成唯識論 不定四·六位心所總結
六位心所講到最後一位，叫「不定」。為什麼不定？因為前面五位性格都定了：遍行一定在，善十一一定善，煩惱一定染。這四個不是——悔、眠、尋、伺，它們可以是善的，也可以是染的，看你拿它做什麼。\n\n後悔可以是懊惱做了好事（染），也可以是慚愧做了壞事（善）。睡意可以是懈怠（染），也可以是身心該歇了（無記）。尋是粗略地想，伺是細細地推——這兩個更明顯：拿去攀緣五欲，是染；拿去思惟法義，是善。\n\n頌文說「二各二」，就是這個意思：兩雙，每雙各通兩邊。\n\n六位既列完，論主收尾問了一句很根本的話：這些心所，究竟是離開心另外有的東西，還是心自己的不同樣子？ 有部說離心別有實體；經部與大乘說是心的分位。論主的答覆不含糊：心所與心相應而起，說「別有」則不成相應，說「即是」則不成能所——所以既非全然離心，亦非即心。\n\n這一問看似瑣碎，其實決定了整個唯識的骨架：若心所是離心實有，那就不是唯識了。
The last of the six classes is called indeterminate. Why indeterminate? Because the character of the other five is already fixed: the omnipresent are always present, the eleven wholesome are always wholesome, the afflictions are always defiled. These four are not. Regret, torpor, applied thought, sustained thought — they can be wholesome or defiled, depending on what you do with them.\n\nRegret can be chagrin at having done good (defiled) or shame at having done wrong (wholesome). Torpor can be indolence (defiled) or a body and mind that ought to rest (neutral). Applied thought gropes coarsely, sustained thought probes finely — and these two are plainer still: turned upon the five desires they are defiled; turned upon the meaning of the teaching they are wholesome.\n\n"Two, each in two," says the verse — two pairs, and each pair running both ways.\n\nThe six classes complete, the treatise closes with a question that goes to the root: do these mental factors exist apart from mind, or are they mind's own modes? The Sarvāstivādins said they have substance apart; the Sautrāntikas and the Mahāyāna said they are modes of mind. The treatise does not equivocate: mental factors arise concomitant with mind — call them wholly separate and there is no concomitance; call them simply identical and there is no one-and-the-other. Neither wholly apart, then, nor simply the same.\n\nThe question looks like a technicality. In fact it settles the frame of the whole system: were the mental factors real apart from mind, this would not be consciousness-only at all.
〔T31 0035c06〕已說二十隨煩惱相。不定有四，其相云何？
頌曰：
〔頌曰 10 T31 0035c08〕
「不定謂悔、眠、尋、伺，二各二。」
論曰：悔、眠、尋、伺於善、染等皆不定故，非如觸等定遍心故，非如欲等定遍地故，立不定名。
悔謂惡作，惡所作業，追悔為性，障止為業。此即於果假立因名，先惡所作業，後方追悔故；悔先不作，亦惡作攝，如追悔言：我先不作如是事業，是我惡作。
眠謂睡眠，令身不自在，昧、略為性，障觀為業。謂睡眠位，身不自在，心極闇劣，一門轉故。昧簡在定，略別寤時，令顯睡眠非無體用。有無心位假立此名，如餘蓋纏心相應故。
有義：此二唯癡為體，說隨煩惱及癡分故。
有義：不然，亦通善故。應說此二染癡為體；淨即無癡，論依染分說隨煩惱及癡分攝。
有義：此說亦不應理，無記非癡、無癡性故。應說惡作思、慧為體，明了思擇所作業故。睡眠合用思、想為體，思、想種種夢境相故。論俱說為世俗有故。彼染污者是癡等流，如不信等，說為癡分。
有義：彼說理亦不然，非思、慧、想纏彼性故。應說此二各別有體，與餘心所行相別故。隨癡相說，名世俗有。
尋謂尋求，令心怱遽於意言境，麁轉為性；伺謂伺察，令心怱遽於意言境，細轉為性。此二俱以安、不安住身心分位所依為業。並用思、慧一分為體，於意言境不深推度及深推度，義類別故，若離思、慧，尋、伺二種體類差別不可得故。
〔T31 0036a05〕「二各二」者，有義：尋、伺各有染、淨二類差別。
有義：此釋不應正理，悔、眠亦有染、淨二故。
應說如前諸染心所，有是煩惱、隨煩惱性，此二各有不善、無記，或復各有纏及隨眠。
有義：彼釋亦不應理，不定四後有此言故。
應言「二」者顯二種二：一謂悔、眠；二謂尋、伺。此二二種，種類各別，故一「二」言，顯二二種。
此各有二，謂染、不染。
非如善、染各唯一故。或唯簡染，故說此言，有亦說為隨煩惱故。為顯不定義，說「二各二」言，故置此言深為有用。
四中尋、伺定是假有，思、慧合成，聖所說故。
悔、眠，有義：亦是假有，《瑜伽》說為世俗有故。
有義：此二是實物有，唯後二種說假有故。世俗有言隨他相說，非顯前二定是假有，又如內種體雖是實，而論亦說世俗有故。
四中尋、伺定不相應，體類是同，麁、細異故。依於尋、伺有染、離染立三地別，不依彼種現起有無，故無雜亂。
俱與前二容互相應，前二亦有互相應義。
四皆不與第七、八俱，義如前說；悔、眠唯與第六識俱，非五法故。
有義：尋、伺亦五識俱，論說：五識有尋、伺故。
又說：尋、伺即七分別，謂有相等。《雜集》復言：任運分別謂五識故。
有義：尋、伺唯意識俱。
論說：尋求、伺察等法皆是意識不共法故。又說：尋、伺憂、喜相應，曾不說與苦、樂俱故。捨受遍故，可不待說。何緣不說與苦、樂俱？雖初靜慮有意地樂，而不離喜，總說喜名；雖純苦處有意地苦，而似憂故，總說為憂。又說：尋、伺以名身等義為所緣，非五識身以名身等義為境故。
〔T31 0036b06〕然說五識有尋、伺者，顯多由彼起，非說彼相應。《雜集》所言：任運分別謂五識者，彼與《瑜伽》所說分別，義各有異：彼說任運即是五識，《瑜伽》說此是五識俱分別意識相應尋、伺。
故彼所引為證不成，由此五識定無尋、伺。
有義：惡作憂、捨相應，唯慼行轉，通無記故。
睡眠喜、憂、捨受俱起，行通歡、慼、中庸轉故。
尋、伺憂、喜、捨、樂相應，初靜慮中意樂俱故。
有義：此四亦苦受俱，純苦趣中，意苦俱故。
四皆容與五別境俱，行相、所緣不相違故。
悔、眠但與十善容俱，此唯在欲，無輕安故。尋、伺容與十一善俱，初靜慮中輕安俱故。
悔但容與無明相應，此行相麁，貪等細故。
睡眠、尋、伺十煩惱俱，此彼展轉不相違故。
悔與中、大隨惑容俱，非忿等十，各為主故。睡眠、尋、伺二十容俱，眠等位中皆起彼故。
此四皆通善等三性，於無記業亦追悔故。
有義：初二唯生得善，行相麁鄙及昧略故；後二亦通加行善攝，聞所成等有尋、伺故。
有義：初二亦加行善，聞、思位中有悔、眠故。
後三皆通染、淨無記，惡作非染，解麁猛故。四無記中，悔唯中二，行相麁猛，非定果故。眠除第四，非定引生，異熟生心亦得眠故。尋、伺除初，彼解微劣，不能尋察名等義故。
惡作、睡眠唯欲界有，尋、伺在欲及初靜慮，餘界地法皆妙靜故。
〔T31 0036c02〕悔、眠生上必不現起，尋、伺上下亦起下上。
下上尋、伺能緣上下。
有義：悔、眠不能緣上，行相麁近，極昧略故。
有義：此二亦緣上境，有邪見者悔修定故，夢能普緣所更事故。
悔非無學，離欲捨故；睡眠、尋、伺皆通三種。求解脫者有為善法皆名學故；學究竟者有為善法皆無學故。
悔、眠唯通見、修所斷，亦邪見等勢力起故，非無漏道親所引生故，亦非如憂，深求解脫故。若已斷故名非所斷，則無學眠非所斷、攝。
尋、伺雖非真無漏道，而能引彼，從彼引生，故通見、修、非所斷攝。
有義：尋、伺非所斷者，於五法中唯分別攝，《瑜伽》說彼是分別故。
有義：此二亦正智攝，說：正思惟是無漏故，彼能令心尋求等故。又說：彼是言說因故，未究竟位於藥、病等未能遍知，後得智中為他說法必假尋、伺，非如佛地無功用說，故此二種亦通無漏。雖說尋、伺必是分別，而不定說唯屬第三，後得正智中亦有分別故。
餘門准上，如理應思。
如是六位諸心所法，為離心體有別自性？為即是心分位差別？
設爾何失？
二俱有過。
若離心體有別自性，如何聖教說唯有識？又如何說心遠、獨行，染、淨由心，士夫六界？
《莊嚴論》說復云何通？如彼頌言：
「許心似二現，如是似貪等，
或似於信等，無別染、善法。」
若即是心分位差別，如何聖教說心相應？他性相應，非自性故。又如何說心與心所俱時而起，如日與光？《瑜伽論》說復云何通？彼說心所非即心故。如彼頌言：
「五種性不成，分位差過失，
因緣無別故，與聖教相違。」
〔T31 0037a06〕應說離心有別自性，以心勝故，說唯識等，心所依心勢力生故，說似彼現，非彼即心。又識心言亦攝心所，恒相應故。唯識等言及現似彼，皆無有失，此依世俗。
若依勝義，心所與心非離非即，諸識相望應知亦然，是謂大乘真、俗妙理。
已說六識心所相應，云何應知現起分位？
頌曰：
The canonical text stands in Chinese only. This edition renders the essence, the plain reading, the exposition and the apparatus into English — never the sūtra itself. Switch to 漢讀本 or 並行雙語 above to read it.
〔所釋之頌〕第十四頌·不定四
甲、不定四
二十個隨煩惱的相，前面已經講完了。接下來講「不定」（性質不定的這一類心所）——它有四個，相狀又是怎樣呢？頌就回答：不定的有悔、眠、尋、伺這四個，再加一句「二各二」。
論說：悔、眠、尋、伺這四個法，到底算善、算染、還是無記，是『定不下來』的（不固定屬哪一性，看情況變）；再說，它們也不像「觸」等遍行心所那樣『一定遍布在每一個心裡』，也不像「欲」等別境心所那樣『一定遍布在每一個地（界地）裡』。正因為它們在這幾頭都『定不下來』，所以才給它們立個名叫「不定」。
一、悔（惡作）
「悔」又叫「惡作」，意思是：對自己做過的事感到厭惡，於是『事後追悔』——這追悔就是它的性。作用（業）：擋住「止」（奢摩他，把心定下來的修行）。這個「惡作」的叫法，是『拿『因』的名去叫『果』』。怎麼說呢？「惡作」本來指的是『自己厭惡的那件事』（這是因，先有的）；先有了這件叫人厭惡的事（因），後來才生出追悔（果）；現在卻拿前頭那個「因」的名（惡作），來叫後頭那個「果」（追悔）——這就是『拿因名叫果』。還有，『追悔自己當初沒做某件事』也算進「惡作」裡，就像有人懊悔說：『我當初沒去做那件事，這就是我的惡作（我懊惱沒做）。』
二、眠（睡眠）
「眠」就是「睡眠」，它讓身體不聽使喚，以「昧、略」（心裡昏昧、行相又粗又簡）為性。作用（業）：擋住「觀」（毘鉢舍那，看清事理的修行）。怎麼說呢？睡著的時候，身體不由自主、心極其昏暗微弱，只剩『一道門』（意門）還在運轉，用不上眼耳鼻舌身那五道門。這裡「昧」和「略」兩個字各有用意：用「昧」（昏昧）這個字，是要把「入定」撇開——入定時心雖也專注一境，可它清明、並不昏昧；用「略」（行相粗簡）這個字，是要把『清醒時』撇開——清醒時行相清楚、並不粗簡。這兩個字一立，就顯出睡眠是有它自己的體和作用的（不是一片空白）。另外，在「無心位」（像悶絕昏死那種沒有心識活動的狀態）也照樣給它安個「眠」的名，那是因為它就像「蓋」、「纏」這些別的隨煩惱心所一樣，本來是跟心相應的（這是順著別的相將就著這麼叫）。
〔悔、眠的底子·第一種說法·只拿癡當體〕 一說：悔、眠這兩個只拿「癡」（糊塗）當底子——理由是《論》說這兩個是「隨煩惱」、又是『癡的一分』。
〔第二種說法·染的那分拿癡、淨的那分拿無癡〕 又說：不對，悔、眠也通善性（不光是染的）。應該這麼分：這兩個『染污的那一分』拿癡當底子，『清淨的那一分』就拿無癡當底子；《論》之所以說它們是隨煩惱、是癡的一分，那只是就『染污的那一分』說的，並不是說它們整個只是癡。
〔第三種說法·拿思、慧／思、想當體〕 又說：上一說也講不通——因為悔、眠還通「無記」（那種不善不惡的中性狀態），可無記既不是癡、也不是無癡（它兩頭都不沾），所以光用『染的拿癡、淨的拿無癡』這套是分不乾淨的（漏了無記這一塊）。應該這麼說：「惡作（悔）」拿「思、慧」當底子（因為追悔得清清楚楚地去思量、揀擇自己做過的事，這正是思和慧在管）；「睡眠」則合用「思、想」當底子（因為睡夢裡思啊想啊各種夢境的影像，這也是思和想在管）；《論》也把這兩個都說成「世俗有」（假立的）。至於它們染污的那一分，是從癡流出來的同類（就像「不信」那些一樣），所以才說成是癡的一分。
〔應知·正確的說法·悔、眠各自有自己的體〕 又說（這是正解）：上一說道理也站不住——悔、眠並不就是「思、慧、想」這幾個變成「纏」（「纏」就是隨煩惱，可思、慧、想本身並不是纏，怎麼能拿它們當悔眠的體）。應該說：悔、眠各自有自己獨立的體，跟其餘心所的樣子都不一樣；至於《論》說它們『順著癡的相、將就著叫世俗有』，那也是順著別的相方便這麼講罷了（並不是說它們的體真的是假的）。
三、尋 · 伺
「尋」就是尋求，它讓心在「意言境」（心裡用名言概念去想的那個對象）上匆匆忙忙地『粗略地推敲』——這就是它的性。「伺」就是伺察，它讓心在同一個意言境上匆匆忙忙地『細細地推敲』——這就是它的性。這兩個都拿『身心安不安穩這個狀態的依靠』當作用（業）：尋、伺要是平和，身心就安穩；尋、伺要是躁動，身心就不安穩。兩個都拿『思、慧的一小部分』當底子；差別只在：對著意言境，尋是『不往深裡推』、伺是『往深裡推』，這兩種意趣分得開。可是話說回來，要是離開了思和慧，尋、伺這兩個的體到底差在哪，就根本找不出來了（可見它倆的底子終究還是思和慧）。
頌裡「二各二」這三個字是什麼意思？〔第一種說法〕 一說：是說尋、伺這兩個，各自又分「染」和「淨」兩類（一個「二」指尋伺兩個，「各二」指每個再分染淨兩類，所以叫「二各二」）。
〔第二種說法〕 又說：上一說講不通——悔、眠也一樣有染、淨兩類，憑什麼『染淨兩類』就單指尋、伺（這麼解，那悔眠豈不也該算進來）？應該這麼說：就像前面那些染污心所，有的是「根本煩惱」這一性、有的是「隨煩惱」那一性各有分別，這尋、伺兩個也各自分「不善」和「無記」兩類，或者各自分「纏」（現行，當下起作用的）和「隨眠」（種子，潛伏著的）兩類——這才是「二各二」（尋伺兩個，每個再分兩類）。
〔應知·正解〕 又說（這是正解）：上一說也講不通——「二各二」這句話是擺在『不定四個』全講完之後的（是給這四個法作總結），不是單就尋、伺說的。應該這麼講：頭一個「二」字，顯的是『兩組各兩個』：第一組那個「二」指悔、眠，第二組那個「二」指尋、伺。這兩組各自的種類不一樣，所以用一個「二」字總起來，把這『兩組各兩個』一齊點出。而每一個法又「各有二」，指的是「染」和「不染」（這就跟善心所、染心所不一樣了——那些善的就純善、染的就純染，性質只有一個；這四個卻是染淨都通）。或者換個講法：「各二」單單是為了把「染」這一面撇清——是要顯出它們不是只有染、還通著不定——才特地說這句的；因為悔、眠、尋、伺也曾被說成是隨煩惱，怕人就此咬定它們只是染的，所以才擺上這句「各二」來顯出它們其實性質不定。總之，這句「二各二」是為了把「不定」的意思點明才說的，所以擺上它非常有用（不是廢話）。
〔不定四諸門〕
〔假實門〕
這四個法裡：尋、伺一定是假的（沒有自己的實體）——因為它倆是「思」和「慧」湊起來的，這是聖教說的。至於悔、眠〔是假是實·第一種說法〕 一說：也是假的——《瑜伽》把這兩個說成「世俗有」（假立的）。〔第二種說法〕 又說：悔、眠是『實實在在有自己的東西』——因為《瑜伽》只說了『後兩個（尋、伺）』是假的，並沒說前兩個（悔、眠）一定假。那《瑜伽》不是也叫悔眠「世俗有」嗎？那個「世俗有」只是順著別的相將就著說的，並不表示前兩個（悔眠）一定就是假的；打個比方：「內種子」（藏識裡的種子）它的體明明是實的，可《論》也照樣叫它「世俗有」——可見叫「世俗有」不一定就是體假。
〔互不相應門〕
這四個法裡，尋、伺這兩個一定不會一起起（不並列同時轉）——它倆的底子雖然同是「思、慧」，可一個粗、一個細不一樣，同一個心裡容不下一粗一細並著轉。佛經依著尋、伺的「有」和「沒有」，分出「三地」（也就是「有尋有伺地」、「無尋唯伺地」、「無尋無伺地」這三層）；要注意：這個分法只看尋伺「現行」起來時的粗、細，不看它們的「種子」現不現起——所以這三地分得清清楚楚、不會攪混。再說尋、伺跟前兩個（悔、眠）可以彼此一起起；而前兩個（悔、眠）之間，也有可以一起起的情形。
〔何識相應門〕
這四個法都不跟第七、第八識一起起（道理在前面那章說過了）；悔、眠只跟第六意識一起起——因為它們不是『前五識的法』（眼耳鼻舌身這五個識，沒有追悔、睡眠這種行相）。
