成唯識論 證有別體·五教·前五理
阿賴耶識講了兩節,一個問題躲不掉:你說有這個識,可它「不可知」、感覺不到——那你憑什麼說它在?
論主的答覆很老實:憑兩樣,聖教與正理。 不憑體驗,因為凡夫本來就體驗不到。
聖教舉五處。《大乘阿毘達磨經》兩頌最直接:「無始時來界,一切法等依」「由攝藏諸法,一切種子識,故名阿賴耶」。《解深密經》說「阿陀那識甚深細」。《楞伽》說「藏識海常住」。第四是總成大乘是佛說——因為若不許大乘為佛說,前面的經證就沒有分量,所以要先立。第五最有意思:連四部阿含也密意說過,只是換了名字——大眾部叫它根本識,上座部叫有分識,化地部叫窮生死蘊。論主的用意很清楚:這不是大乘新造的東西,是各部都摸到了、只是沒有明說。
正理列十條,本節先講五條。第一條最要緊:持種證——善惡業造了之後,果報往往隔世才現,中間這段時間種子存在哪裡?前六識會斷(睡著、悶絕、無想定就斷了),第七識恆執我而不持種——所以必須有一個不斷、無記、能持種的識。
這一條的分量在於:它不是玄想,是被因果律逼出來的。 你若承認業果不失,就得承認有一個能存的地方。
Two chapters on the ālaya, and one question cannot be dodged: you say this consciousness is there, yet it is imperceptible and never felt — on what ground do you say so?
The treatise answers plainly: on two grounds, scripture and reason. Not on experience, since an ordinary being has no experience of it to begin with.
Five scriptural testimonies are given. The two verses of the Mahāyāna Abhidharma Sūtra are the most direct: "the realm beginningless in time, the equal support of all dharmas"; "because it stores all dharmas, the consciousness of all seeds is called the ālaya." The Saṃdhinirmocana says the ādāna consciousness is deep and subtle. The Laṅkāvatāra says the store-consciousness ocean abides constant. The fourth establishes that the Mahāyāna is the Buddha's word — for if that were not granted, the foregoing citations would carry no weight, and so it must be settled first. The fifth is the most striking: the four Āgamas too taught it, covertly, only under other names — the Mahāsāṃghikas called it the root consciousness, the Sthaviras the factor of existence, the Mahīśāsakas the aggregate lasting through birth-and-death. The point is unmistakable: this is not a Mahāyāna invention. Every school had felt for it; none had said it outright.
Ten reasons follow, of which this chapter gives five. The first weighs most: the proof from holding seeds. Wholesome and unwholesome deeds are done, and their fruit often ripens a lifetime later; where do the seeds reside in the interval? The first six consciousnesses break off — in deep sleep, in fainting, in the mindless attainment they stop; the seventh grasps a self unceasingly and holds no seeds. There must therefore be a consciousness unbroken, morally neutral, and able to hold.
The weight of that argument is this: it is not speculation; it is forced by the law of act and fruit. Grant that deeds are not lost, and you must grant somewhere for them to be kept.
云何應知此第八識離眼等識有別自體?
聖教、正理為定量故。
謂有《大乘阿毘達磨》契經中說:
「無始時來界,一切法等依,
由此有諸趣,及涅槃證得。」
此第八識自性微細,故以作用而顯示之。
頌中初半,顯第八識為因緣用,後半顯與流轉還滅,作依持用。
「界」是因義,即種子識,無始時來展轉相續,親生諸法,故名為因。
「依」是緣義,即執持識無始時來,與一切法等為依止,故名為緣。
謂能執持諸種子故,與現行法為所依故,即變為彼及為彼依。
變為彼者,謂變為器及有根身;「為彼依」者,謂與轉識作所依止。以能執受五色根故,眼等五識依之而轉,又與末那為依止故,第六意識依之而轉。末那、意識轉識攝故。如眼等識依俱有根,第八理應是識性故,亦以第七為俱有依。
是謂此識為因、緣用。
「由此有」者,由有此識;「有諸趣」者,有善、惡趣。
謂由有此第八識故,執持一切順流轉法,令諸有情流轉生死。
〔T31 0014b01〕雖惑、業、生皆是流轉,而趣是果,勝故偏說;或「諸趣」言通能、所趣,諸趣資具亦得趣名。
諸惑、業、生皆依此識,是與流轉作依持用。
「及涅槃證得」者,由有此識故,有涅槃證得。
謂由有此第八識故,執持一切順還滅法,令修行者證得涅槃。
此中但說能證得道,涅槃不依此識有故。
或此但說所證涅槃,是修行者正所求故。
或此雙說涅槃與道俱是還滅品類攝故。謂「涅槃」言顯所證滅,後「證得」言顯能得道,由能斷道,斷所斷惑,究竟盡位,證得涅槃。
能、所斷、證皆依此識,是與還滅作依持用。
又此頌中初句,顯示此識自性無始恒有,後三顯與雜染、清淨二法,總、別為所依止。
雜染法者,謂苦、集諦,即所能趣生及業、惑;清淨法者,謂滅、道諦,即所、能證涅槃及道;彼二皆依此識而有,依轉識等,理不成故。
或復初句顯此識體無始相續,後三顯與三種自性為所依止:
謂依他起、遍計所執、圓成實性,如次應知。
今此頌中諸所說義,離第八識皆不得有。
即彼經中復作是說:
「由攝藏諸法,一切種子識,
故名阿賴耶,勝者我開示。」
由此本識具諸種子,故能攝藏諸雜染法。
依斯建立阿賴耶名,非如勝性轉為大等,種子與果體非一故;能依、所依俱生滅故;與雜染法互相攝藏,亦為有情執藏為我,故說此識名「阿賴耶」。
已入見道諸菩薩眾得真現觀,名為「勝者」,彼能證解阿賴耶識,故我世尊正為開示;或諸菩薩皆名「勝者」,雖見道前未能證解阿賴耶識,而能信解,求彼轉依,故亦為說。
〔T31 0014c03〕非諸轉識有如是義。
《解深密經》亦作是說:
「阿陀那識甚深細,一切種子如瀑流,
我於凡愚不開演,恐彼分別執為我。」
以能執持諸法種子,及能執受色根依處,亦能執取結生相續,故說此識名「阿陀那」。無性有情不能窮底,故說「甚深」;趣寂種性不能通達,故名「甚細」。
是一切法真實種子,緣擊便生轉識波浪,恒無間斷,猶如瀑流。
「凡」即無性,「愚」即趣寂。恐彼於此起分別執,墮諸惡趣,障生聖道,故我世尊不為開演。
唯第八識有如是相。
《入楞伽經》亦作是說:
「如海遇風緣,起種種波浪,
現前作用轉,無有間斷時。
藏識海亦然,境等風所擊,
恒起諸識浪,現前作用轉。」
眼等諸識,無如大海恒相續轉起諸識浪,故知別有第八識性。
此等無量大乘經中,皆別說有此第八識。
諸大乘經:皆順無我,違數取趣;棄背流轉,趣向還滅;讚佛、法、僧,毀諸外道;表蘊等法,遮勝性等;樂大乘者,許能顯示無顛倒理,契經攝故,如《增壹》等至教量攝。
又,聖慈氏以七種因,證大乘經真是佛說。
一、先不記故。若大乘經佛滅度後,有餘為壞正法故說,何故世尊非如當起諸可怖事,先預記別?
二、本俱行故。大小乘教本來俱行,寧知大乘獨非佛說?
三、非餘境故。大乘所說廣大甚深,非外道等思量境界。彼經論中曾所未說,設為彼說,亦不信受,故大乘經非非佛說。
〔T31 0015a03〕四、應極成故。若謂大乘是餘佛說,非今佛語,則大乘教是佛所說,其理極成。
五、有、無有故。若有大乘,即應信此諸大乘教是佛所說,離此大乘不可得故。
若無大乘,聲聞乘教亦應非有,以離大乘決定無有得成佛義,誰出於世說聲聞乘?故聲聞乘是佛所說,非大乘教不應正理。
六、能對治故。依大乘經勤修行者,皆能引得無分別智,能正對治一切煩惱,故應信此是佛所說。
七、義異文故。大乘所說意趣甚深,不可隨文而取其義,便生誹謗謂非佛語。
是故大乘真是佛說。
如《莊嚴論》頌此義言:
「先不記、俱行、非餘所行境、
極成、有無有、對治、異文故。」
餘部經中亦密意說阿賴耶識有別自性。
謂大眾部阿笈摩中,密意說此名根本識,是眼識等所依止故。譬如樹根是莖等本,非眼等識有如是義。
上坐部經分別論者,俱密意說此名有分識,「有」謂三有;「分」是因義,唯此恒、遍,為三有因。
化地部說此名窮生死蘊,離第八識無別蘊法,窮生死際無間斷時。謂無色界諸色間斷,無想天等餘心等滅,不相應行離色、心等無別自體,已極成故,唯此識名窮生死蘊。
說一切有部《增壹》經中,亦密意說此名阿賴耶,謂愛阿賴耶、樂阿賴耶、欣阿賴耶、憙阿賴耶。
謂阿賴耶識是貪總、別三世境故,立此四名。有情執為真自內我,乃至未斷恒生愛著,故阿賴耶識是真愛著處。
〔T31 0015b03〕不應執餘五取蘊等,謂生一向苦受處者,於餘五取蘊不生愛著,彼恒厭逆餘五取蘊,念我何時當捨此命、此眾同分、此苦身心,令我自在受快樂故。
五欲亦非真愛著處,謂離欲者於五妙欲,雖不貪著而愛我故。
樂受亦非真愛著處,謂離第三靜慮染者,雖厭樂受而愛我故。
身見亦非真愛著處,謂非無學信無我者,雖於身見不生貪著,而於內我猶生愛故。
轉識等亦非真愛著處,謂非無學求滅心者,雖厭轉識等而愛我故。
色身亦非真愛著處,離色染者,雖厭色身而愛我故。
不相應行離色、心等無別自體,是故亦非真愛著處。
異生、有學起我愛時,雖於餘蘊有愛、非愛,而於此識,我愛定生,故唯此是真愛著處。
由是彼說阿賴耶名,定唯顯此阿賴耶識。
已引聖教,當顯正理。
謂契經說:雜染、清淨諸法種子之所集起,故名為心,若無此識,彼持種心不應有故。
謂諸轉識在滅定等有間斷故,根、境、作意、善等類別易脫起故,如電光等不堅住故,非可熏習,不能持種,非染、淨種所集起心。
此識一類、恒無間斷,如苣蕂等堅住可熏,契當彼經所說心義。
若不許有能持種心,非但違經,亦違正理。
謂諸所起染、淨品法,無所熏故,不熏成種,則應所起唐捐其功。染、淨起時既無因種,應同外道執自然生。
〔T31 0015c01〕色、不相應,非心性故,如聲、光等,理非染、淨內法所熏,豈能持種?又彼離識無實自性,寧可執為內種依止?
轉識相應諸心所法,如識間斷,易脫起故,不自在故,非心性故,不能持種,亦不受熏。
故持種心,理應別有。
有說:六識無始時來,依根、境等前後分位,事雖轉變而類無別,是所熏習,能持種子。由斯染、淨因果皆成,何要執有第八識性?
彼言無義!
所以者何?
執類是實,則同外道;許類是假,便無勝用,應不能持內法實種。
又執識類何性所攝?若是善、惡,應不受熏,許有記故,猶如擇滅;若是無記,善、惡心時,無無記心,此類應斷,非事善、惡類可無記;別類必同別事性故。
又無心位此類定無,既有間斷,性非堅住,如何可執持種、受熏?
又阿羅漢或異生心,識類同故,應為諸染,無漏法熏,許便有失。又眼等根或所餘法,與眼等識根、法類同,應互相熏,然汝不許。
故不應執識類受熏。
又六識身,若事、若類,前後二念既不俱有;如隔念者,非互相熏。能熏、所熏必俱時故。
執唯六識俱時轉者,由前理趣,既非所熏,故彼亦無能持種義。
有執色、心自類無間,前為後種,因果義立,故先所說,為證不成。
彼執非理,無熏習故。謂彼自類既無熏習,如何可執前為後種?
又間斷者,應不更生,二乘無學應無後蘊,死位色、心為後種故。
亦不應執色、心展轉互為種生,轉識、色等非所熏習,前已說故。
〔T31 0016a01〕有說:三世諸法皆有,因果感赴,無不皆成,何勞執有能持種識?然經說心為種子者,起染、淨法,勢用強故。
彼說非理。過去、未來,非常、非現,如空花等,非實有故。
又無作用,不可執為因緣性故。若無能持染、淨種識,一切因果皆不得成。
有執大乘遣相空理為究竟者,依似比量,撥無此識及一切法,彼特違害前所引經。
智、斷、證、修、染、淨因果皆執非實,成大邪見。
外道毀謗染、淨因果亦不謂全無,但執非實故。
若一切法皆非實有,菩薩不應為捨生死,精勤修集菩提資糧。誰有智者為除幻敵,求石女兒用為軍旅?
故應信有能持種心,依之建立染、淨因果。
彼心即是此第八識。
又契經說有異熟心,善、惡業感,若無此識,彼異熟心不應有故。
謂眼等識有間斷故,非一切時是業果故,如電、光等,非異熟心。異熟不應斷已更續,彼命根等,無斯事故。
眼等六識,業所感者,猶如聲等,非恒續故,是異熟生,非真異熟。
定應許有真異熟心,酬牽引業,遍而無斷,變為身、器作有情依,身、器離心,理非有故。不相應法無實體故,諸轉識等非恒有故,若無此心,誰變身、器?復依何法恒立有情?
又在定中,或不在定,有別思慮、無思慮時,理有眾多身受生起。此若無者,不應後時身有怡適,或復勞損,若不恒有真異熟心,彼位如何有此身受?
非佛起餘善心等位,必應現起真異熟心,如許起彼時,非佛有情故。
〔T31 0016b01〕由是恒有真異熟心,彼心即是此第八識。
又契經說:有情流轉五趣、四生。若無此識,彼趣、生體不應有故。
謂要實有、恒、遍、無雜,彼法可立正實趣、生。
非異熟法趣、生雜亂,住此起餘趣、生法故。
諸異熟色及五識中業所感者不遍趣、生,無色界中全無彼故。
諸生得善及意識中業所感者,雖遍趣、生,起無雜亂而不恒有。
不相應行無實自體,皆不可立正實趣、生。
唯異熟心及彼心所,實恒、遍、無雜,是正實趣、生。
此心若無,生無色界起善等位應非趣、生。設許趣、生攝諸有漏,生無色界起無漏心應非趣、生,便違正理。勿有前過及有此失,故唯異熟法是正實趣、生。
由是如來非趣、生攝,佛無異熟無記法故,亦非界攝,非有漏故,世尊已捨苦、集諦故,諸戲論種已永斷故。
正實趣、生既唯異熟心及心所,彼心、心所離第八識理不得成,故知別有此第八識。
又契經說:有色根身是有執受,若無此識,彼能執受,不應有故。
謂五色根及彼依處,唯現在世是有執受,彼定由有能執受心,唯異熟心,先業所引,非善、染等,一類、能遍、相續執受有色根身;眼等轉識無如是義。
此言意顯眼等轉識,皆無一類、能遍、相續執受自內有色根身,非顯能執受唯異熟心,勿諸佛色身無執受故;然能執受有漏色身唯異熟心,故作是說。
謂諸轉識現緣起故,如聲、風等,彼善、染等,非業引故,如非擇滅。異熟生者,非異熟故、非遍依故、不相續故,如電、光等,不能執受有漏色身。
〔T31 0016c02〕諸心識言,亦攝心所,定相應故,如唯識言。
非諸色根、不相應行可能執受有色根身,無所緣故,如虛空等。
故應別有能執受心,彼心即是此第八識。
又契經說:壽、煖、識三,更互依持,得相續住。若無此識能持壽、煖,令久住識不應有故。
謂諸轉識有間、有轉,如聲、風等,無恒持用,不可立為持壽、煖識。
唯異熟識無間、無轉,猶如壽、煖,有恒持用,故可立為持壽、煖識。
經說三法更互依持,而壽與煖一類相續,唯識不然,豈符正理?
雖說三法更互依持,而許唯煖不遍三界,何不許識獨有間、轉?
此於前理,非為過難。謂若是處具有三法無間轉者,可恒相持。不爾,便無恒相持用。前以此理,顯三法中所說識言,非詮轉識,舉煖不遍,豈壞前理?故前所說,其理極成。
又三法中,壽、煖二種既唯有漏,故知彼識如壽與煖,定非無漏;生無色界起無漏心,爾時,何識能持彼壽?
由此故知有異熟識,一類、恒、遍、能持壽、煖,彼識即是此第八識。
The canonical text stands in Chinese only. This edition renders the essence, the plain reading, the exposition and the apparatus into English — never the sūtra itself. Switch to 漢讀本 or 並行雙語 above to read it.
