成唯識論 義疏通講 · 冊4

釋違理·因果(一)·釋分別生難—唯識性·真如 · 5 單元 · 第 46 冊 · 冊目次

釋違理·因果(一)·釋分別生難Resolving Objections Contrary to Principle · Cause and Effect (I)

全文五層 →Full five layers →
義疏Exposition

〔所釋之頌〕第十八頌

唯識立宗,說一切只是內識、沒有心外的境作助緣。這就引來一個尖銳的反問:既然沒有外緣,那種種「分別」(虛妄分別的識)究竟是怎麼生起來的?這一節先用一頌正面答覆,再層層展開:先把『一切種識如何變現』『識與識之間的展轉力』講透,接著轉入一大段四緣(因緣、等無間緣、所緣緣、增上緣)的通論,又附帶辨明『四緣依十五處立十因、十因攝為二因、由因緣得五果』的整套因果架構,最後回到本頌正義——本識中的種子在生起分別時,到底能作哪幾種緣。

這一頌「由一切種識,如是如是變」之所本,經根即在《解深密經》。彼〈心意識相品〉說:那含藏萬法的本識「阿陀那」(隨逐執持),其中「一切種子如瀑流」般念念流注、變現不停。本頌講『一切種識變現分別』,正是承這「一切種子」之義——分別由內識所持的種子變現而生,不必假借心外之緣。至於四緣、十因、五果這一整套因果名數,論本即在《瑜伽師地論·本地分》:那裡立定「十因、四緣、五果」的名與數(十因者,隨說、觀待、牽引、生起、攝受、引發、定異、同事、相違、不相違;四緣者,因緣、等無間緣、所緣緣、增上緣;五果者,異熟、等流、離繫、士用、增上),又開出『依依處施設因』的條例——依「語依處」立隨說因、依「領受依處」立觀待因、依「習氣依處」立牽引因、依「有潤種子依處」立生起因等;本論『四緣依十五處立十因』即依此而廣。五果之名數,《大乘阿毘達磨集論》於〈論議品〉也決擇而立(異熟、等流、增上、士用、離繫)。本節的因果架構,其經在《解深密》,其論在《瑜伽》《集論》——下面順著本頌講開。

㊀ 釋違理·釋分別生難

一、難與答——分別由何而生

外人這樣難:照你唯識所立,只有內識而完全沒有外緣(沒有心外的境來幫忙),那麼種種「分別」——也就是虛妄分別的這些識——到底是憑什麼生起來的?論主不繞,直接用頌文答覆。

頌說:由「一切種識」(含藏一切種子的本識)作如是如是的變現,又由諸識互相增上的「展轉力」,種種「分別」(彼彼虛妄分別的識)就得以生起。——這一頌的骨架就是兩個力:一個是種子變現的力,一個是現行識彼此推動的力;兩力具足,分別自生,不假外緣。

二、逐句開講——「一切種識」是什麼

論主先解「一切種識」。所謂「一切種識」,是指第八本識中「能生自果」的種種功能差別,也就是一切種子。這些種子能生四種果:等流果、異熟果、士用果、增上果,所以叫「一切種」。唯獨「離繫果」要除開——離繫果(斷除障礙所證的無為法)不是種子所生的;它雖然可以證得,卻不是種子的果,必須現起聖道、斷除結縛才證得到。這裡頭雖然也有一種「展轉」(先修道、後斷結而證)的意思,但那不是本頌講的「展轉」;本頌講的,是「能生分別」的那種子。

為什麼叫「一切種識」而不單叫「一切種」?因為是以第八識為它的體,所以安上一個「識」字;種子離開了本識並沒有別的自體,它就是依附本識而有的。再者,「種」「識」兩字一起並舉,是要簡別兩件事:一是『不是種子的識』(像現行的七轉識,是識而非種),二是『不是這識本身的種』(種要揀別,不可混同識體)——所以非得兩字並標不可。又,「種識」這說法是要顯『這識當中的種子』,而不是指『能持種的識』(也就是本識自體);能持種的識另有講法,後文再說。

接著解頌中「如是如是變」。這本識中的種子,由其餘眾緣的資助,就如是如是地轉變——所謂轉變,是說從「生位」(種子初引生的階段)轉到『成熟之時』(堪招現果的階段)。頌中為什麼重說「如是如是」?是要顯所變的種類非常多。所謂「一切種」,攝盡了「三種熏習」(名言習氣、我執習氣、有支習氣)三類,也攝盡了『共相種、不共相種』等本識中一切的種子。

再解「展轉力」。所謂「展轉力」,是指八種現行識,連同與它們相應的心所,以及各識的「相分、見分」等——這些彼此都互有相資相助的力量,所以能展轉著生出分別。而「彼彼分別」一語:現行的這些識總名為「分別」,因為它們都以「虛妄分別」為自性;而分別的種類繁多,所以頌說「彼彼分別」。

整頌合起來的意思就是:縱然沒有心外的緣,但由本識中有一切種子的轉變差別,又由現行八識等的展轉力,種種分別仍然得以生起——何必非要借外緣才能起分別?而且不只染法如此,清淨法的生起也是同一個道理:由清淨種子與清淨現行作緣而生,同樣不待外緣。

㊁ 四緣——分別緣生之相

上面說『由種子、現行作緣而生分別』,那就要進一步問:這「緣生」之相該怎麼了知?緣總共有四種。下面逐一辨明。

窺基《述記》在此判明全章的層次:辨這「緣生」之法、廣前頌三句,文中分兩段——先「正解四緣」,後「傍乘義明十五依處等」(即下文的十因、二因、五果都是岔開的附論)。他又就頌文配緣:頌「一切種」這一句,是廣「因緣」一緣;頌「展轉力」這一句,是廣其餘三緣(等無間、所緣、增上)——四緣之辨,骨子裡就是這兩句的開展。

一、因緣

第一是「因緣」。所謂因緣,是指有為法『親自辦成自果』的那種因(親因)。它的體有兩類:一是種子,二是現行。

先說種子這一邊。所謂種子,是本識中善、染(不善)、無記,以及通三界、九地等的種種功能差別。它有兩個作用:一是引『次後自類的功能』(種引種,前種引後種),二是起『同時自類的現果』(種生現);唯有就它對自類功能、自類現果這層關係而言,它才算因緣性。

再說現行這一邊。所謂現行,是七轉識,連同與它們相應的心所所變的相分、見分,以及其性、界、地等。其中要除開兩種:「佛果善」與「極劣無記」——這兩種不熏成種子;除此之外,其餘的現行都熏習本識、生起自類的種子;也唯有就它對自類種子這層關係而言,才算因緣性。至於第八識的心王心所,是不熏成種子的,理由有四:它本身就是「所熏」之處,不另去熏他;它「非簡所依」,不能撇開所依而獨自能熏;它的體又「極微」(劣弱)、又「圓」(已圓滿無增減)——所以不熏成種。還要分清:現行與同類現行彼此相望,都不是因緣,因為各自從自種而生、不是這個生那個;一切異類彼此相望,也不是因緣,因為彼此不相親生。

這裡有兩處異說。一說主張『異類、同類的現行彼此相望可以作因緣』——對這個說法應當知道:那是「假說」,或是「隨轉門」(隨順他宗的方便講法),不是究竟義。又一說則『只承認種子是因緣性』(現行不算)——這是「依顯勝」而說,取種子的勝義立論,並不是窮盡道理的講法;因為聖教明明說『轉識與阿賴耶識彼此相望可作因緣』,可見現行也能作因緣。

二、等無間緣

第二是「等無間緣」。所謂等無間緣,是指八種現行識及其心所,『前一聚』對『後一自類聚』之間沒有間隔,平等地「開避、引導」(前念讓開、給後念引路),令後聚決定得生。要注意:眾多同類的種子是「同時」轉起的,沒有前後開導的意思,所以「不相應行法」不被這緣所攝;也正因此,八識彼此不能互作等無間緣(不是自類無間)。不過心所與心王雖然恒常同時俱轉,卻因彼此「相應」、和合似一體,不可把它們施設成各別殊異,所以心王與心所之間倒可以互作等無間緣(這不違自類無間的理)。又,入「無餘涅槃」時的最後一念心,最極微劣,既沒有開導後念的用,後面也再沒有「當起」的等無間法(其後更無心生),所以這一念不作等無間緣。怎麼知道是這樣?論有確切的說法:『若前聚的識等無間,後聚的識等就決定生起』,這就說前聚是後聚的等無間緣。

依這個道理,可以逐一看八識的等無間緣。先看第八阿陀那識:它在三界九地都容許互作等無間緣,因為它在上下界地、死生位中都能彼此開導;而且『有漏的第八無間能有無漏的第八生』;但反過來『無漏之後決定不生有漏』——因為大圓鏡智一旦現起,有漏的第八就永無、永斷了;它的「善」與「無記」相望也是這樣(無漏善起之後不再生有漏無記)。那麼這無漏的第八是在哪一界之後引生的?或從色界之後,或從欲界之後。凡夫求佛果的,一定是色界之後引生無漏,因為他必生在色界淨居天上的「大自在宮」而證菩提;二乘人迴小向大、趣求大菩提的,一定是欲界之後引生無漏,因為他迴趣所留的身唯在欲界——他雖然也必往大自在宮才成佛,但本願力所留的「生身」是欲界身,所以就所留身講是欲界後引。這裡有一處異說:一說色界也有聲聞迴趣大乘、以願力留身的,這既不違教也不違理,所以聲聞的第八無漏,在色界心之後也得現前(不限欲界後);不過五淨居天裡沒有迴趣大乘的,因為經中不說那裡的聖者發大乘心。

再看第七末那識:它在三界九地也容許互作等無間緣,因為它隨著第八識所生之處而界地繫屬。它的「有漏、無漏」可以互相生起,因為十地位中有漏末那與平等性智得相引;它的「善」與「無記」相望也一樣可互生;在無記之中,「染污末那」與「不染末那」也能互相開導,因為「生空智果」的前後位中得相引。不過第七的有漏與無漏相生,只在欲界、色界,不在無色界——因為地上菩薩不生於無色界。

再看第六意識:它在三界九地的有漏、無漏、善、不善等,各容互作等無間緣,因為「潤生位」等中能更相引;它『最初起無漏』唯在色界之後,因為「順決擇分」的善唯在色界。

最後看前五識:眼識、耳識、身識通「二界二地」(欲界、初禪),鼻識、舌識唯「一界一地」(欲界);都在自類互作等無間緣,它們的善等相望也是如此。這裡有兩處異說。一說:前五識的有漏、無漏在自類互作等無間緣,因為「未成佛時」容許有漏、無漏互起。又一說:無漏五識可以在有漏五識之後生起,但無漏之後不容再起有漏;理由是——無漏五識非佛位則沒有;那五色根一定是有漏的(色根是異熟識的相分所攝);『有漏不共所依的色根』與『俱時同境而能發無漏識』這件事在事理上不相應;而且有漏、無漏二者對所緣境有「明、昧」之別,所以不容前後互轉回有漏。

三、所緣緣

第三是「所緣緣」。所謂所緣緣,是說若有一個法,是『帶己相的心(或相應的心所)所緣慮、所依託』的——也就是心所緣慮、所仗託的那個境。它的體有兩類:一是「親所緣緣」,二是「疎所緣緣」。怎麼分?若這個境與「能緣」的體不相離(也就是見分等內在所慮託的相分),那就是親所緣緣;若它與能緣的體雖相離,卻能作「本質」而引起內在的所慮託(也就是外在的本質),那就是疎所緣緣。再就有無來說:親所緣緣是一切能緣心都有的,因為離了內在的所慮託,能緣心必不生;疎所緣緣則能緣心或有或無,因為離了外在的所慮託,能緣心也還能生。

底下逐識辨疎緣的有無。先看第八識心品,這裡有三說。一說:第八『只有親所緣緣』,因為它隨業因之力任運變現,不仗外質。又一說:第八『也一定有疎所緣緣』,因為它要仗他人所變的本質、自己這方才變。又一說(破前二而立正義):前兩說都不應理。一方面,自身、他身、自土、他土可以「互相受用」,他人所變的可作自己的本質(所以不是沒有疎緣);另一方面,『自己的種子對別的有情沒有受用的道理』,說全憑他變作自己的本質也不應理,何況諸有情的種子並不完全平等(所以也不是一定有疎緣);因此應當說:第八心品的疎所緣緣,在一切位中是有是無並不決定。再看第七心品:在「未轉依位」是俱生我執,必仗外質(緣第八見分作質),所以也一定有疎所緣緣;到「已轉依位」疎緣就非一定有了,因為緣真如等時沒有外質。再看第六心品:行相猛利,在一切位都能自在轉起,所仗的外質或有或無,所以疎所緣緣有無不定。最後看前五心品:在「未轉依位」,以其麁、鈍、劣,必仗外質(色境本質),所以也一定有疎所緣緣;到「已轉依位」就非一定有了,因為成所作智能緣過去、未來等,那時沒有外質。

四、增上緣

第四是「增上緣」。所謂增上緣,是說若有一個法有殊勝的勢用,能對其餘的法「或順、或違」(幫助或障礙)。其實前三緣也都帶有增上的意思,但這第四緣是『除去前三、只取其餘』來立的,目的是為了顯出諸緣各別之相。這「順、違」的勢用在「生、住、成、得」四處轉起,因為生、住、成、得四件事各別。增上的用隨事雖多,而最勝最顯的只有二十二,這就是「二十二根」。

二十二根各以什麼為自性?前五色根(眼耳鼻舌身)以本識等所變的眼等「淨色」為性;男、女二根為身根所攝,就以身根的少分為性;命根只是依『本識的親種』在分位上假立的,並沒有別的自性;意根總以「八識」為性;五受根(苦、樂、憂、喜、捨)各以自受為性;信等五根(信、進、念、定、慧)就以信等及善念等為自性。

後三根(未知當知根、已知根、具知根)要細看。先說「未知當知根」,它的體位有三種。一是「根本位」,指在見道位(不過要除最後一剎那,因為那最後剎那已經沒有「未知可當知」的了,所以除開)。二是「加行位」,指煖、頂、忍、世第一法這四善根,因為它們臨近能引發根本位(見道)。三是「資糧位」,指從『為求得諦現觀』而發起決定殊勝的善法欲起、一直到『還沒得順決擇分』之間的所有善根,因為它能遠遠地資助、引生根本位。在這三位中,『信等五根、意根、喜、樂、捨』就是這未知當知根的根性;加行等位中於後面殊勝法求證時雖也有「愁慼」、帶著「憂根」,但憂根不是正善根,所以多分不算進去。又,前三無色界(空無邊、識無邊、無所有)也有此根,是由『殊勝見道傍修』而得;或者二乘迴趣大乘的人,為證法空、在地前也起『九地所攝的生空無漏』,他們都已是菩薩,為此根所攝。至於菩薩見道位其實也有此根,上文只說「地前」,是因為見道時極短促,略而不別說。

再說「已知根」:從見道的最後一剎那、一直到「金剛喻定」之間,所有信等的無漏九根,都是已知根性。其中還沒離欲的,於上界解脫求證時也有「愁慼」、帶憂根,但憂根非正善根,多分不算進去。

再說「具知根」:在諸「無學位」中,無漏九根一切都是具知根性。要補一句:「有頂」(非想非非想處)雖有「遊觀無漏」(由下地無漏遊歷觀照),但它的相不明利,所以不攝為後三根。二十二根的自性大略如此,其餘各門的義理,應依《瑜伽》等論去了知。

㊂ 傍論——四緣依十五處立十因

四緣講完,論主在此岔開做一大段附論:這四緣又依「十五處」(十五種依處),因義的差別,立為「十因」。怎麼依這十五處而立?逐一說。

窺基《述記》替這一大段傍論立了四節綱目,便於把握脈絡:第一、明四緣依十五處而立十因(即此下逐處立因);第二、辨十因與『二因(能生、方便)』如何相攝;第三、明四緣的依處及其與十因、二因的相攝;第四、明四緣依處各得幾果(得果多少)。他並提醒:十因與二因的相攝,『只是因明(就因義作分明),是十因的傍義,並不是另立一個門類』——讀者不必把它看成與四緣並列的別科。

一、語依處——指由「法名」與「想」所起的「語性」(言說);就依這處立「隨說因」,也就是依著言語、隨見聞等而宣說諸義,這就是『能說作所說的因』。(有論把這語依處說成是「名、想、見」三者:由如名字般的取相、執著而隨起言說;若依那論的講法,正好顯出此因就是語依處。)

二、領受依處——指所觀待的『能受、所受』之性;就依這處立「觀待因」,也就是觀待此一法,令彼諸事或生、或住、或成、或得,此即彼的觀待因。

三、習氣依處——指內種、外種的「未成熟位」;就依這處立「牽引因」,因為它能從遠處牽引自果。

四、有潤種子依處——指內種、外種的「已成熟位」(已得潤);就依這處立「生起因」,因為它能在近處生起自果。

五、無間滅依處——指心、心所的「等無間緣」(前念無間滅、開導後念)。

六、境界依處——指心、心所的「所緣緣」(所緣的境)。

七、根依處——指心、心所所依的「六根」。

八、作用依處——指在所作的業、所用的「作具」、其「作用」當中(著眼於作具),除去種子之外其餘助成的現緣。

九、士用依處——指在所作的業、其「作者」、其「作用」當中(著眼於作者),除去種子之外其餘能作的現緣。

十、真實見依處——指「無漏見」;除『引自類種子』一事之外,於無漏法能助引、助證。總依第五到第十這六處,立「攝受因」,因為攝受前五處可辦成有漏法、具攝受這六處可辦成無漏法。

十一、隨順依處——指無記、染、善的現行、種子諸行,能隨順「同類勝品」諸法;就依這處立「引發因」,因為能引起同類的勝行、又能引得無為法。

十二、差別功能依處——指有為法各於自果有『能起、能證』的差別勢力;就依這處立「定異因」,因為各能生自界等的果、又各能得自乘的果。

十三、和合依處——指從「領受依處」一直到「差別功能依處」,在所生、住、成、得的果中有「和合」之力;就依這處立「同事因」,因為從觀待因到定異因,都共同成辦生等、是同一事業。

十四、障礙依處——指在生、住、成、得事中能障礙的法;就依這處立「相違因」,因為它能違逆生等事。

十五、不障礙依處——指在生、住、成、得事中不障礙的法;就依這處立「不相違因」,因為它不違逆生等事。

十因攝為二因

這十因,又被「二因」所攝:一是能生因,二是方便因。〈菩薩地〉說:『牽引種子、生起種子,名能生因;其餘諸因,方便因所攝。』這話的意思是說:在牽引、生起、引發、定異、同事、不相違這六因中,凡「因緣種」的未成熟位叫「牽引種」、已成熟位叫「生起種」;這六因中的諸因緣種,全攝在這未熟、已熟兩位之中。雖然也有「現行」是能生因的(像前四緣中能生自類種子的現行),但現行多有間斷,所以此處略而不說,單就種子立能生;至於「親辦果」的現行有時也得安「種」之名(像世間說現行的穀、麥等也叫「種」)。其餘的因——指第一隨說、第二觀待、第五攝受、第九相違這四因,以及前六因中的「非因緣法」——都是生位、熟位因緣種以外的,所以總說為方便因所攝。要注意兩頭都不可說死:並非『牽引種、生起種』這二種只屬於能生那二因(因為其餘四因——引發、定異、同事、不相違——中也有因緣種);也並非只有『那八因』叫所餘因、歸方便攝(因為牽引、生起那二因中也有非因緣種)。

這裡論主又引另一處〈有尋有伺等地〉的不同講法:那裡說『生起因是能生因,其餘為方便所攝』。這話的意思是:六因中凡「現行、種子」是因緣的都叫「生起因」(因為能親生起自類果),此外所餘的因都方便攝。同樣兩頭不可說死:並非「生起」只屬於那生起因(因為其餘五因中也有因緣);也並非只有『那九因』叫所餘因(因為那生起因中也有非因緣)。

論主進一步把這兩種講法會通。一種會通是:〈菩薩地〉所說「牽引、生起種子」就指那「二因」(牽引因、生起因),「所餘諸因」就指那『餘八因』。雖然這二因之內也有「非能生因」者,但其中因緣種最勝、最顯,所以偏就此說它能生;雖然其餘八因之內也有「非方便因」者,但其中增上者居多、最顯,所以偏就此說它方便。另一種會通是:〈有尋等地〉說『生起因是能生因、餘為方便』——它的「生起」就指那「生起因」,它的「餘因」就指那「餘九因」(連牽引也算進去)。雖然生起因中也有「非因緣種」,但它去果近、親義顯,所以偏就此說它能生;雖然牽引因中也有因緣種,但它去果遠、親義隱,所以不就此說。其餘為方便攝,依上類推可知。

四緣依何處立·如何攝十因二因

那麼,前面說的「四緣」是依哪些處立的?又怎麼攝歸十因、二因?《論》說:「因緣」依「種子」而立;依「無間滅處」立等無間緣;依「境界處」立所緣緣;依「所餘」諸處立增上緣。

先說因緣這邊的「種子」,指的是第三習氣、第四有潤、第十一隨順、第十二差別功能、第十三和合、第十五不障礙這「六依處」中的因緣種;雖然另有四處的現行也有因緣,但現行多間斷,所以此處略而不說。(那些現行有時也能親辦自果,像世間外麥等,也得安「種」之名;或者把「種子」一語只歸到第四有潤種子處——其親、疎、隱、顯的取捨,跟前面一樣。)再說「無間滅、境界」二處:應知這是「總顯」等無間、所緣這兩緣的依處,並不是只有第五、第六二處,因為其餘依處中也有這「中間二緣」的義;或者說只就第五、六二處立此二緣,其餘處雖有此義,但少而隱,所以略而不說。

至於四緣攝歸二因:《論》說「因緣」為能生因所攝;「增上緣」的性就是方便因;「中間二緣」(等無間、所緣)為攝受因所攝。雖然方便因內具足後三緣(等無間、所緣、增上),但其中增上居多,所以偏就增上說;其餘諸因也有中間二緣,但在攝受因中此義最顯,所以偏就攝受說。至於最初『因緣為能生攝』,它的寬狹取捨也跟前面一樣。

由因緣得五果

上面說的「因、緣」必定要有「果」。這果有幾種?依哪些處而得?果有五種。一是「異熟果」:指有漏善法及不善法所招感、在自相續中異熟而生的「無記」性果。二是「等流果」:指熏習善等所引的「同類」果(或者相似於先前的業,後果隨之而轉)。三是「離繫果」:指以無漏道斷障所證的善「無為法」。四是「士用果」:指諸作者假借諸作具所辦成的事業。五是「增上果」:指除前四果之外其餘所得的果。

這五果各依哪一依處而得?《瑜伽》等說:習氣依處得異熟果;隨順依處得等流果;真見依處得離繫果;士用依處得士用果;其餘依處得增上果。論主提醒:說『習氣處得異熟果』,是顯諸依處中「感異熟果」的一切功能(不是只此一處能感);說「隨順處」是顯諸依處中「引等流果」的一切功能;說「真見處」是顯諸依處中「證離繫果」的一切功能;說「士用處」是顯諸依處中「招士用果」的一切功能;說「所餘處」是顯諸依處中「得增上果」的一切功能。若不這樣會通,界定就會太寬或太狹。論主又給另一種讀法:或者「習氣」就唯屬第三處——雖然異熟因其餘處也有、這處也有非異熟因,但異熟因去果相遠、習氣(未成熟種)也去果相遠,二者相似,所以偏就此說;「隨順」唯屬第十一處——雖然等流果其餘處也得、這處也得非等流果,但此因招「勝行」之相最顯、隨順之義也是隨順勝品,所以偏就此說;「真見處」唯詮第十處——雖然證離繫其餘處也能、這處也能得非離繫,但此處證離繫之相最顯,所以偏說;「士用處」唯詮第九處——雖然士用果其餘處也招、這處也能招增上等,但它名實相符、名相最顯,所以偏說;「所餘」唯屬其餘十一處——雖然這十一處也得其餘四果、招增上果其餘處也能,但這十一處多招增上、而其餘四果已由前四處顯示了,所以偏就這十一處說增上。

最後把五果各由哪些因、哪些緣而得,總結一張帳。異熟果——由牽引、生起、定異、同事、不相違這五因,加增上緣而得。等流果——由牽引、生起、攝受、引發、定異、同事、不相違這七因,加「初、後」二緣(因緣、增上緣)而得。離繫果——由攝受、引發、定異、同事、不相違這五因,加增上緣而得。士用果——這裡有兩說:一說由觀待、攝受、同事、不相違四因,加增上緣而得;又一說由觀待、牽引、生起、攝受、引發、定異、同事、不相違八因,並除所緣緣外、其餘三緣而得。增上果——十因、四緣一切都容許得到。

傍論到此講完,回到本頌正義。

㊃ 結正論——本識中種容作三緣

回到正論。本識中的種子,在『生起現行分別』這件事上,容許作三種緣(唯獨除掉等無間緣)。怎麼說?各自的親種子,對它的現果是「因緣」;種子若被緣慮,就對能緣的心作「所緣緣」;種子若對那現行有能助之力、或不障礙,就作「增上緣」。它生起清淨現行的道理,也跟這一樣。

再看『現起的分別』彼此展轉相望,容許作三種緣(沒有因緣,因為現行不親生現行)。其中:有情類『自身與他身』展轉相望,容作二緣(除去因緣與等無間);而『自身的八識聚』展轉相望,則一定有增上緣、一定沒有等無間(八識不互為等無間)。

至於這八識之間「所緣緣」的義,則或無或有,要一識一識看:第八對第七有(第八的相分作第七的質),第七對第八沒有(因為其餘七識不是第八所仗的本質);第七對第六當中、五者無、一者有(第七的見分作第六的質),其餘六識對第七一切都沒有;第六對前五沒有(第六不作五識所託的質),其餘五識對第六則有(前五識所變的相分,第六得緣作質);前五識則唯獨依託『第八的相分』(不託第六)。再看「自類前後」相望:第六識(前念對後念)容作三緣(除因緣);其餘識則要再除「所緣緣」(因為前五等只取現境、不緣前念)。若承認『五識後念的見分能緣前念的相分』,那麼前五、第七的前後也有三緣。前七識對第八的所緣緣容許有,因為前七能熏成第八的相分種、見分種。

接著看『同一聚中的異體心心所』彼此展轉相望,唯有增上緣——因為諸相應法所仗的本質相同,所以彼此不相緣。不過這要分兩面看:依「見分」說,則彼此不相緣;依「相分」說,則有「相緣」的義——所謂諸相分互為本質而起(像識中的種子,可作觸等心所相分的本質)。若不這樣許,那麼緣「無色」(無質之境)時,無色界等就該沒有所緣境了;即使許它變似有色,也一定要緣種子(以種作質),不然見分所緣的境就與本質不同(失了所緣緣義)。再看『同體的相分』,它對同體的「見分」作二緣(所緣緣、增上緣);見分對它只有增上緣。『見分與自證分』相望也一樣(自證對見作二緣,見對自證只增上);其餘二分(自證分與證自證分)彼此展轉相望,都作二緣。要說明:這一段不是依『種子相分』而說的,只是就「現起」諸分互為緣而說。最後說『清淨的八識聚』,它在自身、他身彼此相望都有所緣緣,因為它能遍緣一切;唯獨除「見分」不作相分的所緣(也就是相分不能反緣見分),因為相分在理上沒有能緣的用。

論主再補一個對稱的問題:既然「現行分別」是緣種子而現生,那麼「種子」在理上也應該緣現行、緣種子而起;那『現行對種子』『種子對種子』能作幾種緣?種子一定不由「中間二緣」(等無間、所緣)而起,因為這二緣是待「心、心所」而立的,而種子不是心心所。所以:『現行對親種』具作二緣(因緣、增上),對「非親種」只作增上;『種子對親種』也具作二緣(因緣、增上),對「非親種」也只作增上。

這一句「本識中種容作三緣」,窺基《述記》補釋兩點:一、所謂「分別」,是通攝心王、心所,連帶見分、相分都算在內,不只指識的自體;二、所以單單除掉「等無間緣」,是因為等無間這一緣,唯就『心、心所前後相望』而立(種子不是心心所,故無此緣)。到結尾「依斯內識」一句,他點明所破的對象——正是小乘所執「心外之緣」:依內識的種、現互為緣起,一切分別的因與果、能生與所生都能成立,你們小乘所執心外之緣,縱使有也無用,何況違理違教,又何苦死執?

依著這「內識互為緣起」的道理,「分別」的因與果,在道理上、在聖教上都能成立。那妄執的「外緣」,縱使有它也沒有用處,何況它違背正理與聖教——又何必死死執著它呢?最後補一句界定:頌中「分別」一語,雖然總顯三界的心及心所,然而隨它當中勝出的,諸聖教裡用多種門徑顯示,或說為二、三、四、五等種種分類;這在其餘諸論中已經廣為分別過了。窺基《述記》於此特別點出:這頌末的「分別」,唯指『有漏的心、心所』,並引《辯中邊論》「虛妄分別謂是三界心、心所」為證——「分別」即三界有漏心心所,與本頌「彼彼分別」前後一貫。

承衍

本節所立的因果架構——一切種識變現、現行展轉力、四緣十因五果這一整套帳——是整個唯識系安立『內識緣起』的骨幹,後出諸論逐一承用。《百法明門論》把這套因果的諸法各歸其位:心法之第八阿賴耶(即一切種識)、心所之五遍行等(現行心心所互為緣)、無為之擇滅(即離繫果所證的善無為)。《唯識三十論頌》的頌十八(一切種識、展轉力、分別生),正是本節所釋的本頌,逐頌相承;上又接頌二「一切種」(賴耶因相、種子)。《辯中邊論·辯相品》立「虛妄分別」為三界心心所,所承的正是本節末窺基引《辯中邊》釋「分別」之義。《攝大乘論·所知依分》廣辯阿賴耶識持種熏習、種現互為緣,即是本節「內識互為緣起」的廣本。至於《二十唯識論》,主於成立唯識無境、破外人實境之執,於四緣十因這套因果架構沒有正面對位,這裡從闕。

Consciousness-only takes its stand on the claim that everything is nothing but inner consciousness, with no object outside the mind serving as a supporting condition. This at once invites a sharp counter-question: if there is no external condition, then how do the many kinds of "discrimination" (the consciousness of false discrimination) actually arise? This section first answers head-on with a single verse, then unfolds the matter layer by layer. It explains fully how the all-seeds consciousness transforms and how consciousnesses reinforce one another; then it turns into a long general treatment of the four conditions (causal condition, immediately-antecedent condition, object-as-condition, and dominant condition); along the way it also clarifies the entire causal architecture by which the four conditions, set upon fifteen bases, establish the ten causes, the ten causes are gathered into two causes, and from the causal condition the five fruits are obtained; and finally it returns to the proper sense of the verse — namely, exactly which conditions the seeds within the root consciousness can serve when discrimination arises.