〔尋、伺跟哪個識一起·第一種說法·也跟五識一起〕 一說：尋、伺也跟前五識一起起。引了三條經論為據：一是《論》說『五識也有尋、伺』；二是又說『尋、伺就是七種分別』（像『有相分別』那些）；三是《雜集》也說『任運分別指的就是五識』（五識那種自自然然的分別，就是尋伺）。
〔應知·正解·只跟意識一起〕 又說（這是正解）：尋、伺只跟第六意識一起起。理由：一是《論》說『尋求、伺察這些法都是意識專有的法』；二是又說『尋、伺跟憂、喜這兩種感受相應』，從沒說它跟苦、樂相應（至於「捨受」，那是一切心都有的、不必特地提）。〔有人問〕那《論》為什麼不說尋伺也跟苦、樂相應呢？〔答〕雖然初禪裡確實有『意地的樂』，可它跟「喜」分不開，所以就一概用「喜」這個名把它收進去了（不另立「樂」）；又雖然純苦的地方（地獄）確實有『意地的苦』，可它的樣子很像「憂」，所以就一概說成「憂」了（不另立「苦」）——這才是不另外提苦、樂的緣故。三是《論》又說：尋、伺攀的是「名身」（語言名相）這些意思當對象，可前五識並不拿名身這些意思當境（五識只攀事物本身的相、不攀語言名相）——既然尋伺非靠名相不可、而五識又不碰名相，可見尋、伺只跟意識一起起。
那回頭再看第一說引的「五識有尋、伺」這句，到底什麼意思呢？它只是說尋伺『多半是被五識帶起來的』，並不是說尋伺跟五識相應、一塊起。再看《雜集》那句『任運分別指的就是五識』——它跟《瑜伽》所說的「分別」其實不是一個意思：《雜集》說的「任運分別」直接就指五識本身，而《瑜伽》說的這個「分別」，指的是『跟五識一起起的那個分別意識所相應的尋、伺』（也就是第六意識的尋伺，不是五識自己有尋伺）。兩處「分別」一詞各指各的，所以第一說拿《雜集》當證據是不成立的；由此可知五識一定沒有尋、伺。
〔受相應門〕
〔不定四配哪些感受·第一種說法〕 一說：惡作（悔）跟「憂、捨」相應——因為它老是帶著『憂愁難過』的樣子在轉，又通無記（所以也配得上不憂不樂的「捨」）。睡眠跟「喜、憂、捨」三受一起起——因為它的樣子可以是高興的、可以是難過的、也可以是不高興不難過的（歡、慼、中庸三樣都通）。尋、伺跟「憂、喜、捨、樂」四受相應——因為在初禪裡，它倆能跟『意地的樂』一塊起（所以多配到一個樂）。
〔第二種說法〕 又說：這四個法也都跟「苦受」一起——因為在純是苦的去處（地獄）裡，它們能跟『意地的苦』一塊起（這麼一來，這四個法就五種感受全通了）。
〔別境相應門〕
這四個法都可以跟『別境五個』（欲、勝解、念、定、慧）一起起——因為它們的樣子、攀的對象都跟那五個合得來、不牴觸。
〔善相應門〕
悔、眠只能跟『十個善心所』一起起——因為這兩個只在欲界出現，而欲界裡沒有「輕安」這個善心所（把輕安扣掉，十一個善就剩十個了）。尋、伺則能跟『十一個善』全都一起起——因為它倆可以上到初禪，初禪裡有「輕安」一塊起（十一個善湊齊）。
〔煩惱·隨煩惱相應門〕
先講跟「根本煩惱」搭配：悔只能跟「無明（癡）」這一個根本煩惱相應——因為悔的樣子粗，而貪這些根本煩惱樣子細，一粗一細搭不到一塊。睡眠、尋、伺則跟十個根本煩惱都能一起起——彼此都不牴觸。再講跟「隨煩惱」搭配：悔能跟中隨、大隨那些惑一起起，可不跟小隨忿等十個一起起——因為忿等各個都要當家作主，跟悔『也要當主』正好頂上了。睡眠、尋、伺則跟整整二十個隨煩惱都能一起起——因為睡眠等狀態裡頭，那些隨煩惱都能跟著冒出來。
〔三性門〕
這四個法善、惡、無記三性都通——舉個例子：對『無記的事』（不善不惡的事）也照樣能追悔，可見悔連無記都通；其餘三個照這個樣子推就行。
〔屬於哪一檔善·第一種說法〕 一說：前兩個（悔、眠）只屬「生得善」（生來就有、不費力的那種善）——因為悔的樣子又粗又鄙、眠的樣子又昏又粗，撐不起「加行」（用功修出來的那種善）。後兩個（尋、伺）則還通「加行善」——因為像「聞所成慧」（聽聞正法修出來的智慧）這些智慧裡頭，就有尋、伺在用。
〔第二種說法〕 又說：前兩個（悔、眠）也通「加行善」——因為在「聞、思」的階段（聽聞、思惟正法的時候）也照樣有悔、眠。再說後三個（眠、尋、伺）都通『染污的無記』和『清淨的無記』這兩種；唯獨「惡作（悔）」不通染污的無記——因為它的行解又粗又猛（染污的無記得是細的，悔太粗了，所以排除在外）。
〔四無記門〕
「無記」（不善不惡的中性狀態）又細分四種：異熟無記、威儀無記、工巧無記、變化（自在）無記。這四種裡頭——悔只通『中間那兩種』（威儀、工巧）：因為它樣子又粗又猛，又不是「定」修出來的果（所以把要靠定才有的「變化無記」也排掉了），剩下威儀、工巧這兩個跟它對得上。眠則『把第四種（變化無記）扣掉』、通前三種：因為睡眠不是靠定引生的，而且『異熟生的心』也照樣會有睡眠（所以異熟、威儀、工巧這前三種它都通）。尋、伺則『把第一種（異熟無記）扣掉』、通後三種：因為異熟那種心行解太微弱，沒法去尋察名言這些意思（尋伺非得碰名言不可，異熟做不到，所以扣掉異熟，通威儀、工巧、變化這後三種）。
〔界繫門〕
惡作（悔）、睡眠只在欲界才有；尋、伺則在欲界和初禪都有；至於再上去的界地（二禪以上）那些法，個個又妙又靜（容不下這四個又粗又動的法）。所以悔、眠的人要是生到上地，這兩個一定起不來。尋、伺就靈活些，『在上的、在下的』都能起到『下面、上面』去（生在上面的能起下面的尋伺、生在下面的能起上面的尋伺，上下互通）。並且不管在下、在上，尋、伺都能緣到上地或下地的境。
〔悔、眠能不能緣上地·第一種說法〕 一說：悔、眠緣不到上地——因為它倆樣子又粗又只盯近處、又極其昏昧粗簡，沒法遠遠地去抓上地的境。〔第二種說法〕 又說：這兩個也能緣到上地——比方有邪見的人，會追悔自己『修過上界的定』這件事（這悔不就緣到上地了嗎）；又夢裡能把自己經歷過的一切事普遍地夢到（裡頭也含上地的境，這眠不就緣上了嗎）。
〔學無學門〕
悔不算「無學」（阿羅漢那一檔）——因為一旦離了欲、證得無學，悔這個法當下就捨掉了（無學位裡沒有悔）。睡眠、尋、伺則「學、無學、非學非無學」這三種都通。為什麼？因為『正在求解脫的人』（聖者）所修的有為善法，都叫「學」；『修行已經圓滿的人』（阿羅漢）所有的有為善法，都叫「無學」——而眠、尋、伺在這兩個身位裡都還有，所以都通得上。
〔見修所斷門〕
悔、眠只通「見所斷」和「修所斷」這兩種（也就是見道、修道時斷掉的）。為什麼？一是它倆也會被邪見這些力推著起來（所以歸見道斷）；二是它倆不是由無漏道直接引生的（所以進不了「非所斷」那一檔）；三是它倆也不像「憂」那樣能深深地推著人去求解脫（「憂」還能算進「非所斷」，悔、眠卻不能）。不過要補一句：如果按『已經斷盡了就叫非所斷』這個意思來算，那無學位（阿羅漢）的睡眠也可以算進「非所斷」（因為到那時染污已斷光了）。
尋、伺雖然本身不是真正的無漏道，可是它倆能引發無漏（並且也能從無漏裡被引生出來），所以「見所斷、修所斷、非所斷」這三種它倆全通。
〔尋、伺那個「非所斷」歸到哪·第一種說法·只算分別〕 一說：尋、伺裡「非所斷」的那部分，在『相、名、分別、正智、如如』這五法當中，只能歸到「分別」這一法——因為《瑜伽》說尋伺是「分別」。〔第二種說法·也算正智〕 又說：這兩個也能歸到「正智」這一法。理由有幾條：一是《論》說『正思惟是無漏的』，而正思惟正是讓心去尋求、推敲（這就是尋伺）；二是又說尋伺是『言說（說法）的根子』——一個菩薩還沒修到究竟位的時候，對眾生的「藥」（對治法門）和「病」（煩惱）還不能全曉得，那他在「後得智」（出定後了別事相的那種智）裡頭給人說法，就非得靠尋、伺去推敲不可，不像「佛地」那樣『不費勁就把法說出來』（佛任運說法、用不著尋伺）——可見尋、伺這兩個也通無漏。
所以說，雖然尋、伺確實是「分別」，可不能一口咬定它倆只能歸到五法裡的第三個（分別）——因為「後得正智」裡頭也有分別（也就是說尋伺也通正智那一法）。至於其餘那些門類，照上面講隨煩惱諸門的辦法，自己順著道理推想就行。
乙、六位心所總結（離心即心之辨）
這「六類」（遍行、別境、善、煩惱、隨煩惱、不定）心所法，到底是『離開心王的體、自己另有一個本性』呢？還是『就是心王在不同情境下顯出的別相』（離不開心王）呢？〔反問〕假如真照其中一邊講，會有什麼毛病？〔答〕兩邊都有毛病。下面分兩頭把毛病攤出來。
〔難·說『心所離心另有本體』會出的毛病〕假如心所離開心王、自己另有一個本性，那就有好幾處說不通：第一，經教怎麼還能說『只有識（唯識）』呢？——既然心所是另一套東西，那就不止有識了，「唯識」這話豈不落空。第二，經教怎麼還能說『心走得最遠、心獨自而行』、『染淨都由心決定』、『士夫（眾生）由六界構成（裡頭含識界，是拿心把心所一併攝進去的）』呢？——這些話都把功用歸在心一個身上，可見心所不該離心。第三，《莊嚴論》那段話又怎麼講得通呢？那首偈的意思是：要承認『心會變現出像『能取、所取』兩面那樣的相』，同樣也會變現出像『貪等染法』的相、或像「信等善法」的相——並沒有離開心、另外實有的染法和善法。（這幾條都在證明：心所離不開心。）
〔難·說『心所就是心』會出的毛病〕反過來，假如心所就是心王在不同情境下的別相（跟心王是一個、沒有兩樣），那又有好幾處說不通：第一，經教怎麼還能說『心和心所相應』呢？——「相應」是兩個不同的東西配在一起（他性相應），不是一個東西跟自己相應；既然心所就是心，哪來兩個相應。第二，經教怎麼還能說『心和心所同時起，像太陽和陽光一塊現』呢？——既然心所就是心，就只有一個法，談不上兩個一塊起。第三，《瑜伽論》那段話又怎麼講得通呢？它明說『心所並不就是心』。那首偈的意思是：（要是心所就是心，）那「五種性」就立不住了（也就是自性、所依、所緣、行相、相應這五樣分不出來了），又會落下『把心所只當成心的分位別相』這個毛病，再說（這麼一來）心和心所的因緣也就沒分別了——這些統統跟經教相違。（這幾條都在證明：心所並不就是心。）
〔答·正解〕那該怎麼說才對呢？應該說：心所離開心王、自己另有本性。不過呢，因為『心王是主、比較殊勝』，所以經教才說「唯識」這些話（這是舉那個主的、把次要的心所一併收進去，並不是說沒有心所）；又因為心所是靠著心王的力才生起的，所以說它『變現得像心王那樣』，可這並不等於說心所就是心。再說經教裡「識」、「心」這些字，本來就把心所也包在裡頭（因為心所跟心王老是相應在一起）。這麼一來，「唯識」這些話、以及『變現得像心王那樣』這個說法，就都沒毛病了——這些都是『就世俗這一層』講的（在世俗這一層，心所跟心王是「離」是「即」還分得出來）。可要是『就勝義這一層』講，那心所跟心王就是『不離、也不即』（不是一個、也不是兩個）；各個識彼此之間也該這麼看（一樣是不離不即）。這就是大乘「真（勝義）」、『俗（世俗）』兩層道理的奧妙所在。
〔Verses commented〕Verse 14 · the four indeterminate
A. The Four Indeterminate
The marks of the twenty secondary defilements have already been told above. Next come the "indeterminate" (this class of mental factors whose nature is not fixed) — there are four of them, and what are their marks? The verse answers: the indeterminate are these four, regret, drowsiness, applied-thought, sustained-thought, plus the one line "the two, each in two."
The treatise says: these four dharmas, regret, drowsiness, applied-thought, sustained-thought, are "undecidable" as to whether they count as wholesome, defiled, or unmarked (not fixed in any one nature, but shifting as the case may be); further, they are not, like the omnipresent factors "contact" and the rest, "definitely spread through every single mind," nor, like the object-determined factors "desire" and the rest, "definitely spread through every single stage (of the realms)." Precisely because they are "undecidable" on all these heads, they are given the name "indeterminate."
1. Regret (悔 · remorse)
"Regret" is also called "remorse" (惡作), and the sense is: one feels aversion at a thing one has done, and so "regrets it afterward" — this after-regret is its nature. Its function: it blocks "calm-abiding" (śamatha, the practice of settling the mind down). This name "remorse" is a case of "giving the name of the 'cause' to the 'effect.'" How so? "Remorse" (惡作, the aversion-deed) originally refers to "the very thing one feels aversion at" (this is the cause, the prior thing); first there is this aversion-rousing thing (the cause), and only afterward does the after-regret arise (the effect); yet now the name of the prior "cause" (惡作) is taken to name the latter "effect" (the after-regret) — and this is "giving the cause's name to the effect." Further, "regretting that one did not do a certain thing at the time" is also counted under "remorse," as when someone repents and says: "I did not go and do that thing at the time — this is my remorse (I fret that I did not do it)."
2. Drowsiness (眠 · sleep)
"Drowsiness" is "sleep": it makes the body not at its own command, and has "dimness, abridgement" (the mind dim and dull, the mode coarse and brief) for its nature. Its function: it blocks "insight" (vipaśyanā, the practice of seeing clearly into the principle of things). How so? In sleep the body is not its own master, the mind is in the extreme dim and feeble, and only "one door" (the mind-door) is still in operation, the five doors of eye, ear, nose, tongue, body being out of use. Here the two words "dimness" and "abridgement" each have their point: the word "dimness" (dim) is to set aside "being in concentration" — for in concentration the mind too is focused on a single object, yet it is clear and bright, not dim; the word "abridgement" (the mode coarse and brief) is to set aside "the waking state" — for when awake the mode is clear, not coarse-and-brief. With these two words set down, it comes out that sleep has a substance and a function of its own (it is not a sheer blank). Moreover, in the "no-mind state" (states like swoon or a death-faint where there is no conscious activity) this name "drowsiness" is conventionally pinned on all the same, because it is, just like the other secondary-defilement mental factors such as the "covers" and the "fetters," by nature associated with mind (this is speaking conventionally by following the mark of something else).
