成唯識論 通染不染·三差別·證有第七
前一節說末那在三位「無有」。這就逼出一個問題：無有的，是那個染污的我執，還是第七識這個位子整個沒了？
一說：末那唯染，三位既無，就是沒了。另一說——論主取為正義——不是：聖教明說有「出世末那」；而且諸論說「轉第七識，得平等智」，若第七識整個沒了，那平等性智轉自何處？所以斷的是它的染，不是它的體。
於是末那有三種差別：與我見相應的（凡夫）、與法見相應的（二乘與地前）、與平等性智相應的（佛與見道以上）。同一個位子，三種面貌。
最後論主給出六條正理，證明真有這第七識——其中一條很平實：藏識恒與一識俱轉，那個識就是它。
這一節的份量在這裡：我執可斷，而那個能執的識，轉過來就是平等性智。不是消滅一個東西，是同一個東西換了方向。
六理證的次第也值得一提。論主先舉聖教（出世末那），再列理證：藏識定與一識俱轉、無染意識亦須不共依、《顯揚論》明末那或翻彼相應、阿羅漢位捨賴耶名而賴耶體不失可為例、轉第七識得平等性智必有所依淨識。
最後一條最有分量： 若第七識體全無，則平等性智無所依而起。這條理路與前面阿賴耶「阿羅漢位捨」的處理完全一致——捨的是名分與染，不是體。 全論凡講「斷」「捨」「無有」處，都要照這一條去讀，否則容易讀成斷滅。
The previous chapter said the manas is "absent" in three states. That forces a question: what is absent — the defiled grasping at self, or the seat of the seventh consciousness entire?
One position: the manas is defiled and nothing else; absent in the three states, it is simply gone. The other — which the treatise takes as settled — says no. Scripture expressly speaks of a supramundane manas; and the treatises say "transforming the seventh consciousness, one gains the knowledge of equality." Were the seventh consciousness gone entire, out of what would that wisdom be transformed? What is cut, then, is its defilement, not its substance.
Hence the manas has three distinctions: concomitant with the view of a person (the ordinary being), with the view of dharmas (the two vehicles and the pre-ground bodhisattva), and with the wisdom of equal-nature (buddhas, and those from the path of seeing onward). One seat, three faces.
The treatise closes with six rational grounds proving that this seventh consciousness truly exists — one of them plain enough: the store consciousness turns together, invariably, with one consciousness, and that consciousness is this one.
Here is the weight of the chapter: self-grasping can be cut, and the very consciousness that did the grasping, turned around, is the wisdom of equal-nature. Nothing is destroyed; one and the same thing has changed direction.
The order of the six rational grounds is worth a word. Scripture comes first (the supramundane manas), then the reasons: the store consciousness turns invariably with one consciousness; an undefiled mind-consciousness also requires its own unshared support; the Prakaraṇāryavācā shows the manas as concomitant either with those afflictions or their opposites; the ālaya's name is relinquished at the arhat stage while its substance is not lost, which serves as precedent; and the wisdom of equal nature, won by turning the seventh, must have a purified consciousness as its support.
The last weighs most: were the seventh's substance wholly absent, that wisdom would have nothing to arise upon. The reasoning matches exactly the earlier handling of the ālaya's "relinquished at the arhat stage" — what is relinquished is the title and the defilement, not the substance. Wherever the treatise says severed, relinquished, or absent, it must be read by this rule, or it will be read as annihilation.
此中有義：末那唯有煩惱障俱。聖教皆言：三位無故。又說：四惑恒相應故。又說：為識雜染依故。
有義：彼說教、理相違，出世末那，經說有故。
無染意識，如有染時，定有俱生不共依故。
論說：藏識決定恒與一識俱轉，所謂末那；意識起時，則二俱轉，所謂意識，及與末那；若五識中隨起一識，則三俱轉，乃至或時頓起五識，則七俱轉。若住滅定，無第七識，爾時，藏識應無識俱，便非恒定一識俱轉。住聖道時，若無第七。爾時，藏識應一識俱，如何可言，若起意識，爾時，藏識定二俱轉？
《顯揚論》說：末那恒與四煩惱相應，或翻彼相應，恃舉為行，或平等行。故知此意通染、不染。
若由論說：阿羅漢位無染意故，便無第七。應由論說：阿羅漢位捨賴耶故，便無第八。彼既不爾，此云何然？
又諸論言：轉第七識，得平等智。彼如餘智，定有所依相應淨識。此識無者，彼智應無。非離所依有能依故。不可說彼依六轉識，許佛恒行，如鏡智故。
又無學位，若無第七識，彼第八識，應無俱有依。然必有此依，如餘識性故。
又如未證補特伽羅無我者，彼我執恒行；亦應未證法無我者，法我執恒行，此識若無，彼依何識？非依第八，彼無慧故。由此應信，二乘聖道、滅定、無學此識恒行，彼未證得法無我故。
〔T31 0024b03〕又諸論中，以五同法證有第七，為第六依。聖道起時，及無學位，若無第七為第六依，所立宗、因，便俱有失。或應五識亦有無依。五恒有依，六亦應爾。
是故定有無染污意，於上三位，恒起現前。言彼無者，依染意說；如說四位無阿賴耶，非無第八，此亦應爾。
此意差別，略有三種：
一、補特伽羅我見相應；二、法我見相應；三、平等性智相應。
初通一切異生相續、二乘有學、七地以前一類菩薩有漏心位，彼緣阿賴耶識，起補特伽羅我見。
次通一切異生、聲聞、獨覺相續、一切菩薩法空智果不現前位，彼緣異熟識，起法我見。
後通一切如來相續、菩薩見道及修道中法空智果現在前位，彼緣無垢異熟識等，起平等性智。
補特伽羅我見起位，彼法我見亦必現前。我執必依法執而起。如夜迷杌等，方謂人等故。
我、法二見，用雖有別，而不相違，同依一慧。如眼識等，體雖是一，而有了別青等多用，不相違故，此亦應然。
二乘有學聖道，滅定現在前時；頓悟菩薩，於修道位；有學漸悟，生空智果現在前時，皆唯起法執，我執已伏故。
二乘無學及此漸悟法空智果不現前時，亦唯起法執，我執已斷故。
八地以上，一切菩薩所有我執皆永不行，或已永斷；或永伏故。法空智果不現前時，猶起法執，不相違故。
如契經說：八地以上，一切煩惱，不復現行；唯有所依所知障在。此所知障，是現非種。不爾，煩惱亦應在故。
〔T31 0024c02〕法執俱意，於二乘等，雖名不染；於諸菩薩，亦名為染，障彼智故。由此亦名有覆無記。於二乘等，說名無覆，不障彼智故。是異熟生攝，從異熟識恒時生故，名異熟生，非異熟果，此名通故，如增上緣，餘不攝者，皆入此攝。
云何應知此第七識，離眼等識，有別自體？
聖教正理，為定量故。
謂薄伽梵處處經中說：心、意、識三種別義。集起名心，思量名意，了別名識，是三別義。
如是三義，雖通八識，而隨勝顯。第八名心，集諸法種，起諸法故；第七名意，緣藏識等，恒、審思量，為我等故；餘六名識，於六別境，麁動間斷，了別轉故。
如《入楞伽》伽他中說：
「藏識說名心，思量性名意，
能了諸境相，是說名為識。」
又大乘經處處別說有第七識，故此別有。諸大乘經是至教量，前已廣說，故不重成。
《解脫經》中，亦別說有此第七識。如彼頌言：
「染污意恒時，諸惑俱生滅，
若解脫諸惑，非曾非當有。」
彼經自釋此頌義言：有染污意，從無始來，與四煩惱，恒俱生滅。謂我見、我愛，及我慢、我癡。對治道生，斷煩惱已，此意從彼便得解脫。爾時，此意相應煩惱，非唯現無，亦無過、未，過去、未來，無自性故。如是等教，諸部皆有，恐厭廣文，故不繁述。
已引聖教；當顯正理。
謂契經說：不共無明，微細恒行，覆蔽真實。若無此識，彼應非有。
〔T31 0025a02〕謂諸異生，於一切分，恒起迷理不共無明，覆真實義，障聖慧眼。如伽他說：
「真義心當生，常能為障礙，
俱行一切分，謂不共無明。」
是故契經說：異生類恒處長夜，無明所盲，惛醉纏心，曾無醒覺。
若異生位，有暫不起此無明時，便違經義。俱異生位，迷理無明，有行、不行，不應理故。此依六識，皆不得成。應此間斷，彼恒染故。許有末那，便無此失。
染意恒與四惑相應，此俱無明，何名不共？
有義：此俱我見、慢、愛，非根本煩惱，名不共何失？
有義：彼說理、教相違。純隨煩惱中，不說此三故，此三，六、十煩惱攝故。處處皆說染污末那與四煩惱恒相應故。
應說四中，無明是主，雖三俱起，亦名不共。從無始際，恒內惽迷，曾不省察，癡增上故。
此俱見等，應名相應，若為主時，應名不共？如無明故，許亦無失。
有義：此癡名不共者，如不共佛法，唯此識有故。
若爾，餘識相應煩惱，此識中無，應名不共。依殊勝義，立不共名，非互所無，皆名不共。謂第七識相應無明，無始恒行，障真義智，如是勝用，餘識所無，唯此識有，故名不共。既爾，此俱三亦應名不共。無明是主，獨得此名。或許餘三，亦名不共；對餘「癡」故，且說無明。
不共無明，總有二種：一、恒行不共，餘識所無；二、獨行不共，此識非有。
故《瑜伽》說無明有二：若貪等俱者，名相應無明；非貪等俱者，名獨行無明。是主獨行，唯見所斷。如契經說：「諸聖有學，不共無明，已永斷故，不造新業。」非主獨行，亦修所斷。忿等皆通見、修所斷故。
〔T31 0025b03〕恒行不共，餘部所無；獨行不共，此、彼俱有。
又契經說：眼、色為緣，生於眼識。廣說乃至意、法為緣，生於意識。若無此識，彼意非有。
謂如五識，必有眼等增上不共俱有所依。意識既是六識中攝，理應許有如是所依。此識若無，彼依寧有？
不可說色為彼所依，意非色故。意識應無隨念、計度二分別故。
亦不可說五識無有俱有所依，彼與五根俱時而轉，如牙、影故。又識與根，既必同境，如心、心所，決定俱時。
由此理趣，極成意識如眼等識必有不共，顯自名、處。等無間不攝，增上生所依，極成六識隨一攝故。
又契經說：思量名意。若無此識，彼應非有。
謂若意識現在前時，等無間意已滅非有。過去、未來，理非有故。彼思量用，定不得成。既爾，如何說名為意？若謂假說，理亦不然。無正思量，假依何立？若謂現在，曾有思量，爾時名識，寧說為意？
故知別有第七末那，恒、審思量，正名為意，已滅依此，假立「意」名。
又契經說：無想、滅定染意若無，彼應無別。
謂彼二定，俱滅六識及彼心所，體數無異。若無染意，於二定中，一有一無，彼二何別？若謂加行、界、地、依等有差別者，理亦不然。彼差別因，由此有故。此若無者，彼因亦無。
是故定應別有此意。
又契經說：無想有情，一期生中，心、心所滅。若無此識，彼應無染。
謂彼長時，無六轉識；若無此意，我執便無。非於餘處有具縛者，一期生中，都無我執。彼無我執，應如涅槃，便非聖賢同所訶厭。
〔T31 0025c03〕初、後有故，無如是失。中間長時無故，有過。去、來有故，無如是失。彼非現、常，無故，有過。所得無故，能得亦無。
不相應法，前已遮破。
藏識無故，熏習亦無。餘法受熏，已辯非理。
故應別有染污末那，於無想天恒起我執，由斯賢聖同訶厭彼。
又契經說：異生善、染、無記心時，恒帶我執，若無此識，彼不應有。
謂異生類，三性心時，雖外起諸業，而內恒執我。由執我故，令六識中所起施等，不能亡相。
故《瑜伽》說：染污末那，為識依止，彼未滅時，相了別縛，不得解脫。末那滅已，相縛解脫。
言相縛者，謂於境相不能了達，如幻事等。由斯見分相分所拘，不得自在，故名相縛。
依如是義，有伽他言：
「如是染污意，是識之所依，
此意未滅時，識縛終不脫。」
又善、無覆無記心時，若無我執，應非有漏。自相續中，六識煩惱與彼善等不俱起故。去、來緣縛，理非有故。非由他惑，成有漏故；勿由他解，成無漏故。
又不可說：別有隨眠，是不相應，現相續起，由斯善等成有漏法。彼非實有，已極成故。
亦不可說：從有漏種，生彼善等，故成有漏。彼種先無因可成有漏故。
非由漏種，彼成有漏；勿學無漏心，亦成有漏故。
雖由煩惱，引施等業，而不俱起，故非有漏正因；以有漏言，表漏俱故；又無記業，非煩惱引，彼復如何得成有漏？
〔T31 0026a01〕然諸有漏，由與自身現行煩惱俱生、俱滅，互相增益，方成有漏。由此熏成有漏法種，後時現起，有漏義成；異生既然，有學亦爾。無學有漏，雖非漏俱；而從先時有漏種起，故成有漏，於理無違。
由有末那恒起我執，令善等法有漏義成。此意若無，彼定非有，故知別有此第七識。
證有此識，理趣甚多，隨《攝大乘》，略述六種，諸有智者，應隨信學。
然有經中說六識者，應知彼是隨轉理門，或隨所依六根說六，而識類別，實有八種。
〔科判〕3 釋第三能變 〔T31 0026a11〕
The canonical text stands in Chinese only. This edition renders the essence, the plain reading, the exposition and the apparatus into English — never the sūtra itself. Switch to 漢讀本 or 並行雙語 above to read it.
