成唯識論 所緣行相·四分

What does the ālaya cognize? Two things, the treatise answers. One is what it appropriates — your body, and every seed lodged in the depths of the mind; it holds them without a moment's pause, and the only reason your body is a living body rather than a corpse is that it is still holding on. The other is the world — the receptacle you stand in, its mountains and rivers.

And how does it cognize? By discerning. Simply discerning — passing no judgement, raising no like or dislike, merely registering.

The weight of the verse falls on the word set at its head: imperceptible. Not that the thing is absent, but that it is too fine — too fine in what it takes, too fine in the taking, so fine that an ordinary mind looking for it will not find it. The Saṃdhinirmocana is blunter still: this consciousness is deep and subtle, and the Buddha does not expound it to the childish, for fear they will hear of it and take it for a self.

It is on this gate, too, that the treatise raises the four parts: the moment a consciousness arises it puts out of itself the side that is known and the side that knows, and a third that knows itself knowing — cognition, from end to end, never once stepping outside consciousness.

The doctrine of the four parts is established at length here and deserves a further word. The treatise names the positions: Sthiramati one part (self-witnessing); Nanda two (seeing and image); Dignāga three (adding self-witnessing); Dharmapāla four (adding the witnessing of self-witnessing).

Why a fourth? The reason given is plain: the self-witnessing part witnesses the seeing part — then who witnesses the self-witnessing? Without a fourth, self-witnessing has no witness; posit a fifth and the regress has no end. So four and no more — the third and fourth witness each other, and nothing further need be posited.

The structure looks laboured, and answers a very ordinary question: how do you know that you just saw? Not by looking again with the eyes, but by the mind's knowing itself. The four parts are that matter set out plainly.

〔Verses commented〕Verse 3, first half

〔Verses expounded〕

(v3) Unknowable [are its] appropriation, location, and discerning; it is ever concurrent with contact, attention, feeling, conception, and volition — and only with equanimity-feeling. (v4) It is unobstructed-indeterminate, and contact and the rest are likewise so. Constant-yet-turning like a torrent, at the arhat stage it is relinquished.

A. The gate of object-support and mode of activity

This passage answers two questions: what exactly are the ālaya-consciousness's "mode of activity" (how it works, the way it cognizes) and its "object-support" (the object it takes hold of)? The answer lies in that one line of the verse, "unknowable appropriation, location, and discerning." Take it one word at a time. "Discerning" just means "discernment" (sorting out and taking hold) — and this is its "mode of activity," for this consciousness takes precisely "discernment" as the way it works. "Location" just means "place," that is, the "receptacle-world" (the material world outside our bodies, the mountains, rivers, and the great earth), which is the place where all sentient beings settle their lives and rely. "Appropriation" falls into two classes: one is "seeds," the other is "the body-with-faculties" (this body equipped with the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body faculties). By "seeds" is meant the three classes of habit-energy — "appearance, name, discrimination" (the seeds perfumed in and stored up); by "the body-with-faculties" is meant the "material faculties" (the pure-form of the five faculties, the very portion that can actually give rise to seeing, hearing, and the rest) and the "locus on which the faculties rest" (the supporting-faculty dust, the lump of flesh that holds up the faculties). Both of these are what this consciousness "appropriates" — the consciousness takes them in as a part of itself, sharing safety-and-peril with them (the body safe, the consciousness too is safe; the body hurt, the consciousness too is pained). So both "appropriation" and "location" are objects this consciousness has as object-support. Now as to how it comes about: by force of cause and condition, in the very moment of its own arising, the ālaya-consciousness transforms inwardly into "seeds" and "the body-with-faculties," and transforms outwardly into "the receptacle-world"; then it takes these things it has itself transformed as the objects it has as object-support, and that "discerning" function of its can arise only in reliance on these objects (the consciousness transforms into objects, then takes as object the very objects it transformed).

The "discerning" here spoken of means that the "maturation-consciousness" (the name set up for the ālaya-consciousness from its side of requiting the fruit of karma) has, with respect to the object it has as object-support, a "discerning" function; and this discerning function is gathered under the "perceiving-part" (the side of the consciousness that does the cognizing). One should know: whenever a contaminated consciousness arises, it puts forth two seemings — one "resembling the object had as object-support," one "resembling the cognizing function"; and the mental factors that arise along with it are likewise so, putting forth these same two seemings. Of these, the side "resembling the object had as object-support" is called the "appearance-part" (the image taken hold of); the side "resembling the cognizing function" is called the "perceiving-part" (the function that takes hold).

This passage uses reductio to show that mind and mental factors must have both the appearance-part and the perceiving-part. First suppose it had no "appearance-part" (that image had as object-support): then it should not be able to take hold of its own object; failing that, an absurd conclusion follows — any one consciousness should be able to take hold of all objects whatever. Why? Because they would all alike lack an appearance-part and be all of one sort, "one's own object being no different from another's, and another's object no different from one's own" — there would be no telling which object should be cognized by which consciousness, and everything would fall into confusion. Conversely, suppose it had no "perceiving-part" (that cognizing function): then it should be utterly unable to cognize anything, no more aware than empty space; failing that, even empty space and such lifeless things should be able to cognize objects — which is of course absurd. Pressed from both ends, it is clear that mind and mental factors must possess both these sides, "appearance-part and perceiving-part," at once, neither being dispensable.

This is just as a scripture (the Ghanavyūha-sūtra) says: all there is is the consciousness that does the perceiving ("perceiving" being the perceiving consciousness); the outer objects perceived are, in fact, simply not there; in truth it is only the perceiving side and the perceived side within the consciousness, each turning of its own accord.

