成唯識論 證有別體·後五理

The previous chapter gave five reasons; this one gives the latter five. They share a way of taking evidence: they go to the extremes. What shows no difference in ordinary conditions shows itself at the limit.

Six, the mind at birth and death. At the moment of taking birth and of dying, the mind must be a distracted mind; it cannot be one in a mindless attainment. Yet the first six consciousnesses are often not manifest then — who, then, is there? There must be an unbroken consciousness appropriating the body, or there is no mind to speak of at those moments.

Seven, the support of dependent origination. Scripture says consciousness conditions name-and-form and name-and-form conditions consciousness, the two leaning on each other like sheaves of reeds. If that consciousness were one of the first six it would itself fall within name-and-form, and the statement would not hold. It must be the eighth.

Eight, consciousness as nutriment. Among the four nutriments is consciousness, which sustains a being and keeps it from breaking up. The first six break off; the seventh does not appropriate the body — so the substance of consciousness-as-nutriment is the eighth alone.

Nine, consciousness in the attainment of cessation. This is the strongest. One who enters that attainment has all six consciousnesses extinguished, feeling and conception no longer functioning — and yet has not died: the body is still warm, the lifespan still there. Scripture says that in one abiding in cessation, consciousness does not leave the body. Whose is that consciousness?

Ten, the defiled and purified mind. Turning from defiled to pure requires a support able to hold seeds; without one, how would a severed affliction ever rearise, and how would a cultivated good not be lost?

With that the ten are full. Looking back, the treatise's method has been of a piece throughout: it never asks you to feel this consciousness. It asks only that you grant this — that without it, the things you have already granted cannot be made to hold together.

〔Verses commented〕Continuing: unfolding verses 2–4 · proving the eighth · the latter five reasons

Reason 6. The proof from the mind of birth-and-death (the mind at birth and death is only the maturation-consciousness)

A sūtra says further: the kinds of beings, at the time of taking birth (entering the womb) and of ending life (dying), are certainly abiding in a "distracted mind" (a scattered mind, not in concentration), and not in a "no-mind concentration." But if there were no this eighth consciousness, that mind at the instant of birth and death would not stand to exist.

This is to say: at the instant of birth or death, body and mind are dim and dull, just as in dreamless sleep or in a dead faint, and that clear, distinct turning consciousness certainly cannot arise. Moreover, at this (birth-and-death) time, the "appearance" (the manner of operation) and the "object-support" (the object referred to) of the six kinds of turning consciousnesses cannot be made out (cannot be told apart), and so, just as in the no-mind stage, the six turning consciousnesses certainly do not operate.

The "appearance" and "object-support" of the six kinds of turning consciousnesses are "certainly able to be made out" — because at other times (in ordinary waking moments) they can be made out. Plainly, then, the mind at the instant of birth-and-death whose appearance cannot be made out is simply not the turning consciousness. Only the true maturation-consciousness is so utterly subtle that both its appearance and its object-support cannot be made out; it is the fruit of "impelling karma" (the karma that draws forth the total retribution), continuing on for a whole lifetime, ever unchanging; it is "distracted, a mind present" (not a no-mind concentration), and this is what is called the "mind of birth-and-death" — and put this way it does not clash with reason.

〔A side refutation: the view that the mind-consciousness is the mind of birth-and-death〕

〔One faction · at the time of taking birth there is no mind-consciousness〕 One faction holds: the five consciousnesses are certainly absent at this (birth-taking) time; and the mind-consciousness, to grasp an object, must rely on one of the three — being drawn by the five consciousnesses, being taught by another, or the power of concentration — yet at the instant of taking birth none of these three can be found, so at birth-taking the mind-consciousness too is absent. 〔A〕 If one says so (that the mind-consciousness can arise only by relying on these three), then trouble follows: a being born in the formless realm ought then never again to have a mind-consciousness arise — because the concentrated mind of the formless realm must be drawn by a "distracted mind-consciousness," yet in that realm the five consciousnesses and the teaching of another are certainly both absent, and so the distracted mind that could draw forth concentration would have no way to arise. This plainly will not do.

〔The opponent again rescues〕 The opponent may rescue with a word: the concentrated mind of the formless realm, by the "power of habituation" (the force built up from long practice), comes forth of itself afterward, with no need for a distracted mind-consciousness to draw it. 〔Q〕 Very well, then this throws the question back: by this principle, at the instant he has just taken birth, why does the mind-consciousness not likewise come forth of itself? And again, when those of the desire and form realms have just taken birth, that habituated mind-consciousness ought likewise to come forth (the same principle). 〔Wresting it back〕 If you answer "at the instant of just taking birth one is dim and dull, so the mind-consciousness does not come forth" — but this "dimness" is precisely the reason already given above (the dullness of birth-and-death); why trouble to set up a fresh account? — which goes to show that at the instant of taking birth there really is no turning consciousness operating.

〔Yet another school maintains · there is a subtle mind-consciousness〕 Again, another school maintains: at the times of birth, death, and the like, there is separately a kind of "subtle mind-consciousness," whose appearance and object-support cannot be made out. 〔A〕 It should be known that this "subtle mind-consciousness" is in fact this eighth consciousness — because the commonly-conceded "mind-consciousness" (the sixth) does not have the trait of "appearance and object-support that cannot be made out." Plainly, then, the subtle consciousness they set up is just the eighth consciousness.

〔At the time of death · the cold touch arising by degrees〕

Looking now from the side of "the instant of death": when a person is on the point of dying, then according to whether the karma he made in this life is good karma or evil karma, his body, either from the lower half or from the upper half, gives rise by degrees to a "cold touch" (that is, the body turning cold section by section). 〔When one has made good karma, the warmth retreats from below upward, leaving last from the crown; when one has made evil karma, the warmth retreats from above downward, leaving last from the soles — so the sequence of cold follows just upon the good or evil karma.〕 But if there were no this eighth consciousness, this matter would not stand to reason. How so? The turning consciousnesses (the first seven) cannot bear up this matter of the cold touch arising by degrees — first the eye-consciousness and the rest of the five consciousnesses: they each rest on their own faculty (the eye on the eye-faculty, the ear on the ear-faculty…), and moreover they intermit (sometimes do not arise at all), and so they cannot govern the whole body turning cold section by section. Next the sixth, mind-consciousness: it does not abide fixed at any one place on the body, and its object-support is moreover flitting and unfixed; it is "scattered and lodged throughout the whole body, continuing on without break" (it does not cling to some one section of flesh to appropriate it), and so that cold touch, arising in section-by-section sequence, is likewise not something brought about by degrees through the sixth, mind-consciousness.

Only the "maturation-mind" (the eighth consciousness) can bear up this matter — by the force of past karma, it appropriates each part of the whole body "of one kind, pervadingly, and continuously" (every section of flesh is appropriated by it, every section still having sensation). Wherever it "lets go of appropriation" upon a section of flesh, the cold touch on that section thereupon arises — for life (the lifespan), warmth (body-heat), and consciousness, these three, are originally not to be parted from one another (the moment consciousness lets go, warmth retreats and cold arises). And the place where the cold touch arises becomes, right then, "insentient" (dead flesh without sensation, no different from wood or stone); toward this dead flesh the eighth consciousness still "transforms" (can still manifest its image) and still "refers" (can still take it as object), yet it no longer "appropriates" it (no longer holds it as a part of one's own body with sensation). By this it is known that there must be this eighth consciousness (otherwise this death-mark — "cold following karma, cold arising where appropriation is let go" — would have nothing to ground it).