This verse — "by the all-seeds consciousness transforming thus and thus" — has its scriptural root in the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra. Its chapter on mind, mentation, and consciousness speaks of the root consciousness that holds all phenomena within it, the ādāna ("that which follows along and appropriates"), in which "all the seeds, like a torrent," flow on and transform without cease moment after moment. When the present verse says "the all-seeds consciousness transforms and gives rise to discrimination," it is precisely carrying forward this sense of "all the seeds" — discrimination arises by the transformation of the seeds held within inner consciousness, with no need to borrow any condition outside the mind. As for the whole set of causal categories — the four conditions, the ten causes, the five fruits — their treatise-basis lies in the Yogācārabhūmi, in its Fundamental Section: there the names and numbers of "the ten causes, four conditions, and five fruits" are fixed (the ten causes being speaking-accordingly, observation-in-dependence, drawing-forth, giving-rise, embracing, inducing, determining-as-distinct, shared-undertaking, contrary, and non-contrary; the four conditions being causal, immediately-antecedent, object-as-condition, and dominant; the five fruits being maturation, outflow, disjunction, agent-action, and dominant), and there too the rule of "establishing causes in dependence on bases" is laid out — establishing the cause of speaking-accordingly upon the basis of speech, the cause of observation-in-dependence upon the basis of receiving, the drawing-forth cause upon the basis of latent forces, the giving-rise cause upon the basis of moistened seeds, and so on; the present treatise's "the four conditions, set upon fifteen bases, establish the ten causes" is an expansion drawn from this. The names and numbers of the five fruits are likewise settled and established in the Mahāyāna-abhidharma-samuccaya, in its chapter on doctrinal discussion (maturation, outflow, dominant, agent-action, disjunction). The causal architecture of this section thus has its scripture in the Saṃdhinirmocana and its treatise-basis in the Yogācārabhūmi and the Abhidharma-samuccaya — and below, following the verse, the exposition opens out.

I. Refuting the Objection from Doctrine · Resolving the Objection "From What Does Discrimination Arise?"

1. The Objection and the Answer — From What Does Discrimination Arise?

The opponent objects in this way: on what you have established as consciousness-only, there is only inner consciousness and no external condition whatsoever (no object outside the mind to lend a hand) — so on the strength of what, then, do the many kinds of "discrimination" arise, that is, these very consciousnesses of false discrimination? The author does not take a roundabout path; he answers directly with the words of the verse.

The verse says: by the "all-seeds consciousness" (the root consciousness that holds within it all the seeds) transforming thus and thus, and by the "mutually reinforcing power" through which the several consciousnesses augment one another, the many kinds of "discrimination" (those several consciousnesses of false discrimination) come to arise. The skeleton of this verse is just two powers: one is the power of seeds transforming, the other is the power by which the manifestly active consciousnesses drive one another along. When both powers are present, discrimination arises of itself, with no need to borrow an external condition.

2. Opening the Lines One by One — What Is the "All-Seeds Consciousness"?

The author first explains "all-seeds consciousness." This term refers to the manifold functional distinctions within the eighth, root consciousness that are "able to give rise to their own fruit" — that is, all the seeds. These seeds can give rise to four kinds of fruit: the outflow fruit, the maturation fruit, the agent-action fruit, and the dominant fruit; this is why they are called "all-seeds." The one exception that must be set aside is the disjunction fruit — the disjunction fruit (the unconditioned reality realized when obstructions are cut off) is not produced by seeds; though it can indeed be realized, it is not a fruit of seeds, for it is realized only by bringing forth the noble path and cutting off the fetters. There is, to be sure, a kind of "successive process" in this (cultivating the path first, then cutting the fetters and realizing the fruit), but that is not the "successive" power the verse intends; what the verse intends is the seed that is "able to give rise to discrimination."

Why is it called the "all-seeds consciousness" and not simply "all-seeds"? Because it takes the eighth consciousness for its substance, so the word "consciousness" is appended; once seeds are separated from the root consciousness they have no separate self-substance of their own, for they exist only in dependence upon the root consciousness. Further, naming "seed" and "consciousness" together is meant to distinguish two things: first, "a consciousness that is not a seed" (such as the manifestly active seven evolving consciousnesses, which are consciousness but not seed), and second, "a seed that is not this very consciousness" (the seed must be marked off and not confused with the substance of consciousness) — and so the two words must be set side by side. Again, this phrasing "seed-consciousness" is meant to point to "the seeds within this consciousness," not to "the consciousness that is able to retain seeds" (that is, the root consciousness itself); the consciousness that retains seeds is treated separately and will be discussed later.

Next he explains "transforming thus and thus" in the verse. These seeds within the root consciousness, assisted by the remaining various conditions, transform thus and thus — by "transform" is meant the passage from the "stage of arising" (the stage in which a seed is first drawn forth and produced) to the "moment of maturity" (the stage fit to summon a present fruit). Why does the verse repeat "thus and thus"? To show that the kinds of what is transformed are exceedingly many. The term "all-seeds" exhausts the "three kinds of perfuming" (the latent forces of designation, the latent forces of self-grasping, and the latent forces of the limbs of existence), all three classes, and likewise exhausts the "common-mark seeds, uncommon-mark seeds," and all the rest of the seeds within the root consciousness.

Next he explains "mutually reinforcing power." This "mutually reinforcing power" refers to the eight manifestly active consciousnesses, together with the mental factors associated with them, and the "image-portion and seeing-portion" of each consciousness — all of these have, among one another, a power of mutual assistance and support, and so they can in successive reinforcement give rise to discrimination. As for the phrase "those several discriminations": the manifestly active consciousnesses are collectively named "discrimination," because they all have "false discrimination" as their very nature; and since the kinds of discrimination are many, the verse says "those several discriminations."

Putting the whole verse together, the meaning is this: even with no condition outside the mind, by the distinctions in the transformation of all the seeds within the root consciousness, and by the mutually reinforcing power of the eight manifestly active consciousnesses and the rest, the many kinds of discrimination still come to arise — why must one borrow an external condition before discrimination can arise? And not only defiled phenomena are so; the arising of pure phenomena follows the very same principle: they arise by pure seeds and pure manifest activity serving as conditions, and likewise do not wait upon an external condition.

II. The Four Conditions — The Manner in Which Discrimination Arises Through Conditions

The foregoing has said "discrimination arises by seeds and manifest activity serving as conditions"; one must therefore press further and ask: how is this "arising through conditions" to be understood? Conditions are four in all. Each is clarified in turn below.

Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) marks out the levels of the whole chapter here: this clarifying of the "arising through conditions" — the broadening of the first three lines of the verse — divides into two passages: first, "the proper explanation of the four conditions," and afterward, "branching off to clarify the fifteen bases and the rest" (that is, the ten causes, the two causes, and the five fruits below are all a digression off to the side). He further matches verse-lines to conditions: the verse-line "all-seeds" is the broadening of the single "causal condition," and the verse-line "mutually reinforcing power" is the broadening of the remaining three conditions (immediately-antecedent, object-as-condition, and dominant) — so the clarifying of the four conditions is, at bottom, the unfolding of just these two lines.

1. The Causal Condition

The first is the "causal condition." By causal condition is meant that cause whereby a conditioned phenomenon "personally accomplishes its own fruit" (the intimate cause). Its substance is of two kinds: one is seeds, the other is manifest activity.

Take first the side of seeds. By seeds is meant the manifold functional distinctions within the root consciousness — wholesome, defiled (unwholesome), and indeterminate, and those bound to the three realms, the nine grounds, and so on. They have two operations: one is to draw forth "the next, later function of their own kind" (seed drawing seed, the prior seed drawing forth the later seed), and the other is to give rise to "the simultaneous present fruit of their own kind" (seed producing manifest activity); only with respect to this relation — toward the function of their own kind and the present fruit of their own kind — do they count as having the nature of a causal condition.

Now take the side of manifest activity. By manifest activity is meant the seven evolving consciousnesses, together with the image-portion and seeing-portion transformed by the mental factors associated with them, and their nature, realm, ground, and so on. Among these, two kinds must be set aside: "the wholesome of buddhahood's fruit" and "the extremely inferior indeterminate" — these two do not perfume seeds into being; apart from these, all the remaining manifest activity perfumes the root consciousness and gives rise to seeds of its own kind; and only with respect to this relation — toward seeds of its own kind — does it count as having the nature of a causal condition. As for the mind-king and mental factors of the eighth consciousness, they do not perfume seeds into being, for four reasons: it is itself the very "site that is perfumed," and does not in turn go perfuming others; it "does not stand apart from its support," and cannot, setting aside its support, perfume by itself; and its substance is both "exceedingly subtle" (weak) and "complete" (already perfect, neither increasing nor decreasing) — and so it does not perfume seeds into being. One must also keep clear: manifest activity and manifest activity of the same kind, regarded against each other, are not causal conditions, for each arises from its own seed and it is not the case that this one produces that one; and all heterogeneous kinds regarded against each other are likewise not causal conditions, for they do not intimately produce one another.

Here there are two divergent views. One view maintains that "heterogeneous and homogeneous manifest activity, regarded against each other, can serve as causal condition" — concerning this view, one should know that it is a "provisional statement," or a "teaching that goes along with the position of another school" (an expedient way of speaking that accommodates another tradition), and is not the ultimate sense. Another view then "admits only seeds to have the nature of causal condition" (manifest activity not counting) — this is spoken "in accordance with the more conspicuous," taking the higher sense of seeds for its thesis, and is not an exhaustive account of the principle; for the noble teaching plainly says that "the evolving consciousnesses and the ālaya-consciousness, regarded against each other, can serve as causal condition," which shows that manifest activity too can serve as a causal condition.

2. The Immediately-Antecedent Condition

The second is the "immediately-antecedent condition." By immediately-antecedent condition is meant that the eight manifestly active consciousnesses and their mental factors — the "prior aggregate" toward the "later aggregate of its own kind" — are, without interval, equally "yielding and ushering" (the prior moment giving way, opening the road for the later moment), so that the later aggregate is determined to arise. Note this: the many seeds of the same kind arise simultaneously, with no sense of a prior one opening the way for a later, and so the "dissociated-from-mind formations" are not embraced by this condition; and for just this reason the eight consciousnesses cannot serve as immediately-antecedent condition for one another (they are not without interval within a single kind). However, the mental factors and the mind-king, though they constantly evolve together at the same time, are by their "association" so blended as to seem one substance, and cannot be set up as separate and distinct; therefore the mind-king and the mental factors can, after all, serve as immediately-antecedent condition for one another (this does not violate the principle of being-without-interval-within-a-kind). Again, the final moment of mind upon entering "remainderless nirvāṇa" is the most extremely subtle and weak; it has no function of opening the way for a later moment, and there is, afterward, no further immediately-antecedent phenomenon "about to arise" (no mind arises beyond it), and so this moment does not serve as immediately-antecedent condition. How do we know it is so? The treatise has a definite statement: "if the consciousnesses and the rest of the prior aggregate are without interval, then the consciousnesses and the rest of the later aggregate are determined to arise," which says that the prior aggregate is the immediately-antecedent condition of the later aggregate.

On this principle one may examine the immediately-antecedent condition of the eight consciousnesses one by one. First, the eighth, the ādāna-consciousness: across the three realms and nine grounds it is allowed to serve as immediately-antecedent condition mutually, for in the upper and lower realms and grounds, and in the positions of death and birth, it can open the way for itself; moreover "the defiled eighth, without interval, can give rise to the undefiled eighth"; but conversely "after the undefiled there is determinedly no arising of the defiled" — for once the great-perfect-mirror wisdom appears, the defiled eighth is forever absent, forever cut off; and its "wholesome" and "indeterminate," regarded against each other, are the same in this way (after undefiled wholesomeness arises, defiled indeterminacy no longer arises). Then after which realm is this undefiled eighth drawn forth? Either after the form realm or after the desire realm. An ordinary being who seeks the fruit of buddhahood is certain to draw forth the undefiled after the form realm, for he must be born in the "palace of Maheśvara" in the Pure-Abodes heavens of the form realm and there realize awakening; while a person of the two vehicles who turns from the lesser toward the greater and aspires to the great awakening is certain to draw forth the undefiled after the desire realm, for the body he turns toward and retains is only in the desire realm — though he too must go to the palace of Maheśvara before becoming a buddha, the "born body" retained by the power of his fundamental vow is a desire-realm body, and so, with respect to the retained body, it is drawn forth after the desire realm. Here there is one divergent view: it says that in the form realm there are also voice-hearers who turn toward the great vehicle and retain a body by the power of vow — this contradicts neither teaching nor principle, and so a voice-hearer's undefiled eighth can also appear after a form-realm mind (not restricted to being after the desire realm); however, within the five Pure-Abodes heavens there are none who turn toward the great vehicle, for the scriptures do not say that the noble ones there bring forth the great-vehicle mind.

Next, the seventh, the manas: across the three realms and nine grounds it too is allowed to serve as immediately-antecedent condition mutually, for it is bound to the realm and ground in accordance with the place where the eighth consciousness arises. Its "defiled and undefiled" can give rise to each other, for in the ten grounds the defiled manas and the wisdom of equal-nature can draw each other forth; its "wholesome" and "indeterminate," regarded against each other, can likewise give rise to each other; and within the indeterminate, the "defiled manas" and the "undefiled manas" can also open the way for each other, for in the prior and later positions of "the fruit of the wisdom of the emptiness of person" they can draw each other forth. However, the mutual giving-rise of the seventh's defiled and undefiled occurs only in the desire realm and form realm, not in the formless realm — for bodhisattvas on the grounds are not born in the formless realm.

Next, the sixth, the mind-consciousness: across the three realms and nine grounds, its defiled and undefiled, wholesome and unwholesome, and so on, are each allowed to serve as immediately-antecedent condition mutually, for in the "position of moistening rebirth" and the like they can draw one another forth; its "first arising of the undefiled" is only after the form realm, for the wholesomeness of the "factors conducive to penetration" exists only in the form realm.

Finally, the first five consciousnesses: the eye-, ear-, and body-consciousness extend to "two realms and two grounds" (the desire realm and the first dhyāna), while the nose- and tongue-consciousness extend only to "one realm and one ground" (the desire realm); all serve as immediately-antecedent condition mutually within their own kind, and their wholesomeness and the rest, regarded against each other, are the same. Here there are two divergent views. One view: the defiled and undefiled of the first five consciousnesses serve as immediately-antecedent condition mutually within their own kind, for "before buddhahood is attained" the defiled and undefiled are allowed to arise alternately. Another view: the undefiled five consciousnesses can arise after the defiled five consciousnesses, but after the undefiled, the defiled are not allowed to arise again; the reasons are — the undefiled five consciousnesses exist nowhere but at the buddha-stage; those five physical faculties are certainly defiled (the physical faculties are embraced by the image-portion of the maturation consciousness); the matter of a "defiled, uncommon supporting physical faculty" together with "simultaneously, on the same object, giving rise to an undefiled consciousness" does not accord in fact or in principle; and moreover the two — defiled and undefiled — differ as to "clarity and dimness" with respect to their object, and so it is not allowed that they revert in succession to the defiled.

3. The Object-as-Condition

The third is the "object-as-condition." By object-as-condition is meant that if there is a phenomenon that is "apprehended and relied upon by a mind (or an associated mental factor) bearing its own image" — that is, the object that the mind apprehends and leans upon — then it is an object-as-condition. Its substance is of two kinds: one is the "intimate object-as-condition," the other is the "remote object-as-condition." How are they distinguished? If this object is not separate from the substance of the "apprehender" (that is, the image-portion that the seeing-portion and the rest inwardly apprehend and lean upon), then it is the intimate object-as-condition; if it is separate from the substance of the apprehender, yet can serve as the "underlying basis" giving rise to the inward apprehending-and-leaning (that is, the external underlying basis), then it is the remote object-as-condition. Speaking again in terms of presence or absence: the intimate object-as-condition is had by every apprehending mind, for apart from the inward apprehended-and-leaned-upon, an apprehending mind certainly does not arise; the remote object-as-condition the apprehending mind may or may not have, for apart from the external apprehended-and-leaned-upon, an apprehending mind can still arise.

Below, the presence or absence of the remote condition is clarified consciousness by consciousness. First, the mind-class of the eighth consciousness — here there are three views. One view: the eighth "has only the intimate object-as-condition," for by the power of karmic causes it transforms spontaneously and does not rely on an external basis. Another view: the eighth "certainly also has a remote object-as-condition," for it must lean upon the underlying basis transformed by others before this side itself transforms. Another view (refuting the prior two and establishing the settled, correct reading): both prior views fail to accord with principle. On one hand, one's own body, another's body, one's own land, and another's land can "be mutually made use of," and what others transform can serve as one's own underlying basis (so it is not that there is no remote condition); on the other hand, "one's own seeds have no principle of being made use of by another sentient being," so to say that everything relies wholly on what others transform serving as one's own underlying basis also fails to accord with principle, all the more since the seeds of the several sentient beings are not entirely equal (so it is also not that there is certainly a remote condition); therefore one should say: the remote object-as-condition of the eighth mind-class is, in all positions, indeterminate as to being present or absent. Next, the mind-class of the seventh: in the "position before transformation of the basis" it is the innate self-grasping, which must lean upon an external basis (apprehending the seeing-portion of the eighth as its basis), and so it too certainly has a remote object-as-condition; reaching the "position after transformation of the basis," the remote condition is then no longer certainly present, for when it apprehends suchness and the like there is no external basis. Next, the mind-class of the sixth: its mode of activity is fierce and keen, and in all positions it can evolve freely; the external basis it leans upon may or may not be present, and so its remote object-as-condition is indeterminate as to presence or absence. Finally, the mind-class of the first five: in the "position before transformation of the basis," being coarse, dull, and inferior, it must lean upon an external basis (the underlying basis of form-objects), and so it too certainly has a remote object-as-condition; reaching the "position after transformation of the basis" it is then no longer certainly present, for the wisdom that accomplishes what is to be done can apprehend the past, the future, and the like, and at that time there is no external basis.

4. The Dominant Condition

The fourth is the "dominant condition." By dominant condition is meant that if there is a phenomenon possessing a surpassing potency, able toward the remaining phenomena to "either assist or obstruct" (help or hinder), then it is a dominant condition. In truth the prior three conditions all carry a dominant sense as well; but this fourth condition is established by "setting aside the prior three and taking only the remainder," for the purpose of bringing out the distinct character of the several conditions. This potency to "assist or obstruct" evolves in the four locations of "arising, abiding, accomplishing, and obtaining," because the four matters of arising, abiding, accomplishing, and obtaining are distinct. Though the dominant operations are many according to the matter, the most surpassing and most conspicuous are just twenty-two — these are the "twenty-two faculties."

What does each of the twenty-two faculties take for its own nature? The first five physical faculties (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body) take for their nature the "pure form" of the eye and the rest, transformed by the root consciousness and so on; the two faculties of maleness and femaleness are embraced by the body-faculty and so take a portion of the body-faculty for their nature; the life-faculty is merely provisionally established, upon a positional division of "the intimate seed of the root consciousness," and has no separate nature of its own; the mind-faculty takes the "eight consciousnesses" collectively for its nature; the five feeling-faculties (pain, pleasure, sorrow, joy, equanimity) each take their own feeling for their nature; and the five faculties beginning with faith (faith, vigor, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom) take faith and the rest, and wholesome mindfulness and so on, for their own nature.

The last three faculties (the faculty of "I-shall-come-to-know-the-unknown," the faculty of "having-known," and the faculty of "complete-knowing") must be examined closely. First, the faculty of "I-shall-come-to-know-the-unknown" — its substance has three positions. The first is the "root position," referring to the position of the path of seeing (excepting, however, the final instant, for in that final instant there is no longer anything "unknown that can come to be known," and so it is excepted). The second is the "preparatory position," referring to the four wholesome roots of warmth, summit, forbearance, and the supreme-mundane-dharma, for they draw near to being able to induce the root position (the path of seeing). The third is the "provisioning position," referring to all the wholesome roots from the arising of the resolute and surpassing wholesome aspiration "to attain the direct realization of the truths" up to "not yet having attained the factors conducive to penetration," for it can from afar assist and induce the root position. In these three positions, the "five faculties beginning with faith, the mind-faculty, joy, pleasure, and equanimity" are the faculty-nature of this "I-shall-come-to-know-the-unknown"; in the preparatory and other positions, although in seeking to realize the later surpassing dharma there is also "grief and distress," carrying the "faculty of sorrow," yet the faculty of sorrow is not a proper wholesome root, and so for the most part it is not counted in. Again, the first three formless heavens (boundless-space, boundless-consciousness, nothing-whatever) also have this faculty, attained by "cultivating it as an adjunct to the surpassing path of seeing"; or persons of the two vehicles who turn toward the great vehicle, in seeking to realize the emptiness of phenomena, also bring forth, before the grounds, "the undefiled emptiness-of-person embraced by the nine grounds" — these are already bodhisattvas, and are embraced by this faculty. As for the bodhisattva's position on the path of seeing, it in fact also has this faculty; the text above spoke only of "before the grounds" because the path of seeing is exceedingly brief, and so it was passed over and not separately stated.

Next, the faculty of "having-known": from the final instant of the path of seeing all the way up to the "vajra-like concentration," all the undefiled nine faculties beginning with faith are the faculty-nature of "having-known." Among them, those who have not yet departed from desire, in seeking to realize liberation in the upper realms, also have "grief and distress," carrying the faculty of sorrow, but the faculty of sorrow is not a proper wholesome root, and so for the most part it is not counted in.

Next, the faculty of "complete-knowing": in the several "positions beyond training," all the undefiled nine faculties are entirely the faculty-nature of "complete-knowing." One word must be added: the "peak of existence" (the station of neither-perception-nor-non-perception), though it has "roving-contemplation undefiled" (undefiled contemplation roving through it from the lower grounds' undefiled), has a character that is not clear and keen, and so it is not embraced by the last three faculties. The own-nature of the twenty-two faculties is roughly thus; the doctrine of the several other approaches should be understood by relying on the Yogācārabhūmi and the like.

III. The Subsidiary Treatment — The Four Conditions, Set Upon the Fifteen Bases, Establish the Ten Causes

With the four conditions finished, the author here branches off into a long subsidiary discussion: these four conditions, further set upon "fifteen bases" (fifteen kinds of supporting basis), according to the distinctions of the sense of "cause," establish the "ten causes." How are they established upon these fifteen bases? Each is stated in turn.

Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) sets up a four-fold outline for this long subsidiary stretch, to make its course easy to follow: first, clarifying how the four conditions, set upon the fifteen bases, establish the ten causes (that is, the establishing of causes basis by basis below); second, distinguishing how the ten causes and the "two causes (the cause that gives rise, the expedient cause)" mutually embrace one another; third, clarifying the bases of the four conditions and their mutual embracing with the ten causes and the two causes; fourth, clarifying how many fruits each of the bases of the four conditions obtains. He cautions, moreover, that the mutual embracing of the ten causes and the two causes is "merely a making-clear of the sense of cause — a side-sense of the ten causes, and not the setting up of another category"; the reader need not take it as a separate division standing alongside the four conditions.

1. The basis of speech — this refers to the "nature of speech" (verbal expression) that arises from "the name of a phenomenon" and "the idea" of it; set upon this basis, the "cause of speaking-accordingly" is established, that is, the cause whereby, relying on speech and according to what is seen, heard, and so on, one declares the several meanings — this is "the cause that makes the speaker produce what is spoken." (Some treatise states this basis of speech to be the three of "name, idea, and view": by grasping the image as if it were a name, and by attachment, speech arises accordingly; on that treatise's account, this very cause is precisely shown to be the basis of speech.)

2. The basis of receiving — this refers to the nature of the "able-to-receive and the received" that is observed-in-dependence; set upon this basis, the "cause of observation-in-dependence" is established, that is, the cause whereby, observing this one phenomenon in dependence, it makes those several matters either arise, abide, accomplish, or be obtained — this is "that phenomenon's cause of observation-in-dependence."

3. The basis of latent forces — this refers to the "not-yet-matured position" of inner seeds and outer seeds; set upon this basis, the "drawing-forth cause" is established, because it can from afar draw forth its own fruit.

4. The basis of moistened seeds — this refers to the "already-matured position" (already moistened) of inner seeds and outer seeds; set upon this basis, the "giving-rise cause" is established, because it can from near at hand give rise to its own fruit.

5. The basis of immediate cessation — this refers to the "immediately-antecedent condition" of mind and mental factors (the prior moment ceases without interval and opens the way for the later moment).

6. The basis of the object-field — this refers to the "object-as-condition" of mind and mental factors (the object that is apprehended).

7. The basis of faculties — this refers to the "six faculties" upon which mind and mental factors depend.

8. The basis of activity — this refers to the present conditions, apart from seeds, that help bring about the deed performed and the "instrument" used and its "operation" (with attention to the instrument).

9. The basis of agent-action — this refers to the present conditions, apart from seeds, that can perform the deed performed, its "agent," and its "operation" (with attention to the agent).

10. The basis of true vision — this refers to "undefiled vision"; apart from the one matter of "drawing forth seeds of its own kind," it assists in inducing and assists in realizing among undefiled phenomena. Setting upon these six bases, the fifth through the tenth, collectively, the "embracing cause" is established, because embracing the prior five bases can accomplish defiled phenomena, and fully embracing these six bases can accomplish undefiled phenomena.

11. The basis of conformity — this refers to the indeterminate, defiled, and wholesome manifest activities, seeds, and the several formations, which can conform to "the superior grades of their own kind"; set upon this basis, the "inducing cause" is established, because it can induce the superior activities of its own kind, and can also induce the unconditioned.

12. The basis of distinct function — this refers to the distinct potency of "being able to give rise to, being able to realize" that each conditioned phenomenon has toward its own fruit; set upon this basis, the "determining-as-distinct cause" is established, because each can give rise to the fruit of its own realm and so on, and each can obtain the fruit of its own vehicle.

13. The basis of conjunction — this refers to the power of "conjunction" present, from the basis of receiving up to the basis of distinct function, within the fruits that are given rise to, abide, accomplished, and obtained; set upon this basis, the "shared-undertaking cause" is established, because from the cause of observation-in-dependence to the cause of determining-as-distinct, all jointly accomplish arising and the rest, and are a single undertaking.

14. The basis of obstruction — this refers to the phenomena that can obstruct in the matters of arising, abiding, accomplishing, and obtaining; set upon this basis, the "contrary cause" is established, because it can run counter to the matters of arising and the rest.

15. The basis of non-obstruction — this refers to the phenomena that do not obstruct in the matters of arising, abiding, accomplishing, and obtaining; set upon this basis, the "non-contrary cause" is established, because it does not run counter to the matters of arising and the rest.

The Ten Causes Gathered into Two Causes

These ten causes are, further, embraced by "two causes": the first is the cause that gives rise, the second is the expedient cause. The Bodhisattva-bhūmi says: "Drawing-forth seeds and giving-rise seeds are called the cause that gives rise; the remaining several causes are embraced by the expedient cause." The meaning of this statement is: among the six causes of drawing-forth, giving-rise, inducing, determining-as-distinct, shared-undertaking, and non-contrary, whatever is the not-yet-matured position of "causal-condition seeds" is called the "drawing-forth seed" and the already-matured position is called the "giving-rise seed"; the several causal-condition seeds within these six causes are wholly embraced within these two positions, the not-yet-matured and the already-matured. Although there is also "manifest activity" that is a cause-that-gives-rise (such as the manifest activity within the prior four conditions that can give rise to seeds of its own kind), manifest activity is for the most part discontinuous, and so it is here passed over and not stated, and the cause-that-gives-rise is set up only on seeds; as for the manifest activity that "personally accomplishes the fruit," it may at times be given the name "seed" as well (as the world says that the manifestly active grain, wheat, and so on are also called "seed"). The remaining causes — namely the first, speaking-accordingly; the second, observation-in-dependence; the fifth, embracing; and the ninth, contrary; these four causes, together with the "non-causal-condition phenomena" within the prior six causes — are all outside the causal-condition seeds of the arising-position and matured-position, and so are collectively said to be embraced by the expedient cause. Note that neither end may be stated rigidly: it is not that "drawing-forth seeds and giving-rise seeds," these two seeds, belong only to those two causes-that-give-rise (for among the remaining four causes — inducing, determining-as-distinct, shared-undertaking, non-contrary — there are also causal-condition seeds); nor is it that only "those eight causes" are called the remaining causes and gathered under the expedient (for within the two causes of drawing-forth and giving-rise there are also non-causal-condition seeds).

Here the author further cites a different account from another place, the Stage-With-Application-and-Sustained-Thought: there it says "the giving-rise cause is the cause that gives rise, the remainder being embraced by the expedient." The meaning of this is: among the six causes, whatever "manifest activity or seeds" are causal-condition is called the "giving-rise cause" (because it can intimately give rise to the fruit of its own kind), and apart from this the remaining causes are all embraced by the expedient. Here too neither end may be stated rigidly: it is not that "giving-rise" belongs only to that giving-rise cause (for within the remaining five causes there are also causal conditions); nor is it that only "those nine causes" are called the remaining causes (for within that giving-rise cause there are also non-causal conditions).

The author further reconciles these two accounts. One reconciliation is this: what the Bodhisattva-bhūmi calls "drawing-forth and giving-rise seeds" refers to those "two causes" (the drawing-forth cause, the giving-rise cause), and the "remaining several causes" refers to those "remaining eight causes." Although within these two causes there are also those that are "not causes-that-give-rise," yet within them the causal-condition seeds are most surpassing and most conspicuous, and so it is spoken of one-sidedly, with respect to this, as "giving rise"; and although within the remaining eight causes there are also those that are "not expedient causes," yet within them the dominant ones are in the majority and most conspicuous, and so it is spoken of one-sidedly, with respect to this, as "expedient." Another reconciliation is this: the Stage-With-Application-and-Sustained-Thought says "the giving-rise cause is the cause that gives rise, the remainder being expedient" — its "giving-rise" refers to that "giving-rise cause," and its "remaining causes" refers to those "remaining nine causes" (counting drawing-forth in as well). Although within the giving-rise cause there are also "non-causal-condition seeds," yet it is near to the fruit and its intimate sense is conspicuous, and so it is spoken of one-sidedly, with respect to this, as "giving rise"; and although within the drawing-forth cause there are also causal-condition seeds, yet it is far from the fruit and its intimate sense is hidden, and so it is not spoken of with respect to this. The remainder being embraced by the expedient is to be understood by extending the above analogously.

