be held.

What, then, was the point of everything said before? The author answers: “As for why there is nevertheless speech, know that it is the Tathāgata’s skillful means. Provisional words are used to guide sentient beings, and their intent is entirely to lead one away from thought and back to suchness.”

Each of the five misreadings seizes a sentence of teaching and turns it into a thing.

The problem was never only which thing was seized. It was the seizing itself.

原典Canonical · verbatim

馬鳴菩薩造·梁西印度三藏法師真諦譯《大乘起信論》〈對治邪執〉· 大正藏 T32n1666〔起 T32 0579c26〕。段/行首〔T32 …〕=大正藏頁・欄・行錨。

〔T32 0579c26〕對治邪執者,一切邪執皆依我見,若離於我則無邪執。是我見有二種。云何為二?一者、人我見,二者、法我見。人我見者,依諸凡夫說有五種。云何為五?一者、聞修多羅說如來法身畢竟寂寞猶如虛空,以不知為破著故,即謂虛空是如來性。云何對治?明虛空相是其妄法、體無不實,以對色故有,是可見相令心生滅。以一切色法本來是心,實無外色。若無色者,則無虛空之相。所謂一切境界唯心妄起故有,若心離於妄動則一切境界滅,唯一真心無所不遍。此謂如來廣大性智究竟之義,非如虛空相故。二者、聞修多羅說世間諸法畢竟體空,乃至涅槃真如之法亦畢竟空,從本已來自空離一切相。以不知為破著故,即謂真如、涅槃之性唯是其空。云何對治?明真如法身自體不空,具足無量性功德故。三者、聞修多羅說如來之藏無有增減,體備一切功德之法。以不解故,即謂如來之藏有色心法自相差別。云何對治?以唯依真如義說故,因生滅染義示現說差別故。四者、聞修多羅說一切世間生死染法皆依如來藏而有,一切諸法不離真如。以不解故,謂如來藏自體具有一切世間生死等法。云何對治?以如來藏從本已來唯有過恒沙等諸淨功德,不離、不斷、不異真如義故。以過恒沙等煩惱染法,唯是妄有,性自本無,從無始世來未曾與如來藏相應故。若如來藏體有妄法,而使證會永息妄者,則無是處故。五者、聞修多羅說依如來藏故有生死,依如來藏故得涅槃。以不解故,謂眾生有始。以見始故,復謂如來所得涅槃,有其終盡,還作眾生。云何對治?以如來藏無前際故,無明之相亦無有始。若說三界外更有眾生始起者,即是外道經說。又如來藏無有後際,諸佛所得涅槃與之相應則無後際故。法我見者,依二乘鈍根故,如來但為說人無我。以說不究竟,見有五陰生滅之法,怖畏生死、妄取涅槃。云何對治?以五陰法自性不生則無有滅,本來涅槃故。 〔T32 0580b08〕復次,究竟離妄執者,當知染法、淨法皆悉相待,無有自相可說,是故一切法從本已來,非色非心、非智非識、非有非無,畢竟不可說相。而有言說者,當知如來善巧方便,假以言說引導眾生,其旨趣者皆為離念歸於真如,以念一切法令心生滅不入實智故。

The canonical text stands in Chinese only. This edition renders the essence, the plain reading, the exposition and the apparatus into English — never the sūtra itself. Switch to 漢讀本 or 並行雙語 above to read it.

白話Plain reading

馬鳴菩薩造·梁西印度三藏法師真諦譯《大乘起信論》,自「對治邪執者」至「不入實智故」。段首(…)=大正藏頁·欄·行錨。

〔一·一切邪執皆依我見〕(0579c26)所謂對治邪執:一切邪執都是依著我見;若離於「我」,就沒有邪執。

〔二·我見有二種〕(0579c27)這我見有兩種。哪兩種?第一是人我見,第二是法我見。

〔三·人我見有五種〕(0579c28)所謂人我見,是依著諸凡夫而說,有五種。哪五種?

〔四·第一執:以為虛空就是如來性〕(0579c29)第一:聽到經中說如來法身畢竟寂寞、猶如虛空,因為不知道那是為了破除執著而說,就以為虛空即是如來之性。

(0580a02)怎麼對治?要明白:虛空之相是妄法,它的體是沒有的、不真實——因為對著色才有,是可見之相,令心生滅。(0580a04)因為一切色法本來就是心,實在沒有外色;若沒有色,也就沒有虛空之相。(0580a06)就是說:一切境界都是心妄起才有的;若心離於妄動,一切境界就滅了,唯一真心無所不遍。(0580a08)這是說如來廣大性智究竟之義,不像虛空之相。

〔五·第二執:以為真如涅槃只是空〕(0580a09)第二:聽到經中說世間諸法畢竟體空,乃至涅槃、真如之法也畢竟空,從本以來自空、離一切相;因為不知道那是為了破除執著而說,就以為真如、涅槃之性只是那個空。

(0580a12)怎麼對治?要明白:真如法身的自體不空,具足無量的性功德。

〔六·第三執:以為如來藏有色心之差別〕(0580a13)第三:聽到經中說如來之藏沒有增減、體上具備一切功德之法;因為不理解,就以為如來之藏有色法心法的自相差別。

(0580a15)怎麼對治?因為那是唯依真如之義而說的;至於說有差別,是依生滅染義而示現說的。

〔七·第四執:以為如來藏自體具有生死〕(0580a16)第四:聽到經中說一切世間生死染法都依如來藏而有、一切諸法不離真如;因為不理解,就以為如來藏的自體具有一切世間生死等法。

(0580a19)怎麼對治?因為如來藏從本以來唯有超過恒沙的種種淨功德,不離、不斷、不異於真如之義。(0580a21)而超過恒沙的煩惱染法,只是妄有,其性本來就沒有,從無始世以來不曾與如來藏相應。(0580a23)若如來藏體上有妄法,而要使證會的人永息其妄,那是不可能的。