Reason 7. The proof from the basis of dependent arising (the consciousness in "consciousness conditions name-and-form" is the eighth)

A sūtra says further: "consciousness conditions name-and-form, name-and-form conditions consciousness" (consciousness serves as the condition of name-and-form, and name-and-form in turn serves as the condition of consciousness); these two, turning about, rest on each other, just like two bundles of reeds propping each other up to stand, turning at the same time. But if there were no this eighth consciousness, that "consciousness" (the one that rests mutually on name-and-form) would have no substance, and would not stand to exist.

That sūtra itself gives this gloss: "name" refers to the four non-form aggregates (that is, the mind and mental factors within feeling, conception, formations, and consciousness — here "name" especially takes feeling, conception, formations, and the rest, together with what is associated with them), and "form" refers to the kalala (the lump of embryonic matter at the very instant of conception) and the like. These two, name and form, abide resting on consciousness, like two bundles of reeds each serving as the other's condition, ever turning at the same time, never to be parted from each other.

Here is the crux: the eye-consciousness and the rest of the turning consciousnesses are in fact already counted within "name" (for "name" includes the four aggregates, and the turning consciousnesses within the consciousness-aggregate are all within it). That being so, the "consciousness" that rests mutually on name-and-form — if there is no eighth, pray, who is left to serve as this "consciousness"? Nor can one rescue it thus: "the consciousness-aggregate within name refers to the five consciousnesses, while the consciousness that rests on name-and-form refers to the sixth" — because at the instant of the kalala (just after conception) there are as yet no five consciousnesses at all, so within "name" there are no five consciousnesses to speak of, and this rescue cannot stand.

Again, since the turning consciousnesses intermit and vary, they have not the power to appropriate name-and-form "constantly," so how could one say they constantly serve as the condition for name-and-form? Therefore this word "consciousness" in "consciousness conditions name-and-form" displays the eighth consciousness.

Reason 8. The proof from the consciousness-food (the substance of the consciousness-food is only the eighth consciousness)

A sūtra says further: "all beings abide in dependence on food." But if there were no this eighth consciousness, that "substance of the consciousness-food" would not stand to exist. A sūtra says that "food" is of four kinds —

(1) Morsel-food (food eaten in morsels, mouthful by mouthful), whose mark is "transformation-and-decay": that is, the three of the desire realm — smell, taste, and touch — can do the work of "food" at the time of being digested (transformed and decayed). Therefore "form-base" (the visible color and shape) is not subsumed under morsel-food, because color and shape can do no nourishing work at the time of transformation-and-decay.

(2) Contact-food (nourishing by contact), whose mark is "contacting the object": that is, contaminated "contact," the moment it contacts an object, draws in feelings of joy and the like, and can do the work of "food." Although this "contact" is associated with every one of the consciousnesses, the contact that "belongs to the six consciousnesses" has the preponderant sense of food — because when the contact of the six consciousnesses meets its object it is markedly coarse and manifest, drawing in joy and pleasure and that conformably-beneficial equanimous feeling, so its nourishing force is strong.

(3) Mental-volition-food (nourishing by the longing of the mind), whose mark is "expectation" (longing): that is, contaminated "volition," turning together with "desire," longs for a lovable object, and can do the work of "food." Although this "volition" is associated with every one of the consciousnesses, the volition that "belongs to the mind-consciousness" has the preponderant sense of food — because when the mind-consciousness faces its object, that force of longing is strong.

(4) Consciousness-food (nourishing by the appropriating of consciousness), whose mark is "appropriating": that is, contaminated "consciousness," growing by the force of the three foods morsel, contact, and volition, can do the work of "food." Although this "consciousness" pervades the substance of every one of the consciousnesses, the "eighth consciousness" has the preponderant sense of food — because it continues on of one kind, and its force of appropriating is strong.

Accordingly the Abhidharmasamuccaya says these four foods are subsumed under "three aggregates, five bases, eleven elements." These four can uphold beings' body and life, keeping them from decay and rupture, and so are named "food."

Among these four foods: morsel-food is of use only in the desire realm; contact-food and mental-volition-food, though they pervade the three realms, must each turn in dependence on "consciousness," existing or not as consciousness exists or not. And the eye-consciousness and the rest of the turning consciousnesses "intermit and vary," and cannot pervade all and constantly uphold body and life — because in the no-mind concentration, sleep, fainting, and the no-conception heaven they all break off; and even at times when a mind is present, they vary about according to their basis, object, nature, realm, stage, and so on. So as for upholding body and life, the turning consciousnesses are neither pervading nor constant, and cannot be the chief agent of the consciousness-food.

Those who maintain that there is no eighth consciousness — one must ask them: when a person is in the no-mind stage, in dependence on what food does he live on? The Sūtra plainly says "all beings abide in dependence on food" (beings in the no-mind stage too must have food). Here you cannot say it is the "past consciousness, future consciousness" of the no-mind stage that serves as food — because past and future consciousness are neither present nor permanent, just like a flower [seen] in empty space, having no substance and able to exert no function.

Even taking a step back and granting that past and future have substance and function, still they "are not subsumed under the present," like empty space, and so are simply not of the nature of food. Nor can one say it is "the mind just before entering concentration" and the like that serve as food for the being in the no-mind stage — because while one abides in no-mind, that mind from just before entering concentration has long since ceased, and "the past is not food" is moreover already commonly conceded.

Nor can one say it is the non-concurrent formations such as the no-conception concentration that serve as that food — because they are not subsumed under the four foods morsel, contact, volition, and consciousness, and because the non-concurrent dharmas are not really existent to begin with. Some may maintain that "in the cessation-attainment and the like there is still a sixth, mind-consciousness," able to do the work of food for the being there — this maintenance is unreasonable, and will be broadly refuted below (Reason 9 · the proof that there is consciousness in the cessation-attainment).

Again, those who maintain there is no eighth consciousness must answer one more question: when someone is born in the upper two realms (the form and formless realms) and arouses an uncontaminated mind, in dependence on what does he have food? The uncontaminated consciousnesses are things that "demolish the [three] existences," and cannot serve as food for that contaminated body-and-life. Nor can one forcibly say that "within the uncontaminated consciousness there are contaminated seeds" that could serve as that food — because the uncontaminated consciousnesses, just like nirvāṇa, cannot appropriate contaminated seeds.

Furthermore one cannot say "the body and life of upper-realm beings uphold each other, and so serve as each other's food" — because these four foods simply do not subsume that body, that life; again, the formless realm has no body at all (with no body, "body and life upholding each other" cannot stand), and its life has nothing able to uphold it; and the like-lot-of-beings and the rest (belonging to the non-concurrent formations) have no real substance.

By this it is settled and known: apart from those turning consciousnesses, there is separately a "maturation-consciousness," appropriating body and life of one kind, constantly, and pervadingly, keeping them from decay and rupture. The World-Honored One, going by just this, accordingly said: "all beings abide in dependence on food."

One word more to add: what is called a "being" is set up only in dependence on the "appropriating aggregates" (the contaminated five appropriating aggregates); the Buddha already has no contamination and is not subsumed under "beings." So if a sūtra should say that the Buddha "too is a being, too abides in dependence on food," it should be known that this is all said in dependence on "manifestation" (the appearance shown in accord with the world). Since the maturation-consciousness is known to be that preponderant "food-nature" (that is, the chief agent of the consciousness-food), this consciousness is precisely this eighth consciousness.

