成唯識論 相應·五受·三性·恒轉·伏斷
這一節把阿賴耶識剩下的幾件事一次講完。
它身邊固定跟著五個心所：觸、作意、受、想、思——這五個是「遍行」，任何識起來它們都在。它的受只有一種：捨受，不苦不樂。想想也合理：這個識深細到你察覺不到，它若帶著苦樂，你早就發現它了。
它的性是「無覆無記」——不善不惡，也不障蔽聖道。它必須是這樣，因為它要當一切善惡種子的倉庫；倉庫本身若有立場，就裝不了對立的兩邊。
然後是最有名的一句：「恒轉如瀑流。」瀑布遠看是一道靜止的白練，其實沒有一滴水停留過。「恒」所以不是斷滅，「轉」所以不是常住——中道就落在這兩個字之間。
最後論主留了一個出口：「阿羅漢位捨。」這個一直在的識，不是永遠都在。到了那一位，它就捨了——不是消滅，是那個「執藏為我」的名分沒有了。
「恒轉如瀑流」一喻，論主辨得很細。他先破二邊：若執此識是常，則不應受熏、不應有轉變，種子無由增減；若執是斷，則前後不相續，業果無所依。恒故非斷，轉故非常。
瀑流之喻正取此二義：流不停故非斷，水不住故非常；而且瀑流「相續」中能漂溺魚草——顯此識雖念念滅而能持種、能感果。
論主還補了一層：此識非唯自類相續，亦與前七識展轉相望——所以「恒轉」不是一條孤流，是整個心識活動的底盤在動。你以為心是一幕一幕的畫面，其實底下一直有一條沒停過的流。
This chapter finishes off what remains to be said of the ālaya.
Five mental factors accompany it without fail: contact, attention, feeling, conception, volition — the five omnipresent, present wherever any consciousness arises. Of feelings it has one only: equanimity, neither painful nor pleasant. Which stands to reason: a consciousness too subtle for you to notice would have been noticed long ago had it carried pleasure and pain.
Its moral nature is unobstructed-and-neutral — neither wholesome nor unwholesome, and no veil upon the noble path. It has to be so, since it is the storehouse for the seeds of good and evil alike; a storehouse that took sides could not hold both.
Then the famous line: "ever-turning as a torrent." Seen from a distance a waterfall is a still white sheet, and not one drop of it has ever stopped. Ever, and so not annihilation; turning, and so not permanence — the middle falls between those two words.
And the treatise leaves an exit: "relinquished at the stage of the arhat." This consciousness that is always there is not always there. At that stage it is let go — not annihilated, but stripped of the name by which it was held onto as a self.
The simile "ever-turning as a torrent" is drawn out finely. Two extremes are refuted first: hold this consciousness permanent, and it could not be perfumed, could not alter, and its seeds could neither increase nor diminish; hold it cut off, and before and after would not continue, and act and fruit would have no support. Ever, and so not cut off; turning, and so not permanent.
The torrent takes both senses: the flow does not stop, hence not cut off; the water does not stay, hence not permanent. And a torrent in its very continuity sweeps fish and grasses along — showing that this consciousness, ceasing moment upon moment, still holds seeds and still calls forth fruit.
One layer is added: this consciousness continues not only in its own kind but stands in mutual regard with the first seven — so that "ever-turning" is no solitary stream but the whole floor of mental activity in motion. You take the mind for a series of pictures; underneath, a flow has never once stopped.
此識與幾心所相應？
常與觸、作意、受、想、思相應。
阿賴耶識無始時來乃至未轉，於一切位恒與此五心所相應，以是遍行心所攝故。
「觸」謂三和分別變異，令心、心所觸境為性，受、想、思等所依為業。
謂根、境、識更相隨順，故名三和。觸依彼生，令彼和合，故說為彼；三和合位皆有順生心所功能，說名變異；觸似彼起，故名分別。
根變異力，引觸起時，勝彼識、境，故《集論》等但說分別根之變異。
和合一切心及心所，令同觸境，是觸自性。
既似順起心所功能，故以受等所依為業。
《起盡經》說：受、想、行蘊一切皆以觸為緣故，由斯故說識、觸、受等因二、三、四和合而生。
《瑜伽》但說與受、想、思為所依者，思於行蘊為主勝故，舉此攝餘。《集論》等說為受依者，以觸生受近而勝故，謂觸所取可意等相與受所取順益等相，極相隣近，引發勝故。
〔T31 0011c04〕然觸自性，是實非假，六六法中，心所性故，是食攝故，能為緣故，如受等性，非即三和。
作意謂能警心為性，於所緣境，引心為業；謂此警覺，應起心種，引令趣境，故名作意。雖此亦能引起心所；心是主故，但說引心。
有說：令心迴趣異境，或於一境，持心令住，故名作意。彼俱非理，應非遍行，不異定故。
「受」謂領納順、違、俱非境相為性，起愛為業，能起合、離、非二欲故。
有作是說：受有二種：一、境界受，謂領所緣；二、自性受，謂領俱觸。唯自性受是受自相。以境界受共餘相故。
彼說非理，受定不緣俱生觸故。
若似觸生，名領觸者，似因之果，應皆受性。
又既受因，應名因受，何名自性？
若謂如王食諸國邑，受能領觸所生受體，名自性受。理亦不然，違自所執不自證故。
若不捨自性，名自性受，應一切法皆是受自性。
故彼所說，但誘嬰兒。
然境界受，非共餘相，領順等相，定屬己者，名境界受，不共餘故。
「想」謂於境取像為性，施設種種名言為業，謂要安立境分齊相，方能隨起種種名言。
「思」謂令心造作為性，於善品等役心為業，謂能取境正因等相，驅役自心令造善等。
此五既是遍行所攝，故與藏識決定相應，其遍行相後當廣釋。
此觸等五與異熟識行相雖異，而時、依同，所緣、事等，故名相應。
此識行相極不明了，不能分別違、順境相，微細、一類、相續而轉，是故唯與捨受相應。
〔T31 0012a02〕又，此相應受唯是異熟，隨先引業轉；不待現緣，住善、惡業勢力轉故。唯是捨受；苦、樂二受是異熟生，非真異熟，待現緣故，非此相應。
又，由此識常無轉變，有情恒執為自內我；若與苦、樂二受相應，便有轉變，寧執為我，故此但與捨受相應。
若爾，如何此識亦是惡業異熟？既許善業能招捨受，此亦應然。捨受不違苦、樂品故，如無記法，善、惡俱招。
如何此識非別境等心所相應？
互相違故。
謂欲希望所樂事轉；此識任運，無所希望。勝解印持決定事轉；此識瞢昧，無所印持。念唯明記曾習事轉，此識昧劣，不能明記。定能令心專注一境；此識任運；剎那別緣。慧唯簡擇德等事轉；此識微昧，不能簡擇。故此不與別境相應。
此識唯是異熟性故，善、染污等亦不相應。
惡作等四無記性者，有間斷故，定非異熟。
法有四種：謂善、不善、有覆無記、無覆無記，阿賴耶識何法攝耶？
此識唯是無覆無記，異熟性故。
異熟若是善、染污者，流轉還滅應不得成，又此識是善、染依故，若善、染者，互相違故，應不與二俱作所依；又此識是所熏性故，若善、染者，如極香臭，應不受熏。
無熏習故，染、淨因果俱不成立，故此唯是無覆無記。
「覆」謂染法障聖道故，又能蔽心，令不淨故；此識非染，故名「無覆」。「記」謂善、惡，有愛、非愛果，及殊勝自體可記別故；此非善、惡，故名「無記」。
〔T31 0012b01〕「觸等亦如是」者，謂如阿賴耶識，唯是無覆無記性攝，觸、作意、受、想、思亦爾，諸相應法，必同性故。
又，觸等五，如阿賴耶，亦是異熟，所緣、行相俱不可知，緣三種境，五法相應，無覆無記，故說「觸等亦如是」言。
有義：觸等如阿賴耶，亦是異熟及一切種，廣說乃至無覆無記，「亦如是」言，無簡別故。
彼說非理。
所以者何？
觸等依識，不自在故。如貪、信等不能受熏，如何同識，能持種子？
又，若觸等亦能受熏，應一有情有六種體。
若爾，果起從何種生？理不應言從六種起，未見多種生一芽故。
若說果生唯從一種，則餘五種便為無用；亦不可說次第生果，熏習同時，勢力等故；又不可說六果頓生，勿一有情一剎那頃，六眼識等俱時生故。
誰言觸等亦能受熏持諸種子？不爾，如何觸等如識名一切種？
謂觸等五，有似種相，名一切種，觸等與識所緣等故，無色觸等有所緣故，親所緣緣定應有故，此似種相不為因緣生現識等，如觸等上似眼根等非識所依，亦如似火無能燒用，彼救非理，觸等所緣似種等相，後執受處方應與識而相例故。
由此前說一切種言，定目受熏、能持種義；不爾，本頌有重言失。
又彼所說，「亦如是」言，無簡別故，咸相例者，定不成證，勿觸等五，亦能了別，觸等亦與觸等相應。
由此故知「亦如是」者，隨所應說，非謂一切。
阿賴耶識為斷？為常？
非斷、非常，以「恒轉」故。「恒」謂此識無始時來，一類、相續，常無間斷，是界、趣、生施設本故，性堅、持種令不失故。「轉」謂此識無始時來，念念生滅前後變異，因滅果生，非常、一故，可為轉識熏成種故。
〔T31 0012c04〕「恒」言遮斷，「轉」表非常，猶如瀑流，因果法爾。
如瀑流水，非斷、非常，相續長時有所漂溺，此識亦爾，從無始來生滅相續，非常、非斷，漂溺有情令不出離。
又如瀑流，雖風等擊，起諸波浪而流不斷，此識亦爾，雖遇眾緣，起眼識等而恒相續。
又如瀑流，漂水下上魚、草等物，隨流不捨，此識亦爾，與內習氣外觸等法恒相隨轉。
如是法喻，意顯此識無始因果非斷、常義。謂此識性無始時來，剎那剎那果生因滅。果生故非斷，因滅故非常，非斷、非常是緣起理，故說此識恒轉如流。
過去、未來既非實有，非常可爾；非斷如何？斷豈得成緣起正理？
過去、未來若是實有，可許非斷；如何非常？常亦不成緣起正理。
豈斥他過，己義便成？
若不摧邪難以顯正。前因滅位後果即生，如秤兩頭低、昂時等，如是因果相續如流，何假去、來，方成非斷？
因現有位，後果未生，因是誰因？果現有時，前因已滅，果是誰果？既無因果，誰離斷、常？
若有因時，已有後果，果既本有，何待前因？因義既無，果義寧有？無因無果，豈離斷、常？
因果義成，依法作用，故所詰難，非預我宗。
體既本有，用亦應然，所待因緣，亦本有故。
由斯汝義因果定無，應信大乘緣起正理。謂此正理深妙離言，因果等言皆假施設。觀現在法有引後用，假立當果對說現因；觀現在法有酬前相，假立曾因對說現果。假謂現識似彼相現。
〔T31 0013a02〕如是因果，理趣顯然，遠離二邊，契會中道，諸有智者應順修學。
有餘部說：雖無去、來而有因果恒相續義。
謂現在法極迅速者，猶有初、後，生、滅二時，生時酬因，滅時引果，時雖有二，而體是一，前因正滅，後果正生，體相雖殊，而俱是有。
如是因果非假施設，然離斷、常，又無前難，誰有智者捨此信餘？
彼有虛言，都無實義，何容一念而有二時？生、滅相違，寧同現在？滅若現在，生應未來。有故名生，既是現在，無故名滅，寧非過去？滅若非無，生應非有；生既現有，滅應現無，又二相違，如何體一？非苦、樂等見有是事，生、滅若一，時應無二；生、滅若異，寧說體同？故生、滅時俱現在有，同依一體，理必不成。
經部師等因果相續，理亦不成，彼不許有阿賴耶識能持種故。
由此應信大乘所說因果相續緣起正理。
此識無始恒轉如流，乃至何位當究竟捨？
阿羅漢位方究竟捨。
謂諸聖者斷煩惱障究竟盡時，名阿羅漢。爾時，此識煩惱麁重永遠離故，說之為「捨」。
此中所說阿羅漢者，通攝三乘無學果位，皆已永害煩惱賊故；應受世間妙供養故；永不復受分段生故。
云何知然？
〈決擇分〉說：諸阿羅漢、獨覺、如來皆不成就阿賴耶故；《集論》復說：若諸菩薩得菩提時，頓斷煩惱及所知障，成阿羅漢及如來故。
若爾，菩薩煩惱種子未永斷盡非阿羅漢，應皆成就阿賴耶識，何故即彼〈決擇分〉說不退菩薩亦不成就阿賴耶識？
〔T31 0013b01〕彼說二乘無學果位迴心趣向大菩提者，必不退起煩惱障故，趣菩提故，即復轉名不退菩薩，彼不成就阿賴耶識。
即攝在此阿羅漢中，故彼論文不違此義。
又不動地已上菩薩，一切煩惱永不行故，法駛流中任運轉故；能諸行中起諸行故；剎那剎那轉增進故，此位方名不退菩薩。
然此菩薩雖未斷盡異熟識中煩惱種子，而緣此識我見、愛等，不復執藏為自內我，由斯永捨阿賴耶名，故說不成阿賴耶識，此亦說彼名阿羅漢。
有義：初地已上菩薩，已證二空所顯理故；已得二種殊勝智故；已斷分別二重障故；能一行中起諸行故；雖為利益起諸煩惱，而彼不作煩惱過失故，此亦名不退菩薩。
然此菩薩雖未斷盡俱生煩惱，而緣此識所有分別我見、愛等，不復執藏為自內我，由斯亦捨阿賴耶名，故說不成阿賴耶識，此亦說彼名阿羅漢。
故《集論》中作如是說：十地菩薩雖未永斷一切煩惱，然此煩惱猶如呪、藥所伏諸毒，不起一切煩惱過失。一切地中，如阿羅漢已斷煩惱，故亦說彼名阿羅漢。
彼說非理。七地已前猶有俱生我見、愛等，執藏此識為自內我，如何已捨阿賴耶名？
若彼分別我見、愛等，不復執藏，說名為捨，則預流等諸有學位，亦應已捨阿賴耶名，許便違害諸論所說。
地上菩薩所起煩惱皆由正知，不為過失，非預流等得有斯事，寧可以彼例此菩薩？
彼六識中所起煩惱，雖由正知不為過失，而第七識有漏心位，任運現行執藏此識，寧不與彼預流等同？由此故知彼說非理。
〔T31 0013c03〕然阿羅漢斷此識中煩惱麁重究竟盡故，不復執藏阿賴耶識為自內我。由斯永失阿賴耶名，說之為捨，非捨一切第八識體。勿阿羅漢無識持種，爾時便入無餘涅槃。
然第八識雖諸有情皆悉成就，而隨義別立種種名。
謂或名心，由種種法熏習種子所積集故；或名阿陀那，執持種子及諸色根令不壞故；或名所知依，能與染、淨所知諸法為依止故；或名種子識，能遍任持世、出世間諸種子故。
此等諸名通一切位。
或名阿賴耶，攝藏一切雜染品法令不失故，我見、愛等執藏以為自內我故。此名唯在異生、有學，非無學位、不退菩薩，有雜染法執藏義故。
或名異熟識，能引生死善、不善業異熟果故。此名唯在異生、二乘諸菩薩位，非如來地猶有異熟無記法故。
或名無垢識，最極清淨諸無漏法所依止故。此名唯在如來地有，菩薩、二乘及異生位，持有漏種可受熏習，未得善淨第八識故。如契經說：
如來無垢識，是淨無漏界，
解脫一切障，圓鏡智相應。
阿賴耶名過失重故，最初捨故，此中偏說。異熟識體菩薩將得菩提時捨，聲聞、獨覺入無餘依涅槃時捨。無垢識體無有捨時，利樂有情無盡時故。心等通故，隨義應說。
然第八識總有二位：一、有漏位，無記性攝。
唯與觸等五法相應，但緣前說執受、處境。
〔T31 0014a01〕二、無漏位，唯善性攝。
與二十一心所相應，謂遍行、別境各五，善十一，與一切心恒相應故。常樂證智所觀境故；於所觀境恒印持故；於曾受境恒明記故；世尊無有不定心故；於一切法常決擇故。極淨信等常相應故，無染污故。無散動故。
此亦唯與捨受相應，任運恒時平等轉故。
以一切法為所緣境，鏡智遍緣一切法故。
The canonical text stands in Chinese only. This edition renders the essence, the plain reading, the exposition and the apparatus into English — never the sūtra itself. Switch to 漢讀本 or 並行雙語 above to read it.
