成唯識論 六位心所·總標·三受·遍行·別境

What is a mental factor? A dharma belonging to the mind-king, arising concomitant with him. The treatise states the six classes first: five omnipresent, five object-specific, eleven wholesome, six afflictions, twenty secondary afflictions, four indeterminate.

Then a matter easily skipped that is in fact the frame: concomitance. For mind-king and factor to be concomitant, four conditions must hold — same support, same object, similar mode, and each a single instance. Those four are the criterion; what fails them is not a mental factor but something else.

Next, the three feelings. The six consciousnesses pair with painful, pleasant and neutral feeling; divided finer, sorrow and joy are added, making five. One detail is worth a pause: feeling is not emotion. Feeling is that portion of function which takes in the agreeable and disagreeable; emotion comes after.

The five omnipresent — contact, attention, feeling, conception, volition. Why omnipresent? Because they pervade every mind, every moment, every stage, every moral nature: let any consciousness arise, and these five are present. Their order is not arbitrary either: contact brings faculty, object and consciousness together; attention rouses the mind toward the object; feeling takes it in; conception seizes its image; volition sets about it — one complete act of cognition, in five steps.

The five object-specific — aspiration, resolve, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom. These do not pervade; each takes its own object: aspiration toward what is desired, resolve upon what is settled, mindfulness on what was formerly practised, concentration and wisdom upon what is contemplated.

The most useful observation here is that attention stands among the omnipresent. Attention is not a tool you pick up now and then; it is a necessary constituent of every mental act whatsoever. When practice speaks of gathering the mind, this is the member it gathers.

B. The General Statement of the Six Consciousnesses' Mental Factors · Concurrence with the Three Feelings (v9)

1. The general sense of the mental factors

With how many mental factors do the six consciousnesses go together? The verse has answered it above (v9). The treatise says: these six evolving consciousnesses (the first six consciousnesses), taken all together, go together with "the six classes of mental factors" (the six great classes of mental factors) — that is, the class of the omnipresent and the rest, six great classes in all.

Why are they called "mental factors"? Because they constantly arise only by leaning on the "mind" (the mind-king, the very substance of the eight consciousnesses), and they go together with the mind, and they belong to the mind (are under the mind's charge) — and so they are called "mental factors" (things belonging to the mind). This is just like the way anything belonging to me gets given the name "mine."

A step further in the analysis: the mind-king, facing the object it refers to, grasps only its "general mark" (the whole, large look of it); the mental factors, facing the very same object, besides the general mark also grasp its "particular mark" (the individual, detailed parts), and help get done the business the mind-king means to do — and so they too have won this name "mental factors." This is like painting a picture: the master-painter (the teacher) and his apprentice (the "helper," that is, the assistant) divide the labor — one first sketches the outline (makes the model), the other then fills in the color — each doing his own share, the two together making one picture.

This principle is put thus in the Yogācāra treatise it relies on: "the 'consciousness' (mind-king) can cognize the 'general mark' of a thing; while the mental factor 'attention' can cognize the side this consciousness has not yet cognized" — and this not-yet-cognized side is precisely the "particular mark" that each of the several mental factors goes to grasp. One by one: "contact" can cognize this object's side of "the agreeable and the like"; "feeling" can cognize this object's side of "favoring-and-oppressing (taking-in)"; "conception" can cognize this object's side of "what name-and-word it should be set with (the cause of saying)"; "volition" can cognize this object's side of "which direction it should be fashioned toward (the right course)" — and so attention and the rest are all called "mental-factor dharmas." This passage makes plain: the mental factors, besides grasping the particular mark, in fact also refer to the general mark (referring to both general and particular).

Elsewhere it again says: "desire" too can cognize the object's side of "whether or not it is worth wishing for (the wished-for thing)"; "resolve" too can cognize the side of "whether or not it is settled, determined (the determined thing)"; "mindfulness" too can cognize the side of "whether or not one has grown familiar with it before (the once-practiced thing)"; "concentration and wisdom" too can cognize the side of "whether it is a merit, a fault, or neither of the two (merit-fault and the like)" — and just because each grasps these particular marks, the mind then raises, toward the object, its differing responses of wholesome, defiled, and so forth. One sees, then, that all the mental-factor dharmas, facing the object they refer to, grasp the particular mark along [with the general] (not the general mark alone).

2. The number of the six classes of mental factors · totaling fifty-one

Although the several mental factors are alike when one speaks of "name" and of "sense" (all called mental factors, all things belonging to the mind), yet when sorted by kind there is a difference of six great classes: the omnipresent five, the object-specific five, the wholesome eleven, the defilements (the root defilements) six, the secondary defilements twenty, the indeterminate four — fifty-one in all. Why each of these six classes is called by its name, said one by one — the omnipresent: because in "any single mind" whatever it is surely to be found (pervading every mind), and so it is called omnipresent; the object-specific: because it arises only on leaning on "its several distinct objects" (it does not arise on just any object at all), and so it is called object-specific; the wholesome: because it arises only within a wholesome mind, and so it is called wholesome; the (root) defilements: because its very substance is reckoned within the "root defilements," and so it is called the defilements; the secondary defilements: because it is merely the branch-and-tip flowing out from the root defilements (the outflow-nature), and so it is called the secondary defilements; the indeterminate: because among wholesome, defiled, and the rest it is not fixed (now following the wholesome, now following the evil, unable to settle), and so it is called the indeterminate.

The Yogācāra treatise, however, reckons these "six great classes" as merged into "five great classes" — for the defilements and the secondary defilements are both defiled, and so it simply merges them into "one defiled class" (and thus the six become five).

3. The differentiation of the five by the four "all"

Next, by this measuring-stick of "the four 'all,'" the differences of these five great classes are sorted out. Which four "all"? Just whether or not [the class] runs through "four sides": first, whether it runs through "all nature" (does it go through all three natures, wholesome, evil, indeterminate?); second, whether it runs through "all stage" (does it go through all the three realms and nine stages?); third, whether it runs through "all time" (is it present at any time?); fourth, whether it runs through "all concurrence" (can it arise together with any mind?). Take these four sticks to measure the five great classes: the omnipresent — runs through all four "all" (every one complete); the object-specific — runs only through the first two (runs through all-nature, runs through all-stage; the latter two it does not); the wholesome — runs through only one (only all-stage); the defiled (that is, the class of the defilements and the secondary defilements) — runs through not one of the four; the indeterminate — runs through only one (only all-nature). By one measuring with these four sticks, the difference of kind among the five great classes is told clear.

4. Concurrence with the three feelings · the sense of the three feelings

These six evolving consciousnesses (the first six consciousnesses) change very easily, unable to settle ("slipping easily" being changing-and-altering), and so they may all go together with "the three kinds of feeling." Why can they all go together? Because these six consciousnesses all take in (receive, sense) the three kinds of object-mark "agreeable, contrary, not-of-the-two" — that is, the one that goes with me, the one that goes against me, and the one neither-going-with-nor-against. One by one: taking in the object that goes with me, and feeling body-and-mind fitted and gladdened, is called "pleasant feeling"; taking in the object that goes against me, and feeling body-and-mind pressed and oppressed, is called "painful feeling"; taking in that neither-with-nor-against, middling (middling-bearable) object, with neither pressing nor gladdening in body or in mind, is called "neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling" (that is, equanimity feeling).

5. The three feelings unfolded into two / three / four / five

These three kinds of feeling may also each be split again into two: the one that goes with the first five consciousnesses (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body) is called "body-feeling" (because it additionally leans on the body-faculty); the one that goes with the mind-consciousness is called "mind-feeling" (because it leans on the mind alone). Again, these three feelings all run through "outflowing" (still within defilement) and "unoutflowing" (already out of defilement) — even painful feeling can be one that arises within the unoutflowing (for instance, the kind of compassion-pain a bodhisattva raises on seeing sentient beings suffer is just such an unoutflowing painful feeling).

They may also each be split into three: one set is sorted by "what severs it" — that severed only on the path of seeing (severed-by-seeing), that severed only on the path of cultivation (severed-by-cultivation), and that needing no severing at all (not-to-be-severed); another set is sorted by the stages of training-realization — the one still in training (training), the one whose training is complete (no-more-training), and the one in neither of these two (not-of-the-two, that is, neither-training-nor-no-more-training).

They may also be sorted together into four: the wholesome, the unwholesome, the obscured-indeterminate, and the unobscured-indeterminate — these last two are both "indeterminate feeling" (the class neither-wholesome-nor-evil), only one carries a veil (obscured) and one carries no veil (unobscured).

〔Fork on splitting the three feelings into four · a divergent account〕 One account: these three kinds of feeling may each be split into four (wholesome, unwholesome, obscured, unobscured). Why say so? Because two sorts of "spontaneous defilement" (defilements not deliberately raised, but coming up of themselves, naturally) are of indeterminate nature: one is the "spontaneous greed, spontaneous delusion" that comes up together with the first five consciousnesses; the other is those spontaneous defilements within the pure painful destiny (the hells) — these defilements, so long as they "set no [new] karma going" (do not drive the fashioning of new karma), are of indeterminate nature, and may all go together with the painful faculty. Two treatises witness to this. The Yogācāra treatise says: "Whatever defilements come up spontaneously can all be found in present operation within the three feelings; of these, the kind that runs through all the consciousnesses (present in all six) goes with all the faculties (the five feeling-faculties of pleasure, joy, grief, pain, equanimity); the kind that does not run through all the consciousnesses goes with all the faculties only in the one stage of the mind-consciousness." The Vyākhyā treatise (the Abhidharma-samuccaya-vyākhyā) says: "Within the desire-realm, a spontaneous defilement, if it drives an evil deed, then becomes unwholesome; the rest (those that drive no evil deed) are all obscured-indeterminate." By these two passages it is known: the three feelings can indeed each hold four (wholesome, unwholesome, obscured, unobscured).

They may also be sorted together into five: pain, pleasure, grief, joy, equanimity. There were originally only three feelings — why here do they become five? Because the "pain" and "pleasure" among the three feelings are each split into two (pleasure split into "pleasure" and "joy," pain split into "pain" and "grief"), and the reasons for the splitting are three: first, the pressing-and-gladdening on the body and the pressing-and-gladdening on the mind are by nature different marks (the marks of body-feeling and mind-feeling differ); second, body-feeling is without discrimination, mind-feeling is with discrimination (one carries no conceiving, one carries conceiving); third, body-feeling is especially gross-and-heavy, mind-feeling rather slight, a difference of weight. As for why "neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling" (equanimity feeling) is not split into two, there are likewise three reasons: first, being neither pressing nor gladdening, its "neither-pressing-nor-gladdening" mark in body and in mind has no two-ness about it; second, it carries no discrimination; third, it turns calmly and evenly, all of a piece (with no gross-fine split of body and mind), and so there is no need to break it into two.

