成唯識論 破法執(二)·破無為·結成唯識
破法執到這一節收尾。前面破完了外道的實法、小乘的實色與不相應行，還剩最後一類最難破的：無為法。
虛空、擇滅、非擇滅——這些東西不生不滅、不變不動，看起來最有資格當「實有」。論主怎麼破？他問：你說的無為，是有體還是無體？若無體，那就是沒有，不必爭。若有體，那它是常還是無常？常則不能有作用（不能與別的法發生關係），無用之法與無體何異？
再問：虛空遍一切處嗎？若遍，那它與色法就在同一處，二法相礙；若不遍，就不叫虛空。擇滅是斷惑所顯，那斷惑之前它在不在？在，則不待斷；不在，則是所作而非無為。
論主的結論不是『無為法沒有』，而是：無為法是依真如上假立的名，不是離識別有的實體。 真如是識之實性，不是識外之物。
破完我法二執，論主結成唯識：既然離識的我與法都不可得，那所餘者唯識而已。這裡還補了兩層——法執也有俱生與分別二種，斷位與我執相似而更難；以及法執所緣的，其實只是自心所現的「似法」，不是心外之法。
這一節的份量在收尾那一步：破，不是為了破掉一切，是為了把「所餘者」逼出來。 我與法都不可得之後，剩下的那個『不可不有』的，就是識。
The refutation of dharma-grasping closes here. The heterodox reals, the Lesser Vehicle's real form and non-concurrent formations have all been refuted; one class remains, the hardest: the unconditioned.
Space, cessation-through-discernment, cessation-not-through-discernment — unarising, unceasing, unchanging, unmoving, these look best qualified to be real. How does the treatise refute them? By asking: has your unconditioned a substance or not? If not, it is simply absent and there is nothing to argue. If it has, is it permanent or impermanent? Permanent, and it can exercise no function, entering into relation with nothing else — and how does a functionless dharma differ from one with no substance at all?
Again: does space pervade everywhere? If it does, it occupies the same place as form, and the two obstruct each other; if it does not, it is not space. Cessation-through-discernment is disclosed by severing affliction — then was it there before the severing? If it was, it did not wait upon severing; if it was not, it is something produced, and not unconditioned.
The conclusion is not that the unconditioned does not exist, but that the unconditioned is a name provisionally set upon suchness, not an entity real apart from consciousness. Suchness is the true nature of consciousness, not a thing outside it.
Both graspings refuted, the treatise establishes consciousness-only: since neither self nor dharma apart from consciousness can be found, what remains is consciousness alone. Two further points are added — dharma-grasping too is innate and discriminated, severed on a course like that of self-grasping but harder; and what dharma-grasping takes as object is only the semblance of a dharma manifested by one's own mind, never a dharma outside it.
The weight of the chapter lies in that closing step: refutation is not for the sake of refuting everything, but to force out what remains. Once neither self nor dharma can be found, what is left — what cannot not be — is consciousness.
諸無為法離色、心等決定實有，理不可得。且定有法，略有三種：一、現所知法，如色、心等。二、現受用法，如瓶、衣等，如是二法，世共知有，不待因成。三、有作用法，如眼、耳等，由彼彼用證知是有。無為非世共知定有，又無作用，如眼、耳等。設許有用，應是無常，故不可執無為定有。然諸無為所知性故，或色、心等所顯性故，如色、心等，不應執為離色、心等實無為性。
又虛空等為一、為多？
若體是一，遍一切處，虛空容受色等法故，隨能合法，體應成多，一所合處餘不合故。不爾，諸法應互相遍。若謂虛空不與法合，應非容受，如餘無為。又色等中有虛空不？有應相雜，無應不遍。一部、一品結法斷時，應得餘部、餘品擇滅；一法緣闕得不生時，應於一切得非擇滅。執彼體一，理應爾故。
〔T31 0006c01〕若體是多，便有品類，應如色等，非實無為。虛空又應非遍容受。
餘部所執離心、心所實有無為，准前應破。
又諸無為許無因果故，應如兔角，非異心等有。
然契經說，有虛空等諸無為法，略有二種：
一、依識變假施設有。謂曾聞說虛空等名，隨分別有虛空等相，數習力故，心等生時，似虛空等無為相現。此所現相，前後相似，無有變易，假說為常。
二、依法性，假施設有。
謂空、無我所顯真如，有、無、俱非，心言路絕，與一切法非一、異等，是法真理，故名法性。
離諸障礙，故名虛空；由簡擇力，滅諸雜染，究竟證會，故名擇滅；不由擇力，本性清淨，或緣闕所顯，故名非擇滅；苦、樂受滅，故名不動；想、受不行，名想受滅。
此五皆依真如假立，真如亦是假施設名。
遮撥為無，故說為有；遮執為有，故說為空；勿謂虛、幻，故說為實；理非妄倒，故名真如。不同餘宗離色、心等有實常法名曰真如。
故諸無為非定實有。
外道、餘乘所執諸法異心、心所非實有性，是所取故，如心、心所。
能取彼覺亦不緣彼，是能取故，如緣此覺。
諸心、心所依他起故，亦如幻事，非真實有。
為遣妄執心、心所外實有境故，說唯有識。
若執唯識真實有者，如執外境，亦是法執。
然諸法執略有二種：
一者俱生；二者分別。
俱生法執，無始時來虛妄熏習，內因力故，恒與身俱，不待邪教及邪分別，任運而轉，故名俱生。
此復二種：一、常相續，在第七識，緣第八識，起自心相，執為實法；二、有間斷，在第六識，緣識所變蘊、處、界相，或總、或別，起自心相，執為實法。
〔T31 0007a03〕此二法執細故難斷，後十地中數數修習勝法空觀，方能除滅。
分別法執，亦由現在外緣力故，非與身俱，要待邪教及邪分別然後方起，故名分別。
唯在第六意識中有。此亦二種：一、緣邪教所說蘊、處、界相，起自心相，分別、計度，執為實法。二、緣邪教所說自性等相，起自心相，分別、計度，執為實法。
此二法執麁故易斷，入初地時，觀一切法，法空真如，即能除滅。
如是所說一切法執，自心外法或有或無，自心內法一切皆有，是故法執皆緣自心所現似法，執為實有。然似法相從緣生故，是如幻有，所執實法妄計度故，決定非有。故世尊說：「慈氏當知，諸識所緣，唯識所現，依他起性，如幻事等。」
如是外道、餘乘所執離識我、法皆非實有。故心、心所決定不用外色等法為所緣緣，緣用必依實有體故。
現在彼聚心、心所法，非此聚識親所緣緣，如非所緣，他聚攝故。同聚心所亦非親所緣，自體異故，如餘非所取。
由此應知，實無外境，唯有內識，似外境生。是故契經伽他中說：「如愚所分別，外境實皆無，習氣擾濁心，故似彼而轉。」
The canonical text stands in Chinese only. This edition renders the essence, the plain reading, the exposition and the apparatus into English — never the sūtra itself. Switch to 漢讀本 or 並行雙語 above to read it.
〔所釋之頌〕廣釋第一頌
甲、破無為法
有人主張：那些「無為法」（不生不滅、不由造作而成的法，像虛空、擇滅這些）是離開色法、心法等等，自己另外實實在在地存在的。這個講法，按道理是站不住的。（底下就要說明：無為並不是離開色、心而另有一個實在的東西。）
先說：凡是『確實存在』的東西，大致不出三種。第一種叫「現所知法」，就是當下能直接認識到的東西，像色法、心法那些（不必推論，眼前就知道它有）。第二種叫「現受用法」，就是當下能拿來用的東西，像瓶子、衣服那些——這頭兩類，世間人人都曉得它是有的，用不著另立什麼理由去證明。第三種叫「有作用法」，像眼根、耳根那些，雖然看不見，可是從它能起的種種作用，就能推知它確實是有的。
可是「無為」呢？它既不像前兩類那樣人人共知是有，又不像第三類那樣起得了作用——拿眼根、耳根來比，那是要靠作用才知道它有，而無為偏偏沒有作用。退一步說，就算承認無為有作用好了，那它反倒該是「無常」的了（凡是有作用的東西都會變動、都無常）。所以，不能說無為是確實實在地存在的。
再從正面說：那些無為，一來它『是被認識的對象』，二來它是『靠著色、心等才顯現出來的』——就這兩點看，它跟色法、心法是一個道理（都是被認識的、都得靠別的東西才顯現）。既然如此，就不該把它執成『離開色、心而另外實在存在的無為』。
底下再單獨破「虛空」這一項：所謂「虛空」這類無為，到底是『一個』呢，還是『許多個』呢？（這兩條路都走不通，下面分頭破。）
先說『是一個』這條路。假設虛空只有一個整體，又周遍到一切地方。可是虛空既然能容納色法那些東西，那它就得隨著所容納的各個東西（各個東西各佔一個地方）跟著分散開——這樣一來，虛空的「體」反倒成了『許多個』了。為什麼？因為『跟這個地方的東西相合的那一塊虛空』，跟『別的地方的東西相合的虛空』就不是同一塊了（虛空隨著各個東西各別開來，就成了許多塊）。
要是你不肯這樣講，硬說虛空仍舊是一個整體、不隨各個東西分開，那就會逼出個怪結論：所有的東西都該互相周遍、彼此重疊了（因為虛空一個整體周遍到所有東西，而所有東西都跟這一個整體相合，那它們也就跟著互相通到一塊兒去了——這明明跟事實不合）。
那你或許又辯解說：『虛空根本不跟那些東西相合。』可是這麼一說，虛空就該『容納不了東西』了（不相合，就談不上容納）——那它就跟其餘那些無為一個樣了（像擇滅那些無為本來就不容納色法；虛空若也不相合，那就跟它們一樣，連「能容納」這個本事都丟了）。
再追問一句：色法那些東西裡頭，到底有沒有虛空在裡面？這也是兩頭堵。要是說「有」（虛空就在色裡面），那虛空跟色就攪在一塊兒了（兩個會佔位子的東西擠在同一個地方，講不通）。要是說「沒有」（色裡面沒有虛空），那虛空就不算「周遍一切處」了（有色的地方就沒有虛空，那它哪裡周遍）。
順著『無為只有一個體』這個毛病，再拿擇滅、非擇滅來一併破。擇滅，是靠智慧揀擇的力量把煩惱滅掉所得的那種無為；非擇滅，是不靠揀擇、只因緣缺了、那個法生不出來所顯的那種無為。如果擇滅只有一個體，那麼當你斷掉『某一部、某一品』的煩惱、得到那一份擇滅時，你就該同時把『其餘各部、各品』的擇滅也一起得到了（既然擇滅是一個體，得了一份就等於得了全部）。同樣，如果非擇滅只有一個體，那麼當『某一個法』因緣缺了、得到它的「不生」（非擇滅）時，你就該對「一切法」都得到非擇滅了（一個體，得一份就等於得全部）。為什麼會推出這種怪結論？正是因為你把無為執成『只有一個體』，照這個前提推下去就該是這樣。（可事實上，斷了這一品煩惱並不會連帶得到別品的擇滅——可見無為並不是『只有一個體』。）
再說『是許多個』這條路。假設無為是許多個，那它就有了種種品類、種種差別，這就跟色法那些東西一個樣了（凡是分得出品類差別的，都是會變動、無常的），那它就不是真正的無為了。而且虛空若是許多個，那它也就不能『周遍地容納一切』了（既是許多個，就各佔各的一塊、互不通連，哪裡還周遍）。至於其餘部派所主張的那些『離開心、心所而實在存在的無為』，也都可以照前面破虛空的同一套道理去破。
再用一個推論來破：你們自己也承認，那些無為是『沒有原因、也沒有結果』的。可是凡是既無因又無果的東西，就像『兔子的角』一樣——根本是個沒有的東西。既然如此，無為就不該是『離開心法等等而另外存在』的（無為並不是離開心而實實在在有一個東西）。
破到這裡，會有人拿經來問：經裡明明說『有虛空等等無為法』呀，這又怎麼講？這話要會通著看。經裡說的這個「有」，其實大致分兩種說法。
第一種，是『靠著識的變現，姑且安立個名目說它有』。怎麼說呢？我們曾經聽人說過「虛空」這些名字，跟著就在心裡分別出「虛空」這些相狀；這麼一再地熏習慣了，等到心生起的時候，心裡頭就現出一個像「虛空」那樣的無為相來。這個現出來的相，前前後後看起來都差不多、沒什麼變動，所以就姑且把它叫作「常」（這是靠識變現、暫且安立的那種無為）。
第二種，是『靠著法的本性，姑且安立個名目說它有』。怎麼說呢？由「空、無我」所顯出來的那個「真如」——你說它是「有」也不對、說它是「無」也不對、說它『既非有也非無』也定不下來，連用心去想、用話去說的路子都斷了；它跟一切法說『是同一個』也不對、說『是兩個』也不對；它就是一切法的真實道理，所以叫它「法性」。
就在這同一個法性上，從不同的角度看，便安立出五個無為的名目：
從『它離開了種種障礙』這一面看，叫它「虛空無為」； 從『靠揀擇的智慧把種種雜染滅掉、徹底證到它』這一面看，叫它「擇滅無為」； 從『不靠揀擇的力量、它本來就清淨，或者只因某個法的因緣缺了而顯出來』這一面看，叫它「非擇滅無為」； 從『苦受、樂受都息滅了』這一面看，叫它「不動無為」； 從『想、受都不起作用了』這一面看，叫它「想受滅無為」。
這五個無為，全都是靠著「真如」才安立起來的名目；而說到底，連「真如」這個詞本身，也不過是個姑且安立的名字罷了。
「真如」這個名字既然也是假立的，那為什麼還要這樣立名呢？道理是這樣的：這幾個字都不是正面去描述它，而是各擋掉一種誤解——
怕人『一口抹掉、說它根本沒有』，所以說它「有」； 怕人反過來『把它當成實實在在的東西去抓』，所以說它「空」； 怕人又『以為它是虛的、假的、像幻影一樣』，所以說它「實」； 因為它的道理並不虛妄、並不顛倒，所以叫它「真如」。
（可見『有、空、實、真如』這四個字，都只是擋掉誤解的假名，並不是正面替它安一個體性。）這就跟其餘那些宗派不一樣了——他們是把「真如」當成『離開色、心等等、另外實實在在又恆常不變的一個法』。所以結論是：那些無為，全都不是確實實在地存在的。（破無為這一段，到這裡講完。）
乙、總結破法執·成立唯識
底下總起來，用兩個推論替前面破法執的話作個結。
第一個推論：外道、別的乘所執著的那些法，凡是被當成『離開心、心所而另外存在』的，其實都不是實在的東西。為什麼？因為它『是被認取的對象』呀；這就好比心、心所自己（心、心所被自證分認取時，也並不是離開識而實在的）——凡是被認取的對象，都不是離開識而實在地存在的。
第二個推論：那個『去認取那些法的認識作用（也就是識）』，其實也並沒有真的緣到『離開識、實在的法』。為什麼？因為它『是能認取的』呀；這就好比『去緣前一念那個認識的後一念認識』（後念去緣前念，緣的還是自己這邊的識）——凡是能認取的，它所緣的也都離不開自己這邊的識。
不過話要說回來：那能認取的心、心所自己，也是「依他起」的——意思是它得靠種種因緣湊在一起才生得起來；既是這樣，它也就像幻化出來的東西一樣，並不是真正實在的（連心、心所自己都不是實有的，這是要免得人聽了「唯有識」就反過來把識當成實在的）。所以要曉得：之所以說『只有識』，本是為了破掉『在心、心所之外還執著有實在的外境』這個妄執；可是你要是反過來，又把『只有識』這件事當成『真實實在的』去抓，那就跟執著外境一個樣，照樣是一種「法執」（連「唯識」也不可以拿來實實在在地執取）。
丙、二法執（俱生·分別）及其斷位
話說這「法執」，大致分兩類：一類叫「俱生」（與生俱來、自自然然就有的），一類叫「分別」（後天被錯誤的教法或思惟引起來的）。
先說「俱生法執」。它是從無始以來、虛妄的習氣一再熏成的，靠的是裡頭自帶的這股力量，所以一直跟著這個身心、從不離開；它用不著什麼錯誤的教法、也用不著刻意去錯想，自自然然就轉個不停——正因為這樣，才叫它「俱生」（與生俱來）。這一類又分兩種：
第一種叫「常相續」，老是接連不斷的那一種——它在第七識裡頭，緣著第八識（的見分），在自己心裡變現出一個相來，把它執成實在的法。 第二種叫「有間斷」，會中斷的那一種——它在第六識裡頭，緣著識所變現出來的「蘊、處、界」這些相（五蘊、十二處、十八界，也就是把身心世界拆開來的幾套分類），有時整個一起緣、有時一樣一樣分開緣，在自己心裡變現出一個相來，把它執成實在的法。
這兩種俱生法執，因為太細微了，所以難斷；得在後面菩薩「十地」的修行階段裡，一遍又一遍地修那殊勝的「法空觀」（觀照一切法都沒有實在自體的那種觀行），才能把它除掉。
