成唯識論 序分·唯識總標

Vasubandhu composed thirty verses; ten masters, Dharmapāla among them, wrote commentaries; Xuanzang welded them into one work — and so this treatise came to be. Its first move is not a conclusion but a question: the world and the sacred teaching alike speak of a self and of dharmas; if all is consciousness-only, what are those words worth?

The answer turns on one light word that decides the course of the whole book: provisional. "By provisional designation, self and dharmas" — not that there is no self and no dharma, but that these are names set down in dependence. Provisional does not mean deceitful; it means established upon something. Upon what? Upon the aspects into which consciousness transforms.

Hence "the manifold aspects turn" — every difference you see is a transformation of consciousness. And the consciousnesses that transform are of three kinds only: maturation (the eighth), deliberation (the seventh), object-discernment (the first six). The frame of the whole treatise stands up in the first verse.

Three things in the opening pages repay attention. The verse of homage — "I bow to the nature of consciousness-only, and to the perfectly and the partially purified" — pays homage to that nature, and to two kinds of person: the perfectly purified (buddhas) and the partially purified (bodhisattvas). On why the treatise was made three accounts are given: Sthiramati and others, that beings might realize the two emptinesses, sever the two obstructions, win the two fruits; Citrabhāna and others, that they might penetrate the two emptinesses and know the principle of consciousness-only as it is; Dharmapāla and others, to block such divergent graspings as that the outer object is no less existent than consciousness, or the inner consciousness no more existent than its object. Three accounts set side by side and none adjudicated — the manner of this treatise throughout.

The first thing to set down before reading is the wish to be told at once whether the thing exists. From beginning to end the treatise is not answering that. It is answering: this existence you speak of — how was it set up?

〔Verse expounded〕

"Because self and dharmas are posited only by convention, manifold appearances turn; these rest on what consciousness transforms, and the transformers are but three: the maturational, the deliberative, and the consciousness that discerns objects." (v1)

A. The Prefatory Homage Division

1. Homage to the field of merit (the homage stanza)

Take the first words, "I bow my head" (稽首) — that is, paying reverent homage. The object of this homage is the consciousness-only nature (唯識性) — the true nature of consciousness, which is the perfectly-accomplished (圓成實, the perfectly-accomplished reality). Besides paying homage to this truth, [the author] also pays homage to those who have realized this truth and are thereby purified; these are of two kinds. One is the fully-purified (滿清淨) — the Buddha, who is completely and thoroughly pure. The other is the partially-purified (分清淨) — the bodhisattvas, who have realized only a part and not yet reached the summit. Having paid homage, the author then states his purpose: I now expound these verses composed by the bodhisattva Vasubandhu, for the benefit and ease of all sentient beings.

2. The intent in composing the treatise (three accounts laid open)

Why did the author compose this treatise? On this question, when the several masters' accounts are laid open, there are three in all:

〔One position · to awaken, sever, and attain the fruit〕 The first account runs thus: composing this treatise is a chain of links, each pushing up to the next. Taken one by one —

First step: why people must be made to "generate right understanding." Some people are confused or mistaken about the two emptinesses (二空 — "emptiness of self," that there is no real self; "emptiness of dharmas," that there is no real dharma). The treatise is composed to make such people generate correct understanding.

Second step: and generating right understanding is in turn for what? It is for severing the twofold obscuration (二重障). Where do these two obscurations come from? They are brought out by self-attachment (我執, grasping a self) and dharma-attachment (法執, grasping a real dharma): self-attachment brings out the affliction-obscuration (煩惱障), dharma-attachment brings out the obscuration-to-the-knowable (所知障); the two attachments together raise the two obscurations together. Yet once the two emptinesses are realized, these two obscurations are severed along with them.

Third step: and severing the obscurations is in turn for what? It is for realizing the two excellent fruits (二勝果), each answering to one obscuration: severing the affliction-obscuration (which keeps the round of birth-and-death running on) realizes true liberation (解脫); severing the obscuration-to-the-knowable (which blocks the clarity of wisdom) attains great awakening (大菩提 — the unsurpassed perfect enlightenment, the wisdom of buddhahood).

So this account threads the whole line together: generate right understanding → in order to sever the two obscurations → in order to attain the two fruits.