6. Matching pleasure and joy to the stages

First, whether the various "fitting-and-gladdening feelings" (the feelings that make one comfortable) are called pleasure or joy depends on which consciousness they go with and in which stage. The kind going with the first five consciousnesses is, without exception, called "pleasure." The kind going with the mind-consciousness must be sorted further by stage: if it is in the desire-realm, or in the access-concentration of the first or second meditative absorption (the stretch nearing the basic absorption, not yet reached), it is called "joy" (because at this point it has gladdened only the mind, not yet reached the body); if it is in the basic absorption of the first or second meditative absorption, then both names "pleasure" and "joy" apply (because at this point it has gladdened both body and mind); if it is in the access or basic absorption of the third meditative absorption, then again only "pleasure" (because at this point it is calm and still, especially deep, already carrying no discrimination, and so is called pleasure, not joy).

7. Matching pain and grief to the consciousnesses (the dispute over the hells' grief and pain)

Next, whether the various "pressing-and-oppressing feelings" (the feelings that make one suffer) are called pain or grief. The kind going with the first five consciousnesses is, without exception, called "pain." As for that pressing-and-oppressing feeling going with the mind-consciousness, what it should be called — here there are two accounts below. 〔The pressing-feeling concurrent with the mind-consciousness · divergent account one · only grief〕 The first account says: the kind going with the mind-consciousness can only be called "grief" (because what it presses is the mind, not the body). The reason: the several holy teachings all say "the painful feeling in the stage of the mind (the dejected feeling) is called the grief-faculty"; the Yogācāra treatise also says "the sentient beings born in the hells, their maturation-fruit arising one upon another without a break, pain-feeling and grief-feeling continuing unbroken," and again says "in the hells, applied thought and sustained thought both go together with grief; a part of the hungry-ghost destiny and the animal destiny are likewise." This account then reasons: in the hells even that especially deep dejected feeling is still called only "grief" — how much more so the lighter ones (they should the more be called grief)?

〔Divergent account two · running through both (grief and pain)〕 The second account says: the pressing feeling going with the mind-consciousness runs through both "grief" and "pain," depending on which destiny one is in. In the human and heavenly [destinies] it is, without exception, called "grief" (because it does not reach the especially-deep degree); in the animal and hungry-ghost destinies, both "grief" and "pain" may be said (because there some have a "mixed feeling" laced with pleasure, some a pure painful feeling, the weights uneven); in the hells (Naraka) only "pain" is said (because that is a pure feeling, especially deep, carrying no discrimination). This account too cites a treatise as witness. The Yogācāra treatise says "whatever defilements come up spontaneously can all be found in present operation within the three feelings" (spoken out at length as in the passage above); and again says "the view-of-self-in-the-aggregates (satkāya-dṛṣṭi, that view which grasps body-and-mind into a 'self') born together [with one] is of indeterminate nature only" — then the extreme-grasping view (the view that grasps annihilation, that grasps eternity) linked to it should likewise be of indeterminate [nature]. Here is a key inference: since the view-of-self-in-the-aggregates is indeterminate, the painful feeling arising together with it cannot be reckoned "the grief-faculty" — for the Treatise plainly says "the grief-faculty is not indeterminate" (the grief-faculty being of obscured nature), and since this born-together view is indeterminate only, the painful feeling going with it cannot be the grief-faculty, but can only be the painful faculty. (This precisely shows that the mind-consciousness too has painful feeling, not only grief.)

The second account next goes on to nail down the matter that "in the hells there is only pain, no grief." The Yogācāra says: "Among the various faculties in the hells, the remaining three — their present operation definitely cannot be established." (The pure-painful hungry-ghost and animal [destinies] are likewise.) This "remaining three (the remaining three)" must mean the pleasure-faculty, the joy-faculty, and the grief-faculty — for in the hells the present operation of "equanimity" is definitely established (the equanimity-faculty is established, and so equanimity is not among the "remaining three"; what is ruled out is precisely pleasure, joy, grief). Here someone presses a challenge. 〔Q〕 Is it not so that "occasional equanimity" (the kind of equanimity that arises now and then, not lasting) likewise cannot be established in the hells (how can you then say equanimity is established)? 〔A〕 (The second account presses back) How do you know that the treatise-passage speaks of "occasional feeling" (a feeling that arises now and then) alone? Were that passage speaking only of occasional feeling, it ought not to say the hells "definitely establish the mind-faculty" (lastingly establish it) — for those six "occasional consciousnesses" (the six consciousnesses that arise only now and then) are sometimes simply not there (the occasional consciousnesses are not always present); so the treatise-passage cannot be read as speaking of occasional feeling alone — it is in fact spoken running through "the lasting establishment of the mind-faculty," and there is no other reason that would let one cut it forcibly into the two halves "occasional feeling" and "lasting feeling." (Since the mind-faculty is lastingly established, the equanimity spoken of in the same passage is also lastingly established, not a fleeting occasional equanimity.)

Press one step further: were that treatise-passage spoken in terms of "occasional feeling" (a fleeting feeling), how could it go on to say the hells "definitely establish eight faculties" (lastingly establish eight)? (How could a fleeting thing be lastingly established?) 〔A turn of reckoning〕 The opponent changes his account: in the hells the first five consciousnesses do not connect up, breaking off in fits, so the lastingly-established "eighth faculty" must be the "grief-faculty" (using the grief-faculty to fill out the eighth). 〔Refutation〕 But at the very moment of dying, the very moment of being just reborn, and at the time of swooning into a dead faint — where is there a grief-faculty (grief being a feeling-with-discrimination in the stage of the mind, and these three states all lacking the mind-consciousness's discrimination, naturally have no grief-faculty, so the grief-faculty is not lastingly established)? 〔Yet another reckoning〕 And there are those who instead grasp the "painful faculty" as the eighth faculty — refuted by the very same reasoning (dying, being born, swooning, these three states equally lacking the lasting establishment of the painful faculty).

〔Yet another reckoning〕 Again there are those who instead grasp "a single sex-organ (the male or female organ)" as the eighth faculty — this too does not work, for the sex-organ is not fixedly there (the hells are summoned by evil karma, and there may be among them those with no sex-organ). First reckon the lastingly-established faculties in the hells: the hell-beings, by evil karma, have their five faculty-gates constantly receiving pain, and so definitely establish the five form-faculties, eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, with the painful faculty, the life-faculty, and the mind-faculty added — that is already seven faculties. 〔Counter-question〕 What use, then, is it to insist that "there must still be one sex-organ" to fill out the eighth? In the great hell of no-interval there simply cannot be such a thing as craving for sexual acts (since there is no such need, the sex-organ is not that lastingly-established eighth faculty). Once these are ruled out one by one, the lastingly-established eighth faculty must be the "equanimity-faculty" — for the seventh and eighth consciousnesses constantly go together with equanimity feeling (these two consciousnesses keep turning even in the hells, so the equanimity-faculty is lastingly established, and this is the eighth faculty).

Set the two extremes side by side and it grows clearer. In "the place of utmost pleasure" (the third meditative absorption) the gladdening in the stage of the mind is called only "pleasure," with no joy-faculty (pure pleasure, no joy); by the same principle, in "the place of utmost pain" (the hells) the pressing in the stage of the mind is called only "pain," with no grief-faculty (pure pain, no grief). So the "remaining three (remaining three)" that the Yogācāra spoke of above must mean the three feeling-faculties grief, joy, pleasure (the hells establishing not these three, lastingly establishing only the equanimity-faculty). As for other places saying the hells "have outflow-pleasure" (a pleasure that flows out), one should know that is spoken in terms of the "principle-of-following" (going along, for the moment, with another school's account, not the ultimate teaching); or else it is spoken running through "it is the other places laced with pleasure (not the hells) that have no maturation-pleasure, and so are called pure-pain" — it is not that there is really pleasure in the hells.

Then how do the holy teachings cited by the first account above, saying "the dejected feeling in the stage of the mind is called the grief-faculty," reconcile [with this]? One must know: that is spoken in terms of "the most part" (the majority of cases), or in terms of the "gate-of-following" (going along, for the moment, with another school's account), and so does not clash with this [teaching] (the hells being pure-pain, without grief). Likewise, the Yogācāra treatise's "the sentient beings born in the hells, their maturation-fruit arising one upon another without a break, pain-feeling and grief-feeling continuing unbroken," and its "in the hells applied thought and sustained thought go together with grief, a part of the hungry-ghost destiny and the animal destiny likewise" — these words too are all spoken in terms of the gate-of-following (not the definitive, ultimate account).

Then how is it that the holy teachings call this feeling in the stage of the mind "grief"? There are two ways of reading it. One: the "painful faculty" going with the mind-consciousness counts as "of the same class as grief," and so it borrows the name "grief" (though it is really the painful faculty). The other: that painful faculty harms both body and mind, and so, though its substance is the painful faculty, it is also called "grief" by extension — just as "access-joy" (the joy in the access-concentration) benefits both body and mind, and so, though its substance is the joy-faculty, it is also called "pleasure" by extension (both cases being "one substance, one borrowed name"). This principle the Prakaraṇāryavāca and like treatises set out in full. There is also a point to add in passing: in "the not-yet-reached stage" (the access-concentration before the first meditative absorption) there is definitely no pleasure-faculty (for the Treatise says that stage has only eleven faculties, and counting them up there is no pleasure-faculty). Putting these together, one should know: "the dejected feeling in the stage of the mind" and "the place of pure-pain feeling" (the hells) are in fact both reckoned under "the painful faculty" (not under the grief-faculty).

This sort of holy teaching has yet many more ways of sorting; for fear the text should drag on longer and longer, it is not set out item by item.

8. Whether the six consciousnesses' three feelings are concurrent or not (the dispute)

〔The six consciousnesses' three feelings · divergent account one · not concurrent〕 The first account says: the three feelings of the six consciousnesses do not arise at once (in one and the same instant there is not at once pleasure, pain, and equanimity). Why? Because the six consciousnesses all "turn toward the outer gate" (reach outward to grasp objects), and pleasure, pain, equanimity in turn mutually contradict (cannot stand together). Add a further reason: the "five-concurrent mind-consciousness" arising together with the five consciousnesses refers to the same object as the five; were the five consciousnesses able to raise three feelings at once, the mind-consciousness ought to raise three feelings along with them at once — but this contradicts right principle, and so it is settled that the six consciousnesses' three feelings definitely are not concurrent. As for the Yogācāra and like treatises' saying "the store-consciousness at one time goes together with the evolving consciousnesses, the three feelings arising at once," that is spoken running through "several instants (several thoughts)" linked together (just as when we say "one mind," it too is in fact not a single arising-and-ceasing but many instants), and so does not clash with "the three feelings are not concurrent."