〔八·第五執:以為眾生有始、涅槃有終〕(0580a25)第五:聽到經中說依如來藏故有生死、依如來藏故得涅槃;因為不理解,就以為眾生有一個開始。(0580a27)因為見有開始,又以為如來所得的涅槃有其終盡,還會再作眾生。

(0580a28)怎麼對治?因為如來藏沒有前際,無明之相也沒有開始。(0580a29)若說三界之外另有眾生初起,那是外道經中的說法。(0580b01)又:如來藏沒有後際,諸佛所得的涅槃與它相應,所以也沒有後際。

〔九·法我見〕(0580b03)所謂法我見:是依二乘的鈍根,所以如來只為他們說人無我。(0580b04)因為所說不究竟,他們就見有五陰生滅之法,怖畏生死、妄取涅槃。

(0580b05)怎麼對治?因為五陰之法自性不生,也就沒有滅——本來就是涅槃。

〔十·究竟離妄執〕(0580b08)再者,所謂究竟離妄執:應當知道染法與淨法都是相待而有的,沒有自相可說。(0580b09)所以一切法從本以來,非色非心、非智非識、非有非無,畢竟不可說相。

〔十一·那為什麼還有言說〕(0580b11)而之所以有言說,應當知道那是如來的善巧方便,假借言說來引導眾生。(0580b12)其旨趣都是為了離念、歸於真如——因為念一切法,會令心生滅而不入實智。

Composed by the Bodhisattva Aśvaghoṣa; translated by Paramārtha, Tripiṭaka Master of Western India, under the Liang. The Awakening of Faith in the Great Vehicle, from “As for countering deviant attachments” to “and does not enter true wisdom.” The figures at the head of each segment give the Taishō page, register, and line.

〔1 · All deviant attachments depend on the view of a self〕(0579c26)As for countering deviant attachments: all deviant attachments depend on the view of a self. If one departs from “self,” there are no deviant attachments.

〔2 · The view of self has two kinds〕(0579c27)This view of self has two kinds. Which two? First, the view of a self in persons; second, the view of a self in dharmas.

〔3 · The view of a self in persons has five kinds〕(0579c28)The view of a self in persons is spoken of in relation to ordinary beings, and it has five kinds. Which five?

〔4 · First attachment: taking empty space to be the nature of the Tathāgata〕(0579c29)First: hearing the scriptures say that the Tathāgata’s dharma-body is ultimately quiescent, like empty space, one does not understand that this is said in order to break attachment and takes empty space itself to be the nature of the Tathāgata.

(0580a02)How is this countered? Understand that the mark of empty space is a deluded dharma. It has no substance and is not real: it exists only in contrast to form, is a visible mark, and causes the mind to arise and cease.(0580a04)Because all dharmas of form are originally mind, there is in truth no external form; if there is no form, neither is there any mark of empty space.(0580a06)That is to say, all object-realms exist only because the mind deludedly gives rise to them. If the mind departs from deluded movement, every object-realm ceases, and the one true mind alone pervades everywhere.(0580a08)This expresses the ultimate meaning of the Tathāgata’s vast nature-wisdom; it is not like the mark of empty space.

〔5 · Second attachment: taking suchness and nirvāṇa to be mere emptiness〕(0580a09)Second: hearing the scriptures say that the substance of all mundane dharmas is ultimately empty, and that even the dharmas of nirvāṇa and suchness are ultimately empty—empty of themselves from the beginning and apart from every mark—one does not understand that this is said in order to break attachment and takes the nature of suchness and nirvāṇa to be nothing but that emptiness.

(0580a12)How is this countered? Understand that the substance of the dharma-body of suchness is not empty: it is complete in immeasurable qualities of its own nature.

〔6 · Third attachment: taking the Tathāgata-womb to contain distinctions of form and mind〕(0580a13)Third: hearing the scriptures say that the womb of the Tathāgata neither increases nor decreases and that its substance is complete in all dharmas of merit, one fails to understand and takes the Tathāgata-womb to possess distinct intrinsic marks of the dharmas of form and mind.

(0580a15)How is this countered? That statement is made solely in dependence on the meaning of suchness; as for distinctions, they are shown and spoken in dependence on the defiled meaning of arising and ceasing.

〔7 · Fourth attachment: taking the substance of the Tathāgata-womb to contain birth and death〕(0580a16)Fourth: hearing the scriptures say that all defiled mundane dharmas of birth and death exist in dependence on the Tathāgata-womb, and that no dharma is apart from suchness, one fails to understand and takes the substance of the Tathāgata-womb to contain all mundane dharmas such as birth and death.

(0580a19)How is this countered? From the beginning, the Tathāgata-womb has only the various pure qualities exceeding the sands of the Ganges, which are inseparable, unbroken, and not different from the meaning of suchness.(0580a21)The defiled dharmas of the afflictions, also exceeding the sands of the Ganges, exist only deludedly; their nature has never existed, and from beginningless time they have never been associated with the Tathāgata-womb.(0580a23)If the substance of the Tathāgata-womb contained deluded dharmas, it would be impossible for one who realizes it to bring delusion forever to rest.

〔8 · Fifth attachment: taking sentient beings to have a beginning and nirvāṇa an end〕(0580a25)Fifth: hearing the scriptures say that because of the Tathāgata-womb there is birth and death, and because of the Tathāgata-womb nirvāṇa is attained, one fails to understand and takes sentient beings to have a beginning.(0580a27)Because one sees a beginning, one further takes the nirvāṇa attained by the Tathāgata to have an end, after which the Tathāgata will again become a sentient being.

(0580a28)How is this countered? The Tathāgata-womb has no former limit, and the mark of ignorance likewise has no beginning.(0580a29)To say that sentient beings first arise somewhere beyond the three realms is a teaching found in the scriptures of non-Buddhist paths.(0580b01)Further, the Tathāgata-womb has no latter limit. The nirvāṇa attained by the buddhas accords with it and therefore likewise has no latter limit.

