成唯識論 善十一
善心所十一：信、慚、愧、無貪、無瞋、無癡、勤、安、不放逸、行捨、不害。
信排第一，不是排場，是次第。 論主給信下的定義很特別：「於實、德、能，深忍、樂、欲，心淨為性」——信實有（信諸法實事理）、信有德（信三寶真淨德）、信有能（信一切善法能得能成）。三分之中最後一分最實在：信自己做得到。 而信的體性是「心淨」，像水清珠投入濁水，水就澄了。所以信不是『相信某個說法』，是心的一種澄淨狀態。沒有這個，後面十個都起不來。
慚與愧是一對：慚依自法力，崇重賢善；愧依世間力，輕拒暴惡。一個對內、一個對外。
無貪無瞋無癡稱「三善根」，因為它們正對治三不善根，一切善法從此生。
勤（精進）有五相：被甲、加行、無下、無退、無足——從發心到不知足，一條完整的用功曲線。
安（輕安）要注意：它唯在定位才有，遠離麤重、調暢身心。散心位是沒有輕安的。
然後論主辨真假：十一之中，不放逸、行捨、不害三者是假立的——不放逸即精進與三善根在防修上的作用，行捨即四法令心平等正直，不害即無瞋於有情不為損惱。餘八是實有。
這個真假之辨不是吹毛求疵。 它在說：你不必去『另外修一個不放逸』，把精進與三善根修好，不放逸自然就在。修行的著力點，因此清楚了。
Eleven wholesome factors: faith, shame, embarrassment, non-greed, non-hatred, non-delusion, energy, pliancy, heedfulness, equanimity of practice, non-harming.
Faith comes first not for ceremony but for sequence. The definition given it is distinctive: "toward the real, the excellent, and the capable — deep acceptance, delight, aspiration; its nature is the clarifying of mind." Faith in the real (in the facts and principles of dharmas), in the excellent (in the pure virtue of the Three Jewels), in the capable (that every good can be attained and accomplished). Of the three, the last is the most concrete: faith that you can do it. And faith's own nature is clarity of mind — like a water-clearing gem dropped into muddy water, and the water settles. Faith is therefore not believing a proposition; it is a clarified condition of mind. Without it, the other ten cannot rise.
Shame and embarrassment are a pair: shame draws on oneself and the teaching, honouring the worthy and good; embarrassment draws on the world's regard, recoiling from the coarse and evil. One faces inward, one outward.
Non-greed, non-hatred, non-delusion are called the three wholesome roots, since they counteract the three unwholesome roots and every good grows from them.
Energy has five marks: donning armour, application, no lowering, no retreat, no complacency — a full curve of effort from first resolve to never being satisfied.
Pliancy deserves notice: it exists only in the concentrated state, removing grossness and making body and mind supple. In a distracted mind there is no pliancy at all.
The treatise then sorts real from provisional: of the eleven, heedfulness, equanimity of practice and non-harming are provisionally established — heedfulness being just energy and the three roots at their work of guarding and cultivating; equanimity being those four keeping the mind level, upright and effortless; non-harming being non-hatred not injuring beings. The other eight are real.
That sorting is no pedantry. It says: you need not go off and cultivate heedfulness separately. Cultivate energy and the three roots well, and heedfulness is already there. Where to apply oneself becomes, with that, clear.
成唯識論卷第六
護法等菩薩造
三藏法師玄奘奉 詔譯
已說遍行、別境二位。善位心所，其相云何？
頌曰：
〔頌曰 7 T31 0029b19〕
１１善謂信、慚、愧、無貪等三根，
勤、安、不放逸、行捨及不害。
論曰：唯善心俱，名善心所。謂信、慚等，定有十一。
云何為信？於實、德、能，深忍、樂、欲，心淨為性；對治不信，樂善為業。
然信差別，略有三種：一、信實有，謂於諸法實事、理中，深信忍故；二、信有德，謂於三寶真淨德中，深信樂故；三、信有能，謂於一切世、出世善，深信有力，能得能成，起希望故。
由斯對治彼不信心，愛樂證修世、出世善。
忍謂勝解，此即信因；樂欲謂欲即是信果。礭陳此信，自相是何？
〔T31 0029c01〕豈不適言，心淨為性？
此猶未了，彼「心淨」言，若淨即心，應非心所；若令心淨，慚等何別？心俱淨法，為難亦然。
此性澄清，能淨心等。以心勝故，立心淨名。如水清珠，能清濁水。慚等雖善，非淨為相。此淨為相，無濫彼失。又諸染法，各別有相。唯有不信，自相渾濁，復能渾濁餘心、心所。如極穢物，自穢穢他。信正翻彼，故淨為相。
有說：信者愛樂為相。應通三性，體應即欲。又應苦、集非信所緣。
有執信者隨順為相。應通三性，即勝解、欲。若印順者，即勝解故。若樂順者，即是欲故。離彼二體，無順相故。由此應知，心淨是信。
云何為慚？依自、法力，崇重賢、善為性；對治無慚，止息惡行為業。謂依自、法尊、貴增上，崇重賢、善，羞恥過惡，對治無慚，息諸惡行。
云何為愧？依世間力，輕拒暴惡為性；對治無愧，止息惡行為業。謂依世間訶、厭增上，輕拒暴惡，羞恥過罪，對治無愧，息諸惡業。
羞恥過惡是二通相；故諸聖教，假說為體。
若執羞恥，為二別相，應慚與愧，體無差別。則此二法定不相應，非受、想等有此義故。若待自、他，立二別者，應非實有，便違聖教。若許慚、愧實而別起，復違論說十遍善心。
崇重、輕拒若二別相，所緣有異，應不俱生。二失既同，何乃偏責？誰言二法所緣有異？不爾，如何？善心起時，隨緣何境，皆有崇重善，及輕拒惡義。故「慚」與「愧」，俱遍善心，所緣無別。豈不我說亦有此義？汝執「慚」、「愧」自相既同，何理能遮前所設難？
然聖教說：「顧自、他者」，自法名自，世間名他。或即此中，崇拒善惡，於己益損，名自、他故。
〔T31 0030a03〕「無貪等」者，等無瞋、癡。此三名根，生善勝故。三不善根，近對治故。
云何無貪？於有、有具，無著為性；對治貪著，作善為業。
云何無瞋？於苦、苦具，無恚為性；對治瞋恚，作善為業。
善心起時，隨緣何境，皆於有等，無著、無恚，觀有等立，非要緣彼。如前慚、愧，觀善、惡立，故此二種，俱遍善心。
云何無癡？於諸理事，明解為性；對治愚癡，作善為業。
有義：無癡即慧為性。《集論》說：此報、教、證、智決擇為體，生得、聞、思、修所生慧。如次皆是決擇性故。
此雖即慧，為顯善品，有勝功能，如煩惱見，故復別說。
有義：無癡非即是慧，別有自性，正對無明。如無貪、瞋，善根攝故。
論說：大悲無瞋、癡攝，非根攝故。若彼無癡，以慧為性，大悲如力等，應慧等根攝。又若無癡無別自性，如不害等，應非實物。便違論說：十一善中，三世俗有，餘皆是實。
然《集論》說：慧為體者，舉彼因果，顯此自性。如以忍、樂，表「信」自體，理必應爾。
以貪、瞋、癡六識相應，正煩惱攝。起惡勝故，立不善根。斷彼必由通、別對治。通唯善慧，別即三根。由此無癡必應別有。
勤謂精進，於善、惡品修、斷事中，勇、悍為性；對治懈怠，滿善為業。
「勇」表勝進，簡諸染法。「悍」表精純，簡淨無記。即顯精進，唯善性攝。
此相差別略有五種。所謂：被甲、加行、無下、無退、無足。
即經所說：有勢、有勤、有勇、堅猛、不捨善軛，如次應知。
此五別者，謂初發心、自分、勝進，自分行中，三品別故；或初發心、長時、無間、慇重、無餘，修差別故；或資糧等，五道別故。二乘究竟道，欣大菩提故，諸佛究竟道，樂利樂他故；或二加行、無間、解脫、勝進別故。
〔T31 0030b05〕「安」謂輕安，遠離麁重，調暢身心，堪任為性；對治惛沈，轉依為業。
謂此伏除能障定法，令所依止，轉安適故。
「不放逸」者：精進、三根，於所斷、修，防、修為性；對治放逸，成滿一切世、出世間善事為業。
謂即四法，於斷修事，皆能防、修，名不放逸。非別有體，無異相故。於防惡事、修善事中，離四功能，無別用故。雖信、慚等，亦有此能，而方彼四，勢用微劣；非根、遍策，故非此依。
豈不防、修是此相用？
防、修何異精進、三根？
彼要待此，方有作用。
此應復待餘，便有無窮失。
勤唯遍策，根但為依，如何說彼有防、修用？
汝防、修用，其相云何？
若普依持，即無貪等。若遍策錄，不異精進。止惡、進善，即總四法。令不散亂，應是等持。令同取境，與觸何別？令不忘失，即應是念。
如是推尋不放逸用，離無貪等，竟不可得。故不放逸，定無別體。
云何「行捨」？精進、三根，令心平等、正直、無功用住為性；對治掉舉，靜住為業。
謂即四法，令心遠離掉舉等障，靜住名捨。平等、正直、無功用住，初、中、後位，辯捨差別。由不放逸先除雜染；捨復令心寂靜而住。
此無別體，如不放逸，離彼四法，無相、用故。能令寂靜，即四法故；所令寂靜，即心等故。
云何「不害」？於諸有情，不為損惱，無瞋為性；能對治害，悲愍為業。
〔T31 0030c01〕謂即無瞋，於有情所，不為損惱，假名不害。
無瞋，翻對斷物命瞋；不害，正違損惱物害。無瞋與樂；不害拔苦。是謂此二麁相差別。
理實無瞋實有自體；不害依彼一分假立。為顯慈、悲，二相別故。利樂有情，彼二勝故。
有說：不害非即無瞋，別有自體，謂賢善性。此相云何？謂不損惱。無瞋亦爾，寧別有性？謂於有情不為損惱，慈悲賢善，是無瞋故。
「及」顯十一，義別心所，謂欣、厭等善心所法。雖義有別，說種種名，而體無異，故不別立。
欣謂欲俱，無瞋一分，於所欣境，不憎恚故。
不忿、恨、惱、嫉等亦然；隨應正翻瞋一分故。
厭謂慧俱無貪一分，於所厭境，不染著故。
不慳、憍等，當知亦然。隨應正翻，貪一分故。
不覆、誑、諂無貪、癡一分；隨應正翻，貪、癡一分故。
有義：不覆唯無癡一分；無處說覆亦貪一分故。
有義：不慢信一分攝，謂若信彼，不慢彼故。有義：不慢捨一分攝，心平等者，不高慢故。有義：不慢慚一分攝，若崇重彼，不慢彼故。
有義：不疑即信所攝，謂若信彼，無猶豫故。有義：不疑：即正勝解，以決定者，無猶豫故。有義：不疑即正慧攝，以正見者，無猶豫故。
不散亂體，即正定攝。正見、正知，俱善慧攝。不忘念者，即是正念。
悔、眠、尋、伺，通染、不染，如觸、欲等，無別翻對。
何緣諸染所翻善中，有別建立，有不爾者？
相、用別者，便別立之；餘善不然，故不應責。又諸染法遍六識者，勝故翻之，別立善法。慢等、忿等，唯意識俱。害雖亦然，而數現起損惱他故；障無上乘勝因悲故；為了知彼增上過失，翻立不害。失念、散亂及不正知，翻入別境，善中不說。
〔T31 0031a02〕染、淨相翻，淨寧少染？
淨勝染劣，少敵多故。又解理通，說多同體，迷情事局，隨相分多。故於染、淨，不應齊責。
此十一法，三是假有，謂不放逸、捨及不害，義如前說。餘八實有，相、用別故。
有義：十一四遍善心，精進、三根，遍善品故。餘七不定。
推尋事理，未決定時，不生信故。慚、愧同類，依處各別，隨起一時，第二無故。要世間道斷煩惱時，有輕安故。不放逸、捨，無漏道時，方得起故。悲愍有情時，乃有不害故。
論說：十一六位中起。謂決定位，有信相應。止息染時，有慚、愧起，顧自、他故。於善品位，有精進、三根。世間道時，有輕安起，於出世道，有捨、不放逸。攝眾生時，有不害故。
有義：彼說未為應理。推尋事理，未決定心，信若不生，應非是善。如染心等，無淨信故。
慚、愧類異，依別境同，俱遍善心，前已說故。
若出世道輕安不生，應此覺支非無漏故。
若世間道無捨、不放逸，應非寂靜防惡修善故；又應不伏掉、放逸故。有漏善心既具四法，如出世道應有二故。
善心起時，皆不損物，違能損法，有不害故。
論說：「六位起十一」者，依彼彼增，作此此說。故彼所說，定非應理。
應說信等十一法中，十遍善心，輕安不遍。要在定位，方有輕安，調暢身心，餘位無故。
〈決擇分〉說：十善心所定、不定地皆遍善心，定地心中，增輕安故。
有義：定加行，亦得定地名。彼亦微有調暢義故。由斯欲界亦有輕安。不爾，便違〈本地分〉說：信等十一通一切地。
〔T31 0031b02〕有義：輕安唯在定有。由定滋養，有調暢故。論說：欲界諸心、心所，由闕輕安，名不定地。說一切地有十一者，通有尋伺等三地皆有故。
此十一種，前已具說。第七、八識，隨位有無。第六識中，定位皆具。若非定位，唯闕輕安。
有義：五識唯有十種，自性散動，無輕安故。
有義：五識亦有輕安。定所引善者，亦有調暢故。成所作智俱，必有輕安故。
此善十一，何受相應？十五相應。一除憂、苦，有逼迫受，無調暢故。
此與別境皆得相應。信等欲等，不相違故。
十一唯善。
輕安非欲，餘通三界。
皆學等三。
非見所斷。《瑜伽論》說：信等六根，唯修所斷，非見所斷。
餘門分別，如理應思。
The canonical text stands in Chinese only. This edition renders the essence, the plain reading, the exposition and the apparatus into English — never the sūtra itself. Switch to 漢讀本 or 並行雙語 above to read it.
〔所釋之頌〕第十一頌
〔所釋頌〕
甲、善十一
論曰：只有跟「善心」一起生起的心所，才叫「善心所」。這樣的善心所總共有十一個：信、慚、愧、無貪、無瞋、無癡、勤、安（也就是輕安）、不放逸、行捨、不害。
一、信
什麼叫「信」？面對三種對象，心裡會深深地認可它（忍可）、喜歡它（愛樂）、想要它（希欲）；它的本性就是讓『心變得清澄』（心淨）。它的作用是：對治「不信」，並且讓人樂意去修善。
「信」可以分成三種：第一種叫信實有——對於一切法，無論是它的事相、還是它的道理，都打心底相信、認可。第二種叫信有德——對於佛、法、僧三寶那真實清淨的功德，打心底相信、喜愛。第三種叫信有能——對於一切世間、出世間的善法，相信它確實有力量、能讓人得到、能讓人成就，因而生起一份盼望（盼自己也能做到）。
靠著這三種信，就能對治「不信」的心，讓人樂意去親證、去修習世間和出世間的善。前面說的三個字裡頭：「忍」（深信認可）其實就是「勝解」（確定不疑的理解），它是信生起的「因」；「樂欲」（喜歡、想要）其實就是「欲」（希求），它是信生起的「果」。
再進一步把信的「自相」（它自己獨有的樣子）究竟是什麼確定下來。〔難〕有人問：剛才不是已經說了『以心淨為性』嗎？〔答〕光這麼說還沒講清楚。因為「心淨」這兩個字，可以有三種解法，每一種都有毛病，要一條一條地看——
(一)如果說「淨」就是「心」本身，那信豈不就等於心王了？可是信明明是「心所」，是隨著心王轉的，不是心王本身——所以這樣講不通。 (二)如果說『能讓心變淨』就算數，那也不對：慚、愧那些善法也都能讓心變淨，這樣一來，信跟慚、愧又有什麼分別？（變成大家都一樣了。） (三)如果說「心淨」指的是『跟心一起生起的那個淨法』，毛病還是跟上一條一樣——還是分不出信跟慚、愧到底差在哪。
〔答〕該怎麼正面講呢？信的體性是一種『使之澄清』的力量，它能把心和心所都淨化乾淨。因為這幾樣裡頭「心」是主角，所以就單拿「心」來說，叫它「心淨」。打個比方：好比把一顆「水清珠」投進濁水裡，水自己就清了——信對心的作用正是這樣。至於慚、愧那些，雖然也是善法，可是它們並不是拿「淨」當自己獨有的樣子；唯獨信是拿「淨」當自己的樣子。這樣一分，信跟慚、愧就不會混在一起了，前面那個『分不開』的毛病也就沒有了。
再從反面看：各種染污的法，各自都有自己不同的樣子；可是唯獨「不信」這一個，它自己就是渾濁的，而且還會把旁邊其餘的心、心所一起攪渾——就像一件極髒的東西，自己髒、還會把別的也弄髒。信正好是「不信」的反面，所以信就拿「淨」當它的樣子（一個渾濁、一個清淨，剛好對著）。
〔異說一·拿「愛樂」當信的樣子〕 有一說主張：信是拿「愛樂」（喜歡）當它的樣子。這講法駁得掉，理由有兩條：一是「愛樂」這東西善的、惡的、不善不惡的（三性）都通——如果信就是拿愛樂當樣子，那信的體豈不就等於「欲」（希求）了？二是苦諦、集諦這兩樣（生死之苦、苦的原因）根本不是讓人喜歡的東西，那它們豈不就不該是信所緣的對象了？可是信明明是緣著四諦（苦集滅道都緣）的。所以『拿愛樂當信的樣子』不對。
〔異說二·拿「隨順」當信的樣子〕 又有一說主張：信是拿「隨順」（順著、隨順認可）當它的樣子。這也駁得掉：一來「隨順」也是善惡無記三性都通；二來再追問這「隨順」到底指什麼——如果指『認定地順從』（印順），那就是「勝解」；如果指『歡喜地順從』（樂順），那就是「欲」。離開了「勝解」和「欲」這兩樣，根本找不出一個獨立的「順」的樣子來。由這兩說都站不住，就可以曉得（正義）：信的樣子就是「心淨」。
二、慚 · 愧
什麼叫「慚」？它靠的是「自己」和「正法」這兩股力量，本性就是『敬重賢人、敬重善法』（崇重賢善），作用是對治「無慚」、止住惡行。說得細一點：因為看重自己、看重正法的尊貴，所以就敬重賢善、對自己的過錯惡行感到羞恥，這樣來對治「無慚」、止住種種惡行。（「無慚」就是做了壞事也不知羞。）
什麼叫「愧」？它靠的是『世間（眾人輿論）』這股力量，本性就是『看不起、拒斥兇暴惡行』（輕拒暴惡），作用是對治「無愧」、止住惡行。說得細一點：因為顧慮世間的責備、厭惡，所以就看輕、拒斥兇暴惡行，對自己的過錯罪行感到羞恥，這樣來對治「無愧」、止住種種惡業。（「無愧」就是做了壞事也不怕人說。）
『對過錯惡行感到羞恥』這一點，是慚和愧兩個共通的樣子（通相，兩個都有的，不是哪一個專有的）。所以經教有時就借這一點，姑且說它是慚愧的「體」。
〔難·別相說一〕假如有人偏要把「羞恥」當成慚、愧各自專有的樣子（別相），那會出毛病：既然兩個都拿「羞恥」當自己的體，那慚和愧的體豈不就一模一樣、分不出差別了？而體既然一樣，這兩個法就該『一定不會同時相應』（同一種東西不會跟自己並起，好比「受」和「想」是兩回事、不會混成一個）——可是這就違背經教了，因為經教說慚、愧是會同時生起的。
〔難·別相說二〕（為了救上一條，有人改口）說：那就用『對著自己』、『對著別人』來分這兩個吧（慚是對自己羞恥、愧是怕別人）。可是這樣又有新毛病：既然慚、愧是『對著什麼』才安立的，那它們就成了『相對而說的假法』、不該是實實在在有的東西了——這又違背經教（經教說慚愧是實有的）。要是硬說它們既實有、又各自分開生起（一個時候只起一個），那又違背《論》裡『十一個善法都遍滿一切善心』這句話了（既然各別、就不能兩個同時遍滿善心）。
〔難·別相說三〕（再退一步，又有人）說：那就用『敬重善（這是慚）』、『拒斥惡（這是愧）』來分這兩個別相吧。可是這樣，兩個所緣的對象就不一樣了（一個緣善、一個緣惡），那它們就該不會同時生起了。〔論主反問〕你提的這第三條毛病，跟前面（別相說二）犯的『兩個毛病』是一樣的（都是讓慚愧變成不能同時遍滿善心）——憑什麼你只挑一邊來責難（卻不知道你自己的別相說也犯同樣的病）？
〔答〕（論主正面立自己的講法）誰說慚、愧這兩個所緣的對象不一樣？〔問〕那不一樣的話，又該怎麼講？〔答〕其實是這樣：善心一生起的時候，不管它緣的是哪一個境，這個善心裡頭都同時帶著『敬重善』和『拒斥惡』這兩重意思（緣任何境都是又敬善、又拒惡）。所以慚、愧兩個是一起遍滿一切善心、所緣的境也沒有分別（不是一個緣善、一個緣惡，而是同一個善心裡兩義俱全）。
〔論主再追問那主張別相的人〕你（主張別相的人）難道不也得承認『慚愧一起遍滿善心』這個道理嗎？可是你既然主張慚、愧各自的樣子是相同的（都拿羞恥當體），那你又拿什麼道理去擋掉前面那三條毛病呢？（你擋不掉——所以只有『通相說』站得住：慚愧拿羞恥當共通的樣子，各有各的作用，又能同時遍滿善心。）
那麼，經教裡說慚是『顧自己』、愧是『顧別人』（顧自、顧他），這又該怎麼配？有兩種講法：一種是把『自己和正法』算作「自」、把『世間（眾人）』算作「他」（所以慚靠自和法、愧靠世間）。另一種是就『敬善拒惡』對自己是有益還是有損來說——敬善對己有益、拒惡免己受損，順著這個姑且安個「自、他」的名目。總之這個「自、他」只是方便分說，並不是說慚、愧所緣的境真的不一樣。
三、無貪 · 無瞋 · 無癡（三善根）
頌裡「無貪等三根」那個「等」字，把無瞋、無癡也含進去了（無貪、無瞋、無癡三個）。這三個之所以叫「善根」，有兩個緣故：一是它們『生出善法的力量』特別強（善法都從這裡長出來，像根一樣）；二是它們正好就近對治「貪、瞋、癡」這三個「不善根」（壞事的總根頭）。
什麼叫「無貪」？面對「有」（也就是三界輪迴的果報，生命相續這件事）和「有具」（招來這輪迴的那些因），心裡都不貪著、不黏上去——這就是它的本性；它的作用是對治貪著、去做善事。什麼叫「無瞋」？面對「苦」（種種苦果）和「苦具」（招來苦的那些因），心裡都不憎恨、不發火——這就是它的本性；它的作用是對治瞋恚（憎恨發怒）、去做善事。
這裡有個要點：善心一生起，不管緣的是哪一個境，這個善心裡頭都帶著『對有不貪、對苦不瞋』這份心。要注意——這是『對著『有、苦』這些來安立』的，並不是說每次都真的去緣著「有、苦」那些境（不是非緣到它不可）；就像前面講慚、愧，也是『對著『善、惡』來安立』的（並非每次都真去緣善緣惡）。正因如此，無貪、無瞋這兩個也是一起遍滿一切善心的。
什麼叫「無癡」？對於種種道理、種種事相，都能明明白白地通曉理解——這就是它的本性；它的作用是對治愚癡（糊塗無明）、去做善事。
〔異說一·無癡就是慧〕 有一說主張：無癡其實就是拿「慧」（智慧、能辨別的那種心力）當它的本性，並沒有另外一個東西。它的根據是《集論》：無癡是拿『報慧、教慧、證智』那種『決斷揀擇』（決擇，能分辨對錯取捨）當體的——也就是『生得慧（生來就有的）、聞慧、思慧、修慧』這四種慧。這四種既然都是「決擇」這個性質，可見無癡就是慧。那為什麼還要把它另立一個名字呢？只是為了顯出：在善法這一類裡，這種慧有特別殊勝的功能，所以才特地拈出來說——就好比在煩惱那一類裡，也把一種染污的慧特地拈出來、另立個名叫「惡見」一樣。
〔應知·無癡另有自己的體（正義）〕 又有一說（這是正確的講法）：無癡並不就是慧，它另外有自己的體性，正好對著「無明」（愚癡）。理由有三條，一條一條看——