〔所釋之頌〕承前章,廣釋第二頌至第四頌·證有第八
〔所釋頌〕
甲、總標:聖教正理為定量
我們怎麼知道第八識(阿賴耶識)是離開眼等諸識、另外別有它自己的本體呢?靠兩樣東西來作準:一是「聖教」(佛親口說的契經),二是「正理」(如理的推究)。先看聖教這一面:《大乘阿毘達磨》這部契經裡說了一首頌——「無始時來界,一切法等依,由此有諸趣,及涅槃證得。」這頌是說:從無始以來就有這個「界」(也就是第八識),一切法都平等地依著它;正因為有這個識,才有眾生在六道裡輪轉,也才有涅槃可以證得。
第八識的本體實在太細微了,很難直接指給人看,所以只好藉著它的「作用」來把它顯示出來。這首頌的前半句(「無始時來界,一切法等依」),顯的是這個識的「因緣用」(它當一切法的因、當一切法的緣的那種作用);後半句(「由此有諸趣,及涅槃證得」),顯的是它在「流轉」(生死輪轉)和「還滅」(修道還歸寂滅)這兩條路上所作的「依持用」(撐持、依託的作用)。
頌裡的「界」字,講的是「因」的意思,指的就是「種子識」(第八識藏著一切種子)——它從無始以來一直接續不斷,親自把一切法生出來,所以叫它「因」。頌裡的「依」字,講的是「緣」的意思,指的就是「執持識」(第八識執持著一切法)——它從無始以來跟一切法平等地當依靠,所以叫它「緣」。
這是說:這個識一方面能執持著一切種子(這是它當「因」),一方面又給已經現起來的諸法當依靠(這是它當「緣」);所以這個識既「變為彼」(把諸法變現出來),又「為彼依」(給諸法當依靠)。所謂「變為彼」,就是變現出器世間(外在的山河大地)和有根身(我們這個有六根的身體);所謂「為彼依」,就是給其餘各個轉識(前七識)當依靠。
因為這個識能執受五色根(眼、耳、鼻、舌、身這五個淨色根,也就是看不見的那層細色),所以眼等五識才靠著它而轉起來;又因為這個識給末那(第七識)當依靠,所以第六意識才靠著它而轉起來——末那和意識,都歸在「轉識」這一類裡。再說,就像眼等諸識各自都靠著它的「俱有根」(同時並存的那個所依根),第八識按理也是個「識」,所以它同樣拿第七識當它的「俱有依」(同時並存、互相扶持的依靠)。以上講的就是這個識的「因用」和「緣用」。
頌裡「由此有」三個字,是說『正因為有這個識』;「有諸趣」三個字,是說『才有善趣、惡趣』(眾生才有好的、壞的去處)。意思就是:正因為有這第八識,它執持著一切順著生死流轉的法,才害得眾生在生死裡輪轉不停。
流轉這件事,其實惑(煩惱)、業(造作)、生(受生的果報)三樣都算;可是這三樣裡頭,「趣」(受生的去處)是最後的果,果最緊要,所以頌裡只偏舉一個「趣」字。或者也可以說:「諸趣」這一詞,能把「能趣」(趣向去處的那一面)和「所趣」(被趣向的那個去處)都包進去,連那些去處裡的種種資生工具也都算在「趣」字裡。總之,惑、業、生都是靠這個識才立得起來——這就是這個識在流轉這一門上所作的「依持用」。
頌裡「及涅槃證得」這一句,是說:正因為有這個識,才有涅槃可以證得。意思就是:正因為有這第八識,它執持著一切順著還滅(還歸寂滅)的法,才能讓修行人得以證到涅槃。
「涅槃證得」這四個字,可以有三種解法:(一)只就「能證得」的那條道來講——因為涅槃(那個被證到的寂滅)本身並不是靠這個識才有的。(二)只就「所證」的那個涅槃來講——因為涅槃正是修行人一心要求的果。(三)涅槃(被證的)和道(能證的)兩面一起講——因為這兩樣都歸在「還滅」這一類裡。
這是按第三種解法來講:「涅槃」這個詞,顯的是被證到的那個「滅」;底下「證得」這個詞,顯的是能去證的那條「道」——靠著能斷的道,斷掉所要斷的惑,一直到「究竟盡位」(煩惱徹底斷盡的地步),才證得涅槃。這裡頭,能斷的道、所斷的惑、以及能證所證這一整套,全都是靠這個識才立得起來——這就是這個識在還滅這一門上所作的「依持用」。
再換個角度看:這首頌的第一句(「無始時來界」),顯的是這個識的本體從無始以來就一直存在;後面三句,顯的是這個識給「雜染」和「清淨」這兩類法當依靠——既當它們「總」(整體合說)的依靠,也當它們「別」(一條一條分說)的依靠。
所謂「雜染法」,就是苦諦、集諦——也就是被趣向的那個「生」(受生的果),和趣向它的那個「業、惑」(造作和煩惱)。所謂「清淨法」,就是滅諦、道諦——也就是被證到的那個「涅槃」,和能去證的那條「道」。這兩類法都是靠這個識才有的;要是有人說它們是靠轉識(前七識)才有的,這在道理上講不通——因為轉識會中斷,撐不起這個依靠的擔子。
還有另一種解法:第一句顯這個識的本體從無始以來一直接續不斷;後面三句,顯這個識給「三種自性」當依靠——也就是依他起性(靠眾緣而起的)、遍計所執性(妄加分別計執出來的)、圓成實性(圓滿成就的真實),照這個次第去懂就是了。一句話:這首頌裡所說的種種道理,離開了第八識,一樣都立不起來。
乙、五教:契經明證有第八識
一、《大乘阿毘達磨》契經(攝藏阿賴耶頌)
就在這部《大乘阿毘達磨》經裡,又說了一首頌——「由攝藏諸法,一切種子識,故名阿賴耶,勝者我開示。」這頌是說:因為它能把一切法攝藏起來、又是含藏一切種子的那個識,所以叫它「阿賴耶」(藏);而且我(佛)只對「勝者」(根器高的人)才把它開示出來。
因為這個本識(第八識)裡頭具足了一切種子,所以它能把種種雜染法攝藏起來;就根據這一點,才給它立了「阿賴耶」這個名。不過要留意:它這種「攝藏」,跟數論外道講的「勝性」(也就是他們講的那個自性)轉變成「大」等東西,是兩回事——數論講的是一個本體一路展轉變過去(始終是同一個東西在變),而這裡不是這樣,因為種子跟它長出來的果體並不是同一個,而且能依(種子)和所依(識)兩面都有生有滅。再說,這個識跟雜染法是「互相攝藏」(你藏我、我藏你)的,又被眾生「執藏」成「我」(牢牢地當作自我抱著不放),所以才把這個識叫作「阿賴耶」(藏)。
頌裡「勝者」這個詞,可以有兩種解法:(一)已經進入「見道」(初次親見真理)的那些菩薩,得了「真現觀」(真正當下的證見),這才叫「勝者」——他們能親自證解阿賴耶識,所以世尊正是對他們開示的。(二)或者說,凡是菩薩都叫「勝者」——他們雖然在見道之前還沒能親證阿賴耶識,可是已經能信得過、解得來,又一心想求「轉依」(轉染成淨),所以佛也對他們講。總之,這個『攝藏、種子、執藏』的道理,只有第八識才有,其餘那些轉識(前七識)是沒有的。
二、《解深密經》(阿陀那頌)
《解深密經》也說了一首頌——「阿陀那識甚深細,一切種子如瀑流,我於凡愚不開演,恐彼分別執為我。」這頌是說:阿陀那識又深又細,含藏著一切種子,一直接連不斷,像瀑布的水流一樣;我(佛)對凡夫、對淺根的人不把它講開來,是怕他們起了分別、反把它執成「我」。
因為這個識能執持著一切法的種子、能執受色根和它的依託處(也就是撐持著身體的根),又能執取「結生相續」(投胎受生的那一刻把前後生命接續起來、不斷掉),所以才把這個識叫作「阿陀那」(執持)。
「無性有情」(沒有大乘種性、與佛道無緣的人)摸不到這個識的底,所以說它「甚深」;「趣寂種性」(只想自己證得寂滅的聲聞、緣覺二乘)也通達不了它,所以說它「甚細」。這個識是一切法真正的種子,一遇到外緣來擊發,就生起一個個轉識的波浪,而它本身永遠不間斷,正像那瀑布的水流。
頌裡的「凡」字,指的就是無性有情;「愚」字,指的就是趣寂種性。佛是怕他們對這個識起了分別、把它執成「我」,因而墮入惡道、又障住了聖道的生起,所以才不把它講開來。像這樣的相狀——又深又細、種子多得像瀑流、還可能被人執成我——只有第八識才有。
三、《入楞伽經》(藏識海頌)
《入楞伽經》也說了頌——「如海遇風緣,起種種波浪,現前作用轉,無有間斷時。藏識海亦然,境等風所擊,恒起諸識浪,現前作用轉。」這頌打了個比方:大海一遇上風,就掀起種種波浪,當下就翻騰起來、一刻也不停;藏識這片海也是這樣,被「境界」等等的風一打,就不斷掀起一個個識的波浪,當下就翻騰起來。
眼等這些識(前七識)並不能像大海那樣一直接連不斷地掀起識浪——它們是會中斷的。可見另外別有一個第八識,才是這片「藏識海」的本體。像這樣,無數的大乘經裡頭,都另外講到有這個第八識。
四、總成大乘是佛說(七因+《莊嚴論》頌)
〔這一段是要先證明大乘經確實是佛說的,這樣前面引的那些大乘經才站得住、才能當作憑據。〕這些大乘經,有幾個共同的特點:都順著「無我」、跟「數取趣」(也就是補特伽羅我、那個一再投胎受報的「我」)相違;都是要人背離生死流轉、走向還歸寂滅;都讚歎佛、法、僧三寶,斥責種種外道;都把五蘊這些法如實顯示出來、又遮掉「勝性」(數論講的那個自性)等等外道的妄計。凡是喜好大乘的人,都承認大乘經能顯示沒有顛倒的道理;既然它也歸在「契經」(佛說經藏)裡,那它就跟《增壹阿含》等等一樣,同屬「至教量」(也就是聖言量,佛聖言這一種可靠的憑據)。
再說,聖者慈氏(也就是彌勒菩薩)用七條理由,來證明大乘經確確實實是佛說的:
(一)佛事先沒預言過(先不記故):假如大乘經是佛入滅以後,另有別人為了破壞正法才編出來的,那麼世尊為什麼不像對其他『將來會發生的可怕事情』那樣,事先就把這件事預言出來呢?——既然佛事先根本沒預言會冒出這種偽經,可見大乘經不是後人偽造的。
(二)大小乘本來一起流行(本俱行故):大乘和小乘的教法,本來就是同時流傳在世間的;既然如此,憑什麼單單斷定大乘不是佛說的呢?
(三)不是別人想得出來的境界(非餘境故):大乘所講的道理又廣大、又深,根本不是外道那些人能想得到的;外道的經論裡從來沒講過這種道理,就算你講給他們聽,他們也接受不了。既然這道理不是外道造得出來的,那就不能說大乘經『不是佛說的』。
(四)反而徹底證成了(應極成故):就算有人說大乘是『別的佛』說的、不是『現在這位佛(釋迦)』說的——那也沒關係,因為它終究還是「佛」說的;這麼一來,「大乘是佛說」這個道理反而被牢牢地證成了,再也推翻不了。
(五)從「有大乘」『沒大乘』兩面逼(有、無有故):這條分兩面逼。先說「有大乘」這一面:要是承認確實有大乘這條成佛之道,那就該相信這些大乘教是佛說的——因為離開了大乘教,這條大乘道根本就找不到。再說『沒大乘』這一面:要是說根本沒有大乘,那麼連聲聞乘的教也該跟著不存在了——因為離開了大乘就絕對沒有「成佛」這回事,既然沒有佛成出來,那又是誰出世來說聲聞乘的呢?可聲聞乘明明是佛(出世)說的,那就反證了:說『大乘教不是佛說』根本不合道理。
(六)真能對治煩惱(能對治故):照著大乘經用功修的人,都能引發出「無分別智」(離開一切分別的智慧)、真正對治掉一切煩惱;既然有這種實實在在的效驗,那就該相信大乘是佛說的。
(七)意思在文字外頭(義異文故):大乘所講的意趣很深,它真正的意思不能光照著字面去抓(字面底下另有深意);不可以因為自己讀不懂,就反過來毀謗它、說它不是佛說的。由上面這七條理由,可見大乘確確實實是佛說的。
《莊嚴論》就用一首頌把這七條總起來——「先不記、俱行、非餘所行境、極成、有無有、對治、異文故。」這頌不過是把上面那七條理由一條一條列成偈罷了。
五、餘部密意:四部阿含密說阿賴耶
不只大乘,連部派(其餘各派)的經裡,也用「密意」的方式講到阿賴耶識另外別有它自己的本體。所謂「密意」,就是不點明它的名字,換個別的名字暗暗地講它。先看大眾部:他們的阿笈摩(也就是阿含)裡,暗暗地把這個識叫作「根本識」,因為它是眼識等的依靠——好比樹根是樹莖、樹枝的根本;而眼等這些識,自己並沒有『能當根本所依』的本事。可見他們是另外指了一個當根本的識,那就是第八識。
再看上座部:他們的經,還有分別論的論師,也都暗暗地把這個識叫作「有分識」。這名字拆開來講——「有」指的是三有(欲界、色界、無色界這三層生死世界),「分」是「因」的意思;之所以這麼叫,是因為唯獨這個識又恆常、又周遍,能當三有的因。可見他們立的這個「有分識」,講的也就是第八識。
再看化地部:他們把這個識叫作「窮生死蘊」(也就是一直撐到生死最盡頭的那個蘊)——因為離開了第八識,就再找不出另一個蘊能『一路撐到生死最盡頭、中間不斷掉』。一條一條看就明白了:無色界裡,種種色法是斷掉的(沒有色);無想天等地方,其餘的心、心所也滅掉了(沒有心);至於不相應行,它離開了色、心又沒有自己獨立的本體(這一點大家早就公認了)。色、心、不相應行都撐不住,所以唯獨這個識才配叫「窮生死蘊」,那也就是第八識。
再看說一切有部:他們的《增壹阿含》裡,也暗暗地把這個識叫作「阿賴耶」,就是所謂「愛阿賴耶、樂阿賴耶、欣阿賴耶、憙阿賴耶」這四句。為什麼立這四個名呢?因為阿賴耶識正是「貪」所攀緣的對象——它既被「總緣」(整體合起來緣)、又被「別緣」(一段一段分開緣),緣的是過去、現在、未來三世;所以就照著這個,立了愛、樂、欣、憙這四個名。
眾生把這個識執成真實的「自內我」(裡頭那個我),而且只要這個執著還沒斷,就一直對它生起愛著;所以阿賴耶識才是「真愛著處」(眾生真正死命愛著、執著的地方)。不應該把『其餘的五取蘊』等等當成真愛著處——下面一條一條說理由:
(1)生在「一向苦受處」(比如地獄那種只有苦、沒有樂的地方)的眾生,對其餘那五取蘊根本不生愛著,反而老是討厭、排斥這個五取蘊,念念都在想『我什麼時候才能甩掉這條命、甩掉這個身分處境、甩掉這個受苦的身心,好讓我自由自在地享快樂』。——可見他對其餘那些蘊只有厭惡,那些蘊就不是真愛著處。
(2)「五欲」(色聲香味觸這五種欲樂)也不是真愛著處——一個已經離了欲的人(也就是斷了欲界貪的人),對那五種美妙的欲樂雖然不再貪著了,可他還是愛「我」。可見愛我這件事,並不靠五欲撐著。(3)「樂受」(快樂的感受)也不是真愛著處——已經斷了第三禪那層貪染的人(快樂的感受只到三禪為止,再上去就沒有了),雖然連樂受都厭離了,可他還是愛「我」。
(4)「身見」(把身心執成我的那種見)也不是真愛著處——就拿那種還沒到無學位、卻已經能信解無我的人來說,他對「身見」(也就是薩迦耶見那種把五蘊執成我的相)已經不再貪著了,可他對『裡頭那個我』還是生愛。(5)「轉識」(前七識)等等也不是真愛著處——就拿那種還沒到無學位、卻一心想把心滅掉的人來說(比如修滅定的人),他連轉識都厭離了,可他還是愛「我」。
(6)「色身」(這個有形的身體)也不是真愛著處——已經斷了色界貪染的人,雖然連色身都厭離了,可他還是愛「我」。(7)「不相應行」(既不屬色、也不屬心的那一類法)既然離開了色、心就沒有自己獨立的本體,那它也不是真愛著處。
總結一下:凡夫(異生)和有學位的人,在起「我愛」的時候,對其餘那些蘊,有時愛、有時不愛,並不一定;可是對這第八識,「我愛」是一定會生起來的。所以唯獨這個識才是真愛著處。由此可見,有部講的那個「阿賴耶」之名,指的鐵定就是這個阿賴耶識(第八)。——以上把聖教這一面引完了(五教到此講完),底下要來顯正理這一面(也就是十條道理)。
丙、十理:正理顯證有第八識
理一、持種證(能持種心,理應別有)
契經裡說:『能把雜染、清淨種種法的種子聚集起來、又從這裡生起的那個東西,就叫作『心』。』——可要是沒有這第八識,那個『能執持種子的心』就不該存在了。
為什麼轉識(前七識)擔不起執持種子這個擔子呢?有幾個理由:第一,這些轉識在滅盡定等位裡會中斷(一斷就接不上);第二,它們會隨著根、境、作意、善惡等等的不同,一會兒起、一會兒滅,變動不定;第三,它們像閃電一樣留不住、站不穩。正因為這樣,轉識既受不了熏、也持不住種,根本不是經裡講的那個『把染淨種子聚起來生起的心』。
唯有這第八識,是『同一類一直接續、永遠不中斷』的,就像胡麻(苣蕂,可以拿來熏香)那樣,站得穩、所以受得了熏——這才正好對得上經裡講的『能把種子集起來生起、所以叫作心』這個意思。可見那個能集起的心,就是第八識。
要是不肯承認有這麼一個『能執持種子的心』,那不但跟經牴觸,也跟道理牴觸。怎麼說呢?我們起的那些染法、淨法,要是沒有一個可以受熏的地方,就熏不成種子;熏不成種子,那這些起過的法就『白忙一場』(白白起了一回,沒留下種子,後面也接不上)。再說,染淨法生起的時候既然沒有因(沒有種子當因),那就跟外道講的『無因自然就生出來』(沒有原因,東西憑空冒出來)一個樣了。
也許有人說:那拿「色法」或「不相應行」來執持種子,不行嗎?也不行。色法、不相應行都不是心性的東西,就像聲音、光線一樣,按道理它們受不了『染淨的內法』來熏,那怎麼持得住種子?再說那個不相應行,它離開了識就沒有自己真實的本體,怎麼能硬把它當成「內種」(內在種子)的依靠呢?
至於那些跟轉識相應的心所法,毛病也跟轉識一樣——會中斷、容易一起一滅、做不了主、又不是那種恆常如一的心性——所以它們既持不住種、也受不了熏。這麼一路推下來,可見那個『能執持種子的心』按道理一定是另外別有一個,那就是第八識。
〔破:六識類受熏說〕
〔一說·六識的「類」能受熏〕 有一派說:六識從無始以來,靠著根、境等等,前前後後有許多分位;它的「事」(也就是一個一個的現行)雖然一直在變,可它的「類」(同一類接連不斷的那個相)卻沒變。他們說,就是這個「類」在受熏、在執持種子;有了它,染淨因果就都立得起來,何必另外硬說有個第八識呢?
〔答〕這話講不通。為什麼?這個「類」要嘛實有、要嘛假有,兩條都堵死了:要是說這個「類」是實實在在有的,那就跟外道一樣了(外道也立一個常住、單一的「類」);要是說這個「類」只是假有,那它就沒有真正的『殊勝作用』,那它就持不住『內法的真實種子』——因為一個假的東西,撐不住真的種子。
再追問一句:你說的那個「識類」,到底歸在哪一性?這又有兩條路,條條走不通。(甲)假如它是善性或惡性,那它就該受不了熏——因為凡是「有記」(有善惡記別)的法都受不了熏,就像擇滅(一種無為法)那樣。(乙)假如它是無記性,那麻煩了:當善心、惡心正起的時候,並沒有無記的心在,那這個「類」豈不就斷了?而且你也不能說『事是善惡的、類卻是無記的』——因為一條一條的「類」一定跟它那一條一條的「事」同一性:事是善的,它的類也得是善;事是惡的,它的類也得是惡。
再說,到了無心位(比如滅盡定),這個「類」一定沒有;既然會中斷、站不穩,那怎麼能說它持得住種、受得了熏?還有一條:阿羅漢的心和凡夫的心,它們的「識類」是一樣的;照你『類一樣就能互相熏』的講法推下去,那凡夫的染法就該能去熏阿羅漢、阿羅漢的無漏法也該能去熏凡夫——這要是承認了,那毛病就大了(染的淨的全攪在一起亂套了)。
又有一條:眼等根、或其餘種種法,跟眼等識在「根」、在「法」上,類也是相同的;照你『類相同就能互相熏』的道理,它們也該互相熏才對,可這一點你自己也不肯承認。可見『識的類能受熏』這個講法站不住,不該執著它。
還有一條:六識這東西,不管是就它的「事」、還是就它的「類」來看,前一念和後一念都不會同時並存(前一念滅了,後一念才生);這就像『隔了一念』的兩個東西,是沒法互相熏的——因為能熏的和被熏的,必須同時在場才行。退一步說,就算有人主張『只要六識、而且六識能同時一起轉起』,可照前面講的那些道理,六識既然不是能受熏的東西,那它一樣沒有執持種子的本事。
〔破:色心無間互為種說〕
〔又一種主張·色、心自己接自己當種子〕 又有人主張:色法在色法自己這一類裡『一個接一個、中間不斷』,心法在心法自己這一類裡也是這樣;前一念就當後一念的種子,這樣因果之義也立得起來——所以前面(持種證)那一套,拿來當證據是不成立的。〔答〕這個主張不合理,因為它根本沒有「熏習」這回事:它自己這一類既然沒有熏習(沒有受熏這件事),那怎麼能說『前一念是後一念的種子』呢?
再說,要是『前一念當後一念的種子』,那凡是中間斷掉的就該再也生不出來了——可這就出問題了:二乘無學(在還沒入無餘涅槃之前)臨死那一刻的色、心,要照你說的當後一輩子蘊的種子,那他死後就不該再有後蘊(後一輩子的身心)了;可二乘在沒入無餘之前明明還有後蘊,這就跟你的講法打架了。也不應該主張色、心輾轉地互相當種子而生——因為轉識、色法等等都不是能受熏的,這前面已經講過了。
〔破:三世實有不待持種識說〕
〔又一派·三世都實有〕 又有一派(這是有部的主張)說:過去、現在、未來這三世的種種法都是實實在在有的,因果自然就接得上、成得了,何必另外硬說有個『能執持種子的識』?至於經裡說『心是種子』,那只不過是因為心在生起染淨法的時候力道偏強罷了(所以才偏舉個心來說,並不是說另有一個持種的識)。
〔答〕這話不合理:過去和未來,既不是常住的、又不是現在的,就像空中冒出來的花(空華)一樣,根本不是實實在在有的;再說它們也起不了作用,不能硬把它們當成「因緣」。所以說,要是沒有那個『能執持染淨種子的識』,那一切因果就全都立不起來。
〔破:遣相空理撥無此識說〕
〔又一種主張·把「遣相空理」當究竟〕 又有人主張:把大乘那種「遣相」(蕩除一切相)的空理當作最究竟的;他靠著一種『似是而非的推理』(看起來像對、其實是謬的比量),一口抹掉這個識、乃至抹掉一切法——他這麼一抹,尤其是把前面引的那些經都頂撞了。他把智、斷、證、修這些修行成果,以及染、淨因果,全都執成『不是真實的』,這就成了一個大邪見。
〔答〕這種主張比外道還不如。外道毀謗染淨因果,也還沒說它『全然沒有』,只是說它『不是真實的』罷了——而這種主張跟外道一個樣,還更過分。試想:要是一切法都不是真實有的,那菩薩就不該為了出離生死,而辛辛苦苦去修集菩提的資糧了——哪有聰明人為了打跑『虛幻的敵人』,而跑去求『石女生的兒子』(根本不存在的東西)來湊軍隊的?
所以應該相信確實有一個『能執持種子的心』,染、淨因果就是靠它才建立起來的——而這個心,就是這第八識。(持種這條理由講完了。)
理二、異熟證(真異熟心,理應別有)
契經裡又說有一個「異熟心」(由過去業成熟而招感出來的果報心),它是被善業、惡業招感來的——可要是沒有這第八識,那個異熟心就不該存在了。
為什麼轉識不能當異熟心呢?眼等這些識會中斷,而且也不是任何時候都是業的果報(有時候它起來並不是業招感的),就像閃電一樣不牢、又會斷,所以它不是真正的異熟心。要曉得,真正的異熟是不該『斷掉又接上』的——你看命根這一類異熟果,就從沒有『斷了再續』這回事。可見異熟一定是一直接續不斷的,而轉識擔不起這個。
眼等六識裡頭由業招感出來的那些,就像聲音一樣(碰到緣才起),不是一直接續的,所以它們頂多算「異熟生」(從異熟那裡生出來的),算不上「真異熟」。所以一定要承認有一個「真異熟心」——它酬答「牽引業」(也就是招來總報、決定一輩子大方向的那種業),周遍一切、又從不間斷,能變現出身(有根身)和器(器世間)來,給眾生當依靠;因為身和器要是離開了心,按道理就生不出來,可見一定有一個能把它們變出來的心。
不相應行沒有真實的本體,變不出身和器;那些轉識又不是一直都在,沒法一直變現身和器。那麼,要是沒有這個真異熟心,請問誰來把身、器變出來呢?又靠什麼法才能「一直」把眾生的生命相續撐住呢?
再說,不管是在定中、還是不在定中,不管是有特別在思慮、還是沒在思慮的時候,按道理都會有許多「身受」(身上的種種感受)生起。要是沒有這些身受,那後來就不該覺得身上有舒坦、或有疲累的感覺(舒坦、疲累正是身受結出來的果)。可是如果沒有一個一直都在的真異熟心,那在那些(沒在思慮等等的)時候,怎麼會有這種身受呢?
