成唯識論 破法執(一)·破小乘實色·不相應行
小乘不執外道那些神我、諦、句義，他們執的是很樸素的東西：色法是實有的，還有一類『不是色也不是心』的東西——得、命根、眾同分、無想定、生住異滅——也是實有的。
論主先破色。你說麁色由極微合成？那就問極微：它有沒有方分（上下左右）？有，就還能再分，不成極微；沒有，就無所謂接觸與積聚，合不出一座山來。兩邊都不通。那五識所見的青黃長短呢？那是識所變的相分，不是心外之物。
再破不相應行。「得」——你說證果時另有一個叫「得」的東西加到你身上？那沒得之前它在哪裡？其實只是「成就」這件事的分位假名。「命根」——你說另有一個維持壽命的實體？其實只是異熟識上一分連續勢力的假名。『生住異滅』——你說有為法上另有四個實在的相？那這四相自身又要不要再有四相？無窮了。
這一節長，破得很細，但骨幹只有一句：凡是離開色心而另立的「東西」，追問到最後，都只是色心某個分位上安的一個名字。 論主不否認你經驗到它，只是說：那個名字底下，沒有另一個實體。
The Lesser Vehicle does not hold the self, principles and categories of the heterodox. What it holds is plainer: that form is real, and that a further class of things which are neither form nor mind — attainment, the life-faculty, group-homogeneity, the mindless attainment, arising-abiding-changing-ceasing — is real too.
The treatise refutes form first. You say gross form is composed of atoms? Then ask of the atom: has it spatial parts, an above and below, a left and right? If it has, it can be divided again and is no atom; if it has not, there is no contact and no accumulation, and no mountain can be made of it. Neither way goes through. And the blue and yellow, the long and short the five consciousnesses meet? Those are the image-part into which consciousness transforms, not a thing outside the mind.
Then the non-concurrent formations. Attainment — you say that when a fruit is realized some further thing called attainment is added to you? Then where was it before? It is only a provisional name for a phase of accomplishment. Life-faculty — you say there is a separate entity maintaining the lifespan? It is only a name for a portion of continuing force upon the maturation consciousness. Arising, abiding, changing, ceasing — you say a conditioned dharma bears four further real marks? Then must those four bear four of their own? The regress has no end.
The chapter is long and refutes finely, but its spine is one line: whatever thing is posited apart from form and mind turns out, pressed to the end, to be a name placed on some phase of form and mind. The treatise does not deny that you experience it; it says only that under the name there is no second entity.
餘乘所執，離識實有色等諸法，如何非有？
彼所執色、不相應行及諸無為，理非有故。
且所執色總有二種：一者有對，極微所成；二者無對，非極微成。
彼有對色定非實有，能成極微非實有故。
謂諸極微，若有質礙，應如瓶等，是假非實。
若無質礙，應如非色，如何可集成瓶、衣等？
又諸極微，若有方分，必可分析，便非實有。
若無方分，則如非色，云何和合承光、發影？日輪纔舉照柱等時，東、西兩邊光影各現，承光、發影處既不同，所執極微定有方分。又，若見、觸壁等物時，唯得此邊不得彼分。既和合物即諸極微，故此極微必有方分。又諸極微隨所住處，必有上、下、四方差別，不爾便無共和、集義。或相涉入應不成麁，由此極微定有方分。執有對色即諸極微，若無方分，應無障隔。若爾，便非障礙有對。
是故汝等所執極微必有方分，有方分故，便可分析，定非實有。
故有對色實有不成。
五識豈無所依、緣色？
雖非無色，而是識變。謂識生時。內因緣力，變似眼等、色等相現，即以此相為所依、緣。
然眼等根非現量得，以能發識，比知是有，此但功能，非外所造。外有對色理既不成，故應但是內識變現，發眼等識，名眼等根，此為所依，生眼等識。
〔T31 0004b03〕此眼等識外所緣緣，理非有故，決定應許自識所變為所緣緣，謂能引生似自識者，汝執彼是此所緣緣。
非但能生，勿因緣等亦名此識所緣緣故。
眼等五識了色等時，但緣和合，似彼相故，非和合相異諸極微有實自體。分析彼時，似彼相識定不生故，彼和合相既非實有，故不可說是五識緣，勿第二月等能生五識故。
非諸極微共和合位可與五識各作所緣，此識上無極微相故，非諸極微有和合相，不和合時無此相故。非和合位與不合時，此諸極微體相有異，故和合位如不合時，色等極微非五識境。
有執色等一一極微不和集時，非五識境，共和集位，展轉相資，有麁相生，為此識境，彼相實有，為此所緣。彼執不然，共和集位與未集時，體相一故。瓶、甌等物極微等者，緣彼相識應無別故；共和集位一一極微，各各應捨微、圓相故；非麁相識緣細相境，勿餘境識緣餘境故；一識應緣一切境故。
許有極微，尚致此失，況無識外真實極微。
由此定知，自識所變似色等相為所緣緣，見託彼生，帶彼相故。然識變時，隨量大、小，頓現一相，非別變作眾多極微合成一物。為執麁色有實體者，佛說極微，令其除析，非謂諸色實有極微。諸瑜伽師以假想慧，於麁色相漸次除析，至不可析，假說極微，雖此極微猶有方分，而不可析，若更析之便似空現，不名為色，故說極微是色邊際。
〔T31 0004c04〕由此應知，諸有對色，皆識變現，非極微成。
餘無對色是此類故，亦非實有，或無對故，如心、心所，定非實色。諸有對色現有色相，以理推究，離識尚無，況無對色現無色相，而可說為真實色法？
表、無表色豈非實有？
此非實有，所以者何？
且身表色若是實有，以何為性？
若言是形，便非實有，可分析故；長等極微不可得故。若言是動，亦非實有，纔生即滅無動義故；有為法滅不待因故；滅若待因應非滅故。若言有色非顯、非形，心所引生，能動手等，名身表業，理亦不然。此若是動，義如前破；若是動因，應即風界，風無表示，不應名表；又觸不應通善、惡性，非顯、香、味，類觸應知。
故身表業定非實有。
然心為因，令識所變手等色相，生滅相續，轉趣餘方，似有動作。表示心故，假名身表。
語表亦非實有聲性，一剎那聲無詮表故，多念相續便非實故，外有對色，前已破故。
然因心故，識變似聲，生滅相續，似有表示，假名語表，於理無違。
表既實無，無表寧實？然依思願善惡分限，假立無表，理亦無違。謂此或依發勝身、語善惡思種增長位立；或依定中止身、語惡現行思立，故是假有。
世尊經中說有三業，撥身、語業豈不違經？
不撥為無，但言非色。
能動身思說名身業，能發語思說名語業。審、決二思，意相應故，作動意故，說名意業。
〔T31 0005a02〕起身、語思，有所造作，說名為業，是審、決思所遊履故；通生苦、樂異熟果故，亦名為道。故前七業道，亦思為自性，或身、語表由思發故，假說為業，思所履故，說名業道。
由此應知實無外色，唯有內識變似色生。
不相應行亦非實有，所以者何？
得、非得等，非如色、心及諸心所體相可得；非異色、心及諸心所作用可得，由此故知定非實有，但依色等分位假立。
此定非異色、心、心所，有實體用，如色、心等，許蘊攝故。
或心、心所及色、無為所不攝故，如畢竟無，定非實有。或餘實法所不攝故，如餘假法，非實有體。
且彼如何知得、非得，異色、心等，有實體用？
契經說故。如說：如是補特伽羅成就善、惡，聖者成就十無學法。又說：異生不成就聖法，諸阿羅漢不成就煩惱，成、不成言，顯得、非得。
經不說此異色、心等有實體用，為證不成。
亦說：輪王成就七寶。豈即成就他身、非情？
若謂於寶有自在力，假說成就，於善、惡法，何不許然，而執實得？
若謂七寶在現在，故可假說成，寧知所成善、惡等法離現在有？離現實法，理非有故。
現在必有善種等故。
又得於法有何勝用？
若言能起，應起無為，一切非情應永不起，未得、已失應永不生。
若俱生得為因起者，所執二生便為無用。又具善、惡、無記得者，善、惡、無記應頓現前，若待餘因，得便無用。
若得於法是不失因，有情由此成就彼故，諸可成法不離有情，若離有情實不可得，故得於法俱為無用。
〔T31 0005b02〕得實無故，非得亦無。
然依有情可成諸法分位，假立三種成就：一、種子成就；二、自在成就；三、現行成就。翻此假立不成就名，此類雖多，而於三界見所斷種未永害位，假立非得，名異生性，於諸聖法未成就故。
復如何知異色、心等有實同分？
契經說故。如契經說：此天同分、此人同分，乃至廣說。
此經不說異色、心等有實同分，為證不成。
若同智、言，因斯起故，知實有者，則草、木等應有同分。
又，於同分起同智、言，同分復應有別同分，彼既不爾，此云何然？
若謂為因起同事、欲，知實有者，理亦不然。宿習為因，起同事、欲，何要別執有實同分？
然依有情身、心相似，分位差別，假立同分。
復如何知異色、心等，有實命根？
契經說故。如契經說：壽、煖、識三，應知命根說名為壽。
此經不說異色、心等有實壽體，為證不成。
又，先已成色不離識，應此離識無別命根。
又，若命根異識實有，應如受等，非實命根。
若爾，如何經說三法？義別說三，如四正斷。住無心位，壽、煖應無。豈不經說識不離身。既爾，如何名無心位？彼滅轉識，非阿賴耶。有此識因，後當廣說。此識足為界、趣、生體，是遍、恒、續。異熟果故，無勞別執有實命根。
然依親生此識種子，由業所引功能差別，住時決定，假立命根。
復如何知二無心定、無想異熟，異色、心等有實自性？
若無實性，應不能遮心、心所法，令不現起。
若無心位，有別實法，異色、心等，能遮於心，名無心定。
〔T31 0005c02〕應無色時，有別實法，異色、心等，能礙於色，名無色定。彼既不爾，此云何然？
又，遮礙心何須實法，如堤塘等，假亦能遮。
謂修定時，於定加行，厭患麁動心、心所故，發勝期願，遮心、心所。令心、心所漸細漸微，微微心時，熏異熟識，成極增上厭心等種。由此損伏心等種故，麁動心等暫不現行，依此分位，假立二定。此種善故，定亦名善。
無想定前，求無想果，故所熏成種，招彼異熟識。依定麁動想等不行，於此分位，假立無想。依異熟立，得異熟名，故此三法，亦非實有。
成唯識論卷第二
護法等菩薩造
三藏法師玄奘奉 詔譯
復如何知，諸有為相異色、心等，有實自性？
契經說故。如契經說：有三有為之有為相，乃至廣說。
此經不說異色、心等有實自性，為證不成。
非第六聲便表異體，色、心之體即色、心故。
非能相體定異所相，勿堅相等異地等故。
若有為相異所相體，無為相體應異所相。
又生等相，若體俱有，應一切時齊興作用；若相違故，用不頓興，體亦相違，如何俱有？又住、異、滅用不應俱。
能相、所相體俱本有，用亦應然，無別性故。若謂彼用更待因緣，所待因緣應非本有。又執生等便為無用。
〔T31 0006a03〕所相恒有而生等合，應無為法亦有生等，彼此異因，不可得故。
又去、來世，非現、非常，應似空花，非實有性。生名為有，寧在未來？滅名為無，應非現在。滅若非無，生應非有。又滅違住，寧執同時？住不違生，何容異世。故彼所執，進退非理。
然有為法，因緣力故，本無今有，暫有還無，表異無為，假立四相。
本無今有，有位名生；生位暫停，即說為住；住別前後，復立異名；暫有還無，無時名滅。
前三有故，同在現在，後一是無，故在過去。
如何無法與有為相？表此後無，為相何失？生表有法先非有，滅表有法後是無，異表此法非凝然，住表此法暫有用。故此四相，於有為法，雖俱名表，而表有異。
此依剎那假立四相，一期分位亦得假立。初有名生；後無名滅；生已相似相續名住；即此相續轉變名異。
是故四相皆是假立。
復如何知異色、心等，有實詮表名、句、文身？
契經說故。如契經說，佛得希有名、句、文身。
此經不說異色、心等有實名等，為證不成。
若名、句、文異聲實有，應如色等，非實能詮。
謂聲能生名、句、文者，此聲必有音韻屈曲，此足能詮，何用名等。
若謂聲上音韻屈曲即名、句、文，異聲實有，所見色上形量屈曲，應異色處別有實體。
若謂聲上音韻屈曲，如絃管聲非能詮者，此應如彼聲，不別生名等。又誰說彼定不能詮？聲若能詮，風鈴聲等應有詮用，此應如彼不別生實名、句、文身。若唯語聲能生名等，如何不許唯語能詮。
〔T31 0006b02〕何理定知能詮即語？寧知異語別有能詮？語不異能詮，人天共了，執能詮異語，天愛非餘。
然依語聲分位差別，而假建立名、句、文身。
名詮自性；句詮差別；文即是字，為二所依。
此三離聲雖無別體，而假、實異，亦不即聲。由此法、詞二無礙解，境有差別；聲與名等，蘊、處、界攝亦各有異。
且依此土說名、句、文依聲假立，非謂一切；諸餘佛土亦依光明、妙香、味等假立三故。
有執隨眠異心、心所，是不相應行蘊所攝。
彼亦非理，名貪等故，如現貪等，非不相應。
執別有餘不相應行，准前理趣皆應遮止。
The canonical text stands in Chinese only. This edition renders the essence, the plain reading, the exposition and the apparatus into English — never the sūtra itself. Switch to 漢讀本 or 並行雙語 above to read it.
〔所釋之頌〕承前章，廣釋第一頌·破法執
破餘乘（小乘）所執色等諸法
前面破完了外道，接著破其餘各部派（小乘）。他們主張『心外另有真實存在的種種法』，為什麼說這也找不到、不是真有呢？因為他們所主張的那三類——「色法」、「不相應行法」、『種種無為法』，按道理講都不是真實有的。（底下就照這個次序，一類一類地破：先破色法，再破不相應行，最後破無為。）
（甲）破色法——破極微（有對色）
先說色法。他們所主張的色法總共分兩種：一種是「有對色」（有質礙、會互相阻擋的色），是由極微（微塵）組成的；另一種是「無對色」（沒有質礙的色），不是由極微組成的。先破第一種——「有對色」一定不是實有的，因為組成它的那個「極微」根本就不是實有的。
就拿這些極微來說，兩頭一逼：要嘛它有質礙（佔地方、會擋人），那它就該跟瓶子那一類一樣可以拆開，是假合的、不是實有的（有質礙的東西都拆得開）；要嘛它沒有質礙，那它就跟『不是色法的東西』（像心、心所）一個樣了，那又怎麼能聚集起來、組成瓶子、衣服這些有質礙的東西呢（沒質礙的東西湊不出有質礙的物體）？
再說，這些極微還是兩頭一逼：要嘛它有「方分」（有方位、有部分），那就一定可以再切開來剖析，那它就不是實有的了（拆得開的就不是不可分的實一）；要嘛它沒有方分，那它就跟『不是色法的東西』一樣了，那又怎麼能湊在一起『一邊承受光照、一邊投出影子』呢？你看太陽剛升起、照到柱子這些東西的時候，柱子東邊、西邊各自現出光（向著太陽那一面）和影（背著太陽那一面）；既然『承光的地方』和『投影的地方』不是同一處（一個東西分得出向日、背日兩面），可見組成它的那個極微一定是有方分的（有向著的一面、有背著的一面）。
再說，當我們看牆壁、摸牆壁這些東西的時候，只能看到、摸到朝著自己的這一面，看不到、摸不到背著自己的那一面。既然『湊合成的這個物體』說到底就是『那一堆極微』（湊成的物體無非就是眾多極微），那這極微就一定是有方分的（有朝我的這一面、有背我的那一面）。
再說，這些極微不管擺在哪兒，總有上、下、東南西北這些方位的差別；要是沒有方位，它們就沒辦法彼此相鄰、湊合堆積了（沒有方位就無從一個挨一個地疊起來）。要不然（假定它真沒方分），那一顆顆極微就會互相重疊、鑽進同一個地方，那就堆不成大東西了（都疊在一處又怎麼成其為大）。由此可知，極微一定是有方分的。
你既然主張『有對色就是那一堆極微』，那就再逼一層：極微若沒有方分，它就該不會『擋人、隔人』了（沒有方分就無從互相阻擋）；既然不擋人，那它就不成其為「有對色」（有質礙、會相擋）了——可你立的偏偏是「有對色」啊。所以你們主張的這個極微一定是有方分的；既然有方分，就可以切開來剖析，那它就一定不是實有的了。這麼一來，『有對色是實有的』這主張就立不起來了。（破有對色到此為止。）
（乙）破無對色——五識所依緣色唯識所變
〔難〕有人問：前五識（眼識到身識）難道不是有『所依的色』（也就是五根）和『所緣的色』（也就是五境）嗎？〔答〕並不是說沒有色，只是那些色都是識變現出來的。意思是：識生起的時候，憑著它裡頭因緣（種子）的力量，變現出像「眼等五根」、「色等五境」那樣的影像來，就拿這些（內識變出來的）影像當作它的所依（根）和所緣（境）。
不過要曉得，「眼等五根」並不是當下親眼看得見的（根本身看不到），而是『因為它能發起識』、才靠推理曉得它存在的；這個根只是一種「功能」（能發起識的作用、種子上的一股勢力），並不是心外（極微）造出來的實在色法。
『心外的有對色』這道理既然立不住（前面已經破掉極微了），那麼所依的根就應該只是內識變現出來的一種功能——這個能發起眼等識的功能，就叫作「眼等根」；就拿這個（內識變出來的根）當所依，生起眼等的識。
眼等識的「外所緣緣」（拿心外實在的境當作所緣緣），這道理是立不住的；所以一定得承認『識自己變出來的那個相』才是它的所緣緣——也就是說，那個『能引出跟識自己相似的影像』的東西，才是你也得承認的『這個識的所緣緣』（所緣緣得是識上面那個能引出像自己一樣的相）。
要當「所緣緣」，可不是光『能生出這個識』就算數的（它還得帶起一個相、能引出像識自己的影像）；不然的話，「因緣（種子）」這些也都能生出識，豈不也都要被叫作這個識的所緣緣了（種子能生識，可它並不是識所緣的對象，所以光「能生」還不夠）？
眼等五識在了別色等的時候，只是緣著那個「和合之相」（許多極微湊合而成的整體相狀），因為識上面現出了像那個和合相的影像；並不是說「和合相」離開了那一堆極微、另有一個實在的本體。你把那個（和合的）物體拆散剖析的時候，那個『現出像它的影像』的識就一定生不起來了（一拆散，整體相就不現、識也起不來），可見那「和合相」根本不是實有的，所以不能說它是五識所緣的緣。不然的話，『第二個月亮』（揉眼睛時看到的那個假月亮，其實不存在）這類東西也能生起五識了（像那種假影像也能生識、可它並不是實在的境，正跟和合相是一回事）。
也不能說『那一堆極微湊在一起的時候，就一顆顆當五識的所緣』——因為五識上面現的是整體相、根本沒有『一顆顆極微的相』（識上現的是總相，不現微相）。也不能說『那一堆極微（各自）就帶著和合相』——因為它們還沒湊合的時候，並沒有這個「和合相」（和合相不是極微自己本來就有的）。
也不能說『湊合的時候』和『沒湊合的時候』這些極微的本體和相狀有什麼不一樣（極微的體相前後都沒變）；所以『湊合的時候』就跟『沒湊合的時候』一樣，色等的極微都不是五識的對象（不管湊不湊合，極微的相都不是識所緣的境）。
（丙）破「和集相」（餘部救義）
有另一個部派出來救（前面講的和合相被破了，他們改個說法）：色等的一顆顆極微，在『還沒會聚』的時候，確實不是五識的對象；可是到了『彼此會聚』的時候，這些極微互相幫襯，就生出一個『粗大之相』來，當作五識的對象；而且他們說那個粗大之相是實有的，就拿它當這個識所緣的對象。（這叫『和集相實有』的救法。）
這個救法也不行，這裡一條一條地駁——
第一，極微在『彼此會聚』的時候，和『還沒會聚』的時候，它的本體和相狀是同一個（會聚並沒有改變一顆極微的體相），那粗大之相又從哪兒冒出來？
第二，瓶子和瓦盆這些東西，假如組成它們的極微數目一樣多，那緣這兩個相的識就該沒有差別了（極微的相一樣，識就分不出來）——可實際上我們明明看瓶子和瓦盆是不一樣的。
第三，到了會聚的時候，假如真生出個粗大相來，那一顆顆極微就該各各丟掉它本來那『細小、圓圓的相』了（變成粗大相，細圓相就沒了）——可極微其實並沒丟掉它的細小圓相。
第四，『緣粗大相的識』不該去緣『細小相的境』（識上現的是粗大、境卻只是細小的極微，兩邊對不上），不然的話，就成了『緣這個境的識卻去緣了那個境』（張冠李戴了）。
第五，（要是不講究識和境得對得上）那一個識就該能緣一切境了（沒有了『相要對得上』這條限制，什麼都能緣了）。
那個部派還承認有極微、想拿它來救「和集相」，就已經招來上面這一堆毛病了；何況（照唯識來看）本來就根本沒有心外真實的極微，那「和集相」就更立不起來了。（破和集相到此為止。）
（丁）結成：諸有對色皆識變·假說極微
由此就可以斷定：真正的所緣緣，是『識自己變出來的那個像色等的相』——因為「見分」（能緣的那一面）是依託著它（相分）才生起、又帶著它（相分）的相的。而識變現的時候，是按著對象的大小，一下子就現出『一個整體的相』（一整片相分），並不是另外變出許許多多極微、再把它們合成一個東西（識是一下子現出整體相的，用不著靠極微去拼湊）。
那佛為什麼也講「極微」呢？那是為了破那些執著『粗大之色有實在本體』的人，佛才講「極微」這一套，叫他一層層地往下分析（好破掉『粗大之色是實有』這個執著），並不是說色裡頭真有極微這個東西（極微是個方便說法，不是真有的法）。修行人用一種「假想慧」（觀想中的假設分析），把粗大之色的相一步步往下分析，分析到『再也分不下去』的地方，就假給它取個名叫「極微」；這個極微其實還是有方分的，只是（在觀智上）不再去分它了——要是再往下分，就會現出像「空」那樣的相、不再算是色了，所以說極微是『色的盡頭邊際』（色法分析到底的極限，並不是一顆實在的微塵）。
由此應該明白：種種「有對色」都是識變現出來的，並不是由（實在的）極微組成的。
（戊）破無對色實有
至於另一種「無對色」（像法處所攝色那些沒有質礙的色），它既然跟前面那種（識變的色）是一類的，所以也不是實有的；再說它本來就『沒有質礙』，那它就跟心、心所一個樣（也沒質礙），一定不是實在的色法。你想想：那種明明現出色相、又有質礙的「有對色」，按道理推究下來，離開識都尚且沒有；何況這種本來就現不出色相（不顯眼、不擋人）的「無對色」，又怎麼能說它是真實的色法呢（有對色都尚且沒有，無對色就更沒有了）？
（己）破表色·無表色
〔難〕有人問：「表色」（身體、言語表現出來的業，看得見、聽得到）和「無表色」（藏在裡頭、不顯露出來的業色）難道不是實有的嗎？〔答〕這也不是實有的，為什麼呢？
先說「身表色」（身體做出來的動作這種業色）。它要是實有，那它拿什麼當本體？你若說它就是「形狀」，那它就不是實有的——因為形狀可以再分析（拆得開的就不是實一的）；再說，「長、短」這些形狀根本找不到它的「極微」（沒有所謂『一小份的長』『一小份的短』，可見形狀並不是由實在的微塵組成的）。