(一)無貪、無瞋這兩個都歸在「善根」裡、各有各的體，那無癡照例也該另有自己的體（三個善根一齊論，不該獨缺它一個）。 (二)《論》裡說『大悲是拿『無瞋、無癡』來收攝的』，而不是拿「根」來收攝的。假如無癡的本性就是慧，那大悲豈不就該像「力」（十力裡那種以慧為體的）一樣，被「慧」（也就是慧根那一類）收攝去了？——可《論》偏偏不這麼說，可見無癡不是慧。 (三)假如無癡沒有自己獨立的體（像「不害」那些只是借名安立的假法一樣），那它就不該是個實在的東西了——可這就違背《論》裡那句話：『十一個善法當中，只有三個是世俗安立的假法，其餘八個都是實有的。』（無癡正在那八個實有的裡頭，所以它必有自己的體。）
那麼《集論》說『無癡拿慧當體』，又該怎麼會通呢？那是『拿無癡的因和果來把它的本性顯出來』（無癡的樣子多半是靠慧才看得出來，所以借慧來指它），並不是說無癡就等於慧。這就好比前面講「信」，也是拿『忍（勝解）、樂（欲）』——也就是信的因和果——來指出信的體一樣。道理一定是這樣（借因果來顯體，不等於說它就是那個因果）。
再補一個道理：貪、瞋、癡這三個會跟六個識相應，正是煩惱、起壞事的力量特別大，所以立它們為「不善根」（壞事的總根）。要斷掉這三個，得靠兩種對治：一種是「通對治」（通用的對治，那就是善慧——一個慧通治三者），另一種是「別對治」（一個一個分開對治，那就是無貪、無瞋、無癡三個善根，各治一個）。既然要用到「別對治」這一層（無癡專治癡），那無癡就一定另有自己的體，並不就是那個「通對治」的慧（不然就只剩通對治、沒有別對治了）。
四、勤（精進）
「勤」就是精進。它的本性是「勇悍」——在「修善」（對好的就去修）和「斷惡」（對壞的就去斷）這兩件事上，又勇猛、又強悍地往前。它的作用是對治懈怠（懶散）、把善事做圓滿。這裡「勇」和「悍」兩個字各有用意：「勇」（勇猛勝進）是要把『染污的法』撇開——因為染污的法也有一股往前的猛勁，那種不算善；「悍」（精純強悍）是要把『不善不惡的清淨無記』撇開。一撇兩邊，就顯出精進只屬於「善」這一性（既不是染、也不是無記）。
精進的樣子大致分五種：被甲、加行、無下、無退、無足（披上鎧甲般立定志向、真正動手做、不自卑退縮、不半途而廢、不到頭不止息）。這五種，正好跟經裡說的『有勢、有勤、有勇、堅猛、不捨善軛（不丟下善的擔子）』五句一句一句對得上。
這五種怎麼配法，古來有好幾種解釋，可以挑著看——
一種是按『剛發心／守住本分／更上一層』（初發心、自分、勝進）來配，也就是在『守住本分』這段修行裡又分頭、中、尾三個品級。 一種是按『剛發心、長時間、不間斷、殷殷懇懇、做到沒有剩』（初發心、長時、無間、慇重、無餘）這幾層修行的差別來配。 一種是按「資糧道」等五道（資糧、加行、見道、修道、究竟）的差別來配——其中二乘的究竟道是欣求大菩提，諸佛的究竟道是樂於利樂眾生。 一種是按「加行、無間、解脫、勝進」這四道（修一個果位時前後相承的四個階段）的差別來配。
五、安（輕安）
「安」就是輕安。它的本性是「堪任」（身心輕快、用得上力、擔得起修行）——它能離開「麁重」（身心那種粗笨沉滯、提不起來的狀態），把身心調得通暢柔順。它的作用是對治「惛沈」（昏沉發悶），並且讓人「轉依」（把所依的身心整個換成清淨）。說細一點：輕安能把那些妨礙入定的法壓下去、除掉，使這所依的身心轉成輕快安適的樣子。
六、不放逸
「不放逸」（不縱容、不鬆懈）說穿了就是『精進＋無貪、無瞋、無癡』這四個法合起來。它的本性是「防、修」——對該斷的惡，防著它不犯；對該修的善，盡力去修。它的作用是對治「放逸」（縱容鬆懈），把一切世間、出世間的善事都做圓滿。說細一點：就是這四個法在「斷惡、修善」這件事上又能防又能修，合起來給個名叫「不放逸」。要注意——它並沒有自己另外一個體（它的樣子跟那四個法完全沒兩樣）：在防惡修善這件事上，把那四個法的功能拿掉，就再也找不出一個屬於「不放逸」自己的作用了。
也許有人問：信、慚那些不也多少有點「防惡修善」的本事嗎，怎麼不算進去？答案是：信、慚那些雖然也略有這份本事，可是比起那四個（精進、無貪、無瞋、無癡），力道差得遠；而且它們既不是「善根」，也不能「遍策」（不能普遍地策動、推動一切善法）。所以不拿信、慚那些當不放逸的依靠，只拿精進加三善根這四個。
〔難〕有人反問：「防、修」不就是不放逸自己獨有的作用嗎（怎麼說它沒有自體）？〔答〕「防、修」並沒有跳出精進和三善根之外（防修就是這四個法在做的事）。你要是說『防、修非得靠『不放逸』出來才起得了作用』，那同樣的道理，「不放逸」豈不也得再靠另一個東西才起得了作用？這樣一個靠一個、沒完沒了，就犯了「無窮」的毛病（永遠找不到頭）。
〔難〕又有人問：精進的作用只是「遍策」（普遍推動），三善根的作用只是『給人當依靠』，那怎麼能說這四個有「防、修」的作用呢（防修好像不在這四個本職裡）？〔答〕那就反問你：你說的這個『防、修作用』，它的樣子究竟是什麼？一條一條地追下去，你會發現它跑不出那四個法——
- 你若說它是『普遍地依持』，那就是無貪那幾個（三善根當依靠）；
- 你若說它是『普遍地策動督促』，那就跟精進沒兩樣；
- 你若說它是『止住惡、推進善』，那正是這四個法合起來做的事；
- 你若說它是『讓心不散亂』，那應該是「等持」（定）；
- 你若說它是『讓心跟對象碰上、一同取境』，那跟「觸」（遍行裡那個觸）有什麼分別？
- 你若說它是『讓人不忘失』，那就應該是「念」了。
這麼一條一條推下來，想找出「不放逸」自己獨有的作用，離開了無貪那四個法，竟然怎麼也找不到。所以不放逸一定沒有自己另外的體，是個借名安立的假法。
七、行捨
什麼叫「行捨」（這個「捨」是行蘊裡的捨，跟「捨受」那個捨不一樣）？它一樣是那四個法（精進、無貪、無瞋、無癡）讓心保持『平等、正直、不費力地安住』（平等、正直、無功用住）——這是它的本性；它的作用是對治「掉舉」（心浮動、定不下來）、讓心靜靜安住。說細一點：就是這四個法讓心離開「掉舉」這些障礙、靜靜安住，給個名叫「捨」。其中『平等、正直、不費力安住』這三句話，是按修行的頭、中、尾三個階段，來分說「捨」前後的不同樣子（先做到心平，再做到心直，最後做到不必使力自然安住）。
這兩個是接著來的：先由「不放逸」把雜染除掉，再由「行捨」讓心安安靜靜地住下來。行捨跟不放逸一樣，也沒有自己另外的體：離開那四個法，就既沒有它的樣子、也沒有它的作用了——因為『能讓心寂靜的』就是那四個法，『被弄得寂靜的』就是心和心所這些，兩頭都另有著落，中間並沒有一個獨立的「行捨」。
八、不害
什麼叫「不害」？就是對一切眾生都不去傷害、不去惱亂，它的本性其實就是「無瞋」；它的作用是對治「害」（傷害眾生的那個心所）、起悲憫之心。說細一點：就是把「無瞋」當中『對眾生不傷害不惱亂』的那一分拈出來，給個名叫「不害」。
那無瞋和不害怎麼分？無瞋是反過來對著『斷人性命』的那種瞋，不害是正對著『傷害惱亂眾生』的那種害；無瞋偏向『給人安樂』（這就是慈），不害偏向『替人拔苦』（這就是悲）——這就是兩個粗看之下的不同。可是就道理的實在處說，無瞋才真有自己的體，不害只是借無瞋的一分安立的假名。那既然如此，為什麼還要把「不害」另立出來呢？因為要顯出「慈」和「悲」這兩種樣子的差別——在「利益安樂眾生」這件事上，慈、悲這兩樣最為殊勝，所以特地分立，好把它們各自點清楚。
〔異說·不害另有自體〕 有一說主張：不害並不就是無瞋，它另有自己的體，也就是一種『賢善的性子』。這講法駁得掉：先問你，這「賢善性」的樣子是什麼？你說是『不傷害惱亂眾生』——可是無瞋也正是這樣啊（無瞋對眾生本來就是不傷害不惱亂、本來就是慈悲賢善），那又何必另立一個自體出來？所以不害只是假名（沒有自己的體）。
九、「及」字所攝義別心所
頌裡那個「及」字，是要點出：除了上面這十一個善心所，還另有一些善心所（像欣、厭那些）——它們『意思上有差別，可是體跟前面十一個沒兩樣』。也就是說，它們雖然各有各的意思、各有各的名字，可是論體性都不出前面那十一個之外，所以就不再另外立出來算數了。
先說「欣」（欣樂，跟「欲」一起起的）：它其實是無瞋的一分——因為對所欣樂的境不起憎恨，正是無瞋。同樣，不忿、不恨、不惱、不嫉這些，也都是這個道理，各自正好是『瞋的一分』的反面（忿、恨、惱、嫉本來都是瞋的支流，把它們翻過來就歸到無瞋裡）。再說「厭」（厭離，跟「慧」一起起的）：它其實是無貪的一分——因為對所厭離的境不染著，正是無貪。同樣，不慳、不憍這些，也是這個道理，各自正好是『貪的一分』的反面。至於不覆、不誑、不諂這三個，是無貪和無癡的一分，各自正好是『貪、癡的一分』的反面（覆、誑、諂裡頭夾著貪也夾著癡，把它們翻過來就歸到無貪、無癡裡）。
〔不覆歸哪一分的爭論〕 有一說主張：不覆只是無癡的一分（不歸無貪那邊）——理由是經論裡頭找不到哪一處說「覆」也算貪的一分（「覆」只夾著癡，不夾貪，所以它的反面不覆只歸無癡）。
〔不慢歸哪一分的爭論〕 「不慢」該歸到哪裡，有三說：一說歸「信」的一分（因為信得過對方，就不會慢待對方）；一說歸「捨」（行捨）的一分（因為心一平等，就不會自高自大）；一說歸「慚」的一分（因為敬重對方，就不會慢待對方）。
〔不疑歸哪一分的爭論〕 「不疑」該歸到哪裡，也有三說：一說歸「信」所攝（信得過了，就不再猶豫）；一說就是「正勝解」（理解確定了，就不再猶豫）；一說就是「正慧」（見得正了，就不再猶豫）。
至於其餘幾個：「不散亂」歸「正定」（心不散就是定）；「正見」和「正知」都歸「善慧」（看得正、知得正都是慧）；「不忘念」就是「正念」（記得住、不忘失正法就是念）。
還有悔、眠、尋、伺這四個（它們屬於「不定」心所），染的時候也有、不染的時候也有，兩邊都通；它們就像觸、欲那些（遍行、別境的心所）一樣，沒有一個專門『翻過來對著它』的善法可配，所以也就不另外立善法（不是每個都得配一個善的反面）。
〔難〕有人問：那些『把染污法翻過來』而成的善，為什麼有的要另立一個名（像不害），有的卻不立？標準在哪？〔答〕標準是：樣子、作用跟別的有分別的，就另立一個；其餘的（樣子作用沒什麼特別的）就不另立，這你不該責怪（不是非得每個都立）。再說一層：那些染污法當中，能通到六個識的（遍六識）力量大，所以才特地把它翻過來、另立一個善法。像慢那一類、忿那一類，只跟意識一起起（不通六識），所以就不特地給它翻一個善。
至於「害」，它雖然也只跟意識一起起（照理也該不立），可是有兩個特別處：一是它一再地冒出來、傷害惱亂別人；二是它正障礙著『無上乘（成佛之道）』最殊勝的那個因——「悲」。為了讓人認清「害」這個格外嚴重的過失，所以特地把它翻過來、立一個「不害」。
還有失念、散亂、不正知這三個染法，把它們翻過來，正好歸進「別境」裡的念、定、慧三個（失念翻成念、散亂翻成定、不正知翻成慧），所以在善法這裡就不再另外說了。
〔難〕又有人問：染法和淨法既然是一個翻一個、兩兩相對的，那為什麼淨法（善才十一個）反倒比染法（根本煩惱六個＋隨煩惱二十個）少這麼多？〔答〕有兩個道理：一是淨法強、染法弱，本來就可以『以少敵多』（一個善能對治好幾個染，用不著一一對等）。二是淨法是『通達道理』的，所以它能通（很多看似不同的善，其實同一個體，就不必分那麼多個）；染法是『迷在事相上』的，所以它就局促（隨著一個個事相分得很細，自然數目就多）。所以染、淨兩邊的數目本就不該硬要它一樣多。
〔善之假實〕
這十一個善法當中，有三個是假有（借名安立、沒有自己的體），就是不放逸、行捨、不害（為什麼是假的，前面已經講過了）；其餘八個是實有（真有自己的體）——因為這八個各有各別的樣子和作用。
〔善遍善心否 · 輕安遍否〕
〔異說一·只有四個遍滿善心，分配在六個位次裡〕 有一說主張：這十一個裡頭，只有精進、無貪、無瞋、無癡『這四個遍滿一切善心』（任何善心都有它們），其餘七個則『不一定都在』。理由是——推求事理還沒拿定主意的時候，「信」並不生（所以信不遍）；慚和愧雖然同一類，可是它們依靠的處所各別，隨便起了一個，另一個就沒了（所以慚愧不能同時遍）；輕安要等到用「世間道」斷煩惱的時候才有；不放逸、行捨要等到「無漏道」才起得來；不害要等到悲憫眾生的時候才有。他還引《論》『這十一個是分在六個位次裡起的』來證：拿定主意的位次（決定位）有信，止住染污的時候有慚、愧（一個顧自、一個顧他），修善的位次有精進加三善根，走世間道時有輕安，走出世道時有行捨和不放逸，攝受眾生時有不害。
〔破前一說〕 又有一說反駁前面那個講法，說它講得不對，一條一條地破——
(1)說『推求事理還沒拿定主意的心裡沒有信』，這不對：要是那個心連信都沒有，它就根本算不上善心了（就像染污的心，正因為沒有清淨的信，才不算善）。可見只要是善心，就一定有信，信是遍的。 (2)慚和愧雖然分兩類，可是它們依靠的「別境」是同一個（依的是同一個善心），所以是一起遍滿善心的——這一點前面早已立過了（不是隨起一個、另一個就沒）。 (3)要是說『出世道裡沒有輕安』，那「輕安覺支」（七覺支之一）豈不就不是無漏的了？（可它明明是無漏的，所以出世道也有輕安。） (4)要是說『世間道裡沒有行捨、不放逸』，那世間道豈不就成了『不寂靜、不防惡、不修善』的了？又豈不就壓不住掉舉和放逸了？（這明明說不通。）何況有漏的善心既然也具足那四個法（精進、三善根），那就照『出世道有捨與不放逸』一樣，有漏善心裡也該有這兩個。 (5)善心一起的時候，全都不會去傷害眾生、都跟『能傷害的法』相違——既然如此，善心裡就一定有不害（不只攝眾生時才有）。
至於《論》說『十一個分在六個位次裡起』，那是『順著各個位次裡哪一個最突出』才這麼說的（哪個位次哪個善法最顯眼就點哪個），並不是說別的位次就缺了其餘的善法。所以前面那個講法不合道理。
〔應知·正確的講法〕 所以該這樣說：這十一個裡頭，有十個遍滿一切善心，只有輕安一個不遍——因為輕安要在「定」的位次裡才能把身心調得通暢，散亂的位次裡就沒有它。《瑜伽》〈決擇分〉就說：那十個善心所，不管是在「定地」（入定的狀態）還是「不定地」（散心的狀態），都遍滿一切善心；只有在「定地」的心裡，才多出一個輕安來。
〔輕安到底在哪些地才有的爭論〕 有一說主張：入定前的「加行」（預備功夫）也可以算「定地」（因為那時身心也微微有點調暢），所以連欲界也有輕安——不然的話，就違背〈本地分〉那句『信等十一個善法通於一切地』了。又有一說（這一說較合正理）主張：輕安只在定裡才有（要靠定來滋養，身心才調暢得起來）；它引《論》『欲界的種種心、心所因為缺了輕安，才叫『不定地』』來證；至於〈本地分〉說『一切地都有這十一個』，那是就「有尋有伺地、無尋唯伺地、無尋無伺地」這三地都有來說的（這三地都屬定地，並不是說散亂的心裡也有輕安）。
再看這十一個善法在各個識裡頭是有是無：第七、第八識，要看在哪個位次，有時有、有時無；第六識則在「定」的位次裡十一個全有，不在定的位次裡就只少一個輕安。〔五識到底有沒有輕安的爭論〕 有一說主張：五識只有十個（沒有輕安）——因為五識天生就是浮動散亂的，不容輕安。又有一說主張：五識也有輕安——因為由定所引發的善（五識）也有那份身心調暢；而且當五識跟「成所作智」（佛轉前五識所成的智）一起起的時候，就一定有輕安。
〔善之諸門〕
最後從幾個門類來分判這十一個善法——
〔跟哪些受相應〕 善十一跟『十五種受』相應（五受配三界各地，總共十五）；只除掉「憂受」和「苦受」這兩種，因為這兩種受是逼迫煎熬的、沒有那份調暢，跟善法的調暢勁兒合不來。
〔跟別境相不相應〕 善十一跟『別境五個』（欲、勝解、念、定、慧）都能相應——因為信那些跟欲那些並不相違背（可以同時起）。
〔屬三性中的哪一性〕 這十一個都只屬「善」這一性。
〔繫在哪一界〕 輕安不屬欲界（只在上二界的定地才有）；其餘十個則三界都通。
〔學位的分判〕 這十一個都通「有學、無學、非學非無學」這三種（凡聖都可以有）。
〔是見道斷還是修道斷〕 它們不是見道所斷的——《瑜伽》說：信等六根只是修道所斷、不是見道所斷的。
其餘的門類怎麼分判，就照這個道理自己推想去（不一一細列了）。
〔The verses expounded〕
The wholesome are: trust, shame, embarrassment; the three roots beginning with non-greed; diligence, ease, non-heedlessness; equanimity-of-formations, and non-harm. (v11) The afflictions are: greed, hatred, delusion, pride, doubt, and evil views. (v12)
A. The Eleven Wholesome
The treatise says: only those mental factors that arise together with the "wholesome mind" are called "wholesome mental factors." Such wholesome mental factors are eleven in all: trust, shame, embarrassment, non-greed, non-hatred, non-delusion, diligence, ease (that is, buoyant-ease), non-heedlessness, equanimity-of-formations, and non-harm.
1. Trust
What is "trust"? Facing three sorts of object, the mind comes to deeply accept it (accept-as-true), to delight in it (delight-and-liking), and to want it (hope-and-desire); its very nature is to make "the mind grow clear and clean" (mind-purifying). Its function is twofold: it counteracts "non-trust," and it makes one glad to cultivate the wholesome.
"Trust" can be divided into three sorts. The first is called trust-in-the-real — toward every dharma, whether its concrete fact or its principle, one believes and accepts from the bottom of the heart. The second is called trust-in-the-virtuous — toward the truly pure virtues of the Three Jewels (Buddha, Dharma, Saṅgha), one believes and delights from the bottom of the heart. The third is called trust-in-the-capable — toward every wholesome thing, worldly and supramundane, one believes it truly has the power, that one can attain it and can accomplish it, and so a hope arises (the hope that one might do it oneself).
By these three trusts one can counteract the "non-trusting" mind, and is made glad to realize and to cultivate the wholesome, worldly and supramundane. Of the three words used above: "accepting" (deep believing-and-accepting) is in fact "resolve" (the settled, doubt-free understanding), and it is the "cause" by which trust arises; "delight-and-desire" (liking, wanting) is in fact "desire" (longing), and it is the "fruit" that trust gives rise to.
Now to pin down further just what the "own-mark" of trust is (the look that is its alone). 〔Q〕Someone asks: was it not just said that "mind-purifying is its nature"? 〔A〕Merely saying that has still not made it clear. For the two words "mind-purifying" can be taken in three ways, and each has a fault; they must be gone through one by one —
(1) If one says "the pure" just is "the mind" itself, then trust would amount to the mind-king. But trust is plainly a "mental factor," turning along with the mind-king, and is not the mind-king itself — so this reading does not get through. (2) If one says "what makes the mind pure" is enough, that is wrong too: shame, embarrassment, and those wholesome [factors] also make the mind pure, and then what would distinguish trust from shame and embarrassment? (Everyone would come out the same.) (3) If one says "mind-purifying" means "the pure dharma that arises together with the mind," the fault is the same as the one just above — it still cannot tell apart just where trust and shame and embarrassment differ.
〔A〕How, then, is it to be put positively? The substance of trust is a force that "makes [things] clarify"; it can cleanse the mind and the mental factors both. Because among these the "mind" is the chief one, one takes just the "mind" to speak of it, and calls it "mind-purifying." A comparison: it is like casting a "water-clearing gem" into turbid water — the water clears of itself; trust's action on the mind is just so. As for shame, embarrassment, and the rest, although they too are wholesome, they do not take "purity" as the look that is theirs alone; trust alone takes "purity" as its look. Drawn apart this way, trust no longer gets jumbled with shame and embarrassment, and the earlier fault of "they cannot be told apart" is gone.