〔所釋之頌〕第三頌·下半至第四頌
甲、心所相應門（五遍行）
〔卷3〕
這個阿賴耶識，跟幾個心所綁在一起呢？答案是恒常跟「觸、作意、受、想、思」這五個綁在一起。阿賴耶識從無始以來、一直到它還沒轉成無漏（也就是還沒『轉識成智』）之前，在任何階段都恒常跟這五個心所相應——為什麼偏偏是這五個？因為這五個正是「遍行心所」（也就是只要有心動、它們就普遍跟著起的那一類）所攝的。
一、觸
先講第一個「觸」。它是在「三和」（根、境、識三樣湊在一起）這個基礎上「分別變異」而起的；它的性質是『讓心、心所去接觸對象』，它的作用是『給受、想、思這些當依靠』。一個詞一個詞拆開講——所謂「三和」，就是根、境、識這三樣彼此順應、湊到一塊兒，所以叫「三和」。觸是靠這個三和才生出來的，反過來它又能把這三樣黏合得更緊，所以論裡乾脆拿果來說因，說觸『就是那個三和』（其實是它促成了三和）；再說「變異」——三樣湊到一塊兒的時候，本來就帶著一股『順著就能生起心所』的勁，這股勁就叫「變異」；最後說「分別」——觸正是『學著那股勁、跟它相像』才起來的，所以叫「分別」（跟著它、像它，就叫分別）。
在根、境、識這三樣裡頭，「根」那股變異的勁，在引生觸的時候，比識、境兩樣都來得有力，所以《集論》這些論裡就只挑「根」來講，說『觸是分別根的變異』（舉那個最有力的，其餘的就帶過去了）。再說觸的本性是什麼：就是『把一切心和心所黏合起來、讓它們一起去觸取同一個對象』，這就是觸的本性。而觸既然是學著那股『順著就生起心所』的勁、跟它相像，所以它的作用就是『給受這些當依靠』。
《起盡經》說：受、想、行這三蘊，一律都拿觸當條件才起得來。順著這個就可以排出一條由少到多的線：識是靠『兩樣』（根、境）湊合生的，觸是靠『三樣』（根、境、識三和）生的，受這些又是靠『四樣』（根、境、識、再加觸）湊合生的。接著解釋幾部論為什麼講法不一。《瑜伽論》只說『觸是受、想、思的依靠』，那是因為「思」在「行蘊」裡頭當頭、最有分量，舉一個「思」就把其餘的行心所都帶上了。《集論》這些只說『觸是受的依靠』，那是因為觸去生受，是最貼近、最直接的——你看，觸所取的那個『合意（順）、不合意（違）』的相，跟受所取的那個『順著有益、逆著受損』的相，靠得太近了，所以觸引發受最有力，就單拿受來說。
最後要澄清一點：觸這東西是「實有」的，不是「假有」（不是徒有其名的虛設）。憑什麼說它實有？有三條理由：一是在「六六法」（六根、六境、六識、六觸、六受、六愛這六組各六樣）裡頭，它正是一個「心所」；二是它屬於「四食」（維持身命的四種資養）裡的「觸食」；三是它能當受這些的條件——就憑這三條，它跟受那些心所一樣是實在的法。換句話說，觸是依著三和另外起的一個法，它本身並不就等於「三和」。
二、作意
第二個是「作意」。它的性質是『把心叫醒、驚動它』，它的作用是『把心牽向所緣的對象』。說白了就是：這個心所能去警覺那個『快該生起來的心的種子』，把它一引、領著它奔向對象，所以叫「作意」（把心思鼓動起來）。它雖然也能順帶引起別的心所，可因為「心王」是主，所以只挑主來說、講「引心」（舉個主的，心所就帶上了）。
〔異說·迴趣持住〕 有人換了個講法，說：作意是『讓心掉頭轉向別的對象』、或者『把心摁在一個對象上、叫它定住』，所以叫作意。這兩種講法都站不住。就拿『把心摁住在一個對象上』這條說：果真這樣，作意就不該是「遍行」了（因為摁住一境只在入定時才有，平常根本不是這樣，可遍行是無時不有的）；而且這麼一講，作意就跟「定」（把心專一安住）分不出來、混成一回事了。
三、受
第三個是「受」。它的性質是『領受順境、違境、不順不違（俱非）這三種境的相』，也就是去嘗那境是甜是苦還是平淡；它的作用是『能勾起愛』——因為它一領受，就跟著生出三種想頭：樂受了就『想湊上去』，苦受了就『想躲開』，平淡的就『不湊也不躲』。
〔異說·自性受是受自相〕 有人提出一個分法，說：受有兩種——一種叫「境界受」（領受外頭那個對象），一種叫「自性受」（領受跟它一起起的那個觸）；而且只有「自性受」才算受真正獨有的相，至於「境界受」嘛，那是跟別的心所共有的相、算不上受自己的特色（因為觸這些也都在領那個境）。
這個分法站不住，底下一條一條駁。第一條：受根本不會去緣那個『跟它同時起的觸』（同時的觸不是受緣的對象，所以哪有「領觸」這回事？）。第二條：你要是說『受是學著觸、跟觸相像才生的，所以就叫它『領觸』』，那照這個邏輯，凡是跟因相像的果都該算「受性」了（這當然荒唐）；何況觸既然是受的因，那也該叫「因受」才對，怎麼倒叫起「自性受」來了？第三條：你要是說『就像國王收用各郡縣的賦稅那樣，受能領收那個由觸生出來的受體，這就叫自性受』——這也不通，因為它正好違背他們自己『受不能自己證自己』的主張（受既然不能緣自己，又怎麼能去領收自己的受體？）。第四條：你要是說『凡是不丟掉自己本性的，就叫自性受』，那一切法都不會丟掉自己的本性，豈不一切法都成了『受的自性』了（這更荒唐）？所以他們這套說法，只是哄哄小孩的話，沒什麼實在道理。
那正確的講法是怎樣呢？其實「境界受」並不是跟別的心所共有的相——它是『領受順、違這些相、而且這領受是受獨家的活兒』，所以才叫「境界受」，並不跟別的心所共有（領順、違之相是受一個人在領，觸那些只管把根境識黏合起來、並不領這個相）。
四、想
第四個是「想」。它的性質是『在境上面取個像』（把那個境的樣子攝下來、抓個輪廓），它的作用是『替它安上種種名稱』。怎麼運作的呢？得先把『境的界限相』立起來（也就是先框定這東西到哪兒為止、長什麼樣），框定了，才能跟著替它起種種名稱（先有輪廓，才依著輪廓叫得出名字）。
五、思
第五個是「思」。它的性質是『叫心去造作』（推著心去動手、去造業），它的作用是『在善事這些上頭差遣、驅使自己的心』。怎麼運作？它先把境上那個『該不該做』（正因）的相抓準，再驅使自己的心去造作善業這些（造業這件事，就是由思當頭的）。
把這五個收個尾：觸、作意、受、想、思這五個既然都歸在「遍行」底下，那它們一定跟藏識（阿賴耶識）相應；至於「遍行」到底是怎麼個遍法，後文還會細講。這裡要說清楚它們憑什麼算「相應」：這五個心所跟異熟識，雖然各自運作的樣子（行相）不一樣（識管了別、受管領納，各幹各的），可它們有四樣是齊平的——一是「時」（同一個時候起）、二是「依」（靠同一個根）、三是「所緣」（緣同一個境）、四是「事」（各自的本體數目對得上）。正因為這四樣都平齊，所以才叫「相應」（彼此配得上、湊得攏）。
乙、五受相應門（唯捨受）
這個阿賴耶識運作起來（行相）非常不清不楚，分辨不出眼前是「順境」還是『逆境』（也就是不曉得苦、不曉得樂），它細細微微、自始至終一個味道（不會今天苦、明天樂，也不夾雜喜、憂）、一路接續地轉。正因為它這個樣子，所以它只跟「捨受」（不苦也不樂的那種平淡感受）相應。
再從另一個角度看：跟這個識相應的那個受，是純粹的「異熟」（也就是真異熟，專門酬報那個牽引你來投生的「引業」的）；它是隨著『前世那個引業』來轉的，用不著當前的緣來湊，光憑善業、惡業留下的那股勁就轉起來了。所以它只能是「捨受」。那苦、樂這兩種受呢？它們屬於「異熟生」（是異熟果上再添出來的那種滿業果，得等當前的緣才起得來），不是「真異熟」——正因為它們非得等當前的緣才冒出來，所以它們不跟這個識相應。
還有一層理由：正因為這個識恒常不變（不會一會兒苦一會兒樂），有情才能把它一直執成『裡頭那個我』（內在的自我）；它要是跟苦、樂兩種受相應，那就會忽高忽低、起起伏伏了——一個老在變的東西，又怎麼會被人當成『恒常如一的我』呢？所以這個識只跟「捨受」相應（就因為它不變，才禁得起被人妄執為我）。
〔難〕有人不服：照你說它只配捨受，可它明明也是「惡業」招來的果啊——惡業不是該招苦果嗎？怎麼倒招了個不苦不樂的捨受？〔答〕你先想想：大家都承認『善業也能招來捨受』（善業未必只招樂受嘛）；既然善業能招捨受，那惡業也照樣能招來一個帶捨受的賴耶，這沒什麼奇怪。道理在於：「捨受」並不跟苦、樂這兩類對著幹（捨是中性的，苦也好樂也好都能歸到捨上頭去），就好比「無記法」（不善也不惡的那種性）可以由善、惡兩種業一起招感一樣。
丙、心所例同門（觸等亦如是·三性門）
一、不與別境、善、染相應
〔難〕有人問：這個識為什麼不跟「別境」（欲、勝解、念、定、慧這五個，各自緣各自的境才起的那一類）這些心所相應？〔答〕因為這個識的脾性跟那五個處處對不上。一個一個來看就清楚了。「欲」是對著喜歡的事生個盼頭才轉的，可這個識是自自然然地轉、對什麼都不存盼頭——所以它不跟欲在一塊兒。「勝解」是對著拿定了的事咬死不放才轉的，可這個識昏昏沉沉、根本咬不定什麼——所以它不跟勝解在一塊兒。「念」只在曾經練熟、記過的事上清清楚楚記著才轉的，可這個識又昏又弱、什麼都記不清——所以它不跟念在一塊兒。「定」是能把心摁在一個境上專一不動的，可這個識自自然然地轉、而且一剎那一剎那換著緣不同的境（根本定不住）——所以它不跟定在一塊兒。「慧」只在功德這些事上挑挑揀揀、辨個是非才轉的，可這個識細微昏昧、根本挑揀不了——所以它不跟慧在一塊兒。這五個既然樣樣對不上，所以這個識不跟別境這五個相應。
再說，這個識純粹是「異熟」的性質（也就是無覆無記，既不障道又不善不惡），所以「善」的心所、「染污」的心所（煩惱、隨煩惱那些）也都不跟它相應。那『惡作（也就是後悔）、睡眠、尋、伺』這四個裡頭、屬於「無記」的那一面呢？——它們雖是無記的，可它們會『斷斷續續』（不是一路接續的），這就決定了它們算不上「異熟」（異熟必須一路接續不斷），所以照樣不跟這個識相應。
二、三性門——無覆無記
法總共分四種：善、不善、有覆無記、無覆無記。那阿賴耶識歸哪一種？答案是它只屬「無覆無記」（既不障蔽聖道、又不善不惡），因為它是「異熟」的性質。底下三條理由說明它非得是無覆無記不可。第一條：異熟要是善的或染污的，那『流轉（生死）、還滅（涅槃）』這兩件事就都成立不了了——因為善性不該往生死裡流轉，染性又不該能還滅成涅槃。第二條：這個識是善、染的『靠山』（所依），它要是自己也成了善或染，那麻煩就來了——同性的相順、異性的相沖，它要是偏了善這一邊，就跟染那邊沖、撐不住染；要是偏了染這一邊，又跟善那邊沖、撐不住善，總之就不能同時給善、染兩邊都當靠山了。第三條：這個識是「被熏」的性質（能受熏、能存種），它要是自己已是善或染，那就好比一塊「極香」或『極臭』的東西，味道已經定死了，再也熏不進別的味道了；既然熏不進、沒法存種，那染的、淨的因果就統統建立不起來。把這三條合起來，結論就是：這個識只能是「無覆無記」。
最後把「無覆無記」這名字一個字一個字解開。「覆」是什麼意思？就是染法能擋住聖道，又能蒙住心、把心弄髒；這個識不是染的，所以叫「無覆」（沒有遮蔽的毛病）。「記」是什麼意思？就是『可以記別、分得出來』——善、惡這兩種法，一個招來可愛的果、一個招來不可愛的果，而且各有各鮮明的本體，分得清清楚楚；這個識既不善也不惡（不招那種可愛、不可愛的果），分不出個善惡來，所以叫「無記」。
三、觸等亦如是
頌裡「觸等亦如是」這一句是什麼意思？就是說：阿賴耶識既然只屬「無覆無記」，那「觸、作意、受、想、思」這五個也跟著一樣是無覆無記——因為凡是相應的這些法，性質一定跟著主走（心王是無記，心所也得是無記）。而且不光性質一樣，還有好幾處都一樣：觸等這五個，跟阿賴耶識一樣也是「異熟」，所緣、行相也一樣都「不可知」，緣的也是同樣「三種境」（種子、根身、器世間），它們是『五法（心王連同這五個遍行）』一起相應的，而且也都「無覆無記」——正是憑這一處處的相同，所以才說「觸等亦如是」（觸這些也跟阿賴耶一個樣）。
〔異說·觸等亦是一切種〕 這裡有人把「亦如是」拉得太遠，說：觸等這五個也像阿賴耶識一樣，既是「異熟」、又是「一切種」（也就是也能執持一切種子），乃至往下說一概都是無覆無記——理由是「亦如是」這三個字並沒有打折扣、沒說哪樣不算，那就該樣樣都跟賴耶一個樣。這個講法不對。
為什麼不對？底下幾條一駁就清楚了。第一條：觸等這些心所是『跟著識轉、自己作不了主』的，就好比貪、信這些心所都不能受熏，那它們怎麼好意思也像識一樣去執持種子？（連受熏都不能，談什麼持種。）第二條：假設觸等真能受熏、真能持種好了，那一個有情身上豈不就有『六套持種的本體』了（心王一套、五個心所各一套）？真要這樣，麻煩立刻就來——現行的果起來時，到底是從哪一套種子生的？說『六套一起生』不行，因為從沒見過『好幾顆種子合長一棵芽』（幾個因擠著生一個果，沒這個道理）；說『果只從一套生』也不行，那其餘五套豈不全成了擺設、白擱著沒用？說『六套排隊輪流生果』更不行，因為熏習是同時熏進去的、六套勁頭一樣大，根本排不出先後來；說『六個果一下子全冒出來』還是不行，不然一個有情在同一剎那，豈不就有六個眼識之類一齊蹦出來了（這當然荒唐）？
〔正義反詰〕話說回來，本來就沒人講過『觸等也能受熏、能持種子』啊（這是對方自己加上去的）。〔難〕那有人要追問了：既然觸等不能持種，那論裡為什麼又說『觸等跟識一樣叫『一切種』』呢？〔答〕這話的意思是：觸等這五個心所，它們的相分裡頭照見著『像種子的影子』（似種子之相），就憑這個才說它們叫「一切種」——因為觸等跟識『緣的境一樣』（同樣緣種子等那三種境），就連無色界裡的觸等也有它所緣的境，而且心、心所一定都有「親所緣緣」（也就是它貼身的那個相分）。可是要分清楚：這個『像種子的影子』只是個影像而已，它並不能真的當「因緣」去生出現行的識來（這跟真種子能生現行是兩碼事）；就好比觸等相分上那個『像眼根的影子』並不是識真正所依的眼根，又好比畫個『像火的影子』並不能真把東西燒著。所以，要是有人想拿這個「似種」來救前面那套『觸等持種』的講法，那是救不活的——因為觸等所緣的「似種」這些相，得等到後文講「執受、處」那裡才好拿來跟識相比（那裡講的是識變現出像境的影子，並不是說觸等真能持種）。
把這一段收攏，結論就出來了。第一，前文頌裡那個「一切種」三個字，鐵定是專指『能受熏、能持種子』這個意思（這只有第八識當得起）；要不然這麼解，本頌就犯了『同一件事說兩遍』的毛病了——因為「異熟、一切種」這句已經把第八識說了，「觸等亦如是」要是再把種義加給觸等，那不就重了？第二，對方說『『亦如是』沒打折扣，所以樣樣都一概照搬』，這話根本當不了證據；不然的話，難道觸等五個也能「了別」（那是識才有的活兒）？難道觸等還跟觸等它自己相應（哪有自己跟自己相應的）？這些當然都不成立。可見「亦如是」是『就那相同的部分』說的（取它們相像的那一小部分），並不是說『一切意思都一模一樣』。
丁、因果譬喻門（恒轉如暴流·非斷非常）
阿賴耶識到底是「斷」（會斷滅）呢，還是「常」（永遠固定不變）呢？答案是：既不斷、也不常，因為它是「恒轉」的。這兩個字得分開講。先講「恒」——是說這個識從無始以來，一個味道（始終同一個無記性）、一路接續、從不間斷；正因為它這麼穩當不斷，才當得起『界（三界）、趣（五趣）、生（四生）』這一切得以安立的根本，也才靠它性質堅穩、把種子守住不讓散失。再講「轉」——是說這個識從無始以來，又一念一念地生了又滅、前後變個不停，前念一滅、後念就生，可見它並不是永遠固定的、也不是死死一個（非常、非一）；正因為它這樣念念翻新，才能當「轉識」（前七識）熏習存種的那塊地方。
所以「恒」這個字是用來擋掉「斷」的，「轉」這個字是用來點明「非常」的。它這樣又恒又轉、又轉又恒，就好比一道「瀑流」（一條奔流不停的大水），因果的道理本來就是這個樣子。你看那瀑流的水：它不斷（一路相連、沒斷過）、也不常（前頭的水後頭的水時時翻新），長長久久地往下流，還一路把東西捲進去、淹掉；這個識也正是這樣，從無始以來生生滅滅、接連不斷，不常也不斷，把有情捲在裡頭、淹著、出不了生死。
這個瀑流的比方還能再往下打兩層。一層是：瀑流雖被風一吹、激起一個個浪頭，可那股水照樣流個不停；這個識也一樣，雖然碰上種種緣、激起眼識這些（就像激起一個個浪頭），可它照樣接連不斷。再一層是：瀑流一路把水裡那些浮浮沈沈的魚啊、草啊也帶著走、不肯丟下；這個識也一樣，總帶著裡頭的「習氣」（種子）、外起的「觸」這些法一道轉。拿「法」（賴耶）配上「喻」（瀑流）這麼一對照，要點出來的就是這個識『從無始以來，因果既不斷、也不常』的道理。
說白了就是：這個識的本性從無始以來，一剎那一剎那地『果生而因滅』（前一念當因、滅掉，後一念當果、生起）。因為『果一直在生』，所以它不斷（後頭老有東西接上）；因為『因隨即就滅』，所以它不常（前一念當下就過去了）。這個不斷、不常，正正就是「緣起」的道理，所以才說這個識「恒轉如瀑流」。
〔底下要破『過去、未來都是實在有的』這種別家執著（像有部、經部），好把唯識的緣起顯出來。〕〔難·先有人衝著唯識來〕對方先發難：照你唯識說，過去、未來都不是實在有的，那「非常」固然好說（過、未都無體，當然不常）；可你那「非斷」又怎麼立得起來呢（過去、未來都沒體了，前後不就斷開了）？而一旦成了「斷」，又哪裡談得上緣起的正理？〔唯識反過來將他一軍〕那好，反問你：你說過去、未來是實在有的，那「非斷」固然可以許（三世都有體，接得上嘛）；可你那「非常」又怎麼立得起來（三世樣樣都實有，那不就成了常住）？這麼一來，「常」也照樣立不起緣起的正理。〔有人替唯識擔心〕——難道我光把對方的毛病挑出來，自己的道理就算立住了嗎？〔答〕話不能這麼說：不先把那些歪理打破，正理就難得顯出來（破歪理正是為了顯正理）。
〔正面把唯識的講法立起來〕在『前一個因正滅』的那一刻，『後一個果』就同時生出來了，這就像一桿秤的兩頭：一頭往下沈、一頭往上翹，兩件事是同一時間發生的。因果就這樣一前一後、相連如流水，哪裡還用得著借『過去、未來實有』這套，才湊得出「非斷」來？〔回頭再將那執三世實有的一軍〕你那邊呢——在「因」現在還在的時候，後「果」還沒生出來，那這個因是『誰的』因（沒有果，這因就配不上）？等到「果」現在有了的時候，前「因」早滅掉了，那這個果又是『誰的』果（沒有因，這果也配不上）？你既然主張因、果不在同一時間，那因果根本就配不成對；連個成對的因果都沒有，又談得上誰能離開斷、常呢？
〔對方又換一招救，說『因果本來就一起有』，這也要破〕對方改口說：『有因的時候，後果其實早就有了』（也就是因、果一直同時並存）。這也不通：果既然本來就有，那它還等前因幹什麼（果根本不必靠因了）？因之所以是因的意思既然沒了，果之所以是果的意思又從哪兒來？沒因沒果，照樣談不上離開斷、常。〔把正義收一下〕在唯識這邊，因果的意思是『靠現行法當下的作用』才立得起來的（前一念滅、後一念生，兩股勢力彼此借力），所以前面那些衝著『三世實有』『因果本有』來的詰難，根本沾不到我唯識宗頭上。
〔再追著「本有」這套打〕你既然主張『體本來就有』，那照樣推下去，「作用」也該本來就有了；作用本來就有，那它所要等的「因緣」也該本來就有、不必新生了——這麼一路本有下去，一切就都死死地擱著、再沒有作用可言了。可見你那套裡頭，因果鐵定立不起來，所以還是該信受大乘的緣起正理。這個正理是怎麼回事呢？它深妙、又不是言語套得住的，「因、因、果」這些字眼其實都是『暫且安個名』（假施設）。看見現在的法有『能牽出後面那個法』的作用，就暫且立個『將來的果』來，反過來把現在這個叫「因」；看見現在的法有『酬報前面那個法』的樣子，就暫且立個『曾經的因』來，反過來把現在這個叫「果」。所謂「假」，是說這都是現行識變現得『好像有因果的樣子』罷了（因果其實都是識變出來的，名字是暫且安上去的）。
這樣講的因果，道理一清二楚，離開了「斷」和「常」這兩頭的偏執，正正合上中道；凡是有智慧的人，都該照這個去隨順修學。
〔餘部·一體二時說〕 另有一些部派（經部裡的一路）出來說：我們不立過去、未來實有，可照樣有『因果一路接續』這個道理。怎麼說呢？現在的法雖然快得很，可裡頭還分得出「先、後」、「生、滅」這兩個時候——生的那時候酬報它的因，滅的那時候引出它的果；時候雖有兩個，本體卻是同一個；前因正滅、後果正生，樣子雖兩樣，可這兩樣都是『實實在在有』的。這麼一講，因果就不是隨便安個名（不是假施設），又離了斷、常，又躲開了前面那一堆衝著『三世實有』來的難——哪個有智慧的人肯丟下這個，反去信你那套『暫且安名』的唯識呢？
〔破他〕這也只是嘴上一套，全沒實在道理。哪能容你『一念裡頭擠著兩個時候（生的時候、滅的時候）』？「生」和「滅」本來就對著幹，怎麼能一塊兒擠在「現在」？你要說「滅」是現在，那「生」就該排到「未來」去了（兩個就不同時了）。再說：「有」才叫「生」，那它既是現在有的；「無」才叫「滅」，那它豈不該是過去那個無的？反過來逼也一樣：「滅」要是並不無，那「生」就該不是有；可「生」既然現在是有的，「滅」就該現在是無的——生、滅這兩件事既然這麼對著幹，你又怎麼好說『體是同一個』？就連苦、樂這類對著幹的法，也沒見過『同一個體』的事。把這話收緊了說：生、滅若是同一個，時候就不該分成兩個（哪還分什麼生時、滅時）；生、滅若是兩樣，又憑什麼說體相同？所以你那套『生、滅兩個時候都在現在有、又同靠一個體』的講法，鐵定立不起來。
至於經部師這些人所立的「因果相續」，照樣立不起來——因為他們根本不承認有『阿賴耶識能執持種子』這回事；既然沒有一個持種的本體，前後的因果就沒處寄託，所謂「相續」也就接不上了。把這幾路都駁完，就該回過頭信受大乘所說的「因果相續」這條緣起正理了。
戊、伏斷位次門（阿羅漢位捨）
這個識從無始以來「恒轉如流」，那要到哪一個位次，才算把「阿賴耶」這個名徹底「捨」掉呢？要到「阿羅漢位」才徹底捨。意思是：聖者把「煩惱障」斷得乾乾淨淨、一點不剩的那會兒，就叫阿羅漢；到了那會兒，這個識裡頭的「煩惱麁重」（也就是煩惱種子留下的那股又粗又重的習氣）已經永遠離開了，所以才說它「捨」（捨掉了阿賴耶這個名）。
這裡說的「阿羅漢」，是把三乘（聲聞、獨覺、菩薩／佛）的「無學果位」一起算進來的，不是單指聲聞那一種阿羅漢。憑什麼三乘無學都可以叫阿羅漢？因為「阿羅漢」這名字本來就含三層意思，而三乘無學都當得起：一是「殺賊」——他們都已經把「煩惱賊」永遠除掉了；二是「應供」——他們都該受世間最好的供養；三是「不生」——他們都永遠不再受「分段生死」（一段一段地投生受身）了。
怎麼知道阿羅漢是通三乘無學的呢？有兩處經論作證。〈決擇分〉說：阿羅漢、獨覺、如來這三種，都『不成就阿賴耶識名』（可見這三種都已捨了賴耶名、都當得起阿羅漢）。《集論》又說：菩薩得菩提的時候，一下子把煩惱障、所知障都斷掉，就『成了阿羅漢，也成了如來』——可見菩薩果也算在阿羅漢裡頭。
〔難〕有人抓住一個矛盾來問：照你說，阿羅漢是拿『煩惱斷盡』當準的；那菩薩的煩惱種子既然還沒斷乾淨，他就還不是阿羅漢，照理就都還「成就阿賴耶識」才對。可同樣那部〈決擇分〉怎麼又說『不退菩薩也不成就阿賴耶識』呢——煩惱還沒斷盡、卻已經捨了賴耶名，這不是自相矛盾嗎？
〔答〕其實不矛盾，關鍵在那〈決擇分〉講的「不退菩薩」是指哪一種。它指的是『本來已經是二乘無學、又迴小向大、轉去求大菩提』的那種人——他們煩惱障早斷盡了、必定不會再退、不會再起煩惱，又一心趣向菩提，於是改個名叫「不退菩薩」。這種菩薩，本身既是二乘無學、煩惱已盡，所以不成就阿賴耶識，正好就收在前面那『三乘阿羅漢』裡頭。這麼一看，那段論文跟前面的道理一點不衝突——它說的是『迴心轉向的二乘』，並不是說地上那些還帶煩惱種子的凡位菩薩。
還有一種「不退菩薩」也得算進來：就是第八「不動地」以上的菩薩。為什麼他配叫不退？因為他一切煩惱再也不現行了，在那『無相的法流』（法駛流）裡頭自自然然地往前轉，能在「萬行」當中起「萬行」，一剎那一剎那不停地往上長進——到了這個地步，才叫「不退菩薩」。這種菩薩呢，雖然異熟識裡的煩惱種子還沒斷盡，可是緣著這個識而起的「我見、我愛」這些，已經不再『把這個識執藏成裡頭那個我』了（也就是第七識的我執永遠伏住、不再現行），就憑這個，他便永遠捨掉了「阿賴耶」這個名，所以說他「不成就阿賴耶識」；這也就把他叫作「阿羅漢」（是就「已捨阿賴耶名」這一面說的）。
〔異說·初地已上即捨〕 這裡又有人提早了界線，說：其實初地以上的菩薩就算「不退菩薩」了。他列了一串理由：初地菩薩已經證得『我空、法空』這兩空所顯的理，已經得了『根本智、後得智』這兩種殊勝的智，已經斷了『分別我執、分別法執』這兩重障，能在「一行」當中起「萬行」；他雖然為了利益眾生會故意起些煩惱，可那煩惱並不真造成煩惱的過患（不會把他纏住染汙）——憑這些，初地菩薩也該叫「不退菩薩」。這種菩薩呢，雖然「俱生煩惱」還沒斷盡，可緣著這個識起的『分別我見、我愛』這些，已經不再執藏成裡頭那個我了，就憑這個也捨了「阿賴耶」這個名，所以說他「不成就阿賴耶識」，這也把他叫作「阿羅漢」。
〔這初地說還搬出《集論》來給自己撐腰〕他引《集論》的話說：十地菩薩雖然還沒把一切煩惱永遠斷盡，可這些煩惱就像被『咒、藥』鎮住了的毒蛇一樣，掀不起一點煩惱的禍害；在任何一地，他都跟『煩惱已斷的阿羅漢』一個樣，所以也把他們叫作「阿羅漢」。
〔破掉這個『初地就捨』的講法，把『不動地才捨』的正義立起來〕這個『初地就捨』其實站不住。你看第七地以前的菩薩，他還帶著『俱生的我見、我愛』，還照樣把這個識執藏成裡頭那個我，那怎麼能說他『已經捨了阿賴耶名』？再說，你要是主張『只要分別的我見、我愛不再執藏，就算捨了』，那麻煩就來了——「預流」（須陀洹）這些有學位的聖者，他們的分別我執也早斷了，按你這標準，他們也該已經捨了阿賴耶名才對；可真要承認這個，就跟好幾部論的明文對著幹了（那些論明明說：有學位的人還有阿賴耶）。
〔再把他拿《集論》來自救這一手也擋掉〕你引《集論》是想說『地上菩薩的煩惱由正知管著、不成過失，所以等同已斷』；可這話救不了你。地上菩薩起的煩惱都是『在正知的看管下起的』（不被它迷、不釀成過患），這本事預流那些人根本沒有，你怎麼好拿《集論》『像咒藥鎮毒』那句，去把這個道理套到『初地菩薩已捨賴耶』上頭？更要命的是：就算初地到七地菩薩「第六識」裡起的煩惱由正知看著、不成過失，可他的「第七識」在有漏心位上照樣『自自然然地現行、把這個識執藏成裡頭那個我』——這一點豈不就跟預流那些『還帶俱生我執』的人一個樣？由此可見，前面那個『初地就捨』的講法是不對的。
那正確的講法是這樣：阿羅漢把這個識裡的「煩惱麁重」斷得乾乾淨淨，不再把阿賴耶識執藏成裡頭那個我，於是就永遠丟了「阿賴耶」這個名，這才叫「捨」。要緊的是：所捨掉的只是這個「名」，並不是把整個第八識的「本體」也捨掉。要不然就糟了——那就成了『阿羅漢沒有識能執持種子』了，那他當下豈不就該入「無餘涅槃」（身心俱滅）了？可事實上，還在世的阿羅漢仍舊活著、仍舊靠第八識持種，可見第八識的本體並沒捨。
〔第八識諸名 · 三位捨時〕
話說回來，這第八識雖然一切有情身上都有，可它隨著不同的角度、會有種種不同的名字。下面就一個一個把這些名字列出來。
第一批是凡聖都有的名。或者叫「心」——因為它是被種種法熏成的種子一層層積攢起來的（「心」就取「積集」的意思）。或者叫「阿陀那」（這個音譯詞就是「執持」的意思）——因為它把種子和各個色根抓牢、不讓它們壞掉。或者叫「所知依」——因為它能給染的、淨的一切「所知之法」當靠山。或者叫「種子識」——因為它能普遍地把世間、出世間的一切種子都守持住。這幾個名，是通於「一切位」的（不管凡夫聖人都有）。
或者叫「阿賴耶」（這個音譯詞就是「藏」的意思）——一來是因為它能把一切雜染那一類的法收藏起來、不讓散失，二來是因為它被我見、我愛這些執藏成裡頭那個我。這個名只有『異生（凡夫）、有學』位才有，「無學位、不退菩薩」位就沒有了——因為只有前面那兩種，才還有『把雜染法執藏起來』這層意思；無學、不退菩薩已經不執藏了，所以這個名就捨掉了。
或者叫「異熟識」——因為它能酬報那個牽引生死的善業、不善業，結成異熟果。這個名只有『異生、二乘、還在因位的諸菩薩』才有，到了「如來地」就沒有了——因為只有如來地才再沒有「異熟無記」這種法了（佛果轉成了清淨無垢，到異熟果空盡那會兒，才捨掉這個名）。
或者叫「無垢識」（也音譯作「阿末羅識」）——因為它最極清淨、是一切無漏法的靠山。這個名只有「如來地」才有；菩薩、二乘和異生那幾位，因為都還執持著有漏種、還能受熏，都還沒證到那個『又善又淨』的第八識，所以沒這個名。這正像契經（《如來功德莊嚴經》）裡說的：如來的無垢識，是清淨無漏的境界，已解脫了一切障，跟大圓鏡智相應。
把這幾個名擺齊了，就能回答一個問題：頌文為什麼單單挑「捨阿賴耶名」來講？因為阿賴耶這個名的過失最重，又是最早被捨掉的，所以特地拿它說。其餘幾個名各有各的捨時：「異熟識」這個體，菩薩在『快得菩提』的時候捨，聲聞、獨覺在「入無餘依涅槃」的時候捨；「無垢識」這個體則『永遠不捨』——因為佛果利樂有情沒有窮盡的時候（識就一直在）。至於『心、阿陀那、所知依、種子識』這幾個名，是通於一切位的（沒有特別的捨時），就隨它各自的意思去理會、去說。
〔第八識二位 · 二十一心所〕
最後分兩個階段把第八識相應的心所說清楚。第八識總共有兩個階段。第一個是「有漏位」：這時候它屬無記性，只跟『觸等五個遍行』相應，也只緣前面講的「執受、處」那些境（種子、根身、器世間）。第二個是「無漏位」（也就是轉成大圓鏡智的時候）：這時候它純屬「善」性，跟『二十一個心所』相應——也就是遍行五個、別境五個、善心所十一個——因為這二十一個是跟一切清淨的心恒常相應的。底下就一條一條說明：無漏位為什麼連別境五、善十一都齊了。
先說別境這五個怎麼一個個都齊了。它具「欲」——因為佛恒常樂於拿證智去觀照所觀的境（有那份希欲）。它具「勝解」——因為它對所觀的境恒常咬定不放。它具「念」——因為它對曾經領受過的境恒常記得清清楚楚。它具「定」——因為佛沒有不專定的心（從不散亂）。它具「慧」——因為它對一切法恒常辨得分明。別境五就這樣全了。再說善心所十一個也全：因為「極淨信」這些善心所恒常跟它相應；又因為它沒有一點染污、沒有一點散動（所以不放逸、行捨這些善心所也都齊備）——這樣善十一也就樣樣具足了。
最後說無漏位這個第八識的受和所緣。它也只跟「捨受」相應——因為它自自然然、無時不在、一味平等地轉（佛果離了苦樂、永遠一個味道）。它拿「一切法」當所緣的境——因為大圓鏡智能遍緣一切法（這就跟有漏位不一樣了，有漏位只緣那三種境）。
〔Verses commented〕Verse 3 (latter half) through Verse 4
A. The gate of concurrence of mental factors (the five omnipresent)
〔Scroll 3〕
With how many mental factors is this ālaya-consciousness bound up? The answer is that it is ever bound up with these five: "contact, attention, feeling, conception, volition." From beginningless time, and right up until it is transformed into the uncontaminated (that is, before it has "transformed consciousness into wisdom"), the ālaya-consciousness is, in every stage, ever concurrent with these five mental factors. Why precisely these five? Because these five are precisely those gathered under the "omnipresent mental factors" (the class that, whenever there is any mental stirring, omnipresently arises along with it).
1. Contact
First, the first one, "contact." It arises by "discriminating the alteration" upon the basis of the "three concurring" (faculty, object, consciousness coming together); its nature is "to make mind and mental factors touch the object," and its function is "to serve as the basis for feeling, conception, volition, and the rest." Take it word by word. By "three concurring" is meant faculty, object, and consciousness following one another and coming together into one — hence "three concurring." Contact is born in reliance on this "three concurring," and conversely it binds these three together more tightly, so the treatise simply states the cause by way of the effect, saying contact "just is that three-concurring" (in fact it brings the three-concurring about). Next, "alteration" — when the three come together there is, by nature, a momentum of "following-along so as to give rise to the mental factors," and this momentum is called "alteration"; lastly, "discriminating" — contact arises precisely by "modeling itself on that momentum, resembling it," and so is called "discriminating" (following it, resembling it, just this is called discriminating).
Of these three, faculty, object, and consciousness, the "faculty's" momentum of alteration, in giving rise to contact, is mightier than either object or consciousness; so the Abhidharma-samuccaya and such texts pick out only the "faculty" to speak of, saying "contact discriminates the faculty's alteration" (citing the mightiest, the rest passed over with it). Next, what is contact's own nature: just this — "to bind together all mind and mental factors, making them touch one and the same object" — this is contact's own nature. And since contact models itself on, and resembles, that momentum of "following-along so as to give rise to the mental factors," its function is therefore "to serve as the basis for feeling and the rest."
The Udaya-astamgama-sūtra says: the aggregates of feeling, conception, and formations, every one of them, arise only with contact as their condition. Following this one can lay out a line from few to many: consciousness is born from "two" (faculty, object) coming together, contact is born from "three" (the three-concurring of faculty, object, consciousness), and feeling and the rest are born from "four" (faculty, object, consciousness, plus contact) coming together. Then it explains why several treatises speak differently. The Yogācārabhūmi says only "contact is the basis for feeling, conception, volition," and that is because "volition" is the head in the "formations aggregate," the weightiest, so citing the one "volition" brings all the other formation-factors along. The Abhidharma-samuccaya and such say only "contact is the basis for feeling," and that is because contact's giving rise to feeling is the nearest, the most direct — you see, the "agreeable (favorable), disagreeable (contrary)" mark that contact takes hold of is too close to the "favorable-and-beneficial, adverse-and-harmful" mark that feeling takes hold of, and so contact gives rise to feeling most mightily, and feeling alone is singled out.
