成唯識論 隨煩惱二十
根本煩惱只有六個：貪、瞋、癡、慢、疑、惡見。可是人心裡的毛病顯然不止六種——忿、恨、覆、惱、嫉、慳、誑、諂、害、憍、無慚、無愧、掉舉、惛沈、不信、懈怠、放逸、失念、散亂、不正知，論主一口氣列了二十個。\n\n關鍵在論主怎麼安置它們：這二十個，沒有一個是新的東西。 它們或是根本煩惱在某個場合的一種樣子（分位差別），或是根本煩惱流出來的餘勢（等流）。忿是瞋在當下爆開的樣子，恨是瞋沉澱下來的樣子，惱是那個恨再被碰一下的樣子——同一個瞋，三種面孔。\n\n所以論主把它們分成三層：小隨十個，各別而起，一次只來一個，行相最麤最容易看見；中隨二個——無慚、無愧——只要是不善心，它們一定在；大隨八個，凡是染污心，無論善惡未定，它們都在，細到你根本不覺得那是煩惱。\n\n這個分層有實修的用處。小隨麤，好認也好對治；大隨細，你以為自己心平氣和的時候，掉舉、散亂、不正知可能一直在。修行到後來，難的從來不是那十個看得見的，是那八個看不見的。
There are only six root afflictions: greed, hatred, delusion, conceit, doubt, and wrong view. Yet the faults of the human mind plainly run to more than six — rage, enmity, concealment, vexation, envy, avarice, deceit, dissembling, harmfulness, arrogance, shamelessness, non-embarrassment, restlessness, torpor, faithlessness, indolence, heedlessness, forgetfulness, distraction, and non-vigilance: twenty, listed in a single breath.\n\nWhat matters is how the treatise places them: not one of these twenty is a new thing. Each is either a root affliction wearing a particular occasion's face (a modal differentiation) or the spent momentum flowing out of one (an outflow). Rage is hatred as it bursts in the moment; enmity is hatred settled and kept; vexation is that kept enmity struck once more — one hatred, three faces.\n\nSo the treatise sorts them into three ranks. The lesser ten arise singly, one at a time, coarse in mode and easy enough to see. The middling two — shamelessness and non-embarrassment — are present wherever the mind is unwholesome at all. The greater eight are present in any defiled mind whatever, so fine that you would never take them for afflictions.\n\nThe ranking has a practical use. The lesser ones are coarse: easy to recognise, easy to work on. The greater eight are fine, and just when you take yourself to be calm and even, restlessness, distraction and non-vigilance may have been running all along. What proves hard, further on, is never the ten you can see; it is the eight you cannot.
已說根本六煩惱相，諸隨煩惱其相云何？
頌曰：
〔頌曰 9 T31 0033b01〕
隨煩惱謂：忿、恨、覆、惱、嫉、慳、
１３誑、諂與害、憍、無慚與無愧、
掉舉與惛沈、不信并懈怠、
１４放逸及失念、散亂不正知。
〔T31 0033b05〕論曰：唯是煩惱分位差別、等流性，故名隨煩惱。
此二十種，類別有三：謂忿等十，各別起故，名小隨煩惱；無慚等二，遍不善故，名中隨煩惱；掉舉等八，遍染心故，名大隨煩惱。
云何為忿？依對現前不饒益境，憤發為性；能障不忿，執杖為業。謂懷忿者，多發暴惡身表業故。此即瞋恚一分為體，離瞋無別忿相用故。
云何為恨？由忿為先，懷惡不捨，結怨為性；能障不恨，熱惱為業。謂結恨者，不能含忍，恒熱惱故。此亦瞋恚一分為體，離瞋無別恨相用故。
云何為覆？於自作罪，恐失利、譽，隱藏為性；能障不覆，悔惱為業。謂覆罪者，後必悔惱，不安隱故。
有義：此覆，癡一分攝。論唯說此癡一分故，不懼當苦，覆自罪故。
有義：此覆，貪、癡一分攝，亦恐失利譽，覆自罪故。論據麁顯，唯說癡分，如說掉舉是貪分故，然說掉舉遍諸染心，不可執為唯是貪分。
云何為惱？忿、恨為先，追觸暴熱，佷戾為性；能障不惱，䖧螫為業。謂追往惡，觸現違緣，心便佷戾，多發囂暴、凶鄙麁言，䖧螫他故。此亦瞋恚一分為體，離瞋無別惱相用故。
云何為嫉？徇自名利，不耐他榮，妬忌為性；能障不嫉，憂慼為業。謂嫉妬者聞見他榮，深懷憂慼，不安隱故。此亦瞋恚一分為體，離瞋無別嫉相用故。
〔T31 0033c01〕云何為慳？耽著財、法，不能慧捨，祕悋為性；能障不慳，鄙畜為業。謂慳悋者，心多鄙澁，畜積財法，不能捨故。此即貪愛一分為體，離貪無別慳相用故。
云何為誑？為獲利譽，矯現有德，詭詐為性；能障不誑，邪命為業。謂矯誑者，心懷異謀，多現不實邪命事故。此即貪、癡一分為體，離二無別誑相用故。
云何為諂？為網他故，矯設異儀，險、曲為性；能障不諂教誨為業。謂諂曲者，為網帽他，曲順時宜，矯設方便，為取他意或藏己失。不任師、友正教誨故，此亦貪、癡一分為體，離二無別諂相用故。
云何為害？於諸有情，心無悲愍，損惱為性；能障不害，逼惱為業。謂有害者，逼惱他故。此亦瞋恚一分為體，離瞋無別害相用故。瞋、害別相，准善應說。
云何為憍？於自盛事，深生染著，醉傲為性；能障不憍，染依為業。謂憍醉者，生長一切雜染法故。此亦貪愛一分為體，離貪無別憍相用故。
云何無慚？不顧自、法，輕拒賢善為性；能障礙慚，生長惡行為業。謂於自、法無所顧者，輕拒賢善，不恥過惡，障慚生長，諸惡行故。
云何無愧？不顧世間，崇重暴惡為性；能障礙愧，生長惡行為業。謂於世間無所顧者，崇重暴惡，不恥過罪，障愧生長，諸惡行故。
不恥過惡，是二通相；故諸聖教，假說為體。
若執不恥為二別相，則應此二體無差別。由斯二法應不俱生，非受、想等有此義故；若待自、他，立二別者，應非實有，便違聖教；若許此二實而別起，復違論說俱遍惡心。
〔T31 0034a02〕不善心時，隨緣何境，皆有輕拒善及崇重惡義故，此二法俱遍惡心，所緣不異，無別起失。
然諸聖教說不顧自、他者，自、法名自，世間名他。或即此中拒善、崇惡，於己益損，名自、他故。而論說為貪等分者，是彼等流，非即彼性。
云何掉舉？令心於境不寂靜為性；能障行捨、奢摩他為業。
有義：掉舉貪一分攝，論唯說此是貪分故，此由憶昔樂事生故。
有義：掉舉非唯貪攝，論說掉舉遍染心故，又掉舉相謂不寂靜，說是煩惱共相攝故，掉舉離此無別相故。雖依一切煩惱假立，而貪位增，說為貪分。
有義：掉舉別有自性，遍諸染心，如不信等，非說他分，體便非實，勿不信等亦假有故。而論說為世俗有者，如睡眠等，隨他相說。掉舉別相，謂即囂動，令俱生法，不寂靜故。若離煩惱無別此相，不應別說障奢摩他，故不寂靜非此別相。
云何惛沈？令心於境，無堪任為性；能障輕安、毘鉢舍那為業。
有義：惛沈癡一分攝，論唯說此是癡分故，惛昧沈重是癡相故。
有義：惛沈非但癡攝，謂無堪任是惛沈相，一切煩惱皆無堪任，離此無別惛沈相故。雖依一切煩惱假立，而癡相增，但說癡分。
有義：惛沈別有自性，雖名癡分而是等流，如不信等，非即癡攝。隨他相說名世俗有，如睡眠等，是實有性。惛沈別相，謂即瞢重，令俱生法，無堪任故。若離煩惱無別惛沈相，不應別說障毘鉢舍那故。無堪任非此別相，此與癡相有差別者，謂癡於境，迷闇為相，正障無癡，而非瞢重，惛沈於境瞢重為相，正障輕安而非迷闇。
〔T31 0034b04〕云何不信？於實、德、能不忍樂欲，心穢為性；能障淨信，惰依為業。謂不信者多懈怠故。
不信三相，翻信應知。然諸染法，各有別相，唯此不信，自相渾濁，復能渾濁餘心、心所，如極穢物，自穢、穢他，是故說此心穢為性。由不信故，於實、德、能不忍樂欲，非別有性，若於餘事，邪忍樂欲，是此因果，非此自性。
云何懈怠？於善、惡品修、斷事中，懶惰為性；能障精進，增染為業。謂懈怠者，滋長染故。於諸染事而策勤者，亦名懈怠，退善法故。於無記事而策勤者，於諸善品無進、退故，是欲、勝解，非別有性。如於無記，忍可樂欲，非淨、非染，無信不信。
云何放逸？於染、淨品，不能防、修，縱蕩為性；障不放逸，增惡損善所依為業。謂由懈怠及貪、瞋、癡，不能防修染淨品法，總名放逸，非別有體。雖慢、疑等亦有此能，而方彼四，勢用微劣，障三善根、遍策法故。推究此相，如不放逸。
云何失念？於諸所緣，不能明記為性；能障正念、散亂所依為業。謂失念者，心散亂故。
有義：失念念一分攝，說是煩惱相應念故。
有義：失念癡一分攝，《瑜伽》說此是癡分故，癡令念失，故名失念。
有義：失念俱一分攝，由前二文影略說故，論復說此遍染心故。
云何散亂？於諸所緣，令心流蕩為性；能障正定，惡慧所依為業。謂散亂者發惡慧故。
〔T31 0034c02〕有義：散亂癡一分攝，《瑜伽》說此是癡分故。
有義：散亂貪、瞋、癡攝，《集論》等說是三分故，說癡分者，遍染心故，謂貪、瞋、癡令心流蕩，勝餘法故，說為散亂。
有義：散亂別有自體，說三分者是彼等流，如無慚等，非即彼攝，隨他相說名世俗有。散亂別相，謂即躁擾，令俱生法皆流蕩故。若離彼三，無別自體，不應別說障三摩地。掉舉、散亂二用何別？彼令易解，此令易緣，雖一剎那，解、緣無易，而於相續有易義故。染污心時，由掉亂力，常應念念易解、易緣，或由念等力所制伏，如繫猨猴有暫時住，故掉與亂，俱遍染心。
云何不正知？於所觀境，謬解為性；能障正知、毀犯為業。謂不正知者，多所毀犯故。
有義：不正知慧一分攝，說是煩惱相應慧故。
有義：不正知癡一分攝，《瑜伽》說此是癡分故，令知不正，名不正知。
有義：不正知俱一分攝，由前二文，影略說故，論復說此遍染心故。
「與」、「并」、「及」言顯隨煩惱非唯二十，《雜事》等說貪等多種隨煩惱故。
隨煩惱名，亦攝煩惱，是前煩惱等流性故；煩惱同類餘染污法，但名隨煩惱，非煩惱攝故。
唯說二十隨煩惱者，謂非煩惱，唯染、麁故；此餘染法，或此分位，或此等流，皆此所攝。隨其類別，如理應知。
如是二十隨煩惱中，小十、大三，定是假有；無慚、無愧、不信、懈怠定是實有；教、理成故。掉舉、惛沈、散亂三種，有義是假，有義是實。所引理、教，如前應知。
〔T31 0035a02〕二十皆通俱生、分別，隨二煩惱勢力起故。
此二十中，小十，展轉定不俱起。互相違故，行相麁猛，各為主故。
中二，一切不善心俱，隨應皆得小、大俱起。論說：大八遍諸染心。展轉小、中，皆容俱起。
有處說：六遍染心者，惛、掉增時，不俱起故。有處但說：五遍染者，以惛、掉等違唯善故。
此唯染故，非第八俱。第七識中唯有大八，取捨差別，如上應知。第六識俱容有一切。小十麁猛，五識中無。中、大相通，五識容有。
由斯中、大五受相應。
有義：小十除三，忿等唯喜、憂、捨三受相應。諂、誑、憍三，四俱，除苦。
有義：忿等四俱，除樂；諂、誑、憍三，五受俱起。意有苦受，前已說故。
此受俱相，如煩惱說。
實義如是，若隨麁相，忿、恨、惱、嫉、害憂、捨俱；覆、慳喜、捨；餘三增樂。中、大隨麁，亦如實義。
如是二十，與別境五，皆容俱起，不相違故。
染念、染慧，雖非念、慧俱，而癡分者，亦得相應故。念亦緣現、曾習類境。忿亦得緣剎那過去，故忿與念，亦得相應。染定起時，心亦躁擾，故亂與定相應無失。
中二、大八十煩惱俱。
小十定非見、疑俱起。此相麁動，彼審細故。忿等五法，容慢、癡俱，非貪、恚並，是瞋分故。慳癡、慢俱，非貪、瞋並，是貪分故。憍唯癡俱，與慢解別，是貪分故。覆、誑與諂，貪、癡、慢俱。行相無違，貪、癡分故。
小七、中二，唯不善攝。小三、大八，亦通無記。
小七、中二，唯欲界攝。誑、諂欲、色，餘通三界。
生在下地，容起上十一。耽定於他，起憍、誑、諂故。
〔T31 0035b01〕若生上地，起下後十。邪見愛俱，容起彼故。小十，生上無由起下。非正潤生，及謗滅故。
中二、大八，下亦緣上。上緣貪等，相應起故。
有義：小十，下不緣上。行相麁近，不遠取故。
有義：嫉等亦得緣上。於勝地法，生嫉等故。
大八諂、誑，上亦緣下。下緣慢等，相應起故。梵於釋子，起諂、誑故。憍不緣下，非所恃故。
二十皆非學、無學攝。此但是染，彼唯淨故。
後十，唯通見、修所斷，與二煩惱相應起故。見所斷者，隨迷諦相，或總、或別，煩惱俱生，故隨所應，皆通四諦。迷諦親疎等，皆如煩惱說。
前十，有義：唯修所斷，緣麁事境，任運生故。有義：亦通見、修所斷。依二煩惱勢力起故。緣他見等，生忿等故。見所斷者，隨所應緣，總、別惑力，皆通四諦。此中有義：忿等但緣迷諦惑生，非親迷諦。行相麁淺，不深取故。有義：嫉等亦親迷諦，於滅、道等生嫉等故。
然忿等十，但緣有事，要託本質，方得生故。緣有漏等，准上應知。
成唯識論卷第七
護法等菩薩造
三藏法師玄奘奉 詔譯
The canonical text stands in Chinese only. This edition renders the essence, the plain reading, the exposition and the apparatus into English — never the sūtra itself. Switch to 漢讀本 or 並行雙語 above to read it.
〔所釋之頌〕第十三頌至第十四頌·隨煩惱
〔所釋頌〕
甲、隨煩惱二十
六個根本煩惱的相狀，前面已經講完了。那麼這些「隨煩惱」（跟著根本煩惱起的次一級煩惱）的相狀又是怎樣呢？頌就回答如上：忿、恨、覆、惱、嫉、慳、誑、諂、害、憍、無慚、無愧、掉舉、惛沈、不信、懈怠、放逸、失念、散亂、不正知——一共二十個。
論說：這二十個法，全都只是根本煩惱的「分位差別」（同一個根本煩惱在不同情境下顯出的各種別相）和「等流性」（從根本煩惱流出來、跟它同一類的法）；正因為它們是隨著根本煩惱才起的，所以叫「隨煩惱」。這二十個，按它們起的時候『鋪得多廣』分成三類：(一)忿等十個，各起各的、彼此不會同時並起，叫「小隨煩惱」；(二)無慚、無愧這兩個，凡是不善的心一概都有，叫「中隨煩惱」；(三)掉舉等八個，凡是染污的心一概都有，叫「大隨煩惱」。
一、忿
什麼叫「忿」？就是當前碰上對自己不利、來損惱自己的境，心裡那股『憤憤發作』的勁——這是它的「性」（它本身是什麼）。它的作用（業）有兩面：一是擋住「不忿」（不發火的那個善心），二是會「執杖」（抄起棍棒兇器）；因為一個心裡懷著忿的人，往往就此發出兇暴的身體動作（也就是外現於身的行為）。再說它的「體」（它的底子是什麼）：忿其實就是「瞋」（憤恨）的一小部分——離開了瞋，並沒有另外一個獨立的忿可言。
二、恨
什麼叫「恨」？它先有「忿」打頭陣，然後把那股惡念懷在心裡放不下，結成怨仇——這「結怨」就是它的性。作用（業）：擋住「不恨」，又叫人「熱惱」（心裡像被火烤一樣難受）；因為結了恨的人含忍不下去，老是被這股熱惱燒著。它的底子（體）同樣是瞋的一小部分，離開了瞋，並沒有另外一個獨立的恨。
三、覆
什麼叫「覆」（遮蓋、藏起來）？就是自己造了罪，怕暴露出來會丟掉好處、壞了名聲，於是把它『藏起來』——這藏匿就是它的性。作用（業）：擋住「不覆」（坦然不藏的善心），又招來「悔惱」；因為遮蓋罪過的人，事後一定會悔恨懊惱、心裡不得安穩。
〔覆的底子·第一種說法·只是癡的一分〕 一說：覆只算「癡」（也就是無明、糊塗）的一小部分。理由有兩條：一是《論》裡只說覆是癡的一分；二是遮蓋罪過的人，是因為不怕將來的苦果才敢藏罪——這種『不怕苦果』正是糊塗（癡）的樣子。
〔應知·正確的說法·是貪和癡兩者的一分〕 又說（這是正解）：覆其實是「貪」和「癡」兩者的一小部分。因為遮蓋罪過的人，也是『怕丟掉好處、壞了名聲』才藏罪——這『怕失利譽』的成分就屬於貪。那《論》裡為什麼只說它是癡的一分呢？那是就它最明顯、最粗的一面來講罷了。打個現成的比方：《論》裡也說過『掉舉是貪的一分』，可是《論》接著又說『掉舉是凡染污的心一概都有的』——既然一概都有，就不能死死咬定掉舉只是貪的一分（否則沒有貪的染心就不該有掉舉了）。覆的道理也一樣：不能因為《論》只挑明說一面，就死咬它只是癡的一分。
四、惱
什麼叫「惱」？它先有「忿」和「恨」打頭陣，然後一面翻起以前的舊惡、一面又撞上眼前不順心的事，於是心裡冒出一股又凶又熱的火氣，變得「佷戾」（狠毒、暴躁、彆扭）——這就是它的性。作用（業）：擋住「不惱」，又會「䖧螫」（像蜂、蠍螫人那樣去刺傷別人）；因為一個人翻著舊惡、又撞上眼前不順心的境，心就變得狠戾，往往放出囂張、暴烈、又粗又惡的話來刺傷別人。它的底子（體）同樣是瞋的一小部分，離開了瞋，並沒有另外一個獨立的惱。
五、嫉
什麼叫「嫉」？就是一心追逐自己的名利，看不得別人好——別人一榮耀興旺，自己就受不了，於是『妒忌』起來，這就是它的性。作用（業）：擋住「不嫉」，又招來「憂慼」（憂愁難過）；因為善妒的人一聽見、看見別人風光，心裡就深深地憂悶難過、坐立不安。它的底子（體）同樣是瞋的一小部分，離開了瞋，並沒有另外一個獨立的嫉。
六、慳
什麼叫「慳」（小氣、吝嗇）？就是死抱著財物和法（自己懂的道理、學問）不放，捨不得用智慧去布施，於是『偷偷藏起來、緊緊吝惜』——這就是它的性。作用（業）：擋住「不慳」，又叫人「鄙畜」（小氣巴拉地一個勁兒囤積）；因為吝嗇的人心思又狹又澀，只曉得把財、法囤起來，怎麼也捨不得給出去。它的底子（體）是「貪愛」的一小部分，離開了貪，並沒有另外一個獨立的慳。
七、誑
什麼叫「誑」（欺騙、裝樣子）？就是為了撈取好處、博取名聲，硬裝出自己很有德行的樣子，於是『弄虛作假、坑蒙拐騙』——這就是它的性。作用（業）：擋住「不誑」，又造成「邪命」（用不正當的手段討生活）；因為這種裝模作樣的人心裡另有盤算，常做出種種不老實的、騙人謀生的勾當。它的底子（體）是「貪」和「癡」兩者的一小部分（一面貪利、一面糊塗），離開這兩個，並沒有另外一個獨立的誑。
八、諂
什麼叫「諂」（諂媚、巴結）？就是為了把別人籠絡住、套牢在自己這邊，故意裝出種種反常的姿態，於是內心『陰險、邪曲』——這就是它的性。作用（業）：擋住「不諂」，又『障教誨』（讓人受不了正當的教導）。怎麼說呢？諂曲的人為了把別人套牢，便看風使舵、曲意逢迎，刻意擺出種種花樣，好討別人歡心、或者把自己的過失遮掩過去；這樣一來，他就再也聽不進師長、朋友的正當教誨了。它的底子（體）同樣是貪和癡兩者的一小部分，離開這兩個，並沒有另外一個獨立的諂。
九、害
什麼叫「害」？就是對眾生一點悲憫之心都沒有，只想去『損害、折磨』他們——這就是它的性。作用（業）：擋住「不害」，又會「逼惱」（逼迫折磨）別人；因為有害心的人就是要逼惱別人。它的底子（體）同樣是瞋的一小部分，離開了瞋，並沒有另外一個獨立的害。至於「瞋」和「害」這兩個怎麼分？可以照前面講善心所那一章的辦法來分——那裡分過「無瞋」是『給人快樂』、「不害」是『替人拔除痛苦』；反過來，瞋是斷人之樂、害是加人之苦，這就是兩者的差別。
十、憍
什麼叫「憍」（自滿、得意忘形）？就是對自己的種種風光（年輕、有錢有勢、聰明能幹等等）深深地迷戀貪著，於是『像喝醉了酒一樣飄飄然、傲氣十足』——這就是它的性。作用（業）：擋住「不憍」，又成了「染依」（種種染污法的溫床）；因為得意忘形的人會滋長出一切染污法。它的底子（體）同樣是貪愛的一小部分，離開了貪，並沒有另外一個獨立的憍。
十一、無慚
什麼叫「無慚」？就是一個人不顧念自己、也不顧念正法，於是『輕慢、排斥賢者善法』——這就是它的性。作用（業）：障礙「慚」（那個會反省自責的善心），又「生長惡行」（把壞事一樁樁養大）；因為一個對自己、對正法都毫不顧惜的人，就會輕慢排斥賢善、不拿過惡當羞恥，於是把「慚」壓住、把種種惡行養大。
十二、無愧
什麼叫「無愧」？就是一個人不顧世間的譏笑指責，反而『推崇、看重凶暴惡劣』（把壞人壞事當好）——這就是它的性。作用（業）：障礙「愧」（那個會怕人非議、怕丟臉的善心），又「生長惡行」；因為一個對世間眼光毫不在乎的人，就會推崇看重暴惡、不拿罪過當羞恥，於是把「愧」壓住、把種種惡行養大。
『不拿過惡當羞恥』是無慚、無愧這兩個共有的相（它倆都有這一面）；所以經教有時就方便地拿這個『不知羞恥』當作它倆的底子來說。
〔難·有人主張『不知羞恥』是它倆各自的特相〕假如有人硬把『不知羞恥』當作它倆各自的別相（也就是無慚、無愧各以『不知羞恥』為自己的本相），那就會推出一連串說不通的結果——
第一，這兩個的底子就分不出差別了（既然都拿同一個『不知羞恥』當自相，那無慚和無愧豈不一模一樣）。
第二，底子既然沒差別，這兩個法就應該『不會同時並起』了——就像「受」和「想」那樣，沒有『同時各起各的』這種事（兩個本相相同的法，不會在一個心裡分頭並起）。可事實上無慚無愧偏偏是同時並起的。
第三，假如改個說法，靠『對著自己』和『對著別人』這兩頭來區分它倆（無慚對自、無愧對他），那它倆就成了『彼此對待才有』的假法、不是實實在在的東西了——這又違背經教（經教說無慚、無愧都是實有的）。
第四，那退一步，承認它倆是實有、又各起各的吧——可這又違背《論》裡說的『無慚、無愧凡是惡心一概都有』（既然一概都有、總是一起出現，就不能說它倆各起各的了）。〔總之，『不知羞恥是各自別相』這條路，怎麼走都走不通。〕