Upon Which Bases the Four Conditions Are Established · How They Are Embraced into the Ten Causes and the Two Causes

Then, upon which bases are the "four conditions" spoken of above established? And how are they gathered into the ten causes and the two causes? The treatise says: the "causal condition" is established upon "seeds"; the immediately-antecedent condition is established upon the "basis of immediate cessation"; the object-as-condition is established upon the "basis of the object-field"; and the dominant condition is established upon the "remaining" several bases.

Take first the "seeds" on the side of the causal condition: this refers to the causal-condition seeds within these "six bases" — the third, latent forces; the fourth, moistened; the eleventh, conformity; the twelfth, distinct function; the thirteenth, conjunction; and the fifteenth, non-obstruction; although there is also manifest activity in another four bases that is causal-condition, manifest activity is for the most part discontinuous, and so it is here passed over and not stated. (That manifest activity can at times also personally accomplish its own fruit, as the worldly outer wheat and so on, and may be given the name "seed"; or one may assign the term "seed" only to the fourth, the basis of moistened seeds — the choice of intimate, remote, hidden, and conspicuous being as before.) Next, the two bases of "immediate cessation and the object-field": one should know that this is a "collective showing" of the bases of the two conditions of immediate-antecedence and object, and is not only the fifth and sixth bases, for the sense of these "two intermediate conditions" is present in the remaining bases as well; or it is that these two conditions are established only upon the fifth and sixth bases, and although this sense is present in the remaining bases, it is slight and hidden, and so it is passed over and not stated.

As for the four conditions gathered into the two causes: the treatise says the "causal condition" is embraced by the cause that gives rise; the "dominant condition" is by nature the expedient cause; and the "two intermediate conditions" (immediate-antecedence and object) are embraced by the embracing cause. Although the expedient cause fully possesses the latter three conditions (immediate-antecedence, object, and dominant), among them the dominant is in the majority, and so it is spoken of one-sidedly with respect to the dominant; and the remaining several causes also have the two intermediate conditions, but within the embracing cause this sense is most conspicuous, and so it is spoken of one-sidedly with respect to the embracing. As for the first item, "the causal condition is embraced by the cause that gives rise," the choice of its breadth and narrowness is also as before.

From the Causal Condition the Five Fruits Are Obtained

The "causes and conditions" spoken of above must certainly have a "fruit." How many kinds is this fruit? Upon which bases is it obtained? Fruits are of five kinds. The first is the "maturation fruit": the "indeterminate"-natured fruit that is summoned by defiled wholesome phenomena and unwholesome phenomena and that arises through maturation within one's own continuum. The second is the "outflow fruit": the "same-kind" fruit drawn forth by the perfuming of the wholesome and so on (or that which, resembling the prior karma, has the later fruit evolve in accordance). The third is the "disjunction fruit": the wholesome "unconditioned phenomenon" realized by cutting off obstruction through the undefiled path. The fourth is the "agent-action fruit": the undertaking accomplished by agents through the borrowed aid of the several instruments. The fifth is the "dominant fruit": the fruits obtained apart from the prior four fruits.

Upon which basis is each of these five fruits obtained? The Yogācārabhūmi and the like say: the basis of latent forces obtains the maturation fruit; the basis of conformity obtains the outflow fruit; the basis of true vision obtains the disjunction fruit; the basis of agent-action obtains the agent-action fruit; and the remaining bases obtain the dominant fruit. The author cautions: to say "the basis of latent forces obtains the maturation fruit" is to show all the functions among the several bases that "summon the maturation fruit" (not that this basis alone can summon it); to say "the basis of conformity" is to show all the functions among the several bases that "draw forth the outflow fruit"; to say "the basis of true vision" is to show all the functions among the several bases that "realize the disjunction fruit"; to say "the basis of agent-action" is to show all the functions among the several bases that "summon the agent-action fruit"; and to say "the remaining bases" is to show all the functions among the several bases that "obtain the dominant fruit." Were the matter not reconciled in this way, the delimitation would be either too broad or too narrow. The author further gives another reading: or "latent forces" belongs only to the third basis — although the maturation cause is present in the remaining bases as well, and this basis has non-maturation causes too, yet the maturation cause is far from its fruit and the latent forces (the not-yet-matured seed) are likewise far from their fruit, the two being similar, and so it is spoken of one-sidedly with respect to this; "conformity" belongs only to the eleventh basis — although the outflow fruit is obtained in the remaining bases as well, and this basis obtains non-outflow fruit too, yet the character of this cause summoning "superior activities" is most conspicuous and the sense of conformity is also conformity to superior grades, and so it is spoken of one-sidedly with respect to this; "the basis of true vision" expounds only the tenth basis — although the realization of disjunction can occur in the remaining bases as well, and this basis can obtain non-disjunction too, yet the character of realizing disjunction at this basis is most conspicuous, and so it is spoken of one-sidedly; "the basis of agent-action" expounds only the ninth basis — although the agent-action fruit is summoned in the remaining bases as well, and this basis can summon the dominant and the like too, yet its name and reality correspond and its name-character is most conspicuous, and so it is spoken of one-sidedly; "the remaining" belongs only to the remaining eleven bases — although these eleven bases also obtain the remaining four fruits and the summoning of the dominant fruit can occur in the remaining bases as well, yet these eleven bases for the most part summon the dominant, while the remaining four fruits have already been shown by the prior four bases, and so it is spoken of one-sidedly with respect to these eleven bases as dominant.

Finally, by which causes and which conditions each of the five fruits is obtained — the whole ledger is summarized. The maturation fruit — obtained by the five causes of drawing-forth, giving-rise, determining-as-distinct, shared-undertaking, and non-contrary, plus the dominant condition. The outflow fruit — obtained by the seven causes of drawing-forth, giving-rise, embracing, inducing, determining-as-distinct, shared-undertaking, and non-contrary, plus the "first and last" two conditions (the causal condition and the dominant condition). The disjunction fruit — obtained by the five causes of embracing, inducing, determining-as-distinct, shared-undertaking, and non-contrary, plus the dominant condition. The agent-action fruit — here there are two views: one view holds it obtained by the four causes of observation-in-dependence, embracing, shared-undertaking, and non-contrary, plus the dominant condition; another view holds it obtained by the eight causes of observation-in-dependence, drawing-forth, giving-rise, embracing, inducing, determining-as-distinct, shared-undertaking, and non-contrary, together with the three remaining conditions other than the object-as-condition. The dominant fruit — all ten causes and four conditions are allowed to obtain it.

The subsidiary treatment is finished here; we return to the proper sense of the verse.

IV. Concluding the Proper Doctrine — The Seeds Within the Root Consciousness May Serve as Three Conditions

Returning to the main doctrine. The seeds within the root consciousness, in the matter of "giving rise to manifestly active discrimination," are allowed to serve as three kinds of condition (excepting only the immediately-antecedent condition). How so? Each intimate seed is the "causal condition" toward its present fruit; if a seed is apprehended, it serves as the "object-as-condition" toward the apprehending mind; and if a seed has the power to assist that manifest activity, or does not obstruct it, it serves as the "dominant condition." The principle by which it gives rise to pure manifest activity is the same as this.

Look next at "manifestly active discriminations" regarded against one another in succession: they are allowed to serve as three kinds of condition (there being no causal condition, for manifest activity does not intimately produce manifest activity). Among these: the "own body and another's body" of sentient kinds, regarded against each other in succession, are allowed to serve as two conditions (excepting the causal condition and the immediately-antecedent condition); while "the aggregate of one's own eight consciousnesses," regarded against each other in succession, certainly has the dominant condition and certainly lacks the immediately-antecedent condition (the eight consciousnesses are not immediately-antecedent for one another).

As for the sense of the "object-as-condition" among these eight consciousnesses, it is either absent or present and must be looked at consciousness by consciousness: the eighth has it toward the seventh (the eighth's image-portion serves as the seventh's basis), the seventh does not have it toward the eighth (because the remaining seven consciousnesses are not the underlying basis upon which the eighth leans); of the seventh toward the sixth and the rest, five lack it and one has it (the seventh's seeing-portion serves as the sixth's basis), while the remaining six consciousnesses toward the seventh all lack it entirely; the sixth lacks it toward the first five (the sixth does not serve as the basis upon which the five consciousnesses lean), while the remaining five consciousnesses toward the sixth have it (the image-portion transformed by the first five consciousnesses the sixth can apprehend as its basis); the first five consciousnesses then lean solely upon "the image-portion of the eighth" (not leaning upon the sixth). Look next at "the prior and later within one's own kind," regarded against each other: the sixth consciousness (prior moment toward later moment) is allowed three conditions (excepting the causal condition); the remaining consciousnesses must further except the "object-as-condition" (because the first five and the like take only the present object and do not apprehend the prior moment). If one admits that "the seeing-portion of the later moment of the five consciousnesses can apprehend the image-portion of the prior moment," then the prior-and-later of the first five and of the seventh also have three conditions. The object-as-condition of the prior seven consciousnesses toward the eighth is allowed to be present, for the prior seven can perfume into being the image-portion seeds and seeing-portion seeds of the eighth.

Next, look at "the distinct-substance mind and mental factors within a single aggregate," regarded against each other in succession: there is only the dominant condition — because the underlying basis upon which the several associated phenomena lean is the same, and so they do not apprehend one another. But this must be looked at in two aspects: speaking in terms of the "seeing-portion," they do not apprehend one another; speaking in terms of the "image-portion," there is a sense of "mutual apprehension" — namely, the several image-portions arise mutually serving as underlying basis (as the seeds within consciousness can serve as the underlying basis for the image-portion of contact and the other mental factors). Were this not admitted, then when apprehending "the formless" (an object without basis), the formless realm and the like would have no apprehended object; even if one admits that it transforms into a semblance of having form, it must certainly apprehend a seed (taking the seed as basis), or else the object apprehended by the seeing-portion would differ from the underlying basis (losing the sense of object-as-condition). Look next at "the same-substance image-portion": it serves toward the same-substance "seeing-portion" as two conditions (object-as-condition and dominant condition); the seeing-portion toward it has only the dominant condition. "The seeing-portion and the self-witnessing portion," regarded against each other, are likewise so (the self-witnessing serves the seeing as two conditions, the seeing serves the self-witnessing as only dominant); the remaining two portions (the self-witnessing portion and the witness of self-witnessing) regarded against each other in succession both serve as two conditions. It should be clarified: this passage is not spoken in terms of "seed image-portions," but only in terms of the manifestly arisen several portions mutually serving as conditions. Finally, "the pure aggregate of eight consciousnesses": in one's own body and another's body, regarded against each other, it has the object-as-condition throughout, for it can pervasively apprehend all things; only the "seeing-portion" is excepted as not serving as the object of the image-portion (that is, the image-portion cannot in turn apprehend the seeing-portion), for the image-portion has in principle no apprehending function.

The author further adds a symmetrical question: since "manifestly active discrimination" arises in the present by apprehending seeds, then "seeds" should in principle also arise by apprehending manifest activity and apprehending seeds; so how many conditions can "manifest activity toward seeds" and "seeds toward seeds" serve? Seeds certainly do not arise by the "two intermediate conditions" (immediate-antecedence and object), for these two conditions are established in dependence upon "mind and mental factors," and seeds are not mind and mental factors. Therefore: "manifest activity toward its intimate seed" fully serves as two conditions (causal condition and dominant condition), and toward a "non-intimate seed" serves only as dominant; "seed toward its intimate seed" likewise fully serves as two conditions (causal condition and dominant condition), and toward a "non-intimate seed" also serves only as dominant.

On this line "the seeds within the root consciousness may serve as three conditions," Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) supplies two clarifications: first, what is meant by "discrimination" here embraces the mind-king together with the mental factors, the seeing-portion and image-portion reckoned in along with them, and not the substance of consciousness alone; second, the reason only the "immediately-antecedent condition" is set aside is that this one condition is established solely with respect to "mind and mental factors regarded as prior and later" (seeds are not mind and mental factors, and so this condition does not apply to them). And on the closing line "in dependence on these inner consciousnesses," he points out the object being refuted — precisely the "condition outside the mind" that the Hīnayāna grasps at: in dependence on the seeds and manifest activity of inner consciousness serving as conditions for one another's arising, every cause and fruit of discrimination, every giver-of-rise and given-rise-to, is established; the "condition outside the mind" the Hīnayāna grasps at, even if it existed, would be of no use, all the more since it contradicts principle and teaching — why then cling to it so doggedly?

In accordance with this principle of "inner consciousnesses serving as conditions for one another's dependent arising," the cause and fruit of "discrimination" are established both in principle and in the noble teaching. As for the "external condition" that is falsely grasped — even if it existed, it would be of no use, all the more since it contradicts correct principle and the noble teaching — so why cling to it so stubbornly? One last delimitation is added: although the word "discrimination" in the verse collectively shows the mind and mental factors of the three realms, yet according to what is surpassing within them, the several noble teachings show it by manifold approaches, speaking of it as two, three, four, five, and the like — these various classifications having already been extensively distinguished in the several other treatises. On this point Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) draws out one thing in particular: this "discrimination" at the verse's close refers only to the "defiled mind and mental factors," and he cites the Madhyānta-vibhāga's "false discrimination, that is, the mind and mental factors of the three realms" in support — "discrimination" being the defiled mind and mental factors of the three realms, consistent from first to last with the verse's "those several discriminations."

Onward Transmission

The causal architecture this section sets up — the transformations of the all-seeds consciousness, the mutually reinforcing power of manifest activity, and the whole ledger of the four conditions, ten causes, and five fruits — is the backbone on which the entire consciousness-only system founds its account of "the dependent arising of inner consciousness," and the later books take it up one by one. The Hundred Dharmas treatise assigns the several dharmas of this causal scheme each to its place: among the mind-dharmas, the eighth, the ālaya (the all-seeds consciousness itself); among the mental factors, the five omnipresent ones and the rest (manifestly active mind and mental factors serving as conditions for one another); and among the unconditioned, cessation-through-analysis (the wholesome unconditioned realized as the disjunction fruit). The Thirty Verses — its verse eighteen ("by the all-seeds consciousness, the mutually reinforcing power, discrimination arises") — is the very root-verse this section expounds, verse answering to verse; and upstream it links back to verse two, "all-seeds" (the ālaya as cause-aspect, the seeds). The Madhyānta-vibhāga, in its chapter on characteristics, establishes "false discrimination" as the mind and mental factors of the three realms — precisely what this section carries forward at its close, where Kuiji cites the Madhyānta-vibhāga to gloss "discrimination." The Mahāyāna-saṃgraha, in its section on the basis of the knowable, broadly clarifies how the ālaya-consciousness holds seeds and is perfumed, and how seeds and manifest activity serve as conditions for one another — which is the expanded version of this section's "inner consciousnesses serving as conditions for one another's dependent arising." As for the Twenty Verses, its concern is to establish consciousness-only and the absence of objects and to refute the outsiders' grasping at real objects; it has no direct counterpart to this whole causal architecture of the four conditions and ten causes, and here it is left aside.

釋違理·因果(二)·釋生死相續難Resolving Objections Contrary to Principle · Cause and Effect (II)

全文五層 →Full five layers →
義疏Exposition

〔所釋之頌〕第十九頌

「生死相續」一義,經論早有所本。論主答「變易生死」所引的一段契經(大乘阿毘達磨契經,漢土已無傳本,唯靠論文存錄)說:正如以『取(煩惱障)』為緣、以「有漏業」為因而接續後有的,就生「三有」(這是分段生死);同樣地,以『無明住地(所知障)』為緣、以「無漏業」為因,就有阿羅漢、獨覺、已得自在的菩薩,生「三種意成身」(這是變易生死)——這一段,正是本節「二死」之說的經本。至於十二有支的料簡,則本於《瑜伽師地論》與《大乘阿毘達磨集論》。《瑜伽師地論》定「緣起體」為『前際、中際、後際』三相所建,這正是「生死相續」的論本;又以「三是煩惱道、二是業道、餘是苦道」判十二支,這正是本節「惑、業、苦」門的論本;又以『九支實有、五支一事』料簡十二支,這正是本節『九實三假、五是一事』門的論本。《集論》則定「能引、所引、能生、所生」四支類,這正是本節「略攝為四」的論本(只是《集論》把「識」收入能引,本論把「識」收入所引,本論在這一點上另作會通)。本節所釋,經根即在那一段契經,論本即在《瑜伽》《集論》——下面順著頌文講開。

開場:這一難要回答什麼

前面立了『只有內識、沒有外境(外緣)』。馬上有人質疑:就算承認有內識,可是既然沒有外緣,那麼有情一生接著一生的「生死相續」,到底是靠什麼成立的?這一節就是來回答這個質疑的,論主用一首頌(第十九頌)先把答案點出來,再一層一層展開。

頌文先給答案:兩種習氣俱在,前果盡了後果就接上

頌說:由「諸業習氣」和「二取習氣」這兩者一起存在,前一期的異熟果一旦受盡,緊接著就生起後一期的異熟果——就這樣,生死相續永無止盡。整首頌的骨架就是:生死接得下去,是因為識裡有兩股種子(習氣)在運作,根本不必向外去找一個推手。下面論主分好幾「門」(好幾個角度),把這兩股習氣是什麼、怎麼運作,反覆講透。

第一門:業習氣與二取習氣,一疎一親

什麼叫「諸業」、什麼叫「業習氣」

先講「業」。所謂「諸業」,指的是「福業、非福業、不動業」這三種,也就是有漏的善、不善的「思」業——「思」是心所之一,業就是由它造作出來的。除了思業本身,凡是跟思業相應的眷屬法,也一併安上「業」的名字,因為它們跟思業一樣,都能招感「引果」和「滿果」這兩種異熟果(引果是把一期生命招來的總報,滿果是這一期裡種種別報)。

可是這裡有個關卡:業才剛生起,下一剎那就滅了。已經滅掉的業,照道理是沒辦法直接去招來未來的異熟果的。那它怎麼還能起作用?關鍵在於:業在滅去的同時,會熏習「本識」(第八識),在本識裡生起一股「功能」——這股功能,就叫「習氣」。所以「習氣」是業遺留下來的氣分,是熏習而成的;之所以特別叫它「習氣」,是要跟『正在現行的業』分清楚——現行的業本身不是習氣,習氣是它熏成的潛在勢力。這股習氣輾轉相續,等到成熟的時候,就招感異熟果。這就是頌裡「業習氣」所指的東西——它是未來那個異熟果的「殊勝增上緣」(一個強而有力的助緣)。

什麼叫「二取習氣」

再講「二取」。所謂「二取」,是把好幾組對立都收進來:相分與見分、名與色、心與心所、本與末——這些當中能取的一邊、所取的一邊,全都算「二取」。由這些能取所取所熏發、能夠親自生起異熟本識上那股功能的,就叫「二取習氣」。它指的是頌裡「二取習氣」一語所顯——也就是『來世那個異熟果的心』,以及跟它相應的種種法的「因緣種子」。

「俱」字的意思:一疎緣、一親緣

頌裡的「俱」字,是說「業種」和「二取種」這兩者一起在。它們的身分不同:業習氣是「疎緣」(增上緣,從旁助力),二取習氣是「親緣」(因緣,親自生果),兩者互相資助。因為『業招感生命』這層意思比較顯眼,所以頌文先說「業習氣」、後說「二取習氣」。

「前異熟」「餘異熟」:為什麼前果盡了後果接得上

頌說「前異熟既盡,復生餘異熟」。「前異熟」指前前一生的業所招的異熟果,「餘異熟」指後後一生的業所招的異熟果。這裡有個微妙處:二取種受果(生果)是無窮的,但業習氣受果卻是有盡的。為什麼?因為異熟果是「性別」的——業有善有惡,果卻是無記,因和果性類不同,所以難招;而等流果、增上果則是『因果同性』,所以容易感。正因如此,二取種容易、業種較難。窺基《述記》在這裡繫上《攝大乘論》的兩個名相來坐實:二取種「受果無窮」,就是《攝大乘論》第三所說的「無受盡相」;業習氣「受果有盡」,就是該論所說的「有受盡相」——並打個比方,像沈香、麝香沾了穢草,香氣會漸漸萎歇耗盡一樣(業習氣也這樣受果到盡)。但靠著後生的業等種子陸續成熟的力量,前一期異熟果受用完的時候,就能另外生起後一期的異熟果。生死就這樣輪轉不盡——哪裡還需要借外緣才接得下去?

這首頌的用意,歸結成一句話:由「業」和「二取」,生死輪迴全都離不開識,因為心、心所法正是業、二取、生死的自體。

第二門:換個角度——生死相續由『三種習氣』

論主接著「復次」,從另一個門講同一件事:生死相續是由「諸習氣」而成,而習氣總共可分三種。

第一是名言習氣。 指的是有為法各自的『親因緣種子』。這裡的「名言」又分兩種:一種是「表義名言」,就是能詮表義理的語言(音聲的差別);另一種是「顯境名言」,就是能了別境界的心、心所法——因為心心所也像名言一樣能把境顯出來,所以借「名言」之名來稱它。隨著這兩種名言所熏成的種子,就成了有為法各自的因緣。

第二是我執習氣。 指的是虛妄執著「我、我所」的種子。「我執」分兩種:一種是「俱生我執」(與生俱來、任運而起,要修道才斷得了的我我所執);另一種是「分別我執」(後天分別計度而起,見道就斷的我我所執)。隨這兩種我執所熏成的種子,使得有情之間有了「自、他」的差別。

第三是有支習氣。 指的是能招感三界異熟的「業種」。「有支」也分兩種:一種是「有漏善」,能招感可愛果的業;另一種是「諸不善」,能招感非愛果的業。隨這兩種有支所熏成的種子,使得異熟果有了「善趣、惡趣」的差別。

要知道:我執習氣和有支習氣這兩者,對『自他、善惡趣』這種差別果而言,扮演的是「增上緣」(從旁助成),不是因緣。

那麼這三習氣跟頌裡的兩習氣怎麼對上?頌說的「業習氣」,就是這裡的「有支習氣」;頌說的「二取習氣」,就是這裡的「我執習氣」加「名言習氣」兩種。為什麼後兩者合稱「取」?因為它們是由『取我、取我所』和「取名言」熏成的,所以都安上「取」的名字。至於頌裡「俱」字等其餘文字,意思跟前一門講的一樣。

第三門:再換角度——生死相續由「惑、業、苦」

論主再「復次」,又開一門:生死相續是由「惑、業、苦」三者而成。能「發業、潤生」的煩惱叫「惑」;能感後有的種種業叫「業」;由業所引生的眾苦叫「苦」。惑、業、苦的種子,都叫「習氣」。

它們在生死中的角色:前兩者(惑、業)對「生死苦」作增上緣,從旁助生苦;第三者(苦)對「生死苦」能作因緣,親自生苦。

跟頌的對配:頌只說了業、二取兩習氣,要跟這「三習氣」對起來,該這樣理解——惑和苦叫「取」(因為它們是能取、所取),「取」是執著的意思,而「業」不能叫「取」(業不是取)。頌裡「俱」等其餘文字,意思同前。

惑業苦如何總攝十二有支

這「惑、業、苦」三者,要知道它能總收「十二有支」(十二緣起),也就是從無明一路到老死,這在論裡有詳細解釋。而這十二支可以簡略地收成『四支類』來看:

一、能引支: 指「無明、行」這兩支,因為它們能引出「識等五果」的種子。要注意:這裡的「無明」只取那種『能發起、正招後世善惡業』的無明,不是泛指一切無明;由這種無明所發的業,才叫「行」。所以那些「順現受業」(現世就受報的業)以及只是從旁幫助當來之業的,都不算「行支」。

二、所引支: 指本識裡「親生當來異熟果」的那批種子,包含「識、名色、六處、觸、受」五種,因為它們是前面無明、行二支所引發出來的。這裡的「識種」指本識的因(異熟識種);除了後三因(六處、觸、受)以外,其餘的因都歸「名色種」攝。後三因照名字次第,就是後三種。或者也可以說「名色種」總攝這五因,在其中隨最殊勝的,另立其餘四種(識、六處、觸、受);「六處」和「識」之間,總說別說的關係也是這樣(可以總提,也可以別列)。

這裡有不同的講法。《集論》說「識」也是能引支——因為『識中的業種』叫做「識支」(業種寄託在識裡),而它的「異熟識種」則歸名色攝。又有經說「識支」是通能引、所引兩邊的——因為「業種、識種」都叫「識」,而且「識」是名色的所依、不被名色所攝(所以識可以橫跨兩邊)。

論主對五支的同時與假說次第有一段細辨:識等五種雖然實際上是由業所熏發、其實是同時的,但是依著「主伴、總別、勝劣、因果」這些方面的差異,所以聖教才假立它們有前後;或者依「當來、現起」分位上有次第,所以說有前後。也因此,識等五支也可以說成是「現行」(就現起的分位來說);因為在「因位」(種子位)時,根本沒有「現行」這回事。又因此說『生支、引支同時』(就義理上講),因為「已潤、未潤」之時必不能同在(所以引、生才有分別)。

三、能生支: 指「愛、取、有」三支,因為它們能就近生起當來的生、老死。流程是這樣:先緣『迷於內異熟果』的那種愚(無明),發起正能招後有的種種業作為緣,引發親生當來生老死位的「五果種」;之後再依『迷於外增上果』的愚,緣著境界的受,發起「貪愛」;緣愛又生起「欲取」等四取;「愛、取」合起來潤澤種子,於是那能引的「業種」和所引的因,就轉個名字叫「有」——因為它們合起來能就近生起後有之果。也有地方只把「業種」叫「有」,因為業種能正招異熟果;又有地方只把「五種」(五果種)叫「有」,因為它們親生當來識等的種。

四、所生支: 指「生、老死」兩支,因為它們是愛、取、有所就近生的。從「中有」一直到「本有」之中,還沒衰變以來,都歸「生支」攝;種種衰變的階段,總名「老」;身壞命終,才叫「死」。「老」不是決定有(也有少壯就死的人,沒經過老),所以把它附在「死」上,合立成一支。

為什麼是這幾支、不是別的——立支的道理

這裡論主用一連串問答把『為什麼立這支、不立那支』講清楚。

有人問:「病」為什麼不立成一支?答:因為病既「不遍」(不是一切受生的人都會病)又「不定」。可是「老」雖然也不定,為什麼立支?因為它「遍」——各界、各趣、各種受生(除了中途夭折的),臨終都會有衰朽之行。又問:「名色」既然不遍(化生等不需要經過名色位),為什麼立支?答:因為它「定」——胎生、卵生、濕生的,在六處還沒長滿的時候,一定有名色位。何況「名色支」其實也是遍有的。怎麼說?有色界的化生,在初受生位雖然已具五根,但五根還沒有作用,那時還不叫「六處支」(所以那時仍是名色,可見名色也遍);初生在無色界的,雖然一定有「意根」卻還不明了,所以那時也不叫「意處」(仍是名色)。因此論說:十二有支『一切或一分』在上二界也有。

又問:「愛」既然不遍有(生惡趣的人不愛惡趣),為什麼要別立一支?答:因為它「定」——不求「無有」(不求斷滅)而生善趣的人,一定有愛。至於「不還果」聖者的潤生,現行的愛雖然不起,可是它就像「取」一樣,一定有種子在(所以愛也算定)。而且「愛」其實也遍——生惡趣的人,對『現在的我』這個境也有愛。經裡說『依著不希求惡趣,所以惡趣身的愛非有』,那是就「希求」這層說它非有,並不是說惡趣全然沒有愛。

又問:「所生」只立生、老死兩支,「所引」卻別立識等五支,為什麼?答:因為「因位」(種子位)的差別相很難看清楚,所以依『當來果位』的差別來別立五支:結生的時候,「因識」(異熟識)的相最顯,所以立識支;接著諸根還沒滿,「名色」的相增盛,立名色支;接著諸根圓滿,「六處」明盛,立六處支;依此發起「觸」,立觸支;因觸而起「受」,立受支;到這裡才叫「受果究竟」(感果圓滿)。就是依這果位,把它的因(種子)別立成五支。至於『所生果位』的差別相容易了知,所以只總立「生、老死」兩支,用來顯「三苦」(行苦、壞苦、苦苦)。而且:所生果如果在未來,為了讓人生厭離,就說「生、老死」;如果到了現在,為了讓人了知『一一分位次第而生』,就說「識等五」。

又問:「發業」位只總立一個「無明」,「潤業」位卻別立「愛、取」兩支,為什麼?答:雖然種種煩惱都能發業、潤業,但「發業位」裡無明的力量偏強(因為它具備十一種殊勝事,像所緣等等,這在經裡有詳說),所以發業就總立無明;「潤業位」裡愛的力量偏強(所以說「愛如水」,能澆潤種子),而且要一再灌溉才生得出「有」的芽,所以潤業就別立愛、取。再說,依『初潤、後潤』的分別,把潤業分成「愛、取」兩支;而發業沒有『重複再發』的道理(一發就夠),所以只立一個「無明」。雖然「取支」裡也收了種種煩惱,但因為「愛潤」最有力,所以就著愛來說、稱「愛增」。

又問:各個緣起支,是不是都依「自地」(同一界地)?答:也有『所發的行』是依『他地無明』的——比如『下地的無明』可以發起『上地的行』(上地的定業)。如果不許這樣,那初伏下地染而生起的上定,就不能算「行支」了,因為那時上地的無明還沒起呢(所以要許他地能發)。又問:從上地生下地、或從下地生上地的,是緣哪個「受」而起「愛支」?答:它的愛也是緣『當生地的受』(不論是現行的受還是種子的受),這在道理上沒有妨礙。