Look again from the reverse side: each of the various defiled dharmas has its own different look; but "non-trust" alone is itself turbid, and it further muddies the surrounding mind and mental factors along with it — just like an utterly filthy thing, dirty itself and making others dirty too. Trust is exactly the reverse of "non-trust," and so trust takes "purity" as its look (the one turbid, the other clear — squarely opposed).
〔One view · taking "delight-and-liking" as the look of trust〕 One view holds: trust takes "delight-and-liking" (fondness) as its look. This can be refuted, on two grounds. First, "delight-and-liking" runs through all three natures — wholesome, unwholesome, and neither-wholesome-nor-unwholesome — so if trust took delight-and-liking as its look, would not trust's substance amount to "desire" (longing)? Second, the truth of suffering and the truth of its origin (the suffering of birth-and-death and the cause of suffering) are simply not things one would be fond of, so would they not then fall outside what trust takes as its object? Yet trust plainly refers to the Four Truths (it refers to suffering, origin, cessation, and path alike). So "taking delight-and-liking as the look of trust" is wrong.
〔Another view · taking "conformity" as the look of trust〕 Again, one view holds: trust takes "conformity" (going along with, complying-and-accepting) as its look. This too can be refuted. First, "conformity" likewise runs through all three natures, wholesome and unwholesome and indeterminate. Second, press further what this "conformity" points to — if it points to "fixed, confirming compliance" (confirming-conformity), that just is "resolve"; if it points to "glad compliance" (glad-conformity), that just is "desire." Apart from the two, "resolve" and "desire," there is simply no independent "conformity"-look to be found. Since both views thus fail to stand, it can be known (the correct position): the look of trust just is "mind-purifying."
2. Shame · Embarrassment
What is "shame"? It leans on two forces, "oneself" and "the true Dharma"; its very nature is "to revere the worthy and revere the wholesome" (revering-the-worthy-and-wholesome), and its function is to counteract "shamelessness" and to halt evil conduct. Said in more detail: because one prizes one's own worth and prizes the dignity of the true Dharma, one therefore reveres the worthy-and-wholesome and feels ashamed of one's own faults and evil deeds, and in this way counteracts "shamelessness" and halts every kind of evil conduct. ("Shamelessness" is doing wrong yet feeling no shame.)
What is "embarrassment"? It leans on one force, "the world" (the opinion of the many); its very nature is "to slight and to refuse the violent-and-evil" (slighting-and-refusing the violent-and-evil), and its function is to counteract "unembarrassment" and to halt evil conduct. Said in more detail: because one minds the world's blame and disgust, one therefore slights and refuses violent-and-evil conduct and feels ashamed of one's own faults and crimes, and in this way counteracts "unembarrassment" and halts every kind of evil deed. ("Unembarrassment" is doing wrong yet not fearing what people say.)
"Feeling ashamed of fault and evil" is the shared look of both shame and embarrassment (a thing both have, not the private possession of either one). And so the holy teachings will sometimes borrow just this point and provisionally call it the "substance" of shame-and-embarrassment.
〔Q · distinct-mark, first〕Suppose someone insists on taking "feeling ashamed" as the look that is distinctively each one's own (a distinct mark): a fault follows. Since both then take "feeling ashamed" as their substance, would not shame's substance and embarrassment's substance turn out exactly alike, undistinguishable? And if their substance is alike, the two dharmas would have to "definitely not concur at all" (one and the same thing does not arise alongside itself, just as "feeling" and "conception" are two different things and do not run together into one) — but this contradicts the holy teachings, for the holy teachings say shame and embarrassment do arise together.
〔Q · distinct-mark, second〕(To rescue the previous line, someone changes tack and) says: then let us tell the two apart by "facing oneself" and "facing another" (shame is being ashamed before oneself, embarrassment is fearing another). But this brings a fresh fault: since shame and embarrassment would then be set up only "with respect to something faced," they would become "conventional [factors] spoken of relatively," and not real things truly there — which again contradicts the holy teachings (which say shame and embarrassment are really existent). And if one insists they are both real and arise separately (only one at a time), that contradicts the line in the Treatise that "the eleven wholesome dharmas all pervade every wholesome mind" (if they are separate, the two cannot pervade the wholesome mind at the same time).
〔Q · distinct-mark, third〕(Stepping back once more, someone) says: then let us tell the two distinct marks apart by "revering the wholesome (this is shame)" and "refusing the evil (this is embarrassment)." But on this account the two have different objects (one refers to the wholesome, one to the evil), so they ought not to arise together. 〔A〕(The treatise's author retorts:) this third fault you raise is the same as the "two faults" committed before (in the second distinct-mark line) — all of them make shame and embarrassment unable to pervade the wholesome mind at the same time; so on what grounds do you pick on just one side to attack (when your own distinct-mark account commits the very same fault)?
〔A〕(The author now sets out his own account positively.) Who says shame's and embarrassment's two objects are different? 〔Q〕If they are not different, then how is it to be put? 〔A〕It is in fact like this: the moment a wholesome mind arises, whatever object it refers to, that wholesome mind carries within it both senses at once — "revering the wholesome" and "refusing the evil" (referring to any object whatever, it both reveres the good and refuses the evil). So shame and embarrassment both pervade every wholesome mind, and the object they refer to is no different (it is not that one refers to the wholesome and one to the evil; rather, within one and the same wholesome mind both senses are present in full).
〔The author presses the distinct-mark holder once more〕Do not you (who hold the distinct-mark view) also have to grant the principle that "shame and embarrassment both pervade the wholesome mind"? Yet since you hold that shame's and embarrassment's own looks are the same (both taking feeling-ashamed as their substance), by what principle can you fend off the three faults set out above? (You cannot fend them off — and so only the "shared-mark" account stands: shame and embarrassment take feeling-ashamed as their shared look, each with its own function, and both able to pervade the wholesome mind at the same time.)
Then how is the holy teachings' word — that shame "regards oneself" and embarrassment "regards another" (regarding self, regarding other) — to be fitted in? There are two ways to take it. One takes "oneself and the true Dharma" as the "self" and "the world (the many)" as the "other" (so shame leans on self-and-Dharma, embarrassment leans on the world). The other takes it from whether "revering the good and refusing the evil" is of benefit or of harm to oneself — revering the good benefits oneself, refusing the evil saves oneself from harm — and along these lines provisionally pins on the names "self" and "other." In sum, this "self" and "other" is only a convenient way of telling them apart, and does not mean that shame's and embarrassment's objects are truly different.
3. Non-Greed · Non-Hatred · Non-Delusion (the three wholesome roots)
The word "beginning with" in the verse's "the three roots beginning with non-greed" takes in non-hatred and non-delusion as well (non-greed, non-hatred, non-delusion — three). These three are called "wholesome roots" for two reasons: first, their "power to produce wholesome dharmas" is especially strong (the wholesome dharmas grow out from here, like a root); second, they are exactly the close counteragents of the three "unwholesome roots," greed, hatred, and delusion (the head-root of all bad things).
What is "non-greed"? Facing "existence" (that is, the fruits of rebirth in the three realms, the continuance of life) and "the means of existence" (the causes that draw on that round of rebirth), the mind does not crave them, does not cling to them — this is its nature; its function is to counteract craving-and-clinging and to do the wholesome. What is "non-hatred"? Facing "suffering" (the various fruits of suffering) and "the means of suffering" (the causes that bring on suffering), the mind does not hate them, does not flare up — this is its nature; its function is to counteract hatred-and-ire (hating and flaring up) and to do the wholesome.
Here is a key point: the moment a wholesome mind arises, whatever object it refers to, that wholesome mind carries within it this disposition of "not craving existence, not hating suffering." Note well — this is "set up with respect to 'existence, suffering' and the like," and does not mean that each time one actually refers to the objects "existence, suffering" and the rest (it is not that one must reach those objects). It is just as with shame and embarrassment spoken of earlier, which are also "set up with respect to 'the wholesome, the evil'" (not that each time one actually refers to the good or the evil). For just this reason, non-greed and non-hatred too both pervade every wholesome mind.
What is "non-delusion"? Toward every principle and every concrete fact, being able to understand them clearly and plainly — this is its nature; its function is to counteract delusion (muddle, ignorance) and to do the wholesome.
〔One view · non-delusion just is wisdom〕 One view holds: non-delusion is in fact nothing but "wisdom" (intelligence, the mind-force that can discriminate) taken as its nature, with no separate thing besides. Its ground is the Abhidharmasamuccaya: non-delusion takes as its substance the "discriminating-decision" (decision, the power to tell right from wrong, what to take and what to leave) of "the wisdom of report, the wisdom of teaching, the wisdom of realization" — that is, the four wisdoms "wisdom of innate-attainment (had from birth), wisdom of hearing, wisdom of reflection, wisdom of cultivation." Since these four are all of the nature "discriminating-decision," it is plain that non-delusion just is wisdom. Why, then, set up another name for it at all? Only to bring out that, within the wholesome class, this wisdom has an especially excellent function, and so it is singled out and spoken of — just as, within the affliction class, a [certain] defiled wisdom is likewise singled out and given the separate name "evil view."
〔It should be known · non-delusion has a substance of its own (the correct position)〕 Again, one view holds (and this is the correct account): non-delusion is not just wisdom; it has a substance of its own, set squarely against "ignorance" (delusion). There are three grounds, taken one by one —
(1) Non-greed and non-hatred are both comprised among the "wholesome roots," each with its own substance; non-delusion ought, by the same token, to have a substance of its own (the three wholesome roots are discussed as a set, and it would not do for this one alone to lack [a substance]). (2) The Treatise says "great compassion is comprised by 'non-hatred and non-delusion,'" and not by "[the wholesome] roots." If non-delusion's nature were just wisdom, would not great compassion, like the "[ten] powers" (which take wisdom as their substance), have to be comprised by "wisdom" (that is, by the wisdom-faculty class)? — Yet the Treatise precisely does not say so, which shows non-delusion is not wisdom. (3) If non-delusion had no independent substance (like "non-harm" and the rest, which are mere conventional [factors] set up by borrowing a name), then it ought not to be a real thing — but this contradicts the line in the Treatise: "Of the eleven wholesome dharmas, only three are conventionally set up, the remaining eight are really existent." (Non-delusion is squarely among those eight real ones, so it must have a substance of its own.)
Then how is the Abhidharmasamuccaya's "non-delusion takes wisdom as its substance" to be reconciled? It is "raising the cause and the fruit of non-delusion in order to disclose its nature" (non-delusion's look is, for the most part, seen by way of wisdom, and so wisdom is used to point to it), and does not mean non-delusion is the same as wisdom. This is just like the earlier account of "trust," where one also uses "accepting (resolve) and delight (desire)" — that is, trust's cause and fruit — to point out the substance of trust. The principle must be so (using cause-and-fruit to disclose the substance does not mean it is that cause-and-fruit).
Add one more reason: greed, hatred, and delusion are the three that concur with all six consciousnesses, and they are precisely afflictions, with an especially strong power to stir up evil, and so they are set up as the "unwholesome roots" (the head-root of bad things). To sever these three, two counteragents are needed: one is the "general counteragent" (the common one — namely wholesome wisdom, a single wisdom treating all three), the other is the "particular counteragent" (treating them one by one — namely the three wholesome roots non-greed, non-hatred, non-delusion, each treating one). Since the level of "particular counteragent" must be used (non-delusion specifically treating delusion), non-delusion must have a substance of its own, and is not just that "general counteragent" wisdom (otherwise only the general counteragent would be left, with no particular counteragent).
4. Diligence (vigor)
"Diligence" is vigor. Its nature is "brave-and-bold" — in the two affairs of "cultivating the wholesome" (going after the good) and "severing the evil" (cutting off the bad), pressing forward both bravely and boldly. Its function is to counteract indolence (slackness) and to bring the wholesome to fullness. The two words "brave" and "bold" each carry their point: "brave" (brave, pressing-forward) is to set aside the "defiled dharmas" — for the defiled dharmas too have a forward drive, and that drive does not count as wholesome; "bold" (pure-and-bold) is to set aside the "pure-indeterminate" (the neither-wholesome-nor-unwholesome and pure). Setting both aside, it comes out that vigor belongs to the "wholesome" nature alone (neither defiled nor indeterminate).
The looks of vigor fall, broadly, into five sorts: donning-armor, application, no-lowness, no-retreat, no-satisfaction (fixing one's resolve as though donning armor, actually setting to work, not flinching low, not stopping halfway, not resting until the end). These five line up one-for-one with the five phrases scripture states — "having force, having diligence, having bravery, firm-and-strong, not dropping the wholesome yoke (not casting off the burden of the wholesome)."
How these five are matched up, the old [masters] explained in several ways, and one may take one's pick —
One matches them by "the first arousing-of-the-mind / holding-to-one's-own-share / pressing-onward-higher" (first arousing-the-mind, one's-own-share, pressing-onward) — that is, within the stretch of "holding to one's own share" there are again three grades, beginning, middle, and end. One matches them by the several levels of cultivation — "first arousing-the-mind, long-time, unbroken, earnest-and-grave, with-nothing-left-over" (first arousing-the-mind, long-time, unbroken, earnest, with-nothing-left-over). One matches them by the differences of the five paths, "the path of provisions" and the rest (provisions, application, the path of seeing, the path of cultivation, the ultimate path) — of which the ultimate path of the two vehicles gladly seeks great awakening, while the ultimate path of the buddhas takes joy in benefiting-and-gladdening others. One matches them by the differences of the four [sub-]paths "application, unbroken, liberation, pressing-onward" (the four stages that follow one upon another in cultivating a single fruition-position).
5. Ease (buoyant-ease)
"Ease" is buoyant-ease. Its nature is "fit-for-the-task" (body-and-mind light and quick, ready to bear, equal to taking up the practice) — it can leave behind the "gross-and-heavy" (that coarse, sluggish, leaden state of body-and-mind that cannot be lifted) and tune body-and-mind to flow smooth and supple. Its function is to counteract "torpor" (a dull, stuffy heaviness), and to make one "transmute-the-basis" (turn the body-and-mind one rests on wholly over into the pure). Said in more detail: buoyant-ease can press down and clear away the dharmas that obstruct meditative concentration, so that this body-and-mind one rests on turns into something light, quick, ease-filled.
6. Non-Heedlessness
"Non-heedlessness" (not letting-go, not slacking) is, when laid bare, just "vigor plus non-greed, non-hatred, non-delusion" — these four dharmas taken together. Its nature is "guarding-and-cultivating" — toward the evil that should be severed, guarding against it lest it be committed; toward the wholesome that should be cultivated, cultivating it to the utmost. Its function is to counteract "heedlessness" (letting-go, slacking), and to bring to fullness every wholesome thing, worldly and supramundane. Said in more detail: it is just these four dharmas being able, in the affair of "severing the evil and cultivating the wholesome," both to guard and to cultivate, and the whole given the name "non-heedlessness." Note well — it has no separate substance of its own (its look is no different at all from those four dharmas): in the affair of guarding-against-evil and cultivating-the-wholesome, take away the function of those four dharmas, and one can no longer find any function belonging to "non-heedlessness" of its own.
Someone might ask: do not trust, shame, and the rest also have some of this "guarding-against-evil and cultivating-the-wholesome" capacity — why are they not counted in? The answer is: although trust, shame, and the rest do have a little of this capacity, compared with the four (vigor, non-greed, non-hatred, non-delusion) their force is far weaker; and besides, they are neither "wholesome roots" nor able to "universally spur on" (they cannot broadly spur on and drive every wholesome dharma). So trust, shame, and the rest are not taken as the support of non-heedlessness; only the four, vigor plus the three wholesome roots, are.
〔Q〕Someone retorts: is not "guarding-and-cultivating" the very function that is non-heedlessness' own (how can you say it has no substance of its own)? 〔A〕"Guarding-and-cultivating" does not step outside vigor and the three wholesome roots (guarding-and-cultivating is just the work these four dharmas do). If you say "guarding-and-cultivating must come forth from 'non-heedlessness' before it can take effect," then by the same logic, would not "non-heedlessness" too have to lean on yet another thing before it could take effect? This way, one leans on another, on and on without end, and so commits the fault of "infinite regress" (one never finds the head).
〔Q〕Again someone asks: vigor's function is only "to spur on universally," and the three wholesome roots' function is only "to serve as a support" — so how can it be said that these four have a "guarding-and-cultivating" function (guarding-and-cultivating seems not to lie within these four's own jobs)? 〔A〕Then it is asked back of you: this "guarding-and-cultivating function" you speak of — just what is its look? Trace it down one by one, and you will find it cannot run outside those four dharmas —
- If you say it is "universal supporting-and-holding," that just is non-greed and the rest (the three wholesome roots serving as support);
- If you say it is "universal spurring-on and driving," that is no different from vigor;
- If you say it is "halting the evil, advancing the wholesome," that is precisely what the four dharmas do together;
- If you say it is "keeping the mind from scattering," that ought to be "concentration" (meditative stability);
- If you say it is "making the mind meet its object, taking the object together [with it]," then how does it differ from "contact" (that "contact" within the universal [factors])?
- If you say it is "keeping one from forgetting," then it ought to be "mindfulness."
Tracing it down this way, one by one, when one seeks out a function of "non-heedlessness" that is its own, apart from non-greed and those four dharmas, it simply cannot be found. So non-heedlessness definitely has no separate substance of its own; it is a conventional [factor] set up by borrowing a name.
7. Equanimity-of-Formations
What is "equanimity-of-formations" (this "equanimity" is the equanimity within the formations-aggregate, not the same as the "equanimity-feeling")? It too is those four dharmas (vigor, non-greed, non-hatred, non-delusion) making the mind keep "even, upright, and effortlessly abiding" (even, upright, effortlessly-abiding) — this is its nature; its function is to counteract "agitation" (the mind's restlessness, unable to settle) and to make the mind abide quiet and still. Said in more detail: it is just these four dharmas making the mind leave behind "agitation" and the rest of those obstructions and abide quiet and still, the whole given the name "equanimity." Of the three phrases "even, upright, effortlessly abiding," they tell apart, by the three stages of cultivation — beginning, middle, and end — the differing looks of "equanimity" before and after (first the mind made even, then the mind made upright, and last made to abide of itself without any effort).
These two come one after the other: first "non-heedlessness" clears away the defiled, then "equanimity-of-formations" makes the mind abide quiet and calm. Equanimity-of-formations, like non-heedlessness, also has no separate substance of its own: apart from those four dharmas, it has neither look nor function — for "what makes the mind quiet-and-calm" just is those four dharmas, and "what is made quiet-and-calm" just is the mind and the mental factors and the rest; both ends have their own lodging, and in between there is no independent "equanimity-of-formations."
8. Non-Harm
What is "non-harm"? It is, toward all sentient beings, not to injure them and not to vex them; its nature is in fact just "non-hatred"; its function is to counteract "harm" (the mental factor that injures sentient beings) and to raise a mind of compassion-and-pity. Said in more detail: it is taking the portion within "non-hatred" that "does not injure and does not vex sentient beings," singling it out, and giving it the name "non-harm."
Then how are non-hatred and non-harm to be told apart? Non-hatred is set in reverse against the kind of hatred that "cuts off another's life," while non-harm stands squarely against the kind of harm that "injures and vexes sentient beings"; non-hatred leans toward "giving beings ease" (this just is loving-kindness), non-harm leans toward "drawing out beings' suffering" (this just is compassion) — this is the difference between the two at a coarse glance. Yet, speaking at the point of what is truly so, non-hatred alone truly has a substance of its own, while non-harm is only a conventional name set up upon one portion of non-hatred. That being so, why set up "non-harm" separately at all? Because one must bring out the difference between the two looks "loving-kindness" and "compassion" — for in the affair of "benefiting and gladdening sentient beings," these two, loving-kindness and compassion, are the most excellent, and so they are set up apart, the better to point each one out clearly.
〔One view · non-harm has a substance of its own〕 One view holds: non-harm is not just non-hatred; it has a substance of its own — namely a "worthy-and-wholesome disposition." This can be refuted: first it is asked of you, what is the look of this "worthy-and-wholesome disposition"? You say it is "not injuring and not vexing sentient beings" — but non-hatred is precisely that too (non-hatred is, toward beings, originally not injuring and not vexing, originally loving-kind, compassionate, worthy, wholesome), so why set up another substance of its own? Hence non-harm is only a conventional name (with no substance of its own).
9. Variant-Meaning Mental Factors Included by the Word "And"
The word "and" in the verse is to point out: besides these eleven wholesome mental factors above, there are still other wholesome mental factors (such as elation and aversion) — they are "different in sense, but no different in substance from the foregoing eleven." That is, although they each have their own sense and their own name, in substance they none of them step outside those eleven before, and so they are not set up separately and counted.
Take first "elation" (gladness, arising together with "desire"): it is in fact a portion of non-hatred — for not hating the object one is glad about is precisely non-hatred. Likewise, non-anger, non-rancor, non-vexation, non-envy and the rest are all on this principle, each being exactly the reverse of "a portion of hatred" (anger, rancor, vexation, envy are all offshoots of hatred; turned over, they revert into non-hatred). Take next "aversion" (turning-away, arising together with "wisdom"): it is in fact a portion of non-greed — for not clinging to the object one turns away from is precisely non-greed. Likewise, non-stinginess, non-conceit and the rest are also on this principle, each being exactly the reverse of "a portion of greed." As for non-concealment, non-deceit, non-flattery, these three are a portion of non-greed and non-delusion, each being exactly the reverse of "a portion of greed and delusion" (concealment, deceit, flattery have within them both greed and delusion; turned over, they revert into non-greed and non-delusion).
〔The dispute over which portion non-concealment reverts to〕 One view holds: non-concealment is only a portion of non-delusion (it does not revert to the non-greed side) — the ground being that nowhere in scripture or treatise is it said that "concealment" too counts as a portion of greed ("concealment" carries delusion alone, not greed, so its reverse, non-concealment, reverts to non-delusion alone).
〔The dispute over which portion non-pride reverts to〕 As to where "non-pride" reverts, there are three views: one holds it reverts to a portion of "trust" (because, trusting the other, one does not slight the other); one holds it reverts to a portion of "equanimity" (equanimity-of-formations) (because, the mind once even, one does not put oneself up high in pride); one holds it reverts to a portion of "shame" (because, revering the other, one does not slight the other).
〔The dispute over which portion non-doubt reverts to〕 As to where "non-doubt" reverts, there are likewise three views: one holds it is comprised by "trust" (once one trusts, one no longer wavers); one holds it just is "right resolve" (once one's understanding is settled, one no longer wavers); one holds it just is "right wisdom" (once one's seeing is correct, one no longer wavers).
As for the remaining few: "non-distraction" reverts to "right concentration" (the mind not scattering just is concentration); "right view" and "right knowing" both revert to "wholesome wisdom" (seeing correctly and knowing correctly are both wisdom); "non-forgetful-mindfulness" just is "right mindfulness" (holding fast, not forgetting the true Dharma, just is mindfulness).