First, look at one faction who maintain that "apart from consciousness there is a real outer object" (this is the road of the Hīnayāna who hold real objects). They line it up thus: the outer object alone counts as the object had as object-support; they call the "appearance-part" the "mode of activity," and call the "perceiving-part" the "substance" (that is, the own-substance side of mind and mental factors). On their view: the mind-king and the mental factors rely on the same "basis" (that is, the faculty) and have as object-support the same "object" (that is, the object); their "mode of activity" (which, for them, refers to the appearance-part) resemble one another; while their "substance" (the own-substance), though the mind-king and mental factors are equal in number, each has its own different mark — for the dharmas of consciousness, feeling, conception, and the rest each have, by nature, their own several marks.

Next, look at the road that penetrates "there is no object at all apart from consciousness" (this is the orthodox sense of consciousness-only). They line it up thus: the "appearance-part" alone is the object had as object-support, the "perceiving-part" is called the "mode of activity," and the substance on which both appearance-part and perceiving-part rely is called the "substance," that is, the "self-witnessing-part" (the part by which the consciousness witnesses itself). Why must there be this self-witnessing-part? Because, were it lacking, a person should be unable to recall his own past mind and mental factors — the principle is like this: an event one has never undergone at all, one cannot afterward recall; in the same way, were that earlier discernment never witnessed by the self-witnessing-part, one could not afterward recall it (there must first have been a self-witnessing-part witnessing it in the present, for it to be recalled later). On the view of the consciousness-only masters: the mind-king and the mental factors rely on the same "basis-faculty," the "object had as object-support" (the appearance-part) resemble one another, yet their "mode of activity" (here meaning the perceiving-part) each differs — for the functions of discerning, receiving, and the rest are by nature each its own; while the "substance" (the self-witnessing-part), though equal in number, each has its own different mark — for the own-substances of the dharmas of consciousness, feeling, and the rest are by nature distinct.

A step further: when mind and mental factors arise, each and every one, then, examined closely by reason, each has "three parts," that is, the appearance-part, the perceiving-part, and the self-witnessing-part. Why say there are three parts? For two reasons: first, in any single act of cognition there is, by nature, the distinction of "the measured, the measurer, and the result of measuring" (the measured is the object that gets measured, the measurer is the function that does the measuring, the result of measuring is the result that the measuring yields); second, the two sides, appearance-part and perceiving-part, must have a substance to underlie them (that is, the self-witnessing-part) before they can stand. This is just as Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya says in a verse: that "image resembling the object" (the appearance-part) is the "measured," that "function that grasps" (the perceiving-part) and the "self-witnessing-part" are the "measurer" and the "result"; and these three are, in fact, one and the same substance of the consciousness, having no several separate substances.

Going on to a still finer division, one can mark off a fourth part: were mind and mental factors divided more finely still, there should be "four parts" — the first three the same as above, and a fourth "witnessing-of-self-witnessing-part" set up besides (the part that witnesses the self-witnessing-part). Why must there be a fourth? Take it in several points. First, were it lacking, then "who witnesses the third part (the self-witnessing-part)?" — one surely cannot say no one does; for since these several parts of the mind all belong to the class "the cognizing," by rights they should all have an object they witness. Second, were there no fourth part, the self-witnessing-part would be left with no "result of measuring" (the result it measures would have nowhere to land); but whatever is a "measurer" must always have a "result of measuring." Could one then say "the perceiving-part is the self-witnessing-part's result of measuring"? — no; for the perceiving-part is at times "non-veridical" (like a mistaken or astray cognition, the erroneous sort), and relying on it to witness the self-witnessing-part would be unreliable. From these two points it is clear: the perceiving-part cannot witness the third part (the self-witnessing-part), and so a fourth part must be set up besides to witness it — for whatever can witness one's own substance must be "veridical perception" (cognition that is direct, immediate, and never mistaken).

How these four parts divide into inner and outer, and how they take one another as object-support, is here laid out point by point. First, inner and outer: the first two parts (appearance-part, perceiving-part) count as "outer" (the coarser, the outward-facing), the latter two parts (self-witnessing-part, witnessing-of-self-witnessing-part) count as "inner" (the inward-facing witnessing). Next, what each part can take as object-support: the first part (appearance-part) is only "an object that gets had as object-support," not itself taking hold of anything else; the latter three parts have both sides, "being had as object-support" and "the cognizing." Look closely — the second part (perceiving-part) only takes the first part (appearance-part) as object-support, and this taking is at times veridical (veridical perception) and at times non-veridical (non-veridical), at times direct seeing here-and-now (perception) and at times knowing by inference (inference); the third part (self-witnessing-part) can take the second part (perceiving-part) as object-support, and likewise takes the fourth part as object-support; the fourth part (witnessing-of-self-witnessing-part) only takes the third part (self-witnessing-part) as object-support, and no longer takes the second part (perceiving-part) as object-support — for taking the perceiving-part as object-support is a task it does not need (the self-witnessing-part's taking the perceiving-part as object-support is enough). And both the third and fourth parts belong to "veridical perception" (direct seeing here-and-now, never mistaken). In this way, mind and mental factors are composed of these four parts, possessing both "being had as object-support" and "the cognizing" (the self-witnessing-part and the witnessing-of-self-witnessing-part taking one another as object-support, witnessing one another, witnessing and witnessing without break), yet not falling into the fault of "cognizing without end" (once the third and fourth parts witness one another, it stops, with no need to add a fifth part); these four parts are, with one another, not identical (neither-identical) and yet not apart (neither-apart). The principle of consciousness-only stands firm just so.