Lastly, one point to clear up: this thing contact is "really existent," not "conventional" (not a mere empty name with nothing behind it). On what ground is it really existent? Three reasons: first, within the "six sixes" (the six sets of six — the six faculties, six objects, six consciousnesses, six contacts, six feelings, six cravings) it is precisely one "mental factor"; second, it belongs to the "touch-food" among the "four foods" (the four sustenances that uphold body and life); third, it can serve as the condition for feeling and the rest — and just on these three counts, it is as really existent a dharma as feeling and the other mental factors. In other words, contact is a dharma that arises separately upon the three-concurring; it itself is not the same as the "three-concurring."
2. Attention
The second is "attention." Its nature is "to rouse and stir the mind," and its function is "to draw the mind toward the object it has as object-support." Put plainly: this mental factor can rouse and alert "the seed of the mind that is about to arise," give it a pull and lead it on toward the object, and so is called "attention" (stirring the thought up). Though it can also incidentally rouse the other mental factors, since the "mind-king" is the head, it is the head alone that is cited, speaking of "drawing the mind" (citing the head brings the factors along).
〔A divergent view: turning toward and holding fast〕 Someone gives it another reading, saying: attention is "making the mind turn its head toward a different object," or "pinning the mind onto a single object and making it settle," and so is called attention. Both these readings cannot stand. Take just the line "pinning the mind onto a single object": were it really so, attention would not be an "omnipresent" factor (since pinning onto one object happens only on entering concentration, and is not at all the ordinary case, whereas the omnipresent factors are there at all times); and reading it this way, attention would become indistinguishable from "concentration" (pinning the mind one-pointedly and settling it), the two muddled into one and the same.
3. Feeling
The third is "feeling." Its nature is "to receive the marks of the favorable, the contrary, and the neither-favorable-nor-contrary (both-not) object" — that is, to taste whether the object is sweet, bitter, or bland; its function is "to be able to stir up craving" — for the moment it receives, it gives rise to three impulses in turn: with a pleasant feeling, "the wish to draw near"; with a painful feeling, "the wish to get away"; with the bland, "neither drawing near nor getting away."
〔A divergent view: the own-nature feeling is feeling's own mark〕 Someone puts forward a division, saying: feeling is of two kinds — one called "object-feeling" (receiving that outer object it has as object-support), one called "own-nature feeling" (receiving the contact that arises together with it); and only the "own-nature feeling" counts as the mark feeling truly has of its own, while the "object-feeling" is a mark feeling shares in common with others and counts as no distinctive feature of feeling itself (since contact and the rest are all receiving that object too).
This division cannot stand; it is refuted below point by point. First point: feeling simply does not have as object-support "the contact that arises together with it" (the co-temporal contact is not an object feeling has as object-support — so where is this "receiving contact"?). Second point: were you to say "feeling is born modeling itself on contact, resembling contact, and so call it 'receiving contact,'" then by that logic, whatever effect resembles its cause should count as "feeling-nature" (which is of course absurd); besides, since contact is feeling's cause, it ought rather to be called "cause-feeling" — how does it instead come to be called "own-nature feeling"? Third point: were you to say "just as a king collects and uses the taxes of the several prefectures and counties, so feeling can collect the feeling-substance born of contact, and this is called own-nature feeling" — this too does not get through, for it runs squarely against their own thesis that "feeling cannot witness itself" (since feeling cannot have itself as object-support, how could it collect its own feeling-substance?). Fourth point: were you to say "whatever does not throw away its own nature is called own-nature feeling," then no dharma whatever throws away its own nature — would not every dharma then become "feeling's own nature" (which is more absurd still)? So this whole account of theirs is but words to coax an infant, with no real principle to it.
What, then, is the correct account? In fact "object-feeling" is not a mark shared in common with the other mental factors — it is "the receiving of the marks of the favorable, the contrary, and the rest, and this receiving is feeling's own exclusive doing," and so it is called "object-feeling," not shared in common with the others (receiving the marks of the favorable and the contrary is feeling alone doing the receiving; contact and the rest only bind faculty, object, and consciousness together and do not receive this mark).
4. Conception
The fourth is "conception." Its nature is "to take an image upon the object" (capturing the object's likeness, seizing an outline of it), and its function is "to set up various names for it." How does it work? It must first set up the "boundary-mark of the object" (that is, first fix where this thing ends and what it looks like); only with that fixed can it then go on to set up various names for it (first the outline, then, following the outline, the name can be uttered).
5. Volition
The fifth is "volition." Its nature is "to make the mind do and make" (pushing the mind to set to work, to make karma), and its function is "to deploy and drive one's own mind upon good deeds and the rest." How does it work? It first seizes accurately the mark of "what should or should not be done" (the right cause) upon the object, then drives its own mind to do and make good karma and the rest (this business of making karma is led by volition).
To round off these five: since contact, attention, feeling, conception, and volition all are gathered under the "omnipresent," they are necessarily concurrent with the store-consciousness (the ālaya-consciousness); and as to just how the "omnipresent" is omnipresent, that will be expounded at length later. Here one must make clear on what ground they count as "concurrent": these five mental factors and the maturation-consciousness, though their several modes of activity differ (the consciousness handles discerning, feeling handles receiving, each its own task), are yet equal in four respects — first, "time" (arising at one and the same time); second, "basis" (resting on the same faculty); third, "object-support" (having one and the same object as object-support); fourth, "substance" (their own substances matching in number). Just because these four are equal, they are therefore called "concurrent" (matching one another, coming together).
B. The gate of concurrence with the five feelings (equanimity-feeling alone)
This ālaya-consciousness, in its working (mode of activity), is exceedingly unclear and muddy; it cannot tell apart whether what is before it is a "favorable object" or an "adverse object" (that is, it does not know pain, does not know pleasure); it turns subtle and faint, of one taste from start to finish (it is not bitter today and pleasant tomorrow, nor does it mix in joy or sorrow), continuous all along. Just because it is of this character, it is concurrent only with "equanimity-feeling" (that bland feeling that is neither painful nor pleasant).
Look again from another angle: the feeling concurrent with this consciousness is pure "maturation" (that is, true maturation, which requites precisely that "projecting karma" that drew you to take this birth); it turns following "the projecting karma of a former life," not awaiting any present condition to set it off, turning on the sheer momentum left by good and evil karma. So it can only be "equanimity-feeling." What of the two feelings, painful and pleasant? They belong to "maturation-born" (the kind of completing-karma fruit added on top of the maturation-fruit, which arises only on awaiting a present condition), not "true maturation" — and precisely because they cannot show up but on awaiting a present condition, they are not concurrent with this consciousness.
There is a further reason: precisely because this consciousness is ever changeless (not now painful, now pleasant), sentient beings can grasp it without break as "the self within" (the inner self); were it concurrent with the two feelings, painful and pleasant, it would go up and down, rise and fall — and how would a thing that is forever changing ever be taken by anyone as a "constant, uniform self"? So this consciousness is concurrent only with "equanimity-feeling" (just because it does not change, it can bear being deludedly grasped as a self).
〔Q〕Someone is not satisfied: on your account it is matched only with equanimity-feeling, yet it is plainly also a fruit drawn by "evil karma" — should not evil karma draw a painful fruit? How is it that it has instead drawn a neither-painful-nor-pleasant equanimity-feeling? 〔A〕Consider first: everyone grants that "good karma too can draw equanimity-feeling" (good karma need not draw only pleasant feeling); and since good karma can draw equanimity-feeling, evil karma can all the same draw an ālaya bearing equanimity-feeling — there is nothing strange in it. The principle is this: "equanimity-feeling" does not run counter to the two classes, painful and pleasant (equanimity is neutral, and pain or pleasure alike can be gathered up into equanimity) — just as an "indeterminate dharma" (that nature which is neither good nor evil) can be drawn by both good and evil karma alike.
C. The gate of the mental factors' parallel (contact and the rest are likewise so · the gate of the three natures)
1. Not concurrent with the object-specific, the good, or the defiled
〔Q〕Someone asks: why is this consciousness not concurrent with the "object-specific" mental factors (the five — aspiration, resolve, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom — the class that arises only when each has its own respective object)? 〔A〕Because this consciousness's temper is at odds with those five at every turn. Take them one by one and it is clear. "Aspiration" turns by raising a longing toward something liked, but this consciousness turns of itself, naturally, harboring no longing for anything — so it does not keep company with aspiration. "Resolve" turns by biting down hard and not letting go of something settled, but this consciousness is dim and muddled, simply unable to bite down on anything — so it does not keep company with resolve. "Mindfulness" turns only by clearly and distinctly bearing in mind something once practiced and remembered, but this consciousness is dim and feeble and remembers nothing clearly — so it does not keep company with mindfulness. "Concentration" can pin the mind one-pointedly upon a single object, unmoving, but this consciousness turns of itself, naturally, and moment by moment shifts to a different object as object-support (simply cannot settle) — so it does not keep company with concentration. "Wisdom" turns only by picking and choosing, telling right from wrong, upon such things as virtue, but this consciousness is subtle and dim and simply cannot pick and choose — so it does not keep company with wisdom. Since it is at odds with all five at every point, this consciousness is not concurrent with these five object-specific factors.
Further, this consciousness is purely of "maturation" nature (that is, unobstructed-indeterminate, neither hindering the path nor good nor evil), and so the "good" mental factors and the "defiled" mental factors (the afflictions and secondary afflictions) are also not concurrent with it. And what of the indeterminate side among "remorse (that is, regret), torpor, applied thought, sustained thought" (these four)? — though they are indeterminate, they are "intermittent" (not continuous all along), and this settles that they do not count as "maturation" (maturation must be continuous all along, unbroken), so they too are not concurrent with this consciousness.
2. The gate of the three natures — unobstructed-indeterminate
Dharmas fall, in all, into four kinds: good, non-good, obstructed-indeterminate, and unobstructed-indeterminate. Under which kind, then, does the ālaya-consciousness fall? The answer is that it belongs only to "unobstructed-indeterminate" (neither veiling the noble path nor good nor evil), because it is of "maturation" nature. Below are three reasons why it must be unobstructed-indeterminate. First reason: were maturation good or defiled, then "flowing-on (birth-and-death), reverting (nirvāṇa)" — both of these — would fail to be accomplished, for a good nature ought not to flow on into birth-and-death, and a defiled nature ought not to be able to revert and become nirvāṇa. Second reason: this consciousness is the "backing" (basis) of the good and the defiled, and were it itself to become good or defiled, trouble would come — like natures accord, unlike natures clash: leaned to the good side, it would clash with the defiled and could not uphold the defiled; leaned to the defiled side, it would clash with the good and could not uphold the good; in short, it could not be the backing for both good and defiled at once. Third reason: this consciousness is of "perfumable" nature (able to receive perfuming, able to store seeds), and were it itself already good or defiled, it would be like a thing "extremely fragrant" or "extremely foul," its smell fixed dead, so that no other smell could be perfumed into it; and since nothing could be perfumed in and no seeds stored, the cause-and-effect of the defiled and the pure would all fail to be established. Putting these three together, the conclusion is: this consciousness can only be "unobstructed-indeterminate."
Lastly, unpack the name "unobstructed-indeterminate" word by word. What does "obstructed" mean? Just that a defiled dharma can block the noble path, and further can veil the mind and make it foul; this consciousness is not defiled, and so is named "unobstructed" (without the fault of veiling). What does "determinate" mean? Just "able to be marked off and distinguished" — the two dharmas, good and evil, the one drawing a lovable fruit, the other an unlovable fruit, each having its own vivid substance, can be told clearly apart; this consciousness is neither good nor evil (drawing no such lovable or unlovable fruit), and no good-or-evil can be distinguished in it, and so it is named "indeterminate."
3. Contact and the rest are likewise so
What does the verse's line "contact and the rest are likewise so" mean? Just this: since the ālaya-consciousness belongs only to "unobstructed-indeterminate," those five — "contact, attention, feeling, conception, volition" — are along with it likewise unobstructed-indeterminate — for whatever dharmas are concurrent must take their nature from the head (the mind-king being indeterminate, the mental factors too must be indeterminate). And not only is the nature the same; there are several other respects all the same: contact and these five, like the ālaya-consciousness, are also "maturation," their object-support and mode of activity likewise both "unknowable," having as object-support the same "three objects" (seeds, body-with-faculties, receptacle-world), being "five dharmas (the mind-king together with these five omnipresent)" concurrent together, and likewise all "unobstructed-indeterminate" — and it is just on this point-by-point sameness that it is said "contact and the rest are likewise so" (these contact and the rest too are just like the ālaya).
〔A divergent view: contact and the rest are also the all-seeds〕 Here someone stretches "likewise so" too far, saying: contact and these five, like the ālaya-consciousness, are also "maturation," and also "all-seeds" (that is, they too can hold all the seeds), and so on right down, all of it, to being unobstructed-indeterminate — the ground being that these three words "likewise so" make no discount, do not say which respect does not count, and so every respect ought to be just like the ālaya's. This account is wrong.