Then there are remorse, torpor, applied-thought, sustained-thought, these four (they belong to the "indeterminate" mental factors): they are present sometimes when defiled and sometimes when not defiled, running through both sides; they are like contact, desire, and the rest (the universal and the object-specific mental factors), in that there is no wholesome dharma specially "turned over against" them to be matched up — and so no wholesome dharma is set up apart for them (it is not that every one must be matched with a wholesome reverse).
〔Q〕Someone asks: among the wholesome [factors] formed by "turning over the defiled dharmas," why are some set up with a separate name (like non-harm) while some are not? Where lies the standard? 〔A〕The standard is this: the ones whose look and function are distinct from others get set up separately; the rest (whose look and function are nothing special) are not set up separately, and at this you should not cavil (it is not that every one must be set up). And a further layer: among those defiled dharmas, the ones that reach through all six consciousnesses (pervade the six consciousnesses) are powerful, and so they are turned over and a separate wholesome dharma is set up [against them]. The likes of pride and the likes of anger arise only together with the mind-consciousness (they do not reach the six consciousnesses), and so no wholesome reverse is specially set up for them.
As for "harm," although it too arises only together with the mind-consciousness (by rights it should likewise not be set up), it has two special points: first, it crops up again and again, injuring and vexing others; second, it squarely obstructs the most excellent cause of the "unsurpassed vehicle (the path to buddhahood)" — namely "compassion." To make people see clearly this especially grave fault of "harm," it is specially turned over, and a "non-harm" is set up.
There are still forgetfulness, distraction, and incorrect-knowing, these three defiled dharmas: turned over, they fall squarely into the "object-specific" mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom (forgetfulness turns into mindfulness, distraction into concentration, incorrect-knowing into wisdom), and so they are not spoken of again separately here among the wholesome.
〔Q〕Again someone asks: defiled dharmas and pure dharmas turn over one against the other, two by two; why then are the pure dharmas (only eleven wholesome) so many fewer than the defiled (six root afflictions plus twenty secondary afflictions)? 〔A〕There are two reasons. First, pure dharmas are strong and defiled dharmas weak, so by nature one can "match the many with the few" (one wholesome can counteract several defiled, with no need for a one-to-one match). Second, pure dharmas "penetrate the principle," and so they can run through [things] (many seemingly different wholesome [factors] are in fact one and the same substance, so there is no need to divide them into so many); defiled dharmas are "mired in concrete fact," and so they are cramped (dividing very finely along one concrete mark after another, the number naturally grows large). So between defiled and pure, one ought not to demand that the numbers come out equal.
〔The wholesome's being-conventional-or-real〕
Of these eleven wholesome dharmas, three are conventionally existent (set up by borrowing a name, with no substance of their own) — namely non-heedlessness, equanimity-of-formations, and non-harm (why they are conventional has been told above); the remaining eight are really existent (truly have a substance of their own) — for these eight each have a distinct look and function of their own.
〔Whether the wholesome pervade the wholesome mind · whether buoyant-ease pervades〕
〔One view · only four pervade the wholesome mind, distributed across six positions〕 One view holds: among these eleven, only vigor, non-greed, non-hatred, non-delusion — "these four pervade every wholesome mind" (every wholesome mind has them), while the remaining seven "are not necessarily all present." The grounds are: at the time of seeking out concrete fact and principle, before one's mind is made up, "trust" does not arise (so trust does not pervade); shame and embarrassment, though of one kind, have separate basis-loci, so when one happens to arise, the other is absent (so shame and embarrassment cannot pervade at the same time); buoyant-ease comes only when one severs the afflictions by the "worldly path"; non-heedlessness and equanimity-of-formations come to arise only at the "outflow-free path"; non-harm comes only when one pities sentient beings. He further cites the Treatise's "these eleven arise distributed across six positions" to prove it: the position of resolve (the decided position) has trust; at the time of stilling the defiled there are shame and embarrassment (one regarding self, one regarding other); the position of cultivating-the-wholesome has vigor plus the three wholesome roots; on the worldly path there is buoyant-ease; on the supramundane path there are equanimity-of-formations and non-heedlessness; at the time of gathering-in sentient beings there is non-harm.
〔Refuting the previous view〕 Again, one view rebuts the previous account, saying it is wrongly put, and breaks it one by one —
(1) Saying "in the mind seeking out concrete fact and principle, before it is made up, there is no trust" is wrong: if that mind had no trust at all, it could not count as a wholesome mind in the first place (just as a defiled mind, precisely because it has no pure trust, does not count as wholesome). So as long as it is a wholesome mind, it definitely has trust; trust pervades. (2) Shame and embarrassment, though of two kinds, have the same "object-specific" basis (they depend on one and the same wholesome mind), and so they pervade the wholesome mind together — this point was already established earlier (it is not that when one happens to arise the other is absent). (3) If one says "on the supramundane path there is no buoyant-ease," then would not the "buoyant-ease awakening-limb" (one of the seven awakening-limbs) fail to be outflow-free? (Yet it is plainly outflow-free, so the supramundane path has buoyant-ease too.) (4) If one says "on the worldly path there is no equanimity-of-formations, no non-heedlessness," then would not the worldly path turn out to be "un-quiet, un-guarding-against-evil, un-cultivating-the-wholesome"? And would it not then fail to press down agitation and heedlessness? (This plainly does not get through.) What is more, since the contaminated wholesome mind also possesses those four dharmas (vigor, the three wholesome roots), then, just as "the supramundane path has equanimity and non-heedlessness," the contaminated wholesome mind too ought to have these two. (5) The moment a wholesome mind arises, it never injures sentient beings at all, and is wholly at odds with "the dharmas that can injure" — that being so, the wholesome mind definitely has non-harm (not only at the time of gathering-in beings).
As for the Treatise's saying "the eleven arise distributed across six positions," that is "spoken according to whichever [factor] stands out most in each several position" (whichever wholesome dharma is most conspicuous in a given position is the one pointed to), and does not mean that the other positions lack the remaining wholesome dharmas. So the previous account does not accord with principle.
〔It should be known · the correct account〕 So it should be put this way: among these eleven, ten pervade every wholesome mind, only the one buoyant-ease does not pervade — for buoyant-ease can tune body-and-mind to flow smooth only in the position of "concentration," and in the scattered positions there is none of it. The Yogācārabhūmi's "Viniścaya section" says just this: those ten wholesome mental factors, whether in "the concentrated ground" (the state of being in concentration) or in "the unconcentrated ground" (the state of a scattered mind), all pervade every wholesome mind; only in the mind of "the concentrated ground" is there the added one, buoyant-ease.
〔The dispute over just which grounds have buoyant-ease〕 One view holds: the "application" before concentration (the preparatory work) may also count as "the concentrated ground" (for at that time body-and-mind too is faintly tuned and smooth), and so even the desire realm has buoyant-ease — otherwise it would contradict the "Foundational-Stages section"'s line that "the eleven wholesome dharmas beginning with trust run through every ground." Again, one view holds (and this view accords better with right principle): buoyant-ease is present only in concentration (it must be nourished by concentration before body-and-mind can be tuned smooth); it cites the Treatise's "the various minds and mental factors of the desire realm, because they lack buoyant-ease, are named the unconcentrated ground" to prove it; and as for the "Foundational-Stages section"'s saying "every ground has these eleven," that is spoken with respect to "the ground with applied-and-sustained-thought, the ground with sustained-thought alone, the ground without applied-or-sustained-thought" — these three grounds all having them (all three of these grounds belong to the concentrated ground; it does not mean that a scattered mind has buoyant-ease too).
Now look at whether these eleven wholesome dharmas are present or absent in the several consciousnesses: in the seventh and eighth consciousnesses, it depends on which position one is in — sometimes present, sometimes absent; in the sixth consciousness, in the position of "concentration" all eleven are present, and in the position not of concentration only the one buoyant-ease is lacking. 〔The dispute over whether the five [sense] consciousnesses have buoyant-ease〕 One view holds: the five consciousnesses have only ten (no buoyant-ease) — for the five consciousnesses are by nature stirring-and-scattered, and admit no buoyant-ease. Again, one view holds: the five consciousnesses too have buoyant-ease — for the wholesome (of the five consciousnesses) that is drawn forth by concentration also has that body-and-mind smoothness; and moreover, when the five consciousnesses arise together with the "wisdom-of-accomplishing-what-is-to-be-done" (the wisdom the Buddha makes by transmuting the former five consciousnesses), there is definitely buoyant-ease.
〔The various gates of the wholesome〕
Finally, the eleven wholesome dharmas are judged through a few gates —
〔With which feelings they concur〕 The eleven wholesome concur with "fifteen feelings" (the five feelings matched against each of the several grounds of the three realms, fifteen in all); only "the feeling of grief" and "the feeling of pain" are excepted, because these two feelings are oppressive and tormenting, with none of that smoothness, and do not square with the wholesome dharmas' smooth ease.
〔Whether they concur with the object-specific〕 The eleven wholesome can concur with "the five object-specific [factors]" (desire, resolve, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom) — for trust and the rest are not at odds with desire and the rest (they can arise at the same time).
〔Which of the three natures they belong to〕 These eleven all belong to "the wholesome" nature alone.
〔To which realm they are bound〕 Buoyant-ease does not belong to the desire realm (it is present only in the concentrated grounds of the upper two realms); the remaining ten run through all three realms.
〔Their division by the learner-positions〕 These eleven all run through the three — "the learner, the no-more-learner, the neither-learner-nor-no-more-learner" (the ordinary and the noble alike may have them).
〔Whether they are severed by seeing or by cultivation〕 They are not severed by the path of seeing — the Yogācārabhūmi says: the six faculties beginning with trust are severed by the path of cultivation alone, not by the path of seeing.
How the remaining gates are to be divided, one should think out for oneself along this same principle (they are not all set out one by one here).
〔所釋之頌〕第十一頌
說完了遍行、別境，這一節講「六位心所」裡的第三位——「善」。頌文一口氣列了十一個：信、慚、愧，加上無貪、無瞋、無癡這三個善根，再加勤（精進）、安（輕安）、不放逸、行捨，最後是不害。它們有一個共同的身分：只跟「善心」一起生起，所以叫「善心所」；換句話說，凡是善心現前的時候，這一類心所才登場。
這一節的講法是：先一個個交代它們各是什麼（自性）、各做什麼（業用），中間遇到論主立的各種「異說」就一一攤開、一一辨它的對錯（攤開時不點名是哪位論師，只說『一說／又說／應知正義』）；交代完十一個之後，再回頭處理幾個收尾的大問題——頌裡那個「及」字還順帶攝了哪些善心所、這十一個裡哪三個是「假有」、是不是每個善心都帶滿這十一個、以及它們在『受、別境、三性、界、學位、見修所斷』這些門目上各落在哪裡。一段不漏，逐一講來。
善十一的安立，是阿毘達磨法相對心所的開合，並沒有哪一處經文正面把這十一個別立成數，所以這一節的經證從略，是直接以論本為宗的。它的名數與相應之本，在《瑜伽師地論·本地分》——那裡列出『十一自性善』（信、慚、愧、無貪、無瞋、無癡、精進、輕安、不放逸、捨、不害），正是本論善十一名數的所本；又以六個位次分配它們的相應：心「決定」時有信、「止息雜染」時有慚與愧（一個顧自、一個顧他）、「善品業轉」時有無貪無瞋無癡與精進、「世間道離欲」時有輕安、「出世道離欲」時有不放逸與捨——本論『論說十一於六位中起』一語，宗的就是這裡。各個善心所的體業定義，則本於《集論》：那裡定信以「於有體、有德、有能忍可清淨希望為體」，定慚以「自羞」、愧以「羞他」（本論慚愧依自法力、依世間力一分的論本），定無癡以「報、教、證智決擇為體」（本論「無癡即慧」一諍所引的論文），定不害以「無瞋善根一分心悲愍為體」（本論『不害依無瞋一分假立』的論本）；《雜集論》又補一句「決擇者，謂慧勇勤俱」，正是辨無癡與慧因果關係的論據。護法糅釋這一節所宗的，其論就在瑜伽師地論、集論、雜集論這三部。下面順著頌文講開。
甲、總說——什麼叫「善心所」
論主先總標：唯有跟善心相應而生起的，才叫「善心所」；它們的數目是確定的——一共十一個：信、慚、愧、無貪、無瞋、無癡、勤、安（也就是輕安）、不放逸、行捨、不害。下面就順這個次第一個個講。窺基《述記》提醒：底下出這些善體，雖列十一個名，講起來其實是「分為八段」——把慚、愧合成一段、把無貪無瞋無癡三善根合成一段，所以實際是信、慚愧、三善根、勤、安、不放逸、行捨、不害這八段，攝盡十一法。下面的講解就照這八段的開合走。
乙、信
信是什麼
第一個是「信」。什麼叫信？它有一個對象、一個自性、一個業用。對象是三種境——「實、德、能」；對著這三種境，心裡生起『深忍可、深愛樂、深希欲』三種態度；而它的自性，是「心淨」（讓心澄淨）；它的業用，是對治「不信」、並且愛樂去修善。
信的三種差別
信對著那三種境，就分成三種：第一種叫「信實有」——對於一切法的事相與道理，深深地信受、忍可（承認它確實如此）；第二種叫「信有德」——對於三寶真實清淨的功德，深深地信受、愛樂；第三種叫「信有能」——對於一切世間、出世間的善法，深信它有力量、能夠證得、能夠成辦，因而生起希求嚮往之心。
由這三種信，就能對治「不信」的心，讓人愛樂去證、去修世間與出世間的善。這裡要分清因果：前面說的「忍」其實就是「勝解」，那是信的「因」（先勝解了才信得起來）；「樂欲」其實就是「欲」，那是信的「果」（信了之後才生起希欲）。
信的自相究竟是什麼——逐難「心淨」一語
接著要把信的『自相（它自己最本己的相）』再確定下來。有人就難問：方才不是已經說『以心淨為性』了嗎？答：那句話還沒講清楚。因為「心淨」這個說法，細推有三重難處。第一，如果「淨」就等於『心（心王）』本身，那信就不該算「心所」了（心所是別於心王的）。第二，如果『能讓心變淨』就算數，那慚等別的善法也都能讓心變淨，信跟慚等又有什麼分別？第三，如果說「淨」是指『跟心一起生的某種淨法』，難處還是一樣（仍舊跟慚等分不開）。
對這三難，論主回答：信的體性是一種『澄清（使之澄淨）』的作用，它能淨化心王以及其餘心所；因為心王是主，所以就單拿「心淨」來給它命名（並非說只淨心、不淨心所）。這好比一顆「水清珠」投進濁水裡，水自己就清了——珠的本性是「清」，但它清的是水。慚等雖然也是善法，卻不是拿「淨」當自己的相；唯有信是以「淨」為相，所以它跟慚等並不相濫，前面那三難也就不成立了。
論主又從反面補一個理由：一切染法各自有各自的別相，唯獨「不信」這個染法，它自己的相就是「渾濁」的，而且還能把其餘的心、心所一起弄濁——就像極髒的東西，自己髒、還髒了別的。信正好是「不信」的反面，所以信就以「淨」為相（一個渾濁、一個澄淨，恰成對翻）。窺基《述記》把信的這幾項收成一個清楚的分判：「實、德、能」這三種境是信所託的「依處」，「深忍、樂、欲」是信的「因果」（忍是因、樂欲是果），唯「心淨」才是正顯信「自體」的——三項各有所司，不可混為一談。
異說一·以「愛樂」為相
下面是第一個異說。一說：信是以「愛樂」為相。論主破它：愛樂這個東西是通善、惡、無記三性的（壞事也可以愛樂）；如果信拿愛樂當相，那信的體就該等於「欲」了（欲才是通三性而愛樂的）。再說，苦諦、集諦這兩諦並不是讓人愛樂的對象，那麼苦、集就該不是信所緣的境了——可是信其實是緣四諦的（連苦集也信）。所以『以愛樂為相』說不通。
異說二·以「隨順」為相
第二個異說。又有人主張：信是以「隨順」為相。論主破它：隨順同樣通三性；而且細分起來，如果你說的「隨順」是指『印順（印定隨順）』，那其實就是「勝解」；如果是指『樂順（愛樂隨順）』，那其實就是「欲」——離開了勝解和欲這兩個體，根本找不到一個獨立的「隨順」相。
由前面這一路辨下來，應知正義是：信就是以「心淨」為相。
丙、慚與愧
慚是什麼·愧是什麼
接著講慚、愧這一對。什麼叫「慚」？它依靠「自身」和「正法」這兩種力量，以『崇重賢善（尊崇看重賢者與善法）』為自性，以「對治無慚、止息惡行」為業用——也就是說，依著自己與正法的尊貴增上，去崇重賢善、羞恥於過惡，這就對治了無慚，息掉種種惡行。
什麼叫「愧」？它依靠「世間」的力量，以『輕拒暴惡（輕視、拒斥兇暴罪惡）』為自性，以「對治無愧、止息惡行」為業用——也就是說，依著世間的訶責厭棄這種增上，去輕拒暴惡、羞恥於過罪，這就對治了無愧，息掉種種惡業。
「羞恥過惡」是通相，不是別相
論主指出：「羞恥過惡」這一點，是慚、愧兩者共同的「通相」（共相），所以聖教有時就權且拿它當慚愧的體。問題就出在：能不能把「羞恥」當成兩者的『別相（各自的特相）』來分慚、愧？論主下面用三道難來說不能。
第一難：如果硬把「羞恥」當成兩者的別相，那慚和愧的體就沒有差別了；體既然沒差別，這兩個法就應該『決定不相應（不能同時生起）』——像受、想那樣不並起——可這就違背聖教（聖教明說慚愧是俱起的）。
第二難：如果改從『待自／待他（一個對自己、一個對他人）』來立兩者的差別，那慚愧就成了『觀待而假立』的法、應該不是實有了，這又違背聖教（聖教說慚愧是實有）；而若你又承認它倆實有、卻各別生起（不俱起），那就違背《論》裡『十一善遍善心』的話（既要俱遍，就不能各別不俱）。
第三難：如果拿『崇重善／輕拒惡』當兩者的別相，那它倆所緣的境就不同（一個緣善、一個緣惡）、應該不能同時生起。論主在這裡反詰一句：這第三難所犯的『兩個過失』，跟前面說的其實是同一類，你為什麼偏偏只挑一方來責難？
論主接著正面收：誰說這兩個法所緣的境不同了？——有人追問：不是不同，那是怎樣？——論主答：當善心生起時，不管它所緣的是什麼境，那一刻心裡都同時帶著「崇重善」和「輕拒惡」這兩重意思；所以慚、愧其實是『俱遍善心、所緣相同』的，並沒有各緣各的境。
論主再回頭詰問那持別相說的人：你豈不是也得承認這個「俱遍」的義？可你既然堅持慚、愧的自相相同，又有什麼道理能擋得住前面那三道難呢？（所以只有『通相說』站得住。）
那麼聖教裡『顧自、顧他』那句話又怎麼安頓？論主說：那是把『自身與正法』叫作「自」、把「世間」叫作「他」；或者就著這裡頭「崇善拒惡」對自己是有益還是有損，而權且安一個「自、他」的名——並不是說慚愧兩者所緣的境真的不同。
丁、無貪·無瞋·無癡（三善根）
為什麼叫「善根」
頌文「無貪等三根」裡的那個「等」字，就把無瞋、無癡也攝進來了。這三個之所以得名「善根」，有兩個道理：一是它們「生善」的力量特別強，二是它們正好是貪、瞋、癡這三個「不善根」最貼近的對治者（一一對翻）。
無貪·無瞋是什麼
什麼叫「無貪」？對著『有（三有的果報）』和『有具（招感三有的因）』沒有染著，這就是它的自性；它的業用是對治貪著、修作善法。什麼叫「無瞋」？對著「苦」和『苦具（招苦之因）』沒有憎恚，這就是它的自性；它的業用是對治瞋恚、修作善法。
這裡論主補一個重要的觀念：當善心生起時，不論它所緣的是哪一個境，這顆心都已經對「有」等保持著無著、對苦等保持著無恚——這是『觀著『有』『苦』這些道理而安立』的無著無恚，並不是說它一定得真的去緣「有」「苦」那些境（境不現前也照樣無著無恚）。這跟前面講慚愧時『觀著善惡而安立』是同一個道理。所以無貪、無瞋這兩個，是俱遍一切善心的。
無癡是什麼
什麼叫「無癡」？對著種種道理與事相能明白通解，這就是它的自性；它的業用是對治愚癡、修作善法。無癡這一條，底下牽出一場『它到底是不是就等於『慧』』的辯論。
異說一·無癡就是「慧」
一說：無癡就是以「慧」為自性（無癡無別體，它本身就是慧）。它的根據是《集論》：無癡是以『報慧、教慧、證智』這幾種「決擇」為體——也就是生得慧（與生俱來的）、聞慧、思慧、修慧這四種慧；既然這四種都是「決擇」性，可見無癡就是慧。至於為什麼還要把無癡單獨立出來，那只是為了標顯：在善品這一邊，這種慧有特別殊勝的功能，所以另給個名——這就像在煩惱那一邊，也把「慧」單獨立出個「惡見」來一樣。
應知正義·無癡別有自體
又一說（這是正義）：無癡並不就是慧，它『另有自己的自性，正好對治無明』。理由有三。第一，無貪、無瞋都是各別有體而同入善根，無癡照例也該各別有體（三善根要齊整）。第二，《論》說『大悲是以無瞋、無癡攝』，而不是說『以善根攝』；倘若無癡就是慧，那大悲就該像『力』等那樣被「慧（等根）」所攝了——這就跟論文牴觸。第三，倘若無癡沒有別的自體（像不害等那種依他假立的假法），那它就該不是實物了，可這又違背《論》裡『十一善中，三個是世俗有（假），其餘八個都是實』的話（無癡正在那實有的八個裡頭）。
