攝大乘論 第二分 所知依分
我們的一生，做過的事、起過的念，過了就過了——那它們到底去了哪裡？今生造的業，憑什麼隔著好幾世還能結果？還有更難的一問：如果心裡裝的盡是煩惱的習氣，那能讓人解脫的清淨力量，又是從哪裡冒出來的？
《攝大乘論》十大題目的第一個，『所知依』，就是來回答這個『究竟依靠什麼』的問題。無著菩薩的答案，是一個我們從不曾察覺、卻一刻不停在運作的深層心識——阿賴耶識，意思就是『藏』。
祂像一座無始以來不斷收受、又不斷生發的庫：我們每一個起心動念都薰進去，成為一顆『種子』；因緣一到，種子又生出新的現行。生死之所以能貫穿、業力之所以能存放、輪迴之所以說得通，全靠這座底層的庫在默默承載。
可是這一分最精彩的一步還在後頭：既然庫裡裝的是雜染，解脫又怎麼可能？無著的回答美極了——當我們聽聞諸佛從清淨實相流出的正法，會在這同一座庫裡，薰下一種全新的、清淨的種子；它寄住在染識之中，卻不屬於它，像水裡的乳。隨著它一分分增長、染種一分分消減，整個生命的底盤就被慢慢換掉了。這就是『轉依』——凡夫成聖的真正機關。
底層的心、種子、緣起、為什麼非有這個識不可、解脫如何可能——這些，可循本分一段一段讀下去。但你不必一上來就跳進去——先認識這座『藏』，就夠了。
Everything we have ever done, every thought we have ever had, passes and is gone — so where does it all go? How can an act committed in this life ripen lifetimes later? And here is the harder question: if the mind is stocked with nothing but the habits of affliction, where could the pure power that sets us free possibly come from?
The first of the ten topics of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, "the foundation of the knowable," exists to answer this question of what everything rests on. Asaṅga's answer is a deep layer of mind we never notice, yet which never stops working — the ālaya-vijñāna, the "storehouse" consciousness.
It is like a reservoir that, from beginningless time, ceaselessly takes in and ceaselessly gives forth: every stirring of the mind is "perfumed" into it as a seed, and when conditions ripen the seed gives rise to a fresh active state. The continuity that runs through birth and death, the safekeeping of karmic force, the very coherence of rebirth — all of it rests on this quiet, underlying store.
But the finest step comes later. If the store holds only what is defiled, how could liberation be possible at all? Asaṅga's answer is a beautiful one: when we hear the true Dharma that flows out of the utterly pure reality realized by the buddhas, it perfumes into this same store a wholly new and pure kind of seed — one that lodges within the defiled consciousness yet does not belong to it, like milk held within water. As that pure seed grows and the defiled seeds wane, the entire basis of one's existence is gradually exchanged. This is the "transformation of the basis" — the true hinge on which an ordinary being becomes a sage.
The underlying mind, the seeds, dependent arising, why this consciousness must exist, and how liberation becomes possible — you can follow these one stretch at a time. But you need not dive in all at once — for now, it is enough to meet this "storehouse."
二 所知依分 〔T31 0133b11〕
此中最初且說所知依，即阿賴耶識。世尊何處說阿賴耶識名阿賴耶識？謂薄伽梵於阿毘達磨大乘經伽他中說：
「無始時來界，一切法等依，
由此有諸趣，及涅槃證得。」
即於此中復說頌曰：
「由攝藏諸法，一切種子識，
故名阿賴耶，勝者我開示。」
如是且引阿笈摩證。復何緣故此識說名阿賴耶識？一切有生雜染品法，於此攝藏為果性故；又即此識，於彼攝藏為因性故；是故說名阿賴耶識。或諸有情攝藏此識為自我故，是故說名阿賴耶識。
復次，此識亦名阿陀那識。此中阿笈摩者，如《解深密經》說：
「阿陀那識甚深細，一切種子如瀑流，
我於凡愚不開演，恐彼分別執為我。」
何緣此識亦復說名阿陀那識？執受一切有色根故，一切自體取所依故。所以者何？有色諸根，由此執受，無有失壞，盡壽隨轉。又於相續正結生時，取彼生故，執受自體。是故此識亦復說名阿陀那識。
此亦名心，如世尊說：「心意識三。」此中意有二種：第一、與作等無間緣所依止性，無間滅識能與意識作生依止。第二、染污意與四煩惱恒共相應：一者、薩迦耶見，二者、我慢，三者、我愛，四者、無明；此即是識雜染所依。識復由彼第一依生，第二雜染；了別境義故。等無間義故，思量義故，意成二種。
復次，云何得知有染污意？謂此若無，不共無明則不得有，成過失故。又五同法亦不得有，成過失故。所以者何？以五識身必有眼等俱有依故。又訓釋詞亦不得有，成過失故。又無想定與滅盡定差別無有，成過失故。謂無想定染意所顯，非滅盡定；若不爾者，此二種定應無差別。又無想天一期生中，應無染污成過失故，於中若無我執我慢。又一切時我執現行現可得故，謂善、不善、無記心中；若不爾者，唯不善心彼相應故，有我我所煩惱現行，非善無記。是故若立俱有現行，非相應現行，無此過失。
此中頌曰：
「若不共無明，及與五同法，
訓詞，二定別，無皆成過失；
無想生應無我執轉成過；
我執恒隨逐一切種無有。
離染意無有，二三成相違；
無此，一切處我執不應有。
真義心當生，常能為障礙，
俱行一切分，謂不共無明。」
此意染污故，有覆無記性，與四煩惱常共相應。如色無色二纏煩惱，是其有覆無記性攝，色無色纏為奢摩他所攝藏故；此意一切時微細隨逐故。
心體第三，若離阿賴耶識，無別可得。是故成就阿賴耶識以為心體，由此為種子，意及識轉。何因緣故亦說名心？由種種法熏習種子所積集故。
復次，何故聲聞乘中不說此心名阿賴耶識，名阿陀那識？由此深細境所攝故。所以者何？由諸聲聞，不於一切境智處轉，是故於彼，雖離此說，然智得成，解脫成就，故不為說。若諸菩薩，定於一切境智處轉，是故為說。若離此智，不易證得一切智智。
復次，聲聞乘中亦以異門密意，已說阿賴耶識，如彼《增壹阿笈摩》說：「世間眾生，愛阿賴耶，樂阿賴耶，欣阿賴耶，憙阿賴耶；為斷如是阿賴耶故，說正法時，恭敬攝耳，住求解心，法隨法行。如來出世，如是甚奇希有正法，出現世間。」於聲聞乘《如來出現四德經》中，由此異門密意，已顯阿賴耶識。於大眾部阿笈摩中，亦以異門密意，說此名根本識，如樹依根。化地部中，亦以異門密意，說此名窮生死蘊。有處有時見色心斷，非阿賴耶識中彼種有斷。
阿賴耶如是所知依，說阿賴耶識為性，阿陀那識為性，心為性，阿賴耶為性，根本識為性，窮生死蘊為性等；由此異門，阿賴耶識成大王路。
復有一類，謂心意識義一文異。是義不成，意識兩義差別可得，當知心義亦應有異。復有一類，謂薄伽梵所說眾生愛阿賴耶，乃至廣說，此中五取蘊說名阿賴耶。有餘復謂貪俱樂受名阿賴耶。有餘復謂薩迦耶見名阿賴耶。此等諸師，由教及證，愚於藏識，故作此執。如是安立阿賴耶名，隨聲聞乘安立道理，亦不相應。若不愚者，取此藏識安立彼說阿賴耶名，如是安立則為最勝。云何最勝？若五取蘊名阿賴耶，生惡趣中一向苦處，最可厭逆，眾生一向不起愛樂，於中執藏不應道理，以彼常求速捨離故。若貪俱樂受名阿賴耶，第四靜慮以上無有，具彼有情常有厭逆，於中執藏亦不應理。若薩迦耶見名阿賴耶，於此正法中信解無我者，恒有厭逆，於中執藏亦不應理。阿賴耶識內我性攝，雖生惡趣一向苦處求離苦蘊，然於藏識我愛隨縛，未嘗求離。雖生第四靜慮以上，於貪俱樂恒有厭逆，然於藏識我愛隨縛。雖於此正法信解無我者厭逆我見，然於藏識我愛隨縛。是故安立阿賴耶識名阿賴耶，成就最勝。
如是已說阿賴耶識安立異門，安立此相云何可見？安立此相略有三種：一者、安立自相，二者、安立因相，三者、安立果相。此中安立阿賴耶識自相者，謂依一切雜染品法所有薰習為彼生因，由能攝持種子相應。此中安立阿賴耶識因相者，謂即如是一切種子阿賴耶識，於一切時與彼雜染品類諸法現前為因。此中安立阿賴耶識果相者，謂即依彼雜染品法無始時來所有薰習，阿賴耶識相續而生。
復次，何等名為薰習？薰習能詮。何為所詮？謂依彼法俱生俱滅，此中有能生彼因性，是謂所詮。如苣蕂中有花薰習，苣蕂與花俱生俱滅，是諸苣蕂帶能生彼香因而生。又如所立貪等行者，貪等薰習，依彼貪等俱生俱滅，此心帶彼生因而生。或多聞者，多聞薰習，依聞作意俱生俱滅，此心帶彼記因而生，由此薰習能攝持故，名持法者。阿賴耶識薰習道理，當知亦爾。
復次，阿賴耶識中諸雜染品法種子，為別異住？為無別異？非彼種子有別實物於此中住，亦非不異。然阿賴耶識如是而生，有能生彼功能差別，名一切種子識。
復次，阿賴耶識與彼雜染諸法同時更互為因，云何可見？譬如明燈，焰炷生燒，同時更互。又如蘆束互相依持，同時不倒。應觀此中更互為因道理亦爾。如阿賴耶識為雜染諸法因，雜染諸法亦為阿賴耶識因，唯就如是安立因緣，所餘因緣不可得故。
云何薰習無異無雜，而能與彼有異有雜諸法為因？如眾纈具纈所纈衣，當纈之時，雖復未有異雜非一品類可得，入染器後，爾時衣上便有異雜非一品類染色絞絡文像顯現。阿賴耶識亦復如是，異雜能薰之所薰習，於薰習時雖復未有異雜可得，果生染器現前已後，便有異雜無量品類諸法顯現。
如是緣起，於大乘中極細甚深。又若略說有二緣起：一者、分別自性緣起，二者、分別愛非愛緣起。此中依止阿賴耶識諸法生起，是名分別自性緣起，以能分別種種自性為緣性故。復有十二支緣起，是名分別愛非愛緣起，以於善趣惡趣能分別愛非愛種種自體為緣性故。
於阿賴耶識中，若愚第一緣起，或有分別自性為因，或有分別宿作為因，或有分別自在變化為因，或有分別實我為因，或有分別無因無緣。若愚第二緣起，復有分別我為作者，我為受者。譬如眾多生盲士夫，未曾見象，復有以象說而示之。彼諸生盲，有觸象鼻，有觸其牙，有觸其耳，有觸其足，有觸其尾，有觸脊𮌹。諸有問言：「象為何相？」或有說言象如犁柄，或說如杵，或說如箕，或說如臼，或說如箒，或有說言象如石山。若不解了此二緣起，無明生盲亦復如是，或有計執自性為因，或有計執宿作為因，或有計執自在為因，或有計執實我為因，或有計執無因無緣；或有計執我為作者，我為受者。阿賴耶識自性，因性，及果性等，如所不了象之自性。
又若略說，阿賴耶識用異熟識，一切種子為其自性，能攝三界一切自體，一切趣等。
此中五頌：
「外、內。不明了。於二唯世俗、
勝義。諸種子，當知有六種：
剎那滅、俱有，恒隨轉應知、
決定、待眾緣、唯能引自果。
堅、無記、可熏、與能熏相應：
所熏非異此，是為熏習相。
六識無相應，三差別相違，
二念不俱有，類例餘成失。
此外內種子，能生、引應知，
枯喪由能引，任運後滅故。」
為顯內種非如外種，復說二頌：
「外或無熏習，非內種應知；
聞等熏習無，果生非道理；
作不作失得，過故成相違；
外種內為緣，由依彼熏習。」
復次，其餘轉識普於一切自體諸趣，應知說名能受用者，如《中邊分別論》中說伽他曰：
「一則名緣識，第二名受者，
此中能受用、分別、推心法。」
如是二識更互為緣，如《阿毘達磨大乘經》中說伽他曰：
「諸法於識藏，識於法亦爾，
更互為果性，亦常為因性。」
若於第一緣起中，如是二識互為因緣，於第二緣起中復是何緣？是增上緣。如是六識幾緣所生？增上，所緣，等無間緣。如是三種緣起：謂窮生死，愛非愛趣，及能受用；具有四緣。
如是已安立阿賴耶識異門及相，復云何知如是異門及如是相，決定唯在阿賴耶識非於轉識？由若遠離如是安立阿賴耶識，雜染清淨皆不得成：謂煩惱雜染，若業雜染，若生雜染皆不成故；世間清淨，出世清淨亦不成故。
云何煩惱雜染不成？以諸煩惱及隨煩惱熏習所作彼種子體，於六識身不應理故。所以者何？若立眼識貪等煩惱及隨煩惱俱生俱滅，此由彼熏成種非餘：即此眼識若已謝滅，餘識所間，如是熏習，熏習所依皆不可得，從此先滅餘識所間，現無有體眼識與彼貪等俱生，不應道理，以彼過去現無體故。如從過去現無體業，異熟果生，不應道理。又此眼識貪等俱生所有熏習亦不成就：然此熏習不住貪中，由彼貪欲是能依故，不堅住故。亦不得住所餘識中，以彼諸識所依別故，又無決定俱生滅故。亦復不得住自體中，由彼自體決定無有俱生滅故。是故眼識貪等煩惱及隨煩惱之所熏習，不應道理；又復此識非識所熏。如說眼識，所餘轉識亦復如是，如應當知。
復次，從無想等上諸地沒來生此間，爾時煩惱及隨煩惱所染初識，此識生時應無種子，由所依止及彼熏習並已過去，現無體故。
復次，對治煩惱識若已生，一切世間餘識已滅，爾時若離阿賴耶識，所餘煩惱及隨煩惱種子在此對治識中，不應道理。此對治識自性解脫故，與餘煩惱及隨煩惱不俱生滅故。復於後時世間識生，爾時若離阿賴耶識，彼諸熏習及所依止久已過去，現無體故，應無種子而更得生。是故若離阿賴耶識，煩惱雜染皆不得成。
云何為業雜染不成？行為緣識不相應故。此若無者，取為緣有亦不相應。
云何為生雜染不成？結相續時不相應故。若有於此非等引地沒已生時，依中有位意起染污意識結生相續，此染污意識於中有中滅，於母胎中識羯羅藍更相和合。若即意識與彼和合，既和合已依止此識於母胎中有意識轉。若爾，即應有二意識於母胎中同時而轉。又即與彼和合之識是意識性，不應道理，依染污故，時無斷故，意識所緣不可得故。設和合識即是意識，為此和合意識即是一切種子識？為依止此識所生餘意識是一切種子識？若此和合識是一切種子識，即是阿賴耶識，汝以異名立為意識。若能依止識是一切種子識，是則所依因識非一切種子識，能依果識是一切種子識，不應道理。是故成就此和合識非是意識，但是異熟識，是一切種子識。
復次，結生相續已，若離異熟識，執受色根亦不可得。其餘諸識各別依故，不堅住故，是諸色根不應離識。
若離異熟識，識與名色更互相依，譬如蘆束相依而轉，此亦不成。
若離異熟識，已生有情，識食不成。何以故？以六識中隨取一識，於三界中已生有情能作食事不可得故。
若從此沒，於等引地正受生時，由非等引染污意識結生相續，此非等引染污之心，彼地所攝，離異熟識，餘種子體定不可得。
復次，生無色界，若離一切種子異熟識，染污善心應無種子，染污善心應無依持。
又即於彼若出世心正現在前，餘世間心皆滅盡故，爾時便應滅離彼趣。若生非想非非想處，無所有處出世間心現在前時，即應二趣悉皆滅離。此出世識不以非想非非想處為所依趣，亦不應以無所有處為所依趣，亦非涅槃為所依趣。
又將沒時，造善造惡，或下或上所依漸冷，若不信有阿賴耶識，皆不得成。是故若離一切種子異熟識者，此生雜染亦不得成。
云何世間清淨不成？謂未離欲纏貪未得色纏心者，即以欲纏善心為離欲纏貪故勤修加行。此欲纏加行心，與色纏心不俱生滅故，非彼所熏，為彼種子不應道理。又色纏心過去多生餘心間隔，不應為今定心種子，唯無有故。是故成就色纏定心一切種子異熟果識，展轉傳來為今因緣；加行善心為增上緣。如是一切離欲地中，如應當知。如是世間清淨，若離一切種子異熟識，理不得成。
云何出世清淨不成？謂世尊說依他言音及內各別如理作意，由此為因正見得生。此他言音，如理作意，為熏耳識？為熏意識？為兩俱熏？若於彼法如理思惟，爾時耳識且不得起；意識亦為種種散動餘識所間。若與如理作意相應生時，此聞所熏意識與彼熏習久滅過去，定無有體，云何復為種子能生後時如理作意相應之心？又此如理作意相應是世間心，彼正見相應是出世心，曾未有時俱生俱滅，是故此心非彼所熏。既不被熏，為彼種子，不應道理。是故出世清淨，若離一切種子異熟果識，亦不得成。此中聞熏習攝受彼種子不相應故。
復次，云何一切種子異熟果識為雜染因，復為出世能對治彼淨心種子？又出世心昔未曾習，故彼熏習決定應無，既無熏習從何種生？是故應答：從最清淨法界等流正聞熏習種子所生。
此聞熏習，為是阿賴耶識自性？為非阿賴耶識自性？若是阿賴耶識自性，云何是彼對治種子？若非阿賴耶識自性，此聞熏習種子所依云何可見？乃至證得諸佛菩提，此聞熏習隨在一種所依轉處，寄在異熟識中，與彼和合俱轉，猶如水乳；然非阿賴耶識，是彼對治種子性故。
此中依下品熏習成中品熏習，依中品熏習成上品熏習，依聞思修多分修作得相應故。
又此正聞熏習種子下中上品，應知亦是法身種子，與阿賴耶識相違，非阿賴耶識所攝，是出世間最淨法界等流性故，雖是世間而是出世心種子性。又出世心雖未生時，已能對治諸煩惱纏，已能對治諸嶮惡趣，已作一切所有惡業朽壞對治，又能隨順逢事一切諸佛菩薩。雖是世間，應知初修業菩薩所得亦法身攝。聲聞獨覺所得，唯解脫身攝。
又此熏習非阿賴耶識，是法身解脫身攝。如如熏習，下中上品次第漸增，如是如是異熟果識次第漸減，即轉所依。既一切種所依轉已，即異熟果識及一切種子無種子而轉，一切種永斷。
復次，云何猶如水乳？非阿賴耶識與阿賴耶識同處俱轉，而阿賴耶識一切種盡，非阿賴耶識一切種增？譬如於水鵝所飲乳。又如世間得離欲時，非等引地熏習漸減，其等引地熏習漸增而得轉依。
又入滅定識不離身，聖所說故。此中異熟識應成不離身，非為治此滅定生故。
又非出定此識復生，由異熟識既間斷已，離結相續無重生故。
又若有執以意識故滅定有心，此心不成：定不應成故，所緣行相不可得故，應有善根相應過故，不善無記不應理故，應有想受現行過故，觸可得故，於三摩地有功能故，應有唯滅想過失故，應有其思信等善根現行過故，拔彼能依令離所依不應理故，有譬喻故，如非遍行此不有故。
又此定中由意識故執有心者，此心是善不善無記皆不得成，故不應理。
若復有執色心無間生是諸法種子，此不得成，如前已說。又從無色、無想天沒，滅定等出，不應道理。又阿羅漢後心不成。唯可容有等無間緣。
如是若離一切種子異熟果識，雜染清淨皆不得成，是故成就如前所說相阿賴耶識，決定是有。
此中三頌：
「菩薩於淨心，遠離於五識，
無餘，心轉依云何汝當作？
若對治轉依，非斷故不成，
果因無差別，於永斷成過。
無種或無體，若許為轉依，
無彼二無故，轉依不應理。」
復次，此阿賴耶識差別云何？略說應知或三種，或四種。
此中三種者，謂三種熏習差別故：一、名言熏習差別，二、我見熏習差別，三、有支熏習差別。
四種者，一、引發差別、二、異熟差別，三、緣相差別，四、相貌差別。
此中引發差別者，謂新起熏習。此若無者，行為緣識，取為緣有，應不得成。
此中異熟差別者，謂行有為緣，於諸趣中異熟差別。此若無者，則無種子，後有諸法生應不成。
此中緣相差別者，謂即意中我執緣相。此若無者，染污意中我執所緣，應不得成。
此中相貌差別者：謂即此識有共相，有不共相，無受生種子相，有受生種子相等。
共相者，謂器世間種子。不共相者，謂各別內處種子。共相即是無受生種子，不共相即是有受生種子。對治生時，唯不共相所對治滅。共相為他分別所持，但見清淨，如瑜伽師於一物中種種勝解，種種所見皆得成立。
此中二頌：
「難斷難遍知，應知名共結，
瑜伽者心異，由外相大故，
淨者雖不滅，而於中見淨；
又清淨佛土，由佛見清淨。」
復有別頌：對前所引種種勝解，種種所見皆得成立。
「諸瑜伽師於一物，種種勝解各不同，
種種所見皆得成，故知所取唯有識。」
此若無者，諸器世間，有情世間生起差別，應不得成。
復有麁重相及輕安相：麁重相者，謂煩惱隨煩惱種子。輕安相者，謂有漏善法種子。此若無者，所感異熟無所堪能，有所堪能所依差別，應不得成。
復有有受盡相無受盡相：有受盡相者，謂已成熟異熟果善不善種子。無受盡相者，謂名言熏習種子，無始時來種種戲論流轉種子故。此若無者，已作已作善惡二業，與果受盡，應不得成。又新名言熏習生起，應不得成。
復有譬喻相：謂此阿賴耶識，幻炎夢翳為譬喻故。此若無者，由不實遍計種子故，顛倒緣相應不得成。
復有具足相不具足相：謂諸具縛者，名具足相。世間離欲者，名損減相。有學聲聞及諸菩薩，名一分永拔相。阿羅漢、獨覺及諸如來，名煩惱障全永拔相，及煩惱所知障全永拔相，如其所應此若無者，如是次第雜染還滅應不得成。
何因緣故善不善法能感異熟，其異熟果無覆無記？由異熟果無覆無記，與善不善互不相違，善與不善互相違故。若異熟果善不善性，雜染還滅應不得成，是故異熟識唯無覆無記。
卷中
The canonical text stands in Chinese only. This edition renders the essence, the plain reading, the exposition and the apparatus into English — never the sūtra itself. Switch to 漢讀本 or 並行雙語 above to read it.