Reason 9. The proof that there is consciousness in the cessation-attainment (for one abiding in the cessation-attainment, the consciousness does not leave the body)

A sūtra says further: when a person abides in the "cessation-attainment" (a deep concentration in which the mind is brought to a stop), his bodily formation, verbal formation, and mental formation (the activities of body, speech, and mind) are, every one of them, extinguished, yet "his lifespan is not extinguished, his warmth has not retreated, his faculties have not decayed, and the consciousness has not left the body." But if there were no this eighth consciousness, that "consciousness that has not left the body of one abiding in the cessation-attainment" would not stand to exist.

This is to say: the eye-consciousness and the rest of these consciousnesses are coarse and stirring in their manner of operation, and the moment they arise toward an object they cannot but toil and fret; the practitioner, wearied of this toil, wishes to bring it to rest for a while, and so layer by layer he subdues and removes it, all the way to the stage of "utter exhaustion" (where all is brought to a stop), and going by this stage he is given the name "one abiding in the cessation-attainment" — and so in this concentration those six turning consciousnesses are all extinguished. But since they are all extinguished, if one refuses to grant that there is still a "subtle, of-one-kind, constant, pervading consciousness able to appropriate life and the rest" remaining, then on what ground does one say "the consciousness has not left the body"?

〔The opponent rescues〕 The opponent may rescue with a word: that (turning) consciousness arises again after the cessation-attainment, and this is like "alternate-day malaria" (a malarial fever that recurs every other day) — though it breaks off in between, it may all the same be called "not having left the body." 〔Wresting it back〕 If so, then the sūtra ought not to say "the mental formation is extinguished" — because consciousness arises and ceases together with conception and the like (born together, ceasing together); since the sūtra says conception and the rest are extinguished, consciousness too ought to be extinguished along with them. Moreover, by your rescue, life, warmth, and the faculties ought too, like that "alternate-day" consciousness, to break off — and this is a great fault (yet the sūtra plainly says life, warmth, and the faculties are unbroken). So one ought to grant that this "consciousness," just like life, warmth, and the rest, truly does not leave the body and is constantly present.

Again: if at this (cessation) time there were no consciousness at all, then this body would be just like a potsherd or a bit of gravel, not to be counted among beings — and how then could it be called "one abiding in the cessation-attainment"? And again: if the maturation-consciousness were absent at this time, then who could appropriate the faculties, the lifespan, and the warmth? With none to appropriate them, these ought all to decay and be extinguished, like a corpse, with even life and warmth gone — yet the person in the cessation-attainment plainly still has his life, warmth, and faculties, and so it is known that there is consciousness within.

That being so (were there no consciousness, the faculties would decay and be extinguished like a corpse), then the later consciousness certainly could never arise again, and so the "consciousness" in the sūtra's saying "the consciousness has not left the body" — to which would it belong? — for note that once the maturation-consciousness has left this body, the body left on its own cannot come back to life. Plainly, then, in the cessation-attainment the maturation-consciousness has not left, and so the body can live again afterward. And again: if at this time there were no "seed-upholding consciousness," then the later consciousness would have no seed of its own, so how could it arise?

(Could one then bring in some other thing to uphold the seeds, as a rescue? Each has already been blocked off above:) past, future, and the non-concurrent formations all have no real substance, and this is long commonly conceded; and form-dharmas and the rest, apart from consciousness, can all neither receive perfuming nor uphold the seeds, and this too has already been refuted. So it follows that in the cessation-attainment and the like, these no-mind times, there is in fact, just as in the with-mind times, certainly really a consciousness — because at these times the faculties, life, and warmth are all present, and [the person] still counts as a being. Following this chain of reasoning, it is known that "one abiding in the cessation-attainment certainly has consciousness, and this consciousness truly does not leave the body."

〔Refuting: the view that there is a sixth, mind-consciousness in the cessation-attainment〕

〔One faction · there is a sixth, mind-consciousness in the cessation-attainment〕 Some say: at this (cessation) time there is a sixth, mind-consciousness present, and this is the "consciousness that has not left the body" the sūtra speaks of — this too is wrong. Why? Because this concentration is also named the "no-mind concentration" (were there a sixth, mind-consciousness within, it would not be no-mind). 〔The opponent rescues: no five consciousnesses is "no-mind"〕 The opponent may rescue with a word: it is called "no-mind" merely if the five consciousnesses are absent (not that even the sixth need be absent). 〔Wresting it back〕 If one says so, then every concentration ought to be called a "no-mind concentration" — because in not one concentration are there any five consciousnesses. Yet in fact only the cessation-attainment and the no-conception concentration are called no-mind concentrations, which shows that "no-mind" does not just mean the absence of the five consciousnesses, simple as that.

Again, the mind-consciousness too is counted among the six turning consciousnesses, and so, like the five consciousnesses, it is absent in the cessation-attainment. Again: the consciousness at this time has an appearance and an object-support that cannot be made out, just like life and warmth (which cannot be made out or told apart), and so it is not the sixth, mind-consciousness (whose appearance can ordinarily be made out). Were there at this time a consciousness "whose appearance and object-support could be made out," then it ought, like at other times, not to be subsumed under this (cessation) concentration — for the practitioner enters this concentration precisely in order to bring to rest that "consciousness whose appearance and object-support can be made out." Plainly, then, there is no sixth, mind-consciousness within this concentration.

Again: if at this time there were a sixth, mind-consciousness, then are the mental factors associated with it present or absent? This must be pressed from two sides. (a) Suppose there are mental factors: then the sūtra ought not to say "the mental formation of one abiding in this concentration is wholly extinguished," nor ought it to name this concentration the "cessation-of-feeling-and-conception concentration" (since, with mental factors present, feeling and conception would not have been extinguished).

〔The opponent rescues〕 The opponent may rescue with a word: the preparatory practice of the cessation-attainment merely wishes to grow weary of "feeling and conception," and so in this concentration it is merely feeling and conception that are extinguished (the rest of the mental factors, and the consciousness, are all still present); and again, these two, feeling and conception, aid the mind with especial force, and so among the host of mental factors just these two are named "the mental formation," and so when the sūtra says "the mental formation is extinguished" it means just the extinction of feeling and conception — and how does this clash with there being "a sixth, mind-consciousness with its mental factors" within?

〔Wresting it back〕 By your principle, the no-conception concentration grows weary only of "conception," and so it ought to have only conception extinguished — yet this you yourself refuse to grant. Again, since you yourself grant that "only feeling and conception aid the mind with especial force," then when these two are extinguished, the mind too ought to be extinguished along with them. 〔The opponent again wards it off〕 The opponent rescues again: just as "the bodily formation (that is, breathing) is extinguished, yet the body is still there," why must one force the mind too to be extinguished along with the mental formation?

〔Wresting this warding-off back too〕 If one says so (a "formation" being extinguished does not necessarily mean the dharma resting on it is extinguished along with it), then when "the verbal formation (that is, applied and sustained thought)" is extinguished, "speech" too ought not to be extinguished — yet this again you refuse to grant (you plainly grant that the moment applied and sustained thought are extinguished, speech is certainly extinguished). Plainly, then, a "formation," with respect to the dharma resting on it, is to be told into two kinds, "pervasive formation" and "non-pervasive formation": one that is "pervasive," when it is extinguished, the dharma is certainly extinguished along with it; one that is "non-pervasive," when it is extinguished, the dharma may yet remain.