〔Another · to penetrate emptiness and awaken to the nature〕 The second account is simpler: the treatise is composed to point things out to those who grasp self and dharmas rigidly and are muddled about consciousness-only — so they may penetrate the two emptinesses (emptiness of self, emptiness of dharmas) and understand the principle of consciousness-only as it really is.

〔It should be known (the correct view) · to break attachments and display the principle〕 The third account (this is the correct one) is the most detailed: there are still others who get the principle of consciousness-only wrong or muddled, and their biased attachments are of four kinds —

(1) Some hold that "the outer object, like consciousness, is not non-existent" (the outer object is not nothing; it is just as real as consciousness); (2) Some hold that "inner consciousness, like the object, is non-existent" (consciousness too is empty, originally nothing, just like the outer object); (3) Some hold that "the several consciousnesses differ in function but are one in substance" (the eight consciousnesses have separate uses but are, at bottom, a single substance); (4) Some hold that "apart from the mind-king there are no separate mental factors" (there is only the mind-king, no such thing as mental factors).

The treatise is composed to ward off and break these various biases one by one, so that people may gain a true and correct understanding of this deep and subtle principle of consciousness-only.

B. The Establishing-the-Teaching-at-Length Division · Clarifying the Marks of Consciousness-Only · Brief Exposition Raising the Thesis

1. Posing the question

〔Q〕 Someone first raises a question: if there really is "consciousness alone" (with no real outer object apart from consciousness), then why do ordinary people in their everyday speech, and the Buddha's various scriptural teachings, all plainly speak of "there being self and dharmas"? (Since there is only consciousness, where do a self and dharmas come from?)

2. The verse gives the answer

〔A · the verse〕 The answer is given in a verse: the two things "self" and "dharmas" are both set up by conventional positing (假說 — merely a name given for convenience, not something truly there); and because of this conventional positing, manifold differing appearances show forth; and these manifold appearances all exist only because consciousness transforms and manifests them. As for this transforming consciousness, there are just three classes in all — the first is the maturational consciousness (異熟識, i.e. the eighth, the ālaya); the second is the deliberative consciousness (思量識, i.e. the seventh, manas); the third is the object-discerning consciousness (了別境識, i.e. the first six: the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind consciousnesses).

3. The long-prose exposition (expounding the three lines above)

(a) Self and dharmas are merely conventional, set up in dependence on consciousness

The author answers: the "self and dharmas" spoken of by ordinary people and in the Buddha's teachings are all merely set up by convention (following circumstance, a name given for convenience), and not some really existent thing that exists in its own right. First, the two words "self" and "dharma." "Self" (我) means "that which governs" (something that calls the shots, that takes charge). "Dharma" (法) means "holding-and-rule" (軌持) — that it holds its own character and can serve as a standard by which one recognizes it (lets one know it for what it is).

Self and dharmas each show forth manifold differing appearances. Take first the manifold appearances of "self," which run along two tracks: one is what worldly people reckon — things like "sentient being" (有情, a being with sentience), "life-bearer" (命者, a living thing with a lifespan); the other is what the Buddha's teachings speak of — things like "stream-enterer" (預流) and "once-returner" (一來) (these are names of stages on the path, which are likewise only conventional names). Take next the manifold appearances of "dharmas," which also run along two tracks: one is what the heterodox reckon — things like "substance, quality, motion" (實、德、業, their categories for classifying all things); the other is what the Buddha's teachings speak of — things like "aggregates, bases, elements" (蘊、處、界).

That last word, "turn" (轉), means that these appearances "are set up according to differing conditions, and so look different too" — not one fixed, rigid shape.

(b) The appearances come about through consciousness's transformation

〔Q〕 Here a difficulty is set up: if the appearances of self and dharmas are all set up only by convention, then on what do they actually get established (there must be some support — they cannot be conventionally posited out of thin air)?

〔A〕 The answer: these appearances are all conventionally set up in dependence on the transforming of consciousness. Two key words need clarifying first —

First, the word "consciousness" (識). The nature of consciousness is just discerning (了別 — to distinguish, to cognize). Note too that "consciousness" said here also takes in the mental factors (心所). Why can they be taken in together? Because the mental factors always arise together with the mind-king, inseparable from it (this is called "concurrence," 相應) — so when consciousness is spoken of, the mental factors are counted in along with it.