你若說「身表色」就是「動」（動作），那也不是實有的——因為一切法都是剛生出來馬上就滅掉的，根本沒有「移動」這回事（剎那剎那地生滅，沒有一個東西真的從這裡挪到那裡）。再說，有為法的「滅」是用不著別的原因的（法自己就會滅，並沒有另一個『使它滅』的原因）；那「滅」若還要等個原因（比如要等「動」才滅），那它就不是真正的「滅」了（要靠原因才滅的，就不是法自然而滅）。
你又也許說：『有那麼一種色，既不是顯色（青黃這些顏色）、也不是形色（長短這些形狀），它是由心引生出來的，能讓手腳動起來，這就叫『身表業』。』這道理也立不住，逼問下去：這（色）若就是「動」，那前面已經破過了（根本沒有移動這回事）；它若是『使東西動的原因』，那它就該是「風界」了（四大裡頭主管動的是風），可是風界並沒有『表達、顯示（內心）』的作用，就不該叫它「表」了（風吹東西動，並不是在表達什麼業）。再說（風界屬於觸塵，）觸塵是不通善、惡性的（觸是無記的，可表業卻分善惡，兩邊對不上）；至於那些『不是顯色』的、香、味等等，也照「觸」這個例子可以曉得（都當不了表業的本體）。所以「身表業」一定不是實有的。
那麼按正理，到底是怎麼回事呢？是以「心」當原因，讓『識所變出來的手等色相』一念念地生滅接續、朝別的方位挪過去，看起來好像有動作（其實是一連串新的色相在生滅接續，並不是同一個東西真的挪了位）；因為它能『把內心表達出來』，所以才借個名叫它「身表」（身表只是假名）。
「語表」（說出來的話這種業）也不是實有的聲音本體，理由有三條：一是單單一剎那的聲音表達不了意思（一個剎那湊不成一句話的意思）；二是好多念接續起來的聲音又是假合的、不是實有的（許多合在一起的是假法）；三是心外的有對色（聲音屬於有對色）前面已經破過了。那麼按正理：是因為有「心」，識才變現出像「聲音」那樣的相，一念念地生滅接續，看起來好像在表達什麼，所以才借個名叫它「語表」，這在道理上沒有違背（語表也只是假名）。
「表色」既然不是實有的，那「無表色」哪會是實有的呢？不過按正理，依著「思願」（造作的心思、發願的心思）善惡的那個分限，假立一個「無表」，這在道理上也沒有違背。意思是說：這個「無表」，有的是依著『能發起殊勝身、語業的那種善惡之思』、在它種子增長的階段而立的（這叫散位無表）；有的是依著『在定中止息身、語之惡的那種思』而立的（這叫定中無表）；所以它是假有的（無表也只是假名）。
（庚）會通三業·業道（破撥身語業）
〔難〕有人問：世尊在經裡明明說有「身、語、意」三種業，你現在把「身業、語業」說成不是實在的色，這豈不是跟經唱反調？〔答〕並沒有把它一筆抹掉、說它沒有（三業還是承認的），只是說它『不是色』（不是實在的色法，而是「思」的一種分位罷了）。
那『能讓身體動起來』的那個「思」（心思、意志），就叫它「身業」；『能發出言語』的那個「思」，就叫它「語業」；至於『審慮思』和「決定思」這兩種思，因為它們跟意相應、又能造作鼓動這個意，所以就叫它「意業」（可見這三種業，本體其實都是「思」）。
那『發起身、語的思』既然有所造作，就叫它「業」；又因為它是審慮思、決定思『所走過的路』（思在它上頭經行），而且能通向、生出苦或樂的異熟果報，所以也叫它「道」。所以前七種「業道」（身的三種、語的四種）也都是以「思」為本體的；或者這麼說，身表、語表是由思發出來的，所以借個名叫它「業」，又因為它是思所走過的路，所以叫它「業道」（說到底業道還是「思」）。
由此應該明白：心外根本沒有色，只有內識變現出像色的相生起來而已。（破色法到此全部結束。）
（辛）破不相應行——總標
破完色法，接著破第二類——「不相應行」（跟心不相應的那類行法），它也不是實有的，為什麼呢？像「得、非得」這些不相應行，一來它不像色、心和各種心所那樣，有個自己找得到的『本體相狀』；二來它也不是『離開色、心和各種心所』、另有一個找得到的「作用」。由這兩點就曉得，它一定不是實有的，只是依著色、心等的「分位」（也就是種種差別狀態）假立出來的名目罷了。
這裡用推理來成立，分三條看：第一，這個不相應行一定不是『離開色、心、心所、另有實在本體和作用』的東西——它就像色、心那些一樣（色心都有實在的體用、又都歸在蘊裡頭），因為大家也都承認不相應行是歸在「行蘊」裡的（同樣歸在蘊裡的法，就不該離開色心另有實在的體用）。第二，因為它『色、心、心所、無為這四樣都收不進去』，所以它就跟「畢竟無」（徹底的虛無）一樣，一定不是實有的。第三，因為它『其餘那些實在的法都收不進去』，所以它就跟其餘那些假法一樣，沒有實在的本體。（破不相應行的總綱到此為止。）
（壬）破得·非得
〔難〕先破「得、非得」。對方（薩婆多部）怎麼曉得「得、非得」是離開色、心等、另有實在本體和作用的呢？他們答：因為經裡這麼說的。比如經說『某某有情（補特伽羅，也就是眾生）成就了善法、惡法』、『聖者成就了十種無學法』；又說『凡夫沒成就聖法』、『阿羅漢沒成就煩惱』——他們說，這「成就、不成就」的字眼，正是在說「得、非得」（所以得、非得是實有的）。
〔答〕可是經裡並沒有說這「成就、不成就」是離開色、心等、另有實在本體和作用的（經只是講「成就、不成就」，並沒講另有一個實在的「得」）；所以拿這個來當證據，是立不住的。
再說，經裡也講『轉輪王成就了七寶』，難道輪王就（憑著一個實在的『得』）把別人的身體、那些無情的東西也都成就到自己身上了嗎（七寶裡頭可是含著別人、含著無情之物的）？你若說『輪王對七寶有自由受用的能力，所以才『假說』他成就了七寶』（並不是真有個實在的『得』），那麼對善、惡法你為什麼不也照樣承認是「假說成就」，偏要硬說另有一個實在的「得」呢？
你也許會辯解：『七寶是現在的東西，東西現在在，才可以『假說』成就它（言下之意：善惡法卻在過去未來，得有個實在的『得』把它繫住）。』那就破你：你怎麼曉得你所成就的善、惡等法是『離開現在』（跑到過去未來）才有的呢？離開現在的實在之法，按道理是沒有的（過去、未來的法沒有本體）；再說，現在身上一定有『善的種子』等等（善法就是拿現在的種子當本體的，憑這個就可以假說成就，哪裡用得著一個實在的「得」）。
再說，這個「得」對於法到底有什麼用呢？你若說『得能讓法現起來』，那就一條一條看：第一，它也該能讓「無為法」現起來才對（得既然不分對象，可無為法是不會現起的）；第二，『一切無情的東西』（身上沒有得的）就該永遠也現不起來了（可無情之物明明也會生起）；第三，一個法在『還沒得到、已經失掉』的時候就該永遠生不起來了（可丟了又重新得到的事明明是有的）。你若改說『跟法同時生的那個得』才是讓法現起的原因，那你另外執著的「二生」（生相、生生相，那兩個專管讓法生起的不相應行）就成了廢物了（既然拿得當生起的原因，又何必再要那二生）。再說，一個眾生身上若同時有善、惡、無記三性的「得」，那善、惡、無記的法就該一下子全冒出來了（三個得都在嘛）；你若說還得等別的原因（才一個一個現起），那「得」就又成了廢物了（反正還得等別的原因，可見得並不是讓法生起的原因）。
你若改說「得」對於法是個『不讓它丟失的原因』（靠它法才不丟、才一直成就著），那也不通：那些『可以成就的法』本來就離不開有情（法本來就依著有情的身心而在），要是離了有情，這些法根本就無從談起（離了身就無從成就）；所以這個「得」對於法（不管你說它是讓法生起的原因、還是不讓法丟失的原因）都是廢物（不立這個得，法自自然然就繫在有情身上）。「得」既然其實沒有，那「非得」（得的反面）也就跟著沒有了。（破得、非得到此為止。）
那麼按正理，是依著『有情可以成就種種法』這個分位，假立出三種「成就」來：一是「種子成就」、二是「自在成就」、三是「現行成就」。把這三種反過來，就假立出「不成就」的名目（也就是非得）。這「非得」一類雖然不少，可是其中最要緊的一個是：在三界『見道才斷得掉的那些種子』還沒有被永遠斷除的時候，就假立一個「非得」的名目，這就叫「異生性」（也就是凡夫的體性）——因為凡夫對於種種聖法都還沒成就。（破得、非得到此全部結束。）
（癸）破同分（眾同分）
〔難〕接著破「同分」（眾同分，也就是有情共同的那種類性，讓天是天、人是人的那個共通分位）。對方怎麼曉得「同分」是離開色、心等、另有實在本體和作用的呢？他們答：因為經裡這麼說的。比如經說『這是天的同分、這是人的同分』，乃至往下廣說（各道各有各的同分，所以同分是實有的）。
〔答〕可是這部經並沒有說「同分」是離開色、心等、另有實在本體的（經只是講「同一類」，並沒講另有一個別的本體）；所以拿這個來當證據，是立不住的。
對方又說：『我們對眾生會起『這是人、那也是人』這種相同的認識、相同的稱呼，這是憑著『同分』才起得來的，所以曉得同分是實有的。』那就破他，兩條看：第一，照這麼說，草、木這些（我們也會起『這是草、那也是草』這種相同的認識和稱呼）也該有「同分」了（可他自己並不承認草木有同分）。第二，再說，你既然能對著「同分」起相同的認識、相同的稱呼（同分自己也成了被緣的對象、也引出相同的稱呼），那「同分」自己頭上就又該另有一個「同分」了（這樣一層套一層、沒完沒了）；可他自己又不承認『同分還另有一個同分』——既然後面這條他不認，那前面這條（拿相同認識、相同稱呼來證明同分實有）又怎麼立得住呢？
對方又說：『『同分』能當原因，引起『相同的事業、相同的欲望』（人人都做人該做的事、都有人該有的欲望），所以曉得它是實有的。』這道理也立不住：其實是『過去世的串習（積累的習氣）』當原因，就能引起這些相同的事業和欲望了，何必另外執著有個實在的「同分」呢？那麼按正理，是依著『有情身、心彼此相似』的這個分位差別，假立一個「同分」罷了。（破同分到此為止。）
（子）破命根
〔難〕接著破「命根」。對方怎麼曉得「命根」是離開色、心等、另有實在本體的呢？他們答：因為經裡這麼說的。比如經說『壽、煖、識這三樣（合在一起，有情才活得下去）』，他們說，這裡頭那個「命根」就叫作「壽」（所以命根是實有的）。
〔答〕可是這部經並沒有說有一個『離開色、心等的實在壽體』（經只是講壽、煖、識三樣，並沒講「壽」是另一個本體）；所以拿這個來當證據，是立不住的。再說，前面已經成立了『色離不開識』，那這個（命根）也該離不開識、並沒有另外一個命根。再用推理逼一逼：命根若是離開識、另外實有的，那它就該跟「受」這些心所一樣（受等雖然離開識也是另一回事，可它並不叫命根），總之離開識的那東西就不是真正的命根。
〔難〕有人問：照你這麼說（壽就是識、並沒有另一個本體），那經裡為什麼要分開講「壽、煖、識」三樣（豈不正說明三個各別）？〔答〕那是就「意思」的不同而分成三個來講的，就好比「四正斷」（四正勤本來只是一個精進，只是就意思分成四個來講罷了）。〔難〕那人又問：到了「無心位」（像無想定那些，心不活動的時候），識既然不起作用了，那壽、煖就該沒有了（你既說壽就是識，無心的時候不就沒了壽）？〔答〕你難道沒聽經裡說「識不離身」嗎（無心位裡其實還有識）？〔難〕那人再追問：既然（無心位裡還有識），那又怎麼能叫它「無心位」呢？〔答〕那無心位裡滅掉的只是「轉識」（前六識那些），並不是「阿賴耶識」（第八識還在，所以還有壽、煖，可前六識不起，就叫它無心位了）。至於『有這個第八識』的證據，後文會詳細講。這個第八識，足以當『界（三界）、趣（六道）、生（四生）』的本體，它是周遍的、恆常的、接續不斷的，又是異熟果報，所以根本用不著另外執著有個實在的「命根」。
那麼按正理，是依著『那能直接生出第八識的種子』、又由著『業力所牽引出來的種種功能差別』，而把它『住世的時間定了下來』（這一期能活多久是定好的），就依這個假立一個「命根」罷了。（破命根到此為止。）
（丑）破二無心定·無想異熟
〔難〕接著破「二無心定」（無想定和滅盡定）跟「無想異熟」（無想天的果報）。對方怎麼曉得這幾樣是離開色、心等、另有實在本體的呢？他們的理由是：這幾樣要是沒有實在本體，那它們就不該擋得住心、心所、讓它不現起了（既然擋得住心，可見它有實在本體）。〔答〕反過來破他：你若說『在無心位裡，有一個跟色、心等不同的實在之法，能擋住心，這就叫無心定』，那照同樣的道理，『在無色位（無色界）裡，也該有一個跟色等不同的實在之法，能擋住色，叫它無色定』才對（可無色界裡並沒有這麼個專門擋住色的實在之法）；既然那邊（無色定）並不是這樣（並沒有個實在之法去擋色），那這邊（無心定有個實在之法去擋心）又怎麼立得住呢？
再說，要擋住心，哪裡非得要個實在之法？就像堤壩這些東西（其實也是假合之物），假法照樣擋得住水。這裡是怎麼回事呢？是修定的時候，在快入定的加行階段，行者厭煩那『粗重浮動的心、心所』，所以發起一個殊勝的「期願」（盼著進入無心的那種願），拿它來壓伏心、心所；讓心、心所漸漸變細、漸漸變微，到了「微微心」（極細微的那一念心）的時候，就熏進「異熟識」（第八識）裡頭，熏成一種『極強的厭心等種子』；憑著這種厭種去壓伏住現行的心等種子，那粗重浮動的心等就暫時不現起來了——就依著這『不現起的分位』，假立出「二無心定」來。（這二定也只是假名。）
這（厭心等）種子是善的，所以立出來的這個定也就叫「善」。再說無想異熟：在修「無想定」之前，行者一心盼著「無想果」（也就是生到無想天去的果報），所以他熏成的那個種子，就能招來那個「異熟識」（無想天一期的果報身）；靠著（無想天的）定力，粗重浮動的想等都不起作用了，就依著這個分位假立一個「無想（異熟）」。它是依著異熟（果報）立的，所以得了「異熟」這個名。所以這三樣（兩種無心定、無想異熟）也都不是實有的。（破到此為止。）
（寅）破有為相（生住異滅·卷二）
（以下入第二卷，續破不相應行之「有為相」。）
〔難〕接著破「有為相」（也就是生、住、異、滅這四相）。對方怎麼曉得這些有為相是離開色、心等、另有實在本體的呢？他們答：因為經裡這麼說的，比如經說『有三種有為法的有為相（生、異、滅，或者合起來算生、住、異、滅四個）』，乃至往下廣說。〔答〕可是這部經並沒有說（有為相）是離開色、心等、另有實在本體的（經只是標出這幾個相，並沒講它們另有別的本體）；所以拿這個來當證據，是立不住的。
接著正面說明：這四相和它所相的法（色、心）並不是兩回事，分三條看：第一，「有為『之』相」這個說法裡頭的「之」字（梵文屬格的「之」），並不表示相和本體是兩個不同的東西——就好比「色、心『之』體」說到底就是色、心本身（這個「之」字並不表示兩回事）。第二，「能相」（生等四相）的本體，並不一定跟「所相」（色、心）是兩回事——不然的話，『堅硬等等的相』也該跟「地」這些是兩回事了（可地本來就拿堅硬當相，堅相並不跟地的本體是兩回事）。第三，假如「有為相」真跟「所相」的本體是兩回事，那「無為相」（無為法的相）也該跟它的所相是兩回事了（可無為相並不跟無為是兩回事，照這個例子就曉得，有為相也不跟有為是兩回事）。
再說，生、住、異、滅這四個相（薩婆多部主張這四相同時都在），逼問下去就出毛病：它們的本體既然同時都在，那它們的作用就該無時無刻一齊發動才對（本體都在，作用就該都在）；你若說（四相）彼此互相違反、所以作用沒法一下子都發動，那它們的「本體」也該互相違反才對（作用既然違反，本體也該違反），那又怎麼能說它們『同時都在』呢（作用都不能同時，本體也就不該同時）？再說，「住、異、滅」這三個的作用尤其不該同時（住是讓法停住、滅是讓法滅掉，根本相反）。再逼一層：『能相（四相）』和『所相（色心）』的本體既然都是本來就有的（薩婆多主張法體永遠都在），那它們的「作用」也該本來就一直在才對（本體和作用沒有兩樣），因為本體和作用是一回事；你若說『那四相的作用還得等因緣（才發得起來）』，那它所等的那個「因緣」就該不是本來就有的了（要等因緣才起，就不是本來就有，這又跟你『法體永遠都在』的主張打架了）。
再說，照薩婆多『法體本來就有』這說法逼下去，毛病一條接一條：第一，既然法體本來就有，那再執著有個「生」等四相就成廢物了（法本來就有，還要「生」幹嘛）。第二，「所相」（色心）既然本來就一直有，「生」等又跟它配在一塊兒（說生能讓本來就有的法現起），那「無為法」也該有「生」等了（無為也是法，憑什麼不被生），因為找不出『無為跟有為該分開算』的什麼理由（沒道理只生有為不生無為）。第三，（薩婆多承認）過去、未來世的法體：它既不是現在、又不是恆常，那它就該像空中花一樣，不是實有的（過去未來的法沒有本體）。第四，「生」是『讓法成為有』的，那它怎麼能待在「未來」呢（未來還沒有，怎麼談得上讓法成為有）？「滅」是『讓法成為無』的，那它就該不在「現在」（現在的法是有的，怎麼談得上讓它成為無）。第五，「滅」若不是「無」（薩婆多硬說滅也有本體），那「生」也該不是「有」了（生和滅是同一個道理，你這就自相矛盾了）。第六，「滅」和「住」本來相反，你怎麼能執著它們同時呢（住和滅相反，不該同時在）？「住」跟「生」並不相反，你又怎麼容得它們處在不同的世呢（住和生並不相反，可薩婆多卻把生判在現在、住也判在現在、四相還要分先後，自相矛盾）？所以薩婆多執著的這套（四相實有、又同時都在），不管你說它『同時都在』還是說它『處在不同的世』，都不合道理。
那麼按正理是怎麼回事呢？有為法靠著因緣的力量，總是『本來沒有、如今才有』、『暫時有了、隨後又沒有』；為了顯出它跟「無為」不一樣（無為沒有這四相），才假立「生、住、異、滅」四個相。『本來沒有、如今才有』——它「有」的那一段就叫「生」；「生」的這一段暫時停住，就叫它「住」；「住」這一段裡頭有前後的差別（前面跟後面不一樣了），就再立一個「異」的名；『暫時有了、隨後又沒有』——它「沒有」的那會兒就叫「滅」。前三個相（生、住、異）是「有」，所以同在現在；後一個相（滅）是「無」，所以在過去。（這四相都是依著現在的法假立的。）
〔難〕有人問：「滅」既然是『已經歸於無的東西』，那它怎麼能當有為法的「相」呢（已經沒有的東西哪能當相）？〔答〕那「滅相」是用來表顯『這個法後來歸於無』的，拿它當（有為法的）相有什麼不對？——「生」是表顯有為法『先前沒有』、「滅」是表顯有為法『後來沒有』、「異」是表顯這個法『不是凝固不變的』、「住」是表顯這個法『暫時還有作用』。所以這四個相對著有為法，雖然都叫「表」（表顯），可是它們所表顯的各有各的不同。
上面這是依著「剎那」（極短的一念）來假立四相；若是就「一期」（一段生命歷程）這個分位來看，也照樣可以假立四相：最初的有叫「生」；最後的無叫「滅」；生出來以後相似地接續下去叫「住」；就在這接續當中起的變化叫「異」。所以這四相全都是假立的。（破有為相到此為止。）
（卯）破名身·句身·文身
〔難〕接著破「名身、句身、文身」（也就是名稱、句子、字母這三組能表達意思的東西）。對方怎麼曉得這幾樣是離開色、心等、另有實在的能表達之體的呢？他們答：因為經裡這麼說的，比如經說『佛得了稀有的名、句、文身』（所以名、句、文是實有的）。〔答〕可是這部經並沒有說（名、句、文）是離開色、心等、另有實在的「名」等本體（經只是在讚歎佛的功德，並沒講它們另有別的本體）；所以拿這個來當證據，是立不住的。
「名、句、文」若是離開「聲音」、另外實有的，那它就該跟色等一樣，並不能真正表達意思（一旦離了聲音另成一個東西，就跟色一樣，光擺在那兒不傳達意思）。再說，你說『聲音能生出名、句、文』，那這聲音本身就一定帶著『音韻的抑揚曲折』（聲調的高低起伏），光憑這抑揚曲折就已經足以表達意思了，又何必另外再立一個名、句、文呢（聲音自己就能表意，名句文就多餘了）？你若辯解說『聲音上頭的那個音韻曲折就是名、句、文，而且它離開聲音、另外實有』，那就破你：照這麼說，『我們看見的色上頭的形狀曲折』（東西的形狀彎彎曲曲）也該離開「色」、另有一個實在本體了（色上頭的曲折並不另立一個本體，那聲音上頭的曲折憑什麼就能另立一個）。
你又也許辯解說：『聲音上頭的音韻曲折，就像琴弦、簫管那種樂器聲一樣，本身並不能表達意思（樂器聲也有抑揚曲折，可它不傳達意思，所以才另外要立個能表意的名句文）。』那就破你：照這麼說，這（說話的聲音）就該跟那（樂器聲）一樣，不另外生出名等了（既然都同樣有曲折、又同樣不傳達意思，那它也就不生名句文）。再說，誰說那樂器聲就一定不能表達意思呢？要是（有曲折的）聲音就能表意，那風鈴的聲音這些也該有表達的作用了（它們也都有抑揚曲折嘛）；反過來，要是樂器聲、風鈴聲不能表意，那這（說話的聲音）也該跟那（樂器聲、鈴聲）一樣，不另外生出實在的名、句、文身來（說話的聲音跟樂器聲是同一類，不該一個能生、一個不能生）。
你若說『只有『說話的聲音』才能生出名等（樂器聲、風鈴聲就不行）』，那你為什麼不乾脆承認『只有說話的聲音才能表達意思』呢（既然只有語聲才生得出那能表意的名，那就等於說只有語聲能表意，何必夾一個名句文在中間）？再說，你憑什麼道理斷定『能表意的就是說話的聲音』呢（你既然曉得能表意的就是語聲，那正好成立了『只有語聲能表意』）？再說，你又怎麼曉得『離開說話的聲音、另有一個能表意的東西（名句文）』呢？『說話的聲音跟能表意的不是兩回事』，這是人、天都明白的事；偏要執著『能表意的跟說話的聲音是兩回事（另外立個名句文）』的，只有「天愛」（這是對愚人的一種譏稱）那種人才這麼想，別的有智慧的人是不會認可的。
那麼按正理，是依著『說話的聲音』那些分位差別，假建立出「名身、句身、文身」三樣來：「名」是表達事物的『本身是什麼』（比如『色』、『香』這些名稱）；「句」是表達事物的「種種差別」（連成句子，比如『色是無常』）；「文」就是「字」（也就是字母、音素），是名、句這兩樣的依託。這三樣離開了「聲音」雖然沒有另外的本體，可是（名句文是假、聲音是實，）假和實到底有差別，所以（名句文）也不就等於聲音（跟聲音是不一也不異）。
正因為（名句文跟聲音不一也不異），所以「法無礙解」（緣的是名句文）和「詞無礙解」（緣的是聲音）這兩種，所緣的對象有差別；而且「聲音」和「名」等在蘊、處、界裡頭的歸屬也各不相同（聲音歸在色蘊、聲處，名等歸在行蘊、法處）。還要補一句：這（依著聲音假立名句文）是就『我們這個世界』（娑婆世界）來說的，並不是一切佛國都這樣；其餘的佛國，也有依著『光明、妙香、味道』這些去假立名、句、文這三樣的（可見並不限於聲音）。（破名句文到此為止。）
（辰）破隨眠·遮餘不相應行
有一派主張：「隨眠」（也就是煩惱的種子）是離開心、心所的，歸在「不相應行蘊」裡頭。這也不合理：因為隨眠照樣叫「貪」等等（貪、瞋這些隨眠），那它就跟現行的貪等一個樣（都是跟心相應的），並不是不相應行（隨眠是煩惱的種子，屬於心法那一邊，不是不相應行）。
凡是執著另有其餘那些「不相應行」（像勢速、次第、和合性這些）的，都可以照前面（破得、破命根等等）那一套道理，一個一個地破掉。（破不相應行到此全部結束。）
〔Verses commented〕Continuing: unfolding verse 1 · refuting the dharma-attachment
3. Refuting the form and other dharmas held by the other vehicles (the Hīnayāna)
The heterodox now refuted, next come the other schools (the Hīnayāna). They maintain "there really exist, apart from the mind, dharmas of every kind such as form"; why is it said that these too cannot be found, that they are not really existent? Because the three classes they maintain — "form," "the non-concurrent formations," and "the various unconditioned dharmas" — are, in principle, none of them really existent. (Below, the refutation runs in this order, class by class: first form, then the non-concurrent formations, last the unconditioned.)
