成唯識論 破法執(一)·破外道所執實法
破完「我」，接著破「法」。所謂法執，就是認定心外真有那些東西——不是「我」，是我以外的一切。
論主的破法很有規矩：不罵人、不斷言，只問一句『你說的那個東西，是幾樣合成的？』
數論說「大」等二十三法由三德合成，卻又說它是實有、是現量所得。論主答：既然是好幾樣湊成的，那就跟軍隊、樹林一樣——軍隊不過是許多士兵，樹林不過是許多樹，另外沒有一個叫『軍隊』的實體。合成的東西是假的，現量也見不到它。
勝論說有實、德、業六句義，各有自性。論主一樣拆：你說「有性」與「有法」是一？那有性就不成其為性；是異？那有法就不由有性而有。一異俱不成，四宗盡破。
大自在天生一切法？一因不能生多果。聲是常？那說話與不說話就沒有差別。極微實有能生麁色？極微若有方分則可再分，無方分則不能合成有礙之色。
這一節讀起來像一場場辯論，其實只有一個方法：凡是『合成的』，就不是實有的；凡說『不合成而有』的，就說不出它怎麼與別的東西發生關係。 兩頭都堵死了，心外實法就無處安立。
The self refuted, the treatise turns to dharmas. Dharma-attachment is the conviction that outside the mind those things are really there — not the self, but everything other than the self.
The method of refutation is disciplined: no abuse, no assertion, only one question — how many things is the thing you name composed of?
Sāṃkhya says the Great and the other twenty-three principles are composed of the three constituents, and then says they are real, and grasped by direct perception. The treatise replies: if several things go into their making, they are as an army is, or a forest — an army is only many soldiers, a forest only many trees, and there is no further entity called army. What is composed is provisional, and direct perception does not meet it.
Vaiśeṣika posits substance, quality, motion and the rest, six categories each with its own nature. The same taking-apart: is being identical with the thing that has being? Then being is no nature of anything. Different? Then the thing does not have its being from being. Neither identity nor difference stands, and all four positions fall.
Does Maheśvara produce all dharmas? One cause does not produce many effects. Is sound eternal? Then speaking and not speaking would not differ. Are atoms real and able to produce gross form? An atom with spatial parts can be divided again; one without them cannot compose anything obstructive.
It reads like a series of debates, but there is only one method throughout: whatever is composed is not real; and whatever is said to exist uncomposed cannot say how it comes into relation with anything else. Both exits sealed, a real dharma outside the mind has nowhere to be placed.
如何識外實有諸法不可得耶？
外道、餘乘所執外法，理非有故。
外道所執云何非有？
且數論者執我是思，受用薩埵、剌闍、答摩所成大等二十三法，然大等法三事合成，是實非假，現量所得。
彼執非理，所以者何？
大等諸法，多事成故，如軍、林等，應假非實，如何可說現量得耶？又大等法，若是實有，應如本事，非三合成。
薩埵等三，即大等故，應如大等，亦三合成，轉變非常，為例亦爾。又三本事，各多功能，體亦應多，能、體一故。三體既遍，一處變時，餘亦應爾，體無別故。許此三事體、相各別，如何和合共成一相？不應合時變為一相，與未合時，體無別故。若謂三事體異相同，便違己宗體、相是一，體應如相，冥然是一，相應如體，顯然有三，故不應言三合成一。
〔T31 0002c07〕又三是別，大等是總，總、別一故，應非一、三。此三變時，若不和合成一相者，應如未變，如何現見是一色等？若三和合成一相者，應失本別相，體亦應隨失。不可說三各有二相：一、總；二、別。總即別故，總亦應三，如何見一？若謂三體各有三相，和雜難知，故見一者，既有三相，寧見為一？復如何知三事有異？若彼一一皆具三相，應一一事能成色等，何所𨵗少，待三和合，體亦應各三，以體即相故，又大等法皆三合成，展轉相望，應無差別，是則因、果、唯量、諸大、諸根差別皆不得成。若爾，一根應得一切境，或應一境一切根所得，世間現見情與非情、淨穢等物，現、比量等，皆應無異，便為大失。
故彼所執實法不成，但是妄情計度為有。
勝論所執實等句義，多實有性，現量所得。
彼執非理。
所以者何？
諸句義中且常住者，若能生果，應是無常，有作用故，如所生果；若不生果，應非離識實有自性，如兔角等。諸無常者，若有質礙，便有方分，應可分析，如軍、林等，非實有性；若無質礙，如心、心所，應非離此有實自性。
又彼所執地、水、火、風應非有礙，實句義攝，身根所觸故，如堅、濕、煖、動。即彼所執堅、濕、煖等，應非無礙，德句義攝，身根所觸故，如地、水、火、風，地、水、火三，對青色等，俱眼所見，准此應責。故知無實地、水、火、風與堅、濕等各別有性，亦非眼見實地、水、火。
〔T31 0003a06〕又彼所執實句義中，有礙、常者，皆有礙故，如麁地等，應是無常。諸句義中，色根所取，無質礙法，應皆有礙，許色根取故，如地、水、火、風。又彼所執非實德等，應非離識有別自性，非實攝故，如石女兒，非有實等，應非離識有別自性，非有攝故，如空花等。
彼所執有，應離實等無別自性，許非無故，如實、德等。若離實等，應非有性，許異實等故，如畢竟無等。如有非無，無別有性，如何實等有別有性？若離有法，有別有性，應離無法，有別無性，彼既不然，此云何爾？故彼有性唯妄計度。
又彼所執實、德、業性，異實、德、業，理定不然，勿此亦非實、德、業性，異實等故，如德、業等。又應實等非實等攝，異實等性故，如德、業、實等。地等諸性對地等體，更相徵詰，准此應知。如實性等，無別實等性，實等亦應無別實性等。若離實等有實等性，應離非實等，有非實等性。彼既不爾，此云何然？故同異性唯假施設。
又彼所執和合句義定非實有，非有、實等諸法攝故，如畢竟無。彼許實等現量所得，以理推徵尚非實有，況彼自許和合句義非現量得，而可實有？設執和合是現量境，由前理故，亦非實有。
〔T31 0003b01〕然彼實等，非緣離識實有自體現量所得，許所知故，如龜毛等。又緣實智，非緣離識實句自體現量智攝，假合生故，如德智等。廣說乃至緣和合智，非緣離識和合自體現量智攝，假合生故，如實智等。
故勝論者實等句義，亦是隨情妄所施設。
有執有一大自在天，體實、遍、常，能生諸法。
彼執非理，所以者何？
若法能生，必非常故；諸非常者，必不遍故；諸不遍者，非真實故。體既常、遍，具諸功能，應一切處、時，頓生一切法。待欲或緣方能生者，違一因論。或欲及緣亦應頓起，因常有故。
餘執有一大梵、時、方、本際、自然、虛空、我等，常住、實有，具諸功能，生一切法，皆同此破。
有餘偏執，明論聲常，能為定量，表詮諸法；有執一切聲皆是常，待緣顯發，方有詮表。
彼俱非理，所以者何？
且明論聲，許能詮故，應非常住，如所餘聲。
餘聲亦應非常聲體，如瓶、衣等，待眾緣故。
有外道執地、水、火、風、極微實、常，能生麁色，所生麁色不越因量，雖是無常，而體實有。
彼亦非理，所以者何？
所執極微，若有方分，如蟻行等，體應非實。若無方分，如心、心所應不共聚生麁果色，既能生果，如彼所生，如何可說極微常住？
又所生果不越因量，應如極微，不名麁色，則此果色應非眼等色根所取，便違自執。若謂果色，量德合故，非麁似麁，色根能取。所執果色，既同因量，應如極微，無麁德合；或應極微亦麁德合；如麁果色，處無別故。若謂果色遍在自因，因非一故，可名麁者，則此果色體應非一，如所在因，處各別故。既爾，此果還不成麁，由此亦非色根所取。若果多分合故成麁，多因極微合應非細，足成根境，何用果為？既多分成，應非實有，則汝所執，前後相違。
〔T31 0003c07〕又果與因俱有質礙，應不同處，如二極微。若謂果、因體相受入，如沙受水，藥入鎔銅。誰許沙、銅體受水、藥？或應離、變，非一、非常，又麁色果體若是一，得一分時應得一切，彼、此一故，彼應如此，不許違理，許便違事，故彼所執進、退不成，但是隨情虛妄計度。
然諸外道品類雖多，所執有法不過四種：
一、執有法與有等性其體定一，如數論等。彼執非理，所以者何？勿一切法即有性故，皆如有性，體無差別，便違三德、我等體異，亦違世間諸法差別。又若色等即色等性，色等應無青、黃等異。
二、執有法與有等性其體定異，如勝論等。彼執非理，所以者何？勿一切法非有性故，如已滅無，體不可得，便違實等自體非無，亦違世間現見有物。又若色等非色等性，應如聲等非眼等境。
三、執有法與有等性亦一、亦異，如無慚等，彼執非理，所以者何？一、異同前一、異過故；二相相違，體應別故，一、異體同俱不成故。勿一切法皆同一體，或應一、異是假非實，而執為實理定不成。
四、執有法與有等性非一、非異，如邪命等。彼執非理，所以者何？非一、異執同異、一故。非一、異言為遮為表？若唯是表，應不雙非；若但是遮，應無所執；亦遮、亦表應互相違；非表、非遮應成戲論。又非一、異，違世共知有一、異物，亦違自宗色等有法決定實有。
〔T31 0004a05〕是故彼言唯矯避過，諸有智者勿謬許之。
The canonical text stands in Chinese only. This edition renders the essence, the plain reading, the exposition and the apparatus into English — never the sūtra itself. Switch to 漢讀本 or 並行雙語 above to read it.
〔所釋之頌〕廣釋第一頌·破法執
破法執
一、總標：諸法亦不可得
前面已經講過『心外實有的『我』找不到』，那『心外實有的『種種法』也找不到』又怎麼說呢？因為不論是外道、還是其餘各部派（小乘）所主張的那些「心外之法」，按道理講都不是真實有的。（底下就分兩大塊來破：先破外道的四家主張，再破小乘所執的色法等等。）
二、破外道所執法
外道所主張的那些心外之法，為什麼說它不是真實有的呢？（底下先破第一家——數論。）
（甲）破數論（二十三諦·三事合成）
先說數論師這一家。他們主張：有一個「我」（也就是「神我」，他們說它是純粹的受用者），這個「我」的本性是「思」（能領納、能受用）；它所受用的對象，是由「薩埵、剌闍、答摩」這三種根本成分（合稱「三德」，相當於明、動、暗三種性質）所組成的「大」（也就是「覺」，理智）等等二十三種法。他們又主張：「大」這一類法既然都是這三德合成的，那它就是實實在在有的、不是假的，而且是「現量」（當下親眼所見、不靠推理）所得到的。
這個主張站不住，為什麼呢？「大」這一類法既然是好幾樣東西（也就是三德）合起來才成的，那它就跟『軍隊』、「樹林」是一個道理——軍隊是許多士兵湊成的、樹林是許多樹湊成的，都是「假合」之物，並不是另外有個實在的本體。既然如此，「大」也該是假的、不是實有的；那你又怎麼能說它是「現量」（當下親見）所得到的呢？（許多東西湊成的假合之物，根本不是現量能直接見到的對象。）
再說，這裡可以兩頭夾攻。先從一頭看：「大」這一類法如果真是實有，那它就該像『三德本身』那樣是不靠合成的（你既然把三德當作不合成的根本，凡實有的就該如此）——可你偏說它是合成的，自相矛盾。再從另一頭看：薩埵等這三德，既然你說它『就是大等的本體』（三德和大等不是兩回事），那它也該反過來像大等一樣，是『三樣合成、會轉變、不恆常』的了。兩頭一比照（互相為難），可見這三德也立不成『實有而恆常的根本』。
再說，這三德每一個都各自具有好幾種作用（譬如薩埵主管喜、剌闍主管憂、答摩主管暗等等）。可你又主張『作用和本體是一回事』（不分開）；那麼一個德既有好幾種作用，它的本體也就該跟著變成好幾個（不再是一個整體了）。還有，你說這三德的本體都是「周遍」（無所不在）的；既然處處都有它，那它在某一處變動的時候，其餘各處也該同時跟著變動才對——因為同一個周遍的本體沒法只局限在一處變、別處不變。（這就推出種種荒謬。）
你既然已經承認這三德的「本體」和「相狀」各各不同（三個分得清清楚楚），那它們又怎麼能湊在一塊兒、合成『一個相』（也就是合成一個「大」的相狀）呢？總不能說它們一湊合就忽然變成一個相吧——因為合的時候和沒合的時候，它們的「本體」根本沒變（既然本體沒變，相狀也就不該突然變成一個）。
你也許會改口辯解說：『三德的『本體』雖然各別、可是『相狀』相同，正因相同，所以才能合成一個。』可這一說又自打嘴巴：第一，這就違背了你自家『本體和相狀是一回事』的立論（既然體相是一，體既各別，相怎麼會相同）。第二，再順著你「體相是一」推：本體該跟相狀一樣，模模糊糊地合成一個（那本體也成一個了）；相狀又該跟本體一樣，清清楚楚地分成三個（那相狀也成三個了）——左右都不對。所以你根本不能說『三樣合成一個』。
再說，三德是『分開的個別』、大等是『合起來的整體』；可你又主張『整體和個別是一回事』（因為你說體相是一）。既然整體和個別合一了，那就既不能定說它是「一」、也不能定說它是「三」（一旦合一，反而說不清到底算一還是算三了）。又：這三德變現出來的時候，如果它們不湊合成一個相，那就該還跟沒變之前一樣（仍舊是三個），那你又怎麼能當下看見「大」等是『一個』呢？反過來，如果三德湊合成了一個相，那它們本來各自的『個別相狀』就該丟掉了（三個相沒了）；而你既然主張體相是一，相狀一丟，它們的本體也就跟著沒了（相失則體也失）。
你也不能換個說法辯解：『三德各有兩種相——一種是『整體相』、一種是『個別相』；憑整體相所以看見一個，憑個別相所以看見三個。』這也不行：因為照你自家『體相不二』的講法，『整體相就等於個別相』；既然整體相就是個別相，那整體相也該是三個了，你又怎麼能看見『一個』呢？
你再換個說法辯解：『三德的本體各有三種相，它們混雜在一起、難以分辨，所以才看成一個。』這也有兩重毛病：第一，你既然已經承認有三種相了，那又怎麼能看成一個呢（有三就不是一）？第二，你既然說它們混雜難辨，那你又是怎麼知道這三德彼此是不同的呢（既然難辨，憑什麼斷定它們有異）？
而且，要是這三德每一個都已經具足了三種相（薩埵自己含三、剌闍自己含三、答摩自己含三），那麼每一個德單憑自己就能成就色等諸法了（一個德裡頭就已經三相俱全了，何必再等三個來湊）——既然如此，它還缺什麼，非要等三德湊合不可呢？再者，每個德既各有三相，照你『本體就是相狀』的講法，它的本體也該各自分成三個了。
再說，「大」等諸法既然都是這同樣三德合成的，那麼它們彼此一比，就該沒有差別了（成分都一樣，自然分不出高下）。這麼一來，數論自家分的那一套等級——「因」（也就是根本的自性）、「果」（大等）、「唯量」（色聲香味觸這五種微細的『五唯』）、「諸大」（地水火風空這『五大』）、「諸根」（種種感官）——這種種差別也就全都立不起來了（成分既然都相同，就無從分出這些差別）。
要是真照這樣（諸法一律沒有差別），就會推出一堆荒謬：一個感官就該能領取一切對象、或者一個對象就該被一切感官領取（眼能聽聲、耳能看色，根和境再也分不開了）；世間明明看得見的『有情（眾生）和無情（草木瓦石）』、『乾淨的和污穢的』這些東西，連『現量（親見）、比量（推理）』這些認識方式，也都該沒有差別了——這顯然是天大的過失。所以數論所主張的那些『實在之法』根本立不起來，只不過是憑著虛妄的心情亂猜亂算、自以為它真有罷了。（破數論到此為止。）
（乙）破勝論（六句義·實等）
接著破第二家——勝論師。他們把萬法歸成六類，叫「六句義」（也就是六大範疇）：實（事物本體）、德（屬性）、業（運動）、同（共相）、異（別相）、和合（把前幾樣黏在一起的關係）。他們主張這六類大都是實實在在有的、是「現量」（當下親見）所得到的。這個主張站不住，為什麼呢？