再說「分別法執」。它是靠當下外在的那些緣（聽來的、想出來的）才有的，並不是與生俱來、跟著身心一道有的；非得碰上錯誤的教法、再加上錯誤的思惟，然後才起得來——正因為這樣，才叫它「分別」（後天分別出來的）；而且它只在第六意識裡才有。這一類也分兩種：
第一種，是緣著錯誤教法裡所講的「蘊、處、界相」，在自己心裡變現出一個相來，又是分別、又是揣度，把它執成實在的法。 第二種，是緣著錯誤教法裡所講的「自性」這類相（指外道替萬物立的那種常住自性、或是神我之類），在自己心裡變現出一個相來，又是分別、又是揣度，把它執成實在的法。
這兩種分別法執，因為比較粗、比較顯眼，所以容易斷；只要一進到菩薩的「初地」，觀照一切法的「法空真如」（一切法皆無實自體所顯的那個真如），就能把它除掉。
丁、法執所緣唯自心似法
上面講的這一切法執，就它們所緣的對象來看：心外頭那些法，有的有、有的沒有（未必真有）；可是自己心裡所現出來的那些法，倒是個個都有。這就說明了：一切法執，緣的其實都是『自己心裡現出來的、那看起來像是法的相』，再把這個相當成實在的去執取。
話說回來，那『看起來像法的相』，是靠種種緣湊起來才生出來的，所以它是『像幻影那樣地有』（有它的相，但不是實在的）；至於被執成的那個『實在的法』，純是胡亂揣度出來的，所以它根本就是沒有的。
所以世尊才說：『慈氏（也就是彌勒菩薩）你要曉得：各個識所緣的對象，都只是識自己變現出來的，是依他起性（靠眾緣才生起的），就像幻化出來的事物一樣。』這麼一來就清楚了：外道、別的乘所執著的那種『離開識而另有的我、法』，全都不是實在的。
戊、結成唯識·遮他聚同聚為親所緣
所以，心、心所決定不會拿『心外的色法那些東西』當它的「所緣緣」（也就是它攀緣、認識的那個對境）。為什麼？因為『能攀緣的這個作用』一定得有個『實實在在的體』托著才行；而離開識的那些外法根本沒有實在的體，當不了所緣緣。
再說，眼前『另外那一聚』的心、心所（指別人身上的、或別的剎那的那一套心法），也不是『我這一聚』的識所能『親自緣到的對象』——它就跟那些『根本緣不到的法』（全不相干的東西）一個樣，因為它是歸在『另外那一聚』裡頭的（別人那一聚的心，我這個識親自緣不著）。
還有，就算是『我這同一聚裡頭』的心所（跟心王一道起的受、想那些），它也不是心王所能『親自緣到的對象』——因為心所自己的體，跟心王（所變的相分）到底是兩回事；它就跟其餘那些緣不著的法一個樣。由這幾層就該明白：其實根本沒有心外的境，有的只是裡頭的識變現得「像」外境，於是看起來好像有外境生出來罷了。（到這裡，『萬法唯識』這個結論就立住了。）
所以契經的偈頌裡才這麼說：『像愚癡的人所分別出來的那種外境，其實統統都沒有；只因為過去的習氣把這個心攪得又亂又濁，心才現出一個像那外境的樣子、就這麼轉個不停。』
4. Refuting the unconditioned dharmas
Some maintain that those "unconditioned dharmas" (dharmas that neither arise nor perish, made by no activity — such as space and cessation-through-discrimination) exist really and on their own, apart from form, mind, and the rest. This claim, in principle, cannot stand. (What follows will show that the unconditioned is not some real thing existing apart from form and mind.)
First: whatever "definitely exists" falls, broadly, into three kinds. The first is called "a dharma presently cognized" — what one can directly know here and now, such as form and mind (no inference needed; right before you, you know it is there). The second is called "a dharma presently made use of" — what one can put to use here and now, such as a pot or a cloth. These first two kinds everyone in the world knows to exist; no further reason need be set up to prove them. The third is called "a dharma having function" — such as the eye-faculty or the ear-faculty: invisible, yet from the various functions they can exert one infers that they really are there.
But what of the "unconditioned"? It is not, like the first two kinds, commonly known by all to exist; nor does it, like the third kind, exert any function. Take the eye-faculty or ear-faculty for comparison: those are known to exist by their function — and the unconditioned, precisely, has none. And even granting, for argument's sake, that the unconditioned did have a function, it would then turn out to be "impermanent" (anything with a function changes, and is impermanent). So one cannot say the unconditioned definitely and really exists.
Now to put it positively: those unconditioned [dharmas], first, "are objects that get cognized," and second, "are disclosed only by means of form, mind, and the rest" — and on just these two counts they are on a par with form and mind (both get cognized; both must rely on something else to be disclosed). That being so, one should not grasp them as "an unconditioned nature existing really and apart from form and mind."
Below, "space" is taken up and refuted on its own: this so-called "space"-type unconditioned — is it "one," or is it "many"? (Both roads are dead ends; each is refuted in turn below.)
Take first the road "it is one." Suppose space is a single whole, pervading every place. But since space contains forms and the like, it must divide up following each thing it contains (each thing occupying its own place) — and then space's "substance" turns out, on the contrary, to be "many." Why? Because "the patch of space conjoined with the thing in this place" is not the same patch as "the space conjoined with things in other places" (space, parceling out among the several things, becomes many patches).
If you refuse to put it this way and insist that space stays a single whole, not dividing among the several things, then an absurd conclusion is forced: all things would have to interpenetrate and overlap one another (for one single whole of space pervades all things, and all things conjoin with this one whole, so they too would all run together into one — which plainly does not fit the facts).
You might then plead again: "Space simply does not conjoin with those things at all." But once you say that, space turns out to be "unable to contain anything" (without conjoining, there is no containing) — and then it would be just like the other unconditioned [dharmas] (cessation-through-discrimination and the like never did contain forms; if space too fails to conjoin, it is no different from them, having lost even the capacity to contain).
One further question: within forms and the rest, is there space inside them, or not? Here too it is blocked both ways. If you say "there is" (space sits inside form), then space and form get jumbled together in one spot (two space-occupying things crammed into the same place — incoherent). If you say "there is not" (no space inside form), then space is not "pervading every place" after all (wherever there is form there is no space — so where is the pervasion?).
Pressing the same fault of "the unconditioned has but one substance," bring in cessation-through-discrimination and cessation-not-through-discrimination and refute them together. Cessation-through-discrimination is the unconditioned attained when, by the power of discriminating wisdom, the defilements are extinguished; cessation-not-through-discrimination is the unconditioned disclosed not through discrimination but when, a condition lacking, some dharma simply cannot arise. Now if cessation-through-discrimination had but one substance, then when you sever "one particular division, one particular class" of defilement and attain that share of cessation-through-discrimination, you ought at the same time to attain the cessation-through-discrimination of "all the remaining divisions and classes" as well (one substance: win a share, and you have won the whole). Likewise, if cessation-not-through-discrimination had but one substance, then when "one particular dharma," a condition lacking, attains its "non-arising" (cessation-not-through-discrimination), you ought to attain the cessation-not-through-discrimination of "all dharmas" as well (one substance: a share is the whole). Why does so strange a conclusion follow? Precisely because you grasped the unconditioned as having "but one substance"; carry that premise through, and this is what it comes to. (But in fact, severing this one class of defilement does not bring with it the cessation-through-discrimination of other classes — which shows the unconditioned is not "one substance" after all.)
Take next the road "it is many." Suppose the unconditioned is many: then it has its sorts and classes, its various differences — and that puts it on a par with forms and the like (whatever admits of sorts and differences is changeable, impermanent), so it would be no true unconditioned. And if space were many, then it could not "pervade and contain all" either (being many, each patch keeps to its own place, cut off from the rest — where is the pervasion?). As for the "unconditioned existing really and apart from mind and the mental factors" that the remaining schools maintain — these too can all be refuted by the very same reasoning used above against space.
One more refutation, by inference: you yourselves admit that the unconditioned [dharmas] are "without cause and without effect." But whatever is both causeless and effectless is just like "a hare's horn" — a thing that simply is not there. That being so, the unconditioned cannot be something "existing apart from mind and the rest" (the unconditioned is not some real thing standing apart from mind).