(a) Refuting form — refuting atoms (resistant form)
Take first form. The form they maintain falls into two kinds: one is "resistant form" (有對色, form with obstruction, that mutually blocks), composed of atoms; the other is "non-resistant form" (無對色, form without obstruction), not composed of atoms. First the refutation of the first kind: "resistant form" is definitely not really existent, because the "atom" that composes it is simply not really existent.
Take these atoms, press from two sides: either it has obstruction (takes up space, blocks the way), and then it is like a pot and its class, which can be taken apart — assembled and conventional, not really existent (what has obstruction can all be taken apart); or it has no obstruction, and then it is on the same footing as "what is not form" (such as mind and the mental factors), and how then could it gather and assemble into things with obstruction, like a pot or a garment (what has no obstruction cannot add up to a body with obstruction)?
Again, these atoms, still pressed from two sides: either it has "spatial division" (has position, has parts), and then it can necessarily be cut and analyzed further, and so is not really existent (what can be taken apart is not an indivisible real unit); or it has no spatial division, and then it is on the same footing as "what is not form," and how then could they gather and "catch the light on one side and cast a shadow on the other"? Look: when the sun has just risen and shines on a pillar and such things, the pillar's east side and west side each show forth light (the face toward the sun) and shadow (the face away from the sun); and since "the place that catches the light" and "the place that casts the shadow" are not the same spot (one thing has a sun-facing side and a sun-away side to be told apart), the atom that composes it must have spatial division (a side facing, a side turned away).
Again, when we look at or touch a wall and such things, we get only the side that faces us, not the side turned away. And since "this assembled thing" is, in the end, just "that heap of atoms" (an assembled thing is nothing but the many atoms), this atom must have spatial division (a side facing me, a side turned away).
Again, these atoms, wherever they sit, must have the differences of up, down, and the four directions; if they did not, they would have no way to lie side by side and assemble into a heap (without position, there is no piling up one against another). Otherwise (granting it truly had no spatial division), atom upon atom would overlap and crowd into the very same spot, and so could not pile into anything large (all stacked in one place, how could they make something big?). From this it is known: the atom must have spatial division.
Since you maintain "resistant form just is that heap of atoms," press one layer more: if the atom had no spatial division, it ought not to "block and bar" (without spatial division there is no mutual blocking); and if it does not block, then it is not "resistant form" (which has obstruction, mutually blocks) at all — yet "resistant form" is precisely what you posited. So the atom you maintain must have spatial division; and since it has spatial division, it can be cut and analyzed, and so is definitely not really existent. And thus the thesis "resistant form is really existent" cannot stand. (The refutation of resistant form ends here.)
(b) Refuting non-resistant form — the form the five consciousnesses rest on and refer to is consciousness's own transformation
〔Q〕 Someone asks: do the first five consciousnesses (eye-consciousness through body-consciousness) then have no "form they rest on" (the five faculties) and no "form they refer to" (the five objects)? 〔A〕 It is not that there is no form; only, that form is all manifested by consciousness. That is: when a consciousness arises, by the force of the causes and conditions within it (the seeds), it manifests images that look like "the five faculties, eye and the rest" and "the five objects, form and the rest," and it takes just these (images manifested by the inner consciousness) as the form it rests on (the faculty) and refers to (the object).
Yet note: "the five faculties, eye and the rest" are not got by direct perception, seen at first hand (the faculty itself is not visible); it is "because it can set a consciousness going" that we know by inference it exists. This faculty is only a "function" (the power to set a consciousness going, a force borne on the seeds), not a really-existent form made out of something outside the mind (atoms).
Since "resistant form outside the mind" cannot be established in principle (the atom having already been refuted above), the faculty rested on must be only a function manifested by the inner consciousness — this function, which can set the eye-consciousness and the rest going, is what is named "the eye-faculty and the rest"; it is taken (this faculty manifested by the inner consciousness) as the rest, and the eye-consciousness and the rest are produced.
The eye-consciousness and the rest taking "a real object outside the mind as their object-condition" cannot be established in principle; so one must concede that "the appearance consciousness itself transforms" is its object-condition — that is, the thing that "can draw forth an image resembling the consciousness itself" is the "object-condition of this consciousness" that you too must concede (the object-condition must be that appearance upon consciousness which can draw forth an image like the consciousness itself).
To be the "object-condition," it is not enough merely that something "can produce this consciousness" (it must also carry an appearance, able to draw forth an image like the consciousness itself); otherwise, the "causal condition (the seeds)" and such, which can also produce a consciousness, would all have to be called this consciousness's object-condition too (the seeds can produce the consciousness, yet they are not what the consciousness refers to — so "able to produce" alone is not enough).
When the five consciousnesses, eye and the rest, cognize form and the like, they refer only to the "aggregated appearance" (the whole-appearance that many atoms put together make), because there shows forth upon consciousness an image resembling that aggregated appearance; it is not that the "aggregated appearance" has a real body of its own apart from that heap of atoms. When you break that (aggregated) thing apart and analyze it, the consciousness that "shows forth an image resembling it" definitely does not arise (break it apart and the whole-appearance does not show, so the consciousness does not arise either) — which shows the "aggregated appearance" is not really existent at all, and so cannot be said to be the object-condition the five consciousnesses refer to. Otherwise, "a second moon" (the false moon seen when rubbing the eyes, which in fact does not exist) and such things could produce the five consciousnesses too (such a false image can produce a consciousness, yet it is not a real object — exactly like the aggregated appearance).
Nor can it be said that "when the heap of atoms is gathered together, each atom serves one by one as the object of the five consciousnesses" — for what shows forth upon the five consciousnesses is the whole-appearance, with no "appearance of single atoms" at all (what shows on consciousness is the total appearance, not the atom-appearance). Nor can it be said that "the heap of atoms (each) carries the aggregated appearance" — for when they have not yet gathered, this "aggregated appearance" is not there (the aggregated appearance is not something the atoms have of themselves).
Nor can it be said that "at the time of gathering" and "at the time of not gathering" the substance and appearance of these atoms are in any way different (the atom's substance-and-appearance is unchanged before and after); so "the time of gathering" is just like "the time of not gathering," and the atoms of form and the rest are not the object of the five consciousnesses (gathered or not, the atom-appearance is not the object consciousness refers to).
(c) Refuting the "collected appearance" (the rescue offered by another school)
Another school comes forward to rescue the position (the "combined appearance" having just been refuted, they shift their account): the single atoms of form and the rest, while they are "not yet collected together," are indeed not an object of the five consciousnesses; but once they reach the state of "being collected together with one another," these atoms mutually reinforce one another, and a "coarse appearance" arises, which serves as the object of the five consciousnesses; and they hold that this coarse appearance is really existent, taking it as what this consciousness refers to. (This is the rescue called "the collected appearance is really existent.")
This rescue does not hold either; here it is refuted point by point. First: an atom in the state of "being collected together" and in the state of "not yet collected" has one and the same substance and appearance (collecting changes nothing in a single atom's substance-and-appearance) — so where would the "coarse appearance" spring from? Second: a pot and a clay basin and such things — supposing the atoms composing them were equal in number — then the consciousness that refers to their two appearances ought to have no difference (the atom-appearance being the same, the consciousness could not tell them apart), yet we plainly see a pot and a basin as different. Third: at the moment of collecting, if a coarse appearance really arose, then each single atom ought to "cast off its original tiny, round appearance" (turning coarse, the tiny-round appearance would be gone), yet the atoms do not in fact cast off their tiny round appearance. Fourth: a "consciousness referring to a coarse appearance" ought not to go and refer to "an object of tiny appearance" (what shows on consciousness is coarse, but the object is only tiny atoms — the two sides do not match); otherwise it would amount to "a consciousness referring to this object going off and referring to that object" (mistaking the one for the other). Fifth: (if you drop the requirement that consciousness and object must match) then one consciousness ought to be able to refer to every object (once the "appearance must match" restriction is gone, anything could be referred to).
That school still concedes there are atoms, and tried to use them to rescue the "collected appearance" — and already it has brought this whole heap of faults down upon itself; how much more so when (on the consciousness-only view) there are simply no real atoms outside the mind at all, so that the "collected appearance" can the less be established. (The refutation of the collected appearance ends here.)
(d) Conclusion: every form-with-obstruction is consciousness's own transformation · "atom" is a conventional designation
From this it can be settled for certain: the true object-condition is "the form-resembling appearance that consciousness itself transforms into" — for the "seeing-part" (the apprehending side) arises in dependence on it (the image-part) and carries its (the image-part's) appearance. And when consciousness transforms, it manifests "a single whole appearance" all at once, according to the size of the object, large or small (one whole image-part); it does not separately transform out a multitude of atoms and then assemble them into one thing (consciousness manifests the whole appearance at a stroke, with no need to piece it together out of atoms).
Then why did the Buddha himself speak of "atoms"? It was for the sake of those who cling to "coarse form having a real substance" that the Buddha set out the teaching of "atoms," telling them to analyze form away layer by layer (so as to break the clinging to "coarse form is really existent"); he did not mean that there is really such a thing as an atom inside form (the atom is an expedient way of speaking, not a really existent dharma). The yoga-practitioners, with a "cognition of imagined supposition" (an analytic supposing carried out in contemplation), break the appearance of coarse form down step by step, and where it "can be broken down no further" they conventionally give it the name "atom." This atom still does have spatial division; only it is no longer (in the contemplative cognition) divided further — for were it divided yet further, there would show forth an appearance like "empty space," no longer counting as form. And so the atom is said to be "the very last limit of form" (the extreme reached when form is analyzed to the end, not a real existing mote).
From this it should be understood: every "form-with-obstruction" is a manifestation transformed by consciousness, and is not composed of (real) atoms.
(e) Refuting the reality of "form-without-obstruction" (無對色)
As for the other kind, "form-without-obstruction" (無對色, the form gathered under the dharma-base that offers no physical resistance) — since it belongs to the very same class as the foregoing (the consciousness-transformed form just dealt with), it too is not really existent; and besides, being by its very nature "without obstruction," it is just like mind and the mental-associates (which likewise offer no resistance), and so is certainly not a real form-dharma. Only consider: that "form-with-obstruction," which does plainly show forth a form-appearance and does resist, when pressed by reasoning turns out not even to exist apart from consciousness — how much less can this "form-without-obstruction," which by its nature shows forth no form-appearance at all (inconspicuous, obstructing nothing), be called a true form-dharma (if even form-with-obstruction does not stand, form-without-obstruction stands the less)?
(f) Refuting expressive form (表色) and non-expressive form (無表色)
〔Q〕Someone asks: is "expressive form" (表色, the karma displayed by body and speech — visible, audible) and "non-expressive form" (無表色, the hidden karma-form that does not show itself outwardly) not really existent? 〔A〕This too is not really existent. Why so?
First take "bodily expressive form" (身表色, the karma-form that is the body's performing of an action). If it is really existent, what does it take for its own substance? If you say it is just "shape," then it is not really existent — for shape can be analyzed further (what can be broken apart is not unitarily real); and besides, for "long, short" and such shapes one can find no "atom" at all (there is no such thing as "a tiny bit of length" or "a tiny bit of shortness" — which shows that shape is not composed of real motes).
If you say "bodily expressive form" is just "motion" (the moving), that too is not really existent — for every dharma is born and perishes in the very instant, so there is no such thing as "moving across" at all (instant by instant things arise and perish; nothing actually travels from here to there). Moreover, the "perishing" of a conditioned dharma waits upon no other cause (a dharma perishes of itself; there is no separate cause that "makes it perish"); and if "perishing" still had to wait upon a cause (say, had to wait upon "motion" before it perished), then it would not be true "perishing" at all (what perishes only by relying on a cause is not a dharma perishing of its own nature).
You might then say: "There is a kind of form that is neither display-color (the blues and yellows) nor shape-color (the longs and shorts); it is drawn forth by mind, can set the hands and so on in motion, and this is what is called 'bodily expressive karma.'" This too will not stand, and pressed it falls apart: if this (form) is just "motion," it was already refuted above (there is no moving-across at all); if it is "the cause that makes things move," then it would have to be the "wind-element" (among the four great elements it is wind that governs motion) — yet the wind-element has no function of "expressing, displaying (the inner mind)," and so should not be called "expressive" at all (wind blowing a thing into motion is not expressing any karma). Furthermore (since the wind-element belongs to the tangible base), the tangible does not range over good and evil natures (the tangible is karmically neutral, yet expressive karma divides into good and evil — the two sides do not match up); and as for what is "not display-color," together with smell and taste and the like, they may be understood on the model of "the tangible" (none of them can serve as the substance of expressive karma). Therefore "bodily expressive karma" is certainly not really existent.
What, then, is really going on, rightly understood? It is mind that serves as cause, making "the form-appearances of hands and so on that consciousness transforms into" arise-and-perish moment by moment in succession and shift toward another quarter, so that there seems to be an action (in fact it is a string of fresh form-appearances arising and perishing in succession — not one same thing actually moving its place); and because this can "express the inner mind," it is given the borrowed name "bodily expression" (bodily expression is only a conventional designation).
"Verbal expression" (語表, the karma that is spoken speech) likewise is not a really existent sound-substance, for three reasons: first, a single instant of sound expresses no meaning (one instant cannot make up the sense of a sentence); second, sound made up of many successive instants is a conventional composite, not really existent (what is many joined together is a conventional dharma); third, the external form-with-obstruction (sound belongs to form-with-obstruction) was already refuted above. Rightly understood, then: because of mind, consciousness transforms into an appearance resembling "sound," arising-and-perishing moment by moment in succession, so that there seems to be an expressing — and so it is given the borrowed name "verbal expression," with no offense to reason (verbal expression too is only a conventional designation).
If "expressive form" is not really existent, how should "non-expressive form" be really existent? Yet, rightly understood, in dependence on the good-and-evil bounds of "volition-and-resolve" (思願, the constructing mind, the resolving mind) a "non-expressive" is conventionally set up, and this too offends no reason. That is to say: this "non-expressive" is in some cases set up in dependence on "the good or evil volition that can issue in superior bodily and verbal karma," at the stage when its seed is growing (this is called the non-expressive of the dispersed state); and in other cases set up in dependence on "the volition that, within meditative absorption, halts the evils of body and speech" (this is called the non-expressive of absorption); and so it is conventionally existent (the non-expressive too is only a conventional designation).
(g) Reconciling the three kinds of karma and the paths of action (三業·業道)
〔Q〕Someone asks: in the scriptures the World-Honored One plainly speaks of three kinds of karma — "bodily, verbal, mental" — yet you now call "bodily karma and verbal karma" not real form; does this not run counter to the scriptures? 〔A〕We are not striking them out as nonexistent (the three kinds of karma are still granted); we say only that they are "not form" (not a real form-dharma, but simply a phase of "volition," 思).
That very "volition" (思, the constructing will) which "can set the body in motion" is what is called "bodily karma"; that "volition" which "can issue speech" is what is called "verbal karma"; and as for the two volitions, "deliberating volition" (審慮思) and "deciding volition" (決定思), because they are associated with the mental faculty (意) and can construct and rouse this faculty, they are called "mental karma" (which shows that the substance of all three kinds of karma is, in fact, just "volition").
Now the "volition that initiates bodily and verbal action," since it does some constructing, is called "karma" (業, action); and because it is "the road traveled" by the deliberating and deciding volitions (those volitions journey upon it), and because it can lead to and produce the maturation-fruits of suffering or pleasure, it is also called "a path" (道). Hence the foregoing seven paths-of-action (the three of body, the four of speech) also take "volition" for their substance; or, put another way, bodily expression and verbal expression are issued by volition, and so are given the borrowed name "karma," and because they are the road traveled by volition, they are called "paths of action" (in the end the paths of action are still just "volition").
From this it should be understood: outside the mind there is no form at all; there is only inner consciousness transforming so as to give rise to appearances resembling form. (The refutation of the form-dharmas ends here in full.)
(h) Refuting the non-concurrent formations — general statement (不相應行·總標)
The form-dharmas refuted, we come next to the second class — the "non-concurrent formations" (不相應行, the formations not concurrent with mind) — and it too is not really existent. Why so? Take such non-concurrent formations as "acquisition and non-acquisition" (得、非得): first, unlike form, mind, and the various mental-associates, they have no "substance-and-appearance" of their own that can be found; second, neither do they have, "apart from form, mind, and the mental-associates," any function of their own that can be found. From these two points it is known that they are certainly not really existent, but are merely names conventionally set up in dependence on the "phases" (分位, the various differentiated states) of form and the rest.