Why is it wrong? It is plain once refuted point by point below. First point: these mental factors, contact and the rest, "turn following the consciousness and cannot be their own master" — just as the mental factors greed, faith, and the like all cannot receive perfuming, so how could they have the face to hold seeds like the consciousness? (Unable even to receive perfuming, what talk is there of holding seeds.) Second point: grant, for argument, that contact and the rest really could receive perfuming and hold seeds — then would not a single sentient being have "six substances that hold seeds" (the mind-king one, the five mental factors one each)? Were it really so, trouble comes at once — when a present-active fruit arises, from which of the six sets of seeds, after all, is it born? Saying "all six together give birth to it" will not do, for one has never seen "several seeds growing up one sprout in common" (several causes crowding to give birth to one fruit — there is no such principle); saying "the fruit is born from one set only" will not do either, for would not the other five sets then become mere ornaments, set idle with no use? Saying "the six sets give birth to fruit by taking turns" will not do still more, for the perfuming was perfumed in all at once, and the six sets' momenta are equally strong, so no before-and-after order can be laid out among them; and saying "the six fruits spring up all at once" still will not do, for then would not a single sentient being, in one and the same instant, have six eye-consciousnesses and the like leaping up together (which is of course absurd)?
〔Orthodox counter-question〕 In fact no one ever said "contact and the rest can also receive perfuming and hold seeds" (that is the opponent's own addition). 〔Q〕Then someone presses: since contact and the rest cannot hold seeds, why does the treatise then say "contact and the rest are called 'all-seeds' just like the consciousness"? 〔A〕The sense of this is: within the appearance-part of these five mental factors, contact and the rest, there shows "the shadow that resembles seeds" (the resembling-seed mark), and it is just on this that they are said to be called "all-seeds" — for contact and the rest "have as object-support the same objects" as the consciousness (likewise having seeds and the rest, those three objects, as object-support), and even the contact and the rest in the formless realm have an object they have as object-support, and mind and mental factors must always have a "direct object-support condition" (that is, their close-fitting appearance-part). But it must be told apart: this "shadow that resembles seeds" is only an image, and it cannot really serve as a "cause-condition" to give birth to the present-active consciousness and the like (this is a wholly different matter from real seeds giving birth to the present-active); just as "the shadow that resembles the eye-faculty" upon contact's appearance-part is not the eye-faculty the consciousness really rests on, and just as drawing "a shadow that resembles fire" cannot really set a thing alight. So if someone wishes to take this "resembling-seed" to rescue the earlier account of "contact and the rest holding seeds," it cannot be brought back to life — for those "resembling-seed" marks that contact and the rest have as object-support are something to be compared with the consciousness only later, where "appropriation and location" are treated (where what is spoken of is the consciousness transforming into the shadow that resembles the object, not that contact and the rest can really hold seeds).
Gathering up this stretch, the conclusion comes out. First, those three words "all-seeds" in the earlier verse certainly point only to the sense of "able to receive perfuming, able to hold seeds" (a thing only the eighth consciousness is fit for); were it not so read, the root verse would commit the fault of "saying the same thing twice" — for the line "maturation, all-seeds" has already stated the eighth consciousness, and were "contact and the rest are likewise so" to assign the seed-sense to contact and the rest again, would that not be a repeat? Second, the opponent's saying "'likewise so' makes no discount, so every respect is copied straight across wholesale" can serve as no proof at all; for otherwise, are contact and these five then also able to "discern" (which is the consciousness's own task alone)? Are contact and the rest then concurrent with contact and the rest themselves (whoever heard of a thing being concurrent with itself)? These of course cannot stand. It can be seen, then, that "likewise so" is said "with respect to that same part" (taking the small part in which they resemble), and is not to say "every sense is one and the same."
D. The gate of the cause-and-effect simile (constant-yet-turning like a torrent · neither severed nor permanent)
Is the ālaya-consciousness "severed" (does it cut off and perish), or is it "permanent" (forever fixed and changeless)? The answer is: neither severed nor permanent, because it is "constant-yet-turning." These two words must be told apart. First, "constant" — meaning that this consciousness, from beginningless time, is of one taste (one and the same indeterminate nature throughout), continuous all along, never broken off; precisely because it is so steady and unbroken, it is fit to be the foundation by which "realm (the three realms), destiny (the five destinies), birth (the four births)" — all this — can be set up, and it is on its firm-natured strength that the seeds are held fast and not let scatter. Next, "turning" — meaning that this consciousness, from beginningless time, again arises and perishes thought after thought, altering on and on before and after, the former thought perishing and the latter thought at once arising, which shows it to be not forever fixed, nor dead-set as one (not permanent, not one); precisely because it is thus renewed thought by thought, it can be the very ground where the "evolving consciousnesses" (the first seven) perfume and store seeds.
So the word "constant" serves to ward off "severance," and the word "turning" serves to point out "non-permanence." Being thus at once constant and turning, turning and constant, it is just like a "torrent" (a great water rushing on without stop), the principle of cause-and-effect being, of its very nature, just so. Look at the water of a torrent: it is not severed (linked all along, never broken) and not permanent either (the water ahead and the water behind ever renewing), flowing on long and long, sweeping things in and drowning them as it goes; this consciousness is just so, from beginningless time arising-and-perishing on and on, unbroken, neither permanent nor severed, sweeping sentient beings up within it, drowning them, so they cannot get out of birth-and-death.
This simile of the torrent can be carried two layers further. One layer: though a torrent be struck by wind and the like, raising one wave-crest after another, that body of water flows on without stop; this consciousness too is so — though it meet sundry conditions, raising the eye-consciousness and the like (just as wave-crests are raised one after another), it carries on all the same unbroken. The other layer: a torrent sweeps along too the fish, the grass, and such things bobbing up and down in the water, carrying them with it and not letting go; this consciousness too is so, ever turning along together with the inner "habit-energy" (seeds) and the outwardly arising "contact" and such dharmas. Setting the "dharma" (the ālaya) against the "simile" (the torrent) in this way, what it means to point out is just this principle of the consciousness's "cause-and-effect, from beginningless time, being neither severed nor permanent."
Put plainly: the nature of this consciousness, from beginningless time, "effect arising and cause perishing" instant by instant (the former thought as cause, perishing; the latter thought as effect, arising). Because "the effect is ever arising," it is not severed (there is always something behind to take up); because "the cause at once perishes," it is not permanent (the former thought passes the very instant it comes). This being-neither-severed-nor-permanent is precisely the principle of "dependent-arising," and so it is said that this consciousness "is constant-yet-turning like a torrent."
〔Below, the home thesis refutes the other schools' clinging that "past and future are both really existent" (such as the Sarvāstivāda and the Sautrāntika), so as to bring out the consciousness-only dependent-arising.〕 〔Q · first someone comes at consciousness-only〕 The opponent first presses: on your consciousness-only account, past and future are both not really existent, so "non-permanence" is of course easy to say (past and future are both substanceless, so of course not permanent); but how does your "non-severance" stand up (with past and future both substanceless, are not the before and after thereby cut apart)? And once it becomes "severance," what talk is there of the right principle of dependent-arising? 〔Consciousness-only turns it back on him〕 Very well, then turn the question on you: you say past and future are really existent, so "non-severance" can of course be granted (with all three times having substance, they link up well enough); but how does your "non-permanence" stand up (with the three times all really existent, is not that being permanently-abiding)? In which case "permanence" too fails to establish the right principle of dependent-arising. 〔Someone worries on consciousness-only's behalf〕 — But does merely picking out the opponent's fault count as establishing one's own principle? 〔A〕It is not to be put that way: unless the crooked principles are first broken, the right principle can hardly come out (breaking the crooked principles is precisely for the sake of bringing out the right).
〔Setting up the consciousness-only account head-on〕 At the very instant "the former cause is perishing," "the latter effect" arises at the same moment — this is like the two ends of a steelyard: one end sinks down, one end tips up, the two events happening at one and the same time. Cause and effect link up just so, one ahead and one behind, joined like flowing water — so where is there any need to borrow that "past and future are really existent" before "non-severance" can be put together? 〔Now turn the question once more on the one who clings to the three times' real existence〕 As for your side — at the time when the "cause" is still present, the latter "effect" has not yet been born, so whose cause is this cause (with no effect, this cause has nothing to match)? And by the time the "effect" is present, the former "cause" has already perished, so whose effect is this effect (with no cause, this effect has nothing to match)? Since you maintain that cause and effect are not at one and the same time, cause and effect simply cannot be matched into a pair; and with no matched pair of cause and effect at all, what talk is there of who can get free of severance and permanence?
〔The opponent shifts to another rescue, saying "cause and effect are there together from the start," and this too must be broken〕 The opponent changes his words: "When there is the cause, the latter effect was already there long since" (that is, cause and effect coexisting all along, at the same time). This too does not get through: since the effect was already there from the start, what does it still wait on the former cause for (the effect need not lean on the cause at all)? And since the sense of the cause's being a cause is gone, whence the sense of the effect's being an effect? With no cause and no effect, again there is no getting free of severance and permanence. 〔Gather up the home thesis〕 On this consciousness-only side, the sense of cause and effect is established only "by the present-active dharma's here-and-now function" (the former thought perishing, the latter arising, the two momenta lending strength to one another); so those earlier challenges, leveled at "the three times' real existence" and "cause and effect there from the start," touch the home school of consciousness-only not at all.
〔Press the "there from the start" account again〕 Since you maintain "the substance is there from the start," then carried right through, the "function" too should be there from the start; and the function being there from the start, the "cause and condition" it waits on should also be there from the start, with no need to arise anew — and on this road of "there from the start" all the way down, everything just sits dead-set, with no function left to speak of. It can be seen, then, that within your account cause and effect surely cannot be established, and so one should after all receive in faith the Mahāyāna's right principle of dependent-arising. What is this right principle? It is deep and marvelous, and again is not a thing words can pin down; the words "cause, effect," and the rest are all "set up for the moment" (conventionally set up). Seeing that a present dharma has the function of "drawing out the dharma to come after," one sets up for the moment a "future effect," and conversely calls this present one "the cause"; seeing that a present dharma has the mark of "requiting the dharma before it," one sets up for the moment a "past cause," and conversely calls this present one "the effect." By "set up for the moment" is meant that all this is the present-active consciousness transforming so as to "seem to have the marks of cause and effect" (cause and effect are in fact all transformed by the consciousness, the names set up for the moment).
Cause and effect put this way, the principle is plain and clear, free of the two extremes of "severance" and "permanence," squarely meeting the middle way; and all who have wisdom should, in accord with this, take it up and train.
〔A remaining school: the one-substance-two-times account〕 Yet another school (one line within the Sautrāntika) comes forward and says: we do not set up past and future as really existent, yet all the same there is the principle of "cause and effect carrying on continuously." How so? A present dharma, fast as it is, can yet be told apart into the two times "before, after" and "arising, perishing" — at the time of arising it requites its cause, at the time of perishing it draws out its effect; the times are two, but the substance is one and the same; the former cause is just perishing, the latter effect is just arising, and though they are two in appearance, both of these "really and truly are." Put this way, cause and effect are not merely set up by a name (not conventionally set up), and again they are free of severance and permanence, and again they dodge that whole pile of challenges leveled at "the three times' real existence" — what man of wisdom would let this go and instead believe your account of "setting up by a name"?
〔Refute him〕 This too is but a string of empty words, with no real principle in it at all. How can you allow "two times (the time of arising, the time of perishing) crammed into one thought"? "Arising" and "perishing" are by nature at odds — how can they crowd together into "the present" at once? If you say "perishing" is the present, then "arising" should be pushed off to "the future" (and the two would no longer be at the same time). Again: only what "is" is called "arising," and it being present, it is; only what "is not" is called "perishing," so should it not be that past which is not? Press from the reverse, and it is the same: if "perishing" is not a not-being, then "arising" should be not a being; yet since "arising" is present and is, "perishing" should be present and is not — and since arising and perishing are thus at odds, how can you say "the substance is one and the same"? Even of such mutually-at-odds dharmas as pain and pleasure, one never sees "one and the same substance." Tightening it up: if arising and perishing are one and the same, the times should not divide into two (what further dividing into time-of-arising, time-of-perishing); if arising and perishing are two, on what ground do you say the substance is the same? So your account, "both the time of arising and the time of perishing are present and are, and both rest on one substance," surely cannot be established.
As for the "cause and effect carrying on continuously" set up by the Sautrāntika masters and the rest, it too fails to be established — for they simply do not admit that there is "an ālaya-consciousness that can hold seeds"; and with no seed-holding substance, the before-and-after cause and effect have nowhere to lodge, so the so-called "carrying-on continuously" cannot link up. Having refuted all these roads, one should turn back and receive in faith the right principle of dependent-arising — "cause and effect carrying on continuously" — that the Mahāyāna teaches.
E. The gate of the stages of subduing-and-severing (relinquished at the arhat stage)
This consciousness, from beginningless time, is "constant-yet-turning like a stream"; up to what stage, then, does it count as having thoroughly "relinquished" this name "ālaya"? Only at the "arhat stage" is it thoroughly relinquished. The meaning is: the moment a noble one severs the "affliction-hindrance" clean and bare, not a trace left, he is named an arhat; at that moment, the "affliction-grossness" within this consciousness (that is, the coarse, heavy habit-residue left by the affliction-seeds) has forever departed, and so it is said to "relinquish" (to relinquish this name ālaya).
The "arhat" spoken of here gathers in together the "stage of the fruit of no-more-training" across the three vehicles (śrāvaka, pratyekabuddha, bodhisattva / buddha), and is not the śrāvaka sort of arhat alone. On what ground may all three vehicles' no-more-training [stages] be called arhat? Because the very name "arhat" contains three senses, and all three vehicles' no-more-training are fit for each: first, "slayer of the bandit" — they have all forever rid themselves of the "affliction-bandit"; second, "the worthy of offerings" — they should all receive the world's finest offerings; third, "no-[further]-birth" — they all never again undergo "apportioned birth-and-death" (taking birth and a body in installment after installment).
How is it known that arhat runs through the three vehicles' no-more-training? Two places in scripture and treatise bear witness. The Viniścaya[-saṃgrahaṇī] says: the arhats, the pratyekabuddhas, and the tathāgatas — these three — all "do not accomplish the name of the ālaya-consciousness" (which shows all three have already relinquished the ālaya-name and are all fit to be called arhat). The Abhidharma-samuccaya says again: when the bodhisattvas attain bodhi, they sever at one stroke both the affliction-hindrance and the knowable-hindrance, and so "become arhats, and also become tathāgatas" — which shows the bodhisattva-fruit too is counted within arhat.
〔Q〕Someone seizes on a contradiction and asks: on your account, arhat is reckoned by "the afflictions severed to exhaustion"; then since the bodhisattva's affliction-seeds are not yet severed clean, he is not yet an arhat, and by rights should all still "accomplish the ālaya-consciousness." Yet how does that same Viniścaya[-saṃgrahaṇī] then say "the non-retrogressing bodhisattva too does not accomplish the ālaya-consciousness" — the afflictions not yet severed clean, yet the ālaya-name already relinquished, is this not a self-contradiction?
〔A〕In fact there is no contradiction; the key is which sort the "non-retrogressing bodhisattva" that Viniścaya[-saṃgrahaṇī] speaks of refers to. It refers to the sort who "was already a two-vehicle no-more-trainer, and then turned from the small toward the great, turning to seek the great bodhi" — they severed the affliction-hindrance to exhaustion long since, will surely never again retrogress, never again raise an affliction, and turn single-mindedly toward bodhi, and so are given a new name, "non-retrogressing bodhisattva." This sort of bodhisattva, being himself a two-vehicle no-more-trainer with afflictions already exhausted, does not accomplish the ālaya-consciousness, and is gathered precisely within that earlier "three-vehicle arhat." Seen thus, that treatise-text does not clash with the earlier principle at all — it speaks of "the two-vehicle [adept] who has turned his mind around," and not of the still-afflicted ground-stage bodhisattvas of the ordinary-position who still bear affliction-seeds.
There is another sort of "non-retrogressing bodhisattva" that must also be counted in: namely the bodhisattva of the eighth "immovable stage" and above. Why is he fit to be called non-retrogressing? Because in him no affliction whatever any longer becomes present-active; within that "swift dharma-stream" (the markless dharma-flow) he turns on of itself, naturally, forward; he can raise "the myriad practices" amid "the myriad practices," instant by instant advancing without stop — having reached this point, he is named "non-retrogressing bodhisattva." This sort of bodhisattva — though the affliction-seeds within his maturation-consciousness are not yet severed clean — yet the "view-of-self, love-of-self" and the rest that arise having this consciousness as object-support no longer "grasp-and-store this consciousness as the self within" (that is, the self-grasping of the seventh consciousness is forever subdued and no longer becomes present-active), and just on this he has forever relinquished the name "ālaya," and so it is said he "does not accomplish the ālaya-consciousness"; this too names him "arhat" (said with respect to that side of "having already relinquished the ālaya-name").
〔A divergent view: relinquished from the first stage and above〕 Here again someone draws the line earlier, saying: in fact a bodhisattva from the first stage and above already counts as a "non-retrogressing bodhisattva." He lists a string of reasons: the first-stage bodhisattva has already realized the principle disclosed by the "two emptinesses, of self and of dharmas"; has already gained the two excellent wisdoms, the "root-wisdom and the subsequently-attained wisdom"; has already severed the two hindrances "discriminated self-grasping and discriminated dharma-grasping"; can raise "the myriad practices" amid "a single practice"; and though for the benefit of beings he deliberately raises some afflictions, those afflictions do not truly bring about the faults of affliction (do not bind and defile him) — and on these counts the first-stage bodhisattva too should be called "non-retrogressing." This sort of bodhisattva — though the "innate afflictions" are not yet severed clean — yet the "discriminated view-of-self, love-of-self" and the rest that arise having this consciousness as object-support no longer grasp-and-store it as the self within, and just on this he too has relinquished the name "ālaya," and so it is said he "does not accomplish the ālaya-consciousness"; this too names him "arhat."
〔This first-stage account further hauls in the Abhidharma-samuccaya to prop itself up〕 He cites the Abhidharma-samuccaya's words, saying: the ten-stage bodhisattva, though he has not yet forever severed all afflictions, yet these afflictions are like the poisonous snakes held down by "spell and medicine," unable to stir up a single affliction-calamity; in any of the stages, he is just like an "arhat with afflictions already severed," and so they too are named "arhat."
〔Refute this "relinquished from the first stage" account, and set up the "relinquished only at the immovable stage" orthodox sense〕 This "relinquished from the first stage" in fact cannot stand. Look: a bodhisattva before the seventh stage still bears the "innate view-of-self, love-of-self," and still grasps-and-stores this consciousness as the self within all the same — how then can it be said he "has already relinquished the ālaya-name"? Besides, were you to maintain "the moment the discriminated view-of-self and love-of-self no longer grasp-and-store, that counts as relinquishment," then trouble comes — the noble ones in the training-positions, the "stream-enterer" (srotaāpanna) and the rest, severed their discriminated self-grasping long since, and by your standard they too should have already relinquished the ālaya-name; but to grant this is to clash head-on with the plain text of several treatises (those treatises plainly say: those in the training-positions still have the ālaya).
〔Now block off, too, his move of rescuing himself by hauling in the Abhidharma-samuccaya〕 You cite the Abhidharma-samuccaya meaning to say "the ground-stage bodhisattva's afflictions are kept in check by right knowing and bring about no faults, so they are equal to already-severed"; but this rescues you not. The afflictions a ground-stage bodhisattva raises are all "raised under the watch of right knowing" (not deluded by them, not letting them ripen into calamity), a skill the stream-enterer and the rest simply do not have — how then can you take the Abhidharma-samuccaya's line "like poison held down by spell and medicine" and fit that principle onto "the first-stage bodhisattva having already relinquished the ālaya"? And worse: even granting the afflictions raised within the "sixth consciousness" of a first-to-seventh-stage bodhisattva are watched by right knowing and bring about no faults, his "seventh consciousness," in the contaminated-mind stage, all the same "turns present-active of itself, naturally, grasping-and-storing this consciousness as the self within" — is not this very point equal to those, the stream-enterer and the rest, who "still bear innate self-grasping"? From this it can be seen that the earlier "relinquished from the first stage" account is wrong.
The correct account, then, is this: the arhat severs the "affliction-grossness" within this consciousness clean and bare, no longer grasps-and-stores the ālaya-consciousness as the self within, and so forever loses the name "ālaya" — this is what is called "relinquishment." The crucial thing: what is relinquished is only this "name," and it is not that the whole "substance" of the eighth consciousness is relinquished along with it. Were it otherwise, it would go ill — for then it would amount to "the arhat having no consciousness to hold seeds," and at that very moment he would have to enter "nirvāṇa-without-remainder" (body and mind alike extinguished). But in fact the arhat still in the world lives on still, still holding seeds by the eighth consciousness — which shows the substance of the eighth consciousness has not been relinquished.
〔The eighth consciousness's several names · the times of relinquishment in three positions〕
To turn back, then: though every sentient being has this eighth consciousness, it bears various names according to differing angles. Below, each of these names is listed in turn.
The first batch is the names both ordinary beings and noble ones bear. It is named "mind" — because it is the layer-on-layer accumulation of the seeds perfumed by sundry dharmas ("mind" taking the sense of "accumulation"). It is named "ādāna" (this transliteration just means "appropriating") — because it grasps fast the seeds and the several material faculties, not letting them be destroyed. It is named "basis of the knowable" — because it can serve as the backing for the defiled and the pure, all the "dharmas that are knowable." It is named "seed-consciousness" — because it can hold fast, omnipresently, all the seeds of the worldly and the supraworldly. These several names run through "all stages" (whether ordinary being or noble one, all bear them).
It is named "ālaya" (this transliteration just means "store") — first, because it can take in and store all dharmas of the defiled class so they are not lost; second, because it is grasped-and-stored as the self within by the view-of-self, love-of-self, and the rest. This name is only in the "ordinary being (the unenlightened), the one in training" positions, and not in the "no-more-training position, the non-retrogressing bodhisattva" position — for only the former two still have this sense of "grasping-and-storing the defiled dharmas"; the no-more-trainer and the non-retrogressing bodhisattva grasp-and-store no longer, and so this name is relinquished.
It is named "maturation-consciousness" — because it can requite that good and non-good karma which draws birth-and-death, ripening it into a maturation-fruit. This name is only in the "ordinary being, the two vehicles, and the bodhisattvas still in the causal positions"; in the "tathāgata-stage" it is no longer there — for only the tathāgata-stage no longer has this dharma "maturation-indeterminate" (the buddha-fruit has been transformed into the pure and undefiled, and only when the maturation-fruit is utterly exhausted is this name relinquished).
It is named "undefiled-consciousness" (also transliterated "amala-consciousness") — because it is most utterly pure, the backing of all uncontaminated dharmas. This name is only in the "tathāgata-stage"; the bodhisattva, two-vehicle, and ordinary-being positions, since they all still hold the contaminated seeds and can still receive perfuming, have all not yet realized that "good and pure" eighth consciousness, and so do not bear this name. This is just as a scripture (the Tathāgata-guṇa-alaṃkāra-sūtra) says: the tathāgata's undefiled-consciousness is the pure, uncontaminated realm, liberated from all hindrances, concurrent with the great-perfect-mirror wisdom.