先拿這六類裡『恆常不變』的那些來說（譬如他們講的常住之實、極微等等）。這裡兩頭一逼：要嘛它能生出果來，那它就該是「無常」的——因為凡是有作用、能生果的東西都會變動，正像它所生出來的那個果一樣（果是無常的，能生果的也跟著無常）；要嘛它生不出果來，那它就根本不是離開識而獨立實有的東西，就跟『兔子的角』一個樣（沒作用又說它在心外，那跟兔角一樣是子虛烏有）。——橫豎都立不成『實有的常法』。
再拿這六類裡「無常」的那些來說，照樣兩頭一逼：要嘛它有「質礙」（佔地方、會互相阻擋），那它就有方位、有部分，就能切開來剖析，正像軍隊、樹林一樣（可拆的就不是實有的整體）；要嘛它沒有質礙，那它就跟「心、心所」一個樣，也該是離不開這個「識」、沒法在心外獨立實有的（沒質礙的東西都離不開識）。——橫豎也立不成心外實法。
這裡再用他們自家的分類來夾攻。勝論把「地、水、火、風」歸在「實」這一類，又把「堅、濕、煖、動」（堅硬、濕潤、溫熱、流動這些手感）歸在「德」這一類；他們還說「實」這類有質礙、「德」這類沒質礙。可是這兩組明明都是『身體（身根）摸得到』的——既然摸得到這一點上它們完全一樣，那性質就該也一樣才對。於是兩頭都出毛病：一頭，地水火風（實類）就該跟堅濕煖動（德類）一樣『沒有質礙』了（因為同樣是身體摸得到的，而德類你說沒質礙）；另一頭，堅濕煖等（德類）又該跟地水火風（實類）一樣「有質礙」了（同樣是身體摸得到的，而實類你說有質礙）。再者，地、水、火這三樣，跟「青色」等顏色一樣都是眼睛看得見的；照同一個道理，也可以這樣逼問它（地水火既然跟青色同樣是眼見的，那性質也該跟青色一類了）——你這套分類根本對不起來。
所以可知：根本沒有『實在的地、水、火、風』和「堅、濕」等等各自分立、各有各的本性這回事（你那「實」類「德」類沒法各別實有）；而且眼睛也並不是真能看見實在的地、水、火（眼睛看見的其實只是青、黃這些顏色而已）。
再說，勝論「實」這類裡頭那些『既有質礙、又恆常』的東西（譬如他們講的常住極微）：既然它有質礙，那就該跟粗大顯明的地塊等一樣，是「無常」的了（凡有質礙的都無常）——這就跟你說它『恆常』自相矛盾。又：這六類裡頭那些『感官取得到、卻沒有質礙』的東西（譬如「德」類裡的顏色、滋味等），照理也都該是「有質礙」的——因為你既承認它們是感官取得到的，那就跟地水火風（感官取得到、有質礙）一個道理（凡感官取得到的都該有質礙，這就跟你說它沒質礙打架了）。
再說，勝論所執那些『不算『實』類的德』等等（也就是不歸在「實」這一範疇裡的東西），照理也不該離開識而另有自己的本體——因為它既『不被『實』類所收』，那就跟『石女生的兒子』一樣（石女不能生育，這兒子根本不存在）。又：那些『不算『有』類所收』的東西（不歸在「有」這一範疇裡的），也不該離開識而另有本體——因為它既『不被『有』類所收』，那就跟『空中的花』一樣（眼花看見的花，其實沒有）。
勝論還另立一個總的「有」（叫「有性」，或「大有句義」，意思是讓萬法成其為「有」的那個總根據）。針對它，兩頭一逼：一頭，這個「有」離開了實、德等等，就不該另有自己的本體——因為你承認它『不是無、是有』，那就跟實、德等一樣（凡是有的東西都離不開實、德這些具體的法）。另一頭，你若硬說這個「有」離開實等、另外獨立存在，那它反倒該「不是有」了——因為你承認它跟實等不是一回事，那它就跟「畢竟無」（徹底的虛無）一樣了（離開了一切具體之法，就等於什麼都沒有）。
再用一個對稱的反問來破：就拿「有」本身來說，它自己『不是無』（它自己就是有），並不需要再另外加一個「有性」上去（「有」本身不必再靠別的「有」才成其為有）；既然如此，實、德等等諸法，又哪裡需要另外加一個「有性」（大有）上去、才算是「有」呢？再者，你若主張『離開了『有法』（具體的有），另有一個『有性』』，那同樣的道理，就也該『離開了『無法』（具體的無），另有一個『無性』』才對——可你勝論並不承認後面這條（不承認另有獨立的「無性」）；既然後一條你不認，那前一條（另有獨立的「有性」）又怎麼立得住呢？所以你那個「有性」純粹是亂猜出來的。（破「大有句」到此為止。）
勝論又主張：有所謂的『實性、德性、業性』（也就是讓某物成其為「實」、成其為「德」、成其為「業」的那個共通根據，屬「同」這一範疇），而且這些「性」跟「實、德、業」本身是兩回事（性在體外）。這講法一定立不住。為什麼？因為照『性在體外、性異於體』這條路推下去，就會沒完沒了：第一，這個「實性」自己也該再需要另一個「性」（性外更要有性），不然它自己就算不上「實、德、業性」了——因為按你的邏輯它跟實等是兩回事，正像德、業跟實是兩回事一樣（這樣一層套一層，沒個盡頭）。第二，那「實」本身也該算不進「實」這一類裡頭去了，因為按你的講法它跟「實性」是兩回事（既然體和性是兩回事，體就被排在性外、收不進去了）。再者，地等諸法的「性」對著地等的「體」，也可以同樣這麼一層層逼問下去——其餘的照這個道理就都明白了。（破「同」這一範疇的「性」到此為止。）
再用對稱的反問破它：就拿「實性」來說，它頭上並不需要再頂著一個『實性的性』（性不必再有性）；既然如此，那「實」等諸法頭上，也就不該另外頂著一個「實性」了（體也不必再有性）。再者，你若主張『離開了實等、另有一個實等之性』，那同樣的道理，也該『離開了非實等、另有一個非實等之性』才對——可你勝論並不承認後面這條；既然後一條你不認，那前一條又怎麼立得住呢？所以「同、異」這兩種性，都只是假安立的名目罷了。（破「同、異」這兩個範疇到此為止。）
再破第六個範疇「和合」（把前幾類黏在一起的那種關係）。它一定不是實有的——因為它不被「有、實」等等諸法所收（它自己既不算實、不算德、也不算有），那就跟「畢竟無」（徹底的虛無）一樣（哪一類都收不進去的，就等於什麼都不是）。再說，連勝論自己承認是『現量親見』的那些（實、德等），都已經被前面用道理推破、立不成實有了；何況「和合」這一樣，連勝論自己都承認它『不是現量親見的』，那它又怎麼會是實有的呢？就算你硬要說「和合」也是當下親見的對象，照前面講過的道理（許多東西湊成的假合之物不是實有），它照樣不是實有。
總起來說：勝論那「實」等等，並不是『緣著一個離開識而真實存在的本體』所親見到的——因為你承認它『是被認識的對象（所知）』，凡是被認識的對象就不是離識實有的，正像「龜毛」（烏龜身上的毛，根本沒有）一樣。再分開來講：你那『緣『實』的認識』，並不是『緣著離識的『實』之本體』的真正現量——因為它是『靠許多條件湊合才生起的』，正像『緣『德』的認識』一樣（是湊合生的，不是直對什麼實在本體）。這樣一路推下去，乃至『緣『和合』的認識』，也不是『緣著離識的『和合』之本體』的真正現量——因為它也是湊合才生的，正像『緣『實』的認識』一樣（凡是湊合生的認識，都不是直接緣著什麼離識的實在本體）。所以勝論師那「實」等六句義，也都是隨著自己的心情亂安立出來的。（破勝論到此為止。）
（丙）破大自在天等（一因生諸法）
接著破第三家。有一派外道主張：有一位「大自在天」，他的本體是實在的、是無所不在的、是恆常不變的，而且能生出萬法。這主張站不住，為什麼呢？這裡有三句話一環扣一環：凡是『能生東西』的，就一定不是恆常的（既然能生，就有變動，哪能恆常不變）；凡是『不恆常』的，就一定不是無所不在的（既然會變，就被限在某些時候、某些地方，不可能處處都在）；凡是『不是無所不在』的，就不是你所說的那種「真實」（你立的本就是『實、遍、常』連在一起的真實，不遍就不合你自己的定義）。——這三句一路逼下來，正好把你說的「實、遍、常」一一拆掉。
再從另一頭逼：他的本體既然又恆常、又無所不在、又具足生萬法的能力，那他就該在一切地方、一切時候，一下子把萬法統統生出來才對（既然恆常、遍在、又有能力，就沒有什麼可等的）。你若辯解說『他還得等到自在天起了『想生』的念頭、或者湊齊了種種條件，才生得出來』，那就違背了你自家『萬法只由自在天這一個原因生出來』的立論（既然還要等念頭、等條件，那就不止他一個原因了）。再說，那『想生的念頭』和『種種條件』，照理也該被他一下子全生出來、沒有先後（因為生它們的那個原因——自在天——是恆常都在的，原因恆常，結果也該恆常地一下子都有）。——可見『等念頭、等條件』這條路也走不通。
此外還有些外道，把『大梵天、時間、方位、本際（萬物最初的起點）、自然、虛空、神我』等等，當作恆常實有、又具足生法能力、能生出一切法的那個唯一根源。這些主張，都跟前面破自在天用的是同一套道理，照樣一一破掉。（凡是『由某一個原因生出萬法』的這一類主張，到此一概破完。）
（丁）破聲常論（明論聲常·一切聲常）
接著破第四家——主張『聲音恆常』的。這裡頭有兩種說法。一種偏執：「明論」（也就是吠陀，婆羅門的聖典）的聲音是恆常不變的，能當作一種絕對可靠的標準、能用來表達指稱種種法。另一種主張：不只明論，一切聲音都是恆常的，只是平時隱著，要等條件湊上（譬如有人開口）才顯發出來、才有指稱表達的作用。這兩種說法都站不住，為什麼呢？
先說明論的聲音。你既然承認它「能詮」（能表達意思），那它就該不是恆常的——因為凡是能表達意思的聲音都是無常的，正像其餘那些聲音一樣。再說其餘那些聲音，也都該不是『恆常的聲音本體』，就跟瓶子、衣服一個樣——因為它們都得等種種條件（嘴、舌頭、氣等等）湊上才響得出來，凡是要等條件才有的，就都是無常的。（所以『聲音恆常』這一說站不住，破聲常論到此為止。）
（戊）破極微實常能生麁色
有一派外道主張：地、水、火、風的「極微」（最小的微塵單位）是實在的、是恆常的，而且能生出「麁色」（粗大顯明的物體）；他們又說，生出來的麁色不會超過它的原因（極微）那麼大的量，這麁色雖然是無常的，可它的本體是實實在在有的。這主張也站不住，為什麼呢？
你說的這個極微，兩頭一逼：要嘛它有「方分」（有方位、有上下左右這些部分），那它就跟一行螞蟻排成的隊伍一樣，可以一個一個拆開，它的本體就不是實在的（可拆的就不是不可分的實有）；要嘛它沒有方分，那它就跟「心、心所」一個樣（心、心所也沒有方位部分），那它就該湊不到一塊兒、生不出粗大的物體來（沒有方位的東西沒法相鄰堆疊、合聚成大）。再說，它既然能生出果來，那它就該跟它生出來的那個果一樣是無常的（凡能生果的都會變動），你又怎麼能說極微是恆常不變的呢？
再說，生出來的果既然不超過它原因（極微）那麼大，那它就該跟極微一樣小，根本算不上「麁色」（粗大顯明之物）；既然這麼小，那這個果色就該不是眼睛等感官能取得到的了（極微太小，不是感官的對象）——這就跟你自己『極微能生粗大之色』的主張打架了。
你也許會改口辯解：『果色雖然跟極微一樣小，可是它跟『量德』（一種讓東西顯得粗大的屬性）相合了，所以雖然不是真的粗大、卻顯得像粗大，感官就取得到了。』這也不行，兩頭一逼：你說的這個果色既然跟它的原因（極微）一樣大，那它就該跟極微一樣『沒有跟量德相合』（極微既然沒有量德，跟它同樣大的果也該沒有）；要不然反過來，極微也該跟果一樣『有跟量德相合』才對（果有了，原因也該有）——因為果和它原因所在的地方根本沒分別（既然一樣大、又在同一處，那『有沒有量德』這件事，兩個就該一樣）。
你又也許辯解：『果色是遍布在它那一堆原因（許多極微）上頭的，原因不只一個、是一大堆，所以果色就可以叫『粗大』了。』這也不行：照這麼說，這個果色的本體就該『不只一個』（跟著那一堆原因而散成許多），就跟它所遍布的那一堆極微一樣，各在各的地方、彼此分開。既然果色散成了許多（散在一顆顆極微上），那它還是成不了『粗大』（散開不聚就談不上粗大），這麼一來，它照樣不是感官能取得到的。
你若說『果是由好多分（許多小份的果）合起來才成粗大的』，那麼『那一大堆當原因的極微』湊起來時，照樣也該不再是細小的了（許多極微一湊也就粗大了），那它本身就足以當感官的對象了，又何必另外再立一個『果』呢（一堆原因已經夠當對象，再立果就多餘）？再說，果既然是由好多分湊合成的，那它就該不是實有的了（許多東西湊成的是假合之物），這麼一來，你『果的本體是實有的』這個主張，前頭後頭就自相矛盾了。
再說，果和因既然都有「質礙」（佔地方、會互相阻擋），那它們就該不在同一個地方（兩個都佔地方的東西沒法擠在一處），就像兩顆極微互不相容一樣。你若辯解說『果和因的本體是互相鑽進去、彼此容納的，就像沙子吸水、藥熔進銅水裡那樣』，那就破你：誰承認『沙子、銅的本體』真的把「水、藥」容納進去了（沙縫裡含著水、藥摻在銅裡，那只是縫隙之間混雜在一起，並不是本體真的彼此鑽進去）？再說，果和因若真的互相鑽進對方本體，那它們就該要嘛『散開』、要嘛「變壞」，成了『不是一個、也不是恆常』的了（一旦互相鑽入，本體就變了，這就違背你說的『恆常、是一』）。
再說，粗大之色這個果，它的本體若是「一」（一個整體），那麼你摸到它一小部分的時候就該摸到它的全部（碰一處就等於碰了整個），因為這一處和那一處本來是一個整體，那一處就該跟這一處一樣（一處被觸，全體都被觸、一動全動）。這就把你逼到兩難：你若不承認『摸一分就等於摸到全部』，就違背了你自己『果的本體是一個整體』的道理；你若承認，又違背世間明擺著的事實（明明可以只碰到一小塊、碰不到全部）。所以你這個主張，不管承認還是不承認，都立不起來，只是隨著自己的心情亂猜亂算罷了。（破『極微生粗大之色』到此為止。）
（己）總破外道四宗（有法與有性·一異俱非）
外道雖然門派眾多，可是他們對「有法」（也就是種種具體的法）和「有等性」（讓那些法成其為『有』的那個共通性質）這兩者的關係，講來講去也不過四種主張罷了：
第一種主張：『有法和有等性，本體一定是同一個』，數論這一派就是這樣。這主張站不住，為什麼呢？因為照這麼說，一切法就都等於那個「有性」了；既然都等於同一個有性，那它們的本體就沒有差別了——這一來就違背了數論自家『三德、神我等本體各各不同』的立論，也違背了世間種種法明明各不相同的現象。再說，要是『色等諸法就等於色等之性』，那色等就該沒有「青、黃」這些差別了（本體既然是同一個性，就分不出青黃了）。
第二種主張：『有法和有等性，本體一定是兩回事』，勝論這一派就是這樣。這主張站不住，為什麼呢？因為照這麼說（性在法外、法本身不是性），那一切法就都不是「有性」了；既然法本身都不算「有」，那它就跟『已經滅掉的虛無』一樣、根本找不到本體了——這就違背了勝論自家『實等諸法本體不是沒有』的立論，也違背了世間明明看得見有東西這件事。再說，要是『色等諸法不等於色等之性』（本體和性是兩回事），那色等就該跟聲音一樣不是眼睛的對象了（性既然跟色分了家，色也就不成其為眼睛能看的東西了）。
第三種主張：『有法和有等性，既是一個、又是兩回事』，無慚（也就是尼犍子）這一派就是這樣。這主張站不住，為什麼呢？這裡有三層毛病：第一，它說的『是一個』和『是兩回事』，分別都犯了前面破第一說、破第二說時講過的那些過失（前面破「一」、破「異」的話，在這裡照樣管用）。第二，『是一個』和『是兩回事』這兩種樣子本來是互相違反的，那它們的本體就該各別（一和異這兩個本體沒法擠在同一個法上頭）。第三，「一」和「異」的本體既然非要算作同一個（你硬說它們同在一個法上），那『是一個』和『是兩回事』就都立不成了（兩個互相違反的東西沒法同時成立）。再說，總不能說一切法都同是一個本體吧（你若只取『是一個』這一面，就掉進破第一說的那個過失裡去了）。要不然，這「亦一亦異」就只能是假安立的、不是實在的；可你偏把它執成實在的，這道理一定立不住。（破「亦一亦異」到此為止。）
第四種主張：『有法和有等性，不是一個、也不是兩回事』，邪命（也就是邪命外道）這一派就是這樣。這主張站不住，為什麼呢？這個『不是一個、不是兩回事』的講法，犯的毛病跟前面『是兩回事』、『是一個』那兩說一樣（你說『不是一個』就掉進『是兩回事』那邊、說『不是兩回事』就掉進『是一個』那邊）。再追問一句：你這『不是一個、不是兩回事』的話，到底是「遮」（一概否定、把話堵掉）還是「表」（正面立出一個主張）？這就把你逼到四面都是牆：若它純粹是正面立主張，那你就不該把『一個』『兩回事』一概否定掉（既然要立，就不能兩邊都不認）；若它純粹是否定堵話，那你就等於什麼也沒主張（光否定不立，就拿它當不成你的宗旨了）；若說它『又否定又主張』，那否定和主張兩件事本身就互相違反；若說它『既不主張也不否定』，那就成了一句沒意思的廢話了。
再說，『不是一個、不是兩回事』這話，違背了世間人人都曉得的『有的是同一個東西、有的是不同的東西』這個常識，也違背了他自家『色等諸法一定是實有的』這個立論。所以他這套話只不過是耍個花招、好躲開人家的責難罷了（是一句閃避過失的空話，並沒有真實的內容），有智慧的人千萬別糊裡糊塗地認可它。（破外道這四派主張到此為止。）
〔Verses commented〕Unfolding verse 1 · refuting the dharma-attachment
B. Refuting the Dharma-Attachment
1. General statement: dharmas, too, cannot be found
It has already been shown that "a really-existent 'self' outside the mind cannot be found"; what, then, of "really-existent 'dharmas of every kind' outside the mind, which likewise cannot be found"? Because the "dharmas outside the mind" maintained by the heterodox and by the other schools (the Hīnayāna) are, in principle, none of them really existent. (Below, the refutation falls into two great blocks: first the four heterodox schools, then the form and other dharmas held by the Hīnayāna.)