What belongs to the "non-pervasive" is, for instance, breathing (the bodily formation) — you see that when breathing stops, the body is still there. But applied and sustained thought, with respect to "speech," are "pervasive" — the moment they are extinguished, speech is certainly gone. Likewise, feeling and conception, with respect to "the mind," are "pervasive" too — because everyone grants that feeling and conception, just like volition and the rest, alike belong to the "universal-ground factors" (those present along with every mind). So the moment feeling and conception are extinguished, the mind certainly is extinguished along with them; how then can one say "feeling and conception are extinguished, yet the mind is still there"?

Again: since you grant that "volition" and the rest are universal-ground factors, then when feeling and conception are extinguished, volition and the rest ought to be extinguished too. That being so, the mental factors such as faith and the rest are at this time also absent — for it is only when "non-pervasive" [formations] are extinguished that the rest of the dharmas can remain, and since the pervasive volition and the rest are all extinguished, how then can one say that other mental factors remain? Conversely, if you insist that volition and the rest are not extinguished at this time, then feeling and conception ought too to be not extinguished (since they alike belong to the universal-ground factors). 〔This becomes a dilemma blocked at both ends: volition and the rest advance and retreat together with feeling and conception — either they are all present, and then it is not a cessation-of-feeling-and-conception concentration; or they are all extinguished, and then not one mental factor is left.〕

Again: if in this concentration there were mental factors such as volition, then there ought too to be "contact" — because there is not one of the rest of the mental factors that does not arise by the force of contact. Once you grant there is contact, there ought too to be "feeling" — because contact serves as the condition of feeling. Once you grant there is feeling, "conception" too ought to arise — because feeling and conception are not to be parted. (And so feeling and conception would not have been extinguished, and then it is no cessation-of-feeling-and-conception concentration.)

〔The opponent rescues〕 The opponent may rescue with a word: just as "feeling serves as the condition of craving," yet not every feeling can arouse craving (there is a selection here), so likewise "contact serves as the condition of feeling," yet not every contact can give birth to feeling. So put, your refutation "if there is contact there must be feeling" does not stand. 〔Wresting it back〕 This rescue is wrong, because the two cases differ —

Where does the difference lie? The Buddha himself made a selection: only "the feelings born of contact-with-ignorance" can serve as condition to give birth to craving (so "feeling gives birth to craving" is selective, not that every feeling gives birth to it); but as for "contact gives birth to feeling," nowhere in the sūtras did he ever make any selection. Therefore wherever there is contact there must certainly be feeling born, and feeling arises together with conception — this principle is settled. Plainly, then, where there is contact there must be feeling and conception; and since within the cessation-attainment there ought to be no contact, there ought too to be no sixth, mind-consciousness.

Or, pressing you to the limit: by your account, the feeling and conception at this time too ought, like at other times, to be not extinguished — for since you insist that there are mental factors such as volition at this time (and volition and the rest advance and retreat together with feeling and conception), to grant that runs afoul of the words "the mental formation is extinguished," and then this concentration too fails to be a "cessation-of-feeling-and-conception concentration."

Conversely, if you change your tune and say that at this time there are no mental factors, then "consciousness" too ought to be absent — and there are four grounds: (1) one never sees a mind that can exist on its own apart from its mental factors; (2) when the rest of the pervasive [factors] (contact and the like) are extinguished, the dharma resting on them is extinguished along with them; (3) were the mental factors gone yet consciousness still standing on its own, then feeling and the rest ought not to count as "universal-ground factors" (though they plainly are); (4) this consciousness ought then not to count as a "concomitant dharma." And to grant that this consciousness has no basis, no object-support, and the like, then it would be just like form-dharmas, and simply not a mind at all. 〔Conclusion: so within the cessation-attainment there ought not to be a sixth, mind-consciousness.〕

〔Refuting: the view that in the cessation-attainment the mind-consciousness, by the union of three, gives birth to contact〕

A sūtra says further: "with the mind-faculty and the dharma-object as condition, the mind-consciousness is born; the coming-together of the three — [faculty, object, and consciousness] — is contact, and arising together with contact there are feeling, conception, and volition." If within this (cessation) concentration there were a mind-consciousness, then with the coming-together of the three — faculty, object, and consciousness — there must certainly be contact; and since contact certainly arises together with feeling, conception, and volition, how could there be "consciousness yet no mental factors"? — which shows that "there is a mind-consciousness in the cessation-attainment" cannot stand.

〔The opponent rescues〕 The opponent may rescue with a word: at ordinary times the coming-together of the three — faculty, object, and consciousness — has power, and can form contact, give birth to contact, and thereby arouse feeling and the rest; but because, before entering this concentration, one had grown weary of the mental factors, therefore in the concentration the three (faculty, object, consciousness) have no power, cannot come together into contact, cannot give birth to contact, and so there are no feeling and the rest either — and thus one could have "consciousness yet no feeling and conception."

〔Wresting it back〕 If one says so (the coming-together of the three is wholly without power, and not one mental factor can arise), then this concentration ought to be named the "cessation-of-mental-factors concentration"; how is it that one says only "cessation of feeling and conception"? 〔The opponent wards it off again: naming by what is grown weary of〕 The opponent rescues again: on entering the concentration one grows weary only of the two, feeling and conception, and because these two are extinguished, the rest of the mental factors are all extinguished along with them, but in naming it one names it only "after what was grown weary of beforehand (feeling and conception)," and so it is named the cessation-of-feeling-and-conception concentration. 〔Wresting it back〕 That being so (all the mental factors are extinguished), then the "mind" within too ought to be extinguished along with them — for the mind is of a piece with what was grown weary of (feeling and conception), and would, like the rest of the mental factors, be extinguished along with them; and if the mind is not extinguished, then how could it be called a "no-mind concentration"?

Again, to press: what nature is the mind-consciousness in this concentration? — It ought not to be of "defiled" nature, nor of "indeterminate" nature, for four grounds: (1) within a good concentration there is no such thing as "arousing a defiled mind or arousing an indeterminate mind"; (2) the rest of defiled minds and indeterminate minds certainly have mental factors (yet you say there are no mental factors at this time — and this is self-contradiction); (3) one ought not, after growing weary of the good, to arouse the defiled and the rest; (4) the practitioner enters concentration in order to seek quiescence, and ought not on the contrary to arouse distraction (and the defiled and indeterminate are precisely what verge on distraction).

〔The opponent shifts: it is good〕 The opponent may shift his plea and say this mind-consciousness is "good." Then it must be "concomitant-good" (that is, good by being associated with the good roots), and so non-greed and the other good roots ought to be associated with it (and this again makes it have mental factors, the same contradiction). Again, this mind cannot be "intrinsic-good" or "ultimate-good" — for that would clash with your own school's account: this mind is neither of the class of the good roots (so it cannot be intrinsic-good), nor is it nirvāṇa (so it cannot be ultimate-good).

〔The opponent shifts again: equally-arisen-good〕 The opponent may shift again and say this mind is "equally-arisen-good" (that is, good by being drawn forth by the good roots of the preparatory stage before entering concentration). This too will not stand to reason, and again clashes with your own school: for the rest of good minds are not good by being "equally-arisen" but by being "concomitant"; and again, a good mind in the very next moment can arouse a mind of [any of] the three natures (after a good [mind] there can follow a defiled mind or an indeterminate mind), so how could you fix that "this good mind is equally-arisen from the prior preparatory [stage]"? So this mind's being good is, after all, by the force of "concomitance" (that is, of being associated with the good roots). That being so, it must be associated with the good roots, and how then can one say that it alone has no mental factors?

