成唯識論 體相·四煩惱

The second transformer is the manas. Its name is deliberation — not thinking, but constant and examining deliberation: weighing, unceasingly and finely. Weighing what? Weighing out an "I."

The treatise settles three things. Its support — "it turns in dependence on that," on the eighth, the ālaya. Its object — "taking that as object," again the eighth; it seizes the seeing-part of the eighth and holds it as a self. Its own-nature and mode — "deliberation is its nature and its mode," nature and mode both being deliberation.

One structural point must be seen clearly: the "I" the manas grasps is in fact the eighth consciousness. It does not fabricate a self out of nothing; it mistakes that unbroken stream of consciousness in the depths for a permanent, single sovereign. Self-grasping is therefore not creation from nothing. It is misidentification.

Then the four afflictions: delusion about self, view of self, conceit of self, love of self. Delusion is not seeing that the self is no self; view is holding it as self; conceit is exalting oneself upon it; love is deep attachment to it. All four arise with the manas always, unbroken at every moment — unlike the greed and hatred of the sixth consciousness, which come and go. These four never stop.

The chapter is unsettling to read, and should be. What it says is this: before you are aware of what you are thinking, a mind has already settled on your behalf that there is an "I." Every calculation, comparison, injury and defence of yours is built on a verdict you never agreed to and have never noticed.

And the reason it can be cut is precisely that it is a misidentification — a misidentification can be corrected. Were self-grasping a real thing, there would be no remedy at all.

〔Verses expounded〕

(5) "Next, the second transformer: this consciousness is named the manas; resting on that, referring to that, it has cogitation for its nature and mark." (v5) (6) "Four defilements are constantly co-present, namely: self-delusion, self-view, together with self-conceit and self-love, and co-present with the rest, contact and so on." (upper half of v6) (7) "It belongs to the veiled-indeterminate; it follows the realm into which one is born and bound. In the arhat, in the concentration of cessation, and on the supramundane path it is absent." (v7 — not reached in this section, listed here for the record)

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A. Opening the theme — the second transformer is the cogitating transformer (the manas)

The treatise says: after the first transformer (the maturational transformer, the eighth, the ālaya-consciousness), the next thing to clarify is the marks of the second transformer, "the cogitating transformer." In scripture this consciousness has another, special name, "manas" — because its cogitation is both constant (never broken off) and examining (it investigates, it decides), surpassing all the other consciousnesses; and that is why it is given this distinct name.

〔challenge〕 Since "manas" is rendered "intellect" (意), how does it differ from the "intellect" in "the sixth, the mental consciousness" (意識)? 〔answer〕 This seventh-consciousness name is a "karmadhāraya gloss" (an appositional gloss) — just like the name "store-consciousness," where the "consciousness" here just is the "intellect" (the very body of the consciousness is the intellect, the two words pointing to one and the same dharma); whereas that sixth-consciousness name is a "tatpuruṣa gloss" (a dependent gloss) — just like "eye-consciousness," where the "consciousness" and the "intellect" are not one thing (the eye-consciousness is set up in dependence on the eye-faculty, consciousness and faculty being two, and likewise consciousness and intellect being two).

Scripture, again, fears that the seventh's "intellect" might be confused with the sixth's "mental consciousness," and so for the seventh it sets up only the single name "intellect," not calling it "consciousness." Further, lifting up the one word "intellect" serves to set apart the two senses "mind" (心) and "consciousness" (識) — for the seventh's "accumulating" (this is the sense of "mind") and its "discerning" (this is the sense of "consciousness") are both weaker than in the other consciousnesses, and so neither of these two names is taken; and on the other side it serves to display that the seventh and the sixth, the mental consciousness, are each other's "near support" (the seventh is the defiling-and-purifying support of the sixth), and so it is called only "intellect."

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B. What it rests on — glossing "resting on that"

1. "That" is the eighth; this consciousness rests on the store-consciousness

The verse's line "resting on that" is meant to clarify "on what the manas relies in arising." "That" refers precisely to the first transformer spoken of before — that is, the eighth, the ālaya-consciousness. Scripture says: this consciousness, the manas, is able to arise only by relying on the store-consciousness (the eighth).

〔The seed-as-support view〕 One view holds: what the manas relies on is the "seed" of the eighth consciousness, and not its risen-up "present-activity consciousness." The reason: the manas is never broken off, always continuing, so it has no need to draw in the present-activity consciousness of the eighth to serve as a "concomitant support" (that is, the kind of support that co-exists simultaneously and props it up mutually) in order to arise.

〔The seed-and-present-both-as-support view · leaning correct〕 Another view holds: what the manas relies on is the "seed" of the eighth consciousness and its "present-activity consciousness" both, neither one to be lacked. The reason: the manas, though never broken off, still "alters" (changes and shifts), and just because it can change it is called an "evolving consciousness"; and being an evolving consciousness, it must draw in the present-activity consciousness of the eighth to serve as concomitant support before it can arise.

The word "evolving" (轉) in the verse means just "flowing-on." It is meant to point out: this consciousness, the manas, constantly relies on the eighth consciousness and unceasingly reaches out to grasp its own object (that is, referring to the eighth and grasping it as a "self").

2. Side-treatise — the three supports of every mind and mental factor

〔The side-treatise begins〕 Here the text first turns aside to set out a general scheme. All minds (mind-kings) and mental factors must have something they rest on; and what they rest on comes, in all, to three kinds:

First, the causal-condition support — that is, the "seed" of one's own kind. All conditioned dharmas must rely on this to arise; lacking its own causal condition (its seed), it absolutely cannot grow forth. Second, the dominant-condition support — that is, the "inner six bases," namely the six faculties, eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and intellect. All minds and mental factors must rely on this to arise; lacking the "concomitant faculty" (the faculty that co-exists simultaneously), the mind cannot stir. Third, the immediately-antecedent-condition support — that is, the "just-ceased intellect," namely the mind of the preceding moment that has just ceased and made way for the moment to follow. All minds and mental factors must rely on this to arise; lacking this "opening-and-guiding faculty" (the mind that yields its place and leads the way), the following moment cannot arise.

Note well: only mind and mental factors, these two, possess all three of these supports at once, and so are called "having a support"; the rest of the dharmas (such as the form-dharmas) do not count.

(a) First · the causal-condition support (the seed-support)

The first is the "seed-support" (also called the causal-condition support). 〔The seed-fruit-in-sequence view〕 One view maintains: the seed must first cease, and only then does the present-activity fruit arise next — that is, seed and fruit run one after the other and are never simultaneous. They give two reasons: first, the Abhidharmasamuccaya (the Compendium) said "there is no such thing as 'the seed still present while the fruit has already been born'"; second, a seed and the sprout it grows are, after all, not simultaneous.

〔The seed-fruit-both-present view · the correct view〕 It should be known (the correct view): the "in-sequence view" above — the proofs it brings out in fact none of them stand. Take them one by one: (one) that line of the Compendium was "said with respect to 'a seed drawing forth a later seed'" — meaning that one seed draws forth the next, which is the continuity of one kind of seed; it speaks not at all of "a seed producing a present-activity," and so cannot be used to prove that seed and present-activity are likewise in sequence. (two) "a seed growing a sprout" and the like are only a worldly figure of speech, not the ultimate truth, and cannot be carried straight over to settle that seed and present-activity must also be in sequence. (three) "the seed ceases and only then the sprout arises" is not itself something both sides concede (it is not common ground). (four) take a further figure: a lamp-flame and the lamp-wick (the 炷) are plainly simultaneous, and moreover each other's cause — which shows that "cause" and "fruit" can be simultaneous.

Here, though, two cases must be told apart: the cause-and-fruit "of the seed's own kind" (one seed drawing forth the next) is indeed not simultaneous; but the kind where seed and present-activity "produce each other" (the seed producing the present-activity, and the present-activity perfuming back into a seed) is necessarily simultaneous and co-existent. And so the Yogācārabhūmi says: an impermanent dharma "is a cause to another-nature" (the seed and the present-activity being each other's cause — this is "other-nature") and "is also a cause to the same-nature of a later moment" (the prior seed drawing forth the later seed — this is "self-nature") — and this is the meaning of "causal condition."

In the text the word "self-nature" says that "the seed's own kind," the prior moment serving as cause to the later (this is sequential, not simultaneous); the word "other-nature" says that "the seed and the present-activity" serve as each other's cause (this is simultaneous, co-existent).

The Mahāyānasaṃgraha says the same: the store-consciousness and the defiled dharmas are each other's causal condition, just as two bundles of reeds lean on each other and stand up at the same time; and it says further: a seed and its fruit are necessarily simultaneous. So the matter of the "seed-support" (between seed and present-activity) is by no means sequential and apart, but simultaneous and co-existent.

If somewhere it does say "seed and fruit are in sequence," then one should know: that is all "the gate of going-along-with the [other school's] principle" — that is, going along with another school's way of speaking and saying so for the moment, not the ultimate account. So the conclusion is: the eight consciousnesses and the several mental factors each, every one, have their own "seed-support" (the causal-condition support).

(b) Second · the concomitant support

The second is called the "concomitant support" (which belongs to the dominant-condition support spoken of above). 〔The faculties-are-just-the-seeds view〕 Someone maintains thus: the five consciousnesses, eye and the rest, take "the mental consciousness" as their concomitant support — because the moment the five consciousnesses appear, there is necessarily the mental consciousness alongside; as for "the five faculties, eye and the rest," they say there is no such separate thing serving as concomitant support, because "the five faculties, eye and the rest, just are the seeds of the five consciousnesses." They also cite the verse of the Viṃśatikā (the Twenty Verses on consciousness-only) in proof:

(prose unpacking of the verse) Consciousness arises from a seed of its own kind, and transforms so as to resemble an object-mark, evolving and manifesting; in order to establish the inner bases (the faculties) and the outer bases (the objects), the Buddha taught them as ten (the five faculties and the five objects).

They read this verse thus: the World-Honored One, in order to establish the twelve bases, spoke of "the seeds of the five consciousnesses" as the five faculties, eye and the rest, and of "the perceived-part of the five consciousnesses" as the five objects, form and the rest; and so (they say) the five faculties, eye and the rest, just equal the seeds of the five consciousnesses. They also cite the Ālambana-parīkṣā (the Treatise on the Object of Cognition), which says the same:

(prose unpacking of the verse) The "function" upon consciousness that can produce (form), named the five faculties — this alone is reasonable; this function and the object-form have, from beginningless time, been each other's cause.

They read this verse to mean: upon the maturation consciousness (the eighth), the seed that "can produce the eye and the other form-consciousnesses" is named the "form-function," and this is what is spoken of as the five faculties — there being no separate set of faculties, eye and the rest; and the seed and the five consciousnesses constantly serve as each other's cause, because "the perfuming agent (the present-activity)" and "the perfumed seed" take turns being each other's cause.

〔The faculties-are-just-the-seeds view, continued〕 They go on to say further: the seventh and the eighth, these two consciousnesses, have no separate concomitant support — because they evolve in continuous succession, their own power being strong enough; only the sixth, the mental consciousness, has besides a concomitant support (namely the manas) — because the sixth can arise only by relying on the manas.

