成唯識論 義疏通講 · 冊1

序分·唯識總標 · 1 單元 · 第 16 冊 · 冊目次

序分·唯識總標Preface · The General Statement of Consciousness-Only

全文五層 →Full five layers →
義疏Exposition

〔所釋之頌〕第一頌至第二頌

這是全論的起點。世親菩薩把唯識的綱要寫成三十首頌,玄奘大師再糅集印度十位大論師的解釋來疏通它——這一節,先依規矩向佛菩薩致敬、說明為什麼要造這部論,然後用一首頌,把全書的宗旨一口氣立起來。

這『我法但假、識變似境』的宗旨,本不是論主自立,經論早有所本。《解深密經·分別瑜伽品》明說所緣的影像「唯是識」,世尊更直言「我說識所緣,唯識所現」,又說「此中無有少法能見少法;然即此心如是生時,即有如是影像顯現」——所緣的境只是識自己變現出來的影像,識外並沒有另一個實境,這正是頌一「彼依識所變」、內識變似外境的經根。《楞伽經》則從另一面立:要善能分別自心所現,便當這樣觀「三界唯心」,從而「離我我所」——三界唯是一心、我和法本來空無,這正是頌一『我法但假』的經根。到了《瑜伽師地論·攝決擇分》,又把《解深密》『識所緣唯識所現、心不見心』這一段錄為論本定說,坐實了唯識所現之義。本論這一節所釋,經根即在《解深密》《楞伽》,論本即在《瑜伽》——下面順著頌文講開。

歸敬,與造論的三重用心

論一開頭,先「稽首」禮敬兩樣:一是「唯識性」——也就是識的真實本性(即圓成實、真如);二是證得這真實性而清淨的人——圓滿清淨的,是佛;分證清淨的,是諸位菩薩。禮敬之後,作者表明:我如今解釋世親所說的這些頌,是為了利樂一切眾生。窺基《述記》把這「唯識性」開為兩種來讀:一是「虛妄」的唯識性,即遍計所執,那是要「遣」掉而後清淨的;二是「真實」的唯識性,即圓成實,那是要「證」得而後清淨的——前者所遣淨、後者所證淨,一遣一證,「清淨」二字才落實。他又分判所敬的兩種人:如來智周德圓、窮盡真如之性,所以稱「滿淨者」;諸位菩薩只分證唯識真如,覺照還未圓明,所以稱「分淨者」。又,全論的釋文,窺基判作三大分:起首歸敬頌連同隨後的長行,是「宗前敬敘分」;從「云何世間及諸聖教」以下正釋本文,是「依教廣成分」;到「此論三分成立唯識」以下,是「釋結施願分」——而這歸敬頌本身,上兩句歸敬福田、下兩句敘明釋論之意。

那麼,為什麼要造這部論?論主把用心攤開成三層。

最深的一層,是為了「斷障、得果」。有些人對「二空」(我空、法空)迷惑誤解,造論先要讓他們生起正解;之所以要他們生正解,是為了斷除『兩重障』——我執與法執一起,便牽出煩惱障與所知障;一旦證得二空,這兩重障就跟著斷。而之所以要斷障,是為了證得兩種殊勝的果:斷了那不斷招感後有的煩惱障,得「真解脫」;斷了那障礙智慧的所知障,得「大菩提」(無上正覺)。

第二層,是要為那些誤執我、法、迷於唯識的人開示,使他們通達二空、對唯識的道理如實了知。

第三層,是要破掉幾種對「唯識」本身的誤解。有人執『外境像識一樣是實有的』,有人反過來執『內識像外境一樣其實沒有』,有人執『諸識作用雖別、體性卻是同一個』,還有人執『離開心王、別無心所』。為了遮遣這幾種偏執,讓人在唯識的深妙義理中得到如實的正解,所以造這部論。

這三層用心怎麼分判,窺基《述記》說長行「文勢有三」,並把它繫到印度三系論師的讀法上:安慧等一系,意在顯明論主為令人生解、斷障、得果而造論(即第一層);火辨等一系,意在顯明論主為令人通達二空、悟唯識性而造論(即第二層);護法等一系,意在顯明論主為破諸邪執、顯唯識理而造論(即第三層)。窺基並指出,這三系雖各標一義,總歸不出『為人、為法』兩重用意——三義雖別,造論之意不二。

一個提問,一首頌的回答

接著,論主先設一個問難,替讀者問出口:如果一切「唯有識」、識外無實境,那世間的言談、乃至佛的聖教,為什麼都說『有我、有法』?