At this point someone presses with scripture: scripture plainly says "there are unconditioned dharmas, such as space" — how do you account for that? This must be understood by reconciliation. The "there is" that scripture speaks of, broadly, comes in two senses.
The first is "conventionally set up as existent in dependence on consciousness-transformation." How so? We have at some time heard the names "space" and the like spoken; thereupon we discriminate in the mind the appearances of "space" and the like; and as this is practiced over and over, when the mind and the rest arise, there appears within them an unconditioned-appearance resembling "space." This appearance that shows up looks much the same before and after, with no change about it, and so it is conventionally called "permanent" (this is the unconditioned merely set up for the moment by consciousness-transformation).
The second is "conventionally set up as existent in dependence on the dharma-nature." How so? There is the "suchness" disclosed by "emptiness and no-self" — say it is "existent," and you are wrong; say it is "non-existent," and you are wrong; say it is "neither existent nor non-existent," and that too cannot be pinned down; even the road of thinking it out with the mind or saying it in words is cut off. With respect to all dharmas, to call it "one and the same [as them]" is wrong, and to call it "two [from them]" is wrong; it just is the true principle of all dharmas, and so is called the "dharma-nature."
Upon this one same dharma-nature, viewed from differing angles, five unconditioned names are set up:
viewed as "apart from all obstructions," it is called "unconditioned space";
viewed as "the defilements extinguished by the power of discriminating wisdom, and [suchness] finally realized," it is called "cessation-through-discrimination";
viewed as "not by the power of discrimination — being originally pure of itself, or disclosed merely because some dharma's condition is lacking," it is called "cessation-not-through-discrimination";
viewed as "painful and pleasant feeling both stilled," it is called "the immovable";
viewed as "conception and feeling no longer at work," it is called "the cessation of conception-and-feeling."
These five unconditioned [names] are all set up in dependence on "suchness"; and in the end, even the word "suchness" is itself no more than a name set up for the moment.
Since even the name "suchness" is conventionally set up, why set up a name at all? The reasoning is this: not one of these words describes it positively; each only wards off a particular misunderstanding —
for fear one might "dismiss it outright and say it is simply nothing," it is said to be "existent";
for fear one might turn around and "grasp it as a real thing to be seized," it is said to be "empty";
for fear one might further "suppose it hollow, illusory, like a phantom," it is said to be "real";
and because its principle is not deluded and not inverted, it is called "suchness."
(So the four words "existent, empty, real, suchness" are all conventional names that ward off misunderstanding; they do not positively assign it a substance.) This marks it off from those other schools — who take "suchness" to be "a real, permanent dharma existing apart from form, mind, and the rest." The conclusion, therefore: those unconditioned [dharmas] are none of them definitely and really existent. (The refutation of the unconditioned ends here.)
5. Concluding the refutation of the dharma-attachment · establishing consciousness-only
Now, to wrap up, two inferences round off what was said above in refuting the dharma-attachment.
The first inference: the dharmas maintained by the heterodox and the other vehicles — all those taken to "exist apart from mind and the mental factors" — are in fact not really existent. Why? Because each "is an object that gets grasped"; and this is just like mind and the mental factors themselves (which, when grasped by their own self-witnessing part, are likewise not really existent apart from consciousness) — whatever is a grasped-object is not something existing really and apart from consciousness.
The second inference: the very "act of cognition that grasps those dharmas" (that is, consciousness) does not, in fact, really lay hold of "a dharma existing apart from consciousness, really." Why? Because it "is a grasper"; and this is just like "the later moment of cognition that grasps the immediately preceding moment of cognition" (the later grasping the earlier still grasps only what is on its own side, consciousness) — whatever is a grasper, what it grasps too is never apart from consciousness on its own side.
But this must be added: the very mind and mental factors that do the grasping are themselves "other-dependent" — meaning they arise only when sundry causes and conditions come together; and being so, they too are like something conjured up by illusion, not truly real (even mind and the mental factors are not really existent — said precisely to keep one from hearing "there is consciousness alone" and then turning around to take consciousness as real). So one must realize: "there is only consciousness" is said in the first place to break the deluded grasping at "a really-existent outer object apart from mind and the mental factors"; but if you turn around and grasp this very "there is only consciousness" as "truly and really existent," that is no different from grasping an outer object — it is, just the same, a kind of "dharma-attachment" (not even "consciousness-only" may be grasped as really existent).
6. The two dharma-attachments (innate · discriminated) and where they are severed
Now this "dharma-attachment" falls, broadly, into two kinds: one called "innate" (born with one, arising of itself, naturally there), and one called "discriminated" (stirred up later by mistaken teaching or mistaken thinking).
Take first the "innate dharma-attachment." It comes of false habit-energy perfumed over and over from beginningless time, [working] by the force of an inner cause; and so it stays with this body-and-mind always, never leaving; it needs no mistaken teaching, no deliberate wrong thinking, but turns of itself, ceaselessly — and just for this it is called "innate" (born with one). This kind is itself of two sorts:
The first is called "constantly continuing," the unbroken sort — it lies in the seventh consciousness, takes the eighth consciousness (its perceiving part) as object, raises an appearance within its own mind, and grasps it as a real dharma.
The second is called "intermittent," the sort that breaks off — it lies in the sixth consciousness, takes as object the "aggregate, base, and element" appearances that consciousness has transformed (the five aggregates, the twelve bases, the eighteen elements — the several schemes that break body, mind, and world down), grasping them now all together, now one by one, raising an appearance within its own mind and grasping it as a real dharma.
These two innate dharma-attachments, being very subtle, are hard to sever; only within the later bodhisattva "ten stages," by cultivating again and again the excellent "contemplation of the emptiness of dharmas" (the contemplation that all dharmas are without any real substance of their own), can they be removed.
Take next the "discriminated dharma-attachment." It comes about by the force of present outer conditions (things heard, things thought up), and is not born together with the body-and-mind; only on meeting mistaken teaching, plus mistaken thinking, does it then arise — and just for this it is called "discriminated" (drawn out later by discrimination); and it occurs only within the sixth mental consciousness. This kind too is of two sorts:
The first takes as object the "aggregate, base, and element" appearances spoken of in mistaken teaching, raises an appearance within its own mind, and — discriminating and reckoning — grasps it as a real dharma.
The second takes as object the "self-nature" and like appearances spoken of in mistaken teaching (the permanent, abiding self-nature the heterodox posit for things, or a divine self and the like), raises an appearance within its own mind, and — discriminating and reckoning — grasps it as a real dharma.
These two discriminated dharma-attachments, being coarser and more conspicuous, are easy to sever; the moment one enters the bodhisattva's "first stage," contemplating the "dharma-emptiness suchness" of all dharmas (the suchness disclosed by all dharmas being without real substance of their own), one can remove them.
7. The dharma-attachment's object: only the resembling-dharma of one's own mind
Of all the dharma-attachments just spoken of, looking to their objects: as for the dharmas outside one's own mind, some are there and some are not (they need not really be there); but as for the dharmas appearing within one's own mind, every one of them is there. This shows that every dharma-attachment refers, in fact, to "the resembling-dharma appearance that one's own mind manifests," and then grasps that appearance as really existent.
That said, this "appearance resembling a dharma" arises from the coming-together of sundry conditions, and so is "existent the way a phantom is" (it has its appearance, but is not really existent); while the "real dharma" that gets grasped is sheer deluded reckoning, and so is, flatly, not there at all.
Hence the World-Honored One said: "Maitreya (that is, the bodhisattva Maitreya), know this: what each consciousness takes as object is only what consciousness itself manifests — it is the other-dependent nature (arising only through the assembly of conditions), like something conjured by illusion." And so it is clear: the "self and dharmas apart from consciousness" that the heterodox and the other vehicles maintain are none of them really existent.
8. Resolving into consciousness-only · warding off the other-cluster and same-cluster as direct object
Therefore mind and the mental factors definitely do not take "forms and the like outside the mind" as their "object-support condition" (the very object they reach out to and cognize). Why? Because "the function of reaching out and cognizing" must have a "really-existent substance" to support it; and the outer dharmas apart from consciousness have no real substance at all, and so cannot serve as object-support condition.
Again, the mind and mental factors of "some other cluster" present now (the set of mind-dharmas in another person, or in another moment) are also not what "this cluster" of consciousness can "directly take as object" — they are just like dharmas one "cannot reach as object" at all (utterly unrelated things), because they belong within "that other cluster" (the mind in another's cluster my consciousness cannot directly lay hold of).
Furthermore, even the mental factors "within this same cluster of mine" (the feeling, conception, and the rest that arise together with the mind-king) are not what the mind-king can "directly take as object" — because the mental factors' own substance is, after all, a different thing from the mind-king (and from the perceived-part it transforms); they are just like the other dharmas one cannot reach. From these several points it should be clear: there is, in fact, no object outside the mind at all; there is only the inner consciousness transforming so as to "resemble" an outer object, so that it merely looks as though an outer object had arisen. (Here the conclusion "the myriad dharmas are consciousness-only" stands firm.)
And so a verse (gāthā) in scripture says: "The outer objects that the foolish discriminate are, every one, simply not there; it is only that habit-energy stirs and muddies the mind, and the mind therefore manifests a semblance of them and turns on so."