〔Refuting the faculties-are-just-the-seeds view · the correct view〕 It should be known (the correct view): the account "the five faculties just are the seeds of the five consciousnesses" does not get through, whether by reasoning or by scripture. Below it is driven down point by point —

(one) Suppose the five form-faculties just were the seeds of the five consciousnesses; then would not the seeds of the eighteen elements collapse together into a tangle? Yet scripture everywhere plainly says: the eighteen elements each have their own separate seed. (So one cannot mash "the seeds of the faculties" and "the seeds of the consciousnesses" into one.)

(two) Again, the seeds of the five consciousnesses can each grow forth two different things, "the perceived-part" (the image reached out to) and "the perceiving-part" (the apprehending function). So tell us, which of these do you take and call "the faculties, eye and the rest"? If you take "the seed of the perceiving-part" as the faculty, then the faculty should be classed under the aggregate of consciousness; if you take "the seed of the perceived-part" as the faculty, then the faculty should be classed under the outer bases — yet both of these contradict scripture, for scripture says the five faculties, eye and the rest, are all the aggregate of form and all the inner bases.

(three) Again, suppose the five faculties just were the seeds of the five consciousnesses; then the five faculties should be the "causal condition" of the five consciousnesses (since only a seed counts as causal condition), and should not be said to belong to the "dominant condition." (But scripture says precisely that the faculty is a dominant condition.)

(four) Again, suppose the nose-faculty and the tongue-faculty just were the seeds of the nose-consciousness and the tongue-consciousness; then two conclusions are forced out: either the nose- and tongue-faculties too, following their consciousnesses, can belong only to the desire-realm; or the nose- and tongue-consciousnesses too, following their faculties, can extend up to the form-realm — take whichever you like, and either contradicts scripture (scripture says the nose- and tongue-faculties can extend to the upper realm, but the nose- and tongue-consciousnesses are only in the desire-realm).

(five) Likewise, if the eye-, ear-, and body-faculties just were the seeds of the eye-, ear-, and body-consciousnesses, then on the divisions of "the two realms, desire and form," and "the five stages," the very same trouble breaks out as in the previous point (the realm and stage to which the faculty belongs and to which the consciousness belongs do not match up).

(six) Again, since the seeds of the five consciousnesses extend to the wholesome and the unwholesome (the five consciousnesses being by nature of all three moral kinds), the five form-faculties too should be not only indeterminate. (But scripture says the five faculties can only be indeterminate.)

(seven) Again, the seeds of the five consciousnesses do not count as "appropriated" (a seed is not something appropriated), so the five faculties too should not count as "appropriated." (But the five faculties are plainly form-dharmas that are "appropriated.")

(eight) Again, if the five form-faculties just were the seeds of the five consciousnesses, then by the same reasoning carried on, "the seed of the mental consciousness" too should just be "the manas" — for they are taking "the faculty on which the five consciousnesses rest" as their case in point: since the faculty on which the five consciousnesses rest equals the seeds of the five consciousnesses, the faculty on which the mental consciousness rests (the manas) too should equal the seed of the mental consciousness. 〔But this plainly does not get through — the manas is a present-activity consciousness, not the seed of the mental consciousness.〕

(nine) Again, the Yogācārabhūmi says: the consciousnesses, eye and the rest, all possess the three supports in full (causal, dominant, immediately-antecedent). But if you say the five form-faculties just are the seeds of the five consciousnesses, then you have merged "the seed" and "the faculty" into one, and the five consciousnesses' supports come down to only two — which contradicts the Yogācārabhūmi's account of "three supports."

(ten) Again, scripture everywhere says: the faculties, eye and the rest, have both sides, "present-activity" and "seed." Now you insist the five faculties are only seeds — and that runs against the whole of scripture.

〔The retreating-rescue view〕 Someone wants to dodge the whole heap of faults above, yet is loath to let go of the position, and shifts to rescue it with a phrase: in the maturation consciousness, that "dominant karmic seed that can summon the five consciousnesses" (the seed of the karma that draws the five consciousnesses on) is what is named the five form-faculties; it is not the kind of seed that "serves as causal condition to produce the five consciousnesses" — by this shift (he fancies) he both neatly matches the two verses cited before and falls in well with the Yogācārabhūmi (on one hand still calling it a seed, on the other not a causal-condition seed, so that the faculty comes out as a dominant condition yet still tinged with the sense of "seed").

〔Refuting the retreating-rescue view · the correct view〕 This is mere talk on the lips, with no real principle in it. Taking the faculty to be the karmic seed, the old heap of faults is not lessened by even one: (1) the five form-faculties should then be not indeterminate (a karmic seed extends to the wholesome and the unwholesome); (2) the five faculties should then be not only "appropriated, of the aggregate of form, of the inner bases" (a karmic seed possesses none of these three); (3) the nose- and tongue-faculties should then belong only to the desire-realm; (4) the eye-, ear-, and body-faculties, three faculties, should then not extend to the five stages; (5) "the karma that summons the mental consciousness" should then equal the manas (the fault being the same as point eight before); (6) the faculties, eye and the rest, should then not have both sides, "present-activity" and "seed" (you admit only the karmic seed); (7) the faculties, eye and the rest, should then not be "form-faculties" (a karmic seed is not form).

(8) Again, suppose the five consciousnesses were all summoned by karma; then the five consciousnesses should belong wholly and only to "the indeterminate nature"; but the wholesome and unwholesome five consciousnesses are not summoned by karma (only the indeterminate maturation is summoned by karma). On your account, then, would not the wholesome and unwholesome five consciousnesses have no "faculties, eye and the rest," to serve as concomitant support? — so this 〔retreating-rescue〕 too is no clever rescue.

(9) Again, scripture everywhere says: the ālaya-consciousness transforms so as to manifest things like "the form-faculties," "the seats of the faculties" (the gross sense-organs, that is, these eyes of flesh and so on), and "the receptacle-world" (the outer mountains, rivers, and earth). How can you, then, wipe out "the form-faculties" with one stroke, saying the faculty is only a seed, that there are no real form-faculties? You already grant that "the consciousnesses, eye and the rest, transform so as to manifest things resembling form-objects," yet refuse to grant that "the faculties, eye and the rest, are form transformed out by the store-consciousness" — so muddled is this, it deeply violates both scripture and reason.

〔Correctly explaining the intent of the two verses〕 Then what do the two verses cited before, saying "the seed and the function are named the five faculties," in fact mean? Their real intent is to "break the notion that 'apart from consciousness, there is a really-existent form-faculty'" (that is, to refute the real faculty the heterodox speak of). They are aimed at "the thing transformed and manifested by consciousness, resembling the eye-faculty" (that is, the form-faculty transformed out by the store-consciousness) — because this thing has the "function of setting the five consciousnesses going," they borrow a name for it and call it a "seed," call it a "form-function"; it is not said that "a form-faculty just equals the karmic seed of consciousness."

〔Supplying the concomitant support · the five-accompanying mental consciousness〕 Add one more: that "clear mental consciousness" which refers to the five objects, clearly and distinctly (the mental consciousness that arises together with the five consciousnesses), should take "the five consciousnesses" as its concomitant support — because this clear mental consciousness is necessarily simultaneous with the five consciousnesses. Turn it the other way: were this clear mental consciousness not to rely on the five consciousnesses, eye and the rest, then the five consciousnesses too should not rely on this clear mental consciousness — for the force of the mutual reliance on the two sides is equal (you not relying on me, I too not relying on you).

〔Supplying the concomitant support · the seventh〕 Add one more: the seventh consciousness, though never broken off, still "alters" (changes) at stages such as the path of seeing. Since it alters, it should, like the first six consciousnesses, have a concomitant support; were one to say it has none, then the seventh could not count as an "evolving consciousness," which again contradicts scripture's account of "the seven evolving consciousnesses." So one must grant that the seventh too has a concomitant support — and this concomitant support is "the present-activity eighth consciousness" (the present-activity of the eighth serving as the concomitant support of the seventh).

So the Yogācārabhūmi says: "because there is the store-consciousness, there can be the manas; and with the manas as support, the mental consciousness can evolve." What this means is just: it is by relying on the "present-activity store-consciousness" as support that there is the manas, and not by relying on the "seed" of the eighth.

Otherwise (if the manas relied only on the seed of the eighth), then the Yogācārabhūmi should have said "because there is the store-consciousness, the mental consciousness can evolve"; but it says rather "with the manas as support, the mental consciousness evolves" — which shows the manas relies on the present-activity of the eighth. From this it can be seen: that 〔seed-as-support view〕 does not get through, whether by reasoning or by scripture.

〔This view's conclusion · the count of concomitant supports〕 So this view's conclusion is:

• The first five evolving consciousnesses, each one, certainly has "two concomitant supports": namely "the five form-faculties" and "the simultaneously-arising mental consciousness";
• The sixth evolving consciousness certainly and always has "one concomitant support": namely "the seventh consciousness"; if it arises at the same time as the five consciousnesses, then "the five consciousnesses" too count as concomitant support;
• The seventh evolving consciousness certainly has only "one concomitant support": namely "the eighth consciousness";
• only "the eighth consciousness" never alters and can stand by its own power, and so it has no concomitant support.

〔The correct view · refuting the prior view's "the eighth has no concomitant support"〕 Yet again someone says (going one layer deeper): the account above has still not gone all the way. Since the eighth, like the rest of the consciousnesses, is alike of the nature "consciousness," on what grounds do you single it out and forbid it a concomitant support? And further, the seventh and the eighth, these two consciousnesses, do after all always evolve together, each serving as the other's support — what is wrong with this mutual reliance?

You already grant that "the present-activity consciousness relies on the seed for support"; then "the seed of consciousness" too should be allowed to "rely on the present-activity consciousness" — that is, "the perfuming agent (the present-activity of the seven evolving consciousnesses)" and "the maturation (the present-activity of the eighth)" are precisely the support by which the seed can "be born, grow, and abide"; for the seed, were it to leave this perfuming agent and this maturation, could not be born, could not grow, and could not abide. (So the eighth, whether as seed or as present-activity, each has its support, and the relation of mutual reliance is established.)

Again: the maturation consciousness (the eighth), within the "form-possessing realms" (that is, the desire-realm and the form-realm), can maintain this faculty-body, and does so precisely by "relying on the form-faculties and evolving" — as a scripture says, "the ālaya-consciousness, blown along by the wind of karma, relies pervadingly on the several faculties and evolves in continuous succession"; and the Yogācārabhūmi says too, "the six consciousnesses, eye and the rest, because they each rely on their own separate faculty, cannot govern, cannot appropriate, this form-possessing faculty-body" (the six consciousnesses each rely on their own, and so cannot appropriate it; turned the other way, this displays just that the eighth relies pervadingly on the several faculties, and so can appropriate it). Were the maturation consciousness not to rely pervadingly on "the several form-possessing faculties," then it should, like the six consciousnesses, be unable to appropriate the faculty-body; and otherwise, the reason set up before ("the six consciousnesses each rely on their own, and so cannot appropriate it") would incur the fault of "not necessarily holding."