這裡得補一句以免誤會:並不是說佛在起其餘善心等等的時候也有真異熟現起——要曉得,上面凡是講『會起身受、會起異熟』的,都是指『佛以外的眾生』(佛已經沒有異熟了,所以不在這個例子裡頭)。由此可知,確實一直有一個真異熟心,而這個心,就是這第八識。
理三、趣生體證(正實趣生,唯異熟心)
契經裡又說:眾生在五趣(天、人、畜生、餓鬼、地獄這五種去處)、四生(胎生、卵生、濕生、化生這四種出生方式)裡頭流轉。可要是沒有這第八識,那個「趣、生」的本體就不該存在了。
這要怎麼判呢?必須是『真實有、恆常、周遍、不夾雜』的法,才配當『真正的趣、生』的本體。要是不是異熟的法,它的趣生就會夾雜混亂——因為當你住在這一趣、這一生的時候,還會起別趣、別生的法(好比身在人趣,卻能起天上那種善心),這就不純了,所以算不上真正的趣生。
拿這個標準一個一個去檢查:(1)那些異熟的色法、以及五識裡頭由業招感出來的,都不夠「周遍」趣生——因為到了無色界,色和五識通通沒有。(2)那些天生本有的善、以及意識裡頭由業招感出來的,雖然夠「周遍」趣生、起來也不夾雜,可是它們『不是一直都有』(會中斷)。(3)不相應行又沒有真實的本體。——以上這幾樣,都當不了真正的趣生。
唯有異熟心、加上跟它相應的那些心所,才是『真實、恆常、周遍、不夾雜』的,才當得了真正的趣生。要是沒有這個心,那麼一個人生在無色界、又起了善心的時候(那時候沒有色、沒有五識,而生得的善又不是一直都有),他豈不就成了『既非趣、又非生』了嗎?——這就出問題了。
就算你退一步,把「趣生」放寬到把一切有漏法都包進去(想藉這個來補前面那個漏洞),那也救不了:因為一個人生在無色界、又起了無漏心的時候,他還是成了『既非趣、又非生』(無漏不歸在有漏裡頭),這又跟道理打架。為了既避開前面那個毛病、又避開這個毛病,所以只有「異熟法」才是真正的趣、生。
由此就明白一件事:如來不歸在「趣、生」裡頭——因為佛已經沒有異熟無記的法了;如來也不歸在「界」(三界)裡頭——因為佛已經不是有漏的了,世尊早把苦、集這兩諦都捨掉了,種種戲論的種子也都永遠斷盡了。
真正的趣、生既然只能是異熟心和它的心所,而這個心、心所離開了第八識在道理上就立不起來,所以可知另外別有這第八識。
理四、執受證(執受色根,唯異熟心)
契經裡又說:有色根的身體(也就是具備五個色根的這個身子)是「有執受」的——意思是它被心執持、領受著,所以才有覺受、才會痛會癢。可要是沒有這第八識,那個『能去執受(的心)』就不該存在了。
這是說:五色根和它的依託處,只有在「現在世」才是有執受的(過去、未來就不是被執受的了),而這一定得靠『有一個能執受的心』才成得了。這個能執受的心,只能是異熟心——它是由過去的業牽引來的,本身不是善、也不是染,而是用『同一類、能周遍、一直接續』的方式去執受這個有色的根身;眼等轉識並沒有這種本事。
這裡有個分寸要說清楚:這段話的意思,只是要顯出眼等轉識都沒有那種『同一類、能周遍、一直接續』去執受自己這個有色根身的本事;它並不是說『凡是能執受的,一概只能是異熟心』。——為什麼要這麼分?因為要是一概都這麼說,那佛的色身因為沒有異熟,豈不就成了沒人執受了嗎?這不行。所以應該曉得,這裡講的其實是『能執受『有漏』色身的,只有異熟心』,這才是它的本意。
下面一條一條來破轉識:(1)那些轉識都是『碰到當前的境才起』(要等現前有了境才生),就像聲音、風那樣,所以它沒法一直執受。(2)轉識裡頭那些善的、染的,『不是業牽引來的』,就像非擇滅(一種無為法,跟業掛不上鉤)那樣,所以也不執受。(3)轉識裡頭那些「異熟生」的,又『不是真異熟、不能周遍當依靠、不接續』,就像閃電那樣——這幾種,全都執受不了有漏的色身。
還要補一句:凡是講「心、識」的時候,其實也把跟它相應的「心所」一起包進去了(因為心王一定有心所相應,好比講「唯識」這個詞,其實也把心所包在裡頭)。再說,色根和不相應行都執受不了有色根身——因為它們『沒有所緣』(沒有攀緣的對象),就像虛空那樣。所以一定另外別有一個『能執受的心』,而這個心,就是這第八識。
理五、壽煖識證(持壽、煖識,唯異熟識)
契經裡又說:壽(壽命)、煖(體溫)、識這三樣彼此撐持,才能接連著住下去(人才活得下去)。可要是沒有這第八識來撐持壽和煖,那個『能讓壽煖久住的識』就不該存在了。
這是說:那些轉識『會中斷、會變動』,就像聲音、風那樣,沒有那種恆久撐持的作用,所以當不了『撐持壽煖的識』。唯有異熟識『不中斷、不變動』,正好跟壽、煖一個樣(也是恆常如一地接續著),有那種恆久撐持的作用,所以才當得了撐持壽煖的識。
〔難〕有人問:經說這三樣是『彼此撐持』的,可壽和煖都是一類接續不斷的,偏偏「識」不是這樣(如果識指的是轉識,那它就會中斷)——這豈不就不合道理了嗎(三樣裡有一樣會斷,怎麼互相撐持)?〔答·反問回去〕你不是承認『煖只是不遍三界』嗎(無色界裡就沒有煖了)?這一點都不妨礙三法互相撐持的說法;那你憑什麼不准我說『識也可以單單有間斷、有變動』呢?〔再答〕話雖如此,這個反問對前面的道理其實構不成什麼難倒——
怎麼說呢?凡是『壽煖識三樣都齊全、又都不間斷地運轉』的地方,這三樣才談得上一直互相撐持;要是缺了「不間斷」這一條,就沒有一直互相撐持這回事了。前面那段話,正是靠這個道理,指出三法裡所講的「識」不是指轉識(因為轉識會間斷,就沒有恆久撐持的力量了)。至於你拿「煖不遍三界」來難,那其實壞不了這個道理——因為『煖遍不遍三界』是一回事,『識必須恆久撐持』是另一回事,兩件事不能混為一談。所以前面所講的,道理是站得穩穩的。
再說,這三樣裡頭,壽和煖既然都只是有漏的,那可知跟它們互相撐持的那個「識」,也該跟壽煖一樣、一定不是無漏的(無漏的識撐持不了有漏的壽煖)。那就要問了:一個人生在無色界、又起了無漏心的時候,是哪個識在撐持他的壽呢?(這時候轉識若成了無漏,就撐持不了壽煖,所以一定另外別有一個識。)由此可知,確實有一個「異熟識」,是同一類、恆常、周遍的,能撐持壽、煖——而這個識,就是這第八識。
〔Verses commented〕Continuing: unfolding verses 2–4 · proving the eighth
〔The verse expounded〕
"First, the ālaya-consciousness, the maturation [consciousness], the all-seeds [consciousness]…" (v2) … "ever turning like a torrent, at the arhat stage it is relinquished." (v4)
A. General statement: scriptural teaching and right principle are the deciding measures
How do we know that the eighth consciousness (the ālaya-consciousness) has a substance of its own apart from the eye-consciousness and the rest of the consciousnesses? We go by two things as our standard: one is "scriptural teaching" (the sūtras the Buddha himself spoke), the other is "right principle" (sound reasoning). Look first at the scriptural side: the Mahāyāna-abhidharma, a sūtra, sets down a verse — "the element from beginningless time, the equal basis of all dharmas; because of this there are the destinies, and the attaining of nirvāṇa." This verse means: from beginningless time there has been this "element" (that is, the eighth consciousness), on which all dharmas alike rest; precisely because there is this consciousness, there is the turning of beings round through the six destinies, and there is also a nirvāṇa to be attained.
The substance of the eighth consciousness is truly too subtle to point out to anyone directly, so one can only display it by means of its "function." The first half of this verse ("the element from beginningless time, the equal basis of all dharmas") displays this consciousness's "cause-and-condition function" (its working as the cause of all dharmas, and as the condition of all dharmas); the second half ("because of this there are the destinies, and the attaining of nirvāṇa") displays the "basing-and-upholding function" (the function of bearing up, of providing a basis) that it performs along the two roads of "flowing-and-turning" (the turning of birth-and-death) and "returning-and-ceasing" (returning, through cultivation, to quiescence).
The word "element" in the verse means "cause," and refers to the "seed-consciousness" (the eighth consciousness, which holds all the seeds) — from beginningless time it continues on without break, directly giving birth to all dharmas, and so is called the "cause." The word "basis" in the verse means "condition," and refers to the "appropriating consciousness" (the eighth consciousness, which appropriates all dharmas) — from beginningless time it serves equally as the support for all dharmas, and so is called the "condition."
This is to say: this consciousness, on the one hand, can appropriate all the seeds (this is its being the "cause"), and on the other hand serves as the support for the dharmas already arisen and active (this is its being the "condition"); so this consciousness both "transforms into them" (manifests the dharmas) and "serves as their basis" (provides the dharmas with support). What is meant by "transforms into them" is that it manifests the receptacle-world (the outer mountains, rivers, and great earth) and the body-with-faculties (this body of ours that has the six faculties); what is meant by "serves as their basis" is that it gives support to the several turning consciousnesses (the first seven).
Because this consciousness can appropriate the five form-faculties (the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body — the five subtle pure-form faculties, that invisible layer of subtle form), the five consciousnesses (eye-consciousness and the rest) turn in dependence on it; and because this consciousness gives support to the manas (the seventh consciousness), the sixth, mind-consciousness, turns in dependence on it — the manas and the mind-consciousness both belonging to the class of "turning consciousnesses." Moreover: just as the eye-consciousness and the rest each rest on their own "concurrent faculty" (the supporting faculty that co-exists with them), the eighth consciousness too, being by principle a "consciousness," likewise takes the seventh consciousness as its "concurrent basis" (the co-existing, mutually-supporting support). The foregoing displays this consciousness's "cause function" and "condition function."
The three words "because of this there are" in the verse say "precisely because there is this consciousness"; the three words "the destinies" say "there come to be good destinies and evil destinies" (beings come to have their good and bad goings-forth). The sense is: precisely because there is this eighth consciousness, it appropriates all the dharmas that go along with flowing-and-turning, and so drives beings to flow and turn endlessly in birth-and-death.
As for flowing-and-turning, in fact all three — affliction (the defilements), karma (deeds), and birth (the fruit of taking birth) — count [as it]; but among these three, "destiny" (the goal of taking birth) is the final fruit, and the fruit is the most weighty, so the verse one-sidedly names just the single word "destiny." Or else one may say: this term "the destinies" can take in both "the one who goes" (the side that heads toward the goal) and "that toward which one goes" (the goal itself headed for), and even the various supports-of-life within those destinies count under the word "destiny." In sum, affliction, karma, and birth all stand up only in dependence on this consciousness — this is the "basing-and-upholding function" this consciousness performs along the road of flowing-and-turning.
The line "and the attaining of nirvāṇa" in the verse says: precisely because there is this consciousness, there is a nirvāṇa to be attained. The sense is: precisely because there is this eighth consciousness, it appropriates all the dharmas that go along with returning-and-ceasing (returning to quiescence), and so enables the practitioner to attain nirvāṇa.
These four words "the attaining of nirvāṇa" admit of three readings: (1) speaking only of the "attaining" path — because nirvāṇa (the quiescence attained) does not itself exist in dependence on this consciousness. (2) Speaking only of the "attained" nirvāṇa — because nirvāṇa is precisely the fruit the practitioner single-mindedly seeks. (3) Speaking of both sides together, nirvāṇa (the attained) and the path (the attaining) — because both these belong to the class of "returning-and-ceasing."
This goes by the third reading: the word "nirvāṇa" displays the "cessation" that gets attained; the word "attaining" below displays the "path" that can attain it — by the path that can sever, one severs the affliction to be severed, and reaching the "stage of ultimate exhaustion" (where the defilements are utterly severed), one attains nirvāṇa. Here the whole set — the path that severs, the affliction severed, and the attaining-and-attained — all stand up only in dependence on this consciousness; this is the "basing-and-upholding function" this consciousness performs along the road of returning-and-ceasing.
To put it from yet another angle: the first line of this verse ("the element from beginningless time") displays that this consciousness's substance has existed constantly from beginningless time; the latter three lines display that this consciousness serves as the support for the two classes of "defiled" and "pure" dharmas — serving both as their "whole" (taken together) support and as their "particular" (taken one by one) support.
What are called the "defiled dharmas" are the truth of suffering and the truth of origination — that is, the "birth" headed toward (the fruit of taking birth) and the "karma and affliction" that head toward it (deeds and defilements). What are called the "pure dharmas" are the truth of cessation and the truth of the path — that is, the "nirvāṇa" attained, and the "path" that can attain it. These two classes of dharmas both exist only in dependence on this consciousness; if someone says they exist in dependence on the turning consciousnesses (the first seven), this will not stand to reason — because the turning consciousnesses intermit, and cannot bear up the load of being this support.
Or yet another reading: the first line displays that this consciousness's substance continues on without break from beginningless time; the latter three lines display that this consciousness serves as the support for the "three natures" — that is, the other-dependent nature (what arises in dependence on the conjunction of conditions), the wholly-imagined nature (what is falsely discriminated and reckoned out), and the perfectly-accomplished nature (the perfectly-accomplished reality), to be understood in just that order. In a word: the several senses set forth in this verse, every one of them, cannot stand apart from the eighth consciousness.
B. The five teachings: the sūtras clearly witness the existence of the eighth consciousness
1. The Mahāyāna-abhidharma sūtra (the gathering-and-storing ālaya verse)
In this very Mahāyāna-abhidharma sūtra, there is also set forth a verse — "because it gathers and stores all dharmas, [it is] the all-seeds consciousness; hence it is named the ālaya, which I disclose to the superior ones." This verse means: because it can gather-and-store all dharmas, and is also that consciousness which holds all the seeds, it is named the "ālaya" (the store); and I (the Buddha) disclose it only to the "superior ones" (those of high capacity).
Because this root-consciousness (the eighth) is replete with all the seeds, it can gather-and-store the various defiled dharmas; and just on this score it is given the name "ālaya." But note: this "gathering-and-storing" of its is a different matter from the way the Sāṃkhya heretics' "root-nature" (the self-nature they posit) transforms into "the great one" and the rest — what the Sāṃkhya teach is one single substance turning all the way through (always one and the same thing changing), whereas here it is not so, because the seed is not one and the same as the fruit it grows into, and because both sides — the dependent (the seed) and the depended-on (the consciousness) — arise and perish. Again, this consciousness "mutually gathers-and-stores" with the defiled dharmas (you store me, I store you), and is also "grasped-and-stored" by beings as a "self" (clung to as one's very self and not let go), and so this consciousness is named the "ālaya" (the store).
The word "superior ones" in the verse admits of two readings: (1) Those bodhisattvas who have already entered the "path of seeing" (the first direct seeing of the truth) and gained "true direct realization" (the truly immediate insight) — these are called "the superior ones"; they can directly realize and understand the ālaya-consciousness, and it is just to them that the World-Honored One discloses it. (2) Or one may say that every bodhisattva is called a "superior one" — for even though, prior to the path of seeing, they cannot yet directly realize the ālaya-consciousness, still they can trust and understand it, and single-mindedly seek "the transformation of the basis" (the turning of the defiled into the pure), and so the Buddha teaches it to them too. In all events, this sense — gathering-and-storing, seeds, being grasped-and-stored — belongs only to the eighth consciousness; the rest, the turning consciousnesses (the first seven), do not have it.
2. The Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra (the ādāna verse)
The Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra also sets forth a verse — "the ādāna-consciousness is most deep and subtle, all its seeds [flowing] like a torrent; I do not expound it to the foolish and ordinary, lest they discriminate and grasp it as a self." This verse means: the ādāna-consciousness is deep and subtle, holding all the seeds, continuing on unbroken like the water of a torrent; and I (the Buddha) do not expound it openly to ordinary folk and to those of shallow capacity, for fear that they should raise discriminations and instead grasp it as a "self."
Because this consciousness can appropriate the seeds of all dharmas, can appropriate the form-faculties and their basis (that is, can bear up the body's faculties), and can take up the "linking-of-birth and continuance" (at the moment of taking birth, joining one life onto the next without a break), this consciousness is named the "ādāna" (the appropriating).
The "natureless beings" (those without the Mahāyāna lineage, with no bond to the Buddha-path) cannot touch the bottom of this consciousness, and so it is called "most deep"; the "quiescence-bound lineage" (the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, the two vehicles who seek only their own attaining of quiescence) too cannot penetrate it, and so it is called "most subtle." This consciousness is the true seed of all dharmas; the moment a condition strikes and rouses it, it raises the waves of the turning consciousnesses one after another, while it itself is forever unbroken, just like the water of a torrent.
The word "foolish" [literally "ordinary"] in the verse refers to the natureless beings; the word "ordinary" [literally "foolish"] refers to the quiescence-bound lineage. The Buddha, fearing that they should raise a discrimination toward this consciousness and grasp it as a "self," and thereby fall into the evil destinies and also block the arising of the noble path, accordingly does not expound it openly. Such a mark as this — deep and subtle, with seeds as many as a torrent, and liable to be grasped by people as a self — belongs only to the eighth consciousness.
3. The Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra (the store-consciousness-ocean verse)
The Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra also sets forth a verse — "as the ocean, meeting the condition of the wind, raises manifold waves, their workings turning right before one, with no time of interruption; so too the store-consciousness ocean, struck by the wind of objects and the rest, ever raises the waves of the consciousnesses, their workings turning right before one." This verse draws a comparison: the great ocean, the moment it meets the wind, heaves up manifold waves and at once churns up, not pausing for an instant; the ocean of the store-consciousness is just so — struck by the wind of "objects" and the rest, it ceaselessly heaves up the waves of the consciousnesses one by one, churning up right then and there.
The eye-consciousness and the rest (the first seven) cannot, like the great ocean, raise the waves of the consciousnesses continuously and unbroken — they intermit. Plainly, then, there is separately an eighth consciousness, which is the substance of this "store-consciousness ocean." In this manner, countless Mahāyāna sūtras all speak separately of there being this eighth consciousness.
4. Establishing that the Mahāyāna as a whole is Buddha-spoken (the seven reasons + the Sūtrālaṃkāra verse)
〔This passage first sets out to prove that the Mahāyāna sūtras really are Buddha-spoken, so that the Mahāyāna sūtras cited above may stand firm and may serve as warrant.〕 These Mahāyāna sūtras have several traits in common: they all conform to "no-self" and run counter to the "number-taker-of-destinies" (that is, the personal self, the "self" that takes birth and retribution again and again); they all bid one turn one's back on the flowing-and-turning of birth-and-death and head toward returning to quiescence; they all praise the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Saṅgha — the Three Jewels — and rebuke the various heretics; they all display the dharmas such as the five aggregates as they truly are, and ward off the heretics' false reckonings such as the "root-nature" (the self-nature the Sāṃkhya teach). Whoever delights in the Mahāyāna admits that the Mahāyāna sūtras can display the principle that is without inversion; and since they too belong under "sūtra" (the Buddha-spoken scripture-basket), they are, just like the Ekottara-āgama and the rest, subsumed under "the measure of authoritative teaching" (that is, the measure of the sacred word, that reliable warrant which is the sacred word of the Buddha).
Further, the holy Maitreya (that is, Maitreya Bodhisattva) uses seven kinds of reason to prove that the Mahāyāna sūtras truly are Buddha-spoken:
(1) The Buddha did not foretell it beforehand (not foretold beforehand): Suppose the Mahāyāna sūtras were something that, after the Buddha's passing, others had composed in order to wreck the true Dharma. Then why did the World-Honored One not foretell this beforehand, just as he foretold the other "fearful things that would arise in time to come"? — Since the Buddha gave no advance warning at all that such counterfeit sūtras would crop up, plainly the Mahāyāna sūtras are not a later forgery.
(2) Both ran together from the start (proceeding together from the start): The teachings of the Mahāyāna and of the Hīnayāna circulated together in the world from the very start. That being so, on what ground does one single out the Mahāyāna alone and judge it not Buddha-spoken?
(3) Not a field others could reach (not the field of others' practice): What the Mahāyāna teaches is vast and most deep, plainly not a field those heretics could conceive of; in the heretics' own sūtras and treatises such a doctrine was never set forth, and even were you to teach it to them, they could not accept it. Since this doctrine is not one the heretics could have produced, one cannot say the Mahāyāna sūtras "are not Buddha-spoken."
(4) It is, if anything, thoroughly proved (thoroughly established): Even if someone says the Mahāyāna was spoken by "some other Buddha" and is not the word of "the present Buddha (Śākyamuni)" — that is no objection, for it is, after all, still spoken by a "Buddha"; and thus the doctrine "the Mahāyāna is Buddha-spoken" is, if anything, firmly proved and can never be overturned.
(5) Pressing from both "there is a Mahāyāna" and "there is none" (existent-or-non-existent): This reason presses from two sides. First the side "there is a Mahāyāna": if one grants that there really is this Mahāyāna path to buddhahood, then one ought to believe these Mahāyāna teachings are Buddha-spoken — because apart from the Mahāyāna teaching this Mahāyāna path is simply nowhere to be found. Next the side "there is no Mahāyāna": if one says there is no Mahāyāna at all, then even the śrāvaka-vehicle teaching ought to fail to exist along with it — for apart from the Mahāyāna there is absolutely no such thing as "becoming a Buddha," and if no Buddha came forth, then who appeared in the world to teach the śrāvaka-vehicle? Yet the śrāvaka-vehicle was plainly spoken by a Buddha (come forth into the world), which proves conversely that to say "the Mahāyāna teaching is not Buddha-spoken" simply does not fit reason.
(6) It really counteracts the defilements (counteracting): Those who diligently cultivate in dependence on the Mahāyāna sūtras can all draw forth "non-discriminating wisdom" (the wisdom apart from all discrimination) and truly counteract all the defilements; and since it has so real and tested an effect, one ought to believe the Mahāyāna is Buddha-spoken.