This is established by reasoning, viewed under three heads. First: this non-concurrent formation is certainly not something that, "apart from form, mind, and the mental-associates, has a real substance and function" — it is just like form and mind and so on (form and mind have real substance-and-function and are all subsumed under the aggregates), since it too is conceded to be subsumed under the formations-aggregate (a dharma likewise subsumed under an aggregate should not have a real substance-and-function apart from form and mind). Second: because "the four — form, mind, mental-associates, and the unconditioned — cannot take it in," it is just like "utter nonexistence" (畢竟無, sheer nothing) and is certainly not really existent. Third: because "the remaining real dharmas cannot take it in," it is just like the remaining conventional dharmas, having no real substance. (The general statement on the non-concurrent formations ends here.)
(i) Refuting acquisition and non-acquisition (得·非得)
〔Q〕First the refutation of "acquisition and non-acquisition" (得、非得). How does that school (the Sarvāstivāda) know that "acquisition and non-acquisition" have a real substance and function apart from form, mind, and the rest? They answer: because the scriptures say so. For instance the scripture says, "such-and-such a sentient being (補特伽羅, pudgala, a living being) has attained good and evil," and "the noble one has attained the ten dharmas of the adept"; and again it says, "the ordinary person has not attained the noble dharmas," and "the arhats have not attained the defilements" — they argue that these very words "attained / not attained" are precisely declaring "acquisition and non-acquisition" (and so acquisition and non-acquisition are really existent).
〔A〕But the scripture does not say that this "attaining / not-attaining" has a real substance and function apart from form, mind, and the rest (the scripture only speaks of "attaining / not attaining"; it never speaks of some separate, real "acquisition"); so to take this as proof does not hold.
The scripture also says, "the wheel-turning king has attained the seven treasures" — does the king then (by some real "acquisition") attain to himself even the bodies of others and the insentient things as well (for the seven treasures include other persons and include insentient things)? If you say, "the king has a power of free disposal over the treasures, and so it is only conventionally said that he has attained them" (there being no real "acquisition" at all), then why not concede the very same for good and evil dharmas — that "attainment" is conventionally said — instead of insisting on a real "acquisition"?
You might object: "The seven treasures are present things; because the thing is present, one may 'conventionally say' it is attained (the implication being: but good and evil dharmas lie in the past or future, so one needs a real 'acquisition' to bind them fast)." Then this refutes you: how do you know that the good and evil dharmas you have attained exist "apart from the present" (off in the past or future)? Apart from the present, a real dharma, by reason, does not exist (past and future dharmas have no substance); and besides, there must be present in you a "seed of good" and the like (a good dharma takes the present seed for its substance, and on that basis one may conventionally say it is attained — what need of a real "acquisition"?).
Further: what excellent function does "acquisition" have with respect to a dharma? If you say "acquisition can make a dharma arise," then take it point by point. First, it ought to be able to make the unconditioned arise as well (acquisition being no respecter of objects — yet the unconditioned does not arise). Second, "all the insentient things" (which have no acquisition in them) ought never to be able to arise (yet insentient things plainly do arise). Third, a dharma "not yet acquired, or already lost" ought never to be able to be born (yet a thing lost and then re-acquired plainly does happen). And if you shift and say "the acquisition that is born together with the dharma" is the cause that makes it arise, then the "two births" you separately posit (the birth-mark and the birth-of-birth, those two non-concurrent formations whose whole office is to make dharmas arise) become useless (if you take acquisition for the cause of arising, what need of those two births?). Furthermore, if in one being there are at once the "acquisitions" of all three natures — good, evil, and neutral — then the good, evil, and neutral dharmas ought to come present all at once (all three acquisitions being there); and if you say they must still await some other cause (to come present one by one), then "acquisition" is again useless (since some other cause is needed anyway, acquisition is plainly not the cause of a dharma's arising).
If you shift again and say "acquisition" is, with respect to a dharma, a "cause of not-losing" (the dharma is not lost, and stays attained, by relying on it), this too will not pass: those "attainable dharmas" are inseparable from sentient beings to begin with (a dharma rests, from the first, upon the body-and-mind of a being), and were they apart from the being there would be nothing to attain at all (apart from the body, nothing is attained); and so "acquisition," with respect to a dharma — whether you call it the cause of a dharma's arising or the cause of its not being lost — is in every way useless (without positing this acquisition, the dharma quite naturally cleaves to the being's body). And since "acquisition" in truth does not exist, "non-acquisition" (its reverse) does not exist either. (The refutation of acquisition and non-acquisition ends here.)
Rightly understood, then, it is in dependence on the phase "a sentient being's capacity to attain the various dharmas" that three kinds of "attainment" are conventionally set up: first, seed-attainment; second, mastery-attainment; third, present-activity-attainment. Reversing these three, the name "non-attainment" (that is, non-acquisition) is conventionally set up. This "non-acquisition" is of many kinds, yet the most important of them is this: at the stage when "the seeds eradicable only on the path of seeing" within the three realms have not yet been forever destroyed, a "non-acquisition" is conventionally set up, and this is called "the ordinary-being nature" (異生性, the very constitution of the unenlightened) — because such a one has not yet attained any of the noble dharmas. (The refutation of acquisition and non-acquisition ends here in full.)
(j) Refuting the generic-similarity (同分·眾同分)
〔Q〕Next the refutation of "generic-similarity" (同分, the shared class-nature of beings — that which makes a god a god and a human a human, the common phase they share). How does that school know that "generic-similarity" has a real substance and function apart from form, mind, and the rest? They answer: because the scriptures say so. For instance the scripture says, "this is the god generic-similarity, this is the human generic-similarity," and so on at length (each destiny having its own generic-similarity — therefore generic-similarity is really existent).
〔A〕But this scripture does not say that "generic-similarity" has a real substance apart from form, mind, and the rest (the scripture only speaks of "being of one class"; it never speaks of some separate substance); so to take this as proof does not hold.
The school says again: "Toward beings we form a like cognition and use a like designation — 'this is a human, that too is a human' — and this can arise only on the basis of 'generic-similarity'; hence we know generic-similarity is really existent." This is refuted on two heads. First: by this account, grass and trees and the like (toward which we likewise form the like cognition and use the like designation, 'this is grass, that too is grass') ought also to have a "generic-similarity" (yet the school itself does not concede that grass and trees have generic-similarity). Second: since you can form a like cognition and use a like designation toward "generic-similarity" itself (generic-similarity having become a referent in turn, and drawing forth a like designation), then "generic-similarity" itself ought to have yet another "generic-similarity" over its head (and so layer within layer, without end); but the school does not concede that "generic-similarity has a further generic-similarity" either — and since it denies this latter point, how can the former point stand (how can the like cognition and like designation prove generic-similarity really existent)?
The school says again: "'Generic-similarity' can serve as a cause that gives rise to 'like undertakings and like desires' (everyone does what a person should do, has the desires a person should have), and so we know it is really existent." This too will not stand: in fact it is "the habituation of former lives" (the accumulated latent tendencies) that, serving as cause, gives rise to these like undertakings and like desires — what need to posit, besides, a real "generic-similarity"? Rightly understood, then, it is in dependence on the phase-difference "the mutual resemblance of beings in body and mind" that a "generic-similarity" is conventionally set up. (The refutation of generic-similarity ends here.)
(k) Refuting the life-faculty (命根)
〔Q〕Next the refutation of the "life-faculty" (命根). How does the school know that the life-faculty has a real substance apart from form, mind, and the rest? They answer: because the scriptures say so. For instance the scripture says, "the three — vital span (壽, āyus), warmth (煖, uṣman), and consciousness (識, vijñāna) (together, a being stays alive)"; and they argue that the "life-faculty" within this is precisely what is called "vital span" (and so the life-faculty is really existent).
〔A〕But this scripture does not speak of a "real vital-span-substance apart from form, mind, and the rest" (the scripture only speaks of the three, vital span, warmth, and consciousness; it never says that "vital span" is a separate substance); so to take this as proof does not hold. Moreover, it was already established earlier that "form is inseparable from consciousness," so this (the life-faculty) too should be inseparable from consciousness, with no separate life-faculty besides. And pressing the point by reasoning: if the life-faculty were really existent apart from consciousness, it would have to be like the mental-associate "feeling" and the rest (which, though they too are something other than consciousness, are not called the life-faculty) — in short, what is apart from consciousness is not the true life-faculty.
〔Q〕If so, why does the scripture speak of three dharmas (does that not show the three are each distinct)? 〔A〕They are spoken of as three according to a difference of sense, much as with "the four right exertions" (which are at bottom one single energy, only spoken of as four according to a difference of sense). 〔Q〕But in the "mindless state" (like the no-thought absorption, when mind does not function), since consciousness is then inoperative, vital span and warmth ought to be absent (for if you say vital span just is consciousness, then in the mindless state there would be no vital span)? 〔A〕Have you not heard the scripture say "consciousness does not leave the body" (in the mindless state there is, in fact, still consciousness)? 〔Q〕Since (there is still consciousness in the mindless state), how then can it be called the "mindless state"? 〔A〕What is extinguished in that mindless state is only the "evolving consciousnesses" (轉識, the first six), and not the "store-consciousness" (阿賴耶, the eighth still remaining — so vital span and warmth remain, while the first six do not operate, and so it is called the mindless state). As for the proof that "there is this eighth consciousness," the later text will treat it in full. This eighth consciousness suffices to be the substance of "realm (the three realms), destiny (the six paths), and birth (the four modes of birth)"; it is pervasive, enduring, and continuous, and is a maturation-fruit — so there is no need to posit, besides, a real "life-faculty."
Rightly understood, then, it is in dependence on "the seed that directly generates this eighth consciousness," and by reason of "the differentiated capacities drawn forth by karmic force," that "the duration of its abiding is fixed" (how long this one life can last is settled); and in dependence on just this a "life-faculty" is conventionally set up. (The refutation of the life-faculty ends here.)
(l) Refuting the two mindless absorptions and the no-thought maturation (二無心定·無想異熟)
〔Q〕Next the refutation of the "two mindless absorptions" (二無心定, the no-thought absorption and the cessation absorption) and the "no-thought maturation" (無想異熟, the fruit of the no-thought heaven). How does the school know these have a real self-nature apart from form, mind, and the rest? Their ground is this: if these had no real nature, they could not block mind and the mental-associates so as to keep them from coming present (since they do block mind, this shows they have a real nature). 〔A〕This is refuted by turning it around: if you say "in the mindless state there is a real dharma, distinct from form, mind, and the rest, that can block mind, and this is what is called the mindless absorption," then by the very same reasoning "in the formless state (the formless realm) there ought likewise to be a real dharma, distinct from form and the rest, that can block form, called the formless absorption" (yet in the formless realm there is no such real dharma whose special office is to block form); and since that side (the formless absorption) is not so (there being no real dharma there to block form), how can this side (the mindless absorption having a real dharma to block mind) stand?
Further: to block mind, what need of a real dharma? Just as a dam and the like (which are themselves but conventional composites), a conventional thing can block all the same. What is really going on here? At the time of cultivating absorption, in the preparatory effort toward absorption, the practitioner wearies of the "coarse, agitated mind and mental-associates," and so raises up an excellent "aspiring resolve" (a yearning to enter the mindless state) and uses it to suppress mind and the mental-associates; this makes mind and the mental-associates grow gradually finer and gradually subtler, and at the moment of "the faintest mind" (微微心, the most extremely subtle instant of mind) it perfumes the "maturation-consciousness" (the eighth), forming a "seed of supremely intensified weariness-of-mind and the rest"; and because this weariness-seed suppresses the active seeds of mind and the rest, the coarse, agitated mind and the rest temporarily do not come present — and it is in dependence on just this phase of "not coming present" that the "two mindless absorptions" are conventionally set up (these two absorptions too are only conventional designations).
This (weariness-of-mind and the rest) seed is good, and so the absorption that is set up upon it is also called "good." Then for the no-thought maturation: before cultivating the "no-thought absorption," the practitioner single-mindedly yearns for the "no-thought fruit" (the maturation of being born into the no-thought heaven), and so the seed he perfumes can summon that "maturation-consciousness" (the one-life retribution-body of the no-thought heaven); relying on the (no-thought heaven's) absorptive power, the coarse, agitated conceptions and the rest do not operate, and it is in dependence on just this phase that a "no-thought (maturation)" is conventionally set up. It is set up in dependence on the maturation (the retribution), and so gets the name "maturation." Therefore these three dharmas (the two mindless absorptions and the no-thought maturation) are likewise not really existent. (The refutation ends here.)
(m) Refuting the marks of the conditioned (有為相·生住異滅·fascicle two)
(Here begins fascicle two, continuing the refutation of the non-concurrent formations with "the marks of the conditioned.")
〔Q〕Next the refutation of "the marks of the conditioned" (有為相, that is, the four marks: arising, abiding, decay, and perishing). How does the school know that these conditioned-marks have a real self-nature apart from form, mind, and the rest? They answer: because the scriptures say so — for instance the scripture says, "there are the three conditioned-marks of conditioned dharmas (arising, decay, perishing; or, taken together, the four: arising, abiding, decay, perishing)," and so on at length. 〔A〕But this scripture does not say that (the conditioned-marks) have a real self-nature apart from form, mind, and the rest (the scripture only sets out these marks; it never says they have some separate substance); so to take this as proof does not hold.
Now to state the matter positively: these four marks and the dharma they mark (form, mind) are not two separate things, viewed under three heads. First, in the expression "the marks of the conditioned," the genitive "of" (非第六聲, the Sanskrit sixth-case "of") does not signify that mark and substance are two different things — just as in "the substance of form-and-mind" the word "of" is at bottom form-and-mind itself (the "of" signifying no two things). Second, the substance of the "marker" (the four marks of arising and so on) is not necessarily other than the "marked" (form, mind) — otherwise the "mark of solidity and the like" would have to be other than "earth" and so on (yet earth takes solidity for its very mark; the mark of solidity is not other than the substance of earth). Third, if "the conditioned-marks" were really other than the substance of the "marked," then "the marks of the unconditioned" would have to be other than what they mark (yet the marks of the unconditioned are not other than the unconditioned; and by this model it is known that the conditioned-marks too are not other than the conditioned).
Further, the four marks — arising, abiding, decay, perishing (which the Sarvāstivāda hold to be all present at once) — when pressed yield faults. Their substances being all present at once, their functions ought to break forth all together at every time (the substances being present, the functions should be too); and if you say the (four marks) mutually conflict, so that their functions cannot all break forth at once, then their "substances" ought likewise to mutually conflict (the functions conflicting, the substances should conflict too) — so how can they be said to be "all present at once" (if even the functions cannot be simultaneous, neither should the substances)? Further, the functions of "abiding, decay, perishing" especially ought not to be simultaneous (abiding makes a dharma stay, perishing makes it perish — flatly opposed). Pressing one layer deeper: the substances of "marker (the four marks)" and "marked (form, mind)" being all originally existent (the Sarvāstivāda holding that dharma-substance exists for all time), their "functions" too ought to be there originally and always (substance and function being not two), for substance and function are one and the same; and if you say "those four marks' functions must still await conditions (before they can break forth)," then the very "conditions" they await ought not to be originally existent (what must await conditions in order to arise is not originally existent — and this in turn clashes with your own thesis that "dharma-substance exists for all time").
Further, pressing the Sarvāstivāda thesis "dharma-substance is originally existent," the faults come one upon another. First: since dharma-substance is originally existent, then to posit "arising" and the other marks besides becomes useless (the dharma being there already, what is "arising" for?). Second: the "marked" (form, mind) being always there from the first, and "arising" and the rest yet joined to it (you say arising makes the already-existent dharma come present), then "the unconditioned" too ought to have "arising" and the rest (the unconditioned is a dharma too — why should it not be arisen?), for one can find no reason "the unconditioned and the conditioned should be reckoned apart" (there is no warrant for arising the conditioned only and not the unconditioned). Third: (the Sarvāstivāda concede that) the dharma-substance of the past and future worlds is neither present nor permanent — so it ought to be like a flower in the sky, not really existent (past and future dharmas have no substance). Fourth: "arising" is what "makes a dharma become existent" — so how can it sit in the "future" (the future not yet being, how can there be a making-existent there)? "Perishing" is what "makes a dharma become nonexistent" — so it ought not to be in the "present" (the present dharma being existent, how can there be a making-nonexistent there)? Fifth: if "perishing" is not "the nonexistent" (the Sarvāstivāda insisting that perishing too has substance), then "arising" ought not to be "the existent" either (arising and perishing run by the same reasoning — here you contradict yourself). Sixth: "perishing" and "abiding" are flatly opposed — so how can you insist they are simultaneous (abiding and perishing being opposed, they should not be present at once)? Yet "abiding" and "arising" are not opposed — so how can you allow them to sit in different worlds (abiding and arising being not opposed, yet the Sarvāstivāda assign arising to the present, assign abiding to the present, and still rank the four marks in sequence — self-contradiction)? Therefore the thesis the Sarvāstivāda cling to (the four marks really existent and all present at once) is, whether you call them "all present at once" or "sitting in different worlds," contrary to reason.
What, then, is rightly the case? A conditioned dharma, by the force of conditions, is ever "originally not, now existent" and "for a moment existent, then again not"; and to display how it differs from "the unconditioned" (which has none of these four marks), the four marks "arising, abiding, decay, perishing" are conventionally set up. "Originally not, now existent" — the stretch of its being existent is called "arising"; this stretch of "arising" pauses for a moment, and that is called "abiding"; within this stretch of "abiding" there is a difference of before and after (the later no longer as the earlier), and so a further name, "decay," is set up; "for a moment existent, then again not" — the while of its being nonexistent is called "perishing." The first three marks (arising, abiding, decay) are "existent," and so are all in the present; the last mark (perishing) is "nonexistent," and so is in the past. (All four marks are conventionally set up in dependence on the present dharma.)
〔Q〕Someone asks: "perishing," being "what has already become nonexistent," how can it serve as a "mark" of a conditioned dharma (how can what is already gone serve as a mark)? 〔A〕That "mark of perishing" serves to display "this dharma's becoming nonexistent afterward"; what fault in taking it as a (conditioned dharma's) mark? — "Arising" displays that the conditioned dharma "was formerly not"; "perishing" displays that it "is afterward not"; "decay" displays that this dharma "is not frozen-fast"; "abiding" displays that this dharma "for a moment still has function." So these four marks, with respect to a conditioned dharma, though all called "display," yet differ in what they display.
The foregoing sets up the four marks conventionally in dependence on the "instant" (the briefest single moment); but in dependence on the phase of "one life-span" (一期, a single stretch of a life), the four marks may likewise be conventionally set up: the first being is called "arising"; the final nonbeing is called "perishing"; after arising, the similar continuance is called "abiding"; and the transformation within just this continuance is called "decay." Therefore all four marks are conventionally set up. (The refutation of the conditioned-marks ends here.)
(n) Refuting the name-group, phrase-group, and syllable-group (名身·句身·文身)
〔Q〕Next the refutation of "name-group, phrase-group, and syllable-group" (名身、句身、文身, that is, names, sentences, and letters — the three sets of meaning-expressing entities). How does the school know that these have a real, meaning-expressing substance apart from form, mind, and the rest? They answer: because the scriptures say so — for instance the scripture says, "the Buddha attained the rare name-group, phrase-group, and syllable-group" (and so name, phrase, and syllable are really existent). 〔A〕But this scripture does not say that (name, phrase, syllable) have a real "name"-substance and the rest apart from form, mind, and the rest (the scripture is only praising the Buddha's merits; it never says they have some separate substance); so to take this as proof does not hold.
If "name, phrase, syllable" were really existent apart from "sound," they ought, like form and the rest, to be unable really to express meaning (once cut off from sound into a separate thing, they would be like form — just sitting there, conveying nothing). And you say "sound can produce name, phrase, syllable" — but then this sound itself must carry "the bending of intonation" (the rise and fall of tone), and this is already enough to express meaning, so what need of name and the rest besides (sound by itself can convey meaning; name, phrase, syllable are then superfluous)? And if you protest, "the very bending of intonation upon the sound is name, phrase, syllable, and it is really existent apart from sound," then this refutes you: by that account, "the bending of shape-and-size that we see upon form" (the curving outline of a thing) ought also to be apart from "form" and to have a real substance of its own (the bending upon form sets up no separate substance — so by what right does the bending upon sound get to set up one?).
You may protest again: "the bending of intonation upon sound is like the sound of strings and pipes — it cannot of itself express meaning (instrumental sound too has its rise and fall, yet conveys nothing; that is just why one needs, besides, a meaning-expressing name, phrase, syllable)." Then this refutes you: by that account, this (the speaking sound) ought to be like that (instrumental sound) and produce no name and the rest besides (both alike having intonation and both alike conveying nothing, this too would produce no name, phrase, syllable). And besides, who says that instrumental sound certainly cannot express meaning? If (intonation-bearing) sound can express meaning, then the sound of wind-chimes and the like ought to have an expressing function too (they too have their rise and fall); and conversely, if instrumental sound and wind-chime sound cannot express meaning, then this (the speaking sound) ought, like those (instrumental and chime sound), to produce no real name, phrase, syllable besides (the speaking sound being of the same class as instrumental sound, it cannot be that the one produces them and the other does not).
If you say "only the 'speaking sound' can produce name and the rest (instrumental and chime sound cannot)," then why not simply concede that "only the speaking sound can express meaning" (since only the speaking sound produces that meaning-expressing name, that comes to saying only the speaking sound expresses meaning — why interpose a name, phrase, syllable in between)? And besides, by what reasoning do you settle that "what expresses meaning just is the speaking sound" (since you do know the meaning-expresser is the speaking sound, that very point establishes "only the speaking sound expresses meaning")? And again, how do you know that "apart from the speaking sound there is a separate meaning-expresser (a name, phrase, syllable)"? That "the speaking sound is not other than the meaning-expresser" is a thing humans and gods alike understand; only a "darling of the gods" (天愛, a mocking epithet for a fool) — and no one else — would cling to "the meaning-expresser being other than the speaking sound" (setting up a separate name, phrase, syllable); the wise will not allow it.
Rightly understood, then, it is in dependence on the phase-differences of "the speaking sound" that "name-group, phrase-group, and syllable-group" are conventionally established. "Name" expresses a thing's "what-it-is-in-itself" (its own-nature — names like "form," "smell"); "phrase" expresses a thing's "various differentiations" (strung into a sentence, as in "form is impermanent"); "syllable" is just the "letter" (the letters, the phonemes), serving as the support for the other two, name and phrase. These three, apart from "sound," have indeed no separate substance; yet (name, phrase, syllable being conventional, and sound being real) conventional and real do after all differ, and so (name, phrase, syllable) are not simply identical with sound (neither one with sound nor other than it).