那麼《集論》「以慧為體」的話又怎麼講？論主說：那是『舉無癡的因與果，來顯它的自性』——無癡的相多半要靠慧才顯得出來（決擇是慧、而無癡常隨決擇而現），所以借慧來表它；這就好比前面以「忍、樂」來表「信」的自體一樣（忍是信因、樂是信果，借因果表體），道理一定是這樣，並不是說無癡就等於慧。
論主再補一條最有力的理由：貪、瞋、癡跟前六識相應，正屬煩惱，起惡的力量特別強，所以立為「不善根」；要斷掉這三個，必須靠「通對治」和「別對治」兩路——「通對治」唯是善慧（一味慧通治三毒），「別對治」就是無貪、無瞋、無癡這三善根（一一各治一毒）。既然斷貪瞋癡還需要「別對治」這一路，可見無癡必定別有自體，並不就是那個當「通對治」的慧。窺基《述記》把這「別有自性」用一個比量正式立出來：無癡一定別有自體（這是宗）；因為它『所正對治的是不善根（無明）』（這是因）；就像無貪、無瞋那樣（這是喻）——無貪無瞋各別有體而正對治貪、瞋，無癡同例，正對治癡（無明），所以也該別有自體。
戊、勤（精進）
勤是什麼
「勤」就是精進。它的場合是『善品要修、惡品要斷』這兩件事；在這修、斷之中，以「勇、悍」為自性，以『對治懈怠、圓滿善事』為業用。這裡「勇」和「悍」兩字各有所簡別：「勇」表『勝進（向上奮進）』，用來簡別開諸染法——染法裡也有勇猛精進的（造惡也很賣力），那不算善；「悍」表「精純」，用來簡別開「淨無記」。由這一簡，就顯出精進唯屬善性。
精進的五種差別
精進的相，細分大略有五種：被甲、加行、無下、無退、無足。這五個正好對應經裡說的「有勢、有勤、有勇、堅猛、不捨善軛」，順次相配（披上鎧甲是有勢、實下功夫是有勤、不自卑怯是有勇、不退轉是堅猛、不知足、肩上善擔不肯放是不捨善軛）。
這五種的分判，前人有好幾種解法：或約「初發心／自分／勝進」，是就「自分行」裡頭分成三品；或約「初發心、長時、無間、慇重、無餘」，是就「修」的差別分；或約資糧位等「五道」的差別分（其中二乘的究竟道是因為欣慕大菩提，諸佛的究竟道是因為樂於利樂他人）；或約「加行、無間、解脫、勝進」這四道的差別分。
己、安（輕安）
「安」就是「輕安」。它的自性是『遠離麁重、調暢身心、堪任（身心調柔、堪能任事）』；它的業用是「對治惛沈、轉依」——意思是說，輕安能伏除那些障礙禪定的法，使得所依止的身心轉變成安適調柔的狀態。（這一條後面講『遍不遍善心』時還要重提，因為輕安是十一個裡唯一「不遍」的。）
庚、不放逸
不放逸是什麼·它沒有別體
「不放逸」其實就是『精進＋無貪、無瞋、無癡』這四個法合起來的作用：在『該斷的惡、該修的善』這些事上，以『防（防惡）、修（修善）』為自性，以『對治放逸、成滿一切世出世善事』為業用——也就是說，這四個法在斷惡修善上都能防、能修，這個合起來的功能就叫「不放逸」。要緊的是：不放逸並沒有自己的別體，它的相不外乎那四個法的相；在防惡修善這件事上，離開了那四個法的功能，再也找不出不放逸自己獨有的作用。
那為什麼偏取那四個、不取信慚等？論主說：信、慚等雖然也略有一點防修的能力，但比起那四個法，它們的勢用就微弱多了；而且信慚等不是「善根」、也不能『遍策（普遍策動一切善）』，所以不拿它們當不放逸的所依，只取精進加三善根這四個。
逐難『防、修是不放逸的別相』
有人難：防、修不就是不放逸自己的相用嗎（怎麼說它沒別體）？論主答：防、修並不異於精進、三根本身；如果硬說『防修要靠不放逸才有作用』，那不放逸也該靠別的才有作用，這樣輾轉推下去就成了「無窮」的過失。
對方再難：精進只管「遍策」、三善根只管「為依」，怎麼能說它們有防修的作用呢（防修還是得另立不放逸）？論主答：那你倒說說，你講的「防修用」它的相到底是什麼？我們逐一替你推：如果你說的是『普遍依持』，那就是無貪等三根；如果是『遍策督錄』，那就不異於精進；如果是「止惡進善」，那就是這四個法的總和；如果是「令心不散亂」，那應該是「等持（定）」；如果是『令心同取一境』，那跟「觸」有什麼分別；如果是『令心不忘失』，那就該是「念」——這樣一路推尋下去，「不放逸」的用，離開了無貪等四法，竟然一個也找不到。所以不放逸確定沒有別體（是假法）。
辛、行捨
行捨是什麼·它也沒有別體
什麼叫「行捨」？它也是『精進＋無貪無瞋無癡』這四個法的作用：令心「平等、正直、無功用住」，這是它的自性；對治掉舉、令心靜住，這是它的業用——也就是說，這四個法令心遠離掉舉等障礙而安靜地住下，就叫「捨」。那「平等／正直／無功用住」三個詞，是就修行的「初、中、後」三個階位，分別來辨「捨」的差別（初則令心平等、中則令心正直、後則令心無功用而自然安住）。
論主說明行捨與不放逸的分工：先由不放逸除去雜染，行捨再令心寂靜而住。行捨跟不放逸一樣，也沒有別體：離開那四個法就既無相、也無用——能令心寂靜的就是那四法，所令寂靜的就是心等（能、所兩頭都不出四法與心，找不出行捨自己的體）。
壬、不害
不害是什麼·它是無瞋的一分假立
什麼叫「不害」？對著一切有情不去損害惱亂，以「無瞋」為自性，以『對治『害』、悲愍（拔苦）』為業用——也就是說，就「無瞋」在『對有情不損惱』這一分上，權且安一個「不害」的名。
論主把無瞋和不害的分工講細：無瞋是翻對『斷物命（要人性命）』那種瞋的，不害是正違『損惱物（傷害惱亂眾生）』那種害的；無瞋偏在『與樂（給眾生安樂）』，那是「慈」，不害偏在『拔苦（替眾生除苦）』，那是「悲」——這就是兩者粗略的相上之別。但就道理講，無瞋是實有自體的，不害只是依著無瞋的「一分」而假立罷了；之所以還要把不害單立出來，是為了顯出「慈、悲」兩個相的不同，因為在「利樂有情」這件事上，慈與悲這兩面最為殊勝（值得各表一名）。窺基《述記》在這裡解一個容易起的疑：前面講「大悲」是拿無瞋、無癡兩個法為體，這裡講不害怎麼又獨說「無瞋」一個？他答：兩處所就的不同——大悲是「據實體」說（就它實有的無瞋無癡兩法），不害是「約假成」說（就無瞋一分上拔苦之義勝，假立其名）；而且那邊是「大悲」，這邊只是「悲」（屬四無量心所攝），名雖近而所指的位次與開合並不相同，所以不相牴觸。
異說·不害別有自體
下面是一個異說。一說：不害不就是無瞋，它別有自體，就是「賢善性」。論主破它：那「賢善性」的相是什麼呢？你說是「不損惱」——可是無瞋也正是這樣啊（無瞋對有情就是不損惱、就是慈悲賢善），那何必再另立一個自性？所以不害還是「假」，依無瞋一分而立。
癸、頌中「及」字所攝的「義別心所」
「及」字攝了哪些
頌文裡那個『及（行捨『及』不害）』字，除了連接，還顯示：在這十一個之外，還有一類『意義雖然有別、但體並無異』的善心所（像「欣、厭」等等）；它們雖然各有各的意義、各有各的名字，可體並不異於前面那十一個，所以不另外立為單獨的善心所，只用一個「及」字帶過。
欣·厭·一連串「不×」的善，各歸到三善根的一分
論主一一交代這些『義別體同』的善都歸到哪裡。『欣（欣樂）』是跟「欲」一起的、屬於「無瞋」的一分（因為它對所欣的境不憎恚）；「不忿、不恨、不惱、不嫉」等也一樣，各隨其宜，都是正翻「瞋」的一分。『厭（厭離）』是跟「慧」一起的、屬於「無貪」的一分（因為它對所厭的境不染著）；「不慳、不憍」等也一樣，各隨其宜，都是正翻「貪」的一分。「不覆、不誑、不諂」是『無貪、無癡』的一分，各隨其宜，正翻「貪、癡」的一分。
不覆之諍
關於「不覆」，有一個小異說。一說：不覆只是「無癡」的一分——因為沒有哪處經論說「覆」也是「貪」的一分（既然覆不通貪，那不覆就單翻無癡，不必兼無貪）。
不慢之諍（三說）
「不慢」該歸到哪裡，有三說：一說歸「信」的一分（既信服他，就不會慢他）；一說歸「捨」的一分（心既平等，就不會自高慢人）；一說歸「慚」的一分（既崇重他，就不會慢他）。
不疑之諍（三說）
「不疑」該歸到哪裡，也有三說：一說即「信」所攝（既信服他，就沒有猶豫）；一說即「正勝解」（既已決定，就沒有猶豫）；一說即「正慧」所攝（既是正見，就沒有猶豫）。
其餘幾個的歸屬
至於「不散亂」，就歸「正定」所攝；「正見、正知」都歸「善慧」所攝；「不忘念」就是「正念」。
悔·眠·尋·伺為什麼不別立善
「悔、眠、尋、伺」這四個（也就是「不定」位的心所），它們是通染、通不染的（既可染、也可不染，並非一向善），就像「觸、欲」等遍行、別境那樣兩通，所以沒有一個『專門翻對它的善』可立——既無別翻，就不在善裡別立它們。
為什麼有的染所翻的善要別立、有的不別立
有人總難：諸染法所翻出來的善，為什麼有的單獨立成善心所、有的卻不立？論主答：凡是相、用有特別差別的，就單獨立它；其餘的就不立，這不該責難。再進一步說：那些「遍六識」的染法，因為勢力強盛，所以特別翻它、別立成善法。至於「慢」等、「忿」等，只跟「意識」相應（不遍六識），所以不別翻成善。「害」雖然也只跟意識相應，但因為它一再現起、損惱他人，又障礙了無上乘的殊勝因——「悲」，為了讓人了知它這種增上的過失，才特地翻它、立出「不害」。而「失念、散亂、不正知」這三個，它們所翻入的是「別境」裡的念、定、慧，所以善裡就不再另說。
為什麼淨法（善）反而比染法少
又有人難：染、淨既是相翻的，為什麼淨法（善十一）反倒比染法（根本煩惱六＋隨煩惱二十）少這麼多？論主答：因為淨勝、染劣，是『以少敵多』（一個善法足以敵過好幾個染法，所以不必一一對等）；再說，淨法是『解理（通達道理）』的，所以能通（許多染所翻的善其實同一個體，譬如那一連串「不×」都收歸三善根的一分），而染法是『迷事（迷於事相）』的，所以瑣碎局限（隨著事相分出許多名目）。所以染、淨兩邊的數目，本就不該拿來齊頭責難。
子、善十一的假與實
把十一個過完，論主結算它們的假實：這十一個裡，三個是假有——就是不放逸、行捨、不害（理由如前面各條所說，它們都沒有別體，是依精進三根或無瞋一分而假立的）；其餘八個都是實有（因為它們各有各別的相與用）。
丑、是不是每個善心都帶滿這十一個·輕安遍不遍
異說一·只有四個遍善心，餘七不定
這是一場重要的辯論。一說：十一個裡，只有精進、無貪、無瞋、無癡這『四個遍善心』，其餘七個都『不定（不是每個善心都有）』。它的理由是：人在推尋事理、還沒決定的時候，信生不起來（所以信不遍）；慚、愧雖同類卻依處各別，隨起一個、第二個那一刻就沒有（所以慚愧不能同遍）；輕安要到「世間道斷煩惱」時才有；不放逸、行捨要到「無漏道」時才生起；不害要到「悲愍有情」時才有。它還引《論》『十一個於六個位次中生起』來證：決定位才有信相應、止息染污時才起慚愧（顧自顧他）、善品位才有精進三根、世間道時才有輕安、出世道時才有行捨與不放逸、攝受眾生時才有不害。
破前說
又一說出來破它：前面那一說不合理。逐條駁：第一，推尋未決的心，如果信不生，那這心就該不算善了（就像染心等，正因為沒有清淨的信才不算善）——可推尋未決時明明也可以是善心，可見信仍在。第二，慚、愧雖然種類不同，但所依的「別境」是同一個，前面已經立過它倆是俱遍善心的。第三，如果出世道沒有輕安，那「輕安覺支」就該不是無漏的了（可它分明是無漏覺支）。第四，如果世間道沒有行捨、不放逸，那世間善心就該不算「寂靜、防惡修善」、也該伏不住掉舉與放逸了——可有漏善心既然也具足那四個法（精進三根），就該像出世道一樣有行捨與不放逸。第五，善心生起時都不損害眾生、都違逆能損害的法，所以那一刻就有不害。至於《論》說「六位起十一」，那是『依著某位某法特別增勝』而那樣說的（強調那一位某法最顯，並不是說別位就缺）。所以前說不合理。
應知正義·十個遍善心，唯輕安不遍
於是定論（正義）：應當說十一個裡，有十個遍善心，唯獨輕安不遍——因為輕安要在「定位」才能調暢身心，散位裡沒有，所以不遍。論主引〈決擇分〉作證：那十個善心所，在定地、不定地都遍善心；唯有在定地的心中，才增上一個「輕安」。
輕安到底在哪些地有——之諍
關於輕安落在哪些「地」，又有小異說。一說：禪定的『加行（預備功夫）』也算得上「定地」之名（因為加行也微微有點調暢的意思），所以連欲界也有輕安——不然就違背〈本地分〉「信等十一通一切地」的話。又一說（偏正義）：輕安只在「定」裡才有（要靠定的滋養才生得起調暢）；《論》說『欲界的諸心、心所，因為缺了輕安，才叫『不定地』』；至於「一切地有十一」那句，是就「有尋有伺、無尋唯伺、無尋無伺」這三地都有而說的，並不是說連散心的欲界也有輕安。
這十一個在八識裡各有沒有
論主接著交代這十一個在各識裡的有無：第七、第八識隨它的位次而有、而無；第六識在「定位」是十一個全具、在「非定位」就唯獨缺一個輕安（其餘十個都有）。
五識有沒有輕安——之諍
最後一個小諍，是問前五識有沒有輕安。一說：五識只有十個（缺輕安）——因為五識的自性是「散動」的，沒有輕安。又一說：五識也有輕安——因為『由定所引發的善』也有調暢，而且成所作智（轉前五識而成的智）現前時必定有輕安相隨（既然轉成的智有輕安，那本識位也該許有）。
寅、善十一的諸門分別
最後把這十一個放進幾個門目裡定位。
受相應：善十一跟『十五受』相應——也就是在全部受裡，要除掉「憂、苦」這兩個逼迫受，因為逼迫受沒有調暢，跟善法的調暢相違。
別境：善十一跟『別境五（欲、勝解、念、定、慧）』都能相應，因為信等與欲等並不相違。
三性：這十一個唯是「善」性。
界繫：唯獨「輕安」不通欲界（如前所說，散位無輕安），其餘十個通三界。
學位：十一個都通「學、無學、非學非無學」這三位。
見修所斷：它們不是「見所斷」——《瑜伽》說『信等六根（信進念定慧加上不放逸等善法）唯是修所斷、不是見所斷』（善法不在見道所斷的染惑之列）。
其餘還有別的門目分別，可以照這個道理自己去推思。
承衍
善十一這一節所立的——十一善心所的名數、各自的體業、三假八實的判分、十遍善心而唯輕安不遍——是唯識系安立『淨品骨幹、修道資糧』的根據，後出諸論順著它一一承用。《百法明門論》把這十一個逐一收在心所「善」位之下（信、慚、愧、無貪、無瞋、無癡、勤、安、不放逸、行捨、不害），與本節逐法對位。《唯識三十論頌》的頌十一，正是本節所釋的本頌，逐頌相承。《辯中邊論》在「辯修對治品」裡開展三十七菩提分，其中信、勤、輕安、捨這些善法，正是善十一中的幾個在道品次第裡的展開，與本節所立的善法義相涉相承。《攝大乘論》在「彼入因果分」講六波羅蜜多，精進與禪定所攝的輕安、不放逸等善法增上義，也是本節善心所在波羅蜜行裡的承用。至於《二十唯識論》，它主於成立唯識無境、破外人實境之執，於善心所的體業沒有正面對位，這裡從闕。
Having finished the universal factors (the ones present in every act of cognition) and the object-specific factors, this section takes up the third of the "six classes of mental factors" — the wholesome (good) factors. The verse lists eleven of them in a single breath: trust, the sense of shame and the sense of moral dread, then the three wholesome roots of non-greed, non-aversion, and non-delusion, then diligence (energy), tranquillity (mental and bodily ease), conscientiousness, equanimity-in-action, and finally non-harming. They share one identity: they arise only together with a wholesome mind, which is why they are called wholesome mental factors — in other words, this class of factors steps onto the stage only when a wholesome mind is present.
The method of this section is as follows. First it takes each factor one by one and sets out what each one is in itself (its intrinsic nature) and what each one does (its function), and wherever the treatise's author has set up one or another "alternative view," each is laid open and tested for soundness in turn (when the views are laid out, the particular master is never named — they are introduced only as "one view / another view / the settled (correct) reading"). After all eleven have been treated, it turns back to handle several large closing questions: which further wholesome factors that little word "and" in the verse silently gathers in; which three of the eleven are "merely nominal" (without a self-standing reality); whether every wholesome mind carries the full set of eleven; and where each of them falls across the topical headings of feeling, the object-specific factors, the three moral qualities, the realms, the stages of training, and what is abandoned on the path of seeing versus the path of cultivation. Not a single passage is skipped; everything is taken in turn.
The establishing of these eleven wholesome factors is the Abhidharma analysis — the unfolding and gathering — of the mental factors that go with a wholesome mind; there is no scriptural passage that positively sets up these eleven as a separate enumeration, and so this section's grounding draws directly from the treatises rather than from a sūtra. The source of their names, their number, and their associations is the Yogācārabhūmi, in its Basic Section: there it lists "the eleven wholesome by intrinsic nature" (trust, the sense of shame, the sense of moral dread, non-greed, non-aversion, non-delusion, energy, tranquillity, conscientiousness, equanimity, and non-harming), which are precisely the names and number of this treatise's eleven wholesome factors; and it apportions their associations across six positions — when the mind is "decided" there is trust; when it "stills the defiled" there are the sense of shame and the sense of moral dread (one regarding self, one regarding others); when "wholesome-quality activity proceeds" there are non-greed, non-aversion, non-delusion, and energy; when there is "freedom from desire by the worldly path" there is tranquillity; and when there is "freedom from desire by the supramundane path" there are conscientiousness and equanimity — and this treatise's phrase "the eleven arise across six positions" rests on just this. The defining of each wholesome factor's substance and function then rests on the Abhidharma-samuccaya: there trust is defined as "having, toward what has reality, what has virtue, and what has capacity, acceptance, pure aspiration as its substance," the sense of shame as "being ashamed before oneself" and the sense of moral dread as "being ashamed before others" (the treatise-basis for the sense of shame and moral dread relying on the force of one's own self and the Dharma, and partly on the force of the world); non-delusion as "having as its substance discernment by the knowledge of retribution, of instruction, and of realization" (the treatise text cited in the dispute over "non-delusion just is wisdom"); and non-harming as "having as its substance a portion of the wholesome root of non-aversion, the compassionate pity of beings" (the treatise-basis for "non-harming is provisionally posited on a portion of non-aversion"); and the Abhidharma-samuccaya-vyākhyā adds the line "the discerner is wisdom, energy, and diligence together," which is exactly the textual ground for distinguishing the cause-and-effect relation of non-delusion and wisdom. The treatises on which Dharmapāla's synthetic commentary rests for this section are these three — the Yogācārabhūmi, the Abhidharma-samuccaya, and its commentary. With that we follow the verse and open the exposition.
A. General statement — what "wholesome mental factor" means
The author begins with the general heading: only what arises in association with a wholesome mind is called a wholesome mental factor; and their number is fixed — there are eleven exactly: trust, the sense of shame, the sense of moral dread, non-greed, non-aversion, non-delusion, diligence, tranquillity (that is, mental and bodily ease), conscientiousness, equanimity-in-action, and non-harming. What follows takes them up one by one in this order. Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) points out that, in setting out the substances of these wholesome factors below, although eleven names are listed, the exposition in fact "divides into eight segments" — combining the sense of shame and moral dread into one segment, and combining the three wholesome roots of non-greed, non-aversion, and non-delusion into one segment — so that the actual segments are trust, the shame-and-moral-dread pair, the three roots, diligence, tranquillity, conscientiousness, equanimity-in-action, and non-harming: eight segments gathering up the eleven factors in full. The exposition below follows this eight-segment unfolding-and-gathering.
B. Trust
What trust is
The first is trust. What is trust? It has an object, an intrinsic nature, and a function. Its object is three kinds of thing — the real, the virtuous, and the capable; facing these three, the mind generates three attitudes — deep acceptance, deep delight, and deep aspiration; its intrinsic nature is the purifying of the mind (making the mind limpid); and its function is to counteract distrust and to delight in cultivating the good.
The three varieties of trust
Trust, facing those three kinds of object, divides into three. The first is trust that the real exists — toward the concrete facts and principles of all phenomena, one deeply accepts and assents to them (one acknowledges that they truly are so). The second is trust that virtue exists — toward the truly pure qualities of the Three Jewels, one deeply accepts them with delight. The third is trust that capacity exists — toward all the wholesome things of the world and beyond it, one deeply trusts that they have power, that they can be realized and brought to completion, and so one generates aspiration and longing for them.
By these three kinds of trust one is able to counteract the mind of distrust, so that a person comes to delight in realizing and cultivating the good of both the worldly and the supramundane. Here a distinction of cause and effect must be kept clear: the "acceptance" mentioned above is in fact resolute conviction, and that is the cause of trust (one must first be resolutely convinced before trust can take hold); the "delight-aspiration" is in fact desire, and that is the effect of trust (only after trusting does one generate aspiration).
What the defining mark of trust really is — refuting the phrase "purifying of the mind" point by point
Next the defining mark of trust (the mark most properly its own) must be pinned down further. Someone raises an objection: did we not just say that trust "has the purifying of the mind as its nature"? The reply: that phrase has not yet been made clear. For the expression "purifying of the mind," pressed closely, runs into three difficulties. First, if "the pure" simply equals the mind itself (the principal consciousness), then trust ought not to count as a mental factor at all (a mental factor is something distinct from the principal mind). Second, if "being able to make the mind pure" is enough to qualify, then the sense of shame and the other wholesome factors can equally make the mind pure — so what would distinguish trust from the sense of shame and the rest? Third, if "the pure" means "some pure factor that arises together with the mind," the difficulty is just the same (it still cannot be told apart from the sense of shame and the rest).
To these three difficulties the author replies: the very substance of trust is a kind of clarifying function, one that purifies both the principal mind and the remaining mental factors; and because the principal mind is the master, one simply takes "purifying of the mind" as the name for it (this does not mean it purifies the mind only and not the other factors). It is like a water-clearing gem dropped into muddy water — the water clears of itself; the gem's own nature is "clarity," but what it clarifies is the water. The sense of shame and the rest, though they too are wholesome factors, do not take "purity" as their own defining mark; only trust has "purity" as its mark, and so it is not confused with the sense of shame and the rest, and the three difficulties above do not stand.
The author then adds a supporting reason from the opposite side: each defiled factor has its own particular mark, but distrust alone is one whose own mark is precisely muddiness, and which can moreover muddy the remaining mind and mental factors along with it — like something filthy that is dirty itself and dirties others as well. Trust is exactly the reverse of distrust, and so trust takes "purity" as its mark (the one muddy, the other limpid, the two answering each other exactly as opposites). Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) gathers these items of trust into one clear sorting: the three kinds of object, "the real, the virtuous, and the capable," are the "basis" on which trust rests; "deep acceptance, delight, and aspiration" are the "cause and effect" of trust (acceptance the cause, delight-aspiration the effect); and only "purifying of the mind" is what properly displays the "very substance" of trust — the three having each its own role, not to be run together into one.