2. Refuting the dharmas held by the heterodox
Why is it said that the dharmas outside the mind maintained by the heterodox are not really existent? (Below, the first school refuted is the Sāṃkhya.)
(i) Refuting the Sāṃkhya (the twenty-three principles · the three constituents combined)
Take first the Sāṃkhya masters. They maintain: there is a "self" (the puruṣa, the "spirit-self," which they call a pure experiencer), and the nature of this self is "thought" (it receives and enjoys); the objects it enjoys are the twenty-three principles — "the great one" (mahat, i.e. intellect, buddhi) and the rest — which are composed of the three root constituents "sattva, rajas, tamas" (together the "three qualities," guṇa, corresponding to the brightening, the stirring, and the darkening). They maintain further: since "the great one" and its class are all composed of these three qualities, it is really existent, not conventional, and is grasped by "direct perception" (現量, what is seen at first hand, not got by inference).
This position does not hold. Why? Since "the great one" and its class come to be only by several things (the three qualities) put together, it is on the same footing as an "army" or a "forest" — an army is many soldiers put together, a forest is many trees put together, both being assembled conventional things with no separate real substance of their own. That being so, "the great one" too must be conventional, not really existent; and then how can you say it is got by "direct perception" (seen at first hand)? (An assembled conventional thing, made of many things, is precisely not an object that direct perception can grasp directly.)
Again, here a two-pronged attack is possible. From one side: if "the great one" and its class were really existent, then they ought, like the "root things themselves" (the three qualities), to be not composed (since you take the three qualities as the uncomposed root, whatever is really existent ought to be likewise) — yet you say it is composed; self-contradiction. From the other side: the three qualities, sattva and the rest, since you say they "just are the substance of the great one and the rest" (the qualities and the great one are not two separate things), ought conversely, like the great one and the rest, to be "composed of three, changeable, and impermanent." Set the two sides against each other (each pressing the other), and it is plain that the three qualities too cannot be established as "a really-existent, permanent root."
Again, each of these three qualities possesses several functions of its own (for instance, sattva governs joy, rajas governs sorrow, tamas governs darkness, and so on). Yet you also maintain that "function and substance are one and the same" (not separate); then since one quality has several functions, its substance too ought to split into several (no longer a single whole). Further, you say the substance of these three qualities is all "pervasive" (everywhere without exception); since it is everywhere, then when it changes in one place, everywhere else ought to change at the same time too — for one and the same pervasive substance cannot change only in one place and not in others. (This forces out all manner of absurdities.)
Since you have already conceded that the "substance" and the "appearance" of these three qualities are each distinct (the three told cleanly apart), how could they get put together and compose "a single appearance" (the single appearance of "the great one")? It surely cannot be that the moment they combine they suddenly turn into a single appearance — for at the time of combining and the time of not combining, their "substance" has not changed at all (and if the substance has not changed, the appearance ought not suddenly to become one either).
You may then shift your plea and say: "The 'substance' of the three qualities is distinct, but their 'appearance' is the same; and just because the appearance is the same, they can compose one." But this plea slaps its own face. First, it contradicts your own school's thesis that "substance and appearance are one and the same" (if substance and appearance are one, then since substance is distinct, how could appearance be the same?). Second, follow out your "substance and appearance are one" further: the substance ought, like the appearance, to compose blurredly into one (so the substance becomes one too); and the appearance ought, like the substance, to split clearly into three (so the appearance becomes three too) — wrong either way. So you simply cannot say "three combine into one."
Again, the three qualities are the "particulars," "the great one" and the rest the "whole"; yet you maintain that "whole and particular are one and the same" (since you say substance and appearance are one). Since whole and particular are thus made one, it can be fixed neither as "one" nor as "three" (once made one, it cannot even be told whether it counts as one or as three). Further: when these three qualities show forth, if they do not combine into a single appearance, then it ought to be just as before they showed forth (still three) — so how could you see at first hand that "the great one" and the rest are "one"? Conversely, if the three qualities do combine into a single appearance, then their original separate "particular appearances" ought to be lost (the three appearances gone); and since you maintain that substance and appearance are one, once the appearance is lost, their substance is lost along with it (appearance lost, substance lost too).
Nor can you escape by saying: "Each of the three qualities has two appearances — one a 'whole-appearance,' one a 'particular-appearance'; by the whole-appearance one sees a single thing, by the particular-appearance one sees three." This too fails: for on your own "substance and appearance are not two" account, "the whole-appearance just equals the particular-appearance"; and since the whole-appearance is the particular-appearance, the whole-appearance too must be three — so how could you see "one"?
You shift your plea again: "The substance of each of the three qualities has three appearances; they are mixed together and hard to tell apart, and so are seen as one." This carries two faults. First, since you have already conceded there are three appearances, how could they be seen as one (three is not one)? Second, since you say they are mixed and hard to tell apart, how then do you know that the three qualities are distinct from one another (if they are hard to tell apart, on what basis do you judge them different)?
Moreover, if each one of these three qualities already possesses three appearances in full (sattva itself holds three, rajas itself holds three, tamas itself holds three), then each single quality could on its own complete form and the rest (one quality already has all three appearances within it, so why wait for three to combine?) — that being so, what is it short of, that it must wait for the three qualities to combine? Furthermore, since each quality has three appearances, then by your "substance just is appearance" account, its substance too ought to split into three each.
Again, since "the great one" and its class are all composed of the same three qualities, then compared one against another they ought to have no difference (the constituents being the same, no rank can be told apart). And so the very grading that the Sāṃkhya themselves draw up — "cause" (i.e. the root nature, prakṛti), "fruit" (the great one and the rest), "the bare-essences" (the five subtle elements, tanmātra: form, sound, smell, taste, touch), "the great elements" (the five gross: earth, water, fire, wind, space), "the faculties" (the various sense-organs) — all these differences fail to be established (the constituents being identical, no such differences can be drawn).
Were it really so (all dharmas without any difference), a heap of absurdities would follow: one sense-organ ought to grasp every object, or one object ought to be grasped by every sense-organ (the eye could hear sound, the ear could see form, organ and object no longer to be told apart); the very things the world plainly sees — "the sentient (beings) and the insentient (grass, trees, tiles, stones)," "the clean and the filthy" — and even the modes of cognition, "direct perception (seeing at first hand) and inference (reasoning)," ought all to have no difference — which is plainly a colossal fault. So the "real dharmas" the Sāṃkhya maintain cannot be established at all; they are merely things that deluded feeling guesses and reckons up and supposes to be real. (The refutation of the Sāṃkhya ends here.)
(ii) Refuting the Vaiśeṣika (the six categories · substance and the rest)
Next, the second school refuted: the Vaiśeṣika masters. They sort all things into six classes, called the "six categories" (六句義, the six great divisions): substance (實, a thing's body), quality (德, attribute), motion (業, movement), the common (同, the universal), the distinct (異, the particular), and inherence (和合, the relation that binds the foregoing together). They maintain that these six classes are mostly really existent, and got by "direct perception" (seen at first hand). This position does not hold. Why?
Take first, among the six classes, those that are "permanent and unchanging" (such as their permanent substances, the atoms, and so on). Press from two sides: either it can produce a fruit, and then it must be "impermanent" — for whatever has function and produces a fruit undergoes change, just like the fruit it produces (the fruit being impermanent, what produces it is impermanent too); or it cannot produce a fruit, and then it is simply not something really existent apart from consciousness, just like a "hare's horn" (no function, yet said to be outside the mind — that is empty as a hare's horn). Either way, a "really-existent permanent dharma" cannot be established.
Take next, among the six classes, those that are "impermanent"; press them likewise from two sides: either they have "obstruction" (take up space, mutually block), and then they have spatial position and parts, and can be cut apart and analyzed, just like an army or a forest (what can be taken apart is not a really-existent whole); or they have no obstruction, and then they are on the same footing as "mind and the mental factors," and so must be inseparable from this "consciousness," unable to be really existent apart from the mind (what has no obstruction is inseparable from consciousness). Either way, a real dharma outside the mind cannot be established.
Here their own classification is turned against them. The Vaiśeṣika place "earth, water, fire, wind" under the class "substance," and place "the hard, the wet, the warm, the moving" (hardness, wetness, warmth, flow — felt qualities) under the class "quality"; they also say the "substance" class has obstruction and the "quality" class has none. But both groups are plainly "felt by the body (the body-faculty)" — and since on this point, being felt, they are exactly alike, their nature ought to be alike too. So faults break out on both sides: on one side, earth-water-fire-wind (the substance class) ought, like the hard-wet-warm-moving (the quality class), to "have no obstruction" (since both are felt by the body, and the quality class you say has none); on the other side, the hard-wet-warm and the rest (the quality class) ought, like earth-water-fire-wind (the substance class), to "have obstruction" (both being felt by the body, and the substance class you say has it). Furthermore, the three — earth, water, fire — are, like "blue" and the other colors, all seen by the eye; by the same reasoning they can be pressed the same way (earth, water, fire being seen by the eye just as blue is, their nature ought to fall in with color too) — your whole classification does not match up.
So it can be known: there is no such thing as "real earth, water, fire, wind" and "the hard, wet," and so on, each standing apart with a nature of its own (your "substance" class and "quality" class cannot each be really existent); and the eye does not in fact truly see real earth, water, fire (what the eye sees is only colors like blue and yellow).
Again, those things in the Vaiśeṣika "substance" class that are "both obstructive and permanent" (such as their permanent atoms): since they have obstruction, they ought, like a coarse, plain clod of earth, to be "impermanent" (whatever has obstruction is impermanent) — which contradicts your calling them "permanent." And again, those things among the six classes that are "grasped by a sense-organ yet without obstruction" (such as the colors and tastes in the "quality" class) ought by rights all to "have obstruction" — for since you concede they are grasped by a sense-organ, they are on the same footing as earth-water-fire-wind (grasped by a sense-organ, and having obstruction); whatever is grasped by a sense-organ ought to have obstruction — which clashes with your saying they have none.
Again, those Vaiśeṣika items that "do not count as substance-class qualities" and so on (things not subsumed under the category "substance") ought by rights to have no nature of their own apart from consciousness — for since they are "not subsumed under the 'substance' class," they are like "a barren woman's son" (a barren woman cannot bear, so this son simply does not exist). And again, those things "not subsumed under the 'being' class" (not falling under the category "being," 有) ought to have no nature apart from consciousness either — for since they are "not subsumed under the 'being' class," they are like "a flower in the sky" (a flower seen by dazzled eyes, which in fact is not there).
The Vaiśeṣika also set up an overarching "being" (called "being-ness," or "the great category of being," meaning the universal ground by which all things come to count as "existent"). Against it, press from two sides: on one side, this "being," apart from substance, quality, and the rest, ought to have no nature of its own — for you concede it "is not non-existent, it is existent," and so it is on the same footing as substance, quality, and the rest (whatever is existent is inseparable from concrete dharmas like substance and quality). On the other side, if you insist this "being" exists separately, apart from substance and the rest, then it ought conversely to "not be existent" — for you concede it is other than substance and the rest, and so it is on the same footing as "utter nothing" (apart from every concrete dharma, it amounts to nothing at all).
