成唯識論 根本煩惱六
根本煩惱六：貪、瞋、癡、慢、疑、惡見。前五個名字都認得，最後一個「惡見」才是論主真正著力的地方。
先看前五。貪於有、有具染著；瞋於苦、苦具憎恚；癡於諸理事迷闇；慢恃己於他高舉，細分有七；疑於諸諦理猶豫。
論主辨它們的相應關係，讀來很有意思：貪與瞋、疑定不俱起——愛與憎的對象不同，貪著時不會同時猶豫。這種細辨不是繁瑣，是在描摹心的實際運作。
惡見分五：薩迦耶見（身見·執我我所）、邊執見（執斷執常）、邪見（撥無因果）、見取見（執己所見為最勝）、戒禁取見（執非因為因·非道為道）。
五見之中，薩迦耶見是根——其餘四見都從它出。而戒禁取見最值得今人留意：把不是解脫因的當作解脫因，把不是道的當作道。這不限於外道苦行；凡是把某種形式當成目的本身，都在這一見裡。
最後論主辨斷：見所斷、修所斷。分別起的煩惱（後天由邪教邪思而起）見道即斷；俱生起的（無始任運而起）要修道位漸斷。疑與三見（邪見·見取·戒禁取）唯分別起，見道全斷；貪瞋癡慢與身見邊見則通俱生。
這個斷位表的實用意義是：見道之後仍會起貪瞋，那不是退轉，是俱生的那一層還在。 知道這一點，修行才不會因為『怎麼還是這樣』而灰心。
Six root afflictions: greed, hatred, delusion, conceit, doubt, and wrong view. The first five are familiar by name; it is the last on which the treatise really bears down.
The first five briefly. Greed clings to existence and its means; hatred resents suffering and its means; delusion is darkness about principle and fact; conceit exalts oneself over others, in seven finer kinds; doubt hesitates over the truths.
The treatise sorts their concomitance, and the sorting repays reading: greed does not arise together with hatred or doubt — love and loathing take different objects, and one clinging does not at the same moment hesitate. Such fineness is not fussiness; it is a description of how a mind actually runs.
Wrong view divides into five: the view of a real personality (grasping I and mine), the view seizing extremes (annihilation or eternity), the false view (denying cause and effect), the view exalting views (holding one's own view supreme), and the view exalting rules and observances (taking what is not a cause for a cause, what is not the path for the path).
Of the five, the view of a real personality is the root; the other four issue from it. And the view exalting rules and observances deserves a modern reader's attention: to take what is not a cause of liberation for its cause, what is not the path for the path. This is not confined to the austerities of other schools; wherever a form is taken for the end itself, this view is at work.
Last, the treatise sorts severance: severed by seeing, severed by cultivation. Discriminated afflictions (arising from wrong teaching and wrong reflection) are severed at the path of seeing; innate ones (arising spontaneously from beginningless time) are severed gradually on the path of cultivation. Doubt and three of the views are discriminated only, and go entire at seeing; greed, hatred, delusion, conceit, and the views of personality and of extremes run also as innate.
The practical force of that table is this: greed and hatred still arise after the path of seeing, and that is not backsliding — it is the innate layer, still there. Knowing it, one does not lose heart at finding oneself unchanged.
如是已說善位心所，煩惱心所其相云何？
頌曰：
〔頌曰 8 T31 0031b17〕
１２煩惱謂貪、瞋、癡、慢、疑、惡見。
論曰：此貪等六性是根本煩惱攝故，得煩惱名。
云何為貪？於有、有具，染著為性；能障無貪，生苦為業。
謂由愛力，取蘊生故。
云何為瞋？於苦、苦具，憎恚為性；能障無瞋，不安隱性，惡行所依為業。
謂瞋必令身、心熱惱，起諸惡業，不善性故。
云何為癡？於諸理、事，迷闇為性；能障無癡，一切雜染所依為業。
謂由無明，起疑、邪見、貪等煩惱、隨煩惱業，能招後生雜染法故。
云何為慢？恃己於他，高舉為性；能障不慢，生苦為業。
謂若有慢，於德、有德，心不謙下，由此生死輪轉無窮，受諸苦故。
此慢差別有七、九種，謂於三品、我、德處生。
〔T31 0031c01〕一切皆通見修所斷，聖位我慢既得現行，慢類由斯起亦無失。
云何為疑？於諸諦理，猶豫為性；能障不疑善品為業。
謂猶豫者，善不生故。
有義：此疑以慧為體，猶豫簡擇說為疑故。「毘」助「末底」，是疑義故，「末底」般若義無異故。
有義：此疑別有自體，令慧不決，非即慧故。《瑜伽論》說：「六煩惱中，見世俗有，即慧分故。餘是實有，別有性故。」「毘」助「末底」，執慧為疑，「毘」助「若南」，智應為識。界由助力，義便轉變，是故此疑非慧為體。
云何惡見？於諸諦理，顛倒推度，染慧為性；能障善見，招苦為業。
謂惡見者，多受苦故。
此見行相，差別有五：
一、薩迦耶見：謂於五取蘊，執我、我所，一切見趣所依為業。
此見差別，有二十句、六十五等，分別起攝。
二、邊執見：謂即於彼，隨執斷、常，障處中行、出離為業。
此見差別，諸見趣中，有執前際四遍常論、一分常論；及計後際有想十六；無想、俱非各有八論；七斷滅論等，分別起攝。
三、邪見：謂謗因果、作用、實事及非四見諸餘邪執，如增上緣，名義遍故。
此見差別，諸見趣中，有執前際二無因論、四有邊等、不死矯亂；及計後際五現涅槃；或計自在、世主、釋、梵及餘物類，常恒不易；或計自在等是一切物因；或有橫計諸邪解脫；或有妄執非道為道，諸如是等皆邪見攝。
四、見取：謂於諸見及所依蘊，執為最勝，能得清淨，一切鬪諍所依為業。
五、戒禁取：謂於隨順諸見戒禁及所依蘊，執為最勝，能得清淨，無利勤苦所依為業。
〔T31 0032a01〕然有處說：執為最勝，名為見取，執能得清淨，名戒取者，是影略說，或隨轉門。不爾，如何非滅計滅、非道計道，說為邪見，非二取攝。
如是總別十煩惱中，六通俱生及分別起，任運、思察，俱得生故。疑後三見，唯分別起，要由惡友或邪教力，自審思察，方得生故。
邊執見中通俱生者，有義：唯斷。常見相麁，惡友等力方引生故。《瑜伽》等說：「何邊執見是俱生耶？謂斷見攝。」學現觀者，起如是怖：「今者我，我何所在耶？」故禽獸等若遇違緣，皆恐我斷，而起驚怖。
有義：彼論依麁相說，理實俱生，亦通常見。謂禽獸等，執我常存，熾然聚集長時資具。故《顯揚》等諸論皆說：於五取蘊，執斷、計常，或是俱生或分別起。
此十煩惱，誰幾相應？
貪與瞋、疑，定不俱起，愛、憎二境，必不同故；於境不決，無染著故。
貪與慢、見，或得相應，所愛、所陵境非一故，說不俱起。所染、所恃境可同故，說得相應。於五見境，皆可愛故，貪與五見相應無失。
瞋與慢、疑或得俱起；所瞋、所恃境非一故，說不相應。所蔑、所憎境可同故，說得俱起；初猶豫時，未憎彼故，說不俱起。久思不決，便憤發故，說得相應；疑順、違事，隨應亦爾。
瞋與二取，必不相應，執為勝、道，不憎彼故。
此與三見，或得相應，於有樂蘊，起身、常見，不生憎故，說不相應。於有苦蘊，起身、常見，生憎恚故，說得俱起。斷見翻此，說瞋有、無。邪見誹撥惡事、好事，如次說瞋或無或有。
〔T31 0032b01〕慢於境定，疑則不然。故慢與疑，無相應義。
慢與五見，皆容俱起，行相展轉，不相違故。然與斷見，必不俱生，執我斷時，無陵、恃故。
與身、邪見一分亦爾。
疑不審決，與見相違，故疑與見，定不俱起。
五見展轉，必不相應，非一心中，有多慧故。
癡與九種，皆定相應，諸煩惱生，必由癡故。
此十煩惱，何識相應？藏識全無；末那有四；意識具十；五識唯三：謂貪、瞋、癡。無分別故。由稱量等，起慢等故。
此十煩惱，何受相應？
貪、瞋、癡三，俱生分別，一切容與五受相應。貪會違緣，憂、苦俱故；瞋遇順境，喜、樂俱故。
有義：俱生分別起慢，容與非苦四受相應，恃苦劣蘊，憂相應故。
有義：俱生亦苦俱起，意有苦受，前已說故。
分別慢等，純苦趣無，彼無邪師、邪教等故。然彼不造引惡趣業，要分別起能發彼故。
疑後三見，容四受俱。欲疑無苦等，亦喜受俱故；二取若緣憂俱見等，爾時得與憂相應故。
有義：俱生身邊二見，但與喜、樂、捨、受相應，非五識俱，唯無記故。分別二見，容四受俱，執苦俱蘊為我、我所。常、斷見翻此，與憂相應故。
有義：二見若俱生者，亦苦受俱，純受苦處，緣極苦蘊，苦相應故。論說：俱生一切煩惱，皆於三受現行可得，廣說如前，餘如前說。
此依實義，隨麁相者，貪、慢、四見，樂、喜、捨俱。瞋唯苦、憂、捨受俱起。癡與五受皆得相應。邪見及疑四俱，除苦。
貪、癡俱樂，通下四地，餘七俱樂，除欲通三，疑、獨行癡欲唯憂、捨，餘受俱起，如理應知。
〔T31 0032c02〕此與別境幾互相應？
貪、瞋、癡、慢容五俱起，專注一境，得有定故。疑及五見，各容四俱，疑除勝解，不決定故；見非慧俱，不異慧故。
此十煩惱何性所攝？
瞋唯不善，損自、他故，餘九通二。
上二界者，唯無記攝，定所伏故。若欲界繫分別起者，唯不善攝，發惡行故。若是俱生，發惡行者，亦不善攝，損自、他故。餘無記攝，細不障善，非極損惱自、他處故。當知俱生身、邊二見，唯無記攝，不發惡業，雖數現起，不障善故。
此十煩惱何界繫耶？瞋唯在欲，餘通三界。
生在下地，未離下染，上地煩惱，不現在前。要得彼地根本定者，彼地煩惱容現前故。
謂有漏道，雖不能伏分別起惑及細俱生，而能伏除俱生麁惑，漸次證得上根本定。
彼但迷事，依外門轉，散亂、麁動，正障定故。
得彼定已，彼地分別、俱生諸惑，皆容現前。
生在上地，下地諸惑，分別、俱生皆容現起。
生第四定中有中者，由謗解脫，生地獄故；身在上地，將生下時，起下潤生俱生愛故。
而言生上，不起下者，依多分說，或隨轉門。
下地煩惱，亦緣上地。《瑜伽》等說：欲界繫貪，求上地生，味上定故。既說瞋恚憎嫉滅、道，亦應憎嫉離欲地故。總緣諸行，執我、我所斷常，慢者得緣上故。餘五緣上，其理極成。
而有處言：貪、瞋、慢等不緣上者，依麁相說，或依別緣，不見世間執他地法為我等故；邊見必依身見起故。
上地煩惱亦緣下地，說生上者，於下有情，恃己勝德，而陵彼故。
〔T31 0033a01〕總緣諸行，執我、我所、斷、常、愛者，得緣下故。疑後三見，如理應思。
而說上或不緣下者，彼依多分或別緣說。
此十煩惱，學等何攝？非學無學，彼唯善故。
此十煩惱何所斷耶？
非非所斷，彼非染故。
分別起者，唯見所斷，麁易斷故；若俱生者，唯修所斷，細難斷故。
見所斷十，實俱頓斷，以真見道總緣諦故。
然迷諦相，有總、有別。總謂十種，皆迷四諦。苦、集是彼因依處故；滅、道是彼怖畏處故。
別謂別迷四諦相起，二唯迷苦，八通迷四，身、邊二見，唯果處起，別空、非我，屬苦諦故。
謂疑、三見，親迷苦理。二取執彼三見、戒禁及所依蘊為勝能淨，於自、他見及彼眷屬，如次隨應，起貪、恚、慢。相應無明，與九同迷；不共無明，親迷苦理。疑及邪見，親迷集等。二取、貪等，准苦應知。然瞋亦能親迷滅、道，由怖畏彼，生憎嫉故。
迷諦親疎，麁相如是。
委細說者，貪、瞋、慢、三見、疑俱生，隨應如彼。
俱生二見及彼相應愛、慢、無明，雖迷苦諦，細難斷故，修道方斷。
瞋餘愛等，迷別事生，不違諦觀，故修所斷。
雖諸煩惱，皆有相分，而所仗質，或有或無，名緣有事、無事煩惱。
彼親所緣，雖皆有漏，而所仗質，亦通無漏，名緣有漏、無漏煩惱。
緣自地者，相分似質，名緣分別所起事境。緣滅、道諦及他地者，相分與質不相似故，名緣分別所起名境。
餘門分別如理應思。
The canonical text stands in Chinese only. This edition renders the essence, the plain reading, the exposition and the apparatus into English — never the sūtra itself. Switch to 漢讀本 or 並行雙語 above to read it.
〔所釋之頌〕第十二頌
根本煩惱六
論主說：貪等這六個（貪、瞋、癡、慢、疑、惡見），它們的本性都歸在「根本煩惱」這一類裡頭——「根本」是說其餘那些枝末煩惱都從這六個生出來——所以才得了「煩惱」這個名字。
什麼叫「貪」？它的本性是「染著」——對「有」（也就是三界的果報，眼前這條命）和「有具」（招來這條命的種種因，能讓你繼續輪迴的那些東西）黏住、放不下。它的作用有兩面：一是『障住無貪』，也就是擋著那個不貪的善心生不起來；二是「生苦」，也就是惹來種種苦。為什麼會生苦呢？因為由著這股貪愛的力氣，「五取蘊」（也就是被執取、會招苦的這個身心）就一再地生起來，苦也就跟著沒完沒了。
什麼叫「瞋」？它的本性是「憎恚」——對「苦」（不順心的果報）和「苦具」（招來苦的那些東西）起恨意、發脾氣。它的作用是：一面『障住無瞋』，擋著那個不瞋的善心；一面叫人『不安穩』、又成了種種壞行為的根子。為什麼這麼說呢？因為人一發瞋，必定把身、心都燒得熱惱不安，惹出種種惡業；瞋本身就是「不善性」（純粹是壞的，不像貪還可能夾著一點點順境的味道）。
什麼叫「癡」？「癡」就是「無明」——它的本性是「迷闇」，對種種道理（像四諦、緣起這些理）和種種事相，一片昏昧、看不明白。它的作用是：一面『障住無癡』，擋著那明白的善心；一面成了『一切雜染的根子』。怎麼說是一切雜染的根子呢？因為由著這無明，才接著起「疑」、起「邪見」、起貪等等根本煩惱，又連帶起種種隨煩惱的業；這些業又能招來下一輩子種種染污的法——一環扣一環，全從這無明起頭。
什麼叫「慢」？它的本性是「恃己於他、高舉」——仗著自己、跟別人比，把心抬得高高的，自高自大。它的作用是：一面『障住不慢』（擋著那謙下的善心），一面「生苦」。怎麼會生苦呢？因為一有了慢，對「德」（種種功德、好處）和『有德的人』就放不下身段、不肯謙下；這麼一來，生死就輪轉個沒完，受種種苦。
慢還分得很細，有「七慢」「九慢」這些說法。它們是從哪幾處比出來的呢？是從「三品」加上「我」、「德」這幾處生出來的——所謂「三品」，就是把對方分成比我「勝」（強）、跟我「等」（一樣）、比我「劣」（差）這三檔，再配上對「我」、對「功德」的自高，就排出了七種、九種的差別。
這些慢，不論哪一種，原則上「見道」「修道」兩個階段都能斷得掉（不是只在一處斷）。這裡要補一句：到了聖位，那種「我慢」竟然還會現起（聖人也還有最細的一念自我感）；既然連聖位都還有我慢現行，那麼『慢這一類』依著它而生起，也就講得通、沒有矛盾了。
什麼叫「疑」？它的本性是「猶豫」——對種種諦理（四諦這些該信受的道理）拿不定主意、半信半疑。它的作用是：一面『障住不疑』（擋著那確信的善心），一面『礙住善品』（攔著善法生不出來）。為什麼會礙善呢？因為一個人老是猶猶豫豫、定不下心，善法就生不起來了。
〔一說·疑就是慧〕 有一派人主張：疑並沒有自己的體，它其實就是「慧」（也就是簡擇、分辨的那個心所）。他們的理由有兩條。第一，所謂疑，就是『一邊猶豫、一邊在那裡分辨』——既然在分辨，那分辨正是慧的作用，可見疑就是慧。第二，從梵語的構詞看：疑這個字，是在「末底」（意思就是慧、思量）前頭加一個前綴「毘」拼成的；既然「末底」本身就是慧，那加了前綴變出來的「疑」，骨子裡也還是慧。
〔又說（這是正解）·疑另有自己的體〕 另一派人說：疑有它自己的體，它的作用是『讓慧定不下來』，並不就是慧。理由有兩層。第一是經教的根據：《瑜伽》說過——『六個根本煩惱裡頭，只有『惡見』是『世俗有』（也就是它只是慧的一分、不是另立一個東西），其餘五個（貪、瞋、癡、慢、疑）都是『實有』、各有各的自體。』既然疑被算在『實有、別有自體』這五個裡，可見它不是慧。第二是針對前一派那條構詞理由的反駁：你說『在『末底』（慧）前面加個前綴『毘』，拼出來的還是慧、所以疑就是慧』；可是照這個推法，在「若南」（意思是智）前面加同一個前綴「毘」，拼出來的「識」豈不也該還是智？事實上「智」和「識」明明是兩回事。可見一個詞根（這裡指「末底」「若南」這種字根）一旦加了前綴，意思就會整個變掉、不能再當原來那個字看。所以「疑」雖從「慧」這個字加綴而來，骨子裡已經不是慧了——疑不是以慧為體的。
什麼叫「惡見」？它的本性是「染慧」——就是一種被染污了的慧（這裡可以看出，前頭講疑時那一派把疑也當成慧，而真正算慧之一分的其實是這個見）：對種種諦理顛顛倒倒地去推想、亂猜亂量。它的作用是：一面『障住善見』（擋著那正確的見解），一面「招苦」。為什麼說招苦呢？因為抱著錯誤見解的人，往往要受很多苦。
這個「惡見」運作起來的樣子（行相），又可以分成五種：
(一)薩迦耶見（也叫「身見」，就是把這個身心當成「我」的見）：它在「五取蘊」（這個會招苦的身心五堆）上頭，硬執出一個「我」、又執出種種「我所」（屬於我的東西）。它是『一切見趣的根子』——所有岔出去的邪見路數，都從這個我執生出來。它細分起來，有「二十句」『六十五句』等等說法（這是把「我、我所」配上五蘊，一條一條排出來的執法數目）；這一種，全是「分別起」（後天被邪師邪教熏出來、要靠思量推度才生的那種）。
(二)邊執見（執著一邊、落在極端的見）：它接著前面那個被執出來的「我」，再往一邊倒——要嘛執它「斷」（死了就一了百了、什麼都沒了），要嘛執它「常」（這個我永遠不變、長存不滅）。它的害處是『障住中道』和『障住出離』（落在斷、常兩頭，就走不上不偏不倚的中道，也就出不了生死）。
它細分起來，散在外道種種邪見路數裡。大致分兩路：一路是『就過去那一頭推想的』（執前際），這裡頭有「四遍常論」（四種主張一切徹底常住的說法）、「一分常論」（主張一部分常、一部分不常的說法）。另一路是『就未來那一頭推想的』（計後際），這裡頭有「有想十六」（主張人死後還帶著想、共十六種說法）、『無想八種』和『非有想非無想八種』（這兩類各八種）、還有「七斷滅論」（七種主張死後徹底斷滅的說法）等等。這些全是「分別起」（靠後天推度、被邪說帶出來的）。
(三)邪見：它的主幹是「撥無」——也就是一口否定、毀謗。否定些什麼呢？四樣：否定「因」（不信有善惡的因）、否定「果」（不信有苦樂的報）、否定「作用」（不信種子能生現行、此生能往後世這些真實作用）、否定「實事」（不信有阿羅漢、有聖人這些確實有的事）。除了這主幹，凡是前面四種見（身見、邊見、見取、戒禁取）以外、剩下的那些亂七八糟的邪執，也都歸到邪見來；這就好比「增上緣」這個名目最寬、什麼都能兜進去一樣，邪見也是個最寬的袋子，把零零碎碎的邪執全收進來。
它細分起來，也散在外道種種邪見路數裡。就過去那一頭推想的（執前際），有「二無因論」（兩種主張萬物根本沒有原因、憑空冒出的說法）、「四有邊等」（四種瞎猜世界有邊、無邊之類的說法）、「不死矯亂」（怕說錯話而含含糊糊、東閃西躲、不肯正面答的說法）。就未來那一頭推想的（計後際），有「五現涅槃」（五種把眼前的快樂境界錯當成涅槃的說法）。此外還有種種：有的把「自在天」、世間的主宰、帝釋、大梵天這些天神、以及別的什麼東西，當成永恆不變的；有的把自在天那些當成造出萬物的總原因；有的胡亂安立種種假的解脫（其實根本不是解脫）；有的把『不是路的』硬當成「是路」（把邪道錯認成正道）——像這些，全都歸在邪見裡頭。
(四)見取：它是把『種種見解』、以及『撐起這些見解的那個身心五蘊』，一概執成『最高明、最殊勝』的，又執它『能讓人得清淨』（以為抱住這套見解就能解脫）。它的害處是成了『一切爭吵的根子』——人各執己見、都覺得自家的最對，於是吵個沒完。
(五)戒禁取：它是把『順著那些邪見立下的戒條、禁忌』（像外道學牛、學狗、投火、臥釘床那一套苦行戒），以及『撐起這些戒禁的身心五蘊』，執成『最高明、最殊勝』的，又執它「能得清淨」（以為守住這些就能解脫）。它的害處是成了『白吃苦的根子』（無利勤苦）——白白吃一堆苦，於解脫一點用都沒有。