Next, the word "transform" (變). "Transform" means that the substance of consciousness turns and shows forth what looks like "two parts" — and these two parts are the image-part (相分) and the seeing-part (見分). The image-part is the side that is cognized (the supported image, the object); the seeing-part is the side that does the cognizing (the supporting, cognizing function). Both these parts, image and seeing, arise from a still more inward self-witnessing part (自證分). Self and dharmas are set up upon these two parts: "dharma" is set up upon the image-part, "self" upon the seeing-part — and self and dharmas, once apart from these two parts of image and seeing, have nowhere else to rest.

(c) Inner consciousness transforms to resemble an outer object

Put another way: the inner consciousness turns and shows forth what looks like an "outer object." How does this come about? It is because the discrimination of self-attachment and dharma-attachment, perfuming again and again in the past, has left seeds; by the force of these seeds, when the several consciousnesses arise, they transform and manifest appearances that look like "self" and like "dharmas." These appearances of self and dharmas are plainly within the inner consciousness; yet, worked up by discrimination, they show forth as if they were "outer objects." Sentient beings, from beginningless time, have clung to this (the inner consciousness's transformed appearance, which looks like an outer object) and grasped it as a "real self and real dharmas."

A comparison makes this clear: it is like a sick person, or a person dreaming — by the force of the sickness, by the force of the dream, the mind also shows forth all sorts of appearances that look like outer objects, and the person clings to these appearances and grasps them as "really existent outer objects" — when in fact those are all manifested within his own mind in sickness or dream, and outside there is nothing.

(d) The two senses of "convention": the fool's reckoning (wholly nothing) · consciousness's transformation (a seeming-existent)

Here a distinction must be drawn: the single word "convention" (假) in fact carries two different meanings.

The first sense of "convention": the "real self and real dharmas" that the fool reckons are utterly without existence, simply not there at all; he merely fastens such a label on, following his deluded feeling. This "convention" is the convention of "there being nothing underneath at all — purely a name fastened on according to feeling" (i.e. substanceless-following-feeling convention, 無體隨情假 — not even a substance to it).

The second sense of "convention": the appearance "resembling self, resembling dharmas" that the inner consciousness transforms and manifests — this one does exist (it exists as other-dependent, 依他起 — an existence assembled from a confluence of conditions, with a function of its own); yet, though it exists, it is not really of the nature of "real self and real dharmas" (there is no such wholly-imagined, really-existent self-and-dharma nature). It merely "shows forth resembling that self, that dharma," and so it too is called "convention." This "convention" is the convention of "there being a thing underneath, only set up for convenience" (i.e. substantial-designation convention, 有體施設假 — having substance, but merely designated).

(e) Warding off over- and under-statement · resolving on the two truths

Finally, the two sides, outer object and inner consciousness, are squared off — and this exactly wards off two biased attachments.

On the one side: the outer object is set up following deluded feeling, and so it "is not existent" — not really existent in the way the inner consciousness is. This line wards off the attachment of over-statement (增益執 — making something out of nothing, the bias of adding an extra layer by treating the outer object as really existent); it tells people not to take the outer object as truly there.

On the other side: the inner consciousness must arise in dependence on causes and conditions, and so it "is not non-existent" — not originally nothing in the way the outer object is. This line wards off the attachment of under-statement (損減執 — taking what is there and declaring it not there, the bias of subtracting a layer); it tells people not to wipe out consciousness as well.

In this way both the biases, over- and under-statement, are warded off — nothing added, nothing subtracted.

A step further, dividing by the two truths (二諦): the outer object is only conventionally set up in dependence on the inner consciousness, and so it counts as existent only on the "conventional" level (it exists within the conventional truth, 俗諦); whereas consciousness is the real thing on which that conventional outer object depends, and so it counts as existent even on the "ultimate" level (it exists within the ultimate truth, 真諦) as well.