Just because (name, phrase, syllable are neither one with sound nor other than it), the two analytic-knowledges, "dharma-analytic-knowledge" (法無礙解, which takes name, phrase, syllable for its object) and "diction-analytic-knowledge" (詞無礙解, which takes sound for its object), differ in their objects; and "sound" and "name" and the rest differ too in their subsumption under aggregate, base, and element (sound falls under the form-aggregate and the sound-base; name and the rest fall under the formations-aggregate and the dharma-base). One further point: this (the conventional setting-up of name, phrase, syllable in dependence on sound) is said with respect to "our world" (the Sahā world), and does not hold of every world; for in the other buddha-lands too there are those that set up the three — name, phrase, syllable — in dependence on "light, fine fragrance, taste," and the like (which shows the three are not confined to sound). (The refutation of name, phrase, syllable ends here.)
(o) Refuting the latent dispositions · warding off the remaining non-concurrent formations (隨眠·遮餘不相應行)
One school holds that the "latent dispositions" (隨眠, the seeds of the defilements) are apart from mind and the mental factors, subsumed under the aggregate of non-concurrent formations. This too does not hold: because the latent dispositions are still called "greed" and the rest (the latent greed, hatred, and so on), they are just like the active greed and the rest (all concurrent with mind), and are not non-concurrent formations (the latent dispositions, being the seeds of the defilements, belong on the side of the mind-dharmas, not among the non-concurrent formations).
And whoever grasps that there are yet other "non-concurrent formations" besides (such as speed, sequence, and the property of combination — 勢速、次第、和合性) — these are all to be refuted, one by one, by the same line of reasoning as before (the refutation of acquisition, the life-faculty, and the rest). (The refutation of the non-concurrent formations ends here in full.)
〔所釋之頌〕承前章，廣釋第一頌·破法執
破小乘實色與不相應行，論本有據。《瑜伽師地論·本地分》定色法『若略說有十一種』而皆為識之所行境，不許離識別有；又於心不相應行法立「分位假立」之義——謂得、命根、眾同分等，皆依色、心分位而假立，非別有體。此「分位假立」四字，即本章逐一破小乘實有之總樞。下面順著頌文逐法破之。
破小乘所執的色等諸法
小乘執「離識實有色等諸法」。下面依次破色法、不相應行（無為法在下一節）。
色法（一）·破有對色（極微）
所執的色總有兩種：一是「有對色」（有質礙、相障，由極微所成），二是「無對色」（無質礙，非極微成）。先破有對色——能成它的極微就立不住。
極微若有質礙，就該像瓶等一樣是假非實；若無質礙，就該如「非色」，又怎能聚集成瓶、衣？又：極微若有方分，必可分析、便非實有；若無方分，又怎能和合而「承光、發影」？日輪剛升照柱時，柱的東邊（向日）承光、西邊（背日）發影，承光處與發影處既然不同，可見極微定有方分（向、背二分）。又：見、觸牆壁時，只得這一邊（向我之面）、得不到那一分（背我之面）；既然『和合之物』就是『眾極微』，可見極微必有此邊、彼分。又：諸極微隨所住處，必有上下四方的差別，不然就無從彼此相鄰、和合積聚；或者（若無方分而相涉入一處）就積不成麁物了。所以執『有對色就是諸極微』的人：極微若無方分，就該沒有「障隔」；既無障隔，就不成其為「障礙有對」之色了。可見你們所執的極微必有方分；既有方分，就可分析，定非實有。所以「有對色實有」不能成立。
色法（二）·無對色——五識所依緣色唯識所變
那前五識難道沒有『所依的色（根）』『所緣的色（境）』嗎？不是沒有色，只是那色是「識所變」。識生起時，由內因緣之力，變現出似眼等（根）、似色等（境）的相，就以這（內變的）相為所依、所緣。而「眼等五根」並非現量所見（根不可見），是因它『能發起識』而以比量推知其有；這根只是一種「功能」（發識之能），並非心外（極微）所造的實色。心外的有對色既已破不成，所以所依的根就只是內識所變的功能——能發起眼等識的，就叫眼等根，以它為依而生眼等識。
而眼等識的「外所緣緣」（心外實境作所緣緣）於理也不能有，所以決定該承認『自識所變的相』才是它的所緣緣——也就是『能引生與自識相似（之相分）』的，才是所緣緣。並不是凡「能生此識」的都算所緣緣，否則「種子」等也要叫作此識的所緣緣了（種子能生識卻不是所緣）。
再說細：眼等五識了別色時，只是緣那『和合的總相』，因識上現似那相；並不是「和合相」離開諸極微而別有實體。一旦把那物分析破散，『現似那相』的識就一定不生了，可見那「和合相」非實有，不能說它是五識的（所緣）緣；否則『第二個月亮』（捏目所見的似月、非實）也能生五識了。也不是『諸極微在共相和合的位上』就能各各作五識的所緣——因為五識上並沒有『極微之相』；也不是『諸極微各自有和合相』——因為不和合時並沒有這個（和合）相。也不是『和合的位』與『不和合的時』極微的體相有了變異（極微體相前後不變）；所以和合的位就如同不合的時，色等極微都不是五識的境。
色法（三）·破「和集相」（餘部救義）
有人（餘部）救說：色等的一一極微在「不和集」時固然不是五識境，但在『共相和集』的位上，諸微展轉相資，就有「麁相」生起、作此五識的境，而且那麁相是實有的、作此識的所緣。論主破：不對——其一，「共和集位」與『未集之時』極微的體相是同一的（和集不改其體相）；其二，瓶與甌等物若極微的數量相等，緣它們的識就該無差別（可明明見瓶、甌相不同）；其三，在共和集位，一一極微就該各各捨掉自己的『微小、圓相』了（成麁則微圓相失，可極微實不失）；其四，『緣麁相的識』不該緣『細相的境』（識現麁、境唯細微，相不相稱），否則就成『緣別的境的識能緣別的境』了；其五，（若不論相稱）那一個識就該能緣一切境了。連『承認有極微』尚且招來這些過失，何況依唯識本來就沒有識外的真實極微。
色法（四）·結成：諸有對色皆識變·假說極微
由此定知：是『自識所變的似色等相』作所緣緣——因為見分依託它（相分）而生、又帶著它的相。而識變現時，是隨它的量大、小，頓時現起『一個整相』，並不是另外變作眾多極微、再合成一物。至於佛為什麼說「極微」？那是為破那些執「麁色有實體」的人，教他逐步除析（以破麁色實有之執），並不是說諸色裡真有極微。瑜伽師用「假想慧」於麁色之相一層層除析，析到不可再析，假名「極微」；這極微雖然仍有方分，卻不再去析它——再析下去就現「空」相、不成色了，所以說極微是『色的邊際』（分析的極限），不是實有的微塵。由此可知，諸有對色都是識所變現，不是極微所成。
窺基《述記》在這裡剖明「方」與「分」的關係：極微的「體」就是它的「分」、而體仍占一個方位，所以說「極微猶有方分」；但『方即是分（方位本身就是那一分）、並非在方位之外另有可析的細分』，這便與《瑜伽師地論》說『極微有方而無分』並不相違——「無分」是指再無更細之分可析，因為極微之相已與「空相」相鄰了。他又解「色邊際」的「邊際」就是「窮盡」之義：分析到此已到盡頭，過此再折就成『非色（空相）』。所以「色邊際」是分析的終點、不是實有的塵粒，諸經論說「極微是色邊際」都是這個意思。
色法（五）·破無對色實有
其餘的「無對色」（如法處所攝色）既是這（識變）一類，也非實有；又因它「無對」，就如心、心所一樣（無對），定非實色。有對色尚且現有色相、以理推究離識都還沒有，何況「無對色」現本無色相（不顯不礙），怎能說它是真實的色法？
色法（六）·破表色·無表色
那「表色」（身語的表業）與「無表色」（不顯的業色）難道不是實有？也不是。先說「身表色」若實有，以什麼為體？若說是『形（形狀）』，便非實有，因為形可分析、又找不到「長短」的實極微。若說是『動（動作）』，也非實有，因為諸法纔生即滅、本無「移動」之義；何況有為法的「滅」不待別的因（法自然滅），滅若要待因（待動而滅）就不是真滅了。若說『有一種色，非顯色、非形色，由心引生、能動手等，叫身表業』，也不成：這色若是「動」，前面已破（無動義）；若是『動的因』，那就該是「風界」（風主動），可風界並無「表示」之義、不該叫「表」；何況風界屬「觸」，而觸是無記、不通善惡（表業通善惡，二不相當），至於非顯色、香、味等也照「觸」例可知（都不能作表業之體）。所以身表業定非實有。其實是「心」為因，使識所變的手等色相生滅相續、轉向別處，看似有動作，因它能「表示內心」，才假名「身表」。「語表」也不是實有的聲性：一剎那的聲沒有詮表（單念不成義），多念相續又是假合非實，何況外在的有對色（聲）前面已破；其實是因「心」故、識變似聲、生滅相續似有表示，假名「語表」。「表」既然實無，「無表」哪會實有？只是依「思願」的善惡分限假立的：或依『能發起殊勝身語善惡業的思』其種子增長的位而立（散位無表），或依『定中止息身語惡的現行思』而立（定中無表），所以是假有。
色法（七）·會通三業·業道
佛經中說有「身、語、意」三業，如今把身業、語業判為非實色，豈不違經？不是撥為沒有（仍承認三業），只是說它「非色」：能動身的「思」叫身業、能發語的「思」叫語業；『審慮思、決定思』與意相應、又能造動意，叫意業——三業都以「思」為體。能起身、語的「思」既有所造作就叫「業」，又因它是審慮、決定二思所遊履之處、且能招感苦樂異熟果，也叫「道」，所以前七業道（身三、語四）也以「思」為自性；或者，身表、語表既由思所發、假說為「業」，又是思所遊履、叫「業道」。由此可知，實無心外的色，唯有內識變似色而生。
不相應行（總標）
「不相應行」（與心不相應的行法，如得、非得等）也非實有：它既不像色、心、心所那樣有可得的「體相」，也沒有「異於色心心所」而別有的「作用」可得，可見定非實有，只是依色心等的「分位」（差別狀態）假立。「不相應行」這個名字本身就點出它的處境——窺基《述記》析其名說：「不相應」三字，是要揀別開色、心、心所（它與這三者不相似，所以叫「不相應」）；「行」這個字，又是要揀別開無為（無為非行、它是行蘊所攝之有為）。一名兩揀，已先標出它既非色心心所、又非無為，只是依色心分位而假立的一類。以理成立：它定不是『異於色心心所而別有實體用』者（如色心等皆有實體用而攝於蘊），因為它也被「行蘊」所攝（同蘊之法不該另有外於色心的實體用）；又因它不被『心心所、色、無為』所攝，如畢竟無，定非實有；又因它不被『其餘實法』所攝，如其餘假法，沒有實體。下面逐一破。
不相應行·破得·非得
薩婆多憑什麼說「得、非得」異於色心而有實體用？說是因為經有明文：經說『某補特伽羅成就善、惡』「聖者成就十無學法」，又說『凡夫不成就聖法』「阿羅漢不成就煩惱」，這「成就、不成就」就是顯示「得、非得」。論主破：經並沒說這「成就、不成就」是異於色心而有實體用，拿它作證據不成立。經也說『轉輪王成就七寶』，難道輪王就（因實「得」而）成就了他人之身、非情之物？若說『對七寶有自在受用之力，所以假說成就』，那對善惡法為何不也這樣假說，偏要執一個實「得」？若說『七寶是現在的法、所以可假說成就（現有故可假說）』，那你怎知所成就的善惡法是「離現在」（在過未）而有的？離現在的實法於理是沒有的（過未無體），而現在本就有『善的種子』（可假說成就，何須實得）。再問：「得」對法有什麼殊勝作用？若說它能令法現起，那它也該能令「無為」現起、「一切非情」就該永不現起、法在「未得、已失」的位就該永不生；若說『俱生的得』是令法現起之因，那另立的『二生（生相、生生相）』就成無用了；又：若一人同時具善、惡、無記三性的「得」，善惡無記的法就該同時頓現了，若說還要等別的因（才一一現起），那「得」就成無用。若說「得」是法的『不失之因』（令法不失而恒成就），可那些『可成就的法』本來就不離有情、離了有情根本得不到，所以「得」對法（無論作生因、不失因）都無用。「得」既實無，「非得」也跟著無。其實是依『有情可成就諸法』的分位，假立三種「成就」：種子成就、自在成就、現行成就；翻過來假立『不成就（非得）』之名；這類雖多，而其中『於三界見所斷的種子還沒永斷』的那一位，假立「非得」之名、叫「異生性」（凡夫性），因為對諸聖法還沒成就。
不相應行·破同分（眾同分）
又憑什麼說『同分（有情共同的類性）』異於色心而有實體用？也說經有明文：經說『這是天同分、這是人同分』等。論主破：經並沒說「同分」是異於色心而實有，拿它作證不成立。若說『（對有情）能起相同的認知、相同的言說（『這是人、這是人』），是因同分而起，所以同分實有』，那麼草、木等（也能讓人起『這是草、這是草』）也該有同分了；而且若「同分」上也能起相同的智、言，那「同分」自己又該別有一個「同分」（無窮），你既不承認後者，前者又怎能成立？若說『同分作為因、能引起相同的事業與欲樂（眾人同作人事、同有人欲），所以它實有』，這也不成：「宿世串習」作為因就能引起相同的事業與欲樂，何必另執一個實「同分」？其實是依「有情身心相似」的分位差別假立同分。
不相應行·破命根
又憑什麼說「命根」異於色心而實有？也說經有明文：經說「壽、煖、識」三法，這當中的「命根」就叫「壽」。論主破：經並沒說有個『異於色心的實壽體』，拿它作證不成立。又：前面已成立「色不離識」，那命根也該不離識、沒有別的命根。又：命根若異於識而實有，就該像「受」等心所一樣（異於識的心所也不叫命根），不是真命根。有人問：那為何經要說「壽、煖、識」三法（豈非三者各別）？答：是就「義」的差別說為三，像「四正勤」本是一精進、約義說四。又問：住在「無心位」（無想定等）時識不行了，壽、煖豈不該沒了？答：豈不聞經說「識不離身」（無心位仍有識）？又問：既然有識，怎麼叫「無心位」？答：那時滅的是「轉識」（前六等），不是「阿賴耶識」（第八識仍在，所以有壽煖、而名無心）；有這第八識的證據，後文會詳說。這第八識足以作「界、趣、生」的體，是周遍、恒常、相續、又是異熟果，所以不必另外執一個實「命根」。其實是依『親生這（第八）識的種子、由業所引而住世的時量決定』假立命根。
不相應行·破二無心定·無想異熟
又憑什麼說『二無心定（無想定、滅盡定）』與『無想異熟（無想天的果報）』異於色心而有實自性？說：它們若無實自性，就不能遮止心、心所令其不起（既能遮心，可見有實體）。論主反破：若說『無心位有一個別異的實法、能遮止於心、叫無心定』，那麼『無色位（無色界）』也該有一個別異的實法、能障礙於色、叫無色定了（可無色界並無這種能礙色的實法）；那邊（無色定）既不如此，這邊（無心定有實法遮心）又怎能成立？再說，遮礙於心何須實法？像堤壩這種假法也能遮（水）。其實是：修定時，於入定的加行位厭患『粗動的心、心所』，發起殊勝的「期願」去遮伏心心所，使心心所漸細漸微，到「微微心」時熏「異熟識」、成就『極強的厭心種子』；由這厭種損伏了現行的心種，粗動的心暫時不起——就依這『不起的分位』假立二無心定。這厭心的種子是善的，所以定也叫善。修無想定前，行者求「無想果」，所熏成的種子招感那（無想天）的異熟果報；依定力粗動的想等不行，就依這分位假立「無想」；它是依異熟果而立、所以得「異熟」之名。所以這三法（二無心定、無想異熟）也非實有。
不相應行·破有為相（生·住·異·滅）
又憑什麼說諸『有為相（生、住、異、滅）』異於色心而有實自性？也說經有明文：經說『有三種有為的有為相』等。論主破：經並沒說有為相是異於色心而有實自性，拿它作證不成立。再正面成立其「非異」：其一，「有為『之』相」裡那個「之」字（屬格），並不表示相與體是別異之體，就像「色心『之』體」就是色心（屬格不表異體）；其二，『能相（生等）』的體並不定異於『所相（色心）』，否則『堅等相』也該異於「地」了（地以堅為相、堅相不異地）；其三，若「有為相」異於所相之體，那「無為相」也該異於它的所相了（可無為相不異無為，例知有為相也不異）。又：生等四相若體都俱有，就該一切時齊發其用；若說它們相違、用不能頓發，那體也該相違，怎能「俱有」？又「住、異、滅」三者的用尤其不該俱（住令法住、滅令法滅，相違）。又：能相（四相）與所相（色心）的體既都「本有」（薩婆多許法體恒有），用也該如此恒有（無別性故）；若說它們的用還要等因緣才起，那所等的因緣就該不是本有了（違法體恒有）。又：（法體既本有）那立「生」等就成無用了（法本有，何須生）；而所相既恒有、生等又與之相合，那「無為法」也該有生等了（無為亦法，憑什麼分判有為才有生）。又：過去、未來世既非現在、又非常住，就該像空中花、非實有；「生」名為「有」（令法成有）怎能在未來（未來尚無，何能名有）？「滅」名為「無」（令法成無）就該不在現在（現在是有，何得名無）；「滅」若非無（薩婆多許滅亦有體），「生」就也該非有了（生滅同例、自相違）；「滅」與「住」相違怎能同時、「住」不違「生」又怎容它們處於異世（薩婆多判四相次第，矛盾）？所以它執四相實有、俱有，進退都不合理。其實是：有為法由因緣之力「本無今有、暫有還無」，為了表顯它有別於無為（無為無這四相），才假立生、住、異、滅四相——「本無今有」的有位叫生、生位暫停叫住、住有前後差別叫異、暫有還無的無時叫滅；前三相是「有」故同在現在、後一（滅）是「無」故在過去。有人問：「滅」既是「無法」（已歸於無），怎能作有為的「相」？答：滅是表顯『此法後來歸無』，作相有何過失——生表此法先前非有、滅表此法後來是無、異表此法非凝然不變、住表此法暫時有用；四相對有為法雖都叫「表」，而所表各有不同。這是依「剎那」假立四相；若約「一期」（一段生命）的分位也可假立：最初的有叫生、最後的無叫滅、生後相似相續叫住、相續中的轉變叫異。所以四相都是假立。
不相應行·破名身·句身·文身
又憑什麼說異於色心而有實能詮的「名身、句身、文身」？也說經有明文：經說『佛得希有的名、句、文身』。論主破：經並沒說名句文是異於色心而有實體，拿它作證不成立。再破：名、句、文若異於「聲」而實有，就該像色等一樣不是真能詮（離聲別有則如色、不能詮義）。若說「聲能生名句文」，那這聲必有「音韻屈曲」（抑揚），這就足以詮義了，何必另立名等？若說『聲上的音韻屈曲就是名句文、且異於聲而實有』，那『所見之色上的形狀屈曲』也該異於色而別有實體了。若說『聲上的音韻屈曲、像絃管（樂器）的聲一樣並不能詮（所以要另立能詮的名句文）』，那這語聲就該像那樂聲一樣、不另生名等了；而且誰說那樂聲一定不能詮？若有屈曲的聲就能詮，那風鈴的聲也該有詮用了；反之（若樂聲鈴聲不詮），這語聲也該像它們一樣、不另生實的名句文。若說『唯有語聲能生名等（簡別樂聲風鈴）』，那為何不直接承認『唯語聲能詮』（既唯語能生能詮的名，就是唯語能詮，何必名句文居間）？又憑什麼定知『能詮就是語』、又憑什麼知『異於語別有能詮』？『語不異於能詮』是人、天共知的事；執『能詮異於語（另立名句文）』的，只是「天愛」（愚者）之輩、不是有智者所許。其實是依「語聲」的分位差別假立名、句、文：「名」詮事物的自性、「句」詮事物的差別、「文」就是字、作前二的所依；這三者離開聲雖無別體，但（名句文是假、聲是實）假與實有別，所以也不就等於聲。由此『法無礙解（緣名句文）』與『詞無礙解（緣聲）』所緣的境有差別；「聲」與「名」等在蘊、處、界的歸屬也各有不同。而且這（依聲假立名句文）是就『此土（娑婆）』說的、不通一切佛土，因為別的佛土也有依「光明、妙香、味」等假立名句文三者的。
不相應行·破隨眠·遮餘
有人執『隨眠（煩惱種子）』異於心心所、是不相應行蘊所攝。也不對——隨眠仍叫「貪」等，就像現行的貪等一樣（與心相應），並不是不相應行。其餘凡執別有種種「不相應行」的，都可照前面的道理一一遮止。
歸結一句：實無心外的色法、也無實有的不相應行，有的只是內識的變現。
承衍
本節破外道、小乘所執實法，坐實『色、不相應行皆唯識變、唯假立』，這一立義是唯識系安立『諸法非離識實有』的根柢，後出諸論逐一承用。《百法明門論》列『色法十一、心不相應行二十四、無為六』三聚——本節正破這三聚的「離識實有」之執，明其唯識所變、唯依分位假立，所以《百法》把它們收在「識所現」的後三位（不入心王心所之首）。《唯識三十論頌》的頌一「由假說我、法，有種種相轉。彼依識所變」，正是本節所釋的本頌之「法」分，逐頌相承。最切近的是《二十唯識論》：它是『破極微、明唯識無境』的專論，與本節同破極微實有——本節說『極微若有方分則可分析、便非實有』，《二十論》則以『極微與六方相合，一極微就該有六分；若六微同處一處，那積聚也該只如一極微大』一路逼問、結成『一個實極微不能成立』，二者同一鋒刃；而《二十論》所立的「唯識無境」，也正是本節「實無外色，唯有內識變似色生」的張本。《辯中邊論·辯相品》講「虛妄分別」（識是依他、所執之境本無），即是本節『境唯識變、外境非有』之義的所依。《攝大乘論·所知相分》立三性，說『遍計所執無體、依他起即識變』——本節所破的外道小乘實法，正是遍計所執；所立的內識變似，正是依他起。前後一義貫通。
〔Verses commented〕Continuing: unfolding verse 1 · refuting the dharma-attachment
The refutation of Lesser-Vehicle real form and of the non-concurrent formations has its treatise ground. The Yogācārabhūmi, Basic Section, fixes form as eleven kinds in brief, all of them the range of consciousness, and allows none of them existence apart from it; and for the formations not concurrent with mind it establishes that they are provisionally set up upon phases — attainment, life-faculty, group-homogeneity and the rest being posited upon phases of form and mind, with no substance of their own. Those words, provisionally set up upon phases, are the hinge on which this chapter refutes the Lesser-Vehicle reals one by one.