〔所釋之頌〕承前章，第七頌餘義·並證有第七識
甲、末那通染不染之諍（教理二門）
〔此中一說·末那唯染〕 接著要問：末那是不是只能是染污的，會不會也有不染污的末那？這裡有一說：末那只跟「煩惱障」綁在一起——也就是它永遠是染污的，根本沒有不染污的末那。理由有三條：一是聖教都說在那三個階段（阿羅漢、滅盡定、出世道）沒有末那；二是又說末那一直跟四惑相應；三是又說末那是『各個識染污的依靠』。
〔應知·正義·末那通染不染〕 又一說（這是正義）：那『末那只能染』的講法，跟聖教、跟道理都不合——因為「出世末那」（也就是清淨的末那），經裡明明說有。底下分頭把這一點立起來。
第一個道理：出世位那個『不染污的意識』（也就是出世時的第六識），跟它在有染時的情形一樣，一定有個『與它同生、又專屬於它』的所依——這所依就是第七末那。可見出世位必定有個清淨末那，當第六識的依靠。
第二個道理，先引一段論。《論》說：藏識（第八）一定一直跟『一個識』一起轉，這個識就是末那；等意識也起來時，就是『兩個識』一起轉，也就是意識加末那；要是五識裡隨便起一個，就是『三個識』一起轉；一直到有時候五識一齊起來，那就是『七個識』一起轉。（這裡頭從頭到尾，末那都在。）
用這段論來逼問對方：照『末那唯染』那一派的講法，住滅盡定時沒有第七識（因為他們說末那只能染、滅定裡染的沒了，就一個第七都沒了）。那這時候藏識豈不就『一個識都沒跟它一起』了？這就跟剛才那句『藏識一定一直跟一個識一起轉』對著幹了。
同樣，住出世聖道時要是沒有第七識，那這時候（聖道裡起著意識）藏識就只『跟一個識一起』（只有意識）了；可這又怎麼對得上前面那句『等意識也起來時，藏識一定是跟兩個識一起轉』（意識加末那）呢？兩頭兜不攏。可見聖道裡、滅定裡，一定還有個清淨末那在。
第三個道理，引《顯揚論》。它說：末那一直跟四煩惱相應；可「或翻彼相應」——也就是它也能反過來、轉染成淨，去跟善法相應。換句話說，末那有時以「恃舉」（自高自大）為它運作的樣子（這是染的），有時以「平等」為它運作的樣子（這是淨的）。一句話裡擺了兩種樣子，可見末那是通於染、也通於不染兩面的。
第四個道理，拿第八來作對照。對方因為論說『阿羅漢位沒有染污末那』，就一口咬定那位沒有第七識；可照這個邏輯，論也說過『阿羅漢位捨掉了『阿賴耶』（那個名）』，那豈不也得說那位沒有第八識了？可大家明明都承認第八並不是這樣（並不是一捨『阿賴耶』這個名，第八的體就沒了，只是換了個名而已）。第八既然不能這樣推，那第七又憑什麼能這樣推（憑什麼一說沒染污末那，就連體都沒了）？
第五個道理，從平等性智倒推。各論都說：把第七識轉過來，就得到「平等性智」。這個平等智跟其餘各種智一樣，一定有它所依的那個『相應的淨識』；既然如此，倘若第七識根本沒有，那平等智也就無所依、也就不該有了——因為『能依的』不能離開『所依的』而單獨存在。
有人也許會說：那讓平等智靠「前六識」當所依不就行了？這也不行。因為大家已經承認：佛的平等智是「恒行」的（一直不間斷），就跟大圓鏡智一樣從不斷。可前六識是會間斷的，間斷的東西當不了那個從不間斷之智的所依。所以平等智的所依只能是那個從不間斷的第七淨識——足見第七一定有。
第六個道理，從第八的俱有依說。到了無學位，倘若沒有第七識，那第八識就會『沒有俱有依』（沒有同時並存、互相扶持的依靠）了。可是第八識一定有這個俱有依（就是第七），就像其餘各個識都有自己的俱有依一樣——這是識的通例。所以無學位也得有第七。
第七個道理，從法我執說。正像一個還沒證得「補特伽羅無我」（也就是人無我）的人，他的「人我執」是一直在起的；同樣道理，一個還沒證得「法無我」的人，他的「法我執」也應該一直在起。可這個法我執要靠哪個識才起得來呢？倘若沒有第七識，它就無處安身了。它不能靠第八——因為第八不跟「慧」相應，沒有慧（執法為實得拿慧當依，第八既沒有慧，就托不住法執）。所以一定得有第七，法我執才有著落。
由這一條就該相信：在二乘的聖道、滅盡定、無學位裡，這第七識仍舊一直在起（起著法我執）——因為二乘人並沒有證得法無我，法我執自然還在，第七也就還在。
第八個道理，從一個現成的論證說。各論裡常拿『五識同法』打比方來證有第七——意思是：五識個個都有專屬自己的俱有依（就是五根），照同一個道理，第六意識也該有專屬它的俱有依，那就是第七。這個論證裡，『五識皆有不共俱有依』是當例子（同喻），用來推出第七是第六的所依。可是倘若在聖道起時、無學位裡偏偏沒有第七當第六的依，那這個論證所立的「宗」（主張）和「因」（理由）就一齊出毛病、推不下去了。
再逼一步：你若准第六有時候沒有所依，那照同一個例子，五識也該有時候沒有所依了。可五識明明是一直有所依的；那第六也該照樣一直有所依（也就是一直有第七當依）才對。
把這幾條合起來，結論就是：一定有個『不染污的末那』（清淨末那），在上面那三個階段（聖道、滅定、無學）裡一直現起著。
那頌裡說『這三個階段沒有它』，又怎麼講？那是就『染污的末那』說的，並不是說第七的體沒了。這就跟前面講的一樣：說『四個階段沒有阿賴耶』，指的是沒了「阿賴耶」那個名，並不是第八的體沒了；這裡『三個階段沒有染污末那』也該照這個道理來懂。
乙、末那三種差別（我見·法見·平等性智）
末那按它所配的東西，大致分三種：第一種，跟「補特伽羅我見」（也就是人我見，把身心執成一個「我」）相應；第二種，跟「法我見」（把諸法執成實有）相應；第三種，跟「平等性智」相應（這已是轉依後的清淨末那）。
第一種（配人我見的）通在這幾類身上：一切異生（也就是凡夫）的相續、二乘的有學、七地以前那「一類菩薩」（指他們還會起人我執的那種有漏心的階段）——這些位上的末那，緣著阿賴耶識，起了補特伽羅我見。
第二種（配法我見的）通在這幾類身上：一切異生、聲聞、獨覺的相續，以及一切菩薩在『法空智果還沒現前』的那個位上——這些位上的末那，緣著異熟識，起了法我見。
第三種（配平等性智的）通在這幾類身上：一切如來的相續，以及菩薩在見道、修道裡「法空智果現在前」的那個位上——這些位上的末那，緣著「無垢識」（最清淨的第八）、異熟識等等，起了平等性智。
這裡要點明人、法二見的關係：人我見一起來，法我見也一定同時現前。因為人我執非得靠著法我執才起得來——打個比方：天黑時把一根『木樁』看錯了，總得先迷在『這裡有個東西』這個相上（這是法執），才會進一步把它妄認成「人」（這是人執）。可見法執在底下墊著，人執才立得起來。
人我見和法我見，作用雖然各不相同，可是彼此並不打架，它們同靠『一個慧』（拿同一個慧當體）。
打個比方：就像眼識等，本身明明是一個，卻能有了別青、了別黃等好多種作用，這些作用彼此並不衝突。這裡『一個慧帶起人、法兩種見的用』也是同樣道理。
下面講哪些位上只起法執、不起人執。二乘的有學在聖道、滅定現前時，頓悟的菩薩在修道位上，有學的漸悟者在「生空智果」（親證人無我的那種智果）現前時——這幾種情形都只起法執、不起人執，因為這時候人我執已經被伏住了。
二乘的無學、以及這漸悟者在『法空智果還沒現前』時，也只起法執，因為這時候人我執已經斷掉了。
到了八地以上，一切菩薩所有的「我執」（人我執）都永遠不再現起了——或是已經永斷、或是已經永伏。不過他們在『法空智果還沒現前』時，照樣還會起「法執」；這跟『我執永不現行』並不矛盾（一個是人執、早停了，一個是法執、還在，兩回事）。
這有契經作證。契經說：八地以上，一切「煩惱障」不再現行，只剩它所依的「所知障」還在。這個「還在」的所知障，指的是「現行」，不是「種子」（煩惱障的種子其實也還沒斷盡，只是不現行了）。怎麼知道這裡「在」指的是現行？因為倘若不這樣講（倘若連現行的所知障也算沒有了），那煩惱障的種子既然也沒斷，就同樣該說它「在」了——可經偏偏只說所知障「在」、不提煩惱障「在」，足見這個「在」說的是現行（所知障現行還在，煩惱障現行已停）。
這個跟「法執」一起起的末那，染不染要看對誰說。對二乘等人，它叫「不染」（因為它並不擋二乘所求的那種智）；可對菩薩，它就也叫「染」了——因為它擋住菩薩要證的智（法空智）。正因為對菩薩是「染」，所以（在菩薩這邊）它也叫「有覆無記」。
而對二乘等人，就說它叫「無覆」（無覆無記），因為它並不擋二乘所求的那種智。
這個（跟法執一起的末那）歸在「異熟生」這一類裡——因為它是從異熟識那裡一直不斷地生出來的，所以叫「異熟生」；但它並不是「異熟果」（真正的異熟）。「異熟生」這個名收得寬，就好比「增上緣」（凡是其餘三緣收不進去的，都歸到增上緣裡）一樣：凡是別的類別收不進去的，就都歸進這個「異熟生」裡。
丙、證有第七識（聖教量 · 六理證）
〔問〕怎麼曉得這第七識是離開眼等各識、另有它自己一個體的？〔答〕靠「聖教」和「正理」這兩樣當作最可靠的憑據（一個是佛說的話，一個是站得住的道理）。
一、聖教量
先說聖教這一邊。世尊在許多經裡都說過「心、意、識」這三個各有各的意思。
「集起」（積集種子、生起諸法）這一義叫作「心」，「思量」這一義叫作「意」，「了別」（分別認知）這一義叫作「識」——這就是三者各別的意思。
這三個意思，其實八個識都各帶幾分（每個識都多少有點集起、思量、了別的成分）；不過哪個識在哪一義上最突出，就拿那一義來給它立名。
所以第八立名叫「心」——因為它收藏一切法的種子、又從種子生起一切法；第七立名叫「意」——因為它緣著藏識等，又「恒」又「審」地思量、把它執成「我」；其餘六個立名叫「識」——因為它們對著六種各別的境，粗粗動動、又會間斷地了別轉起。
就像《入楞伽經》的伽他（也就是偈頌）裡說：
藏識就立名叫「心」，那思量的性就叫作「意」，能了別種種境相的，這就立名叫「識」。
再說，大乘經在許多地方都另外明說有第七識，所以曉得這第七識是另有它自己一個體的。
那大乘經本身可不可信？這些大乘經都是「至教量」（最可靠的佛說憑據），這一點前面已經詳細講過（論證過它們確是佛說），所以這裡不再重複了。
《解脫經》裡也另外說有這第七識，就像它那首頌講的：
染污意在一切時，都和那些煩惱一同生、一同滅；一旦從這些煩惱裡解脫了，這染污意就過去不曾有、未來也不會有。
那部經自己解釋這首頌的意思說：有個「染污意」，從無始以來就跟四個煩惱一直一同生、一同滅，這四個就是我見、我愛、我慢、我癡。
等到對治的道生起、把煩惱斷掉以後，這染污意就從那些煩惱裡解脫出來了。
這時候，跟這意相應的煩惱，不光現在沒有，連過去、未來也沒有——因為過去、未來本來就沒有實在的自性（不是實有的）。
像這一類的聖教，各部經論裡都有；怕人嫌引得太多太煩，所以不一一列舉了。
二、正理（六理證）
前面已經引了聖教來作證；底下該擺「正理」了，也就是用道理來證明第七識確實有。
〔理證一·不共無明〕
第一個理證。契經說有一種「不共無明」，它微細、又一直在起，把真實的道理蓋住。試想：要是沒有這第七識，那這「不共無明」就無處可安、應該根本沒有了（它得有個地方依著才起得來）。
詳細說：一切凡夫在「一切分」（一切階段、一切時候）都恒常起著『迷在道理上的不共無明』，把真實的義理蓋住、把那能見真理的聖慧眼擋住。就像伽他說的：
當見真義的心正要生起時，它總是擋著、礙著；在一切分（一切位）上都跟著一道走的，就是不共無明。
所以契經才說：凡夫這一類，恒常處在漫漫長夜裡，被無明弄瞎了眼、被昏醉纏住了心，從沒有一念是醒覺的。
既然這樣，倘若凡夫位上竟有『這無明暫時不起』的時候，那就跟經義頂上了（經明明說凡夫『恒處長夜、從沒醒覺』）。
在同一個凡夫位裡，這『迷理的無明』竟然有時起、有時不起，這是講不通的——它應該是一直在起才對。
那這個『一直在起的不共無明』能不能就掛在前六識上？掛不住。因為前六識是會間斷的（像睡眠、悶絕等五種無心位，或者轉成善心等時候，六識都會停）；可這無明非得一直染著、一刻不停。六識一間斷，掛在它上頭的無明就跟著斷了，這就跟『一直在起』對不上。
可要是承認有末那（讓這一直在起的無明掛在末那上，末那從不間斷），這毛病就沒了。
〔難〕這裡有人挑一個字眼：染污末那一直跟四惑（我癡、我見、我慢、我愛）相應，那跟末那一起起的這個「無明」，怎麼還配叫「不共」呢？——照常理講，「不共無明」應該是單獨起、不跟別的煩惱搭夥的；可末那這個無明明明跟另外三惑搭著，怎麼算「不共」？
〔一說·三者非根本〕 一說：跟末那一起起的我見、我慢、我愛這三個，並不算「根本煩惱」（只有無明才是根本）。既然搭夥的那三個不是根本煩惱，那這個無明就還是『沒跟別的根本煩惱搭夥』，叫它「不共」又有什麼不對？
〔應知·正義〕 又一說（這是正義）：那『三者非根本』的講法，跟道理、跟聖教都不合。因為在「純隨煩惱」的名目裡，根本就沒把這三個（我見、我慢、我愛）算作隨煩惱；而且這三個明明是歸在「六根本煩惱」「十煩惱」裡的。可見它們是根本煩惱，不是隨煩惱——所以說『搭夥的三個不是根本』站不住。
再說，各論到處都講『染污末那跟四個（根本）煩惱一直相應』，可見這四惑個個都是根本煩惱。
那「不共」到底該怎麼解？應該說：四惑裡頭以「無明」當主角，雖然有另外三個（我見、慢、愛）跟著一起起，這個無明還是可以叫「不共」——因為它是強的主角，那三個是隨的配角，主角獨佔這個名。
為什麼說無明是主角？因為從無始以來，這無明一直在裡頭昏迷、從不曾省察，是『癡（無明）特別偏強』的——既然無明特強，就單拿它標個「不共」。
〔難〕那有人接著問：跟末那一起的我見等，因為是跟別的一道起的，本該叫『相應（無明那一路）』；可要是輪到它們『當主角』的時候，是不是也該叫「不共」呢？〔答〕對，就像無明當主角時叫不共一樣，准許我見等當主角時也叫不共，這也沒什麼不對。
〔又釋·不共之義一〕 「不共」還有另一種解法。有人這樣解『這癡叫不共』：就像「不共佛法」那個「不共」（指唯獨佛才有的法），這無明也是唯獨末那才有的——只有第七識才有這個一直在起的無明，別的識都沒有，所以叫「不共」。
〔難〕有人駁：要是照『唯獨這個識才有』來解不共，那毛病就大了——別的識所相應的那些煩惱（這些末那裡頭沒有），豈不也都該叫「不共」了？凡是『人家有、末那沒有』的都能叫不共，這名就太濫了。
〔答〕這「不共」是就『殊勝的意思』立的名，並不是凡『你有我無、我有你無』就都叫不共。下面說明什麼才算殊勝。
所謂殊勝，是指：第七識相應的這個無明，無始以來一直在起、又能擋住見真義的智。這樣一份殊勝的作用，別的識都沒有、唯獨第七識有，所以才叫它「不共」（不是泛泛的有無，是這份殊勝獨此一家）。
〔難〕又有人接著問：既然照這個（拿殊勝、恒行當不共），那跟末那一起起的那三個（我見、慢、愛，它們也是無始以來一直在起的）豈不也都該叫「不共」了？
〔答〕兩種說法都行。一是：以無明當主角，所以單由它得「不共」這個名（那三個是隨，不另標）。二是：也准那三個一樣叫不共，只不過為了跟『別的識裡那個跟眾惑搭夥的癡（共無明）』分個清楚，這裡才姑且偏挑無明出來說它「不共」。
這裡再把「不共無明」分成兩種：第一種叫「恒行不共」——這是別的識都沒有的，就是末那相應的那個無明（一直在起）。第二種叫「獨行不共」——這倒是末那裡頭沒有的，指那種不跟別的煩惱搭夥、單獨冒出來的無明。
這跟《瑜伽》把無明分兩種對得上：跟貪等一道起的，叫「相應無明」；不跟貪等一道、單獨起的，叫「獨行無明」。
獨行無明還可細分。那種『當主角的獨行無明』只屬「見所斷」（見道就斷得掉）。就像契經說：『諸聖人裡的有學，因為他那不共無明已經永斷了，所以不再造新業。』
那種『不當主角的獨行無明』就也通「修所斷」（修道才斷得了）；因為跟它相應的那些忿等隨煩惱，本來就通見道斷、也通修道斷。
最後對個帳：「恒行不共」（也就是末那相應的那個無明）是其餘部派所沒有的（只有大乘才立它）；「獨行不共」則大乘、別的部派兩邊都有（這個是大家都認的）。
〔理證二·意法為緣生意識〕
第二個理證。契經說：拿眼根、色境作緣，就生出眼識；這樣一路說下去，直到拿『意（根）、法（境）』作緣，就生出意識。試想：要是沒有這第七識，那作為意識生起之緣的那個「意」（也就是意識的俱有依、意根）就沒著落了。
詳細說：就像五識一定有眼等那樣「增上、不共、俱有」的所依（也就是五根），意識既然同屬六識之列，按理也該准它有這樣一個所依；可這第七識要是沒有，那意識的這個所依又從哪兒來呢？
有人也許想拿「色（法）」充當意識的所依，這不行——因為意識的根是「意（根）」，意根並不是色。再說，倘若拿色當意識的依，那意識就該沒有「隨念分別」（順著回憶來分別）和「計度分別」（推度來分別）這兩種分別了（色法引不出這兩種來）；可意識明明有這兩種分別，足見它的所依不是色，而是第七。
對方也許反過來說『五識本來就沒有俱有所依』，想用這話來推翻『第六非有俱有依不可』。這也不行——因為五識是跟五根同時轉的，就像種子跟它長出的芽、形體跟它的影子那樣，總是一道並存的。可見五識實實在在有俱有依，並不是沒有。
再說，識和根既然一定同緣一個境，那就跟心王和心所一定同時並起一樣（既同緣一境，根就得跟識同時在，這正是俱有依的意思）。
把這幾步合起來，就立成一個論證：『極成的意識』（也就是雙方都承認的那個第六識）跟眼等五識一樣，一定有個『不共的所依』，這所依能把意識自己的名、自己的處標出來。而且要分清楚：這個所依不是「等無間緣」那一路（等無間緣是前一念的意識，已滅讓位的那種），它是『增上、能生』這一路的所依。憑什麼這樣說？因為意識是「極成六識」裡的一個——既跟其餘五識同列，照例就該有個不共的俱有依，那就是第七。
〔理證三·思量名意〕
第三個理證。契經說『思量叫作意』。試想：要是沒有這第七識，那個『（又恒又審）思量的意』就應該沒有了。
詳細說：假定就拿「意識」現在眼前這時候來講，那麼當它等無間依的『前一念的意』早已滅了、不在了（已經落到過去去了）；而過去、未來按道理又不是實有的。這麼一來，「思量」這份作用就根本立不起來——因為沒有一個一直在的意來掌管思量。
既然這樣（前一念的意早滅了，又沒一個一直在思量的），那又怎麼說得上『（又恒又審地思量）叫作意』呢？
對方也許說：這「意」是「假說」的（靠著那已滅的前一念假立個名罷了）。這也說不通——倘若根本沒有一個『真在思量的東西』，那這個假名又靠什麼立得起來呢？（假名總得有個真實的底子。）
對方又也許說：那就靠『現在這個曾在思量的』（也就是當下現行的意識）來立這個「意」吧。這也不行——因為它當下正以「了別」見長、正叫作「識」呢，怎麼能把它說成「意」（思量）？（一個當下，名分只能取一個最突出的，它既已名識，就佔不住意這個名。）
這幾條一逼，就曉得：另有一個第七末那，又恒又審地思量，它才是名副其實的「意」；至於那『已滅的前一念第六』，是靠著這第七、才借立了個「意」的名（也就是說，那個當等無間依的前念意，是借第七的名假稱作意的）。
〔理證四·無想滅定二定有別〕
第四個理證。契經說「無想定」和「滅盡定」這兩個定是有分別的；可試想：要是沒有「染意」（染污末那），這兩個定就該分不出差別了。怎麼說？這兩個定都一樣把前六識連同它們的心所滅掉，所滅的體、數完全相同——也就是說，從六識心所這一面看，兩個定外表一模一樣。
既然外表一樣，那分別就只能落在染意上：無想定裡還有染意、滅盡定裡沒有染意，靠這『一個有、一個沒有』才分得開。倘若根本沒有染意這樣東西、不能立這一有一無，那這兩個定還憑什麼分出差別來？
對方也許說：那拿『加行（入定前的用功）、界、地、所依』這些不同來分這兩個定不就行了？這也說不通——因為那些不同的「因」，正是從『染意的有無』上來的；倘若連染意的有無這一條都沒有，那上面那些差別的因也就跟著沒了（根還在染意，染意是更根本的那一層）。
所以一定另有『這個（染污末那）』意，拿它當這兩個定最根本的差別因。
〔理證五·無想有情有我執〕
第五個理證。契經說：「無想有情」（生在無想天的眾生）在那一輩子裡，前六識的心、心所統統滅掉。試想：要是沒有這第七識，那無想有情就該沒有「染污」（也就是沒有我執）了。
詳細說：無想有情有那麼長一段時間都沒有前六轉識；倘若再沒有這末那意，那他的我執就根本沒有了（整整一輩子的長時間裡都沒我執）。
可天底下並沒有這樣的事：在別處一個「具縛」的人（凡夫，煩惱繫縛樣樣俱足的），竟會在一輩子裡全無我執。具縛的人一定一直有我執；無想天的眾生既然也還是具縛凡夫，那他一輩子裡也該一直有我執——這我執靠的就是末那。
再說，無想有情倘若真沒有我執，那他就該像涅槃一樣（已離執著）了，那就不該被聖賢一致地訶斥、厭離才對。可無想天偏偏正是聖賢所共同訶斥厭離的（聖賢嫌它是個歧途），足見它裡頭還是有我執的。
〔難·約三時辨〕對方也許說：在剛進無想的「最初」、和快出無想的「最後」這兩頭，他是有前六識、有我執的，所以前面那個毛病（一輩子全無我執）並不成立。〔答〕可是中間那一大段長時間裡並沒有前六識呀；中間既然沒我執，那『具縛凡夫竟有一段長時全無我執』這個毛病還是擺在那裡，沒躲過去。
〔難〕對方又也許說：那拿「過去、未來」的我執（也就是它的種子或餘勢）來頂著，前面的毛病就沒了。〔答〕可那過去、未來的我執既不是「現行」、又不是「常住」，等於沒有；既等於沒有，前面那個毛病還是在。
再把對方剩下的退路一條一條堵死。第一條：「所得」（我執結出的果）既然沒有，那「能得」（能起我執的那個依靠）也就沒有了。第二條：對方若想拿「不相應行法」（像「得」、命根那一類）來當我執的依，可這一類法前面早已破過了，根本不是實有，當不了依。第三條：對方若想拿藏識來當依，可這一派（主張無想天無染、不立第七的那派）本來就不立第七，在這藏識熏習的事上——藏識裡那份我執的熏習既然沒有，熏習也就無從談起。第四條：對方若想拿『其餘各種法』來受熏（存我執的種），這在前面也早辯明不合理，別的法根本受不了熏。四條退路都堵死了。
所以一定另有個「染污末那」，在無想天裡一直起著我執；正因為它在起我執，賢聖才一致訶斥、厭離那個無想天。
〔理證六·三性心恒帶我執〕
第六個理證。契經說：凡夫不管起「善、染、無記」哪一種心，都一直帶著「我執」；試想，要是沒有這第七識，那這份隨時帶著的我執就不該有了。
詳細說：凡夫這一類，在起三性心的時候，雖然向外做著種種事業，可向裡頭卻一直執著有個「我」。
正因為一直在裡頭執我，才害得六識所起的布施等善業『亡不了相』——也就是放不下『我在施、施給某人』這些相，做不到真正清淨。
所以《瑜伽》說：染污末那是（前六）識的依靠；它還沒滅的時候，「相了別縛」（被自己對相分的了別綁住）解脫不了；等末那滅了，這「相縛」才得解脫。
所謂「相縛」，是指：對境的相看不透它其實如幻（不曉得這些就像幻化的事），於是就被「見分、相分」拘住、綁住、不得自在，所以叫「相縛」。
就著這個意思，有伽他說：
這樣的染污意，是前六識的所依；這意還沒滅的時候，前六識的繫縛終究解脫不了。
再從「有漏」這個角度補一條更要緊的。凡夫起「善」心、「無覆無記」心的時候，倘若沒有一個隨時相伴的我執，那這些心就該不算「有漏」了。怎麼說？因為在同一個相續裡，前六識的那些煩惱跟這善心、無覆無記心並不同時起（六識的煩惱是斷斷續續的，這會兒起善心、那會兒才起煩惱，碰不到一塊）。既然碰不到一塊，前六識的煩惱就沒法把這善心、無記心染成有漏——要使它們成有漏，得靠一個一直在的東西，那就是末那的我執。
這裡先堵兩條歪路。第一條：想拿『過去、未來的煩惱來緣縛這善心』當理由，這在道理上行不通，因為過去、未來本不是實有的。第二條：也不能說『靠別人相續裡的煩惱』就能把我這善心染成有漏——否則照同一個邏輯，『靠別人相續裡的解脫』豈不也能令我自己成無漏了？這顯然講不通。
第三條歪路：也不能說另有個「隨眠」是「不相應行法」，現在相續裡起著，靠它把善心等染成有漏；因為這種（不相應行的）隨眠不是實有的，這一點大家早已公認了。
第四條歪路：也不能說這善心等是「從有漏種子」生出來的、所以就成有漏；因為那種子在更前頭並沒有一個「因」能把它弄成有漏（要曉得，沒有末那的我執，那種子根本無從成為有漏種——病根還在我執上）。
再把第四條釘死：根本不是「有漏種子」把善心等弄成有漏的。不然的話，有學人所起的「無漏心」（它也是從有漏的身、種裡生出來的）豈不也該成有漏了？可無漏心明明是無漏的。可見不是靠種子，而是靠現行的我執，才把善心染成有漏。
話說回來，前六識的煩惱固然會引發布施等業，可它跟那善業並不同時起；既不同時，它就當不了「有漏」的正因。為什麼？因為「有漏」這個詞，本來就是『跟漏（煩惱）同時相伴』的意思——能跟善業時時相伴的，得是那個一直在的末那我執，那才是有漏的正因。
還有更明白的一例：「無記業」根本不是煩惱引發的，那它又怎麼會成「有漏」呢？（它既不靠煩惱引發，卻照樣是有漏，足見必定另有個一直相伴的末那我執，把它染成有漏。）
那麼，諸法到底怎麼才成有漏的？正面說：是因為它跟『自己身上一直現行著的煩惱』一同生、一同滅、彼此添勢，這才成有漏——而這個時時相伴的現行煩惱，正是末那的我執。
由著這層相伴，就熏成了『有漏法的種子』，等後來再現起時，有漏的義理才算坐實。凡夫是這樣，有學也是這樣。
那無學位的有漏法又怎麼講？無學人已經沒有現行的漏了，他的有漏法雖然眼下並不跟漏相伴，可它是從『先前所熏的那個有漏種』生起來的，所以照樣成有漏，這在道理上並不矛盾。
把這一整串收攏：正因為有末那一直起著我執，才使善等法成得了「有漏」的義；倘若沒有這末那意，那善等的有漏義就一定立不起來。由此就曉得，另有這第七識。
〔結·六理證〕
證明有這第七識的道理還有很多，這裡只順著《攝大乘論》略講了六種；有智慧的人，該照著它生起信解、依之而學。
那有的經裡只說『六個識』，又怎麼講？要曉得：那是「隨轉理門」（順著別人的講法、權且方便這麼說），或者是隨『所依的六根』而數成六個；可若論識的類別，其實有八種。
〔Verses commented〕Continuing: the residual sense of verse 7, and the proof of a seventh consciousness
A. The dispute over whether the manas pervades the defiled and undefiled (the two gates of scripture and reason)
〔Herein one view · the manas is only defiled〕 Next one must ask: can the manas only be defiled, or might there also be an undefiled manas? Here one view: the manas is bound up only with the "affliction-obstruction" — that is, it is always defiled, and there is no undefiled manas at all. There are three reasons: first, holy scripture all says that in those three states (the arhat, cessation-attainment, the supramundane path) there is no manas; second, it further says that the manas is always concomitant with the four afflictions; third, it further says that the manas is "the basis of the defilement of the consciousnesses."