〔所釋之頌〕廣釋第一頌
破完了「有為」的色法與不相應行，還剩最後一類：「無為法」（像虛空、擇滅、非擇滅等）。論主連這個也破，然後就把「唯識」總結出來。本節依序講開：破無為、總結成唯識、二法執、法執所緣、結成唯識。
這一節破無為、結唯識，經根論本都早有所本。《解深密經·分別瑜伽品》說「我說識所緣，唯識所現」——影像唯是識的所現、識外沒有實境，這正是本節終結唯識所引「慈氏當知，諸識所緣，唯識所現」之經本。同經〈無自性相品〉以『三無自性』（相無自性、生無自性、勝義無自性）顯遍計無相、依他無生、圓成是勝義無性所顯——本節『依法性假立無為』（真如為空、無我所顯，有無俱非、心思言語的路都絕）所依的，正是這一段經。《楞伽經》以「藏識海」常住、被境界風一吹便騰起『種種識浪』為喻，顯外境的似現全是藏識所變。到論本《瑜伽師地論·攝決擇分》，更立了一個專目『決擇虛空、非擇滅二無為』，判定虛空『唯是諸色非有所顯、唯假有而非實物有』、判定非擇滅『唯滅唯靜、亦是假有而非實物有』——本節破『無為非離色心實有』，所破與所立全與《瑜伽》相契；《瑜伽》同處又錄《解深密》「識所緣唯識所現」，與本節結成唯識同源。本節護法糅釋所宗，經在《解深密》《楞伽》，論在《瑜伽師地論》——下面順著科判講開。
甲、破無為法
窺基《述記》把這一段「破無為」的章法分成三段：先「破外計」（破他宗所執的實無為）、次「顯正理」（顯本宗的會通）、第三「結非」（總結諸無為非定實有）。其中「破外計」又分「總非」（總體否定它實有）和「別破」（逐一破虛空、擇滅等）；而「總非」一段再開三節——先「總非無實」、次「顯法定無」（以定有法三種為判）、後「為量遮破」（以兔角等比量遮）。下面就順這個章法看。
執諸「無為法」離開色心而決定實有，於理不可得。先立一個判準：什麼叫「決定是有」的法？大略三種——一是「現所知法」，如色、心（現量所知）；二是「現受用法」，如瓶、衣；這兩類世間共認是有、不待立因。三是「有作用法」，如眼、耳，由它的作用而推知它有。可「無為」呢？它不在前兩類之列（非世共知），又沒有作用（不像眼耳要靠作用才知有）；就算勉強承認它有作用，有作用的又該是無常了。所以不能執無為「決定實有」。再說，無為既是「所知」、又是『色心等所顯的性』，就跟色心一樣（都有所依），不該把它執成離色心而獨存的實無為性。
特別破「虛空」：它的體是「一」還是「多」？若體是「一」、周遍一切處：因虛空能容受色等法，那就該隨它所容的諸法（各在一處）而把體變成「多」——因為『這一處所容（的虛空）』，別處（諸法所在處的虛空）便不（與此法）相合（隨法各別就成多）。若不這樣（仍執一體不隨法別），那諸法就該互相周遍了（虛空一體遍諸法、法也跟著互遍）。若救說『虛空根本不與法相合』，那它就「不能容受」了，跟其餘無為（如擇滅不容受色）一樣，失了它「容受」的本義。又問：色等法之中有沒有虛空？若「有」（虛空在色中），就該與色相雜（二礙同處）；若「無」（色中無虛空），就該不周遍（有色處即無空）。又（例破擇滅、非擇滅的體一）：斷「一部、一品」的煩惱結時，就該同時得到『其餘部、其餘品』的擇滅了（擇滅體一、得一即得一切）；某「一法」因緣欠缺而得「不生」時，就該對「一切法」都得非擇滅了（非擇滅體一、一得一切）——因為執它體一，理應如此（可實際斷一品不得餘品擇滅，正反證它非體一）。若說體是「多」，那就有了品類差別、該像色等一樣非真無為；虛空也該不再『周遍容受』（多則各局、不遍）了。其餘部派執『離心心所而實有的無為』，都照前面（破虛空等）破。又：諸無為既承認「無因、無果」，就該像兔角一樣（無因果者非實），不是異於心等而別有。
那經裡明明說「有虛空等諸無為法」，怎麼講？論主會通成兩層意思。第一層，「依識變假施設有」：曾聽過「虛空」等名，隨之分別出虛空等的相，串習久了，心等生起時就現似虛空等無為之相；這所現的相前後相似、沒有變易，就假說它「常」。第二層，「依法性假施設有」：由「空、無我」所顯的「真如」——它說有、說無、說非有非無都不可定言，心思言語的路都絕了，與一切法非一非異，是諸法的真理，所以叫「法性」。就著這法性：離一切障礙叫「虛空（無為）」、由簡擇智的力滅盡雜染、究竟證會叫「擇滅（無為）」、不由簡擇之力而本性清淨（或由緣欠缺而顯）叫「非擇滅（無為）」、苦樂受滅叫「不動（無為）」、想受不行叫「想受滅（無為）」——這五種無為都是依「真如」假立的，連「真如」這名字本身也是假施設。為什麼還要立「真如」之名？為遮『把它撥成無』才說它「有」、為遮『把它執成實』才說它「空」、為遮『說它虛幻』才說它「實」、因它的理不虛妄顛倒才叫「真如」。這跟別宗『離色心另有一個實常之法、叫真如』完全不同。窺基《述記》在這裡特別揀別大乘的「真如」和薩婆多等所執的「實有無為」之異：前面破不相應行時，因不相應行不離色心，可以說它『不異色心』；可是這些「無為」並非即是色心，所以不能像破不相應行那樣說它『不異色心』，只能說『離開色心而實有的無為，決定是沒有』。至於大乘的「真如」，對著有為法乃是「非即非離、不異不一」——這跟薩婆多執一個離色心的實常無為判然有別，所以破他宗並不傷及大乘的真如。所以諸無為都不是決定實有。
乙、總結破法執·成立唯識
把外道、小乘所執的實法破盡，論主用一個總推論收束：他們所執那些『異於心心所』的諸法，並非實有性——因為它『是所取（被認知的對象）』，凡所取的就如同（自證所緣的）心、心所一樣（不離識）；而『能認取那些法的覺（識）』也並不真緣到它們（離識實法）——因為它「是能取」，凡能取的，所緣都不離自識（如同『緣這覺的覺』）。
但要小心：諸心、心所自己也是「依他起」（依眾緣而起），也像幻化之事、並非真實有。說「唯有識」，本是為了遣除『心心所之外另有實境』的妄執；若反過來把「唯識」也執為真實有，那就跟執外境一樣，同樣是「法執」。
丙、二法執（俱生·分別）及其斷位
跟我執一樣，諸「法執」也分兩類：「俱生」和「分別」。「俱生法執」由無始以來的虛妄熏習、內在因力，恒常跟著身命，不待邪教與邪分別、任運而轉，所以叫「俱生」。它又分兩種：一種「常相續」，在第七識，緣第八識（的見分）變起自心的相、執為實法；一種「有間斷」，在第六識，緣識所變的「蘊、處、界」相，或總緣、或別緣，變起自心的相、執為實法。這兩種俱生法執很微細、難斷，要在後面的「十地」中一再修『殊勝的法空觀』，才除得掉。「分別法執」由現在的外緣力，不是與生俱來，要等遇上邪教、起了邪分別才生，所以叫「分別」；只在第六意識裡有。它也分兩種：一種緣邪教所說的「蘊、處、界相」、一種緣邪教所說的「自性」等相（外道立的法自性、神我等），變起自心的相，加以分別、計度、執為實法。這兩種分別法執比較粗顯、容易斷，一入「初地」、觀照一切法的「法空真如」，就能除滅。
丁、法執所緣，唯是自心所現的「似法」
把上面所說的一切法執合起來看：它們所緣的，在自心之外的法或有或無（未必實有），而在自心之內所現的法則一切都有；所以一切法執，其實都是緣『自心所現的似法相』，執它為實有。然而這『似法之相』是眾緣所生的，所以是『如幻而有』；至於所執的「實法」，純是妄加計度而成，決定是沒有。所以世尊說：『慈氏（彌勒）應當知道：諸識的所緣，唯是識的所現，是依他起性，如幻化之事等。』這樣，外道、小乘所執『離識的我、法』，就全都不是實有了。
戊、結成唯識·遮『他聚、同聚』為親所緣
於是「唯識」立穩了。其一，心、心所決定不會拿『心外的色等法』作所緣緣，因為『能緣的作用』一定得依『實有的體』（而心外之法沒有實體，不堪作所緣緣）。其二，現在『別一聚』（他人、或他剎那）的心、心所法，並不是『這一聚』識的「親所緣緣」——就像那些『全不相干、非所緣』的法一樣，因為它是『他聚所攝』（他聚的心不是此識的親緣）。其三，連同一聚中的「心所」（與心王同起的受、想等），也不是心王的親所緣，因為它的自體與心王（的相分）有別，如同其餘非所取的法。由此可知：實無心外之境，唯有內識變似外境而生。正如經中的「伽他」（偈頌）所說：『如愚夫所分別的外境，其實全都沒有；只因習氣擾亂渾濁了心，心才現似那外境而轉。』
承衍
本節『破無為、結成唯識』所立，唯識一系後出諸論依次承用。《百法明門論》把「無為法」列為第五位，開出『六無為』（虛空、擇滅、非擇滅、不動、想受滅、真如）——本節正破這些無為『離色心而實有』，並判它們是依識變、依法性所假立；心法、心所、色法、不相應行四位之外，無為居第五位，也由此確立。《唯識三十論頌》第一頌「由假說我法……彼依識所變」，本節即是此頌『廣辯破法執』的收束結分，逐頌相承。《唯識二十論》立「三界唯識」、明『內識生時似外境現，此中都無少分實義』——這跟本節「實無外境，唯有內識，似外境生」正面對位，同立『似外境現而境無實』之宗。《辯中邊論·辯相品》辯「虛妄分別」，立『境無而識有、識現似外境』，與本節結成唯識同一脈絡。《攝大乘論·所知相分》辨「依他起、遍計所執」——似法是從緣而生、如幻而有，所執實法則決定非有，正與本節『法執所緣唯是似法』相涉。
We have already refuted the conditioned dharmas — the form-dharmas (matter) and the dharmas-not-concomitant-with-mind. One last category remains: the unconditioned dharmas (the asaṃskṛta — such as empty space, cessation-through-analysis, and cessation-not-through-analysis). The author of the treatise refutes these as well, and then draws the whole argument together into "consciousness-only." This section opens out in order: refuting the unconditioned, summing up into consciousness-only, the two kinds of dharma-grasping, the object that dharma-grasping takes, and the final establishing of consciousness-only.
This refutation of the unconditioned and conclusion into consciousness-only has its roots in scripture and treatise alike. The Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, in its chapter on the discernment of yoga, says "the object I speak of is consciousness-only, what consciousness manifests" — the image is solely what consciousness manifests, and there is no real realm outside consciousness; this is exactly the scriptural basis for the words this section quotes at the close, "Maitreya should know — the object of the various consciousnesses is only what consciousness manifests." The same sūtra, in its chapter on the absence of self-nature, sets out the "three kinds of absence of self-nature" (the absence of self-nature in characteristic, in arising, and in the ultimate sense), showing that the wholly-imagined is without characteristic, the other-dependent is without arising, and the perfectly-accomplished is what the ultimate absence of self-nature displays — and this is the very passage on which this section's "the unconditioned is provisionally established in dependence on the nature of dharmas" rests (the suchness displayed by emptiness and no-self, of which existence and non-existence are alike unsayable, the road of thought and speech cut off). The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra gives the image of "the store-consciousness as an ocean," abiding constantly, that the wind of objects stirs into surging "waves of the various consciousnesses," showing that the seeming manifestation of outer objects is wholly transformed by the store-consciousness. Coming to the treatise, the Yogācārabhūmi, in its section settling the meaning by selection, sets up a dedicated heading "settling empty space and cessation-not-through-analysis, the two unconditioned," and rules that empty space "is only the non-existence of the various matter-dharmas displayed, only provisionally existent and not a real thing," and that cessation-not-through-analysis "is only cessation, only stillness, and is likewise provisionally existent and not a real thing" — so that this section's refutation of "the unconditioned existing really apart from matter and mind" agrees, in what it refutes and what it establishes, entirely with the Yogācārabhūmi; and that same place in the Yogācārabhūmi also records the Saṃdhinirmocana's "the object is consciousness-only, what consciousness manifests," sharing one source with this section's conclusion into consciousness-only. What this section's synthetic commentary takes as its authority has its scriptural root in the Saṃdhinirmocana and the Laṅkāvatāra, and its treatise-basis in the Yogācārabhūmi — and following the outline, we now open the exposition.
Four. Refuting the unconditioned dharmas
Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) divides the plan of this "refuting the unconditioned" passage into three parts: first "refuting the outsiders' position" (refuting the real unconditioned that the other schools grasp), next "displaying the right principle" (displaying our own school's harmonization), and third "concluding its negation" (summing up that the various unconditioned dharmas are not determinately real). Within these, "refuting the outsiders' position" further splits into "the general negation" (denying as a whole that it is real) and "the particular refutation" (refuting empty space, cessation-through-analysis, and the rest one by one); and the "general negation" itself opens into three steps — first "the general negation of its reality," next "displaying that the dharma is determinately non-existent" (judging by the three kinds of determinately-existent dharma), and last "refuting by inference" (using the hare's horns and the like as inferential disproof). The passage now follows this plan.
To grasp the unconditioned dharmas as standing apart from matter and mind and being determinately, truly real cannot be sustained on reason. First, set up a criterion: what is it that counts as a dharma "determinately existent"? Broadly, three kinds. The first is a presently-known dharma, such as matter and mind, which are known by direct perception. The second is a presently-used dharma, such as a jar or a garment. These first two kinds the world holds in common to be existent; they need no further reason set up to prove them. The third is a dharma that has efficacy — such as the eye or the ear, whose existence we infer from its functioning. But what of the unconditioned? It does not fall into the first two classes, for it is not what the world commonly recognizes; and it has no efficacy either, unlike the eye and ear that are known to exist only through their functioning. And even if one grudgingly grants that it has some efficacy, then whatever has efficacy would have to be impermanent. Therefore one cannot grasp the unconditioned as determinately, truly real. Moreover, since the unconditioned is itself something known, and is a nature displayed by matter, mind, and the rest, it is on the same footing as matter and mind (it too has something it depends on); so it should not be grasped as some real unconditioned-nature standing alone apart from matter and mind.
Now refute empty space in particular: is its substance one or many? Suppose its substance is one, pervading every location. Because empty space accommodates matter and the other dharmas, its substance ought to follow the various dharmas it accommodates (each of which occupies its own place) and so become many — for the empty space "accommodated at this one place" would not coincide, at another place, with the empty space (where the other dharmas stand); following the dharmas, each is separate, and so it becomes many. If one refuses this (still insisting the substance is one and does not divide along with the dharmas), then the dharmas themselves would have to interpenetrate one another (a single pervasive space holding all dharmas, the dharmas thereby pervading each other too). If one rescues the position by saying that empty space simply does not coincide with the dharmas at all, then it would fail to accommodate them — and would be just like the remaining unconditioned dharmas (as cessation-through-analysis does not accommodate matter), losing the very meaning of "accommodation" that is its own. Again, ask: within matter and the other dharmas, is there empty space or not? If there is (space inside matter), then it would be mixed in with matter (two obstructing things in the same place). If there is not (no space inside matter), then it would fail to pervade (where there is matter there would be no space).