有些地方講得簡略，說『執為最高明的就叫見取、執能得清淨的就叫戒取』，好像兩取各管一邊。要曉得這種講法是「影略說」（彼此互相映帶、各省一半話，其實兩取都兼含「最勝」和「能淨」這兩義），或者是「隨轉門」（順著別宗的講法暫且這麼說）；並不是真的見取只管「最勝」、戒取只管「清淨」。怎麼知道不能死分呢？反過來想就清楚了：『把不是滅諦的錯當成滅諦、把不是正道的錯當成正道』這種執法，論裡明明是判它作「邪見」，並沒有把它收進兩取去——可見「執能得清淨」一義並不專屬戒取，否則『把非道計為道、以為能得清淨』的那種，早該算戒取了。
前面把根本煩惱「總」說是六個（貪、瞋、癡、慢、疑、惡見），又把其中的「惡見」一個拆成五個（身、邊、邪、見取、戒取），這麼一「別」開來，連起來就是十個。這十個煩惱，按生起的方式可以分成兩撥。
第一撥共六個——貪、瞋、癡、慢，再加上身見、邊見——這六個『俱生、分別兩種都有』：既能「任運」生（自自然然、與生俱來就會冒出來），也能「思察」生（靠後天思量推度、被邪說帶起來）。
第二撥共四個——疑，再加上後三種見（邪見、見取、戒禁取）——這四個『只有分別起一種』：一定要碰上壞朋友或邪教的影響、再自己一番琢磨推度，才生得出來（與生俱來是不會有的）。
〔邊執見的俱生·一說·只有斷見〕 上面說邊見也通「俱生」（與生俱來那一種）。可是邊見裡頭，斷見、常見都算嗎？有一派說：與生俱來的邊見只有「斷見」一種。理由有三條。一是常見「相麁」（樣子粗、要費一番道理才執得起來），非得壞朋友這些外力來勾引才生，可見常見不是與生俱來的。二是《瑜伽》問答裡就說過：『哪一種邊見是俱生的？答：歸在斷見裡。』三是拿經驗看——剛學「現觀」（正觀真理）的人，常會冒出一陣怕：『現在這個我，到底我在哪裡呀？』（怕找不到我、怕我沒了）；連禽獸碰上凶險，也都本能地怕『我要斷了、要沒命了』而驚慌——這種對「斷」的恐懼是天生的，可見與生俱來的邊見偏在斷見一邊。
〔又說·常見也能是俱生〕 另一派說：上面那一派引《瑜伽》『俱生邊見只是斷見』，其實《瑜伽》那句是『就粗的一面說的』（只挑明顯的那種講）；論到底裡，與生俱來的邊見不只斷見，連常見也通。怎麼見得？你看禽獸也天生執著『我會長長久久活下去』，所以才拼了命地囤積、長年累月地張羅吃用——這份『我能常存』的勁頭，正是與生俱來的常見。《顯揚》等論也說：『在五取蘊上頭執斷、執常，可以是俱生的、也可以是分別起的』——可見常見一樣有俱生的一面。
〔根本煩惱諸門〕
〔相應門〕（問：這十個煩惱，彼此能不能在同一念心裡一起起？）先講「貪」跟誰能搭、跟誰不能搭。
貪跟瞋、跟疑，一定不會一起起。為什麼？貪是愛、瞋是恨，「愛」和「恨」這兩種心對的境正相反，不可能同時黏住同一個境，所以貪、瞋不並起。至於疑，是對境拿不定主意；既然還在猶豫、定不下來，就談不上死死黏住，所以貪、疑也不並起（要黏住才叫貪，半信半疑時黏不上）。
貪跟慢、跟見，倒是有時能搭、有時不能。先說有時不能：慢是「欺人」（瞧不起、要壓過別人），慢所欺的那個對象，跟貪所愛的對象往往不是同一個，這時候貪、慢就不一起。再說有時能：可是若『所染的』（貪愛的）和『所恃的』（慢所仗恃的）剛好是同一個（比方又愛又自恃自己這個我），貪、慢就能一起起。至於貪跟「見」（五種見），那五種見的境其實都可以拿來貪愛（人連自家的邪見都捨不得、貪著得很），所以貪跟五種見都能相應，並無妨礙。
接著講「瞋」跟誰能搭。
瞋跟慢、跟疑，有時能一起、有時不能。先說慢：若瞋所恨的對象、跟慢所仗恃的對象不是同一個，這時瞋、慢就不搭；可是若『所瞧不起的』和『所憎恨的』剛好是同一個（一面瞧不起他、一面又恨他），瞋、慢就一起起了。再說疑：人剛起疑、還在猶豫的當口，還沒生出恨意，這時瞋、疑不一起；可是琢磨了半天還是定不下來、心一煩就火了，這時瞋、疑就搭上了——對『順心的事』起疑、對『不順心的事』起疑，也都照這個道理隨情況而定。
瞋跟那兩取（見取、戒取）一定搭不上。因為兩取是把那套見解、那套戒法執成『最高明、是正道』，既然把它捧得高高的，就不會去恨它，所以瞋進不來。
瞋跟那三種見（身見、邊見、邪見）則有時能搭。分幾種情形看：(一)若在『順心的身心』（樂蘊）上起身見、常見（在快活的境上執我、執常），心裡舒坦、不起恨，這時瞋就不搭。(二)若在『苦惱的身心』（苦蘊）上起身見、常見（在受苦的境上執我、執常），心裡厭惡、起了恨，這時瞋就搭上了。(三)斷見正好跟常見反過來算（在苦境執斷時反倒舒坦、在樂境執斷時反倒起恨），所以斷見配瞋，也是有時有、有時無。(四)邪見呢，它一面毀謗壞事（撥無惡因惡果，這時心裡沒恨）、一面也毀謗好事（撥無善因善果，這時就帶恨了）——所以邪見配瞋，照這兩面，也是有時無、有時有。
再講「慢」跟「疑」：慢是對境拿得很定（認定自己就是高），疑卻是對境定不下來——一個篤定、一個猶豫，正相反，所以慢、疑搭不上。
慢跟那五種見，倒大體都能一起起，因為它們運作的樣子彼此不衝突。只有一處例外：慢跟「斷見」一定不一起——因為當你執著『我要斷了、我沒了』的時候，哪裡還生得出『自高自恃』的勁頭？沒有「我」可恃，慢就起不來了。連帶地，慢跟「身見」「邪見」裡頭〔執斷的〕那一分，也一樣搭不上。
再講「疑」跟「見」：疑是定不下來，見卻是『決度』（一口咬定、認準了去推斷）——一個游移、一個篤定，正相反，所以疑跟那五種見一定不一起。
再講五種見彼此之間：它們也一定不互相搭，因為見本身就是一種慧，而『同一念心裡不會有兩個慧』，所以五種見不會兩個一起冒出來。
最後講「癡」：癡跟其餘九個煩惱，個個都一定相應——因為任何一個煩惱要生起，背後都少不了這份無明（癡）在撐著，所以癡是哪兒都在。
〔何識相應〕（問：這十個煩惱，分別跟哪幾個識搭得上？）逐個識來看。
第八藏識：一個都沒有（它是無覆無記、不染污，所以十個煩惱全不跟它搭）。
第七末那：只跟四個搭——就是我癡、我見、我慢、我愛（這四個正是上一節要講的）。
第六意識：十個全有（它分別力最強，什麼煩惱都起得來）。
前五識（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身）：只跟三個搭——貪、瞋、癡。為什麼只這三個？因為前五識『沒有分別』（只管當下取境，不會推度比量）；而慢、疑、見這幾個，都得靠「稱量」（掂量、比較）這類分別作用才生得起來，前五識做不了這道工夫，所以慢、疑、見都進不了前五識。
〔何受相應〕（問：這十個煩惱，分別配得上哪幾種「受」——苦、樂、憂、喜、捨這五種感受？）
先講貪、瞋、癡這三個（不論俱生的、分別的）：它們五種受都配得上。舉例說：貪本來配樂喜，可是貪一旦碰上不順心的境（求而不得），就跟著起憂、起苦了；瞋本來配憂苦，可是瞋一旦碰上順心的境（恨對了、出了氣），就跟著起喜、起樂了——所以五受都通。
〔慢配什麼受·有兩說〕 一說：慢（不論俱生、分別）配得上『除苦以外』的四種受（樂、喜、憂、捨）；至於碰上拿苦惱低劣的身心去自恃的時候，就跟「憂」搭上。另一說：俱生的慢連「苦」也搭得上——因為「意地」（第六意識這一層）本來就有苦受，這一點前面已經說過了。再補一點：分別起的慢這些煩惱，在「純苦趣」（也就是地獄）裡是沒有的，因為那裡沒有邪師、邪教來熏（分別煩惱要靠熏才起）；不過話說回來，正因為地獄眾生只有俱生煩惱、起不了分別煩惱，他們在地獄裡並不會再造出「招感惡趣」的新業（要分別煩惱才發得動那種引業）。
再講疑、和後三種見（邪見、見取、戒取）：它們配得上四種受。比方欲界裡的疑，除了不配苦，連喜受也配得上；那兩取若是緣著一個本來帶憂的見而起，那當口也就跟「憂」搭上了。
〔身見、邊見配什麼受·又有兩說〕 一說：與生俱來的身見、邊見，只配喜、樂、捨這三種受；因為它們不跟前五識一起起（不會落到五識那一層的苦樂），又一向是「無記性」（不善不惡，所以不配憂、苦這兩種帶善惡分量的受）。至於分別起的身見、邊見，就配得上四種受了：比方在苦惱的身心上執它作我、我所（這時配憂）；常見、斷見又跟這個倒過來算（執得不對勁時也帶憂），所以也跟「憂」搭上。另一說：身見、邊見若是俱生的，連「苦」也搭得上——因為在純受苦的去處、緣著極苦的身心，這份俱生我見就跟「苦」相應了。論裡也說『凡是俱生的一切煩惱，在苦、樂、捨這三種受裡都找得到它現行』，詳細跟前面講的一樣。
以上是按「實義」（最嚴格、最究竟那一層道理）細分的。如果換個說法、只按「麁相」（粗略、好懂的那一面）來配，就簡單些：貪、慢、和四種見（身、邊、邪、見取、戒取裡頭那幾種）配樂、喜、捨；瞋只配苦、憂、捨；癡五種受全配；邪見和疑配四種受（只不配苦）。
再按「地」（三界裡一層層的境界）分一下『配樂受』的範圍：貪、癡這兩個的『配樂』，通到底下四地——也就是欲界，再加上初禪、二禪、三禪；其餘七個（瞋以外）的『配樂』，要除掉欲界、只通色界那三地（初二三禪）。還有，疑、以及「獨行癡」（不跟別的煩惱搭、自己單獨起的那種癡）在欲界裡，只配憂、捨兩種受；至於它們配的其餘受，也照前面這個道理去推，就明白了。
〔別境相應〕（問：這十個煩惱，跟「別境」那五個心所——欲、勝解、念、定、慧——能不能一起起？）
貪、瞋、癡、慢這四個，別境五個都配得上（連「定」也行，因為人專注盯著一個境，就有定的成分）。
疑、和那五種見，各只配得上其中四個。疑要除掉「勝解」——因為勝解是『認準了、毫不動搖』，疑卻是『定不下來』，兩個正相反，搭不上。五種見要除掉「慧」——因為見本身就是一種染污的慧、跟慧是一回事，自己就是慧了，當然不必、也不能再『另外』配一個慧上來。
〔三性門〕（問：這十個煩惱，按善、惡、無記三性算，各歸哪一性？）
瞋只能是「不善」（純粹是壞的），因為它既傷自己、也傷別人。其餘九個則通「不善」和「無記」兩性，要看情形：
第一，上二界（色界、無色界）裡的煩惱，一律算「無記」——因為那兩界靠定力把粗的惡都壓住了，煩惱現起也是細細的，談不上造惡。
第二，欲界裡「分別起」的那些，算「不善」——因為它們會發動出種種惡行。
第三，欲界裡「俱生」的，要再分兩種:會發動惡行的，也算「不善」（一樣傷自傷他）；其餘不發惡行的俱生煩惱，就算「無記」——因為它們很細、不至於擋住善法，也不至於狠狠地惱害自己和別人。
最後要曉得：俱生的身見、邊見，只算「無記」——它們不發惡業，雖然一天到晚都在現起，可並不擋著善法生起，所以判它無記。
〔界繫門〕（問：這十個煩惱，分屬三界裡的哪一界？又能不能跨界去緣別的地？）
先講歸屬：瞋只在欲界有（上二界靠定力，瞋不起）；其餘九個三界都通。
再講「現起」要什麼條件。住在下地、又還沒離開下地染污的人，上地的煩惱是不會在他身上現起的——要先修得『那一地的根本定』，那一地的煩惱才有機會現起。（這裡補一句道理：靠「有漏道」修定，雖然壓不住分別起的惑、也壓不住細的俱生惑，可是能把俱生裡頭粗的那些惑壓下去，這麼一步步壓，就漸漸證上了上地的根本定。）反過來，已經生到上地的人，下地那些分別、俱生的惑，倒都可能在他身上現起——比方一個生在第四禪的人，在「中有」階段、快要墮回下地投生時，就會起那種潤生的俱生貪愛（把人拉回下地受生）。
接著講『跨地緣』。先講下地煩惱能緣到上地：《瑜伽》就說『欲界繫的貪，會去貪求生到上地、會貪味上地的定』；又比方憎恨嫉妒滅諦、道諦的（瞋），總緣一切行而執我、我所、執斷執常的（見），還有慢——這些都能緣到上地去；其餘五個能緣上地，道理也是順理成章的。（有些地方說『貪、瞋、慢這些不緣上地』，那是就粗的一面、或單就某一種緣法說的，不是通則。）再講上地煩惱也能緣到下地：生在上地的人，會仗著自己境界高、有殊勝功德，去輕慢底下的眾生（這是慢緣下）；總緣一切行而執我、我所、執斷執常、起貪愛的，也都能緣到下地。至於疑、和後三種見能不能緣下地，照這個道理去推就明白了。（有些地方說『上地不緣下地』，那也是就大多數情形、或單就某一種緣法說的。）
〔學等門〕（問：這十個煩惱，算不算「有學、無學」？——「有學」是還在修道的聖者，「無學」是學圓滿了的阿羅漢。）答：都不算。因為「有學、無學」這兩種，講的都是清淨的善法，而這十個是煩惱、是染污的，所以擺不進去。
〔見修所斷門〕（問：這十個煩惱，是在「見道」斷、還是在「修道」斷？）先排除一種:它們不是「非所斷」的——所謂「非所斷」是指清淨無染、根本不必去斷的法，而這十個是染污的，當然要斷。
接著分兩種:「分別起」的，只在「見道」斷——因為它們粗、容易斷（一見真理，這些後天熏起來的邪執立刻就垮）。「俱生」的，只在「修道」斷——因為它們細、難斷（與生俱來、盤根錯節，要在修道裡一點一點磨）。
最後補一句:那些「見道所斷」的十個，在「真見道」（親證真理的那一刻）其實是一齊頓斷的（不是一條一條慢慢斷），因為真見道是「總緣四諦」（一下子把四諦的真理整個照破），所以迷四諦的那些見惑也就一齊斷光了。
這些見道所斷的煩惱，為什麼判它「迷四諦」呢？這「迷諦」可以從兩個角度講：一個籠統說（總），一個一條條說（別）。
先說籠統的（總）：這十個煩惱，可以說個個都迷四諦——苦諦、集諦是它們『賴以生起的因處』（煩惱就攀著苦、集這兩個有漏的境而起），滅諦、道諦是它們『害怕躲避的處』（煩惱一見了滅、道這出離的真理就怕、就躲）。從這個角度，十個全都跟四諦掛上了。
再說一條條的（別）：這是按『各自正面迷的是哪一諦』來分。身見、邊見這兩個，只迷「苦諦」——因為它們只在「果處」（也就是這個果報身心上）起執，正好違背「空、無我」這個道理，而「空、無我」屬苦諦的內容，所以這兩個專迷苦。其餘八個則四諦都迷得到。底下細看怎麼迷:疑、和三種見（邪見、見取、戒取），是直接正面迷「苦諦」的道理；那兩取（見取、戒取）把那三種見、那套戒禁、以及撐起它們的身心五蘊執成『最殊勝、能得清淨』，於是對自己的見、別人的見、以及這些的眷屬，依次起了貪、起了瞋、起了慢（所以貪、瞋、慢也跟著迷苦）；至於跟這九個搭著的「相應無明」，就跟著這九個一同迷，而那『不跟別的搭、自己單獨起的無明』（不共無明）則直接正面迷苦諦的道理。
不只迷苦：疑和邪見也能直接正面迷「集諦」等其餘三諦；兩取和貪等迷集等諦的情形，照前面迷苦那一套去比類，就明白了。最後還要補一個:瞋也能直接正面迷「滅諦、道諦」——因為它一見滅、道這出離的真理就害怕，怕就生出憎恨嫉妒，這份憎嫉正是直接撲著滅、道去的。
上面講的『直接迷（親）』和『間接迷（疎）』，還只是粗略的一面；要再細細地講，就得把「俱生」的那些單獨拿出來看了。貪、瞋、慢、三種見、疑這些裡頭俱生的部分，迷諦的情形也照前面所說、隨各自情況去配。
這裡頭要點出兩種『雖然迷苦諦、卻不在見道斷、要留到修道才斷』的:第一種，是俱生的身見、邊見、以及跟它們搭著的愛、慢、無明——這些雖然也迷苦諦，可是它們細、難斷，所以不在見道斷，要到修道才斷得掉。第二種，是瞋、和其餘的貪愛等——這些是『緣著一件件具體的事』（別事）而起的（不是衝著四諦的真理來的），並不妨礙人去正觀四諦，所以也歸「修道所斷」。
最後再從「所緣」這一面分三組。
第一組，按有沒有「本質」分。每一個煩惱起來，心裡都會浮出一個「相分」（也就是它所緣的那個影像）；可是這影像背後，到底有沒有一個真實的「本質」（被它依託、映出影像的那個東西）撐著，就不一定了——有的有、有的無。依這個差別，就把煩惱分成『緣有事的』（背後有本質）和『緣無事的』（背後沒本質）兩種。
第二組，按本質是有漏還是無漏分。煩惱當下親緣的那個影像，固然都是有漏的（煩惱本身染污）；但它背後依託的本質，卻可以通到無漏去（比方煩惱去緣滅諦、道諦的時候，所託的就是無漏法）。依這個差別，又分成『緣有漏的』和『緣無漏的』兩種煩惱。
第三組，按影像跟本質像不像分。緣『自己這一地』的境時，心裡浮的影像跟那本質長得像，這叫『緣分別所起的事境』（緣到的是有實事的境）；可是緣「滅諦、道諦」、或緣『別的地』的境時，影像跟本質長得不像（因為滅道、他地不是它親歷的，只能憑名言摹想），這就叫『緣分別所起的名境』（緣到的只是個名相摹出來的境）。其餘還有別的分門法，照這個道理去推想就明白了。
B. The Six Root Afflictions
The treatise-master says: these six — greed and the rest (greed, anger, delusion, conceit, doubt, bad view) — are by their very nature all subsumed under this class called "the root afflictions" ("root" meaning that all those other, branch-tip afflictions are born out of these six) — and just for that they got the name "afflictions."
What is "greed"? Its nature is "craving-attachment" — it sticks fast, unable to let go, to "existence" (that is, the karmic fruit of the three realms, this very life before one's eyes) and to "the instruments of existence" (the various causes that summon up this life, the things that keep one rolling on in saṃsāra). Its function has two sides: one, it "obstructs non-greed," that is, it blocks the wholesome mind of non-greed from arising; two, it "gives rise to suffering," that is, it draws on every kind of suffering. Why does it give rise to suffering? Because, by the force of this craving-greed, the "five appropriated aggregates" (this body-and-mind that is appropriated and summons suffering) arise again and again, and so suffering too goes on without end.
What is "anger"? Its nature is "hatred-resentment" — toward "suffering" (the karmic fruit that goes against one's wishes) and "the instruments of suffering" (the things that summon up suffering) it stirs up hatred and flies into a rage. Its function is: on one side it "obstructs non-anger," blocking the wholesome mind of non-anger; on the other it makes one "un-secure," and becomes the root of every kind of bad conduct. Why is this so? Because the moment a person flares into anger, it surely scorches both body and mind into a fevered unrest and provokes every kind of bad karma; anger is itself "of an unwholesome nature" (purely bad — unlike greed, which may carry along a faint taste of the agreeable).
What is "delusion"? "Delusion" is "ignorance" — its nature is "benighted confusion": toward the various principles (such as the four truths, dependent arising, and the like) and the various things and phenomena, it is all a murky darkness, unable to see clearly. Its function is: on one side it "obstructs non-delusion," blocking the wholesome mind that sees clearly; on the other it becomes "the root of all defilement." How is it the root of all defilement? Because it is by way of this ignorance that there next arise "doubt," "wrong view," then greed and the other root afflictions, and along with them the deeds of every kind of secondary affliction; and these deeds in turn can summon up every kind of defiled dharma for the next life — link upon link in a chain, all starting out from this ignorance.