〔The correct view · the three feelings may be concurrent〕 The second account says (this is the correct account): the three feelings of the six consciousnesses may arise at once. The reason: the three kinds of object, agreeable, contrary, middling, may be set before one all at once, and so the three feelings too may be taken in at once; moreover the feeling of that five-concurrent mind-consciousness need not be the same as the feeling of the five consciousnesses (when the five consciousnesses feel pain, the mind-consciousness need not feel pain too); and if the mind-consciousness "stares fixedly" at one particular object (fixed attention), it raises that one feeling alone, while if it stares fixedly at none in particular (no fixed attention), it raises equanimity feeling. By these several points, one knows the six consciousnesses' three feelings can be concurrent. But upon reaching "the stage of attained mastery" (Buddhahood) only the three feelings pleasure, joy, equanimity remain — for the Buddhas have already severed the things that would give rise to "grief and pain." The six classes of mental factors having been roughly marked out above, their several distinguishing marks should now be set out at length. First ask: the first class (the omnipresent) and the second class (the object-specific) — what are their marks? The verse answers (v10).

C. The First Class · The Five Omnipresent (v10)

1. The scriptural proof and rational proof of the omnipresent

The treatise says: among the six great classes of mental factors, the first is "the omnipresent mental factors" (the mental factors present in every mind), namely the five — contact, attention, feeling, conception, volition (set out at length above). How is this "omnipresent" mark to be known? It must be settled by leaning on two things as the standard: one is "scripture" (the holy teaching, the sūtras the Buddha spoke), the other is "reason" (right principle, inference on the side of reasoning).

First, the side of "scripture." The sūtra puts it thus: "Taking the eye-faculty and the form-object as conditions, eye-consciousness is given rise to; once the three — eye-faculty, form-object, eye-consciousness — come together (the three coming-together), there is 'contact'; and arising together with 'contact' there are further feeling, conception, volition" (a long stretch follows). On the strength of this sūtra, one knows that "contact," together with feeling, conception, volition — these four — are all omnipresent (whatever mind arises, they arise along with it).

And what of "attention"? There is also a sūtra to witness for it. One sūtra says "only when the faculty is unimpaired, and the object is present before one, and 'attention' moreover rightly arises — only then can consciousness be given rise to" (without attention, consciousness cannot be given rise to). Another sūtra again says "where there is attention, there is cognizing; where there is cognizing, there is attention" — one sees that attention and consciousness, these two, are matched together all the while (a stretch follows here too). On the strength of these, one knows that "attention" too is omnipresent. The plain words of this sort of holy teaching are not one alone (everywhere they are found) — the proof is as solid as a mountain.

Next, the side of "reason," pressing the mental factors through one by one. First press "contact": the moment a consciousness arises, there must be "the three coming-together" (the three — faculty, object, consciousness — gathering into one place); the three coming-together must give rise to "contact," and conversely the three coming-together too must rely on "contact" before they can gather (contact has the function of drawing the three coming-together into one place). Were there no contact, then the mind-king and mental factors could not gather into one place, could not meet upon the same object (the very function of contact being to make mind and mental factors meet upon one and the same object) — and so contact is omnipresent (whenever a mind arises, there is contact).

Next press "attention": attention's function is to draw the mind along, to make it head toward the very object it ought to refer to. Were there no attention, then the mind simply could not arise at all (with nothing to draw it, it could not be given rise to) — and so attention is omnipresent.

Next press "feeling": feeling's function is to take in the three kinds of object, agreeable, contrary, middling, making the mind raise the look of gladness, dejection, or evenness (gladness, dejection, equanimity). There is no mind that arises yet carries not even one of these three feelings — and so feeling is omnipresent.

Next press "conception": conception's function is to set up the "bounds" of the object it itself refers to (that is, its limits, its outline, what shape it is — drawing it a range, setting it a name). Were there no such conception at the time the mind arises, then one could not grasp the bounds-mark of the object (could not tell what it is) — and so conception is omnipresent.

Next press "volition": volition's function is to make the mind grasp the mark of "which direction it should head toward (the right course and the rest)," and then go on to fashion the various deeds, wholesome and evil (volition being just that force which makes the mind stir into action and do). There is no mind that arises yet has not even this volition — and so wherever a mind arises there must be volition. Pressing the five above through one by one proves it: contact, attention, feeling, conception, volition — these five are surely all present the moment a mind arises, and so they are "the omnipresent." As for why the rest (the class of the object-specific and so on) are not omnipresent, that is left for later.

D. The Second Class · The Five Object-Specific (v10)

Next comes the second class, "the object-specific." It takes in the five from "desire" all the way to "wisdom" (desire, resolve, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom). Why are they called "object-specific"? Because the objects these five each refer to are, for the most part, each different (each refers to its own, not, like the omnipresent, referring to everything alike). Among the six great classes of mental factors, it is expounded next after "the first class (the omnipresent)," and so is the second class.

1. Desire

What is "desire"? Facing "the wished-for object (the wished-for object)," its nature is "wish" (hoping for, wanting), and its function is "being that on which exertion rests" (one must first have a wanting mind before one will put strength into the doing).

What this "wished-for (the wished-for object)" points to, the accounts below differ. 〔On the reading of "the wished-for" · divergent account one · the delighting object〕 The first account says: "the wished-for" just means "the delighting object" (the object that gladdens one, that one wants to draw near) — for facing a delighting thing, one wants to see it, wants to hear it, and there is a hoping in the heart. 〔Q〕 Someone challenges: but facing a hateful thing, one hopes "not to be joined with it," hopes "to be parted from it" — is this not also a kind of desire (how can you say a hateful thing carries no desire)? 〔A〕 This account answers: what one is really seeking there is "the delighting itself (the ease that comes after being free of the hateful)" got at "the time of being parted from it, no longer stuck to it" — it is not really a desire raised toward "the hateful thing itself." So one says: toward "the hateful" and toward "the middling, neither-hateful-nor-pleasing" object, there is never any desire; and even facing a delighting thing, if no hope is raised in the heart, there is likewise no desire raised.

〔Divergent account two · the sought object〕 The second account says: "the wished-for" just means "the sought object" (whatever object one has some seeking toward) — for whether toward a delighting thing or a hateful thing, one raises a hoping: toward the delighting one seeks "to be joined with it," toward the hateful one seeks "to be parted from it," and both carry a hoping. On this account, then, it is only toward the "middling, neither-hateful-nor-pleasing" object that there is never any desire; and facing delighting and hateful things, if no thought of seeking is raised in the heart, there is likewise no desire raised.

〔Divergent account three · the to-be-contemplated object〕 The third account says: "the wished-for" just means "the to-be-contemplated object" (the object one wants to go and contemplate) — for toward any single thing, the moment one stirs the thought "I want to go and look it over, examine it," there is a hoping. Turn it around: if one does not want to go and contemplate, but merely follows the prior cause, follows the momentum of the present object, referring to it of itself (spontaneously), then there is not a trace of desire. By this line of reasoning one sees: "desire is not omnipresent" (it is not that every mind has it).

〔The dispute over desire being omnipresent · the refutation〕 There is yet another account that one-sidedly holds desire to be omnipresent: they say, only by the strength of "hoping for that object (hoping for the object)" can the various minds and mental factors grasp the object they refer to, and so the sūtra says "desire is the root of all dharmas" — which would show desire to be omnipresent. The refutation: this is wrong — the mind grasps its object by means of "attention" (the several holy teachings all say that the moment attention comes to the fore it can give rise to consciousness); nowhere has it ever been said that "it is by desire that mind and mental factors are given rise to." Take a comparison: the sūtra has also said "the dharmas have craving for their root" — does that mean every mind and mental factor is given rise to by craving (of course not)? So the sūtra's "desire is the root of all dharmas" means "all the deeds and works that desire sets going" (it says that to do a thing one must first have a mind to do it — not that desire can give rise to the several minds); or else it means "good desire (wholesome desire) can set right exertion going" — for by this wholesome desire helping all wholesome deeds get done, the Treatise says desire's function is "being that on which exertion rests (being that on which exertion rests)."

2. Resolve

What is "resolve"? Facing "the already-determined object (the determined object)," its nature is "stamping-and-holding" (fixing it down and biting onto it like setting a seal, not letting go), and its function is "cannot be drawn off, cannot be turned away (being undivertible)" — that is, by the strength of "teaching (heard), reason (thought through), realization (seen for oneself)," whether wrong or right, a person bites firmly onto the object he has taken, so that thereafter no other factor coming at it can shake or wrench it. So toward "an object still in doubt, not yet settled (the doubtful object)" there is no resolve at all; and toward a mind not yet bitten firm, still hazy, there is no resolve either. From this one knows: resolve is not reckoned omnipresent (it is not that every mind has it).

〔The dispute over resolve being omnipresent · the refutation〕 There is an account that one-sidedly holds resolve to be omnipresent: they say, when the mind grasps its own object it meets no holding-back, runs through unhindered, and this "unhindered" is just resolve, so every mind has resolve. The refutation: this is unreasoning. Why? Take apart this matter of "unhindered": the "one that can refrain from hindering it (the one that does not hinder)" is in fact the various object-dharmas (the object never hinders the mind); the "one let through, not hindered (the one not hindered)" is in fact the mind and the rest (the mind was never hindered); the "one that mightily sets [the mind] going to head toward the object (the one that sets it going)" is in fact the faculty and attention (the strength driving the mind to rush toward the object is the strength of faculty and attention) — and among these three there is simply no turn for resolve. Furthermore, if you insist "it is by resolve that the mind is so mightily set going," then this resolve must itself rely on something else to be set going, and that on yet another… relying on and on without end, you fall into the fault of "the endless regress."

3. Mindfulness

What is "mindfulness"? Facing "the object once experienced before (the once-practiced object)," its nature is to make the mind "record it clearly, not forget it (clear recording, not forgetting)," and its function is "being that on which concentration rests" — that is, by recording firm, again and again, the object once experienced, and not letting it slip away, one can then draw concentration forth (the mind must first hold fast to a familiar object before it can settle). Toward "what has never been experienced at all," whether the thing itself or its kind, no mindfulness can be raised (what has not been gone through cannot be recalled); and even what was experienced before, if it can no longer be recorded clearly, no mindfulness arises either. So mindfulness is surely not reckoned omnipresent (it is not that every mind has it).

〔The dispute over mindfulness being omnipresent · the refutation〕 There is an account that one-sidedly holds mindfulness to be omnipresent: they say, the moment a mind arises there must be mindfulness along with it, for later one can recall (later recollection), which would show that within that earlier mind there must have been mindfulness, so mindfulness ought to be omnipresent. The refutation: this is unreasoning. 〔A counter-instance〕 A counter-instance refutes it: you cannot, because "later there came delusion, came faith," reason backward that "within that earlier mind there must also have been delusion, have been faith" (what is present later does not prove it was present earlier) — by the same token, that one can recall later does not prove there must have been mindfulness within that earlier mind. Moreover, the mind and mental factors of the prior instant, or just the lingering momentum of that earlier "conception," already suffice to serve as the cause of "later recollection" (there need not have been a prior mindfulness at all).