〔The substance of regret and drowsiness · first view · taking only delusion for substance〕 One view: these two, regret and drowsiness, take only "delusion" (muddle-headedness) for their substance — the ground being that the treatise says these two are "secondary defilements" and also "a portion of delusion."
〔Second view · the defiled portion takes delusion, the pure portion takes non-delusion〕 Another view: not so, for regret and drowsiness also reach the wholesome (they are not defiled alone). One should sort it thus: the "defiled portion" of these two takes delusion for its substance, and the "pure portion" takes non-delusion for its substance; the treatise's calling them secondary defilements and a portion of delusion was said only with respect to "the defiled portion," not that they are, entire, only delusion.
〔Third view · taking volition-and-discernment / volition-and-conception for substance〕 Another view: the foregoing view does not hold either — because regret and drowsiness also reach "the unmarked" (that neutral, neither-good-nor-bad state), yet the unmarked is neither delusion nor non-delusion (it falls on neither side), so the scheme "the defiled takes delusion, the pure takes non-delusion" cannot sort it cleanly (it leaves out the unmarked portion). One should say: "remorse (regret)" takes "volition and discernment" for its substance (for the after-regret requires that one clearly think over and sift the thing one has done, and this is just volition and discernment at work); and "sleep" combines "volition and conception" for its substance (for in dreams one thinks and conceives all manner of dream-images, and this too is volition and conception at work); the treatise also says both are "conventionally existent." As for the defiled portion of them, it is of one kind flowing out of delusion (the outflow-kind, just like "lack-of-faith" and the rest), and so is spoken of as a portion of delusion.
〔It should be known · the correct view · regret and drowsiness each have a substance of their own〕 Another view (and this is the correct reading): the foregoing view's reasoning does not stand either — regret and drowsiness are not just "volition, discernment, conception" turned into a "fetter" (a "fetter" is a secondary defilement, yet volition, discernment, conception are not themselves fetters, so how could they be made the substance of regret and drowsiness?). One should say: regret and drowsiness each have a substance of their own, with a look unlike that of any other mental factor; and as for the treatise's saying they are "spoken of, by following the mark of delusion, as conventionally existent," that too is a convenient way of speaking by following something else's mark (not that their substance is truly conventional).
3. Applied-thought · sustained-thought (尋 · 伺)
"Applied-thought" means seeking-out: it makes the mind, upon the "mental-speech object" (that object one thinks over in the mind by means of names and concepts), "deliberate coarsely" in a hurry — this is its nature. "Sustained-thought" means investigating: it makes the mind, upon the same mental-speech object, "deliberate finely" in a hurry — this is its nature. Both take "the basis of the state in which body and mind are at ease or not at ease" for their function: if applied-thought and sustained-thought are gentle, body and mind are at ease; if applied-thought and sustained-thought are restless, body and mind are not at ease. Both take "a portion of volition and discernment" for their substance; the difference lies only in this: upon the mental-speech object, applied-thought "does not push in deep" and sustained-thought "pushes in deep" — these two bearings can be told apart. Yet that said, were one to take away volition and discernment, just where the substances of applied-thought and sustained-thought differ could no longer be found at all (which shows that, in the end, their substance is still volition and discernment).
What do the three words "the two, each in two" in the verse mean? 〔First view〕 One view: it means that applied-thought and sustained-thought, these two, each further divide into the two classes "defiled" and "pure" (the one "two" refers to the pair applied-thought and sustained-thought, and "each in two" to each of them again dividing into the two classes defiled and pure — hence "the two, each in two").
〔Second view〕 Another view: the foregoing reading does not hold — regret and drowsiness likewise have the two classes defiled and pure, so on what ground does "the two classes defiled and pure" refer to applied-thought and sustained-thought alone (on this reading, ought not regret and drowsiness to be reckoned in too)? One should say: just as among the earlier defiled mental factors some are of the "root-defilement" nature and some of the "secondary-defilement" nature, told apart, so too these two, applied-thought and sustained-thought, each divide into the two classes "unwholesome" and "unmarked," or each divide into the two classes "fetter" (the active mode, at work in the present) and "latent disposition" (the seed, lying dormant) — this is "the two, each in two" (the pair applied-thought-and-sustained-thought, each again dividing into two classes).
〔It should be known · the correct view〕 Another view (and this is the correct reading): the foregoing view does not hold either — the phrase "the two, each in two" is placed after "the four indeterminate" have all been told (it is a summing-up of these four dharmas), not said of applied-thought and sustained-thought alone. One should put it thus: the first word "two" discloses "two sets, each of two": the "two" of the first set refers to regret and drowsiness, the "two" of the second set to applied-thought and sustained-thought. These two sets are each of a different kind, and so the single word "two" gathers them up to point out, all at once, this "two-sets-each-of-two." And each one of these dharmas "has two," namely "defiled" and "non-defiled" (and herein they differ from the wholesome mental factors and the defiled mental factors — those wholesome ones are purely wholesome, those defiled ones purely defiled, with only the one nature; whereas these four run both defiled and pure). Or, put another way: "each in two" is said solely to clear away "the defiled" side — it is to bring out that they are not defiled alone but also run "indeterminate" — and so this line is specially spoken; for regret, drowsiness, applied-thought, sustained-thought have also been spoken of as secondary defilements, and lest one then doggedly take them to be defiled only, this "each in two" is set down to bring out that their nature is in fact indeterminate. In sum, this phrase "the two, each in two" is spoken to make plain the sense of "indeterminate," and so its placement is deeply useful (it is no idle word).
〔The several gates of the four indeterminate〕
〔The gate of conventional and real〕
Among these four dharmas: applied-thought and sustained-thought are definitely conventional (having no substance of their own) — because they are put together out of "volition" and "discernment," and this is what the sacred teaching says. As for regret and drowsiness 〔conventional or real · first view〕 One view: they too are conventional — the Yogācārabhūmi calls these two "conventionally existent." 〔Second view〕 Another view: regret and drowsiness "are really, substantially existent, having a thing of their own" — because the Yogācārabhūmi said only that "the latter two (applied-thought and sustained-thought)" are conventional, and did not say the former two (regret and drowsiness) are definitely conventional. Then does not the Yogācārabhūmi also call regret-and-drowsiness "conventionally existent"? That "conventionally existent" is merely spoken conventionally by following something else's mark, and does not show that the former two (regret-and-drowsiness) are definitely conventional; take a comparison: the "inner seed" (the seed within the store-consciousness) has a substance that is plainly real, yet the treatise also calls it "conventionally existent" — which shows that to be called "conventionally existent" does not necessarily mean the substance is conventional.
〔The gate of not being mutually associated〕
Among these four dharmas, applied-thought and sustained-thought definitely do not arise together (do not run side by side at one time) — for though their substance is alike "volition and discernment," the one is coarse and the other fine, and one mind cannot hold a coarse and a fine running side by side. Scripture, going by the "presence" and "absence" of applied-thought and sustained-thought, marks off the "three stages" (that is, the three tiers "the stage with applied-thought and sustained-thought," "the stage without applied-thought but with sustained-thought," "the stage without applied-thought and without sustained-thought"); and note, this marking-off looks only to the coarseness or fineness of applied-thought and sustained-thought when they are "actively present," and not to whether their "seeds" are actively present or not — and so these three stages are marked off cleanly, without getting jumbled. Further, applied-thought and sustained-thought may each arise together with the former two (regret, drowsiness); and the former two (regret, drowsiness), among themselves, also have the case where they may arise together.
〔The gate of association with which consciousness〕
These four dharmas all do not arise together with the seventh and eighth consciousnesses (the principle was told in an earlier chapter); regret and drowsiness arise together with the sixth, the mental consciousness, only — because they are not "dharmas of the first five consciousnesses" (the five consciousnesses eye, ear, nose, tongue, body have no such modes as after-regret or sleep).
〔Applied-thought and sustained-thought, with which consciousness · first view · they arise with the five consciousnesses too〕 One view: applied-thought and sustained-thought arise together with the first five consciousnesses too. Three citations from the treatises are adduced as grounds: first, the treatise says "the five consciousnesses too have applied-thought and sustained-thought"; second, it further says "applied-thought and sustained-thought just are the seven [kinds of] discrimination" (such as "discrimination of marks" and the like); third, the Vyākhyā also says "spontaneous discrimination refers to the five consciousnesses" (the spontaneous, of-themselves discrimination of the five consciousnesses just is applied-thought and sustained-thought).
〔It should be known · the correct view · they arise with the mental consciousness only〕 Another view (and this is the correct reading): applied-thought and sustained-thought arise together with the sixth, the mental consciousness, only. The grounds: first, the treatise says "the dharmas of seeking-out and investigating and the like are all dharmas exclusive to the mental consciousness"; second, it further says "applied-thought and sustained-thought are associated with the two feelings sorrow and joy," and never said they are associated with pain and pleasure (as for "the feeling of equanimity," that belongs to every mind and need not be specially mentioned). 〔Someone asks〕 Then why did the treatise not say applied-thought and sustained-thought are associated with pain and pleasure too? 〔A〕 Though in the first dhyāna there is indeed "pleasure of the mental ground," it is inseparable from "joy," and so it was gathered in under the name "joy" once for all (no separate "pleasure" set up); and though in the place of unmixed suffering (the hells) there is indeed "pain of the mental ground," its look closely resembles "sorrow," and so it was spoken of as "sorrow" once for all (no separate "pain" set up) — this is why pain and pleasure were not separately mentioned. Third, the treatise further says: applied-thought and sustained-thought take "the name-body" (verbal designations) and the like for their object, whereas the first five consciousnesses do not take the name-body and the like for their object (the five consciousnesses cling only to the marks of things themselves, and do not cling to verbal designations) — since applied-thought and sustained-thought must depend on names-and-marks while the five consciousnesses never touch names-and-marks, it is plain that applied-thought and sustained-thought arise together with the mental consciousness only.
Then turning back to the first view's cited line "the five consciousnesses have applied-thought and sustained-thought," what does it really mean? It says only that applied-thought and sustained-thought are "for the most part set going by the five consciousnesses," not that applied-thought and sustained-thought are associated with the five consciousnesses, arising along with them. And as to the Vyākhyā's line "spontaneous discrimination refers to the five consciousnesses" — it and the "discrimination" that the Yogācārabhūmi speaks of are in fact not one meaning: the Vyākhyā's "spontaneous discrimination" refers straight to the five consciousnesses themselves, whereas the "discrimination" the Yogācārabhūmi speaks of refers to "the applied-thought and sustained-thought associated with the discriminating mental consciousness that arises together with the five consciousnesses" (that is, the applied-thought and sustained-thought of the sixth mental consciousness, not that the five consciousnesses have applied-thought and sustained-thought of their own). The word "discrimination" in the two places each refers to its own thing, and so the first view's adducing the Vyākhyā as proof does not stand; from this it is known that the five consciousnesses definitely have no applied-thought or sustained-thought.
〔The gate of association with feeling〕
〔Which feelings the four indeterminate go with · first view〕 One view: remorse (regret) is associated with "sorrow, equanimity" — because it forever runs along with a "sorrowful-distressed" look, and also reaches the unmarked (and so matches the neither-sorrowful-nor-glad "equanimity" too). Sleep arises together with the three feelings "joy, sorrow, equanimity" — because its look may be glad, may be sorrowful, may be neither-glad-nor-sorrowful (glad, distressed, and middling-neutral, all three reach it). Applied-thought and sustained-thought are associated with the four feelings "sorrow, joy, equanimity, pleasure" — because in the first dhyāna they can arise together with "the pleasure of the mental ground" (and so they pick up one more, pleasure).
〔Second view〕 Another view: these four dharmas also arise together with "the feeling of pain" — because in the destinies of unmixed suffering (the hells) they can arise together with "the pain of the mental ground" (and so, on this account, these four dharmas reach all five feelings entire).
〔The gate of association with the object-determined [factors]〕
These four dharmas may all arise together with the "five object-determined" (desire, resolve, mindfulness, concentration, discernment) — because their look and the object they cling to agree with those five and do not clash.
〔The gate of association with the wholesome [factors]〕
Regret and drowsiness can arise together with only "ten wholesome mental factors" — because these two appear in the desire-realm only, and in the desire-realm there is no "pliancy" wholesome factor (take pliancy out, and of the eleven wholesome there remain ten). Applied-thought and sustained-thought, then, can arise together with all "eleven wholesome" — because these two can rise as far as the first dhyāna, and in the first dhyāna "pliancy" arises along with them (the eleven wholesome complete).
〔The gate of association with the [root] defilements and the secondary defilements〕
First, as to pairing with the "root defilements": regret can be associated with only the one root defilement "ignorance (delusion)" — because regret's look is coarse, while root defilements such as greed have a fine look, and a coarse and a fine cannot be brought together. Sleep, applied-thought, sustained-thought, then, can arise together with all ten root defilements — they are mutually not at odds. Next, as to pairing with the "secondary defilements": regret can arise together with the middling and major secondary afflictions, but not with the minor ten, anger and the rest — because anger and the rest must each be its own master, which butts head-on against regret's also "wanting to be master." Sleep, applied-thought, sustained-thought, then, can arise together with all twenty secondary defilements — because in states such as sleep all those secondary defilements can come along too.
〔The gate of the three natures〕
These four dharmas reach all three natures, wholesome, unwholesome, unmarked — to give an instance: one can feel after-regret even over "an unmarked matter" (a matter neither good nor bad), which shows that regret reaches even the unmarked; the other three may be inferred on this pattern.
〔Under which class of wholesome · first view〕 One view: the former two (regret, drowsiness) belong only to "innately-acquired wholesome" (the kind of wholesome one has of birth, effortlessly) — because regret's look is coarse and base, and drowsiness's look is dim and coarse, and they cannot bear up "the applied" (the kind of wholesome worked up by effort in practice). The latter two (applied-thought, sustained-thought), then, also reach "applied wholesome" — because in such wisdoms as "the wisdom born of hearing" (the wisdom worked up by hearing the true Dharma) there is applied-thought and sustained-thought at work.
〔Second view〕 Another view: the former two (regret, drowsiness) also reach "applied wholesome" — because in the stages of "hearing and reflecting" (when one hears and reflects on the true Dharma) there is regret and drowsiness too. Further, the latter three (drowsiness, applied-thought, sustained-thought) all reach both "defiled unmarked" and "pure unmarked"; only "remorse (regret)" does not reach the defiled unmarked — because its working-understanding is coarse and fierce (the defiled unmarked must be fine; regret is too coarse, and so is left out).
〔The gate of the four unmarked [states]〕
"The unmarked" (the neutral, neither-good-nor-bad state) further divides into four kinds: maturation-unmarked, deportment-unmarked, craft-unmarked, and transformation (mastery)-unmarked. Among these four — regret reaches only "the middle two" (deportment, craft): because its look is coarse and fierce, and it is not "a fruit worked up by concentration" (so the "transformation-unmarked," which requires concentration, is ruled out too), leaving deportment and craft, these two, to match it. Drowsiness, then, "takes out the fourth (transformation-unmarked)" and reaches the former three: because sleep is not drawn forth by concentration, and besides "a maturation-born mind" can have sleep too (and so it reaches all three of maturation, deportment, craft). Applied-thought and sustained-thought, then, "take out the first (maturation-unmarked)" and reach the latter three: because that maturation kind of mind has a working-understanding too feeble, unable to seek-and-investigate the senses of names-and-words (applied-thought and sustained-thought must touch names-and-words, which maturation cannot do, and so maturation is taken out, leaving deportment, craft, transformation, the latter three).
〔The gate of binding to the realms〕
Remorse (regret) and sleep exist in the desire-realm only; applied-thought and sustained-thought exist in both the desire-realm and the first dhyāna; as for the realms and stages further up (the second dhyāna and beyond), their dharmas are every one subtle and still (and cannot hold these four coarse, restless dharmas). And so if one of regret and drowsiness is born into an upper stage, these two definitely cannot become actively present. Applied-thought and sustained-thought, then, are more nimble: "those above and those below" can each rise to act "below or above" (one born above can give rise to applied-thought and sustained-thought below, one born below can give rise to applied-thought and sustained-thought above, upper and lower being mutually open). And whether below or above, applied-thought and sustained-thought can take an upper-stage or a lower-stage object.
〔Whether regret and drowsiness can take an upper-stage object · first view〕 One view: regret and drowsiness cannot take an upper-stage object — because their look is coarse and fixed on what is near, and extremely dim and coarse besides, so that they cannot reach far off to seize an upper-stage object. 〔Second view〕 Another view: these two can take an upper-stage object too — say a person with a wrong view feels after-regret over the fact that "he had cultivated the concentration of an upper realm" (does this regret not then take an upper-stage object?); and in dreams one can dream over all things one has gone through (and among them lies the upper-stage object too — does this drowsiness not then take an upper-stage object?).