III. Refuting the form-dharmas and the rest grasped by the Lesser Vehicle
The Lesser Vehicle grasps "form and the other dharmas as really existing apart from consciousness." In what follows we refute, in order, the form-dharmas and then the non-concurrent formations (the unconditioned dharmas come in the next section).
Form-dharmas (1) · refuting resistant form (atoms)
The form they grasp is of two kinds in total: one is "resistant form" (having resistant solidity, mutually obstructing, made of atoms), the other is "non-resistant form" (without resistant solidity, not made of atoms). First we refute resistant form — the atoms that are supposed to constitute it cannot stand.
If the atoms have resistant solidity, they ought, like a jar and so on, to be nominal and not real; if they have no resistant solidity, they ought to be like "non-form," and then how could they aggregate to form a jar or a robe? Again: if the atoms have spatial parts, they must be analyzable and so are not really existent; if they have no spatial parts, then how can they combine and "receive light, cast shadow"? When the orb of the sun has just risen and shines on a pillar, the east side of the pillar (toward the sun) receives the light, and the west side (away from the sun) casts the shadow; since the place that receives light and the place that casts shadow are different, the atoms must definitely have spatial parts (a toward-part and an away-part). Again: when we see and touch a wall, we obtain only this one side (the face toward us) and cannot obtain the other part (the face away from us); and since "the aggregated thing" just is "the many atoms," the atoms must have this side and that part. Again: the atoms, wherever they reside, must have the distinctions of up, down, and the four directions, for otherwise there would be no way for them to neighbor one another and aggregate; or else (if they had no spatial parts and interpenetrated into one spot) they could not aggregate into a gross thing. Therefore, for those who grasp that "resistant form just is the many atoms": if the atoms have no spatial parts, they ought to have no "obstruction"; and having no obstruction, they do not constitute "resistant, obstructing" form. So the atoms you grasp must have spatial parts; and having spatial parts, they are analyzable and definitely not really existent. Therefore "resistant form is really existent" cannot be established.
Form-dharmas (2) · non-resistant form — the form on which the five consciousnesses depend and which they take as object is only transformed by consciousness
Then do the first five consciousnesses have no "form on which they depend (the faculties)" and no "form which they take as object (the objects)"? It is not that there is no form; it is only that that form is "transformed by consciousness." When consciousness arises, by the power of the inner causes and conditions it manifests an image resembling the eye and the rest (the faculties) and resembling color and the rest (the objects), and it takes this (inwardly transformed) image as that on which it depends and which it takes as object. And the "five faculties — eye and the rest" are not seen by direct perception (the faculties are imperceptible); their existence is inferred from the fact that they "can give rise to consciousness." This faculty is only a kind of "capacity" (the power to give rise to consciousness), not a real form made (of atoms) outside the mind. Since resistant form outside the mind has already been refuted as untenable, the faculty on which consciousness depends is only a capacity transformed by the inner consciousness — that which can give rise to the eye-consciousness and the rest is called the eye-faculty and the rest, and dependent on it the eye-consciousness and the rest arise.
And the "external object-condition" of the eye-consciousness and the rest (a real outer object serving as object-condition) also cannot, in reason, exist; therefore one must definitely grant that "the image transformed by one's own consciousness" is its object-condition — that is, what "can draw forth a (perceived-image) resembling one's own consciousness" is the object-condition. It is not that everything which "can give rise to this consciousness" counts as the object-condition; otherwise "seeds" and the rest would have to be called the object-condition of this consciousness too (seeds can give rise to consciousness but are not its object).
To put it more finely: when the five consciousnesses, eye and the rest, discern color, they only apprehend that "aggregated whole-characteristic," because the consciousness manifests an image resembling that characteristic; it is not that the "aggregated characteristic" has a separate real essence apart from the many atoms. Once that thing is analyzed and broken apart, the consciousness that "manifests resembling that characteristic" definitely does not arise, which shows that the "aggregated characteristic" is not really existent and cannot be called the (object-)condition of the five consciousnesses; otherwise a "second moon" (the apparent moon seen when one presses the eye, which is not real) could also give rise to the five consciousnesses. Nor is it that "the many atoms, in the position of common-characteristic aggregation," can each serve as object of the five consciousnesses — because there is no "atom-characteristic" appearing in the five consciousnesses; nor that "the many atoms each have an aggregated characteristic" — because when not aggregated this (aggregated) characteristic is absent. Nor is the essence-and-characteristic of the atoms altered between "the position of aggregation" and "the time of non-aggregation" (the essence and characteristic of the atoms do not change before and after); therefore the position of aggregation is just like the time of non-aggregation, and the atoms of color and the rest are in neither case the objects of the five consciousnesses.
Form-dharmas (3) · refuting the "assembled characteristic" (a rescue offered by another sect)
Someone (another sect) tries to rescue the position by saying: each single atom of color and the rest, in the time of "non-assembly," is indeed not an object of the five consciousnesses, but in the position of "common-characteristic assembly," the many atoms mutually reinforce one another in succession, and a "gross characteristic" arises, serving as the object of these five consciousnesses, and that gross characteristic is really existent and serves as the object of this consciousness. The master refutes: not so. First, the "position of common assembly" and the "time before assembly" are one and the same in the essence-and-characteristic of the atoms (assembly does not alter their essence and characteristic). Second, if a jar and a bowl and the like have equal numbers of atoms, the consciousness apprehending them ought to have no difference (yet one plainly sees that the characteristics of jar and bowl differ). Third, in the position of common assembly, each single atom ought to discard its own "small, round characteristic" (to become gross is to lose the small-round characteristic, yet the atoms in fact do not lose it). Fourth, "a consciousness apprehending a gross characteristic" ought not to apprehend "a fine object" (consciousness manifests the gross, the object is only fine atoms, the two do not correspond), otherwise it becomes "a consciousness apprehending one object able to apprehend another object." Fifth, (if correspondence is set aside) then a single consciousness ought to be able to apprehend every object. Even granting "there are atoms" already invites these faults; how much more, since on the principle of consciousness-only there are from the start no real atoms outside consciousness.
Form-dharmas (4) · the conclusion: all resistant form is transformed by consciousness; "atom" is a nominal designation
From this it is definitely known: it is "the image resembling color and the rest transformed by one's own consciousness" that serves as the object-condition — because the perceiving-part arises depending on it (the perceived-image-part) and carries its characteristic. And when consciousness manifests, it manifests "a single whole image" all at once, in proportion to its size, large or small; it does not separately transform into many atoms and then combine them into a thing. Then why did the Buddha speak of "atoms"? That was to refute those who grasp that "gross form has a real essence," teaching them to remove and analyze it step by step (in order to break the grasping at the reality of gross form); it was not that there really are atoms within the various forms. The yoga-practitioner, using the "wisdom of imaginative conception," removes and analyzes the characteristic of gross form layer by layer, and when it is analyzed to the point where it can no longer be analyzed, it is nominally called "atom"; this atom, though it still has spatial parts, is no longer analyzed — for to analyze it further would manifest the characteristic of "empty space" and would no longer constitute form. Hence the atom is called the "limit of form" (the extreme of analysis), not a really existent mote of dust. From this it can be known that all resistant form is manifested by transformation of consciousness and is not constituted of atoms.
Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) here lays bare the relation between "direction" and "part": the "essence" of the atom just is its "part," and the essence still occupies a single position, which is why it is said that "the atom still has spatial parts"; but "the direction just is the part (the position itself is that one part), and it is not that there is, outside the position, some further analyzable fine part" — and this does not contradict the Yogācārabhūmi's statement that "the atom has direction but no part," for "no part" means there is no still-finer part left to analyze, since the characteristic of the atom already borders on "the characteristic of empty space." He further glosses the "limit" in "limit of form" as meaning "the utmost exhaustion": analysis here has reached its end, and to split further beyond this point would become "non-form (the characteristic of empty space)." So "the limit of form" is the terminus of analysis, not a really existent particle of dust; whenever the scriptures and treatises say "the atom is the limit of form," this is what they mean.
Form-dharmas (5) · refuting the reality of non-resistant form
The remaining "non-resistant form" (such as the form subsumed under the dharma-base), being of this same (consciousness-transformed) kind, is likewise not really existent; and because it is "non-resistant," it is like mind and the mental factors (which are also non-resistant), and so is definitely not real form. Resistant form, even though it manifests a form-characteristic, when reasoned through still does not exist apart from consciousness — how much more "non-resistant form," which manifests no form-characteristic at all (neither showing nor obstructing): how can it be called a truly real form-dharma?
Form-dharmas (6) · refuting expressive form and non-expressive form
Then are "expressive form" (the manifesting karma of body and speech) and "non-expressive form" (the unmanifest karmic form) not really existent? They too are not. First, on "bodily expressive form": if it is really existent, what is its essence? If one says it is "shape (configuration)," then it is not really existent, because shape can be analyzed and one cannot find a real atom of "length" or "shortness." If one says it is "motion (movement)," it too is not really existent, because dharmas perish the moment they arise, so there is fundamentally no meaning of "movement"; and besides, the "perishing" of a conditioned dharma does not depend on a separate cause (a dharma perishes of itself), and a perishing that had to await a cause (perishing only on account of motion) would not be a true perishing. If one says "there is a kind of form, neither visible color nor configuration, which is drawn forth by mind and can move the hand and so on, and is called bodily expressive karma," this too does not hold: if this form is "motion," it has been refuted above (there is no meaning of motion); if it is "the cause of motion," then it ought to be the "wind element" (wind governs motion), but the wind element has no "expressive" meaning and ought not to be called "expressive"; and besides, the wind element belongs to "tangibles," and the tangible is karmically neutral and does not range over good and evil (whereas expressive karma ranges over good and evil — the two do not match); as for non-visible color, smell, taste, and the rest, they can be understood on the model of "tangibles" (none of them can serve as the essence of expressive karma). Therefore bodily expressive karma is definitely not really existent. In truth it is "mind" that is the cause, making the form-characteristic of the hand and the rest, transformed by consciousness, arise and perish in succession and turn toward another place, so that it appears as though there were movement; and because it can "express the inner mind," it is nominally called "bodily expression." "Verbal expression" too is not a really existent sound-nature: a sound of a single instant has no expressive denotation (a single utterance does not constitute meaning), and many instants in succession are a nominal combination and not real; how much more so, since the external resistant form (sound) has already been refuted above; in truth it is on account of "mind" that consciousness transforms so as to resemble sound, arising and perishing in succession so as to appear to have expression, and this is nominally called "verbal expression." Since "expression" is in fact not real, how could "non-expression" be really existent? It is only nominally established on the basis of the divisions of good and evil within "intention-resolve": either it is established on the basis of the position in which the seeds of "the intention that can give rise to outstanding good or evil bodily and verbal karma" have grown (non-expression of the dispersed state), or it is established on the basis of "the intention, within concentration, that suppresses the active operation of evil body and speech" (non-expression within concentration). Therefore it is only nominally existent.
Form-dharmas (7) · reconciling the three kinds of karma and the courses of karma
The scriptures speak of three kinds of karma — bodily, verbal, and mental; does it not now contradict scripture to judge bodily karma and verbal karma to be not real form? It is not that they are dismissed as non-existent (the three karmas are still granted); it is only said that they are "not form": the "intention" that can move the body is called bodily karma, and the "intention" that can give rise to speech is called verbal karma; "deliberative intention and resolving intention," which are associated with the mind and can also set the mind in motion, are called mental karma — all three karmas have "intention" as their essence. The "intention" that can set body and speech in motion, since it has something it does, is called "karma"; and because it is the place ranged over by the two intentions, deliberative and resolving, and can summon up ripened fruits of pain and pleasure, it is also called a "course" — so the first seven courses of karma (the three of body and the four of speech) also have "intention" as their self-nature; or else, bodily expression and verbal expression, being given rise to by intention, are nominally called "karma," and being places ranged over by intention, are called "courses of karma." From this it can be known: there is in fact no form outside the mind; there is only the inner consciousness transforming so as to resemble form and thereby arising.
Non-associated formations (general thesis)
The "non-concurrent formations" (the formative dharmas not associated with mind, such as possession, non-possession, and so on) are likewise not really existent: they have no obtainable "essence-and-characteristic" as do form, mind, and the mental factors, nor any obtainable "operation" that is "distinct from form, mind, and the mental factors" — which shows they are definitely not really existent and are only nominally established on the basis of the "states-of-division" (the differentiated conditions) of form, mind, and the rest. The very name "non-concurrent formations" points to its situation — Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) analyzes the name thus: the three words "non-associated" serve to mark it off from form, mind, and the mental factors (it does not resemble these three, hence "non-associated"); and the single word "formation" serves to mark it off from the unconditioned (the unconditioned is not a formation, whereas this is conditioned, subsumed under the formation-aggregate). One name, two markings-off, already announces in advance that it is neither form, mind, and the mental factors, nor the unconditioned, but only a class nominally established on the basis of the states-of-division of form and mind. Established by reasoning: they are definitely not things that "have a real essence and operation distinct from form, mind, and the mental factors" (whereas form, mind, and the rest all have a real essence and operation and are subsumed under the aggregates), because they too are subsumed under the "formation-aggregate" (and a dharma within the same aggregate ought not to have a real essence and operation outside form and mind); again, because they are not subsumed under "mind, the mental factors, form, or the unconditioned," like absolute non-existence, they are definitely not really existent; again, because they are not subsumed under "the remaining real dharmas," like the remaining nominal dharmas, they have no real essence. In what follows we refute them one by one.
Non-associated formations · refuting possession and non-possession
On what grounds do the Sarvāstivādins say "possession and non-possession" are distinct from form and mind and have a real essence and operation? They say it is because scripture has explicit words: scripture says "a certain person accomplishes good, accomplishes evil," "a noble one accomplishes the ten dharmas of the adept," and again "the ordinary person does not accomplish the noble dharmas," "the arhat does not accomplish the defilements" — and this "accomplishing, not accomplishing" just displays "possession, non-possession." The master refutes: scripture nowhere says that this "accomplishing, not accomplishing" is distinct from form and mind and has a real essence and operation, so taking it as proof does not hold. Scripture also says "a wheel-turning king accomplishes the seven treasures" — does the wheel-turning king then (by real "possession") accomplish another's body, or non-sentient things? If one says "because he has the power of sovereign use over the seven treasures, he is nominally said to accomplish them," then why not also speak nominally in the same way of good and evil dharmas, instead of grasping at a real "possession"? If one says "the seven treasures are present dharmas, so they may be nominally said to be accomplished (present, hence nominally sayable)," then how do you know that the good and evil dharmas accomplished are "apart from the present" (in the past or future)? Real dharmas apart from the present do not, in reason, exist (the past and future have no essence), and the present already has "the seeds of the good" (which may be nominally said to be accomplished — why need a real possession?). To press further: what outstanding operation does "possession" perform upon a dharma? If one says it can make a dharma manifest, then it ought also to be able to make the "unconditioned" manifest, and "all non-sentient things" ought never to manifest, and a dharma in the position of being "not yet possessed or already lost" ought never to arise; if one says "co-arisen possession" is the cause that makes a dharma manifest, then the separately posited "two births (the characteristic of birth and the birth-of-birth)" become useless; again: if one person simultaneously has the "possession" of the three natures, good, evil, and neutral, then good, evil, and neutral dharmas ought to manifest all at once, and if one says they still await another cause (before manifesting one by one), then "possession" is useless. If one says "possession" is "the cause of a dharma's not being lost" (making a dharma not be lost and so be ever-accomplished), then those "accomplishable dharmas" are from the start not apart from the sentient being, and once apart from the sentient being cannot be obtained at all — so "possession," whether as a cause of arising or a cause of not-being-lost, is useless upon a dharma. Since "possession" is in fact non-existent, "non-possession" too is non-existent along with it. In truth, on the basis of the state-of-division "a sentient being can accomplish dharmas," three kinds of "accomplishing" are nominally established: accomplishment of seeds, accomplishment of sovereignty, and accomplishment of active operation; and reversing these, the name "non-accomplishment (non-possession)" is nominally established; and although these kinds are many, within them the position "the seeds severed in the path of seeing across the three realms have not yet been permanently severed" is the one on which the name "non-possession" is nominally established and called "ordinary-being-nature" (the nature of the unenlightened), because the noble dharmas have not yet been accomplished.
Non-associated formations · refuting the shared lot (the lot common to a class)
On what grounds, again, do they say "the shared lot (the class-nature common to sentient beings)" is distinct from form and mind and has a real essence and operation? They again say scripture has explicit words: scripture says "this is the god-lot, this is the human-lot," and so on. The master refutes: scripture nowhere says that the "shared lot" is distinct from form and mind and really exists, so taking it as proof does not hold. If one says "the arising of similar cognition and similar speech (about sentient beings) — 'this is a human, this is a human' — arises because of the shared lot, so the shared lot really exists," then grass, trees, and the rest (which also make one say 'this is grass, this is grass') ought to have a shared lot too; and besides, if upon the "shared lot" itself one can also raise similar cognition and speech, then the "shared lot" itself ought to have a further "shared lot" (without end), and since you do not grant the latter, how can the former be established? If one says "the shared lot, as a cause, can give rise to similar deeds and similar wishes (people in common doing human deeds, in common having human wishes), so it really exists," this too does not hold: "the habituation cultivated in former lives," as a cause, can give rise to similar deeds and similar wishes, so why grasp at an additional real "shared lot"? In truth, on the basis of the state-of-division of "the similarity of sentient beings' body and mind," the shared lot is nominally established.
Non-associated formations · refuting the life-faculty
On what grounds, again, do they say "the life-faculty" is distinct from form and mind and really exists? They again say scripture has explicit words: scripture speaks of the three dharmas "vital warmth, warmth, and consciousness," and among these the "life-faculty" is called "life-span." The master refutes: scripture nowhere says there is a "real life-span-essence distinct from form and mind," so taking it as proof does not hold. Again: since it has already been established above that "form is not apart from consciousness," the life-faculty too ought not to be apart from consciousness, and there is no separate life-faculty. Again: if the life-faculty were distinct from consciousness and really existent, it ought, like the mental factor "feeling" and the rest (mental factors distinct from consciousness are not called the life-faculty), not to be the true life-faculty. Someone asks: then why does scripture speak of the three dharmas "life-span, warmth, and consciousness" (are they not three distinct things)? Answer: they are spoken of as three on account of distinctions of "meaning," just as the "four right exertions" are basically one diligence, spoken of as four with respect to meaning. Again it is asked: when one abides in a "mindless state" (such as the no-conception concentration) and consciousness does not operate, ought not life-span and warmth then be absent? Answer: have you not heard scripture say "consciousness is not apart from the body" (even in a mindless state there is still consciousness)? Again it is asked: since there is consciousness, why is it called a "mindless state"? Answer: what perishes at that time is the "evolving consciousnesses" (the first six and so on), not the "store-consciousness" (ālaya-vijñāna) (the eighth consciousness still remains, hence there are life-span and warmth, and it is named "mindless"); the proof for this eighth consciousness will be set out in detail later. This eighth consciousness suffices to serve as the essence of "the realm, the destiny, and the birth," being pervasive, constant, continuous, and also the ripened fruit, so there is no need to grasp at an additional real "life-faculty." In truth, on the basis of "the seeds that intimately give rise to this (eighth) consciousness, the duration of abiding in the world drawn forth and fixed by karma," the life-faculty is nominally established.
Non-associated formations · refuting the two mindless concentrations and the no-conception ripened fruit
On what grounds, again, do they say "the two mindless concentrations (the no-conception concentration and the cessation concentration)" and "the no-conception ripened fruit (the karmic fruit of the no-conception heaven)" are distinct from form and mind and have a real self-nature? They say: if they had no real self-nature, they could not block mind and the mental factors from arising (since they can block mind, this shows they have a real essence). The master refutes in turn: if one says "in a mindless state there is a distinct real dharma that can block the mind, called the mindless concentration," then "in a formless state (the formless realm)" too there ought to be a distinct real dharma that can obstruct form, called a formless concentration (yet in the formless realm there is no such real dharma capable of obstructing form); since that side (formless concentration) is not so, how can this side (a mindless concentration with a real dharma blocking mind) be established? Moreover, what need is there of a real dharma to block the mind? Even a nominal dharma like a dam can block (water). In truth: when cultivating concentration, in the preparatory position of entering concentration, one is wearied by "the coarse and agitated mind and mental factors," and gives rise to an outstanding "aspiration" to block and suppress mind and the mental factors, making mind and the mental factors gradually finer and subtler, until at the "subtle-subtle mind" it perfumes the "ripening consciousness" and accomplishes "an extremely strong seed of the wearied mind"; by this wearied seed the active seeds of mind are suppressed and harmed, and the coarse and agitated mind temporarily does not arise — and on the basis of this "state-of-division of non-arising" the two mindless concentrations are nominally established. The seed of this wearied mind is good, so the concentration too is called good. Before cultivating the no-conception concentration, the practitioner seeks "the no-conception fruit," and the seed perfumed thereby summons that (no-conception heaven) ripened fruit; by the power of the concentration, the coarse and agitated conception and the rest do not operate, and on the basis of this state-of-division "no-conception" is nominally established; it is established on the basis of the ripened fruit, and so receives the name "ripened." Therefore these three dharmas (the two mindless concentrations and the no-conception ripened fruit) are likewise not really existent.