〔The correct view · the support of the eighth〕 So it is said: if the store-consciousness is "present-activity," it certainly has "one support": namely the seventh consciousness; and within the form-possessing realms, it must besides rely on "the form-faculties." If the store-consciousness is "seed," it certainly has "one support": namely the maturation consciousness (that is, the present-activity eighth); and at the very first stage of perfuming, it must besides rely on "the perfuming agent (the seven evolving consciousnesses)." The rest (the concomitant supports of the first five, the sixth, and the seventh) are as said before.

〔The ultimate correct view · distinguishing "what it rests on" (所依) from "the support" (依)〕 Yet again someone says (and this is the most ultimate account): these several views above have still not gone all the way, and the fault is that they have not told apart the two words "what-it-rests-on" (所依) and "support" (依), which are not the same.

First, the word "support" (依): its range is wide — whatever dharma has arising-and-perishing, that must rely on a cause and lean on a condition to arise and to abide, and so whatever it relies on and leans on is all called a "support" — just as a king and his minister rely on each other (both sides counting as support).

Next, the word "what-it-rests-on" (所依): its demand is strict — it must be a dharma that is "decisive" (fixed and unchanging), "has an object" (itself has an object it reaches out to), "is dominant" (takes the lead), and can make the mind and mental factors lay hold of their own object — only such a one is fit to be called "what it rests on," and that is "the inner six bases" (that is, the six faculties). The rest (such as the form-objects), being neither having-an-object, nor decisive, nor dominant, are at most like "the minister" (a support, not a what-it-rests-on); only the six faculties are like "the king" (and these alone are what it rests on).

So scripture says only mind and mental factors are called "having a what-it-rests-on," and does not say the form-dharmas have a what-it-rests-on — because the form-dharmas have no object of their own. And further: scripture says only that "the mind-king" is the what-it-rests-on of "the mental factors," and does not say that "the mental factors" are the what-it-rests-on of "the mind-king" — because the mental factors are not dominant (the mind-king alone is dominant).

In some places, though, "support" is spoken of as "what-it-rests-on," or "what-it-rests-on" as "support" — and that is all said for the moment, as convenient (the wide sense and the strict sense being used interchangeably, not fixed).

Reckoning anew by this strict "what-it-rests-on," the five consciousnesses' concomitant what-it-rests-on certainly comes to four kinds: namely "the five form-faculties," "the sixth consciousness," "the seventh consciousness," and "the eighth consciousness" — for lacking any one of these four, the five consciousnesses cannot evolve. These four each have their own designation: "the same-object support" (the five form-faculties), "the discriminating support" (the sixth), "the defiling-and-purifying support" (the seventh), and "the root support" (the eighth).

As for scripture's saying only that the five consciousnesses "rely on the five faculties," that is because: the five faculties are "exclusive" to the five consciousnesses (only the five consciousnesses rely on them, the other consciousnesses do not), and the five faculties are necessarily "of the same object" as the five consciousnesses, the nearest and most accordant — so it lifts up only this nearest one to speak of, and not that there are no other three supports.

The sixth, the mental consciousness, has its concomitant what-it-rests-on in only two kinds: namely the seventh consciousness and the eighth consciousness — for lacking either one, the sixth cannot evolve. As for that clear mental consciousness which arises together with the five consciousnesses and can be of the same object as them, clearly and distinctly — the five consciousnesses "are not necessarily present" (they do not accompany it every time), and so the five consciousnesses do not count as the (strict-sense) what-it-rests-on of the sixth.

As for scripture's saying only that the sixth "relies on the seventh," that is because: the seventh is the "defiling-and-purifying support" of the sixth, and they are alike classed within "the evolving consciousnesses," the nearest and most accordant — so it lifts up only this nearest one to speak of.

The seventh intellect (that is, the manas) has its concomitant what-it-rests-on in only one kind: namely the eighth consciousness — for if the store-consciousness be absent, the seventh certainly cannot evolve. As the verse says:

(prose unpacking of the verse) With the ālaya as support, there comes to be the evolving of the manas; relying on "mind" (the eighth) and "intellect" (the seventh), the other evolving consciousnesses (the first six) can then arise.

The ālaya-consciousness has its concomitant what-it-rests-on also in only one kind: namely the seventh consciousness — for if that seventh be absent, the eighth too certainly cannot evolve.

The treatise says "the store-consciousness always evolves at the same time as the manas"; and it says "the store-consciousness always relies on the defiled one," and this "defiled one" refers to the manas. Someone will ask: then the treatise also says "in three states (the arhat, the concentration of cessation, the supramundane path) there is no manas" — how is that to be understood? One should know: that is "said with respect to the 'veiled-and-defiled' layer of meaning" — meaning that in these three states there is no such veiled-and-defiled manas, and not that the seventh has utterly ceased to exist. It is just like the treatise's saying "in four states there is no ālaya," which does not mean the eighth is utterly gone (only that the designation "ālaya," the appropriating-store, is gone); here too it is to be understood by the same reasoning.

〔The ultimate correct view · supplying the remainder〕 The eighth, though within the form-possessing realms it must besides rely on the five faculties, yet the five faculties "are not necessarily present" (in the formless realm there are none), and so the five faculties do not amount to the (strict-sense) what-it-rests-on of the eighth. Again, the seed of consciousness cannot here-and-now lay hold of its own object (it has no reaching-out function), and so it may be said to have the sense of "support" yet to have no "what-it-rests-on" (in the strict sense). As for the what-it-rests-on of the several mental factors, that is spoken of following the consciousness they are concomitant with, and then to each is besides added "the mind-king it is concomitant with" (as its what-it-rests-on). Said in this way, it neatly matches both reason and scripture.

(c) Last · the opening-and-guiding support (the immediately-antecedent-condition support)

The third is called the "opening-and-guiding support" (that is, the immediately-antecedent-condition support, the support of the preceding moment that makes way for the following). 〔Opening-and-guiding view one〕 One view speaks thus —

• The first five consciousnesses, whether their own kind or another's, cannot connect back and forth (once arisen, they break off), and moreover must be drawn forth by the sixth consciousness, and so take only "the sixth consciousness" as their opening-and-guiding support;
• The sixth, the mental consciousness, can connect with its own kind, and can also be drawn forth by the five consciousnesses, and so takes "the first six consciousnesses" as its opening-and-guiding support;
• The seventh and eighth consciousnesses can connect with their own kind, and have no need of another consciousness to draw them forth, and so take only "their own kind" as their opening-and-guiding support.

〔Refuting opening-and-guiding view one · the correct view〕 Yet again someone says: the account above has not gone all the way. The first five consciousnesses, at "the not-yet-sovereign stage" (the stage of the ordinary worldling), and meeting a non-special object, may be as he says (unable to connect); but at "the sovereign stage" (as with the buddhas), wholly sovereign over objects, the faculties even interchanging their uses, settling spontaneously, with no need to toil and seek — at that time how could the five consciousness-bodies fail to connect? (They plainly do connect continuously.)

Again, the "outflow five consciousnesses" — since they are drawn forth by the several forces of "the determining mind," "the defiling-and-purifying mind," and "attention," and stay fixed on their object, not able to let go for a moment — how can one refuse them moment-after-moment continuity? And so the Yogācārabhūmi says: first there is "the determining mind," next there is "the defiling-and-purifying mind," and only after that is there "the outflow eye-consciousness" evolving as wholesome or unwholesome; and this outflow eye-consciousness is not by its own power of discrimination (turning at will); right up until this intellect (the sixth) has not turned to another object, for just such a span of time the eye-consciousness and the mental consciousness, the two of them, evolve continuously, now wholesome, now defiled. As the eye-consciousness arises, so on down to the body-consciousness, it should be known to be likewise.

What the Yogācārabhūmi means is plainly just this: for just such a span of time, the eye-consciousness and the mental consciousness, the two of them, each evolve continuously; and since, at the time the eye-consciousness arises, the mental consciousness is not absent (the two being simultaneous), it is therefore not the case that "the two consciousnesses arise by relieving each other in turn" (not eye and intellect taking turns in a relay, but each connecting on its own).

If a "specially intense object" stays continuously present, gripping body and mind so they cannot let go for an instant, then at that time the five consciousness-bodies must by reason connect continuously — as in the hot hells (fierce suffering pressing the body, which cannot be let go) and the heaven of forgetful play (lost in amusement, forgetting the body) and the like.

And so the Yogācārabhūmi says: "taking 'these six consciousnesses' as the immediately-antecedent condition of 'those six consciousnesses,' one sets up the designation 'the intellect-faculty' (mano-indriya) for this." Suppose before and after the five consciousnesses there were certainly only "the mental consciousness" (to serve as their immediately-antecedent condition); then the treatise should have said "taking 'this one consciousness' (the mental consciousness) as the immediately-antecedent condition of 'those six consciousnesses'"; or it should have said "taking 'these six consciousnesses' as the immediately-antecedent condition of 'that one consciousness.'" But the treatise precisely does not say so (it says six-to-six), which shows that the five consciousnesses too have the sense of "connecting with their own kind."

〔Refuting "the sixth relies on the first six"〕 The moment the five consciousnesses arise, there is necessarily the mental consciousness alongside (arising simultaneously); this mental consciousness can of itself draw forth the next moment's mental consciousness and make it arise — so where is the need to draw in "the five consciousnesses" to serve as the opening-and-guiding support of the sixth? (So the sixth need not take the five consciousnesses as its opening-and-guiding support.)

Again, at stages such as "mindless sleep" and "faint," the mental consciousness has already broken off, and when later it arises again — the store-consciousness and the manas, since they are never broken off, should by 〔view one〕's logic come and serve as the opening-and-guiding support of this re-arisen mental consciousness (yet in fact this is not so; the mental consciousness still takes the preceding moment's own-kind mental consciousness as opening-and-guiding). Since you 〔view one〕 already allow the mental consciousness to take "the preceding moment's own kind" as opening-and-guiding (that is, leaping across the intervening blank and joining back to the own-kind before the break), on what grounds do you forbid the five consciousnesses' "own-kind" opening-and-guiding to do likewise? Since this (the mental consciousness leaping the break to rejoin its own kind) is so, how is that (the five consciousnesses doing the same) not so?

Again, the manas that is concomitant with "the wisdom of equality," when it first arises, is certainly drawn forth by the sixth, the mental consciousness; so by 〔view one〕's logic the seventh too should take the sixth as its opening-and-guiding support (yet 〔view one〕 insists the seventh takes only its own kind). Again, the pure eighth consciousness that is concomitant with "the great-mirror wisdom," when it first arises, must too be drawn forth with the aid of the sixth and the seventh; and again, the maturation mind (the eighth) relies on the defiled intellect (the seventh), or relies on the wholesome mind concomitant with compassion-and-vow (the sixth) — that being so, one must grant that the eighth too takes the sixth and the seventh as its opening-and-guiding support (yet 〔view one〕 insists the eighth takes only its own kind). From this it can be seen: 〔view one〕's words have not gone all the way.