〔9 · The view of a self in dharmas〕(0580b03)As for the view of a self in dharmas: because those of the two vehicles have dull capacities, the Tathāgata teaches them only that there is no self in persons.(0580b04)Because this teaching is not ultimate, they see the dharmas of the five aggregates as arising and ceasing, fear birth and death, and deludedly grasp nirvāṇa.

(0580b05)How is this countered? Because the dharmas of the five aggregates do not arise in their own nature, neither do they cease—they are originally nirvāṇa.

〔10 · Ultimately departing from deluded attachment〕(0580b08)Further, as for ultimately departing from deluded attachment: know that defiled dharmas and pure dharmas exist only in dependence on one another and have no intrinsic marks that can be spoken.(0580b09)Therefore, from the beginning all dharmas are neither form nor mind, neither wisdom nor consciousness, neither existent nor nonexistent; ultimately, they have no mark that can be spoken.

〔11 · Why, then, is there still speech?〕(0580b11)As for why there is nevertheless speech, know that it is the Tathāgata’s skillful means: provisional words are used to guide sentient beings.(0580b12)Their intent is entirely to lead one away from thought and back to suchness, because thinking of any dharma causes the mind to arise and cease and prevents entry into true wisdom.

義疏Exposition

解釋分三科,第一科立正義、第三科指階次,中間這一科是

而它要破的,不是外道。

有一種讀法把這一點說得極明白:這五種人我見,「此是佛法內初學大乘人迷教妄起。非是外道等所起也」——是佛法之內初學大乘的人,因為對教理理解偏了才生的。

換句話說:這一段是這部論回過頭來,對自己的讀者說話。

而每一執的句式都一樣:先說「聞修多羅說」某某,次說因不知不解而生何種認定,末後問「云何對治」——先舉他所聽到的教,再指出他誤解在哪裡,然後才給藥。每一個執都被安在聽對了一半的位置上,沒有一個是憑空冒出來的胡思亂想。

總綱:一切邪執皆依我見

「對治邪執者,一切邪執皆依我見,若離於我則無邪執。」

不是一條一條去修理各種見解,而是指出它們共同的根:。所以下面五條雖各執一物,所治的其實只有一件事。

然後分二:人我見(依凡夫說,五種)、法我見(依二乘鈍根說)。

第一種誤讀:以為虛空就是如來性

他聽到的是:如來法身「畢竟寂寞猶如虛空」。

他誤在哪裡?——「以不知為破著故,即謂虛空是如來性」。經說「猶如虛空」,本是要破他對形相的執著;他卻把那個譬喻當成了定義。

論主的對治很細:虛空之相本身就是妄法。「以對色故有,是可見相令心生滅」——虛空是對著「色」才顯出來的,它不是一個獨立的東西。而「一切色法本來是心,實無外色。若無色者,則無虛空之相」。

你以為最空、最無形的那個東西,其實是最依賴對比才成立的。

論主末後把正面說出來:「若心離於妄動則一切境界滅,唯一真心無所不遍。此謂如來廣大性智究竟之義,非如虛空相故。」——法身之遍,是的遍,不是空無一物的遍。

第二種誤讀:以為真如涅槃只是空

他聽到的是:世間諸法畢竟體空,乃至涅槃、真如之法也畢竟空,「從本已來自空離一切相」。

他誤在哪裡?——同樣是「不知為破著」,於是「即謂真如、涅槃之性唯是其空」。

論主的對治只有一句,短得驚人:「明真如法身自體不空,具足無量性功德故。」

一句話就夠了,因為藥前面早就配好了——真如自體相那一段講的六義、講的「性自滿足一切功德」,就是為了這裡。破執所用的藥,都是前文已經立好的義。

而這一執與第一執恰成一對:第一執把它認作虛空,第二執把它認作空無。前者錯在把譬當成體,後者錯在把遮詮當成全部。

第三種誤讀:以為如來藏裡有色心的差別

他聽到的是:如來之藏「無有增減,體備一切功德之法」。

他誤在哪裡?——「以不解故,即謂如來之藏有色心法自相差別」。既然說「體備一切功德」,那裡面是不是分著一樣一樣擺著?

論主的對治點在依什麼義而說:「以唯依真如義說故,因生滅染義示現說差別故。」

——說它「備一切功德」,是依真如義說的;而之所以能說出差別來,是依生滅染義示現而說。同一件事,依不同的義去說,就有不同的說法;把說法當成裡面的擺設,就錯了。

這一著與真如自體相那一段的「以依業識,生滅相示」是同一個道理,在此處用來破執。

第四種誤讀:以為如來藏自體裡有生死

他聽到的是:「一切世間生死染法皆依如來藏而有,一切諸法不離真如。」

他誤在哪裡?——「謂如來藏自體具有一切世間生死等法」。既然生死依它而有,那生死豈不就在它裡面?

這是五執之中最深的一個,因為它幾乎就是論文自己說過的話。論主的對治因此也最長:

「以如來藏從本已來唯有過恒沙等諸淨功德,不離、不斷、不異真如義故。以過恒沙等煩惱染法,唯是妄有,性自本無,從無始世來未曾與如來藏相應故。」

——如來藏裡只有淨功德;那些煩惱染法「唯是妄有,性自本無」,從無始以來不曾與如來藏相應

然後論主給了一個反證,這一句是全段最有力的一著:「若如來藏體有妄法,而使證會永息妄者,則無是處故。」

若妄法真的在如來藏的體裡,那麼證悟之後也永遠息不了妄——因為那是它自己的成分。 修行之所以可能,正因為妄不在體裡。

「依如來藏而有」與「如來藏體有」,一字之差,一個是修行可能的根據,一個是修行不可能的判決。

第五種誤讀:以為眾生有開始、涅槃有終盡

他聽到的是:「依如來藏故有生死,依如來藏故得涅槃。」

他誤在哪裡?——「謂眾生有始。以見始故,復謂如來所得涅槃,有其終盡,還作眾生。」

既然生死依如來藏而有,那是不是有一個時刻,眾生從那裡開始?而既然有始,是不是也會有終——成佛之後還會退回來?