And take the same line against the unity-of-substance of cessation-through-analysis and cessation-not-through-analysis: when one severs the afflictive bonds of "one portion, one grade," one would have to obtain at the same instant the cessation-through-analysis of "the remaining portions, the remaining grades" as well (cessation-through-analysis being one in substance, to obtain one is to obtain all); and when "one dharma," lacking the needed conditions, comes to be "non-arisen," one would have to obtain the cessation-not-through-analysis of "all dharmas" (cessation-not-through-analysis being one in substance, to obtain one is to obtain all) — for if you grasp its substance as one, this is how it ought to go. Yet in fact severing one grade does not obtain the cessation-through-analysis of the remaining grades, and this very fact proves in reverse that it is not one in substance. Now suppose instead the substance is many: then it has differences of kind and class, and ought, like matter and the rest, to be no true unconditioned; and empty space too would then no longer "pervade and accommodate" (being many, each is confined to its own place and does not pervade). The other schools that grasp "a truly existent unconditioned apart from mind and mental factors" are all refuted just as above (in the refutation of empty space and the rest). Further: since the unconditioned dharmas are themselves admitted to be without cause and without effect, they ought to be like a hare's horns (what has neither cause nor effect is not real) — not something existing separately, distinct from mind and the rest.
But the scriptures plainly say "there are empty space and the other unconditioned dharmas." How is this to be taken? The author harmonizes it into two layers of meaning. The first layer is "provisionally posited as existent in dependence on the transformations of consciousness": one has heard the names "empty space" and the rest, and accordingly discriminates the characteristics of empty space and the rest; with this habituated over long practice, when mind and the rest arise they manifest a semblance of the characteristics of empty space and the other unconditioned dharmas. Because this manifested characteristic is similar before and after, without alteration, it is provisionally called "permanent." The second layer is "provisionally posited as existent in dependence on the nature of dharmas": the suchness displayed by emptiness and no-self — to call it existent, or non-existent, or neither-existent-nor-non-existent cannot be settled in words; the very road of thought and speech is cut off; it is neither identical with nor different from any dharma; it is the truth of all dharmas, and so it is called the nature of dharmas. With respect to this nature of dharmas: to be free of every obstruction is called "empty space (unconditioned)"; the extinguishing of the defiled by the power of discriminating wisdom, the final realization, is called "cessation-through-analysis (unconditioned)"; what is pure in its own nature without the power of discrimination (or what is displayed through the lack of conditions) is called "cessation-not-through-analysis (unconditioned)"; the cessation of pleasant and painful feeling is called "the immovable (unconditioned)"; and the non-operation of perception and feeling is called "the cessation of perception-and-feeling (unconditioned)." All five of these unconditioned dharmas are provisionally established in dependence on suchness — and even the name "suchness" itself is only provisionally posited. Why then still set up the name "suchness"? In order to block the dismissing of it into nothingness, we say that it "exists"; in order to block the grasping of it as something real, we say that it is "empty"; in order to block the calling of it illusory, we say that it is "real"; and because its principle is not false and not inverted, it is named "suchness." This is altogether unlike the other schools' position, that "there is some real, permanent dharma standing apart from matter and mind, called suchness." Here Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) draws a careful distinction between the Mahāyāna's "suchness" and the "really existent unconditioned" grasped by the Sarvāstivādins and the like. Earlier, in refuting the dharmas-not-concomitant-with-mind, since those dharmas are not apart from matter and mind, one could say they are "not different from matter and mind"; but these unconditioned dharmas are not themselves matter and mind, and so one cannot, as in refuting the dharmas-not-concomitant, say they are "not different from matter and mind" — one can only say that "an unconditioned that is really existent apart from matter and mind is determinately non-existent." As for the Mahāyāna's "suchness," in relation to the conditioned dharmas it is "neither identical nor apart, neither different nor one" — and this is sharply distinct from the Sarvāstivādins' grasping at a real, permanent unconditioned standing apart from matter and mind; so refuting the other schools does not touch the Mahāyāna's suchness. Therefore none of the unconditioned dharmas is determinately, truly real.
Five. Summing up the refutation of dharma-grasping and establishing consciousness-only
Having exhausted the refutation of the real dharmas grasped by the non-Buddhist schools and the lesser vehicle, the author closes the matter with a single overarching inference: those dharmas they grasp as "distinct from mind and mental factors" are not of truly-real nature — because each of them is something grasped (an object of cognition), and whatever is grasped is, like the mind and mental factors (whose objects the self-witnessing portion takes), inseparable from consciousness. And the awareness (the consciousness) that grasps those dharmas does not in fact reach them either (as real dharmas apart from consciousness) — because it is a grasper, and whatever is a grasper has its object inseparable from its own consciousness (just as in "the awareness that takes this awareness" as its object).
But here is the caution: the mind and mental factors are themselves other-dependent (arising in dependence on a host of conditions); they too are like a conjured thing and are not truly real. To say "there is only consciousness" was, in the first place, to dispel the deluded grasping that "apart from mind and mental factors there is some real object." If one then turns about and grasps even "consciousness-only" as truly real, that is exactly the same as grasping outer objects — it is equally a case of dharma-grasping.
Six. The two kinds of dharma-grasping (innate and discriminated) and where each is severed
Just as with self-grasping, the dharma-graspings too divide into two kinds: innate and discriminated.
Innate dharma-grasping arises from the deluded perfuming since beginningless time, an inner causal force; it accompanies the body-and-life constantly, does not wait upon false teachings or false discrimination, and turns of its own momentum — and so it is called "innate." It is itself of two sorts. One is constantly continuous: it lies in the seventh consciousness, which takes the eighth consciousness (its perceiving portion) as object, conjures up a characteristic in its own mind, and grasps it as a real dharma. The other is with interruptions: it lies in the sixth consciousness, which takes the characteristics of the aggregates, sense-fields, and elements that consciousness has transformed — sometimes grasping them collectively, sometimes singly — conjures up a characteristic in its own mind, and grasps it as a real dharma. These two innate dharma-graspings are very subtle and hard to sever; only by repeatedly cultivating the excellent contemplation of the emptiness of dharmas throughout the later ten grounds can they be removed.
Discriminated dharma-grasping arises from a present external-conditioning force; it is not inborn, but waits until one meets a false teaching and gives rise to false discrimination before it arises — and so it is called "discriminated"; it is present only within the sixth, the mental consciousness. It too divides into two sorts: one takes as object the "characteristics of the aggregates, sense-fields, and elements" as stated by a false teaching; the other takes as object the "self-nature" and similar characteristics stated by a false teaching (the inherent natures of dharmas and the divine self posited by the non-Buddhist schools) — conjuring up a characteristic in its own mind, then discriminating, calculating, and grasping it as a real dharma. These two discriminated dharma-graspings are comparatively coarse and obvious, and easy to sever: as soon as one enters the first ground and contemplates the suchness that is the emptiness of dharmas in all dharmas, they can be extinguished.
Seven. The object of dharma-grasping is only the "semblance-dharma" manifested by one's own mind
Take together all the dharma-graspings spoken of above. What they take as object — the dharmas outside one's own mind — may exist or may not (they are not necessarily real); but the dharmas manifested within one's own mind all exist. Therefore every dharma-grasping is in fact taking as object the "characteristics of semblance-dharmas manifested by one's own mind," and grasping them as truly real. Yet these "characteristics of semblance-dharmas" are produced by a host of conditions, and so they are "existent as an illusion is existent"; whereas the "real dharmas" that are grasped are purely a fabrication of deluded calculation, and are determinately non-existent. This is why the World-Honored One said: "Maitreya should know — the object of the various consciousnesses is only what consciousness manifests; it is of other-dependent nature, like a conjured thing and the like." In this way, the self and the dharmas "apart from consciousness" that the non-Buddhist schools and the lesser vehicle grasp are, every one of them, not truly real.
Eight. The final establishing of consciousness-only: ruling out "another aggregation" and "the same aggregation" as the immediate object
And so consciousness-only stands firm. First: mind and mental factors will determinately not take "form-dharmas outside the mind" as their object-condition, for the "function of taking an object" must rest upon a truly-existent substance (and dharmas outside the mind have no real substance, and so cannot serve as object-condition). Second: the mind and mental factors of "another aggregation" in the present (another person's, or another moment's) are not the immediate object-condition of "this aggregation's" consciousness — just like those dharmas that are wholly unrelated and are not its object — because they belong to "another aggregation" (and the mind of another aggregation is not the immediate object of this consciousness). Third: even the "mental factors" within the same aggregation (the feeling, perception, and the rest arising together with the mind-king) are not the immediate object of the mind-king, because their own substance is distinct from the mind-king (from its image-portion), just like the remaining dharmas that are not grasped. From this it is to be known: there truly is no object outside the mind; there is only inner consciousness transforming so as to resemble an outer object and thereby arising. As the verse in the scripture says: "The outer objects that the foolish discriminate are, in truth, wholly non-existent; it is only that habit-energies have stirred and muddied the mind, so that the mind manifests a semblance of those outer objects and turns."
Onward Transmission
What this section establishes — refuting the unconditioned and concluding into consciousness-only — the later treatises of the consciousness-only line take up one by one. The Hundred Dharmas treatise lists the "unconditioned dharmas" as the fifth category, opening out the "six unconditioned" (empty space, cessation-through-analysis, cessation-not-through-analysis, the immovable, the cessation of perception-and-feeling, and suchness) — and this section is precisely the refutation of these unconditioned dharmas as "existing really apart from matter and mind," judging them to be provisionally established in dependence on the transformations of consciousness and on the nature of dharmas; it is also from here that the fifth category, the unconditioned, standing beyond the four categories of mind-dharmas, mental factors, form-dharmas, and dharmas-not-concomitant-with-mind, is fixed in place. In the Thirty Verses, the first verse — "by provisional speech there are self and dharmas... these rest upon the transformations of consciousness" — finds in this section the concluding part that "broadly argues the refutation of dharma-grasping," verse answering to verse. The Twenty Verses establishes that "the three realms are consciousness-only" and makes clear that "when inner consciousness arises it manifests the semblance of an outer object, and in this there is not the least real meaning" — which stands directly opposite this section's "there truly is no outer object; there is only inner consciousness arising so as to resemble an outer object," both establishing the thesis that "an outer object seems to manifest, yet the object has no reality." The Madhyānta-vibhāga, in its chapter on characteristics, argues "false discrimination," establishing that "the object is non-existent while consciousness exists, and consciousness manifests the semblance of an outer object" — of one strand with this section's conclusion into consciousness-only. The Mahāyāna-saṃgraha, in its chapter on the characteristics of the knowable, distinguishes "the other-dependent and the wholly-imagined" — the semblance-dharma being produced from conditions and existent as an illusion is existent, while the grasped real dharma is determinately non-existent — which bears directly on this section's "the object of dharma-grasping is only the semblance-dharma."