〔It should be said · the correct view · the manas pervades the defiled and undefiled〕 Another view (this is the correct one): that "the manas can only be defiled" account is at odds with holy scripture and with reason alike — because the "supramundane manas" (that is, the purified manas) is plainly said by scripture to exist. Below, this point is set up under separate heads.
The first reason: the "undefiled mind-consciousness" in the supramundane state (that is, the sixth consciousness in supramundane times), just as in its defiled times, must have a basis "co-arisen with it and exclusively its own" — and this basis is the seventh manas. Which shows that in the supramundane state there must be a purified manas serving as the support of the sixth consciousness.
The second reason: first a passage of treatise is cited. The Treatise says: the store-consciousness (the eighth) definitely turns constantly together with "one consciousness," and this consciousness is the manas; when the mind-consciousness also arises, then it is "two consciousnesses" turning together, namely the mind-consciousness plus the manas; if any one of the five consciousnesses arises, then it is "three consciousnesses" turning together; all the way to a time when the five consciousnesses arise at once, which is "seven consciousnesses" turning together. (Throughout all of this, the manas is present.)
This passage of treatise is used to press the opponent: on the "the manas is only defiled" faction's account, when abiding in the cessation-attainment there is no seventh consciousness (since they say the manas can only be defiled, and in cessation-attainment the defiled is gone, then there is no seventh at all). But then at that time would not the store-consciousness have "no consciousness turning with it at all"? And this runs square against the line just cited, "the store-consciousness definitely turns constantly together with one consciousness."
Likewise, when abiding in the supramundane holy path, if there were no seventh consciousness, then at that time (the mind-consciousness being aroused in the holy path) the store-consciousness would turn together with "only one consciousness" (only the mind-consciousness); but how does this then square with the earlier line, "when the mind-consciousness also arises, the store-consciousness definitely turns together with two consciousnesses" (the mind-consciousness plus the manas)? The two ends will not meet. Which shows that in the holy path and in the cessation-attainment there must still be a purified manas present.
The third reason cites the Xianyang lun. It says: the manas is always concomitant with the four afflictions; yet "or, reversing, it is concomitant [otherwise]" — that is, it can also turn around, turning the defiled into the pure and becoming concomitant with the good dharmas. In other words, the manas at times has "haughtiness" (self-exalting) as its mode of operation (this is the defiled), and at times has "equanimity" as its mode of operation (this is the pure). Two modes are set down in a single sentence, which shows that the manas reaches both sides, the defiled and the undefiled.
The fourth reason takes the eighth for comparison. Because the treatise says "at the arhat-state there is no defiled manas," the opponent flatly insists that at that state there is no seventh consciousness; but on this same logic, the treatise has also said "at the arhat-state the [name] 'ālaya' is given up," so must one not then say that at that state there is no eighth consciousness either? Yet everyone plainly grants the eighth is not so (it is not that the moment the name "ālaya" is given up the very essence of the eighth is gone — only the name is changed). Since the eighth cannot be argued this way, then on what does the seventh allow being argued this way (on what does its very essence vanish the moment one says there is no defiled manas)?
The fifth reason works back from the wisdom of equal-nature. The various treatises all say: turn the seventh consciousness around, and one obtains the "wisdom of equal-nature." This wisdom of equal-nature, like every other wisdom, must have its supporting "concomitant purified consciousness"; that being so, if the seventh consciousness simply did not exist, then the wisdom of equal-nature would have no support and ought not to exist either — for "the supported" cannot stand alone apart from "the support."
Someone may perhaps say: then let the wisdom of equal-nature take the "first six consciousnesses" as its support — would that not do? This too will not do. For all already grant that the buddha's wisdom of equal-nature is "ever-operating" (constant, without break), just like the great-mirror wisdom, never breaking off. But the first six consciousnesses do break off, and what breaks off cannot serve as the support of a wisdom that never breaks off. So the support of the wisdom of equal-nature can only be that never-breaking seventh purified consciousness — which proves the seventh must exist.
The sixth reason speaks from the eighth's co-existent basis. At the no-more-learning stage, if there were no seventh consciousness, then the eighth consciousness would "have no co-existent basis" (no support standing alongside it at once and mutually upholding it). But the eighth consciousness must have this co-existent basis (namely the seventh), just as each of the other consciousnesses has its own co-existent basis — this is the rule for consciousnesses. So at the no-more-learning stage too there must be a seventh.
The seventh reason speaks from the dharma-self-grasping. Just as one who has not yet realized "the no-self of persons" (that is, the no-self of the person) has his "person-self-grasping" arising constantly, so by the same reasoning one who has not yet realized "the no-self of dharmas" ought to have his "dharma-self-grasping" arising constantly. But on which consciousness must this dharma-self-grasping rely in order to arise? If there were no seventh consciousness, it would have nowhere to settle. It cannot rely on the eighth — because the eighth is not concomitant with "wisdom," having no wisdom (grasping dharmas as real requires taking wisdom as its support, and since the eighth has no wisdom, it cannot hold up the dharma-grasping). So there must be a seventh for the dharma-self-grasping to have its footing.
From this one should believe: in the supramundane holy path, the cessation-attainment, and the no-more-learning stage of the two vehicles, this seventh consciousness still arises constantly (arising as dharma-self-grasping) — because the two-vehicle people have not realized the no-self of dharmas, the dharma-self-grasping naturally still remains, and so the seventh still remains.
The eighth reason speaks from a ready-made argument. The various treatises commonly use "the five consciousnesses as a parallel case" to prove there is a seventh — meaning: each of the five consciousnesses has its own exclusive co-existent basis (namely the five faculties); by the same reasoning, the sixth mind-consciousness too ought to have such an exclusive co-existent basis, and that is the seventh. In this argument, "the five consciousnesses all have an unshared co-existent basis" serves as the example (the corroborating instance), used to infer that the seventh is the support of the sixth. But if, just in the arising of the holy path and at the no-more-learning stage, there were no seventh to serve as the sixth's support, then the "thesis" (the proposition) and the "reason" (the ground) set up by this argument would both fail together and could not be carried through.
Pressing one step further: if you allow that the sixth at times has no support, then by the same example the five consciousnesses too ought at times to have no support. But the five consciousnesses plainly have a support at all times; then the sixth too ought likewise to have a support at all times (that is, to have the seventh as support at all times).
Putting these several points together, the conclusion is: there definitely is an "undefiled manas" (the purified manas), constantly arising and present in the above three states (the holy path, the cessation-attainment, the no-more-learning).
Then how is the verse's saying that "in these three states it is not present" to be taken? That is said with respect to the "defiled manas," and does not mean that the essence of the seventh is gone. This is just like what was said before: to say "in the four states there is no ālaya" means that the name "ālaya" is gone, not that the essence of the eighth is gone; here too "in the three states there is no defiled manas" should be understood on this same principle.
B. The manas's three differentiations (the self-view · the dharma-view · the wisdom of equal-nature)
The manas, according to what it is matched with, broadly divides into three kinds: the first, concomitant with "the view of a self in persons" (that is, the person-self-view, grasping body-and-mind as a single "self"); the second, concomitant with "the view of a self in dharmas" (grasping the dharmas as really existent); the third, concomitant with "the wisdom of equal-nature" (this being the purified manas after turning around).
The first (matched with the person-self-view) extends to these classes: the continua of all ordinary beings (that is, the unenlightened), the learners of the two vehicles, and "a certain kind of bodhisattva" prior to the seventh stage (referring to the stage of their contaminated mind where person-self-grasping can still arise) — the manas at these stages takes the ālaya-consciousness as object and arouses the view of a self in persons.
The second (matched with the dharma-self-view) extends to these classes: the continua of all ordinary beings, disciples, and solitary buddhas, and the stage where "the fruit of the wisdom of dharma-emptiness is not yet present" for all bodhisattvas — the manas at these stages takes the maturation-consciousness as object and arouses the view of a self in dharmas.
The third (matched with the wisdom of equal-nature) extends to these classes: the continua of all Tathāgatas, and the stage where "the fruit of the wisdom of dharma-emptiness is present" for bodhisattvas in the path of seeing and the path of cultivation — the manas at these stages takes the "stainless consciousness" (the utterly pure eighth), the maturation-consciousness, and so on as object, and arouses the wisdom of equal-nature.
Here the relation between the person-view and the dharma-view must be pointed out: the moment the person-self-view arises, the dharma-self-view too must be present at the same time. For the person-self-grasping can only arise by resting on the dharma-self-grasping — to draw a comparison: in the dark one mistakes a "tree-stump" for something, but one must first be deluded onto the mark "there is something here" (this is the dharma-grasping) before one can go on to misidentify it as "a person" (this is the person-grasping). Which shows that the dharma-grasping underlies it, and only so can the person-grasping stand up.
The person-self-view and the dharma-self-view, though their functions each differ, do not clash with each other; they both rest on "one wisdom" (taking the same wisdom as their essence).
To draw a comparison: just as the eye-consciousness and the rest, plainly one in themselves, can yet have many functions — discerning blue, discerning yellow, and so on — these functions not clashing with one another, so here too "one wisdom bearing up both the person-view and the dharma-view as its functions" works on the same principle.
Below it tells which stages arouse only the dharma-grasping and not the person-grasping. The learners of the two vehicles when the holy path or the cessation-attainment is present, the sudden-awakening bodhisattvas at the stage of the path of cultivation, and the learner gradual-awakeners when "the fruit of the wisdom of person-emptiness" (the fruit of the wisdom directly realizing the no-self of persons) is present — these several cases all arouse only the dharma-grasping and not the person-grasping, because at these times the person-self-grasping has already been suppressed.
The no-more-learning [adepts] of the two vehicles, and this gradual-awakener when "the fruit of the wisdom of dharma-emptiness is not yet present," also arouse only the dharma-grasping, because at these times the person-self-grasping has already been severed.
From the eighth stage on up, all bodhisattvas' "self-grasping" (the person-self-grasping) never comes forth again — either already severed forever, or already suppressed forever. Yet when "the fruit of the wisdom of dharma-emptiness is not yet present," they still arouse "dharma-grasping"; and this does not clash with "self-grasping never coming forth" (the one being the person-grasping, long since stopped, the other the dharma-grasping, still present — two different matters).
There is a scripture to attest this. The scripture says: from the eighth stage on up, all the "affliction-obstruction" no longer arises, and there remains only the "knowable-obstruction" on which it depends. This "remaining" knowable-obstruction refers to "present activity," not to "seeds" (the seeds of the affliction-obstruction are in fact not yet wholly severed, only no longer arising). How is it known that "remaining" here refers to present activity? Because if it were not put this way (if even the present activity of the knowable-obstruction were reckoned gone), then since the seeds of the affliction-obstruction too are not severed, it ought equally to be said to "remain" — yet the scripture says only that the knowable-obstruction "remains" and does not mention the affliction-obstruction "remaining," which shows that this "remain" speaks of present activity (the present activity of the knowable-obstruction still remains, while the present activity of the affliction-obstruction has already stopped).
This manas arising together with the "dharma-grasping" — whether it is called defiled or undefiled depends on whom one is speaking of. With respect to the two vehicles and the like, it is called "undefiled" (because it does not obstruct the kind of wisdom the two vehicles seek); but with respect to the bodhisattvas, it is then called "defiled" — because it obstructs the wisdom the bodhisattvas would realize (the wisdom of dharma-emptiness). Just because it is "defiled" with respect to the bodhisattvas, it (on the bodhisattvas' side) is also called "obscured-indeterminate."
And with respect to the two vehicles and the like, it is said to be called "unobscured" (unobscured-indeterminate), because it does not obstruct the kind of wisdom the two vehicles seek.
This (the manas arising together with the dharma-grasping) is comprised within the class "maturation-born" — because it is born unceasingly from the maturation-consciousness, it is called "maturation-born"; but it is not the "maturation-fruit" (the true maturation). The name "maturation-born" reaches wide, just like "the predominant condition" (whatever the other three conditions cannot take in is all assigned to the predominant condition): whatever the other categories cannot take in is all assigned to this "maturation-born."
C. Proving the existence of the seventh consciousness (the scriptural authority · the six doctrinal grounds)
〔Q〕How is it to be known that this seventh consciousness, apart from the eye and the other consciousnesses, has its own separate essence? 〔A〕By relying on "holy scripture" and "right reason," these two, as the most reliable authority (the one being the Buddha's word, the other being reasoning that holds firm).
1. The scriptural authority
First on the scripture side. The World-Honored One, in many scriptures, has said that "mind, mentation, and consciousness" each have their own meaning.
The sense "accumulating-and-arising" (accumulating the seeds and giving rise to all dharmas) is named "mind"; the sense "cogitating" is named "mentation"; the sense "discerning" (distinguishing and cognizing) is named "consciousness" — these are the three distinct senses of the three.
These three senses do, in fact, each pertain in some measure to all eight consciousnesses (each consciousness has, more or less, something of accumulating-and-arising, of cogitating, and of discerning); but in whichever sense a given consciousness is most outstanding, by that sense its name is set up.
So the eighth has its name set up as "mind" — because it stores the seeds of all dharmas and gives rise to all dharmas from those seeds; the seventh has its name set up as "mentation" — because it takes the store-consciousness and so on as object and cogitates "constantly" and "examiningly," grasping it as a "self"; the remaining six have their names set up as "consciousness" — because, toward the six distinct kinds of object, they discern coarsely, movingly, and intermittently, and so turn.
Just as the gāthā (that is, a verse) in the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra says:
The store-consciousness has its name set up as "mind"; that cogitating nature is named "mentation"; and that which can discern the various marks of objects, this has its name set up as "consciousness."
Again, the Mahāyāna scriptures in many places separately state plainly that there is a seventh consciousness, and so it is known that this seventh consciousness separately has its own essence.
Are the Mahāyāna scriptures themselves trustworthy? These Mahāyāna scriptures are all "the authority of supreme teaching" (the most reliable witness of the Buddha's word) — this point has already been argued at length before (it has been demonstrated that they truly are the Buddha's word), and so it is not repeated here.