這一執暴露的是一種很本能的時間想像:凡有依託,必有起點;凡有起點,必有終點。

論主的對治從兩頭堵:「以如來藏無前際故,無明之相亦無有始。」——沒有前際,所以無明無始。他還順帶劃了一條界:「若說三界外更有眾生始起者,即是外道經說。」

另一頭:「又如來藏無有後際,諸佛所得涅槃與之相應則無後際故。」——沒有後際,所以涅槃不會終盡,不會退回來作眾生。

無始,所以你不必去找那個『當初怎麼會迷的』;無終,所以你不必擔心到了會退。 這兩句一起讀,才是完整的安心。

法我見:怖畏生死而妄取涅槃

五種人我見講完,論主轉到法我見,只用了很短的一段。

「法我見者,依二乘鈍根故,如來但為說人無我。以說不究竟,見有五陰生滅之法,怖畏生死、妄取涅槃。」

因為只被說了人無我、沒有被說到法無我,於是他們見到五陰確有生滅,就怖畏生死、妄取涅槃

對治也只有一句:「以五陰法自性不生則無有滅,本來涅槃故。」

——五陰之法自性不生,也就沒有滅;本來就是涅槃,不必另取一個。

「怖畏」與「妄取」兩個詞用得極準:怕的心與求的心,其實是同一件事的兩頭。

而這一條與前面五條的分別也值得看:前五條是理解上的偏,這一條是情緒上的偏——怖與取都不是見解,是心的反應。論主把它與五種人我見並列,等於承認:執不只長在腦裡,也長在怕裡。 一個人可以在道理上什麼都懂,而仍舊怕生死、仍舊急著要一個安穩的去處。這一條就是說給那樣的人聽的。

最後:連「破」本身也要離

論主沒有停在破執上,他加了一段「究竟離妄執」:

「當知染法、淨法皆悉相待,無有自相可說,是故一切法從本已來,非色非心、非智非識、非有非無,畢竟不可說相。」

染與淨是相待而有的——連前面用來對治的那些「淨功德」,也不是可以獨立握住的東西。所以一切法非色非心、非智非識、非有非無。

這一段若停在這裡,讀的人會問:那你前面說了那麼多,算什麼?

論主自己答了:「而有言說者,當知如來善巧方便,假以言說引導眾生,其旨趣者皆為離念歸於真如,以念一切法令心生滅不入實智故。」

一切言說都是方便,其旨趣只有一個:離念,歸於真如。

這一句也回頭照亮了整部論的位置。前面九個單元說了那麼多——一心、二門、三大、五意、六染、熏習、二身——依這一句,那些全是「假以言說引導眾生」。不是說它們是假的,是說它們是為了引導而設的。 標指之指,不是月;而沒有指,人也未必抬得起頭。

而理由是最後那一句:「以念一切法令心生滅不入實智故」——只要在念,心就在生滅,就進不了實智。

回頭看這一整段:五種誤讀,每一種都是把某一句教說抓成了一個東西——抓虛空、抓空、抓功德的擺設、抓體中之妄、抓時間的兩端。而末後這一段告訴人:問題從來不在抓錯了哪一樣,在『抓』本身。

承衍——注家如何讀這一段

上來是這一段自身的義。此下另以注家之眼旁照——注非論,只是同一樁事,換一個位置來看。

法藏《大乘起信論義記》科這一科為二:「二別中有二。初對治離。後究竟離。前中有三。先標數。次列名。後辨相。」——先對治而離,後究竟而離;本段末後那一小節之所以另立,即在此。

而他釋人我見時下了一句判,是讀這一段的關鍵:「言人我見者。計有總相主宰。此是佛法內初學大乘人迷教妄起。非是外道等所起也。」——五執不是外道之見,是佛門之內初學大乘者因迷於教而妄起。一部注疏肯把話說得這麼直,是因為若不點明,讀的人會以為這一段在說別人。

法我見他則依論文繫於二乘鈍根,說其「計一切法各」有自性一路。

元曉《起信論疏》於本段不重錄論文,是隨科而釋;兩本此段亦無相違之判可並錄。

而論自己那句「若離於我則無邪執」還立在那裡——它不需要注家,也不需要階位。

The part on explication has three divisions. The first establishes the correct meaning; the third points out the stages of the path. This middle division breaks.

And what it breaks is not a teaching of non-Buddhist paths.

One old reading makes this perfectly clear. The five kinds of the view of a self in persons are “deludedly raised by beginners in the Great Vehicle within the Buddhadharma who have misunderstood the teaching. They are not raised by followers of non-Buddhist paths and the like.” This passage is addressed to people learning the Great Vehicle from within the Buddhadharma whose understanding of the teaching has gone awry.

In other words, the treatise turns back here and speaks to its own readers.

Each attachment is presented in the same form: first, “hearing the scriptures say” a certain thing; next, because one does not know or understand, arriving at a certain conclusion; and last, the question, “How is it countered?” The treatise first gives the teaching the person actually heard, then locates the misunderstanding, and only afterward administers the medicine. Every attachment is placed at the point of having heard half correctly. Not one is an idle fancy that sprang from nowhere.

The Guiding Principle: All Deviant Attachments Depend on the View of Self

“As for countering deviant attachments: all deviant attachments depend on the view of a self. If one departs from self, there are no deviant attachments.”

The treatise does not set out to repair one view after another. It points to their common root: self. The five attachments below fasten onto five different things, but what is being treated is one and the same.