With these several names set out side by side, one can answer a question: why does the verse-text single out "relinquishing the ālaya-name" alone to speak of? Because the name ālaya's fault is the heaviest, and it is also the earliest to be relinquished, so it is purposely taken to speak of. The remaining names each have their own time of relinquishment: the "maturation-consciousness" substance, the bodhisattva relinquishes "when he is about to attain bodhi," and the śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha relinquish "when they enter nirvāṇa-without-remaining-basis"; the "undefiled-consciousness" substance, by contrast, "is never relinquished" — for there is no time when the buddha-fruit's benefiting and gladdening of sentient beings is exhausted (the consciousness is there all along). As for the names "mind, ādāna, basis of the knowable, seed-consciousness," these run through all stages (with no special time of relinquishment), and one should understand and speak of them following each one's respective sense.
〔The eighth consciousness in two positions · the twenty-one mental factors〕
Lastly, divide into two phases and make clear which mental factors the eighth consciousness is concurrent with. The eighth consciousness has, in all, two phases. The first is the "contaminated position": in this it belongs to the indeterminate nature, is concurrent only with "the five, contact and the rest," and has as object-support only the objects spoken of earlier, "appropriation and location" (seeds, body-with-faculties, receptacle-world). The second is the "uncontaminated position" (that is, when it is transformed into the great-perfect-mirror wisdom): in this it belongs purely to the "good" nature, and is concurrent with "twenty-one mental factors" — namely the five omnipresent, the five object-specific, and the eleven good — because these twenty-one are ever concurrent with all pure minds. Below, each is explained one by one: why, in the uncontaminated position, even the five object-specific and the eleven good are all complete.
First, how the five object-specific are each, one by one, complete. It has "aspiration" — because the buddha ever delights in taking the realizing-wisdom to contemplate the object contemplated (he has that wish-and-longing). It has "resolve" — because it ever bites down on the object contemplated and does not let go. It has "mindfulness" — because it ever bears in mind, clearly and distinctly, the object once received. It has "concentration" — because the buddha has no unconcentrated mind (never scattered). It has "wisdom" — because it ever discerns clearly all dharmas. The five object-specific are thus all complete. Next, the eleven good mental factors are likewise all complete: because the "utterly-pure faith" and the other good factors are ever concurrent with it; and because it has not a trace of defilement, not a trace of agitation (so non-heedlessness, equanimity-of-mind, and the rest of the good factors are all complete as well) — and thus the eleven good are, each and every one, fully present.
Lastly, the feeling and the object-support of this eighth consciousness in the uncontaminated position. It too is concurrent only with "equanimity-feeling" — because it turns of itself, naturally, at all times, in one even taste (the buddha-fruit being apart from pain and pleasure, forever of one taste). It takes "all dharmas" as the object it has as object-support — because the great-perfect-mirror wisdom can have all dharmas as object-support throughout (which is just where it differs from the contaminated position, which has only those three objects as object-support).
〔所釋之頌〕第三頌·下半至第四頌
本節『相應、五受、三性、恒轉、伏斷』諸門，經論早有所本。《楞伽經》以喻顯其恒轉：「藏識海常住，境界風所動，種種諸識浪，騰躍而轉生」——海常在而浪不停，正是頌文「恒轉如瀑流」所取之象。論本則在《瑜伽師地論》：「阿賴耶識與五遍行心相應所恒共相應。謂作意、觸、受、想、思」，即相應門之論據；「阿賴耶識於所緣境念念生滅，當知剎那相續流轉，非一非常」，即「恒轉」二字非斷非常之論據；「或有成就轉識，非阿賴耶識。謂阿羅漢、若諸獨覺、不退菩薩，及諸如來住有心位」，即伏斷位次門之論據。下面順著頌文一門一門講開。
甲、心所相應門——伴隨它的五個遍行心所
此識和幾個心所相應？恒常與「觸、作意、受、想、思」五者相應。阿賴耶識從無始以來、直到還沒轉成無漏之前，在一切位中都恒與這五個相應——因為這五是「遍行心所」（遍一切心而起）。
觸——是在「三和」（根、境、識三者和合）上的「分別變異」，以『令心心所接觸所緣』為性、以『作受想思等的所依』為業。根、境、識更互隨順叫「三和」；觸依三和而生、又能令三和合，所以反過來說它『就是那三和』；三和合的位上都有『隨順生起心所』的功能，叫「變異」；觸是相似於那變異而起的，所以叫「分別」。三者裡「根」的變異力在引生觸時勝過識、境，所以《集論》等只說『觸是分別根之變異』（舉勝攝餘）。『和合一切心心所、令它們同緣一境』，這是觸的自性；觸既相似於隨順生心所的功能，所以以『作受等所依』為業。《起盡經》說受、想、行三蘊都以觸為緣，由此說識由二法和合生、觸由三和生、受等由四法（根境識觸）和合生；《瑜伽》只說觸是受想思的所依（思在行蘊中為主，舉思攝餘）；《集論》等只說觸是受的所依（觸生受最親最勝，因為觸所取的可意等相與受所取的順益等相極鄰近，引發受最強）。觸的自性是實有不是假——它在「六六法」裡是心所性、是「觸食」所攝、能作受等的緣，跟受等心所一樣是實的，並不就等於三和。
作意——以『警動其心』為性、以『在所緣境上引心趣向』為業。它能警覺那『應當生起的心之種子』、引它趣向境，所以叫作意；它雖也引起諸心所，但心王為主，所以只說「引心」。有人說作意是『令心迴轉趣向別境、或於一境持心令住』——不對：若是『持心住一境』就該不是遍行（只在定位有），而且和「定」沒分別了。
受——以『領納順、違、非順非違三種境相』為性、以「能起愛」為業（能引起樂受求合、苦受求離、捨受非合非離之欲）。有人說受有兩種（境界受、自性受），只有「自性受」才是受的自相（因為境界受和別的心所共有相）——不對：受根本不緣同時的觸；若說『相似於觸而生就叫領觸』，那凡相似於因的果都該是受性了；既是受之因，該叫「因受」、怎叫「自性受」？若說『像國王食用諸國邑那樣、受能領納由觸所生的受體叫自性受』，這又違背他們自己『受不自證』的主張（受不能自緣怎能自領受體）；若說『凡不捨自性的就叫自性受』，那一切法都不捨自性、都成受的自性了。所以那說法只是哄小孩。正義是：「境界受」並不和別的心所共相——它是『領納順等相、確定只屬於受自己』的，不與別的心所共有（受獨領順違之相，觸只管和合、不領納）。
想——以『在境上取像（攝取相狀）』為性、以「施設種種名言」為業：要先安立『境的界限相狀』，才能隨之起種種名言（依相立名）。
思——以「令心造作」為性、以『在善品等上驅役其心』為業：能攝取境的『正因（應作）』等相，驅役自心去造善等業（思是造業的主）。
這五個既是遍行所攝，就和藏識決定相應；它們和異熟識雖「行相」各異（識了別、受領納等不同），而『時（同時）、依（同根）、所緣（同境）、事（自體數等）』相同——憑這四義平等，所以叫「相應」。
乙、五受相應門——只與「捨受」相應
此識的行相極不明了，分不出違、順境相，微細、純一、相續而轉，所以只與「捨受」（不苦不樂）相應。而且它所相應的受唯是「真異熟」，隨先世的引業而轉、不待現前的緣；至於苦、樂二受是「異熟生」（滿業果，要待現前的緣），不是真異熟，所以不與此識相應。又：正因為此識恒常沒有起伏轉變，有情才能恒執它為「自內我」；若它與苦樂相應就有起伏了，怎堪被執為『常一之我』？所以只與捨受相應。有人問：那它怎麼又是「惡業」的異熟果（惡業豈不該招苦）？答：既然承認善業也能招捨受（善業未必只招樂），那此識也一樣（惡業也能招捨受的賴耶）——因為捨受不違苦樂二品，就像無記性可由善惡二業共同招感。
丙、心所例同門——不與別境善染相應·無覆無記·觸等亦如是
為什麼此識不與「別境」五心所（欲、勝解、念、定、慧）相應？因為彼此相違：「欲」要在所樂之事上希望，此識任運、無所希望；「勝解」要在決定之事上印持，此識瞢昧、無所印持；「念」只在曾串習之事上明記，此識昧劣、不能明記；「定」令心專注一境，此識任運、剎那剎那別緣異境；「慧」只在功德等上簡擇，此識微昧、不能簡擇。所以不與別境相應。此識又唯是異熟性，所以善心所、染污心所也不與它相應；至於「惡作、睡眠、尋、伺」這四個不定心所中屬無記的，因為有間斷、決定不是異熟，也不與它相應。
那此識在「善、不善、有覆無記、無覆無記」四性裡屬哪一種？唯是「無覆無記」，因為它是異熟性。理由三條：其一，異熟若是善或染，『流轉（生死）、還滅（涅槃）』就都不能成（善性不該流轉、染性不該還滅）；其二，此識是善、染的所依，若它自身是善或染，就因同異相違而不能同時給善、染兩邊作所依；其三，此識是「所熏」之性，若它自身是善或染，就像極香、極臭之物氣味已定、不能再受熏了，不受熏則染淨因果都不成。所以唯是無覆無記。「覆」是說染法能障聖道、蒙蔽心令不淨，此識非染，所以「無覆」；「記」（可記別）是說善惡能招可愛非可愛之果、又有殊勝自體可記別，此識非善非惡，所以「無記」。
頌說「觸等亦如是」，是說：正如阿賴耶識唯是無覆無記，相應的觸、作意、受、想、思五者也是如此（相應之法必同性）；而且觸等五也像賴耶一樣是異熟、所緣行相不可知、緣三種境（種子根身器界）、五法相應、無覆無記——憑這些相同處，才說「觸等亦如是」。有人說：觸等也像賴耶，既是異熟、又是『一切種（能持種子）』，乃至全部都同——因為「亦如是」沒有簡別。這不對。為什麼？其一，觸等是依識而轉、不得自在的，像貪、信等心所不能受熏，怎能像識一樣持種？其二，若觸等也能受熏持種，一個有情就有六套持種體了；那現行果起時從哪一種生的？說『從六種同生』不合理（沒見多種子生一芽）；說『只從一種生』那其餘五種就沒用；說『六種次第生』也不行（熏習是同時、六者勢力相等，沒有先後之理）；說「六果頓生」更不行（一有情一剎那就有六個眼識同時生了）。誰說觸等能受熏持種？有人難：若不能，那觸等怎麼又「如識名一切種」？答：是說觸等五的相分裡有『似種子的影像』，所以叫一切種（因為觸等與識所緣相等、無色界的觸等也有所緣、心心所必有親所緣緣）；但這『似種的影像』只是影像，並不能當「因緣」去生現行識（就像觸等相分上的「似眼根」並不是識真正的所依根、「似火」的影也沒有燒物的用）。有人想拿這「似種」來救『觸等持種』之說——不對，因為觸等所緣的「似種」等相，要到後文講「執受、處」時才該與識相例（那裡是說識變似境，不是說觸等真持種）。由此可知：前文頌說的「一切種」一語，一定是指『受熏、能持種子』之義（唯第八識當得起）；不然本頌就有『重複』的毛病了（「異熟、一切種」和「觸等亦如是」就重了）。而『亦如是沒有簡別、所以一切都相例』這說法決定不能成立——不然難道觸等也能「了別」（識的用）？觸等也與觸等自身相應？所以「亦如是」是『隨所該相同的而說』，不是說一切都同。窺基《述記》把本節這初能變判為「以十門解釋」（自相、果相、因相、所緣、行相、相應、五受、三性、因果譬喻、伏斷位次十門），並就此「觸等亦如是」一句定它的讀法：「觸等」是說俱時的心所例同於心王（一樣是無覆無記、所緣行相不可知），並不是說觸等五也能像第八識那樣了別、持種；他又判「不可知」不是另立一門，而是收在「所緣、行相」二門之內的差別義（行相、所緣俱微隱，故名不可知）。
丁、因果譬喻門——「恒轉如瀑流」，非斷非常
阿賴耶識是「斷」還是「常」？非斷非常，因為它是「恒轉」。「恒」——是說它無始以來純一、相續、常無間斷，是「界、趣、生」得以安立的根本，性堅住、能持種子令不失。「轉」——是說它無始以來念念生滅、前後變異、因滅果生，並非常一，能作前七識熏習成種的處所。「恒」遮「斷」、「轉」表「非常」，就像一道瀑流，因果本來如此：像瀑流之水，非斷（相續不絕）非常（前後新新），長時相續而漂溺人物——此識也這樣漂溺有情、令不出離；像瀑流雖被風擊起波浪而流不斷——此識雖遇眾緣起前七識而恒相續；像瀑流漂著上下浮沈的魚草隨流不捨——此識也與內在習氣、外起的觸等恒相隨轉。就是說：此識剎那剎那『果生而因滅』，果生所以非斷、因滅所以非常，非斷非常正是緣起之理，所以說它「恒轉如流」。
這裡論主借機破『三世實有』等執，以顯唯識緣起。有人難：在你唯識看來過去未來既非實有，「非常」固然可以，可「非斷」怎麼成立（過未無體豈不成斷）？反過來詰問主張三世實有的：若過未實有可許非斷，可「非常」又怎麼成立（三世皆實則成常）？難道指斥了別人的過、自己的義就算成立了嗎？不——不摧破邪執就難以顯正。正立唯識義：在「前因正滅」的位上，「後果」就同時生起，像秤的兩頭一低一昂、時間相等；這樣因果相續如流，何必借『過去未來實有』才能成立非斷？反詰那執三世實有的：在「因」現在有的位上後果還沒生，這因是誰的因？在「果」現在有時前因已滅，這果是誰的果？既沒有成立的因果，又是誰離斷常？再破『因果同時本有』的救：若『有因時後果已有』，果既本有何必等前因？因的意義既沒了、果的意義又怎有？無因無果豈離斷常？你既說「體本有」那「用」也該本有、它所待的因緣也該本有（如此一切凝然、沒有作用可言）——可見你的義裡因果決定不成，所以該信大乘緣起正理。這正理深妙離言，「因、果」等說都是假施設：看現在法有『引生後法』的作用，就假立『當來之果』來對說『現在之因』；看現在法有『酬答前法』的相，就假立『曾有之因』來對說『現在之果』；所謂「假」，是現行識變現得似那因果之相。如此因果，遠離斷常二邊、契合中道，有智者該隨順修學。
又有別的部派（經部一類）說：雖無過去未來，而有因果恒相續——現在法極迅速的，仍有「初、後、生、滅」二時，生時酬因、滅時引果，時雖有二而體是一，前因正滅、後果正生，體相雖殊而都是「有」；這樣因果不是假施設、又離斷常、又沒有前面那些難，哪個有智者肯捨它去信別的？破云：這只是虛言、毫無實義。一念裡怎容得下『二時（生時、滅時）』？生與滅相違怎能同在現在？若「滅」在現在，「生」就該在未來了。「有」故名「生」，既是現在；「無」故名「滅」，豈不該是過去？「滅」若不是無，「生」就該不是有；「生」既現在是有，「滅」就該現在是無——生滅相違，怎能說體是一？連苦樂這種相違之法都不見有同體的。生滅若是一，時就該無二；生滅若是異，又怎說體同？所以『生滅二時都在現在、同依一體』這道理一定不成。至於經部師立的「因果相續」，其理也不成——因為他們不承認有阿賴耶識能持種子（沒有持種的體，前後因果無所寄託，相續立不住）。所以該信大乘所說的「因果相續」緣起正理。
戊、伏斷位次門——到「阿羅漢位」才捨
此識無始恒轉如流，那到什麼位才究竟「捨」？到「阿羅漢位」。就是說：諸聖者斷「煩惱障」究竟淨盡時名阿羅漢，那時此識中的「煩惱麁重」（煩惱種子的粗重習氣）永遠離了，就說它為「捨」。這裡的「阿羅漢」是通攝三乘的「無學果位」——都已永害煩惱賊（殺賊）、都應受世間妙供養（應供）、都永不再受分段生死（不生）。怎麼知道通三乘？〈決擇分〉說諸阿羅漢、獨覺、如來都不成就阿賴耶；《集論》又說菩薩得菩提時頓斷煩惱障、所知障，便成阿羅漢及如來。窺基《述記》於此明說「諸聖」是通三乘的，又標出這「捨名」只就「斷煩惱障究竟盡」立、不是就所知障說——因為阿羅漢之得名，是約害盡煩惱賊（煩惱是繫縛生死之賊）、約除盡分段生死而立的「無生」，與所知障的斷不斷無關。
有人難：菩薩的煩惱種子還沒斷盡、不是阿羅漢，理該都還成就阿賴耶，可為何〈決擇分〉又說『不退菩薩也不成就阿賴耶』？答：那是指『二乘無學迴小向大、趣向大菩提』者——他們必不退起煩惱障、又趣菩提，就又轉名「不退菩薩」，這種菩薩（本是二乘無學、煩惱已盡）不成就阿賴耶，攝在『三乘阿羅漢』裡，所以論文不違此義。又：第八「不動地」以上的菩薩，一切煩惱永不現行、於無相法流中任運而轉、能於萬行中起萬行、剎那剎那增進——這位才叫「不退菩薩」；他雖還沒斷盡異熟識中的煩惱種子，而緣此識所起的我見、我愛已不再「執藏此識為自內我」（第七識的我執永伏不行），由此永捨「阿賴耶」之名，所以說他不成就阿賴耶識，也說他名阿羅漢。
對『到哪一位捨』還有一個異說。一說：初地以上的菩薩——已證二空所顯的理、已得根本後得二種勝智、已斷分別二障、能於一行起諸行，雖為利益有情而故意起煩惱、那煩惱卻不成過失——也叫不退菩薩；他雖沒斷盡俱生煩惱，而緣此識所起的『分別我見、我愛』已不執藏，也捨阿賴耶名。它引《集論》：十地菩薩雖未斷一切煩惱，但這煩惱像被呪、藥制伏的毒、不起過失，於一切地中都像阿羅漢已斷煩惱，所以也名阿羅漢。論主破這初地說：不合理。第七地以前還有『俱生我見、我愛』、仍執藏此識為自內我，怎能說已捨阿賴耶名？若說『只要分別我見愛不執藏就名為捨』，那「預流」等諸有學位（分別我執已斷）也該已捨阿賴耶名了——這就違背諸論（諸論明說有學位仍有阿賴耶）。至於它拿《集論》『如呪藥伏毒』自救：地上菩薩起的煩惱由「正知」、不成過失，這不是預流等所能有，怎能拿它來例同此初地菩薩已捨賴耶？何況他第六識的煩惱雖由正知不成過失，可「第七識」在有漏心位仍任運現行、執藏此識為內我，這豈不和預流等一樣（仍有俱生我執）？所以初地說不合理。正義是：阿羅漢於斷此識中的煩惱麁重究竟淨盡，不再執藏阿賴耶為自內我，由此永失「阿賴耶」之名、說它為「捨」；但所捨的只是「名」，並不是捨掉一切第八識的「體」——不然就成『阿羅漢沒有識能持種』、那時就該入無餘涅槃了（可有餘位的阿羅漢還住世持種，所以第八識的體不捨）。
第八識雖然一切有情都有，卻隨不同的義而立種種名。通於「一切位」（凡聖都有）的有四名：「心」（種種法熏習的種子所積集）、「阿陀那」（執持種子與諸色根令不壞）、「所知依」（給染淨所知諸法作依止）、「種子識」（普遍任持世間出世間諸種子）。只在『凡夫、有學』位有的是「阿賴耶」（攝藏一切雜染令不失、又被我見我愛執藏為自內我；無學位與不退菩薩就沒有了，因為他們已無雜染的執藏義）。只在『凡夫、二乘、因位諸菩薩』有的是「異熟識」（能酬引生死的善不善業之異熟果；如來地就沒有了，因為佛地已無異熟無記之法）。只在「如來地」才有的是「無垢識」（最極清淨、諸無漏法的所依；菩薩二乘凡夫還持有漏種、可受熏，沒證得善淨的第八識）；經（《如來功德莊嚴經》）說：『如來的無垢識，是清淨無漏的界，解脫一切障，與大圓鏡智相應。』頌之所以「偏說」捨「阿賴耶」名，是因為這名過失最重、又最先所捨。至於各名的「捨時」：「異熟識」的體，菩薩在「將得菩提」時捨、聲聞獨覺在「入無餘涅槃」時捨；「無垢識」的體則「無有捨時」（佛利樂有情無有窮盡）；『心、阿陀那、所知依、種子識』等名通一切位（無別捨時），隨義而說。
最後，第八識總有兩位。一是「有漏位」，無記性所攝，只與觸等五遍行相應，只緣前說的執受、處之境（種子、根身、器界）。二是「無漏位」（轉成大圓鏡智），唯善性所攝，與「二十一心所」相應——遍行五、別境五、善十一——因為這些都與一切淨心恒相應。為什麼無漏位連別境五都具足？因為：恒樂於以證智所觀之境（具「欲」）、於所觀境恒印持（具「勝解」）、於曾受境恒明記（具「念」）、世尊沒有不定的心（具「定」）、於一切法恒決擇（具「慧」）；而「極淨信」等善心所恒相應、又無染污、無散動（所以善十一都具）。無漏位的第八識也只與「捨受」相應，因為它任運、恒時、平等而轉（佛果離苦樂、恒一味）；它以「一切法」為所緣境，因為大圓鏡智遍緣一切法（不像有漏位只緣那三種境）。
承衍
阿賴耶識『所緣行相、相應、五受、三性、恒轉、伏斷』這一節所廣辯的諸門，是整個唯識系安立「染淨所依」的根本，後出諸論各依其義而承用。《百法明門論》把阿賴耶列為八識中第八的心法，又把本節相應門所辯的觸、作意、受、想、思五者立為「五遍行」心所——遍一切心而起。《唯識三十論頌》的頌三（所緣行相·相應·五受）與頌四（三性·心所例同·恒轉·伏斷），正是本節所釋的本頌，逐頌相承。《辯中邊論·辯相品》立「虛妄分別」、說識生起時現得似有「所取、能取」二分，這「似二取」之說，正是本節相、見二分（乃至四分）所依之本。《攝大乘論·所知依分》以阿賴耶識為『染淨所知諸法的所依』、為「一切種子識」，與本節三性門『此識是善染所依』、諸名門「所知依」一名正相對應。至於《二十唯識論》，它的「唯識無境」、以及『內變所緣、以所變為自所緣，沒有離識的實境』之理，與本節四分成立之說相通；但阿賴耶的體相，《二十論》沒有正面對位，這裡從略。
〔Verses commented〕Verse 3 (latter half) through Verse 4
The gates taken up here — concomitance, feeling, moral nature, ever-flowing, relinquishment — have their ground in scripture and treatise. The Laṅkāvatāra gives the ever-flowing in an image: "the store-consciousness ocean abides constant, stirred by the wind of objects; the many waves of consciousness leap up and turn into being" — the ocean constant and the waves never still, which is the very figure the verse takes in "ever-turning as a torrent." The treatise ground is the Yogācārabhūmi: "the ālaya consciousness is ever concomitant with the five omnipresent mental factors: attention, contact, feeling, conception, volition" — the warrant for the gate of concomitance; "the ālaya consciousness arises and ceases moment by moment upon its object; know it as a momentary continuum in flow, neither one nor permanent" — the warrant for the "neither cut off nor permanent" of "ever-turning"; and "some have accomplished the evolving consciousnesses and not the ālaya — namely arhats, pratyekabuddhas, non-retrogressing bodhisattvas, and the Tathāgatas abiding in the state with mind" — the warrant for the gate of stages. What follows unfolds the verse gate by gate.