〔Opening-and-guiding view two · the conclusion〕 So it should be said thus:

• The five consciousnesses: within "the preceding moment's first six consciousnesses," whichever consciousness may be taken as opening-and-guiding support;
• The sixth, the mental consciousness: takes "the preceding moment's own kind," or "the seventh and the eighth," as opening-and-guiding support;
• The seventh, the manas: takes "the preceding moment's own kind," or "the sixth consciousness," as opening-and-guiding support;
• The ādāna-consciousness (that is, the eighth): takes "the preceding moment's own kind," and "the sixth and the seventh," as opening-and-guiding support.

Said this way, none of it violates reason (the grounds having been given before).

〔The ultimate correct view · refuting opening-and-guiding view two〕 Yet again someone says (and this is the most ultimate account): 〔view two〕 too is wrong. What is called the "opening-and-guiding support" must be a dharma that "has an object," is "dominant (the mind-king alone is dominant)," and can serve as the "immediately-antecedent condition"; toward the mind and mental factors that are to arise after, it can "make way" (the preceding moment first yielding its place) and "lead the way" (drawing the following moment up), and so is called the "opening-and-guiding support." This qualification belongs only to "the mind-king"; the mental factors and the rest do not count (the mental factors are not dominant, and cannot serve as opening-and-guiding support).

Only when "this one" and "that one" have no sense of "arising at the same time" (this one ceasing and only then that one arising, ranked one before the other, not side by side) can one speak of this one's having an "opening-and-guiding power" over that one (the opening-and-guiding support must yield place one before another, and cannot stand side by side). But "the eight consciousnesses in one body" plainly can arise at the same time (the eight consciousnesses evolving all together), so how can one take "a consciousness of another kind" as opening-and-guiding support? Were one to allow another kind to be the support, then this one and that one should not arise at the same time — which then comes to the same as "another school's" (the Hīnayāna's) thesis that "minds cannot arise side by side" (only one mind at a time).

Again, when the several consciousnesses in one body arise at the same time, their number is besides now more, now fewer (sometimes one arises, sometimes several); were one to allow consciousnesses of differing kinds to serve as each other's immediately-antecedent condition (even with unequal numbers serving as each other's condition), then "the form-dharmas and the rest" too should be able to do this (form too able to serve as immediately-antecedent condition) — which violates scripture's account that "the immediately-antecedent condition extends only to mind and mental factors."

As for the Mahāyānasaṃgraha's saying "the form-dharmas too may have an immediately-antecedent condition," that is a "yield-then-take-back" manner of speaking — meaning: it provisionally "yields" a step, conceding the Hīnayāna's claim that "form and mind have an immediately-antecedent condition before and after," and then "takes back" its "causal condition" (breaking it down by right reasoning), so that it is not really a concession at all. Otherwise, the word "immediately" (等, "equal") in "immediately-antecedent condition" would become a useless word (this word "equal" is precisely meant to show before-and-after evenness, single-line connection, and so it bars the form-dharmas from outside). And a further step back: were you to insist that this word "equal" is not meant to bar "unequal numbers" but only to show "same kind," then this strikes squarely at your own 〔view two〕 — you 〔view two〕 maintain "taking consciousnesses of differing kinds as immediately-antecedent condition," yet since the word "equal" shows "same kind," differing kinds cannot count.

〔The correct view · the conclusion〕 So it is said: the eight consciousnesses each take only "their own kind" as opening-and-guiding support — and this truly accords with reason and scripture, because one's own kind certainly has no sense of "arising at the same time" (the own kind being ranked one before another, not side by side), which is just what fits the requirement that "the opening-and-guiding support must not arise at the same time."

The opening-and-guiding support of the mental factors is to be spoken of following their mind-king. Although the mind-king and the mental factors are of differing kinds yet arise together, they are concomitant with one another, blending so as to seem one, certainly arising and perishing together, their work necessarily the same — and so when "the one" (the mind-king) opens-and-guides, "the rest" (the concomitant mental factors) also open-and-guide at the same time, and thus they can serve as each other's immediately-antecedent condition back and forth (the concomitant mind-king and mental factors can open-and-guide each other, precisely because they blend so as to seem one). But "the several consciousnesses" (among the eight) are not like this (they do not blend into one), and so one cannot use the example of the mind-king-and-mental-factors to set it over the eight consciousnesses.

Yet the several "mental factors" are themselves not an opening-and-guiding support — because toward the dharmas they draw forth after, they have no qualification of "being dominant" (only the mind-king is dominant).

〔Challenge · the four conditions〕 Someone objects: if the immediately-antecedent condition of mind and mental factors can only be "one's own kind," then when the seventh and eighth consciousnesses first reach "the transformation of the basis" (newly turning into pure wisdom), the wholesome mental factors concomitant with them, "trust" and the rest (which, at the stage before the transformation, had no own-kind such wholesome factor preceding them) — would not their "immediately-antecedent condition" then be lacking one? Is this not a violation of scripture's saying that "all minds and mental factors arise from the four conditions (causal, immediately-antecedent, object, dominant)"?

〔Answer · leaping the break to join the preceding own kind〕 The answer: at stages such as mindless sleep and faint, although the mental consciousness has broken off, when it later arises its opening-and-guiding support is still that "preceding moment's own kind" (that is, the moment of mental consciousness before the break); and the five consciousnesses that have been interrupted should be known to be likewise (leaping across the intervening blank to join back to the preceding moment's own kind) — because in the middle there is "no other own-kind mind set between as a divider," and so it is called "immediate (without intervening)" all the same; and that preceding moment's own-kind mind, at the time it first ceased, had already served as opening-and-guiding for the present moment, so why trouble to draw in "another kind" to serve as opening-and-guiding support? (So the four conditions are not lacking: the immediately-antecedent condition of that "trust" and other wholesome factors at the transformation is just the preceding moment's own-kind wholesome factor-seed manifesting as present-activity — the own kind connects up all the same.)

As for scripture's saying "the first six consciousnesses draw one another forth," or saying "the seventh and eighth arise relying on the sixth and seventh," those are all said with respect to "a specially potent dominant condition," and not that they are an immediately-antecedent condition, and so it does not conflict with this (a dominant condition may be of a differing kind; only the immediately-antecedent condition can be one's own kind alone).

The Yogācārabhūmi says "if this consciousness be without intervening, then the consciousnesses certainly arise, and one calls this the immediately-antecedent condition of those"; and it says "taking these six consciousnesses as the immediately-antecedent condition of those six consciousnesses, one sets up the designation 'the intellect-faculty' for this" — this is "the words said in a general way, but the meaning told apart" (on the face of it speaking generally of six-to-six, but in meaning each connecting with its own kind), and so it too does not conflict.

〔The side-treatise concludes〕 So the account "taking one's own kind as opening-and-guiding support" truly accords with reason and scripture. This turned-aside talk ends here, and we should return to the main subject (back to the manas itself).

3. Returning to the main argument — "resting on that" displays only the first two supports

This second transformer (the manas), though it possesses all three what-it-rests-on (the causal-condition support, the concomitant support / dominant, the opening-and-guiding support / immediately-antecedent), is nonetheless pointed at by the verse's line "resting on that" in only "the first two supports" (the causal-condition support and the concomitant support) — and this for three reasons: (one) it is to display that the manas's "what-it-rests-on" and its "what-it-refers-to" are one and the same (both being the eighth, relying on it and also referring to it); (two) the first two supports "have a more conspicuous function"; (three) or else because the "opening-and-guiding support" is of itself easy to understand (the own-kind connection being plain at a glance, so it need not be specially pointed out).

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C. What it refers to — glossing "referring to that"

Now that the manas's "what it rests on" has been told, what of its "what it refers to"? It is just the verse's two words "referring to that." "That" refers to the consciousness on which the manas rested before (the eighth, the store-consciousness) — scripture says: the manas refers to the store-consciousness, and thereupon raises a "self-attachment."

〔Object-view one · referring to the substance and the concomitant dharmas〕 One view says: what the manas refers to is the "consciousness-substance" of the eighth itself, plus "the dharmas concomitant with it" (that is, the mental factors, contact and the rest, concomitant with the eighth). The reason: the treatise says "the manas is always concomitant with the 'self-attachment' and the 'attachment to what-belongs-to-self,'" meaning it refers to the "consciousness-substance" of the eighth and to its "concomitant dharmas," and in sequence grasps the former as "self" and the latter as "what-belongs-to-self." And since the several mental factors are inseparable from consciousness, to say it "refers to the concomitant dharmas" still accords with the principle of "consciousness-only," and incurs no fault against scripture.

〔Object-view two · referring to the perceiving-part and the perceived-part〕 Another view says: the account above does not get through — for nowhere does scripture ever say the manas "refers to the mental factors, contact and the rest." It should be said: the manas refers only to the "perceiving-part" (the apprehending side) and the "perceived-part" (the side of the reached-out-to image) of the eighth consciousness, and in sequence grasps the former as "self" and the latter as "what-belongs-to-self"; and since the perceived-part and the perceiving-part both have "consciousness" for their substance, it does not violate scripture (what it refers to is still consciousness).

〔Object-view three · referring to the store-consciousness and the seeds〕 Yet another view says: 〔view two〕 too is wrong — for within the perceived-part of the eighth are contained outer objects such as the five form-faculties and the receptacle-world, and were the manas to refer even to these, three faults would break out: (1) the objects such as the five form-faculties do not belong to the aggregate of consciousness, and were the manas to refer to them, it would be just the same as the five consciousnesses (also referring to outer objects); (2) the manas would then be like the sixth, the mental consciousness (referring to objects common to all); (3) it would further entail that "one born into the formless realm does not grasp what-belongs-to-self" (the formless realm having no form-perceived-part, there is naturally nothing to grasp) and that "one who, weary of form, is born there has the eighth no longer manifesting form" (the eighth not manifesting a form-perceived-part, the manas then has no what-belongs-to-self to reach) — these are all faults. So it should be said: the manas refers only to "the store-consciousness" (its perceiving-part) and "its seeds," and in sequence grasps the former as "self" and the latter as "what-belongs-to-self"; and since the seed just is that consciousness's function and not a really-existent thing, it does not violate scripture.

〔The ultimate correct view · refuting the three prior views〕 Yet again someone says (and this is the most ultimate account): the three prior views are all wrong. 〔First refuting view three's "referring to the seeds as what-belongs-to-self"〕 The seeds of form and the rest do not belong to the aggregate of consciousness (were the seed to be referred to and grasped as what-belongs-to-self, the fault would be the same as view two's); and the treatise plainly says the seed is "really, truly existent" (the seed is not unreal, and so one cannot say, as view three does, that "the seed is just a function, not a really-existent thing"); were you to insist the seed is unreal, then the unreal thing should be just like "nothing" (having no substance), and then it could not serve as a "causal condition" (an unreal dharma cannot be a causal condition, yet the seed precisely is a causal condition, which shows the seed is really existent — and this breaks view three).