Alternative view 1 · "delight" as the mark
Here is the first alternative view. One view holds: trust has delight as its mark. The author refutes it: delight is something common to all three moral qualities — wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral (one can delight in bad things too); if trust took delight as its mark, then the substance of trust would amount to desire (it is desire that is common to all three qualities and delights). Further, the truth of suffering and the truth of its origin are not objects one delights in, so suffering and origin would then not be objects that trust takes — yet trust in fact takes all four noble truths as its objects (one trusts suffering and origin as well). So "delight as the mark" will not hold.
Alternative view 2 · "conformity" as the mark
The second alternative view. Another holds: trust has conformity as its mark. The author refutes it: conformity is likewise common to all three moral qualities; and pressed finely, if the "conformity" you mean is assenting conformity (conformity that fixes and ratifies), then that is in fact resolute conviction; and if it is delighting conformity (conformity that delights), then that is in fact desire — apart from these two substances, resolute conviction and desire, no independent "conformity" mark can be found at all.
From this whole line of argument it should be known that the settled (correct) reading is: trust has the "purifying of the mind" as its mark.
C. The sense of shame and the sense of moral dread
What the sense of shame is · what the sense of moral dread is
Next come the sense of shame and the sense of moral dread, a pair. What is the sense of shame? It relies on two forces — one's own self and the true Dharma — and takes as its intrinsic nature the honoring of the worthy and the good (revering and prizing worthy persons and wholesome things), and takes as its function the counteracting of shamelessness and the stopping of evil conduct — that is, drawing on the eminence of one's own self and of the true Dharma, one honors the worthy and the good and is ashamed of faults and evils, and this counteracts shamelessness and stops the various kinds of evil conduct.
What is the sense of moral dread? It relies on the force of the world (public opinion), and takes as its intrinsic nature the spurning of the cruel and evil (disdaining and rejecting what is violent and wicked), and takes as its function the counteracting of the absence of moral dread and the stopping of evil conduct — that is, drawing on the censure and revulsion of the world as its impetus, one spurns the cruel and evil and is ashamed of offenses and crimes, and this counteracts the absence of moral dread and stops the various kinds of evil deeds.
"Being ashamed of fault and evil" is a shared mark, not a distinguishing mark
The author points out: "being ashamed of fault and evil" is the shared mark common to both the sense of shame and the sense of moral dread, and so scripture sometimes provisionally takes it as the substance of the pair. The problem is just this: can "being ashamed" be taken as the distinguishing mark (the particular mark proper to each) by which the sense of shame and the sense of moral dread are told apart? The author shows below, by three difficulties, that it cannot.
The first difficulty: if one forcibly takes "being ashamed" as the distinguishing mark of the two, then the substances of the sense of shame and the sense of moral dread would have no difference; and if their substances have no difference, then the two factors ought to be "definitely non-co-arising" (unable to arise at the same time) — like feeling and perception, which do not arise together — but this contradicts scripture (scripture clearly says the sense of shame and moral dread arise together).
The second difficulty: if instead one establishes their difference by "with reference to oneself / with reference to others" (one toward oneself, one toward others), then the two would become factors "provisionally posited by relational reference" and ought not to be really existent — which again contradicts scripture (scripture says the sense of shame and moral dread are really existent); and if you then grant that the two are really existent yet arise separately (not co-arising), that contradicts the treatise's statement that "the eleven wholesome factors pervade the wholesome mind" (if they must both pervade, they cannot arise each apart from the other).
The third difficulty: if one takes "honoring the good / spurning the evil" as the distinguishing mark of the two, then the objects the two take would differ (one takes the good as object, one the evil) and they ought not to be able to arise at the same time. Here the author turns the question back on the objector: the "two faults" that this third difficulty commits are of the very same kind as the ones already named — why do you single out only one side for censure?
The author then states the matter positively: who said the objects taken by these two factors differ? — Someone presses: if they are not different, then how are things? — The author answers: when a wholesome mind arises, whatever its object may be, in that moment the mind simultaneously carries both meanings, "honoring the good" and "spurning the evil"; so the sense of shame and the sense of moral dread in fact "both pervade the wholesome mind and take the same object," and it is not that each takes a separate object.
The author again turns back and questions the holder of the distinguishing-mark view: must you not also concede this "both pervade" sense? Yet since you insist that the sense of shame and the sense of moral dread have the same defining mark, what reason can you give to fend off the three difficulties above? (So only the "shared-mark view" stands.)
Then how is scripture's phrase "regarding oneself, regarding others" to be settled? The author says: that calls "one's own self and the true Dharma" the "self," and calls "the world" the "other"; or it provisionally fixes a name of "self" and "other" with reference to whether this "honoring the good and spurning the evil" is beneficial or harmful to oneself — it does not mean that the objects taken by the sense of shame and the sense of moral dread are really different.
D. Non-greed · non-aversion · non-delusion (the three wholesome roots)
Why they are called "wholesome roots"
In the verse's phrase "the three roots, non-greed and so forth," that word "and so forth" gathers in non-aversion and non-delusion as well. There are two reasons these three earn the name wholesome roots: first, their power to generate the wholesome is especially strong; second, they are precisely the nearest counteragents to the three unwholesome roots of greed, aversion, and delusion (each answering one, opposite for opposite).
What non-greed and non-aversion are
What is non-greed? Non-attachment toward "existence" (the fruit-results of the three forms of becoming) and toward "the equipment of existence" (the causes that summon the three forms of becoming) — this is its intrinsic nature; its function is to counteract greedy attachment and to do wholesome deeds. What is non-aversion? Non-hatred toward "suffering" and toward "the equipment of suffering" (the causes that summon suffering) — this is its intrinsic nature; its function is to counteract hatred and to do wholesome deeds.
Here the author adds an important point: when a wholesome mind arises, whatever object it takes, that mind already maintains non-attachment toward "existence" and the like and non-hatred toward "suffering" and the like — this is a non-attachment and non-hatred "posited with reference to the principles of 'existence' and 'suffering,'" and it does not mean the mind must actually take "existence" and "suffering" as its objects (even when those objects are not present, it is still non-attached and non-hating all the same). This is the same principle as "posited with reference to the good and the evil" in the discussion of the sense of shame and moral dread above. So non-greed and non-aversion, these two, pervade every wholesome mind.
What non-delusion is
What is non-delusion? Clearly comprehending the various principles and concrete facts — this is its intrinsic nature; its function is to counteract delusion and to do wholesome deeds. This factor of non-delusion draws out below a debate over "whether it is simply identical with wisdom."
Alternative view 1 · non-delusion just is "wisdom"
One view: non-delusion has wisdom as its intrinsic nature (non-delusion has no separate substance; it is wisdom itself). Its basis is the Abhidharma-samuccaya: non-delusion has as its substance the several "discernments" of "the wisdom of innate endowment, the wisdom of instruction, and realizing knowledge" — that is, the four wisdoms of innate wisdom (born with one), the wisdom of hearing, the wisdom of reflecting, and the wisdom of cultivating; since all four are of the nature of "discernment," it is clear that non-delusion just is wisdom. As for why non-delusion is still set up separately, that is only to highlight that, on the side of the wholesome, this wisdom has an especially excellent function, and so it is given a separate name — just as, on the side of the afflictions, "wisdom" is also set up separately as "wrong view."
The settled (correct) reading · non-delusion has its own separate substance
Another view (and this is the correct one): non-delusion is not simply wisdom; it "has its own separate intrinsic nature, precisely counteracting ignorance." There are three reasons. First, non-greed and non-aversion each have their own separate substance and yet enter together among the wholesome roots, so non-delusion, by the same rule, ought to have its own separate substance (the three wholesome roots must be uniform). Second, the treatise says "great compassion is gathered up by non-aversion and non-delusion," and not "gathered up by the wholesome roots"; if non-delusion were just wisdom, then great compassion ought to be gathered up by "wisdom (and the like roots)" the way "power" and so forth are — which contradicts the treatise text. Third, if non-delusion had no separate substance (like non-harming and such, which are merely nominal, posited in dependence on something else), then it ought not to be a real thing — but this again contradicts the treatise's statement that "among the eleven wholesome factors, three are conventionally existent (nominal) and the remaining eight are all real" (non-delusion is right among those eight real ones).
Then how is the Abhidharma-samuccaya's phrase "having wisdom as its substance" to be understood? The author says: that "cites the cause and the effect of non-delusion in order to display its intrinsic nature" — the mark of non-delusion mostly shows itself only by way of wisdom (discernment is wisdom, and non-delusion regularly appears following discernment), so wisdom is borrowed to express it; this is just like expressing the substance of trust above by "acceptance and delight" (acceptance is the cause of trust, delight is the effect of trust, and one borrows cause and effect to express the substance). The principle is necessarily this way, and it does not mean non-delusion just equals wisdom.
The author then adds a most forceful reason: greed, aversion, and delusion are associated with the first six consciousnesses, belong properly to the afflictions, and have an especially strong power to give rise to evil, so they are set up as the "unwholesome roots"; to cut off these three, one must rely on two routes — the "general counteragent" and the "specific counteragent." The "general counteragent" is solely wholesome wisdom (a single wisdom that counteracts the three poisons together), while the "specific counteragents" are precisely the three wholesome roots of non-greed, non-aversion, and non-delusion (each one counteracting one poison). Since cutting off greed, aversion, and delusion still requires the route of "specific counteragents," it is clear that non-delusion must have its own separate substance and is not simply that wisdom which serves as the "general counteragent." Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) sets this "having its own separate nature" out formally as an inference: non-delusion must have its own separate substance (this is the thesis); because "what it properly counteracts is an unwholesome root (ignorance)" (this is the reason); just as in the case of non-greed and non-aversion (this is the example) — non-greed and non-aversion each have their own separate substance and properly counteract greed and aversion, and non-delusion is the same case, properly counteracting delusion (ignorance), and so it too ought to have its own separate substance.
E. Diligence (energy)
What diligence is
Diligence is energy. Its arena is the two matters of "the wholesome is to be cultivated, the unwholesome is to be cut off"; within this cultivating and cutting, it takes "bravery and toughness" as its intrinsic nature and takes "counteracting indolence and bringing wholesome matters to completion" as its function. Here the two words "bravery" and "toughness" each make a distinction: "bravery" expresses forging upward (striving ahead), used to set diligence apart from the defiled factors — among the defiled there is also bold and energetic effort (one can be very industrious at doing evil), but that does not count as wholesome; "toughness" expresses purity, used to set it apart from "pure neutral" states. By this distinction it becomes clear that energy belongs solely to the wholesome quality.
The five varieties of energy
The mark of energy, finely divided, has roughly five varieties: donning the armor, the preparatory application, no inferiority, no backsliding, and no contentment. These five answer exactly to what the scripture calls "having force, having effort, having bravery, being firm and fierce, and not casting off the wholesome yoke," matched in order (donning the armor is "having force"; actually putting in the work is "having effort"; not feeling timid and inferior is "having bravery"; not regressing is "being firm and fierce"; not being satisfied, not willing to set down the wholesome burden on one's shoulders, is "not casting off the wholesome yoke").
The dividing of these five has had several explanations among the earlier masters. Some explain it by "initial resolve / one's own measure / forging upward," which divides the conduct "within one's own measure" into three grades; some explain it by "initial resolve, the long term, the uninterrupted, the earnest, and the without-remainder," which divides by the varieties of "cultivation"; some explain it by the varieties of the "five paths" such as the path of equipment (among which, the final path of the two vehicles is so because of their longing for the great awakening, and the final path of the buddhas is so because of their delight in benefiting and gladdening others); some explain it by the varieties of the four paths of "preparatory application, the uninterrupted, liberation, and forging upward."
F. Tranquillity (mental and bodily ease)
Tranquillity is "mental and bodily ease." Its intrinsic nature is "departing from heaviness, attuning and easing body and mind, fitness for work (body and mind made supple and capable of tasks)"; its function is "counteracting torpor and the transformation of the basis" — meaning that tranquillity can subdue and remove the factors that obstruct meditative concentration, so that the body and mind one depends on are transformed into a state of comfort and suppleness. (This factor will be brought up again later, in the discussion of "pervading or not pervading the wholesome mind," because tranquillity is the only one of the eleven that "does not pervade.")
G. Conscientiousness
What conscientiousness is · it has no separate substance
Conscientiousness is in fact the combined function of four factors — "energy plus non-greed, non-aversion, and non-delusion": in the matters of "the evil that should be cut off, the good that should be cultivated," it takes "guarding (guarding against evil) and cultivating (cultivating the good)" as its intrinsic nature, and takes "counteracting negligence and bringing to completion all wholesome matters worldly and supramundane" as its function — that is, these four factors can guard and can cultivate in cutting off evil and cultivating good, and this combined capacity is called conscientiousness. The crucial point is this: conscientiousness has no separate substance of its own; its mark is nothing beyond the marks of those four factors; in this business of guarding against evil and cultivating good, once you take away the function of those four factors, you cannot find any function that belongs to conscientiousness alone.
Then why are exactly those four taken, and not trust, the sense of shame, and so on? The author says: trust, the sense of shame, and the rest do have a slight capacity for guarding and cultivating, but compared to those four factors their power is far weaker; moreover trust, the sense of shame, and the rest are not "wholesome roots" and cannot "universally urge on" (universally drive all the wholesome), so they are not taken as the basis of conscientiousness — only energy plus the three wholesome roots, these four, are taken.
Refuting "guarding and cultivating are the distinguishing mark of conscientiousness" point by point
Someone objects: are not guarding and cultivating precisely the very mark and function of conscientiousness itself (how can you say it has no separate substance)? The author answers: guarding and cultivating are not different from energy and the three roots themselves; if you forcibly say "guarding and cultivating depend on conscientiousness in order to have their function," then conscientiousness too ought to depend on something else in order to have its function, and pushing this back step by step leads to the fault of "infinite regress."
The objector presses again: energy only handles "universally urging on" and the three wholesome roots only handle "serving as basis" — how can you say they have the function of guarding and cultivating (guarding and cultivating still require setting up a separate conscientiousness)? The author answers: then you tell us, what exactly is the mark of this "guarding-and-cultivating function" you speak of? We will press it through one by one: if what you mean is "universal supporting and holding," that is non-greed and the other two roots; if it is "universally urging on and overseeing," that is no different from energy; if it is "stopping evil and advancing good," that is the sum of these four factors; if it is "keeping the mind undistracted," that should be "concentration"; if it is "making the mind take a single object together," what difference is there from "contact"; if it is "keeping the mind from forgetting," that should be "mindfulness" — and following this whole line of search, the function of "conscientiousness," once you take away the four factors of non-greed and so forth, cannot be found at all. Therefore conscientiousness definitely has no separate substance (it is a nominal factor).
H. Equanimity-in-action
What equanimity-in-action is · it too has no separate substance
What is equanimity-in-action? It too is the function of those four factors, "energy plus non-greed, non-aversion, non-delusion": making the mind "even, upright, and abiding without effort" is its intrinsic nature; counteracting restlessness and making the mind abide in quiet is its function — that is, these four factors make the mind depart from restlessness and the like obstacles and abide quietly, and this is called equanimity. As for those three terms, "even / upright / abiding without effort," they distinguish the varieties of "equanimity" with reference to the "initial, middle, and final" stages of practice (at first it makes the mind even, in the middle it makes the mind upright, at the end it makes the mind abide naturally without effort).
The author explains the division of labor between equanimity-in-action and conscientiousness: first conscientiousness removes the defilements, then equanimity-in-action makes the mind quiet and abiding. Equanimity-in-action, like conscientiousness, also has no separate substance: take away those four factors and it has neither mark nor function — what makes the mind quiet is precisely those four factors, and what is made quiet is the mind and the rest (both the agent side and the object side fall within the four factors and the mind, and no substance belonging to equanimity-in-action itself can be found).
I. Non-harming
What non-harming is · it is the provisional positing of a portion of non-aversion
What is non-harming? Not injuring or vexing any sentient being, with "non-aversion" as its intrinsic nature, and with "counteracting harming and compassion (the drawing out of suffering)" as its function — that is, on the one portion of "non-aversion" that concerns "not injuring or vexing sentient beings," a name "non-harming" is provisionally posited.
The author explains in detail the division of labor between non-aversion and non-harming: non-aversion is what reverses the aversion of "cutting off a being's life (taking life)," while non-harming is what directly opposes the harming of "injuring and vexing beings"; non-aversion inclines toward "bestowing happiness (giving beings ease)," and that is loving-kindness, while non-harming inclines toward "drawing out suffering (removing suffering for beings)," and that is compassion — this is the rough distinction between the two on the level of marks. But on the level of principle, non-aversion really has its own substance, whereas non-harming is merely posited provisionally in dependence on "one portion" of non-aversion; the reason non-harming is still set up separately is to display the difference between the two marks of "loving-kindness and compassion," since in this matter of "benefiting and gladdening sentient beings," these two sides, loving-kindness and compassion, are the most excellent (worth giving each its own name). Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) here resolves a doubt that easily arises: earlier, "great compassion" was said to take the two factors of non-aversion and non-delusion as its substance, so why, in treating non-harming here, is "non-aversion" alone spoken of? He answers that the two passages are framed differently — "great compassion" is stated "with reference to real substance" (with respect to its really-existent two factors, non-aversion and non-delusion), whereas non-harming is stated "with reference to nominal positing" (since on one portion of non-aversion the sense of drawing out suffering is foremost, a name is provisionally posited there); moreover the former is "great compassion," while this is merely "compassion" (one of the four immeasurables), so that although the names are close, the positions and the unfolding-and-gathering they point to are not the same, and the two passages do not conflict.
Alternative view · non-harming has its own separate substance
Here is an alternative view. One view: non-harming is not just non-aversion; it has its own separate substance, namely "goodly-good nature." The author refutes it: what then is the mark of that "goodly-good nature"? You say it is "not injuring and vexing" — but non-aversion is exactly that too (non-aversion toward sentient beings is precisely not injuring and vexing them, is precisely the kindly-compassionate goodly-good), so why set up yet another intrinsic nature? Therefore non-harming is still "nominal," posited in dependence on one portion of non-aversion.
J. The "meaning-distinct mental factors" gathered in by the word "and" in the verse
What the word "and" gathers in
That word "and" in the verse (equanimity-in-action and non-harming), besides connecting, also displays this: beyond these eleven there is a class of wholesome mental factors "distinct in meaning but not different in substance" (like gladness, weariness-of-the-world, and so forth); though each has its own meaning and its own name, their substance is not different from the eleven before, so they are not set up separately as individual wholesome mental factors but are merely swept in with the one word "and."
Gladness · weariness · a whole string of "non-X" wholesome factors, each assigned to a portion of the three wholesome roots
The author assigns one by one where these "meaning-distinct, substance-same" wholesome factors belong. "Gladness (glad delight)" goes together with "desire" and belongs to a portion of "non-aversion" (because it does not hate the object it is glad about); "non-resentment, non-grudging, non-vexing, non-envy" and the like are the same, each as is fitting all directly reversing a portion of "aversion." "Weariness (weariness-of-the-world)" goes together with "wisdom" and belongs to a portion of "non-greed" (because it is not attached to the object it is weary of); "non-stinginess, non-arrogance" and the like are the same, each as is fitting directly reversing a portion of "greed." "Non-concealment, non-deceit, non-flattery" are a portion of "non-greed and non-delusion," each as is fitting directly reversing a portion of "greed and delusion."
The dispute over non-concealment
Concerning "non-concealment" there is a small alternative view. One view: non-concealment is only a portion of "non-delusion" — because nowhere in scripture or treatise is it said that "concealment" is also a portion of "greed" (since concealment does not extend to greed, non-concealment singly reverses non-delusion and need not also involve non-greed).
The dispute over non-conceit (three views)
Where "non-conceit" should be assigned has three views: one view assigns it to a portion of "trust" (having trusted and submitted to another, one will not be conceited toward him); one view assigns it to a portion of "equanimity" (the mind being even, one will not exalt oneself and be conceited toward others); one view assigns it to a portion of "the sense of shame" (having honored another, one will not be conceited toward him).
The dispute over non-doubt (three views)
Where "non-doubt" should be assigned also has three views: one view, it is gathered up by "trust" (having trusted and submitted to another, one has no wavering); one view, it just is "right resolute conviction" (having decided, one has no wavering); one view, it is gathered up by "right wisdom" (being right view, one has no wavering).
The assignment of the remaining few
As for "non-distraction," it is gathered up by "right concentration"; "right view, right knowing" are both gathered up by "wholesome wisdom"; "non-forgetting" just is "right mindfulness."
Why regret, sleep, applied thought, and sustained thought are not set up separately as wholesome
"Regret, sleep, applied thought, sustained thought," these four (that is, the mental factors of the "indeterminate" class), are common to both the defiled and the undefiled (they can be defiled or undefiled, and are not invariably wholesome), just as "contact, desire," and the like among the universal and object-specific factors are both ways; and so there is no "wholesome factor specifically reversing them" that can be set up — since there is no separate reversal, they are not separately set up among the wholesome.
Why some wholesome factors reversing the defiled are set up separately and some are not
Someone objects generally: among the wholesome factors that the defiled factors reverse into, why are some set up as separate wholesome mental factors and some not? The author answers: whatever has a special difference in mark and function is set up separately; the rest are not, and this should not be faulted. Going further: those defiled factors that "pervade the six consciousnesses," because their power is strong and abundant, are specially reversed and set up separately as wholesome factors. As for "conceit" and the like, "resentment" and the like, they are associated only with the "mental consciousness" (they do not pervade the six consciousnesses), and so they are not separately reversed into wholesome factors. "Harming," though it too is associated only with the mental consciousness, because it arises again and again, injures and vexes others, and obstructs the excellent cause of the unsurpassed vehicle — "compassion" — is, in order to let people know its especially grave fault, specially reversed and set up as "non-harming." And the three of "loss of mindfulness, distraction, and wrong knowing" — what they reverse into is the mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom among the object-specific factors, and so among the wholesome they are not again separately spoken of.
Why the pure factors (the wholesome) are fewer than the defiled
Someone else objects: since the defiled and the pure are mutual reverses, why are the pure factors (the eleven wholesome) so much fewer than the defiled factors (the six root afflictions plus the twenty derivative afflictions)? The author answers: because the pure are superior and the defiled inferior, it is a case of "the few standing against the many" (a single wholesome factor can stand against several defiled factors, so there is no need for a one-to-one match); furthermore, the pure factors "comprehend principle (penetrate the principles)," and so they can run together (many wholesome factors that the defiled reverse into are in fact a single substance — for instance, that whole string of "non-X" are all gathered under portions of the three wholesome roots), whereas the defiled factors "are deluded about concrete facts," and so they are fragmented and confined (parsed out into many names as the facts dictate). So the numbers on the defiled and the pure sides ought not to be faulted by lining them up head to head in the first place.
K. The nominal and the real among the eleven wholesome factors
Having gone through all eleven, the author reckons up which are nominal and which are real: among these eleven, three are nominally existent — namely conscientiousness, equanimity-in-action, and non-harming (for the reasons given under each entry above, none of them has a separate substance, but is posited provisionally in dependence on energy and the three roots, or on a portion of non-aversion); the remaining eight are all really existent (because each has its own separate mark and function).