Refute it further by a symmetrical question: take "being" itself — it is on its own "not non-existent" (it is itself existent), and needs no further "being-ness" added on top ("being" itself need not rely on some other "being" to count as existent); that being so, what need have substance, quality, and the rest of a further "being-ness" (the great being) added on, to count as "existent"? Furthermore, if you maintain that "apart from the 'being-things' (concrete existents) there is a separate 'being-ness,'" then by the same reasoning there ought also to be, "apart from the 'non-being-things' (concrete non-existents), a separate 'non-being-ness'" — yet you Vaiśeṣika do not concede this latter (you do not admit a separate independent "non-being-ness"); and since you reject the latter, how can the former (a separate independent "being-ness") stand? So your "being-ness" is purely guessed up out of nothing. (The refutation of the "great being" category ends here.)
The Vaiśeṣika maintain further that there are such things as "substance-ness, quality-ness, motion-ness" (the common ground by which a thing comes to count as a "substance," a "quality," a "motion" — falling under the category "the common"), and that these "-nesses" are a separate matter from "substance, quality, motion" themselves (the -ness lying outside the body). This account is bound to fail. Why? Because following out the road of "the -ness lies outside the body, the -ness is other than the body" leads to an endless regress. First, this "substance-ness" itself would also need yet another "-ness" (a -ness beyond the -ness), or else it would not itself count as a "substance-, quality-, or motion-ness" — for by your logic it is a separate matter from substance and the rest, just as quality and motion are a separate matter from substance (and so, layer upon layer, with no end). Second, "substance" itself would then no longer count within the class "substance," for by your account it is a separate matter from "substance-ness" (since body and -ness are two separate matters, the body is shut out of the -ness and not taken in). And likewise the "-ness" of earth and the rest, set against the "body" of earth and the rest, can be pressed the same way layer by layer — the rest is understood by this same reasoning. (The refutation of the "-ness" of the category "the common" ends here.)
Refute it by a symmetrical question: take "substance-ness" — it does not need yet another "substance-ness-ness" perched on top (a -ness needs no further -ness); that being so, substance and the rest need no separate "substance-ness" perched on them either (the body needs no further -ness). Furthermore, if you maintain "apart from substance and the rest there is a separate substance-and-the-rest-ness," then by the same reasoning there ought also to be, "apart from the not-substance-and-the-rest, a separate not-substance-and-the-rest-ness" — yet you Vaiśeṣika do not concede this latter; and since you reject the latter, how can the former stand? So the two "-nesses," "the common" and "the distinct," are merely conventionally posited names. (The refutation of the two categories "the common" and "the distinct" ends here.)
Next, refute the sixth category, "inherence" (the relation that binds the foregoing classes together). It is bound to be not really existent — for it is not subsumed under "being, substance," and the rest (it counts as neither substance, nor quality, nor being), and so is like "utter nothing" (what no class can take in amounts to nothing at all). Moreover, even those items the Vaiśeṣika themselves concede are "seen by direct perception" (substance, quality, etc.) have already been refuted by reasoning and cannot be established as really existent; how much less can "inherence," which even the Vaiśeṣika themselves concede is "not seen by direct perception," be really existent? And even if you insist "inherence" too is an object seen at first hand, then by the reasoning already given (an assembled conventional thing, made of many things, is not really existent) it is not really existent all the same.
To sum up: the Vaiśeṣika "substance" and the rest are not got by perceiving "a substance really existing apart from consciousness" at first hand — for you concede they "are objects of cognition (the known)," and whatever is an object of cognition is not really existent apart from consciousness, just like "tortoise-fur" (fur on a tortoise, which simply does not exist). And taking it apart: your "cognition that refers to 'substance'" is not a genuine direct perception "referring to a substance-body apart from consciousness" — for it "arises from a confluence of conditions," just like the "cognition that refers to 'quality'" (assembled into arising, not directly facing some real substance). Following this out all the way, even the "cognition that refers to 'inherence'" is not a genuine direct perception "referring to an inherence-body apart from consciousness" — for it too arises from a confluence of conditions, just like the "cognition that refers to 'substance'" (every cognition that arises from a confluence of conditions refers to no substance existing apart from consciousness). So the Vaiśeṣika masters' six categories, substance and the rest, are likewise posited following their own feeling, out of nothing. (The refutation of the Vaiśeṣika ends here.)
(iii) Refuting Maheśvara and the like (one cause producing all dharmas)
Next, the third school. One school of heterodox maintains: there is a "Maheśvara" (the Great Sovereign God), whose body is real, all-pervading, and permanent, and who can produce all dharmas. This position does not hold. Why? Here three statements chain one to the next: whatever "can produce things" is necessarily not permanent (since it can produce, it has change — how could it be permanent and unchanging?); whatever "is not permanent" is necessarily not all-pervading (since it changes, it is confined to certain times and places, and cannot be everywhere); and whatever "is not all-pervading" is not the "real" you speak of (the very thing you set up was "real-pervading-permanent" bound together, so not-pervading does not fit your own definition). Pressed down this chain, your "real, pervading, permanent" is dismantled point by point.
Press from the other side: since his body is at once permanent, all-pervading, and possessed of the power to produce all dharmas, he ought to produce all dharmas all at once, in every place and at every time (being permanent, pervading, and able, there is nothing to wait for). If you plead, "He must still wait until Maheśvara raises the wish to produce, or until various conditions are assembled, before he can produce," then this contradicts your own thesis that "all dharmas are produced by Maheśvara as the single cause" (for if he must wait on a wish and on conditions, then he is not the only cause). And again, that "wish to produce" and "the various conditions" ought, by rights, to be produced by him all at once, without before or after (for the cause that produces them — Maheśvara — is permanently present, and a permanent cause should yield its effects permanently, all at once). So the road of "waiting on a wish, waiting on conditions" does not work either.
Besides this, there are heterodox who take "Brahmā, time, space, the primal limit (the first starting-point of all things), nature, the void, the spirit-self," and the like, to be the one permanent, really-existent source, possessed of the power to produce, that produces all things. These positions are all refuted by the very same reasoning used against Maheśvara, and are all dismantled one by one. (Every position of this type — "all dharmas produced by some single cause" — is hereby refuted in full.)
(iv) Refuting the sound-is-permanent school (the Vedic sound is permanent · all sound is permanent)
Next, the fourth school — those who maintain "sound is permanent." Within this there are two accounts. One, a narrow attachment: the sound of the "Vedic treatises" (the Veda, the brahmins' sacred scripture) is permanent and unchanging, can serve as an absolutely reliable standard, and can be used to express and designate all dharmas. The other: not only the Veda but all sound is permanent, only ordinarily hidden, becoming manifest — and so coming to have its designating, expressing function — when conditions are met (for instance, when someone opens his mouth). Both accounts fail. Why?
Take first the Vedic sound. Since you concede it "can designate" (can express meaning), it must be not permanent — for every sound that can express meaning is impermanent, just like all the other sounds. And the other sounds, too, must be not "a permanent sound-body," on the same footing as a pot or a garment — for they all sound forth only when various conditions (mouth, tongue, breath, and so on) are met, and whatever requires conditions in order to be is impermanent. (So "sound is permanent" cannot stand; the refutation of the sound-is-permanent school ends here.)
(v) Refuting permanent, real atoms producing coarse form
One school of heterodox maintains: the "atoms" (極微, the smallest motes) of earth, water, fire, wind are real and permanent, and can produce "coarse form" (gross, plainly visible bodies); they say further that the coarse form produced does not exceed the measure of its cause (the atom), and that this coarse form, though impermanent, has a really-existent body. This position too does not hold. Why?
This atom you speak of, press from two sides: either it has "spatial division" (has position, has parts — up, down, left, right), and then it is like a line of ants strung out, which can be taken apart one by one, so its body is not real (what can be taken apart is not an indivisible real thing); or it has no spatial division, and then it is on the same footing as "mind and the mental factors" (which also have no spatial parts), and so it could not gather together with others to produce a coarse fruit-body (what has no position cannot lie side by side and pile up into something large). Furthermore, since it can produce a fruit, it ought, like the fruit it produces, to be impermanent (whatever produces a fruit undergoes change); so how can you say the atom is permanent and unchanging?
Again, since the fruit produced does not exceed the measure of its cause (the atom), it ought to be as tiny as an atom, and so cannot count as "coarse form" (gross, plainly visible); and being this tiny, this fruit-form ought then not to be graspable by the eye and the other sense-organs (an atom is too small to be a sense-object) — which clashes with your own thesis that "the atom produces coarse form."
You may shift your plea: "Though the fruit-form is as tiny as the atom, it has combined with a 'measure-quality' (an attribute that makes a thing appear coarse), so that, while not truly coarse, it appears coarse, and the sense-organ can grasp it." This too fails, pressing from two sides: since this fruit-form you speak of is as large as its cause (the atom), it ought, like the atom, to have "no combination with a measure-quality" (the atom having no measure-quality, the fruit of the same size should have none either); or else, conversely, the atom too ought, like the fruit, to "have combination with a measure-quality" (the fruit having it, the cause should have it too) — for the fruit and its cause are in no different place at all (being the same size and in the same place, whether or not there is a "measure-quality" should be the same for both).
You may plead again: "The fruit-form spreads over the whole heap of its causes (the many atoms); the causes being not one but a whole heap, the fruit-form can be called 'coarse.'" This too fails: on this account, the body of this fruit-form ought to be "not one" (scattering into many along with the heap of causes), just like the heap of atoms it spreads over, each in its own place, apart from one another. And since the fruit-form has scattered into many (spread out over atom after atom), it still does not amount to "coarse" (scattered and not gathered, it cannot be coarse); and so it is, once again, not graspable by a sense-organ.
If you say "the fruit becomes coarse by many parts (many small portions of the fruit) combining," then "the whole heap of atoms acting as cause," once assembled, ought likewise to be no longer tiny (many atoms put together are coarse too), so the atoms themselves would already suffice as the sense-object — and what need then of a separate "fruit"? (A heap of causes already serves as the object; setting up a fruit besides is redundant.) Moreover, since the fruit is composed of many parts put together, it ought to be not really existent (what many things are put together into is an assembled conventional thing); and so your thesis "the body of the fruit is really existent" contradicts itself, front and back.
Again, since the fruit and the cause both have "obstruction" (take up space, mutually block), they ought not to be in the same place (two things that both take up space cannot crowd into one spot), just as two atoms cannot admit each other. If you plead, "The bodies of fruit and cause penetrate and admit each other, as sand admits water, or as medicine enters molten copper," then this is refuted thus: who concedes that "the bodies of sand and copper" truly admit the "water and medicine" into themselves (water held in the gaps of sand, medicine mixed into copper — these are just things mingling in the interstices; it is not that the bodies truly penetrate each other)? Furthermore, if fruit and cause truly penetrate each other's bodies, then they ought either to "come apart" or to "be altered," becoming "not one, and not permanent" (once they penetrate each other, the body is changed — which contradicts your "permanent, and one").
Again, this fruit of coarse form — if its body is "one" (a single whole), then when you touch a small part of it you ought to touch the whole (to touch one place is to have touched the entire thing), for this place and that place are originally one whole, and that place ought to be just like this one (touch one place, and the whole is touched, the whole moves at once). This forces you into a dilemma: if you do not concede that "touching a part is touching the whole," you contradict your own principle that "the body of the fruit is a single whole"; if you do concede it, you contradict the plain fact the world sees (one can plainly touch a small patch and not the whole). So your thesis cannot be established, whether you concede or refuse; it is merely guessing and reckoning following your own feeling. (The refutation of "atoms producing coarse form" ends here.)
(vi) General refutation of the four heterodox positions (the dharma-thing and being-ness · one, other, both, neither)
Though the heterodox are many in their sects, on the relation between "the dharma-thing" (有法, the concrete dharmas of every kind) and "being-ness" (有等性, the shared nature by which those dharmas come to count as "existent"), all their accounts come down to just four positions:
First position: "the dharma-thing and being-ness are definitely one in substance," as with the Sāṃkhya and the like. This does not hold. Why? On this account, every dharma would just equal that "being-ness"; and since all equal the one being-ness, their substances would have no difference — which then contradicts the Sāṃkhya's own thesis that "the three qualities, the spirit-self, and the rest are each distinct in substance," and contradicts as well the plain phenomenon that the world's many dharmas are each different. Further, if "form and the rest just equal the nature of form and the rest," then form and the rest ought to have no differences such as "blue, yellow" (the substance being one single nature, blue and yellow could not be told apart).
Second position: "the dharma-thing and being-ness are definitely other in substance," as with the Vaiśeṣika and the like. This does not hold. Why? On this account (the -ness lying outside the dharma, the dharma itself not being the -ness), every dharma would then not be "being-ness"; and since the dharma itself does not count as "existent," it would be like "what has already perished into nothing," with no substance to be found at all — which contradicts the Vaiśeṣika's own thesis that "the substance of substance and the rest is not non-existent," and contradicts as well the plain fact that the world sees there are things. Further, if "form and the rest do not equal the nature of form and the rest" (body and -ness being two separate matters), then form and the rest ought, like sound, to not be an object of the eye (the -ness having parted from form, form would no longer count as something the eye can see).
Third position: "the dharma-thing and being-ness are both one and other," as with the Nirgrantha ("the Shameless") and the like. This does not hold. Why? Here are three faults. First, its "being one" and "being other" each incur the very faults already laid out in refuting the first and second positions (what was said there against "one" and against "other" applies here just the same). Second, "being one" and "being other" are by nature mutually opposed, so their substances ought to be distinct (the two substances of one and other cannot be crammed onto the same dharma). Third, since the substances of "one" and "other" are held to be the very same (you insist they sit together on one dharma), neither "being one" nor "being other" can be established (two mutually opposed things cannot both stand at once). And surely you cannot say all dharmas are alike one single substance (take only the "being one" side, and you fall into the fault of the first position). Otherwise, this "both one and other" can only be conventional, not real; yet you insist on grasping it as real — and this is bound to fail. (The refutation of "both one and other" ends here.)
Fourth position: "the dharma-thing and being-ness are neither one nor other," as with the Ājīvika ("the wrong-livelihood heterodox") and the like. This does not hold. Why? This "neither one nor other" account incurs the same faults as the "other" and "one" positions before it (say "not one" and you fall to the "other" side; say "not other" and you fall to the "one" side). Press it further: is your statement "neither one nor other" a "warding-off" (a sheer denial, blocking the words away) or a "positing" (positively setting up a claim)? This walls you in on four sides: if it is purely a positing, you ought not to deny both "one" and "other" outright (if you are setting something up, you cannot reject both sides); if it is purely a warding-off denial, then you have set up no claim at all (sheer denial that posits nothing cannot serve as your thesis); if you say it is "both denying and positing," then denying and positing are themselves mutually opposed; and if you say it is "neither positing nor denying," then it becomes an empty, meaningless phrase.
Further, "neither one nor other" contradicts the common knowledge of all the world that "some things are one and the same, some are different," and contradicts as well their own thesis that "form and the other dharma-things are definitely really existent." So this account is merely a trick to dodge others' challenges (an evasive, empty phrase with no real content); let those who have wisdom not muddle-headedly grant it. (The refutation of these four heterodox positions ends here.)