考據Apparatus
〔所釋之頌〕廣釋第一頌
本章承破我法執之末，釋無為非離色心實有（虛空·擇滅·非擇滅等），終結成唯識——是《唯識三十論頌》第一頌廣辯之結。
一、科判定位
| 科判 | 此章之位 |
|---|---|
| 破我法執 | 破我執 → 破法執（破有為·色法·不相應行 → 破無為）→ 結成唯識 |
| 破法執章內 | 破無為（總非·別破虛空擇滅非擇滅·會通契經）· 總結成唯識 · 二法執（俱生·分別）· 法執所緣唯似法 · 結成唯識遮他聚同聚 |
| 所釋頌 | 《唯識三十論頌》第一頌「由假說我法，有種種相轉……」之廣辯結分 |
破法執次第破有為（色法·不相應行）已訖，本章破最後一類「無為」，破竟而我法二執俱遣，乃總收「實無外境，唯有內識，似外境生」——下啟『廣辯三能變』（初能變·阿賴耶起）。
二、源頌 · 義理脈絡
「由假說我法，有種種相轉。彼依識所變，此能變唯三：謂異熟、思量，及了別境識。」 〔T1586 0060a27–a29〕
第一頌標『我、法皆依識所變而假說』，本論依之先廣破外道、餘乘所執實我實法，本章即此廣辯之收束：破訖有為，更破無為，令『離識實法』一無所立，乃成「唯識」。
| 頌語 | 本章義門 | 所辯 |
|---|---|---|
| 假說我法 | 破無為 | 虛空·擇滅·非擇滅等亦假施設，非離色心實有 |
| 彼依識所變 | 結成唯識 | 似法相從緣生如幻，所執實法妄計度決定非有 |
| 此能變唯三 | 遮所緣緣 | 心心所不用外法為所緣緣，他聚·同聚皆非親所緣 |
本章破無為，先立『定有法三種』判準（現所知·現受用·有作用）以遮無為實有，次別破虛空『體一·體多』兩關、例破擇滅非擇滅，後會通契經所說無為為「依識變假立」『依法性假立』二義。本論於『種子由何而有』一類設諸「有義」，本章『依識變·依法性』乃會通之雙開，諸說具於〔義疏〕。
三、經論宗依（經證 → 論本）
經證
我說識所緣，唯識所現故。 〔解深密經·分別瑜伽品 T676 0698b02〕
勝義生！當知我依三種無自性性密意，說言一切諸法皆無自性，所謂相無自性性、生無自性性、勝義無自性性。 〔解深密經·無自性相品 T676 0694a13–a15〕
藏識海常住，境界風所動，種種諸識浪，騰躍而轉生。 〔楞伽阿跋多羅寶經 T670 0484b11–b12〕
《解深密·分別瑜伽品》以「識所緣唯識所現」明影像唯識、無離識實境——本章結成唯識所引「慈氏當知，諸識所緣，唯識所現」之經本；〈無自性相品〉以三無自性（相·生·勝義）顯遍計無相、依他無生、圓成勝義無性——本章『依法性假立無為』（真如為空無我所顯、心言路絕）所依之經本。《楞伽》以藏識海起諸識浪，顯外境似現皆識所變。
論本（瑜伽師地論 T1579）
復次，虛空云何？謂唯諸色非有所顯，是名虛空……是故當知此唯假有，非實物有。 〔T1579·攝決擇分 0593a15–a18〕
復次，云何非擇滅？謂若餘法生緣現前，餘法生故，餘不得生，唯滅、唯靜，名非擇滅……是故此滅亦是假有，非實物有。 〔T1579·攝決擇分 0593a19–a22〕
我說識所緣、唯識所現故。 〔T1579·攝決擇分 0724a06〕
《瑜伽·攝決擇分》立專目『決擇虛空非擇滅二無為』，斷虛空『唯諸色非有所顯·唯假有非實物有』、斷非擇滅『唯滅唯靜·亦是假有非實物有』——本章破無為（無為非離色心實有）之論本，所破與所立全契。〈攝決擇分〉復錄《解深密》「識所緣唯識所現」，與本章結成唯識同源。護法糅釋所宗，其經在解深密、楞伽，其論在瑜伽師地論。
四、本論釋要（護法糅釋 · T1585）
破無為 · 總非無實
諸無為法離色、心等決定實有，理不可得。 〔T1585 0006b15〕
判準 · 定有法三種
且定有法，略有三種：一、現所知法，如色、心等。二、現受用法，如瓶、衣等，如是二法，世共知有，不待因成。三、有作用法，如眼、耳等，由彼彼用證知是有。無為非世共知定有，又無作用，如眼、耳等。設許有用，應是無常，故不可執無為定有。 〔T1585 0006b15–b21〕
別破虛空 · 體一體多
又虛空等為一、為多？若體是一，遍一切處……隨能合法，體應成多，一所合處餘不合故……若體是多，便有品類，應如色等，非實無為。 〔T1585 0006b23–c02〕
例破擇滅非擇滅 · 體一之失
一部、一品結法斷時，應得餘部、餘品擇滅；一法緣闕得不生時，應於一切得非擇滅。執彼體一，理應爾故。 〔T1585 0006b28–c01〕
比量 · 無因果如兔角
又諸無為許無因果故，應如兔角，非異心等有。 〔T1585 0006c04–c05〕
會通契經 · 二假施設
然契經說，有虛空等諸無為法，略有二種：一、依識變假施設有……二、依法性，假施設有。謂空、無我所顯真如，有、無、俱非，心言路絕，與一切法非一、異等，是法真理，故名法性。 〔T1585 0006c05–c12〕
五無為皆依真如假立
離諸障礙，故名虛空；由簡擇力，滅諸雜染，究竟證會，故名擇滅；不由擇力，本性清淨，或緣闕所顯，故名非擇滅；苦、樂受滅，故名不動；想、受不行，名想受滅。此五皆依真如假立，真如亦是假施設名。 〔T1585 0006c12–c17〕
真如四遮 · 名亦假
遮撥為無，故說為有；遮執為有，故說為空；勿謂虛、幻，故說為實；理非妄倒，故名真如……故諸無為非定實有。 〔T1585 0006c17–c20〕
結成唯識 · 二法執
為遣妄執心、心所外實有境故，說唯有識。若執唯識真實有者，如執外境，亦是法執。 〔T1585 0006c24–c26〕
法執所緣 · 唯似法
是故法執皆緣自心所現似法，執為實有。然似法相從緣生故，是如幻有，所執實法妄計度故，決定非有。 〔T1585 0007a13–a16〕
引經結成
故世尊說：「慈氏當知，諸識所緣，唯識所現，依他起性，如幻事等。」如是外道、餘乘所執離識我、法皆非實有。 〔T1585 0007a16–a18〕
遮他聚同聚 · 結唯內識
現在彼聚心、心所法，非此聚識親所緣緣……同聚心所亦非親所緣，自體異故……由此應知，實無外境，唯有內識，似外境生。 〔T1585 0007a20–a23〕
要義：破無為，先以『定有法三種』（現所知·現受用·有作用）為判，定無為既非世共知、復無作用，許有用則墮無常，故不得執實。別破虛空以『體一·體多』兩關夾之：執一則隨法成多、不隨則諸法互遍、不合則失容受；執多則有品類同色，皆非真無為。擇滅、非擇滅例以『斷一品應得餘品擇滅、一法不生應得一切非擇滅』破其體一。更以『無因果如兔角』一量總遮。會通契經所說無為，判為二假：依識變者（聞名起相、數習所現、似常無實）、依法性者（空無我所顯真如，離障名虛空、簡擇滅染名擇滅、本淨緣闕名非擇滅、苦樂滅名不動、想受不行名想受滅）。連「真如」之名亦假，立名唯為四遮（遮撥無·遮執有·遮虛幻·遮妄倒），不同餘宗別立離色心之實常法。破我法二執既訖，乃結「唯有內識，似外境生」，並遮他聚、同聚心心所為親所緣，以坐實「實無外境」。
五、諸家異釋（窺基《述記》T1830）
次下第三、破無為法，於中有三：初破外計；次顯正理；第三結非。就破外中，初總非，後別破。總非中有三：初總非無實；次顯法定無；後為量遮破。 〔T1830 0289b11–b14〕
薩婆多等實有無為，此中皆破。然不相應即色、心等，故初遮中皆言不異，此諸無為非即色等，不可言不異，但可言離色等實有定無。大乘真如望有為法，非即非離，不異不一，既殊彼計，故破無失。 〔T1830 0289b16–b20〕
〔依識變假施設有〕此無本質，唯心所變，如極微等……此即七地以前有漏加行心等。緣名起分別相……此皆變境而緣故也。 〔T1830 0291a03–a17〕
〔依法性假施設有〕此顯空等依真如立……此空無我所顯真如 〔T1830 0291a29–b04〕
窺基判破無為科為三（初破外計·次顯正理·第三結非），破外復分總非、別破，總非更開三節（總非無實·顯法定無·為量遮破）。又揀別大乘「真如」與薩婆多「實有無為」之異：不相應行可言『不異色心』，諸無為則非即色心，唯可言『離色心實有定無』；大乘真如望有為法乃「非即非離、不異不一」，與彼實常之計判然有別，故破彼不傷大乘真如。於「依識變」釋為無本質、唯心所變、聞名起相之有漏加行所緣；於「依法性」釋為空無我唯遮非表所顯之真如。諸異計之繫名（何說屬薩婆多等何部），《述記》詳之。
六、譯名 · 古譯對讀（玄奘 ↔ 真諦《轉識論》）
| 義 | 玄奘《成唯識論》 | 真諦《轉識論》 |
|---|---|---|
| 結成唯識 | 實無外境，唯有內識，似外境生 | 離識之外無別境，但唯有識義成（「離識之外無別境，但唯有識義成」〔0062c13–c14〕） |
| 能所即三性 | 依他起·遍計所執（似法從緣·所執妄計） | 能分別即依他性·所分別即分別性（「能即依他性、所即分別性」〔0062c12〕） |
| 唯識之究極 | 唯識亦不可實執（執唯識真實有，亦是法執） | 境識俱泯即實性·即阿摩羅識（「此境識俱泯即是實性，實性即是阿摩羅識」〔0062c18–c19〕） |
玄奘結「唯有內識、似外境生」而誡『執唯識真實亦是法執』，止於依他·圓成；真諦《轉識論》以『離識無別境、唯有識義成』結唯識，更進言『境識俱泯即實性、即阿摩羅識（第九）』——古譯於唯識之究極一分歧：玄奘攝歸真如（圓成實），真諦別立阿摩羅識。
七、術語
無為（asaṃskṛta）— 不待因緣造作之法；本章破其離色心實有，判為依識變·依法性所假立。 虛空（ākāśa）— 唯諸色非有所顯；離諸障礙假名虛空無為。 擇滅（pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha）— 由簡擇智力滅諸雜染、究竟證會所顯之無為。 非擇滅（apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha）— 不由簡擇力、本性清淨或緣闕所顯之無為。 真如（tathatā）— 空無我所顯之法性、諸法真理；有無俱非、心言路絕，名亦假施設（遮撥無·遮執有·遮虛幻·遮妄倒）。 所緣緣（ālambana-pratyaya）— 能緣之用所依之實有體境；本章遮外法·他聚·同聚為親所緣緣。 〔梵文為古德所傳發音輔助。〕
八、互讀（唯識系次第：百法 → 三十頌 → 二十論 → 辯中邊論 → 攝大乘論）
- 百法：無為法（六無為：虛空·擇滅·非擇滅·不動·想受滅·真如）——本章正破其離色心實有；心法·心所·色法·不相應行四位之外，無為為第五位。
- 三十頌：第一頌「由假說我法……彼依識所變」——本章為此頌廣辯破法執之結分；逐頌姊妹。
- 二十論：唯識無境（「安立大乘三界唯識……內識生時似外境現……此中都無少分實義」〔T1590 0074b27–c01〕）——與本章「實無外境，唯有內識，似外境生」正面對位，同立『似外境現而境無實』之宗。
- 辯中邊論：辯相品·虛妄分別（境無識有、似外境現，與本章結成唯識同脈）。
- 攝大乘論：所知相分·依他起·遍計所執（似法從緣如幻、所執實法決定非有，與本章法執所緣唯似法相涉）。
章內：廣辯三能變（本章結成唯識，下啟初能變·阿賴耶起）· 阿賴耶識章（三相·種子）· 末那識章（第二能變）。
九、校本定位
頌 T1586〔0060a27〕· 本論 T1585 破無為·結成唯識〔總非 0006b15·定有法 0006b15–b21·別破虛空 0006b23–c02·例破二滅 0006b28–c01·兔角量 0006c04–c05·會通二假 0006c05–c12·五無為 0006c12–c17·真如四遮 0006c17–c20·說唯有識 0006c24–c26·法執所緣 0007a13–a16·引經 0007a16–a18·遮聚 0007a20–a23〕· 述記 T1830〔破無為科 0289b11–b14·真如非即非離 0289b16–b20·依識變 0291a03·a12–a17·依法性 0291a29·b03–b04〕· 《轉識論》T1587〔0062c12·0062c13–c14·0062c18–c19〕。 〔經證〕解深密 T676〔分別瑜伽品 0698b02·無自性相品 0694a13〕· 楞伽 T670〔0484b11〕。〔論本〕瑜伽師地論 T1579〔攝決擇分·虛空 0593a15·非擇滅 0593a19–a22·唯識所現 0724a06〕。〔互讀〕二十論 T1590〔0074b27–c01〕。
This chapter takes up the end of the refutation of the self- and dharma-attachments, showing the unconditioned (space · cessation-through-discrimination · cessation-not-through-discrimination, and the rest) to be not really existent apart from form and mind, and closes by resolving into consciousness-only — the conclusion of the broad treatment of Triṃśikā verse 1.
1. Position in Kuiji's Structural Outline
| Outline level | This chapter's place |
|---|---|
| Refuting the self- and dharma-attachments | refuting the self-attachment → refuting the dharma-attachment (refuting the conditioned · form · the non-concurrent formations → refuting the unconditioned) → resolving into consciousness-only |
| Within the dharma-attachment chapter | refuting the unconditioned (general denial · the point-by-point refutation of space, cessation-through-discrimination, and cessation-not-through-discrimination · reconciling scripture) · the general resolution into consciousness-only · the two dharma-attachments (innate · discriminated) · the dharma-attachment's object is only a resembling-dharma · resolving into consciousness-only, warding off the other-cluster and the same-cluster |
| Verse expounded | the concluding portion of the broad treatment of Triṃśikā verse 1, "by conventional positing of self and dharmas, manifold appearances turn…" |
The refutation of the dharma-attachment, having in sequence refuted the conditioned (form · the non-concurrent formations), now in this chapter refutes the last class, the unconditioned; the refutation done, both attachments — to self and to dharmas — are dispelled together, so that it gathers the whole up into "there is truly no outer object; there is only inner consciousness, arising to resemble an outer object" — opening onto "the extended treatment of the three transformers" (the first transformer, the arising of the ālaya). 〔T1830 0289b11–b14〕
2. Source verse · doctrinal context
「由假說我法，有種種相轉。彼依識所變，此能變唯三：謂異熟、思量，及了別境識。」 〔T1586 0060a27–a29〕
tr. "Because of the conventional positing of self and dharmas, manifold appearances turn; these rest on what consciousness transforms — and the transformers are but three: namely, the maturation [consciousness], the cogitation [consciousness], and the consciousness that discerns objects."
