成唯識論 會通「假必依真」·成立假說我法

Both graspings refuted, an objection comes from the other side: you say self and dharmas are provisional designations — but whatever is provisional is set up in dependence on the real, on a real thing, a semblance, a shared attribute. If so, a real self and real dharmas apart from consciousness must exist; otherwise on what does your "provisional" rest?

The objection is strong, for it grants your premise and then turns it against you. The treatise peels it back layer by layer.

First, provisional designation by class. You say the provisional is set up on a real of the same class — as, seeing fire, one says "this man is fire," from fire's fierceness naming his temper. But fire and man are not of one class. If sameness of class were required, "this man is fire" would not stand; if it is not required, your "must rest on the real" does not stand either.

Next, provisional designation on a real thing. You say the provisional must rest on something really there, as, seeing a rope, one takes it for a snake. But the rope you rest on is itself, in your seeing, a provisionally established aspect — press the regress and the final "real" is nowhere found.

Then the general rule itself. What the provisional rests on need not be a real apart from consciousness; a semblance suffices — and the image-part into which consciousness transforms is exactly such a semblance. Provisional designation turns upon that.

So the conclusion: the provisional in "provisional designation of self and dharmas" rests on the semblance of self and dharmas into which consciousness transforms, not on a real self and real dharmas outside the mind. With that step taken, consciousness-only has no line of retreat behind it: even the provisional has been drawn inside.

The chapter looks like a tidying-up. In fact it is the closing of the door. What went before refuted what others had posited; this refutes the place you might still have retreated to once the refuting was done.

C. Reconciling the objection that "the conventional must rest on the real" (establishing the conventional positing of self and dharmas)

1. The outsider's objection: if self and dharmas do not exist, on what does conventional positing rest?

Someone presses this challenge: "You say there is no real self or real dharmas apart from consciousness; then even 'conventional positing' ought to be nil. Why? Because to draw a comparison — to posit something conventionally — three things must come together before it can stand: first a 'real thing' (the thing truly being there), second a 'resembling-thing' (something else that looks like it), and third a 'shared property' (the quality both things have in common).

"Take 'calling a certain man fire': there must first truly be 'fire' (the real thing), and truly be 'a man whose temper is fierce like fire' (the resembling-thing), and these two must share the quality 'fierce-and-red' (the shared property) — the three together, and only then may one say by comparison 'this man is fire.' Likewise conventionally calling 'a certain fool an ox' is the same: there must be a real ox, a man resembling an ox, and the property shared by both, before it can be said.

"Look back, then, by this principle: now you say 'self and dharmas' simply are not there — on what, then, can 'conventional positing' stand? And since 'conventional positing' cannot stand, even the 'resembling' (the appearance the mind transforms so as to look like an outer object) fails along with it. That being so, on what ground do you say 'the mind transforms into the semblance of an outer object and so turns'?"

2. The general answer: a self and dharmas apart from consciousness were already refuted

This challenge in fact cannot stand. First, a word in general: you take "a real self and real dharmas apart from consciousness" as your premise — but that premise was already demolished above (in segments A and B); there is no such thing at all, so there is nothing to "rest on."

And your line "conventional positing must rest on a real thing" does not get through either. Consider: to say by comparison "a man is fire" can go only two ways — either in dependence on the "class" (the common nature of the fire-kind), or in dependence on the "real" (the one real substance of fire). Below, each is taken in turn: both roads, in fact, fail to stand.

3. Refuting "conventional positing in dependence on the class"

Take first the road "in dependence on the class" — that is, saying "a man is fire" by leaning on "the common nature of the fire-kind." This fails at the outset. Why? Because the qualities you take for your bridge, "fierce, red," and the like, do not belong to the "class" itself (the class-nature shared by everything of the fire-kind) — "fierce, red" are only the particular traits of some individual thing, not the class-nature of "the fire-kind."

Someone might say: even without a shared quality, one can still say by comparison "a man is fire." But to say this throws everything into confusion: by that logic, one ought to be able to point at "water" and call it "fire" too — though water plainly shares nothing with fire. So "one can conventionally posit anything at will, even without a shared quality" will not stand.