十項殊勝裡的頭一項，是『所知依』——一切該知道的東西，所依靠的根本。無著說：這個根本，就是阿賴耶識（心最底層、含藏一切『種子』的根本識）。以下順著他的話講下來。
一、世尊在哪裡說過這個識叫「阿賴耶識」
無著先問：世尊究竟在哪裡，把這個識立名為「阿賴耶識」？他答：在《阿毘達磨大乘經》的一首偈裡，佛這樣說過——
有一個『界』（這裡指含藏種子的根本依處），祂無始以來就在，是一切法平等所依託的根本；正因為有祂，眾生才有種種生死的去處（諸趣），也才有涅槃可以證得。
接著那部經又補了一首偈，意思是：因為祂收藏、含攝著一切法，是「一切種子識」（藏著一切種子的識），所以名叫阿賴耶；這個道理，佛是特地向已經深入的勝者（堪受深法的人）開示的。
無著說：以上這兩段，就是先引『阿笈摩』（聖教、佛親口傳下的經文）來作證明。
二、為什麼這個識叫「阿賴耶識」
引了聖教，無著再追問：憑什麼這個識要叫「阿賴耶識」（『阿賴耶』有收藏、攝藏的意思）？他給出幾層理由——
第一，一切會生起、屬於雜染這一類的法（種種有漏的、染污的現象），都被這個識收藏起來，作為它們的『果』（它們薰成的結果都存在此識中），所以叫阿賴耶識。
第二，反過來，也正是這個識，對那些雜染法又作為『因』（祂含藏的種子能生起那些法），所以叫阿賴耶識。
還有一層：眾生會把這個識執取、收藏為自己的『我』（誤認祂是那個恆常的自我），所以也叫阿賴耶識。
三、這個識又叫「阿陀那識」
無著接著說：這個識還有另一個名字，叫阿陀那識（『阿陀那』有執持、執取的意思）。這一名也有聖教為證。《解深密經》裡，佛說過一首偈，意思是——
阿陀那識極其深、極其細，祂含藏的一切種子像奔流的瀑布一樣相續不斷；我（佛）對凡愚之人不去開講祂，是怕他們起分別、誤把祂執為『我』。
那麼，為什麼這個識又叫阿陀那識？無著說：因為祂執持著一切有色的根（攝持、撐住眼耳鼻舌身這些有形的官能），又是『執取自體』的所依（一期生命整個身心自體，靠祂執取維繫）。
怎麼說呢？這些有色的諸根，正因為被這個識執持著，才能一輩子不毀壞、隨著生命相續運轉。又：在生命相續、正當『結生』（投胎受生、接續下一期生命）的那一刻，是祂去執取那受生之身，因而執持起新一期的自體。就憑這兩點，這個識也叫阿陀那識。
四、這個識又名『心』——並由此帶出『意』
無著說：這個識又名『心』。正如世尊講過『心、意、識』三個字。
這裡先說『意』，『意』有兩種——
第一種意，是作「等無間緣」的所依（前念剛滅、緊接著無間隔地引生後念，那個被依靠的位子）：前一剎那剛滅去的識，能作為後面意識生起的依憑。
第二種意，就是『染污意』（一個恆時暗中執我的染污心識）。它總是和四種煩惱長相左右、時時相應：一是薩迦耶見（把身心執為實有的『我』見），二是我慢（恃我而起的高舉），三是我愛（對我的貪愛），四是無明（對真相的昏昧）。這第二種意，正是『識』之所以雜染的所依。
無著小結：識（指阿賴耶識）由那第一種意而引生（依等無間而起），又因第二種意（染污意）而成雜染。再就字義說：『識』是「了別境界」之義（認識、分別所對的境），『意』一是『等無間』之義（前滅後生、無間引導），二是『思量』之義（恆常度量、執我）。『意』由這兩義，所以成兩種。
五、怎麼知道真有一個『染污意』——六條反證
接著無著問：怎麼能斷定，確實有這麼一個『染污意』存在？他用一連串『假如沒有它，就講不通』的反證來成立它——
一、假如沒有染污意，那麼「不共無明」（不與貪等同起、單獨潛伏的那種無明）就無處安立，這就成了過失。
二、又『五識同法』也不能成立，這也是過失。為什麼？因為眼等五識身（眼識乃至身識）一定要有『俱有依』（與它同時並存、作它依靠的根）；染污意正是意識的俱有依，沒有它，『五識各有俱有依、意識卻沒有』就不對等了。
三、又對『意』這個名稱所作的字義訓釋（把『意』釋為『思量』）也無從安立，這也是過失——沒有恆常思量執我的染污意，『意＝思量』就落空了。
四、又『無想定』和『滅盡定』這兩種定就分不出差別，這也是過失。要知道：無想定裡仍有染污意在運作（所以還沒真正寂止我執），滅盡定裡則沒有；假如不立染污意，這兩種定就該毫無分別了——可它們明明有別。
五、又生到『無想天』的眾生，在那一整期生命裡，就會變成『沒有染污』——這也是過失：因為那一期裡若連我執、我慢都沒有了，那等於凡夫在無想天裡成了無我，這講不通。
六、又『我執』是一切時都在現行、隨處可見的：不論在善心、不善心、還是無記心（非善非惡的心）裡，都有我執暗暗運作。假如不立一個恆時俱有的染污意，那我執就只能跟著『相應』的心起——而貪等煩惱只與不善心相應，於是『我、我所』這類煩惱就只該在不善心裡現行，善心、無記心裡不該有了。可事實是善、無記心中也有我執。所以——只要把染污意安立成一個「俱有現行」（與各種心同時並存、恆時暗中現行）的東西，而不是「相應現行」（不是只跟特定心相應才起），上面這些過失就都沒有了。
無著用一首偈把這六條收攏，偈意是：若不立染污意，那「不共無明」、『五識同法』、『字義訓釋』、『二定有別』這幾項，沒有一項立得起來，全成過失；無想天一期生中就該變成沒有我執運轉，這又是過失；而我執其實是恆時隨逐、貫穿一切種類的心的，少了它便交代不了。離開了染污意，這些都無處安頓，前說的『二、三』諸項都互相違背；沒有它，便不該處處都有我執了。又：當『真實義』之心（契入真相的心）將要生起時，總有個東西恆常作障礙——與它同行、貫穿一切位的，正是那「不共無明」（也就是染污意所攝的無明）。
無著再補一句它的性質：這個『意』因為是染污的，所以屬於「有覆無記」（會障覆聖道、本身卻非善非惡）；它與那四種煩惱恆常相應。就好比色界、無色界裡『纏』這一類的煩惱，也是有覆無記所攝，因為色、無色界的纏煩惱被『奢摩他』（止、定）所攝伏含藏著；同樣，這個染污意也是一切時都極其微細地暗暗隨逐著。
六、『心』為什麼成立、又為什麼叫『心』
無著回到『心』。他說：『心』這個體，論到第三（心、意、識三者中的心），假如離開了阿賴耶識，就別無可得——找不到另一個東西當『心體』。所以就以阿賴耶識作為『心』之體。憑著祂作種子，『意』和『識』才得以轉起運作。
那為什麼這個識又叫『心』？因為種種法所薰下的種子，都積集、聚藏在祂裡頭（『心』有積集義），所以叫心。
七、聲聞乘為什麼不說這個『阿賴耶識／阿陀那識』之名
無著問：那為什麼在聲聞乘的教法裡，不把這個心叫作阿賴耶識、不叫阿陀那識？
他答：因為這是極深細的境界所攝。怎麼說？聲聞人並不是『在一切境、一切智上都要轉起、都要通達』的——他們的目標有限。所以對他們，就算不講這個識，他們的智慧仍能成就、解脫仍能成就，因此佛不對他們講。至於菩薩，必定要在一切境、一切智上轉起、無不通達；所以非對菩薩講不可。因為若離開了對這個識的智慧，要證得「一切智智」（佛那無所不知的智）就不容易了。
八、其實聲聞乘也用『別的說法、含藏密意』說過它
無著進一步說：其實聲聞乘裡，也曾用「異門密意」（換個名目、暗藏深意）說過阿賴耶識，只是沒明白點名。
例如那部《增壹阿笈摩》裡說：世間眾生，愛阿賴耶、樂阿賴耶、欣阿賴耶、憙阿賴耶（對阿賴耶又貪愛、又喜樂、又欣慕、又歡喜）；為了斷除這樣的阿賴耶，所以當佛宣說正法時，眾生才會恭敬側耳、安住於求解脫的心、依著法一步步去行。如來出世，正是這樣甚奇希有的正法在世間出現了。——這段在聲聞乘的《如來出現四德經》裡，就是借這種「異門密意」，已經把阿賴耶識暗暗點出來了。
又在大眾部所傳的阿笈摩裡，也用異門密意，把祂叫作『根本識』，比喻成樹要依著樹根（一切識像枝葉，都依這根本識而立）。在化地部裡，也用異門密意，把祂叫作「窮生死蘊」（窮盡整個生死、始終不斷的那一蘊）——因為有時可見『色』與『心』中斷（如入無心定時），可是阿賴耶識中那些種子並不中斷。
無著總結：這個『所知依』，所以說祂以阿賴耶識為體性、以阿陀那識為體性、以心為體性、以阿賴耶為體性、以根本識為體性、以窮生死蘊為體性……如此種種；正因為有這許多『別的名目』都通向同一個祂，阿賴耶識便成了一條人人可循、四通八達的『大王路』（總綱大道）。
九、駁斥幾種把『阿賴耶』認錯的說法
無著接著辨正幾種錯解。
其一，有一類人主張：『心、意、識』三個字只是名稱不同，意義其實是同一個。這說法不成立——『意』和『識』這兩者的意義明明可以分得出差別，那麼可知『心』的意義也應當與它們有別，不能一概混同。
其二，有一類人主張：佛說「眾生愛阿賴耶」乃至種種廣說裡的那個『阿賴耶』，指的是『五取蘊』（執取所成的五蘊身心）。又有人說，是與貪同起的『樂受』叫阿賴耶。又有人說，是「薩迦耶見」（身見）叫阿賴耶。
無著評斷：這幾家論師，由於對『藏識』（阿賴耶識）這一教、這一證都還愚昧不明，才作此種執取。他們這樣去安立『阿賴耶』之名，連照著聲聞乘自家的安立道理來看，也都不相應。倘若是不愚於藏識的人，拿這個藏識去安立佛所說的『阿賴耶』之名，那才是最為殊勝、最妥當的。
為什麼說『拿藏識來解才最殊勝』？無著逐條破前三說——
倘若『五取蘊』就是阿賴耶：可是生在惡趣、那一向受苦的去處（如地獄），五取蘊最叫人厭惡、想避之唯恐不及，眾生對它一向生不起愛樂；說眾生在那裡頭還『執藏為我而愛著』，講不通——因為他正一心只求快快捨離。
倘若『與貪同起的樂受』就是阿賴耶：可是第四靜慮以上就沒有這種樂受了，而生在那些天的有情，對這種樂受常懷厭離；說他們在那裡頭還執藏愛著它，也講不通。
倘若「薩迦耶見」就是阿賴耶：可是在這正法中，已經信解『無我』的人，對身見恆常厭離；說他們還執藏愛著身見，同樣講不通。
反過來看藏識就都通了：阿賴耶識是被當作『內在的我』而攝受的——
縱然生在惡趣那一向受苦處、一心求離苦蘊，可是對藏識的『我愛』始終如影隨形綁著他，他從沒想過要離開藏識；
縱然生到第四靜慮以上、對與貪同起的樂受恆常厭離，可是對藏識的我愛照樣綁著他；
縱然在這正法中信解了無我、厭離了我見，可是對藏識的我愛照樣綁著他。
所以——把阿賴耶識安立為佛所說的『阿賴耶』，這才最為殊勝、最站得住。
十、立此識的『三相』：自相、因相、果相
無著說：以上把阿賴耶識的種種『別名』說完了；那麼，要怎麼安立祂的『相』（呈現的樣態）呢？簡略說有三種：一是自相，二是因相，三是果相。
自相：阿賴耶識依著一切雜染品類的法所留下的『薰習』（薰染下的習氣），作為生起那些法的因；祂能攝持相應的種子，這就是祂的自相（祂自身就是個能持種、能生起雜染的藏體）。
因相：就是這個含藏一切種子的阿賴耶識，在一切時，對那些雜染品類的諸法現前生起時，作為它們的『因』。
果相：就是依著那些雜染品類的法、無始以來所留下的薰習，阿賴耶識才相續不斷地生起——祂自己又是被那些薰習所薰成的『果』。
十一、什麼叫『薰習』
無著問：那麼，什麼叫『薰習』（一個法在另一個法上薰染、留下能再生它的勢力）？『薰習』是『能詮』（用來表述的名）；它所表述（所詮）的是什麼？是說：依著某個法，「俱生俱滅」（與那個法同時生起、同時謝滅），在這同生同滅當中，留下了一份『能生起它的因性』——這份留下的因性，就是『薰習』所指的東西。
他舉例：好比胡麻（苣蕂）裡薰進花香——胡麻和花同時生、同時滅（一同壓榨在一起），這些胡麻就帶著『能再生那花香的因』而生（榨出的麻油自帶花香）。又如所說的『貪行人』（貪重的人）：他的貪等薰習，是依著他那貪等心同生同滅而留下的，於是他的心便帶著『能再起貪』的因而生（貪愈薰愈重）。又如『多聞』的人：他的多聞薰習，是依著『聞、作意』同生同滅而留下的，於是他的心便帶著『能憶持所聞』的因而生；正因為這份薰習能攝持所聞，所以稱他為『持法者』（守持教法的人）。——阿賴耶識被薰習的道理，要知道也是這樣。
十二、種子是『別異住』還是『無別異』
無著問：阿賴耶識裡那些雜染品類法的種子，是各自分立、別有一個個實物地存放在裡頭呢（別異住）？還是與識毫無分別呢（無別異）？
他答：那些種子並不是『另有一件件實在的東西』存放在識中（不是別異住）；可也不是與識完全沒有分別（不是全無別異）。實情是：阿賴耶識就這樣生起時，自帶著『能生起那些法』的種種功能差別——正因為有這些功能差別，才叫祂「一切種子識」。（種子不是另存的小實物，而是此識上能生諸法的功能差別。）
十三、阿賴耶識與雜染法「同時互為因」
無著問：阿賴耶識和那些雜染諸法，是『同時、彼此互相作因』的，這要怎麼理解？
他打兩個比方——好比一盞明燈：火焰和燈炷，一個生出火光、一個被燒，是同一時刻彼此互成（焰依炷、炷被焰燒，同時相成）。又好比一束蘆葦：根根互相依倚撐持，同一時刻誰也不倒。要這樣去看此處『互為因』的道理：阿賴耶識作那些雜染法的因，那些雜染法也回過來作阿賴耶識的因（識生諸法、諸法薰識，同時互成）。也只有這樣去安立『因緣』（親生之因）才講得通，因為除此之外，再找不到別的因緣了。
十四、無別無雜的薰習，怎能生出有別有雜的諸法
無著問：薰習本身是『無差別、不夾雜』的（薰下時還渾然一片），它怎麼能作那些『有差別、有夾雜』的諸法之因？
他比方：好比一件要紮染的布——拿線把布結紮起來、待染的時候，布上其實還看不出有什麼花色差別、還是一片素白；可是一放進染缸，染過之後，布上便顯出種種有別、有雜、絞絡交錯的花樣紋像來。阿賴耶識也是這樣：被那『有別有雜的能薰之法』所薰，正薰的當下還看不出差別；可等到『果生起、染缸現前』之後，便有種種有別有雜、無量品類的諸法一一顯現出來了。
十五、兩種緣起——並破除對緣起的種種愚執
無著說：這樣的『緣起』（萬法依緣而起），在大乘裡講得極細、極深。略說有兩種緣起——
一是「分別自性緣起」：一切法都依著阿賴耶識而生起，這叫分別自性緣起，因為祂能分別、變現出種種法各自的『自性』（各色各樣的體性）作為生緣。
二是「分別愛非愛緣起」：就是那十二支緣起（無明、行……老死），這叫分別愛非愛緣起，因為它在善趣、惡趣裡，能分別變現出種種『可愛的／不可愛的』自體（招感樂報或苦報的果身）作為緣。
無著接著說：對阿賴耶識中的緣起若不明白，就會生出種種錯執——
若愚於『第一種緣起』（分別自性緣起），就會誤計：或說萬法以『自性』為因，或以「宿世所作」為因，或以『自在天的變化』為因，或以『實有的我』為因，或乾脆說「無因無緣」。若愚於『第二種緣起』（分別愛非愛緣起），就會誤計：有個『我』是造作者、有個『我』是受報者。
他用一則比喻——好比一群生來就瞎的人，從沒見過象；有人牽來一頭象，讓他們各摸一處：有的摸到象鼻，有的摸到象牙，有的摸到象耳，有的摸到象腿，有的摸到象尾，有的摸到象的脊背。旁人問：『象長什麼樣？』摸到不同部位的，就各執一詞——有的說象像犁柄，有的說像杵，有的說像簸箕，有的說像臼，有的說像掃帚，有的乾脆說象像一座石山。對這兩種緣起若不通達，被無明蒙住的『生盲』也正是如此：或執自性為因、或執宿作為因、或執自在為因、或執實我為因、或執無因無緣；或執『我是作者、我是受者』。而阿賴耶識的自性、因性、果性等等，就如同那頭象真正的整體模樣——盲人各摸一處而不能識其全。
十六、阿賴耶識即異熟識、一切種子識
無著略說：阿賴耶識，是以『異熟識』（由善惡業所感、異時異類而成熟的果報識）和「一切種子識」為祂的自體；祂能總攝三界一切的『自體』（一切受生之身）、一切去處（諸趣）等等。
接著他用一組偈把『種子』的種種義收攏，偈意是——
種子有『外種、內種』之分（外如稻麥的穀種，內如阿賴耶識中的種子）；種子『不明了』（隱微難覺，非粗顯可見）；就「世俗、勝義」兩面說，內外種各有其安立。要知道種子有六種義：
一、剎那滅——才生即滅，不停一念（停住的東西不能作種子）。 二、俱有——與所生的果同時並存（而非前後隔絕）。 三、恒隨轉——一類相續、恆常隨之而轉（不中途轉成別類、也不間斷）。 四、決定——善因定生善果、惡因定生惡果，所生有定、不亂套。 五、待眾緣——還須等待眾多助緣會合，才生起現行（不是隨時自起）。 六、唯能引自果——只能引生它自己那一類的果（麥種只生麥，不生豆）。
無著又說『能薰』與『所薰』的相：能作『所薰』的（被薰染、能受持薰習的），須是『堅住、無記、可薰、且與能薰相應』——性質安穩相續（堅）、不偏善惡（無記）、性可受薰（可薰）、又與那能薰者同時相應；而且這『所薰』不能與『能薰』是同一個東西（所熏非異此而又不即此）。這幾條，就是『薰習』之所以能成立的條件。
他又指出反面：『六識』彼此並不能互作所薰——因為六識前念後念無法相應、又有三性（善、惡、無記）的差別互相違背、前後兩念不同時並存（二念不俱有）……拿這些去比照、要它們當受薰之體，都會落空、成過失。所以受薰之體只能是阿賴耶識。
無著再回到內、外種子，說它們都有「能生、能引」兩種作用：種子既能『生』起現行（正生果時），又能『引』其相續（如草木枯了還能依『引』之力撐一陣、任運慢慢謝滅，不是當下就斷）。
為了顯明『內種』不同於『外種』，無著再用一首偈申明，偈意是：外種有時可以不待薰習（如有些果實不靠前面薰成也能生），內種卻不然——內種必由薰習而成。試想：聞法等等的薰習若沒有，卻說後面能生起聞慧之果，這道理講不通；而且會落入『該得的不得、不該得的反得』（作不作、失得錯亂）的過失，自相矛盾。至於外種，其實也得靠內種作緣——外種是依著阿賴耶識中那份薰習（業力、共相種子）才生長的。
十七、藏識與轉識『互為緣』
無著說：除了阿賴耶識之外，其餘的『轉識』（眼耳鼻舌身意等現起的識），普遍於一切自體、一切去處中，要知道它們叫作「能受用者」（領納、受用境界的那一邊）。正如《中邊分別論》（《辯中邊論》）的一首偈所說，偈意是：第一個叫『緣識』（即阿賴耶識，作一切的所緣依緣），第二個叫『受者』（即轉識，受用境界）；在這當中，能受用、能分別、能推度的，都是這一邊的心法。
而這兩類識（阿賴耶識與轉識）又是彼此互作緣的。正如《阿毘達磨大乘經》的一首偈所說，偈意是：諸法薰藏於識（轉識薰諸法於藏識），識對諸法也是如此（藏識又生起諸法）；它們彼此互作『果性』，也恆常互作『因性』（互為因、互為果）。
無著接著釐清『緣』的種類——
在『第一種緣起』（分別自性緣起）裡，這兩類識互作的是『因緣』（親生之因）。那在『第二種緣起』（分別愛非愛緣起、即十二支）裡，又是哪種緣？是『增上緣』（助成之緣）。
那麼『六識』是由哪幾種緣所生？由「增上緣、所緣緣、等無間緣」三種所生（六識不另立因緣，因緣歸於藏識）。
把上面合起來看：這樣三類緣起——『窮生死』（自性緣起、藏識相續不斷）、「愛非愛趣」（十二支緣起、招感善惡趣）、『能受用』（轉識受用境界）——合起來，正好具足『四緣』（因緣、等無間緣、所緣緣、增上緣）。
十八、為什麼『三相、異門』只能屬阿賴耶識，不屬轉識——以「雜染清淨皆不得成」反證
無著說：上面把阿賴耶識的別名與三相都安立了。可是怎麼知道，這些別名、這些相，一定只屬於阿賴耶識，而不屬於那些轉識呢？
他的總證據是：假如離開了這樣安立的阿賴耶識，那麼『雜染』和『清淨』兩邊都講不通——煩惱雜染、業雜染、生雜染都不能成立；世間清淨、出世清淨也都不能成立。下面逐項拆給你看。
（一）煩惱雜染講不通
無著問：為什麼「煩惱雜染」會講不通（若無藏識）？因為種種煩惱、隨煩惱薰習所成的種子，要安放在『六識身』上，是不合理的。
怎麼說？假定立『眼識上的貪等煩惱與它同生同滅，由此薰成種子、別無他處』——可是這眼識一旦謝滅，中間又被別的識（如耳識、意識）插隔開來，那麼這份薰習、以及薰習所依的處所，就都找不到了。從這『先已滅去、又被別識間隔、如今已無體』的眼識，要說它還能與後來的貪同生（好讓貪有所依），不合道理——因為它早已過去、現在根本沒有體了。這就像『從一個過去的、現已無體的業，要直接生出異熟果來』一樣講不通。
再說，這眼識與貪等同生時所留的薰習，也安放不住：它不能住在『貪』裡頭——因為貪是『能依』（要靠別的撐著的）、又不堅住（一閃即逝）。也不能住在其餘各識中——因為那些識所依的根各別不同，又彼此沒有『決定同生同滅』的關係。也不能住在眼識自己裡頭——因為眼識自體並沒有『決定同生同滅』的相續性可言。所以說『眼識被貪等煩惱、隨煩惱所薰』，根本不合道理；而且這識本身也不堪受別的識來薰。眼識如此，其餘的轉識也都一樣，可以照此類推。
無著再舉一例：當一個人從無想天等高地命終、下生到此間時，那一刻被煩惱、隨煩惱所染的『最初一念識』生起——可此時若無藏識，這一念識竟會找不到種子：因為最初識原來的所依、以及那份薰習，都已過去、現在沒有體了（中間隔了無心位）。
又舉一例：當『對治煩惱的清淨識』（如聖道現前的無漏心）已經生起時，世間其餘的識都已滅去；這時假如離開阿賴耶識，那剩下的煩惱、隨煩惱種子要藏在『對治識』裡頭，這不合理——因為對治識自性是解脫清淨的，跟煩惱、隨煩惱並不同生同滅（清淨心怎麼藏得了染種）。而等到後來世間心又生起時，假如離開阿賴耶識，那些薰習與所依早已過去、現在無體了，豈不成了『沒有種子卻又重新生起』？——這也不通。所以說：若離開阿賴耶識，煩惱雜染統統不能成立。
（二）業雜染講不通
無著問：為什麼『業雜染』會講不通（若無藏識）？因為十二支裡『行緣識』（由行業引生識）這一環就接不上了（行所薰的業種無處可存、無從引識）。這一環若沒有，那『取緣有』（由取引生後有）也跟著接不上。
（三）生雜染講不通
無著問：為什麼『生雜染』會講不通（若無藏識）？因為「結生相續」（投胎、接續下一期生命）那一刻就交代不了。
他細推：若有眾生從「非等引地」（散心地）命終、要去受生時，是在『中有』位（死後生前的中陰身）起一個染污的意識去「結生相續」。可這個染污意識，到了中有之末就滅掉了；要在母胎裡與『羯羅藍』（受精初凝的胚體）和合的，另是別的東西。
於是兩難來了：假設『與胚體和合的』就是那意識——既已和合，便要依著這識在母胎中又轉起一個意識；那豈不是母胎中同時有『兩個意識』一起轉？這講不通。再說，硬要說『那和合之識就是意識性』，也不合道理：因為它依著染污而轉、又一刻不斷（時無斷）、而意識所該攀緣的境又找不到（胎中昏昧無境可緣）——這都不像意識。
退一步，就算承認『和合之識即是意識』，還得追問：是『這和合意識本身』就是一切種子識呢？還是『依著這識所生的別的意識』才是一切種子識？若說『這和合識是一切種子識』——那祂其實就是阿賴耶識，你不過給祂換個名字硬叫『意識』罷了。若說『那能依的識才是一切種子識』——那就成了『所依的因識反而不是一切種子識，能依的果識倒是一切種子識』，本末倒置，講不通。所以結論是：這「和合之識」並不是意識，祂正是異熟識，就是一切種子識（阿賴耶識）。
無著再舉幾條，都指向同一結論——
結生相續之後，假如離開異熟識，那『執持色根』（撐住眼等諸根）也辦不到：因為其餘諸識各依別根、又不堅住，諸色根不能離開一個恆常執持色根的識。
假如離開異熟識，那『識與名色互相依倚』（像蘆束相依而轉）也立不起來。
假如離開異熟識，已受生的有情，那『識食』（以識為食、維繫生命的一種食）也不能成立。為什麼？因為六識裡隨便取哪一個，要它在三界中對『已受生的有情』起到『作食、維繫』的作用，都辦不到（六識有間斷，撐不住一期命）。
又：若從這裡命終、要去『等引地』（定地）受生時，是由一個『非等引（散心）的染污意識』去結生相續；可這個非等引的染污心，是屬於下界所攝的，離開異熟識，別的種子體決然找不到（散心種子存於何處？）。
再者，生到『無色界』時，假如離開「一切種子異熟識」，那無色界裡的染污心、善心就會沒有種子、也沒有依靠（無色界連色身都沒有，種子更非藏識莫屬）。
又：在那裡若「出世間心」正現前時，其餘的世間心都滅盡了；那時豈不該連那一趣（那一受生處）都一併滅離了？比方生在「非想非非想處」，當「無所有處」的出世間心現前時，豈不該把這兩趣都滅離掉？——可是這出世間心，並不以「非想非非想處」為它的所依趣，也不以「無所有處」為所依趣，更不以『涅槃』為所依趣（出世心自有其無漏所依，不在三有任何一趣）。可見非有藏識持身不可。
又：人將命終時，或造善、或造惡，依其善惡，所依的身或從下身漸冷、或從上身漸冷（暖識漸捨的次第有別）；若不承認有阿賴耶識（執持暖、識、命），這『捨身次第』也都交代不了。
無著總結這一段：所以，若離開「一切種子異熟識」，這『生雜染』也不能成立。
（四）世間清淨講不通
無著問：為什麼「世間清淨」（如由欲界修上、得色界定）會講不通（若無藏識）？
他推：一個『還沒離欲界貪、還沒得色界心』的人，是拿『欲界的善心』當下手處，為了離欲界貪而勤修加行。可這『欲界的加行心』，與將要證得的『色界心』並不同生同滅，所以它薰不成色界心、也作不了色界心的種子，這講不通（兩心不同時，薰不上）。而那要得的『色界心』，又早在過去、隔了好多生別的心，也不能拿來當『現在這定心』的種子，因為它如今根本不存在。所以正確的安立是：是那『色界定心的一切種子』存在異熟識裡，輾轉傳到今生，作今生定心的『因緣』（親因）；而「加行善心」只作『增上緣』（助緣）。凡是一切『離欲』的地方，都要這樣去理解。所以說：世間清淨，若離開「一切種子異熟識」，道理上立不起來。
（五）出世清淨講不通
無著問：為什麼「出世清淨」會講不通（若無藏識）？
世尊說過：依『聽聞他人（佛）的言音』與『自己內心如理作意』（如理思惟），以這兩者為因，正見才得以生起。無著就追問：這『佛的言音』「如理作意」，到底薰的是『耳識』？是『意識』？還是兩者都薰？
他逐一堵死：當人正「如理思惟」那法時，耳識其實並未在起（聽是一回事、思是另一回事，二者不並起）；而意識又老被種種散動的別識插隔打斷。就算偶爾「與如理作意相應」而生起一念，可這『聞所薰的意識』與那份薰習，轉眼又滅、成了過去、決然無體了——它怎麼還能當種子，去生起後來「與如理作意相應」的心？再說，這「與如理作意相應」的心是世間心，而那「正見相應」的心是出世間心，兩者從來不曾同生同滅；所以這（世間）心薰不到那（出世）心。既然薰不到、卻要它當出世心的種子，講不通。所以說：出世清淨，若離開「一切種子異熟果識」，也不能成立——因為『聞薰習所攝受的那份種子』根本無處安立（不依藏識則無所託）。
十九、聞薰習：出世心的種子從何而來
無著進一步問：那這個「一切種子異熟果識」（藏識），既然是雜染的因，怎麼又能同時是『能對治雜染、生出世清淨』的淨心種子？而且，出世心是過去從未薰習過的（凡夫從沒起過無漏心），出世心的薰習照理該完全沒有；既沒有薰習，出世心又從哪顆種子生？
他答：出世心是『從最清淨法界等流的正聞薰習所生的種子』生起的——也就是說，諸佛從那最清淨法界中流出正法、我們聽聞受持、薰下這份『正聞薰習』，由它作種子，引生出世之心。
無著再追問這份『聞薰習』的歸屬：聞薰習到底是不是阿賴耶識的自性？若說「是阿賴耶識自性」，聞薰習怎麼反過來作「對治阿賴耶識」的種子（自己對治自己）？若說『不是阿賴耶識自性』，那這份聞薰習種子的所依，又該怎麼看？
他答：一直到證得諸佛菩提之前，這份聞薰習隨其所依之處而轉，是『寄存』在異熟識裡的，與藏識和合俱轉，就像水和乳摻在一起（同處而體性各別）；然而聞薰習並不是阿賴耶識，因為其性正是「對治阿賴耶識」的種子性（性質與藏識相反）。
他補一句修證的次第：依『下品』的薰習，養成『中品』；依『中品』，養成『上品』；這是順著『聞、思、修』愈修愈多、漸次相應而成的。
又說：這『正聞薰習』的下、中、上品種子，要知道也就是『法身』的種子——法身種子與阿賴耶識相違、不被阿賴耶識所攝，因為其性是『最清淨出世法界等流』；這種子雖還算是世間（尚未現起無漏），卻是出世心的種子性。而且這出世心縱然還沒生起，那聞薰習已經能對治種種煩惱纏、能對治種種險惡趣、能把已造的一切惡業作『朽壞的對治』（令惡業勢力枯朽）、又能隨順去逢事、承事一切諸佛菩薩。聞薰習雖還屬世間，但要知道：初發心修業的菩薩所得的這份薰習，也歸『法身』所攝；而聲聞、獨覺所得的，則只歸『解脫身』所攝（菩薩通向法身，二乘止於解脫身）。
又說：這份薰習既不是阿賴耶識，便歸「法身、解脫身」所攝。隨著薰習由下品、中品、上品次第漸漸增長，那異熟果識（藏識）便次第漸漸減損——這就叫『轉所依』（把所依的根本從染轉淨）。等到「一切種所依」整個轉了之後，那異熟果識以及祂含藏的一切種子，便「無種子而轉」（再無雜染種可生），一切雜染種永遠斷盡。
無著又解『水乳』之喻：怎麼說像水乳？是說『非阿賴耶識（清淨聞薰習）』與「阿賴耶識」雖同處俱轉，可結果卻是阿賴耶識那邊的一切種逐漸盡、非阿賴耶識這邊的一切種逐漸增。好比水裡摻了乳，鵝去飲時能只飲乳、留下水（各取所性）。又好比世間人得『離欲』時，是那『非等引地（散地）的薰習』漸漸減、『等引地（定地）的薰習』漸漸增，這樣換了所依（轉依）。
二十、再就『滅盡定』破「定中有意識」之說
無著再補幾條，仍是反證非有藏識不可——
聖者說過：入『滅盡定』時「識不離身」。可滅盡定中六識都不行了，那『不離身』的識，正該是異熟識（藏識持身）；而入滅定本不是為了對治、滅除這個異熟識（滅定滅的是前六識心心所，不是滅藏識）。
又：人並不是『出定時這識才重新生起』。因為異熟識一旦中斷，就如同「結生相續」斷了一樣，不能再重生（藏識若斷，命根即斷，何來出定）；可見定中藏識本未斷。
又，有人偏執『滅盡定裡其實還有意識在，所以說它有心』——無著說這『心』立不起來，並列一串理由：照『定』的本義它不該還有心（定不應成）；定中找不到所緣、行相（所緣行相不可得）；若有意識便該有善根與之相應（應有善根相應過）；說它是不善或無記又都不合理（不善無記不應理）；有意識便該有『想、受』現行（可滅定正是滅想受，應有想受現行過）；便該有『觸』可得（觸可得故）；意識對三摩地該起作用（於三摩地有功能故）；那滅定豈不成了只滅『想』一個（應有唯滅想過失）；又該有『思、信』等善根現行（應有其思信等善根現行過）；硬把『能依的意識』留下、卻說『離了所依』，講不通（拔彼能依令離所依不應理）；而且有現成的譬喻可證（有譬喻故）；總之意識並非滅定中所該有的——它在這裡不該有（如非遍行此不有故）。
又說：若硬主張滅定中『由意識故而有心』，那這心要安成善、不善、還是無記，都安不上，所以講不通。
又有人別執：『色、心無間相生（前色心滅、後色心緊接著生），這相續本身就是諸法的種子。』——無著說這也立不起來，如前面已說過的（中間隔了無心位，相續斷了，種子無處安）。再說：若如此，從無色界、無想天命終，或從滅盡定等出來時，那『色心無間相生』早斷了，後法又如何生？——講不通。又『阿羅漢的最後一念心』也交代不了（後無心可接，種子何託）。所以這種主張，只可勉強容許有個「等無間緣」（前念引後念之緣），卻撐不起『種子』的角色。
無著總結這一大段：這樣看來，若離開「一切種子異熟果識」，雜染、清淨兩邊統統不能成立；所以可以斷定——前面所說那種種相的阿賴耶識，決定是有的。
他用一組偈把這層收攏，偈意大致是：菩薩在淨心位，遠離了五識（前五識不行）、乃至無餘（連染識亦盡）——那『心的轉依』，你要怎麼安立？若說『轉依就是把所對治的斷掉』，可單講『斷』又不成（果與因若無差別，便落入『永斷』反成過失的難處）；若又說『沒有種子、或沒有體，也能算轉依』，可既然那兩樣（種子、體）都沒有了，『轉依』一詞就無從安立。——層層追問，最後仍逼向『必須有一個能持種、能轉依的阿賴耶識』。
二十一、阿賴耶識的『差別』：三種與四種
無著問：那麼阿賴耶識的種種『差別』（分類）怎麼說？略說可以說成三種，也可以說成四種。
三種——是就『三種薰習的差別』說的：
一、名言薰習差別（由種種名言、概念所薰下的種子之別）。 二、我見薰習差別（由執我之見所薰下的種子之別）。 三、有支薰習差別（由十二有支、業力所薰下的種子之別）。
四種——是就以下四項說的：
一、引發差別——指『新起的薰習』。這一項若沒有，那「行緣識、取緣有」（十二支裡這兩環）就接不上了（新業要靠新薰才引得起後識後有）。
二、異熟差別——指由『行、有』為緣，在六道諸趣中所感的異熟果之別。這一項若沒有，便沒了種子，後世諸法的生起就不能成立。
三、緣相差別——指『意』（染污意）中那個『我執的所緣相』。這一項若沒有，染污意中『我執所緣的對象』就無從安立。
四、相貌差別——指這個識所帶的種種相貌：有『共相』、有『不共相』，有「無受生種子相」、有「有受生種子相」等等。
無著就「相貌差別」細說——
『共相』，指能變現『器世間』（山河大地等共同依報）的種子（眾生共感、共同所對的世界）。『不共相』，指各人『別有的內處』（眼等內根、各別自身）的種子（人各一份、不共他人）。共相也就是「無受生種子相」，不共相也就是「有受生種子相」。
當聖道『對治』生起時，所滅的只是『不共相』這一邊所對治的（各人斷自己那份內身種子）；至於『共相』（共同世界），它是被別人的分別所執持著的，聖者這邊雖斷，卻不能替別人把世界也斷了——聖者只是於其中「但見清淨」（看見它是清淨的）罷了。正像瑜伽師（修觀行者）對同一件東西能起種種不同的勝解、種種不同的所見，而那些所見都各自能成立（隨心轉變，見各不同）。
無著用一首偈申明：共相（共結）難斷、難周遍了知，所以稱它為『共結』；瑜伽師的心若已轉變，（雖物未滅）所見已異，因為『外相』廣大、為眾人共持之故；得清淨的人，雖不能把那共世界滅掉，卻已能於其中見其清淨；又如清淨的佛土，正由佛的清淨所見而顯為清淨。
他又附一首別偈，重申前面「種種勝解、種種所見皆得成立」之意，偈意是：眾位瑜伽師對著同一件東西，各自的勝解都不相同，而種種所見卻都能成立；由此可知——所取的境其實『唯有識』（一切所見都不離心識所現）。
無著接著說：（這「相貌差別」）這一項若沒有，那『器世間（物質世界）、有情世間（眾生）生起的種種差別』就不能成立了。
無著再補幾組『相』——
又有『麁重相』與『輕安相』：麁重相，指煩惱、隨煩惱的種子（沉重粗澀、礙道）；輕安相，指有漏善法的種子（輕利安適、順善）。這一項若沒有，那『所感的異熟果有的堪能（堪修善、有能力）、有的不堪能，以及這種堪能與否的所依差別』，就不能成立。
又有「有受盡相」與「無受盡相」：有受盡相，指那已成熟的異熟果的善、不善種子（受報受盡便完了的）；無受盡相，指『名言薰習』的種子——那是無始以來，種種戲論（言說分別）流轉所薰下的種子，綿綿不盡。這一項若沒有，那『已造的善、惡二業，與果報受盡之後便了結』就不能成立；而且『新的名言薰習不斷生起』也不能成立。
又有『譬喻相』：是說這阿賴耶識，可以拿『幻、焰、夢、翳（眼病所見的空花）』來作譬喻（似有非實）。這一項若沒有，那『由不實的遍計種子，而生起種種顛倒的緣相（錯認虛妄為實有）』就不能成立。
又有『具足相』與「不具足相」：種種『具縛者』（煩惱繫縛還齊全的凡夫），叫具足相；「世間離欲者」（伏了欲貪的），叫損減相（減了一分）；『有學的聲聞』與『諸菩薩』，叫一分永拔相（永斷了一部分）；『阿羅漢、獨覺、以及諸如來』，叫煩惱障全永拔相（阿羅漢、獨覺），乃至『煩惱障、所知障全永拔相』（如來，二障俱盡）——各依其位而定。這一項若沒有，那『按這次第，雜染漸漸還滅（由凡至聖層層斷染）』就不能成立。
二十二、為什麼異熟果是「無覆無記」
無著最後問：善法、不善法為什麼都能招感異熟果，而所感的異熟果卻是「無覆無記」（不障聖道、非善非惡）？
他答：正因為異熟果是無覆無記，祂才能與『善』『不善』兩邊都不相違背——而善與不善彼此是相違的（水火不容）。假如異熟果本身就帶善性或不善性，那『雜染漸漸還滅』就不能成立了（果若有定善定惡，便鎖死，轉不動）。所以異熟識唯是「無覆無記」。
Of the ten special points, the very first is the basis of the knowable (所知依) — the root on which everything worth knowing depends. Asaṅga says: this root is the storehouse consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna) — the deepest layer of mind, the root consciousness that holds and contains all the "seeds." What follows runs through his account of it.
1. Where did the World-Honored One call this consciousness the "storehouse consciousness"?
Asaṅga first asks: where exactly did the World-Honored One set up the name "storehouse consciousness" for this consciousness? He answers: in a verse of the Abhidharma-mahāyāna-sūtra (阿毘達磨大乘經), the Buddha said this —
There is a "realm" (here meaning the root basis that holds the seeds) that has existed from beginningless time; it is the root on which all things equally depend. Just because it is there, sentient beings have their many destinies of birth-and-death (the various courses of rebirth), and nirvāṇa too can be realized.
Then that same sūtra adds a further verse, meaning: because it gathers in and contains all things, being the "consciousness of all seeds" (the consciousness that holds every seed), it is named the storehouse; this teaching the Buddha set forth specifically for those of advanced attainment (those fit to receive the deep teaching).
Asaṅga says: these two passages are the scriptural authority — the "āgama" (the holy teaching, the scripture passed down from the Buddha's own mouth) — cited first as proof.
2. Why is this consciousness called the "storehouse consciousness"?
Having cited the scripture, Asaṅga presses further: on what grounds is this consciousness to be called the "storehouse consciousness" (the word "ālaya" carries the sense of storing up, gathering in)? He gives several reasons —
First, all things of the defiled kind that arise (the many tainted, defiled phenomena) are stored up in this consciousness as their "fruit" (the results they perfume in are all kept in this consciousness), and so it is called the storehouse consciousness.
Second, the other way around: it is precisely this consciousness that serves as the "cause" for those defiled things (the seeds it holds are able to give rise to them), and so it is called the storehouse consciousness.
And there is a further sense: sentient beings grasp and store this consciousness as their own "self" (mistaking it for that permanent self), and so it is called the storehouse consciousness as well.
3. This consciousness is also called the "appropriating consciousness"
Asaṅga goes on: this consciousness has another name too — the appropriating consciousness (ādāna) (the word "ādāna" carries the sense of holding fast, taking up). This name also has scriptural authority. In the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra (解深密經), the Buddha spoke a verse, meaning —
The appropriating consciousness is extremely deep and extremely subtle; the seeds it holds, all of them, run on like a rushing torrent. I (the Buddha) do not expound it to the ignorant and immature, for fear they would form discriminations and wrongly grasp it as a "self."
So why is this consciousness also called the appropriating consciousness? Asaṅga says: because it holds fast all the material faculties (it takes up and sustains the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body — those bodily organs), and because it is the basis for "appropriating one's own bodily existence" (the whole body-and-mind of a single lifetime is held together and appropriated through it).