Again, the "satkāya-view" (the view that grasps body-and-mind as a "self") that is concomitant with the manas is "spontaneously arising" (born with one), "of one unchanging savor," and arises in unbroken continuous succession — how could it split apart and grasp on one side "there is a self" and on the other "there is what-belongs-to-self," these two? 〔The reason〕 there is no such thing as "in one and the same mind, referring at once to 'annihilation' and to 'permanence,' two differing objects, separately grasping a set apiece, and moreover running side by side" (one view cannot at once refer to two objects and grasp two sets apart); nor can one say "the self-attachment and the attachment-to-what-belongs-to-self arise by turns, before and after" — because the manas, from beginningless time, evolves "of one savor" (forever a single line in succession, with no such thing as a before-and-after split-grasping). 〔So view one, view two, and view three's "in sequence grasping self, grasping what-belongs-to-self" all fail to stand.〕

〔The correct view · referring only to the perceiving-part〕 It should be known: the manas refers only to the "perceiving-part" of the store-consciousness, and to nothing else (not to the consciousness-substance, not to the concomitant dharmas, not to the perceived-part, not to the seeds) — because that perceiving-part of the eighth, from beginningless time, is "of one kind in unbroken succession," appearing like "permanent" (constant and unchanging), like "one" (a single one), and constantly serving all the dharmas as what-they-rest-on (and so it is most easily grasped as "the self within").

The manas only grasps that perceiving-part of the eighth as "the self within"; as for the treatise's text also saying "what-belongs-to-self" alongside, that is only "carried along on the run of the words" (following the verbal momentum and saying it in passing), and so the word "what-belongs-to-self" comes out (it is not that it really goes on besides to refer to a what-belongs-to-self). Or one may put it thus: it grasps that eighth as "the very self that is mine" (grasping it as self over and over), and so upon the meaning of "a single body-view" it says the two words "self, what-belongs-to-self." Said this way, it falls in well with scripture and reason.

〔Side-proof · only a self-view〕 Scripture in many places says only that the manas "has a self-view" (it does not say it has a view-of-what-belongs-to-self), and moreover "the self-attachment" and "the attachment-to-what-belongs-to-self" do not arise together (in one mind two sets are not grasped at once). 〔Before and after the transformation, what it refers to differs〕 The manas, at "the stage not yet transformed at its basis," refers only to the store-consciousness; but once "the transformation of the basis" is done (having turned into the wisdom of equality), it can then refer even to "suchness" and the several other dharmas — because the wisdom of equality has realized "the ten kinds of equality," and so it can know the differences in the resolute understanding of the several sentient beings, and can manifest the various buddha-images (the range of what it refers to having broadened).

The treatise's text here speaks only of "the time not yet transformed," and so it says only that the manas "refers to that store-consciousness." "Awakened" (after the transformation), what it refers to is wide; "deluded" (before the transformation), what it refers to is narrow — this is how the principle ought to be; and further, "the object of no-self" (suchness) is all-pervading, while "the object of self" (the store-consciousness) is not all-pervading, and so the wide-and-narrow of what is referred to in the deluded and awakened states differs.

〔Challenge · referring to its own what-it-rests-on〕 Someone asks: since the manas takes the eighth as its what-it-rests-on, how can it again take the eighth as its what-it-refers-to (how can a thing refer to what it itself relies on)? 〔Answer〕 It is just like there being "a later-moment consciousness" (the following moment of mental consciousness) that refers to "the preceding-moment intellect" (the preceding moment's intellect, which was originally its immediately-antecedent what-it-rests-on) — since that (referring to one's own what-it-rests-on) is conceded by all, what fault is there in the manas's referring to its own what-it-rests-on?

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D. Self-nature and activity-mark — glossing "cogitation for its nature and mark"

The verse's line "cogitation for its nature and mark," in one breath, points out both the "self-nature" of the manas (what it is) and its "activity-mark" (how it operates), the two sides. The manas takes "cogitation" as its self-nature, and so also takes this same cogitation as its activity-mark (both nature and mark being cogitation). And it is precisely by this line that the special name set up before is glossed in passing — "being able to cogitate examiningly" is just the source of the name "manas."

At "the stage not yet transformed at its basis," the manas is constantly and examiningly cogitating "the mark of self that it grasps" (that is, grasping a self); at "the stage already transformed at its basis," it is likewise examiningly cogitating "the mark of no-self" (that is, realizing no-self) — which shows that this nature-and-mark "cogitation" is present both in delusion and in awakening, the difference lying only in the object cogitated: in the one case "self," in the other "no-self."

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E. The concomitant mental factors — the four defilements constantly co-present (self-delusion · self-view · self-conceit · self-love)

How many mental factors are concomitant with the manas? 〔This section first treats the four root defilements〕 First, it is constantly bound up with "four defilements." That word "co-present" here just means "concomitant." It means: from beginningless time, right up until before the transformation of the basis, the manas spontaneously and constantly refers to the store-consciousness, and is concomitant with "four root defilements."

Which four are they? They are just the verse's "self-delusion, self-view, together with self-conceit and self-love" — these are the four kinds.

Self-delusion: that is, "ignorance" — being all in a fog about "the mark of self," and dazed and dim about "the principle of no-self," and so it is named "self-delusion."

Self-view: that is, "self-attachment" — wildly taking dharmas that are originally not the self (that is, the five aggregates) to be "self," and so it is named "self-view."

Self-conceit: that is, "haughtiness" — relying on that "self" it has grasped to lift the mind high and aloft (puffed up, looking down on others), and so it is named "self-conceit."

Self-love: that is, "greed for the self" — being deeply infatuated with that "self" it has grasped (clinging in craving and not letting go), and so it is named "self-love."

The word "together" in the verse ("together with self-conceit and self-love") is meant to make clear that "self-conceit and self-love" can arise together with "self-view and self-conceit" (that is, that self-view, self-conceit, and self-love, these three, can be concomitant and arise side by side), and uses this to drive down another school's claim that "these three cannot arise together."

These four defilements arise unceasingly, stirring up and muddying the inner mind, and besides keeping those outer seven evolving consciousnesses (the first six, and the manas's own present-activity as well) ever defiled and unclean. It is precisely because of this that sentient beings die and are born again and again, revolving without end and unable to get out — and so these are named "defilements."

〔Challenge · why only four〕 Someone asks: the root defilements come in ten in all (greed, hatred, delusion, conceit, doubt, plus the five views); why does the manas have only four? 〔Answer〕 Because the manas, having already the "self-view" (that is, the body-view), the other four views (the extreme view, the wrong view, view-clinging, the clinging to precepts-and-observances) cannot arise — the reasoning being "in one and the same mind there cannot be two wisdoms" (a view is in fact a kind of defiled wisdom, and one mind cannot have two wisdoms at once), so once there is the self-view, the other views cannot get going.

〔Challenge · why it must have a self-view〕 Then why must the manas have just the "self-view" (and not some other view)? 〔Answer〕 (1) The two clingings, view-clinging and the clinging-to-precepts-and-observances, and the wrong view, all arise by "discrimination" (stirred up after birth) and can be severed only at "the path of seeing"; but the defilements concomitant with the manas are only "born-with-one and spontaneous," and can be severed only at "the path of cultivation" — so those two clingings and the wrong view are not within the manas. (2) The "view-of-what-belongs-to-self" and the "extreme view" both must arise in dependence on the "self-view"; but this view concomitant with the manas "does not arise in dependence on them (the view-of-what-belongs-to-self, the extreme view)" (the manas only grasps a self within, neither referring outward nor grasping annihilation or permanence) — so it can only be the "self-view." (3) The manas is forever within grasping "there is a self," and so it must have the "self-view."

〔Glossing the absence of doubt, the absence of hatred〕 Because the "self-view" examines so decisively (without the least wavering), "doubt" cannot arise (the view being fixed, doubt is gone); and because it "is infatuated with this self of its own" (that is, self-love), "hatred" too cannot arise (within, it only loves the self, and will not hate this very object of its own). So the root defilements concomitant with the manas are just these four (self-delusion, self-view, self-conceit, self-love).

〔Challenge · self-view, conceit, and love arising together〕 Someone asks: self-view, self-conceit, and self-love, these three — how can they arise together? 〔Answer〕 The way they operate does not conflict with one another, so what is wrong with their arising together? 〔A further challenge · greed and conceit conflicting〕 But the Yogācārabhūmi says "greed makes the mind go down (cravingly bending low), conceit makes the mind go up (loftily looking down on others)" — would these two not conflict (and then how can self-love and self-conceit arise together)?

〔Answer · distinguishing inner-and-outer, coarse-and-subtle〕 The Yogācārabhūmi's "greed goes down, conceit goes up" conflicting is said with respect to another situation: that is the greed and conceit "arisen by later discrimination," referring to "outer objects," having "an object looked down upon" (conceit going to bully others) and "another object relied on" (greed having something else to lean on), and of a relatively "coarse" cast. But the manas's self-conceit and self-love are "born with one," referring to "the inner object" (within, referring to the store-consciousness), relying on the same one self, and of a very "subtle" cast — the two being one coarse and one subtle, utterly different; and so the Yogācārabhūmi's passage and this passage here (self-conceit and self-love arising together), the two accounts, do not conflict in their meaning.

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Having finished with the eighth consciousness, the ālaya-vijñāna, we turn now to the second transformation — the manas. Following the verse, this section sets out its name and meaning, what it rests upon (its support), what it takes as object, its essential nature and mode of activity, and the four root afflictions that never leave it for an instant. When the treatise comes to the matter of "support," it opens out into a long general discussion — an excursus on the "three supports" — and that is the longest and most densely argued passage in the whole section.

This manas has its roots in scripture and treatise alike. The Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, in its chapter on mind, mentation, and consciousness, speaks of an "appropriating consciousness" (ādāna-vijñāna) — "ādāna" meaning "that which follows along and appropriates": it appropriates the body and the life-faculty, is profound and subtle, and the World-Honored One "did not expound it to the foolish, for fear they would take it as a self." That very grasping is what the manas does (the manas grasps the eighth as its "inner self" — the very danger the sūtra warns of). The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra gives the image of "the store-consciousness as an ocean, stirred by the wind of objects into surging waves of the various consciousnesses," showing that the manas is one of the seven transforming consciousnesses that arise in dependence on the store-consciousness. The Yogācārabhūmi then fixes the manas as "named 'mind,' deliberating by nature, constantly grasping I and what is mine," lists the four spontaneous afflictions it never parts from (the view of the perishing aggregates, self-conceit, self-love, and the unshared ignorance), and says "because there is the ālaya-vijñāna there is the manas," which "takes the ālaya-vijñāna as its object, grasping a self and giving rise to conceit." What this section expounds has its scriptural root in the Saṃdhinirmocana and the Laṅkāvatāra, and its treatise-basis in the Yogācārabhūmi — and with that we follow the verse and open the exposition.