(7) The meaning lies beyond the literal (differing from the literal): What the Mahāyāna teaches has a most deep intent; its real meaning is not to be grasped just by following the letter (beneath the letter there is a further depth); one must not, just because one cannot understand it oneself, turn round and slander it, saying it is not Buddha-spoken. By the seven reasons above, plainly the Mahāyāna truly is Buddha-spoken.
The Sūtrālaṃkāra sums up these seven in a single verse — "because: not foretold beforehand · proceeding together · not the field of others' practice · thoroughly established · existent-or-non-existent · counteracting · differing from the literal." This verse simply lays out, item by item in verse, the seven reasons given above.
5. The hidden intent of the other schools: the four āgamas covertly teach the ālaya
Not the Mahāyāna alone — even the sūtras of the [Hīnayāna] schools (the various other schools) speak, by way of "hidden intent," of the ālaya-consciousness as having a substance of its own. "Hidden intent" means: not naming it openly, but speaking of it covertly under some other name. First the Mahāsāṃghika: in their āgama they covertly name this consciousness the "root-consciousness," because it is the support of the eye-consciousness and the rest — just as a tree-root is the root of the trunk and branches; whereas the eye-consciousness and the rest do not themselves have the capacity of "being the root that is depended on." Plainly, then, they pointed separately to a consciousness that is the root — namely the eighth consciousness.
Next the Sthavira: their sūtras, and the Vibhajyavādin masters too, both covertly name this consciousness the "existence-factor consciousness." Unpacking the name — "existence" refers to the three existences (the desire, form, and formless realms, the three tiers of the world of birth-and-death), and "factor" means "cause"; it is so named because this consciousness alone is both constant and pervading, and can be the cause of the three existences. Plainly, then, the "existence-factor consciousness" they set up is likewise the eighth consciousness.
Next the Mahīśāsaka: they name this consciousness the "aggregate that runs to the end of birth-and-death" (the aggregate that holds out all the way to the very end of birth-and-death) — for apart from the eighth consciousness one can find no other aggregate that can "hold out all the way to the very end of birth-and-death, never breaking in between." Going through them one by one makes it plain: in the formless realm, the various form-dharmas are cut off (there is no form); in places like the no-conception heaven, the rest of mind and the mental factors too are extinguished (there is no mind); as for the non-concurrent formations, apart from form and mind they have no substance of their own (this much has long been commonly conceded). Form, mind, and the non-concurrent formations all fail to hold up; so this consciousness alone deserves to be called the "aggregate that runs to the end of birth-and-death" — which is just the eighth consciousness.
Next the Sarvāstivāda: in their Ekottara-āgama they too covertly name this consciousness the "ālaya," in the four phrases "loving the ālaya, delighting in the ālaya, taking pleasure in the ālaya, rejoicing in the ālaya." Why set up these four names? Because the ālaya-consciousness is precisely the object that "craving" refers to — it is referred to both by "whole-reference" (referring to it as a whole) and by "particular-reference" (referring to it segment by segment), the reference being to the three times, past, present, and future; and so, going by this, the four names — loving, delighting, taking pleasure, rejoicing — were set up.
Beings grasp this consciousness as a real "inner self" (the self within), and so long as this attachment is not severed, they ceaselessly give rise to loving-attachment toward it; hence the ālaya-consciousness is the "true place of loving attachment" (the place beings truly love and cling to with their lives). One ought not to take "the rest, the five appropriating aggregates," and the like, as the true place of loving attachment — the reasons follow, one by one:
(1) Beings born in a "place of unrelieved painful feeling" (such as the hells, those places with only pain and no pleasure) give rise to no loving-attachment toward the rest of the five appropriating aggregates at all; on the contrary, they constantly loathe and recoil from these five appropriating aggregates, thinking moment by moment, "When shall I be rid of this life, rid of this lot-and-station, rid of this suffering body-and-mind, so that I may enjoy pleasure freely?" — Plainly, then, toward the rest of the aggregates they have only loathing; so those aggregates are not the true place of loving attachment.
(2) "The five desires" (the five sensual pleasures — sight, sound, smell, taste, touch) too are not the true place of loving attachment — one who has already left desire (that is, one who has severed desire-realm craving), though he no longer craves and clings to those five fine pleasures, still loves the "self." Plainly, then, this loving-of-self does not rest on the five desires. (3) "Pleasant feeling" (the feeling of pleasure) too is not the true place of loving attachment — one who has already severed the craving of the third meditative absorption (pleasant feeling reaches only as far as the third absorption, and above that there is none of it), though he has left even pleasant feeling behind, still loves the "self."
(4) "The view of the body" (the view that grasps body-and-mind as a self) too is not the true place of loving attachment — take, say, the person who has not yet reached the no-more-learning stage but can already trust-and-understand no-self: he no longer craves and clings to "the view of the body" (that is, the view of the perishable composite, which grasps the five aggregates as a self), yet he still gives rise to love toward "the self within." (5) "The turning consciousnesses" (the first seven) and the like too are not the true place of loving attachment — take, say, the person who has not yet reached the no-more-learning stage but single-mindedly wishes to extinguish the mind (such as one cultivating the cessation-attainment): he has left even the turning consciousnesses behind, yet he still loves the "self."
(6) "The form-body" (this body of form) too is not the true place of loving attachment — one who has already severed form-realm craving, though he has left even the form-body behind, still loves the "self." (7) "The non-concurrent formations" (that class of dharma which belongs neither to form nor to mind), since apart from form and mind they have no substance of their own, are likewise not the true place of loving attachment.
To sum up: when the ordinary being and the one in the stage of learning arouse "self-love," toward the rest of those aggregates they sometimes love, sometimes do not — it is not fixed; but toward this eighth consciousness, "self-love" definitely arises. So this consciousness alone is the true place of loving attachment. By this it is plain that the "ālaya" the Sarvāstivāda speak of refers, for certain, to just this ālaya-consciousness (the eighth). — With this the scriptural side has been cited in full (the five teachings end here); below, the side of right principle (that is, the ten reasons) is to be displayed.
C. The ten principles: right principle displays the existence of the eighth consciousness
Reason 1. The proof from upholding the seeds (a mind able to uphold the seeds must exist separately)
A sūtra says: "That which gathers up and from which arise the seeds of all defiled and pure dharmas — this is named the 'mind.'" — But if there were no this eighth consciousness, that "mind able to appropriate the seeds" would not stand to exist.
Why can the turning consciousnesses (the first seven) not bear the load of appropriating the seeds? For several reasons: first, these turning consciousnesses intermit in the cessation-attainment and the like (once cut off, they cannot be joined back on); second, they arise and cease now this way, now that, varying without fixity according to differences of faculty, object, attention, good-or-evil, and so on; third, they are like a lightning-flash that cannot be held, cannot stand firm. Just on this account, the turning consciousnesses can neither receive perfuming nor uphold the seeds, and are simply not the "mind that gathers up and from which arise the defiled and pure seeds" spoken of in the sūtra.
Only this eighth consciousness is "of one kind, continuing on, forever unbroken" — like sesame (jùshèng, which can be used to take in fragrance), it stands firm and so can receive perfuming. This precisely answers to the sūtra's sense of "the mind that gathers up the seeds and from which they arise, and is therefore named the mind." Plainly, then, the mind that gathers them up is the eighth consciousness.
If one refuses to grant that there is such a "mind able to appropriate the seeds," then one runs counter not only to the sūtras but also to reason. How so? The defiled and pure dharmas we arouse, if they had no place to be perfumed, could not be perfumed into seeds; and being unperfumed into seeds, those once-arisen dharmas would be "spent for nothing" (they arose for a moment, left behind no seed, and nothing can carry on from them). Again, since at the time the defiled and pure dharmas arise there would be no cause (no seed serving as cause), it would come to the same thing as the heretics' "arising spontaneously without a cause" (with no cause, things popping up out of nowhere).
Perhaps someone says: then could one not take "form-dharmas" or "the non-concurrent formations" to appropriate the seeds? That too fails. Form-dharmas and the non-concurrent formations are not of mind-nature; like sound or light, they cannot, by reason, be perfumed by the "defiled and pure inner dharmas," so how could they uphold the seeds? Again, the non-concurrent formations, apart from consciousness, have no real substance of their own — how could one forcibly take them to be the support of the "inner seeds" (the inner seeds)?
As for the various mental factors associated with the turning consciousnesses, their faults are just like those of the turning consciousnesses — they intermit, easily arise-and-cease, are not masters of themselves, and are not that constant, uniform mind-nature — and so they can neither uphold the seeds nor receive perfuming. Following the chain of reasoning all the way through, plainly that "mind able to appropriate the seeds" must, by reason, exist separately — namely the eighth consciousness.
〔Refuting: the view that the six consciousnesses' "kind" receives perfuming〕
〔One view · the "kind" of the six consciousnesses can receive perfuming〕 One faction holds: the six consciousnesses, from beginningless time, in dependence on faculty, object, and so on, pass through many phases one after another; the "event" (that is, each particular present activity) keeps changing, yet the "kind" (that uninterrupted strand of one and the same class) does not change. They say that it is just this "kind" that receives perfuming and appropriates the seeds; with it, defiled-and-pure cause-and-effect all stand up, so why must one separately insist that there is an eighth consciousness?
〔A〕 This will not stand. Why? This "kind" is either really existent or conventionally existent, and both roads are blocked off: if one says this "kind" is really and truly existent, then one is on the same footing as the heretics (who too set up a permanent, single "kind"); and if one says this "kind" is merely conventional, then it has no real "preponderant function," and so it cannot uphold "the real seeds of the inner dharmas" — for a conventional thing cannot bear up real seeds.
Again, to press further: this "consciousness-kind" you speak of — under which nature does it fall? Here too there are two roads, neither of them passable. (a) If it is of good nature or evil nature, then it ought not to receive perfuming — because whatever is "determinate" (marked as good or evil) cannot receive perfuming, just like cessation-through-discrimination (an unconditioned dharma). (b) If it is of indeterminate nature, then there is trouble: when a good mind or an evil mind is actually arising, there is no indeterminate mind present — so would not this "kind" then be cut off? And you cannot say "the event is good or evil, but the kind is indeterminate" — for each particular "kind" must be of one nature with its own particular "event": if the event is good, its kind must be good too; if the event is evil, its kind must be evil too.
Again, in the no-mind stage (such as the cessation-attainment), this "kind" is certainly absent; since it intermits and cannot stand firm, how could one hold that it upholds the seeds and receives perfuming? And one further point: the mind of an arhat and the mind of an ordinary being have the same "consciousness-kind"; carry through your account that "same kind means they can perfume each other," and then the ordinary being's defiled dharmas ought to be able to perfume the arhat, and the arhat's uncontaminated dharmas ought to be able to perfume the ordinary being — and to grant this would be a great fault (the defiled and the pure all jumbled into confusion).
And another point: the eye-faculty and the rest, or the rest of the various dharmas, are also of the same "kind" as the eye-consciousness and the rest, whether in "faculty" or in "dharma"; carry through your principle that "same kind means they can perfume each other," and they too ought to perfume each other — yet this very point you yourself refuse to grant. Plainly, then, the view that "the consciousness-kind receives perfuming" cannot stand, and one ought not to cling to it.
And another point: the six consciousnesses, taken either as their "event" or as their "kind," do not have their prior moment and their later moment co-existing (the prior moment ceases, only then does the later moment arise); this is like two things "separated by a moment," which cannot perfume each other — for the perfumer and the perfumed must both be on hand at the same time. Granting even, for argument's sake, that someone holds "only the six consciousnesses, and that the six consciousnesses can turn all at the same time," still, by the reasons given above, since the six consciousnesses are not something able to receive perfuming, they likewise have no power of appropriating the seeds.
〔Refuting: the view that form and mind, succeeding one another without a gap, serve as each other's seeds〕
〔Another position · form and mind serve as their own seeds, one moment onto the next〕 Again, some maintain: form, within its own class of form, [proceeds] "one moment onto the next without a gap," and mind, within its own class of mind, is likewise; the prior moment serves as the seed of the later moment, and so cause-and-effect too stands up — so the foregoing (the proof from upholding the seeds), brought forward as warrant, does not establish anything. 〔A〕 This position is unreasonable, for it has no "perfuming" at all: since within its own class there is no perfuming (no such thing as receiving perfuming), how could one hold that "the prior moment is the seed of the later moment"?
Again, if "the prior moment serves as the seed of the later moment," then whatever is cut off in between ought never to arise again — but this lands you in trouble: the two-vehicle no-more-learner (before he enters nirvāṇa-without-remainder), if his form-and-mind at the instant of death is, as you say, to serve as the seed of the aggregates of the next life, then after his death he ought to have no later aggregates (the body-and-mind of a next life); yet the two-vehicle one, before he has entered nirvāṇa-without-remainder, plainly still has later aggregates — which clashes with your account. Nor should one maintain that form and mind, turning about, serve as each other's seeds to give birth — for the turning consciousnesses, form, and the rest are not able to receive perfuming, as has been said above.
〔Refuting: the view that the three times are really existent, so no seed-upholding consciousness is needed〕
〔Another faction · the three times are all really existent〕 Again, one faction (this is the Sarvāstivāda position) says: the various dharmas of the three times — past, present, and future — are all really and truly existent, so cause-and-effect joins up and is established of itself, and why trouble to insist that there is a "consciousness able to appropriate the seeds"? As for the sūtra's saying "the mind is the seed," that is merely because, when the mind arouses the defiled and pure dharmas, its force is preponderant (so the mind is one-sidedly named, and it is not that there is some separate seed-upholding consciousness).
〔A〕 This will not stand: the past and the future are neither permanent nor present, just like a flower [seen] in empty space (a sky-flower) — they are simply not really existent; moreover they can exert no function, so one cannot forcibly take them to be "cause-and-condition." Therefore, if there were no "consciousness able to appropriate the defiled and pure seeds," then all cause-and-effect would fail to stand up.
〔Refuting: the view that the emptiness-principle of dispelling-marks denies this consciousness〕
〔Another position · taking the "emptiness-principle of dispelling-marks" as the ultimate〕 Again, some maintain: the Mahāyāna's "dispelling-marks" (sweeping away all marks) emptiness-principle is the most ultimate; relying on a "specious inference" (one that looks correct but is in fact fallacious), they wipe out this consciousness, indeed wipe out all dharmas — and by this wiping-out they especially run afoul of the sūtras cited above. They grasp the practice-fruits — knowledge, severance, realization, cultivation — as well as defiled and pure cause-and-effect, all as "not really existent," and this becomes a great wrong view.
〔A〕 This position is even worse than the heretics'. The heretics, in slandering defiled and pure cause-and-effect, still did not say it was "wholly nothing"; they only said it was "not really existent" — and this position is on a par with the heretics, and goes further still. Just think: if no dharma were really existent, then the bodhisattva ought not, for the sake of leaving birth-and-death, to toil and labor at gathering the provisions of awakening — for what wise person, to drive off "an illusory foe," would go seeking "a barren woman's son" (a thing that simply does not exist) to make up his troops?
Therefore one ought to believe that there really is a "mind able to appropriate the seeds," in dependence on which defiled and pure cause-and-effect are established — and this mind is precisely this eighth consciousness. (Here the reason from upholding the seeds is concluded.)
Reason 2. The proof from maturation (a true maturation-mind must exist separately)
A sūtra says further that there is a "maturation-mind" (the retribution-mind called forth by the ripening of past karma), which is called forth by good karma and evil karma — but if there were no this eighth consciousness, that maturation-mind would not stand to exist.
Why can the turning consciousnesses not be the maturation-mind? The eye-consciousness and the rest intermit, and moreover are not at all times the fruit of karma (sometimes when they arise it is not karma that has called them forth); like a lightning-flash, they are unstable and break off, so they are not the true maturation-mind. Note that a true maturation ought not to "break off and then join back on" — look at the maturation-fruit of the sort that is the life-faculty: there is never any such thing as "breaking off and then continuing." Plainly, then, maturation must continue on without break, and the turning consciousnesses cannot bear this.
Among the six consciousnesses, eye-consciousness and the rest, those called forth by karma are like sound (arising only when a condition meets them), not continuing on constantly, and so they are at most "maturation-born" (born from maturation), and do not count as "true maturation." So one must grant that there is a "true maturation-mind" — which requites the "impelling karma" (that is, the karma that calls forth the total retribution and settles the broad direction of a whole lifetime), pervading all and never intermitting, able to manifest the body (the body-with-faculties) and the receptacle (the receptacle-world) to serve as the basis for beings; for if the body and the receptacle were apart from a mind, by reason they could not arise — plainly, then, there must be a mind able to manifest them.
The non-concurrent formations have no real substance and cannot manifest the body and the receptacle; and the turning consciousnesses are not always present, and cannot constantly manifest the body and the receptacle. That being so, if there were no this true maturation-mind, then who, pray, would manifest the body and the receptacle? And in dependence on what dharma could the continuity of beings' lives be "constantly" borne up?
Again, whether in concentration or out of concentration, whether at times of particular cogitation or of no cogitation, by reason there arise many "bodily feelings" (the various sensations in the body). If these bodily feelings did not arise, then afterward one ought not to feel any ease or weariness in the body (ease and weariness are precisely the fruit borne out by bodily feeling). But if there were no constantly-present true maturation-mind, then at those times (of no cogitation, and so on) how could there be such bodily feeling?
Here a word must be added to forestall misunderstanding: it is not that the Buddha too has a true maturation present when he arouses other good minds and the like — note that wherever it is said above that "bodily feeling arises, maturation arises," the reference is to "beings other than the Buddha" (the Buddha already has no maturation, and so is not in this example). By this it is known that there really is, constantly, a true maturation-mind, and this mind is precisely this eighth consciousness.
Reason 3. The proof from the substance of destiny-and-birth (the truly real destiny-and-birth is only the maturation-mind)
A sūtra says further: beings flow and turn through the five destinies (the five goings-forth: the gods, humans, animals, hungry ghosts, and hells) and the four births (the four modes of birth: womb-born, egg-born, moisture-born, transformation-born). But if there were no this eighth consciousness, that "substance of destiny-and-birth" would not stand to exist.
How is this to be judged? Only a dharma that is "really existent, constant, pervading, and unmixed" deserves to be the substance of the "truly real destiny-and-birth." If it is not a maturation-dharma, then its destiny-and-birth will be mixed and confused — for while one abides in this destiny, this birth, one can still arouse the dharmas of another destiny, another birth (just as, while in the human destiny, one can arouse the kind of good mind that belongs to the heavens); this is impure, and so does not count as truly real destiny-and-birth.
Checking against this standard one by one: (1) the various maturation form-dharmas, and those among the five consciousnesses that are called forth by karma, are not "pervading" of destiny-and-birth — because in the formless realm form and the five consciousnesses are wholly absent. (2) The various inborn goods, and those among the mind-consciousness that are called forth by karma, though they are "pervading" of destiny-and-birth and arise unmixed, are nonetheless "not always present" (they intermit). (3) And the non-concurrent formations have no real substance. — None of these can serve as the truly real destiny-and-birth.
Only the maturation-mind, together with the mental factors associated with it, is "really existent, constant, pervading, and unmixed," and so can serve as the truly real destiny-and-birth. If there were no this mind, then when someone born in the formless realm arouses a good mind (at that time there is no form, no five consciousnesses, and the inborn good is moreover not always present), would he not then turn out to be "neither destiny nor birth"? — and this lands one in trouble.
Even if you take a step back and broaden "destiny-and-birth" to take in all the contaminated dharmas (hoping by this to patch up the previous hole), that still cannot save you: for when someone born in the formless realm arouses an uncontaminated mind, he still turns out to be "neither destiny nor birth" (the uncontaminated is not subsumed under the contaminated), and this again clashes with reason. So as both to avoid the previous fault and to avoid this fault, only the "maturation-dharma" is the truly real destiny-and-birth.
By this one matter becomes plain: the Tathāgata is not subsumed under "destiny-and-birth" — because the Buddha already has no maturation-indeterminate dharma; the Tathāgata is also not subsumed under "the realm" (the three realms) — because the Buddha is no longer contaminated, the World-Honored One having long since cast off both the truth of suffering and the truth of origination, and the seeds of all conceptual proliferation having all been forever severed.
Since the truly real destiny-and-birth can only be the maturation-mind and its mental factors, and this mind and these mental factors cannot, by reason, stand apart from the eighth consciousness, it is therefore known that there is separately this eighth consciousness.
Reason 4. The proof from appropriation (appropriating the form-faculties is only the maturation-mind)
A sūtra says further: a body with form-faculties (that is, this body equipped with the five form-faculties) is "appropriated" — meaning it is appropriated and received by a mind, and so has sensation, can feel pain and itch. But if there were no this eighth consciousness, that "[mind] able to appropriate" would not stand to exist.
This is to say: the five form-faculties and their basis are appropriated only in the "present world" (in the past and future they are not appropriated), and this can come about only if "there is a mind able to appropriate." This mind able to appropriate can only be the maturation-mind — it is drawn forth by past karma, is itself neither good nor defiled, and appropriates this body-with-form-faculties in a manner that is "of one kind, able to pervade, and continuous"; the eye-consciousness and the rest of the turning consciousnesses have no such capacity.
Here a fine point must be made clear: the sense of this passage is only to display that the eye-consciousness and the rest of the turning consciousnesses all lack the capacity to appropriate one's own body-with-form-faculties in a manner "of one kind, able to pervade, and continuous"; it is not to say that "whatever can appropriate must be only the maturation-mind." — Why draw this distinction? Because if one said so across the board, then the Buddha's form-body, having no maturation, would turn out to be appropriated by no one — and that will not do. So one should understand that what is meant here is in fact that "what can appropriate a 'contaminated' form-body is only the maturation-mind"; this is its real intent.