Verse 1 sets down that "self and dharmas are alike conventionally posited in dependence on what consciousness transforms"; on this the root treatise first refutes at length the real self and real dharmas held by the heterodox and the other vehicles, and this chapter is the close of that broad treatment: the conditioned refuted, it goes on to refute the unconditioned, so that "a real dharma apart from consciousness" is left with nothing to stand on — and thus "consciousness-only" is established.
| Verse | Doctrinal gate | What it settles |
|---|---|---|
| 假說我法 by conventional positing of self and dharmas | refuting the unconditioned | space, cessation-through-discrimination, cessation-not-through-discrimination, and the rest are likewise conventionally designated, not really existent apart from form and mind |
| 彼依識所變 they rest on what consciousness transforms | resolving into consciousness-only | the resembling-dharma's appearance arises from conditions and is illusion-like; the real dharma held is reckoned by deluded imagining and is definitely non-existent |
| 此能變唯三 the transformers are but three | warding off [a false] object-support condition | mind and the mental factors do not use outer dharmas as their object-support condition; neither the other-cluster nor the same-cluster is a direct object |
In refuting the unconditioned, this chapter first sets up the criterion of the "three kinds of definitely-existent dharma" (presently cognized · presently made use of · having function) to ward off the real existence of the unconditioned; next it refutes space in particular through the twin horns "substance-one · substance-many," and refutes cessation-through-discrimination and cessation-not-through-discrimination by the same parallel; afterward it reconciles scripture's talk of the unconditioned under two senses, "conventionally set up in dependence on consciousness-transformation" and "conventionally set up in dependence on the dharma-nature." The root treatise, in questions of the type "whence do the seeds come?", sets out various anonymous "one view holds…" positions; here the chapter's twin-opening — "in dependence on consciousness-transformation · in dependence on the dharma-nature" — is its reconciliation, the several positions given in full in the Exposition.
3. Scriptural and treatise grounding (scripture → root śāstra)
Scriptural witnesses
我說識所緣，唯識所現故。 〔Saṃdhinirmocana · Yoga-discernment chapter, T676 0698b02〕
tr. "I teach that the object-support of consciousness is only what consciousness manifests."
勝義生！當知我依三種無自性性密意，說言一切諸法皆無自性，所謂相無自性性、生無自性性、勝義無自性性。 〔Saṃdhinirmocana · chapter on the markless self-nature, T676 0694a13–a15〕
tr. "Paramārthasamudgata! Know that I, with the hidden intent of the three kinds of non-self-nature, declare all dharmas to be without self-nature — namely, the mark-less-ness of self-nature, the arising-less-ness of self-nature, and the ultimate-meaning-less-ness of self-nature."
藏識海常住，境界風所動，種種諸識浪，騰躍而轉生。 〔Laṅkāvatāra T670 0484b11–b12〕
tr. "The store-consciousness ocean abides constant; stirred by the wind of objects, the manifold waves of the consciousnesses leap up and arise in turn."
The Saṃdhinirmocana's Yoga-discernment chapter, with "the object-support of consciousness is only what consciousness manifests," shows the image to be consciousness-only and that there is no real object apart from consciousness — the scriptural root of the "Maitreya, know that the object-support of the consciousnesses is only what consciousness manifests" that this chapter cites in resolving into consciousness-only; its chapter on the markless self-nature, with the three non-self-natures (mark · arising · ultimate-meaning), discloses that the wholly-imagined is markless, the other-dependent without arising, and the perfectly-accomplished without an ultimate-meaning-self-nature — the scriptural root for this chapter's "the unconditioned conventionally set up in dependence on the dharma-nature" (the suchness disclosed by emptiness and no-self, with the paths of mind and speech cut off). The Laṅkāvatāra, with the store-consciousness ocean raising the waves of the consciousnesses, shows the outer object's seeming-appearance to be all what consciousness transforms.
Root śāstra (Yogācārabhūmi T1579)
復次，虛空云何？謂唯諸色非有所顯，是名虛空……是故當知此唯假有，非實物有。 〔T1579 · Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī 0593a15–a18〕
tr. "Further, what is space? It is what is disclosed merely as the non-being of forms — this is called space… Therefore it should be known that this is merely conventionally existent, not really existent as a thing."
復次，云何非擇滅？謂若餘法生緣現前，餘法生故，餘不得生，唯滅、唯靜，名非擇滅……是故此滅亦是假有，非實物有。 〔T1579 · Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī 0593a19–a22〕
tr. "Further, what is cessation-not-through-discrimination? When the arising-conditions of some other dharma are present, then because that other dharma arises, the rest cannot arise — merely ceased, merely still: this is called cessation-not-through-discrimination… Therefore this cessation too is conventionally existent, not really existent as a thing."
我說識所緣、唯識所現故。 〔T1579 · Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī 0724a06〕
tr. "I teach that the object-support of consciousness is only what consciousness manifests."
The Yogācārabhūmi's Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī sets up a dedicated heading "determining the two unconditioned, space and cessation-not-through-discrimination," settling that space is "disclosed merely as the non-being of forms · merely conventionally existent, not really existent as a thing," and that cessation-not-through-discrimination is "merely ceased, merely still · likewise conventionally existent, not really existent as a thing" — the śāstra-root for this chapter's refutation of the unconditioned (the unconditioned not really existent apart from form and mind), with what is refuted and what is established fully matching. The Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī also records the Saṃdhinirmocana's "the object-support of consciousness is only what consciousness manifests," of one source with this chapter's resolving into consciousness-only. What Dharmapāla's redaction takes as authority has its scripture in the Saṃdhinirmocana and the Laṅkāvatāra, and its śāstra in the Yogācārabhūmi.
4. Essentials of the root treatise (Dharmapāla's redaction · T1585)
Refuting the unconditioned · the general denial of real existence
諸無為法離色、心等決定實有，理不可得。 〔T1585 0006b15〕
tr. "That unconditioned dharmas are definitely really existent apart from form, mind, and the rest cannot in principle be found."
The criterion · the three kinds of definitely-existent dharma
且定有法，略有三種：一、現所知法，如色、心等。二、現受用法，如瓶、衣等，如是二法，世共知有，不待因成。三、有作用法，如眼、耳等，由彼彼用證知是有。無為非世共知定有，又無作用，如眼、耳等。設許有用，應是無常，故不可執無為定有。 〔T1585 0006b15–b21〕
tr. "Now dharmas that are definitely existent are, in brief, of three kinds: (1) dharmas presently cognized, such as form, mind, and the rest; (2) dharmas presently made use of, such as a pot, a cloth, and the like — these two kinds the world commonly knows to exist, without awaiting any reason to establish them; (3) dharmas having function, such as the eye, the ear, and the rest, known to exist through this or that function of theirs. The unconditioned is not commonly known by the world to be definitely existent, and it has no function, [unlike] the eye, the ear, and the rest. And granting it had a function, it would then be impermanent; hence one cannot hold the unconditioned to be definitely existent."
Refuting space in particular · substance-one or substance-many
又虛空等為一、為多？若體是一，遍一切處……隨能合法，體應成多，一所合處餘不合故……若體是多，便有品類，應如色等，非實無為。 〔T1585 0006b23–c02〕
tr. "Again, are space and the rest one, or many? If their substance is one, pervading every place… then following the dharmas it conjoins with, the substance ought to become many, since where it conjoins with one [dharma] it does not conjoin with the rest… And if their substance is many, then they have classes and kinds, and ought — like form and the rest — to be no real unconditioned."
Refuting the two cessations by parallel · the fault of substance-one
一部、一品結法斷時，應得餘部、餘品擇滅；一法緣闕得不生時，應於一切得非擇滅。執彼體一，理應爾故。 〔T1585 0006b28–c01〕
tr. "When the bond-dharmas of one division, one class are severed, one ought to attain the cessation-through-discrimination of the remaining divisions and classes [as well]; when, through the lack of a condition, one dharma attains non-arising, one ought to attain the cessation-not-through-discrimination of all dharmas [as well]. For if one holds their substance to be one, by that principle it ought to be so."
The inference · without cause and effect, like a hare's horn
又諸無為許無因果故，應如兔角，非異心等有。 〔T1585 0006c04–c05〕
tr. "Again, since the unconditioned [dharmas] are admitted to be without cause and effect, they ought — like a hare's horn — not to exist as something apart from mind and the rest."
Reconciling scripture · the two conventional designations
然契經說，有虛空等諸無為法，略有二種：一、依識變假施設有……二、依法性，假施設有。謂空、無我所顯真如，有、無、俱非，心言路絕，與一切法非一、異等，是法真理，故名法性。 〔T1585 0006c05–c12〕
tr. "Yet scripture's speaking of unconditioned dharmas such as space is, in brief, of two kinds: (1) conventionally designated as existent in dependence on consciousness-transformation… (2) conventionally designated as existent in dependence on the dharma-nature — that is, the suchness disclosed by emptiness and no-self, of which 'existent,' 'non-existent,' and 'both-not' [are all denied], the paths of mind and speech cut off, neither-one-nor-different with respect to all dharmas: this is the true principle of dharmas, and so is called the dharma-nature."
The five unconditioned all conventionally set up in dependence on suchness
離諸障礙，故名虛空；由簡擇力，滅諸雜染，究竟證會，故名擇滅；不由擇力，本性清淨，或緣闕所顯，故名非擇滅；苦、樂受滅，故名不動；想、受不行，名想受滅。此五皆依真如假立，真如亦是假施設名。 〔T1585 0006c12–c17〕
tr. "As apart from all obstructions, it is called space; as, by the power of discrimination, the defilements are extinguished and [suchness] is finally realized, it is called cessation-through-discrimination; as, not by the power of discrimination, [the nature] is originally pure, or [suchness] is disclosed through the lack of a condition, it is called cessation-not-through-discrimination; as painful and pleasant feeling are extinguished, it is called the immovable; as conception and feeling no longer operate, it is called the cessation of conception-and-feeling. These five are all conventionally set up in dependence on suchness; and 'suchness' too is a conventionally-designated name."
Suchness's four wardings · even the name is conventional
遮撥為無，故說為有；遮執為有，故說為空；勿謂虛、幻，故說為實；理非妄倒，故名真如……故諸無為非定實有。 〔T1585 0006c17–c20〕
tr. "To ward off [its] being dismissed as non-existent, it is said to be 'existent'; to ward off [its] being grasped as existent, it is said to be 'empty'; lest [it] be supposed empty-and-illusory, it is said to be 'real'; because [its] principle is not deluded-and-inverted, it is called 'suchness'… Hence the unconditioned dharmas are not definitely really existent."
Resolving into consciousness-only · and consciousness-only too is not to be grasped
為遣妄執心、心所外實有境故，說唯有識。若執唯識真實有者，如執外境，亦是法執。 〔T1585 0006c24–c26〕
tr. "To dispel the deluded grasping of a really-existent object apart from mind and the mental factors, it is taught that there is consciousness alone. And if one grasps consciousness-only as truly existent, then — like grasping an outer object — that too is a dharma-attachment."
The dharma-attachment's object · only a resembling-dharma
是故法執皆緣自心所現似法，執為實有。然似法相從緣生故，是如幻有，所執實法妄計度故，決定非有。 〔T1585 0007a13–a16〕
tr. "Therefore every dharma-attachment refers to a resembling-dharma manifested by one's own mind, grasping it as really existent. Yet since the resembling-dharma's appearance arises from conditions, it is illusion-like existence; and since the real dharma [held] is reckoned by deluded imagining, it is definitely non-existent."
Citing scripture to conclude
故世尊說：「慈氏當知，諸識所緣，唯識所現，依他起性，如幻事等。」如是外道、餘乘所執離識我、法皆非實有。 〔T1585 0007a16–a18〕
tr. "Hence the World-Honored One said: 'Maitreya, know that the object-support of the consciousnesses is only what consciousness manifests, the other-dependent nature, like an illusion and the rest.' Thus the self and dharmas apart from consciousness, held by the heterodox and the other vehicles, are none of them really existent."