〔The gate of the trainee and the non-trainee〕
Regret does not count as "non-trainee" (the arhat register) — because the moment one is parted from desire and attains the non-trainee [state], this dharma regret is cast off then and there (in the non-trainee stage there is no regret). Sleep, applied-thought, sustained-thought, then, reach all three kinds, "trainee, non-trainee, and neither-trainee-nor-non-trainee." Why? Because the conditioned wholesome dharmas of "one still seeking liberation" (the noble one) are all called "trainee," and the conditioned wholesome dharmas of "one whose practice is complete" (the arhat) are all called "non-trainee" — and sleep, applied-thought, sustained-thought are still present in both these stations, and so reach them all.
〔The gate of what is severed by seeing or by cultivation〕
Regret and drowsiness are of these two kinds only, "severed by seeing" and "severed by cultivation" (that is, severed on the path of seeing and on the path of cultivation). Why? First, these two arise being driven by the force of wrong view and the like (and so fall to severance by seeing); second, these two are not directly drawn forth by the uncontaminated path (and so cannot enter the register "not to be severed"); third, these two are not, like "sorrow," able to drive a person deeply to seek liberation ("sorrow" can be reckoned into "not to be severed," but regret and drowsiness cannot). One thing must be added, though: if one reckons by the sense "once severed away it is called not-to-be-severed," then the sleep of the non-trainee stage (the arhat's) may be reckoned into "not to be severed" too (because by that time the defiled has been severed clean away).
Applied-thought and sustained-thought, though they are not themselves the true uncontaminated path, can yet draw forth the uncontaminated (and can also be drawn forth out of the uncontaminated), and so reach all three, "severed by seeing, severed by cultivation, not to be severed."
〔Where the "not-to-be-severed" portion of applied-thought and sustained-thought belongs · first view · it counts only as discrimination〕 One view: as for the "not-to-be-severed" portion of applied-thought and sustained-thought, among the "five dharmas" (mark, name, discrimination, right cognition, suchness) it can be reckoned only into "discrimination" — because the Yogācārabhūmi says applied-thought and sustained-thought are "discrimination." 〔Second view · it counts as right cognition too〕 Another view: these two can be reckoned into "right cognition" too. The grounds are several: first, the treatise says "right thought is uncontaminated," and right thought is just what sets the mind to seeking-out and deliberating (which is applied-thought and sustained-thought); second, it further says applied-thought and sustained-thought are "the root of speech (preaching)" — for when a bodhisattva has not yet reached the ultimate stage, he cannot fully know the "medicine" (the methods of counteraction) and the "disease" (the defilements) of sentient beings, and so, in the "subsequently-attained cognition" (the cognition that, on coming out of concentration, discerns the marks of things) he preaches the Dharma for others, he absolutely must lean on applied-thought and sustained-thought to deliberate, unlike at "the Buddha stage" where one "preaches the Dharma effortlessly" (the Buddha preaches of himself, with no need of applied-thought and sustained-thought) — which shows that these two, applied-thought and sustained-thought, reach the uncontaminated too.
So, although it is said that applied-thought and sustained-thought are surely "discrimination," one cannot doggedly insist that these two belong only to the third of the five dharmas (discrimination) — because in "the subsequently-attained right cognition" too there is discrimination (which is to say applied-thought and sustained-thought reach that dharma "right cognition" as well). As for the remaining gates, one may follow the method of the gates of the secondary defilements told above, and think them out for oneself going by the principle.
B. The general summary of the six classes of mental factors (the dispute over apart-from-mind or being-mind)
These "six classes" of mental factors (omnipresent, object-determined, wholesome, [root] defilements, secondary defilements, indeterminate) — are they "apart from the substance of the mind-king, possessing a nature of their own"? Or are they "the distinct guises the mind-king shows in differing situations" (inseparable from the mind-king)? 〔Q〕 Granting that one tells it either way, what is the fault? 〔A〕 Both ways have a fault. Below, the faults are laid out under two heads.
〔Q · the faults of saying "the mental factors are apart from mind, with a body of their own"〕 If the mental factors are apart from the mind-king, possessing a nature of their own, then there are several things that do not get through: First, how can the teaching still say "there is only consciousness (consciousness-only)"? — since, if the mental factors are another set of things, then there is more than consciousness, and the word "consciousness-only" falls void. Second, how can the teaching still say "mind travels farthest, mind fares alone," "defilement and purity are decided by mind," "the person (a sentient being) is constituted of the six elements" (which include the element of consciousness, where mind is taken to gather the mental factors in along with it)? — these sayings all set the function on the one mind, which shows the mental factors ought not to be apart from mind. Third, how is that passage in the Sūtrālaṃkāra to be made to fit? The sense of that verse is: one must grant that "mind manifests an appearance as if in two aspects, the 'grasper' and the 'grasped,'" and likewise manifests an appearance as if of "defiled dharmas such as greed," or as if of "wholesome dharmas such as faith" — there being no defiled dharma and no wholesome dharma really existent apart from mind. (These several points all prove: the mental factors are not apart from mind.)
〔Q · the faults of saying "the mental factors are mind itself"〕 Conversely, if the mental factors just are the distinct guises of the mind-king in differing situations (being one with the mind-king, no two), then again there are several things that do not get through: First, how can the teaching still say "mind is associated [with the mental factors]"? — for "association" is two different things paired together (association of differing natures), not one thing associated with itself; if the mental factors just are mind, where are the two to be associated? Second, how can the teaching still say "mind and the mental factors arise at one time, like the sun and its light appearing together"? — for if the mental factors just are mind, there is but one dharma, and no two arising together to speak of. Third, how is that passage in the Yogācārabhūmi to be made to fit? It plainly says "the mental factors are not mind itself." The sense of that verse is: (were the mental factors mind itself,) then "the five natures" would not stand (that is, self-nature, basis, object, mode, association — these five could no longer be told apart); further it would incur the fault of "making the mental factors merely the positional distinct-guises of mind"; and besides (on this view) the causes-and-conditions of mind and of the mental factors would have no difference either — and all these run counter to the teaching. (These several points all prove: the mental factors are not mind itself.)
〔A · the correct view〕 Then how is it to be put rightly? One should say: the mental factors are apart from the mind-king, possessing a nature of their own. Yet because "the mind-king is the master, the superior one," the teaching speaks of "consciousness-only" and the like (this is to lift up that master and gather the lesser mental factors in along with it — not that there are no mental factors); and because the mental factors arise by leaning on the force of the mind-king, they are said to "manifest an appearance resembling the mind-king," yet this is not to say the mental factors are mind. Further, the words "consciousness" and "mind" in the teaching of themselves take the mental factors in too (because the mental factors are forever associated with the mind-king). And so the words "consciousness-only" and the rest, and the saying "manifest an appearance resembling the mind-king," all turn out without fault — these being all spoken "from the level of the conventional" (on the conventional level, whether the mental factors are "apart from" or "identical with" the mind-king can still be told apart). But spoken "from the level of the ultimate," the mental factors and the mind-king are "neither-apart-nor-identical" (not one, and not two); and the several consciousnesses, each against another, are to be viewed in just this way too (likewise neither-apart-nor-identical). This is the very subtlety of the great vehicle's two-level principle, "the true (the ultimate)" and "the conventional."
〔所釋之頌〕第十四頌·不定四
本節『不定四』與心所總結之義，論本有據。《瑜伽師地論·本地分》定尋、伺之相：『尋謂能令心麤分別』『伺謂能令心細分別』——尋伺之麤細，即本節判其通三性、不遍一切地之所本；又立「有尋有伺、無尋唯伺、無尋無伺」三地，正明尋伺非遍一切地，是「不定」一名之論據。至於心所離心與否，《瑜伽》既別立心所有法一聚，又說彼「與心相應」，離即之辨即由此起。下面順著頌文講開。
甲、不定四
〔總標〕——為什麼這四個叫「不定」
二十個隨煩惱的相講完了。「不定」有四個，它們的相是什麼？頌答：不定就是悔、眠、尋、伺，後面跟著「二各二」。為什麼立「不定」這名？因為悔、眠、尋、伺這四個，在善、染等三性裡都「不定」（不定屬哪一性）；又不像「觸」等遍行心所那樣『定遍一切心』，也不像「欲」等別境心所那樣『定遍一切地』；所以立「不定」這名。下面逐一講。
一、悔（惡作）
「悔」就是「惡作」，意思是厭惡所作的業、起追悔，這是體性；作用是『障止（奢摩他）』。這裡有個名相要解清楚：「惡作」本來指的是『所厭惡的事』（這是因），先有了所厭惡作的業（因），後來才起追悔（果），如今卻拿「惡作」這個因名來稱那個追悔的果，這叫「於果假立因名」。還有，『追悔先前沒做』也算「惡作」，譬如有人追悔說：『我先前沒做那樣的事，這是我的惡作。』可見悔不限於悔已做的，也含悔未做的。
二、眠（睡眠）
「眠」就是「睡眠」，它令身不得自在，以「昧、略」——心昏昧、行相略劣——為體性，作用是『障觀（毘鉢舍那）』。睡眠的時候，身不自在、心極闇劣，只靠「一門」（意門，不藉五門）而轉。這裡「昧」字是要簡別開「在定」（入定也是心一境，可那不是昏昧）；「略」字是要簡別開『醒時』（醒時行相不會略劣）——這樣標出來，是要顯睡眠並不是沒有體用。又它在「無心位」（像悶絕等）也假立「眠」這名，那是因為它像其餘的蓋、纏等心所跟心相應一樣，是隨他相方便而說的。
悔、眠這兩個以什麼為體？這場辯論有四說。一說：悔、眠只以「癡」為體，因為論裡說這兩個是「隨煩惱」以及「癡分」。又說：不對，悔、眠也通善性（不只是染）；應該說這兩個的「染分」以癡為體，「淨分」就以無癡為體；論裡是就「染分」說它們是隨煩惱、是癡分所攝，不是說整個都只是癡。又說：前說也不合理——因為悔、眠還通「無記」，而無記既不是癡的性、也不是無癡的性（所以拿染癡、淨無癡也概括不了它）；應該說「惡作」以「思、慧」為體（追悔得明了地思擇所作的業），「睡眠」合用「思、想」為體（睡中思、想種種夢境的相）；論裡也都說這兩個是『世俗有（假）』；它們染污的那一分是癡的等流（像不信等），所以說是癡分。又說（這是應知的正義）：前說的理也不對——悔、眠並不就是「思、慧、想」的「纏」性（纏就是隨煩惱，思、慧、想不是纏）；應該說悔、眠「各別有體」，跟其餘心所的行相有別；它「隨癡相說名世俗有」，也是隨他相的方便說，不是說它的體是假。
三、尋 · 伺
「尋」就是尋求，令心在「意言境」（心裡用名言所緣的境）上匆遽地『粗轉』——粗略地推度——這是體性；「伺」就是伺察，令心在意言境上匆遽地「細轉」——細密地推度——這是體性。這兩個都以『身心安住、不安住的分位的所依』為作用（尋伺安，身心就安；尋伺躁，身心就不安）。它們都以『思、慧的一分』為體：在意言境上「不深推度」（尋）和「深推度」（伺），義類有別；要是離了思、慧，尋、伺這兩個的體類差別根本找不出來。
那麼頌裡「二各二」是什麼意思？這裡又是三說。一說：是指尋、伺這兩個各有「染、淨」兩類差別，所以叫「二各二」。又說：這個解釋不合正理——悔、眠也有染、淨兩類，怎麼單說尋伺？應該說：像前面那些染心所有『是煩惱性』『是隨煩惱性』之別一樣，尋、伺這兩個也各有「不善、無記」兩類，或各有「纏」（現行）和「隨眠」（種子）兩類，這才是「二各二」。又說（這是應知的正義）：那個解釋也不合理——「二各二」這句話是擺在「不定四」的後面（總結這四個），不是單就尋伺說的。應該講：第一個「二」是顯有『兩種的二』：頭一個「二」指悔、眠；第二個「二」指尋、伺。這兩組各自的種類各別，所以用一個「二」字總顯這『兩組之二』。而這每一個法又「各有二」，就是「染、不染」（不像善心所、染心所那樣各只一性）。或者「各二」是專為簡別「染」（顯它不只是染、也有不定），所以說這句——因為悔、眠、尋、伺也曾被說成隨煩惱（怕人死執它們唯染，才擺這句來顯不定）。總之，為了顯「不定」的義，才說「二各二」，所以擺這句話是大有用處的。窺基《述記》就頌文「不定謂悔、眠，尋、伺二各二」這十個字，把它的文段判得清楚：頭上兩個字（「不定」）是標出這一位的總名，接著五個字（「謂悔眠尋伺」）是逐一列它們的別名，末後三個字（「二各二」）才是顯「不定」的義——這和本論「二各二」的正義（兩組之二、各通染與不染）正相符合。
〔不定四諸門〕——同樣從十二個角度把這四個攤開
悔、眠、尋、伺的相和「二各二」講完了，接著從各門辨它們的義理。
〔假實門〕——哪些假、哪些實
這四個裡：尋、伺決定是「假有」——它們由思、慧合成，這是聖教所說。悔、眠則有兩說。一說：也是假有，因為《瑜伽》說這兩個是「世俗有」。又說：悔、眠是「實物有」——《瑜伽》只說『後兩個（尋、伺）』是假有，並沒說前兩個（悔眠）決定是假；「世俗有」這句話是隨他相而說的，不是要顯前兩個決定是假；又好比「內種子」體雖然是實，論裡也說它是「世俗有」，可見「世俗有」不一定就體假。
〔互不相應門〕——彼此能不能同起
這四個裡，尋、伺決定不相應（不同起）——它們體類雖同（都是思、慧），可一粗一細有別，同一個心裡容不下粗、細並轉。依著尋、伺的「有」和「離」（有尋有伺、無尋唯伺、無尋無伺），立「三地」的差別；這只依尋伺現行的粗細，不依它種子的現起有無，所以三地的分判不會雜亂。尋、伺跟前兩個（悔、眠）容許互相應（同起），前兩個（悔、眠）彼此也有互相應的義。
〔何識相應門〕——跟哪幾個識相應
這四個都不跟第七、第八識同起，道理跟前章說的一樣；悔、眠只跟第六意識同起——因為它們不是『五（識）法』（五識沒有追悔、睡眠那樣的行相）。
尋、伺跟哪些識相應？兩說。一說：尋、伺也跟五識同起——論裡說「五識有尋、伺」；又說『尋、伺就是七種分別』（像有相分別等）；《雜集》還說『任運分別就是五識』（五識的任運分別就是尋伺）。又說（這是應知的正義）：尋、伺只跟意識同起——論裡說『尋求、伺察等法都是意識的不共法』；又說『尋、伺跟憂、喜相應』，從沒說跟苦、樂同起（捨受是遍的，可以不必特別說）。這裡有人問：為什麼不說尋伺跟苦、樂同起？回答是：雖然初靜慮有「意地樂」，可它離不開「喜」，所以總用「喜」這名攝它；雖然純苦處有「意地苦」，可它的相近似「憂」，所以總說成「憂」（因此不另立苦、樂）。又論裡說：尋、伺以「名身」等的義為所緣，而五識身不以名身等的義為境（五識緣自相，不緣名言），所以尋伺只跟意識同起。
那前面說「五識有尋、伺」又怎麼講？那是顯尋伺『多半是由五識引起的』，不是說尋伺跟五識相應俱起。至於《雜集》說的『任運分別就是五識』，它跟《瑜伽》說的「分別」義各有不同：《雜集》說『任運分別就是五識』，而《瑜伽》說這個「分別」是『跟五識同起的那個分別意識所相應的尋、伺』（也就是第六意識的尋伺，不是五識自己有的）。所以前說引《雜集》來作證是立不住的；由此可知『五識決定沒有尋、伺』。
〔受相應門〕——跟哪幾種受相應
跟受怎麼相應？兩說。一說：惡作跟「憂、捨」相應——只順「慼行」（憂慼的行相）而轉，又通無記（所以也跟捨）。睡眠跟「喜、憂、捨」三受同起——行相通「歡、慼、中庸」而轉。尋、伺跟「憂、喜、捨、樂」四受相應——因為初靜慮裡跟「意地樂」同起。又說：這四個也跟「苦受」同起——在純苦趣（地獄）裡，跟「意地苦」同起（所以這四個通五受）。
〔別境相應門〕——跟別境五個能不能相應
這四個都容許跟別境五（欲、勝解、念、定、慧）同起——行相、所緣不相違。
〔善相應門〕——跟善心所怎麼相應
悔、眠只容許跟『十個善心所』同起——因為這兩個只在欲界，欲界沒有「輕安」（所以扣掉輕安，只十個善）。尋、伺則容許跟『十一個善』同起——因為初靜慮裡有輕安同起（具足十一善）。
〔煩惱·隨煩惱相應門〕——跟根本煩惱、隨煩惱怎麼相應
悔只容許跟「無明（癡）」這一個根本煩惱相應——因為悔的行相粗，而貪等的行相細（搭不到一起）。睡眠、尋、伺則跟十個根本煩惱都同起——彼此展轉不相違。悔跟中隨、大隨諸惑容許同起，可不跟小隨忿等十個同起——因為忿等各自要當主，跟悔的『要當主』相違。睡眠、尋、伺則跟二十個隨煩惱都容許同起——在眠等位裡都能起那些隨煩惱。
〔三性門〕——屬善、惡、無記哪一性
這四個都通善、惡、無記三性——譬如對『無記的業』也能起追悔（悔通無記），其餘照此類推。
那它們在「善」裡又屬哪種善？兩說。一說：前兩個（悔、眠）只是「生得善」（與生俱來的善）——因為悔的行相粗鄙、眠的行相昧略（堪不起加行）；後兩個（尋、伺）也通「加行善」所攝——因為「聞所成」等慧裡有尋、伺。又說：前兩個也通「加行善」——聞、思的位裡也有悔、眠；又後三個（眠、尋、伺）都通「染無記」和「淨無記」兩種；唯獨「惡作（悔）」不是染無記——因為它的行解粗猛（染無記要細，悔粗所以扣掉）。
〔四無記門〕——在四種無記裡的分布
在「四無記」（異熟無記、威儀無記、工巧無記、變化／自在無記）裡：悔只通『中間兩個』（威儀、工巧）——行相粗猛，又不是「定果」（所以扣掉變化無記）。眠則『除掉第四個』（變化無記）——它不是由定引生的，而且異熟生心也能有眠（所以通前三）。尋、伺則『除掉頭一個』（異熟無記）——它行解微劣，不能尋察名言等義（所以扣掉異熟，通後三）。
〔界繫門〕——繫在哪一界、上下能不能互緣
惡作、睡眠只在欲界有；尋、伺在欲界和初靜慮有；其餘界地（二禪以上）的法都妙、都靜（沒有這四個粗動的法）。所以悔、眠的人若生在上地，這兩個必定不現起；尋、伺則「上、下」都能起「下、上」（在上的起下、在下的起上，互通）。在下、在上的尋、伺也能緣上、緣下的境。
悔、眠能不能緣上，又兩說。一說：悔、眠不能緣上地——行相粗近、極昧略，沒法遠取上境。又說：這兩個也緣上境——像有邪見的人會追悔自己「修定」的事（這就緣上定），又夢裡能普緣一切曾經歷過的事（含上境）。
〔學無學門〕——是不是學、無學所攝
悔不是「無學」所攝——因為一離欲（得無學）就把悔捨了。睡眠、尋、伺則都通「學、無學、非學非無學」三種。因為「求解脫者」的有為善法都叫「學」、『學已究竟者』的有為善法都叫「無學」（眠、尋、伺通這兩位）。
〔見修所斷門〕——見斷、修斷、還是非所斷
悔、眠只通「見所斷、修所斷」——它們也由邪見等勢力而起（所以見斷），不是由無漏道所親引生（所以不入「非所斷」），也不像「憂」那樣能深求解脫（憂可入非所斷，悔、眠不能）。若按『已斷了就叫非所斷』的義，那無學位的眠也可以攝入「非所斷」（已斷盡了）。
尋、伺雖然不是真實的無漏道，可它能引發無漏（也從無漏引生），所以通「見所斷、修所斷、非所斷」三所斷。
尋、伺的「非所斷」又兩說。一說：尋、伺的「非所斷」，在『相、名、分別、正智、如如』五法裡只屬「分別」所攝——《瑜伽》說尋伺是「分別」。又說：這兩個也屬「正智」所攝——因為論裡說「正思惟是無漏」，而正思惟正是令心尋求等（就是尋伺）；又說尋伺是『言說的因』，在「未究竟位」（菩薩位）對藥、病等還不能遍知，後得智裡為別人說法必定要藉尋、伺，不像佛地那樣「無功用說」（任運而說、不假尋伺）——所以尋伺這兩個也通無漏。再補一句：雖然說尋、伺必定是「分別」，可不能斷定它只屬五法的第三（分別）——因為「後得正智」裡也有分別（就是尋伺也通正智）。其餘各門，比照上面（隨煩惱諸門）如理去思就行了。