This is where the whole treatise begins. The bodhisattva Vasubandhu compressed the essentials of consciousness-only into thirty verses, and the master Xuanzang then wove together the explanations of ten great Indian commentators to open them out. This section first pays homage, as custom requires, to the Buddhas and bodhisattvas, states why such a treatise must be composed at all, and then, in a single verse, raises up the thesis of the entire book in one breath.

This thesis — that "self and phenomena are merely borrowed, and consciousness transforms so as to resemble objects" — is not something the author set up on his own; scripture and treatise furnished its ground long before. The Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, in its chapter on the analysis of yoga, states plainly that the image which is the object "is consciousness only," and the World-Honored One says outright, "I declare that the object of consciousness is nothing but what consciousness manifests"; he further says, "herein there is no slight dharma that apprehends any slight dharma; yet when this mind arises in such a way, just such an image appears within it" — the object-realm is only an image that consciousness itself transforms forth, and outside consciousness there is no second, real realm. This is the scriptural root of the first verse's "they rest upon the transforming of consciousness," of inner consciousness transforming so as to resemble an outer object. The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra establishes the same point from the other side: being well able to discern what one's own mind manifests, one should contemplate that "the three realms are mind only," and thereby "leave behind self and what belongs to self" — the three realms being nothing but a single mind, self and phenomena empty from the start; this is the scriptural root of the first verse's "self and phenomena are merely borrowed." And the Yogācārabhūmi, in its section on ascertaining the meaning, records that very passage of the Saṃdhinirmocana — "the object of consciousness is only what consciousness manifests; mind does not see mind" — as the treatise's settled position, fixing firmly the sense that all is what consciousness manifests. What this section expounds has its scriptural root in the Saṃdhinirmocana and the Laṅkāvatāra, and its treatise-basis in the Yogācārabhūmi — and with that we follow the verse and open the exposition.

Homage, and the Threefold Intent Behind the Composition

The treatise opens by "bowing the head" in reverence to two things. The first is the true nature of consciousness — the real, abiding nature of consciousness itself (that is, the perfectly-accomplished nature, suchness). The second is those persons who, having realized that true nature, have become pure: perfectly and completely pure, that is the Buddha; partially pure, those are the bodhisattvas. Having paid this homage, the author declares his purpose: that in now explaining these verses spoken by Vasubandhu, he acts for the benefit and ease of all sentient beings.

Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) opens out this "true nature of consciousness" into two senses to be read together: one is the deluded nature of consciousness, the wholly-imagined nature, which is to be dispelled and so made pure; the other is the real nature of consciousness, the perfectly-accomplished nature, which is to be realized and so made pure — the former pure by what is dispelled, the latter pure by what is realized; with this one dispelling and one realizing, the word "pure" is given its concrete sense. Kuiji further marks off the two kinds of person to whom homage is paid: the Tathāgata, whose wisdom is all-pervading and whose virtue is complete, exhausting the nature of suchness, is therefore called the fully pure one; the bodhisattvas, who realize the suchness of consciousness-only only in part, their illumination not yet perfectly clear, are therefore called the partially pure ones. He also divides the whole of the treatise's exposition into three great parts: the opening homage-verse together with the prose that follows it is "the part of homage and statement before the main body"; from "How are the world and the various sacred teachings..." onward, where the text is properly expounded, is "the part of broad accomplishment in dependence on the teaching"; and from "this treatise establishes consciousness-only in three parts" onward is "the part of concluding interpretation and the dedication of merit" — while the homage-verse itself, in its first two lines, pays homage to the field of merit, and in its latter two lines states the intent of composing the commentary.

So why compose this treatise? The author lays his intent open in three layers.

The deepest layer is for the sake of severing the hindrances and attaining the fruits. Some people are confused and mistaken about the two emptinesses — the emptiness of self and the emptiness of phenomena. The treatise must first bring them to a correct understanding. And the reason they must be brought to correct understanding is so that the two-fold hindrance may be cut off: clinging to a self and clinging to phenomena together draw out the hindrance of the afflictions and the hindrance to what can be known; once the two emptinesses are realized, these two hindrances are severed along with them. And the reason for severing the hindrances is to attain two surpassing fruits: by cutting off the hindrance of the afflictions — which keeps drawing on continued existence without end — one attains true liberation; by cutting off the hindrance to knowledge — which obstructs wisdom — one attains great awakening, unsurpassed perfect enlightenment.