So a scripture (the Ghanavyūha-sūtra) says in a verse: sentient beings' mind has these two sides, "grasper and grasped"; all the parts, whether inner or outer, are bound up by "grasped and grasper," and what is thereby "seen" comes out in manifold differences.

The verse means: sentient beings' mind-nature is composed of these two parts, "grasper and grasped"; whether inner (the latter two parts) or outer (the first two parts), all are bound by the grasped and the grasper; and what is thereby "seen" comes out every which way — at times veridical, at times non-veridical, at times direct seeing here-and-now, at times knowing by inference, with many differences. Note: this word "seen" in the verse refers precisely to the "perceiving-part."

These four parts, depending on how you gather them, can be gathered into fewer still. Gathered into "three parts" — by drawing the fourth (witnessing-of-self-witnessing-part) into the self-witnessing-part; gathered into "two parts" — since the latter three parts all are of the cognizing sort, simply gathering them all into the "perceiving-part," in which case the word "perceiving" takes the sense "the cognizing"; gathered into "one part" — since the four parts are, by nature, one and the same substance of the consciousness, having no several separate substances. This is just as the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra says in a verse: it is because of that grasping within one's own mind that the mind manifests as though there were an outer object turning out there; in truth, the outer object it sees is simply not there, and so it is said that "all is mind-only."

Scriptures everywhere say "the one mind alone," and these words "the one mind" in fact gather in the mental factors too (the mind-king as the head, the mental factors following the mind-king; naming the head brings the factors along). Gathering up this whole long stretch above, the conclusion is: the consciousness's "mode of activity" just is "discernment," and "discernment" just is the consciousness's "perceiving-part."

1. Location — the receptacle-world

That word "location" in the verse speaks of the receptacle-world. It means: by the force of the maturing of "common-mark seeds" (the seeds left by the karma all beings have done in common, the kind they sense in common), the maturation-consciousness (the ālaya-consciousness) transforms into the appearance of a "receptacle-world" that seems to have form-dharmas — that is, the outer "great elements" (earth, water, fire, wind, the four great elements) and the form they produce. Here is a key point: each sentient being's transformed receptacle-world is in fact transformed separately, each its own, not one another's; yet what is transformed resemble one another in appearance, and the place they occupy is no different — much as many lamps, the light of each in fact shining its own and pervading the whole room, yet looking as though it had fused into one sheet of brightness (each pervading its own, yet looking as though combined into one).

Whose maturation-consciousness, then, is it that transforms into this appearance of the receptacle-world? On this question there are three positions below.

〔One view: every sentient being transforms it〕 The first position says: it is the maturation-consciousness of every sentient being that transforms into this receptacle-world. On what ground? Because a scripture says: the receptacle-world is jointly arisen by all sentient beings through the "force of dominant karma" (the force of past karma upholding it from behind).

〔Another view: those now dwelling here and those to be born here transform it〕 The second position comes forward to refute: were one to say, as above, that "every sentient being transforms it," it would force two untenable conclusions. One, the buddhas and bodhisattvas too should really transform into this filthy, foul land (which is plainly wrong); two, ordinary beings too should really transform into the worlds of other quarters, and into the pure, marvelous buddha-lands within our own realm (which is wrong too). Besides, those noble ones who, weary of and detached from the body-with-form, are born into the formless realm, never again come down to be born in this realm — that being so, if you still say they too transform into this land, of what use is the transforming? So one should put it this way instead: only those "now dwelling in this realm" and those "to be born hereafter into this realm" — their maturation-consciousness transforms into this realm. As for the word "all" that scripture speaks, it is said "with respect to a portion" (not really counting in every single sentient being) — meaning that those whose karma is the same all jointly transform this receptacle-world.

〔The orthodox view: whatever the body can hold and use, it transforms〕 The third position (this is the orthodox sense) says: the second position's "only those now dwelling and to be born here transform it" is also not thorough. First catch one gap in it: when the receptacle-world is "about to be destroyed," there is in this realm neither anyone now dwelling nor anyone about to come and be born — whose maturation-consciousness, then, transforms into this realm at that time? (In the eon of destruction there are plainly no sentient beings, yet the receptacle-world is still there — which shows the second position does not cover the whole.) Then press a line by the second position's own words: on its account, when an ordinary being, weary of and detached from the body-with-form, is born into the formless realm and has already manifested a formless body, he yet beforehand transforms into this land — of what use is that? Grant, a step back, that a being of the formless realm did have a form-body: this form-body and the receptacle-world of "another realm" (not the realm it is in) are, one fine and one coarse, too far apart, simply unable to rely on and uphold one another; to take this body and transform that receptacle, what good is it? Once these several layers are thought through, the orthodox sense comes out: the land transformed is, in the first place, for the form-body to "rely on" and to "make use of"; so the criterion is simple — wherever a land has the use of being relied on and made use of by some body, that body's consciousness transforms into it. By this criterion, even a being born into another quarter, or born in its own locale, its consciousness can all the same transform into this realm's land; and just for this reason, the receptacle-world, when it is "about to be destroyed" and when it "first comes to be," though no sentient being dwells within it, is still ready and there (for there is always the sort of consciousness that "still has the use of it" transforming it). What has been spoken of above is "common use" (the receptacle-world of common karma, commonly transformed); as for "separate use" (the object each senses by its own separate karma), understand it by the same principle — for ghost, human, and god see the same one thing each differently (the same pool of water a ghost sees as a river of pus and blood, a god as a ground of lapis lazuli).