乙、六位心所總結——心所到底是離心別有、還是即是心的分位
最後總收一段。前面把「六位」（遍行、別境、善、煩惱、隨煩惱、不定）的心所都講完了，這裡要回答一個根本問題：這些心所，究竟是『離開心王的體、另有自己的自性』呢？還是『就是心王的一種分位差別』（不離心）呢？有人反詰：隨便取哪一邊，又有什麼過失？回答是：兩邊都有過。先把兩邊的過攤開。
先說『心所離心別有』的過。如果心所離了心、另有自性，那就有三重講不通：第一，怎麼能說聖教講的「唯有識」呢——既然心所別有，就不是「唯識」了。第二，怎麼能說『心遠行、心獨行』「染淨由心」『士夫的六界（含識界，用心攝心所）』呢。第三，《莊嚴論》那段文又怎麼會通——它的頌說：許心似「二」（能取、所取）而現，也似貪等（染）而現，或似信等（善）而現，並沒有離心別有的染法、善法。這些都在證明心所不離心。
再說『心所即是心的分位』的過。如果心所就是心的分位差別、跟心無二，那也有三重講不通：第一，怎麼能說聖教講的『心與心所相應』呢——相應是「他性相應」（不同性的兩法才相應），不是自性跟自性相應。第二，怎麼能說『心與心所同時而起、像太陽和日光』呢——既然就是心，沒有兩個法可俱。第三，《瑜伽論》那段文又怎麼會通——它說『心所並不就是心』；它的頌說：若心所即心，則五種義（自性、所依、所緣、行相、相應）都不成立，又有「分位差別」的過失，又因緣應無差別，這就跟聖教相違。這些都在證明心所不就是心。
兩邊都駁過了，於是說正義。應該說：心所是『離心別有自性』的。可是因為『心王勝』，所以聖教說「唯識」等——這是舉勝攝劣，不是說沒有心所；心所是依著心王的勢力而生的，所以說它『似彼（心）而現』，並不是說心所就是心。又「識、心」這個詞，本來也把心所攝在裡頭（心所跟心是恒相應的）。這樣一來，「唯識」這些話、以及「現似彼」的說法，就都沒有過失了——這是「依世俗」而說的（在世俗層次上，離、即可以分辨）。若是「依勝義」，那心所跟心是「非離、非即」（不一不異）的；諸識彼此相望，也該這樣看（非離非即）。這就是大乘『真（勝義）、俗（世俗）』的妙理。
承衍
這一節所立的隨煩惱二十、不定四，是六位心所裡的第五、第六位，後出唯識諸論逐一承用。《百法明門論》在六位心所裡，把隨煩惱二十、不定四全數列出、全數對位——這一節的二十加四，就是百法心所表的第五、第六這兩格。《唯識三十論頌》的頌十三（隨煩惱二十之名）、頌十四（不定四並「二各二」），正是本節所釋的本頌，逐頌相承、彼此是姊妹。到《辯中邊論·辯障品》，把隨煩惱當作『染之相』來辨（隨惑顯染的相狀），與本節這二十染心所的義理正相涉。《攝大乘論》在「彼入因果分」裡講六波羅蜜多所對治的染法，那所對治的染，與本節隨煩惱『所斷之染』一義也相涉。至於《二十唯識論》，主於成立唯識無境、破外人實境之執，於心所的體業沒有正面對位，這裡從闕。
〔Verses commented〕Verse 14 · the four indeterminate
What this chapter settles — the four indeterminate, and the summary of the classes — has its treatise ground. The Yogācārabhūmi, in its Basic Section, fixes the character of applied and sustained thought: "applied thought is what makes the mind discriminate coarsely," "sustained thought is what makes the mind discriminate finely" — and that coarseness and fineness is the ground on which this chapter judges them to run through all three natures while not pervading every stage. The same text establishes the three stages — with both applied and sustained thought, with sustained thought only, with neither — which shows exactly that they do not pervade every stage, and is the warrant for the name "indeterminate." As to whether the mental factors stand apart from mind, the Yogācārabhūmi both sets them out as a separate collection and says they are "concomitant with mind"; the dispute over apart-or-identical arises from just that.
A. The Four Indeterminate
[General Heading] — why these four are called "indeterminate"
The characteristics of the twenty secondary afflictions have been treated. The "indeterminate" are four; what are their characteristics? The verse answers: the indeterminate are regret, sleep, applied thought, and sustained thought, followed by "two, each twofold." Why establish the name "indeterminate"? Because these four — regret, sleep, applied thought, sustained thought — are "indeterminate" within the three moral qualities of wholesome, defiled, and the rest (not fixed as to which quality they belong to); and they are unlike the ever-present factors such as "contact," which "definitely pervade every mind," nor like the object-specific factors such as "desire," which "definitely pervade every stage"; and so the name "indeterminate" is established. We take each in turn.
1. Regret (Wrongdoing)
"Regret" is "wrongdoing" (literally, "the deed regretted"); it means to loathe the deed one has done and to give rise to remorse — this is its essential nature; its function is "obstructing calm abiding (śamatha)." Here a technical term must be clarified: "wrongdoing" properly refers to "the deed that is loathed" (this is the cause). First there is the loathed deed (the cause), and only afterward does remorse arise (the effect); yet now the cause-name "wrongdoing" is used to name that effect, namely remorse — this is called "provisionally applying the cause-name to the effect." Furthermore, "regretting what one previously did not do" also counts as "wrongdoing"; for instance, someone may regret, saying, "My not having done such a thing before — this is my wrongdoing." Clearly regret is not limited to regretting what was done; it also includes regretting what was not done.
2. Sleep
"Sleep" is "sleeping"; it renders the body not free, and takes "dimness and feebleness" — the mind dim, its mode feeble and inferior — as its essential nature; its function is "obstructing insight (vipaśyanā)." During sleep, the body is not free, the mind is utterly dark and inferior, and it operates relying on "a single gate" (the mental gate, without recourse to the five sense gates). Here the word "dim" serves to distinguish it from "being in concentration" (entering concentration is also the mind one-pointed, but that is not dimness); the word "feeble" serves to distinguish it from "waking" (in waking the mode is not feeble and inferior) — marking it out in this way is meant to show that sleep is not without substance and function. Again, even in the "mindless states" (such as fainting) the name "sleep" is provisionally applied, because, like the other hindrances, entanglements, and so on that are associated with the mind, it is stated as a provisional expedient by way of the other's characteristic.
What do regret and sleep take as their substance? This debate has four views. One view: regret and sleep take "delusion" alone as their substance, since the treatise calls these two "secondary afflictions" and "portions of delusion." Another view: not so — regret and sleep also extend to the wholesome (not only the defiled); one should say their "defiled portion" takes delusion as its substance, while their "pure portion" takes non-delusion as its substance; the treatise speaks of them as secondary afflictions and subsumed under a portion of delusion only with respect to the "defiled portion," not as saying that the whole of them is delusion alone. Yet another view: the previous account is also untenable — because regret and sleep also extend to the "neutral," and the neutral is neither the nature of delusion nor of non-delusion (so defiled-delusion and pure-non-delusion cannot encompass it); one should say "wrongdoing" takes "volition and wisdom" as its substance (in remorse one clearly investigates the deed done), and "sleep" jointly takes "volition and conception" as its substance (in sleep one conceives and forms the various characteristics of dreams); the treatise likewise calls both of these "conventionally existent (provisional)"; their defiled portion is an outflow of the same kind from delusion (like lack of faith and the rest), and so they are called a portion of delusion. Yet another view — and this is the settled, correct reading — holds that the reasoning of the previous account is also wrong: regret and sleep are not actually the "entanglement" (the entanglement being a secondary affliction; volition, wisdom, and conception are not entanglements) nature of "volition, wisdom, and conception"; one should say regret and sleep "each have their own distinct substance," differing in mode from the other mental factors; their being "stated, by way of the characteristic of delusion, to be conventionally existent" is again a provisional expedient by way of the other's characteristic, not a statement that their substance is provisional.
3. Applied Thought · Sustained Thought
"Applied thought" (vitarka) is searching, causing the mind to "operate coarsely" upon the "verbal-mental object" (the object grasped through names and words within the mind) in a hurried manner — coarsely deliberating — this is its essential nature. "Sustained thought" (vicāra) is examining, causing the mind to "operate finely" upon the verbal-mental object in a hurried manner — finely deliberating — this is its essential nature. Both take as their function "serving as the basis for the stage in which body and mind are at ease or not at ease" (when applied and sustained thought are calm, body and mind are at ease; when they are agitated, body and mind are not at ease). Both take "a portion of volition and wisdom" as their substance: upon the verbal-mental object, "not deeply deliberating" (applied thought) and "deeply deliberating" (sustained thought) differ in their categories; and were one to set aside volition and wisdom, the difference in category between these two, applied thought and sustained thought, could not be found at all.
Then what does the verse's "two, each twofold" mean? Here, again, there are three views. One view: it refers to applied thought and sustained thought, these two, each having two classes of difference, defiled and pure, and so it is called "two, each twofold." Another view: this interpretation does not accord with right principle — regret and sleep also have the two classes of defiled and pure, so why speak only of applied and sustained thought? One should say: just as the various defiled mental factors above have the distinction of "being of the nature of an affliction" and "being of the nature of a secondary affliction," so applied thought and sustained thought each have the two classes of "unwholesome and neutral," or each have the two classes of "entanglement" (the active manifestation) and "latent tendency" (the seed) — this is what "two, each twofold" means. Yet another view — and this is the settled, correct reading — holds that that interpretation, too, does not accord with right principle: the phrase "two, each twofold" is placed at the end of the "four indeterminate" (summing up these four), not spoken with respect to applied and sustained thought alone. One should explain: the first "two" shows that there are "two pairs of two": the first "two" refers to regret and sleep; the second "two" refers to applied and sustained thought. The categories of these two groups are each distinct, and so a single "two" is used to indicate jointly this "two of the two groups." And each of these factors "is itself twofold," namely "defiled and undefiled" (unlike the wholesome mental factors and the defiled mental factors, which each have only one quality). Or else "each twofold" is specifically to distinguish the "defiled" (to show that they are not only defiled but also indeterminate), and so this phrase is spoken — because regret, sleep, applied thought, and sustained thought have at times also been called secondary afflictions (lest one rigidly hold them to be exclusively defiled, this phrase is placed to show their indeterminacy). In sum, in order to show the sense of "indeterminate," "two, each twofold" is spoken; and so the placing of this phrase is greatly to the purpose. Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) parses the verse-line clearly, dividing its ten words "the indeterminate, namely regret and sleep, applied thought and sustained thought, two, each twofold" into segments: the opening two words ("the indeterminate") mark out the general name of this class; the next five words ("namely regret, sleep, applied thought, sustained thought") list out one by one their particular names; and only the final three words ("two, each twofold") display the sense of "indeterminate" — which agrees exactly with the treatise's own settled reading of "two, each twofold" (two pairs of two, each extending to both the defiled and the undefiled).
[The Gates on the Four Indeterminate] — laying these four out from the same twelve angles
The characteristics of regret, sleep, applied thought, and sustained thought, and the phrase "two, each twofold," have been treated; next we distinguish their doctrinal content from the various gates.
[Gate of Provisional and Real] — which are provisional, which are real
Among these four: applied thought and sustained thought are definitely "provisionally existent" — they are composed of volition and wisdom, as the scriptural teaching states. Regret and sleep have two views. One view: they are also provisionally existent, since the Yogācārabhūmi calls these two "conventionally existent." Another view: regret and sleep are "substantially existent things" — the Yogācārabhūmi says only that "the latter two (applied and sustained thought)" are provisionally existent, and does not say that the former two (regret, sleep) are definitely provisional; the phrase "conventionally existent" is stated by way of the other's characteristic and is not meant to show that the former two are definitely provisional; just as the "inner seed," whose substance is real, is yet called "conventionally existent" in the treatise — which shows that "conventionally existent" does not necessarily mean the substance is provisional.
[Gate of Mutual Non-association] — whether they can arise together
Among these four, applied thought and sustained thought are definitely not associated (do not arise together) — though they are of the same category (both volition and wisdom), they differ as coarse and fine, and a single mind cannot hold coarse and fine operating together. In dependence on the "presence" and "absence" of applied and sustained thought (with both applied and sustained thought, without applied thought but with sustained thought, without either), the distinction of the "three stages" is established; this rests only on the coarseness or fineness of the active operation of applied and sustained thought, not on whether their seeds are present or arising, and so the division of the three stages is not confused. Applied and sustained thought permit mutual association (co-arising) with the former two (regret, sleep), and the former two (regret, sleep) also have the sense of mutual association with each other.
[Gate of Which Consciousness They Are Associated With] — which consciousnesses they are associated with
These four do not co-arise with the seventh or the eighth consciousness, on the same principle as in the previous chapter; regret and sleep co-arise only with the sixth, mental consciousness — because they are not "factors of the five (consciousnesses)" (the five consciousnesses have no mode such as remorse or sleep).