How so? These material faculties, precisely because they are held fast by this consciousness, can remain undamaged for a whole lifetime and run on with the continuum of life. And again: in the continuum of life, at the very moment of "linking up a new birth" (taking conception, joining on to the next life), it is this consciousness that goes to appropriate the body being born, and so takes up a fresh bodily existence. On these two grounds, this consciousness is also called the appropriating consciousness.
4. This consciousness is also called "mind" — and from this comes "thought-faculty" (manas)
Asaṅga says: this consciousness is also called "mind" (citta). Just as the World-Honored One spoke of the three — "mind, thought-faculty, and consciousness."
Here we treat the "thought-faculty" (manas) first. The thought-faculty is of two kinds —
The first kind of thought-faculty is the basis that serves as the "immediately-antecedent condition" (the seat that is relied upon when a prior moment of consciousness has just ceased and, with no gap, gives rise to the next): the consciousness that has just ceased in the preceding instant can serve as the basis from which the next mental consciousness arises.
The second kind of thought-faculty is the defiled mind (kliṣṭa-manas) (a defiled consciousness that, at all times and beneath the surface, grasps a self). It keeps constant company with four afflictions, in unbroken correspondence with them: first, the view of a real self in the body-and-mind (taking the body-and-mind to be a real "self"); second, self-conceit (the haughtiness that rides on the self); third, self-love (craving for the self); fourth, ignorance (the dimness as to how things truly are). This second kind of thought-faculty is just what the "consciousness" depends on for becoming defiled.
Asaṅga sums up: consciousness (meaning the storehouse consciousness) is given rise to by that first kind of thought-faculty (it arises in dependence on the immediately-antecedent condition), and is made defiled by the second kind of thought-faculty (the defiled mind). And further, by the meaning of the words: "consciousness" means "discerning an object" (cognizing and discriminating the object faced); "thought-faculty" means, first, "immediately antecedent" (the prior ceasing and the next arising, leading on without a gap), and second, "deliberating" (constantly measuring, grasping a self). Because "thought-faculty" carries these two meanings, it comes to be of two kinds.
5. How do we know there really is a "defiled mind"? — Six counter-proofs
Asaṅga then asks: how can it be settled that there really is such a "defiled mind"? He establishes it through a chain of counter-proofs of the form "suppose it were absent — then this would not work" —
One. Were there no defiled mind, then "uncommon ignorance" (the kind of ignorance that does not arise together with craving and the rest but lies latent on its own) would have nowhere to stand — and that is a fault.
Two. Again, "the parity of the five consciousnesses" could not be established either — and that too is a fault. Why? Because the five sense-consciousnesses (eye-consciousness through body-consciousness) must each have a "co-existing basis" (a faculty present alongside it that serves as its support); the defiled mind is precisely the co-existing basis of the mental consciousness. Without it, "the five consciousnesses each have a co-existing basis but the mental consciousness does not" would be a mismatch.
Three. Again, the etymological gloss put on the name "thought-faculty" (explaining "thought-faculty" as "deliberating") would have nothing to rest on — and that is a fault. With no defiled mind constantly deliberating and grasping a self, "thought-faculty = deliberating" falls empty.
Four. Again, the two attainments "the meditative attainment of no-thought" and "the meditative attainment of cessation" could not be told apart — and that is a fault. Note: in the attainment of no-thought the defiled mind is still at work (so the grasping of self has not been truly stilled), whereas in the attainment of cessation it is not. Were the defiled mind not posited, these two attainments would have no difference at all — yet they plainly do differ.
Five. Again, a being born into the "heaven of no-thought" would, for that whole stretch of life, turn out to be "without defilement" — and that is a fault: for if, in that lifetime, even the grasping of self and self-conceit were gone, that would amount to an ordinary being becoming selfless in the heaven of no-thought, which does not hold up.
Six. Again, "the grasping of self" is present in active operation at all times, found everywhere: in a wholesome mind, in an unwholesome mind, and even in an indeterminate mind (a mind that is neither wholesome nor unwholesome), the grasping of self quietly operates. Were no constantly co-existing defiled mind posited, then the grasping of self could only arise alongside the mind it "corresponds" to — but craving and the rest correspond only with the unwholesome mind, so afflictions of the "I and mine" kind would have to operate only in unwholesome minds and not in wholesome or indeterminate ones. Yet the fact is that wholesome and indeterminate minds also have the grasping of self. Therefore — only if the defiled mind is posited as something "co-existing in active operation" (present alongside every kind of mind, quietly operating at all times beneath the surface), and not as "operating by correspondence" (not as something that arises only when it corresponds to a particular mind), do all the above faults vanish.
Asaṅga gathers these six in a verse, whose meaning is: if no defiled mind is posited, then "uncommon ignorance," "the parity of the five consciousnesses," "the etymological gloss," and "the difference between the two attainments" — not one of these can stand; all become faults. In the heaven of no-thought one whole lifetime would have to turn out with no grasping of self operating — again a fault; whereas the grasping of self in fact runs along constantly, threading through every kind of mind, and without it there is no accounting for it. Apart from the defiled mind these have nowhere to settle, and items "two and three" spoken of above contradict each other; without it, the grasping of self ought not to be everywhere. And further: when a mind of "true reality" (a mind penetrating to how things truly are) is about to arise, there is always something that constantly obstructs it — accompanying it and threading through every state, namely that "uncommon ignorance" (the ignorance belonging to the defiled mind).
Asaṅga adds a word on its nature: this "thought-faculty," because it is defiled, belongs to the "obstructive-yet-indeterminate" (有覆無記) (it can veil over the noble path, while in itself being neither wholesome nor unwholesome); it corresponds constantly with those four afflictions. Just as in the form realm and the formless realm the afflictions of the "entanglement" kind are likewise reckoned as obstructive-yet-indeterminate — for in the form and formless realms those entanglement-afflictions are held in check and held within by "calm-abiding" (śamatha, stilling-meditation) — so too this defiled mind runs along quietly, at all times and in the most subtle way.
6. Why "mind" is established, and why it is called "mind"
Asaṅga returns to "mind." He says: as to the substance of "mind," reckoned as the third (of the three — mind, thought-faculty, and consciousness), if you set aside the storehouse consciousness, nothing else can be found — there is no other thing to serve as the "substance of mind." So the storehouse consciousness is taken as the substance of "mind." On the strength of it serving as the seed, the "thought-faculty" and the "consciousness" are able to turn and operate.
And why is this consciousness called "mind"? Because the seeds perfumed in by every kind of thing accumulate and gather together in it ("mind" carries the sense of accumulation), it is called mind.
7. Why the Śrāvaka vehicle does not state this name "storehouse / appropriating consciousness"
Asaṅga asks: then why, in the teachings of the Śrāvaka vehicle (聲聞乘), is this mind not called the storehouse consciousness or the appropriating consciousness?
He answers: because this belongs to an extremely deep and subtle domain. How so? Śrāvakas are not those who must "turn and operate, and penetrate through, on every object and every domain of knowledge" — their aim is limited. So for them, even without this consciousness being taught, their wisdom can still be accomplished and their liberation can still be accomplished, and so the Buddha did not teach it to them. As for bodhisattvas, they must turn and operate, and leave nothing unpenetrated, on every object and every domain of knowledge; so it had to be taught to them. For without the wisdom about this consciousness, it is not easy to realize the "wisdom of all-knowing" (the Buddha's all-knowing wisdom).
8. In fact the Śrāvaka vehicle did speak of it too — by another name, with hidden intent
Asaṅga says further: in fact, within the Śrāvaka vehicle, the storehouse consciousness was indeed spoken of by an "alternative gateway with hidden intent" (under another heading, with a deeper meaning concealed) — only it was not named outright.
For example, that Ekottarikāgama (增壹阿笈摩) says: worldly beings love the storehouse, delight in the storehouse, yearn for the storehouse, rejoice in the storehouse (toward the storehouse they have craving, and delight, and yearning, and joy); and it is in order to cut off such a storehouse that, when the Buddha proclaims the true teaching, beings will reverently lend an ear, settle into a mind that seeks liberation, and practice step by step according to the teaching. The arising of a Tathāgata is just this — that such a wondrous, rare true teaching appears in the world. — This passage, in the Śrāvaka vehicle's "Sūtra of the Four Qualities of the Tathāgata's Arising" (如來出現四德經), already quietly points out the storehouse consciousness by way of this "alternative gateway with hidden intent."
Again, in the āgama transmitted by the Mahāsāṃghika school, by an alternative gateway with hidden intent it is called the "root consciousness" (根本識), likened to a tree depending on its root (all the consciousnesses are like branches and leaves, all standing on this root consciousness). In the Mahīśāsaka school, again by an alternative gateway with hidden intent, it is called the "aggregate that runs through birth-and-death" (窮生死蘊) (the aggregate that runs the whole length of birth-and-death, never breaking off) — because at times "form" and "mind" can be seen to break off (as when one enters a mindless meditative attainment), yet the seeds in the storehouse consciousness do not break off.
Asaṅga sums up: this "basis of the knowable," then, is said to have for its essence the storehouse consciousness, to have for its essence the appropriating consciousness, to have for its essence mind, to have for its essence the storehouse, to have for its essence the root consciousness, to have for its essence the aggregate that runs through birth-and-death — and so on. Precisely because there are so many "alternative names" all leading to one and the same thing, the storehouse consciousness becomes a "great royal road" (a master highway) that everyone can travel, opening out in all directions.
9. Refuting several ways of mistaking the "storehouse"
Asaṅga then sets several misreadings straight.
The first. There is a class who hold that "mind, thought-faculty, and consciousness" are merely different names with one and the same meaning. This does not hold up — the meanings of "thought-faculty" and "consciousness" can plainly be told apart, and from this we should know that the meaning of "mind" too ought to be distinct, not lumped in with them.
The second. There is a class who hold that the "storehouse" in the Buddha's saying "beings love the storehouse" and all that is expounded at length means the "five appropriated aggregates" (the body-and-mind of the five aggregates formed by grasping). Others again say it is the "pleasant feeling" arising together with craving that is called the storehouse. Others again say it is the "view of a real self in the body" that is called the storehouse.
Asaṅga's judgment: these masters, being still dim and unclear about the storehouse consciousness — both as to its teaching and as to its realization — fall into such graspings. The way they set up the name "storehouse" does not even square with the principle of the Śrāvaka vehicle's own way of setting things up. Whereas one who is not dim about the storehouse consciousness, who takes this storehouse consciousness to set up the "storehouse" the Buddha spoke of — that is the most excellent and most fitting setup.
Why say "explaining it by the storehouse consciousness is most excellent"? Asaṅga breaks the three preceding claims one by one —
Suppose the "five appropriated aggregates" were the storehouse: but for one born into an evil destiny, into a place of unrelenting suffering (such as the hells), the five appropriated aggregates are most loathsome, a thing one cannot flee fast enough; beings there never feel love or delight for them. To say that, even there, a being "grasps and stores them as a self and clings to them" does not hold up — for there he single-mindedly wants only to be quickly rid of them.
Suppose the "pleasant feeling arising together with craving" were the storehouse: but from the fourth meditative absorption upward there is no such pleasant feeling, and beings born in those heavens constantly hold this kind of feeling in disgust; to say that even there they grasp and store and cling to it does not hold up either.
Suppose the "view of a real self in the body" were the storehouse: but within this true teaching, one who has already come to conviction in "no-self" constantly holds the view-of-self in disgust; to say that they still grasp and store and cling to the view-of-self does not hold up either.
Turn it around to the storehouse consciousness and it all works: the storehouse consciousness is what gets taken up as the "inner self" —
Even one born into an evil destiny, a place of unrelenting suffering, single-mindedly seeking to be rid of the suffering aggregates, is still bound fast by "self-love" for the storehouse consciousness, following him like a shadow; he never once thinks of leaving the storehouse consciousness behind.
Even one born from the fourth meditative absorption upward, constantly holding in disgust the pleasant feeling that arises with craving, is bound just the same by self-love for the storehouse consciousness.
Even one who within this true teaching has come to conviction in no-self and holds the view-of-self in disgust is bound just the same by self-love for the storehouse consciousness.
Therefore — setting up the storehouse consciousness as the "storehouse" the Buddha spoke of is the most excellent, the most defensible.
10. Setting up the "three aspects" of this consciousness: own-aspect, cause-aspect, fruit-aspect
Asaṅga says: the foregoing has finished setting out the various "alternative names" of the storehouse consciousness; how, then, is its "aspect" (the manner in which it presents) to be set up? In brief there are three: first, the own-aspect; second, the cause-aspect; third, the fruit-aspect.
Own-aspect. The storehouse consciousness, taking the "perfuming" left behind by every category of defiled thing (the residual force perfumed in), serves as the cause for the arising of those things; it is able to hold and carry the corresponding seeds — this is its own-aspect (it is itself the storing substance that can hold seeds and give rise to defilement).
Cause-aspect. This is the storehouse consciousness containing all seeds, serving at all times as the "cause" for the various categories of defiled things when they arise before us.
Fruit-aspect. This is the storehouse consciousness arising in unbroken continuity in dependence on the perfuming left behind, from beginningless time, by those various categories of defiled things — it is itself the "fruit" perfumed in by that perfuming.
11. What is "perfuming"?
Asaṅga asks: then what is "perfuming" (薰習) (one thing perfuming into another, leaving behind a force able to give rise to it again)? "Perfuming" is the "expressing term" (the name used to state it); what does it express (what is the thing stated)? It is this: in dependence on a certain thing, "arising together and ceasing together" (arising at the same time as that thing and passing away at the same time), within this arising-and-ceasing-together a portion of "causal nature able to give rise to it" is left behind — and this left-behind causal nature is what "perfuming" refers to.
He gives an example: it is like the fragrance of flowers being perfumed into sesame (the transliterated 苣蕂 is sesame) — the sesame and the flowers arise together and cease together (pressed together at once), and these sesame seeds come along bearing the "cause able to reproduce that flower-fragrance" (the oil pressed from them carries the flower's fragrance). Again, take what is called a "person of craving conduct" (a person heavy with craving): his craving-and-such perfuming is left behind in dependence on his craving-and-such mind arising-and-ceasing-together, so that his mind comes along bearing the "cause able to give rise to craving again" (the more it is perfumed, the heavier the craving grows). Again, take a person of "much learning": his much-learning perfuming is left behind in dependence on "hearing and attending" arising-and-ceasing-together, so that his mind comes along bearing the "cause able to retain what was heard"; and just because this perfuming is able to hold and carry what was heard, he is called a "keeper of the teaching" (one who holds and keeps the teaching). — The way the storehouse consciousness is perfumed, you should know, is just like this.