The second layer is to instruct those who wrongly cling to self and to phenomena and who are confused about consciousness-only, so that they may penetrate the two emptinesses and come to know the principle of consciousness-only as it truly is.

The third layer is to break apart several specific misunderstandings of consciousness-only itself. Some cling to the view that external objects are real, just as consciousness is real. Others swing the opposite way and cling to the view that inner consciousness is in fact non-existent, just as external objects are non-existent. Others cling to the view that though the activities of the various consciousnesses differ, their substance is one and the same. And still others cling to the view that apart from the mind-king there are no mental factors at all. It is in order to dispel these several lopsided clingings, and to let people gain a true and correct understanding within the deep and subtle principle of consciousness-only, that this treatise is composed.

As for how these three layers of intent are to be divided, Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) says the prose "runs in three currents," and ties them to the readings of the three lineages of Indian masters: the lineage of Sthiramati and the rest means to make clear that the author composed the treatise so that people might give rise to understanding, sever the hindrances, and attain the fruits (the first layer); the lineage of Citrabhāna and the rest means to make clear that the author composed it so that people might penetrate the two emptinesses and awaken to the nature of consciousness-only (the second layer); the lineage of Dharmapāla and the rest means to make clear that the author composed it so as to break apart the various wrong clingings and reveal the principle of consciousness-only (the third layer). Kuiji further points out that, although these three lineages each raise up one sense, none of them falls outside the two-fold intent of "for the sake of persons" and "for the sake of the dharma" — the three senses differ, but the intent behind composing the treatise is not two.

One Question, Answered in a Single Verse

Next the author sets up a challenge, asking on the reader's behalf the question that naturally rises to the lips: if everything is consciousness only and there is no real object outside consciousness, then why do ordinary speech, and even the sacred teaching of the Buddha, all speak of "there being a self, there being phenomena"?

The answer is precisely that summarizing master-verse: "Self" and "phenomena" are only names set up by convention; depending on this convention, the manifold differentiated appearances turn forth; and all these appearances arise depending on the transformation of consciousness. As for the consciousness that does the transforming, there are in all only three kinds — the ripening consciousness (the eighth, the ālaya), the deliberating consciousness (the seventh, manas), and the consciousness that discriminates objects (the first six).

"Self" and "Phenomena" Are Just Two Borrowed Names

The author now unpacks this verse in detail. He begins by stating that self and phenomena are merely set up by convention and are not real. What is meant by "self" is something that exercises sovereign control. What is meant by "phenomena" is something that holds onto its own characteristic and can serve as a rule or standard. Both of these have manifold appearances that turn forth. The manifold appearances spoken of under "self" are such things as the worldly notions of a "sentient being" or a "living one," and on up to the names of attainment in the sacred teaching, such as "stream-enterer" and "once-returner." The manifold appearances spoken of under "phenomena" are such things as the substance, quality, and action posited by the non-Buddhist schools, and on up to the aggregates, sense-bases, and elements taught in the sacred teaching. And what "turn forth" means is that these appearances are set up according to conditions and are not fixed — they do not rigidly hold to any one appearance.

On What Do These Appearances Stand? — On the Transforming of Consciousness

So if these "appearances of self" and "appearances of phenomena" are all spoken of by convention, then on what do they actually stand? The author answers: entirely on the transformation of consciousness, by which they are conventionally set up. Here "consciousness" carries its root meaning of discrimination; and this word "consciousness" also includes the mental factors within its scope, because the mental factors are necessarily concomitant with the mind-king, never parting from it like shadow from form. What "transform" means is that the substance of consciousness turns forth so as to appear to have two parts: one part is the seen part, the object that is taken; the other part is the seeing part, that which takes the object. Both of these parts arise depending on a still deeper self-verifying part. Thus, on the basis of the seeing part one sets up "self," and on the basis of the seen part one sets up "phenomena" — apart from these two parts, self and phenomena have nowhere to stand.