〔答〕其實一個不善的心起來時，不管它緣的是哪個境，這境上都同時帶著兩層意思：一層是『輕慢排斥善』（這是無慚那一面），一層是『推崇看重惡』（這是無愧那一面）。所以這兩個法是凡惡心一概都有、緣的又是同一個境——既然這樣，根本不會有『各起各的』這個毛病（用不著它倆分頭並起，它倆本來就總是一起出現）。
那麼經教裡『不顧自、不顧他』這句話，又該怎麼懂呢？這裡的「自」指的是『自身和正法』（無慚不顧的），「他」指的是「世間」（無愧不顧的）。或者換個角度講：就拿這當中『排斥善、推崇惡』對自己是有益還是有損來分——著眼於自己利害的叫「自」、著眼於外面世間的叫「他」，這也只是個方便的叫法。又《論》裡說『無慚、無愧是貪等的一分』，意思是說這兩個是從貪等流出來的同一類東西（等流），並不是說它倆本身就以貪等為底子。
十三、掉舉
什麼叫「掉舉」（心浮躁、靜不下來）？就是叫心對著它的對象老是安定不下來——這就是它的性。作用（業）：擋住「行捨」（那個讓心平靜安住的善心），也擋住「奢摩他」（也就是「止」，把心定下來的修行）。
〔掉舉的底子·第一種說法·只是貪的一分〕 一說：掉舉只算「貪」的一小部分。理由有兩條：一是《論》裡只說掉舉是貪的一分；二是掉舉是因為回想起以前的快活事才浮動起來的——回味快活就屬於貪。
〔第二種說法·凡染心都有它、它是煩惱的共相〕 又說：掉舉不只是貪的一分。理由：一是《論》說掉舉是凡染污的心一概都有的（如果它只是貪，就不該凡染心都有了——沒有貪的染心就不該有它）；二是掉舉的相是『靜不下來』，而《論》把這『靜不下來』歸到『一切煩惱共有的相』裡頭，而且掉舉離開了這個『靜不下來』就找不出自己另外的相了。所以這一說的結論是：掉舉是靠著一切煩惱『湊出來假立的』（沒有自己的實體），只不過在『貪當道』的時候掉舉特別突出，所以才偏著說它是貪的一分——並不是說它只是貪。
〔應知·正確的說法·掉舉自己有實體〕 又說（這是正解）：掉舉自己有實實在在的體，而且凡染污的心一概都有它——就像「不信」這些一樣（不信也是凡染心都有、卻自己有實體）。不能因為《論》說它是『貪等的一分』，就斷定它沒有實體；要是這麼推，那「不信」這些也該成了假的了（可不信明明是實有的）。那《論》為什麼又說掉舉是「世俗有」（也就是假立的）呢？這就跟「睡眠」那些一樣，是『順著它所依的粗相將就著說假』（並不是說它的體真的是假的）。掉舉自己的別相就是「囂動」（吵吵鬧鬧、躁動不安），它一起來，跟它同時並起的那些法都跟著靜不下來。〔反駁前一說〕假如真像前一說那樣，離開了煩惱就沒有掉舉這個相，那《論》就不該另外單立一句『掉舉障奢摩他（止）』了——既然《論》特地說它單獨擋住「止」，可見它一定有自己單獨的相。所以『靜不下來』只是掉舉跟別的煩惱共有的相，不是它自己的別相（它自己的別相是「囂動」）。
十四、惛沈
什麼叫「惛沈」（昏沉、提不起精神）？就是叫心對著它的對象『使不上勁』（昏昏沉沉、又重又鈍，沒法靈活運作）——這就是它的性。作用（業）：擋住「輕安」（那個身心輕快安適的善心），也擋住「毘鉢舍那」（也就是「觀」，看清事理的修行）。
〔惛沈的底子·第一種說法·只是癡的一分〕 一說：惛沈只算「癡」（糊塗）的一小部分。理由有兩條：一是《論》裡只說惛沈是癡的一分；二是那『昏昏沉沉、又重又鈍』的樣子，正是糊塗（癡那種昏暗）的相。
〔第二種說法·靠一切煩惱湊出來的〕 又說：惛沈不只是癡的一分。理由：惛沈的相是『使不上勁』，可一切煩惱都會讓心使不上勁（不是只有癡才這樣），而且惛沈離開了這個『使不上勁』就找不出自己另外的相了。所以惛沈是靠著一切煩惱『湊出來假立的』，只不過在「癡」那裡惛沈的相特別突出，所以才單說它是癡的一分——並不是說它只是癡。
〔應知·正確的說法·惛沈自己有實體〕 又說（這是正解）：惛沈自己有實實在在的體；它雖然叫『癡的一分』，其實是從癡流出來的同一類東西（等流，就像「不信」那些一樣），並不就等於癡、也不歸到癡裡頭。《論》說它是『順著它所依的粗相將就著說假、叫世俗有』，就像「睡眠」那些——可是它的體是實有的。惛沈自己的別相就是「瞢重」（昏蒙、沉重），它一起來，跟它同時並起的那些法都跟著使不上勁。〔反駁前一說〕假如真像前一說那樣，離開了煩惱就沒有惛沈這個相，那《論》就不該另外單立一句『惛沈障毘鉢舍那（觀）』了；所以『使不上勁』只是它跟別的煩惱共有的相，不是它自己的別相（它自己的別相是「瞢重」）。再說惛沈和癡這兩個的相也不一樣：癡對著境是以「迷闇」（迷迷糊糊、看不明白）為相，它正面擋住的是「無癡」（明白），而不是瞢重；惛沈對著境是以「瞢重」（昏蒙沉重）為相，它正面擋住的是「輕安」，而不是迷闇。可見兩者各有各的相、各擋各的善法。
十五、不信
什麼叫「不信」？就是對「實、德、能」這三樣（真實的道理、三寶的功德、自己修行能成的能力）不肯認可、不愛樂、也不嚮往，於是心裡『渾濁不乾淨』——這「心穢」就是它的性。作用（業）：擋住「淨信」（清淨的信心），又成了『懈怠的溫床』；因為不信的人多半就跟著懶散懈怠。
不信的『三個相』，正好跟「信」的三個相反過來，一對照就明白了：信是肯定真實有、樂見有功德、希望自己有能力；不信就是不肯認可真實、不樂見功德、不嚮往那個能力。再說，種種染污的法各有各自的相，可唯獨這個不信，不但『自己這個相就是渾濁的』，還能把旁邊其餘的心王、心所一起弄濁——就好比一個極髒的東西，自己髒，還把碰到的別的東西也一塊弄髒。所以才說不信是以「心穢」（把心弄濁）為性。
正因為有不信，才會對「實、德、能」不肯認可、不愛樂、不嚮往；可是這個『不認可、不愛樂、不嚮往』並不是不信另外的本體（它只是「心穢」起的作用罷了）。還有：要是一個人對別的事情生出了『歪邪的』認可、愛樂、嚮往（比方信邪去了），那是不信引出來的因果（由不信帶出來的），同樣不是不信自己的本體。
十六、懈怠
什麼叫「懈怠」？就是在『該修的善』和『該斷的惡』這兩件正事上偷懶——這「懶惰」就是它的性。作用（業）：擋住「精進」（努力向善），又會「增染」（讓染污越長越多）；因為懈怠的人就把雜染越養越盛。
這裡要分清三種情形。第一種：有人對染污的事反而起勁、賣力地幹——這也叫「懈怠」，因為他這一賣力，正好把善法給丟了（懈怠不是只指躺著不動，往惡上賣力同樣是懈怠）。第二種：有人對『無記的事』（不善不惡的中性事）起勁地幹——這就不算懈怠了，因為他在「善」這一邊既沒進、也沒退，那股勁兒只是「欲」（想做的意願）和「勝解」（認定要這麼做）在起作用，並不是懈怠另外有個本體。第三種，可以拿來作對照：就好比對『無記的事』起的那種『認可、樂意去做』，它既不算淨、也不算染，所以這當中也談不上有「信」或「不信」——同樣的道理，無記事上的賣力也談不上是不是懈怠。
十七、放逸
什麼叫「放逸」（放任、不加管束）？就是對染污的事防不住、對清淨的善修不起來，整個人『放縱散漫』——這就是它的性。作用（業）：擋住「不放逸」（那個謹慎自守的善心），又成了『把惡養大、把善損掉的溫床』。它是怎麼來的呢？就是由「懈怠」加上「貪、瞋、癡」這四個法湊在一起，防不住染、修不起淨，把這整個狀態總起來叫「放逸」——所以放逸自己並沒有另外一個實體（它只是這四個法合起來的一個總名）。
有人會問：慢、疑這些不是也有點『防不住、修不起』的本事，怎麼不算進去？答：慢、疑這些雖然也略有這個本事，可是比起那四個（懈怠、貪、瞋、癡），它們的力道弱多了；而且那四個正好擋住「三善根」（無貪、無瞋、無癡），又是『管得最寬』的法（懈怠管的面最廣，貪瞋癡又是根本煩惱），所以只挑這四個當放逸的底子。至於放逸的相到底怎麼推究，可以照前面講「不放逸」那一章來懂——道理是：離開了那四個法，根本找不到「防、修」這回事，可見放逸自己沒有另外的實體。
十八、失念
什麼叫「失念」（記不住、走神）？就是對所緣的境記不分明、把握不牢——這就是它的性。作用（業）：擋住「正念」（把心牢牢守在正境上），又成了『散亂的溫床』；因為失念的人，心就跟著散開、亂掉了。
〔失念的底子·第一種說法·是「念」的一分〕 一說：失念只算「念」（記憶、把握）的一小部分。理由是《論》說失念其實是『跟煩惱攪在一起的那種念』（念本身染污了，就成了失念）。
〔第二種說法·是「癡」的一分〕 又說：失念只算「癡」（糊塗）的一小部分。理由是《瑜伽》說它是癡的一分；是糊塗把記憶弄丟了，所以才叫「失念」。
〔應知·正確的說法·是「念」和「癡」兩者的一分〕 又說（這是正解）：失念是「念」和「癡」兩者合起來的一小部分。怎麼說呢？前面那兩段話（一段只說念、一段只說癡）其實是『各挑一邊、彼此映襯著說』（並不是只有那一邊，而是省著說、互相補足）；再說《論》又講失念是凡染心都有的——可是若只算「念」那一分就不會凡染心都有了，得再加上「癡」那一分，才遍得了一切染心。所以兩邊都要算上。
十九、散亂
什麼叫「散亂」？就是對所緣的境讓心『東奔西跑、定不住』——這「流蕩」就是它的性。作用（業）：擋住「正定」（把心安定在一處），又成了『惡慧的溫床』；因為散亂的人會生出歪斜的、用錯地方的「惡慧」。
〔散亂的底子·第一種說法·是「癡」的一分〕 一說：散亂只算「癡」（糊塗）的一小部分。理由是《瑜伽》說它是癡的一分。
〔第二種說法·是貪、瞋、癡三者的一分〕 又說：散亂該算「貪、瞋、癡」三個合起來的一小部分——因為《集論》這些論說它是「三分」。那第一說為什麼只說「癡分」呢？那是就『凡染心都有它』這一點來講的（癡遍一切染心，所以挑癡來說它遍）；其實貪、瞋、癡這三個讓心東奔西跑的力道，比別的法都強，所以才把這三個合起來說成散亂。
〔應知·正確的說法·散亂自己有實體〕 又說（這是正解）：散亂自己有實實在在的體。《論》說它是「三分」，意思是說它是從貪瞋癡流出來的同一類東西（等流，就像「無慚」那些一樣），並不就等於那三個、也不歸到那三個裡頭；它那『順著粗相將就著說假、叫世俗有』也是同一個道理（不是說體真的假）。散亂自己的別相就是「躁擾」（躁動、攪擾），它一起來，跟它同時並起的那些法都跟著東奔西跑。〔反駁前一說〕假如真像前一說那樣，離開了那三個法就沒有散亂自己的體，那《論》就不該另外單立一句『散亂障三摩地（定）』了——既然《論》特地說它單獨擋住「定」，可見它一定有自己的實體。
〔問〕掉舉和散亂這兩個，作用上有什麼不一樣？〔答〕掉舉是叫心『換見解』（一會兒一個想法、行解老在變），散亂是叫心『換對象』（攀的境老在跳）。要說明的是：在同一個剎那裡頭，見解和對象都還來不及變（一剎那太短）；可是放到前後一念念接續下來看，就看得出見解在變、對象在跳了——所以這兩個的作用是分得開的。一個染污的心起來時，本來會被掉舉、散亂這股力推著，一念念地換見解、換對象；除非另有「念」（守住正境的力）這些把它按住，才暫時不換——就像拿繩子把猿猴拴住，讓它暫時停一下。正因為這樣，掉舉和散亂是凡染心都有、而且一起出現的（兩個並著起，只是一個管『換見解』、一個管『換對象』，方向不同罷了）。
二十、不正知
什麼叫「不正知」？就是對所觀察的境『理解錯了』（會錯意、解歪了）——這「謬解」就是它的性。作用（業）：擋住「正知」（正確地了知），又造成「毀犯」（違犯戒律威儀）；因為理解錯了的人，往往就會犯這犯那。
〔不正知的底子·第一種說法·是「慧」的一分〕 一說：不正知只算「慧」（判別、了知的能力）的一小部分。理由是《論》說它其實是『跟煩惱攪在一起的那種慧』（慧染污了，就成了不正知）。
〔第二種說法·是「癡」的一分〕 又說：不正知只算「癡」（糊塗）的一小部分。理由是《瑜伽》說它是癡的一分；是糊塗把所知道的弄歪了，所以才叫「不正知」。
〔應知·正確的說法·是「慧」和「癡」兩者的一分〕 又說（這是正解）：不正知是「慧」和「癡」兩者合起來的一小部分。怎麼說呢？前面那兩段話（一段只說慧、一段只說癡）其實是『各挑一邊、省著說、彼此補足』；再說《論》又講不正知是凡染心都有的——這就得「慧」「癡」兩分都算上，才遍得了一切染心。
〔二十之外·隨煩惱名義〕
頌裡用了「與」、「并」、「及」這三個連接詞，正是要點出：隨煩惱不止這二十個——《雜事》這些經論還說過貪等也有好多種隨煩惱。再說「隨煩惱」這個名目，連「根本煩惱」也包在裡頭（因為根本煩惱本身也有『流出同類』這層意思，廣義上也算隨煩惱）；至於那些跟煩惱同一類的其餘染污法，就只能叫「隨煩惱」，進不了「根本煩惱」那六個的圈子。
那這裡為什麼單單挑這二十個來當隨煩惱呢？因為它們『不是根本煩惱』（沒被立進那六個根本裡），而只是些染污、又粗又顯的法。至於其餘的染污法，有的是這二十個在不同情境下的別相（分位），有的是這二十個流出來的同類（等流），全都歸進這二十個裡頭。各自按它的類別（小隨、中隨、大隨這三類）一一去歸，照道理就能弄明白。
〔隨煩惱諸門〕
〔假實門〕
這二十個隨煩惱裡，哪些是『假的』（沒有自己的實體，只是別的法湊出來的）、哪些是『實的』（自己有實體），分得清清楚楚：小隨那十個（忿、恨、覆、惱、嫉、慳、誑、諂、害、憍）跟大隨裡的三個（放逸、失念、不正知）一定是假的；無慚、無愧、不信、懈怠這四個一定是實的（不論按經教還是按道理都站得住）。剩下掉舉、惛沈、散亂這三個，一派說是假的、一派說是實的——兩邊各自引的道理和經教，前面講掉舉、惛沈、散亂那三節（那場『它自己有沒有實體』的爭論）已經說過了。
〔俱生分別門〕
這二十個「俱生」和「分別」兩種起法都通——也就是說，它們既可以隨著「俱生煩惱」（與生俱來、自自然然就有的煩惱）的力起來，也可以隨著「分別煩惱」（後天被邪見邪教熏出來的煩惱）的力起來，兩種都行。
〔互俱起門〕
這二十個裡頭：小隨那十個，彼此之間一定不會同時並起（你起的時候我就不起）。為什麼？因為它們一是彼此牴觸、合不來，二是樣子又粗又猛，三是各個都要『當家作主』——一個心裡容不下兩個主子，所以它們只能一個一個地起。
中隨那兩個（無慚、無愧）跟一切不善的心一起起，並且看情況也都能跟小隨、大隨一塊起。《論》又說『大隨那八個是凡染心都有的』；所以大隨彼此之間、以及跟小隨、中隨之間，都可以同時並起。
不過經論的說法有寬有窄。有的地方說『大隨裡只有六個是凡染心都有的』，那是因為惛沈和掉舉這兩個一旺起來就沒法同時並起（一個往下沉、一個往上躁，正好對著幹），所以把這兩個扣掉、只說六個遍。又有的地方乾脆只說『五個遍染心』，那是因為惛沈、掉舉這些跟『只在善心裡才有』的輕安等正好相違（在這個基礎上再扣掉一個，剩五個）。總之這些大隨的法都只是染性的，所以它們都不會跟第八阿賴耶識（它是無覆無記、不染不淨）一起起。
第七末那識裡頭只有大隨那八個；至於其中哪個取、哪個捨的細分別，照上面講過的（俱生、只通染性等等）就能明白。第六意識就寬了，整整二十個都能跟它一起起。
小隨那十個又粗又猛（得靠分別、盤算才起得來），所以前五識（眼耳鼻舌身識，它們不會分別盤算）裡頭沒有它們；中隨、大隨就跟五識相通，前五識裡可以有。正因為這樣，中隨、大隨能跟「五受」（苦、樂、憂、喜、捨五種感受）相應——因為前五識本來就通苦、樂等等的感受。
〔受相應門〕
〔小隨配哪些感受·第一種說法〕 一說：小隨那十個裡，除掉諂、誑、憍這三個不算，其餘的忿等七個（忿、恨、覆、惱、嫉、慳、害）只跟「喜、憂、捨」這三種感受搭得上。至於諂、誑、憍這三個，則跟『四種感受』搭得上（也就是除掉「苦」這一受，其餘喜、憂、樂、捨都行）。
〔第二種說法〕 又說：忿等七個跟『四種感受』搭得上（這回是除掉「樂」這一受）；諂、誑、憍這三個則跟『五種感受』全搭得上。為什麼諂誑憍能配到苦受？因為『意（第六意識）這裡也有苦受』，這一點前面講根本煩惱那一章已經說過了。這『哪個配哪些感受』的細相，也照前面根本煩惱章講過的去懂。
以上講的是『按確切道理』的算法。要是『只就最明顯的粗相』隨便講講，那就是：忿、恨、惱、嫉、害跟「憂、捨」搭；覆、慳跟「喜、捨」搭；其餘三個（諂、誑、憍）則在這基礎上再加個「樂」受。至於中隨、大隨，就算只就粗相講，也跟它們的確切道理一樣（沒有另外的講法）。
〔別境相應門〕
這二十個隨煩惱，跟『別境五個』（欲、勝解、念、定、慧）都可以一起起，彼此不相違。〔有人起疑〕染污的念（也就是失念）、染污的慧（也就是不正知），不是該跟好的「念」、「慧」相牴觸嗎？怎麼還能一起起？〔答〕失念、不正知雖然不是直接拿「念」「慧」當體而跟它們並起，可是就它們含的「癡分」（糊塗那一面）來說，照樣能跟念、慧一起起（並不是非得體相同才搭得上）。再說「念」這個心所，本來既能緣現在的境、也能緣以前熏習過的同類境；而「忿」也能緣剛過去那一剎那的境——兩個都緣得到過去，所以忿和念也搭得上。又像染污的「定」（就是散亂狀態下那種定），它起的時候心也躁動不安，所以「散亂」跟「定」一起起也沒問題。
〔煩惱相應門〕
中隨那兩個、大隨那八個，跟十個根本煩惱都能一起起。小隨那十個就一定不會跟「見」（各種惡見）和「疑」一起起——因為小隨的樣子又粗又躁，而見、疑的樣子是要細細審察的，一個粗、一個細，搭不到一塊兒。
這裡再一個一個對：忿等五個（忿、恨、惱、嫉、害）能跟「慢、癡」一起起，可不跟「貪、瞋」並起——因為它們本身就是「瞋」的一小部分（一來瞋本就不跟貪並起，二來自己當然也不跟自己〔瞋〕並起）。慳能跟「癡、慢」一起起，不跟「貪、瞋」並起——因為它是「貪」的一小部分（同理，貪不跟瞋並、自己也不跟自己〔貪〕並）。憍只跟「癡」一起起；它跟「慢」雖然像，意思卻不一樣（憍是仗著自己的風光得意忘形、慢是要欺壓別人），而且憍是「貪」的一分（所以它也不跟貪並）。覆、誑、諂這三個能跟「貪、癡、慢」一起起——因為它們的樣子跟這幾個不牴觸，而且它們本身就是「貪、癡」的一小部分。
〔三性門〕
小隨裡的七個（忿、恨、惱、嫉、害、覆、慳）加上中隨那兩個，只屬於「不善」（純是壞的）。小隨裡的另三個（諂、誑、憍）加上大隨那八個，除了不善，還通「無記」（也就是不善不惡的那一檔，不光是不善）。
〔界繫門〕
小隨那七個（忿、恨、惱、嫉、害、覆、慳）加上中隨那兩個，只屬欲界。誑、諂這兩個則通欲界、色界兩界；剩下的（憍，再加大隨八個，一共九個）通欲、色、無色三界。『生在下地的人，能起上地的十一個法』——這十一個就是憍、誑、諂三個加上大隨八個；為什麼？因為他貪著上界的定境，於是就在那上頭對別人起了憍、誑、諂這些。反過來，『生在上地的人，也能起下地的後十個』（也就是大隨八個，再加上中隨無慚、無愧兩個）——因為他的邪見跟貪愛一起冒出來時，會把下地那些牽動起來。
小隨那十個：生在上地的人沒辦法起下地的小隨——因為小隨既不是『真正去滋潤、牽引投生』的那種惑，也不是『毀謗涅槃』的那種惑（這兩種才會在上地攀緣下地而起，小隨都不是，所以起不來）。中隨那兩個、大隨那八個：在下地的人也能緣到上地——因為它們會跟著『緣上地的貪』這些一塊起。
〔小隨能不能緣上地·第一種說法〕 一說：小隨那十個，在下地的人緣不到上地——因為它們的樣子又粗又只盯著近處，沒法遠遠地去抓上地的境。〔第二種說法〕 又說：嫉等也能緣到上地——比方對上面那勝妙之地的法生起嫉妒等，這不就緣上了嗎。
大隨那八個以及諂、誑：在上地的人也能緣到下地——因為它們會跟著『緣下地的慢』這些一塊起；就像大梵天對著釋迦的弟子起了諂、誑（這就是上地緣著下地而起）。只有「憍」緣不到下地——因為下地不是自己拿來自滿自恃的那種風光（憍只仗著自己現有的盛事得意，犯不著去攀下面）。
〔學無學門〕
這二十個都不算「學」、也不算「無學」（「學」指還在修道的聖者、「無學」指修行已圓滿的阿羅漢）——因為隨煩惱只是染污的法，而「學」「無學」這兩種身位都只裝清淨的法，裝不下染污的隨煩惱。
〔見修所斷門〕
後十個（掉舉、惛沈、不信、懈怠、放逸、失念、散亂、不正知，再加無慚、無愧）只通「見所斷」和「修所斷」這兩種——（「見所斷」是見道時斷掉的、「修所斷」是修道時慢慢斷掉的。）為什麼這兩種都通？因為它們既跟「分別煩惱」相應而起、也跟「俱生煩惱」相應而起。屬於「見所斷」的那部分，會隨著它所迷的「諦理」的相——有時整個一片地迷、有時分開來一條一條地迷——跟著煩惱一塊冒出來，所以看情況，迷苦、集、滅、道這四諦它都可能沾上。至於迷諦時是『直接迷』還是『間接迷』這些細分別，都照前面根本煩惱那一章講過的去懂。
前十個（也就是小隨那十個）〔見道斷還是修道斷·第一種說法〕 一說：它們只屬「修所斷」（修道時才斷）——因為小隨攀的是又粗又明擺著的事境、又是自自然然就冒出來的（屬於俱生煩惱，所以歸修道斷）。
〔第二種說法〕 又說：小隨「見所斷」和「修所斷」兩種也都通——因為它們既靠分別煩惱的力起、也靠俱生煩惱的力起；比方緣著別人的邪見而生起忿等（這就是靠分別煩惱起的，屬於見道斷）。屬於見所斷的那部分，看它緣的是什麼，靠『整片地迷』或『分條地迷』的力，迷苦、集、滅、道四諦也都可能沾上。
這裡頭又有一層分歧。〔小隨是不是『直接迷諦』·第一種說法〕 一說：忿等只是『緣著那個迷諦的煩惱』才跟著生起，並不是自己『直接去迷諦理』——因為它的樣子又粗又淺，鑽不進諦理深處。〔第二種說法〕 又說：嫉等也能直接迷諦——比方對著滅諦、道諦這些生起嫉妒，那不就直接緣著諦理了嗎。不過要補一句：忿等這十個都只能緣「有事」（有實在底子的境），非得有個實在的「本質」墊著才生得起來。至於它們『緣有漏的境、還是無漏的境』這些門類，照前面根本煩惱那一章講過的去懂。
〔Verses commented〕Verses 13–14 · the secondary afflictions
〔The verses expounded〕
The secondary defilements are: anger, enmity, concealment, vexation, envy, stinginess; deceit, flattery, together with harming, arrogance, lack-of-shame and lack-of-dread, agitation and torpor, lack-of-faith together with indolence (v13); heedlessness and loss-of-mindfulness, distraction, improper-knowing; the indeterminate are regret, drowsiness, applied-thought, sustained-thought — the two, each in two (v14).