What is "conceit"? Its nature is "relying on oneself over others, exalting [oneself]" — leaning on oneself, sizing oneself up against others, and lifting the mind up high, swollen and self-important. Its function is: on one side it "obstructs non-conceit" (blocking the wholesome mind of humility), on the other it "gives rise to suffering." How does it give rise to suffering? Because once there is conceit, toward "virtue" (the various merits and goods) and "the virtuous" (people who possess virtue) one will not bend low, will not be humble; and so birth-and-death rolls on without end, and one undergoes every kind of suffering.
Conceit is also divided very finely, with such accounts as the "seven conceits" and the "nine conceits." From which loci are they sized up? They arise from the "three grades" plus the "self" and "virtue" — the "three grades" meaning that one sorts the other party into the three tiers of "superior" (stronger than me), "equal" (the same as me), and "inferior" (worse than me), and then, pairing these with self-exaltation toward "self" and toward "virtue," one lays out the seven kinds and the nine kinds of distinction.
These conceits, whatever the kind, can in principle all be severed at both the "path of seeing" and the "path of cultivation" stages (not severed at only one place). One point must be added here: at the sage's stage, that "conceit-of-self" does still get to arise (even a sage still has the very subtlest thought of a sense-of-self); and since even the sage's stage still has the conceit-of-self manifestly active, then the "conceit-class" arising in dependence on it is likewise coherent and free of contradiction.
What is "doubt"? Its nature is "wavering" — toward the various truths and principles (the four truths and such, the principles that ought to be trusted and accepted) it cannot make up its mind, half-believing and half-doubting. Its function is: on one side it "obstructs non-doubt" (blocking the wholesome mind of firm conviction), on the other it "blocks the wholesome class" (barring the wholesome dharmas from arising). Why does it block the wholesome? Because a person who is forever wavering and irresolute, unable to settle the mind, cannot get the wholesome dharmas to arise.
〔One view · doubt just is discernment〕 One party maintains: doubt has no substance of its own; it is in fact just "discernment" (that is, the mental factor of selecting and distinguishing). Their reasons are two. First, what is called doubt is "wavering while at the same time distinguishing" — and since it is distinguishing, that distinguishing is precisely the function of discernment, which shows doubt is discernment. Second, looking to the word-formation in Sanskrit: the word for doubt is composed by adding the prefix "vi" before "mati" (which means discernment, deliberation); and since "mati" is itself discernment, then "doubt," produced by adding the prefix, is at bottom still discernment.
〔Another view (this is the correct one) · doubt has a substance of its own〕 Another party says: doubt has a substance of its own; its function is to "make discernment irresolute," and it is not [identical with] discernment. The reasons are two layers. The first is the warrant of scriptural teaching: the Yogācārabhūmi once said — "Among the six root afflictions, only 'bad view' is 'conventionally existent' (that is, it is but a portion of discernment, not a separately set-up thing); the remaining five (greed, anger, delusion, conceit, doubt) are all 'really existent,' each having a substance of its own." Since doubt is reckoned among these five that are "really existent, having a separate own-substance," it shows that doubt is not discernment. The second is a rebuttal aimed at the former party's word-formation reason: you say "adding the prefix 'vi' before 'mati' (discernment) produces something that is still discernment, and so doubt just is discernment"; but by that reasoning, adding the same prefix "vi" before "jñāna" (which means knowledge) and producing "vijñāna (consciousness)" — should not that too still be knowledge? In fact "knowledge" and "consciousness" are plainly two different things. This shows that once a root-word (here the word-roots such as "mati" and "jñāna") has a prefix added, the meaning shifts entirely and can no longer be taken as the original word. So "doubt," though formed by adding a prefix to "discernment," is at bottom no longer discernment — doubt does not have discernment for its substance.
What is "bad view"? Its nature is "defiled discernment" — a discernment that has been defiled (here one can see that, while the party above, in discussing doubt, took doubt too to be discernment, the thing that truly counts as a portion of discernment is in fact this view): toward the various truths and principles it reckons and surmises in an upside-down, topsy-turvy way, guessing and gauging at random. Its function is: on one side it "obstructs good view" (blocking right understanding), on the other it "invites suffering." Why is it said to invite suffering? Because a person who holds a mistaken view must, more often than not, undergo much suffering.
This "bad view," in the way it runs and operates (its mode of activity), can be further divided into five kinds:
(1) The view of the perishing-body (also called the "body-view," the view that takes this body-and-mind to be a "self"): upon the "five appropriated aggregates" (these five heaps of body-and-mind that summon suffering) it forcibly grasps out a "self," and further grasps out the various "what-belongs-to-self" (the things belonging to me). It is "the basis of all the [false] view-courses" — every branching, wayward view-path is born out of this self-attachment. Spelled out finely, it has such accounts as the "twenty propositions" and the "sixty-five" (these are the graspings laid out one by one, pairing "self, what-belongs-to-self" with the five aggregates); this kind is wholly "discriminated" (the sort drawn out later by bad teachers and wrong teaching, requiring deliberation and reckoning to arise).
(2) The view that grasps an extreme (the view that clings to one side, falling into an extreme): taking up that "self" grasped out before, it then tips it to one side — either grasping it as "annihilated" (at death one is wholly finished, nothing left at all) or grasping it as "eternal" (this self never changes, abides forever and never perishes). Its harm is that it "obstructs the middle way" and "obstructs emancipation" (falling to either extreme of annihilation or eternity, one cannot tread the unswerving middle course, and so cannot get out of birth-and-death).
Spelled out finely, it scatters through the various wayward view-paths of the outsiders. Broadly there are two routes. One route is "reckoning from the past end" (grasping the prior limit), within which are the "four total-eternalisms" (four accounts asserting that all things are utterly permanent) and the "partial eternalism" (the account asserting that one part is permanent and one part not). The other route is "reckoning from the future end" (reckoning the latter limit), within which are the "sixteen with-conception" (accounts asserting that after death one still bears conception, sixteen in all), the "eight without-conception" and the "eight neither-conception-nor-non-conception" (these two classes each having eight), and the "seven annihilationisms" (seven accounts asserting that after death one is utterly annihilated), and the like. These are all "discriminated" (drawn out by later reckoning, brought on by wrong doctrines).
(3) Wrong view: its main trunk is "denial outright" — that is, a flat negation, a slander. What does it negate? Four things: it denies "cause" (not believing there are causes of good and evil), denies "effect" (not believing there are the fruits of suffering and pleasure), denies "function" (not believing in such real functions as seeds producing the manifest, or this life going on to a later world), and denies "the really-existent" (not believing in such truly existing facts as arhats and sages). Besides this main trunk, whatever wrong graspings remain, the messy and scattered ones, other than the four foregoing views (body-view, extreme-view, view-clinging, precept-clinging), are all gathered into wrong view as well; this is just as the term "dominant condition" is the widest of all and can take anything in — wrong view too is the widest sack, gathering in all the odds and ends of wrong grasping.
Spelled out finely, it too scatters through the various wayward view-paths of the outsiders. Reckoning from the past end (grasping the prior limit), there are the "two no-cause-isms" (two accounts asserting that the myriad things have no cause at all and pop up out of nowhere), the "four edge[-theories] and the rest" (four accounts blindly guessing the world to have an edge, no edge, and the like), and the "deathless-evasion" (the account that, for fear of misspeaking, answers vaguely and dodges every which way, refusing to reply straight). Reckoning from the future end (reckoning the latter limit), there is the "five present-nirvāṇas" (five accounts mistaking some pleasure-state before one's eyes for nirvāṇa). Besides these there are all manner of others: some take "Maheśvara (the Sovereign God)," a worldly ruler, Indra, Mahā-brahmā, and such gods, or some other thing, to be eternal and unchanging; some take Maheśvara and the like to be the total cause that produces the myriad things; some recklessly set up various false liberations (which are in fact no liberation at all); some wrongly grasp "what is not the path" as "the path" (mistaking a wrong way for the right way) — all such as these are gathered into wrong view.
(4) View-clinging: it takes "the various views," together with "the body-and-mind five aggregates that prop up these views," and grasps them wholesale as "the most brilliant, the most supreme," and further grasps them as "able to make one win purity" (supposing that to hold fast to this set of views is to be liberated). Its harm is that it becomes "the basis of all quarrels" — each clinging to his own view and each sure his own is the most right, they squabble without end.
(5) Clinging to precepts-and-observances: it takes "the precepts and prohibitions laid down in conformity with those wrong views" (such as the outsiders' set of ascetic precepts — imitating cattle, imitating dogs, throwing oneself into fire, lying on a bed of nails), together with "the body-and-mind five aggregates that prop up these precepts-and-observances," and grasps them as "the most brilliant, the most supreme," and further grasps them as "able to win purity" (supposing that to keep these is to be liberated). Its harm is that it becomes "the basis of profitless toil" (suffering toil with no benefit) — undergoing a heap of suffering for nothing, of not the slightest use for liberation.
Some places put it briefly, saying "to grasp [something] as the most brilliant is called view-clinging; to grasp [something] as able to win purity is called precept-clinging," as though the two clingings each governed one side. One must understand that this way of putting it is an "abbreviated-cross-reference statement" (each implying the other and each leaving out half the words — in fact both clingings carry within them both senses of "most supreme" and "able to purify"), or else a "deference-to-the-other gate" (provisionally putting it so in deference to another school's way of speaking); it is not really the case that view-clinging governs only "most supreme" and precept-clinging only "purity." How do we know they cannot be split rigidly? Turn it around and it becomes clear: "to mistake what is not the truth-of-cessation for the truth-of-cessation, and to mistake what is not the path for the path" — this kind of grasping the treatise plainly judges to be "wrong view," and does not gather it into the two clingings — which shows that the sense "able to win purity" does not belong to precept-clinging alone; otherwise, the kind that "reckons a non-path as the path, supposing it able to win purity" should long since have counted as precept-clinging.
In what precedes, the root afflictions were "in general" said to be six (greed, anger, delusion, conceit, doubt, bad view), and then "bad view," that one of them, was split into five (body, extreme, wrong, view-clinging, precept-clinging); spreading them out thus "in particular," and joining them together, they come to ten. These ten afflictions, by the manner of their arising, can be sorted into two batches.
The first batch is six — greed, anger, delusion, conceit, plus body-view and extreme-view — these six "have both the innate and the discriminated": they can arise "spontaneously" (of themselves, born along with one, welling up naturally), and can also arise by "reflective examination" (through later deliberation and reckoning, brought on by wrong doctrines).
The second batch is four — doubt, plus the last three views (wrong view, view-clinging, precept-clinging) — these four "have only the discriminated kind": they can arise only after meeting the influence of bad friends or wrong teaching and then doing a round of pondering and reckoning oneself (born along with one they will never be).
〔The innate within the extreme-view · one view · only the annihilationist〕 Above it was said that the extreme-view too extends to the "innate" (the kind born along with one). But within the extreme-view, do both the annihilationist and the eternalist count? One party says: the innate extreme-view is only the "annihilationist" kind. Their reasons are three. First, the eternalist view is "coarse in character" (its character is coarse, requiring a stretch of reasoning before it can be grasped), and must be drawn forth by such outer forces as bad friends, which shows the eternalist view is not innate. Second, the Yogācārabhūmi's question-and-answer already said: "Which extreme-view is innate? Answer: it is subsumed under the annihilationist view." Third, take it from experience — one who is newly learning "direct contemplation" (rightly contemplating the truth) will often have a wave of fear well up: "Now this self of mine — where on earth is the self?" (afraid of finding no self, afraid the self is gone); and even beasts, meeting some peril, all instinctively fear "I am about to be annihilated, about to lose my life" and start up in alarm — this dread of "annihilation" is inborn, which shows the innate extreme-view leans to the annihilationist side.
〔Another view · the eternalist too can be innate〕 Another party says: the Yogācārabhūmi passage that party cited — "the innate extreme-view is only the annihilationist" — is in fact a statement of the Yogācārabhūmi "made with respect to the coarse side" (singling out only the conspicuous kind); pressed to the bottom, the innate extreme-view is not the annihilationist alone, but extends to the eternalist as well. How is this seen? Look at beasts: they too inborn-ly grasp "I will go on living long and long," and so they scrape together for dear life, hoarding and laying in provisions for years on end — this drive of "I can abide eternally" is precisely the innate eternalist view. The Xianyang and other treatises also say: "Upon the five appropriated aggregates one grasps annihilation, reckons eternity, which may be innate or may be discriminated" — which shows the eternalist view likewise has an innate side.
〔The gates of the root afflictions〕
〔The concurrence gate〕 (Question: can these ten afflictions arise together in one and the same thought-moment of mind?) First, "greed" — with whom it can pair and with whom it cannot.
Greed and anger, and greed and doubt, definitely do not arise together. Why? Greed is craving, anger is hatred, and the objects these two minds of "craving" and "hatred" face are exactly opposite, so they cannot stick to the same object at the same time — hence greed and anger do not arise together. As for doubt, it cannot make up its mind about its object; and since it is still wavering, unable to settle, there is no question of sticking fast — hence greed and doubt do not arise together either (one must stick fast for it to be greed, and when half-believing-half-doubting one cannot stick).
Greed and conceit, and greed and view, can sometimes pair and sometimes not. First, when they cannot: conceit is "looking down on others" (despising, wanting to overtop others), and the object conceit looks down on is often not the same as the object greed craves, and at such times greed and conceit do not go together. Then, when they can: but if "what is craved" (what greed loves) and "what is relied on" (what conceit leans on) happen to be the very same thing (for instance, both loving and self-relying on this self), then greed and conceit can arise together. As for greed and "view" (the five views), the objects of those five views can all be taken up as something to crave (a person cannot even bear to give up his own wrong view, but craves it greedily), so greed can be concurrent with all five views, with no obstruction.
Next, with whom "anger" can pair.
Anger and conceit, and anger and doubt, can sometimes go together and sometimes not. First, conceit: if the object anger hates and the object conceit leans on are not the same thing, then anger and conceit do not pair; but if "the one despised" and "the one hated" happen to be the same (despising him on one hand and hating him on the other), then anger and conceit arise together. Next, doubt: in the moment a person first starts to doubt, still wavering, no hatred has yet arisen, and at that time anger and doubt do not go together; but when, after pondering a long while, he still cannot settle, his heart frets and then flares into fire, and at that time anger and doubt do join up — and doubting "agreeable things" or doubting "disagreeable things" both follow this same principle, settling according to the case.
Anger and those two clingings (view-clinging, precept-clinging) definitely cannot pair. Because the two clingings grasp that set of views, that set of precepts, as "the most brilliant, the right path"; and since they hold it up high, they will not hate it, so anger cannot get in.
Anger and those three views (body-view, extreme-view, wrong view) can sometimes pair. Look at it case by case: (1) if upon an "agreeable body-and-mind" (a pleasure-aggregate) one raises a body-view or eternalist view (grasping self or grasping eternity upon a pleasant object), the mind is at ease and no hatred arises, and at that time anger does not pair. (2) If upon a "suffering body-and-mind" (a suffering-aggregate) one raises a body-view or eternalist view (grasping self or grasping eternity upon a suffering-laden object), the mind is repelled and hatred arises, and at that time anger does pair. (3) The annihilationist view reckons just the reverse (grasping annihilation upon a suffering object is, on the contrary, at ease; grasping annihilation upon a pleasant object, on the contrary, rouses hatred), so the annihilationist view paired with anger is likewise sometimes present, sometimes absent. (4) As for wrong view, on one side it slanders bad things (denying outright bad causes and bad effects, with no hatred in the heart at that point), and on the other it slanders good things too (denying outright good causes and good effects, and then it carries hatred) — so wrong view paired with anger, following these two sides, is likewise sometimes absent, sometimes present.
Next, "conceit" and "doubt": conceit holds its object firmly fixed (settled that oneself is precisely high), whereas doubt cannot settle on its object at all — one resolute, one wavering, exact opposites, so conceit and doubt cannot pair.
Conceit and those five views can, on the whole, all arise together, because the ways they operate do not clash with one another. There is only one exception: conceit and the "annihilationist view" definitely do not arise together — for when you are clinging to "I am about to be annihilated, I am gone," where would any drive of "self-exalting, self-relying" still spring from? With no "self" to rely on, conceit cannot arise. And along with this, conceit and the 〔annihilation-grasping〕 portion within the "body-view" and "wrong view" likewise cannot pair.
Next, "doubt" and "view": doubt cannot settle, whereas view is "decisive judgment" (biting down firmly, fixing on something and inferring from it) — one shifting, one resolute, exact opposites, so doubt and those five views definitely do not arise together.
Next, the five views among themselves: they too definitely do not pair with one another, because view is itself a kind of discernment, and "within one and the same thought-moment of mind there are not two discernments," so two of the five views will not well up together.
Last, "delusion": delusion is definitely concurrent with each of the other nine afflictions — because for any single affliction to arise, behind it there must be this ignorance (delusion) propping it up, so delusion is everywhere.
〔Which consciousness concurrent〕 (Question: with which of the consciousnesses does each of these ten afflictions pair?) Take the consciousnesses one by one.
The eighth, the store-consciousness: not a single one (it is unobscured-indeterminate, undefiled, so all ten afflictions fail to pair with it).
The seventh, the manas: only four pair with it — that is, self-delusion, self-view, self-conceit, self-love (these four are precisely what the next section will treat).
The sixth, the mind-consciousness: it has all ten (its power of discrimination is the strongest, so any affliction can arise in it).
The first five consciousnesses (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body): only three pair with them — greed, anger, delusion. Why only these three? Because the first five consciousnesses "have no discrimination" (they only take in the present object, and do not reckon or compare-and-infer); whereas conceit, doubt, view, and the like must rely on such discriminating functions as "weighing" (gauging, comparing) in order to arise, and the first five consciousnesses cannot do that work — so conceit, doubt, and view all fail to enter the first five consciousnesses.
〔Which feeling concurrent〕 (Question: with which kinds of "feeling" — the five: suffering, pleasure, sorrow, joy, equanimity — does each of these ten afflictions pair?)
First, greed, anger, delusion, these three (whether innate or discriminated): all five feelings can pair with them. For example: greed normally pairs with pleasure and joy, but once greed meets an unwelcome object (craving without getting), it follows up with sorrow and suffering; anger normally pairs with sorrow and suffering, but once anger meets a welcome object (hating to good purpose, venting one's spleen), it follows up with joy and pleasure — so all five feelings get through.
〔What feeling conceit pairs with · two views〕 One view: conceit (whether innate or discriminated) can pair with the four feelings "other than suffering" (pleasure, joy, sorrow, equanimity); and as for the case of self-relying upon a suffering-laden, inferior body-and-mind, it pairs with "sorrow." Another view: innate conceit can pair even with "suffering" — because the "mind-ground" (the layer of the sixth mind-consciousness) does have a suffering-feeling, as was already said before. One more point to add: discriminated conceit and the like afflictions are absent in the "pure-suffering destinies" (that is, the hells), because there are no bad teachers or wrong teaching there to perfume them (discriminated afflictions must be perfumed to arise); however, this said, precisely because hell beings have only innate afflictions and cannot raise discriminated ones, they do not, while in hell, go on producing new karma that "summons a bad destiny" (it takes a discriminated affliction to set such drawing-karma in motion).
Next, doubt and the last three views (wrong view, view-clinging, precept-clinging): they can pair with four feelings. For instance, doubt in the desire-realm, besides not pairing with suffering, can pair even with the joy-feeling; and those two clingings, if they arise by referring to a view that was itself accompanied by sorrow, then at that moment pair with "sorrow" as well.
〔What feeling the body-view and extreme-view pair with · again two views〕 One view: the innate body-view and extreme-view pair only with the three feelings joy, pleasure, and equanimity; for they do not arise together with the first five consciousnesses (they do not fall to the layer of suffering-and-pleasure at the level of the five consciousnesses), and they are always "of indeterminate nature" (neither wholesome nor unwholesome, so they do not pair with sorrow and suffering, the two feelings carrying a good-or-evil weight). As for the discriminated body-view and extreme-view, they can pair with four feelings: for instance, grasping a suffering-laden body-and-mind as self or what-belongs-to-self (this pairs with sorrow); and the eternalist and annihilationist views are reckoned the reverse of this (when grasped amiss they too carry sorrow), so they pair with "sorrow" as well. Another view: the body-view and extreme-view, if innate, can pair even with "suffering" — because in a place of pure suffering-undergoing, referring to an extremely suffering-laden body-and-mind, this innate self-view pairs with "suffering." The treatise also says, "every innate affliction without exception can be found manifestly active within the three feelings of suffering, pleasure, and equanimity," and the detail is just as said before.
The above was the fine division by "real meaning" (the strictest, most ultimate layer of principle). If one switches to a way of speaking that goes only by "the coarse character" (the rough, easy-to-grasp side), it is simpler: greed, conceit, and the four views (those among the body, extreme, wrong, and view-clinging-and-precept-clinging) pair with pleasure, joy, and equanimity; anger pairs only with suffering, sorrow, and equanimity; delusion pairs with all five feelings; wrong view and doubt pair with four feelings (only not pairing with suffering).
Next, dividing by "ground" (the layer upon layer of stations within the three realms) the scope of "pairing with the pleasure-feeling": the "pairing-with-pleasure" of greed and delusion, these two, extends to the lower four grounds — that is, the desire-realm, plus the first, second, and third dhyānas; the "pairing-with-pleasure" of the remaining seven (other than anger) must drop the desire-realm and extend only to those three grounds in the form-realm (the first, second, third dhyānas). Furthermore, doubt and "solitary-running delusion" (the kind of delusion that pairs with no other affliction and arises on its own) in the desire-realm pair only with the two feelings sorrow and equanimity; and as for the rest of the feelings they pair with, infer it by the foregoing principle and it will be clear.
〔Concurrence with the object-specific〕 (Question: can these ten afflictions arise together with the five "object-specific" mental factors — aspiration, resolve, mindfulness, concentration, discernment?)
Greed, anger, delusion, conceit, these four, can pair with all five of the object-specific (even with "concentration," for when a person fixes attention intently on a single object, there is a component of concentration).