It then divides the view of a self in two: the view of a self in persons, spoken in relation to ordinary beings and presented in five kinds; and the view of a self in dharmas, spoken in relation to those of dull capacity in the two vehicles.

First Misreading: Taking Empty Space to Be the Nature of the Tathāgata

What the person hears is that the Tathāgata’s dharma-body is “ultimately quiescent, like empty space.”

Where does the error lie? “Not understanding that this is said in order to break attachment, one takes empty space to be the nature of the Tathāgata.” The scripture says like empty space to break attachment to form; the listener turns the simile into a definition.

The treatise’s countermeasure is exact: the mark of empty space is itself a deluded dharma. It “exists only in contrast to form, is a visible mark, and causes the mind to arise and cease.” Space shows up only over against form; it is not an independent thing. And “all dharmas of form are originally mind—there is in truth no external form. If there is no form, neither is there any mark of empty space.”

What appears to be the emptiest, most formless thing is in fact the thing most dependent on a contrast for its existence.

At the end, the treatise states the positive meaning: “If the mind departs from deluded movement, every object-realm ceases, and the one true mind alone pervades everywhere. This expresses the ultimate meaning of the Tathāgata’s vast nature-wisdom; it is not like the mark of empty space.” The pervasion of the dharma-body is the pervasion of wisdom, not the pervasion of a vacant nothing.

Second Misreading: Taking Suchness and Nirvāṇa to Be Mere Emptiness

What the person hears is that the substance of all mundane dharmas is ultimately empty, and that even nirvāṇa and suchness are ultimately empty, “empty of themselves from the beginning and apart from every mark.”

The same hinge turns the hearing into an attachment: “not understanding that this is said in order to break attachment,” one takes the nature of suchness and nirvāṇa to be nothing but emptiness.

The countermeasure is a single, startlingly short sentence: “Understand that the substance of the dharma-body of suchness is not empty, being complete in immeasurable qualities of its own nature.”

One sentence is enough because the medicine has already been compounded earlier. The six meanings in the passage on the substance and marks of suchness, and its teaching that suchness “is by nature complete in all qualities,” were established for just this point. The medicines used to break these attachments are the meanings already established by the preceding text.

This attachment forms a pair with the first. The first takes suchness to be empty space; the second takes it to be empty of everything. The former mistakes a simile for the substance. The latter mistakes a negating expression for the whole meaning.

Third Misreading: Taking the Tathāgata-Womb to Contain Distinctions of Form and Mind

What the person hears is that the womb of the Tathāgata “neither increases nor decreases, and its substance is complete in all dharmas of merit.”

Where does the error lie? “Failing to understand, one takes the womb of the Tathāgata to possess distinct intrinsic marks of the dharmas of form and mind.” If its substance is said to be complete in all qualities, must those qualities be arranged inside it one by one?

The countermeasure turns on the standpoint from which a statement is made: “This is spoken solely in dependence on the meaning of suchness; distinctions are shown and spoken in dependence on the defiled meaning of arising and ceasing.”

To say that it is “complete in all qualities” is to speak in dependence on suchness. To speak of distinctions is to show them in dependence on the defiled meaning of arising and ceasing. The same matter takes different forms of statement when spoken from different meanings; the mistake is to turn those forms of statement into objects stored inside it.

This is the same principle expressed in the earlier passage on the substance and marks of suchness by the words “shown through the marks of arising and ceasing in dependence on the karmic consciousness.” Here that principle becomes a medicine for attachment.

Fourth Misreading: Taking the Substance of the Tathāgata-Womb to Contain Birth and Death

What the person hears is that “all defiled mundane dharmas of birth and death exist in dependence on the Tathāgata-womb, and no dharma is apart from suchness.”

Where does the error lie? One “takes the substance of the Tathāgata-womb to contain all mundane dharmas such as birth and death.” If birth and death depend upon it to exist, must birth and death not be inside it?

This is the deepest of the five attachments, because it comes almost word for word from something the treatise itself has said. For that reason its countermeasure is also the longest:

“From the beginning, the Tathāgata-womb has only the various pure qualities exceeding the sands of the Ganges, inseparable, unbroken, and not different from the meaning of suchness. The defiled dharmas of the afflictions, also exceeding the sands of the Ganges, exist only deludedly; their nature has never existed, and from beginningless time they have never been associated with the Tathāgata-womb.”

The Tathāgata-womb contains only pure qualities. The afflictions and defilements “exist only deludedly; their nature has never existed”; from beginningless time they have never been associated with the Tathāgata-womb.

Then the author gives a reductio, the most forceful stroke in the whole passage: “If the substance of the Tathāgata-womb contained deluded dharmas, it would be impossible for one who realizes it to bring delusion forever to rest.”

If deluded dharmas were really within its substance, realization could never bring delusion to rest—for delusion would be one of its own constituents. Practice is possible precisely because delusion is not within the substance.

Birth and death exist in dependence on the Tathāgata-womb and birth and death exist in the substance of the Tathāgata-womb: a shift of one relation turns the first into the ground that makes practice possible, and the second into a verdict that makes practice impossible.

Fifth Misreading: Taking Sentient Beings to Have a Beginning and Nirvāṇa an End

What the person hears is that “because of the Tathāgata-womb there is birth and death, and because of the Tathāgata-womb nirvāṇa is attained.”

Where does the error lie? One “takes sentient beings to have a beginning. Because one sees a beginning, one further takes the nirvāṇa attained by the Tathāgata to have an end, after which the Tathāgata will again become a sentient being.”

If birth and death depend on the Tathāgata-womb, was there a moment when sentient beings first began? And if there was a beginning, might there also be an end—might one become a buddha and afterward fall back again?

This attachment exposes an instinctive picture of time: whatever depends on something must have a first moment, and whatever has a first moment must have a final one.

The treatise closes both ends. “Because the Tathāgata-womb has no former limit, the mark of ignorance likewise has no beginning.” There is no former limit, and so ignorance is beginningless. It also draws a boundary in passing: “To say that sentient beings first arise somewhere beyond the three realms is a teaching found in the scriptures of non-Buddhist paths.”