回答,就是那首總綱頌:「我」和「法」,都只是假說而立的名言,依著這假說,才有種種差別的相轉現出來;而這一切相,全是依「識所變」而起的;至於能變現的識,總共只有三類——異熟識(第八阿賴耶)、思量識(第七末那)、了別境識(前六識)。

「我」「法」,只是兩個假名

論主細解這首頌。先說『我、法只是假立、並非實有』:所謂「我」,是指能主宰的東西;所謂「法」,是指能保持自己的相、可作軌則的東西。這兩者都有種種相在轉現——說「我」的種種相,像世俗講的「有情」「命者」,乃至聖教裡的「預流」「一來」等果位名目;說「法」的種種相,像外道計的「實、德、業」,乃至聖教講的「蘊、處、界」。而所謂「轉」,是說這些相隨緣施設、並不固定(不是死守著一個相)。

這些相,靠什麼立起來?——靠識的變現

那麼這些『我相、法相』既都是假說,又依什麼才立得起來?論主答:全依『識的轉變』假施設而成。這裡的「識」,本義是「了別」;而且這個「識」字也兼攝心所——因為心所一定和心王相應、形影不離。所謂「變」,是說識體會轉現出彷彿有「兩分」:一分是所緣的「相分」,一分是能緣的「見分」;這兩分都依著更底層的「自證分」而生起。於是,就著「見分」施設出「我」、就著「相分」施設出「法」——離了這兩分,我和法便無處安立。

內識,為什麼看起來像『外面的東西』

再進一層:內識會轉現得『好像有外境』。由於我執、法執的分別熏習(種子)之力,諸識一生起,就變現出似我、似法的相;這些相明明在內識之中,卻因分別的力量而現得像是『外面的境』。眾生無始以來就緣著這內識所變的似相,把它執成「實我、實法」——就像生病或作夢的人,由病、夢之力,心裡浮現種種外境之相,便當真以為外頭實有那些東西。

「假」的兩個意思

要注意,這裡說「假」,有兩層不同的分量。愚夫所計度的那個「實我、實法」,根本全無所有,只是隨虛妄情執硬安上去的——這是「無體隨情」的假。而內識所變現的「似我、似法」呢?它作為依他起的現象是「有」的,只是它並不真有『我、法的自性』,只是現得像我、像法罷了——這是「有體施設」的假。同一個「假」字,兩邊並不一樣。

不增也不減:所以說它「世俗有」,也「勝義有」

最後,論主用這套道理,恰好擋掉兩種偏執。外境是隨妄情施設的,所以『不是實有』——不像內識那樣真實(這就遮掉了「增益執」,不把外境執成實有);而內識是依因緣而生的,所以『不是沒有』——不像外境那樣本無(這就遮掉了「損減執」,不把識也撥成無)。一遮增、一遮減,兩頭的偏執都落空。

於是還可以這樣分判:外境是依內識而假立的,所以它只是「世俗有」(俗諦裡有);而內識是那假境所依託的事體,所以它『也是勝義有』(真諦裡也有)。立穩了這個分際,全論的地基就有了——底下三能變的展開,都從這裡長出來。

承衍

這一節立起的『我法但假、識變似境、能變唯三』這個總綱,是整個唯識系的地基,後出諸論都從這裡接著往下講。《百法明門論》把這「能變唯三」攤開為八識心法——異熟識是第八、思量識是第七、了別境識是前六,序分「能變唯三」即是百法心法的總綱。《唯識三十論頌》的頌一,正是本節所釋的本頌,是全論發端的那首略標頌,逐頌相承。《二十唯識論》則從正面立宗:「安立大乘三界唯識,以契經說三界唯心……內識生時似外境現」,專就『唯識無境、破外境實有』這一路廣辯,恰與序分『外境非有如識、內識變似外境』一義相發。《辯中邊論·辯相品》立「虛妄分別」、辯能取所取俱空與三性,序分『遮增減二執、二諦並立』正是它二空、三性的地基。《攝大乘論·所知依分》廣明識變、依他、唯識無境,是序分『識變似境』一義的廣辯本。至於本論自身,序分「能變唯三」只是總標,底下初能變阿賴耶識章(辯三相、種子)、第二能變末那章(辯體相、四煩惱)、第三能變了境章(辯前六識)各廣辯一變,都從這序分長出。

This is where the whole treatise begins. The bodhisattva Vasubandhu compressed the essentials of consciousness-only into thirty verses, and the master Xuanzang then wove together the explanations of ten great Indian commentators to open them out. This section first pays homage, as custom requires, to the Buddhas and bodhisattvas, states why such a treatise must be composed at all, and then, in a single verse, raises up the thesis of the entire book in one breath.