Non-associated formations · refuting the conditioned characteristics (birth, abiding, change, perishing)
On what grounds, again, do they say the "conditioned characteristics (birth, abiding, change, perishing)" are distinct from form and mind and have a real self-nature? They again say scripture has explicit words: scripture says "there are three conditioned characteristics of the conditioned," and so on. The master refutes: scripture nowhere says that the conditioned characteristics are distinct from form and mind and have a real self-nature, so taking it as proof does not hold. Now to establish directly their "non-distinctness": First, the particle "of" in "the characteristics 'of' the conditioned" (the genitive) does not indicate that the characteristic and the essence are distinct essences, just as "the essence 'of' form and mind" just is form and mind (the genitive does not indicate a distinct essence). Second, the essence of the "characterizer (birth and the rest)" is not necessarily distinct from the "characterized (form and mind)," otherwise the "characteristic of solidity and the rest" too ought to be distinct from "earth" (earth has solidity as its characteristic, and the solidity-characteristic is not distinct from earth). Third, if the "conditioned characteristics" were distinct from the essence of the characterized, then the "unconditioned characteristic" too ought to be distinct from its characterized (yet the unconditioned characteristic is not distinct from the unconditioned, and by example the conditioned characteristics too are not distinct). Again: if the essences of the four characteristics, birth and the rest, were all co-present, they ought to exert their operation all at once at every time; if one says they are mutually contradictory and their operations cannot be exerted all at once, then their essences too ought to be mutually contradictory — so how can they be "co-present"? And the operations of the three, "abiding, change, perishing," especially ought not to be co-present (abiding makes a dharma abide, perishing makes a dharma perish — they are contradictory). Again: since the essences of both the characterizer (the four characteristics) and the characterized (form and mind) are "originally present" (the Sarvāstivādins grant that the essence of a dharma is ever-existent), their operations too ought to be ever-present like this (there being no separate nature); if one says their operations still await causes and conditions before they arise, then the causes and conditions awaited ought not to be originally present (contradicting the ever-existence of the dharma-essence). Again: (since the essence of the dharma is originally present) positing "birth" and the rest becomes useless (the dharma is originally present, so why need birth?); and since the characterized is ever-existent and birth and the rest combine with it, the "unconditioned dharma" too ought to have birth and the rest (the unconditioned is also a dharma — on what basis is it judged that only the conditioned has birth?). Again: the past and future, being neither present nor permanent, ought, like a flower in the sky, to be non-existent; how can "birth," which is named "existence" (making a dharma come to be), be in the future (the future is not yet, so how can it be named existence)? And "perishing," which is named "non-existence" (making a dharma cease to be), ought not to be in the present (the present is existent — how can it be named non-existence); if "perishing" is not non-existence (the Sarvāstivādins grant perishing also has an essence), then "birth" too ought to be non-existence (birth and perishing on the same model — self-contradictory); how can "perishing" and "abiding," being contradictory, be simultaneous, and how can "abiding," which does not contradict "birth," allow them to be placed in distinct time-periods (the Sarvāstivādins judge the four characteristics to be sequential — a contradiction)? Therefore their grasping that the four characteristics are really existent and co-present is, going forward or back, unreasonable. In truth: a conditioned dharma, by the power of causes and conditions, "having not been, now is; having briefly been, returns to non-being," and in order to display that it is distinct from the unconditioned (the unconditioned has none of these four characteristics), the four characteristics, birth, abiding, change, and perishing, are nominally established — "having not been and now being," the position of existence, is called birth; the brief pause of the position of birth is called abiding; the difference of before and after within abiding is called change; the time of non-being, having briefly been and returning to non-being, is called perishing; the first three characteristics, being "existence," are alike in the present, and the last (perishing), being "non-existence," is in the past. Someone asks: since "perishing" is a "non-existent dharma" (already returned to non-being), how can it serve as a "characteristic" of the conditioned? Answer: perishing displays "this dharma afterward returns to non-being" — what fault is there in its serving as a characteristic? Birth displays that this dharma was formerly not existent, perishing displays that this dharma is afterward non-existent, change displays that this dharma is not frozen and unchanging, abiding displays that this dharma has a brief operation; though all four characteristics are called "displaying" with respect to the conditioned dharma, what each displays is different. This is the nominal establishment of the four characteristics with reference to the "instant"; and if one takes the state-of-division of "a single life-term" (a stretch of life), they can also be nominally established: the initial coming-to-be is called birth, the final non-being is called perishing, the similar succession after birth is called abiding, and the transformation within the succession is called change. Therefore the four characteristics are all nominally established.
Non-associated formations · refuting the name-group, the phrase-group, and the syllable-group
On what grounds, again, do they say there is, distinct from form and mind and really expressive, a "name-group, phrase-group, and syllable-group"? They again say scripture has explicit words: scripture says "the Buddha attained the rare name-, phrase-, and syllable-groups." The master refutes: scripture nowhere says that names, phrases, and syllables are distinct from form and mind and have a real essence, so taking it as proof does not hold. To refute further: if names, phrases, and syllables were distinct from "sound" and really existent, they ought, like color and the rest, not to be truly expressive (if there were a separate existence apart from sound, it would be like color and could not express meaning). If one says "sound can give rise to names, phrases, and syllables," then this sound must have "the inflection of tone and pitch" (rise and fall), and this is already enough to express meaning — why posit names and the rest in addition? If one says "the inflection of tone and pitch upon sound just is the name, phrase, and syllable, and is distinct from sound and really existent," then "the inflection of configuration upon visible color" too ought to be distinct from color and have a separate real essence. If one says "the inflection of tone and pitch upon sound, like the sound of strings and pipes (musical instruments), cannot express meaning (and so an expressive name, phrase, and syllable must be posited in addition)," then this spoken sound ought, like that musical sound, to give rise to no names and the rest in addition; and besides, who says that musical sound definitely cannot express? If a sound with inflection can express, then the sound of a wind-chime too ought to have an expressive use; conversely (if musical and chime sounds do not express), then this spoken sound too ought, like them, to give rise to no real names, phrases, and syllables in addition. If one says "only spoken sound can give rise to names and the rest (excluding musical sound and wind-chimes)," then why not simply grant "only spoken sound can express" (since only speech can give rise to the expressive name, this just is only speech expressing — why need names, phrases, and syllables in between)? And on what grounds is it definitely known that "the expressive just is speech," and on what grounds is it known that "distinct from speech there is separately an expressive"? "Speech is not distinct from the expressive" is a fact known in common to humans and gods alike; to grasp that "the expressive is distinct from speech (positing names, phrases, and syllables in addition)" is the way of "the god-beloved" (the foolish), not what the wise grant. In truth, on the basis of the divisions of "spoken sound," the name, phrase, and syllable are nominally established: the "name" expresses the self-nature of a thing, the "phrase" expresses the distinctions of a thing, and the "syllable" is the letter, serving as the support of the former two; though these three have no separate essence apart from sound, (names, phrases, and syllables being nominal, sound being real) the nominal and the real differ, so they are also not simply equal to sound. By this, the objects of "unobstructed understanding of dharma (which takes name, phrase, and syllable as object)" and "unobstructed understanding of expression (which takes sound as object)" differ; and "sound" and "name" and the rest each have their own placement among the aggregates, bases, and elements. And this (nominal establishment of name, phrase, and syllable on the basis of sound) is spoken of with reference to "this land (the Sahā world)" and does not hold across all buddha-lands, for in other buddha-lands too there are the three — name, phrase, and syllable — nominally established on the basis of "light, sublime fragrance, taste," and so on.
Non-associated formations · refuting latent tendencies, and barring the rest
Someone grasps that "latent tendencies (the seeds of the defilements)" are distinct from mind and the mental factors and are subsumed under the aggregate of the non-concurrent formations. This too is incorrect — a latent tendency is still called "greed" and the rest, just like active greed and the rest (associated with mind), and is not a non-concurrent formations. As for all the rest who grasp that there separately exist various sorts of "non-concurrent formations," they can all be barred one by one on the foregoing reasoning.
To gather it into one statement: there is in fact no form-dharma outside the mind, nor any really existent non-concurrent formations; there is only the manifestation of the inner consciousness.
Onward Transmission
This section, refuting the real dharmas grasped by the non-Buddhist and Lesser-Vehicle schools, makes good the thesis that "form and the non-concurrent formations are all only consciousness-transformation, only nominally established" — and this established position is the foundation on which the consciousness-only system sets up "the dharmas are not really existent apart from consciousness," taken up one by one in the later treatises. The Hundred Dharmas treatise lists the three sets "the eleven form-dharmas, the twenty-four mind-non-concurrent formations, and the six unconditioned" — and this section refutes precisely the grasping at "real existence apart from consciousness" of these three sets, showing them to be only consciousness-transformed, only nominally established on the basis of states-of-division, which is why the Hundred Dharmas places them in the latter three positions of "what consciousness manifests" (not at the head, among the mind-king and the mental factors). The Thirty Verses — verse one, "through the nominal designation of self and dharmas, the manifold characteristics evolve; these rest on the transformation of consciousness" — is precisely the "dharmas" portion of the root-verse this section expounds, verse answering to verse. Closest of all is the Twenty Verses: it is the dedicated treatise that "refutes atoms and clarifies consciousness-only without object," refuting the reality of atoms together with this section — where this section says "if atoms had spatial parts they could be analyzed and so are not really existent," the Twenty Verses presses on with "an atom combined with the six directions ought to have six parts; and if six atoms occupied one and the same spot, the aggregate too ought to be only as large as a single atom," concluding that "one real atom cannot be established" — the two being one and the same cutting edge; and the "consciousness-only without object" that the Twenty Verses establishes is just the warrant for this section's "there is in fact no outer form, only the inner consciousness transforming so as to resemble form and arising." The Madhyānta-vibhāga, in its chapter on characteristics, expounds "unreal imagination" (consciousness is the other-dependent, and the grasped object is fundamentally non-existent), which is the basis of this section's meaning that "the object is only consciousness-transformation, the outer object is not existent." The Mahāyāna-saṃgraha, in its chapter on the characteristics of the knowable, establishes the three natures, saying "what is wholly wholly-imagined has no essence; the other-dependent just is consciousness-transformation" — and the real dharmas of the non-Buddhist and Lesser-Vehicle schools that this section refutes are precisely "what is wholly wholly-imagined," while the inner consciousness transforming into the semblance that it establishes is precisely "the other-dependent." The one meaning runs through, before and after.
考據Apparatus
〔所釋之頌〕承前章，廣釋第一頌·破法執
一、科判定位
| 科判 | 此章之位 |
|---|---|
| 明唯識相 | 破法執(一)·破外道（前章）→ 破小乘實色·不相應行 → 破無為·結成唯識（§5） |
| 此章內 | 破極微·有對色 · 破無對色 · 破和集相 · 破表無表色 · 會通三業業道 · 破不相應行（得·非得·同分·命根·二無心定·有為相·名句文身·隨眠） |
| 所釋頌 | 《唯識三十論頌》頌一「由假說我、法」之法執一分 |
外道實法既破，本章破餘乘（小乘）所執離識實有之色法與心不相應行法。無為法之破與結成唯識，別為次章（§5）。
二、源頌 · 義理脈絡
由假說我、法，有種種相轉。 〔T1586 0060a27〕
本章仍釋頌一之法執一分，所破者非外道而是餘乘。小乘所執離識實有者二類：一色法（極微·有對·無對·表無表），二心不相應行（得·命根·同分等）。二類俱破，則五位法中唯心、心所與其所變乃真，餘皆假立。
三、經論宗依（經證 → 論本）
經證
我說識所緣，唯識所現故。……此中無有少法能見少法；然即此心如是生時，即有如是影像顯現。 〔解深密經·分別瑜伽品 T676 0698b02–b05〕
如是觀三界唯心分齊，離我我所，無動搖、離去來。 〔楞伽阿跋多羅寶經 T670 0489c02–c03〕
《解深密》以『識所緣唯識所現·無少法能見少法』明所緣境唯是識變（如鏡質為緣還見本質），破『識外實境』——破法執所宗之經本；《楞伽》以『三界唯心·離我我所』明諸法唯心、外境非性。
論本（瑜伽師地論 T1579）
諸法自性略有三種。一、遍計所執自性，二、依他起自性，三、圓成實自性。遍計所執自性者，謂諸所有名言安立諸法自性，依假名言，數數周遍計度諸法而建立故。 〔T1579·攝決擇分 0656c01–c05〕
由相無自性性故，遍計所執自性說無自性。 〔T1579·攝決擇分 0705a02–a03〕
我說識所緣、唯識所現故。……此中無有少法能見少法；然即此心如是生時、即有如是影像顯現。 〔T1579·攝決擇分 0724a06–a09〕
《瑜伽師地論》定「法」之三自性，明所執實法即「遍計所執」（依假名言周遍計度而建立），『由相無自性故說無自性』（破法執之論本：所破即遍計所執自性）；又錄《解深密》「識所緣唯識所現」明境唯識變。護法糅釋所宗，其經在解深密、楞伽，其論在瑜伽師地論——所破之外道小乘實法即「遍計所執」，所立之識變即「依他起」。
四、本論釋要（護法糅釋 · T1585）
總標 · 識外諸法非有
如何識外實有諸法不可得耶？外道、餘乘所執外法，理非有故。 〔T1585 0002b21–b22〕
破小乘色法 · 總標二色
餘乘所執，離識實有色等諸法，如何非有？彼所執色、不相應行及諸無為，理非有故。且所執色總有二種：一者有對，極微所成；二者無對，非極微成。彼有對色定非實有，能成極微非實有故。 〔T1585 0004a07–a11〕
破極微 · 質礙方分二難
謂諸極微，若有質礙，應如瓶等，是假非實。若無質礙，應如非色，如何可集成瓶、衣等？又諸極微，若有方分，必可分析，便非實有。若無方分，則如非色，云何和合承光、發影？ 〔T1585 0004a11–a15〕
有方分故，便可分析，定非實有。故有對色實有不成。 〔T1585 0004a24–a25〕
破五識外緣 · 和合相
眼等五識了色等時，但緣和合，似彼相故，非和合相異諸極微有實自體。分析彼時，似彼相識定不生故，彼和合相既非實有，故不可說是五識緣，勿第二月等能生五識故。 〔T1585 0004b06–b11〕
結成色唯識變 · 色邊際
為執麁色有實體者，佛說極微，令其除析，非謂諸色實有極微。……雖此極微猶有方分，而不可析，若更析之便似空現，不名為色，故說極微是色邊際。由此應知，諸有對色，皆識變現，非極微成。 〔T1585 0004b28–c05〕
破不相應行 · 總標
不相應行亦非實有，所以者何？得、非得等，非如色、心及諸心所體相可得；非異色、心及諸心所作用可得，由此故知定非實有，但依色等分位假立。 〔T1585 0005a06–a10〕
破諸無為 · 總非
諸無為法離色、心等決定實有，理不可得。……不應執為離色、心等實無為性。 〔T1585 0006b15–b23〕
然契經說，有虛空等諸無為法，略有二種：一、依識變假施設有……二、依法性，假施設有……故諸無為非定實有。 〔T1585 0006c05–c20〕
結成唯識 · 總結比量
外道、餘乘所執諸法異心、心所非實有性，是所取故，如心、心所。……諸心、心所依他起故，亦如幻事，非真實有。為遣妄執心、心所外實有境故，說唯有識。若執唯識真實有者，如執外境，亦是法執。 〔T1585 0006c21–c26〕
要義：本論破法執分二大段——破外道所執實法、破小乘所執色等三聚。外道四宗（數論三事合成·勝論六句義·自在天一因生法·聲常·極微生麁色）皆以『多事合成則假·常遍能生則自相違·體相一異俱不成』之理破其實。小乘三聚：色法分有對（極微『有質礙則可析非實·無方分則不能集成承光發影』，故定非實）、無對（五識但緣和合相，和合相非離極微實有，『勿第二月能生五識』；佛說極微唯為破執而假說「色邊際」，非謂色實有極微）；不相應行（得非得等無別體相、無別作用，唯依色等分位假立，逐破得非得·同分·命根·二定無想·有為相·名句文身·隨眠）；無為（離色心實有「理不可得」，虛空擇滅等或依識變假施設、或依法性假施設，「非定實有」）。總結以二比量收：所執諸法「是所取故，如心心所」非實有；心心所「依他起故，亦如幻事」非真實有——故「為遣妄執心心所外實有境故說唯有識」，而「執唯識真實有」亦墮法執。
五、諸家異釋（窺基《述記》T1830）
此即第一外道、小乘略共為問，徵法非有。……今問曰：如何識外實有諸法不可得耶？……此即第二，略答彼問：法體無也。亦答識外，不答識中。 〔T1830 0252a07–a15〕
雖此極微……體即是分而體有方，故言極微猶有方分。……方即分故，非更有分。《瑜伽》說云，極微有方無分者，更無細分，故不相違，以此微相與空相隣故。諸經論皆說極微是色邊際，邊際者是窮盡義，過此更折便為非色。 〔T1830 0272c19–c29〕
不相應者，簡非色、心及諸心所，不相似故，行簡無為。 〔T1830 0276b16–b17〕
此諸無為非即色等，不可言不異，但可言離色等實有定無。大乘真如望有為法，非即非離，不異不一，既殊彼計，故破無失。 〔T1830 0289b17–b20〕
窺基判破法執一段為五段（總問·總答·外道別問破·小乘別問破·結成唯識）；釋「識外」之問乃「外道、小乘略共為問」，答唯遮「識外」不遮『識中（有似法故）』。於「極微」剖「方即分故，非更有分」（極微體即是分而仍有方位，與《瑜伽》「有方無分」不相違，以微相與空相相隣），明「色邊際」即窮盡義（過此更折便為非色）。於「不相應行」釋其名（「不相應」簡色心心所，「行」簡無為）。於「無為」揀大乘真如與薩婆多實有無為之別（彼計離色心實有，大乘真如望有為「非即非離、不異不一」，故所破不及真如）。諸破之救義繫名、伏斷位次，《述記》卷九詳之。
六、譯名 · 古譯對讀（玄奘 ↔ 真諦《轉識論》）
| 義 | 玄奘《成唯識論》 | 真諦《轉識論》 |
|---|---|---|
| 外境（所破） | 外法 · 識外實有諸法 | 塵（「三塵識，即是六識」〔0061c09〕） |
| 境唯識變 | 內識變似色生 | 識轉似塵（「第三塵識者，識轉似塵」〔0062a20〕） |
| 唯識無境 | 為遣妄執心心所外實有境，說唯有識 | 唯識義（「由境無識無故立唯識義」〔0063a23〕） |
| 境識俱遣 | 執唯識真實有，如執外境，亦是法執 | 境識俱遣（「既境識俱遣，何識可成」〔0062c16〕） |
玄奘以『外法／識外實有諸法』標所破、以「內識變似」立能變；真諦《轉識論》以「塵」名外境、以「識轉似塵」明境唯識變，並立「由境無識無故立唯識義」「境識俱遣」——古譯於『破境立識、復遣識執』一義同歸（玄奘『執唯識真實有亦是法執』即真諦「境識俱遣」）。
七、術語
法執（dharma-grāha）— 執諸法（色等）離識實有之自體；對「我執」。本章破之。 遍計所執（parikalpita-svabhāva）— 依假名言周遍計度而建立之自性，畢竟無體；所破之實法即此。 極微（paramāṇu）— 色法分析之最小單位；本論判其唯假（佛為破麁色執而假說「色邊際」）。 有對色 · 無對色（sa-pratigha · a-pratigha rūpa）— 有質礙相障之色／無質礙之色；前者破極微、後者破五識外緣。 不相應行（viprayukta-saṃskāra）— 與心不相應之行法（得·非得·同分·命根等）；唯依色心分位假立。 無為（asaṃskṛta）— 虛空·擇滅·非擇滅等；非離色心實有，依識變或法性假施設。 〔梵文為古德所傳發音輔助。〕
八、互讀（唯識系次第：百法 → 三十頌 → 二十論 → 辯中邊論 → 攝大乘論）
- 百法：色法十一（破其離識實有）· 心不相應行二十四（破得非得等實有）· 無為六（破離色心實有無為）——本章正破此三聚之「實有」執，明其唯識變、唯假立。
- 三十頌：頌一「由假說我法……彼依識所變」——本章釋「法」分（逐頌姊妹）。
- 二十論：正相關。破極微·唯識無境之專論。「極微與六合，一應成六分；若與六同處，聚應如極微」〔T1590 0075c27–c28〕、「極微既無合，聚有合者誰？……是故一實極微不成」〔T1590 0076a06–a12〕——與本章『極微有方分則可析非實』同破極微實有；二十論立「唯識無境」即本章「實無外色，唯有內識變似色生」之張本。
- 辯中邊論：辯相品·虛妄分別（「唯識無境」之所依——識為依他、所執境無）。
- 攝大乘論：所知相分·三性（遍計所執無體、依他起識變——本章所破即遍計所執、所立即依他起）。
章內：破我執（前章·無實我）· 唯識三性（後章·依他·遍計·圓成）· 安立唯識（識變之廣辯）。
九、校本定位
頌 T1586〔0060a27–a28〕· 本論 T1585 破法執〔總標 0002b21–b22·破色 0004a07–c05·破不相應行 0005a06–a10·破無為 0006b15–c20·結成唯識 0006c21–c26〕· 述記 T1830〔五段 0252a07–a20·色邊際 0272c19–c29·不相應行 0276b16–b17·無為 0289b17–b20·結成 0292c11–c12〕· 《轉識論》T1587〔0061c09·0062a20·0062c16·0063a23〕。 〔經證〕解深密 T676〔0698b02–b05〕· 楞伽 T670〔0489c02–c03〕。〔論本〕瑜伽師地論 T1579〔三自性 0656c01–c05·相無自性 0705a02–a03·唯識所現 0724a05–a09〕。〔互讀〕二十論 T1590〔0075c27–c28·0076a06–a12〕。
〔Verses commented〕Continuing: unfolding verse 1 · refuting the dharma-attachment
1. Position in Kuiji's Structural Outline
| Outline | Position of this chapter |
|---|---|
| Clarifying the character | refuting the dharma-attachment (I) - the heterodox (previous chapter) -> Lesser-Vehicle real form and the non-concurrent formations -> refuting the unconditioned (§5) |
| Within this chapter | refuting atoms and obstructive form - non-obstructive form - the aggregate-aspect - expressive and non-expressive form - reconciling the three kinds of action - refuting the non-concurrent formations (attainment, non-attainment, group-homogeneity, life-faculty, the two mindless attainments, the conditioned marks, name-phrase-syllable bodies, latent tendencies) |
| Verses commented | the dharma-attachment portion of Triṃśikā v. 1 |
The heterodox real dharma refuted, this chapter refutes the form-dharmas and mind-non-concurrent formations that the other vehicles hold to be real apart from consciousness. The refutation of the unconditioned and the establishing of consciousness-only form §5.