A. The Twenty Secondary Defilements
The marks of the six root defilements have already been told above. Then what of the marks of these "secondary defilements" (the second-tier defilements that arise following the root ones)? The verse answers as above: anger, enmity, concealment, vexation, envy, stinginess, deceit, flattery, harming, arrogance, lack-of-shame, lack-of-dread, agitation, torpor, lack-of-faith, indolence, heedlessness, loss-of-mindfulness, distraction, improper-knowing — twenty in all.
The treatise says: these twenty dharmas are, one and all, merely the "positional differentiations" of the root defilements (the various distinct guises one and the same root defilement shows in differing situations) and their "outflow-kind" (dharmas that flow out of a root defilement and are of one kind with it); and just because they arise only "following" the root defilements, they are called "secondary defilements." These twenty are sorted into three classes by how widely they "spread out" when they arise: (1) anger and the [other] ten arise each on its own, never two together at once, and are called the "minor secondary defilements"; (2) lack-of-shame and lack-of-dread, these two, are present in every unwholesome mind without exception, and are called the "middling secondary defilements"; (3) agitation and the [other] eight are present in every defiled mind without exception, and are called the "major secondary defilements."
1. Anger (忿)
What is "anger"? It is, when one meets a present object that goes against one and comes to harm and vex one, that surge of "indignant bursting-forth" in the mind — this is its "nature" (what it is in itself). Its function (its "business") has two sides: one, it blocks "non-anger" (the wholesome mind that does not flare up); two, it "takes up a cudgel" (snatches up sticks and weapons); for a person who harbors anger in the mind will, on that account, often issue violent bodily actions (that is, conduct outwardly manifested in the body). And as for its "substance" (what it is at bottom): anger is in fact just a small portion of "ill-will" (resentment) — apart from ill-will there is no separate anger to speak of.
2. Enmity (恨)
What is "enmity"? It has "anger" go ahead of it as its vanguard, and then it harbors that evil thought in the mind and will not let it go, binding it into a grudge — this "binding of a grudge" is its nature. Its function: it blocks "non-enmity," and it makes one "burn-and-fret" (an inner anguish, as though roasted over a fire); for one who has bound up enmity cannot bear and forbear, and is forever scorched by this burning fret. Its substance is likewise a small portion of ill-will; apart from ill-will there is no separate enmity.
3. Concealment (覆)
What is "concealment" (covering up, hiding away)? It is that, having committed a fault oneself, one fears that if it came to light one would lose advantage and ruin one's good name, and so one "hides it away" — this hiding is its nature. Its function: it blocks "non-concealment" (the wholesome mind that does not hide, that is at ease), and it brings on "regret-and-fret"; for one who covers up a fault will surely, afterward, repent and fret over it and find no inner ease.
〔The substance of concealment · first view · merely a portion of delusion〕 One view: concealment counts only as a small portion of "delusion" (that is, ignorance, muddle-headedness). The grounds are two: first, the treatise says only that concealment is a portion of delusion; second, one who covers up a fault dares to hide his sin precisely because he does not fear the future suffering it brings — and this "not fearing the suffering to come" is just the look of muddle-headedness (delusion).
〔It should be known · the correct view · a portion of both greed and delusion〕 Another view (and this is the correct reading): concealment is in fact a small portion of both "greed" and "delusion." For one who covers up a fault also hides his sin out of "fear of losing advantage and ruining his good name" — and this "fearing the loss of advantage and name" component belongs to greed. Then why does the treatise say only that it is a portion of delusion? That is merely speaking from its most conspicuous, coarsest side. Take a ready comparison: the treatise also once said "agitation is a portion of greed," yet the treatise goes on to say "agitation is present in every defiled mind without exception" — and since it is present in all alike, one cannot doggedly insist that agitation is only a portion of greed (else a defiled mind without greed should have no agitation). The principle of concealment is the same: one cannot, just because the treatise pointed out only one side, doggedly insist it is only a portion of delusion.
4. Vexation (惱)
What is "vexation"? It has "anger" and "enmity" go ahead of it as its vanguard, and then, raking up the old evils of the past on one side and running into present things that go against one on the other, there boils up in the mind a fierce, hot fury, and one turns "savage-and-perverse" (vicious, hot-tempered, contrary) — this is its nature. Its function: it blocks "non-vexation," and it "stings" (wounds others as a wasp or scorpion stings); for a person who rakes up old evils and runs besides into present things that go against him grows savage in mind, and will often let loose blustering, violent, coarse and vile words to wound others. Its substance is likewise a small portion of ill-will; apart from ill-will there is no separate vexation.
5. Envy (嫉)
What is "envy"? It is to chase single-mindedly after one's own name and gain, unable to bear another's doing well — so that the moment another flourishes and prospers one cannot stand it, and "jealousy" rises up; this is its nature. Its function: it blocks "non-envy," and it brings on "grief-and-sorrow" (a melancholy distress); for the envious person, the moment he hears or sees another's success, deeply harbors a sorrowful distress and cannot sit still. Its substance is likewise a small portion of ill-will; apart from ill-will there is no separate envy.
6. Stinginess (慳)
What is "stinginess" (miserliness, grudging)? It is to clutch at goods and at "dharmas" (the principles and learning one knows oneself) and not let go, unwilling to use wisdom to give in charity, and so to "secretly hoard and tightly begrudge" — this is its nature. Its function: it blocks "non-stinginess," and it makes one "meanly hoard" (pettily pile things up without end); for the miser is narrow and astringent of mind, knowing only how to pile up goods and dharmas, never able to give them out. Its substance is a small portion of "greed-and-craving"; apart from greed there is no separate stinginess.
7. Deceit (誑)
What is "deceit" (cheating, putting on a false front)? It is, in order to grab advantage and win a name, to fake a show of being a person of great virtue, and so to "swindle and defraud" — this is its nature. Its function: it blocks "non-deceit," and it brings about "wrong livelihood" (making a living by improper means); for this play-acting person harbors other schemes in his mind, and often performs all manner of dishonest, swindling-livelihood doings. Its substance is a small portion of both "greed" and "delusion" (greedy for gain on one side, muddle-headed on the other); apart from these two there is no separate deceit.
8. Flattery (諂)
What is "flattery" (fawning, currying favor)? It is, in order to net another and snare him fast on one's own side, deliberately to put on all manner of unnatural airs, so that the heart within is "treacherous and crooked" — this is its nature. Its function: it blocks "non-flattery," and it "obstructs instruction" (makes one unable to take in proper teaching). How so? The fawning, crooked person, to snare another fast, trims his sails to the wind and bends to please, deliberately contriving all sorts of ploys, in order to win the other's favor or to cover over his own faults; and once he does this, he can no longer take in the proper instruction of teachers and friends. Its substance is likewise a small portion of both greed and delusion; apart from these two there is no separate flattery.
9. Harming (害)
What is "harming"? It is to have not a scrap of compassion in the mind toward sentient beings, wanting only to "injure and torment" them — this is its nature. Its function: it blocks "non-harming," and it "presses-and-torments" (oppresses and afflicts) others; for one with a harming mind means just to press and torment others. Its substance is likewise a small portion of ill-will; apart from ill-will there is no separate harming. As for how "ill-will" and "harming" are told apart, one may follow the method of the earlier chapter on the wholesome mental factors — there it was distinguished that "non-ill-will" is "giving others happiness" and "non-harming" is "pulling out others' suffering"; conversely, ill-will cuts off another's happiness, and harming adds to another's suffering — that is the difference between the two.
10. Arrogance (憍)
What is "arrogance" (self-satisfaction, being carried away with oneself)? It is to fall deeply infatuated and attached over one's own various points of glory (youth, wealth and power, cleverness and ability, and so on), and so to be "drunk-and-haughty" (giddily elated as if drunk, full of an overbearing air) — this is its nature. Its function: it blocks "non-arrogance," and it becomes a "ground of defilement" (a hotbed of all manner of defiled dharmas); for the person carried away with himself will breed and grow every kind of defiled dharma. Its substance is likewise a small portion of greed-and-craving; apart from greed there is no separate arrogance.
11. Lack-of-shame (無慚)
What is "lack-of-shame"? It is that a person gives no heed to himself, and no heed to the true Dharma either, and so "slights and rejects the worthy and the good" — this is its nature. Its function: it obstructs "shame" (the wholesome mind that reflects and reproaches itself), and it "breeds and grows evil deeds" (rears up one bad deed after another); for a person who gives not the least heed to himself or to the true Dharma will slight and reject the worthy and good, will not take faults and evils for a disgrace, and so presses "shame" down and rears up every kind of evil deed.
12. Lack-of-dread (無愧)
What is "lack-of-dread"? It is that a person gives no heed to the world's ridicule and reproach, but on the contrary "esteems and prizes the violent and the evil" (takes bad people and bad deeds for good) — this is its nature. Its function: it obstructs "dread" (the wholesome mind that fears others' censure, that fears losing face), and it "breeds and grows evil deeds"; for a person who cares not at all for the world's eyes will esteem and prize the violent and evil, will not take faults and crimes for a disgrace, and so presses "dread" down and rears up every kind of evil deed.
"Not taking faults and evils for a disgrace" is the shared mark of these two, lack-of-shame and lack-of-dread (both have this side); and so the sacred teachings will at times conventionally take this "shamelessness" as their substance in describing them.
〔Q · someone maintains "shamelessness" is the distinguishing mark of each of the two〕 Suppose someone doggedly takes "not taking [faults] for a disgrace" as the distinguishing mark of each (that is, that lack-of-shame and lack-of-dread each have "shamelessness" for their own proper mark); then a string of untenable consequences follows —
First, the substances of these two could no longer be told apart (if both take the same "shamelessness" as their own mark, would lack-of-shame and lack-of-dread not be one and the same?).
Second, the substances being thus without difference, these two dharmas ought to "not arise together" — just as "feeling" and "conception" do, where there is no such thing as the two arising side by side at once (two dharmas whose proper marks are identical do not arise apart in one mind). Yet in fact lack-of-shame and lack-of-dread do, precisely, arise together at once.
Third, suppose you change the account and tell the two apart by the two heads "toward oneself" and "toward others" (lack-of-shame toward self, lack-of-dread toward other); then they become "mutually-dependent" conventional dharmas, existing only relative to each other, and not really-existent things — and this again contradicts the sacred teaching (which says lack-of-shame and lack-of-dread are both really existent).
Fourth, suppose you step back and concede they are really existent and each arises on its own; this again contradicts the treatise's saying that "lack-of-shame and lack-of-dread are present in every unwholesome mind without exception" (since they are present in all alike and always appear together, one cannot say they each arise on their own). 〔In sum, the road "shamelessness is the distinguishing mark of each" cannot be made to work, go which way you will.〕
〔A〕 In fact, when an unwholesome mind arises, whatever object it takes, that object carries two layers of sense at once: one layer is "slighting and rejecting the good" (this is the lack-of-shame side), one layer is "esteeming and prizing the evil" (this is the lack-of-dread side). And so these two dharmas are present in every unwholesome mind without exception, and take one and the same object — that being so, there is no fault of "each arising on its own" at all (no need for the two to arise apart side by side; they always appear together as a matter of course).
Then how is the line in the sacred teachings, "giving no heed to self, giving no heed to other," to be understood? Here "self" means "oneself and the true Dharma" (which lack-of-shame gives no heed to), and "other" means "the world" (which lack-of-dread gives no heed to). Or, put another way: take this "rejecting the good, esteeming the evil" by whether it benefits or harms oneself — focused on one's own gain and loss, it is called "self"; focused on the outer world, it is called "other"; this too is merely a convenient way of naming. And as for the treatise's saying that "lack-of-shame and lack-of-dread are a portion of greed and the like," the meaning is that these two are of one kind flowing out (the outflow-kind) of greed and the like — it is not to say that they themselves have greed and the like for their substance.
13. Agitation (掉舉)
What is "agitation" (mental restlessness, the inability to settle)? It is to make the mind unable to settle down at all toward its object — this is its nature. Its function: it blocks "equanimity-in-action" (the wholesome mind that lets the mind rest calm and at ease), and it blocks "śamatha" (that is, "calm-abiding," the practice of settling the mind down).
〔The substance of agitation · first view · merely a portion of greed〕 One view: agitation counts only as a small portion of "greed." The grounds are two: first, the treatise says only that agitation is a portion of greed; second, agitation arises by one's recalling some pleasant matter of the past — and to savor pleasures belongs to greed.
〔Second view · every defiled mind has it, and it is a shared mark of the defilements〕 Another view: agitation is not only a portion of greed. The grounds: first, the treatise says agitation is present in every defiled mind without exception (if it were only greed, it should not be in every defiled mind — a defiled mind without greed should have none of it); second, the mark of agitation is "the failure to settle," and the treatise places this "failure to settle" within "the mark shared by all the defilements," and besides, agitation apart from this "failure to settle" can find no separate mark of its own. So this view's conclusion is: agitation is "conventionally set up by leaning on all the defilements" (having no substance of its own), only at the time "greed holds sway" agitation stands out especially, and so it is spoken of, leaningly, as a portion of greed — not that it is only greed.
〔It should be known · the correct view · agitation has a substance of its own〕 Another view (and this is the correct reading): agitation has a really-existent substance of its own, and is present in every defiled mind without exception — just like "lack-of-faith" and the rest (lack-of-faith too is in every defiled mind, yet has a substance of its own). One cannot, just because the treatise calls it "a portion of greed and the like," conclude that it has no substance; were one to argue so, then "lack-of-faith" and the rest would likewise turn out to be conventional (yet lack-of-faith is plainly really existent). Then why does the treatise also say agitation is "conventionally existent" (that is, conventionally set up)? This is just like "drowsiness" and the rest, a case of "speaking conventionally by following the coarse mark of what it leans on" (not that its substance is truly conventional). Agitation's own distinguishing mark is "tumult" (a clamorous, restless stirring): the moment it arises, the dharmas arising together with it all fail to settle along with it. 〔Refuting the foregoing view〕 If it really were as that earlier view said, that apart from the defilements there is no mark of agitation, then the treatise should not separately have set down the line "agitation obstructs śamatha (calm-abiding)" — since the treatise specially says it singly blocks "calm-abiding," it must have a single mark of its own. So "the failure to settle" is only agitation's mark shared with the other defilements, not its own distinguishing mark (its own distinguishing mark is "tumult").
14. Torpor (惛沈)
What is "torpor" (sluggishness, the inability to rouse oneself)? It is to make the mind "unable to put forth strength" toward its object (dull and sunken, heavy and blunt, unable to operate nimbly) — this is its nature. Its function: it blocks "pliancy" (the wholesome mind of bodily and mental lightness and ease), and it blocks "vipaśyanā" (that is, "insight," the practice of seeing clearly into the principle of things).
〔The substance of torpor · first view · merely a portion of delusion〕 One view: torpor counts only as a small portion of "delusion" (muddle-headedness). The grounds are two: first, the treatise says only that torpor is a portion of delusion; second, that "dull-and-sunken, heavy-and-blunt" look is just the mark of muddle-headedness (the dimness that delusion is).
〔Second view · conventionally set up by leaning on all the defilements〕 Another view: torpor is not only a portion of delusion. The grounds: the mark of torpor is "the inability to put forth strength," yet all the defilements make the mind unable to put forth strength (not delusion alone does this), and besides, torpor apart from this "inability to put forth strength" can find no separate mark of its own. So torpor is "conventionally set up by leaning on all the defilements," only at "delusion" the mark of torpor stands out especially, and so it is spoken of singly as a portion of delusion — not that it is only delusion.
〔It should be known · the correct view · torpor has a substance of its own〕 Another view (and this is the correct reading): torpor has a really-existent substance of its own; though it is named "a portion of delusion," it is in fact of one kind flowing out of delusion (the outflow-kind, just like "lack-of-faith" and the rest), and is not identical with delusion, nor taken in under delusion. The treatise's saying that it is "conventionally existent, spoken of conventionally by following the coarse mark of what it leans on" is just like "drowsiness" and the rest — yet its substance is really existent. Torpor's own distinguishing mark is "murky-heaviness" (a dim, sunken weight): the moment it arises, the dharmas arising together with it all become unable to put forth strength along with it. 〔Refuting the foregoing view〕 If it really were as that earlier view said, that apart from the defilements there is no mark of torpor, then the treatise should not separately have set down the line "torpor obstructs vipaśyanā (insight)"; so "the inability to put forth strength" is only its mark shared with the other defilements, not its own distinguishing mark (its own distinguishing mark is "murky-heaviness"). Further, the marks of torpor and of delusion are also not the same: delusion, toward its object, has "confused-darkness" (a befuddled inability to see clearly) for its mark, and what it directly blocks is "non-delusion" (clear understanding), not murky-heaviness; torpor, toward its object, has "murky-heaviness" (dim, sunken weight) for its mark, and what it directly blocks is "pliancy," not confused-darkness. So plainly each has its own mark, and each blocks its own wholesome dharma.
15. Lack-of-faith (不信)
What is "lack-of-faith"? It is, toward the three things "the real, the virtuous, the capable" (the true principle of things, the virtues of the Three Jewels, and one's own capacity to succeed in practice), to be unwilling to accept, to take no delight in, and to have no aspiration after — so that the mind is "befouled, unclean"; this "befoulment of mind" is its nature. Its function: it blocks "pure faith" (a clear, clean faith), and it becomes "a ground for indolence"; for one who lacks faith mostly drifts, along with it, into laziness and indolence.
The "three marks" of lack-of-faith become clear the moment one turns over the three marks of "faith" and reads them backward: faith is to affirm that the real exists, to take delight in seeing that there is virtue, to wish that oneself has the capacity; lack-of-faith is then to be unwilling to accept the real, to take no delight in virtue, and to have no aspiration after that capacity. Further, the several defiled dharmas each have their own proper mark, but this lack-of-faith alone is such that "its own mark is itself a befouling," and it can further befoul the other mind-kings and mental factors around it — just as one extremely filthy thing is itself filthy and besides befouls whatever other things it touches. And so it is said that lack-of-faith has "the befoulment of mind" (the making of mind unclean) for its nature.
It is precisely because of lack-of-faith that one is unwilling to accept, takes no delight in, and has no aspiration after "the real, the virtuous, the capable"; yet this "unwillingness to accept, taking no delight, having no aspiration" is not some other substance of lack-of-faith (it is merely the function that "befoulment of mind" gives rise to). Further: if a person comes to have a "perverse" acceptance, delight, and aspiration toward some other matter (giving his faith to wrong things, say), that is a cause-and-effect drawn out by lack-of-faith (something it brings along), and likewise not the substance of lack-of-faith itself.
16. Indolence (懈怠)
What is "indolence"? It is, in the two proper tasks of "cultivating the good that ought to be cultivated" and "severing the evil that ought to be severed," to be slack — this "laziness" is its nature. Its function: it blocks "vigor" (effortful striving toward the good), and it "increases defilement" (lets the defiled grow ever more); for the indolent person nourishes the defilements ever more rank.
Here three cases are to be told apart. First: a person who, on the contrary, throws himself eagerly and strenuously into defiled doings — this too is called "indolence," for by this very strenuousness he lets the good go (indolence does not mean only lying idle; straining hard toward the evil is indolence just the same). Second: a person who throws himself strenuously into "unmarked matters" (neutral matters, neither wholesome nor unwholesome) — this does not count as indolence, for on the side of "the good" he has neither advanced nor retreated, and that energy is merely "desire" (the will to do a thing) and "resolve" (the settled conviction to do it so) at work, and is not some other substance of indolence. Third, which may be set alongside for comparison: just as the "acceptance and willingness to do" that one has toward "unmarked matters" is neither pure nor defiled, so in this case there is no talk of "faith" or "lack-of-faith" either — by the same principle, the straining toward an unmarked matter is likewise no question of whether or not it is indolence.
17. Heedlessness (放逸)
What is "heedlessness" (letting oneself go, putting on no curb)? It is to be unable to guard against the defiled and unable to cultivate the pure good, the whole person "loose and unbridled" — this is its nature. Its function: it blocks "non-heedlessness" (the wholesome mind that keeps careful watch over itself), and it becomes "a ground for rearing up evil and ruining good." And how does it come about? It comes about just when "indolence" together with "greed, ill-will, and delusion" — these four dharmas combined — fail to guard against the defiled and fail to cultivate the pure, and this whole state gathered up is called "heedlessness" — so heedlessness has no separate substance of its own (it is merely a general name for these four dharmas combined).