Doubt, and those five views, can each pair with only four of them. Doubt must drop "resolve" — because resolve is "settled, unshakable," whereas doubt is "unable to settle," the two being exact opposites and unable to pair. The five views must drop "discernment" — because view is itself a kind of defiled discernment and is of one piece with discernment; being itself discernment, it cannot, and need not, pair with a "further," separate discernment on top.
〔The three-natures gate〕 (Question: reckoned by the three natures — wholesome, unwholesome, indeterminate — to which nature does each of these ten afflictions belong?)
Anger can only be "unwholesome" (purely bad), because it harms both oneself and others. The remaining nine extend to both "unwholesome" and "indeterminate," depending on the case:
First, the afflictions in the upper two realms (form-realm, formless-realm) are uniformly reckoned "indeterminate" — because in those two realms the power of concentration presses down the coarse evil, and even when the afflictions arise they are fine and subtle, with no question of doing evil.
Second, those of the desire-realm that are "discriminated" are reckoned "unwholesome" — because they set various bad conduct in motion.
Third, those of the desire-realm that are "innate" must be divided into two further sorts: those that set bad conduct in motion are likewise reckoned "unwholesome" (harming self and others just the same); the remaining innate afflictions that do not set bad conduct in motion are reckoned "indeterminate" — because they are very subtle, not so as to block the wholesome dharmas, nor so as to harshly afflict and injure oneself and others.
Last, one should know: the innate body-view and extreme-view are reckoned only "indeterminate" — they do not set bad karma in motion; though they arise manifestly all day long, they do not block the wholesome from arising, so they are judged indeterminate.
〔The realm-binding gate〕 (Question: to which of the three realms does each of these ten afflictions belong? And can they cross realms to refer to another ground?)
First, their belonging: anger is found only in the desire-realm (the upper two realms, by the power of concentration, do not give rise to anger); the remaining nine extend to all three realms.
Next, what conditions are required for them to "arise manifestly." For one who dwells in a lower ground and has not yet left the defilement of the lower ground, the afflictions of an upper ground will not arise manifestly in him — one must first cultivate and attain "the root concentration of that ground," and only then have the afflictions of that ground a chance to arise manifestly. (Here a principle is added: cultivating concentration by the "contaminated path," though it cannot press down the discriminated afflictions or the subtle innate afflictions, can press down the coarse ones among the innate, and pressing them down step by step, one gradually realizes upward to the root concentration of the upper ground.) Conversely, for one already born into an upper ground, both the discriminated and the innate afflictions of the lower ground may arise manifestly in him — for instance, a person born in the fourth dhyāna, at the "intermediate-existence" stage, when about to fall back and be reborn in a lower ground, will raise that birth-moistening innate greed-craving (which draws one back down to take rebirth in the lower ground).
Next, "cross-ground referring." First, that lower-ground afflictions can refer up to an upper ground: the Yogācārabhūmi says "the greed bound to the desire-realm will crave to be born into an upper ground, will crave-savor the concentration of an upper ground"; and for instance the anger that hates-and-envies the truth-of-cessation and the truth-of-the-path, the view that refers comprehensively to all formations and grasps self, what-belongs-to-self, annihilation, or eternity, and conceit too — these can all refer up to an upper ground; that the remaining five can refer to an upper ground also follows as a matter of course. (Some places say "greed, anger, conceit, and such do not refer to an upper ground"; that is said with respect to the coarse side, or with respect to one particular mode of referring, and is not the general rule.) Next, that upper-ground afflictions can refer down to a lower ground: a person born in an upper ground will, relying on his lofty station and superior virtue, look down with conceit on the beings below (this is conceit referring downward); and that which refers comprehensively to all formations and grasps self, what-belongs-to-self, annihilation, eternity, or raises greed-craving can all refer down to a lower ground as well. As for whether doubt and the last three views can refer to a lower ground, infer it by this principle and it will be clear. (Some places say "an upper ground does not refer to a lower ground"; that too is said with respect to the majority of cases, or with respect to one particular mode of referring.)
〔The trainee-and-the-rest gate〕 (Question: do these ten afflictions count as "trainee" or "non-trainee"? — "trainee" being a noble one still on the path of cultivation, "non-trainee" being an arhat whose training is complete.) Answer: they count as neither. Because the two, "trainee" and "non-trainee," both speak of pure, wholesome dharmas, whereas these ten are afflictions, are defiled, so they cannot be slotted in.
〔The severed-by-seeing-or-cultivation gate〕 (Question: are these ten afflictions severed at the "path of seeing," or at the "path of cultivation"?) First, one possibility is ruled out: they are not "non-severable" — by "non-severable" is meant a dharma pure and undefiled, not needing to be severed at all, whereas these ten are defiled and so of course must be severed.
Next, they divide into two sorts: the "discriminated" are severed only at the "path of seeing" — because they are coarse and easy to sever (once one sees the truth, these later-perfumed wrong graspings collapse at once). The "innate" are severed only at the "path of cultivation" — because they are subtle and hard to sever (born along with one, deep-rooted and tangled, to be ground away bit by bit through the path of cultivation).
Last, one point to add: those ten that are "severed by the path of seeing" are, at the "true path of seeing" (the very moment of personally realizing the truth), in fact all severed at once (not severed one by one, slowly), because the true path of seeing "refers comprehensively to the four truths" (in one stroke it illumines and breaks through the truth of all four truths), so the view-afflictions that delude the four truths are all severed clean together.
As for why these afflictions severed by the path of seeing are judged to "delude the four truths": this "deluding the truths" can be spoken of from two angles — one a general statement (the "general"), one an item-by-item statement (the "particular").
First the general (the "general"): these ten afflictions can each be said to delude all four truths — for the truth-of-suffering and the truth-of-origin are the "cause and basis on which they arise" (the afflictions arise clinging to those two contaminated objects, suffering and origin), and the truth-of-cessation and the truth-of-the-path are the "place they dread and flee" (the moment the afflictions see the emancipating truth of cessation and the path, they fear it and flee). From this angle, all ten are hooked up with the four truths.
Next the item-by-item (the "particular"): this sorts by "which truth each frontally deludes." The body-view and the extreme-view, these two, delude only the "truth-of-suffering" — because they raise their grasping only at the "fruit-locus" (this very karmic-fruit body-and-mind), running squarely against the principle "empty, no-self," and "empty, no-self" is the content of the truth-of-suffering, so these two delude suffering alone. The remaining eight, by contrast, delude all four truths. Look closely at how they delude: doubt, and the three views (wrong view, view-clinging, precept-clinging), directly and frontally delude the principle of the "truth-of-suffering"; those two clingings (view-clinging, precept-clinging) grasp those three views, that set of precepts-and-observances, and the body-and-mind five aggregates that prop them up, as "the most supreme, able to win purity," and so toward one's own view, others' views, and the retinues of these, they raise, in turn, greed, anger, and conceit (so greed, anger, and conceit too follow along in deluding suffering); as for the "concurrent ignorance" yoked to these nine, it deludes along with these nine, while that "ignorance that pairs with no other and arises on its own" (the uncommon ignorance) directly and frontally deludes the principle of the truth-of-suffering.
Not deluding suffering only: doubt and wrong view can also directly and frontally delude the "truth-of-origin" and the rest of the remaining three truths; how the two clingings and greed and the rest delude the truth-of-origin and the others, infer it by analogy with the foregoing pattern of deluding suffering and it will be clear. Last, one more point to add: anger too can directly and frontally delude the "truth-of-cessation and the truth-of-the-path" — because the moment it sees the emancipating truth of cessation and the path it dreads it, and dreading it gives rise to hatred and envy, and this hatred-envy pounces squarely upon cessation and the path.
The "direct deluding (near)" and "indirect deluding (far)" spoken of above is still only the coarse side; to put it more finely, one must single out the "innate" ones for separate examination. The innate portions among greed, anger, conceit, the three views, and doubt — their deluding-the-truths situation likewise follows what was said before, fitted to each case.
Here two kinds must be picked out that "though they delude the truth-of-suffering, are not severed at the path of seeing but held over to be severed at the path of cultivation": the first kind is the innate body-view, extreme-view, and the craving, conceit, and ignorance yoked to them — these, though they too delude the truth-of-suffering, are subtle and hard to sever, so they are not severed at the path of seeing but are to be severed only at the path of cultivation. The second kind is anger and the remaining greed-craving and the like — these arise "referring to particular concrete things, one by one" (the "particular things," not aimed at the truth of the four truths), and do not get in the way of one's right contemplation of the four truths, so they too belong to "what is severed by the path of cultivation."
Last, divide them into three sets from the angle of the "object referred to."
The first set, dividing by whether there is a "substance" behind it or not. Every affliction, when it arises, floats up in the mind an "image-part" (the image that it refers to); but behind this image, whether there is a real "substance" propping it up (the thing leaned on, which casts up the image) is not fixed — sometimes there is, sometimes there is not. By this difference, afflictions are divided into the two kinds "referring to a thing that exists" (a substance behind) and "referring to a thing that does not exist" (no substance behind).
The second set, dividing by whether the substance is contaminated or uncontaminated. The image that the affliction directly refers to at the moment is, to be sure, always contaminated (the affliction itself is defiled); but the substance it leans on behind can extend even to the uncontaminated (for instance, when the affliction refers to the truth-of-cessation or the truth-of-the-path, what it leans on is an uncontaminated dharma). By this difference, afflictions are again divided into the two kinds "referring to the contaminated" and "referring to the uncontaminated."
The third set, dividing by whether the image and the substance resemble each other. When referring to an object of "one's own ground," the image that floats up in the mind looks like that substance, and this is called "referring to a thing-object set up by discrimination" (what is referred to is an object with a real thing behind it); but when referring to an object of "the truth-of-cessation, the truth-of-the-path," or of "another ground," the image and the substance do not look alike (because cessation-and-path and another ground are not what one has experienced first-hand, and can only be modeled in imagination by way of names), and this is called "referring to a name-object set up by discrimination" (what is referred to is only an object modeled out of name-and-terms). As for the other modes of dividing besides these, infer them by this principle and it will be clear.
〔所釋之頌〕第十二頌
講完前面的心所，接著說「六位心所」裡最沉重的一類：根本煩惱。這六個之所以叫「根本」，是因為它們是一切煩惱的根；其餘的隨煩惱都從它們派生。本節先把六個逐一講清楚（其中「惡見」還要再開成五種），再處理一連串「諸門」——它們彼此能不能相應、跟哪幾個識相應、跟哪幾種受相應、屬善屬惡、繫在哪一界、是見道斷還是修道斷、迷的是哪一諦……一門一門辨下去。
這六個根本煩惱，經論早有所本。煩惱都是依著識而轉、緣著境而起的；《解深密經·心意識相品》說那個「甚深細」的阿陀那識「一切種子如瀑流」，世尊「於凡愚不開演」，怕的正是有人對它「分別執為我」——這一句正是六根本裡頭一個『薩迦耶見（我執）』的經本，其餘各惑也都以這份我執為依而生起。不過心所一一的體性、作用，經裡說得較略，廣辨是在論裡，所以這一節主要依論本而立。論本有三：《瑜伽師地論·本地分》立根本煩惱『或分六種、或分十種』，並把五種惡見定為「染污慧為體」、把貪恚等定為『染著、憎恚、高舉、染污無知、異覺為體』——這正是本論說「染慧」「迷闇」「猶豫」種種體性的根據；《大乘阿毘達磨集論》則把每一個都用『性（體）·業』兩門並舉——這正是本論「性·業」格式的根據；《大乘阿毘達磨雜集論》又在體業之上把意思說得更明白，比方解釋貪為什麼生苦，說是「由愛力五取蘊生故」——這正是本論「謂由愛力，取蘊生故」一句之所承。下面就順著這三部論所立，把六個逐一講開。
六個根本煩惱
這貪等六個，本性都被「根本煩惱」這一類所收攝，所以得到「煩惱」這個名稱。下面逐一說。
一、貪——黏住三有的染著
什麼叫「貪」？它的本性是「染著」——對「有」（三界的生命存在）以及「有具」（招感、維持這存在的種種資具）起一種黏住、捨不得的染心。它的作用（業）是：能障礙「無貪」這個善心所，並且生出苦來。為什麼說它生苦？因為正是靠著這份愛染的力量，五取蘊（這套招來眾苦的身心）才一再地被取著、被生起。愛是後有的因，所以貪一動，輪迴的苦果就跟著來。
二、瞋——對逆境的憎恚
什麼叫「瞋」？它的本性是「憎恚」——對「苦」（種種違逆、不順意的境）以及「苦具」（帶來這些苦的人事物）起一種恨惡、排斥的心。它的作用是：能障礙「無瞋」，並且讓人「不安隱」、又成為一切惡行所依靠的地方。為什麼？因為瞋一起，必定讓身心發熱、焦惱不安，由此引發種種惡業，本性是不善的。貪是黏住、瞋是推開，是兩個相反方向的染心。
三、癡——對理對事的迷闇（就是無明）
什麼叫「癡」？也就是「無明」。它的本性是「迷闇」——對種種「理」（道理，如四諦緣起）和「事」（事相，如業果）都看不明白、糊塗黑暗。它的作用是：能障礙「無癡」，並且成為「一切雜染」所依靠的地方。為什麼說它是一切雜染所依？因為正由這份無明，才會接著生起疑、邪見，以及貪等其餘煩惱、種種隨煩惱的造作，而這些又能招來後世的雜染之法。所以癡是最底層的一個——別的煩惱要起，都離不開它。
四、慢——仗著自己抬高自己
什麼叫「慢」？它的本性是「高舉」——倚仗自己，相對於他人把自己抬高起來。它的作用是：能障礙「不慢」（謙下），並且生苦。為什麼生苦？因為一個人若有慢心，面對「德」（功德）和『有德的人』，心裡就謙卑不下來；由這份不謙下，生死就輪轉個沒完，要受種種苦。慢還有更細的分類，有「七慢」也有「九慢」之說，總的是就「三品」（比人強、與人平、比人劣這三種比較）以及「我」、「德」這些地方而生出來的。這些慢通通是「見道、修道」都要斷的。要附帶說明一點：聖者已到了某些位次，他相應的「我慢」仍然還會現行（還沒究竟斷盡），所以說『慢這一類也由此而起』，這並不矛盾——正因為連聖位都還有我慢的現行，慢通見修所斷才講得通。
五、疑——對真理的猶豫
什麼叫「疑」？它的本性是「猶豫」——對種種「諦理」（如四諦這樣的真實道理）拿不定主意、來回擺盪。它的作用是：能障礙「不疑」、妨礙善品的生起。為什麼？因為一個人猶豫不決，善法就生不起來——心定不下來，善根扎不下去。
關於「疑」的體性，這裡有兩種說法。
一說：疑就是以「慧」為體。 這一說主張：所謂疑，其實就是『一邊猶豫、一邊在那裡分別揀擇』，這種帶猶豫的揀擇就叫疑；而揀擇正是慧的事，所以疑的體就是慧。它還從梵語的構詞上立論：表「疑」的那個字，是在表『慧／思量』的那個語根上加了一個前綴而成的，可見疑不過是慧的一種變樣；而那「思量」的語根，跟『般若（慧）』在意義上沒有兩樣。
又說（應知正義）：疑另有它自己的體，不就是慧。 這一說主張：疑有它獨立的自體，它的作用是『讓慧定不下來』——既然是去攪動慧、使慧不決，可見它本身不就是慧（不然怎麼會去障礙慧）。《瑜伽》裡說：六個根本煩惱當中，只有「見」是世俗安立的有（因為見其實是慧的一分）；其餘五個（含疑）都是實有、各有自己的體性。至於前一說拿梵語構詞作證——『在慧的語根上加前綴就成疑、所以疑即是慧』——這論證站不住：因為同樣那個前綴，加在「智」的語根上時，「智」就變成了「識」，難道能說識就是智嗎？可見『語根』一旦加上助緣（前綴），意義就整個轉變了，前後不是同一回事。所以疑並不以慧為體。窺基《述記》正是這樣讀的：疑「別有自體」，所以說「猶豫」，是因為同時的疑（或異時的疑）令慧不決，所以它不是慧；至於對方拿梵語訓釋立論——把表『慧／思量』的那個語根加上前綴就說成是疑、便判疑體即是慧——窺基反問：那同樣的前綴助在表「智」的語根上，難道也要說智體即是識嗎？前綴一加，意義就轉，所以這個訓釋之說不成。
六、惡見——顛倒推度的染慧
什麼叫「惡見」？它的本性是「染慧」——對種種諦理顛倒地去推度、去判斷，是一種被染污的揀擇。它的作用是：能障礙「善見」（正見），並且招感苦果。為什麼？因為持惡見的人，多半要受苦。
這「惡見」的行相，再細分有五種：
（一）薩迦耶見（身見）。 它是在五取蘊上妄執有「我」、有「我所」（屬於我的東西）。它是一切錯誤見解的依靠——其餘的見幾乎都從它生出。它還有更細的差別，如「二十句」『六十五句』等開合的算法；這種身見唯屬「分別起」（後天經由分別、邪教熏起的那一類）。「薩迦耶」這個名，窺基《述記》舉了三家的不同訓法：薩婆多部把「薩」訓作「有」，所以叫「有身見」；經部把「薩」訓作『偽（虛偽）』，所以叫「虛偽身見」；大乘則取「移轉」一義——意思是這心上所現的、似「我」的那個相，本不是實有（是假法）、卻也不是全然沒有（它依他起而成所緣緣），就在這『非實非全無』的轉變上立名。三家訓名不同，正映出各自對「我相」是有是無的判攝有別。
（二）邊執見。 它就是在身見所執的那個「我」上，進一步偏執——要嘛執它「斷滅」，要嘛執它「常住」。它的作用是障礙「處中行」（中道）與出離。它的差別，散在種種錯誤見解裡：偏在「過去際」上立論的，有「四遍常論」「一分常論」等；偏在「未來際」上計度的，有「有想十六」、『無想／俱非各八』、「七斷滅論」等——這些都屬分別起。
（三）邪見。 它是誹謗因、誹謗果、誹謗作用、誹謗實事，以及前面四種見以外其餘種種錯誤的執著（之所以把雜七雜八的餘執都歸到邪見，是因為邪見『名義最遍』，像「增上緣」一樣涵蓋面最廣）。它的差別也散在種種見裡：偏過去際的有「二無因論」「四有邊等」「不死矯亂」；計未來際的有「五現涅槃」；或計大自在天、世主、帝釋、梵天等以及其餘物類是常恒不變的；或計自在天等是一切物的因；或胡亂計度種種假的解脫；或妄執『不是道的』當作「是道」——如此種種，通通歸邪見所攝。
（四）見取。 它是在種種「見」以及承載這些見的五蘊上，執它們為『最殊勝、能得清淨』。它的作用是成為一切鬥諍所依靠的地方——各執己見、互不相讓，諍論就由此起。
（五）戒禁取。 它是在隨順種種錯誤見解而立的「戒、禁」（戒條、禁忌的行法）以及承載它們的五蘊上，執它們為『最殊勝、能得清淨』。它的作用是成為「無利勤苦」所依靠的地方——白白吃苦、徒勞無益的苦行，就由它而來。
這裡要辨一處異文。有的地方說『執為最勝叫見取、執能得清淨叫戒取』（好像把『最勝』『清淨』分屬兩取）。要知道那是「影略說」或「隨轉門」——互相影顯而各舉一邊，並不是說兩取各偏一義。否則的話，『明明不是滅卻計為滅、明明不是道卻計為道』（這也含『執能得清淨』的意思）為什麼說它是邪見、而不收進二取裡呢？可見「最勝」「能淨」二義在二取裡是互通的，那句話只是各舉一邊而已。
七、十個煩惱裡，哪些是俱生、哪些是分別起
把六個根本（其中惡見開成五）合起來算，總共是十個煩惱。在這十個裡：
有六個——貪、瞋、癡、慢，加上身見、邊見——是俱生與分別起都通的。 也就是說，它們既可以「任運」地（先天、不假思索地）生起，也可以經「思察」（後天分別、受教熏習）而起，兩條路都走得通。
疑，以及後三見（邪見、見取、戒禁取），則唯是分別起。 因為這幾個一定要靠惡友的引誘或邪教的力量，再加上自己一番審察思量，才生得起來——不是任運就能冒出來的。窺基《述記》把這十個的俱生、分別判得更清楚：六根本裡『鈍的四個』（貪、瞋、癡、慢）和『利的兩個』（身見、邊見）通俱生與分別——除掉疑、邪見、見取、戒禁取這幾個（任運就起的是俱生，思察才起的是分別）；他並指出《顯揚論》第一卷和《瑜伽師地論》第八卷都說『這六個通俱生、分別』，作為這一判的論本。
這裡邊見的「通俱生」要補一段辨析，有兩種說法。
一說：邊見裡能通俱生的，只有「斷見」。 常見的行相比較粗，一定要靠惡友等外力才引得出來，所以常見不通俱生。《瑜伽》等就說：『哪一種邊執見是俱生的？是斷見所收的那種。』而且修學現觀的人會生起這樣一種怕：『如今的這個我，到底在哪裡？』乃至禽獸之類遇到違逆的因緣，也都本能地怕『我斷了』而起驚怖——這怕「斷」的本能，正說明斷見是任運俱生的。
又說：邊見的俱生其實也通常見。 這一說主張：前面《瑜伽》那句是『就粗相』說的，論其實理，俱生的邊見也通常見——你看禽獸之類，都本能地執「我常存」，所以才會火急火燎地聚集、長時間地營求資具（若不執我常在，何必為長久打算）。所以《顯揚》等諸論都說：在五取蘊上，執斷也好、計常也好，都可以是俱生、也可以是分別起。
〔根本煩惱的諸門分別〕
下面就這十個煩惱，從各個角度一門一門地辨。
〔相應門〕——它們彼此能不能同時相應
先問：這十個煩惱彼此能不能相應（同時並起）？
貪與瞋、貪與疑，一定不會同起。 因為貪所對的是「可愛境」、瞋所對的是「可憎境」，愛憎兩種境必不同時；而疑是對境拿不定，心既不決，就生不起對某境的染著——所以貪疑也不俱。
貪與慢、貪與見，則或可相應。 就「所愛」與『所陵（所要壓過）』的境不是同一個來說，是不俱的；但就「所染」與「所恃」的境可以是同一個來說，又是相應的；而且面對五種惡見的境都還可起愛，所以說貪與五見相應，沒有過失。
瞋與慢、瞋與疑，則或可同起。 就「所瞋」與「所恃」境不是一個說，是不相應的；就『所蔑（所輕蔑）』與「所憎」可以是同一個說，又是同起的。對疑來說：剛開始猶豫的時候，還沒對那境起憎，所以不俱；但久思不決、終於憤憤發作起來，這時就相應了——疑順自己的事或違自己的事，隨情況各有相應不相應。瞋與二取（見取、戒禁取）一定不相應，因為二取是把見、把道執為殊勝可貴，既然珍視它，就不會去憎它。瞋與三見（身見、邊見、邪見）則或可相應：在『可樂的蘊』上起身見、常見時，不生憎，所以不相應；在『可苦的蘊』上起身見、常見時，生憎恚，所以同起；斷見則翻過來（對可樂蘊起斷見會憎、對可苦蘊起斷見反而不憎），所以說瞋與斷見或有或無；邪見有時誹撥壞事、有時誹撥好事，依次說瞋或無（誹壞事不憎）或有（誹好事生憎）。