In the Vimokṣa-sūtra too there is a separate statement that there is this seventh consciousness, just as its verse says:
The defiled mentation, at all times, arises together and ceases together with those afflictions; once one is freed from these afflictions, this defiled mentation neither was in the past nor will be in the future.
That scripture itself glosses the meaning of this verse, saying: there is a "defiled mentation" that, from beginningless time, arises and ceases together constantly with four afflictions, these four being the self-view, self-love, self-conceit, and self-delusion.
When the countering path arises and the afflictions are severed, this defiled mentation thereupon attains freedom from those afflictions.
At that time, the afflictions concomitant with this mentation are not only absent in the present, but absent in the past and future as well — because past and future are by nature simply not really existent (they are not really there).
Teachings of this kind are found throughout all the divisions of the scriptures and treatises; for fear of wearying [the reader] with extensive text, they are not enumerated one by one.
2. Right reason (the six doctrinal grounds)
Holy scripture has already been cited as witness above; below should come the "right reason," that is, proving by reasoning that the seventh consciousness truly exists.
〔Ground one · the non-shared ignorance〕
The first doctrinal ground. The scripture says there is a kind of "non-shared ignorance" that is subtle and constantly operating, covering over the true and real. Consider: if there were no seventh consciousness, then this "non-shared ignorance" would have nowhere to lodge and ought simply not to exist (it must have something to rest on before it can arise).
In detail: all ordinary beings, in "all phases" (all stages, all times), constantly arouse the "non-shared ignorance deluded as to principle," covering over the true and real meaning and obstructing the holy eye of wisdom that can see the truth. Just as the gāthā says:
When the mind that would see the true meaning is just about to arise, it always blocks and hinders; that which goes along through all phases (all stages) is named the non-shared ignorance.
This is why the scripture says: the class of ordinary beings is constantly in a long night, blinded by ignorance, the mind bound up in stupor-and-intoxication, never once awake.
This being so, if at the ordinary-being stage there were a time when "this ignorance were for a moment not arising," that would run against the meaning of the scripture (the scripture plainly says the ordinary being "is constantly in the long night, never once awake").
Within one and the same ordinary-being stage, for this "principle-deluding ignorance" to sometimes operate and sometimes not is untenable — it ought to be constantly operating.
Then can this "constantly operating non-shared ignorance" be hung on the first six consciousnesses? It cannot hold. Because the first six consciousnesses do break off (in sleep, in fainting, and the like, in the five mindless states, or when turning into a good mind and so on, the six consciousnesses all stop); but this ignorance must defile constantly, not pausing for a moment. The moment the six consciousnesses break off, the ignorance hung upon them breaks off along with them, and this does not square with "constantly operating."
But if one admits there is a manas (so that this constantly-operating ignorance is hung on the manas, which never breaks off), then this fault is gone.
〔Q〕Here someone picks at a word: the defiled manas is always concomitant with the four afflictions (self-delusion, self-view, self-conceit, self-love); then this "ignorance" arising with the manas — how can it still deserve to be called "non-shared"? By ordinary reckoning, a "non-shared ignorance" ought to arise alone, not partnering with other afflictions; yet the manas's ignorance plainly partners with the other three afflictions, so how does it count as "non-shared"?
〔One view · the three are not root [afflictions]〕 One view: the self-view, self-conceit, and self-love arising with the manas, these three, do not count as "root afflictions" (only ignorance is root). Since the three it partners with are not root afflictions, then this ignorance is still "not partnering with any other root affliction," and what is wrong with calling it "non-shared"?
〔It should be said · the correct view〕 Another view (this is the correct one): that "the three are not root" account is at odds with reason and with holy scripture. For within the rubric of "pure secondary-afflictions," these three (self-view, self-conceit, self-love) are simply not counted as secondary-afflictions; and these three are plainly comprised within "the six root afflictions" and "the ten afflictions." Which shows they are root afflictions, not secondary-afflictions — so to say "the three it partners with are not root" will not stand.
Moreover, the various treatises everywhere say "the defiled manas is always concomitant with four (root) afflictions," which shows that each of these four afflictions is a root affliction.
Then how, after all, should "non-shared" be glossed? It should be said: among the four afflictions, "ignorance" is the principal; and although the other three (self-view, self-conceit, self-love) arise together with it, this ignorance may still be called "non-shared" — because it is the strong principal, while those three are the attendant supporting parts, and the principal alone holds the name.
Why is ignorance said to be the principal? Because from beginningless time this ignorance has been deluded inwardly without break, never reflecting, "delusion (ignorance) being especially predominant" — and since ignorance is especially strong, it alone is marked out as "non-shared."
〔Q〕Then someone goes on to ask: the self-view and the rest arising with the manas, because they arise along with others, ought to be called "concomitant (of the ignorance strand)"; but when it is their turn to "be the principal," ought they too to be called "non-shared"? 〔A〕Yes — just as ignorance when principal is called non-shared, so it is allowed that the self-view and the rest, when they are principal, may also be called non-shared, and there is nothing wrong with this.
〔Another gloss · the first sense of "non-shared"〕 "Non-shared" has yet another gloss. Someone glosses "this delusion is called non-shared" thus: just like the "non-shared" of the "non-shared buddha-dharmas" (referring to the dharmas that only a buddha has), this ignorance too is something only the manas has — only the seventh consciousness has this constantly-operating ignorance, and no other consciousness has it, and so it is called "non-shared."
〔Q〕Someone rebuts: if "non-shared" is glossed by "only this consciousness has it," then the fault becomes large — the afflictions concomitant with the other consciousnesses (which the manas does not have) ought all to be called "non-shared" too. If whatever "another has and the manas lacks" can be called non-shared, the name becomes far too loose.
〔A〕This "non-shared" is a name set up with respect to "an outstanding sense," and it is not that whatever "you have and I lack, I have and you lack" is all called non-shared. Below it makes clear what counts as outstanding.
What is meant by outstanding is this: the ignorance concomitant with the seventh consciousness operates constantly from beginningless time and can obstruct the wisdom that sees the true meaning. Such an outstanding function is something the other consciousnesses lack and the seventh consciousness alone has, and so it is called "non-shared" (not a loose having-and-lacking, but this outstanding [function] uniquely its own).
〔Q〕Then someone goes on to ask: that being so, the three arising with the manas (self-view, self-conceit, self-love, which are also constantly operating from beginningless time) ought all to be called "non-shared" too?
〔A〕Both sayings hold. One: with ignorance as the principal, it alone gets the name "non-shared" (those three being attendant, not marked out separately). Two: it is also allowed that those three be likewise called non-shared, only that, in order to set them off clearly from "the delusion that partners with the host of afflictions in the other consciousnesses (the shared ignorance)," here ignorance is for the moment singled out as "non-shared."
Here the "non-shared ignorance" is further divided into two kinds: the first is called "ever-operating non-shared" — this is what the other consciousnesses lack, namely the ignorance concomitant with the manas (constantly operating). The second is called "solitary non-shared" — this, on the contrary, the manas does not have, referring to that sort of ignorance that does not partner with other afflictions but comes forth alone.
This squares with the Yogācārabhūmi's dividing of ignorance into two: that which arises along with greed and the like is called "concomitant ignorance"; that which does not arise along with greed and the like but comes forth alone is called "solitary ignorance."
The solitary ignorance can be subdivided further. The sort of "solitary ignorance that is principal" belongs only to "what is severed by [the path of] seeing" (severed the moment one sees the path). Just as the scripture says: "Those holy ones who are learners, because their non-shared ignorance is already severed forever, do not create new karma."
The sort of "solitary ignorance that is not principal" then also reaches "what is severed by [the path of] cultivation" (severed only in the path of cultivation); because the secondary-afflictions such as wrath that go along with it reach, by their very nature, both what is severed by seeing and what is severed by cultivation.
Finally, to settle accounts: the "ever-operating non-shared" (that is, the ignorance concomitant with the manas) is what the other schools (sectarian divisions) do not have (only the Great Vehicle sets it up); the "solitary non-shared" is something both the Great Vehicle and the other schools have (this one all sides acknowledge).
〔Ground two · the mind-consciousness arising with mentation-and-dharma as condition〕
The second doctrinal ground. The scripture says: taking the eye-faculty and the form-object as condition, the eye-consciousness arises; and so on through, all the way to taking "mentation (the faculty) and the dharma (the object)" as condition, the mind-consciousness arises. Consider: if there were no seventh consciousness, then that "mentation" which serves as the condition for the arising of the mind-consciousness (that is, the co-existent basis of the mind-consciousness, the mentation-faculty) would have nowhere to rest.
In detail: just as the five consciousnesses must have their "predominant, unshared, co-existent basis" such as the eye-faculty (that is, the five faculties), the mind-consciousness, being likewise comprised among the six consciousnesses, ought by rights to be granted such a basis; but if this seventh consciousness simply did not exist, then where would the mind-consciousness's basis come from?
Someone may want to take "the form (dharma)" to stand in as the mind-consciousness's basis — this will not do, because the mind-consciousness's faculty is "mentation (the faculty)," and the mentation-faculty is not form. Moreover, if one took form as the mind-consciousness's basis, then the mind-consciousness ought to lack the two discriminations of "recollective discrimination" (discriminating along the track of memory) and "investigative discrimination" (discriminating by deliberation) — for form-dharmas cannot give rise to these two; yet the mind-consciousness plainly has these two discriminations, which shows that its basis is not form but the seventh.
The opponent may, on the contrary, say "the five consciousnesses simply have no co-existent basis," using this to overturn "the sixth must have a co-existent basis." This too will not do — because the five consciousnesses turn together at the same time with the five faculties, just like the seed and the sprout that grows from it, or a body and its shadow, always coexisting as one. Which shows that the five consciousnesses really do have a co-existent basis, and it is not that they have none.
Again, since the consciousness and the faculty must take one and the same object, it is just like the mind-king and the mental factors, which definitely arise together at the same time (since they take one and the same object as object, the faculty must be present at the same time as the consciousness — and this is precisely the sense of a co-existent basis).
Putting these several steps together establishes an argument: "the established mind-consciousness" (that is, the sixth consciousness that both sides admit), like the eye and the other consciousnesses, must have an "unshared basis," and this basis can mark out the mind-consciousness's own name and own locus. And one must distinguish clearly: this basis is not of the "equal-immediate condition" strand (the equal-immediate condition being the preceding moment of mind-consciousness, the kind that has ceased and yielded its place); it is the basis of the "predominant, productive" strand. On what ground is this said? Because the mind-consciousness is one of the "established six consciousnesses" — being in the same line as the other five, by rule it ought to have an unshared co-existent basis, and that is the seventh.
〔Ground three · cogitating is named mentation〕
The third doctrinal ground. The scripture says "cogitating is named mentation." Consider: if there were no seventh consciousness, then that "(constantly and examiningly) cogitating mentation" ought simply not to exist.
In detail: suppose we take just the time when the "mind-consciousness" is present before one; then its equal-immediate basis, "the preceding moment of mentation," has long since ceased and is no longer there (it has fallen away into the past); and the past and future are, by reason, not really existent. Thus the function of "cogitating" simply cannot be established at all — for there is no constantly-present mentation to preside over the cogitating.
This being so (the preceding moment of mentation having long ceased, and there being no constantly-present cogitating thing), then how can one possibly speak of "(constantly and examiningly cogitating) being named mentation"?
The opponent may say: this "mentation" is "conventionally posited" (a name set up by resting on that already-ceased preceding moment, no more). This too will not get through — for if there were no "thing that truly cogitates" at all, then on what could this conventional name be set up? (A conventional name must after all have some real ground beneath it.)
The opponent may again say: then set up this "mentation" by relying on "the present, once-cogitating thing" (that is, the presently-active mind-consciousness). This too will not do — for at the present moment it leads precisely by "discerning," and is precisely named "consciousness"; how then can it be spoken of as "mentation" (cogitating)? (At one present moment, the designation can take only the single most outstanding one; since it is already named consciousness, it cannot hold the name mentation.)
Pressed by these several points, it is known: there is a separate seventh manas that constantly and examiningly cogitates, and it is the one properly named "mentation"; while "the already-ceased preceding moment of the sixth" is, by resting on this seventh, merely lent the name "mentation" (that is to say, the preceding moment of mentation that serves as the equal-immediate basis is conventionally called mentation by borrowing the seventh's name).
〔Ground four · the two concentrations, no-perception and cessation, differing〕
The fourth doctrinal ground. The scripture says that the "no-perception concentration" and the "cessation-attainment," these two concentrations, do differ; yet consider: if there were no "defiled mentation" (the defiled manas), these two concentrations ought to be indistinguishable. How so? Both these concentrations alike extinguish the first six consciousnesses together with their mental factors, the essence and number of what is extinguished being completely the same — that is, viewed from the side of the six consciousnesses and their factors, the two concentrations look exactly alike on the surface.
Since they look alike on the surface, the difference can fall only on the defiled mentation: in the no-perception concentration there is still defiled mentation, while in the cessation-attainment there is no defiled mentation — by this "one having, one lacking" they can be told apart. If there were no such thing as defiled mentation at all, and one could not set up this one-having-one-lacking, then on what could these two concentrations possibly be told apart?
The opponent may say: then take "the preparatory effort (the effort before entering the concentration), the realm, the stage, the basis," and the like — would not these differences serve to tell these two concentrations apart? This too will not get through — because those differing "causes" arise precisely from "whether or not there is defiled mentation"; if there were not even this one item, the presence-or-absence of defiled mentation, then the causes of those differences would be gone along with it (the root still lies in the defiled mentation, which is the more fundamental layer).
So there must be "this (defiled manas)" mentation separately, to serve as the most fundamental cause of difference between these two concentrations.
〔Ground five · the no-perception beings having self-grasping〕
The fifth doctrinal ground. The scripture says: the "no-perception beings" (the beings born in the no-perception heaven), throughout that one lifetime, have the mind and mental factors of the first six consciousnesses utterly extinguished. Consider: if there were no seventh consciousness, then the no-perception beings ought to have no "defilement" (that is, no self-grasping).
In detail: the no-perception beings have, for that long stretch of time, no first six evolving consciousnesses; if there were furthermore no this manas-mentation, then their self-grasping would simply not exist at all (throughout the long time of a whole lifetime there would be no self-grasping).
But there is no such thing anywhere: that a "fully-bound" person (an ordinary being, complete in every fetter of affliction) elsewhere should, throughout a lifetime, be wholly without self-grasping. A fully-bound person must constantly have self-grasping; and since the beings of the no-perception heaven are, after all, still fully-bound ordinary beings, they too ought constantly to have self-grasping throughout their lifetime — and this self-grasping rests precisely on the manas.
Again, if the no-perception beings truly had no self-grasping, then they ought to be like nirvāṇa (already free of grasping), and ought not to be reproached and shunned with one accord by the sages and worthies. But the no-perception heaven is precisely what the sages and worthies together reproach and shun (the sages and worthies regard it as a wrong turn), which shows that within it there is still self-grasping.
〔Q · arguing by the three times〕 The opponent may say: at the very "beginning" of entering no-perception and at the "end" just before emerging, the being does have the first six consciousnesses and does have self-grasping, and so the earlier fault (wholly without self-grasping for a lifetime) does not stand. 〔A〕But during that great long stretch in the "middle" there are no first six consciousnesses; and since in the middle there is no self-grasping, the fault "a fully-bound ordinary being having a long stretch wholly without self-grasping" still stands there, not dodged.
〔Q〕The opponent may again say: then prop it up with the "past, future" self-grasping (that is, its seeds or residual force), and the earlier fault is gone. 〔A〕But that past-and-future self-grasping is neither "present activity" nor "abiding-constant," and so amounts to nothing; and since it amounts to nothing, the earlier fault still stands.
Then it blocks off the opponent's remaining lines of retreat one by one. First: since "the obtained" (the fruit that self-grasping yields) does not exist, "the obtainer" (the support that can arouse self-grasping) does not exist either. Second: if the opponent would take the "non-concurrent formation dharmas" (the sort like "attainment" and the life-faculty) to serve as the basis of self-grasping, these have already been refuted earlier as not really existent at all, and cannot serve as a basis. Third: if the opponent would take the store-consciousness to serve as the basis — but this faction (the one that maintains the no-perception heaven is undefiled and does not set up a seventh) does not set up a seventh in the first place, and in the matter of perfuming the store-consciousness — since the perfuming of self-grasping in the store-consciousness does not exist, there is no perfuming to speak of at all. Fourth: if the opponent would take "the remaining various dharmas" to receive the perfuming (to store the seeds of self-grasping), this too was already argued earlier to be untenable, for the other dharmas simply cannot receive perfuming. All four lines of retreat are blocked off.
So there must be separately a "defiled manas" that constantly arouses self-grasping in the no-perception heaven; and just because it arouses self-grasping, the worthies and sages with one accord reproach and shun that no-perception heaven.
〔Ground six · the mind of the three natures constantly carrying self-grasping〕
The sixth doctrinal ground. The scripture says: whichever of the "good, defiled, indeterminate" minds the ordinary being arouses, he constantly carries "self-grasping"; consider, if there were no seventh consciousness, then this self-grasping carried along at all times ought not to exist.
In detail: the class of ordinary beings, at the time of arousing a mind of the three natures, though outwardly performing various deeds, inwardly grasps constantly at a "self."
Just because it constantly grasps the self within, it causes the giving and the like aroused in the six consciousnesses to be "unable to lose the marks" — that is, unable to let go of the marks "I am giving, giving to such-and-such," and so unable to attain true purity.
So the Yogācārabhūmi says: the defiled manas is the support of the (first six) consciousnesses; while it has not yet ceased, the "bondage of discerning marks" (being bound by one's own discerning of the seen-part) cannot be freed; once the manas has ceased, this "bondage to marks" is then freed.
What is meant by "bondage to marks" is this: toward the marks of objects one cannot see through them as in fact illusion-like (one does not realize these are like phantom-things), and thereupon one is held fast, bound, and not free by the "seeing-part and the seen-part," and so it is called "bondage to marks."
In accordance with this sense, there is a gāthā that says:
This defiled mentation is the support of the first six consciousnesses; while this mentation has not yet ceased, the bondage of the first six consciousnesses can after all never be freed.
Again, a still weightier point is added from the angle of "the contaminated." When the ordinary being arouses a "good" mind or an "unobscured-indeterminate" mind, if there were no self-grasping accompanying it at all times, then these minds ought not to count as "contaminated." How so? Because within one and the same continuum, the afflictions of the first six consciousnesses do not arise at the same time as this good mind or unobscured-indeterminate mind (the afflictions of the six consciousnesses are intermittent — now a good mind arises, only later does an affliction arise, and the two never meet). Since they never meet, the afflictions of the first six consciousnesses have no way to contaminate this good mind or indeterminate mind into being contaminated — for them to become contaminated must rely on something constantly present, and that is the manas's self-grasping.
Here two crooked roads are first blocked off. First: to take "the past or future afflictions binding-as-condition this good mind" as the reason will not get through in principle, because the past and future are not really existent. Second: nor can one say that "relying on the afflictions in another's continuum" could contaminate my good mind into being contaminated — otherwise, by the same logic, "relying on the liberation in another's continuum" could just as well make my own self uncontaminated, which is plainly untenable.