Someone may ask: do not "conceit, doubt," and the like also have a touch of this power to "fail to guard and fail to cultivate" — why are they not reckoned in? Answer: conceit, doubt, and the like, though they too have a slight measure of this power, are much feebler in force than those four (indolence, greed, ill-will, delusion); moreover those four are just what blocks the "three wholesome roots" (non-greed, non-ill-will, non-delusion), and are the "most widely-reaching" dharmas (indolence reaches the broadest field, and greed-ill-will-delusion are root defilements), and so only these four are taken as the substance of heedlessness. As for how the mark of heedlessness is to be probed out, one may understand it by the earlier chapter on "non-heedlessness" — the principle being: apart from those four dharmas there is no such thing to be found as "guarding and cultivating" at all, which shows that heedlessness has no separate substance of its own.
18. Loss-of-mindfulness (失念)
What is "loss-of-mindfulness" (failing to remember, woolgathering)? It is to be unable to keep the object clearly in mind and hold it fast — this is its nature. Its function: it blocks "right mindfulness" (holding the mind firmly upon the right object), and it becomes "a ground for distraction"; for in the person of lost mindfulness, the mind, along with it, scatters and falls into disorder.
〔The substance of loss-of-mindfulness · first view · a portion of "mindfulness"〕 One view: loss-of-mindfulness counts only as a small portion of "mindfulness" (memory, holding fast). The ground is that the treatise says loss-of-mindfulness is in fact "the kind of mindfulness that has gotten tangled up with the defilements" (mindfulness itself become defiled is loss-of-mindfulness).
〔Second view · a portion of "delusion"〕 Another view: loss-of-mindfulness counts only as a small portion of "delusion" (muddle-headedness). The ground is that the Yogācārabhūmi says it is a portion of delusion; it is muddle-headedness that loses the memory, and so it is called "loss-of-mindfulness."
〔It should be known · the correct view · a portion of both "mindfulness" and "delusion"〕 Another view (and this is the correct reading): loss-of-mindfulness is a small portion of "mindfulness" and "delusion" combined. How so? Those two earlier passages (one speaking only of mindfulness, one only of delusion) are in fact "each taking one side, setting them off against each other" (not that it is only that one side, but a speaking-by-abridgement, each supplementing the other); besides, the treatise also says loss-of-mindfulness is present in every defiled mind — yet if one reckoned only the "mindfulness" portion it would not be in every defiled mind, and one must add the "delusion" portion to make it pervade all defiled mind. So both sides must be reckoned in.
19. Distraction (散亂)
What is "distraction"? It is, toward its objects, to let the mind "run hither and thither, unable to hold still" — this "drifting-and-roving" is its nature. Its function: it blocks "right concentration" (settling the mind in one place), and it becomes "a ground for evil discernment"; for the distracted person gives rise to a crooked, misapplied "evil discernment."
〔The substance of distraction · first view · a portion of "delusion"〕 One view: distraction counts only as a small portion of "delusion" (muddle-headedness). The ground is that the Yogācārabhūmi says it is a portion of delusion.
〔Second view · a portion of greed, ill-will, and delusion, all three〕 Another view: distraction should be reckoned a small portion of "greed, ill-will, delusion," the three combined — because the Abhidharma-samuccaya and the rest say it is "the three portions." Then why did the first view say only "a portion of delusion"? That was speaking from this one point, "it is in every defiled mind" (delusion pervades all defiled mind, so delusion is picked out to show that distraction pervades all); in fact the force with which greed, ill-will, and delusion, these three, let the mind run hither and thither is stronger than that of the other dharmas, and so these three combined are spoken of as distraction.
〔It should be known · the correct view · distraction has a substance of its own〕 Another view (and this is the correct reading): distraction has a really-existent substance of its own. The treatise's calling it "the three portions" means that it is of one kind flowing out of greed-ill-will-delusion (the outflow-kind, just like "lack-of-shame" and the rest), and is not identical with those three, nor taken in under them; and its being "spoken of conventionally, called conventionally existent, by following the coarse mark [of what it leans on]" is on the same principle (not that its substance is truly conventional). Distraction's own distinguishing mark is "restless-stirring" (an agitated commotion): the moment it arises, the dharmas arising together with it all run hither and thither along with it. 〔Refuting the foregoing view〕 If it really were as that earlier view said, that apart from those three dharmas there is no substance of distraction's own, then the treatise should not separately have set down the line "distraction obstructs samādhi (concentration)" — since the treatise specially says it singly blocks "concentration," it must have a substance of its own.
〔Q〕 In what does the function of these two, agitation and distraction, differ? 〔A〕 Agitation makes the mind "switch its understanding" (now one notion, now another, the interpretive grasp forever changing), distraction makes the mind "switch its object" (the object it clings to forever jumping). It should be explained: within one and the same instant, the understanding and the object have not yet had time to change (an instant is too brief); but set against the run of one thought-moment succeeding another, one can see the understanding changing and the object jumping — and so the functions of these two can be told apart. When a defiled mind arises, it would, by the force of agitation and distraction, switch its understanding and switch its object thought-moment by thought-moment; unless some other force such as "mindfulness" (the power that holds the mind to the right object) reins it in, so that for a moment it does not switch — just as one ties up a gibbon with a rope to let it stop a while. Precisely for this reason agitation and distraction are present in every defiled mind and appear together (the two arising side by side, only one governing "switching the understanding" and one "switching the object" — they merely point in different directions).
20. Improper-knowing (不正知)
What is "improper-knowing"? It is, toward the object observed, to "understand it wrongly" (to take its sense amiss, to read it crookedly) — this "mistaken understanding" is its nature. Its function: it blocks "proper knowing" (a correct cognizing), and it brings about "transgression-and-violation" (the breaking of precepts and proper deportment); for the person who understands wrongly will often commit this transgression and that.
〔The substance of improper-knowing · first view · a portion of "discernment"〕 One view: improper-knowing counts only as a small portion of "discernment" (the faculty of judging and knowing). The ground is that the treatise says it is in fact "the kind of discernment that has gotten tangled up with the defilements" (discernment itself become defiled is improper-knowing).
〔Second view · a portion of "delusion"〕 Another view: improper-knowing counts only as a small portion of "delusion" (muddle-headedness). The ground is that the Yogācārabhūmi says it is a portion of delusion; it is muddle-headedness that twists what one knows awry, and so it is called "improper-knowing."
〔It should be known · the correct view · a portion of both "discernment" and "delusion"〕 Another view (and this is the correct reading): improper-knowing is a small portion of "discernment" and "delusion" combined. How so? Those two earlier passages (one speaking only of discernment, one only of delusion) are in fact "each taking one side, speaking by abridgement, supplementing each other"; besides, the treatise also says improper-knowing is present in every defiled mind — and for this one must reckon in both portions, "discernment" and "delusion," to make it pervade all defiled mind.
〔Beyond the twenty · the name-sense of the secondary defilements〕
The verse used the three connectives "together with," "and," "and also" precisely to point out: the secondary defilements are not only these twenty — the Kṣudraka-vastu and the like also speak of many kinds of secondary defilement such as greed. Further, the name "secondary defilement" takes in the "root defilements" too (for the root defilements themselves also have this layer of "flowing out into their own kind," and so, broadly, count as secondary defilements as well); while as for the remaining defiled dharmas that are of one kind with the defilements, these can only be called "secondary defilements," and do not enter the circle of those six "root defilements."
Then why are just these twenty singled out as the secondary defilements here? Because they "are not root defilements" (they were not set up among those six roots), but are merely defiled dharmas, coarse and conspicuous. As for the remaining defiled dharmas, some are the distinct guises (positional differentiations) of these twenty in differing situations, some are the outflow-kind of these twenty, and all are gathered in under these twenty. Each is to be sorted by its class (the three classes minor, middling, major), and so, going by the principle, one can make it out.
〔The several gates of the secondary defilements〕
〔The gate of conventional and real〕
Among these twenty secondary defilements, which are "conventional" (having no substance of their own, merely set up by other dharmas combined) and which are "real" (having a substance of their own) is told cleanly apart: the minor ten (anger, enmity, concealment, vexation, envy, stinginess, deceit, flattery, harming, arrogance) and three of the major (heedlessness, loss-of-mindfulness, improper-knowing) are definitely conventional; lack-of-shame, lack-of-dread, lack-of-faith, indolence — these four are definitely real (this stands firm whether by the sacred teaching or by reasoning). The remaining three, agitation, torpor, distraction, one party calls conventional, one party calls real — the reasoning and teaching each side adduces have already been told in the three earlier sections on agitation, torpor, and distraction (that dispute over "whether or not it has a substance of its own").
〔The gate of innate and discriminated〕
These twenty are all of both modes of arising, "innate" and "discriminated" — that is, they may arise by the force of the "innate defilements" (defilements one is born with, present of themselves as a matter of course), and may arise by the force of the "discriminated defilements" (defilements perfumed in later by wrong views and wrong teaching), either way.
〔The gate of mutual co-arising〕
Among these twenty: the minor ten definitely do not arise together one with another (when one of them arises, the others do not). Why? Because, first, they are mutually opposed and cannot agree; second, their mode is coarse and fierce; third, each must "be its own master" — and one mind cannot hold two masters, so they can only arise one at a time.
The middling two (lack-of-shame, lack-of-dread) arise together with every unwholesome mind, and may also, as the case allows, arise together with the minor and the major. The treatise further says, "the major eight are present in every defiled mind"; and so the major, among themselves, and likewise with the minor and the middling, may all arise together at once.
The accounts of the treatises, however, run broad or narrow. Some places say "of the major, only six are present in every defiled mind," because torpor and agitation, when either swells, cannot arise together (one sinks down, one stirs up, just at cross purposes), and so these two are taken out, leaving six that pervade. And some places say outright "five pervade defiled mind," because torpor, agitation, and the like are at odds with pliancy and the rest, which exist "only in a wholesome mind" (on that footing one more is taken out, leaving five). In any case these major dharmas are all of defiled nature, and so none of them arises together with the eighth, the ālaya-consciousness (which is unobscured-and-unmarked, neither defiled nor pure).
In the seventh, the manas-consciousness, there are only the major eight; and as for which of these is taken and which left out in the fine distinctions, one can make it out by what was told above (innate, of defiled nature only, and so on). The sixth, the mental consciousness, is broad: all twenty entire may arise together with it.
The minor ten are coarse and fierce (they can only arise by way of discriminating and calculating), and so they are not present in the first five consciousnesses (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body — which do not discriminate or calculate); but the middling and the major are open to the five consciousnesses, and may be present in them. And just on this account, the middling and the major can be "associated with the five feelings" (the five feelings of pain, pleasure, sorrow, joy, equanimity) — for the first five consciousnesses are by nature open to the feelings of pain, pleasure, and the rest.
〔The gate of association with feeling〕
〔Which feelings the minor [defilements] go with · first view〕 One view: of the minor ten, setting aside the three flattery, deceit, arrogance, the remaining seven, anger and the rest (anger, enmity, concealment, vexation, envy, stinginess, harming), match up only with the three feelings "joy, sorrow, equanimity." As for the three flattery, deceit, arrogance, they match up with "four feelings" (that is, setting aside "pain," the other four joy, sorrow, pleasure, equanimity all do).
〔Second view〕 Another view: the seven, anger and the rest, match up with "four feelings" (this time setting aside "pleasure"); the three flattery, deceit, arrogance match up with all "five feelings." Why can flattery, deceit, arrogance reach the feeling of pain? Because "in the mind (the sixth mental consciousness) there is the feeling of pain too" — this point was already told in the earlier chapter on the root defilements. As for the fine marks of "which goes with which feeling," one may understand them by what was told in the earlier chapter on the root defilements.
The foregoing is the reckoning "by the exact principle." If one goes loosely "by the coarsest mark," then: anger, enmity, vexation, envy, harming go with "sorrow, equanimity"; concealment, stinginess go with "joy, equanimity"; the remaining three (flattery, deceit, arrogance) add to this a "pleasure" feeling besides. As for the middling and the major, even told only by the coarse mark, they are just as by the exact principle (there is no separate account of them).
〔The gate of association with the object-determined [factors]〕
These twenty secondary defilements may all arise together with the "five object-determined" (desire, resolve, mindfulness, concentration, discernment); they are not mutually at odds. 〔Someone raises a doubt〕 Should not defiled mindfulness (that is, loss-of-mindfulness) and defiled discernment (that is, improper-knowing) be at cross purposes with the good "mindfulness" and "discernment"? How can they then arise together? 〔A〕 Loss-of-mindfulness and improper-knowing, though they do not arise side by side with mindfulness and discernment by taking those as their very substance, can yet, as regards the "delusion portion" they contain (their muddle-headed side), arise together with mindfulness and discernment all the same (it is not required that the substances be identical for them to go together). Besides, "mindfulness" as a mental factor can by nature take both the present object and an object of a kind formerly habituated; and "anger" can take an object just one instant past — both reaching to the past, and so anger and mindfulness can go together too. And the defiled "concentration" (the sort of concentration in a distracted state), when it arises, also has a restless, stirring mind, and so "distraction" arising together with "concentration" is no problem either.
〔The gate of association with the [root] defilements〕
The middling two and the major eight can all arise together with the ten root defilements. The minor ten, however, definitely do not arise together with "[wrong] view" (the several evil views) or "doubt" — because the look of the minor [defilements] is coarse and restless, while the look of [wrong] view and doubt is one of fine, careful investigation; one being coarse, one fine, they cannot be brought together.
Here they are matched one by one again: the five, anger and the rest (anger, enmity, vexation, envy, harming), can arise together with "conceit, delusion," but do not arise together with "greed, ill-will" — because they themselves are a portion of "ill-will" (first, ill-will to begin with does not arise together with greed; second, of course a thing does not arise together with itself, [ill-will]). Stinginess can arise together with "delusion, conceit," but not together with "greed, ill-will" — because it is a portion of "greed" (by the same token, greed does not arise with ill-will, nor with itself, [greed]). Arrogance arises together with "delusion" only; though it resembles "conceit," its sense is different (arrogance is being carried away by leaning on one's own glory, conceit is wanting to bully others), and besides arrogance is a portion of "greed" (and so it does not arise with greed). Concealment, deceit, flattery, these three, can arise together with "greed, delusion, conceit" — because their look does not clash with these, and because they themselves are a portion of "greed, delusion."
〔The gate of the three natures〕
Seven of the minor (anger, enmity, vexation, envy, harming, concealment, stinginess), together with the middling two, belong only to "the unwholesome" (purely bad). The other three of the minor (flattery, deceit, arrogance), together with the major eight, besides the unwholesome, also reach "the unmarked" (that neither-good-nor-bad register — not the unwholesome alone).
〔The gate of binding to the realms〕
Seven of the minor (anger, enmity, vexation, envy, harming, concealment, stinginess), together with the middling two, belong to the desire-realm only. Deceit and flattery, then, reach both the desire-realm and the form-realm; the rest (arrogance, plus the major eight, nine in all) reach all three realms — desire, form, and formless. "One born in a lower stage can give rise to the eleven [defilements] of an upper stage" — these eleven are the three arrogance, deceit, flattery plus the major eight; why? Because, clinging in greed to the concentration-state of the upper realms, he then, over that, gives rise to arrogance, deceit, flattery toward others. Conversely, "one born in an upper stage can also give rise to the latter ten of a lower stage" (that is, the major eight, plus the middling two lack-of-shame and lack-of-dread) — because when his wrong view rises up together with greed-and-craving, it will draw along those lower-stage [defilements].
As for the minor ten: one born in an upper stage has no way to give rise to the minor [defilements] of a lower stage — because the minor are neither the kind of affliction that "truly moistens and draws on rebirth," nor the kind that "slanders nirvāṇa" (these two kinds are what would, in an upper stage, take a lower-stage object and arise; the minor are neither, and so cannot arise). The middling two and the major eight: one in a lower stage can also take an upper-stage object — because they arise together along with "the greed that takes an upper-stage object" and the like.
〔Whether the minor [defilements] can take an upper-stage object · first view〕 One view: as for the minor ten, one in a lower stage cannot take an upper-stage object — because their look is coarse and fixed on what is near, and they cannot reach far off to seize an upper-stage object. 〔Second view〕 Another view: envy and the like can take an upper-stage object too — say one gives rise to envy and the like toward the dharmas of that superior, higher stage; is that not to take an upper-stage object?
The major eight, together with flattery and deceit: one in an upper stage can take a lower-stage object too — because they arise together along with "the conceit that takes a lower-stage object" and the like; just as the Great Brahmā gave rise to flattery and deceit toward the disciples of Śākya (this is taking a lower-stage object from an upper stage). Only "arrogance" cannot take a lower-stage object — because a lower stage is not the kind of glory one takes to be self-satisfied and self-reliant over (arrogance leans only on one's own present points of glory, and has no occasion to reach down below).
〔The gate of the trainee and the non-trainee〕
These twenty are neither "trainee" nor "non-trainee" ("trainee" means the noble one still on the path of cultivation; "non-trainee" means the arhat whose practice is complete) — because the secondary defilements are merely defiled dharmas, while these two states, trainee and non-trainee, hold only pure dharmas and cannot hold the defiled secondary defilements.
〔The gate of what is severed by seeing or by cultivation〕
The latter ten (agitation, torpor, lack-of-faith, indolence, heedlessness, loss-of-mindfulness, distraction, improper-knowing, plus lack-of-shame, lack-of-dread) are of these two kinds only, "severed by seeing" and "severed by cultivation" — ("severed by seeing" means severed on the path of seeing; "severed by cultivation" means severed bit by bit on the path of cultivation.) Why are they of both kinds? Because they arise associated with the "discriminated defilements" and also arise associated with the "innate defilements." That portion which is "severed by seeing" arises along with the defilements following the mark of the "truth" it deludes — now deluding the whole expanse at one stroke, now deluding it point by point one item at a time — and so, as the case allows, it may attach to any of the four truths, suffering, origin, cessation, path. And as for the fine distinctions of whether, in deluding a truth, it deludes "directly" or "indirectly," one may understand them by what was told in the earlier chapter on the root defilements.
The former ten (that is, the minor ten) 〔severed by seeing or by cultivation · first view〕 One view: they belong to "severed by cultivation" only (severed only on the path of cultivation) — because the minor cling to coarse, plainly-laid-out object-matters and arise of themselves as a matter of course (being of the innate defilements, and so falling to severance by cultivation).
〔Second view〕 Another view: the minor are of both kinds, "severed by seeing" and "severed by cultivation" — because they arise by the force of the discriminated defilements and also by the force of the innate defilements; say one gives rise to anger and the like by taking another's wrong view as object (this is arising by the force of a discriminated defilement, falling to severance by seeing). That portion which is severed by seeing, going by what it takes as object, by the force of "deluding the whole expanse" or "deluding point by point," may attach to any of the four truths, suffering, origin, cessation, path.
Here there is a further layer of divergence. 〔Whether the minor [defilements] "directly delude a truth" · first view〕 One view: anger and the rest arise only "following along the defilement that deludes a truth," and do not themselves "directly delude the truth-principle" — because their look is coarse and shallow, unable to bore into the depths of the truth-principle. 〔Second view〕 Another view: envy and the like can directly delude a truth too — say one gives rise to envy toward the truth of cessation, the truth of the path, and so forth; is that not directly taking the truth-principle as object? One thing must be added, though: anger and these ten can take only "an existent matter" (an object with a real footing under it), and must have a real "underlying substance" to bear them up before they can arise at all. As for the gates of whether they "take a contaminated object or an uncontaminated one" and the like, one may understand them by what was told in the earlier chapter on the root defilements.