12. Do the seeds "abide as separate things" or are they "without separation"?
Asaṅga asks: those seeds of the defiled categories of things within the storehouse consciousness — do they abide there each set apart, each a separate real thing stored inside (abiding as separate things)? Or are they wholly without separation from the consciousness (without separation)?
He answers: those seeds are not "another set of real things, item by item," stored in the consciousness (they are not separate things abiding apart); yet neither are they wholly without separation from the consciousness (not entirely without separation). The truth is: when the storehouse consciousness arises in this way, it comes along bearing the various "capacity-differences able to give rise to those things" — and precisely because it has these capacity-differences, it is called the "consciousness of all seeds." (The seeds are not little separate things stored apart, but the capacity-differences in this consciousness able to give rise to all things.)
13. The storehouse consciousness and the defiled things are "simultaneously causes of each other"
Asaṅga asks: the storehouse consciousness and those defiled things are "at one and the same time, causes of each other" — how is this to be understood?
He gives two similes — it is like a bright lamp: the flame and the wick — one producing the firelight, the other being burnt — are at the same single moment mutually accomplishing each other (the flame depends on the wick, the wick is burnt by the flame, accomplishing each other at once). Again, it is like a bundle of reeds: each stalk leans on and props the others, and at the same single moment none falls. The principle of "being causes of each other" here should be seen in just this way: the storehouse consciousness serves as the cause of those defiled things, and those defiled things in turn serve as the cause of the storehouse consciousness (the consciousness gives rise to things, things perfume the consciousness, accomplishing each other at once). And only by setting it up this way does the "causal condition" (the directly producing cause) hold up — for outside of this, no other causal condition can be found.
14. How can perfuming that is undivided and unmixed give rise to things that are divided and mixed?
Asaṅga asks: perfuming in itself is "without distinction, unmixed" (still a single undifferentiated mass when it is perfumed in); how can it serve as the cause of those things that are "with distinction, mixed"?
He offers an analogy: it is like a cloth to be tie-dyed — when you bind up the cloth with threads and it waits to be dyed, there is in fact as yet no visible difference of pattern or color on the cloth, it is still a plain white sheet; yet once it is put into the dye-vat and dyed, the cloth then shows forth all manner of distinct, mixed, interlaced patterns and figures. The storehouse consciousness is just so: perfumed by the "distinct and mixed perfuming things," at the very moment of being perfumed no distinction is yet visible; but once "the fruit arises and the dye-vat is present," then distinct and mixed things of measureless kinds appear forth one by one.
15. The two kinds of dependent arising — and dispelling the various confused graspings about dependent arising
Asaṅga says: such "dependent arising" (all things arising in dependence on conditions), in the Mahāyāna, is taught in the most subtle and profound way. In brief there are two kinds of dependent arising —
The first is "dependent arising that discriminates own-nature" (分別自性緣起): all things arise in dependence on the storehouse consciousness — this is called dependent arising that discriminates own-nature, because it is able to discriminate and manifest the various "own-natures" of things (the manifold natures of each kind) to serve as the condition for arising.
The second is "dependent arising that discriminates the liked and disliked" (分別愛非愛緣起): this is the twelvefold dependent arising (ignorance, formations ... old-age-and-death) — this is called dependent arising that discriminates the liked and disliked, because in the good destinies and the evil destinies it is able to discriminate and manifest various "likeable / unlikeable" bodily existences (bodies that bring on pleasant or painful retribution) to serve as the condition.
Asaṅga continues: if one is unclear about the dependent arising within the storehouse consciousness, various wrong graspings arise —
If one is confused about the "first kind of dependent arising" (dependent arising that discriminates own-nature), one will wrongly suppose: either that things have "own-nature" as their cause, or "deeds done in a former life" as their cause, or "the transformations of Īśvara (the lord-of-creation)" as their cause, or "a real self" as their cause, or else simply say "without cause, without condition." If one is confused about the "second kind of dependent arising" (dependent arising that discriminates the liked and disliked), one will wrongly suppose that there is a "self" that is the doer, and a "self" that is the receiver of retribution.
He gives an illustration — it is like a crowd of men born blind who have never seen an elephant; someone brings an elephant and has each of them touch one part: one touches the trunk, one the tusk, one the ear, one the leg, one the tail, one the back. Bystanders ask, "What is an elephant like?" Those who touched the different parts each insist on their own version — one says the elephant is like a plow-handle, one like a pestle, one like a winnowing basket, one like a mortar, one like a broom, and one says outright that the elephant is like a mountain of stone. Toward these two kinds of dependent arising, the "born blind," blinded by ignorance, are just like this: some grasp own-nature as the cause, some former deeds as the cause, some Īśvara as the cause, some a real self as the cause, some no-cause-no-condition; some grasp "I am the doer, I am the receiver." Whereas the own-nature, cause-nature, fruit-nature, and so forth of the storehouse consciousness are like the true whole shape of that elephant — which the blind, each touching one part, cannot recognize in full.
16. The storehouse consciousness is the maturation-consciousness, the consciousness of all seeds
Asaṅga says in brief: the storehouse consciousness has for its essence the "maturation-consciousness" (the consciousness of retribution drawn on by wholesome and unwholesome deeds, ripening at a different time and in a different kind) and the "consciousness of all seeds"; it gathers in all the "bodily existences" of the three realms (all the bodies taken in rebirth), all the destinies, and so on.
He then draws together the various meanings of "seed" in a set of verses, whose meaning is —
Seeds are of two sorts, "outer and inner" (outer, like the grain-seed of rice and wheat; inner, like the seeds in the storehouse consciousness); they are "not manifest" (hidden and hard to notice, not coarse and plainly visible); spoken of from the two sides of "the conventional and the ultimate," each has its setting-up. Know that seeds have six meanings:
One, momentary cessation — arising only to cease at once, not abiding for even a single thought (a thing that abides cannot serve as a seed). Two, co-existence — present together at the same time with the fruit it gives rise to (not cut off before-and-after). Three, constant continuance — running along of one kind in unbroken continuity, constantly following on (not turning into another kind midway, and not breaking off). Four, fixity — a wholesome cause definitely yields a wholesome fruit, an unwholesome cause definitely an unwholesome fruit; what arises is fixed, not jumbled. Five, awaiting the assembly of conditions — it must still wait for the many supporting conditions to come together before it gives rise to active operation (it does not arise of itself at any time). Six, only able to draw on its own fruit — it can only draw forth a fruit of its own kind (a wheat-seed yields only wheat, not beans).
Asaṅga also states the aspects of "that which can perfume" and "that which is perfumed": that which can serve as "the perfumed" (that which is perfumed into and can hold and carry the perfuming) must be "stable-abiding, indeterminate, perfumable, and corresponding with that which perfumes" — stable and continuous in nature (stable), not leaning to wholesome or unwholesome (indeterminate), perfumable in nature (perfumable), and corresponding at the same time with that which perfumes; and moreover this "perfumed" must not be one and the same thing as "that which perfumes" (the perfumed is not other than this, yet not identical with this). These few conditions are just what makes "perfuming" possible.
He then points out the reverse side: the "six consciousnesses" cannot serve as the perfumed for one another — because the preceding and following moments of the six consciousnesses cannot correspond, because the three natures (wholesome, unwholesome, indeterminate) differ and contradict one another, and because the two moments before and after do not co-exist at the same time ... measure them against these and require them to be the substance that receives perfuming, and it all falls empty, becomes faulty. So the substance that receives perfuming can only be the storehouse consciousness.
Asaṅga returns to inner and outer seeds, saying that both have two functions, "able to generate, able to draw along": a seed can both "generate" active operation (in the very producing of the fruit) and "draw along" its continuity (as grass and trees, even when withered, can still hold on a while by the force of "drawing along," tapering off slowly of their own accord, rather than breaking off at once).
To make clear that "inner seeds" differ from "outer seeds," Asaṅga states it again in a verse, whose meaning is: outer seeds may at times not depend on perfuming (some fruits arise without being perfumed in beforehand), but inner seeds are not so — inner seeds must come about through perfuming. Consider: if there were no perfuming of hearing the teaching and the like, yet one claimed that the fruit of hearing-wisdom could arise later, that does not stand to reason; and it would fall into the fault of "what should be gained is not gained, what should not be gained is gained instead" (doing-and-not-doing, losing-and-gaining all in disorder), a self-contradiction. As for outer seeds, in fact they too must rely on inner seeds as their condition — they grow in dependence on that portion of perfuming within the storehouse consciousness (the force of deeds, the shared-aspect seeds).
17. The storehouse consciousness and the evolving consciousnesses are "conditions for each other"
Asaṅga says: apart from the storehouse consciousness, the remaining "evolving consciousnesses" (the consciousnesses that arise actively — eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind, and so on), present throughout all bodily existences and all destinies, should be known as "those that experience-and-use" (the side that takes in and uses objects). Just as a verse in the Madhyānta-vibhāga (Differentiating the Middle from the Extremes) says, whose meaning is: the first is called the "condition-consciousness" (that is, the storehouse consciousness, serving as the objective-support and basis-condition for everything), the second is called the "experiencer" (that is, the evolving consciousnesses, which experience-and-use objects); and within this, the experiencing, discriminating, and reckoning are all the mental factors of this side.
And these two kinds of consciousness (the storehouse consciousness and the evolving consciousnesses) are conditions for each other. Just as a verse in the Abhidharma-mahāyāna-sūtra says, whose meaning is: things are perfumed and stored into the consciousness (the evolving consciousnesses perfume things into the storehouse consciousness), and the consciousness toward things is likewise (the storehouse consciousness in turn gives rise to things); they mutually serve as each other's "fruit-nature," and constantly serve as each other's "cause-nature" (causes of each other, fruits of each other).
Asaṅga then sorts out the kinds of "condition" —
In the "first kind of dependent arising" (dependent arising that discriminates own-nature), what these two kinds of consciousness serve as for each other is the "causal condition" (the directly producing cause). Then in the "second kind of dependent arising" (dependent arising that discriminates the liked and disliked, that is, the twelvefold chain), which kind of condition is it? It is the "predominant condition" (the condition that helps things along).
Then by which kinds of condition are the "six consciousnesses" produced? They are produced by three: the "predominant condition, the objective-support condition, and the immediately-antecedent condition" (the six consciousnesses do not separately set up a causal condition; the causal condition belongs to the storehouse consciousness).
Put the above together: these three kinds of dependent arising — "running through birth-and-death" (the dependent arising that discriminates own-nature; the storehouse consciousness in unbroken continuity), "the liked and disliked destinies" (the twelvefold dependent arising; drawing on good or evil destinies), and "experiencing-and-using" (the evolving consciousnesses experiencing-and-using objects) — together fully possess the "four conditions" (causal condition, immediately-antecedent condition, objective-support condition, predominant condition).
18. Why the "three aspects and alternative names" belong only to the storehouse consciousness, not to the evolving consciousnesses — proved in reverse by "neither defilement nor purity could be established"
Asaṅga says: the above has set up the alternative names and the three aspects of the storehouse consciousness. But how do we know that these alternative names and these aspects belong definitely only to the storehouse consciousness, and not to those evolving consciousnesses?
His master-proof is this: were one to set aside the storehouse consciousness set up in this way, then both "defilement" and "purity" would fail to hold — affliction-defilement, deed-defilement, and birth-defilement could none of them be established; worldly purity and supramundane purity could neither of them be established. Below he takes them apart item by item for you.
(a) Affliction-defilement could not hold
Asaṅga asks: why would "affliction-defilement" fail to hold (if there were no storehouse consciousness)? Because to place the seeds formed by the perfuming of the various afflictions and secondary afflictions upon the "six-consciousness body" is unreasonable.
How so? Suppose one posits that "the craving-and-such afflictions on the eye-consciousness arise-and-cease together with it, and the seeds are perfumed in by this and by nothing else" — but once this eye-consciousness has passed away, with other consciousnesses (such as ear-consciousness or mental consciousness) intervening in between, then this perfuming, and the place the perfuming rested on, can no longer be found. From this eye-consciousness, "already ceased, intervened upon by other consciousnesses, now without substance," to say it could still arise together with later craving (so as to give craving something to rest on) is unreasonable — for it is long past and has no substance now. This is like trying to have a maturation-fruit arise straight out of a "past deed that now has no substance" — it does not hold.
Further, the perfuming left behind when this eye-consciousness arose together with craving-and-such cannot be lodged anywhere either: it cannot lodge in "craving" — for craving is "that which depends" (it needs something else to prop it up) and is not stable-abiding (it flashes by in an instant). Nor can it lodge in the other consciousnesses — for the faculties those consciousnesses depend on are each different, and they have no "fixed arising-and-ceasing-together" relation with one another. Nor can it lodge in the eye-consciousness itself — for the eye-consciousness's own substance has no "fixed arising-and-ceasing-together" continuity to speak of. So to say that "the eye-consciousness is perfumed by the craving-and-such afflictions and secondary afflictions" is simply unreasonable; and moreover this consciousness is not something that can be perfumed by another consciousness. As it is with the eye-consciousness, so it is with all the other evolving consciousnesses — you may know it by the same reasoning.
Asaṅga gives a further case: when a person passes away from a high station such as the heaven of no-thought and is born down here, at that moment the "very first consciousness" arises stained by afflictions and secondary afflictions — yet here, if there were no storehouse consciousness, this one consciousness would turn out to have no seeds at all: because the basis it depended on, and that portion of perfuming, are both already past and have no substance now (a mindless state intervened in between).
Another case: when the "consciousness that counteracts the afflictions" (such as the uncontaminated mind when the noble path appears) has arisen, all the remaining worldly consciousnesses have already ceased; at that time, if one sets aside the storehouse consciousness, then to have the seeds of the remaining afflictions and secondary afflictions stored within this "counteracting consciousness" is unreasonable — because the counteracting consciousness is by its own nature liberated and pure, and does not arise-and-cease together with the afflictions and secondary afflictions (how could a pure mind store defiled seeds?). And when worldly mind later arises again, if one sets aside the storehouse consciousness, that perfuming and its basis are long past and have no substance now — would it not then be a case of "arising afresh without any seeds"? — which also does not hold. So it is said: if one sets aside the storehouse consciousness, affliction-defilement cannot be established at all.
(b) Deed-defilement could not hold
Asaṅga asks: why would "deed-defilement" fail to hold (if there were no storehouse consciousness)? Because in the twelvefold chain the link "formations conditioning consciousness" (deed-formations giving rise to consciousness) cannot connect (the deed-seeds perfumed by formations would have nowhere to be stored, nothing from which to draw consciousness). And if this link is missing, then "grasping conditioning becoming" (grasping giving rise to subsequent becoming) cannot connect either.
(c) Birth-defilement could not hold
Asaṅga asks: why would "birth-defilement" fail to hold (if there were no storehouse consciousness)? Because the moment of "linking up the continuum of a new birth" (taking conception, joining on to the next life) could not be accounted for.
He works it out in detail: if a being passes away from a "non-meditatively-poised stage" (a stage of scattered mind) and is to take birth, then in the "intermediate-existence" state (the in-between body after death and before birth) it raises a defiled mental consciousness to "link up the continuum of a new birth." But this defiled mental consciousness ceases at the end of the intermediate existence; what joins with the "kalala" (the first congealed embryonic mass) in the mother's womb is something else again.
So a dilemma arises: suppose "what joins with the embryonic mass" were that very mental consciousness — having joined, one would then, in dependence on this consciousness, have another mental consciousness turn and operate in the mother's womb; would there not then be "two mental consciousnesses" turning at the same time in the womb? That does not hold. Moreover, to insist that "the joining consciousness is itself of the nature of mental consciousness" is also unreasonable: because it turns in dependence on defilement, because it goes on without breaking off for an instant (without break in time), and because the object that mental consciousness ought to take cannot be found (in the womb it is dim and dark, with no object to take) — none of this is like mental consciousness.
Stepping back, even granting "the joining consciousness is the mental consciousness," one must still ask: is "this joining mental consciousness itself" the consciousness of all seeds? Or is "another mental consciousness arising in dependence on this consciousness" the consciousness of all seeds? If you say "this joining consciousness is the consciousness of all seeds" — then it is in fact the storehouse consciousness, and you have merely given it another name and forced it to be called "mental consciousness." If you say "the dependent consciousness is the consciousness of all seeds" — then it turns out that "the depended-on cause-consciousness is not the consciousness of all seeds, while the dependent fruit-consciousness is," which puts root and branch backward and does not hold. So the conclusion is: this "joining consciousness" is not the mental consciousness — it is precisely the maturation-consciousness, which is the consciousness of all seeds (the storehouse consciousness).
Asaṅga gives several more cases, all pointing to the same conclusion —
After the continuum of a new birth is linked, if one sets aside the maturation-consciousness, then "holding fast the material faculties" (sustaining the eye and the rest) cannot be managed either: because the remaining consciousnesses each depend on a separate faculty and are not stable-abiding, and the material faculties cannot do without a consciousness that constantly holds them.
If one sets aside the maturation-consciousness, then "consciousness and name-and-form depending on each other" (turning in mutual dependence like a bundle of reeds leaning together) cannot be established either.
If one sets aside the maturation-consciousness, then for a being already born, "consciousness-nutriment" (the nutriment consisting of consciousness that sustains life) cannot be established. Why? Because take any one of the six consciousnesses you like, and to have it "act as nutriment and sustain" a "being already born" throughout the three realms cannot be managed (the six consciousnesses have breaks in them; they cannot hold up a whole lifetime).
Again: when one passes away from here and is to take birth in a "meditatively-poised stage" (a stage of concentration), it is by a "non-meditatively-poised (scattered-mind) defiled mental consciousness" that the continuum of birth is linked; but this non-poised defiled mind belongs to the lower realm, and apart from the maturation-consciousness no other substance of seeds can possibly be found (where would the seeds of a scattered mind be stored?).
Further, when birth is taken in the "formless realm," if one sets aside the "maturation-consciousness of all seeds," then the defiled mind and the wholesome mind in the formless realm would have no seeds and no support (the formless realm has not even a material body, so the seeds, all the more, can belong nowhere but the storehouse consciousness).
Again: there, when a "supramundane mind" is present before one, all the remaining worldly minds have ceased entirely; would one not then have to part from and lose that very destiny (that very place of birth) altogether? For instance, for a being born in the "station of neither-perception-nor-non-perception," when the supramundane mind of the "station of nothingness" is present, would one not have to part from both these destinies? — Yet this supramundane mind does not take the "station of neither-perception-nor-non-perception" as the destiny it depends on, nor the "station of nothingness" as the destiny it depends on, nor even "nirvāṇa" as the destiny it depends on (the supramundane mind has its own uncontaminated basis, not in any one destiny of the three forms of existence). Plainly, there must be a storehouse consciousness holding the body.
Again: when a person is about to pass away, depending on whether the deeds done were wholesome or unwholesome, the body he depends on grows cold either from the lower body upward or from the upper body downward (the order in which warmth-and-consciousness is given up differs). If one does not admit a storehouse consciousness (holding fast warmth, consciousness, and life-force), this "order of giving up the body" cannot be accounted for either.
Asaṅga sums up this section: therefore, if one sets aside the "maturation-consciousness of all seeds," this "birth-defilement" cannot be established either.
(d) Worldly purity could not hold
Asaṅga asks: why would "worldly purity" (such as cultivating up from the desire realm and gaining the meditative absorption of the form realm) fail to hold (if there were no storehouse consciousness)?
He works it out: a person "not yet free of desire-realm craving, not yet having gained a form-realm mind" takes the "wholesome mind of the desire realm" as the starting point and diligently practices the preparatory effort in order to become free of desire-realm craving. But this "preparatory mind of the desire realm" does not arise-and-cease together with the "form-realm mind" he is about to gain, so it cannot perfume in a form-realm mind, nor serve as the seed of a form-realm mind — this does not hold (the two minds are not simultaneous, so the perfuming cannot land). And the "form-realm mind" he is to gain was long ago in the past, separated by many lifetimes of other minds, so it cannot be taken as the seed of "this present concentration-mind" either, because right now it simply does not exist. So the correct setup is: the "all-seeds of the form-realm concentration-mind" exist within the maturation-consciousness, are handed on through this lifetime, and serve as the "causal condition" (the direct cause) of this life's concentration-mind; while the "preparatory wholesome mind" serves only as the "predominant condition" (the helping condition). Wherever there is any "becoming free of desire," it is to be understood in just this way. So it is said: worldly purity, if one sets aside the "maturation-consciousness of all seeds," cannot hold up in principle.
(e) Supramundane purity could not hold
Asaṅga asks: why would "supramundane purity" fail to hold (if there were no storehouse consciousness)?
The World-Honored One said: in dependence on "hearing another's (the Buddha's) spoken word" and "one's own inner reasoned attention" (reflecting in accordance with reason), with these two as cause, right view comes to arise. Asaṅga then presses: this "Buddha's spoken word" and "reasoned attention" — what do they perfume? The "ear-consciousness"? The "mental consciousness"? Or both?
He closes off each route: when a person is "reasonably reflecting" on that teaching, the ear-consciousness is in fact not arising (hearing is one thing, reflecting another; the two do not arise together); and the mental consciousness is forever being intervened upon and broken off by various scattering consciousnesses. Even if now and then a moment "corresponding with reasoned attention" arises, this "hearing-perfumed mental consciousness" and that portion of perfuming cease in a flash, become past, and definitely have no substance — how could it then serve as a seed to give rise to a later mind "corresponding with reasoned attention"? Moreover, this mind "corresponding with reasoned attention" is a worldly mind, whereas the mind "corresponding with right view" is a supramundane mind, and the two have never once arisen-and-ceased together; so this (worldly) mind cannot perfume that (supramundane) mind. Since it cannot perfume it, to require it to serve as the seed of the supramundane mind does not hold. So it is said: supramundane purity, if one sets aside the "maturation-fruit consciousness of all seeds," cannot be established either — for "the seed taken up by the hearing-perfuming" would then have nowhere to be set up (without resting on the storehouse consciousness, it has nothing to lodge in).
19. Hearing-perfuming: where the seed of the supramundane mind comes from
Asaṅga presses further: this "maturation-fruit consciousness of all seeds" (the storehouse consciousness), since it is the cause of defilement, how can it at the same time be the seed of the pure mind that "counteracts defilement and gives rise to supramundane purity"? And besides, the supramundane mind has never been perfumed in the past (an ordinary being has never raised an uncontaminated mind), so its perfuming, by rights, should be entirely absent; and if there is no perfuming, from what seed does the supramundane mind arise?
He answers: the supramundane mind arises from the seed produced by the "right hearing-perfuming that flows out as an outpouring from the most purified dharma-realm" — that is to say, the buddhas pour the true teaching forth from that most purified dharma-realm, we hear and uphold it and perfume in this "right hearing-perfuming," and by it serving as the seed, the supramundane mind is drawn forth.
Asaṅga then questions where this "hearing-perfuming" belongs: is it the very nature of the storehouse consciousness, or not? If you say "it is the nature of the storehouse consciousness," then how can it turn around and serve as the seed that "counteracts the storehouse consciousness" (counteracting itself)? If you say "it is not the nature of the storehouse consciousness," then how is the basis of this hearing-perfuming seed to be understood?
He answers: right up until the realization of the buddhas' awakening, this hearing-perfuming, following along wherever it has its basis, is "lodged" within the maturation-consciousness, turning together in union with the storehouse consciousness, like water and milk mixed together (sharing the same place while each keeps its own nature); yet it is not the storehouse consciousness, for it is precisely the seed-nature that "counteracts the storehouse consciousness" (its nature is the opposite of the storehouse consciousness).
He adds a word on the order of cultivation: in dependence on the "lower-grade" perfuming the "middle-grade" is cultivated; in dependence on the "middle-grade," the "upper-grade" is cultivated; this comes about in accordance with hearing, reflecting, and cultivating, more and more, in gradual correspondence.
He says further: the lower, middle, and upper grades of this "right hearing-perfuming" seed, know, are also the seeds of the "dharma-body" — they are opposed to the storehouse consciousness, not gathered in by the storehouse consciousness, for they are of the nature of "an outpouring from the most-purified supramundane dharma-realm"; though they are still counted as worldly (the uncontaminated has not yet manifested), they are the seed-nature of the supramundane mind. And even when this supramundane mind has not yet arisen, this hearing-perfuming is already able to counteract the various afflictive entanglements, already able to counteract the various perilous evil destinies, already able to act as a "rotting-away counteraction" upon all the evil deeds one has done (making the force of the evil deeds wither away), and is also able to follow along in meeting and serving all the buddhas and bodhisattvas. Though it is still worldly, know that the perfuming gained by a "bodhisattva at the beginning of practice" is also gathered into the "dharma-body"; whereas what is gained by śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas is gathered only into the "liberation-body" (the bodhisattva leads on to the dharma-body, while the two vehicles stop at the liberation-body).
He says further: this perfuming, since it is not the storehouse consciousness, is gathered into the "dharma-body and liberation-body." As the perfuming, by lower-grade, middle-grade, and upper-grade in turn, gradually increases, just so the maturation-fruit consciousness (the storehouse consciousness) in turn gradually diminishes — and this is called the "transformation of the basis" (turning the root basis from defiled to pure). Once the "basis of all seeds" has entirely turned, then the maturation-fruit consciousness, together with all the seeds it holds, "turns with no seeds" (no more defiled seeds left to give rise to anything), and all defiled seeds are forever cut off.
Asaṅga then explains the "water and milk" simile: in what way is it "like water and milk"? It means that "non-storehouse consciousness (the pure hearing-perfuming)" and "the storehouse consciousness," though they turn together in the same place, end in this way: the seeds on the storehouse consciousness's side gradually run out, while the seeds on the non-storehouse-consciousness side gradually increase. It is like milk mixed into water — when the goose drinks, it can drink only the milk and leave the water (each takes by its own nature). Again, it is like a worldly person gaining "freedom from desire": the "non-meditatively-poised (scattered-stage) perfuming" gradually diminishes and the "meditatively-poised (concentration-stage) perfuming" gradually increases, and so the basis is turned (the transformation of the basis).
20. Once more, by "the attainment of cessation," refuting the claim that "there is a mental consciousness in the attainment"
Asaṅga adds several more points, still proving in reverse that there must be a storehouse consciousness —
The Noble One has said: when one enters the "attainment of cessation," "consciousness does not depart from the body." But in the attainment of cessation all six consciousnesses are inactive; so the consciousness that "does not depart from the body" must be the maturation-consciousness (the storehouse consciousness holding the body); and entering the attainment of cessation is not at all for the sake of counteracting and extinguishing this maturation-consciousness (what the attainment of cessation extinguishes is the mind and mental factors of the first six consciousnesses, not the storehouse consciousness).
Again: it is not the case that "this consciousness arises afresh only when one comes out of the attainment." Because once the maturation-consciousness is broken off, it is just like the continuum of birth being broken off — it cannot arise again (if the storehouse consciousness were cut off, the life-faculty would be cut off; how would one come out of the attainment at all?); plainly, then, the storehouse consciousness was not cut off in the attainment.