4. Concentration

What is "concentration"? Facing "the object to be contemplated (the contemplated object)," its nature is to make the mind "concentrate single-mindedly, not scatter (concentrating, not scattering)," and its function is "being that on which wisdom rests" — that is, when one contemplates the objects of "merit, fault, neither of the two (merit, fault, neither)," concentration gathers the mind together and keeps it from scattering, and following on this concentration there is then born that "wisdom" which can judge and discern (the mind must first grow still before it can see through).

The phrase "the mind concentrates single-mindedly" is meant to show that "wherever one wishes to abide, there one can abide," not that concentration can only stare dead at "one single object" — for were it not so, then on the path of seeing, contemplating the four truths, pain, origin, cessation, path, one after another, the object referred to before and after changing one for the next, there would surely be no "even-holding" (that is, concentration) (when in fact there is concentration all the same). Turn it around: if the mind is not gathered, not at that very point of concentrating, then concentration does not arise, and so concentration is not omnipresent (it is not that every mind has it).

〔The dispute over concentration being omnipresent · the refutation〕 There is an account that one-sidedly holds concentration to be omnipresent: they say, even at a scattered time there is concentration arising, only its mark is very faint, hard to make out (so concentration ought to be omnipresent). 〔A〕 One should speak the honest truth, not strain to prop it up. Below he shifts to three accounts to rescue it, refuted one by one — 〔A turn of reckoning, one〕 if he says "concentration can make mind-king and mental factors gather into one place and head together toward one and the same object, and so is omnipresent" — this too is wrong, for that knack of gathering the mind into one place is the function of "contact" (not of concentration). 〔A turn of reckoning, two〕 if he says "this concentration can keep the mind, in an instant, from changing its object (not turning its referring), and so counts as omnipresent" — this too does not get through, for the mind of a single instant, facing its object, simply has no such matter as "changing" (turning its referring): a single instant is too brief, there is no time to change at all, and no need for concentration to manage it. 〔A turn of reckoning, three〕 if he says "it is by concentration that the mind grasps its object, and so it counts as omnipresent" — this too is without reason: the one that makes the mind grasp its object is "attention" (not concentration).

〔The dispute that concentration just is the mind · the refutation〕 There is again an account that says: the very substance of concentration just is "the mind" itself (not a separate mental factor) — their ground being that the sūtra has spoken of "concentration as 'the training of mind,'" and has spoken of concentration as "the mind's one-pointedness-on-an-object (the mind one upon an object)." 〔Refutation〕 The refutation: these two phrases cannot prove "concentration just is the mind." That the sūtra speaks so is because "it is by leaning on concentration that the mind is gathered, made to be one upon an object" that it is put thus (it says concentration can manage the mind — not that concentration just equals the mind). Moreover, concentration is reckoned within the items "concentration-faculty, concentration-power, concentration-awakening-factor, right-concentration (the path-limb)," just like mindfulness, wisdom, and the rest (all mental factors, not the mind-king) — which shows it is not the mind itself at all.

5. Wisdom

What is "wisdom"? Facing "the object to be contemplated (the contemplated object)," its nature is "discerning" (sifting, telling apart, judging), and its function is "severing doubt" (cutting through perplexity and settling it down) — that is, when one contemplates the objects "merit, fault, neither of the two," it is by wisdom going to probe and seek that one at last comes to a settled judgment. As for that kind of "object not contemplated at all (the not-contemplated object)," in a mind dim and dull, there is no sifting and telling apart going on, and so wisdom is not reckoned omnipresent (it is not that every mind has it).

〔The dispute over wisdom being omnipresent · the refutation〕 There is an account that one-sidedly holds wisdom to be omnipresent: they say, even at a dim-and-dull time there is wisdom arising, only the mark is very faint, not to be made out (so wisdom ought to be omnipresent). 〔Refutation〕 The refutation: how do you "Heaven-beloveds" (this is a sarcasm, as good as saying "you Heaven-pity-them fools") know it (when it cannot be made out at all, on what ground do you say it is there)? 〔A turn of reckoning〕 You may perhaps haul out the Abhidharma's having said wisdom is a "great-stage dharma (a dharma pervading every mind)" to prop yourself up — 〔A〕 but the Abhidharma of the several schools do not match up with one another, contradicting each other; on what ground, then, do you take it as a standard? What truly can be the standard is scripture: scripture says only "the five, contact and the rest," are omnipresent; as for the account "the great-stage dharmas number ten," it does not come from scripture, and ought not to be clung to. Furthermore, since "the five, desire and the rest (the object-specific)," are not of the band of "the five, contact and the rest," they are surely not omnipresent — by the very same principle as faith, greed, and the rest (faith and greed too being not omnipresent).

6. The mutual support of the five object-specific and the arising-phrases (the dispute · thirty-one phrases)

When these five object-specific (desire, resolve, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom) arise, whether they must gather all together or may arise singly, two accounts follow below. 〔The mutual support of the object-specific · divergent account one · they definitely support one another〕 The first account says: these five definitely prop and help one another, not one to be missing — the moment any one of them arises, the other four are surely there along with it.

〔The correct view · unfixed (need not be concurrent)〕 The second account says (this is the correct account): unfixed (they need not gather all together). The reasons are two. First, the Yogācāra says that among the "four 'all'" the object-specific lack the latter two (all-time, all-concurrence) — and since they lack "all-concurrence," it shows they need not all arise at once. Second, the Yogācāra again says these five arise on referring each to "one of the four objects" (the wished-for, the determined, the once-practiced, the to-be-contemplated), and the object referred to and the referring mental factor need not necessarily come together at once (each refers to its own object, each arises in its own time).

It should be put thus: of these five, sometimes only "one arises." For instance: facing the wished-for object, one raises "wish" alone (that is, raises desire alone); or facing the determined object, one raises "biting-firm (stamping-resolve)" alone (raises resolve alone); or facing the once-practiced object, one raises "holding-in-record (recollection)" alone (raises mindfulness alone); or facing the to-be-contemplated object, one raises "concentrating" alone (raises concentration alone).

〔Here is explained "how it can be that, facing the to-be-contemplated object, one raises concentration alone and not wisdom"〕 There is a dim-and-dull sort who, to still a scattered mind, can indeed stare at an object (having concentration) but cannot tell good from bad (having no wisdom) — everyone knows this sort to be "with concentration, without wisdom." Such a one, in the stage of preparatory practice (the stage of effort), still carries a little hearing and thinking, and so one says he "even-holds, referring to a to-be-contemplated object" (granting him, just barely, to be contemplating); or else this is spoken loosely in terms of "the most part." Again, take the "play-and-forget gods" (the sort of god who, sunk in play, grows so glad as to forget himself), who stare fixedly at one object in play yet raise greed, anger, and the rest — this too is "with concentration, without wisdom"; of this sort there are, in truth, very many.

Or, the other way round, facing the to-be-contemplated object one raises "discerning" alone (that is, raises wisdom alone) — this is when the mind does not concentrate but, scattering this way and that, goes to probe and seek (with wisdom, without concentration).

Sometimes "two arise." For instance: facing the two objects "the wished-for, the determined," one raises desire and resolve; or facing the two objects "the wished-for, the once-practiced," one raises desire and mindfulness… and so on down the pairings, all the way to facing the to-be-contemplated object and raising concentration and wisdom — count up all the two-by-two pairings and there are twelve in all (twelve phrases).

Sometimes "three arise." For instance: facing the three objects "the wished-for, the determined, the once-practiced," one raises desire, resolve, mindfulness; and so on down the triplings, all the way to facing "the once-practiced, the to-be-contemplated" and raising mindfulness, concentration, wisdom — count up all the three-by-three triplings and there are thirteen in all (thirteen phrases).

Sometimes "four arise." For instance: facing the four objects "the wished-for, the determined, the once-practiced, the to-be-contemplated," one raises the front four (desire, resolve, mindfulness, concentration); and so on down the line, all the way to (this time desire being missing) facing such objects as "the determined, the once-practiced, the to-be-contemplated" and raising the back four (resolve, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom) — of this "four-in-a-group" case there are in all "five fours" (five kinds, each raising four).

Sometimes "five arise": facing these four objects, "the wished-for, the determined, the once-practiced, the to-be-contemplated," all five (desire, resolve, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom) arise. Thus, raising desire and the [other] five upon these "four objects," counting together all the cases of raising one, raising two, raising three, raising four, raising five (the singly-counted and the combined), there are in all "thirty-one (thirty-one phrases)."

There are also some occasions of mind where these five "do not arise at all." For instance: when what is met is not those "four objects" (neither the wished-for, nor the determined, the once-practiced, the to-be-contemplated), the "sudden-falling mind" that flares up of an instant the moment one makes contact (the abrupt, just-arisen mind, before there is time to think it over); and again, the kind of mind arising together with the store-consciousness (the eighth) — of this sort, too, there is more than one [occasion].

7. The presence or absence of the five object-specific in the several consciousnesses

These five object-specific — in which consciousnesses they are present and in which not — must be sorted out separately. In the seventh and eighth consciousnesses, these five are, following the differing stages, now present, now absent (set out above). In the sixth mind-consciousness, at every stage they may arise together with these five — for whether "after transformation-of-the-basis" or "not yet transformed," neither blocks these five (the sixth being the most lively, able to muster them at any time).

Then do the first five consciousnesses (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body) have these five object-specific or not? Two accounts below. 〔Whether the five consciousnesses have the object-specific · divergent account one · all absent〕 The first account says: in the first five consciousnesses these five are all absent, said one by one with the reasons — the five consciousnesses refer to "the object already in hand right now (the already-gotten object)," with no need to hope, and so have no desire; the five consciousnesses do not go to settle carefully, and so have no biting-firm stamping-and-holding, no resolve; the five consciousnesses always grasp "the new object before them," not turning back to recall, and so have no mindfulness; the five consciousnesses are by nature scattering-and-stirring, unable to hold still, and so have no concentration; the five consciousnesses do not go to probe and weigh, and so have no sifting-and-telling-apart, no wisdom.

〔The correct view · they may have these five〕 The second account says (this is the correct account): in the first five consciousnesses these five may in fact be present, only all of them faint. Said one by one — toward the object the five consciousnesses, though they have no strong "hope (heightened hope)," still have a faint flavor of "wanting this object (the pleasing object)," and so have desire; toward the object, though they have no strong "settling (heightened settling)," they still have a faint flavor of "biting onto this object (the stamped object)," and so have resolve; though they cannot record clearly the once-familiar object itself, they still have a faint flavor of "an impression of this kind of object (the minded object)," and so have mindfulness; though they do not deliberately tie the mind to one object, they still have a faint flavor of "concentrating," and so have concentration — what the first account above spoke of, "the five consciousnesses are by nature scattering-and-stirring," is meant to block out "the even-drawing (the deep concentration drawn forth from the concentration-stages)," not to block out "the even-holding (ordinary concentrating)," and so the five consciousnesses may have concentration; though toward the object they do not go to probe and weigh, they still have a faint flavor of "telling-apart (discerning)," and so have wisdom.