2. Source verses · doctrinal context
由假說我、法，有種種相轉。 〔T1586 0060a27〕
This chapter still expounds the dharma-attachment portion of verse 1, but what it refutes is not the heterodox: it is the other vehicles. What they hold to be real apart from consciousness falls in two classes — form (atoms, obstructive and non-obstructive, expressive and non-expressive) and the formations not concurrent with mind (attainment, life-faculty, group-homogeneity and the rest). Both refuted, among the five classes only mind, its factors, and what they transform into stand as real; the rest are provisionally set up.
3. Scriptural and treatise grounding (scripture → root śāstra)
Scriptural witnesses
我說識所緣，唯識所現故。……此中無有少法能見少法；然即此心如是生時，即有如是影像顯現。 〔Saṃdhinirmocana · Yoga-discernment chapter, T676 0698b02–b05〕
tr. "I teach that the object-support of consciousness is only what consciousness manifests. … Herein no slightest dharma sees any slightest dharma; yet when this very mind arises thus, just such an image appears."
如是觀三界唯心分齊，離我我所，無動搖、離去來。 〔Laṅkāvatāra T670 0489c02–c03〕
tr. "Contemplating thus that the triple world is the bound of mind alone, apart from self and what belongs to self, unshaken, free of coming and going."
The Saṃdhinirmocana, with "the object-support of consciousness is only what consciousness manifests · no slightest dharma sees any slightest dharma," shows that the supporting object is only consciousness's transformation (as a mirror's reflection, taken as object, sees back the original) and refutes "a real object outside consciousness" — the scriptural root for refuting the dharma-attachment; the Laṅkāvatāra, with "the triple world is mind-only · apart from self and what belongs to self," shows all dharmas to be mind-only and the outer object to be without nature.
Root śāstra (Yogācārabhūmi T1579)
諸法自性略有三種。一、遍計所執自性，二、依他起自性，三、圓成實自性。遍計所執自性者，謂諸所有名言安立諸法自性，依假名言，數數周遍計度諸法而建立故。 〔T1579 · Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī 0656c01–c05〕
tr. "The self-nature of dharmas is, in brief, of three kinds: (1) the wholly-imagined (parikalpita) self-nature, (2) the other-dependent (paratantra) self-nature, (3) the perfectly-accomplished (pariniṣpanna) self-nature. The wholly-imagined self-nature is the self-nature of dharmas as established by name-and-word — for, relying on conventional name-and-word, [one] again and again reckons dharmas all around and thereby sets [them] up."
由相無自性性故，遍計所執自性說無自性。 〔T1579 · Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī 0705a02–a03〕
tr. "By reason of the mark-less-ness of self-nature, the wholly-imagined self-nature is said to be without self-nature."
我說識所緣、唯識所現故。……此中無有少法能見少法；然即此心如是生時、即有如是影像顯現。 〔T1579 · Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī 0724a06–a09〕
tr. "I teach that the object-support of consciousness is only what consciousness manifests. … Herein no slightest dharma sees any slightest dharma; yet when this very mind arises thus, just such an image appears."
The Yogācārabhūmi fixes the three self-natures of "dharma," showing the real dharmas held to be the "wholly-imagined" (set up by reckoning all around in dependence on conventional name-and-word), and "by reason of mark-less-ness said to be without self-nature" (the śāstra-root for refuting the dharma-attachment: what is refuted is the wholly-imagined self-nature); it also records the Saṃdhinirmocana's "the object-support of consciousness is only what consciousness manifests," showing the object to be consciousness-transformation alone. What Dharmapāla's redaction takes as authority has its scripture in the Saṃdhinirmocana and Laṅkāvatāra, and its śāstra in the Yogācārabhūmi — the heterodox and Hīnayāna real dharmas refuted are the "wholly-imagined," and the consciousness-transformation established is the "other-dependent."
4. Essentials of the root treatise (Dharmapāla's redaction · T1585)
General statement · dharmas outside consciousness are non-existent
如何識外實有諸法不可得耶？外道、餘乘所執外法，理非有故。 〔T1585 0002b21–b22〕
tr. "How is it that really-existent dharmas outside consciousness cannot be found? Because the outer dharmas held by the heterodox and the other vehicles are, in principle, non-existent."
Refuting Hīnayāna form · the general statement of the two forms
餘乘所執，離識實有色等諸法，如何非有？彼所執色、不相應行及諸無為，理非有故。且所執色總有二種：一者有對，極微所成；二者無對，非極微成。彼有對色定非實有，能成極微非實有故。 〔T1585 0004a07–a11〕
tr. "The form and other dharmas the other vehicles hold to be really existent apart from consciousness — how are they non-existent? Because the form, non-concurrent formations, and unconditioned dharmas they hold are, in principle, non-existent. Now the form they hold is of two kinds: (1) resistant, composed of atoms; (2) non-resistant, not composed of atoms. Their resistant form is definitely not really existent, because the atoms that compose it are not really existent."
Refuting atoms · the twin difficulties of obstruction and spatial division
謂諸極微，若有質礙，應如瓶等，是假非實。若無質礙，應如非色，如何可集成瓶、衣等？又諸極微，若有方分，必可分析，便非實有。若無方分，則如非色，云何和合承光、發影？ 〔T1585 0004a11–a15〕
tr. "That is: each atom, if it has obstructive substance, should — like a pot and so on — be conventional, not real. If it has no obstructive substance, it should be like a non-form: how could it aggregate into pot, cloth, and so on? Again, each atom, if it has spatial division, can necessarily be analyzed, and so is not really existent. If it has no spatial division, then it is like a non-form: how could the aggregate catch light and cast a shadow?"
有方分故，便可分析，定非實有。故有對色實有不成。 〔T1585 0004a24–a25〕
tr. "Because [it] has spatial division it can be analyzed, and so is definitely not really existent. Therefore resistant form's real existence is not established."
Refuting the five consciousnesses' outer object · the aggregated-appearance
眼等五識了色等時，但緣和合，似彼相故，非和合相異諸極微有實自體。分析彼時，似彼相識定不生故，彼和合相既非實有，故不可說是五識緣，勿第二月等能生五識故。 〔T1585 0004b06–b11〕
tr. "When the five consciousnesses (eye and the rest) cognize form and the rest, they refer only to the aggregation, because [their cognition] resembles its appearance; it is not that the aggregated-appearance has a real self-substance apart from the atoms. For when [the atoms] are analyzed, the consciousness resembling that appearance definitely does not arise; the aggregated-appearance being thus not really existent, it cannot be said to be the object of the five consciousnesses — lest a second moon and the like be able to produce the five consciousnesses."
Resolving form into consciousness-transformation · the limit of form
為執麁色有實體者，佛說極微，令其除析，非謂諸色實有極微。……雖此極微猶有方分，而不可析，若更析之便似空現，不名為色，故說極微是色邊際。由此應知，諸有對色，皆識變現，非極微成。 〔T1585 0004b28–c05〕
tr. "For the sake of those who hold coarse form to have a real substance, the Buddha taught atoms, to make them break [it] down — not that forms really possess atoms. … Although this atom still has spatial division, it cannot be [further] analyzed; were it analyzed further it would appear like emptiness and not be called form. Hence the atom is said to be the limit of form. By this it should be known that all resistant form is consciousness's transformed manifestation, not composed of atoms."
Refuting the non-concurrent formations · general statement
不相應行亦非實有，所以者何？得、非得等，非如色、心及諸心所體相可得；非異色、心及諸心所作用可得，由此故知定非實有，但依色等分位假立。 〔T1585 0005a06–a10〕
tr. "The non-concurrent formations are likewise not really existent. Why? Acquisition, non-acquisition, and the rest are not, like form, mind, and the mental factors, to be found as a substance-and-mark; nor are they to be found, as differing from form, mind, and the mental factors, as a function. By this it is known [they are] definitely not really existent, but only conventionally posited upon the states of form and the rest."
Refuting the unconditioned dharmas · the general denial
諸無為法離色、心等決定實有，理不可得。……不應執為離色、心等實無為性。 〔T1585 0006b15–b23〕
tr. "That unconditioned dharmas are definitely really existent apart from form, mind, and the rest cannot in principle be found. … [They] should not be held to be a real unconditioned nature apart from form, mind, and the rest."
然契經說，有虛空等諸無為法，略有二種：一、依識變假施設有……二、依法性，假施設有……故諸無為非定實有。 〔T1585 0006c05–c20〕
tr. "Yet scripture's speaking of unconditioned dharmas such as space and the rest is, in brief, of two kinds: (1) conventionally designated in dependence on consciousness-transformation… (2) conventionally designated in dependence on the dharma-nature… Hence the unconditioned dharmas are not definitely really existent."
Resolving into consciousness-only · the closing inferences
外道、餘乘所執諸法異心、心所非實有性，是所取故，如心、心所。……諸心、心所依他起故，亦如幻事，非真實有。為遣妄執心、心所外實有境故，說唯有識。若執唯識真實有者，如執外境，亦是法執。 〔T1585 0006c21–c26〕
tr. "The dharmas the heterodox and other vehicles hold, [taken as] differing from mind and the mental factors, are without real nature, because they are grasped-objects, as are mind and the mental factors. … Mind and the mental factors, being other-dependent, are likewise illusion-like, not truly existent. To dispel the deluded grasping of a really-existent object apart from mind and the mental factors, it is taught that there is consciousness alone. And if one grasps consciousness-only as truly existent, then — like grasping an outer object — that too is a dharma-attachment."
Essentials: the treatise refutes the dharma-attachment in two great segments — refuting the heterodox real dharmas, and refuting the Hīnayāna's three collections of form and the rest. The four heterodox schools (Sāṃkhya's many-things-combined · Vaiśeṣika's six categories · Maheśvara as the single cause producing dharmas · sound-as-permanent · atoms producing coarse form) are all refuted by the principles that "what is composed of many things is conventional · what is permanent-and-pervasive yet productive contradicts itself · substance and mark as either-one-or-many both fail." The Hīnayāna's three collections: form divides into the resistant (the atom, "if it has obstruction it can be analyzed and is not real · if it has no spatial division it cannot aggregate, catch light, or cast a shadow," hence definitely not real) and the non-resistant (the five consciousnesses refer only to the aggregated-appearance, which is not really existent apart from the atoms — "lest a second moon produce the five consciousnesses"; the Buddha taught the atom only to break attachment, conventionally calling it the "limit of form," not that form really possesses atoms); the non-concurrent formations (acquisition, non-acquisition, and the rest have no separate substance-and-mark and no separate function, being only conventionally posited upon the states of form and the rest — refuting in turn acquisition/non-acquisition · the homogeneous · the life-faculty · the two attainments and no-perception · the conditioned marks · names, phrases, and syllables · the latent dispositions); the unconditioned (that they are really existent apart from form and mind "cannot in principle be found"; space, cessation-through-discrimination, and the rest are conventionally designated either in dependence on consciousness-transformation or in dependence on the dharma-nature, "not definitely really existent"). It closes with two inferences: the dharmas held are "grasped-objects, hence — as are mind and the mental factors — not really existent"; mind and the mental factors are "other-dependent, hence illusion-like" and not truly existent — therefore "to dispel the deluded grasping of a really-existent object apart from mind and the mental factors, it is taught that there is consciousness alone," while "grasping consciousness-only as truly existent" itself falls into the dharma-attachment.
5. Divergent readings across the masters (Kuiji, Shuji T1830)
此即第一外道、小乘略共為問，徵法非有。……今問曰：如何識外實有諸法不可得耶？……此即第二，略答彼問：法體無也。亦答識外，不答識中。 〔T1830 0252a07–a15〕
tr. "This is the first [segment] — the heterodox and the Hīnayāna jointly raising the question, challenging that dharmas are non-existent. … The question now runs: how is it that really-existent dharmas outside consciousness cannot be found? … This is the second — briefly answering their question: the dharma-substance is non-existent. [The answer] also answers 'outside consciousness,' not 'within consciousness.'"
雖此極微……體即是分而體有方，故言極微猶有方分。……方即分故，非更有分。《瑜伽》說云，極微有方無分者，更無細分，故不相違，以此微相與空相隣故。諸經論皆說極微是色邊際，邊際者是窮盡義，過此更折便為非色。 〔T1830 0272c19–c29〕
tr. "Although this atom… its substance is just [its] division, yet the substance has spatial position, hence [the treatise] says the atom still has spatial division. … Spatial position is just [its] division, so there is no further division [beyond it]. Where the Yogācārabhūmi says the atom 'has spatial position but no division,' [it means there is] no finer division [yet to be made] — so there is no contradiction, since this atom-appearance borders on the appearance of emptiness. The scriptures and treatises all say the atom is the limit of form; 'limit' means the sense of exhaustion — break it further beyond this and it becomes non-form."
不相應者，簡非色、心及諸心所，不相似故，行簡無為。 〔T1830 0276b16–b17〕
tr. "'Non-concurrent' screens off [these] from form, mind, and the mental factors, because they are not alike [in them]; 'formation' (行) screens off the unconditioned."
此諸無為非即色等，不可言不異，但可言離色等實有定無。大乘真如望有為法，非即非離，不異不一，既殊彼計，故破無失。 〔T1830 0289b17–b20〕
tr. "These unconditioned [dharmas] are not identical with form and the rest, [yet] cannot be called non-different [from them]; one can only say that, [taken as] really existent apart from form and the rest, they are definitely non-existent. Mahāyāna suchness, with respect to conditioned dharmas, is neither-identical-nor-apart, neither-different-nor-one — and since this differs from their reckoning, the refutation [of theirs] is without fault [against suchness]."
Kuiji divides the dharma-attachment passage into five segments (general question · general answer · the heterodox questioned and refuted · the Hīnayāna questioned and refuted · resolving into consciousness-only); he reads the "outside consciousness" question as one "the heterodox and Hīnayāna jointly raise," the answer warding off only "outside consciousness" and not "within consciousness" (since there is a resembling-dharma there). On the "atom" he parses "spatial position is just [its] division, so there is no further division" (the atom's substance is just its division, yet it still has spatial position, which does not contradict the Yogācārabhūmi's "has spatial position but no division," since the atom-appearance borders on the appearance of emptiness), and shows the "limit of form" to be the sense of exhaustion (break it further and it becomes non-form). On the "non-concurrent formations" he glosses the name ("non-concurrent" screens them off from form, mind, and the mental factors; "formation" screens off the unconditioned). On the "unconditioned" he distinguishes Mahāyāna suchness from the Sarvāstivāda's really-existent unconditioned (their reckoning takes it as really existent apart from form and mind; Mahāyāna suchness, with respect to the conditioned, is "neither-identical-nor-apart, neither-different-nor-one," so the refutation does not reach suchness). The naming of each refutation's rescue-arguments and the stages of suppression and severance are detailed in Shuji fascicle nine.
6. Rendering of terms · old-translation comparison (Xuanzang ↔ Paramārtha, Zhuanshi lun)
| Sense | Xuanzang, Cheng Weishi Lun | Paramārtha, Zhuanshi lun |
|---|---|---|
| the outer object (refuted) | 外法 · 識外實有諸法 outer dharmas · really-existent dharmas outside consciousness | 塵 object-field (「三塵識，即是六識」〔0061c09〕 — "the object-consciousness, i.e. the six") |
| object as consciousness-transformation | 內識變似色生 inner consciousness transforms to resemble form | 識轉似塵 consciousness turns to resemble the object-field (「第三塵識者，識轉似塵」〔0062a20〕) |
| consciousness-only-without-object | 為遣妄執心心所外實有境，說唯有識 to dispel grasping a really-existent object apart from mind and factors, it is taught there is consciousness alone | 唯識義 the consciousness-only meaning (「由境無識無故立唯識義」〔0063a23〕 — "since with the object gone consciousness too is gone, the consciousness-only meaning is set up") |
| object and consciousness both dispelled | 執唯識真實有，如執外境，亦是法執 grasping consciousness-only as truly existent is, like grasping an outer object, a dharma-attachment | 境識俱遣 object and consciousness both dispelled (「既境識俱遣，何識可成」〔0062c16〕 — "object and consciousness both dispelled, what consciousness can be established?") |
Xuanzang marks the refuted as "outer dharmas / really-existent dharmas outside consciousness" and establishes the transformer as "inner consciousness transforming to resemble [form]"; Paramārtha's Zhuanshi lun names the outer object "object-field" (塵) and shows the object as consciousness-transformation with "consciousness turns to resemble the object-field," and sets up "since with the object gone consciousness too is gone, the consciousness-only meaning is established" and "object and consciousness both dispelled." The old and new renderings converge on one sense — "refute the object, establish consciousness, then dispel the grasping of consciousness too": Xuanzang's "grasping consciousness-only as truly existent is also a dharma-attachment" is Paramārtha's "object and consciousness both dispelled."
7. Key terms
- dharma-attachment (法執, dharma-grāha) — grasping dharmas (form and the rest) as really existent self-substances apart from consciousness; the counterpart to the "self-attachment." Refuted in this chapter.
- wholly-imagined (遍計所執, parikalpita-svabhāva) — the self-nature set up by reckoning all around in dependence on conventional name-and-word, ultimately without substance; the real dharmas refuted are this.
- atom (極微, paramāṇu) — the smallest unit of form's analysis; the treatise judges it merely conventional (the Buddha conventionally taught the "limit of form" to break attachment to coarse form).
- resistant form · non-resistant form (有對色 · 無對色, sa-pratigha · a-pratigha rūpa) — form with obstructive, mutually-blocking marks / form without obstruction; the former refutes atoms, the latter refutes the five consciousnesses' outer object.
- non-concurrent formations (不相應行, viprayukta-saṃskāra) — formation-dharmas not concurrent with mind (acquisition · non-acquisition · the homogeneous · the life-faculty, etc.); only conventionally posited upon the states of form and mind.
- unconditioned (無為, asaṃskṛta) — space · cessation-through-discrimination · cessation-not-through-discrimination, and the rest; not really existent apart from form and mind, conventionally designated in dependence on consciousness-transformation or on the dharma-nature.
〔Sanskrit forms are a pronunciation aid transmitted by the ancient masters.〕
8. Cross-reading (the Yogācāra sequence: Baifa → Triṃśikā → Viṃśatikā → Madhyāntavibhāga → Mahāyānasaṃgraha)
- Baifa (Hundred Dharmas): the eleven form-dharmas (refuting their real existence apart from consciousness) · the twenty-four non-concurrent formations (refuting the real existence of acquisition, non-acquisition, and the rest) · the six unconditioned (refuting an unconditioned really existent apart from form and mind) — this chapter refutes precisely the "real existence" attachment to these three collections, showing them to be consciousness-transformation alone, conventional positing alone.
- Triṃśikā: verse 1 "by conventional positing of self and dharmas… these rest on what consciousness transforms" — this chapter expounds the "dharma" portion (the verse-by-verse sister).
- Viṃśatikā: directly relevant — the dedicated treatise refuting atoms and establishing consciousness-only-without-object. 「極微與六合，一應成六分；若與六同處，聚應如極微」 〔T1590 0075c27–c28〕 ("if an atom conjoins with six [others], it should come to have six parts; if it occupies one place with the six, the aggregate should be [as small] as an atom") and 「極微既無合，聚有合者誰？……是故一實極微不成」 〔T1590 0076a06–a12〕 ("the atom having no conjunction, what is it in the aggregate that conjoins? … therefore a single real atom is not established") — refuting the real existence of the atom on the same footing as this chapter's "if the atom has spatial division it can be analyzed and is not real"; the Viṃśatikā's establishing of "consciousness-only-without-object" is the charter for this chapter's "there is truly no outer form, only inner consciousness transforming to resemble form."
- Madhyāntavibhāga: the Characteristics chapter · unreal imagining (the support of "consciousness-only-without-object" — consciousness is other-dependent, the object held is non-existent).
- Mahāyānasaṃgraha: the Knowable-Characteristic division · the three natures (the wholly-imagined is without substance, the other-dependent is consciousness-transformation — what this chapter refutes is the wholly-imagined, what it establishes is the other-dependent).
Within the treatise: refuting the self-attachment (previous chapter · no real self) · consciousness-only's three natures (later chapter · other-dependent · wholly-imagined · perfectly-accomplished) · establishing consciousness-only (the extended treatment of consciousness-transformation).
9. Collation position
Verse T1586 〔0060a27–a28〕 · root T1585 refutation of the dharma-attachment 〔general statement 0002b21–b22 · refuting form 0004a07–c05 · refuting non-concurrent formations 0005a06–a10 · refuting the unconditioned 0006b15–c20 · resolving into consciousness-only 0006c21–c26〕 · Shuji T1830 〔five segments 0252a07–a20 · limit of form 0272c19–c29 · non-concurrent formations 0276b16–b17 · unconditioned 0289b17–b20 · resolution 0292c11–c12〕 · Zhuanshi lun T1587 〔0061c09 · 0062a20 · 0062c16 · 0063a23〕. 〔Scripture〕 Saṃdhinirmocana T676 〔0698b02–b05〕 · Laṅkāvatāra T670 〔0489c02–c03〕. 〔Śāstra〕 Yogācārabhūmi T1579 〔three self-natures 0656c01–c05 · mark-less self-nature 0705a02–a03 · only what consciousness manifests 0724a05–a09〕. 〔Cross-reading〕 Viṃśatikā T1590 〔0075c27–c28 · 0076a06–a12〕.