L. Whether every wholesome mind carries the full eleven · whether tranquillity pervades
Alternative view 1 · only four pervade the wholesome mind, the other seven are indeterminate
This is an important debate. One view: of the eleven, only the "four that pervade the wholesome mind" — energy, non-greed, non-aversion, non-delusion — pervade, while the other seven are all "indeterminate (not present in every wholesome mind)." Its reasons are: when a person is searching out a matter or principle and has not yet decided, trust cannot arise (so trust does not pervade); the sense of shame and the sense of moral dread, though of the same kind, have separate bases, so when one of them arises, in that moment the second is absent (so the two cannot both pervade); tranquillity comes only when "the worldly path cuts off the afflictions"; conscientiousness and equanimity-in-action arise only at the "uncontaminated path"; non-harming comes only when there is "compassion for sentient beings." It further cites the treatise's "the eleven arise across six positions" as proof: only at the position of decision is trust associated; only when stilling the defiled do the sense of shame and moral dread arise (regarding self, regarding others); only at the wholesome-quality position do energy and the three roots arise; only at the worldly path is there tranquillity; only at the supramundane path are there equanimity-in-action and conscientiousness; only at the gathering-in of sentient beings is there non-harming.
Refuting the foregoing view
Another view comes forward to refute it: the foregoing view is unsound. Refuting point by point: First, a mind searching and not yet decided — if trust does not arise in it, then this mind ought not to count as wholesome (just as defiled minds and the like, precisely because they lack pure trust, do not count as wholesome) — but a mind searching and not yet decided can plainly still be wholesome, so it is clear that trust is still present. Second, the sense of shame and the sense of moral dread, though of different kinds, have one and the same "object-specific" basis, and it was already established above that the two both pervade the wholesome mind. Third, if there were no tranquillity at the supramundane path, then the "tranquillity factor of awakening" ought not to be uncontaminated (yet it is plainly an uncontaminated factor of awakening). Fourth, if there were no equanimity-in-action and conscientiousness at the worldly path, then the worldly wholesome mind ought not to count as "quiet, guarding against evil and cultivating good," and ought to be unable to subdue restlessness and negligence — but since the contaminated wholesome mind too possesses those four factors (energy and the three roots), it ought to have equanimity-in-action and conscientiousness just as the supramundane path does. Fifth, when a wholesome mind arises it never injures sentient beings and always opposes the factors that can injure, so in that moment there is non-harming. As for the treatise's saying "the eleven arise across six positions," that is said "with reference to a particular factor being especially strong at a particular position" (emphasizing that at that position a certain factor is most prominent — it does not mean the factor is lacking at the other positions). Therefore the foregoing view is unsound.
The settled (correct) reading · ten pervade the wholesome mind, only tranquillity does not pervade
So the settled conclusion (the correct reading): one should say that of the eleven, ten pervade the wholesome mind, and tranquillity alone does not pervade — because tranquillity can attune and ease body and mind only at the "concentrative position," and is absent at the unconcentrated position, and so does not pervade. The author cites the "Section on Ascertainment" as proof: those ten wholesome factors pervade the wholesome mind in both the concentrative ground and the non-concentrative ground; only in a mind of the concentrative ground is there the addition of one further factor, "tranquillity."
The dispute over which grounds tranquillity is found in
Concerning which "grounds" tranquillity falls in, there is again a small alternative view. One view: the "preparatory application" of meditative concentration (the preliminary work) also earns the name "concentrative ground" (because the preparatory work too has a faint sense of attuning and easing), so even the desire realm has tranquillity — otherwise it would contradict the "Basic Section's" statement that "trust and the rest of the eleven extend to all grounds." Another view (leaning toward the correct): tranquillity is found only within "concentration" (it can arise only when nourished by concentration); the treatise says "the various minds and mental factors of the desire realm, because they lack tranquillity, are called the 'non-concentrative ground'"; as for the phrase "all grounds have the eleven," that is said with reference to all three grounds of "with applied thought and sustained thought, without applied thought but with sustained thought, and without applied thought or sustained thought" having them — it does not mean that even the scattered-mind desire realm has tranquillity.
Whether the eleven are present in each of the eight consciousnesses
The author next sets out the presence or absence of these eleven in each consciousness: the seventh and eighth consciousnesses have or lack them according to their position; the sixth consciousness, at the "concentrative position," has all eleven, and at the "non-concentrative position" lacks only tranquillity (the other ten are all present).
Whether the five sense consciousnesses have tranquillity
The last small dispute asks whether the first five sense consciousnesses have tranquillity. One view: the five sense consciousnesses have only ten (they lack tranquillity) — because the intrinsic nature of the five consciousnesses is "scattered and stirring," with no tranquillity. Another view: the five sense consciousnesses too have tranquillity — because "the wholesome drawn forth by concentration" also has attuning and easing, and moreover when the "wisdom of accomplishing what is to be done" (the wisdom into which the first five consciousnesses are transformed) is present there is necessarily tranquillity attending it (since the transformed wisdom has tranquillity, the original consciousness-position too should be allowed to have it).
M. The topical distinctions of the eleven wholesome factors
Finally the eleven are placed within several topical headings.
Association with feeling: the eleven wholesome factors are associated with the "fifteen feelings" — that is, out of all the feelings, one removes the two oppressive feelings of "grief and pain," because the oppressive feelings have no attuning ease and are at odds with the attuning ease of the wholesome factors.
The object-specific factors: the eleven wholesome factors can be associated with all "five object-specific factors (desire, resolute conviction, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom)," because trust and the rest are not at odds with desire and the rest.
The three moral qualities: these eleven are solely of the "wholesome" quality.
Realm-binding: only "tranquillity" does not extend to the desire realm (as said before, the unconcentrated position has no tranquillity); the remaining ten extend to all three realms.
The stages of training: all eleven extend to the three positions of "the trainee, the one beyond training, and neither trainee nor beyond training."
Abandoned on seeing or on cultivation: they are not "abandoned on the path of seeing" — the Yogācārabhūmi says "the six faculties of trust and the rest (trust, energy, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom, plus wholesome factors such as conscientiousness) are abandoned only on the path of cultivation, not on the path of seeing" (wholesome factors are not among the defiled delusions abandoned on the path of seeing).
There are still other topical distinctions besides these, which one may work out for oneself by following this same principle.
Onward Transmission
What this section establishes — the names and number of the eleven wholesome mental factors, the substance and function of each, the reckoning that three are nominal and eight real, and that ten pervade the wholesome mind while tranquillity alone does not — is the ground on which the consciousness-only system founds its account of "the framework of the pure, the equipment of the path of cultivation," and the later treatises take it up one by one. The Hundred Dharmas treatise gathers these eleven, one by one, under the "wholesome" position of the mental factors (trust, the sense of shame, the sense of moral dread, non-greed, non-aversion, non-delusion, diligence, tranquillity, conscientiousness, equanimity-in-action, non-harming), matching this section factor for factor. The Thirty Verses — its verse eleven — is the very root-verse this section expounds, verse answering to verse. The Madhyānta-vibhāga, in its chapter on the cultivation of counteragents, unfolds the thirty-seven factors of awakening, among which such wholesome factors as trust, energy, tranquillity, and equanimity are precisely several of the eleven wholesome factors unfolded within the sequence of the factors of the path — bearing on and carrying forward the doctrine of the wholesome factors this section establishes. The Mahāyāna-saṃgraha, in its chapter on the cause and effect of entering, expounds the six perfections, and the enhancing sense of such wholesome factors as tranquillity and conscientiousness, gathered up under energy and meditative concentration, is likewise this section's wholesome mental factors taken up within the practice of the perfections. As for the Twenty Verses, its concern is to establish consciousness-only without external objects and to refute the outsiders' clinging to real objects, and it has no direct counterpart to the substance and function of the wholesome mental factors; here it is left aside.
考據Apparatus
〔所釋之頌〕第十一頌
本章釋《唯識三十論頌》頌十一（六位心所·善十一）。
一、科判定位
| 科判 | 此章之位 |
|---|---|
| 三能變 | 初能變（阿賴耶）→ 第二能變（末那）→ 第三能變·了境（六位心所） |
| 六位心所 | 遍行 → 別境 → 善（善十一） → 煩惱 → 隨煩惱 → 不定 |
| 所釋頌 | 《唯識三十論頌》頌十一全 |
善十一上承遍行、別境（通三性、通三界之心所），下啟煩惱、隨煩惱（染品之心所）。此章專明「唯善心俱」之十一心所——淨品之骨幹、修道之資糧；其體、業、假實、遍善心與否、諸門相攝，本論依次廣辯。
二、源頌 · 義理脈絡
善謂信、慚、愧、無貪等三根，勤、安、不放逸、行捨及不害。 〔T1586 0060b24–b25〕
頌一句列十一善心所，本論依之逐一出體、辨業，並抉「實有／假立」、『別體／即他法分位』二軸；末以『遍善心否』『輕安遍否』『諸門相攝』收之。
| 頌語 | 義門 | 所辯 |
|---|---|---|
| 善謂信、慚、愧 | 信 · 慚 · 愧 | 信以心淨為性（破愛樂、隨順二說）；慚愧以羞恥過惡為通相（破別相三難） |
| 無貪等三根 | 三善根 | 「等」攝無瞋、無癡；無癡別有自性（破即慧說） |
| 勤、安 | 精進 · 輕安 | 勤勇悍唯善；安遠離麁重、調暢身心，唯定地有 |
| 不放逸、行捨 | 不放逸 · 行捨 | 皆精進＋三根四法之分位，無別體（假） |
| 及不害 | 不害 | 「及」兼攝欣厭等義別心所；不害依無瞋一分假立 |
『無癡別有／即慧』、『慚愧通相／別相』、『不放逸·行捨·不害假／實』、『十遍善心抑四遍』、『輕安通欲界否』、『五識有輕安否』諸「有義」，本論以護法為正，逐說全文具於〔義疏〕。
三、經論宗依（經證 → 論本）
經證
心所體業之安立屬阿毘達磨法相之開合，無正面經文別立此十一；經證從略，以論本為宗。
論本（瑜伽師地論 T1579 · 集論 T1605 · 雜集論 T1606）
問：何等為自性？答：謂信、慚、愧、無貪、無瞋、無癡、精進、輕安、不放逸、捨、不害，如是諸法名自性善。問：如是諸法互相應義，云何應知？答：於決定時，有信相應。止息雜染時，有慚與愧，顧自他故。善品業轉時，有無貪、無瞋、無癡、精進。世間道離欲時，有輕安。出世道離欲時，有不放逸及捨。 〔瑜伽師地論·本地分 T1579 0602b15–b21〕
何等為信？謂於有體有德有能忍可清淨希望為體，樂欲所依為業。何等為慚？謂於諸過惡自羞為體，惡行止息所依為業。何等為愧？謂於諸過惡羞他為體，業如慚說。何等無貪？謂於有有具無著為體，惡行不轉所依為業。何等無瞋？謂於諸有情苦及苦具無恚為體，惡行不轉所依為業。何等無癡？謂由報教證智決擇為體，惡行不轉所依為業。 〔大乘阿毘達磨集論 T1605 0664b06–b13〕
何等為勤？謂心勇悍為體，或被甲、或加行、或無下、或無退、或無足，差別成滿善品為業。何等為安？謂止息身心麁重、身心調暢為體、除遣一切障礙為業。何等不放逸？謂依止正勤無貪無瞋無癡修諸善法，於心防護諸有漏法為體，成滿一切世出世福為業。何等為捨？謂依止正勤無貪無瞋無癡，與雜染住相違，心平等性、心正直性、心無功用住性為體，不容雜染所依為業。何等不害？謂無瞋善根一分心悲愍為體，不損惱為業。 〔大乘阿毘達磨集論 T1605 0664b13–b23〕
無癡者，由報教證智決擇為體，惡行不轉所依為業。慚等易了，故不再釋。報教證智者，謂生得聞思修所生慧，如次應知。決擇者，謂慧勇勤俱。 〔大乘阿毘達磨雜集論 T1606 0697b29–c03〕
《瑜伽師地論》〈本地分〉列『十一自性善』（本論善十一之名數所本），並以六位（決定·止息雜染·善品業轉·世間道離欲·出世道離欲·攝受眾生）分配相應——本論「論說十一六位中起」之所宗；《集論》定信「忍可清淨希望為體」、慚「自羞」愧「羞他」（本論慚愧依自·法／世間之分本）、無癡「報教證智決擇為體」（本論「無癡即慧」一諍之所引）、不害「無瞋善根一分心悲愍為體」（本論『不害依無瞋一分假立』之論本）；《雜集論》復申「決擇者謂慧勇勤俱」（無癡與慧因果之辨本）。護法糅釋所宗，其論在瑜伽師地論、集論、雜集論。
四、本論釋要（護法糅釋 · T1585）
善心所 · 總標
論曰：唯善心俱，名善心所。謂信、慚等，定有十一。 〔T1585 0029b21–b22〕
信 · 體業
云何為信？於實、德、能，深忍、樂、欲，心淨為性；對治不信，樂善為業。 〔T1585 0029b22–b23〕
慚 · 愧
云何為慚？依自、法力，崇重賢、善為性；對治無慚，止息惡行為業。……云何為愧？依世間力，輕拒暴惡為性；對治無愧，止息惡行為業。 〔T1585 0029c13–c17〕
三善根
「無貪等」者，等無瞋、癡。此三名根，生善勝故。三不善根，近對治故。 〔T1585 0030a03–a04〕
無癡 · 別有自性
有義：無癡非即是慧，別有自性，正對無明。如無貪、瞋，善根攝故。 〔T1585 0030a14–a15〕
勤 · 安
勤謂精進，於善、惡品修、斷事中，勇、悍為性；對治懈怠，滿善為業。……「安」謂輕安，遠離麁重，調暢身心，堪任為性；對治惛沈，轉依為業。 〔T1585 0030a23–b06〕
不放逸 · 行捨（無別體）
「不放逸」者：精進、三根，於所斷、修，防、修為性……非別有體，無異相故。……云何「行捨」？精進、三根，令心平等、正直、無功用住為性；對治掉舉，靜住為業。 〔T1585 0030b07–b23〕
不害（依無瞋一分假立）
云何「不害」？於諸有情，不為損惱，無瞋為性；能對治害，悲愍為業。謂即無瞋，於有情所，不為損惱，假名不害。 〔T1585 0030b28–c01〕
善之假實
此十一法，三是假有，謂不放逸、捨及不害，義如前說。餘八實有，相、用別故。 〔T1585 0031a05–a07〕
遍善心 · 正義
應說信等十一法中，十遍善心，輕安不遍。要在定位，方有輕安，調暢身心，餘位無故。 〔T1585 0031a25–a27〕
要義：本論於十一善心所逐一出體、辨業，要在責其自相，故凡『離他法無別相別用』者判為假。信破「愛樂為相」「隨順為相」二說，歸「心淨為性」（澄清能淨心心所，如水清珠投濁水）。慚愧以「羞恥過惡」為二通相、「俱遍善心所緣無別」，破「別相」三難（體無別則應不相應、待自他則應非實、崇拒異緣則應不俱生）。三善根中無癡破「即慧」說，立「別有自性正對無明」（三善根齊立、大悲非根攝、十一中八實），會《集論》「慧為體」為『舉因果顯自性』。勤以「勇悍」唯善（勇簡染法、悍簡淨無記）。安「遠離麁重·調暢身心」。不放逸、行捨皆「精進＋三根」四法之分位，推尋其用離四法不可得，故無別體；不害依無瞋「不損惱」一分假立（無瞋與樂為慈、不害拔苦為悲）。故十一中三假（不放逸·行捨·不害）、八實。「及」字兼攝欣厭等義別體同之善（各歸三善根一分）。遍善心：破「四遍」說，立『十遍善心、唯輕安不遍』（輕安要定位方調暢身心）。
五、諸家異釋（窺基《述記》T1830）
次下第二，出諸善體，分為八段，合慚、愧為一，三善根為一故。別解信中，初申正義；下破外執。 〔T1830 0433c27–c29〕
實、德、能三是信依處，是境第七；深忍、樂、欲是信因果；心淨為性，正顯自體。 〔T1830 0434a03–a05〕
此以量破，「無癡非惠，別有自性」，「正對」不善之中「無明」；善根攝故；如無貪等。量云：無癡定別有體；所正對治是不善根故；如無貪瞋。 〔T1830 0436c08–c11〕
體是實有，不害依無瞋一分，拔苦之義勝故，假立不害。問：前大悲以無瞋、癡二法為體，今何故獨言不害？彼據實體，此約假成。又彼是大悲，此但是悲，四無量攝。 〔T1830 0439b13–b16〕
窺基判善體「分為八段」（合慚愧為一、合三善根為一，故信·慚愧·三根·勤·安·不放逸·行捨·不害凡八，攝十一法）；釋信『實德能為依處·深忍樂欲為因果·心淨正顯自體』（會《顯揚》《對法》《五蘊論》文同而開合異）；於無癡以「比量」破「即慧」立「別有自性·正對無明」（無癡定別有體，所正對治是不善根故，如無貪瞋）；於不害判『依無瞋一分假立，拔苦義勝』，並揀『大悲據實體（無瞋癡二法）、不害約假成（但是悲，四無量攝）』。慚愧通別、無癡因果、諸假實之繫名（何說屬何師），《述記》及《掌中樞要》詳之。
六、譯名 · 古譯對讀（玄奘 ↔ 真諦《轉識論》）
| 義 | 玄奘《成唯識論》 | 真諦《轉識論》 |
|---|---|---|
| 善心所總數 | 善十一 | 十善（「十善者，一信、二羞、三慚……十捨」〔0062a26〕） |
| 信 | 信 | 信 |
| 慚 · 愧 | 慚 · 愧 | 羞 · 慚（二·三，自他相對） |
| 三善根 | 無貪 · 無瞋 · 無癡 | 無貪 · 無瞋 ·〔闕無癡〕 |
| 勤 | 勤（精進） | 精進（六） |
| 安（輕安） | 安 | 猗（七）（「七猗」〔0062a27〕） |
| 不放逸 | 不放逸 | 無放逸（八） |
| 不害 | 不害 | 無逼惱（九） |
| 行捨 | 行捨 | 捨（十） |
玄奘立善十一，真諦《轉識論》作「十善」（自性善，「遍一切三界心及無流心數，名大地」）——少「無癡」一法，慚愧作『羞·慚』、輕安作「猗」、不害作「無逼惱」、行捨作「捨」。古譯於善心所之數目、名相一分歧。
七、術語
善心所（kuśala-caitta）— 唯與善心相應而起之心所，定有十一。 信（śraddhā）— 於實·德·能深忍·樂·欲，心淨為性。 慚 · 愧（hrī · apatrāpya）— 依自·法力崇重賢善（慚）／依世間力輕拒暴惡（愧）；羞恥過惡為二通相。 三善根（kuśala-mūla）— 無貪（alobha）· 無瞋（adveṣa）· 無癡（amoha）；生善勝、近對治三不善根。 勤（vīrya）— 精進；於修斷事勇悍為性。 安（praśrabdhi）— 輕安；遠離麁重·調暢身心·堪任為性。 不放逸（apramāda）· 行捨（upekṣā）— 精進＋三根四法之分位，無別體（假）。 不害（ahiṃsā）— 依無瞋一分（不損惱·悲愍）假立。 〔梵文為古德所傳發音輔助。〕
八、互讀（唯識系次第：百法 → 三十頌 → 二十論 → 辯中邊論 → 攝大乘論）
- 百法：心所·善十一（信·慚·愧·無貪·無瞋·無癡·勤·安·不放逸·行捨·不害）——逐法對位。
- 三十頌：頌十一（善十一）——逐頌姊妹。
- 二十論：〔從闕〕主唯識無境、破外執，善心所體業無正面對位。
- 辯中邊論：辯修對治品·三十七菩提分（信·勤·輕安·捨等善法於道品中之開展，與善十一義相涉）。
- 攝大乘論：彼入因果分·六波羅蜜多（精進·禪定所攝之輕安·不放逸等善法增上義）。
章內：遍行·別境（§15–§16 前二位心所·通三性）· 煩惱（§18 根本煩惱六·染品之根）· 隨煩惱·不定（§19–20 餘二位）。
九、校本定位
頌 T1586〔0060b24–b25〕· 本論 T1585 善十一釋〔總標 0029b21·信 0029b22·慚愧 0029c13–c16·三善根 0030a03·無癡 0030a09–a14·勤 0030a23·安 0030b05·不放逸 0030b08·行捨 0030b21·不害 0030b28·假實 0031a05·遍善心 0031a25〕· 述記 T1830〔八段 0433c27–c29·信 0434a03–a05·無癡別有 0436c08–c11·不害 0439b13–b16·唯修所斷 0443b28〕· 《轉識論》T1587〔0062a22·0062a26–a27〕。 〔經證〕從略（心所體業屬阿毘達磨法相，無別立經）。〔論本〕瑜伽師地論 T1579〔本地分 0602b15–b21〕· 大乘阿毘達磨集論 T1605〔0664b06–b23〕· 大乘阿毘達磨雜集論 T1606〔0697b29–c03〕。
This chapter expounds Triṃśikā verse 11 (the six categories of mental factors · the eleven wholesome).
1. Position in Kuiji's Structural Outline
| Outline | This chapter's place |
|---|---|
| The three transformers | the first transformer (ālaya) → the second transformer (manas) → the third transformer · object-discerning (the six categories of mental factors) |
| The six categories of mental factors | the universal → the object-specific → the wholesome (the eleven wholesome) → the afflictions → the secondary afflictions → the indeterminate |
| Verse expounded | the whole of Triṃśikā verse 11 |
The eleven wholesome follow upon the universal and the object-specific (mental factors that run through the three natures and the three realms) and open onto the afflictions and the secondary afflictions (the defiled-class mental factors). This chapter expounds in particular the eleven mental factors that "concur with the wholesome mind alone" — the backbone of the pure class, the provisions of the path of cultivation; their substance, their function, their being-real-or-conventional, their pervading-the-wholesome-mind-or-not, and the mutual inclusion of the several gates, the root treatise broadly settles in turn.
2. Source verse · doctrinal context
善謂信、慚、愧、無貪等三根，勤、安、不放逸、行捨及不害。 〔T1586 0060b24–b25〕
tr. "The wholesome are: trust, shame, embarrassment, the three roots beginning with non-greed; diligence, ease, non-heedlessness, equanimity-of-formations, and non-harm."