〔所釋之頌〕第十三頌至第十四頌·隨煩惱
前面把根本的六個煩惱講完了。這一節接著講兩類：一類是「隨煩惱」，二十個，都是隨著根本煩惱流出來的染心所；另一類是「不定」，四個，它們善、惡、無記都不一定，所以叫不定。最後再用一段『六位心所總結』，回答一個更根本的問題——這些心所到底是離開心王別有自己的體、還是只是心王的一種分位。
先把頌文的這二十加四列出來：隨煩惱是忿、恨、覆、惱、嫉、慳、誑、諂、害、憍、無慚、無愧、掉舉、惛沈、不信、懈怠、放逸、失念、散亂、不正知；不定是悔、眠、尋、伺，後面還跟著「二各二」三個字。
這一節所講的心所染淨諸相，經論早有所本。《解深密經·分別瑜伽品》裡，世尊答慈氏菩薩：定中所行的影像，與能緣的心「無異」，何以故？「由彼影像唯是識故」——「我說識所緣，唯識所現故」。心所無論染、淨，它顯出來的種種相都不離識而現，這正是本節最後『六位心所總結』歸到「唯識」、說心所『似彼（心）而現』的經本。至於這二十隨煩惱、四不定的名字與體業，論本在《瑜伽師地論·本地分》——它在意地「助伴」一門裡，把忿、恨、覆、惱乃至惡作（悔）、睡眠、尋、伺這些相應心所之名總列了出來，就是隨煩惱二十、不定四所宗的論本；而《大乘阿毘達磨集論》《雜集論》則逐一界定它們的體與業，譬如忿是『瞋的一分、心怒為體、執杖憤發為業』，惡作是『愚癡分、心追悔為體、能障心住為業』，尋是『依思依慧尋求意言、令心麁』，伺是『依思依慧伺察意言、令心細』。下面護法所糅釋的心所體業，其經根在《解深密》，論本即在《瑜伽》《集論》《雜集論》——順著頌文講開。
甲、隨煩惱二十
〔總標〕——為什麼叫「隨」煩惱，又怎麼分成小、中、大三類
根本的六個煩惱講完了，那麼「隨煩惱」的相是什麼？答案就是上面那二十個。為什麼叫「隨」煩惱？因為這二十個都是根本煩惱的「分位差別」（煩惱在各種情境下顯出來的別相）和「等流性」（從煩惱流出來的同類法），它們是隨著根本煩惱而起的，所以叫隨煩惱。窺基《述記》在這「隨煩惱」之名上還補了一層簡別：根本的那十個煩惱其實也得叫「隨」（它們也是隨逐而起），可這裡的「隨煩惱」是把根本那十個簡去的——之所以單把這二十叫「隨」，是因為根本那十個另有「遍」的義（根本煩惱遍一切染，可作通名），所以不把根本那十個叫作「遍」、而把這二十專立「隨」名。
這二十個，依它遍行的廣狹分成三類。第一類，忿等十個，各自單獨而起、彼此不相俱，叫「小隨煩惱」。第二類，無慚、無愧兩個，遍一切不善心，叫「中隨煩惱」。第三類，掉舉等八個，遍一切染污心，叫「大隨煩惱」。下面逐一講。
一、忿
什麼是「忿」？對著當前不饒益、違逆損惱我的境，心裡憤然發作，這就是它的體性；它能障住「不忿」，作用上表現為「執杖」——也就是操起兇器，因為懷忿的人多半會發出粗暴凶惡的身行（外現的舉動）。要注意：忿並不是獨立的東西，它就是『瞋恚的一分』，離了瞋，根本找不到別的忿相、忿用。
二、恨
什麼是「恨」？它以忿為先導，懷著惡意放不下，結成怨仇，這是它的體性；它能障住「不恨」，作用上是「熱惱」——結恨的人不能含忍，老被那股熱惱燒著。恨也一樣是瞋恚的一分，離了瞋就沒有獨立的恨相、恨用。
三、覆
什麼是「覆」（覆藏）？對自己造的罪，怕失掉利養和名譽，就把它隱藏起來，這是體性；它能障住「不覆」，作用是「悔惱」——覆罪的人後來必定悔惱、心不安隱。
那麼「覆」到底以什麼為體？這裡有兩說。一說：覆只是『癡的一分』，因為論裡只說它是癡分；而且覆罪的人是因為不怕將來的苦果才敢覆藏自己的罪，這正是癡（無明）的相。又說（這是應知的正義）：覆是『貪和癡兩者的一分』，因為覆罪的人也是『怕失掉利譽』才去覆藏的——怕失利譽屬於貪。論裡『只說癡分』，那是就比較粗顯的相來說的；好比論裡也說「掉舉是貪分」，可論裡又說『掉舉遍一切染心』，可見不能死執掉舉只是貪分。覆也是同樣道理，不能死執它只是癡分。
四、惱
什麼是「惱」？它以忿、恨為先導，追念過去的惡事、又觸對眼前的逆緣，生出一股暴熱，狠暴乖戾，這是體性；它能障住「不惱」，作用是「螫」——像蜂蠆螫人那樣去刺傷別人。懷惱的人追念過往的惡、又碰上眼前違逆的緣，心就狠戾起來，多半發出囂張暴烈、凶鄙粗猛的話，去螫害他人。惱也是瞋恚的一分，離了瞋就沒有獨立的惱相、惱用。
五、嫉
什麼是「嫉」？為了徇求自己的名利，受不了別人榮盛，起妬忌，這是體性；它能障住「不嫉」，作用是「憂慼」——嫉妬的人一聽見、一看見別人榮盛，就深懷憂慼、心不安隱。嫉也是瞋恚的一分，離了瞋就沒有獨立的嫉相、嫉用。
六、慳
什麼是「慳」？耽著財物和法，不肯用智慧去布施，祕藏吝惜，這是體性；它能障住「不慳」，作用是「鄙畜」——鄙陋地積聚。慳吝的人心多鄙澁，只知道把財、法積攢起來，捨不得給人。慳跟前面幾個不同，它是『貪愛的一分』，離了貪就沒有獨立的慳相、慳用。
七、誑
什麼是「誑」？為了騙取利養名譽，矯飾偽裝自己有德行，弄出一套詭詐，這是體性；它能障住「不誑」，作用是「邪命」——用不正當的手段謀生。矯誑的人心懷異謀，多半表現出種種不實的邪命勾當。誑是『貪和癡兩者的一分』，離了這兩個就沒有獨立的誑相、誑用。
八、諂
什麼是「諂」？為了籠絡、網羅別人，矯飾裝出種種反常的威儀，又陰險又邪曲，這是體性；它能障住「不諂」，作用是『障教誨』。諂曲的人為了把別人罩住，曲意順著時勢，矯飾出種種方便，或為討好別人的心、或為遮掩自己的過失；這樣一來，他就受不了師長、朋友的正當教誨了。諂也是貪和癡兩者的一分，離了這兩個就沒有獨立的諂相、諂用。
九、害
什麼是「害」？對眾生心裡毫無悲愍，一味損惱，這是體性；它能障住「不害」，作用是「逼惱」——有害的人專去逼惱別人。害也是瞋恚的一分，離了瞋就沒有獨立的害相、害用。至於瞋和害怎麼分？可以比照前面善心所那一章來說——當時辨過『無瞋是與樂、不害是拔苦』，瞋與害的別相也照那個道理對看就明白了。
十、憍
什麼是「憍」？對自己的盛事（年盛、富貴、聰明這些），深深染著，像喝醉了一樣傲慢，這是體性；它能障住「不憍」，作用是「染依」——做一切雜染法的依靠。憍醉的人會生長一切雜染法。憍是貪愛的一分，離了貪就沒有獨立的憍相、憍用。
到此『小隨十個』講完——忿、恨、覆、惱、嫉、慳、誑、諂、害、憍。下面接著講『中隨二個』。
十一、無慚
什麼是「無慚」？對自己、對正法都不顧惜，輕慢拒斥賢善，這是體性；它能障礙「慚」，作用是「生長惡行」——對自、法毫不顧惜的人，輕慢拒斥賢善、不以過惡為羞恥，就障住了慚而長出種種惡行。
十二、無愧
什麼是「無愧」？對世間（世人的譏訶）毫不顧忌，反而崇尚敬重暴惡，這是體性；它能障礙「愧」，作用也是「生長惡行」——對世間毫不顧忌的人，崇重暴惡、不以過罪為羞恥，就障住了愧而長出種種惡行。
接著要辨無慚、無愧這兩個的體與分別。先說它們的「通相」：『不以過惡為恥』是這兩個共有的相，所以有些聖教就拿這個「通相」假說作它們的體。可是這裡會引出一個責難。
有人難說：如果把「不恥」當成這兩個各自的「別相」，那這兩個的體就沒有差別了；體既然沒差別，這兩個就應該不能同時生起——好比受、想，它們各有別體，不會這樣同體並起。再說，如果要靠「對自」「對他」來立兩個別相，那這兩個就成了相互觀待而立的假法、應該不是實有，這就違背聖教（聖教說無慚、無愧是實有）；可如果許它們是實有又各別生起，那又違背論裡說的『無慚、無愧都遍一切惡心』——既然都遍，就不該各別單起。
對這個難，回答是：不善心一生起，不論所緣是什麼境，都同時兼有「輕拒善」和「崇重惡」這兩義；所以這兩個是『都遍惡心、所緣不異』的，沒有『各別單起』的毛病——它們不必各自分開生起，本來就一起遍著惡心。
至於聖教說『不顧自、不顧他』這句怎麼講？可以這樣會通：把『自身和正法』叫作「自」、把「世間」叫作「他」；或者就著這裡「拒善」「崇惡」對自己的利、損，假名叫「自」「他」。又論裡說『無慚、無愧是貪等的一分』，意思是這兩個是貪等的「等流」（同類流出來的），不是說它們就以貪等為體性。
到此『中隨二個』講完。下面是『大隨八個』。
十三、掉舉
什麼是「掉舉」？讓心對所緣境靜不下來，這是體性；它能障住「行捨」和「奢摩他」（止），這是作用。
掉舉以什麼為體？這裡有三說。一說：掉舉只是『貪的一分』，因為論裡只說它是貪分，而且掉舉是由回憶往昔的樂事生起的（憶樂屬貪）。又說：掉舉不只是貪所攝——論裡說掉舉遍一切染心（若只是貪，就不該遍），而且掉舉的相是「不寂靜」，論裡說這屬於「煩惱共相」所攝，掉舉離了這「不寂靜」也找不到別的自相；所以掉舉是依一切煩惱假立的，只因為在「貪位」裡掉舉特別增盛，才偏說它是貪分，並不是說它只是貪。又說（這是應知的正義）：掉舉『別有自性，遍一切染心』，就像不信等也是遍染心而別有體。不能因為論裡說它是『貪等之一分』，就認定它的體不實——否則不信等也該成假有了（可不信等是實有）。論裡說掉舉是『世俗有（假）』，那是像睡眠等那樣的「隨他相說」（隨它所依的粗相方便說成假），不是說它的體真的是假。掉舉的「別相」就是「囂動」（喧囂躁動），它讓同時生起的諸法都靜不下來。要是說離了煩惱就沒有掉舉這個相，那論裡就不該另外說「掉舉障奢摩他」了——既然它單獨障止，就必定有它自己的相；所以「不寂靜」只是掉舉的共相、不是它的別相，它的別相是「囂動」。
十四、惛沈
什麼是「惛沈」？讓心對所緣境「無堪任」——昏蒙沈重、運轉不動，這是體性；它能障住「輕安」和「毘鉢舍那」（觀），這是作用。
惛沈以什麼為體？也是三說。一說：惛沈只是『癡的一分』，因為論裡只說它是癡分，而且「惛昧沈重」正是癡（迷闇）的相。又說：惛沈不只是癡所攝——「無堪任」是惛沈的相，可一切煩惱都會令心無堪任，惛沈離了這「無堪任」也找不到別的自相；所以惛沈是依一切煩惱假立的，只因為癡裡惛沈的相特別增盛，才只說它是癡分，並非只是癡。又說（這是應知的正義）：惛沈「別有自性」，雖然名為「癡分」，其實是癡的等流（像不信等一樣），並不就是癡所攝。論裡「隨他相說名世俗有」（隨所依粗相方便說成假），就像睡眠等——可它的體「是實有」。惛沈的「別相」就是「瞢重」（昏瞢沈重），讓同時生起的諸法都無堪任。要是說離了煩惱就沒有惛沈的相，那論裡就不該另外說「惛沈障毘鉢舍那」；所以「無堪任」只是它的共相、不是別相，它的別相是「瞢重」。還要分清惛沈和癡相的差別：癡是對境以「迷闇」為相，正障的是「無癡」、而不是瞢重；惛沈是對境以「瞢重」為相，正障的是「輕安」、而不是迷闇。
十五、不信
什麼是「不信」？對「實、德、能」三種境不肯忍可、不肯愛樂、不肯希欲，心是渾濁不淨的，這是體性；它能障住「淨信」，作用是『作懈怠的依靠』——不信的人多半生懈怠。
不信的「三相」——不忍實有、不樂有德、不欲有能——只要翻對著「信」的三相就懂了。可是各種染法都各有別相，唯獨這「不信」是「自相渾濁」，而且還能渾濁其餘的心、心所；就像一件極髒的東西，自己髒、又把別的弄髒，所以說不信以「心穢」為體性。再講清楚：由於不信，對實、德、能不忍、不樂、不欲——這個「不忍樂欲」並不是不信另有的自性，它只是心穢的作用罷了。又如果對其餘的事生起「邪」的忍可、愛樂、希欲，那是不信引生的因果，也不是不信的自性。
十六、懈怠
什麼是「懈怠」？對該「修」的善品、該「斷」的惡品這些事，懶惰，這是體性；它能障住「精進」，作用是「增染」——懈怠的人滋長雜染。
這裡要辨幾種容易混的情況。對種種染事反而拼命策勵勤奮的，也叫「懈怠」，因為他退失了善法。至於對無記的事策勵勤奮的，對善品既不增、也不退，那只是「欲」和「勝解」的作用，不是懈怠另有的自性；就像對無記事的「忍可、樂欲」，既不是淨、也不是染，那裡頭也談不上有「信」或「不信」。
十七、放逸
什麼是「放逸」？對染品不能「防」、對淨品不能「修」，放縱蕩逸，這是體性；它障住「不放逸」，作用是『作增惡損善的依靠』。要點是：放逸是由懈怠和貪、瞋、癡這四個法，使人不能防染、修淨，總合起來叫「放逸」，它『並不別有自體』。雖然慢、疑等也略有「不能防修」的能耐，可比起那四個來，勢用微弱得多；而且那四個正障「三善根」、又是能「遍策」的法（懈怠遍策一切，貪瞋癡是根本），所以單取這四個當放逸的體。它的相怎麼推究？比照前面「不放逸」那一章就知道——防、修離了那四個就找不到，可見放逸沒有別體。
十八、失念
什麼是「失念」？對種種所緣不能明白記住，這是體性；它能障住「正念」，作用是『作散亂的依靠』——失念的人心隨著散亂。
失念以什麼為體？三說。一說：失念只是『念的一分』，因為論裡說它是『與煩惱相應的念』。又說：失念只是『癡的一分』，因為《瑜伽》說它是癡分；癡使念喪失，所以叫失念。又說（這是應知的正義）：失念是『念和癡兩者的一分』，前面那兩說是『影略而說』（各舉一邊、互相影顯），而且論裡又說失念遍染心——若只是念分就不遍，必須兼著癡分才能遍。
十九、散亂
什麼是「散亂」？對種種所緣令心流散馳蕩，這是體性；它能障住「正定」，作用是『作惡慧的依靠』——散亂的人發起惡慧。
散亂以什麼為體？也是三說。一說：散亂只是『癡的一分』，因為《瑜伽》說它是癡分。又說：散亂是貪、瞋、癡三者所攝，因為《集論》等說它是「三分」；前說只講「癡分」，是就「遍染心」來說的（癡遍染），其實是貪、瞋、癡令心流蕩的力量勝過其餘的法，才說這三個是散亂。又說（這是應知的正義）：散亂「別有自體」；論裡說它是「三分」，意思是它是貪瞋癡的等流（像無慚等一樣），並不就是這三者所攝，「隨他相說名世俗有」也是同例。散亂的「別相」就是「躁擾」（躁動擾亂），讓同時生起的諸法都流蕩。要是說離了那三個法就沒有散亂自體，那論裡就不該另外說『散亂障三摩地』——既然它單獨障定，就必定別有自體。
這裡順帶辨一個問題：掉舉和散亂這兩個的作用有什麼不同？回答是：掉舉令心「易解」——變換它的見解、行解；散亂令心「易緣」——變換它的所緣境。雖然在同一剎那裡，解、緣都沒變，可在前後相續中就有變換的義，所以兩個作用不同。染污心一生起，由掉舉、散亂之力，本該念念變換解、變換緣；除非被「念」等力暫時制伏，就像用繩繫住猿猴、讓牠有暫時的止住。所以掉舉和散亂『都遍染心』，兩個並起，只是作用的方向不同。
二十、不正知
什麼是「不正知」？對所觀的境作錯謬的了解，這是體性；它能障住「正知」，作用是「毀犯」——毀犯律儀，不正知的人多有毀犯。
不正知以什麼為體？三說，跟失念對得很整齊。一說：不正知只是『慧的一分』，因為論裡說它是『與煩惱相應的慧』。又說：不正知只是『癡的一分』，因為《瑜伽》說它是癡分；癡使所知不正，所以叫不正知。又說（這是應知的正義）：不正知是『慧和癡兩者的一分』，前兩說是影略互說，而且論裡又說不正知遍染心——必須兼著慧、癡兩分才能遍。
到此『大隨八個』講完——掉舉、惛沈、不信、懈怠、放逸、失念、散亂、不正知。
〔二十之外〕——隨煩惱不只二十；「隨煩惱」這名怎麼界定
頌裡用了「與」「并」「及」三個連接語，這是要顯隨煩惱『不只二十』——《雜事》等就說貪等還有好多種隨煩惱。要注意「隨煩惱」這個名的範圍：它也把「根本煩惱」攝在裡頭，因為根本煩惱本身也有等流的義；而跟煩惱同類的其餘染污法，就只叫「隨煩惱」、不算「根本煩惱」所攝。
那為什麼這裡單單立這二十為隨煩惱呢？因為它們『不是根本煩惱』（不立為六個根本），而純是染污、粗顯的法；其餘的染法，要嘛是這二十的分位、要嘛是這二十的等流，都收在這二十裡頭。隨它們的類別——小、中、大三類——如理去理解就是了。
〔隨煩惱諸門〕——從十二個角度把這二十攤開來辨
講完二十個的相，接著從十二個門（角度）把它們的義理攤開。
〔假實門〕——哪些是假有、哪些是實有
這二十裡：小隨十個（忿恨覆惱嫉慳誑諂害憍）和大隨裡的三個（放逸、失念、不正知），決定是「假有」；無慚、無愧、不信、懈怠，決定是「實有」，這在教、理上都成立。至於掉舉、惛沈、散亂這三個，有一說是假、有一說是實——所引的理和教，就是前面講掉舉、惛沈、散亂那三章裡「別有自性」的那場辯論。
〔俱生分別門〕——是先天的還是後天分別起的
這二十個都通「俱生」（先天任運而起）和「分別」（後天計度而起）兩種，因為它們都是隨著「俱生煩惱」和「分別煩惱」兩者的勢力而起的。
〔互俱起門〕——彼此能不能同時生起
這二十個彼此能不能同時並起？分幾層說。小隨十個『展轉決定不俱起』——彼此互相違反、行相又粗又猛、各自要當主，一個心裡容不下兩個主。窺基《述記》把這「不俱起」的所以然點得很明：就是「各為主故」——每一個小隨起時都自要當這一念的主，主既不容兩個，所以小隨彼此決定不並起。中隨二個（無慚、無愧）和一切不善心同起，隨所相應，跟小隨、大隨都能同起。論裡說『大隨八個遍一切染心』，所以大隨跟小隨、中隨展轉也都容許同起。
這裡有不同的數法。有處說『大隨裡只有六個遍染心』，那是因為惛沈、掉舉這兩個增盛時不能同起（一沈一動，相違），所以扣掉這兩個只說六個遍。又有處只說『五個遍染』，那是因為惛、掉這些跟「唯善」的輕安等相違（所以再扣一個）。這些大隨諸法都只是染性，所以不會跟第八阿賴耶識（無覆無記）同起。
再看在各識裡的分布。第七末那識裡『只有大隨八個』；它取捨的差別，照上面（俱生唯染那些）就知道。第六意識則容許跟『全部二十個』同起。小隨十個又粗又猛（要靠分別計度），所以前五識裡沒有；中隨、大隨則跟五識相通，前五識容許有。由於這樣，中隨、大隨就能跟「五受」相應（前五識通苦、樂等受）。
〔受相應門〕——跟哪幾種受相應
跟受怎麼相應？這裡有兩說。一說：小隨十個裡，除掉諂、誑、憍三個，其餘忿等（忿恨覆惱嫉慳害）只跟喜、憂、捨三受相應；諂、誑、憍三個則跟四受同起（除掉苦受）。又說：忿等跟四受同起（除掉樂受）；諂、誑、憍三個則跟五受都能同起。意地是有苦受的，這在前面根本煩惱章已經說過。它們跟受相應的相，就照前面根本煩惱章所說。
以上是「實義」（究竟的義）；若隨『粗相』來說：忿、恨、惱、嫉、害跟憂、捨同起；覆、慳跟喜、捨同起；其餘三個（諂、誑、憍）再加上樂受。中隨、大隨若隨粗相，也跟它們的實義一樣，沒有另外的說法。
〔別境相應門〕——跟別境五個能不能相應
這二十個跟別境五（欲、勝解、念、定、慧）都容許同起，因為不相違。這裡有人會疑：染念（失念）、染慧（不正知）豈不是該跟「念」「慧」相違嗎？回答是：失念、不正知雖然不是以「念」「慧」為體而並起，可就它們的「癡分」來說，也得跟念、慧相應。又「念」也能緣現在以及曾經串習過的同類境，而「忿」也能緣剎那的過去境，所以忿跟念也得相應。又染定（散亂位的定）生起時，心也躁擾，所以「散亂」跟「定」相應也沒有問題。
〔煩惱相應門〕——跟根本煩惱怎麼搭配
中隨二、大隨八，跟十個根本煩惱都能同起。小隨十個則『決定不跟『見』『疑』同起』——因為小隨的相又粗又動，而見、疑的相是審細的，一粗一細，搭不到一起。
再細看小隨各自跟哪些根本煩惱搭。忿等五法（忿、恨、惱、嫉、害）容許跟慢、癡同起，不跟貪、瞋並起——因為它們是瞋的一分（瞋不跟貪並，自然也不跟自己並）。慳容許跟癡、慢同起，不跟貪、瞋並起——因為它是貪的一分。憍只跟癡同起，它和「慢」在義上有別（憍是恃自己的盛，慢是陵駕於他），而且憍是貪分（所以不跟貪並）。覆、誑、諂三個容許跟貪、癡、慢同起——行相不相違，而且它們是貪、癡的一分。
〔三性門〕——屬善、惡、無記哪一性
小隨裡的七個（忿、恨、惱、嫉、害、覆、慳）和中隨二個，只屬「不善」。小隨裡的三個（諂、誑、憍）和大隨八個，也通「無記」（不只是不善）。
〔界繫門〕——繫在三界的哪一界、上下地能不能互緣
小隨七和中隨二，只屬欲界。誑、諂通欲界、色界兩界；其餘的（憍以及大隨八，合起來九個）通三界。生在下地的，容許起上地的那十一個（憍、誑、諂三個加大隨八個）——因為耽著定境，就對別人起憍、誑、諂等。若生在上地的，得起下地的後十個——因為邪見和愛俱起時，容許牽起那些。
至於小隨十個：生在上地的人，沒有辦法起下地的小隨——因為小隨既不是「正潤生」的惑、也不是「謗滅」的惑，所以不會緣著下地而起。中隨二、大隨八：在下地的也能緣上地——隨著『緣上的貪』等而相應地起。
這裡小隨能不能緣上，又有兩說。一說：小隨十個在下地的不緣上地——行相又粗又近，沒法遠取上境。又說：嫉等也能緣上——因為對上勝地的法會生嫉等。
再說上緣下：大隨八以及諂、誑，在上地的也能緣下地——隨著『緣下的慢』等而相應地起；像大梵天會對釋迦的弟子起諂、誑（這就是緣下而起）。唯獨「憍」不緣下——因為下地不是自己所恃的盛事。
〔學無學門〕——是不是聖者學位、無學位所攝
這二十個『都不是『學、無學』所攝』——隨煩惱只是染法，而學、無學位唯是淨法。
〔見修所斷門〕——是見道斷、還是修道斷
後十個（掉舉、惛沈、不信、懈怠、放逸、失念、散亂、不正知，再加無慚、無愧）只通「見所斷」和「修所斷」——因為它們是跟分別、俱生兩種煩惱相應而起的。其中見所斷的，隨著所迷之諦的相，或是總迷、或是別迷，跟煩惱俱生，所以隨所相應都通迷四諦。迷諦的親、疎這些，都照前面根本煩惱章所說。
前十個（小隨十）這裡有兩說。一說：只是「修所斷」——因為小隨緣的是粗顯的事境、任運而生（屬俱生，所以修斷）。又說：小隨也通「見、修」兩所斷——因為它依分別、俱生兩種煩惱的勢力而起；像緣著別人的邪見等而生忿等（這就是依分別惑起，屬見斷）。其中見所斷的，隨所相應緣，依總惑、別惑的力量，都通迷四諦。
這裡還有一層：小隨是不是「親迷諦」？又兩說。一說：忿等只是『緣著迷諦的惑』而生，並不「親迷諦」——行相粗淺，不深取諦理。又說：嫉等也親迷諦——像對滅、道等諦生嫉等。不過忿等十個都只緣「有事」（有實本質的境），必須託著「本質」才生得起。它們「緣有漏、無漏」這些門，比照前面根本煩惱章就知道。
（此處原本是卷七的分卷處。）
承衍
隨煩惱二十之立，後出諸論各依其類而承用。《百法明門論》於心所法下列隨煩惱二十，與本節所辨之名數全同，其小十、中二、大八之三分亦本於此。《唯識三十論頌》頌十三、十四上半即本節所釋之本頌，逐頌相承。《辯中邊論·辯障品》以無慚、無愧、掉舉、惛沈等為障菩提分之別障，本節之中二、大八正列其名。《攝大乘論·彼修差別分》明地地所斷之障，其所斷者即此類分位煩惱——彼明斷位，此明體相，二說相須。
〔Verses commented〕Verses 13–14 · the secondary afflictions
The previous section finished treating the six root afflictions. This section takes up two further groups. The first is the "secondary afflictions" (upakleśa) — twenty of them, all defiled mental factors that flow out in the train of the root afflictions. The second is the "indeterminate" factors — four of them, so called because they are not fixed as good, bad, or morally neutral. Finally, a closing passage, the "summary of the six classes of mental factors," answers a more fundamental question: are these factors entities that exist apart from the mind itself, each with its own self-nature, or are they merely modal differentiations of the mind?
First, let us lay out the twenty-plus-four named in the verse. The secondary afflictions are: wrath, enmity, concealment, vexation, envy, stinginess, deceit, flattery, harmfulness, conceit, lack of shame, lack of embarrassment, restlessness, torpor, lack of faith, indolence, heedlessness, forgetfulness, distraction, and wrong knowing. The indeterminate are: regret, sleep, applied thought (vitarka), and sustained thought (vicāra) — followed in the verse by the three words "two, each twofold."