慢對境是決定的，疑則不決定，所以慢與疑沒有相應的道理。 慢與五見都容許同起，因為它們的行相輾轉相通、不相違背；不過慢與斷見一定不俱生（執我要斷的當下，沒有可陵、可恃的我了），慢與身見、邪見的某一分也是這樣（不俱）。疑因為不審決，正跟「見」（決度判斷）相違，所以疑與五見一定不同起。 五見彼此之間也一定不相應，因為一個心裡不會同時有好幾個慧（見即染慧，一心一慧）。癡與其餘九個則一定都相應，因為任何煩惱要生起，都必定由癡（無明）打底。
〔何識相應門〕——它們跟哪幾個識相應
再問：這十個煩惱跟哪幾個識相應？
第八藏識，一個都沒有（藏識是無覆無記，不與煩惱相應）。第七末那，只有四個（我癡、我見、我慢、我愛）。第六意識，十個全具。前五識，只有三個——貪、瞋、癡。 為什麼前五識只有這三個？因為前五識沒有分別作用；而慢、疑、見這些，要靠『稱量、計度』等分別才起得來，前五既無分別，自然就配不上它們。
〔何受相應門〕——它們跟哪幾種受相應
再問：這十個跟「受」（樂、苦、喜、憂、捨五受）怎麼相應？
貪、瞋、癡三個，不論俱生還是分別起，一切都容許與五受相應。 比如貪遇上違逆的因緣（求而不得），就與憂、苦同起；瞋遇上順己的境（順遂其恨），就與喜、樂同起。
慢與受的相應，有兩種說法。 一說：俱生與分別起的慢，容許與『除苦以外』的四受相應；當它倚仗的是『苦的、劣的蘊』時，就與憂相應。又說：俱生的慢也能與苦受同起，因為意地本來就有苦受，這前面已經說過了。要補一句：分別起的慢等，在「純苦趣」（如地獄）裡是沒有的，因為那裡沒有邪師、邪教來熏（分別起須外緣）；不過地獄眾生不是因此就不造引向惡趣的業——那種業要由分別起的煩惱才發得出來（它在別處、別時造）。
疑以及後三見，容許與四受相應。 比如欲界的疑，沒有苦等（但有喜等），也能與喜受同起；二取若緣的是『與憂相應的見』等，那時候就能與憂相應。
身、邊二見與受的相應，也有兩種說法。 一說：俱生的身、邊二見，只與喜、樂、捨三受相應，不與前五識同起，因為它唯是無記的（不發強烈的苦憂）；分別起的二見則容許與四受相應，比如執『帶苦的蘊』為我、我所時，常見、斷見翻過來會與憂相應。又說：二見若是俱生的，也能與苦受同起，因為在『純受苦的地方』緣的是『極苦的蘊』，自然與苦相應。《論》裡也說『俱生的一切煩惱，在三受裡都找得到現行』，詳細如前所說。
以上是依「實義」（嚴格地分）說的；若改依『粗相』（就大體相狀）說，則是這樣： 貪、慢、四見與樂、喜、捨相應；瞋只與苦、憂、捨相應；癡與五受都相應；邪見和疑與四受相應（除苦）。再就「地」的分齊說：貪、癡的「與樂相應」通於下四地（欲界以及初、二、三禪）；其餘七個的「與樂相應」則除掉欲界、通色界三地；至於疑、以及單獨現起的癡（獨行癡），在欲界裡只與憂、捨相應，在別地則與其餘受同起——這些都應如理去領會。
〔別境相應門〕——它們跟「別境」五心所怎麼相應
再問：這十個跟「別境」（欲、勝解、念、定、慧）這五個心所怎麼相應？
貪、瞋、癡、慢，容許與別境五個都同起，因為它們能專注一境，所以也能有「定」。疑以及五見，則各只容許與四個同起。 疑要除掉「勝解」——因為疑是不決定的，正跟『勝解（決定印持）』相違。五見要除掉「慧」——因為見本身就是「染慧」，不離慧，所以不另外再跟「慧」這一心所並起。
〔三性門〕——它們屬善、屬惡、還是無記
再問：這十個按善惡性質歸哪一類？
瞋唯是「不善」，因為它損害自己也損害他人。其餘九個則通「不善、無記」兩類，分情況而定：
凡屬「上二界」（色界、無色界）的煩惱，都唯是無記，因為它們被定力所伏（不發粗惡）。屬欲界繫而是「分別起」的，唯是不善（會引發惡行）。屬「俱生」而能引發惡行的，也算不善（損自他）；其餘的俱生煩惱則是無記，因為它們細微、不障善，沒有粗重地損惱自他。還要知道：俱生的身、邊二見唯是無記——它們不發惡業，雖然頻頻現起，卻不障礙善法。
〔界繫門〕——它們繫屬哪一界
再問：這十個繫屬三界中的哪一界？
瞋唯在欲界，其餘九個通於三界。
這裡有上、下地起惑的辨析。生在下地、還沒離下地之染的人，上地的煩惱不會現前——一定要修得了那一上地的根本定，那一地的煩惱才容許現前（有漏道雖伏不了分別惑和細的俱生惑，卻能伏俱生的粗惑，由此漸次證入上地的根本定）。反過來，生在上地的人，下地分別、俱生的種種惑都還可能現起（譬如生在第四禪的中有身、將要下生到下地時，會起下地潤生的俱生愛）。
煩惱還能『越界緣』。下地的煩惱也能緣上地：如《瑜伽》說『欲界繫的貪，會貪求上地受生、貪味上地的定』；又有憎嫉滅道的、總緣諸行而執我我所執斷常的、慢者得緣上地的——其餘幾個能緣上地，道理也很容易成立。（有的地方說貪瞋慢等不緣上地，那是依大體或依別緣而說。）上地的煩惱也能緣下地：生在上地的人，會仗著自己的勝德而陵蔑下地的有情；總緣諸行而執我我所執斷常的愛，也得緣下地；至於疑與後三見緣不緣下，如理思之即可（說上地不緣下地者，是依大體或別緣而說）。
〔學等門〕——它們屬不屬「學、無學」
再問：這十個歸不歸「有學、無學」？不歸。 因為「學、無學」唯是善性的，而這十個是煩惱（染），所以不在其中。
〔見修所斷門〕——它們是見道斷還是修道斷
再問：這十個怎麼斷？首先，它們不是「非所斷」——「非所斷」指的是無漏的、非染的法，而這十個是染，當然要斷。再分：
分別起的，唯是「見道」所斷，因為它們粗、容易斷。俱生的，唯是「修道」所斷，因為它們細、難斷。而見道所斷的這十個，在「真見道」位其實是一齊頓斷的——因為真見道是總緣四諦而證理的（一時總斷，不是一個一個慢慢來）。
接著辨「迷諦」的相，有「總」有「別」。總的說：這十個都迷四諦——苦諦、集諦是它們的「因依處」（煩惱依苦集而起），滅諦、道諦是它們的「怖畏處」（煩惱怕滅道而排拒）。別的說：是各別地迷某一諦的相而起——
身、邊二見唯迷「苦諦」（它們只在「果處」上起，別違「空、非我」之理，而空非我屬苦諦）；其餘八個則通迷四諦。其中：疑、與三見（邪見、見取、戒禁取）親迷苦理；二取是把那三見、戒禁以及承載它們的蘊執為殊勝、能淨，並且對自己的見、他人的見以及它們的眷屬，依次起貪、起恚、起慢；與這些相應的無明，跟這九個一同迷；而「不共無明」則親迷苦理。疑與邪見也親迷集諦等；二取、貪等的迷集，比照迷苦去理解即可。又：瞋也能親迷滅、道二諦——因為它怖畏滅道，由怖畏而生憎嫉。
迷諦的「親、疎」，就粗相說是如上這樣；若更委細地說：貪、瞋、慢、三見、疑的俱生，隨情況比照前面（粗相）所說。但要特別點出——俱生的身、邊二見，以及與它們相應的愛、慢、無明，雖然迷的是苦諦，卻因為細、難斷，所以要到修道才斷（不在見道）。瞋以及其餘的愛等，是迷『別別的事』而生、不違背諦觀（不直接障礙見諦），所以也是修道所斷。
〔緣有事無事門〕——它們所緣的本質有無、有漏無漏
最後辨煩惱所緣的「本質」。要知道：種種煩惱都有它的「相分」（心內變現的影像），但這影像所仗託的「本質」有時有、有時沒有——所以分別叫「緣有事煩惱」「緣無事煩惱」。它們親緣的所緣雖然都是有漏的，但所仗託的本質也可能通於無漏（比如緣滅道二諦時）——所以又分別叫『緣有漏煩惱』『緣無漏煩惱』。再者：緣「自地」的，相分跟本質相似，叫「緣分別所起事境」；緣滅道二諦以及緣「他地」的，相分跟本質不相似，叫「緣分別所起名境」。其餘各門的分別，如理思之即可。
承衍
這六根本煩惱（惡見開五為十）逐一所立的『體（自性）·業（作用）』與一連串諸門分別，是整個唯識系安立『染法之本』的樞紐，後出諸論逐一承用。《百法明門論》把這六根本列為心所裡的根本煩惱一類——貪、瞋、癡、慢、疑、惡見各立一條（惡見再開為身見、邊見、邪見、見取、戒禁取五），逐法相承，本節則合起來釋它們的體業與彼此相攝。《唯識三十論頌》的頌十二（「煩惱謂貪、瞋、癡、慢、疑、惡見」），正是本節所釋的本頌，逐頌相承；而末那章頌六所說的「四煩惱」（我癡、我見、我慢、我愛），其實就是這六根本裡的癡、見、慢、貪，只取與末那相應的那一分。《辯中邊論·辯障品》立「煩惱障」，以這些根本煩惱為染之本、為障解脫之首，所承的正是本節『障某善·招苦』的業義。《攝大乘論》於彼入因果分、應知勝相中立「煩惱雜染」（三雜染之一），謂它依阿賴耶持種而起，所承的正是這六根本依識而染的義理。至於《二十唯識論》，主於成立唯識無境、破外人實境之執，於根本煩惱的體業、相應沒有正面對位，這裡從闕。
Having finished the earlier mental factors, we come now to the heaviest class within the "six categories of mental factors": the root afflictions. These six are called "root" because they are the root of every affliction; the remaining secondary afflictions are all derived from them. This section first explains the six one by one (with "wrong view" further opened into five kinds), and then works through a long sequence of "gates" — whether they can associate with one another, which consciousnesses they associate with, which feelings they associate with, whether they are wholesome or unwholesome, in which realm they are bound, whether they are cut at the path of seeing or the path of cultivation, which of the truths they are deluded about — testing them one gate at a time.
These six root afflictions have their roots in scripture and treatise alike. Every affliction turns in dependence on consciousness and arises by taking an object as condition. The Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, in its chapter on mind, mentation, and consciousness, says that the "profound and subtle" appropriating consciousness has "all its seeds like a rushing torrent," and that the World-Honored One "did not expound it to the foolish" — for fear, precisely, that someone would "discriminate and grasp it as a self." That very line is the scriptural basis for the first of the six roots, "the view of a real self in the perishing aggregates (self-grasping)"; and the other afflictions, too, all arise in dependence on this grasping at self. But the substance and function of each mental associate is treated only sparingly in the scriptures, the full analysis lying in the treatises — so this section stands chiefly on the treatise-basis. There are three treatise-sources. The Yogācārabhūmi, in its Maulī-bhūmi, sets up the root afflictions "either as six kinds or as ten kinds," fixes the five wrong views as "having defiled wisdom for their substance," and fixes greed, anger, and the rest as "having defiled clinging, hatred-and-rage, self-elevation, defiled ignorance, and divergent cognition for their substance" — this is the ground for what the present treatise calls the substances "defiled wisdom," "murky blindness," "wavering," and the rest. The Abhidharma-samuccaya takes up each one under the two heads "substance (nature)" and "function (karmic work)" together — this is the ground for the present treatise's "nature · function" format. And the Abhidharma-samuccaya-vyākhyā makes the sense plainer still, building on substance and function: in explaining why greed produces suffering, for instance, it says it is "because the five appropriated aggregates are born by the force of craving" — this is what the present treatise's line "because by the force of craving the appropriated aggregates are born" carries on. What follows, then, expounds the six one by one, following the framework these three treatises set up.
B. The Six Root Afflictions
These six — greed and the rest — are all, in their very nature, gathered under the class "root affliction," and so they earn the name "affliction." We take them up one at a time.
1. Greed — the defiled clinging that sticks to the three forms of existence
What is greed? Its nature is defiled clinging — toward "existence" (the living existence found in the three realms) and toward the "supports of existence" (the various provisions that summon and sustain that existence), it raises a clinging, reluctant-to-let-go, defiled mind. Its function (its karmic work) is this: it obstructs the wholesome associate "non-greed," and it produces suffering. Why say it produces suffering? Because it is precisely by the force of this loving defilement that the five appropriated aggregates — this body-and-mind complex that draws in all suffering — are again and again appropriated and brought into being. Craving is the cause of future existence, so the moment greed stirs, the painful fruit of saṃsāra follows along behind it.
2. Anger — the hatred and rage toward what goes against us
What is anger? Its nature is hatred and rage — toward "suffering" (the various adverse, unwelcome objects) and toward the "supports of suffering" (the persons and things that bring those sufferings), it raises a hating, repelling mind. Its function is this: it obstructs "non-anger," it leaves a person "ill at ease," and it becomes the basis on which every evil deed rests. Why? Because once anger arises, body and mind necessarily grow hot and burn with agitated distress, and from this all sorts of evil karma are set off; its nature is unwholesome. Greed sticks fast, anger pushes away — they are two defiled minds running in opposite directions.
3. Delusion — the murky blindness toward principle and toward fact (this is ignorance)
What is delusion? It is also called "ignorance." Its nature is murky blindness — toward all "principles" (such as the four truths and dependent arising) and toward all "facts" (such as karma and its fruit), it cannot see clearly, it is muddled and dark. Its function is this: it obstructs "non-delusion," and it becomes the basis on which "every defilement" rests. Why say it is the basis of every defilement? Because it is precisely from this ignorance that there next arise doubt, false views, and the activity of the remaining afflictions such as greed, along with all the secondary afflictions; and these in turn are able to summon the defiled phenomena of future lives. So delusion is the bottommost of them all — for any other affliction to arise, it cannot do without delusion.
4. Conceit — leaning on oneself to raise oneself up
What is conceit? Its nature is self-elevation — leaning on oneself, one raises oneself up relative to others. Its function is this: it obstructs "non-conceit" (humility), and it produces suffering. Why does it produce suffering? Because if a person harbors conceit, then in the presence of "virtue" (genuine merit) and "those who have virtue," the mind cannot bow down; and out of this failure to bow down, birth-and-death turns round without end and one undergoes all manner of suffering. Conceit has finer subdivisions as well — there is talk of "seven conceits" and of "nine conceits," but on the whole they arise around the "three grades" (the three comparisons: better than another, equal to another, worse than another) and around the loci of "self" and "virtue." All these conceits are cut by both the path of seeing and the path of cultivation. One thing should be added: a noble one who has reached certain stages still has his associated "conceit of self" arise and operate (it is not yet finally and fully cut), so when it is said that "conceit too arises from this," there is no contradiction — it is precisely because even the noble stages still have the self-conceit operating that the claim "conceit belongs to both seeing and cultivation as what is cut" holds together.
5. Doubt — wavering toward the truth
What is doubt? Its nature is wavering — toward the various "truth-principles" (such as the real principles of the four truths), it cannot make up its mind and swings back and forth. Its function is this: it obstructs "non-doubt" and it hinders the arising of wholesome qualities. Why? Because a person who wavers indecisively cannot bring wholesome dharmas to birth — the mind will not settle, and the wholesome roots cannot take hold.
On the very substance of "doubt," there are two readings here.
One view: doubt has wisdom for its substance. This view holds that what we call doubt is really "wavering while at the same time discriminating and selecting" — this kind of selection-with-wavering is what is named doubt; and selecting is precisely the work of wisdom, so the substance of doubt just is wisdom. It further argues from word-formation in Sanskrit: the word that expresses "doubt" is formed by adding a prefix onto the very verbal root that expresses "wisdom / pondering," which shows that doubt is nothing but a variant form of wisdom; and that "pondering" root is, in meaning, no different from prajñā (wisdom).
Another view (the settled, correct reading): doubt has its own substance and is not wisdom. This view holds that doubt has its own independent substance, and its function is "keeping wisdom from settling" — since its work is to stir up wisdom and leave it undecided, this shows that it is not itself wisdom (for if it were, how could it obstruct wisdom?). The Yogācārabhūmi says: among the six root afflictions, only "view" is an existent established by convention (because view is in fact a portion of wisdom); the remaining five (doubt included) are all truly existent, each with its own substance. As for the earlier view's appeal to Sanskrit word-formation — "add a prefix to the root of wisdom and you get doubt, therefore doubt is wisdom" — this argument does not stand: because when that very same prefix is added to the root for "cognition / understanding," "cognition" turns into "consciousness" — yet would one dare to say that consciousness is cognition? This shows that once a "root" takes on an auxiliary condition (a prefix), the meaning shifts entirely, and the before and after are not the same thing at all. So doubt does not have wisdom for its substance. Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) reads it exactly this way: doubt "has its own separate substance," and the reason it is called "wavering" is that a simultaneous doubt (or a doubt at another moment) keeps wisdom from settling — so it is not wisdom. As for the opponent's argument from the Sanskrit gloss — adding a prefix to the root that expresses "wisdom / pondering" and so judging the substance of doubt to be wisdom itself — Kuiji turns the question back: then when that same prefix is applied to the root that expresses "cognition," must one likewise say that the substance of cognition is consciousness itself? Add the prefix and the meaning shifts; so this glossing argument does not hold.
6. Wrong view — the defiled wisdom that judges things upside-down
What is wrong view? Its nature is defiled wisdom — toward the various truth-principles it judges and assesses upside-down; it is a defiled selecting. Its function is this: it obstructs "right view," and it summons painful fruit. Why? Because those who hold wrong views, for the most part, are bound to suffer.
The mode of operation of this "wrong view," subdivided more finely, has five kinds:
(i) The view of a real self in the perishing aggregates (satkāya-dṛṣṭi, the self-view). It is the deluded grasping, upon the five appropriated aggregates, that there is a "self" and there are "things belonging to the self" (what is mine). It is the basis on which every mistaken view rests — nearly all the other views are born from it. It too has finer distinctions, such as the "twenty-clause" and "sixty-five-clause" schemes of expansion and contraction; and this self-view belongs solely to the "discrimination-arisen" type (the type acquired later, stirred up by way of discrimination and by perverse teaching). For the name "satkāya," Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) cites three schools' differing glosses: the Sarvāstivāda glosses "sat" as "existent," so they call it the "view of an existent self"; the Sautrāntika glosses "sat" as "false," so they call it the "view of a false self"; the Mahāyāna takes the sense of "shifting transformation" — meaning that the "self"-like image that appears upon this mind is not really existent (it is a provisional dharma), yet is not utterly nothing either (it arises dependently and so becomes an objective-support condition), and the name is established precisely upon this "neither-real-nor-utterly-nothing" transformation. The three schools' glosses differ, which exactly reflects how each one judges the "self-image" to be existent or non-existent.
(ii) The view that grasps an extreme (the edge-clinging view). It is, upon that "self" grasped by the self-view, the further biased grasping — either grasping it as "cut off into nothing" (annihilation) or grasping it as "permanently abiding" (eternalism). Its function is to obstruct "the middle course" (the middle way) and to obstruct release. Its distinctions are scattered throughout the various mistaken views: those who argue with a bias toward the "past extreme" hold the "four eternalisms," the "partial eternalism," and the like; those who calculate with a bias toward the "future extreme" hold "the sixteen with perception," "the eight without perception / the eight neither-nor," "the seven annihilationisms," and the like — these all belong to the discrimination-arisen type.
(iii) Perverse view (denial-view). It is the slandering of cause, the slandering of effect, the slandering of activity, and the slandering of real facts, together with all the other mistaken graspings outside the preceding four kinds of view (the reason the miscellaneous leftover graspings are all gathered under perverse view is that perverse view is "the most pervasive in name and meaning" — like the "predominant condition," it covers the widest range). Its distinctions too are scattered throughout the various views: biased toward the past extreme are the "two causelessness doctrines," the "four finitude-and-the-rest," and the "deathless equivocation"; calculating toward the future extreme is the "five present-life nirvāṇas"; or it reckons Maheśvara, the world-lord, Indra, Brahmā, and so on, and the other categories of things, to be permanent and unchanging; or it reckons that Maheśvara and the rest are the cause of all things; or it recklessly calculates various counterfeit liberations; or it falsely grasps "what is not the path" as being "the path" — all such things are gathered under perverse view.