Again, there are those who stubbornly hold that "in the attainment of cessation there is in fact still a mental consciousness, and so it is said to have mind" — Asaṅga says this "mind" cannot be established, and lists a string of reasons: by the very meaning of "attainment" it ought not to still have mind (the attainment would not be established); no object-support and no mental aspect can be found in the attainment (object-support and aspect cannot be found); if there were a mental consciousness there ought to be wholesome roots corresponding with it (there would be the fault of wholesome roots corresponding); to say it is unwholesome or indeterminate is in both cases unreasonable (unwholesome or indeterminate does not hold); if there were a mental consciousness there ought to be "perception and feeling" in operation (yet the attainment of cessation is precisely the cessation of perception and feeling — so there would be the fault of perception and feeling operating); there ought to be "contact" to be found (contact would be found); the mental consciousness ought to exert a function upon the concentration (it has a function with respect to the meditative concentration); the attainment of cessation would then turn out to be the cessation of "perception" alone (there would be the fault of only perception ceasing); there ought to be wholesome roots such as "volition and faith" in operation (there would be the fault of its volition, faith, and such wholesome roots operating); to keep "the dependent mental consciousness" yet say it is "parted from its basis" does not hold (to pull out that dependent and have it part from its basis does not hold); and there is a ready simile to prove it (there is a simile); in short, the mental consciousness is not something the attainment of cessation ought to have — it ought not to be here (just as a non-omnipresent factor is not present here).
He says further: were one to insist that in the attainment of cessation "there is mind by way of the mental consciousness," then this mind cannot be settled as wholesome, unwholesome, or indeterminate — and so it does not hold.
Again, some hold separately: "form and mind arising one after another without a gap (the prior form-mind ceases, the next form-mind immediately arises) — this continuum itself is the seed of all things." — Asaṅga says this too cannot be established, as was already stated before (a mindless state intervenes, the continuum is broken, the seeds have nowhere to be set up). Furthermore: if this were so, then when one passes away from the formless realm or the heaven of no-thought, or comes out of the attainment of cessation and the like, that "form and mind arising without a gap" has long since been broken off — so how would the later phenomena arise? — it does not hold. And "the final mind of an arhat" could not be accounted for either (there is no mind afterward to join on, so where would the seed lodge?). So this position can at most be allowed a "immediately-antecedent condition" (the condition of a prior moment leading on to the next), but it cannot bear the role of "seed."
Asaṅga sums up this whole long passage: seen in this way, if one sets aside the "maturation-fruit consciousness of all seeds," defilement and purity, both sides, fail to hold; therefore one can settle it — the storehouse consciousness, with all the aspects spoken of above, definitely does exist.
He draws this point together in a set of verses, whose meaning is roughly: a bodhisattva at the stage of the purified mind has left behind the five consciousnesses — and even to no remainder (even the defiled consciousness exhausted) — so how would you set up that "transformation of the basis" of the mind? If you say "the transformation of the basis is just cutting off what is to be counteracted," then "cutting off" spoken of alone does not work either (if fruit and cause had no distinction, one falls into the difficulty where "permanent cutting-off" itself becomes a fault); if you then say "even with no seed, or no substance, it can still count as the transformation of the basis," then since both of those (seed, substance) are now gone, the term "transformation of the basis" would have nothing to rest on. — Layer upon layer of questioning, and in the end it still drives toward "there must be a storehouse consciousness that can hold seeds and can turn the basis."
21. The "differentiations" of the storehouse consciousness: three kinds and four kinds
Asaṅga asks: how, then, are the various "differentiations" (classifications) of the storehouse consciousness to be stated? In brief one may state them as three kinds, and one may also state them as four kinds.
Three kinds — stated in terms of "the differentiations of three kinds of perfuming":
One, the differentiation of name-and-word perfuming (the differences among seeds perfumed in by various names and concepts). Two, the differentiation of view-of-self perfuming (the differences among seeds perfumed in by the view that grasps a self). Three, the differentiation of factors-of-becoming perfuming (the differences among seeds perfumed in by the twelve factors of becoming, by the force of deeds).
Four kinds — stated in terms of the following four:
One, the differentiation of inducement — this refers to "newly arisen perfuming." Were this item absent, then "formations conditioning consciousness" and "grasping conditioning becoming" (these two links in the twelvefold chain) could not connect (new deeds must rely on new perfuming to induce later consciousness and later becoming).
Two, the differentiation of maturation — this refers to the differences among the maturation-fruits drawn on, in the various destinies of the six paths, with "formations and becoming" as condition. Were this item absent, then there would be no seeds, and the arising of later-life phenomena could not be established.
Three, the differentiation of object-aspect — this refers to the "object-aspect of the grasping of self" within the "thought-faculty" (the defiled mind). Were this item absent, then "the object grasped by the grasping of self" within the defiled mind could not be set up.
Four, the differentiation of features — this refers to the various features this consciousness carries: there is a "shared feature" and an "unshared feature," a "feature of seeds with no further birth" and a "feature of seeds with a further birth," and so on.
Asaṅga spells out the "differentiation of features" in detail —
The "shared feature" refers to the seeds able to manifest the "world-receptacle" (the mountains, rivers, and great earth — the commonly-shared environing world) (the world that beings commonly draw on and commonly face). The "unshared feature" refers to the seeds of "each one's own inner bases" (the eye and other inner faculties, each one's own separate body) (each person's own portion, not shared with others). The shared feature is just the "feature of seeds with no further birth"; the unshared feature is just the "feature of seeds with a further birth."
When the noble path's "counteraction" arises, what is extinguished is only what the "unshared feature" side counteracts (each person cuts off his own portion of inner-body seeds); as for the "shared feature" (the common world), it is held fast by the discriminations of other beings, and although the noble one cuts off his own side, he cannot cut off the world for others too — the noble one only "sees it as pure" there (sees that it is pure). Just as a yoga-practitioner (one cultivating contemplative practice) can raise various different resolutions and various different visions toward one and the same object, and those visions can each be established (changing with the mind, each seeing differently).
Asaṅga states it in a verse: the shared (the shared bond) is hard to cut off and hard to know all around, and so it is called the "shared bond"; if the yoga-practitioner's mind has been transformed, then (though the thing is not extinguished) what is seen is already different, because the "outer feature" is vast and held in common by the many; one who gains purity, though unable to extinguish that shared world, is already able to see its purity there; just as a purified buddha-land is made to appear pure precisely by the buddha's pure vision.
He attaches another verse, restating the foregoing point that "various resolutions and various visions can each be established," whose meaning is: the various yoga-practitioners, toward one and the same object, have resolutions that are each different, yet the various visions can each be established; from this one may know — what is grasped as object is in fact "consciousness-only" (everything seen does not depart from the manifestation of mind and consciousness).
Asaṅga then says: were this item (the "differentiation of features") absent, then "the various differences in the arising of the world-receptacle (the material world) and the world of sentient beings" could not be established.
Asaṅga adds several more sets of "features" —
Again there are the "feature of coarse-heaviness" and the "feature of pliancy": the feature of coarse-heaviness refers to the seeds of the afflictions and secondary afflictions (heavy, coarse, and rough, obstructing the path); the feature of pliancy refers to the seeds of contaminated wholesome things (light, sharp, and at ease, conducive to the wholesome). Were this item absent, then "the maturation-fruit drawn on being in some cases capable (capable of cultivating the wholesome, having the ability) and in some cases incapable, and the differences of basis in this 'capable or not'" could not be established.
Again there are the "feature of exhaustible experience" and the "feature of inexhaustible experience": the feature of exhaustible experience refers to the wholesome and unwholesome seeds of the already-ripened maturation-fruit (which, once the retribution is experienced to the full, are finished); the feature of inexhaustible experience refers to the seeds of "name-and-word perfuming" — those seeds perfumed in by the streaming-on of various conceptual proliferations (verbal discriminations) from beginningless time, going on without end. Were this item absent, then "the wholesome and unwholesome deeds already done coming to an end once their fruit is experienced to the full" could not be established; and "new name-and-word perfuming arising on and on" could not be established either.
Again there is the "feature of simile": this means that this storehouse consciousness can be likened to "an illusion, a mirage, a dream, a cataract (the sky-flowers seen in an eye-disease)" (seeming to be there, yet not real). Were this item absent, then "from the seeds of unreal universal-discrimination, the arising of various inverted object-aspects (mistaking the false and empty for real)" could not be established.
Again there are the "feature of full possession" and the "feature of not-full-possession": the various "fully bound" (ordinary beings whose afflictive bondage is still entire) are the feature of full possession; the "worldly ones free of desire" (those who have suppressed the craving for desire) are the feature of diminishment (diminished by a portion); the "trainee śrāvakas" and "the bodhisattvas" are the feature of partial permanent extraction (having permanently cut off a portion); the "arhats, pratyekabuddhas, and the tathāgatas" are the feature of the complete permanent extraction of the affliction-obstruction (arhats and pratyekabuddhas), and up to the feature of the complete permanent extraction of both the affliction-obstruction and the obstruction-to-the-knowable (the tathāgatas, with both obstructions exhausted) — each settled by its own station. Were this item absent, then "the gradual reversal-and-extinction of defilement by this sequence (cutting off defilement layer by layer from ordinary being up to noble one)" could not be established.
22. Why the maturation-fruit is "non-obstructive-and-indeterminate"
Asaṅga asks at the last: why is it that wholesome things and unwholesome things both can draw on a maturation-fruit, while the maturation-fruit drawn on is "non-obstructive-and-indeterminate" (無覆無記) (not obstructing the noble path, neither wholesome nor unwholesome)?
He answers: it is precisely because the maturation-fruit is non-obstructive-and-indeterminate that it can be at odds with neither the "wholesome" nor the "unwholesome" side — whereas the wholesome and the unwholesome are at odds with each other (incompatible as fire and water). Suppose the maturation-fruit itself carried a wholesome or an unwholesome nature; then "the gradual reversal-and-extinction of defilement" could not be established (if the fruit were fixedly wholesome or fixedly unwholesome, it would be locked solid and could not turn). So the maturation-consciousness is solely "non-obstructive-and-indeterminate."
經論宗依
本分先引《阿毘達磨大乘經》的界頌與阿賴耶頌，又引《解深密經》的阿陀那頌，從經證建立所知依。世親、無性二釋進一步開出攝藏三義、異名與破異執的論證；義疏所講的藏識，須同時守住這些經證與古釋。
請你先靜下來，問自己一件事：在你所有念頭的底下，在那個你一向喚作『我』的東西的更深處，還有沒有一層你自己根本感覺不到的心，一刻不停地在運轉？ 你做的每一件事、起的每一個念，做完、起完就過去了，可它們真的就憑空消失了嗎？業造下之後藏到哪裡去，能隔一生、隔多生再來結果？你辛苦修來的善法又寄存在何處，不隨前念的熄滅而一併熄滅？
無著菩薩造《攝大乘論》，立大乘為十根支柱，稱「十種殊勝」；而這十根之中，第一根、也是其餘九根都要踩上去的那塊地基，他叫它『所知依』——一切『所應知道的道理』所依靠的根本。地基是什麼？無著開門見山，一個字都不繞：就是阿賴耶識。
他為什麼非立這麼一個識不可？正因為上面那串問題，若找不到一個能貫穿生死、能攝持業種、能讓修行不落空的根本識，輪迴就講不通，解脫也講不通。所以這一整分，從頭到尾只做一件事：把這層藏在最底下、你感覺不到卻片刻不離的心，一寸一寸安立起來，並且最後正面證明它「決定是有」。以下順著無著的話講下來。
一、『阿賴耶』就是一個『藏』
無著起手先交代來歷。世尊在哪裡說過這個識？在一部叫《阿毘達磨大乘經》的經裡，有兩首偈。前一首說：「無始時來界，一切法等依，由此有諸趣，及涅槃證得」——從無始以來，就有這麼一個作為根本的『界』，一切法都平等地依著祂；正因為有祂，才有六道輪迴，也才有涅槃的證得。後一首點名：「由攝藏諸法，一切種子識，故名阿賴耶」——正因為祂收藏著一切法的種子，所以叫祂阿賴耶。
『阿賴耶』這三個字，翻過來就是『藏』。為什麼叫藏？無著說有三層意思，缺一不可。
其一，祂是被收藏的地方。我們起的每個念、做的每件事，凡屬雜染的，都會在這個識裡留下一份『將來能再生起同類東西』的潛力，存進去——所以對這些雜染法來說，祂是收藏處，是『果』。其二，祂是能生出東西的主人。存進去的潛力不是死的；因緣一到，祂又從這個識裡把現行生出來——所以反過來，祂又是一切法生起的『因』。其三，祂是被誤認作自我的對象。在更底層，有一個微細的心（下面要講的『染污意』），無始以來一直把這個識緊抱著當『我』。
被藏、能藏、被執為我——三義合起來，才叫阿賴耶識。世親與無性於此釋名，皆順這『攝藏』三義開講；無性更簡別一句：這裡的『藏』唯就雜染這一面說，不是把清淨法也算進去。
二、阿陀那識——把生命『續下去』的那股執持力
同一個識，經裡還換別的名字稱呼，每個名字都點出祂的一種作用。第一個別名，最深，叫阿陀那識，意思是『執持識』。無著引《解深密經》的一首偈來說祂，這偈你務必慢慢讀——
「阿陀那識甚深細，一切種子如瀑流，我於凡愚不開演，恐彼分別執為我。」
請看這個『瀑流』的比喻有多準。一道瀑布，遠看像一條靜止懸著的白練，彷彿是『一個東西』掛在那兒；可你湊近看，它哪有一刻是同一捧水？是後浪推著前浪、剎那剎那不停地流，才在外表撐出那條『不變的白練』。阿陀那識就是這樣：祂甚深、極細，前一念才滅、後一念就生，相續不斷，從不停留，卻在這不停的奔流中撐起了『一個我』的假象。世尊說「我於凡愚不開演」——對根器還沒成熟的人，先不挑明這個識，正是怕他們一聽說有個又深又細、又貫穿生死的識，立刻又把祂抓來當『我』，反而誤事。
祂執持什麼？無著說兩樣。一是執持我們這具有色的身體——正因為有祂在背後不斷地『抓著』，眼耳鼻舌身這些根才不壞散、能撐過一期壽命；人一斷氣、祂一離開，身體立刻就敗壞了。二是投胎受生的那一剎那，由祂去『抓取』當生的果報身，作新一期生命的依託。一句話：阿陀那，就是把生命『續下去』的那股執持力。
三、心、意、識——三個字，各指一物
祂又叫心。佛常連說『心、意、識』三個字，乍聽像同義反覆，其實這三者各有所指，無著在此一一拆開。
『心』就是這個積集種子的阿賴耶識——『心』者『積集』義，祂積集著種種法薰下來的種子，像一座不斷累積的庫；離開阿賴耶識，再也找不到別的東西堪作『心』的本體。『識』指前六識，作用是『了別』——分辨眼前的境，這是好懂的。而『意』，最容易被滑過去，卻最關鍵，所以無著要單講。
『意』有兩種。一種好懂：前一念剛滅的識，給後一念讓出位子、作它生起的依靠，這叫『等無間』的意——『等無間』就是中間沒有任何間隔、前滅後生緊接著。另一種就幽微極了：有一個心，從不間斷地在背景裡，把那個阿賴耶識執為『我』。這個心，就是下一段的主角——染污意。
四、那個一直在偷偷執『我』的心：染污意
染污意是什麼？這是一個老跟四種煩惱綁死在一起的心：把這身心當我的「薩迦耶見」（我見）、覺得我高人一等的『我慢』、貪愛這個我的『我愛』、對真相蒙昧的『無明』。染污意一刻不停地執阿賴耶識為我，而且這四樣煩惱與之形影不離。
問題來了：你憑什麼說底下真有這麼一個心？你又看不見它。無著的辦法極漂亮——他不直接給你看，他叫你把它拿掉試試，看會冒出多少說不通的亂子。他一口氣排出六種過失：
第一，若沒有它，那種誰都拗不過、跟具體善惡無關、底色般始終存在的「不共無明」就無處安立了。第二，五識生起時各有它『俱有依』（同時並存的所依根）——這套『五同法』的道理也跟著垮。第三，連『阿賴耶』『阿陀那』這些名相的『訓釋詞』（依字釋義的說法）都立不住。第四，無想定與滅盡定這兩種深定本該有高下之別——無想定還留著我執的染污，滅盡定才真把它伏住；可你若不立染污意，這兩種定就分不出深淺了。第五，生在無想天的眾生，一整期生命裡本該還潛伏著我執我慢；拿掉染污意，這就說不成了。第六，也是最切身的一條：我們明明在行善、或在發呆放空（無記）的時候，那股『以為有個我』的底味照樣在——它連你睡著都還在運轉。若說『執我』只是偶爾跟惡念一起冒出來，那就解釋不了：為什麼行善、無記的當下也照樣有我執？
六條過失條條都指向同一個結論：底層確有一個微細、持續、不分善惡都在運轉的執我之心。這六過的歸謬正是無著立染污意的命脈——世親順論逐一訓釋這六過，無性則在釋六過之外，更把根本論收攝六過的那首偈也申析開來，並點出它的性質：它不善也不惡（無記），卻像一層蒙在眼上的薄翳，遮住我們見真相的眼——這叫「有覆無記」。『有覆』就是有遮蔽，『無記』就是不記為善也不記為惡。
五、聲聞乘為什麼不明說——卻早已暗暗點到
有人會追問：這麼要緊的一個識，為什麼早期講給聲聞弟子聽的經裡不直接講？無著的回答很有分寸：不是不知道，而是『對那群人不必挑明』。聲聞行者求的是了脫自己這一身的生死，並不需要遍知一切法的底細，所以不對他們細說這個深細的識，他們照樣修得成解脫；可菩薩要遍知一切、要成就佛那『無所不知之智』，就非把這個根本講清楚不可——否則「不易證得一切智智」。
而且聲聞乘其實早就『暗示』過了。經裡說眾生「愛阿賴耶、樂阿賴耶、欣阿賴耶、憙阿賴耶」——眾生深深貪戀、依依不捨的那個東西，正是這藏識。不同部派也各用自己的名字點到祂：大眾部叫祂『根本識』，並用一個樹的比喻——祂像樹根，一切識都依著祂而起，離了根就什麼也長不出來；化地部叫祂「窮生死蘊」，意思是窮盡生死、一路相續到底的那一蘊——因為他們注意到：有時候（像某些無心的位次）眼前的身心活動會中斷，可生命並沒有真的斷，足見底下必有個不斷的東西續著。
種種名字，其實指的是同一個識。無著用一個很美的說法收束：阿賴耶識「成大王路」——就像四面八方的小路最後都通向同一條「大王之路」（主幹大道），名號再多，通的是同一處。
六、為什麼只有『藏識』配叫阿賴耶——一道漂亮的反證
既然眾生「愛阿賴耶」，就有人猜：那個被愛著、抱著不放的『阿賴耶』，會不會其實另有所指？有人說是這具五蘊身（五取蘊），有人說是那種伴著貪的快感（貪俱樂受），有人說是『覺得有個我』的我見（薩迦耶見），還有人乾脆說『心意識本是一個東西，只是字面不同』。無著說，這幾家「由教及證，愚於藏識」——是因為對藏識還不明白，才這麼猜的。
他怎麼破？用一招極漂亮的反證：凡是會被人厭離、想擺脫的東西，就絕不可能是眾生最深執為我的那個。你看——生在最苦的惡趣裡，眾生對這受苦的五蘊身只想趕快甩掉，怎會抱五蘊身為我？修到第四靜慮以上，那種伴貪的快感早就沒了、甚至成了被嫌棄的東西，怎會抱樂受為我？在正法中真信解了無我的人，對『我見』處處提防厭惡，怎會抱我見為我？可是——哪怕你生地獄一心求離苦身、哪怕你入深定厭離了樂受、哪怕你信解無我厭離了我見，有一樣東西你從來、從來沒想過要離開，那股底層的執我之愛始終死死纏著祂：那就是阿賴耶識。
正因為唯獨祂符合『無論如何都被執為我、卻從不被厭離』這條件，所以只有祂，才真配叫阿賴耶。世親於此就三反例作簡明的訓詁；無性則逐家申其立計之由，破得更詳——分二阿賴耶這一段，正是古德二釋最見功力、開合最分明之處。
七、藏識的三個面相：祂怎麼『持種』
把這個識看得更立體些，無著給了三個面相，是同一個識的三個看法。自相（祂本來的樣子）：祂能攝持一切種子，這是祂的本色——一座持種的庫。因相（祂作為原因的那一面）：庫裡的種子，時時刻刻在當一切雜染法生起的因。果相（祂作為結果的那一面）：而這座庫之所以裝著這些種子，又是被無始以來一切雜染法薰出來的——所以祂同時也是被薰的『果』，並且念念相續地生下去。同一個識，從『持』看是自相，從『生』看是因相，從『被薰』看是果相。
八、什麼是『薰習』——苣蕂與花的香
種子是怎麼來的？關鍵在『薰習』這個詞，而薰習的關鍵，又在四個字：俱生俱滅。能薰的東西（比如一個念頭）和被薰的心同時生、同時滅，就在這同生同滅的一剎那，被薰的心裡留下了『將來能再生起同類東西』的潛力——這份潛力就是種子，留下它的這個過程就是薰習。
無著舉了三個例子，第一個最傳神：拿花來薰苣蕂（胡麻、芝麻）。花和芝麻一起放、一起收，花謝了、芝麻收了，可這芝麻就帶上了花香的因，日後榨出油來仍有花香。芝麻和花「俱生俱滅」，香的因就這樣薰進去了——阿賴耶識受薰的道理，跟這一模一樣。第二個例子：貪心重的人，每起一次貪就薰一次，心裡帶貪的因愈積愈厚，所以積習難改。第三個例子：好學多聞的人，每一次專注聽聞都薰下一份記持的因，所以能把所學牢牢攝持，成為『持法的人』。
九、種子不是倉庫裡一粒粒的小東西
這裡要破一個很自然的誤會：種子，是不是像一粒粒米，分開地、實實在在堆在『識』這座倉庫裡？無著說，都不是。種子並非另有一個個獨立的『實物』住在識中，但也不是跟識完全沒分別、混成一團分不出。那它到底是什麼？它就是這個識『能生出某種東西的功能差別』——是一種潛能、一種傾向，不是一顆顆小球。正因為這識帶著種種不同的生果功能，才把祂叫「一切種子識」。
那麼識和祂生出的雜染法，是什麼關係？是同時、互相作因。無著一連用了三個比喻。第一個：明燈的焰與炷——油燈的火焰和燈芯，是同一個剎那互相成就的：芯燒出焰、焰又燒著芯，誰也不在誰之後，是「同時更互」。第二個：兩束蘆葦對靠——兩束蘆葦互相撐著，同時站住、誰也不倒；藏識和雜染法就這樣同時互為因，識持種而生法（識是因），法現行又薰回識（法是因），來回不斷。
第三個比喻最妙，講『種子明明無差別，怎能生出萬般有差別的法』——纈衣入染缸。一塊要紮染（古代的紮染工藝，先把布按花樣紮起來）的布，當它紮著、還沒下缸的時候，看上去渾然一色，看不出什麼花樣；可一下染缸，那斑斕的花紋、交錯的圖像就一齊顯現出來了。種子薰進識裡的時候也是這樣，渾然一味、看不出差別；等到『結果』這口染缸現前，無量差別的諸法才一齊顯出來。
十、兩種緣起，與生盲摸象
『緣起』講的是萬法怎麼依條件而起。無著說，這道理在大乘裡極細極深，略分兩種。第一種，叫「分別自性緣起」：一切法之所以能生，是因為藏識能變現出種種不同體性（自性）的法——這是講萬法生起的總根源。第二種，就是大家熟悉的十二因緣，叫「分別愛非愛緣起」：它管的是眾生在善道惡道裡，受用可愛、不可愛的種種果報——這是講苦樂果報怎麼來的。
為什麼非分這兩種不可？因為人一旦不懂第一種（根源的緣起），就會亂猜萬法的『第一因』：有人說是某個冥冥的自性，有人說是宿命註定，有人說是大自在天變的，有人說有個實在的我在主宰，有人乾脆說沒有因、純屬偶然。一旦不懂第二種（果報的緣起），就會以為真『有個我在造業、有個我在受報』。
無著用一個生盲摸象的比喻點破。一群生來就看不見的人，從沒見過象；有人牽來一頭象讓他們摸。摸到鼻子的、摸到牙的、摸到耳朵的、摸到腿的、摸到尾的、摸到背脊的，各摸著一塊。問他們象長什麼樣，答案五花八門：摸到鼻的說象像犁柄，摸到牙的說像杵，摸到耳的說像畚箕，摸到腿的說像石臼，摸到尾的說像掃帚，摸到背的說象像一座石山。無明的人對這兩種緣起的亂猜，正是如此：各抓著一端，就自以為見了全象。而阿賴耶識的全貌——祂的自性、祂作因、祂作果——就像那頭他們始終沒摸全的整象：誰也沒見著全象，卻人人都在下判語。
十一、種子要合的條件，與內種、外種
種子要能真當種子，得合幾個條件，傳統歸成六樣（種子六義）。無著在偈裡列得很緊，這裡用今語舒展開來：一要剎那即滅（它得是剎那生滅的活東西，不是僵著不動的死物，這樣才有生機）；二要俱有（要和它生的果同時並存，不是隔代相望）；三要恒隨轉（一類相續、不間斷地隨之而轉）；四要決定（善因生善果、惡因生惡果，因果決定不亂套）；五要待眾緣（不是隨時自己就冒，要等眾緣湊齊才生果）；六要唯能引自果（只引生自己這一類的果，種瓜得瓜、種豆得豆，瓜種絕不長出豆來）。
無著還特別分『外種』與『內種』。外種，像田裡的穀麥，有時不靠薰習、借點外緣也能生（拿穀子去種、不必先『薰』它）。可內種——也就是我們心裡由業和聞法薰成的種子——卻非有薰習不可。這一點極要緊：假如連聽聞正法薰下的種子都可以『不薰自有』，那修行就講不通了（不修也能得果、修了反而可能失去，全亂了套）。所以無著強調：哪怕是外種，歸根到柢也要靠內在藏識的薰習作緣，才真正立得住。
十二、根本識與活動識，怎麼互相依存
除了當根本的阿賴耶識，其餘那些向外活動、受用境界的識（前面說的前七轉識），可合稱『能受用的識』。根本識像底盤，活動識像在底盤上跑的車。無著引《中邊分別論》的一首偈點明：一個叫『緣識』（作所緣依託的根本識），一個叫『受用者』（受用境界的活動識）。
這兩者怎麼配合？還是那句互相作對方的條件：諸法薰進藏識（法為因、識為果），藏識又生諸法（識為因、法為果），來來回回，互為因果。這裡無著又引《阿毘達磨大乘經》一偈坐實：「諸法於識藏，識於法亦爾，更互為果性，亦常為因性。」
緣的種類也就理清了：在『根源緣起』裡，根本識與活動識互為親因（因緣）；到了『果報緣起』（十二因緣）那邊，根本識則是幫襯的增上緣。前六識的生起，靠的是增上緣、所緣緣、等無間緣這幾種。三種緣起——窮盡生死的（根源）、感召善惡趣的（果報）、受用境界的（活動識）——加起來，四種緣（因緣、增上緣、所緣緣、等無間緣）就都齊了。
十三、最關鍵的證明：沒有藏識，染與淨統統立不住
前面安立了藏識的種種名相，現在無著要正面證明這個識「非有不可」。他的策略很乾脆——把藏識拿掉，你會發現染污的一面和清淨的一面通通講不通。
先看煩惱這一面。 假設沒有藏識，那貪等煩惱的種子只能存在前六識裡。可前六識是斷斷續續的——眼識才滅，耳識、意識就插進來把它隔斷了。一個剛滅、現在已經沒有體的眼識，怎麼可能跨過中間這一串隔斷，把種子交給後來的貪？已經沒有的東西不能生果。再說，這薰下的種子要存哪兒也成問題：存在『貪』裡嗎？貪自己也生滅不住、留不住種。存在別的識裡嗎？別的識各依各的根，又不和它同生同滅。存在它自己裡嗎？它根本不和自己同生同滅。哪兒都存不住。可見：必須有一個相續不斷、能穩穩存種的識——那就是藏識。
再看造業這一面。 十二因緣裡『行緣識』這一環，講的就是業行薰成識中的種子；沒有藏識來存，這一環就接不上，後面『取緣有』也跟著垮了。
再看受生這一面。 投胎的時候，中陰身的染污意識先滅，要和母胎裡那團初凝的胎質（羯羅藍）結合。問題來了：去跟胎質結合的那個識，若說它就是『意識』，會冒出一串矛盾——母胎裡豈不就有兩個意識同時在轉了？而且這個結合識是恆時的、不攀緣外境的，根本不像意識的脾性。無著順著逼問：那這結合識到底是不是「一切種子識」？若是，那祂其實就是阿賴耶識，你不過換了個『意識』的名字叫祂罷了；若說『依著祂而起的後一個識』才是種子識，那就成了——作因的識反而不持種、作果的識倒持種，因果顛倒。怎麼推，都只剩一條出路：那結合識不是意識，正是執持生命的異熟識（阿賴耶）。 此外，執持根身、識與名色「如蘆束相依」地互相撐著、有情賴以維繫的『識食』、在等引地（定地）受生、生到無色界、臨終時身體由下往上（或由上往下）一截截地變冷……這些只要少了藏識，全都說不成。
再看世間清淨這一面（比如從欲界修上色界定）。用來修的，是欲界的善心；要修成的，是色界的定心。可這兩者並不同時生滅，前者沒法直接薰成後者的種子；而過去多生雖也修過定心，那些定心早已過去、現在沒有體了，也當不了今天的種子。所以必須有個藏識，把定心的種子一路傳到今天來當因，欲界善心只是從旁幫忙的緣。
最後看出世清淨這一面。 佛說，出世的正見要靠「聽聞正法」加「如理思惟」這兩個因才生得起來。可問題是：聽法的時候耳識在動，思惟的時候耳識早不起了；意識又老被別的雜念打斷。哪怕一剎那薰下了種子，這一念意識轉眼就過去、沒有體了，怎麼還能當種子去生起後來的出世心？而且「如理思惟」是世間心，『正見』是出世心，兩者從不同時生滅，世間心薰不出出世心。結論又一次被逼出來：必須有個藏識，把聽聞薰下的種子攝持住，出世清淨才講得通。
十四、那麼，解脫到底從哪裡來？——聞法薰成的清淨種子
這就帶出全分最深、也最動人的一問：如果藏識裡裝的都是雜染種子，那能對治雜染、把人領向解脫的「清淨種子」，到底從哪兒冒出來？出世的心，是我們無始以來從沒修過、從沒生過的，照理出世心的種子根本就不存在——種子既然本來就沒有，出世心又怎麼生得出來？
無著的回答，是整部論的樞紐：出世心的種子，是『從最清淨法界等流的正聞薰習』生的。意思是——諸佛所親證的那個最清淨的真實（法界），會『平等地流出』為正法的言教；我們去聽聞、去薰習這份從清淨法界流出來的正法，就在心裡薰下了一種全新的種子。這種子不是從藏識的染種裡長出來的，而是從『聽聞清淨正法』這件事薰成的。
接著是最精微的一步。有人會追問：這份聞法薰成的種子，到底算不算藏識的一部分？無著說，兩邊都不對。若說聞薰種子就是藏識的本性，種子自己也是染的，怎麼反過來對治染？若說聞薰種子完全不屬於藏識，又依託在哪裡、靠什麼存在？正解是：在還沒成佛之前，這清淨種子寄住在藏識裡，和藏識一起運轉，就像水和乳摻在一起——同處共存，體性卻不相同。聞薰種子的身分始終是『藏識的對治者』，是混在染識裡頭、卻不屬於染識的一股清流。
這股清流會長大：由下品薰成中品，由中品薰成上品，靠的是不斷地聞、思、修。而且要知道，這正聞薰成的清淨種子，其實就是『法身的種子』——清淨種子眼下雖還寄在世間的藏識裡，本性卻是出世的、是從最清淨法界流出來的。即使還沒現起成出世心，清淨種子也已在發揮力量：對治煩惱、對治墮惡趣的勢力、瓦解既造的惡業、讓人有緣親近承事諸佛菩薩。菩薩修得的這份薰習，將來成就的是『法身』；聲聞、獨覺修得的，則只成就『解脫身』（只了脫生死，未圓滿法身）。
於是最美的一幕出現了，這就是『轉依』——轉換生命所依的那塊底盤。隨著清淨種子由下而中而上、節節增長，那個裝染種的異熟識就節節消減；等到清淨這邊圓滿、染污那邊的種子徹底斷盡，生命的『底盤』就整個換掉了——這叫轉依。無著用一個絕妙的比喻收束：水和乳摻在一起，鵝去喝，竟能只把乳喝走、把水留下；清淨種子在染識中漸漸增長、染種漸漸消盡，正像這隻鵝飲乳一樣，能在渾摻一處中，只取那一分而把另一分留下。又像人修到離欲時，散亂的薰習一點點減、定的薰習一點點增，慢慢就轉過來了。
——請你特別留意這一段：它回答了『染識何以能生淨』這個看似自相矛盾的大問題。答案不是『染識自己變出了淨』，而是『另有一股從清淨法界來的清流，暫寄在染識中，終將反客為主』。這是《攝大乘論》整套修行觀的基石。
十五、滅盡定裡，到底還有沒有心？
聖教說，修到『滅盡定』（連最細的心識活動都止息的甚深定）的時候，『識仍不離身』。那這個不離身的識，是哪一個？只能是藏識——因為滅盡定要止息的，是前六識和那些染污的心所，並不是要對治藏識。如果連藏識都斷了，出定的時候，生命憑什麼接得回來？正因為藏識並沒有斷，出定才接得上。