The defiled and pure characteristics of the mental factors treated in this section have their roots in scripture and treatise alike. In the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, in its chapter on the analysis of yoga, the World-Honored One answers the Bodhisattva Maitreya: the image apprehended within concentration is "not different" from the apprehending mind — why so? "Because that image is consciousness alone" — "I declare that what consciousness takes as object is nothing but the manifestation of consciousness." Whether defiled or pure, the various characteristics that the mental factors display are manifested not apart from consciousness; and this is exactly the scriptural basis on which this section's closing "summary of the six classes of mental factors" returns everything to "consciousness-only" and says that the mental factors "appear in the likeness of it (the mind)." As for the names, substances, and functions of these twenty secondary afflictions and four indeterminate, the treatise-basis lies in the Yogācārabhūmi, in its Foundational Section — there, in the section on "auxiliaries" within the ground of mentation, it lists out collectively the names of the conjoined mental factors, wrath, enmity, concealment, vexation, and on down to wrongdoing (regret), sleep, applied thought, and sustained thought; this is the treatise-basis on which the twenty secondary afflictions and four indeterminate are founded. The Abhidharma-samuccaya and the Abhidharma-samuccaya-vyākhyā then define one by one their substance and function — for instance, wrath is "a portion of hatred, with the angering of the mind as substance, and the seizing of a cudgel and bursting into fury as function"; wrongdoing is "a portion of delusion, with the mind's pursuing remorse as substance, and the obstructing of the mind's settling as function"; applied thought is "the seeking-out of the verbal-mental object in dependence on volition and on wisdom, making the mind coarse"; sustained thought is "the scrutinizing of the verbal-mental object in dependence on volition and on wisdom, making the mind fine." The substance and function of the mental factors that Dharmapāla synthesizes and expounds below have their scriptural root in the Saṃdhinirmocana and their treatise-basis in the Yogācārabhūmi, the Abhidharma-samuccaya, and the Abhidharma-samuccaya-vyākhyā — and with that we follow the verse and open the exposition.
A. The Twenty Secondary Afflictions
[General Heading] — why they are called "secondary" afflictions, and how they divide into minor, middling, and major classes
Having finished the six root afflictions, what are the characteristics of the "secondary afflictions"? The answer is the twenty just listed. Why are they called "secondary" (literally, "following") afflictions? Because all twenty are "modal differentiations" of the root afflictions — the distinct aspects that the afflictions display in various situations — and their "outflow of the same kind" — factors of the same family that stream out from the afflictions. They arise in the wake of the root afflictions, and so are called secondary afflictions.
These twenty divide into three classes according to the breadth or narrowness of their pervasion. The first class — wrath and the rest, ten of them — each arises singly and never accompanies the others; these are the "minor secondary afflictions." The second class — lack of shame and lack of embarrassment, two of them — pervades every unwholesome mind; these are the "middling secondary afflictions." The third class — restlessness and the rest, eight of them — pervades every defiled mind; these are the "major secondary afflictions." We will take each in turn.
1. Wrath
What is "wrath"? When faced with a present object that does no good and that contradicts, injures, or vexes me, the mind flares up in anger — this is its essential nature. It obstructs non-wrath, and its function shows itself as "taking up a weapon": one possessed by wrath will mostly issue coarse and violent bodily acts (overt behavior). Note that wrath is not an independent thing — it is simply "a portion of hatred" (pratigha); apart from hatred no separate characteristic or function of wrath can be found at all.
2. Enmity
What is "enmity"? Led on by prior wrath, one nurses ill-will that will not let go and binds it into a grudge — this is its essential nature. It obstructs non-enmity, and its function is "fevered distress": one who harbors a grudge cannot bear it patiently and is forever scorched by that fever. Enmity, too, is a portion of hatred; apart from hatred there is no independent characteristic or function of enmity.
3. Concealment
What is "concealment"? For an offense one has committed, fearing the loss of gain and reputation, one hides it away — this is its essential nature. It obstructs non-concealment, and its function is "remorseful distress": one who conceals an offense is bound to suffer remorse afterward, with no peace of mind.
Now, what exactly constitutes concealment? Here there are two views. One view holds that concealment is merely "a portion of delusion," since the treatise speaks of it only as a portion of delusion; moreover, the one who conceals an offense dares to hide it precisely because he does not fear the suffering that will ripen in the future, and this fearlessness is itself the mark of delusion (ignorance). Another view — and this is the settled, correct reading — holds that concealment is "a portion of both craving and delusion," because the one who conceals also conceals out of "fear of losing gain and reputation," and fear of such loss belongs to craving. When the treatise speaks "only of a portion of delusion," it is speaking from the comparatively coarse and obvious aspect. By way of parallel: the treatise also calls restlessness "a portion of craving," yet it likewise says that restlessness "pervades every defiled mind" — which shows that one must not rigidly insist that restlessness is craving alone. Concealment follows the same logic, and must not be rigidly held to be delusion alone.
4. Vexation
What is "vexation"? Led on by wrath and enmity, dwelling on past wrongs and meeting present adverse conditions, one breeds a surge of violent heat — savage, cruel, and perverse — this is its essential nature. It obstructs non-vexation, and its function is "stinging": like a wasp or scorpion stinging a person, one wounds others. The vexed person, dwelling on past wrongs and running up against present contrary conditions, hardens into cruelty, and mostly issues arrogant, fierce, vile, and coarse speech to sting and harm others. Vexation, too, is a portion of hatred; apart from hatred there is no independent characteristic or function of vexation.
5. Envy
What is "envy"? Out of a craving for one's own fame and gain, one cannot bear another's flourishing, and jealousy arises — this is its essential nature. It obstructs non-envy, and its function is "grief": the envious person, the moment he hears or sees another flourishing, sinks into deep grief, with no peace of mind. Envy, too, is a portion of hatred; apart from hatred there is no independent characteristic or function of envy.
6. Stinginess
What is "stinginess"? Cleaving to wealth and to teaching, one refuses to use one's wisdom to give, but hoards and grudges — this is its essential nature. It obstructs non-stinginess, and its function is "mean accumulation": hoarding meanly. The stingy person is mostly mean and tight of mind, knowing only how to pile up wealth and teaching, unwilling to give to others. Stinginess differs from the preceding few: it is "a portion of craving," and apart from craving there is no independent characteristic or function of stinginess.
7. Deceit
What is "deceit"? In order to swindle gain and reputation, one feigns and counterfeits a show of virtue, contriving a fraud — this is its essential nature. It obstructs non-deceit, and its function is "wrong livelihood": making a living by improper means. The deceitful person, harboring a scheming heart, mostly displays all sorts of false and crooked livelihoods. Deceit is "a portion of both craving and delusion"; apart from these two there is no independent characteristic or function of deceit.
8. Flattery
What is "flattery"? In order to win over and ensnare others, one feigns all manner of contrived and aberrant deportment — both sly and crooked — this is its essential nature. It obstructs non-flattery, and its function is "obstructing instruction." The flatterer, in order to net others, bends his intent to suit the times and contrives all sorts of expedients — whether to curry favor or to cover his own faults. As a result he can no longer bear the proper instruction of teachers and friends. Flattery, too, is a portion of both craving and delusion; apart from these two there is no independent characteristic or function of flattery.
9. Harmfulness
What is "harmfulness"? Toward living beings, the mind has no compassion whatsoever and only sets out to injure and vex — this is its essential nature. It obstructs non-harming, and its function is "tormenting": the harmful person specializes in tormenting others. Harmfulness, too, is a portion of hatred; apart from hatred there is no independent characteristic or function of harmfulness. As for how hatred and harmfulness are to be distinguished, one may proceed by analogy with the earlier chapter on the wholesome mental factors. There it was settled that "non-hatred is the giving of happiness, while non-harming is the removal of suffering"; viewing the distinct characteristics of hatred and harmfulness in the same way makes their difference plain.
10. Conceit
What is "conceit"? Toward one's own prosperous affairs — vigor of youth, wealth and rank, intelligence, and the like — one cleaves deeply and grows arrogant, as if intoxicated — this is its essential nature. It obstructs non-conceit, and its function is "the basis of defilement": being the support for every kind of defiled factor. The conceited and intoxicated person breeds every kind of defiled factor. Conceit is a portion of craving; apart from craving there is no independent characteristic or function of conceit.
With this the "ten minor secondary afflictions" are complete — wrath, enmity, concealment, vexation, envy, stinginess, deceit, flattery, harmfulness, and conceit. We now take up the "two middling secondary afflictions."
11. Lack of Shame
What is "lack of shame"? Holding neither oneself nor the true Teaching in regard, one slights and rejects the worthy and good — this is its essential nature. It obstructs shame, and its function is "the breeding of evil conduct": one who holds neither self nor the Teaching in regard slights and rejects the worthy and good, feels no disgrace at faults and wrongs, and so obstructs shame and breeds every kind of evil conduct.
12. Lack of Embarrassment
What is "lack of embarrassment"? Holding the world (the censure of others) in no regard at all, one instead esteems and reveres what is brutal and evil — this is its essential nature. It obstructs embarrassment, and its function, likewise, is "the breeding of evil conduct": one who holds the world in no regard at all esteems brutality and evil, feels no disgrace at faults and crimes, and so obstructs embarrassment and breeds every kind of evil conduct.
Next we must distinguish the substance of these two — lack of shame and lack of embarrassment — and how they are told apart. First, their "common characteristic": "feeling no disgrace at faults and wrongs" is shared by both, and so some scriptural teachings provisionally take this common characteristic as their substance. But this raises an objection.
Someone objects: if "feeling no disgrace" is taken to be the "distinct characteristic" of each, then there is no difference in the substance of the two; and if there is no difference in substance, the two ought not to be able to arise simultaneously — just as feeling and conception, which each have a distinct substance, cannot arise together as one substance. Furthermore, if one wishes to establish two distinct characteristics by relating them respectively to "oneself" and "others," then the two become provisional factors established by mutual reference and ought not to be substantially real — which contradicts the scriptural teaching (which says lack of shame and lack of embarrassment are substantially real). Yet if one grants that they are substantially real and arise separately, that contradicts the treatise's statement that "lack of shame and lack of embarrassment both pervade every unwholesome mind" — for if both pervade, neither ought to arise separately on its own.
To this objection the answer is: the moment an unwholesome mind arises, whatever its object may be, it simultaneously carries both senses — "slighting and rejecting the good" and "esteeming and revering evil." Hence these two "both pervade the unwholesome mind and do not differ in object," and they suffer no fault of "arising separately on their own": they need not arise apart from one another, for they already pervade the unwholesome mind together.
As for how the scriptural phrase "disregarding oneself, disregarding others" is to be understood, it may be reconciled thus: take "one's own person and the true Teaching" as "self," and "the world" as "others"; or else, with reference to the benefit or harm to oneself in "rejecting the good" and "esteeming evil," provisionally name these "self" and "others." And when the treatise says "lack of shame and lack of embarrassment are a portion of craving and the rest," it means that these two are an "outflow of the same kind" from craving and the rest — not that they take craving and the rest as their essential nature.
With this the "two middling secondary afflictions" are complete. Next come the "eight major secondary afflictions."
13. Restlessness
What is "restlessness"? Keeping the mind from settling upon its object — this is its essential nature. It obstructs equanimity (the wholesome factor of even-mindedness) and calm abiding (śamatha) — this is its function.
What constitutes restlessness? Here there are three views. One view: restlessness is merely "a portion of craving," since the treatise speaks of it only as a portion of craving, and since restlessness arises from recalling past pleasures (recalling pleasure belongs to craving). Another view: restlessness is not subsumed under craving alone — the treatise says restlessness pervades every defiled mind (if it were craving alone, it ought not so to pervade), and the characteristic of restlessness is "non-tranquility," which the treatise says belongs to the "common characteristic of the afflictions"; apart from this non-tranquility no further self-characteristic of restlessness can be found. Restlessness is therefore provisionally established in dependence on all the afflictions; only because it is especially intense within the "station of craving" is it preferentially called a portion of craving — which does not mean it is craving alone. Yet another view — and this is the settled, correct reading — holds that restlessness "has its own distinct self-nature and pervades every defiled mind," just as lack of faith and the rest also pervade the defiled mind and yet have their own distinct substance. One must not, on the grounds that the treatise calls it "a portion of craving and the rest," conclude that its substance is unreal — otherwise lack of faith and the rest would also turn out to be merely provisional (whereas lack of faith and the rest are substantially real). When the treatise says restlessness is "conventionally existent (provisional)," that is like the case of sleep and the like: it is "stated by way of the other's characteristic" (provisionally so described from the coarse characteristic of what it depends on), not a statement that its substance is truly provisional. The "distinct characteristic" of restlessness is precisely "clamorous agitation" (noisy commotion): it keeps the factors arising together with it from settling. Were one to say there is no characteristic of restlessness apart from the afflictions, then the treatise ought not to have separately said "restlessness obstructs calm abiding" — since it obstructs calm abiding singly, it must have its own characteristic. Therefore "non-tranquility" is only the common characteristic of restlessness, not its distinct characteristic; its distinct characteristic is "clamorous agitation."
14. Torpor
What is "torpor"? Rendering the mind "unfit" toward its object — dull, heavy, and unable to function — this is its essential nature. It obstructs pliancy and insight (vipaśyanā) — this is its function.
What constitutes torpor? Here too there are three views. One view: torpor is merely "a portion of delusion," since the treatise speaks of it only as a portion of delusion, and since "dim dullness and heaviness" is precisely the mark of delusion (murky obscurity). Another view: torpor is not subsumed under delusion alone — "unfitness" is the characteristic of torpor, yet every affliction renders the mind unfit, and apart from this unfitness no further self-characteristic of torpor can be found. Torpor is therefore provisionally established in dependence on all the afflictions; only because the characteristic of torpor is especially intense within delusion is it said to be merely a portion of delusion — which does not mean it is delusion alone. Yet another view — and this is the settled, correct reading — holds that torpor "has its own distinct self-nature": though named "a portion of delusion," it is in fact an outflow of the same kind from delusion (like lack of faith and the rest), and is not actually subsumed under delusion. When the treatise says it is "stated by way of the other's characteristic and so called conventionally existent" (provisionally so described from the coarse characteristic of what it depends on), this is like the case of sleep and the like — yet its substance "is substantially real." The "distinct characteristic" of torpor is precisely "dim heaviness" (murky dullness and weight), which renders the factors arising together with it unfit. Were one to say there is no characteristic of torpor apart from the afflictions, then the treatise ought not to have separately said "torpor obstructs insight"; therefore "unfitness" is only its common characteristic, not its distinct one, and its distinct characteristic is "dim heaviness." One must also clearly distinguish torpor from the characteristic of delusion: delusion takes "murky obscurity" toward its object as its characteristic and properly obstructs non-delusion, not dim heaviness; torpor takes "dim heaviness" toward its object as its characteristic and properly obstructs pliancy, not murky obscurity.
15. Lack of Faith
What is "lack of faith"? Toward the three objects of "the real, the virtuous, and the capable," one refuses to assent, refuses to delight, and refuses to aspire, and the mind is turbid and impure — this is its essential nature. It obstructs pure faith, and its function is "serving as the basis for indolence": the faithless person mostly breeds indolence.
The "three characteristics" of lack of faith — not assenting to what is real, not delighting in what is virtuous, not aspiring to what is capable — are understood simply by reversing the three characteristics of faith. But while the various defiled factors each have their own distinct characteristics, lack of faith alone is "turbid in its own characteristic" and is moreover able to make turbid the remaining mind and mental factors; like a thoroughly filthy thing that is itself dirty and dirties other things, it is therefore said to take "defilement of the mind" as its essential nature. To put it more precisely: through lack of faith one does not assent to, delight in, or aspire toward the real, the virtuous, and the capable — yet this "not assenting, delighting, or aspiring" is not a self-nature lack of faith possesses over and above its defilement of the mind; it is merely the function of that defilement. Again, if toward other matters one gives rise to "wrong" assent, delight, or aspiration, that is the cause-and-effect that lack of faith induces, and is likewise not the self-nature of lack of faith.
16. Indolence
What is "indolence"? Toward the wholesome that ought to be "cultivated" and the unwholesome that ought to be "cut off," one is lazy — this is its essential nature. It obstructs vigor, and its function is "increasing defilement": the indolent person feeds defilement.
Here a few easily confused cases must be distinguished. One who, on the contrary, strives and exerts himself diligently toward various defiled matters is also called "indolent," because he has fallen away from the wholesome. As for one who strives and exerts himself toward morally neutral matters, neither increasing nor falling away from the wholesome — that is merely the function of "desire" and "resolve," not a self-nature that indolence possesses in addition; just as the "assent, delight, and aspiration" toward a morally neutral matter is neither pure nor defiled, so within it there is no question of "faith" or "lack of faith" either.
17. Heedlessness
What is "heedlessness"? Toward the defiled one cannot "guard against," and toward the pure one cannot "cultivate"; one is loose and dissolute — this is its essential nature. It obstructs heedfulness, and its function is "serving as the basis for increasing evil and diminishing good." The key point is this: heedlessness arises when the four factors of indolence, craving, hatred, and delusion together make one unable to guard against the defiled and cultivate the pure; combined, they are called "heedlessness," and it "has no separate substance of its own." Although conceit, doubt, and the like also have some slight capacity for "failing to guard and cultivate," their force is far weaker than those four; moreover, those four directly obstruct the "three wholesome roots" and are factors that can "pervasively spur on" (indolence pervasively spurs all; craving, hatred, and delusion are the roots), and so only these four are taken as the substance of heedlessness. How is its characteristic to be investigated? By analogy with the earlier chapter on "heedfulness," one knows: since "guarding and cultivating" cannot be found apart from those four, it is clear that heedlessness has no separate substance.
18. Forgetfulness
What is "forgetfulness"? Being unable to clearly retain the various objects — this is its essential nature. It obstructs right mindfulness, and its function is "serving as the basis for distraction": the forgetful person's mind follows distraction.
What constitutes forgetfulness? Three views. One view: forgetfulness is merely "a portion of mindfulness," since the treatise calls it "mindfulness that is associated with afflictions." Another view: forgetfulness is merely "a portion of delusion," since the Yogācārabhūmi calls it a portion of delusion — delusion causes mindfulness to be lost, and so it is called forgetfulness. Yet another view — and this is the settled, correct reading — holds that forgetfulness is "a portion of both mindfulness and delusion": the previous two views speak "by partial allusion" (each citing one side, the two mutually illuminating each other); moreover the treatise also says forgetfulness pervades the defiled mind — if it were a portion of mindfulness alone it would not so pervade, and only by including a portion of delusion can it pervade.
19. Distraction
What is "distraction"? Causing the mind to scatter and gallop among the various objects — this is its essential nature. It obstructs right concentration, and its function is "serving as the basis for evil wisdom": the distracted person gives rise to evil wisdom.
What constitutes distraction? Again three views. One view: distraction is merely "a portion of delusion," since the Yogācārabhūmi calls it a portion of delusion. Another view: distraction is subsumed under all three of craving, hatred, and delusion, since the Abhidharma-samuccaya and the like call it "a portion of three"; the previous view, which speaks only of "a portion of delusion," speaks with respect to "pervading the defiled mind" (delusion pervades the defiled) — in fact the power of craving, hatred, and delusion to make the mind scatter exceeds that of the other factors, and so these three are called distraction. Yet another view — and this is the settled, correct reading — holds that distraction "has its own distinct substance"; when the treatise calls it "a portion of three," it means that it is an outflow of the same kind from craving, hatred, and delusion (like lack of shame and the rest), and is not actually subsumed under these three — "stated by way of the other's characteristic and so called conventionally existent" is the same kind of case. The "distinct characteristic" of distraction is precisely "agitated disturbance" (restless turbulence), which makes the factors arising together with it scatter. Were one to say there is no substance of distraction apart from those three factors, then the treatise ought not to have separately said "distraction obstructs concentration" — since it obstructs concentration singly, it must have its own distinct substance.
Here, in passing, one question may be settled: what is the difference in function between restlessness and distraction? The answer: restlessness causes the mind to "change its understanding" — to alter its view, its interpretive grasp; distraction causes the mind to "change its object" — to alter the object it apprehends. Although within a single instant neither understanding nor object actually changes, across the successive flow of moments there is the sense of changing, and so the two have different functions. The moment a defiled mind arises, by the force of restlessness and distraction it ought, moment by moment, to change its understanding and change its object — unless temporarily subdued by the force of "mindfulness" and the like, just as a rope tying a monkey lets it have a temporary halt. Thus restlessness and distraction "both pervade the defiled mind" and arise together; only the direction of their function differs.
20. Wrong Knowing
What is "wrong knowing"? Forming an erroneous understanding of the object contemplated — this is its essential nature. It obstructs right knowing, and its function is "transgression": transgression of the disciplinary code — the person of wrong knowing commits many transgressions.
What constitutes wrong knowing? Three views, paired up very neatly with forgetfulness. One view: wrong knowing is merely "a portion of wisdom," since the treatise calls it "wisdom that is associated with afflictions." Another view: wrong knowing is merely "a portion of delusion," since the Yogācārabhūmi calls it a portion of delusion — delusion causes what is known to be wrong, and so it is called wrong knowing. Yet another view — and this is the settled, correct reading — holds that wrong knowing is "a portion of both wisdom and delusion": the previous two views speak by partial allusion, each illuminating the other; moreover the treatise also says wrong knowing pervades the defiled mind — only by including both the portion of wisdom and the portion of delusion can it pervade.
With this the "eight major secondary afflictions" are complete — restlessness, torpor, lack of faith, indolence, heedlessness, forgetfulness, distraction, and wrong knowing.
[Beyond the Twenty] — the secondary afflictions are not only twenty; how the name "secondary affliction" is to be defined
The verse uses the three connectives "with," "together with," and "as well as" — this is meant to show that the secondary afflictions are "not only twenty." The Kṣudraka-vastu and the like say that craving and the rest have many more kinds of secondary affliction. Note the scope of the name "secondary affliction": it also encompasses the "root afflictions" within itself, since the root afflictions, too, have the sense of outflow of the same kind; whereas the remaining defiled factors of the same family as the afflictions are called "secondary afflictions" only, and are not counted as subsumed under the "root afflictions."
Then why are just these twenty established here as the secondary afflictions? Because they are "not root afflictions" (they are not set up as the six roots) and are purely defiled, coarse, and manifest factors; the remaining defiled factors are either modal differentiations of these twenty or outflows of the same kind from these twenty, and so are all gathered within these twenty. Following their classes — minor, middling, and major, the three — one is to understand them rightly.
[The Gates on the Secondary Afflictions] — laying these twenty out from twelve angles
Having treated the characteristics of the twenty, we now lay out their doctrinal content from twelve gates (angles).
[Gate of Provisional and Real] — which are provisionally existent and which are substantially real
Among these twenty: the ten minor (wrath, enmity, concealment, vexation, envy, stinginess, deceit, flattery, harmfulness, conceit) and three of the major (heedlessness, forgetfulness, wrong knowing) are definitely "provisionally existent." Lack of shame, lack of embarrassment, lack of faith, and indolence are definitely "substantially real" — this holds on both scriptural and rational grounds. As for restlessness, torpor, and distraction, these three — one view says provisional, another says real; the reasoning and the scripture cited are precisely the debate over "having a distinct self-nature" found in the three chapters above on restlessness, torpor, and distraction.
[Gate of Innate and Discriminated] — whether they are innate or arise from acquired discrimination
All twenty pervade both the "innate" (arising spontaneously from birth) and the "discriminated" (arising through acquired reckoning), because they all arise following the force of both the "innate afflictions" and the "discriminated afflictions."