Below, the turning consciousnesses are refuted one by one: (1) the turning consciousnesses all "arise upon a present condition" (they arise only when an object is present before them), like sound or wind, and so cannot appropriate continuously. (2) Among the turning consciousnesses, those that are good or defiled are "not drawn forth by karma," like cessation-not-through-discrimination (an unconditioned dharma, which has no link to karma), and so they too do not appropriate. (3) Among the turning consciousnesses, those that are "maturation-born" are moreover "not true maturation, cannot pervade as a basis, and are not continuous," like a lightning-flash — and these several kinds all cannot appropriate the contaminated form-body.
One further word to add: whenever one speaks of "mind" or "consciousness," one in fact also takes in the "mental factors" associated with it (for a mind-king must have mental factors associated with it — just as the term "consciousness-only" in fact takes in the mental factors). Again, the form-faculties and the non-concurrent formations cannot appropriate the body-with-form-faculties — because they "have no object-support" (no object referred to), like empty space. Therefore there must be separately a "mind able to appropriate," and this mind is precisely this eighth consciousness.
Reason 5. The proof from life-warmth and consciousness (the consciousness that upholds life and warmth is only the maturation-consciousness)
A sūtra says further: the three — life (the lifespan), warmth (body-heat), and consciousness — mutually rest on and uphold one another, and so get to abide on in succession (a person stays alive). But if there were no this eighth consciousness to uphold life and warmth, that "consciousness able to make life and warmth long-abide" would not stand to exist.
This is to say: the turning consciousnesses "intermit and vary," like sound or wind, and have no constant upholding function, and so cannot be set up as the "consciousness that upholds life and warmth." Only the maturation-consciousness "neither intermits nor varies," just like life and warmth (which too continue on constant and uniform), and has a constant upholding function, and so can be set up as the consciousness that upholds life and warmth.
〔Q〕 Someone asks: the sūtra says these three "mutually uphold one another," yet life and warmth both continue on of one kind without break, while only "consciousness" is not so (if "consciousness" here means the turning consciousness, then it intermits) — would this not then fail to fit reason (with one of the three breaking off, how can they uphold one another)? 〔A · turning the question back〕 Do you not yourself grant that "only warmth does not pervade the three realms" (in the formless realm there is no warmth)? That point does not in the least hinder the account of the three dharmas upholding one another; on what ground, then, do you forbid me to say "consciousness too may, all on its own, intermit and vary"? 〔Further answer〕 Be that as it may, this counter-question in fact poses no real refutation of the foregoing reason —
How so? In any place where "all three — life, warmth, and consciousness — are present and all turn without intermission," there these three can be said to uphold one another constantly; lacking the condition "without intermission," there is no constant mutual upholding. The foregoing passage, on just this principle, points out that the "consciousness" spoken of among the three dharmas is not the turning consciousness (for the turning consciousness intermits, and so has no constant upholding power). As for your refutation by "warmth does not pervade the three realms," that in fact cannot wreck this principle — for "whether warmth pervades the three realms" is one matter, and "consciousness must uphold constantly" is another; the two matters are not to be confounded. So what was said above stands firm in reason.
Again, among the three dharmas, since life and warmth are both only contaminated, plainly the "consciousness" that upholds-and-rests-on them along with them must, like life and warmth, certainly be not uncontaminated (an uncontaminated consciousness cannot uphold contaminated life and warmth). The question then arises: when someone born in the formless realm arouses an uncontaminated mind, which consciousness is upholding his life? (At that time, were the turning consciousness to become uncontaminated, it could not uphold life and warmth, and so there must be separately some other consciousness.) By this it is known that there really is a "maturation-consciousness," of one kind, constant, and pervading, able to uphold life and warmth — and this consciousness is precisely this eighth consciousness.
〔所釋之頌〕承前章,廣釋第二頌至第四頌·證有第八
前兩節把阿賴耶識的三相、種子與諸門都講過了。可是有人會問:你講了這麼多,這個識真的離開眼耳鼻舌身意之外,另有一個自體嗎?這一節就答這一問。論主立兩個標準——聖教與正理。本節舉五教,並列十理之前五;後五理別為次章。
證有第八這件事,經論本有所據。《解深密經·心意識相品》用三個名字顯這同一個識:「阿陀那」是「隨逐執持」(執持身命)、「阿賴耶」是「攝受、藏隱、同安危」(與身同安危)、「心」是「積集滋長」;又有一頌「阿陀那識甚深細,一切種子如瀑流」,並誡「我於凡愚不開演,恐彼分別執為我」——這正是證有第八的經本,顯它執受身命、種子如瀑而恒續,又難測難知、易被妄執為我。《楞伽經》以「藏識海常住,境界風所動,種種諸識浪,騰躍而轉生」為喻——眼等識不能像大海那樣恒相續地起識浪,反顯另有一個第八識作「藏識海」之體。《大乘阿毘達磨經》更有兩頌:一頌「無始時來界,一切法等依,由此有諸趣,及涅槃證得」(界依),一頌「由攝藏諸法,一切種子識,故名阿賴耶,勝者我開示」(攝藏)——這部經漢地沒有別行本,經文只存於本論所引。至於論本,則在《瑜伽師地論·攝決擇分》:它先引「阿陀那識甚深細」那頌,再立『八相證阿賴耶識決定是有』——執受、最初生起、明了性、種子性、業用差別、身受差別、處無心定、命終時識,這八相若離了阿賴耶識都不應道理。本論這一節的十條正理,正是承《瑜伽》八相而廣開(八相的執受、種子、業用、身受、處無心定、命終時識,分別入十理),其經在《解深密》《楞伽》,其論在《瑜伽》八相證,下面順著本論講開。
甲、總標:以「聖教」與「正理」為定量
怎麼知道第八識離開眼等識而別有自體?要靠兩種『定量(可靠的衡準)』:一是聖教(佛說的契經),二是正理(如理的推徵)。窺基《述記》在這裡釋「定量」二字:第八識不是世間『現量(直接親證)』所能緣的境界,只能靠『聖言量(信佛所說)』和『比量(如理推知)』這兩種量來證,這兩量是決定可靠的,所以叫「定量」——這正點出全節的骨幹:證有第八,不走現量、單走教、理二量。窺基又判這一節在本識長行裡的位次:本識長行先以「八段十義」釋頌(三相、種子、諸門),這一節即是『後以十理、五教證此識有』一段,全段分作三節——初是設問(問離眼等識何以別有第八),次是正答(答以五教、十理),第三到「別有此識教理顯然」一句,是總結勸信。先看聖教。《大乘阿毘達磨經》有一頌:「無始時來界,一切法等依,由此有諸趣,及涅槃證得。」——無始以來就有這個「界」,一切法都平等依著它;由有它,才有諸趣的輪轉,也才有涅槃的證得。
第八識的自性極微細、難以直接顯示,所以借它的「作用」來顯。頌的前半(界、一切法等依)顯它的「因緣用」、後半(諸趣、涅槃)顯它在流轉與還滅兩門裡的「依持用」。「界」是「因」義,就是種子識——無始展轉相續、親生諸法;「依」是「緣」義,就是執持識——無始與一切法平等作依止。它既能執持諸種子(作因)、又給現行法作所依(作緣),所以它「變為彼」(變生器世間與有根身)又「為彼依」(給諸轉識作所依):能執受五色根,所以眼等五識依它而轉;又給末那作依止,所以第六意識依它而轉(末那、意識都是轉識);就像眼等識各依自己的俱有根,第八既也是識,理該也以第七為俱有依。這就是它的因用、緣用。「由此有諸趣」——由有此識,執持一切順流轉的法,令有情流轉生死(惑、業、生都屬流轉,而「趣」是果、最顯,所以偏說「趣」;或「諸趣」通能趣所趣、連趣的資具也叫趣);惑業生都依此識,這是它在流轉門的「依持用」。「及涅槃證得」——由有此識,執持一切順還滅的法,令修行者證涅槃。這句有三釋:或單說『能證之道』(涅槃之滅不依此識而有)、或單說『所證之涅槃』(修行者正所求)、或雙說涅槃與道(同屬還滅);總之能斷之道、所斷之惑、能所之證都依此識,這是它在還滅門的依持用。又:頌的初句顯此識自性無始恒有,後三句顯它與『雜染(苦集)、清淨(滅道)』二法作總、別所依(若說依轉識,轉識間斷,立不住);或說後三句顯它與「依他起、遍計所執、圓成實」三自性作所依。總之這頌裡說的一切義,離了第八識都成立不了。
乙、五教——契經明證有第八識
一、《大乘阿毘達磨經》(攝藏阿賴耶頌)
那經又有一頌:「由攝藏諸法,一切種子識,故名阿賴耶,勝者我開示。」——由於此本識具足一切種子、能攝藏諸雜染法,所以立『阿賴耶(藏)』之名。這「攝藏」不像數論的「勝性」轉成「大」等(那是一體展轉),因為種子與它的果體並非一個、能依所依又都有生滅;此識與雜染法互相攝藏、又被有情執藏為我,所以叫「阿賴耶」。頌說「勝者」有兩解:一指已入見道、得真現觀的菩薩(能證解阿賴耶,所以佛正為他開示),二指一切菩薩(見道前雖未證解、卻能信解、求它的轉依,所以佛也為他說)。這攝藏、種子、執藏的義,只有第八識當得起,不是諸轉識所能有。
二、《解深密經》(阿陀那頌)
《解深密經》也有一頌:「阿陀那識甚深細,一切種子如瀑流,我於凡愚不開演,恐彼分別執為我。」——此識能執持諸法種子、執受色根及依處、又執取「結生相續」(受生時前後不斷),所以叫「阿陀那(執持)」。『無性有情(無大乘種性者)』窮不到它的底,所以說「甚深」;『趣寂種性(只求自寂的二乘)』通達不了它,所以說「甚細」;它是一切法的真實種子,遇緣一擊就生起諸轉識的波浪、恒無間斷,所以像瀑流。頌裡「凡」就是無性、「愚」就是趣寂——恐怕他們對它起分別、執它為我,因而墮惡趣、障聖道,所以佛不為他們開演。這種『甚深細、種子如瀑流、會被執我』的相,只有第八識有。
三、《入楞伽經》(藏識海頌)
《入楞伽經》也有頌:「如海遇風緣,起種種波浪,現前作用轉,無有間斷時;藏識海亦然,境等風所擊,恒起諸識浪,現前作用轉。」——眼等諸識並不能像大海那樣恒相續地起諸識的浪(它們會間斷),可見另有一個第八識作這「藏識海」的體。像這樣的大乘經,無量無數,都別說有此第八識。
四、總成「大乘是佛說」(七因+《莊嚴論》頌)
既引大乘經作證,就得先成立『大乘經確是佛說』。諸大乘經都順「無我」、違「我」,棄流轉、趣還滅,讚佛法僧、毀外道,顯蘊等法、遮「勝性」等,凡樂大乘者都認它能顯無顛倒之理,既是契經所攝,就跟《增壹阿含》等同屬『至教量(聖言量)』。又,彌勒以七種理由證大乘真是佛說:一、先不記——若大乘是佛滅後有人為壞正法而造,佛何以不像對別的『將起的可怖事』那樣預先記別(既無預記,可見非偽造)?二、本俱行——大小乘教本來並行於世,怎能斷定單單大乘非佛說?三、非餘境——大乘所說廣大甚深,不是外道思量的境界,外道經論從沒說過、就算對他說他也不信受。四、應極成——若說大乘是『別的佛』說、不是今佛說,那大乘仍是佛說,「大乘是佛說」反而鐵定成立。五、有無有——若承認有大乘(道),就該信大乘教是佛說(離此則大乘道不可得);若說沒有大乘,那聲聞乘教也該沒有了,因為離大乘決定無「成佛」之義,既無人成佛、誰出世說聲聞乘?所以聲聞乘既是佛說,「大乘非佛說」就不合理。六、能對治——依大乘經勤修的人都能引生無分別智、正對治一切煩惱,可見是佛說(有實效)。七、義異文——大乘所說意趣甚深,不可只隨文面取義、就誹謗為非佛語。《莊嚴論》一頌總攝這七因:「先不記、俱行、非餘所行境、極成、有無有、對治、異文故。」
五、餘部密意——四部阿含也暗說阿賴耶
不只大乘,部派的經裡也用「密意」說了第八識,只是換了名字。大眾部的阿含密意說它名「根本識」,是眼等識的所依——像樹根是莖枝之本,眼等識並沒有『作根本所依』之義。上座部及分別論者密意說它名「有分識」:「有」指三有、「分」是「因」義,唯有它恒常周遍、能作三有之因。化地部說它名「窮生死蘊」——離了第八識,沒有別的蘊能『窮盡生死際而無間斷』(無色界諸色間斷、無想天等餘心心所也滅、不相應行又離色心無體,所以唯它堪當)。說一切有部的《增壹阿含》密意說它名「阿賴耶」,即「愛阿賴耶、樂阿賴耶、欣阿賴耶、憙阿賴耶」四句——因為阿賴耶識是貪總緣、別緣三世之境,所以立這四名。
這裡有部還用一段「真愛著處」的論證:有情執此識為真實的「自內我」,沒斷以前恒生愛著,所以唯有此識才是「真愛著處」,不該把「餘五取蘊」等當真愛著處。怎麼證?逐一排除:一、生在『一向苦受處(如地獄)』的,對餘五取蘊不但不愛、反而恒厭,念念盼『何時捨這命、這身心去受快樂』(可見餘蘊非真愛處);二、「五欲」非真愛處——離欲的人對五妙欲雖不貪、卻仍愛我;三、「樂受」非真愛處——離了三禪染的人雖厭樂受、卻仍愛我;四、「身見」非真愛處——還沒到無學、卻信解無我的人,雖對身見不貪、卻仍愛內我;五、「轉識」等非真愛處——還沒無學、卻修滅心的人,雖厭轉識、卻仍愛我;六、「色身」非真愛處——離色染的人雖厭色身、卻仍愛我;七、「不相應行」離色心無體,更非真愛處。凡夫與有學起我愛時,對餘蘊或愛或不愛(不定),唯獨對此第八識「我愛」一定生起,所以唯它是真愛著處——可見有部說的「阿賴耶」,鐵定就是指這第八識。聖教(五教)引完了,下面說正理(十理)。
丙、十理——正理顯證有第八識
理一、持種證——能持種的心,理該另有
經說『雜染、清淨諸法的種子所集所起的,叫做心』;若沒有第八識,這『能持種的心』就不該有。為什麼轉識不堪持種?因為諸轉識在滅定等位會間斷、又隨根境作意善惡等類別而易起易脫、像電光一樣不能堅住——所以不能受熏、不能持種,不是『集起染淨種的心』。唯有第八識一類相續、恒無間斷,像胡麻(可熏香)那樣堅住可熏,正合經說的「集起名心」。若不許有能持種的心,不但違經、也違理:所起的染淨法既無處受熏、就熏不成種,那它白起一場(無因可續);染淨法生起時既沒有因種,就成了外道的『無因自然生』。拿色法、不相應行來持種也不行——它們非心性、像聲光一樣不能受染淨內法的熏,怎能持種?何況不相應行離識又無實體,怎能當「內種」的依止?至於與轉識相應的心所,也跟轉識一樣有間斷、易脫、不自在、非恒一心性,既不持種也不受熏。所以『能持種的心』理該另有,那就是第八識。
這裡破幾種異說。有人說『六識的『類』能受熏持種』(六識的一一現行雖變、而同類相續之相無別,就拿這「類」持種)。破:這「類」若執為實有就同外道、若許是假有就沒有實用、持不了內法的實種;再問這「識類」是什麼性?若是善惡性就不該受熏(有記的不受熏,像擇滅)、若是無記性那善惡心現起時沒有無記心、這「類」就該間斷了(而且不能說『事是善惡而類是無記』,別別的類必和別別的事同性);又無心位這「類」一定沒有、既間斷就非堅住、怎能持種受熏?又阿羅漢的心和凡夫的心「識類」相同,那凡夫的染法該能熏阿羅漢、無漏法該能熏凡夫了(類同則互熏),這就壞了;又眼根和眼識在「根、法」上類也相同、該互熏,可你不許;又六識無論事、類,前念後念都不同時、像隔了一念一樣不能互熏(能熏所熏必同時)——就算有人執『六識可同時並起』,六識既非所熏,也沒有持種義。又有人執『色、心各自前念作後念的種』(自類無間相續)。破:自類既沒有熏習,怎能執前為後種?又若「前為後種」,那凡間斷的就該不再生了(二乘無學死位的色心若作後蘊的種,便不該再有後蘊,可實有);色心展轉互為種也不成(轉識、色非所熏,前已說)。又有人執『三世實有、不必另立持種識』(經說「心為種子」只因心起染淨時勢力強)。破:過去未來既非常住、又非現在,像空花、非實有,又沒有作用、不能當因緣;若沒有能持染淨種的識,一切因果都立不起來。又有人執『大乘遣相的空理是究竟、撥無此識乃至一切法』。破:這特別違害前引諸經,把智、斷、證、修和染淨因果都執成非實、成了大邪見——外道謗因果還不說它全無、只說非實,這執比外道還甚;若一切法都非實有,菩薩就不必為捨生死去修菩提資糧了——哪個有智者會為了打『虛幻的敵人』而去求「石女兒」來當軍隊?所以該信有能持種的心,依它建立染淨因果,那心就是第八識。
理二、異熟證——真異熟的心,理該另有
經說有「異熟心」,是善惡業所感;若沒有第八識,這異熟心就不該有。眼等識會間斷、又不是一切時都是業果,像電光一樣,所以不是真異熟心(真異熟不該『斷了又接』,看命根等異熟就沒有斷已更續的事);眼等六識裡由業所感的,像聲音一樣不恒續,只是「異熟生」、不是「真異熟」。所以一定得許有「真異熟心」——它酬答牽引業(總報業)、周遍而無間斷、變生身與器作有情的依(身、器離了能變的心就立不住)。不相應行無實體、轉識又非恒有,若沒有這真異熟心,誰來變身、器?又依什麼能「恒」立有情?又不論在定不在定、有思慮無思慮時,理該都有許多「身受」生起,不然後來怎會覺得身體怡適或勞損?若不恒有真異熟心,那些位上哪來這身受?(要注意:說『起身受、異熟』都是指『非佛的有情』,佛無異熟、不在此例。)由此知恒有真異熟心,那就是第八識。
理三、趣生體證——真正的「趣、生」之體,唯是異熟心
經說有情流轉於五趣、四生;若沒有第八識,這「趣、生」之體就不該有。要當『正實的趣、生』之體,得是「實有、恒、遍、無雜」的法(不是異熟的法,趣生就雜亂——住在這趣這生時還能起別趣別生的法)。逐一檢驗:異熟的色法、五識中業所感的,不「遍」(無色界裡全沒有);生得善、意識中業所感的,雖「遍」又無雜亂、卻「不恒」(會間斷);不相應行又無實體——都立不成。唯有異熟心及它的心所,才是實、恒、遍、無雜的正實趣生。這心若沒有,那生在無色界、起善心的時候(無色、無五識、生善又不恒)就該不算趣生了。就算退一步、許趣生通攝一切有漏法,那生無色界起無漏心時又該不算趣生(無漏不屬有漏),還是違理。為免這兩重過失,所以唯「異熟法」是正實趣生。也正因此,如來不被趣生所攝(佛無異熟無記)、也不被三界所攝(非有漏、已捨苦集、戲論種已斷)。正實趣生既唯是異熟心心所,而它離第八識又立不住,所以知道別有第八識。
理四、執受證——能執受色根身的,唯是異熟心
經說有色根身是「有執受」(被心執持領受、成覺受);若沒有第八識,這『能執受的心』就不該有。五色根及它的依處,只在現在世是有執受,這必定由『有能執受的心』才成;這能執受的唯是異熟心——由先業所引、非善非染、「一類、能遍、相續」地執受有色根身,眼等轉識沒有這本事。(這話是顯轉識沒有一類能遍相續執受的能耐,不是說『凡能執受一概唯異熟心』,不然佛的色身沒有異熟就成無執受了;應知是說『能執受『有漏』色身的唯異熟心』。)逐破轉識:諸轉識『待現境才起』,像聲、風,不能恒執受;其中善染的「非業所引」,像非擇滅,不執受;其中異熟生的『非真異熟、非遍依、不相續』,像電光——都不能執受有漏色身。凡說「心、識」也都攝它的心所(決定相應,像「唯識」一語也攝心所)。色根、不相應行又都不能執受色根身——因為它們「無所緣」,像虛空。所以該別有能執受的心,那就是第八識。
理五、壽煖識證——能持壽、煖的識,唯是異熟識
經說壽、煖、識三者更互依持,才得相續而住;若沒有第八識能持壽、煖,這『令壽煖久住的識』就不該有。諸轉識有間有轉、像聲風,沒有恒持之用,立不成持壽煖的識;唯異熟識無間無轉、正像壽煖(也恒一相續),有恒持之用,所以可立為持壽煖的識。有人難:經說三法「更互依持」,而壽、煖是一類相續、唯獨「識」不然(若指轉識就間斷),這豈合理?反詰他:你既許『煖唯不遍三界』(無色界無煖)尚不害依持之說,那為何不許「識獨有間轉」?再答清楚:凡是『具足三法、無間而轉』的地方,三者才能恒相依持;不具足無間,就沒有恒相持的用——前文正是用這道理顯『三法裡的識不是指轉識』;至於「舉煖不遍」的難,並不能壞這道理。又:三法裡壽、煖既然唯是有漏,可見和它相持的「識」也定非無漏;那麼生無色界起無漏心時,是誰持那壽?(轉識成無漏就不持了,故須另有。)由此知有個「一類、恒、遍能持壽煖」的異熟識,那就是第八識。
承衍
五教與前五理之證,後出諸論各承其目。《攝大乘論·所知依分》以十相辨阿賴耶,其「引證」一節所舉《阿毘達磨經》二頌與《解深密》阿陀那頌,與本節五教所引全同,可謂同源。《瑜伽師地論·攝決擇分》立『八相證有阿賴耶識』,其持種、異熟、執受諸相,即本節前五理之所本。《百法明門論》列阿賴耶為心法之第八,其得以別立,正繫於本節所證之「別有自體」一義——若無此證,第八識即無名分可立。
〔Verses commented〕Continuing: unfolding verses 2–4 · proving the eighth
The two previous chapters have set out the ālaya's three aspects, its seeds, and its gates. But one may ask: for all that has been said, does this consciousness really have a substance of its own, apart from the consciousnesses of eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind? This chapter answers that. The treatise raises two standards — scripture and reason. Here are the five scriptures and the first five of the ten reasons; the latter five form the next chapter.