2. Appropriation — seeds and the body-with-faculties

The first item of "appropriation" is "seeds." The seeds spoken of here mean all the seeds of "contaminated dharmas" (those dharmas still bound with affliction, not yet out of birth-and-death) that the maturation-consciousness holds; these seeds are of the same nature as this consciousness (both contaminated-indeterminate), and so they are an object this consciousness can have as object-support. But the seeds of "uncontaminated dharmas" (those pure dharmas that get out of birth-and-death) are otherwise: though they too cling to this consciousness, their nature differs from this consciousness's (they are uncontaminated, not indeterminate), and so they are not an object this consciousness can have as object-support. That said, though the uncontaminated seeds cannot be had as object-support, they too are inseparable from this consciousness, ever clinging to it — much like the substance-nature of "suchness," which, though not an object the consciousness has as object-support, is yet inseparable from consciousness; to say this in no way contradicts the principle of "consciousness-only."

The second item of "appropriation" is "the body-with-faculties." This means: by the force of the maturing of "uncommon-mark seeds" (the seeds drawn by each one's separate karma, given over to its own use alone), the maturation-consciousness transforms into the seeming of "material faculties" (the pure-form of the five faculties) and "the locus on which the faculties rest" (the lump of flesh that holds up the faculties) — that is, the great elements within the body and the form they produce. Besides this, by the force of the maturing of "common-mark seeds," it transforms even the locus of "another's body" into the seeming of another's body. Why transform another's body too? Because, were it not so, there would be no accounting for "being able to make use of others" (we plainly see others' bodies and can rely on and use one another).

〔One view: it also transforms into the seeming of another's faculties〕 Here a divergence arises again: when the ālaya-consciousness transforms another's body, does it or does it not also transform another's "pure-form faculties"? The first position says: it also transforms into the seeming of the "faculties" (pure-form faculties) on another's body. His ground is: the Madhyāntavibhāga says "the consciousness transforms so as to seem to have the five faculties of self-body and other-body."

〔Another view: it transforms only into the seeming of the locus〕 The second position disagrees, saying: when the ālaya-consciousness transforms another's body, it can transform only into the seeming of the "locus on which the faculties rest" (the supporting-faculty dust, that is, the lump of flesh), and cannot transform another's pure-form faculties — for another's pure-form faculties are simply of no use to oneself, and there is no reason one should transform them. Then how to read the Madhyāntavibhāga's line "transforms so as to seem to have the five faculties of self-body and other-body"? The second position says: that speaks of "one's own consciousness and another's consciousness each transforming the faculties on its own body" (not that my consciousness transforms another's faculties). Putting it this way also conveniently accounts for one phenomenon: when a person has been born elsewhere, or has entered nirvāṇa, why his left-behind corpse still lies there and does not at once vanish — for that body of flesh (the locus) was, in the first place, jointly transformed by everyone's common-mark seeds, and though the rightful owner's pure-form faculties have already been relinquished, this lump of locus all the same remains.

3. Concentration-fruit form · brief summary of the objects transformed

What has been spoken of above is said with respect to the outer receptacle and inner body transformed by "karma-force," and the distinctions of which realm (the three realms) and which locale (the nine locales) they belong to. But change to the receptacle, body, realm, locale, self, and other transformed by "concentration-force and the like" (the excellent powers of meditative concentration and such), and then it is not so fixed (one with the power of concentration can, by concentration-force, transform into the objects of another locale). One more point: the body and receptacle transformed are for the most part constant and continuous, while sounds, lights, and the like transformed are for the most part of a passing moment — for they arise as the present condition, at a single spur, sets them off (and once the condition passes, they are gone).

To round off briefly the objects this consciousness transforms, there are in all just these few: first, "contaminated seeds"; second, "the ten form-bearing bases" (that is, the ten form-dharmas, the five faculties plus the five objects); third, "the real form manifested at the dharma-base that falls [under it]" (this is, within that kind of form gathered under the dharma-base, the form that really and truly is there — for instance, the "concentration-fruit form" transformed by meditative concentration).

〔Q〕Here, then, someone is bound to ask: why can this maturation-consciousness not transform into objects that "seem to have mind and mental factors" to have as object-support (since it can transform form, why does it not transform mind)? 〔A〕To answer this, one must first tell apart: the transforming of a contaminated consciousness is, broadly, of two kinds. The first is "transforming by the force of cause and condition" — that is, transforming of itself, naturally, following the seeds; what is so transformed must have a real use. The second is "transforming by the force of discrimination" — that is, the sixth consciousness thinking and reckoning, forcibly throwing something together; this is but an image, a mere object given you to look at. The former always has a real use, the latter can only serve as an object. And the maturation-consciousness's transforming belongs precisely to the former, the "by-cause-and-condition" transforming; so the form and the rest it transforms must have a real use (able to appropriate, able to be made use of). But were it to transform into mind and mental factors, there would be no real use — for then the mind and mental factors are taken as the "appearance-part" (an image had as object-support), and the appearance-part can only be had as object-support, and cannot turn back and have an object as object-support; while that real function of "having an object as object-support" must be born separately from the seeds of the present-active mind and mental factors themselves, and is not something the appearance-part transformed by the maturation-consciousness can take on. Likewise, transforming into the unconditioned dharmas and such has no real use either. So the conclusion is: the maturation-consciousness does not take mind and mental factors and the like as object-support.