有人偏要說『滅盡定裡其實還留著一個意識在活動』，無著一口氣列了一長串矛盾把它駁倒：既然名叫『滅盡』定，還留個意識在那兒攀緣、在那兒運轉，那還算什麼『滅盡』？種種都說不通。結論還是同一個：要有那個不離身的藏識，這些位次才講得通。講到這裡，全部證明合攏：離了藏識，染、淨都不成立，所以這個識，決定是有。
十六、藏識的種種面相
證成了藏識實有，無著再把祂的『分類面相』理一遍，幫我們看得更細。
按所薰的種類，可分三種薰習：『名言』的（用語言概念去分別事物，薰下萬法生起的親因）、『我見』的（染污意執我所薰下的）、『有支』的（造善惡業、感未來果報所薰下的）。換個角度，又可分四類差別：新薰起的（引發）、感異熟果的（異熟）、作染污意所緣的（緣相），以及下面要細講的『相貌』。
『相貌』裡，最值得講的是一組：共相與不共相。共相，是『器世間』（山河大地這個共同世界）的種子；不共相，是各人『根身』的種子。這一組解釋了一件我們習以為常、其實極深的事：為什麼我們各有各的身體（不共），卻共享著同一個世界（共）？因為共相的種子，是大家共同變現、共同維繫的。也正因如此，當一個修行人證了道、心已轉淨，他能滅掉的『只是自己根身那一份染種』（不共相）；那個共同的世界（共相），卻因為還被無數沒證道的人共同執持著，並不會跟著消失——但在已淨的人眼裡，同樣一個世界，卻顯出清淨來。經裡的偈點明這層：同一個東西，不同心境的瑜伽行者會看出不同的相（這正是『萬法唯識』的有力證據——好幾位瑜伽行者看同一物，各人所見都能成立，足見所見的境其實是各自的識變現出來的）；乃至清淨的佛土，也由佛的清淨見而顯現。
此外還有幾組面相，一併點到。麤重與輕安：煩惱的種子讓身心粗重、僵滯不堪，善法的種子讓身心輕快、堪能用功。有受盡與無受盡：已成熟的善惡果報種子，受報受完也就了了（有受盡）；而名言薰下的種子，無始以來戲論流轉、相續不盡（無受盡）。還有如幻的譬喻——藏識所變現的，如幻、如陽焰、如夢、如眼翳所見的空花，似有而非實。最後是從凡到聖的一條光譜：煩惱全縛的凡夫（具縛）、伏而未斷的世間離欲者（損減）、分斷的有學聖者與菩薩（一分永拔）、斷盡煩惱障的阿羅漢獨覺、二障俱斷的如來——這條由染到淨、層層遞進的光譜，也唯有安立了藏識持種，才排得出來。
結語、為什麼這個識是「無覆無記」——以及它通向哪裡
最後一問，收束全分：既然善業、惡業都從藏識生，為什麼藏識所感的那個果報體（祂的異熟性），卻是「無覆無記」——既不善也不惡的中性？
無著的回答很見功力：正因為祂中性，才能同時容得下善與惡兩種種子並存。 善和惡彼此相違、勢不兩立，可它們都能存進一個中性的庫裡；也正因為祂中性，從染到淨的整個升沉轉換，才跑得起來。試想：如果這塊底盤本身就是善的、或就是惡的，那染淨同處、漸轉漸淨就根本不可能了。所以異熟識只能是無覆無記。
這，就是〈所知依分〉從頭到尾的全副用心：先安立一個無覆無記、能持種受薰的阿賴耶識，作一切染淨法的共同地基；輪迴與還滅、繫縛與解脫，全都在這塊地基上發生。地基立定了，下一分〈所知相分〉才好接著講——立足於這個『所知依』，我們所要認識的種種法，究竟會現出什麼樣的『相』？那便是三自性（依他起、遍計所執、圓成實）的一片天地了。無著要從這層『藏在最底下的心』，一路把你領到『世界與心如何呈現』的真相門前。
承衍
《唯識三十論頌》開篇承用阿賴耶識、異熟與一切種子，又續說染污意；《成唯識論》再廣開其義。這條承衍可顯所知依如何成為後出唯識論書的地基，但本分仍以攝論三譯與二釋為準。
Scriptural and Commentarial Ground
This division first cites the realm verse and the storehouse verse of the Abhidharma Mahayana Sutra, then the appropriating-consciousness verse of the Samdhinirmocana Sutra. The two ancient commentaries unfold the three senses of storing, the alternate names, and the refutations of rival accounts; the exposition keeps those warrants together.
Settle yourself first, and ask yourself one thing. Beneath all your thoughts, deeper than that thing you have always called "I" — is there a layer of mind you cannot feel at all, running on without a single pause? Every act you perform, every thought you raise, passes away the moment it is done; but do they truly vanish into nothing? Once an act of karma is done, where is it stored away, that it can ripen into its fruit a lifetime — many lifetimes — later? And the wholesome qualities you laboured to cultivate — where are they kept, that they do not perish together with the thought that preceded them?
Asanga composed the Mahayanasamgraha, setting up ten pillars for the Great Vehicle, which he calls the "ten kinds of excellence"; and of these ten pillars, the first — the very ground on which the other nine must all stand — he calls the "basis of the knowable": the root upon which everything that ought to be known depends. And what is this ground? Asanga says it at the outset, without circling around a single word: it is the storehouse consciousness (alaya-vijnana).
Why must he posit such a consciousness at all? Precisely because of that string of questions above: unless one can find a root consciousness that runs through birth-and-death, that can hold and carry the seeds of karma, that keeps practice from coming to nothing — then samsara makes no sense, and liberation makes no sense either. So this whole chapter, from beginning to end, does one thing only: inch by inch it establishes this mind that lies hidden at the very bottom, which you cannot feel yet which never leaves you for an instant, and at the last it proves head-on that it most certainly exists. What follows expounds Asanga's words in order.
1. "Alaya" simply means a "store"
Asanga begins by giving the lineage. Where did the World-Honoured One ever speak of this consciousness? In a sutra called the Abhidharma-mahayana-sutra, there are two verses. The first says: "From beginningless time there is the realm (dhatu), the equal support of all dharmas; because of it there are the destinies of rebirth, and the attainment of nirvana as well" — from beginningless time there has been just such a fundamental "realm" on which all dharmas equally rest; precisely because it exists, there is the round of the six destinies, and the realization of nirvana as well. The second verse names it outright: "Because it stores and holds all dharmas, it is the consciousness containing all seeds; therefore it is called the alaya" — precisely because it stores up the seeds of all dharmas, it is called the alaya.
These syllables "alaya," rendered over, mean "store." Why "store"? Asanga says there are three senses, none of which may be missing.
First, it is the place where things are stored. Every thought we raise, every act we do — whatever is defiled — leaves in this consciousness a portion of potential "to give rise again later to something of the same kind," which is deposited into it. So with respect to these defiled dharmas, it is the place of storage, the "fruit." Second, it is the master that gives rise to things. The potential deposited into it is not dead; when conditions are right, it again brings forth the active arising out of this consciousness. So, conversely, it is also the "cause" of the arising of all dharmas. Third, it is the object mistakenly grasped as a self. At a deeper level there is a subtle mind (the "defiled mind" to be discussed below) that, from beginningless time, has been clutching this consciousness as "I."
Stored, storing, and grasped as a self — these three senses taken together are what is called the storehouse consciousness. In glossing the name here, both Vasubandhu and Asvabhava expound it along these three senses of "storing and holding"; Asvabhava adds one distinguishing remark: the "store" here is spoken of only on the side of defilement — it does not reckon the pure dharmas into it.
2. The appropriating consciousness — the force of holding that keeps life "continuing on"
The same consciousness is called by yet other names in the sutras, each name pointing to one of its functions. The first alternate name, the deepest, is the appropriating consciousness (adana), which means "the consciousness that holds and appropriates." Asanga cites a verse from the Samdhinirmocana-sutra to describe it, and this verse you must read slowly —
"The appropriating consciousness is deep and subtle; all its seeds are like a torrent. I do not expound it to the foolish, lest they discriminate and grasp it as a self."
See how exact the simile of the torrent is. A waterfall, seen from afar, looks like a still white ribbon hung in the air, as though "one thing" were draped there; but come close, and where is it ever the same handful of water for even a moment? It is wave pushing wave, instant after instant flowing without pause — and only so does it prop up, on the surface, that "unchanging white ribbon." The appropriating consciousness is just like this: deep, exceedingly subtle, the prior thought-moment perishing the very instant the next is born, continuous and unbroken, never resting — and yet within this ceaseless rushing it props up the illusion of "an I." The World-Honoured One says, "I do not expound it to the foolish": for those whose capacity is not yet ripe, he does not at first make this consciousness plain, precisely for fear that the moment they hear there is a consciousness so deep and subtle, running through birth-and-death, they would at once seize upon it as "I," and so come to harm.
What does it hold and appropriate? Asanga says two things. One, it appropriates this material body of ours — precisely because it is there behind the scenes ceaselessly "holding on," the faculties of eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body do not decay and scatter, and can last out a single lifespan; the moment one's breath stops and it departs, the body at once decays. Two, at the very instant of taking rebirth, it "appropriates" the fruiting body of that life, to serve as the support for a new span of life. In a word: adana is the very force of holding that keeps life "continuing on."
3. Mind, thought, consciousness — three words, each pointing to its own thing
It is also called mind. The Buddha often says "mind, thought, consciousness" in a single breath, and at first this sounds like a synonymous repetition; in truth these three each point to something distinct, which Asanga here takes apart one by one.
"Mind" (citta) is this storehouse consciousness that accumulates seeds — "mind" means "accumulation," and it accumulates the seeds perfumed in by all the various dharmas, like a storehouse that piles up without cease; apart from the storehouse consciousness, no other thing can be found fit to be the substance of "mind." "Consciousness" (vijnana) refers to the first six consciousnesses, whose function is "discerning" — distinguishing the object before one; this much is easy to grasp. But "thought" (manas), most easily glossed over, is the most crucial, and so Asanga discusses it separately.
"Thought" is of two kinds. One is easy: the consciousness that has just perished in the prior moment yields its place to the next moment and serves as its support for arising — this is the thought of "immediate succession" ("immediate succession" meaning that between them there is no interval at all, the prior perishing and the next being born in unbroken sequence). The other is exceedingly subtle: there is a mind, never interrupted, that in the background grasps that storehouse consciousness as "I." This mind is the protagonist of the next section — the defiled mind (klista-manas).
4. The mind that all along is secretly grasping "I": the defiled mind
What is the defiled mind? It is a mind bound up inseparably with four afflictions: the "view of a personal self" (the self-view that takes this body-and-mind to be "I"); "self-conceit" (feeling oneself superior); "self-love" (craving for this self); and "ignorance" (being benighted about the truth). It grasps the storehouse consciousness as "I" without a moment's pause, and these four follow it like an inseparable shadow.
Here comes the question: on what grounds do you say there really is such a mind underneath, when you cannot see it? Asanga's method is exquisite — rather than show it to you directly, he tells you to try removing it and see how many things stop making sense. He lays out in one stretch six faults:
First, if it were absent, that "unshared ignorance" — the kind no one can overcome, unconnected to any particular good or evil, present always like a ground-colour — would have nowhere to be established. Second, when the five (sense-)consciousnesses arise, each has its "co-existent support" (the faculty-support that exists simultaneously with it); this doctrine of "the five sharing one rule" would collapse along with it. Third, even the "explanatory glosses" (the explanations of meaning by the words) of terms like "alaya" and "adana" could not stand. Fourth, the two deep attainments — the attainment of no-thought and the attainment of cessation — ought to differ in rank: the attainment of no-thought still retains the defilement of self-grasping, while only the attainment of cessation truly subdues it; yet if you do not posit a defiled mind, these two attainments cannot be told apart in depth. Fifth, a being born in the heaven of no-thought ought, throughout that whole span of life, still to have self-grasping and self-conceit latent within; remove the defiled mind, and this cannot be accounted for. Sixth — and this one is the most intimate — even while we are plainly doing good, or in a blank, indeterminate (avyakrta) state, that undertone of "supposing there is an I" is still there; it goes on running even while you sleep. If "grasping a self" only occasionally arose together with evil thoughts, then there would be no explaining why self-grasping is equally present in the very moments of doing good and of being indeterminate.
All six faults point to one conclusion: there is indeed underneath a subtle, continuous, self-grasping mind that runs on regardless of good or evil. These six reductios are the very lifeblood of Asanga's establishing of the defiled mind — Vasubandhu glosses these six faults one by one in line with the treatise, while Asvabhava, besides explaining the six faults, further unfolds the verse in which the root treatise gathers up the six faults, and points out its nature: it is neither wholesome nor unwholesome (indeterminate), yet like a thin film cast over the eye, veiling the eye that would see the truth — this is called "obstructive-indeterminate." "Obstructive" means it veils; "indeterminate" means it is recorded as neither wholesome nor unwholesome.
5. Why the Sravaka Vehicle does not say it outright — yet has already quietly pointed to it
Someone may press: such an important consciousness — why is it not spoken of directly in the early sutras taught to the disciples of the Sravaka (Hearer) path? Asanga's answer is finely measured: it is not that it was unknown, but that "for that group there was no need to make it plain." Sravaka practitioners seek to be freed from the birth-and-death of this single body of theirs; they have no need to know thoroughly the inner workings of all dharmas, and so this deep and subtle consciousness is not expounded to them in detail — they still accomplish liberation all the same. But the bodhisattva must know all things thoroughly, must accomplish the Buddha's "omniscient knowledge," and so cannot but make this root clear — otherwise "it is not easy to attain the wisdom of all-knowing-wisdom."
And in fact the Sravaka Vehicle had long since "hinted" at it. A sutra says that beings "love the alaya, delight in the alaya, rejoice in the alaya, take joy in the alaya" — the thing that beings deeply crave and cannot bear to part with is precisely this storehouse consciousness. Different schools too each pointed to it by their own names: the Mahasamghika school called it the "root consciousness," using a tree simile — it is like the root of a tree, on which all the consciousnesses depend in order to arise; cut from the root, nothing can grow. The Mahisasaka school called it the "aggregate that lasts to the end of birth-and-death," meaning the aggregate that exhausts birth-and-death and continues all the way through — because they had noticed that sometimes (as in certain mindless states) the present activity of body-and-mind is interrupted, yet life is not truly cut off, which shows that underneath there must be something unbroken continuing on.
The various names, in truth, all refer to the one same consciousness. Asanga draws it together with a beautiful image: the storehouse consciousness "becomes the great royal road" — just as the small paths from all directions finally lead to the one same "great royal road" (the main thoroughfare), so however many its names, they all lead to the one same place.
6. Why only the "storehouse" deserves to be called alaya — an elegant counter-proof
Since beings "love the alaya," some conjectured: this "alaya" that is loved and clung to — might it in fact be something else? Some said it is this five-aggregate body (the five appropriated aggregates); some said it is that pleasurable feeling accompanied by craving (the joy conjoined with craving); some said it is the "sense that there is an I," the view of a personal self; and some said outright that "mind, thought, and consciousness are at bottom one thing, only the words differ." Asanga says that these various parties, "by both scripture and reasoning, are confused about the storehouse consciousness" — it is because they are not yet clear about the storehouse consciousness that they conjecture so.
How does he refute them? With an exquisite counter-proof: whatever a person comes to loathe and wish to be rid of can never be the very thing that beings most deeply grasp as a self. Consider: born into the most miserable evil destinies, beings want only to fling off this suffering five-aggregate body as fast as they can — how could they cling to it as "I"? Cultivated above the fourth meditative absorption, that craving-accompanied pleasure has long since vanished, has even become a thing despised — how could one cling to it as "I"? One who within the true Dharma has genuinely understood selflessness guards against and loathes "self-view" at every turn — how could he cling to it as "I"? And yet — even if you are born in hell and single-mindedly seek to leave the suffering body, even if you enter deep absorption and have come to loathe pleasurable feeling, even if you understand selflessness and have come to loathe self-view, there is one thing you have never, ever thought of leaving, to which that underlying self-loving grasp clings on and on for dear life: and that is the storehouse consciousness.
Precisely because it alone meets the condition of "being grasped as a self no matter what, yet never being loathed," it alone truly deserves to be called the storehouse consciousness. Vasubandhu gives a concise gloss on the three counter-examples here; Asvabhava unfolds, party by party, the grounds on which each set up its position, and refutes them in fuller detail — this passage on the storehouse consciousness in Chapter 2 is just where the two ancient commentaries are at their most skilful, their analysis most clearly articulated.
7. The three characteristics of the storehouse consciousness: how it "holds the seeds"
To see this consciousness more in the round, Asanga gives three characteristics, three ways of looking at the one same consciousness. The self-characteristic (its own native aspect): it can hold and carry all seeds — this is its native colour, a storehouse that holds the seeds. The cause-characteristic (its aspect as a cause): the seeds in the storehouse are, moment by moment, serving as the cause for the arising of all defiled dharmas. The fruit-characteristic (its aspect as a result): and the reason this storehouse comes to hold these seeds is that it has been perfumed by all defiled dharmas from beginningless time — so it is at the same time the "fruit" that is perfumed, continuing to arise thought after thought. The one same consciousness: viewed from "holding" it is the self-characteristic, from "giving rise" it is the cause-characteristic, from "being perfumed" it is the fruit-characteristic.
8. What "perfuming" is — the scent of flower in sesame
Where do the seeds come from? The key lies in the word "perfuming," and the key to perfuming lies in four words: arising together, perishing together. The thing that perfumes (a thought, say) and the mind that is perfumed arise at the same time and perish at the same time, and in that very instant of co-arising and co-perishing there is left in the perfumed mind a potential "to give rise again later to something of the same kind" — this potential is the seed, and the process that leaves it is perfuming.
Asanga gives three examples, the first the most vivid: perfuming sesame with flowers. The flower and the sesame are placed together and gathered together; the flower withers, the sesame is gathered, yet the sesame has taken on the cause of the flower's scent, so that the oil pressed from it later still carries that fragrance. The sesame and the flower "arise together and perish together," and so the cause of the scent is perfumed in — the principle by which the storehouse consciousness is perfumed is exactly this. The second example: a person heavy with greed perfumes once with every arising of greed, and the greed-laden cause within the mind grows ever thicker, so that the ingrained habit is hard to change. The third example: one who learns much and hears much perfumes in a portion of the cause of retention with each attentive act of hearing, and so can firmly hold what has been learned, becoming a "holder of the Dharma."
9. Seeds are not little things stacked one by one in a warehouse
Here a very natural misunderstanding must be broken: are seeds, then, like grains of rice — separate, solid, heaped up inside this "consciousness" as a warehouse? Asanga says: not at all. Seeds are not a set of independent "real things" residing in the consciousness; but neither are they utterly undifferentiated from the consciousness, fused into one mass beyond telling apart. What, then, are they? They are just this consciousness's "differentiated capacity to give rise to a particular kind of thing" — a potency, a tendency, not a set of little balls. Precisely because this consciousness carries within it all the various fruit-giving capacities, it is called the "consciousness containing all seeds."
Then what is the relation between the consciousness and the defiled dharmas it gives rise to? They are simultaneous, mutually serving as cause. Asanga uses three similes in a row. The first: the flame and the wick of a lamp — the flame and the wick of an oil-lamp are accomplished by each other in the very same instant: the wick burns out the flame, and the flame in turn burns the wick; neither comes after the other, but "simultaneously and mutually." The second: two bundles of reeds propped against each other — two reed-bundles support each other and stand at the same moment, neither falling. The storehouse consciousness and the defiled dharmas are mutual causes in just this way, at the same time: the consciousness holds the seeds and gives rise to the dharmas (the consciousness is cause), and the dharmas, manifest in act, perfume back into the consciousness (the dharmas are cause), back and forth without cease.