The third crooked road: nor can one say that there is separately a "latent tendency" that is a "non-concurrent formation dharma," arising now in the continuum, and that by it the good mind and the rest are contaminated into being contaminated; because such a (non-concurrent formation) latent tendency is not really existent, a point already commonly established.
The fourth crooked road: nor can one say that this good mind and the rest are born "from contaminated seeds" and so become contaminated; because that seed, at a still earlier point, had no "cause" that could make it contaminated (one should understand: without the manas's self-grasping, that seed has no way to become a contaminated seed — the root of the malady still lies in self-grasping).
It nails down this fourth point again: it is simply not "contaminated seeds" that make the good mind and the rest contaminated. Otherwise, the "uncontaminated mind" aroused by a learner (which is itself also born out of a contaminated body and seeds) ought too to become contaminated; yet the uncontaminated mind is plainly uncontaminated. Which shows it is not by way of seeds, but by way of the present-active self-grasping, that the good mind is contaminated into being contaminated.
That said, the afflictions of the first six consciousnesses do, to be sure, draw forth giving and the other deeds; but they do not arise at the same time as that good deed; and since they are not at the same time, they cannot serve as the "proper cause" of "the contaminated." Why? Because the very word "contaminated" means "accompanied at all times by the contaminant (affliction)" — and what can accompany the good deed moment by moment must be that constantly-present manas's self-grasping, and that is the proper cause of the contaminated.
There is, moreover, a still plainer example: "indeterminate karma" is not drawn forth by afflictions at all; then how does it manage to become "contaminated"? (Since it is not drawn forth by afflictions, yet is contaminated all the same, it shows there must surely be separately a manas's self-grasping accompanying it at all times, contaminating it into being contaminated.)
Then how, after all, do the various dharmas become contaminated? Stated positively: it is because they arise together, cease together, and mutually augment with "the affliction constantly present and active in one's own body," and only thus do they become contaminated — and this affliction present and active at all times is precisely the manas's self-grasping.
By this constant accompaniment, the "seeds of contaminated dharmas" are perfumed into being, and when later they arise again, the sense of the contaminated is then made firm. The ordinary being is so, and the learner is likewise so.
Then what of the contaminated dharmas at the no-more-learning stage? The no-more-learner already has no present-active contaminant, and his contaminated dharmas, though for the moment not accompanied by a contaminant, are born from "the contaminated seeds perfumed at an earlier time," and so are contaminated all the same — and this is not at odds with reason.
Gathering up this whole chain: it is precisely because there is a manas constantly arousing self-grasping that the good and other dharmas are able to attain the sense of "the contaminated"; were there no this manas-mentation, then the contaminated sense of the good and the rest definitely could not be established. From this it is known that there is separately this seventh consciousness.
〔Conclusion · the six doctrinal grounds〕
The lines of reasoning that prove there is this seventh consciousness are very many; here only six kinds have been briefly set forth, following the Mahāyānasaṃgraha; those of wisdom should accordingly arouse faith-and-understanding toward it and learn by it.
Then how is one to take it that some scriptures speak of only "six consciousnesses"? One should understand: that is "the gate of reasoning that goes along [with another's view]" (provisionally putting it that way as an accommodation, following others' manner of speaking), or it is a counting into six following "the six faculties on which they depend"; but if one speaks of the classes of consciousness, there are in fact eight kinds.
〔所釋之頌〕承前章，第七頌餘義·並證有第七識
本節之諍，經有明文。《瑜伽師地論》設問曰：「如世尊說出世末那，云何建立？答：名假施設，不必如義。又對治彼，遠離顛倒正思量故」——世尊既說有「出世末那」，則末那非唯染污，此正是本節「通染不染」一義之論本。又論說「藏識決定恒與一識俱轉，所謂末那」，若阿羅漢位末那全無，則藏識無俱轉之識，於理不成——此為六理證中之一。下面順著教、理二門講開。
甲、末那通不通「不染」——一場教理之辨
末那是不是永遠染污？一說：末那唯與煩惱障俱（恒染、無不染的末那）——因聖教說三位無末那、又說它與四惑恒相應、又說它是『諸識雜染的依』。正義說這違教理，因為『出世末那（清淨末那）』經裡說有。理由一串：無染的意識（出世位第六）正如有染時一樣，一定有『俱生、不共的所依』（即第七），所以出世位必有清淨末那作第六的依。論說『藏識一定恒與『一識』俱轉，就是末那；意識起時二識俱轉；五識隨起一識則三俱轉，乃至頓起五識則七俱轉』——若滅定中無第七，那時藏識就『無一識與它俱』了，違「恒與一識俱轉」；若聖道中無第七，那起意識時藏識就只「一識俱」了，又怎能說『起意識時藏識定二識俱轉』？《顯揚論》說末那恒與四煩惱相應、『或翻過來相應（轉染成淨）』、以恃舉或平等為行相——可見末那通染與不染。再說，若因論說「阿羅漢位無染意」就說無第七，那也該因論說『阿羅漢位捨阿賴耶（之名）』就說無第八了——第八既不因捨名而無體，第七怎能因無染意而無體？又諸論說「轉第七識，得平等智」，這智像別的智一樣一定有所依的「相應淨識」，第七若無、這智就無（能依不能離所依）；也不能說它依六轉識，因為已許佛的平等智「恒行」（如大圓鏡智），而六轉識有間斷、作不了恒行智的所依。又無學位若無第七，第八就「無俱有依」了，可第八一定有俱有依（如餘識）。又像未證「人無我」者人我執恒行，那未證「法無我」者法我執也該恒行，這第七若無、法我執依什麼識起？不能依第八（第八無「慧」）。所以該信：二乘的聖道、滅定、無學位這第七識仍恒行（起法我執），因他們未證法無我。又諸論用『五識同法（都有不共俱有依）』證有第七作第六的依，若聖道、無學位無第七作第六依，那所立的宗、因就都有過了；否則五識也該有時無依，可五識恒有依、第六也該如此。所以一定有『無染污末那』，在這三位恒起現前；頌說「三位無」，是依「染污末那」說（不是說第七的體無），正如說「四位無阿賴耶」是指無那名、不是無第八的體。窺基《述記》於此處還記下《瑜伽》『出世末那名假施設、不必如義』一語的兩種讀法：一讀謂出世位的末那已不再思量（任運而知、無麁慧散慧），既不思量便不該叫「末那」了，所以這「出世末那」唯局有漏、不在無漏；又一讀依《瑜伽》「遠離顛倒正思量故」一句，許這出世末那通於無漏。中性記下，不判二讀孰是。
乙、末那的三種差別
窺基《述記》提示這一門的脈絡：前面講『三位伏斷』既已說完，這裡是「因乘義」一轉，從「分位行相」上開出末那的三種差別。
末那的差別略有三種：與「人我見」相應、與「法我見」相應、與「平等性智」相應。第一種通一切凡夫、二乘有學、七地以前一類菩薩的有漏心位——緣阿賴耶識起人我見；第二種通一切凡夫、聲聞、獨覺、及一切菩薩「法空智果不現前」位——緣異熟識起法我見；第三種通一切如來、及菩薩於見道修道中『法空智果現前』位——緣無垢識、異熟識等起平等性智。人我見起時法我見必同時現前，因人我執必依法我執而起——像夜裡先迷有個『木樁』（法執），才妄謂是「人」（人執）；人、法二見作用雖別卻不相違、同依『一個慧』——像眼識體雖一而能了別青黃多用、不相違。二乘有學在聖道、滅定現前時，頓悟菩薩在修道位，有學漸悟者在「生空智果」現前時，都只起法執（人執已伏）；二乘無學、漸悟者在「法空智果不現前」時，也只起法執（人執已斷）；八地以上菩薩的我執都永不現行（或已斷、或永伏），但「法空智果不現前」時仍起法執，二者不相違——如經說『八地以上一切煩惱不復現行，唯有所依的所知障在』，這所知障是「現行」非「種子」（種子未斷、唯不現行）。與法執俱的末那，在二乘等雖名「不染」（不障他們所求的智），在菩薩則名「染」（障菩薩的法空智），所以對菩薩也叫「有覆無記」；對二乘則叫「無覆」（不障他們的智）。它是「異熟生」所攝（從異熟識恒時生，名異熟生、但非真異熟果；這名寬通，像增上緣攝餘三緣所不攝者，凡別類不攝的都入此攝）。
丙、怎麼證明真有第七識——聖教與六條正理
怎麼知道第七識離眼等識而別有自體？靠聖教與正理。
聖教量：世尊處處經中說「心、意、識」三種各別之義——「集起」名心、「思量」名意、「了別」名識。這三義雖通八識，卻各隨殊勝而立名：第八名「心」（集諸法種、起諸法）、第七名「意」（緣藏識恒審思量執我）、餘六名「識」（於六境麁動間斷地了別）。《入楞伽經》偈說：『藏識名為心，思量性名意，能了諸境相，是說名為識。』又大乘經處處別說有第七識（大乘經是至教量，前已廣說）。《解脫經》也別說有它，偈說：『染污意恒時，與諸惑俱生俱滅；若解脫了諸惑，則它非曾有、非當有。』那經自釋：有染污意從無始與我見、我愛、我慢、我癡四惑恒俱生滅，對治道生、斷煩惱後，此意便得解脫；那時它相應的煩惱不只現在無、過去未來也無（過未無自性）。這類聖教諸部都有，不繁述。
正理（六條）：
一、不共無明證——經說有「不共無明」微細恒行、覆蔽真實；若無第七識，它就立不住。凡夫在一切位恒起『迷理的不共無明』，覆真實、障聖慧眼（偈說『真義之心將生時它常為障礙、俱行一切位的，就是不共無明』），所以經說凡夫恒處長夜、為無明所盲、曾無醒覺；若凡夫位有「暫不起此無明」之時就違經了，同一凡夫位裡無明時行時不行也不合理（無明該恒行）。這恒行無明若依前六識就立不成——六識會間斷、而無明須恒染。許有末那（作它的依）就沒這毛病。有人難：末那恒與四惑相應，那與它俱的無明怎叫「不共」？一說：與末那俱的我見、慢、愛不是根本煩惱（唯無明是根本），所以無明可叫不共。正義破：這違理教——純隨煩惱裡不說這三、這三是六根本/十煩惱所攝（是根本），處處都說末那與四根本煩惱恒相應；該說四惑裡「無明為主」，雖三者俱起、無明也名不共（無始恒內惛迷、曾不省察、癡增上故）。（那與它俱的見等，為主時是否也叫不共？許它們為主時也叫不共，也無過。）又一解：『此癡叫不共』是像「不共佛法」那樣——唯此識獨有。有人難：那其餘識相應、此識所無的煩惱也該叫不共了？答：是依「殊勝義」立不共名、不是凡互所無都叫不共——第七相應的無明無始恒行、能障真義智，這殊勝用唯此識有，所以叫不共。（那與它俱的三也該叫不共？以無明為主獨得此名；或也許那三也叫不共，只是為對揀『餘識中與貪等共的癡』，姑且偏說無明。）總之「不共無明」有二種：「恒行不共」（餘識所無，即末那相應的）、「獨行不共」（此識所無，獨頭起的）；所以《瑜伽》說無明二種——與貪等俱的叫相應無明、不與貪等俱的叫獨行無明。為主的獨行無明唯見所斷（經說有學的不共無明已永斷、不造新業）；非主的獨行無明也通修所斷（忿等通見修所斷）。「恒行不共」是餘部所無（唯大乘立）、「獨行不共」則大乘小乘都有。
二、意法為緣生意識證——經說眼色為緣生眼識，乃至「意、法為緣生意識」；若無第七，作意識生緣的「意（根）」就沒有了。像五識必有眼等「增上、不共、俱有」的所依（五根），意識既同屬六識，理該也有這樣的所依；第七若無、它的依哪來？不能說「色」是意識的依（意非色），不然意識就該沒有「隨念、計度」二分別了（而意識實有）；也不能反過來說『五識沒有俱有所依』，因為五識與五根俱時而轉（像種與芽、形與影）；識與根既必同境，就像心與心所決定俱時（所以根是俱時的俱有依）。由此，共許的意識像眼等識一樣必有『不共、能顯自名自處』的俱有依，這依不屬「等無間緣」（那是前念意），而是『增上、能生』的所依——因為意識是六識隨一所攝（就是第七）。
三、思量名意證——經說「思量名意」；若無第七，這『思量的意』就沒有。若拿「意識」說：它現前時，作它等無間依的『前念意』已滅、不在了，而過去未來非實有，那「思量」的作用就立不成（沒有一個恒在的意司思量）；既這樣，怎能說「思量名意」？若說這「意」是假說（依已滅前念立），也不對——沒有一個『正思量（的實體）』，假名依什麼立？若說依「現在曾有思量」（現行意識）立，可那時它正名「識（了別）」、怎叫「意（思量）」？所以該知別有第七末那恒審思量、正名為「意」；那『已滅的前念第六』是借第七之名而假稱「意」的。
四、無想滅定二定有別證——經說無想定、滅盡定二定有別；若無「染意」，這二定就該無別。這二定都滅了前六識及心所、體數沒兩樣（外相相同）；若無染意（作差別因），那二定（一個有染意、一個無染意）若不立這一有一無，憑什麼分別？若說拿『加行、界、地、所依』等來分，也不對——那些差別的「因」正是由『染意有無』而有，染意有無若無、那些差別的因也就沒了。所以一定別有「此染意」（作二定的根本差別）。
五、無想有情有我執證——經說無想有情一期生中心、心所（前六）都滅；若無第七，他就該無染（我執）。他長時沒有六轉識，若無末那、我執就沒了；可哪有『具足煩惱繫縛的凡夫，一期生中全無我執』的道理？他若無我執就該像涅槃（離執），那就不該被聖賢共同訶斥厭離了（可無想天確被訶厭）。（若說『入無想的初、出無想的後二時有我執』就沒過，可「中間長時」無、過失還在；若說拿『過去未來的我執』抵，可過未非現非常、等於無、過失還在；『所得（我執果）』無、「能得」也無，拿不相應行作依前已破、拿藏識熏習作依——這宗既不立第七、藏識我執熏習無、熏習也無，拿餘法受熏前已辯非理。）所以該別有染污末那，於無想天恒起我執——正因此聖賢才共同訶厭那天。
六、三性心恒帶我執證——經說凡夫起善、染、無記三性心時恒帶我執；若無第七，這恒帶的我執就沒有。凡夫三性心時雖向外起種種業、向內恒執我；由執我，令六識所起的布施等不能「亡相」（離能所相、成清淨）。所以《瑜伽》說『染污末那是（前六）識的依止，它未滅時『相了別縛』不得解脫，末那滅了相縛才解脫』——「相縛」就是對境相不能了達其如幻、被見分相分所拘不得自在。偈說：『這染污意是識的所依，此意未滅時、識縛終不脫。』又：起善、無覆無記心時，若無我執（恒俱），這些心就該不是「有漏」——因為自相續中六識的煩惱與善等不俱起（六識煩惱間斷、撐不起善等的有漏）；拿『過去未來的惑緣縛』說也不對（過未非實）；不是靠『別人相續的惑』令己成有漏（不然該靠別人的解脫令己成無漏）；也不能說『另有個隨眠是不相應行、現於相續令善等成有漏』（不相應行非實，已共許）；也不能說『從有漏種生善等所以成有漏』（那種先前無「因」可成有漏）；不是由有漏種令它成有漏（不然有學的無漏心也該成有漏了）。其實諸有漏之所以成有漏，是與『自身現行的煩惱』俱生俱滅、互相增益才成的（這現行恒俱的煩惱就是末那我執）；由此熏成有漏種、後時現起，有漏義才成——凡夫如此、有學也如此；無學的有漏雖非與漏俱、卻從先時的有漏種生，所以成有漏，於理無違。所以是「末那恒起我執」才令善等成立有漏義；這末那若無，那有漏義定無——所以知道別有第七識。
證有第七識的道理很多，這裡隨《攝大乘論》略述六種，有智者該隨之信學。至於有經只說「六識」，要知道那是『隨轉理門（權說）』、或是隨六根說六；論識的類別，實有八種。
承衍
末那這餘門諸義——伴它的隨煩惱、它唯捨受、有覆無記、隨所生繫、三位伏斷、通染不染、三差別、別有自體——後出諸論各依其門承用。《百法明門論》在隨煩惱裡列出惛沈、掉舉、不信、懈怠、放逸、忘念、散亂、不正知這八者，正是本節定為『遍染心、與末那俱』的八隨；又於別境列出「慧」，即本節所說末那的我見以慧為體。《唯識三十論頌》的頌六下半「及餘觸等俱」、頌七「有覆無記攝，隨所生所繫。阿羅漢、滅定、出世道無有」，正是本節所釋的本頌，逐頌相承。《辯中邊論》兩處承用：〈辯障品〉以四惑為染之本、末那恒與之俱，即煩惱障之根；〈辯相品〉明虛妄分別，末那執我令布施等不能亡相，即此義。《攝大乘論》於〈所知依分〉立「染污意」一名，明末那作染污依這一義；而本節證有第七「隨《攝大乘》，略述六種」的那六條正理，本身就是承《攝大乘論》的六理證而來。至於《二十唯識論》，主於成立唯識無境、破外人實境之執，於末那的餘門、三位、證有沒有正面對位，這裡從闕。
〔Verses commented〕Continuing: the residual sense of verse 7, and the proof of a seventh consciousness
The dispute taken up here has explicit warrant. The Yogācārabhūmi raises the question: "As the World-Honoured One speaks of a supramundane manas, how is it established? Answer: it is a name provisionally set down, not necessarily to be taken according to its sense. Further, because it counteracts that, being right deliberation that has left inversion behind." Since the World-Honoured One does speak of a supramundane manas, the manas is not defiled only — which is the treatise ground for this chapter's "pervading the defiled and the undefiled." The treatise further says that "the store consciousness turns together, invariably, with one consciousness, namely the manas"; were the manas wholly absent at the arhat stage, the store consciousness would have no consciousness turning with it, which will not stand — and that is one of the six rational grounds. What follows unfolds the two gates, of scripture and of reason.
A. Whether manas can ever be undefiled — a debate over scripture and reason
Is manas forever defiled? One position holds: manas accompanies only the hindrance of affliction (it is perpetually defiled, with no undefiled manas) — because scripture says manas is absent in the three states, and says it is perpetually associated with the four afflictions, and says it is "the support of the defilement of the consciousnesses." The settled correct reading holds that this contradicts both scripture and reason, for a "supramundane manas (a pure manas)" is said to exist in scripture. The reasons form a chain.
An undefiled mental consciousness (the sixth at the supramundane stage), just as in its defiled phase, must have an "innate, exclusive support" (that is, the seventh); therefore at the supramundane stage there must be a pure manas serving as the support of the sixth. The treatise says, "the store-consciousness always turns together with exactly 'one consciousness,' namely manas; when the mental consciousness arises, two consciousnesses turn together; when one of the five sense consciousnesses arises along with it, three turn together; and on up to when all five arise at once, seven turn together." If there were no seventh in the absorption of cessation, then at that time the store-consciousness would have "no one consciousness turning with it," contradicting "always turns together with one consciousness." And if there were no seventh on the noble path, then when the mental consciousness arises the store-consciousness would have "only one consciousness" with it — how then could one say "when the mental consciousness arises the store-consciousness invariably turns with two consciousnesses"? The Āryadeśanā-vikhyāpana (the Xianyang treatise) says manas is perpetually associated with the four afflictions, "or conversely associated (turning from defiled to pure)," with self-elevation or evenness as its mode of activity — which shows that manas spans the defiled and the undefiled.