The opponent may retreat a step and plead: "Granted 'fierce, red,' and the like are not the qualities of the 'class' itself; still, they are stuck together with the 'class,' inseparable from it — and being inseparable, one can still lean on the 'class' to draw the comparison." This too is wrong.

The reasoning is plain: look at the plain facts before us — "the human kind" and the quality "fierce" can in fact come apart (some people are not fierce; some things are very fierce yet do not belong to the fire-kind). So the "class" and the qualities "fierce, red" are neither one and the same nor inseparable — they come apart. And yet, all the same, the world does have the conventional positing "point at a man and call him fire," and it stands. This proves, conversely, that conventional positing is not accomplished in dependence on the "class" at all.

4. Refuting "conventional positing in dependence on the real substance"

Take next the road "in dependence on the real" — that is, saying "a man is fire" by leaning on "the one real substance of fire." This road too cannot stand. Why? Because the qualities "fierce, red" are not one same thing "shared in common" by both fire and man.

To put it more exactly: the "fierce, red" on fire and the "fierce, red" on a man are each their own substance — fire's fierceness grows on the body of fire, the man's fierceness grows on the body of the man, and the substances they attach to (one the fire-body, one the man-body) are simply two different things. Since each side has its own, no truly "shared" quality can be found to serve as the bridge for the comparison. So this road's fault is the same as the "in dependence on the class" road above: it does not get through.

The opponent may plead again: "Granted each has its own substance; still, the man's fierceness and fire's fierceness do 'look very much alike,' and on the strength of that resemblance, surely one can draw the comparison?" This too is wrong.

You need only look at how the world actually speaks, and it is clear: when people draw the comparison they say "fire is in this man" (taking the man outright to be fire), not "fire's quality is in this man" (pointing out that the qualities on the two sides resemble each other). So conventional positing really points at "the substance fire," and does not land on "the resemblance of qualities." From this it can be seen: conventional positing is not accomplished in dependence on a "real substance" either.

5. Refuting "the conventional must rest on a real thing"

Step back yet further, to the very root, and take your line "conventional positing must be set up in dependence on a 'real thing'" — this line itself does not get through.

First, what is the "real"? Here "real" means the "particular characteristic" — the substance-mark each thing has of its own, unique to it, that nothing else has. But you must realize: drawing a comparison relies on two tools — one the "conventional cognition" (the conventionally-set-up cognition in the mind when one draws the comparison), the other the "conventional expression" (the conventionally-set-up name-and-word on the lips when one draws it). And these two tools, precisely, never touch the "particular characteristic."

How do they not touch it? The "conventional cognition" and the "conventional expression" alike, in the object they reach out to, never get as far as the "particular characteristic"; they only turn upon a thing's "general characteristic" (the common mark abstracted across many things). And besides this "general characteristic," there is no other clever route by which one could set up the "particular characteristic" and hand it over to serve as the conventional's support — the "particular characteristic" is simply beyond the reach of conventional cognition and conventional expression, and so cannot be the conventional's support.

And to confirm it from the other end: the "conventional cognition" and the "conventional expression" must both arise in dependence on "sound" (the sound of spoken name-and-word); wherever "sound" cannot reach, this conventional cognition and expression cannot turn and can do nothing. But look: the expressing side (sound, name-and-word) and the expressed side (the general characteristic) — neither side is the "particular characteristic." Since from start to finish it never touches the "particular characteristic" (that is, the "real thing"), this proves that conventional positing is not accomplished in dependence on a "real thing" at all.

6. Conclusion: the conventional turns in dependence on a resembling-thing

With these several refutations done, the positive conclusion comes out of itself: "conventional positing" in fact turns only in dependence on a "resembling-thing," resting on no "real thing" whatever. And what does this "resembling" mean? It means a "superimposed" mark — a mark that one adds on and sets up upon the "general characteristic," which is not a really-existent mark. The "sound" of speech turns precisely in dependence on this "superimposed, resembling mark." So one simply cannot say "conventional positing must rest on a real thing." And with that, the earlier challenge turns out to be contrary to right principle.