〔所釋之頌〕廣釋第一頌·破法執
破完了「我」，接著破「法」——那些被當成「心外實有」的東西。這一節先破外道：數論、勝論、大自在天等、聲常論，以及執極微實有能生麁色者，末以『有法與有性』四宗總破之。至於小乘所執的色法、不相應行，別為次章。
破「法」這一分，經論早有所本。《解深密經·分別瑜伽品》說「我說識所緣，唯識所現」——所緣既唯識所現，則心外實法無立足處，此為通破法執之經本。論本則在《瑜伽師地論·本地分》所定「識，謂現前了別所緣境界」：所了別者不離能了別，離識之法不可得。下面逐宗破之。 破「法」這一分，經論早有所本。《解深密經·分別瑜伽品》說「我說識所緣，唯識所現」，又說「此中無有少法能見少法；然即此心如是生時，即有如是影像顯現」——所緣之境唯是識變（如鏡以本質為緣還照本質），心外並無一個被見的實境，這正是破「識外實有諸法」所宗的經本。《楞伽經》以「觀三界唯心分齊，離我我所」一句，顯諸法唯心、外境非有其性。到《瑜伽師地論》，更把「法」判為三自性——「遍計所執自性、依他起自性、圓成實自性」，並指明所謂遍計所執，就是「依假名言，數數周遍計度諸法而建立」的，所以『由相無自性故，說遍計所執自性為無自性』。本論這一節所破的外道、小乘所執的實法，正是「遍計所執」（依假名言計度而立、畢竟無體）；所立的內識變似，正是「依他起」。其經根在《解深密》《楞伽》，其論本在《瑜伽師地論》——下面順著本論講開。
一、總標：心外諸法也不可得
怎麼知道心外確實沒有實有的諸法、只有內識變似外境而生？因為外道與小乘所執的心外法，於理都非實有。
二、破外道所執的實法
數論（二十三諦·三事合成）
數論師執「神我」是「思」（受用者），所受用的是薩埵、剌闍、答摩三德合成的「大」（覺）等二十三法；又說大等諸法雖三德合成卻是實有非假、是現量直見的。論主層層破：
其一，大等既是『多事（三德）合成』，就該像「軍」（眾兵合成）、「林」（眾樹合成）一樣是假法，怎能說是現量所得的實有？其二，大等若真實有，就該像三德「本事」一樣不由合成；反過來，薩埵等三德既然就是大等之體（與大等不異），也就該像大等一樣由三合成、轉變無常——以此互難，三德也立不成實常之本。其三，三德本事各具多種功能（薩埵主喜、剌闍主憂、答摩主闇），那它的「體」也該是多（因功能與體是一）；而三德之體既各各周遍，那麼一處變動時、其餘各處也該同時跟著變（體周遍無別，局不住一處）。其四，既承認三德的「體」「相」各各有別，又怎能和合成『一個相』？不該在和合時忽然變成一相，因為和合時與未合時、它的體並沒有差別（體不變，相憑什麼變一）。其五，若救說『三德體異而相同（相同故能合一）』，這就違了自宗「體相是一」的立論；何況體相既一，體也該像相一樣冥然成一、相也該像體一樣顯然成三——所以不能說「三合成一」。其六，三德是「別」、大等是「總」，總別既是一，就該『非一非三』；三德變現時，若不和合成一相，就該像沒變時一樣仍是三，怎會現見是「一」色？若和合成一相，就該丟掉本來的別相，連體也跟著丟。其七，也不能救說『三德各有總、別二相（總故見一、別故見三）』——因『總即是別』，總相也該是三，怎能見一？其八，再救說『三德的體各含三相，和雜難分故見為一』——既已有了三相，又怎能見為一？而且既和雜難分，你又怎知三德彼此有異？其九，若那三德每一個都已具足三相，那每一個單獨就能成色等了（一德已具三，何待合），還缺什麼要等三德和合？而且體也該各成三（每德三相、體即相）。其十，大等諸法既都由三德合成，彼此一比就該毫無差別，如此『因（自性）、果（大等）、五唯、五大、諸根』的種種差別都立不起來。其十一，這樣一來，一根就該能取一切境、或一境被一切根所取；世間現見的有情與非情、淨與穢、乃至現量與比量，都該無差別了——這是大過失。所以數論的實法不能成立，只是妄情計度。
勝論（六句義·實等）
勝論師執『實、德、業、同、異、和合』六句義多是實有、現量所得。論主逐項破：
先就「常住」的句義（如常住之實、極微）說：它若能生果，就該無常（有作用故，如它所生的果）；若不生果，就該非離識實有，如兔角。再就「無常」的句義說：它若有質礙，就有方分、可分析，如軍如林、非實有；若無質礙，就如心、心所，應非離識而有實自性。
再以「實句」與「德句」互例：你執的「地、水、火、風」（實句）應「非有礙」——因它們與「堅、濕、煖、動」（德句，無質礙）同是身根所觸；反過來，你執的「堅、濕、煖」（德句）應「非無礙」——因它們與地水火風（有礙）同是身根所觸。又地、水、火三者與「青色」同是眼所見，也可照樣徵責。所以並沒有『實的地水火風』與「堅濕」等各別自有其性，眼睛也不是真見到實的地水火（所見只是青色等顯色）。又：實句裡『有礙而常』的（如常住極微）既都有礙，就該像粗顯的地一樣無常；而諸句義裡『色根所取卻無質礙』的法，又該都是有礙的（既許色根能取，就如地水火風），這就和它「無礙」的立場相違。
再破『不屬實、不屬有』者：你執的『非實的德』等（不屬實句的），應非離識別有自性，因為它不被實句所攝，如石女的兒（根本不實有）；你執的『非有性所攝』者（不屬『有』句的），也應非離識別有自性，因為它不被有句所攝，如空中花。
破「大有」句：你執的「有」（大有），應是離了實、德等便無別自性，因為你承認它「非無」（是有），如實、德等；可若說「有」離開實等別有，它又該「非有性」了，因為你承認它異於實等，如「畢竟無」（離一切法者同於畢竟無）。正如「有」本身的「非無」並不另加一個「有性」（有不必再有個有），那實等諸法又何必另立一個「有性」加上去才算有？若說『離了『有法』別有一個『有性』』，那『離了『無法』也該別有一個『無性』』——你既不承認後者，前者又怎能成立？所以「大有」之性只是妄情計度。
破「同、異」句：你執的『實性、德性、業性』異於「實、德、業」本身，這定然不成；否則（性可異於體），這「實性」自己也該不是「實德業性」了（性外還得有性），因為它異於實等，如德、業——這就無窮。又該「實等」自己也不被「實等性」所攝了，因為它異於實等性，如德、業、實。正如「實性」之上並不另有一個『實性之性』，那「實等」之上也不該另有一個「實性」。若說『離了實等別有實等性』，那『離了非實等也該別有非實等性』——你既不承認後者，前者又怎能成立？所以「同、異」二性只是假施設。地等諸法的「性」對地等之「體」，也可照樣互相徵詰。
破「和合」句：你執的「和合」定非實有，因為它不被「有、實」等諸法所攝，如畢竟無。你連自己承認是現量所得的實等，以理一推都尚且非實，何況「和合」你自己也承認非現量所得，怎會是實有？就算硬說和合是現量之境，由前面的道理（多合假法非實）也還是非實。
最後總收：你那「實」等其實並非緣到離識而實有的自體、由現量所得，因為它「是所知」，凡所知的就如龜毛（非離識實有）；而且，緣「實」的智也不是緣離識實句自體的現量智，因為它是「假合而生」，如緣「德」的智……如此乃至緣「和合」的智也一樣。所以勝論的「實」等句義，同樣是隨情妄加施設。
大自在天等（一因生諸法）
有外道執有一「大自在天」，體是實、是遍、是常，能生諸法。論主三句連破：凡「能生」的必不常（有變動），凡「不常」的必不遍（局於時處），凡「不遍」的就非真實。何況體既常、遍、又具生力，就該一切處、一切時頓生一切法；若說要等它起「欲」、或等眾「緣」才生，就違背了『一因生諸法』之說（既要待欲緣便不是單一因），而那「欲」與「緣」也該頓時並起（因常之故）。其餘執『大梵、時、方、本際、自然、虛空、神我』等為常住實有、具生力而生一切法的，都照此例破。
聲常論（明論聲常·一切聲常）
有人偏執『明論（吠陀）之聲是常』、能作定量、能表詮諸法；也有人執『一切聲都常』、待緣顯發才有詮表。二說都不成：明論的聲既然承認「能詮」，就該像別的聲一樣非常住；其餘的聲也該非常住之體，像瓶、衣一樣是待眾緣（口舌等）才顯的。
極微實常能生麁色
有外道執『地水火風的極微實而常、能生麁色』，且所生的麁色不超過極微的量，雖無常而體實有。論主破：所執的極微，若有方分，就像螞蟻的行列一樣可分，體應非實；若無方分，就如心、心所，應不能共聚生出麁果色（無方分則無從合聚）。而且它既能生果，就該像它所生的果一樣無常，怎能說極微常住？又：所生的果既不超過極微的量，就該像極微一樣小、不得叫「麁色」，那這果色就非眼等色根所能取了，這就違了你「能生麁色」的本意。若救說『果色因為和『量德（粗大之德）』相合，雖非真麁而似麁、色根能取』，破云：所執的果色既與極微同量，就該像極微一樣沒有「麁德合」（極微既無麁德，同量的果也該無）；或反過來，極微也該『有麁德合』了（果有則因也該有）——因為果與因所在之處並無分別。若再救說『果色周遍在它的眾多自因之上、因不止一個，所以可名為麁』，那這果色的體就該「非一」、像它所在的眾因一樣處處各別；既然非一（散在眾微），這果還是不成其麁（散而不聚則不麁），也就非色根所取了。
總破外道四宗（有法與「有」性·一異俱非）
外道品類雖多，論到『諸法（有法）』與『『有』等性（能別）』的關係，不出四種，論主一一破：
第一，執『體定是一』（如數論）：那一切法都該等於「有性」、彼此體無差別，這就違了你自家『三德、神我體各異』、也違世間萬象有別；又若『色等即是色等之性』，色等就該沒有青、黃等差異了。第二，執『體定是異』（如勝論）：那一切法都該不是「有性」、法外無有、等於已滅之無，這就違了你自家「實等自體非無」、也違現見有物；又若『色等不是色等之性』，色等就該像聲一樣不是眼的境了。第三，執「亦一亦異」（如無慚、尼犍子）：它一來兼犯前「一」「異」二說的過失，二來「一」與「異」二相相違、體該各別、不能同居一法。第四，執「非一非異」（如邪命外道）：它的過同於前面（非一即墮異、非異即墮一）；再者，這「非一非異」的話到底是「遮」還是「表」？純是表詮就不該雙否，純是遮遣就無所立、不能執為宗義，又遮又表就自相違，非遮非表就成戲論——還違背世間明明有『一物、異物』的常識。所以這些都只是矯飾躲過的遁辭，有智慧的人別上當。
承衍
破外道實法一分，後出諸論各承其義。《二十唯識論》以「處、時定如夢」等四事成立唯識無境，正是本節破外道實法之同軌。《辯中邊論·辯相品》以虛妄分別攝能取所取，本節所破之『有法與有性』即所取一邊之執。《攝大乘論·所知相分》明遍計所執性畢竟無所有，本節逐宗所破者，即此遍計所執之種種相。《百法明門論》立五位百法而無外道所計之諦、句義，其取捨即本於此類破義。
〔Verses commented〕Unfolding verse 1 · refuting the dharma-attachment
The self refuted, the treatise turns to dharmas — the things taken to be real outside the mind. This chapter refutes the heterodox first: Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika, Maheśvara and the rest, the eternality of sound, and those who hold real atoms capable of producing gross form; it closes with a general refutation of the four positions concerning a thing and its being. The form-dharmas and non-concurrent formations held by the Lesser Vehicle form the next chapter.
The refutation of dharmas has its ground in scripture and treatise. The Saṃdhinirmocana, in its chapter on discerning yoga, says: I declare that what consciousness takes as object is only what consciousness manifests. If the object is only what consciousness manifests, a real dharma outside the mind has nowhere to stand — the scriptural ground for the refutation of dharma-attachment at large. The treatise ground is the Yogācārabhūmi, Basic Section, which fixes consciousness as the present discerning of an object: what is discerned is never apart from the discerning, and a dharma apart from consciousness cannot be found. What follows refutes school by school. This refutation of "dharmas" has its roots in scripture and treatise alike. The Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, in its chapter on the analysis of yoga, says "I declare that the object of consciousness is only what consciousness manifests," and again "here there is no dharma that perceives any dharma; rather, when this mind arises in such a way, just such an image appears" — the object cognized is only consciousness transforming (as a mirror, taking its own substance as condition, reflects back that very substance), and there is no real object outside the mind that is perceived. This is the very scriptural root of refuting "the various dharmas really existing apart from consciousness." The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, with the line "contemplate that the three realms are mind-only in their measure, apart from self and what is mine," displays that all dharmas are mind-only and that outer objects have no nature of their own. The Yogācārabhūmi goes further and assigns "dharmas" to the three own-natures — "the own-nature of what is wholly wholly-imagined, the other-dependent own-nature, and the perfectly-accomplished own-nature" — and makes plain that what is called "wholly wholly-imagined" is "established by repeatedly and pervasively reckoning dharmas on the basis of nominal speech," so that "because of the absence of own-nature in characteristic, the own-nature of what is wholly wholly-imagined is said to be without own-nature." The real dharmas grasped by the non-Buddhist and Lesser-Vehicle schools that this section refutes are precisely "what is wholly wholly-imagined" (established by nominal-speech reckoning, ultimately without essence); and the inner consciousness transforming into the semblance (of an object) that it establishes is precisely "the other-dependent." Its scriptural root is in the Saṃdhinirmocana and the Laṅkāvatāra, its treatise-basis in the Yogācārabhūmi — and with that we follow the treatise and open the exposition.
I. The general thesis: dharmas outside the mind also cannot be found
How do we know that there are in fact no really-existing dharmas outside the mind, and that there is only the inner consciousness transforming so as to resemble an outer object and thereby arising? Because the dharmas-outside-the-mind grasped by both the non-Buddhist schools and the Lesser Vehicle are, when reasoned through, not really existent.
II. Refuting the real dharmas grasped by the non-Buddhist schools
Sāṃkhya (the twenty-three principles, compounded of the three constituents)
The Sāṃkhya teachers hold that the "spirit-self" (puruṣa) is the "intelligence" — the experiencer — and that what it experiences is the "great one" (mahat, intellect) and so on, twenty-three dharmas, all compounded out of the three constituents sattva, rajas, and tamas. They further claim that, although the great one and the rest are compounded from the three constituents, they are nonetheless really existent and not merely nominal, being directly given to perception. The master refutes this in layer after layer.
First: since the great one and the rest are "compounded from many items" (the three constituents), they ought, like an "army" (compounded of many soldiers) or a "forest" (compounded of many trees), to be merely nominal dharmas — how then can they be called really existent items obtained by direct perception?
Second: if the great one and the rest were truly existent, they ought, like the three constituents that are the "underlying substances," not to be produced by compounding. Conversely, since the three constituents sattva and the rest just are the very essence of the great one and the rest (being non-different from them), they too ought, like the great one and the rest, to be compounded out of three and to be impermanent in their transformation. By this mutual objection the three constituents themselves cannot be established as a real, permanent ground.
Third: each of the three underlying constituents possesses many distinct capacities (sattva governs joy, rajas governs distress, tamas governs darkness), so its "essence" too ought to be many (since capacity and essence are one and the same). And since the essence of each of the three constituents is everywhere pervasive, then when one place undergoes change, all the other places ought to change along with it simultaneously (a pervasive, undifferentiated essence cannot be confined to one spot).
Fourth: having granted that the essences and the characteristics of the three constituents are each distinct, how can they then combine into "one single characteristic"? They should not suddenly become one characteristic upon combining, because at the moment of combining the essence is no different from what it was before combining (the essence does not change, so on what could the characteristic become one?).