Further: if, because the treatise says "in the arhat state there is no defiled manas," one inferred there is no seventh, then one ought equally, because the treatise says "in the arhat state one relinquishes the ālaya (in name)," to infer there is no eighth. Since the eighth does not lack its substance merely by the relinquishing of the name, how could the seventh lack its substance merely by the absence of the defiled manas? Again: the treatises say "by transforming the seventh consciousness one attains the wisdom of equality"; this wisdom, like every other wisdom, must have a supporting "associated pure consciousness," and if there were no seventh this wisdom would not exist (the dependent cannot stand apart from its support). Nor can it be said to depend on the six evolving consciousnesses, for it is already granted that the buddha's wisdom of equality "operates perpetually" (like the great-mirror wisdom), whereas the six evolving consciousnesses are intermittent and cannot serve as the support of a perpetually operating wisdom. Again: if at the adept stage there were no seventh, the eighth would have "no co-existing support," yet the eighth must have a co-existing support (like the other consciousnesses). Again: just as in one who has not realized "the selflessness of persons" the grasping at a personal self operates perpetually, so in one who has not realized "the selflessness of dharmas" the grasping at a dharma-self ought also to operate perpetually; if there were no seventh, on what consciousness would this grasping at a dharma-self arise? It cannot arise on the eighth (the eighth has no "discernment"). Therefore one should believe: in the two vehicles' noble path, absorption of cessation, and adept stage, this seventh consciousness still operates perpetually (giving rise to grasping at a dharma-self), because they have not realized the selflessness of dharmas. Again: the treatises use "the five sense consciousnesses, being alike in dharma (each having its own exclusive co-existing support)" to prove that there is a seventh serving as the support of the sixth; if on the noble path and at the adept stage there were no seventh serving as the sixth's support, then the thesis and the reason so established would both incur a fault. Otherwise the five sense consciousnesses too would at times have no support — yet the five sense consciousnesses always have a support, and the sixth should be likewise. Therefore there must be an "undefiled manas," perpetually arising and present in these three states; and when the verse says "absent in three states," it is said with reference to the "defiled manas" (it does not say the substance of the seventh is absent) — just as when it is said "the ālaya is absent in four states," it means the name is absent, not that the substance of the eighth is absent.
Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) at this point also records two readings of the Yogācārabhūmi's remark that "the supramundane manas is a designation only, not necessarily to be taken in the literal sense." On one reading, the manas of the supramundane stage no longer deliberates (it knows spontaneously, without coarse or scattered discernment), and since it no longer deliberates it ought not to be called "manas" at all — so this "supramundane manas" is confined to the contaminated and does not extend to the uncontaminated. On another reading, taking the Yogācārabhūmi's line "because it has left distortion behind and deliberates rightly," it is granted that this supramundane manas does extend to the uncontaminated. The Notes records both neutrally, passing no judgment on which of the two readings is correct.
B. The three distinctions of manas
Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) signals the connective thread of this topic: the foregoing treatment of "subduing and cutting off in the three states" being now complete, here the discourse turns upon "the sense of the causal vehicle," opening out the three distinctions of manas from the side of "its positional modes of activity."
The distinctions of manas are, in brief, three: associated with the view of a personal self, associated with the view of a dharma-self, and associated with the wisdom of equality. The first runs through all ordinary beings, the learners of the two vehicles, and the bodhisattvas of one kind up to and including the seventh stage in their contaminated mental phases — taking the ālaya-vijñāna as object, it gives rise to the view of a personal self. The second runs through all ordinary beings, the disciples, the solitary realizers, and all bodhisattvas in those phases where "the fruit of the wisdom of dharma-emptiness is not present" — taking the consciousness-of-maturation as object, it gives rise to the view of a dharma-self. The third runs through all the tathāgatas, and the bodhisattvas in the phases of the path of seeing and the path of cultivation where "the fruit of the wisdom of dharma-emptiness is present" — taking the immaculate consciousness, the consciousness-of-maturation, and the like as object, it gives rise to the wisdom of equality.
When the view of a personal self arises, the view of a dharma-self must be simultaneously present, because grasping at a personal self must arise in dependence on grasping at a dharma-self — just as on a dark night one first mistakes a thing for a "tree-stump" (the dharma-grasping), and only then falsely calls it a "person" (the person-grasping). The two views, person and dharma, though distinct in function, are not mutually contrary and rest together on "one discernment" — just as the eye consciousness, single in substance, can discern the many — blue, yellow, and so on — in many functions without contradiction. The learners of the two vehicles, when the noble path or the absorption of cessation is present; the bodhisattvas of sudden realization, in the path of cultivation; and the learners of gradual realization, when "the fruit of the wisdom of person-emptiness is present" — all give rise to dharma-grasping alone (person-grasping having been subdued). The adepts of the two vehicles, and those of gradual realization, when "the fruit of the wisdom of dharma-emptiness is not present," likewise give rise to dharma-grasping alone (person-grasping having been cut off). In the bodhisattvas of the eighth stage and above, self-grasping never again becomes active (whether cut off or perpetually subdued), but when "the fruit of the wisdom of dharma-emptiness is not present" they still give rise to dharma-grasping, and the two are not mutually contrary — as scripture says, "from the eighth stage and above all afflictions no longer become active; there remains only the supporting hindrance to the knowable," and this hindrance to the knowable is "active" and not merely "seed" (the seeds are not yet cut off, only no longer active).
The manas that accompanies dharma-grasping, although in the two vehicles and the like it is named "undefiled" (it does not obstruct the wisdom they seek), is in the bodhisattva named "defiled" (it obstructs the bodhisattva's wisdom of dharma-emptiness), and so with respect to the bodhisattva it too is called "obscured-indeterminate"; with respect to the two vehicles it is called "unobscured" (it does not obstruct their wisdom). It is subsumed under "maturation-born" (it arises perpetually from the consciousness-of-maturation, and so is named maturation-born — though it is not the true fruit of maturation; this name is broadly applicable, just as "the dominant condition" subsumes whatever the other three conditions do not, so that whatever a distinct category fails to subsume is entered into this subsumption).
C. How it is proved that a seventh consciousness truly exists — scripture and six rational proofs
How do we know that the seventh consciousness has its own substance, distinct from the eye consciousness and the rest? By scripture and by reason.
Scriptural authority. The World-Honored One, in scripture after scripture, sets forth the three distinct senses of "mind, mentation, and consciousness" — "accumulating-and-giving-rise" is named mind, "deliberating" is named mentation, and "discerning" is named consciousness. Although these three senses run through all eight consciousnesses, the names are assigned according to which sense is preeminent in each: the eighth is named "mind" (it accumulates the seeds of all dharmas and gives rise to all dharmas); the seventh is named "mentation" (taking the store-consciousness as object, it perpetually examines and deliberates, grasping a self); the remaining six are named "consciousness" (over the six kinds of object they discern coarsely, movingly, and intermittently). A verse of the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra says: "The store-consciousness is named mind; the nature of deliberating is named mentation; what discerns the features of objects is what is called consciousness." Moreover, the Great Vehicle scriptures in place after place separately speak of a seventh consciousness (the Great Vehicle scriptures are scriptures of perfect authority, as already shown at length). The Vimokṣa-sūtra also speaks of it separately, with a verse: "The defiled mentation, perpetually, arises and ceases together with the afflictions; if it is liberated from the afflictions, then it is neither past nor to come." That scripture explains itself: there is a defiled mentation that from beginninglessness perpetually arises and ceases together with the four afflictions of the view of self, love of self, conceit of self, and delusion of self; when the counteracting path arises and the afflictions are cut off, this mentation attains liberation; at that time the afflictions associated with it are not only absent in the present but also absent in past and future (past and future have no own-being). Scriptural passages of this kind are found in all the schools and are not exhaustively recounted here.
Reason (six proofs).
One — the proof from the non-common ignorance. Scripture says there is a "non-common ignorance," subtle and perpetually operating, veiling the truth; if there were no seventh consciousness, it could not be established. In all phases the ordinary being perpetually gives rise to "the non-common ignorance that is deluded about principle," veiling the truth and obstructing the noble eye of wisdom (a verse says: "When the mind of true meaning is about to arise, that which is always its obstacle, operating together in all phases, is the non-common ignorance"); and so scripture says the ordinary being perpetually dwells in the long night, blinded by ignorance, never once awake. If there were a time, in the ordinary state, when this ignorance temporarily did not arise, that would contradict scripture; and it would also be unreasonable for ignorance, within one and the same ordinary state, to operate at some moments and not at others (it must operate perpetually). This perpetually operating ignorance cannot be established as resting on the prior six consciousnesses — the six are intermittent, whereas this ignorance must defile perpetually. If one grants a manas (to serve as its support), this fault does not arise.
Someone objects: manas is perpetually associated with the four afflictions; how then can the ignorance that accompanies it be called "non-common"? One position answers: the view of self, conceit, and love that accompany manas are not root afflictions (only ignorance is a root), and so this ignorance may be called non-common. The settled reading refutes this: it contradicts both reason and scripture — for in the category of pure secondary afflictions these three are not listed; these three are subsumed under the six roots, or the ten afflictions (they are roots); and everywhere it is said that manas is perpetually associated with the four root afflictions. It should rather be said that among the four afflictions "ignorance is the chief," and although the three arise together with it, ignorance is still named "non-common" (from beginninglessness it is perpetually inwardly deluded, never once examined, delusion being preeminent). (Then are the view and the rest that accompany it also called non-common when each is preeminent? Granting that they too may be called non-common when preeminent is no fault.) Another explanation: "this delusion is called non-common" in the way "the non-common qualities of a buddha" are so called — that is, this consciousness alone possesses it. Someone objects: then the afflictions associated with the other consciousnesses, which this consciousness lacks, should also be called non-common. Answer: the name "non-common" is assigned by the consideration of preeminence, not because whatever is mutually absent is called non-common — the ignorance associated with the seventh operates perpetually from beginninglessness and can obstruct the wisdom of true meaning, and this preeminent function belongs to this consciousness alone, so it is called non-common. (Then should the three that accompany it also be called non-common? With ignorance as the chief it alone obtains this name; or perhaps the three may also be called non-common, but in order to distinguish "the delusion shared with craving and the rest in the other consciousnesses," ignorance is for now singled out.) In sum, "non-common ignorance" is of two kinds: "perpetually operating non-common" (which the other consciousnesses lack — namely the one associated with manas) and "solitary non-common" (which this consciousness lacks — the one arising alone). And so the Yogācārabhūmi speaks of two kinds of ignorance — the one accompanying craving and the rest, called "associated ignorance," and the one not accompanying craving and the rest, called "solitary ignorance." The solitary ignorance that is preeminent is abandoned only by the path of seeing (scripture says the learner's non-common ignorance is permanently cut off and creates no new karma); the solitary ignorance that is not preeminent is also abandoned by the path of cultivation (anger and the rest span the paths of seeing and cultivation). "Perpetually operating non-common" is lacking in the other schools (only the Great Vehicle posits it); "solitary non-common" is found in both the Great and the Lesser Vehicle.
Two — the proof from "mentation and dharmas as conditions giving rise to the mental consciousness." Scripture says that eye and form as conditions give rise to the eye consciousness, and on up to "mentation and dharmas as conditions give rise to the mental consciousness"; if there were no seventh, the "mentation (the faculty)" that serves as the condition for the arising of the mental consciousness would be missing. Just as the five sense consciousnesses must have the eye and so on as their "dominant, exclusive, co-existing" supports (the five faculties), the mental consciousness, belonging likewise to the six consciousnesses, ought in principle to have such a support too; and if there were no seventh, where would its support come from? It cannot be said that "form" is the support of the mental consciousness (mentation is not form); otherwise the mental consciousness would have to lack the two discriminations of "recollection" and "calculation" (whereas it truly has them). Nor can one reverse the case and say "the five sense consciousnesses have no co-existing support," for the five sense consciousnesses turn simultaneously with the five faculties (like seed and sprout, like form and shadow); since consciousness and faculty must share an object, it is just as mind and mental factors are necessarily simultaneous (so the faculty is a simultaneous co-existing support). Hence the commonly granted mental consciousness, like the eye consciousness and the rest, must have an "exclusive support that displays its own name and place" as its co-existing support; this support is not of the category "the immediately antecedent condition" (which is the prior moment of mentation) but is a "dominant, generating" support — because the mental consciousness is subsumed under one of the six consciousnesses (and this support is the seventh).
Three — the proof from "deliberating is named mentation." Scripture says "deliberating is named mentation"; if there were no seventh, this "mentation that deliberates" would be missing. If one takes "the mental consciousness" to be it: when it is present, the "prior moment of mentation" that served as its immediately antecedent support has already ceased and is no longer present, while past and future are not real — and so the function of "deliberating" cannot be established (there is no perpetually present mentation conducting the deliberating); this being so, how could one say "deliberating is named mentation"? If one says this "mentation" is a designation (posited in dependence on the already-ceased prior moment), that too is wrong — without a "true deliberating (substance)," on what is the designation posited? If one says it is posited in dependence on "a deliberating that was present (the active mental consciousness)," then at that time it is properly named "consciousness (discerning)" — how could it be named "mentation (deliberating)"? Therefore one should know there is a distinct seventh, manas, perpetually examining and deliberating, which is properly named "mentation"; and "the already-ceased prior moment of the sixth" is designated "mentation" by borrowing the name of the seventh.
Four — the proof from the distinction between the two absorptions, the no-perception absorption and the absorption of cessation. Scripture says the no-perception absorption and the absorption of cessation are distinct; if there were no "defiled mentation," these two absorptions would have to be without distinction. Both absorptions extinguish the prior six consciousnesses and their mental factors, and are identical in substance and number (their outer appearance is the same); if there were no defiled mentation (to serve as the cause of their difference), then since the two absorptions (one with defiled mentation, one without) are not so distinguished — one having it and one not — by what could they be told apart? If one says they are distinguished by "the preparatory effort, the realm, the stage, the support," and the like, that too is wrong — for the very "cause" of those distinctions is precisely the presence or absence of "defiled mentation"; if the presence or absence of defiled mentation were itself absent, the cause of those distinctions would be gone too. Therefore there must be a distinct "defiled mentation" (serving as the fundamental difference of the two absorptions).
Five — the proof from self-grasping in the no-perception beings. Scripture says that in the no-perception beings, for the span of one life, the mind and mental factors (the prior six) are all extinguished; if there were no seventh, they would have to be without defilement (self-grasping). For the long span of that life they lack the six evolving consciousnesses; if there were no manas, self-grasping would be gone — yet what sense is there in "an ordinary being fully bound by the afflictions, having no self-grasping at all for an entire life"? If he had no self-grasping he would be like one in nirvāṇa (free of grasping), and then he should not be jointly censured and turned away from by the noble and the worthy (yet the no-perception heaven is in fact censured and turned away from). (If one says "self-grasping is present at the first moment of entering and the last moment of emerging from the no-perception state," there is no fault — but the fault remains for "the long middle span" where it is absent; if one offers "the self-grasping of past and future" to cover it, past and future are neither present nor permanent, equivalent to nothing, and the fault remains; if "the fruit obtained (the fruit of self-grasping)" is absent, then "what obtains it" is absent too; to take a non-concurrent formations as the support has been refuted before, and to take the perfuming of the store-consciousness as the support — this very thesis posits no seventh, so there is no perfuming of self-grasping in the store-consciousness, and so no perfuming at all; and that some other dharma is perfumed has already been argued to be unreasonable.) Therefore there must be a distinct defiled manas, perpetually giving rise to self-grasping in the no-perception heaven — and it is precisely for this that the noble and the worthy jointly censure and turn away from that heaven.
Six — the proof that the minds of the three moral qualities perpetually carry self-grasping. Scripture says that when an ordinary being gives rise to a mind of any of the three qualities — wholesome, defiled, or indeterminate — it perpetually carries self-grasping; if there were no seventh, this perpetually carried self-grasping would be missing. When the ordinary being's mind of the three qualities is operating, though it gives rise outwardly to various kinds of action, inwardly it perpetually grasps a self; and because of this self-grasping, the giving and the rest performed by the six consciousnesses cannot "let go of features" (be free of the features of grasper and grasped, and so become pure). And so the Yogācārabhūmi says, "The defiled manas is the support of the (prior six) consciousnesses; while it is unextinguished, 'the bondage of feature-discerning' is not liberated, and only when manas is extinguished is the feature-bondage liberated" — "feature-bondage" meaning the inability to understand the dreamlike nature of the features of objects, being bound by the perceiving-aspect and the perceived-aspect and not free. A verse says: "This defiled mentation is the support of the consciousnesses; while this mentation is unextinguished, the bondage of the consciousnesses is never undone." Again: when a wholesome or unobscured-indeterminate mind arises, if there were no self-grasping (perpetually accompanying it), these minds ought not to be "contaminated" — because within one's own continuum the affliction and the wholesome and the rest of the six consciousnesses do not arise together (the affliction of the six is intermittent and cannot sustain the contaminatedness of the wholesome and the rest); and to say it is by "the bondage of afflictive conditions in past and future" is also wrong (past and future are not real); it is not that "another's continuum's affliction" makes one's own contaminated (otherwise another's liberation should make one's own uncontaminated); nor can it be said that "there is some latent tendency that is a non-concurrent formations, manifesting in the continuum and making the wholesome and the rest contaminated" (the non-concurrent formations is not real, as already granted); nor can it be said "they are contaminated because produced from a contaminated seed" (that seed has no prior "cause" by which it could become contaminated); it is not that a contaminated seed makes them contaminated (otherwise the learner's uncontaminated mind would have to become contaminated too). In truth, what makes the contaminated contaminated is that it arises and ceases together with "the actively present affliction of one's own person," the two mutually augmenting (this perpetually accompanying active affliction being precisely the self-grasping of manas); from this a contaminated seed is perfumed and later becomes active again, and only thus is the sense of "contaminated" established — for the ordinary being, and for the learner alike; as for the adept, his contaminated states, though not accompanied by an outflow, arise from a previously contaminated seed and so are contaminated, with no violation of reason. Therefore it is "manas perpetually giving rise to self-grasping" that establishes the contaminated sense of the wholesome and the rest; and if this manas were absent, that contaminated sense would surely be absent — by which one knows there is a distinct seventh consciousness.
The reasons proving the existence of a seventh consciousness are many; here, following the Mahāyāna-saṃgraha, six have been set forth in brief, and the wise should accordingly believe and study. As for the scriptures that speak only of "six consciousnesses," it should be understood that this is the "expedient teaching that accords with the occasion," or that it counts six consciousnesses in accordance with the six faculties; in discussing the kinds of consciousness, there are in truth eight.