十二支的「義門」差別——十幾個角度逐一分辨

論主接著從許多角度,把十二支的性質一一分判。

因果世別與兩重之失: 這十二支中,「十因、二果」決定不同世(因在前世、果在後世)。因當中的前七支(無明到受)跟愛、取、有之間,或異世、或同世;但「無明與行」這二、「愛取有」這三、「識等五」這七,各自內部則一定同世。這樣,十二支用「一重因果」(因跨兩世、果在一世)就足以顯出輪轉、也顯出離斷離常;如果非要施設『兩重因果』那是沒有用的,要是再多(三重以上)就會落入無窮的過失。

九實三假門: 十二支裡,九支是實、三支是假。哪三假?『已潤的六支』(無明、行、識、名色、六處、觸、受裡被愛取潤過的那部分)合起來成了「有」一支,這是假;「識等五」(識到受)的『三相位差別』(初生、衰變、命終)別立成「生、老、死」,這也是假。所以三假是有、生、老死,其餘九支是實。

一事門: 五支各是「一事」——指無明、識、觸、受、愛這五支,各自只是一法;其餘七支(行、名色、六處、有、生、老死)則不只一法(攝了多法)。

染不染門: 三支唯是染(無明、愛、取,都是煩惱性);七支唯不染(識、名色、六處、觸、受、生、老死,都是異熟果性);不過這七支在某些分位裡也容許起染法,所以假說它通染與不染兩邊;其餘(行、有)也通兩種。

獨相雜相門: 無明、愛、取叫「獨相」(不跟其餘支交雜);其餘的是「雜相」。

色非色門: 六支唯非色——指無明、識、觸、受、愛、取這六支唯是非色法;其餘(行、名色、六處、有、生、老死)則通色與非色兩種。

有漏有為門: 十二支都是有漏、唯被有為攝(無漏、無為不是有支)。

三性門: 「無明、愛、取」唯通「不善、有覆無記」;「行」唯通「善、惡」;「有」通「善、惡、無覆無記」;其餘七支唯是「無覆無記」(不過這七在分位裡也起善、染)。

界繫門: 十二支雖都通三界,但在上二界是「有分」(只有一分)、在欲界是「有全」(全分都有)。這裡論主補一段:上地的「行支」能伏下地——也就是用觀下地「麁、苦」等「六種行相」的伏惑觀行;因為有人求生上地而起這觀。但要注意:一切『非學、無學的聖者』所起的有漏善業,都不被有支攝——因為它以「明」(無漏智)為緣、又違逆有支。由此可知:聖者一定不造「感後有」的業,因為他對後世苦果不迷、不希求。至於聖者「雜修靜慮」資助下地的舊業,因而生到淨居天等,這在道理上不違——那是資助舊業,不是新造業。

見修所斷門: 這一門有不同的講法。一說(無明唯見斷): 「無明」唯見所斷——因為它要迷諦理才能發行,而且聖者見道後一定不造後有業;「愛、取」二支唯修所斷——因為它們貪求當有而潤生,而且「九種命終心」都跟俱生愛同在;其餘九支都通見、修所斷。又一說(一切通二斷): 十二支一切都通「見、修」二斷。後一說的理據是:論說『預流果已斷一切支的一分,沒有全斷一支的』。如果「無明支」唯見所斷,怎麼會說預流(見道已斷見惑)『沒有全斷一支』呢?可見無明也通修斷。如果「愛、取」唯修所斷,怎麼會說預流『已斷一切支的一分』呢?可見愛取也通見斷。又經說『全界一切煩惱都能結生』;而且『往惡趣的行』唯有「分別起煩惱」能發,並沒有說「潤生唯修所斷」,也沒有說『凡感後有的行都由見所斷所發』。由此可知:無明、愛、取三支,也通見、修二斷。論主再會通一句:無明支裡「正發行」的唯見所斷,「助發」的則不定(通二);愛、取裡「正潤生」的唯修所斷,「助潤」的則不定(通二)。又:染污法是「自性應斷」(它的自性本來就該斷除),因為對治一起、它就永斷;一切有漏而不染污的法則是「非性應斷」(不是自性就該斷),因為它不違逆聖道。然後論主立兩種「斷」義:一是「離縛斷」——斷除那『緣它、雜它』的煩惱(法體還在,只是解開它的縛);二是「不生斷」——斷掉它的所依,讓它永不生起。依「離縛斷」說,則有漏善、無覆無記唯修所斷;依「不生斷」說,則諸惡趣、無想定等唯見所斷。前面說「十二支通二斷」,要放在這幾種斷義裡,隨它所應去理解。

受相應門: 十二支裡『十支與樂、捨俱』(除了受支與老死支不取樂)——因為「受支」自己不跟受相應,而「老死位」中多半無樂、但容許有捨。『十一支與苦俱』(除受支)——因為受支不跟受同俱。

三苦門: 『十一支少分為壞苦所攝』(除老死)——老死位多半沒有樂受,而壞苦是依樂受之壞而立的,所以老死不入壞苦。『十二支少分為苦苦所攝』——因為一切支裡都有苦受。『十二支全分為行苦所攝』——因為一切有漏法都是行苦。若依「捨受」來說,則十一支的少分(除老死支)為行苦攝,跟前面壞苦的說法一樣。實義就是這樣;不過諸聖教裡會隨著某個相的增勝,所說不定(各有偏取)。

四諦門: 十二支都被「苦諦」攝(因為是取蘊性);其中五支(無明、行、愛、取、有)也被「集諦」攝(因為是業、煩惱性)。

四緣門: 各支彼此相望,「增上緣」決定有;其餘三緣(因緣、等無間、所緣)則有無不定。契經依著「決定有」的,所以只說有「一」緣(增上)。其中「愛望於取」、「有望於生」,有「因緣」之義(親生);如果採「識支是業種」的說法,那「行望於識」也作因緣。其餘各支彼此相望,就沒有因緣之義。這裡論主會通兩部論的歧異:《集論》說「無明望行有因緣」,那是依『無明位時的業習氣』說的——因為那業習氣跟無明同在,就假說成「無明」,其實它是「行」的種子(所以無明望行有因緣,骨子裡是行種望行)。《瑜伽論》說「諸支相望無因緣」,那是依『現行的愛、取』以及『唯業的有』說的(這三者是現行或業,所以彼此沒有因緣)。再講中間二緣:「無明望行」、「愛望於取」、「生望老死」這三者都有其餘二緣(等無間、所緣);「有望於生」、「受望於愛」這兩者則『沒有等無間緣、有所緣緣』;其餘各支彼此相望,這中間二緣都沒有。以上是就『鄰近、順次、不相雜亂』的「實緣起」說的;要是逆次、隔越、雜亂地相望,那為緣就不定了。聰慧的人,應當依理去思量。

惑業苦攝門: 「惑、業、苦」三者怎麼攝這十二支?「無明、愛、取」歸惑攝;「行」以及「有」的一分(業有)歸業攝;「七支」(識、名色、六處、觸、受、生、老死)以及「有」的一分(報有)歸苦攝。有地方說「業全攝有」,要知道那是依「業有」(有支的業分)說的;有地方說『識為業所攝』,那是說『識中的業種』就是識支。而『惑、業所招來的』特別單名為「苦」——唯被苦諦攝,為的是讓人生厭離(所以另外別說苦)。由於「惑、業、苦」就是十二支,所以這惑業苦能讓生死相續。

第四門:總結——生死相續由「內因緣」,不待外緣

論主最後「復次」開總結門:生死相續是由「內因緣」、不待外緣,所以只有內識。這裡的「因」指有漏業、無漏業這兩種業,正招感生死,所以叫因;「緣」指煩惱障、所知障這兩障,從旁助感生死,所以叫緣。為什麼這麼說?因為生死分兩種。

一、分段生死。 指種種有漏善、不善業,由「煩惱障」這個緣的助力,所招感的三界麁顯異熟果;它的身、命長短隨因緣的力量而有『決定齊限』(定量),所以叫「分段」。

二、不思議變易生死。 指種種「無漏有分別業」,由「所知障」這個緣的助力,所招感的殊勝微細異熟果。它由悲願的力量改轉身、命,沒有決定齊限,所以叫「變易」;因為它是無漏定、願正所資助、所招感的,妙用難以測度,所以叫「不思議」。它也叫「意成身」(意生身),因為它隨意、隨願而成。

論主引契經與論說來證成這變易身。如契經說:正如以「取」為緣、以「有漏業」為因而接續後有的,就生三有(這是分段);同樣地,以「無明住地」為緣、以「無漏業」為因,就有阿羅漢、獨覺、已得自在的菩薩,生「三種意成身」(這是變易)。它也叫「變化身」——因為用無漏定力把身轉得異於本身、就像變化一樣。

接著是一連串的問答辨難。有論說:有人問——聲聞無學已經永盡後有,怎麼還能證無上菩提?答:他是依「變化身」(變易身)證無上覺,而不是依業報身(分段身),所以不違理。又有人問——如果「所知障助無漏業能感生死」,那麼二乘定性的人(也有所知障)就應該不能永入無餘涅槃,像種種異生被煩惱所拘(出不了生死)一樣,這怎麼說?又問——道諦(無漏)怎麼竟能實感「苦」(生死)?答:誰說是「實感」了?再問——若不是實感,那是怎樣?答:是「無漏定、願」資助「有漏業」,讓所得的果相續長時、輾轉增勝,這才假說名為「感」(並不是無漏業真的感生死)。這樣「感」的時候,也是由所知障作緣助力,並不是所知障單獨能感。而「所知障不障解脫」(不障涅槃),因為它沒有「發業、潤生」的作用——所以二乘定性還是能入無餘,前面那個質疑就化解了。

又問:那何必去資感生死苦呢?答:為了自證菩提、利樂眾生。那些不定性的獨覺、聲聞,以及已得自在的大願菩薩,既已永斷、永伏煩惱障,就不會再受當來的「分段身」;可是又怕廢失「長時修菩薩行」(分段身已盡、壽量有限),於是用無漏勝定、願的力量,像「延壽法」一樣資助現身的因,讓他長時與果不斷,一再這樣用定、願資助,直到證得無上菩提——所以才須資感變易。

又問:他資感變易,又何必要「所知障」來幫?答:理由有三。一、他既然還沒圓證「無相大悲」,若不(微帶法執地)執菩提、眾生為實有,就沒辦法發起猛利的悲願(所以須要所知障之餘來起悲願);二、所知障正障大菩提,為了「永斷除」它,所以須留身久住(好斷這障);三、所知障是「有漏」的所依,這障若沒了,那有漏身一定也沒了,所以所知障對『身的久住』有大助力。

又辨身的歸屬:所留的身如果是「有漏定、願」所資助的,就歸「分段身」攝(因為它是二乘、異生的所知境);如果是「無漏定、願」所資助的,就歸「變易身」攝(不是二乘異生的境)。由此應知:變易生死它的「性是有漏」、歸「異熟果」攝,對「無漏業」而言只是「增上果」(不是無漏業的等流)。聖教裡有說它「無漏、出三界」的,那是隨它的「助因」(無漏定願)說的,並不是說它的性是無漏。

回到頌:頌裡說的「諸業習氣」,就是前面說的「二業種子」(有漏、無漏業);「二取習氣」就是前面說的「二障種子」(煩惱障、所知障)——因為二障都有執著,所以叫「取」。頌裡「俱」等其餘文字,意思同前。

論主還補一句把變易也合進頌:變易生死雖然沒有分段身那樣『前後異熟各別盡、各別生』,可是由於一再資助、前後改轉,也有『前分位盡、後分位再生』之義(這也合頌裡「前異熟既盡,復生餘異熟」)。又:生死相續雖然也由「現行」而成,但「種子」決定是有(是親因),所以頌偏就『種子(習氣)』來說。或者頌偏說種子,還有一層用意:為了顯示「真異熟」的因、果都不離本識,所以不說「現行」。因為現行的異熟因不會即時與果(因果有隔),又轉識有間斷、不是真異熟(所以不就現行說)。

收結:連清淨法的相續也是這道理

前際、中際、後際的生死輪迴都不待外緣,既然是由「內識」而成;那麼『清淨法的相續』也該知道是同樣的道理。怎麼說?無始以來依附在本識裡的「有漏、無漏種子」,由轉識等一再熏發,漸漸增勝,乃至究竟、得成佛時,就「轉捨」本來的雜染識種、「轉得」始起的清淨種識,由它任持一切功德種子;再由本願的力量,盡未來際起種種妙用、相續無窮。由此應知:一切唯有內識,根本不待外緣——生死如此,清淨也如此。

承衍

本節以「業習氣、二取習氣」立生死相續,廣明十二有支與分段、變易二死,這一義在唯識系裡逐書相承。《百法明門論》於心法立「阿賴耶」(業、二取習氣所熏所藏的本識),於心所立「思」(業的自體,也就是『有漏善、不善的思業』),於根本煩惱立『癡、貪、見、慢』(我執習氣、也就是「惑」的自體)——本節的業、二取、惑,在百法裡都有它的位次。《唯識三十論頌》的頌十九(諸業習氣、二取習氣、前異熟既盡、復生餘異熟),正是本節所釋的本頌,逐頌相承;而它上承頌二(一切種、異熟)所立的「持種」義。《辯中邊論》的辯相品以「虛妄分別」收業、二取(業與二取都不離識、識為染依),辯障品立「煩惱障、所知障」(正是本節二死的緣助)——所承的就是本節這一義。《攝大乘論》的所知依分講「熏習」,立「有受盡相、無受盡相」(業習氣有盡、二取種無窮的所本,前面引窺基《述記》時已說到),是本節「前盡後生」的論本。至於《二十唯識論》,主於成立唯識無境、破外人的實境之執,於『生死相續、十二有支』沒有正面對位,這裡從闕。

This doctrine of the "continuity of birth-and-death" has its roots in scripture and treatise alike. The passage of scripture the author cites in answering the matter of "transformational birth-and-death" — drawn from the Mahāyāna-abhidharma scripture, which has no transmitted Chinese witness and survives only as preserved within the treatise's text — says: just as, taking "grasping" (the affliction-hindrance) as condition and "contaminated deed" as cause, one continues a future existence and so is born into the "three existences" (this is sectional birth-and-death); so too, taking "the ground of ignorance" (the cognitive-hindrance) as condition and "uncontaminated deed" as cause, there are the arhat, the solitary-buddha, and the bodhisattva who has attained mastery, who are born with the "three kinds of mind-made body" (this is transformational birth-and-death) — and this passage is precisely the scriptural basis for the "two deaths" expounded in this section. As for the parsing of the twelve existence-links, it is grounded in the Yogācārabhūmi and the Abhidharma-samuccaya. The Yogācārabhūmi fixes the "substance of dependent arising" as built upon the three marks "the prior, the intermediate, and the later," and this is just the treatise-basis for "the continuity of birth-and-death"; it further judges the twelve links by "three being the affliction-path, two the deed-path, and the rest the suffering-path," and this is just the treatise-basis for this section's gate of "affliction, deed, and suffering"; it further parses the twelve links by "nine links really existent, five links being one entity," and this is just the treatise-basis for this section's gate of "nine real and three provisional, five being one entity." The Abhidharma-samuccaya, for its part, fixes the four classes of links "the drawing-forth, the drawn-forth, the producing, the produced," and this is just the treatise-basis for "gathered in brief into four." (Only, the Abhidharma-samuccaya places "consciousness" within the drawing-forth, whereas this treatise places "consciousness" within the drawn-forth — and on just this point this treatise works out its own harmonization.) What this section expounds has its scriptural root in that passage of scripture, and its treatise-basis in the Yogācārabhūmi and the Abhidharma-samuccaya — and in what follows we follow the verse and open the exposition.

Opening: What This Objection Must Answer

The preceding argument established that there is only inner consciousness and no outer object — no external condition. At once someone presses a challenge: even granting that there is inner consciousness, if there is no outer condition, then how does the "continuity of birth-and-death" — one lifetime succeeding the next for a sentient being — get established at all? This section answers that challenge. The author of the treatise first states the answer outright in a single verse (the nineteenth), and then unfolds it layer by layer.

The Verse States the Answer First: Both Latent Energies Are Present; When the Earlier Fruit Is Exhausted, the Later Fruit Takes Over

The verse says: because the "latent energies of the various deeds" and the "latent energies of the twofold grasping" are both present together, the moment the maturation-fruit (vipāka) of one lifetime is used up, the maturation-fruit of the next lifetime arises immediately after it — and in just this way birth-and-death continues without ever coming to an end. The skeleton of the whole verse is this: birth-and-death carries on because two streams of seeds — two latent energies — are operating within consciousness; there is no need whatsoever to look outside for some agent that pushes it along. In what follows the author opens several "gates" — several angles of approach — and explains, repeatedly and thoroughly, what these two streams of latent energy are and how they work.

The First Gate: The Latent Energy of Deeds and the Latent Energy of Twofold Grasping — One Remote, One Intimate

What "the various deeds" Means, and What "the latent energy of deeds" Means

First, "deeds." By "the various deeds" is meant the three kinds — meritorious deeds, non-meritorious deeds, and unmoving (i.e. immovable, the deeds of the meditative spheres) — that is, the contaminated wholesome and unwholesome deeds of "volition" (cetanā). Volition is one of the mental factors, and a deed is what it brings about by its activity. Besides volitional deeds themselves, whatever associated factors accompany volition are likewise given the name "deed," because they too, just like volition, can call forth the two kinds of maturation-fruit: the "drawing-forth fruit" and the "completing fruit." (The drawing-forth fruit is the total recompense that summons a whole lifetime; the completing fruit is the various particular recompenses within that one life.)

But here lies a difficulty. A deed has barely arisen when, in the very next instant, it perishes. A deed that has already perished cannot, by any rights, directly call forth a future maturation-fruit. How then can it still take effect? The key is this: at the very moment a deed perishes, it perfumes the "root consciousness" (the eighth consciousness), giving rise within the root consciousness to a "capacity" — and this capacity is precisely what is called "latent energy." So latent energy is the residual energy a deed leaves behind, formed by perfuming. The reason it is given the special name "latent energy" is to keep it clearly distinct from "the deed in present activity": the deed in present activity is not itself the latent energy; the latent energy is the dormant force that the deed has perfumed into being. This latent energy continues on, transforming from moment to moment, and when it ripens it calls forth the maturation-fruit. This is what the verse's phrase "the latent energy of deeds" refers to — it serves as the "outstanding contributory condition" (a powerful supporting condition) for that future maturation-fruit.

What "the twofold grasping" Means

Next, "the twofold grasping." By "twofold grasping" several pairs of opposites are gathered in: the image-portion and the seeing-portion; name and form; mind and mental factors; root and branch. In all of these, the grasping side and the grasped side together count as the "twofold grasping." Whatever is perfumed into being by these graspers and grasped, and is able to give rise directly to that capacity within the maturation root consciousness, is called "the latent energy of twofold grasping." It is what the verse's phrase "the latent energy of twofold grasping" displays — that is, "the mind of the next life's maturation-fruit" together with the "causal seeds" of the various factors associated with it.

The Force of the Word "Both": One a Remote Condition, One an Intimate Condition

The word "both" in the verse says that the "deed-seeds" and the "twofold-grasping-seeds" are present together. Their roles differ: the latent energy of deeds is a "remote condition" (a contributory condition, lending help from the side); the latent energy of twofold grasping is an "intimate condition" (the causal condition, itself giving rise to the fruit). The two assist each other. Because the sense in which "a deed calls forth a life" is the more conspicuous, the verse states "the latent energy of deeds" first and "the latent energy of twofold grasping" afterward.

"The Prior Maturation" and "The Remaining Maturation": Why the Earlier Fruit Spent, the Later Takes Over

The verse says, "the prior maturation being exhausted, there arises a remaining maturation." "The prior maturation" means the maturation-fruit called forth by the deeds of the foregoing life; "the remaining maturation" means the maturation-fruit called forth by the deeds of the following life. There is a subtle point here: the twofold-grasping-seeds' bearing of fruit is inexhaustible, but the latent energy of deeds bears fruit only finitely. Why? Because the maturation-fruit is "of a different moral nature": deeds are either wholesome or unwholesome, but the fruit is morally indeterminate — cause and fruit are of unlike nature, and so it is hard to call forth. Whereas the outflow fruit and the dominant fruit are "cause and fruit of the same nature," and so are easily summoned. For just this reason the twofold-grasping-seeds bear fruit easily while the deed-seeds bear it with more difficulty. Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) here fastens on two terms from the Mahāyāna-saṃgraha to make the point firm: the twofold-grasping-seeds' "inexhaustible bearing of fruit" is just the Mahāyāna-saṃgraha's "the mark of inexhaustible felt-result," and the latent energy of deeds' "finite bearing of fruit" is just that treatise's "the mark of exhaustible felt-result" — and he gives an image, that just as aloeswood or musk, once touched with foul grass, has its fragrance gradually fade and wear away to nothing (so too the latent energy of deeds bears fruit until it is spent). But by the force of the deed-and-other seeds of later lives successively ripening, when the maturation-fruit of one lifetime has been used up, another maturation-fruit of the following lifetime can be made to arise. Birth-and-death turns on in just this way, never spent — so where is there any need to borrow an outer condition to carry it on?

The intent of this verse, gathered into a single statement, is this: through "deeds" and "twofold grasping," the whole cycle of birth-and-death never departs from consciousness, because mind and mental factors are precisely the very substance of deeds, of twofold grasping, and of birth-and-death.

The Second Gate: Another Angle — Birth-and-Death Continues Through "Three Kinds of Latent Energy"

The author then says "furthermore," and from another gate speaks of the same matter: the continuity of birth-and-death is constituted by "the various latent energies," and these latent energies may be divided into three kinds in all.

The first is the latent energy of designation (the latent energy of names-and-words). This means the "intimate causal seeds" proper to each conditioned factor. Here "designation" is itself of two kinds. One is "expressive designation" — language that can express and signify meaning (the differentiations of sound). The other is "object-displaying designation" — the mind and mental factors that can discern objects; because mind and mental factors, like designation, can bring an object to display, they too borrow the name "designation." Following these two kinds of designation, the seeds perfumed into being become the causal condition proper to each conditioned factor.

The second is the latent energy of self-grasping. This means the seeds of the deluded clinging to "self" and "what belongs to self." "Self-grasping" is of two kinds. One is "innate self-grasping" — the grasping of self and what belongs to self that is inborn, arising spontaneously, and can be cut off only by cultivating the path. The other is "deliberated self-grasping" — the grasping of self and what belongs to self that arises through acquired discrimination and calculation, and is cut off at the path of seeing. Following these two kinds of self-grasping, the seeds perfumed into being are what give rise, among sentient beings, to the distinction of "self and other."

The third is the latent energy of the existence-links. This means the "deed-seeds" able to call forth maturation in the three realms. The "existence-links" are also of two kinds. One is "contaminated wholesome" — the deeds able to call forth a desirable fruit. The other is "the various unwholesome" — the deeds able to call forth an undesirable fruit. Following these two kinds of existence-link, the seeds perfumed into being are what give rise, among maturation-fruits, to the distinction of "good destinies and evil destinies."

It must be understood that the latent energy of self-grasping and the latent energy of the existence-links, with respect to such distinguishing fruits as "self-and-other, good-and-evil destinies," play the role of "contributory condition" (assisting from the side), not of causal condition.

How then do these three latent energies match up with the two latent energies of the verse? What the verse calls "the latent energy of deeds" is here "the latent energy of the existence-links." What the verse calls "the latent energy of twofold grasping" is here "the latent energy of self-grasping" plus "the latent energy of designation," the two together. Why are these latter two jointly named "grasping"? Because they are perfumed into being by "grasping-at-self, grasping-at-what-belongs-to-self," and "grasping-at-designation," and so all are given the name "grasping." As for the word "both" and the remaining wording in the verse, the meaning is the same as in the first gate.

The Third Gate: Yet Another Angle — Birth-and-Death Continues Through "Affliction, Deed, and Suffering"

The author again says "furthermore," opening yet another gate: the continuity of birth-and-death is constituted by the three — "affliction, deed, and suffering." The defilements able to "set deeds in motion and to moisten birth" are called "affliction"; the various deeds able to call forth a future existence are called "deed"; the manifold sufferings drawn forth by deeds are called "suffering." The seeds of affliction, deed, and suffering are all called "latent energy."

Their roles within birth-and-death: the first two — affliction and deed — serve as contributory condition for "the suffering of birth-and-death," assisting from the side to produce suffering; the third — suffering — can serve as causal condition for "the suffering of birth-and-death," itself directly producing suffering.

The match with the verse: the verse spoke of only the two latent energies, deed and twofold grasping; to bring these into alignment with the present "three latent energies," it should be understood thus — affliction and suffering are called "grasping" (because they are graspers and the grasped), "grasping" meaning clinging; whereas "deed" cannot be called "grasping" (a deed is not a grasping). As for the word "both" and the remaining wording in the verse, the meaning is the same as before.

How Affliction, Deed, and Suffering Comprehend the Twelve Existence-Links

These three — affliction, deed, suffering — it must be understood, can collect within them the "twelve existence-links" (the twelve links of dependent arising), that is, the whole sequence from ignorance through to old-age-and-death, which the treatise explains in detail. And these twelve links may, in brief, be gathered into "four classes of links":

First, the drawing-forth links. These are the two links "ignorance and formations," because they can draw forth the seeds of the "five fruits, consciousness and the rest." Note: the "ignorance" taken here is only that ignorance which "can set in motion, properly calling forth, the wholesome and unwholesome deeds of the next life" — not ignorance in the broad, general sense; only the deed set in motion by this kind of ignorance is called "formations." Therefore those deeds that "are felt in the present" (deeds recompensed in this very life), and those that merely assist a future deed from the side, do not count as the "formations link."

Second, the drawn-forth links. These are the batch of seeds within the root consciousness that "intimately give rise to the future maturation-fruit," comprising the five — "consciousness, name-and-form, the six sense-spheres, contact, feeling" — because they are drawn forth by the foregoing two links, ignorance and formations. Here the "consciousness-seed" means the cause of the root consciousness (the maturation-consciousness seed); apart from the latter three causes (the six sense-spheres, contact, feeling), the remaining causes are comprehended under "name-and-form seed." The latter three causes, taken in the order of their names, are just the latter three kinds. Or it may be said that "name-and-form seed" comprehends all five causes, and among them, following whichever is most outstanding, the remaining four (consciousness, the six sense-spheres, contact, feeling) are separately established; between "the six sense-spheres" and "consciousness," the relation of stating-as-a-whole and stating-separately is likewise so (one may state it as a whole, or one may list it separately).

There is a divergent account here. The Abhidharma-samuccaya says "consciousness" too is a drawing-forth link — because the "deed-seed within consciousness" is called the "consciousness link" (the deed-seed being lodged within consciousness), while its "maturation-consciousness seed" is comprehended under name-and-form. And there is a scripture which says the "consciousness link" runs through both sides, both drawing-forth and drawn-forth — because both "the deed-seed and the consciousness-seed" are called "consciousness," and because "consciousness" is the support of name-and-form and is not comprehended by name-and-form (so consciousness can straddle both sides).

The author offers a fine analysis of the simultaneity and the provisional sequence of the five links: although the five — consciousness and the rest — are in fact perfumed into being by deeds and are actually simultaneous, nonetheless, in dependence on differences of "principal-and-companion, whole-and-part, superior-and-inferior, cause-and-effect," the sagely teaching provisionally posits them as having a before and after; or, in dependence on the phases of "future-arising and present-arising," there is a sequence, and so a before and after is spoken of. For this reason too, the five links, consciousness and the rest, can also be spoken of as "present activity" (with reference to the phase of present arising); for in the "causal phase" (the seed-phase), there is no such thing as "present activity" at all. For this reason too it is said that "the producing link and the drawing-forth link are simultaneous" (in terms of doctrinal meaning), because the times of "already-moistened and not-yet-moistened" can never coexist (which is just why drawing-forth and producing are distinguished).

Third, the producing links. These are the three links "craving, grasping, becoming," because they can produce, in close proximity, the future birth and old-age-and-death. The flow is this: first, conditioned by that confusion which is "deluded about the inner maturation-fruit" (ignorance), one sets in motion the various deeds that properly call forth a future existence, as the condition that draws forth the "five-fruit seeds" which intimately give rise to the future phase of birth and old-age-and-death; then, in dependence on the confusion which is "deluded about the outer dominant fruit," conditioned by the feeling toward objects, one sets in motion "greed-craving"; conditioned by craving there further arise the four graspings such as "grasping-at-desire"; "craving and grasping" together moisten the seeds, and thereupon the drawing-forth "deed-seed" and the drawn-forth cause change their name and are called "becoming" — because, taken together, they can produce in close proximity the fruit of a future existence. There are also places that call only the "deed-seed" "becoming," because the deed-seed properly calls forth the maturation-fruit; and other places that call only the "five seeds" (the five-fruit seeds) "becoming," because they intimately give rise to the seeds of the future consciousness and the rest.

Fourth, the produced links. These are the two links "birth, old-age-and-death," because they are produced in close proximity by craving, grasping, and becoming. From the "intermediate existence" all the way through the "essential existence," so long as no decay has yet set in, all is comprehended under the "birth link"; the various phases of decay are jointly named "old age"; only when the body breaks up and the life-faculty ends is it called "death." "Old age" is not necessarily present (there are those who die young without passing through old age), and so it is attached to "death," the two being jointly established as a single link.

Why Just These Links and Not Others — The Rationale for Positing the Links

Here the author, through a chain of questions and answers, makes clear "why this link is posited and that one not."

Someone asks: why is "sickness" not posited as a link? Answer: because sickness is both "not universal" (not every being who takes birth falls sick) and "not fixed." But then, "old age" too is not fixed — why is it posited as a link? Because it is "universal": in all realms, all destinies, all kinds of birth (excepting those cut off midway), at life's end there is the activity of decay. Again it is asked: "name-and-form" is not universal (the spontaneously-born and the like need not pass through a name-and-form phase) — why is it posited as a link? Answer: because it is "fixed" — for the womb-born, egg-born, and moisture-born, while the six sense-spheres are not yet fully grown there is invariably a name-and-form phase. What is more, the "name-and-form link" is in fact universal too. How so? Among the spontaneously-born in the form realm, at the initial moment of taking birth the five faculties are already complete, yet the five faculties do not yet have function; at that moment it is not yet called the "six-sense-spheres link" (so at that moment it is still name-and-form — showing name-and-form too is universal). For one first born in the formless realm, although the "mind-faculty" is invariably present it is not yet clear, and so at that moment it is not called the "mind-sphere" either (still name-and-form). Hence the treatise says: the twelve existence-links, "in whole or in part," obtain in the upper two realms as well.