A. Opening — the second transformation is the "deliberating transformation" (the manas)

After the first transformation (the consciousness of maturation, the eighth consciousness), it remains to clarify the characteristics of the second transformation, the deliberating transformation. In the teachings this consciousness has the special name manas — because its deliberating is both constant (uninterrupted) and examining (it scrutinizes and decides), surpassing the other consciousnesses in this respect. Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) unpacks the two words "deliberating-examining": "deliberating" is reflective thought, "examining" is measuring-and-deciding; the manas deliberates upon the eighth and measures it as "I," and so is named manas. Kuiji further lays out four alternatives of "constant" and "examining" to mark off what is distinctive about the manas: the seventh alone is "both constant and examining" (uninterrupted, and scrutinizing-and-deciding in its grasp of self); the eighth is "constant but not examining" (uninterrupted, yet not scrutinizing-and-deciding); the sixth mental consciousness is "examining but not constant" (it scrutinizes and decides, but is interrupted); and the first five are "neither constant nor examining" — set side by side, the four alternatives bring out why the manas's "constant, examining grasp of self" is unique. Someone asks: since manas is also rendered "mind" (mano, "the intellect"), how does it differ from the "mind" of the sixth, the mental consciousness (mano-vijñāna)? The answer: the name of the seventh is a "co-referential compound" — like the term "store-consciousness," where "consciousness" simply is the "mind" (the substance of the consciousness is itself the manas; the two words point to one and the same thing). The name of the sixth is a "dependent-determinative compound" — like "eye-consciousness," where "consciousness" is other than the "mind" (just as eye-consciousness rests on the eye-faculty, so consciousness and faculty, consciousness and mind, are two distinct things). Further: the teachings, fearing that the "mind" of the seventh would be confused with the "mental consciousness" of the sixth, give the seventh only the single name "mind" (not "mental consciousness"). And by raising the bare word "mind" alone, they mean to set it apart from the other two senses, "citta" and "vijñāna" — for in the seventh the function of "accumulating" (the sense of citta) and the function of "discerning" (the sense of vijñāna) are both weaker than in the other consciousnesses; so those two names are not taken, and only the most fitting name, "mind," is kept. It is also to show that this is the closest support of the sixth mental consciousness (its immediate support, the support that defiles or purifies it), and so it is called simply "mind."

B. The support — explaining "it turns in dependence on that"

1. "That" is the eighth; the manas arises in dependence on the store-consciousness

The verse-phrase "it turns in dependence on that" displays the support of the manas. "That" refers to the first transformation just discussed (the eighth, the ālaya); the teachings say the manas arises in dependence on the store-consciousness. Here there are two views. One view: the manas takes the seeds of the eighth as its support, not the active eighth consciousness — because the manas is uninterrupted, it need not borrow the active eighth as a "co-present support" in order to arise. Another view (the one inclining to correctness): the manas takes both the seeds and the active eighth consciousness as its support — for although the manas is uninterrupted, it still undergoes transformation (change), and therefore is called a "transforming consciousness"; and being a transforming consciousness, it must borrow the active eighth as a co-present support in order to arise at all. The word "turns" in the verse means "flows on": it shows that the manas, in constant dependence on the eighth, reaches out and grasps its object (it takes the eighth as object and grasps it as "I").

2. The excursus — the "three supports" of every mind and mental factor

Having come to the matter of "support," the treatise here opens out into a long general discussion: not only the manas, but every mind-king and every mental factor has a support, and the supports are of three kinds. First, the causal support — namely, one's own seeds (every conditioned dharma comes to be in dependence on its seeds; apart from its own seeds it cannot arise). Second, the dominant-condition support — namely, the inner six bases (the six faculties); every mind and mental factor turns in dependence on these (apart from its co-present faculty it cannot turn). Third, the equal-immediately-antecedent support — namely, the just-ceased mind (the preceding thought-moment, which has perished and so opens the way for the succeeding one); every mind and mental factor arises in dependence on this (apart from this way-clearing faculty it cannot arise). Only mind and mental factors possess all three of these supports, and only they are said to "have support"; the other dharmas (matter and so on) do not count. Each is now examined in turn.

(i) The causal support (the seed-support) — seed and active state are simultaneous

The first kind is the seed-support. Someone maintains that "the seed perishes, and only then does the active fruit arise" (seed and fruit are not simultaneous but successive), arguing that the Abhidharma-samuccaya says "there is no such thing as 'the seed still present while the fruit has already arisen,'" and that seed and sprout are not simultaneous. The correct view rebuts this: that evidence does not stand. The line in the Abhidharma-samuccaya is said with respect to a seed drawing forth a later seed (members of the same kind generating one another) — not of a seed generating an active state. "Seed generates sprout" is a conventional simile, not the ultimate truth; "seed perishes, sprout arises" is not a thesis both sides admit; and what is more, a lamp's flame and its wick plainly exist simultaneously while serving as cause for one another — proof that cause and effect can be simultaneous. One must distinguish clearly: in a seed's own-kind causation (a preceding seed drawing forth a later seed) the two are indeed not simultaneous; but in the mutual generation of seed and active state (seed generates the active state, the active state perfumes the seed) the two are necessarily simultaneous. So the Yogācārabhūmi says: "An impermanent dharma is cause both for an other nature (seed and active state as cause for one another) and for a later own-nature (a preceding seed for a later seed)" — and this is precisely the meaning of "causal condition": "own-nature" displays a seed's own kind, earlier and later, as cause (not simultaneous), while "other nature" displays seed and active state as cause for one another (simultaneous). The Mahāyāna-saṃgraha likewise says that the store-consciousness and the defiled dharmas are causal conditions for one another, standing simultaneously like a bundle of reeds, and that seed and fruit are necessarily simultaneous. Therefore the seed-support (seed together with active state) is certainly not successive but simultaneous; and wherever a text speaks of "seed and fruit as successive," that is all a "provisional teaching that follows the position of others" (a concession to another school's framing). In this way the eight consciousnesses and all the mental factors each separately have their own seed-support.

(ii) The co-present support — refuting "the five faculties are just the seeds of the five consciousnesses," then distinguishing "support" from "mere reliance"

The second kind is the co-present support. Someone maintains that "the five consciousnesses, eye and the rest, take the mental consciousness as their co-present support (whenever the five arise the mental consciousness is present along with them), and there is no separate five faculties serving as co-present support, because the five faculties simply are the seeds of the five consciousnesses." He cites a verse from the Twenty Verses ("consciousness arises from its own seed and turns as the semblance of an object; to establish the inner and outer bases, the Buddha spoke of them as the ten") and a verse from the Investigation of the Object ("the color-capacity upon consciousness is reasonably called the five faculties; capacity and the object-color are cause for one another beginninglessly") as proof: that the Buddha, to establish the twelve bases, called the seeds of the five consciousnesses the faculties (eye and the rest) and called the image-portion of the five consciousnesses the objects (color and the rest), so the faculties just are the seeds of the five consciousnesses. He further says that the seventh and eighth consciousnesses have no separate co-present support (their own power is strong, and they continue constantly), and that only the sixth mental consciousness has an additional co-present support (it must borrow the manas in order to arise).

The correct view says this "the five faculties are just the seeds of the five consciousnesses" contradicts both reason and scripture, and refutes it on ten counts. One: if the five faculties were just the seeds of the five consciousnesses, the seeds of the eighteen elements would be thrown into confusion — yet the teachings everywhere say the eighteen elements each have their own separate seeds. Two: the seeds of each of the five consciousnesses can generate two portions, image-portion and seeing-portion; which one will you take as "the faculty, eye and the rest"? Take the seeing-portion's seed, and the faculty becomes part of the consciousness-aggregate; take the image-portion's seed, and the faculty becomes an outer base — either way contradicting the teaching that "the five faculties are matter-aggregate, inner bases." Three: if the five faculties were just the seeds of the five consciousnesses, the faculties would become the causal condition of the five consciousnesses and could not be called the dominant condition — yet the teachings say the faculties are the dominant condition. Four: if the nose- and tongue-faculties were just the seeds of nose- and tongue-consciousness, then the nose- and tongue-faculties would have to be bound only to the desire realm, or else nose- and tongue-consciousness would have to extend into the form realm — both horns contradict scripture. Five: the same difficulty arises for the eye-, ear-, and body-faculties as seeds of their three consciousnesses, regarding their distribution across the two realms (desire and form) and the five stages. Six: since the seeds of the five consciousnesses extend to both wholesome and unwholesome, the five faculties would have to be not merely indeterminate — yet the teachings say the five faculties are exclusively indeterminate. Seven: the seeds of the five consciousnesses are not "appropriated," so the five faculties would have to be unappropriated — yet the five faculties are appropriated matter. Eight: if the five faculties were just the seeds of the five consciousnesses, then by parity "the seeds of the mental consciousness" would have to be the manas — yet the manas is an active consciousness, not the seed of the mental consciousness. Nine: the Yogācārabhūmi says the consciousnesses, eye and the rest, all possess three supports; if the five faculties were just the seeds of the five consciousnesses, then the supports of the five consciousnesses would be reduced to only two. Ten: the teachings say the faculties, eye and the rest, extend to both active state and seed; clinging to them as seed alone therefore contradicts all the teachings.

To dodge these difficulties someone shifts his position to rescue it: "Within the consciousness of maturation, the dominant karmic seeds capable of summoning forth the five consciousnesses are called the five matter-faculties — not the seeds that act as causal condition generating the five consciousnesses — and this both accords with those two verses and follows the Yogācārabhūmi." The correct view says this too is empty words; the faults remain. The five matter-faculties still ought not to be indeterminate (karmic seeds extend to wholesome and unwholesome); ought not to be exclusively appropriated, exclusively matter-aggregate, exclusively inner base; the nose- and tongue-faculties ought to be bound only to the desire realm; the three faculties ought not to extend to the five stages; "the karma summoning the mental consciousness" ought to be the manas; eye and the rest ought not to extend to active state and seed; eye and the rest ought not to be matter-faculties. Moreover, if all five consciousnesses were summoned by karma, they would have to be uniformly indeterminate — yet wholesome and unwholesome five-consciousnesses are not karmically summoned, and so there would then be no "faculty, eye and the rest" serving as co-present support for the wholesome and unwholesome five-consciousnesses. So this rescue is no improvement. What is more, the teachings everywhere say the ālaya-vijñāna manifests as the semblance of "matter-faculties, faculty-bases, and the container world" — how can you strike out "matter-faculties"? You grant that "the consciousnesses, eye and the rest, manifest as the semblance of color-objects," yet refuse that "the faculties, eye and the rest, are matter transformed by the store-consciousness" — this confusion deeply contradicts the teaching and the reasoning. In truth, when those two verses said "seeds, capacity, are called the five faculties," their real intent was to refute matter-faculties existing apart from consciousness: with reference to the "semblance of the eye-faculty transformed by consciousness," and because it has the function of "giving rise to the five consciousnesses," they provisionally named it "seed, color-capacity" — not that "the matter-faculty just is the karmic seed of consciousness."