That said, the above holds only for the "contaminated stage." When one comes to the "uncontaminated stage" (the stage where this consciousness is transformed into the great-perfect-mirror wisdom), things are otherwise: then this consciousness is concurrent with the most excellent wisdom, and though it raises no discrimination, its substance-nature is clear and pure, so that even if the mind and mental factors transformed have no real use, it can all the same manifest the images of those mind and mental factors. Were it not so, would the buddhas not then fail to be "all-knowing" (knowing all without exception)? Having made this boundary clear, turn back and round off the contaminated stage: in the "contaminated stage" this maturation-consciousness has as object-support only three things — "the receptacle-world, the body-with-faculties, and the contaminated seeds." In the desire-realm and the form-realm, all three of these objects-of-object-support are complete; in the formless realm, it has as object-support only "the contaminated seeds" — for the beings of the formless realm, weary of and detached from form-dharmas, have no "karma-fruit form" (the form-body drawn by karma); yet it still has "concentration-fruit form" (the form transformed by meditative concentration), and this is in no way contrary to principle, the formless-realm consciousness likewise having this concentration-fruit form as its object.

4. The unknowable

What does that "unknowable" in the verse mean? Here it is told in two halves. One half is that its "mode of activity" (that is, the discerning function of the perceiving-part) is too subtle, hard to detect; the other half is that the object it has as object-support is also hard to detect — inwardly, that inner "appropriated" object (seeds, the body-with-faculties) is likewise so subtle as to be hard to know; outwardly, that outer "receptacle-world" is again so boundlessly vast that its measure cannot be taken. Mode of activity and object-support alike, both so hidden and hard to detect — and so it is named "unknowable."

〔Q〕Someone finds it incredible: how can there be such a consciousness — one that plainly takes hold of the object it has as object-support, yet whose working is so subtle as to be undetectable? 〔A〕A comparison makes it clear: in the "cessation-attainment" (that deep concentration in which the first six consciousnesses are all stilled), there is a "consciousness that does not leave the body" (that is, the ālaya-consciousness); though you cannot detect it, you should believe it is there; and one must grant that "in the cessation-attainment there is still a consciousness" — for the one entered into the concentration is, after all, a "sentient being" (a living person), and whatever is a sentient being must have a consciousness holding body and life, just as in his ordinary times of having mind (were even this consciousness gone, the body would perish). The cases of the "no-conception concentration" and the "no-conception heaven" and the like should all be understood likewise (within them too there is the subtle, hard-to-know ālaya carrying on).

〔Verses commented〕Verse 3, first half

The previous chapter established the three aspects of the ālaya and set out the seeds. This chapter follows the verse and takes first its two root matters: what it cognizes (its object) and how it cognizes (its mode) — and out of that very distinction raises the doctrine of the four parts. The gates of concomitant factors, feeling, nature, ever-flowing and relinquishment form the next chapter.

The sense of this chapter — object, mode, and the four parts — has its ground in scripture and treatise. The Saṃdhinirmocana, in its chapter on mind, thought and consciousness, gives this consciousness its other name together with its appropriating sense: "this consciousness is also called the ādāna consciousness — why? because it pursues and appropriates the body"; ādāna states exactly the appropriation that is one half of this chapter's object. It further says: "the ādāna consciousness is deep and subtle, all its seeds like a torrent; I do not expound it to the childish, lest they discriminate and take it for a self" — which is the ground for the verse's opening word, "imperceptible." The treatise ground is the Yogācārabhūmi: "the ālaya consciousness turns by way of two objects: by discerning the inner appropriated, and by discerning the outer undifferentiated receptacle-aspect" — the warrant for "appropriation" and "world" in the verse; and "the ālaya consciousness takes its object so subtly that even the worldly-wise find it hard to make out" — the warrant for "imperceptible." What follows unfolds the verse. The many gates argued out at length in this section have their roots in scripture and treatise alike. The Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, in its chapter on the characteristics of mind, mentation, and consciousness, says this consciousness is "also named the appropriating consciousness (ādāna-vijñāna)" — "ādāna" meaning "that which follows along the body and appropriates," holding the seeds and the various material faculties so that they do not decay; and that it is "also named the storehouse consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna)," because it "takes in, conceals, and shares one fate with the body" — and this is the scriptural source for this section's phrase "the appropriation... taken in as its own substance, sharing one fate with it." The same sūtra further admonishes, in verse, that the foolish should not falsely grasp this profound, hard-to-know appropriating consciousness as a "self": "the appropriating consciousness is profound and subtle, all its seeds like a torrent; I have not expounded it to the foolish, for fear they would discriminate and grasp it as a self" — and this section's account of the "unknowable" and of "ever-flowing as a torrent" is rooted here. The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra gives the image "the store-consciousness ocean abides constantly, stirred by the wind of objects, and the various consciousness-waves leap up and turn into being," showing that the eighth consciousness is the root on which all the transforming consciousnesses depend. The Mahāyāna-abhidharma Sūtra (which has no transmitted witness in the Chinese tradition, its text surviving only within this treatise) establishes, in two verses, that "the beginningless realm is the equal support of all phenomena" and that "because it stores and conceals all phenomena, it is the consciousness of all seeds, and so is named the ālaya" — the most excellent scriptural attestation for setting up the name ālaya. The treatise-basis lies in the "Section on Ascertainment" of the Yogācārabhūmi: there the ālaya-vijñāna is fixed as "turning by way of two kinds of object-field" (inwardly discerning the appropriated seeds and body-with-faculties, outwardly discerning the non-discriminated receptacle-appearance — the source of this section's "appropriation" and "locale"); it is said to "take an exceedingly subtle object, hard for even the worldly-wise to fathom" (the source of "unknowable"); to "arise and cease moment by moment, flowing on in instantaneous continuity, neither one nor permanent" (the source of "ever-flowing as a torrent"); to "be associated with the five omnipresent mental factors... and its associated feeling is invariably neither painful nor pleasant, subsumed under the neutral quality" (the source of "the five feelings being neutral alone, unobstructed-neutral"); and that "arhats, solitary buddhas, non-retrogressing bodhisattvas, and the tathāgatas do not possess a storehouse consciousness" (the source of "suppression, relinquishment, and the giving-up of the name"). What this section expounds has its scriptural root in the Saṃdhinirmocana, the Laṅkāvatāra, and the Mahāyāna-abhidharma Sūtra, and its treatise-basis in the Yogācārabhūmi — and from here we follow the verse and open the gates one by one.