(iv) View-attachment (the grasping of views as supreme). It is, upon the various "views" and upon the five aggregates that carry those views, the grasping of them as "most excellent, able to win purity." Its function is to become the basis on which all disputation rests — each clinging to his own view and refusing to yield, and so quarrels arise from it.
(v) Attachment to precepts and observances (rule-and-ritual grasping). It is, upon the "precepts and observances" (the codes and taboo-practices) set up in accordance with various mistaken views, and upon the five aggregates that carry them, the grasping of them as "most excellent, able to win purity." Its function is to become the basis on which "profitless toil and hardship" rests — the futile, fruitless ascetic suffering comes from it.
Here a variant reading should be sorted out. Some passages say "grasping as most excellent is called view-attachment; grasping as able to win purity is called rule-and-ritual grasping" (as though "most excellent" and "purity" were divided between the two graspings). One should understand that this is "abbreviation by mutual implication" or "the gate of accommodation" — each is mentioned for one side so that they mutually illumine each other; it is not that the two graspings each lean to one meaning. Otherwise, "what is not cessation reckoned as cessation, what is not the path reckoned as the path" (which also carries the sense of "grasping as able to win purity") — why is it said to be perverse view and not gathered into the two graspings? This shows that the two senses, "most excellent" and "able to purify," are interchangeable within the two graspings; that passage merely mentions one side of each.
7. Among the ten afflictions, which are innate and which are discrimination-arisen
Counting the six roots together (with wrong view opened into five), there are ten afflictions in all. Among these ten:
Six — greed, anger, delusion, conceit, plus the self-view and the edge-clinging view — run through both the innate and the discrimination-arisen. That is, they can arise both "spontaneously" (innately, without reflection) and through "deliberate examination" (later discrimination, stirred up by teaching) — both roads are open to them.
Doubt, together with the latter three views (perverse view, view-attachment, rule-and-ritual grasping), are solely discrimination-arisen. Because these necessarily depend on the enticement of bad friends or the force of perverse teaching, plus a stretch of one's own scrutinizing and pondering, before they can arise — they do not simply spring up spontaneously. Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) sorts out the innate and the discrimination-arisen of these ten still more clearly: among the six roots, the "four dull ones" (greed, anger, delusion, conceit) and the "two sharp ones" (self-view, edge-clinging view) run through both the innate and the discrimination-arisen — leaving out doubt, perverse view, view-attachment, and rule-and-ritual grasping (what arises spontaneously is innate, what arises only through deliberate examination is discrimination-arisen); and he points out that both the first scroll of the Prakaraṇāryavāca and the eighth scroll of the Yogācārabhūmi say "these six run through both the innate and the discrimination-arisen," which serves as the treatise-basis for this judgment.
Here the "runs through the innate" of the edge-clinging view needs a passage of analysis, and there are two readings.
One view: within the edge-clinging view, only the "annihilation view" runs through the innate. The mode of the eternalism view is rather coarse, and it must be drawn out by external forces such as bad friends, so eternalism does not run through the innate. The Yogācārabhūmi and others say: "Which kind of edge-grasping view is innate? The kind gathered under the annihilation view." Moreover, one who cultivates direct contemplation will give rise to this kind of fear: "This very self I now have — where exactly is it?" And even animals and the like, when they meet adverse conditions, instinctively fear that "my self is cut off" and rouse alarm — this instinctive fear of being "cut off" precisely shows that the annihilation view is spontaneous and innate.
Another view: the innate edge-clinging view in fact runs through eternalism as well. This view holds that the earlier line in the Yogācārabhūmi was spoken "with respect to the coarse mode"; argued by its true principle, the innate edge-clinging view runs through eternalism too — observe that animals and the like instinctively grasp "my self permanently endures," which is exactly why they urgently gather and over long stretches strive to lay up provisions (for if they did not grasp the self as permanently present, why plan for the long term?). So the Prakaraṇāryavāca and other treatises say: upon the five appropriated aggregates, grasping annihilation and reckoning permanence can both be innate and can both be discrimination-arisen.
[The Gate-by-Gate Analysis of the Root Afflictions]
Now, with respect to these ten afflictions, we analyze them from each angle, one gate at a time.
[The Gate of Mutual Association] — whether they can associate with one another
First ask: can these ten afflictions associate (arise simultaneously) with one another?
Greed and anger, greed and doubt, certainly never arise together. Because what greed faces is a "lovable object" and what anger faces is a "hateful object," and the two objects, love and hate, cannot be simultaneous; and doubt is undecided toward its object, so since the mind does not settle, no defiled clinging toward a given object can arise — therefore greed and doubt also do not co-occur.
Greed and conceit, greed and view, may associate. With respect to "what is loved" and "what is to be overtopped" not being the same object, they do not co-occur; but with respect to "what is defiled-with" and "what is relied-upon" being able to be the same object, they do associate; and one can still raise craving while facing the objects of all five wrong views, so it is said that greed associates with the five views, without fault.
Anger and conceit, anger and doubt, may arise together. With respect to "what is angered-at" and "what is relied-upon" not being one object, they do not associate; with respect to "what is despised" and "what is hated" being able to be the same object, they do arise together. As for doubt: at the very first wavering, hatred toward that object has not yet arisen, so they do not co-occur; but when, after long pondering without resolution, one at last flares up in resentment, then they associate — doubt that accords with one's own affairs or that goes against one's own affairs associates or fails to associate as the case may be. Anger and the two graspings (view-attachment, rule-and-ritual grasping) certainly do not associate, because the two graspings grasp views and the path as excellent and prizeworthy, and since one treasures it, one will not hate it. Anger and the three views (self-view, edge-clinging view, perverse view) may associate: when one raises self-view or eternalism upon "delightful aggregates," no hatred is born, so they do not associate; when one raises self-view or eternalism upon "painful aggregates," hatred and rage are born, so they arise together; the annihilation view reverses this (raising annihilation upon delightful aggregates brings hatred, raising it upon painful aggregates brings no hatred), so it is said that anger and the annihilation view may or may not co-occur; perverse view sometimes denies bad facts, sometimes denies good facts, so accordingly anger is said to be absent (denying bad facts brings no hatred) or present (denying good facts brings hatred).
Conceit is decided toward its object while doubt is undecided, so there is no principle by which conceit and doubt associate. Conceit may arise together with all five views, because their modes of operation interpenetrate one another in succession and are not mutually opposed; however, conceit certainly does not co-arise with the annihilation view (at the very moment of grasping that the self is to be cut off, there is no self to be overtopped or relied upon), and the same holds with a certain portion of self-view and perverse view (no co-occurrence). Because doubt does not examine-and-decide, it is precisely opposed to "view" (which decides and judges), so doubt certainly does not co-arise with the five views. The five views also certainly do not associate with one another, because within a single mind there cannot be several instances of wisdom at once (view is defiled wisdom, and one mind has one wisdom). Delusion certainly associates with all the other nine, because for any affliction to arise, it must rest on the foundation of delusion (ignorance).
[The Gate of Which Consciousnesses] — which consciousnesses they associate with
Next ask: which consciousnesses do these ten afflictions associate with?
The eighth, the storehouse consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna), associates with none of them (the storehouse consciousness is unobstructed-indeterminate, and does not associate with afflictions). The seventh, manas, associates with only four (self-delusion, self-view, self-conceit, self-love). The sixth, the mental consciousness, possesses all ten in full. The first five consciousnesses associate with only three — greed, anger, delusion. Why do the first five consciousnesses have only these three? Because the first five consciousnesses have no discriminative function; whereas conceit, doubt, and the views need such discrimination as "weighing and calculating" before they can arise, and since the first five lack discrimination, they naturally cannot pair with them.
[The Gate of Which Feelings] — which feelings they associate with
Next ask: how do these ten associate with "feeling" (the five feelings: pleasure, pain, joy, sorrow, equanimity)?
The three — greed, anger, delusion — whether innate or discrimination-arisen, may all associate with all five feelings. For example, when greed meets adverse conditions (seeking but not getting), it arises together with sorrow and pain; when anger meets an object favorable to itself (its hatred running its course), it arises together with joy and pleasure.
The association of conceit with feeling has two readings. One view: innate and discrimination-arisen conceit may associate with the four feelings "other than pain"; when what it leans on is "painful, inferior aggregates," it associates with sorrow. Another view: innate conceit can also arise together with painful feeling, because the mental ground does have painful feeling, as was already stated earlier. One should add a line: discrimination-arisen conceit and the like are absent in the "wholly painful destinies" (such as the hells), because there are no perverse teachers or perverse teachings there to stir them up (the discrimination-arisen requires external conditions); nevertheless, the hell-beings are not thereby unable to commit the karma leading to evil destinies — such karma is set off by discrimination-arisen afflictions (committed in other places, at other times).
Doubt, together with the latter three views, may associate with four feelings. For example, doubt in the desire realm has no pain and the like (but has joy and the like), and can also arise together with joy; if the two graspings take as object "a view associated with sorrow" and the like, then at that time they can associate with sorrow.
The association of the self-view and edge-clinging view with feeling also has two readings. One view: the innate self-view and edge-clinging view associate only with the three feelings of joy, pleasure, and equanimity, and do not arise together with the first five consciousnesses, because they are solely indeterminate (they do not set off strong pain or sorrow); the discrimination-arisen pair, however, may associate with four feelings — for example, when one grasps "aggregates carrying suffering" as self and as mine, eternalism and annihilation, reversely, will associate with sorrow. Another view: if the two views are innate, they too can arise together with painful feeling, because in "a place of wholly undergoing suffering" they take as object "extremely painful aggregates" and so naturally associate with pain. The treatise also says that "all innate afflictions are found operating within the three feelings," in detail as stated before.
The above is spoken according to "the strict sense" (analyzed rigorously); if instead we speak according to "the coarse mode" (the general aspect), then it is thus: greed, conceit, and the four views associate with pleasure, joy, and equanimity; anger associates only with pain, sorrow, and equanimity; delusion associates with all five feelings; perverse view and doubt associate with four feelings (except pain). Speaking further by the boundaries of "ground": the "association with pleasure" of greed and delusion runs through the lower four grounds (the desire realm together with the first, second, and third meditative absorptions); the "association with pleasure" of the remaining seven excludes the desire realm and runs through the three grounds of the form realm; as for doubt, and delusion that arises by itself (independent delusion), within the desire realm it associates only with sorrow and equanimity, while in other grounds it arises together with the other feelings — all this should be understood in accord with principle.
[The Gate of Association with the Object-Specific Associates] — how they associate with the five "object-specific" mental factors
Next ask: how do these ten associate with the "object-specific" associates (aspiration, resolve, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom), these five mental factors?
Greed, anger, delusion, conceit may all arise together with all five object-specific associates, because they can fix upon a single object, and so they can also have "concentration." Doubt and the five views, however, may each arise together with only four. Doubt must exclude "resolve" — because doubt is undecided, precisely opposed to "resolve" (the decided holding-fast). The five views must exclude "wisdom" — because view itself is "defiled wisdom," not separate from wisdom, so it does not additionally arise alongside the "wisdom" associate.
[The Gate of the Three Natures] — whether they are wholesome, unwholesome, or indeterminate
Next ask: under which of the three natures do these ten fall?
Anger is solely "unwholesome," because it harms both oneself and others. The remaining nine run through both classes, "unwholesome" and "indeterminate," as the case decides:
Any affliction belonging to "the upper two realms" (the form realm and the formless realm) is solely indeterminate, because they are subdued by the power of concentration (they do not set off coarse evil). Those bound to the desire realm that are "discrimination-arisen" are solely unwholesome (they trigger evil deeds). Those that are "innate" and able to trigger evil deeds also count as unwholesome (they harm self and others); the remaining innate afflictions are indeterminate, because they are subtle, do not obstruct the wholesome, and do not coarsely harm and distress self and others. One should also know: the innate self-view and edge-clinging view are solely indeterminate — they do not set off evil karma, and although they operate again and again, they do not obstruct wholesome dharmas.
[The Gate of Realm-Binding] — which realm they are bound to
Next ask: to which of the three realms are these ten bound?
Anger is found only in the desire realm; the remaining nine run through the three realms.
Here there is an analysis of afflictions arising across upper and lower grounds. For one born in a lower ground who has not yet left the defilement of the lower ground, the afflictions of an upper ground will not appear before him — only when he has cultivated the root absorption of that upper ground will the afflictions of that ground be permitted to appear (the contaminated path, though it cannot subdue the discrimination-arisen afflictions or the subtle innate ones, can subdue the coarse innate ones, and by this gradually realizes entry into the root absorption of the upper ground). Conversely, for one born in an upper ground, the various discrimination-arisen and innate afflictions of the lower grounds can still arise (for instance, the intermediate-existence being born in the fourth absorption, about to descend and be reborn into a lower ground, will raise the innate craving of the lower ground that moistens rebirth).
The afflictions can also "take an object across realms." Lower-ground afflictions can take an upper ground as object: as the Yogācārabhūmi says, "the greed bound to the desire realm craves rebirth in an upper ground and savors the absorption of an upper ground"; and there are those who hate and envy cessation and the path, those who take all formations together as object and grasp self, mine, annihilation, and permanence, and the conceited who can take an upper ground as object — that the remaining few can take an upper ground as object is also easily established as principle. (Where some passages say that greed, anger, conceit and the like do not take an upper ground as object, that is spoken with respect to the general case or with respect to a particular condition.) Upper-ground afflictions can also take a lower ground as object: one born in an upper ground will, leaning on his own superior virtue, overtop and despise the beings of a lower ground; the craving that takes all formations together as object and grasps self, mine, annihilation, and permanence can also take a lower ground as object; and as for whether doubt and the latter three views take a lower ground as object, ponder it in accord with principle (where it is said that an upper ground does not take a lower ground as object, that is spoken with respect to the general case or a particular condition).
[The Gate of the Trainee and the Rest] — whether they belong to "trainee" and "beyond-training"
Next ask: do these ten belong to "trainee" and "beyond-training"? They do not. Because "trainee" and "beyond-training" are solely of wholesome nature, while these ten are afflictions (defiled), and so they are not among them.
[The Gate of What Is Cut by Seeing or by Cultivation] — whether they are cut at the path of seeing or the path of cultivation
Next ask: how are these ten cut? First, they are not "what is not to be cut" — "what is not to be cut" refers to the uncontaminated, undefiled dharmas, while these ten are defiled, and so of course they must be cut. Further dividing:
The discrimination-arisen are solely cut by "the path of seeing," because they are coarse and easily cut. The innate are solely cut by "the path of cultivation," because they are subtle and hard to cut. And these ten that are cut at the path of seeing are, at the position of "the true path of seeing," cut all at once in a single stroke — because the true path of seeing takes all four truths together as object and realizes the principle (cut all at once, not slowly one by one).
Next we sort out the modes of "being deluded about the truths," which have a "general" and a "particular" account. In the general account: all ten are deluded about the four truths — the truth of suffering and the truth of origin are their "loci of cause-and-basis" (the afflictions arise in dependence on suffering and origin), and the truth of cessation and the truth of the path are their "loci of dread" (the afflictions dread cessation and the path and repel them). In the particular account: they arise each being deluded about the mode of one particular truth —
The self-view and edge-clinging view are deluded solely about "the truth of suffering" (they arise only upon the "locus of fruit," specifically violating the principle of "emptiness and non-self," and emptiness-and-non-self belongs to the truth of suffering); the remaining eight run through delusion about all four truths. Among them: doubt and the three views (perverse view, view-attachment, rule-and-ritual grasping) are intimately deluded about the principle of suffering; the two graspings grasp those three views, the precepts-and-observances, and the aggregates carrying them as excellent and as able to purify, and toward one's own view, another's view, and their retinues, raise greed, raise rage, and raise conceit in turn; the ignorance associated with these is, along with these nine, deluded together; while the "exclusive ignorance" (independent ignorance) is intimately deluded about the principle of suffering. Doubt and perverse view are also intimately deluded about the truth of origin and the rest; that the two graspings, greed, and so on are deluded about origin should be understood by analogy with their delusion about suffering. Furthermore, anger too can be intimately deluded about the two truths of cessation and the path — because it dreads cessation and the path, and out of dread gives rise to hatred and envy.
The "intimate and distant" of being deluded about the truths is, in the coarse mode, as above; if stated more finely: the innate forms of greed, anger, conceit, the three views, and doubt are, as the case dictates, understood by analogy with what was said before (in the coarse mode). But one point must be singled out — the innate self-view and edge-clinging view, together with the craving, conceit, and ignorance associated with them, although they are deluded about the truth of suffering, are nonetheless, because they are subtle and hard to cut, cut only at the path of cultivation (not at the path of seeing). Anger and the remaining craving and the like arise being deluded about "particular facts" and do not violate the contemplation of the truths (they do not directly obstruct the seeing of the truths), and so they too are cut at the path of cultivation.
[The Gate of Taking an Object With or Without a Real Substrate] — the presence or absence and the contamination-status of the substrate they take as object
Finally we sort out the "substrate" that the afflictions take as object. One should know: every affliction has its "image-portion" (the reflected image manifested within the mind), but the "substrate" that this image leans upon is sometimes present and sometimes absent — and so they are distinguished as "afflictions taking an object with a real substrate" and "afflictions taking an object without a real substrate." Although the object they intimately take is in every case contaminated, the substrate they lean upon may also run through the uncontaminated (for example, when taking the two truths of cessation and the path as object) — and so they are further distinguished as "contaminated-object afflictions" and "uncontaminated-object afflictions." Furthermore: those taking "their own ground" as object have an image-portion resembling the substrate, and are called "taking as object the fact-domain arisen by discrimination"; those taking the two truths of cessation and the path as object, and those taking "another ground" as object, have an image-portion not resembling the substrate, and are called "taking as object the name-domain arisen by discrimination." The analysis of the remaining gates should be pondered in accord with principle.
Onward Transmission
The "substance (own-nature) · function (karmic work)" established for each of these six root afflictions (with wrong view opened into five, making ten), together with the long gate-by-gate analysis, is the pivot on which the whole consciousness-only system founds "the root of defiled dharmas," and the later treatises take it up one by one. The Hundred Dharmas treatise lists these six roots as a class within the mental factors, the root afflictions — greed, anger, delusion, conceit, doubt, and wrong view each set up as a single entry (wrong view further opened into the five: self-view, edge-clinging view, perverse view, view-attachment, rule-and-ritual grasping), each dharma carried on in turn, while the present section explains them together, their substance and function and how they mutually include one another. The Thirty Verses — verse twelve ("the afflictions are greed, anger, delusion, conceit, doubt, and wrong view") — is the very root-verse this section expounds, verse answering to verse; and the "four afflictions" spoken of in verse six of the manas chapter (self-delusion, self-view, self-conceit, self-love) are in fact the delusion, view, conceit, and greed among these six roots, taking only the portion that associates with the manas. The Madhyānta-vibhāga, in its chapter on the obstructions, sets up "the afflictive obstruction," taking these root afflictions as the root of defilement and the foremost obstruction to liberation — which carries on precisely the present section's sense of "obstructing such-and-such wholesome quality · summoning suffering" as their function. The Mahāyāna-saṃgraha, in its chapter on the cause-and-fruit of entry and its account of the characteristics to be known, sets up "afflictive defilement" (one of the three defilements), saying it arises in dependence on the ālaya holding the seeds — which carries on precisely the principle that these six roots are defiled in dependence on consciousness. As for the Twenty Verses, its concern is to establish consciousness-only and the absence of external objects and to refute the outsiders' clinging to real objects, and it has no direct counterpart to the substance, function, or association of the root afflictions; here it is left aside.