A. The Gate of Concomitant Mental Factors — the Five Omnipresent Factors That Accompany It
With how many mental factors is this consciousness associated? It is constantly associated with five: contact, attention, feeling, conception, and volition. From beginningless time, until the point before it turns into the uncontaminated, the storehouse consciousness is in every state constantly associated with these five — because these are the omnipresent mental factors (which arise with every mind whatsoever).
Contact — this is the "discriminated alteration" upon the "three coming together" (the coming together of faculty, object, and consciousness); its nature is to bring mind and mental factors into contact with their object, and its function is to serve as the support for feeling, conception, volition, and the rest. The mutual conforming of faculty, object, and consciousness is called the "three coming together"; contact arises in dependence on this coming-together and is also able to bring about the coming-together, and so, conversely, it is said to "be that very coming-together." In the state where the three come together there is the function of "giving rise to conforming mental factors," and this is called "alteration"; contact arises resembling that alteration, and so it is called "discriminated." Among the three, the altering force of the "faculty" surpasses that of consciousness and object in inducing contact, and so the Abhidharma-samuccaya and the like say only that "contact is the discrimination of the alteration of the faculty" (naming the strongest to stand for the rest). "To bring all mind and mental factors together and make them cognize one and the same object" — this is the intrinsic nature of contact; and because contact resembles the function of inducing conforming mental factors, its function is to be the "support for feeling and the rest." The Sūtra of Arising and Ceasing says the three aggregates of feeling, conception, and conditioning-forces all take contact as their condition; on this basis it is said that consciousness arises from the coming-together of two things, contact arises from the coming-together of three, and feeling and the rest arise from the coming-together of four (faculty, object, consciousness, and contact). The Yogācārabhūmi says only that contact is the support of feeling, conception, and volition (volition being chief within the aggregate of conditioning-forces, it is named to stand for the rest). The Abhidharma-samuccaya and the like say only that contact is the support of feeling (contact's giving rise to feeling being the most intimate and the strongest, for the agreeable-and-the-like character that contact apprehends and the beneficial-and-the-like character that feeling apprehends are exceedingly close, so it most strongly induces feeling). The intrinsic nature of contact is real, not nominal — among the "six sixes" it is reckoned as a mental factor, it is subsumed under "the nourishment of contact," and it can serve as the condition for feeling and the rest, being, just like feeling and the other mental factors, real, and not simply equivalent to the three coming-together.
Attention — its nature is to "rouse and stir the mind," and its function is to "draw the mind toward its object." It can arouse the seed of "the mind that is due to arise" and draw it toward the object, and so it is called attention; though it also arouses the various mental factors, the mind-king is chief, and so it is said only to "draw the mind." Someone says attention "makes the mind turn and incline toward a particular object, or holds the mind upon a single object so that it stays" — this is wrong: if it were "holding the mind on a single object," it ought not to be omnipresent (it would arise only in the state of concentration), and moreover there would be no distinction between it and "concentration."
Feeling — its nature is to "receive the three object-characters of agreeable, disagreeable, and neither-agreeable-nor-disagreeable," and its function is to "give rise to craving" (it can induce the desire of pleasant feeling to seek union, of painful feeling to seek separation, and of neutral feeling to seek neither union nor separation). Someone says feeling is of two kinds (object-feeling and self-natured feeling), and that only "self-natured feeling" is feeling's own character (because object-feeling shares a character with other mental factors) — this is wrong: feeling does not, after all, cognize the simultaneous contact; if one says "arising in resemblance to contact is called receiving-contact," then any effect resembling its cause would have to be of the nature of feeling; and being a cause of feeling, it should be called "causal feeling" — how can it be called "self-natured feeling"? If one says "just as a king consumes the lands of his realm, so feeling receives the feeling-body produced by contact, and this is called self-natured feeling," this contradicts their own thesis that "feeling does not witness itself" (if feeling cannot take itself as object, how can it receive its own feeling-body)? And if one says "whatever does not abandon its own nature is called self-natured feeling," then all phenomena, since they do not abandon their own natures, would all be of the nature of feeling. So that account is mere coaxing of children. The correct reading is: "object-feeling" does not share a character with other mental factors — it is "the receiving of the agreeable-and-the-like character, fixed as belonging to feeling alone," not shared with other mental factors (feeling alone receives the agreeable-and-disagreeable character; contact only brings about the coming-together and does not receive).
Conception — its nature is to "take the image upon the object (to grasp the configuration)," and its function is to "set up the various names and expressions": one must first establish the "boundary and configuration of the object," and only then can the various names and expressions arise in train (names being established in dependence on configurations).
Volition — its nature is to "make the mind act," and its function is to "drive the mind upon the wholesome and the like": it can grasp the "correct cause (what is to be done)" and the like upon the object, and drive one's own mind to perform wholesome and other deeds (volition being the chief in the making of karma).
These five, being reckoned as omnipresent, are necessarily associated with the storehouse consciousness; and although their mode differs from that of the maturational consciousness (consciousness discerns, feeling receives, and so on differ), they share its "time (simultaneous), support (the same faculty), object (the same field), and substance (equal in number of substances)" — and it is on the strength of these four equalities that they are called "associated."
B. The Gate of the Five Feelings — Associated Only with Neutral Feeling
The mode of this consciousness is exceedingly indistinct, unable to tell apart disagreeable and agreeable object-characters, and it turns subtly, uniformly, and continuously; and so it is associated only with neutral feeling (neither painful nor pleasant). Moreover, the feeling with which it is associated is solely "true maturation," turning in accordance with the projecting karma of a former life and not waiting upon a present condition; whereas the two feelings of pain and pleasure are "born of maturation" (the fruits of completing karma, which must wait upon a present condition), and are not true maturation, and so are not associated with this consciousness. Again: precisely because this consciousness is constant, without rise or fall, sentient beings are able constantly to grasp it as the "inner self"; if it were associated with pain and pleasure it would have rise and fall, and how then could it be grasped as a "constant, single self"? So it is associated only with neutral feeling. Someone asks: then how is it the maturational fruit of "evil karma" (should evil karma not summon pain)? The answer: since it is granted that wholesome karma too can summon neutral feeling (wholesome karma does not necessarily summon only pleasure), this consciousness is the same way (evil karma too can summon a neutral-feeling ālaya) — for neutral feeling is not in conflict with either the painful or the pleasant class, just as the morally neutral can be summoned jointly by both wholesome and evil karma.
C. The Gate of Parity Among Mental Factors — Not Associated with the Object-Specific, the Wholesome, or the Defiled · Unobstructed-and-Neutral · Contact and the Rest Are Likewise
Why is this consciousness not associated with the five "object-specific" mental factors (desire, resolve, mindfulness, concentration, and discernment)? Because each conflicts with it. "Desire" must hope upon a thing it delights in, whereas this consciousness turns of its own accord and hopes for nothing; "resolve" must impress and hold a thing that has been decided, whereas this consciousness is dim and impresses-and-holds nothing; "mindfulness" clearly retains only a thing previously and repeatedly practiced, whereas this consciousness is dim and weak and cannot clearly retain; "concentration" makes the mind focus upon a single object, whereas this consciousness turns of its own accord and, moment after moment, cognizes a different object; "discernment" discriminates only upon merits and the like, whereas this consciousness is subtle and dim and cannot discriminate. So it is not associated with the object-specific factors. Again, this consciousness is solely of the maturational nature, and so the wholesome mental factors and the defiled mental factors are likewise not associated with it; and as for those among the four "indeterminate" mental factors — regret, sleep, applied thought, and sustained thought — that are morally neutral, because they are intermittent and are definitely not maturational, they too are not associated with it.
To which, then, of the four moral qualities — wholesome, unwholesome, obstructed-neutral, unobstructed-neutral — does this consciousness belong? Solely "unobstructed-neutral," because it is of the maturational nature. There are three reasons. First, if the maturational were wholesome or defiled, then neither "the round of birth-and-death" nor "the return to quiescence (nirvāṇa)" could be accomplished (a wholesome nature ought not to flow on in the round, and a defiled nature ought not to return to quiescence). Second, this consciousness is the support of both the wholesome and the defiled; if it were itself wholesome or defiled, then, the like and the unlike being in conflict, it could not simultaneously serve as support for both the wholesome and the defiled sides. Third, this consciousness is of the nature of "that which is perfumed"; if it were itself wholesome or defiled, then, like an intensely fragrant or intensely foul thing whose odor is already fixed and can take on no further perfuming, it could not be perfumed — and if it could not be perfumed, then neither the causes-and-fruits of defilement nor those of purification could be accomplished. So it is solely unobstructed-neutral. "Obstructed" means that defiled phenomena can obstruct the noble path and veil the mind so that it is not pure; this consciousness is not defiled, and so it is "unobstructed." "Determinate (capable of being marked off)" means that the wholesome and the unwholesome can summon lovable and unlovable fruits and also have a distinguished substance that can be marked off; this consciousness is neither wholesome nor unwholesome, and so it is "neutral (indeterminate)."
The verse says "contact and the rest are likewise so," meaning: just as the storehouse consciousness is solely unobstructed-neutral, so too are the five associated factors — contact, attention, feeling, conception, and volition (factors that are associated must share one moral quality); and moreover, contact and the rest, like the ālaya, are maturational, are unknowable in object and mode, take the three kinds of object as object (seeds, body-with-faculties, receptacle-world), are associated with the five factors, and are unobstructed-neutral — it is on the strength of these points of likeness that it is said "contact and the rest are likewise so." Someone says: contact and the rest are like the ālaya in being both maturational and "all-seeds-bearing (able to hold seeds)," and indeed are alike in all respects — for "likewise so" makes no exception. This is wrong. Why? First, contact and the rest turn in dependence on consciousness and are not self-determining; like greed, faith, and other mental factors, they cannot be perfumed, so how could they hold seeds as consciousness does? Second, if contact and the rest could also be perfumed and hold seeds, then a single sentient being would have six seed-holding substances; and when an actually-functioning fruit arises, from which seed would it be born? To say "born from six seeds together" is unreasonable (one has never seen many seeds produce a single sprout); to say "born from one seed only" leaves the other five seeds useless; to say "the six seeds produce in sequence" will not do either (perfuming is simultaneous, the six are equal in force, and there is no principle of priority among them); and to say "the six fruits arise all at once" is even worse (a single being in a single instant would then have six eye-consciousnesses arising at once). Who, then, says contact and the rest can be perfumed and hold seeds? An objector presses: if they cannot, then how is it that contact and the rest are also "named all-seeds-bearing like consciousness"? The answer: it is said that within the image-aspect of these five — contact and the rest — there are "images resembling seeds," and so they are called all-seeds-bearing (since contact and the rest are equal to consciousness in object, since contact and the rest of the formless realm also have an object, and since mind and mental factors must have an intimate object-condition); but these "images resembling seeds" are mere images and cannot serve as a "causal condition" to produce the actually-functioning consciousness (just as the "semblance of an eye-faculty" upon the image-aspect of contact and the rest is not the true supporting faculty of consciousness, and the image of a "semblance of fire" has no power to burn things). Someone wishes to use this "semblance of seeds" to rescue the thesis that "contact and the rest hold seeds" — but this is wrong, because the "semblance-of-seeds and similar characters" that contact and the rest take as object are to be drawn into parity with consciousness only later, when "appropriation and locale" are discussed (and there it is consciousness that is said to project a semblance of the field, not contact and the rest that are said really to hold seeds). From this it is clear: the term "all-seeds-bearing" used earlier in the verse must mean "able-to-be-perfumed, able to hold seeds" (a sense to which only the eighth consciousness can answer); otherwise the verse would incur the fault of "redundancy" (the phrase "maturational, all-seeds-bearing" and the phrase "contact and the rest are likewise so" would overlap). And the claim that "'likewise so' makes no exception, so all things are drawn into parity" definitely cannot stand — for otherwise, must contact and the rest also "discern" (the function of consciousness)? Must contact and the rest also be associated with contact and the rest themselves? So "likewise so" means "said with respect to whatever ought to be alike," not that all things are alike. Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) frames this first transformation as "explained by way of ten gates" (the self-characteristic, the fruit-characteristic, the cause-characteristic, the object, the mode, the concomitants, the five feelings, the three moral qualities, the simile of cause-and-fruit, and the stages of suppression — ten gates in all), and on this very phrase "contact and the rest are likewise so" fixes its reading: "contact and the rest" means that the simultaneous mental factors are drawn into parity with the mind-king (alike unobstructed-neutral, alike unknowable in object and mode), and not that the five — contact and the rest — can, like the eighth consciousness, discern and hold seeds; and it further judges that "unknowable" is not a separate gate of its own but a point of distinction subsumed within the two gates of "object" and "mode" (since both mode and object are subtle and hidden, it is named "unknowable").
D. The Gate of Cause, Fruit, and Simile — "Ever-Flowing as a Torrent," Neither Cut Off Nor Permanent
Is the storehouse consciousness "cut off" or "permanent"? Neither cut off nor permanent, because it is "ever-flowing." "Ever" — means that from beginningless time it is uniform, continuous, and constantly uninterrupted; it is the root by which "realm, destiny, and birth" are established; its nature is firmly settled, and it can hold seeds so that they are not lost. "Flowing" — means that from beginningless time it arises and ceases moment by moment, altering before and after, the cause ceasing as the fruit arises, so that it is not permanently one; it is the locus in which the perfuming of the prior seven consciousnesses becomes seeds. "Ever" rules out "cut off," and "flowing" indicates "not permanent," just as with a torrent, where cause and fruit are inherently so: like the water of a torrent, neither cut off (continuous without break) nor permanent (ever new before and after), continuing for a long time while it sweeps along and drowns beings and things — so too this consciousness drowns sentient beings and keeps them from escape; like a torrent which, though struck up into waves by the wind, still flows on unbroken — so too this consciousness, though it meets the various conditions and gives rise to the prior seven consciousnesses, still continues constantly; like a torrent that sweeps along the fish and the weeds bobbing up and down without letting them go — so too this consciousness constantly turns along with the inner habit-energies and the outwardly arising contact and the rest. That is to say: this consciousness, moment by moment, "produces its fruit as its cause ceases"; because the fruit arises it is not cut off, and because the cause ceases it is not permanent — and "neither cut off nor permanent" is precisely the principle of dependent arising, and so it is said to "flow ever on like a torrent."
Here the author of the treatise takes the occasion to refute such clinging-views as "the real existence of the three times," in order to display the dependent arising of consciousness-only. An objector presses: on your consciousness-only view, since the past and the future are not really existent, "not permanent" is all very well, but how can "not cut off" be established (if past and future have no substance, does this not amount to being cut off)? Turning the question back upon those who hold that the three times are really existent: if the past and the future are really existent, you may indeed grant "not cut off," but how then is "not permanent" to be established (if all three times are real, this amounts to being permanent)? Does merely exposing another's fault establish one's own thesis? No — yet without demolishing the wrong clinging it is hard to display the right. The correct establishment of the consciousness-only thesis is this: at the very moment "the prior cause is just ceasing," "the subsequent fruit" arises simultaneously, like the two ends of a scale, one dipping and one rising, equal in their timing; in this way cause and fruit continue like a flowing stream — why should one need to borrow "the real existence of past and future" to establish "not cut off"? And turning back upon those who cling to the real existence of the three times: at the moment the "cause" exists in the present, the subsequent fruit has not yet arisen — whose cause, then, is this cause? At the moment the "fruit" exists in the present, the prior cause has already ceased — whose fruit, then, is this fruit? Since neither an established cause nor an established fruit exists, who is it that is free of being cut off and of being permanent? Then to break the rescue of "cause and fruit being inherently existent and simultaneous": if "when the cause exists the subsequent fruit already exists," then since the fruit already exists inherently, why need it wait for the prior cause? The sense of "cause" being gone, how can the sense of "fruit" be present? And with no cause and no fruit, how is one free of being cut off and of being permanent? Since you say "the substance is inherently existent," its "function" too ought to be inherently existent, and the cause and condition on which it depends ought also to be inherently existent (and so everything would be frozen-fixed, with no function to speak of) — clearly, then, on your thesis cause and fruit definitely cannot be established, and so one ought to believe the correct principle of Mahāyāna dependent arising. This correct principle is profound and beyond words, and the terms "cause" and "fruit" are all nominal designations: seeing that a present phenomenon has the function of "inducing a subsequent phenomenon," one nominally posits a "future fruit" to set over against it as the "present cause"; seeing that a present phenomenon has the character of "answering to a prior phenomenon," one nominally posits a "past cause" to set over against it as the "present fruit." What is meant by "nominal" is that the actually-functioning consciousness projects a semblance of those characters of cause and fruit. Cause and fruit so understood are far removed from the two extremes of being cut off and being permanent, accord with the middle way, and the wise should follow and train in them.
Again, another school (a strand of the Sautrāntika) says: although there is no past and no future, there is cause and fruit in constant continuity — a present phenomenon, however swiftly fleeting, still has the two moments of "arising-and-ceasing, the initial and the later"; at the moment of arising it answers to its cause, and at the moment of ceasing it induces its fruit; though there are two moments, the substance is one, and the prior cause is just ceasing while the subsequent fruit is just arising; though their characters differ, both are "existent" — in this way cause and fruit are not mere nominal designations, are free of being cut off and being permanent, and incur none of the earlier difficulties; what wise person would abandon this to believe something else? The refutation: this is mere empty talk, with no real meaning at all. How can a single thought-moment contain "two moments (arising and ceasing)"? Arising and ceasing being in mutual conflict, how can they be in the present together? If "ceasing" were in the present, then "arising" would have to be in the future. Being "existent," it is called "arising," and so is present; being "non-existent," it is called "ceasing" — should this not therefore be in the past? If "ceasing" were not non-existent, then "arising" would have to be not existent; and since "arising," in the present, is existent, "ceasing," in the present, would have to be non-existent — arising and ceasing being in conflict, how can one say the substance is one? Even mutually conflicting things such as pain and pleasure are never seen to share one substance. If arising and ceasing were one, then the time should not be two; if arising and ceasing were different, how can one say the substance is one? So the doctrine that "the two moments of arising and ceasing are both in the present, sharing a single substance" definitely cannot stand. And as for the "continuity of cause and fruit" posited by the Sautrāntika master, its principle too cannot stand — because they do not admit a storehouse consciousness able to hold seeds (with no seed-holding substance, the cause and fruit of before and after have nowhere to lodge, and the continuity cannot be maintained). So one ought to believe the correct principle of dependent arising — the "continuity of cause and fruit" — taught in the Mahāyāna.
E. The Gate of Suppression and Final Relinquishment — Relinquished Only at the Stage of the Arhat
This consciousness has flowed ever on like a torrent from beginningless time — so at what stage is it finally "relinquished"? At the "stage of the arhat." That is to say: when the noble ones have utterly purified away the "hindrance of the afflictions," they are called arhats, and at that point the "coarse heaviness of the afflictions" within this consciousness (the coarse-heavy habit-energy of the seeds of affliction) is forever gone, and so it is said to be "relinquished." The "arhat" here comprehends the "stage of the adept (beyond training)" across all three vehicles — all have forever slain the thief of affliction (slayer of the thief), all are worthy of the marvelous offerings of the world (worthy of offerings), and all will forever no longer undergo the birth-and-death of allotted lifespans (no more rebirth). How do we know it comprehends the three vehicles? The "Section on Ascertainment" of the Yogācārabhūmi says that arhats, solitary buddhas, and tathāgatas all do not possess a storehouse consciousness; and the Abhidharma-samuccaya further says that when a bodhisattva attains enlightenment, the bodhisattva all at once cuts off the hindrance of the afflictions and the hindrance to the knowable, thereby becoming both arhat and tathāgata. Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) makes explicit here that "the noble ones" comprehends the three vehicles, and marks out that this "relinquishing of the name" is established solely with respect to "the utter exhaustion of the hindrance of the afflictions," and not with respect to the hindrance to the knowable — for the arhat receives his name by way of having utterly slain the thief of affliction (affliction being the thief that binds one to birth-and-death) and by way of "no-more-rebirth," established upon the utter removal of the birth-and-death of allotted lifespans, and it has nothing to do with whether the hindrance to the knowable has been cut off.
An objector presses: a bodhisattva's seeds of affliction are not yet utterly cut off, and the bodhisattva is not an arhat, so in principle should still possess a storehouse consciousness — why then does the "Section on Ascertainment" also say that "the non-retrogressing bodhisattva too does not possess a storehouse consciousness"? The answer: that refers to those of the two vehicles, adepts (beyond training), who "turn from the small toward the great and incline toward the great enlightenment" — they will surely never retrogress into rousing the hindrance of the afflictions, and they incline toward enlightenment, and so they are renamed "non-retrogressing bodhisattvas"; such a bodhisattva (originally an adept of the two vehicles, the afflictions already exhausted) does not possess a storehouse consciousness, and is subsumed under the "arhats of the three vehicles," so the treatise's words do not contradict this principle. Again: a bodhisattva from the eighth "immovable ground" upward — in whom all afflictions forever cease to manifest, who turns of his own accord within the stream of the signless dharma, who can give rise to the myriad practices within the myriad practices, advancing moment after moment — this is the one called the "non-retrogressing bodhisattva"; though he has not yet utterly cut off the seeds of affliction within the maturational consciousness, the self-view and self-love that take this consciousness as object no longer "grasp-and-store this consciousness as the inner self" (the self-grasping of the seventh consciousness is forever suppressed and does not function), and thereby he forever relinquishes the name "storehouse," and so it is said that he does not possess a storehouse consciousness, and is also called an arhat.