The proof that an eighth consciousness exists has its roots in scripture and treatise alike. The Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, in its chapter on mind, mentation, and consciousness, displays this one consciousness under three names: "ādāna" is "following along and appropriating" (it appropriates the body and the life-faculty); "ālaya" is "receiving, harboring, and sharing one safety and danger" (sharing one safety and danger with the body); and "mind" is "accumulating and increasing." It also has a verse — "The ādāna consciousness is profound and subtle; all the seeds are like a rushing torrent" — and the warning, "I do not expound it to the foolish and immature, lest they discriminate it and grasp it as a self." This is precisely the scriptural basis for an eighth consciousness: it displays that it appropriates the body and the life-faculty, that its seeds flow on like a torrent in perpetual succession, and that, being hard to fathom and hard to know, it is easily grasped wrongly as a self. The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra gives the image, "The ocean of the store-consciousness perpetually abides, stirred by the wind of its objects into the various waves of the consciousnesses, surging up and arising by turns" — for the eye-consciousness and the rest cannot, like the great ocean, raise the waves of consciousness perpetually and continuously, which by contrast reveals that there is another, eighth consciousness serving as the substance of the "store-consciousness ocean." The Mahāyāna Abhidharma Sūtra has, moreover, two verses: one — "The realm that has existed from beginningless time is the equal support of all dharmas; because of it there are the destinies of rebirth, and the realization of nirvāṇa as well" (the realm-support) — and one — "Because it stores and harbors all dharmas, it is the all-seed consciousness; therefore it is named ālaya, which I reveal to the superior ones" (the storing-harboring) — and this sūtra has no separately circulating version in the Chinese lands, its text surviving only as quoted in the present treatise. As for the treatise-basis, it lies in the Yogācārabhūmi, in its section settling the points to be known: it first cites the verse "the ādāna consciousness is profound and subtle," then establishes "eight characters that prove the ālaya-vijñāna definitely exists" — appropriation, the first arising, the quality of clarity, the quality of seeds, the differentiation of karmic function, the differentiation of bodily sensation, the place of the mindless absorptions, and the consciousness at the time of death — none of which would be coherent apart from the ālaya-vijñāna. The ten reasons of this section unfold precisely from those eight characters of the Yogācārabhūmi (appropriation, seeds, karmic function, bodily sensation, the place of the mindless absorptions, and the consciousness at the time of death each entering into the ten reasons); its scriptural root is in the Saṃdhinirmocana and the Laṅkāvatāra, and its treatise-root in the eight-character proof of the Yogācārabhūmi. What follows expounds it in order, following the present treatise.
A. General Statement: Scripture and Reason as the Two Standards of Measure
How do we know that the eighth consciousness stands apart from the eye-consciousness and the rest, possessing a substance of its own? We must rely on two "standards of measure" — two reliable criteria. The first is scripture, the discourses spoken by the Buddha; the second is reason, demonstration that accords with how things actually are. Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) here unpacks the two words "standard of measure": the eighth consciousness is not an object that worldly "direct perception" (immediate first-hand witnessing) can take, but can be proven only through the two means of "the standard of noble speech" (trusting what the Buddha said) and "inference" (knowing as it accords with reason); these two means are decisively reliable, and so are called "standards of measure" — which is just the backbone of the whole section: the proof of an eighth consciousness does not go by direct perception, but by scripture and reason alone. Kuiji further marks where this section falls within the prose treatment of the root consciousness: the prose first expounds the verse by "eight passages and ten meanings" (the three aspects, the seeds, and the various gates), and this section is the passage that "afterward proves this consciousness exists by ten reasons and five scriptures." The whole passage divides into three parts — first, the posing of the question (asking why, apart from the eye-consciousness and the rest, there should be a separate eighth); second, the direct answer (answering with the five scriptures and ten reasons); and third, down to the line "that there is a separate such consciousness is plainly evident in scripture and reason," the concluding exhortation to belief. Take scripture first. The Mahāyāna Abhidharma Sūtra has a verse: "The realm that has existed from beginningless time is the equal support of all dharmas; because of it there are the destinies of rebirth, and the realization of nirvāṇa as well." From beginningless time there has been this "realm," and all dharmas rest equally upon it; because it exists, there is the turning of beings through the destinies of rebirth, and there is also the realization of nirvāṇa.
The intrinsic nature of the eighth consciousness is exceedingly subtle and hard to display directly, so we display it by way of its functions. The first half of the verse — the "realm," the "equal support of all dharmas" — displays its function as cause-condition; the second half — the destinies and nirvāṇa — displays its function of supporting-and-sustaining within the two gates of forward flow (saṃsāra) and reverse return (nirvāṇa). "Realm" carries the sense of "cause": it is the seed-consciousness, which from beginningless time, in unbroken succession, directly gives rise to all dharmas. "Support" carries the sense of "condition": it is the appropriating consciousness, which from beginningless time serves as the equal basis for all dharmas. Because it can both hold all the seeds (acting as cause) and provide a basis for the active dharmas (acting as condition), it both "becomes those things" (transforming into the receptacle-world and the sense-endowed body) and "is the basis for those things" (the support of all the evolving consciousnesses). It is able to appropriate the five material faculties, so the eye and the other four consciousnesses turn in dependence upon it; and it provides a basis for the manas, so the sixth, mental consciousness turns in dependence upon it (both the manas and the mental consciousness being evolving consciousnesses). Just as the eye-consciousness and the rest each depend on their own concomitant faculty, the eighth, being likewise a consciousness, ought in reason also to take the seventh as its concomitant support. This is its function as cause and its function as condition. "Because of it there are the destinies of rebirth" — because this consciousness exists, holding all the dharmas that conduce to forward flow, it causes sentient beings to flow on through birth-and-death. (Affliction, action, and the resultant birth all belong to forward flow, but "destiny" is the fruit and the most conspicuous, so the verse singles out "destiny"; or "the destinies" may cover both the act of going and the place gone to, and even the equipment of going may be called a destiny.) Affliction, action, and birth all depend on this consciousness — this is its supporting-and-sustaining function within the gate of forward flow. "And the realization of nirvāṇa" — because this consciousness exists, holding all the dharmas that conduce to reverse return, it causes the practitioner to realize nirvāṇa. This line admits three readings: it may refer to the "path that realizes" alone (the cessation that is nirvāṇa does not exist in dependence on this consciousness); or to the "nirvāṇa that is realized" alone (what the practitioner truly seeks); or to both nirvāṇa and the path together (both belonging to reverse return). In any case, the path that severs, the affliction that is severed, and both subject and object of realization all depend on this consciousness — this is its supporting-and-sustaining function within the gate of reverse return. Further: the first line of the verse displays that the intrinsic nature of this consciousness exists eternally from beginningless time, while the latter three lines display that it serves as the general and particular support for the two sets of dharmas — defilement (suffering and its origin) and purity (cessation and the path). (If one said the evolving consciousnesses were the support, they break off and cannot stand as such.) Or the latter three lines may display that it serves as the support for the three natures — the other-dependent, the wholly-imagined, and the perfectly-accomplished. In short, nothing said in this verse can hold together once the eighth consciousness is removed.
B. The Five Scriptures — Explicit Discourse Testimony for the Eighth Consciousness
1. The Mahāyāna Abhidharma Sūtra (the "Storing the Ālaya" verse)
That sūtra has another verse: "Because it stores and harbors all dharmas, it is the all-seed consciousness; therefore it is named ālaya, which I reveal to the superior ones." Because this root consciousness possesses all seeds and can store and harbor all the defiled dharmas, the name "ālaya" (store) is established for it. This "storing-and-harboring" is not like the Sāṃkhya's "primordial nature" transforming into "the great" and so on (where it is one substance unfolding by stages), because the seeds and the substance of their fruits are not one and the same, and both the supported and the supporting arise and perish. This consciousness and the defiled dharmas mutually store and harbor one another, and it is moreover grasped and harbored by sentient beings as a self — therefore it is called "ālaya." The verse's "superior ones" admits two readings: first, the bodhisattvas who have entered the path of seeing and attained true direct insight (they can realize and understand the ālaya, so the Buddha discloses it precisely to them); second, all bodhisattvas (though before the path of seeing they have not yet realized it, they can have confident understanding and can seek the transformation of its basis, so the Buddha speaks of it for them too). This sense of storing-harboring, of seeds, and of being grasped-and-harbored is something only the eighth consciousness can sustain — it is not anything the evolving consciousnesses could possess.
2. The Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra (the "ādāna" verse)
The Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra also has a verse: "The ādāna consciousness is profound and subtle; all the seeds are like a rushing torrent. I do not expound it to the foolish and immature, lest they discriminate it and grasp it as a self." This consciousness can hold the seeds of all dharmas, appropriate the material faculties and their bases, and grasp the "linking of rebirth, continued in succession" (the unbroken continuity from before to after at the moment of taking birth) — therefore it is called "ādāna" (appropriator). "Beings without the requisite nature" (those lacking the Mahāyāna lineage) cannot fathom its depths, so it is called "profound"; the "lineage inclined to mere quiescence" (the two vehicles, who seek only their own peace) cannot penetrate it, so it is called "subtle." It is the true seed of all dharmas, and the moment a condition strikes, the waves of the evolving consciousnesses arise from it, ceaselessly and without interruption, so it is likened to a rushing torrent. In the verse, "the foolish" are those without the nature, and "the immature" are those inclined to quiescence — the Buddha does not expound it to them for fear that they would discriminate it and grasp it as a self, and so fall into evil destinies and obstruct the noble path. This character — "profound and subtle, seeds like a torrent, liable to be grasped as a self" — belongs to the eighth consciousness alone.
3. The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra (the "store-consciousness ocean" verse)
The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra also has a verse: "Just as the ocean, meeting the condition of wind, raises waves of every kind, their present operation turning on without any interval; so too the ocean of the store-consciousness, struck by the winds of its objects and the rest, perpetually raises the waves of the consciousnesses, their present operation turning on." The eye-consciousness and the rest cannot, like the great ocean, perpetually and continuously raise the waves of the consciousnesses (they break off) — which shows that there is another, eighth consciousness that serves as the substance of this "store-consciousness ocean." Mahāyāna sūtras of this kind are beyond measure and number, and all of them separately affirm the existence of this eighth consciousness.
4. Establishing That "the Mahāyāna Is the Buddha's Word" (Seven Reasons + the Verse from the Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra)
Having adduced Mahāyāna sūtras as testimony, we must first establish that "the Mahāyāna sūtras are indeed the Buddha's word." All the Mahāyāna sūtras accord with non-self and oppose self, discard forward flow and incline toward reverse return, praise the Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha and disparage the non-Buddhist schools, display the aggregates and the rest while refuting "primordial nature" and the like. Everyone who delights in the Mahāyāna acknowledges that it can display the principle that is without distortion; being included among the discourses, it belongs, just as the Ekottarikāgama and the like do, to "the standard of authoritative teaching" (the standard of noble speech). Furthermore, Maitreya proves by seven reasons that the Mahāyāna truly is the Buddha's word: first, no prior prediction — if the Mahāyāna had been composed after the Buddha's parinirvāṇa by someone bent on destroying the true Dharma, why did the Buddha not predict it in advance, as he did with the other "fearful things to come"? (Since there was no such prediction, it is evidently not a forgery.) Second, original co-currency — the Mahāyāna and the lesser-vehicle teachings ran together in the world from the start, so how can one conclude that the Mahāyāna alone is not the Buddha's word? Third, beyond others' range — what the Mahāyāna teaches is vast and profound, not within the range that the non-Buddhists can contemplate; their scriptures and treatises have never spoken of it, and even if it were explained to them they would not accept it. Fourth, it must be granted either way — if one says the Mahāyāna was spoken by "another Buddha" and not by the present Buddha, then the Mahāyāna is still the Buddha's word, so "the Mahāyāna is the Buddha's word" is established beyond doubt. Fifth, its being or non-being — if one grants that there is a Mahāyāna (a path), then one ought to believe its teaching is the Buddha's word (apart from this, the Mahāyāna path cannot be obtained); and if one says there is no Mahāyāna, then there ought to be no śrāvaka-vehicle teaching either, because apart from the Mahāyāna there is definitely no meaning to "becoming a Buddha" — and if no one becomes a Buddha, who appears in the world to teach the śrāvaka vehicle? So since the śrāvaka vehicle is the Buddha's word, "the Mahāyāna is not the Buddha's word" is incoherent. Sixth, it counteracts — those who diligently cultivate by the Mahāyāna sūtras can all give rise to non-discriminating wisdom that genuinely counteracts every affliction, which shows it is the Buddha's word (it has real efficacy). Seventh, the meaning differs from the letter — what the Mahāyāna teaches is exceedingly profound in intent; one must not take its meaning at the surface of the letter alone and then slander it as not the Buddha's speech. A verse from the Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra gathers these seven reasons together: "Because of no prior prediction, co-currency, being beyond others' range, being granted either way, its being or non-being, its counteracting power, and its meaning differing from the letter."
5. The Hidden Intent of the Other Schools — the Four Āgamas Too Secretly Teach the Ālaya
Not only the Mahāyāna: in the sūtras of the Nikāya schools too, the eighth consciousness is taught "by hidden intent," only under a changed name. The Mahāsāṃghikas, in the hidden intent of their Āgama, call it the "root consciousness," the basis of the eye-consciousness and the rest — just as the root of a tree is the source of trunk and branches, while the eye-consciousness and the rest carry no sense of "serving as a root basis." The Sthaviras and the Vibhajyavādins, by hidden intent, call it the "consciousness of existence-factors": "existence" refers to the three modes of existence, and "factor" carries the sense of "cause" — it alone is perpetual and all-pervading, able to serve as the cause of the three modes of existence. The Mahīśāsakas call it the "aggregate that lasts to the end of birth-and-death" — apart from the eighth consciousness, there is no other aggregate that can "exhaust the very limit of birth-and-death without interval" (in the formless realm the material dharmas break off; in the heaven of no-conception and the like the remaining mind and mental factors also cease; the non-concomitant formations, again, have no substance apart from matter and mind — so it alone is fit for the role). The Sarvāstivādins, in the hidden intent of their Ekottarikāgama, call it the "ālaya," in the four phrases "delighting in the ālaya, taking pleasure in the ālaya, rejoicing in the ālaya, being glad in the ālaya" — because the ālaya-vijñāna is the general and particular object of craving across the three times, these four names are established for it.
Here the Sarvāstivādins also use a line of argument about the "true locus of attachment": sentient beings grasp this consciousness as the real "self within," and so long as this has not been severed they perpetually give rise to attachment toward it — therefore this consciousness alone is the "true locus of attachment," and one should not take the "remaining five appropriating aggregates" and the like as the true locus of attachment. How is this proven? By eliminating the candidates one by one. First, one born in a "place of wholly painful sensation" (such as the hells) not only fails to love the remaining five appropriating aggregates but perpetually loathes them, longing moment after moment, "When shall I cast off this life, this body-and-mind, and go to receive pleasure?" (which shows the remaining aggregates are not the true locus of attachment). Second, the "five sense-pleasures" are not the true locus of attachment — one who is free of desire, though he does not crave the five fine sense-pleasures, still loves a self. Third, "pleasant sensation" is not the true locus of attachment — one who is free of the defilement of the third dhyāna, though he loathes pleasant sensation, still loves a self. Fourth, the "view of the body" is not the true locus of attachment — one not yet at the stage beyond training, who yet has confident understanding of non-self, though he does not crave the view of the body, still loves an inner self. Fifth, the "evolving consciousnesses" and the like are not the true locus of attachment — one not yet beyond training, who yet cultivates the cessation of mind, though he loathes the evolving consciousnesses, still loves a self. Sixth, the "material body" is not the true locus of attachment — one free of the defilement of matter, though he loathes the material body, still loves a self. Seventh, the "non-concomitant formations," having no substance apart from matter and mind, are still less the true locus of attachment. When ordinary beings and those still in training give rise to self-love, their love toward the remaining aggregates is sometimes present and sometimes absent (indeterminate), but their "self-love" toward this eighth consciousness invariably arises — so it alone is the true locus of attachment. This shows that the "ālaya" the Sarvāstivādins speak of refers, beyond doubt, to this eighth consciousness. The scriptural testimony (the five scriptures) is now complete; what follows are the reasoned proofs (the ten reasons).
C. The Ten Reasons — Reasoned Proofs Displaying the Existence of the Eighth Consciousness
Reason 1, the Proof from Holding Seeds — There Must Be Some Other Mind That Holds the Seeds
Scripture says that "what gathers and gives rise to the seeds of all the defiled and pure dharmas is called mind"; without the eighth consciousness, this "mind that holds the seeds" ought not to exist. Why are the evolving consciousnesses unfit to hold the seeds? Because they break off in such states as the absorption of cessation; and because they arise and depart easily, varying by faculty, object, attention, wholesome-or-unwholesome category and the like, and cannot hold firm — flickering like lightning. So they cannot receive perfuming, cannot hold seeds, and are not the "mind that gathers and gives rise to defiled and pure seeds." Only the eighth consciousness continues as one homogeneous stream, perpetual and without interval, holding firm and capable of being perfumed like sesame (which can absorb fragrance) — this precisely fits the scripture's "the gathering-and-giving-rise is called mind." If one will not grant a mind that holds the seeds, this contravenes both scripture and reason: the defiled and pure dharmas that arise would have nowhere to deposit their perfuming, so the perfuming could not form into seeds, and they would have arisen for nothing (no cause for them to be continued); and when defiled and pure dharmas arise without any causal seed, they become the non-Buddhists' "uncaused, spontaneous arising." Nor will it do to have matter or the non-concomitant formations hold the seeds — they are not of the nature of mind, and like sound or light they cannot receive the perfuming of the inner defiled and pure dharmas, so how could they hold seeds? Still more, the non-concomitant formations have no real substance apart from consciousness, so how could they serve as the basis for "inner seeds"? As for the mental factors concomitant with the evolving consciousnesses, they too, like the evolving consciousnesses, break off, depart easily, are not self-determining, and are not a perpetual single mental nature — so they neither hold seeds nor receive perfuming. Therefore the "mind that holds the seeds" must be some other mind, namely the eighth consciousness.
Here several divergent views are refuted. Some say that "the 'category' of the six consciousnesses can receive perfuming and hold seeds" (although each particular instance of the six consciousnesses changes, the character of the homogeneous succession of the same kind does not differ, so they take this "category" to hold the seeds). Rebuttal: if this "category" is held to be really existent, it is the same as the non-Buddhists' position; if it is granted to be merely nominal, it has no real efficacy and cannot hold the real seeds of the inner dharmas. And ask further: what nature is this "consciousness-category"? If it is wholesome or unwholesome in nature, it ought not to receive perfuming (what is morally determinate does not receive perfuming, like analytical cessation); if it is morally neutral in nature, then when a wholesome or unwholesome mind is active there is no neutral mind present, so this "category" would have to break off. (Nor can one say "the instances are wholesome and unwholesome while the category is neutral," for each particular category must share the nature of its particular instance.) Again, in mindless states this "category" is definitely absent — being thus broken off, it does not hold firm, so how could it hold seeds and receive perfuming? Again, the "consciousness-category" of an arhat's mind and of an ordinary being's mind is the same, so an ordinary being's defiled dharmas ought to be able to perfume an arhat, and undefiled dharmas ought to perfume an ordinary being (sameness of category implying mutual perfuming) — which is a ruinous consequence. Again, the eye-faculty and the eye-consciousness are of the same category in respect of "faculty and dharma," so they ought to perfume each other, yet you do not allow this. Again, the six consciousnesses, whether in respect of instance or of category, are never simultaneous in their prior and later moments — as though separated by a moment, they cannot perfume each other (perfumer and perfumed must be simultaneous). Even granting someone who holds that "the six consciousnesses can arise together simultaneously," the six consciousnesses are still not what is perfumed, so they have no sense of holding seeds. Others hold that "matter and mind each, in their prior moment, serve as the seed for their later moment" (homogeneous, uninterrupted succession). Rebuttal: since the homogeneous succession involves no perfuming, how can one hold the prior to be the seed of the later? Moreover, if "the prior is the seed of the later," then whatever breaks off ought never to arise again (if the matter and mind at the moment of death of a two-vehicle adept beyond training were the seed of a later set of aggregates, there ought to be no later aggregates — yet there really are). Nor does it work for matter and mind to serve reciprocally as each other's seeds (the evolving consciousnesses and matter are not what is perfumed, as said above). Others hold that "the three times are really existent, so there is no need to posit a separate seed-holding consciousness" (the scripture's "mind is the seed" is said only because the force of mind is strong when it gives rise to defiled and pure dharmas). Rebuttal: the past and future are neither permanent nor present; like sky-flowers, they are not really existent and have no function, so they cannot serve as the cause-condition. Without a consciousness that can hold the defiled and pure seeds, no cause and effect whatsoever can be established. Others hold that "the Mahāyāna principle of emptiness, which dispels characteristics, is the ultimate, denying this consciousness and indeed all dharmas." Rebuttal: this especially violates and damages the sūtras adduced above, holding wisdom, severance, realization, cultivation, and the cause-and-effect of defilement and purity all to be unreal, and so becomes a great wrong view — even the non-Buddhists who slander cause and effect do not say it is wholly nonexistent, only that it is unreal, so this grasping is worse than the non-Buddhists'. If all dharmas were unreal, the bodhisattva need not cultivate the equipment of awakening in order to cast off birth-and-death — what wise person would, in order to fight "an illusory enemy," go and seek "the son of a barren woman" to serve as his army? Therefore one should believe there is a mind that holds the seeds, and on it establish the cause-and-effect of defilement and purity; that mind is the eighth consciousness.