A. The Gate of Object and Mode — What It Cognizes, and How

What are the "mode of cognition" (the form that its act of knowing takes) and the "object" (the field it apprehends) of this consciousness? The verse answers: "unknowable in its appropriation, its locale, and its discernment." "Discernment" is the act of cognizing-and-distinguishing — this is the mode, for a consciousness has cognition-and-distinction as its very form. "Locale" is place, meaning the receptacle-world (the physical universe), the ground on which all sentient beings rest. "Appropriation" is of two kinds: first, the various seeds (that is, the three classes of habit-energy — those of perceptual forms, of names, and of discrimination); second, the body endowed with sense-faculties (the body possessing the five faculties, comprising the pure-form matter of the five faculties and the fleshly body that supports them). Both of these are "appropriated" by this consciousness — taken in as its own substance, sharing one fate with it (when the body is at ease the consciousness is at ease, when the body is endangered the consciousness is endangered). Both the appropriation and the locale are the object of this consciousness. By the force of causes and conditions, when the storehouse consciousness arises as its own substance, it projects inwardly into the appearance of seeds and the body-with-faculties, and outwardly into the appearance of the receptacle-world; it then takes what it has itself projected as its object, and its mode (the function of discernment) can only arise resting upon that object.

This "discernment" means that the maturational consciousness has a discriminating function with respect to its own object — this belongs to the seeing-aspect (the portion that does the apprehending). Whenever any defiled consciousness arises as its own substance, it manifests two appearances: a "semblance of the object" and a "semblance of the apprehender"; the mental factors associated with it do likewise. Of these, the "semblance of the object" is called the image-aspect, and the "semblance of the apprehender" is called the seeing-aspect. Why must there be these two aspects? Because if mind and mental factors had no "object-appearance" (image-aspect), they ought either to be unable to cognize their own field at all, or else each of them ought to be able to cognize everything indiscriminately (with no image-aspect, one's own field and another's field could not be told apart). And if mind and mental factors had no "apprehender-appearance" (seeing-aspect), they ought to be utterly incapable of cognizing — like empty space — for otherwise empty space too would have to be able to cognize. Therefore mind and mental factors must have both the image-aspect and the seeing-aspect. Scripture confirms this: there is only the consciousness that is aware; the object that is grasped as external has no real status; within the consciousness, the aware portion and the portion that is taken as known each turn of their own accord.

On how to establish "image, seeing, and substance," two schools differ. The Hīnayāna position, which holds that there is a real object apart from consciousness, says the external object is the field, the image-aspect is the "mode," and the seeing-aspect is the "substance (the self-body)"; on their view mind and its factors share the same support and the same object, their mode (image-aspect) is similar, while their "substance" — though equal in number — differs in shape. The correct Yogācāra reading, which has penetrated the truth that there is no real object apart from consciousness, says instead that the image-aspect is the field, the seeing-aspect is the "mode," and the self-substance on which both image and seeing rest is the "substance" — namely the self-witnessing aspect (the portion that witnesses one's own knowing). If this self-witnessing aspect did not exist, one ought to be unable to recall one's own past mind and mental factors — just as one can never recall a field one never experienced, there must be a self-witnessing aspect that witnessed the knowing, so that one can later recall it. On the Yogācāra view, then, mind and its factors share the same supporting faculty and a similar object (image-aspect), while their mode (seeing-aspect) differs (the functions of discernment, of reception, and so on are distinct), and their "substance" (self-witnessing aspect), though equal in number, differs in shape (the substances of consciousness, of feeling, and so on are distinct).

Pressing finer still: when any mind or mental factor arises, in principle it ought to have three aspects — image-aspect (the measured), seeing-aspect (the measuring), and self-witnessing aspect (the result of the measuring) — because cognition involves the threefold distinction of "what is measured, what does the measuring, and the result of measurement," and the image and seeing aspects must have a substance on which they rest. As Dignāga's Compendium of Valid Cognition puts it: the semblance-of-object appearance (image-aspect) is what is measured; the apprehending appearance (seeing-aspect) and the self-witnessing aspect are, respectively, the measuring and its result; and these three are not different in substance (they are one and the same consciousness-body).