The third simile is the finest, addressing "the seeds are plainly without distinction, so how can they give rise to dharmas of every distinct kind?" — tie-dyed cloth into the dye-vat. A piece of cloth to be tie-dyed (the old craft of tie-dyeing, in which the cloth is first bound up according to a pattern): while it is still bound and has not yet gone into the vat, it looks all of one colour, and no pattern can be made out; but the moment it goes into the dye-vat, the riotous figures, the interlacing images, all show forth at once. So too when the seeds are perfumed into the consciousness — all of one flavour, no distinctions to be seen; and when the dye-vat of "fruition" comes forth, the boundless distinctions among the dharmas show forth all at once.
10. The two dependent originations, and the blind men touching the elephant
"Dependent origination" speaks of how all dharmas arise in dependence on conditions. Asanga says this principle is exceedingly subtle and deep within the Great Vehicle, and may be roughly divided into two. The first is called "the dependent origination that distinguishes own-being": all dharmas can arise because the storehouse consciousness can manifest dharmas of all various own-natures (own-beings) — this speaks of the total source of the arising of all dharmas. The second is the familiar twelvefold conditioned arising, called "the dependent origination that distinguishes the loved and the unloved": it governs the loved and unloved fruits of recompense that beings undergo in the good and evil destinies — this speaks of how the fruits of pleasure and pain come about.
Why must these two be distinguished? Because once a person fails to understand the first (the dependent origination of the source), he will wildly guess at a "first cause" of all dharmas: some say it is some hidden own-being, some say it is fixed by fate, some say it is the transformation of Mahesvara (the Great Lord-god), some say there is a real self in command, and some say outright that there is no cause at all, that it is pure chance. And once one fails to understand the second (the dependent origination of recompense), one will suppose there truly "is an I that creates karma, an I that undergoes recompense."
Asanga breaks this open with a simile of blind men touching an elephant. A group of men blind from birth, who have never seen an elephant; someone leads an elephant to them to feel. One feels the trunk, one the tusk, one the ear, one the leg, one the tail, one the spine — each touching one part. Asked what an elephant is like, their answers run all over: the one who felt the trunk says an elephant is like a plough-handle; the one who felt the tusk, like a pestle; the one who felt the ear, like a winnowing-basket; the one who felt the leg, like a mortar; the one who felt the tail, like a broom; the one who felt the back, like a stone mountain. The wild guessing of the ignorant about these two dependent originations is exactly this: each clutching one end, each supposing he has seen the whole elephant. And the whole of the storehouse consciousness — its own-being, its acting as cause, its acting as fruit — is like that whole elephant they never managed to touch in full: no one has seen the whole elephant, yet everyone is handing down a verdict.
11. The conditions seeds must meet, and inner seeds and outer seeds
For seeds to truly serve as seeds, they must meet several conditions, traditionally grouped into six (the six features of seeds). Asanga lists them tightly in verse; here they are stretched out in present-day language. First, perishing in the instant (a seed must be a living thing of instantaneous arising-and-perishing, not a rigid dead thing, so that it has vital force). Second, co-existence (it must exist simultaneously with the fruit it gives rise to, not facing it across generations). Third, continuously following on (continuing of one kind, uninterruptedly following along). Fourth, being determinate (a wholesome cause gives a wholesome fruit, an unwholesome cause an unwholesome fruit; cause and effect are determinate and do not get crossed). Fifth, awaiting the assembly of conditions (it does not pop up of itself at any time, but awaits the gathering of conditions before it gives fruit). Sixth, drawing forth only its own fruit (it draws forth only the fruit of its own kind — plant melons and you get melons, plant beans and you get beans; a melon-seed will never grow a bean).
Asanga further distinguishes "outer seeds" and "inner seeds." Outer seeds, like the grain in the field, can sometimes arise even without perfuming, by borrowing some outer condition (you take grain and sow it without first "perfuming" it). But inner seeds — that is, the seeds within our minds perfumed by karma and by hearing the Dharma — cannot do without perfuming. This point is utterly crucial: if even the seeds perfumed in by hearing the true Dharma could exist "of themselves without perfuming," then practice would make no sense (you could attain the fruit without cultivating, and might even lose it by cultivating — all thrown into disorder). So Asanga stresses: even outer seeds, at bottom, must also rely on the perfuming of the inner storehouse consciousness as their condition before they can truly stand.
12. Root-consciousness and active consciousnesses, how they depend on each other
Besides the storehouse consciousness that serves as the root, those other consciousnesses that turn outward and enjoy objects (the seven active consciousnesses spoken of earlier) may together be called "the consciousnesses that enjoy." The root consciousness is like the chassis, the active consciousnesses like the cars running on the chassis. Asanga cites a verse from the Madhyanta-vibhaga to make it plain: one is called the "conditioning consciousness" (the root consciousness that serves as object-support), the other the "enjoyer" (the active consciousness that enjoys objects).
How do these two work together? Again that same phrase — each serving as the other's condition: the dharmas perfume into the storehouse consciousness (the dharmas are cause, the consciousness is fruit), and the storehouse consciousness in turn gives rise to the dharmas (the consciousness is cause, the dharmas are fruit), back and forth, mutually cause and fruit. Here Asanga cites another verse from the Abhidharma-mahayana-sutra to settle it: "All dharmas store within the consciousness, and the consciousness within the dharmas likewise; reciprocally they are each other's fruit-nature, and constantly each other's cause-nature."
The kinds of condition are thereby sorted out too: in the "dependent origination of the source," the root consciousness and the active consciousnesses are each other's direct cause (the causal condition); over in the "dependent origination of recompense" (the twelvefold chain), the root consciousness is the assisting dominant condition. The arising of the first six consciousnesses relies on these — the dominant condition, the object-condition, and the immediately-preceding condition. The three dependent originations — that which exhausts birth-and-death (the source), that which summons the good and evil destinies (recompense), and that which enjoys objects (the active consciousnesses) — together complete all four conditions (causal condition, dominant condition, object-condition, immediately-preceding condition).
13. The most crucial proof: without the storehouse consciousness, neither defilement nor purity stands
Having set up the various names of the storehouse consciousness, Asanga now means to prove head-on that this consciousness "cannot but exist." His strategy is direct — take the storehouse consciousness away, and you will find that the side of defilement and the side of purity both stop making sense.
First, the side of the afflictions. Suppose there is no storehouse consciousness; then the seeds of greed and the other afflictions could only reside in the first six consciousnesses. But the first six consciousnesses are intermittent — the eye-consciousness has just perished when the ear-consciousness or the mind-consciousness cuts in and interrupts it. An eye-consciousness that has just perished, and now has no substance at all, how could it leap across this whole string of interruptions and hand the seed over to a later greed? What no longer exists cannot give a fruit. And where the perfumed seed is to reside is also a problem: reside in "greed"? Greed itself does not stay put, arising and perishing, and cannot retain a seed. Reside in some other consciousness? The other consciousnesses each depend on their own faculty, and do not co-arise and co-perish with it. Reside in itself? It does not co-arise and co-perish with itself at all. Nowhere can it reside. Which shows: there must be a consciousness continuous and unbroken, able to store the seeds steadily — and that is the storehouse consciousness.
Next, the side of creating karma. In the twelvefold chain, the link "consciousness conditioned by formations" speaks precisely of the karmic formations being perfumed into seeds within the consciousness; with no storehouse consciousness to store them, this link cannot be joined, and the later "existence conditioned by clinging" collapses along with it.
Next, the side of taking rebirth. At the moment of taking rebirth, the defiled mind-consciousness of the intermediate-state being first perishes, and must join with that first-congealed embryonic matter (the kalala) in the mother's womb. Here comes the problem: that consciousness which goes to join with the embryonic matter — if you say it is just the "mind-consciousness," a string of contradictions arises: would there not then be two mind-consciousnesses turning at once in the mother's womb? Moreover, this joining consciousness is constant and does not take outer objects as its support — which is utterly unlike the temperament of the mind-consciousness. Asanga presses on: is this joining consciousness, then, the "consciousness containing all seeds" or not? If it is, then it is in fact the storehouse consciousness, and you have merely renamed it "mind-consciousness." If you say it is "the later consciousness that arises in dependence on it" that is the seed-containing consciousness, then it comes out that the consciousness serving as cause does not hold the seeds while the consciousness serving as fruit holds the seeds — cause and effect reversed. However you push it, only one way out remains: that joining consciousness is not the mind-consciousness, but precisely the ripening consciousness (the alaya) that appropriates and holds life. Beyond this, the appropriating of the material faculties; consciousness and name-and-form propping each other up "like bundles of reeds leaning together"; the "consciousness-as-nutriment" by which sentient beings are sustained; taking rebirth in a state of even-concentration (a meditative ground); being born into the formless realm; the body growing cold section by section from below upward (or from above downward) at the time of death — all of these, the moment the storehouse consciousness is lacking, can no longer be accounted for.
Next, the side of worldly purity (for instance, cultivating up from the desire-realm to the form-realm absorption). What one cultivates with is the wholesome mind of the desire-realm; what is to be accomplished is the concentrated mind of the form-realm. But these two do not co-arise and co-perish, and the former cannot directly perfume into the seed of the latter; and although one may have cultivated the concentrated mind in many past lives, those concentrated minds have long since passed and have no substance now, and cannot serve as today's seed. So there must be a storehouse consciousness to carry the seed of the concentrated mind all the way down to today to serve as the cause, with the wholesome mind of the desire-realm only assisting from the side as a condition.
Finally, the side of supramundane purity. The Buddha says that the supramundane right view arises from two causes: "hearing the true Dharma" and "thinking it through in accordance with principle." But the problem is: while hearing the Dharma the ear-consciousness is active, and while thinking it through the ear-consciousness is no longer arising; and the mind-consciousness is forever being interrupted by other scattered thoughts. Even if a seed is perfumed in for a single instant, this thought of mind-consciousness passes in the blink of an eye and has no substance — how could it still serve as a seed to give rise to the later supramundane mind? Moreover, "thinking it through in accordance with principle" is a worldly mind, and "right view" is a supramundane mind; the two never co-arise and co-perish, and the worldly mind cannot perfume out the supramundane mind. The conclusion is forced once again: there must be a storehouse consciousness to hold and carry the seed perfumed in by hearing, before supramundane purity can make sense.
14. So where, then, does liberation come from? — the pure seeds perfumed by hearing the Dharma
This brings out the deepest and most moving question of the whole chapter: if what the storehouse consciousness holds is all defiled seeds, then the "pure seed" that can counteract defilement and lead a person toward liberation — where on earth does it spring from? The supramundane mind is something we have never cultivated, never given rise to, from beginningless time; by rights its seed simply does not exist — and if the seed never existed, how could the supramundane mind ever be brought forth?
Asanga's answer is the pivot of the whole treatise: the seed of the supramundane mind arises from the "perfuming of right hearing, equally flowing forth from the most pure dharma-realm." That is to say — that most pure reality (the dharma-realm) personally realized by the Buddhas "flows forth equally" as the verbal teaching of the true Dharma; and we, by hearing and being perfumed by this true Dharma that flows forth from the pure dharma-realm, perfume into the mind a brand-new seed. It does not grow out of the defiled seeds of the storehouse consciousness; rather, it is perfumed in by the very act of "hearing the pure true Dharma."
Then comes the most delicate step. Someone will press: does this seed perfumed in by hearing the Dharma count as part of the storehouse consciousness or not? Asanga says: both sides are wrong. If you say it is the very nature of the storehouse consciousness, then it too is defiled — how could it turn around and counteract defilement? If you say it does not belong to the storehouse consciousness at all, then on what does it rest, by what does it exist? The correct view is: before Buddhahood is attained, this pure seed lodges within the storehouse consciousness and turns together with it, just like water and milk mixed together — co-resident in one place, yet of a nature that is not the same. Its identity is always that of "the counter-agent of the storehouse consciousness," a pure current mixed in among the defiled consciousness yet not belonging to the defiled consciousness.
This pure current will grow: from the lower grade it is perfumed into the middle grade, from the middle into the higher, by ceaseless hearing, thinking, and cultivating. And one must know that this pure seed perfumed in by right hearing is in fact the "seed of the dharma-body" — though for now it still lodges within the worldly storehouse consciousness, its nature is supramundane, flowing forth from the most pure dharma-realm. Even before it has manifested as the supramundane mind, it is already exerting its power: counteracting the afflictions, counteracting the force that drags one into the evil destinies, breaking down the evil karma already made, and making a person able to draw near and serve the Buddhas and bodhisattvas. The perfuming a bodhisattva cultivates will in the future accomplish the "dharma-body"; what Sravakas and Pratyekabuddhas cultivate accomplishes only the "liberation-body" (freed from birth-and-death alone, the dharma-body not yet perfectly-accomplished).
And so the most beautiful scene appears, and this is "the transformation of the basis" — the changing-over of the very ground on which life depends. As the pure seed grows by stages from lower to middle to higher, the ripening consciousness that holds the defiled seeds wanes by stages; and when the side of purity is perfected and the seeds on the side of defilement are utterly cut off, the "ground" of life is changed over altogether — this is the transformation of the basis. Asanga draws it together with a marvellous simile: water and milk are mixed together, and a goose, drinking, can drink off only the milk and leave the water behind; the pure seed gradually grows within the defiled consciousness while the defiled seeds gradually waste away, just like this goose drinking the milk — able, within what is all blended in one place, to take only the one portion and leave the other behind. It is also like a person who, cultivating to the point of leaving craving behind, finds the perfuming of distraction lessening little by little while the perfuming of concentration increases little by little, and so gradually turns over.
This passage answers the great, seemingly self-contradictory problem of "how a defiled consciousness can give rise to purity." The answer is not "the defiled consciousness itself produced purity," but "there is a separate pure current, come from the pure dharma-realm, lodging for a time within the defiled consciousness, which will in the end turn from guest into host." This is the cornerstone of the whole practice-view of the Mahayanasamgraha.
15. In the attainment of cessation, is there still a mind, or not?
The sacred teaching says that when one cultivates to the "attainment of cessation" (the deep absorption in which even the subtlest activity of mind-consciousness is stilled), "consciousness still does not depart the body." Then this consciousness that does not depart the body — which one is it? It can only be the storehouse consciousness — because what the attainment of cessation stills is the first six consciousnesses and those defiled mental factors; it is not aimed at counteracting the storehouse consciousness. If even the storehouse consciousness were cut off, then when one emerges from the absorption, by what would life be picked up again? Precisely because the storehouse consciousness is not cut off, emergence from the absorption can be picked up.
Someone insists on saying "in the attainment of cessation there is in fact still a mind-consciousness active," and Asanga lists in one breath a long string of contradictions to refute it: since it is named the "attainment of cessation," if there were still a mind-consciousness there taking objects, there turning on, then what kind of "cessation" would that be? Every which way it fails to hold. The conclusion is still the same one: there must be that storehouse consciousness which does not depart the body, before these states can make sense. With this, the whole proof draws together: leave out the storehouse consciousness, and neither defilement nor purity is established; therefore this consciousness most certainly exists.
16. The various modes of the storehouse consciousness
Having proven that the storehouse consciousness really exists, Asanga goes over its "modes of difference" once more, to help us see it in finer detail.
By the kind of perfuming, it may be divided into three perfumings: that of "name-and-language" (using verbal concepts to discriminate things, perfuming in the direct cause for the arising of all dharmas); that of "self-view" (perfumed in by the defiled mind's grasping of a self); and that of "the limbs of existence" (perfumed in by creating wholesome and unwholesome karma and summoning future fruits of recompense). From another angle, it may be divided into four kinds of difference: that newly perfumed and arisen (instigation); that summoning the fruit of ripening (ripening); that serving as the object of the defiled mind (the object-aspect); and the "modes of appearance" to be discussed in detail below.
Within the "modes of appearance," the most worth discussing is one pair: the shared characteristic and the unshared characteristic. The shared characteristic is the seeds of the "container world" (this common world of mountains, rivers, and the great earth); the unshared characteristic is the seeds of each individual's "faculty-body." This pair explains something we take for granted yet is in truth exceedingly deep: why is it that we each have our own body (unshared), yet share one and the same world (shared)? Because the seeds of the shared characteristic are manifested in common, sustained in common, by all. And precisely because of this, when a practitioner has realized the Way and his mind has turned pure, what he is able to extinguish is "only that portion of defiled seeds belonging to his own faculty-body" (the unshared characteristic); that common world (the shared characteristic), because it is still held in common by countless beings who have not realized the Way, does not vanish along with it — but to the one already purified, that same one world shows forth as pure. The verse in the sutra makes this layer plain: of the one same thing, yoga-practitioners of differing states of mind will make out differing characteristics (this is precisely strong evidence for "all dharmas are consciousness-only" — several yoga-practitioners look at one same object and what each sees can each be established, which shows that the objects seen are in fact manifested by each one's own consciousness); and even the pure Buddha-land is manifested by the Buddha's pure seeing.
Beyond this there are several more pairs of modes, touched on together. Coarse-heaviness and pliancy: the seeds of the afflictions make body and mind coarse, heavy, and unworkable; the seeds of wholesome dharmas make body and mind light, quick, and capable of effort. The exhaustible-in-experience and the inexhaustible-in-experience: the seeds of already-ripened wholesome and unwholesome fruits are spent and done once their recompense has been undergone (exhaustible-in-experience); whereas the seeds perfumed in by name-and-language flow on in proliferation from beginningless time, continuing without end (inexhaustible-in-experience). There is also the simile of illusion — what the storehouse consciousness manifests is like an illusion, like a mirage, like a dream, like the sky-flowers seen by an eye with a cataract: seeming to exist, yet not real. And finally a spectrum from ordinary to noble: the ordinary person fully bound by the afflictions (fully bound); the worldly one who has left craving behind, suppressing but not yet cutting off (diminished); the partly-cut learners of the noble path and the bodhisattvas (one portion forever uprooted); the Arhats and Pratyekabuddhas who have cut off the affliction-obscuration; and the Tathagata who has cut off both obscurations — this spectrum, ascending layer by layer from defiled to pure, can likewise only be laid out by positing the storehouse consciousness as holder of the seeds.
Conclusion: why this consciousness is "non-obstructive-indeterminate" — and where it leads
A last question, to draw together the whole chapter: since both wholesome and unwholesome karma arise from the storehouse consciousness, why is the fruiting body it summons (its ripening-nature) "non-obstructive-indeterminate" — neutral, neither wholesome nor unwholesome?
Asanga's answer is masterful: precisely because it is neutral, it can hold the seeds of both good and evil at the same time. Good and evil are mutually opposed, irreconcilable; yet both can be deposited into one neutral storehouse. And precisely because it is neutral, the whole rising and sinking, the turning-over from defiled to pure, can be set in motion. Consider: if this ground were itself wholesome, or itself unwholesome, then the co-residence of defilement and purity, the gradual turning-pure, would be flatly impossible. So the ripening consciousness can only be non-obstructive-indeterminate.
This, then, is the whole aim of "The Basis of the Knowable" from beginning to end: first to establish a non-obstructive-indeterminate storehouse consciousness, able to hold the seeds and receive perfuming, as the common ground of all defiled and pure dharmas; samsara and the return-to-cessation, bondage and liberation, all take place upon this ground. Once the ground is fixed, the next chapter, "The Characteristic of the Knowable," can take up the thread: standing upon this "basis of the knowable," what "characteristics" will the various dharmas we are to know actually show forth? That is the whole country of the three natures (the other-dependent, the wholly-imagined, the perfectly-accomplished). From this layer of "the mind hidden at the very bottom," Asanga means to lead you all the way to the threshold of the truth of "how world and mind present themselves."
Later Reception
The Thirty Verses opens by taking up the storehouse consciousness, maturation, all seeds, and then the defiled mind; the Cheng weishi lun later expands them. This later reception shows how the basis of the knowable became a foundation for subsequent Yogacara treatises while leaving the three recensions and two commentaries primary here.