Reason 2, the Proof from Maturation — There Must Be Some Other Mind That Is the True Maturation
Scripture says there is a "maturation mind," felt as the result of wholesome and unwholesome action; without the eighth consciousness, this maturation mind ought not to exist. The eye-consciousness and the rest break off, and are not at all times the fruit of action — like lightning — so they are not the true maturation mind (the true maturation ought not to "break off and then resume"; look at the life-faculty and other maturation-results, where there is no case of resuming after having been cut off). Among the six consciousnesses, those felt as the result of action are, like sound, not perpetually continuous; they are merely "maturation-produced," not "true maturation." So one must grant a "true maturation mind" — one that requites the directive (general-result) action, that is all-pervading and without interval, that transforms into the body and the receptacle as the support of sentient beings (the body and the receptacle cannot stand apart from a mind that transforms into them). The non-concomitant formations have no real substance, and the evolving consciousnesses are not perpetually present; so without this true maturation mind, who is to transform into the body and the receptacle? And in dependence on what could "a sentient being" be perpetually established? Furthermore, whether in absorption or not, whether deliberating or not, there ought always to be many "bodily sensations" arising — otherwise how, afterwards, would one feel the body refreshed or fatigued? If there were not perpetually a true maturation mind, where would these bodily sensations come from in those states? (Note: speaking of "bodily sensations and maturation arising" refers throughout to "sentient beings who are not Buddhas" — the Buddha has no maturation and is not in question here.) From this we know there is perpetually a true maturation mind, and that is the eighth consciousness.
Reason 3, the Proof from the Substance of Destiny and Birth-Mode — The True Substance of "Destiny and Birth-Mode" Is Solely the Maturation Mind
Scripture says that sentient beings flow on through the five destinies and the four modes of birth; without the eighth consciousness, this substance of "destiny and birth-mode" ought not to exist. To serve as the "truly real substance of destiny and birth-mode," a dharma must be "really existent, perpetual, all-pervading, and unmixed" (a dharma that is not maturation makes destiny and birth-mode chaotic — while abiding in this destiny and this birth-mode one could still give rise to dharmas of another destiny and another birth-mode). Test the candidates one by one: maturation matter, and those among the five consciousnesses felt as the result of action, are not "all-pervading" (entirely absent in the formless realm); innately wholesome dharmas, and those within the mental consciousness felt as the result of action, though "all-pervading" and unmixed, are "not perpetual" (they break off); the non-concomitant formations, again, have no real substance — none of these can be established as the substance. Only the maturation mind and its mental factors are the truly real destiny and birth-mode that is real, perpetual, all-pervading, and unmixed. If this mind did not exist, then at the time of being born in the formless realm and giving rise to a wholesome mind (no matter, no five consciousnesses, wholesome arising and not perpetual) one would not count as having a destiny and birth-mode. Even granting, for argument's sake, that destiny and birth-mode comprehend all contaminated dharmas, then when one is born in the formless realm and gives rise to an uncontaminated mind, that too would not count as destiny and birth-mode (the uncontaminated not belonging to the contaminated) — still contravening reason. To avoid both these faults, only a "maturation dharma" is the truly real destiny and birth-mode. And precisely for this reason the Tathāgata is not comprehended by destiny and birth-mode (the Buddha has no neutral maturation), nor comprehended by the three realms (not contaminated, having cast off suffering and its origin, the seeds of conceptual proliferation already severed). Since the truly real destiny and birth-mode is solely the maturation mind and its factors, and these cannot stand apart from the eighth consciousness, we know there is a separate eighth consciousness.
Reason 4, the Proof from Appropriation — That Which Can Appropriate the Material Faculties and Body Is Solely the Maturation Mind
Scripture says the material faculties and body are "appropriated" (held and received by mind, so as to become felt and sensate); without the eighth consciousness, this "mind that appropriates" ought not to exist. The five material faculties and their bases are appropriated only in the present world, and this must come about through "a mind that can appropriate"; and this appropriating is solely the maturation mind — drawn forth by prior action, neither wholesome nor defiled, appropriating the material faculties and body "homogeneously, all-pervadingly, and continuously," a capacity the eye-consciousness and the other evolving consciousnesses do not have. (This statement displays that the evolving consciousnesses lack the capacity to appropriate homogeneously, all-pervadingly, and continuously; it does not say that "whatever can appropriate is invariably the maturation mind" — otherwise the Buddha's material body, having no maturation, would become unappropriated. One should understand it as saying that "what can appropriate a contaminated material body is solely the maturation mind.") Refute the evolving consciousnesses one by one: the evolving consciousnesses "arise only when a present object is at hand," and like sound or wind they cannot appropriate perpetually; among them, the wholesome and defiled, being "not drawn forth by action," like non-analytical cessation, do not appropriate; among them, the maturation-produced, being "not true maturation, not all-pervading in their support, and not continuous," like lightning — none of them can appropriate a contaminated material body. Whenever one says "mind" or "consciousness," it comprehends its mental factors as well (which are determinately concomitant — just as the single phrase "consciousness-only" comprehends the mental factors). Matter and the non-concomitant formations, again, cannot appropriate the material faculties and body — because they "have no object," like empty space. So there must be a separate mind that can appropriate, and that is the eighth consciousness.
Reason 5, the Proof from Lifespan, Warmth, and Consciousness — The Consciousness That Can Hold Lifespan and Warmth Is Solely the Maturation Consciousness
Scripture says that the three — lifespan, warmth, and consciousness — mutually depend on and hold one another, and only thus do they get to abide in succession; without the eighth consciousness able to hold lifespan and warmth, this "consciousness that makes lifespan and warmth abide long" ought not to exist. The evolving consciousnesses have intervals and turnings — like sound and wind — and have no function of perpetual holding, so they cannot be established as the consciousness that holds lifespan and warmth; only the maturation consciousness, without interval and without turning, just like lifespan and warmth (also perpetual and homogeneously continuous), has the function of perpetual holding, so it can be established as the consciousness that holds lifespan and warmth. Someone objects: scripture says the three dharmas "mutually depend on and hold one another," yet lifespan and warmth are homogeneously continuous while "consciousness" alone is not (if it means the evolving consciousness, it breaks off) — how is this coherent? Counter-question to him: since you grant that "warmth alone does not pervade the three realms" (no warmth in the formless realm) and this still does not damage the doctrine of mutual dependence, then why will you not grant that "consciousness alone has intervals and turnings"? Then answer it clearly: wherever the three dharmas are "complete and turn without interval," there the three can perpetually depend on and hold one another; where they are not complete and not without interval, there is no function of perpetual mutual holding — the foregoing precisely uses this principle to display that "the consciousness among the three dharmas does not mean the evolving consciousness"; and the objection that "warmth, when adduced, does not pervade" cannot damage this principle. Furthermore: since lifespan and warmth among the three dharmas are solely contaminated, the "consciousness" that holds them in mutual support is likewise definitely not uncontaminated; so when one is born in the formless realm and gives rise to an uncontaminated mind, who holds that lifespan? (When the evolving consciousness becomes uncontaminated it no longer holds, so there must be some other.) From this we know there is a "homogeneous, perpetual, all-pervading" maturation consciousness that can hold lifespan and warmth, and that is the eighth consciousness.
Onward Transmission
This proof by five scriptures and five reasons is carried forward under the same headings. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha, in its chapter on the knowable ground, treats the ālaya under ten aspects, and the two verses of the Abhidharma Sūtra and the ādāna verse of the Saṃdhinirmocana cited in its section of scriptural attestation are exactly those cited here — one source. The Yogācārabhūmi, in its Section of Ascertainment, establishes eight aspects proving the ālaya, and its aspects of seed-holding, maturation and appropriation are the ground of the first five reasons here. The Hundred Dharmas lists the ālaya as the eighth of the mind-dharmas, and its right to be separately listed rests on just what is proved here — that it has a substance of its own. Without this proof the eighth consciousness would have no title to stand.
考據Apparatus
〔所釋之頌〕承前章,廣釋第二頌至第四頌·證有第八
一、科判定位
| 科判 | 此章之位 |
|---|---|
| 三能變 | 初能變·阿賴耶 → 第二能變 → 第三能變 |
| 阿賴耶章內 | 三相·種子(§7)→ 諸門廣辯(§8–9)→ 證有別體·五教前五理 → 後五理(次章) |
| 所釋頌 | 頌二至頌四之總證(頌文未別出,依《述記》科) |
阿賴耶之相與門既明,本章立聖教與正理二量以證其別有自體:先舉五教,次列十理之前五(持種·異熟·趣生體·執受·壽煖識)。後五理別為次章。
二、源頌 · 義理脈絡
初阿賴耶識,異熟一切種。 〔T1586 0060b04〕
頌二既立阿賴耶之名,然其體是否離眼等識別有?此非頌文所別出,而窺基《述記》科為『證有別體』一大科。論主立二量:一聖教量,舉五經之明文;二正理量,列十理之推徵。本章舉五教與前五理。
三、經論宗依(經證 → 論本)
經證
此識亦名阿陀那識。何以故?由此識於身隨逐執持故。亦名阿賴耶識。何以故?由此識於身攝受、藏隱、同安危義故。 〔解深密經·心意識相品 T676 0692b15–b17〕
阿陀那識甚深細,一切種子如瀑流,我於凡愚不開演,恐彼分別執為我。 〔解深密經 T676 0692c22–c23〕
藏識海常住,境界風所動,種種諸識浪,騰躍而轉生。 〔楞伽阿跋多羅寶經 T670 0484b11–b12〕
〔無始時來界,一切法等依,由此有諸趣,及涅槃證得。〕〔由攝藏諸法,一切種子識,故名阿賴耶,勝者我開示。〕——《大乘阿毘達磨經》二頌,漢無傳本·經文存論〔照本論引錄 T1585 0014a13–b23〕。
《解深密》以『阿陀那(隨逐執持)·阿賴耶(攝受藏隱同安危)·心(積集滋長)』三名顯此執受之識、種子如瀑流而誡凡愚勿執為我——證有第八之經本;《楞伽》以藏識海為境風所擊而起諸識浪,顯眼等識不能如海恒續、別有第八作藏識海之體;《大乘阿毘達磨》二頌(界依·攝藏)漢地無別行本,其文唯存本論所引,故照本論引錄、標『經文存論』。
論本(瑜伽師地論 T1579)
由八種相,證阿賴耶識決定是有。謂若離阿賴耶識,依止執受不應道理,最初生起不應道理,有明了性不應道理,有種子性不應道理,業用差別不應道理,身受差別不應道理,處無心定不應道理,命終時識不應道理。 〔瑜伽師地論·攝決擇分 T1579 0579a20–a25〕
唯有阿賴耶識能執持身。此若捨離,即於身分冷觸可得,身無覺受。意識不爾。是故若無阿賴耶識,不應道理。 〔T1579 0579c19–c22〕
《瑜伽師地論》〈攝決擇分〉先引「阿陀那識甚深細」頌〔0579a15〕、繼以嗢拕南「執受、初、明了、種子、業、身受、無心定、命終」立八相證阿賴耶決定是有〔0579a17–25〕——此即本論十理之論本所自:八相之執受(理四)·種子(理一)·業用(理三)·身受(理二)·處無心定(理九)·命終時識(理六),本論廣之為十。其經在解深密、楞伽,其論在瑜伽師地論八相證,護法糅釋承之而開為五教十理。
四、本論釋要(護法糅釋 · T1585)
總標 · 定量
云何應知此第八識離眼等識有別自體?聖教、正理為定量故。 〔T1585 0014a10–a11〕
五教 · 界依頌釋
「界」是因義,即種子識……「依」是緣義,即執持識無始時來,與一切法等為依止,故名為緣。 〔T1585 0014a17–a20〕
五教 · 攝藏頌釋
與雜染法互相攝藏,亦為有情執藏為我,故說此識名「阿賴耶」。 〔T1585 0014b26–b28〕
五教 · 阿陀那頌釋
以能執持諸法種子,及能執受色根依處,亦能執取結生相續,故說此識名「阿陀那」。 〔T1585 0014c07–c08〕
五教 · 大乘佛說七因(《莊嚴論》頌)
先不記、俱行、非餘所行境、極成、有無有、對治、異文故。 〔T1585 0015a16–a17〕
五教 · 餘部密意
謂大眾部阿笈摩中,密意說此名根本識……上坐部經分別論者,俱密意說此名有分識……化地部說此名窮生死蘊……說一切有部《增壹》經中,亦密意說此名阿賴耶。 〔T1585 0015a19–a28〕
五教 · 真愛著處結
異生、有學起我愛時,雖於餘蘊有愛、非愛,而於此識,我愛定生,故唯此是真愛著處。由是彼說阿賴耶名,定唯顯此阿賴耶識。 〔T1585 0015b15–b18〕
十理 · 逐證標目
〔理一·持種〕若無此識,彼持種心不應有故。 〔T1585 0015b20–b21〕 〔理二·異熟〕又契經說有異熟心,善、惡業感,若無此識,彼異熟心不應有故。 〔T1585 0016a16–a17〕 〔理三·趣生〕又契經說:有情流轉五趣、四生。若無此識,彼趣、生體不應有故。 〔T1585 0016b03–b04〕 〔理四·執受〕又契經說:有色根身是有執受……故應別有能執受心,彼心即是此第八識。 〔T1585 0016b20–c05〕 〔理五·壽煖〕又契經說:壽、煖、識三,更互依持,得相續住……令久住識不應有故。 〔T1585 0016c06–c07〕 〔理六·生死〕又契經說:諸有情類,受生、命終,必住散心,非無心定……生、死時心不應有故。 〔T1585 0016c23–c24〕 〔理七·緣起〕又契經說:識緣名色,名色緣識……彼識自體,不應有故。 〔T1585 0017a23–a25〕 〔理八·識食〕又契經說:一切有情皆依食住……此識雖通諸識自體,而第八識食義偏勝,一類相續執持勝故。 〔T1585 0017b11–b24〕 〔理九·滅定〕又契經說:住滅定者……識不離身。若無此識住滅定者,不離身識不應有故。 〔T1585 0017c25–c28〕 〔理十·染淨〕又契經說:心雜染故,有情雜染;心清淨故,有情清淨。若無此識,彼染、淨心不應有故。 〔T1585 0018c24–c25〕
總結勸信
許有此識,一切皆成,唯此能持染、淨種故。證此識有,理趣無邊,恐厭繁文,略述綱要。別有此識,教理顯然,諸有智人,應深信受。 〔T1585 0019a25–a28〕
要義:本論證有第八,骨幹在「聖教、正理為定量」一句——此識非現量可緣,唯比量與聖言量可證。五教先引大乘三經(界依·攝藏·阿陀那·藏識海),為防「大乘非佛說」之難,更立慈氏七因坐實大乘佛說,復舉四部阿含『根本識·有分識·窮生死蘊·愛阿賴耶』之密意異名與「真愛著處」之逐破,顯部派經中早已暗說此識。十理則以同一推徵格遍破:諸轉識『間斷、易脫、待緣、有轉』,色法不相應行『非心性、無所緣、無實體』,過未法『非現非常如空華』——皆不堪為持種·異熟·趣生·執受·壽煖·生死·緣起·識食·滅定·染淨之體,故知別有一「一類、恒、遍」之異熟識,即第八。
五、諸家異釋(窺基《述記》T1830)
後以十理、五經證此識有。八段十義者,初之三相合為一門……餘門各別,七門正解十義,一門別解觸等。 〔T1830 0300c07–c11〕
次下第二以五教十理證有本識。於中有三:初問、次答。第三至第四卷云:「別有此識教理顯然」下,總結勸信。 〔T1830 0347a05–a07〕
此非世間現量境故,唯信聖言,及比知有。以此二量為決定證,故言定量。 〔T1830 0347a29–b02〕
前十證中所攝八證,諸後講者一一敘之。 〔謂八證中最初生起,明了生起,業用不可得等,皆此未說〕 〔T1830 0376c02–c03〕
述曰:此總結上教、理二證第三文也。 〔T1830 0376c04–c05〕
窺基定本章在科判之位:本識長行『初八段十義釋頌、後以十理五經證此識有』,此章即後一段,分三(問·答·勸信)。釋「定量」:第八識非世間現量境,唯聖言量(信聖言)與比量(比知有)可證,二量決定,故名「定量」。又《述記》明判本論「十理」與《瑜伽》『八相證』之相攝:十證所攝瑜伽八證,唯瑜伽之『最初生起·明了·業用』三相本論未列(屬諸識俱轉門、非正證有),餘八相一一入十理——此即本章承《瑜伽》八相而開為五教十理之教證脈絡。
六、譯名 · 古譯對讀(玄奘 ↔ 真諦《轉識論》)
| 義 | 玄奘《成唯識論》 | 真諦《轉識論》 |
|---|---|---|
| 第八識 | 阿賴耶識 · 異熟識 · 一切種識 | 果報識(「一果報識,即是阿梨耶識」〔0061c08〕) |
| 異名 | 阿陀那識 · 心 | 本識 · 宅識 · 藏識(「亦名本識……亦名宅識……亦名藏識」〔0061c10–12〕) |
| 一切種子識 | 一切種(攝藏諸法種子) | 阿梨耶識(「謂是一切種子識者,是阿梨耶識」〔0062b29〕) |
| 證有之方 | 自性微細,以作用顯示;聖教正理為定量 | 由事故知有(「云何知有?答:由事故知有此識」〔0061c14〕) |
玄奘以「阿賴耶」為第八識正名、「阿陀那」亦第八之異名(依《解深密》隨逐執持義);真諦《轉識論》立「三能緣」——果報識(阿梨耶)·執識(阿陀那)·塵識(六識),以「阿陀那」名第七執識,與玄奘異。二師同明此識自性微細、不可現量分別,皆以「作用/事」反顯其有。
七、術語
阿賴耶(ālaya)— 藏;攝藏諸法、為有情執藏為我之第八識。 阿陀那(ādāna)— 執持;隨逐執持色根、種子、結生相續之義。 界(dhātu)— 因義;即種子識,無始展轉相續、親生諸法。 真愛著處 — 有情我愛定生之處,唯第八識當之,非餘五取蘊。 異熟識(vipāka-vijñāna)— 酬牽引業、遍而無斷、變身器作有情依之真異熟心。 持種 · 受熏 — 一類恒無間斷、堅住可熏,能集起染淨諸法種子。 〔梵文為古德所傳發音輔助。〕
八、互讀(唯識系次第:百法 → 三十頌 → 二十論 → 辯中邊論 → 攝大乘論)
- 百法:心法·阿賴耶(八識之第八);其所持染淨種即百法諸位之種子依。
- 三十頌:頌二至四(阿賴耶相·異熟·一切種·恒轉如瀑流·阿羅漢位捨)——本章即證此所立第八識別有自體。
- 二十論:〔從闕〕主唯識無境、破外執,第八識證有無正面對位。
- 辯中邊論:辯相品·虛妄分別(識為染依,與本識持染淨種義通)。
- 攝大乘論:所知依分·阿賴耶識(《攝論》以十相·八證廣立阿賴耶,與本章五教十理同源於《瑜伽》攝決擇分)。
章內:阿賴耶識(一)(二)(三相·種子·諸門——本章承之證有)· 第二能變·末那(依阿賴耶而轉、緣阿賴耶執我)· 第三能變·了境。
九、校本定位
頌 T1586〔0060b04·0060b07–08〕· 本論 T1585 證有第八〔0014a10–b28·0014c07–08·0015a16–b18·0015b20–0019a28〕· 述記 T1830〔0300c07·0347a05·0347a29–b03·0376b27·0376c04〕· 《轉識論》T1587〔0061c08·0061c10–14·0062b29〕。 〔經證〕解深密 T676〔0692b15·0692c22〕· 楞伽 T670〔0484b11〕· 〔大乘阿毘達磨經·漢無傳本·經文存論 T1585 0014a13·0014b22〕。〔論本〕瑜伽師地論 T1579〔0579a15·0579a20·0579c19〕。
〔Verses commented〕Continuing: unfolding verses 2–4 · proving the eighth
1. Position in Kuiji's Structural Outline
| Outline | Position of this chapter |
|---|---|
| Three transformers | first - the ālaya -> second -> third |
| Within the ālaya chapter | three aspects and seeds (§7) -> the gates unfolded (§8–9) -> proof of a distinct substance - five scriptures, first five reasons -> the latter five reasons (next chapter) |
| Verses commented | the general proof of vv. 2-4 (not separately raised in the verse; on Kuiji's outline) |
The character and gates of the ālaya being settled, this chapter raises the two standards of scripture and reason to prove that it has a substance of its own: five scriptural testimonies first, then the first five of ten reasons (seed-holding, maturation, the substance of destiny, appropriation, life-warmth-consciousness). The latter five form the next chapter.
2. Source verses · doctrinal context
初阿賴耶識,異熟一切種。 〔T1586 0060b04〕
Verse 2 has given the ālaya its name; but has it a substance apart from the eye-consciousness and the rest? The verse does not separately raise this, and Kuiji's Shuji makes of it a major heading, proof of a distinct substance. The treatise raises two standards: scriptural authority, in the explicit words of five sūtras, and reason, in ten inferences. This chapter gives the five scriptures and the first five reasons.