This thesis — that "self and phenomena are merely borrowed, and consciousness transforms so as to resemble objects" — is not something the author set up on his own; scripture and treatise furnished its ground long before. The Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, in its chapter on the analysis of yoga, states plainly that the image which is the object "is consciousness only," and the World-Honored One says outright, "I declare that the object of consciousness is nothing but what consciousness manifests"; he further says, "herein there is no slight dharma that apprehends any slight dharma; yet when this mind arises in such a way, just such an image appears within it" — the object-realm is only an image that consciousness itself transforms forth, and outside consciousness there is no second, real realm. This is the scriptural root of the first verse's "they rest upon the transforming of consciousness," of inner consciousness transforming so as to resemble an outer object. The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra establishes the same point from the other side: being well able to discern what one's own mind manifests, one should contemplate that "the three realms are mind only," and thereby "leave behind self and what belongs to self" — the three realms being nothing but a single mind, self and phenomena empty from the start; this is the scriptural root of the first verse's "self and phenomena are merely borrowed." And the Yogācārabhūmi, in its section on ascertaining the meaning, records that very passage of the Saṃdhinirmocana — "the object of consciousness is only what consciousness manifests; mind does not see mind" — as the treatise's settled position, fixing firmly the sense that all is what consciousness manifests. What this section expounds has its scriptural root in the Saṃdhinirmocana and the Laṅkāvatāra, and its treatise-basis in the Yogācārabhūmi — and with that we follow the verse and open the exposition.

Homage, and the Threefold Intent Behind the Composition

The treatise opens by "bowing the head" in reverence to two things. The first is the true nature of consciousness — the real, abiding nature of consciousness itself (that is, the perfectly-accomplished nature, suchness). The second is those persons who, having realized that true nature, have become pure: perfectly and completely pure, that is the Buddha; partially pure, those are the bodhisattvas. Having paid this homage, the author declares his purpose: that in now explaining these verses spoken by Vasubandhu, he acts for the benefit and ease of all sentient beings.

Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) opens out this "true nature of consciousness" into two senses to be read together: one is the deluded nature of consciousness, the wholly-imagined nature, which is to be dispelled and so made pure; the other is the real nature of consciousness, the perfectly-accomplished nature, which is to be realized and so made pure — the former pure by what is dispelled, the latter pure by what is realized; with this one dispelling and one realizing, the word "pure" is given its concrete sense. Kuiji further marks off the two kinds of person to whom homage is paid: the Tathāgata, whose wisdom is all-pervading and whose virtue is complete, exhausting the nature of suchness, is therefore called the fully pure one; the bodhisattvas, who realize the suchness of consciousness-only only in part, their illumination not yet perfectly clear, are therefore called the partially pure ones. He also divides the whole of the treatise's exposition into three great parts: the opening homage-verse together with the prose that follows it is "the part of homage and statement before the main body"; from "How are the world and the various sacred teachings..." onward, where the text is properly expounded, is "the part of broad accomplishment in dependence on the teaching"; and from "this treatise establishes consciousness-only in three parts" onward is "the part of concluding interpretation and the dedication of merit" — while the homage-verse itself, in its first two lines, pays homage to the field of merit, and in its latter two lines states the intent of composing the commentary.

So why compose this treatise? The author lays his intent open in three layers.

The deepest layer is for the sake of severing the hindrances and attaining the fruits. Some people are confused and mistaken about the two emptinesses — the emptiness of self and the emptiness of phenomena. The treatise must first bring them to a correct understanding. And the reason they must be brought to correct understanding is so that the two-fold hindrance may be cut off: clinging to a self and clinging to phenomena together draw out the hindrance of the afflictions and the hindrance to what can be known; once the two emptinesses are realized, these two hindrances are severed along with them. And the reason for severing the hindrances is to attain two surpassing fruits: by cutting off the hindrance of the afflictions — which keeps drawing on continued existence without end — one attains true liberation; by cutting off the hindrance to knowledge — which obstructs wisdom — one attains great awakening, unsurpassed perfect enlightenment.