On "at which stage it is relinquished" there is also a divergent view. One view: a bodhisattva from the first ground upward — who has realized the truth disclosed by the twofold emptiness, has gained the two superior wisdoms of the fundamental and the subsequently-attained, has cut off the two discriminated hindrances, and can give rise to many practices within a single practice; who, though he deliberately rouses afflictions for the benefit of sentient beings, incurs no fault thereby — is also called a non-retrogressing bodhisattva; though he has not utterly cut off the innate afflictions, the "discriminated self-view and self-love" that take this consciousness as object no longer grasp-and-store, and so he too relinquishes the name "storehouse." This view cites the Abhidharma-samuccaya: a bodhisattva of the ten grounds, though he has not cut off all afflictions, has these afflictions like a poison subdued by a spell or a medicine, so that they produce no fault, and on every ground he is like an arhat who has cut off the afflictions, and so he too is called an arhat. The author of the treatise refutes this "first-ground" view: it is unreasonable. Up through the seventh ground there is still "innate self-view and self-love," and one still grasps-and-stores this consciousness as the inner self — how can it be said that the name "storehouse" has already been relinquished? If one says "as soon as the discriminated self-view and self-love do not grasp-and-store, it is called relinquished," then the various stages of the trainee such as "stream-enterer" (in whom the discriminated self-grasping has been cut off) ought also already to have relinquished the name "storehouse" — and this contradicts the treatises (the treatises plainly say that the trainee stages still have a storehouse consciousness). As for that view's rescue by the Abhidharma-samuccaya's "like a poison subdued by spell or medicine": the afflictions a bodhisattva of the grounds rouses are accompanied by "right knowledge" and incur no fault, and this is not something a stream-enterer and the like can possess — so how can it be used to draw a first-ground bodhisattva into parity with one who has already relinquished the ālaya? Moreover, although his sixth-consciousness afflictions, by right knowledge, incur no fault, the "seventh consciousness," in the state of a contaminated mind, still functions of its own accord, grasping-and-storing this consciousness as the inner self — and is this not, then, just like a stream-enterer and the like (still possessing innate self-grasping)? So the first-ground view is unreasonable. The correct reading is: the arhat, having utterly purified away the coarse heaviness of the afflictions within this consciousness, no longer grasps-and-stores the ālaya as the inner self, and thereby forever loses the name "storehouse" and is said to "relinquish" it; but what is relinquished is only the "name," not the relinquishing of the entire "substance" of the eighth consciousness — otherwise it would amount to "an arhat having no consciousness able to hold seeds," and at that point he would have to enter nirvāṇa-without-remainder (whereas an arhat in the with-remainder state still dwells in the world and holds seeds, so the substance of the eighth consciousness is not relinquished).
The eighth consciousness, though all sentient beings possess it, is given various names according to differing senses. There are four names that hold across "all stages" (possessed by ordinary beings and noble ones alike): "mind" (the accumulation of the seeds perfumed by the various phenomena); "appropriating-consciousness" (ādāna, that which holds the seeds and the material faculties so they do not decay); "support of the knowable" (that which serves as support for all the knowable phenomena, defiled and pure); and "seed-consciousness" (that which universally bears all the seeds, mundane and supramundane). The name held only at the "stages of the ordinary being and the trainee" is "ālaya / storehouse" (that which stores and conserves all defilement so it is not lost, and which is grasped-and-stored by self-view and self-love as the inner self; the adept stage and the non-retrogressing bodhisattva no longer have this, since for them the sense of defiled grasping-and-storing is gone). The name held only at the "stages of the ordinary being, the two vehicles, and bodhisattvas at the causal stage" is "maturational consciousness" (that which can answer to the maturational fruit of the wholesome and unwholesome karma inducing birth-and-death; the stage of the tathāgata no longer has it, since at the buddha-stage there is no maturational-neutral phenomenon). The name held only at the "stage of the tathāgata" is "stainless consciousness" (utterly pure, the support of all uncontaminated phenomena; bodhisattvas, the two vehicles, and ordinary beings still hold contaminated seeds and can be perfumed, and have not realized the wholesome-and-pure eighth consciousness); scripture says: the stainless consciousness of the tathāgata is the pure, uncontaminated realm, liberated from all hindrances, associated with the Great Perfect Mirror Wisdom. The verse "singles out" the relinquishment of the name "storehouse" because this name is the gravest in fault and is the first to be relinquished. As for the "time of relinquishment" of the several names: the substance of the "maturational consciousness" is relinquished by the bodhisattva at the time he is "about to attain enlightenment," and by the śrāvaka and the solitary buddha at the time they "enter nirvāṇa-without-remainder"; the substance of the "stainless consciousness" has "no time of relinquishment" (the buddha's benefiting and gladdening of sentient beings is without end); and the names "mind, appropriating-consciousness, support of the knowable, seed-consciousness" hold across all stages (with no separate time of relinquishment), being applied according to their senses.
Finally, the eighth consciousness has, in all, two stages. One is the "contaminated stage," subsumed under the morally neutral quality, associated only with the five omnipresent factors such as contact, taking as object only the previously stated objects of appropriation and locale (seeds, body-with-faculties, receptacle-world). The other is the "uncontaminated stage" (when it has turned into the Great Perfect Mirror Wisdom), subsumed solely under the wholesome quality, and associated with "twenty-one mental factors" — the five omnipresent, the five object-specific, and the eleven wholesome — because all of these are constantly associated with every pure mind. Why, at the uncontaminated stage, are even the five object-specific factors fully present? Because: it constantly delights in the object observed by realizing wisdom (it has "desire"); it constantly impresses-and-holds the object observed (it has "resolve"); it constantly clearly retains the object once received (it has "mindfulness"); the World-Honored One has no unconcentrated mind (it has "concentration"); and it constantly discriminates upon all phenomena (it has "discernment"); while the "utterly pure faith" and the other wholesome factors are constantly associated, free of defilement, and free of distraction (so all eleven wholesome are present). The eighth consciousness at the uncontaminated stage is also associated only with "neutral feeling," because it turns of its own accord, constantly, and evenly (the buddha-fruit being free of pain and pleasure, ever of one savor); and it takes "all phenomena" as its object, because the Great Perfect Mirror Wisdom universally takes all phenomena as object (unlike the contaminated stage, which takes only those three kinds of object).
Onward Transmission
The many gates argued out at length in this section — the ālaya-vijñāna's object and mode, its concomitants, its five feelings, its three moral qualities, its ever-flowing, and its suppression — are the very ground on which the whole consciousness-only system founds "the support of defilement and purification," and the later treatises take it up each according to its sense. The Hundred Dharmas treatise lists the ālaya as the eighth, the last of the eight consciousness-dharmas, and establishes the five that this section's gate of concomitants argues out — contact, attention, feeling, conception, and volition — as the "five omnipresent" mental factors, which arise with every mind whatsoever. The Thirty Verses — verse three (object and mode · concomitants · five feelings) and verse four (three moral qualities · parity among mental factors · ever-flowing · suppression) — is the very root-text this section expounds, verse answering to verse. The Madhyānta-vibhāga, in its chapter on characteristics, establishes "unreal imagination" and says that when consciousness arises it manifests as though there were the two portions of "grasped and grasper"; this account of "the semblance of the two-graspings" is precisely the basis on which this section's image-aspect and seeing-aspect (and indeed the four aspects) rest. The Mahāyāna-saṃgraha, in its chapter on the support of the knowable, takes the ālaya-vijñāna as "the support of all the knowable phenomena, defiled and pure" and as "the consciousness of all seeds," answering exactly to this section's gate of moral quality ("this consciousness is the support of the wholesome and the defiled") and to its gate of names (the name "support of the knowable"). As for the Twenty Verses, its principle of "consciousness-only, no external object," and its account that "consciousness transforms inwardly into its object and takes what it has projected as its own object, with no real object apart from consciousness," accords with this section's establishment of the four aspects; but the essential characteristic of the ālaya the Twenty Verses has no direct counterpart to, and here it is left aside.
考據Apparatus
〔所釋之頌〕第三頌·下半至第四頌
一、科判定位
| 科判 | 此章之位 |
|---|---|
| 三能變 | 初能變·阿賴耶 → 第二能變（末那）→ 第三能變（了境） |
| 阿賴耶章內 | (二)諸門廣辯·相應以下（頌三下半、頌四） |
| 所釋頌 | 《唯識三十論頌》頌三下半 · 頌四全 |
窺基《述記》判初能變「以十門解釋」；前章既明行相、所緣二門，本章續辨相應門、受俱門、三性門、因果譬喻門、伏斷位次門，五門既畢，初能變之辨乃竟。
二、源頌 · 義理脈絡
常與觸、作意、受、想、思，相應唯捨受。 〔T1586 0060b06〕 是無覆無記，觸等亦如是， 〔T1586 0060b07〕 恒轉如瀑流，阿羅漢位捨。 〔T1586 0060b08〕
頌三下半明五遍行相應與唯捨受；頌四明三性（無覆無記）、心所例同、恒轉如瀑流之因果喻，與阿羅漢位捨之伏斷位次。五門相次，明此識恒而不常、轉而不斷，終有可捨之位。
三、經論宗依（經證 → 論本）
經證
阿陀那識甚深細，一切種子如瀑流，我於凡愚不開演，恐彼分別執為我。 〔解深密經·心意識相品 T676 0692c22–c23〕
此識亦名阿陀那識。何以故？由此識於身隨逐執持故。亦名阿賴耶識。何以故？由此識於身攝受、藏隱、同安危義故。 〔解深密經 T676 0692b15–b17〕
藏識海常住，境界風所動，種種諸識浪，騰躍而轉生。 〔楞伽阿跋多羅寶經 T670 0484b11–b12〕
無始時來界，一切法等依，由此有諸趣，及涅槃證得。 〔大乘阿毘達磨契經·漢無傳本·經文存論 T1585 0014a13–a14〕
由攝藏諸法，一切種子識，故名阿賴耶，勝者我開示。 〔大乘阿毘達磨契經·漢無傳本·經文存論 T1585 0014b22–b23〕
《解深密》以『阿陀那（隨逐執持）』名此執受之識，又以「攝受、藏隱、同安危」釋「阿賴耶」之名（即本論「執受…攝為自體，同安危故」之經本），更以「甚深細·一切種子如瀑流」誡凡愚勿執為我——本論『不可知·恒轉如瀑流』之經本；《楞伽》以藏識海被境界風所動而起諸識浪，顯第八為諸轉識所依；《大乘阿毘達磨契經》二頌（漢土無傳本，經文唯存於本論）立『界（因·種子識）·依（緣·等依）』與『攝藏諸法·故名阿賴耶』，為建立阿賴耶名之最勝教證。
論本（瑜伽師地論 T1579 · 攝決擇分）
阿賴耶識由於二種所緣境轉。一、由了別內執受故；二、由了別外無分別器相故。了別內執受者，謂能了別遍計所執自性妄執習氣，及諸色根根所依處……了別外無分別器相者……於一切時無有間斷器世間相。 〔T1579 0580a03–a09〕
阿賴耶識緣境微細，世聰慧者亦難了故。 〔T1579 0580a13–a14〕
阿賴耶識於所緣境念念生滅，當知剎那相續流轉，非一非常。 〔T1579 0580a17–a18〕
阿賴耶識與五遍行心相應所恒共相應。謂作意、觸、受、想、思……又阿賴耶識相應受，一向不苦不樂，無記性攝。 〔T1579 0580a29–b04〕
或有成就轉識，非阿賴耶識。謂阿羅漢、若諸獨覺、不退菩薩，及諸如來住有心位。 〔T1579 0582a08–a09〕
《瑜伽師地論·攝決擇分》立阿賴耶識「所緣轉相」（二種所緣：內執受種子根身·外無分別器，即本論執受、處之論本）、「緣境微細·世聰慧者亦難了」（不可知之論本）、『念念生滅·剎那相續·非一非常』（恒轉如瀑流之論本）、『與五遍行相應·相應受一向不苦不樂無記性』（五受唯捨、無覆無記之論本）、『阿羅漢等不成就阿賴耶識』（伏斷捨名之論本，本論〈決擇分〉所引即此）。護法糅釋所本，其經在解深密、楞伽、大乘阿毘達磨契經，其論在瑜伽師地論。
四、本論釋要（護法糅釋 · T1585）
所緣 · 行相
此識行相、所緣云何？謂不可知執受、處了。「了」謂了別，即是行相……「處」謂處所，即器世間……「執受」有二：謂諸種子及有根身……此二皆是識所執受，攝為自體，同安危故。執受及處俱是所緣，阿賴耶識因緣力故，自體生時，內變為種及有根身，外變為器，即以所變為自所緣，行相仗之而得起故。 〔T1585 0010a11–a20〕
不可知
「不可知」者，謂此行相極微細故，難可了知；或此所緣內執受境亦微細故；外器世間量難測故，名不可知。 〔T1585 0011b03–b05〕
相應 · 五遍行
此識與幾心所相應？常與觸、作意、受、想、思相應。阿賴耶識無始時來乃至未轉，於一切位恒與此五心所相應，以是遍行心所攝故。 〔T1585 0011b16–b19〕
五受 · 唯捨受
此識行相極不明了，不能分別違、順境相，微細、一類、相續而轉，是故唯與捨受相應。 〔T1585 0011c29–0012a02〕
三性 · 無覆無記
此識唯是無覆無記，異熟性故……「覆」謂染法障聖道故，又能蔽心，令不淨故；此識非染，故名「無覆」。「記」謂善、惡，有愛、非愛果，及殊勝自體可記別故；此非善、惡，故名「無記」。 〔T1585 0012a20–a29〕
因果譬喻 · 恒轉如瀑流
阿賴耶識為斷？為常？非斷、非常，以「恒轉」故。「恒」謂此識無始時來，一類、相續，常無間斷，是界、趣、生施設本故，性堅、持種令不失故。「轉」謂此識無始時來，念念生滅前後變異，因滅果生，非常、一故，可為轉識熏成種故。 〔T1585 0012b28–c04〕
伏斷 · 阿羅漢位捨
此識無始恒轉如流，乃至何位當究竟捨？阿羅漢位方究竟捨。謂諸聖者斷煩惱障究竟盡時，名阿羅漢。爾時，此識煩惱麁重永遠離故，說之為「捨」……非捨一切第八識體。 〔T1585 0013a19–c06〕
諸名 · 捨時
然第八識雖諸有情皆悉成就，而隨義別立種種名。謂或名心……或名阿陀那……或名所知依……或名種子識……此等諸名通一切位。或名阿賴耶……此名唯在異生、有學……或名異熟識……此名唯在異生、二乘諸菩薩位……或名無垢識……此名唯在如來地有。 〔T1585 0013c07–c20〕
要義：本論於「所緣、行相」立「四分」（相·見·自證·證自證）以成唯識（內變為種及有根身、外變為器，以所變為自所緣；相見必有所依之自證、自證必有證自證以止無窮，四分非即非離）。「不可知」者，行相極微細、執受境微細、器量難測，三皆難知。相應唯五遍行，以『時、依、所緣、事』四義平等故；唯捨受者，行相不明、不分違順、微細一類相續故，且唯真異熟、隨先引業轉。三性唯無覆無記者，異熟若善染則流轉還滅不成、不堪為善染所依、不堪受熏。「恒轉如瀑流」者，恒遮斷（持種令不失）、轉表非常（念念生滅、因滅果生），非斷非常正是緣起正理。「阿羅漢位捨」者，唯捨「阿賴耶」之名（執藏義盡），非捨第八識體。又隨義立七名：心、阿陀那、所知依、種子識（通一切位）、阿賴耶（唯異生有學）、異熟識（至金剛心·無餘涅槃捨）、無垢識（唯如來地，無有捨時）。
五、諸家異釋（窺基《述記》T1830）
三師俱云：初二行頌半解初能變中，本頌以十門解釋……不可知者，即於所緣、行相之內差別之義，既無別用，故非別門……「觸等亦如是」者，俱時心所例同於王，非是分別第八識也。 〔T1830 0300b25–c07〕
文雖有二，義即有三，或實說一分如安慧，或二分親勝等，或三分陳那等，或四分護法等。此中護法但說三分，以證自證分別義建立，義相猶隱，所以不說。 〔T1830 0242a24–a27〕
「謂諸聖」者，即通三乘……此中唯依斷煩惱障盡名阿羅漢，非據所知障，害煩惱賊故，非是縛故。又依除分段生以名無生，非所知障故。 〔T1830 0341a11–a21〕
窺基判初能變為「十門」釋頌，定「不可知」非別門（攝於所緣、行相內）、定「觸等亦如是」為心所例同心王（非謂觸等亦能持種、了別）。於「四分」之安立，《述記》繫名古德：一分說屬安慧、二分說屬親勝（難陀一系）、三分說屬陳那、四分說屬護法（護法於本論但顯三分，以證自證分義相猶隱故）。於「阿羅漢位捨」，《述記》明「諸聖」通三乘、判此唯約「斷煩惱障盡」立（害煩惱賊·除分段生），非約所知障。諸門「有義」之繫名（何說屬何師），《述記》及《掌中樞要》詳之。
六、譯名 · 古譯對讀（玄奘 ↔ 真諦《轉識論》）
| 義 | 玄奘《成唯識論》 | 真諦《轉識論》 |
|---|---|---|
| 第八識 | 阿賴耶識（藏）· 異熟識 · 一切種識 | 果報識（即阿梨耶識）·本識·宅識·藏識（「一果報識，即是阿梨耶識……亦名本識……亦名宅識……亦名藏識，一切種子隱伏之處」〔0061c08–c13〕） |
| 不可知 | 不可知（行相·所緣俱微隱） | 「相及境不可分別，一體無異」〔0061c13–c14〕 |
| 性 | 無覆無記 | 自性無記（「此識及心法，但是自性無記」〔0062a11〕） |
| 恒轉 · 捨位 | 恒轉如瀑流 · 阿羅漢位捨 | 念念恒流如水流浪·本識如流·乃至得羅漢果此流浪法亦猶未滅（〔0062a11–a13〕） |
玄奘以『阿賴耶（藏）』為第八識正名、以「阿陀那」名第八之執持義；真諦《轉識論》以「阿梨耶」為果報識（第八）、別以「阿陀那」名第二執識（第七）——古譯於「阿陀那」之配屬一分歧。真諦「相及境不可分別一體無異」即玄奘「不可知」之古譯對讀，「念念恒流如水流浪…乃至得羅漢果」即「恒轉如瀑流·阿羅漢位捨」之古譯對讀。
七、術語
阿賴耶（ālaya）— 藏；攝藏一切雜染種令不失，又被我見我愛執藏為自內我之第八識。 阿陀那（ādāna）— 執持；執持種子及諸色根令不壞。 所緣 · 行相（ālambana · ākāra）— 所攀緣之境／能緣了別之相；第八識內變種及有根身、外變器，以所變為所緣，行相（了別·見分）仗之而起。 執受（upādi）— 攝為自體、同安危者；謂諸種子（相·名·分別習氣）及有根身（色根及根依處）。 四分 — 相分（所緣·所量）·見分（行相·能量）·自證分（量果）·證自證分（證自證者）。 無覆無記 — 非染（無覆）、非善非惡（無記）；異熟性攝。 恒轉 — 恒（一類相續·持種令不失·遮斷）· 轉（念念生滅·因滅果生·表非常）。 異熟識（vipāka）· 無垢識（amala-vijñāna）— 第八識隨義別名。 〔梵文為古德所傳發音輔助。〕
八、互讀（唯識系次第：百法 → 三十頌 → 二十論 → 辯中邊論 → 攝大乘論）
- 百法：心法·阿賴耶識（八識之第八）；心所·五遍行（觸、作意、受、想、思）——本章相應門所辯五心所。
- 三十頌：頌三（所緣行相·相應·五受）· 頌四（三性·心所例同·恒轉·伏斷）——逐頌姊妹。
- 二十論：唯識無境、四分成立之理（內變所緣、以所變為自所緣，無離識實境）相通；阿賴耶體相無正面對位，從略。
- 辯中邊論：辯相品·虛妄分別（識生似所取能取二分，即四分相見之所本）。
- 攝大乘論：所知依分（阿賴耶識為染淨所知之所依·一切種子識），本章三性『為善染所依』、諸名「所知依」與此正相對。
章內：阿賴耶識章(一)（三相·種子——本章上承）· 末那（第二能變·以阿賴耶見分為所緣、執為自內我）· 了境（第三能變）。
九、校本定位
頌 T1586〔0060b05·0060b06·0060b07·0060b08〕· 本論 T1585 阿賴耶諸門〔0010a11–a20·0011b03·0011b16·0011c29–0012a02·0012a20–a29·0012b28–c04·0013a19·0013c06–c20〕· 述記 T1830〔0242a24–a27·0300b25–c07·0341a11–a21〕· 《轉識論》T1587〔0061c08–c14·0062a11–a13〕。 〔經證〕解深密 T676〔0692b15·0692c22–c23〕· 楞伽 T670〔0484b11〕· 大乘阿毘達磨契經（漢無傳本·經文存論）T1585〔0014a13·0014b22〕。〔論本〕瑜伽師地論 T1579〔0580a03–b04·0582a08〕。
〔Verses commented〕Verse 3 (latter half) through Verse 4
1. Position in Kuiji's Structural Outline
| Outline | Position of this chapter |
|---|---|
| Three transformers | First transformer · the ālaya → second (manas) → third (object-discerning) |
| Within the ālaya chapter | (ii) the gates unfolded · from concomitance onward (v. 3 latter half, v. 4) |
| Verses commented | Triṃśikā v. 3, latter half · v. 4 entire |
Kuiji's Shuji resolves the first transformer through ten gates. The previous chapter settled the gates of mode and object; this one continues with the gates of concomitance, of feeling, of moral nature, of cause-fruit-and-simile, and of the stages of suppression and relinquishment. With those five, the treatment of the first transformer is complete.
2. Source verses · doctrinal context
常與觸、作意、受、想、思，相應唯捨受。 〔T1586 0060b06〕 是無覆無記，觸等亦如是， 〔T1586 0060b07〕 恒轉如瀑流，阿羅漢位捨。 〔T1586 0060b08〕 Ever concomitant with contact, attention, feeling, conception, volition; and of feelings, with equanimity alone. / It is unobstructed-and-neutral, and contact and the rest are likewise so. / Ever-turning as a torrent; relinquished at the stage of the arhat.
The latter half of verse 3 gives concomitance with the five omnipresent factors and with equanimity alone; verse 4 gives the moral nature (unobstructed-and-neutral), the parity of the concomitant factors, the cause-and-fruit simile of the torrent, and the stage at which it is let go. Taken in order the five gates show a consciousness that is constant without being permanent, turning without being cut off, and that has, at the last, a stage where it can be relinquished.
3. Scriptural and treatise grounding (scripture → root śāstra)
Scriptural witnesses
阿陀那識甚深細，一切種子如瀑流，我於凡愚不開演，恐彼分別執為我。 〔Saṃdhinirmocana · chapter on the marks of mind, mentation, and consciousness, T676 0692c22–c23〕
tr. "The ādāna-consciousness is exceedingly deep and subtle; all seeds [flow] like a torrent. I do not expound it to the foolish and the ordinary, fearing they would discriminate and grasp it as a self."