考據Apparatus
科判定位
此分在說什麼 — 全論第一殊勝『所知依』，即阿賴耶識（ālaya-vijñāna）。分二立阿賴耶識為一切雜染法之所依止，結構為：（a）阿賴耶之異門（阿賴耶識／阿陀那識／心／根本識／窮生死蘊等異名）、（b）三相安立（自相／因相／果相）、（c）薰習義（種子如何攝持）、（d）一切種子識與雜染法更互為因、（e）大乘極細甚深之緣起二種（分別自性／分別愛非愛）。此處只作定位，不重述逐句義理。
與全論的關聯 — 分二是十殊勝之地基：後九分（相→入→因果→修→三學→果）皆預設此持種根本識。對全書依存，如百法八識之於唯識、三十頌 vv.1–5 之於阿賴耶——攝論分二『立』之，三十頌『用』之（見互讀）。
異譯·平行對勘
攝論存三漢譯；分二核心術語三系對勘（玄奘 T1594 底本）。
| 義 | 玄奘 T1594（底本） | 真諦 T1593 | 佛陀扇多 T1592 | 校 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 殊勝目『所知依』 | 所知依 | 應知依止 | 智依 | |
| 根本識（ālaya） | 阿賴耶識 | 阿黎耶識 | 阿犁耶識（亦作阿梨耶識） | |
| 執受識（ādāna） | 阿陀那識 | 阿陀那識 | 阿陀那識 | 三系同 |
| 染污意（kliṣṭa-manas） | 染污意 | 染污意（亦作染污識） | 無此詞 | 佛陀扇多歧 |
| 種子識 | 一切種子識 | 一切種子識 | 無此詞 | 佛陀扇多歧 |
| 薰習（vāsanā） | 薰習 | 熏習（異體） | 無此詞 | |
| 化地部蘊名 | 窮生死蘊 | （無） | （無） | 唯玄奘譯 |
| 三相 | 自相／因相／果相〔0134b23〕 | 立自相／立因相／立果相〔相品第二·0115a08〕 | 自相差別處／因事差別相／果差別相〔0098b10〕 | 佛陀扇多歧（綴『差別處／差別相』、『因事』非『因』） |
| 緣起二種 | 分別自性緣起／分別愛非愛緣起〔0134c29〕 | 分別自性／分別愛非愛（作『緣生』）〔引證品·0115b10〕 | 性差別／愛不愛果差別（作『因緣』）〔0098c10〕 | 三系皆歧（玄奘『緣起』·真諦『緣生』·佛陀扇多『因緣』；名亦異） |
要點：① ālaya 三系音寫各異（阿賴耶／阿黎耶／阿犁耶），本編以玄奘譯語為準；② 佛陀扇多譯本在此差異最多，未見『染污意』、『一切種子識』、『薰習』、『窮生死蘊』等玄奘譯語；③「窮生死蘊」為玄奘所用譯語，真諦與佛陀扇多另有表述。三相與緣起二種的對勘亦見差異：佛陀扇多於三相綴『差別處／差別相』，緣起二種作『性差別／愛不愛果差別（因緣）』；玄奘作『分別自性／分別愛非愛（緣起）』，真諦作『緣生』。
經論宗依
分二嵌 8 處經／部派引證，各就底本玄奘 T1594 出處與 CBETA 全藏可考性列之；其中兩處查無逐字漢本依據。
| # | 引文（首句） | 攝論標稱出處 | T1594 出處 | 現存漢譯／古釋關係 | 出處性質 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 無始時來界，一切法等依… | 阿毘達磨大乘經 伽他 | 0133b15 | 源經已佚；此頌另見 T1585 成唯識論 · T1597 世親釋 · T1598 無性釋 | 源經不存；唯識系古籍平行保存 |
| 2 | 由攝藏諸法，一切種子識，故名阿賴耶… | 阿毘達磨大乘經 | 0133b18 | 同上：源經已佚；另見 T1585 · T1597 · T1598 | 源經不存；唯識系古籍平行保存 |
| 3 | 阿陀那識甚深細，一切種子如瀑流… | 解深密經 | 0133b27 | 現存 T16n0676《解深密經》0692c22（玄奘譯·心意識相品）；首句逐字相符，全頌即解深密阿陀那頌 | 回原經逐字符（首句相符 · 全頌 0692c22） |
| 4 | 心意識三 | 世尊說（泛引） | 0133c05 | 泛稱「如世尊說」，非定一經；阿含/大乘多處『心意識』連用 | 未定：泛引，無單一出處（不影響其泛引性質） |
| 5 | （染污意）薩迦耶見/我慢/我愛/無明 | 論主自立（非外引） | 0133c08 | 論本自說，非經證 | 未定：非引證 |
| 6 | 世間眾生，愛阿賴耶，樂阿賴耶… | 增壹阿笈摩 | 0134a18 | 現存漢譯增一阿含 T02n0125 查無『阿賴耶』任何音寫（阿賴耶/阿羅耶/阿黎耶/阿犁耶 全藏阿含部 T01–T02 零）；即巴利 ālayarāmā pajā 一段，漢譯傳統作義譯（愛樂／染著）而未音寫 | 源不可考——漢本無逐字依據，論以異門密意稱之 |
| 7 | （於聲聞乘）如來出現四德經 | 如來出現四德經 | 0134a22 | 無獨立現存本；CBETA 全藏僅 T1594 + T1598（無性釋） 引此名，別無他證 | 源不可考——僅見攝論傳承內部引稱，未見可定位的漢譯經文 |
| 8 | （大眾部）根本識 / （化地部）窮生死蘊 | 大眾部·化地部 阿笈摩 | 0134a24–25 | 部派 阿笈摩 漢本多佚；「窮生死蘊」唯玄奘本有此譯語（真諦/佛陀扇多無此詞）；部派歸屬屬教史 | 未定：部派異門 · 無現存部派阿含可校；教史註 |
要點：現存漢譯可逐字近合者唯第 3 項《解深密經》；第 1、2 項原經已佚，但 T1585／T1597／T1598 三證相合；第 6、7 項無逐字漢本依據，故只作攝論傳承內部引稱，不列為已定位的阿含原句。
所釋之經（佛說） — 分二阿賴耶說之經據樞紐為《解深密經》〈心意識相品〉阿陀那頌（T16n0676 0692c，現存漢譯可定位）；界頌、阿賴耶頌出《阿毘達磨大乘經》（漢土無全譯，但世親 T1597、無性 T1598、《成唯識論》T1585 三處同引）。
傳本 — 攝論原典已佚；阿賴耶頌、阿陀那頌無可供本版核驗的古德傳梵。現以三種獨立漢譯及古釋所引為據；無古德傳梵可核者從闕。
古德釋論（進階所依） — 分二阿賴耶為古釋最詳處，欲深究讀二系古印度釋（皆入藏）：
- 世親《攝大乘論釋》（bhāṣya）：真諦 T1595 · 笈多 T1596 · 玄奘 T1597。
- 無性《攝大乘論釋》（upanibandhana）：玄奘 T1598。 各處異釋彙見〈諸家異釋〉。
本論釋要
分二可分為三個論證單元。下列先概括本論立義，再並列世親 T1597、無性 T1598 二釋；細部異讀見〈諸家異釋〉。
- 染污意必有之證（0133c08–0134a17） 本論： 『若無染污意則成六種過失』之歸謬——一者不共無明不得有、二者五同法（五識俱有依）不得有、三者訓釋詞不得有、四者無想定與滅盡定無別、五者無想天一期應無我執、六者善不善無記一切時我執不得現行。 古釋： 世親（T1597 0325b28 以下）順論訓釋六過；無性（T1598 0384a02–a25 以下）於釋六過之外，別申根本論之攝義伽他（「若不共無明，及與五同法…」0384a14–21），並析『有覆無記性、一切時微細隨逐』之機理。是二釋俱備，而無性以申析之體稍展其機。
- 阿賴耶名最勝之諍（破四家）（0134a26–0134b22） 本論： 破四家以『心意識一、五取蘊、貪俱樂受、薩迦耶見』釋『阿賴耶』者；論主舉三反例（惡趣眾生不愛五蘊、第四靜慮以上無貪俱樂受、信解無我者厭薩迦耶見），證唯藏識（我愛隨縛，未嘗求離）堪當其名，「成就最勝」。 古釋： 此處二釋之體判然最著——世親（T1597 0327b19–b28）唯就反例語詞作訓詁（『不愚者者，謂諸菩薩…惡趣中者，謂餓鬼傍生那落迦…』），其釋簡；無性（T1598 0386c11 以下）則逐家申其立計之由，復開「愚」之二義，更加勝論之喻，其釋詳（細目見 〈諸家異釋〉〔三〕）。是破執之段落，無性顯詳。
- 聲聞乘異門密意之諍（0134a18–0134a26） 本論： 答『何故聲聞乘不說阿賴耶識』者——由深細境所攝故；然聲聞乘亦以異門密意已說之（四愛阿賴耶、大眾部根本識、化地部窮生死蘊），故曰「阿賴耶識成大王路」。〔引證之可考性見 〈經論宗依〉；述而不作，不判大乘是佛說。〕 古釋： 世親（T1597 0327a04–a09）以三時別釋四愛（現愛、過樂、今欣、未憙），復出別義；無性（T1598 0386a02–a09）則別繫部派（「是說一切有部中說」，世親未繫部），且時位配屬有異（樂屬現在、欣屬過去）（細目見 〈諸家異釋〉〔二〕）。是決了處，無性別出部派，二釋配屬亦異。
總之，本分二釋都依根本論次第申釋，詳略則隨段落而異。世親多順文訓詁；無性在破四家處逐家申明立計之由，又於四愛的部派歸屬與時位配屬另作分辨。三相安立處二釋較近，但仍各有補充：世親加『相應即修義』之訓，無性析「攝持種子相應」的文法與因類。主要出處為世親 T1597 0327a04–0327b28、0327c10–20，以及無性 T1598 0386a02–0386c11、0387b18–0387c07。
分二以『異門 · 三相 · 薰習 · 互為因 · 緣起』五事，立全論之地基——把『一切所應知法依何而立』收到一個持種的根本識上；其立論同時是一場『此識唯大乘能正說』的辯。
諸家異釋
分二為阿賴耶核心，古印度二系釋論於此最詳（皆入藏）：世親釋《攝大乘論釋》（bhāṣya）三譯——真諦 T1595 · 笈多 T1596 · 玄奘 T1597；無性釋《攝大乘論釋》（upanibandhana）——玄奘 T1598。玄奘系 T1597／T1598 逐玄奘十一分同構，可 1：1 對讀（主校）；真諦 T1595 將分二開為〈眾名／相／引證／差別〉四子品（玄奘攝為一分），讀其異釋須據此位移。以下列玄奘系二釋之四叉，引 T#＋出處，標『世親釋／無性釋』。
〔一〕界頌・阿賴耶頌・攝藏釋名之疏密 根本論引《阿毘達磨大乘經》二頌（界頌 0133b15・阿賴耶頌「…故名阿賴耶，勝者我開示」0133b19），並自設『攝藏三義』釋名（0133b20–24：雜染法藏此為果性／此識藏彼為因性／有情攝藏此識為自我）。三者皆本論所具，二釋於其疏密異：
- 世親釋（T1597 0324a21–b20）：界＝因，引世間於金鑛等說「界」名為喻；阿賴耶頌「由第二句釋第一句」，勝者＝諸菩薩眾（釋簡）；攝藏三義則訓『雜染品法是遮清淨義，於中轉故名為攝藏』。
- 無性釋（T1598 0383a05–b04）：界＝因＝種子，加簡「此唯雜染非是清淨」（伏「多聞熏習所依非阿賴耶識所攝」）；阿賴耶頌之釋較詳——簡別「藏最勝」非如大等顯了法性、明『阿賴耶識與諸轉識互為緣，展轉攝藏』、釋勝者＝大菩薩有堪能、為彼開示非餘劣者。
- 〔異點〕同本二頌＋攝藏三義，世親釋簡、無性釋詳（無性多出『唯雜染』界限、『藏最勝』簡別、轉識互緣、勝者＝有堪能）。
〔二〕聲聞乘異門・愛樂欣憙四名之時位配屬
- 世親釋（T1597 0327a04–18）：「愛阿賴耶」是總標句，餘三句約現・過・未三時別釋；復有別義——現在愛／過去樂／（由先世樂故）今世欣／未來憙。並釋大眾部「根本識」樹根喻（莖等總因，離根則無）、化地部「窮生死蘊」（有處＝無色界無色，有時＝無想等定無心，色心熏習為因故種不斷）。
- 無性釋（T1598 0386a02–10）：標其出處屬說一切有部（世親未指部派）；愛＝總說貪著阿賴耶識，樂＝現在世／欣＝過去世已生／憙＝未來世當生，『由樂欣喜總名愛阿賴耶』。
- 〔異點〕時位配屬相違：世親判『樂』屬過去，無性判『樂』屬現在、『欣』屬過去；無性別出部派歸屬（有部），世親未繫部。
〔三〕破異執之家數與開合
- 根本論（T1594 0134b01–06）列四家：① 心意識義一文異 ② 五取蘊名阿賴耶 ③ 貪俱樂受名阿賴耶 ④ 薩迦耶見名阿賴耶——「此等諸師，由教及證，愚於藏識，故作此執」。
- 世親釋（T1597 0327a25–0327b14）：略破。不展他師立計之由，逕以三反例證藏識最勝——惡趣苦處眾生不愛樂五蘊／第四靜慮以上無貪俱樂受／信解無我者厭薩迦耶見；唯藏識「我愛隨縛，未嘗求離」堪當其名。
- 無性釋（T1598 0386c11–0386c28）：詳破。逐一申他師立計之由（五取蘊→眾生攝為我故；貪俱樂受→貪所隨增眠，或各別著處異；薩迦耶見→取彼為我性故）；「愚」開二義（有惡教惡證／無親教無自解）；並加外道喻（如勝論所立實等非為勝，有過失故）。
- 〔異點〕世親略、無性詳；無性多出『他師理據逐列＋雙重愚義＋勝論喻』。
〔四〕三相安立（自相／因相／果相）
- 世親釋（T1597 0327c10–20）：先科『異門非即了相』，故次說此識自性／因性／果性；釋自相＝緣雜染熏習能生彼之功能差別為性，並訓「攝持種子相應」之「相應」為修義。
- 無性釋（T1598 0387b18–23）：同立三相安立，與根本論逐句對。
- 〔異點〕二釋大體同；世親於自相加『相應＝修義』之訓詁及『異門非了相』之科判，稍詳。
真諦 T1595 分品致科判與玄奘系異（眾名／相／引證／差別分立）。四叉皆以上異說並列，未另作取捨。
術語
關鍵詞 — 阿賴耶識（ālaya-vijñāna）· 阿陀那識（ādāna）· 染污意（kliṣṭa-manas）· 一切種子識（sarvabīja-vijñāna）· 薰習（vāsanā）· 三相（自/因/果）· 異門（paryāya）· 緣起二種。
術語義界以本分根本論、古釋與三系異譯為限；無古德傳梵可核者從闕，不以後出重構補作原語。
譬喻·修辭
世親以金鑛說『界』為因，又以樹根說根本識為餘識總因；無性另引勝論之喻以顯他計有失。各喻的論證位置與古釋頁錨見上。
互讀·承衍
- 三十頌：阿賴耶（vv.1–5，「初阿賴耶識，異熟一切種…」）· 末那（vv.5–7）——三十頌『用』此持種識與染污意，攝論分二『立』之（源頭）。
- 百法：八識（阿賴耶=第八、末那=第七）+ 種子/薰習地基——分二之先備。
- 二十論：唯識無境之證成，以阿賴耶緣起為底（分二緣起二種 → 唯識緣起）。
- 解深密經（T16n0676）：心意識相品阿陀那頌（0692c）為分二第3項的引證源經，也是《攝大乘論》阿賴耶說的重要經據。
校本定位
- 玄奘 T31n1594 · 分二（所知依分）0133b11–0137c18（卷上）· 無著菩薩造·玄奘譯。
- 真諦 T31n1593 · 依止勝相品（眾名/相/引證/差別 4 子品）0113b16–（卷上）· 無著菩薩造·真諦譯。
- 佛陀扇多 T31n1592 · 卷上 0097a09–（連續散文，阿賴耶段 0097b 起）· 阿僧伽作·後魏佛陀扇多譯。
- 釋論分二對應段出處：T1597 世親釋·玄奘 0324a15（之二 0326c21·之三 0331c08）T1598 無性釋·玄奘 0382c28（之二 0385c20·之三 0392b06）T1595 世親釋·真諦〈依止勝相品·眾名品一〉0153c06（之二 0160b17）T1596 世親釋·笈多〈應知依止勝語一〉0271a08。〔真諦／笈多併分一入序，其品／勝語第 N＝玄奘分 N＋1，讀其異釋據此位移。〕
Structural Location
What this chapter does — the first eminent point, "the basis of the knowable," i.e. the storehouse consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna). Fen 2 establishes the ālaya as that on which all defiled phenomena rest: its alternative names, threefold positing, perfuming, mutual causation with defiled phenomena, and two kinds of dependent origination.
Relation to the whole — Fen 2 is the foundation of the ten eminent points: the remaining nine (characteristic → entering → cause-and-fruit → cultivation → trainings → fruit) all presuppose this seed-bearing root consciousness. Its relation to the whole book is like that of the eight consciousnesses to Yogācāra, or Triṃśikā vv. 1–5 to the ālaya — the Saṃgraha establishes it here; the Triṃśikā uses it. Related passages appear under “Cross-Reading and Reception.”
Recensions and Parallels
The treatise survives in three Chinese translations; the core terms of fen 2 are compared below, with Xuanzang T1594 as the base.
| term | Xuanzang T1594 (base) | Paramārtha T1593 | Buddhaśānta T1592 | note |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| heading "basis of the knowable" | 所知依 | 應知依止 | 智依 | three forms |
| root consciousness (ālaya) | 阿賴耶識 | 阿黎耶識 | 阿犁耶識 (also 阿梨耶識) | different transliterations |
| appropriating consciousness (ādāna) | 阿陀那識 | 阿陀那識 | 阿陀那識 | identical |
| defiled mind (kliṣṭa-manas) | 染污意 | 染污意 (also 染污識) | term absent | Buddhaśānta diverges |
| seeds consciousness | 一切種子識 | 一切種子識 | term absent | Buddhaśānta diverges |
| perfuming (vāsanā) | 薰習 | 熏習 (variant graph) | term absent | Buddhaśānta omits it |
| Mahīśāsaka aggregate | 窮生死蘊 | (none) | (none) | Xuanzang only |
| the three characteristics | 自相／因相／果相 | 立自相／立因相／立果相 | 自相差別處／因事差別相／果差別相 | Buddhaśānta adds 差別處 / 差別相 and reads 因事 |
| two dependent originations | 分別自性緣起／分別愛非愛緣起 | 分別自性／分別愛非愛 (as 緣生) | 性差別／愛不愛果差別 (as 因緣) | Xuanzang 緣起 · Paramārtha 緣生 · Buddhaśānta 因緣 |
The three translations transliterate ālaya differently (阿賴耶 / 阿黎耶 / 阿犁耶); Xuanzang's form is followed here. Buddhaśānta's translation diverges most: "defiled mind," "all-seeds consciousness," "perfuming," and "the aggregate-to-the-end-of-saṃsāra" are absent. "窮生死蘊" is Xuanzang's rendering alone (Mahīśāsaka āsaṃsārika-skandha). Across the three characteristics and two dependent originations, Buddhaśānta again diverges most (三相 adds 差別處 / 差別相; the two originations are 性差別 / 愛不愛果差別, 因緣), against Xuanzang's 緣起 and Paramārtha's 緣生.
Canonical Foundations
Fen 2 embeds eight scriptural or sectarian citations; two have no exact extant Chinese counterpart.
| # | Citation (opening) | Saṃgraha's stated source | T1594 locus | Source evidence | Source relation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A beginningless dhātu, the equal support of all dharmas… | Abhidharma-mahāyāna-sūtra (gāthā) | 0133b15 | The source sūtra is lost; T1585 Cheng weishi lun, T1597 Vasubandhu, and T1598 Asvabhāva all preserve the verse | three Yogācāra witnesses |
| 2 | By holding all dharmas, the all-seeds consciousness, hence called ālaya… | Abhidharma-mahāyāna-sūtra | 0133b18 | The source sūtra is lost; T1585, T1597, and T1598 preserve the verse | three Yogācāra witnesses |
| 3 | The ādāna consciousness, deep and subtle, all seeds like a torrent… | Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra | 0133b27 | T16n0676 0692c22, Chapter on Mind, Mentation, and Consciousness, preserves the standard ādāna verse | extant source; same opening |
| 4 | "Mind, mentation, consciousness — three" | The World-Honored One (generic) | 0133c05 | "Mind, mentation, consciousness" recurs across Āgama and Mahāyāna texts | generic attribution; no single locus |
| 5 | (defiled mind) view of self / conceit / self-love / ignorance | author's own thesis (not external) | 0133c08 | the treatise's own statement | not an external citation |
| 6 | Worldly beings delight in the ālaya, take pleasure in the ālaya… | Ekottarāgama | 0134a18 | The extant Chinese Ekottarāgama T02n0125 contains no transliteration of ālaya; the Chinese tradition renders the parallel by sense as delight or attachment, while the Pāli parallel reads ālayarāmā pajā | source not identified in extant Chinese; cited by veiled intent |
| 7 | (in the śrāvaka vehicle) the Tathāgatotpatti-catur-guṇa-sūtra | the same sūtra | 0134a22 | no extant standalone text; across all of CBETA only T1594 + T1598 (Asvabhāva) cite this title — no other witness | source unlocatable — a title cited only within the Saṃgraha tradition, not a recoverable sūtra |
| 8 | (Mahāsāṃghika) root consciousness / (Mahīśāsaka) the aggregate running to the end of saṃsāra | Mahāsāṃghika and Mahīśāsaka Āgamas | 0134a24–25 | The sectarian Āgamas are largely lost in Chinese; "窮生死蘊" is Xuanzang's rendering alone | doxographic, veiled-intent attribution |
Only entry 3 traces to an extant source sūtra with the same opening. Entries 1 and 2 have a lost source but three Yogācāra witnesses. Entries 6 and 7 remain internal warrants of the Saṃgraha transmission rather than identified Āgama quotations.
The sūtra it explicates — the scriptural pivot of fen 2's ālaya doctrine is the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra's ādāna verse (T16n0676 0692c). The dhātu and ālaya verses derive from the lost Abhidharma-mahāyāna-sūtra and are preserved in T1585, T1597, and T1598.
Transmission — no ancient transmitted Sanskrit of the ālaya or ādāna verses survives. The witnesses here are the three independent Chinese translations and passages preserved in ancient commentaries.
Ancient commentaries — the two Indian traditions are especially full on the ālaya:
- Vasubandhu's commentary (bhāṣya): Paramārtha T1595 · Dharmagupta T1596 · Xuanzang T1597.
- Asvabhāva's commentary (upanibandhana): Xuanzang T1598.
Root-Treatise Exposition
Fen 2 establishes the storehouse consciousness through three connected arguments.
- Proof that the defiled mind exists (0133c08–0134a17) Root treatise. Were there no defiled mind, six faults follow — ① the unshared ignorance could not exist; ② the five co-functions (the simultaneous support of the five sense-consciousnesses) could not exist; ③ the etymological gloss could not hold; ④ the no-thought and cessation attainments would not differ; ⑤ a being in the no-thought heaven would lack self-grasping for a whole life-span; ⑥ self-grasping could not operate at all times across virtuous / non-virtuous / neutral minds. Commentaries. Vasubandhu (T1597 0325b28ff.) follows the root, glossing the six faults in order; Asvabhāva (T1598 0384a02–a25ff.), beyond glossing the six, separately sets out the root's summarizing verse ("if there were no unshared ignorance, and no five co-functions…" 0384a14–21) and analyses the mechanism of "the veiled-neutral nature, subtly trailing at all times." Both are complete, with Asvabhāva unfolding the mechanism further.
- The dispute that the ālaya name is supreme (refuting four masters) (0134a26–0134b22) Root treatise. Four masters gloss "ālaya" as the one-in-substance mind-thought-consciousness / the five appropriating aggregates / pleasant feeling conjoined with craving / the view of self. The author gives three counter-examples (beings in woeful destinies do not love the five aggregates; no craving-conjoined pleasant feeling above the fourth dhyāna; one resolved on no-self loathes the view of self), proving that only the storehouse consciousness (bound by self-love, never sought to be abandoned) merits the name, "supremely established." Commentaries. Vasubandhu (T1597 0327b19–b28) briefly glosses the counter-examples ("the unconfused are the bodhisattvas… those in woeful destinies are pretas, animals, hell-beings…"). Asvabhāva (T1598 0386c11ff.) sets out each master's ground in turn, opens "confusion" into two senses, and adds the Vaiśeṣika simile; see “Ancient Commentarial Readings,” item 3.
- The śrāvaka vehicle's veiled-intent teaching (0134a18–0134a26) Root treatise. The śrāvaka vehicle does not teach the ālaya openly because it is too subtle an object; yet by veiled intent (ābhiprāyika) it already taught it through the four delightings-in-the-ālaya, the Mahāsāṃghika root-consciousness, and the Mahīśāsaka aggregate-running-to-saṃsāra's-end. The sources are identified under “Canonical Foundations.” Commentaries. Vasubandhu (T1597 0327a04–a09) glosses the four delightings by three times (present love, past pleasure, present joy, future delight) and gives a further sense. Asvabhāva (T1598 0386a02–a09) separately assigns the teaching to the Sarvāstivāda, which Vasubandhu does not, and assigns the times differently (pleasure to the present, joy to the past); see “Ancient Commentarial Readings,” item 2.
Fen 2 lays the treatise's foundation in five topics — the alternative names, the threefold positing (own/cause/effect characteristic), perfuming, mutual causation, and the two dependent originations — grounding "what all knowables rest on" in a single seed-bearing root consciousness.
Ancient Commentarial Readings
The ancient Indian commentaries are especially full on the ālaya: Vasubandhu's commentary (Mahāyānasaṃgraha-bhāṣya) survives in Paramārtha T1595, Dharmagupta T1596, and Xuanzang T1597; Asvabhāva's commentary (upanibandhana) survives in Xuanzang T1598. T1597 and T1598 follow Xuanzang's eleven divisions. Paramārtha T1595 instead opens this material into the four subchapters Names, Characteristic, Scriptural Proof, and Differentiation.
〔1〕 The dhātu verse · the ālaya verse · the density of the "store" etymology The root treatise cites two verses of the Abhidharma-mahāyāna-sūtra (the dhātu verse 0133b15; the ālaya verse "…hence called ālaya; to the eminent ones I disclose it" 0133b19), and itself posits a "threefold sense of storing" to gloss the name (0133b20–24: defiled dharmas store here as effect-nature / this consciousness stores them as cause-nature / sentient beings store this consciousness as a self). All three are present in the treatise; the two commentaries differ in density of gloss:
- Vasubandhu (T1597 0324a21–b20): dhātu = cause, drawing the figure of how the world speaks of a "dhātu" in gold ore and the like; in the ālaya verse, "the second line glosses the first," and the eminent ones = the assembly of bodhisattvas (brief); the threefold storing he glosses as "defiled-class dharmas are what blocks the meaning of purity, and because they turn within this, it is called storing."
- Asvabhāva (T1598 0383a05–b04): dhātu = cause = seed, adding the qualification "this is only defiled, not pure" (forestalling that "the basis perfumed by much hearing is not encompassed by the ālaya"); his gloss of the ālaya verse is fuller — distinguishing that "the supremeness of storing" is not like the manifest dharma-nature of the great-element and so on, clarifying that "the ālaya and the active consciousnesses are mutual conditions, storing one another in turn," and glossing the eminent ones = great bodhisattvas with the capacity, for whom it is disclosed and not for the lesser.
- Difference. Both explain the same two verses and threefold storing. Asvabhāva additionally marks the ālaya as only defiled, qualifies the supremacy of storing, explains mutual conditioning with the active consciousnesses, and identifies the eminent ones as those with capacity.
〔2〕 The śrāvaka-vehicle alternative names · the time-stage assignment of the four names love / pleasure / joy / delight
- Vasubandhu (T1597 0327a04–18): "delighting in the ālaya" is the summary phrase, the other three glossed by the three times present / past / future; and there is a further sense — present love / past pleasure / (because of pleasure in a former life) present-life joy / future delight. He also glosses the Mahāsāṃghika "root consciousness" tree-root simile (the trunk etc. are the total cause; without the root there is none) and the Mahīśāsaka "aggregate that runs to the end of saṃsāra" (the place = the formless realm where there is no form, the time = the mindless states such as no-thought; since form and mind perfume each other as cause, the seeds are unbroken).
- Asvabhāva (T1598 0386a02–10): marks its source as belonging to the Sarvāstivāda (which Vasubandhu does not assign to a sect); love = the general clinging to the ālaya, pleasure = the present world / joy = what has already arisen in the past / delight = what will arise in the future, "by pleasure, joy, and delight together it is named delighting-in-the-ālaya."
- Difference. Vasubandhu assigns "pleasure" to the past; Asvabhāva assigns "pleasure" to the present and "joy" to the past. Asvabhāva also attributes the teaching to the Sarvāstivāda; Vasubandhu names no sect.
〔3〕 The number of refuted positions and the unfolding
- Root treatise (T1594 0134b01–06) lists four masters: ① the mind-mentation-consciousness one-in-substance-different-in-word; ② the five appropriating aggregates named ālaya; ③ pleasant feeling conjoined with craving named ālaya; ④ the view of self named ālaya — "these masters, by teaching and by realization, being confused about the storehouse consciousness, make this assertion."
- Vasubandhu (T1597 0327a25–0327b14): brief refutation. He does not unfold the other masters' grounds for positing, but straightaway proves the storehouse consciousness supreme by three counter-examples — beings in woeful, suffering destinies do not delight in the five aggregates / above the fourth dhyāna there is no craving-conjoined pleasant feeling / one resolved on no-self loathes the view of self; only the storehouse consciousness, "bound by self-love, never sought to be abandoned," merits the name.
- Asvabhāva (T1598 0386c11–0386c28): full refutation. He sets out each master's ground for positing in turn (the five appropriating aggregates → because beings take them as a self; pleasant feeling conjoined with craving → the latent disposition that craving augments, or because each clings to a different object; the view of self → because it grasps that as the nature of self); he opens "confusion" (「愚」) into two senses (having bad teaching and bad realization / having no preceptor's teaching and no self-understanding); and he adds the outsiders' simile (as the substance and the like posited by the Vaiśeṣika are not supreme, for they are faulty).
- Difference. Vasubandhu is brief. Asvabhāva itemizes the other masters' grounds, distinguishes two senses of confusion, and adds the Vaiśeṣika simile.
〔4〕 The threefold positing (own-characteristic / cause-characteristic / effect-characteristic)
- Vasubandhu (T1597 0327c10–20): first schematizes "the alternative names are not yet the comprehended characteristic," so next he states this consciousness's own-nature / cause-nature / effect-nature; he glosses the own-characteristic as "the differentiated capacity to give rise to those, conditioned by defiled perfuming, as its nature," and glosses the "association" of "associated with the holding of seeds" as the sense of cultivation.
- Asvabhāva (T1598 0387b18–23): likewise sets out the three characteristics, matching the root treatise line by line.
- Difference. The two are largely the same. Vasubandhu adds that association means cultivation and that the alternative names have not yet stated the comprehended characteristic.
Paramārtha T1595's subchapter scheme differs from the Xuanzang tradition by setting Names, Characteristic, Scriptural Proof, and Differentiation out separately.
Terminology
Keywords — ālaya-vijñāna · ādāna · kliṣṭa-manas (defiled mind) · sarvabīja-vijñāna (all-seeds consciousness) · vāsanā (perfuming) · the three characteristics (own / cause / effect) · paryāya (alternative designation) · the two dependent originations.
Similes and Rhetoric
Vasubandhu uses gold ore to explain “element” as cause and a tree root for the root consciousness as the general cause of the other consciousnesses; Asvabhāva separately invokes a Vaiśeṣika analogy to expose a faulty thesis. Their locations are recorded above.
Cross-Reading and Reception
- Triṃśikā: the ālaya (vv. 1–5, "first, the ālaya consciousness, maturation and all-seeds…") and the manas (vv. 5–7) — the Triṃśikā uses this seed-bearing consciousness and defiled mind; the Saṃgraha fen 2 establishes them (the source).
- Hundred Dharmas: the eight consciousnesses (ālaya = eighth, manas = seventh) + the seed/perfuming groundwork — preparation for fen 2.
- Viṃśatikā: the proof of consciousness-only rests on ālaya-based dependent origination (fen 2's two dependent originations → the consciousness-only causation).
- Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra (T16n0676): the ādāna verse of the Mind/Mentation/Consciousness chapter (0692c) is the cited source sūtra and a scriptural pivot of the Saṃgraha's ālaya doctrine.
Textual Location
- Xuanzang T31n1594 · fen 2 (Basis of the Knowable) 0133b11–0137c18 (fasc. 1) · Asaṅga, tr. Xuanzang.
- Paramārtha T31n1593 · Chapter on the Support (sub-chapters: names / characteristic / scriptural proof / differentiation) 0113b16– (fasc. 1) · Asaṅga, tr. Paramārtha.
- Buddhaśānta T31n1592 · fasc. 1, 0097a09– (running prose; ālaya section from 0097b) · Asaṅga, tr. Buddhaśānta.
- Commentary loci: T1597 Vasubandhu, Xuanzang 0324a15 (sub-2 0326c21 · sub-3 0331c08) · T1598 Asvabhāva, Xuanzang 0382c28 (sub-2 0385c20 · sub-3 0392b06) · T1595 Vasubandhu, Paramārtha 〈Support chapter · Names sub-1〉 0153c06 (sub-2 0160b17) · T1596 Vasubandhu, Dharmagupta 〈Support division 1〉 0271a08. Paramārtha and Dharmagupta merge fen 1 into the preface, so their numbering is one lower than Xuanzang's.