Warding off the other-cluster and same-cluster · settling on inner consciousness alone
現在彼聚心、心所法，非此聚識親所緣緣……同聚心所亦非親所緣，自體異故……由此應知，實無外境，唯有內識，似外境生。 〔T1585 0007a20–a23〕
tr. "The present mind and mental factors of that [other] cluster are not the direct object-support condition of this cluster's consciousness… and the mental factors of the same cluster are likewise not its direct object, their substances being other… By this it should be known that there is truly no outer object; there is only inner consciousness, arising to resemble an outer object."
Essentials: in refuting the unconditioned, the treatise first takes the "three kinds of definitely-existent dharma" (presently cognized · presently made use of · having function) as its criterion — the unconditioned is neither commonly known [to exist] nor possessed of function, and to grant it function is to make it impermanent; hence it cannot be held real. It refutes space in particular by pressing it between the twin horns "substance-one · substance-many": hold it one, and it becomes many following the dharmas [it conjoins]; refuse that, and all dharmas interpenetrate; let it not conjoin, and it loses [the power of] containing; hold it many, and it has classes and kinds like form — none of these a true unconditioned. Cessation-through-discrimination and cessation-not-through-discrimination are refuted in their "substance-one" by the parallel "severing one class ought to win the cessation-through-discrimination of the remaining classes, and one dharma's non-arising ought to win the cessation-not-through-discrimination of all." It then wards off the whole with the single inference "without cause and effect, like a hare's horn." Reconciling scripture's talk of the unconditioned, it judges it twofold-conventional: that in dependence on consciousness-transformation (an appearance arising upon hearing the name, manifested by repeated practice, resembling something permanent yet unreal), and that in dependence on the dharma-nature (the suchness disclosed by emptiness and no-self — apart from obstruction named space, the discriminating extinction of defilement named cessation-through-discrimination, original purity or a lacking condition named cessation-not-through-discrimination, the extinction of pain-and-pleasure named the immovable, the non-operation of conception-and-feeling named the cessation of conception-and-feeling). Even the name "suchness" is conventional, the name set up only for the four wardings (warding off dismissal-as-non-existent · grasping-as-existent · supposing-it-illusory · deluded-inversion), unlike the other schools that set up a real, permanent dharma apart from form and mind and call it suchness. The two attachments — to self and to dharmas — refuted, it then closes with "there is only inner consciousness, arising to resemble an outer object," and wards off the other-cluster and same-cluster mind-and-mental-factors from being the direct object, so as to make firm "there is truly no outer object."
5. Divergent readings across the masters (Kuiji, Shuji T1830)
次下第三、破無為法，於中有三：初破外計；次顯正理；第三結非。就破外中，初總非，後別破。總非中有三：初總非無實；次顯法定無；後為量遮破。 〔T1830 0289b11–b14〕
tr. "Next, the third [segment], refuting the unconditioned dharmas, within which there are three: first, refuting the outsiders' reckonings; next, disclosing the right principle; third, the concluding denial. Within the refuting of the outsiders: first the general denial, then the point-by-point refutation. Within the general denial there are three: first the general denial of [their] real existence; next disclosing that the dharma is definitely non-existent; last warding [them] off by inference."
薩婆多等實有無為，此中皆破。然不相應即色、心等，故初遮中皆言不異，此諸無為非即色等，不可言不異，但可言離色等實有定無。大乘真如望有為法，非即非離，不異不一，既殊彼計，故破無失。 〔T1830 0289b16–b20〕
tr. "The Sarvāstivāda and the rest [who hold] a really-existent unconditioned are all refuted here. But the non-concurrent formations just are form, mind, and the rest, so in the first warding-off [of them] it was said throughout that they are 'not different'; these unconditioned [dharmas], however, are not identical with form and the rest, [yet] cannot be called 'not different' [from them] — one can only say that, [taken as] really existent apart from form and the rest, they are definitely non-existent. Mahāyāna suchness, with respect to conditioned dharmas, is neither-identical-nor-apart, neither-different-nor-one; and since this differs from their reckoning, the refutation [of theirs] is without fault [against suchness]."
〔依識變假施設有〕此無本質，唯心所變，如極微等……此即七地以前有漏加行心等。緣名起分別相……此皆變境而緣故也。 〔T1830 0291a03–a17〕
tr. "〔Conventionally designated as existent in dependence on consciousness-transformation〕 This has no underlying substance, being only what mind transforms, like atoms and the rest… this is the contaminated preparatory mind and the rest, prior to the seventh stage. Referring to a name, it raises a discriminated appearance… for these all transform an object and [then] refer to it."
〔依法性假施設有〕此顯空等依真如立……此空無我所顯真如 〔T1830 0291a29–b04〕
tr. "〔Conventionally designated as existent in dependence on the dharma-nature〕 This shows space and the rest to be set up in dependence on suchness… this is the suchness disclosed by emptiness and no-self."
Kuiji divides the refutation-of-the-unconditioned into three (refuting the outsiders' reckonings · disclosing the right principle · the concluding denial); the refuting of the outsiders he further splits into general denial and point-by-point refutation, opening the general denial into three nodes (the general denial of real existence · disclosing that the dharma is definitely non-existent · warding off by inference). He also marks off the difference between Mahāyāna "suchness" and the Sarvāstivāda "really-existent unconditioned": the non-concurrent formations can be called "not different from form and mind," but the unconditioned [dharmas] are not identical with form and mind and can only be called "definitely non-existent as really existent apart from form and mind"; Mahāyāna suchness, with respect to conditioned dharmas, is "neither-identical-nor-apart, neither-different-nor-one," plainly distinct from their reckoning of a real and permanent [dharma], so the refutation of them does not injure Mahāyāna suchness. On "in dependence on consciousness-transformation" he glosses [the unconditioned] as having no underlying substance, only what mind transforms, the object of the contaminated preparatory [mind] that raises an appearance upon hearing a name; on "in dependence on the dharma-nature" he glosses it as the suchness disclosed by emptiness-and-no-self, [shown] only by warding-off, not by positive predication. Which reckonings belong to which school (the Sarvāstivāda and the rest) the Shuji details.
6. Rendering of terms · old-translation comparison (Xuanzang ↔ Paramārtha, Zhuanshi lun)
| Sense | Xuanzang, Cheng Weishi Lun | Paramārtha, Zhuanshi lun |
|---|---|---|
| resolving into consciousness-only | 實無外境，唯有內識，似外境生 there is truly no outer object; there is only inner consciousness, arising to resemble an outer object | 離識之外無別境，但唯有識義成 apart from consciousness there is no separate object; only "there is consciousness alone" is established (「離識之外無別境，但唯有識義成」〔0062c13–c14〕) |
| grasper and grasped as the three natures | 依他起·遍計所執 the other-dependent · the wholly-imagined (the resembling-dharma from conditions · the held [dharma] reckoned by imagining) | 能分別即依他性·所分別即分別性 the grasping discrimination is the other-dependent nature, the discriminated is the discriminated-imagined nature (「能即依他性、所即分別性」〔0062c12〕) |
| the ultimate of consciousness-only | 唯識亦不可實執 consciousness-only too is not to be really grasped (grasping consciousness-only as truly existent is also a dharma-attachment) | 境識俱泯即實性·即阿摩羅識 object and consciousness both effaced is the real nature, i.e. the amala-consciousness (「此境識俱泯即是實性，實性即是阿摩羅識」〔0062c18–c19〕) |
Xuanzang closes with "there is only inner consciousness, arising to resemble an outer object" and warns that "to grasp consciousness-only as truly existent is also a dharma-attachment," stopping at the other-dependent and the perfectly-accomplished; Paramārtha's Zhuanshi lun closes consciousness-only with "apart from consciousness there is no separate object; only 'there is consciousness alone' is established," and goes further to say "object and consciousness both effaced is the real nature, i.e. the amala-consciousness (the ninth)" — the old and new renderings parting on a single point at the ultimate of consciousness-only: Xuanzang gathers it back into suchness (the perfectly-accomplished), while Paramārtha sets up a separate amala-consciousness.
7. Key terms
- the unconditioned (無為, asaṃskṛta) — dharmas not made through causes and conditions; this chapter refutes their real existence apart from form and mind, judging them conventionally set up in dependence on consciousness-transformation and on the dharma-nature.
- space (虛空, ākāśa) — disclosed merely as the non-being of forms; conventionally named "unconditioned space" as apart from all obstructions.
- cessation-through-discrimination (擇滅, pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha) — the unconditioned disclosed when, by the power of discriminating wisdom, the defilements are extinguished and [suchness] is finally realized.
- cessation-not-through-discrimination (非擇滅, apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha) — the unconditioned disclosed not by the power of discrimination but through original purity, or through the lack of a condition.
- suchness (真如, tathatā) — the dharma-nature disclosed by emptiness and no-self, the true principle of all dharmas; "existent," "non-existent," and "both-not" all denied, the paths of mind and speech cut off; even the name is a conventional designation (warding off dismissal-as-non-existent · grasping-as-existent · supposing-it-illusory · deluded-inversion).
- object-support condition (所緣緣, ālambana-pratyaya) — a really-existent substantial object on which the function of grasping rests; this chapter wards off outer dharmas, the other-cluster, and the same-cluster from being the direct object-support condition.
〔Sanskrit forms are a pronunciation aid transmitted by the ancient masters.〕
8. Cross-reading (the Yogācāra sequence: Baifa → Triṃśikā → Viṃśatikā → Madhyāntavibhāga → Mahāyānasaṃgraha)
- Baifa (Hundred Dharmas): the unconditioned dharmas (the six unconditioned: space · cessation-through-discrimination · cessation-not-through-discrimination · the immovable · the cessation of conception-and-feeling · suchness) — this chapter refutes precisely their real existence apart from form and mind; beyond the four positions of mind, the mental factors, form, and the non-concurrent formations, the unconditioned is the fifth position.
- Triṃśikā: verse 1, "by conventional positing of self and dharmas… these rest on what consciousness transforms" — this chapter is the concluding portion of this verse's broad refutation of the dharma-attachment (the verse-by-verse sister).
- Viṃśatikā: consciousness-only-without-object — 「安立大乘三界唯識……內識生時似外境現……此中都無少分實義」 〔T1590 0074b27–c01〕 ("establishing that in the Mahāyāna the triple world is consciousness-only… when inner consciousness arises it appears to resemble an outer object… herein there is not the slightest real meaning") — squarely paired with this chapter's "there is truly no outer object; there is only inner consciousness, arising to resemble an outer object," both setting up the thesis "an outer object appears yet the object has no reality."
- Madhyāntavibhāga: the Characteristics chapter · unreal imagining (the object non-existent, consciousness existent; appearing to resemble an outer object — the same vein as this chapter's resolving into consciousness-only).
- Mahāyānasaṃgraha: the Knowable-Characteristic division · the other-dependent · the wholly-imagined (the resembling-dharma from conditions, illusion-like; the real dharma held definitely non-existent — bearing on this chapter's "the dharma-attachment's object is only a resembling-dharma").
Within the treatise: the extended treatment of the three transformers (this chapter resolves into consciousness-only, opening onto the first transformer, the arising of the ālaya) · the chapter on the ālaya-consciousness (three marks · seeds) · the chapter on the manas (the second transformer).
9. Collation position
Verse T1586 〔0060a27〕 · root T1585 refuting the unconditioned · resolving into consciousness-only 〔general denial 0006b15 · the three definitely-existent dharmas 0006b15–b21 · refuting space in particular 0006b23–c02 · refuting the two cessations 0006b28–c01 · the hare's-horn inference 0006c04–c05 · reconciling the two conventional designations 0006c05–c12 · the five unconditioned 0006c12–c17 · suchness's four wardings 0006c17–c20 · "there is consciousness alone" 0006c24–c26 · the dharma-attachment's object 0007a13–a16 · scriptural citation 0007a16–a18 · warding off the clusters 0007a20–a23〕 · Shuji T1830 〔the refutation-of-the-unconditioned outline 0289b11–b14 · suchness neither-identical-nor-apart 0289b16–b20 · in dependence on consciousness-transformation 0291a03·a12–a17 · in dependence on the dharma-nature 0291a29·b03–b04〕 · Zhuanshi lun T1587 〔0062c12 · 0062c13–c14 · 0062c18–c19〕. 〔Scripture〕 Saṃdhinirmocana T676 〔Yoga-discernment chapter 0698b02 · chapter on the markless self-nature 0694a13〕 · Laṅkāvatāra T670 〔0484b11〕. 〔Śāstra〕 Yogācārabhūmi T1579 〔Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī · space 0593a15 · cessation-not-through-discrimination 0593a19–a22 · only what consciousness manifests 0724a06〕. 〔Cross-reading〕 Viṃśatikā T1590 〔0074b27–c01〕.