考據Apparatus
〔所釋之頌〕第十二頌
本章釋《唯識三十論頌》頌十二（六根本煩惱：貪、瞋、癡、慢、疑、惡見；惡見開五，合為十）。
一、科判定位
| 科判 | 此章之位 |
|---|---|
| 三能變 | 初能變（阿賴耶）→ 第二能變（末那）→ 第三能變（了境） |
| 了境章內 | 六位心所：遍行 · 別境 · 善 · 根本煩惱 · 隨煩惱 · 不定 |
| 心所章內 | 遍行(一)·別境(一)·善(二)→ 根本煩惱六(三) → 隨煩惱(四)·不定 |
| 所釋頌 | 《唯識三十論頌》頌十二（煩惱謂貪、瞋、癡、慢、疑、惡見） |
根本煩惱者，諸煩惱之本，餘隨煩惱皆由之派生（依止根本煩惱、分位差別、等流性故名隨）。上承善心所（淨）、下啟隨煩惱（染之等流）。本章先逐一立六之體業，惡見開五而成十，次以諸門（相應·何識·何受·別境·三性·界繫·學等·見修所斷·迷諦·緣有事無事）廣辯。
二、源頌 · 義理脈絡
煩惱謂貪、瞋、癡、慢、疑、惡見。 〔T1586 0060b26〕
頌舉六根本，本論依之逐一立『性（自性）·業（作用）』，惡見更開薩迦耶見·邊執見·邪見·見取·戒禁取五，合六為十，諸門之辯皆就此十而起。
| 頌語 | 義門 | 所辯 |
|---|---|---|
| 貪 | 性·業 | 於有、有具染著為性；障無貪、生苦為業 |
| 瞋 | 性·業 | 於苦、苦具憎恚為性；障無瞋、惡行所依為業 |
| 癡 | 性·業 | 於諸理事迷闇為性；障無癡、一切雜染所依為業 |
| 慢 | 性·業 | 恃己於他高舉為性；障不慢、生苦為業 |
| 疑 | 性·業 | 於諸諦理猶豫為性；障不疑善品為業 |
| 惡見 | 性·業（開五） | 於諸諦理顛倒推度、染慧為性；障善見、招苦為業 |
疑之體性（即慧／別有自體）、邊執見之通俱生（唯斷／亦通常），本論於此列「有義」而以後說為正義，諸說全文具於〔義疏〕。
三、經論宗依（經證 → 論本）
經證
阿陀那識甚深細，一切種子如瀑流，我於凡愚不開演，恐彼分別執為我。 〔解深密經·心意識相品 T676 0692c22–c23〕
煩惱者依識而轉、緣境而起；《解深密》誡凡愚於阿陀那識「分別執為我」，正薩迦耶見（我執）之經本——餘煩惱皆以此我執為依而生。心所體業之定義，經本較疏，廣辯具於本地分之論；故此章經證從略，以論本為主。
論本（瑜伽師地論 T1579 · 大乘阿毘達磨集論 T1605 · 雜集論 T1606）
《瑜伽師地論·本地分》立根本煩惱六、開為十：
或分六種。謂貪、恚、慢、無明、見、疑。 〔T1579 0313b06〕
或分十種。一、薩迦耶見，二、邊執見，三、邪見，四、見取，五、戒禁取，六、貪，七、恚，八、慢，九、無明，十、疑。 〔T1579 0313b12–b14〕
薩迦耶見者……等隨觀執五種取蘊，若分別、不分別染污慧為體。 〔T1579 0313b29–0313c03〕
貪者……於外及內可愛境界，若分別、不分別染著為體。恚者……於外及內非愛境界，若分別、不分別憎恚為體。 〔T1579 0313c18–0313c23〕
慢者……於外及內高下勝劣，若分別、不分別高舉為體。無明者……於所知事，若分別、不分別染污無知為體。疑者……即於所知事，唯用分別異覺為體。 〔T1579 0313c23–0314a02〕
《集論》體業並舉，列六根本與五見：
何等為貪？謂三界愛為體，生眾苦為業。何等為瞋？謂於有情苦及苦具心恚為體，不安隱住惡行所依為業。何等為慢？謂依止薩迦耶見心高舉為體，不敬苦生所依為業。何等無明？謂三界無知為體，於諸法中邪決定疑雜生起所依為業。何等為疑？謂於諦猶豫為體，善品不生所依為業。 〔T1605 0664b24–0664c01〕
何等薩迦耶見？謂於五取蘊等隨觀執我及我所，諸忍欲覺觀見為體，一切見趣所依為業。 〔T1605 0664c01–c03〕
於五取蘊有二十句薩迦耶見，謂計色是我、我有諸色、色屬於我、我在色中，如是計受想行識…… 〔T1605 0664c23–c25〕
《雜集論》於《集論》體業之上更釋其義：
貪者，三界愛為體，生眾苦為業。生眾苦者，謂由愛力五取蘊生故。 〔T1606 0697c27–c28〕
慢者，依止薩迦耶見心高舉為體，不敬苦生所依為業。不敬者，謂於師長及有德所而生憍傲。苦生者，謂生後有故。 〔T1606 0698a03–a05〕
無明者，謂三界無智為體，於諸法中邪決定疑雜染生起所依為業。 〔T1606 0698a06–a07〕
邪見者，謗因謗果，或謗作用、或壞實事、或邪分別，諸忍欲覺觀見為體，斷善根為業…… 〔T1606 0698a25–a26〕
三論為心所體業定義之所本：《瑜伽》立六、開十而定五見「染污慧為體」、貪恚等『染著／憎恚／高舉／染污無知／異覺為體』（本論「染慧」「迷闇」「猶豫」諸性之論本）；《集論》以『性（體）·業』二門並舉（本論「性·業」格式之論本）；《雜集論》於體業更明其義（如貪「由愛力五取蘊生」——即本論「謂由愛力，取蘊生故」之所承）。護法糅釋所宗，其論在瑜伽、集論、雜集論。
四、本論釋要（護法糅釋 · T1585）
總標
論曰：此貪等六性是根本煩惱攝故，得煩惱名。 〔T1585 0031b18–b19〕
貪
云何為貪？於有、有具，染著為性；能障無貪，生苦為業。謂由愛力，取蘊生故。 〔T1585 0031b19–b20〕
瞋
云何為瞋？於苦、苦具，憎恚為性；能障無瞋，不安隱性，惡行所依為業。 〔T1585 0031b20–b22〕
癡
云何為癡？於諸理、事，迷闇為性；能障無癡，一切雜染所依為業。謂由無明，起疑、邪見、貪等煩惱、隨煩惱業，能招後生雜染法故。 〔T1585 0031b23–b26〕
慢
云何為慢？恃己於他，高舉為性；能障不慢，生苦為業。 〔T1585 0031b26–b27〕
此慢差別有七、九種，謂於三品、我、德處生。一切皆通見修所斷，聖位我慢既得現行，慢類由斯起亦無失。 〔T1585 0031b29–c02〕
疑
云何為疑？於諸諦理，猶豫為性；能障不疑善品為業。謂猶豫者，善不生故。 〔T1585 0031c02–c04〕
惡見
云何惡見？於諸諦理，顛倒推度，染慧為性；能障善見，招苦為業。 〔T1585 0031c11–c12〕
此見行相，差別有五：一、薩迦耶見：謂於五取蘊，執我、我所，一切見趣所依為業。 〔T1585 0031c13–c14〕
二、邊執見：謂即於彼，隨執斷、常，障處中行、出離為業。 〔T1585 0031c15–c17〕
三、邪見：謂謗因果、作用、實事及非四見諸餘邪執，如增上緣，名義遍故。 〔T1585 0031c19–c21〕
四、見取：謂於諸見及所依蘊，執為最勝，能得清淨，一切鬪諍所依為業。五、戒禁取：謂於隨順諸見戒禁及所依蘊，執為最勝，能得清淨，無利勤苦所依為業。 〔T1585 0031c26–0032a01〕
俱生·分別
如是總別十煩惱中，六通俱生及分別起，任運、思察，俱得生故。疑後三見，唯分別起…… 〔T1585 0032a05–a06〕
何識相應
此十煩惱，何識相應？藏識全無；末那有四；意識具十；五識唯三：謂貪、瞋、癡。無分別故。 〔T1585 0032b07–b09〕
見修所斷
分別起者，唯見所斷，麁易斷故；若俱生者，唯修所斷，細難斷故。見所斷十，實俱頓斷，以真見道總緣諦故。 〔T1585 0033a06–a08〕
要義：本論依頌立六，每一皆以『性（自性體）·業（障某善、生某果）』二門定之——貪染著（障無貪·生苦）、瞋憎恚（障無瞋·惡行所依）、癡迷闇（障無癡·一切雜染所依，故為諸惑之底）、慢高舉（障不慢·生苦）、疑猶豫（障不疑·礙善品）、惡見染慧（障善見·招苦）。惡見開五：薩迦耶見（執我我所，諸見所依）、邊執見（隨執斷常，障中道）、邪見（謗因果作用實事，名義最遍而攝餘執）、見取（執見為最勝能淨，諍論所依）、戒禁取（執非道戒禁為能淨，無利勤苦所依）。合六為十，分二類：貪瞋癡慢及身、邊二見通俱生與分別（任運·思察俱起），疑與後三見唯分別起（要藉惡友邪教·自審思察）。諸門以「何識相應」（藏識無·末那四·意識十·五識三）、「見修所斷」（分別唯見斷·俱生唯修斷·見斷十於真見道頓斷）為樞。
五、諸家異釋（窺基《述記》T1830）
別有自體。然說猶豫，簡擇者由同時疑，或異時疑令慧不決，故非是慧。 〔T1830 0445a13–a15〕
訓釋辭中，汝以「末底」是慧，「毘」助之故，說慧體為疑。亦應「若南」是智，「毘」助之故，說智為識……何以助末底，疑體即慧？ 〔T1830 0445a22–a26〕
於諸諦理顛倒推度者，即唯迷理。雖緣有親疎，迷理義等故。 〔T1830 0445b07–b08〕
梵云：「薩迦耶達利瑟致」，經部師云：「薩」是偽義，「迦耶」是身，「達利瑟致」是見……薩婆多云：「薩」是有義……大乘應言「僧吃爛底薩」，便成移轉……薩婆多名「有身見」，經部名「虛偽身見」，今大乘意心上所現似我之相，體非實有，是假法故也；又體非全無，依他起性成所緣緣故。 〔T1830 0445b15–b29〕
〔貪等六者〕鈍四、利二，通分別、俱生，除疑、三見，任運起，故是俱生；思察生，故是分別。《顯揚》第一及《大論》第八皆云：此六通俱生、分別故。 〔T1830 0449c02–c05〕
窺基於「疑體」判別有自體、非即慧（疑令慧不決，故非慧；若「毘助末底」即執慧為疑，則「毘助若南」應執智為識，理不成），繫此說與《顯揚》《對法》同；於「惡見」釋「顛倒推度」即唯迷理；於「薩迦耶」舉三家梵義之異（薩婆多訓「薩」為有，立「有身見」；經部訓「薩」為偽，立「虛偽身見」；大乘訓「僧吃爛底」為移轉，謂我相依他起、非實非全無，故名「移轉」）；於「俱生分別」判貪瞋癡慢（鈍四）及身、邊（利二）通二類，疑與邪見·見取·戒取唯分別起，繫《顯揚》第一·《瑜伽》第八。諸門細判（迷諦親疎·界繫越緣·受相應異說）之繫名，《述記》及《樞要》詳之。
六、譯名 · 古譯對讀（玄奘 ↔ 真諦《轉識論》）
| 義 | 玄奘《成唯識論》 | 真諦《轉識論》 |
|---|---|---|
| 根本煩惱 | 根本煩惱（六）·貪、瞋、癡、慢、疑、惡見 | 大惑（十）·「一欲、二瞋、三癡、四慢、五五見、十疑」〔0062a29–b01〕 |
| 貪 | 貪 | 欲（「大惑有十種者，一欲」〔0062a29–0062b01〕） |
| 惡見 | 惡見（開五：身·邊·邪·見取·戒取） | 五見（合計於大惑十中） |
| 隨煩惱 | 隨煩惱 | 小惑（二十四種，「一忿恨……二十四觀」〔0062b02–b07〕） |
玄奘立六根本（惡見開五為十），真諦《轉識論》以『大惑十種』攝之：開五見入十而以「欲」名貪、「疑」殿後——同十而次第·譯名小異。玄奘「隨煩惱」真諦作「小惑」（二十四種）。
七、術語
根本煩惱（mūla-kleśa）— 諸煩惱之本；貪、瞋、癡、慢、疑、惡見六，餘隨煩惱皆由之派生。 貪（rāga）— 於有、有具染著為性；障無貪、生苦。 瞋（pratigha）— 於苦、苦具憎恚為性；障無瞋、為惡行所依。 癡（moha，無明）— 於諸理事迷闇為性；障無癡、為一切雜染所依（諸惑生必由癡）。 慢（māna）— 恃己於他高舉為性；障不慢、生苦。差別有七慢、九慢。 疑（vicikitsā）— 於諸諦理猶豫為性；別有自體、令慧不決，非即慧。 惡見（dṛṣṭi）— 於諸諦理顛倒推度、染慧為性；開薩迦耶見·邊執見·邪見·見取·戒禁取五。 薩迦耶見（satkāya-dṛṣṭi，身見）— 於五取蘊執我、我所；一切見趣所依。 邊執見（anta-grāha-dṛṣṭi）— 即於所執我隨執斷、常；障處中行。 邪見（mithyā-dṛṣṭi）— 謗因、果、作用、實事；名義最遍，攝四見外諸餘邪執。 見取（dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa）— 執諸見及所依蘊為最勝、能淨；諍論所依。 戒禁取（śīlavrata-parāmarśa）— 執隨順諸見之戒禁為最勝、能淨；無利勤苦所依。 俱生 · 分別起（sahaja · parikalpita）— 任運而起者／藉惡友邪教審思而起者。 〔梵文為古德所傳發音輔助。〕
八、互讀（唯識系次第：百法 → 三十頌 → 二十論 → 辯中邊論 → 攝大乘論）
- 百法：心所·根本煩惱六——貪（30）·瞋（31）·癡（32）·慢（33）·疑（34）·惡見（35），逐法姊妹（百法以六根本各立一條，此章合釋其體業·相攝）。
- 三十頌：頌十二（煩惱謂貪、瞋、癡、慢、疑、惡見）——逐頌姊妹；末那章頌六之「四煩惱」（我癡·我見·我慢·我愛）即此六中之癡·見·慢·貪，與末那相應者。
- 二十論：〔從闕〕主唯識無境、破外人實境之執，根本煩惱之體業·相應無正面對位。
- 辯中邊論：辯障品·煩惱障（根本煩惱為染之本、障解脫；與此章『障某善·招苦』之業義相涉）。
- 攝大乘論：彼入因果分·應知勝相——煩惱雜染（三雜染之一，依阿賴耶持種而起，與此六根本之染依義相涉）。
章內：遍行(一)·別境(一)·善(二)（前章）· 根本煩惱(三)（此章）· 隨煩惱(四)（次章，二十隨惑皆此六之分位等流）· 不定。
九、校本定位
頌 T1586〔0060b26〕· 本論 T1585 根本煩惱釋〔總標 0031b18·貪 0031b19·瞋 0031b20·癡 0031b23·慢 0031b26–0031c02·疑 0031c02–c10·惡見 0031c11·五見 0031c13–c29·俱生分別 0032a05·何識 0032b08·見修所斷 0033a06–a08·迷諦 0033a09〕· 述記 T1830〔疑體 0445a13·毘助末底 0445a22–a27·惡見 0445b07·薩迦耶三家 0445b15–b29·俱生分別 0449c02–c07〕· 《轉識論》T1587 大惑十〔0062a29–0062b01〕。 〔論本〕瑜伽師地論 T1579〔六種·十種 0313b06·0313b12–b14·染污慧 0313b29–0313c13·貪恚慢無明疑 0313c18–0314a02〕· 集論 T1605〔六根本體業 0664b24–c01·五見 0664c01–c11·二十句 0664c23〕· 雜集論 T1606〔貪 0697c27·慢 0698a03·無明 0698a06·薩迦耶 0698a13·五見 0698a15–a20·邪見 0698a25·五見增益 0698b07〕。 〔經證〕解深密 T676〔0692c22〕。
This chapter expounds Triṃśikā verse 12 (the six root afflictions: greed, anger, delusion, conceit, doubt, and bad view; bad view opens into five, making ten in all).
1. Position in Kuiji's Structural Outline
| Outline level | This chapter's place |
|---|---|
| The three transformers | the first transformer (the ālaya) → the second transformer (the manas) → the third transformer (discerning objects) |
| Within the object-discerning chapter | the six categories of mental factors: the omnipresent · the object-specific · the wholesome · the root afflictions · the secondary afflictions · the indeterminate |
| Within the mental-factors chapter | the omnipresent (I) · the object-specific (I) · the wholesome (II) → the six root afflictions (III) → the secondary afflictions (IV) · the indeterminate |
| Verse expounded | Triṃśikā verse 12 (the afflictions are: greed, anger, delusion, conceit, doubt, and bad view) |
The root afflictions are the root of all the afflictions; the remaining secondary afflictions are all derived from them (named "secondary" because they rest on the root afflictions, are differentiations of their phases, and are of an out-flow nature). They follow upon the wholesome mental factors (the pure) above and open onto the secondary afflictions (the out-flow of the defiled) below. This chapter first sets up, one by one, the substance and function of the six, opens bad view into five to make ten, and then argues them at length through the several gates (concurrence · with which consciousness · with which feeling · the object-specific · the three natures · the realm-binding · the trainee-and-the-rest · severed by seeing or by cultivation · which truth they delude · referring to a thing that exists or does not exist).
2. Source verse · doctrinal context
煩惱謂貪、瞋、癡、慢、疑、惡見。 〔T1586 0060b26〕
tr. "The afflictions are: greed, anger, delusion, conceit, doubt, and bad view."
The verse names the six roots; the root treatise, following it, sets up one by one their "nature (own-nature) · function (operation)," and further opens bad view into five — the view of the perishing-body, the view that grasps an extreme, wrong view, view-clinging, and clinging to precepts-and-observances — combining the six into ten, all the gate-by-gate argument arising upon these ten.
| Verse term | Doctrinal gate | What is argued |
|---|---|---|
| 貪 greed | nature · function | its nature is craving-attachment toward existence and the instruments of existence; its function is to obstruct non-greed and to give rise to suffering |
| 瞋 anger | nature · function | its nature is hatred-resentment toward suffering and the instruments of suffering; its function is to obstruct non-anger and to be the basis of bad conduct |
| 癡 delusion | nature · function | its nature is benighted confusion toward the various principles and things; its function is to obstruct non-delusion and to be the basis of all defilement |
| 慢 conceit | nature · function | its nature is exalting oneself over others; its function is to obstruct non-conceit and to give rise to suffering |
| 疑 doubt | nature · function | its nature is wavering toward the various truths and principles; its function is to obstruct non-doubt of the wholesome class |
| 惡見 bad view | nature · function (opening into five) | its nature is inverted reckoning toward the various truths and principles, a defiled discernment; its function is to obstruct good view and to invite suffering |
The substance-nature of doubt (whether it is discernment, or has a separate own-substance) and the both-innate-character of the view that grasps an extreme (severed by cultivation only, or extending also to the eternalist) — on these the root treatise here lists a "one view holds" and takes the latter position as the correct one; the several positions are given in full in the Exposition.
3. Scriptural and treatise grounding (scripture → root śāstra)
Scriptural witness
阿陀那識甚深細，一切種子如瀑流，我於凡愚不開演，恐彼分別執為我。 〔Saṃdhinirmocana · chapter on the marks of mind-thought-consciousness, T676 0692c22–c23〕
tr. "The ādāna-consciousness is most deep and subtle; all the seeds [in it run] like a torrent. I do not expound it to the ignorant and foolish, fearing they would discriminate and grasp it as a self."
The afflictions turn in dependence on consciousness and arise by referring to an object; the Saṃdhinirmocana warns that the ignorant and foolish "discriminate and grasp" the ādāna-consciousness "as a self" — precisely the scriptural root of the view of the perishing-body (the self-attachment), upon which all the remaining afflictions arise in dependence. The definitions of the mental factors' substance and function the scripture states sparingly, while the broad argument is found in the śāstra of the Stage-of-One's-Own-Ground; hence in this chapter the scriptural witness is given briefly, the root śāstra taken as the mainstay.
Root śāstra (Yogācārabhūmi T1579 · Abhidharma-samuccaya T1605 · Abhidharma-samuccaya-vyākhyā T1606)
The Yogācārabhūmi's Stage-of-One's-Own-Ground sets up the six root afflictions and opens them into ten:
或分六種。謂貪、恚、慢、無明、見、疑。 〔T1579 0313b06〕
tr. "Or they are divided into six kinds: namely, greed, hatred, conceit, ignorance, view, and doubt."
或分十種。一、薩迦耶見，二、邊執見，三、邪見，四、見取，五、戒禁取，六、貪，七、恚，八、慢，九、無明，十、疑。 〔T1579 0313b12–b14〕
tr. "Or they are divided into ten kinds: first, the view of the perishing-body; second, the view that grasps an extreme; third, wrong view; fourth, view-clinging; fifth, clinging to precepts-and-observances; sixth, greed; seventh, hatred; eighth, conceit; ninth, ignorance; tenth, doubt."
薩迦耶見者……等隨觀執五種取蘊，若分別、不分別染污慧為體。 〔T1579 0313b29–0313c03〕
tr. "As for the view of the perishing-body… its substance is the defiled discernment, whether discriminating or non-discriminating, that contemplates and grasps the five appropriated aggregates accordingly."
貪者……於外及內可愛境界，若分別、不分別染著為體。恚者……於外及內非愛境界，若分別、不分別憎恚為體。 〔T1579 0313c18–0313c23〕
tr. "As for greed… its substance is craving-attachment, whether discriminating or non-discriminating, toward outer and inner agreeable objects. As for hatred… its substance is hatred-resentment, whether discriminating or non-discriminating, toward outer and inner disagreeable objects."
慢者……於外及內高下勝劣，若分別、不分別高舉為體。無明者……於所知事，若分別、不分別染污無知為體。疑者……即於所知事，唯用分別異覺為體。 〔T1579 0313c23–0314a02〕
tr. "As for conceit… its substance is exalting [oneself], whether discriminating or non-discriminating, over outer and inner [things as] high-low, superior-inferior. As for ignorance… its substance is defiled not-knowing, whether discriminating or non-discriminating, toward what is to be known. As for doubt… toward what is to be known, its substance is solely the discriminating divergent apprehension."
The Abhidharma-samuccaya states substance and function together, listing the six roots and the five views:
何等為貪？謂三界愛為體，生眾苦為業。何等為瞋？謂於有情苦及苦具心恚為體，不安隱住惡行所依為業。何等為慢？謂依止薩迦耶見心高舉為體，不敬苦生所依為業。何等無明？謂三界無知為體，於諸法中邪決定疑雜生起所依為業。何等為疑？謂於諦猶豫為體，善品不生所依為業。 〔T1605 0664b24–0664c01〕
tr. "What is greed? Its substance is the craving of the three realms; its function is to give rise to the manifold sufferings. What is anger? Its substance is the mind's resentment toward sentient beings' suffering and the instruments of suffering; its function is to be the basis of dwelling un-securely and of bad conduct. What is conceit? Its substance is the mind's exalting [itself] in dependence on the view of the perishing-body; its function is to be the basis of disrespect and of the arising of suffering. What is ignorance? Its substance is the not-knowing of the three realms; its function is to be the basis from which, among the dharmas, wrong determination, doubt, and [the rest, all] mixed, arise. What is doubt? Its substance is wavering toward the truths; its function is to be the basis of the non-arising of the wholesome class."