Why Inner Consciousness Looks Like "Something Outside"

Going one layer further: inner consciousness turns forth so as to seem to have external objects. By the force of the discriminating perfuming — the seeds — laid down by clinging to self and clinging to phenomena, the various consciousnesses, the moment they arise, manifest appearances that resemble a self and resemble phenomena. These appearances are plainly within inner consciousness, yet through the force of discrimination they appear as though they were "objects outside." From beginningless time, sentient beings take these resemblance-appearances transformed by inner consciousness as their object and cling to them as a "real self and real phenomena" — just as a sick person or a dreamer, by the force of illness or dream, has appearances of various external objects float up in the mind and takes them, in earnest, to be things really existing outside.

The Two Senses of "Borrowed"

It must be noticed that "borrowed" or "conventional" is said here with two different weights. The "real self and real phenomena" that foolish beings calculate and impute have utterly no existence at all; they are simply forced into place along with deluded emotional clinging — this is the convention that is without substance, following only the deluded mind. But what of the "resemblance-self and resemblance-phenomena" that inner consciousness transforms forth? As a other-dependent phenomenon it does exist; it is only that it does not truly possess the self-nature of self or phenomena — it merely appears as if it were self, as if it were phenomena — this is the convention that is set up upon a substance. The single word "borrowed" is not the same on the two sides.

Neither Increased Nor Diminished: Hence It Is Both "Conventionally Existent" and "Existent in the Ultimate Sense"

Finally, the author uses this framework to fend off exactly two lopsided clingings. External objects are set up according to deluded emotion, and so they are not real — not real in the way inner consciousness is real (and this dispels the clinging that superimposes, refusing to cling to external objects as real). And inner consciousness arises depending on causes and conditions, and so it is not non-existent — not originally absent in the way external objects are (and this dispels the clinging that diminishes, refusing to dismiss consciousness too as nothing). Blocking superimposition with the one hand and diminution with the other, both extremes of clinging fall away.

From this one can further draw the distinction: external objects are conventionally set up in dependence on inner consciousness, and so they are only conventionally existent — existent within the conventional truth. Inner consciousness is the substantial event upon which those conventional objects rest, and so it is also existent in the ultimate sense — existent within the ultimate truth as well. With this boundary set firmly in place, the foundation of the whole treatise is laid — and the unfolding of the three transformers of consciousness that follows all grows up out of this very ground.

Onward Transmission

The general thesis this section raises up — "self and phenomena are merely borrowed, consciousness transforms so as to resemble objects, and the transformers are only three" — is the very foundation of the entire consciousness-only system, and the later treatises take it up and carry it onward from here. The Hundred Dharmas treatise opens out this "only three transformers" into the eight consciousness-dharmas — the ripening consciousness is the eighth, the deliberating consciousness the seventh, the object-discriminating consciousness the first six; the preface's "only three transformers" is just the general statement of the consciousness-dharmas among the hundred dharmas. The Thirty Verses — its first verse — is precisely the root-verse this section expounds, the brief-statement verse that opens the whole treatise, verse answering to verse. The Twenty Verses establishes its thesis from the positive side: "establishing the Mahāyāna teaching that the three realms are consciousness-only, since the scripture says the three realms are mind only... when inner consciousness arises it manifests so as to resemble an outer object," and argues broadly along just this one line — "consciousness-only, no object; refuting the reality of external objects" — which exactly draws out the preface's sense that "external objects are not real as consciousness is real; inner consciousness transforms so as to resemble an outer object." The Madhyānta-vibhāga, in its chapter on characteristics, establishes "deluded discrimination" and argues for the emptiness of both the grasped and the grasping together with the three natures; the preface's "dispelling the two clingings of superimposition and diminution, and the side-by-side establishment of the two truths" is precisely the foundation of its two emptinesses and three natures. The Mahāyāna-saṃgraha, in its section on the support of the knowable, makes clear at length the transforming of consciousness, dependent arising, and consciousness-only-without-object, and is the broad argument for the preface's sense that "consciousness transforms so as to resemble objects." As for this treatise itself, the preface's "only three transformers" is merely the general statement; below it, the chapter on the first transformer, the ālaya consciousness (arguing its three characteristics and the seeds), the chapter on the second transformer, the manas (arguing its nature, characteristics, and four afflictions), and the chapter on the third transformer, the object-discriminating consciousnesses (arguing the first six), each argue out one transformer in full — all growing up out of this preface.