Just for this, the holy teaching says "the eye-power and ear-power are that wisdom-nature which goes with the eye-consciousness and ear-consciousness" (this proves that there is wisdom in the five consciousnesses). The other three consciousnesses (nose, tongue, body), reasoned out by this principle, may be said to have wisdom too, with nothing amiss in it.

One must also sort it out by stage. In "the stage not yet at mastery" (that is, the stage of the ordinary being), these five in the five consciousnesses may still be absent at times; but upon reaching "the time of attained mastery" (Buddhahood), these five are surely all present, said one by one with the reasons — the Buddha delights to contemplate the several objects, and so "desire" is not lacking; the Buddha's resolve in biting onto an object is ever full, and so "resolve" is not lacking; the Buddha can hold in record what was experienced before, and so "mindfulness" is not lacking; moreover the Buddha's five consciousnesses can refer to the three times, past, present, and future (this too must lean on mindfulness), and so there is mindfulness; the Tathāgata has no mind that fails to settle (never scattered), and so there is "concentration"; the Buddha's five consciousnesses all carry "the duty-doing wisdom (that is, the all-accomplishing wisdom)," and so there is "wisdom."

8. The feeling-concurrence of the five object-specific (the dispute)

With which feelings do these five object-specific go together? Two accounts below. 〔Divergent account one〕 The first account says: "desire" goes with three feelings (only grief-feeling and painful-feeling must be left out, for the grief and painful objects are hateful, not "the wished-for," and so desire does not go with those two); the other four (resolve, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom) go with four feelings, leaving out only painful-feeling — for the settling-set is not in the five consciousnesses (whereas painful-feeling happens to be in the five consciousnesses), so these four, being absent from the five consciousnesses, cannot go together with painful-feeling.

〔The correct view · they go with all five feelings〕 The second account says (this is the correct account): all five object-specific go with all five feelings. First on "desire" going with grief and pain too, there are three grounds: first, the Treatise says "toward the unsurpassed Dharma one yearns and longs, grieves and is dejected (the grief-faculty), single-mindedly seeking to realize it" — and this is desire going together with grief; second, in "the place of pure-pain feeling" (the hells), the beings single-mindedly seek release, and so in the mind there is the painful faculty (said above — this is desire going together with pain); third, the Treatise says "greed-craving goes with grief and pain," and when greed-craving arises there must be desire along with it — and this again is desire going together with grief and pain. Next on the other four: since the painful faculty can go with the mind-consciousness, what wrong is there in the settling four (resolve, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom) going with the painful faculty (being in the mind-consciousness, they match up with pain)? Moreover, when the five consciousnesses arise, there are too those faint "biting-onto-the-object (the stamped object)" and the [other] three (the principle being as said above). By all this one knows: the object-specific, desire and the rest, go with all five feelings.

These five object-specific may further be sorted from several more angles: for instance, by the three natures (wholesome, evil, indeterminate); by the three realms (desire, form, formless); by the stages of training-realization (training, no-more-training, and so on) — these are left for each to think out for himself, according to right principle.

Having finished discussing the substance of the first six evolving consciousnesses (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind), this section turns to the caitta, the "mental factors" — that crowd of mental functions which constantly move in step with the mind-king. It first gives a general statement: the mental factors fall into six great classes (six positions), fifty-one in all; then it explains how these six consciousnesses correspond to the three feelings of pain, pleasure, and the neutral feeling; and then, following the verses, it expounds in detail the first two of the six classes — the "universal five" and the "object-specific five." The places where the debate is most densely argued are two: first, the long dispute over whether what is felt in the hells is bodily pain or mental distress, and second, the several variant readings on whether the object-specific five must arise together and how they correspond to the five feelings. We open it up section by section below.

What this section establishes has its roots in scripture and treatise alike. As for the names and definitions of the mental factors, although the scriptures speak of them only sparingly, there is still a scriptural root to anchor them to. The Saṃyukta-āgama says "faculty, object, and consciousness, these three, come together and there is contact; arising together with contact are feeling, perception, and volition" — and this "the coming-together of three gives rise to contact, and arising together with contact are feeling, perception, and volition" is precisely the scriptural basis on which the treatise proves the "universal," showing that contact, together with feeling, perception, and volition, constantly co-arise and pervade every state of mind. As for "attention," a scripture likewise says "only if the faculty is unimpaired, the object is present, and attention rightly arises can consciousness arise," making clear that attention too pervades every state of mind. The scriptures point to the universal ones only in brief; the complete inventory of the substance and function of the six classes of mental associate, and the definitions of each one, fall to the treatises. The Yogācārabhūmi, in its chapter on the auxiliaries, lists the full inventory of the corresponding mental factors, ranking the universal five (attention, contact, feeling, perception, volition) and the object-specific five (aspiration, resolve, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom) at the head; the Abhidharma-samuccaya and the Abhidharma-samuccaya-vyākhyā go further and fix the "substance and function" of the universal five and the object-specific five one by one — for instance, saying that "aspiration" has "drawing forth longing upon a longed-for matter as its substance, and serving as the basis of right diligence as its function," and that "wisdom" has "discerning dharmas upon an observed matter as its substance, and severing doubt as its function." The kind of definition in Dharmapāla's compiled commentary in this treatise — "What is aspiration? Upon a longed-for object, it has wishing as its nature and serving as the basis of diligence as its function" — all derives from these. So the scriptural root of this section lies in the Āgama's "coming-together of three giving rise to contact," and the treatise-basis lies in the Yogācārabhūmi, the Abhidharma-samuccaya, and the Abhidharma-samuccaya-vyākhyā — and with that we follow the verses and open the exposition.

A. The Six Consciousnesses Generally, and Their Correspondence with the Six Classes of Mental Factors

1. What "Mental Associate" Means — Its Relationship to the Mind-King

How many kinds of mental associate do the six consciousnesses correspond with? The verse answers: these mental factors fall, in all, into six classes — the universal, the object-specific, the wholesome, the afflictions, the secondary afflictions, and the indeterminate — and all of them correspond with the three feelings of pain, pleasure, and neutrality. The treatise then says: these six evolving consciousnesses, generally speaking, correspond with the "six classes of mental associate," that is, with the class of universal ones and so on, six classes in all.

Why are they called "mental factors"? Because they constantly arise in dependence on the mind-king, correspond with the mind-king, and belong to the mind-king — just as we set up the term "what is mine" for things that belong to me, so these functions that belong to the mind and accompany it are named "mental factors" (literally, "what belongs to the mind"). Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) marks out what each of these three meanings answers to: the meaning "constantly arising in dependence on the mind" displays the universal ones (they invariably arise along with the mind); the meaning "corresponding with the mind" displays the remaining mental factors (corresponding by way of same-object, same-time, same-support); and only the meaning "belonging to the mind, taking the mind as sovereign" is the proper sense of the name "mental associate" (the mental associate accompanies the mind and cannot stand on its own) — only when all three meanings are present is the name "mental associate" established.

What, then, is the division of labor between mind-king and mental associate? The mind-king, facing its object, grasps only its "general aspect" (its overall outline); the mental associate, facing the very same object, grasps not only the general aspect but also the "particular aspect" (each separate facet), and it helps bring about the mind-king's work — and that is precisely why it earns the name "mental associate." It is like a master painter working with apprentices: the master draws the outline (sets the form), the apprentices fill in the color (apply the pigment); each has its task, and together they complete a single painting — the mind-king grasps the general, the mental factors grasp the particular, and only the two together complete one full act of cognition.

This principle has scriptural and treatise authority. The Yogācārabhūmi says: "consciousness" can discern the general aspect of a thing; "attention" can discern the facet that consciousness has not yet discerned — and this is the particular aspect that the mental factors grasp: "contact" discerns the facet of "agreeable or disagreeable," "feeling" discerns the facet of "appropriating and receiving," "perception" discerns the facet of "the basis for verbal designation," and "volition" discerns the facet of "right cause and so on" — therefore attention and the rest are all called "mental-associate dharmas." This passage also shows that the mental factors in fact also take the general aspect as their object (they do not grasp only the particular aspect). Elsewhere it again says: "aspiration" too can discern the facet of "what is delightful," "resolve" too discerns the facet of "the settled," "mindfulness" too discerns the facet of "what was formerly practiced," and "concentration and wisdom" too discern the facet of "merit and fault" — and by this the mind comes to arise as wholesome or defiled upon its object. So it is clear that the mental factors, facing their object, all grasp the particular aspect in addition to the general aspect.

2. Fifty-One in All Across the Six Classes, and Why Each Class Is Named as It Is

Although these functions are all alike called "mental factors" (with no difference in name or in meaning), by difference of kind they are divided into six classes: the universal, five; the object-specific, five; the wholesome, eleven; the (root) afflictions, six; the secondary afflictions, twenty; and the indeterminate, four — which comes to exactly fifty-one. Each class is named for a reason. "Universal" — because it is invariably found in every state of mind. "Object-specific" — because it arises only when it takes a particular object. "Wholesome" — because it arises only within a wholesome mind. "(Root) affliction" — because its very nature is subsumed under the root afflictions. "Secondary affliction" — because it is merely an outflow, a derivative-equivalent, of the root afflictions. "Indeterminate" — because it is not fixed with respect to wholesome, defiled, and the rest (it may be good or bad).

Here a variant reading must be added: the Yogācārabhūmi combines these six classes into five — because the "afflictions" and the "secondary afflictions" are alike defiled, it merges these two into a single "defiled class" for counting. Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) also reconciles this number of "fifty-one in all": the way this treatise opens out the "fifty-one" differs from the fifty-three of the Abhidharma-samuccaya, and from the fifty-three and fifty-five of the Yogācārabhūmi, the difference being that this treatise opens out, within the object-specific, several additional ones such as "wrong aspiration" and "wrong resolve" (a different opening and folding), so the numbers do not match; and this number "fifty-one" agrees precisely with the Prakaraṇa-āryavācā-śāstra, the Pañcaskandhaka, and the Hundred Dharmas treatise.

3. Clarifying the Distinctions Among the Five Classes by the "Four Universalities"

The treatise then takes a further angle, distinguishing them by the "four universalities" (here reckoned according to the five classes after the merger). The "four universalities" are four measures of "pervasive or not": whether it extends to "all moral natures" (the three natures of wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral), whether it extends to "all stages," whether it extends to "all times" (present at any moment), and whether it extends to "all co-arisings" (able to co-arise with every state of mind). Apply these four measures to the five classes: the "universal" possesses all four universalities; the "object-specific" holds only the first two (all natures, all stages); the "wholesome" holds only one (all stages); the "defiled" class (afflictions and secondary afflictions merged) holds none of the four; and the "indeterminate" holds only one (all natures). By these four measures the differences of kind among the five classes are clarified.