At the other end: “The Tathāgata-womb has no latter limit. The nirvāṇa attained by the buddhas accords with it and therefore likewise has no latter limit.” There is no latter limit, and so nirvāṇa can neither end nor turn back into sentient existence.

Because there is no beginning, you need not hunt for the moment when delusion first occurred. Because there is no end, you need not fear that arrival will be followed by regression. Read together, those two statements offer the full reassurance of the passage.

The View of a Self in Dharmas: Fearing Birth and Death and Deludedly Grasping Nirvāṇa

Having finished the five kinds of the view of a self in persons, the author turns to the view of a self in dharmas in a very short passage.

“As for the view of a self in dharmas: because those of the two vehicles have dull capacities, the Tathāgata teaches them only that there is no self in persons. Because this teaching is not ultimate, they see the dharmas of the five aggregates as arising and ceasing, fear birth and death, and deludedly grasp nirvāṇa.”

They have been taught only that there is no self in persons, not yet that there is no self in dharmas. They therefore see the five aggregates as truly arising and ceasing, and this view takes affective form: fear of birth and death, and deluded grasping after nirvāṇa.

The countermeasure is likewise only one sentence: “Because the dharmas of the five aggregates do not arise in their own nature, neither do they cease—they are originally nirvāṇa.”

They are originally nirvāṇa. There is no separate nirvāṇa to be seized.

The precision of the two words fear and grasp is worth hearing. The mind that recoils and the mind that reaches are the two ends of the same movement.

The difference between this and the preceding five is also revealing. The first five are deviations in understanding; this one is a deviation lodged in feeling. Fear and grasping are not propositions but reactions of the mind. By placing this beside the five views of a self in persons, the treatise acknowledges that attachment grows not only in what the mind thinks, but also in what it fears. A person may understand every proposition and still fear birth and death, still hurry toward a secure place. This sentence is spoken to that person.

At the End, Even “Breaking” Must Be Left Behind

The author does not stop with countering attachments. He adds a passage on “ultimately departing from deluded attachment”:

“Know that defiled dharmas and pure dharmas all exist in mutual dependence and have no intrinsic marks that can be spoken. Therefore, from the beginning all dharmas are neither form nor mind, neither wisdom nor consciousness, neither existent nor nonexistent; ultimately they have no mark that can be spoken.”

Defilement and purity arise only in relation to one another. Even the pure qualities used as medicines above are not independent things that can be grasped. Thus all dharmas are neither form nor mind, neither wisdom nor consciousness, neither existent nor nonexistent.

If the passage stopped there, the reader would ask: what, then, was the point of everything just said?

The author answers: “As for why there is nevertheless speech, know that it is the Tathāgata’s skillful means. Provisional words are used to guide sentient beings, and their intent is entirely to lead one away from thought and back to suchness, because thinking of any dharma causes the mind to arise and cease and prevents entry into true wisdom.”

All speech is expedient; it has one intent—to lead away from thought and back to suchness.

That sentence shines backward over the position of the whole treatise. The one mind, the two aspects, the three greatnesses, the five consciousnesses, the six defiled minds, perfuming, and the two bodies—all of it is “provisional words used to guide sentient beings.” That does not mean these teachings are false. It means they are established for the work of guidance. The pointing finger is not the moon; without a finger, however, one may never look up.

The reason comes in the last clause: “thinking of any dharma causes the mind to arise and cease and prevents entry into true wisdom.” As long as thought fastens on a dharma, the mind remains in arising and ceasing and cannot enter true wisdom.

Now look back over the whole passage. Each of the five misreadings seizes a sentence of teaching and turns it into a thing: empty space, emptiness, an arrangement of qualities, delusion within the substance, or the two ends of time. The last movement reveals that the problem was never only which thing one seized. It was the seizing itself.

Carrying Forward—How the Commentators Read This Passage

The foregoing is the sense of this passage in itself. What follows lets the commentators’ eyes shine on it from the side—a commentary is not the treatise, only the same matter seen from another position.

Fazang’s Record of the Meaning of the Awakening of Faith in the Great Vehicle divides this section in two: “Within the second, the particular treatment, there are two: first, departing through countermeasures; later, ultimately departing. Within the former there are three: first stating the number, next listing the names, and last distinguishing their marks.” That division explains why the short final passage stands on its own: particular countermeasures have done their work, and now even the standpoint of countering must be relinquished.

In explaining the view of a self in persons, Fazang gives the judgment that unlocks the passage: “As for what is called the view of a self in persons: it reckons a general mark that governs. This is deludedly raised by beginners in the Great Vehicle within the Buddhadharma who have misunderstood the teaching. It is not raised by followers of non-Buddhist paths and the like.” The sentence turns the mirror squarely toward the reader: one cannot safely file these five attachments under somebody else’s beliefs.

He associates the view of a self in dharmas, following the treatise, with those of dull capacity in the two vehicles, who reckon that dharmas each have their own intrinsic nature.

Wonhyo’s Commentary does not repeat the words of the treatise in this passage, but explains them according to the outline; the two works offer no divergent judgment here for parallel recording.

And the treatise’s own sentence still stands without need of any commentator or any stage of the path: “If one departs from self, there are no deviant attachments.”