Again it is asked: "craving" is not universally present (one born in an evil destiny does not crave the evil destiny) — why establish it as a separate link? Answer: because it is "fixed" — one who is not seeking "non-existence" (not seeking annihilation) but is born into a good destiny invariably has craving. As for the moistening-of-birth in the case of a non-returner sage, although the present activity of craving does not arise, yet, just like "grasping," the seed of it is invariably present (so craving too counts as fixed). And "craving" is in fact universal: even one born in an evil destiny has craving for the object that is "the present self." Where a scripture says, "in dependence on not yearning for the evil destiny, craving for the evil-destiny body is non-existent," that says it is non-existent only with respect to the dimension of "yearning"; it does not say there is no craving at all in the evil destinies.

Again it is asked: for the "produced," only two links — birth and old-age-and-death — are posited, whereas for the "drawn-forth," the five, consciousness and the rest, are separately posited. Why? Answer: because the distinguishing marks of the "causal phase" (the seed-phase) are hard to make out, the links are separated into five in dependence on the distinctions of the "future fruit-phase." At the moment of rebirth-linking, the mark of the "causal consciousness" (the maturation-consciousness) is most conspicuous, and so the consciousness link is posited; next, the faculties not yet complete, the mark of "name-and-form" grows abundant, and the name-and-form link is posited; next, the faculties complete, "the six sense-spheres" are bright and abundant, and the six-sense-spheres link is posited; in dependence on this there arises "contact," and the contact link is posited; from contact there arises "feeling," and the feeling link is posited — and only here is it called "the fruit-feeling brought to completion" (the recompense fully felt). It is in dependence on this fruit-phase that its cause (the seed) is separately posited as five links. As for the "produced fruit-phase," its distinguishing marks are easily known, and so only the two links "birth, old-age-and-death" are posited as a whole, to display the "three sufferings" (the suffering of conditioning, the suffering of change, and the suffering of pain). Moreover: if the produced fruit lies in the future, then in order to make people give rise to weariness-and-detachment, one speaks of "birth, old-age-and-death"; if it has come into the present, then in order to make people understand "each phase arising one after another in sequence," one speaks of "consciousness and the five."

Again it is asked: at the "deed-setting" phase only one "ignorance" is posited as a whole, whereas at the "deed-moistening" phase the two links "craving, grasping" are posited separately. Why? Answer: although all manner of defilements can set deeds in motion and moisten deeds, at the "deed-setting phase" the force of ignorance is preponderant (because it possesses eleven outstanding features, such as its object and so on, which the scripture explains in detail), and so for deed-setting only ignorance is posited as a whole; at the "deed-moistening phase" the force of craving is preponderant (which is why it is said "craving is like water," able to soak the seeds), and it must irrigate again and again before the "sprout of becoming" can grow, and so for deed-moistening, craving and grasping are posited separately. Furthermore, in dependence on the distinction of "first-moistening and later-moistening," deed-moistening is divided into the two links "craving, grasping"; whereas deed-setting has no principle of "setting in motion repeatedly" (one setting is enough), and so only one "ignorance" is posited. Although the "grasping link" too gathers in all manner of defilements, because "craving's moistening" is the most forceful, it is stated with reference to craving and called "the increase of craving."

Again it is asked: are the several links of dependent arising all in dependence on the "own ground" (the same realm-ground)? Answer: there are cases too where the "formations set in motion" are in dependence on the "ignorance of another ground" — for instance, the "ignorance of a lower ground" can set in motion the "formations of an upper ground" (the meditative deed of an upper ground). If this were not permitted, then the upper meditative state arisen upon first suppressing the defilement of a lower ground could not count as the "formations link," because at that time the ignorance of the upper ground has not yet arisen (so one must permit that another ground can set deeds in motion). Again it is asked: when one is born from an upper ground into a lower, or from a lower ground into an upper, conditioned by which "feeling" does the "craving link" arise? Answer: its craving too is conditioned by the "feeling of the ground in which one will be born" (whether the present-activity feeling or the seed of the feeling); this is doctrinally without obstruction.

The "Doctrinal-Gate" Distinctions of the Twelve Links — Distinguished One by One from a Dozen Angles

The author then, from many angles, judges the nature of the twelve links one by one.

The cause-fruit-different-life gate, and the fault of a twofold round: among these twelve links, the "ten causes and two fruits" are definitely of different lives (the causes in the prior life, the fruits in the later life). Among the causes, between the first seven links (ignorance through feeling) and craving-grasping-becoming, they may be of different lives or of the same life; but "ignorance and formations" as a pair, "craving-grasping-becoming" as a triad, and "consciousness and the five" as a set, are each, internally, definitely of the same life. In this way, the twelve links, by a "single round of cause and fruit" (the cause spanning two lives, the fruit in one life), suffice to display the turning of the round, and also to display the freedom from annihilation and from permanence; if one insisted on positing a "twofold round of cause and fruit," that would be useless, and if one went further still (three rounds or more) one would fall into the fault of an infinite regress.

The nine-real-three-provisional gate: among the twelve links, nine links are real and three are provisional. Which three are provisional? The "six already-moistened links" (that portion of ignorance, formations, consciousness, name-and-form, the six sense-spheres, contact, feeling which has been moistened by craving and grasping) are together made into the one link "becoming" — and this is provisional; the "three phase-mark distinctions" (initial arising, decay, the ending of life) of "consciousness and the five" (consciousness through feeling) are separately posited as "birth, old age, death" — and this too is provisional. So the three provisional are becoming, birth, and old-age-and-death; the remaining nine links are real.

The single-entity gate: five links are each "a single entity" — namely ignorance, consciousness, contact, feeling, craving — each being but one factor; whereas the remaining seven links (formations, name-and-form, the six sense-spheres, becoming, birth, old-age-and-death) are not single factors (each comprehends many factors).

The defiled-or-undefiled gate: three links are exclusively defiled (ignorance, craving, grasping — all of the nature of defilement); seven links are exclusively undefiled (consciousness, name-and-form, the six sense-spheres, contact, feeling, birth, old-age-and-death — all of the nature of maturation-fruit); though in certain phases these seven links also admit the arising of defiled factors, and so are provisionally said to run through both the defiled and the undefiled; the remaining two (formations, becoming) likewise run through both kinds.

The exclusive-mark and mixed-mark gate: ignorance, craving, grasping are called "exclusive-mark" (not intermixed with the remaining links); the rest are "mixed-mark."

The form-or-non-form gate: six links are exclusively non-form — namely ignorance, consciousness, contact, feeling, craving, grasping, these six being exclusively non-form factors; the rest (formations, name-and-form, the six sense-spheres, becoming, birth, old-age-and-death) run through both form and non-form.

The contaminated-and-conditioned gate: all twelve links are contaminated and are comprehended exclusively by the conditioned (the uncontaminated and the unconditioned are not existence-links).

The three-natures gate: "ignorance, craving, grasping" are exclusively of "the unwholesome and the obscured-indeterminate"; "formations" exclusively of "the wholesome and the unwholesome"; "becoming" runs through "the wholesome, the unwholesome, and the unobscured-indeterminate"; the remaining seven links are exclusively "unobscured-indeterminate" (though these seven, in their phases, also give rise to wholesome and defiled factors).

The realm-binding gate: although all twelve links run through the three realms, in the upper two realms they are "partly present" (only a part), while in the desire realm they are "wholly present" (the whole part is there). Here the author adds a passage: the "formations link" of an upper ground can suppress a lower ground — that is, the suppressing-of-defilement contemplative practice that contemplates the "coarse, painful," and the like, the "six contemplative aspects" of a lower ground; for there are those who, seeking birth in an upper ground, set this contemplation in motion. But note: all the contaminated wholesome deeds set in motion by sages who are "neither-trainees-nor-non-trainees" (i.e. all the noble ones) are not comprehended by the existence-links — because they take "clarity" (uncontaminated wisdom) as their condition and run counter to the existence-links. From this it should be known: a sage definitely does not perform deeds that "call forth a future existence," because he is not deluded about, and does not yearn for, the suffering-fruit of a future life. As for a sage's "interspersed cultivation of the meditative absorptions" assisting an old deed of a lower ground, whereby he is born into such places as the Pure Abodes — this is doctrinally not in conflict, for it is the assisting of an old deed, not the performing of a new deed.

The cut-off-by-seeing-or-by-cultivation gate: there is a divergent account here. One view (ignorance is cut off only by seeing): "ignorance" is cut off only by seeing — because it must be deluded about the truth-principle before it can set formations in motion, and because a sage, after the path of seeing, definitely does not perform future-existence deeds; the two links "craving, grasping" are cut off only by cultivation — because they covet a future existence and moisten birth, and because all "nine deaths-end minds" coexist with innate craving; the remaining nine links all run through being cut off by seeing and by cultivation. Another view (all run through both modes of cutting-off): all twelve links run through being cut off by both "seeing and cultivation." The ground for this latter view is: the treatise says that "the stream-enterer fruit has already cut off a part of every link, with no link wholly cut off." If the "ignorance link" were cut off only by seeing, how could it be said of the stream-enterer (who at the path of seeing has cut off the view-defilements) that "no link is wholly cut off"? This shows that ignorance too runs through being cut off by cultivation. If "craving, grasping" were cut off only by cultivation, how could it be said of the stream-enterer that "a part of every link has been cut off"? This shows that craving and grasping too run through being cut off by seeing. Again a scripture says, "all the defilements of the whole realm can effect rebirth-linking"; and "the formations leading toward an evil destiny" can be set in motion only by "the deliberation-arisen defilements," yet it is not said that "the moistening of birth is cut off only by cultivation," nor that "every formation that calls forth a future existence is set in motion by what is cut off by seeing." From this it should be known: the three links — ignorance, craving, grasping — also run through being cut off by both seeing and cultivation. The author then harmonizes with a further word: in the ignorance link, that which "properly sets formations in motion" is cut off only by seeing, while that which "assists in setting them in motion" is undetermined (running through both); in craving and grasping, that which "properly moistens birth" is cut off only by cultivation, while that which "assists in moistening" is undetermined (running through both). Further: a defiled factor is "to be cut off by its own nature" (its own nature being inherently what should be removed), because the moment its antidote arises it is forever cut off; whereas every factor that is contaminated but not defiled is "not to be cut off by its own nature" (its nature not being inherently what should be removed), because it does not run counter to the noble path. The author then sets up two senses of "cutting-off": the first is "cutting-off-as-release-from-bondage" — cutting off the defilement that "takes it as object, that is intermixed with it" (the factor's own substance remaining, only its bondage loosened); the second is "cutting-off-as-non-arising" — cutting off its support so that it forever does not arise. By "cutting-off-as-release-from-bondage," contaminated wholesome and unobscured-indeterminate factors are cut off only by cultivation; by "cutting-off-as-non-arising," the various evil destinies, the absorption-of-no-thought, and the like, are cut off only by seeing. The earlier statement that "the twelve links run through both modes of cutting-off" is to be set within these several senses of cutting-off, and understood as each accords.

The feeling-association gate: among the twelve links, "ten links coexist with pleasant feeling and with neutral feeling" (excepting the feeling link and the old-age-and-death link, which do not take pleasant feeling) — because the "feeling link" itself does not associate with feeling, and the "old-age-and-death phase" is for the most part without pleasure but admits neutrality. "Eleven links coexist with painful feeling" (excepting the feeling link) — because the feeling link does not coexist with feeling.

The three-sufferings gate: "eleven links in part are comprehended by the suffering of change" (excepting old-age-and-death) — for the old-age-and-death phase is for the most part without pleasant feeling, and the suffering of change is posited in dependence on the destruction of pleasant feeling, so old-age-and-death does not enter the suffering of change. "Twelve links in part are comprehended by the suffering of pain" — because within every link there is painful feeling. "Twelve links wholly are comprehended by the suffering of conditioning" — because every contaminated factor is the suffering of conditioning. If one speaks in terms of "neutral feeling," then eleven links in part (excepting the old-age-and-death link) are comprehended by the suffering of conditioning, the same as the account of the suffering of change above. Such is the real meaning; but in the various sagely teachings, following the heightening of some particular mark, what is stated is undetermined (each taking a partial emphasis).

The four-truths gate: all twelve links are comprehended by the "truth of suffering" (because they are of the nature of the grasping-aggregates); among them five links (ignorance, formations, craving, grasping, becoming) are also comprehended by the "truth of origin" (because they are of the nature of deed and defilement).

The four-conditions gate: as the links stand mutually related, the "contributory condition" is definitely present; the other three conditions (causal condition, immediately-antecedent-and-uninterrupted condition, object condition) are present or absent without fixity. The scripture, in dependence on what is "definitely present," states only that there is "one" condition (the contributory). Among them, "craving as related to grasping" and "becoming as related to birth" have the sense of "causal condition" (intimately giving rise); and if one takes the account that "the consciousness link is the deed-seed," then "formations as related to consciousness" also serves as causal condition. As the remaining links stand mutually related, there is no sense of causal condition. Here the author harmonizes a divergence between two treatises: the Abhidharma-samuccaya says "ignorance as related to formations has causal condition," and that is stated in dependence on "the deed-latent-energy at the time of the ignorance phase" — because that deed-latent-energy coexists with ignorance, it is provisionally called "ignorance," though in fact it is the seed of "formations" (so "ignorance as related to formations has causal condition," at bottom being the formations-seed as related to formations). The Yogācārabhūmi says "as the various links stand related there is no causal condition," and that is stated in dependence on "the present-activity craving and grasping" and "becoming, which is deed alone" (these three being present-activity or deed, and so among them there is no causal condition). Now for the two intermediate conditions: "ignorance as related to formations," "craving as related to grasping," and "birth as related to old-age-and-death," these three all have the remaining two conditions (the immediately-antecedent and the object); "becoming as related to birth" and "feeling as related to craving," these two then "have no immediately-antecedent condition but have the object condition"; as the remaining links stand mutually related, neither of these two intermediate conditions is present. The above is stated with reference to the "real dependent arising" that is "proximate, in proper succession, and unmixed"; were one to relate the links in reverse succession, across intervals, or in a mixed way, then their serving as conditions would be undetermined. The discerning should reflect on this according to reason.

The affliction-deed-suffering comprehension gate: how do the three — "affliction, deed, suffering" — comprehend these twelve links? "Ignorance, craving, grasping" are comprehended under affliction; "formations" together with one part of "becoming" (the deed-portion of becoming) are comprehended under deed; the "seven links" (consciousness, name-and-form, the six sense-spheres, contact, feeling, birth, old-age-and-death) together with one part of "becoming" (the recompense-portion of becoming) are comprehended under suffering. Where some place says "deed wholly comprehends becoming," it must be known that this is stated in dependence on "the deed-becoming" (the deed-portion of the becoming link); where some place says "consciousness is comprehended by deed," that says "the deed-seed within consciousness" is the consciousness link. And "what is called forth by affliction and deed" is specially named "suffering" alone — comprehended exclusively by the truth of suffering, in order to make people give rise to weariness-and-detachment (which is why suffering is separately stated). Since "affliction, deed, suffering" are precisely the twelve links, these affliction-deed-suffering can make birth-and-death continue.

The Fourth Gate: The Summation — Birth-and-Death Continues Through "Inner Causes and Conditions," Not Awaiting Any Outer Condition

The author at last says "furthermore," opening the summing-up gate: the continuity of birth-and-death is through "inner causes and conditions," not awaiting any outer condition, and therefore there is only inner consciousness. Here "cause" means the two kinds of deed, contaminated deed and uncontaminated deed, which properly call forth birth-and-death, and so are called cause; "condition" means the two hindrances, the affliction-hindrance and the cognitive-hindrance, which assist from the side in calling forth birth-and-death, and so are called condition. Why is this said? Because birth-and-death is of two kinds.

First, sectional birth-and-death. This means the coarse and manifest maturation-fruit of the three realms, called forth by the various contaminated wholesome and unwholesome deeds, by the assisting force of the condition that is the "affliction-hindrance"; its body and life-span, long or short, have a "fixed limit" (a fixed measure) according to the force of causes and conditions, and so it is called "sectional."

Second, the inconceivable transformational birth-and-death. This means the outstanding and subtle maturation-fruit called forth by the various "uncontaminated deeds that have discrimination," by the assisting force of the condition that is the "cognitive-hindrance." It transforms its body and life by the force of compassion-and-vow, having no fixed limit, and so is called "transformational"; because it is assisted and called forth precisely by uncontaminated absorption and vow, its marvelous functioning is hard to fathom, and so it is called "inconceivable." It is also called the "mind-made body" (mind-born body), because it is made according to thought, according to vow.

The author cites scripture and treatise to establish this transformational body. As a scripture says: just as, conditioned by "grasping" and caused by "contaminated deed," one continues a future existence and is born into the three existences (this is the sectional kind); so too, conditioned by the "ground of ignorance" and caused by "uncontaminated deed," there are the arhat, the solitary-buddha, and the bodhisattva who has attained mastery, who are born with the "three kinds of mind-made body" (this is the transformational kind). It is also called the "transformation body" — because by the force of uncontaminated absorption the body is transformed to differ from the original body, just as in a magical transformation.

Then comes a chain of questions and resolutions of difficulties. A treatise says: someone asks — the śrāvaka non-trainee has already forever exhausted future existence; how can he still realize unsurpassed awakening? Answer: he realizes unsurpassed awakening in dependence on a "transformation body" (a transformational body), not in dependence on the deed-recompense body (the sectional body), and so it is not against reason. Again someone asks — if "the cognitive-hindrance assisting an uncontaminated deed can call forth birth-and-death," then those of fixed two-vehicle disposition (who also have the cognitive-hindrance) ought to be unable to enter forever into nirvāṇa-without-remainder, just as the various ordinary beings, bound by defilement, cannot get out of birth-and-death — how is this to be answered? Again it is asked — how could the truth of the path (the uncontaminated) actually call forth "suffering" (birth-and-death)? Answer: who says it has actually called it forth? Again it is asked — if not actually called forth, then how? Answer: it is that "uncontaminated absorption and vow" assist a "contaminated deed," making the fruit obtained continue for a long time and increasingly intensify by turns, and this is only provisionally named "calling forth" (it is not that an uncontaminated deed truly calls forth birth-and-death). And when it thus "calls forth," it is likewise by the assisting force of the cognitive-hindrance as condition — it is not that the cognitive-hindrance alone can call it forth. Whereas "the cognitive-hindrance does not obstruct liberation" (does not obstruct nirvāṇa), because it has no function of "setting deeds in motion or moistening birth" — and so those of fixed two-vehicle disposition can still enter the without-remainder, and that earlier challenge is dissolved.

Again it is asked: why then bother to assist-and-call-forth the suffering of birth-and-death at all? Answer: in order to realize awakening for oneself and to benefit and gladden sentient beings. Those solitary-buddhas and śrāvakas of indefinite disposition, together with the great-vow bodhisattvas who have attained mastery, having already forever cut off and forever suppressed the affliction-hindrance, will no longer receive a future "sectional body"; yet, fearing they might forfeit "the long cultivation of the bodhisattva conduct" (the sectional body being exhausted, the life-span limited), they use the force of uncontaminated outstanding absorption and vow, like a "life-prolonging method," to assist the cause of the present body, making it endure long with its fruit unbroken; assisting in this way again and again by absorption and vow until they realize unsurpassed awakening — and so they must assist-and-call-forth the transformational kind.

Again it is asked: in their assisting-and-calling-forth of the transformational, why too must the "cognitive-hindrance" lend help? Answer: there are three reasons. First, since they have not yet perfectly realized the "marklessness of great compassion," if they did not (with a faint trace of dharma-clinging) hold awakening and sentient beings as truly existent, they would have no way to set in motion a fierce and keen compassion-vow (so they require a remnant of the cognitive-hindrance to raise the compassion-vow). Second, the cognitive-hindrance is precisely what obstructs great awakening; in order to "forever cut it off," they must keep the body abiding long (the better to cut off this hindrance). Third, the cognitive-hindrance is the support of "the contaminated"; if this hindrance were gone, that contaminated body would certainly be gone too, and so the cognitive-hindrance greatly assists "the long abiding of the body."

Then the author distinguishes the assignment of the body: if the body that is kept is assisted by "contaminated absorption and vow," it is comprehended under the "sectional body" (because it is the cognized object of the two vehicles and ordinary beings); if it is assisted by "uncontaminated absorption and vow," it is comprehended under the "transformational body" (not the object of the two vehicles and ordinary beings). From this it should be known: transformational birth-and-death — "its nature is contaminated" and it is comprehended under the "maturation-fruit," and with respect to "uncontaminated deed" it is merely a "dominant fruit" (not the outflow of an uncontaminated deed). Where the sagely teaching says it is "uncontaminated, beyond the three realms," that is stated in dependence on its "assisting cause" (uncontaminated absorption and vow), and does not say that its nature is uncontaminated.

Returning to the verse: what the verse calls "the latent energies of the various deeds" is precisely the "seeds of the two deeds" spoken of above (contaminated and uncontaminated deed); "the latent energy of twofold grasping" is precisely the "seeds of the two hindrances" spoken of above (the affliction-hindrance and the cognitive-hindrance) — because both hindrances involve clinging, they are called "grasping." As for the word "both" and the remaining wording in the verse, the meaning is the same as before.

The author adds a further word to fold the transformational kind too into the verse: although transformational birth-and-death does not have, as the sectional body does, "each maturation severally exhausted and severally arising," yet because of being assisted again and again and transformed by turns, before and after, it too has the sense of "an earlier phase exhausted, a later phase arising again" (this too accords with the verse's "the prior maturation being exhausted, there arises a remaining maturation"). Again: although the continuity of birth-and-death is also constituted by "present activity," the "seed" is definitely present (being the intimate cause), and so the verse speaks with an emphasis on the "seed (latent energy)." Or, the verse's emphasis on the seed carries a further intent: in order to display that the cause and fruit of "true maturation" both do not depart from the root consciousness, it does not speak of "present activity." For the present-activity maturation-cause does not give the fruit at the very same time (cause and fruit being separated), and the transforming-consciousnesses have interruptions and are not true maturation (so the verse does not speak with reference to present activity).

Closing: Even the Continuity of Pure Factors Follows This Same Principle

The cycle of birth-and-death in the prior, intermediate, and later phases all awaits no outer condition, being constituted by "inner consciousness"; this being so, "the continuity of pure factors" should likewise be understood to follow the same principle. How so? The "contaminated and uncontaminated seeds" lodged within the root consciousness from beginningless time, by the transforming-consciousnesses and the rest perfuming them again and again, gradually grow more intense, until at last, when buddhahood is attained, one "turns away" the original defiled consciousness-seeds and "turns to attain" the newly-arisen pure consciousness-seeds, which then hold and sustain all the seeds of merit; and then, by the force of the original vow, throughout the limit of the future one gives rise to all manner of marvelous functioning, in continuity without end. From this it should be known: there is only inner consciousness, awaiting no outer condition whatsoever — so it is with birth-and-death, and so it is with the pure as well.

Onward Transmission

This section establishes the continuity of birth-and-death upon "the latent energy of deeds and the latent energy of twofold grasping," and sets out at length the twelve existence-links together with the two deaths, sectional and transformational; and this doctrine is taken up book by book throughout the consciousness-only system. The Hundred Dharmas treatise, among the mind-dharmas, posits the "ālaya" (the root consciousness perfumed and stored by the latent energies of deeds and of twofold grasping); among the mental factors, posits "volition" (the very substance of deeds, that is, "the contaminated wholesome and unwholesome deeds of volition"); and among the root afflictions, posits "delusion, greed, view, conceit" (the substance of the latent energy of self-grasping, which is "affliction") — so the deeds, the twofold grasping, and the affliction of this section all have their place within the Hundred Dharmas. The Thirty Verses — verse nineteen ("the latent energies of the various deeds, the latent energies of twofold grasping; the prior maturation being exhausted, there arises a remaining maturation") — is the very root-verse this section expounds, verse answering to verse; and it in turn rests on the "holding of seeds" established by verse two ("all-seeds, maturation"). The Madhyānta-vibhāga, in its chapter on the characteristics, gathers deeds and twofold grasping under "false discrimination" (deeds and twofold grasping alike not departing from consciousness, consciousness being the support of defilement), and in its chapter on the obstructions posits "the affliction-hindrance and the cognitive-hindrance" (precisely the conditions that assist the two deaths of this section) — and what it carries forward is just this section's doctrine. The Mahāyāna-saṃgraha, in its chapter on the basis of the knowable, expounds "perfuming" and posits "the mark of exhaustible felt-result and the mark of inexhaustible felt-result" (the basis for the latent energy of deeds being exhaustible and the twofold-grasping-seeds inexhaustible, already noted above in citing Kuiji's Notes), and this is the treatise-basis for this section's "the earlier exhausted, the later arising." As for the Twenty Verses, its main concern is to establish consciousness-only and no-object and to refute the outsiders' clinging to real objects, and it has no direct counterpart to the "continuity of birth-and-death and the twelve existence-links"; here it is left aside.

釋違教·三性Resolving Objections Contrary to Scripture · The Three Natures

全文五層 →Full five layers →
義疏Exposition

〔所釋之頌〕第二十頌至第二十二頌

前面已經一路說「唯有識」,這裡會遇到一個現成的反問:既然萬法唯識,那世尊為什麼在許多經裡反覆講「三性」(遍計所執、依他起、圓成實)?這一節就是回答這個「違教難」。要先把答案點出來:三性並不在識之外另立一套東西,三性正是就著「識」而安立的——所以說「三性亦不離識」。下面順著頌文,先把三性各自講通(誰在遍計、被遍計的是什麼、遍計所執長什麼樣、圓成實又是什麼),再把三性跟一套套教法名相(三無為、七真如、六法、五事、五相、四真實、四諦、三解脫門、二諦……)一一對攝,最後辨它們之間是假是實、是異非異。

三性之立,經論早有所本。《解深密經·一切法相品》明說「諸法相略有三種」:遍計所執相是「一切法名假安立自性差別」(只是依名言假安立出來的自性、差別)、依他起相是「一切法緣生自性」(此有故彼有、此生故彼生,從緣而生)、圓成實相是「一切法平等真如」。此經更以「清淨頗胝迦寶」(水晶)為喻:水晶本淨,染上一層色相便似有種種顏色;依他起相本身如水晶,而「遍計所執相」就像那加上去的染色——並非依他自有,只是妄執安立的言說習氣染上去的。此經又就「相、名相應」與「執、無執」分判三相的了知次第;到《無自性相品》,更依三相說『相無自性、生無自性、勝義無自性』三無自性性——這正是後一節「即依此三性,立彼三無性」的經本。《瑜伽師地論·攝決擇分》同樣定三自性:遍計所執是『名言安立、數數周遍計度而建立』,依他起是『眾緣生、他力所起、非自然有,故說無性』,圓成實即諸法真如;並判『在依他、圓成上妄起遍計執』叫作「增益邊」——這正是頌文「圓成實於彼,常遠離前性」所要遠離的(所離者唯這增益的遍計,依他本身不空)。本論這一節所釋,經根即在《解深密》,論本即在《瑜伽師地論》(旁及《攝大乘論》《辯中邊論》)——下面順著頌文講開。

甲、先把三性各自講通(v20–22)

一、能遍計——是哪些識在「遍計」?

先問:能去「遍計」的,是哪一種識?

所謂「遍計」,就是『周遍地計量、推度』——心對境普遍地分別、揣度,所以叫「遍計」;這種能分別之心品類眾多,所以頌文用「彼彼」兩字來說它。簡單講,能遍計就是那「虛妄分別」之心。就由這「彼彼」種種虛妄分別,去遍計種種『被分別的東西』——也就是被妄執的五蘊、十二處、十八界等等,不管把它執成「法」還是執成「我」,所執出來的那些自性、差別,總名叫「遍計所執自性」。而這樣執出來的自性,其實全然是「都無所有」的:拿正理去推、拿聖教去驗,都找不到它的實體。

頌文也可以這樣配著讀:第一句「由彼彼遍計」顯『能遍計的識』,第二句「遍計種種物」示『被遍計的境』,後半兩句「此遍計所執,自性無所有」才正式說明——遍計所執不管是執我還是執法,其自性都是沒有的,因為前面已經廣顯它了不可得。

那麼究竟哪些識是能遍計?這裡有兩說。

一說(八識皆能遍計):八識連同它們的心所,凡是有漏的,都算能遍計。理由有三:第一,有漏的心、心所都以「虛妄分別」為體性;第二,它們都現起似「所取、能取」的二相;第三,論裡還說阿賴耶識是以「遍計所執自性」的妄執種子作所緣的,可見連藏識也該攝在能遍計裡。

又一說(正義·唯六七能遍計):只有第六意識和第七末那這兩個心品裡頭「執我、執法」的部分,才是真正的能遍計。理由要逐條看:一、聖教只說「意識能遍計」;二、「意」(指第七)和「意識」(指第六)都可名為「意識」,所以這「意識」是把六、七一併攝進去的;三、能遍計必須是「計度分別」,而前五識沒有計度的功能;四、能執我、執法的必是「慧」,前五識裡慧不勝;五、我、法二執必定跟「無明」一起生;六、聖教不說無明有善性,所以善心不是能遍計;七、「癡」跟「無癡」不能相應,所以無漏無癡之心不是能遍計;八、從沒見過有哪個「執」能引導出「空智」,可見執與證空不並存;九、「執有」跟「達無」不會同時起,所以無漏的達無之智不會起執;十、從來沒有哪個「執」是「不能熏」的,而異熟識等本不熏習,所以也不是能遍計。

回頭把前一說的理據一一化解。先說『有漏心都是虛妄分別』這條:有漏心確實不能證真如,所以一律名為「虛妄分別」沒錯;但『雖然現似所取、能取之相』並不等於『都是能遍計』——否則無漏心也現似這二相,難道無漏心也有執?那如來的後得智豈不也該有執了?這顯然不行。所以不能拿「現似二取」當作『都是能遍計』的證據。經裡更明說:佛智能現起身、土等種種影像,就像明鏡照物一樣;倘若說無漏智沒有『緣慮之用』(即不現似相分),那它就不成其為「智」了——可見「現似二相」絕不等於「執」。再說「藏識緣遍計種」這條:聖教雖說藏識緣遍計所執的種子,卻沒說藏識「唯」緣這個(藏識所緣其實兼有實境),所以這不能確證『藏識是能遍計』。由上面這些道理可知:唯有第六、第七這兩個心品,才有能遍計。

窺基《述記》在這裡立「四句分別」,把「遍」(普遍能緣)和「計」(計度執著)兩義交絡開來,好揀清能遍計的寬狹:一、有「遍」而非「計」——指無漏諸識、以及有漏的善識等,它們能普遍廣緣一切境,卻不起計執;二、有「計」而非「遍」——指第七有漏識(恒執我,卻只內緣藏識一境,不普遍);三、亦「遍」亦「計」——指有漏染污、執我執法的第六意識等(既能普遍計度、又起執);四、非「遍」非「計」——指有漏的前五識以及第八識等(既不普遍計度、也不起執)。四句一擺,『真正的能遍計唯是六、七執我法者』就揀得分明了。窺基又就「遍計種種物」的「物」字釋作「物者,體也」——這「物」是隨能計之心而說的,因為能計之心品類眾多,所以說「種種」,並不是說「物體」本身有種種(種種只在能計心那一邊)。

附帶一句:能遍計的識品雖只有兩個(六、七),可是它「遍計」的開合卻有二、三、四、五、六、七、八、九、十等種種不同的分法(隨分別開合而算),所以頌文才說「彼彼」。

二、所遍計——被遍計的,是什麼境?