此識亦名阿陀那識。何以故？由此識於身隨逐執持故。亦名阿賴耶識。何以故？由此識於身攝受、藏隱、同安危義故。 〔Saṃdhinirmocana T676 0692b15–b17〕
tr. "This consciousness is also named the ādāna-consciousness. Why? Because this consciousness follows after and appropriates the body. It is also named the ālaya-consciousness. Why? Because this consciousness, with respect to the body, has the sense of taking-in, storing-and-concealing, and sharing safety-and-peril."
藏識海常住，境界風所動，種種諸識浪，騰躍而轉生。 〔Laṅkāvatāra T670 0484b11–b12〕
tr. "The store-consciousness ocean abides constant; stirred by the wind of objects, the manifold waves of the consciousnesses leap up and arise in turn."
無始時來界，一切法等依，由此有諸趣，及涅槃證得。 〔Mahāyāna-abhidharma-sūtra · no transmitted Chinese witness · the scriptural text preserved in the treatise, T1585 0014a13–a14〕
tr. "The realm [that has been there] from beginningless time is the equal basis of all dharmas; through this there are the [several] destinies and the attainment of nirvāṇa."
由攝藏諸法，一切種子識，故名阿賴耶，勝者我開示。 〔Mahāyāna-abhidharma-sūtra · no transmitted Chinese witness · the scriptural text preserved in the treatise, T1585 0014b22–b23〕
tr. "Because it takes in and stores all dharmas, the all-seeds consciousness is therefore named the ālaya; to the superior ones I disclose it."
The Saṃdhinirmocana, with "ādāna (following after and appropriating)," names this consciousness that appropriates, and with "taking-in, storing-and-concealing, sharing safety-and-peril" glosses the name "ālaya" (this being the scriptural source of the treatise's "appropriated… taken in as its own substance, sharing safety-and-peril"); further, with "exceedingly deep and subtle · all seeds like a torrent" it warns the foolish and ordinary not to grasp it as a self — the scriptural source of the treatise's "unknowable · constant-yet-turning like a torrent." The Laṅkāvatāra, with the store-consciousness ocean stirred by the wind of objects so that the waves of the consciousnesses rise, shows the eighth to be the basis of all the evolving consciousnesses. The Mahāyāna-abhidharma-sūtra's two verses (with no transmitted Chinese witness, the scriptural text surviving only in this treatise) set up "the realm (cause · seed-consciousness) · the basis (condition · equal basis)" and "takes in and stores all dharmas · therefore named ālaya," the most excellent scriptural attestation for establishing the name ālaya.
Root śāstra (Yogācārabhūmi T1579 · Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī)
阿賴耶識由於二種所緣境轉。一、由了別內執受故；二、由了別外無分別器相故。了別內執受者，謂能了別遍計所執自性妄執習氣，及諸色根根所依處……了別外無分別器相者……於一切時無有間斷器世間相。 〔T1579 0580a03–a09〕
tr. "The ālaya-consciousness turns by way of two kinds of object-support. First, by discerning the inner appropriated; second, by discerning the outer, undiscriminated receptacle-appearance. Discerning the inner appropriated means it can discern the habit-energy of the deluded grasping of a self-nature wholly-imagined, and the material faculties together with the locus on which the faculties rest… Discerning the outer, undiscriminated receptacle-appearance means… at all times the receptacle-world appearance without interruption."
阿賴耶識緣境微細，世聰慧者亦難了故。 〔T1579 0580a13–a14〕
tr. "The ālaya-consciousness's cognizing of objects is subtle, so that even the worldly clever and wise can hardly discern it."
阿賴耶識於所緣境念念生滅，當知剎那相續流轉，非一非常。 〔T1579 0580a17–a18〕
tr. "The ālaya-consciousness, with respect to its object-support, arises and perishes moment by moment; know it to flow on in instant-by-instant continuity, neither one nor permanent."
阿賴耶識與五遍行心相應所恒共相應。謂作意、觸、受、想、思……又阿賴耶識相應受，一向不苦不樂，無記性攝。 〔T1579 0580a29–b04〕
tr. "The ālaya-consciousness is ever co-concurrent with the five omnipresent mental concurrents — namely attention, contact, feeling, conception, volition… Moreover, the feeling concurrent with the ālaya-consciousness is throughout neither-painful-nor-pleasant, gathered under the indeterminate nature."
或有成就轉識，非阿賴耶識。謂阿羅漢、若諸獨覺、不退菩薩，及諸如來住有心位。 〔T1579 0582a08–a09〕
tr. "There are those who accomplish the evolving consciousnesses but not the ālaya-consciousness — namely the arhats, the pratyekabuddhas, the non-retrogressing bodhisattvas, and the tathāgatas dwelling in the with-mind stage."
The Yogācārabhūmi's Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī sets up the ālaya-consciousness's "object-support turning-marks" (the two object-supports: the inner appropriated seeds-and-body-with-faculties · the outer undiscriminated receptacle — the śāstra-source of the treatise's appropriation and location), "cognizing objects subtly · even the worldly clever and wise can hardly discern it" (the śāstra-source of the unknowable), "arising-and-perishing moment by moment · instant-by-instant continuity · neither one nor permanent" (the śāstra-source of the constant-yet-turning like a torrent), "concurrence with the five omnipresent [factors] · the concurrent feeling throughout neither-painful-nor-pleasant, of indeterminate nature" (the śāstra-source of feeling-equanimity-alone and unobstructed-indeterminate), and "the arhats and the rest do not accomplish the ālaya-consciousness" (the śāstra-source of the subduing-and-severing relinquishment of the name, which is precisely what the treatise's Viniścaya[-saṃgrahaṇī] citation cites). What Dharmapāla's redaction takes as authority has its scripture in the Saṃdhinirmocana, the Laṅkāvatāra, and the Mahāyāna-abhidharma-sūtra, and its śāstra in the Yogācārabhūmi.
4. Essentials of the root treatise (Dharmapāla's redaction · T1585)
Object-support · mode of activity
此識行相、所緣云何？謂不可知執受、處了。「了」謂了別，即是行相……「處」謂處所，即器世間……「執受」有二：謂諸種子及有根身……此二皆是識所執受，攝為自體，同安危故。執受及處俱是所緣，阿賴耶識因緣力故，自體生時，內變為種及有根身，外變為器，即以所變為自所緣，行相仗之而得起故。 〔T1585 0010a11–a20〕
tr. "What are this consciousness's mode of activity and object-support? Namely, the unknowable appropriation, location, and discerning. 'Discerning' means discernment, which just is the mode of activity… 'Location' means the place, which is the receptacle-world… 'Appropriation' is twofold: namely, the seeds and the body-with-faculties… These two are both appropriated by the consciousness, taken in as its own substance, sharing safety-and-peril [with it]. Appropriation and location are both object-support; by force of cause and condition, the ālaya-consciousness, when its own substance arises, inwardly transforms into seeds and the body-with-faculties and outwardly transforms into the receptacle, and so takes what it transforms as its own object-support — for the mode of activity arises in reliance on it."
The unknowable
「不可知」者，謂此行相極微細故，難可了知；或此所緣內執受境亦微細故；外器世間量難測故，名不可知。 〔T1585 0011b03–b05〕
tr. "'Unknowable' means: because this mode of activity is exceedingly subtle, it is hard to discern; or because the inner appropriated object that it has as object-support is also subtle; and because the measure of the outer receptacle-world is hard to fathom — therefore it is named unknowable."
Concurrence · the five omnipresent [factors]
此識與幾心所相應？常與觸、作意、受、想、思相應。阿賴耶識無始時來乃至未轉，於一切位恒與此五心所相應，以是遍行心所攝故。 〔T1585 0011b16–b19〕
tr. "With how many mental factors is this consciousness concurrent? Ever concurrent with contact, attention, feeling, conception, and volition. From beginningless time and until it is transformed, the ālaya-consciousness is, in every stage, ever concurrent with these five mental factors, because they are gathered under the omnipresent mental factors."
The five feelings · equanimity-feeling alone
此識行相極不明了，不能分別違、順境相，微細、一類、相續而轉，是故唯與捨受相應。 〔T1585 0011c29–0012a02〕
tr. "This consciousness's mode of activity is exceedingly unclear; it cannot distinguish the contrary from the favorable object-mark, and turns subtle, of one kind, and continuous — therefore it is concurrent only with equanimity-feeling."
The three natures · unobstructed-indeterminate
此識唯是無覆無記，異熟性故……「覆」謂染法障聖道故，又能蔽心，令不淨故；此識非染，故名「無覆」。「記」謂善、惡，有愛、非愛果，及殊勝自體可記別故；此非善、惡，故名「無記」。 〔T1585 0012a20–a29〕
tr. "This consciousness is unobstructed-indeterminate alone, because of [its] nature of maturation… 'Obstructed' means a defiled dharma, because it hinders the noble path, and further because it can veil the mind and make it impure; this consciousness is not defiled, and so is named 'unobstructed.' 'Determinate' means good and evil — having lovable and non-lovable fruits, and an excellent substance that can be marked off as determinate; this is neither good nor evil, and so is named 'indeterminate.'"
The cause-and-effect simile · constant-yet-turning like a torrent
阿賴耶識為斷？為常？非斷、非常，以「恒轉」故。「恒」謂此識無始時來，一類、相續，常無間斷，是界、趣、生施設本故，性堅、持種令不失故。「轉」謂此識無始時來，念念生滅前後變異，因滅果生，非常、一故，可為轉識熏成種故。 〔T1585 0012b28–c04〕
tr. "Is the ālaya-consciousness severed? Is it permanent? Neither severed nor permanent, because it is 'constant-yet-turning.' 'Constant' means that this consciousness, from beginningless time, is of one kind, continuous, ever without interruption, being the foundation for the positing of realm, destiny, and birth, and because its nature is firm and it holds the seeds so they are not lost. 'Turning' means that this consciousness, from beginningless time, arises and perishes moment by moment, altering before and after — cause perishing, effect arising — and because it is not permanent and not one, it can be perfumed by the evolving consciousnesses into seeds."
Subduing-and-severing · relinquished at the arhat stage
此識無始恒轉如流，乃至何位當究竟捨？阿羅漢位方究竟捨。謂諸聖者斷煩惱障究竟盡時，名阿羅漢。爾時，此識煩惱麁重永遠離故，說之為「捨」……非捨一切第八識體。 〔T1585 0013a19–c06〕
tr. "This consciousness, from beginningless time, is constant-yet-turning like a stream; up to what stage will it at last be relinquished? Only at the arhat stage is it at last relinquished. That is, when the noble ones sever the affliction-hindrance to ultimate exhaustion, [they] are named arhats. At that time, because this consciousness's affliction-grossness is forever departed, this is spoken of as 'relinquishment'… It is not that the whole substance of the eighth consciousness is relinquished."
The several names · the times of relinquishment
然第八識雖諸有情皆悉成就，而隨義別立種種名。謂或名心……或名阿陀那……或名所知依……或名種子識……此等諸名通一切位。或名阿賴耶……此名唯在異生、有學……或名異熟識……此名唯在異生、二乘諸菩薩位……或名無垢識……此名唯在如來地有。 〔T1585 0013c07–c20〕
tr. "Yet though the eighth consciousness is accomplished by every sentient being, it is given various names according to differing senses. Namely: it is named 'mind'… or named 'ādāna'… or named 'basis of the knowable'… or named 'seed-consciousness'… these names run through all stages. Or it is named 'ālaya'… this name is only in the ordinary beings and those in training… Or it is named 'maturation-consciousness'… this name is only in the ordinary beings, the two vehicles, and the bodhisattvas [in the causal stages]… Or it is named 'undefiled-consciousness'… this name is only in the tathāgata-stage."
Essentials: on "object-support, mode of activity" the treatise sets up the "four parts" (appearance · perceiving · self-witnessing · witnessing-of-self-witnessing) to establish consciousness-only (inwardly transforming into seeds and the body-with-faculties, outwardly transforming into the receptacle, taking what it transforms as its object-support; appearance and perceiving must have a self-witnessing on which they rest, and the self-witnessing must have a witnessing-of-self-witnessing to stop the infinite regress — the four parts being neither-identical-nor-apart). "Unknowable": the mode of activity is exceedingly subtle, the appropriated object is subtle, and the measure of the receptacle is hard to fathom — all three hard to know. Concurrence is with the five omnipresent [factors] alone, because of the equality of the four senses "time · basis · object-support · substance"; equanimity-feeling alone, because the mode of activity is unclear, does not distinguish the contrary from the favorable, and is subtle, of one kind, and continuous, and because it is the true maturation alone, turning in dependence on the prior projecting karma. The nature is unobstructed-indeterminate alone, because, were maturation good or defiled, neither flowing-on [in saṃsāra] nor reverting [to nirvāṇa] would be accomplished, and it could neither serve as the basis of the good and the defiled nor receive perfuming. "Constant-yet-turning like a torrent": "constant" wards off severance (holding the seeds so they are not lost), "turning" shows it is not permanent (arising-and-perishing moment by moment, cause perishing and effect arising) — neither severed nor permanent being precisely the right principle of dependent-arising. "Relinquished at the arhat stage": only the name "ālaya" is relinquished (the sense of grasping-and-storing being exhausted), not the substance of the eighth consciousness. And it is given seven names according to sense: mind, ādāna, basis of the knowable, seed-consciousness (running through all stages), ālaya (only in the ordinary beings and those in training), maturation-consciousness (relinquished at the diamond-mind · the nirvāṇa-without-remainder), undefiled-consciousness (only in the tathāgata-stage, with no time of relinquishment).
5. Divergent readings across the masters (Kuiji, Shuji T1830)
三師俱云：初二行頌半解初能變中，本頌以十門解釋……不可知者，即於所緣、行相之內差別之義，既無別用，故非別門……「觸等亦如是」者，俱時心所例同於王，非是分別第八識也。 〔T1830 0300b25–c07〕
tr. "The three masters all say: the first two-and-a-half lines of verse expound, within the first transformer, the root verse by ten gates… 'Unknowable' is a sense of distinction within the object-support and mode of activity; having no separate function, it is therefore not a separate gate… 'Contact and the rest are likewise so' means the co-temporal mental factors take the mind-king as their parallel — it is not a separate marking-off of the eighth consciousness."
文雖有二，義即有三，或實說一分如安慧，或二分親勝等，或三分陳那等，或四分護法等。此中護法但說三分，以證自證分別義建立，義相猶隱，所以不說。 〔T1830 0242a24–a27〕
tr. "Though the text has two [parts], the sense has three — some really teach one part, as Sthiramati; some two parts, as Bandhuśrī and the rest; some three parts, as Dignāga and the rest; some four parts, as Dharmapāla and the rest. Here Dharmapāla teaches but three parts, because the witnessing-of-self-witnessing is established only by a distinguishing sense and its sense-mark is still hidden — that is why it is not [here] spoken of."
「謂諸聖」者，即通三乘……此中唯依斷煩惱障盡名阿羅漢，非據所知障，害煩惱賊故，非是縛故。又依除分段生以名無生，非所知障故。 〔T1830 0341a11–a21〕
tr. "'That is, the noble ones' runs through the three vehicles… Here [an arhat] is named arhat only on the basis of severing the affliction-hindrance to exhaustion, not on the basis of the knowable-hindrance — because [one] slays the affliction-bandit, [the affliction] being a binding [whereas the knowable-hindrance] is not. And [one] is named 'no-[further-]birth' on the basis of removing apportioned birth-and-death, not on the basis of the knowable-hindrance."
Kuiji judges the first transformer to be expounded by "ten gates," settles that "unknowable" is no separate gate (gathered within the object-support and mode of activity), and settles that "contact and the rest are likewise so" is the mental factors taking the mind-king as their parallel (not that contact and the rest can themselves hold seeds or discern). On the setting up of the "four parts," the Shuji attaches the names of the ancient masters: the one-part teaching belongs to Sthiramati, the two-part teaching to Bandhuśrī (the Nanda line), the three-part teaching to Dignāga, the four-part teaching to Dharmapāla (Dharmapāla, in the root treatise, displays only three parts, because the witnessing-of-self-witnessing's sense-mark is still hidden). On "relinquished at the arhat stage," the Shuji makes clear that "the noble ones" runs through the three vehicles, and judges this to be set up only with respect to "severing the affliction-hindrance to exhaustion" (slaying the affliction-bandit · removing apportioned birth), not with respect to the knowable-hindrance. Which "one view" attaches to which master (which position belongs to which master), the Shuji and the Zhangzhong shuyao detail.
6. Rendering of terms · old-translation comparison (Xuanzang ↔ Paramārtha, Zhuanshi lun)
| Sense | Xuanzang, Cheng Weishi Lun | Paramārtha, Zhuanshi lun |
|---|---|---|
| the eighth consciousness | 阿賴耶識（藏）· 異熟識 · 一切種識 ālaya-consciousness (store) · maturation-consciousness · all-seeds consciousness | 果報識（即阿梨耶識）·本識·宅識·藏識 retribution-consciousness (i.e. the ālaya-consciousness) · root-consciousness · abode-consciousness · store-consciousness ("a single retribution-consciousness, which is the ālaya-consciousness… also named the root-consciousness… also named the abode-consciousness… also named the store-consciousness, the place where all seeds lie hidden" 〔0061c08–c13〕) |
| the unknowable | 不可知（行相·所緣俱微隱） unknowable (mode of activity and object-support both subtle and hidden) | 「相及境不可分別，一體無異」 "appearance and object cannot be distinguished, being one substance without difference" 〔0061c13–c14〕 |
| nature | 無覆無記 unobstructed-indeterminate | 自性無記 indeterminate of own-nature ("this consciousness and the mental factors are but indeterminate of own-nature" 〔0062a11〕) |
| constant-yet-turning · the stage of relinquishment | 恒轉如瀑流 · 阿羅漢位捨 constant-yet-turning like a torrent · relinquished at the arhat stage | 念念恒流如水流浪·本識如流·乃至得羅漢果此流浪法亦猶未滅 moment by moment ever-flowing like water in waves · the root-consciousness like a stream · even up to the attaining of the arhat fruit this flowing-wave dharma is still not yet extinguished (〔0062a11–a13〕) |
Xuanzang takes "ālaya (store)" as the proper name of the eighth consciousness and uses "ādāna" to name the eighth's appropriating sense; Paramārtha's Zhuanshi lun takes "ālaya" as the retribution-consciousness (the eighth) and separately uses "ādāna" to name the second grasping-consciousness (the seventh) — the old translations parting on a single point in the assignment of "ādāna." Paramārtha's "appearance and object cannot be distinguished, being one substance without difference" is the old-translation counterpart to Xuanzang's "unknowable," and "moment by moment ever-flowing like water in waves… even up to the attaining of the arhat fruit" is the old-translation counterpart to "constant-yet-turning like a torrent · relinquished at the arhat stage."
7. Key terms
ālaya (ālaya) — store; the eighth consciousness that takes in and stores all defiled seeds so they are not lost, and that is grasped-and-stored as an inner self by the view-of-self and love-of-self. ādāna (ādāna) — appropriating; appropriating the seeds and the material faculties so they are not destroyed. object-support · mode of activity (ālambana · ākāra) — the object grasped onto / the discerning mark that grasps; the eighth consciousness inwardly transforms into seeds and the body-with-faculties and outwardly transforms into the receptacle, taking what it transforms as object-support, and the mode of activity (discernment · perceiving part) arises in reliance on it. the appropriated (upādi) — what is taken in as one's own substance, sharing safety-and-peril; namely the seeds (the habit-energy of appearance · name · discrimination) and the body-with-faculties (the material faculties and the locus on which the faculties rest). the four parts — the appearance-part (object-support · the measured) · the perceiving-part (mode of activity · the measurer) · the self-witnessing-part (the result of measuring) · the witnessing-of-self-witnessing-part (that which witnesses the self-witnessing). unobstructed-indeterminate — not defiled (unobstructed), neither good nor evil (indeterminate); gathered under the nature of maturation. constant-yet-turning — constant (of one kind, continuous · holding the seeds so they are not lost · warding off severance) · turning (arising-and-perishing moment by moment · cause perishing and effect arising · showing it is not permanent). maturation-consciousness (vipāka) · undefiled-consciousness (amala-vijñāna) — alternative names of the eighth consciousness according to sense. 〔Sanskrit forms are a pronunciation aid transmitted by the ancient masters.〕
8. Cross-reading (the Yogācāra sequence: Baifa → Triṃśikā → Viṃśatikā → Madhyāntavibhāga → Mahāyānasaṃgraha)
- Baifa (Hundred Dharmas): mind-dharma · the ālaya-consciousness (the eighth of the eight consciousnesses); mental factors · the five omnipresent [factors] (contact, attention, feeling, conception, volition) — the five mental factors treated in this chapter's concurrence gate.
- Triṃśikā: verse 3 (object-support and mode of activity · concurrence · the five feelings) · verse 4 (the three natures · the mental factors' parallel · constant-yet-turning · subduing-and-severing) — the verse-by-verse sister.
- Viṃśatikā: the principle of consciousness-only-without-object and of establishing the four parts (inwardly transforming into the object-support, taking what it transforms as its own object-support, with no real object apart from consciousness) runs in common; the ālaya's substance-and-marks have no head-on correspondent, and so are passed over.
- Madhyāntavibhāga: the Characteristics chapter · unreal imagining (consciousness arising to resemble the two parts grasped and grasper — the source of this chapter's four-parts appearance-and-perceiving).
- Mahāyānasaṃgraha: the Knowable-Basis division (the ālaya-consciousness as the basis of the defiled-and-pure knowable · the all-seeds consciousness) — this chapter's three-natures "as the basis of the good and the defiled" and the name "basis of the knowable" stand squarely opposite to it.
Within the treatise: the ālaya-consciousness chapter (I) (the three marks · seeds — what this chapter carries on from) · the manas (the second transformer · taking the ālaya's perceiving part as its object-support, grasping it as an inner self) · object-discerning (the third transformer).
9. Collation position
Verse T1586 〔0060b05·0060b06·0060b07·0060b08〕 · root T1585 the ālaya's several gates 〔0010a11–a20·0011b03·0011b16·0011c29–0012a02·0012a20–a29·0012b28–c04·0013a19·0013c06–c20〕 · Shuji T1830 〔0242a24–a27·0300b25–c07·0341a11–a21〕 · Zhuanshi lun T1587 〔0061c08–c14·0062a11–a13〕. 〔Scripture〕 Saṃdhinirmocana T676 〔0692b15·0692c22–c23〕 · Laṅkāvatāra T670 〔0484b11〕 · Mahāyāna-abhidharma-sūtra (no transmitted Chinese witness · the scriptural text preserved in the treatise) T1585 〔0014a13·0014b22〕. 〔Śāstra〕 Yogācārabhūmi T1579 〔0580a03–b04·0582a08〕.