B. The Six Consciousnesses and Their Correspondence with the Three Feelings

1. What the Three Feelings — Pleasure, Pain, and Neither-Painful-Nor-Pleasant — Are

These six evolving consciousnesses are "shifting and unsettled" (they change with their object), and so all of them admit correspondence with the "three feelings." Why? Because they all receive the three kinds of object-appearance: the agreeable, the disagreeable, and the one that is neither. Receiving an agreeable object-appearance, one that gladdens body and mind, is "pleasant feeling." Receiving a disagreeable object-appearance, one that oppresses body and mind, is "painful feeling." Receiving the moderate object-appearance that is neither agreeable nor disagreeable, that neither oppresses nor gladdens body or mind, is "neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling" (that is, neutral feeling).

2. These Three Feelings Can Also Be Opened Out into Two, Three, Four, and Five

These same three feelings can be opened out further from different angles.

Opened into "two": those that correspond with the first five consciousnesses are called "bodily feeling" (because each depends severally on a bodily faculty); those that correspond with mental consciousness are called "mental feeling" (because it depends only on the mind). Moreover, all three feelings extend to the contaminated and the uncontaminated — even painful feeling can arise from the uncontaminated (for instance, the compassionate sorrow a bodhisattva feels out of pity for sentient beings).

Opened into "three": one way of dividing is "to-be-abandoned-by-seeing, to-be-abandoned-by-cultivation, and not-to-be-abandoned"; another way is "of the trainee, of the adept, and of neither (neither trainee nor adept)."

Opened into "four": that is, wholesome, unwholesome, obscured-neutral, and unobscured-neutral — the last two being two kinds of neutral feeling.

On this "opening into four" there is a variant reading. One view: each of the three feelings in fact admits being opened into four. The reasoning: the "spontaneously arising (naturally occurring) greed and delusion" that come when the five consciousnesses are active together, and the spontaneous afflictions in the purely painful destinies (the hells), so long as they "do not set deeds in motion," belong to the neutral nature — and all these admit correspondence with the faculty of pain. The Yogācārabhūmi says: "all afflictions that arise spontaneously become active across the three feelings; those that extend to all bodies-of-consciousness correspond with all faculties, and those that do not extend to all bodies-of-consciousness correspond with all faculties at the mental stage." The Abhidharma-samuccaya (in its expanded compendium) also says: "of the spontaneous afflictions bound to the desire realm, those that set evil conduct in motion count as unwholesome, and the rest are all obscured-neutral." So it is known that each of the three feelings admits four kinds (wholesome, unwholesome, obscured, unobscured).

Opened into "five": that is, pain, pleasure, distress, joy, and equanimity. Why must "pain and pleasure" within the three feelings each be split into two (pleasure split into pleasure and joy, pain split into pain and distress), while "neither-painful-nor-pleasant" is not split? There are three reasons. Pain and pleasure are split because: the aspect of oppression or gladdening differs in the "body" and in the "mind"; bodily feeling is non-discursive while mental feeling is discursive; and bodily feeling is especially heavy while mental feeling is comparatively slight — so pleasure splits into bodily pleasure and mental joy, and pain splits into bodily pain and mental distress. Neither-painful-nor-pleasant is not split, again for three reasons: its aspect of "neither oppressing nor gladdening" is the same in body and in mind; it is non-discursive; and it proceeds evenly — so there is no place where it could be split.

3. How Pleasant Feeling and Joyful Feeling Are Assigned According to the Stages

How are the "gladdening feelings" named according to the stages of meditative cultivation? Those corresponding with the five consciousnesses are uniformly called "pleasure." Those corresponding with mental consciousness depend on the stage: in the desire realm and in the "access concentrations" of the first and second meditative absorptions, it is called "joy" (because it gladdens only the mind, not the body); on reaching the "fundamental concentrations" of the first and second absorptions, it is called both "pleasure" and "joy" (gladdening both body and mind); and on reaching the access and fundamental concentrations of the third absorption, it is called "pleasure" (because here the tranquillity is especially heavy and is also non-discursive).

4. How Painful Feeling and Distressful Feeling Are Assigned to the Consciousnesses — In the Hells, Is It Distress or Pain?

And the "oppressing feelings"? Those corresponding with the five consciousnesses are uniformly called "pain." But as for the oppressing feeling that arises together with mental consciousness, whether it is called distress or pain — here a long dispute breaks out.

One view (called only "distress"): the oppressing feeling that arises together with mental consciousness is called only "distress," because what it oppresses is the mind. All the sacred teachings say "the aversive feeling at the mental stage is called the faculty of distress"; the Yogācārabhūmi says "the beings born in the hells, with the maturation-fruit followed without interval by maturation-born states, have painful feeling and distressful feeling in unbroken succession," and again "the applied and sustained thought in the hells arise together with distress, and so too for a portion of the hungry-ghost and animal destinies." So even the heaviest aversive feeling at the mental stage is still called "distress" — how much more, then, the lighter ones, which of course are also called distress.

Another view (it extends to both distress and pain): the oppressing feeling that arises together with mental consciousness in fact extends to both "distress" and "pain." Among humans and gods it is uniformly called "distress" (because it does not count as especially heavy); among animals and ghosts it is called both "distress" and "pain" (because there the painful feeling is sometimes mixed and sometimes pure, varying in weight); and in naraka (the hells) it is called only "pain" (because it is purely received, especially heavy, and non-discursive). This view too cites the Yogācārabhūmi's "all afflictions that arise spontaneously become active across the three feelings" (expounded at length as before), and cites "the innate view of self-identity is merely of the neutral nature" — then the extreme-grasping view of the same kind should be likewise — and so this co-arising painful feeling is not subsumed under the faculty of distress, because the treatise says the faculty of distress is not neutral, whereas this innate view is merely neutral; therefore the painful feeling accompanying it cannot be the faculty of distress, but must be the faculty of pain.

This "extends-to-both" view then cites a string of Yogācārabhūmi passages to establish firmly that "the hells are the faculty of pain, not the faculty of distress." The Yogācārabhūmi says "among the faculties of the hells, the remaining three faculties are definitely not active" (and the purely painful ghost and animal destinies are likewise). These "remaining three faculties" must be the three faculties of pleasure, joy, and distress — because the hells definitely accomplish the activity of "equanimity" (and since the faculty of equanimity is accomplished, it does not stand among "the remaining ones not accomplished"). Someone objects: "Then would not the momentarily arising 'adventitious equanimity' also definitely not be accomplished in the hells?" The reply turns it back: how do you know that passage speaks only of "adventitious feeling (the momentarily arising feeling)"? If that passage spoke only of adventitious feeling, it ought not to say that the hells "definitely accomplish the faculty of mind (constantly accomplished)," because those momentarily arising six adventitious consciousnesses are sometimes absent (not constant); therefore one should not force-read that treatise as speaking only of adventitious feeling — it speaks comprehensively of the "constantly accomplished faculty of mind," and there is no other reason to cut it in two halves of adventitious and constant feeling.

Going further: if that treatise truly spoke by way of "adventitious feeling," how could it also say that the hells "definitely accomplish eight faculties (constantly accomplished)"? Someone shifts the wording to rescue it: "because the five consciousnesses are not continuous in the hells, one must definitely take the 'faculty of distress' as the eighth faculty." Refute him: in the states of death, of birth, and of swooning, where would there be any faculty of distress (distress is a discursive feeling of the mental stage, and these three states have none of it at all)? Again, someone grasps the "faculty of pain" as the eighth faculty, and is refuted with the same words (death, birth, and swooning have no constant accomplishment of the faculty of pain either). Again, someone grasps "a single gender (the male or female faculty)" as the eighth faculty, and this too does not hold — the gender faculty is not fixed, and the hells, summoned by evil karma, admit beings without gender. In truth, the beings of the hells, pressed by evil karma, constantly receive pain at the five faculty-doors, so they definitely accomplish the eye and the rest (the five material faculties, the faculty of pain, the life faculty, and the faculty of mind — already seven faculties gathered); but turn it back and ask: what use is "there must definitely be a gender faculty" to the beings of the hells? In the great unremitting hell there can be no matter of lustful craving at all (so the gender faculty cannot be that constantly accomplished eighth). By this whole line of reasoning, the eighth constantly accomplished faculty must be the "faculty of equanimity" — because the seventh and the eighth consciousnesses constantly correspond with neutral feeling, and these two consciousnesses operate constantly in the hells, so the faculty of equanimity is constantly accomplished, and that is precisely the eighth faculty.

Then why do the hells not accomplish the three faculties of "joy, distress, and pleasure"? The principle is just like the "stage of supreme bliss" (the third absorption), where the mental gladdening is called only "pleasure" and there is no faculty of joy (pure pleasure without joy) — so, conversely, at the "place of supreme pain" (the hells), the mental oppression is called only "pain" and there is no faculty of distress (pure pain without distress). Therefore those "remaining three faculties" must refer to the three faculties of distress, joy, and pleasure (the hells do not accomplish these three and definitely accomplish the faculty of equanimity). As for the passages elsewhere that speak of the hells "having an outflow-pleasure," one must understand that this is spoken by way of the "principle-gate of according-with-others" (a provisional statement that accommodates another school's tenet); or else it speaks comprehensively, meaning that "apart from the hells, the other places of mixed feeling have no maturation-pleasure, and so it is called purely painful" — not that the hells truly have pleasure.

How, then, do we explain the sacred teachings' plain statement that "the aversive feeling at the mental stage is called the faculty of distress"? One must understand that this is spoken by way of "the majority of cases," or by way of the "gate of according-with-others," and so it does not conflict with "the hells are the faculty of pain." The earlier-cited Yogācārabhūmi passages — "in the hells pain and distress follow in succession," "the applied and sustained thought in the hells co-arise with distress, and a portion of the ghost and animal destinies likewise" — are all likewise spoken by way of the gate of according-with-others (not the definitive meaning).

Then why do the sacred teachings call that painful feeling in the hells co-arising with mental consciousness "distress"? Two explanations. First, it is "of the kind of distress," and so the word "distress" is borrowed and provisionally applied to it (it is in reality the faculty of pain). Second, that faculty of pain harms both body and mind, and so, although in substance it belongs to the faculty of pain, it is also called "distress" by extension — just as the earlier-mentioned "joy of the access concentration" benefits both body and mind, so although it is the faculty of joy, it is by extension also called "pleasure." The Prakaraṇāryavācā-śāstra and treatises like it make this principle very clear. Furthermore, in the "preliminary stage" concentration there is no faculty of pleasure (the treatise says there are only eleven faculties there). From all this it is known: "the aversive feeling at the mental stage," and "the place of purely received pain" (the hells), are both subsumed under the "faculty of pain" (not the faculty of distress).

These distinctions in the sacred teachings have many avenues; fearing the text would grow too tangled, we will not expound them one by one.