再問:被遍計的(所遍計),它的自性是什麼?

《攝大乘論》說:所遍計就是「依他起」——因為依他起正是能遍計之心的「所緣緣」(妄執必定要託著依他事才起得來,不會憑空執)。

這裡有人追問:圓成實性難道不也是能遍計之心的境嗎?回答:真如(圓成實)不是妄執能「親緣」的境(妄執攀不到真如),不過依「展轉」來說(迷了真才起妄),也勉強可說它是所遍計。至於「遍計所執」呢,它雖然是能遍計之心所對的「境」,可它根本沒有體、不能充當「所緣緣」,所以也不算嚴格意義的所遍計。嚴格說來,所遍計就只是依他起。

三、遍計所執之相——它跟依他起到底差在哪?

接著辨:遍計所執長什麼樣?它跟依他起又有什麼分別?這一段是全節的關鍵,也有兩說。

一說(二取就是遍計所執):三界的心、心所,由無始以來的虛妄熏習,雖然各自的「體」只有一個,卻現起似「二分」——也就是「見分、相分」(亦即能取、所取)。這「二分」是「情有理無」的(在妄情上彷彿有、在道理上其實無),這個樣子就叫「遍計所執」。而二分所依的那個「體」(心心所的自體),是實實在在託眾緣而生的、它的性不是沒有,這就叫「依他起」——因為它是「虛妄分別緣所生」的。怎麼知道是這樣分的?因為諸聖教就這麼說:「虛妄分別」(心心所體)是依他起,「二取」(見相二分/能所取)才叫遍計所執。

又一說(正義·二分也是依他,妄定執才是遍計所執):一切心、心所由熏習力所變出來的「二分」(見、相),既然是從緣生的,那也該是「依他起」——二分本身並不就是遍計所執。要等能遍計者依著這二分,去妄執它『定是實有、定是實無、是一、是異、俱、不俱』等等,這個「妄執」才叫遍計所執。理據是:第一,諸聖教說『唯量(自證)、唯二(見相二分)、唯種種(眾多相分)』都名為依他起,可見二分屬依他;第二,『相、見、自證、證自證』這四法以及《攝論》講的「十一識」等,論裡都判作依他起所攝。

接著正義用幾重反證來夾死前說。其一:若二分就是遍計所執,那無漏「後得智」品裡的二分也該叫遍計所執了;若承認,那聖智就不該緣著遍計所執而生、緣它的智品就不該算是「道諦」(這不行);若不承認(即承認後得智的二分不是遍計所執),那就該知道有漏的二分也一樣不是遍計所執。其二:若二分是遍計所執,那它就該像「兔角」一樣不能作所緣緣(因為遍計所執沒有體,作不了緣);而且二分既然沒有體,就不該熏成種子;種子既熏不成,後面的識生起時就該沒有二分了——這些都跟事實相違。其三:諸「習氣」(種子)是「相分」所攝的,這豈不正說明相分是「有法」、能作「因緣」嗎?(可見相分有體、屬依他。)再說,若硬說緣所生的『內相分、見分』不是依他起,那它們『所依的體』(自證)照同樣的道理也該不是依他了(沒有別的理由可分),這樣一推,整套就全垮了。由這些道理可知:凡眾緣所生的「心、心所自體」和它的「相分、見分」,不論有漏無漏,全都是依他起——因為它們都是依眾緣而生起的。

那頌文「分別緣所生」這句,是『且就染分依他』說的(偏就染污那一分講)——因為「淨分依他」其實已攝歸圓成(淨分依他與圓成相即)。或者也可以說:染、淨的心心所都可名為「分別」(因為都能緣慮),這樣一來,一切染、淨的依他就全是這頌「依他起」所攝,不限於染分了。

四、圓成實之相(v21 後半、v22)

由『我空、法空』二空所顯出來的、「圓滿、成就」的諸法實性,就叫「圓成實」。『圓滿、成就、實』這三個字,正顯這真性是『周遍、常住、體非虛謬』的——用來簡別開「自相、共相」(那是不周遍的)、「虛空」(無體、不是實)、「我」(虛謬的)等等。另外,無漏的「有為」法(比如無漏智),因為它離顛倒、究竟、勝用周遍,也可以叫「圓成實」;不過這一頌講的圓成實取的是「初義」(圓滿成就的諸法實性,即真如),不是「後義」(無漏有為)。

這圓成實,就是『在那依他起之上,永遠遠離前面所說的遍計所執』,以『二空所顯的真如』為它的體性——這正是頌文「圓成實於彼,常遠離前性」。逐字看這句:說「於彼」(在那依他起上),是顯圓成實跟依他起「不即不離」;說「常遠離」,是顯妄執的能取、所取性『在道理上恆常沒有』(不是一時才無,而是本來常無);說「前」(遠離「前」性,即只離遍計),其義在顯『依他不空』(所要空掉的只是遍計,依他本身不空);說「性」(遠離前「性」),是顯所離的只是「二空」(即遍計的我、法二性),而「二空」本身並不就是圓成實——因為真如是「離有、離無」之性(不是把它說成「無」就成了圓成)。

由前面「不即不離」這層道理,所以圓成實跟依他起是「非異、非不異」(這正是頌文「故此與依他,非異非不異」)。為什麼不能說「全異」?因為若全異,真如就該不是依他的「實性」了(實性即是依他之性,所以不能全異)。為什麼不能說「全同」?因為若全同,圓成這性就該跟依他一樣是「無常」了(真如是常住的,所以不能全同)。再說,若全異或全同,那圓成與依他就該同樣都是「淨境」、或同樣都是「非淨境」,這麼一來「根本智」(緣淨)跟「後得智」(緣染淨)的作用就該沒分別了,這不行。那麼二性怎能「非異非一」呢?這就好比「無常、無我」等性與行法之間的關係:「無常」等性跟「行」等法,若說「異」,那行法就該不是無常了(可行法當體就是無常,所以不能全異);若說「不異」,那這無常就不該是諸行的「共相」了(共相是通於諸法的,所以不能全同)。由這個比喻可顯:圓成實與依他「非一非異」——這就是「法」與「法性」的關係,道理上必然如此(圓成正是依他的法性);因為「勝義」(圓成)跟「世俗」(依他)是相待而有的。

再看頌文「非不見此彼」這句。它的意思是:並不是『沒證見圓成實,就能見到依他起性』(必須先見圓成,才能如實見依他)——因為一個人若還沒通達「遍計所執性空」,就不能如實了知『依他之有』(不知二取是空,便會把依他誤當成遍計)。唯有「無分別智」證了真如之後,才能在後得智中了達依他起性「如幻事」一般(如幻、非實有而似有)。要知道,無始以來心心所雖然早就能緣自己的相分、見分等,可是因為我執、法執恆與它一起運轉,所以始終不能如實了知(依他與圓成)。眾緣所牽引的自心、心所,虛妄地變現出來,就像幻術、陽焰、夢境、鏡中像、光影、空谷回響、水中月、變化所成——『不是有而像是有』(這八個比喻顯依他如幻)。依著這個道理,所以有頌說:『不是還沒見真如,便能了知諸行皆如幻事等;那些行雖有而不真。』這頌的意思就是說:三種自性(遍計所執、依他起、圓成實),都不離心、心所法。

五、三性總攝心法——三性都不離識

把上面收束起來:所謂心、心所以及它們所變現的相,都是眾緣生的,像幻事一樣『不是有而像是有』、誑惑著愚夫,這一切都名為「依他起性」。愚夫就在這依他事上橫加執取「我、法、有、無、一、異、俱、不俱」等等,像空中花一樣『性、相都沒有』,這一切都名為「遍計所執」。而在依他起上,那些被妄執的我、法都是空的,這個「空」所顯出來的「識等真性」,就名為「圓成實」。所以這三性都不離心等——這正是「三性亦不離識」的結論。

乙、三性與一套套教法名相的對攝

六、三性攝三無為

有人問:虛空、擇滅、非擇滅這三種無為,該歸三性中的哪一性?回答:三性都可以容攝它(依不同的角度而攝)。其一,心等變現出似「虛空」等的相,這是隨著心而生的,所以屬「依他起」攝;其二,愚夫在這上頭妄執虛空等是實有的,這就屬「遍計所執」攝;其三,若就真如而假名安立「虛空」等的意義(比如擇滅是用來顯真如的),那就屬「圓成實」攝。再說,有漏的心等一定屬「依他」;無漏的心等則容許「依他、圓成」二性都攝它——因為它是眾緣生的,所以攝屬依他;又因為它無顛倒,所以攝屬圓成實。

七、三性與七真如相攝

三性跟「七真如」怎麼相攝?先列七真如:一、流轉真如(有為法流轉的實性);二、實相真如(我、法二無我所顯的實性);三、唯識真如(染淨法唯識的實性);四、安立真如(苦諦的實性);五、邪行真如(集諦的實性);六、清淨真如(滅諦的實性);七、正行真如(道諦的實性)。這七者既然都是「實性」,就都歸「圓成實」攝(因為它們是根本智、後得智二智所緣的境)。不過若「隨相」而攝,那『流轉、安立(苦)、邪行(集)』這三者就屬「前二性」(遍計、依他)攝——因為它們帶有妄執、雜染;其餘四者(實相、唯識、清淨、正行)才都歸圓成實攝。

八、三性與六法相攝

三性跟「六法」(色、受、想、行、識、無為)怎麼相攝?這六法當中,每一法都具足三性——因為這六法都同時有「妄執」(遍計)、「緣生」(依他)、「理」(圓成)這三層意思。

九、三性與五事相攝

三性跟「五事」(相、名、分別、正智、真如)怎麼相攝?這裡聖教所說「相攝不定」,有好幾家不同的分法,依次列出。

說一:依他起攝「相、名、分別、正智」這四事,圓成實攝「真如」,遍計所執則「不攝五事」。這一說的講法是:有漏心心所變出似『所詮(被表詮的義)』的,叫「相」;變出似『能詮(能表詮的言)』的,安立為「名」;那能變的心等立為「分別」;而無漏心等因為離戲論,所以總名為「正智」(不再分能詮、所詮)——這四者都是從緣生的,所以全歸依他攝。

說二:依他起攝「相、分別」,遍計所執只攝「名」,正智、真如都歸圓成實攝。這一說的講法是:有漏心心所的相分叫「相」,其餘的叫「分別」;遍計所執本來都沒有體,為了顯它的「非有」,姑且假說它為「名」;「正智、真如」二者因為無倒,所以歸圓成實攝。

說三:依他起只攝「分別」,遍計所執攝「相、名」,正智、真如都歸圓成實攝。這一說的講法是:有漏心心所的相分、見分等,總名為「分別」(因為它以虛妄分別為體性);遍計所執的能詮、所詮,是隨情而立的「名、相」二事。

說四:「名」屬依他起,「義」屬遍計所執。這一說的講法是:有漏心心所的相分、見分等,是靠「名」的勢力才成了「所遍計」,所以說它為「名」;遍計所執則是隨著名去橫計、體實在沒有,所以假立一個「義」的名目。

這幾家所說的五事,文字雖然不同,意義卻不相違背。不過要知道,「初說」(說一)是「不相雜亂」、最為周正的,這在《瑜伽論》裡有詳細的說明,應當依它而知。

十、三性與五相相攝

聖教又說有「五相」,它跟三性怎麼相攝?「所詮、能詮」各自都具三性:「妄所計」歸初性(遍計所執)攝;「相、名、分別」隨它所對應的,不管是作所詮還是作能詮,都歸依他起攝;「真如、正智」隨它所對應的,作所詮或能詮,都歸圓成實攝(因為後得智能變出似「能詮」的相)。另外,「二相屬相」(能詮、所詮二相互相隸屬的那個相)只歸初性(遍計)攝——因為妄執的義、名一定相隸屬。而「執著相」只歸依他起攝(以虛妄分別為體性);「不執著相」只歸圓成實攝(以無漏智等為體性)。

十一、三性與四真實相攝

聖教又說「四真實」(世間極成、道理極成、煩惱障淨智所行、所知障淨智所行),它跟三性怎麼相攝?『世間極成、道理極成』這兩種真實歸依他起攝(因為被相、名、分別這三事所攝);「二障淨智所行」這真實歸圓成實攝(因為被正智、真如這二事所攝)。《辯中邊論》則另有一說:第一真實(世間極成)只歸初性攝——因為它是世間共同所執的;第二真實(道理極成)通歸三性——因為它的理通於「執」與「無執」、通於雜染與清淨;後二真實(二障淨智所行)只歸第三性(圓成實)。

十二、三性與四諦相攝

三性跟「四諦」怎麼相攝?四諦中每一諦都具三性。

就拿「苦諦」來說,它的「無常、苦、空、無我」四個行相,各各都有三性。先看「無常」的三性:一、無性無常(遍計所執之性常是無的,所以說「無常」);二、起盡無常(依他有生有滅,所以「無常」);三、垢淨無常(圓成在染、淨位上轉變而顯,所以「無常」)。再看「苦」的三性:一、所取苦(遍計——是我、法二執所依取的);二、事相苦(依他——具足三苦之相);三、和合苦(圓成——與苦相和合、不相離)。再看「空」的三性:一、無性空(遍計——它的性非有,所以空);二、異性空(依他——它跟妄執的自性相異,所以說空,即空掉那遍計);三、自性空(圓成——以二空所顯為自性)。再看「無我」的三性:一、無相無我(遍計——我相本來就無);二、異相無我(依他——跟妄執的我相相異);三、自相無我(圓成——以「無我所顯」為自相)。

接著是「集諦」的三性:一、習氣集(遍計——即遍計所執自性執的習氣,就著『執那習氣』而假立「集」名);二、等起集(依他——即業與煩惱所等起);三、未離繫集(圓成——即還沒離障的真如)。再來「滅諦」的三性:一、自性滅(遍計——它的自性本來不生,故本來滅);二、二取滅(依他——即擇滅令二取不生);三、本性滅(圓成——即真如、本性寂滅)。最後「道諦」的三性:一、遍知道(對遍計——能遍知遍計所執);二、永斷道(對依他——能斷染分依他起);三、作證道(對圓成——能證圓成實);不過「遍知道」也通於後二(也知依他、也證圓成)。

這樣,苦諦下的「無常、苦、空、無我」四門,加上集、滅、道三諦,總共這『七組三』的三性,都如上面依次配釋。要知道,此處所配的三性,有的是屬「假」、有的是屬「實」,當如理而知。

十三、三性與三解脫門、三無生忍、二諦相攝

「三解脫門」(空、無願、無相)所行的境界,跟三性怎麼相攝?就道理而言,這三門都通於三性;若隨相而配,則各配一性:「空」解脫門配遍計、「無願」解脫門配依他、「無相」解脫門配圓成,依次而知。緣著這三性,又生起「三無生忍」:一、本性無生忍;二、自然無生忍;三、惑苦無生忍——這三忍依次以三性為境(本性無生忍緣遍計、自然無生忍緣依他、惑苦無生忍緣圓成)。

那麼這三性又怎麼攝「二諦」呢?應知「世俗諦」具足這三種(含遍計、依他、圓成的世俗分);「勝義諦」則只是圓成實性。世俗有三:一、假世俗(即遍計所執);二、行世俗(即依他起);三、顯了世俗(即圓成實,於世俗位上顯了)——依次就是這三性。勝義也有三:一、義勝義(即真如——是「勝」之「義」,殊勝法的義);二、得勝義(即涅槃——「勝」即是「義」,所得的殊勝就是義);三、行勝義(即聖道——「勝」「為」義,能趣向殊勝之行)。這三者因為「無變、無倒」,隨它所對應的,全都攝在圓成實性裡。

十四、三性與智所行、假實、異不異

最後辨三性的幾個性質。先問:三性各是哪種智所行?「遍計所執」根本不是「智」所行的(因為它沒有自體、不能作所緣緣);不過愚夫把它執為有、聖者把它通達為無,所以也勉強可說它是凡智、聖智之「境」。「依他起性」是根本、後得二智所行;「圓成實性」則唯是聖智之境(只有無分別智及後得智能緣它)。

再問:這三性裡幾分是假、幾分是實?「遍計所執」因為是妄安立的,可以說它是「假」;可是它根本無體相,所以其實是「非假非實」(因為「假」必須依著「實」才立得起,而遍計根本沒有實可依)。「依他起性」則有實也有假:就「聚集、相續、分位」這些性而言說它是「假有」(像瓶、像流、像時這類假法);就「心、心所、色」是從緣生的而言說它是「實有」。要知道,若沒有實法,假法也就沒有了——因為假法必須依著實的因才施設得出來。「圓成實性」則純是實有——因為它不依他緣而施設(真如不待緣而立)。

最後問:這三性是異、還是不異?應當說「俱非」(非異也非不異):因為三性沒有各別的體,所以不能說「異」;而「妄執、緣起、真義」這三層意義各有分別,所以也不能說「不異」。三性的義類其實無邊無盡,這裡怕文字太繁讓人生厭,所以只略略示出綱要如上。

承衍

三性(遍計所執、依他起、圓成實)是唯識系判一切法的總綱,本節所立的三性義,後出諸論依次承用。《百法明門論》立八識心王與諸心所:能遍計就是那有漏的第六、第七心心所,遍計所執則不入百法所攝(因為它情有理無、根本沒有體),圓成實所依的真如則收在「無為法」之下——三性正好把百法統攝起來。《唯識三十論頌》的頌二十(遍計所執·自性無所有)、頌二十一(依他起·圓成實·常遠離前性)、頌二十二(與依他非異非不異·非不見此彼),正是本節所釋的本頌,逐頌相承。《辯中邊論·辯相品》以「虛妄分別」的『境、性、二空』立三性——依虛妄分別的「境」說有遍計所執、依虛妄分別的「性」說有依他起、依「所取能取空」說有圓成實,跟本節「三性亦不離識」是同一條路;本節辨「四真實」時所引的別判,也出自《辯中邊論》。《攝大乘論·所知相分》是三性的廣辯本:它說依他起相是『以阿賴耶識為種子、虛妄分別所攝的諸識』,遍計所執相是『於無義中似義顯現』,圓成實相是『在那依他起相上、似義之相永遠沒有』——本節『所遍計就是依他起』一句,正是引《攝大乘論》而立。至於《二十唯識論》,主於成立唯識無境、破外人的實境之執,對三性的相攝判釋沒有正面對位,這裡從闕。

We have been saying all along that "there is only consciousness," and right here a natural objection presents itself. If the ten thousand things are only consciousness, then why did the World-honored One, in sūtra after sūtra, repeatedly teach the three natures — the wholly-imagined nature (what is grasped through pervasive imagining), the other-dependent nature (what arises in dependence on conditions), and the perfectly-accomplished nature (the real character of things)? This section answers that "objection from scripture." Let the answer be stated first: the three natures do not set up some separate set of things outside of consciousness. The three natures are precisely established with reference to consciousness itself — which is why we say "the three natures, too, are not apart from consciousness." In what follows we will track the verses: first work each of the three natures through clearly (who does the imagining, what is wholly-imagined, what the wholly-imagined looks like, and what the perfectly-accomplished is), then match the three natures one by one against the various sets of doctrinal categories (the three unconditioned, the seven suchnesses, the six dharmas, the five items, the five characteristics, the four realities, the four truths, the three gateways to liberation, the two truths, and so on), and finally distinguish among the three natures whether each is nominal or real, and whether they are different or not different.

The establishing of the three natures has its roots in scripture and treatise alike. The Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, in its chapter on the characteristics of all dharmas, says plainly that "the characteristics of dharmas are in brief of three kinds": the wholly-imagined mark is "the self-nature and the distinctions of all dharmas, nominally established through names" (merely a self-nature and distinctions nominally set up in reliance on conventional designation); the other-dependent mark is "the condition-born nature of all dharmas" (this being, that is — this arising, that arises — born from conditions); and the perfectly-accomplished mark is "the equal suchness of all dharmas." The same sūtra gives the image of a "pure crystal gem": the crystal is in itself clear, yet once it takes on a tint of color it seems to bear all manner of hues; the other-dependent mark is itself like the crystal, while the "wholly-imagined mark" is like the tint laid over it — not something the other-dependent has of itself, but only the perfuming of verbal habit, falsely grasped and laid on top. The sūtra further divides the order in which the three characteristics are understood by way of "characteristic-and-name in correspondence" and "grasping versus non-grasping"; and in its chapter on the characteristic of non-self-nature it goes on, in reliance on the three characteristics, to teach the three kinds of non-self-nature — "the non-self-nature of characteristic, the non-self-nature of arising, and the non-self-nature in the ultimate sense" — which is precisely the scriptural basis for the later section, "in reliance on just these three natures, those three non-natures are established." The Yogācārabhūmi, in its chapter on the ascertaining of the meaning, likewise fixes the three self-natures: the wholly-imagined is "established by conventional designation, set up through repeated all-pervading reckoning"; the other-dependent is "born of the host of conditions, arisen by the power of others, not existing of itself, and so said to be without nature"; and the perfectly-accomplished is just the suchness of all dharmas. It further judges that "falsely giving rise to wholly-imagined grasping upon the other-dependent and the perfectly-accomplished" is called "the extreme of superimposition" — which is exactly what the verse "the perfectly-accomplished is, upon that, forever apart from the previous nature" means to set apart (what is set apart is only this superimposed wholly-imagined; the other-dependent itself is not emptied). What this section expounds has its scriptural root in the Saṃdhinirmocana and its treatise-basis in the Yogācārabhūmi (with the Mahāyāna-saṃgraha and the Madhyānta-vibhāga alongside) — and with that we follow the verses and open the exposition.

A. First, work each of the three natures through clearly (v20–22)

1. The imagining agent — which consciousnesses do the "pervasive imagining"?

First the question: which kind of consciousness is the one that does the "pervasive imagining"?

"Pervasive imagining" means measuring and reckoning all-pervasively — the mind discriminating and conjecturing about its objects across the board; this is why it is called pervasive imagining. And because this discriminating mind comes in many kinds, the verse uses the words "this one and that one" to speak of it. Put plainly, the imagining agent is just that mind of "false discrimination." It is by this "this-and-that" variety of false discrimination that one pervasively imagines all manner of "wholly-imagined things" — that is, the falsely-grasped aggregates, sense-fields, and elements, grasped whether as "dharmas" or as "self." The natures and distinctions that are grasped out in this way are together called the "wholly-imagined nature." And a nature grasped out in this way is in fact "entirely without any existence at all": probe it by correct reasoning, test it against the holy teaching, and no substantial reality can be found.

The verse can also be read matched up this way: the first line, "by this and that imagining," shows the consciousness that does the imagining; the second line, "imagining all manner of things," indicates the object that is wholly-imagined; and the latter half, "this wholly-imagined nature has no existence of its own," is the formal statement — that the wholly-imagined, whether it grasps self or grasps dharma, has no nature of its own, because the foregoing has already shown at length that it cannot be found.

So then, which consciousnesses are actually the imagining agent? Here there are two views.

One view (all eight consciousnesses can imagine): the eight consciousnesses together with their mental factors — whatever among them is defiled (with-outflow) — all count as imagining agents. The reasoning is threefold. First, defiled mind and mental factors all have "false discrimination" as their very substance. Second, they all arise displaying the semblance of two characteristics, the "grasped and the grasper." Third, the treatise also says that the store-consciousness, the ālaya-vijñāna, takes as its object the seeds of the wholly-imagined nature's false grasping — which shows that even the store-consciousness should be included among the imagining agents.

Another view (the settled, correct reading: only the sixth and seventh imagine): only those parts within the two mind-kinds — the sixth, the mental consciousness, and the seventh, the manas — that "grasp self and grasp dharma" are truly the imagining agent. The reasons must be taken point by point. (1) The holy teaching says only that "the mental consciousness can imagine." (2) Both "manas" (the seventh) and "mental consciousness" (the sixth) can be named "mental consciousness," so this term "mental consciousness" gathers the sixth and seventh together. (3) An imagining agent must be capable of "reckoning discrimination," and the first five consciousnesses have no faculty of reckoning. (4) What can grasp self and grasp dharma must be "discernment" (prajñā), and in the first five consciousnesses discernment is not strong. (5) The two graspings, of self and of dharma, must arise together with "ignorance." (6) The holy teaching does not say that ignorance has a wholesome nature, so a wholesome mind is not an imagining agent. (7) "Delusion" and "non-delusion" cannot accompany one another, so an undefiled mind of non-delusion is not an imagining agent. (8) No "grasping" has ever been seen to lead forth the "wisdom of emptiness," which shows that grasping and the realization of emptiness do not coexist. (9) "Grasping as existent" and "penetrating non-existence" never arise at once, so the undefiled wisdom that penetrates non-existence will not give rise to grasping. (10) No "grasping" has ever been one that "cannot perfume"; and the consciousness of karmic maturation and the like do not perfume, so they too are not imagining agents.

Now let us go back and dissolve, one at a time, the reasons given for the first view. Take first the point that "all defiled mind is false discrimination." It is true that defiled mind cannot realize suchness, so it may indeed all be named "false discrimination"; but "even though it arises displaying the semblance of grasped and grasper" does not amount to "therefore it is all an imagining agent." Otherwise, undefiled mind also arises displaying the semblance of these two characteristics — would undefiled mind then also have grasping? Would the subsequently-attained wisdom of a Tathāgata then also have grasping? Plainly this will not do. So one cannot take "displaying the semblance of the two graspings" as proof of "being an imagining agent." Scripture says even more explicitly: a Buddha's wisdom can give rise to all manner of images — bodies, lands, and the rest — just as a clear mirror reflects things; and if one said that undefiled wisdom had no "function of cognizing-its-object" (that is, did not display the semblance of an object-aspect), then it would no longer be "wisdom" at all — which shows that "displaying the semblance of the two characteristics" is by no means the same as "grasping." Take next the point that "the store-consciousness takes the wholly-imagined seeds as object." Although the holy teaching does say that the store-consciousness takes as object the seeds of the wholly-imagined nature, it does not say that the store-consciousness takes only this as object (the store-consciousness in fact also takes real objects), so this does not establish for certain that "the store-consciousness is an imagining agent." From all the foregoing it is known: only these two mind-kinds, the sixth and the seventh, have the capacity for pervasive imagining.

Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) sets up here a "four-alternative analysis," disentangling the two senses of "pervasive" (universally able to take an object) and "imagining" (reckoning and grasping), the better to mark off how wide or narrow the imagining agent is. First, "pervasive but not imagining" — this covers the undefiled consciousnesses, and the defiled wholesome consciousnesses and the like, which can take all objects widely and all-pervasively yet give rise to no reckoning-grasping. Second, "imagining but not pervasive" — this is the defiled seventh consciousness (it constantly grasps a self, but takes only the single inner object of the store-consciousness, and is not all-pervading). Third, "both pervasive and imagining" — this is the defiled, self-and-dharma-grasping sixth consciousness and the like (which both reckons all-pervasively and gives rise to grasping). Fourth, "neither pervasive nor imagining" — this covers the defiled first five consciousnesses and the eighth consciousness (which neither reckon all-pervasively nor give rise to grasping). Once the four alternatives are laid out, "the true imagining agent is only the sixth and seventh, those that grasp self and dharma" stands out clearly. Kuiji further glosses the word "things" in "imagining all manner of things": "'things' means substances" — and this "thing" is spoken with reference to the imagining mind, for since the imagining mind comes in many kinds it is said to be "all manner," and it is not that the "substances" themselves come in many kinds (the manifoldness lies only on the side of the imagining mind).

A note in passing: although there are only two kinds of imagining consciousness (the sixth and seventh), its "imagining" admits of various ways of counting — two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, and so on (reckoned according to how the discrimination is grouped or split out). This is why the verse says "this one and that one."

2. The wholly-imagined object — what is the object that is wholly-imagined?

Next the question: as for the imagined (the object of imagining), what is its own nature?

The Mahāyāna-saṃgraha says: the imagined is just the dependent nature — because the other-dependent nature is precisely the "object-condition" of the imagining mind (false grasping must always lean upon an other-dependent event to arise; it never grasps out of thin air).

Here someone presses further: is the perfectly-accomplished nature not also an object of the imagining mind? The answer: suchness (the perfectly-accomplished) is not an object that false grasping can "directly take" (false grasping cannot reach all the way to suchness); yet, speaking by way of "succession" (it is by deluding oneself about the real that one then gives rise to the false), one may, with some stretching, call it wholly-imagined too. As for the "wholly-imagined" itself — although it is the "object" that the imagining mind faces, it has no substance whatever and cannot serve as an "object-condition," so it too does not count as the wholly-imagined in the strict sense. Strictly speaking, then, the imagined is just the dependent nature.

3. The character of the wholly-imagined — exactly how does it differ from the other-dependent?

Next the distinction: what does the wholly-imagined look like, and how does it differ from the other-dependent? This passage is the pivot of the whole section, and here too there are two views.