The correct view then additionally establishes several further co-present supports. The "clear mental consciousness" (the mental consciousness conjoined with the five) that takes the five objects ought to take the five consciousnesses as its co-present support (it must be present along with the five; for if it did not rest on the five, the five too ought not to rest on it, the force of mutual reliance being equal). The seventh consciousness, though uninterrupted, undergoes transformation in such stages as the path of seeing, and so ought, like the six consciousnesses, to have a co-present support — otherwise it would not count as a "transforming consciousness," contradicting the doctrine "the transforming consciousnesses number seven"; so the co-present support of the seventh is the active eighth consciousness. Just as the Yogācārabhūmi says, "because there is the store-consciousness there is the manas, and with the manas as support the mental consciousness turns" — this is saying the active store-consciousness is the support, not the seeds of the eighth (otherwise it would have said "because there is the store-consciousness the mental consciousness turns"); which shows the view that "the seeds are the support" contradicts the teaching and the reasoning. The conclusion of this view is: the first five consciousnesses each definitely have two co-present supports (the five matter-faculties and the simultaneous mental consciousness); the sixth consciousness constantly has one co-present support (the seventh consciousness), and when arising together with the five it additionally rests on the five; the seventh consciousness has only one co-present support (the eighth consciousness); and only the eighth consciousness is constantly without transformation, stands by its own power, and has no co-present support.

But a more penetrating correct view says: this still does not exhaust the principle. Since the eighth is of the same "consciousness-nature" as the other consciousnesses, on what grounds is it alone refused a co-present support? Since the seventh and eighth turn together constantly and serve as support for one another, what fault is there in that? Since you grant that "an active consciousness takes the seeds as its support," then "the seeds of consciousness" too should be granted to "rest on the active consciousness" — for the seeds need the "perfuming agent (the active seven transforming consciousnesses) and the maturation-consciousness (the active eighth)" as the support for their generation, growth, and abiding; apart from these the seeds could not be generated, could not grow, could not abide. Again, the maturation-consciousness in the realms with form is able to appropriate the body and "turns in dependence on the matter-faculties" (scripture says the ālaya is blown about by the wind of karma and turns constantly, pervasively in dependence on all the faculties; the Yogācārabhūmi says the six consciousnesses each rest separately and so cannot appropriate the body and faculties — which by contrast shows that the eighth, resting pervasively, can appropriate them); if the eighth did not rest pervasively on the faculties of the realms with form, then like the six consciousnesses it would be unable to appropriate. Therefore: if the store-consciousness is an active state, it definitely has one support (the seventh consciousness), and in the realms with form it additionally rests on the matter-faculties; if the store-consciousness is seeds, it definitely has one support (the active maturation-consciousness), and in the stage of initial perfuming it additionally rests on the perfuming agent.

The most ultimate correct view then distinguishes one crucial point — "support" and "mere reliance" are not the same thing. "Reliance" is the broad sense: every dharma subject to arising and ceasing, coming to be and abiding by depending on causes and conditions, calls whatever it leans upon "reliance" (like ruler and minister leaning upon one another — whatever is depended upon is called reliance). "Support" is the strict sense: only what is "fixed (constant), object-bearing (has an object), governing (acts as sovereign), and able to make the mind and mental factors grasp their own object" is called "support" — and that is the "inner six bases" (the six faculties); the rest, color-objects and so on, are not object-bearing, not fixed, not governing, but are like the "minister," not the "support"; only the six faculties are like the "ruler" and so are the support. This is why the teachings say only that mind and mental factors "have support" and do not say matter has support (matter has no object); and why they say only that "mind" is the support of "mental factors" and do not say "mental factors" are the support of "mind" (the mental factors do not govern). And wherever a text calls "reliance" by the name "support," or calls "support" by the name "reliance," these are all expedient provisional usages. By this strict sense the number of co-present supports is re-established: the five consciousnesses definitely have four co-present supports — the five matter-faculties (the same-object support), the sixth (the discriminating support), the seventh (the defiling-or-purifying support), and the eighth (the root support); lacking any one, the five consciousnesses do not turn. The teachings single out "resting on the five faculties" because the five faculties are "exclusive" (only the five consciousnesses rest on them) and are necessarily "of the same object, close and conforming" to the five consciousnesses (singling out the most immediate). The sixth mental consciousness has only two co-present supports — the seventh and the eighth; lacking either, it does not turn. Although the clear mental consciousness conjoined with the five also takes objects together with the five consciousnesses, the five consciousnesses are "not invariably present (not constantly co-present)," and so do not count as a support of the sixth; the teachings single out "resting on the seventh" because the seventh is its "defiling-or-purifying support," is likewise a transforming consciousness, and is close and conforming. The seventh, the manas, has only one co-present support — the eighth (if the store-consciousness were absent, the seventh would definitely not turn; as the verse says, "with the ālaya as support, therefore the manas turns; resting on mind and manas, the remaining transforming consciousnesses come to be"). The eighth, the ālaya, likewise has only one co-present support — the seventh (if the seventh were absent, the eighth would definitely not turn). The treatise says "the store-consciousness constantly turns together with the manas," and also "the store-consciousness constantly rests on the defiled (that is, the manas)"; and as for the saying "in three stages (the arhat, the cessation absorption, and the supramundane path) there is no manas," that is "said with respect to the obscuring (defiled) manas" (there is no obscuring manas, not that the seventh is wholly absent) — just as the saying "in four stages there is no ālaya" likewise does not mean the eighth is wholly absent (only that the name "ālaya," the grasped-store, is absent). Although the eighth also rests on the five faculties in the realms with form, the five faculties are "not invariably present (absent in the formless realm)," and so do not count as its strict-sense support; and the seeds of consciousness cannot actively grasp their own object (they have no reaching-out function), and so may have "reliance" but no "support." The support of the mental factors is stated according to the consciousness they accompany, with the addition in each case of "their own conjoined mind-king." Stated thus, the account fits the teaching and the reasoning.

(iii) The clearing-the-way support (the equal-immediately-antecedent support) — each of the eight consciousnesses takes its own kind as its clearing-the-way support

The third kind is the clearing-the-way support. One view: the first five consciousnesses neither continue from one moment to the next nor arise except as drawn forth by the sixth, and so take only the sixth as their clearing-the-way support; the sixth mental consciousness continues in its own kind and is also drawn forth by the five consciousnesses, and so takes the prior six consciousnesses as its clearing-the-way support; the seventh and eighth continue in their own kind and are not drawn forth by other consciousnesses, and so take only their own kind as the clearing-the-way support. The correct view refutes this: it does not reach the principle. The first five consciousnesses, in "the stage of non-mastery, when meeting a non-superior object," may be as he says (not continuous); but in "the stage of mastery (as in the buddhas)," where there is mastery over objects, the faculties are mutually employed, and decision arises spontaneously without seeking, how could the five consciousnesses not be continuous? Since the "outflowing five consciousnesses" are drawn forth by the force of the deciding mind, the defiling-or-purifying mind, and attention, and concentrate on their object without being able to let it go for a moment, why should they not be allowed to continue through many moments? So the Yogācārabhūmi says: after the deciding mind there is the defiling-or-purifying mind, and after that the outflowing eye-consciousness turns, wholesome or unwholesome... and right up until this "mind" moves to a different object, eye-consciousness and mental consciousness turn on continuously, wholesome or defiled — which shows that "when eye-consciousness is present the mental consciousness is not absent (the two are simultaneously continuous)," and not that "the two arise by alternating." And if upon meeting an overwhelming object that continuously presses upon body and mind it cannot be let go for a moment, the five consciousnesses must continue (as in the hot hells, or among the play-and-forgetting gods). Again, the Yogācārabhūmi says: "if these six consciousnesses are the equal-immediately-antecedent condition for those six consciousnesses, it is called the mind-faculty" — if the five consciousnesses had only the mental consciousness preceding them (as their equal-immediately-antecedent condition), the treatise ought to have said "this one consciousness is the condition for those six consciousnesses" or "these six consciousnesses are the condition for that one consciousness"; since it does not say this (but says six answering to six), the five consciousnesses too clearly continue in their own kind. Furthermore, when the five consciousnesses arise the mental consciousness must be present, and the mental consciousness can itself draw forth its own succeeding moment — so why borrow "the five consciousnesses" as the clearing-the-way support of the sixth? Again, when the mental consciousness re-arises after mindless sleep or fainting, since the store-consciousness and the manas are constantly continuous they too ought to serve it as a clearing-the-way support (yet in fact the mental consciousness still uses its "prior own kind," stepping across the interruption to link up); and since the mental consciousness is granted to link its own kind across an interruption, why should the five consciousnesses not be granted to link their own kind likewise? Again, the manas conjoined with the wisdom of equal-nature, when it first arises, must be drawn forth by the sixth; the eighth conjoined with the great-mirror wisdom, when it first arises, must be drawn forth by the sixth and seventh; and the maturation-mind in turn rests on the defiled manas or on a wholesome mind of compassion and vow — given this, one must grant that the eighth too takes the sixth and seventh as its clearing-the-way support (yet that one view holds that the seventh and eighth take only their own kind). So that one view does not reach the principle at all. Hence there is a second view: the five consciousnesses take whichever of the "prior six consciousnesses" they may use as the clearing-the-way support; the sixth takes "its prior own kind, or the seventh and eighth"; the seventh takes "its prior own kind, or the sixth"; and the eighth takes "its prior own kind, and the sixth and seventh."

The most ultimate correct view says the second view too is wrong. The "clearing-the-way support" must be something that is "object-bearing, governing, and able to act as the equal-immediately-antecedent condition," that for a later-arising mind and mental factor can "make way (the preceding moment yields its place) and lead onward (draw the succeeding one into being)," and so belongs only to the mind-king, not to the mental factors. Moreover, only where "this and that cannot arise together (preceding and succeeding yield to one another and do not coexist)" can it be said that this has clearing-the-way power for that; now since "the eight consciousnesses in a single body" are allowed to arise simultaneously, how can one take a "different kind (another consciousness)" as the clearing-the-way support? If a different kind were allowed as the clearing-the-way support, then this and that would have to not coexist — which would be the same as the Hīnayāna position that "at one time there is only one mind." Again, the consciousnesses in a single body arise together, their number indefinite; if a different kind were allowed to serve mutually as the equal-immediately-antecedent condition, then matter too ought to be able to serve as such — contradicting the teaching that "the equal-immediately-antecedent condition belongs only to mind and mental factors." As for the Mahāyāna-saṃgraha saying "matter too may have the equal-immediately-antecedent condition," that is a "concede-then-seize statement" (provisionally conceding the Hīnayāna view that "matter and mind have an equal-immediately-antecedent condition successively," in order to seize away its "causal condition" and so refute it), not a real concession; otherwise the word "equal" in "equal-immediately-antecedent" (which expresses preceding and succeeding being matched and equal, a single continuity) would be useless; and if "equal" did not exclude many-or-few but merely expressed sameness of kind, that would directly contradict your own clinging to "a different-kind consciousness as the equal-immediately-antecedent condition." Therefore each of the eight consciousnesses takes only its own kind as the clearing-the-way support — this alone deeply fits the teaching and the reasoning; one's own kind, preceding and succeeding, necessarily do not coexist, which exactly meets the requirement of the clearing-the-way support that it "not arise together." The clearing-the-way support of the mental factors is stated according to their mind-king: mind-king and mental factors, though of different kinds, arise together, yet they are mutually conjoined, harmonize as one, are fixed to arise and cease together, and their activity is necessarily identical; so when the mind-king clears the way, its conjoined mental factors clear the way at the same time, each in turn serving as the equal-immediately-antecedent condition for the other (because they harmonize as one); the eight consciousnesses are not like this (they do not harmonize as one), and so one cannot use the case of mind-king-and-mental-factors to argue the case of the eight consciousnesses. And the mental factors are not themselves the clearing-the-way support (in respect of a later dharma they have no "governing" function). Someone objects: if the equal-immediately-antecedent condition is in each case only one's own kind, then at the moment of "the initial transformation of the basis" of the seventh and eighth, the conjoined wholesome mental factors such as "trust" (which had no own-kind predecessor in the prior stage) would lack their equal-immediately-antecedent condition, contradicting the doctrine that "all minds and mental factors arise from four conditions." The answer: just as when the mental consciousness re-arises after mindless sleep or fainting its clearing-the-way support is still its "prior own kind (the just-ceased mental consciousness)," and the interrupted five consciousnesses are the same (linking their prior own kind across the interruption) — because in between there is "no own-kind mind intervening," it is still called "immediate," and the prior own-kind mind, in ceasing earlier, has already cleared the way for the present consciousness, so why trouble a different kind? (At the transformation of the basis, the equal-immediately-antecedent condition of "trust" and the rest is precisely the prior own-kind wholesome dharma-seeds rising into the active state — the own kind still links up.) As for the teachings saying "the six consciousnesses draw one another forth" and "the seventh and eighth come to be in dependence on the sixth and seventh," those are all said "with respect to the superior dominant condition," not the equal-immediately-antecedent condition (the dominant condition allows different kinds; the equal-immediately-antecedent condition is only own kind), and so there is no contradiction; and the Yogācārabhūmi's "the six consciousnesses are the equal-immediately-antecedent condition for the six consciousnesses, called the mind-faculty" is "general in word but particular in intent" (the text speaks generally of six answering six, but the intent takes each its own kind). So "own kind as the clearing-the-way support" deeply fits the teaching and the reasoning. With this the excursus is finished, and we return to the main text on the manas.