[Gate of Mutual Co-arising] — whether they can arise simultaneously with one another
Can these twenty arise simultaneously with one another? This is treated in several layers. The ten minor "are definitely fixed not to co-arise" — they mutually contradict one another, their mode is coarse and fierce, and each demands to be master, and a single mind cannot hold two masters. Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) makes the ground of this "not co-arising" perfectly plain: it is precisely "because each is its own master" — when any of the minor arises it demands to be the master of that very thought-moment, and since a master will not admit a second, the minor are definitely fixed not to arise together with one another. The two middling (lack of shame, lack of embarrassment) arise together with every unwholesome mind, and accordingly can co-arise with both the minor and the major. The treatise says the "eight major pervade every defiled mind," so the major also permit co-arising with the minor and the middling.
Here there are differing enumerations. One place says "only six of the major pervade the defiled mind," because torpor and restlessness, when intense, cannot co-arise (one sinking, one stirring — mutually contradictory), and so, subtracting these two, only six are said to pervade. Another place says "only five pervade the defiled," because torpor, restlessness, and the like contradict pliancy and the rest, which are "exclusively wholesome" (so one more is subtracted). All these major factors are exclusively of defiled nature, and so do not co-arise with the eighth, the ālaya-vijñāna (which is unobstructed-neutral).
Now consider their distribution among the various consciousnesses. In the seventh, the manas, there are "only the eight major"; its distinctions of inclusion and exclusion are known from what was said above (the innate, exclusively defiled set). The sixth, mental consciousness, permits co-arising with "all twenty." The ten minor are coarse and fierce (depending on acquired discriminative reckoning), and so are absent from the first five consciousnesses; the middling and major, however, are shared with the five consciousnesses and are permitted there. Because of this, the middling and major can be associated with the "five feelings" (the first five consciousnesses have access to suffering, pleasure, and the rest).
[Gate of Association with Feeling] — which feelings they are associated with
How are they associated with feeling? Here there are two views. One view: among the ten minor, excluding the three of flattery, deceit, and conceit, the remaining ones — wrath and the rest (wrath, enmity, concealment, vexation, envy, stinginess, harmfulness) — are associated only with the three feelings of joy, sorrow, and equanimity; flattery, deceit, and conceit co-arise with four feelings (excluding suffering). Another view: wrath and the rest co-arise with four feelings (excluding pleasure); flattery, deceit, and conceit can co-arise with all five feelings. The mental ground does have suffering-feeling, as was already said in the chapter on root afflictions. The manner of their association with feeling follows what was said there.
The above is the "real meaning" (the ultimate sense); if one speaks instead from the "coarse characteristic": wrath, enmity, vexation, envy, and harmfulness co-arise with sorrow and equanimity; concealment and stinginess co-arise with joy and equanimity; the remaining three (flattery, deceit, conceit) add pleasure on top. The middling and major, taken from the coarse characteristic, are the same as their real meaning, with no further separate account.
[Gate of Association with the Object-specific Five] — whether they can be associated with the five object-specific factors
These twenty all permit co-arising with the object-specific five (desire, resolve, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom), because they are not in contradiction with them. Here someone may doubt: do not defiled mindfulness (forgetfulness) and defiled wisdom (wrong knowing) contradict "mindfulness" and "wisdom"? The answer is: although forgetfulness and wrong knowing do not arise by taking "mindfulness" and "wisdom" as their substance, yet with respect to their "portion of delusion" they too must be associated with mindfulness and wisdom. Again, "mindfulness" can also apprehend the present and objects of the same kind that have been previously habituated, while "wrath" too can apprehend a momentary past object, and so wrath, too, must be associated with mindfulness. Again, when defiled concentration (concentration in the state of distraction) arises, the mind is also agitated, and so there is no problem in "distraction" being associated with "concentration" either.
[Gate of Association with the Afflictions] — how they pair with the root afflictions
The two middling and the eight major can all co-arise with the ten root afflictions. The ten minor, however, "are definitely fixed not to co-arise with 'views' and 'doubt'" — because the characteristic of the minor is coarse and stirring, while the characteristic of views and doubt is deliberative and fine; coarse and fine cannot be paired.
Now examine in detail which root afflictions each of the minor pairs with. The five factors of wrath and the rest (wrath, enmity, vexation, envy, harmfulness) permit co-arising with conceit and delusion, but not with craving and hatred — because they are a portion of hatred (and hatred does not pair with craving, so neither, of course, does it pair with itself). Stinginess permits co-arising with delusion and conceit, but not with craving and hatred — because it is a portion of craving. Conceit co-arises only with delusion; it differs in meaning from "pride" (conceit relies on one's own prosperity; pride lords over others), and conceit is a portion of craving (so it does not pair with craving). Concealment, deceit, and flattery — these three permit co-arising with craving, delusion, and conceit, since their modes are not in contradiction, and they are portions of craving and delusion.
[Gate of the Three Moral Qualities] — to which they belong: wholesome, unwholesome, or neutral
Seven of the minor (wrath, enmity, vexation, envy, harmfulness, concealment, stinginess) and the two middling belong only to the "unwholesome." Three of the minor (flattery, deceit, conceit) and the eight major also extend to the "neutral" (not only the unwholesome).
[Gate of Realm-binding] — to which of the three realms they are bound, and whether higher and lower stages can take each other as object
The seven minor and two middling belong only to the desire realm. Deceit and flattery extend to both the desire realm and the form realm; the remaining ones (conceit plus the eight major, nine in all) extend to all three realms. One born in a lower stage may give rise to the eleven of the higher stage (conceit, deceit, flattery, plus the eight major) — because, cleaving to the state of meditative absorption, one gives rise to conceit, deceit, flattery, and the like toward others. And one born in a higher stage may give rise to the latter ten of the lower stage — because, when wrong view and craving arise together, they permit the dragging up of those.
As for the ten minor: a person born in a higher stage has no way to give rise to the minor of a lower stage — because the minor are neither afflictions that "properly moisten rebirth" nor afflictions that "slander cessation," and so do not arise with reference to a lower stage. The two middling and the eight major: even one in a lower stage can apprehend a higher stage — arising correspondingly in the train of "craving directed upward" and the like.
Here, whether the minor can apprehend the upper, there are again two views. One view: the ten minor in a lower stage do not apprehend a higher stage — their mode is coarse and near at hand, with no way to apprehend a distant higher object. Another view: envy and the like can also apprehend the upper — because one gives rise to envy and the like toward the factors of a higher, superior stage.
Now the case of the upper apprehending the lower: the eight major plus flattery and deceit, even in a higher stage, can apprehend a lower stage — arising correspondingly in the train of "pride directed downward" and the like; for instance, the great Brahmā gives rise to flattery and deceit toward Śākyamuni's disciples (this is arising with reference to the lower). Only "conceit" does not apprehend the lower — because the lower stage is not the prosperity on which one prides oneself.
[Gate of the Trainee and the Adept] — whether they are subsumed under the noble trainee's stage or the adept's stage
These twenty "are not subsumed under either the 'trainee' or the 'adept'" — the secondary afflictions are purely defiled factors, whereas the stages of the trainee and the adept are exclusively pure factors.
[Gate of What Is Cut Off in the Path of Seeing and of Cultivation] — whether cut off in the path of seeing or the path of cultivation
The latter ten (restlessness, torpor, lack of faith, indolence, heedlessness, forgetfulness, distraction, wrong knowing, plus lack of shame and lack of embarrassment) extend only to "cut off in the path of seeing" and "cut off in the path of cultivation" — because they arise in association with both the discriminated and the innate afflictions. Among these, those cut off in the path of seeing, following the characteristic of the truth they are deluded about, arise together with the afflictions whether in general delusion or particular delusion, and so accordingly extend to delusion about all four noble truths. The intimacy or remoteness of their delusion about the truths, and the rest, follow what was said in the chapter on root afflictions.
For the former ten (the ten minor) there are here two views. One view: they are only "cut off in the path of cultivation" — because the minor take coarse and manifest objective matters as their object and arise spontaneously (belonging to the innate, and so cut off in cultivation). Another view: the minor also extend to both "cut off in seeing and in cultivation" — because they arise following the force of both the discriminated and the innate afflictions; for instance, giving rise to wrath and the like with reference to another's wrong view (this is arising in dependence on the discriminated affliction, and belongs to what is cut off in seeing). Among these, those cut off in seeing, accordingly associated with their object, by the force of general or particular delusion, all extend to delusion about the four noble truths.
There is here a further layer: do the minor "directly delude about the truths"? Again two views. One view: wrath and the rest merely arise as "afflictions that accompany delusion about the truths" and do not "directly delude about the truths" — their mode is coarse and shallow, not deeply grasping the principle of the truths. Another view: envy and the like do directly delude about the truths — for instance, giving rise to envy and the like toward the truths of cessation, the path, and so on. Still, all ten of wrath and the rest apprehend only "objects with substance" (objects with a real underlying basis) and can arise only by relying on a "substratum." Their gates of "apprehending the defiled and the undefiled" and the like are known by analogy with the chapter on root afflictions.
(This was originally the point of division between fascicles, at the close of fascicle seven.)
Onward Transmission
The establishing of the twenty secondary afflictions is taken up by the later treatises group by group. The Hundred Dharmas lists the twenty under the mental factors with exactly the names and number settled here, and its threefold division into the lesser ten, middling two and greater eight rests on this. Verse 13 and the first half of verse 14 of the Thirty Verses are the root verses this chapter expounds. The Madhyāntavibhāga, in its chapter on obstructions, treats shamelessness, non-embarrassment, restlessness and torpor as particular obstructions to the limbs of awakening — the very middling two and greater eight named here. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha, in its chapter on the stages of cultivation, sets out what is severed ground by ground, and what is severed is this class of modal affliction: there the stages of severance, here the substance and character — the two accounts requiring each other.
考據Apparatus
〔所釋之頌〕第十三頌至第十四頌·隨煩惱
一、科判定位
| 科判 | 此章之位 |\n|---|---|\n| 第三能變 | 了境識·六位心所 |\n| 心所章內 | 遍行·別境（§16）→ 善十一（§17）→ 根本煩惱六（§18）→ 隨煩惱二十 |\n| 所釋頌 | 《唯識三十論頌》頌十三 · 頌十四上半 |\n\n六位心所之第五位。隨煩惱依根本煩惱之分位差別而立，類別有三：小十、中二、大八。不定四與心所總結，別為次章。
二、源頌 · 義理脈絡
隨煩惱謂：忿、恨、覆、惱、嫉、慳，誑、諂與害、憍、無慚與無愧，掉舉與惛沈、不信并懈怠、放逸及失念、散亂、不正知。 〔T1586 0060c15–0060c19〕\n\n頌十三、十四上半列隨煩惱二十。此二十者，非別有體，皆是根本煩惱之分位差別或等流性；以行相之麤細、現起之寬狹，分為小十（各別而起）、中二（遍不善心）、大八（遍染心）。
三、經論宗依（經證 → 論本）
經證
佛告慈氏菩薩曰：「善男子！當言無異。何以故？由彼影像唯是識故。善男子！我說識所緣，唯識所現故。」 〔解深密經·分別瑜伽品 T676 0698a29–0698b02〕
《解深密》明三摩地所行影像「唯是識」、「識所緣唯識所現」——心所染淨諸相皆不離識而現，正是本章末『六位心所總結』歸「唯識」、『心所似彼（心）而現』之經本。
論本
〔助伴〕……忿、恨、覆、惱、嫉、慳、誑、諂、憍、害，無慚、無愧，惛沈、掉舉、不信、懈怠、放逸、邪欲、邪勝解、忘念、散亂、不正知，惡作、睡眠、尋、伺，如是等輩俱有相應心所有法，是名助伴。 〔瑜伽師地論·本地分 T1579 0280b16–0280b19〕
何等為忿？謂於現前不饒益相，瞋之一分，心怒為體，執杖憤發所依為業。 〔大乘阿毘達磨集論 T1605 0665a03–0665a04〕
何等惡作？謂依樂作不樂作、應作不應作，是愚癡分，心追悔為體，或善或不善或無記、或時或非時、或應爾或不應爾，能障心住為業。 〔大乘阿毘達磨集論 T1605 0665b19–0665b22〕
尋者，或依思或依慧尋求意言，令心麁為體。 〔大乘阿毘達磨雜集論 T1606 0699c24〕
伺者，或依思或依慧伺察意言，令心細為體。 〔大乘阿毘達磨雜集論 T1606 0699c27〕
《瑜伽師地論·本地分》於意地「助伴」門總列隨煩惱與不定諸心所之名（隨煩惱二十、不定四之論本所宗）；《集論》《雜集論》逐一界定其體業——忿『瞋之一分·心怒為體·執杖憤發為業』、惡作『愚癡分·心追悔為體·障心住為業』、尋『依思依慧尋求意言·令心麁』、伺『依思依慧伺察意言·令心細』。護法糅釋之心所體業，其論本在瑜伽、集論、雜集論。
四、本論釋要（護法糅釋 · T1585）
隨煩惱 · 名義三類
唯是煩惱分位差別、等流性，故名隨煩惱。此二十種，類別有三：謂忿等十，各別起故，名小隨煩惱；無慚等二，遍不善故，名中隨煩惱；掉舉等八，遍染心故，名大隨煩惱。 〔T1585 0033b05–b08〕
忿 · 體業
何為忿？依對現前不饒益境，憤發為性；能障不忿，執杖為業。謂懷忿者，多發暴惡身表業故。此即瞋恚一分為體，離瞋無別忿相用故。 〔T1585 0033b09–b12〕
掉舉 · 惛沈 · 不信（大隨體業）
云何掉舉？令心於境不寂靜為性；能障行捨、奢摩他為業。 〔T1585 0034a07–a08〕 云何惛沈？令心於境，無堪任為性；能障輕安、毘鉢舍那為業。 〔T1585 0034a19–a20〕 云何不信？於實、德、能不忍樂欲，心穢為性；能障淨信，惰依為業。謂不信者多懈怠故。 〔T1585 0034b04–b06〕
隨煩惱 · 假實門
小十、大三，定是假有；無慚、無愧、不信、懈怠定是實有；教、理成故。掉舉、惛沈、散亂三種，有義是假，有義是實。所引理、教，如前應知。 〔T1585 0034c27–0035a01〕
隨煩惱 · 何識門
第七識中唯有大八，取捨差別，如上應知。第六識俱容有一切。 〔T1585 0035a08–a10〕
隨煩惱 · 名義（非唯二十）
「與」、「并」、「及」言顯隨煩惱非唯二十，《雜事》等說貪等多種隨煩惱故。隨煩惱名，亦攝煩惱，是前煩惱等流性故；煩惱同類餘染污法，但名隨煩惱，非煩惱攝故。 〔T1585 0034c21–c24〕
不定 · 名義
論曰：悔、眠、尋、伺於善、染等皆不定故，非如觸等定遍心故，非如欲等定遍地故，立不定名。 〔T1585 0035c09–c11〕
悔（惡作）· 眠 · 尋 · 伺（不定體業）
悔謂惡作，惡所作業，追悔為性，障止為業。 〔T1585 0035c11–c12〕 眠謂睡眠，令身不自在，昧、略為性，障觀為業。 〔T1585 0035c14–c15〕 尋謂尋求，令心怱遽於意言境，麁轉為性；伺謂伺察，令心怱遽於意言境，細轉為性。 〔T1585 0035c28–0036a01〕
不定 · 二各二（正義）
應言「二」者顯二種二：一謂悔、眠；二謂尋、伺。此二二種，種類各別，故一「二」言，顯二二種。此各有二，謂染、不染。非如善、染各唯一故。或唯簡染，故說此言，有亦說為隨煩惱故。為顯不定義，說「二各二」言，故置此言深為有用。 〔T1585 0036a10–a15〕
六位心所總結 · 二難
為離心體有別自性？為即是心分位差別？設爾何失？二俱有過。 〔T1585 0036c22–c23〕 又如何說心遠、獨行，染、淨由心，士夫六界？ 〔T1585 0036c25〕 許心似二現，如是似貪等，或似於信等，無別染、善法。 〔莊嚴論頌·存本論 T1585 0036c27–c28〕 五種性不成，分位差過失，因緣無別故，與聖教相違。 〔瑜伽論頌·存本論 T1585 0037a04–a05〕
六位心所總結 · 正義
應說離心有別自性，以心勝故，說唯識等，心所依心勢力生故，說似彼現，非彼即心。又識心言亦攝心所，恒相應故。唯識等言及現似彼，皆無有失，此依世俗。若依勝義，心所與心非離非即，諸識相望應知亦然，是謂大乘真、俗妙理。 〔T1585 0037a06–a11〕
要義：本論於隨煩惱以「分位差別·等流性」定其名、以遍行廣狹判小（各別起）·中（遍不善）·大（遍染心）三類；於忿等諸條以『即某根本煩惱一分為體，離彼無別相用』定其依他無別自性，唯掉舉、惛沈、散亂、覆、失念、不正知等存『唯某分／別有自性』之諍，假實門遂判小十大三假、無慚無愧不信懈怠實、掉惛亂三存兩可。何識門定第七唯大八、第六容一切、五識唯中大。不定四以『於善染不定、不定遍心、不定遍地』立名，悔以「於果假立因名」釋（惡所作之事為因，追悔為果），眠以「昧、略」雙簡在定與寤時，尋伺以『思慧一分·麁細推度意言』分；「二各二」一語護法判為總結四法之『二種之二、各通染不染』，非單約尋伺。六位既畢，總辨心所離心、即心二難——離心則違唯識、即心則違相應，故歸『依世俗離心別有、依勝義非離非即』。
五、諸家異釋（窺基《述記》T1830）
隨煩惱者，簡去於前根本十法，彼亦名隨，不說根本名為遍故。 〔T1830 0398a26–a28〕
各為主故。 〔T1830 0462c04〕
二各二。述曰：上二字標位總名，次五字烈別名字，下三字顯不定義。 〔T1830 0466a08–a09〕
窺基於「隨煩惱」名簡別根本（根本亦得名隨，但不名遍）；釋小隨『各別起、不相俱』之由為「行相麁猛、各為主」（一心不容二主）；於頌「不定謂悔、眠，尋、伺二各二」十字判其文段——『上二字（不定）標位總名、次五字（謂悔眠尋伺）烈別名字、下三字（二各二）顯不定義』，與本論「二各二」正義（二種之二、各通染不染）相符。掉舉、惛沈、散亂、覆、失念、不正知諸「有義」之繫名（何說屬何師），及小、中、大十二門取捨之判，《述記》詳之。
六、譯名 · 古譯對讀（玄奘 ↔ 真諦《轉識論》）
| 義 | 玄奘《成唯識論》 | 真諦《轉識論》 |
|---|---|---|
| 染心所總名 | 隨煩惱二十 | 小惑二十四（「小惑者，有二十四種，一忿恨、二結怨、三覆藏、四不捨惡、五嫉妬……」〔0062b01–0062b03〕） |
| 大隨之數 | 大隨八 | （列無慚、無愧等於小惑二十四之中，不別立大、中、小三類） |
| 唯識歸宗 | 心所似彼（心）而現，依世俗離心別有 | 唯識義成（「何者立唯識義？意本為遣境遣心，今境界既無，唯識又泯，即是說唯識義成也」〔0062b22–0062b24〕） |
玄奘《成唯識論》判隨煩惱為小（十）·中（二）·大（八）三類、共二十；真諦《轉識論》則總列『小惑二十四種』（忿恨、結怨、覆藏、不捨惡、嫉妬、無慚、無愧等並收一處），不分小中大——古譯數目開合之分歧。唯識歸宗則同：真諦明『遣境遣心、境心俱泯』之唯識義，與玄奘『心所似心而現、唯識等言無失』相通。
七、術語
隨煩惱（upakleśa）— 隨根本煩惱而起之染心所；皆根本煩惱之分位差別、等流性。 小隨 · 中隨 · 大隨 — 忿等十各別起（小）· 無慚無愧遍不善（中）· 掉舉等八遍染心（大）。 不定（aniyata）— 於善染無記不定、不遍一切心、不遍一切地之四心所（悔、眠、尋、伺）。 惡作（kaukṛtya）— 悔；厭所作業而追悔，於果假立因名。 睡眠（middha）— 眠；令身不自在，昧、略為性。 尋 · 伺（vitarka · vicāra）— 於意言境麁轉（尋）· 細轉（伺）；並用思、慧一分為體。 掉舉 · 惛沈（auddhatya · styāna）— 令心不寂靜（掉舉，障奢摩他）· 令心無堪任（惛沈，障毘鉢舍那）。 〔梵文為古德所傳發音輔助。〕
八、互讀（唯識系次第：百法 → 三十頌 → 二十論 → 辯中邊論 → 攝大乘論）
- 百法：心所·隨煩惱二十·不定四（六位心所之第五、第六位，全數對位）。
- 三十頌：頌十三（隨煩惱二十名）· 頌十四（不定四·二各二）——逐頌姊妹。
- 二十論：〔從闕〕主唯識無境、破外執，心所體業無正面對位。
- 辯中邊論：辯障品·隨煩惱（隨惑為染之相，與此二十染心所義相涉）。
- 攝大乘論：彼入因果分·六波羅蜜多所對治（隨煩惱為所斷之染，對治義相涉）。
章內：根本煩惱章（§18 上承——隨煩惱皆其分位、等流）· 善十一章（無瞋·不害·輕安等，隨煩惱所障之淨法）· 六位心所總結（殿此章——離心非即之大乘真俗妙理）。
九、校本定位
頌 T1586〔0060b27–0060c01·0060c02〕· 本論 T1585 隨煩惱釋〔名義三類 0033b05–b08·忿 0033b09–b12·掉舉 0034a07–08·惛沈 0034a19–20·不信 0034b04–06·名義非唯二十 0034c21–24·假實 0034c27–0035a01·何識 0035a08–a10〕· 不定釋〔名義 0035c09–c11·悔 0035c11–12·眠 0035c14–15·尋伺 0035c28–0036a01·二各二正義 0036a10–a15〕· 六位總結〔二難 0036c22–c23·心遠獨行 0036c25·莊嚴論頌 0036c27–c28·瑜伽頌 0037a04–a05·正義 0037a06–a11〕· 述記 T1830〔名義 0398a26–a28·各為主 0462c04·二各二 0466a08–a09〕· 《轉識論》T1587〔小惑二十四 0062b01–b03·唯識義 0062b22–b24〕。 〔經證〕解深密 T676〔0698a29–0698b02〕。〔論本〕瑜伽師地論 T1579〔本地分·助伴 0280b16–b19〕· 集論 T1605〔忿 0665a03–a04·惡作 0665b19–b22〕· 雜集論 T1606〔尋 0699c24·伺 0699c27〕。
〔Verses commented〕Verses 13–14 · the secondary afflictions
1. Position in Kuiji's Structural Outline
| Outline | Position of this chapter |\n|---|---|\n| Third transformer | the object-discerning consciousness · the six classes of mental factors |\n| Within the mental-factor chapter | omnipresent and object-specific (§16) → the eleven wholesome (§17) → the six root afflictions (§18) → the twenty secondary afflictions |\n| Verses commented | Triṃśikā v. 13 · v. 14, first half |\n\nThe fifth of the six classes. The secondary afflictions are established as modal differentiations of the root afflictions, in three groups: the lesser ten, the middling two, the greater eight. The four indeterminate factors and the summary of the classes form the next chapter.