One view (the two aspects just are the wholly-imagined): the mind and mental factors of the three realms, through beginningless false perfuming, although each has but a single "substance," arise displaying the semblance of "two aspects" — namely the "seeing-aspect and the object-aspect" (that is, the grasper and the grasped). These "two aspects" are "present to feeling but absent in reason" (seemingly there to deluded feeling, in fact not there in reason), and this appearance is what is called the "wholly-imagined." But the "substance" on which the two aspects depend (the self-substance of the mind and mental factors) is genuinely born in reliance on the host of conditions, and its nature is not nothing — and this is called the "other-dependent," because it is "born from the conditions of false discrimination." How do we know it is divided this way? Because the holy teachings put it just so: "false discrimination" (the substance of mind and mental factors) is the other-dependent, and "the two graspings" (the seeing- and object-aspects, the grasper and grasped) are what is called the wholly-imagined.

Another view (the settled, correct reading: the two aspects too are other-dependent; it is the false fixed grasping that is the wholly-imagined): the "two aspects" (seeing and object) that all mind and mental factors transform out through the power of perfuming, since they too are born from conditions, ought also to be "other-dependent" — the two aspects are not in themselves the wholly-imagined. It is only when the imagining agent, leaning on these two aspects, falsely grasps that they are "definitely really existent, definitely really nonexistent, one, different, both, or not-both," and so on, that this "false grasping" is what is called the wholly-imagined. The reasons are these. First, the holy teachings say that "the cognizing-measure alone (self-awareness), the two alone (seeing- and object-aspects), and the many alone (the manifold object-aspects)" are all named other-dependent — which shows that the two aspects belong to the other-dependent. Second, the four — object-aspect, seeing-aspect, self-awareness, and the awareness of self-awareness — together with the "eleven cognitions" of which the Mahāyāna-saṃgraha speaks, are all judged in the treatise to be included under the other-dependent.

Then the settled reading uses several layers of counter-argument to pin down the first view. (i) If the two aspects just were the wholly-imagined, then the two aspects in the undefiled "subsequently-attained wisdom" would also have to be called wholly-imagined; and if this is granted, then holy wisdom ought not to arise taking the wholly-imagined as object, and the wisdom-kind that takes it as object ought not to count as the "truth of the path" (which will not do); and if this is not granted (that is, if one grants that the two aspects of subsequently-attained wisdom are not wholly-imagined), then one should recognize that the defiled two aspects are likewise not wholly-imagined. (ii) If the two aspects were wholly-imagined, then they should be unable, like a "hare's horn," to serve as an object-condition (since the wholly-imagined has no substance and cannot serve as a condition); moreover, the two aspects, having no substance, ought not to be perfumed into seeds; and seeds not being perfumed, then when later consciousness arises there ought to be no two aspects at all — all of which run contrary to the facts. (iii) The various "perfumings" (seeds) are included under the "object-aspect" — does this not precisely show that the object-aspect is "an existent dharma" and can serve as a "causal condition"? (Which shows the object-aspect has substance and belongs to the other-dependent.) Furthermore, if one insisted that the condition-born "inner object-aspect and seeing-aspect" are not other-dependent, then by the very same reasoning their "underlying substance" (self-awareness) ought also not to be other-dependent (there being no other ground to divide them), and on this reasoning the whole structure collapses. From these reasons it is known: every condition-born "self-substance of mind and mental factors," together with its "object-aspect and seeing-aspect," whether defiled or undefiled, is wholly other-dependent — because they all arise in reliance on the host of conditions.

As for the verse line "born from the conditions of discrimination," this is spoken "with reference, for the moment, to the defiled portion of the other-dependent" (taking, in particular, the defiled portion) — because the "pure portion of the other-dependent" is in fact already gathered into the perfectly-accomplished (the pure portion of the other-dependent and the perfectly-accomplished are mutually identical). Or one may also say: both defiled and pure mind and mental factors may be named "discrimination" (since both cognize objects), and on this reading the whole of the other-dependent, defiled and pure alike, is gathered under this verse's "other-dependent," not limited to the defiled portion.

4. The character of the perfectly-accomplished (latter half of v21, v22)

The "full, accomplished" real nature of all dharmas, displayed by the two emptinesses — the emptiness of self and the emptiness of dharmas — is called the "perfectly-accomplished." The three words "full, accomplished, real" display that this real nature is "all-pervading, abiding, and not false in substance" — used to set it off from "self-character and common-character" (which are not all-pervading), from "empty space" (which has no substance and is not real), from "self" (which is false), and the like. Furthermore, an undefiled "conditioned" dharma (such as undefiled wisdom), because it is free of inversion, ultimate, and all-pervading in its superior function, may also be called "perfectly-accomplished"; but the perfectly-accomplished of this verse takes the "first sense" (the full, accomplished real nature of all dharmas, that is, suchness), not the "later sense" (undefiled conditioned dharmas).

This perfectly-accomplished is just "that which, upon the other-dependent, is forever apart from the previously-stated wholly-imagined," with the "suchness displayed by the two emptinesses" as its very nature — and this is exactly the verse's "the perfectly-accomplished is, upon that, forever apart from the previous nature." Reading this line word by word: to say "upon that" (upon the other-dependent) displays that the perfectly-accomplished is "neither identical with nor apart from" the other-dependent; to say "forever apart" displays that the falsely-grasped grasper-nature and grasped-nature are "in reason eternally absent" (not merely absent at one moment, but absent from the very beginning and always); to say "previous" (apart from the previous nature, that is, apart only from the wholly-imagined) has as its point to display that "the other-dependent is not emptied" (what is to be emptied is only the wholly-imagined; the other-dependent itself is not emptied); to say "nature" (apart from the previous nature) displays that what is set apart is only the "two emptinesses" (that is, the self-nature and the dharma-nature that are wholly-imagined), and that "the two emptinesses" are not themselves the perfectly-accomplished — because suchness is a nature "apart from existence and apart from nonexistence" (one does not make it the perfectly-accomplished merely by calling it "nonexistent").

By the foregoing principle of being "neither identical with nor apart from," the perfectly-accomplished and the other-dependent are therefore "not different, not non-different" (this is exactly the verse's "therefore this and the other-dependent are neither different nor non-different"). Why can one not say "wholly different"? Because if wholly different, then suchness would not be the "real nature" of the other-dependent (the real nature just is the nature of the other-dependent, so they cannot be wholly different). Why can one not say "wholly the same"? Because if wholly the same, then this perfectly-accomplished nature would, like the other-dependent, be "impermanent" (suchness is abiding, so they cannot be wholly the same). Furthermore, if wholly different or wholly the same, then the perfectly-accomplished and the other-dependent would both alike be "pure objects" or both alike be "non-pure objects," and on this reading the functions of "fundamental wisdom" (which takes the pure as object) and "subsequently-attained wisdom" (which takes both defiled and pure as object) would have no distinction — which will not do. Then how can the two natures be "not different and not one"? It is just like the relation between properties such as "impermanence and non-self" and the conditioned dharmas they characterize: properties such as "impermanence" and dharmas such as the "conditioned" — if you say "different," then the conditioned dharmas ought not to be impermanent (yet conditioned dharmas in their very substance are impermanent, so they cannot be wholly different); if you say "not different," then this impermanence ought not to be the "common-character" of all conditioned things (a common-character pervades all dharmas, so they cannot be wholly the same). By this analogy it is displayed: the perfectly-accomplished and the other-dependent are "not one, not different" — this is the relation of "dharma" to "dharma-nature," which in reason must necessarily be so (the perfectly-accomplished is precisely the dharma-nature of the other-dependent); for "ultimate truth" (the perfectly-accomplished) and "conventional truth" (the other-dependent) are established only in mutual dependence.

Now look at the verse line "it is not that, without seeing this, one sees that." Its meaning is: it is not the case that "without realizing the perfectly-accomplished one could yet see the other-dependent nature" (one must first see the perfectly-accomplished before one can see the other-dependent as it truly is) — because a person who has not yet penetrated "the emptiness of the wholly-imagined nature" cannot know as it truly is "the existence of the other-dependent" (not knowing that the two graspings are empty, one will mistake the other-dependent for the wholly-imagined). Only after "non-discriminating wisdom" has realized suchness can one, in subsequently-attained wisdom, penetrate the other-dependent nature as "like a conjured event" (illusory, not really existent yet seemingly existent). One should know that, from beginningless time, although mind and mental factors have long been able to take their own object-aspect, seeing-aspect, and so on as object, yet because the grasping of self and the grasping of dharma run on perpetually along with them, they can never know as it truly is (the other-dependent and the perfectly-accomplished). One's own mind and mental factors, drawn along by the host of conditions, falsely manifest, just like a magician's conjuring, a heat-shimmer mirage, a dream, an image in a mirror, a shadow or reflection, an echo in an empty valley, the moon in water, or a thing produced by transformation — "not existent yet seemingly existent" (these eight similes display the other-dependent as illusory). On this principle there is a verse that says: "It is not that, without yet seeing suchness, one can know all conditioned things to be like conjured events and the rest; those conditioned things, though existent, are not real." The meaning of this verse is just this: the three self-natures (the wholly-imagined, the other-dependent, and the perfectly-accomplished) are all not apart from mind and mental factors.

5. The three natures all gathered into the dharmas of mind — the three natures are all not apart from consciousness

Drawing the above together: what we call mind, mental factors, and the characteristics they manifest are all born from the host of conditions, and like conjured events are "not existent yet seemingly existent," deceiving the foolish — and all of this is named the "other-dependent nature." The foolish, upon these other-dependent events, forcibly impose grasping at "self, dharma, existence, nonexistence, one, different, both, not-both," and so on, which like a flower in the sky has "neither nature nor character" — and all of this is named the "wholly-imagined." And upon the other-dependent, the self and the dharmas that are falsely grasped are all empty; the "real nature of consciousness and the rest" displayed by this "emptiness" is named the "perfectly-accomplished." Thus these three natures are all not apart from mind and the rest — which is exactly the conclusion, "the three natures, too, are not apart from consciousness."

B. Matching the three natures against the various sets of doctrinal categories

6. The three natures gather the three unconditioned

Someone asks: empty space, cessation-through-analysis, and cessation-not-through-analysis — these three unconditioned — into which of the three natures do they fall? The answer: all three natures can gather them (each gathering from a different angle). First, mind and the rest manifesting the semblance of "empty space" and so on, these arise in train with mind, and so belong to the other-dependent. Second, the foolish, upon these, falsely grasp that empty space and so on are really existent, and this belongs to the wholly-imagined. Third, if, with reference to suchness, one nominally establishes the meanings of "empty space" and so on (as cessation-through-analysis is used to display suchness), then this belongs to the perfectly-accomplished. Furthermore, defiled mind and the rest definitely belong to the other-dependent; undefiled mind and the rest, however, may be gathered by both natures, other-dependent and perfectly-accomplished — because, being born from the host of conditions, they are gathered under the other-dependent, and because, being free of inversion, they are gathered under the perfectly-accomplished.

7. The three natures and the seven suchnesses

How do the three natures gather the "seven suchnesses"? First, list the seven suchnesses: (1) the suchness of flowing-on (the real nature of conditioned dharmas as they flow on); (2) the suchness of the real character (the real nature displayed by the two selflessnesses, of self and of dharma); (3) the suchness of consciousness-only (the real nature of defiled and pure dharmas as consciousness-only); (4) the suchness of the established (the real nature of the truth of suffering); (5) the suchness of wrong conduct (the real nature of the truth of origination); (6) the suchness of purity (the real nature of the truth of cessation); (7) the suchness of right conduct (the real nature of the truth of the path). Since these seven are all "real nature," they all belong to the perfectly-accomplished (because they are the objects of the two wisdoms, fundamental and subsequently-attained). However, if gathered "by way of their characteristics," then "flowing-on, the established (suffering), and wrong conduct (origination)" — these three — belong to the "first two natures" (wholly-imagined and other-dependent), because they carry false grasping and defilement; the remaining four (real character, consciousness-only, purity, and right conduct) all belong to the perfectly-accomplished.

8. The three natures and the six dharmas

How do the three natures gather the "six dharmas" (form, feeling, perception, formations, consciousness, and the unconditioned)? Among these six dharmas, every single one is fully endowed with the three natures — because each of these six dharmas at once carries the three layers of meaning: "false grasping" (wholly-imagined), "condition-born" (other-dependent), and "principle" (perfectly-accomplished).

9. The three natures and the five items

How do the three natures gather the "five items" (characteristic, name, discrimination, right wisdom, and suchness)? Here the holy teaching says the "gathering is not fixed," and there are several different ways of dividing it among the schools, listed in order.

Account one: the other-dependent gathers the four items "characteristic, name, discrimination, and right wisdom"; the perfectly-accomplished gathers "suchness"; and the wholly-imagined "does not gather any of the five items." The explanation of this account: defiled mind and mental factors transforming out the semblance of "the signified (the meaning that is expressed)" is called "characteristic"; transforming out the semblance of "the signifier (the words that express)" is established as "name"; the transforming mind and the rest are established as "discrimination"; and undefiled mind and the rest, because they are free of conceptual elaboration, are together named "right wisdom" (no longer dividing signifier from signified) — and these four, being all born from conditions, all belong to the other-dependent.

Account two: the other-dependent gathers "characteristic and discrimination"; the wholly-imagined gathers only "name"; and right wisdom and suchness both belong to the perfectly-accomplished. The explanation of this account: the object-aspect of defiled mind and mental factors is called "characteristic," and the rest is called "discrimination"; the wholly-imagined in itself has no substance at all, so, in order to display its "non-existence," it is tentatively spoken of as "name"; "right wisdom and suchness," being free of inversion, belong to the perfectly-accomplished.

Account three: the other-dependent gathers only "discrimination"; the wholly-imagined gathers "characteristic and name"; and right wisdom and suchness both belong to the perfectly-accomplished. The explanation of this account: the object-aspect, seeing-aspect, and the rest of defiled mind and mental factors are together named "discrimination" (because their very substance is false discrimination); the signifier and signified of the wholly-imagined are the two items "name and characteristic" established in accord with deluded feeling.

Account four: "name" belongs to the other-dependent, and "meaning" belongs to the wholly-imagined. The explanation of this account: the object-aspect, seeing-aspect, and the rest of defiled mind and mental factors become "the imagined" by the force of "name," and so are spoken of as "name"; the wholly-imagined, following the name, is forcibly reckoned and in substance is truly nothing, so a designation of "meaning" is tentatively set up for it.

These several schools' accounts of the five items, though differing in wording, do not conflict in meaning. But one should know that the "first account" (account one) is "without confusion or jumbling" and the most correct and well-formed — this is set out in detail in the Yogācārabhūmi, and one should rely on it for understanding.

10. The three natures and the five characteristics

The holy teaching also speaks of "five characteristics" — how do they gather with the three natures? "The signified and the signifier" each is fully endowed with the three natures: "what is falsely reckoned" belongs to the first nature (wholly-imagined); "characteristic, name, and discrimination," according to what they correspond to, whether functioning as signified or as signifier, all belong to the other-dependent; "suchness and right wisdom," according to what they correspond to, functioning as signified or signifier, all belong to the perfectly-accomplished (because subsequently-attained wisdom can transform out the semblance of a "signifier"). Furthermore, "the characteristic of the two characteristics' mutual belonging" (the characteristic by which signifier and signified are subordinate to one another) belongs only to the first nature (wholly-imagined) — because the falsely-grasped meaning and name are necessarily subordinate to each other. And "the characteristic of grasping" belongs only to the other-dependent (since its substance is false discrimination); "the characteristic of non-grasping" belongs only to the perfectly-accomplished (since its substance is undefiled wisdom and the like).

11. The three natures and the four realities

The holy teaching also speaks of "four realities" (what is established by common consent in the world, what is established by reasoning, the object of the wisdom purified of the affliction-hindrance, and the object of the wisdom purified of the cognitive-hindrance) — how do they gather with the three natures? "What is established by common consent in the world" and "what is established by reasoning," these two realities, belong to the other-dependent (because they are gathered by the three items: characteristic, name, and discrimination); "the objects of the two wisdoms purified of the hindrances," this reality, belongs to the perfectly-accomplished (because it is gathered by the two items: right wisdom and suchness). The Madhyānta-vibhāga, however, has a different account: the first reality (what is established by common consent in the world) belongs only to the first nature — because it is what is commonly grasped in the world; the second reality (what is established by reasoning) belongs to all three natures — because its principle runs through "grasping" and "non-grasping," through defilement and purity; the latter two realities (the objects of the two wisdoms purified of the hindrances) belong only to the third nature (the perfectly-accomplished).

12. The three natures and the four truths

How do the three natures gather the "four truths"? Within the four truths, every single truth is fully endowed with the three natures.

Take the "truth of suffering": its four aspects of "impermanence, suffering, emptiness, and non-self" each has the three natures. First, the three natures of "impermanence": (1) the impermanence of no-nature (the wholly-imagined nature is forever nonexistent, hence "impermanent"); (2) the impermanence of arising-and-ceasing (the other-dependent has arising and ceasing, hence "impermanent"); (3) the impermanence of defilement-and-purity (the perfectly-accomplished turns and is displayed across the defiled and pure positions, hence "impermanent"). Next, the three natures of "suffering": (1) the suffering of what is grasped (the wholly-imagined — what the two graspings of self and dharma lean upon and take); (2) the suffering of the character of events (the other-dependent — fully endowed with the characteristics of the three sufferings); (3) the suffering of conjunction (the perfectly-accomplished — conjoined with the character of suffering and not apart from it). Next, the three natures of "emptiness": (1) the emptiness of no-nature (the wholly-imagined — its nature is non-existent, hence empty); (2) the emptiness of difference-of-nature (the other-dependent — it differs from the falsely-grasped nature, hence said to be empty, that is, empty of the wholly-imagined); (3) the emptiness of own-nature (the perfectly-accomplished — its own-nature is what the two emptinesses display). Next, the three natures of "non-self": (1) the non-self of no-characteristic (the wholly-imagined — the self-characteristic is originally nonexistent); (2) the non-self of difference-of-characteristic (the other-dependent — it differs from the falsely-grasped self-characteristic); (3) the non-self of own-characteristic (the perfectly-accomplished — its own-characteristic is what "non-self displays").

Next, the three natures of the "truth of origination": (1) the origination of perfuming (the wholly-imagined — that is, the perfumings of the wholly-imagined nature's grasping; with reference to "grasping those perfumings," a "origination" is nominally established); (2) the origination of co-arising (the other-dependent — that is, what karma and afflictions co-arise); (3) the origination of the not-yet-unbound (the perfectly-accomplished — that is, the suchness not yet free of the hindrances). Next, the three natures of the "truth of cessation": (1) the cessation of own-nature (the wholly-imagined — its own-nature is originally unborn, hence originally ceased); (2) the cessation of the two graspings (the other-dependent — that is, cessation-through-analysis causing the two graspings not to arise); (3) the cessation of fundamental nature (the perfectly-accomplished — that is, suchness, fundamentally still and ceased). Finally, the three natures of the "truth of the path": (1) the path of full knowing (toward the wholly-imagined — able to fully know the wholly-imagined); (2) the path of forever-severing (toward the other-dependent — able to sever the defiled portion of the other-dependent); (3) the path of bearing-witness (toward the perfectly-accomplished — able to realize the perfectly-accomplished); but the "path of full knowing" also runs through the latter two (it also knows the other-dependent and realizes the perfectly-accomplished).

In this way, the four gateways of "impermanence, suffering, emptiness, and non-self" under the truth of suffering, together with the three truths of origination, cessation, and path, in total these "seven sets of three" natures are all matched and explained in order as above. One should know that the three natures matched here are some of them "nominal" and some "real," and one should understand this as it accords with principle.

13. The three natures and the three gateways to liberation, the three forbearances of non-arising, and the two truths

The realms accessed by the "three gateways to liberation" (emptiness, wishlessness, and signlessness) — how do they gather with the three natures? In point of principle, these three gateways all run through the three natures; if matched "by way of characteristic," then each matches one nature: the gateway of "emptiness" matches the wholly-imagined, the gateway of "wishlessness" matches the other-dependent, the gateway of "signlessness" matches the perfectly-accomplished — to be understood in order. Taking these three natures as object, there arise, further, the "three forbearances of non-arising": (1) the forbearance of non-arising of fundamental nature; (2) the forbearance of non-arising of the spontaneous; (3) the forbearance of non-arising of affliction-and-suffering — and these three forbearances take the three natures as their objects in order (the forbearance of fundamental nature takes the wholly-imagined as object, the forbearance of the spontaneous takes the other-dependent as object, the forbearance of affliction-and-suffering takes the perfectly-accomplished as object).

Then how do these three natures gather the "two truths"? One should know that "conventional truth" is fully endowed with these three kinds (it contains the conventional portion of the wholly-imagined, the other-dependent, and the perfectly-accomplished); "ultimate truth" is only the perfectly-accomplished nature. The conventional is of three kinds: (1) the nominal conventional (that is, the wholly-imagined); (2) the active conventional (that is, the other-dependent); (3) the made-manifest conventional (that is, the perfectly-accomplished, made manifest at the conventional position) — in order, just these three natures. The ultimate too is of three kinds: (1) the ultimate as meaning (that is, suchness — the "meaning" of the "ultimate," the meaning of the supreme dharma); (2) the ultimate as attainment (that is, nirvāṇa — the "ultimate" itself being the "meaning," the supreme that is attained just being the meaning); (3) the ultimate as practice (that is, the holy path — the "ultimate" "made into" meaning, the practice that proceeds toward the supreme). These three, because they are "unchanging and non-inverted," according to what they correspond to, are all gathered into the perfectly-accomplished nature.

14. The three natures and the wisdoms that access them, the nominal and the real, the different and the non-different

Finally, distinguish several properties of the three natures. First the question: which kind of wisdom accesses each of the three natures? The "wholly-imagined" is not at all what "wisdom" accesses (because it has no self-substance and cannot serve as an object-condition); yet the foolish grasp it as existent, and the noble penetrate it as nonexistent, so with some stretching one may say it is the "object" of both ordinary wisdom and noble wisdom. The "other-dependent nature" is accessed by both wisdoms, fundamental and subsequently-attained; the "perfectly-accomplished nature," however, is the object of noble wisdom alone (only non-discriminating wisdom and subsequently-attained wisdom can take it as object).

Next the question: among these three natures, how much is nominal and how much real? The "wholly-imagined," because it is falsely established, may be said to be "nominal"; yet it has no substance or characteristic at all, so in fact it is "neither nominal nor real" (because the "nominal" must be established in reliance on the "real," and the wholly-imagined has no real on which to rely). The "other-dependent nature," on the other hand, has both real and nominal: with reference to natures such as "aggregation, continuity, and positional phase," it is said to be "nominally existent" (nominal dharmas like a jar, like a stream, like a span of time); with reference to "mind, mental factors, and form" being born from conditions, it is said to be "really existent." One should know that if there were no real dharmas, then nominal dharmas too would be gone — because a nominal dharma must be set up in reliance on a real cause. The "perfectly-accomplished nature," however, is purely real — because it is not set up in reliance on other conditions (suchness is established without awaiting conditions).

Finally the question: are these three natures different, or not different? One should say "both not" (neither different nor non-different): because the three natures have no separate substances, one cannot say "different"; and because the three layers of meaning — "false grasping, dependent arising, and the real meaning" — each has its distinction, one cannot say "not different." The kinds of meaning of the three natures are in fact boundless and inexhaustible; here, fearing that too much wording would weary the reader, only the essentials are sketched as above.

Onward Transmission

The three natures — the wholly-imagined, the other-dependent, and the perfectly-accomplished — are the master rubric by which the consciousness-only system sorts out all dharmas, and the meaning of the three natures established in this section is taken up in order by the later treatises. The Hundred Dharmas treatise sets up the eight mind-kings and the various mental factors: the imagining agent is just the defiled sixth and seventh mind and mental factors; the wholly-imagined does not enter into the hundred dharmas at all (present to feeling but absent in reason, it has no substance whatever); and the suchness on which the perfectly-accomplished rests is gathered under the "unconditioned dharmas" — so the three natures exactly draw the hundred dharmas together into one. The Thirty Verses — verse twenty (the wholly-imagined, its own-nature having no existence), verse twenty-one (the other-dependent, and the perfectly-accomplished as forever apart from the previous nature), and verse twenty-two (it and the other-dependent as neither different nor non-different; not that, without seeing this, one sees that) — are the very root-verses this section expounds, verse answering to verse. The Madhyānta-vibhāga, in its chapter on characteristics, sets up the three natures by way of the "object, nature, and twofold emptiness" of "false discrimination" — in reliance on the "object" of false discrimination it speaks of the wholly-imagined, in reliance on the "nature" of false discrimination it speaks of the other-dependent, and in reliance on "the emptiness of grasped and grasper" it speaks of the perfectly-accomplished — which is one and the same road as this section's "the three natures, too, are not apart from consciousness"; the alternative account this section cites when distinguishing the "four realities" likewise comes from the Madhyānta-vibhāga. The Mahāyāna-saṃgraha, in its chapter on the characteristic of the knowable, is the place where the three natures are expounded at length: it says the other-dependent mark is "the various consciousnesses gathered under false discrimination, with the ālaya-vijñāna as their seed," the wholly-imagined mark is "the semblance of meaning appearing where there is no meaning," and the perfectly-accomplished mark is "the perpetual absence, upon that other-dependent mark, of the semblance of meaning" — and this section's line "the imagined is just the other-dependent nature" is set up precisely by citing the Mahāyāna-saṃgraha. As for the Twenty Verses, its concern is to establish consciousness-only and the absence of external objects, and to refute the outsiders' grasping at real external objects; it has no direct counterpart to the matching and judging of the three natures, and here it is left aside.

釋違教·三無性Resolving Objections Contrary to Scripture · The Three Non-Natures

全文五層 →Full five layers →
義疏Exposition

〔所釋之頌〕第二十三頌至第二十四頌

前面立了「三性」(遍計所執、依他起、圓成實),馬上會碰到一個尖銳的問題:既然你立了三種「性」,那世尊為什麼又在別處說『一切法都沒有自性』?這一節就接著三性、回頭講「三無性」,把這看似自相矛盾的兩句話會通起來。順著的是兩首頌(v23–v24)。

『依三性立三無性』並非本論杜撰,經論早有所本。《解深密經·無自性相品》中,世尊親告勝義生菩薩:祂是『依三種無自性性的密意』,才說「一切諸法皆無自性」——這三種就是相無自性性、生無自性性、勝義無自性性。經裡又逐一界說:相無自性性,是就遍計所執相說的,因為它只是「假名安立」而非由自相安立;生無自性性,是就依他起相說的,因為它是『依他緣力而有、非自然有』;勝義無自性性,是就圓成實說的,是「法無我所顯」的那一分真實。經更以『空中之花、幻化之像、周遍的虛空』三個譬喻,分別配這三無性——本論底下「如空華」「如幻事託眾緣生」「如太虛空雖遍眾色而是眾色無性所顯」三喻,一一即本於此經。《瑜伽師地論·攝決擇分》同樣定這三無性是『依所化(所度化的眾生)的根機勢力而說』,並把「三種自性」與「三種無自性性」一一對配,正是『依三性立三無性』的論本。窺基《成唯識論述記》更引《解深密》第七十六卷點出這密意的所以然:佛並不是『另外觀三種自性、立三無性』,而是因為有情在依他、圓成這『確實有體』的二性之上,妄添了一層遍計所執,佛才立三無性來遮這妄添——所以『三無性並不是把後二性也說成沒有,只是說那遍計所執沒有』。本論這一節所釋,經根即在《解深密》,論本即在《瑜伽》——下面順著頌文講開。

甲、釋三無性——先解開『有三性卻說無性』的疑難

有人發難:如果真的實有三性,世尊又怎麼會說「一切法皆無自性」呢?這豈不是自己跟自己打架?

回答是:佛說的「無性」,正是『就著這前面所說的三性』而立起來的——並不是另外撇開三性、憑空說個「無」。具體說,是依這三性,立起後面所說的「三種無性」,也就是『相無性、生無性、勝義無性』。所以佛說『一切法都沒有自性』,是「密意」之說(話裡有隱含的別意),並不是說諸法的性『全然都沒有』。這正是頌文所講的:依這三性,立那三無性,所以佛是密意說一切法無性。

關鍵就在「密意」這兩個字。說它是「密意」,恰恰點明了「一切法無性」這句話並『不是了義』(不是究竟、直截了當的說法,底下藏著要簡別的意思)。為什麼這麼說?因為後面那兩性——依他起與圓成實——它們的「體」並不是沒有;只是有些愚癡的凡夫,在這『並非沒有』的東西上頭「增益」(多添了一層本來沒有的東西),妄執說真有一個實在的「我」、實在的「法」的自性,這妄添上去的部分就叫「遍計所執」。為了除掉這份妄執,佛才在「有」的(依他、圓成這兩種確實有體的)和「無」的(遍計這種本來就沒有的)上頭,籠統地、一句話通通說個「無性」——用一句話把該遮的都遮掉。所以這「無性」是對治語、是密意語,不能死扣字面當成『什麼都沒有』。

乙、三無性逐一安立——一性配一無性

那麼,究竟怎麼依著這三性、各別立起那三種無性?要一個一個對著看。

第一,依「遍計所執」這初性,立「相無性」。 為什麼叫「相無性」?因為遍計所執的東西,它的「體相」根本就徹底沒有——就像空中本沒有花,是病眼妄見的「空華」一樣,全是錯認,連個影子也立不住。這就是頌說的「初即相無性」:頭一個(遍計)對的就是相無性。

第二,依「依他起」這次性,立「生無性」。 依他起的法,是像幻術變出來的事物那樣,仗著種種因緣才生起來的;它並沒有『像凡夫妄執的那種『自然就有、自己本來如此』的性』——它不是自有的,是緣生的。正因為它『不是自然有』,所以才『假借個名』說它「無性」,並不是說它的性『全然都沒有』(它仍有緣生的這一層存在)。這就是頌說的「次無自然性」:第二個(依他)無的是那「自然性」。

第三,依「圓成實」這後性,立「勝義無性」。 這個要小心分辨:所謂圓成實的「勝義無性」,是說這勝義(也就是圓成實本身),因為它『遠離了前面遍計所執的那個我、法之性』,所以才假借個名說它「無性」——同樣不是說它的性全然都沒有。它正是『離了遍計妄執』這一面上得名為「無性」的。這就是頌說的「後由遠離前,所執我法性」:最後一個(圓成)的無性,是就『遠離前面所執的我、法性』而立的。

這裡可以打個比方來體會圓成的勝義無性:好比那廣大的虛空,雖然它周遍含著一切有形的色物,但虛空本身,正是從『眾色之上沒有實在自性』這一點被顯出來的——你正是在『色不實有』的地方,才見到那遍一切處的空。圓成的勝義無性也是如此:是在『遠離了遍計妄執』的地方,才把那真實之性顯出來的。

最後還要補一個簡別,免得讀者誤會範圍:其實依他起,由於它『不是勝義』(它只是緣生的世俗有),就著它『身上並沒有遍計那種妄執之性』這一點,本來也可以勉強說它是「勝義無性」。但要是真這麼說,就會跟『第二個』——也就是依他自己對的那個「生無性」——混淆相濫了。所以這裡不採用這個說法:勝義無性,單單就著圓成實來立,不旁及依他。這樣三性對三無性,才條理分明、各歸其位。

承衍

『依三性立三無性、密意說無性而非性全無』這一節所立,是唯識系會通『立三性』與『說空無性』的關鍵,後出諸論各有承用。《百法明門論》此處從闕——百法所列的是五位百法的「事相」,三無性屬三性之下的「理門」,沒有正面對位之條。《唯識三十論頌》的頌二十三(依三性立三無性、密意說無性)與頌二十四(相、生、勝義三無性逐一安立),正是本節所釋的本頌,逐頌相承。《二十唯識論》主於成立唯識無境、破外人實境之執,於三無性沒有正面對位,這裡從闕。《辯中邊論·辯真實品》立三自性而謂『遍計常非有、依他有而不真、圓成有無真實』,與本節『相無性約遍計、生無性約依他、勝義無性約圓成』三無性逐配相通。《攝大乘論·所知相分》立遍計、依他、圓成三自性,三無性即依此三性而立——所知相一分,正是本節『即依三性立三無性』之所宗。

Once the three natures have been set up — the wholly-imagined nature (parikalpita), the dependent-on-others nature (paratantra), and the perfectly-accomplished nature (pariniṣpanna) — a sharp problem immediately arises. If you have just established three "natures," then why does the World-Honored One elsewhere declare that "all dharmas have no self-nature"? This section follows directly on the three natures and turns back to teach the "three non-natures," reconciling these two statements that look, on their face, to contradict one another. The thread it follows is the pair of verses (v23–v24).