So the conclusion is: with no mental factors, the mind too ought to be absent (mind and mental factors are mutually dependent). Following this chain of reasoning all the way through, the eye-consciousness and the rest of the six turning consciousnesses are all "gone from the body" (all extinguished) within the cessation-attainment; and so the consciousness the sūtra speaks of, the one that "(within the cessation-attainment) has not left the body," is precisely this eighth consciousness — because when one enters the cessation-attainment, one does not bring this "utterly quiescent appropriating consciousness" (that is, the eighth) to rest. As for the no-conception concentration and the like, they too are to be understood after this same principle (within them too only the eighth consciousness remains).

Reason 10. The proof from the defiled and pure mind (the defiled and pure mind — only the eighth can uphold their seeds)

A sūtra says further: "because the mind is defiled, beings are defiled; because the mind is pure, beings are pure." But if there were no this eighth consciousness, that defiled mind, that pure mind (the one able to receive perfuming and able to appropriate the seeds), would not stand to exist.

This is to say: the defiled and pure dharmas all have the mind as their root — they arise only through the mind, abide only in dependence on the mind, while the mind receives their (the defiled and pure dharmas') perfuming and appropriates their seeds. To begin with the defiled side, it falls broadly into three kinds: affliction, karma, and fruit, these three each being one class. Below, one class after another is taken up, [to show] what would follow if there were no eighth consciousness.

(1) The seeds of affliction: if there were no this consciousness to appropriate the seeds of affliction, then after a person has risen and fallen among the three realms and nine stages, or has passed through a stretch of "time with no defiled mind" (such as when a good mind or an uncontaminated mind arises), those afflictions, in arising again, ought all to be without cause — because no other dharma can appropriate the seeds of that affliction, and the past and future are moreover not really existent (and so cannot bear this either).

And if the afflictions could arise without cause, then the "learner's fruit" and "no-more-learner's fruit" of the three vehicles (the fruit-stages of the path) could not stand up — because the afflictions already severed ought too to arise again (severed and then arising again, there would be no real "fruit of severance" to speak of at all). (2) The seeds of karma and fruit: if there were no this consciousness to appropriate the seeds of karma and fruit, then after a person has come and gone among the three realms and nine stages, passing through a stretch of "dharmas of a different class" (a mind of a different class from karma-and-fruit), those karmas and fruits, in arising again, ought too to be without cause — because the other seeds and other causes (form-dharmas, the non-concurrent formations, past and future) have all already been refuted above.

And if karma and fruit could arise without cause, then a great problem follows: a person who has already entered nirvāṇa-without-remainder (where the seeds of karma-and-fruit ought to have been forever extinguished) ought yet to have the karma-and-fruit of the three realms arise again, and affliction too ought to arise again without cause — which is plainly wrong. Again: the link "formations condition consciousness" in the twelvefold dependent arising could too not stand up — because if one says "the formations perfume the turning consciousness, perfuming it into the seed of consciousness," then "the turning consciousness receives perfuming" has already been refuted above.

What is more, the defiled consciousness at the linking-of-birth within "formations condition consciousness" is moreover not something directly called forth by the "formations"; were one to say that what the "formations" condition should be "name-and-form" (rather than consciousness), then "the formations serving as condition" should reach over to name-and-form; and again, the "formations" belong to the prior life and the "consciousness" to the present life, and the two are sundered by a great stretch of time, with no way to serve directly as each other's condition (across this gap, it is only by the eighth consciousness appropriating the seeds that the link can be joined). Plainly, then, if this "formations condition consciousness" cannot stand up, then the whole string of dependent-arising links that follow cannot stand up either — and so the eighth consciousness is indispensable.

Having dealt with the defiled dharmas, now the pure dharmas: they too fall into three kinds — the mundane path, the supramundane path, and the fruit-of-severance, each being one class. (1) The seeds of the mundane and supramundane paths: if there were no this consciousness to appropriate the seeds of the mundane and supramundane pure paths, then after a stretch of "mind of a different class" (a mind of a different class from the pure path), these pure dharmas, in arising again, ought all to be without cause — because the other causes you cling to have all already been refuted above.

And if these two — the mundane path and the supramundane path — could arise without cause, then trouble too follows: a person who has already entered nirvāṇa-without-remainder ought yet to have these two pure paths arise again, and their basis too ought to arise again without cause — which is plainly wrong. Again: the very first moment of the supramundane path could then simply not arise — because there is no dharma able to appropriate that "natural seed" (that is, the uncontaminated seed inherently present); and the contaminated, being of a different class [from the uncontaminated], cannot be the cause of the uncontaminated; while "arising without cause" is, all the more, no principle a disciple of Śākya can grant.

Since the very first moment of the supramundane path cannot arise, the later moments too cannot arise, and so the path-fruits of the three vehicles would all be lost. (2) The fruit-of-severance: if there were no this consciousness to appropriate the seeds of affliction, then "the transformation of the basis and the fruit-of-severance" too could not stand up — how so? At the time the path arises, the present afflictions and their seeds are both absent (there being no place to lodge the seeds of affliction, there is then no object to be severed either): because the defiled mind and the pure mind do not arise together (the path is a pure mind, affliction a defiled mind, and the two do not co-exist); the mind associated with the path moreover cannot uphold the seeds of that affliction, because the two are opposite in nature, just like nirvāṇa (the pure cannot bear up the defiled); while the "past, future, and attainment" and the like (the past, the future, and that "attainment" among the non-concurrent formations) are moreover not really existent; and for any other dharma to uphold the seeds, in reason, cannot stand up either.

Since "what is to be severed" (the seeds of affliction) is simply absent, then "what can sever" too has no opponent left to sever, so on what (what is severed) and by what (what severs) is one to set up this "fruit-of-severance"? 〔The opponent rescues: setting up the fruit-of-severance by the power of the path〕 The opponent may rescue with a word: by the power of the path the afflictions thereafter do not arise again, and this counts as setting up the fruit-of-severance (no real seeds need be there to be severed). 〔Wresting it back〕 If one says so, then the very first moment the path arises one ought to become a no-more-learner (an arhat) — for (since there are no seeds to be severed) the afflictions thereafter would all already be without cause, and forever never arise again (the very first moment of the path would have severed everything, throwing the whole graded order of the path into disorder). Plainly, then, only by granting that there is this consciousness do all these — the three defiled, the three pure — stand up — because this consciousness alone can uphold the defiled and pure seeds.

To prove that this (eighth) consciousness really exists, the principles one could set forth are without end; but for fear that the reader should weary of so great a profusion of words, only the essentials are here stated in brief (that is, the five teachings and ten principles above). That there is separately this consciousness is plain to see, whether one looks from the scriptural teaching or from reason; all those who have wisdom should deeply believe and accept this.

〔Verses commented〕Continuing: unfolding verses 2–4 · proving the eighth · the latter five reasons

The latter five reasons have explicit ground in scripture and treatise. The Yogācārabhūmi, in its Section of Ascertainment, proves the ālaya by eight aspects, among them that lifespan, warmth and consciousness sustain one another, that in one abiding in the attainment of cessation consciousness does not leave the body, and that consciousness conditions name-and-form while name-and-form conditions consciousness — the treatise ground of reasons five through nine here. And the Saṃdhinirmocana says the ādāna consciousness pursues and appropriates the body, which is what the sixth reason rests on: at birth and at death the mind must be a distracted one, not one in a mindless attainment — and were there no appropriating consciousness, there would be no mind at those moments at all.