2. Source verses · doctrinal context
隨煩惱謂：忿、恨、覆、惱、嫉、慳，誑、諂與害、憍、無慚與無愧，掉舉與惛沈、不信并懈怠、放逸及失念、散亂、不正知。 〔T1586 0060c15–0060c19〕\n\nVerse 13 and the first half of verse 14 list the twenty secondary afflictions. These twenty have no substance of their own: each is a modal differentiation or an outflow of the root afflictions. By the coarseness or fineness of their mode and the narrowness or breadth of their arising they fall into the lesser ten (each arising singly), the middling two (pervading every unwholesome mind), and the greater eight (pervading every defiled mind).
3. Scriptural and treatise grounding (scripture → root śāstra)
Scriptural witnesses
佛告慈氏菩薩曰：「善男子！當言無異。何以故？由彼影像唯是識故。善男子！我說識所緣，唯識所現故。」 〔解深密經·分別瑜伽品 T676 0698a29–0698b02〕
tr. The Buddha said to the bodhisattva Maitreya: "Good son! It is to be said that they are not different. Why so? Because that image is only consciousness. Good son! I teach that the object-support of consciousness is only what consciousness manifests."
The Saṃdhinirmocana shows the image coursed in concentration to be "only consciousness," and "the object-support of consciousness is only what consciousness manifests" — the several marks of mental factors, defiled and pure, all appearing not apart from consciousness; this is precisely the scriptural root for this chapter's closing "general summary of the six classes of mental factors," which resolves to "consciousness-only" and to "the mental factors resembling that [mind] and so appearing."
Root śāstra
〔助伴〕……忿、恨、覆、惱、嫉、慳、誑、諂、憍、害，無慚、無愧，惛沈、掉舉、不信、懈怠、放逸、邪欲、邪勝解、忘念、散亂、不正知，惡作、睡眠、尋、伺，如是等輩俱有相應心所有法，是名助伴。 〔瑜伽師地論·本地分 T1579 0280b16–0280b19〕
tr. "〔The accompanying associates〕… anger, enmity, concealment, vexation, envy, stinginess, deceit, flattery, arrogance, harming; lack-of-shame, lack-of-dread; torpor, agitation, lack-of-faith, indolence, heedlessness, wrong-desire, wrong-resolve, forgetting-mindfulness, distraction, improper-knowing; regret, drowsiness, applied-thought, sustained-thought — such as these are the concurrently-existing associated mental factors, and this is called the accompanying associates."
何等為忿？謂於現前不饒益相，瞋之一分，心怒為體，執杖憤發所依為業。 〔大乘阿毘達磨集論 T1605 0665a03–0665a04〕
tr. "What is anger? With regard to a present mark of non-benefit, a portion of ill-will, having mind's wrath for substance, and the basis for taking up a cudgel and bursting forth for function."
何等惡作？謂依樂作不樂作、應作不應作，是愚癡分，心追悔為體，或善或不善或無記、或時或非時、或應爾或不應爾，能障心住為業。 〔大乘阿毘達磨集論 T1605 0665b19–0665b22〕
tr. "What is remorse? In dependence on what is liked-to-be-done or not-liked-to-be-done, what ought-to-be-done or ought-not-to-be-done, it is a portion of delusion, having mind's after-regret for substance — whether wholesome, or unwholesome, or unmarked; whether timely or untimely; whether what-ought-to-be-so or what-ought-not — and having the obstructing of mind's [calm] abiding for function."
尋者，或依思或依慧尋求意言，令心麁為體。 〔大乘阿毘達磨雜集論 T1606 0699c24〕
tr. "Applied-thought: in dependence on volition or on discernment, seeking-out the mental-speech [object], having the making-coarse of mind for substance."
伺者，或依思或依慧伺察意言，令心細為體。 〔大乘阿毘達磨雜集論 T1606 0699c27〕
tr. "Sustained-thought: in dependence on volition or on discernment, investigating the mental-speech [object], having the making-fine of mind for substance."
The Yogācārabhūmi's Stage-of-the-Foundation, in the "accompanying associates" gate of the mental stage, lists together the names of the secondary defilements and the indeterminate mental factors (the śāstra-source for the twenty secondary defilements and the four indeterminate); the Abhidharma-samuccaya and the Vyākhyā define one by one their substance and function — anger as "a portion of ill-will · mind's wrath for substance · taking up a cudgel and bursting forth for function," remorse as "a portion of delusion · mind's after-regret for substance · obstructing mind's abiding for function," applied-thought as "in dependence on volition and discernment, seeking-out the mental-speech [object] · making mind coarse," sustained-thought as "in dependence on volition and discernment, investigating the mental-speech [object] · making mind fine." The substance-and-function of the mental factors in Dharmapāla's redaction has its śāstra-root in the Yogācārabhūmi, the Samuccaya, and the Vyākhyā.
4. Essentials of the root treatise (Dharmapāla's redaction · T1585)
The secondary defilements · the name and the three classes
唯是煩惱分位差別、等流性，故名隨煩惱。此二十種，類別有三：謂忿等十，各別起故，名小隨煩惱；無慚等二，遍不善故，名中隨煩惱；掉舉等八，遍染心故，名大隨煩惱。 〔T1585 0033b05–b08〕
tr. "They are merely positional differentiations of the defilements and [their] outflow-kind, and so are called secondary defilements. These twenty are sorted into three classes: namely, anger and the [other] ten, since each arises separately, are called the minor secondary defilements; lack-of-shame and the [other] one [making two], since they pervade the unwholesome, are called the middling secondary defilements; agitation and the [other] eight, since they pervade defiled mind, are called the major secondary defilements."
Anger · substance and function
何為忿？依對現前不饒益境，憤發為性；能障不忿，執杖為業。謂懷忿者，多發暴惡身表業故。此即瞋恚一分為體，離瞋無別忿相用故。 〔T1585 0033b09–b12〕
tr. "What is anger? Facing a present object of non-benefit, having bursting-forth for nature; and having the obstructing of non-anger, [and] taking up a cudgel, for function. That is, one who harbors anger mostly issues violent, evil bodily manifest-action. This has just a portion of ill-will for substance, since apart from ill-will there is no separate mark-and-function of anger."
Agitation · torpor · lack-of-faith (the substance-and-function of the major)
云何掉舉？令心於境不寂靜為性；能障行捨、奢摩他為業。 〔T1585 0034a07–a08〕
tr. "What is agitation? Having the making of mind unstill toward its object for nature; and having the obstructing of equanimity-in-action and of śamatha for function."
云何惛沈？令心於境，無堪任為性；能障輕安、毘鉢舍那為業。 〔T1585 0034a19–a20〕
tr. "What is torpor? Having the making of mind unfit-for-work toward its object for nature; and having the obstructing of pliancy and of vipaśyanā for function."
云何不信？於實、德、能不忍樂欲，心穢為性；能障淨信，惰依為業。謂不信者多懈怠故。 〔T1585 0034b04–b06〕
tr. "What is lack-of-faith? Toward the real, the virtuous, and the capable, an unwillingness to accept, delight, and aspire — having mind's befoulment for nature; and having the obstructing of pure faith, [and being] the basis for indolence, for function. That is, one who lacks faith is mostly indolent."
The secondary defilements · the gate of conventional and real
小十、大三，定是假有；無慚、無愧、不信、懈怠定是實有；教、理成故。掉舉、惛沈、散亂三種，有義是假，有義是實。所引理、教，如前應知。 〔T1585 0034c27–0035a01〕
tr. "The minor ten and three of the major are definitely conventionally existent; lack-of-shame, lack-of-dread, lack-of-faith, indolence are definitely really existent — established by both teaching and reasoning. As for the three, agitation, torpor, distraction, one view holds them conventional, one view holds them real; the reasoning and teaching adduced are to be known as before."
The secondary defilements · the gate of which consciousness
第七識中唯有大八，取捨差別，如上應知。第六識俱容有一切。 〔T1585 0035a08–a10〕
tr. "In the seventh consciousness there are only the major eight; their inclusion-and-exclusion differences are to be known as above. With the sixth consciousness all [twenty] may be present."
The secondary defilements · the name-sense (not only twenty)
「與」、「并」、「及」言顯隨煩惱非唯二十，《雜事》等說貪等多種隨煩惱故。隨煩惱名，亦攝煩惱，是前煩惱等流性故；煩惱同類餘染污法，但名隨煩惱，非煩惱攝故。 〔T1585 0034c21–c24〕
tr. "The words 'together with,' 'and,' 'and also' disclose that the secondary defilements are not only twenty, since the Kṣudraka-vastu and the rest speak of many kinds of secondary defilement such as greed. The name 'secondary defilement' also takes in the [root] defilements, since these are the outflow-kind of the foregoing defilements; and the remaining defiled dharmas of the same kind as the defilements are merely called secondary defilements, not being taken in under the [root] defilements."
The indeterminate · the name-sense
論曰：悔、眠、尋、伺於善、染等皆不定故，非如觸等定遍心故，非如欲等定遍地故，立不定名。 〔T1585 0035c09–c11〕
tr. "The treatise says: regret, drowsiness, applied-thought, sustained-thought, since they are indeterminate alike as to wholesome, defiled, and the rest; since they are not like contact and the rest in definitely pervading mind; since they are not like desire and the rest in definitely pervading the stages — are given the name 'indeterminate.'"
Regret (remorse) · drowsiness · applied-thought · sustained-thought (the substance-and-function of the indeterminate)
悔謂惡作，惡所作業，追悔為性，障止為業。 〔T1585 0035c11–c12〕
tr. "Regret means remorse: toward the deed done, having after-regret for nature, and having the obstructing of calm-abiding for function."
眠謂睡眠，令身不自在，昧、略為性，障觀為業。 〔T1585 0035c14–c15〕
tr. "Drowsiness means sleep: making the body not its own master, having dimness and abridgement for nature, and having the obstructing of insight for function."
尋謂尋求，令心怱遽於意言境，麁轉為性；伺謂伺察，令心怱遽於意言境，細轉為性。 〔T1585 0035c28–0036a01〕
tr. "Applied-thought means seeking-out: making the mind hurried upon the mental-speech object, having coarse turning for nature; sustained-thought means investigating: making the mind hurried upon the mental-speech object, having fine turning for nature."
The indeterminate · "the two, each in two" (the correct view)
應言「二」者顯二種二：一謂悔、眠；二謂尋、伺。此二二種，種類各別，故一「二」言，顯二二種。此各有二，謂染、不染。非如善、染各唯一故。或唯簡染，故說此言，有亦說為隨煩惱故。為顯不定義，說「二各二」言，故置此言深為有用。 〔T1585 0036a10–a15〕
tr. "One should say 'the two' discloses two sets of two: the first being regret and drowsiness; the second being applied-thought and sustained-thought. These two sets of two are each a separate kind, and so the single word 'two' discloses [these] two-sets-of-two. And each of these has two, namely defiled and non-defiled — not, like the wholesome and the defiled, each only one. Or, [the phrase] is solely to set aside [their being only] defiled, and so this word is spoken, since [these] have also been spoken of as secondary defilements. To disclose the 'indeterminate' sense, the words 'the two, each in two' are spoken; hence the placing of this phrase is deeply useful."
The general summary of the six classes of mental factors · the two challenges
為離心體有別自性？為即是心分位差別？設爾何失？二俱有過。 〔T1585 0036c22–c23〕
tr. "Are they apart from the substance of mind, possessing a separate self-nature? Or are they positional differentiations of mind itself? Granting either, what is the fault? Both alike have faults."
又如何說心遠、獨行，染、淨由心，士夫六界？ 〔T1585 0036c25〕
tr. "And further, how is it said that mind 'travels far,' 'fares alone,' that defilement and purity are 'by mind,' that the person [is constituted of] 'the six elements'?"
許心似二現，如是似貪等，或似於信等，無別染、善法。 〔莊嚴論頌·存本論 T1585 0036c27–c28〕
tr. "Granting that mind appears [as if] in two [aspects], so too it appears [as if] like greed and the rest, or appears like faith and the rest — there being no separate defiled or wholesome dharmas." 〔a verse of the Sūtrālaṃkāra · preserved in the root treatise〕
五種性不成，分位差過失，因緣無別故，與聖教相違。 〔瑜伽論頌·存本論 T1585 0037a04–a05〕
tr. "The five natures would not be established; [there would be] the fault of [making them] positional differentiations; and since [their] causes-and-conditions would have no difference, [this] contradicts the sacred teaching." 〔a verse of the Yogācārabhūmi · preserved in the root treatise〕
The general summary of the six classes of mental factors · the correct view
應說離心有別自性，以心勝故，說唯識等，心所依心勢力生故，說似彼現，非彼即心。又識心言亦攝心所，恒相應故。唯識等言及現似彼，皆無有失，此依世俗。若依勝義，心所與心非離非即，諸識相望應知亦然，是謂大乘真、俗妙理。 〔T1585 0037a06–a11〕
tr. "It should be said: [the mental factors are] apart from mind, possessing a separate self-nature. Because mind is the superior, [scripture] speaks of 'consciousness-only' and the like; because the mental factors arise by the force of mind, [it] speaks of their 'appearing to resemble that [mind]' — yet that is not [to say] they are mind. Again, the words 'consciousness' and 'mind' also take in the mental factors, since [the two] are ever associated. The words 'consciousness-only' and the rest, and [the phrase] 'appearing to resemble that,' are all without fault — this being [stated] by the conventional. If [stated] by the ultimate, the mental factors and mind are neither-apart-nor-identical, and the several consciousnesses, viewed each against another, are to be known as likewise — this is the great-vehicle's subtle principle of the true [ultimate] and the conventional."
Essentials: in the secondary defilements the treatise fixes their name by "positional differentiation · outflow-kind," and sorts them into three by breadth or narrowness of pervasion — minor (each arising separately) · middling (pervading the unwholesome) · major (pervading defiled mind); in the several entries such as anger it fixes their other-dependent want of a separate self-nature by "having just a portion of some root defilement for substance, with no separate mark-and-function apart from it," only agitation, torpor, distraction, concealment, loss-of-mindfulness, improper-knowing and the like retaining the dispute over "[merely] a portion of some [defilement] / possessing a separate self-nature," whereupon the gate of conventional-and-real judges the minor ten and major three conventional, lack-of-shame · lack-of-dread · lack-of-faith · indolence real, and the three agitation-torpor-distraction left at two-ways-possible. The gate of which-consciousness fixes the seventh as having only the major eight, the sixth as admitting all, the five [sense-]consciousnesses as having only the middling-and-major. The four indeterminate take their name from "indeterminate as to wholesome-and-defiled, indeterminate as to pervading mind, indeterminate as to pervading the stages"; regret is explained by "conventionally giving the cause's name to the effect" (the deed one is remorseful over being the cause, the after-regret the effect), drowsiness by "dimness, abridgement" twice setting aside [the state] in concentration and at waking, applied-thought-and-sustained-thought parted by "a portion of volition and discernment · coarse-and-fine deliberating upon the mental-speech [object]"; the single phrase "the two, each in two" Dharmapāla judges to be the summing of all four dharmas as "two-sets-of-two, each running both defiled and non-defiled," not [restricted] to applied-thought-and-sustained-thought alone. The six classes done, [the treatise] resolves the whole on the twin challenge of [the mental factors] apart from mind or [being] mind — apart from mind contradicts consciousness-only, [being] mind contradicts association — and so resolves to "by the conventional, separate and apart from mind; by the ultimate, neither-apart-nor-identical."
5. Divergent readings across the masters (Kuiji, Shuji T1830)
隨煩惱者，簡去於前根本十法，彼亦名隨，不說根本名為遍故。 〔T1830 0398a26–a28〕
tr. "'Secondary defilement' sets aside the foregoing ten root [defilements] — though those too are named 'secondary,' [yet here] one does not call a root [defilement] 'pervading.'"
各為主故。 〔T1830 0462c04〕
tr. "Because each is [its own] master."
二各二。述曰：上二字標位總名，次五字烈別名字，下三字顯不定義。 〔T1830 0466a08–a09〕
tr. "'The two, each in two.' The commentary says: the upper two graphs [不定] mark the class and its general name; the next five graphs [謂悔眠尋伺] set out the separate names; the lower three graphs [二各二] disclose the 'indeterminate' sense."
Kuiji on the name "secondary defilement" sets it off from the root [defilements] (the root too may be named "secondary," only it is not named "pervading"); explains the ground of the minor secondary defilements' "each arising separately, not concurrent" as "coarse-and-fierce in mode, each [being its own] master" (one mind does not admit two masters); and on the verse's ten graphs "the indeterminate are regret, drowsiness, applied-thought, sustained-thought — the two, each in two" judges the textual segments — "the upper two graphs (不定) mark the class and its general name · the next five graphs (謂悔眠尋伺) set out the separate names · the lower three graphs (二各二) disclose the indeterminate sense" — concordant with the root treatise's correct view of "the two, each in two" (two-sets-of-two, each running both defiled and non-defiled). The attaching of names to the several "one view holds" positions on agitation, torpor, distraction, concealment, loss-of-mindfulness, improper-knowing (which saying belongs to which master), and the judgment of the inclusion-and-exclusion across the twelve gates of minor, middling, and major, the Shuji details.
6. Rendering of terms · old-translation comparison (Xuanzang ↔ Paramārtha, Zhuanshi lun)
| Sense | Xuanzang, Cheng Weishi Lun | Paramārtha, Zhuanshi lun |
|---|---|---|
| general name for the defiled mental factors | 隨煩惱二十 the twenty secondary defilements | 小惑二十四 the twenty-four minor afflictions ("小惑者，有二十四種，一忿恨、二結怨、三覆藏、四不捨惡、五嫉妬……" "the minor afflictions are twenty-four kinds: first anger-and-enmity, second binding-grudge, third concealing-and-hiding, fourth not-relinquishing-evil, fifth envy…" 〔0062b01–0062b03〕) |
| the number of the major secondary [defilements] | 大隨八 the major eight | (lists lack-of-shame, lack-of-dread, and the rest within the twenty-four minor afflictions, not separately setting up the three classes major, middling, minor) |
| the resolving into consciousness-only | 心所似彼（心）而現，依世俗離心別有 the mental factors appear resembling that [mind]; by the conventional, [they exist] separately apart from mind | 唯識義成 the sense of consciousness-only is established ("何者立唯識義？意本為遣境遣心，今境界既無，唯識又泯，即是說唯識義成也" "What is it to establish the sense of consciousness-only? The intent was at root to dispel object and dispel mind; now the object-realm being already gone and consciousness-only too effaced — this is to say the sense of consciousness-only is established" 〔0062b22–0062b24〕) |
Xuanzang's Cheng Weishi Lun judges the secondary defilements as three classes — minor (ten) · middling (two) · major (eight), twenty in all; Paramārtha's Zhuanshi lun instead lists altogether "twenty-four kinds of minor affliction" (anger-and-enmity, binding-grudge, concealing-and-hiding, not-relinquishing-evil, envy, lack-of-shame, lack-of-dread, and the rest gathered in one place), not dividing into minor, middling, major — the old translation parting [from the new] on the opening-and-closing of the number. On the resolving into consciousness-only the two agree: Paramārtha clarifies the sense of consciousness-only as "dispelling object and dispelling mind, object and mind both effaced," in accord with Xuanzang's "the mental factors appear resembling mind, the words 'consciousness-only' and the rest without fault."
7. Key terms
The secondary defilements (隨煩惱, upakleśa) — defiled mental factors that arise following the root defilements; all are positional differentiations and the outflow-kind of the root defilements. The minor · middling · major secondary [defilements] (小隨 · 中隨 · 大隨) — anger and the [other] ten each arising separately (minor) · lack-of-shame and lack-of-dread pervading the unwholesome (middling) · agitation and the [other] eight pervading defiled mind (major). The indeterminate (不定, aniyata) — the four mental factors (regret, drowsiness, applied-thought, sustained-thought) indeterminate as to wholesome-defiled-unmarked, not pervading all mind, not pervading all stages. Remorse (惡作, kaukṛtya) — regret; aversion to the deed done and after-regret over it, conventionally giving the cause's name to the effect. Sleep (睡眠, middha) — drowsiness; making the body not its own master, with dimness, abridgement for nature. Applied-thought · sustained-thought (尋 · 伺, vitarka · vicāra) — coarse turning (applied-thought) · fine turning (sustained-thought) upon the mental-speech object; both using a portion of volition and discernment for substance. Agitation · torpor (掉舉 · 惛沈, auddhatya · styāna) — making mind unstill (agitation, obstructing śamatha) · making mind unfit-for-work (torpor, obstructing vipaśyanā). 〔Sanskrit forms are a pronunciation aid transmitted by the ancient masters.〕
8. Cross-reading (the Yogācāra sequence: Baifa → Triṃśikā → Viṃśatikā → Madhyāntavibhāga → Mahāyānasaṃgraha)
- Baifa (Hundred Dharmas): the mental factors · the twenty secondary defilements · the four indeterminate (the fifth and sixth positions of the six classes of mental factors, matched in full number).
- Triṃśikā: verse 13 (the names of the twenty secondary defilements) · verse 14 (the four indeterminate · "the two, each in two") — the verse-by-verse sister.
- Viṃśatikā: 〔wanting〕 it chiefly [treats] consciousness-only-without-object and refutes the outer grasping, with no head-on counterpart for the substance-and-function of the mental factors.
- Madhyāntavibhāga: the Obstruction chapter · the secondary defilements (the secondary afflictions as the mark of defilement, bearing on the sense of these twenty defiled mental factors).
- Mahāyānasaṃgraha: its Cause-and-Effect-of-Entry division · what the six perfections counteract (the secondary defilements as the defilement to be severed, bearing on the sense of counteraction).
Within the chapter: the chapter on the root defilements (§18 above — the secondary defilements being one and all their positional [differentiations] and outflow-kind) · the chapter on the eleven wholesome (non-ill-will · non-harming · pliancy and the rest, the pure dharmas obstructed by the secondary defilements) · the general summary of the six classes of mental factors (closing this chapter — the great-vehicle's subtle principle of the conventional and the ultimate, [the mental factors] apart from mind yet not identical).
9. Collation position
Verse T1586 〔0060b27–0060c01·0060c02〕 · root T1585 the secondary-defilement exposition 〔name and three classes 0033b05–b08 · anger 0033b09–b12 · agitation 0034a07–08 · torpor 0034a19–20 · lack-of-faith 0034b04–06 · the name-sense not-only-twenty 0034c21–24 · conventional-and-real 0034c27–0035a01 · which-consciousness 0035a08–a10〕 · the indeterminate exposition 〔name-sense 0035c09–c11 · regret 0035c11–12 · drowsiness 0035c14–15 · applied-thought-sustained-thought 0035c28–0036a01 · "the two, each in two" correct view 0036a10–a15〕 · the general summary of the six classes 〔the two challenges 0036c22–c23 · "mind travels far, fares alone" 0036c25 · Sūtrālaṃkāra verse 0036c27–c28 · Yogācārabhūmi verse 0037a04–a05 · the correct view 0037a06–a11〕 · Shuji T1830 〔name-sense 0398a26–a28 · "each is master" 0462c04 · "the two, each in two" 0466a08–a09〕 · Zhuanshi lun T1587 〔the twenty-four minor afflictions 0062b01–b03 · the sense of consciousness-only 0062b22–b24〕. 〔Scripture〕 Saṃdhinirmocana T676 〔0698a29–0698b02〕. 〔Śāstra〕 Yogācārabhūmi T1579 〔Stage-of-the-Foundation · the accompanying associates 0280b16–b19〕 · Samuccaya T1605 〔anger 0665a03–a04 · remorse 0665b19–b22〕 · Vyākhyā T1606 〔applied-thought 0699c24 · sustained-thought 0699c27〕.