3. Return to the main argument — why "it turns in dependence on that" displays only the first two supports

Although the manas is fully equipped with all three supports, the verse "it turns in dependence on that" displays only the "first two supports (the causal support and the co-present support)," for three reasons: first, to show that the manas's support and its object are the same (both are the eighth — it rests on it and also takes it as object); second, the first two supports are "more conspicuous in function"; and third, the "clearing-the-way support" is in any case easy to understand (own kind being obvious, it need not be specially displayed).

C. The object — explaining "it takes that as object"

The object of the manas is the verse-phrase "it takes that as object." "That" refers to the consciousness it rests upon (the eighth, the store-consciousness); the teachings say the manas takes the store-consciousness as object and grasps it as "I." Here there are several views. One view: the manas takes the substance of the eighth together with its "conjoined dharmas (the contact and the other mental factors conjoined with the eighth)" and grasps them, in order, as "I" and "what is mine" (the mental factors are inseparable from the consciousness, so saying it takes the conjoined dharmas as object is like the term "consciousness-only" and does not contradict the teaching). Another view: the teachings nowhere say that the manas "takes contact and the rest as object," so one should say the manas takes only the seeing-portion and image-portion of the eighth and grasps them, in order, as "I" and "what is mine" (both seeing-portion and image-portion have consciousness as their substance, so this does not contradict the teaching). Another view: if it took the image-portion of the eighth (which includes the five matter-faculties, the container world, and other outer objects) there would be faults — taking an outer object it would be like the five consciousnesses, would be like the sixth taking a shared object, and one born in the formless realm would not grasp "what is mine" (the formless realm having no matter-image-portion); so one should say the manas takes only the "store-consciousness (its seeing-portion)" and its "seeds," grasping them, in order, as "I" and "what is mine" (the seeds being the capacity of the eighth, not a real thing, so this does not contradict the teaching).

The most ultimate correct view refutes all three of the foregoing. The seeds are not part of the consciousness-aggregate (taking the seeds as "what is mine" incurs the same fault as before), and moreover the treatise says the seeds are "really existent" (one cannot say "the seeds are mere capacity, not a real thing," for if the seeds were said to be provisional, a provisional dharma would amount to nothing and could not act as a causal condition — yet the seeds are a causal condition). And, more fundamentally: the "view of the self in the perishing aggregates (the self-view)" with which the manas is conjoined is spontaneous, of a single flavor, and constantly continuous — how could it admit of "separately grasping 'I' and 'what is mine'" as two? A single mind cannot take two objects such as "permanence" and "annihilation" and grasp both discriminatingly; nor can one say that the self-grasping and the mine-grasping arise successively — for the manas has from beginningless time turned of "a single flavor (constantly one)," with no separate prior-and-later grasping. So one should know: the manas takes only the seeing-portion of the store-consciousness as object and nothing else (not the substance of the consciousness, not the conjoined dharmas, not the image-portion, not the seeds) — because that seeing-portion, from beginningless time, "continues as one kind," seems "permanent" and seems "single," and constantly serves as the support of all dharmas, and so is the most fit to be grasped as "the inner self." It grasps only that seeing-portion as "the inner self"; where the treatise additionally mentions "what is mine," that is said by "following the momentum of the language," or it means "grasping it as 'my self'" (grasping it doubly as self), so that within the meaning of a "single self-view" the two words "I" and "what is mine" are spoken. The teachings in many places say only that the manas "has the self-view," and that the self-grasping and the mine-grasping do not arise together. The manas, "before the transformation of the basis," takes only the store-consciousness as object; "after the transformation of the basis (when it becomes the wisdom of equal-nature)" it also takes thusness and the remaining dharmas as object — because the wisdom of equal-nature realizes the "ten kinds of equal-nature," is able to know the differences in the aspirations of sentient beings, and manifests the various reflected images of the buddhas (its object turning broader). This passage of the treatise speaks just with respect to "before the transformation of the basis," and so says only "it takes that, the store-consciousness, as object"; deluded, its object is narrow, awakened, its object is broad — and so it ought to be. Someone asks: since the manas takes the eighth as its support, how can it also take the eighth as its object (taking its own support as object)? The answer: just as "a succeeding moment of consciousness" takes "the preceding mind (which is also its equal-immediately-antecedent support)" as object, and this is universally admitted, what fault is there in the manas taking its own support as object?

D. Essential nature and mode of activity — explaining "deliberating is its nature and its activity"

The verse-line "deliberating is its nature and its activity" displays at once the self-nature and the mode of activity of the manas: the manas has "deliberating" as its self-nature, and likewise uses this deliberating as its mode of activity (both nature and activity are deliberating). By this it also incidentally explains its alternative name — "the one that examines and deliberates" is what manas means. In "the stage before the transformation of the basis," it constantly and examiningly deliberates upon "the self-characteristic it grasps" (grasping a self); in "the stage after the transformation of the basis," it also examiningly deliberates upon "the characteristic of no-self" (realizing no-self) — which shows that the nature-and-activity of deliberating belongs to both delusion and awakening, only the object deliberated differs as "self" or "no-self."

E. The conjoined mental factors — the four root afflictions that never leave it for an instant

How many mental factors are conjoined with the manas? First, it is constantly co-present with "four kinds of affliction" ("co-present" meaning "conjoined"). From beginningless time until before the transformation of the basis, the manas spontaneously and constantly takes the store-consciousness as object and is conjoined with the "four root afflictions." Which four? "Self-delusion, self-view, self-conceit, and self-love." Self-delusion is "ignorance" — bewildered about the "self-characteristic," dark to "the principle of no-self." Self-view is "self-grasping" — falsely reckoning as a self the five aggregates that are fundamentally not a self. Self-conceit is "haughtiness" — leaning on the grasped self, it makes the mind exalt itself (raising itself and looking down on others). Self-love is "self-greed" — toward the grasped self it gives rise to deep attachment. The word "and" in the verse ("and self-conceit, self-love") expresses that the three — view, conceit, and love — can arise together, and is used to set aside the position of another school that "these three cannot be conjoined." These four constantly manifest and roil the inner mind, making the outer seven transforming consciousnesses constantly defiled; through this sentient beings revolve in birth-and-death and cannot get free — and so they are called "afflictions."

Someone asks: there are ten root afflictions; why does the manas have only four? The answer: since the manas already has "the self-view (the view of the self in the perishing aggregates)," the other four views (the extreme view, wrong view, view-grasping, and the grasping of rules and observances) do not arise — for "within a single mind there are not two discernments (a view being a defiled discernment)"; having the self-view, the other views do not arise. Someone asks again: why must the manas have "the self-view" (rather than some other view)? The answer: first, view-grasping, the grasping of rules and observances, and wrong view are all "discriminated (arisen through later conditioning), severed only on the path of seeing," whereas the afflictions conjoined with the manas are exclusively "innate (spontaneous from birth), severed on the path of cultivation," and so those views have no place in the manas. Second, "the view of what is mine, and the extreme view," both arise in dependence on "the self-view," whereas the view conjoined with the manas "does not arise in dependence on them" (the manas only grasps inwardly, does not take outer objects, does not grasp annihilation or permanence). Third, the manas constantly grasps inwardly at "there being a self," and so must have "the self-view." Further: because the self-view examines and decides (there is no hesitation), "doubt" cannot arise; and because of attachment to the self (self-love), "hatred" cannot be produced — and so the root afflictions conjoined with the manas are only these four. Someone asks again: how can the three — self-view, self-conceit, and self-love — arise together? The answer: their modes of activity do not conflict; what fault is there in their arising together? Someone asks again: the Yogācārabhūmi says "greed makes the mind sink, conceit makes the mind exalt itself" — does this not conflict (how can self-love and self-conceit arise together)? The answer: the "greed-sinking, conceit-exalting" conflict the Yogācārabhūmi speaks of is said with respect to the "discriminated, outer-object-taking, having-something-it-looks-down-on-and-leans-on, coarse" greed and conceit; whereas the self-conceit and self-love of the manas are "innate, inner-object-taking (inwardly taking the store-consciousness as object), leaning on one and the same self, subtle" — coarse and subtle being on different levels, so the two passages do not conflict in their doctrine.

Onward Transmission

What this section establishes — that the manas constantly and examiningly grasps a self, ever conjoined with the four afflictions — is the keystone on which the whole consciousness-only system founds its account of "the root of defilement," and the later treatises take it up one by one. The Hundred Dharmas treatise lists the manas as the seventh of the eight consciousness-dharmas, and places self-delusion, self-view, self-conceit, and self-love under the root afflictions of delusion, view, conceit, and greed. The Thirty Verses — verse five (the nature and characteristics of the manas) and the first half of verse six (the four afflictions) — is the very root-text this section expounds, verse answering to verse. The Madhyānta-vibhāga, in its chapter on the obstructions, takes "self-grasping" as the root of the afflictive obstruction, which is just this section's manas grasping a self. The Mahāyāna-saṃgraha establishes the name "defiled mentation" (kliṣṭa-manas) — precisely the manas serving as the "defiling support" that keeps the first six consciousnesses perpetually defiled. As for the Twenty Verses, its concern is to establish consciousness-only and refute the outsiders' real external objects, and it has no direct counterpart to the essential characteristics of the manas; here it is left aside.