何等薩迦耶見？謂於五取蘊等隨觀執我及我所，諸忍欲覺觀見為體，一切見趣所依為業。 〔T1605 0664c01–c03〕
tr. "What is the view of the perishing-body? Its substance is the acceptances, wishes, apprehensions, examinations, and views that, toward the five appropriated aggregates, contemplate and grasp accordingly a self and what belongs to a self; its function is to be the basis of all the [false] view-courses."
於五取蘊有二十句薩迦耶見，謂計色是我、我有諸色、色屬於我、我在色中，如是計受想行識…… 〔T1605 0664c23–c25〕
tr. "Toward the five appropriated aggregates there are the twenty propositions of the view of the perishing-body: namely, reckoning that form is the self, that the self has the forms, that form belongs to the self, that the self is within form; and so reckoning feeling, conception, formations, and consciousness [likewise]…"
The Abhidharma-samuccaya-vyākhyā, upon the Samuccaya's substance-and-function, further explains their meaning:
貪者，三界愛為體，生眾苦為業。生眾苦者，謂由愛力五取蘊生故。 〔T1606 0697c27–c28〕
tr. "As for greed, its substance is the craving of the three realms; its function is to give rise to the manifold sufferings. 'To give rise to the manifold sufferings' means that by the force of craving the five appropriated aggregates arise."
慢者，依止薩迦耶見心高舉為體，不敬苦生所依為業。不敬者，謂於師長及有德所而生憍傲。苦生者，謂生後有故。 〔T1606 0698a03–a05〕
tr. "As for conceit, its substance is the mind's exalting [itself] in dependence on the view of the perishing-body; its function is to be the basis of disrespect and of the arising of suffering. 'Disrespect' means giving rise to arrogance toward teachers and elders and toward the virtuous. 'The arising of suffering' means the arising of future existence."
無明者，謂三界無智為體，於諸法中邪決定疑雜染生起所依為業。 〔T1606 0698a06–a07〕
tr. "As for ignorance, its substance is the lack of knowing of the three realms; its function is to be the basis from which, among the dharmas, wrong determination, doubt, and defilement [all] mixed, arise."
邪見者，謗因謗果，或謗作用、或壞實事、或邪分別，諸忍欲覺觀見為體，斷善根為業…… 〔T1606 0698a25–a26〕
tr. "As for wrong view, [it] denies cause and denies effect, or denies function, or wrecks the really-existent, or reckons wrongly; its substance is the acceptances, wishes, apprehensions, examinations, and views [of this kind]; its function is to sever the wholesome roots…"
The three śāstras are the basis of the definitions of the mental factors' substance and function: the Yogācārabhūmi sets up the six, opens the ten, and fixes the five views as having "defiled discernment for substance," and greed-hatred and the rest as having "craving-attachment / hatred-resentment / exalting / defiled not-knowing / divergent apprehension for substance" (the śāstra-root of the root treatise's natures "defiled discernment," "benighted confusion," "wavering," and the rest); the Abhidharma-samuccaya states the two gates "nature (substance) · function" together (the śāstra-root of the root treatise's "nature · function" format); the Abhidharma-samuccaya-vyākhyā further clarifies their meaning upon substance-and-function (as with greed, "by the force of craving the five appropriated aggregates arise" — that which the root treatise's "that is, by the force of craving the appropriated aggregates arise" inherits). What Dharmapāla's redaction takes as authority — its śāstra is in the Yogācārabhūmi, the Samuccaya, and the Samuccaya-vyākhyā.
4. Essentials of the root treatise (Dharmapāla's redaction · T1585)
General statement
論曰：此貪等六性是根本煩惱攝故，得煩惱名。 〔T1585 0031b18–b19〕
tr. "The treatise says: these six, greed and the rest, because by nature they are subsumed under the root afflictions, get the name 'afflictions.'"
Greed
云何為貪？於有、有具，染著為性；能障無貪，生苦為業。謂由愛力，取蘊生故。 〔T1585 0031b19–b20〕
tr. "What is greed? Toward existence and the instruments of existence, its nature is craving-attachment; its function is to be able to obstruct non-greed and to give rise to suffering. That is, by the force of craving the appropriated aggregates arise."
Anger
云何為瞋？於苦、苦具，憎恚為性；能障無瞋，不安隱性，惡行所依為業。 〔T1585 0031b20–b22〕
tr. "What is anger? Toward suffering and the instruments of suffering, its nature is hatred-resentment; its function is to be able to obstruct non-anger, to be an un-secure nature, and to be the basis of bad conduct."
Delusion
云何為癡？於諸理、事，迷闇為性；能障無癡，一切雜染所依為業。謂由無明，起疑、邪見、貪等煩惱、隨煩惱業，能招後生雜染法故。 〔T1585 0031b23–b26〕
tr. "What is delusion? Toward the various principles and things, its nature is benighted confusion; its function is to be able to obstruct non-delusion and to be the basis of all defilement. That is, by ignorance there arise doubt, wrong view, greed and the other afflictions, and the deeds of the secondary afflictions, which can summon the defiled dharmas of the later birth."
Conceit
云何為慢？恃己於他，高舉為性；能障不慢，生苦為業。 〔T1585 0031b26–b27〕
tr. "What is conceit? Relying on oneself over others, its nature is exalting [oneself]; its function is to be able to obstruct non-conceit and to give rise to suffering."
此慢差別有七、九種，謂於三品、我、德處生。一切皆通見修所斷，聖位我慢既得現行，慢類由斯起亦無失。 〔T1585 0031b29–c02〕
tr. "This conceit has, by distinction, seven and nine kinds, arising at the loci of the three grades, the self, and virtue. All alike extend to [being] severed by seeing and by cultivation; since at the sage's stage the conceit-of-self does still get to be manifestly active, the conceit-class arising thereby is likewise without fault."
Doubt
云何為疑？於諸諦理，猶豫為性；能障不疑善品為業。謂猶豫者，善不生故。 〔T1585 0031c02–c04〕
tr. "What is doubt? Toward the various truths and principles, its nature is wavering; its function is to be able to obstruct non-doubt of the wholesome class. That is, for one who wavers, the wholesome does not arise."
Bad view
云何惡見？於諸諦理，顛倒推度，染慧為性；能障善見，招苦為業。 〔T1585 0031c11–c12〕
tr. "What is bad view? Toward the various truths and principles, inverted in reckoning, its nature is defiled discernment; its function is to be able to obstruct good view and to invite suffering."
此見行相，差別有五：一、薩迦耶見：謂於五取蘊，執我、我所，一切見趣所依為業。 〔T1585 0031c13–c14〕
tr. "This view, in its mode of activity, has five distinctions: first, the view of the perishing-body — that is, toward the five appropriated aggregates, it grasps a self and what belongs to a self; its function is to be the basis of all the [false] view-courses."
二、邊執見：謂即於彼，隨執斷、常，障處中行、出離為業。 〔T1585 0031c15–c17〕
tr. "Second, the view that grasps an extreme — that is, toward that [self], it grasps accordingly annihilation or eternity; its function is to obstruct the middle course and emancipation."
三、邪見：謂謗因果、作用、實事及非四見諸餘邪執，如增上緣，名義遍故。 〔T1585 0031c19–c21〕
tr. "Third, wrong view — that is, it denies cause-and-effect, function, and the really-existent, and [includes] all the remaining wrong graspings other than the four views; like the dominant condition, its name-and-sense is the most pervasive."
四、見取：謂於諸見及所依蘊，執為最勝，能得清淨，一切鬪諍所依為業。五、戒禁取：謂於隨順諸見戒禁及所依蘊，執為最勝，能得清淨，無利勤苦所依為業。 〔T1585 0031c26–0032a01〕
tr. "Fourth, view-clinging — that is, toward the views and the aggregates they rest on, it grasps them as supreme and as able to win purity; its function is to be the basis of all disputation. Fifth, clinging to precepts-and-observances — that is, toward the precepts-and-observances that conform to the views and the aggregates they rest on, it grasps them as supreme and as able to win purity; its function is to be the basis of profitless toil."
Innate · discriminated
如是總別十煩惱中，六通俱生及分別起，任運、思察，俱得生故。疑後三見，唯分別起…… 〔T1585 0032a05–a06〕
tr. "Thus among the ten afflictions, general and particular, six extend to both the innate and the discriminated, since they can arise both spontaneously and by reflective examination. Doubt and the last three views are only discriminated…"
With which consciousness concurrent
此十煩惱，何識相應？藏識全無；末那有四；意識具十；五識唯三：謂貪、瞋、癡。無分別故。 〔T1585 0032b07–b09〕
tr. "With which consciousness are these ten afflictions concurrent? The store-consciousness has none at all; the manas has four; the mind-consciousness has the full ten; the five consciousnesses have only three, namely greed, anger, and delusion — for they have no discrimination."
Severed by seeing or by cultivation
分別起者，唯見所斷，麁易斷故；若俱生者，唯修所斷，細難斷故。見所斷十，實俱頓斷，以真見道總緣諦故。 〔T1585 0033a06–a08〕
tr. "The discriminated are severed by seeing only, being coarse and easy to sever; the innate are severed by cultivation only, being subtle and hard to sever. The ten severed by seeing are in fact all severed at once, for the true path of seeing refers to the truths comprehensively."
Essentials: the root treatise, following the verse, sets up the six, each fixed by the two gates "nature (own-substance) · function (obstructing some wholesome, giving rise to some fruit)" — greed is craving-attachment (obstructs non-greed · gives rise to suffering), anger is hatred-resentment (obstructs non-anger · the basis of bad conduct), delusion is benighted confusion (obstructs non-delusion · the basis of all defilement, hence the bedrock of all the afflictions), conceit is exalting (obstructs non-conceit · gives rise to suffering), doubt is wavering (obstructs non-doubt · blocks the wholesome class), bad view is defiled discernment (obstructs good view · invites suffering). Bad view opens into five: the view of the perishing-body (grasps self and what belongs to self, the basis of all the views), the view that grasps an extreme (grasps accordingly annihilation or eternity, obstructs the middle way), wrong view (denies cause-and-effect, function, the really-existent; its name-and-sense the most pervasive, subsuming the remaining graspings), view-clinging (grasps a view as supreme and as able to purify, the basis of disputation), clinging to precepts-and-observances (grasps a non-path precept-and-observance as able to purify, the basis of profitless toil). Combining the six into ten, they divide into two classes: greed, anger, delusion, conceit, and the view of the body and the view of the extreme — these two — extend to both the innate and the discriminated (arising both spontaneously · by reflective examination); doubt and the last three views are only discriminated (requiring the dependence on bad friends and wrong teaching · one's own reflective examination). The several gates pivot on "with which consciousness concurrent" (the store-consciousness has none · the manas four · the mind-consciousness ten · the five consciousnesses three) and "severed by seeing or by cultivation" (the discriminated severed by seeing only · the innate severed by cultivation only · the ten severed by seeing severed at once in the true path of seeing).
5. Divergent readings across the masters (Kuiji, Shuji T1830)
別有自體。然說猶豫，簡擇者由同時疑，或異時疑令慧不決，故非是慧。 〔T1830 0445a13–a15〕
tr. "[Doubt] has a separate own-substance. Yet to say 'wavering [in] discernment' [means] that, by a simultaneous doubt or by a doubt at another time, [doubt] makes discernment irresolute — hence it is not discernment [itself]."
訓釋辭中，汝以「末底」是慧，「毘」助之故，說慧體為疑。亦應「若南」是智，「毘」助之故，說智為識……何以助末底，疑體即慧？ 〔T1830 0445a22–a26〕
tr. "In the explanatory etymology, you take 'mati' to be discernment and, because 'vi' assists it, say discernment's substance is doubt. Then likewise 'jñāna' is knowledge and, because 'vi' assists it, [you should] say knowledge is consciousness… Why, when [vi] assists mati, is doubt's substance discernment [yet when it assists jñāna it is not]?"
於諸諦理顛倒推度者，即唯迷理。雖緣有親疎，迷理義等故。 〔T1830 0445b07–b08〕
tr. "'Inverted in reckoning toward the various truths and principles' [means] it deludes the principle only. Though its referring [to objects] has near and far, in the sense of deluding the principle they are equal."
梵云：「薩迦耶達利瑟致」，經部師云：「薩」是偽義，「迦耶」是身，「達利瑟致」是見……薩婆多云：「薩」是有義……大乘應言「僧吃爛底薩」，便成移轉……薩婆多名「有身見」，經部名「虛偽身見」，今大乘意心上所現似我之相，體非實有，是假法故也；又體非全無，依他起性成所緣緣故。 〔T1830 0445b15–b29〕
tr. "In Sanskrit it is 'sat-kāya-dṛṣṭi'; the Sautrāntika masters say 'sat' means 'false,' 'kāya' is body, 'dṛṣṭi' is view… the Sarvāstivāda say 'sat' means 'existent'… in the Mahāyāna one should say 'saṃkrānti-sat,' and it comes to mean 'shifting-over'… the Sarvāstivāda name it 'view of an existent body,' the Sautrāntika name it 'view of a false body'; now the Mahāyāna intent is that the self-resembling mark appearing upon the mind has no really-existent substance, being a conventional dharma; yet its substance is not wholly nothing, since, being of the other-dependent nature, it forms the object-support condition."
〔貪等六者〕鈍四、利二，通分別、俱生，除疑、三見，任運起，故是俱生；思察生，故是分別。《顯揚》第一及《大論》第八皆云：此六通俱生、分別故。 〔T1830 0449c02–c05〕
tr. "〔As for the six, greed and the rest〕 the four dull and the two sharp extend to both the discriminated and the innate, excepting doubt and the [last] three views; arising spontaneously, they are innate; arising by reflective examination, they are discriminated. The Xianyang, fascicle one, and the Great Treatise [Yogācārabhūmi], fascicle eight, both say that these six extend to both the innate and the discriminated."
Kuiji, on "doubt's substance," judges that it has a separate own-substance and is not [identical with] discernment (doubt makes discernment irresolute, hence is not discernment; if "vi-assisting mati" meant taking discernment to be doubt, then "vi-assisting jñāna" should take knowledge to be consciousness — which does not hold), and links this position with the Xianyang and the Abhidharma [comparable]; on "bad view," he explains "inverted in reckoning" as deluding the principle only; on "sat-kāya," he sets out the difference of three schools' Sanskrit senses (the Sarvāstivāda gloss "sat" as "existent," setting up "view of an existent body"; the Sautrāntika gloss "sat" as "false," setting up "view of a false body"; the Mahāyāna gloss "saṃkrānti" as "shifting-over," saying the self-mark is other-dependent, neither really existent nor wholly nothing, hence named "shifting-over"); on "innate and discriminated," he judges that greed-anger-delusion-conceit (the four dull) and the body-view and extreme-view (the two sharp) extend to both classes, while doubt and wrong-view · view-clinging · precept-clinging are only discriminated, linking [this] to the Xianyang fascicle one · the Yogācārabhūmi fascicle eight. The linked names of the gate-by-gate fine judgments (near-and-far in deluding the truths · realm-binding and over-referring · the divergent positions on feeling-concurrence) the Shuji and the Shūyao detail.
6. Rendering of terms · old-translation comparison (Xuanzang ↔ Paramārtha, Zhuanshi lun)
| Sense | Xuanzang, Cheng Weishi Lun | Paramārtha, Zhuanshi lun |
|---|---|---|
| the root afflictions | the root afflictions (six) · greed, anger, delusion, conceit, doubt, bad view | the great delusions (ten) · "first desire, second anger, third delusion, fourth conceit, fifth the five views, tenth doubt" 〔0062a29–b01〕 |
| greed | 貪 greed | 欲 desire ("the great delusions are ten in kind: first, desire" 〔0062a29–0062b01〕) |
| bad view | 惡見 bad view (opening into five: body · extreme · wrong · view-clinging · precept-clinging) | 五見 the five views (counted together within the ten great delusions) |
| the secondary afflictions | 隨煩惱 the secondary afflictions | 小惑 the lesser delusions (twenty-four kinds, "first wrath-and-hatred… twenty-fourth contemplating" 〔0062b02–b07〕) |
Xuanzang sets up the six roots (bad view opened into five to make ten); Paramārtha's Zhuanshi lun subsumes them under the "ten kinds of great delusion": opening the five views into the ten while naming greed "desire" and placing doubt last — the same ten yet with the sequence and the rendered names slightly differing. Xuanzang's "secondary afflictions" Paramārtha gives as "lesser delusions" (twenty-four kinds).
7. Key terms
The root afflictions (mūla-kleśa) — the root of all the afflictions; the six, greed, anger, delusion, conceit, doubt, and bad view, the remaining secondary afflictions all derived from them. Greed (rāga) — its nature is craving-attachment toward existence and the instruments of existence; obstructs non-greed · gives rise to suffering. Anger (pratigha) — its nature is hatred-resentment toward suffering and the instruments of suffering; obstructs non-anger · is the basis of bad conduct. Delusion (moha, ignorance) — its nature is benighted confusion toward the various principles and things; obstructs non-delusion · is the basis of all defilement (the arising of every affliction necessarily by way of delusion). Conceit (māna) — its nature is exalting oneself over others; obstructs non-conceit · gives rise to suffering. It has, by distinction, the seven conceits and the nine conceits. Doubt (vicikitsā) — its nature is wavering toward the various truths and principles; it has a separate own-substance · makes discernment irresolute, not [identical with] discernment. Bad view (dṛṣṭi) — its nature is inverted reckoning toward the various truths and principles, a defiled discernment; it opens into five: the view of the perishing-body · the view that grasps an extreme · wrong view · view-clinging · clinging to precepts-and-observances. The view of the perishing-body (satkāya-dṛṣṭi, body-view) — toward the five appropriated aggregates it grasps self and what belongs to self; the basis of all the [false] view-courses. The view that grasps an extreme (anta-grāha-dṛṣṭi) — toward the self thus grasped it grasps accordingly annihilation or eternity; obstructs the middle course. Wrong view (mithyā-dṛṣṭi) — denies cause, effect, function, and the really-existent; its name-and-sense the most pervasive, subsuming the remaining wrong graspings other than the four views. View-clinging (dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa) — grasps the views and the aggregates they rest on as supreme and as able to purify; the basis of disputation. Clinging to precepts-and-observances (śīlavrata-parāmarśa) — grasps the precepts-and-observances conforming to the views as supreme and as able to purify; the basis of profitless toil. The innate · the discriminated (sahaja · parikalpita) — that which arises spontaneously / that which arises by reflective examination through bad friends and wrong teaching. 〔Sanskrit forms are a pronunciation aid transmitted by the ancient masters.〕
8. Cross-reading (the Yogācāra sequence: Baifa → Triṃśikā → Viṃśatikā → Madhyāntavibhāga → Mahāyānasaṃgraha)
- Baifa (Hundred Dharmas): the mental factors · the six root afflictions — greed (30) · anger (31) · delusion (32) · conceit (33) · doubt (34) · bad view (35), the per-dharma sisters (Baifa sets up one entry for each of the six roots, while this chapter explains their substance-function · mutual subsumption together).
- Triṃśikā: verse 12 (the afflictions are greed, anger, delusion, conceit, doubt, and bad view) — the verse-by-verse sister; the "four afflictions" of the manas chapter's verse 6 (self-delusion · self-view · self-conceit · self-love) are precisely the delusion · view · conceit · greed among these six, those concurrent with the manas.
- Viṃśatikā: 〔omitted〕 mainly [treats] consciousness-only-without-object and the refutation of the outsider's grasping at real objects, with no direct counterpart for the substance-function · concurrence of the root afflictions.
- Madhyāntavibhāga: the Obstruction chapter · the affliction-obstruction (the root afflictions as the root of the defiled, obstructing liberation; bearing on this chapter's functional sense of "obstructing some wholesome · inviting suffering").
- Mahāyānasaṃgraha: the Cause-and-Effect-of-Entering division · the mark-to-be-known-as-superior — the affliction-defilement (one of the three defilements, arising in dependence on the ālaya's holding the seeds; bearing on the defilement-dependence sense of these six roots).
Within the treatise: the omnipresent (I) · the object-specific (I) · the wholesome (II) (the prior chapters) · the root afflictions (III) (this chapter) · the secondary afflictions (IV) (the next chapter, the twenty secondary afflictions all phase-out-flows of these six) · the indeterminate.
9. Collation position
Verse T1586 〔0060b26〕 · root T1585 the explanation of the root afflictions 〔general statement 0031b18 · greed 0031b19 · anger 0031b20 · delusion 0031b23 · conceit 0031b26–0031c02 · doubt 0031c02–c10 · bad view 0031c11 · the five views 0031c13–c29 · innate-and-discriminated 0032a05 · which consciousness 0032b08 · severed by seeing or cultivation 0033a06–a08 · deluding the truths 0033a09〕 · Shuji T1830 〔doubt's substance 0445a13 · vi-assisting-mati 0445a22–a27 · bad view 0445b07 · sat-kāya's three schools 0445b15–b29 · innate-and-discriminated 0449c02–c07〕 · Zhuanshi lun T1587 the ten great delusions 〔0062a29–0062b01〕. 〔Root śāstra〕 Yogācārabhūmi T1579 〔the six kinds · the ten kinds 0313b06 · 0313b12–b14 · defiled discernment 0313b29–0313c13 · greed-hatred-conceit-ignorance-doubt 0313c18–0314a02〕 · Abhidharma-samuccaya T1605 〔the six roots' substance-function 0664b24–c01 · the five views 0664c01–c11 · the twenty propositions 0664c23〕 · Abhidharma-samuccaya-vyākhyā T1606 〔greed 0697c27 · conceit 0698a03 · ignorance 0698a06 · sat-kāya 0698a13 · the five views 0698a15–a20 · wrong view 0698a25 · the five views' augmentation 0698b07〕. 〔Scripture〕 Saṃdhinirmocana T676 〔0692c22〕.