With which consciousnesses are applied and sustained thought associated? Two views. One view: applied and sustained thought also co-arise with the five consciousnesses — the treatise says "the five consciousnesses have applied and sustained thought"; it also says "applied and sustained thought are the seven kinds of discrimination" (such as discrimination-with-characteristic and the rest); the Abhidharma-samuccaya further says "spontaneous discrimination is the five consciousnesses" (the spontaneous discrimination of the five consciousnesses is applied and sustained thought). Yet another view — and this is the settled, correct reading — holds that applied and sustained thought co-arise only with mental consciousness — the treatise says "factors such as searching and examining are all the exclusive factors of mental consciousness"; it also says "applied and sustained thought are associated with sorrow and joy," and never says they co-arise with suffering and pleasure (equanimity-feeling is pervasive, so it need not be specially mentioned). Here someone asks: why is it not said that applied and sustained thought co-arise with suffering and pleasure? The answer: although the first meditative absorption has "pleasure of the mental ground," it is inseparable from "joy," and so it is collectively subsumed under the name "joy"; although a place of pure suffering has "suffering of the mental ground," its mode resembles "sorrow," and so it is collectively spoken of as "sorrow" (hence suffering and pleasure are not separately established). Again, the treatise says: applied and sustained thought take the meaning of "name-bodies" and the like as their object, while the five-consciousness body does not take name-bodies and the like as its object (the five consciousnesses apprehend the particular characteristic, not names and words), and so applied and sustained thought co-arise only with mental consciousness.
Then how is the earlier statement that "the five consciousnesses have applied and sustained thought" to be understood? That shows that applied and sustained thought are "mostly aroused by the five consciousnesses," not that applied and sustained thought are associated and co-arise with the five consciousnesses. As for the Abhidharma-samuccaya's statement that "spontaneous discrimination is the five consciousnesses," its sense of "discrimination" differs from that of the Yogācārabhūmi: the Abhidharma-samuccaya says "spontaneous discrimination is the five consciousnesses," whereas the Yogācārabhūmi says this "discrimination" is "the applied and sustained thought associated with that discriminating mental consciousness which co-arises with the five consciousnesses" (that is, the applied and sustained thought of the sixth, mental consciousness, not something the five consciousnesses possess of themselves). Therefore the earlier view's citing of the Abhidharma-samuccaya in evidence does not stand; and from this one knows that "the five consciousnesses definitely have no applied and sustained thought."
[Gate of Association with Feeling] — which feelings they are associated with
How are they associated with feeling? Two views. One view: wrongdoing (regret) is associated with "sorrow and equanimity" — it operates only in accord with the "mode of grief" (the mode of sorrowful distress), and also extends to the neutral (so also with equanimity). Sleep co-arises with the three feelings of "joy, sorrow, and equanimity" — its mode operates through "the joyful, the grieving, and the middling." Applied and sustained thought are associated with four feelings, "sorrow, joy, equanimity, and pleasure" — because in the first meditative absorption they co-arise with "pleasure of the mental ground." Another view: these four also co-arise with "suffering-feeling" — in a destiny of pure suffering (the hells), they co-arise with "suffering of the mental ground" (so these four extend to all five feelings).
[Gate of Association with the Object-specific Five] — whether they can be associated with the object-specific five
These four all permit co-arising with the object-specific five (desire, resolve, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom) — their mode and object are not in contradiction.
[Gate of Association with the Wholesome] — how they are associated with the wholesome mental factors
Regret and sleep permit co-arising only with "ten wholesome mental factors" — because these two exist only in the desire realm, and the desire realm has no "pliancy" (so, subtracting pliancy, only ten wholesome). Applied and sustained thought permit co-arising with "eleven wholesome" — because in the first meditative absorption pliancy co-arises (the full eleven wholesome).
[Gate of Association with the Afflictions and Secondary Afflictions] — how they are associated with the root afflictions and the secondary afflictions
Regret permits association only with the single root affliction of "ignorance (delusion)" — because the mode of regret is coarse, while the mode of craving and the rest is fine (they cannot be paired). Sleep, applied thought, and sustained thought co-arise with all ten root afflictions — they are mutually non-contradictory. Regret permits co-arising with the middling and major secondary afflictions, but not with the ten minor such as wrath — because wrath and the rest each demand to be master, which contradicts regret's "demanding to be master." Sleep, applied thought, and sustained thought permit co-arising with all twenty secondary afflictions — within the state of sleep and the rest, all those secondary afflictions can arise.
[Gate of the Three Moral Qualities] — to which they belong: wholesome, unwholesome, or neutral
These four all extend to all three moral qualities, wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral — for instance, one can give rise to remorse even toward a "neutral deed" (regret extends to the neutral); the rest follow by analogy.
Then, within the "wholesome," which kind of wholesome do they belong to? Two views. One view: the former two (regret, sleep) are only "innately acquired wholesome" (the wholesome present from birth) — because the mode of regret is coarse and crude, and the mode of sleep is dim and feeble (incapable of supporting applied effort); the latter two (applied and sustained thought) also extend to "applied-effort wholesome" — because within the wisdom of "what is attained through hearing" and the like there are applied and sustained thought. Another view: the former two also extend to "applied-effort wholesome" — within the stages of hearing and reflection there are also regret and sleep; and further, the latter three (sleep, applied thought, sustained thought) all extend to both "defiled-neutral" and "pure-neutral"; only "wrongdoing (regret)" is not defiled-neutral — because its mode of understanding is coarse and fierce (the defiled-neutral must be fine, and regret being coarse, it is subtracted).
[Gate of the Four Kinds of Neutral] — their distribution among the four kinds of neutral
Among the "four kinds of neutral" (the neutral of karmic maturation, the neutral of deportment, the neutral of craftsmanship, the neutral of transformation / mastery): regret extends only to the "middle two" (deportment and craftsmanship) — its mode is coarse and fierce, and it is not a "fruit of concentration" (so the neutral of transformation is subtracted). Sleep "excludes the fourth" (the neutral of transformation) — it is not induced by concentration, and even the mind born of karmic maturation can have sleep (so it extends to the first three). Applied and sustained thought "exclude the first" (the neutral of karmic maturation) — their mode of understanding is feeble and inferior, and cannot search out and examine the meaning of names, words, and the like (so karmic maturation is subtracted, and they extend to the latter three).
[Gate of Realm-binding] — to which realm they are bound, and whether higher and lower can take each other as object
Wrongdoing and sleep exist only in the desire realm; applied and sustained thought exist in the desire realm and the first meditative absorption; the factors of the remaining realm-stages (the second absorption and above) are all subtle and all calm (there are none of these four coarse and stirring factors). Therefore, if a person of regret and sleep is born in a higher stage, these two definitely do not arise; applied and sustained thought, however, can "in the upper and the lower give rise to the lower and the upper" (those above giving rise to the lower, those below giving rise to the upper, mutually interchanging). The applied and sustained thought of those below and above can also apprehend objects above and below.
Whether regret and sleep can apprehend the upper, again two views. One view: regret and sleep cannot apprehend a higher stage — their mode is coarse and near at hand, utterly dim and feeble, with no way to apprehend a distant higher object. Another view: these two also apprehend higher objects — for instance, a person with wrong view may regret the matter of his own "cultivation of concentration" (this is apprehending the higher concentration), and in dreams one can apprehend universally all the matters one has experienced (including higher objects).
[Gate of the Trainee and the Adept] — whether they are subsumed under the trainee or the adept
Regret is not subsumed under the "adept" — because, once free of desire (attaining the adept stage), one casts off regret. Sleep, applied thought, and sustained thought all extend to all three of "trainee, adept, and neither-trainee-nor-adept." For the conditioned wholesome factors of "those seeking liberation" are all called "trainee," and the conditioned wholesome factors of "those who have brought training to completion" are all called "adept" (sleep, applied thought, and sustained thought extend to both these stages).
[Gate of What Is Cut Off in Seeing and in Cultivation] — cut off in seeing, in cultivation, or not subject to cutting off
Regret and sleep extend only to "cut off in seeing and cut off in cultivation" — they too arise by the force of wrong view and the like (so cut off in seeing), are not directly induced by the undefiled path (so not entering "not subject to cutting off"), and unlike "sorrow," cannot deeply seek liberation (sorrow can enter the not-subject-to-cutting-off, but regret and sleep cannot). If one takes the sense of "what has already been cut off is called not-subject-to-cutting-off," then the sleep of the adept stage can also be subsumed under "not subject to cutting off" (it has been completely cut off).
Applied and sustained thought, although not the truly undefiled path, can arouse the undefiled (and also arise from the undefiled), and so extend to all three: "cut off in seeing, cut off in cultivation, and not subject to cutting off."
For the "not-subject-to-cutting-off" of applied and sustained thought, again two views. One view: the "not-subject-to-cutting-off" of applied and sustained thought, among the five categories of "characteristic, name, discrimination, right wisdom, and suchness," is subsumed only under "discrimination" — the Yogācārabhūmi says applied and sustained thought are "discrimination." Another view: these two are also subsumed under "right wisdom" — because the treatise says "right thought is undefiled," and right thought is precisely what causes the mind to search and the like (that is, applied and sustained thought); it also says applied and sustained thought are "the cause of verbal expression," and in the "stage not yet completed" (the bodhisattva stage) one cannot yet fully know remedies, ailments, and the like, so in subsequently-attained wisdom one must, in order to teach the Dharma to others, rely on applied and sustained thought, unlike the buddha-ground with its "effortless teaching" (teaching spontaneously, without recourse to applied and sustained thought) — therefore these two, applied and sustained thought, also extend to the undefiled. One more remark: although it is said that applied and sustained thought are definitely "discrimination," one cannot conclude that they belong only to the third of the five categories (discrimination) — because within "subsequently-attained right wisdom" there is also discrimination (that is, applied and sustained thought also extend to right wisdom). The remaining gates are to be reflected on rightly by analogy with the above (the gates on the secondary afflictions).
B. Summary of the Six Classes of Mental Factors — are the mental factors something existing apart from the mind, or simply modal differentiations of the mind?
Finally, a closing passage gathers all together. Having now treated the mental factors of all "six classes" (the ever-present, the object-specific, the wholesome, the afflictions, the secondary afflictions, and the indeterminate), we must here answer a fundamental question: are these mental factors "something with a self-nature existing apart from the substance of the mind itself," or are they "modal differentiations of the mind itself" (not apart from the mind)? Someone counters: whichever side one takes, what fault is there? The answer is: there is fault on both sides. Let us first lay out the faults of each.
First, the faults of "the mental factors existing apart from the mind." If the mental factors had a self-nature apart from the mind, then there would be three things that cannot be made to cohere. First, how could one speak, as the scriptural teaching does, of "consciousness-only" — for if the mental factors existed apart, it would not be "consciousness-only." Second, how could one speak of "the mind travels far, the mind moves alone," "defilement and purity are by the mind," "the six elements of the person" (which include the consciousness-element, taking the mind to subsume the mental factors). Third, how would that passage of the Ornament Treatise be reconciled — its verse says: it is granted that the mind appears as "two" (the apprehending subject and the apprehended object), and appears also as craving and the rest (the defiled), or as faith and the rest (the wholesome), and there are no defiled factors or wholesome factors existing apart from the mind. All these go to prove that the mental factors are not apart from the mind.
Next, the faults of "the mental factors being modal differentiations of the mind." If the mental factors were just modal differentiations of the mind, non-dual with the mind, then there too would be three things that cannot be made to cohere. First, how could one speak, as the scriptural teaching does, of "the mind and the mental factors being associated" — for association is "association of distinct natures" (only two factors of different nature can be associated), not the association of a self-nature with itself. Second, how could one speak of "the mind and the mental factors arising simultaneously, like the sun and sunlight" — for if they just were the mind, there would not be two factors that could be together. Third, how would that passage of the Yogācārabhūmi be reconciled — it says "the mental factors are not just the mind"; its verse says: if the mental factors were just the mind, then the five senses (self-nature, basis, object, mode, and association) would all fail to be established, and there would further be the fault of "modal differentiation," and the causes and conditions ought to have no differences — which contradicts the scriptural teaching. All these go to prove that the mental factors are not just the mind.
Having refuted both sides, we now state the correct view. It should be said: the mental factors "have their own self-nature, existing apart from the mind." Yet because "the mind itself is dominant," the scriptural teaching speaks of "consciousness-only" and the like — this is citing the dominant to subsume the subordinate, not saying that there are no mental factors; the mental factors arise in dependence on the force of the mind itself, and so it is said that they "appear in its likeness (the mind's)," not that the mental factors just are the mind. Again, the term "consciousness, mind" originally subsumes the mental factors within itself (the mental factors being ever-associated with the mind). In this way, the statements "consciousness-only" and the rest, and the expression "appearing in its likeness," are all without fault — this is stated "in accord with the conventional" (at the conventional level, "apart" and "identical" can be distinguished). If one speaks "in accord with the ultimate," then the mental factors and the mind are "neither apart nor identical" (not one and not different); and the various consciousnesses, regarded relative to one another, should be seen in the same way (neither apart nor identical). This is the marvelous principle of the Great Vehicle's "two truths," the ultimate and the conventional.
Onward Transmission
The twenty secondary afflictions and four indeterminate established in this section are the fifth and sixth of the six classes of mental factors, and the later consciousness-only treatises take them up one by one. The Hundred Dharmas treatise, within its six classes of mental factors, lists out the full twenty secondary afflictions and four indeterminate and matches each to its place — the twenty-plus-four of this section are precisely the fifth and sixth cells of the hundred-dharmas table of mental factors. The Thirty Verses — verse thirteen (the names of the twenty secondary afflictions) and verse fourteen (the four indeterminate together with "two, each twofold") — is the very root-text this section expounds, verse answering to verse, the two being sisters. In the Madhyānta-vibhāga, in its chapter on the obstructions, the secondary afflictions are treated as "the characteristic of defilement" (the secondary afflictions displaying the marks of the defiled), which bears directly on the doctrine of this section's twenty defiled mental factors. The Mahāyāna-saṃgraha, in its chapter on the cause and fruit of entering, speaks of the defiled factors that the six perfections counteract, and that counteracted defilement bears, in one sense, on this section's "defilement to be cut off" of the secondary afflictions. As for the Twenty Verses, its concern is to establish consciousness-only and the absence of external objects, and to refute the outsiders' clinging to real objects; it has no direct counterpart to the substance and function of the mental factors, and here it is left aside.