Fifth: if one tries to save the position by saying "the three constituents have distinct essences but the same characteristic (and being the same in characteristic they can combine into one)," this contradicts the school's own thesis that "essence and characteristic are one." Furthermore, since essence and characteristic are one, the essence too ought, like the characteristic, to merge obscurely into one, and the characteristic too ought, like the essence, to show plainly as three — so one cannot say "three combine into one."
Sixth: the three constituents are the "particulars" and the great one and the rest are the "whole"; and since whole and particular are one, the result ought to be "neither one nor three." When the three constituents manifest, if they do not combine into one characteristic, they ought, as before manifesting, to remain three — so how can what is actually seen be "one" color? And if they do combine into one characteristic, they ought to discard their original particular characteristics, and with them the essence is discarded too.
Seventh: nor can one save the position by saying "each of the three constituents has both a whole-characteristic and a particular-characteristic (whole, hence seen as one; particular, hence seen as three)" — because "the whole just is the particular," the whole-characteristic too ought to be three, so how could one see "one"?
Eighth: nor, again, by saying "the essence of each of the three constituents contains three characteristics, mingled and hard to distinguish, hence seen as one" — for once there are already three characteristics, how can one see them as one? And if they are mingled and hard to distinguish, how then do you know that the three constituents differ from one another at all?
Ninth: if each one of those three constituents already fully possesses three characteristics, then each one alone could form color and the rest (each constituent already has three, so why wait for combining?) — what is still lacking that requires the three constituents to combine? And the essence too ought to form three in each (each constituent has three characteristics, and essence just is characteristic).
Tenth: since the great one and all the rest are compounded from the three constituents, then comparing any with any they ought to show no difference at all; and on this footing the manifold distinctions among "cause (primordial nature), effect (the great one and the rest), the five subtle elements, the five gross elements, and the faculties" can none of them be established.
Eleventh: on this footing, one faculty ought to be able to grasp every object, or one object ought to be grasped by every faculty; and the world's plainly observed distinctions — between sentient and non-sentient, pure and foul, and even between direct perception and inference — ought all to vanish. This is a gross fault. Therefore the real dharmas of Sāṃkhya cannot be established; they are only the reckonings of deluded imagination.
Vaiśeṣika (the six categories: substance and the rest)
The Vaiśeṣika teachers hold that the six categories — substance, quality, motion, generality, particularity, and inherence — are mostly really existent and obtained by direct perception. The master refutes each in turn.
First, regarding the "permanent" categories (such as permanent substances and the atoms): if such a thing can produce an effect, it ought to be impermanent (since it has an operation, like the effect it produces); if it cannot produce an effect, then it ought not to exist really apart from consciousness, like the horns of a hare.
Next, regarding the "impermanent" categories: if such a thing has resistant solidity, then it has spatial parts and can be analyzed, like an army or a forest, and so is not really existent; if it has no resistant solidity, then it is like mind and the mental factors, and so ought not to have a real self-nature apart from consciousness.
Then, taking the "substance" category and the "quality" category as mutual examples: the "earth, water, fire, wind" that you grasp (the substance category) ought to be "non-resistant" — because they, together with "solidity, wetness, warmth, motion" (the quality category, which is non-resistant), are alike touched by the body-faculty; and conversely, the "solidity, wetness, warmth" you grasp (the quality category) ought to be "non-non-resistant" — because they, together with earth, water, fire, and wind (which are resistant), are alike touched by the body-faculty. Again, earth, water, and fire, together with "blue color," are alike seen by the eye, and can be pressed in just the same way. Therefore there are no separately self-existent natures of "real earth, water, fire, wind" and "solidity, wetness," and so on; nor does the eye truly see real earth, water, and fire (what is seen is only the visible color, blue and the rest). Further: among the substance category, those that are "resistant yet permanent" (such as the permanent atoms), being all resistant, ought, like gross manifest earth, to be impermanent; while among the categories, any dharma that is "grasped by a form-faculty yet non-resistant" ought all to be resistant (since you grant a form-faculty can grasp it, it is like earth, water, fire, and wind) — which contradicts its "non-resistant" status.
Next, refuting what is "neither belonging to substance nor belonging to being": the "non-substance qualities" you grasp (those not subsumed under the substance category) ought to have no self-nature separately apart from consciousness, because they are not subsumed by the substance category, like the child of a barren woman (utterly non-existent). And what you grasp as "not subsumed by the nature of being" (not belonging to the "being" category) ought likewise to have no self-nature separately apart from consciousness, because it is not subsumed by the being category, like a flower in the sky.
Refuting the "great being" category: the "being" (great being) you grasp ought to have no separate self-nature once apart from substance, quality, and the rest, because you grant it "is not non-existent" (it is existent), like substance, quality, and the rest. Yet if you say "being" exists separately apart from substance and the rest, then it ought to be "non-being," because you grant it differs from substance and the rest, like "absolute non-existence" (what stands apart from all dharmas is the same as absolute non-existence). Just as "being" itself, in being "not non-existent," does not add some further "nature of being" (being need not have yet another being added), so why should substance and the other dharmas require some additional "nature of being" laid on top before they count as existent? If you say "apart from the dharma-that-has-being there is separately a nature of being," then "apart from the dharma-that-has-non-being there ought separately to be a nature of non-being" — and since you do not grant the latter, how can the former be established? Therefore the nature of "great being" is only the reckoning of deluded imagination.
Refuting the "generality" and "particularity" categories: the "substance-nature, quality-nature, motion-nature" you grasp as different from "substance, quality, motion" themselves definitely cannot be established. Otherwise (if a nature could differ from its essence), this "substance-nature" itself ought also not to be "the nature of substance, quality, and motion" (a nature outside which yet another nature is required), because it differs from substance and the rest, like quality and motion — and this proceeds without end. And "substance and the rest" themselves ought then not to be subsumed by "substance-nature and the rest," because they differ from substance-nature and the rest, like quality, motion, and substance. Just as upon "substance-nature" there is no further "nature of substance-nature," so upon "substance and the rest" there ought not to be a further "substance-nature." If you say "apart from substance and the rest there is separately a substance-nature," then "apart from non-substance and the rest there ought also to be separately a non-substance-nature" — and since you do not grant the latter, how can the former be established? Therefore the two natures, "generality" and "particularity," are merely nominal designations. The "nature" of earth and the rest, in relation to the "essence" of earth and the rest, can likewise be pressed back and forth in the same way.
Refuting the "inherence" category: the "inherence" you grasp is definitely not really existent, because it is not subsumed by the dharmas "being, substance," and the rest, like absolute non-existence. Even the substances and the rest that you yourself grant are obtained by direct perception turn out, on one stroke of reasoning, to be not real — how much more "inherence," which even you grant is not obtained by direct perception: how could it be really existent? And even if one stubbornly insists that inherence is an object of direct perception, by the foregoing reasoning (the compound of many is a nominal dharma, not real) it is still not real.
Finally, the general conclusion: those "substances" and the rest of yours are in fact not apprehensions of self-essences really existing apart from consciousness and obtained by direct perception, because they are "objects of knowledge," and whatever is an object of knowledge is like the hairs of a tortoise (not really existent apart from consciousness). Moreover, the cognition that apprehends "substance" is not a direct-perceptual cognition apprehending the self-essence of the substance category apart from consciousness, because it "arises from a nominal combination," like the cognition apprehending "quality" — and so on, down to the cognition apprehending "inherence," which is the same. Therefore the categories of "substance" and the rest in Vaiśeṣika are likewise designations imposed in keeping with deluded imagination.
Maheśvara and the like (one cause producing all dharmas)
There are non-Buddhists who hold that there is a single "great sovereign god" (Maheśvara) whose essence is real, all-pervasive, and permanent, and who can produce all dharmas. The master refutes this in three linked steps: whatever "can produce" is necessarily not permanent (it undergoes change); whatever is "not permanent" is necessarily not pervasive (it is confined to a time and place); and whatever is "not pervasive" is not truly real. Besides, if its essence is permanent and pervasive and also has productive power, then it ought to produce all dharmas at once, in every place and at every time. And if one says it must wait until it gives rise to "desire," or wait for the assemblage of "conditions," before it produces, then this contradicts the thesis of "one cause producing all dharmas" (needing to wait on desire and conditions means it is not a single cause); and that "desire" and those "conditions" ought themselves to arise all at once (since the cause is permanent). All who grasp at "great Brahmā, time, direction, the original limit, spontaneous nature, empty space, the spirit-self," and so on, as permanently and really existent, possessed of productive power and producing all dharmas, are refuted on this same model.
The eternalist-of-sound schools (the Veda-sound is eternal; all sound is eternal)
Some narrowly hold that "the sound of the treatises of light (the Veda) is eternal," able to serve as a fixed standard and able to express and denote all dharmas; others hold that "all sound is eternal," merely awaiting conditions to be made manifest before it has expressive denotation. Neither view stands: since the Veda-sound is granted to be "denotative," it ought, like other sounds, to be non-eternal; and the other sounds too ought to be of a non-eternal essence, like a jar or a robe, being made manifest only when various conditions (mouth, tongue, and so on) await.
Atoms that are real and permanent and produce gross form
There are non-Buddhists who hold that "the atoms of earth, water, fire, and wind are real and permanent and can produce gross form," and that the gross form so produced does not exceed the measure of the atoms, and though impermanent is nonetheless real in essence. The master refutes: the atoms you grasp, if they have spatial parts, are divisible like a column of ants, and so their essence ought not to be real; if they have no spatial parts, then they are like mind and the mental factors and ought not to be able to aggregate together to produce a gross resultant form (without spatial parts there is no way to combine). Furthermore, since they can produce an effect, they ought, like the effect they produce, to be impermanent — so how can the atoms be called permanent? Again: since the resultant effect does not exceed the measure of the atoms, it ought, like the atoms, to be small and not deserve the name "gross form"; and then that resultant form would not be graspable by the eye and the other form-faculties, which contradicts your own intent that it "produces gross form." If one saves the position by saying "the resultant form, because it combines with the 'quality of magnitude' (the quality of grossness), although not truly gross, resembles gross form and can be grasped by the form-faculties," the refutation is: since the resultant form you grasp is equal in measure to the atoms, it ought, like the atoms, to have no "combination with a quality of grossness" (the atoms have no quality of grossness, so an equal-measured effect ought to have none either); or conversely, the atoms too ought to "have a combination with a quality of grossness" (if the effect has it, the cause ought to as well) — because there is no difference between the place where the effect resides and the place where its cause resides. If one then saves it by saying "the resultant form pervades its many own-causes, and the causes are more than one, so it may be named gross," then the essence of that resultant form ought to be "not one," distinct from place to place like the many causes in which it resides; and since it is not one (scattered across the many atoms), this effect still does not constitute grossness (scattered and not aggregated, it is not gross), and so it is still not grasped by the form-faculties.
General refutation of the four positions of the non-Buddhist schools (the dharma-that-has and the "being"-nature: neither identical, nor different, nor both)
Although the varieties of non-Buddhist schools are many, when it comes to the relation between "dharmas (the subject-that-has)" and "the natures such as 'being' (the predicate)," it does not exceed four positions, and the master refutes them one by one.
First, grasping that "the essence is definitely identical" (as in Sāṃkhya): then all dharmas ought to equal "the nature of being," with no difference of essence among them, which contradicts your own school's "the three constituents and the spirit-self each have distinct essences," and also contradicts the world's manifold distinctions; and if "color and the rest just are the nature of color and the rest," then color and the rest ought to have no differences such as blue, yellow, and so on.
Second, grasping that "the essence is definitely different" (as in Vaiśeṣika): then all dharmas ought not to be "the nature of being," and apart from the dharma there is no being, equal to a non-existence already perished, which contradicts your own school's "the self-essence of substance and the rest is not non-existent," and also contradicts the plainly seen existence of things; and if "color and the rest are not the nature of color and the rest," then color and the rest ought, like sound, not to be objects of the eye.
Third, grasping "both identical and different" (as among the Nirgranthas and the Jainas): this firstly incurs together the faults of both the foregoing "identical" and "different" positions, and secondly, the two characteristics "identical" and "different" are mutually contradictory, so the essences ought to be distinct and cannot reside together in one dharma.
Fourth, grasping "neither identical nor different" (as among the Ājīvika non-Buddhists): its faults are the same as the foregoing (to be non-identical is to fall into difference; to be non-different is to fall into identity); furthermore, is this statement "neither identical nor different" a "negation" or an "affirmation"? If it is purely affirmation, it ought not to doubly deny; if it is purely negation, it establishes nothing and cannot be held as a thesis; if it is both negation and affirmation, it is self-contradictory; if it is neither negation nor affirmation, it becomes idle prattle — and it also contradicts the world's plain common sense that there really are "things identical and things different." Therefore these are all evasive turns of phrase contrived to slip away, and the wise should not be taken in by them.
Onward Transmission
This refutation of the heterodox real dharma is carried forward by the later treatises. The Twenty Verses establishes consciousness-without-object by the four considerations of place, time, and the rest, on the same track as this chapter. The Madhyāntavibhāga, in its chapter on characteristics, gathers grasper and grasped under unreal imagination; what is refuted here as a thing and its being is the grasped side of that. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha, in its chapter on the character of the knowable, shows the wholly-imagined nature to be utterly without existence; the schools refuted one by one here are so many faces of that imagining. The Hundred Dharmas sets out five classes and a hundred dharmas with no place for the principles and categories the heterodox posit — a selection resting on refutations of just this kind.