Reason 6, the Proof from the Mind at Birth and Death — The Mind at the Time of Taking Birth and at Death Is Solely the Maturation Consciousness

Scripture says that sentient beings, at the time of taking birth and at death, must abide in a "scattered mind," not in a "mindless absorption"; without the eighth consciousness, the mind at birth and death ought not to exist. At the junctures of birth and death, body and mind are clouded and dim — as in dreamless deep sleep, or in extreme fainting — and the clear evolving consciousness definitely does not arise; moreover, in these states the modes of activity and the objects of the six evolving consciousnesses are unknowable, as in mindless states, so the six evolving consciousnesses definitely are not active. Yet the modes of activity and objects of the six evolving consciousnesses are "definitely knowable" (as in ordinary waking) — so what is unknowable at the junctures of birth and death is not the evolving consciousnesses. Only the true maturation consciousness, exceedingly subtle, its modes of activity and objects both unknowable, the fruit of directive action, continuous through a single life-span, perpetual and unchanging — it is the "scattered, mind-bearing" mind, and is named the "mind at birth and death." Said thus, it does not contravene reason. Here one view is refuted: some say "at the time of taking birth there is no mental consciousness" (the five consciousnesses are definitely absent in this state; for the mental consciousness to grasp an object it must rely on one of three — the five consciousnesses, another's teaching, or absorption — and at the time of taking birth all three of these causes are absent, so there is no mental consciousness either). Rebuttal: if the mental consciousness arises only through these three causes, then one born in the formless realm would thereafter never have his mental consciousness arise again — because the absorbed mind of that realm must be drawn forth by a "scattered mental consciousness," yet the five consciousnesses and another's teaching are both absent in that realm, so the scattered mind that could draw forth absorption cannot arise. If one rescues this by saying "the absorbed mind of the formless realm arises afterward, abruptly, by the force of repeated practice," then when he first takes birth there, why does his mental consciousness not likewise arise abruptly? At the first taking of birth in the desire realm and the form realm too, the practiced mental consciousness ought to arise; and if one says "in the first moment it is clouded and dim, so it does not arise," this "clouded and dim" is precisely the cause spoken of above — why posit a new account? (This shows that at the time of taking birth there is indeed no evolving consciousness.) And some other schools hold that "at the junctures of birth and death and the like there is another, subtle kind of mental consciousness, its modes of activity and objects both unknowable." Rebuttal: one should understand that this "subtle mental consciousness" is precisely the eighth consciousness — for the (sixth) mental consciousness that everyone acknowledges does not have the character of "modes of activity and objects unknowable."

Reason 7, the Proof from the Support in Dependent Origination — The Consciousness in "Consciousness Conditions Name-and-Form" Is the Eighth

Scripture says "consciousness conditions name-and-form, and name-and-form conditions consciousness"; these two dharmas mutually depend by turns, like two bundles of reeds leaning on each other and turning together at the same time; without the eighth consciousness, the substance of this "consciousness that mutually depends with name-and-form" ought not to exist. That scripture explains itself: "name" is the four non-material aggregates, and "form" is the kalala (the embryonic substance at the start of taking birth) and the rest; this name-and-form and consciousness abide in mutual dependence, like the reed-bundles serving as each other's condition, perpetually turning at the same time and never abandoning each other. But the eye-consciousness and the other evolving consciousnesses are already comprehended within "name," so if the "consciousness" that mutually depends with name-and-form is not the eighth, then which is it? Nor can one rescue this by saying "the consciousness in 'name' refers to the five consciousnesses, while the mutually-dependent consciousness refers to the sixth" — because at the kalala stage there are as yet no five consciousnesses (so this rescue fails). Moreover, the evolving consciousnesses have intervals and turnings, and have not the strength to "perpetually" appropriate name-and-form, so how could they be said perpetually to serve as the condition for name-and-form? Therefore this "consciousness" displayed here is precisely the eighth consciousness.

Reason 8, the Proof from Consciousness-Food — Among the Four Foods, the Substance of "Consciousness-Food" Is Solely the Eighth

Scripture says "all sentient beings abide in dependence on food"; without the eighth consciousness, the substance of this "consciousness-food" ought not to exist. There are four kinds of food. Morsel-food has "transformation-and-decay" as its character (the three sense-spheres of fragrance, taste, and touch in the desire realm, which nourish the body as they are digested and decay; manifest shape and color do not count as morsel-food, being useless once color decays). Contact-food has "contacting an object" as its character (when contaminated contact takes hold of an object it appropriates joy and the like; among these, "the contact belonging to the six consciousnesses" is preeminent in its food-sense, because the object-contact is coarse and conspicuous and its power to appropriate joy and pleasure is strong). Volition-food has "aspiration" as its character (contaminated volition arising together with desire, longing for a desirable object; among these, "the volition belonging to the mental consciousness" is preeminent, because the mental consciousness's power of aspiration is strong). Consciousness-food has "appropriating-and-holding" as its character (contaminated consciousness, increased and nourished by the force of the prior three foods; among these, "the eighth consciousness" is preeminent, because it is homogeneously continuous and its power of appropriating-and-holding is strong). The Abhidharma-samuccaya says these four foods are comprehended by three aggregates, five sense-spheres, and eleven elements, and can hold sentient beings' bodily life so that it is not destroyed or severed — therefore they are called food. Among them, morsel-food is of use only in the desire realm; contact-food and volition-food, though they pervade the three realms, all turn in dependence on consciousness and follow upon the presence or absence of consciousness. But the eye-consciousness and the other evolving consciousnesses have intervals and turnings, and cannot all-pervadingly and perpetually hold the bodily life (in mindless absorption, sleep, fainting, and the heaven of no-conception they all break off, and even in mind-bearing states they shift according to support, condition, nature, realm, and stage). So ask one who holds "there is no eighth consciousness": on what food does a sentient being in a mindless state abide? Scripture plainly says "all sentient beings abide in dependence on food." One cannot take the "past or future consciousness" in a mindless state as the food — it is neither present nor permanent, like a sky-flower, without substance and without function; and even granting, for argument's sake, that the past and future have substance and function, they are still "not present," like empty space, and are not of the nature of food. Nor can one take "the mind before entering absorption" as the food — while abiding in the mindless state it has already ceased, and the past is not food. Nor can one take the non-concomitant formations of the mindless absorption and the like as the food — they are not comprehended by the four foods, and are moreover not really existent. As for the view that "in the absorption of cessation there is a sixth consciousness that can serve as food," this is rebutted at length below (Reason 10). And one should also ask him: when one is born in the upper two realms and gives rise to an uncontaminated mind, what serves as the food? An uncontaminated consciousness is destructive of the three modes of existence and cannot serve as food for a contaminated bodily life; nor can one say "within the uncontaminated consciousness there are contaminated seeds that can serve as food" — the uncontaminated consciousness, like nirvāṇa, does not hold contaminated seeds; nor can one say "the bodily lives of beings in the upper realms mutually hold one another and serve as each other's food" — the four foods do not comprehend bodily life, the formless realm moreover has no body, and "shared lot of sentient beings" and the like have no real substance. From this we know for certain: there is a separate maturation consciousness, "homogeneous, perpetual, and all-pervading, that appropriates and holds the bodily life so that it is not destroyed or severed," and that is the true substance of consciousness-food — the eighth consciousness. ("Sentient being" is established in dependence on the contaminated appropriating aggregates; the Buddha, being already uncontaminated, does not count as a sentient being. If scripture says the Buddha "is a sentient being, abiding in dependence on food," that is a manifestation taught in accord with the world.)