考據Apparatus
〔所釋之頌〕第十四頌·不定四
一、科判定位
| 科判 | 此章之位 |\n|---|---|\n| 第三能變 | 了境識·六位心所 |\n| 心所章內 | 隨煩惱二十（前章）→ 不定四 → 六位心所總結 |\n| 所釋頌 | 《唯識三十論頌》頌十四下半 |\n\n六位心所之第六位，兼收全章。不定四者，悔、眠、尋、伺——以其通善、不善、無記三性，且非遍一切心、一切地，故名不定。末以『離心即心』之辨總結六位。
二、源頌 · 義理脈絡
不定謂悔、眠、尋、伺二各二。 〔T1586 0060c19〕\n\n頌十四下半列不定四。「二各二」者，悔與眠為一雙、尋與伺為一雙，每雙各通染淨二性——是以不定。既列六位已周，論主乃總結一問：心所究竟是離心別有自體，抑即是心之分位？
三、經論宗依（經證 → 論本）
經證
佛告慈氏菩薩曰：「善男子！當言無異。何以故？由彼影像唯是識故。善男子！我說識所緣，唯識所現故。」 〔解深密經·分別瑜伽品 T676 0698a29–0698b02〕
《解深密》明三摩地所行影像「唯是識」、「識所緣唯識所現」——心所染淨諸相皆不離識而現，正是本章末『六位心所總結』歸「唯識」、『心所似彼（心）而現』之經本。
論本
〔助伴〕……忿、恨、覆、惱、嫉、慳、誑、諂、憍、害，無慚、無愧，惛沈、掉舉、不信、懈怠、放逸、邪欲、邪勝解、忘念、散亂、不正知，惡作、睡眠、尋、伺，如是等輩俱有相應心所有法，是名助伴。 〔瑜伽師地論·本地分 T1579 0280b16–0280b19〕
何等為忿？謂於現前不饒益相，瞋之一分，心怒為體，執杖憤發所依為業。 〔大乘阿毘達磨集論 T1605 0665a03–0665a04〕
何等惡作？謂依樂作不樂作、應作不應作，是愚癡分，心追悔為體，或善或不善或無記、或時或非時、或應爾或不應爾，能障心住為業。 〔大乘阿毘達磨集論 T1605 0665b19–0665b22〕
尋者，或依思或依慧尋求意言，令心麁為體。 〔大乘阿毘達磨雜集論 T1606 0699c24〕
伺者，或依思或依慧伺察意言，令心細為體。 〔大乘阿毘達磨雜集論 T1606 0699c27〕
《瑜伽師地論·本地分》於意地「助伴」門總列隨煩惱與不定諸心所之名（隨煩惱二十、不定四之論本所宗）；《集論》《雜集論》逐一界定其體業——忿『瞋之一分·心怒為體·執杖憤發為業』、惡作『愚癡分·心追悔為體·障心住為業』、尋『依思依慧尋求意言·令心麁』、伺『依思依慧伺察意言·令心細』。護法糅釋之心所體業，其論本在瑜伽、集論、雜集論。
四、本論釋要（護法糅釋 · T1585）
隨煩惱 · 名義三類
唯是煩惱分位差別、等流性，故名隨煩惱。此二十種，類別有三：謂忿等十，各別起故，名小隨煩惱；無慚等二，遍不善故，名中隨煩惱；掉舉等八，遍染心故，名大隨煩惱。 〔T1585 0033b05–b08〕
忿 · 體業
何為忿？依對現前不饒益境，憤發為性；能障不忿，執杖為業。謂懷忿者，多發暴惡身表業故。此即瞋恚一分為體，離瞋無別忿相用故。 〔T1585 0033b09–b12〕
掉舉 · 惛沈 · 不信（大隨體業）
云何掉舉？令心於境不寂靜為性；能障行捨、奢摩他為業。 〔T1585 0034a07–a08〕 云何惛沈？令心於境，無堪任為性；能障輕安、毘鉢舍那為業。 〔T1585 0034a19–a20〕 云何不信？於實、德、能不忍樂欲，心穢為性；能障淨信，惰依為業。謂不信者多懈怠故。 〔T1585 0034b04–b06〕
隨煩惱 · 假實門
小十、大三，定是假有；無慚、無愧、不信、懈怠定是實有；教、理成故。掉舉、惛沈、散亂三種，有義是假，有義是實。所引理、教，如前應知。 〔T1585 0034c27–0035a01〕
隨煩惱 · 何識門
第七識中唯有大八，取捨差別，如上應知。第六識俱容有一切。 〔T1585 0035a08–a10〕
隨煩惱 · 名義（非唯二十）
「與」、「并」、「及」言顯隨煩惱非唯二十，《雜事》等說貪等多種隨煩惱故。隨煩惱名，亦攝煩惱，是前煩惱等流性故；煩惱同類餘染污法，但名隨煩惱，非煩惱攝故。 〔T1585 0034c21–c24〕
不定 · 名義
論曰：悔、眠、尋、伺於善、染等皆不定故，非如觸等定遍心故，非如欲等定遍地故，立不定名。 〔T1585 0035c09–c11〕
悔（惡作）· 眠 · 尋 · 伺（不定體業）
悔謂惡作，惡所作業，追悔為性，障止為業。 〔T1585 0035c11–c12〕 眠謂睡眠，令身不自在，昧、略為性，障觀為業。 〔T1585 0035c14–c15〕 尋謂尋求，令心怱遽於意言境，麁轉為性；伺謂伺察，令心怱遽於意言境，細轉為性。 〔T1585 0035c28–0036a01〕
不定 · 二各二（正義）
應言「二」者顯二種二：一謂悔、眠；二謂尋、伺。此二二種，種類各別，故一「二」言，顯二二種。此各有二，謂染、不染。非如善、染各唯一故。或唯簡染，故說此言，有亦說為隨煩惱故。為顯不定義，說「二各二」言，故置此言深為有用。 〔T1585 0036a10–a15〕
六位心所總結 · 二難
為離心體有別自性？為即是心分位差別？設爾何失？二俱有過。 〔T1585 0036c22–c23〕 又如何說心遠、獨行，染、淨由心，士夫六界？ 〔T1585 0036c25〕 許心似二現，如是似貪等，或似於信等，無別染、善法。 〔莊嚴論頌·存本論 T1585 0036c27–c28〕 五種性不成，分位差過失，因緣無別故，與聖教相違。 〔瑜伽論頌·存本論 T1585 0037a04–a05〕
六位心所總結 · 正義
應說離心有別自性，以心勝故，說唯識等，心所依心勢力生故，說似彼現，非彼即心。又識心言亦攝心所，恒相應故。唯識等言及現似彼，皆無有失，此依世俗。若依勝義，心所與心非離非即，諸識相望應知亦然，是謂大乘真、俗妙理。 〔T1585 0037a06–a11〕
要義：本論於隨煩惱以「分位差別·等流性」定其名、以遍行廣狹判小（各別起）·中（遍不善）·大（遍染心）三類；於忿等諸條以『即某根本煩惱一分為體，離彼無別相用』定其依他無別自性，唯掉舉、惛沈、散亂、覆、失念、不正知等存『唯某分／別有自性』之諍，假實門遂判小十大三假、無慚無愧不信懈怠實、掉惛亂三存兩可。何識門定第七唯大八、第六容一切、五識唯中大。不定四以『於善染不定、不定遍心、不定遍地』立名，悔以「於果假立因名」釋（惡所作之事為因，追悔為果），眠以「昧、略」雙簡在定與寤時，尋伺以『思慧一分·麁細推度意言』分；「二各二」一語護法判為總結四法之『二種之二、各通染不染』，非單約尋伺。六位既畢，總辨心所離心、即心二難——離心則違唯識、即心則違相應，故歸『依世俗離心別有、依勝義非離非即』。
五、諸家異釋（窺基《述記》T1830）
隨煩惱者，簡去於前根本十法，彼亦名隨，不說根本名為遍故。 〔T1830 0398a26–a28〕
各為主故。 〔T1830 0462c04〕
二各二。述曰：上二字標位總名，次五字烈別名字，下三字顯不定義。 〔T1830 0466a08–a09〕
窺基於「隨煩惱」名簡別根本（根本亦得名隨，但不名遍）；釋小隨『各別起、不相俱』之由為「行相麁猛、各為主」（一心不容二主）；於頌「不定謂悔、眠，尋、伺二各二」十字判其文段——『上二字（不定）標位總名、次五字（謂悔眠尋伺）烈別名字、下三字（二各二）顯不定義』，與本論「二各二」正義（二種之二、各通染不染）相符。掉舉、惛沈、散亂、覆、失念、不正知諸「有義」之繫名（何說屬何師），及小、中、大十二門取捨之判，《述記》詳之。
六、譯名 · 古譯對讀（玄奘 ↔ 真諦《轉識論》）
| 義 | 玄奘《成唯識論》 | 真諦《轉識論》 |
|---|---|---|
| 染心所總名 | 隨煩惱二十 | 小惑二十四（「小惑者，有二十四種，一忿恨、二結怨、三覆藏、四不捨惡、五嫉妬……」〔0062b01–0062b03〕） |
| 大隨之數 | 大隨八 | （列無慚、無愧等於小惑二十四之中，不別立大、中、小三類） |
| 唯識歸宗 | 心所似彼（心）而現，依世俗離心別有 | 唯識義成（「何者立唯識義？意本為遣境遣心，今境界既無，唯識又泯，即是說唯識義成也」〔0062b22–0062b24〕） |
玄奘《成唯識論》判隨煩惱為小（十）·中（二）·大（八）三類、共二十；真諦《轉識論》則總列『小惑二十四種』（忿恨、結怨、覆藏、不捨惡、嫉妬、無慚、無愧等並收一處），不分小中大——古譯數目開合之分歧。唯識歸宗則同：真諦明『遣境遣心、境心俱泯』之唯識義，與玄奘『心所似心而現、唯識等言無失』相通。
七、術語
隨煩惱（upakleśa）— 隨根本煩惱而起之染心所；皆根本煩惱之分位差別、等流性。 小隨 · 中隨 · 大隨 — 忿等十各別起（小）· 無慚無愧遍不善（中）· 掉舉等八遍染心（大）。 不定（aniyata）— 於善染無記不定、不遍一切心、不遍一切地之四心所（悔、眠、尋、伺）。 惡作（kaukṛtya）— 悔；厭所作業而追悔，於果假立因名。 睡眠（middha）— 眠；令身不自在，昧、略為性。 尋 · 伺（vitarka · vicāra）— 於意言境麁轉（尋）· 細轉（伺）；並用思、慧一分為體。 掉舉 · 惛沈（auddhatya · styāna）— 令心不寂靜（掉舉，障奢摩他）· 令心無堪任（惛沈，障毘鉢舍那）。 〔梵文為古德所傳發音輔助。〕
八、互讀（唯識系次第：百法 → 三十頌 → 二十論 → 辯中邊論 → 攝大乘論）
- 百法：心所·隨煩惱二十·不定四（六位心所之第五、第六位，全數對位）。
- 三十頌：頌十三（隨煩惱二十名）· 頌十四（不定四·二各二）——逐頌姊妹。
- 二十論：〔從闕〕主唯識無境、破外執，心所體業無正面對位。
- 辯中邊論：辯障品·隨煩惱（隨惑為染之相，與此二十染心所義相涉）。
- 攝大乘論：彼入因果分·六波羅蜜多所對治（隨煩惱為所斷之染，對治義相涉）。
章內：根本煩惱章（§18 上承——隨煩惱皆其分位、等流）· 善十一章（無瞋·不害·輕安等，隨煩惱所障之淨法）· 六位心所總結（殿此章——離心非即之大乘真俗妙理）。
九、校本定位
頌 T1586〔0060b27–0060c01·0060c02〕· 本論 T1585 隨煩惱釋〔名義三類 0033b05–b08·忿 0033b09–b12·掉舉 0034a07–08·惛沈 0034a19–20·不信 0034b04–06·名義非唯二十 0034c21–24·假實 0034c27–0035a01·何識 0035a08–a10〕· 不定釋〔名義 0035c09–c11·悔 0035c11–12·眠 0035c14–15·尋伺 0035c28–0036a01·二各二正義 0036a10–a15〕· 六位總結〔二難 0036c22–c23·心遠獨行 0036c25·莊嚴論頌 0036c27–c28·瑜伽頌 0037a04–a05·正義 0037a06–a11〕· 述記 T1830〔名義 0398a26–a28·各為主 0462c04·二各二 0466a08–a09〕· 《轉識論》T1587〔小惑二十四 0062b01–b03·唯識義 0062b22–b24〕。 〔經證〕解深密 T676〔0698a29–0698b02〕。〔論本〕瑜伽師地論 T1579〔本地分·助伴 0280b16–b19〕· 集論 T1605〔忿 0665a03–a04·惡作 0665b19–b22〕· 雜集論 T1606〔尋 0699c24·伺 0699c27〕。
〔Verses commented〕Verse 14 · the four indeterminate
1. Position in Kuiji's Structural Outline
| Outline | Position of this chapter |\n|---|---|\n| Third transformer | the object-discerning consciousness · the six classes of mental factors |\n| Within the mental-factor chapter | the twenty secondary afflictions (previous chapter) → the four indeterminate → summary of the six classes |\n| Verses commented | Triṃśikā v. 14, latter half |\n\nThe sixth of the six classes, together with the summary of the whole chapter. The four indeterminate — regret, torpor, applied thought, sustained thought — are so called because they run through all three moral natures and pervade neither every mind nor every stage. The chapter closes by settling whether the mental factors exist apart from mind or are modes of it.
2. Source verses · doctrinal context
不定謂悔、眠、尋、伺二各二。 〔T1586 0060c19〕\n\nThe latter half of verse 14 lists the four indeterminate. "Two, each in two" means regret and torpor form one pair, applied and sustained thought another, and each pair runs through both the defiled and the undefiled — hence indeterminate. The six classes now complete, the treatise closes with a single question: do the mental factors have a substance apart from mind, or are they modes of mind itself?
3. Scriptural and treatise grounding (scripture → root śāstra)
Scriptural witnesses
佛告慈氏菩薩曰：「善男子！當言無異。何以故？由彼影像唯是識故。善男子！我說識所緣，唯識所現故。」 〔解深密經·分別瑜伽品 T676 0698a29–0698b02〕
tr. The Buddha said to the bodhisattva Maitreya: "Good son! It is to be said that they are not different. Why so? Because that image is only consciousness. Good son! I teach that the object-support of consciousness is only what consciousness manifests."
The Saṃdhinirmocana shows the image coursed in concentration to be "only consciousness," and "the object-support of consciousness is only what consciousness manifests" — the several marks of mental factors, defiled and pure, all appearing not apart from consciousness; this is precisely the scriptural root for this chapter's closing "general summary of the six classes of mental factors," which resolves to "consciousness-only" and to "the mental factors resembling that [mind] and so appearing."
Root śāstra
〔助伴〕……忿、恨、覆、惱、嫉、慳、誑、諂、憍、害，無慚、無愧，惛沈、掉舉、不信、懈怠、放逸、邪欲、邪勝解、忘念、散亂、不正知，惡作、睡眠、尋、伺，如是等輩俱有相應心所有法，是名助伴。 〔瑜伽師地論·本地分 T1579 0280b16–0280b19〕
tr. "〔The accompanying associates〕… anger, enmity, concealment, vexation, envy, stinginess, deceit, flattery, arrogance, harming; lack-of-shame, lack-of-dread; torpor, agitation, lack-of-faith, indolence, heedlessness, wrong-desire, wrong-resolve, forgetting-mindfulness, distraction, improper-knowing; regret, drowsiness, applied-thought, sustained-thought — such as these are the concurrently-existing associated mental factors, and this is called the accompanying associates."
何等為忿？謂於現前不饒益相，瞋之一分，心怒為體，執杖憤發所依為業。 〔大乘阿毘達磨集論 T1605 0665a03–0665a04〕
tr. "What is anger? With regard to a present mark of non-benefit, a portion of ill-will, having mind's wrath for substance, and the basis for taking up a cudgel and bursting forth for function."
何等惡作？謂依樂作不樂作、應作不應作，是愚癡分，心追悔為體，或善或不善或無記、或時或非時、或應爾或不應爾，能障心住為業。 〔大乘阿毘達磨集論 T1605 0665b19–0665b22〕
tr. "What is remorse? In dependence on what is liked-to-be-done or not-liked-to-be-done, what ought-to-be-done or ought-not-to-be-done, it is a portion of delusion, having mind's after-regret for substance — whether wholesome, or unwholesome, or unmarked; whether timely or untimely; whether what-ought-to-be-so or what-ought-not — and having the obstructing of mind's [calm] abiding for function."
尋者，或依思或依慧尋求意言，令心麁為體。 〔大乘阿毘達磨雜集論 T1606 0699c24〕
tr. "Applied-thought: in dependence on volition or on discernment, seeking-out the mental-speech [object], having the making-coarse of mind for substance."
伺者，或依思或依慧伺察意言，令心細為體。 〔大乘阿毘達磨雜集論 T1606 0699c27〕
tr. "Sustained-thought: in dependence on volition or on discernment, investigating the mental-speech [object], having the making-fine of mind for substance."
The Yogācārabhūmi's Stage-of-the-Foundation, in the "accompanying associates" gate of the mental stage, lists together the names of the secondary defilements and the indeterminate mental factors (the śāstra-source for the twenty secondary defilements and the four indeterminate); the Abhidharma-samuccaya and the Vyākhyā define one by one their substance and function — anger as "a portion of ill-will · mind's wrath for substance · taking up a cudgel and bursting forth for function," remorse as "a portion of delusion · mind's after-regret for substance · obstructing mind's abiding for function," applied-thought as "in dependence on volition and discernment, seeking-out the mental-speech [object] · making mind coarse," sustained-thought as "in dependence on volition and discernment, investigating the mental-speech [object] · making mind fine." The substance-and-function of the mental factors in Dharmapāla's redaction has its śāstra-root in the Yogācārabhūmi, the Samuccaya, and the Vyākhyā.
4. Essentials of the root treatise (Dharmapāla's redaction · T1585)
The secondary defilements · the name and the three classes
唯是煩惱分位差別、等流性，故名隨煩惱。此二十種，類別有三：謂忿等十，各別起故，名小隨煩惱；無慚等二，遍不善故，名中隨煩惱；掉舉等八，遍染心故，名大隨煩惱。 〔T1585 0033b05–b08〕
tr. "They are merely positional differentiations of the defilements and [their] outflow-kind, and so are called secondary defilements. These twenty are sorted into three classes: namely, anger and the [other] ten, since each arises separately, are called the minor secondary defilements; lack-of-shame and the [other] one [making two], since they pervade the unwholesome, are called the middling secondary defilements; agitation and the [other] eight, since they pervade defiled mind, are called the major secondary defilements."
Anger · substance and function
何為忿？依對現前不饒益境，憤發為性；能障不忿，執杖為業。謂懷忿者，多發暴惡身表業故。此即瞋恚一分為體，離瞋無別忿相用故。 〔T1585 0033b09–b12〕
tr. "What is anger? Facing a present object of non-benefit, having bursting-forth for nature; and having the obstructing of non-anger, [and] taking up a cudgel, for function. That is, one who harbors anger mostly issues violent, evil bodily manifest-action. This has just a portion of ill-will for substance, since apart from ill-will there is no separate mark-and-function of anger."
Agitation · torpor · lack-of-faith (the substance-and-function of the major)
云何掉舉？令心於境不寂靜為性；能障行捨、奢摩他為業。 〔T1585 0034a07–a08〕
tr. "What is agitation? Having the making of mind unstill toward its object for nature; and having the obstructing of equanimity-in-action and of śamatha for function."
云何惛沈？令心於境，無堪任為性；能障輕安、毘鉢舍那為業。 〔T1585 0034a19–a20〕
tr. "What is torpor? Having the making of mind unfit-for-work toward its object for nature; and having the obstructing of pliancy and of vipaśyanā for function."