The second layer is to instruct those who wrongly cling to self and to phenomena and who are confused about consciousness-only, so that they may penetrate the two emptinesses and come to know the principle of consciousness-only as it truly is.

The third layer is to break apart several specific misunderstandings of consciousness-only itself. Some cling to the view that external objects are real, just as consciousness is real. Others swing the opposite way and cling to the view that inner consciousness is in fact non-existent, just as external objects are non-existent. Others cling to the view that though the activities of the various consciousnesses differ, their substance is one and the same. And still others cling to the view that apart from the mind-king there are no mental factors at all. It is in order to dispel these several lopsided clingings, and to let people gain a true and correct understanding within the deep and subtle principle of consciousness-only, that this treatise is composed.

As for how these three layers of intent are to be divided, Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) says the prose "runs in three currents," and ties them to the readings of the three lineages of Indian masters: the lineage of Sthiramati and the rest means to make clear that the author composed the treatise so that people might give rise to understanding, sever the hindrances, and attain the fruits (the first layer); the lineage of Citrabhāna and the rest means to make clear that the author composed it so that people might penetrate the two emptinesses and awaken to the nature of consciousness-only (the second layer); the lineage of Dharmapāla and the rest means to make clear that the author composed it so as to break apart the various wrong clingings and reveal the principle of consciousness-only (the third layer). Kuiji further points out that, although these three lineages each raise up one sense, none of them falls outside the two-fold intent of "for the sake of persons" and "for the sake of the dharma" — the three senses differ, but the intent behind composing the treatise is not two.

One Question, Answered in a Single Verse

Next the author sets up a challenge, asking on the reader's behalf the question that naturally rises to the lips: if everything is consciousness only and there is no real object outside consciousness, then why do ordinary speech, and even the sacred teaching of the Buddha, all speak of "there being a self, there being phenomena"?

The answer is precisely that summarizing master-verse: "Self" and "phenomena" are only names set up by convention; depending on this convention, the manifold differentiated appearances turn forth; and all these appearances arise depending on the transformation of consciousness. As for the consciousness that does the transforming, there are in all only three kinds — the ripening consciousness (the eighth, the ālaya), the deliberating consciousness (the seventh, manas), and the consciousness that discriminates objects (the first six).

"Self" and "Phenomena" Are Just Two Borrowed Names

The author now unpacks this verse in detail. He begins by stating that self and phenomena are merely set up by convention and are not real. What is meant by "self" is something that exercises sovereign control. What is meant by "phenomena" is something that holds onto its own characteristic and can serve as a rule or standard. Both of these have manifold appearances that turn forth. The manifold appearances spoken of under "self" are such things as the worldly notions of a "sentient being" or a "living one," and on up to the names of attainment in the sacred teaching, such as "stream-enterer" and "once-returner." The manifold appearances spoken of under "phenomena" are such things as the substance, quality, and action posited by the non-Buddhist schools, and on up to the aggregates, sense-bases, and elements taught in the sacred teaching. And what "turn forth" means is that these appearances are set up according to conditions and are not fixed — they do not rigidly hold to any one appearance.

On What Do These Appearances Stand? — On the Transforming of Consciousness

So if these "appearances of self" and "appearances of phenomena" are all spoken of by convention, then on what do they actually stand? The author answers: entirely on the transformation of consciousness, by which they are conventionally set up. Here "consciousness" carries its root meaning of discrimination; and this word "consciousness" also includes the mental factors within its scope, because the mental factors are necessarily concomitant with the mind-king, never parting from it like shadow from form. What "transform" means is that the substance of consciousness turns forth so as to appear to have two parts: one part is the seen part, the object that is taken; the other part is the seeing part, that which takes the object. Both of these parts arise depending on a still deeper self-verifying part. Thus, on the basis of the seeing part one sets up "self," and on the basis of the seen part one sets up "phenomena" — apart from these two parts, self and phenomena have nowhere to stand.