考據Apparatus
〔所釋之頌〕廣釋第一頌·破法執
一、科判定位
| 科判 | 此章之位 |
|---|---|
| 明唯識相 | 破我執（§2）→ 破法執(一)·破外道 → 破法執(二)·破小乘（次章）→ 破無為·結成唯識（§5） |
| 此章內 | 總標諸法不可得 · 破數論 · 破勝論 · 破大自在天等 · 破聲常論 · 破極微 · 總破外道四宗 |
| 所釋頌 | 《唯識三十論頌》頌一「由假說我、法」之法執一分 |
破我執既畢，本章破法執之外道一分。小乘所執色等諸法，別為次章。
二、源頌 · 義理脈絡
由假說我、法，有種種相轉。 〔T1586 0060a27〕
頌一既言我、法皆是假說，前章已破實我，本章續破實法之外道一分。外道所執有法，不出四宗：有法與有性一、異、亦一亦異、非一非異——四宗俱破，則離識實有之法不可得。
三、經論宗依（經證 → 論本）
經證
我說識所緣，唯識所現故。……此中無有少法能見少法；然即此心如是生時，即有如是影像顯現。 〔解深密經·分別瑜伽品 T676 0698b02–b05〕
如是觀三界唯心分齊，離我我所，無動搖、離去來。 〔楞伽阿跋多羅寶經 T670 0489c02–c03〕
《解深密》以『識所緣唯識所現·無少法能見少法』明所緣境唯是識變（如鏡質為緣還見本質），破『識外實境』——破法執所宗之經本；《楞伽》以『三界唯心·離我我所』明諸法唯心、外境非性。
論本（瑜伽師地論 T1579）
諸法自性略有三種。一、遍計所執自性，二、依他起自性，三、圓成實自性。遍計所執自性者，謂諸所有名言安立諸法自性，依假名言，數數周遍計度諸法而建立故。 〔T1579·攝決擇分 0656c01–c05〕
由相無自性性故，遍計所執自性說無自性。 〔T1579·攝決擇分 0705a02–a03〕
我說識所緣、唯識所現故。……此中無有少法能見少法；然即此心如是生時、即有如是影像顯現。 〔T1579·攝決擇分 0724a06–a09〕
《瑜伽師地論》定「法」之三自性，明所執實法即「遍計所執」（依假名言周遍計度而建立），『由相無自性故說無自性』（破法執之論本：所破即遍計所執自性）；又錄《解深密》「識所緣唯識所現」明境唯識變。護法糅釋所宗，其經在解深密、楞伽，其論在瑜伽師地論——所破之外道小乘實法即「遍計所執」，所立之識變即「依他起」。
四、本論釋要（護法糅釋 · T1585）
總標 · 識外諸法非有
如何識外實有諸法不可得耶？外道、餘乘所執外法，理非有故。 〔T1585 0002b21–b22〕
破小乘色法 · 總標二色
餘乘所執，離識實有色等諸法，如何非有？彼所執色、不相應行及諸無為，理非有故。且所執色總有二種：一者有對，極微所成；二者無對，非極微成。彼有對色定非實有，能成極微非實有故。 〔T1585 0004a07–a11〕
破極微 · 質礙方分二難
謂諸極微，若有質礙，應如瓶等，是假非實。若無質礙，應如非色，如何可集成瓶、衣等？又諸極微，若有方分，必可分析，便非實有。若無方分，則如非色，云何和合承光、發影？ 〔T1585 0004a11–a15〕
有方分故，便可分析，定非實有。故有對色實有不成。 〔T1585 0004a24–a25〕
破五識外緣 · 和合相
眼等五識了色等時，但緣和合，似彼相故，非和合相異諸極微有實自體。分析彼時，似彼相識定不生故，彼和合相既非實有，故不可說是五識緣，勿第二月等能生五識故。 〔T1585 0004b06–b11〕
結成色唯識變 · 色邊際
為執麁色有實體者，佛說極微，令其除析，非謂諸色實有極微。……雖此極微猶有方分，而不可析，若更析之便似空現，不名為色，故說極微是色邊際。由此應知，諸有對色，皆識變現，非極微成。 〔T1585 0004b28–c05〕
破不相應行 · 總標
不相應行亦非實有，所以者何？得、非得等，非如色、心及諸心所體相可得；非異色、心及諸心所作用可得，由此故知定非實有，但依色等分位假立。 〔T1585 0005a06–a10〕
破諸無為 · 總非
諸無為法離色、心等決定實有，理不可得。……不應執為離色、心等實無為性。 〔T1585 0006b15–b23〕
然契經說，有虛空等諸無為法，略有二種：一、依識變假施設有……二、依法性，假施設有……故諸無為非定實有。 〔T1585 0006c05–c20〕
結成唯識 · 總結比量
外道、餘乘所執諸法異心、心所非實有性，是所取故，如心、心所。……諸心、心所依他起故，亦如幻事，非真實有。為遣妄執心、心所外實有境故，說唯有識。若執唯識真實有者，如執外境，亦是法執。 〔T1585 0006c21–c26〕
要義：本論破法執分二大段——破外道所執實法、破小乘所執色等三聚。外道四宗（數論三事合成·勝論六句義·自在天一因生法·聲常·極微生麁色）皆以『多事合成則假·常遍能生則自相違·體相一異俱不成』之理破其實。小乘三聚：色法分有對（極微『有質礙則可析非實·無方分則不能集成承光發影』，故定非實）、無對（五識但緣和合相，和合相非離極微實有，『勿第二月能生五識』；佛說極微唯為破執而假說「色邊際」，非謂色實有極微）；不相應行（得非得等無別體相、無別作用，唯依色等分位假立，逐破得非得·同分·命根·二定無想·有為相·名句文身·隨眠）；無為（離色心實有「理不可得」，虛空擇滅等或依識變假施設、或依法性假施設，「非定實有」）。總結以二比量收：所執諸法「是所取故，如心心所」非實有；心心所「依他起故，亦如幻事」非真實有——故「為遣妄執心心所外實有境故說唯有識」，而「執唯識真實有」亦墮法執。
五、諸家異釋（窺基《述記》T1830）
此即第一外道、小乘略共為問，徵法非有。……今問曰：如何識外實有諸法不可得耶？……此即第二，略答彼問：法體無也。亦答識外，不答識中。 〔T1830 0252a07–a15〕
雖此極微……體即是分而體有方，故言極微猶有方分。……方即分故，非更有分。《瑜伽》說云，極微有方無分者，更無細分，故不相違，以此微相與空相隣故。諸經論皆說極微是色邊際，邊際者是窮盡義，過此更折便為非色。 〔T1830 0272c19–c29〕
不相應者，簡非色、心及諸心所，不相似故，行簡無為。 〔T1830 0276b16–b17〕
此諸無為非即色等，不可言不異，但可言離色等實有定無。大乘真如望有為法，非即非離，不異不一，既殊彼計，故破無失。 〔T1830 0289b17–b20〕
窺基判破法執一段為五段（總問·總答·外道別問破·小乘別問破·結成唯識）；釋「識外」之問乃「外道、小乘略共為問」，答唯遮「識外」不遮『識中（有似法故）』。於「極微」剖「方即分故，非更有分」（極微體即是分而仍有方位，與《瑜伽》「有方無分」不相違，以微相與空相相隣），明「色邊際」即窮盡義（過此更折便為非色）。於「不相應行」釋其名（「不相應」簡色心心所，「行」簡無為）。於「無為」揀大乘真如與薩婆多實有無為之別（彼計離色心實有，大乘真如望有為「非即非離、不異不一」，故所破不及真如）。諸破之救義繫名、伏斷位次，《述記》卷九詳之。
六、譯名 · 古譯對讀（玄奘 ↔ 真諦《轉識論》）
| 義 | 玄奘《成唯識論》 | 真諦《轉識論》 |
|---|---|---|
| 外境（所破） | 外法 · 識外實有諸法 | 塵（「三塵識，即是六識」〔0061c09〕） |
| 境唯識變 | 內識變似色生 | 識轉似塵（「第三塵識者，識轉似塵」〔0062a20〕） |
| 唯識無境 | 為遣妄執心心所外實有境，說唯有識 | 唯識義（「由境無識無故立唯識義」〔0063a23〕） |
| 境識俱遣 | 執唯識真實有，如執外境，亦是法執 | 境識俱遣（「既境識俱遣，何識可成」〔0062c16〕） |
玄奘以『外法／識外實有諸法』標所破、以「內識變似」立能變；真諦《轉識論》以「塵」名外境、以「識轉似塵」明境唯識變，並立「由境無識無故立唯識義」「境識俱遣」——古譯於『破境立識、復遣識執』一義同歸（玄奘『執唯識真實有亦是法執』即真諦「境識俱遣」）。
七、術語
法執（dharma-grāha）— 執諸法（色等）離識實有之自體；對「我執」。本章破之。 遍計所執（parikalpita-svabhāva）— 依假名言周遍計度而建立之自性，畢竟無體；所破之實法即此。 極微（paramāṇu）— 色法分析之最小單位；本論判其唯假（佛為破麁色執而假說「色邊際」）。 有對色 · 無對色（sa-pratigha · a-pratigha rūpa）— 有質礙相障之色／無質礙之色；前者破極微、後者破五識外緣。 不相應行（viprayukta-saṃskāra）— 與心不相應之行法（得·非得·同分·命根等）；唯依色心分位假立。 無為（asaṃskṛta）— 虛空·擇滅·非擇滅等；非離色心實有，依識變或法性假施設。 〔梵文為古德所傳發音輔助。〕
八、互讀（唯識系次第：百法 → 三十頌 → 二十論 → 辯中邊論 → 攝大乘論）
- 百法：色法十一（破其離識實有）· 心不相應行二十四（破得非得等實有）· 無為六（破離色心實有無為）——本章正破此三聚之「實有」執，明其唯識變、唯假立。
- 三十頌：頌一「由假說我法……彼依識所變」——本章釋「法」分（逐頌姊妹）。
- 二十論：正相關。破極微·唯識無境之專論。「極微與六合，一應成六分；若與六同處，聚應如極微」〔T1590 0075c27–c28〕、「極微既無合，聚有合者誰？……是故一實極微不成」〔T1590 0076a06–a12〕——與本章『極微有方分則可析非實』同破極微實有；二十論立「唯識無境」即本章「實無外色，唯有內識變似色生」之張本。
- 辯中邊論：辯相品·虛妄分別（「唯識無境」之所依——識為依他、所執境無）。
- 攝大乘論：所知相分·三性（遍計所執無體、依他起識變——本章所破即遍計所執、所立即依他起）。
章內：破我執（前章·無實我）· 唯識三性（後章·依他·遍計·圓成）· 安立唯識（識變之廣辯）。
九、校本定位
頌 T1586〔0060a27–a28〕· 本論 T1585 破法執〔總標 0002b21–b22·破色 0004a07–c05·破不相應行 0005a06–a10·破無為 0006b15–c20·結成唯識 0006c21–c26〕· 述記 T1830〔五段 0252a07–a20·色邊際 0272c19–c29·不相應行 0276b16–b17·無為 0289b17–b20·結成 0292c11–c12〕· 《轉識論》T1587〔0061c09·0062a20·0062c16·0063a23〕。 〔經證〕解深密 T676〔0698b02–b05〕· 楞伽 T670〔0489c02–c03〕。〔論本〕瑜伽師地論 T1579〔三自性 0656c01–c05·相無自性 0705a02–a03·唯識所現 0724a05–a09〕。〔互讀〕二十論 T1590〔0075c27–c28·0076a06–a12〕。
〔Verses commented〕Unfolding verse 1 · refuting the dharma-attachment
1. Position in Kuiji's Structural Outline
| Outline | Position of this chapter |
|---|---|
| Clarifying the character | refuting the self-attachment (§2) -> refuting the dharma-attachment (I) - the heterodox -> refuting the dharma-attachment (II) - the Lesser Vehicle (next chapter) -> refuting the unconditioned (§5) |
| Within this chapter | the general thesis that dharmas cannot be found - refuting Sāṃkhya - refuting Vaiśeṣika - refuting Maheśvara and the rest - refuting the eternality of sound - refuting real atoms - the general refutation of the four heterodox positions |
| Verses commented | the dharma-attachment portion of Triṃśikā v. 1 |
The refutation of self-attachment complete, this chapter refutes the heterodox portion of the dharma-attachment. The form and other dharmas held by the Lesser Vehicle form the next chapter.
2. Source verses · doctrinal context
由假說我、法，有種種相轉。 〔T1586 0060a27〕
Verse 1 has already said that self and dharmas alike are provisional designations. The previous chapter refuted the real self; this one continues with the heterodox portion of the real dharma. What the heterodox schools hold does not exceed four positions concerning a thing and its being — identical, different, both, or neither. All four refuted, no dharma real apart from consciousness can be found.
3. Scriptural and treatise grounding (scripture → root śāstra)
Scriptural witnesses
我說識所緣，唯識所現故。……此中無有少法能見少法；然即此心如是生時，即有如是影像顯現。 〔Saṃdhinirmocana · Yoga-discernment chapter, T676 0698b02–b05〕
tr. "I teach that the object-support of consciousness is only what consciousness manifests. … Herein no slightest dharma sees any slightest dharma; yet when this very mind arises thus, just such an image appears."
如是觀三界唯心分齊，離我我所，無動搖、離去來。 〔Laṅkāvatāra T670 0489c02–c03〕
tr. "Contemplating thus that the triple world is the bound of mind alone, apart from self and what belongs to self, unshaken, free of coming and going."
The Saṃdhinirmocana, with "the object-support of consciousness is only what consciousness manifests · no slightest dharma sees any slightest dharma," shows that the supporting object is only consciousness's transformation (as a mirror's reflection, taken as object, sees back the original) and refutes "a real object outside consciousness" — the scriptural root for refuting the dharma-attachment; the Laṅkāvatāra, with "the triple world is mind-only · apart from self and what belongs to self," shows all dharmas to be mind-only and the outer object to be without nature.
Root śāstra (Yogācārabhūmi T1579)
諸法自性略有三種。一、遍計所執自性，二、依他起自性，三、圓成實自性。遍計所執自性者，謂諸所有名言安立諸法自性，依假名言，數數周遍計度諸法而建立故。 〔T1579 · Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī 0656c01–c05〕
tr. "The self-nature of dharmas is, in brief, of three kinds: (1) the wholly-imagined (parikalpita) self-nature, (2) the other-dependent (paratantra) self-nature, (3) the perfectly-accomplished (pariniṣpanna) self-nature. The wholly-imagined self-nature is the self-nature of dharmas as established by name-and-word — for, relying on conventional name-and-word, [one] again and again reckons dharmas all around and thereby sets [them] up."
由相無自性性故，遍計所執自性說無自性。 〔T1579 · Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī 0705a02–a03〕
tr. "By reason of the mark-less-ness of self-nature, the wholly-imagined self-nature is said to be without self-nature."
我說識所緣、唯識所現故。……此中無有少法能見少法；然即此心如是生時、即有如是影像顯現。 〔T1579 · Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī 0724a06–a09〕
tr. "I teach that the object-support of consciousness is only what consciousness manifests. … Herein no slightest dharma sees any slightest dharma; yet when this very mind arises thus, just such an image appears."
The Yogācārabhūmi fixes the three self-natures of "dharma," showing the real dharmas held to be the "wholly-imagined" (set up by reckoning all around in dependence on conventional name-and-word), and "by reason of mark-less-ness said to be without self-nature" (the śāstra-root for refuting the dharma-attachment: what is refuted is the wholly-imagined self-nature); it also records the Saṃdhinirmocana's "the object-support of consciousness is only what consciousness manifests," showing the object to be consciousness-transformation alone. What Dharmapāla's redaction takes as authority has its scripture in the Saṃdhinirmocana and Laṅkāvatāra, and its śāstra in the Yogācārabhūmi — the heterodox and Hīnayāna real dharmas refuted are the "wholly-imagined," and the consciousness-transformation established is the "other-dependent."
4. Essentials of the root treatise (Dharmapāla's redaction · T1585)
General statement · dharmas outside consciousness are non-existent
如何識外實有諸法不可得耶？外道、餘乘所執外法，理非有故。 〔T1585 0002b21–b22〕
tr. "How is it that really-existent dharmas outside consciousness cannot be found? Because the outer dharmas held by the heterodox and the other vehicles are, in principle, non-existent."
Refuting Hīnayāna form · the general statement of the two forms
餘乘所執，離識實有色等諸法，如何非有？彼所執色、不相應行及諸無為，理非有故。且所執色總有二種：一者有對，極微所成；二者無對，非極微成。彼有對色定非實有，能成極微非實有故。 〔T1585 0004a07–a11〕
tr. "The form and other dharmas the other vehicles hold to be really existent apart from consciousness — how are they non-existent? Because the form, non-concurrent formations, and unconditioned dharmas they hold are, in principle, non-existent. Now the form they hold is of two kinds: (1) resistant, composed of atoms; (2) non-resistant, not composed of atoms. Their resistant form is definitely not really existent, because the atoms that compose it are not really existent."
Refuting atoms · the twin difficulties of obstruction and spatial division
謂諸極微，若有質礙，應如瓶等，是假非實。若無質礙，應如非色，如何可集成瓶、衣等？又諸極微，若有方分，必可分析，便非實有。若無方分，則如非色，云何和合承光、發影？ 〔T1585 0004a11–a15〕
tr. "That is: each atom, if it has obstructive substance, should — like a pot and so on — be conventional, not real. If it has no obstructive substance, it should be like a non-form: how could it aggregate into pot, cloth, and so on? Again, each atom, if it has spatial division, can necessarily be analyzed, and so is not really existent. If it has no spatial division, then it is like a non-form: how could the aggregate catch light and cast a shadow?"
有方分故，便可分析，定非實有。故有對色實有不成。 〔T1585 0004a24–a25〕
tr. "Because [it] has spatial division it can be analyzed, and so is definitely not really existent. Therefore resistant form's real existence is not established."