云何不信？於實、德、能不忍樂欲，心穢為性；能障淨信，惰依為業。謂不信者多懈怠故。 〔T1585 0034b04–b06〕
tr. "What is lack-of-faith? Toward the real, the virtuous, and the capable, an unwillingness to accept, delight, and aspire — having mind's befoulment for nature; and having the obstructing of pure faith, [and being] the basis for indolence, for function. That is, one who lacks faith is mostly indolent."
The secondary defilements · the gate of conventional and real
小十、大三，定是假有；無慚、無愧、不信、懈怠定是實有；教、理成故。掉舉、惛沈、散亂三種，有義是假，有義是實。所引理、教，如前應知。 〔T1585 0034c27–0035a01〕
tr. "The minor ten and three of the major are definitely conventionally existent; lack-of-shame, lack-of-dread, lack-of-faith, indolence are definitely really existent — established by both teaching and reasoning. As for the three, agitation, torpor, distraction, one view holds them conventional, one view holds them real; the reasoning and teaching adduced are to be known as before."
The secondary defilements · the gate of which consciousness
第七識中唯有大八，取捨差別，如上應知。第六識俱容有一切。 〔T1585 0035a08–a10〕
tr. "In the seventh consciousness there are only the major eight; their inclusion-and-exclusion differences are to be known as above. With the sixth consciousness all [twenty] may be present."
The secondary defilements · the name-sense (not only twenty)
「與」、「并」、「及」言顯隨煩惱非唯二十，《雜事》等說貪等多種隨煩惱故。隨煩惱名，亦攝煩惱，是前煩惱等流性故；煩惱同類餘染污法，但名隨煩惱，非煩惱攝故。 〔T1585 0034c21–c24〕
tr. "The words 'together with,' 'and,' 'and also' disclose that the secondary defilements are not only twenty, since the Kṣudraka-vastu and the rest speak of many kinds of secondary defilement such as greed. The name 'secondary defilement' also takes in the [root] defilements, since these are the outflow-kind of the foregoing defilements; and the remaining defiled dharmas of the same kind as the defilements are merely called secondary defilements, not being taken in under the [root] defilements."
The indeterminate · the name-sense
論曰：悔、眠、尋、伺於善、染等皆不定故，非如觸等定遍心故，非如欲等定遍地故，立不定名。 〔T1585 0035c09–c11〕
tr. "The treatise says: regret, drowsiness, applied-thought, sustained-thought, since they are indeterminate alike as to wholesome, defiled, and the rest; since they are not like contact and the rest in definitely pervading mind; since they are not like desire and the rest in definitely pervading the stages — are given the name 'indeterminate.'"
Regret (remorse) · drowsiness · applied-thought · sustained-thought (the substance-and-function of the indeterminate)
悔謂惡作，惡所作業，追悔為性，障止為業。 〔T1585 0035c11–c12〕
tr. "Regret means remorse: toward the deed done, having after-regret for nature, and having the obstructing of calm-abiding for function."
眠謂睡眠，令身不自在，昧、略為性，障觀為業。 〔T1585 0035c14–c15〕
tr. "Drowsiness means sleep: making the body not its own master, having dimness and abridgement for nature, and having the obstructing of insight for function."
尋謂尋求，令心怱遽於意言境，麁轉為性；伺謂伺察，令心怱遽於意言境，細轉為性。 〔T1585 0035c28–0036a01〕
tr. "Applied-thought means seeking-out: making the mind hurried upon the mental-speech object, having coarse turning for nature; sustained-thought means investigating: making the mind hurried upon the mental-speech object, having fine turning for nature."
The indeterminate · "the two, each in two" (the correct view)
應言「二」者顯二種二：一謂悔、眠；二謂尋、伺。此二二種，種類各別，故一「二」言，顯二二種。此各有二，謂染、不染。非如善、染各唯一故。或唯簡染，故說此言，有亦說為隨煩惱故。為顯不定義，說「二各二」言，故置此言深為有用。 〔T1585 0036a10–a15〕
tr. "One should say 'the two' discloses two sets of two: the first being regret and drowsiness; the second being applied-thought and sustained-thought. These two sets of two are each a separate kind, and so the single word 'two' discloses [these] two-sets-of-two. And each of these has two, namely defiled and non-defiled — not, like the wholesome and the defiled, each only one. Or, [the phrase] is solely to set aside [their being only] defiled, and so this word is spoken, since [these] have also been spoken of as secondary defilements. To disclose the 'indeterminate' sense, the words 'the two, each in two' are spoken; hence the placing of this phrase is deeply useful."
The general summary of the six classes of mental factors · the two challenges
為離心體有別自性？為即是心分位差別？設爾何失？二俱有過。 〔T1585 0036c22–c23〕
tr. "Are they apart from the substance of mind, possessing a separate self-nature? Or are they positional differentiations of mind itself? Granting either, what is the fault? Both alike have faults."
又如何說心遠、獨行，染、淨由心，士夫六界？ 〔T1585 0036c25〕
tr. "And further, how is it said that mind 'travels far,' 'fares alone,' that defilement and purity are 'by mind,' that the person [is constituted of] 'the six elements'?"
許心似二現，如是似貪等，或似於信等，無別染、善法。 〔莊嚴論頌·存本論 T1585 0036c27–c28〕
tr. "Granting that mind appears [as if] in two [aspects], so too it appears [as if] like greed and the rest, or appears like faith and the rest — there being no separate defiled or wholesome dharmas." 〔a verse of the Sūtrālaṃkāra · preserved in the root treatise〕
五種性不成，分位差過失，因緣無別故，與聖教相違。 〔瑜伽論頌·存本論 T1585 0037a04–a05〕
tr. "The five natures would not be established; [there would be] the fault of [making them] positional differentiations; and since [their] causes-and-conditions would have no difference, [this] contradicts the sacred teaching." 〔a verse of the Yogācārabhūmi · preserved in the root treatise〕
The general summary of the six classes of mental factors · the correct view
應說離心有別自性，以心勝故，說唯識等，心所依心勢力生故，說似彼現，非彼即心。又識心言亦攝心所，恒相應故。唯識等言及現似彼，皆無有失，此依世俗。若依勝義，心所與心非離非即，諸識相望應知亦然，是謂大乘真、俗妙理。 〔T1585 0037a06–a11〕
tr. "It should be said: [the mental factors are] apart from mind, possessing a separate self-nature. Because mind is the superior, [scripture] speaks of 'consciousness-only' and the like; because the mental factors arise by the force of mind, [it] speaks of their 'appearing to resemble that [mind]' — yet that is not [to say] they are mind. Again, the words 'consciousness' and 'mind' also take in the mental factors, since [the two] are ever associated. The words 'consciousness-only' and the rest, and [the phrase] 'appearing to resemble that,' are all without fault — this being [stated] by the conventional. If [stated] by the ultimate, the mental factors and mind are neither-apart-nor-identical, and the several consciousnesses, viewed each against another, are to be known as likewise — this is the great-vehicle's subtle principle of the true [ultimate] and the conventional."
Essentials: in the secondary defilements the treatise fixes their name by "positional differentiation · outflow-kind," and sorts them into three by breadth or narrowness of pervasion — minor (each arising separately) · middling (pervading the unwholesome) · major (pervading defiled mind); in the several entries such as anger it fixes their other-dependent want of a separate self-nature by "having just a portion of some root defilement for substance, with no separate mark-and-function apart from it," only agitation, torpor, distraction, concealment, loss-of-mindfulness, improper-knowing and the like retaining the dispute over "[merely] a portion of some [defilement] / possessing a separate self-nature," whereupon the gate of conventional-and-real judges the minor ten and major three conventional, lack-of-shame · lack-of-dread · lack-of-faith · indolence real, and the three agitation-torpor-distraction left at two-ways-possible. The gate of which-consciousness fixes the seventh as having only the major eight, the sixth as admitting all, the five [sense-]consciousnesses as having only the middling-and-major. The four indeterminate take their name from "indeterminate as to wholesome-and-defiled, indeterminate as to pervading mind, indeterminate as to pervading the stages"; regret is explained by "conventionally giving the cause's name to the effect" (the deed one is remorseful over being the cause, the after-regret the effect), drowsiness by "dimness, abridgement" twice setting aside [the state] in concentration and at waking, applied-thought-and-sustained-thought parted by "a portion of volition and discernment · coarse-and-fine deliberating upon the mental-speech [object]"; the single phrase "the two, each in two" Dharmapāla judges to be the summing of all four dharmas as "two-sets-of-two, each running both defiled and non-defiled," not [restricted] to applied-thought-and-sustained-thought alone. The six classes done, [the treatise] resolves the whole on the twin challenge of [the mental factors] apart from mind or [being] mind — apart from mind contradicts consciousness-only, [being] mind contradicts association — and so resolves to "by the conventional, separate and apart from mind; by the ultimate, neither-apart-nor-identical."
5. Divergent readings across the masters (Kuiji, Shuji T1830)
隨煩惱者，簡去於前根本十法，彼亦名隨，不說根本名為遍故。 〔T1830 0398a26–a28〕
tr. "'Secondary defilement' sets aside the foregoing ten root [defilements] — though those too are named 'secondary,' [yet here] one does not call a root [defilement] 'pervading.'"
各為主故。 〔T1830 0462c04〕
tr. "Because each is [its own] master."
二各二。述曰：上二字標位總名，次五字烈別名字，下三字顯不定義。 〔T1830 0466a08–a09〕
tr. "'The two, each in two.' The commentary says: the upper two graphs [不定] mark the class and its general name; the next five graphs [謂悔眠尋伺] set out the separate names; the lower three graphs [二各二] disclose the 'indeterminate' sense."
Kuiji on the name "secondary defilement" sets it off from the root [defilements] (the root too may be named "secondary," only it is not named "pervading"); explains the ground of the minor secondary defilements' "each arising separately, not concurrent" as "coarse-and-fierce in mode, each [being its own] master" (one mind does not admit two masters); and on the verse's ten graphs "the indeterminate are regret, drowsiness, applied-thought, sustained-thought — the two, each in two" judges the textual segments — "the upper two graphs (不定) mark the class and its general name · the next five graphs (謂悔眠尋伺) set out the separate names · the lower three graphs (二各二) disclose the indeterminate sense" — concordant with the root treatise's correct view of "the two, each in two" (two-sets-of-two, each running both defiled and non-defiled). The attaching of names to the several "one view holds" positions on agitation, torpor, distraction, concealment, loss-of-mindfulness, improper-knowing (which saying belongs to which master), and the judgment of the inclusion-and-exclusion across the twelve gates of minor, middling, and major, the Shuji details.
6. Rendering of terms · old-translation comparison (Xuanzang ↔ Paramārtha, Zhuanshi lun)
| Sense | Xuanzang, Cheng Weishi Lun | Paramārtha, Zhuanshi lun |
|---|---|---|
| general name for the defiled mental factors | 隨煩惱二十 the twenty secondary defilements | 小惑二十四 the twenty-four minor afflictions ("小惑者，有二十四種，一忿恨、二結怨、三覆藏、四不捨惡、五嫉妬……" "the minor afflictions are twenty-four kinds: first anger-and-enmity, second binding-grudge, third concealing-and-hiding, fourth not-relinquishing-evil, fifth envy…" 〔0062b01–0062b03〕) |
| the number of the major secondary [defilements] | 大隨八 the major eight | (lists lack-of-shame, lack-of-dread, and the rest within the twenty-four minor afflictions, not separately setting up the three classes major, middling, minor) |
| the resolving into consciousness-only | 心所似彼（心）而現，依世俗離心別有 the mental factors appear resembling that [mind]; by the conventional, [they exist] separately apart from mind | 唯識義成 the sense of consciousness-only is established ("何者立唯識義？意本為遣境遣心，今境界既無，唯識又泯，即是說唯識義成也" "What is it to establish the sense of consciousness-only? The intent was at root to dispel object and dispel mind; now the object-realm being already gone and consciousness-only too effaced — this is to say the sense of consciousness-only is established" 〔0062b22–0062b24〕) |
Xuanzang's Cheng Weishi Lun judges the secondary defilements as three classes — minor (ten) · middling (two) · major (eight), twenty in all; Paramārtha's Zhuanshi lun instead lists altogether "twenty-four kinds of minor affliction" (anger-and-enmity, binding-grudge, concealing-and-hiding, not-relinquishing-evil, envy, lack-of-shame, lack-of-dread, and the rest gathered in one place), not dividing into minor, middling, major — the old translation parting [from the new] on the opening-and-closing of the number. On the resolving into consciousness-only the two agree: Paramārtha clarifies the sense of consciousness-only as "dispelling object and dispelling mind, object and mind both effaced," in accord with Xuanzang's "the mental factors appear resembling mind, the words 'consciousness-only' and the rest without fault."
7. Key terms
The secondary defilements (隨煩惱, upakleśa) — defiled mental factors that arise following the root defilements; all are positional differentiations and the outflow-kind of the root defilements. The minor · middling · major secondary [defilements] (小隨 · 中隨 · 大隨) — anger and the [other] ten each arising separately (minor) · lack-of-shame and lack-of-dread pervading the unwholesome (middling) · agitation and the [other] eight pervading defiled mind (major). The indeterminate (不定, aniyata) — the four mental factors (regret, drowsiness, applied-thought, sustained-thought) indeterminate as to wholesome-defiled-unmarked, not pervading all mind, not pervading all stages. Remorse (惡作, kaukṛtya) — regret; aversion to the deed done and after-regret over it, conventionally giving the cause's name to the effect. Sleep (睡眠, middha) — drowsiness; making the body not its own master, with dimness, abridgement for nature. Applied-thought · sustained-thought (尋 · 伺, vitarka · vicāra) — coarse turning (applied-thought) · fine turning (sustained-thought) upon the mental-speech object; both using a portion of volition and discernment for substance. Agitation · torpor (掉舉 · 惛沈, auddhatya · styāna) — making mind unstill (agitation, obstructing śamatha) · making mind unfit-for-work (torpor, obstructing vipaśyanā). 〔Sanskrit forms are a pronunciation aid transmitted by the ancient masters.〕
8. Cross-reading (the Yogācāra sequence: Baifa → Triṃśikā → Viṃśatikā → Madhyāntavibhāga → Mahāyānasaṃgraha)
- Baifa (Hundred Dharmas): the mental factors · the twenty secondary defilements · the four indeterminate (the fifth and sixth positions of the six classes of mental factors, matched in full number).
- Triṃśikā: verse 13 (the names of the twenty secondary defilements) · verse 14 (the four indeterminate · "the two, each in two") — the verse-by-verse sister.
- Viṃśatikā: 〔wanting〕 it chiefly [treats] consciousness-only-without-object and refutes the outer grasping, with no head-on counterpart for the substance-and-function of the mental factors.
- Madhyāntavibhāga: the Obstruction chapter · the secondary defilements (the secondary afflictions as the mark of defilement, bearing on the sense of these twenty defiled mental factors).
- Mahāyānasaṃgraha: its Cause-and-Effect-of-Entry division · what the six perfections counteract (the secondary defilements as the defilement to be severed, bearing on the sense of counteraction).
Within the chapter: the chapter on the root defilements (§18 above — the secondary defilements being one and all their positional [differentiations] and outflow-kind) · the chapter on the eleven wholesome (non-ill-will · non-harming · pliancy and the rest, the pure dharmas obstructed by the secondary defilements) · the general summary of the six classes of mental factors (closing this chapter — the great-vehicle's subtle principle of the conventional and the ultimate, [the mental factors] apart from mind yet not identical).
9. Collation position
Verse T1586 〔0060b27–0060c01·0060c02〕 · root T1585 the secondary-defilement exposition 〔name and three classes 0033b05–b08 · anger 0033b09–b12 · agitation 0034a07–08 · torpor 0034a19–20 · lack-of-faith 0034b04–06 · the name-sense not-only-twenty 0034c21–24 · conventional-and-real 0034c27–0035a01 · which-consciousness 0035a08–a10〕 · the indeterminate exposition 〔name-sense 0035c09–c11 · regret 0035c11–12 · drowsiness 0035c14–15 · applied-thought-sustained-thought 0035c28–0036a01 · "the two, each in two" correct view 0036a10–a15〕 · the general summary of the six classes 〔the two challenges 0036c22–c23 · "mind travels far, fares alone" 0036c25 · Sūtrālaṃkāra verse 0036c27–c28 · Yogācārabhūmi verse 0037a04–a05 · the correct view 0037a06–a11〕 · Shuji T1830 〔name-sense 0398a26–a28 · "each is master" 0462c04 · "the two, each in two" 0466a08–a09〕 · Zhuanshi lun T1587 〔the twenty-four minor afflictions 0062b01–b03 · the sense of consciousness-only 0062b22–b24〕. 〔Scripture〕 Saṃdhinirmocana T676 〔0698a29–0698b02〕. 〔Śāstra〕 Yogācārabhūmi T1579 〔Stage-of-the-Foundation · the accompanying associates 0280b16–b19〕 · Samuccaya T1605 〔anger 0665a03–a04 · remorse 0665b19–b22〕 · Vyākhyā T1606 〔applied-thought 0699c24 · sustained-thought 0699c27〕.