Reason 9, the Proof from Consciousness in the Absorption of Cessation — In One Who Abides in the Absorption of Cessation, Consciousness Does Not Leave the Body

Scripture says that in one who abides in the "absorption of cessation," the bodily formation, the verbal formation, and the mental formation are all ceased, yet "lifespan is not extinguished, warmth does not leave, the faculties are unimpaired, and consciousness does not leave the body"; without the eighth consciousness, this "consciousness that does not leave the body" ought not to exist. The eye-consciousness and the rest are coarse and agitated in their modes of activity, and necessarily involve toil and effort when they take an object; the practitioner, weary of this toil and seeking momentary respite, gradually subdues them to the "wholly exhausted" stage, and on this stage establishes the name "one who abides in the absorption of cessation" — so in this absorption the six evolving consciousnesses are all ceased. Since they are all ceased, if one will not grant that some "subtle, homogeneous, perpetual, all-pervading consciousness that appropriates and holds lifespan and the rest" still remains, then on what basis is "consciousness does not leave the body" said? If one rescues this by saying "after the absorption of cessation the evolving consciousness will arise again, so it counts as not leaving the body, like a quotidian-fever ague" — then one ought not to say "the mental formation is ceased" (consciousness arises and ceases in step with conception and the rest; since conception and the rest are ceased, consciousness ought to be ceased too), and moreover lifespan, warmth, and the faculties ought, like that "every-other-day consciousness," to break off — a great fault. Furthermore: if in this state there were no consciousness at all, this body would be like a tile or stone and would not count as a sentient being — how then could one be called "one who abides in the absorption of cessation"? Furthermore, if the maturation consciousness were absent in this state, who would appropriate and hold the faculties, lifespan, and warmth (without something to appropriate and hold them, they would all be destroyed, like a corpse)? And once destroyed, a later consciousness could never arise again (apart from consciousness, the remaining body cannot be revived) — so to whom would the scripture's "consciousness does not leave the body" then refer? This shows that once the maturation consciousness has abandoned this body, the remaining body cannot be revived (so it is because the maturation consciousness has not left during the absorption of cessation that the body can later come to life again). Again, if in this state there were no seed-holding consciousness, how could a later consciousness arise without seeds? (The past and future, and the non-concomitant formations, are not real; matter and the rest, apart from consciousness, neither receive perfuming nor hold seeds — all already refuted.) Therefore in the absorption of cessation and the other mindless states, just as in mind-bearing states, there is definitely and really a consciousness — complete with faculties, lifespan, and warmth, and comprehended among sentient beings.

Here the view that "in the absorption of cessation there is a sixth consciousness" is refuted. If one says that in this state there is a sixth consciousness, named the one that "does not leave the body" — this too is wrong: this absorption is also called the "mindless absorption" (if there were a sixth, it would not be mindless). If one rescues this by saying "having no five consciousnesses is what is called mindless," then all absorptions ought to be called mindless (all absorptions are without the five consciousnesses). The mental consciousness too is comprehended among the six evolving consciousnesses; like the body of five consciousnesses, it is absent in the absorption of cessation. Again, the consciousness in this state has modes of activity and objects that are unknowable — like lifespan and warmth — and so is not the sixth consciousness (whose modes of activity are knowable); and if there were in this state a consciousness whose "modes of activity and objects are knowable," it ought, like other states, not to be comprehended by this absorption of cessation (the practitioner entered the absorption precisely to still the "knowable consciousness"). Press him further: if in this state there is a sixth consciousness, does it have mental factors or not? If it has mental factors — then scripture ought not to say "the mental formation is wholly ceased," nor ought it to be called the "absorption of the cessation of sensation and conception." (Rescue: in the preparatory stage one is weary only of sensation and conception, so in the absorption only sensation and conception cease; sensation and conception strongly assist the mind, and are singly named "the mental formation," so saying "the mental formation is ceased" refers to the cessation of sensation and conception.) Counter: then the absorption of no-conception, in which one is weary only of "conception," ought to have only conception cease — yet you do not allow this; and since you yourself grant that "only sensation and conception strongly assist the power of mind," then when these two cease, the mind too ought to cease along with them. (Rescue: just as "the bodily formation, the in-and-out breath, ceases while the body still remains," why must the mind be forced to cease along with the mental formation?) Counter: then when the "verbal formation, namely applied and sustained thought, ceases," speech too ought not to cease — yet you do not allow this (when applied and sustained thought cease, speech is definitely absent). This shows that "formations" stand in two relations to the dharmas they support — "pervasive" and "non-pervasive": when a pervasive one ceases the dharma definitely ceases with it, but when a non-pervasive one ceases the dharma may still remain. The in-and-out breath is "non-pervasive" (the breath ceases while the body remains); applied and sustained thought are "pervasive" with respect to speech (when they cease speech is absent); sensation and conception are likewise "pervasive" with respect to mind (because sensation and conception, like volition, are "factors of broad extent," pervading every mind) — so when sensation and conception cease the mind definitely ceases along with them. How then can one say "sensation and conception cease while the mind remains"? Furthermore, since you grant that volition and the rest are factors of broad extent, then when sensation and conception cease, volition and the rest ought to cease too, and confidence and the rest ought to be absent in this state as well (only when a non-pervasive one ceases can the remaining dharmas persist) — how can you still say there are remaining mental factors? Conversely, if you hold that volition and the rest are not absent in this state, then sensation and conception too ought not to be absent (being equally factors of broad extent). Again, if in this absorption there were volition and the rest, there ought also to be "contact" (the remaining mental factors arise by the force of contact); if there is contact there ought to be "sensation" (contact conditions sensation); if there is sensation, "conception" ought to arise too (sensation and conception are inseparable). (Rescue: just as "sensation conditions craving" does not mean every sensation gives rise to craving, so "contact conditions sensation" does not mean every contact produces sensation.) Counter: the Buddha himself draws a distinction — he says only "the sensation born of ignorance-contact" conditions the arising of craving, but he never draws any distinction over "contact producing sensation," so wherever there is contact there must be sensation, and sensation and conception arise together. Or force the conclusion: then, as in other states, sensation and conception too ought not to cease (and since you posit volition and the rest, this contradicts "the mental formation is ceased" and fails to constitute "the absorption of the cessation of sensation and conception"). Conversely, if one says that in this state there are no mental factors — then "consciousness" too ought to be absent: because one never sees a mind subsisting alone apart from mental factors; because when the pervasive ones among the remaining factors cease the dharma ceases with them, so sensation and the rest ought not to be factors of broad extent, and this consciousness ought not to be a concomitant dharma; and if one grants that this consciousness has no support and no object, then it is like matter, and is likewise not a mind.