Onward Transmission
The various remaining topics of manas established here — the secondary afflictions that accompany it, its pairing with equanimity alone, its obscured-indeterminate quality, its being bound according to where one is born, its subduing and cutting off in the three states, its spanning the defiled and the undefiled, its three distinctions, and its having a substance of its own — are taken up by the later treatises each according to its own topic. The Hundred Dharmas treatise, among the secondary afflictions, lists torpor, restlessness, lack of faith, indolence, heedlessness, lost-mindfulness, distraction, and non-discernment — precisely the eight secondaries this section settles as "pervading the defiled mind and accompanying manas"; and among the object-specific factors it lists "discernment," which is just the view of self of manas, said here to have discernment as its substance. The Thirty Verses — the second half of verse six, "together with the rest, contact and so on," and verse seven, "subsumed under the obscured-indeterminate; bound according to where one is born; absent in the arhat, the absorption of cessation, and on the supramundane path" — is the very root-text this section expounds, verse answering to verse. The Madhyānta-vibhāga takes it up in two places: in its chapter on the obstructions, it makes the four afflictions the root of defilement and manas their perpetual companion, which is the very root of the afflictive obstruction; and in its chapter on characteristics, in clarifying false discrimination, manas grasping a self makes the giving and the rest unable to let go of features — which is just this sense. The Mahāyāna-saṃgraha, in its chapter on the support of the knowable, establishes the name "defiled mentation," clarifying the sense in which manas serves as the defiling support; and the six rational proofs by which this section proves the seventh, "following the Mahāyāna-saṃgraha, set forth in brief," are themselves carried over from the six rational proofs of the Mahāyāna-saṃgraha. As for the Twenty Verses, its concern is to establish consciousness-only and refute the outsiders' real external objects, and it has no direct counterpart to the remaining topics, the three states, or the proof of manas; here it is left aside.
考據Apparatus
〔所釋之頌〕承前章，第七頌餘義·並證有第七識
一、科判定位
| 科判 | 此章之位 |
|---|---|
| 三能變 | 初能變（阿賴耶）→ 第二能變·末那 → 第三能變（了境） |
| 末那章內 | (二)餘門廣辯·通染不染以下 |
| 所釋頌 | 《唯識三十論頌》頌七餘義 · 證有第七識（頌文未別出，依《述記》科） |
前章五門既畢，本章辨末那通染不染之教理二諍、三種差別（我見·法見·平等性智），終以聖教量與六理證成立第七識別有自體——第二能變之辨至此竟。
二、源頌 · 義理脈絡
阿羅漢、滅定、出世道無有。 〔T1586 0060b13〕
本章所辨，皆頌七『三位無有』一句之餘義：既說三位無有，則有『無有者為染意抑為末那全體』之諍——若末那全體皆無，何以論說「轉第七識得平等性智」？由此開出通染不染之辨、三種差別之列，與證有第七識之六理。頌文未別出此三門，窺基《述記》依十門例科而系之。
三、經論宗依（經證 → 論本）
經證
此識亦名阿陀那識。何以故？由此識於身隨逐執持故。 〔解深密經·心意識相品 T676 0692b15–b16〕
藏識海常住，境界風所動，種種諸識浪，騰躍而轉生。 〔楞伽阿跋多羅寶經 T670 0484b11–b12〕
《解深密》以『阿陀那（於身隨逐執持）』立執持之識，本論證有第七之聖教量本『心、意、識三別』（思量名意）即依《解深密》「心意識相品」而開；《楞伽》以藏識海起諸識浪，顯末那為依藏識而轉之識。本論證有第七所引「藏識說名心，思量性名意」之伽他，即《入楞伽》之頌，存錄於本論（見目四）。
論本（瑜伽師地論 T1579）
末那恒與四種任運煩惱相應，於一切時俱起不絕。謂我我所行薩迦耶見、我慢、我愛、不共無明……其性唯是隱沒無記，任運而起。 〔T1579 0651c15–0651c19〕
阿賴耶識，或於一時唯與一種轉識俱轉，所謂末那……或於一時與二俱轉，謂末那及意識……或時乃至與七俱轉，謂五識身和合轉時。 〔T1579 0580c01–c09〕
又復意識，染污末那以為依止，彼未滅時，相了別縛不得解脫；末那滅已，相縛解脫。 〔T1579 0580c09–0580c11〕
如世尊說出世末那，云何建立？答：名假施設，不必如義。又對治彼，遠離顛倒正思量故。 〔T1579 0651c01–0651c03〕
《瑜伽師地論》定末那『恒與四任運煩惱（薩迦耶見·我慢·我愛·不共無明）相應、隱沒無記、任運而起』（此章三性「有覆無記」之論本）；明阿賴耶『恒與一識（末那）俱轉，意識起則二俱轉，乃至七俱轉』（通染不染章『藏識恒與一識俱轉』之論本）；說『染污末那為識依止、未滅則相縛不脫』（理證六「相縛」之論本，本論引錄見目四）；又立「出世末那」（通染不染「出世末那經說有」之論本）。護法糅釋所宗，其經在解深密、楞伽，其論在瑜伽師地論。
四、本論釋要（護法糅釋 · T1585）
餘心所 · 「餘」字
此意心所唯有四耶？不爾，「及餘觸等俱」故。 〔T1585 0022b17–b18〕
受 · 三說發端
此染污意，何受相應？有義：此俱唯有喜受，恒內執我，生喜愛故。 〔T1585 0023b20–b21〕
受 · 唯捨受（正義）
又此末那與前藏識義有異者，皆別說之。若四受俱，亦應別說。既不別說，定與彼同。故此相應，唯有捨受。 〔T1585 0023b29–c02〕
三性 · 有覆無記
末那心所，何性所攝？有覆無記所攝，非餘。此意相應四煩惱等，是染法故；障礙聖道，隱蔽自心，說名有覆；非善、不善，故名無記。 〔T1585 0023c06–c09〕
界繫 · 隨所生
隨彼所生，彼地所繫。謂生欲界，現行末那相應心所，即欲界繫。乃至有頂應知亦然；任運恒緣自地藏識，執為內我，非他地故。 〔T1585 0023c12–c15〕
三位 · 永斷暫斷
此染污意，無始相續，何位永斷？或暫斷耶？「阿羅漢、滅定、出世道無有。」阿羅漢者，總顯三乘無學果位。此位染意種及現行，俱永斷滅，故說無有。學位滅定、出世道中，俱暫伏滅，故說無有。 〔T1585 0023c19–c23〕
通染不染 · 定有無染污意（正義）
是故定有無染污意，於上三位，恒起現前。言彼無者，依染意說；…… 〔T1585 0024b07–b08〕
證有第七 · 心意識三別
集起名心，思量名意，了別名識，是三別義……第八名心，集諸法種，起諸法故；第七名意，緣藏識等，恒、審思量，為我等故；餘六名識，於六別境，麁動間斷，了別轉故。 〔T1585 0024c10–c15〕
證有第七 · 入楞伽伽他
「藏識說名心，思量性名意，能了諸境相，是說名為識。」 〔T1585 0024c16–c17〕
證有第七 · 解脫經頌
「染污意恒時，諸惑俱生滅，若解脫諸惑，非曾非當有。」 〔T1585 0024c21–c22〕
證有第七 · 思量名意（理證三）
故知別有第七末那，恒、審思量，正名為意，已滅依此，假立「意」名。 〔T1585 0025b21–b22〕
結 · 六理證
由有末那恒起我執，令善等法有漏義成。此意若無，彼定非有，故知別有此第七識。證有此識，理趣甚多，隨《攝大乘》，略述六種，諸有智者，應隨信學。 〔T1585 0026a06–a09〕
要義：餘心所一門以「餘」字啟諍——「餘」指五遍行則心所九，「餘」顯隨煩惱則須定隨煩惱遍染心之數，本論列五隨、六隨、十隨三說而以「八隨」為正（前九法＋八隨煩惱＋別境慧＝十八）。受門破唯喜受（喜受不上有頂，違聖言）、破四受（末那一類無變易，異於變異受；又凡與第八異義論皆別說、既不別說定與第八同），歸唯捨受。三性以『染（有覆）而非善惡（無記）』定有覆無記。界繫以『恒緣自地藏識執我』定隨所生所繫。三位以『染意種及現行，金剛喻定頓斷』定阿羅漢永斷、滅定出世道暫斷。通染不染破『末那唯染』，立「出世末那」（清淨末那）於三位恒行——頌「三位無」依染意說，如「四位無阿賴耶」唯無其名非無第八體。證有第七以聖教（心意識三別·入楞伽伽他·解脫經染污意頌）與六理（不共無明·意法為緣生意識·思量名意·二定有別·無想有情有我執·三性心恒帶我執）成之，六理隨《攝大乘》而述。
五、諸家異釋（窺基《述記》T1830）
頌有「餘」字遂有諍生，下有二解「餘」字。即為二文：一謂四惑之餘，即次第一解是；二謂觸等之餘…… 〔T1830 0396a04–a06〕
述曰：護法菩薩為第四說，於中有三：初總非；次申理；後總結。 〔T1830 0401a05–a06〕
述曰：上來依頌第十門中，已略分別伏斷位訖。自下第二，因乘義解分位行相。 〔T1830 0406b26–b28〕
佛言出世末那云何建立？答：名假施設，不必如義。此義意言，出世末那更不思量，任運知故、無麁慧故、無散慧故，不名末那，即唯有漏，非在無漏，此一解也。又云：遠離顛倒正思量故。 〔T1830 0377b02–b06〕
窺基判「餘」字一語生諍，剖為二解（「四惑之餘」與「觸等之餘」）；明心所數諸說之第四即護法正義（總非前三、申理、總結），其數十八；於三位伏斷既訖，乃就「因乘義」開三種差別（分位行相）；於「出世末那」釋《瑜伽》「名假施設不必如義」二解（一謂出世位更不思量、不名末那，唯局有漏；一謂遠離顛倒正思量，許通無漏）。餘心所遍染心五/六/十/八之諸說繫名、受門三說、通染不染教理逐破之繫屬，《述記》及《掌中樞要》詳之。
六、譯名 · 古譯對讀（玄奘 ↔ 真諦《轉識論》）
| 義 | 玄奘《成唯識論》 | 真諦《轉識論》 |
|---|---|---|
| 第七識 | 末那 · 意 | 第二執識（「此識以執著為體」〔0062a14〕） |
| 性 | 有覆無記 | 有覆無記（「此識名有覆無記」〔0062a15–0062a16〕） |
| 四惑 | 我癡·我見·我慢·我愛 | 無明·我見·我慢·我愛（「與四惑相應，一無明、二我見、三我慢、四我愛」〔0062a14–0062a15〕） |
| 餘心所 | 觸等（前細此麁） | 五種心法（「亦有五種心法相應，名字同前，而前細此麁」〔0062a16–0062a17〕） |
| 永斷位 | 阿羅漢 | 羅漢位（「至羅漢位究竟滅盡」〔0062a17–0062a18〕） |
| 暫斷位 | 滅定 · 出世道 | 無心定 · 出世道（「及入無心定亦皆滅盡」「得出世道十六行究竟滅盡」〔0062a18–0062a19〕） |
真諦《轉識論》「第二執識」一段，與本論末那(二)諸門密合：同立有覆無記、同列四惑（首作「無明」，玄奘自註「我癡者：謂無明」）、同言五心法「前細此麁」（即本論「前說觸等，異熟識俱……故置『餘』言」之簡別〔T1585 0022b20–b21〕）、同舉羅漢位滅盡與無心定滅盡、出世道滅盡（即頌七「阿羅漢、滅定、出世道無有」）。真諦於此以「第二執識」統攝，玄奘則分餘心所·受·三性·界繫·三位諸門廣辯。
七、術語
末那（manas）— 恒審思量之第七識；此章辯其餘心所·受·性·繫·斷位·染不染·差別。 有覆無記 — 染（障聖道·隱自心）而非善惡（無記）；末那性攝。 隨煩惱遍染心 — 遍與一切染污心相應之隨煩惱；本論列五·六·十·八諸說，以八隨為正。 三位無有 — 阿羅漢（永斷·種現俱滅）· 滅盡定 · 出世道（暫斷·伏滅）。 出世末那 — 清淨末那；轉染成淨、與平等性智相應之第七，於三位恒行。 平等性智（samatā-jñāna）— 轉第七識所得之智；末那三差別之第三。 不共無明 — 恒行不共（餘識所無·唯第七有）· 獨行不共（不與他惑俱）二種；證有第七理證一所依。 相縛 — 為見分相分所拘、於境相不能了達如幻；末那未滅則相縛不脫。 〔梵文為古德所傳發音輔助。〕
八、互讀（唯識系次第：百法 → 三十頌 → 二十論 → 辯中邊論 → 攝大乘論）
- 百法：心所·隨煩惱（惛沈·掉舉·不信·懈怠·放逸·忘念·散亂·不正知＝末那俱八隨）；心所·別境慧（我見以慧為體）。
- 三十頌：頌六下半（及餘觸等俱）· 頌七（有覆無記·隨所生所繫·阿羅漢滅定出世道無有）——逐頌姊妹。
- 二十論：〔從闕〕主唯識無境、破外執，末那餘門·三位·證有無正面對位。
- 辯中邊論：辯障品·煩惱障（四惑為染之本，末那恒俱）；辯相品·虛妄分別（末那我執令施等不亡相）。
- 攝大乘論：所知依分·染污意（末那之染污依義）；本論「證有此識……隨《攝大乘》略述六種」即本《攝大乘》六理證。
章內：末那(一)（§12 上承——體相·所依·所緣·四煩惱）· 了境（第三能變·末那染令前六識成雜染）。
九、校本定位
頌 T1586〔0060b13·0060b14·0060b15〕· 本論 T1585 末那(二)釋〔餘心所 0022b17·受 0023b20·唯捨受 0023b29–0023c02·三性 0023c06·界繫 0023c12·三位 0023c19·通染不染 0024b07–0024b08·心意識三別 0024c10·入楞伽伽他 0024c16·解脫經頌 0024c21·思量名意 0025b21·六理證結 0026a06–0026a09〕· 述記 T1830〔餘字二解 0396a04–0396a05·護法第四說 0401a05·三種差別 0406b26·出世末那 0377b02〕· 《轉識論》T1587 第二執識〔0062a14–0062a19〕。 〔經證〕解深密 T676〔0692b15〕· 楞伽 T670〔0484b11〕。〔論本〕瑜伽師地論 T1579〔轉轉相 0580b29–0580c09·相縛 0580c09–0580c11·出世末那 0651c01–0651c03·隱沒無記四任運煩惱 0651c15–0651c19〕。
〔Verses commented〕Continuing: the residual sense of verse 7, and the proof of a seventh consciousness
1. Position in Kuiji's Structural Outline
| Outline | Position of this chapter |
|---|---|
| Three transformers | first (ālaya) → second · the manas → third (object-discerning) |
| Within the manas chapter | (ii) the remaining gates · from the defiled-or-undefiled dispute onward |
| Verses commented | the residual sense of Triṃśikā v. 7 · the proof of a seventh consciousness (not separately raised in the verse; listed on Kuiji's outline) |
The five gates of the previous chapter being complete, this one takes up the twofold dispute — from scripture and from reason — over whether the manas pervades the undefiled, then its three distinctions (view of self, view of dharmas, wisdom of equal-nature), and closes by establishing through scriptural authority and six rational grounds that a seventh consciousness has a substance of its own. With that the second transformer is settled.
2. Source verses · doctrinal context
阿羅漢、滅定、出世道無有。 〔T1586 0060b13〕 Absent at the arhat stage, in the attainment of cessation, and on the supramundane path.
All that this chapter settles is residual to the single line "absent in three states." For if absence is declared, a dispute follows: is what is absent the defiled thought, or the manas entire? Were the manas entire absent, how could the treatises say "transforming the seventh consciousness, one gains the wisdom of equal-nature"? Out of that come the discrimination of defiled from undefiled, the listing of three distinctions, and the six grounds proving a seventh consciousness. The verse does not separately raise these three gates; Kuiji's Shuji attaches them on the pattern of the ten gates.
3. Scriptural and treatise grounding (scripture → root śāstra)
Scriptural witnesses
此識亦名阿陀那識。何以故？由此識於身隨逐執持故。 〔Saṃdhinirmocana · Mind-Mentation-Consciousness chapter, T676 0692b15–b16〕 tr. "This consciousness is also called the ādāna-consciousness. Why so? Because this consciousness follows along and appropriates the body."
藏識海常住，境界風所動，種種諸識浪，騰躍而轉生。 〔Laṅkāvatāra T670 0484b11–b12〕 tr. "The store-consciousness ocean abides constant; stirred by the wind of objects, the manifold waves of the consciousnesses leap up and arise in turn."
The Saṃdhinirmocana, with "the ādāna [consciousness] (following along and appropriating the body)," sets up the consciousness that appropriates; the scriptural authority on which this chapter proves the existence of the seventh — that "mind, mentation, and consciousness are three distinct [senses]" (the cogitating being named mentation) — is opened precisely on the basis of the Saṃdhinirmocana's "Mind-Mentation-Consciousness chapter"; the Laṅkāvatāra, with the store-consciousness ocean raising the waves of the consciousnesses, discloses the manas to be a consciousness that turns in dependence on the store-consciousness. The gāthā "the store-consciousness is named mind, the cogitating nature is named mentation" that this chapter cites in proving the existence of the seventh is precisely the verse of the Laṅkāvatāra, recorded in the root treatise (see heading 4).
Root śāstra (Yogācārabhūmi T1579)
末那恒與四種任運煩惱相應，於一切時俱起不絕。謂我我所行薩迦耶見、我慢、我愛、不共無明……其性唯是隱沒無記，任運而起。 〔T1579 0651c15–0651c19〕 tr. "The manas is constantly concomitant with four kinds of spontaneously-arising afflictions, arising together at all times without break — namely, the self-and-mine-functioning view of the perishable composite, self-conceit, self-love, and the non-shared ignorance… its nature is solely the submerged-indeterminate, arising spontaneously."
阿賴耶識，或於一時唯與一種轉識俱轉，所謂末那……或於一時與二俱轉，謂末那及意識……或時乃至與七俱轉，謂五識身和合轉時。 〔T1579 0580c01–c09〕 tr. "The ālaya-consciousness at one time turns together with only one kind of evolving consciousness, namely the manas… at one time turns together with two, namely the manas and the mind-consciousness… and at one time turns together with as many as seven, namely when the body of the five consciousnesses turns in combination."
又復意識，染污末那以為依止，彼未滅時，相了別縛不得解脫；末那滅已，相縛解脫。 〔T1579 0580c09–0580c11〕 tr. "Furthermore, the mind-consciousness takes the defiled manas as its basis; while that has not ceased, the bondage of discerning marks is not freed; once the manas has ceased, the bondage to marks is freed."
如世尊說出世末那，云何建立？答：名假施設，不必如義。又對治彼，遠離顛倒正思量故。 〔T1579 0651c01–0651c03〕 tr. "As the World-Honored One spoke of a supramundane manas, how is it to be set up? Answer: the name is conventionally posited, not necessarily according to [its literal] sense. And it counters that [defiled manas], by departing from inversion and cogitating rightly."