考據Apparatus

一、科判定位

本單元為全論十六單元之第十一,範圍〔T32 0579c26–0580b14〕,七百三十九字。屬解釋分三科之第二科「對治邪執」全部:標宗(一切邪執皆依我見)・人我見五種及其對治・法我見及其對治・究竟離妄執。

法藏《大乘起信論義記》牒本段之首句而科之:「對治邪執者一切邪執皆依我見若離於我則無邪執」——「二別中有二。初對治離。後究竟離。前中有三。先標數。次列名。後辨相。」〔T44n1846 0276b27〕

二、異譯對勘

實叉難陀本此段之五執名目與本段不盡同形;本段之名不得逕搜彼本。二本此段之逐段對勘未備,誌之。

三、經論宗依

本段五執皆以『聞修多羅說』起句〔0579c29・0580a09・0580a13・0580a16・0580a25〕——所聞之經論文未標其名,誌不判,不代為繫某經

另〔0580a29〕「若說三界外更有眾生始起者,即是外道經說」一句,所指之外道經論文亦未標名;同誌不判

四、本段釋要

五執之所屬——本段最要之一判:《義記》釋人我見云:「言人我見者。計有總相主宰。此是佛法內初學大乘人迷教妄起。非是外道等所起也。」〔T44n1846 0276c03〕——五種人我見非外道之執,是佛法內初學大乘者因迷教而起。

法我見之所屬——《義記》同處續云:「法我見者。計一切法各」〔T44n1846 0276c04〕,依論文即繫於二乘鈍根。

究竟離之科——《義記》牒「復次究竟離妄執者當知染法淨法皆悉相待無有自相可說是故一切法從本已來非色非心非智非識非有非無畢竟不可說相而有言」〔T44n1846 0277c16〕,隨文而釋。

五、諸家異釋(分欄並錄)

逐字
法藏《義記》(唐·判五執之所屬)「此是佛法內初學大乘人迷教妄起。非是外道等所起也。」〔T44n1846 0276c03〕
法藏《義記》(唐·科對治邪執)「二別中有二。初對治離。後究竟離。」〔T44n1846 0276b27〕

元曉《疏》為科釋體,本段不重錄論文;本段無二家相違之判可並錄——已查 T44n1846、T44n1844 兩本。

六、術語

  • 人我見・法我見〔0579c27〕:我見之二種。『五種人我見』一詞論文無(論作「依諸凡夫說有五種」),為後人綜稱;讀者面用之不得加「」。
  • 如來藏〔0580a13〕:本段三執皆繫於此名(第三、第四、第五執),是全論如來藏誤讀之集中處
  • 前際・後際〔0580a28–b02〕:本段用以破『眾生有始・涅槃有終』之執。
  • 究竟離妄執〔0580b08〕:對治離之後一層。

七、譬喻·修辭

本段無譬喻——七百三十九字全為破執之語,無一譬。誌此,不代為本段造譬。

其修辭之特出者:五執皆作同一句式(聞某說→以不知故→即謂→云何對治)——先舉所聞之教、次指誤解之處、再出對治。句式之整齊本身即是教法:每一執都被安在半解之位,非憑空之妄想。

八、徵引承衍

  • 論內之前後相繫:本段第二執之對治「真如法身自體不空,具足無量性功德故」〔0580a12〕,即真如自體相一段之義;第四執之對治「唯有過恒沙等諸淨功德」〔0580a19〕亦然——破執所用之藥,皆前文已立之義
  • 本叢書之內:如來藏之三處誤讀與《楞伽》帙如來藏/藏識之語脈可對讀,然名相體系各出其書;各繫其書,不相混計

九、校本定位

本單元域〔0579c26–0580b14〕之異讀九處,並錄不判:

大正作他本作
〔0579c26〕邪執耶執
〔0580a05〕外色
〔0580a08〕性智智性
〔0580a12〕〔-〕
〔0580a15〕
〔0580a21〕過於
〔0580a25〕求・求
〔0580a25〕有是
〔0580b07〕無有滅有無滅

〔0580b07〕一處於法我見之對治句相關(「自性不生則無有滅」他本作「有無滅」);〔0580a08〕「性智」他本作「智性」,於第一執對治之落句相關。並錄不判。

本單元域內:缺字標記 0、私用區字 0、夾註 0。

I. Doctrinal-Outline Placement

This unit is the eleventh of the sixteen units of the whole treatise, its range 〔T32 0579c26–0580b14〕, seven hundred and thirty-nine characters. It comprises the whole of the second of the three divisions within the part on explication, “countering deviant attachments”: the principal statement (all deviant attachments depend on the view of a self); the five kinds of the view of a self in persons and their countermeasures; the view of a self in dharmas and its countermeasure; and ultimately departing from deluded attachment.

Fazang’s Record of the Meaning of the Awakening of Faith in the Great Vehicle takes up the first sentence of the passage and outlines it: 「對治邪執者一切邪執皆依我見若離於我則無邪執」—“As for countering deviant attachments: all deviant attachments depend on the view of a self; if one departs from self, there are no deviant attachments”—followed by 「二別中有二。初對治離。後究竟離。前中有三。先標數。次列名。後辨相。」—“Within the second, the particular treatment, there are two: first, departing through countermeasures; later, ultimately departing. Within the former there are three: first stating the number, next listing the names, and last distinguishing their marks” 〔T44n1846 0276b27〕.

II. Cross-Recension Collation

The names of the five attachments in Śikṣānanda’s recension do not all take the same form as in the present passage; the names used here may not simply be searched for in that recension. A passage-by-passage collation of the two recensions for this unit has not been prepared; this is recorded.

III. Scriptural and Treatise Basis

Each of the five attachments in this passage begins with 『聞修多羅說』—“hearing the scriptures say” 〔0579c29・0580a09・0580a13・0580a16・0580a25〕. The scriptural passages heard are not identified by name. This is recorded without adjudication; no particular scripture is supplied on their behalf.

Further, in the sentence at 〔0580a29〕, 「若說三界外更有眾生始起者,即是外道經說」—“if it is said that sentient beings first arise somewhere beyond the three realms, that is a teaching found in the scriptures of non-Buddhist paths,” the non-Buddhist scripture meant is likewise not identified. This too is recorded without adjudication.