3. Scriptural and treatise grounding (scripture → root śāstra)
Scriptural witnesses
此識亦名阿陀那識。何以故?由此識於身隨逐執持故。亦名阿賴耶識。何以故?由此識於身攝受、藏隱、同安危義故。 〔解深密經·心意識相品 T676 0692b15–b17〕
tr. "This consciousness is also named the ādāna-consciousness. Why? Because this consciousness follows after and appropriates the body. It is also named the ālaya-consciousness. Why? Because this consciousness, with respect to the body, takes-in, stores-away, and shares one weal-and-woe with it."
阿陀那識甚深細,一切種子如瀑流,我於凡愚不開演,恐彼分別執為我。 〔解深密經 T676 0692c22–c23〕
tr. "The ādāna-consciousness is most deep and subtle, all its seeds [flowing] like a torrent; I do not expound it to the foolish and ordinary, lest they discriminate and grasp it as a self."
藏識海常住,境界風所動,種種諸識浪,騰躍而轉生。 〔楞伽阿跋多羅寶經 T670 0484b11–b12〕
tr. "The store-consciousness ocean abides constant; stirred by the wind of objects, the manifold waves of the consciousnesses leap up and arise in turn."
〔無始時來界,一切法等依,由此有諸趣,及涅槃證得。〕〔由攝藏諸法,一切種子識,故名阿賴耶,勝者我開示。〕——《大乘阿毘達磨經》二頌,漢無傳本·經文存論〔照本論引錄 T1585 0014a13–b23〕。
tr. "〔The element from beginningless time, the equal basis of all dharmas; because of this there are the destinies, and the attaining of nirvāṇa.〕 〔Because it gathers and stores all dharmas, [it is] the all-seeds consciousness; hence it is named the ālaya, which I disclose to the superior ones.〕" — two verses of the Mahāyāna-abhidharma-sūtra, with no transmitted witness in Chinese, the sūtra-text surviving [only] in the treatise 〔quoted as recorded in the root treatise, T1585 0014a13·0014b22〕.
The Saṃdhinirmocana, with the three names "ādāna (following after and appropriating) · ālaya (taking-in, storing-away, sharing one weal-and-woe) · mind (accumulating and nourishing)," discloses this appropriating consciousness, whose seeds [flow] like a torrent, and warns the foolish and ordinary not to grasp it as a self — the scriptural root for proving the existence of the eighth; the Laṅkāvatāra, with the store-consciousness ocean struck by the wind of objects so as to raise the waves of the consciousnesses, discloses that the eye-consciousness and the rest cannot, like the ocean, endure constantly, and that there is separately an eighth consciousness as the substance of the store-consciousness ocean; the Mahāyāna-abhidharma's two verses (the basis-as-element · the gathering-and-storing) have no separately-circulating witness in the Chinese lands, their text surviving only as quoted in the root treatise, and so are quoted as recorded in the root treatise and marked "the sūtra-text surviving in the treatise."
Root śāstra (Yogācārabhūmi T1579)
由八種相,證阿賴耶識決定是有。謂若離阿賴耶識,依止執受不應道理,最初生起不應道理,有明了性不應道理,有種子性不應道理,業用差別不應道理,身受差別不應道理,處無心定不應道理,命終時識不應道理。 〔瑜伽師地論·攝決擇分 T1579 0579a20–a25〕
tr. "By eight kinds of mark it is proved that the ālaya-consciousness definitely exists. That is: if there were no ālaya-consciousness, then the basis-and-appropriation would not stand to reason, the very first arising would not stand to reason, having a clear nature would not stand to reason, having a seed-nature would not stand to reason, the differentiation of karmic function would not stand to reason, the differentiation of bodily feeling would not stand to reason, abiding in the no-mind concentration would not stand to reason, and the consciousness at the time of death would not stand to reason."
唯有阿賴耶識能執持身。此若捨離,即於身分冷觸可得,身無覺受。意識不爾。是故若無阿賴耶識,不應道理。 〔T1579 0579c19–c22〕
tr. "Only the ālaya-consciousness can appropriate the body. Should it let go, then a cold touch is gotten upon the parts of the body, and the body has no sensation. The mind-consciousness is not so. Therefore, if there were no ālaya-consciousness, it would not stand to reason."
The Yogācārabhūmi's Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī first cites the verse "the ādāna-consciousness is most deep and subtle" 〔0579a15〕, then with the uddāna "appropriation, the first, the clear, the seeds, karma, bodily feeling, the no-mind concentration, death" sets up eight marks proving that the ālaya definitely exists 〔0579a17–25〕 — this is the very śāstra-source of this treatise's ten principles: among the eight marks, appropriation (principle four) · seeds (principle one) · karmic function (principle three) · bodily feeling (principle two) · abiding in the no-mind concentration (principle nine) · consciousness at the time of death (principle six), which the root treatise broadens to ten. Its scripture is in the Saṃdhinirmocana and the Laṅkāvatāra, its śāstra in the Yogācārabhūmi's eight-mark proof; Dharmapāla's redaction carries these forward and opens them into the five teachings and ten principles.
4. Essentials of the root treatise (Dharmapāla's redaction · T1585)
General statement · the deciding measures
云何應知此第八識離眼等識有別自體?聖教、正理為定量故。 〔T1585 0014a10–a11〕
tr. "How is it to be known that this eighth consciousness has a separate substance of its own apart from the eye-consciousness and the rest? Because scriptural teaching and right principle are the deciding measures."
The five teachings · gloss on the basis-as-element verse
「界」是因義,即種子識……「依」是緣義,即執持識無始時來,與一切法等為依止,故名為緣。 〔T1585 0014a17–a20〕
tr. "'Element' is the sense of cause, namely the seed-consciousness… 'basis' is the sense of condition, namely the appropriating consciousness, which from beginningless time is the equal basis for all dharmas, and is hence named the condition."
The five teachings · gloss on the gathering-and-storing verse
與雜染法互相攝藏,亦為有情執藏為我,故說此識名「阿賴耶」。 〔T1585 0014b26–b28〕
tr. "It mutually gathers-and-stores with the defiled dharmas, and is also grasped-and-stored as a self by sentient beings; hence this consciousness is said to be named the 'ālaya.'"
The five teachings · gloss on the ādāna verse
以能執持諸法種子,及能執受色根依處,亦能執取結生相續,故說此識名「阿陀那」。 〔T1585 0014c07–c08〕
tr. "Because it can appropriate the seeds of all dharmas, and can appropriate the form-faculties and their bases, and can take up the linking-of-birth and continuance, this consciousness is said to be named the 'ādāna.'"
The five teachings · the Mahāyāna being Buddha-spoken, seven reasons (the Sūtrālaṃkāra verse)
先不記、俱行、非餘所行境、極成、有無有、對治、異文故。 〔T1585 0015a16–a17〕
tr. "Because: not foretold beforehand · proceeding together · not the field of others' practice · thoroughly established · existent-or-non-existent · counteracting · differing from the literal."
The five teachings · the hidden intent of the other schools
謂大眾部阿笈摩中,密意說此名根本識……上坐部經分別論者,俱密意說此名有分識……化地部說此名窮生死蘊……說一切有部《增壹》經中,亦密意說此名阿賴耶。 〔T1585 0015a19–a28〕
tr. "That is, in the Mahāsāṃghika's āgama it is, with hidden intent, named the root-consciousness… the Sthavira's sūtras and the Vibhajyavādin masters both, with hidden intent, name it the existence-factor consciousness… the Mahīśāsaka name it the aggregate that runs to the end of birth-and-death… in the Sarvāstivāda's Ekottara-sūtra it is also, with hidden intent, named the ālaya."
The five teachings · the conclusion, the true place of loving attachment
異生、有學起我愛時,雖於餘蘊有愛、非愛,而於此識,我愛定生,故唯此是真愛著處。由是彼說阿賴耶名,定唯顯此阿賴耶識。 〔T1585 0015b15–b18〕
tr. "When the ordinary [being] and the [noble] learner arouse self-love, then though toward the other aggregates there is loving and not-loving, yet toward this consciousness self-love definitely arises; hence this alone is the true place of loving attachment. By this, the 'ālaya' that they speak of definitely discloses only this ālaya-consciousness."
The ten principles · the heading-by-heading proof
〔理一·持種〕若無此識,彼持種心不應有故。 〔T1585 0015b20–b21〕
tr. "〔Principle one · upholding the seeds〕 If there were no this consciousness, that seed-upholding mind would not stand to exist."
〔理二·異熟〕又契經說有異熟心,善、惡業感,若無此識,彼異熟心不應有故。 〔T1585 0016a16–a17〕
tr. "〔Principle two · maturation〕 Again, the sūtras say there is a maturation-mind, called forth by good and evil karma; if there were no this consciousness, that maturation-mind would not stand to exist."
〔理三·趣生〕又契經說:有情流轉五趣、四生。若無此識,彼趣、生體不應有故。 〔T1585 0016b03–b04〕
tr. "〔Principle three · destiny-and-birth〕 Again, the sūtras say: sentient beings flow and turn through the five destinies and the four births. If there were no this consciousness, that substance of destiny-and-birth would not stand to exist."
〔理四·執受〕又契經說:有色根身是有執受……故應別有能執受心,彼心即是此第八識。 〔T1585 0016b20–c05〕
tr. "〔Principle four · appropriation〕 Again, the sūtras say: a body with form-faculties is appropriated… hence there must be separately a mind able to appropriate, and that mind is precisely this eighth consciousness."
〔理五·壽煖〕又契經說:壽、煖、識三,更互依持,得相續住……令久住識不應有故。 〔T1585 0016c06–c07〕
tr. "〔Principle five · life-warmth〕 Again, the sūtras say: the three — life, warmth, and consciousness — mutually rest on and uphold one another, and so get to abide continuously… [otherwise] the consciousness that makes [them] long-abide would not stand to exist."
〔理六·生死〕又契經說:諸有情類,受生、命終,必住散心,非無心定……生、死時心不應有故。 〔T1585 0016c23–c24〕
tr. "〔Principle six · birth-and-death〕 Again, the sūtras say: the kinds of sentient beings, in taking birth and in ending life, must abide in a distracted mind, not in a no-mind concentration… [otherwise] the mind at the time of birth and death would not stand to exist."
〔理七·緣起〕又契經說:識緣名色,名色緣識……彼識自體,不應有故。 〔T1585 0017a23–a25〕
tr. "〔Principle seven · dependent arising〕 Again, the sūtras say: consciousness conditions name-and-form, name-and-form conditions consciousness… [otherwise] the substance of that consciousness would not stand to exist."
〔理八·識食〕又契經說:一切有情皆依食住……此識雖通諸識自體,而第八識食義偏勝,一類相續執持勝故。 〔T1585 0017b11–b24〕
tr. "〔Principle eight · the consciousness-food〕 Again, the sūtras say: all sentient beings abide in dependence on food… though this [consciousness-]food pervades the substance of all the consciousnesses, yet in the eighth consciousness the sense of food is especially preponderant, for it appropriates of one kind, continuously, and preponderantly."
〔理九·滅定〕又契經說:住滅定者……識不離身。若無此識住滅定者,不離身識不應有故。 〔T1585 0017c25–c28〕
tr. "〔Principle nine · the cessation-attainment〕 Again, the sūtras say: one abiding in the cessation-attainment… the consciousness does not leave the body. If there were no this consciousness, then for one abiding in the cessation-attainment, the consciousness not leaving the body would not stand to exist."
〔理十·染淨〕又契經說:心雜染故,有情雜染;心清淨故,有情清淨。若無此識,彼染、淨心不應有故。 〔T1585 0018c24–c25〕
tr. "〔Principle ten · defilement-and-purity〕 Again, the sūtras say: because the mind is defiled, sentient beings are defiled; because the mind is pure, sentient beings are pure. If there were no this consciousness, that defiled-and-pure mind would not stand to exist."
The general conclusion, urging belief
許有此識,一切皆成,唯此能持染、淨種故。證此識有,理趣無邊,恐厭繁文,略述綱要。別有此識,教理顯然,諸有智人,應深信受。 〔T1585 0019a25–a28〕
tr. "Grant that this consciousness exists, and all is established, for this alone can uphold the defiled and pure seeds. The principles proving that this consciousness exists are without bound; fearing weariness at a profusion of words, [the treatise] briefly states the essentials. That there is separately this consciousness is plain in teaching and in principle; all those with wisdom should deeply believe and accept it."
Essentials: the treatise's proof of the eighth's existence has its backbone in the single line "scriptural teaching and right principle are the deciding measures" — this consciousness cannot be referred by direct perception, and can be proved only by inference and by the measure of scriptural word. The five teachings first cite the three Mahāyāna sūtras (the basis-as-element · the gathering-and-storing · the ādāna · the store-consciousness ocean), and, to ward off the objection that "the Mahāyāna is not Buddha-spoken," further set up Maitreya's seven reasons to make firm that the Mahāyāna is Buddha-spoken; it then adduces the hidden divergent names of the four āgama schools (root-consciousness · existence-factor consciousness · the aggregate that runs to the end of birth-and-death · loving the ālaya) and the heading-by-heading refutation at "the true place of loving attachment," disclosing that the sectarian sūtras had long covertly spoken of this consciousness. The ten principles then refute pervasively by one and the same demonstrative pattern: the turning consciousnesses "intermit, slip off easily, await a condition, have turning"; form-dharmas and the non-concurrent formations are "not of mind-nature, have no object-support, have no real substance"; the past-and-future dharmas are "neither present nor permanent, like a sky-flower" — all unequal to being the substance of upholding-the-seeds · maturation · destiny-and-birth · appropriation · life-warmth · birth-and-death · dependent arising · the consciousness-food · the cessation-attainment · defilement-and-purity; and so one knows there is separately a maturation-consciousness "of one kind, constant, and pervading," which is the eighth.
5. Divergent readings across the masters (Kuiji, Shuji T1830)
後以十理、五經證此識有。八段十義者,初之三相合為一門……餘門各別,七門正解十義,一門別解觸等。 〔T1830 0300c07–c11〕
tr. "Afterward, by ten principles and five scriptures, it proves that this consciousness exists. As for the eight segments and ten meanings: the first three marks are combined into one gate… the remaining gates each separate, seven gates directly explaining the ten meanings, one gate separately explaining contact and the rest."
次下第二以五教十理證有本識。於中有三:初問、次答。第三至第四卷云:「別有此識教理顯然」下,總結勸信。 〔T1830 0347a05–a07〕
tr. "Next below, second, by five teachings and ten principles it proves the existence of the root-consciousness. Within this there are three: first the question, next the answer. The third, in the fourth fascicle, from 'that there is separately this consciousness is plain in teaching and in principle' downward, is the general conclusion, urging belief."
此非世間現量境故,唯信聖言,及比知有。以此二量為決定證,故言定量。 〔T1830 0347a29–b02〕
tr. "Because this is not an object of worldly direct perception, one only trusts the sacred word, and by inference knows it to exist. Taking these two measures as the deciding proof, [the treatise] therefore says 'deciding measures.'"
前十證中所攝八證,諸後講者一一敘之。 〔謂八證中最初生起,明了生起,業用不可得等,皆此未說〕 〔T1830 0376c02–c03〕
tr. "The eight proofs subsumed within the foregoing ten proofs the later expositors set forth one by one. 〔That is: among the eight proofs, the very first arising, the clear arising, the unattainability of karmic function, and the like — these are all not stated here.〕"
述曰:此總結上教、理二證第三文也。 〔T1830 0376c04–c05〕
tr. "Commentary: this is the general conclusion, the third text [closing] the foregoing twofold proof by teaching and by principle."
Kuiji fixes this chapter's place in the outline: the root-consciousness long prose "first in eight segments, with ten meanings, expounds the verse; afterward, by ten principles and five scriptures, proves that this consciousness exists" — this chapter being the latter segment, divided into three (the question · the answer · urging belief). He glosses "the deciding measures": the eighth consciousness is not an object of worldly direct perception, and can be proved only by the measure of the sacred word (trusting the sacred word) and the measure of inference (knowing by inference that it exists); the two measures being decisive, it is named "the deciding measures." The Shuji further plainly judges the mutual subsumption of this treatise's "ten principles" and the Yogācārabhūmi's "eight-mark proof": of the eight proofs subsumed by the ten proofs, only the Yogācārabhūmi's three marks "the very first arising · the clear · karmic function" are not listed in the root treatise (belonging to the gate of the consciousnesses turning together, not a direct proof of existence), the remaining eight marks entering one by one into the ten principles — this being precisely the chapter's teaching-proof lineage, carrying the Yogācārabhūmi's eight marks forward and opening them into the five teachings and ten principles.
6. Rendering of terms · old-translation comparison (Xuanzang ↔ Paramārtha, Zhuanshi lun)
| Sense | Xuanzang, Cheng Weishi Lun | Paramārtha, Zhuanshi lun |
|---|---|---|
| the eighth consciousness | 阿賴耶識 ālaya-consciousness · 異熟識 maturation-consciousness · 一切種識 all-seeds-consciousness | 果報識 fruit-retribution consciousness ("the one fruit-retribution consciousness is just the ālaya-consciousness" — 「一果報識,即是阿梨耶識」〔0061c08〕) |
| alternative names | 阿陀那識 ādāna-consciousness · 心 mind | 本識 root-consciousness · 宅識 abode-consciousness · 藏識 store-consciousness ("also named the root-consciousness… also named the abode-consciousness… also named the store-consciousness" — 「亦名本識……亦名宅識……亦名藏識」〔0061c10–12〕) |
| the all-seeds consciousness | 一切種 the all-seeds [consciousness] (gathering-and-storing the seeds of all dharmas) | 阿梨耶識 the ālaya-consciousness ("what is called the all-seeds consciousness is the ālaya-consciousness" — 「謂是一切種子識者,是阿梨耶識」〔0062b29〕) |
| the means of proving [its] existence | 自性微細,以作用顯示;聖教正理為定量 [its] self-nature is subtle, shown by [its] function; scriptural teaching and right principle are the deciding measures | 由事故知有 known to exist through its workings ("how is it known to exist? Answer: through its workings this consciousness is known to exist" — 「云何知有?答:由事故知有此識」〔0061c14〕) |
Xuanzang takes "ālaya" as the proper name of the eighth consciousness, "ādāna" likewise as an alternative name of the eighth (on the sense of "following after and appropriating" from the Saṃdhinirmocana); Paramārtha's Zhuanshi lun sets up "three that can refer" — the fruit-retribution consciousness (ālaya) · the grasping consciousness (ādāna) · the dust [object]-consciousness (the six consciousnesses), naming by "ādāna" the seventh grasping consciousness, which differs from Xuanzang. The two masters alike disclose that this consciousness is subtle in its self-nature and cannot be discriminated by direct perception, and both disclose its existence inversely by "function / its workings."
7. Key terms
- ālaya (ālaya) — the store; the eighth consciousness, which gathers-and-stores all dharmas and is grasped-and-stored as a self by sentient beings.
- ādāna (ādāna) — the appropriating; the sense of following after and appropriating the form-faculties, the seeds, and the linking-of-birth and continuance.
- element (dhātu) — the sense of cause; namely the seed-consciousness, from beginningless time turning and continuing in succession, directly giving birth to all dharmas.
- the true place of loving attachment — the place where the self-love of sentient beings definitely arises; only the eighth consciousness answers to it, not the other five appropriating aggregates.
- maturation-consciousness (vipāka-vijñāna) — the true maturation-mind that requites the impelling karma, pervading and without intermission, transforming into body and receptacle-world to serve as the basis for sentient beings.
- upholding the seeds · receiving perfuming — of one kind, constant, and uninterrupted, firmly abiding and able to be perfumed, able to gather and arouse the seeds of all defiled and pure dharmas.
〔Sanskrit forms are a pronunciation aid transmitted by the ancient masters.〕
8. Cross-reading (the Yogācāra sequence: Baifa → Triṃśikā → Viṃśatikā → Madhyāntavibhāga → Mahāyānasaṃgraha)
- Baifa (Hundred Dharmas): the mind-dharmas · the ālaya (the eighth of the eight consciousnesses); the defiled-and-pure seeds it upholds are precisely the seed-basis of the several positions among the hundred dharmas.
- Triṃśikā: verses 2 to 4 (the marks of the ālaya · maturation · all-seeds · ever turning like a torrent · relinquished at the arhat stage) — this chapter precisely proves that the eighth consciousness thus set down has a real substance of its own.
- Viṃśatikā: 〔omitted here〕 it chiefly [treats] consciousness-only-without-object and the refuting of outer attachments; the proof of the eighth's existence has no frontal counterpart there.
- Madhyāntavibhāga: the Characteristics chapter · unreal imagining (consciousness as the basis of defilement, of one vein with the root-consciousness's sense of upholding the defiled-and-pure seeds).
- Mahāyānasaṃgraha: the Knowable-Basis division · the ālaya-consciousness (the Saṃgraha broadly sets up the ālaya by ten marks and eight proofs, of one source with this chapter's five teachings and ten principles in the Yogācārabhūmi's Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī).
Within the treatise: the ālaya-consciousness (I)(II) (three marks · seeds · the several gates — this chapter carries them forward to prove [its] existence) · the second transformer · the manas (turning in dependence on the ālaya, referring to the ālaya and grasping it as a self) · the third transformer · the discerning of objects.
9. Collation position
Verse T1586 〔0060b04·0060b07–08〕 · root T1585 proving the existence of the eighth 〔0014a10–b28·0014c07–08·0015a16–b18·0015b20–0019a28〕 · Shuji T1830 〔0300c07·0347a05·0347a29–b03·0376b27·0376c04〕 · Zhuanshi lun T1587 〔0061c08·0061c10–14·0062b29〕. 〔Scripture〕 Saṃdhinirmocana T676 〔0692b15·0692c22〕 · Laṅkāvatāra T670 〔0484b11〕 · 〔Mahāyāna-abhidharma-sūtra · no transmitted witness in Chinese · the sūtra-text surviving in the treatise T1585 0014a13·0014b22〕. 〔Śāstra〕 Yogācārabhūmi T1579 〔0579a15·0579a20·0579c19〕.