Why Inner Consciousness Looks Like "Something Outside"

Going one layer further: inner consciousness turns forth so as to seem to have external objects. By the force of the discriminating perfuming — the seeds — laid down by clinging to self and clinging to phenomena, the various consciousnesses, the moment they arise, manifest appearances that resemble a self and resemble phenomena. These appearances are plainly within inner consciousness, yet through the force of discrimination they appear as though they were "objects outside." From beginningless time, sentient beings take these resemblance-appearances transformed by inner consciousness as their object and cling to them as a "real self and real phenomena" — just as a sick person or a dreamer, by the force of illness or dream, has appearances of various external objects float up in the mind and takes them, in earnest, to be things really existing outside.

The Two Senses of "Borrowed"

It must be noticed that "borrowed" or "conventional" is said here with two different weights. The "real self and real phenomena" that foolish beings calculate and impute have utterly no existence at all; they are simply forced into place along with deluded emotional clinging — this is the convention that is without substance, following only the deluded mind. But what of the "resemblance-self and resemblance-phenomena" that inner consciousness transforms forth? As a other-dependent phenomenon it does exist; it is only that it does not truly possess the self-nature of self or phenomena — it merely appears as if it were self, as if it were phenomena — this is the convention that is set up upon a substance. The single word "borrowed" is not the same on the two sides.

Neither Increased Nor Diminished: Hence It Is Both "Conventionally Existent" and "Existent in the Ultimate Sense"

Finally, the author uses this framework to fend off exactly two lopsided clingings. External objects are set up according to deluded emotion, and so they are not real — not real in the way inner consciousness is real (and this dispels the clinging that superimposes, refusing to cling to external objects as real). And inner consciousness arises depending on causes and conditions, and so it is not non-existent — not originally absent in the way external objects are (and this dispels the clinging that diminishes, refusing to dismiss consciousness too as nothing). Blocking superimposition with the one hand and diminution with the other, both extremes of clinging fall away.

From this one can further draw the distinction: external objects are conventionally set up in dependence on inner consciousness, and so they are only conventionally existent — existent within the conventional truth. Inner consciousness is the substantial event upon which those conventional objects rest, and so it is also existent in the ultimate sense — existent within the ultimate truth as well. With this boundary set firmly in place, the foundation of the whole treatise is laid — and the unfolding of the three transformers of consciousness that follows all grows up out of this very ground.

Onward Transmission

The general thesis this section raises up — "self and phenomena are merely borrowed, consciousness transforms so as to resemble objects, and the transformers are only three" — is the very foundation of the entire consciousness-only system, and the later treatises take it up and carry it onward from here. The Hundred Dharmas treatise opens out this "only three transformers" into the eight consciousness-dharmas — the ripening consciousness is the eighth, the deliberating consciousness the seventh, the object-discriminating consciousness the first six; the preface's "only three transformers" is just the general statement of the consciousness-dharmas among the hundred dharmas. The Thirty Verses — its first verse — is precisely the root-verse this section expounds, the brief-statement verse that opens the whole treatise, verse answering to verse. The Twenty Verses establishes its thesis from the positive side: "establishing the Mahāyāna teaching that the three realms are consciousness-only, since the scripture says the three realms are mind only... when inner consciousness arises it manifests so as to resemble an outer object," and argues broadly along just this one line — "consciousness-only, no object; refuting the reality of external objects" — which exactly draws out the preface's sense that "external objects are not real as consciousness is real; inner consciousness transforms so as to resemble an outer object." The Madhyānta-vibhāga, in its chapter on characteristics, establishes "deluded discrimination" and argues for the emptiness of both the grasped and the grasping together with the three natures; the preface's "dispelling the two clingings of superimposition and diminution, and the side-by-side establishment of the two truths" is precisely the foundation of its two emptinesses and three natures. The Mahāyāna-saṃgraha, in its section on the support of the knowable, makes clear at length the transforming of consciousness, dependent arising, and consciousness-only-without-object, and is the broad argument for the preface's sense that "consciousness transforms so as to resemble objects." As for this treatise itself, the preface's "only three transformers" is merely the general statement; below it, the chapter on the first transformer, the ālaya consciousness (arguing its three characteristics and the seeds), the chapter on the second transformer, the manas (arguing its nature, characteristics, and four afflictions), and the chapter on the third transformer, the object-discriminating consciousnesses (arguing the first six), each argue out one transformer in full — all growing up out of this preface.

Translator · 釋慧鏡 Shi Huijing — with AI-assisted consistency checking

License · CC BY-NC-SA 4.0