7. The closing verse

To put it the other way round, then: why did the Buddha speak this whole language of "the conventional and the resembling" (that is, the conventional positing of a self and dharmas)? He spoke it standing on the principle of "what consciousness transforms" — in order to counter and break sentient beings' grasping that "clings to self and dharmas as dead-real," he expediently spoke the "conventional, resembling" words. Just for this, a verse (gāthā) in scripture says:

　　"In order to counter and break the 'real self, real dharmas' that the fool clings to as dead-real, the Buddha, upon the appearances that consciousness transforms, expediently sets up the two names 'self' and 'dharmas.'"

Having finished refuting a substantial self and substantial dharmas, an opponent presses back from the opposite direction: you say that self and dharmas are both merely "provisional designations" — but surely the provisional has to rest on something real in order to stand at all. If self and dharmas are truly nonexistent, then on what basis can a provisional designation even be made? In this section, the author of the treatise dismantles this objection — "the provisional must rest on the real" — point by point.

What this section sets out to establish — that self and dharmas are provisional designations and that the wholly-imagined mark has no own-nature — has its roots in scripture and treatise alike. Its scriptural root is the chapter on the absence of own-nature in the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra and its teaching of the "three absences of own-nature." There the World-Honored One, with hidden intent, declares that "all dharmas are without own-nature," resting this on three: the absence of own-nature as to characteristic, the absence of own-nature as to arising, and the absence of own-nature in the ultimate sense. The first of these — the absence of own-nature as to characteristic — speaks precisely of the "wholly-imagined mark of dharmas": this characteristic is "set up by provisional naming" and "not set up by its own self-character," and so it is said to be without own-nature. That the wholly-imagined mark is merely set up by provisional naming and does not exist by virtue of any self-character of its own — this is the Buddha's own warrant for the present section's thesis, that the provisional designation of self and dharmas turns merely in dependence on a resembling instance (a superimposition) and not on a real instance (an own-character). And the "absence of own-nature in the ultimate sense" — which discloses the inexpressible real-nature of the other-dependent and the perfectly-accomplished — is just where this treatise's account ("it rests on the transformation of consciousness, set up to counter and dispel deluded grasping") finally comes to rest. The treatise-basis lies in the chapter on the meaning of reality, in the Bodhisattva stage of the Yogācārabhūmi. There two gates are set up — the "inexpressible own-nature" and the "provisionally-designated own-nature": the provisionally-designated own-nature is defined as the "existence" that the world has grasped at through beginningless time (and which is the very root of all discriminating conceptual elaboration), while "everything on which the provisional designation rests is nonexistent" is defined as "nonexistence," the whole reconciled into the middle way that "is free of superimposition and free of denial." That all dharmas are "merely set up provisionally and have no own-nature" is precisely the treatise-basis for this section's thesis — that the provisional turns merely in dependence on a resembling instance, and that the resembling instance just is a superimposition. What Dharmapāla's collated reading takes as its ground in this section, then, has its scriptural root in the three absences of own-nature in the Saṃdhinirmocana and its treatise-basis in the chapter on the meaning of reality in the Yogācārabhūmi. With that, we follow the opponent's objections and dismantle them one by one.

1. The External Objection: If Self and Dharmas Do Not Exist, On What Does the Provisional Designation Rest?

The opponent's objection runs like this. If there is no substantial self and no substantial dharma standing apart from consciousness, then "provisional designation" itself should also fail — because a provisional designation can only be set up when three things are in place: a real instance, a resembling instance, and a shared property. For example, only because there is a "real fire," a "person whose temperament is fierce and so resembles fire," and the property "blazing and red" that the fire and the person hold in common, can one provisionally say "this person is fire." Provisionally calling some foolish person an "ox" works the same way — it rests on a real ox, on a person who resembles an ox, and on a shared property in order to make the designation. Now, the opponent argues, if self and dharmas are truly nonexistent, on what does the provisional designation rest? And if there is no provisional designation, then "the resembling" — the appearance of an outer object — cannot be established either; so how can you go on to say that "the mind manifests what resembles an outer object and turns thereby"?

Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) judges the pedigree of this objection clearly. The claim that "the provisional must rest on a real instance, a resembling instance, and a shared property" is one set up by the Vaiśeṣika masters on the basis of their doctrine of categories. They reckon the "real instance" to be the substance-category and quality-category among the Vaiśeṣika's six categories — as when they say "earth has fourteen qualities, fire has eleven qualities," taking the fierceness and redness of fire to be really existent "qualities" — and they take the "real instance" to be the "self-character of a dharma." The "resembling instance" is the similar appearance formed in dependence on the real instance, and the "shared property" is just that "quality" (the fierceness and redness held in common by fire and by the person). And so what the treatise goes on to refute below is precisely this reckoning that "the categories such as substance just are the real instance" — for once it is established that "the categories such as substance are not the real instance," the real instance topples, and the resembling instance and the shared property (the quality-category) that were formed in dependence on it topple along with it. The Notes points out, further, that the author's earlier passage sets up the objection by way of "the outer school (the Vaiśeṣika categorists), who admit a real instance," while the later passage sets it up by way of "the Hīnayāna (the Sarvāstivādins and the like), who likewise admit a real instance" — two routes of objection, which the treatise dismantles in order.

2. The General Answer: The Self and Dharmas Apart from Consciousness Have Already Been Refuted

This objection does not hold. First, "self and dharmas standing apart from consciousness" have already been refuted in the previous two sections. Second, what the opponent calls "the provisional must rest on the real" cannot be made to stand by either of its two possible routes — whether by "provisional designation based on the universal" or by "provisional designation based on the real substance." Both routes are refuted below in turn.

3. Refuting "Provisional Designation Based on the Universal"

"Provisional designation based on the universal" — designating a person as fire on the basis of the universal nature, the class-character, of fire — fails at the outset. This is because properties such as "fierce" and "red" are not inherent to the universal, the shared character; fierceness and redness are particular properties, not the nature of the class as such. And if one were to claim that a provisional designation can be made even without a shared property, then one ought equally to be able to apply the name "fire" to "water" — for if no shared property is required, any name could be assigned arbitrarily, which makes no sense. Suppose the opponent then revises the claim and says: although "fierce" and the rest are not properties of the class, they are nonetheless inseparable from the class, and so a designation based on the universal can still be made. This too is wrong — for in actual fact the class "humankind" and properties like "fierceness" plainly can be separated from one another: there are people who are not fierce, and there is fierceness that is not of the fire-class. Since the class neither possesses that property nor is inseparable from it, and yet the world goes on provisionally designating "this person is fire" all the same, it is evident that the provisional designation is not established by resting on the "universal."

4. Refuting "Provisional Designation Based on the Real Substance"

"Provisional designation based on the real substance" — designating a person as fire on the basis of the actual substance of fire — also fails. This is because properties such as "fierce" and "red" are not held in common by fire and person: the fierceness of fire is the fierceness of fire, and the fierceness of a person is the fierceness of a person; the substances on which they rest — the substance of fire, the substance of the person — are separate, and there is no single "shared property" to serve as the basis of the designation. The fault is the same as before. And if the opponent says, "the properties of person and fire resemble each other — both are fierce and red — and so a designation can be made," this too is wrong: for when the world makes the provisional designation, it says "fire is in the person" — "this person is fire" — and not "the property of fire is in the person." From this it is evident that the provisional designation is not established by resting on the "real substance."

5. Refuting "The Provisional Must Rest on a Real Instance"

Further, the claim that "the provisional must be set up by resting on a real instance" is itself unreasonable. "Real" here refers to the "own-character" — the individual, distinct self-character of each dharma. But neither "provisional cognition" — the provisionally established act of knowing — nor "provisional expression" — the provisionally established name and word — takes the "own-character" as its object: they cannot reach the own-character at all; they operate only upon the "shared character" of dharmas. Nor is it the case that, setting the shared character aside, there is some additional device by which the "own-character" is set up as the basis on which the provisional rests. What is more, provisional cognition and provisional expression must always arise in dependence on "sound" — the sound of name and word; and where sound cannot reach, provisional cognition and expression cannot operate. Yet both the "expressing sound and name" and the "shared character that is expressed" are not the "own-character." Therefore one can know that the provisional designation is not established by resting on a "real instance," the own-character.