Finer yet, there must also be a fourth aspect — the witnessing-of-self-witnessing aspect (the portion that witnesses the self-witnessing aspect). If it did not exist, who would witness the third (the self-witnessing aspect)? Since the several aspects of mind are alike in being apprehenders, each ought in principle to have something that witnesses it. Moreover, without the fourth, the self-witnessing aspect would have no result-of-measurement, yet whatever measures must have a result. Nor can one say "the seeing-aspect is the result-of-measurement for the self-witnessing aspect" — for the seeing-aspect is sometimes erroneous cognition (it apprehends mistakenly), whereas whatever witnesses the substance must be direct perception (immediate and unerring); so the seeing-aspect cannot witness the third. Among these four aspects, the first two (image and seeing) are "outer," the latter two (self-witnessing and witnessing-of-self-witnessing) are "inner." The first aspect (image) is object only; the latter three are both object and apprehender. The second aspect (seeing) cognizes only the first (image), and its cognition may be either valid or erroneous, either direct or inferential. The third aspect (self-witnessing) cognizes the second (and also the fourth). The fourth aspect (witnessing-of-self-witnessing) cognizes only the third (self-witnessing), not the seeing-aspect — because there would be no use in its cognizing the seeing-aspect (the self-witnessing aspect cognizing the seeing-aspect already suffices). The third and the fourth are both direct perception. Composed in this way, the four aspects together possess both object and apprehender (the self-witnessing and the witnessing-of-self-witnessing cognize each other, so the mutual witnessing never breaks off), yet incur no fault of "an endless regress of apprehenders" (since the third and fourth witness each other, the chain comes to rest and there is no need for a fifth). The four aspects are neither identical (not one) nor separate (not different), and so the truth of consciousness-only is established. As scripture says in verse: the minds of sentient beings have the twofold nature of apprehender and apprehended; all the aspects, inner and outer, are bound up in this grasping of object and grasping by apprehender, and what is seen has manifold variety — and this "seeing" is the seeing-aspect.

These four aspects can also be gathered together: into three (the fourth folded into the self-witnessing aspect), or into two (the latter three, all being apprehenders, folded into the seeing-aspect), or into one (one and the same consciousness-body, undivided in substance). Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) assigns these several accounts — those where "the text has but two aspects while the sense has three" — each to its ancient master by name: the one who maintains "a single aspect" (the self-witnessing aspect alone) is Sthiramati; the one who maintains "two aspects" (image and seeing) is Bandhuśrī (of Nanda's line); the one who maintains "three aspects" (further setting up the self-witnessing aspect) is Dignāga; and the one who maintains "four aspects" (setting up the witnessing-of-self-witnessing as well) is Dharmapāla — and this treatise is built upon Dharmapāla's reading; in the body of the text it makes explicit only three aspects, because the characteristic of the fourth aspect (the witnessing-of-self-witnessing) is still hidden and subtle, and so it is passed over and not displayed. As the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra says in verse: through the clinging of one's own mind, the mind manifests as though there were external objects and turns; the external objects it sees in fact do not exist, and so we say "mind-only." Everywhere the scriptures say "the one mind alone," and this "one mind" also subsumes the mental factors (the mind-king being chief, it subsumes its factors). Therefore: the mode of the consciousness is just discernment, and discernment is the seeing-aspect of the consciousness.

1. "Locale" — the Receptacle-World, and Who Projects It

The "locale" of which the verse speaks means this: by the force of the maturation of common-aspect seeds (the seeds produced by the shared karma of all beings), the maturational consciousness projects the appearance of a receptacle-world resembling material form — the outer four great elements and the matter derived from them. Although each sentient being projects its own receptacle-world separately, the resulting appearances resemble one another and the locale shows no difference — like the light of many lamps, each shining throughout the room, which appears as a single field of brightness. So whose maturational consciousness projects this receptacle-world? Here there are three views.

One view: all sentient beings project it — for scripture says the receptacle-world arises through the "dominant karmic force" shared by all beings. But it is then objected: if all beings projected it, then the buddhas and bodhisattvas would really have to project this defiled, foul land, and ordinary beings would really have to project the pure, marvelous buddha-lands of other regions (which is not so); and those noble ones who, weary of bodily form, are born in the formless realm and will surely never again descend to this realm — what would they be projecting this land for? So one should say that only those "now dwelling in this realm" and those "due to be born in this realm hereafter" have a consciousness that projects this realm; when scripture says "all," it speaks of a "portion" (those whose karma is alike project it together). The correct reading, however, replies: if it were limited to those now dwelling or due to be born, then when the receptacle-world is "about to be destroyed" there would be no one dwelling in it and none due to be born — so who would be projecting it then? And formless-realm beings already manifest a formless body — what would they project this land for in advance? Even granting them a bodily form, that body and the receptacle of another sphere are coarse and fine in vastly different degrees and do not support one another, so what benefit would there be in using such a body to project this receptacle? In truth the "land that is projected" exists in order to serve a bodily form as its support and means of enjoyment — so wherever a land can have the function of support and enjoyment for some body, that land is projected. Therefore even a being born in another region, or born within its own sphere, may have a consciousness that projects this land; and so, when the receptacle-world is "about to be destroyed" or is "just forming," even though no sentient being dwells in it, the receptacle is still present (there is always some consciousness, capable of using it, projecting it). All this is said with respect to "common enjoyment" (the receptacle commonly projected by shared karma); "individual enjoyment" (what individual karma individually evokes) is inferred along the same lines — a hungry ghost, a human, and a heavenly being see the very same thing differently (the ghost sees a river of pus, the heavenly being sees lapis lazuli).

2. "Appropriation" — Seeds and the Body Endowed with Faculties

The first thing appropriated is the seeds: namely, all the seeds of contaminated phenomena held by the maturational consciousness; they share the same moral quality as this consciousness (both being morally neutral), and so they are its object. As for the seeds of uncontaminated phenomena — though they too lodge in this consciousness, they do not share its moral quality, and so they are not its object; yet, though not its object, they are not separate from it — just like the nature of suchness (which lodges in all phenomena, is not the object of consciousness, yet is not separate from it), and this does not contradict consciousness-only.