5. Can the Three Feelings of the Six Consciousnesses Arise Simultaneously?

The last dispute: can the three feelings of the six consciousnesses arise together at the same time?

One view (they cannot co-arise): the three feelings of the six consciousnesses cannot co-arise, because they are all "outward-door-operating" and mutually contradictory. The reasoning: the "five-accompanying mental consciousness" that arises together with the five consciousnesses takes the very same object as the five consciousnesses; if the five consciousnesses could have the three feelings together, then mental consciousness should likewise — but this contradicts right principle, so they definitely do not co-arise. As for what the Yogācārabhūmi and the like say, that "the store-consciousness corresponds with the evolving consciousnesses at one time, the three feelings arising together," that is spoken by way of "many moments (different instants)," just as the expression "one mind" does not refer to the arising-and-perishing of a single instant — so it does not count as a contradiction.

Another view (it admits co-arising, and this is the settled correct reading): the three feelings of the six consciousnesses do admit arising together at the same time. Because the agreeable object, the disagreeable object, and the moderate object can in their own right be received simultaneously; and because the feeling of mental consciousness need not be the same as the feeling of the five consciousnesses; and because the mind, when it "particularly attends to" a given object, arouses that one feeling, and when there is no particular attending it arouses neutral feeling — therefore the three feelings of the six consciousnesses do admit co-arising. But upon reaching the "stage of attained mastery" (buddhahood), only the three feelings of pleasure, joy, and equanimity remain — because the buddhas have already cut off the whole matter of "distress and pain." The six classes of mental factors have already been set out in brief above; now their distinguishing characteristics ought to be displayed in detail. So one first asks: what exactly are the characteristics of the first two classes (the universal and the object-specific)? The verse answers next.

C. The First Class — the Universal Five

1. The Names and Definitions of the Universal Ones, and the Twofold Proof from "Teaching" and "Reasoning"

The treatise says: first among the six classes is the "universal mental factors," that is, the five — contact, attention, feeling, perception, and volition (already expounded in detail before). How, then, is this characteristic of "universality" to be known? It is established by the two "criteria of certainty": "teaching" (the explicit text of the sacred teachings) and "reasoning" (investigation by right principle).

First, the side of "teaching." As a scripture says, "with eye and form as condition there arises eye-consciousness; the coming-together of the three — faculty, object, and consciousness — gives rise to contact; and arising together with contact are also feeling, perception, and volition" (expounded at length below) — by this passage we know that "contact," together with feeling, perception, and volition, these four, are universal. Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) marks out, at this point on the "universal," the dispute that stood at the time: the Sarvāstivādins and the like asked only "whether these five pervade every state of mind," while the Sautrāntika masters and the like asked "whether these five, taken as really existent, can count as universal"; the fifty-sixth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi cites this same Āgama passage to refute the Sautrāntikas — and since this passage is a root scripture admitted in common by the Great and the Small Vehicle (namely the Āgama), taking it as the scriptural proof of the "universal" is something none of the schools can rebut. And a scripture says, "if the faculty is unimpaired, the object is present, and attention rightly arises, only then can consciousness arise"; another scripture says, "wherever one attends, there one discerns; wherever one discerns, there one attends, so attention and consciousness, these two, constantly come together in mutual harmony" (expounded at length below) — by this passage we know that "attention" too is universal. Explicit texts of the sacred teachings of this kind are not in just one place.

Then the side of "reasoning," investigated for the five one by one. On "contact" being universal: the arising of consciousness always has the "coming-together of three" (the harmonizing of faculty, object, and consciousness), and the coming-together of three always gives rise to "contact," while the coming-together of three also definitely depends on "contact" to be accomplished (contact causes the three to come together); if there were no contact, then mind and mental factors could not come together to touch the same single object (contact is precisely the function that makes mind and mental factors touch one object together), so contact pervades every state of mind. On "attention" being universal: attention can guide the mind, making the mind incline toward its own object; if there were no attention, the mind could not arise at all, so attention pervades every state of mind. On "feeling" being universal: feeling can receive the three objects — agreeable, disagreeable, and moderate — making the mind and the rest arise with the aspect of gladness, aversion, or equanimity; there is no state of mind that arises lacking one of the feelings, so feeling pervades every state of mind. On "perception" being universal: perception can fix the "delimitation" (the bounding form) of its own object; if when the mind arose there were no perception, it could not grasp the delimiting aspect of the object, so perception pervades every state of mind. On "volition" being universal: volition can make the mind grasp the "right cause and so on" aspects and thereupon perform wholesome and other deeds; there is no state of mind that arises lacking volition, so there is definitely volition. From this it is proven: contact and the rest, these five dharmas, are all definitely present the moment the mind arises, and so are "universal"; the others (the object-specific and so on) are not universal, and this principle will be expounded below.

D. The Second Class — the Object-Specific Five

The treatise says: next is the class of "object-specific," that is, the five from "aspiration" to "wisdom" (aspiration, resolve, mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom). The object-events they take are for the most part each different, and within the six classes they are ranked after the "first class (the universal)," so they are the second class. Each is discussed one by one below.

1. Aspiration — Wishing

What is "aspiration"? Upon a "longed-for object," it has "wishing" as its nature, and "serving as the basis of energetic diligence" as its function (only with wishing is one willing to be diligent).

What object, then, does "the longed-for" refer to? Here there are three views. One view (the delight-worthy object): "the longed-for" is the "delight-worthy object" — toward delight-worthy things one wishes to see, to hear, and so on, and has wishing. Someone objects: toward repugnant things, wishing that one will not meet them, wishing to be free of them — is this not also aspiration? Answer: this is merely seeking the "delight-worthy self-substance" attained upon "being freed from the repugnant," and is not aspiration toward the repugnant thing itself. So toward "repugnant" and "moderate" objects there is uniformly no aspiration; and even when one takes a delight-worthy thing as object, if no wishing arises, there is no aspiration either. Another view (the sought object): "the longed-for" is the "sought object" — toward both the delight-worthy and the repugnant, one seeks "union" and seeks "separation" and has wishing. In that case, only toward the "moderate" object is there uniformly no aspiration; and even taking a delight-worthy or repugnant thing as object, if no seeking arises, there is no aspiration. Another view (the object one wishes to observe): "the longed-for" is the "object one wishes to observe" — toward any thing whatever, if one wishes to observe it, there is wishing. If one does not wish to observe, but merely takes the object spontaneously under the force of cause and object, there is no aspiration at all. From this principle it can be known: "aspiration is not universal" (it does not pervade every state of mind).

In passing, a claim that "aspiration ought to be universal" is refuted. Someone says: it is precisely by the force of "wishing for the object" that mind and mental factors manage to take their object, so a scripture says "aspiration is the root of all dharmas" (and if so, aspiration ought to be universal). Refutation: that statement is wrong — the mind and the rest take their object "by relying on attention" (all the sacred teachings say that only with attention present can consciousness arise), and nowhere has it ever been said that "it is by relying on aspiration that mind and mental factors arise." Just as a scripture says "all dharmas have craving as their root" — are mind and mental factors then born by relying on craving (plainly not)? The scripture's saying "aspiration is the root of all dharmas" means "all the undertakings that aspiration sets in motion" (not that aspiration can give birth to all states of mind); or it means "wholesome aspiration can set right diligence in motion" — because wholesome aspiration helps bring about all wholesome deeds, the treatise therefore says aspiration is "the basis of energetic diligence."

2. Resolve — Imprinting and Holding

What is "resolve"? Upon a "settled object," it has "imprinting and holding" (settling and grasping firmly) as its nature, and "not being able to be drawn away" as its function. That is to say: by the force of teaching, the force of reasoning, and the force of witness — whether wrong or right — one examines and settles upon the object grasped, imprinting it and dwelling on it firmly, so that no other condition can ever stir it or alter it. So toward a "doubtful object" there is no resolve at all; and a mind that is not examining-and-settling has no resolve either. From this it is known: resolve is not subsumed under the universal.

In passing, a claim that "resolve ought to be universal" is refuted. Someone says: when mind and the rest take their own object, there is no obstruction, so they all have resolve (and if so, resolve ought to be universal). Refutation: that statement has no ground. Why? What "can be unobstructing" is the dharmas (the object-dharmas are by nature unobstructing), what "is unobstructed" is the mind and the rest (the mind is by nature unobstructed), and what truly "powerfully sets things in motion (forcefully arouses the mind to incline toward the object)" is the faculty and attention — if one insisted it is by relying on resolve that things are powerfully set in motion, then resolve itself would have to rely on something else, and that on something else again, committing the fault of "infinite regress."

3. Mindfulness — Clear Remembrance, Not Forgetting

What is "mindfulness"? Upon a "formerly-practiced object" (an object one has previously experienced), it has "making the mind remember clearly and not forget" as its nature, and "serving as the basis of concentration" as its function. That is to say: repeatedly holding in memory an object formerly received, making it not be lost, and thereby it can induce concentration. Toward a "formerly-unreceived" substance or kind of object, mindfulness cannot arise at all; and even toward what was formerly received, if it cannot be clearly remembered, mindfulness cannot arise either. So mindfulness is definitely not subsumed under the universal.

In passing, a claim that "mindfulness ought to be universal" is refuted. Someone says: the moment the mind arises there is definitely mindfulness accompanying it, because it can serve as the cause of "later remembrance" (and if so, mindfulness ought to be universal). Refutation: that statement has no ground. Take a counterexample: one cannot, because there is delusion, faith, and so on later on, infer back that the earlier mind too definitely had delusion or faith (what is present later cannot prove that it was present earlier). Besides, the force of the earlier mind, mental factors, or "perception" is already enough to serve as the cause of later remembrance (the earlier mindfulness is not necessarily required).

4. Concentration — Focused Attention, Not Scattered

What is "concentration"? Upon an "observed object," it has "making the mind focus and not scatter" as its nature, and "serving as the basis of knowledge" as its function. That is to say: when observing the object of "merit, fault, or neither," concentration makes the mind focus and not scatter, and in dependence on this there arises the "knowledge of discrimination."

One must note that the phrase "the mind focuses" means "it can dwell wherever one wishes to make it dwell," and does not mean that it can only be confined to a single object — were it otherwise, then at the path of seeing, where one observes the four truths in succession with each successive object different, would there then be no "even-holding (concentration)"? Conversely, if one does not bind the mind, and is not in the stage of a focused object, no concentration arises, so concentration is not universal.