"Establishing the three non-natures in dependence on the three natures" is no invention of this treatise; scripture and treatise alike provide its basis. In the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, in its chapter on the absence of self-nature in characteristics, the World-Honored One tells the bodhisattva Paramārtha-samudgata in person that it is "with a hidden intent directed at three kinds of non-self-nature" that he declares "all dharmas are without self-nature" — these three being the non-nature of characteristics, the non-nature of arising, and the non-nature of ultimate truth. The sūtra then defines each in turn: the non-nature of characteristics is spoken of with respect to the wholly-imagined mark, since it is only "provisionally established as a name" and not established by its own characteristic; the non-nature of arising is spoken of with respect to the dependent-on-others characteristic, since it "exists through the force of conditions and is not naturally existent"; and the non-nature of ultimate truth is spoken of with respect to the perfectly-accomplished, that portion of reality "made manifest by the selflessness of dharmas." The sūtra further pairs the three non-natures with three images — "a flower in the empty air, a conjured reflection, and all-pervading empty space" — and this section's three similes below ("like a sky-flower," "like a conjured thing arising in reliance on the gathering of conditions," and "like vast empty space which, though it pervades the host of forms, is made manifest from the formlessness of those very forms") are each grounded in this sūtra. The Yogācārabhūmi, in its section settling the points to be understood, likewise fixes these three non-natures as "spoken with respect to the capacity and disposition of those to be guided," and pairs the "three kinds of self-nature" one-to-one with the "three kinds of non-self-nature" — which is exactly the treatise-basis for "establishing the three non-natures in dependence on the three natures." Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) goes further, citing the seventy-sixth fascicle of the Saṃdhinirmocana to bring out the reason behind this hidden intent: it is not that the Buddha "separately contemplates three kinds of self-nature and then sets up three non-natures." Rather, because sentient beings, upon the other-dependent and the perfectly-accomplished — the two natures that "genuinely have substance" — falsely add on a layer of the wholly-imagined, the Buddha sets up the three non-natures in order to negate that false addition. So "the three non-natures do not declare the latter two natures to be nonexistent as well; they only declare that the wholly-imagined is without nature." What this section expounds has its scriptural root in the Saṃdhinirmocana and its treatise-basis in the Yogācārabhūmi — and with that we follow the verse and open the exposition.

B. Explaining the Three Non-Natures — First Untying the Difficulty of "Having Three Natures Yet Saying There Is No Nature"

Someone raises an objection: if the three natures really and truly exist, how could the World-Honored One go on to say that "all dharmas are without self-nature"? Is this not the teaching at war with itself?

The answer is this. The "non-nature" the Buddha speaks of is established precisely with reference to these very three natures set out above — it is not some separate "nothingness" conjured up apart from the three natures. Concretely, it is on the basis of these three natures that the three non-natures spoken of afterward are established: namely, the non-nature of characteristics (lakṣaṇa-niḥsvabhāvatā), the non-nature of arising (utpatti-niḥsvabhāvatā), and the non-nature of ultimate truth (paramārtha-niḥsvabhāvatā). So when the Buddha says "all dharmas have no self-nature," this is spoken with a hidden intent — there is an implicit, further meaning carried inside the words — and it is not a claim that the nature of dharmas is utterly absent. This is exactly what the verse states: in dependence on these three natures, those three non-natures are established, and therefore the Buddha, with hidden intent, says that all dharmas have no nature.

Everything turns on those two words, "hidden intent." To call it a teaching of hidden intent is precisely to point out that the statement "all dharmas have no nature" is not the definitive teaching (not the ultimate, direct, fully explicit statement; it conceals a meaning that still needs to be distinguished out). Why say so? Because the latter two natures — the dependent-on-others and the perfectly-accomplished — are not such that their substance is absent. It is only that certain deluded ordinary beings, upon these things that are not in fact absent, "superimpose" something — they add on a layer that was never there — and falsely cling to there being a real "self" and real "dharmas," a genuinely existent self-nature. That falsely added-on portion is exactly what is called the wholly-imagined nature. In order to remove this false clinging, the Buddha makes a single sweeping statement of "no nature" that covers both what is (the other-dependent and the perfectly-accomplished, the two that genuinely have substance) and what is not (the wholly-imagined, which never had any) — with one phrase he negates everything that needs negating. So this "non-nature" is corrective language, language of hidden intent; it cannot be read literally, clamped onto the words, and taken to mean "there is nothing at all."

1. Establishing the Three Non-Natures One by One — One Nature Paired with One Non-Nature

So then, exactly how are those three kinds of non-nature each established in dependence on these three natures? They must be looked at one at a time.

First, in dependence on the wholly-imagined as the initial nature, the non-nature of characteristics is established. Why is it called the non-nature of characteristics? Because the wholly-imagined thing has, in its very "substance and characteristic," no existence whatsoever — just like the sky-flower, where there is in fact no flower in the empty air and the diseased eye merely sees one falsely: it is all misrecognition, and not even a shadow of it can stand. This is what the verse means by "the first is the non-nature of characteristics": the first one (the wholly-imagined) corresponds precisely to the non-nature of characteristics.

Second, in dependence on the dependent-on-others as the next nature, the non-nature of arising is established. A dependent-on-others dharma is like a thing produced by conjuring — it arises only in reliance on the gathering of various causes and conditions. It does not possess "the kind of nature that ordinary beings falsely cling to, that of being naturally existent, self-existent, just so of itself" — it is not self-arisen, but condition-arisen. Precisely because it "is not naturally existent," it is "given a borrowed name" and called "without nature"; this is not to say that its nature is utterly absent (it still retains this layer of existence, that of condition-arising). This is what the verse means by "the next is the non-nature of the natural": the second one (the other-dependent) lacks that "natural nature."

Third, in dependence on the perfectly-accomplished as the later nature, the non-nature of ultimate truth is established. This one requires careful distinguishing. The so-called "non-nature of ultimate truth" of the perfectly-accomplished means that this ultimate (which is the perfectly-accomplished itself), because it is "far removed from the self-and-dharma nature of the wholly-imagined spoken of before," is for that reason given a borrowed name and called "without nature" — likewise not a claim that its nature is utterly absent. It is precisely on the side of "being parted from the wholly-imagined false clinging" that it earns the name "non-nature." This is what the verse means by "the last, through being far removed from the self-and-dharma nature clung to before": the non-nature of the final one (the perfectly-accomplished) is established with reference to its "being far removed from the self-and-dharma nature clung to before."

Here a comparison can help one feel out the ultimate-truth non-nature of the perfectly-accomplished. It is like vast empty space: although it pervades and contains within it every shaped and material thing, empty space itself is made manifest precisely from this point — that "upon the host of forms there is no real self-nature." It is exactly at the place where "form is not really existent" that you come to see that space which pervades all places. The ultimate-truth non-nature of the perfectly-accomplished is just so: it is at the place where one "is far removed from the wholly-imagined false clinging" that the true nature is made manifest.

Finally, one further distinction must be added, lest the reader misunderstand the scope. In fact the dependent-on-others, since it "is not the ultimate" (it is merely the condition-arisen conventional existent), could — with reference to the point that "upon it there is no imagined-clinging nature" — even be said, with some stretching, to be "ultimate-truth non-nature" as well. But if one really spoke this way, it would become confused and conflated with "the second one" — that is, with the non-nature of arising that the other-dependent itself already corresponds to. So this manner of speaking is not adopted here: the non-nature of ultimate truth is established with reference to the perfectly-accomplished alone, and does not reach over to the other-dependent. Only in this way do the three natures match the three non-natures with clear order, each returning to its own proper place.

Onward Transmission

What this section establishes — that the three non-natures are set up in dependence on the three natures, and that "no nature" is spoken with hidden intent and is not a claim that nature is utterly absent — is the keystone by which the consciousness-only system reconciles "establishing the three natures" with "teaching emptiness and non-nature," and the later treatises take it up each in their own way. The Hundred Dharmas treatise is left aside here: what it lists is the "phenomenal characteristics" of the hundred dharmas across the five categories, whereas the three non-natures belong to the "doctrinal gate of principle" under the three natures, and there is no head-on corresponding entry. The Thirty Verses — verse twenty-three (establishing the three non-natures in dependence on the three natures, and teaching non-nature with hidden intent) and verse twenty-four (the one-by-one setting-up of the non-natures of characteristics, of arising, and of ultimate truth) — is the very root-text this section expounds, verse answering to verse. The Twenty Verses, whose concern is to establish consciousness-only-without-objects and to refute the outsiders' clinging to real objects, has no head-on counterpart for the three non-natures, and so is left aside here. The Madhyānta-vibhāga, in its chapter on discerning the real, sets up the three self-natures and holds that "the wholly-imagined is ever nonexistent, the other-dependent exists yet is not real, and the perfectly-accomplished is the real that is both existent and nonexistent" — converging with this section's one-to-one pairing, where the non-nature of characteristics is referred to the wholly-imagined, the non-nature of arising to the other-dependent, and the non-nature of ultimate truth to the perfectly-accomplished. The Mahāyāna-saṃgraha, in its chapter on the characteristics of the knowable, sets up the three self-natures — the wholly-imagined, the other-dependent, and the perfectly-accomplished — and the three non-natures are established precisely in dependence on these three natures; that portion on the characteristics of the knowable is exactly what this section's "establishing the three non-natures in dependence on the three natures" takes as its source.

唯識性·真如The True Nature of Consciousness-Only · Suchness

全文五層 →Full five layers →
義疏Exposition

〔所釋之頌〕第二十五頌

前面一路講「唯識相」,到了第二十五頌,要講的是「唯識性」——也就是這一切唯識所現的法,它們最究竟、最真實的那個底子是什麼。這一頌的前三句說『這一切法的勝義,也就是真如,因為它恒常如其本性』,第四句說『這也就是唯識的真實性』。下面順著頌文,分三段講:先釋前三句(勝義、真如),再釋第四句(唯識實性),最後把第二十三到二十五這三頌的總意收攏起來。

這一頌所說的『勝義·真如』,經論早有所本。《解深密經·勝義諦相品》說「勝義是諸聖者內自所證」、「超過一切尋思境相」——尋思分別所行的,只是異生輾轉相傳的境,而勝義離言離分別,唯聖者親證,這正是頌「諸法勝義」的經本;又說「勝義諦是遍一切一味相」——真如於一切蘊、處乃至道支中無別異、無變異,這正是頌「常如其性」的經本。到《瑜伽師地論·真實義品》,更立「四種真實」(世間所成·道理所成·煩惱障淨智所行·所知障淨智所行),而以最後一種「所知障淨智所行真實」攝最究竟者——那是諸佛菩薩入法無我、無分別智所緣的「一切法離言自性」,是「最第一、真如無上、所知邊際」,一切正法思擇到此都退還、越度不過。本論這一頌所釋,經根即在《解深密》勝義諦相品,論本即在《瑜伽》真實義品——下面順著頌文講開。

甲、明唯識性(釋第二十五頌「唯識真性」)

這一科總名「明唯識性」,正是要點出:前面所說圓成實的那個性,就是這裡要講的「唯識真性」。下面分節細講。

乙、釋初三句——「此諸法勝義,亦即是真如,常如其性故」

(一)這個性就是『諸法的勝義』——而「勝義」其實有四個層次

先講頌的第一句「此諸法勝義」。這裡說的「此性」,就是前面講的圓成實性、也就是真如;它就是『一切法的勝義』,因為它是一切法的勝義諦。

不過要把話說清楚:「勝義諦」並不是只有一個意思,粗分有四個層次。第一是「世間勝義」——指蘊、處、界這些法;它們雖然還在世間,但比起一般世俗事相已經算是「勝」(比凡夫所執的粗淺事相要深一層),所以叫世間勝義。第二是「道理勝義」——指苦、集、滅、道這四聖諦;這是依正理觀察所顯的義。第三是「證得勝義」——指由我空、法空二空所顯的真如;這是聖者親證所得。第四是「勝義勝義」——指那個唯一真實的法界(一真法界);這是勝義裡頭最勝的勝義。

(二)這一頌的「勝義」,是專指最後那一層

那麼這一頌講「此諸法勝義」,是指上面四個裡的哪一個?答案是專指最後一個——「勝義勝義」,也就是一真法界。為什麼單取它?因為它是『最殊勝的(無分別)道』所行的境界;為了把前三種勝義簡別開、不讓人誤會成那較淺的三層,所以特別這樣標舉「此諸法勝義」,指的就是最究竟的那一層。

(三)這個勝義就是「真如」——「真」與「如」兩個字怎麼講

頌接著說「亦即是真如」:這個諸法勝義,也就是「真如」。「真如」這兩個字要分開講。「真」是「真實」的意思,用來顯示它不是虛妄的(不是顛倒、不是假相)。「如」是「如常」的意思,用來表示它沒有變易(不會這樣那樣地改換)。合起來說,就是:這個真實的性,在一切位(無論凡位聖位、迷時悟時)都『恒常如其本性』——這正對應頌的最後一句「常如其性故」。因為它如此恒常不變、真實不虛,所以名為「真如」,意思就是『湛然安住、不虛妄』。

窺基《述記》把「真」「如」這兩個字再細分作兩重揀別,使它的簡別更見分明。第一重就「有漏、無漏」說:「真」是要簡去有漏法(有漏是虛妄的)、「如」是要簡去無漏的有為法(這類法體性雖真,卻仍有生滅、不是如常不變)——兩字一夾,唯有那無漏無為、真而且如的真如才當得起。第二重就「三性」說:「真」是要簡去遍計所執(那是妄執出來的)、「如」是要簡去依他起(那是有生滅的)——前面三句之所以要加個「亦」字(亦即是真如),正因為前三性(或前三種勝義)都還「非如」,唯第四這一層才既真且如。窺基又順帶點明:本頌只舉了「真如」「唯識實性」兩個名,加上論主釋文,也才四個稱號,所以「等」字是要等取其餘的諸多別名(如《大般若》《對法》等別處所列的種種名目),都在『隨各自的義理而廣作解釋』。

(四)頌裡一個「亦」字——點出它還有許多別名

頌說「亦即是真如」,這個「亦」字不是閒字,它在提示:這同一個性,除了叫真如,還有好多別的名字。比方也叫「法界」、也叫「實際」等等。這些名字在別的論裡,會隨著各自要強調的義理而有詳細的解釋;這裡只點到為止,讓人知道「真如」並不是孤零零一個稱呼,而是同一實性的眾多名目之一。

丙、釋第四句——「即唯識實性」

(一)為什麼要說「實性」——因為「唯識性」裡有虛有實

頌的第四句說「即唯識實性」:這個性,就是『唯識的真實性』。這裡要小心一個分別:「唯識性」這個詞本身,其實含著兩種,一虛一實。第一種是「虛妄」的唯識性——就是遍計所執;連「唯識」這個道理,若被人用顛倒妄計的方式去執取,那也成了虛妄(執著「唯識」本身,仍是一種妄)。第二種是「真實」的唯識性——就是圓成實性。頌特地加一個「實」字、說「實性」,正是為了把那「虛妄」的一邊簡別出去,只取真實的這一邊。

(二)還有另一重虛實——世俗的依他,與勝義的圓成

「唯識性」還可以從另一個角度分成兩種。第一種是「世俗」的唯識性——就是依他起;它是依緣而有的有為法,屬世俗諦這一層。第二種是「勝義」的唯識性——就是圓成實;它是勝義諦這一層。頌說「實性」,在這個角度上,是為了把「世俗」(依他)那一邊也簡別出去,顯示這裡所取的「唯識實性」,唯獨是那勝義的圓成實,而不是依他。換句話說,「實性」這兩個字,前面簡掉了遍計所執的「虛妄」,這裡又簡掉了依他起的「世俗」,最後落定在圓成實這個唯一的真實上。

丁、總釋——第二十三到二十五這三頌合起來在說什麼

最後把前面三頌(第二十三、二十四、二十五)合起來看,它們共同要表達一個重點:佛經裡有些地方說「一切法無自性」,這種「無性」的話,並不是最究竟、最了義的說法,而是有密意的權說。所以真正有智慧的人,不應該抓著這幾句「無性」的話,就一概地否定(總撥)一切法、認定它們全都沒有自性。要知道:依他起、圓成實這兩種的性,其實並不是無。

承衍

本節所立『圓成實·真如·唯識實性』這一勝義底子,是整個唯識系安立「真實性」的歸結處,後出諸論逐一承用。《百法明門論》把真如收在『六無為』之中,作為圓成實所攝、一切法所依的那個真實底子。《唯識三十論頌》的頌二十五(明唯識性·真如·唯識實性),正是本節所釋的本頌,逐頌相承;它上承頌二十到二十四(三性·三無性)而來,把前面所辯的圓成實坐實為諸法勝義。《辯中邊論·辯真實品》辯「圓成實」時說『勝義諦亦三種,一義勝義,謂真如是勝智之境,名勝義故』,又說「此三勝義應知但依三根本中圓成實立」、「無為總攝真如涅槃,無變異故,名圓成實」——與本節四勝義、真如無變異的義理正相發明。《攝大乘論》於「彼入因果分」「彼修差別分」廣辯圓成實(淨分依他、轉依所顯的真實),即是本節這一勝義底子的展開。至於《二十唯識論》,主於成立唯識無境、破外人實境之執,於圓成實·真如·勝義無性沒有正面對位,這裡從闕。

Up to this point the treatise has been laying out, step by step, what it calls the "appearance" of consciousness-only — how everything we experience is nothing but a presentation of consciousness. With the twenty-fifth verse the subject changes. Now the question is the "nature" of consciousness-only: of all these things that consciousness presents, what is their most ultimate, most real ground? The first three lines of this verse say, "The supreme sense of all these things — this is precisely Suchness, because it is constant, always just as its own nature is." The fourth line says, "And this is exactly the true reality of consciousness-only." Following the verse, we will explain it in three parts: first the first three lines (the supreme sense, and Suchness), then the fourth line (the true reality of consciousness-only), and finally we will draw together the combined intent of the three verses, the twenty-third through the twenty-fifth.

The "supreme sense" and "Suchness" spoken of in this verse have their roots in scripture and treatise alike. The Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, in its chapter on the character of the supreme-sense truth, says that "the supreme sense is what the noble ones realize inwardly for themselves" and that it "surpasses every domain of investigative thought" — for what investigation and discrimination range over is only the realm handed down in turn among ordinary beings, whereas the supreme sense is apart from words and apart from discrimination, realized in person by the noble ones alone; and this is the scriptural source of the verse's phrase "the supreme sense of all things." The same chapter says the supreme-sense truth "is of a single flavor, pervading all things" — Suchness is without difference and without alteration in all the aggregates, the sense-fields, and even the limbs of the path; and this is the scriptural source of the verse's phrase "constant, always just as its own nature is." The Yogācārabhūmi, in its chapter on the meaning of reality, goes further and sets up "four kinds of reality" (that established by the world, that established by reasoning, that ranged over by the wisdom purified of the afflictive obstruction, and that ranged over by the wisdom purified of the cognitive obstruction); and it gathers the most ultimate under the last of these, "the reality ranged over by the wisdom purified of the cognitive obstruction" — namely the "inexpressible own-nature of all things" that is the object of the buddhas' and bodhisattvas' non-discriminating wisdom upon entering the selflessness of phenomena, which is "the supreme, the unsurpassed Suchness, the very limit of the knowable," beyond which all right investigation turns back and cannot cross. What this verse expounds has its scriptural root in the chapter on the character of the supreme-sense truth in the Saṃdhinirmocana, and its treatise-basis in the chapter on the meaning of reality in the Yogācārabhūmi — and with that we follow the verse and open the exposition.

C. Clarifying the Nature of Consciousness-Only (commentary on the twenty-fifth verse, "the true nature of consciousness-only")

This section as a whole is titled "Clarifying the Nature of consciousness-only," and its very point is to bring out one thing: the nature spoken of earlier as the perfectly-accomplished nature is exactly the "true nature of consciousness-only" to be explained here. Below it is taken up in detail, point by point.

1. Commentary on the First Three Lines — "The supreme sense of all these things is precisely Suchness, because it is constant, always just as its own nature is"

(i) This nature is "the supreme sense of all things" — and "the supreme sense" in fact has four levels

Begin with the verse's first line, "the supreme sense of all these things." The "this nature" spoken of here is the perfectly-accomplished nature discussed earlier, which is the same as Suchness; and it is "the supreme sense of all things," because it is the supreme-sense truth of everything that exists.

But the point must be stated precisely: "the supreme-sense truth" does not carry only a single meaning. Broadly divided, it has four levels. The first is the worldly supreme sense — this refers to such things as the aggregates, the sense-fields, and the elements. Although these still belong to the world, compared with ordinary worldly appearances they already count as "supreme" — they go one layer deeper than the coarse, surface phenomena that ordinary beings grasp at — and so they are called the worldly supreme sense. The second is the reasoned supreme sense — this refers to the four noble truths: suffering, its origin, its cessation, and the path. This is the meaning disclosed when one investigates by correct reasoning. The third is the realized supreme sense — this refers to the Suchness disclosed through the two emptinesses, the emptiness of self and the emptiness of phenomena. This is what the noble ones obtain by direct realization. The fourth is the supreme of the supreme sense — this refers to the one truly real dharma-realm, the single true dharma-realm. This is, among all the supreme senses, the most supreme supreme sense.

(ii) The "supreme sense" of this verse points specifically to that last level

So when this verse says "the supreme sense of all these things," which of the four above does it intend? The answer is that it intends specifically the last one — the supreme of the supreme sense, that is, the one true dharma-realm. Why is this one alone selected? Because it is the domain ranged over by the most excellent path, the path of non-discrimination. Precisely in order to set apart the first three kinds of supreme sense, and to keep anyone from mistaking the meaning as one of those shallower three layers, the verse deliberately marks it out this way as "the supreme sense of all these things" — pointing to that most ultimate level.

(iii) This supreme sense is "Suchness" — how to read the two words "true" and "so"

The verse goes on, "this is precisely Suchness": this supreme sense of all things is the same as "Suchness." The two words that make up the term must be read separately. "True" means real, and is used to show that it is not false — not inverted, not a mere semblance. "So" means constantly so, and is used to express that it has no alteration — it does not shift about, becoming this way and that. Put together, the meaning is: this real nature, in every state — whether the ordinary state or the noble state, the time of delusion or the time of awakening — is "constant, always just as its own nature is." This corresponds exactly to the verse's last line, "because it is constant, always just as its own nature is." Because it is in this way constant and unchanging, real and not false, it is named "Suchness," meaning "abiding clear and serene, not false."

Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) divides these two words "true" and "so" into two further pairs of distinctions, so that what each sets apart stands out the more plainly. The first pair works in terms of the contaminated and the uncontaminated: "true" sets aside the contaminated dharmas (the contaminated being false), and "so" sets aside the uncontaminated conditioned dharmas (these, though true in their essence, still undergo arising and ceasing and so are not constantly so) — with the two words clamping in from either side, only that which is uncontaminated and unconditioned, both true and so, answers to the name. The second pair works in terms of the three natures: "true" sets aside the wholly-imagined (which is grasped by false imagining), and "so" sets aside the other-dependent (which is subject to arising and ceasing) — and the reason the first three lines add the word "also" ("this is also precisely Suchness") is just that the prior three natures (or the prior three kinds of supreme sense) are all still "not so," and only this fourth level is both true and so. Kuiji further notes in passing that this verse raises only the two names "Suchness" and "the true reality of consciousness-only," and that, counting in the commentary of the treatise-author, there are in all but four titles; hence the word "and the rest" is meant to gather in the remaining many other names (such as the various titles listed elsewhere, in the Mahā-prajñāpāramitā and the Abhidharma texts), each of which "receives its fuller explanation according to its own particular doctrinal point."

(iv) The single word "also" in the verse — pointing to its many other names

The verse says "this is also precisely Suchness," and that word "also" is no idle word. It is hinting that this one and the same nature, besides being called Suchness, has many other names as well. For instance it is also called the "dharma-realm," also called the "true limit," and so on. In other treatises these names receive detailed explanation, each according to the particular doctrinal point it is meant to emphasize; here it is only touched upon in passing, so that one knows "Suchness" is not some single, isolated designation, but one among the many titles of one and the same real nature.

2. Commentary on the Fourth Line — "And this is exactly the true reality of consciousness-only"

(i) Why it must say "true reality" — because within "the nature of consciousness-only" there is the false and the real

The fourth line of the verse says "and this is exactly the true reality of consciousness-only": this nature is exactly the true reality of consciousness-only. Here one distinction must be watched carefully: the very term "the nature of consciousness-only" in fact contains two kinds, one false and one real. The first kind is the false nature of consciousness-only — that is, the wholly-imagined nature. Even the very doctrine of "consciousness-only," if a person grasps at it by way of inverted false imagining, becomes itself false (to cling to "consciousness-only" itself is still a form of delusion). The second kind is the real nature of consciousness-only — that is, the perfectly-accomplished nature. The verse deliberately adds the word "true" and says "true reality" precisely in order to set apart that "false" side, and to take only the real side.

(ii) There is yet a second layer of false-and-real — the worldly other-dependent, and the supreme perfectly-accomplished

"The nature of consciousness-only" can also be divided into two kinds from another angle. The first kind is the worldly nature of consciousness-only — that is, the other-dependent nature; it is a conditioned thing that exists in dependence on conditions, and it belongs to the level of conventional truth. The second kind is the supreme nature of consciousness-only — that is, the perfectly-accomplished nature; it belongs to the level of supreme-sense truth. When the verse says "true reality," on this angle the purpose is to set apart that "worldly" side (the other-dependent) as well, showing that the "true reality of consciousness-only" taken here is solely that supreme-sense perfectly-accomplished nature, and not the other-dependent. In other words, the two words "true reality" first set aside the "falseness" of the wholly-imagined, and here again set aside the "worldliness" of the other-dependent, finally coming to rest on the perfectly-accomplished nature as the one and only reality.

3. The Combined Commentary — what the three verses, the twenty-third through the twenty-fifth, are saying when taken together

Finally, taking the three preceding verses (the twenty-third, twenty-fourth, and twenty-fifth) together, they share one central point they mean to convey: in some places the Buddha's scriptures say "all things are without self-nature," but this kind of "without-nature" speech is not the most ultimate, most fully explicit teaching — it is an expedient utterance carrying a hidden intent. Therefore a person of genuine wisdom should not seize on these few lines about "without-nature" and, on that basis, sweepingly deny all things, concluding that they are utterly without any self-nature. One must understand: the two natures, the other-dependent and the perfectly-accomplished, are in fact not nonexistent.

Onward Transmission

The supreme-sense ground established in this section — the perfectly-accomplished, Suchness, the true reality of consciousness-only — is the resting-point at which the whole consciousness-only system gathers up its account of "true reality," and the later treatises take it up one by one. The Hundred Dharmas treatise places Suchness among the "six unconditioned dharmas," as the real ground that the perfectly-accomplished comprehends and that all things rest upon. The Thirty Verses — verse twenty-five (clarifying the nature of consciousness-only: Suchness, the true reality of consciousness-only) — is the very root-text this section expounds, verse answering to verse; coming after verses twenty through twenty-four (the three natures and the three non-natures), it sets the perfectly-accomplished, argued out earlier, firmly down as the supreme sense of all things. The Madhyānta-vibhāga, in its chapter on reality, when it argues the "perfectly-accomplished," says that "the supreme-sense truth is likewise of three kinds — the first being the supreme sense as meaning, namely Suchness, which is named supreme sense because it is the object of supreme wisdom," and again that "these three supreme senses are to be known as established solely upon the perfectly-accomplished among the three roots," and that "the unconditioned comprises in all Suchness and nirvāṇa, and because it is without alteration it is named the perfectly-accomplished" — which precisely illumines this section's four supreme senses and the changelessness of Suchness. The Mahāyāna-saṃgraha, in its chapters on the cause-and-fruit of that entry and on the distinctions of that cultivation, argues the perfectly-accomplished at length (the pure-portion other-dependent, the reality disclosed in the transformation of the basis) — which is just the unfolding of the supreme-sense ground of this section. As for the Twenty Verses, its concern is to establish that consciousness is without external objects and to refute the outsiders' clinging to real objects, and it has no direct counterpart to the perfectly-accomplished, Suchness, and the supreme-sense non-nature; here it is left aside.

Translator · 釋慧鏡 Shi Huijing — with AI-assisted consistency checking

License · CC BY-NC-SA 4.0