The Yogācārabhūmi settles that the manas is "constantly concomitant with the four spontaneously-arising afflictions (the view of the perishable composite · self-conceit · self-love · the non-shared ignorance), submerged-indeterminate, arising spontaneously" (the śāstra-root for this chapter's "obscured-indeterminate" under the three natures); it makes clear that the ālaya "constantly turns together with one consciousness (the manas), and when the mind-consciousness arises the two turn together, and so on up to seven turning together" (the śāstra-root for the pervading-the-defiled-and-undefiled chapter's "the store-consciousness constantly turns together with one consciousness"); it says that "the defiled manas is the basis of the [mind-]consciousness, and while unceased the bondage to marks is not freed" (the śāstra-root for doctrinal ground six, "bondage to marks," cited in the root treatise — see heading 4); and it further sets up "a supramundane manas" (the śāstra-root for pervading-the-defiled-and-undefiled's "the supramundane manas, which scripture says exists"). What Dharmapāla's redaction takes as authority has its scripture in the Saṃdhinirmocana and the Laṅkāvatāra, and its śāstra in the Yogācārabhūmi.
4. Essentials of the root treatise (Dharmapāla's redaction · T1585)
The remaining mental factors · the word "rest"
此意心所唯有四耶？不爾，「及餘觸等俱」故。 〔T1585 0022b17–b18〕 tr. "Are the mental factors of this mentation only four? Not so — because [the verse says] 'and concurrent with the rest, contact and so on.'"
Feeling · the opening of the three positions
此染污意，何受相應？有義：此俱唯有喜受，恒內執我，生喜愛故。 〔T1585 0023b20–b21〕 tr. "With what feeling is this defiled mentation concomitant? One view holds: concurrent with it there is only joy-feeling, since it constantly grasps a self inwardly and so gives rise to joy-and-love."
Feeling · only equanimity-feeling (the correct view)
又此末那與前藏識義有異者，皆別說之。若四受俱，亦應別說。既不別說，定與彼同。故此相應，唯有捨受。 〔T1585 0023b29–c02〕 tr. "Again, wherever the manas differs in meaning from the store-consciousness spoken of earlier, [the treatise] states it separately in each case. Were it concurrent with the four feelings, this too ought to have been stated separately. Since it is not stated separately, it is definitely the same as that [store-consciousness]. Hence concomitant with it there is only equanimity-feeling."
The three natures · obscured-indeterminate
末那心所，何性所攝？有覆無記所攝，非餘。此意相應四煩惱等，是染法故；障礙聖道，隱蔽自心，說名有覆；非善、不善，故名無記。 〔T1585 0023c06–c09〕 tr. "The manas and its mental factors — within what nature are they comprised? They are comprised within the obscured-indeterminate, not the rest. The four afflictions and so on concomitant with this mentation are defiled dharmas; because they obstruct the holy path and veil their own mind, [it] is called 'obscured'; because [it] is neither good nor bad, [it] is called 'indeterminate.'"
Realm-binding · binding follows where it is born
隨彼所生，彼地所繫。謂生欲界，現行末那相應心所，即欲界繫。乃至有頂應知亦然；任運恒緣自地藏識，執為內我，非他地故。 〔T1585 0023c12–c15〕 tr. "Bound to the stage of wherever it is born. That is, when born in the desire realm, the present-activity manas and its concomitant mental factors are bound to the desire realm; and so on up to the peak of existence it should be known to be likewise — for spontaneously and constantly it takes the store-consciousness of its own stage as object and grasps it as an inner self, not [that of] another stage."
The three states · permanent and temporary severance
此染污意，無始相續，何位永斷？或暫斷耶？「阿羅漢、滅定、出世道無有。」阿羅漢者，總顯三乘無學果位。此位染意種及現行，俱永斷滅，故說無有。學位滅定、出世道中，俱暫伏滅，故說無有。 〔T1585 0023c19–c23〕 tr. "This defiled mentation, continuing without beginning — in what state is it severed forever? Or severed for a time? 'In the arhat, in cessation-attainment, and in the supramundane path, it is not present.' 'Arhat' generally shows the no-more-learning fruit-state of the three vehicles. In this state both the seeds and the present activity of the defiled mentation are severed and extinguished forever, and so it is said to be 'not present.' In the learner's cessation-attainment and in the supramundane path, both are suppressed-and-extinguished for a time, and so it is said to be 'not present.'"
Pervading the defiled and undefiled · there definitely is an undefiled mentation (the correct view)
是故定有無染污意，於上三位，恒起現前。言彼無者，依染意說；…… 〔T1585 0024b07–b08〕 tr. "Therefore there definitely is an undefiled mentation, constantly arising and present in the above three states. The saying that it is 'not present' is said with reference to the defiled mentation; …"
Proving the existence of the seventh · mind, mentation, and consciousness as three distinct [senses]
集起名心，思量名意，了別名識，是三別義……第八名心，集諸法種，起諸法故；第七名意，緣藏識等，恒、審思量，為我等故；餘六名識，於六別境，麁動間斷，了別轉故。 〔T1585 0024c10–c15〕 tr. "'Accumulating-and-arising' is named mind, 'cogitating' is named mentation, 'discerning' is named consciousness — these are the three distinct senses… The eighth is named 'mind,' because it accumulates the seeds of all dharmas and gives rise to all dharmas; the seventh is named 'mentation,' because it takes the store-consciousness and so on as object and constantly and examiningly cogitates, [grasping] it as a self and so forth; the remaining six are named 'consciousness,' because toward the six distinct objects they coarsely, movingly, and intermittently discern and turn."
Proving the existence of the seventh · the Laṅkāvatāra gāthā
「藏識說名心，思量性名意，能了諸境相，是說名為識。」 〔T1585 0024c16–c17〕 tr. "'The store-consciousness is said to be named mind; the cogitating nature is named mentation; that which can discern the marks of all objects, this is said to be named consciousness.'"
Proving the existence of the seventh · the Vimokṣa-sūtra verse
「染污意恒時，諸惑俱生滅，若解脫諸惑，非曾非當有。」 〔T1585 0024c21–c22〕 tr. "'The defiled mentation, at all times, arises and ceases together with the afflictions; once freed from the afflictions, it is neither past nor yet-to-be.'"
Proving the existence of the seventh · "cogitating is named mentation" (doctrinal ground three)
故知別有第七末那，恒、審思量，正名為意，已滅依此，假立「意」名。 〔T1585 0025b21–b22〕 tr. "Hence it is known that there is a separate seventh manas, constantly and examiningly cogitating, properly named 'mentation'; and the already-ceased [prior moment] is, in dependence on this, conventionally given the name 'mentation.'"
Conclusion · the six doctrinal grounds
由有末那恒起我執，令善等法有漏義成。此意若無，彼定非有，故知別有此第七識。證有此識，理趣甚多，隨《攝大乘》，略述六種，諸有智者，應隨信學。 〔T1585 0026a06–a09〕 tr. "Because there is the manas constantly raising self-grasping, the contaminated sense of good and other dharmas is established. Were this mentation absent, that [contaminated sense] would definitely not be; hence it is known that there is this separate seventh consciousness. The lines of reasoning that prove this consciousness are very many; following the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, six kinds are briefly set forth; those possessed of wisdom should accordingly have faith and learn."
Essentials: the gate of the remaining mental factors opens its dispute on the word "rest" — if "rest" means the five omnipresent factors, then the mental factors are nine; if "rest" discloses the secondary-afflictions, then the number of secondary-afflictions that pervade defiled mind must be settled, and the root treatise sets out three positions, five, six, and ten, taking "eight secondary-afflictions" as correct (the prior nine dharmas + eight secondary-afflictions + the determinative-object wisdom = eighteen). The feeling-gate refutes only-joy-feeling (joy-feeling does not reach the peak of existence, contradicting holy scripture), refutes four-feelings (the manas, of one kind, has no alteration, differing from the alteration-feelings; and again, wherever it differs in meaning from the eighth it is stated separately, and since it is not stated separately it is definitely the same as the eighth), and settles on only equanimity-feeling. The three natures settle on obscured-indeterminate by "defiled (obscured) yet neither good nor evil (indeterminate)." Realm-binding settles on "bound to wherever it is born" by "constantly taking the store-consciousness of its own stage as object and grasping it as a self." The three states settle, by "the seeds and present activity of the defiled mentation are cut all at once in the vajra-like concentration," that the arhat is permanent severance and that cessation-attainment and the supramundane path are temporary severance. Pervading the defiled and undefiled refutes "the manas is only defiled" and sets up "the supramundane manas" (the purified manas), constantly operating in the three states — the verse's "absent in the three states" is said with reference to the defiled mentation, just as "in the four states there is no ālaya" merely [denies] its name and not the essence of the eighth. Proving the existence of the seventh is accomplished by holy scripture (mind-mentation-consciousness as three distinct [senses] · the Laṅkāvatāra gāthā · the Vimokṣa-sūtra verse on the defiled mentation) and by the six doctrinal grounds (the non-shared ignorance · the mind-consciousness arising with mentation-and-dharma as condition · "cogitating is named mentation" · the two concentrations differing · the non-conceptual beings having self-grasping · the mind of the three natures constantly carrying self-grasping), the six grounds being set forth following the Mahāyānasaṃgraha.
5. Divergent readings across the masters (Kuiji, Shuji T1830)
頌有「餘」字遂有諍生，下有二解「餘」字。即為二文：一謂四惑之餘，即次第一解是；二謂觸等之餘…… 〔T1830 0396a04–a06〕 tr. "The verse has the word 'rest,' and thereupon a dispute arises; below there are two glosses of the word 'rest.' Thus there are two passages: the first takes [it as] 'the rest beyond the four afflictions' — namely, the first gloss in sequence; the second takes [it as] 'the rest beyond contact and so on'…"
述曰：護法菩薩為第四說，於中有三：初總非；次申理；後總結。 〔T1830 0401a05–a06〕 tr. "The Shuji says: the bodhisattva Dharmapāla gives the fourth position, within which there are three: first the general denial; next the laying out of the principle; last the general conclusion."
述曰：上來依頌第十門中，已略分別伏斷位訖。自下第二，因乘義解分位行相。 〔T1830 0406b26–b28〕 tr. "The Shuji says: thus far, within the tenth gate of the verse, the states of suppression-and-severance have already been briefly distinguished. From here on, secondly, taking up the sense of the vehicles, [the treatise] explains the marks of activity of the [several] states."
佛言出世末那云何建立？答：名假施設，不必如義。此義意言，出世末那更不思量，任運知故、無麁慧故、無散慧故，不名末那，即唯有漏，非在無漏，此一解也。又云：遠離顛倒正思量故。 〔T1830 0377b02–b06〕 tr. "The Buddha said: how is the supramundane manas to be set up? Answer: the name is conventionally posited, not necessarily according to [its literal] sense. The meaning here is that the supramundane manas no longer cogitates, knowing spontaneously, without coarse wisdom, without distracted wisdom, and so is not [really] named manas — it being only contaminated, not in the uncontaminated: this is one gloss. It also says: because it departs from inversion and cogitates rightly."
Kuiji judges that the single word "rest" gives rise to the dispute, and cleaves it into two glosses ("the rest beyond the four afflictions" and "the rest beyond contact and so on"); he makes clear that the fourth of the several positions on the number of mental factors is Dharmapāla's correct view (generally denying the prior three · laying out the principle · the general conclusion), its number being eighteen; the states of suppression-and-severance having been settled in the three states, he then, "taking up the sense of the vehicles," opens out the three differentiations (the marks of activity of the [several] states); and on "the supramundane manas" he glosses the Yogācārabhūmi's "the name is conventionally posited, not necessarily according to its sense" with two readings (one: in the supramundane state it no longer cogitates and is not [really] named manas, confined to the contaminated; one: it departs from inversion and cogitates rightly, allowing it to extend to the uncontaminated). The several positions on the five/six/ten/eight secondary-afflictions that pervade defiled mind — their attribution by name, the three positions of the feeling-gate, and the doctrinal-and-textual point-by-point refutation of the pervading-the-defiled-and-undefiled — the Shuji and the Zhangzhong shuyao detail.
6. Rendering of terms · old-translation comparison (Xuanzang ↔ Paramārtha, Zhuanshi lun)
| Sense | Xuanzang, Cheng Weishi Lun | Paramārtha, Zhuanshi lun |
|---|---|---|
| the seventh consciousness | 末那 · 意 manas · mentation | 第二執識 the second grasping-consciousness ("this consciousness takes grasping as its essence" 「此識以執著為體」〔0062a14〕) |
| nature | 有覆無記 obscured-indeterminate | 有覆無記 obscured-indeterminate ("this consciousness is named obscured-indeterminate" 「此識名有覆無記」〔0062a15–0062a16〕) |
| the four afflictions | 我癡·我見·我慢·我愛 self-delusion · self-view · self-conceit · self-love | 無明·我見·我慢·我愛 ignorance · self-view · self-conceit · self-love ("concomitant with the four afflictions: first ignorance, second self-view, third self-conceit, fourth self-love" 「與四惑相應，一無明、二我見、三我慢、四我愛」〔0062a14–0062a15〕) |
| the remaining mental factors | 觸等（前細此麁） contact and so on (the former subtle, these coarse) | 五種心法 five kinds of mind-dharma ("there are also five kinds of mind-dharma concomitant, the names the same as before, but the former subtle and these coarse" 「亦有五種心法相應，名字同前，而前細此麁」〔0062a16–0062a17〕) |
| state of permanent severance | 阿羅漢 the arhat | 羅漢位 the arhat-state ("at the arhat-state it is finally extinguished" 「至羅漢位究竟滅盡」〔0062a17–0062a18〕) |
| states of temporary severance | 滅定 · 出世道 cessation-attainment · the supramundane path | 無心定 · 出世道 the mindless concentration · the supramundane path ("and on entering the mindless concentration it too is all extinguished" "attaining the supramundane path, by the sixteen aspects it is finally extinguished" 「及入無心定亦皆滅盡」「得出世道十六行究竟滅盡」〔0062a18–0062a19〕) |
The passage on "the second grasping-consciousness" in Paramārtha's Zhuanshi lun dovetails closely with the several gates of the manas (II) in the root treatise: both set up the obscured-indeterminate, both list the four afflictions (the first set down as "ignorance," Xuanzang's own gloss reading "self-delusion: that is, ignorance"), both say of the five mind-dharmas that "the former are subtle and these coarse" (precisely the root treatise's distinguishing note, "the contact and so on spoken of earlier, concurrent with the maturation-consciousness… and so it places the word 'rest'" 〔T1585 0022b20–b21〕), and both adduce extinction at the arhat-state and extinction in the mindless concentration and the supramundane path (precisely verse 7's "in the arhat, cessation-attainment, and the supramundane path it is not present"). Paramārtha here subsumes [it all] under "the second grasping-consciousness," whereas Xuanzang argues out at length the several gates of the remaining mental factors · feeling · the three natures · realm-binding · the three states.
7. Key terms
manas (manas) — the seventh consciousness that constantly and examiningly cogitates; this chapter argues out its remaining mental factors · feeling · nature · binding · states of severance · defiled-or-undefiled · differentiations. obscured-indeterminate — defiled (obstructing the holy path · veiling its own mind) yet neither good nor evil (indeterminate); the nature within which the manas is comprised. secondary-afflictions pervading defiled mind — the secondary-afflictions concomitant with every defiled mind; the root treatise sets out the positions of five · six · ten · eight, taking eight secondary-afflictions as correct. absent in the three states — the arhat (permanent severance · seeds and present activity both extinguished) · the cessation-attainment · the supramundane path (temporary severance · suppressed-and-extinguished). the supramundane manas — the purified manas; the seventh that has turned the defiled into the pure and is concomitant with the wisdom of equal-nature, operating constantly in the three states. the wisdom of equal-nature (samatā-jñāna) — the wisdom obtained on turning the seventh consciousness; the third of the manas's three differentiations. the non-shared ignorance — of two kinds, the ever-operating non-shared (which the other consciousnesses lack · which only the seventh has) and the solitary non-shared (which is not concurrent with other afflictions); the basis of doctrinal ground one in proving the existence of the seventh. bondage to marks — being held fast by the seeing-part and the seen-part, unable to penetrate the marks of objects as illusion-like; while the manas is unceased, the bondage to marks is not freed. 〔Sanskrit forms are a pronunciation aid transmitted by the ancient masters.〕
8. Cross-reading (the Yogācāra sequence: Baifa → Triṃśikā → Viṃśatikā → Madhyāntavibhāga → Mahāyānasaṃgraha)
- Baifa (Hundred Dharmas): the mental factors · secondary-afflictions (sloth · restlessness · non-faith · indolence · negligence · forgetting-mindfulness · distraction · improper knowing = the eight secondary-afflictions concurrent with the manas); the mental factors · the determinative-object wisdom (the self-view having wisdom as its essence).
- Triṃśikā: the latter half of verse 6 (and concurrent with the rest, contact and so on) · verse 7 (obscured-indeterminate · bound to wherever it is born · in the arhat, cessation-attainment, and the supramundane path it is not present) — the verse-by-verse sisters.
- Viṃśatikā: 〔absent〕 it chiefly [argues] consciousness-only-without-object and refutes outer grasping; the manas's remaining gates · the three states · proving its existence have no frontal counterpart.
- Madhyāntavibhāga: the Obstructions chapter · the affliction-obstruction (the four afflictions being the root of defilement, constantly concurrent with the manas); the Characteristics chapter · unreal imagining (the manas's self-grasping causing giving and the rest not to be freed of marks).
- Mahāyānasaṃgraha: the Knowable-Basis division · the defiled mentation (the sense of the manas as a defiled basis); the root treatise's "to prove there is this consciousness… following the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, six kinds are briefly set forth" is precisely the Mahāyānasaṃgraha's six doctrinal grounds.
Within the chapter: the manas (I) (§12, taken up above — the essence and marks · the basis · the object · the four afflictions) · the discerning of objects (the third transformer · the manas's defilement causing the first six consciousnesses to become defiled).
9. Collation position
Verse T1586 〔0060b13 · 0060b14 · 0060b15〕 · root T1585, the manas (II) exposition 〔the remaining mental factors 0022b17 · feeling 0023b20 · only equanimity-feeling 0023b29–0023c02 · the three natures 0023c06 · realm-binding 0023c12 · the three states 0023c19 · pervading the defiled and undefiled 0024b07–0024b08 · mind-mentation-consciousness as three distinct 0024c10 · the Laṅkāvatāra gāthā 0024c16 · the Vimokṣa-sūtra verse 0024c21 · "cogitating is named mentation" 0025b21 · the conclusion of the six doctrinal grounds 0026a06–0026a09〕 · Shuji T1830 〔the two glosses of "rest" 0396a04–0396a05 · Dharmapāla's fourth position 0401a05 · the three differentiations 0406b26 · the supramundane manas 0377b02〕 · Zhuanshi lun T1587, the second grasping-consciousness 〔0062a14–0062a19〕. 〔Scripture〕 Saṃdhinirmocana T676 〔0692b15〕 · Laṅkāvatāra T670 〔0484b11〕. 〔Śāstra〕 Yogācārabhūmi T1579 〔the turning-after-turning marks 0580b29–0580c09 · bondage to marks 0580c09–0580c11 · the supramundane manas 0651c01–0651c03 · submerged-indeterminate, the four spontaneously-arising afflictions 0651c15–0651c19〕.