Refuting the five consciousnesses' outer object · the aggregated-appearance
眼等五識了色等時，但緣和合，似彼相故，非和合相異諸極微有實自體。分析彼時，似彼相識定不生故，彼和合相既非實有，故不可說是五識緣，勿第二月等能生五識故。 〔T1585 0004b06–b11〕
tr. "When the five consciousnesses (eye and the rest) cognize form and the rest, they refer only to the aggregation, because [their cognition] resembles its appearance; it is not that the aggregated-appearance has a real self-substance apart from the atoms. For when [the atoms] are analyzed, the consciousness resembling that appearance definitely does not arise; the aggregated-appearance being thus not really existent, it cannot be said to be the object of the five consciousnesses — lest a second moon and the like be able to produce the five consciousnesses."
Resolving form into consciousness-transformation · the limit of form
為執麁色有實體者，佛說極微，令其除析，非謂諸色實有極微。……雖此極微猶有方分，而不可析，若更析之便似空現，不名為色，故說極微是色邊際。由此應知，諸有對色，皆識變現，非極微成。 〔T1585 0004b28–c05〕
tr. "For the sake of those who hold coarse form to have a real substance, the Buddha taught atoms, to make them break [it] down — not that forms really possess atoms. … Although this atom still has spatial division, it cannot be [further] analyzed; were it analyzed further it would appear like emptiness and not be called form. Hence the atom is said to be the limit of form. By this it should be known that all resistant form is consciousness's transformed manifestation, not composed of atoms."
Refuting the non-concurrent formations · general statement
不相應行亦非實有，所以者何？得、非得等，非如色、心及諸心所體相可得；非異色、心及諸心所作用可得，由此故知定非實有，但依色等分位假立。 〔T1585 0005a06–a10〕
tr. "The non-concurrent formations are likewise not really existent. Why? Acquisition, non-acquisition, and the rest are not, like form, mind, and the mental factors, to be found as a substance-and-mark; nor are they to be found, as differing from form, mind, and the mental factors, as a function. By this it is known [they are] definitely not really existent, but only conventionally posited upon the states of form and the rest."
Refuting the unconditioned dharmas · the general denial
諸無為法離色、心等決定實有，理不可得。……不應執為離色、心等實無為性。 〔T1585 0006b15–b23〕
tr. "That unconditioned dharmas are definitely really existent apart from form, mind, and the rest cannot in principle be found. … [They] should not be held to be a real unconditioned nature apart from form, mind, and the rest."
然契經說，有虛空等諸無為法，略有二種：一、依識變假施設有……二、依法性，假施設有……故諸無為非定實有。 〔T1585 0006c05–c20〕
tr. "Yet scripture's speaking of unconditioned dharmas such as space and the rest is, in brief, of two kinds: (1) conventionally designated in dependence on consciousness-transformation… (2) conventionally designated in dependence on the dharma-nature… Hence the unconditioned dharmas are not definitely really existent."
Resolving into consciousness-only · the closing inferences
外道、餘乘所執諸法異心、心所非實有性，是所取故，如心、心所。……諸心、心所依他起故，亦如幻事，非真實有。為遣妄執心、心所外實有境故，說唯有識。若執唯識真實有者，如執外境，亦是法執。 〔T1585 0006c21–c26〕
tr. "The dharmas the heterodox and other vehicles hold, [taken as] differing from mind and the mental factors, are without real nature, because they are grasped-objects, as are mind and the mental factors. … Mind and the mental factors, being other-dependent, are likewise illusion-like, not truly existent. To dispel the deluded grasping of a really-existent object apart from mind and the mental factors, it is taught that there is consciousness alone. And if one grasps consciousness-only as truly existent, then — like grasping an outer object — that too is a dharma-attachment."
Essentials: the treatise refutes the dharma-attachment in two great segments — refuting the heterodox real dharmas, and refuting the Hīnayāna's three collections of form and the rest. The four heterodox schools (Sāṃkhya's many-things-combined · Vaiśeṣika's six categories · Maheśvara as the single cause producing dharmas · sound-as-permanent · atoms producing coarse form) are all refuted by the principles that "what is composed of many things is conventional · what is permanent-and-pervasive yet productive contradicts itself · substance and mark as either-one-or-many both fail." The Hīnayāna's three collections: form divides into the resistant (the atom, "if it has obstruction it can be analyzed and is not real · if it has no spatial division it cannot aggregate, catch light, or cast a shadow," hence definitely not real) and the non-resistant (the five consciousnesses refer only to the aggregated-appearance, which is not really existent apart from the atoms — "lest a second moon produce the five consciousnesses"; the Buddha taught the atom only to break attachment, conventionally calling it the "limit of form," not that form really possesses atoms); the non-concurrent formations (acquisition, non-acquisition, and the rest have no separate substance-and-mark and no separate function, being only conventionally posited upon the states of form and the rest — refuting in turn acquisition/non-acquisition · the homogeneous · the life-faculty · the two attainments and no-perception · the conditioned marks · names, phrases, and syllables · the latent dispositions); the unconditioned (that they are really existent apart from form and mind "cannot in principle be found"; space, cessation-through-discrimination, and the rest are conventionally designated either in dependence on consciousness-transformation or in dependence on the dharma-nature, "not definitely really existent"). It closes with two inferences: the dharmas held are "grasped-objects, hence — as are mind and the mental factors — not really existent"; mind and the mental factors are "other-dependent, hence illusion-like" and not truly existent — therefore "to dispel the deluded grasping of a really-existent object apart from mind and the mental factors, it is taught that there is consciousness alone," while "grasping consciousness-only as truly existent" itself falls into the dharma-attachment.
5. Divergent readings across the masters (Kuiji, Shuji T1830)
此即第一外道、小乘略共為問，徵法非有。……今問曰：如何識外實有諸法不可得耶？……此即第二，略答彼問：法體無也。亦答識外，不答識中。 〔T1830 0252a07–a15〕
tr. "This is the first [segment] — the heterodox and the Hīnayāna jointly raising the question, challenging that dharmas are non-existent. … The question now runs: how is it that really-existent dharmas outside consciousness cannot be found? … This is the second — briefly answering their question: the dharma-substance is non-existent. [The answer] also answers 'outside consciousness,' not 'within consciousness.'"
雖此極微……體即是分而體有方，故言極微猶有方分。……方即分故，非更有分。《瑜伽》說云，極微有方無分者，更無細分，故不相違，以此微相與空相隣故。諸經論皆說極微是色邊際，邊際者是窮盡義，過此更折便為非色。 〔T1830 0272c19–c29〕
tr. "Although this atom… its substance is just [its] division, yet the substance has spatial position, hence [the treatise] says the atom still has spatial division. … Spatial position is just [its] division, so there is no further division [beyond it]. Where the Yogācārabhūmi says the atom 'has spatial position but no division,' [it means there is] no finer division [yet to be made] — so there is no contradiction, since this atom-appearance borders on the appearance of emptiness. The scriptures and treatises all say the atom is the limit of form; 'limit' means the sense of exhaustion — break it further beyond this and it becomes non-form."
不相應者，簡非色、心及諸心所，不相似故，行簡無為。 〔T1830 0276b16–b17〕
tr. "'Non-concurrent' screens off [these] from form, mind, and the mental factors, because they are not alike [in them]; 'formation' (行) screens off the unconditioned."
此諸無為非即色等，不可言不異，但可言離色等實有定無。大乘真如望有為法，非即非離，不異不一，既殊彼計，故破無失。 〔T1830 0289b17–b20〕
tr. "These unconditioned [dharmas] are not identical with form and the rest, [yet] cannot be called non-different [from them]; one can only say that, [taken as] really existent apart from form and the rest, they are definitely non-existent. Mahāyāna suchness, with respect to conditioned dharmas, is neither-identical-nor-apart, neither-different-nor-one — and since this differs from their reckoning, the refutation [of theirs] is without fault [against suchness]."
Kuiji divides the dharma-attachment passage into five segments (general question · general answer · the heterodox questioned and refuted · the Hīnayāna questioned and refuted · resolving into consciousness-only); he reads the "outside consciousness" question as one "the heterodox and Hīnayāna jointly raise," the answer warding off only "outside consciousness" and not "within consciousness" (since there is a resembling-dharma there). On the "atom" he parses "spatial position is just [its] division, so there is no further division" (the atom's substance is just its division, yet it still has spatial position, which does not contradict the Yogācārabhūmi's "has spatial position but no division," since the atom-appearance borders on the appearance of emptiness), and shows the "limit of form" to be the sense of exhaustion (break it further and it becomes non-form). On the "non-concurrent formations" he glosses the name ("non-concurrent" screens them off from form, mind, and the mental factors; "formation" screens off the unconditioned). On the "unconditioned" he distinguishes Mahāyāna suchness from the Sarvāstivāda's really-existent unconditioned (their reckoning takes it as really existent apart from form and mind; Mahāyāna suchness, with respect to the conditioned, is "neither-identical-nor-apart, neither-different-nor-one," so the refutation does not reach suchness). The naming of each refutation's rescue-arguments and the stages of suppression and severance are detailed in Shuji fascicle nine.
6. Rendering of terms · old-translation comparison (Xuanzang ↔ Paramārtha, Zhuanshi lun)
| Sense | Xuanzang, Cheng Weishi Lun | Paramārtha, Zhuanshi lun |
|---|---|---|
| the outer object (refuted) | 外法 · 識外實有諸法 outer dharmas · really-existent dharmas outside consciousness | 塵 object-field (「三塵識，即是六識」〔0061c09〕 — "the object-consciousness, i.e. the six") |
| object as consciousness-transformation | 內識變似色生 inner consciousness transforms to resemble form | 識轉似塵 consciousness turns to resemble the object-field (「第三塵識者，識轉似塵」〔0062a20〕) |
| consciousness-only-without-object | 為遣妄執心心所外實有境，說唯有識 to dispel grasping a really-existent object apart from mind and factors, it is taught there is consciousness alone | 唯識義 the consciousness-only meaning (「由境無識無故立唯識義」〔0063a23〕 — "since with the object gone consciousness too is gone, the consciousness-only meaning is set up") |
| object and consciousness both dispelled | 執唯識真實有，如執外境，亦是法執 grasping consciousness-only as truly existent is, like grasping an outer object, a dharma-attachment | 境識俱遣 object and consciousness both dispelled (「既境識俱遣，何識可成」〔0062c16〕 — "object and consciousness both dispelled, what consciousness can be established?") |
Xuanzang marks the refuted as "outer dharmas / really-existent dharmas outside consciousness" and establishes the transformer as "inner consciousness transforming to resemble [form]"; Paramārtha's Zhuanshi lun names the outer object "object-field" (塵) and shows the object as consciousness-transformation with "consciousness turns to resemble the object-field," and sets up "since with the object gone consciousness too is gone, the consciousness-only meaning is established" and "object and consciousness both dispelled." The old and new renderings converge on one sense — "refute the object, establish consciousness, then dispel the grasping of consciousness too": Xuanzang's "grasping consciousness-only as truly existent is also a dharma-attachment" is Paramārtha's "object and consciousness both dispelled."
7. Key terms
- dharma-attachment (法執, dharma-grāha) — grasping dharmas (form and the rest) as really existent self-substances apart from consciousness; the counterpart to the "self-attachment." Refuted in this chapter.
- wholly-imagined (遍計所執, parikalpita-svabhāva) — the self-nature set up by reckoning all around in dependence on conventional name-and-word, ultimately without substance; the real dharmas refuted are this.
- atom (極微, paramāṇu) — the smallest unit of form's analysis; the treatise judges it merely conventional (the Buddha conventionally taught the "limit of form" to break attachment to coarse form).
- resistant form · non-resistant form (有對色 · 無對色, sa-pratigha · a-pratigha rūpa) — form with obstructive, mutually-blocking marks / form without obstruction; the former refutes atoms, the latter refutes the five consciousnesses' outer object.
- non-concurrent formations (不相應行, viprayukta-saṃskāra) — formation-dharmas not concurrent with mind (acquisition · non-acquisition · the homogeneous · the life-faculty, etc.); only conventionally posited upon the states of form and mind.
- unconditioned (無為, asaṃskṛta) — space · cessation-through-discrimination · cessation-not-through-discrimination, and the rest; not really existent apart from form and mind, conventionally designated in dependence on consciousness-transformation or on the dharma-nature.
〔Sanskrit forms are a pronunciation aid transmitted by the ancient masters.〕
8. Cross-reading (the Yogācāra sequence: Baifa → Triṃśikā → Viṃśatikā → Madhyāntavibhāga → Mahāyānasaṃgraha)
- Baifa (Hundred Dharmas): the eleven form-dharmas (refuting their real existence apart from consciousness) · the twenty-four non-concurrent formations (refuting the real existence of acquisition, non-acquisition, and the rest) · the six unconditioned (refuting an unconditioned really existent apart from form and mind) — this chapter refutes precisely the "real existence" attachment to these three collections, showing them to be consciousness-transformation alone, conventional positing alone.
- Triṃśikā: verse 1 "by conventional positing of self and dharmas… these rest on what consciousness transforms" — this chapter expounds the "dharma" portion (the verse-by-verse sister).
- Viṃśatikā: directly relevant — the dedicated treatise refuting atoms and establishing consciousness-only-without-object. 「極微與六合，一應成六分；若與六同處，聚應如極微」 〔T1590 0075c27–c28〕 ("if an atom conjoins with six [others], it should come to have six parts; if it occupies one place with the six, the aggregate should be [as small] as an atom") and 「極微既無合，聚有合者誰？……是故一實極微不成」 〔T1590 0076a06–a12〕 ("the atom having no conjunction, what is it in the aggregate that conjoins? … therefore a single real atom is not established") — refuting the real existence of the atom on the same footing as this chapter's "if the atom has spatial division it can be analyzed and is not real"; the Viṃśatikā's establishing of "consciousness-only-without-object" is the charter for this chapter's "there is truly no outer form, only inner consciousness transforming to resemble form."
- Madhyāntavibhāga: the Characteristics chapter · unreal imagining (the support of "consciousness-only-without-object" — consciousness is other-dependent, the object held is non-existent).
- Mahāyānasaṃgraha: the Knowable-Characteristic division · the three natures (the wholly-imagined is without substance, the other-dependent is consciousness-transformation — what this chapter refutes is the wholly-imagined, what it establishes is the other-dependent).
Within the treatise: refuting the self-attachment (previous chapter · no real self) · consciousness-only's three natures (later chapter · other-dependent · wholly-imagined · perfectly-accomplished) · establishing consciousness-only (the extended treatment of consciousness-transformation).
9. Collation position
Verse T1586 〔0060a27–a28〕 · root T1585 refutation of the dharma-attachment 〔general statement 0002b21–b22 · refuting form 0004a07–c05 · refuting non-concurrent formations 0005a06–a10 · refuting the unconditioned 0006b15–c20 · resolving into consciousness-only 0006c21–c26〕 · Shuji T1830 〔five segments 0252a07–a20 · limit of form 0272c19–c29 · non-concurrent formations 0276b16–b17 · unconditioned 0289b17–b20 · resolution 0292c11–c12〕 · Zhuanshi lun T1587 〔0061c09 · 0062a20 · 0062c16 · 0063a23〕. 〔Scripture〕 Saṃdhinirmocana T676 〔0698b02–b05〕 · Laṅkāvatāra T670 〔0489c02–c03〕. 〔Śāstra〕 Yogācārabhūmi T1579 〔three self-natures 0656c01–c05 · mark-less self-nature 0705a02–a03 · only what consciousness manifests 0724a05–a09〕. 〔Cross-reading〕 Viṃśatikā T1590 〔0075c27–c28 · 0076a06–a12〕.