The second thing appropriated is the body endowed with faculties: by the force of the maturation of uncommon-aspect seeds (those evoked by individual karma, for one's own enjoyment alone), the maturational consciousness projects the appearance of the pure-form matter of the five faculties and the fleshly body that supports them (the inner four great elements and the matter derived from them); and by the force of the maturation of common-aspect seeds, with respect to the locale of "another's body" it also projects a semblance of it — otherwise there would be no sense in "enjoying another's body" (a person being able to see, to rest on, and to make use of another person's body). On what is projected with respect to "another's body," there are two views. One view: with respect to another's body too, it projects a semblance of faculties (the pure-form sense-faculties) — on the authority of the Madhyānta-vibhāga, which says consciousness manifests as the five faculties of one's own body and of another's body. The correct reading, however, says: with respect to another's body it projects only a semblance of the seat of the faculties (the fleshly body), and does not project a semblance of another's pure-form faculties — for another person's pure-form faculties hold no possibility of enjoyment for oneself; what the Madhyānta-vibhāga means by "the five faculties of self and other manifesting" is that "the consciousness of self and the consciousness of other each project the faculties of its own body," not that my consciousness projects another's faculties. It is precisely because of this that one can explain how, when a being is reborn in another sphere or enters final nirvāṇa, the corpse it leaves behind is still seen to continue in existence (the seat-of-faculties was projected from common-aspect seeds, so even though the original owner's faculties are relinquished, the seat still remains).

3. Form Born of Concentration · A Brief Summary of the Projected Field

All of the above has been said with respect to the outer receptacle, the inner body, and their differences of realm (the three realms) and sphere (the nine spheres) as projected by karmic force. As for the receptacle, body, realm, sphere, and self-and-other projected by "the force of concentration and the like" (the superior power of meditative absorption), these are not so fixed (they can, by the power of concentration, project a field belonging to another sphere). What is projected as body and receptacle is for the most part continuous and enduring; what is projected as sound, light, and the like is for the most part momentary (arising as the force of an immediately present condition strikes it forth). To sum up: the field that this consciousness projects consists of contaminated seeds, the ten material bases (the five faculties and the five fields), and the real form manifested within the base of mental objects (form born of concentration and the like).

Why, then, does this consciousness not project a "semblance of mind and mental factors" as its object? Because the projection of a contaminated consciousness is of two kinds: one is "projection following the force of causes and conditions" (projection that occurs of its own accord from seeds, and must have real function); the other is "projection following the force of discrimination" (projection that occurs through the discrimination of the sixth consciousness, producing only a field that is a mere image). The maturational consciousness projects only "following causes and conditions," and what it projects as form and the like must have real function (it can support, it can be enjoyed); but if it projected mind and mental factors there would be no real function — for mind and mental factors set up as the image-aspect could no longer go on to cognize an object, and that real function must arise instead from the seeds of the actually-functioning mind and mental factors; and projecting unconditioned phenomena likewise has no real function. So the maturational consciousness does not take mind, mental factors, and the like as its object. But at the uncontaminated stage (when it has turned into the Great Perfect Mirror Wisdom), this consciousness, associated with supreme insight, though free of discrimination, is by nature pure and clear, so that even though the mind and the like it manifests have no real function, it can still manifest their images — otherwise the buddhas would not be omniscient. Therefore, at the contaminated stage, this maturational consciousness takes as its object only the three: the receptacle-world, the body-with-faculties, and contaminated seeds. The desire realm and the form realm have all three of these objects; the formless realm takes as object only contaminated seeds (its beings, weary of material form, have no bodily form evoked by karma), yet there is still "form born of concentration" there (the form manifested by meditative absorption), which does not violate the principle — so that consciousness too takes this concentration-born form as its object.

4. "Unknowable"

The "unknowable" of which the verse speaks means this: the mode of this consciousness (its function of discernment) is exceedingly subtle and hard to know; its inner appropriated object (the seeds, the body-with-faculties) is likewise exceedingly subtle; and the outer receptacle-world is vast and hard to fathom — both its mode and its object are subtle, hidden, and hard to know, and so it is called "unknowable." Someone asks: how can there be a consciousness like this, one that grasps an object and has a mode, yet whose object and mode are hard to know? The answer: just as, in the attainment of cessation, that "consciousness which does not leave the body" (the ālaya) is unknowable yet should be believed to exist; and indeed one must admit that there is a consciousness in the attainment of cessation — for one who has entered that attainment is still a sentient being, and so must have an appropriating consciousness, just as in the state where mind is active. The state of the attainment of non-conception, the heaven of non-conception, and the like are the same way (a subtle, unknowable ālaya still continues there).

Onward Transmission

What this chapter settles — object, mode, and the four parts — is the ground on which the tradition rests its claim that consciousness itself transforms into two parts and then grasps. The Hundred Dharmas lists the ālaya as the eighth of the mind-dharmas; it is precisely this eighth consciousness whose mode and object are settled here. Verse 3, first half, of the Thirty Verses is the root verse this chapter expounds. The Twenty Verses, establishing that there is consciousness and no outer object, refutes exactly the notion of an object real apart from consciousness — the obverse of this chapter's claim that the object is never apart from it. The Madhyāntavibhāga, in its chapter on characteristics, gathers grasper and grasped under "unreal imagination"; the seeing part and image part settled here are those two graspings. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha, in its chapter on the knowable ground, unfolds the ālaya's object and perfuming at length — the same consciousness, treated now in brief and now in full.