The verse, in a single sentence, lists the eleven wholesome mental factors; the root treatise, following it, draws out the substance of each one by one and discerns its function, and decides them along the two axes "really existent / conventionally set up" and "having a separate substance / being a positional state of some other dharma"; it closes with "whether or not [each] pervades the wholesome mind," "whether ease pervades [all]," and "the mutual inclusion of the several gates."
| Verse phrase | Doctrinal gate | What is settled |
|---|---|---|
| the wholesome are trust, shame, embarrassment | trust · shame · embarrassment | trust has mind-purifying as its nature (refuting the two views "delight-and-liking" and "conformity"); shame and embarrassment have being-ashamed-of-fault-and-evil as their shared mark (refuting the three difficulties of the "distinct-mark" position) |
| the three roots beginning with non-greed | the three wholesome roots | "beginning with" includes non-hatred and non-delusion; non-delusion has a separate self-nature of its own (refuting the "it just is wisdom" view) |
| diligence · ease | vigor · ease | diligence, brave-and-bold, is wholesome alone; ease, leaving behind the gross-and-heavy and harmonizing-and-easing body-and-mind, exists only in the meditative stages |
| non-heedlessness · equanimity-of-formations | non-heedlessness · equanimity-of-formations | both are positional states of the four dharmas — vigor plus the three roots — with no separate substance (conventional) |
| and non-harm | non-harm | "and" further includes such variant-meaning mental factors as elation and aversion; non-harm is conventionally set up in dependence on a portion of non-hatred |
The several "one view holds" positions — "non-delusion has a separate [substance] / it just is wisdom," "shame and embarrassment have a shared mark / a distinct mark," "non-heedlessness · equanimity-of-formations · non-harm are conventional / real," "ten pervade the wholesome mind or only four," "whether ease runs through the desire realm," "whether the five [sense] consciousnesses have ease" — the root treatise takes Dharmapāla as the correct [position] and sets each out, the full text given in the Exposition.
3. Scriptural and treatise grounding (scripture → root śāstra)
Scriptural witnesses
The establishing of the substance and function of the mental factors belongs to the opening-and-combining of the Abhidharma dharma-marks; there is no positive scriptural passage that separately sets up these eleven; scriptural witnesses are left aside, the root śāstra taken as authority.
Root śāstra (Yogācārabhūmi T1579 · Abhidharmasamuccaya T1605 · Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā T1606)
問：何等為自性？答：謂信、慚、愧、無貪、無瞋、無癡、精進、輕安、不放逸、捨、不害，如是諸法名自性善。問：如是諸法互相應義，云何應知？答：於決定時，有信相應。止息雜染時，有慚與愧，顧自他故。善品業轉時，有無貪、無瞋、無癡、精進。世間道離欲時，有輕安。出世道離欲時，有不放逸及捨。 〔瑜伽師地論·本地分 T1579 0602b15–b21〕
tr. "Question: what are [these] as to self-nature? Answer: namely trust, shame, embarrassment, non-greed, non-hatred, non-delusion, vigor, buoyant-ease, non-heedlessness, equanimity, non-harm — such dharmas are named the self-natured wholesome. Question: how should the sense of these dharmas' mutual concurrence be known? Answer: at the time of resolve there is the concurrence of trust. At the time of stilling the defiled there are shame and embarrassment, for they regard self and other. When the wholesome-class deeds proceed there are non-greed, non-hatred, non-delusion, vigor. When the worldly path departs from craving there is buoyant-ease. When the supramundane path departs from craving there are non-heedlessness and equanimity."
何等為信？謂於有體有德有能忍可清淨希望為體，樂欲所依為業。何等為慚？謂於諸過惡自羞為體，惡行止息所依為業。何等為愧？謂於諸過惡羞他為體，業如慚說。何等無貪？謂於有有具無著為體，惡行不轉所依為業。何等無瞋？謂於諸有情苦及苦具無恚為體，惡行不轉所依為業。何等無癡？謂由報教證智決擇為體，惡行不轉所依為業。 〔大乘阿毘達磨集論 T1605 0664b06–b13〕
tr. "What is trust? It has as its substance the accepting-as-true, purity, and hoping with respect to what has substance, what has virtue, what has capacity; and its function is to be the basis of delight-and-desire. What is shame? It has as its substance being-ashamed-of-oneself with respect to faults and evils; and its function is to be the basis of the ceasing of evil conduct. What is embarrassment? It has as its substance being-ashamed-before-others with respect to faults and evils; its function as told for shame. What is non-greed? It has as its substance non-attachment with respect to existence and the means of existence; and its function is to be the basis of evil conduct not proceeding. What is non-hatred? It has as its substance non-ire with respect to sentient beings' suffering and the means of suffering; and its function is to be the basis of evil conduct not proceeding. What is non-delusion? It has as its substance the discriminating-decision by the wisdom of [innate-]report, of teaching, and of realization; and its function is to be the basis of evil conduct not proceeding."
何等為勤？謂心勇悍為體，或被甲、或加行、或無下、或無退、或無足，差別成滿善品為業。何等為安？謂止息身心麁重、身心調暢為體、除遣一切障礙為業。何等不放逸？謂依止正勤無貪無瞋無癡修諸善法，於心防護諸有漏法為體，成滿一切世出世福為業。何等為捨？謂依止正勤無貪無瞋無癡，與雜染住相違，心平等性、心正直性、心無功用住性為體，不容雜染所依為業。何等不害？謂無瞋善根一分心悲愍為體，不損惱為業。 〔大乘阿毘達磨集論 T1605 0664b13–b23〕
tr. "What is diligence? It has as its substance the mind being brave-and-bold — whether as donning-armor, or application, or no-lowness, or no-retreat, or no-satisfaction — and its function is the differentiated fulfilling of the wholesome class. What is ease? It has as its substance the stilling of the gross-and-heavy of body-and-mind and the harmonizing-and-easing of body-and-mind, and its function is the removing of every obstruction. What is non-heedlessness? It has as its substance, in dependence on right vigor, non-greed, non-hatred, non-delusion, cultivating the various wholesome dharmas and guarding the mind against the various contaminated dharmas; and its function is the fulfilling of all worldly and supramundane merit. What is equanimity? It has as its substance, in dependence on right vigor, non-greed, non-hatred, non-delusion, being at odds with a defiled abiding — the mind's evenness, the mind's uprightness, the mind's effortless abiding — and its function is to be the basis of not admitting the defiled. What is non-harm? It has as its substance the compassionate pity of one portion of the non-hatred wholesome root, and its function is non-injuring."
無癡者，由報教證智決擇為體，惡行不轉所依為業。慚等易了，故不再釋。報教證智者，謂生得聞思修所生慧，如次應知。決擇者，謂慧勇勤俱。 〔大乘阿毘達磨雜集論 T1606 0697b29–c03〕
tr. "Non-delusion: it has as its substance the discriminating-decision by the wisdom of [innate-]report, of teaching, and of realization, and its function is to be the basis of evil conduct not proceeding. Shame and the rest are easy to understand, so they are not explained again. As for the wisdom of report, teaching, and realization — namely the wisdom born of innate-attainment, of hearing, of reflection, and of cultivation, to be understood respectively. As for discriminating-decision — namely wisdom together with bravery and diligence."
The Yogācārabhūmi's Foundational-Stages section lists the "eleven self-natured wholesome" (the root of the name and number of this treatise's eleven wholesome), and distributes their concurrence by six positions (resolve · stilling the defiled · the wholesome-class deeds proceeding · the worldly path departing from craving · the supramundane path departing from craving · gathering in sentient beings) — the authority for this treatise's "the treatise says the eleven arise within six positions"; the Abhidharmasamuccaya fixes trust as "accepting-as-true, purity, and hoping as substance," shame as "being-ashamed-of-oneself" and embarrassment as "being-ashamed-before-others" (the basis for this treatise's shame-and-embarrassment depending on self-and-Dharma / the worldly), non-delusion as "discriminating-decision by the wisdom of report, teaching, realization, as substance" (the source cited in this treatise's dispute "non-delusion just is wisdom"), and non-harm as "the compassionate pity of one portion of the non-hatred wholesome root as substance" (the śāstra-root for this treatise's "non-harm is conventionally set up in dependence on one portion of non-hatred"); the Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā further states that "discriminating-decision is namely wisdom together with bravery and diligence" (the root for discerning the cause-and-effect [relation] of non-delusion and wisdom). What Dharmapāla's redaction takes as authority — its śāstra lies in the Yogācārabhūmi, the Abhidharmasamuccaya, and the Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā.
4. Essentials of the root treatise (Dharmapāla's redaction · T1585)
The wholesome mental factors · general statement
論曰：唯善心俱，名善心所。謂信、慚等，定有十一。 〔T1585 0029b21–b22〕
tr. "The treatise says: those that concur with the wholesome mind alone are called wholesome mental factors. Namely trust, shame, and the rest — definitely eleven."
Trust · substance and function
云何為信？於實、德、能，深忍、樂、欲，心淨為性；對治不信，樂善為業。 〔T1585 0029b22–b23〕
tr. "What is trust? With respect to the real, the virtuous, the capable, [there is] deep accepting, delight, and desire; mind-purifying is its nature; counteracting non-trust and delighting-in-the-wholesome is its function."
Shame · embarrassment
云何為慚？依自、法力，崇重賢、善為性；對治無慚，止息惡行為業。……云何為愧？依世間力，輕拒暴惡為性；對治無愧，止息惡行為業。 〔T1585 0029c13–c17〕
tr. "What is shame? In dependence on the force of self and of the Dharma, revering the worthy and the wholesome is its nature; counteracting shamelessness and stilling evil conduct is its function… What is embarrassment? In dependence on the force of the world, slighting-and-refusing the violent-and-evil is its nature; counteracting unembarrassment and stilling evil conduct is its function."
The three wholesome roots
「無貪等」者，等無瞋、癡。此三名根，生善勝故。三不善根，近對治故。 〔T1585 0030a03–a04〕
tr. "As for 'beginning with non-greed,' the 'beginning with' [takes in] non-hatred and non-delusion. These three are named roots because they are superior at producing the wholesome; [and] because they are the close counteragents of the three unwholesome roots."
Non-delusion · having a separate self-nature
有義：無癡非即是慧，別有自性，正對無明。如無貪、瞋，善根攝故。 〔T1585 0030a14–a15〕
tr. "One view holds: non-delusion is not just wisdom; it has a separate self-nature, squarely opposed to ignorance. Like non-greed and non-hatred, it is comprised among the wholesome roots."
Diligence · ease
勤謂精進，於善、惡品修、斷事中，勇、悍為性；對治懈怠，滿善為業。……「安」謂輕安，遠離麁重，調暢身心，堪任為性；對治惛沈，轉依為業。 〔T1585 0030a23–b06〕
tr. "Diligence is vigor; in the affairs of cultivating the wholesome class and severing the evil class, brave-and-bold is its nature; counteracting indolence and fulfilling the wholesome is its function… 'Ease' is buoyant-ease; leaving behind the gross-and-heavy, harmonizing-and-easing body-and-mind, fit-for-the-task is its nature; counteracting torpor and the transmutation-of-the-basis is its function."
Non-heedlessness · equanimity-of-formations (no separate substance)
「不放逸」者：精進、三根，於所斷、修，防、修為性……非別有體，無異相故。……云何「行捨」？精進、三根，令心平等、正直、無功用住為性；對治掉舉，靜住為業。 〔T1585 0030b07–b23〕
tr. "As for 'non-heedlessness': vigor and the three roots, with respect to what is to be severed and to be cultivated, guarding-and-cultivating is its nature… it has no separate substance, having no mark of its own different [from theirs]… What is 'equanimity-of-formations'? Vigor and the three roots, making the mind even, upright, and effortlessly abiding is its nature; counteracting agitation and abiding-in-stillness is its function."
Non-harm (conventionally set up in dependence on one portion of non-hatred)
云何「不害」？於諸有情，不為損惱，無瞋為性；能對治害，悲愍為業。謂即無瞋，於有情所，不為損惱，假名不害。 〔T1585 0030b28–c01〕
tr. "What is 'non-harm'? With respect to sentient beings, not doing injury-and-vexation, non-hatred being its nature; able to counteract harm, compassionate-pity being its function. That is, it is just non-hatred, [which,] with respect to sentient beings, does not do injury-and-vexation — conventionally named non-harm."
The wholesome's being-conventional-or-real
此十一法，三是假有，謂不放逸、捨及不害，義如前說。餘八實有，相、用別故。 〔T1585 0031a05–a07〕
tr. "Of these eleven dharmas, three are conventionally existent — namely non-heedlessness, equanimity, and non-harm — the sense as told before. The remaining eight are really existent, for their marks and functions are distinct."
Pervading the wholesome mind · the correct position
應說信等十一法中，十遍善心，輕安不遍。要在定位，方有輕安，調暢身心，餘位無故。 〔T1585 0031a25–a27〕
tr. "It should be said that, among the eleven dharmas beginning with trust, ten pervade the wholesome mind, but buoyant-ease does not. Only in the meditative position is there buoyant-ease, harmonizing-and-easing body-and-mind; in the other positions there is none."
Essentials: the root treatise, for each of the eleven wholesome mental factors, draws out its substance one by one and discerns its function, the demand being to hold it to its own mark; hence whatever "has no separate mark or separate function apart from other dharmas" is judged conventional. Of trust it refutes the two views "delight-and-liking as its mark" and "conformity as its mark," settling it as "mind-purifying as its nature" (a clarifying [factor] able to purify mind and mental factors, like a water-clearing gem cast into turbid water). Shame and embarrassment have "being-ashamed-of-fault-and-evil" as their two shared marks, "both pervading the wholesome mind with no difference of object," refuting the three difficulties of the "distinct-mark" [position] (if the substance is undifferentiated they should not concur; if they depend on self-and-other they should not be real; if they revere-and-refuse with different objects they should not co-arise). Among the three wholesome roots, of non-delusion it refutes the "it just is wisdom" view and establishes "it has a separate self-nature, squarely opposed to ignorance" (the three wholesome roots stand together; great compassion is not comprised among the roots; eight of the eleven are real), reconciling the Abhidharmasamuccaya's "wisdom as substance" as "raising the cause-and-effect to disclose the self-nature." Diligence, with "brave-and-bold," is wholesome alone ("brave" excludes the defiled dharmas, "bold" excludes the pure-indeterminate). Ease is "leaving behind the gross-and-heavy · harmonizing-and-easing body-and-mind." Non-heedlessness and equanimity-of-formations are both positional states of the four dharmas "vigor plus the three roots"; seek out their function and apart from the four dharmas it cannot be found, hence they have no separate substance; non-harm is conventionally set up in dependence on one portion — the "non-injuring" — of non-hatred (non-hatred giving-of-ease is loving-kindness; non-harm drawing-out-of-suffering is compassion). So of the eleven, three are conventional (non-heedlessness · equanimity-of-formations · non-harm) and eight real. The word "and" further includes the wholesome [factors] of variant meaning but same substance, such as elation and aversion (each reverting to one portion of the three wholesome roots). On pervading the wholesome mind: it refutes the "four pervade" view and establishes "ten pervade the wholesome mind, only buoyant-ease does not pervade" (buoyant-ease must be in the meditative position to harmonize-and-ease body-and-mind).
5. Divergent readings across the masters (Kuiji, Shuji T1830)
次下第二，出諸善體，分為八段，合慚、愧為一，三善根為一故。別解信中，初申正義；下破外執。 〔T1830 0433c27–c29〕
tr. "Next, the second [segment], setting out the substance of the various wholesome, is divided into eight passages, since shame and embarrassment are combined into one and the three wholesome roots into one. In the separate explanation of trust: first the correct position is stated; below, the outsiders' grasping is refuted."
實、德、能三是信依處，是境第七；深忍、樂、欲是信因果；心淨為性，正顯自體。 〔T1830 0434a03–a05〕
tr. "The real, the virtuous, the capable — these three are trust's basis-loci, [its] objects, the seventh [case]; deep-accepting, delight, and desire are trust's cause-and-effect; mind-purifying as its nature squarely discloses its own substance."
此以量破，「無癡非惠，別有自性」，「正對」不善之中「無明」；善根攝故；如無貪等。量云：無癡定別有體；所正對治是不善根故；如無貪瞋。 〔T1830 0436c08–c11〕
tr. "Here, refuting by inference: 'non-delusion is not wisdom; it has a separate self-nature'; it 'squarely opposes' the 'ignorance' among the unwholesome; because it is comprised among the wholesome roots; like non-greed and the rest. The inference runs: non-delusion definitely has a separate substance; because what it squarely counteracts is an unwholesome root; like non-greed and non-hatred."
體是實有，不害依無瞋一分，拔苦之義勝故，假立不害。問：前大悲以無瞋、癡二法為體，今何故獨言不害？彼據實體，此約假成。又彼是大悲，此但是悲，四無量攝。 〔T1830 0439b13–b16〕
tr. "[Non-hatred's] substance is really existent; non-harm depends on one portion of non-hatred, the sense of drawing-out-suffering being superior, [so] non-harm is conventionally set up. Question: earlier, great compassion took the two dharmas non-hatred and non-delusion as its substance; why now is non-harm alone spoken of? That [great compassion] was based on the real substance; this [non-harm] is taken as conventionally established. Again, that is great compassion, this is merely compassion, comprised among the four immeasurables."
Kuiji judges the substance of the wholesome to be "divided into eight passages" (shame and embarrassment combined into one, the three wholesome roots combined into one, so that trust · shame-and-embarrassment · the three roots · diligence · ease · non-heedlessness · equanimity-of-formations · non-harm make eight, comprising the eleven dharmas); he glosses trust as "the real-virtuous-capable as basis-loci · deep-accepting-delight-desire as cause-and-effect · mind-purifying squarely discloses its own substance" (reconciling the passages of the Xianyang, the Duifa, and the Pañcaskandha as same in sense but differing in opening-and-combining); on non-delusion he refutes "it just is wisdom" by "inference" and establishes "it has a separate self-nature · squarely opposed to ignorance" (non-delusion definitely has a separate substance, because what it squarely counteracts is an unwholesome root, like non-greed and non-hatred); on non-harm he judges "it is conventionally set up in dependence on one portion of non-hatred, the sense of drawing-out-suffering superior," and distinguishes "great compassion is based on the real substance (the two dharmas non-hatred and non-delusion), non-harm is taken as conventionally established (merely compassion, comprised among the four immeasurables)." The shared-and-distinct of shame-and-embarrassment, the cause-and-effect of non-delusion, and the attaching-of-names for the various conventional-and-real (which saying belongs to which master) the Shuji and the Zhangzhong shuyao set out in detail.
6. Rendering of terms · old-translation comparison (Xuanzang ↔ Paramārtha, Zhuanshi lun)
| Sense | Xuanzang, Cheng Weishi Lun | Paramārtha, Zhuanshi lun |
|---|---|---|
| total number of wholesome mental factors | the eleven wholesome | the ten wholesome ("the ten wholesome are: first trust, second modesty, third shame… tenth equanimity" 〔0062a26〕) |
| trust | trust | trust |
| shame · embarrassment | shame · embarrassment | modesty · shame (the second and third, set against self and other) |
| the three wholesome roots | non-greed · non-hatred · non-delusion | non-greed · non-hatred ·〔non-delusion lacking〕 |
| diligence | diligence (vigor) | vigor (the sixth) |
| ease (buoyant-ease) | ease | tranquillity (the seventh) ("the seventh, tranquillity" 〔0062a27〕) |
| non-heedlessness | non-heedlessness | non-laxity (the eighth) |
| non-harm | non-harm | non-oppression (the ninth) |
| equanimity-of-formations | equanimity-of-formations | equanimity (the tenth) |
Xuanzang sets up the eleven wholesome; Paramārtha's Zhuanshi lun makes them "the ten wholesome" (the self-natured wholesome, "pervading the mind of all three realms and the outflow-free mind-factors, named the great ground") — short the one dharma "non-delusion," with shame-and-embarrassment as "modesty · shame," buoyant-ease as "tranquillity," non-harm as "non-oppression," and equanimity-of-formations as "equanimity." The old translation diverges, in one part, as to the number and the names of the wholesome mental factors.
7. Key terms
the wholesome mental factors (善心所, kuśala-caitta) — mental factors that arise concurring with the wholesome mind alone; definitely eleven. trust (信, śraddhā) — with respect to the real · virtuous · capable, deep-accepting · delight · desire; mind-purifying as its nature. shame · embarrassment (慚 · 愧, hrī · apatrāpya) — in dependence on the force of self-and-Dharma, revering the worthy-and-wholesome (shame) / in dependence on the force of the world, slighting-and-refusing the violent-and-evil (embarrassment); being-ashamed-of-fault-and-evil is their two shared marks. the three wholesome roots (善根, kuśala-mūla) — non-greed (alobha) · non-hatred (adveṣa) · non-delusion (amoha); superior at producing the wholesome, the close counteragents of the three unwholesome roots. diligence (勤, vīrya) — vigor; brave-and-bold as its nature in the affairs of cultivating-and-severing. ease (安, praśrabdhi) — buoyant-ease; leaving behind the gross-and-heavy · harmonizing-and-easing body-and-mind · fit-for-the-task as its nature. non-heedlessness (不放逸, apramāda) · equanimity-of-formations (行捨, upekṣā) — positional states of the four dharmas, vigor plus the three roots, with no separate substance (conventional). non-harm (不害, ahiṃsā) — conventionally set up in dependence on one portion (non-injuring · compassionate-pity) of non-hatred. 〔Sanskrit forms are a pronunciation aid transmitted by the ancient masters.〕
8. Cross-reading (the Yogācāra sequence: Baifa → Triṃśikā → Viṃśatikā → Madhyāntavibhāga → Mahāyānasaṃgraha)
- Baifa (Hundred Dharmas): the mental factors · the eleven wholesome (trust · shame · embarrassment · non-greed · non-hatred · non-delusion · diligence · ease · non-heedlessness · equanimity-of-formations · non-harm) — matched dharma by dharma.
- Triṃśikā: verse 11 (the eleven wholesome) — the verse-by-verse sister.
- Viṃśatikā: 〔not present〕 it chiefly [treats] consciousness-only-without-object and the refuting of outsiders' grasping; there is no positive correspondence for the substance and function of the wholesome mental factors.
- Madhyāntavibhāga: the chapter on discerning the counteragents · the thirty-seven limbs of awakening (the unfolding, within the path-limbs, of such wholesome dharmas as trust · diligence · buoyant-ease · equanimity, bearing on the sense of the eleven wholesome).
- Mahāyānasaṃgraha: the division on entering the cause-and-effect · the six perfections (the augmenting sense of such wholesome dharmas as buoyant-ease · non-heedlessness, comprised by vigor · meditation).
Within the chapter: the universal · the object-specific (the first two categories of mental factors, §15–§16 · running through the three natures) · the afflictions (the six root afflictions, §18 · the root of the defiled class) · the secondary afflictions · the indeterminate (the remaining two categories, §19–20).
9. Collation position
Verse T1586 〔0060b24–b25〕 · root T1585 the exposition of the eleven wholesome 〔general statement 0029b21 · trust 0029b22 · shame-and-embarrassment 0029c13–c16 · the three wholesome roots 0030a03 · non-delusion 0030a09–a14 · diligence 0030a23 · ease 0030b05 · non-heedlessness 0030b08 · equanimity-of-formations 0030b21 · non-harm 0030b28 · conventional-and-real 0031a05 · pervading the wholesome mind 0031a25〕 · Shuji T1830 〔the eight passages 0433c27–c29 · trust 0434a03–a05 · non-delusion has a separate [substance] 0436c08–c11 · non-harm 0439b13–b16 · severed by cultivation alone 0443b28〕 · Zhuanshi lun T1587 〔0062a22 · 0062a26–a27〕. 〔Scripture〕 left aside (the substance and function of the mental factors belongs to the Abhidharma dharma-marks, with no separately-set-up scripture). 〔Root śāstra〕 Yogācārabhūmi T1579 〔Foundational-Stages section 0602b15–b21〕 · Abhidharmasamuccaya T1605 〔0664b06–b23〕 · Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā T1606 〔0697b29–c03〕.