In passing, several shifted reckonings that "concentration ought to be universal" are refuted. Someone says: even in a scattered state concentration arises, only its aspect is faint and hidden (and if so, concentration ought to be universal). Answer: one should speak honestly (one cannot force-assert that it is present). The first shifted reckoning: if one says "concentration can make the mind and the rest harmonize and incline toward one object together, so it is universal" — the principle does not hold; that is in fact the function of "contact" (not concentration). The second shifted reckoning: if one says "concentration can make the mind, within a single instant, not shift its object, so it is subsumed under the universal" — this too is unreasonable; the mind of a single instant, with respect to its own object, has no question of "shifting" in the first place. The third shifted reckoning: if one says "it is by relying on concentration that the mind takes its object, so it is subsumed under the universal" — this too has no ground; it is "attention" that makes the mind take its object (not concentration). Yet another says: "the substance of concentration is just the mind" — because a scripture says "concentration is the training in the mind" and "the one-pointedness of mind." Refutation: that is no firm proof — it is said in this way "by relying on concentration to gather the mind and make the mind one-pointed" (not that concentration just is the mind). Moreover, concentration is also subsumed under "the faculty of concentration, the power of concentration, the awakening-factor of concentration, right concentration," and so on, just like mindfulness, wisdom, and the rest (all of which are mental factors), and so it is not the mind itself.

5. Wisdom — Discernment

What is "wisdom"? Upon an "observed object," it has "discernment (distinguishing and deciding)" as its nature, and "severing doubt" as its function. That is to say: when observing the object of merit, fault, or neither, by wisdom one investigates and arrives at a settled conclusion. In the deluded mind that is "not an object of observation" there is no discernment, so wisdom is not subsumed under the universal.

In passing, a claim that "wisdom ought to be universal" is refuted. Someone says: even in delusion wisdom arises, only its aspect is faint and hidden (and if so, wisdom ought to be universal). Refutation: "you heaven-beloved (you people)" — how do you know this? You say it is because the Abhidharma lists wisdom among the "great-ground dharmas (the universal)" — but the Abhidharma texts of the various schools contradict one another, so how can you take them as a criterion? The scripture says only "contact and the other five" are universal; "speaking of ten (the great-ground dharmas)" is not derived from the scripture, and should not be rigidly clung to. Furthermore, since "aspiration and the other five (the object-specific)" are not "contact and the other five," they are definitely not universal — just like faith, greed, and the rest (which are likewise not universal).

6. Whether the Object-Specific Five Must Arise Together — the Reckoning of the "Thirty-One Phrasings"

Do these five object-specific ones definitely draw one another up and appear together? Here there are two views.

One view (they definitely aid one another): these five definitely aid one another — whichever one arises, the other four are definitely present.

Another view (not necessarily, and this is the settled correct reading): not necessarily (they need not arise together). The Yogācārabhūmi says the object-specific lack the latter two of the "four universalities" (no all-times, no all-co-arisings); and it says these five arise by taking "four kinds of object" (the longed-for, the settled, the formerly-practiced, the observed) as condition, and the object grasped and the grasping consciousness do not necessarily arise together. Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) assigns the earlier "they definitely aid one another" view to "the position of one master" — meaning that whenever any one of aspiration and the rest arises, the other four are definitely present; whereas this treatise takes "they need not arise together" as the settled correct reading.

Following the correct reading, the treatise reckons through all the various combinations.

It should be said that these five sometimes "arise singly": upon a longed-for object only wishing (aspiration) arises; or upon a settled object only imprinting-understanding (resolve); or upon a formerly-practiced object only remembrance (mindfulness); or upon an observed object only focus (concentration). The line "upon an observed object only concentration arises" needs special explanation here: those deluded folk, in order to still the scattered mind, focus on the object yet cannot discern it — everyone in the world knows them as "having concentration without wisdom." In the stage of preparatory practice they have little hearing and reflection, and so it is said "even-holding takes the observed object as condition"; or it is said this way by way of "the majority of cases." And like the "gods who play and forget," who focus on a single object yet arouse greed, hatred, and so on, they too have concentration without wisdom — and of this kind there are in fact a great many. Conversely there are also those who, "upon an observed object, only discernment (wisdom) arises" — that is, not focusing but galloping and scattering while investigating (having wisdom without concentration).

The case of "arising in twos": for instance, upon the two objects of the longed-for and the settled, wishing and resolve arise; or upon the two objects of the longed-for and the formerly-practiced, wishing and mindfulness arise... and so on down the line, up to, upon the observed object, concentration and wisdom arising — twelve phrasings in all.

The case of "arising in threes": for instance, upon the three objects of the longed-for, the settled, and the formerly-practiced, wishing, resolve, and mindfulness arise; and so on, up to, upon the formerly-practiced and the observed, mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom arising — thirteen phrasings in all.

The case of "arising in fours": for instance, upon the four objects of the longed-for, the settled, the formerly-practiced, and the observed, the first four (wishing, resolve, mindfulness, concentration) arise; and so on, up to (lacking wishing) upon the settled, formerly-practiced, observed, and other objects, the latter four (resolve, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom) arising — "five fours" in all (five phrasings each arising in four).

The case of "arising in fives": upon the four objects of the longed-for, the settled, the formerly-practiced, and the observed, all five (wishing, resolve, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom) arise. Thus, arousing the five — aspiration and the rest — within the "four objects," reckoning the general and the particular together, there are "thirty-one phrasings" in all.

There is, in addition, a state of mind where "none of the five arises": for instance, the "abrupt-falling mind" (a mind that flashes up suddenly, not yet discriminating) that is not upon those "four objects" (not the longed-for, settled, formerly-practiced, or observed), and the state arising together with the store-consciousness — and of this kind too there is more than one sort.

7. The Presence or Absence of the Object-Specific Five in the Several Consciousnesses

In the seventh and eighth consciousnesses, these object-specific five are present in some states and absent in others (already discussed above). The sixth, mental consciousness, in every state admits arising together with these five — whether "transformed at the basis" or "not yet transformed at the basis," neither case excludes them.

As for whether the first five consciousnesses have the object-specific five, here there are two views. One view (they have none): the first five consciousnesses have none of these five — because the five consciousnesses take "already-attained objects," they have no wishing (no aspiration); because they cannot examine-and-settle, they have no imprinting-and-holding (no resolve); because they constantly take "new objects," they have no recollection (no mindfulness); because they are by nature scattered and moving, they have no focus (no concentration); and because they cannot deliberate, they have no discernment (no wisdom).

Another view (they admit having them all, and this is the settled correct reading): the first five consciousnesses admit having these five. Although toward the object they have no "augmented wishing," they do have the faint, weak sense of "delighting in the object" (so they have aspiration); although toward the object they have no "augmented examining-and-settling," they do have the faint, weak sense of "imprinting the object" (so they have resolve); although they cannot clearly remember the substance of a formerly-practiced object, they do have a faint, weak kind of "mindfulness-object" (so they have mindfulness); although they do not deliberately bind their mindfulness to one object, they do have a faint, weak sense of "focus" (so they have concentration) — the "scattered and moving by nature" mentioned earlier negates "even-induction" (the kind induced by the concentration-stage), not "even-holding," so the five consciousnesses admit having concentration; and although they cannot deliberate upon the object, they do have a faint, weak sense of "discernment" (so they have wisdom). It is precisely for this reason that the sacred teachings say "the eye-superknowledge and the ear-superknowledge are the knowledge-nature corresponding with eye-consciousness and ear-consciousness" (and this is plain proof that the five consciousnesses have wisdom); and inferring the remaining three — nose, tongue, and body consciousness — by this, there is no fault in saying they too have wisdom.

One must also distinguish the two stages of the ordinary and the holy: in the "stage not yet at mastery" (the ordinary stage) these five may perhaps be absent; "at the time of attained mastery" (buddhahood) these five are definitely all present — the buddha delights in observing every object, so wishing is undiminished; the resolve that imprints the object is constantly undiminished; he remembers what was formerly practiced and received, so mindfulness is undiminished; moreover, the buddha's five consciousnesses can take as object the three times — past, present, and future (so they have mindfulness); the Tathāgata has no unconcentrated mind (so there is concentration); and the five consciousnesses all have the "knowledge that accomplishes tasks" (the perfecting-of-action knowledge, so they have wisdom).

8. Which Feelings the Object-Specific Five Correspond With

Which feelings do these object-specific five correspond with? Here there are two views.

One view: "aspiration" corresponds with three feelings (excluding distress and pain, because the objects of distress and pain are not "longed-for"); the other four (resolve, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom) extend to four feelings, excluding only painful feeling — because examining-and-settling and the rest are not present in the five consciousnesses, whereas painful feeling is present in the five consciousnesses, and since the five consciousnesses have none of these four (per the earlier "one view" that the five consciousnesses lack the object-specific), these four do not correspond with painful feeling.

Another view (all of them correspond with the five feelings, and this is the settled correct reading): the object-specific five all uniformly correspond with all five feelings. The grounds: the treatise says "the faculty of distress yearns aversively toward the unsurpassed dharma, and grieves while seeking and clinging to its attainment" (so it is clear that aspiration can co-arise with distress); in the "place of purely received pain" (the hells) one seeks for liberation, and the mental stage has the faculty of pain (already discussed above, so it is clear that aspiration can co-arise with pain); the treatise also says "greedy craving corresponds with distress and pain," and when this greedy craving co-arises there is definitely aspiration (so it is clear that aspiration can co-arise with distress and pain). Since the faculty of pain can correspond with mental consciousness, what obstruction is there to examining-and-settling and the other three (resolve, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom) co-arising with painful feeling? Moreover, when the five consciousnesses co-arise there are also the faint and subtle four of imprinting-the-object and the rest (the principle as stated before, this being per the correct reading that "the five consciousnesses admit having the object-specific"). From this, the object-specific aspiration and the other five all correspond with all five feelings.

Finally the treatise adds a closing line: these object-specific five can be further distinguished by the various gates of "the three natures, the three realms, the trainee and the adept," and so on — this is left for the learner to ponder duly for oneself.

Onward Transmission

The framework this section establishes — "the six classes of mental associate, fifty-one in all," together with the substance and function of each of the universal five and the object-specific five — is the governing outline by which the whole consciousness-only system accounts for "mental functions," and the later treatises take it up one by one. The Hundred Dharmas treatise lists "the dharmas that are mental factors" as the second of the five positions of the hundred dharmas, with the universal five (contact, attention, feeling, perception, volition) and the object-specific five (aspiration, resolve, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom) as precisely its first two classes, dharma answering to dharma. The Thirty Verses — verse nine (the six classes of mental associate, all corresponding with the three feelings) and verse ten (the universal five and the object-specific five) — is the very root-text this section expounds, verse answering to verse. The Madhyānta-vibhāga, in its chapter on characteristics, when clarifying "unreal imagination," regards the mental factors as the other-dependent mental functions that serve as the basis of defilement and purity — a sense that touches on this section's "general subsumption of the mental factors." The Mahāyāna-saṃgraha, in its section on the characteristic of the knowable, distinguishes how the other-dependent nature, the three natures, and mind-and-mental-associates are mutually subsumed; this section's body of mental factors falls within that general subsumption too, only it has no point-for-point counterpart there that argues each class separately. As for the Twenty Verses, its concern is to establish consciousness-only and refute the outsiders' clinging to real objects, and it has no direct counterpart to the division of the six classes of mental associate; here it is left aside.