Then the view that "in the absorption of cessation the mental consciousness produces contact through the meeting of three" is refuted. Scripture says "with mind-faculty and dharma as condition the mental consciousness arises; the meeting of the three is contact; arising together with contact are sensation, conception, and volition"; so if in this absorption there were a mental consciousness, then through the meeting of the three there must be contact, and contact must invariably arise together with sensation, conception, and volition — how then could there be "consciousness without mental factors"? (Rescue: at other times the meeting of three is potent and can produce contact, and with contact arising, sensation and the rest arise; but because before entering absorption one was weary of the mental factors, the three things in the absorption-state are impotent, do not produce contact, and so there are no sensation and the rest.) Counter: then it ought to be called the "absorption of the cessation of mental factors" — why is only "the cessation of sensation and conception" spoken of? (Rescue: on entering absorption one is weary only of these two, sensation and conception; when these two cease the mental factors all cease, but the name of the absorption is established "according to what was previously the object of weariness.") Counter: this being so (the mental factors all ceasing), the "mind" too ought to cease (arising together with the wearied-of sensation and conception, like the remaining mental factors); and if the mind does not cease, how is it called the "mindless absorption"? Again, of what nature is the mental consciousness in this absorption-state? It ought not to be defiled or neutral (in a wholesome absorption there is no occasion to give rise to a defiled or neutral mind; moreover a defiled or neutral mind must have mental factors; one ought not, in weariness of the wholesome, to give rise instead to the defiled; in seeking quiescence one ought not to give rise instead to the scattered). If one says it is "wholesome," then it is "concomitantly wholesome" and ought to have non-greed and the other wholesome roots concomitant with it (which again makes it have mental factors), and moreover it is neither wholesome by its own nature nor wholesome in the ultimate sense (contradicting your own school: it is neither a wholesome root nor nirvāṇa). If one says it is "wholesome by way of arising-in-train" (drawn forth by preparatory wholesome roots), this too is wrong and contradicts your own school (other wholesome minds are not wholesome by arising-in-train but wholesome by concomitance; and after a wholesome mind a mind of any of the three natures can arise, so how can one definitely say it is wholesome by what preceded it?). This shows that its being wholesome rests, in the end, on the force of "concomitance" and must be concomitant with the wholesome roots — so how can one say it alone has no mental factors? Therefore "if there are no mental factors then the mind too ought to be absent" (mind and mental factors mutually depend). By such demonstration, the eye-consciousness and the other evolving consciousnesses, in the absorption-of-cessation state, are all "not the one that does not leave the body" (they are all ceased); so the consciousness of which scripture says "(in the absorption of cessation) consciousness does not leave the body" is precisely this eighth consciousness — on entering the absorption of cessation one does not still this "utterly quiescent appropriating consciousness." The states of the absorption of no-conception and the like are to be understood in the same way (in all of them only the eighth remains).

Reason 10, the Proof from the Defiled and Pure Mind — The Mind That Can Hold the Seeds of Defilement and Purity Is Solely the Eighth

Scripture says "because the mind is defiled, sentient beings are defiled; because the mind is pure, sentient beings are pure"; without the eighth consciousness, this defiled-and-pure mind that can receive perfuming and hold the seeds ought not to exist. The defiled and pure dharmas take mind as their root — they arise because of mind and abide in dependence on mind, mind receives their perfuming and holds their seeds. There are three kinds of defiled dharma: affliction, action, and result. First, the seeds of affliction: if there were no such consciousness to hold the seeds of affliction, then when one rises and sinks back and forth across realms and stages, or after passing through an "undefiled mind" (a wholesome mind or an uncontaminated mind), the renewed arising of the afflictions would all be without cause (the remaining dharmas cannot hold them, and the past and future are not real); and afflictions arising without cause would mean there is no learner's or beyond-the-learner's fruit in the three vehicles (the afflictions already severed ought to arise again — then there would be no real severance). Second, the seeds of action and result: if there were no such consciousness to hold the seeds of action and result, then in moving back and forth across realms and stages, after passing through "dharmas of a different kind," the renewed arising of action and result would also be without cause (the remaining seeds and remaining causes already refuted above); and if action and result arose without cause, then after one had entered the nirvāṇa without remainder the action and result of the three realms ought to arise again, and afflictions too ought to arise again without cause; moreover the link "formations condition consciousness" in the twelvefold dependent origination could not be established (the evolving consciousnesses receiving perfuming has been refuted above), and the defiled consciousness at the linking of rebirth is not what the formations bring about — the formations ought to link to "name-and-form," and besides, the temporal gap is too wide for a direct conditioning relation — and once "formations condition consciousness" cannot stand, the later links cannot stand either. Pure dharmas too are of three kinds: the worldly path, the supramundane path, and the fruit of severance. First, the seeds of the worldly and supramundane paths: if there were no such consciousness to hold the seeds of the two paths, then after a mind of a different kind the renewed arising of pure dharmas would all be without cause; and if the two pure paths arose without cause, then after entering the nirvāṇa without remainder the two pure paths ought to arise again, and their support ought to arise again without cause; moreover the very first moment of the supramundane path ought not to arise at all (there being no dharma that could hold those "innately existent uncontaminated seeds that are there by their very nature," while the contaminated cannot be the cause of the uncontaminated, and "arising without cause" is not something the Buddha's disciples allow either); and if the first moment does not arise, the later moments do not arise either, so there would be no path-fruit in the three vehicles. Third, the fruit of severance: if there were no such consciousness to hold the seeds of affliction, then "the transformation of the basis, the fruit of severance," could not be established either — because when the path arises, neither the active afflictions nor their seeds are present (the defiled mind and the pure mind do not arise together; the path is a pure mind and does not hold the defiled seeds of the afflictions, being of a contrary nature, like nirvāṇa; and "past, future, acquisition" and the like are not real, while the remaining dharmas, again, cannot hold the seeds). Since there is no "what is to be severed" (the seeds of affliction), "what severs" has nothing to bear upon either — by means of what, and through what, would the fruit of severance be established? If one rescues this by saying "by the power of the path the later afflictions are prevented from arising, and so the fruit of severance is established," then the moment the first instant of the path arises one ought to become beyond-the-learner (all later afflictions being without cause, never to arise again). Only by granting that there is this eighth consciousness can all of this (the three defiled and the three pure) be established — because it alone can hold the seeds of defilement and of purity.

To prove the existence of this eighth consciousness, the reasons are inexhaustible and without end; for fear that the text would grow too prolix, only the essentials have been set out in outline (the five scriptures and the ten reasons). That there is a separate such consciousness is plainly evident both in scripture and in reason; let those endowed with wisdom believe and accept it deeply.

Onward Transmission

What this section establishes — that the eighth ālaya-vijñāna has a distinct substance of its own — is the foundation of the entire consciousness-only system, and the later treatises take it up each in its own place. The Hundred Dharmas treatise lists the ālaya as the eighth of the eight consciousness-dharmas (the root of the eight consciousnesses), and the defiled and pure seeds it appropriates and holds are precisely the "seed-support" from which all the dharmas of the hundred-dharma categories (mind, mental factors, matter, and the non-concomitant formations) come to arise. The Thirty Verses — verses two through four (the ālaya's maturation, its all-seed nature, its being unobscured and morally neutral, its concomitance with contact and the rest, its perpetual flow like a torrent, and its being cast off at the stage of the arhat) — is the very root-text this section sets out to make good: what this section proves by the five scriptures and ten reasons is just that the eighth consciousness established in these verses truly has a distinct substance. The Madhyānta-vibhāga, in its chapter on characteristics, establishes "unreal imagination" as the support of the defiled dharmas, which runs together in doctrine with this section's "the eighth consciousness holds the seeds of defilement and purity" (consciousness as the support of defilement). The Mahāyāna-saṃgraha, in its section on the support of the knowable, establishes the ālaya-vijñāna still more fully by "ten characteristics and eight proofs," and those eight proofs share one source with this section's five scriptures and ten reasons — both rest on the eight-character proof of the ālaya in the Yogācārabhūmi's section settling the points to be known. As for the Twenty Verses, its concern is to establish consciousness-only without objects and to refute the outsiders' clinging to real external objects, and it has no direct counterpart to "the proof that the eighth consciousness exists"; here it is left aside.