6. Drawing the Conclusion: The "Provisional" Merely Turns in Dependence on a "Resembling Instance"

Reasoning the matter all the way through: the "provisional" merely turns in dependence on a "resembling instance." "Resembling" here refers to the appearance of "superimposition" — what is added and set up upon the shared character — and not to any really existent appearance. "Sound" then turns in dependence on this superimposed, resembling appearance. Therefore one cannot say that "the provisional must rest on the real." That objection, accordingly, fails to accord with correct reasoning.

Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) supplies a decisive gloss on the four words "the resembling refers to superimposition." To say "resembling," it explains, is meant to bring out that the resembling instance is not really existent — it is "a shared character superimposed, upon an own-character, as an other-dependent existent": as when "a single color-appearance," which is in itself a particular own-character, is forcibly extended over "all colors" (one appearance taken as the appearance common to many colors), this setting-up that "extends it over all colors" is what is called "superimposition." And so the resembling instance — the superimposed appearance — is not something really existent apart from consciousness, but merely an other-dependent dharma added and set up upon the shared character. This confirms the conclusion drawn above: that the provisional does not rest on a real instance (an own-character), but turns merely in dependence on a resembling instance.

7. The Concluding Verse

At the root of it all: it is in dependence on the principle of "the transformation of consciousness" that the Buddha, in order to counteract and remove sentient beings' deluded grasping at a substantial self and substantial dharmas, speaks the language of the "provisional" and the "resembling" — provisionally designating self and dharmas. And so the verse in the treatise says: "In order to counteract and remove the substantial self and substantial dharmas grasped by the foolish, the names 'self' and 'dharmas' are provisionally set up upon the appearances transformed and manifested by consciousness."

Onward Transmission

This section's refutation of "the provisional must rest on the real" and its establishment of "the provisional designation of self and dharmas in dependence on the transformation of consciousness" are the crucial knot on which the whole consciousness-only system founds its principle that "all dharmas are merely set up provisionally," and the later treatises take it up one by one. The Hundred Dharmas treatise lists all dharmas, provisionally set up "in such an order," as the hundred dharmas — mind, mental factors, matter, the non-associated factors, and the unconditioned, these five categories of a hundred dharmas, all of them the unfolding of "what consciousness transforms, the provisional designation of self and dharmas" (not one dharma existing really apart from consciousness) — carrying forward exactly this section's sense that "the provisional is set up in dependence on the transformation of consciousness." The Thirty Verses — verse one, "by the provisional designation of self and dharmas, which rest on the transformation of consciousness" — is the very root-verse this section expounds on its positive side: this chapter expounds precisely the residual objections to the line "the provisional designation of self and dharmas" in verse one, taking it up clause by clause. The Madhyānta-vibhāga, in its chapter on characteristics, establishes that "deluded discrimination exists; in it the two are wholly absent" — there the "resembling instance, the superimposition," just is the "resembling object" manifested by deluded discrimination, a sense that touches and may be read alongside this section's "the provisional turns in dependence on a resembling instance (a superimposition)." The Mahāyāna-saṃgraha, in its part on the characteristic of the knowable, argues at length the three natures (the other-dependent, the wholly-imagined, and the perfectly-accomplished) — and "the provisionally-designated own-nature, the absence of own-nature as to characteristic" is precisely "the wholly-imagined formed by superimposition upon the other-dependent," so that this section's sense, "the resembling just is superimposition," receives its fullest unfolding only in the three-natures chapter of the Mahāyāna-saṃgraha. As for the Twenty Verses, its concern is to refute outer objects and establish consciousness-only with no objects (refuting atoms, clarifying consciousness-only without objects); it does not stand in direct correspondence to this section's "refuting that the provisional must rest on a real instance, establishing the provisional designation of self and dharmas." The two belong together only under the one great heading of "refuting the real, consciousness-only" (refuting the grasping at a substantial self and dharmas, set against refuting substantial outer objects) — kindred in doctrinal vein but without a clause-by-clause reading; that is left aside here.