IV. Exegesis of the Passage (the word-by-word mirror, phrase by phrase)

To whom the five attachments belong—one of the passage’s most important judgments. The Record of the Meaning explains the view of a self in persons: 「言人我見者。計有總相主宰。此是佛法內初學大乘人迷教妄起。非是外道等所起也。」—“As for what is called the view of a self in persons: it reckons a general mark that governs. This is deludedly raised by beginners in the Great Vehicle within the Buddhadharma who have misunderstood the teaching. It is not raised by followers of non-Buddhist paths and the like” 〔T44n1846 0276c03〕. The five kinds of the view of a self in persons are not attachments of non-Buddhists; they arise when beginners in the Great Vehicle within the Buddhadharma misunderstand the teaching.

To whom the view of a self in dharmas belongs. The Record of the Meaning continues in the same place: 「法我見者。計一切法各」—“As for the view of a self in dharmas: it reckons that each and every dharma…” 〔T44n1846 0276c04〕; the text of the treatise itself associates it with those of dull capacity in the two vehicles.

The division of ultimate departure. The Record of the Meaning takes up: 「復次究竟離妄執者當知染法淨法皆悉相待無有自相可說是故一切法從本已來非色非心非智非識非有非無畢竟不可說相而有言」—“Further, as for ultimately departing from deluded attachment: know that defiled dharmas and pure dharmas all exist in mutual dependence and have no intrinsic marks that can be spoken. Therefore, from the beginning all dharmas are neither form nor mind, neither wisdom nor consciousness, neither existent nor nonexistent; ultimately they have no mark that can be spoken—and yet there is speech…” 〔T44n1846 0277c16〕, and explains it as the passage proceeds.

V. Divergent Readings of the Commentators (recorded side by side, without adjudication)

MirrorWord for wordAnchor
Fazang, Record of the Meaning (Tang; on those to whom the five attachments belong)「此是佛法內初學大乘人迷教妄起。非是外道等所起也。」—“This is deludedly raised by beginners in the Great Vehicle within the Buddhadharma who have misunderstood the teaching. It is not raised by followers of non-Buddhist paths and the like.”〔T44n1846 0276c03〕
Fazang, Record of the Meaning (Tang; outlining the countering of deviant attachments)「二別中有二。初對治離。後究竟離。」—“Within the second, the particular treatment, there are two: first, departing through countermeasures; later, ultimately departing.”〔T44n1846 0276b27〕

Wonhyo’s Commentary is an outline-and-explanation commentary and does not repeat the treatise’s words in this passage. No divergent judgment between the two commentators is available here for parallel recording—T44n1846 and T44n1844 have both been checked.

VI. Terms (first occurrences in this passage)

  • 人我見・法我見the view of a self in persons · the view of a self in dharmas 〔0579c27〕: the two kinds of the view of a self. The expression 『五種人我見』—“the five kinds of the view of a self in persons”—does not occur in the treatise (the treatise says 「依諸凡夫說有五種」—“spoken of in relation to ordinary beings, there are five kinds”); it is a later collective expression and may not be placed in quotation marks in the reader-facing layers.
  • 如來藏Tathāgata-womb 〔0580a13〕: three attachments in this passage center on this term (the third, fourth, and fifth). This is the place in the whole treatise where misreadings of the Tathāgata-womb are concentrated.
  • 前際・後際former limit · latter limit 〔0580a28–b02〕: used here to counter the attachment that sentient beings have a beginning and nirvāṇa has an end.
  • 究竟離妄執ultimately departing from deluded attachment 〔0580b08〕: the level following departure through particular countermeasures.

VII. Simile and Rhetoric

This passage has no simile—all seven hundred and thirty-nine characters are words that break attachments, without a single simile. This is recorded; no simile is manufactured on the passage’s behalf.

Its outstanding rhetorical feature is that all five attachments use the same sentence form: hearing a certain teaching → failing to understand → consequently taking it in a certain way → how is it countered? First the teaching heard is presented, then the point of misunderstanding is identified, and only then is the countermeasure given. The regularity of the form is itself a teaching method: every attachment is situated in a half-understanding, not in a delusion that arose from nothing.

VIII. Citation and Carrying Forward

  • Connections before and after within the treatise: the countermeasure to the second attachment, 「真如法身自體不空,具足無量性功德故」—“the substance of the dharma-body of suchness is not empty, being complete in immeasurable qualities of its own nature” 〔0580a12〕, is the meaning of the passage on the substance and marks of suchness; so too is the countermeasure to the fourth attachment, 「唯有過恒沙等諸淨功德」—“it has only the pure qualities exceeding the sands of the Ganges” 〔0580a19〕. The medicines used to break the attachments are all meanings already established earlier in the treatise.
  • Within this series: the three misreadings involving the Tathāgata-womb may be read alongside the language of Tathāgata-womb and store consciousness in the Laṅkāvatāra edition, but each system of terms belongs to its own book. Each is kept with its own book; their counts are not combined.

IX. Text-critical Placement

Within the range of this unit 〔0579c26–0580b14〕 there are nine variant readings, recorded side by side without adjudication:

AnchorTaishōOther witnesses
〔0579c26〕邪執耶執
〔0580a05〕外色
〔0580a08〕性智智性
〔0580a12〕〔-〕
〔0580a15〕
〔0580a21〕過於
〔0580a25〕求・求
〔0580a25〕有是
〔0580b07〕無有滅有無滅

The reading at 〔0580b07〕 concerns the countermeasure to the view of a self in dharmas (「自性不生則無有滅」—“if intrinsic nature does not arise, then there is no cessation”; another witness reads 「有無滅」). The reading at 〔0580a08〕, 「性智」, with another witness reading 「智性」, concerns the concluding sentence of the countermeasure to the first attachment. Both are recorded without adjudication.

Within the range of this unit: lacuna markers 0, private-use-area characters 0, interlinear notes 0.

Translator · 釋慧鏡 Shi Huijing — with AI-assisted consistency checking

License · CC BY-NC-SA 4.0